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Digitized by the Internet Archive 
in 2010 with funding from 
The Library of Congress 





1861 TO 1865. 





— BY- 









In writing this narrative, I have freely used my own recollec- 
-ons and memoranda, and have also consulted many volumes by 
•fferent writers, and the Government records. 

It is the duty of every participant to give the future generation 
,he benefit of his personal experience when able to do so, as no of- 
ial statement can convey an adequate idea of the sufferings and 
sacrifice endured by the thousands of men, the flower of the Ameri- 
can youth, who have gone down to their graves practically un- 
nown, and whose achievements are forgotten. Therefore I offer 
these personal recollections of the war, feeling that they should be 
written before the facts have faded from the memory of the living. 
In this attempt I have omitted much, and have added nothing 
to a truthful history. 

St. Louis, Mo., 1903. 




South Carolina 

Fort Sumter and Charleston Harbor. 

Indiana Election and War Spirit 

Indiana War Meetings 

The Confederate States 

President Lincoln . . . 





1 1 





Bombardment of Fort Sumter 49 

The Call to Arms 55 

As a Recruit in the West Virginia Campaign 62 


Phillipi, Laurel Hill and Carrack's Ford 70 

Re-enlistment for three years in the Artillery 83 

To and in Baltimore 9^ 

At Harper's Ferry 97 

As Prisoner of War .123 

March, 1863. Burnside in Command of the Department of th^ 
Ohio 128 

June, 1863. The 9th Army Corps goes to Vicksburg. The 
raids of Generals White and Kantz. ....'. 150 

July, 1863. The Morgan Raid • 156 


Burnside's March into East Tennessee 172 


September, 1863. Burnside reaches Knoxville. Capture of 
Cumberland Gap. Battle of Chickamauga 182 

October, 1863. Arrival of the 9th Army Corps. George Col- 
lins leaves for West Point 1^5 

November, 1863. Longstreet invades East Tennessee. Siege of 
Knoxville. Assault on Fort Saunders. 207 

December, 1863. Death of Lieut. Torr. Sherman relieves Knox- 
ville. Burnside relieved by Gen. Forster 233 

January,. 1864.. The MorristoAvn Campaign, fearful suffering 
for man and beast 2 si 

February, 1864. Schofield relieves Forster. Longstreet ap- 
proaches Knoxville . . . . _ ... . .261 



March and April, 1864. Schofield's March to Morristowii. 

General Cox in Command of 23d Army Corps 267 

May, 1864. The forward movement of Sherman's Army against 

Joseph E. Johnston into Georgia 278 


June, 1864. The affairs at Burnt Hickory, New Hope Church. 
Lost Mountain, and Kennesaw Mountain 313 

July, 1864. The 23rd Corps. The first to cross the Chatta- 
hoochie. Hood in command of the Confederate Army. 
The Battle of Atlanta. Death of General McPherson 358 

August, 1864. Siege of Atlanta and the movement to the rear 
of Hood's army 395 


September, 1864. The Battle of Jonesboro and Lovejoy Sta- 
tion 402 



Font . . Title Page 

Soldier's Monument between 8-9 

McClellan between 54-55 

Jackson : between 97-98 

Collins . . between 200-201 

Stith between 1 54-1 55 

Longstreet , between 200-201 

Scholield between 268-269 

Sherman between 232-233 

Johnston between 278-279 

Cox between 296-297 

Henderson between 313-314 

Casement . between 340-341 

WangeHn between 388-389 

Osterhaus between 410-411 

Torr between 164-165 

Kunz between 228-220 - 


Map of West Virginia between 81-82 

Map of East Tennessee between 176-177 

Map of Northern Georgia between 283-285 

Assault on Fort Saunders between 224-225 

The 15th Indiana Battery led by Lieut. Fred'k W. Font into 

the Battle of Resaca between 290-291 





South Carolina was one o£ the original thirteen States Lhat 
formed the American Union in 1776, by declaring their indepen- 
dence from Great Britain, but in 1778 the Legislature deprived the 
Governor of the veto power and required that the candidate for 
that office, to be eligible for the high position, should be in posses- 
sion of at least £10,000 sterling ($50,000) cash. They also passed 
other laws in opposition to the spirit of free government. The 
right to vote was confined to all free men who paid taxes, but to 
give the slave owners the preference of power, they were per- 
mitted to cast additional votes for the slaves they owned. South 
Carolina refused to ratify the Constitution of the United States 
until it was agreed that the slave trade should be open and free 
for a number of years to come. But no sooner had the Federal 
party succeeded and ratified the Constitution than the Anti-Fed- 
eralists (Tories) elected a majority of the Representatives to 
Congress, and in 1790 again called a State convention to formu- 
late a new Constitution, to be still more in sympathy with the 
ideas and aristocratic notions of the large slave owners. Accord- 
ing to this new instrument any one desiring to be elected to 
the House of Representatives of the State must have been a citi- 
zen at least three years and a free holder of five hundred acres 
of land and ten negro slaves. Those wishing to become Senators 
were required to have still more realty and slaves. Candidates 
for Governor must have been citizens of the State for ten years 
and own real estate to the amount of $6,666 and have no debts. 
Ministers of the Gospel could not be elected to the Legislature 
or to Governor or Lieutenant Governor. During Washington's 
administration the State supported his policy, but the Republicans 
(Democrats) were soon in the majority and in opposition to the 
Federal party, and voted for Jefferson for President. After the 
war of 1 812 the internal improvements and protective tariff were 
first advocated by them, and South Carolina was in the front rank 
for both measures, to be carried on by the National Government, 
but under the strong influence that slavery exerted in the economy 


of life they changed their minds and the protective tariff was de- 
clared unnecessary and unconstitutional. At the same time a 
strong stream of emigrants, mostly mechanics, settled in the more 
Northern States of the Union. This caused the protectionists to re- 
tain the majority in Congress. 

The State of South Carolina embraces a large sea coast front, a 
number of sea islands, marshes, river swamps and low, unhealthy al- 
luvial lands, producing much malarial fever and a half tropical vege- 
tation of unsurpassed fertility. This is the region of the great cotton, 
rice and sugar plantations which have made that State rich and 
famous. Here the owners counted their slaves by the hundreds and 
aspired to a life of ease, living in hospitable mansions, surrounded 
by magnificent live oak and magnolia groves, avenues of stately 
palms, princely gardens of native and exotic bloom and illimitable 
hedge lines of Cherokee roses. A swarm of house servants to min- 
ister to pampered indolence and dispense a lavish hospitality, a troop 
of field hands to fill the cotton, rice and sugar houses, made a blending 
of arcadian simplicity and feudal pretension. Every plantation had its 
indulgent master, its overseer and its submissive slaves. This, then, 
is the picture that made South Carolina almost independent within 
independence ; but there was a background of the bloody slave whip, 
barbarous slave codes, slave auction, yellow fever, cypress swamps, 
the hunt with the bloodhounds and the ever-present dread of a 
negro uprising. From such surroundings came the dream of free 
trade, which should produce a great slave empire before which the 
intellect, the power and splendor and government of all preceding na- 
tions should fade away. About the latter part of the year 1829 their 
representation in Congress, as also the Legislature of South Carolina 
in its sovereignty, intended to declare all national laws objectionable 
to them null and void and the protective policy of the Government 
to be discontinued, but when the first effort was made by the Legisla- 
ture the nullifiers did not have a full majority, and it failed. The 
tariff of 1832 added new fuel to the fire, and on October 24th of that 
year, by a vote of 20 to 12 in the Senate, and in the House by 99 to 
25, they called a State convention, to meet in Columbia in November. 
The convention, with a great majority, passed the nullification ordi- 
nance of the tariff of the 19th of' May, 1828, and of the 14th of July, 
1832, with instructions to the Legislature to enact laws to carry the 
nullification ordinanceof the objectionable laws into immediate effect. 


The convention further prohibited the testing of the legahty of the 
ordinance by the Supreme Court of the United States, requesting the 
State Judges to see that the ordinance was carried out, urging fur- 
ther that all the State officers should make oath that they would 
carry out any law passed by the Legislature, and later proclaimed 
the overbearing acts of Congress prevented South Carolina from 
remaining in the Union, and that they should at once organize a sep- 
arate government, and do all other things necessary and required by 
a sovereign State. The convention adjourned until March, 1833. The 
Legislature met on November 27th and passed several laws to carry 
out the nullification ordinance, as proposed by the convention, in- 
cluding authority for the Governor to call into service twelve thou- 
sand militia. But President Jackson issued a proclamation on De- 
cember nth, in which he denied the right of the nullifiers, and ac- 
cording to the oath of his office notified South Carolina that he 
would carry all the laws of Congress into effect. 

Warships were sent to Charleston Harbor and Gen. Scott was 
sent there to watch the crisis. The custom house was changed to 
another place, and other measures taken to prevent a collision. 
Congress passed two bills, one known as the force bill, authorizing 
the President to have full power to carry out the laws, and a com- 
promise tariff bill between the protectionists and the free traders of 
the Cotton States. The nullification ordinance adopted by South 
Carolina was to go into effect on February ist, but the convention 
being still in session decided to postpone the execution of the ordi- 
nance to see what the compromise tariff bill would accomplish. The 
two bills were passed by Congress and signed by Jackson on the 
2nd of March, and on the i6th the South Carolina conven- 
tion withdrew the nullification ordinance. Both parties claimed a 
victory, but South Carolina from this time on represented the ex- 
treme fire-eating idea of the slave owners in the Cotton States. 

In 1850 the extremists of South Carolina wanted to call another 
convention, but the lesson of 1833 had not been lost on the cooler 
headed ones, for they later claimed that nothing could be effected 
unless the other slave States co-operated, and the co-operators 
were in the majority, and no convention was called. But in the next 
ten years the extreme fire-eaters gained control, so that they were 
allowed to elect thirteen delegates to the Democratic convention in 
Charleston, and, as the platform was not to their liking, they left 
the convention in a body and broke up the gathering. One branch 


of the party met in Baltimore and nominated Douglas, of Illinois, 
■and Johnson, of Georgia, and the others met in Frederick, Maryland, 
and nominated Breckenridge, of Kentucky, and Lane, of Oregon. 
The Republicans had nominated Lincoln and Hamlin. As the cam- 
paign advanced it could almost be seen by a blind man that Lincoln 
would be the next President. Several States held their State election 
in October, and these generally indicated the drift of events, and as 
Governor Gist of South Carolina saw what was coming, he sent, on 
the 5th of October, a letter by special messenger to each of the Gov- 
ernors of the cotton and slave States, asking them their opinion about 
secession, as soon as Lincoln's election was assured. "If a single 
State secedes," he said, "South Carolina will follow her. If no 
other State will take the lead, South Carolina will secede alone, if 
she has the assurance that she will soon be followed by another or 
other States. Otherwise it is doubtful." He advised concerted action. 

North Carolina was the first to answer. "The people would 
not," so wrote the Governor, on October i8th, "consider Lincoln's 
election sufficient cause for disunion." The Governor of Alabama on 
October 25th, thought his State would not secede alone, but would 
secede if two or more States would lead. The Governor of Louisi- 
ana answered : "I do not think the people of Louisiana will decide 
in favor of that course, and I shall not advise it." The Governor 
of Georgia, under date of October 31st, advised retaliatory meas- 
ures, and ventured the opinion that the people would wait for an 
overt act of the Republicans before they would secede. Florida 
alone responded with enthusiasm. Her Governor said that her peo- 
ple were ready to wheel into line with the gallant "Palmetto" State 
or any other Cotton State or States, and thought her people would 
call a convention. 

The discouraging tone of the answers established the fact that 
secession was not in any sense a popular revolution, but a mere in- 
surrection or conspiracy among local office holders and politicians 
which the people neither desired nor expected, but which they were 
made to justify and uphold by the usual arts and expedience of the 
conspiracy. Directly and indirectly the Southern people had con- 
trolled the National Government since its whole existence. Excited 
to ambition by this, they sought to perpetuate that control. The ex- 
tension of slavery and the creation of new slave States was the neces- 
sary step in the scheme and had been the well-defined single issu{ j 


in the Presidential election, but in this contest the Southern States 
for the first time met overwhelming defeat. The choice of Lincoln 
was the conclusive and final decision in legal form and by constitu- 
tional majorities that slavery could not be extended, and the vote 
of i860 transferred the balance of power to the free States. 

During the Presidential campaign of i860, as well as in preced- 
ing years, the Southern politicians had made free use of two leading 
arguments, always with telling effect. The first, to intimidate the 
North was a threat of disunion; the second, to fire the Southern 
heart, was the alarm cry that the North, if successful, would not 
merely exclude slavery from Federal territory, but would destroy 
slavery in slave States. The knownothing masses of the South ac- 
cepted both of these arguments as truth, and Southern public opin- 
ion, excited and suspicious, became congenial soil in which the in- 
tended revolt easily rooted. As we have seen. South Carolina had 
been the hotbed of treason for over thirty years. Her least repub- 
lican form of Government made her the center of the conspiracy. 
Aristocratic and reactionary as she was, made her distrustful of 
popular participation in Government. She longed for distinction of 
caste and privileges in society. 

Before the replies of the Governors of the Cotton States had 
been received a consultation of the leaders had been held and the 
programme of insurrection agreed upon. A special session of the 
Legislature had been called and at the election during October 
local fanaticism predominated. 

There was no opposition in the State, and under the manipula- 
tion of the leaders the question was, who was the most zealous candi- 
date. In opposition to the National Government, Governor Gist, 
on November 5th, issued a defiant revolutionary message, the first 
official notice of the insurrection, declaring that our institutions 
were in danger of the hostile and fixed majority of the North, rec- 
ommending the call of the State convention and the purchase of 
arms and the material of war. As there was still some doubt on 
that day about the result of the election, the Legislature did not se- 
lect the delegates that were to vote for Breckenridge and Lane, but 
the morning of November 7th brought positive news that Lincoln 
and Hamlin had been elected, and they rejoiced and jubilated over 
the success of the Republicans, which now offered them the long- 
coveted pretext to break up the Union. 

The Legislature immediately ordered a convention, made ap- 


propriations and passed military bills. The Federal office holders re- 
signed their offices. Military companies and minute men were or- 
ganized in the city and rural neighborhoods. Drills, parades, meet- 
ings, bonfires, speeches, cockades and palmetto flags, purchase of 
firearms and powder, singing of the Marseillaise, were diversions to 
which the people of Charleston devoted their days and nights. As 
matters progressed there was universal satisfaction, as the leaders 
believed that their scheme would succeed, and the rabble was happy 
because they had a continued holiday. 

To increase the excitement of this character, these proceedings 
were daily stimulated by similar ones in other Cotton States. In this 
way the month of November and the first half of December passed 
away. During this time the new Governor, Francis W. Pickens, a 
revolutionist of the most radical type, had been chosen and inaug- 
urated. The members authorized for the convention by the Legisla- 
ture were chosen at the election held on December 6th. On Decem- 
ber 17th the convention met at Columbia, but on account of an epi- 
demic disease adjourned to Charleston.. 

As they were all of the same political opinion, they needed no 
time to make up their minds, and on the fourth day of its term it 
passed unanimously what it called the ordinance of secession. They 
enumerated a number of causes to give it strength and stability, and 
sought to deduce one for secession from the Declaration of In- 
dependence, asserting the State's supremacy and State rights and 
reversing the national order of Government existence, considering a 
State superior to the United States and a part greater than the 
whole. In their causes of complaint their grievances of past and 
present were against the Northern States and the remedy was barred 
by their own theory of State rights, and their complaints against 
the Union were of danger to come. This would not give them the 
moral justice for secession. They refused the remedy of future elec- 
tions to right future wrongs and discarded the entire theory of prin- 
ciple of republican form of Government. Although they complained 
of unfriendly State laws, the burden of their wail rose at the senti- 
ment of the North, where public opinion had been led into a great 
error, sanctioned by a wrong religious belief against the institution 
of slavery. 

This false assumption of the slave States cannot be admitted. 
Although slavery was tolerated in the formation of the Government 
it could not claim perpetual protection. The Constitution of the 



United States makes few features of our system perpetually oblip- 
tory. Almost everything is subject to amendment by three-fourths 
of the States. Our Republic was established for reform, not for 
blind conservatism ; certainly not for despotic action. On one hand 
Congress had legal power to tolerate the African slave trade; on 
the other, three-fourths of the States might lawfully abolish slavery, 
as was done near the close of the Civil War, to effect necessary and 
salutary political changes needed, by lawful and peaceful elec- 
tion through constitutional majority, as a prudent alternative to 
the violence and horror of revolution. This is one of the blessings 
which a republican representative Government confers on an intelli- 
gent nation. 

Although the Secession Ordinance was passed in secret session, 
the fact was immediately made public by large placards issued from a 
printing office as directed by the convention, and celebrated by 
the firing of guns, ringing of bells and a general jubilee at a meet- 
ing held on the same night by the convention. The members 
signed the ordinance, and soon after the chairman proclaimed South 
Carolina an independent Republic. Some one of the convention 
acknowledged that the secession of the State was not the result of 
Lincoln's election, but had been developing for more than thirty 
years past, and was therefore without a direct cause. 

The request of Governor Gist for co-operative action by the rest 
of the people of the Cotton States was promptly responded to by 
Georgia, Florida, Alabama, Mississippi and Louisiana, but if the 
truth could have been presented the strong Union sentiment in those 
States would not have followed South Carolina, although they had 
been berated by the partisans of Breckenridge as being in sympathy 
with the black Republicans and Abolitionists, for the time they were 
true to the Union. But the tryanny of the Southern public opinion 
made many weak-kneed voters belie their honest convictions when 
asked "if they would submit to black Republican rule," and they an- 
swered "no." 

The office holders formed in each State a center, around which 
the rest of the disgruntled gathered. The power of the Governor 
had such an influence in the State that if wielded in behalf of seces- 
sion the insurrection would begin with official prestige and sweep 
the hesitating and timid with them. In many cases, by nursing 
deceit, majorities that indorsed secession were obtained. Wherever 
co-operation was assured the Legislature would be convened and 


conventions called, military bills passed and volunteer companies or- 

In Washington the Extremists held nightly meetings. In- 
dividual opinion was overawed and all kinds of pretexts were in- 
vented to prevent the sending of election returns of voters. Personal 
judgment was obliterated by proscription and by the doctrine of su- 
preme State allegiance. 

As the slave population and Ultra-Secessionists of the Cotton 
States lived, as a rule, in the southern district, on the border of the 
Atlantic or the Gulf, the Union element was at home in the thinly- 
settled and sandy uplands of the northern part of those States where 
no great slave plantations could flourish, and the poorer white peo- 
ple were therefore in the majority, where they were burdened and be- 
wildered by the social detriments of the slave system, without en- 
joying any of its delights. But the political power lay in the slave 
regime, supported by the commercial interests of the southern sea- 
ports. It is, therefore, no wonder that secession succeeded, but 
strange that there was any contest at all in the Cotton States ; and 
yet, if we believe certain reports, there was a great deal of deceit and 
fraud practiced, and not one of the Cotton States, except Texas, had 
a direct vote on the Ordinance of Secession. 

Georgia was the Empire State of the South, and therefore 
needed to complete the co-operation movement of secession. Among 
the leaders in this State were Governor Brown, Cobb, Tooms and 
Iverson. The Extremists wanted the Legislature to pass the Act of 
Secession at once, but Stephens and the Conservatives of Northern 
Georgia opposed this course. He contended that the Legislature 
was elected as lawmakers and sworn to support the Constitution of 
the United States, and not sent there to disrupt the Government. He 
proposed, therefore, to call a convention of the people by a 
unanimous vote of the Legislature. A convention was called, and 
a heated campaign for the election of delegates followed, which dis- 
closed the fact that' the people of Georgia would demand new guar- 
antee for the protection of slavery, although they were decidedly 
against disunion. But the leaders were now inventing a new 
scheme by which to turn the balance in their favor in the following 
words : "We can make better terms out of the Union than we can 
in it." Stephens said that two-thirds of those who voted for the 
Secession Ordinance did so with the view of insuring a reformation 
of the Union. But the supremacy of State allegiance conquered all 


opposition. Stephens himself, in a speech for the Union, is a strik- 
ing illustration. He said that "the election of Lincoln could do no 
harm, as House and Senate were against him." He admonished his 
hearers not to act rashly and not to try the experiment of a change, 
for liberty once lost might never be restored. In the same speech he 
declared if Georgia seceded he would bow to the will of the people. 
And Georgia went to its ruin. The convention passed the Secession 
Ordinance by 208 to 89. 


When, in 1820, Missouri asked for admission as a State in the 
Union, the measure was opposed by those who desired the exclusion 
of slavery. Just then the free State of Maine was also asking ad- 
mission, and those who favored slavery in Missouri determined to 
exclude Maine unless Missouri should also be admitted. 

After an angry debate that lasted until the i6th of February, 
the bill coupling the new States together was actually passed. Then 
Senator Thomas of Illinois made a motion that hereafter and for- 
ever slavery should be excluded from all parts of the Louisiana Ces- 
sion — Missouri excepted — lying north and parallel to the thirty- 
sixth degree and thirty minutes. Such was the celebrated Missouri 
Compromise. By this compromise the slavery agitation was al- 
layed until 1849. 

While the Cotton States east of the Mississippi River had 
clothed the insurrection in the form of law and constitutionality, 
the State of Texas pursued an altogether bold and unblushing 
course. Gen. Houston had struggled hard and long to bring Texas 
into the Union. He therefore resisted the secession movement, but 
as he was in accord with the Southern proslavery prejudice, and an- 
tagonistic to the Republican party, he conceived a scheme to again 
make Texas an independent Republic, and, with her population, to 
undertake the conquest of Mexico. But the Secessionists, without the 
authority of Governor Houston, assembled a State convention and 
on February ist passed a Secession Ordinance and provided for a 
popular vote. Governor Houston, on February 4th, approved the 
resolution which legalized the convention, but accompanied with his 
approval he stipulated that it should have no effect except on the 
question of adherence to the Union. When the vote was taken, Feb- 
ruary 23rd, ratifying the secession, the ordinance was submitted to 
him for approval, but he refused to recognize further acts of the 


convention, and on March i6th declared his office vacant and em- 
powered the Lieutenant Governor to assume executive authority. 

The Insurrectionists lost no time, and at once organized a pro- 
visional military force to accept the surrender of the Federal troops 
and forts in Texas under command of Gen. Twiggs, who was in 
full sympathy with the secession movement. The various detach- 
ments of Federal troops were set in motion by him and vacated the 

Before this had taken place, and as soon as the Republican ad- 
ministration was inaugurated in Washington, Lincoln sent to Hous- 
ton, who still claimed to be loyal, and offered him the assistance of 
a large force, under Col. Waite, to sustain his authority. Houston 
refused the offer, and, having no one to support him, the Insurrec- 
tionists pushed him into obscurity, and the State was transferred to 
the Confederate military domination. 

Thus, by easy stages, the insurrection was accomplished, un- 
molested and unopposed. South Carolina seceded December 20, 
i860; Mississippi, January 10; Alabama, January 11; Georgia, 
January 19; Louisiana, January 26, and Texas, February i. All 
these States now claimed to be independent Republics, but the pre- 
tension was only short-lived, as it was designed to be by its pro- 
moters. But the assumption of independence through elections and 
conventions did not make it so. 

They hoped to avoid civil war, but there was no escape from it, 
if the North would fight, and as they were fairly well assured of this 
they took possession of arms and military posts within their borders. 
Among these was the navy yard at Pensacola and fifteen harbor 
ports along the Atlantic and Gulf Coast, with about a thousand guns, 
valued at five million dollars; a half dozen arsenals, with 150,000 
small arms, sent there by Floyd a year previous, as he claimed, for 
protection against slave insurrection ; three mints, four large custom 
houses, three revenue cutters on duty in the seaports, and a variety of 
other property, exclusive of the other property surrendered by Gen. 
Twiggs in Texas, which contained eighteen military posts and sta- 
tions, with arms and stores of great value, purchased with money 
from the Federal Government. The land on which the forts and 
buildings were located had in some instances been donated by formal 
legislation and deeded from the States themselves. But by State su- 
premacy and State Secession Ordinance they claimed the restoration 
of this property and the right to them of eminent domain, that 



they had always retained it, and that under the law of nations had a 
right to take possession and hold it, intending to settle the damages 
by money consideration through negotiation. 

As the National Government, in time of peace, opposed the 
maintenance of a large army, the whole force at the time amounted 
to only seventeen thousand men, mostly occupied on the Western 
frontier against hostile Indians, leaving only three Southern forts to - 
be garrisoned, and these with one company each. An equal number 
were stationed at the arsenals of Augusta, Ga. ; Mount Vernon, Ala., 
and Baton Rouge, La. The provisional military companies of the 
Insurrectionists took forcible possession of these forts, arsenals, navy 
yards and custom houses, and in some cases before the Secession 
Ordinance was passed. This was levying actual war against the 
United States, that had not yet caused any bloodshed. They usually 
appeared with a superior force and demanded the surrender in the 
name of the State. The officer in command would comply under 
protest, salute the flag and vacate, unmolested, proceeding to his 
home. Several exceptions were made to this. First, no attempt 
was made at Fort Taylor, Fort Jefferson and Pickens, in Florida, as 
they were too far to be reached ; second, the troops in Texas were not 
permitted transportation, and, third, the fort in Charleston Harbor 
was not so easily taken. 



The spirit of revolution and insurrection was not confined to 
the Cotton States. It had formed a place in the inner circle of the 
national administration. Among the members of the Cabinet Cobb, 
Floyd and Thompson were ardent Disunionists, and with a num- 
ber of subordinate office holders formed the central insurrectionists 
at the National Capital and worked, in violation of their official 
oaths, to disrupt the Union. At the assembling of Congress the first 
Tuesday in December the Southern Senators and Representatives 
arrived in Washington and promptly aided and assisted the insur- 
rectionary organization by using their influence with the President 
and subjecting him by personal pressure to indecision. No disloyal 
purpose or thought was in President Buchanan's mind, but he ap- 
pears to have fallen in a remarkable degree under the controlling in- 
fluence of his counselors. Advanced in years, and want of vigor, 
added to his feeble will and irresolution, with limited capabilities, he 
had, by the sweeping success of the Republicans suffered a rebuke 
and humiliation, and with his proud party a hopeless wreck and no 
hope to recover from defeat, he mistrusted popular judgment and 
the decision of the ballot box. He saw through Southern eyes and 
dwelt on the fancied wrongs of the South, and by impulse would em- 
barrass the incoming administration, as he could during the re- 
mainder of his official life, and the members of his Cabinet who were 
devoted Democrats shared the same feeling. As reports of the 
Southern insurrection thickened and the Federal officials in South 
Carolina, with much ostentation, had resigned, the loyal members 
of his Cabinet expressed themselves that the rebellion must be put 
down; but as the President, during the political campaign just ended, 
had encouraged the Southern people in their complaint of oppres- 
sion, he could not become an accuser of his late friends when disaster 
had overtaken them ; but his disloyal members of the Cabinet had no 
such scruples. They were ready to desert the President as soon as 


they had used him. In his message to Congress on December 3rd he 
made the most childish and useless suggestion, . claiming that the 
Southern people were irritated with the question of slavery by the 
Northern interference, when the crisis was really caused by slave 
owners when they wanted to invade the free territory of the North. 
He claimed the State had no right to secede, but the Government 
had no right to prevent secession; but the constitution gave him a 
right, according to his oath of office, to suppress insurrection and 
punish individuals for the violations of United States laws. To do 
this he argued it must be done by a writ in the hands of a United 
States marshal, but as the judges and marshals had resigned the 
execution became impossible. He ignored the fact that he could ap- 
point new judges and marshals, with the whole army, navy and 
militia of the nation as a posse; but a month later he nominated a 
new collector for the port of Charleston. He concluded his reason- 
ing by urging a constitutional amendment which would give the 
slave owners every concession asked for, and which the Northern 
people had rejected by the election of Mr. Lincoln. This message 
tied the hands of the administration and left the pathway of the 
insurrectionist free of danger. 

The first object of the South Carolinians was to get possession 
of the forts in Charleston Harbor. They had organized their State 
into a miniature Republic, but their claim of independence and sov- 
ereignty would be ridiculous if they could not control their own sea- 
ports that would give them the highway to the world, by which the}^ 
could negotiate treaties and secure powerful alliance. "We 
must have the forts," was the shibboleth that echoed from every 
street corner in Charleston. The harbor of Charleston is defended 
by three forts. The first and smallest is Castle Pinckney, capable of 
holding 100 men, armed with twenty-two guns; the second was 
Fort Moultrie, capable of mounting fifty-five guns and holding a 
garrison of 300 men ; the third, and most important, was Fort Sum- 
ter, situated in the middle of the harbor entrance and half a mile 
from its mouth, with five sides about 350 feet square, the casemates 
to contain 140 guns and able to hold a war garrison of 650 men. 
There were also the Charleston custom house and United States 
arsenal, containing nearly 25,000 stands of arms and accoutrements. 
As a guard the arsenal contained a military storekeeper and fourteen 
men. Castle Pinckney was occupied by an ordnance sergeant and 
his family; Fort Sumter by two engineer officers and no working- 


men. Fort Moultrie also contained an engineer officer and fifty 
workingmen, and in addition to these, sixty-nine soldiers and nine 
officers under Major Anderson, the senior officer in command of all 
the troops in the harbor. In the city companies were organized for 
an expedition to capture the forts. The newspapers, as also the 
public, believed they could have the forts whenever they 
wanted them. The higher class of Insurrectionists would invite 
Major Anderson and dine and wine him, expecting that he as a 
Southerner would turn the forts over to them without resistance. 
So far everything had gone their way, and the biggest feather in 
their cap was Buchanan's policy of non-coercion, which would pre- 
vent re-enforcements being sent to the forts in Charleston Harbor. 
They also relied on Floyd, then Secretary of War, who still claimed 
to be for the Union, that he would favor the Insurrectionists by an 
easy surrender of the forts. 

As a result of the fatal doctrine of non-coercion by the Presi- 
dent, the Representatives of the other Cotton States made boasts and 
threats in Congress, where South Carolina and secession were the 
topics of the hour ; but the Senators and Representatives of the loyal 
States, the Governors and newspaper press, brought their influence 
on the President to re-enforce the forts in Charleston Harbor. At 
the same time the Insurrectionists then in Washington were very 
active, and secured a promise of Buchanan that he would not re- 
enforce Moultrie unless the fort was attacked, and induced Floyd to 
give Anderson confidential instruction not to take offence, as they 
might assault and overwhelm him. The conflicting efforts from 
both sides caused Gen. Cass, influenced by the Union sentiment of 
the Northwest, to insist on re-enforcements being sent to Charleston. 

Buchanan's own sluggish blood had been brought to circulation 
by the high-handed, unchecked insurrection, and he called on Floyd 
who dallied, evaded and pooh-poohed the danger with chivalric bom- 
bast, claiming the South Carolinians were honorable gentlemen and 
ought not to be irritated. Floyd advised the President to consult 
Gen. Scott. As Scott was a Virginian, it was believed by Floyd 
that the former would join the secession movement and advise the 
surrender of the forts. Gen. Scott reached Washington on Decem- 
ber 12, and for the first time during Buchanan's administration was 
consulted in War Department affairs. As soon as he understood the 
situation he heartily joined Gen. Cass in recommending that re- 
enforcements be sent to Charleston Harbor. As this was not in line 


with Floyd's plan, he rejected the advice of Scott and opposed that 
of Cass, claiming all that was needed in the forts was an ordnance 
sergeant to represent the sovereignty and rights of the United States. 

Buchanan now saw the treachery and continued to plead with 
his secretary that the proprietary rights were no longer complete if 
once lost, and w^arning Floyd that if the forts were lost his name 
would be covered with infamy for all time to come. Floyd was in 
despair, "Send troops to Charleston," he said, "and the South 
Carolinians will not leave one brick of Moultrie upon another." He 
also gave the alarm to every prominent Southerner in Washington. 
These flocked around the President, promising in turn good be- 
havior and revolutionary violence, and Buchanan became reluctant in 
complying with Cass and Scott's advice, and at the Cabinet meeting 
on December 13 told Secretary Cass that he could not order re- 
enforcements to Charleston. 

Gen. Cass at once tendered his resignation and retired from the 
Cabinet, and Attorney General Black was made Secretary of State. 
Cobb of Georgia had resigned a few days before, and Thomas, of 
Maryland, was made Secretary of the Treasury and Edwin M. Stan- 
ton was appointed Attorney General. Mr. Buchanan believed these 
concessions to Floyd and Davis would stop the tide of disunion in 
the South, but was quickly undeceived. Encouraged as the Insur- 
rectionists were, they at once circulated a paper for signatures 
through the two houses of Congress containing the first proclama- 
tion for the formation of a Southern Confederacy. The document 
was brief, and contained the signatures of about one-half of the 
Senators and Representatives of North Carolina, South Carolina, 
Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, Florida, Texas and Ar- 
kansas, which was the beginning of the Confederate States. After 
South Carolina passed the Secession Ordinance, they resolved to 
have the forts in Charleston Harbor necessary for their sovereignty 
and independence, and prepared diplomatic negotiations for the prop- 
erty between the two governments. The convention appointed three 
commissioners to proceed to Washington to arrange for the delivery 
of the forts and other property, also an apportionment of the public 
debt, and negotiate about other matters necessary. 

The commissioners reached Washington December 26th. Pres- 
ident Buchanan did not consider the proceedings as a miserable farce 
but as a real piece of Government affair, and as soon as the com- 
missioners made their presence known he appointed the next day, at 


I o'clock for an interview with them. But before the time of meet- 
ing occurred it was announced that Major Anderson had during 
the night transferred his command from Fort Moultrie to Sumter, 
as he believed from daily observation that Moultrie could be as- 
saulted. He had despaired of receiving the often-called-for re- 
enforcements, and, as Sumter was the real key to the harbor, Capt. 
Forster, with his engineer force, could soon prepare it for defense. 
Sumter's guns also commanded Moultrie, and there was no approach 
except by boats, and, therefore, beyond the reach of the 
Charleston mob and its scaling ladders. Anderson had been in- 
vited out on Christmas night and learned of the resolve of the 
Charlestonians during the holiday, and when he returned decided to 
abandon Moultrie and take up his position at Sumter. He only 
permitted two officers to know of his intention, it being necessary to 
hire boats and send away the baggage and the families in the after- 
noon. The usual parade was held and the men instructed to be on 
watch for an assault. When the officers' supper was ready Capt. 
Doubleday received the first notice to have his men ready in twenty 
minutes to march to the beach. Everything moved like clockwork, 
and the South Carolina guardboat rested in full security, and failed 
to take any notice or make any discovery, and before tatoo was due at 
Moultrie the transfer was accomplished, and the officers' supper that 
had been prepared at Moultrie was eaten in Sumter. The guns in 
Moultrie were spiked, the carriages burned and supplies removed 
during the night. By daylight next morning the detail for this work 
rejoined the garrison in Sumter. 

The patriotic act of Anderson filled the Union people of the na- 
tion with exultation and will bring Anderson's name in grateful rec- 
ollection so long as history will be read. The news of this movement 
was at once sent to the South Carolina commissioners at Washington 
and they committed the same to Mr. Buchanan, which caused the 
commissioners' interview to be postponed. 

The President called a Cabinet meeting. Floyd declared the 
movement in violation of orders, and the President was inclined to 
order Anderson back to Moultrie, but preferred to hear from him, 
as he had become suspicious of Floyd, and believed that Anderson's 
movements might be technically justified. 

On December 28 the President granted the interview and told 
the commissioners that he could only receive them as private citi- 
zens ; that if they held any grievance they must apply to Congress, 


but was willing to communicate their proposition to that body. His 
recognition of the claim for the independence of South Carolina was 
a misdemeanor which could have been punished by impeachment, but 
the commissioners were too stupid to take notice of the advantage ; 
for the President now appeared in the attitude of their advocate that 
would have restrained him from any hostile action against South 
Carolina during the proceedings of Congress, as he had proposed. 
This would have made Washington the center of the insurrection; 
but the blindness of the commissioners lost them the possible chance 
of success. 

They were, however, very angry at Anderson. They demanded 
an explanation, and if it was not satisfactory they would suspend 
negotiations. The threat was equally stupid. 

For being a patriot Anderson narrowly escaped dismissal and 
disgrace by the President, for the Insurrectionists had complete con- 
trol of Mr. Buchanan. 

In the Cabinet meetings there was considerable struggle be- 
tween the disloyal counselors of the South and the loyal ones of the 
North over the possession and control of the President, but when the 
loyal members determined to resign the President decided against the 
Insurrectionists. To aid him in this decision was the influence 
brought about by outsiders on account of the bad reputation of Floyd 
and Thompson because of a transaction where a million dollars of 
Indiana Trust money had disappeared from the safe of the Interior 
Department and replaced by Floyd, which gave it the appearance of 
offlcial theft. This was brought to the attention of the courts and dis- 
turbed the mind of the President. 

Floyd had on the 29th tendered his resignation, which was ac- 
cepted on the 31st. The President now sent his final communication, 
to the South Carolina Commissioners, telling them that whatever 
might have been his original inclination the Governor of South Car- 
olina had, since Anderson's movement, taken forcible possession of 
Fort Moultrie, Castle Pinckney, Charleston Arsenal, Custom House 
and Post Office and covered them with the palmetto flag, and he 
would not withdraw the Federal troops from Fort Sumter. 

The newly-elected Governor Pickens was the most daring revo- 
lutionist in South Carolina, and acted the dictator within a few days 
after the seizure of the forts. He selected points on the islands on 
which to erect batteries to command the inlet and ship channel 
to prevent re-enforcements. 


Moultrie was soon restored. Castle Pinckney was undamaged, 
and a volunteer force, with slaves, was erecting battery after battery 
without being molested by Anderson, for nearly three months. Dur- 
ing this time the enemy repeatedly used the new batteries, firing at 
Sumter as a target, and yet the people from South Carolina, from 
the Governor down to the street rabble, insisted that the Govern- 
ment was waging war upon their State. 

With Floyd out of the Cabinet, the administration changed the 
attitude of the Government toward the Insurrectionists. Holt, of- 
Kentucky, became Secretary of War. Black also changed his mind 
and advocated re-enforcement of Sumter, and all the rest of the 
Cabinet joined to vindicate the national authority. Gen. Scott was 
placed in command of military control and various precautionary 
measures were taken. Among these was the effort to re-enforce 
Sumter. A swift merchant steamer, ^^Star of the West," was char- 
tered in New York and loaded with supplies and 250 recruits. She 
steamed out on the night of the 5th of January, 1861. The effort to 
keep the expedition a secret was a failure, and notice was sent from 
New York to Charleston of her coming, and as Thompson was still 
in the Cabinet, he learned of the fact and also warned his Charleston 
friends. But from newspapers they had gathered some in- 
formation that some such enterprise was on foot, and therefore 
Anderson was not surprised when on the morning of January 
9th he was notified that a strange vessel was entering the harbor and 
steaming up the channel, headed for Fort Sumter. The supplies and 
men were below deck and not seen, but the enemy had completed 
Fort Moultrie, and a sand battery at the harbor entrance, and as soon 
as the vessel came within range they opened a vigorous fire. Con- 
cealment being no longer possible, the vessel hoisted a large United 
States flag, to let Anderson know that it had come to bring him the 
long-wished-for re-enforcements. He ordered the guns of the fort 
to be manned and prepared to fire on the batteries. The steamer had 
passed the first battery and was hit but once, and without damage. 
The course of the channel required the vessel to steam directly to 
Fort Moultrie, but the sight of the ready guns discouraged the of- 
ficers in charge of her. Anderson and his men, with deep regret, 
just ready to cheer and op'en fire on the batteries, saw the steamer 
slacken its speed and turn around and once more pass through the 
enemy's cannon balls unharmed, and oiit again to sea. 

Anderson wrote a very drastic letter to Governor Pickens, stat- 


ing that if the firing on the flag was by his order he (Anderson) 
would close the harbor with the guns of Sumter. But in bravado 
Anderson was no match for Pickens. The latter justified the act 
and the next day sent Anderson a formal demand for the surrender 
of Fort Sumter. Anderson's reply was meek, but if the Governor 
saw fit to refer the matter to Washington, he would send an officer 
to accompany the messenger. 

As the Charleston Insurrectionists were not ready to fight, they 
accepted the truce which Anderson offered them, as it afforded them 
time to complete the harbor batteries. On January 12th the At- 
torney General proceeded to Washington to carry to the President 
the Governor's demand for the surrender of Fort Sumter, with au- 
thority to give a pledge that the value of the property would be ac- 
counted for by the State upon its settlement of its relation with the 
United States. 

When Hayne, the South Carolina Attorney General, reached 
Washington most of the Cotton States had seceded and taken forcible 
possession of the forts within their limits. They saw at once that a 
large number of petty republics would be of little importance and less 
influence and would only temporarily paralyze the laws of the 
Union. But the constitution and the military power of the nation 
were unbroken. They, therefore, sought some system of 
common defence and the formation of a Southern Confederacy had 
been from the beginning a recognized object. The plan was elab- 
orately worked by a few leading spirits, but so far the combination 
had failed. As time passed on the scheme gained success. An- 
derson's offer gave them time to work, and set a Provisional Govern- 
ment of a Southern Confederacy in motion, avoiding any pretext 
for a military movement which might check their plans, and the cor- 
respondence between the President and the insurrectionary leaders 
who had joined Hayne. This was carried on until February, when, 
on the 6th of that month, Secretary Holt brought it to an end by 
writing to Hayne, for thd President, that neither would there be a sale 
of Fort Sumter nor a relinquishment of South Carolina's claim of 
eminent domain thought of, since it was not a question of prop- 
erty, but of political right of the highest national importance. This 
closed the correspondence, and a second attempt to gain the forts by 
diplomacy failed. 

The negotiations had postponed the plans to send help to Ander- 
son, and on February 4th, two days before Hayne's dismissal, the 


Provisional Congress of the Confederate States assembled at Mont- 
gomery, Alabama, and on the i6th of February organized and in- 
augurated the Provisional Government of the Confederacy, and the 
insurrection became an organized rebellion against the National Gov- 

Since the 12th of February the same condition existed in the 
harbor at Pensacola as at Charleston ; the insurgents had threatened 
and the officer had surrendered the navy yard. But Lieutenant 
Slemmer of the army, with forty-six men, held Fort Barancas, find- 
ing that he could not defend that fort or Fort McRea, with loyal cour- 
age, repeated the strategy of Anderson, and moved his small com- 
mand, increased by thirty seamen from the navy yard, on the morn- 
ing of January 10 to Fort Pickens at the harbor entrance at the 
western end of Santa Rosa Island. The Government sent him a 
few ships to assist him, while the enemy began to gather an army to 
assault the fort, but the President here again agreed that the fort 
should not be re-enforced unless it were assaulted by the insurrec- 
tionists. After Hayne departed from Washington another consulta- 
tion was held in the executive mansion to devise and dispatch a new 
expedition for the relief of Fort Sumter, by small vessels from the 
coast survey, under command of Capt. Ward from the navy, but the 
effort was abandoned on February 23, probably on account of the 
fact that nine days only remained of Mr. Buchanan's Presidential 



Indiana, for State officers, held an election in October, '60, and 
Lane was elected Governor over Hendricks by a majority of nearly 
10,000 votes. All the other Republican State officers were elected, 
and the Legislature was also Republican in both branches. The cam- 
paign to be decided in November remained at a white heat on both 
sides, but when November came the Republicans had largely in- 
creased their vote and Lincoln had been elected by a popular major- 
ity, his vote coming almost wholly from the North. The Southern 
people claimed that he was a sectional candidate, and to this they 
would never submit, and would rather break up the Union; South 
Carolina, in the lead, which, on November 5, met and cast its elec- 
toral vote for Breckenridge and Lane. A convention was called 
to meet on the 1 7th of December to determine the question of seces- 
sion, but on account of the smallpox then raging in Columbia in 
epidemic form, they adjourned to Charleston, and the ordinance of 
secession was passed a little after midday on December 20, in secfet 
session, as already referred to in another chapter. 

Now the question was, what the Federal Government would 
do, and what the policy of the incoming Republican party would be ? 
Should they be permitted to go in peace and come back at their pleas- 
ure; or should they be brought to submission? The views of the 
President-elect were then little known, and President Buchanan had 
not yet defined his constitutional right in this matter. The opinion 
of the Northern people differed. Many Republican party leaders 
wanted to let them go. I heard John Coburn, a prominent politician, 
and, later, a General in the Union Army, in front of the Palmer 
House in Indianapolis, make a speech, in which he said : "Let them 
go, they have held the offices and we have paid the expenses." The 
Nezu York. Tribune (Horace Greeley's paper) and the Indianapolis 
Journal did not want the Southern States to be held in the Union at 
the expense of a Civil War, yet the great body of the loyal people 


of the North revolted against such conclusions and were looking 
around for a leader with a clear head who would demand the main- 
tenance of the Union. Just then a meeting was called by the "Rail 
Splitters," a political organization, and Oliver P. Morton, the Lieu- 
tenant-Governor-elect, was invited to make them a speech at the re- 
joicing over the election of Lincoln, but at the time a violent storm 
prevented the out-door meeting and they had to celebrate their re- 
joicing in the Court House. Being then a young man, and eager 
to learn all about the political affairs of our country, I attended the 
meeting. Both the Governor-elect Lane and Morton made speeches. 
Lane, who spoke first, was full of the spirit of reconciliation, refer- 
ring to the strong ties between Indiana and many Southern States, 
and the great gallantry of Kentucky soldiers, who had frequently 
rendered great aid to the early Indiana settlers against the Indians. 
Lane's speech was received in silence, and apparently not favored 
by his hearers. Morton followed Lane, and led his hearers in an en- 
tirely different direction and explained to them "that coercion meant 
nothing but the enforcement of the laws and that secession or nullifi- 
cation could only be regarded by the general government as indi- 
vidual action upon individual responsibility, and the actors could not 
entrench themselves behind State Government and give their conduct 
the semblance of legality and load the responsibility upon the 
State, which of itself was not responsible, for the Constitution of 
the United States operates upon individuals, not upon States, just 
as if there were no States, and, therefore, the President has no discre- 
tion, for he has taken a solemn oath to enforce the laws, and for 
this reason was made commander-in-chief of the army and navy 
and the President can not be released of his official oalh by resolu- 
tions of convention, or by the advice of the newspaper, or by the 
preponderance of public opinion. The Constitution provides that 
Congress may admit a new State to the Union, but there is no pro- 
vision for turning one out. • A State once admitted becomes a part 
of the whole, and secession is not contemplated by the Constitution 
as permissible or possible. Congress can only be forced to acknowl- 
edge the independence of any State or States after a successful revo- 
lution. There is no power under the Constitution permitting the 
general Government to enter into negotiations with State Govern- 
ment. No Government possesses the constitutional power to dismem- 
ber itself. The right does not exist. If the right does exist to 
acknowledge the independence of South Carolina, or any other State, 


that right can only be exercised by an act of Congress. The Presi- 
dent does not possess it, and until released from his duty he must 
exert his power to enforce the law. In an attempt at secession there 
are but two courses to pursue, either to allow the seceding States 
peaceably to set up for themselves an independent Government, or 
else, by the military power of the United States, compel an observ- 
ance of the laws and submission to Constitutional obligations. If 
we allow a State peaceably to secede, we thereby concede the right 
to secession in the most substantial and solemn manner. We could 
not allow South Carolina to secede and deny other States the same 
right to retire when they see fit. The right of secession conceded, the 
nation is dissolved. Instead of having one mighty people, we have 
but a collection of independent and petty States, held to- 
gether by a treaty, hitherto called a Constitution, or the infraction 
of the Constitution, of which each State is to be the judge, and from 
which combination any State may withdraw at pleasure, and soon 
we would have a Pacific Empire set on foot. California and Oregon, 
sovereign and independent, would have a right to withdraw from 
their present partnership and form two separate nations. In doing 
so they would act with a far greater show of reason and a far 
greater prospect of success than South Carolina. They are sepa- 
rated from the other States by thousands of miles of barren plains 
and snow-clad mountains. Their commerce is naturally with the 
East Indias and the islands of the Pacific Ocean. The tie of com- 
mercial interest between them and the other States is weaker than 
that which binds together any other part of the Republic. 

"The right to secede being conceded, and the easy way shown 
to be safe, the prestige of the Republic is gone, the national pride ex- 
tinguished; secession would become the remedy for every national 
grievance, and in a few years we should witness the total dissolution 
of the mighty Republic which has been the hope and glory of the 
world, and we would be following the petty States of Greece and 
Italy and the principal cities of Germany, and with it the wreck and 
ruin of our political, intellectual, social and commercial death. 

"We must then cling to the idea of an indivisible nation, sub- 
divided into State lines for local and domestic purposes, remain one 
people and citizens of a common country, having like institutions 
and possessing a common interest in the inheritance and glory pro- 
vided by our forefathers. We must, therefore, do no act, 
we must tolerate no act, we must concede no idea or 


theory that looks to or involves the dismemberment of the 
nation. And especially must we of the inland States cling 
to the national idea — If South Carolina may secede, so may 
New York, Massachusetts, Maryland and Louisiana, cutting off our 
commerce and destroying our right-of-way to the ocean, and we 
would be shut off in the interior, surrounded by independent and 
perhaps hostile nations, through whose territory we could obtain 
egress to the seaboard only upon such terms as might be agreed to 
by treaty. Emigrants from foreign lands could only come to us by . 
permission of our neighbors. We could not reach any Atlantic port 
except by passports duly revised. In such a condition of affairs the 
seaboard States would have immense advantage, which may be illus- 
trated by comparing the wealth and power of the seaboard Kingdoms 
of Europe and those shut up in the interior. 

"Can it be possible, then, that Kentucky, Tennessee, Arkansas 
and Missouri can ever become infatuated with the doctrine that a 
State has a right to secede, thereby placing the existence of their 
commerce, their everything, within the power of Louisiana, com- 
manding, as she does, the outlet of the Mississippi and the entrance 
to the Gulf? As the matter now stands, the port of New 
York is the property of the nation, held for the benefits of all 
States, the revenue there being collected for the benefit of all ; but we 
are told if we use force to compel South Carolina, this act would lead 
the other slave States to take common cause with her. I cannot be- 
lieve that treason is so widely spread; that sympathy with South 
Carolina was stronger than the devotion to the Union. Should such 
be the case, the course of the Union-loving people to pursue could not 
be changed thereby. If the people of other Southern States would 
not permit the enforcement of the laws of South Carolina, it would 
be evidenced that they were intending to follow her example at their 
own convenience. If they intended to stay in the Union they will 
thrust no obstacle in the way of the general Government in com- 
pelling obedience to laws. But if they intend to secede we cannot 
know the fact too soon, that we may prepare for the worst. I do not 
believe that the bad example set by South Carolina would be followed 
by any other State; certainly not by more than one or two. If 
South Carolina gets out of the Union, I trust," he said, "it will be at 
the point of the bayonet. After our best efforts have failed to com- 
pel her to submit to the laws, better concede her independence by 
force, to revolution, than to right and principle. Such a concession 


cannot be drawn into precedence and construed into an admission 
that we are but a combination of petty States, any one of which has 
the right to secede and set up for herself whenever it suits her temper 
or her views of pecuHar interest. Such a contest, let it terminate as 
it may, would be a declaration of the only terms upon which they 
would be permitted to withdraw from the Union. 

"The lapping of South Carolina by the sword of revolution 
would not disturb the unity of the balance of the nation, but would 
simply be a diminution from its aggregate of power to the extent of 
her resources and population. Although the American Revolution 
terminated so disastrously to the British Government, after an 
enormous expenditure of blood and treasure, accompanied by such 
humiliation of the national pride, still, the integrity of the remaining 
portion of the Empire was preserved. 

"Had our claims to independence been at once recognized and 
conceded by the mother country, the thirteen Colonies peaceably al- 
lowed to constitute a separate Government and take their place 
among the nations of the earth, an example would have been set and 
an admission made of which every colony, island and dependency 
of the Empire would have speedily claimed the benefit. The Canadas, 
East and West Indias and Australia would in turn have pointed to 
this epoch in history as a palpable and unconditional avowal of the 
doctrine 'that they had the right under the British Constitution at 
any time to peaceably terminate their allegiance to the crown and 
secede from the Empire,' An admission of such a right could only 
have been retracted at the end of numerous and bloody wars. 

"Shall we now surrender the nation without a struggle and let 
the Union go, with merely a few words ? Shall we encourage faint- 
hearted traitors to pursue their treason by advising them in advance 
that it will be safe and successful ? If it was worth a bloody struggle 
to establish the nation, it is worth one to preserve it, and I trust that 
we shall not," he said, "by surrendering with indecent haste, publish 
to the world that the inheritance which our fathers purchased with 
their blood we have given up to save ours. 

"Seven years is but a day in the life of a nation, and we would 
rather come out of the struggle at the end of that time defeated in 
arms and conceding independence to successful revolution than pur- 
chase present peace by the concession of a principle that must be in- 
evitably exploded; scattering this nation into small and dishonored 


"But of the results of such a struggle I entertain the utmost 
hope and confidence. He who compares our glorious war for in- 
dependence with a war set on foot to propagate human slavery, to 
crush our liberty of speech and of the press, and to inaugurate and 
revive, with all its untold and indescribable horrors the African slave 
trade, must have an indifferent Idea of the justice of that Providence 
who holds in His hand the issue of battle. To employ the language 
of a great statesman 'Surely, the Almighty has no attribute that 
could take sides with our enemy in such a contest.' " 

The whole question he summed up in his proposition : "Are we 
one nation, one people, or thirty-three nations and thirty-three in- 
dependent and petty States ?" 

The statement of the proposition furnishes the answer : "If we 
are one nation, then no State has the right to secede. Secession 
can only be the result of successful revolution." He answered the 
question, and said his answer would find response in every true 
American heart — "that we are one people, one nation, undivided and 

The alternatives of coercion or national ruin were never held 
up more clearly than in the severe yet simple diction of this sentence. 

The above speech was the first true Union sentiment expressed 
and was of irresistible logic and influence. It was the speech de- 
manded by the emergency. The sentiment which it delivered guided 
the conduct of the administration during the Civil War. When Lin- 
coln read it he said : "It covers the whole ground and declares the 
necessary policy of the Government." 



In the meantime public opinion ripened rapidly, and the senti- 
ment in Indiana was an epitome of the nation-at-large, and many 
Conciliations were devised, such as permitting slaveholders to travel 
through Northern States with their slaves. ^ 

The restoration of the Missouri compromise would set every- 
thin<. ri-ht Many Republican newspapers looked forward to the 
*::oU:tion of the Union. In Perry County they -solved that U. 
boundary line, if it was to be drawn between North and South, must 
belawn nor h of Cannelton. The Democrats held a State conven- 
tion on the 8th of January, in honor of the birthday °f General Jack- 
son and in resolution the coercion of Southern Staes , 
wanted Indiana to act as "mediator" between the contending fac- 
tions, with action directed towards preserving the Union or recon- 
structing it if it dissolved, urging the Legislature to call a conven- 
tion to declare the position of the State in the present crisis. Mr. 
Hendricks, the defeated Democratic candidate for Governor, sup- 
ported these resolutions. , c. ^ vi, ♦!,» 
Meetings were held everywhere throughout the State, with the 
object to propose concessions which would bring back the South to 
h Union' !n Franklin the meeting was held in the -rt hou 
and was so well attended that the room was filled to its utmost 
capacity. There was but one sentiment present, or could be heaid, 
which was "the preservation of the Union, even through war. 
A Mr. Overstreet, a prominent lawyer, made the remark that the 
Union, when organized, was certainly not ''^'^-^^^ '° ^; ^^j;'^_ 
where any one could come and go as he pleased. A Mr Oyler an 
other lawyer, was for organizing an army at once, and, like Gen. 
Jackson, go down to South Carolina and give them a drubbmg 
Many y;ung students then attending college at *at place -ade short 
and pa'riotfc speeches. If there were dissenters they d'd-t per- 
mit themselves to be heard, but some few Southern students left as 


soon as the season was over. On the loth of January, when the 
Legislature met, a resolution was introduced not to support any one 
for office unless he was in favor of the perpetuation of the Union. 
Upon a compromise on the slavery question another resolution was 
introduced to hear the grievance of South Carolina; another to re- 
peal the Personal Liberty Bill ; another to adopt the Crittenden com- 
promise then pending before Congress. A resolution was adopted 
that the navigation of the Mississippi must not be interfered with, 
and another introduced to give slaveholders the right of transit for 
slaves through Indiana. Such was the jumble of resolutions in- 
troduced to calm the excitement of the country. 

In his message to the Legislature Governor Hammond alleged 
the cause of trouble due to fanatical agitation of the slavery question, 
promoted by dangerous political teachers belonging to the ministry. 
On January 12th a Mr. Murray introduced a resolution de- 
nouncing the action of the South as hostile and treason, approving 
the President's Federal authority, with aid in men and money, and 
another resolution that the laws must be executed and the union pre- 
served by force, if necessary. 

Under such conditions the Republicans resumed charge of the 
administration in Indiana, Lane became Governor and O. P. Morton 
President of the State Senate, who performed the duties of that body 
but two days. 

On the evening of the 1 5th of January Lane was unanimously 
chosen Senator by the Republicans. After his election and resigna- 
tion of the Governorship, Morton became Governor, and in his ad- 
dress announced his intention to sustain every effort of the general 
Government in enforcing the law. He soon had public opinion on 
the side of the Union. On the 226. of January the national flag was 
to be raised on the dome of the State House. On the programme 
Lane, Hammond, Hendricks and Voorhees were to be speakers. 
Morton, as Governor, was excluded, but would review the several 
military companies of the city. 

Senator Lane was the mildest and most harmless of the Re- 
publicans and his remarks would not hurt the feelings of any one. 
Hammond, Voorhees and Hendricks were considered safe men. 
Morton was not to speak, because his ideas were radical. A large 
crowd was present, myself among them. After Lane made his ad- 
dress Hammond followed, recommending the Crittenden compro- 
mise. Hendricks argued equal rights of the South, which he be- 



lieved were denied on account of her peculiar institution of slavery. 
These were the arguments of Conservatives present at the time. 
Morton was in the crowd, and the multitude were determined to hear 
him, for in such surroundings he was the incarnation of popular 
patriotism. He at once went to the heart of the matter. He said : 
"I am not here to airgue State equality, but to denounce treason and 
uphold the cause of the Union, and on this occasion we should renew 
our allegiance to the flag which floats over the dome of the Capitol. 

"We live at a time when treason is running riot through the 
land. Certain States, unmindful of the blessing of liberty, forgetting 
the duties they owe to their sister States and to the American people 
as a nation, are attempting to sever the bonds of union and pull 
down to irretrievable ruin the system of our Government, which 
has been the admiration and wonder of the world. We are lost in 
astonishment at the wickedness and folly of this attempt. It requires 
no prophetic eye, no second sight, to perceive that the social and 
political destruction will speedily overtake the seceding States if 
they persist in the desperate and criminal enterprise in which they 
are now engaged. The civilized world will look upon their scheme 
v/ith horror, and the voice of the nation is raised in solemn rebuke 
of that treason which is aiming a fatal blow at the liberties of the 
world. It is a time when the hearts of all men should beat in unison 
and every patriot join hands with his neighbor and swear eternal 
devotion to liberty, the Constitution and the Union. 

*Tn view of the solemn crisis in which we stand, all minor and 
party considerations should be banished from every heart. There 
should be but one party and that the party of the Constitution and 
the Union. No man need pause to consider his duty. It is in- 
scribed in all our institutions and on everything by which we are 
surrounded. The path is so plain that the wayfaring men cannot err 
therein. It is no time for hesitation. The man who hesitates under 
circumstances like these is lost. I would here in kindness speak a 
word of warning to the unwary. Let us beware how we encourage 
them to persist in their mad design by assurance that we are a divided 
house ; that there are those in our midst who will not permit the en- 
forcement of the laws and punishment of their crimes. Let us search 
our hearts and see if there are any partisan prejudices and party 
presentments that are imperceptible and unknown to ourselves, lead- 
ing us aside from the path of duty, and, if we find them there, pluck 
them out and hastily return. For myself, I will know no man who 


will Stop and prescribe the conditions upon which he will maintain 
that flag ; who will argue that a single star may be erased, or who 
will consent that it may be torn that he may make choice between its 
dishonored fragments. I will know that man only who vows fidelity 
to the Union and Constitution under all circumstances and at all 
hazards; who declares that he will stand by the constituted authori- 
ties of the land, though they be not of his own choosing; who, when 
he stands in the base presence of treason, forgets the contest and 
squabbles of the past in the face of the coming danger; who then 
recognizes but two parties, the party of Union and the base faction 
of its foes. To that man, come from what political organization he 
may, by whatever name he may have been known, I give my hand as 
a brother^ and between us there shall be no strife. When the strug- 
gle comes, if come it must, when the appeal to arms is made (which 
God, in His mercy may avert) we must then rely not on a standing 
army, but on the citizens of the land, on those men whose hearts 
beat high with patriotism and who will strike for it with their strong 

After the delivery of this speech there was less uncertainty and 
hesitation and more of duty to sustain the Government, but there 
were not so man)^ who believed that war was coming. Morton freely 
told his opinion to his friends that the outcome of the national 
difficulty must be war, and public opinion was prepared to meet it; 
but he felt that the risk of the border States was so great in aligning 
themselves with the South that he doubted whether they would se- 
cede. His conclusion was right. 



The result of the Congressional manifesto of December 14th, 
i860, came to a final on February 4th, 1861, when the delegates of 
the Cotton States met in Montgomery, Ala., to organize the South- 
ern Confederacy as the outcoming of the separate secession. The 
agreement of the Washington caucus was adhered to. The argu- 
ment invented in Georgia, that better terms could be made out of 
the Union than in it, and the declaration of the Mississippi Commis- 
sioner that secession was not undertaken with a view to break up the 
present Government, but to secure to Mississippi the guarantee and 
principles of liberty which had been pledged to her by the "fathers 
of the Revolution." 

The leaders knew that if their State was once committed to se- 
cession, that the moment of the crisis would carry them to whatever 
combination they might desire. 

The plan for the organization of the Confederate States appears 
to have been adopted in Washington at a caucus held on January 5, 
1861. The points arranged were that the Cotton States should at 
once secede, and that delegates should be chosen, to meet in Mont- 
gomery, to organize the Confederate States, not later than February 
1 5th ; that the Insurrectionists should remain in Congress as long as 
possible, to prevent coercion, and that Jefferson Davis, Slidel and 
Mallory be appointed a committee to carry out the object of the 
caucus. The programme was carried out with but slight deviation. 
The intention was to complete their new Government before Mr. 
Buchanan's term of the Presidency expired. They knew he was 
opposed to coercion. What his successor would decide to do was 
uncertain. They had made efforts to have Mr. Lincoln express him- 
self as to what he intended to do, but had been unsuccessful. The se- 
cession delegates met on February 4th, instead of the 15th, and on 
February 8th adopted a provisional Government to be known as 
the Confederate States of America. They had no trouble to come 


to a conclusion, as the insurrectionary States had declared that their 
new Government was to be modeled after that of the United States. 

They now proceeded to frame a permanent Constitution, which 
was completed and adopted on March ii, 1861. Few changes from 
the Constitution of the United States were made. The new Consti- 
tution was to be established by each State, instead of by "we, the 
people." It provided for the protection of slavery in newly-acquired 
territory by Congress; also the right for transit and sojourn for 
slaves and other property, and the right to reclaim slaves and other 
persons, servants or laborers. It did not deny the right to coercion 
as they did to the National Government, for it declared itself to be 
the supreme law of the land, binding on judges in every State, and 
provided for the punishment of treason, and declared that no State 
should enter into any treaty, alliance or confederation, grant letters 
of marque or reprisal, coin money, pay duties, keep troops on ships 
of war in time of peace, or make any compact with another State 
or foreign power. A sweeping practical negative of the dogma of 
State supremacy, upon which they had built their revolution. 

The day after they adopted their provisional Government they 
elected Jefferson Davis as President and Alexander Stephens as 
Vice President of the new Confederacy. It was reported that Cobb 
and Tooms both wanted the Presidency, and Davis preferred the 
chief command of the Confederate Army. Cobb remained presiding 
officer and Tooms became Secretary of State. Davis was sent for 
and inaugurated February i8th, 1861. 

In his inaugural address he intimated that they would permit 
the non-seceded Slave States to join the Confederacy, and further re- 
marked that if he was not mistaken in the will and judgment of the 
people a reunion with the States from which they had separated was 
neither practical or desirable. There is no doubt from what was said 
that the whole purpose of the insurrection was the establishment of a 
powerful slavocracy. If doubt existed, it was removed by Mr. 
Stephens in his speech, in Savannah, Ga., on March 21st, 1861. He 
defined the ruling idea in the following language : 

"The prevailing opinion entertained by Jefferson and most of 
the leading statesmen at the time of the formation of the old Consti- 
tution was that the enslavement of the African was in violation of 
the law of nature, and that it was wrong in principle, morally and 
politically. It was an evil they knew not well how to deal with." 

The general opinion was that, some way or other, in the order 



of Providence, the institution would be evanescent. This idea, 
though not incorporated in the Constitution, was the prevailing one 
at that time. The Constitution, it is true, secured every essential 
guarantee to the institution while it should last, and hence the argu- 
ment can be justly urged against the Constitutional guarantee thus 
secured because of the common sentiment of the day. Those pleas 
were, however, fundamentally wrong ; they rested upon the assump- 
tion of the equality of the races. This was an error. It was a sandy 
foundation, the Government built upon it, and when the storm came 
and the wind blew, could not stand. Our new Government is 
founded upon exactly the opposite idea. Its foundation and corner- 
stone rests upon the great truth that its negro is not equal to the 
white man; that slavery subordination to the superior race is his 
natural and normal condition. Thus our new Government is the 
first based upon this great physical, philosophical and moral truth." 

Mr. Stephens was very enthusiastic in his estimate of the re- 
sources of the Confederacy. "We have all the essential elements of 
a high national career. The idea has been given out in the North 
and in the border States that we are too small and too weak to main- 
tain a separate nationality. This is a great mistake. In extent of 
territory we embrace 564,000 square miles and more. This is up- 
• w^ards of 200,000 square miles more than the original thirteen States. 
It is an area of more than double the territory of France or Austria. 
France, in round numbers, has 212,000 square miles, and Austria 
has 248,000 square miles. Ours is greater than both combined. It 
is greater than all France, Spain and Portugal, including England, 
Ireland and Scotland together. In population, we have upwards of 
5,000,000, according to the census of i860. This indues whites and 
black. The entire population of the original thirteen States was 
4,000,000 in 1790, and still less in 1776, when the independence of 
the fathers was achieved. If they, with less population, dared to 
maintain their independence against the greatest power on earth, 
shall we have any apprehension of maintaining our's now?" 



From the official neglect of the old administration and impotence 
of Congress, and from the hostile preparation of the South, the 
country now turned to the newly-elected President and the incoming 
administration. Many of his political friends had requested him to 
make some public declaration, but Mr. Lincoln preserved his silence 
except in confidential letters to personal friends of opposing politics. 
He wrote, while holding to the Republican doctrine, "No Extension 
of Slavery." He bore no ill will to the South, intended no aggression 
on her rights and would, on the contrary, treat her with liberal in- 
dulgence. As the day of his inauguration approached he received a 
number of invitations from the Legislature in the States he had to 
pass through on his way to the national capital. He started from 
home on February i ith, and passed through the principal cities from 
Springfield, III, to New York, and from New York to' Washington. 
Crowds came forward everywhere to greet and see the new Chief 
Magistrate, whose strange career they had heard so much about in 
the recent election speeches ; his obscure birth in the seclusion of the 
Kentucky wilderness; his reading of Weem's life of Washington in 
the humble cabin of Southern Indiana; how as a tall boy he split 
rails to fence his father's clearing ; his boating on the Sangamon and 
Mississippi Rivers; as a postmaster, deputy surveyor, a volunteer 
captain in the Black Hawk Indian War ; studying law by borrowing 
Blackstone and arguing cases before his neighbors as jurors; fol- 
lowing the circuit courts from county to county and becoming by de- 
grees the first lawyer of the State; how in a primitive community he 
rose from a Representative in the Legislature to the Presidency of 
the United States, but not without a mighty political conflict of 
principle in the momentous slavery question. He had overcome 
Douglas, the victorious leader in the Kansas-Nebraska bill, by his 
matchless definition of the injustice of slavery in all ages. "When 


the white man governs himself," he said, "that is self-government; 
but when he governs himself and another man, that is more than 
self-government ; that is despotism." 

His statement of the right of every man to eat bread without 
the permission of any one else, which his own hands earn ; his states- 
manship in declaring that the Union cannot endure half slave and 
half free, before Seward proclaimed the irrepressible conflict, had been 
told by the newspapers and campaign speakers during the recent 
canvass. Thus he had risen from obscurity to fame ; from ignorance 
to eloquence; from want to a ruler, uncontaminated by vice, un- 
despoiled by temptation, without schools, without family influence, 
without wealth, championed by no clique or fraternity, clinging to 
no corporation or combination, winning popularity without art, re- 
ceiving consideration without parade, he had led his party from de- 
spondency to success and from success to renown. Known among 
his fellow-men by such personal conduct that his very name was a 
proverb of integrity and a recognized token of social, moral and 
political uprightness. 

Malicious gossip and friendly jest described the rail splitter 
candidate as the ugliest man in the Republican party. He was six 
feet four inches high, which at once gave him the outward sign of 
a leader. He possessed a spare and muscular frame, strongly marked 
features to correspond to his muscular stature, with a quiet de- 
meanor, erect bearing. His face was not unattractive when lit up 
by his open, genial smile, as I saw him when he came out of the 
Governor's mansion at Indianapolis, on his way to Washington. 
His countenance was positively handsome ; his voice of great clear- 
ness, and so penetrating that it could be heard by a wide circle of an 
audience. His speeches were full of logic, directness and force. 
He made some short addresses on his journey, but the key note was 
uttered in his first speech at Indianapolis. "The people," he said, 
"when they rise en masse in behalf of the Union and the liberty of 
their country, the gates of hell cannot prevail against them. In all 
trying positions in which I shall be placed, my reliance will be upon 
you and the many people of the United States, and I wish you to 
remember, now and forever, that it is your business, and not mine, if 
the Union of these States and the liberty of the people shall be lost. 
It is but little to any one man of fifty-two years of age, but a great 
deal to the thirty millions of people who inhabit the United States 
and to their posterity in all coming time. It is your business to rise 


up and preserve the Union and liberty for yourselves, and not for 

Ever since the election in November there had been rumors of 
a plot to seize the Capitol, public buildings and the archives and by 
force prevent the inauguration of Lincoln, and in this way succee^l 
the administration of President Buchanan. There were many 
threats, boasts and warnings, but an investigation held by Congress 
disclosed no cc«ibination ; but ]VIr. Buchanan had authorized Gen. 
Scott to gather sufficient troops in Washington to insure both peace- 
able counts of the electoral vote and the inauguration of Mr. Lincoln. 
The htter event tock p]ace with due formality and in the presence 
of a large crowd on the 4th of 3^Iardi, 1861. In his inaugural ad- 
dress he declared that he had no purpose, directly or indirectly, to in- 
terfere with slavery where it existed; but he also asserted that the 
Union is perpetual ; that secession resolves and ordinances are legally 
void; that acts of violence within any State against the authority of 
the United States are insurrectionary, and as far as he was able he 
should cause the laws to be faithfully executed in all the States. ITie 
Union would deiend itself, hold its property and places and collect 
the duties and imposts, but b^ond this what may be necessary to 
carry out th^se (Ejects. There will be no .invasion, no using of force 
against or among the p«>ple anywhere. There should 1^ no bloo^j- 
shcd or violence unless forced upon the national authority. He 
would tolerate the t«nporary discontent and would forego the ex- 
ercise of office in disaffected districts, and would continue to furnish 
the mails unless repelled. He would «ideavor to preserve the ;-er//; 
of perfectsecurity,fevorabletocalm thoughts and renewed allegian e. 
This was an unanswerable argvanent against disunion and an earnest 
appeal to reason and, lawful ranedy. He continue^! his address of 
peace and good will by saying : **That in your hands, my dissatisfie^l 
fellow countrymen, and not in mine, is the momentous issue of the 
Civil War. The Government will not assail you. You can have no 
conflict without being yourselves the aggr^sors. You have no oath 
registered in Heaven to destroy the Government, whik I shall have 
the most sol«nn one to preserve, protect and deiend it.'* 

When he came into office he Ijelieved that Major Anderson was 
secure in Fort Sumter until the South Carolina batteries should drive 
him out, but the unfailing enemy, starvation, was rapidly driving 
the brave little garrison to surrender. A letter had l>een placed in 
the Presidait's hands -.VirnvirH/ ^li;4t ilie {/-jtrrisr/n had pr'jvhums for 


a little more than a month longer, and an estimate of Major Ander- 
son and his officers that it would require a large fleet and twenty 
thousand men to raise the siege, but no fleet and such an army existed 
and it would take time to organize it. Gen. Scott advised the Presi- 
dent that it was impossible to relieve or re-enforce Sumter, and that 
as a military question it was necessary to order 'its evacuation. But 
Mr. Lincoln had promised the nation that he would hold, occupy 
and possess the property belonging to the Government. He there- 
fore ordered a re-examination, and the Cabinet, military and naval 
officers joined in its discussion. A naval officer made the proposition 
to the Cabinet that he could, in the dark of night, get through a 
small quantity of provisions and a few men in the fort. But this 
did not settle the political question of the case, and he asked his Cab- 
inet if it was possible to provision Fort Sumter, and whether it was 
wise to do so. By written answers five members argued against any 
possible relief, while two were in favor. The majority, led by 
Seward, argued that any relief would be only temporary, and were 
for giving it up at once, under the military necessity already existing 
and for which the new administration was not responsible. 

The exposed position of Fort Pickens received Mr. Lincoln's 
earliest attention by ordering its re-enforcement from the fleet, as the 
January truce was still in existence. He was in painful anxiety to re- 
ceive news that his order had been executed, as that would have an 
important influence in deciding the question of Sumter. Among 
the many expedients that were set in motion in the early part of the 
month of January to appease the disaffected was the General Assem- 
bly of Virginia, that sent out to the different States an invitation to 
a convention called for the purpose of adjusting the controversies be- 
tween the North and the Souths Each State was to appoint four 
commissioners. The States that had seceded did not send any com- 
missioner, as the delegates of these States had already gone to 
Montgomery, Alabama, to organize the Southern Confederacy. All 
sorts of concessions were asked to keep the border States in the 
Union. On the 15th of February the committee reported a series 
of resolutions, which were adopted by the convention and submitted 
to Congress, with the request that they be referred to the States for 
ratification as an amendment to the Constitution, but nothing came 
of the amendments. Li Virginia the insurrectionary influence in the 
Legislature had, after the failure of the peace convention, ordered a 
State convention, to which her people had elected a large majority of 


loyal people. Their loyalty was of a qualified sort of factional preju- 
dice with the imaginary wrongs of the South, an element upon which 
the insurrectionists were working with telling effect, and, instead of 
declaring with frankness and direct adherence to the Union, they 
were forming baseless complaints, demanded impossible guarantees 
and pleaded indulgence for the course of South Carolina and the 
other seceded States. This was about a fair sample of the loyalty of 
the leaders of the border States. How to treat this disturbed ele- 
ment and half-hearted allegiance was the problem for the adminis- 
tration. Mr. Seward believed that the revolution in the South had 
spent its force, and therefore favored the evacuation of Fort Sumter 
and kind treatment to the insurrectionists in the border States, 
which would strengthen the Unionists and Union sentiment and re- 
store allegiance and prevent civil war. 

The President was equally pacifically inclined, and informed 
himself as best he could from Charleston, Richmond and Fort Pick- 
ens, but nothing encouraging reached him, and Anderson did not 
believe that the relief expedition would reach him. Just about that 
time Governor Morton of Indiana paid the President a visit and told 
him the impossibility of a compromise, and by trying to conciliate 
the South the North might become indifferent; that he would do 
what he could to strengthen the administration, to enforce the laws, if 
the Government would adopt a vigorous policy. Indiana would fur- 
nish at least 6,000 troops to march at once in defense of the Union. 
Although the State was politically divided, it would be loyal when 
the time came for action, and the lack of decision on the part of the 
administration would only discourage the Union men. He also asked 
for arms, and received an order for 5,000 muskets. 

All the Union sentiment in South Carolina had disappeared, 
and the Virginia convention, which played fast and loose with 
treason, and the morbid cry for concession, caused Gen. Scott to ad- 
vise the evacuation of Forts Sumter and Pickens. On top of all 
this came the news that the commanding officer of the ships at Pensa- 
cola had refused to allow Fort Pickens to be re-enforced because of 
Buchanan's January truce and objection to Gen. Scott's order as not 
coming through the Navy Department. After Morton's visit, and on 
March 29th, a Cabinet meeting was held, in which there appeared a 
taint of sentiment. The majority voted to relieve Anderson, and 
the President ordered the expedition proposed by Capt. Fox, a naval 
officer. Three ships of war, with a transport and three swift steam- 


2rs, a supply of open boats, provisions for six months and 200 re- 
:ruits, were fitted out secretly in New York and sailed from that 
port on April the 9th and loth, with sealed orders to be at Charles- 
ton Harbor at daylight on the nth. New orders were also sent to 
the commander of the fleet at Pensacola by the President direct. 
The garrison of Fort Pickens, including those landed from the fleet, 
now numbered 858 men, with provisions for six months. 

There is plenty of credible evidence that those in authority at 
Montgomery did not believe that they would need to resort to arms 
and the bluff of sending three commissioners to Washington would 
be sufficient to negotiate for recognition and for adjustment of dif- 
ference and possession of the Federal forts. Although they had 
failed at two different times to secure Sumter by intrigue, they 
still tried a third time with the new administration. The Insurrec- 
tionists still had parties at the head of the Government, and through 
one of these, who professed loyalty, the three Confederate commis- 
sioners presented their paper to Mr. Seward, the new Secretary of 
State, at Washington. They received a courteous but decided an- 
swer that the new administration would have nothing to do either 
with the Confederate Government or the commissioners, and un- 
officially replied on the memorandum to the same purpose. This 
ended the negotiation, but the commissioners delayed their departure 
and Justice Campbell volunteered to act as their go-between, and 
continued to press their errand on Secretary of State Seward. 
Campbell had opposed secession, and in that friendly guise was ad- 
mitted by Secretary Seward to an intimacy that, had his true senti- 
ment been known, he could not have secured, and in this intimacy 
Seward told Campbell of his willingness to give up the forts, and 
that the President, upon the recommendation of Gen. Scott, would 
order their evacuation. 

Whatever Seward's language to Campbell was, a patriot could 
not have misunderstood it; but Campbell's way of reasoning made 
him believe that Seward had given him the pledge and conveyed this 
idea to the commissioners, and they sent the news to Montgomery 
in high glee. 

President Lincoln followed his own conclusion, which was 
reached on the 29th of March, when he gave the order for relief ex- 
pedition. Campbell saw now the hole he was in and sought Seward 
for an explanation. Seward, finding his former explanation at 
fault, consulted with the President, who authorized him to say to 


Campbell that in regard to Sumter the administration would not 
change the military status at Charleston without giving notice. 
This was the only promise Mr. Lincoln ever made in regard to the 

This occurred on the ist of April, after the visit of Gov. Morton 
of Indiana to the President, and after which Mr. Lincoln strongly 
self-asserted his carefully matured purpose to force the Insurrection- 
ists by attacking Fort Sumter. 



The bombardment of batteries to reduce Fort Sumter was com- 
menced by South Carohna about January i, 1861, and soon after 
the organization of the Confederate States at Montgomery Gen. 
Beauregard was sent to Charleston to complete the military prepara- 
tion for the capture of Fort Sumter, which was intended to be ac- 
complished before Mr. Buchanan's administration would expire. 
They believed that Mr. Buchanan would not resist the capture (as 
he had expressed himself as having no power) , and the incoming ad- 
ministration might not act, because the trouble would be considered 
as over. But Mr. Davis did not want to act so promptly and 
aggressive, for fear it would lose them their friends in the North. ' 

Gen. Beauregard also admonished the Governor that no attack 
must be made until complete preparation had been made, as a fail- 
ure would demoralize and wreck the object of the insurrection. Gen. 
Beauregard claimed that Fort Sumter was a perfect Gibraltar, but 
the small garrison would render the capture feasible. His first ob- 
ject was to devise means that would prevent re-enforcement, and 
being himself a skilful engineer, with ample supply of guns, mortars 
and a large number of slaves for ditching and raising embankments, 
he would give the volunteers time for drill and gun practice; and 
so the work went on day and night, with relieving gangs. 

Gen. Beauregard was an enthusiastic Secessionist himself, but 
the Governor untiringly urged him to complete the preparation. On 
the first of April Beauregard telegraphed to Montgomery that the 
batteries were ready to open during the week, and asked for in- 

The Confederates had hoped that Lincoln would give up the 
fort and prevent civil war, and, encouraged by Northern sympathy 
and Campbell's report of the Seward conversation, they were so 
confident of this, that Pickens, Walker and Beauregard had some 
trouble among themselves as to what terms to give Major Anderson. 


One of the commissioners in Washington telegraphed PickenS' 
on the 1st of April that Fort Sumter would not be supplied until due 
notice was given them by the National Government. This did not 
show that Fort Sumter was to be evacuated, and the Confederates 
next day stopped all the courtesies to the garrison in the way of sup- 
plies and passes from and to the fort, so Major Anderson had to rely 
upon rumors. He expected orders that the garrison would be with- 
drawn, and was surprised when, on April 7th, he received a con- 
fidential letter from Cameron, the Secretary of War, that a relieving 
expedition would be sent, and for him to hold out. To this Major 
Anderson replied : 

"I frankly say my heart is not in this war which is about to be 
commenced." But by his loyalty and devotion to the Union the pub- 
lic has forgiven this indiscretion. But the Confederates had cap- 
turned Anderson's letter and retained it until the war was over, and 
then it was found among the Confederate archives. 

During the week following the commissioner's telegram the 
Confederates received all kinds of conflicting reports from Washing- 
ton and New York, while the Union authorities were active in load- 
ing ship's supplies, and their spies failed to obtain the information 
where they were to be sent. They guessed Fort Pickens, New Or- 
leans or San Domingo. But on the evening of April 8th a messenger 
was sent to Governor Pickens and was at once received. Gen. 
Beauregard was present, and the messenger read then the following 
communication from Mr. Lincoln : 

"The President of the United States has determined to supply 
Fort Sumter with provisions, and there will be no collision of arms 
unless such attempt should be resisted." 

On the morning after the notice had been served on Pickens the 
relieving expedition, under Captain Fox, sailed from New York 
Harbor, consisting of the transport Baltic, three war steamers and 
two steam tugs, with orders to rendezvous at Charleston Harbor 
on the morning of the nth. The whole expedition was in charge 
of Capt. Fox of the navy, with instructions to open a passage, ef- 
fect an entrance and place both troops and supplies in Fort Sum- 

As soon as Mr. Lincoln's notice had been received at Mont- 
gomery, Mr. Davis and the Confederate authorities lost no time 
in beginning' the war without further delay. They would not 
permit, after three months of battery building. Major Anderson to 


be reprovisioned, and suffer the insurrection to collapse. They 
spent a whole day deliberating on the situation, and with inquiries 
from their commissioners at Washington. On the loth, they in- 
structed Gen. Beauregard to demand the evacuation of Fort Sum- 
ter. At two o'clock in the afternoon, on the nth, Beauregard sent 
two of his aides to make the demand, which Major Anderson, with 
the concurrence of his officers, refused. In the conversation with 
the aides Anderson remarked that "he would await the first shot, 
and if not cut to pieces they would in a few days be starved out," 

This was repeated to Gen. Beauregard and at Montgomery, 
causing them to believe that Major Anderson desired to capitulate. 
Another message was sent tq him, permitting him to do so at 
his own convenience, if he would designate the time and not use 
his guns against the Confederates unless they should fire on Fort 
Sumter. This would leave their guns free to beat back the fleet. 
He answered that he would vacate the fort by noon on the 15th of 
April, and agreed not to open fire on their forces "unless com- 
pelled to do so by some hostile act against this fort or the flag of 
my Government by the forces under your command, if I do not re- 
ceive, prior to that time, instructions from my Government or addi- 
tional supplies." 

This reply was unsatisfactory to the Confederates. The ex- 
change of their messages had consumed the day and night of 
April nth, and at 2:30 on the morning of the 12th Gen. Beaure- 
gard's aides handed Major Anderson the notice that the Con- 
federates would open fire an hour from that time. 

The Charleston population for three months had followed 
the development with zeal and daily interest, and regarded the 
Sumter affair as a pet drama of their own. The excitement, 
speeches, drills, parades, flag-raising, music and banners carried 
fathers, sons, brothers and friends into the camps and trenches 
that surrounded Fort Sumter. It was their daily talk and nightly 
dream, and created intense curiosity as the drama reached the 
climax. There had been no effort to conceal the preparations and 
orders, and the population of the city was as well informed as the 
officers of the time when the bombardment would begin. In the 
early morning, before dawn, the Charlestonians of all sexes and 
ages thronged down to the wharfs to select places from which 
they could view the impending spectacle of the sanguinary conflict 
of arms. 


It was just half-past four on April 12, 1861. The night had 
not disappeared from the bay, and the dark outlines of Fort Sum- 
ter were not yet visible. The spectators saw a flash from the 
mortar batteries of Fort Johnson, and a moment later a shell of 
large caliber rose in .a high cur\'e through the morning air and 
fell upon the fort. This was the inauguration of the final scene 
in the drama and notice to the nation and the world that the 
gigantic conflict — the greatest in the history of our country — had 

Gun after gun now opened fire, and before another hour 
every battery was active in the general bombardment of the fort. 

It has been wondered at, that this bombardment which caused 
the surrender should have lasted thirty-six hours without the loss 
of a life on either side. 

Fort Sumter was a work of recent construction, built of brick, 
on an artificial island in the center and at the entrance of Charles- 
ton Harbor. It was five-sided, three hundred by three hundred 
and fifty feet in size. Its walls were eight feet thick and forty 
feet high, and capable of mounting one hundred and forty guns 
in casemates and barbettes. But the lower tier of casemates was 
closed, and a total of forty guns was ready for use; twenty-one of 
these in casemates and twenty-seven in ramparts on barbette car- 
riages. The garrison contained nine officers, sixty-eight enlisted 
men, eight musicians and forty-three workmen that had been re- 
fused permission to depart by the besiegers, that they might help 
to consume Anderson's stock of provisions and hasten the sur- 
render by starvation. 

The batteries of the enemy had been built on the ap- 
proaching island in the harbor, at a distance of 1,800 yards, 
with a total of forty-seven guns. But the difference was that the 
enemy's fire was concentrated, while Anderson's fire was dif- 
fused. The enemy's guns were sheltered by bomb-proof logs and 
sand, and some with a sloping roof of railroad iron. 

Anderson had a force of only 128 men, all told, while the 
Confederates had their batteries supported by five thousand men. 
There was also a great difference between the opposing forces in 
their ordnance. Anderson could only deliver a horizontal fire, 
while the besiegers could give a vertical fire by throwing shells 
on a high curve through the air and inside of the walls of the be- 
sieged fort. 



The garrison of Fort Sumter was in excellent spirits and 
quite ready to make a manful resistance. The forty-three work- 
men caught the impulse of the fighting and volunteered their help, 
and every one had changed their quarters into the gun casemates. 
Here they were housed and protected when the bombardment be- 
gan. For several hours the guns in the fort made no reply, and 
were silent, with not a soul stirring. The last barrel of flour 
was issued two days before, and there was little left except pork 
and water. On this the garrison made its breakfast, and shortly 
after Capt. Abner Doubleday fired the first shot at the enemy's bat- 
tery on Cummings' Point, and soon Sumter made a spirited reply 
from their guns to the enemy's fire, they carefully watching 
for three hours the enemy's cannonade. It was apparent that 
under the concentrated missiles of their vertical fire it would be 
foolish to expose the gunners in barbettes of the fort, and with such 
a slender force Anderson decided that he could not afford to 
lose any of his men, and therefore did not use the rampart guns 
and restricted the men to the casemates, thus reducing the force 
to one-half. But of the twenty-one casemates, four contained 
only forty-pounders, the remainder, thirty-two-pounders; really 
a light metal against the enemy's fortification. The cannonading 
continued without much damage to either party, except on the 
buildings of Sumter and Moultrie, used as barracks and quar- 
ters. Sumter suffered most, first by the vertical fire of the mortars 
and by the horizontal fire from three sides. The men were shel- 
tered in casemates, and could not be reached by the bombs. 

Anderson's men soon found that they were getting too fast 
to the end of their stock of 700 cartridges, and with slow speed 
set to work to manufacture a new supply. 

It was about i o'clock when they were cheered by new hope 
of the relieving expedition, but it proved unable to furnish suc- 
cor to the garrison by a blunder in the Navy Department. Confused 
orders to the commanding officer of the squadron had been issued 
and the soldiers to Sumter had been detached from this duty and sent 
to the Gulf of Mexico. In addition to this, a severe storm pre- 
vented the tugs from leaving the harbor. Therefore the men of 
the relief expedition remained only as an audience to the bom- 

After midday on the 12th Sumter kept up the fire with 
slackening speed, and only six guns were kept in action, two 


against Cummings' Point and four against Moultrie and Sulli- 
van's Island, and by nightfall they ceased altogether, as also did 
the enemy's, batteries. But their mortars kept up a discharge of 
their bombs, upon the fort, during the whole of the dark and 
stormy night which followed. 

On the 13th the enemy began their cannonade with vigor 
and precision, and the garrison again made a spiteful reply, but other 
elements intervened and brought the combat to a close. 

The barracks inside had been several times set on fire by hot 
shot during the past day and promptly extinguished by the gar- 
rison. This had been noticed by the enemy, and on the second 
morning they used the hot shot more frequently, and about 9 
o'clock on the same day the buildings were once more in a blaze. 
The flames were quickly beyond control, and fifty barrels of the 
powder in the magazine, which was badly needed by the garrison, 
had to be rolled into the sea. The heat in the fort was intense, 
and the air filled with flying cinders and a stifling, blinding smoke, 
drove the men into the casemates. 

About I o'clock the flag-staff in the fort was destroyed, but 
soon after raised on an improvised mast; but the smoke concealed 
it from the enemy's view. Seeing the blaze in the fort, and no 
guns replying and no flag waving, they concluded that the garrison 
was ready to surrender. One of Gen. Beauregard's aides, Sena- 
tor Wigfall, was sent out to ascertain the fact, and when brought 
before the commander offered to permit Anderson to name his 
own terms of evacuation. 

Anderson replied that he would accept the terms offered hirn 
by Beauregard on the nth. Wigfall returned to his post, 
and reported an unconditional surrender. During the meantime 
three aides arrived from Beauregard with an offer to quench the 
flames, and the misunderstanding became apparent. Anderson 
became angry and wanted to renew the fight, but the aides sug' 
gested to wait until the blunder was corrected by Gen. Beaure-. 
gard. This commander soon reconciled the difficulty by agreeing 
to Anderson's proposal, and at noon, Sunday, April 14, 1861, 
Major Anderson and his faithful garrison, with an impressive 
prayer and salute, hauled down the United States flag and aban- 
doned Fort Sumter. 





The Confederate Government had lulled itself into the belief 
that the assault on Sumter would not provoke immediate civil 
war, and expected only military movements of a local nature to 
take place. As the size of the Federal Army, or the limited mili- 
tary organization of the Confederacy, pointed to no hostilities on a 
large scale, the Southern authorities also knew that the frontier 
could not be stripped of the regular forces. They were aware 
that the existing laws of the United States authorized no call of 
the militia and that Congress had neglected at its recent session 
to pass a force bill, and the political opposition of their Northern 
friends would make it difficult for the new administration to se- 
cure coercive legislation. During the political campaign of i860 
the Democrats had predicted a coming revolution to obstinate 
voters if the Southern complaints were not adjusted, and the neglect 
of the Northerners to repeal their personal liberty laws would justify 
the South to revolutionary resistance which the newspapers echoed, 
and some of the public speakers had declared that the North would 
not permit a policy of subjugation. Ex-President Pierce had con- 
fidentially informed his friend, Jefferson Davis, in the early part of 
i860 that he did not believe the Union would be disrupted without 
blood; that the fighting would not be along Mason and Dixon's line, 
but on the Northern States and on our own streets, and those who 
defied the laws (meaning- Abolitionists) and constitutional obliga- 
tions would find occupation at home. 

Mr. Douglas had made an elaborate argument in the Senate, 
showing that the President possessed no right of coercion, and it 
seemed as if the spirit of secession had found lodgement in the 
North. A member of Congress from New York declared that 
that State would set up her own sovereignty and independence. 
The Mayor of New York City proposed that the metropolis de- 
clare itself a free city, but the firing on the Star of the West, in 


January, had checked the current of seditious utterances. One ol 
the Confederate Commissioners to Washington had visited New 
York and met one of the spokesmen of Northern sympathizers, 
who recited to him the most marvelous scheme of a local insur- 
rection. Two hundred of New York's best citizens were then try- 
ing to perfect a plan to secede, both from the Union and the State,^ 
seize the navy yard and forts in the harbor and declare New Yorl 
a free city. The commissioner reported the story to Jefferson' 
Davis and added that there was something in it. Jefferson Davis 
did not believe in the extravagant prediction, but looked for this 
class of sentiment to thwart the new administration in any quick 
measure to suppress the Confederacy. 

The Northern people were apprehensive of the actual state of 
Southern sentiment. For ten years threats of disunion had been 
empty bluster, and the conspiracy of 1856 consisted only of agi- 
tators, but in the last three months the signs had become more seri- 
ous, by the retirement of Southern Congressmen, the secession of 
States, the seizure of several forts and the formation of a Pro- 
visional Government. The delusive hope of a compromise was 
not realized by the North or sustained by the high-sounding pro- 
fession of the Washington Peace Conference. 

As the loss by runaway slaves appeared to be the real griev- 
ance of the South, would the evil be cured by moving the line to 
the Ohio River? And if they really wanted a separate nation, 
could the 10,000,000 of Southern people maintain themselves in 
war against the 20,000,000 of the North? Could the Southern 
credit cope with the solid capital of the North? Could the 
monotonous slave agriculture try expedience with the skilled me- 
chanic of the Free States, and would the West permit a foreign 
flag to close the Mississippi? In this way they sized up the am- 
bition and desperation of the Southern leaders that forced the 
Cotton States into a revolution and the Southern people, without 
substantial cause, into the chaos and ruin of hopeless civil war. 

The roar of Beauregard's gun changed all of this as if by 
magic into facts and left no room for doubt. Seven States, with 
their machinery of local government, stood behind the guns, and 
the cool deliberation, assault, purpose and confidence of the insur- 
rection had given away to revolution. The news of the bom- 
bardment of Sumter reached Washington on Saturday, April 13. 
On Sunday morning the Cabinet met to discuss the surrender. 


I On that same day Mr. Lincoln drafted the proclamation calling for 
'75,000 volunteers, and published it to the country on Monday 
morning, April 15, Mr. Lincoln had redeemed his promise made 
at Trenton on his way to Washington. The call of the militia 
was based on a law of 1795. The President had taken care to 
state the issue and strip it of all provocation and ingenious ex- 
cuse and show the malignity of the Insurrectionists in showering 
red-hot shot on a starving garrison at Fort Sumter. He asked 
the people to maintain their assaulted dignity and outraged au- 
thority, and invoked directly the spirit of free government to pre- 
serve itself, against which the gates of hell could not prevail. 
The manifestation of the national will and strength marked the 
grand epoch in Qur history. The whole country was awakened 
as from a feverish dream, and for once men entered upon their 
proper relations to the Government. Parties vanished from poli- 
tics, opinions recognized but two rallying points. One was the 
camps of the South, which gathered to assail the Union, and the 
other the armies of the North that rose to defend it. Nowhere 
was the fire of patriotism more intense than in Indiana. It turned 
away every other feeling. The streets of Indianapolis were 
black with a multitude of people waiting the tidings of the seventy 
loyal men in an unfinished fort, bombarded by five thousand des- 
perate Insurrectionists. In F'ranklin, twenty miles south of In- 
dianapolis, where I then lived, young men, men in middle life and 
old citizens stood in the streets near the telegraph office where 
one Jerry was operator at the time. But his knowledge of tel- 
egraphy being limited, he closed the office about 9 p. m. and the 
gathering dispersed, except about a half a dozen, among these 
myself. We made arrangements with the section boss (there 
were no trains running on Sunda}^) for a hand-car, and next 
morning early reached Indianapolis, when we learned that Sum- 
ter had fallen. A dispatch just then appeared that Mr. Lincoln 
on the morrow would issue a proclamation calling for 75,000 men 
to suppress the insurrection. Cheer upon cheer was the response 
to this news ; one meeting was held at the court-house, and another 
at the Masonic Hall. Resolutions were passed that the people of In- 
diana would offer their lives and fortunes to preserve the Union, and 
sympathizing friends of the South kept quiet, and obnoxious news- 
papers were required to hoist the flag, and many doubtful ones 
were invited to express their sentiment, which should be strongly 


in support of the Union and the war to maintain it. Three day; 
before, the Indianapolis Sentinel had said that Governor Morto: 
could not make good his promise to Mr. Lincoln of 6,000 volun' 
teers, and that the people of Indiana did not intend to enter into 
a crusade against the South. The sudden change of public feel- 
ing now made matters unpleasant and dangerous for the editor 
of that paper, and he feared personal violence and the destruction 
of the establishment, and a few days later asked Morton to pro- 
tect it from harm. About 4 p. m. in the afternoon we started 
with our hand-car on the return trip, and on our arrival at Frank- 
lin found a large part of its citizens in the street awaiting news. 

Jerry had not been able to give them much over the wire, 

and the public eagerly devoured all he had been able to furnish. 

As soon as Morton heard of the bombardment of Sumter he 
at once set about to raise the troops, and enlistment of volunteers 
began in almost every county of the State, and money by individ- 
uals was donated, liberal appropriations being made by State Legis- 
lature and municipal government to arm, clothe and equip the re- 
cruits. More than double the number of men required tendered their ' 
services, and there vx^as not the slightest sign or movement of the pre- 
dicted division of the Northern sentiment. In New York they 
held a monster mass meeting of two hundred thousand strong, 
and the crowds that filled the streets were loud in their hurrahs for 
the Union. The New York Herald hoisted the Stars and Stripes 
and changed its tone of lamentation to a fierce war cry. Every 
prominent individual in the North came voluntarily and by letter 
or speech espoused the Union cause. Ex-President Buchanan, 
Pierce, Everett, Cass, Archbishop Hughes, Fernando Wood, John 
A. Dix, Phillip Walker, Dudly Field, Crittenden and Hendricks 
— Democrats, Republicans, Radicals and Conservatives, natives and 
foreigners. Catholics and Protestants, from Maine to Oregon, all 
were of one mind for the preservation of the Union. Among 
the most energetic and powerful leaders in favor of the preserva- 
tion of the Union was Stephen A. Douglas, who had received dur- 
ing the Presidential contest nearh^ one and a half million of votes 
and in the Senate had expressed himself as opposed to coercion; 
but the uncalled-for attack on Sumter had stirred his patriotic 
blood, and on Sunday, April 14, before Lincoln's call for troops had 
been written, he called on the President and in a long, confidential in- 
terview assured him of his support in an unrelenting war against 


the rebellion, and the morning telegrams gave the country notice 
iof his patriotic allegiance. Shortly after he started for his home 
I in Illinois, and on his journey, wherever the train stopped, he made 
! eloquent appeals to his fellow-citizens to rise in vindication of the 
National Government, declaring that every man must be for the 
United States or against it. There were only two classes, patriots 
land traitors. There could be no neutrals in this war, he said. At 
Columbus, Ohio, he was called out of his sick room, and the public 
would not leave the front of the hotel until they heard him and 
men like Governor Todd and Judge Key, that had been present at 
the Democratic feast on the 8th of January, when they celebrated 
the birthday of General Jackson, the Democratic saint; and 
speeches then made that two hundred thousand Democrats would 
prevent the crossing of the Ohio by any troops intending to invade 
jthe South, were overcome by a feeling of loyalty and support of 
the war. Todd became the great war Governor of Ohio at the 
mext election, and Judge Key served on McClellan's staff as judge 

j Hendricks of Indiana, a strong Douglas Democrat, wrote a 
'public letter, in which he indorsed in strong terms the war measure 
for the preservation of the Union. Such was the uprising of the 
I people in the North, on part of which the Southern people had de- 
pended for support, which some of the leaders had promised them, 
but at the first call found themselves deserted and the eyes of the 
Southern people were opened to the fatal enterprise that they were 
engaged in. They had dared in behalf of error, and were called on 
to sustain it. Sumter was a bloodless conquest and filled the 
South with intoxication for the combat. The adverse sentiment 
to Southern independence had disappeared, aided by despotic pub- 
lic opinion, palmetto banners, rattlesnake flags and stars and bars 
became the symbols of their deliverance. 

With Lincoln's proclamation and the war spirit of the North 
ended the hope of the Montgomery authorities of obtaining peace- 
ful separation. While they counted much on their military re- 
sources they seemed to have based their final reliance on foreign 
intervention for King Cotton. They claimed that European Gov- 
ernments must open their ports, recognize and protect their flag 
to secure the staple and commercial advantages of free trade. 

In answer to Lincoln's proclamation, Mr. Davis issued on 
April 17 his proclamation offering letters of marque and reprisal 


lo armeti privateers of any nation. A few vessels of this charac- 
ter did in the following- years great damage upon the ships that 
sailed under the Federal flag, hut the extra vag-ant claim which the 
pri\-ateer proclamation was to have produced was never realized. 

Shortly after this Lincoln issued the blockade proclamation, 
closing- the Southern seaports, and that Mr. Davis' privateers 
should be held and punished as pirates. This, however, was not 
literally fulfilled. The large increase of the United States Navy 
made the blockade very efficient, aided by the vigilant foreign 
diplomatic ser\~ice of tlie administration, and the vigorous precau- 
tion of tlie war left no excuse to foreign powers to intervene. 
and during tlie hour of distress the ^lancliester cotton operators 
were so devoted to universal liberty tliat tliey put to shame the 
cotton mercliants of Liverpool. 

In addition to tlie twelve tliousand Confederate troops at 
Oiarleston and Fort Pickens, ]*^Ir. Da^-is had called on April 8tli 
for .20,000 additional, and on tlie i6tli of April added a further 
call of 34,000 volunteers. Tlirough tiie possession of tlie Soutli- 
eni arsenals they secured over a hundred tliousand arms and about 
fifty tliousand additional liad been purcliased. with a A"ariety of 
niilitan' stores, among the property surrendered by Twiggs in Tex- 
as, and T^ith a plentiful supply of heav}- guna in the seaboard. 
The recmits for the Southern army were in abundance, and were 
insrrucied by skillful officers tliat had left the Federal service 
Diplomats were sent in haste to Europe and the Mississippi River 
blockaded. The Confederate Congress was convened, and on 
April .20 Mr, Davis sent them a special message announcing thi: 
he had 10,000 men in the field and 16,000 more were on the way 
to Mrginia, and that he proposed to raise 100,000 mcH-e for instan: 

The scope and character of the insurrection had material; 
changed ance the fall of Sumter. The people in the border 5ti:-rr 
were divided in sentiment. They favored slavery, but they Li: 
loved the L'nioru which they had indicated through a p:z- ir 
vote, but the bambardment of Stnnter fell on tbem '." - : 
stoine. Lincoln's prodamation and the regnisTtion f:r :___iit;c:: 
left tbem no chance for canceahneni. Carnpelled to take ades, se-^- 
cral Governors replied -w-itii fn ^^lt rn g refusal, and Virginia, 'Sonr 
Carolina, Tennessee and Arkansas became pait of liiE Coni^rr- 
acT. :::~is3e T>a55£bje bv the sadden msh and DODribtr acdtanectt 


upon the fall of Sumter. The four other border States, Mary- 
land, Kentucky, Missouri and West Virginia, were saved to the 
Union by the loyalty of their people. _ 

The insurrectionary States were thus by a single bound in- 
creased to nearly double in population and resources that could 
claim the attention of foreign nations, which made the leaders 
hopeful, as they now had a territory four times as large as France 
and a population of nearly six millions of whites and four millions 
of blacks, producing cotton valued at two hundred million dollars 
per year, with a long seacoast, several important harbors and many 
navigable rivers, with mountains, mines and forests of the most 
valuable timber in the world, and they believed that they possessed 
the substantial elements of a prosperous and powerful nation. 



On the 19th came the Baltimore riots, and next day I enrolled 
my name as a volunteer in the Franklin company. My number was 
120 and, as there were 119 ahead of me, my chance of being accepted 
was slim. Next day being Sunday, the several ministers in town 
preached, loyal sermons. I heard one, with many of my com- 
rades, at the Baptist Church. In the afternoon I attended, for 
the last time in that town, the Baptist Sunday School, which was 
crowded with both volunteers and citizens. Later the same day 
we elected officers for our company. 

Next morning we reported at the public hall, and soon 
marched to the depot, where the train arrived to take us to In- 
dianapolis. After many kisses and hand-shaking with the loved 
ones, we boarded the cars for the Capital City, which we reached 
in due time, and, after lining up, each in his proper position, we 
marched out on Pennsylvania street to Camp Morton. On' our 
arrival a grand lunch of coffee, ham, bread and other eatables 
awaited us, and the day passed rapidly, in looking over the camp 
ground and talking with others. Next day was to be our muster 
day, which occurred about 11 a. m. on Tuesday, the 22nd, but, to 
my horror and surprise, my services were not accepted; for only 
100 of the 125 enrolled could be mustered, as the companies were 
only to contain that number. I learned that an old neighbor and 
a lawyer, Jonathan Gordon, was raising an artillery company, and 
I at once reported to him. When I asked him to let me join his 
battery he told me that the Government did not want any volun- 
teer batteries, and that he would have to disband his organization, 
and would have to look for a place himself, if he desired to go in 
the field. But he remarked, "The Government will need lots of 
artillerymen later on." I now turned in another direction, and 
found a number of my acquaintances in Dob's Indianapolis Com- 
pany. I joined this company, only to find next day that they, 


I too, would not be mustered. In the afternoon I asked for a pass 
to get out of camp, and went downtown. While standing that 
evening on the corner of Illinois and Washington streets, I met 
Mr. Byron Finch, then Quartermaster Sergeant of the Seventh 
Indiana, coming from the Bates House. He said: "Hello, Fred! 
Aren't you going with us?" I answered: "Yes, but they won't 
take me." "Well," he remarked, "are you going?" "Sure, if I 
can get a place," I said. "Come on, quick," he said. "I know a 
vacancy, and will get you in." 

We hastened up the steps of the Bates House and met Capt. 
Rabb, then of Company I, Seventh Indiana. Finch introduced 
me to Rabb and said: "Here is a boy from our town. We had 
too many, and he could not go with us, but as you have just mus- 
tered out a man, put Fred in his place." 

Finch and Rabb went with me into Capt. Woods' room, the 
mustering officer, who at once swore me into the United States 
service, and told me to report the next morning in camp. I slept 
well that night, at my relative's home, and reported as ordered. 
Although I was not in the Franklin company, which was H, I 
was next to it, in Company I, the same regiment, and though I 
had not met one of them before, I found them very agreeable com- 
panions. The quarters we occupied had been cattle stalls, but 
made comfortable by clean straw, which in the early days of the 
war, was often renewed, and as we had plenty of exercise, we 
had no trouble to sleep. With the aid of drum and fife we soon 
learned the step and the march, also the facings; but many of the 
drummers in the camp had a hard time to beat correct step by 
which a trooper could march, but they all soon learned. The of- 
ficers received additional instructions, and as all that had been 
elected had military pride they became well versed in the tactics and 
after four weeks of daily exercise and hard drilling the officers 
and men made a fairly good military exhibition. 

The Eleventh Indiana, Colonel Lew Wallace, had adopted the 
Zouave uniform and drill and had been quartered at what was 
known as the Bellefontaine car shops. This regiment received 
orders to proceed to the Ohio River near Evansville, and, as their 
barracks became empty, we moved into them. The quarters were 
none better than those in Camp Morton, except that we were now 
under one roof and nearer the town. Soon after our removal to 
our new quarters we received our arms, several companies getting 


Springfield muskets, others altered flintlocks and again others 
Austrian muskets that had evidently been sold for old iron before 
the Austro-Sardinian War. With these we learned the manual 
of arms and firing. Both were soon acquired by the men, and we 
were able to make a fair showing, equal to any troops that had 
ever been mustered, for the high intelligence of the men under the 
first call made this possible. As the State of Ohio, on account of 
the number of troops called for, was entitled to a Major General, 
that commission and honor fell to George B. McClellan, who had 
graduated at the top of the military class at West Point, and 
Thomas A. Morris, another highly military-educated man, from 
the same academy, received from the Governor of Indiana the 
appointment as Brigadier General, to which Indiana was entitled 
under the 75,000 call. Morris had served previously as Quarter- 
master General of the Indiana troops on Morton's staff and had 
acquitted himself well, especially in the matter of uniforms fur- 
nished, it being made of gray material, was probably better than 
any furnished to any of the Indiana troops thereafter during the 
war. But in the selection of commissary, Governor Morton had 
no such luck. He appointed Frank Mansure, an old friend in the 
pork-packing business. We soon found that he was distributing 
all the tainted meat he could to the volunteers, and when called 
upon for explanation naively answered that if any one was to 
make money out of the supplies that he considered himself 
justly entitled to the same. The cofifee we received was mixed 
with beans, corn and rye. In fact, little of the taste of coffee was 
left; and other supplies issued by him were of the same grade and 
worse. Morton soon relieved Mansure, and Gen. Stone, a retired 
regular army officer, was appointed in his place. 

The war news was enlivened on the evening of May nth and 
the following two days, by the Camp Jackson affair at St. Louis, 
where the Germans, under Lyon, Blair and Siegel, had made prison- 
ers of the gathering at Camp Jackson. Every detail was eagerly de- 
voured and many expressed the opinion that we would never see 
an armed enemy, as they would surely lay down their arms and 
acknowledge the Federal authority. 

About the 23rd of May Gen. McClellan, with his staff, in 
brilliant uniform and well mounted, appeared in Indianapolis to 
review the troops that were to serve for the three months under 
the 75,000 call. We marched from our quarters to the west of 


Indianapolis and on an open common just east of Blake street 
and north of New York formed in line. The five regiments pres- 
ent made as fine an appearance as any body of soldiers ever did. 
The reviewing officer passed in front, the line being in open order, 
at "present arms," as he passed. After reaching his stand, about 
500 yards distant from the center, the line closed up, and, wheel- 
ing in columns of companies, passed the reviewing officer, after 
which we soon marched back to our quarters at the barracks. By 
this time we were fairly well instructed, the drill and exercises being 
given us vigorously, but we were not yet taken out for any target 
practice. This important branch of the active service was omitted 
for lack of time, and was probably unnecessary, as most of us had 
been practicing at home, and most of the boys were considered a 
very good shot. Our friends visited us many times, and there was 
no thought that we would ever go to the field, but the practice of 
packing our knapsacks and getting ready for the march was gone 
through with every day. 

On the afternoon of the 29th of May, just about the time 
when a large number of visitors had called to see the regimental 
exercises, with every part of our kit packed and rations in haver- 
sack, we were marched out of our comfortable quarters to a rail- 
road track, where forty round of fixed cartridges were given each 
man, and we were ordered to board the cars. Soon after this the 
train started, and we said a fond good-bye to our assembled 
friends. This was in striking contrast to the spectacular show 
made by another regiment, who, on their knees, took oath around 
the State House to remember Buena Vista, in Mexico, where an 
Indiana regiment had been overpowered. About sunset we were 
rolling as fast as the wheels could be turned, now on our 
way to West Virginia. The whole thing was done so quietly and 
with so little noise that our relatives and more intimate friends, 
who looked for us at the barracks next day were not aware of our 
absence. Early next morning we passed Bellefontaine, but no 
stop was made until we reached Marietta, where the people spread 
the best they had to eat to appease our hunger. Our rations were 
not in a condition that we could make usd of them. Hardtack 
had not yet been manufactured, and at Indianapolis we had been 
supplied with soft bread, of which a supply had been carried with 
us. This public meal stood us in good stead. We soon parted, 
and next morning reached Bellaire. Everything looked gloomy 


and dark here, and while waiting to be ferried across the river 
the officers took advantage of a grindstone in an abandoned glass- 
house to sharpen their swords, and those of the men who could 
get at the stone made a sharp point on their bayonets. Later in 
the day we crossed the river and a train of freight cars awaited 
us. In the sides of these cars we cut openings to serve us for air- 
holes, also for portholes in case of an unexpected attack. We now 
rolled on, and next morning reached the vicinity of Grafton. Two 
others, the Sixth and Ninth Indiana Regiments, reached the place 
soon after. Our camp was laid out, and we expected to stay, as 
the enemy, under Col. Potterfield, who had been there and tried to 
recruit for the Confederate Army, had left a day or two before for 
Philippi. We had just cleaned the place to set our tents, but had not 
pitched them, when we received orders to march. 

Gen. Thomas A. Morris of Indiana had gathered a force of 
about 6,000 men at Grafton, W. Va., a town on the Baltimore and 
Ohio Railroad, where the junction with Parkersburg connects 
with the main line, to drive away and disperse a gathering of Con- 
federates, who had reached that place about May 24 from Harper's 
Ferry, and had left the town on the 26th. Two expeditions were 
organized to follow immediately, to surprise and attack them. The 
First Virginia Union Regiment, the Sixteenth Ohio and Ninth 
Indiana, all under command of Colonel Kelly, moved eastward about 
five miles to Thornton Station, and from there marched twenty-two 
miles to Philippi, reaching the town on the lower side. 

The Second Division, consisting of the Sixth and Seventh 
Indiana and Fourteenth Ohio Infantry and a battery of regular 
artillery, under the then Lieut. Sturgis, from Carlisle Barracks, 
and several detachments that we met at Webster, six miles from 
Grafton, on the then Northwestern Railroad, marched twelve 
miles to Philippi. The combined forces were under Colonel Dumont 
of the Seventh Indiana. At 8 o'clock on the night of the 2d of 
June we marched forward through one of the most overwhelm- 
ing storms known to this country for many years. Col. Lander had 
been detailed as a special aide by Gen. Morris, and in the terrible 
march that followed, through darkness and mud and rain, he led 
the way, sometimes exploring the route several miles ahead of our 
forces, in the midst of densest darkness and through mud so deep 
and tenacious that every advance was a struggle. We followed 
bravely, toiling through miry soil, staggering forward in the dark- 


ness, and pelted by rain so violently that we could scarce have seen 
the road had it been daylight. Now and then a flash of lightning 
would give us a gleam of light to the files ahead of us. Still, not a 
murmur was heard. Against the whole force of elements, thunder, 
lightning, rain and mud, we struggled on, eager for the storm of fire 
which was soon to follow the deluge now pouring upon us. 

Now and then Dumont's diminutive form, seated upon his 
charger, would Igom upon us through the darkness, as he would 
pass the lines, cheering us with his sympathetic voice, which 
aroused us like a trumpet. Thus we moved on, supported by one 
stern purpose, through woods, across valleys and over hills ; the 
storm drowning our approach, until we drew upon the hill over- 
looking the town and the enemy's camp. We halted and unslung 
our knapsacks and put them in piles by companies. Our regiment, 
the Seventh Indiana, was in the lead. As it stepped aside the artil- 
lery passed and took position farther to the front, on a hill which 
then commanded the road for the retreat of the enemy. 

Our approach would have been a complete surprise to the 
enemy, but for an unexpected incident. As we pased near a farm 
house, about three miles distant from their camp, a woman, aroused 
from her sleep, saw the lines of troops slowly marching by in the 
storm and guessed their object. She instantly awoke her little son 
(her husband being with Potterfield) and sent him by a short cross 
road to the enemy's camp to give the alarm. The boy was quick of 
foot, but reached the camp only a short time ahead of us. After the 
artillery passed us they took position and prepared to fire, just 
at 4 o'clock, the hour agreed upon for attack by both brigades. 
Dumont was to assault from the front, while Kelly and Milroy 
were to attack the rear and cut off all retreat, but Dum'ont, alas! 
found his brigade alone before the enemy. The terrible night, the 
almost impassable roads and march of twenty-two miles had de- 
layed Kelly's forces, and when he did arrive, fifteen minutes later, 
came in, by mistake, below the town. The information furnished 
by the 12-year-old boy had aroused the enemy's troops and thrown 
the whole camp in a terrible commotion. In vain did Dumont 
search the distant hills for Kelly's appearance. The hour for at- 
tack had arrived and passed. Dumont became impatient, and, 
with his indomitable courage, commenced the forward maneuver 
with but a portion of his forces. 

As soon as we divested ourselves of our knapsacks, which, as 


is usual with new soldiers, were overloaded, we were called to 
attention and formed in platoons and fixed bayonets. Just then 
the artillery opened fire, and for the first time during the war we 
heard the projectiles go through the air and explode in the ene- 
my's camp. At the sound of the guns we moved forward down 
the hill; first at a quickstep. Col. Dumont leading; then at a dou- 
ble-quick to the bridge which crossed the Tiger's Valley River. 
One side of the bridge was barricaded by stone being packed in 
queensware crates; the other was open but guarded, though the 
guards ran away. During our run down the hill the artillery kept up 
a rapid fire over our heads. Kelly's command had at last reached the 
town, but instead of heading off the enemy, advanced in the wrong 
direction on the enemy's rear. The range of the battery was good 
and the excitement was beyond description. As we charged after 
the enemy we captured many prisoners, some in their nightgowns, 
among these the Sheriff of Barbour County. Col. Kelly's com- 
mand came down the hill and followed in the rear of Dumont' s 

As Kelly advanced in the road following the enemy a shot 
was fired by a concealed foe and struck him, entering the left 
breast and lodging below the shoulder blade. He was brought 
back to the town by his men, who also captured the man who was 
accused of shooting Kelly. I was detailed to do guard duty over 
him and other prisoners, among them the Sheriff. I believe this 
man, the accused, who occupied the position as Quartermaster in 
Potterfield's brigade, was the most scared man I ever met. About 
10 a. m. Kelly's sons came to the guardhouse, and, with pistols in 
hand, threatened to do up our prisoner for shooting their father, 
for which act he claimed to be innocent. We soon put the junior 
Kellys out, but shortly after some one fired through the weather- 
boarding from the outside at the place where our prisoner was 
thought to be. The bullet came near hitting two of us instead. 
After having been relieved from guard we joined in a fine break- 
fast, which the Sheriff's beautiful daughters brought down to 
the guardhouse, they having been assured that no harm would come 
to their father. We now rested wherever we could find a place 
to sleep. My partner and myself took possession of quarters in 
the Philippi Hotel, where we found more than a dozen concealed 
muskets in our room. Several shots from the battery had struck 
the hotel on the roof, near where a rebel flag had been flying. In 


the afternoon Col. Dumont occupied a judge's seat in the Court- 
house and asked the prisoners that were brought before him all 
sorts of interesting questions. Results of this skirmish were that 
the surprise was complete and the attack so sudden as to force the 
enemy to disperse in utter rout and disorganization. Their loss 
in killed and captured was small, owing to the fatiguing march, 
'which had left us too thoroughly exhausted to make pursuit. The 
great success of the first dash at the enemy not only had the hap- 
piest effect of inspiriting the Union troops, but it also encouraged 
and fortified the West Virginia Unionists in their political scheme 
of forming a new State. On the day after the Phillippi affair a 
previously concerted agreement to elect delegates was carried out 
and about forty counties lying between and west of the Allegheny 
and Ohio Rivers met in convention on June nth. They repudi- 
ated the treasonable usurpation of the Richmond convention and 
Governor Letcher, and on June 19th organized a State Govern- 
ment, appointed F. H. Piermont Governor, and after some more 
necessary work took a recess until August 25. The Legislature, 
however, met and elected two United States Senators, who, five 
days after, were admitted and took part in national legislation. 
In addition to affording Union sentiment protection, this military 
success insured the safet)^ of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, 
not only at Grafton, but also at the bridges across Cheat River 
and the numerous tunnels in the mountains east of it. The Confed- 
erate Government had some weeks before this ordered a special ex- 
pedition to destroy them. Gen. Lee wrote to his new commander that 
the rupture of the railroad bridge over the Cheat River would be 
worth an army to the Confederacy. The day following the Phil- 
ippi affair my company was sent out on special duty to guard the 
commissary train. One of my comrades fell on the slippery 
ground, the hammer of his gun struck a rock, the piece was dis- 
charged and the ball entered the bowels of my partner, Charles 
Dagner. Poor Dagner died at a farm house, near by, shortly after- 



For several days we remained at Grafton, guarding commis- 
sary and quartermaster stores, but as soon as a wagon train could 
be secured we marched back again with the loaded wagons to Phil- 
lipi and assumed our position in the regiment. Daily drills and 
exercise, as also regimental maneuver, with dress parades, guard 
and picket duties, kept our time occupied. We had been fur- 
nished flour instead of bread. Hardtack was not then issued, and 
every squad had to do its own cooking and baking. 

Not being accustomed to such work, we secured a man who 
had been boating on the Ohio and Mississippi Rivers. He be- 
longed to our company and was willing to cook and bake, if we 
performed his guard duty. We agreed to this, and were relieved 
of a disagreeable job. We thought ourselves to have the best part 
of the bargain, as to bake the flour into pancakes, or flapjacks, it 
required shortening, and as the neighborhood had been stripped 
of lard, bacon and butter, the want was felt by everybody except 
our cook, who always had plenty of shortening, but what it was 
he kept to himself. One evening, while waiting to get my coffee, 
pancakes and fried meat, to go on a night's outpost duty for him, 
I stood around the kitchen watching him turn the flapjacks 
and lay them, poundcake fashion, on top of one another. They 
looked really appetizing, and to satisfy my curiosity I asked him 
about his good luck to always be supplied with shortening. He 
answered: "A good cook always knows how to help himself." 
But I wanted to know how he did this. He gave me an evasive 
answer and again greased the pans with something he had in his 
hand. I walked over to his side, and to my horror found that he 
had a lot of candles, issued to us as part rations, cut into inch 
blocks, and with these he greased the skillet. I said nothing, but 
waited until the Sergeant called, when I told him that I refused 
to go on duty for the cook, and that he had better go himself, for 


as soon as our mess boss would arrive the cook, no doubt, would 
be relieved. A few minutes later the regiment returned from dress 
parade, and Sergt. Jamison, the mess boss, was made acquainted 
with the condition and the kind of flapjacks we had been eating. 
Some of the mess were so mad that they would have bayoneted 
the cook, but Jamison quietly told him to resume his position and 
perform his own duty, and we would try to do our own cooking. 
We had no flapjacks that night, but the coffee, meat and sugar 
tasted that much better. 

We had been in the service now about two months and the 
Governor of Indiana, who always looked after the well-being of 
the soldiers from his State, sent down a paymaster, with five dol- 
lars, in demand notes, for each soldier. This gave those inclined 
to gamble a chance to win their comrades' money. One of my 
friends, knowing that I did not take any chances that way, came 
to me after he had lost his own money to borrow my five dollars. 
I gave him the money, and his luck turned so that with his win- 
nings he later bought a farm near his home, in Johnson County, In- 
diana. All the games, from chuck-a-luck to poker, were played 
and money changed hands rapidly. 

On the 4th of July the brigade was formed in close column be- 
fore the headquarters tent of Gen. Morris, and with much,' im- 
pressive ceremony the Declaration of Independence was read to 
the command. The day following the Ninth Ohio, a German regi- 
ment, passed us to go to Buchanan. While marching down the 
hill to Philippi they were singing their German war songs. They 
made a fine military appearance and were the first three-year 
troops we had met. 

As we had been laying around Philippi for a month and no 
further movements were undertaken, we though that, as our term 
of service was going to close soon, no further service would be 
required of us, and the three-year troops arriving in large numbers 
from Ohio would take our places for active work. Gen. McClel- 
lan had arrived at Grafton on the 21st of June and issued a proc- 
lamation, and from there proceeded to Buchanan, where his best 
prepared troops from Ohio were gathering some force. With 
the troops at Philippi and those at Buchanan he intended to dis- 
lodge and defeat the enemy's forces at Laurel Hill under Garnett 
and at Rich Mountain under Pegram. He therefore issued orders 
on July 7 to Gen. Morris to march at once to Laurel Hill, some 


twenty miles distant. We arrived at our destination about lo a. m. 
on the 9th and deployed in line of battle in front of Belington, a 
distance of about one and a half miles from the enemy's entrench- 
ments. We were to hold a threatening position against Garnett, 
while McClellan and Rosecrans were to get in the rear of Pegram 
and capture him. 

After the Philippi affair the Confederate authority had re- 
lieved Potterfield and in his place appointed Robert S. Garnett, 
formerly a Major in the Eleventh United States Infantry, and re- 
cently Adjutant-General of Gen. Robert E. Lee, and given com- 
mand of all the troops in West Virginia. He claimed that the 
Rich Mountain Pass to Buchanan, as also the road leading over 
Laurel Hill to Philippi, were the gates to West Virginia. Be- 
lieving that Rich Mountain was the stronger natural position of 
the two, he left Pegram there with about 1,300 men, who rudely 
fortified themselves, while Garnett himself held the Laurel Hill 
pass with about 4,500 men, also fortified with four guns. Gar- 
nett's depot of supplies was at Beverly, sixteen miles distant from 
Laurel Hill and five miles from Rich Mountain. The Confed- 
erate friends living in the neighborhood kept him well informed 
of the movements of the Federal troops. The forces under Mc- 
Clellan at both places consisted of sixteen Ohio regiments, nine 
from Indiana and two from West Virginia. In all, twenty-seven 
regiments of infantry, four batteries of light artillery of six guns 
each, two troops of cavalry and an independent company of regu- 
lars (Company I, Fourth United States Artillery) were with him, 
waiting to be armed with mountain howitzers, which arrived 
shortly afterwards. As the regiments had been recently organ- 
ized, they must have averaged about 700 each. The total force 
was therefore about 20,000 men. Of these 5,000 were guarding 
two hundred miles of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad and were 
under command of General G. W. Hill of the Ohio State Militia. 
The brigade of Gen. Morris had advanced from Philippi. The 
rest were in three brigades under Gen. W. S. Rosecrans, Gen. 
Newton Schleich and Col. Robert L. McCook. 

McClellan had intended to move on the same date when he 
issued his proclamation to the people of West Virginia, first to 
Buchanan and then to Beverly, the base of supplies for Gen. Gar- 
nett, but delays as usual occurred, and he was not able to move 
until the 7th of July. The same day that Morris marched from 


Philippi to Laurel Hill, about a mile or more from Garnett's camp, 
we met the Confederate outpost, and on our approach they 
promptly retired, while we were held in line of battle and laid that 
way during all of the first night. There was considerable firing by the 
outpost and patrol, and if our guns had carried the ball any dis- 
tance, there would have been some of our men wounded and killed 
by our own comrades, for the videttes fired at every imaginary 
noise and object. The next day, however, we had the sad sight 
of seeing the first man of our brigade killed by the enemy. He 
was on outpost duty at Bellington and had no doubt exposed him- 
self to the enemy's sharpshooters, and was killed by them. He 
belonged to a company of the Ninth Indiana (Milroy's) Regi- 
ment. Just after his burial it began to rain very hard, and as we 
had no other duty to perform, I, with some others, sought shelter 
in a log house. Col. Milroy and Sergt. Lawton, afterwards Gen. 
Lawton of the Spanish War fame, came in out of the wet. Just 
then a trooper from my company passed by, the heavy rain splash- 
ing down on him. He had taken off his jacket, shirt, drawers and 
stockings, and only wore his hat, trousers and shoes. Milroy 
asked him how he happened to undress that way. The trooper 
answered that he kept his clothes in his knapsack to keep dry, and 
as he was accustomed to a bath every once in a while, he enjoyed 
the occasion to refresh himself. Milroy answered that he would 
do, and the trooper passed on. During his recent service in the 
Philippines I had correspondence with General Lawton, who wrote 
me that he remembered the incident very well. 

About the loth Gen. McCellan had his troops to gather at 
Roaring Creek, two miles from Pegram's position. He had been 
informed that the total Confederate force under Garnett and Pe- 
gram was about 7,000 men, with the larger part at Laurel Hill 
before Morris, and about 1,500 under Pegram at Rich Mountain. 
The Confederates were aware of McClellan's force, but they made 
him believe that the Confederates were 20,000 strong, of which 
12,000 were at Rich Mountain. McClellan had no desire to assault 
Pegram's position, but he made all the preparations to do so next 
day, instructing Morris to hold his position before Garnett and 
watch the effect of his attack at Rich Mountain. During the day 
of the loth Rosecrans' outpost captured a boy about 12 years old 
who lived in the neighborhood. The lad, named Hart, was taken 
to McClellan's headquarters, and it was learned that he was well 


acquainted with the surrounding country, as his father hved on 
the top of the hill, two miles in the- rear of Pegram's position. The 
boy, being bright, thought he could lead a column by a round- 
about way to his father's farm, and was to receive one hundred 
dollars in gold for the job. The road was a cow path and artil- 
lery could not go that way, but Rosecrans would take his infantry 
and reach the rear of Pegram's position. McClellan agreed to 
do this, and Rosecrans was to start early on the morning of the 
nth with two thousand men, including a company of mounted 
troops, and that as soon as McClellan should hear the noise of bat- 
tle in the rear of Pegram, he should attack the Confederates in 
front. By some one blundering in one of the regiments that were 
to go with Rosecrans the bugle sounded the reveille. This alarmed 
the enemy, and they were now on the lookout, but they believed 
that McClellan would attempt to get to their rear by their right 
flank and were not looking for Rosecrans' actual route, as they 
thought it impracticable. As Rosecrans believed that the enemy, 
by the midnight alarm, were looking for him, he made a larger 
circuit than he first intended, and after ten hours of severe march- 
ing and mountain climbing he reached the Hart farm. He had 
turned Pegram's position, but found that Pegram had detached 
about 350 men from his 1,300 to oppose him. With this detach- 
ment was one piece of artillery from the four-gun battery in his 
breastworks. As soon as they reached the Hart farm they built 
a little breastwork of logs. When Rosecrans came out of the 
woods, on the turnpike, he was confronted with a hot fire from 
musketry and the -one piece of artillery. As the ground was 
rough and the men for the first time under fire, the skirmish lasted 
about three hours, when Rosecrans' line made a splendid charge, 
and, aided by a volley from a flanking column, broke the enemy's 
line. Pegram had sent re-enforcements and another piece of ar- 
tillery, but they did not come up in time, and a runaway team of 
a caisson dashed into the gun that was coming up and capsized it 
down the mountain. Both guns thus fell into Rosecrans' hands 
and he held the fleld. During the march and the assault it rained 
and stormed, but no tidings came of McClellan. The enemy, fur- 
ther to the rear, made some show of resistance. Rosecrans now 
rested his men until next morning. At the dawn of day on the 
1 2th the enemy had disappeared, and Rosecrans, feeling his way 
to Pegram's position, found it abandoned. The two guns that 


remained had been spiked, and a few sick and wounded of the 
enemy had been left in charge of a Sergeant, but nothing was 
seen of McClellan. When Rosecrans sent word to him that he 
was in possession of the enemy's camp he found McClellan still 
in camp at Roaring Creek, two miles from Pegram's position. 
Rosecrans had twelve killed and forty-nine wounded. The Con- 
federates left twenty wounded and sixty-three surrendered in Pe- 
gram's camp. No reliable reports of the Confederate dead have 
ever been made. McClellan heard the noise of the engagement 
and formed his troops for an advance, but the continuance of the 
artillery fire and the sign of exultation by the enemy made him 
believe that Rosecrans had been defeated. Why he failed to as- 
sist, as had been agreed with Rosecrans, has never been explained. 
The messenger from Rosecrans failed to reach McClellan on the 
nth, but the sound of the combat should have been sufficient no- 
tice that the summit was reached; but Rosecrans was left to win 
his own battle or get out of the hole if he could. 

In the afternoon of the nth McClellan began to cut a road 
for his twelve guns, but at night he withdrew his lines to the west 
of Roaring Creek, and nothing further was done that day to help 
Rosecrans. Half of Pegram's men had marched and passed by 
Rosecrans' right flank and reached Beverly during the night. Here 
they met a newly-arrived regiment, the Forty-fourth Virginia, 
and together they fled to the south, in the direction of Staunton. 
The brigade of Gen. Morris reached the place in due time, and at 
once deployed in line of battle, and by slow progress reached the 
heights surrounding the enemy's line. On the night of July nth 
it was my duty to be on outpost. During the night we heard the 
continuous chopping of the trees by the enemy, but we did not 
know its meaning. The night was pitch-dark, but daylight re- 
vealed the fact that the Southerners had abandoned the strong 
works in our front, owing to the affair that Rosecrans had with 
another brigade of the enemy, at Rich Mountain, under command 
of Gen. Pegram, as already related. Our brigade was soon in 
their camp and ready to follow, and by lo o'clock a. m. we were on 
the road after them, the rebels having now about twelve hours 
the start of us. The Confederate Gen. Garnett's intentions had 
been to join Pegram at Beverly; his forces united would make 
him 6,000 strong, but finding these troops defeated, demoralized 
and part made prisoners, and conscious that he would not be able 


to make any resistance against the combined forces under McClel- 
lan, he struck off on a country road a short distance from Lead- 
ville and retreated rapidly towards St. George, in Tucker County. 

Our brigade, under Gen. Morris, comprised the Fourteenth 
Ohio, Col. Steadman; the Ninth Indiana, Col. Milroy; the Sev- 
enth Indiana, Col. Dumont, and two pieces of regular artillery 
from Carlisle's barracks (the same that were used with us at Phil- 
ippi) — total about 2,500 men. By rapid and late marching we 
gained and closed in upon the enemy. 

After a few hours of rest in a wet meadow, we started early 
in the morning of the 13th, in a pitiless storm, guided only by the 
baggage, tents, trunks, blankets, knapsacks and clothing thrown 
away by the enemy. The roads had been obstructed as much as 
possible by cutting down the trees, and we kept a large squad of 
axmen to clear the road. A guide led us by a cross road, and we rap- 
idly gained upon the retreating foe. 

About noon Gen, Garnett had passed Kaler's Ford, twelve 
miles from St. George, and when our advance crossed this ford 
they caught sight of the rear of the enemy ; so with renewed energy 
we followed the retreating Southerners, who were also excited 
and increased their speed to get out of our way, throwing away 
everything that impeded their progress. When Gen. Garnett came 
up to the fourth crossing, known as Carrick's Ford, he had some 
trouble in getting his wagons through the stream, and here pre- 
pared to receive his pursuers. On the left bank of the river were 
leveled cornfields and meadows; on the right were higher bluffs 
overlooking the field on the left, but hedged with laurel bushes. 
Here Gen. Garnett placed his men and two guns to the north of 
the wagon train and one gun to the south of the ford and train. 
Little could be seen of the enemy. The wagon train was left in 
the river crossing, and as our advance was about to seize it 
they were fired on by the enemy's, artillery and infantry, from the 
other side of the river. The Fourteenth Ohio had the lead and 
at once replied. Our artillery was soon in action, and the Ninth 
Indiana, which now came in range, opened an oblique fire. The 
Seventh Indiana, under Dumont, entered the river to cross and 
take position on a high hill to get on the enemy's fiank and rear. 
As the hill was steep and Dumont always ready to get close to 
the enemy, he filed the head of his regiment around the base of 
the hill and came close upon the enemy's left. As soon as the 


j Confederates noticed Dumont's movement they broke and fled 
j and left their train and one gun in our hands. During this 
movement of the Seventh Indiana, the Fourteenth Ohio, the ar- 
tillery and the Ninth Indiana kept up a steady fire at the Con- 

Just as my company was entering the river to cross I en- 
countered my old friend, Jonathan Gordon, with whom I had 
made my first efforts at enlistment in the artillery at Indianapo- 
lis. He had a fine private rifle in his hand, and in civilian dress 
stepped to my side, and with my company crossed the river. As 
we reached the bluff the alignment of company and regiment 
was somewhat out of shape, but in a full run after the enemy we 
tried to perform a right wheel. This brought us to the north of 
the road, where the laurel bushes had somewhat separated the 
command. In this manner we ran about a quarter of a mile, 
when we came upon two dead bodies, one in the uniform of a 
Brigadier General, with Federal shoulder straps, the other a pri- 
vate soldier in a Georgia militia uniform. On reaching the sup- 
posed dead, the General with Federal shoulder straps was still 
breathing. Gordon remarked, with surprise, after seeing the dy- 
ing officer: "Why this is the rebel. Gen. Garnett!" There were 
four others present, all of my company, and their names are Ve- 
haus, Williams, Gockle and Stout. Mr. Gordon did not belong to 
our regiment, but I learned later that he was then Sergeant Major 
of the Ninth Indiana, Milroy's regiment, and a somewhat priv- 
ileged character. Hence he went where he pleased, and joined 
the Seventh Indiana in this run after the enemy. He dressed as 
he pleased, and was permitted to carry a better but smaller rifle 
and no knapsack. We five of Company I, Seventh Indiana, left 
the dead Gen. Garnett with Gordon and followed in hot haste 
after our regiment, which had gone on about one mile and a half, 
turned into an open field on the right hand of the road and rested. 
Soon after this Captain Benham of Gen. Morris' staff came up and 
ordered the pursuit to cease. We had marched twenty-six miles 
since lo a. m. on the 12th in a most constant and furious rain- 
storm. Dumont, always ready with sarcasm, asked Benham if 
we were to be jubilant over the captured baggage, and give the 
enemy a chance to get away. Our regiment had captured about 
fifty officers and men belonging to a Georgia militia regiment. 

Now, as to the killing of Gen. Garnett. It is claimed by 


some writers that Mr. Gordon, seeing the rebel General, who 
was waving his sword and calling on his men to make a stand, 
had called on Captain Ferry's company to fire at them, and that 
Sergeant Burlingame took a dead aim at Garnett and killed him. 
This story is erroneous. Mr. Gordon was not far from my side 
from the time that we entered the river until we found the dead, 
and nowhere near Ferry's company, and the finding of the body 
was as much a surprise to Gordon as to any of us. He prob- 
ably went with me on account of our previous long acquaintance, 
and during the run after the enemy issued no orders to any one. 
But Mr. Gordon was a keen lawyer and quickly embraced the 
opportunity offered. He continued with us no farther, but re- 
mained and claimed the dead Brigadier General as his trophy. 
He was therefore detailed to take Gen. Garnett through the 
lines to his friends in Richmond. On his return he stopped 
in Washington and related his story to President Lincoln, 
who commissioned him to the vacancy as Major in the Elev- 
enth Infantry, a position Garnett had resigned, on May 14, 1861, 
and from that date Gordon's new commission was dated. Gen. 
Garnett wore a fine uniform, with a brilliant star on his shoulder 
strap. He had long black hair, and we found him lying with his ] 
head towards us. Ferry's company was to the right or south of 
the road, during the run, and not near Gen. Garnett or within 
musket reach of him. The position in which Garnett lay and 
the route which Ferry's company followed make it absolutely 
clear to my mind that Garnett was killed by his own men, 
the Georgians, who formed his rear guard and were cap- 
tured by us (the Seventh Indiana) on the run. Garnett be- 
ing between the lines and in the rear of his own, they un- 
doubtedly mistook him, through the laurel bushes, for a Federal of- 
ficer. The pointing out by Major Gordon, as so many writers 
have it, never happened, as I have related. Surely, if Gordon 
had recognized Gen. Garnett before he reached his body he, with 
his far-reaching and better rifle, would have taken aim at him 
himself. Gordon had been in good practice with the rifie a year 
or two before, when he was preparing to fight a duel with Hef- 
fren, an opposing politician in Indiana, and would no doubt have 
brought Garnett down, without calling on any one to do this for 
him. Gen. Hill, in command of the railroad guard at Grafton, 
had been ordered by McClellan to gather a force to oppose the 



enemy that would try to escape from the northern end of the 
mountains, but McClellan's miHtary telegraph reached no farther 
than his camp at Roaring Creek, and the dispatch to Hill, dated 
on the 1 2th, was only sent forward by noon on the 13th. On 
the receipt of the message Hill displayed considerable energy 
I and collected the greater part of his detachment at Oakland, and 
1 with about 1,000 men at West Union, expected to hold the enemy 
I back from reaching Red House, a point where the Confederates 
had to cross. But unfortunately Irvine had been made to be- 
lieve that the Confederates were 8,000 strong, and he therefore, 
with his smaller force, did not occupy Red House. He kept his 
force together until Gen. Hill re-enforced them to about 1,500 
men, and when they jointly marched to the Red House on the 
morning of the 14th they found that the Confederates had passed 
at daylight. They followed them, but did not reach them. Gen. 
Hill had worked all night to hasten the railroad trains to Oak- 
land, but none reached there until morning, and the Confederates 
had now twenty miles the start of him, with good roads to the 
south, on the eastern side of the mountains. . 

McClellan kept the wires hot urging Hill to capture the 
retreating enemy. Although Hill had no wagon train or ra- 
tions, he showed the greatest energy and marched his men with 
empty stomachs after the fleeing Confederates; but as soon as 
McClellan learned that the enemy was twenty miles ahead of 
Hill he ordered the pursuit stopped. The cause of the failure to 
head the Confederates off was due to the railroads not being able to 
forward the troops. 

McClellan had no knowledge of what had become of Pe- 
gram. On the 12th the latter had intended to follow the retreat- 
ing column from the mountain tops, but in the darkness of the 
night in the woods, and on bad roads, had divided his troops and 
had marched all day trying to connect with Garnett, and in the 
evening reached Tiger's Valley River, some six miles north of 
Beverly, where he learned that Garnett had retreated from Laurel 
Hill. He could have probably escaped by a road east of the val- 
ley, but east of that there were a hundred miles of wilderness, 
with mountains on which no food for men could be found. He 
called his officers together and sent to McClellan at Beverly and 
offered to surrender. This was on the 13th, and Pegram, with 
thirty officers and about 600 men, became prisoners of war. Mc- 


Clellan now moved south with his whole force on the road to 
Staunton, after the balance of Pegram's men that had escaped, 
and on the following day reached Huttonville. There had been 
some re-enforcements sent from Staunton to Garnett, but on Mc- 
Clellan's approach they halted at Montgomery, east of the Alle- 
ghenies. To this Pegram's remnants reported. Garnett having 
been killed, Brigadier General H. R. Jackson was placed in com- 
mand oi the Confederate forces in Garnett's place. The State au- 
thorities in Virginia made great efforts to increase the Confed- 
erate forces, to enable Jackson to assume the aggressive against 
McClellan, but on the 22nd of July the latter was called to Wash- 
ington to command the army which had retreated from Bull Run. 

The Philippi, Laurel Hill, Rich Mountain and Carrick's 
Ford affairs were small events in the great war, but they were 
the cause of McClellan being promoted to the command of the 
Army of the Potomac and later to the Commander-in-Chief of 
the United States Army. Gen. McClellan, with proclamations 
and dispatches, and aided by the newspapers, had announced to 
the people that he annihilated two armies, commanded by the best 
Confederate officers and fortified with great care in the moun- 

People who were looking for good news took this all in as 
literally true, and McClellan was declared the young Napoleon 
of the American soldiers, and when the efforts of other Generals 
had failed at Bull Run he was pointed out as the one man who 
could repair the disaster and bring victory out of defeat. He 
bore all this with becoming modesty, and for the time being the 
people were pleased that McClellan should play the role of Fred- 
erick the Great or of the little Napoleon, and his letters and dis- 
patches at the time were full of enthusiasm and energy. But this 
assumed task made the reaction more painful when his great cau- 
tion, while in command of the Army of the Potomac in the field, 
was considered. But his action at Rich Mountain, in withdraw- 
ing his troops from before Pegram, after hearing the guns of the 
latter against Rosecrans, shows him in the true character, which 
became so well known later. The same overestimating of the 
enemy, the same pessimistic interpretation of the sight, signs and 
sounds in his front, the same hesitancy in throwing in his whole 
force when he knew his subordinates needed them, the same re- 
liance on false reports and rumors caused him to be a complete failure 



as a Commanding General. With the force Garnett was claimed 
to have had, he could have overwhelmed our brigade, un- 
der Morris, during the four days that we were in his front, and 
beaten us, and then marched to Clarksburg to McClellan's base; 
but Garnett was less enterprising and also learning the art of 
war, and missed his opportunity; and when Pegram was defeated 
by Rosecrans the Confederates retreated and McClellan received 
the credit for the success of the whole campaign. 

After having rested all night near Carrick's Ford we marched 
next morning after the enemy to St. George, and there waited for 
further orders. As the enemy had fled, and as a stern chase is a 
long chase, we went no further, and on the morning of the 1 5th we 
started on our return trip to Laurel Hill, a distance, by a short cut, 
of fourteen miles. We rested for the night, and orders reached 
us to march by easy stages via Philippi to Grafton, there to take 
the cars, via Cincinnati, to Indianapolis, to be mustered out of our 
three months' service. While en route for home the news reached 
us of the Union defeat at Bull Run. This fell like a wet blanket 
over our splendid victories in West Virginia, but the people of 
Ohio and Indiana gave us a royal greeting, and without any delay 
or accident on the road we reached Indianapolis and were wel- 
comed by the Governor. 

The total loss in battle of the Indiana three-months men had 
been only twenty-four dead by battle and disease. Governor Mor- 
ton had sent an agent to West Virginia, urging us to re-enlist for 
three years, but as many had left their business they desired to 
see their homes first. On our arrival arrangements had been made 
to reorganize and re-enlist every man, which would have succeeded 
but for the delay in mustering us out. This caused great dissatis- 
faction, and, thinking that we were possibly to be held and sent to 
Washington, caused many to decline further service. Having 
faithfully lived up to our contract, we wanted to go home, see our 
people and families, and could not understand the reason why we 
should be held longer. We were assured that the next day we 
would be mustered out and paid, and each day were again disap- 
pointed. We almost lost patience, and became mutineers against 
the Government officers who were deceiving us. But as we had 
confidence in Governor Morton, he persuaded us to have patience 
and that we would soon get our discharges and pay. Having been 
held over for ten days before being mustered out, many were so 


exasperated that they declared that they would not re-enllst. But 
the influence of the Governor was great with his people, so that be- 
fore three months passed most all of us were in the service again, 
and many became the most efficient officers that Indiana furnished at 
any time during the war, and were the bulwark and pride of the 
Northern soldiers in the Union Army. 



As soon as I received my discharge from the three-months 
service I went to Palestine, Ind., where an elder brother was in 
the smithing business. He was just then building a house, and the 
contractor not being up in the building line, was getting on so 
slowly that he asked me to help him out. I readily accepted, and 
we soon completed the building, but as stable and fences had to be 
put up this kept us busy for another month. During October we 
had occasion to visit Indianapolis, and, stopping at the Union Hall, 
a place where many German officers congregated, met among them 
Col. Fritz Anneke, a countryman of ours, who had received a com- 
m.ission to raise a regiment of field artillery. I was introduced to 
the Colonel, and he proposed that if I joined the artillery he would 
make me an orderly on his staff, but, as I was not yet through with 
the work of my brother I gave the matter of new service no serious 
thought. After completing the fence and other little jobs, I made 
a lot of school benches for the school trustee. Having seen cof- 
fins made at Franklin, I was called on to make several for some of 
the neighbors. Everything indicated that I would become a perma- 
nent citizen of the place, M^ork being plentiful and at good pay; 
but during the long winter evenings several of the neighbor boys 
who had been at Rich Mountain under Col. Benton, in the Eighth 
Indiana, met with me in the store, and our talk naturally centered 
on the war and our mutual experiences in West Virginia. This 
talk was continued around the stores nightly, and we had all the 
neighbor boys for our eager auditors. We all agreed that the most 
desirable service to enlist in was the field artillery, and immediately 
after New Years, by common impulse, several of us concluded to 
go to Indianapolis and enlist in Col. Anneke's artillery regiment. 
On the morning of the i8th about fifteen of us, after a seven-mile 
walk, took cars for Indianapolis and went out to Camp Burnside, 
vvhere part of the regiment was then quartered. Somehow I be- 


came the leader of the squad and reported at once to Col. Anneke, 
who sent us over to the tent of his adjutant, Lieut. Von Sehlen. 
He sent a Sergeant with us to the examining surgeons, Drs. Bobb 
and Jamison. After being physically examined we were taken to 
Major Carpenter, the post mustering officer, and again sworn in, 
this time to serve three years, unless sooner discharged. After being 
mustered and marched back to camp we received our clothing and 
thirty days' furlough to go home and get more recruits. About the 
same time another squad, from the southwestern part of the State, 
near Evansville, appeared under the leadership of Lochmueller and 
Stifel, all Germans, with the same object, to enlist and serve with 
artillery. They, too, were mustered and furloughed, and still an- 
other detachment from Bremen, Indiana, led by Peter Schlarb, 
came to Indianapolis. They, too, were Germans, and were also 
mustered and furloughed. Thus from three parts of the State, 
each 100 miles or more from the other, came the patriots who 
formed the nucleus of the Fifteenth Battery organization. Each 
and all desiring to serve in the ranks, not one asking for a position 
or a commission, but only to restore the Union of their adopted 
countr}^ No promise or offer had been made us for even a non- 
commissioned office in the organization, and no one had a right to 
claim us as his recruits and get a commission thereon. During the 
term of our furlough the battles of Fort Henry and Fort Donald- 
son had taken place, and when Gen. Grant had captured 12,000 
prisoners it was thought that the Confederates would disband and 
give up hope of dividing the Union. The capture of Nashville 
and the flight of the Confederates from that town proved the de- 
moralization of our enem.y and confirmed our wishful thought of 
a speedy closing of the Civil War. The several victories of the 
Union troops had made a large number of Confederate prisoners, 
and 5,000 of these were sent to Indiana, 4,000 arriving at Camp 
Morton, and the Sixtieth Indiana Infantry, then in process of organi- 
zation at Evansville, under Col. Robert Owen, was moved to Indian- 
apolis to guard them. Their appearance indicated that they had not 
been well supplied with clothing and blankets, and many carried 
pieces of carpet to cover them in the night, but as soon as they were 
quartered in the same barracks that we had occupied during our 
first enlistment, they received blankets and clothing to keep them 
warm; but many suffered from penumonia, and for a short time 
the death rate was large. About this time the three different 


squads of the Fifteenth Indiana Battery that had been on furlough 
returned with a number of recruits. As my squad was the first to 
report, I was ordered to call the roll every evening and draw the ra- 
tion. Peter Schlarb's squad came next and added to my list. He 
good-naturedly acted as quartermaster sergeant and relieved me of 
that part of duty. Lochmueller and Stifel soon came into camp with 
their detachment, and we had now about seventy men, but no ofHcers. 
Our adjutant would sign requisitions, and a Prussian who had 
served in the field artillery in Germany, but was at this time at- 
tached to Col. Anneke's headquarters, organized us into detach- 
ments and instructed us in the manual of the guns. Two six- 
pounder brass field pieces were made to do duty for that purpose. 
The drill sergeant, one Rumler, was very exacting in our move- 
ments, and he knew his business well. He was one of the neatest 
soldiers I ever met. His uniform was always a sample of per- 
fection, his leather sword belt shining and his scabbard almost a 
looking-glass. But when through instructing us in the morning 
he would get a pass in the afternoon and go to some public house, 
generally to Union Hall, meet some patriots who would not enlist 
but who were his auditors and who would help to fill him up. It 
often happened at this period of our service that our instructor on 
his return to camp had a larger load than he could carry. When we 
came to the camp we were practically ignorant of artillery tactics, 
but soon learned, and Kuntz and others knew a great deal more 
about artillery than several of the officers who pushed themselves 
on us. About that time six batteries, the product of Col. Anneke's 
instruction, had gone to the field, and no State ever sent better ar- 
tillerymen during the Civil War into action than these batteries 
proved to be. 

Gov. Morton, in his great effort to preserve the Union, es- 
tablished a State arsenal and placed the management of this ar- 
senal into the hands of a Hanoverian, who, it was claimed, knew 
nothing about the manufacture of ammunition. The establish- 
ment was fought by Morton's political enemies, and as Col. An- 
neke was a Prussian, he had no use for the Hanoverian, but the 
influence of the latter was great with Morton. One day, late 
in February, Anneke had been sent out with two batteries 
for target practice. He fired shell and shrapnel with paper 
fuse. For some reason the shell and shrapnel would not explode. 
Anneke, at once, caused the batteries to limber up and return to 


town in high dudgeon. The batteries went to camp, but Anneke 
to the Governor, and in great wrath told him that it was an outrage 
to keep a man in charge of the arsenal who could not manufacture 
ammunition that the artillery could use in action, and he believed 
now the influence in the kitchen was the cause of his keep- 
ing the present manager at the arsenal. The Governor politely 
told him to return to camp, turning his back on Anneke. The 
next morning about lo o'clock an order came that Anneke's serv- 
ices were no longer required, and that all Indiana batteries would 
go to the field as independent organizations. The regimental or- 
ganization, not yet mustered into the United States service, was 
thus abolished. 

This left the adjutant, Von Sehlen, and Sergeant William H. 
Torr out of the service. Both lost no time in making application 
for the vacant commissions in our battery, the former as Captain 
and the latter as First Lieutenant. Von Sehlen asked me if such 
would be agreeable to the men, and I frankly stated that nothing 
better could please them. 

Among the many men who came to this country as soldiers of 
fortune was one Carl Mueller. Although strict instructions had 
been given to our Consuls in Europe to encourage no one to come 
to this country with the expectation of receiving a commission, this 
man, a native of Hesse-Cassel, came thus recommended. He had 
learned of the great war Governor of Indiana and came there to 
offer his services. Soon after Von Sehlen and Torr had been com- 
missioned, Mueller appeared with the shoulder straps of a Second 
Lieutenant. He could not speak the English language, and had been, 
as he then claimed, a riding master in an Austrian cavalry regiment 
and saw active service in the Franco-Austrian War in Italy in 
1859. In 1886 I learned that his father was a Hessian tax col- 
lector and his mother an illegitimate child of an Austrian Grand 
Duke, and that the Grand Duke had educated this man in the mili- 
tary academy at Ulm and Vienna, in Austria,, and that after 
the war in 1859 he had joined an Austrian Major who had 
organized a band of outlaws in Italy. This information came from 
a former native Hessian who knew him well. But it appeared that 
he had received his commission through the kitchen cabinet of Gov- 
ernor Morton. 

The day following, after Von Sehlen and Torr had been com- 
missioned, we moved our quarters over to the west of Camp Morton, 


and our new Captain at once drew six three-inch rifle guns of the 
most improved pattern. The battery now became fully organized and 
had nearly lOO men. I was made orderly sergeant, Peter Schlarb, 
quartermaster sergeant ; • Adam Kuntz, first gun sergeant ; Hook, 
second gun sergeant; Rumler, third gun sergeant; Hartner, fourth 
gun sergeant; Tuttle, fifth gun sergeant; Lynam, sixth gun ser- 
geant — all brave and loyal soldiers, and no better artillery- 
men in the entire service. The gunners and corporals were 
equally well fitted and have proved their worth on every 
field of battle they appeared on. Our daily gun exercise 
soon made us perfect in handling the piece. My duty called 
me to Col. Owen's headquarters in Camp Morton nearly every 
morning. One day as I entered the gate through the guards to 
take my report to headquarters a prisoner called me by name, say- 
ing: "Fred, what are you doing with that uniform on?" I could 
scarcely believe my eyes, for here was Bill Johnson, a young brick 
mason with whom I had worked on many buildings in Indianapolis 
and elsewhere. I answered : "How's this. Bill ? You in the Con- 
federate Army and a prisoner of war, from Fort Donaldson, and 
your brother a soldier in the Eleventh Indiana, wounded nearly 
unto death, on the Union side? "Yes," he replied, "such is this 
civil war. It is brother against brother and father against son." 
He told me how he left me in Franklin in i860. He had gone to 
Louisville, and from there to Nashville, Tenn. While there the 
Civil War began, and he took the Southern side of the question, 
while his brother, who lived in the North, defended the Northern 
cause. I asked him if any more of my old friends were with him. 
He stated that the two McFall brothers were with him, but were 
now sick in the hospital at Camp Morton. The latter were de- 
scendants of the first settlers of Indianapolis, and had been Re- 
publicans when they first voted in 1856 and 1858, but like John- 
son had gone down to Nashville, and while there had taken sides 
with the Confederates. The McFalls both died in the hospital 
at Indianapolis, and were buried with the Confederates. 
The prisoners at that time were granted many privileges, 
and from us received the treatment of erring brothers. 
They soon had their own bakery, both for wheat and 
cornbread, fresh every morning. Their friends and relatives vis- 
ited them as often as they pleased and brought many nicknacks to 
make them happy. They received passes to go around town and 


to the depot. Later on, when the weather became warm, Col 
Owen, the camp commander, would take a whole regiment of them' 
at a time, and without guard, to the canal, a mile distant, for 
bathing. Not a man ever took advantage of his liberty and de- 
serted. One day Johnson, my old friend and prisoner, went with 
a pass downtown to see some of his former fellow-workmen on the 
Johns Building, then being erected on the northeast corner of 
Washington and Meridian streets. There were a number who had 
learned their trade with Johnson, but so intense was the loyalty 
of these workmen that one and all refused to shake hands with 
him, and were told that they would probably meet him later on, in 
the field of battle. Although passes were freely issued to prison- 
ers and visitors, yet a strong guard was kept around the camp, and 
none were perrhitted to pass and repass at will. So it happened 
that one morning about lo o'clock, just as I was taking my morn- 
ing report to headquarters, a carriage drove up with the Governor's 
coachman, Coleman, on the seat. Coleman talked to the officer of 
the guard, Lieut. Fred Mertz : "Lasz mich doch da durch, es ist 
doch der Governor." Mertz was a green German and. answered : 
"They cannot enter unless they have a pass." "Da koente ein 
jeder sagen er wehre Governor." By this time the two occupants 
looked out, one on each side, and proved to be Governor Morton 
and Senator Andrew Johnson, from Tennessee. They asked ad- 
mittance, but Mertz would not budge. Soon Col. Owen heard of 
the hubbub and came to the gate and admitted them. Mertz was 
complimented for his attention to duty. 

In the early part of April we were fully and well instructed in 
handling the pieces and firing blank cartridges, so that now we were 
ready to receive instruction in maneuvers. The Captain therefore 
drew a number of horses to mount four guns. We had no bridles 
for the horses, only a halter, surcingle and blanket. Never having 
been mounted or accustomed to riding, Sergt. Rumler adjusted 
the halter on my horse, fixed the blanket and surcingle and helped 
me to mount. Just as I was on the horse he lit out as though shot 
from a cannon, and I held on as best I could until he reached a 
pump on the corner of Massachusetts and Delaware streets, about 
three-quarters of a mile from our starting point. Here he sud- 
'denly stopped and I promptly dismounted. The others soon came 
up, and had a great laugh on me. 

We lost no time in learning the maneuvers, and soon after we 



had the other section mounted, and were able to appear on drill 
with six guns. Just as we were getting ready for the field an order 
was issued from the War Department that no more troops were 
wanted. This was a wet blanket over our patriotism, but during 
the month of May a number of recruits arrived and were accepted, 
for the Governor of Indiana did not believe that the army then in 
the field would be able to crush the rebellion, although success had 
been with the Union Army up to that time. We received plenty of 
ammunition for target practice, and our time was spent daily in 
making us more perfect in the use of the guns. Every effort was 
made by the officers to get us to the field. Letters to McClellan, Fre- 
mont and Halleck were written, in order to put us on friendly terms 
with the Secretary of War. We were synonymed the Stanton Battery. 
On May 28 one A. D. Harvey appeared in camp, with First Lieuten- 
ant shoulder straps. This raised a storm among the men, as they 
claimed they were imposed upon. The day following, the 29th, an 
order was received from the War Department by the Governor to 
send one battery at once to Washington. At the same time the 
Sixtieth Indiana, Col. Owen's regiment, was also ordered to the 
field. For some cause, unknown to us then, our battery was not 
sent, but an order for twenty-five men, to be transferred, with 
twenty-five horses, to the Sixteenth Indiana Battery, was received. 
Although illegal, it was obeyed, and we were reduced that 
number before we could go to the field. The men transferred were 
of the best, and though they did not care to leave the organization 
their desire to go to the field finally overcame the objection. The 
guards around Camp Morton were now kept more strict, and no 
passes given to the prisoners. 

In the early part of the prison camp many sick Confederates 
had been permitted to go to private houses, and their savings from 
such rations as they did not draw were placed in a fund for the 
purchase of other articles not furnished by the Government. The 
prisoners spoke well of their treatment, although some would com- 
plain, but there was no cause for it at this time. A general ex- 
change was effected in August and the Confederate authorities 
placed these men at once into active service. About the first regi- 
ment they met on the field of battle was the Sixtieth Indiana, and 
the boot was now on the other leg, as Col. Owen, with nearly his 
whole regiment were made prisoners. The Confederates esteemed 
Col. Owen so highly that he and his men were at once paroled and 


sent home to await the exchange. We were expecting orders to go 
to the field ahnost daily, and one evening I asked for a pass to be 
out until midnight. About half-past ten I started back for the 
camp. Just as I was within a stone's throw of our quarters I was 
halted by the provost guard. I tried to identify myself, but the 
guards had such strict orders from Col. Ross that they suspected 
every one out after 9 o'clock might be a spy ; and when they caught 
me coming to camp they thought they had one. While the cor- 
poral talked to me the three men with him pointed their bayonets 
at me, and with loaded muskets and pulled-back hammers. I 
thought my time had surely come. Just then another squad of 
the guard appeared, in charge of a Lieutenant. As the officer 
knew me he released me, but the occasion was enough to turn every 
hair on my head white, and I never again experienced such a terri- 
ble fear. We received new recruits daily, and as the i st of July was 
approaching the muster in and pay of the whole battery was ex- 
pected; and the reverses McClellan had met with at Richmond 
created a hope among the men that we would at last be sent to the 
East to give the country some benefit of our now most perfect 
target practice and battery maneuvers. 



Col. Simonson, the regular mustering officer at Indianapolis, 
came out to Camp Morton on July i and mustered the battery to 
the number of 119 enlisted men and three officers; although four 
officers held commissions, the number of men present did not war- 
rant the muster of the fourth officer. This left Second Lieutenant 
Mueller out, but he still remained with the battery, not performing 
any duty, however. A. new levy of six-month men had hastily been 
called into the service to guard the prisoners in Camp Morton. 
These latter had become very restless, and an outbreak was feared. 
Upon the request of Capt. Von Sehlen permission was granted 
to recruit among these State troops, but there was no officer to go 
among them to recruit. We had been instructed as horse artillery^ 
and, being fairly well posted in the maneuvers, the Captain fitted 
out a section, with cannoneers mounted, and placed it in my charge 
to march up and down the road that led from Camp Morton to the 
city, executing some of the battery maneuvers, to show the militia 
the bright side of artillery; This movement had its proper effect. 
The sergeants, corporals and privates were sent out into the camps 
of the militia, and we soon had recruits enough, so that we could 
muster 142 enlisted men, only nine lacking to have the full number. 


In the early part of the war, among the Union people In East- 
ern Kentucky, there was a desperado named Hispeth. He had killed 
many worthy people that believed in Southern rights. He had been 
at the head of guerrilla organization, but his bloody deeds had caused 
his companions to leave him. In the extremity for help he had 
dressed his wife, then about 22 years of age, with red hair, and 
about five feet two Inches high, weighing 120 pounds. In men's cloth- 
ing, and armed her with a Winchester. A Confederate company of 
Infantry, under Captain Johnson, surrounded and killed him on or 



about May 24th, 1862. His wife escaped to Indiana and enlisted in-: 
a six-months' infantry regiment, to guard the prisoners around 
Camp Morton. After a few weeks in the Fifty-sixth Indiana, we 
received the order to recruit for the battery. Among those troops 
came a red-headed, beardless boy, who volunteered to go with us. 
After his muster he became very active to induce others from the 
same regiment to join us. He was given the lead team on the fourth 
piece, and took good care of his horses, being one of the tidiest 
soldiers in the battery. He soon learned the drill and maneuvers, 
but almost continually kept a looking-glass in his left hand to see 
that his deceptive appearance was perfect. He had the faculty of 
fussing with every one in the battery, at all times, and never wanted 
to make his tent or bed with any of the others of the batterymen. 
He was fond of paper collars, and in cleanliness could pass as a 
model for the rest. He served with us for fully three years, and 
about seven years after his discharge came to my office at the In- 
dianapolis glass works. He cried and shed tears at his bad luck of 
making a living at selling sewing machines, and two months later 
was found dead about three miles east of Indianapolis. The body 
was badly decomposed when found, he having doubtless committed 
suicide. In the early nineties the most positive proof was sent me 
that Reilley, our red-headed driver for three years in the battery, was 
the wife of the desperado Hispeth of Eastern Kentucky. 

The news from Virginia and McClellan's retreat made it 
necessary for the Government to call troops to Baltimore and 
Washington. On the evening of July 4 we received orders to be 
ready next day for our trip to Baltimore. About 3 p. m. on the 5th 
we boarded the cars, and at 5 p. m. all was in readiness to pull out, 
but as the night train was to be ahead of us we remained on the 
track until 8 :30 before the wheels were set in motion. Without 
any mishap we reached Newark, Ohio, where we fed and watered 
our horses, and also partook of a square meal ourselves. I 
asked one of the waitresses why they had not dished up for us 
again as they had done the year before with the Seventh 
Indiana Infantry, en route to West Virginia. I was soon informed 
that conditions had changed, and their generous meals of that time 
had been too good a thing to last, and if we wished any extras now 
we must pay for them. 

While on the road from Harrisburg to York we met with a 
serious accident by a rear collision. It injured several of our best 


lorses and damaged one of the guns, which we had to exchange 
for another, in Baltimore. The Captain reported our arrival at 
Gen. Wool's headquarters, and we were sent out to Camp Carroll, 
ion West Pratt street, into quarters. Special barracks for horses 
jhad been prepared, and our location, for the time, was a desirable 
one; but we had entirely too many visitors of an undesirable kind 
and a nearby saloon did a much too thriving business. One of our 
most thirsty ones, who had served in the English Army before 
bebastapool, made enough trouble for the whole battery. Our time 
was occupied in camp duty and drilling the new recruits. In camp 
near us w^ere four batteries and one, a regular battery, about a mile 
away. One moonlight night in July, while all was quiet in camp, 
but rumors plenty that Jackson was marching on Washington and 
Baltimore, a lively fusillade opened on West Baltimore street about 
a mile from our camp, in a northwesterly direction. The alarm 
was at once given, and all the batteries hitched and the battalion of 
cavalary, the Purnelf Legion, stood to horse. The firing ceased, but 
the Captain, anxious to learn the cause, had a sergeant report from 
each battery and from the cavalry, and placed them in my charge 
to go down and ascertain the cause of the firing. We had gone 
about half a mile on Baltimore street, when we came upon a group 
of happy and hilarious people. This must be the place where the 
shooting had occurred. I demanded the cause of the gathering and 
the hubbub and firing. They told us that the brewer's daughter 
had just been married, and the firing had been the salute, and we 
were in time to enjoy the festivities with them. I ordered them not 
to fire any more, as they had been disturbing our camp. The father 
of the bride now came forward and invited us to partake of the 
wedding feast. After having our fill of the good things from the 
brewer's table we returned to camp. Just as we left Baltimore 
street a squad of another troop of mounted men, in charge of Lieut. 
Torr, met us. We told our story, and nothing would do except to 
go back with them and let the new squad enjoy part of the feast 
also. We finally reached camp, where our comrades still stood by 
the guns. A more disgusted body of troops never existed than the 
men of the battery and cavalry when they learned the true cause of 
the alarm, and many went over to the battlefield at the brewer's 
next day to look for relics; and from the appearance of some of 
them later they must have found plenty to fill up on, for an extra 
detail for the guard house had to be made. 


Among the recent recruits to join the battery was a 
man of past 40 years. He appeared to be of Irish descent, was well 
educated, and claimed to have been a Methodist minister. So one 
Sunday morning, on inspection, he was called to unbutton his 
jacket and shirt, and then had to sit down and take off his shoes 
and socks. He was ordered to redress and step to the front. There 
were two others who had failed to polish their buttons. They also 
came to the front, and the rest of the battery was dismissed. Tho 
corporal of the guard was called, with a detail of gun guard, to 
take the delinquents to the Potaposca River. The two with the dim 
buttons, as their punishment, received orders to go in the water 
and give Moran a soap and brush cleaning. This duty was per- 
formed in such a way that Moran' s powerful voice, no doubt trained 
by preaching, could be heard a mile away. After that scrubbing 
and clean dressing he appeared at headquarters, but did not look 
like the same man. And during his stay in the battery never again 
needed any one to scrub him; but later he deserted. 

We had many callers of an undesirable kind; so in order to 
escape their company the Captain called on Gen. Morris, at Fort 
McHenry, under whom Von Sehlen had served in the Mexican 
War, to give us quarters at the camping ground in Fort McHenry. 
This shut out the saloon man as well as the demi-monde, who had 
made life so unbearable at Camp Carroll. 

As soon as we were camped the men received their pay, and then 
were granted passes to go to the city, each in his turn, to give them 
a chance to spend their money. Three deserted, one the irrepressible 
corporal of Sabastapool fame, and another his brother-in-law, Reed, 
who was brought back to the battery, court-martialed and sentenced 
to two years at hard labor, thence to be returned to the battery and 
drummed out of camp. The last part of the sentence was executed 
at Decatur, Ga., just after the capture of Atlanta, and witnessed by 
thousands as the most humiliating sight during the Civil War. 

At the time we left Indianapolis for the field we did not have the 
full number of men required for a six-gun battery. This served as 
an excuse for the prevention of mustering as an officer Lieutenant 
Carl Mueller, but he somehow managed to follow the battery to 
Baltimore. His place as Second Lieutenant had been offered to 
one Frank Rose, who also came to Baltimore with shoulder straps, 
but took them off before he came to camp, and served his term of 
three years in the ranks. Somehow Mueller learned that we now 


had 141 men on the rolls, and on the 15th day of July called on the 
mustering officer at General Wool's headquarters and was mustered 
into the United States service, but Captain Von Sehlen gave him 
no orders and was preparing to prefer charges against him for in- 
competency. Mueller learned of this and resigned. As to his 
knowledge as a riding instructor, our farmer boys could have given 
him a hundred lessons to his giving them one; but all the men of 
the battery were happy that we were rid of the imposition. 

In the camping ground with us were the famous Seventh New 
York. Their appearance and soldierly bearing was truly inspir- 
ing, and their dress parade a sight, once seen, never to be forgot- 
ten. Every morning details of this regiment were sent downtown 
to headquarters. Col. Belger, who was chief quartermaster, also 
had some orderlies from this regiment. One morning, when Lieut. 
Torr was waiting to have a requisition filled. Col. Belger called on 
one of these New York upper-ten Orderlies. The Orderly ap- 
peared, saluted and waited the Colonel's pleasure. "Tell my negro 
to bring my handkerchief." This order he gave to a man who' 
would outrank Col. Belger a hundred times in New York society. 
But a soldier's duty is first to pay attention and then to obey or- 

About this time Quartermaster Sergeant Schlarb was sent home 
to recruit and was also recommended for a commission. He was my 
senior in years, but below me in rank. Of course, it was unpleasant, 
but I complained not. Just then a detachment of recruits reached us 
from Indianapolis. One of these, a prince of blood, was made a 
corporal. After Mueller's resignation as Second Lieutenant he 
expected to receive the next commission, which he did, in the cav- 
alry, later on. Our time was again occupied with maneuvers and 
drills, and we now had many of the Seventh New York as an audi- 
ence, v^ho enjoyed the perfection with which we executed the move- 

One morning about the middle of August, just after drill, the 
first section, under Lieut. Torr, was ordered to the point outside of 
the fort. About 11 a. m. the steamer Lady Washington left Bal- 
timore for the lower Potomac with passengers and freight. An 
infantry detachment stood near by, at the water's edge. One of 
the men fired his piece, with a ball, across the bow of the boat, that 
now at once turned towards us and stopped at the landing. The 
infantry took charge and the passengers were taken inside of the 


fort. On the boat was found a lot of oats, mixed in which were car- 
tridges and caps. Of course they were contraband, the boat a 
prize and the officers made prisoners, being promptly locked up. 
Some were sent to Fort Lafayette and others held in Fort McHenry 
for some time. The duties of the first section were not required, and 
they were returned to camp. 

As the rumors came thick and fast about the immense losses 
and Lee's approach toward Washington and Baltimore, we re- 
ceived full instructions as to a part a battery should take in the 
burial service of a general officer. It was also hinted that a dead 
officer was on the way from the battlefield to be buried with full 
military honors, in Baltimore, and that our battery and the famous 
Seventh New York would be the military escort. But up to our de- 
parture for the field the dead General failed to materialize. Camp 
life was fairly endurable, and we enjoyed ourselves in many ways. 
With money in our pockets we could buy many extras not furnished 
by the Government. Of our large company fund, gathered in In- 
dianapolis, we saw nothing then; but after the war I learned what 
had become of it. 

(stonewall. ) 



On Sunday, August 24, about 2 o'clock p. m. an order was re- 
ceived at the headquarters of the battery, in Fort McHenry, to re- 
port at once at the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad switch, near our 
old camping ground at Camp Carroll, where transportation was 
waiting us to take us to the field. Capt. Von Sehlen and Lieuts. 
Torr and Harvey had gone down to the city to enjoy the afternoon 
at some cafe. This left me the next highest non-commissioned 
officer of rank in charge of the camp. I ordered the 
tents struck and loaded on the wagons and the battery 
hitched, ready for a move, and sent a corporal and bugler down 
to hunt up the officers, but without avail. I now mounted my 
horse, and took a Corporal with me, and we 'soon found them, 
We returned to camp and found all ready for the march to the 
railroad, where cars for guns, horses and men awaited our coming. 
Col. Belger, the depot quartermaster at Baltimore, had driven out 
in his carriage and saw to it that nothing was wanting. We soon 
had the battery loaded, and steamed out from Baltimore. Our des- 
tination was unknown to us, but after an all-night ride we halted 
on the Maryland side, opposite Harper's Ferry, Va. At early day- 
light we unloaded and soon crossed on the pontoon into the old 
town, made historic by John Brown's raid in 1859. The Captain 
reported our arrival to Col. Miles, and without much delay we were 
ordered out to Camp Hill, northeast of Bolivar, into quarters. 

A line of breastwork running across the peninsular formed 
by the Shenandoah and Potomac Rivers formed the defense. The 
scenery surrounding us was beautiful and inspiring and one of the 
glory spots of this round earth. We soon had our tents arranged 
and the troops already in camp seemed surprised at our promptness. 
Everything was in regulation form, and on the morning of the 
26th we turned out to our usual battery drill, in which we were 
easily second to none, and had for an audience nearly the entire 


garrison, about 8,000 strong. The chief of artillery, Major Mc- 
Ilvain, of the Fifth New York Heavy Artillery, was full of praise 
over our efficiency, and Capt. Von Sehlen became a recognized ■ 
military authority in field artillery at the post, for which he was 
justly proud. Each day that we went through the battery maneuvers 
we had the same splendid audience, as it pleased them to see a 
battery drill. One afternoon we were all "shot" by a photographer 
from New York who had the attention of the garrison, and as I 
remember, his name was Brady. 

On the 27th rumors came thick and fast that the enemy had 
crossed the Potomac, and we would soon be cut off from connec- 
tion with Baltimore and Washington. The 28th passed more quiet- 
ly, but on the 29th the rumbling of distant artillery, near Manasas, 
became ominous, and continued during the 30th and 31st more 
distinctly. On the 30th we had to change our camp and move for- 
ward to within a short distance of where the Winchester road 
crossed Bolivar Heights and about three-quarters of a mile south- 
west of Camp Hill, on the southeastern slope of Bolivar Heights 
and west of the Winchester pike. On the morning of the 31st I 
was sent in charge of the drivers, who took their horses to water 
them, in the Shenandoah River. All went well with us until on our 
return we reached the Winchester pike. I ordered a slow trot, but 
somehow the leading horse started off in a gallop, the others, of 
course, following. I could not stop them until we came up nearly 
to our quarters. The horses were not winded, only a little over- 
exercised, but this was sufficient to give the Captain the long- 
sought excuse to place me under arrest. I had often observed the 
Captain's prejudice and dislike for some one, and his desire that 
he would like to place a young man who had reached us at Balti- 
more with a number of recruits in my position. This young man 
was the son of the Duke of Braunfels, founder of the new Braun- 
fels Colony in Texas. He held rank in the battery as corporal and 
was well educated, but was at that time much out of repair, as he 
had to attend sick call every morning and take regular baths in the 
muddy Potomac. During my arrest he came to my tent to console 
me, but really to find out my intentions if court-martialed and re- 
duced to the ranks. I frankly told him that if the Captain preferred 
charges against me I should prefer counter-charges against the of- 
ficers of the battery for neglect of duty and many other short- 
comings. As it was the duty of a commissioned officer, and not 

AT harper's ferry. 99 

mine, to take the horses to the water; and while I had done this 
they had lazily spent their time in camp! My young interviewer 
went away, and about an hour later I was called to the Captain's 
tent, released from arrest, given my sword and restored to duty. 
On drill I still handled the center section and attended to such duties 
as are required of a commissioned officer, but it seemed doubtful 
if I would ever get a commission. 

As soon as we were assigned to the brigade of D'Utassey, 
Capt. Von Sehlen became a fast and intimate friend of the Colonel, 
and the two were seen much in each other's company. We were 
still short another commissioned officer, and it evidently had been 
determined not to commission me, probably on account of my 
youth. Although we had plenty of material in our own battery, 
notably Sergt. Kuntz, in whose appointment I would have cheer- 
fully acquiesced. Von Sehlen, a descendant at least by name from 
a family of German nobility, looked around in D'Utassey's Thirty- 
ninth New York Regiment for some one to fill the requirements of 
nobility. He found what he wanted, possibly a relative of the Col- 
onel, a man with an unpronounceable foreign name. He was pre- 
sented to us as an Austrian artillery officer who had seen hard and 
active service in the Sardinian War against the French. 
Not knowing any better, we had to take it all in, and were led to 
believe in him as a man of wonderfully high and scien- 
tific artillery knowledge. Like many others of his kind, 
he had been a fresh importation, plainly indicated by his 
lack of knowledge of the rudiments of the English lan- 
guage, and we soon learned that the whole transaction 
of our officers in bringing this man into our battery was an outrage 
on the valor and patriotism of our men. He was unable to repeat 
the commands of the Captain to the center section; and distance, 
"elevation" and time to cut fuses by, as well as duties of gunners, 
were as Greek to him. His service was cut short with us before 
he could learn the difference between a shell, case shot, shrapnel, 
canister or percussion shell, or between a dial and a paper fuse. 

Our officers had evidently forgotten, or ignored the fact, that 
by the militia laws of Indiana we had the right to elect our own 
officers, then send the results of such election to the Governor and 
let him issue the commissions, and a United States officer would 
muster the man on that commission. Such is the law in most of 
the States even at the present day, and by such an election system the 


men may not always elect the best men, but never the worst or most 
unpopular ones. The selection, therefore, of some one from outside of 
the battery was both illegal and void, and if we had not all been 
boys we would not have suffered these wrongs, although this was 
the fourth time, but happily the last one for us to be imposed on. 

Among the many duties of an orderly sergeant are those to 
take the sick to the doctor. While the battery was not brigaded the 
post surgeon was called upon to prescribe for those who needed it. 
Among his regular callers was a young Frenchman, "Leclair," 
who had been assigned to drive a team, but would have served 
better as a French cook than as a driver in a Union battery. Le- 
clair demurred at being a driver and wanted to be excused, claim- 
ing to be suffering from a lame back. I took him to the doctor, 
who gave him some liniment to rub his back with, but he was not 
cured. He continued to call, without results, until we were bri- 
gaded with the Thirty-ninth New York (Garibaldi) Regiment. 
The doctor of that regiment now took charge of our sick, and Le- 
clair, of course, attended . sick calls and went to the doctor's tent. 
He explained to the old German medico his troubles. The doctor 
had him draw his shirt over his head, and with a sharp instrument 
made a checker board of Leclair's back, and then rubbed some 
strong liniment on the scratches. Leclair began to howl, and ran 
screaming from the doctor's tent. The doctor told me what was 
the matter with Leclair; that the soldier was only lazy and trying 
to shirk his duty. This proved to be true, for he never attended 
sick call thereafter, but as we passed Baltimore about three weeks 
later he deserted. 

During our leisure the boys often visited John Brown's fort, 
where, with twenty-two men, he tried to liberate 4,000,000 slaves. 

On September ist it was rumored that the enemy was crossing 
the Potomac into Maryland at Noland's Ferry in large force, and 
Col. Miles at once sent the Eighty-seventh Ohio Infantry and two 
twelve-pound howitzers, all under command of Col, Banning, to 
Point of Rocks for observation. About 4 in the afternoon of the 
same day, the enemy, twenty-five strong, under a Lieutenant, 
dashed into Key's Ferry and captured a Union outpost in charge 
of a sergeant with six men from the First Home Brigade of Mary- 
land Volunteers. This little affair aroused Col. Miles, as it gave 
him early notice that Lee's whole army was coming. Col. Ban- 
ning reported the enemy crossing at many points, and on Septem- 

AT harper's ferry. 101 

ber 2 Miles began the examination of the ground about Harper's 
Ferry for his defenses. At the same time Gen. Halleck had ordered 
the forces under Gen. White, then at Winchester, to vacate that 
place and retreat to Harper's Ferry. A regiment of New York 
State militia, on duty at Hall Town, was relieved, to be sent home, 
as its term of service had expired, but could not then get through 
the lines. Miles sent out many reconnoitering parties on different 
roads leading to Winchester, Martinsburg, Shepard's Town and 
Williamsport. As rumors reached us from every direction that 
all the roads were filled with Confederates, and that the reports 
were partially true was proven by the fact that our telegraph lines 
were cut between us and Baltimore. Still greater excitement was 
caused on the 4th, when Col. Banning was driven back by an over- 
whelming force from the Point of Rocks to Berlin. At the same 
time the canal was cut and the water run out, to enable the enemy 
to cross their artillery. 

White's forces from Winchester, consisting of the Thirty- 
ninth New York Infantry, Thirty-second Ohio, Sixtieth Ohio, 
Ninth Vermont, Rigby's Indiana and Pott's Ohio Batteries, First 
Maryland Cavalry and a battalion of Rhode Island cavalry, gave us 
a good increased armed force for defense. On the 5th, by an order 
from Gen. Halleck, via Pittsburg and Cumberland, Gen. White was 
sent to command the forces at Martinsburg. On this day a prisoner 
taken at Berlin erroneously reported that A. P. Hill's Confederate 
division was at Point of Rocks and Stonewall Jackson had his 
headquarters at Frederick. Col. Miles now brigaded his troops 
and placed them in position for defense. The First Brigade, Col. 
D'Utassey commanding, composed of the Thirty-ninth New York 
(Garibaldi) Regiment, One tlundred and Fifteenth New York, 
One Hundred and Eleventh New York and the Fifteenth Indiana 
Battery, were assigned to the right of the line on Bolivar Heights, 
facing west. The Second Brigade, Col. Trimble of the Sixtieth 
Ohio commanding, composed of the Sixtieth Ohio, One Hundred 
and Twenty-sixth New York, the Ninth Vermont and Pott's and 
Rigsby's Batteries, were placed on the left of the line on Bolivar 

The Third Brigade, Col. Ford commanding, composed of the 
Thirty-second Ohio Infantry, a battalion of the Potomac Home 
Brigade, Company F, New York Heavy Artillery; a battalion of 
Rhode Island cavalry and a detachment of the First Maryland 


Union Cavalry. This brigade, though the smallest, was sent to 
hold and defend the most important point about the ferry and key 
to the situation, Maryland Heights. 

The Fourth Brigade, under Col. Ward, was composed of the 
Twelfth New York State Militia Regiment, called into the United 
States service for three months, were stationed on Camp Hill. There j 
were also several small organizations not connected with any bri- 
gade. Of these were the First Maryland Home Brigade, stationed at 
Sandy Hook; the Eighth New York Cavalry, at Harper's Ferry. 
These mounted troops performed outpost duty and kept Col. Miles 
well informed of every movement of the enemy. The sick and 
wounded were sent north to Gettysburg, and the stores at Fred- 
erick removed before the enemy reached that town. It will also be 
noticed that in the distribution of the troops Miles had not sent a 
man to Loudon Heights or J^oudon Flats. Both places played an 
important part in the attack on Harper's Ferry. On the morning 
of the 6th the enemy made quite a demonstration against Col. Ban- 
ning, the Eighty-seventh Ohio, and his two howitzers, at Berlin, 
and a good fight was made by him against an overwhelming force, 
but he was finally forced to retreat to Knoxville. The enemy was 
so close on them that they had to abandon hastily a limber 
and place a gun on a flat car to save it from capture. 

At Sandy Hook Banning was re-enforced by Maulsby's Mary- 
land Home Brigade and the limber was recaptured and brought in. 

The telegraph communications to the east .were now all in 
the hands of the enemy, and their operators used the wires to send 
Miles the compliments of Gen. Pope. They had captured the lines 
and keys, and were making good use of their instruments to jolly 
us in our cooped-up position. They would sign their dispatches 
Gen. Jackson's Army. 

On Sunday, the 7th, Col. Miles made a tour of inspection in 
the direction of Waverton Mills. He ordered reconnaissance made 
by a battalion of the Eighth New York Cavalry, but they went as 
far as Berlin without finding the enemy. Capt. Green of the First 
Maryland Cavalry, with more daring than others, rode within two 
and one-half miles of Frederick, captured a half dozen of the enemy 
and brought them to the Ferry. From them Miles learned the true 
position of the enemy. Another detachment was sent out under 
Col. Voss of the Twelfth Illinois Cavalry. This regiment had a 
severe fight, and lost two killed and twelve wounded, but brought 


in forty-five prisoners. Miles appeared very active, and began vis- 
iting the different posts and giving instructions to all the troops, 
and expressing himself that if each one would do his full duty we 
could defend the Ferry. On the 8th, Monday, Miles visited Colonel 
Ford, in command of Maryland Heights. He impressed upon 
the latter the importance of his position, but neglected entirely to 
have Ford construct works for defense. It may properly be held 
as an excuse that at that time we had not learned the art of throw- 
ing up a protection for defense, as we did during the Atlanta cam- 
paign under Sherman, and the Middle Tennessee campaign under 
Schofield and Thomas. If Ford had built a fort, as Burnside did 
at Knoxville, when McLaw's division assaulted Fort Saunders, 
that resulted in 1,300 dead and wounded, the enemy would have 
run up against the same result on Maryland Heights, and Harper's 
Ferry would never have surrendered. But Miles failed to urge on 
j Ford the protection of defensive works. He may have relied on 
! the trees that fairly covered the Heights to serve as a shelter, 
but as a military man he should have noticed that the guns under 
' McGrath were of little service for the defense of the Heights, as 
they were on the west side of the Elk Mountains, and in their po- 
sition could only be used to fire up the Potomac and over to Boli- 
var Heights, in Virginia. No nine-inch Columbian can be fired 
with accuracy or do damage to an object at such a distance. 

The reports of the movement of the enemy came so thick 
and fast from all directions that some of the unreliable scouts, 
who always magnify their importance, saw the enemy crossing 
and camping at Snicker's Gap. The dust in the daytime and the 
campfires at night they had seen proved this, but their report at 
that time was wholly false. They also saw a column of Union 
troops coming up on the west side of the Shenandoah, under Siegel, 
50,000 strong, from Washington. Another column was reported 
coming from Cumberland and Hagerstown that would surely re- 
lieve us. To ascertain the truth of any relief, General White sent out 
a reconnaissance from Martinsburg, and Miles sent the Eighth 
New York Cavalry in several directions in the Shenandoah Val- 
ley, but found neither enemy nor troops intended for our relief. An- 
other expedition was sent to Hagerstown, in Pennsylvania, but 
no sign of an enemy was found in that direction. These recon- 
naissances proved that we could have marched out of Harper's 
Ferry and gone to Pennsylvania, joining the right wing of the 


Army of the Potomac, providing that army would not have beetij 
defeated by Jackson and Lee together. The separation of Jack- 
son from Lee, with twenty-six brigades, leaving Lee sixteen bri-j 
gades to meet McClellan, was a weak point in the Confederate 
movement. The Rhode Island cavalry also made a scout to Solo- 
man's Gap and thence to Jefferson, where they captured twenty- 
five prisoners. On Thursday, September 9th, our telegraph com- 
munication with the West was cut off. On the same day General! 
White, at Martinsburg, made preparations to vacate the town, and] 
a train of empty cars was sent to him to bring the stores to Har- 
per's Ferry. Miles was very active, and again inspected every po- 
sition on the Maryland side of the river. The rumors of the ene- 
my's advance continued all day. 

September loth Jackson left Frederick, passed through Mid- 
dleton and Boonsboro, and recrossed the Potomac at Williamsport 
into Virginia, where General A. P. Hill marched to Martinsburg, 
and Jackson and Ewell's division went to the North Mountain 
depot on the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad. On their first day's 
march Hill arrived within several miles northwest of Martins- 
burg. As soon as General White became aware of the near presence 
of the enem}^ he evacuated and retreated to Harper's Ferry. On 
his arrival at the Ferry he predicted that Lee would be defeated 
in Maryland, but that we at the Ferry would be captured. But, 
strangely, no thought was given for us to leave and escape cap- 
ture. The enemy's movements were closely observed by our 
scouts and cavalry, and at one time they dashed at the Confederate 
column and came upon Jackson himself, who liesurely, and with- 
out thinking of danger, was marching at the head of his column. 
But as the Federals were only a small force they were soon driven off, 
and Jackson selected a more secure position in his column on the 
march. In the skirmish our forces had several wounded and one 
killed. The loss to the enemy was unknown. From the observa- 
tory on Maryland Fleights the movement of Jackson could not 
yet be seen, and the reports of his coming received but little credence. 
But on the following day, the nth, a strong force of the enemy 
appeared before Solomon's Gap, this being the key to Maryland 
Heights and to the Antietam Ford. Our pickets were re-enforced, 
but the enemy lost no time, and at once opened fire on our post at 
that gap, continuing active all day. During this time the main 
body of the enemy entered Pleasant Valley and made preparation 



to march on Elk Mountain, of which the southern end juts on the 
Potomac River and is caUed Maryland Heights, the natural de- 
fensive position by which to hold Harper's Ferry. During the 
night the enemy in Pleasant Valley kept very quiet, but early next 
morning was active and displayed a force of three brigades on 
the eastern slope of Maryland Heights. They had expected quite 
a resistance at Solomon's Gap, but after shelling the place our 
pickets retired and left the enemy in possession of this important 
point. Later, Captain McGrath, with his nine-inch Columbians, 
tried to reach the gap and shell the enemy out of the position, but 
so far as known no projectile from his gun disturbed the Con- 
federates in that place. After Solomon's Gap was in the hands 
of the enemy they advanced in force, but with great caution, to 
the lookout on Maryland Heights. The skirmishing had been 
brisk during the day, but at no time did the enemy show any 
great energy to force an engagement. Finally night intervened 
and our troops still held the Heights. Colonel Ford, the senior of- 
ficer in command, doubted his ability to hold the position, but 
Miles promised him re-enforcements during the night. In the 
evening General White had arrived at the Ferry with his troops from 
Martinsburg. By rank he should have resumed command of the 
post, but he believed that as Miles held the rank of Colonel in the 
regular army the Government intended for him to command the 
defenses, and so General White proffered him his services. Colonel' 
Miles accepted and issued an order directing that troops should obey 
General White on any part of the line. Early in the morning of the 
13th McGrath opened his guns again in the direction of Solomon's 
Gap, and shelled the intervening woods, but received no response 
from the enemy. The Confederates, however, became very active 
with their infantry in Pleasant Valley. The re-enforcements to 
Colonel Ford were sent him, consisting of the One Hundred and 
Twenty-sixth New York and the Thirty-ninth New York (Gari- 
baldi) Regiments. The One Hundred and Twenty-sixth New 
York was sent to the top of the mountain, and were under fire 
for their first time. They went into the fight in most gallant 
manner, but as they became heavily engaged at once, and the 
Colonel was carried off the field wounded, they soon ^ave way, 
and in a slight panic ran down the hill, where McGrath' s battery 
was in action. The other troops on the lookout with them also 
gave way. Several companies of the Thirty-ninth New York had 



been sent in the direction of Solomon's Gap to reconnoiter. The 
others, with some of the One Hundred and Twenty-sixth, regained, 
the lookput, which had not yet been taken possession of by the! 
enemy, who, being now more encouraged, pressed forward and] 
drove our troops from the point. This settled our fate at Harper's] 
Ferry, for shortly afterward, without paying any attention to Mc-l 
Grath's guns on the side of the hill, they brought their artilleryl 
forward, and were now in position to shell any part of Harper's 
Ferry, Camp Hill and Bolivar Heights. 

As all our troops were on the west side of Elk Mountain and 
the Confederates on the top of the mountain, there was no chancel 
for us to regain the hill except by the use of McClellan's superior 
force and rapid movement, for he now knew every move the 
enemy was making to capture us. And as Jackson had marched 
o£f and used twenty-six brigades of Lee's army against us, he had 
but sixteen brigades to oppose him. Although Miles had urged 
Colonel Ford to hold the hill under all circumstances, yet it was but 
common sense that after the lookout was in possession of the 
enemy any further use of troops on that side of the river was folly. 
So Colonel Ford ordered McGrath's gun spiked and thrown down 
the hill, and retreated across the Potomac. 

The enemy cared so little for the guns that at noon of the 
next day, the 14th, they had not been taken possession of, and 
the Thirty-ninth New York was sent over to bring over the brass 
fieldpieces, also spiked the day before, and they succeeded in re- 
gaining them without being disturbed. The troops on the Mary- 
land Heights were the One Hundred and Twenty-sixth New York, 
Thirty-ninth New York, Thirty-second Ohio, the Potomac Home 
Brigade of Maryland Volunteers, the First Maryland Cavalry, 
Corliss' Company of Rhode Island Cavalry (the latter had been 
ordered to Bolivar Heights early in the morning), and McGrath's 
battery of the Fifth New York Heavy Artillery, a total force of 
about 3,000 men. If these had been judiciously placed' they could 
have offered considerable resistance to the three brigades of Mc- 
Law and probably held the Heights for at least another day. But, 
being nearly all new troops and badly led, with rumors of being 
surrounded by Lee's whole army of veterans, they saw but little 
chance for "success and only inevitable slaughter, with no fortifica- 
tion excepting a rifle pit of very poor construction. As soon as Ford's 
troops had crossed over to Harper's Ferry the outposts on the Sandy 

AT harper's ferry. 10 7 

Hook road were withdrawn to the head of the pontoon and railroad 
bridge, remaining there undisturbed until relieved by the Con- 
federates on the morning of the surrender. Our losses on Mary- 
land Heights had been about i6o killed and wounded. That of 
the enemy was not ascertained. Just before noon Colonel Miles 
visited Ford on Maryland. Heights, and by personal exertion suc- 
ceeded in getting some of the troops back to the lookout; but no 
sooner was the enemy advancing in force than they gave way again. 

When Miles reached Camp Hill on his return from Maryland 
Heights, he found Major Mcllvain preparing to open fire with two 
twenty-pound Parrotts. In viewing the position on the Heights 
from Camp Hill he noticed the troops of Ford coming down, and 
was surprised that Ford was leaving the Heights. He sent Lieu- 
tenant Binney, his aide, to stop the retreat, but it was to no pur- 
pose and too late. The act had been done, and soon afterward the 
enemy had a battery on top of the lookout, ready to use it on our 
troops at Camp Hill and Bolivar Heights. The vacation of the 
Heights by Ford did not relieve the enemy of fighting. General 
Slocum, who commanded the advance division in Franklin's Corps, 
was very anxious to regain Crumpton's and Solomon's Gap, and 
with the proper energy and assistance of the rest of the corps 
could have succeeded and captured the three brigades under Mc- 

As our troops were retreating from Sandy Hook they were 
followed by the enemy some distance and shelled by their artillery. 
As Colonel Miles had his headquarters in the lower part of the 
town, several of the enemy's shells reached that place. On the 
evening of the 13th the enemy had full possession of two out of 
three of the Heights that surrounded Harper's Ferry. This re- 
duced our holdings to Camp Hill and Bolivar Heights. 

After two days easy marching. General Jackson's corps 
reached Martinsburg on the 12th, and had quite a feast on the 
commissary stores left b}^ General White. He did not lose much 
[time, but marched at once by the several different roads for Har- 
per's Ferry, and about 11 a. m. on the morning of the 13th came 
into view of our forces on Bolivar Heights. We were now com- 
ipletely surrounded by McLaw on Maryland Heights, Walker on 
j Loudon Heights and Jackson's whole corps in the Shenandoah 
I Valley at Halltown. General A. P. Hill of Jackson's corps 
marched his division at once in a southeasterly direction to the 


Shenandoah River and pushed two six-gun batteries forward onto 
Bull's Mountain, a hill just south of Bolivar Heights, from which 
he was able to enfilade our batteries on that ridge. As soon as 
possible Jackson advanced in line of battle to School House Hill, 
into the edge of the woods, and further north on Furnace Hill 
placed two batteries, with General Winder's brigade, near the 
Sheppard's Town road to operate on Bolivar Heights. 

There were four of the enemy's batteries placed in position to 
the south and southeast of us, with an enfilading fire on our left 
flank. The batteries of Ewell's division were distributed on prom- 
inent places from the Winchester pike to Furnace Hill, and ten 
guns went with A. P. Hill's division to the left bank of the 
Shenandoah, Thus we were surrounded by seventy-six guns, all 
in position, with a plunging fire from every side of the compass, 
and no protection, and but a limited amound of ammunition. 

m'clellan's lost opportunity. 
Up to the 13th Lee and Jackson had executed every part of 
their plan to perfection, but about noon on that day the plan and 
order for the capture of Harper's Ferry accidentally fell into the 
hands of General McClellan. The enemy's cavalry, under Stewart, 
had covered every movement of the Confederates, and McClellan 
knew only that Lee was marching in two columns, one to Hagers- 
town and the other to Harper's Ferry, leaving him still in doubt 
whether Lee intended to recross the Potomac or move into Penn- 
sylvania. Hooker, who commanded the advance and First Corps 
on McClellan's right, reported it as his opinion that Lee did not 
intend to go to Pennsylvania. McClellan, still undecided, pushed 
only his cavalry forward on the Boonsboro road, and so slowly that 
in four days he covered, over good roads on the enemy's trail, just 
twenty-five miles, which showed an unusual amount of caution 
and fear to come up with the enemy's rear, and prevented him 
opening communication with Harper's Ferry. Obtaining the copy 
of Lee's order for the investment of Harper's Ferry was a rare piece 
of good luck, as it contained the exact position of each division of 
Lee's army, and a chance was here presented to destroy Lee's 
forces in detail. As McClellan was within twenty-five miles of 
Harper's Ferry, and the distance between Lee and Jackson's col- 
umn now more than thirty-five miles, he had the best and most 
unique opportunity in history over an opponent. As he was within 

AT harper's ferry. 109 

plain hearing of the guns of McLaw on Maryland Heights and 
those of Walker on London Heights, he had no reason to believe 
that the capture of the order was a ruse by the enemy, and a reso- 
lute advance of his army would have compelled the Confederates 
to have abandoned Maryland Heights, and this would have placed 
the left wing in touch with Miles at Harper's Ferry and his whole 
army between the now widely-separated wings of the Confederates 
under Lee. 

But McClellan was not the man to use his great opportunity 
and not a move was made until late in the afternoon on the 13th. 
One division (Slocum's) was pushed forward to the foot of 
Crumpton's Gap. Stewart's Confederate Cavalry was very active 
in his front and held the two passes, through Turner's and Crump- 
ton's Gap, but no Confederate infantry was nearer than McLaw' s 
division on Maryland Heights and the rear guards at the passes 
and at Boonsboro. With good roads and fine weather and a moon- 
light night, a march of twelve miles would have brought McClel- 
lan' s army at the foot of the mountain and ready at the early dawn 
of the 14th to have forced the gaps and relieved Miles and de- 
stroyed Jackson and Lee. 

But McClellan, with that inherent caution, waited before he 
made any movement until next morning. Lee knew and depended 
on McQellan's irresolution, and withdrew all the rest of the troops 
except General D. H. Hill's division and the cavalry to guard the 
passes. As the combat at Harper's Ferry indicated that the sur- 
rounded garrison had not yet surrendered, Lee determined to hold 
the passes and fight McClellan to gain time for Jackson to carry 
out his plans, and Longstreet was ordered back from Hagerstown, 
a distance of thirteen miles, to South Mountain, to support Hill. 
At the same time Jackson, who was now in communication by 
several signal stations with McLaw on Maryland Heights and 
Walker on Loudon Heights, made the necessary arrangements for 
the combination of attacks on our lines. On Bolivar Heights our 
line of defense was about a mile and one-half long, with the right 
resting on the Potomac and the left, by a short curve, on the 

On this open plateau, without protection, were placed the four 
batteries, six guns each, at proper intervals. Rigsby's Twenty-fifth 
Indiana Battery, on the extreme left, next Von Sehlen (our) Fif- 
teenth Indiana, next Philipp's Illinois Battery and Pott's Ohio 


Battery. In Camp Hill were Graham's New York Battery, four 
twenty-pound Parrotts and some brass guns of small caliber and 
of no service except at close quarters. Around these thirty-two guns 
were the numerous batteries of the Confederates. Those on Mary- 
land Heights, nearly 800 feet over our heads, and those on Loudon 
Heights, about 600 feet higher than our position, and the Bull's 
Mountain Battery on the southern flank, about 200 feet higher 
than the rifle batteries, on the line of Bolivar Heights. 

During the early morning on the 14th (Sunday) Jackson's 
signal station on School House Hill, near the Winchester pike, 
was very busy waving and sending messages to the enemy's sta- 
ton on Maryland and Loudon Heights, and about 10 a. m. a rifle 
battery on Loudon Heights opened fire on us. At the same time a 
brigade of infantry moved down to Loudon Flats. The Confed- 
erates under McLaw, on Maryland Heights, had completed a clear- 
ing on the top of the lookout and placed their guns in position to 
fire from that point. 


We were now anxiously awaiting General Franklin ?nd his 
corps of 20,000, who had been sent to our relief, but unfortunately 
had not started from their camp in Pleasant Valley until the morn- 
ing of that day, when they should have been at the foot of the 
mountain by the break of day, ready to assault McLaw's position 
on Maryland Heights, and doubtless would have had him and all 
his division prisoners by noon, instead of the condition being re- 
versed for us. 

At half-past two that afternoon every gun from the sur- 
rounding enemy was in action, and energetically replied to by 
every serviceable piece on our side. Firing was kept up until dark. 
During the afternoon a solid shot struck the limber of the second 
piece of our battery, killing several horses and wounding three can- 
noneers and shattering the limber into a thousand pieces, so that the 
color of the paint could not be recognized. 

By this rapid firing our ammunition was getting short 
and, as we expected heavy work at close quarters during the night, 
I was sent down to the ordnance department with three wagons 
to get all the three-inch ammunition the teams could haul. As I 
reached the ordnance officer and gave him my requisition I was 
told that not a shot could be had, as all the ammunition obtainable 


was already at Camp Hill and Bolivar Heights. I had to return 
empty handed, and while passing the fortifications at Camp Hill 
noticed a lone Sergeant of Graham's battery laboring to ram down 
a twenty-pound Parrott shot in a gun that was already loaded. 
I asked him if I should stop the vent. He had no one there to do 
this. He replied that he thought the shot was already at the bot- 
tom. He now unrolled the lanyard to its full length, attached the 
friction primer and told me to stand to the windward and see the 
effects of his shot on Maryland Heights. After taking good aim at 
McLaw's guns he pulled the lanyard, and two, instead of one shot, 
sailed forth to the Confederate position. 

Whether any damage was done to the enemy is doubtful, but 
when the smoke cleared away I noticed the Sergeant on his haunches 
trying to raise himself and saying: "What do you think of that, 
orderly? Didn't I send them rebels a good one?" At the same 
time I noticed that the recoil of the gun had been so heavy that it 
broke the trail of the gun. 

I left the Sergeant with his broken gun and reported the fruit- 
less result of my mission to our now astonished Captain. He at 
once ordered a slow fire, and soon after sent me to Camp Hill and 
Bolivar to hunt for more ammunition. I made a thorough search, but 
found that other batteries had been around on a similar mission, 
with no better results. 

As night was coming on, I stopped to get a little lunch at the 
home of a German family, and tied my horse to the hitching rail 
outside. I had my baggage, consisting of underwear and blouse, 
in my saddle-bags and saddle-straps. After enjoying my lunch I 
stepped out of the house to mount my horse, and, to my great sur- 
prise, fou^d him gone. I walked to the camp, reported the mat- 
ter to the Captain and received another horse; but next morning, 
when General Jackson rode into our lines, some one in his escort was 
mounted on my little horse, with my baggage untouched. I ap- 
proached the rider and asked him how he came in possession of my 

On looking for my horse on that moonlight night I noticed the 
head of the column of Colonel Davis' mounted brigade on their 
way, cutting themselves out of this trapped position. They passed 
on to the Ferry, then to the Kennedy farm, and from 
there to Sharpsburg. The Kennedy farm was rented by John 
Brown in 1859 and used by him as the base of supplie 




twenty-two negroes and white men. General Jackson had first in- 
tended sending a flag of truce and have all the non-combatant citizens 
removed, if we refused to surrender. But with Slocum's guns 
against McLaw on Maryland Heights he dispensed with the formal- 
ity and ordered the batteries to open on us from all points. Jack- 
son had great faith in the precaution of McClellan, and believed that 
the artillery sounds were only the result of a cavalry affair, little 
dreaming that McClellan could ever become active. Jackson sent 
Lee a message to ask General D. H, Hill, then fighting at South 
Mountain, to protect his rear. If he had had the slightest suspicion of 
McClellan's advance he no doubt would have ordered an assault on 
our lines that afternoon, and forced a surrender that evening, which 
would at once have enabled him to join Lee on the northern bank of 
the Potomac. 

Our natural position on Bolivar Heights was a strong one, 
and could not have been assaulted from the west. Jackson there- 
fore preferred that Walker and McLaw should bombard our rear, 
expecting this to force our surrender, knowing that we would soon 
be out of ammunition. The enemy became encouraged and ad- 
vanced to the edge of the woods, where they found cover by means 
of trees and broken ground, driving our skirmishers towards us, 
and before nightfall had possession of a line to our left and right 
flank, giving them an artillery fire down the Potomac. Reaching 
the pontoon and railroad bridge at the Ferry, Jones' Confederate 
division was also pushed forward. The slacking of our fire on ac- 
count of the shortage of ammunition had made the enemy believe 
that we had suffered injury to our guns. Although exposed from 
all sides, the Confederate artillery had done us practically no dam- 
age, save the explosion of our limber and a solid shot through our 
blacksmith shop (the forge), which scattered the horseshoes andj 
scared one of the farriers who was resting under the shop. No at- 
tempt was made to assault our lines that day, and everything was 
quiet in our front from sundown until about 9 p. m., when on our left 
a division of infantry began to move across the Shenandoah to get 
to our rear. Ten pieces of the enemy's artillery had already been^ 
on the Loudon Flats early in the afternoon, and at a distance of 900 
yards, in action on our left. But as the Confederates were crossing] 
in force the situation became serious for the infantry that held that 
part of our line. They had seen the cavalry getting away, and the 
officers got together and insisted since the artillery was out oi 

AT harper's ferry. 113 

ammunition that their Colonels should see Miles and permit them 
to follow the mounted troops, claiming that instead of being relieved 
by McClellan the latter's artillery fire had been farther in the distance 
at the close of the day's fighting than in the morning. At midnight 
our officers went to Miles, but received no encouragement, except 
that we must stay and fight and hold Harper's Ferry, this being his 
orders from Washington. The enemy evidently appeared to be 
satisfied with the day's operations, as they believed that their artil- 
lery shelling us from every part of the compass had- done great dam- 
age and demoralized our new troops. Their guns, from the lofty crest 
of Maryland Heights, as also the batteries from Loudon Heights, 
reached every part of our line on Bolivar Heights, and the pieces 
on Bull's Mountain had a raking flank fire on us, while six batteries 
had a front fire, with only four field batteries of the Union line to op- 
pose them. Yet not a single gun was injured or made unserviceable, 
not a cannoneer was killed, and only three wounded by the limber 
explosion in our battery as previously described. 

Our expert marksmanship told a different story. As Walker's 
Confederate batteries were not reaching their mark, a Lieutenant 
tried to point a gun himself, and a shot from Sergeant Kuntz's gun 
of our battery, sighted by Corporal Stiefel, cost that Lieutenant 
his life, the shell completely ripping him to pieces. The Southern 
artillery was never equal to ours, but the cavalry in the early part 
of the war was justly claimed to be superior to the Union horse. It 
may also be stated that our raw troops, of which most of the gar- 
rison was composed, stood the shelling by the enemy's batteries like 
veterans, and at no time were they panic-stricken, and if the artillery 
had ceased firing and an assault been made over open ground, where 
they could see the enemy, they, too, would have given return blows 
before giving way, as many bloody and sanguinary fields bore testi- 
mony thereafter. 

The greatest injury that we received was done by ourselves in 
replying to the enemy's guns and spending our ammunition almost 
to the last round before an assault was made. The direct assault, no 
doubt, would have been repulsed, but when A. P. Hill, on the morn- 
ing of the 15th, appeared on Loudon Flats with a whole division, and 
several batteries on our left, within 400 yards of our rear, then the in- 
telligent soldier, from a private in the ranks to the highest officer in 
command, knew that the "jig was up" and the loss of another life 
meant nothing short of murder. 


The only position from which the enemy conld have an enfilading- 
fire against the right of our line was from Sugarloaf ^Mountain 
(Port Duncan), just in the bend of the Potomac north of Bolivar 
Heights. Captain Von Sehlen, fearing that a battery would be lo- 
cated there, rode to ]\Iiles' headquarters and reported his observa- 
tion. He received an order to place four of his guns on the north- 
em end of Bolivar Heights, where he had good protection from all 
the rest of tlie enemy's artillery, except from two batteries on his 
tiank on Furnace Hill. The right and left sections were, in accord- 
ance with that order, taken to that position. AA^ith them were the 
Captain and his two First Lieutenants, and the Austrian Lieutenant 
of the Garibaldi Guards was left in charge of the center sec- 
tion, in a greatly exposed position, on Bolivar Heights. This was a 
mistake of the Captain, as he should have left his first section there 
and with tlie other two sections gone to the new position. 

We had a full day's experience with field artiller}- at long range 
and, according to histories published of wars before and since our 
Civil ^^'ar, proved that artillery does but little damage at long dis- 
tance. But this did not deter Captain Yon Sehlen from using the 
last few rounds in our limber to shell a supposed batter}- on Sugarloaf 
^Mountain. Subsequent reports show that the Confederates had no 
battery tliere. Miles was quite correct in abandoning ^larAdand 
Heights and forming his line of battle on Bolivar Heights, pro- 
\-ided he had thrown up some breastworks and traverses against 
Loudon Heights and Loudon Flats. But the trouble was that Jack- 
son had about 25,000 infantr\- for assault, all veterans flushed by vic- 
tories on ever\- field. They had fought since tlie beginning of the 
war, while we had thousands who had never been in battle, intelli- 
gent and brave, but discouraged beyond endurance by the defeat 
of even** engagement in the East, and with Generals in command 
who were intriguing against each other. 

McClellan had tlie Lee and Jackson plans at noon on the 13th, 
as is e^^denced by his message to Lincoln at that hour, when he 
tel^;Taphed him that he had caught the enemy in their own trap 
and would use them up, pro^-iding his men were equal to the emer- 
gency. He certainly had no time to lose, and should have ad^-anced 
his whole army and had them on top of South ^Mountain and Frank- 
lin Corps aroimd McLaw's forces on ^lar^land Heights before the 
sunset of that day. But only a part of the corps passed the Catoctin 
Mountain during the day and night of the 13th, and on the 14th he 



leisurely followed with the rest of the army, and he himself did not 
leave Frederick until 2 p. m., and then left for the front, twelve 
miles away. This showed that the fault was not with his men, but 
that he himself was not equal to the emergency. 

There is no doubt, although never admitted, that Jackson 
learned during the night that if he did not capture us early in the 
morning, some one in the Army of the Potomac might force a 
corps around McLaw and open a way for us to get out, for at early 
daylight, before any object could be distinguished, and our whole 
army at the Ferry was still veiled by a heavy fog, he had every one of 
his guns in position, opened fire on our line and kept it up for fully 
two hours. 

During the night I had gone to the northern end of Bolivar 
Heights with Von Sehlen and his four guns. After selecting a cov- 
ered place for the caissons and reporting the position to the 
Captain, I remained with him for a time until the firing in our rear 
on top of Bolivar Heights became most terrific. I rode up to the 
Captain, saluted him and asked permission to go back to the other 
two guns left in charge of the Austrian Lieutenant on Bolivar 
Heights. The permission was granted, and I rode off through shot 
and shell that now swept the open plateau on the east of Bolivar 
Heights. Every gun of the enemy appeared in action, and every 
part of our position was unsafe. 

After riding about a mile through this iron hail, I reached the 
section, but to my astonishment found it abandoned. I looked 
around for the cannoneers and soon found some of them sheltered 
in a deep gully, I asked the Sergeant and Corporal : "How is this? 
Why are you not with your guns and replying to the enemy's fire?" 
"Well," said one of the men, "when we were up by the guns and 
were exposed to the fire from all sides, the Lieutenant that the 
Captain put over us said, 'Mein Gott in Himmel! Run boys! 
Come, get away from here !' And so we just left and sought protec- 
tion.' By that time the enemy had ceased most of their firing, and 
I at once sized up the situation, and asked them to join me and we 
would open fire on the rebels. 

I soon had the required number to man one gun, and we 
went up the hill and opened fire. Our aim was directed on School 
House Hill, near the Winchester pike. Joel Smith, a lead driver of 
gun No. 3, left his team in the gully and came forward voluntarily 
to act as No. 3, to stop the vent. Not having a thumb stall, he 


pulled the sleeve of his blouse forward to protect his thumb, which 
after the first shot had already been burned. 

No sooner had we begun firing than every battery and gun of 
the enemy renewed their action, and the roar of artillery was most 
terrific. Colonel Miles, expecting an assault by the infantry, during 
the brief interval of quiet, called the brigade commander^ together. 
Two batteries and a large part of a division of infantry of the enemy 
had advanced to our left and rear just across the Shenandoah, and 
not a single shot had been heard for our relief from McClellan's 
100,000 on the Maryland side. As the firing in that direction the 
evening before had apparently receded instead of coming nearer, 
and as the ammunition was exhausted, the brigade commanders 
unanimously decided it was absolutely useless to try and defend the 
post longer, and determined on surrender. 

Up to this time the infantry, as usual in case of bombardment, 
held closely to the trenches, and were by no means panic- 
stricken, as has been stated by some misinformed historians, 
but waiting for the charge and under complete control of the of- 
ficers. The trenches were not strong, only ordinary rifle pits, with 
no head logs for protection, and, to my knowledge and observation, 
not a man left his place in the line. That they would have re- 
pelled an assault, the same as we did at Franklin in 1864 is my firm 
belief, but the positive conviction of the brigade commanders that 
McClellan was not coming to our relief, caused our superiors to 
agree to surrender. 

With this decision reached, General White was sent to make 
terms with the enemy. Colonel Miles walked up to where I had 
shortly before taken charge of the gun and was still firing, and, ad- 
dressing me, said : "Orderly, cease firing. We will have to surrender." 
The gun was loaded, and Corporal Johnson gave the order to fire, 
and, turning to Miles, said : "General, don't let us surrender to 
these rebels. Let us fight them." Miles replied : "It's no use, as 
we cannot be relieved (pointing over to Maryland) by our friends." 
John Gimber pulled the lanyard, and a final shot was sent to the 
enemy on School House Hill. Von Sehlen had previously stopped 
firing. Miles waved the white handkerchief. At this the enemy's 
line gave vent to one of the most piercing rebel yells I ever heard, 
but their guns kept up their firing. We remained standing by our 
guns. Colonel Miles walked to our left about fifty yards. Lieutenant 
Binney, his aide, being the only person with him. A piece of shell 

AT harper's ferry. 11 7 

fired by a battery across the Shenandoah, at our left and rear and 
close to us, struck the Colonel in the leg. The wound proved mortal. 
He died on the second day thereafter. 

As soon as General White reached the top of Bolivar Heights, 
where the Winchester road crosses, he was joined by a 
staff officer from General Jackson and soon after by General A. P. 
Hill of the Confederate Army. The three then rode down to where 
Jackson was on his horse, at School House Hill. As the enemy's 
battery had not ceased firing, they probably had not noticed the white 
handkerchief through the still overhanging fog. Jackson, not more 
than 800 yards away, sent forward his corps color bearer, who 
rode toward us, on Winchester pike, turning into Bolivar Heights, 
swinging his flag at their own artillery and asking us to hoist the 
white emblem of surrender. 

Corporal Johnson called out: "See here, sir, you are off of 
your beat. If you desire a white flag hoisted you will have to do it 
yourself." A cook of the One Hundred and Eleventh New York, 
who was standing near, went back to his quarters and brought 
out either a piece of tent or a sheet, and, climbing up the lone tree 
near us, tied the emblem of surrender to a branch, where it spread 
to the wind. 

Captain Von Sehlen now brought up his guns from the right 
of Bolivar Heights, but in changing position two of his caissons 
tumbled down the hill. 

The enemy did not permit us to wait long, but sent a detail of 
men and marched off with the guns, putting an infantry guard over 
us, which was not done to any of the other field batteries. They 
brought one of their field batteries (twelve-pound Napoleon guns) 
close to us. The horses were well cared for, but the harness was of 
cotton or hemp rope. No cannoneer was permitted to ride, and no 
baggage carried on the footboard, so they told us. Their cannoneers 
certainly were not schooled as we were in the handling of guns. 

With the infantry brigade that had now arrived came a German 
music band, organized in Richmond, which quartered itself across 
the road and opposite to us. They had hardly squatted down when 
some one shouted, "Here comes the General !" and, looking up, we 
saw Jackson, with his great slouch hat, big boots and much-worn 
gray uniform, leading a cavalcade at full gallop. The band stood 
at attention, playing while he passed. Emmory Mattlock, a member 
of our battery, always full of dry humor, remarked within my hear- 



ing : "Boys — he ain't much for looks, but if we had him we wouldn't 
be in this fix." 

Jackson passed on to Camp Hill. Later I was sent down there 
and found, as previously related, the horse that had been stolen from 
me the night before, now ridden by one of Jackson's officers, but I 
never learned how he procured the animal. About 2 p. m. the 
guard was withdrawn. In accordance with the terms of surrender 
a muster roll had to be made of each company. This kept the of- 
ficers busy until about 5 p. m., when they gathered at Camp Hill to 
meet such Confederate officers as were present in a sort of love 
feast. Our officers went there, and the men fraternized with each 
other, as if they were brothers who had not met for years; and, 
strange as it may seem, not an unkind word passed between the con- 
querors and the vanquished. 

The Confederates did not lose much time with us, although we 
were mixed together, and met as long-lost friends as soon as we were 
within hearing of each other. But they took leave of us and marched 
back from whence they came by way of the Winchester pike to 
Shepardstown and Williamsport road, over the Potomac to Antie- 
tam, where McClellan was waiting to attack them as soon as they 
were all there, for he had failed to destroy the sixteen brigades while 
the twenty-six brigades were around with us, but it was shown that 
neither Lee nor Jackson was a Frederick the Great, a Napoleon, a 
Blucher, a Moltke, a Grant, Sherman, or a Sheridan; for if either 
had been any of those they would not have marched back to Antie- 
tam, but with at least twenty-one brigades would have crossed the 
Potomac at the Point of Rocks and fallen on McClellan's rear and 
base of supplies, then at Frederick, Md., and placed themselves be- 
tween McClellan's army, with Baltimore and Washington at their 
mercy. But this country was not to be divided; hence Lee and Jack- 
son did not grasp the opportunity, with less risk against McClellan 
then at Antietam. 

Part of Walker's and A. P. Hill's divisions marched all day and 
night on the 15th to get back to Maryland to help Lee. 

Harper's Ferry would have been relieved if General Franklin 
had shown a little more energy to get to us with his corps ; but it is 
due to General Slocum, one of his division commanders, that he alone 
showed any energy on the morning of September 15 to help us. 
Franklin intended to wait until the fog had disappeared, and there- 
fore did not move. The cause of the surrender was not the fault of 

AT harper's ferry. 119 

Miles and his men, but the authorities in Washington, and General 
McClellan, then commanding the Army of the Potomac, nearly 
100,000 strong. It is due to McClellan that before he left Washing- 
ton he recommended the withdrawal of Miles from Harper's Ferry 
to Hagerstown, or to Maryland Heights, then to destroy the pontoon 
bridges across the Potomac, and hold out to the last ; but Washing- 
ton authorities did not concur in this suggestion, and simply relied 
on McClellan's activity to relieve Miles, and sent instructions to the 
latter to hold Harper's Ferry. One of the amusing incidents at 
Harper's Ferry surrender was a New York State militia regiment, 
wherein each member carried his pet cat. The Confederates per- 
mitted them to carry their pets home, but retained their fine Spring- 
field rifles for further use on their side of the cause. 

form of parole at harper's ferry. 
As soon as the officers of the opposing army completed their 
greetings and telling of experiences during the fight, a call was 
made upon General L. O'B. Branch of the Confederate Army, to 
ascertain what the form of parole would be for the captured forces. 
It was learned that duplicate muster rolls were to be required ; that 
the regiments and batteries were to be drawn up as for muster, the 
roll called and the men to answer to their names. Then a form of the 
parole was to be read to them, and the men, raising their right 
hands, were to promise not to serve against the so-called Confed- 
eracy, unless regularly exchanged, the officers to sign individual 
paroles. The rolls of the regiments and, batteries were at once pre- 
pared, and about 6 p. m. word was sent to General Branch that 
D'Utassey's brigade was ready, and for him to come over and parole 
them as he had promised to do. General Branch came over, and the 
first regiment to be paroled was the Thirty-ninth New York. The 
regiment was drawn up in column by companies. Colonel D'Utassey, 
Colonel Seguine of the One Hundred and Eleventh New York and 
a Mr. Kent, correspondent of the New York Tribune, who acted 
as private secretary to Colonel D'Utassey, and Lieutenant Chas. G. 
Bacon, Adjutant General, were present. When General Branch was 
handed the muster roll of the first company, turning to Colonel 
D'Utassey, he remarked : I suppose. Colonel, you understand this 
parole as I do, viz, that you and your men are not to 
go into any camp of instruction or drill, until such a time as 
you may be exchanged?" Colonel D'Utassey became excited and 


exclaimed : "No, sir ; I do nothing of the kind. Such an under- 
standing would not be correct. Suppose my Government would 
use this paroled force against tlie Indians in the Northwest, who are, 
like you, in a state of insurrection. Would you, sir, consider that a 
violation of this parole?" "Well," said General Branch, "I do not 
think I would." "Then, sir," said D'Utassey, "in the present state 
of our forces, here surrendered, some of whom are green troops, it 
might be necessary to place them in a camp of instruction. I must 
therefore decline to accept the parole for my men, on the condition 
now imposed by you, which was not intended at the time of our sur- 

The articles of capitulation were drawn up upon the decision 
of Colonel D'Utassey, but General Branch refused to parole any of 
the troops until he could see General A. P. Hill. After waiting for 
over three hours. General Hill sent notice that he sustained Gen- 
eral Branch in his view of the parole. Colonel D'Utassey said that 
he would rather go to Richmond than take such a parole. But all 
is fair in war, and so Colonel D'Utassey ordered his brigade to be 
ready to march out next morning, early on the i6th. It appeared 
to us that the enemy was very busy and wanted to get rid of us as 
quickly as possible, and by 6 a. m. the brigade was in motion for 
the pontoon bridge. The muster rolls of the brigade were given to 
General Hill at his headquarters and a pass asked for D'Utassey's 
troops to march out. General Hill asked whether the brigade had 
been paroled. An affirmative answer was given. Hill wrote the 
pass and we crossed the river. On the other side stood a guard, who 
ordered the men who had kept their ramrods to deposit them in a 
pile close by the bridge. 

Our drivers and cannoneers had packed their small arms (re- 
volvers, etc.) in their knapsacks, and were not disturbed. The of- 
ficers had also brought out a full complement of horses, covering the 
U. S. branded on their side, by a blanket. Some of these officers 
got into serious trouble over the horses later. Whether the other 
brigades had given General Branch the slip, as we had, I never 
learned. Every flag in the brigade had been taken from the staff 
and carried out in the officers' baggage wagon. 

We did not have to march very far until we reached the Con- 
federate outpost. A fine, good looking young man of the Con- 
federate cavalry performed the duty. Not more than 300 yards 
from him stood the Federal vidette, an old man who had seen serv- 


ice in Mexico and on the plains as well as in the regular cavalry. 
We felt relieved when once more under Stars and Stripes and that 
day marched to Knoxville, where we stopped over night. We contin- 
ued our march the next day through Frederick, and halted long 
enough to examine all the places that had become historic by the 
presence of Generals Lee, Jackson and Longstreet, but heard noth- 
ing of Barbara Fritchie, the originator of that story not having 
then materialized. 

We marched by easy stages to Annapolis, where we were placed 
in a camp of paroled prisoners, remaining there for several days. 
Then we received transportation for Baltimore, where we remained 
one day and were then sent by the Pennsylvania Central to Chicago, 
en route to New Ulm, Minnesota, to fight the Indians. 


Colonel Miles, on his deathbed, mentioned the following as de- 
serving great credit during the fight: "Brigadier General White 
was everywhere when the danger was greatest, giving orders on the 
left of our line, which was the most exposed. Major J. H. Mcll- 
vain, chief of artillery, deserves much credit for his cool manner 
and skill in placing the batteries. Captain McGrath, Company F, 
and Captain J. H. Graham, Company A, Fifth New York 
Heavy Artillery, deserve great credit for the way they handled 
their guns on Camp Hill and Maryland Heights. First Lieutenant 
Sam A. Barras of the One Hundred and Twenty-sixth New York 
is highly praised for rallying the regiment on Maryland Heights 
after Colonel Sherrill was wounded. Orderly Sergeant Fred'k W. 
Fout, of Von Sehlen's battery, and a sergeant of Captain Graham's 
battery, are deserving of promotion. The batteries of Rigsby, Phil- 
hps. Potts and Von Sehlen, for their courage displayed on Bolivar 
Heights, deserve great praise for holding their position against tre- 
mendous odds." 

Just before his death Colonel Miles remarked : "I have done 
my duty, and as an old soldier am willing to die." This was a fit 
ending to the long years of service he had given to his country, and 
he only regretted that he was unable to live to do full justice to 
those who had been so closely connected with him for their bravery 
in carrying out his orders. He could not understand why the Gov- 
ernment had been so slow in sending him assistance, when the au- 


thorities at Washington knew that he was surrounded by 40,000 of 
the enemy for five and a half days. 

At 4:30 p. m. on Tuesday, the i6th, he passed away, his staff 
officers being with him. His death came easily, without a struggle. 
General Hill promised ever3^thing as to transportation of the body, 
but his mind was so occupied with our parole and for the relief of 
Lee, that he did nothing. By the exertions of Major Mcllvain, Bin- 
ney and Reynolds, on the 19th the body was transported to Fred- 
erick, thence to Sweet Air, and buried. 

Although high officials, in order to shield themselves, have de- 
nounced his surrender as disgraceful, yet those with him who knew 
the facts will remember Colonel Miles as a patriot and a hero, who 
gave his life for his country and the cause he defended, and can 
testify that not a traitorous hair grew on his head. 

The responsibility for his surrender lies entirely upon the shoul- 
ders of others. 


24-pounder howitzers 6 

20-pounder Parrotts 4 

i2-pounder guns 6 

6-pounder smooth guns 6 

i2-pounder light howitzers 2 

3-inch rifled pieces 10 v 

3-inch rifled James 6 

The following guns were spiked : 

lo-inch Dahlgrens 2 

50~pounder Parrotts i 

i2-pounder light howitzers 2 

i2-pounder guns 2 

Total , 47 




On our way to Chicago, as we passed through that part of In- 
diana that was the home of many of the battery boys, some sHpped 
off to pay a visit to their folks and the girls they had left behind them. 
But nearly all reported in a few days, at Camp Douglas, where 
we quartered, preparatory to being sent to Minnesota to subdue 
the Indians. No sooner had we been made comfortable than a 
swarm of Chicago newspaper reporters sought interviews with 
each of the men who cared to talk. The Chicago Times, at that 
time a disloyal and pro-British sheet, printed the most treasonable 
articles that were ever permitted during the war, and tried to in- 
fuse the idea into the men that their officers had absolutely no 
control over them; that they could do as they pleased, and were 
at liberty to go home; that the Indian insurrection was in sym- 
pathy with the rebellion, and if we went to Minnesota we were 
violating our paroles. 

Such tirades appeared daily in the Democratic press of the 
country, now that President Lincoln had issued the emancipation 
proclamation, but the good discipline of our men was so deeply 
rooted that few of them paid any attention to these disloyal ad- 
visers. As soon as the Indian uprising had been put down and 
our services in Minnesota no longer needed, the men were fur- 
loughed for thirty days in squads, and returning, generally 
brought some few recruits with them. This continued during 
October and November. 

Others who had been on furlough and desired to work were 
given permission to go down to the lumber district of Chicago 
and help unload lumber, thereby earning some extra money. On 
the ist of October Captain Von Sehlen was ordered to report to 
Washington before the Court of Inquiry reviewing the surrender of 
Harper's Ferry. 


Lieutenant Torr was in command of the battery in Camp 
Douglas, and Lieutenants Harvey and Schlaib with him. I re- 
ceived a leave of absence and went at once to Indianapolis. The 
second day after my arrival I met by accident, on the street, Gen- 
eral Lazarus Noble, then Adjutant General of Indiana. We were 
well acquainted, and, saluting him, he said: "Orderly, please 
come to my office to-morrow morning at lo o'clock." I called, 
as requested, and after some questions about Harper's Ferry fight 
he read to me Colonel Miles' death-bed recommendation and asked 
me to tell him all about my reopening the fire and about the Austrian 
Lieutenant from the Garibaldi Guards. I gave him a true and 
straight story. He asked me to wait a few minutes, and shortly 
returned with my commission as Second Lieutenant in the Fif- 
teenth Indiana Battery, to date from the resignation of Lieutenant 
Mueller, in August. He told me where to go and be mustered. I 
lost no time calling on Lieutenant Morris, the then mus- 
ter-in officer at Indianapolis, and promptly became an of- 
ficer. I called again on General Noble and thanked him. 
Taking his pen knife, he cut the chevrons of an orderly sergeant 
from my sleeves, and suggested that I now buy a fine uniform, 
that of a Second Lieutenant. The position I had well earned, 
but as I had spent every spare dollar early in the year recruiting 
the battery, I had no money to buy the uniform. I met an old 
friend. Dr. Espey of Palestine. I told him of my good luck, but 
also of my poverty, and, thanks to him, he handed me thirty dol- 
lars, to pay it back when I could. With this money I started off 
to get the uniform in a ready-made clothing store. The dealer 
had no trouble to fit me, and all of my friends claimed it was most 
becoming. I at once wrote the Lieutenant in command of the 
battery, at Chicago, of what had happened. Captain Von Sehlen, 
on his return, appeared to have been greatly surprised, but was 
unable to change what had been done. My being commissioned 
put a stop to future traffic in Lieutenant commissions. I was 
credibly informed that several promises were still out, but they 
could not be fulfilled. However, soon after we went into the 
field, a fight was made on Lieutenant Schlarb, which was both un- 
just and disgraceful. 

To give no cause for complaint, I returned to the battery long 
before my furlough as orderly sergeant had expired and remained in 
camp until about November 15, when a furlough as Second Lieuten- 


ant was given me. After the expiration of this leave I was ordered to 
recruit. The records will show that I brought more recruits to 
the battery in that one month than Lieutenant Harvey sent forward 
in the whole eleven months of 1863. I reported to the battery in 
December. Just then the battle of Fredericksburg had been fought 
and the press, both Republican and Democratic, pounced upon 
Lincoln for having placed an incompetent General at the head of 
the Army of the Potomac. The Chicago Times declared the 
Union was now dissolved and the Confederacy a fixed fact. But 
while the tirade was still going on Rosecrans, at Stone River, gained 
a single victory in a three-days' fight over Bragg and caused him 
to evacuate Murfreesboro. 

As the emancipation proclamation had gone into effect, many 
soldiers were encouraged by their Southern sympathizing riends 
to desert, and for about two months the list of deserters in 
the Union Army was greater than before or after. As an excuse, 
they claimed that now it was only a war to free the slaves and not 
for the Union. But drastic measures by the Government soon 
put an end to the practice, and those who had been led astray re- 
turned under the amnesty proclamation of the President. 

In December our exchange was perfected, and the Eastern 
troops captured at Harper's Ferry were sent to the Army of the 
Potomac, while those from Indiana and Illinois received orders 
to go to Camp Butler, at Springfield, Illinois. I now received 
transportation, with a sergeant, to go after some absentees. A few 
of our men who had grown tired of waiting had joined the Six- 
teenth Illinois Cavalry, under Colonel Capron, then in camp at 
Peoria. I was sent there with Sergeant Crawford. On the way 
our train met with an accident that came nearly making an end 
of our future usefulness. The track had been washed out, and the 
whole train, except the rear car, went in the ditch. We found our 
men, but Colonel Capron did not want to give them up, claiming 
that we would easily fill their places with others. 

The old veteran was so agreeable about it that I left the men 
and returned to Chicago. As I found the battery no longer there 
I followed on to Springfield, and on my arrival I found that the 
battery had been ordered to Indianapolis to be remounted. Camp 
Butler was some distance from Springfield, but,, at the time of 
our visit was the dirtiest camp we had seen up to that date. On 
reaching Indianapolis I found the men of the battery in fine quar- 


ters, at Camp Morton. We soon had a new outfit of guns am 
horses and were once again ready for the field. The commander 
of Camp Morton was an aide-de-camp on the staff of Governor 
Morton, with the rank of Major in the Indiana State Mihtia. 
Being in the United States service, we did not recognize his au- 
thority. All the batteries from Indiana were independent, but 
the Major had been helping to organize certain batteries still in 
that camp, and therefore assumed an authority over us. 

Finally this matter came to focus by our refusing to appear 
on dress parade with the other batteries. He sent his adjutant to 
put us all under arrest, demanding our swords. These we re- 
fused to give up, and one evening, after supper, the Major 
called. He was greeted and offered some hot punch, made him- 
self very agreeable and remained with us for over an hour. Fin- 
ally he broached the subject of our arrest. The Captain and 
Lieutenant Torr had been expecting this and were prepared with 
their arguments, which completely convinced the Major that he 
had no authority over us. For the sake of the discipline of the 
other batteries, he asked that, as a courtesy, we should appear in 
dress parade while at Camp Morton. This was done, and the 
matter ended satisfactorily. During the fine weather in February 
and the early part of March we again resumed battery maneuvers 
and gun drill, and of the six batteries in camp it was common 
talk that our maneuvers were letter perfect. 

As a divertisement, the men off duty enjoyed themselves at 
the expense of a trim young officer who was sporting a new mous- 
tache, and often a chorus of voices would call on him to "take those 
mice out of his mouth, and "No use saying they are not there, 
for we see their tails hanging out." Others with great beards would 
be urged to come out of that bunch of hair. We know 
you are in there; we see your ears a-working," etc., etc. In this 
way the soldiers had their fun with the dandies and none escaped 
pranks and jokes. The camp rang with laughter, fun and frolic, 
and these brave fighters behaved like school boys, little thinking 
of the hardships on the march and in the field awaiting them, and 
soon to be endured and shared by each. 

On the 22nd of February our battery of six guns was called 
on to fire the salute, it being Washington's birthday. At noon 
we fired loi rounds at the State House yard, in about four and 
one-half minutes, but in the evening, at dress parade, the Major 



had a large party of ladies to see all the batteries salute. The 
first thirty rounds were fired for the Union of States, the second for 
the State of Indiana, the third for the Governor of Indiana, and 
the fourth for the ladies of Indiana. 

After the fourth round a driver named Lanning jumped out 
of the line on a stump in our front, and at the top of his voice 
shouted : "Now, boys, let's fire one round for the pie-women of 
Indianapolis." Lanning immediately jumped back into the ranks, 
but the adjutant came and wanted to know who it was made that 
remark, and insisted that we arrest him; but of course none knew 
the party. As soon as the dress parade was dismissed the boys 
had a hearty laugh over the occurrence, believing that the "pie- 
women" were as much entitled to a salute as any others in the 
Union, for they were regular in their attendance to supply the 
boys with the national delicatessen, and it is claimed that several 
made quite a little fortune out of their "home bakeries" during 
the Civil War. 






After our muster for pay on the ist of ^March the pa}-master 
put in an appearance, and once more we were flushed with money, 
and the first few days many a dollar went to buy such nick-nacks 
as the Government did not furnish. I bought myself a nice young 
horse, but it was totally imfit for the ser^-ice as a saddle horse > 
also a fine outfit of saddle and bridle. We passed time in camp 
with the usual duty of drill and batter)' maneuvers until the 15th, 
when orders reached us to at once proceed to Cincinnati and re- 
port to General Bumside, who shortly before had been placed in 
command of the Department of the Ohio, including the States 
of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, ^lichigan and Kentuck}-, with such parts 
of Tennessee as he might occupy east of the Cumberland !Moimtains. 

On reaching Cincimiati the Captain at once reported our 
arrival at department headquarters, and without unhitching we 
were ordered into camp at Covington, Kentucky-, where we found 
a part of the Xinth Army Corps, which had just arrived from the 
East, in camp. Lieutenant Har^-ey and Corporal Zahm had re- 
mained at Indianapolis on recruiting duties. 

On the 3rd of ^March Congress had passed an enrollment act 
to enroll all the able-bodied men between 20 and 45 years of age in 
each Congressional District, subject to draft, under charge of a 
provost marshal, having the lank of Captain. Those not having 
families were to be called first, and those claiming exemption on 
account of physical defects were examined by a board of three, of 
which the local provost marshal was chairman, and one a medical 
man. Substitutes would be accepted, or a payment of three hun- 
dred dollars would be taken, in place of personal sen-ice. That sum 


was thought sufficient to secure a voluntary recruit by the Gov- 
ernment. The effect of the law was to fix a market price for sub- 

The provisions for drafting were wise and were admirably 
carried out by the chief marshal and administered with patience and 
honesty. There was no ground for complaint, but in New York 
hostile authorities provoked a collision between the mob and na- 
tional authorities on account of the exemption and substitutes; 
but as new regiments were still received, the benefit the draft could 
have made by filling up the old organizations was lost. The pub- 
lic looked upon the draft as a disgrace, and great efforts were 
made to escape it, resulting in extra bounties being paid by coun- 
ties and towns, and very few men were actually put in the ranks 
by the draft. This created the crime of bounty jumping, one 
equaled only by the repeaters at election. With sublime cheek 
the former now come forward with claims for pensions, and I 
have met some in the '90s who acknowledged having deserted no 
less than three times, for no other purpose than to get bounty, 
and one man confessed, while a convict in the New York State 
prison at Albany, that he had jumped the bounty thirty-two times. 
There were other reasons why the draft should have been enforced, 
but especially a political one. The volunteering of the patriotic young 
men to the field gave an undue power at home to the dissatisfied 
opponents of the National Government. This lasted until the 
State laws allowed the soldier to vote in the field. This was never 
given to the Indiana soldier, but in many other States the soldier 
vote was certified to in the field and sent home. The nature of the 
draft was only a make-shift to cure the mischief that had been done 
by calling into service new regiments, instead of filling up the old. 
During the nine months that Lieutenant Harvey was on recruiting 
service he enlisted twenty-two men. Nine came to the battery,' but 
the other thirteen deserted as soon as they had their bounty, and 
then sold their uniforms to a species of low characters who 
dealt in clothing. These would sell the clothing to army contractors, 
who would buy them for one-third of their value. The State of 
Indiana paid, for every recruit mustered, seven dollars expense 
money to the officer on recruiting duty. This gave additional en- 
couragement to enlist bounty- jumpers, and the men enlisted under 
this arrangement in the State of Indiana would not have formed a 


Permission was also given to recruit from prisoners in Camp 
Morton, but, fortunately, not one of them ever reached our battery, 
while two other batteries, then in process of organization, were filledj 
up with them. 

We were comfortably fixed in our quarters at Covington, whenj 
one evening, early in April, orders came for our battery to proceed] 
to Paris, Kentucky, that section of the State being open to in- 
cursions of the Confederates whenever they felt like it. It was by] 
that route that open communication was kept up from sympathizing] 
friends in the North with friends all over the Confederacy, and, as] 
Burnside had not come to the West merely to command and ad-j 
ministrate the department, but to suppress the rebellion and its sym-] 
pathizers and just as soon as he took in the situation he deter- 
mined to put a stop to this communication and the traffic in contra- 
band goods. Of these quinine and percussion caps formed the prin- 
cipal part. 

As Lincoln still had faith in General Burnside, even after hisi 
failure at Fredericksburg, he permitted him to bring his old corps,] 
the Ninth, to the West, and issued an order for the other troops then] 
doing duty in Kentucky to be organized into the Twenty-third! 
Corps. With this little army Burnside was to carry out Lincoln's 
long-cherished idea and hope to reach East Tennessee by way of] 
Lexington, Camp Nelson and Cumberland Gap, while Rosecrans 
was allowed to carry out his plan, so ably supported by the Corps 
commanders of the Army of the Cumberland. 

In the new Twenty-third Army Corps were many regiments oi 
East Tennesseeans who had refugeed and enlisted in the United] 
States service. In the other part of the corps were recent organiza-^ 
tions from Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois, and some few Kentucky 
regiments. General Parke, Burnside's former chief of staff, was 
placed in command of the Ninth ^Corps; General Harsuff, a former 
brigade commander in the Ninth Corps, and an officer in the regu- 
lar army, received the command of the Twenty-third Corps; Gen- 
eral Cox, who had commanded the Ninth Corps at Antietam, had 
been promoted for meritorlus service to a Major General, but in the 
Congress just closed the United States Senate had failed to con-, 
firm him, was placed in command of the District of Ohio. He was 
one of the ablest of volunteer Generals during the entire Civil War,' 
and had been previously sent to Columbus to supervise the draft; 
and General Wilcox, another division commander of the Ninth 


Corps, was given command in the District of Indiana, with General 
Boyle remaining in command of the District of Kentucky. 

At the time of Burnside's arrival Cincinnati was in a curious 
.political and social condition. The raid of Bragg and Kirby Smith 
had made it a center for Southern sympathizers. The fact that the 
Confederate Army, in the second year of the war, had occupied the 
hills that skirted the Ohio River, had revived the hopes and confi- 
dence of those that wished success to the Southern Cause, and seemed 
to have been stimulated to personal activity. Situated as Cincinnati 
was, there were a considerable number of influential business men 
of Southern families who had trade connection with the South and 
personal alliances by marriage, forming a broad basis of sympathy 
for the Southern independency, and making a large element of 
the community. The other citizens were ardently and intensely 
loyal. The sympathizing and disloyal were bitter, and not always 
restrained by their prudence. Many Southern women that had 
refugeed from the theater of active war (among these Mrs. Semes 
and daughter, wife of Admiral Semes) were very open in their de- 
fiance of the Government, and carried on a notoriously large and 
active contraband mail. Such conditions made a deep impres- 
sion on General Burnside when he took command of the Depart- 
ment of the Ohio. General Boyle, who was a Kentuckian, had been 
in command of the department before Burnside, and had struggled 
against these irregularities, but without avail, and it had come to be 
looked upon as impossible to stop it, or even to restrain the evil in 
this half-civil, half-military government of the Kentucky District. 
After his arrival, Burnside, being convinced of this wide-spread 
activity of the disloyal elements, issued the famous "General Orders, 
No. 38," which gave a fair idea of these hostile influences, since 
every class named therein was numerously represented. 

The text of the order is as follows : 

Headquarters of the Department of the Ohio^ 
Cincinnati, Ohio, April 13, 1863. 
General Orders, No. j8. 

The Commanding General publishes, for the information of 
all concerned, that hereafter all persons found within our lines who 
commit acts for the benefit of the enemies of our Country, will be 
tried as spies or traitors, and, if convicted, will suffer death. This 
order includes the following class of persons : Carriers of secret 


mails; writers of letters sent by secret mails; secret recruiting of- 
ficers within the lines ; persons who have entered into an agreement 
to pass our lines for the purpose of joining the enemy; persons 
found concealed within our lines, belonging to the service of the 
enemy; and in fact all persons found improperly within our lines 
who could give private information to the enemy, and all persons 
within our lines who harbor, protect, conceal, feed, clothe, or in any 
way aid the enemies of our Country. The habit of declaring sym- 
pathy for the enemy will not be allowed in this department. Persons 
committing such offences will be at once arrested, with a view to 
being tried as above stated, or sent beyond our lines into the lines of 
their friends. It must be distinctly understood that treason, ex- 
pressed or implied, will not be tolerated in this department. All 
officers and soldiers are strictly charged with the execution of this 

By command of Major-General Burnside. 

Lewis Richmond, Assistant Adjutant General. ■ 

By these means the Confederate authorities had constant com- 
munication with their friends and sympathizers in the Northern 
States. Many of those that carried on the trade and contraband 
traffic between the States represented themselves as spies, and 
no doubt were such, for each side in turn, but there were prob- 
ably many who were honestly and fanatically devoted to the cause 
of the South. Of these the women were the most troublesome, 
and practiced upon the forbearance of the Federal officers to the 
last degree. Although spies and informers received but little en- 
couragement at headquarters, and were looked upon with contempt, 
in aggravated cases examples were made, and some few were pun- 
ished, and a few women sent through the lines to their Southern 

We were now again on the march, and soon reached Paris, Ky., 
the garden spot of the world, with all that this statement implies. 
There our battery was divided, three guns being placed on the Win- 
chester pike and three remaining on Mount Sterling and Maysville 
pike. For about two weeks we lay in position, when one evening we 
were ordered into camp, overlooking the bridge in the town. Nearly 
all the infantry had been ordered away. We had lit- 
tle time to drill and maneuver, but now since the bat- 
tery was together again, we turned out every morning 


and paraded through the town to our drill grounds In 
the town lived a Major Buford, a retired artillery officer of the 
United States Army, with seven daughters. The Major had noticed 
our fine military appearance and was now anxious to see us drill. 
First he came alone, on horseback, without letting us know who he 
was, but critically viewed every movement of the battery. Next 
day he came again, alone, but on the third day brought two of his 
daughters, on saddle horses, out with him. A few days later it had 
become the fad of the young Blue Grass beauties to ride out and 
see us maneuver, which generally would open with a salute 
of six rounds for our lady visitors. This visit became so interest- 
ing that some of the ladies, not supplied with saddle horses, would 
mount the ammunition chests and remain on them during the flying 
execution of a movement. 

Captain Von Sehlen, after he had recommended Lieutenant 
Schlarb' for promotion, discovered that he did not have the military 
aptness required of an artillery officer, and now wanted to get rid of 
him. This Schlarb knew and felt. Hence the two were decidedly 
unfriendly. One morning, as we reached the drill grounds, a num- 
ber of ladies being seated on the limber chests and caissons, the 
Captain gave the order : "Forward into line on right piece ! Gallop 
— march!" All the guns moved as if by a clock. The signal for 
"Left about" was given, and "Commence firing on the right!" All 
followed in quick succession. The firing of the pieces was carried 
out, as ordered, but the third piece was fired off quicker than the 
ramrod could be withdrawn, which, passing through the hand of No. 
I, lacerated one of his fingers, knocking the cannoneer down. This 
gave Schlarb a good chance to even up with the Captain. He rode 
to him, thinking the cannoneer killed, and told him that he would 
hold him responsible. Schlarb was at once ordered under arrest and 
sent to camp. Owing to our own particular instructions, no one 
could come in front of the muzzle during the loading of the gun, 
and thus No. i escaped with comparatively slight injury to his 
finger. If we had followed the regular tactics No. i would 
have been ripped in two, and while other batteries have lost by 
accident, we never had another during the whole of our service. 
Our maneuvers continued and our audience of beauties was always 
present, until the beginning of May, when we were called on to do 
a most disagreeable duty, for which we had never enlisted, and 
which came nearly demoralizing us, although we obeyed the orders. 


One morning, just as we were about to go on our usual drill, 
the Captain received an order from the post commander to furnish 
mounted men, armed and equipped, with an officer, to report to one 
Captain Reed, who held a commission similar to that of Mosby in 
the Confederate Army, but had no men except one Lieutenant. 
These were to go to the country to hunt rebel deserters and bush- 
wackers. Reed was a native of Paris, but loyalty had made him 
many deadly enemies. Our Captain took the first trip, but was dis- 
gusted with the duty. On his return Lieutenant Torr went out on 
the next raid. They had gone over a great deal of country, but 
had not encountered a single Confederate. Torr was also disgusted 
with the duties, and as it was my turn next, it seems that we were 
about sure to catch the spy. He was a young man, of a prominent 
Southern family, who was reported to have come to pay a visit to 
his sweetheart, a Miss Talbot. John Throckmorton, a nephew of 
General Burrbridge, went with us. He knew the country and peo- 
ple. We went to the Talbot plantation, Reed and his Lieutenant 
with us. On our arrival the young lady came to the door, and was 
so sweet, agreeable and obliging in her answers, that she promptly 
disarmed all our suspicion and asked us, fourteen all together, if she 
could not serve us with something to eat. We accepted, and the 
negro servants were set to work to prepare a meal. Reed asked the 
young lady about her love affairs with the young Kentuckian, whom 
we heard was paying her a visit. But she just laughed and jollied 
all of us out of any suspicion. The meal was soon prepared, and I 
had seven to eat and seven to stand guard to prevent a surprise. All 
were anxious to eat, but I would not permit it until the first seven 
had finished the meal and then exchanged places. I remarked to 
John Throckmorton, "Isn't she lovely?" "Yes," he answered, "en- 
tirely too lovely to be true. You don't know the arts of these Ken- 
tucky women, that they employ to deceive. I believe that man we 
are hunting is at a near neighbor's, and she just dished up, to de- 
tain us so he can escape." 

Captain Reed soon joined us, and he thought like Throckmor- 
ton, and concluded to make a call upon all the neighbors. We rode 
away from our hostess, who was all smiles and politeness, inviting 
us to be sure and call again, if we ever passed that way. Leisurely, 
but with eyes wide open, we left the place for the next plantation, 
about three-quarters of a mile distant. AVe surrounded the place, 
asked the negroes and looked the premises over. Just as John 


'Throckmorton and myself cast a glance back at the Talbot farm, we 
j saw the young man leave the Talbot house and dash for a thick brush 
I nearby. There was only one fence between us and the Talbot man- 
sion ; so we, as quick as lightning, were over the fence and through 
the fields for the Talbot homestead. We called the lady out, and 
some went to the brush. They found the place where the horse had 
been hid, but horse and rider were now gone. Miss Talbot would 
eive us no facts, but one of the colored servants who had waited 
on us told us that the young man had been hidden in the large fire- 
place while we were in the house and eating our meal. Captain 
Reed now read to her "Order No. 38," under which she was ar- 
rested. John Throckmorton asked her to have the family carriage 
hitched and have her coachman drive her to town, as it was now 
getting dark. She asked us if we, Throckmorton and myself, 
would not accompany her in the carriage, but our sympathy for her 
prevented our acceptance of the generous offer. The distance we 
had to make was about ten miles, on the Mount Sterling road, and it 
was nearly ten o'clock when we reached Paris, with our fair pris- 
oner, where she was locked in jail. 

At the time General Burnside issued "Order No. 38" he organ- 
ized a military commission, of which General Potter, one of his 
division commanders, became president. He was a brother of 
Clarkson M. Potter, a Democratic member of Congress, after the 
war, and a son of the Episcopal Bishop Potter of Pennsylvania. 
The character of the whole court was high in intelligence and stand- 
ing, and before this court the young lady was arraigned and con- 
victed, to be sent through the lines. During her imprisonment she 
was treated with the greatest kindness and consideration. I have 
often regretted that I was ever detailed to perform such a dis- 
agreeable duty, as one of my objects in enlisting in the artillery 
was to meet the enemy in open battle, and I believe that Captain 
Von Sehlen, Lieutenant Torr and every man detailed for such duties 
with Captain Reed were equally disgusted, 

What became of either our prisoner or her escaped lover I 
never have learned, but presume they met again, were married, and 
"lived happily together ever after." 


About the same time that these petty arrests were made, Val- 
landingham, who had been a representative in Congress from the 


Dayton, Ohio, District, denounced "Order No. 38" and General 
Burnside, who, he claimed, had issued the order wholly on his own 
responsibility. This, of course, was not true. The year before the 
President had proclaimed against the treasonable practice in very 
emphatic terms; that the aiders and abettors of the rebellion, and 
persons that discouraged voluntary enlistment, resisting drafts, or 
guilty o± any disloyal practice, by giving aid and comfort to the 
enemy of the United States, shall be subjected to martial law, and 
liable to trial and punishment by court-martial or military com- 

Burnside, therefore, was carrying out in his department the 
purpose of the administration. General Wright, who had com- 
manded the Department of the Ohio, had been obliged to put a stop 
to the treasonable editorials and publications of military informa- 
tion that would be of benefit to the enemy. The same had also 
been done about that time by General Sherman (when he was in 
command at Memphis) to the editors of the Memphis Appeal. 
Burnside, therefore, carried out the administration views by issuing 
such an order. Vallandingham, with his extreme views of Mr. 
Lincoln and the war, advocated peace at any price. 

Although he was not a Secessionist, he would have prevented 
secession by yielding to every demand that the Southern States could 
have made. This made him oppose every effort to suppress the re- 
bellion, believing that the war was unconstitutional, on the part of 
the National Government. He believed that if the Southern people 
were let alone a reconstruction of the Union could be effected by 
yielding to the slavery faction, and that the interest of the 
Western States was with the South. He was a Northern man, with 
Southern principle, and had a violent temper of personal hatred and 
opposition to the leaders of the party in power at the North. In 
his denunciation he was most extreme, and his expressions wholly 
unbridled. He claimed that he was within the limits of constitu- 
tional opposition, bcause he refused to encourage armed resistance 
to the Government. In the early part of May he made a speech at 
Mount Vernon, Ohio, denouncing the Lincoln administration, and 
also attacked "Order No. 38" and Burnside. 

As it happened, a Captain of volunteers was there, on leave of 
absence from the army in the field, who took down the speech in 
shorthand. Other reputable witnesses corroborated the report, 
charging the administration with design to erect a despotic form of 


I Government, and refusing to restore the Union when it could be 
' done, and that the war was carried on for the simple purpose of lib- 
; erating the slaves, and declaring that the Provost Marshals for the 
Congressional Districts were intended to destroy the liberties of the 
i people; that courts-martial were usurping power and trying citi- 
I zens contrary to law ; that he would never submit to the orders of a 
military dictator, such as Burnside, and his subordinates, and that 
if the party in power would be allowed to accomplish its object, 
the people would be deprived of their liberty and a monarchy estab- 
lished. Such were his expressions, and they were supplemented by 
the disgraceful action of trampling under his feet a copy of "Order 
No. 38." 

As soon as Burnside learned the truth, he promptly accepted a 
challenge to test the order, and ordered the arrest of Vallanding- 
ham. Without consulting with any onCj he sent his own aide-de- 
camp, with a guard, to make the arrest at Dayton. Burnside' s rea- 
son for prompt action was that he did not want to meet failure or 
be baffled in the arrest, to give Vallandingham a chance to raise 
a mob, which there would have been had the purpose of General 
Burnside become known in advance. 

Early on the morning of May 5 the prisoner was taken in 
charge and brought to Cincinnati, to the Burnett House, where he 
breakfasted, and was then taken to the military prison connected 
with the barracks, for the troops in the city. On the same day he 
was brought before the military commission, of which General Pot- 
ter was president, on charges of publicly expressing sympathy with 
those in arms against the Government and uttering disloyal senti- 
ments and opinions, with the intention and purpose of weakening 
the power of the Government in its efforts to suppress the rebellion. 
After Vallandingham had consulted with a niimber of lawyers, 
among them George E. Pugh, he adopted the course of protesting 
against the jurisdiction of the court, and against the authority of 
his arrest, claiming that he was not amenable to military authority, 
and that his speech did not constitute an offense against the Con- 
stitution and laws. At the trial his counsel failed to appear, and so 
Mr. Vallandingham cross-examined the witnesses himself, calling 
on some to testify for him. He tried to prove that he had not ad- 
vised any forcible resistance to the Government, but had urged his 
hearers to defeat the party in power at the polls. The commission 
thought he intended to arouse an outbreak of sympathy for the 


amied enemies of the country. The trial ended on the 7th of May, 
but on account of a habeas corpus proceedings the judgment was 
not promulgated until the i6th, when the court found that the pris- 
oner was guiltv, as cliarged. and the sentence was close confinement 
at Fort \\'arren. Boston Harbor, during the continuance of the war. 

The proceedings of tlie writ of habeas corpus were set for the 
iitli of ^Nla}' and ably argued by the District Attorney, for General 
Bumside. The decision was given by Judge Leavitt, refusing the 
writ, on the ground that civil war being in the land, and Ohio being 
imder the militar\- command of General Bumside, by the appoint- 
ment of tlie President, the acts and offenses described in "General 
Order Xo. 38" were cognizable by the military commission. But 
three days later tlie President commuted the sentence, by directing 
that ^"allandingham be sent, under a secure guard, to the headquar- 
ters of General Rosecrans. to be forwarded by him beyond our 
militar}- line. That in case of his return within our line, he be ar- 
rested and confined for tlie term specified in the sentence. Under 
these instructions he reached the Confederate lines. The Southern 
ofliicials treated him kindly, and though tliey did not acknowledge 
tliat he was one of tliemselves, facilities were given him for running 
the blockade to reach Canada. There he placed himself in com- 
munication with the Democratic Convention, and during that year 
received the nomination for the Governorship of Ohio. 

This case caused considerable embarrassment to the Govern- 
ment, but 'Six. Lincoln showed his shrewd and practical judgment in 
dealing with \'allandingham so that it finally resulted to the politi- 
cal adA-antage of the national cause. Sending Vallandingham across 
tlie line deprived him of tlie personal S}Tnpathy which would have 
been aroused had he been confined at Fort Warren, and he could 
now only be considered as one of the enemies of the countr}-, from 
which the cautious treatment of the Confederates could not reheve 
him, even by helping him on his way to Canada, though they re- 
garded him as a friend, and expected that he would prove consid- 
erable trouble, at that place, to the National Government. 

\Mien certain politicians asked tlie President to rescind the 
sentence, he made it a condition that \^allandingham should make 
certain declarations of support to the National Government in a 
\-igorous prosecution of the war. This was done for him by Mr. 
^IcDonald of Indiana, then tlie nominee for Governor of that State. 
The conditions exacted were a fine piece of policy on the part of Mr. 


I Lincoln, as they relieved him of the sting and accusation of tyranny 
'and oppression, but it placed Burnside in an unfortunate position. 
;When Vallandingham was arrested, the Secretary of War tele- 
I graphed his approval, saying to Burnside: "In your determination 
I to support the Government, and to suppress treason in your depart- 
' ment, you can count on the firm support of the President." But a 
little later Burnside suppressed the Chicago Times for similar ut- 
ijterances, on the request of Senator Trumball, backed by prominent 
' citizens of Chicago. The President directed Burnside to revoke 
"Order No. 38." This he did by issuing "Order No. 91." Secre- 
tary Stanton also wrote him not to arrest civilians, until he had first 
! conferred with the War Department. These instructions should 
! have been sent to Burnside when he first took command of the De- 
partment of the Ohio, and not until outside political pressure had 
thus forced him to contradict his own well-defined policy. It put 
Burnside in a bad light, and he promptly declined any further re- 
sponsibility for such affairs in his department. 


During the month of May we made several raids in the neigh- 
borhood, under Captain Reed and Lieutenant Pettit, but no more 
arrests were made. On one of these excursions I was ordered to 
search the house of a planter where the men were not at home. 
While the rest of the squad, some ten men, stood guard outside, 
that no one could pass or repass, the Captain sent me in, with three 
men, to find a rebel deserter, a son who had come home, either to 
pay a visit or to take the oath of allegiance. With drawn revolvers, 
we made our duty known and told the lady what we were looking 
for. Having searched in the cellar without result, she showed us 
through the first floor of the mansion, then to the next, and finally 
the third floor. Here was a closet to which she said she had no 
key, but on her honor as a lady there was nothing in it but a lot of 
tobacco; but on her repeated assurances that there was nothing in 
the closet, in the shape of a human being, I accepted her word for 
it. After withdrawing from the house, and reporting that nothing 
had been found we rode away. The Corporal with me reported to 
the Captain, the incident of the closet, together with the 
assurance given by the mistress. I was promptly reprimanded, but 
I reminded the officer that I had enlisted for the artillery, and 
such duties as searching for fugitives belonged to Captain Reed and 
his Lieutenant. 


Nothing further was said about this affair until, an hour later, 
we reached the Armstrong plantation, which was deserted, not 
a soul was in the house, and all the doors were open and closets un- 
locked. We carefully examined -the premises, and as it was about 
noon, having been in the saddle all morning, we were hungry. We 
found the smoke-house Avell supplied, as was also the wine cellar, 
but for bread found only a few corncakes. One of the men looked 
through the cellar and found a lot of empty fruit jars, also one that 
seemed to have something in it and was sealed up with wax. 
The jar was brought up and opened, and, to our great surprise, it 
contained a silk Confederate Hag. A thorough search was made for 
other contraband goods, but none were found. We feasted the best 
we could on the wine, bacon and corncakes, and, without seeing any 
one or disturbing anything, left the place. On our return we passed 
the other mansion I had searched but failed to get into the upper 
closet, and now found the neighbors had all gathered there for a 
party, and were present in large numbers. The fugitive that we 
had wanted had not been in the house that morning, but the closet 
contained a large number of letters from friends and relatives in the 
Confederate Army. The owner had taken the key with him, but 
after we passed there the Confederate warrior had come home and 
joined the party in merry-making, as they now felt sure that he 
would not be disturbed. 

About seven miles from Paris, on the Mount Sterling pike, 
there lived a Mr. Sandusky, who owned a large farm near what is 
now Irvington, a suburb of Indianapolis. His son was in the Con- 
federate Army, and he, as a native Hoosier, made us feel at home. 
As soon as he knew from whence we came, and whose children 
we were, every time we called he had his slaves, who had remained 
with him, attend to our wants. Nothing was too good for us, not 
even his best and oldest bourbon, of which nearly every planter then 
had a generous supply. In fact, we were his friends, and he was 
our friend, as much as friendship could make it. The elder San- 
dusky never tired telling of the early settling of Indianapolis, of 
which he was one of the first families that had settled in the woods 
on White River, in the early '20s. On one of our calls, one of the 
negroes repeated the remarks of a near neighbor, a Mrs. Lea, whose 
men folks (several sons) were also in the Confederate Army, that 
she would not treat the Yankees with Kentucky courtesy, although 
they were the sons of former neighbors, as the Sanduskys were do- 


ing. This irritated the officers in command of the post (Colonel 
Pierce of the Twenty-ninth Massachusetts) so he ordered me to go 
to the Lea plantation, one of the finest in the State, and bring in as 
much corn as I could get teams to haul. 

I set out, and reached the farm about 2 p. m. The lady and her 
daughter were the only occupants, excepting some house slaves that 
were at home. I told my mission to the lady and asked how 
many teams she could arrange for. She^said none, as she had none. 
I told her that was strange, but promptly detailed five men to look 
for them, and they soon brought mules and oxen to fit out four 
wagons. These were loaded by the numerous slaves that now 
swarmed around the mansion. I asked her that, as it would be late 
before we returned, whether she would not get us some supper. 
This she reluctantly did. 

We had our supper, and I offered to pay for it, but she declined 
to accept. We drove to town with the corn. Mrs. Lea accepted my 
receipt, which she was at liberty to present to the Quartermaster and 
get pay, providing she or her husband proved their loyalty. 

As Mrs. Lea was still wagging her tongue about the Indiana 
Yankees, Colonel Pierce one afternoon called for thirty horses and 
saddles. On these he mounted his men and rode to the Lea man- 
sion. As he rode up to the front portico Mrs. Lea and her daugh- 
ter appeared. The Colonel notified her that he had come to stay all 
night, expected supper for his men and quarters in the house. She 
could select a room for herself and family, and he desired the rest 
to test her true Kentucky hospitality. He further stated that he did 
not come on account of her sons being in the Confederate Army; 
but as she had complained of Indiana Yankees, he would make her 
acquainted with some of the real dreaded Massachusetts Yankees. 

That Mrs. Lea was horrified can be imagined, but the servants 
were set to work, and Mrs. Lea and family retired, and Colonel 
Pierce, who had lost an arm at Fair Oaks, had charge of the house. 
Next morning, after breakfast, they all left, but before Colonel Pierce 
departed he gave Mrs. Lea and her daughters a lecture, cautioning 
them not to make another visit necessary, and she took the hint. It 
was afterwards that she complimented the Massachusetts soldiers for 
their gentlemanly behavior, while quartered in her house. She found 
nothing disturbed nor anything taken, but Colonel Pierce's harsh 
language she ascribed to the loss of his right arm in the conflict. 

The Government, as well as the people and soldiers, had seen 


the operation of "Order No. 38" for a month, and its opposition 
and results made General Burnside disgusted, so that when he 
arranged to start for the field, about June ist, he became indifferent 
as to how it was carried out. Although Captam Reed had a special" 
commission issued to him, on account of this order to my knowledge 
he never overstepped his instruction, at least while we were with 
him, and at no time did the men under him commit any overt act 
against citizens on account of their relatives being in the Confed- 
erate Army. Reed's object was to break up the contraband mail be- 
tween the Confederates and their friends in the North. So well and 
systematically was this arranged that during the early part of June a 
Confederate Captain, whose home was within a mile of Paris, Ky., 
rode up one Sunday afternoon to his gate, picked up the mail de- 
posited under the cap-stone of the gate post, and rode away before 
the alarm was given. No one had suspected that a stone pillar would 
serve as a mail depository for the Confederates, but such was the 
truth. Not a horse was taken by Reed's men from over-loyal Con- 
federates. Although his ipen were not in uniform, he always carried 
his authority with him, while Mosby's victims were loyal Virginians, 
and for their own protection. Nearly all the horse-thieves in the 
Confederacy joined him. It is claimed they were very active when 
even a sutler's train was in sight; but when Mosby was called on 
for the actual fighters, which was seldom and far between, General 
Lee tells us that he was only able to bring a few to 
the front. They were, however, very active to waylay and 
kill small parties from ambush, and executed all the forms of guer- 
rilla warfare, while on the Union side nothing of the kind was ever 

About the time Burnside reached Cincinnati, General John Pe- 
gram, of the Confederate Army, had entered Kentucky from East 
Tennessee with some 2,000 mounted troops, and reached Danville, 
Ky., on the 23rd of March. He spread the report that he was the 
advance of a large force of all armies, intending a serious invasion 
of the State. 

This caused a considerable disturbance in the Department of 
Ohio. The troops stationed at Danville retreated to the northern 
side of the Kentucky River at Hickman's Bridge. Brigadier General 
Ouincy A. Gilmore was in command of the district in Central Ken- 
tucky, and soon concentrated a sufficient force to resume the offen- 
sive against Pegram. Re-enforcements reached Gilmore from all 


parts of Kentucky, and as Pegram had entered Kentucky for beef, 
cattle, horses and mules, he was soon pushed by Gilmore, who recap- 
tured a large part of the cattle and horses he had collected and over- 
took the principal column at Somerset, thoroughly routing him and 
driving him beyond the Cumberland River. 

The weather during the month of March was pleasant and 
springlike. In the early part of that month General Wright had 
written to Halleck that the enemy would probably invade Ken- 
tucky, if Rosecrans did not resume the aggressive against Bragg in 
Tennessee. In Halleck's letter of instruction to General Burnside, 
as the latter was leaving Washington to relieve General Wright, a 
plan of advance into East Tennessee, in connection with Rosecrans' 
movement toward Chattanooga, had been outlined. Halleck ac- 
knowledged that the supply of an army in East Tennessee by wagon 
was improbable, and pointed out to Burnside the number and size of 
the garrisons he was to leave in the rear, and, bending everything 
on the object of having a strong army for active service against 
the enemy in the field, he recommended building block-houses to 
protect the railroad bridges in his rear, but gave no positive in- 
structions for General Burnside to obtain a definite object, which 
leads us to believe that Halleck did not intend the organization of 
a separate army in the Department of the Ohio. But Burnside was 
acting on an understanding with President Lincoln, who ardently 
wished to send a column for the relief of the loyal people in East 
Tennessee, and was beginning to doubt whether Rosecrans' army 
would ever be able to accomplish that object. The uneasiness at 
Washington over the action of the Army of the Cumberland was 
was becoming acute, and Lincoln hoped that Burnside, with his great 
energy would make the movement. In this hope Burnside had been 
sent West, and the Ninth, his corps, with him. As the question of 
transportation was an important one, the President had requested 
Congress to pass an act to construct a railroad, after Burnside's ad' 
vance from Danville, Kentucky, to Knoxville, Tennessee, but no ap- 
propriation to build it had been made, as the scheme was not 
considered practical through such a difficult country as the 
Cumberland Mountains, which could only be satisfactorily 
made when the country was at peace. The only thing to 
do was to push Rosecrans to Chattanooga and beyond, and with the 
Tennessee Valley held by our troops, with a new base of supplies 
at Chattanooga, the holding of East Tennessee by a column from 


Kentucky would be comparatively easy. Without this, all efforts 
as to holding Knoxville and the Halston Valley were visionary. It 
would be an easy- matter to get there, but the trouble would be to 
remain. When Burnside started to organize his little army for 
a march over the mountains, he surprised the Quartermaster by his 
large requisition for mules and wagons, and ordered able engineers 
to survey the proposed railroad for actual construction, the pay for 
which the Quartermaster afterwards declined to honor. As soon 
as Halleck learned that Burnside had organized the troops, ex- 
clusive of the Ninth Corps, into the Twenty-third Corps, he objected 
to this, but the President directed it tc5 be done, and General Hart- 
suff was appointed to command it. At the beginning of May the 
latter was sent to General Rosecrans to arrange for an aggressive 
campaign. As Hartsuff had served with Rosecrans, on the latter's 
staff in West Virginia, he was the fit person to negotiate the ar- 

But Rosecrans was not ready, and called on his principal of- 
ficer for advice. The result was that Rosecrans suggested that the 
Ninth Corps be sent down to Glasgow, near the Tennessee line, and 
the Twenty-third Corps remain scattered in Kentucky. But Burn- 
side intended to take the field with both corps, which he had organ- 
ized under the name of Army of the Ohio, assuring Rosecrans that 
in case the two armies came together he would waive his older rank 
and serve under Rosecrans while they should remain in Tennessee. 
This was about the 15th of May, and Burnside once more sent a 
staff officer to Rosecrans to try and arrange a common plan of 

The Washington authorities had learned that Bragg had sent 
10,000 re-enforcements to Johnston, with which the latter was to re- 
lieve Pemberton at Vicksburg. They became urgent for Rosecrans 
and Burnside to make a forward movement, as that would be the 
best way to protect the rear from the intending raids of the Con- 
federate mounted troops, as also to crush their now diminished op- 

Burnside hastened his preparation for the movement, and sub- 
stituted pack mules for the want of wagons, and his detachments 
were concentrated. He asked for the Third Division (Getty's) of 
the Ninth Army Corps, which was still with the Army of the Po- 
tomac, to be sent to him, and on June i he was ready, and in person 
left for the front. He arrived at Lexington on June 3, to start the 


movement into East Tennessee, but there an order reached him from 
Washington to send at once 8,000 men to re-enforce General Grant 
I at Vicksburg. As soon as the troops were no longer needed at 
I Vicksburg they were to be returned to Kentucky, but the order for 
I sending the troops was imperative, and Burnside never hesitated to 
I obey it. The two divisions of the Ninth Corps were immediately 
I turned back to the Ohio River and ordered to be shipped at once, 
i by steamboats, to General Grant. 

Burnside had requested to go with his men, but was informed 
that duties in his department were so important that he could not 
be spared from them. Major General Parke was sent in command 
of the corps. Burnside and his staff returned to Cincinnati, as this 
was just at the time when he was directed to recall his "Order No. 
38" and stop suppressing disloyal newspapers and to cease arrest- 
ing civilians. His duties were not to his liking, but he enjoyed the 
confidence of the President and Secretary Stanton, for they were not 
pleased by Plalleck having taken the Ninth Corps from Burnside, 
but as Rosecrans was making no effort to advance on Bragg to pre- 
vent the latter sending re-enforcements to General Joseph E. John- 
ston, Halleck saw no other alternative to help Grant than by sending 
the Ninth Corps to his relief. 

Every effort was made to urge Rosecrans to active service, but 
the latter always found a plausible excuse for delay. His leading 
Generals, he claimed, were adverse to a movement at that time. 
Then he wanted more cavalry, but Halleck had no cavalry to give 
him. He wanted his commission antedated, so he would outrank 
Grant, Burnside and others. Finally he claimed that he was waiting 
for Burnside to be ready, on the 4th of June. He notified Burnside 
that his army was moving, and wanted the Army of theOhiotocome 
up as quickly as possible, but he had sent no notice to Washington 
of his moving and no advance had been made, and no indication of 
any purpose to make one. On the 3rd of June Halleck notified 
Rosecrans that if he did not advance and hurt the enemy, the latter 
would soon hurt him. This was followed by Halleck ordering the 
Ninth Corps to Grant, and the rest of the troops in Kentucky, to re- 
main on the defensive. 

Rosecrans' inaction had led the Confederates to send two di- 
visions of infantry, with artillery, and one division of cavalry, to re- 
enforce Johnston. If Rosecrans had marched. General Bragg could 
not have sent any troops away, and Bragg would have been beaten 



before he was able to reach the Tennessee River, and without Long- 
street to help Bragg, but it was the same inaction of Meade, afterj 
the battle of Gettysburg, that enabled Longstreet to be with Bragj 
at Chickamauga, and if Rosecrans could have gained a most prob- 
able victory over Bragg, the same as Grant did at Vicksburg, the 
war would probably have ended a year sooner. 

It has often been related by Confederates, when they were 
asked why they kept up the fight, after Vicksburg and Gettysburg,] 
that their hopes were revived by their success at Chickamauga. 

Bragg's army, before he sent any troops to Johnston, numbered] 
37,000 infantry, 3,000 artillery and 15,000 cavalry — total, 55,00c 
men of all arms. Ten thousand were sent to Johnston. This leftj 
Bragg 45,000 men. Garfield claims that Rosecrans had a force at] 
the same time of 82,700 men of all arms, with 3,000 more on the 
way, but required 15,000 for the posts and garrisons in his rear. In] 
drawing his balance he shows that Rosecrans had 65,000 against 
Bragg's 41,500. Garfield was about the only General with Rose- 1 
crans that urged an aggressive movement, and claimed that delay] 
would give the enemy time to have his detachment returned. With' 
no hope for further increase for Rosecrans' army during the rest 
of the season, he also urged on Rosecrans military and civil reasons 
for active movements, believing that he would be successful, and| 
that the authorities in Washington, as also the people, had a right 
to expect the army to try it. On the i ith of June Rosecrans sent to , 
Halleck the opinion of his corps and division commanders, which 
was against an early advance, but on the i6th Halleck asked Rose- 
crans whether he would make an immediate forward movement. 
Rosecrans answered that if it meant as soon as all were ready, yes. 
He evidently had received a plain intimation that if he did not move, 
action in Washington would be taken to relieve him. 

We now know that the advice of Garfield had great weight, 
with Rosecrans, as to the feasibility to turn the enemy's flank, 
which he adopted and carried out to final success, and which gave 
Rosecrans a claim as a great military strategist. General Rose- 
crans had already disappointed the administration, before the battle 
of Stone River, at the time he succeeded Buell, and when Bragg was 
retreating to the Tennessee River. A vigorous pursuit was expected 
and a reoccupation of the country held by us in the early summer. 
This was necessary to prevent foreign intervention, then trembling 
in the balance, to let Europe know that we had not lost what had 


been gained from our advance from Donaldson, For this reason the 
Washington authorities had chosen Rosecrans to supersede Buell, 
beHeving that his character was better adapted than the slow but 
more solid qualities of Thomas, the second in command of the 
Army of the Cumberland of that time. Halleck soon re 
minded him that he had given the decisive advice to the 
President, when the question as to who was to succeed Buell was 
being -considered. But when the Army of the Cumberland was 
again at Nashville, Rosecrans made urgent demands for the means 
to reorganize the same. 

He wanted his cavalry force increased and armed with repeat- 
ing arms of the most approved pattern, and horses for a select corps 
of mounted infantry, which would take months before his army 
would be in condition to resume the campaign. While Rosecrans 
spent his energy to supply his wants, Bragg stopped his flight and 
retraced his steps until he reached the vicinity of Murfreesboro, 
Tennessee. In early December Rosecrans was notified that the ad- 
ministration was disappointed and dissatisfied, and that unless he 
would at once make a forward movement another change in the 
commanders would be made. To this Rosecrans paid no attention. 
Halleck gave his reason and claimed the demand for activity was a 
reasonable one, and added that his appointment had been made be- 
cause it was believed that he would move more rapidly than Buell. 

After a great effort to furnish Rosecrans with all that he desired 
in arms, equipment and horses, he moved on Bragg, at Stone's 
River, where, during three days, an indecisive engagement was being 
fought, but the retreat of the Confederates made it a victory for 
the Union Army. The Army of the Cumberland, after this battle, 
was not in a condition to resume active operations at once, the 
troops requiring rest and re-enforcements. 

Congratulations and thanks for officers and men from the Gov- 
ernment and a grateful people came in abundance, and promotions 
were given in profusion to encourage an aggressive campaign, with 
as little delay as possible, and sufficient supplies and means were 
promptly furnished to carry it out. Rosecrans had at the close of 
January a force of 65,000 men, while Bragg's army numbered at 
the same time 40,400 men. By the ist of March Rosecrans showed 
the national forces to be 80,000, the enemy's force numbering 
43,600. Bragg's army now increased rapidly and by the ist of June 
numbered 57,000 men of all arms, and Rosecrans counted his force 


to be 84.000. The enemy had a larger force of mounted troops, 
but was much weaker in infantry than the National Army. The 
latter was the decisive arm in battle. With such odds in favor of 
Rosecrans the Government at Washington insisted on an aggressive 
campaign. As the weather was favorable, the movement should 
have begun on the ist of March, just about the time when the Con- 
federates were sending Pegram into Kentucky and Wheeler to Fort 
Donaldson. They were also active on the flank and rear of Rose- 
crans. At the same time Van Dorn captured a brigade at Spring 
Hill, and Forrest, within eight miles of Nashville, and at Brentwood 
Hills, captured Colonel Bloodgood with 800 men. Rosecrans 
mounted a brigade of infantry on mules, under Colonel Streight, 
and sent them south to cut the railroad in the rear of Bragg's army. 
It did not get off until the end of April, and the whole command 
was captured near Rome, Ga. During all of this time the Army 
of the Cumberland lay still near Murfreesboro, and the commander 
complained that he was not getting his share of the supplies, while 
rifles, carbines, revolvers and horses reached him daily. His readi- 
ness seemed to be as far off as ever, and there was nothing to urge 
him to action, not even the inducement of a promotion to be a 
Major General in the regular army ; but he rather scorned the hint, as 
if it had been an insult, as he called it the "auction of an honor." 
Halleck, however, reminded him that he himself had asked for pro- 
motions on account of services rendered while in West Virginia, 
and he answered this by his grievances that he had not been pro- 
moted, as requested, and had failed to get his commission antedated, 
by which he would have outranked Grant, Buell and Burnside. 

Every effort having failed to move him to action. Grant was 
compelled to take his chances, with part of Bragg's army under 
Johnston in his rear, or the Government must send him re-enforce- 
ments from Burnside, which could easily be spared at that time, 
so by good judgment they sent him the Ninth Army Corps, in- 
stead of reducing the Army of the Cumberland, for the latter should 
have been in active service when the National forces in Virginia and 
Mississippi were drawing the attention of the enemy by their for- 
ward movement. 

Although Burnside had but few troops at his disposal on his 
arrival from the East, the administration gave him such a force 
that at the end of May he had an army of nearly 40,000 men for 
duty in his whole department, including the four great States, Ohio, 



llllinois, Indiana and Michigan; also the eastern half of Kentucky. 
I The several camps of prisoners north of the Ohio River required 
a garrison of about 8,000 men. This left him 30,000 south of the 
Ohio River. He expected his active column to number 25,000; this 
left him 5,000 to cover his communication. The advance had be- 
gun when he was ordered to suspend it, as related, by sending the 
Ninth Corps to General Grant. 

The Confederates had placed General Simon B. Buckner, of 
Fort Donaldson fame, in command at Knoxville, to op- 
pose him, and on May 31 had about 17,000 men of 
all arms present for duty. He was very accurately in- 
formed about our movements and numbers, as he counted 
on Burnside's army to be about 20,000 men, and believed 
himself able to deal with that number, as the passes in the moun- 
tians were few and not easy to cross, he being on the interior line, 
which was much in his favor, and as Bragg was in position between 
the Armies of the Ohio and Cumberland, they intended to concen- 
trate against Burnside and crush him, before a decisive action would 
take place. This was the weak point of the two independent armies, 
in their attempt to co-operate. 

If Rosecrans had only opened his campaign early in March, all 
the troops in Kentucky would have been ordered to him, instead of 
being organized into a separate army. The President had not in- 
tended to create the Army of the Ohio, under Burnside, until Rose- 
crans made a conspicuous and continued failure to move. 








In Cincinnati, General Burnside and his staff cut quite a swath 
in society. The young men were of fine appearance, well educated 
and social lions. On the evening before they left for the field a public 
reception was given them, and a special train held until it was over. 
They appeared at the affair in the fine regulation uniform of cav- 
alry boots, booted and spurred, with trim, round riding jackets, 
and with every eye in the gathering upon them. They bade their fair 
friends farewell and went on their way to Lexington that night, but 
on their arrival there, the order to send the Ninth Army Corps to 
Grant spoiled the campaign, and before another week they returned 
to Cincinnati, disgusted at their bad luck, and to make things more 
discomforting, their lach^ friends poked fun at the boys on account 
of their early return and the quick termination of their brilliant 
campaign, all of which they had to grin at and bear; but they were 
a good-natured lot and stood the chaffing very well, and were as 
much amused as were their fair friends. 

Burnside not being able to lead a solid column into East Ten- 
nessee, at that time, he organized two expeditions, and were com- 
manded, one under Brigadier General Julius White, into Southwest- 
ern Virginia, where a number of deserters and skulkers from the 
Confederate Army had formed themselves into guerrilla bands 
(cut-throats and thieves), that preyed upon the Union people in that 

On General White's advance they were forced back upon the 
Confederate Army, and the Union people relieved. The other expe- 


dition, under Colonel W. P. Saunders, a graduate of West Point, but 
now Colonel of the Fifth Kentucky Cavalry, was one of the boldest, 
longest and most successful raids during the Civil War, and kept 
the enemy busy and destroyed considerable military stores and rail- 
road bridges important to the enemy. And this raid served as a pre- 
liminary reconnaissance through the Cumberland Mountains into 
East Tennessee. 

With a picked force, consisting of 400 men of Colonel Byrd's 
First Tennessee Union Regiment, and 400 of the Forty-fifth Ohio 
Mounted Infantry, two hundred of the One Hundred and Twelfth 
Illinois Mounted Infantry, 150 of the Seventh Ohio Cavalry, 150 of 
the Second Ohio Cavalry, and 100 of the First Kentucky Cavalry, he 
started from Mount Vernon, Kentucky, on the 14th day of June, and 
passed the neighborhood of Huntsville, Scott County, and Mont- 
gomery, Morgan County, leaving Loudon and Kingston in succes- 
sion to his right, and at Lenoirs made quite a capture, and reached 
Knoxville at daylight of the 20th. 

The Confederate General, Simon Bolivar Buckner, was in 
command of the enemy's army in East Tennessee. He was sent 
to concentrate a force at Clinton with which to capture Saunders. 
Great preparations were made to repel Saunders, as it was believed 
the latter would assault the town of Knoxville, and capture it. But 
Saunders stated afterwards that he had no such intention, as he 
could not have held the place if captured, and only made the demon- 
stration to have the Confederate troops brought from above. His 
attack was on the Confederate battery, on Summit Hill, southwest 
of the town and overlooking the depot. His own guns (only two) 
were posted on elevated ground opposite, near the junction of Fifth 
avenue and Crosier street, in North Knoxville. 

The artillery practice on either side showed but little result, ex- 
cept to frighten the women and children, as the projectiles passed 
through the air. But one of the shells seemed to have killed a 
Lieutenant of a Florida regiment and a Sergeant who came out of 
the hospital, sitting on a fence watching the fight; and also 
Avounded the Captain of a company of citizen volunteers who had 
unnecessarily exposed themselves by not taking the precaution to 
drop for safety into the ditch, when the flash of Saunders' guns 
was seen. He would stand upright and exclaim : "Don't be 
afraid, boys; there is no danger," but at that instant a shell, hit him 
and badly mutilated his body. He was borne to his kinsmen in 


town, surgical aid summoned to alleviate his sufferings, but noth- 
ing could save his life. 

He was surrounded by his wife and children, and, being a 
Christian, prayed for the forgiveness of his enemies. Whether these 
were the men he had been fighting in the morning, or those 
that were accountable for and had inaugurated the bloody Civil 
War, I do not know; but the forgiveness prayed for will be de- 
termined by the Son of Man, whom God has appointed to judge the 
living and the dead. Sleep on, then, until the great day, but may 
your sons heed well the lesson taught by brothers, and avoid the 
awful consequences of a quarrel. This young Captain, who thus 
gave his life for the Confederate cause, was a great grandson of 
William Blount, Governor of the territory south of the Ohio River 
from 1792 to 1796 and also of James White, the founder of Knox- 

Colonel Saunders, after an hour's fighting with the Confeder- 
ates under command of Colonel E. C. Trigg, marched on to Straw- 
berry Plains and Mossy Creek, where he destroyd the bridges and 
trestle work of the East Tennessee and Virginia railroad. He cap- 
tured much valuable property, which he destroyed, and also many 
prisoners that he paroled. Being pressed on all sides by the enemy 
he was forced to hastily withdraw, through Smith's Gap, into Ken- 
tucky, which was not a road, only a bridle path. 

He had to abandon his artillery (two guns), which he com- 
pletely destroyed. On the 24th, just ten days after he had started, 
he reached Boston, Kentucky, with the loss of two killed, four 
wounded and thirteen missing. He had taken and paroled 461 
prisoners. Saunders' escape was due to Sergeant Reynolds, of the 
First Tennessee Volunteers, who knew the country and served as a 
reliable and invaluable guide, and to the energy of his men, who at 
all times were ready for the march or the fight. At the same time 
the Union garrison at Cumberland was forced to evacuate that 
thoroughfare for lack of water and supplies. 

General White, w^ith his expedition, afforded considerable as- 
sistance to Colonel Saunders by sending Major Brown up to the 
Virginia State Line, through Pond Gap, on the Big Sandy River, : 
with the Second Battalion of the Tenth Kentucky Cavalry and a 
squadron of the First Ohio Cavalry, who attacked the enemy, kill-; 
ing fourteen, wounding twenty, and brought in 127 prisoners, in-; 
eluding the Colonel in command. 


Another column, led by General White himself, from Pikeville 
niip the Louisa Fork, on the Big Sandy River, to Gladesville, W. 
'Va., skirmished all the way, but at Gladesville surprised and routed 
■he enemy. A number were killed and eighteen commissioned of- 
Ificers and ninety-nine privates surrendered. But the object of the 
raid, to reach Bristol on the railroad, was frustrated by the concen- 
tration of a superior force of the enemy. 

Still another little force was detached against the enemy, under 
iColonel May, near the State Line, in the direction of the Salt Works, 
but the enemy retreated before May's force w^ere able to come up 
with them. 

A small force was sent in the direction of Tug Fork, under 
Colonel Cameron. The enemy attacked Cameron at Pond Creek, 
but part of the Thirty-ninth Kentucky Mounted Infantry and Sixty- 
iifth Illinois (Cameron's own regiment) routed them, and having 
nothing further in their front, they marched back to Pikeville. They 
had penetrated into a section where no Union forces had been before. 

A column under Colonel August V. Kautz of the regular army, 
with about 400 men and a battery of artillery, was sent to Monticello. 
At the Interscection of the Mill Spring Road he was joined by Lieu- 
tenant Colonel Adams wuth about 300 more men. Unfortunately 
Adams' men had driven in the enemy's pickets and notified them of 
their coming, and three miles further on met them in line of battle. 
After a little skirmishing the enemy retreated, and were pursued by 
the combined forces under Kautz through Monticello, beyond Beaver 
Creek. Kautz captured some arms and stores and destroyed therm 
and then returned to West's. On his retreat the enemy pursue«l 
him, which caused Kautz to come to a halt and drive them ofif and 
punish them severely. The Confederates fell back. Kautz returned! 
to Simpson's Creek and encamped for the night. The next morning- 
they recrossed to the north bank of the Cumberland River. Kaut2; 
lost seven killed, six missing and thirty-four wounded, but has n® 
definite information of the loss of the enemy. These raids kept the 
enemy occupied, and were in every way successful. Saunders' raid 
was one of the boldest and most successful during the whole war. 
General White's several expeditions, also Kautz's at Monticello, 
cleared the mountains from a bad set of guerrillas, that were a 
menace to the community, and friends of neither the Confederates 
nor the Union people. 



At the time that the several expeditions were started under 
Colonel Saunders into East Tennessee, and General White and 
Kautz, an order was received at the battery headquarters for four 
guns to report to the post commander at Lexington. The Captain, 
with the right and center section, at once proceeded to carry out the 
order, and as the distance was only about eighteen miles through 
the most lovely part of the Blue Grass Valley, the change was quite 
a treat, and highly appreciated by the men that were with the two 
sections. We went into camp on the southern part of the town in a 
fine grove of tall trees, one of the most lovely spots on God's green 
earth, and during our two weeks' stay the men as well as officers 
enjoyed soldier's life as never before. There was no duty, other 
than that of camp guard, and battery maneuvers were not executed, 
only a short exercise of the guns in the morning was required of the 
men. Passes were freely given to visit the Clay Monument, and to 
Ashland, the home of Henry Clay, for whom all Americans had a 
veneration. Everything connected with Ashland was charming. 
James B. Clay, the son of the great statesman, was now the owner 
of Ashland, but had foolishly taken the Southern side in the conflict 
and gone South with Kirby Smith, but his family had remained at 
home. Mr. Thomas Clay, another heir, and his son were staunch 
Union men. The sacred estate was treated with great respect and 
veneration of feeling by the soldiers. It was learned that one of our 
wheel drivers, "George W. Stith," was distantly related to the 
Clays, his ancestor, one Stith, having been the second Governor of 
the Colony of Virginia in the seventeenth century. He made him- 
self known, and was kindly and courteously treated by the Clays, and 
while Stith was in town he never tired of doing all he could for 
the Clays. 

The line between the people of Lexington, for or against the 
great cause, was sharply drawn. The disloyal were the most bitter, 
as also were they the large majority. But there was no small num- 
ber of true and loyal women, brave and fearless to the Union cause, 
and after the Confederates had left they visited and cared for the 
Union troops in the hospitals. It required no little courage for a 
woman in Lexington, despite the snare and tirades of her Southern 
neighbors, to be known as a friend to the Union. If Henry Clay had 
lived in 1861 there would probably have been no secession and no 



neutrality, but Kentucky would have stood solid for the Union. In 
and around Ashland there had been a combat between the Confed- 
erate horsemen under Morgan and some Union troops, and the beau- 
tiful trees were filled with bullets. 

The men received full rations, but their mess and kitchens were 
filled with the best that the farms produced, and one day's supply 
would have, later on, been sufficient for a week. Eggs, sweet milk, 
lamb chops, veal cutlets and spring chickens were found daily on 
their table. Their well-behaved and soldierly appearance won for 
them the respect of friend and enemy, as no complaint of any kind 
was made against the men during our stay in that cultured city. 
The officers found a place to board with a private family, and our 
table was supplied with the best. 

On or about the ist of July we returned to Paris, where Lieu- 
tenant Schlarb had been left in charge with the left section. 





It was a few days before Rosecrans moved forward to Tala- 
homa that the Confederate cavahy leader, John Morgan, re- 
ceived permission to make a raid. He was to cross the 
Cumberland Mountains near Burkesville, and make rapid 
marches on to Louisville, with the object of capturing it, with its 
depot of supplies and military stores, and which his sympathizing 
friends advised him, since Louisville was barren of troops, could be 
done. He started with 2,600 horsemen and expected large addi- 
tions from recruits that would join him on his march northward. 
As Bragg had been stripped of some of his troops to re-enforce 
Johnston in Mississippi, Morgan was instructed to make a rapid 
movement and get back to Bragg's army as quickly as possible. 
Morgan had the reputation for boldness and activity, but had no 
great liking for a hard fight. He would get near the danger, but 
turn aside without getting into it, and any small body of brave men 
was generally sufficient to change his route. If we compare him 
with Forrest, another Confederate raider, we find the latter had no 
social prestige in his favor, as his calling before the war had been 
that of a slave trader, which socially ostracized him -in the South. 
While both were fond of adventure, Forrest was really the daring 
soldier, and ready at any time to force a stubborn fight. Morgan 
showed a great deal of bluster, but was not feared by anybody, 
either in an open-field fight or at close quarters, but Morgan had 
been encouraged by Northern sympathizers. 

As the battle of "Pogues Run," at Indianapolis, played a lead- 
ing part, and was probably the cause of Morgan extending his raid 
to Indiana, I have given it space in this narrative. - 

Immediately after the battle of Stone River, and about the 


time when Lincoln's proclamation was to go into effect, the secret 
jorganizations in sympathy with the enemies of our country, such as 
the Knights of the Golden Circle and Sons of Liberty, were very 
active, and, under the guise of a great Democratic mass meeting 
held a State gathering at Indianapolis on May 20, 1863. 
They had advertised a number of prominent speakers, among them 
Vallandingham, Seymour, Hendricks and McDonald. Every camp 
of the secret societies was to be represented, and not a man miss- 
ing. All had instructions to come prepared, with weapons con- 
cealed on their persons. General Hascall, with a small Federal 
force, was in command at Indianapolis at the time. He, as also 
Governor Morton, was informed of these preparations and of the 
intentions of those who commanded the secret organizations that 
they would attempt to seize the Government arms, arsenal and 
stores. Just at that time there were a number of paroled prison- 
ers at Camp Carrington. These were placed under command of Gen- 
eral Coburn. These men, together with other regular troops were 
stationed at various places in the city to protect Government prop- 
erty and suppress any riotous demonstration. There were several 
companies at the "circle," where now the great soldier monument 
stands, and two blocks distant from the State House yard, where 
the meeting was to be held, a section of artillery was located, being 
in position to cover the place of the meeting. 

On the day of the gathering special trains were run from all 
parts of the State. The meeting was a large one, and Some twelve 
to fifteen thousand were present, and no less than five thousand 
were armed, but as they were not thoroughly organized, the out- 
come proved ridiculous, and the mass meeting was a failure. Sey- 
mour and Cox were not there. Vallandingham was in prison, ready 
to be sent to his friends across the lines. Pendleton was in the city, 
but his friends advised him not to attend the meeting. Dan Voor- 
hees was present, and presided over the meeting, which he opened 
very much like Jeremiah in "Lamentations." He said : "Confusion 
and disorder darken the sky; the very earth is laden with the sorrows 
of our people ; the voice of woe comes up from every portion of our 
people. The angel of death has spread his wings on the blast, and 
there has been no blood sprinkled on the door posts of our homes to 
stay the hand of the destroyer. There would have been an invited 
and honored guest (Vallandingham), one whom you all expected 
to see here, upon this occasion, but he has fallen a little sooner than 


any of the rest of us, a victim to the Cause usurpation which has 
taken the place of pubhc rights and of the Constitution." 

A Committee on Resolutions was appointed and speeches were 
made by Mr. Merrick and Mr. Eden, as well as by McDonald and 
Hendricks. About 4 p. m., while Mr. Hendricks was speaking, 
some dozen soldiers, with fixed bayonets and rifles cocked, entered 
the crowd and advanced slowly towards the stands. A great com- 
motion occurred, and multitudes scattered in every direction. A 
high fence on the east side of the State House was pushed down 
by the rushing crowd. To add to the tumult, a squad of cavalry 
galloped along the street near by. The soldiers who advanced to- 
wards the stand came to halt by order of General Coburn, who had 
been guarding the Quartermaster's stores, north of the State 
House, but who rushed forward when he heard of the disturbance. 
He asked what they were doing. They said that they were going 
for Tom Hendricks, who had said too much, and they were going 
to kill him. Coburn expostulated with them, and they desisted. 
There was great confusion on the stand. Hendricks closed his re- 
marks prematurely, suggesting that the resolutions be read, and the 
meeting dismissed. The resolutions declared that the Federal Gov- 
ernment had two wars on its hands, one against the rebels and the 
other against the Constitution. 

The Republicans in the Legislature who had broken the 
quorum were denounced, and it was declared that the Governor 
could not clear himself from complicity except by taking steps to 
prevent repudiation (i. e. by calling a special session). When the 
resolutions were passed great numbers shouted "No!" and cheers 
were given for Lincoln, for the war and the Conscription Act. 

General Hascall had given orders for the soldiers to stay away 
from the State House. It was not easy, however, to restrain the 
men. Many were at the meeting and mingled with the throng. 
The torn flags of two Indiana regiments were upon the stand. These 
were cheered by the soldiers, who also cheered the Governor and 
the war, in which the Union men present joined them; but those in 
sympathy with the meeting stood silent and angry. After the reso- 
lution had been adopted the meeting adjourned, but a great number 
of Union men remained, took possession of the stand and made 
Union speeches. About the close of the day, if the soldiers in the 
crowd would hear any one talking against the war, they would seize 
the culprit, march him up the street, with a great rabble following. 


iOthers were taken to the police station and charged with carrying 
Concealed weapons, and about forty pistols were gathered in from 
such arrests. 

After the meeting was over and the trains were leaving tht 
city, many shots were fired by the passengers on the Terre Haute 
and the Lafayette trains. That they had intended to create a dis- 
turbance was now clear, and the soldiers determined to give those 
that remained a lesson. When the Indiana Central train, now the 
Pennsylvania road, had left the Union Station a short distance, it 
came upon a piece of artillery that had been placed in front of the 
train. On stopping, a small body of soldiers, under General Hascall, 
and a policeman, in company with them, demanded that the 
passengers hand over their firearms of every description. 
About 200 were given up. On the Cincinnati train, now 
the Big Four, an equal number were taken, and a still larger num- 
ber were thrown into Pogues Run, a little, dirty stream that ran 
through the city at that time. Many pistols had been given to the 
women on the train, in the belief that they would not be searched. 
Seven revolvers were found upon a woman, a two- foot knife was 
found in a stove of the car, and about 600 revolvers were taken from 
those that attended the meeting. Thus ended the battle of Pogues 
Run, without the shedding of a drop of blood, but with firearms 
cast away, that bloodshed might be avoided. That a few men could 
disarm such a multitude aroused laughter and contempt. They 
had come to the meeting, armed, for the purpose of making trouble 
and not one had the courage to strike a blow, not even when they 
were arrested and searched. Next morning, in glaring headlines, 
appeared the following : "It is with a feeling of sorrow, humilia- 
tion and degradation that we witnessed the scenes of yesterday. 
Indiana is completely under military rule," said The Sentinel, the 
Democratic paper. But The Journal retorted : "We implore you 
not to despair. There is hope, a glimmer, a ray, a beam, a whole 
dawn of hope, if you will, only open your eyes and see. You did 
not consider the liberty you enjoyed when writing your denuncia- 
tion of the Government and assisting the rebellion. Do you want 
any more liberty of abuse than you exercised yesterday morning?" 

The Union men had acquired valuable information, and had 
discovered the courage of their defamers; and the Union-loving 
people of the State were no longer in fear. 

It had been intended to start Morgan on the i8th of June, but 


it was near the end of that month before he got off. He was first 
heard from on the north side of the Cumberland Mountains on July 
2, near Burkesville, and marching on Columbia. As he had full 
knowledge of the position of our detachment, he was able to get 
the start of them and avoid them. After a slight skirmish at Co- 
lumbia, Morgan made for the Green River bridge, an important 
crossing on the Louisville Railroad. Colonel Moore, with part of 
the Twenty-fifth Michigan Infantry, had entrenched himself across 
the neck, at the bend in front of the stockade at the bridge. Mor- 
gan reached the place on the 4th of July, and sent one of his staff 
ofiticers, Lieutenant Elliott, in to demand the surrender of the place, 
Moore's forces amounting to only 200 men. Moore told Lieutenant 
Elliott that the 4th of July was a d d bad day for the loyal peo- 
ple of the United States to surrender, and he did not propose to 
celebrate the day that way. Elliott told his chief that from ap- 
pearances Moore had considerable fight in him, but as Morgan did 
not want to lose the time to march around the place by a distance 
of five miles — (this I was told by Elliott after the war) — he formed 
his best men into a line of battle and advanced on Moore, who beat 
him off, with a loss of six killed and twenty-three wounded. Mor- 
gan's loss was fifty killed, of the best men he had, and 200 wounded, 
and Elliott told the writer, in addition, that they were laughed 
and hooted at by the Michigan boys, who now invited them to cele- 
brate the 4th of July with them. But Morgan found the day no 
more auspicious than Pemberton, at Vicksburg, or Lee, at Gettys- 
burg. The raiders now marched around Moore, and next day 
reached Lebanon, where, some one blundering. Colonel Hansen, 
with 400 men of the Twenty-third Kentucky, after putting a good 
fight against Morgan, had to surrender to save the village from 
destruction. The loss to the Twenty-third Kentucky was four 
killed and fifteen wounded. Morgan left twenty-nine dead on the 
field. Among the killed was his youngest brother, Thomas, First 
Lieutenant in the Second Kentucky Confederate Regiment. On 
the 6th, at dark, he captured a train thirty miles from Louisville 
and tapped the telegraph wires, which he had a habit of doing, and 
thereby learned the position of the Union forces, if possible, to 
avoid them, or attack them, as he deemed best. As a large force 
was concentrating at Louisville, he left the place to his right, and 
on the morning of the 7th, after crossing Salt River, sent two com- 
panies forward to the Ohio River to capture the steamboat, to carry 


his division over into the State of Indiana, as he then believed that 
the supposed 135,000 armed Southern sympathizers in that State 
would flock to his standard. He having learned of the "battle of 
Pogues Run," hoped to wipe out the disgrace and humiliation his 
friends had suffered in that affair. His original orders had been to 
capture Louisville and return to the army in Tennessee. 

He reached Brandenberg with his main force on the 8th. Some 
troops of the Indiana legion had collected on the north side of the 
river, but Morgan's artillery drove them away, and with two 
captured steamers soon landed two regiments on the Indiana shore. 
A wooden gunboat appeared on the river and shelled Morgan's 
troops for several hours, but without doing any damage, and then re- 
tired. Morgan's troops, by midnight, were all on the Indiana side. 

Just at this time Indiana was stripped of Union troops, and the 
legion was too feeble to offer much resistance. There was only a 
small force of mounted men in the State, and Governor Morton 
sent a dispatch to General Boyle for some of the troops in his dis- 
trict, as Morgan was at Corrydon, on his way to Salem and In- 
dianapolis. After capturing Corrydon and the legion that opposed 
him there, he levied a contribution of $1,000 on each of the mills, 
but later compromised on $2,100 for the three of them. As he 
reached Salem he levied another contribution, burned bridges, tore 
up the track, exchanged horses for fresh ones and plundered every- 
thing they could lay their hands on, and sent false reports in every 
direction that General Buckner had crossed the Ohio with a force of 
20,000 to support him in Indiana, but the pistol Democracy that had 
been so valiant at the "battle of Pogues Run" did not materialize as 
an ally to these raiders. 

On the night of the loth they reached Vienna, on the Indian- 
apolis and Jeffersonville Railroad, tapped the wires and learned of 
the preparations to receive him. Then he advanced on Vernon, 
where Colonel Williams of the One Hundred and Fifth Regiment 
• of Indiana legion had gathered a large force to meet him. Among 
those waiting for Morgan was our battery, which had been sent 
from Kentucky, where v/e had been, as already stated, at Paris. 
On the 3rd of July we were fully informed that Morgan would 
probably reach Paris, on his march northward, and preparations 
were made to receive him. On the 4th the ladies of Paris gave the 
garrison, then the One Hundred and Eighteenth Ohio and our 
battery, a royal dinner. We fired a national salute before dinner 


was served. The Declaration of Independence was read to us. On 
the 6th we received marching orders and transportation to Cin- 
cinnati, and reached that place on the 7th, remained at the depot 
all day, and on the 8th were sent to Indianapolis. While in Cincin- 
nati, late at night, we received the news that the enemy at Vicks- 
burg had surrendered to General Grant with 30,000 troops. 

When this became known the next morning the loyal people 
were overjoyed, and faith that the war would end with the preserva- 
tion of the Union seemed now to be assured. The Union soldiers 
after Morgan received the most liberal reception everywhere. Tht 
same was the case in Indianapolis, but the excitement about Mor- 
gan being so near the city city must have been seen to be believed. 
On the night of the 9th we were sent to Vernon, and reported tc 
Colonel Williams about midnight. I found the Colonel to be the] 
Color Sergeant from my company in the three-months' service ini 
the Seventh Indiana Infantry. He had re-enlisted in the Seventl 
Indiana three-years' service, and held the rank of Captain. H( 
had been in Virginia, but just then was on a short leave of absence,J 
at home, in Rising Sun, Indiana. The Governor had appointed] 
him Colonel of the One Hundred and Fifth Regiment of the In- 
diana Legion. It was to him that Morgan sent, demanding a sur-j 
render. Williams, of course, refused this, for he was considerable] 
of a bluff himself, and ready to go one better than Morgan. He] 
told the officer with the flag of truce that all he asked was a little] 
time to remove the non-combatants. Morgan granted him half anl 
hour. Our guns were now in position on a hill, and we expected] 
the combat to begin. Just then General John A. Love arrived from 
Indianapolis. Williams told him what had occurred, and Love 
promptly sent out a flag of truce, and demanded Morgan's surren- 
der. But Morgan, who, up to the time he met Williams, had 
everything his own way in Indiana, now improved the time granted 
him by promptly leaving Vernon by another route. He next was 
heard from at Dupont, where there was a large packing house. 
When they left the place each man had a ham slung at his saddle. 

Bazill Duke tells us that although the weather was hot, for 
three days a man carried seven pairs of skates that he had plundered 
from a store in Salem. Another carried a load of sleigh bells, a 
good-sized Dutch clock, a green decanter, with goblets, a keg of 
butter, a chandelier, a bird cage, with three canaries, and baby shoes 
and calico were also some of the articles carried along for several 


days, and then thrown away, to be replaced by provisions and other 

As they did not find an uprising- or any recruits to join them, 
they would ask the women that stayed at home, "Where is the old 
man?" The good housewife would answer: "The men have all 
gone to the rally. You will see them soon." Morgan then made 
a rapid march through Sunman, on the Indianapolis and Cin- 
cinnati Railroad, and on the 13th reached Harrison, where he en- 
tered Ohio. During his march he sent detachments in every direc- 
tion, burned bridges and tore up railroad tracks. 

At Madison he intended to cross again into Kentucky, as also 
at Lawrenceburg, but at both places found the steamboats and trans- 
ports on the Ohio loaded with troops. He had no time to delay, 
as Hobson's mounted troops were close after him. It was no longer 
a raid but a supreme effort to get away from the Federal troops 
that were following him. On the morning of the 12th we marched 
back to the depot, to take the cars to Lawrenceburg, but there 
was no train to carry us, and great confusion everywhere. So we 
were placed in a column of infantry of minute men, and marched to 
Sunman's Station, and reached there too late to be of any service. 
General Wallace had collected a force there of about 5,500 troops, 
all except a few were minute men, and made as such a fairly good 
showing. If the column had not been detained by some freshly- 
mounted troops that claimed the right of way, we could probably 
have come up with the raiders, as they were completely worn out, 
and many had dropped out and were picked up by Hobson's men at 

Our battery remained there on the 1 3th, and in the evening was 
sent to Indianapolis, where the greatest confusion still existed. A 
brigade of minute men were at the depot. Colonel Carrington in 
command, to be sent by the Indiana Central to Dayton, Ohio; but 
he had taken so many drinks to re-enforce his courage that for five 
hours he delayed his departure, and then, by order of General Wil- 
cox, was relieved, and General Hascall placed in command. Among 
the minute men I found two acquaintances, wholesale liquor deal- 
ers, armed with muskets, forty rounds of cartridges and a haver- 
sack full of rations. Knowing that they were bitter opponents to 

the war, I asked them : "Hello, John and Charlie ! How 

is this ? Morgan counted on you to do battle with him. You must 
be on the wrong side." No," they said. "Morgan is on the wrong 


side. He should stay where he was, on the south side of the Ohio 
River." I met another man that I had reason to beheve belonged 
to the pistol Democracy of "'Pogues Run" fame. I asked him : 

"Henry , how did you get those equipments? They bear the 

name of U. S. It was expected by Morgan that the kind you 
would wear would be C. S." "Well," he answered, "I have changed 
my mind." "That is correct," I replied. "Just keep it changed." 
These were prominent business men, and the smaller fry of the same 
political stripe followed in their wake and instead of furnishing 
Morgan recruits, they were now enlisting to drive him out of the 
State. We remained in Indianapolis until the evening of the 14th, 
and were again loaded on the cars for Cincinnati. We crossed the 
pontoon bridge, over to Covington, and were placed into camp on 
night of the 1 5th, but as General Burnside had declared martial law 
in the southern counties of Ohio, an order came for the battery to 
cross the river at once to Cincinnati. The Captain and Lieutenant 
had gone on a social call to former friends, and I had the batterv 
hitched and brought over to Cincinnati, and placed in position near 
a public garden where political gatherings had been held. It was 
somewhere on Eleventh street, and the Captain and Lieutenant 
Torr soon joined us, but we remained in position all night. 

About II p. m., while walking along the street near where we 
were in position, several Germans that had been at some' secret 
meeting, came along. They talked Low Dutch, and I understood 
every word they said. They complained of the draft, and discussed 
a mode by which they could get out of it. Having heard their con- 
versation, and knowing that they would get into trouble, I stepped 
up to them and told them, as they appeared to be Germans, from 
near my birthplace in the old country, I would offer them my 
friendly advice, and urged them to go home at once, and not trouble 
themselves about the resistance of the draft, for such was useless. 
They had scarcely heard the last of my remarks, in their own lan- 
guage, when each took a route away from the other, and promptly 

The next morning more was learned of this meeting, which had 
proven to be one of the pistol Democracy in Ohio, on which Mor- 
gan had relied for aid in an uprising against the Gov- 
ernment. At about 9 a. m ., we returned to the Kentucky 
side of the river, but at 3 p. m. an order came from General Burn- 
side for an officer and three guns to report at the Little Miami De- 






pot, at once. Lieutenant Torr and guns i, 2 and 3, with their men, 
were sent over to the Ohio side. A train of cars awaited them, al- 
ready loaded with a battalion of cavalry, under Major Roe, to be 
sent north to head off Morgan in the northern part of Ohio. Dur- 
ing our stay in Cincinnati, on our way to and through Indiana, the 
men of our battery had been treated to the greatest hospitality, and 
free lunches and beer and whisky were dealt out to them in pro- 
fusion. The same was the case in Indiana — everything was free. 
"Just clean out Morgan and prevent him from coming near us," 
was their cry. The change in the manner of treatment of our boys, 
with Morgan at the head of 3,000 troops and Morgan fleeing and. 
a prisoner at Columbus, was remarkable. In Cincinnati they were 
tired and sick of seeing us, and had no use whatever for the blue 
coats ; and this was the case everywhere that we had been and passed 
through since Morgan was fleeing from them. He had, after 
leaving Sunman's Station, marched ninety-five miles in thirty-five 
hours, in order to get away and ahead of the Union troops, then 
closing in on him on all sides. 

Manson and Saunders were at Cincinnati, Judah and Hobson 
on his trail only fifteen miles in his rear. But it was a stern chase 
and a long chase with the latter. Morgan, after crossing the Ohio 
line, rested a few hours near Harrison, the first he enjoyed since 
leaving Vernon, and then marched on the road to Cincinnati. He 
reached Glendale, thirteen miles northwest of the city, in a condi- 
tion that men would drop out of the saddle for want of sleep; but 
Morgan kept on until he reached Camp Dennison, where Colonel 
Neff had blockaded the road and caused Morgan to halt. Morgan 
threw a few shells at the camp, but before Neff could reply, he 
again broke away and was forced to make a tour of about ten miles 
to the north. The raiders reached Williamsburg, Clermont 
County, twenty-eight miles east of Cincinnati, and there rested for 
the first time in three days. Morgan had expected to be cut off by 
the regular forces at Cincinnati, and thought it best to make* a 
night march, to get far enough ahead to enable him to take the long- 
needed rest. In expectation of Morgan's appearance at Lawrence- 
burg, Saunders, with his mounted troops, had been kept at Cincin- 
nati, but when Morgan had crossed the Little Miami River, Saun- 
ders was ordered to join the pursuit. The whole track that Morgan 
had passed over was lined with broken-down animals left behind 
by the raiders, taking fresh ones as they went on. When Hobson 


came up there was nothing with which to replace his worn-out] 
horses; but he kept on, not more than ten to fifteen miles behinc 
Morgan, expecting that some of the militia would blockade th( 
road, when he would close up and annihilate his opponent. Ii 
Clermont County it became evident that the raiders were making 
for Maysville, with the intention of crossing the river at that point; 
but Hanson's brigade, on river transports, were near the place. 

The order to the militia to destroy bridges and blockade the 
road had not been carried out, but a few days later the obstructions 
were more efficient. Part of Judah's troops were mounted anc 
sent north by a steamer to Portsmouth, to head off the enemy's 
column. Scammon, in West Virginia, concentrated troops at Gal- 
lipolis and Pomeroy, Ohio, and the militia rallied at Marietta, Hob-j 
son marching forty miles a day trying to overtake the enemy. As 
the river was patrolled and all the ferries well guarded, Morgai 
knew that he could not cross by boats, but now relied on the ford 
at BufiQngton Island, between Marietta and Pomeroy. But at the' 
latter place he found Scammon, with troops of the Kanawha Di-^ 
vision, and not militia. As soon as he learned what he was up 
against, he avoided them and moved around them. Hobson and 
Judah's men were near and approaching BufBngton. Morgan 
reached the ford in the dark of the night, but as the crossing was 
guarded by a permanent garrison in a small fort, he waited for 
daylight, and found that the work had been abandoned a few days 
before. He was, however, attacked by Hobson's men, on two sides, 
and Judah from the south, and the river gunboats were within 
range of the fort. Hobson made a vigorous charge and captured 
Morgan's artillery, resulting in the surrender of about 700 to 
Shackleford and 200 to Hobson's other brigade, and the remaining": 
force, under Morgan, escaped capture, by fleeing under the pro- 
tection of the fog. Shackleford, with his command, followec 
promptly, and Judah had also come up to Morgan in the fog, but 
before he could bring up his troops several of his staff officers werel 
captured and Major Dan McCook mortally wounded, and a piece 
of artillery taken. 

Morgan turned now in the opposite direction, and the lost gun 
of Judah, as also his prisoners, were recaptured, and Morgan 
driven in confusion northward. Some squabble arose as to who 
was to command (between Hobson and Judah), but ShacklefordJ 
had followed Morgan and was in independent command till Mor-' 


gan's capture. Shackleford overtook the enemy sixty miles north 
of Buffington, when Morgan was forced to halt to defend himself. 
Shackleford had nearly surrounded Morgan, and after a short skir- 
mish 1300 surrendered. Morgan, with 600 men, evaded Shackleford 
who now took 500 of his best men and followed for four days of 
continuous riding, in hot pursuit, and, in Jefferson County, fifteen 
miles northwest of Stuebenville, the enemy was overtaken. Here 
were Major W. B. Wade of the Ninth Michigan and Major G. W. 
Roe of the Ninth Kentucky Cavalry and Lieutenant William Torr 
with three guns of the Fifteenth Indiana Battery that had been sent 
by rail from Cincinnati, with fresh horses, to join Shackleford. 
With these 600 men they intercepted Morgan's course at Smith's 
Ferry, close to Columbia County, near Salineville, and forced him 
to surrender with 400 men, all that was left of the proud division 
with which he had started across the Ohio River at Brandenberg. 

It is claimed that 300 of his men escaped into West Virginia, 
but, as Burnside reported 3,000 prisoners captured, very few of his 
division escaped. When Shackleford came up to Morgan the latter 
v/ps JL^«^t ha.idinq tlic c-inteen to; his capturers, and everybody 
pressed near to see what he had to sa}^ One of the artillerymen, 

Joel , slipped in Mnth a sharp knife, and cut off his spurs, 

while he was excited, taking drinks and talking. On Shackleford's 
approach he offered him his sword, pistol and silver spurs, but when 
it came to turn over the spurs they were gone. "Well," he remarked 

to Shackleford, "I thought I had the d -st thieves in all America 

for trinkets, but I see your's beat me." 

The captured private soldiers were sent to Camp Chase, at 
Columbus, and Camp Morton, in Indianapolis, and, by orders 
from Washington, the officers were confined in the Ohio Peniten- 
tiary, The loss on the Union side during this whole raid was nine- 
teen killed, forty-seven wounded and eight massing. During the 
whole campaign, beginning July 2, until the final surrender, with 
the cost to the Confederates of a whole cavalry division, his 
march after he met Colonel Williams at Vernon, Indiana, was 
simply a race for life. He did not delay Burnside's march to East 
Tennessee, nor was Rosecrans cut short of any rations. He closed 
his raid with a farce, by pressing into service a justice of the peace, 
whom he made commander of all the United States forces near 
him, and then surrendered to him and demanded to be paroled. 
But Shackleford would not ;isten to the arrangement, and would 


accept only an unconditional surrender. The distance which Mor-^ 
gan traveled in the two States, Indiana and Ohio, was about 6oc 
miles. To sum up the whole Morgan episode, it was a raid, 
flight, and a failure. 

During the Morgan raid 20,000 men had been mustered ii 
at Indianapolis, 45,000 more had gathered in various parts of the 
State, ready for service, at a loss of half a milHon dollars, whicl 
the National Government paid to reimburse Indiana; but at the 
final surrender the only troops present from Indiana were three 
guns of the Fifteenth Indiana Battery. 

After the first half of our battery had left, with freshly-j 
mounted troops, to go to Northern Ohio, the other three gunsj 
under Captain Von Sehlen, were sent to Paris, Kentucky, tc 
meet a small detachment of the enemy belonging to General Scott's 
Confederate forces that had been sent to Paris to burn the railroad 
and wagon bridges. As soon as we learned of his coming, I was 
sent out with two guns on the Mount Sterling pike, and the Cap- 
tain had gone forward with one gun on the Winchester pike. The 
enemy, about 200 strong, made the attack, but finding us in posi- 
tion, wisely withdrew. We expended about thirty rounds of am- 
munition, and the infantry, part of the One Hundred and Eight- 
eenth Ohio, were not required to fire. The other part of Scott's || 
command had been defeated by General Saunders, who had gath- 
ered a force of 2,400 mounted troops at Lexington, driving Scott 
through Lancaster, Stanford and Somerset, and captured about 
700 prisoners, following and recaptured about 200 of our men 
which had been taken in the first part of the raid. Saunders fol- 
lowed Scott until he reached the Cumberland River, where Scott ^ 
had succeeded in crossing by abandoning his train. During this ^ 
operation Burnside sent forward all of his troops and made ready 
for his march to East Tennessee. The other three guns having re- 
joined the rest at Paris, we were at once sent to Lexington. Cap- 
tain Von Sehlen became sick, and remained at Paris, and the onl] 
officers present for the hard march into East Tennessee with our 
battery were Lieutenant Torr and myself. 


After our return from Lexington, in the latter part of June, 
to Paris, Ky., an incident occurred that came nearly ending my 
military life. We were very well acquainted with the young men 


of the town, those who, during the war, intended to be neutral, 
many evenings one or another of us were invited out to supper. 
Among those quite friendly was a young society man named Boyd. 
For sympathizing' expressions made in the early part of the year 
he had been sent up to Johnson's Island. After enjoying the hos- 
pitality of that bastile.for a short time, he concluded that Uncle Sam 
was too big a man to fool with, and took the oath of allegiance to 
be a good boy thereafter. He had returned home, and now specu- 
lated in Bourbon whiskey, waiting for the Government to put more 
tax on the corn juice, to pay for the cost of the war. So, one 
moonlight evening, while out with him, he asked me for a favor. 
I asked the nature of the same, and he said there were two young 
people at Mount Sterling that wanted to get married. The young 
woman, an heiress, but yet a minor, could not get the consent of 
her uncle, the guardian, and they determined to run away and 
marry on the Ohio River, near Maysville. (That town was at 
that time the Gretna Green of all Kentucky lovers). He stated 
that, as Paris was guarded, they could not get' through and to go to 
Maysville by another route they would be overhauled by the uncle 
and his big son. H I would pass them into town and pass them 
out again, on their way to Maysville, it would be a great favor to 
him and to the young people and to the youth of both sexes oi 
Bourbon County. I told him that I would let him know next day 
early. There was no time to be lost, so I called on Colonel Pierce, 
the post commander, and told him of the plot to fool the old uncle. 
I received his permission, and Boyd was happy. 

He sent word to the parties that I would go out with Boyd 
to the outpost to meet them. He, of course, had supplied himself 
with a bottle of the best Bourbon, although he did not drink a 
drop. About half-past ten we heard the carriage on the 
Winchester pike approaching rapidly. They were halted and in- 
spected and passed in. The outposts were let into the secret, and 
instructed to detain any one that came along until daylight. Boyd 
and myself went with the couple to the groom's parents, who lived 
in Paris, and after lunch and some changes in clothing they were 
driven out to the Maysville pike, over the wagon bridge, where I 
gave the countersign, and to the outpost, where I again gave the 
password, and left the prospective lovers go on to their happiness 
and glory. They did not wait for an order to go, but went at a 
fast Kentucky trot. 


Early, and before daylight, two mounted men approached 
the sentinel on the Winchester pike. They were halted, and proved 
to be Mr. Armstrong and his son, after the fugitives. They were held 
until daylight, and then permitted to enter the town. They expected 
to find the runaways still in Paris, but soon learned that they were 
on the way to the Ohio River. They hunted the telegraph op- 
erator, but he was in the plot, and would not get up until 8 o'clock. 
They tried to get over the bridge, to follow them, but the guard 
would not let them pass; so tl ere was nothing to do but wait for 
the operator, and at 8 a. m., when the latter arrived at his key- 
board, they sent a message to stop the fugitives, but received 
a prompt answer that the parties had been married on board of 
the ferry boat at 6 a. m., and had gone into the interior of Ohio. 

The old gentleman ripped around Paris, swearing vengeanci 
against the Dutch Lieutenant that had passed them through the 
lines, and was overjoyed by the thought that they did not have 
much money and would soon return. Two weeks later the couple 
arrived, and the society people of Paris gave them a grand recep- 
tion. I was invited and was present; so was Mr. Armstrong and 
his son, and all was happiness, at least for the time being. But 
after the Atlanta campaign was over and I on a twenty-days' 
furlough at Indianapolis, General Noble, then Adjutant General 
of Indiana stopped me on the street and said : "Lieutenant, come 
to my office. I have something that will surprise you." I called, 
and to my horror found charges preferred against me by the late 
Lieutenant Schlarb, for disloyalty, he having gone on a furlough 
just about the time this marriage took place, and as he was not 
able to reach Captain Von Sehlen or Lieutenant Torr, with 
charges, he picked on me and made the passage of thi'= rouple 
through the lines the subject of attack. Schlarb had been in poli- 
tics, a Democrat, before the war, but intensely loyal to the Union. 
Yet, like many Democrats, during the war, he idolized the State 
Government, from which all power to the Union originated. I, 
also, was a Democrat at the time, and, as the party in power of- 
fered many opportunities for criticism as to the carrying on of 
the war. I may have expressed myself imprudently; but 
Schlarb had forgotten that the proper place to file charges was not 
with the State authorities, but with the Captain of the battery, who 
would then have been compelled to forward them to the district 
commander. But as he had filed them with the Adjutant General 


of the State, who had no longer any jurisdiction over us, we being in 
the United States service, and not in the State, and as Noble knew 
how I had earned and received my promotion, he, fortunately, per- 
mitted these charges to rest in the pigeon-hole of his office, and 
that was the end of it. Schlarb was discharged from the service 
August, 1863. 


CH.\PTER X\1IL— AUGUST, 1863, 



General Bnmsade took command of die De^eotaaextf^ €5onsi5tmg 
oi Ohio, Midiigan, Illiiiois, and Kenrncky, esoxptiiig the part wes: 
of dw Term^see RiT^er, inft ali east of tiae Tenn^see River thai 
be nngin ai anv time oocai^ CTiin^ lib es^editioo into East Ten- 
Dcsssee. On the abo-v^e date Geoenl Bc^iam of llie Confederate 
ArmT ocCTjaed, with a fonnidUbie cavalry foence, that part of Ken- 
tiidnr sondi of liie KeoUKkr Rirer, Tidth headqoaiters at I>aI^ 
TiBe. A Jew days a£t£r Bnmside's arrival, Goaeral (Hhnore re- 
oeaned orders to drive P<^iam soaiidi, and oat of the State The 
opfpoaog ioKces met at Scmeiset and with the a^sisftwaoe of Gen- 
eral MuBOBk, idm oononBBided 31 port of Baykss' foftse. C3- 
niore ixsa^ksb^ destiojed l^^ram and dran:^ hkn to the Ctrmber- 
laiui Rrrer, vlocii s^gaon bwamBP "Ar dividii^ Visx, and Cenrral 
Kioitackj^, mas ic£ec*cd of dae Guuledkaate ioras. 

The tifio^ idien in the Sbtteof had beoa orgciiiized 
xEto 11k TviBa^Hhiid Ana^ Gair^ and General G. L. HansnE was 
rasade its tsraBiBaider, aeod General Bnna^de, die dqartmeoGt com- 
raoaader, coanmeiaoed to putyane a campa^n wto East Taoiessee. 
£h(«s5^arai^ so &r had progressed so tat^Hahfy that on Jooe 5 be 
ten: Cmui ii is i ^ iKT^tt las siatg to taiae pegsonal a wiiiifMiMl c^ the ~ 

Has lit-LJe znnv ior fee mavcmesA was ooraposed r-f r^: 'dixfi- 
5ais csi xbf Ximi Cosps, xradcr Goieral WiloBs, a:i - ; ^" : - tbc 
Twcnrr-^ird Carps, sader G^eril Hij-i?.::5. re: 15 zz rti: .ed 
JjBSJs^am he iQOQi>ed so. rr : f : ' r-r jrsn- 

cral Ggaaa att \i iIdb M ig - - : __: -^-__-_: : Z^isi 

Till— ijiii.i.. iar tfee time. iiiiri '_?: i:.-: iiiis 


ime General Saunders, who h^d made a raid into East Tennessee 
vith about 1,500 mounted troops and a battery of artillery, re- 
ui-ned minus his guns, which he had to abandon on account of 
laving to retreat over a bridle path through the mountains; but 
he raid had been a success, so far as to scare the Confederates, 
md gave Burnside the assurance that he could enter East 
Tennessee by many ways. His preparations, therefore, were 
:ontinued, with the hope to still enter that State with the remain- 
ng force. 

Just then the rebel General Morgan started with a large force 
)n his raid through Kentucky, Indiana and Ohio, that resulted, as 
ilready stated in another chapter, in the raiders' capture, near 
Steubenville, Ohio. At the same time another raid, under Col- 
:)nel John S. Scott, was made from East Tennessee to the Ohio, to 
issist the former to return. But after Morgan was disposed of the 
ast column was driven out of the State by Colonel Saunders. 

The latter routed the enemy at Lancaster, when two hundred 
Surrendered. Saunders followed them up with vigor and destroyed 
.heir train, making 500 more of them prisoners, but was compelled 
:o halt at the Cumberland River on account of having been out of 
rations for four days. Scott claimed to have taken and paroled 200 
prisoners in the early part of the raid, but the parole was irregular 
md not recognized, and the men returned to their commands. Saun- 
ders' casualties were only trifling, except for the wearing out of his 
mounted troops, but the Confederates being completely defeated. 

Burnside pressed forward from every direction, and his col- 
umn was soon in readiness for an advance. On August 4th he noti- 
fied the War Department that 12,000 of his men were concentrated 
at Lebanon, Stanford and Glasgow. Upon this report orders were 
issued to Rosecrans to advance, and a few days later, like orders were 
sent to Burnside to go forward w4th his column 12,000 strong upon 
Knoxville, and from there make an effort to connect with the forces 
under Rosecrans. 

Burnside's troops had, by these raids, become much scattered, 
fatigued and worn by marches and hard service, but by 
much labor the organization for the invasion into East 
Tennessee was at last perfected, and General J. D. Cox, an officer of 
ability and determination, was placed in charge of the headquarters 
at Cincinnati. 

Our battery, after Lieutenant Torr had returned from service 


chasing the Confederate General John Morgan, was reunited at 
Lexington, where we remained a few days. We were now ordered to 
Camp Nelson, where we noticed, to our delight, the New York riot- 
ers beating rock and doing other hard manual labor, something that 
their appearance and hands indicated they had never done; but it 
must also be remembered that they had come in conflict with national 
authority. As Camp Nelson was the base of supplies, we changed 
as best we could our wornout horses for better teams, and with a 
fine new outfit for guns and wagons, we moved the whole battery to 

After Rosecrans had quarreled with about all his superiors and 
found that delay of a forward movement was no longer possible, he 
asked Halleck whether Burnside was ready to come up on his left 
flank into East Tennessee. Halleck now urged Burnside forward, 
stating that there must be no further delay in the movement, asking 
for reports on position and number of troops organized and ready 
for the march, having forgotten that a part of Burnside's forces had 
been after Morgan, who surrendered on the 26th day of July ; but no 
time was lost in bringing these troops back, some of them 
300 miles north of Cincinnati. 

We remained here several days, and one evening I received 
an order signed by Colonel Byrd to proceed at once to Camp Nel- 
son, to Burnside's headquarters and draw an ambulance. Colonel 
Byrd, who was placed in command of the brigade, was an East 
Tennesseean, and was to lead the column of invasion. His own 
regiment, the First Tennessee, the Forty-fifth Ohio, the One Hun- 
dred and Twelfth Illinois, the Eighth Michigan Cavalry and the 
Fifteenth Indiana Battery had the honor to belong to this brigade. 
As I reached the camp late in the night, I had to hunt up General 
Burnside and his staff, and found them away from headquarters, 
enjoying themselves at the home of a Kentucky Blue Grass beauty, 
at a dance while the Sambos furnished the music. After making my 
errand known, the General signed my requisition, and I now 
hunted up the army quartermaster, who growled because I 
disturbed his slumbers, and in an austere manner informed me that 
he had no more ambulances that he could issue. This made my 
trip useless, and in the early morning, after nearly an all-night 
ride, I reached the battery, where I had left it, camping in a ceme- 
tery, at Sanford. I now caught a few hours' rest, and about 6 a-.) 
m. we were in brigade column, on our way to Crab Orchard, where 


our mounted division, commanded by General Carter, also a Ten- 
nesseean, rendezvoused for the march. The other divisions of the 
Twenty-third Corps v^ere located, on the 17th of August, as fol- 
lows : "White's division at Columbia, Kentucky, .Hascall's division 
tat Stanford, Graham's cavalry at Gleason, and Woolford's cavalry 
at Somerset. General Hartsuff commanded the corps and issued 
the order for Hascall's division to march to Kingston, Tennessee, 
jby way of Somerset, Chit wood, Huntsville and Montgomery. 
White's division to march from Columbia to Montgomery, Tenn., 
by way of Keatsboro and Albany, Ky., and Jamestown, Tenn., 
and Grahame's cavalry to join White's and Woolford's cavalry to 
guard the supplies and ammunition train that was with Hascall's 
division. Carter's cavalry division, with General Burnside's head- 
quarters, was to march by way of Mount Vernon, London and 
Williamsburg, Ky., over to the Jollico Mountains, to Chitwood, 
Huntsville, Montgomery and Kingston, Tenn. 

As all the troops of our brigade were not yet mounted, some 
had to make the distance on foot. It was a depressing, hot day, 
and a number of them gave out and rested on the wayside as we 
marched by. We reached camp in the early evening, located near 
a nice stream of water, and remained for three days, making com- 
plete the preparations for the grand forward movement. While ' 
in camp the second division of our boys passed by and all 
the roads leading to East Tennessee were filled with troops. The 
supply train following the division covered miles of road almost in 
endless column, indicating the vast resources of our Government. 

On August 20 our brigade started with its supply train of 
sixty headquarter wagons, containing supplies and baggage for 
the General and staff only. Our movements over the rough and 
rocky road were necessarily slow, but at sundown we reached 
Mount Vernon to camp for the night. The heavily loaded supply 
train m.oved all night and did not reach our camp until next 
morning. Here some of the loads were rearranged, and some of 
the boys had a chance to visit the town, which they supposed, from 
its historic name, would be quite a village. 

But we soon found out that there was nothing in the name, 
and whatever romance there was about the place was drowned by 
the musical noise of the mule drivers, over whom our Mr. Joel 
Lanning already had become quite the boss. His shouts and laugh- 
ter could be heard over the braying of the mules, and his voice 


did more to inspire the wornout animals with new courage than 
all the beating blows bestowed on the unfortunate brutes. To the 
boys raised on the prairies of Illinois, Indiana, Ohio and Michigan, 
who knew little about mules or mountains, all of this was interesting, 
and no mule of that column ever reached animal heaven, if the 
curses they received kept them from it. The people of Mount 
Vernon were the usual dull, indolent and indifferent mountain in- 
habitants. Their wants were few and their surroundings in keep- 
ing with them. But little vegetation met the eye, and there was 
nothing to invite the soldier possessing an empty stomach. There 
were, however, several places where liquor was sold, but as the 
selling was prohibited by an order (which was not strictly obeyed) 
the provost marshal on Colonel Byrd's staff took possession, and 
confiscated the liquor and brought it to the brigade headquarters 
for purely medicinal purposes, as it was reported the mountains 
were alive with rattlesnakes, and the liquor would become valuable 
to cure the bites. Strange as it may seem, the "medicine" rapidly 
disappeared, although not a single case of "snake bite" was dis- 
covered among the men (of the genuine kind). 

At 6 o'clock on the morning of the 22nd, we were again on 
the road to the Wild Cat Mountains, more lifeless and dead than 
the country we had just passed through. If the contractor who 
furnished the wagons to Uncle Sam had not been honest, the 
bounding of those vehicles over the rocks in the road would have 
crushed the wagons like egg shells before we could have marched 
a mile. Slowly, but surely, we reached the foot of the Wild Cat 
Mountains about noon. The name of these mountains was very 
proper, for a more desolate and wild place cannot well be imagined, 
and they are fit only for the inhabitation of very wild cats. On the top 
of this mountain General Buell and General Bragg had met when 
the latter had retreated from Kentucky in 1862. The earthworks 
'Df Bragg that had been occupied by his batteries to retard Buell 
were still intact. The descent over the mountain by a narrow 
road was very difficult, but after we reached the foot of the moun- 
tain we had for a few miles good road, and in the evening reached 
Rock Castle River, but on the other side was another large hill. 
Yet, with determination and iron will, we climbed on, with our 
wagons, the battery and nearly wornout teams. 

After working all night, it was 10 a. m. the next day before 
the battery and trains finally reached the top of that hill. That 



our horses and mules were all exhausted is not surprising, for the 
last ten days they had been kept on half rations, and mostly hay. 
Necessity compelled us to do that, as grain was scarce, and 
all that could be obtained was held in the wagons, to be fed when 
on top of the mountains, where no forage was to be had. We 
moved on that day six miles beyond London, but the wagons did 
not reach us until next morning at 8 o'clock, with some of the 
mules having entirely given out. At London the Eighth Michi- 
gan Cavalry was detached from the brigade to rejoin us again, at 
Williamsburg, being placed in the rear of the train, and by order 
of General Carter was made the rear guard, which carried with it 
the job of assisting the battery and wagons to get over the Cum- 
berland Mountains, and they were not again with the brigade until 
we reached Chitwood, in East Tennessee. We left our camping 
ground six miles south of London at 4 p. m. and marched all 
night over a very rough road and a wild country, about midnight 
we reached within six miles of Williamsburg. Early next morning 
we started on our march again, and arrived at Williamsburg at 9 
o'clock. Generals Burnside and Carter having reached the place 
ahead of us. Here we were to cross the Cumberland Moun- 
tains. The place was romantic and picturesque in the extreme, 
but with our tired and wornout bodies, and empty stomachs, we 
did not appreciate the beauties of nature. Our eyes and thoughts 
were more on the roasting ears in the corn fields, to satisfy the 
inner man, and on the fodder and stocks for our hungry horses 
and mules ; and a result, with the consequence that we left nothing 
but the stumps visible in the fields. This was the case all along 
the road of our march, but the Government did not allow the loyal 
people to sufl:"er, without the intervention of a claim agent. A pay- 
master was present with the ever-welcome greenback to pay them 
in full for everything, every ear of corn and fodder that the men 
had consumed and taken, and in many instances they were over- 
paid. Many of these mountaineers would look over his small field 
of corn and a stack of fodder or hay in the morning, and at night 
sit down to count his greenbacks, with his fields well harvested. 
Large droves of cattle had to be fed, and hundreds of pack mules, 
besides the teams, consumed an immense amount of forage. As 
we passed over many by-ways, we reached a class of people that 
never had received much for their farm products. After our 
horses and mules had been rested and well fed, and we ourselves 


had filled our bread baskets, we again started forward on our 
march at i p. m., and proceeded to a place called Jones. 

Here we rested for the night, to start next morning into Ten- 
nessee through Big Creek Gap, but during the night news reached 
headquarters that the enemy had blockaded the road, and so next 
morning we had to take another course. The First Tennessee 
passed on over another route, a bridle path by way of Jacksboro. 
This movement was made to mislead the enemy, and we marched 
on unobstructed, but the next morning we took another route that 
had not been much used. For several miles we had fairly good 
traveling, not hilly, but rough. We had believed that the worst of 
the road had been passed, but how often had we been disappointed 
and deceived. 

As we issued out of the woods we discovered a long range of 
mountains, which proved to be, upon inquiry, the Jellico Moun- 
tains, and that our road ran directly over the highest peak, and 
that the roads were extremely bad. There was no sign of a human 
inhabitant near, the trees and rocks peered at us, but nothing was 
to defy us, for we were bound to go into East Tennessee, and no 
mountain, ever so high, could keep us from getting there. About 
sundown, the first piece, with double teams, and a company of the 
Forty-fifth Ohio, pulling on ropes, by a patent pulley invented 
by Artificer Stegsdall, reached the top, and, considering 
that a hill at an angle of forty-five degrees was to be climbed, 
we got along fairly well. But it was daylight before the last wagon 
of our battery landed on top of the mountains, but without the as- 
sistance of the Forty-fifth Ohio and the One Hundred and Twelfth 
Illinois Infantry the movement never would have been accom- 
plished. There were six gun carriages, six caissons, a forge and 
battery wagon and five six-mule army wagons alone for our bat- 
tery, and many times we had twenty-four horses to a carriage. 
Several horses gave out and fell down in the road. As the passage 
was narrow, we could only take the harness off and roll the dying 
animal down the steep cliff. 

The labor was confined to only two officers, present for duty, 
in the battery, while five of them were drawing pay. When the 
top of the mountain was reached the descent was at once com- 
menced, which proved quite as difficult. The road was narrow, 
and ropes had to be attached to the guns, caissons and wagons to 
keep them from going down too fast and from turning over, and 


after twenty-four hours of ihe hardest work ever performed by- 
officers, men and beasts, we succeeded in getting the battery and 
wagons over the JelHco Mountains. The other troops of Burn- 
side's army had better roads and not so many hills to climb. That 
night we camped at a place called ''The Well," some eight miles 
from the foot, on the south side of the Jellico Mountains. The 
well is 450 feet deep, and the water is known for its medicinal 
qualities. As the division supply train had not reached us, we had 
to draw rations, for man and beast, from the corn fields. At early 
dawn we proceeded on our march, and at lo a. m. passed General 
Hascall's camp at Chitwood. We marched six miles further and 
rested for the next twenty- four hours, awaiting the arrival of the 
Eighth Michigan Cavalry and the First East Tennessee Mounted 
Infantry. They rejoined us, after detached service. At this place 
many of our teams gave out, but as we had passed the worst part 
of the road, we felt hopeful and encouraged. 

Our trains had come up and their loads had become much 
lightened, although we had been on half rations on the trip. We 
now had to rely almost wholly on corn fields for our supply, and 
in the mountains they had become less numerous. To relieve the 
condition, we moved on as fast as possible, and as our weak, half- 
starved horses and mules would permit, in order to get into the 
valley, where forage was more abundant. As we were in Scott 
County, Tenn., a very inhospitable section of the country, it re- 
quired a high grade of morals to keep up good spirits, for we could 
travel for miles and not see a single human habitation, and then it 
would be but a little hut, secluded among the tall trees and rocks, 
with an occasional small patch of corn and a few hills of potatoes, 
that, on our approach, would disappear like magic. The horses and 
mules soon became in ■ such a condition that neither whips nor 
spurs could urge them to further service, and we naturally lost 
many a good animal, and our battery became scattered for over a 
mile on the road. 

Just then General Burnside, with his brilliant staff, overtook 
us, and after sizing up the situation, remarked that this would 
never do, and rode on at a gallop to the head of the column and 
halted. A few miles further on we found more forage, but this 
was fed to the stock, and it seemed to revive them. The people in 
this part of the country were truly loyal. Their suffering from 
the effects of war seemed to be beyond all endurance, and they 


had borne all the persecution that our enemies could heap upon 
them. They bore it manfully and heroically, and without a mur- 
mur, knowing that, as in all things, the end would come, and the 
darkest hour before daylight. Why the Government so long de- 
layed in giving protection to this part of the country that was 
equally as loyal as the most loyal parts in the Northern States, is 
hard to understand, at this day, when the question of Union and 
disunion was before the people to be voted on. The m.ajority for 
the Union was over 60,000 votes. When, in 1862, Congressmen 
were elected, three of them from the Athens, Knoxville and Green- 
ville Districts were radical Union men, that had as large a major- 
ity as any Union Congressman in the North. With this love for 
the Union, by these people in a slave State, it ought to put to shame 
any politician in the Northern States, at this day, who by words 
and acts of sympathy gave encouragement to the insurrection; 
for the acts of the latter encouraged those that were really Seces- 
sionists to hold out, after every chance of success had disappeared. 
A matter not generally known, and for reasons not so well circu- 
lated, shows now, since the great rebellion has passed into his- 
tory, that only one out of every twelve white voters in the South 
was a slaveholder, and the other eleven had, therefore, no in- 
terest in the war except State pride, but the slaveholder was usu- 
ally a leading man in the community and carried the other eleven 
along with him. But returning to the loyal mountaineers in East 
Tennessee, who, as soon as we reached an open country where 
habitation was possible, appeared with banners, by families, and 
greeted us with tears running down their faces, and greeted our 
advance as their dehverance. Their joy was beyond the power of 
expression, and they appeared as if hope had once more been born 
in them. The cross-roads blossomed with national flags, and the 
people said they had a religious faith that God would not abandon 

After having marched and camped in Scott County three days 
and nights, we reached Montgomery, the county seat of Morgan 
County. Here the enemy had left the town the day before. We 
expected some resistance from now on, and therefore moved cau- 
tiously along the road. About dark some one of our men of the 
pioneer corps had his horse shot from ambush, but Colonel Byrd 
sent the First Tennessee forward to clear the road. Major Ellis, in 
charge of the advance, had not moved far when he came upon some 


of the enemy's outposts, and a lively skirmish was the result. As 
the enemy appeared to have breastworks, and as it was now nearly 
1 1 o'clock at night, it became advisable not to go any further, and 
we camped for the night. Pickets were sent out on all the roads, 
and at the dawn of day not an enemy was to be found. They had 
retreated to Kingston, and from there to Loudon. Without being 
further molested, our march was continued, and in the afternoon 
we reached Kingston, The battery was brought forward, on high 
ground overlooking the little Tennessee or Holston River, which 
was at this place very wide. The other side was still occupied by 
the enemy's outpost. 





With a force of about 15,000 men, a wagon train nine 
miles long and 1,000 pack mules, General Burnside had success- 
fully crossed the mountains, and on the first day of September 
Colonel Byrd reached his home, from which the enemy had re- 
treated in great haste. As the last boat that crossed the river was 
overloaded (with the enemy) the boat sank, and twenty men were 
drowned. Under the protection of our guns the boat was raised, 
and afterwards did good service to ferry us across the river. Some 
of the drowned came to the surface of the water along with 
the boat, and one of our cannoneers (Summerfield) pulled them 
on shore, where they received a proper burial. Colonel Byrd oc- 
cupied the same house for his headquarters that had just done sim- 
ilar duty for General Forrest. Lieutenant John L. Dow of Com- 
pany "A," One Hundred and Twelfth Illinois Infantry, was made 
provost marshal of Kingston, and he made himself immensely 
popular by treating all Unionists and Confederates with the great- 
est courtesy. Some of the Confederate storekeepers had, on our 
approach, abandoned their goods. These were taken charge of 
and distributed to the citizens. One of these, a Mr. Yost, had left 
a large stock and gone south with the enemy. Our advance 
reached Knoxville on the 2nd of September, and Burnside en- 
tered on the 3rd. The troops of the Twenty-third Corps were 
complimented by General Burnside very highly. 

From the time we left Camp Nelson, in Kentucky, our 
labors had been under great difficulties, and had been performed 
with the greatest efficiency. The mountain route, by which the 


army had traveled, was nearly two hundred miles from its base, 
and fifteen to twenty-five miles were marched daily, and both men 
and animals had lived during this time on less than half rations, 
but as the supplies had to be drawn from Kentucky and the short- 
est route was by way of Cumberland Gap, of which the enemy 
still held possession, Burnside's first duty was to clear that road. Be- 
fore leaving Kentucky General Burnside had ordered the organiza- 
tion if a new division under Colonel De Courcy to move down from 
the north to Cumberland Gap and occupy that position. On his 
arrival he learned that the Gap was still in the enemy's possession. 
General Burnside now directed General Shackleford to march to 
the south side, and if possible capture the garrison and General 
Frazer, 2,500 strong. General Shackleford, on his ai rival, com- 
municated with De Courcy on the north, by courier, and learned 
that the position was too strong to be captured by a small, or any 
force, excepting starvation. General Burnside, after learning the 
facts, started at once for the Gap, with Colonel Gilbert's brigade, 
and made the distance, sixty miles, in fifty-three hours, and reached 
there on the 9th of September. Preparations were made to as- 
sault the place, but before next morning General Frazer, who was 
in command of the enemy, concluded to surrender. About 2,200 
men, with the material and armaments of the fort, were turned 
over to the Federal forces, and about 400 men escaped into the 
mountains during the night. This was certainly a very cheap vic- 
tory, without firing a gun or the loss of a man. The truth was 
that Frazer's command (as shown by an investigation Ly the Con- 
federate authorities) consisted of Union loyal Tennesseeans, who did 
not propose to stand and fight the Federal troops. 

Those surrendered were sent north, and nearly all later en- 
listed in the United States Army for the war. Those loyal to the 
Confederacy (the before-mentioned deserters — about 400) slipped 
out during the night; but this capture served Burnside in getting 
great credit from the authorities in Washington, and praise from 
the lo3'al North. That the men wanted to surrender was not re- 
ferred to in the dispatches. Burnside, with Shackleford's and Gil- 
bert's brigade, returned to Knoxville, and De Courcy's brigade, 
then in command of Colonel Lammert, was left as a garrison at 
the Gap. 

Our boys would sometimes cross the river at Kingston three 
or four a- day. Sergeant Lynam, with several others, rowed acr''=;5 


and called at a farm house to get dinner. To their surprise, the 
table was occupied by an equal number of Confederates, who at 
the sight of the Federals, sprang up to open hostilities. Sergeant 
Lynam assured them that the killing of each other, at that place, 
would not end the war, and would only be murder, and told them 
to eat their meal and go their way in peace. The Confederates 
saw the point and finished their meal. Our boys were served, soon 
after, by the same hostess, and all had their fill and no blood was 
shed, thus showing that as individuals they had nothing against 
each other. 

On the morning of the 7th of September the brigade broke 
camp and crossed the river known as the Little Tennessee or Hol- 
ston, just about where it joins another stream, the two forming 
the Tennessee River that at Paducah, Ky., enters the Ohio. We 
marched about three miles south, thence to Prigmore's mill, where 
we arrived on the evening of the 8th in a most disagreeably cold 
rain storm. The mill was set in operation to grind food for our 
brigade. Prigmore was a thoroughly loyal Confederate, but he 
furnished us freely with supplies, for men and horses, without the 
prospect of being paid for the same, for the brigade purchasing 
agent was not so prompt in turning greenbacks over to him as he 
had been to the loyal mountaineers. Among the supplies taken 
were thirty head of beef cattle, which were slaughtered as we. 
needed them. Although he leceived no cash, yet as a good busi- 
ness man he asked for receipts for everything the Union troops 
appropriated, even for the top rail of a fence. Colonel Byrd hadi 
given strict instructions to look to the rails and not touch them. 
His orders under the circumstances (cold and rain) received no 
attention, and the bright fire made by them felt extremely com- 
fortable, as all could testify. Colonel Byrd rode through the camp 
in high dudgeon, using very bad language for a Christian, but re- 
ceiving from the officers and men just returns of what he gave 
them. This had no effect, however, on the enforcement of his 
order. One of the officers made a remark that if every rail on 
that farm had to go, his men should use all they needed to keep 
comfortable. Byrd finally left off, much disgusted, trying to save 
the top rail. Colonel Byrd had considerable trouble in trying to 
show kindness to the loyal Confederates. For some little overt 
act he tied two of the men of our battery by their thumbs, but 
Sergeant Lynam, with more courage than the rest of us, delib- 


erately cut the two men loose, while Prigmore and Colonel Byrd 
sat on the porch and looked on. He soon came over to us and 
wanted the men arrested. Lieutenant Torr, the officer in com- 
mand of the battery, told Byrd that he would attend to the disci- 
pline of his men. As some of the One Hundred and Twelfth Illinois 
were equally guilty, Colonel Henderson told him about the same 
thing. Colonel Byrd's intentions were all right, but it occurred to me 
when he ingloriously fled, at Calhoun, and left us in the lurch, that 
he did not have full confidence in the restoration of the Union, and 
was trying to make Confederate friends for the future. Hence his 
friendship for the rich planter, and it is dollars to doughnuts that 
Prigmore was paid for everything afterwards, just the same as the 
loyal mountaineers; loyalty in East Tennessee was easily es- 
tablished. During our stay at Prigmore a detachment of the Fif- 
teenth Pennsylvania Cavalry reached us, from the Army of the 
Curnberland, and assured us that all was well with Rosecrans. 
They carried dispatches for General Burnside, and our mounted 
troops carried them forward to Knoxville. 

Headquarters^ Twenty-first Army Corps^ 
Chattanooga, Sept. io, 1863, 2 a. m. 
Major General A. E. Burnside, 

Commanding Department of Ohio, Tennessee River: 
Sir — I am directed by the General commanding the Depart- 
ment of the Cumberland to inform you that I am in full possession 
of this place, having entered it yesterday at 12 m., without resist- 

The enemy has retreated In the direction of Rome, Ga., the 
last of his force, a cavalry, having left a few hours before my ar- 
rival. At daylight I made a rapid pursuit with my corps, and 
hope that he will be intercepted by the center and right, the latter 
of which was at Rome. The General commanding department re- 
quests that you will move down your cavalry and occupy the coun- 
try recently covered by Colonel Minty, who will report particulars 
to you, and who has been ordered to cross the river. 

(Signed) T. L. Crittenden, 

Maj. Gen. Commanding. 

On the following day a scouting party from the One Hundred 
and Twelfth Illinois was sent to Athens, a beautiful town on the 


Tennessee and Virginia Railroad, sixty miles southwest of Knox- 
ville. Its citizens were nearly all intensely loyal and welcomed the 
advance of the Union Army with joy. The detachment returned 
the same night with glowing accounts of their reception by the 
Union people at Athens. On the next day, the loth, the whole bri- 
gade marched to Athens and reached the town about 3 p. m. in 
the afternoon. Our reception was similar to the one the loyal 
people of Marietta, Ohio, gave the Seventh Indiana Infantry, on 
our advance to West Virginia in May, 1861. Nothing was too 
good for us, and each tried to outdo the other. A Mrs. George 
W. Ross (her husband was a druggist in the town, and she had 
two brothers with Stonewall Jackson's division in Virginia — God 
bless her memory — ) came forward with several dishpans full of eat- 
ables. We were all hungry, but there was not a battery boy who 
did not, receive a biscuit or two from her supplies, and as busy as 
this lady was, so were the rest, in supplying us with the best they 
had. Our camp was established on Forrest Hill, and in honor of 
Colonel Henderson of the One Hundred and Twelfth Illinois, it 
was named Camp Henderson. At the approach of the Union 
Army, the Confederates retired, without any resistance to our ad- 
vance. They had joined Bragg's army at Chickamauga, to be 
ready for battle with Rosecrans. As we were the first Union troops 
that passed through this part of the country, in full uniform, we 
became quite a curiosity to both the Union-loving and the Con- 
federate element. They all turned out en masse to see us. The 
Union people, to greet us, the Confederates to satisfy their curi- 
osity, for the latter had been made to believe that we were not like 
other human beings, but horrible looking creatures, with horns, 
and like blood-thirsty savages, and many funny and foolish ques- 
tions were asked. Our good clothes and appearance surprised 
most of them. But few able-bodied men were among our visitors, 
those able to carry arms were fighting on one side or the other, and 
both sides held radical views, the women being very bitter on 
either side. There was no conservative principle upon which they 
would agree, except it might have been on snuff-dipping. The 
East Tennesseeans were probably not all snuff-dippers, but most 
of the ladies, and many of them beauties, used snuff. 

On our march from Prigmore to Athens we had a repetition of 
the gatherings at the cross-roads of men, women and children, bear- 
ing flags that they made themselves, to resemble Old Glory. Many of 


them were very poor imitations, and out of proportion. On more 
than one occasion the color-bearers of the different regiments had 
to unfurl their flags and let them see the real Stars and Stripes, as 
we carried them. Between the Union-loving and loyal Confed- 
erates, in this part of the country, there was no perceptible dif- 
ference in appearance and intelligence. Some were smart and 
good looking, while some were very ignorant. 

There had been many daring acts by Union men of East 
Tennessee in getting away from that section, while under Confed- 
erate control, but the Union women were not behind in risking 
their hves for freedom in the cause they loved. One lady of 
Athens had crossed the mountains, before our arrival, five times, 
forded dangerous rivers, traversed dismal forests, climbed steep 
mountains, by day and night, in storm and sunshine, attended only 
by a trusty negro woman, to furnish information to the Union 
Army in Kentucky. A large number of beautiful young ladies, 
dressed in white, had walked out to meet the Union troops, and 
amid the waving of handkerchiefs, greeted them with hearty cheers. 
All of them carried beautiful bouquets of flowers, tied with red, 
white and blue ribbons. They presented them to the boys, with 
best wishes of success for the Union cause. Such a reception glad- 
dened the heart and gave courage and energy to endure the dan- 
gers and hardships of the campaign. On the following day a 
large meeting of Union people was held at the Methodist Church. 
Colonel Eyrd of the First Tennessee was the first speaker. The gist of 
his speech was that the Union must be preserved, with or without 
the negro. The next speaker was Colonel Worman of the Eighth 
Michigan Cavalry, who told his hearers that he and his boys came 
from the most northern part of the United States, and that they 
came to cure certain ills of the people, with doses of pills, seven at 
a time. They were easily injected, but with terrible results, but that 
they intended to stay in the South until the disease of secession was 
cured. Colonel Thomas Henderson, a native Tennesseean, but now 
a czitien of Illinois, in command of the One Hundred and Twelfth 
Illinois Infantry, was called on. He was happy to have met such a 
reception of the loyal people, and was glad there were so many of 
them, in his native State who understood the situation so well, but 
regretted that politicians (after the people resisted the 
secession) had been able to pass the ordinance to separate the State 
from the Union. He said that Illinois had already sent 130,000 


soldiers to the Union Army, and would send as many more to re- 
store the National authority over every acre of tthe Lmted States. 
\s to the freedom of the slaves, that had become a war measure 
and would be carried out as such, and the people of the North cared 
not what became of slavery, so that the Union of the States remamed 
intact and its laws supreme. , . r 4 

Circulars and notices were published for the farmers that lived 
near by to bring, in their produce, and they would be promptly 
paid for evervthmo- thev sold to the Government. Captam J. U 
Wilkins of the One Hundred and Twelfth Illinois acted as Provost 
Marshal, and his company ("1") was detailed as provost guard. A 
scouting party was sent south to the town of Benton, across the 
Hiawassia River, but came up with none of the enemy m tnat direc- 
tion Some civilian prisoners were brought in, and alter giving 
bond, released. A large number of citizens visited us daily and^ 
many East Tennesseeans in Buckner's and Bragg's army, now that 
the Federals had possession, deeserted the Confederate cause and 
came home to take the oath of allegiance. The occupation of East 
Tennessee bv Burnside had been intended by the Government at 
Washington'to be a support to the Army of the Cumberland, unde- . 
Rosecrans, and Burnside had received positive instructions, and so 
apparently understood his orders to keep in touch with Rosecrans, 
so that in case of necessity he could support him m battle. As our 
brigade was nearest to the Army of the Cumberland, a note was re- 
ceived by Colonel Bvrd, and forwarded to General Burnside, then 
between Cumberland Gap and Knoxville, from General Halleck, 

dated at, -n a r 

Washington, D. C, Sept. nth, 1863—2 P. M. 
"Hold the gaps of the North Carolina mountains, the line of 
the Holston River, or some point (if there be one) to prevent ac- 
cess from Virginia, and connect with General Rosecrans, at least 

with your cavalry.'' 

This gave Burnside the assurance that all was well with Rose- 
crans, up To that time, and just the information he wanted, for he 
evidently did not intend to help win Rosecrans' battle. The force 
under Colonel Bvrd (our brigade), Colonel Woolford's Cavalry and 
White's infantry division were all the troops between Knoxville and 
Buckner's and Bragg's right flank at that time. Byrd received or- 
ders, if possible, to occupy Cleveland, thirty miles from Athens, and 
about 30 miles from Chattanooga. For this purpose, on Sept. 15, he 


sent Captain Dickerson of thte One Hundred and Twelfth Illinois 
Infantry and two other companies, one of the Eighth Michigan and 
the other the First Tennessee, to that place. The enemy had been 
there the day before, but returned and gave the Federals a fight, in 
which Captain Dickerson was killed, and some prisoners taken, and 
the others routed. Burnside therefore knew that the Confederates 
were here in force, yet he moved his principal troops to the east of 
Knoxville, where no enemy had been found. To support his action 
he refers to Halleck's orders "to hold the gaps of the North Carolina 
mountains, etc. 

As there was a rumor at the time that the Confederate General 
Jones was holding some points in the upper part of East Tennessee, 
he ordered General Hartsuff to order all the infantry of the Twenty- 
third Corps east of Knoxville, and for Colonel Byrd to connect with 
Rosecrans in the southwest. Byrd claimed that his brigade only 
numbered i,2CO men, while Burnside crossed the mountain with 
15,000 troops. Fie therefore put a greater distance between the rest 
of his troops and Rosecrans' army in Northern Georgia than if he 
had remained in Kentucky. On the night of the i6th General Burn- 
'^ide received an order from General Halleck dated September 13, 
which read : 

"It is important that all the available forces at your command 
be pushed forward into East Tennessee, and all your scattered forces 
should be concentrated there. Move. down your infantry as rapidly 
as possible towards Chattanooga, to connect with Rosecrans." 

Next morning Burnside ordered the Ninth Corps, that had 
rested in Kentucky since the 12th of August, forward. This corps 
had been with Grant at Vicksburg, and started to return from that 
place by boat July 8, and reached Cincinnati August 12. The ex- 
cuse for not bringing the Ninth Army Corps was that it needed rest 
from its Vicksburg campaign, but it had rested on board 
the transports for a whole month, an ideal place to rest. The troops 
not in the presence of the enemy, in upper East Tennessee, were now 
ordered in great haste to return to Knoxville, and thten march to 
Chattanooga to Rosecrans. Another telegram from Halleck, dated 
September 14, reached Burnside on the 17th, which read: "There 
are several reasons why you should re-enforce Rosecrans with all 
possible dispatch. It is believed the enemy will concentrate to give 
him battle. You must be there to help him." 

On this day we received orders with our brigade at Athens, to 


at once move to Calhoun, but Colonel Byrd sent only two companies 
with Henderson of the One Hundred and Twelfth Illinois and the 
Fifteenth Indiana Battery. We reached that place about noon of 
the 1 8th and placed the battery on high ground, in the cemetery, in 
position, ready for action, overlooking the Hiawasi, and up to the 
hills on the other side. The detachment, or what was left of it, un- 
der Captain Dickerson, but now under Lieutenant John Gudgel, re- 
crossed the river and in the night we retreated to Riceville, seven 
miles east of Calhoun. Here we remained during the day, and 
heard the terrible noise and roar of the battle of Chickamauga, in 
which the Washington authorities had intended we should take part, 
but General Burnside had managed it otherwise, and on the evening 
of the 19th we fell back to Athens. On the morning of the 20th the 
fury of battle and roar of artillery, with the rattling of musketry, 
opened again, and was heard by us until about 4 p. m. of that 
day. The above is a true story of how near Burnside came to being 
of some assistance to Rosecrans at Chickamauga, and which it was 
intended he should render when he left Kentucky with the Army 
of the Ohio for East Tennessee. 

Whether he had fears that, on account of his ranking commis- 
sion, Rosecrans would have surrendered the command to him, or 
whether Rosecrans feared that Burnside would assume command 
when the two met, has never been learned; but as the latter had 
skulked before, at Antietam, it is most probable that he did not care 
to help fight the battles and campaigns Rosecrans had planned, and 
therefore kept at as great a distance from the latter as though he 
had remained in quarters at Camp Nelson, in Kentucky; for when 
Burnside was in Upper East Tennessee, hunting for bushwhackers 
with the Twenty-third Army Corps, he was nearly 200 miles from 
Chattanooga, where it was intended and expected he would be. 
Jones' Confederate force in Upper Tennessee could not be an excuse, 
for he had only about 2,500 men, by report; but Colonel Forster, 
with a brigade of mounted troops, had already destroyed the rail- 
road bridges, so that no large Confederate force could come that 
way. If further evidence was needed that Burnside was mistaken, 
if not intentionally wrong, we may refer to Schofield's campaign in 
February and March, 1864. Longstreet held Upper East Tennessee 
with 20,000 men and Schofield just permitted him to stay there, 
but Longstreet did not distrub Schofield at Knoxville, and the latter, 
without paying any attention to Longstreet, joined Sherman's grand 


army, before Dalton, and East Tennessee was little disturbed, ex- 
cept by raids, until the close of the war. 

Late in the evening of the 21st of September a Confederate 
raiding party came up to Athens, and after a little skirmishing they 
went their way. The appearance of these raiders was the first indi- 
cation we had that Rosecrans had met with reverses ; but we kept in 
harness all night, and during the day, in the evening about 5 o'clock, 
the whole brigade marched down to Calhoun, arriving there at mid- 
night. Next day two companies proceeded south again, as far as 
Cleveland, without finding the enemy. At Calhoun our battery was 
again placed in the cemetery, and during the night I slept in a sunken 
grave. I believed then, and still do, that I never rested better, any- 

During the night It was reported that a large body of mounted 
troops were on the way to attack us. The battery was in position and 
the cannoneers slept by its side. At 4 in the morning the horses had 
been fed, harnessed, hitched and were ready for action. Two com- 
panies of the One Hundred and Twelfth Illinois Infantry were sent 
out to reconnoiter, one on the Dalton road, the other to Cleveland, 
and another company down the river to Cottonwood to watch the 
ford at that place, and prevent the enemy from reaching our rear at 
Calhoun. But our wait, that day, for the enemy had no results, and 
we rested again for the night as we had done before. Early, about 
3 a. m., on the 24th the One Hundred and Twelfth Illinois had its 
full band play the reveille. After the band played, the Martial 
Band began to play, and after the Martial Band came the bugle. 
The object was to deceive the enemy, who were then expecetd to 
be within hearing distance, as to the number of our regiments and 
batteries, but if they had intended to call the enemy they could not 
have had better success. 

At daylight Major Dow of the One Hundred and Twelth Illi- 
nois went out in search of the enemy. He did not have far to go un- 
til he found them, and he came back with the Confederates following 
him with an overwhelming force. Colonel Henderson, with the rest 
of his regiment, went down to the ford to protect Major Dow and 
his men in crossing, but the enemy withdrew and did not press the 
pursuit at this time. On the morning of the 25th we were up and 
ready at 3 :t,o o'clock, and Captain Mitchell of the One Hundred 
and Twelfth Illinois was again sent across the river to ascertain the 
approach of the enemy. At the junction of the Dalton and Cleve- 


land roads he met them in force, and a severe skirmish ensued. The 
enemy tried to outflank him and get in his rear, but he retired and 
recrossed the river. 

In the afternoon Colonel Henderson crossed the river and ad- 
vanced towards Cleveland, where he again found the enemy, and 
after exchanging a few shots retired to the north side of the river. 
Early on the morning of the 26th the whole brigade was ready for 
any movement. A large reconnoitering party was sent across the 
river. They had not proceeded very far before they met the enemy 
in force. A servere skirmish ensued, and our detachment was driven 
back to the main body. A detachment was sent down the river to 
guard the crossing at the ford. The enemy soon occupied the high 
bluffs, south of the river, which gave them control of the bottom, on 
the north side. As soon as the enemy appeared we opened fire with 
the whole battery (six guns), and the enemy lost no time in bring- 
ing their own guns into position. Protected by an old breastworks 
we kept up the practice until about 2 o'clock, when it was found that 
the enemy was crossing the river above and below us. The brigade 
was ordered to fall back. At this time we were under the enemy's 
fire of canister, and with a little more elevation and better aim they 
could have destroyed our whole battery. That they did not do this 
was not the fault of Colonel Byrd, the brigade commander, for he 
appeared to have lost his mind, and in his order for retreat had not 
notified Colonel Henderson at the ford. 

Just as we reached the road a solid shot from the enemy passed 
over us, killing the colored servant of Lieutenant Torr by taking off 
the left half of his head. Our forage wagons were in the bottom to 
gather corn, and at first paid no attention to the combat, but as soon 
as the enemy swarmed across the river, Joel Lanning, in charge of 
the wagons, drove past the fire, and in front of the enemy, and 
brought up in the rear of our column, without losing a wagon, but 
we lost all of our tents, that had been unloaded to make room for the 
forage, and from that day until mustered out of the service, June 30, 
1865, we had no cover except tarpaulins. 

Colonel Henderson of the One Hundred and Twelfth Illinois 
made a miraculous escape, as he was nearly surrounded by the ene- 
my, now crossing and swarming over every part of the river that 
was fordable. As we reached Riceville we formed a line of battle, in 
field on the north side of the road, and again opened on our pursuers.] 
This gave Colonel Henderson a chance to come up with his regi4 


ment, but we soon limbered up, and retreated to within a few 
miles of Athens. Here the brigade of Colonel Woolford joined us, 
and we formed in line again, and for several hours had a lively com- 
bat, which lasted until dark. Woolford brought his mountain how- 
itzer into action, and I became convinced that such field guns, then 
with our army, were out of date. At dark we retreated to Athens 
and pulled into bivouac, at or near the female seminary. We did not 
unhitch or unharness, but built large and many camp fires to mislead 
the enemy, who were still trying to outflank us and get in our rear. 
In the little affairs at Calhoun, Riceville and Athens, our mounted 
infantry, with Sptingfield rifles, and we, with our rifle guns, had the 
advantage over the enemy, who were armed with smooth-bores and 
carbines. A detachment, under Lieutenant Brown of the One Hun- 
dred and Twelfth Illinois, that had been sent out on outpost duty, 
and thought to have been captured, reported at midnight to Colonel 
Henderson. At 2 o'clock in the morning of the 27th we left our 
camp fires burning and marched the rest of the night to Sweet Wa- 
ter, and later to Philadelphia. Here we halted and formed in line 
for a fight. We remained in position all the day and the following 

At noon on the 28th a detachment made an attack on our out- 
post, but soon retired, afterwards coming forward with their main 
force. Information was received that they tried to outflank us, to 
get in between our brigade and the forces then assembling under 
General White, at Loudon. By a road near the Tennessee River 
we retreated to Loudon, and formed in line, on the left of General 
White's division of infantry, but seeing that we were strong enough 
to resist any large force, and they being mainly cavalry, did not care 
to attack us. They came in range of our guns, and for several hours 
we gave them the best practice~of our experience, until night put an 
end to the affair. On the morning of the 29th we exchanged some of 
our worn-out and shoulder-sore horses at the quartermaster's, and 
then leisurely proceeded to Philadelphia, without coming up with the 
enemy. We returned to Loudon for the night, for rumors kept com- 
ing that the enemy was still on our flank, and on the morning of 
the 30th our brigade and Woolford's mounted troops marched to 
Philadelphia, and there formed in line of battle. The roads were dry 
and dusty and the men nearly suffocated. The enemy was in force, 
east of Philadelphia, parallel with the railroad. Lieutenant Colonel 
Adams of the First Kentucky, Woolford's brigade, had gone forward 


to Sweet Water, and was now in great danger of being cut off and 
captured. A detachment of the One Hundred and Twelfth IlHnois 
Infantry was sent to Sweet Water with verbal orders for him to re- 
turn if necessary on byways and through corn fields, but not to stop 
to bring on a fight. The detachment returned in the evening, bring- 
ing Lieutenant Colonel Adams. They had received a few stray 
shots from the enemy, as they galloped by them on the road, but 
without being injured. 

Next morning, October i , we moved forward with the brigade, 
and after a four-mile march stopped and camped at Mouse Creek, 
during a cold, drizzling rain, and the next day, October 2, marched 
to Athens, where we again occupied our old quarters on Forrest 





At Athens we recaptured a number of our sick and wounded, 
and some of the One Hundred and Twelfth IlHnois that had been 
left behind at Calhoun, and had fled to the brush, came also to us, 
but Captain Wilkins and his company were captured by the enemy. 
When Wilkins first came up with the enemy he struck their ambu- 
lance train and made them prisoners. He soon learned, however, 
that the boot was on the wrong leg, as the main body of the enemy 
was ahead of him, and he was notified that he and his men were 
their prisoners. He surrendered with as good grace as the situation 
would permit, but it was a sore disappointment, and he was com- 
pelled to bear it. Wilkins was sent to Libby Prison and the men to 
Andersonville, of which only a few ever returned to their homes 
and friends. Captain Wilkins made an attempt early in 1864 to 
escape from Libby, and did so, but was recaptured. He was then 
sent to Macon, where he again attempted to escape. This time he 
succeeded, and reached our line at Dalton about June 5, 1864. 

As usual, when a horse is stolen the stable is locked, and so 
with Burnside, after the battle of Chickamauga. He ordered 
every able-bodied man in his department to the front. By the 30th 
of September the whole Ninth Corps, 6,000 strong, had arrived. 
With them came Captain Von Sehlen, but instead of being a relief 
he became an additional burden, for he was stricken with typhoid 
fever while we were yet in camp at Athens. Lieutenant Torr waited 
on him with the devotion of a true friend. Lieutenant Harvey also 
came to East Tennessee, with another battery, as its third or fourth 


That battery being an officer short, he took service with them, 
and as soon as the Lieutenant in whose place he served arrived, he 
returned to Indiana to resume recruiting. As instructor of maneu- 
vers and tactics, Lieutenant Harvey was not needed in the battery, for 
our instruction by Von Sehlen was simply perfect, and Harvey did 
not have instructive ability. He was brave, but in the administration 
of a battery, officers can make themselves useful otherwise than by 
the knowledge of tactics, although no one should hold a commission 
in the army unless he can give a command. Governor Morton, as 
well as all other Governors who issued commissions, claimed to be 
imposed on every time they issued a commission secured through 
influence of others and relatives. 

The sickness of Von Sehlen (present in camp) and the return 
of Lieutenant Harvey to Indiana after he had been within thirty 
miles of the battery, provoked Lieutenant Torr to write some very 
interesting and harsh letters to Lieutenant Harvey, letting him know 
that his services were due the Fifteenth Indiana Battery. Torr pro- 
posed other drastic measures, but Captain Von Sehlen would not 
consent to it. 

The One-hundred-and-twelfth Illinois was sent out to find the 
enemy, going towards Calhoun, but was told not to go into 
the town. Taking two guns of the battery I was sent 
with him. Another column, under Lieutenant Griffin, had 
been ordered by another road, both roads uniting near the 
town. Captain Dunn acceded his orders and entered the town, 
and down the river we found the enemy on the opposite side. We 
sent a few shots into them to let them know we were there, and then 
retired, but they did not follow us. On Sunday noon, October the 
4th, we received orders to march at once, and that afternoon went 
seven miles toward Sweet Water. On October 5 we marched to 
Sweet Water, and camped for the night. Early next morning, at 7 
o'clock, we were again on the road to Loudon, reaching there in 
due time, where we halted three hours for our wagons to cross, and 
then marched until 9 o'clock that night. We started early on the 
7th in a cold and drizzling rain, which had kept us company for four 
days, and by noon reached Kingston. 

On October 8th we reached Post Oak Springs, We had been 
there just one month before, when we left that place for Athens. • 
The distance that we had traveled in the last three days was about 
seventy miles, in the worst kind of weather, over a broken road, up 


and down hill, with sore-sholdered horses, and man and beast on half 
rations. We suffered from hunger, many days at a time having but 
one meal per day. But the brigade was now in a good section of the 
country, and watching the enemy, from the direction of the Sequat- 
due Valley, with a chance to rest and recuperate and prepare for 
future action. On October lo Colonel Byrd issued a sort of fare- 
well order. Whatever the rest of the brigade thought, I do not 
know, but the Fifteenth Indiana Battery were in a position to thank 
the Lord for the farewell. 

For many reasons Colonel Byrd was not popular with us. He 
was loyal, but had no military aptness or knowledge. Through his 
ignorance the One Hundred and Twelfth Illinois was too much ex- 
posed at Calhoun, and it is a surprise to me that the whole regiment 
escaped capture, but only by the cool judgment of Colonel Hender- 
son, escaped prison. 

As we were now made to believe that we would spend the win- 
ter looking into the eyes and watching our enemy, the boys began 
to make themselves comfortable, and more than once we had fresh 
roasted pork, also fresh beef, for our mess. The only thing we seri- 
ously missed, if our stay was to be of any duration, was our fine 
outfit of tents, which we had to leave at Calhoun to the tender care 
of our enemy. In place of the tents our tarpaulins for guns and 
caisson stood us in good stead, and gave us protection against the 
weather, with a crackling camp fire, always from the top rail, in our 
front. We knew the enemy was now at some distance, but the rest- 
less spirit of our new brigade commander. Lieutenant Colonel Bond, 
sent out one expedition after another to find the enemy. Colonel 
Henderson had gone to Knoxville with the intention of going home 
on a furlough, and as Colonel Byrd had gone to Kingston, his home, 
to command the post at that place, we looked for an easy time, at 
least until spring, but all of this was changed when, on the 14th of 
October, a detachment was sent down to Washington, Tenn., thirty- 
two miles south of us, and a section of artillery was to go with them, 
but Captain Von Sehlen presented the true condition of our horses, 
and no guns were sent. The object of the scout was to send some 
messages from Burnside to Rosecrans. The mounted troops made 
the distance in one day. With artillery they could not have done 
so, for the weather was simply dreadful. The troops returned the 
next day to Sulphur Springs, and as the weather was still bad, they 
enjoyed themselves at the Springs by living on the fat of the land. 


As this part had never yet been visited by any of the warriors of 
either side, they returned with a full supply of commissary stores, 
enough to last the raiders for a month, but they were liberal and 
divided with their comrades. But the battery boys were not in the 
mess. Still they did not suffer. On the i8th another expedition was 
sent out to Sulphur Springs, with orders to destroy all the boa;ts on 
both sides of the river. As the soldier's joy is to destroy, this order 
was carried out with delight and dispatch, and were kept busy 
for four days. When they returned to Post Oak Springs they found 
the brigade had moved and was on the march to Kingston. At the 
river ford, over Clinch River, as the roads were very heavy and the 
horses worn out and sore, we sent a Sergeant and some men to see 
if we could not secure some mules or oxen to help the battery across 
the near-by stream. As the Sergeant made his errand known to the 
lady of the house, she politely informed him that they had neither 
horses, oxen nor mules. As the Sergeant was about to leave the col- 
ored people, who had been in the field, came in from their day's work 
with enough mules and oxen to have pulled three batteries. 

Without asking the lady's permission the colored overseer, Lor- 
enzen, was politely invited to follow the battery squad, and they 
soon reached us, where we were hard at work trying to get the first 
gun up the slippery hill. Lorenzen surveyed the field and took in the 
situation. He hitched on, and the guns and caissons were moved in 
regular order on high and dry ground. As we took a liking to our 
new-made colored friend, we asked if he would not prefer to go with 
us, and he could cook for the officers' mess. He said he would go, 
and so Lorenzen stayed with us, while we returned the rest of the 
colored help and the teams. We reached Kingston on the 20th, and 
found that a brigade of the enemy's mounted troops were on the 
other side, across the Tennessee River. On the 21st scouting parties 
were again sent in the direction of Post Oak Springs, and brought 
in rumors that Longstreet's forces were coming into Sweet Water 
Valley. In the morning of the 22d another scouting party was sent 
out. They met some of the enemy and an Orderly Sergeant of the 
Eighth Michigan Cavalry was killed and several others wounded 
of the pickets captured. A report was also received that a large 
force of the enemy were passing through Athens for Loudon. At 
10 o'clock that night I was the only commissioned officer in camp 
with the battery. The Captain and Lieutenant Torr had been in- 
vited to some social gathering. We received orders to be ready for 
the march at once. The bugles sounding the necessary calls. 



All was ready in a short time, and when the Captain reached the 
battery he simply gave the command forward, and we were on our 
way to Loudon. The night was densely dark. Six miles from King- 
ston, as we crossed Powell River, our teams were completely broken 
down. The river, at the crossing, was very wide, and on the further 
side was an inclination over rocks and ledges hard to ascend. Cap- 
tain Von Sehlen's horse stumbled. He fell and received an injury 
that made it necessary for him' to keep the ambulance until we 
reached Loudon. With herculean labor we succeeded in getting the 
battery and battery wagons across the stream, by daylight, and now 
marched on, up one hill and down another, until late in the evening 
we turned into camp at Loudon. The march had been one of the 
worst that we had gone through up to that time, a cold and drizzling 
rain all the way, but we were happy that hereafter we were not to be 
disturbed by Colonel Byrd. His regiment remained at Kingston. The 
Sixth Indiana Cavalry was added to the brigade in place of the First 
Tennessee. At Loudon Colonel Saunders, a brilliant young cavalry 
officer, was placed in command of the brigade, and on the following 
day, October 29, the battery was ordered to accompany- an expedition 
across the river to Philadelphia to find and come in touch with the 
enemy, on presentation to General Burnside, who came up from 
Lenoirs with his staff. Captain Von Sehlen stated that no more than 
one section could be properly mounted, and fit for service, and to 
make it serviceable he would hitch eight horses to each carriage and 
leave the rest in camp. The Captain's recommendations were ac- 
cepted and Lieutenant Torr crossed the river with the section, and in 
company with the brigade, under Saunders, proceeded to Philadel- 
phia, drove the enemy's outpost to his principal lines, returned in the 
evening and recrossed the river. The following day I was sent out 
with another section, also with eight horses to a carriage, and the 
same maneuver of the previous day w^as expected ; but the enemy were 
more daring and offered greater resistance. On the 26th the brigade 
had gone out as usual, and Torr was again out with a section. The 
melee became more active, and there were more dead, among these a 
friend of ours. Lieutenant Jones of the Firty-fifth Ohio, on the staff 
of General Saunders, who was killed. Our eight-horse service ap- 
peared to convince General Burnside that he could maneuver with 
cavalry, if an additional team was given us ; but he forgot that the 


resting of one day helped the horses at the guns to gain more strength 
than the additional teams, and we used no horses on the expedition 
that had sore shoulders. On the 27th an order was received to dis- 
charge George Collins, a private in our battery, he having received 
an appointment as cadet to West Point. Captain Von Sehlen, who 
was very anxious to bring the battery to the highest perfection, 
asked General Burnside for an additional team to each carriage. A 
requisition was made and an order issued for one of the officers to 
proceed to Cincinnati to draw the harness, also another order for 
Lieutenant Harvey, then on recruiting service in Indianapolis, to at 
once report to the battery. The question now was who was to go. 
Liuetenant Torr wanted to go, but his home was in Philadelphia, and 
no time was to be lost by furlough, and whoever went had to return 
at once. My home was in Indianapolis, and this offered me a chance 
to be there a few days, and for Lieutenant Torr to a sixty or ninety 
days' furlough on our return. On the morning of the 28th, about 5 
o'clock, I started and George Collins, the cadet, started with me, both 
mounted on fairly good horses, and reached Knoxville about thirty 
miles distant, by 9 a. m. Here we breakfasted and fed the horses. 
We soon were on our way again, and a little after dinner stepped at 
a farmer's, and without asking his permission went to his corn crib 
and fed our horses. While doing this we were called to halt, and a 
number of videttes station at the house leveled their guns, ready for 
our execution. We showed our orders and asked the owner to pre- 
pare something for us to eat. This he did, and his good-looking 
daughters waited on us. We paid for horse feed and our meal and 
rode on. About 4 p. m. we neared Clinch River, about a mile south 
of this place, a young man dressed as a farmer met us, mounted on 
a fairly good horse, but a poor saddle and bridle, and asked where we 
were going. We eyed him with drawn revolvers. W^hen he said if 
we intended to cross the Clinch River we would probably find our 
way barred, as the enemy was just passing on the other side. After 
some more talk, I told Collins : "George, let us go on and see about 
this." We rode on until we came within 300 yards of the ford. Here 
a German shoemaker, with his apron in his hand, came towards us 
and motioned for us not to come, but we rode up to him, when he 
told us, greatly excited, that the enemy marched on the other side. I 
asked him closely how they marched, and about the number. Pulling 
out my map, I saw the parting of the road, one along the river and 
the other towards Tazewell, about a mile ahead of us. So I told 




Collins that we would follow them, as, according to our best in- 
formation, they were only a small battalion that would follow the 
river road. We plunged into the river, then not very deep, but wide. 
I drew my saber and gave Collins an additional revolver. With the 
sling of the sabre on my wrist and revolver in hand, we spurred 
our j added horses and followed the enemy. The dust created by their 
march was plainly visible. As we approached in their rear, at the 
top of my voice I called the command : "Charge them, boys ! Charge 
them!" George and I charged, firing, and soon reached the part- 
ing of the road. 

We turned to the right and rode a short distance, when, zip, 
zip, the bullets passed us, fired by our own vidette post, some 600 
yards away. We at once dismounted, and I raised the white hand- 
kerchief and approached the outpost. The Sergeant in charge 
claimed us as his prisoners, and I called for the Lieutenant, who 
now came up and recognized my orders and identity. We gave 
them all the information obtained and went on our way to Taze- 
well. Soon after we met Colonel Capron, in charge of a cavalry 
column, told him our story, and he marched on to head them ofl. 
In this he succeeded, for large numbers came in to Tazewell that 
evening, as prisoners of war. We tried to get quarters of the many 
Union people in Tazewell for the night, but they all appeared to 
be protected by some order from one or the other Generals that had 
stopped or passed through there. The only thing we could do was 
to try and reach the Cumberland Gap, where our forces had a post. 

Collins and I marched on. We then had made about ninety 
miles since morning, and George was shifting his seat uncomfort- 
ably, from one side to the other, in his saddle, and there were still 
ten miles to be made, and it was already after 9 o'clock. After we 
had covered about five of it, we looked up into the hills, and in one 
of the coves saw a bright light only 200 yards away. We rode up 
and were politely received by an elderly lady. We asked if we could 
stay there over night. She agreed to keep us if we were content to 
sleep on the floor. The beds she had were already occupied by 
some East Tennesseeans that had returned from the north. We 
were ever so glad to get any kind of a place to rest, and a boy about 
12 years old took charge of our horses. He brought us our sad- 
dles and blankets, to be used for a head rest and bed. As we had 
some coffee in our saddle bags, we made the lady accept it, and her 
^ood-looking daughters prepared us a hot cup, that night. As it 


was now midnight, and wc had ridden since 4 a. m., baoiil ninety- 
thre miles, we had no trouble in falling asleep, and did not awake 
until S a. m. next day. The refugees that had occupied the bed 
were already gone. The two daughters of our host had prepared 
a breakfast consisting of fried chickens, sweet potatoes and cof- 
fee, and never was a meal more relished than on that morning in 
this humble cottage. Our conversation revealed the fact that her 
husKand and two elder sons were in the Confederate army. After 
the meal I asked what my oblig-ations were. She said nothing. Re- 
minding her that she had better take the money offered (two dol- 
lars) , for neither she nor we coult]^ tell how the fortunes of war 
would cliange, she finally accepted, and asked that as I returned I 
sliould bring her some winter clothing and shoes for her daugh- 
ters, I told her not to reh' on that, for the reason tliat I might not 
come by that route, on my return, and this was what occurred. 
After bidding tlie old lady, daughters and son an affectionate good- 
b}-^, and pressing another dollar into the hands of the boy. for the 
care of our horses, we parted, and soon crossed the Cumberland 
Mountains at the Gap. \\> rode fifty-four miles and stopped for the 
night, but early next moniing were again in tlie saddle, and rode 
thirty-five miles, as an easy ride for that day. On tlie fourtli day, 
about 2 p. m., we reached Xicliolville, I tunied over tlie Govern- 
ment horse and saddle that George had been using, and gave my 
poA-ate horse to him to ride to Cincinnati, from tliere to be shipped 
to Indianapolis, and left myself on tlie afternoon train. From tliat 
daj- to diis wTiting I have not seen George, but have been in cor- 
respondaice with him. He went to ^^'e^t Point, but for some rea- 
son left the Academy, and again entered tlie anny and sen-ed to 
the close of tlie war. He is now a prosperous farmer in Ingo 
County, Cal. 

I readied Cincinnati tliat night, and at once went to the head- 
quarters of General Cox, delivered my dispatclies. went to tlie Bur- 
nett House, took a bath and had a fiist-class supper. Xext morning 
after breakfast I called on Pa^-niaster Will Cumback. and drew my 
pay for six montlis. After bimng necessary- articles and presenting 
my requisition for tlie extra harness and ambulance. I left for In- 
dianapolis, ha\-ing made tlie trip from Loudon \-ia Kiiox\-ille to 
Cincinnati in four days, one of the quickest on record at tiiat time. 

Our coming up witli the enemy on Oincli River came ver\- near 
preventing us from performing furtlier ser\-ice for tiie Govenmient ; 
but in war there is alwavs risk, so I risked, and succeeded. 


Immediately after the battle of Chickamauga, when our brigade 
first arrived at Calhoun, there was a rumor that Longstreet was 
marching against us. The same rumor was current when we were 
marching from Post Oak Springs to Kingston, but how these rumors 
that had some foundation of truth reached us before any movement 
was started is a mystery to-day. Just after the battle of Chicka- 
magua Longstreet apparently gave the advice to Bragg, either to 
transfer his (Bragg's) base to Rome, Ga., and then move, by way 
of Stevenson, in the rear of Rosecrans, and make the latter abandon 
Chattanooga or starve him into surrender by breaking his lines of 
communication, or permit him (Longstreet) with 15,000 or 20,000 
men, to march into East Tennessee and destroy or capture Burnside. 

Bragg answered that Rosecrans would have to surrender, and 
he would be able to enter Chattanooga at the head of his army, 
where the ladies would greet him with flags and handkerchiefs as 
the hero, and his men as victors of the great cause, and that his 
( Longstreet' s) further advice was out of order. 

There had already been some friction between Bragg and Long- 
street on the first day's battle at Chickamauga, when Longstreet 
asked Bragg whether his divisions should go in. Bragg answered 
this by issuing orders for Longstreet's troops, to the division 
commanders, instead of to Longstreet. Things did not move very 
smoothly in the Confederate camp, and the visit of Mr. Davis, their 
president, did not add oil to the troubled waters. To please Bragg, 
Rosecrans did not surrender, and as the National Government 
found it necessary to have one in authority over the army in the 
west. General Grant was sent to Chattanooga, and on October 22., 
while at Louisville, assumed, in addition to the Army of the Ten- 
nessee, command over the Cumberland Army, under Rosecrans, and 
also the Army of the Ohio, under Burnside. The three 
departsments were known thereafter as the Military Division 
of the Mississippi. If General Grant from that time on 
had ordered the movements of the Confederates, it could 
not have better suited his plans than Bragg and Longstreet 
executed them. These Generals being still at loggerheads, to please 
Longstreet, he was permitted to carry out the invasion of East Ten- 
nessee, against Burnside. These rumors reached us, as stated, at 
Kingston, a week or ten days before Longstreet knew of it; hence 
our march to Loudon and the affairs from the 22nd to the 27th, 
near Philadelphia. Longstreet claims that rumors of his intended 

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command of the Confederate outpost, gathered all he could lay 
hands on and sent them to Chattanooga to Bragg's army, and after 
he had done this he retired and rejoined Bragg's army. So Long- 
street found himself in a new country with a large army and not a 
day's rations at hand, and was at the same time urged by both ctu- 
thorities at Richmond and Chattanooga to make haste with his 
work. His foragers were very busy gathering rations while he per- 
fected plans to cross the Little Tennessee, above its confluence with 
the greater river, by way of Marysville, to the heights above Knox- 
ville, and by forced marches to bring Burnside's troop to defend 
that 'town on open ground. He was ill prepared for the march, but 
when his pontoon train came up by the cars, he had no wagon train 
to haul them, and therefore had to change his plans. He found a 
point in the river, near the railroad, where he could cross, and at 
dark pushed up the cars by hand, and a little further up the river 
found fords where the cavalry had no trouble in crossing. But 
close up to Kingston the enemy had pickets. With his main mounted 
force, under Wheeler, he was moving to Maryville, and from there 
to the southeast side of Knoxville, there to try and hold our forces at 
that place ^ 






On the 4th of November a sutler of the Ninth Corps brought 
his goods to the front. Although the men had no money, it was not 
long before the stock was sold out, with poor prospects for pay. At 
the same time the Ninth Army Corps were preparing to stay all 
winter. The weather being bad, they built the usual huts to make 
themselves comfortable. The Twenty-third Corps was not so previ- 
ous, and waited to see what was coming. The rumors that Long- 
street would move into East Tennessee had reached Washington 
about as early as they did us at Kingston, on the 22nd of October, 
and now since Grant was in command and the move actually on. 
Grant was almost hourly appealed to to do something for Burnside. 
To have a thorough understanding with Burnside, Grant had sent 
Assistant Secretary of War Dana, with a staff officer, from his head- 
quarters, to Burnside ; but as Grant could do nothing until Sherman 
arrived, Burnside was to draw and entertain Longstreet in East 
Tennessee, so that the latter could not get back to Bragg, at Chatta- 
nooga, which w^ould make it easier for Grant to meet and destroy 

After Dana and his party had finished their mission they were 
escorted, by the way of Lenoir and Kingston, thence on the west side 
of Tennessee, to the lines of the Army of the Cumberland. At this 
time a paymaster reported at Cumberland Gap, and a party of the 
One Hundred and Twelfth Illinois was sent out to give him safe 
escort to Knoxville. But he was not permitted to pay off just then, 
although the pay rolls of every organization were ready; but he 


kept his greenbacks in such a position that at any time, in case Long- 
street captured the town a match could be appHed and the money 
burned. We had been glad that we passed from under the command 
of Colonel Byrd, who was now at Kingston, his old home, command- 
ing the post with his regiment, as post commander. He found that 
he could not get along without artillery, so on the 5th Orderly Ser- 
geant Adam Kuntz of our battery, with three pieces, escorted by a 
company of the One Hundred and Twelfth Illinois Mounted In-, 
fantry, was sent to him, and remained there until after the siege. 

Kuntz was quite an able artilleryist, and while in command 
made a fine record. That Grant was highly pleased with Bragg' s 
movement is shown by his letter, in which he writes that the victory 
at Chattanooga was more easily accomplished by Bragg's mistake 
in sending away his ablest corps commander, with 20,000 of his best 
troops. Burnside therefore had no intention to check Longstreet 
at the river, and on the morning of the 15th, with the enemy across 
the river, above and below Loudon, Burnside retreated to Lenoir. 
Longstreet pursued and had sent Wheeler's cavalry to Marysville, 
which they captured. General Saunders, who was in command of 
the Union forces, checked Wheeler, but fell back to the heights 
south of Knoxville, where he and Parke, with part of the Ninth and 
Twenty-third Corps, then stationed at Knoxville, defeated Wheeler, 
who rejoined Longstreet by the way of the little town of Louis- 
ville. Up at this place he tried to lay a pontoon bridge, but the cur- 
rent of the -river would not permit it. 

Burnside, who had come up from Knoxville, received an en- 
thusiastic reception by the troops as he passed them, and by his 
small success had become popular with them. His presence also 
intimated that his little army would not enjoy rest in winter quar- 
ters at that place. Burnside, with his staff and battle flag, m'ade a 
fine appearance as they swept by the troops, and cheers arose from 
regiment to regiment as he passed them. The continued rain had 
made heavy roads, and the hard work to get the wagons and artil- 
lery to the rear caused the troops to become disspirited; but they 
were encouraged and animated when they saw their General among 
them with a confidential look on his face, and few corps commanders 
have ever won the affection of their men as Burnside did here. 

The retreat from Loudon to Lenoir, on the 1 5th, was made with 
great difficulty, a heavy rain, with a cold northwest wind, continu- 
ing during the whole day. The guns that were brought forward 


had tlie service of an infantry regiment, on the ropes, to get them 
through the deep, stiff mud, and often the horses were held by the 
tough clay soil until the men came to their relief; and many soldiers 
would lose their shoes. In hunting- for their lost shoes the victim 
Avould cause laughter from all his comrades. The infantry halted 
at Lenoir and the mules of the lOO wagons, loaded with supplies, 
were taken to bring the artillery to Campbell Station, but Longstreet 
pressed Burnside so closel}^ at this place that the wagons with sup- 
plies became trophies of the enemy. Longstreet claims that he 
captured eighty wagons, loaded with small stores of coffee and 
sugar. The former, his men had not' tasted for nearly two years. 
Burnside claims that he had set fire to the wagons and destroyed the 
stores, and with them the officers' baggage, books and everything that 
retarded the movement. That part of the train saved was started to 
Knoxville, guarded by -the Seventy-ninth New York (Highlanders). 
Then the infantry moved and the rear guard was severely pressed 
by the enemy. They turned and drove them back. 

In this affair Colonel Smith of the Twentieth Michigan was 
killed. The ground they passed over offered great advantages for 
the defense. It had been expected that Longstreet would pass the 
mountains, through the lower ga-p, after he crossed the river; but 
he moved to our right to get in our rear and cut off the little 
army from Campbell Station, but the mountains and heavy, muddy 
roads, through which he also had to pass, protected Burnside against 
a complete surprise. Just west of Campbell Station, where the road 
from Kingston forms a junction with the main road to Knoxville, 
Longstreet was making his great effort to surround and get in the 
rear of Burnside, but the latter had sent General Hartranft, with 
Biddle's cavalry, to that point, and they were successful in getting 
there first, and thereby protecting the passing of the rest of the 
troops and trains, but not without considerable fighting and some 
losses in killed and wounded. 

But this affair gave Burnside a little time to form and prepare 
for battle in the village, as it had become necessary to check the 
enemy, to allow the trains to reach Knoxville. The division of 
Hartrauft had been sent back to Campbell Station, to cover 
the junction of the Kingston road, on which the enemy was march- 
ing, and expected to surprise and surround the Federals, but Burn- 
side's little army had worked so hard during the night that they were 
well out of the way of the enemy before the later became aware of the 

LONGSTREEt's invasion into east TENNESSEE. 209 

Opening by which Burnside retreated, and by daylight the Union 
camp at Lenoir was empty. Longstreet had made great prepara- 
tions to surround Burnside, but as luck was against the former, his 
guide, instead of bringing a brigade on our flank and rear, had led 
the enemy away from us, so that they could not hear the chopping of 
the trees and the noise of our retreat. Burnside and his staff dis- 
mounted more than once on this short march to take hold of the 
wheel of a gun or wagon to help it out of the mud. 

Campbell's Station is not a railroad station, but a village of 
that name, and an old stage station, three miles west of Concord, 
on the railroad, and on the highway between Knoxville and King- 
ston, that leads over and through the mountain, by way of Big Creek 
Gap. The Lenoir and Kingston roads unite at a fork about one mile 
below Campbell Station. Longstreet claims that General Law, a 
brigade commander, was to hold Burnside's troops until he, with 
his superior force, could, during the night, come in on the Union 
flanks and surround them. Law had not acted in good faith, and 
had let Burnside get away from him, but, as one of Longstreet's 
flanking columns had lost its way, it would have made no difference 
if Law had pressed forward; he would have found himself repulsed. 
The cannonading on the evening of the 15th, at Lenoir, had served 
as a notice to the outpost that the main columns of the opposing 
army had met, and several of the videttes had a narrow escape from 
capture. The Union forces had been so far cleverly arranged, and 
the only regret was the loss of 100 wagons, with supplies that had 
been hauled with great labor for several hundred miles over the 
mountains, and of which we had not received half rations since we 
left Kentucky. It appeared to most of the men a matter of greatest 
neglect that these stores had been lost. 

Burnside had no intention to risk a battle, but intended to re- 
treat and retard Longstreet's advance until Grant could get to Bragg 
at Chattanooga. The Union line had barely passed the cross roads 
when the enemy pressed forward on all sides ; but, as Burnside was 
more careful of his right flank, he placed nearly all of his forces,! 
with about forty guns, on the right of the road and Roemer's battery 
of six guns on the left of the road. The road runs in the center of 
the valley a mile wide, and the hills or mountains on each side gave 
them a fine opportunity to deploy on the flank of Burnside's little 
army, which he had disposed to check the enemy's advance. His 
infantry was drawn in line, across the valley, between the two ranges 


of the hills. General Ferreros Ninth Corps Division was on the 
right; White's Twenty-third Corps Division held the center, and 
General Hartranft's Ninth Corps Division on the left of the road. 
The batteries were posted as already stated, the most on the right 
of the road. At noon Longstreet was up and advanced to attatk 
with a double line on our right, Alexander's Confederate battery on 
his left, and a heavy cannonade from both sides was at once begun, 
but the enemy's ammunition was bad, and a large amount of shell 
exploded as they left the muzzles of their guns. 

When McLaw came up and deployed on our right, his batteries 
soon opened, but the result was the same as on our left. Their am- 
munition was poor and only created a noise, as so much blank am- 
munition would have done. As all this occurred about noon. Long- 
street had plenty of time to deploy his large force, which was now 
all present, to surround Burnside and gain the victory. He dis- 
played great energy to make and win at least one successful battle 
under his own leadership while away from the Army of Virginia. 
The work so far done by him had been good, and if 
Burnside would only stay where he was, he would be in the 
enemy's hands. He had sent a brigade of infantry, with a brigade 
of cavalry, well to our right to draw our attention and outflank us 
in that direction ; but Burnside had his eyes open and noticed a move- 
ment that would outflank him on the left by more than a brigade 
in length. As the enemy's movements were well covered by the 
hills, it surprised him that they had not already assaulted his rear. 
General Law, in charge of the Confederate column, did not, as it 
appears, follow the close instructions, and instead of assaulting our 
rear with his own and Anderson's brigade, had veered to his left 
and reached our flank, which he found well prepared to receive him. 
As Burnside had now shifted a large part of his troops from his 
right to the left of the road, he was in no danger of being outflanked, 
but the enemy immediately pressed forward with his center, and the 
noise of the artillery, with the rattling fire of the small arms, on both 
sides, gave the combat the appearance of a battle, which Longstreet 
says was cleverly conducted on the Union side. 

As Burnside now held a strong position, further movements on 
the Confederate side would have been made necessary. Longstreet 
was very active to still make another combination, and therefore 
kept his artillery busy, no doubt with an object to have the Union ar- 
tillery spend at least an equal amount of ammunition, of which they 

•LONGSTREET's invasion into east TENNESSEE. 211 

were getting short. But Burnside kept up his part of the show and 
then merely retreated over a very bad road, in the worst of winter 
weather, to Knoxville. Whatever he had saved of the train was ahead 
of him. A combat at Campbell Station was simply an artillery 
duel. The Union cannoneers had much the advantage over the 
enemy's artillery in guns, ammunition and men. The superiority of 
the Federal artillery has often been acknowledged by the best of 
Confederate authorities, while the advantage in cavalry was decided- 
ly with the enemy, for they had been used to the riding of horses on 
bridle paths, while our people, even the farmers, would seldom 
mount the animals. 

Wherever there is a failure, the party responsible usuallly 
looks around for an excuse. In Longstreet's failure lie 
blamed General Law for not attacking the rear of Burnside, and 
produces a statement from Law that he had no intention to win 
a Major General commission for Jenkins. But with all the facts 
before us, it appears that Burnside, after his blunder at Lenoir Sta- 
tion, had his eyes opened and simply outgeneraled Longstreet, who 
was confident of success, for he had by far the larger force at his dis- 
posal. The highest number claimed to have been under Burnside 
was 6,000, and more than double that number were under Long- 
street. The Union killed was twenty-six, and i66 wounded and 
fifty-seven missing. The rebellion record gives the confederate loss, 
as they were the attacking party, at i ,000 killed and wounded. The 
physical endurance that Burnside's little arm^^ had to undergo after 
another night's hard work and marching caused some to fall asleep 
while marching, only waking up when they reached an uneven place 
in the road that would trip them. The artillery were still with the 
army, and many times in the short eighteen miles the infantry had 
to give a helping hand to bring the guns out of the mire. On one 
place General Burnside, with his staff, was hard at work, after mid- 
night, getting one of Roemer's guns forward. Neither horses nor 
men were able to do this, when the drivers of our battery came for- 
ward and asked to be permitted to bring their teams, and that they 
M^ould pull the gun but. The permission was granted, the gun 
quicldy pulled out and saved. Wiih the thanks of General Burnside, 
they returned to their gun, and about 4 o'clock on Monday morning, 
November 17, the head of Burnside's infantry column reached Knox- 

When the rumors were circulated on Saturday, the 15th, that 


a large body of Confederate cavalry had appeared on the south side, 
opposite Knoxville, and part of Woolford's command had been cap- 
tured, and General Shackleford, with re-enforcements, crossed the 
river on the pontoon bridge, the excitement in town reached a white 
heat, as it was believed that Wheeler already had possession of the 
heights surrounding the place, but the coolness and self-possession of 
Shackleford did much to allay the fears of the thinking people. As 
he rode along he composedly smoked a short-stem pipe, without 
bringing his horse to a gallop, and on reaching the field made such 
disposition of his troops that repelled the enemy's effort to get pos- 
session of the hills. General Carter, who acted as provost marshal, 
was advised of the danger. That the small army of Burnside would 
hardly be able to hold the town against Longstreet's twenty thou- 
sand veterans, and as he had a high regard for the safety of certain 
prominent Union citizens, then in Knoxville, he sent them word of 
the contingency ahead, and if they chose to escape, he would pro- 
vide them an escort on their way to a more favored clime, into Ken- 
tucky, and that such locomotion might deliver them from imprison- 
ment and probably death. Although they did not like to travel by 
night over unbridged rivers, they were also sensitive to ridicule 
for Imputed cowardice; but their love for personal liberty and life 
was strong enough to overcome all objection. Nearly all who re- 
ceived the kindly advice of the provost marshal speedily took their 
leave of home and comfort, and were escorted by Captain Ricks eight 
miles out of town to, the picket line. Among these refugees were 
Judge John Baxter, "Parson" or William G. Brownlow, Samuel R. 
Rodgers, Thomas A. R. Nelson, O. P. Temple, John M. Fleming, 
Samuel Morrow, M. M. Miller of Knoxville and John Netherland 
and Absalon A. Kyle of Rodgersville. 

It was after night and a heavy rain was falling when they 
started, and over a road shortly before traveled by 7,000 hogs that 
had been driven in to supply the army. Despite peril and great diffi- 
culty, the journey was safely accomplished. Some of the lesser 
lights were already setting their sails to the Confederate wind that 
the}'- expected now to come, and therefore remained to take their 
chances if the town should change masters. But to one of General 
Carter's friends, he sent his aide, with the instructions that he must 
leave town, for fear that something might occur that would deprive 
him of liberty and life. The friend had already deliberated a whole 
night whether to go or not, although Carter had said he must go. 


He did not like to leave home, wife and -children, yet he 
would obey his military friend and get ready, for the journey, but 
was not in a hurry. So on the morning when Burnside had returned 
from Campbell Station, he called on the General to bid him good- 
bye. Seeing the- General mount his horse and go out to the fight, he 
did not speak to him, as he saw the General self-composed, and a 
conviction came over the would-be refugee that Burnside would be 
able to hol4 the town. So he went home, returned the horses that 
were to carry him to Kentucky, and he remained with his family dur- 
ing the siege. 

During the time that Longstreet was halted and entertained 
at Campbell Station by Burnside, his cavalry, then under command 
of General Martin, had marched forward to the city to capture the 
town, which was defended by a mounted force under General Saun- 
ders. During the battle of Campbell Station, Burnside tried to 
open communication with General Saunders, and sent an operator 
to Concord, but the wires were cut, and a mounted messenger was 
intrusted with the duty to personally deliver the communication to 
Saunders. The young man who carried this message afterwards 
received a medal of honor for his voluntary service, and a handsome 
cash present from General Burnside. On our retreat from Campbell 
Station a vidette post in charge of Sergeant Nixon of the One Hun- 
dred and Twelfth Illinois had been forgotten, on the river, and not 
being relieved, were, of course, captured. Out of the fourteen sent 
to a Southern prison, twelve died in the enemy's bastile, one died 
after exchange, in the hospital at Baltimore, and the last one was 
sent to the insane hospital. 

After an all-night's march over wretched roads, the little army 
of Burnside began to arrive at Knoxville. On the morning of the 
17th Colonel Woolford, with his own regiment, the First Kentucky, 
and the Forty-fifth Ohio, moved out on the Kingston road to meet 
the enemy. They had not far to go, as tlie fierce rattle of musketry 
indicated the enemy were coming closer, and showed that our troops 
were being driven in. Woolford retired until he reached his re- 
serve, the Eleventh and Twelfth Kentucky Regiments, but the 
enemy came on and attacked and drove back the Union outpost on 
the main body, and with overpowering numbers continued the 
charge, causing Woolford to withdraw in disorder, and carry the 
rest of the Union line with him. But the colors of the One Hun- 
dred and Twelfth Illinois were planted on the hill, and the rest of 


the regiment rallied around the flag. The enemy's guns being empty 
and of short range, gave the Illinois boys a chance to deliver a volley 
with their long-range guns, which sent the enemy reeling back to 
his own line. 

The rest of the Union troops recovered their line and held the 
hill that day, but not without considerable loss. During the night 
the troops rested and drew rations, for the first time since the 1 5th, 
before the battle of Campbell Station. 'Early in the morning the 
Forty-fifth Ohio Infantry, the One Hundred and Twelfth Illinois 
Infantry and the Eighth Michigan Cavalry, all under command of 
General Saunders, moved out on foot to the front, leaving every 
fifth man to hold the horses. A short distance in the front. was a 
ravine, crowned on the west side with hills higher than the ones 
occupied by Saunders' troops. The high hills or bluffs were held by 
the enemy, overlooking the Union advance and outpost. Near the 
road, on the east side, and about a mile out from the fortification, 
was a fine brick residence. The whole force with Saunders hold- 
ing the enemy was not over 600 men. The morning was foggy and 
the contending forces could not see each other, but at 10 a. m. the 
fog raised, and both sides at once opened a vigorous fusillade. The 
enemy's sharpshooters entered the brick house, and after an hour's 
combat the column of the enemy moved down to the ravine and 
prepared for a charge. Under the protection of the blufif, they were 
secure from the Union fire while they prepared for the charge. When 
all was ready, they, with their peculiar yell, came rushing upon the 
bluffs, but, receiving such a withering fire from Saunders 
they recoiled into the ravine, and for nearly two hours firing 
ceased, watching each other for the next move. Saunders could 
have safely withdrawn into our lines, but his success had been so 
great that he felt confident he could hold the enemy in check, to 
give more time to complete the defenses of the city. About 
half -past one the enemy brought up a four-gun battery and planted 
it near the brick building, and for the next hour and a half kept up 
a destructive fire on our line, of which the One Hundred and 
Twelfth Illinois and Forty-fifth Ohio suffered the most. About 
3 :30 the enemy formed in columns of three lines, and made a fierce 
charge upon Saunders' gallant defenders,, but were repulsed with 
heavy loss. They reformed to charge again. The Union troops 
were ordered to hold their fire until they came within easy range 
and then took aim and fired to kill. 

LONGSTREET's invasion into- east TENNESSEE. 2l5 

The enemy misunderstood the motive of this silence, and be- 
Heved the Union troops ready to surrender. A Confederate officer 
rode to the front and right up to the Federal line, demanding their 
surrender, asking them to lay down their arms, as they surely could 
not get out, and would all be killed, and promised good care of them 
if they would surrender. But for answer a demand was made on 
him to surrender, when he wheeled his horse to ride away. Just 
then a dozen Union bullets reached him, and rider and horse lay 
lifeless on the ground. Maddened at the death of their brave of- 
ficer, who proved to be a Colonel, the enemy charged with double 
fury, but were repulsed as before. Another column had formed on 
our right, and charged down to the rear. The former column came 
up again to the front and renewed their attack. In this attack Gen- 
eral Saunders was wounded and carried from the field. 

It was now 4 p. m. and the Forty-fifth Ohio, being overpowered 
and outflanked, gave way, and as it now became apparent that the 
whole force would be captured. Major Dow gave the order in a 
clear, ringing voice to retire. They rushed through the orchard, 
followed by shot and shell, across Second Creek. Most of the 
Eighth Michigan Cavalry and some of the One Hundred and 
Twelfth Illinois Infantry reached the woods, where they found some 
protection, and rejoined the rest on a hill in front of the fort. 
The enemy established their line on the bluff of the third creek. The 
Union outpost occupied the brick house, afterwards burned, and the 
fighting ceased for the day. The loss in killed and wounded was 
about one-third of the force engaged, and some few, nearly all 
wounded, were taken prisoners. 

General Saunders died the next day, popular with the whole 
army, and especially so with his own troops. Captain Lee of the 
One Hundred and Twelfth Illinois died, after the most intense suf- 
fering, on the evening of the i8th, and only regretted that the coun- 
try would lose his service. 


Death had no terror for him. He had done his duty and 
served his countr}^ as well as he could. These were all the few and 
simple words he had to say. When informed that the end of his 
life was near, he asked for a Christian minister, to be baptized in 
that religion. Rev. Mr. Ruler, the post chaplain, performed the 
duty. General Burnsi'de and his staff were present, kneeling around 
the bed. When the prayer was ended the dying hero took General 


Buniside by the hand, and tears dropped down the bronzed cheeks 
of the chief, as he Hstened to the dying man's last words. The sac- 
rament of the Lord's supper was about to be administered, wheii 
suddenly the strength of the dying soldier failed, and like a child he 
gently fell asleep. Greater love hatli no man than this : that a man 
lay down his life for his country. 

As the funeral could not be held by day, for Longstreet had ad- 
vanced to within eas}^ range of our lines of defense, and the nortli- 
west of the town was now fairly besieged from the river above to 
the river below. General Burnside therefore requested that the fu- 
neral take place after nightfall. A resident minister was present. 
At the commander's headquarters a number of officers had gathered, 
among them Captain Poe, the cliief engineer of tlie Army of the 
Ohio, and who had been a class mate at W'est Point and a personal 
friend of the deceased. To Captain Poe General Saunders had com- 
municated tlie premonition that he had, that on tliat da}- he would 
fall in battle, and had left a few personal treasures in the Captain's 
care, among tliese a few letters from a young lad}^ he had hoped to 
make his bride. The General was yomig, d^'ing at tlie age of 28. 

General Buniside had cautioned Saunders not to expose him- 
self, but he would do it. As the patli to glory leads e\-en to the 
grave, we had here a hero who witli dauntless courage refused to 
surrender to tlie eiieni}*, in superior nmiibers, but had now given up 
his sword and surrendered to his God, tlie great ruler of the army 
of the heavens, and who sees that not a sparrow falls to rhe ground 
without His will or wish. At the head of tlie fmieral procession 
walked General Burnside, ^^^th tlie minister. By tlieir side was the 
medical director of the army, bearing a lighted lantern in his hand. 
That lantern did duty at the grave, as the body was committed 
— earth to eartli, ashes to ashes, dust to dust — in the hope of the 
resurrection of tlie dead. A\lien all was over every one went his 
way, but probabty few of tliat company has ever forgotten the night 
burial of General R. M. Saunders, the hero of Knox^^ille. 

Not a drum was heard for our funeral note, 
As his corpse to the ramparts zee hurried. 

Not a soldier discharged his farewell shot 
O'er the ^ra-re where our hero iv<; Imried. 

LONGSTREET's invasion into east TENNESSEE. 21 7 

Fezv and short zvere the prayers zue said, 

And we spoke not a word of sorrow; 
But we steadfastly gazed on the face of the dead, 

And we bitterly thought of the morrow. 

But half our heavy task was done 

When the clock struck the hour for retiring, 

And we knezv by the distant random gun 
That the foe zvas sidlenly firing. 

Slozvly and sadly zve laid him down, 

From the Held of his fame fresh zvith glory; 

We carved not a line, we raised not a stone. 
But his life tells the whole of the story. 


On an inspection, from October 23d to 27th, with a recon- 
noisance from Loudon to Sweet Water, Burnside had conchided to 
abandon London, and adopt for his hne of defense the road from 
Kingston to Knoxville. Kingston, therefore, became a point of 
some importance, as it was near the Cumberland Mountains, and a 
position not so easily outflanked. General Mott was sent there with 
a brigade and the left half of the Fifteenth Indiana Battery had 
been sent to him on the 6th of November. After General Long- 
street had crossed the river he made a rapid movement to cut and 
prohibit Burnside's retreat to Knoxville, but was, by the latter, out- 
generaled and beaten at Campbell Station, by an inferior force, that 
gave Burnside a hot retreat to Knoxville, which point the head of 
his army reached, early on the morning of the 17th, after one of the 
most fearful marches through darkness and mud known in the his- 
tory of all wars, without losing a gun. After his return from 
the Loudon inspection, Captain Poe, chief engineer of the Army of 
the Ohio, had been instructed to prepare the defenses of Knoxville. 
When Loudon was abandoned on the 28th of October, Captain Poe 
had taken up the pontoon at that place, transported it by wagon to 
the railroad at the east of the Loudon bridge, where the boats, some 
forty in numbers, the chess and the anchorage were loaded on the 
cars and sent to Knoxville, and thrown across the Holston River at 
the mouth of the first creek, in condition to permit General Saun- 
ders to cross his command with baggage, about November 2. A 


bridge across the Holston at Lenoir was not saved, but destroyed 
at the time of our retreat. While in Knoxville, preparing the de- 
fenses, Poe received instructions to build another pontoon bridge 
that could be transported on wagons, with the material still in the 
woods and the iron in the scrap pile ; but the will and determination 
of the chief engineer soon had another bridge ready for service. 
The work to build it involved an immense amount of labor, but the 
usefulness of the bridges had been so great, in this campaign, that 
one hundred times as much labor would have been well spent. As 
soon as notice was received that the enemy had crossed at Loudon, 
all the other work of the entire battalion was suspended, and the 
line of defense selected by the chief engineer. The troops were given 
position as they arrived. 

Roemer's battery of four three-inch rifle guns was placed on 
University Hill and supported by Morrison's brigade of the First 
Division, Ninth Army Corps. Benjamin's regular battery of four 
twenty-pound Parrotts, and Buckley's volunteer Rhode Island bat- 
tery of six twelve-pound Napoleon guns were in Fort Saunders, sup- 
ported by two brigades of Humphrey's and Crist's of the First Di- 
vision, Ninth Army Corps. This division occupied the ground from 
the Holston River, near Second Creek, around to the point where the 
East Tennessee and Georgia Railroad crosses Second Creek. This 
line was nearly at right angles with the river, west of the town, and 
thence turned parallel to the river. Gidding's regular battery of four 
ten-pound Parrotts occupied a small earthwork on Vine street near 
the depot. The Fifteenth Indiana Battery of three three-inch rifle 
guns occupied the ridge between Gay street and First Creek, and 
had some protection from cotton bales, that served as embrasures. 
These two batteries were supported by the Second Division, Ninth 
Army Corps. The line runs parallel to the railroad. The Twenty- 
fourth Indiana Battery, Captain Simes, with six James rifles, and 
three eight-inch caliber, and Henshaw's battery, with two James 
rifles and four six-pounder brass guns, occupied the fort on Temper- 
ance Hill, and the ridge adjoining it, supported by Chapin's brigade 
of White's Division and Riley's brigade of Haskell's Division of the 
Twenty-third Corps, extending from First Creek east to Bell House ; 
Shields' Nineteenth Ohio Battery of six twelve-pound Napoleon, 
and one section of Wilder's Twenty-fifth Indiana Battery of three- 
inch rifle guns were on Mabry's Hill, supported by the brigade 
of Colonel Haskins and Casement of the Twenty-third Corps, the 

LONGSTREEt's invasion into east TENNESSEE. 219 

brigades extending from Bell House to the Holston River, at a point 
a little below the glass works. Two sections of the Wilder Indiana 
Battery, four three-inch rifle guns, and Konkle's battery of four 
three-inch rifle guns, were on the heights south of the river, sup- 
ported by Cameron's brigade of Hascall's Division, Twenty-third 
Army Corps. One section of twelve-pound howitzers was on Flint 
Hill, covering the bridge head, and manned by a detail of soldiers 
from loyal Tennesseens. 

During the whole of the siege there was scarcely a change of 
position, either of artiller)^ or infantry. As soon as they arrived 
and were in position, without any rest, they were set to work to in- 
trench themselves, but there were not tools enough to supply the 
demand, and the work was done by relays, with eight hours at a 
shift, except for about 200 colored citizens. They worked all night 
and rested in daytime, as also did some white citizens and refugees ; 
but the most of the white people, on account of blistered hands, were 
excused as soon as fairly good protection had been constructed. The 
first defenses, except where the batteries were placed, were nothing 
but rifle pits, four feet wide and two feet deep, giving a breastwork 
3f four and one-half feet high on the inside. 

Two forts, one on Temperance Hill, the other Fort Saunders, 
had been built by the engineers and in a defensible condition. 
So rapid and hard had been the work that on the morning of the 
1 8th the troops were fairly well protected, but the work was con- 
tinued, as the enemy was held at bay on the Kingston road by Gen- 
eral Saunders' cavalry, and on the Clinton road by Colonel Penne- 
backer's brigade of mounted troops. The holding back of the enemy 
by these gallant troops was worth thousands of men to Burnside in 
the defense. The damming of First Creek made an obstacle in front 
Df and parallel to Temperance Hill, for over a third of a mile, which 
:ould not be crossed only by a bridge. On the morning of the 19th 
Dur position was secure, and we w^ere confident of being able to hold 
the same, but work was kept up and the citizens in the town, with 
all the contrabands, were kept at the trenches. An interior line of 
works was begun from Temperance Hill to the river at Flint Hill. 
Phe enemy placed a battery on the Tazewell road, and from it threw 
the first shell into the city, directly in front of the Fifteenth Indiana 
Battery. On Friday, the 20th, the enemy erected lines of rifle pits 
across the Kingston road, which General Saunders had occupied, 
and erected batteries on the hill south of Fort Saunders, a mile 


distant. The enemy again fired from the Tazewell Battery, and was 
replied to by the Fifteenth Indiana and Gidding's regular Batteries. 
The brick house occupied by the enemy in front of Fort Saunders 
was charged on by the Seventeenth ]\Iichigan and burned. While 
this was going on, the enemy opened from all their batteries, but 
without damage to us. 

Saturday, November 21st, was quiet, but work on the trenches 
was kept up. Sunday, November 22, was quiet except the informa- 
tion that the enemy was constructing a raft at Boyd's Ferry, which 
they intended to float down the ri^'er to carry away our pontoons and 
break our communication with the south side. Capatin Poe con- 
structed a boom by stretching an iron cable across the river above 
the bridge 1,000 feet long and prevented the break. 

INTonday, November 23 — Everything quiet on ihe Holston. In 
the evening the enemy advanced on our skirmishers. They retired, 
but set lire to a number of buildings to prevent the enemy using 
them for protection. 

Tuesday, November 24 — The Michigan volunteers charged 
and carried the most advanced rifle pits, but not being supported, 
were driven back. Another interior line was laid out, from Fort 
Saunders to College Hill and to the river south of Second Creek. 
The enemy crossed the river with some force two miles below the 
pontoon, as it became rumored that Grant was operating against 
Bragg. The absence of enthusiasm among the troops of the enemy 
indicated to us that Grant's operations at Chattanooga had been 

Wednesda}^ November 25 — The enemy pressed forward on 
the south side of the river to occupy the heights south of Knox- 
vllle, but was driven back by Colonel Cameron with considerable 
loss. The enemy fired on Fort Saunders at a distance of 2,800 yards 
without results. ]\Iore rumors about another raft came in, and an- 
other boom had to be erected to prevent the pontoon bridge from 
being carried off. 

Thursday, November 26 — General Burnside made an inspec- 
tion of the defense on the south side, and found the enemy had ad- 
vanced to within 600 yards of our forces. Captain Poe, the chief 
engineer, caused a telegraph wire to be stretched from stump to 
stump in front of Fort Saunders, and made a dicval-dc-frise from 
pikes in front of Colonel Haskins' position, fastening the pikes in 
place with telegraph wire. 

LONGSTREEt's invasion into east TENNESSEE. 221 

Friday, November 27 — The enemy appeared to threaten the 
south side. Works for a two-gmi battery were commenced, and 
rifle pits west of the Maryville Railroad were begun. The enemy 
erected works on the ridge north of Fort Saunders, consisting only 
of light rifle pits. The enemy was active all day, but on account of 
the shortage of ammunition, our batteries did not reply. 

Saturday, November 28 — Both armies were hard at work all 
along the line, the enemy placed a six-gun battery on the south side 
of the river, and opened fire on Roemer's battery, on College Hill, 
and an occasional shot at Fort Saunders, but without doing any 
damage. About midnight the enemy made a furious assault on our 
picket lines and occupied them, and advanced to within about 120 
yards of Fort Saunders. Skirmishing was continued all night, with 
a slow cannonade from the enemy's right, on Fort Saunders, which 
served as a notice that an assault was to be made soon. If they had 
intended to notify us of an intended assault, they could not have 
done it more openly than to keep up the cannonade during the night, 
and early Sunday morning, November 29, under cover of a heavy 
fog, the enemy moved along the capital of the northwestern bastion 
and gallantly and persistently charged our works, which was hand- 
somely repulsed, with a loss to the enemy of the entire brigade that 
led the assault. 

Longstreet reported about 1,300 killed and wounded, while 
our loss was four killed and eleven wounded. Very few instances 
in history show where a storming party was so nearly annihilated. 
The capture was three battle-flags, about 300 prisoners and 500 
small arms. The garrison in Fort Saunders was Benjamin's four- 
gun battery, two guns of Buckley's battery, part of the Seventy- 
ninth New York Infantry and Second Michigan Volunteers, a total 
of about 200 men in the fort. Fort Saunders was a bastioned earth- 
work, in the form of an irregular quadrilateral, with a front of 
ninety-five yards, and the sides 125 yards to the southern and north- 
ern front, and 85 yards eastern front. The eastern front was open, 
to be closed by a stockade when finished. The southern front was 
half done, and the northern and western front finished. Each bastion 
was intended to have a pan coupe and the bastion attacked was the 
only one completely finished, and a light twelve-pounder was 
mounted at the pan coupe and did splendid service. The ditch sur- 
rounding the fort was twelve 'feet wide and in many places eight feet 
deep. The irregularity of the site was such that the bastion was very 


heavy, the rehef of the Hghtest one being twelve feet. The rehef of 
the one attacked was thirteen feet, and with the depth of the ditch 
of eleven feet, made a height over twenty feet from the bottom of 
the ditch to the interior crest. Owing to the nature of the soil and 
the dampness of the morning,the steepness of the slope made the 
storming of the fort a serious matter, and they had no scaling 
ladders, the confusion in their ranks was caused by the stumps, 
wires, entanglement, and brush in front of the fort. The cool and 
steady fire coming from the best of our troops accounts for the re- 
pulse of one of the best divisions in the whole Confederate Army. 

A short time after the assault a truce was offered the enemy, 
which tliey accepted, to bury their dead and take care of their 
wounded, sharp fighting took place on other parts of our line, and on 
the south side of the river ; but we were successful everywhere. 


When Burnside's little army reached Knoxville it was re-en- 
forced by such loyal refugees that had to leave their homes in the 
rural districts, and nad come to town for protection. These were 
organized into military companies and placed in the trenches to 
guard them in daytime and strengthen them after night, while the 
regular volunteer soldier was used for picket and outpost duty. The 
total available force for defense, including these home guards, was 
about I2.O0O men. To feed these was no small task; but by issuing | 
less than a quarter ration of meat and bread, and no small ration; ■ 
coffee and sugar was reserved for the hospital, Burnside could hold 
out ten days, but his good fortune was that the rear door across the 
river was not closed, and at the end of the siege enough corn and 
provisions had been brought in to last his 12,000 men 
for twenty days. There was, however, no fodder for the stock, and 
the horses ate for roughness, each other's manes and tails, 
so that we had nothing but bobtails. In order to accumu- 
late a few days' rations ahead, the troops would receive about one 
ear of corn each per day, for several days, with some fresh pork 
that had been salted down from a drove of hogs brought in just be- 
fore the siege ; but the loyal people south of Knoxville, and especially 
in Servier County, took great risk in bringing forward supplies to 
the army that they themselves needed. 

Longstreet did not bombard the city, for the reason that his 
artillery had no ammunition with which he could reach our lines, 

LONGSTREET's invasion into east TENNESSEE. 223 

for he had tried that at Campbell Station; but the result as to the 
destruction of property was about the same, the weather cold and no 
hrewood on hand. At first the fences would be appropriated, and 
later, when the demand became urgent for the hospital, sheds and 
dwelling houses would be used— those of the loyal Confederates 
who first had left town on our approach, and later some of those that 
had set their sails to catch the wind both ways. The latter would 
usually have some Union men intercede at headquarters for them 
for relief that would not always be granted. The hospitals were 
overcrowded with wounded in the late combats, and daily increased 
by additions from the skirmish line and sick from the ranks. The 
enrolled refugees, however, stood the hardships well, and very few 
of them during the nineten days of the siege had to seek medical 


The only death in town among the citizens was a child that 
was killed by the enemy's sharpshooters, but a young man from a 
prominent Southern family, that belonged to Longstreet's sharp- 
shooters, paid his life for the innocent one in Knoxville. He had 
perched himself in the tower of the house where Longstreet had 
his headquarters. The brave Southerner had been reached by our 
long-ranged rifle cannon, in what he thought a place of safety, and 
a percussion shell had demolished the tower and fatally wounded 
him. He was bleeding profusely from the wound as he was carried 
down the stairs, and all efforts to remove the blood stains from the 
steps were unavailing. 

The provender for the hoises became more scarce, as the siege 
progressed, and many were taken across the river and turned loose. 
Among the reports made during the latter part of the siege was one 
of General Manson, in which he states that the mules on that day 
had eaten up the fifth wheel on the caisson. (I have seen the spokes 
of a fifth wheel gnawed nearly through.) As mules are generally 
' tlought to have their greatest strength in their heels, this report 
caused a round of laughter among the associates at headquarters. 

General Burnside had at first established his headquarters in a 
large mansion on a prominent street, but the fear that he was in the 
enemy's line of fire on the Tazewell road, caused him to change his 
quarters, which were now transferred to a store on a business street. 
The spirit of cheerfulness was always present at headquarters, and 
when the day had closed, the younger members of his military fam- 
ily would join in vocal music. A favorite song of the party would be 


]\Irs. Ward Howe's Battle Hymn of the Republic — "Mine Eyes 
Have Seen the Glory of the Coming of the Lord." 

When Union citizens would visit the headquarters they would 
receive comfort and encouragement from the hopeful words of the 
General. Some few loyal Southerners were restrained, so as not 
to give occasion for offense, but after the siege, during General Fos- 
ter's administration, were sent South and within the Confederate 
lines. Wliile the trying conditions were very hard on the minds 
of the Union people, as to the uncertainty of the results — so full for 
them of weal or woe — they were always reassured by the apparent 
confidence of Burnside and his soldiers. Finally the night of No- 
vember 28th Avas especially disturbing to them. For two hours, 
about midnight, the skirmishers became very active, and were fol- 
lowed by a fearful cannonading from all parts of Longstreet's line, 
which continued until daylight ; when at that time our own guns in 
Fort Saunders and on every part of the line took up the fight to repel 
the assault on. Fort Saunders. All occurred in about one 
hour's time; after which the citizens became as confident as the sol- 
diers. As usual in all actions, many acts of bravery were per- 
formed, but this time almost exclusively by the Confederates, who 
tried to storm the fort without the necessar}^ scaling implements. 
On the Federal side there was nothing to do but wait the coming 
of our enemy and then defend ourselves, which was done with 
promptness by all who were present. Lieutenant Benjamin is cred- 
ited with lighting a fuse in a shell with his cigar. This is false, as 
also is the story of his negro chopping down an assailant with an 

Benjamin fought with his twent^'-pound Parrotts as any other 
artillery officer would have done, and was his dut}^ to do, and if the 
defense of the fort had depended on the negro with his ax, the Con- 
federates would have had it easy. The greatest assistance Benja- 
min and Buckley received was from the batteries on the right, and 
from the Fifteenth Indiana that was able to sweep to his front, and 
the infantry support with the gun in the traverse. The assault must 
liave been very disheartening to the enemy, for they had a very poor 
showing for their efforts. AMiile the burial party kept busy bury- 
ing the dead and the medical corps attended to the wounded, the 
veterans of both sides gathered at the railroad track, one side sitting 
on the southern and the other on the northern rail, discussed the 
probabilities of success, each claiming the final for his side of the 

LONGSTREET's invasion into east TENNESSEE. 225 

The ditch in front of Fort Saunders was filled with dead and 
dying. William Bowman, one of our gunners, whose shoes had 
given out, while walking along the ditch, had his eye 
attracted to a very fine pair of boots on one of the sup- 
posed dead men. Bowman sized up the situation, and with 
an instinct of self-protection began to pull off the boots. At this 
the owner gave a terrible shriek and asked the gunner to help him 
out of the ditch. The supposed dead man had come to life. He 
was readily helped out by the hospital corps and placed on the dress- 
ing board, where the best of medical attendance was given, but 
eight days later he died the death of a brave soldier. During the in- 
terval, when delirious, he would call for his mother, sweetheart and 
si=^ter. He received a Christian burial, with his boots on, and his peo- 
ple were notified of his death through the lines. The Sunday passed 
quietly, and late in the evening the gun agreed on was fired to notify 
both sides that the truce was at an end. 

The skirmishers were soon in their positions, but did not dis- 
turb each other much. It already became rumored that Bragg had 
been defeated by Grant at Chattanooga, but no official notice had 
been received, but was expected hourly. The next day was Thanks- 
giving Dav, and the loyal friends of Burnside had provided him 
with the usual turkey, at least one, or probably more; but the in- 
tended one for that day had been stolen during the night previous, 
and it is claimed was served in the mess of some hungry artillery- 
men that had been hunting and feasting on additional rations— the 
grains of corn that the horses and mules were not able to nibble up 
during their feed. There must have been another turkey on hand, 
for there was not much said about the loss of the bird at headquar- 
ters, and those that fed on turkey did not say anything about their 


Since Captain Von Sehlen received such a high compliment 
for the maneuvers and practice at Campbell's Station, we will give 
a more detailed account of the same. 

The battery was withdrawn, with the rest of the troops to 
Lenoirs Station, and had a few days' rest. The horses 
now received attention and care, and remained so until 
November i6, when Longstreet tried to cut off Burnside's 
retreat from Knoxville, and came near doing so, for 


Long-street's 15,000 were able to outflank and mislead Burnside's 
6.000, while Burnside had to abandon eighty wagons to get teams 
to haul his artillery to the rear and destroy ammunition to lighten 
the load. Von Sehlen received and needed no such assistance, and 
kept his ammunition chest filled to the brim, and arrived at Camp- 
bell's 'Station in good form for the fight. He was placed on the 
right and north side of the road to Knoxville, known as the King- 
ston road, and in the rear of Benjamin's regular battery, in echelon, 
with his left gun forward. 

Ilis practice was the best, which was always good, and 
never to waste ammunition — it was to hit. As the enemy pushed 
his left flank forward he came into action, and Alexander's 
Confederate artillery opened directly in front of him and labored 
hard, but to no purpose, as their ammunition was bad and would ex- 
plode as it left the muzzle of the gun. Not so with Von Sehlen. His 
ammunition was of the best and used with telling effect. He had 
to retire in echelon, and finally by limber to the rear, had to with- 
draw three-fourths of a mile in position to the left of the 
road. Here he opened on the right flank of the enemy and Lay- 
den's Confederate artillery opened on him, with no better result 
than Alexander, while Von Sehlen, with his rifle guns, was the star 
actor. At first he fired to the front, and next formed his guns in 
echelon to the left, and finally fired to the left. As the battle; was 
only an artillery duel, in which the Confederates were, on account of 
their amm\mition, at a disadvantage, the victory remained with the 
Federals, and at 4 p. m. the combat ceased. General Longstreet 
claimed his orders had not been carried out by General Law to get 
in our rear. 

On the way back to Knoxville some artillery was stuck in the 
mud, and our battery was next to them on the road. Twenty-four 
horses and some infantry tried to extricate the piece. Captain Von 
Sehlen rode up and asked permission to bring one of his teams for- 
ward that could pull the piece without assistance. This was granted 
and with More, Stith and Dennison as drivers, they soon had the 
piece, and at which General Burnside and his staff took a personal 
hand, dry upon the ground. 

On reaching Knoxville the battery was placed in the center 
in front of the Tazewell road, and on the morning of the 29th, with a 
left oblique fire, cleared the front, with Gidding's battery of Fort 

LONGSTREET's invasion into east TENNESSEE. 227 

As soon as Longstreet withdrew from Knoxville the highest 
compHment was paid Von Sehlen as an artillery officer. An order 
was issued to Benjamin, Edwards and Giddings, all commanders of 
regular batteries, to turn their serviceable horses over to Von 
Sehlen, with a sufficient number of men to fully man his guns, for 
Von Sehlen to take the field and the regulars to remain in camp. 
The men of the regulars were not wanted, but the horses were ac- 
cepted and the battery moved with the army to Strawberry Plains. 


The movement made by Longstreet in November had been sug- 
gested to Bragg, the day after the battle of Chickamauga, on 
September 26, but Bragg needed no adviser after he had gained the 
first victory, if such it can be called, for his Army of the Tennessee 
since the beginning of the war. It was only when he saw the col- 
umns of Hooker coming to the relief of the Army of the Cumber- 
land, and with General Grant in command that he thought 
of the suggestion of Longstreet. The latter was then started with 
15,000 infantry and artillery and 5,000 cavalry, apparently suffi- 
cient to. capture Burnside's forces of no more than 12,000, then scat- 
tered troops. We had marched several times up and down the 
Sweet Water Valley, parallel with the railroads, in three days easy; 
but it took Longstreet fully nine days to get from Cleveland to Lou- 
don. But large bodies move slowly, and as Longstreet had the 
larger body, he no doubt took his own time for infantry and artil- 
lery, but his cavalry, under the intrepid Wheeler, was active every- 
where, but met with no success in any one of the four efforts it un- 
dertook. At Maryville they expected to rout the Union force, and 
on the heights south of Knoxville. They tried to get a position from 
which they could command the town. Failing in this, they wanted 
to capture Loudon Hill, afterward Fort Saunders, but only suc- 
ceeded in killing a brave L^nion officer. General Saunders, and last, 
but not least, they wanted to capture Kingston, where they met with 
a heavy repulse. These failures were not due to any lack of enter- 
prise, but they were beaten by the bravery and determination of the 
Union troops, that had come to stay, and establish the national au- 
thority over all parts of the State. In his infantry movement he 
had the same to contend with as the Union forces : bad roads and 
broken-down teams. If he, however, could have caught Burnside 
at Lenoir and cut him off from Campbell's Station, his success in 


the campaign would have been sure; but the following of Burnside 
and making a greater distance between his, and Bragg's army, was 
the greatest of mistakes. While Grant was daily increasing his 
forces at Chattanooga, Bragg was continually diminishing his forces 
by sending Longstreet away, and since the latter's movement after 
Burnside he had not been encouraged by a single success. 

Longstreet slowly and carefully came up to Knoxville, formed 
around that town, but had not troops enough to surround or com- 
pletely invest it. He therefore urged the authorities to send him re- 
enforcements from Virginia, where Meade and Lee were playing 
hide and seek; also to Bragg to send him another division. The latter 
sent Bushrod R. Johnson, and Virginia re-enforcements were on the 
way. But on the 23rd Grant had moved forward against Bragg, 
and on the 25th he had been totally defeated. On the 23rd Bragg 
had sent his chief engineer to Longstreet to urge him to capture 
Burnside, if necessary by assault, and at once. This gave Long- 
street the excuse to request Ledbetter to locate the position to assault, 
after looking over the ground. Fort Saunders became the ob- 
jective point and McLaw's division was to assault. To this Mc- 
Law objected, as it would be now, since Bragg had been defeated, a 
waste of life, and such it proved to be without any result. Long- 
street himself intended to have waited for his Virginia re-enforce- 
ments and then to have completely invested the place. But this, too, 
was too late, for Sherman was already on the way with re-enforce- 
ments for Burnside. So the campaign of Longstreet had thus far 
been a complete failure. He, however, took advantage of General 
Law's remarks at or after the battle of Campbell's Station that the 
latter had no intention to help win a Major General commission for 
General Jenkins, and preferred charges against Law for "dis- 
obedience of orders in the face of the enemy." 

He also placed him under arrest, and at the same time he re- 
lieved McLaw, the division commander, and sent him home to 
South Carolina, charged with "laxity during the battle.". But both 
of the Generals named were honorably acquitted after a full hearing 
by the court-martial. 


After it had been agreed by Grant that Burnside's little army 
should be withdrawn to Knoxville to draw Longstreet's troops in 
that direction, to weaken Bragg, it became necessary to send a larger 



LONGSTREET's invasion into east TENNESSEE. 229 

force for strategical reasons to Kingston, and Colonel Byrd, already 
there with his own regiment, the First Tennessee, was re-enforced 
by the brigade of Colonel Mott, composed of the Sixteenth Kentucky 
and the One Hundred and Eighteenth Ohio, the Twentieth Michi- 
o-an Infantry and the Eightieth Indiana Infantry, the Elgin. Illinois, 
battery* of six twelve-pound Napoleon guns, three three-inch rifles, 
commanded by Orderly Sergeant Adam Kuntz of the Fifteenth In- 
diam Batterv, made up the force that was sent to that point. 
The enemy, that now had possession of Sweet Water, posted videttes . 
along the south side of the river as far as Kingston, but did not dis- 
turb the garrison. After the unsuccessful attempt of General Wheeler 
on November 20 to 21 to get possession of the hills on the south side 
near Knoxville that commanded the town, Longstreet issued an order 
to him to at once proceed, with forced marches, with his well- 
equipped cavalry division, to Kingston, forty-six miles distant, and 
attack the post, composed of a small force and two guns, as reported 
to him by Colonel Lyon, and capture the same. Pursuant to these 
instructions he commenced the march at once, but the roads were so 
bad that on the evening of the 22nd he had made but twenty-six 
miles with Kingston still twenty miles away. He proceeded now, 
with his staff, to that place, and had his command to follow. On 
arriving in that vicinity he found that the Union troops had been re- 
enforced with infantry, but did not learn to what extent. About 
3 a m on the 24th his troops came up, having marched two nights 
and days without sleep and on short rations, and were necessarily 
exhausted. He claims that five of his best regiments had been left 
at Knoxville, and many of his men had given out on the road, being 
unable to keep up with the command. After having an hour's rest 
he drove in the Union pickets three miles from Kingston at an hour 
before dayhght. He had expected to cut off the pickets, but failed, 
and he had hoped to reach the town, but was disappointed. As he 
arrived at the foot of the hills near the town he found it covered with 
a long line of infantry, dismounted cavalry and nine pieces of artil- 
lery. Three of these were far-reaching rifle guns and handled with 
consummate skill by the Fifteenth Indiana Battery men. 

The Union Hne had been formed along the crest of the hill m 
concave form, with flanks reaching beyond the Confederates, and 
fired in their rear. Wheeler now intended to charge and break the 
Union center, and when his troops crossed the open field they were 
subjected to a cross fire that caused them to halt, and after seven 


hours continuous work he finally withdrew. But General Longstreet 
appears not to have been pleased with the outcome of this affair, as 
he still maintained that Colonel Byrd had not been re-enforced, and 
expected an easy victor}'- over Byrd; but as Colonel Mott of the One 
Hundred and Eighteenth Ohio was in command, matters were dif- 
ferent, and Longstreet was not informed of this. Colonel Mott 
claims that Wheeler lost in this affair 250 killed and wounded, and 
Colonel Russell of the Fourth Alabama was among the killed, and 
that Wheeler retreated to Loudon, where he destroyed a large 
amount of quartermaster and commissary stores and ammunition, 
also a large train of cars, three engines and a full battery of artil- 
ler}^, claiming that Grants' whole army was after him. Colonel 
Mott praises the officers and men under him, and especially Cap- 
tain Murphy of the Sixteenth Kentucky and Orderly Sergeant 
Kuntz, the latter for the handling of his guns and the way he 
reached the enemy at a great distance ; and he says there were many 
instances where officers and men performed prodigies of valor. 
His losses were fifteen wounded. 

After the repulse of Wheeler the troops at Kingston for sev- 
eral days had a quiet rest; but on the 3rd of December Brigadier 
General Spears of Sherman's army reached that place with his 
brigade, with orders to leave a small garrison at Kingston 
and march with the rest of his brigade and that of Colonel Mott 
down the Tennessee River, resting his right on the river bank.' 
In all eight regiments of infantry and cavalry and seventeen pieces 
of artillery to meet the steamer Paint Rock with supplies for Knox- 
ville from Chattanooga. Colonel Byrd was left at Kingston to 
perform picket duty and assist the steamer to get over the White 
Creek shoals, where she was aground. An experienced pilot was 
sent to get it through the channel, but if necessary Colonel Byrd 
was ordered to have his men unload the steamer and lighten it 
that way, so as to get her off the shoals. A large force of the ene- 
my's cavalry was still within four miles of Kingston. These were 
driven back fully ten miles and the boat protected, but during the 
night Colonel Byrd had taken upon himself the responsibility in- 
stead of unloading the boat to order the same back to Chattanooga 
to reload the stores on a lighter boat. 

As General Spears had routed the enemy in the Sweet Water 
district and no further protection was needed, he marched on to 
near Loudon, where he awaited further instruction. The enemy 

LONGSTREET's invasion into east TENNESSEE. 231 

in his flight from Loudon had abandoned six pieces of artillery, as 
already stated. Three of these he had spiked and the other three 
thrown in the river. The weather and the roads had now become 
more favorable, and on the 4th of December Mott's brigade and 
Orderly Sergeant Kimtz, with three guns, marched twenty 
miles, besides skirmishing and dri^dng the enemy, and had camped 
on Kucky's farm for the night. The next day they marched eight 
miles and camped near Loudon, where they rested for two days, 
and on the 8th marched to Knoxville and reached that place on 
the 9th, and rested again for several days, until the nth, and after 
many halts Orderly Sergeant Kuntz reached the battery with his 
three guns on the i6th. At Blain's Cross Roads, the 
Orderly Sergeant had shown such a capacity for com- 
manding-, a recommendation was made out for his promo- 
tion, and at the same time my recommendation for First 
Lieutenant was sent in and dated January i, 1864, while Kuntz 
was made a Second Lieutenant, dating from August 12, 1863. 
When Kuntz reached us Avith his half of the battery his horses 
w^ere in a very good condition and his men had not suffered, as the 
first half of the battery, under Captain Von Sehlen, in Knoxville; 
and Gun Sergeant Francis M. Hook was promoted to Orderly 
Sergeant of the battery. 








Lieutenant Torr was an officer of fine acquirements and of a seri- 
ous, earnest character, whose miHtary service, up to the time of his 
death, was marked by exclusiveness and modesty. He appeared at 
first a little haughty in his manner, but one could soon see that it was 
but an outward reserve, and free from arrogance. He had a highly 
sensitive organization, and his whole demeanor was quiet and reti- 
cent. His hair was auburn and beard sandy. His voice was strong, 
rather than sonorous ; he was brief of speech ; his whole character and 
discipline being based on these peculiarities. He avoided noisy blus- 
ter of every sort, and was very firm in enforcing his orders. With 
consequences of any disobedience, his subordinates recog'nized his 
purpose to be just, and they had the greatest confidence in him, as 
an officer. 

Physically, the Lieutenant was not strong, and as a field artil- 
lery officer, with its rough and hard service of unusual severity, he 
soon broke down. Had he been in either the Engineer or Adjutant 
General Departments, he no doubt would have lived through the 
war and made his mark as such an officer, or in any position in civil 
life, thereafter. He had a preference for the first section of the bat- 
tery, which was almost entirely composed of Germans. These were 
his ideal artillerymen, and just suited to his nature. 

In action he was brave, seldom excited, and practically knew no 
fear, as demonstrated on the marches in the Sweetwater and King- 




ston Districts. For 600 miles, up and down the valley and cross 
ways, with the cavalry under Colonel Byrd, it was the hardest kind 
of work to keep up, and continually skirmishing with the enemy 
would wear out the most robust nature in the army; never being 
able to stop at any place long enough to clean up, and with only half 
rations, the result could not be otherwise than that his weakened 
condition would break down, and the march from Kingston to Lou- 
don, during that direful Sunday night, but hastened his demise. 

When I left for Cincinnati, and he gave me the parting hand- 
shake, his last remarks on that October morning were : "Now, Fout, 
hurry on and get back, and be sure and bring Harvey with you, for 
its my turn next, you know, for a three-months' furlough." I prom- 
sied him I would, and before going to sleep that night, I had covered 
ninety-five miles to make good my promise. 

On the morning after my departure he broke down, and from 
that time on he was never on duty again. He was placed in the 
ambulance and taken to Knoxville, and placed in the house of Judge 
Baxter, where he received the best medical attendance and care of 
that family. But exposure, overwork and worry had done their 
deadly work, and on December 2, 1863, he passed away. He had 
given his life for his country, but not by the bullet, but a thousand 
times worse than that, and in the darkness of the night he was given 
a soldier's burial. 

Soon after the siege was raised his family was notified by a 
comrade of a New York regiment, who was instructed to carry the 
sad news to his people, and although that officer many times faced 
death and destruction in battle, he lacked courage to meet Torr's 
relatives, and so, from New York, sent the sad news by mail. 

In the following February, his brother-in-law, W. H. Bring- 
hurst, with the ambulance of the Fifteenth Indiana Battery, which 
was still at Knoxville, removed his body from the vault, in the 
burial ground of the Episcopal Church, to Cincinnati, where it was 
met by his father, who conveyed it on to Philadelphia, Pa., where he 
was buried with full military honors in beautiful Woodland Ceme- 
tery, and a polished marble shaft now marks the place where he rests. 
His beloved and intended bride mourns for him to this day. 



My arrival at Indianapolis was unannounced, and surprised 
Lieutenant I-Tarvey, and angered him when I presented the request 
of Captain Von Sehlen and Lieutenant Torr, as also the order of 
General Burnside, for him to report without delay at the battery 

The recruiting service had been an easy berth, and for some 
officers quite a plum. Their rank gave them a social position, their 
work was not scrutinized, and their pay, on account of being on de- 
tached service, was always ready for them, and sometimes, as I have 
known, when paymasters were willing, was drawn in advance. 

According to the promise to Lieutenant Torr, I made my 
stay in Indianapolis only forty-eight hours, and returned to Cincin- 
nati, where I was joined by Lieutenant Harvey two days later. He 
claimed that the winding up of his business as a recruiting officer 
would detain him that much longer. I was really glad to get away 
from Indianapolis, as some of the families of our men loaded me 
with all sorts of delicacies to take to their boys in the field, never 
thinking how I was to get them there. As a result I soon became 
overloaded with canned fruit, pickles, condensed potatoes, cakes and 
biscuits, and before I left Cincinnati one of the relatives even wanted 
me to take a stuffed turkey to her son, for Thanksgiving dinner, but 
I promptly drew the line and declined. Several of our men in the 
hospital, at Covington, two of them, Bunderand and McDonald, 
were convalescent and ready to go with us. I saw the ordnance 
stores which I had drawn started, and the ambulance I turned oyer to 
the two men, to meet us at Nicholsville. We had bought some sup- 
plies for our mess, as also some baggage for ourselves, as the trip 
for the ambulances by wagon road would require several days. Har- 
vey and myself had some little extra time to look after several de- 
serters that were then held by General Tilson, Commander of the 
Post, at Covington, and we called to identify them. They had been 
enlisted by Harvey, and received the usual bounty, and now wanted 
to get out of the service, as minors, by a writ of habeas corpus, 
through a Cincinnati probate judge and his democratic 
friends, that were extreme partisans and ready, for the 
sake of office, to create a collision with the National Gov- 
ernment. But the district commander, General Tilson, was not 
to be fooled with, and the deserters served out their time, not on the 


field of honor, but in the "rip-raps," at hard labor. After having 
given our depositions in the cases just named, we left by rail for 
Paris, Kentucky, and remained a whole day with our former friends 
and laid in a supply of a whole box of brandy sixes of the best Bour- 
bon whiskey. We reached Nicholsville still a day too early. The 
morning after the arrival of our ambulance, we rearranged and re- 
packed our baggage, and at the crack of the whip of our driver, be- 
hind a fine team of horses, we trotted out of the town, for Camp 
Nelson. We were by no means alone on the road, as a number of 
officers on foot and horseback, belonging to Burnside's command, 
were on their way to rejoin their commands. We timed our drive 
at about twenty miles per day, and as long as we could regularly 
feed our horses we had no trouble to cover that distance, but it 
required an immense amount of unbounded energy to overcome the 
obstacles of the now almost impassable roads, as we could scarcely 
advance faster than a walk. We formed quite a circle of acquaint- 
ances of pleasant traveling companions. They were always cheerful 
and some of them quite witty. Many amused themselves by counting, 
in a day's travel, the number of broken-down wagons, dead horses 
and mules. They made a jolly party, just such as was required on such 
a trip over a rough mountain ride. There was no regular escort and 
we risked the chance of meeting an organized force of the enemy, 
but the stream of convalescent recruits and returning officers, could 
at any time be rallied and make quite a defense against mere maraud- 

Our strong and serviceable teams were well cared for by the driv- 
ers, and our choice stock of provisions would at least last us, until 
we reached Knoxville, but only be used in the wilderness on the road, 
where we could buy no other. In this happy way we passed Camp 
Nelson, Stanford, Crab Orchard, Sommerset, LDndon, coming to 
Barbourville, a place we reached in good condition, but were called 
to a halt for several days, as no troops were permitted to proceed 
any further just then, on account of the siege of Knoxville. 

Up to that time there had not been any severe winter weather, 
but the roads were made sloppy by the bright sun overhead. We 
passed through the rich blue grass region, of beautiful rolling coun- 
try that had not been abandoned to the ravages of war, and the own- 
ers still giving attention to the tilling of the soil, and the raising of 
crops to support the family. Their horses and cattle had become 
diminished by raids of Morgan and others, but there was nothing 


dispiriting' to the view thus far unless it be the leatless landscape of 
the winter and the hard use of roads matle b}- the army trains in bad 
weather. The roads were sinipl}' execrable, and sometimes 
there was no sure footing in them for men or beast, and we 
had to cross big hills and outlying ranges of the Cumberland Moun- 
tains, and it was a long, hard pull for our ambulance team in sur- 
mounting them, while we walked by its side. On such a road, that 
the horses and mules, with frail wagons, would come to an inglori- 
ous end, was but natural. 

Part of the time we had a drizzling rain falling on us, as wc 
splashed along, until we came to some convenient halting place 
where the ambulance could rest on the high ground and let the wa- 
ter run off, or at some house on the road, where we could rest and 
sleep for the night, cooking our own meals or wrapping ourselves in 
the blankets, and resting in the ambulance, ready for a night's sleep, 
but alwa3^s with one eye open, for fear that our teams might be 
stolen, as horses were quite desirable to the many foot passengers 
we passed on the road. Part of the road was over 
bare rock, in which the steps would often be a foot or more 
each, in the road. The edges of these steps had been worn off, and 
in places the teamsters would throw rocks and branches of trees in 
the angle to even up. and then with a whoop and crack of the whip, 
the team would dash over the obstacle. In this way we zigzagged 
over the road and by perseverance at last reached Barboursville. 
One of the wags that we passed on the road between London and 
Barboursville had taken the pains to count the dead ani- 
mals, claiming that he passed one hundred and fourteen 
during the -day's travel ; this at a time when there had been no 
wagons moving for several days. It was reported that Longstreet 
had surrounded Burnside and the latter would be captured. 

At Barboursville we met a couple of regular army shirks or 
skulkers. Two 3'oung men belonging to rich families in Ohio had 
received Lieutenant commissions and were on duty with the regi- 
ment at Paris. Ky.. and became acquaintances of ours, but at the 
time when the regiment left for the field, they managed to be placed 
on detached service, and on this service we met them at Barbours- 
ville. They pitifully asked me to keep their whereabouts a secret, as 
they had no desire to go back to the field where their regiment was, 
and to m_v positive recollection they never appeared at the front 
for the remainder of nearly two years' service. 


During our detention at Bar])oursviIIc, wc were one day treated 
to a speech in a church by Parson Brownlow. I le, with others, just 
then had readied the town from tlieir exit of Knoxville. 
Wc listened to his harangue for nearly lialf an liour, in 
which he hurled a regular anathema at the rebels. In fact, he ex- 
hausted the dictionary of its meanest words, and bombarding the 
enemy that had once put him behind prison walls, but now caused 
him to sprint to the Ohio River. The suffering he and his family 
had gone through excited our sympathy, but he was now giving 
vent to his spleen of his tormentors, and if the evil one paid any at- 
tention to his exhortations, Mr. Jefferson Davis and his friends must 
have surely felt the punishment. 

After four days' rest at Barboursville, General Forster reached 
that place from Louisville, on his way with orders, to relieve General 
Burnside, of the Department and Army of the Ohio. Instructions 
were given for all the troops to push forward at once to Cum- 
berland Gap, so we had our ambulance hitched, and on the morning 
of the 28th left Barbourville, by way of the river road, to Wild 
Cat and Log Mountain, and halted at the latter place for the night, 
which was on a spur of Pine Mountain, that runs parallel with the 
Cumberland Mountains, about twenty-five miles to the northwest of 
the latter. At Wild Cat, a stream crosses the range that 
empties into the Cumberland River, as all streams in that 
section of Kentucky do. The Pine Mountain Range loomed 
up before us like a large village with a number of steep 
roofs, often seen in the northern part of Germany, only hundreds of 
feet higher, and here and there like some vast Gothic Cathedral, as 
the dome of Cologne, towering over the rest of the ridges. Our 
road, as it left the creek, ran up to the spur of the mountain, where 
we found our old stopping place, for dinner, as when on our way 
to Cincinnati. The house was kept by a thrifty widow, and as the 
weather was now crisp and cold, we decided to take advantage of a 
feather bed and let our men take care of the ambulance. Being 
tired, we slept well and were out early for breakfast and on the 
road to Cumberland Gap, but we had not gone very far before Har- 
vey and myself felt the pedicidus vestimenti and we had to begin 
skirmishing for them. The little pest, of one kind or another, had 
taken charge of the bed we slept in, and tormented us until w^e 
reached Cumberland Gap, where we had to boil our underwear and 
seek the sutler's tent for ointment to get relief. The punishment for 


the crime of sleeping during the war time in feather beds was a 
severe one, but I remembered the lesson, and never took atlvantage 
again of an indoor sleep while in the service. We made very fast 
time to get to the gap, as the road was more level, and inclined down 
hill, but muddy ; but the pcdiculu, for the first night at the gap, gave 
us no rest and kept disturbing our sweet slumbers until daylight. 

Although we had passed a number of stony hills and much 
beautiful scenery between the summits of the two ranges of the 
Cumberland and Pine IMountains. our unwelcome companions ap- 
peared to have taken charge of every part of our body, and pre- 
vented us from even looking at the sights. As we entered the 
defiles of Cumberland Gap. clouds hung so low over us that we 
could almost touch them, as smooth as silk, a sight never to be for- 
gotten, but which we could not well enjoy. After having spent a 
whole day in cleaning up. and trying to rid ourselves of our in- 
truders. I secured a mount and rode back through the 
gap to once more gaze upon the beautiful scenery between the two 
mountain ranges. As we looked to the east, a stream meandered 
down the depression, and alongside, in the Crest, ran the road we 
had come over. Far in the distance, where the ridges joined, it 
appeared as if an amphitheatre lay before us in perfect symmetry 
and curves. The ridges on the right and left, high up in the air, 
formed the walls of a grand natural coliseum, producing 
a most bewildering efi'ect, flanked on either side by stu- 
pendous clifl's, all bathed in the glorious sun shine. The 
blue stream dashed through the gorges and joined the 
river below. Till noon we wandered from one place to another to 
drink in Nature's beauty, for which people of wealth travel thou- 
sands of miles to see, and which they could, with far less exertion, 
enjoy right at home. 

\\e\ returned to our quarters for dinner, but as we came 
through the gap beheld far in the distance, sixty miles or more, 
the Smoky ^Mountains, running parallel with the Cumberland 
Range that we were now standing on. Between these ridges of 
brilliant scenery, with snoAv-clad peaks and picturesque Alpine 
beauty, dancing in the sunlight lay the great valley of East Ten- 
nessee. The whole sight seemed too grand and too beautiful to be 
real. This was the country we had come to liberate, and caused 
our hearts to pulsate faster, wondering if we would be able to do so. 

After the battle of Chickamauga, the authorities in ^^''ashing- 



ton had expected that the enemy would make just such a move- 
ment as Longstreet was now executing, and the ever-loyal Governor 
Morton of Indiana at once offered six regiments of six months' 
men to the National Government. These, with a battery or two, 
were sent under General Wilcox, to prevent any strong force from 
coming to the assistance of the Confederates, from Virginia. Dur- 
ing the time that Burnside was at Loudon, Lenoir and Campbell's 
Station, Wilcox operated towards Greenville, Bean's Station and 
Rutledge, but on the approach of Longstreet had withdrawn to 
Tazewell and finally to Cumberland Gap. He had been urged and 
ordered to go forward in the direction of Tazewell, Clinch Moun- 
tain and Maynardsville, threatening the rear of Longstreet, who 
still surrounded Burnside, but to no purpose, as long as plausible 
excuses would prevail. It was in this position and mood that we 
found him when we reached Cumberland Gap. As Harvey was 
well acquainted with his staff officers, we soon had congenial com- 
panions, but on the arrival of General Forster the latter at once set 
the column of three thousand infantry and two thousand cavalry 
in motion to Tazewell, and on the 2nd moved forward to Clinch 
River. A battery of six guns, the Twenty-first Ohio, was placed 
on the north of that river, and opposite to them the Confederates 
brought a four-gun battery of the same caliber; and the opposing 
artillery created a noise that echoed from the high battlements of 
the Cumberland Mountains, fifteen miles to our rear, until dark- 
ness put an end to the practice. The enemy tried to reach the left flank 
of Wilcox's little force, but was checked by a column of cavalry and 
some infantry, under Graham. It was plain that this movement 
of the Confederates was made to cover their retreat from Knox- 
ville, and early next morning the cavalry again crossed Clinch 
River and pushed forward to Maynardsville, the place from which 
they had retreated the day before, and found Longstreet's column 
moving in the direction of Strawberry Plains and Morristown. 
With a little more energy on the part of Wil- 
cox, he could have made his little army much more useful 
in the rear, of Longstreet, but by his own secret service and special 
examiners, who seldom told the truth, he was made to believe that 
Longstreet's column was fifty thousand strong, and that the decid- 
ing battle of the Civil War was to be fought in East Tennessee. 
His communication with Burnside, by the way of Morristown, 


could also have been kept open, as lo3^al Tennesseeans would have 
cheerfully risked their lives to have carried the messages. We 
still remained three days at Tazewell, and on the 6th moved for- 
ward to Knoxville, and about noon of the 9th reached 
that place, when, to our sorrow, we found that Lieutenant Torr had 
died on the 3nd. Harvey's grief was great and mine was no less. 
Both of us had a premonition the night before that something un- 
usual had happened during our absence. We went to his grave 
in the Episcopal churchyard, and for half an hour were as near 
as possible to our dead friend and comrade. Next day we secured 
transportation for Strawberry Plains and in due time we found 
Captain Von Sehlen and three guns of our battery and reported 
for duty. Orderly Sergeant Adam Kuntz was still at Kingston, 
where he had made a good fight, referred to in another part of 
this narrative. 

I had made the trip from Loudon to Cincinnati in four and 
a half days, but our return caused us to be on the road nearly three 
weeks. This included the delays at Barboursville and Cumberland 
Gap, and with the scenes presented to us on the road, of dead 
mules, horses and wagons, the bones and carcasses of which would 
have corduroyed the road from Cumberland Gap to Camp Nelson, 
we were glad to be with our command once more and share with 
them the most terrible winter campaign; one that the sufferings of 
Valley Forge, in the Revolutionary War, cannot be compared 
with. We passed droves of hogs and cattle for the army, but 
most of them never reached Knoxville, having died or been butch- 
ered to prevent starvation on the road. Any thinking man could 
have seen that it was absolutely impossible to supply an army in 
East Tennessee by wagons, over the mountains. To force them 
on during the fall and winter months only lined the road with dead 
carcasses, and, as the country was bare of forage, driven beef cat- 
tle were exposed to the danger of starvation, making the mountain 
route for supplies most impracticable. If the possession of East 
Tennessee was to be retained, the subsistence problem of the army 
could only be solved by direct railroad communication with Chat- 
tanooga, where a great depot of supplies for the Army of the 
Cumberland was then being established, and the possession of 
which was the result of Rosecrans' campaign against Bragg dur- 
ing the summer and autumn. The railroad could be repaired from 
Chattanooga to Knoxville and guarded by men and kept in order 


for six months at less cost than to bring provisions and supphes 
over the mountain road, in one month. In addition to the railroads, 
light steamboats could run on the upper Tennessee and Holsten 

While staying in Knoxville we noticed the bread issued to the 
garrison, a composition mostly of ground corn cobs, quite bulky, 
and with little nutriment to support life. A large drove of live cat- 
tle had been collected at Knoxville, but for the lack of forage had 
been reduced to hide and bones, and in this condition the commis- 
sary adopted the custom of driving the cattle over a little ditch in 
the field, where they were coralled, and those too weak to get over 
were butchered and issued to the troops, while the others were re- 
tained for future use. When General Sherman paid a visit to 
Burnside, the whole of the rescued garrison was set to work to 
get together a respectable meal, and succeeded so well that Sher- 
man believed after he had his fill that the troops under Burnside 
during the siege lived on the fat of the land, while in fact they 
had hunted far and wide to get a meal for our deliv- 
erers, which by the withdrawal of the enemy had become possible. 
There had been no danger of actual starvation, but it was the hun- 
ger that caused the stuff issued to be eaten at all, and when the 
siege was raised foraging parties had to go thirty miles or more 
before they could find any kind of provisions which money could 
induce the people to part with, and the suffering lasted for several 
months longer, before anything near a regular ration could be ob- 
tained from the army commissary. To the delight of General 
Longstret, the Federal army of General Sherman had cut the 
connection between Bragg and Longstreet, and the latter was 
forced, after he raised the siege of Knoxville, to take up his march 
to Northeastern Tennessee, in the direction of Rodgersville. On 
this march a division of infantry under Ransom, from Virginia, 
joined him, which gave him a force equal (since Sherman had re- 
turned with his corps to Chattanooga) to that of Burnside. Gen- 
eral Parke with the Ninth and Twenty-third Corps had followed 
the enemy on the 7th, and came up with Martin and Jones' cav- 
alry, that formed the rear guard of Longstreet's corps. The latter 
had halted at Rutledge, looking for the relief column through 
Cumberland Gap, which Grant had informed Burnside was com- 
ing, but being only a ruse, failed to appear, and as the 
country was bare of supplies, he lost no time to look for richer 


fields, at Rodgersville. He marched to Bean's Station and there 
had his cavalry cross the Holsten, and Ransom's division to cover 
the main column, on the 9th reaching Rodgersville, where he 
was able to subsist for a few days on full rations. 

Parke reached Rutledge on the 9th, and our cavalry pushed on 
to Bean's Station. Our battery, then with the Ninth Corps, was 
detached, and sent with the cavalry after the enemy, probably not 
with the object to fight, but to secure subsistence and forage. On 
the loth we had a nice little cavalry combat, and in the evening re- 
tired to our infantry support with a considerable supply of forage. 
This new move of being sent out with the cavalry created a fear 
in our mind that we were again to maneuver with mounted troops. A 
few days later the enemy's horse appeared to have been consider- 
ably re-enforced, and their activity at Bean's Station was not un- 
noticed by us. There was no other artillery except our battery 
with our mounted corps, but an infantry brigade was in close sup- 
port, holding the pass in Clinch Mountain. The valley in which 
we were, was not over two miles wide, and looked to us like a 
trap in which we could easily be surrounded and overwhelmed, for 
we received a report that a column east of the mountain was march- 
ing past us to cut us off, and another column on the east side of 
the Holsten tried to get in between us and the main 
army, but a brigade at Maysford detained the crossing 
of the enemy, and we made a hasty retreat to the rear, fighting as 
we retired. As the Confederate troops moved to co-operate in 
order to surround us, the combination failed, and instead of cap- 
turing a train and a command with full supplies, they only reached 
a few wagons with sugar and coffee, things that were evidently 
short and seldom seen among the Confederate soldiers. In addi- 
tion to the small catch of short rations, they captured twelve pris- 
oners with their mess outfit, while they were making their supper. 
We had been followed to our new position by the enemy, but as re- 
enforcements had reached us, we were able to offer resistance and, 
no longer disturbed, we kept on the road until we reached Blain's 
Cross Roads and were again returned to the infantry. 


On the 1 2th General Forster had relieved General Burnside, 
leaving to Forster an army of about twenty-six thousand men of 
all arms for the field. Longstreet's force, now an independent 


command from Bragg, was of about equal strength, but the in- 
clement weather then setting in made further operations in the 
field impossible. The roads had already become soft and impracti- 
cable for trains and artillery. The brave and patient men occa- 
sionally called for an additional ration of an ear of corn. Crackers 
and bread were out of the question, but the boys were always in a 
cheerful and merry mood. We were not lacking for wood to keep 
us warm, and it seems almost incredible that we got on as well as 
we did, enduring the great hardships that we suffered, as well as 
a shortage of clothes and shoes. The winter that had now broken 
in on us compelled us to give up the game of war and seek a place 
for shelter while the engineers with a detail of infantry were re- 
pairing the railroads and bridges, to connect us with our new base 
of supplies at Chattanooga. 

The three army corps, Ninth, Twenty-third and Fourth, were 
in bivouac mostly in woods where the improvised shelter could 
be made in the form of a leanto by setting crotched posts in 
the ground and connected with long ridge poles. Against these 
were laid other poles covered with branches of trees, on the wind- 
ward side, and laid so that the rain would be shed outward. The 
beds were made of evergreen twigs and would make a comfortable 
couch for the artillery boys. The tarpaulin was used for a roof, 
and with an unlimited amount of firewood from the near forest 
the boys kept up a camp fire that made everybody warm. In this 
way the young men hardened by the service of previous campaigns 
made themselves comfortable, but an infantryman has only to look 
out for his own comfort, while the artillerist has to provide for 
his teams. At that time another regular battery turned its horses 
over to us, and they with their guns were placed on the cars and 
returned to Knoxville, to enjoy the winter quarters. This gave 
us a surplus of teams, at least to feed, but the entire number of 
horses now with the battery would not furnish the motive power 
for a single gun and caisson. The forage for them had to be hauled 
thirty miles and fully half was consumed on the road by the teams 
that brought it in, and then only corn and no fodder could be had. 
One morning I received an order, while in our now comfortable (?) 
quarters at Blain's Cross Roads to take all the disabled horses of the 
battery to Knoxville and turn them over to the quartermaster. This 
would have taken practically every horse in the battery, for not one 
was fit for duty. I selected thirty-four of the worst cases and with 


five men started on my trip. It was then beginning to get very cold. 
Not one of the horses in my charge had a mane or tail left, it having 
been gnawed off by the near horse to appease his hunger. The dis- 
tance to be traveled was about twenty-eight miles. We reached our 
destination late in the night, but I only had twenty animals 
left, as the others we had to abandon on the road to their fate, but 
we could have held an inquest over them on our return trip. I re- 
ceived my quartermaster receipts and accounted for the lost ones as 
having given out. We rested during the night, and while hanging 

around town next morning, I met Lieutenant R , a staff officer to 

General Sturgis, who had been with us at the little affair at Bean's 

Station. R was a good fellow, younger than I, always full of 

fun, and wholesouled. 

We had several drinks of commissary whiskey, and as I had 
nothing to do he asked me to go to the paymaster with him, as he 
needed some money, his usual condition, I believe. With a dragging 
sabre and rattling Mexican spurs, we footed it over the stony pave- 
ments to the paymaster's office. The place was already so well 

known to R that we had no trouble finding it. On our arrival 

a small man that I sized up could not weigh over one hundred 
pounds, was on the pavement in front of the office casting his eyes 
to the right and left, and then up the narrow stairway, with a pair 
of Major General shoulder straps, all out of proportion to his person. 
R saluted him with a "Good morning, General. Are you look- 
ing for the paymaster? General, this is Lieutenant Fout of the 
Fifteenth Indiana Battery. Lieutenant Fout, this is General Sheri- 

To say the least, I was surprised. General Sheridan, the hero of 
Chickamauga and Missionary Ridge? Yes, this was he. I asked 
about some Indiana regiment that was in his division and he directed 
me where to find it, then darted upstairs to the paymaster. We 

followed and during the time he made his errand known, R 

asked the paymaster for a month's pay, then not due, but was re- 
fused. I was asked if I desired pay, having been paid in Cincinnati 
and still in funds. I declined, although three months were due me. 

I could hold out another month. W^e left the paymaster, and R 

was much disappointed. I believe he counted on my drawing pay, 
from which he could have made a loan, but I declined in apparent 
innocence. I believe Sheridan, the paymaster having plenty of 
funds, secured the pay for his .division on this visit. R and I 


parted and I rode over to the south side of the river to see my friends 
in the Seventy-ninth Indiana. They were just drawing overcoats 
that had reached them from Chattanooga in such a Hmited number 
as to have one coat for each company, or ten to a regiment, and 
shoes, pants, stockings, blouses, shirts and drawers were divided in 
the same proportion by a lottery drawing. After my visit I returned, 
by the way of Knoxville, to our battery at Blain's Cross Roads. It 
was said of the paymaster that during the siege of Knoxville he had 
his funds, of over a million dollars, prepared to set on fire in case 
Longstreet should have captured the town. 

When Captain Von Sehlen received orders to march with the 
corps, after Longstreet, he had an inspection of shoes, and such of 
the men as were entirely barefooted were compelled to serve as driv- 
ers with their feet wrapped in some improvised sandals. The lack of 
clothing and shoes was natural, for since we left Carflp Nelson none 
had been issued to the men and our trip over the mountain and up 
and down the vall^ covered nearly seven hundred miles, through 
Kentucky and Tennessee, and some of the boys were literally in rags, 
and not at all prepared for winter. Their shoes were worn out and 
this more than the raggedness made winter marching out of the 
question and caused straggling, and no amount of discipline could 
keep the men together. The feeding of the army had improved 
after we lest Knoxville, and the ration of fresh beef, dried on the 
hoof, as it used to be called, was more regularly issued. We also had 
for a change some fresh pork, but of coffe, sugar and salt, we had 
none and hard bread was out of the question. 

One morning I was sent to Knoxville with more worn-out 
horses, and a short distance on the road I met one of our men, 
Stevens, with a bag of meal. The poor artilleryman made all sorts 
of excuses, but the truth was he had stolen a lot of corn from the 
horses and mules, in the early part of the night, and then gone with 
a mule to a mill fifteen miles away and had the corn ground, and ex- 
pected to be in camp again before roll call, but I met him on his re- 
turn trip. I went on my way to Knoxville and said nothing about 
it, as our mess was suffering with the rest of the men. I found on my 
return our cook supplied with meal, also quite a little ration of dried 
fruit. I had bought some coffee from the commissary in Knoxville 
for our mess and generously shared the same at personal expense 
with the men of our battery. As all the mills in the Union line were 
under control of the military, the flour and meal was equally dis- 


tributed among the troops and citizens, and no corn or grain was 
taken from the latter, on account of their loyalty, unless paid for. 
This made the inhabitants freely offer their produce, such as they 
could spare, for sale, but as the whole of Forster's army had now 
concentrated at Blains Cross Roads, preparatory to offer battle to 
Long-street, should the latter advance on us, the country around us 
and in the vicinity of the army soon became exhausted, and up to 
that time we never obtained any more than a half ration of bread- 
stuff, and rather too often our appetite was appeased with a pint 
of meal, or an ear of corn, and long forage for the animals was out 
of the question. The animals were in a pitiable condition, and for 
a long time every morning our picket ropes contained a number of 
dead horses, they having died of starvation during the previous 
night; and I repeat that our sufferings were far greater than the 
Revolutionary soldiers endured at Valley • Forge ; and that these 
conditions were equally shared by our opponents, is shown by their 
official reports. The situation around us grew desperate, and short 
as the rations were, they could not be accumulated to last over two 
days ahead. God alone knew where more was to come from, and in 
Him we trusted for the final success. 

After our withdrawal from Beans Station toward Blain's Cross 
Roads, the Confederates left our front and crossed the 
Holsten River and camped along the railroad near Mor- 
ristown, between the Holsten and French Broad River, 
a beautiful section of East Tennessee to campaign in, 
provisions and forage being more plentiful, and had not yet been 
taken charge of by either party. The only drawback to the Con- 
federates here was that the inhabitants were intensely loyal to the 
Union, but at that stage of the war, if provisions were not brought 
voluntarily to either camp, they were simply appropriated and set- 
tled for afterwards. I am of the belief, with the easy way in which 
affidavits are made in this country, that many East Tennesseeans 
received pay for supplies from the National Government that had 
been furnished to Longstreet's corps, while on the Holsten and 
French road, as it often happened that Confederate foragers would 
gather corn in one corner of the field while the Federals filled their 
wagons in another corner of the same field, and no sooner had the 
Confederates discovered their new camping ground to be a field of 
clover in this bleak winter of i(S63 than our cavalry was after them, 
not to pick a fight, but to share in the good things they were enjoying 


in this land of plenty. Usually the Confederates appropriated every- 
thing in sight and left little for our side of the house to feast on. 
The want of shoes and clothing produced untold suffering in both 
armies, but could not be supplied by foragers. At one time our 
wagons were sent for corn and fodder, and they had to go nearly 
thirty miles for a load. We sent along a trustee to buy us a fowl or 
two for our mess, but on his return he brought but two chickens,, for 
which he had paid a dollar apiece. We soon learned that a porker had 
come in the way of the foragers. They had butchered and brought 
him to camp. This gave us a change of meat, and with the dried 
fruit, condensed potatoes, pickles and a few sweet potatoes, we 
made, with our high-priced fowls, a fairly good Christmas dinner, 
helped out by a fresh supply of coffee and sugar that I had brought 
from Knoxville. It was quite true that East Tennessee was full of 
provender, enough to have sustained Burnside's army and kept it 
from want, but the large Confederate army prevented the loyal peo- 
ple from bringing it forward, and the territory immediately sur- 
rounding any army corps was soon eaten bare. 

General Sheridan, always self-dependent and an able pro- 
vider for his troops, had moved his division to the French Broad 
River, in Servier County, between the Big and Little Pigeon Rivers, 
and for a time his division fared much better than any of the rest 
of the troops, and as he accumulated a surplus, he sent the same by 
boat to Knoxville, aided by the loyal people of that section, to do 
everything in their power for the Union cause, and Sheridan says 
that so long as his division was on the French Broad, they lived 
off of the fat of the land, but he, too, received orders to march to 
Strawberry Plains, and had to leave about 600 of his division in 
Knoxville, that were without shoes and could go no further. It 
was here that I found them dividing the ten overcoats to a regiment. 
He had, however, managed to get some supplies through, guarded 
by the Second Missouri Infantry, under Colonel Laibold, and aided 
by a number of convalescents. Later they had quite a fight at 
Charleston, on the Hiwasa, to drive off a brigade of Wheeler's and 
Martin's Confederate cavalry that cared not for a fight, but much 
for the shoes and supplies in Laibold's charge. 

When the shoes reached Knoxville, General Forster simply is- 
sued an order to prorate them among all the troops, and Sheridan's 
Division received no more than the rest of the army; but Sheridan 
was not discouraged. He brought forward a fresh supply. This 


time his quartermaster wisely covered the loads with fodder, and 
in this way prevented inspection at Knoxville, and reached his bare- 
footed troopers at Strawberry Plains. In our leanto quarters we 
were snugly fixed as long as the wind came from the right direction, 
but were most uncomfortable when the smoke was driven right to- 
wards us. There were many of the battery boys who cut their 
blankets into the shape of pantaloons, tied like petticoats about their 
waists. Emmer Matlock of our battery appeared to have set this 
fashion. But the men were always cheerful, remarking that this 
was hard, and was what they had enlisted for, and wanted to see it 
through. In the evening, when there was nothing else for them to 
do except stretch their feet to the bright camp fire each detachment 
would sing a song. 

The first squad, with Sergeant Hook, usually led off with some- 
think like: '.'O, give me a home, when I am away from my own, 
where friendship and truth and hospitality are known." Next to 
Hook was Corporal Lochmueller, with "Don't you be alarmed, 
Uncle Sam is rich enough to give us all a farm." Herman Oehler 
would come in with "In Lauterbach hab Ich mein strumpf verloren, 
und ohne strumpf geh Icli nicht heim," etc. Sergeant Hartner had 
his thought on his "Mine pwn love, Maggie, dear," etc., and "I 
thought I saw Susanna coming down the hill." Then the German 
section would get together and sing Luther's hymn in most im- 
pressive tones, "Eine feste Burg ist unser Gott; eine gute Wehr 
tmed Waff en. Er hilft uns auch aus dieser noth, die uns jetzt had be- 
troffen." Very appropriate, indeed; and at other times, "Morgen- 
roth, Morgenroth," mixed with "Du hast mich wie ein Bruder be- 
schuetzet da wo die kanonen geblitzet, wir beide haben me nicht 
gebebt." These German songs echoed through the snow-clad hills, 
and many times our comrades from the infantry would be our audi- 
ence and help drive care away. 

As we were thus getting comfortably fixed, some of the more 
pessimistic of our boys claimed, that in preparing our huts we would 
only be inviting marching orders, and sure enough, on the 28th, our 
boys were ordered to break camp and move closer to Strawberry 
Plains, and on the same day, in rain and mud, we reached the new 
quarters before night. As the cavalry had been quartered here, they 
left it in a condition that neither the artillery, nor the infantry, could 
find a suitable place to camp on. We found, however, a place on 
the side of the hills, covered with some forests, that would make 


a clean and well-drained camp, and as we now had bright weather 
for about two days, we became well and comfortably fixed again, 
and the camp fires of great logs, with the moon and stars shining 
made life again worth living for. During the latter part of 
General Burnside's administration. General Sturges, a former di- 
vision commander of the Ninth Corps, had been ordered to report 
to Burnside for duty, but Burnside gave him no command; so when 
Forster relieved Burnside, Sturges was placed in command of the 
mounted forces, under Forster, and Shackleford, the former cav- 
alry chief of the Department of the Ohio, was relieved, Sturges 
not having seen any active service, since the battle of Fredericks- 
burg, wanted to show his energy with the mounted troops in mid- 
winter, and in the latter days of December started his operation 
against the Confederate trooper Martin. Another column was sent 
from Cumberland Gap to work around the Confederate right and 
rear, but the Confederates under Jones were not idle. They crossed 
the Clinch River and came in rear of the right of the Federal col- 
umn, and on the 3rd of January, a very cold day, surprised and cap- 
tured three hundred prisoners, twenty-seven wagons and three 
pieces of artillery. Sturges' part in this cavalry movement was a 
reconnoissance of the country between the French Board and Hol- 
sten Rivers, towards Dandridge, and Morristown, under command 
of Colonel Forster and General Elliott. Forster found 'no enemy, 
but Elliott, with Mott's brigade of infantry, advanced beyond Mosey 
Creek and met the Confederates, who had the same object in view, to 
attack the Federals. The infantry under Sturges (Mott's brigade) 
were placed in position near the railroad bridge on Mosey Creek. 
The advance cavalry retreated to our position and halted to receive 
the enemy's attack. While the battery was in action. Captain Von 
Sehlen introduced me to General Sturges, who was the same officer 
that had been with us, in command of the regular battery, at Phillip! 
in 1 86 1. The Confederate horse made a bold attack, but as our cav- 
alry withdrew to the right and left like a curtain, and revealed Mott's 
infantry, we, with our guns and the other artillery, had a point-blank 
range at the enemy, and repulsed them. In addition our dismounted 
troopers, on the flanks^ did good execution. The Confederate horse- 
men brought up their artillery, but in that branch of the service the 
Federals were always superior, and after keeping up a useless can- 
nonade between us on that short day, darkness intervened. The 
enemy retreated, but we did not push pursuit, for the object of 


Sturges to make a fight of his own was accompHshed. The Union 
loss was seventeen killed and eighty-seven wounded. The Confed- 
erate loss has never been recorded. For a long time our line at Mosey 
Creek was not disturbed. 

The winter campaign and the severe service of the last three 
months, had so shattered the nerves of Captain Von Sehlen, that he 
was attacked by a malignant fever, which compelled him to leave the 
battery and go to Knoxville for treatment. He was taken to the 
Jiome of Colonel Baxter, and there suffered for nearly a month with 
the typhoid fever. 

At the time Von Sehlen left us a large number of the organi- 
zations, in the three corps veteranized some of our men that had 
joined the battery with me. Schlarb and Lochmueller, and to the 
number of about seventy, had become entitled to the government of- 
fer, and under proper management would have accepted further 
service, but Lieutenant Harvey, always ready for intrigue, had his 
man Rose made up a re-enlistment paper, which at once revealed 
that in the veteran organization Von Sehlen, Kuntz and myself 
were to be left out. If either of the two conspirators had known 
anything about military affairs they would have known that my 
new commission as first lieutenant, which had just been issued, read 
for three years, or during the war. Kuntz's read the same, and 
both of us had fully three years to serve, unless the war was over 
before that time. When the men were approached by Rose to sign 
the re-enlistment papers, and saw that Captain Von Sehlen was not 
to be in it, they flatly refused. I gave the matter no attention, for I 
thought that during the coming campaign the war would end, and we 
would all be sent home before many of the terms of service would 
have expired. But it was very satisfactory to Kuntz and myself 
that Harvey's and Rose's conspiracy had failed. 





The change in the weather had already set in during the last few 
days in December, but on New Year's Eve the thermometer ap- 
proached zero and remained there for about two weeks. The change 
occurred with a strong wind, rain and sleet, and created a lively time 
in all the camps. Lieutenant Harvey, a few days previous, had secured 
a burly colored man from North Carolina, in addition to his negro 
boy, to give him personal attention. After an all-day's rain the ground 
was water soaked, and Harvey's negroes had just made themselves 
comfortable behind his tent, for a night's rest, when a gale from the 
northwest, better known as a norther, began to rattle the canvass, and 
at once drew the tent from its fastenings. Harvey held on one 
corner of the tent and expected his servants to hold down the other 
part, but they both fled behind the big tree near by, and the Lieu- 
tenant's call was not answered. 

The next morning he discharged both of them, and in this way 
was relieved of two who helped him only to consume his scanty ra- 
tions. During the gale Lieutenant Kuntz and myself were in a bet- 
ter condition, holding our tent down, with the help of some of the 
comrades, until the storm was over. We, at least, could stay during 
the rest of the night under some protection, but as we had no tent 
flies, the water began dripping through. But the roaring wind had 
now started in, the tents were soon frozen stiff. The fierce storm 
during the night had blown the smoke and cinders in the eyes of the 
men, who were unable to sleep on account of exposure and cold. At 
daylight the wind was still blowing, with a clear sky, with the ther- 
mometer below zero. 


The exposure during the clay was hard to bear, but in the wet 
and chill of night, when the camp fires had gone low, the men would 
shiver and their teeth chatter, fearing the danger of going to sleep 
that knows no waking. There was also great danger for them to be 
suffocated by the smoke, which caused them to jump from one side 
of the fire to the other. The heroes at heart were in a pitiable con- 
dition as to clothing, many with only drawers on their legs, with 
pantaloons utterly worn out; others with no coats, and tattered 
blankets drawn around them, sitting Indian fashion, on their 
haunches, around the fire. Yet in this, their misery, there was no 
great complaint. One of the gun Sergeants dryly remarked : "The 
rebels will have to take this the same as we do." And as the lack of 
soap had begrimed the faces of the men, they would readily be taken 
by our enemy for African descendants, and in this condition they 
greeted each other with a happy New Year. The Government had 
promised those that had entered the service in 1861 a furlough and 
a veteran bounty if they enlisted for another term of three years. 

The suffering and cold weather had no effect on the patriotism 
of the men, and all those who were entitled to the benefits in our 
corps took advantage of the offer, and many organizations re-enlisted 
to a man. We had exhausted the horses of three regular batteries in 
our corps, and now had turned over to us Buckley's Rhode Island. 
Volunteer Battery, with guns, harness and horses. Lieutenant Har- 
vey, as Von Sehlen was now sick at Knoxyille, receipted for the 
whole outfit, and then turned the guns and harness over to me to 
take them to Knoxville by the cars now running over the improvised 
bridge at Strawberry Plains. We soon had the guns aboard, and 
with several men proceeded to Knoxville. Part of the train was 
used for the wounded, and the shrieking and crying of some of these 
in the bitter cold was heart-rending. All joined in bewailing their 
fate in this terrible cold weather. One boy, scarcely 16 years old, 
cried piteously the whole distance for his mother in Indiana, he hav- 
ing lost a leg. Another had his hand shot off, and all were wounded, 
to the number of about forty. When I reached Knoxville I turned 
my ordnance stores over to the Ordnance Department, but several 
things were short. The obliging ordnance officer promptly prepared 
the papers for the shortage, and I signed them "lost in action." This 
squared my account, which was true. During this visit to Knoxville 
I called on Captain Von Sehlen, who was sick at the house of Judge 
Baxter. Being invited to dinner, I accepted, and for the first time 
had a good square meal in East Tennessee. 


Why the Rhode Island boys did not take their own guns and 
harness to Knoxville has never been explained to me. They passed 
that way, on their route, on veteran leave. As my duty was 
performed in Knoxville, and the weather had become more regular, 
though very cold, with the blizzard over, we returned to our com- 
rades in camp between Blain's Cross Roads and Strawberry Plains. 
While in Knoxville, with the Rhode Island guns. General Grant, had 
just reached there on a tour of inspection. As soon as the weather 
had moderated a little he and General Forster paid a visit to the 
troops in the field. He saw at once that campaigning in such weather 
was out of the question. At the end of his visit the general officers 
gathered around him at General Parke's headquarters, expecting a 
discussion of the campaign, but they were disappointed, as he said 
but little, and smoked a great deal, and what information he had 
gathered he kept to himself and permitted no one to draw him out. 

As his officers at this time were mostly West Point graduates, 
their college life furnished the small talk of the occasion, with fre- 
quent reference to their old friends that were now on the other side. 
They seemed to enjoy the reminiscence, and Grant himself would 
laugh and be amused over the story he had just told; but behind this 
was the unbending will, the restless energy and activity to master 
the details of his great command. 

Such was the character of the man that soon was to lead the 
greatest armies ever assembled and bring the Union cause to final 
success, an achievement no one would have thought possible, had 
they seen him around the camp fires near Blain's Cross Roads dur- 
ing those bitter cold days of January in 1864. His quick observa- 
tion had shown him that clothing and subsistence were vital to our 
existence. He had come to us by the way of Loudon and along the 
railroad to examine the road for our supplies, and returned by the 
way of Cumberland Gap, unmindful of personal comfort, but all 
devotion to duty. He left us on that bitter cold day, January 4, to 
further investigate the possibility of sending us relief by that route. 

The lack of clothing and shoes in the Confederate army was as 
great as our own, and the extremely cold weather had been a relief' 
to both, as no movement of the troops under such conditions was 
possible, and forage was getting scarcer every day in every part of 
East Tennessee. A part of the Confederate horsemen had been re- 
turned to their army in Northern Georgia, to which they belonged, 
but the representatives of the loyal East Tennesseeans that had fled 


to the north just before the siege of Knoxville kept on bombarding 
the autliorities at W^ashington and pleading that something be done 
for the relief of the loyal Tennesseeans, in Upper East Tennessee, 
and that Longstreet be driven out of the State. This in turn was 
transmitted by the War Department, and General Halleck to the 
department commander in East Tennessee, and then the same com- 
plaint repeated to General Grant. When the latter came to Knoxville 
on January i to see for himself that it was not Forster's fault that 
no campaign was being made, with men in such condition, for the 
state of destitution of the army as to clothing and shoes was appall- 
ing, many not even having rags left to cover their nakedness. Gen- 
eral Grant noticed all this as soon as he reached our camps. 

To see whetlier relief could not be had by wagon route, over the 
mountain, caused General Grant to make the horseback ride to Cum- 
berland Gap when the thermometer was at zero, and then settle the i 
question of supplies, witliout delay, which was only possible by wa)^ 
of Chattanoos^a^ and so to reduce the demand at Chattanooga, part 
of the troops of the Anny of the Tennessee were sent on to Alabama. 
The same consideration caused Sherman to make his expedition 
to IMeridian, and a large force was put to work to repair the railroad 
bridges and to construct a few steamboats for the river from Chatta- 
nooga to Knoxville. At Knoxville Forster had stated to Grant that 
there could be no tliought of a forward movement until spring, and 
tlie only movement he contemplated was to bring the troops in posi- 
tion, w'here they could collect forage and bread stuff, and send all 
tlie unnecessar}' animals to Kentucky. After General Grant had 
gone over tlie ground and examined tlie situation for himself, he 
concurred in Forster's statement, and so notified the authorities at 
Washington. As General Forster had met with an accident b}- the 
fall of his horse, which had complicated the wound received in ]\Iex- 
ico. he had asked to be relieved, as he was now totally unfit for 
further field ser\'ice. He therefore remained at Knoxville, and Gen- 
eral Parke was in command of the forces in tlie field. 

As food for men and beast was eaten out nortli of tlie Holsten, 
witli tlie weatlier intensely cold and animals dying daily, something 
had to be done to get to where corn and forage could be had, which 
was reported to be still south and east of the French Broad River, 
and where Longstreet was enjoTidng tlie supplies all b}?- himself, as the 
railroad bridge at Strawberry Plains was complete, and a strong 
garrison could protect it. It was also believed that since a part of 


Longstreet's cavalry had left him, he would not disturb a movement 
made by us, and as trusty information had reached us that at Sevier- 
ville we would find plenty, a day's march was made to Dandridge, to 
our right, there to cross the French Broad and camp in the region 
that would furnish supplies. As very few batteries were still in the 
field, and ours being one of them, we had to march with the ad- 
vance, although the Ninth Corps Infantry, to which we belonged, 
remained in camp near Bean's Station and Strawberry Plains. 

On the 1 6th we reached the neighborhood of the crossing and 
were placed in position. Sturges, who was with his cavalry at 
Mossy Creek, came up across the country, and, anxious to get at the 
enemy, invited Sheridan, who was present and leading the move- 
ment, to go out with him to see him whip the enemy. The total 
Federal column that was present was about 10,000 men, not includ- 
ing the Ninth and part of the Fourth Corps still at Blain's Cross 
Roads and Strawberry Plains. In this bare-footed condition the 
whole army marched, and as the roads were rough for travel, it was 
a not uncommon sight to see bloody tracks, caused by the bruised 
and wounded feet of the marching soldiers. On reaching the vicinity 
of Dandridge, our battery, then only one of the few that were still 
able to march Avith the troops in the field, was placed in line of the 
Twenty-third Corps, on the side of the road towards Morristown. 
The cavalry that had come across the country from Mossy Creek was 
in our advance, and, picketing the road to the northeast of us on a 
mountain range that formed the water shed between the Holsten 
and French Broad, and it was expected that Sturges would guard 
the flanks of our left and gather such forage as would come within 
his reach, and also endanger the right of Longstreet's forces. 

At Dandridge the mounted troops, under Sturges, received sev- 
eral wagon loads of clothing and shoes, that were issued to them on 
the 15th. The same day the infantry were all up and placed in posi- 
tion by Sheridan, then the senior officer present. In the afternoon of 
the 1 6th Sturges moved out and about five miles from town met the 
enemy's troopers under Martin on the Morristown and Bull's Gap 
road. They had quite a sharp engagement, both holding their ground 
without any infantry being engaged. Just then the enemy's col- 
umn appearing on the left of Sturges caused him to seek a new posi- 
tion, at the rear, and taking a large part of his command, made a 
detour to the right and rear of Martin; but ill luck was with him. 
Instead of reaching the rear of Martin, he came upon the enemy's 


infantry, then marching to his rehef. The surprise to Sturges was 
complete, and he sent a courier to Sheridan, advising him that he 
was being driven back by the enemy's infantry. This was far from 
whipping the enemy, as he had proposed in the morning, when he 
invited Sheridan to see him do it. ' 

Sheridan promptly sent an infantry column to relieve him from 
his desperate position. As the enemy was present in heavy force, it 
was thought that a general engagement was to be fought right there 
with the advantage on the side of the Confederates. As Forster had 
permitted many of his veterans to go home on a re-enlistment, our 
army was small and in no condition to make a fight. Sheridan 
promptly sent for the proper commanders, Parke and Granger, but 
at the time of their arrival the enemy had withdrawn, and it ap- 
peared that the Confederates had only made the forward movement 
to learn the object of the Federals, in changing quarters during the 
winter months. Sturges' plan to whip the enemy's cavalry was all 
right, provided the enemy's infantry had not moved, but as Martin, 
the leader of the Confederate horse, was anxious to make a record 
without Wheeler, the former kept a sharp lookout on the Federal 
cavalry and their movements. Longstreet, too, wanted to rise, if not 
in rank, at least in reputation, as a department commander, and was 
therefore very vigilant in watching all the Federal movements. 
Sturges, who had been under a cloud since Fredericksburg, wanted 
to lift the veil ; hence he, too, was active. 

After Sheridan's retreat the enemy came into Dandridge and 
the women that had cared for Granger during his stay there now 
invited Longstreet and his staff to the drinks that were still in the 
bottles on the table in her house, of which Sturges had made several 
toddies for his own benefit. At the consultation of the general of- 
ficers at Granger's headquarters it had been decided to move to the 
rear, after the cavalry had passed to the right, by way of New Mar- 
ket. The infantry division under Sheridan should lead the march 
and then the wagon train and artillery. These were to be followed 
by the Twenty-third Army Corps, with Willich's division of the 
Fourth Corps bringing up the rear. We, with our battery, filed into 
the road about lo p. m., and after laboring all night, sometimes with 
twenty-four horses to the gun or caisson and a company of infantry 
to push and pull, we found ourselves about three miles ahead on the 
road to Blaine's Cross Road^. As the weather that day had been 
very mild, the roads had become sloppy, aided by a rain in the even- 


ing. This made the surface slippery and the road was cut in deep 
ruts. To make any progress with half-starved teams on the high ridge 
ahead of us seemed to be impossible, and the help that the infantry- 
men gave us by pushing and lifting became monotonous enough 
to them. They would leave the guns and gather around a little 
camp lire, built in a fence corner, and soon be fast asleep, while 
the rain was falling in their faces, suddenly to be aroused by the 
commander shouting "Fall in!" then march a short distance, only 
to find the road blocked again, and the fence corner camp fires that 
had been vacated by others now would be taken charge of by them. 
In this way the terrible night at last passed, and at 6 in the morn- 
ing we found that Willich's division had just left the town. As 
the night wore on the fear of an attack by the enemy increased. 
The surrounding hills would give cover for such a movement, but 
it was not until late in the afternoon of the next day that the enemy 
reached our rear guard and for several miles kept up a slight skir- 
mish. During the day the weather changed to snowing. Through 
this the troops toiled on, helping the cannon and wagons over bad 
places, and with several miles still to make, we halted in bivouac 
for the night. The weather was increasing in coldness and snow- 
ing, and instead of our journey proving but of a night's march we 
were on the road nearly thirty hours, with only coffee, fried pork 
and crackers as a luxury to sustain us, and had to sleep on top of 
the few rails available to keep above the mud and snow. 

The next day we passed Strawberry Plains and continued on 
our march to Knoxville. The Fourth Corps had already preceded 
us, and on the evening of the 20th, just before dark, we reached 
the place. On the 21st we marched up to College Hill and were 
quartered in a wing of the college building. We turned our horses 
over to the quartermaster, and as it was then rumored that Long- 
street had been largely re-enforced, and as our troops were with- 
drawn from Strawberry Plains, we expected a renewal of the siege 
of Knoxville, and, as our breastworks on College Hill were then in 
an uncompleted condition, a daily detail was made to finish the de- 

The troops of the Fourth Corps had passed through Knoxville 
over to the south side. The cavalry marched over the same route to 
reach Sevierville, in Sevier County, a country that afforded plenty 
of supplies for both horse and man. Colonel Thomas H. Henderson 
was then in command of this mounted brigade, consisting of his own 


regiment, the One Hundred and Twelfth, Eighth Michigan Cav- 
ahy and the Forty-fifth Ohio Mounted Infantry. 

The total force that had been at Strawberry Plains was now 
withdrawn to Knoxvdle, and the bridge there destroyed and the 
enemy's mounted force kept close on the track of General Parke's 
receding column. 

As General Grant had personally seen the impossibility of 
supplying a large army in East Tennessee, he had instructed Forster 
that if he was overwhelmed by a large force of the enemy, from 
Virginia, which was reported to be on the way to re-enforce Long- 
street, the Union commander should slowly retire along the rail- 
road to Chattanooga and join Thomas. At the same time the 
Washington authorities, through Halleck, sent Thomas orders at 
Chattanooga to re-enforce Forster with 10,000 men, and that Cum- 
berland Gap must be held, as they were in possession of information 
that Ewell had re-enforced the Confederates in East Tennessee. 
But there was no truth in the report, and the movements of Long- 
street had only been for the purpose as already stated. 

Forster reported the improved condition of the defenses of 
Knoxville to General Grant, adding that there would be no neces- 
sity to retire further, unless it were so ordered, and Halleck was ad- 
vised that there would probably be another siege of Knoxville. The 
Washington authorities knew little of Plast Tennessee affairs ex- 
cept the loyal wailing that continually came to theij: ears, from 
refugees, for relief. The Cumberland Gap line of supply was always 
in danger when the enemy was at Strawberry Plains. The troops 
at the front, in the field, soon learned that no re-enforcement had 
reached Longstreet, and the latter had retired to Morristown with 
no intention of again disturbing Knoxville, and the whole of the 
little army under Forster had now taken a defensive position around 
the town, remaining in that position for nearly three months, 
caused by the necessity for forage and clothing. The Confeder- 
ates had been more active and followed our troops to within five miles 
of Knoxville. General Cox was sent out by General Forster to 
take charge, and soon learned that nothing but cavalry was in his 
front, and at once stopped the retreating column under Wilcox, 
driving back the enemy's advance guard and checking their main 

Our troops were placed in line of battle and rested for the 
night, ready for an advance in the morning. At the early dawn of 


day our forces were advanced, but found no enemy. They had left 
during the night. They were followed for about eight miles, by a 
detachment, but conclusive proof showed that they had withdrawn 
and only their cavalry had come across the Holsten. As soon as 
the movement of the enemy was thoroughly understood. General 
Forster assigned the troops under him to winter quarters. He or- 
dered the Fourth Corps to go into camp from Kingston to Loudon, 
near where they could easily rejoin the Army of the Cumberland. 
The Ninth Corps, from Lenoir to Knoxville, and the Twenty-third 
corps around Knoxville. The cavalry was on the French Broad, in 
Sevier County, and for the first time after siege, lived in clover. 

Longstreet, hearing of the presence of Sturges' troopers, and 
the good things they were now enjoying near Fair Garden, sent 
his cavalry, under Martin, across the river (French Broad) to en- 
gage Sturges at once. McCook's division was leading, supported 
by Gerrard on Pigeon River, and Wolford on the Fair Garden and 
Sevierville road. The Confederates, under Martin, moved for- 
ward on McCook, but were surprised to find McCook on the same 
hunt for them. The result was that Martin, in charge of the Con- 
federate right division, was routed by Colonel LaGrange of the 
First Wisconsin, then commanding the brigade. Two regimental 
commanders, seven officers and over a hundred privates, a battle 
flag and two pieces of artillery were captured by the charge. The 
Fourth Indiana Cavalry covered themselves with glory on the field, 
but lost their Lieutenant Colonel Leslie, while leading a sabre 
charge. The Confederate guns captured were commanded by 
Lieutenant Blake, a native of Putnam County, 111., his father at 
one time having been a surveyor of that county. He had gone 
South before the war, and had enlisted as a private, believing, like 
many others, that the war would not amount to much. Public opin- 
ion, he claimed had compelled him to join that side of the cause. 
He was mortally wounded by a sabre thrust, and when brought into 
our line was recognized by some of the One Hundred and Twelfth 
Illinois who had known him before the war. He had preferred to 
die at his post before he would permit himself to be captured and 
recognized as a Northern man. The wound proved fatal, and at 
sunrise next day he was dead. The Federal losses in the affair 
were small, and as Sturges had gained a victory he could afford to 
drink a toddy to the health of Longstreet and Martin, as the latter 
had done at Dandridge to him. Longstreet was so chagrined by 


Martin's defeat, that he then asked to have a more competent cav- 
nh-y commander assigned to his department. 

The Federal horse fohowed Martin to Dandridge, but 'were 
there met by a Confederate force under Alexander, assisted by a 
division of infantry. Sturges now retreated, and, as if by common 
consent, both parties rested for the. winter. As we were now en- 
joying comfortable quarters in one of the buildings of the East 
Tennessee University, and no other duty except to finish the stockade 
and a line of intrenchments to connect with Fort Saunders, we were 
called on to furnish an officer for a Board of Survey to examine 
and condemn such commissary stores as were unfit to be issued to 
thd troops. I was detailed for this service. The result was that 
a large amount of mouldy crackers that had been sent us by boat 
were condemned- but the other goods, sugar, coffee, vinegar and 
beans, proved to be all right. Through with this part of my service, 
I was placed in charge of the working gang in the fort, and know-* 
ing the difference betv/een a straight line and a curve, also an obtuse 
from an acute angle, I was soon recommended to a position on 
General Tilson's staff, probably because we gave our side of the 
breastworks a little nicer finish than the other batteries. 

Our duties were easy, but not satisfactory to either men or 
officers. As the morning fatigue duty, working on the defenses 
and the afternoon drill, at the guns, became monotonous, we there- 
fore longed to be remounted again, so that if we could show the 
citizens of Knoxville our crack battery maneuver, for which the 
college campus, just south of the University buildings, would have 
been an ideal place to exercise in. But it was not to be, and the 
same routine of labor and drill at the guns were our daily life. 
Among the prominent citizens then living in Knoxville, with strong 
Union sentiment, was Colonel Baxter, at whose house our Lieuten- 
ant Torr died and our Captain Von Sehlen was cared for during 
his illness: also Rev. Dr. Hume, the president of the East Tennes- 
see University and rector of the Episcopal Church, a place where 
we often attended, and Parson Brownlow; also Horace Maynard 
Fleming and Temple. Around these gathered the lesser lights of 
Union people, who had suffered so much for the cause of the Na- 
tional Government. The Secessionists were in the minority, but as 
they were mostly slave owners they claimed an influence, by reason 
of wealth and social standing, and pretended to be the upper class, 
as elsewhere in the South, but not true also at Knoxville. 






The month of February began with more settled weather, with 
frost at night, and sometimes snow. But there were many bright 
days, just such weather as would invigorate the body. 

From our high position at College Hill we could view the great 
smoky mountain covered with snow, with the roads still impas- 
sable when thawed. We could, however, have kept the field if for- 
age and supplies had not been lacking; but nothing could be done 
until the railroad bridges connecting us with Chattanooga and 
Nashivlle had been completed. 

As General Forster had urged the Government to relieve him, 
it was not probable that any movement would be made until his suc- 
cessor was appointed, and who this was to be no one then knew, 
Rosecrans had been well thought of and supported by friends in 

President Lincoln was a great friend of Burnside, and in- 
tended to give him the Ninth Corps, then in East Tennessee, and a 
separate command somewhere. The Fourth Corps, then under 
Sheridan, was to be returned to the Army of the Cumberland. This 
would reduce the troops then in East Tennessee to a cavalry outpost 
and the infantry for post and garrison duty, provided Longstreet's 
army would retire into Virginia, which was already rumored; and 
the same rumors connected us with a forward movement under 
Sherman into Northern Georgia. 

The general officers then available to relieve Forster were Scho- 
field, Smith, McPherson and Sheridan. As Grant was to be pro- 


moted to Lieutenant General, and by his rank in command of all 
the armies, he was able to make assignments of his own selection, 
and knowing of the merits of Schofield, the latter was ordered to re- 
lieve Forster, in command of the Department of the Ohio. Mc- 
Pherson was to command the Army of the Tennessee, as soon as 
Sherman was placed in charge of the Military Division of the Mis- 
sissippi. Rosecrans was sent to Missouri, W. T. Smith and Sheri- 
dan were to have high commands in the Eastern Army, under 
Grant, and the changes in the corps and division commanders were 
made as soon as time would permit, and before Grant left the 
Western armies. The latter was well organized to enter the cam- 
paign in Northern Georgia against Joe Johnston. 

The campaign of 1863 had been so active that many of the 
officers of leading regiments, brigades, divisions and corps were 
entitled to higher rank and promotion. But the politicians had 
been able to keep the maximum number of general of- 
ficers always full, and, if, perchance, a vacancy occurred, the political 
pressure would soon fill it. The regular army had a powerful friend 
in General Halleck, and he made every effort to head off the poli- 
ticians, and a system was already being organized in the winter of 
1863, by him, to retire all officers that had not been in active service 
for three months. This would reach the big and little, and was a 
reform in the right direction that would reach from top to bottom, 
and thereafter promotions were to be made on merit alone. But 
to form a plan for reform was one thing and to carry it out another. 
Grant and Sherman were just the men to carry the reform into 
effect, caring little for the political consideration that had so often 
controlled the actions of the President. 

With the order for Schofield to assume the command of the 
Department of the Ohio, Major General George Stoneman was sent 
to report to General Grant for duty from the East. Stoneman had 
been unfortunate in the battle of Chancellorsville, not by his own 
fault, but merely through General Hooker, who had sent him off on 
a cavalry raid during that battle, which had miscarried, and as he 
was then without command, he was sent to Grant at Nashville. 
Stoneman was expected to command the cavalry of the Western 
Army, but Grant had placed General Soo Smith in charge, and as 
General J. D. Cox was only Provisional Commander of the Twenty- 
third Corps, Stoneman was placed in nomination for it, but the ap- 
pointment appeared to be only for a short time. 


Among the Major Generals who had failed to be confirmed by 
the Senate in 1863 were J. D. Cox and John M. Schofield. Cox, in 
i860, while in the Ohio Legislature, had failed to vote for John 
Sherman for Senator, and cast his lot with Chase, Sherman's op- 
ponent. Schofield had in many ways incurred the ill will of the 
Radicals of the Jim Lane and General Blunt stripe in Missouri, who 
made their power felt against Schofield in the Senate, when the 
latter was to be confirmed; but by the same Senate General Mil- 
roy and many more of his kind were confirmed and made Major 

General Cox having been relieved of the command of the 
Twenty-third Corps, now made appHcation to General Grant at 
Nashville for active service in the Army of the Cumberland. As 
Sheridan was to be sent to the East, Cox desired the command of 
Sheridan's old division, which was supported by the former's 
friends in the Fourth Corps; but Major General Newton, a West 
Point graduate, received the appointment in Sheridan's place. 

Stoneman and Schofield reached Knoxville about February 7, 
and promptly assumed their new commands, and General Forster 
bade us farewell, carrying with him the sympathy for his wounds 
and respect of all who knew him. 

Personally Stoneman was tall, wore a full beard, had wide- 
open eyes, and continually looked sad, which indicated an irritable 
temper. In the regular establishment of the army he held the rank 
of Major in the Fourth United States Cavalry. 

General Grant had not been favorably impressed with Stone-, and in the event of Schofield' s second failure to be con- 
firmed as Major General, Stoneman, by his rank, would have be- 
come Department Commander, to succeed Schofield. In the latter 
part of March, General Sturgis was sent to Memphis to command 
the cavalry and Stoneman was placed in charge of the Cavalry 
Corps of the Army of the Ohio, and thus placed out of line of pro- 
motion as a Department Commander. Stoneman's merit was never 
fully appreciated by the authorities and General Grant, but the im- 
pression made in the Chancellorsville campaign had created dis- 

The chronic changes in the Army of the Ohio came to an end 
when General Schofield arrived, and with him we served until the 
close of the war. His personal appearance was that of a well-built 
man, of medium height, and bald head, with full beard. His tastes 


were strictly scientific, as he had been an instructor of astronomy 
at West Point, and one of the youngest Generals in the army. In 
the regular establishment of our army he held the rank of Captain 
of a field battery. As he was not in accord with the radicals of 
Missouri, they obstructed his confirmation in the Senate as a Major 
General, and it was a great relief to him when ordered to duty else- 

Although Schofield had failed of confirmation. President Lin- 
coln promptly reappointed him, and the new assignment of purely 
military service in the field seems to have been very satisfactory to 
the General. On his arrival at Knoxville on the 8th of February 
he found the troops then about the town consisting of the Ninth 
Corps, 2,800 strong, and two divisions of the Twenty-third Corps> 
numbering only 3,000 men fit for duty, these having lived the en- 
tire time in East Tennessee on half rations and not half clad. There 
were in addition to the above about 1,000 cavalry and two divisions 
of the Fourth Corps. The latter belonged to the Army of the 
Cumberland; also a large number of wounded and sick. Of the 
latter, many on account of lack of food and clothing. The few 
horses and mules remaining alive were skeletons. Of the 30,000 
animals with which Burnside crossed the mountains, only 1,000 
rem.ained serviceable, and the army of 25,000 men that had entered 
East Tennessee had only 7,000 now fit for field service. 

Such was the condition of the Army of the Ohio when 
Schofield took charge. At the time the railroad to Chattanooga 
and Nashville was opened, and the starving and naked troops were 
looking for better supplies of food and clothing. The first train 
was eagerly waited for, and on its arrival everybody was joyful. 
But to the surprise of all, the train was loaded with horse and 
mule shoes, that were intended for the now dead animals, that 
covered the road through the mountains to Camp Nelson. But the 
next train soon followed with coffee, sugar and hard bread and 
clothing, for which our men were suffering greatly. 

By instruction from General Grant, Schofield was urged to 
drive Longstreet out of East Tennessee, caused by the rumors that 
the latter had been re-enforced and was then marching on Knox- 
ville. But the Information proved unreliable, and was probably 
sent out by the enemy for effect. These reports had annoyed Gen- 
eral Grant, and with his aggressive nature, intended to whip 
I.ongstreet or get whipped during the month. This was in ac- 


cordance with his plans for the spring campaign, to be carried on 
after his own choosing. Schofield was really anxious to have Long- 
street come to Knoxville'and fight it out there, for 'the reason that 
tJie animals for the artillery and wagon trains had been sent on to 
recuperate for the spring campaign to Kentucky. This also would 
have relieved the men, who still were suffering for clothing and 
supplies. To enable Schofield to drive out Longstreet, Thomas 
was to send 10,000 of his troops to East Tennessee, and if neces- 
sary to go in person to command them. 

General Forster, after being relieved by Schofield, on his way 
to the North, stopped at Nashville and personally explained the 
situation in East Tennessee to General Grant, of the absolute need 
of rest for the men and beasts that were half starved. Grant at 
once saw the necessity of this, and ordered the suspension of the 
movement, and directed Schofield to remain on the defensive and to 
allow the re-enlisted veterans to have their furloughs and be ready 
for the spring operation. 

On the Confederate side the authorities had put their heads 
together to perfect a plan, by which a strong column would be 
gathered, and then march under Beauregard north, past Thomas 
to Nashville, capture the supplies and proceed on to the Ohio 
River. Just such a plan as Longstreet claimed to have suggested 
immediately after the battle of Chickamauga. 

But as Joseph E. Johnston, who was to lead the column, had 
asked the leading question, how the army was to subsist in a bar- 
ren country, this plan of the enemy fell to the ground. Another 
plan was to obtain 10,000 mules and ride through the mountains to 
Kentucky by way of Pond Gap, and get to the Ohio River by that 
route, subsisting on the country as they went. 

As General Lee was present at one of these conferences, he 
intimated that the Confederacy had all it could do to maintain the 
army where it was. All of these chimerical plans were cut short 
by the revival of the rank of Lieutenant General of the United 
States Army, and the appointment of General Grant to that place. 

The most astonished at this common sense move of President 
Lincoln was General Halleck, who had now to see an obscure man 
that had started with a command of a regiment would now com- 
mand in the field more than half a million of the best troops that 
ever marched to battle. 

The Confederate authorities , still demanded that Longstreet 


join Johnston by the route of the Smoky Mountain. This would 
have been a long, perilous flank march, and the easy way by which 
the Union forces could have been concentrated, especially in the 
hands of General Grant, the Confederates would have been beaten 
in detail, if they had carried out this plan. 

Longstreet wished to show his activity, and advanced from 
Morristown to Knoxville, by the way of New Market. He had 
been made to believe that the Union troops were demoralized, and 
Schofield's army an easy catch. In this he was mistaken, although 
our forces had been reduced by furloughs, and as we had no trans- 
portation were not able to move. Johnston was expected to aid 
Longstreet, but as just then Polk was troubled by Sherman in 
Mississippi, Johnston had to assist the former by sending him re- 

But Grant ordered Thomas to advance against Johnston at 
Dalton, thus aiding Sherman in his Meridian enterprise, and assist- 
ing Schofield at Knoxville, by which the movements intended by 
Johnston and Longstreet were balked. The march of Longstreet 
from Morristown to Knoxville was looked upon by Schofield as an 
additional effort of the enemy to secure more food and forage from 
a barren section of the country, but on the i8th Longstreet's 
mounted troops advanced in the angle of the Holsten and French 
Broad at Strawberry Plains. This led Schofield to the belief that 
the enemy's purpose was to cross the French Broad and make his 
way to Johnston's army at Dalton by marching along the base of 
the Smoky Mountains. This seemed to have been the wish of the 
Confederate authorities, and Longstreet was ordered on the loth 
to send Martin's cavalry back to Johnston, with the expecta- 
tion that he would soon follow with his corps. This caused Scho- 
field to concentrate his little army and watch the enemy's move- 
ments until, on the 23d he was reasonably assured that Longstreet 
v/as not moving his infantry column to Georgia, but retracing his 
steps towards Morristown. The withdrawal of Martin's cavalry 
had disturbed Longstreet's plans so much, that he notified the Con- 
federate President of being compelled to withdraw his army from 
East Tennessee, and place them on the border of Virginia, giving 
as an additional reason that Schofield had been largely re-enforced 
by Thomas, from Chattanooga. 

The assertion was not based on facts, since Sherman had 
marched to the relief of Burnside in November. The Fourth 


Corps, then very much reduced, had been the only troops of the 
Cumberland Army in East Tennessee, and now as Schofield was 
on the march after Longstreet, Wood's division of that corps was 
the only one that operated with the Army of the Ohio. Other ex- 
cuses of Longstreet for not going up to Knoxville and capturing 
Schofield had been his discovery that the fortifications were greatly 
strengthened. He must have heard of our ditching around College 
Hill, but as he came no closer than about seventeen miles, he could 
not have seen us, but the assertion served his purpose for an excuse 
to the Richmond Government. As General Cox had not yet been 
assigned to a permanent command, General Schofield had learned 
to like the open and unassuming way of the former, and offered him, 
for the time being, the position as his chief of staff. General Cox 
at once accepted, and the two from that time became great friends 
and served together until the close of the war. 

There were then in East Tennessee the remnants of three corps 
and in the moving column with which Schofield intended to follow 
Longstreet, was one division of the Twenty-third Corps, under 
General Stoneman, and one of the Fourth Corps, under General 
Wood, and what was left of the Ninth Corps, under General Parke, 
and Colonel Garrard's division of cavalry. One division of the 
Twenty-third Corps, under General Hascall, was left to garrison 
Knoxville, aided by the dismounted batteries of the Twenty-third 
Corps, under General Tilson; also' a detachment of cavalry, for 
headquarter duty. With General Hascall in command of the de- 
fences of Knoxville, Schofield felt secure against any effort of the 
enemy to capture the city by a surprise. The little army for the 
field, now led by Schofield, in person, consisted of Wood's division, 
Fourth Corps, 5,477 men; Parke's Ninth Corps detachments, 3,031 
men; Stoneman's Second Division, Twenty-third Corps, 3,363; 
Garrard's cavalry, 2,002; making a total of 13,873 officers and 
men. Longstreet's corps numbered 20,887, of which 5,034 were 

By this forward movement, close to the enemy, after he de- 
clined to come and see us at Knoxville, Schofield intended to learn 
of Longstreet's strength, and intended also to keep his army well 
in hand for a defensive battle. If Longstreet had left East Ten- 
nessee, as rumors had it then, the plans of General Grant were to 
unite the troops of the Army of the Cumberland, for the spring 
campaign. The little army reached Strawberry Plains on the 24th, 


but the bridge had been destroyed ami a temporary wagon bridge 
';vas constructed to cross supphes on, sufficient for a movement to 
New Market and Morristown, 

On the 26th the infantry crossed on flatboats, and the artillery 
and trains used a passable ford. It had not been contemplated to 
march the infantry further than Strawberry Plains, and lenrn the 
rest of Longstreet's movements through the cavalry, but whatever 
Schofield did was to be done thoroughly, and he closely supported 
the cavalrv adwince with his infantry columns. On the 28th the 
columns passed New IMarket, on the way to INIorristown, which was 
reached that evening. The march from Strawberry Plains was in 
a pouring rain, over the worst of roads. This caused many de- 
lays, and it was dark before the mounted troops could cover the 
town, two miles in advance, and in front and flank, to prevent sur- 
prise. But the information gathered by this bold movement of 
Schofield, with a much inferior army, after Longstreet, pointed to 
the fact that the Confederate General, after his heralded intention 
to capture Knoxville, had retreated to the borders of old Virginia. 
The loyal inhabitants of that section had been wide awake to learn 
the destination of the retreating Confederates. The information 
had been imparted by Longstreet's veterans to the inhabitants of 
Morristown that Bristol would be their next stopping place, and 
probably from there would turn on the Union forces if they pur- 
sued them, the air was full of such rumors. 






Schofield made careful preparation to receive the enemy, if he 
should return, but nothing came of the rumors except that the 
Union troops were kept on the keen lookout. During the time that 
Schofield was at Morristown, they occupied the same quarters" that 
Longstreet had abandoned, and had left the house so bare that the 
general officers had to take to the floor for their resting places, 
with saddles for a pillow, wrapped in blankets. The loyal people 
brought in all sorts of reports, and one evening they were sure Long- 
street was advancing, and would attack at daylight. So impressive 
was this report presented at headquarters, that General Cox deter- 
mined to make the grand rounds before the time that the attack was 
expected, to make certain that no surprise would occur. In the heavy 
weather of that stormy night he started out, two hours before day- 
break, and in the cold rain and darkness of the morning hour, with 
a single orderly and on a trusty horse, that would keep the road, 
splashing along until he reached the dim fires of the picket re- 
serves, passed them in the darkness before him, and plodded on 
until he came upon the cavalry outpost, in an open wood. He hap- 
pened to be a son of Erin, doing battle for the Union, in the uniform 
of a dragooner, and wide awake. He was asked to lead the General 
to the Captain's quarters. The Irishman led, saying: "Look out, 
for there are pits every little way, where them rebels dug holes for 
v^himbleys." Suddenly the outpost disappeared, but sung out : 
"Och, I have found one, sir," and so he had fallen headfirst into 
one of the pits. He scrambled out, and had scarcely gone a roci 


further before Pat went down again, once more scrambling out of 
his mud bath. He led the General to the Captain, who gave him 
the desired information from the front. He now returned to in- 
spect the infantry outpost and found them alert and well instructed, 
but in crossing a field he came upon one who was asleep in a fence 
corner. When the General reached him he was bewildered and un- 
able to speak. He was ordered to call the Corporal of the guard, 
and then stammered out, in broken English that he was not asleep. 
He was reported to the officer of the guard, but as General Cox, in 
his kindness of heart, did not order him before a court martial, he 
being a raw recruit, a light punishment by the regimental officer 
was imposed. 

General Cox returned to his cheerless quarters and found his 
stajff still sleeping. He had built a fire and dried himself, first turn- 
ing one side, then the other, to catch the warmth. These incidents 
were often repeated and were so familiar that to mention them seems 
out of place, except to remind the reader that the general officers 
shared the hardships with the men. The railroad bridge at Straw- 
berry Plains was rapidly being rebuilt, and was much needed, as 
there were no wagon trains to carry supplies forward. Through 
the cavalry advance, it was learned that Longstreet held the line of 
Bay's Mountains, near Bull's Gap, and thirteen miles from Morris- 
town, and stretching his flank to Greenville, and had all of his force, 
except Alartin's cavalry, with him. Ransom's division of infantry 
had disappeared, his troops had been merged with other divisions 
and he transferred to the cavalry. 

On March 26. McCook's cavalry, then with Schofield, was 
ordered back to Thomas, Schofield kept General Grant informed 
of his movements, and was advised by the latter not to bring on an 
engagement, but to hold as much of the country as he could. On 
General Grant's promotion he was invited by the President to go 
to Washington for consultation, and all remained quiet during his 
absence, but further advance on account of the bad weather would 
have been impossible. General Cox remained in charge of the head- 
quarters, in the field, to watch the enemy. 

This enabled Schofield to return to Knoxville and attend to de- 
partment matters. As soon as the railroad bridge was complete, 
supplies of clothing and shoes came forward in abundance to the 
little army then at Morristown, on the railroad. There the cloth- 
ing were issued to the men. Longstreet kept quiet in his line at 


Bay's Mountain, but sent out rumors that he was in motion for 
Schofield's army. He was closely watched by the Federal Cavalry. 

As soon as General Grant returned from Washington the 
Ninth Corps was Ordered to be sent at once to General Burnside, at 
Annapolis. This reduced Schofield's force and caused a change of 
position. On the i8th Stoneman's Twenty-third Corps Infantry 
was ordered to Mossy Creek and Wood's Fourth Corps to Rutledge, 
on the road to Cumberland Gap, and one brigade of Wood's Corps 
to Strawberry Plains. 

The little army was able to perform picket duty only. With 
General Grant in command of the United States Army, the plans of 
the future campaigns were of his own choosing, and not those of 
the enemy, as heretofore, and so acknowledged by the Richmond 
authorities; hence the abandonment of all visionary schemes, one 
of which was to send an army through Kentucky to the Ohio by the 
Confederates. Sherman, of course, was placed in command of the 
Military Division of the Mississippi, with the object of destroying 
Johnston's army. Grant personally attached himself to the Army of 
the Potomac, with the same purpose of annihilating Lee's forces. 

The time of small expeditions for individual glorification had 
passed; and heavy work for the army was to be engaged in. To 
meet such movements, the Confederate authorities ordered Long- 
street back to the Army of Northern Virginia, under Lee. On the 
L^nion side, the furloughed veterans were returning; the cavalry 
remounted and additional infantry from the rear brought forward 
to increase the forces in the field. 

As Longstreet's troops, in the early part of April, had been 
ordered back to the Army of Virginia, under Lee, that section of 
East Tennessee occupied by him had been left in charge of the 
irregulars, and these had degenerated into bushwhackers and guer- 
rillas, in which no quarters were given on either side. A scouting 
party of about one hundred had been sent out by General Cox. Thirty 
of the party belonged to the East Tennessee irregulars, better known 
in the Union Army as Home Guards. The hundred scouts had 
come on to a party of Confederate irregulars, and brought fifteen in 
as prisoners and reported about an equal number of killed. The 
fifteen had surrendered to the Indiana Cavalry, and saved their lives, 
when the East Tennessee Home Guards were asked by General Cox 
about their good luck. They answered that they had some good 
and some bad luck. On further inquiry to define their bad luck. 


they said that the bad luck was that the Indiana boys were with 
them, and had saved the Hves of the fifteen that surrendered, while 
the other fifteen had been dealt with, as the captain of the Home 
Guard scouts claimed, they deserved before the Indiana fellows 
could interfere. 

The Confederate irregulars, no doubt, had been guilty of a great 
many outrages, between neighbors and acquaintances, but it was 
Civil War. 

On account of the want of preparation, and the backward state 
of the weather, no large movements were undertaken for about all 
the seasons of the year made a showing in this month. About the 
middle of April there was still snow a-flying, but on the 20th the 
spring weather came, and the long dreary winter of 1863 and '64 
belonged to the past. Our table was improved by the efforts of our 
cook, and Henry Boehn, a gardener by profession, brought us some 
greens and onions, supplemented with such vegetables as the cook 
could buy, at the high prices of the sutler in town. The Indiana 
State sanitar}^ commission had sent a large supply of all kinds of 
vegetables, but I have no recollection that our boys received one 
ounce of the stuff, but as they had money, they were able to buy for 
cash, such extras of the sutler as he could get by wagon 
over the mountain, for the railroads were not permitted to 
carry sutlers' supplies. I often visited our sick and wounded in the 
hospital, and found that the sanitary commission had left a generous 
supply for them, and this was as it should be, the helpless first, al- 
though all the troops were sorely in need of them, as the boys were 
suffering from scurvy and other disorders, and they could only be 
relieved by a change of diet. 

While in quarters in the college we were considerably annoyed 
by a Major Shannon of the colored heavy artillery regiment. Many 
of the youth of African descent, that had enlisted in the colored reg- 
iment, were from the other side of the Smoky Mountains from 
North Carolina, that had emigrated to the land of liberty, and gone 
to Knoxville for their eighty acres and a mule, but on reaching the 
place were met by a colored recruiting officer, and induced to enlist. 
As most of them had brought their young wives, these had to be 
provided for. Several of the university buildings were still empty 
and in these were quartered the women of the freed men. The 
buildings were not a block distant from our quarters; and the ar- 
tillery boys found that washing could be had by these colored refu- 


gees cheap. So they packed their underwear and soap to the col- 
ored laundress. The most of them would do this during their hour 
of leave, but a few, always ready to cause trouble, by some means, 
would get out of the fort after tattoo. They then would take their 
unwashed linen to the laundress and probably spend an hour or so 
talking to the young women, who next day would tell their heroes 
in camp of the visit of the white boys in blue. The colored veter- 
ans naturally objected to these visits, and told their major to stop it. 
He in turn would go to the laundress after roll call to see who he 
could see and these were the boys with the fifteen on their caps. 
This was reported next morning to General Tilson and a reprimand 
to the officers of the battery would follow. So, one day, the provost 
guard of the city was changed to an Indiana regiment that di'd not 
know Major Shannon. The leaders of the nightly prowl made an 
arrangement, by which they would capture the major and land him 
in a guard house. 

About ID p. m. on one very dark evening the provost guard 
halted outside of the laundress' quarters. The sergeant of the 
guard with several men was sent into the houses to hunt for the 
men. His orders were strict to arrest any one found in the houses, 
and to his surprise found no one except Major Shannon. The ser- 
geant notified the major of his being under arrest. The major pro- 
tested, but nothing would do except to march at the point of the bay- 
onet to the guard house, where he had to remain all night with the 
roughs of the Ninth Army Corps, No one knew the guard that 
brought him there, but he was detained and the artillery men were 
blamed for the indignity. Having dressed themselves as infantry- 
men for the occasion and armed with muskets, they could not be 
detected. Evidently the visits to the negro quarters had ceased, for 
the reprimand from Tilson, to the officers of the battery, about keep- 
ing their men in quarters, completely stopped. In the end of 
March General Sherman visited Schofield at Knoxville, and arrange- 
ments were made for the part the Army of the Ohio was to take in 
the coming campaign into Georgia. The troops in the department 
were to constitute the Twenty-third Corps, and Schofield was to be 
in command of that corps in the field, and retain the administration 
of the department. Stoneman, who then was in command of the 
corps, was to reorganize the cavalry of the department, and com- 
mand the same in place of Sturgis. The latter was to be sent to 
Memphis, there to command a cavalry column to operate against 


Forrest. The Federal troops in Upper East Tennessee were to de- 
tain Longstreet if possible, and if the latter retreated were to follow 
him as a feint, until our troops were ready to leave the valley, and 
if the enemy did not burn the bridges our troops were to destroy 
them, and with them the railroads, and then promptly retire to Cleve- 
land, and form the left of Sherman's grand army, then ready to ad- 
vance into the north of Georgia. The troops then near Bull's Gap, 
were those that later on formed the third division of the Twenty- 
third Corps, and Wood's division of the Fourth Corps, with the as- 
signment of Stoneman to the cavalry. Schofield received the perma- 
nent command of the Twenty-third Corps in the fie'd. He had also 
been recommissioned as major general, but the Senate had not yet 
confirmed him. Generals Grant and Sherman, with their powerful in- 
fluence, endeavored to bring this about, but Schofield's bitter enemies 
from Missouri and Kansas were not idle, and blocked every move- 
ment in favor of Schofield, and it was not until General Grant 
at his second visit to Washington, just before the opening of the 
campaign, that Schofield was confirmed. The final withdrawal of 
Longstreet' s army from East Tennessee left a large number of Con- 
federate sympathizers unprotected in the Union line, and as the 
regular volunteer army of the Union forces would soon be with- 
drawn, these Confederates' families that had made themselves very 
prominent during Longstreet's occupations, feared the vengeance of 
the outraged Union people, and the home guards that now had con- 
trol, and therefore in large forces refugeed into the Confederate 
lines, to be near their loved ones, for the male portion had already 
gone into the Confederate army or marched with Longstreet, when 
he left the country, and as they had nothing to lose, the country 
eaten out, either by the enemy or Union forces. They would take 
their leave witliout regrets, and were escorted to the line where 
their friends met them. As the enemy retreated the many bridges 
and trestles were destroyed by him. This is what the Union com- 
mander desired, and for many miles the railroad from Virginia to- 
wards Knoxville would have to be completely rebuilt, before it 
could be utilized, either by friend or foe. 

During all of this time great preparations for a campaign on 
a large scale were in progress, both in the East and West. We were 
kept busy strengthening the defense around College Hill, at Knox- 
ville, and were continually harassed by one of Tilson's staff of- 
ficers demanding better results of our labor ; the other batteries hav- 


in^ similar troubles. So one day when this staff officer called, he 
left an order for me to report at headquarters, at 2 p. m. I prompt- 
ly appeared at the appointed time, and found Colonel Thomas A. 
Morgan, an old acquaintance from Franklin, Indiana, then colonel 
of a colored regiment, in the office of General Tilson. After the 
usual salutations I was asked to take a position as Major in one 
of the colored regiments, then being raised, near Knoxville, an of- 
fer which I promptly declined, as I desired to remain with the boys 
I had enlisted with. 

Time passed on, and we still performed labor on the defenses. 
Our harness was being repaired, the guns and caissons painted 
and the men instructed in the manual of the pieces ; but we could 
not maneuver, as we were without horses. Of clothing and shoes 
we received a full supply, and rumors that the army would soon go 
to the field were many and indications pointed that the Twenty- 
third Corps would go down to Dahon to join Sherman's grand 
army, but what our part in the coming campaign would be, no one 
knew. Several batteries were preparing, and had received orders to 
be ready. One of these was the Nineteenth Ohio, Captain Shields 
commanding, that had shared the University building with us. It 
was the last Sunday in April, and the weather was most beautiful. 
The regular Sunday inspection had been held and the men dismissed 
to their quarters. Lieutenant Harvey invited me to ride down to 
Rev. Dr. Hume's church to hear a good sermon. The horses were 
brought and we dressed in new full regulation artillery uniform, and 
leisurely rode down Main street. Before reaching the church we 
passed Schofield's headquarters, and casting our eyes to the right, I 
saw Lieutenant Bartlett standing in the open front window. We 
saluted and he beckoned us to come in. Lieutenant Harvey being a 
stranger to him, I introduced the two and Bartlett promptly led us to 
a rear room, telling us that General and Mrs. Schofield had gone to 
church, and that just that morning a chest full of fine liquors, from 
the North, for headquarters, had arrived, and desired us to taste 
them and pass upon the quality. This duty was, of course, reluct- 
antly accepted, and we complimented the man who had sent it, for 
his knowledge of the best. But that was not what we had turned in 
for. On our way down town we had talked over our misfortune, as 
we then feared we would never be mounted again, or even able to 
meet an enemy on the field of battle. 

Lieutenant Bartlett was a brother-in-law to General Schofield 


and in good spirits and high glee. Information had 
been received that the Twenty-third Corps was to .be the 
left wing in the field of Sherman's grand army, then preparing to go 
to Georgia. We told hun our story of how we much desired to go 
to the field, but as yet had no orders, and begged him to put us on the 
list for active service. Bartlett at once assured us that we would go. 
He wrote a memorandum and sent it to Colonel George W. Scho- 
field, the corps chief of artillery, and told us that we could rely on 
soon going. We kept on sampling his viands and forgot all about 
Dr. Hume's church, and when ready to mount it was too late to go 
there. So with this much good news we returned to camp and ad- 
vised Lieutenant Kuntz of our good luck, but pledged him to keep 
it a secret from the men until we had the final order, to draw horses 
and get ready for the field. Early Monday morning Lieutenant 
Harvey, with a detail of the drivers, went down to the Quartermas- 
ter's corral, and picked the teams for a four-gun battery. Two of 
our guns were turned in, as did the rest of the batteries in the Army 
of thfe Ohio. 

At the usual hour, about 9 a. m., the staff officer of General Til- 
son reached our quarters, and demanded to know why we were not 
■working on the defenses. Much to the surprise of that officer I told 
him that we had orders to be mounted and get ready for the field. 
He rode back to Tilson's headquarters in a gallop, which indicated 
to us that he was going to stop the preparations and keep us there. 
Shortly after dinner he returned with an order for us to vacate the 
barracks at once. The guns were pulled down hill to a common, 
and in rear of Fort Saunders, and the men with bag and baggage 
turned into camp near by. The guards on the parapet were 
promptly relieved by colored troops, that had entered our quarters 
from their camp, near the river, south of us, almost before we had 
vacated them. 

Nine o'clock roll call had been made and the men dismissed to 
their quarters. But just before taps, a fusilade from several direc- 
tions was opened on the fort, against the colored artillery, who now 
greatly excited, opened fire. Several balls passed close over the 
heads of Lieutenant Kuntz and myself, while lying on our couches 
in our tent. Lieutenant Harvey was not in camp. We at once 
vacated these quarters, and sought safety in the deep cut of the road, 
while the fusilade lasted. Just then an Ohio regiment of heavy ar- 
tillery, doing patrol and garrison duty, marched out to our quarters 


and surrounded the camp. General Tilson and staff also soon ar- 
rived, and Lieutenant Harvey came later. Tilson sent for me, and 
asked to have the assembly sounded and roll called. The night was 
very dark and by the time Orderly Sergeant Hook called the names, 
every mar. of the 142 in the battery, answered here. Tilson not be- 
ing satisfied with this, instructed his staff officer to count the men, 
and to his surprise found more men present than on the rolls. This 
increase had been accomplished by the men at the head of the col- 
umn stepping behind the ranks and passing- by the rear to the lower 
end, to be counted again ; and, in this way, out-witted General Til- 
son, who tried to catch the absentees. But the Ohio heavy was re- 
tained, much to their disgust, on duty all night. 





At early daylight an order reached us to march at once without 
the protection of infantry, to Charleston, Tenn., a distance of about 
100 miles, and report to General J. D. Cox, in command of the Third 
division, Twenty-third Army Corps, for further orders. This order 
was promptly obeyed, and for three days had a most delightful 
march through the Sweet Water valley, that we had campaigned in 
during September, October and November of the previous year. 

On our arrival at Charleston we found the Second and Third 
division of the Twenty-third Corps in camp, the First, a new division 
raised in Indiana, and commanded by General Hovey, was waiting 
our coming at Cleveland, the cavalry then being organized by Gen- 
eral Stoneman, and already on the road to join us, for the advance 
against the enemy then resting at Dalton. Sherman's re- 
turns showed that he had about 95,000 infantry, 12,000 
cavalry and 4,500 artillery when he crossed the Georgia line. 
Against these, on the defensive, Johnston had about 75,000, men of 
all arms, including Polk's corps that joined him at Resaca. Sher- 
man's army was badly organized, Schofield's left wing contained 
only about 15,000 men, Thomas' center 60,000, and McPherson's 
right wing 30,000. A proper division would have given each of 
Sherman's lieutenants about 37,000 men, instead of a large force at 
the center, and such a very small one to the left wing. 

Sherman had expected that Johnston intended to make an ag- 
gressive move on our left flank, as the Richmond authorities wanted 
him to do and to meet such a movement the Fourth Army Corps had 



been detained at Cleveland, on the East Tennessee and Georgia rail- 
road, thirty-five miles north of Dalton. This would have been 
the road for Johnston to follow, if he wanted to march to the north,' 
and the P ourth Corps there would have retarded him until the other 
troops could have concentrated to oppose him. 

The distance from Cleveland to Chattanooga is twenty-seven 
miles, and along the east of the railroad, from Cleveland to Dalton, 
is a high, sharp ridge forming the water shed of the Cooyehuttee 
creek, and on the west are the branches of the Chickamauga, that 
run northward, until they reach the Tennessee near Chattanooga, 
and for a long distance the streams on the east side run to the Gulf 
of Mexico, via the Connasauga, while on the northwest side they run 
into the Ohio via the Tennessee. The number of large ridges that 
are met with, south of Chattanooga, are pierced by the railroad at 
Missionary ridge, close by where the battle was fought between 
Bragg and Grant in November, 1863. Twenty miles further the 
railroad passes another tunnel, into Mill creek valley, a small stream 
that runs east into the Cooyehuttee, near Dalton. At the place 
known as Tunnel Hill was Johnston's outpost during the winter, and 
Thomas's videttes were on top of Taylor's ridge near Ringold. As 
the Confederates desired to be prepared for any flanking movernent,. 
they had intrenched themselves at Dalton, and ready to abandon 
Tunnell Hill, when compelled by Sherman's advance. Johnston's 
position at Dalton was too strong to admit of an attack from the 
north, and Mill creek, that passes through the mountain known as 
Rocky face, and the cliffs are called Buzzard Roost. Looking to the 
west, Rocky face ridge forms a perpendicular wall and has many 
spurs projecting like bastions. Mill creek had been dammed so 
as to cause an overflow in the gorge. The enemy held the cliffs on 
both sides, and occupied the breast works on the lower lines; some 
distance north of Mill creek gap, the country is more open, and the 
leit wing under Schofield was able to connect with the Army of the 
Cumberland at Ringold. Johnston had counted on Sherman's im- 
pulsiveness, and had been in hopes that the latter, with his larger 
army, would dash against his defenses at Mill creek, and Rocky face 
ridge. On the 3d of May we marched from Charleston to Cleve- 
land, where we met the Fourth Corps. On the following day the 
1 wenty-third Corps, our third division leading, marched to Red 
Clay, a little hamlet consisting of a blacksmith shop, a vacant store 
and a few huts, now occupied by women and children, who informed 


the passing soldiers of what Red Clay had once been and the great 
amount of whiskey sold there, and politics talked of, before the war. 
Ihis was the first habitation in Northern Georgia. Our camp was 
aLout a mile south of Red Clay, where the many springs furnished 
us an abundant supply of good cool water. The second division 
was at Red Clay and the first was at Blue Springs, Tenn., on the 
lailroad. The cavalry was scouting and skirmishing with the ene- 
my's outpost at Varnell's Station. The valley that we were in was 
densely covered with scrub trees that had grown on the very poor 
soil in that part of the country, and most of the fields had been 
abandoned, with plenty more like them, as we advanced among the 
hills into Northern Georgia. To protect our division from surprise 
General Cox ordered the cutting down of these trees and constructed 
an abattis with them. The Fourth Corps had kept pace with us and 
marched to our right into position at Catoosa Springs, eight miles 
southwest of Red Clay with a ridge, known as Taylor's ridge, divid- 
ing us. Next to the Fourth Corps was the Fourteenth, facing 
Tunnell Hill, and beyond them Hooker's Twentieth Corps, still fur- 
ther west, marching over Taylor's ridge, by the way of Wood's Sta- 
tion, upon Trikum. Grant and Sherman were both aware that the 
organization of our advancing army was faulty, in that Thomas's 
center was about two-thirds of the whole, but they did not like to dis- 
turb the Army of the Cumberland or give any offense to General 
Thomas by diminishing it, and changes could only be made with the 
President's consent. The Army of the Tennessee, under General 
McPherson, became the right wing of the invading forces and con- 
sisted of the Fifteenth and part of the Sixteenth Corps. These 
troops, to reach their destination, had to march the greater distance 
2nd were longer delayed. They marched to Lee and Gordon's Mill 
and upon Villinow. Garrard's cavalry division was on the right of 
the Tennessee Army. 

Saturday, the 7th of May, was set as a date for every organiza- 
tion to be in position, and at 4 a. m. the bugle sounded reveillie, in 
the battery, but the morning was so balmy and invigorating that it 
was almost a pity to disturb the men out of their healthy slumbers, 
but it had to be done, and in thirty minutes, with breakfast over, the 
riders mounted, and the cannoneers at their post, and all was ready 
for the forward movement. On our march we crossed the ridge by 
Ellidge Mill, to the main road, from Varnell's Station to Ringold, 
near the northern end of Tunnel Hill ridge, which brought us in 


connection with the Fourth Corps. The third division of our corps 
moved forward, the others followed and the rear protected a gap 
in the ridge at Ellidge's Mill, and the cavalry covered the front, as 
also the flank at Varnell's Station. The supply train for the whole 
army had moved forward to Ringold, and the railroad at Red Clay 
was abandoned. As we passed Dr. Lee's house the corps and divis- 
ion conmander turned to one side and found General Sherman and 
General Thomas there, to observe Howard's movement turning Tun- 
nel Hill. From this knoll they could see over the rolling country 
to the end of Rockv Face. The column halted in the road and Gen- 
erals Schofield and Cox soon joined the group of officers in front of 
the Lee house, who had observed the puff of white smoke in the dis- 
tance, indicating the attack going on there, supported by the muffled 
rumbling of the artillery. The officers seemed to be discussing the 
situation in which Sherman carried on the principal part of the de- 
bate, but we, in the line, knew little of the great game of war, that 
the leaders here had under consideration, and when the column 
moved forward, we only followed, and at night camped in a field 
near the division headquarters. Those that had the opportunity to 
notice General Sherman and General Thomas could judge to whom 
they had committed their lives, as also their confidence in the final 
success of the campaign. The first of May had been the day ap- 
pointed on which all the armies of the United States were to be in 
motion, and Sherman had notified Grant that on account of Mc- 
Pherson's delay he would be on the firing line within forty-eight 
hours after the 5th of May. On that day McPherson had been di- 
rected to secure the passage of Snake Creek Gap and from there get 
in on the enemy's flank on the railroad between Tilton and Resaca. 
In the game of war Johnston had not given Snake Creek Gap any 
attention and it is doubtful if the same would have been noticed by 
Sherman but for a German peddler, who had discovered and used 
that route to carry his wares from one side of the mountain to the 
other, and was now serving the Union Army as a scout. This infor- 
mation enabled McPherson to cross with his two corps without be- 
ing noticed by Johnston, who had expected that Sherman would 
butt against the solid Confederate column at Rocky Face ridge, and 
climb the palisades of Buzzard Roost. Sherman had been hopeful 
that Johnston would give him an opportunity to try conclusions at 
Dalton, as he did not care to make a pursuit of the enemy by which 
the latter would continually gain strength, and he (Sherman) would 


have to increase the distance between his army and its base of sup- 

While Thomas and Schofield were to attack in front, McPher- 
son, by his Snake Creek Gap movement, woukl come in upon the 
Confederate left flank, destroy the railroad in Johnston's rear and 
retire to the mountains near Snake Creek Gap, providing he was 
overpowered by Johnston. The movements intended for the Army 
of the Cumberland, as also that of the Ohio, had been carried out as 
■ ordered. The center of Thomas's army was on that evening about 
three miles distant from Tunnel Hill. McPherson on the 7th was 
at Ship Gap, and the next day was to pass Villenow to Snake Creek 
Gap. The Confederates so far made no resistance, except in front 
of the Fourteenth Corps. There the enemy's horse had been very 
active, but the deployment of Howard's Fourth Corps, on the flank 
of the Confederate troopers had caused the latter promptly to with- 
draw. Early on the 8th the whole army was in motion and the 
Fourth Corps were right up to Rocky Face ridge, and scaled the 
heights, the One-hundred-and-twenty-fifth Ohio of Newton's division 
leading, driving back the Confederate outpost, to within about one 
and a half miles of the enemy's signal station at Buzzard's Roost. 
Above Mill Creek Gap the narrow ridge was easily defended, as 
numbers could not be employed and gave no advantage. Wood's 
center of the Fourth Corps and Butterfleld's division of the Twen- 
tieth Corps, each in their position, pushed the enemy into Mill Creek 
Gap. A strong effort by Geary's division of the Twentieth Corps 
to carry the summit of Rocky Face at Dugg Gap, was not successful, 
and the same difficulties were met with at every attempt to scale the 
palisades of this ridge. By scrambling skirmishes over these rocks, 
and through the brushes the men soon became exhausted, and at the 
end of their effort faced a perpendicular wall with a few cracks and 
crevices leading through it, and these were strongly held by the 
enemy, but no amount of gallantry by the Union forces was success- 
ful. The Confederate defense was led by General Hardee, in per- 
son. Early in the morning, on the 8th, the Twenty-third Corps 
moved with the rest of the arm5^ but thus far had not fired a shot. 
Cox's division marched to the Kincannon cross roads. McLean's 
brigade, with the Fifteenth Indiana battery, marched a mile further 
to the south and connected with the second division (Judah's) on 
the right. The latter in turn connected with Newton's Fourth 
Corps division, on the north spur of Rocky Face, and Hovey's first 



division covered tlie road from Dalton to Varnell's Station, and Mc- 
Cook's cavalry were to the east of Cox's third division, taking care 
of that flank of the whole army. Early on the morning of the 9th 
the whole division moved forward, and at noon were at right angles 
to Rocky Face ridge, in the same position to the Fourth Corps as 
the day before. On our left was Burke's place near Varnell's Sta- 
tion, the Dalton road, divided by a ridge on which our 
battery was placed, and the only one at that 
time of our corps, in position. About 2 p. m. we received orders 
from General McLean, then in command of the right brigade of 
Cox's division, to move forward to a knoll, a sort of spur from 
Rocky Face ridge, directly in front of us. Not more than eight hun- 
dred yards away were the enemy's works, at the foot of Potato Hill. 
We unlimbered, I estimated the degrees, time and seconds, of the 
fuses, and then the guns were loaded and commenced to fire. To our 
satisfaction and to the delight of both divisions, the projectile ex- 
ploded just as it was intended for them to do. The first shot from our 
corps artillery had been fired and the Fifteenth Indiana had that 
honor. The infantry shouted as they witnessed the effect of our well 
instructed practice, which Captain von Sehlen, with such great pains 
and care had imparted to us. This work was also viewed by Gen- 
erals Schofield and Cox, who praised the same, and through Cox's 
chief of artillery. Major Wells, the writer was informed that the 
general officer's remark had been, as they saw the shells exploded, 
"Those boys have been well instructed ; they know their business and 
shoot to hit." We kept in position and fired at whatever object the 
enemy gave us a chance to, until night put an end to the practice. 
As the second division touched our right, and then reformed its line 
towards the northwest, they could not then bring their batteries into 
position, and for that day no other artillery of the corps, except ours, 
was in action. 

A most beautiful and sublime sight was presented to us in the 
evening, when looking up the cliffs, on Rocky Face ridge, we saw 
Newton's division, with the One-hundred-and-twenty-fifth Ohio In- 
fantry leading, jumping from one rock to the other, firing and ad- 
vancing in the twilight and darkness, the sight was thrilling and in- 
spiring, while the thundering of our guns below #them echoed through 
the hills, in the night and gave an inkling of the earnest combat that ' 
was going on. About 9 p. m. the firing ceased, all alongthe line. Short- 
ly after, a battalion of engineers arrived, and for the length of fifty 


yards, just sufficient to place the battery at full interval, a wall of dirt 
and stone was thrown up high enough to let the muzzle of the gun 
peer over the protection, but the works offered no shelter for the 
body of the cannoneers. The limbers and caissons, however, were 
well protected behind the guns and under natural cover. While we 
were heavily engaging the enemy, with our rapid firing, in the twi- 
light of the evening, one of the third division music bands took posi- 
tion on the front line in the center between us and Varnell's Station 
and played the National airs for over an hour. All during this time 
the musketry rattled, and the artillery roared and added its deep tone 
to the musical inspiration from the ridge on our left. During the 
night we slept beside our guns, the horses being fed and watered, by 
reliefs, but remained in harness all night. Early next morning our 
men were astir. The rise of the sun was slightly hidden by a veil of 
thin fog that soon gave away. A detail of cannoneers prepared 
breakfast. The smoke of the camp fire mingled with the haze of the 
air, the rest of the cannoneers peered over the breastworks, to watch 
and see the movements of the enemy, who, like ourselves, had per- 
fected some protection against us, at the foot of Potato Hill. Gen- 
eral McLean was on hand earl)'-, and viewed the enemy's work close- 
ly. About 7 o'clock a Confederate general officer deliberately 
rode along on the Potato Plill road and stopped to look at us, prob- 
ably to draw our fire. The officer did not have long to wait, as that 
was what we had come down to Georgia for, and as we had the 
range, from the previous evening, we let fly at him and when the 
smoke of the exploded shells had cleared away, the general and his 
escort had disappeared, but soon after this two four-gun batteries of 
the twelve-pound light Napoleon pattern, appeared in position and 
opened fire on us. After a good bit of firing they caught on to the 
range and sent some very pretty shots in and among us, but always 
a little short of the distance. The projectiles were solid shot and 
they bounded against our little rock-ribbed hill, and then made a 
graceful curve in the air some fifty feet high. AVhen their force was] 
expended they would fall to the ground and roll down to the rear,] 
between the limbers of the guns and caissons, and doing no harm^ 
but the result would have been different if they had been shell oi 
case shot. The greater number of their guns against us gave ther 
a chance to send us two shots for one. During all of this time New- 
ton's division of the Fourth Corps on top of Buzzard Roost, andl 
along on Rocky Face ridge, kept up an incessant infantry fire, while i 


the Confederate General Hardee, personally, in charge of his line, 
tried to prevent Newton's advance. The Confederate general of- 
ficer in our front early that morning proved to have been Bate of 
Tennessee. He soon learned that his artillery was not able to silence 
our guns. He therefore sent his sharp shooters (seventeen to each 
brigade) and armed with the English telescope Withworth guns, 
forward to pick off our cannoneers. For two hours we had kept 
up the unequal contest of four rifle guns against eight twelve- 
pounder light guns, and no damage was done to us. It was now 
9 o'clock and at this hour the balls from the sharp shooters began to 
whiz around us. Our guns were worked, loaded and fired by the 
cannoneers with coolness and determination, and every man was at 
his post. The fourth piece had just fired, the sergeant given the 
command, "load." Numbers one and three stepped forward to ex- 
ecute their numbers, but No. 3 reeled and fell over the trail. No. i 
called, "stop that vent." The sergeant ordered him, with a sabre in 
hand, to his post. The gunner looked around from his elevating 
screw, to see why No. 3 had dodged. I was near the gun, and Par- 
kerson, the red-faced, full-blooded youth of Indiana, with wide open 
eyes and a laugh over his face, with his left resting helpless on the 
trail, soon turned ashen pale, while his eyes closed to the world for- 
ever. The ball of the enemy's sharp shooter had pierced his heart. 
He never knew what hit him. The quartermaster sergeant, the two 
buglers and one artificer carried him off to the rear. A supernu- 
merary cannoneer stepped in Parkerson's place and the firing con- 
tinued uninterrupted. Thus died the first cannoneer killed in Sher- 
man's grand army on his Georgia campaign. Quartermaster Ser- 
geant Kaiser gently notified his bereaved parents of their son's heroic 
death. That evening we buried him near Lee's plantation, placing 
a head board on his grave. As orders had already been given early 
in the morning for the Twenty-third Corps to make a left wheel to 
the rear, we received notice to withdraw my section, to limber to 
the rear, and moved about 300 yards and open fire again. This gave 
the other section, under Lieutenant Kuntz, a chance for the same 
movement, and then withdraw altogether some two miles in the 
direction of Lee's farm, facing now to the east and resting in prep- 
aration to march through Snake Creek Gap, and on to Resaca. In 
the two days we had expended eight hundred and sixteen rounds of 
shrapnell, and shell, and as no infantry, from our corps, was en- 
gaged, we had nearly the whole three divisions for an audience. 


Our movements formed a right angle to the former position occupied 
and now facing to the east, but an alarm that the enemy was ad- 
vancing, caused us to unlimber and prepare for action. After re- 
maining in this position for two hours we limbered up and withdrew 
into camp and rested until the morning of the 12th, when, with three 
days' rations in haversack and ten days' in wagons, we started at 
early daybreak for Snake Creek Gap, by the way of Tunnel Hill and 
Villinow where we had to march to the right and around the immense 
wagon trains of the Army of the Cumberland. At midnight on the 
1 2th we started on the march to cross through Snake Creek Gap, 
and passed through the fortification of the Army of the Tennessee, 
in the forenoon of the 13th. The country we passed through was 
the most desolate part of Northern Georgia, as for five miles not a 
single habitation was met with. Snake creek runs between the Chat- 
tanooga Mountains, on the east, and a parallel range of the Horn 
Mountains, on the west, is a branch of the Ostanaula and receives its 
water from the western shed of Tunnel Hill, while the eastern side 
of that hill furnishes its water into Mill creek. There was no road 
through the gap, other than the bed of this creek, and which had been 
used but very little, before the Army of the Tennessee passed through 
it on the 9th of the month. The dense woods on each side, covered 
the creek and only at noon a little sunlight was let into the gap. 
At the southern end was the Sugar Valley postoffice and beyond a 
more open country through which runs the Connassauga and Ostan- 
aula, and contains the now historic towns of Tilton, Resaca and Cal- 
houn. Our division went into position across the Rome and Dalton 
road, with Reiley's brigade to the front, and the rest in Echelon, to 
the right and rear. The outpost of Manson's brigade were at Mar- 
tin's store. McPherson had been ordered on the fifth that he should 
secure Snake Creek Gap and make a bold attack on the enemy's 
flank, between Tilton and Resaca. 

Sherman had expected great results from this movement and 
assured McPherson that he would be supported by Schofield and 
Thomas, in case Johnston should attack him with his whole force. 
McPherson marched, as ordered, and came within a short distance 
of Resaca, where he found the town occupied in force by the Con- 
federates. Knowing that Johnston could easily concentrate his 
whole army against him, McPherson wisely withdrew to Snake 
Creek Gap, and entrenched himself, until the Army of the Cum- 
berland came to his relief. They reached him on the 12th, and the 


Army of the Ohio on the 13th, Sherman was not pleased with 
McPherson's withdrawal, but the military student will find the 
latter correct for it took two days before Thomas could reach Mc- 
Pherson, and during that time Johnston could have concentrated 
against the former and destroyed him. After the debauch of Sher- 
I man's grand army through Snake Creek Gap, the commanding gen- 
eral had his troops well in hand and every corps division and brigade 
in its proper place for active work. On our march that afternoon, 
over ridges, fields and dense woods, we halted in the evening at a 
little stream just containing enough water to have the men make 
their coffee and water the horses. How we got there and where we 
were, at the time, was a puzzle to us, as no roads were near or in 
sight, we pulled in at close interval, such as the brush and trees would 
permit, but did not unhitch or unharness, but fed and watered by 
nose bags and buckets, in reliefs. Hid in the dense woods there was 
no room to form in battery or to come to an action, in any direction. 
After we had munched on our three days' ration in haversack, we 
laid down where we were, the drivers holding their horses by the 
strap ready to mount at command. The cannoneers had 
stretched themselves at right angles to their guns and caught such 
little rest as they could, as they had been on their feet, and in the 
saddle, from before midnight the previous day, and by 9 p. m. every 
driver and cannoneer except the camp guard were fast asleep. Dur- 
ing the afternoon and evening we had passed many piles of knap- 
sacks in charge of a single guard, as a sure indication that active 
and bloody work was expected. At early dawn of the 14th some 
of our boys were astir and by 6 o'clock the men had made their morn- 
ing meal, and half of the horses fed and watered. During that 
night I had a presentiment of what was coming next day, and early 
next morning communicated the same to one of the gun sergeants. 
This premonition came true. At 7 all was ready for a move in any 
direction, but not a road was visible or an opening through which 
to march. During the evening before and early in the morning the 
infantry of the two divisions, Second and Third, had been moved 
forward until they reached the west bank of Camp creek and found 
the enemy entrenched on the east side of that stream. A little after 
8 o'clock Major Wells, the division chief of artillery, came to us and 
said : "Fout, bring your section forward, we want to see what the 
enemy has in hiding for us." I ordered the drivers to mount. Just 
then he said: "Bring the whole battery." The other section 


mounted, the major led us through the thicket and we followed, 
and after twenty-five yards through the brush, we came unexpected- 
ly, at right angles on the Dalton and Rome road. Along the fence 
of that road lay the Fourth iVrmy Corps and beyond it an aban- 
doned cotton field of about two miles or so, square. The major in- 
dicated a rising position on which to bring the battery in action at 
full interval. On reaching the fence and troops in line, the can- 
noneers of the first piece jumped forward, threw off a few rails and 
the first piece crashed the rest of the rails into splinters. As soon as 
the first piece was clear of the fence, I gave the command, "Cannon- 
eers, mount," then "Forward into line, left oblique, trot, march, 
guide right, and the last two pieces tried to reach their position at 
a full, beautiful gallop. For this movement we had Wood's division 
of the Fourth Corps as our audience, and as the maneuver was 
executed with the greatest neatness, they gave us their hurrahs, that 
echoed through the Georgia hills. As we now reached the desig- 
nated point, I gave the command, "Halt, action front, load with 
shrapnells, time and elevation for eight hundred yards, fire at will," 
and the first piece Sergeant Stiefel in command, poured forth tli6 
volley that opened the battle of Resaca. While the Fourth Corps 
had been liberal with their hurrahs, as they saw us going through 
the cotton field, our division. Cox's Third, lay in wait for a charge 
and hardly had the first rounds reached the enemy, when they, too, 
gave us their plaudits and jumped to their feet, ready for the charge. 
Just then Battery D, First Ohio, also came into the cotton field on 
our left, and soon divided with us the honors of pounding away at 
the enemy's fortification. On our right and along in straight line 
the second division of the Twenty-third Corps, with their battery, 
were in position, and still further on, connecting with its right, was 
the Army of the Tennessee. By 1 1 o'clock the rattling musketry, with 
the thundering detonation of the artillery rolling along, a distance of 
about five miles to the south of us, confirmed the fact that the giants 
had met and the battle of Resaca was truly on. We had not been in 
action for over an hour when the Fourth Corps, that we had crossed 
at right angles on entering the field, was moving to our left and a 
most inspiring sight was presented to us as the whole corps in divis- 
ion formation, marched forward with flying banners, their artillery 
not waiting for the infantry support, forming an angle on our left 
and sweeping our front. Just about that time there appeared near 
our right piece, a major general with an open dress coat, a buff vest 


and light blue pantaloons. I had never seen bim before; in stature 
he was tall, lithe built and of active disposition ; his hair, light brown, 
closely cropped, sandy beard and mustache, his every motion indi- 
cative of energy. He asked me if the enemy replied. I answered 
they had, but were now silenced. He said that he would advise me 
to hold my fire until they opened again ; cautioned us to save our very 
expensive ammunition. When I answered that we were under or- 
ders of General Cox and his chief of artillery, he answered, "That is 
all right, but I am General Sherman." No further request or order 
was necessary and at the top of my voice I gave the command, 
"Cease firing." The general's further request was that I send word 
to the next battery, communicating the general's wish, which was 
promptly complied with. Sherman now walked along the line of 
the division guns, the cannoneers at their post, until he reached the 
left, where Generals Thomas, Howard, Sickles, the latter Inspector 
General United States army, Schofield and Hooker, all dismounted, 
met Sherman and the group walked forward to get a better view of 
the enemy's defenses. The little signal officer, near our right 
gun, by the waving of his flag, had called the generals to meet the 
chief. A small number of staff officers had remained at a short dis- 
tance in the rear, the enemy's guns had been silenced, but they had 
observed the group containing the brains of the Federal army. They 
could save their ammunition no longer or spend it for no better pur- 
pose than to send a few shots among the high officials. This they 
did, and with good aim reached our generals uncomfortably close. 
So close that they promptly parted, each walking in different direc- 
tion from the other, except Hooker and Sherman, each wishing to ap- 
pear braver than the other, and for a few seconds they looked at each 
other without saying a word. As the second round was due from 
the enemy's battery, they separated, while the enemy's solid 
shot now plowed the very ground that they had just stood upon. 
No one was hurt, but such an exposure appeared to us onlookers as 
very unnecessary. The little signal officer, still holding post on our 
right, notified us that Sherman's wish was for us to open fire again, 
which we promptly did, and continued in action until the sun had 
gone down behind the southern spurs of the Cumberland Moun- 
tains, in our rear. An Ohio Fourth Corps battery went into action 
where Sherman and his generals had stood, but the enemy's battery 
had a fine range on that position and knocked one of their guns off 
of the wheels, and injured a limber, and one of the teams took 


fright with the drivers and left for the rear. In looking into our 
rear where we had crossed the road at right angles through the 
Fourth Corps line in the morning, we saw the solid column of the 
Twentieth Corps, marching to our left and their martial appearance, 
with division and brigade banners flying, and their finely dressed 
staff officers at the head of each column, was truly inspiring and 
would have made a picture for the brush of a battle painter, that 
could hardly have done justice to the original scene, as presented by 
this march, with the dark green woods for a back ground. The rat- 
tling of musketry of Stanley's and Wood's division, with the deep 
toned artillery, continued without intermission and the two divisions 
of the Twenty-third Corps, "second and third," were spending am- 
munition at a rapid rate. The dead of the third division were brought 
back and laid out in line to the left of our guns, each covered with a 
part of a sheet or a blanket. Among these the Sixty-third Indiana, 
were most numerous, and at the close of the day, when a merciful 
God had intervened, the darkness put a stop to the fraticide, these 
heroes that had so gallantly marched forward to do battle that day, 
were buried near the places where they had fallen. When the sun 
was still an hour high, above the ridge of Cumberland Mountains, 
as I looked over my right shoulder through the haze created by the 
smoke of battle, on that balmy May evening, my thoughts were of 
the guns, still in rapid action, and I wished that it was night. 
Direct in our front, towards the left wing of Stanley's Fourth 
Corps division, and from the continuous and rapid firing, some dead 
leaves had caught fire, and the same had communicated to a house 
near the edge of the woods, which was soon in flames, but this did 
not concern the contending forces. Both sides kept up a continuous 
rattle of musketry fire, the roar of artillery just before nightfall was 
deafening, and the sight was so sublime that no painter's brush could 
do it justice. Far off to our right and to the south of us (we faced 
east), the same conditions were being met with. The enemy had 
defended, and resisted that day every part of its line, and the set- 
ting sun put an end to the fighting on both sides. On taking an ac- 
count of the number of shots fired we found that nearly eighteen 
hundred rounds of fixed ammunition had been expended, since our 
taking position, and firing the first shot. As every projectile for our 
guns cost the government seven dollars, we alone expended nearly 
fourteen thousand dollars in that short interval of ten hours' active 
service, and other batteries fired about the same number of rounds. 



Whenever I hear the remark that "coming events cast their shadow 
before," it recalls my premonition and dream of the night of the 13th 
of May in the woods, while laying on the ground, and sleeping with 
the halter strap around my wrist. I then saw our guns in position 
in the field, and at noon a large number of dead among them, some 
of my intimate acquaintances laying on the ground to the left of the 
battery, just as it came only too true, on the afternoon of the 14th. 
Another incident that occurred will never leave my memory. Short- 
ly after General Sherman advised us to cease firing, I mounted my 
horse and rode off to the right, on a high hill covered with woods, 
close to the edge of the timber, where the second division batteries 
were actively engaged in firing at the enemy's breastworks. One of 
the guns of the Nineteenth Ohio had become disabled. I rode along 
back towards our position, but at once found myself in an open field, 
over which Judah's division had charged, but met a bloody repulse. 
I rode slowly and any sharp shooter could have picked me off. I 
had entered a cross road that had not been much used. Just as I 
reached a large tree a young soldier lay there with his musket in his 
right hand and a smile on his face. I thought him sleeping and so 
he was, in a sleep from which no one wakes. I dismounted and 
was about to shake him, but as my eyes caught sight of his under or 
left side, I saw that a cannon ball had ripped his heart away. I has- 
tily mounted and rode along the road in a gallop until I reached 
our own guns. The sight of that dead young soldier boy cured me 
from viewing the rest of the field, charged over by the second and 
third division, and I remained at my post until the dark of the night 
gave us rest. The limber of the guns, as also the cassions, were un- 
der cover, but the guns and cannoneers had no protection what- 
ever, and the whole of that day had been in an open field fight. The 
men made their evening meal and Lorenzen, our cook, served our 
appetites v/ith a fine supper. It may have been that our hunger as- 
sisted the mess boss in making it palatable. The horses were fed 
and watered by turns. The cannoneers refilled tne ammunition 
chests, and all rested as they were, by the guns and horses until mid- 
night, when we were relieved by the Fourth Corps and moved a short 
distance to the rear, where we remained all night, but did not unhitch 
or unharness. Although the Fourteenth Corps and McPherson's 
Army of the Tennessee had been engaged in their front, along the 
west bank of Camp creek, on that day, the heavy battle had been 
with the Twenty-third Corps, of which Cox's division had borne 


the brunt and carried off the success of the day, assisted by the 
Fourth Corps, on its left, and under their able division commanders, 
Woods and Stanley, kept up a fierce battle of which we, from our 
position, were the witnesses, until darkness called them to halt. 
When Judah's division of the Twenty-third Corps attempted to 
cross Camp creek the troops under him were exposed to a heavy 
and galling front fire, and as the Confederate line formed a right an- 
gle, they worked their batteries with deadly destruction, 
on Judah's right flank and his losses were heavy. For this ex- 
posure he was lelieved of the command of the division and General 
Hascali put in his place. As Cox's division crossed the already re- 
ferred to cotton field, they had met nothing but the enemy's outpost 
and skirmishers, but on approaching the western bank of Camp 
creek the opposition became hot and at this juncture, our battery, 
then hid in the woods, was called on, as already referred to. At the 
opening of our fire the division crossed Camp creek and made a 
wheel to the right, where, in General Hanson's brigade, composed 
of the One-hundred-and-third Ohio, under Colonel Casement, the 
Fifth Tennessee (Union), the Twenty-fourth Kentucky and the 
Sixty-third Indiana, became the pivot, and Colonel Reiley's brigade, 
the Sixteenth Kentucky, the One-hundred-and-twelfth Illinois (Col- 
onel Henderson), the One-hundred-and-fourth Ohio (Rei- 
ley's own regiment), became the left. As soon as this division had 
crossed Camp creek, the enemy's artillery, in position down the val- 
ley, opened a raking flank fire on them, and the Sixty-third Indiana 
suffered heavily. While Generals Cox and Manson were together 
in conversation at the most exposed point of Hanson's brigade, a 
shell exploded near. Hanson and knocked him down and caused him 
to be carried off the field unconscious. How General Cox escaped 
unhurt is one of those mysteries which often occur in battle. I 
have often met General Hanson in civil life and have always noticed 
his suffering from the injury received at that time. Colonel Hart of 
the Twenty-fourth Kentucky was ordered to assume command of 
Hanson's brigade. As the east side of Camp creek afforded no pro- 
tection for the limbers and caissons, we could not join the infantry 
of our division, but remained in position and action at the same 
place we occupied early in the morning. The failure of Judah's di- 
vision to cross Camp creek caused additional exposure to Cox's divis- 
ion, but the gallant action of the Fourth Corps on Cox's left from 
about 2 p. m. relieved the Twenty-third Corps and protected it 


against the intended flank movement of the enemy, already in mo- 
tion at that time under the Confederate General Hood, which was 
further checked during the evening and night by the movement to our 
left of Hooker's Twentieth Corps. The enemy dur- 
ing that day had defended all their points and not one 
of the well-prepared intrenchments around Resaca had been given 
up, but the resources of Sherman's mind were so fertile that he, on 
the arrival of General Garrard's cavalry division, sent that body 
down to the Ostenaula river by the Rome road. Two pontoon 
bridges had been laid across that stream at Lay's Ferry three miles 
below Resaca. Garrard was to cross here and threaten Calhoun, a 
station on the railroad, seven miles below Resaca and above Kings- 

At early morning on the 15th the enemy was pressed at all 
points, but as he still shifted some of the troops under Hood to our 
left, that flank received the closest attention from the leaders of the 
battle, and at 8 o'clock our corps, the third division leading, were 
put in motion toward Hooker's rear and left, where we relieved the 
division of General Williams of the Twentieth Corps, and part of 
Geary's, of the same corps, that had been fighting heavily, about a 
mile north of the wood shed, on the railroad, and were now out of 
ammunition. The position occupied was on a ridge extending 
north and south between the Dalton and Resaca wagon road, and 
the railroad covering the extreme left of the army, facing on that 
point due south. Work for our protection was at once begun. At 
3 p. m. we changed position and, in support of the rest of the corps, 
moved forward to the ground where the Twentieth Corps in the af- 
ternoon, had met the enemy in fierce battle and where the Seventieth 
Indiana Infantry, under Colonel Benj. Harrison, had met with severe 
losses. The Hon. Daniel M. Randall, now sergeant-at-arms in the 
United States Senate, in this attack, lost his right hand. In our po- 
sition we were not called on to fire that day and no part of our divis- 
ion was in action on our left. About 3 p. m. the Confederate 
wounded were brought back, in great numbers, and those heavily 
and mortally wounded lay near where our battery stood, and it was 
a sad sight to see the southern youth giving their lives for a cause 
that could only have destroyed the Republican form of government. 
Many of the mortally wounded that had fallen into our hands, by 
the successful charge of Hooker's men breathed their last, while we, 
in deep silence, saw them pass av/ay. Another large number of Con- 


federate dead covered the lield, and as soon as their lines had with- 
drawn they were gathered and received a soldier's burial. Colonel 
Reiley. of the One-hundred-and-fourth Ohio, and Colonel Henderson 
of the One-hundred-and-twentieth Illinois, commented on the sad 
scenes we were witnesses of, but such is war and not of the choosing 
of the Union-loving people. This was the first heavy engagement that 
the divisions of the Twenty-third Corps had taken part in on this 
campaign, and all, including the Indiana youths, known as "dough 
faces," under General Hovey, had acquitted themselves well and re- 
ceived the praise of their commanding officers. No other assaults 
than those made by Hooker's Twentieth Corps had been made that 
day but the rattling of musketry and roaring of artillery continued 
from early morning, all along the line. Late in the afternoon Mc- 
Pherson moved his line, of the Army of the Tennessee, to a ridge, 
from where he was able with his artillery, to reach the town and rail- 
road bridge across the Ostenaula. The enemy's attempt to drive 
him off resulted in every instance in a bloody repulse and our men, 
everywhere, showed the finest fighting qualities. Of 
the Fifteenth Corps, Osterhaus's division had advanced upon the 
principal road that leads to Resaca, through a dense wood that faces 
Camp creek, and crossed here by a bridge which the enemy had 
failed to destroy. The leading regiment of Osterhaus, the Twelfth 
Missouri, saw their advantage. They charged the bridge and into 
the timber on the other side, intrenched themselves and greatly weak- 
ened the Confederate left flank by this movement. Logan ordered 
the other division of his corps, as also Dodges' division of the Six- 
teenth Corps, to cross, and by 6 o'clock made a forward movement to 
the heights held by the enemy, under Polk, carried them and erected 
some intrenchments right under the enemy's heavy artillery, and 
infantry fire. The efforts of Polk to recover the lost position were 
repulsed and McPherson continued to send reinforcements to the 
troops engaged. As the position commanded the railroad and 
wagon bridge across the Ostenaula, Johnston was compelled to cut 
a road, during the night, further east and lay a pontoon bridge across 
the river a mile In his rear, over which he retreated out of the range 
of McPherson's guns. General Sherman had directed General 
Dodge to send a division to Lay's Ferry, and to cross over to the 
south side of the Ostenaula to protect the laying of the pontoon 
bridge under Captain Reese, McPherson's chief engineer. One bri- 
gade crossed over, but was recalled as a result of a rumor, that the 


Confederates were crossing between them and McPherson's army, 
which caused Sweeney, in command of the division, to withdraw for 
a distance of a mile and a half, to a more secure place. As soon as 
Johnston had learned of this movement, he sent Walker's division 
of infantry to Calhoun, but as no Union troops were found on the 
south side of the river. Walker was at once recalled. On the morning 
of the 15th Sweeney crossed his whole division, and erected defenses 
which had a meaning that he would remain there. He met with 
little opposition except from Martin's cavalry; the bridge was laid, 
the Federal cavalry crossed, under General Kilpatrick, and became 
very active, but that officer was wounded as he led his troops against 
the flank of Polk's Confederates, 

Sherman now had his army concentrated and well in hand, which 
gave him an additional force with which to execute a flank movement, 
south of the Ostenaula, and a second pontoon bridge was laid at 
Lay's Ferry, near the mouth of Snake Creek, and with Garrard's 
cavalry on his rear, and flank, operating near Calhoun, and the river 
in his rear, made Johnston's position untenable who saw he could 
not safely delay any longer and retreated during the night of the 
.T5th, burning the railroad bridge after him. Polk and Hardee 
crossed at the railroad bridge and marched to Calhoun, while Hood 
crossed the pontoon and marched to Adairsville. On our part of 
the line, the enemy opened a considerable cannonade about midnight', 
probably for no other reason than to let us know that they were with- 
drawing and to bid us good-bye, for such were our conclusions, 
when we heard the firing. Next morning General Sherman, at the 
head of his column, entered the town and promptly had the bridges 
repaired and marched his columns across the river, in support of 
Garrard's cavalry. Davis's division of the Fourteenth Corps led off 
on the march to Rome; the rest of McPherson's army crossed at 
Lay's Ferry, the Fourth and Fourteenth Corps crossed at Resaca, 
Schofield's Twenty-third Corps and Hooker's Twentieth Corps 
crossed the Connasauga at Fite's Ferry, two miles above Resaca, the 
cavalry of the Army of the Ohio, under Gen. Stoneman, covered the 
left and Kilpatrick advanced with the Army of the Cumberland. The 
total losses In the third division, Twenty-third Corps, was, killed 66, 
v\fOunded 486, missing 10. Total 562. 

During the night of the 15th we remained In position imtll 
about TO a. m. next day. We fed and watered the teams, as for two 
days previously, with nose bags and buckets, and without taking the 


harness off, marched to Hogan's Ford, where we forded the Con- 
nesauga river, about two miles below Tilton, into what may be 
called the Etowah district, a more open country than that portion 
of Georgia we had just passed through. The Etowah and the Os- 
tanaula join at Rome, Ga., and form the Coosa river, the two rivers 
with the railroad running due south as far as Kingston form a tri- 
angle. The railroad at the latter place runs due east to Cass Sta- 
tion, then south through Carterville and crossing the Etowah ai 
Allatoona Pass, and a branch railroad runs from Kingston to Rome 
where it stopped, at that time. If General Johnston had held the 
same opinion of Sherman, as did the Southern newspapers, and the 
Richmond authorities, that the Federal general would not be able 
to handle so large an army in a general engagement, he had cer- 
tainly reason, by the last few days' operations, to change his mind, 
which was plainly indicated by the Confederate leader, seeking a 
place where at least he could have protection for one of his flanks 
against the aggressive movements of the energetic leader of the Fed- 
eral forces. ♦Although each corps and division of Sherman's grand 
army, had received their orders where to cross the different rivers. 
General Flooker took it upon himself to violate his instruction. The 
Twenty-third Corps had been assigned different places to cross the 
Connasauga, to the eastward, and thence by the old Federal road 
across the Coosawattee, some five miles east of Adairville. This 
made our march several miles longer than the rest of the army, but 
we kept abreast of the center, although we did not have the benefit 
of the pontoons, they being at Lay's Ferry. The infantry waded the 
streams, so deep that the water reached up to their arm pits and the 
artillery and wagons had to be ferried over by boats. 
Our division crossed the Connasauga at Hogan's Ferry, and the 
Coosawattee at Field's Ferry. Hooker had been ordered to march 
on the Newton road, but he soon learned that the crossing at the 
mouth of the Connasauga was not fordable. He turned east and 
reached Fite's ford where a portion of Schofield's corps had been 
ordered to cross, and there crossed the Connasauga, just as a part of 
the Twenty-third Corps reached the ford, then marching to Mc- 
Clure's ford, another crossing assigned to Schofield, and crossed 
the Coosawattee. Schofield remonstrated with Hooker about his 
sublime cheek in taking charge of the former crossing, but the latter 
told the chief of the Army of the Ohio, that it would be best for him 
(Schofield) to march back to Resaca and cross in rear of the Army 



of the Cumberland. Hooker also took charge of McClure's 
ford, another crossing assigned to Schotield,, and crossed 
on finding his assigned fords unfordable. This was not the only 
place where Hooker blocked the road of other troops, as we shall 
see in the progress of our narrative. By doing so he disarranged 
the plans of the commander-in-chief, and inasmuch as Hooker had 
to ford the river at both places, he could have done so, and reached 
his position sooner if he had remained on the road to Newtown. 

On the 17th, while marching from Hogan's Ferry to Field's 
Mill, we passed through an Indian reservation. While the native 
Americans were peacefully looking on, watching their pale faced 
brethren going after each other, they had really grown quite jubi- 
lant, but were about to have an unlooked for charge thrown on 
them. The people in the towns along the line of railroad, at Resaca, 
Calhoun, Adairsville, Kingston and Cassville, had left their homes 
and sought safety with bag and baggage in this Indian reservation, 
which they thought would be respected by friend and foe, and 
where they could remain without the tramp of a soldier to disturb 
them. Although the reservation was quite a distance north of the 
railroad. Hooker's imposition had caused us to make our march 
through the wild habitation of the Red man, where the women and 
children of the pale faces, whose husbands and fathers were with 
the Southern army, now sought protection from their deadly ene- 
mies. It was truly a sad sight to see these people, that should have 
lived in peace and happiness, camping out, with but meagre belong- 
ings, among these American Indians. 

During the many halts our guns excited the great curiosity of 
the Red men, and smoking their pipes of peace, they came forward 
to closely inspect the death dealing instruments on wheels. 
The interference of Hooker, in our line of march caused 
us to be on the road nearly all night of the 17th, and 
we did not reach Big Springs until 3 a. m. on the 
morning of the iSth. The Confederates had halted to give us bat- 
tle, a mile south of Calhoun, and north of Adairsville, but the theater 
in which to operate was found too narrow, and Johnston's engineers 
reported it so. Being pressed by the heavy column of the Army of 
the Cumberland in their front and the Armies of the Tennessee and 
Ohio moving on left and right flank, the Confederate chieftain gave 
orders to retreat to Cassville, Sherman in his game with Johnston 
had quite the advantage, as the Army of the Cumberland was al- 


ways strong enough to hold the enemy until the Armies of the Ohio 
and the Tennessee could come in on his flanks and rear. Such 
movements continued throughout the whole of the Atlanta cam- 
paign. The Federal cavalry on the right flank of the Union line, 
under General Garrard, had marched down on the right bank of the 
Ostanaula, until it reached Rome, leaving its artillery belnnd. 
Garrard made a flying column of his troopers, supported by Davis' 
division of the Fourteenth Corps, and the army thus extended pre- 
sented a front of twenty miles or more. After McPherson crossed 
the Ostanaula, with his army, at the mouth of Snake Creek, he took 
up the pontoons and marched to the crossing near a mill on the 
Octhealogee creek, just south of Calhoun. The Army of the Cum- 
berland had not been able to proceed so rapidly, and to cross the 
bridge at 'Resaca, with its large artillery and wagon trains, required 
the whole of the i6th, and for this reason Hooker had been ordered 
to follow the Newtown road and cross the Ostanaula there. Instead, 
he took Schofleld's route and crossed the Connasauga between 
Resaca and Tilton, and forded the Coosawattee at McClure's- Ferry, 
as described. In the march of Schofield's corps, up to Field's Mill 
on the Coosawattee, Hooker's Twentieth Corps was on the same 
road and we only came within four miles of the crossing on that 
day. The crossing of the Coosawattee by the Army of the Ohio 
occupied the whole of the 17th, and as the center of the Grand Army 
had been steadily advancing Schofield determined to be in position 
near Adairsville, on the morning of the i8th. After a little rest 
near the crossi.ig, beginning at 10 o'clock that night until 3 in the 
morning of the iSth, he marched on the Adairsville road to within 
three miles of that village. 

Hooker's corps had crossed the Coosawattee at McClure, and 
marched on the 17th on the road to Adairsville. This brought. 
Hooker on the left of Howard's Fourth Corps, then the center of 
the Army of the Cumberland, as also of Sherman's whole army. 
As the Fourth Corps approached Adairsville the enemy's rear guard 
offered determined resistance, having made temporary breastworks 
of fence rails and logs, behind which they fought, retiring and then 
forming a new line, but very slowly did Johnston's troops move to 
the rear. It was at this place that Johnston intended to give us a 
decisive engagement, and General Sherman, who was with New- 
ton's division of the Fourth Corps, drew the enemy's fire and him- 
self had a narrow escape from a shot of the Confederate artillery. 


McPhersoii's line of march had first led him away from Thomas, 
but in the evening of the 17th was turning to the eastward, on the 
roads to Adairsville, coming in on the left flank of Johnston's army, *■ 
north of the town. The indications that evening gave Sherman the 
hope that Johnston would fight a pitched battle the next day and 
the campaign ended then and there. The commander-in-chief, 
therefore, issued his orders for concentration, but at daybreak on the 
1 8th, the Confederate lines were vacant. Sherman's desire to come. to 
battle with Johnston had the appearance of being gratified by the 
Confederate leader, as he had selected the narrow valley of the 
Octhealogee creek, with his flanks bordering on the hills, well pro- 
tected by cavalry and infantry, and the line deployed across the val- 
ley gave him a strong defensive position. But after testing the 
Federal advance with a brisk skirmish, against the central part of 
Sherman's column, the Confederate leader lost confidence in his 
selection of the ground, and retreated to Cassville and Kingston, 
believing that Sherman's army was now divided, that he could de- 
stroy the left wing of his adversary before the center and right 
wing could reach the battle field. Our march after crossing the 
river at Fields Mill was not far. We rested in the early hours of 
the morning of the i8th long enough to feed the teams, and then 
continued on, until we reached Marsteller's Mill, where the Twenty- 
third Corps ran again into Butterfield's division of the Twentieth 
Corps. This allowed us to rest for the night, and for the first time 
since our leaving Rocky Face ridge on the 12th, we were permitted 
to take the harness off the horses. 

Early on the morning of the 19th we were again on the march, 
and as there was some chance of meeting the enemy in battle that 
day, we were eager to go forward. General Cox led our division 
and brought it up to the ground which was disputed by the enemy's 
cavalry. With Hooker's corps on our right, in line of battle, Scho- 
field had the little army of the Ohio well in hand, and deployed the 
whole of the Twenty-third Corps on the left of Hooker. Our 
(Cox's) division formed the extreme left of our corps, and the 
army now advanced and crossed the two Run creek, into a position 
about a mile to the north and east of Cassville. For some distance 
a brisk skirmish had been kept up, but our movement had been cov- 
ered by thick timber and under brush, through which there was 
hardly a cow path, surely nothing worthy the name of a road. As 
we emerged from the woods we found ourselves in the rear and on 


the right of General Hood's Confederate Corps. Major Wells, the 
division chief of artillery, came and ordered me to bring the battery- 
forward to a position in an open field, where General Cox had taken 
position to take a full view of the Confederate line, as now presented 
to us. We unlimbered our guns, I gave the elevation and distance 
at 800 yards and loaded with shrapnell. We fired to hit, and as it 
was done so accurately we received the compliments then and there 
from General Cox. We kept up this fire until dark, and remained 
in the same position all night. 'As Thomas had moved his whole 
army, the TwCiitieth, Fourth and Fourteenth Corps, we had a con- 
tinuous line of battle on the north, extending to the hills that encircle 
Cassville on the west, opposing the Confederates that had formed on 
the range cf hills east of Cassville, with their left reaching as far as 
Cartersviiie. In this position the Union Army remained for the 
night, expecting the morrow to be the day of a big battle. 

The Confederates in their retreat had followed the railroad and 
at Kingston were joined by French's division from Rome, that had, 
on the approach of Davis' division of the Fourteenth Corps, evacu- 
ated that place. Very probably for lack of other transportation in 
the Confederacy, Johnston's army had learned the value of a line of 
communication b}^ rail, just as well as we had, and since this road 
led into Allatoona gorges, it appeared that the Confederate leader 
was trying to decoy us in that direction, where Sherman's larger 
numbei of troops would not count so much against him. The Federal 
commander was, therefore, very anxious to get at his opponent be- 
fore the mountain fastnesses were reached. Johnston's position, 
around the hills east of Cassville, were of his own selection and a 
very strong one, so much so that he decided to retreat no further, 
and in a stirring address to his troops, claimed that his communi- 
cations were secure, and that he was ready to meet our columns with 
full confidence in the conduct of his officers and the courage of his 
soldiers, and so he would lead them into battle. This was on the 
19th, just before we, the third division of the Twenty-third Corps, 
appeared upon his flank and rear, which caused Hood and Polk, his 
two principal corps commanders, to become alarmed and protested 
against going into battle at that place, which influence prevailing 
induced Johnston to continue the retreat across the Etowah river. 
In heeding the advice of his corps commanders Johnston made a 
great mistake, which he soon discovered, and never ceased to regret 
it. As Johnston's relations with the Richmond government were al- 


ready strained, before he entered upon this campaign, the retreat from 
Dalton to tne Etowah had not helped to restore the confidence of 
the Southern authorities, and if continued would finally deprive him 
of the command. His pubhshed order that a battle was to be 
fought, and then retreating during the night, had created great mis- 
chief with his troops, and a defeat in battle could have done no more 
damage to the morale of the army, than this movement to the rear, 
without a battle. By Sherman's position at Kingston, we could 
turn the fastness of the Allatoona Mountains, and that town was 
made a base of supplies, or the movement upon Dallas and Marietta, 
and on the 20th of May orders were in the hands of the commanders 
of the three armies who soon communicated them to the corps com- 
manders. Then in turn transmitted them to the division and bri- 
^gade commanders, that on the 23d the forward march was to begin, 
and with a supply in haversack and wagon to last twenty days, be- 
fore we would be near the railroad again. 

On the early morning of the 20th we were astir, having only 
to rise to be in position for battle, but to our surprise the enemy had 
left his trenches and was on the retreat. The duty to follow was 
delegated to General Cox, and his (our) third division. We 
marched at once down into Cassville, and as the road led close to 
the enemy's defences we inspected the destruction we had done with 
our guns on the evening before. General Thomas had also come 
over and taken a view, and while noticing the dismounted carriages 
and dead horses in rear of Hood's line, one of the general officers re- 
marked: "Those boys that handled the guns that enfiladed these 
lines fired to hit." Another promptly answered : "Yes, and they 
wasted no ammunition." These remarks were very pleasing to us, 
and a merited compliment to the artillery captain that had instructed 
lis. Captain John C. H. Von Sehlen, who always cautioned us to 
waste no ammunition and make the first shot hit the mark. It was 
sincerely regretted that he could not be with us to see the results of 
his teaching. 

Our advance was in line of battle, our battery moved down into 
town, halted near a little run, close by where General Cox and staff 
halted, as did the whole division to give the retiring Confederates 
time to get out of our way, for their conclusions not to give battle 
at Cassville must have been reached late at night or early in the 
morning, for at 10 a. m. a division of the Southerners still barred 
ov:r march to Cass Station and Cartersville. Near where we halted 


was a one-story brick house, apparently abandoned. One of our 
men named Morgan, we called him "Mulligan" Morgan, by reason 
of his having lost three fingers v/ith "Mulligan," at Lexington, Mo. 
(and who is, at this writing, a respected citizen of Peru, Indiana), 
entered the house and found no one there except a sleeping baby not 
more than six months old. He reported the find to me, and as my 
eyes just then were in the direction of the enemy's line of battle in 
our front, slowly retreating, we caught sight of a woman coming 
direct from them, toward us, dressed in a black silk, with- 
out hat or bonnet. The sweat was streaming down her cheeks, and 
with quick steps she entered the house, crying for her baby that was 
still asleep. Being questioned about her leaving home she said that 
her husband was with Johnston's army, and as the great God had 
all children in His charge, she trusted in Him, that no harm would 
come to the little one, and she would stay with her husband until 
the coming battle would be over, but as the Confederate officers 
had learned of her predicament they passed her through the lines, 
telling her that the Yankees would not harm her or the baby. With 
this encouragement she risked her life, and came to stay with her 
little one, but woman like, her thoughts had been more on the black 
silk dress than her infant child. We assured her that she was more 
safe in her home than elsewhere. She had thought so, too, until 
about 4 o'clock on the afternoon of the 19th when the Federal artil- 
lery opened on the Confederates, and the latter replied for over 
three hours, and she believed Dante's Infernos were in control. The 
fear she suffered in her cellar, first in one corner, then in another, 
during those hours, was indescribable, and she felt relieved when the 
firing ceased, but came to no conclusion to follow her husband until 
early in the morning. The baby, like herself, had been tired out, 
and she left it asleep in the crib, donned the best dress she had, left 
for the Confederate lines, from where she was turned back, as stated. 
Our division moved forward, but found stubborn resistance, so that 
we did not reach Cartersville until the twilight in the evening. The 
slow movement of the enemy to the rear was caused by the Confed- 
erates to prepare for the destruction of the bridges over the Etowah, 
which they burned as soon as the rear guard had crossed. From 
our side the One-hundred-and-third Ohio and the Twenty-fourth 
Kentucky, under command of Colonel Casement, were sent to de- 
stroy the mill and iron works, several miles up stream. The work 
was accomplished w^ith neatness and dispatch, just in a manner as 


Colonel Casement had a way of doing. These mills had been of 
the greatest value to the Confederacy, and Johnston had been willing 
to fight a battle to prevent their loss, but the destruction of these 
industrial works was only another sign that the Confederacy was 
going to pieces. Colonel Casement proved to be considerably of a 
mill man, and therefore made a clean job of its destruction without 
the loss of one man. 

The Army of the Ohio, including Stoneman's cavalry division, 
were concentrated by Schofield at Cartersville, and enjoyed the few 
days' rest, for the first time since we had left Knoxville. General 
George Thomas with the heavy columns of the great center occupied 
Kingston, and McPherson's Army of the Tennessee was close to his 
right. Davis' division of the Fourteenth Corps was still at Rome, a 
place that had been of great importance to the Confederates, on ac- 
count of its U'on works and machine shops, and which had been a 
great depot of supplies for the Confederate government. General 
Blair, with his Seventh Corps, was on the road to join Sherman, from 
Decatur, Alabama. We had now been on the road ten days since 
starting to outflank Johnston, and lived on short rations, leaving 
wagons and baggage behind. The order for this had been literally 
carried out by officers and men, and both had learned to do without 
any surplus, except such as we were able to carry with us, and the 
soldier had learned to cling to his knapsack and mess kit to save him 
from utter misery. While the infantry officer was expected to be 
ready for quick movement, when occasion required it, he was not 
able to be supplied with both mess kit and quarters, and was there- 
fore in a more distressing condition than we, and without wagon and 
baggage many valuable reports have never been made by reason of 
not even having their company desk at their disposal. 

t In the artillery this was somewhat different, as the government 
required us to pull a battery wagon with us, and there was always 
room for the company desk, so that at the moment we stopped the 
battery was able to make a full report of its day's operations. The 
commanding officer of our battery had relieved our company clerk 
from performing other duty, and although we had fired nearly three 
thousand rounds since the opening of the campaign, had lost the 
first cannoneer killed in Sherman's grand army, had opened the bat- 
tle of Resaca on the early morning of the 14th of May, had en- 
filaded the Confederate lines at Cassville so that Johnston changed 
his whole plan of battle, yet not a line or single act has been re- 


corded by the proper officer of the Fifteenth Indiana battery, and 
no excuse for this neglect existed except his utter incompetence. 

The greatest sacrihce had to be made to carry out the reasonable 
orders of the commanding general, to leave our baggage behind, 
and without which the Georgia campaign, under Sherman, could 
hardly have been a success. "The soldier's joy is to destroy," espe- 
cially when the troops are called on to live in portion on the enemy's 
countr}^ Their track is covered by desolation and the rights of 
property are disregarded, and it is hard to distinguish the legitimate 
exercise of the rules of war from abuse. Where crops are taken, 
fences and timber appropriated for breastworks and camp fires, and 
buildings dismantled to build bridges at such times apparently nec- 
essary and lawful, but with such devastation disappear the well 
filled barn yards of pigs and poultry, the smoke houses cleaned of 
their bacon and the delicacies of the pantry all gone. Discipline 
strongly forbids these abuses, but there is strong sympathy with the 
solider who is looking for a simple change of diet from the regular 
army ration, and the habit of his might ease his conscience as to his 
right, and only in exceptional cases where officers have winked at 
the license, that pillage has become wanton and in rare cases arson 
committed to cover the crime. With all of these troubles we were 
actually free from the vagabonds that have followed and scoured the 
battlefields of Europe, and then stripped the dead and the wounded, 
and criminal personal assaults upon the unarmed were never heard 
of. A vacant house, however, would usually find itself in flames 
and the region where active operations had taken place would be- 
come desolate, a sure sign of which would be that the carrion birds 
would hover overhead and then pounce down upon the dead horses 
and mules, feasting upon them without being disturbed by an other 
living thing. Such is the picture of a country that war has swept 
over. Strict orders forbidding soldiers from entering houses was 
tried to be carried out by the officers, but it required only a small 
fraction of the grand army of a hundred thousand men to spoil the 
efforts of the others, and in this regard the Confederate stragglers, 
as they retreated, were more to be feared than the invading Union 
forces, for :he latters respect for person and property, among our 
own people, v/ill compare favorably with any other army over 
the whole world, but any tendency to barbarity is necessarily an 
incident to the war, and not due to ferocious nature or lack of dis- 


During our rest at Cartersville, General Judah was relieved 
of the command of the second division, Twenty-third Army Corps, 
and Brigadier General liascall succeeded him. Both were officers in 
the regular establishment and graduates of West Point. In the battle 
of Resaca the second division had met with severe loss without cor- 
responding results. The brigade commanders in their report bitter- 
ly complained of the way the division had been led in the fight, com- 
pelling the army commander to examine into the complaints, which 
caused prompt action for a change, due to lack of judgment and 
coolness, when under grave responsibility. On the morning of the 
23d of May the division marched from Cartersville along the Euhar- 
lee road, parallel with the Etowah river. When near a hamlet known 
as Etowah Cliffs, we came to a halt, caused by the interference of 
General Hooker (this time not his own fault), who had taken 
charge, by an order of General Thomas to cross his corps over the 
two pontoons laid by Schofield's engineers, near Milan's bridge. 
The latter had been burned, but as there were many fords near the 
crossing. Hooker could have passed the river without coming to 
Schofield's bridges and while thus detained, the enemy's cavalry 
appeared on the other side, and they promptly brought their artil- 
lery forward and fired on our flank while on the march, changing 
position just as we advanced, but we were not permitted to come 
to an action left, to reply to them. The order for Hooker to cross 
at the Twenty-third Corps bridges came near deranging Sherman's 
plans and caused us to halt on the road all that night. As Hooker 
had his trains to follow him they kept the right of way. Such a 
loose system of marching could only have serious result, if continued, 
and, happily, it did not occur again during that campaign. 

On our Resaca movement we had started with ten days' rations 
to flank Johnston out of his Cassville position, but now we were 
ordered to provide for twenty days' rations, while absent from 
direct railroad communication, which indicated a movement of 
large proportion before we would again be in touch with the rail- 
road near our camps. Kingston became the depot where supplies 
were loaded in the army wagons and a brigade, under General 
Raum, was placed there, as a garrison. Veterans, recruits and new 
regiments, all m.en full of enthusiasm and of the best quality, came 
forward to the army which supplied the losses sustained in battle. 
The Twenty-third Corps received nine regiments of these while 
: resting on the Etowah. We also were fully supplied by fresh and 


good beef from the herds that followed the army; also bacon, full 
rations of bread or flour were issued, with the regular allowance of 
small rations, coffee, sugar and extras in the shape of vegetables for 
men, and long forage for horses and mules. In the early part of the 
war, ground coffee of very poor quality had been issued, so that 
upon analyzing the same it was found that there was practically no - 
coffee in it, but at this time the genuine article was issued. While 
the infantry used their bayonets, our men had attached an iron 
coffee mill on the trail of the gun or caisson, and under the caisson 
and near the fifth wheel was their mess kit, coffee pot and frying 
pan ; also a large camp kettle for boiling and washing clothing. The 
battery boys were right there, both in promptness and first in coffee 
making, which to our army served the same as in the German forces, 
the "Erbst Wurst," and in the French the soup; but I believe the 
American beverage was much more of a comfort and luxury as well 
as a better restorative than either or any of the European substitutes. 
How and why the Confederate Army got along without this native 
stimulant, and were able to keep the field, I have never seen explained 
in print. Some of their writers have told us that on stopping on the 
march their haversacks and stomachs being empty they were told 
to stack arms and go into the corn fields and get their rations. 
Now, this would be all right when the corn was ready to be gathered, 
but how about it in the spring of the year ? Our men would, during 
any halt, jump into a fence corner and the first thing to do was to 
make a cup of coffee, and then, as they would say, try it again, to 
crush this tremendous rebellion. 


On the evening of May 23d, while the division was waiting to 
cross the Etov\^ah, I received an order from the corps headquarters 
to proceed in the early morning to Cass Station, where we had left 
our forage and battery wagon with the disabled horses and mules, and 
the supernumerary men, and to bring all to Kingston, draw several 
hundred fresh horses for the corps batteries, and rejoin as soon as 
possible, wherever the main column of the corps was found. Why I 
was selected I have never learned, for my knowledge was limited as 
to a good horse from a bad one, and either of the other two officers 
in our battery, or the other corps artillery officers had, on account 
of their rural life before the war, much better judgment than I of 
horses. But such were the orders, and I had no reason to ask why; 


only to obey. I selected my orderly (Swain), a soldier of long experi- 
ence before the war, and early in the morning received special instruc- 
tion from General Cox, who cautioned me to look out for the ene- 
my's cavalry, as our left flank was exposed, and they would most 
likely be found in the neighborhood of Cassville. Our ride was 
over a distance of ten miles, and on the road we met 
several citizens of old age picking up blankets and other articles in 
the vacated camps of the Twentieth Corps. The sun was warm and 
the road dusty. Without meeting any troops we reached Cassville, 
the place where we had left our battery wagon and forge with 
horses and men, but on inquiry of a lady and her daughter were 
told that they moved the night before to Cass Station. I asked 
■" these people for a drink of water. They asked if I did not prefer a 
glass of cool milk. They had during the fight of the 19th and 
20th been out in the woods and taken their cow with them and 
had returned the day before to their home. Of course the milk 
was much preferred, and a crock full handed to us. We emptied the 
same and Swain mounted his horse, telling me, "Lieutenant, let us 
get out of here; I don't like the looks, as the surroundings are en- 
tirely too quiet." So it was. I put my left foot in the stirrup, 
ready to mount, still questioning the lady, when, to our surprise, 
Wheeler's cavalry, two thousand five hundred strong, came gallop- 
ing down the same hill that had been occupied by Johnston's army 
on the 19th. A second and I was in my saddle, gave the spurs to 
my horse and Swain did the same. In a bound we were over the 
stone fence over three feet high, and as fast as the horses could run, 
on the road to Kingston. After reaching the high ground near 
the seminary, we looked back and saw the whole town full of the 
enemy. We lost no time and rode at a trot to the crossing of the 
Cass Station and Kingston roads, where a sutler of the Twentieth 
Corps had spread his wares. Swain dismounted and entered the 
tent, asking for a big pair of riding boots. Swain simply told the 
sutler he wanted them and no price was asked, but the sutler was 
informed that as the enemy would soon relieve him of the rest of 
his wares the best thing he could do was to mount his horse, take 
his cash and get out. Swain asked me what I wanted. I told him 
a can of peaches would do. The sutler would not let it go, but 
Swain mounted again. I was mounted, and while still arguing with 
the sutler the teams of the Twenty-third Corps, that had been at Cass 
Station with our battery wagon, came in sight down a mud road that 


formed an angle at the sutler's tent. The colored drivers on the teams 
were thoroughly frightened, fearing capture by Wheeler's cavalry, 
and loudly did they plead for help and mercy. I placed myself in 
the road. On our right was a platoon of tlie enemy's cavalry trying 
to dispute our boys the right-of-way. 

The quartermaster of the One-hundred-and-Twelfth Illi- 
nois, at the head of the train, told me that our men 
Avere in the column. The quartermaster left me and went back to 
see about his wagons and was captured. Just then we heard the 
command given by an enemy's officer, "Charge them." I wheeled 
my horse, Swain did the same and with revolver in hand rode back 
on the road to Kingston as fast as our horses could run. We soon 
reached a little stream with an open pasture on the right and left of 
the road. On our right was a platoon of the enemy's cavalry trying 
to get across the run and head us off. One of them, with a better 
horse than the others, succeeded. He rode up to a squad of con- 
valescents, unarmed, and demanded their surrender. While talking 
to the men Swain and I came abreast of him on the road, both fired 
and his horse fell. The convalescents saw their chance and ran for 
the thick brush not more than two hundred yards distant. Swain 
and I galloped on and reached the brush, also. The advance train 
guard, a small body of men, had deployed along the edges of the 
woods and stopped the raiders from following. We rode on until 
we reached Colonel Boyd's quartermaster wagon broken down in 
the road. ^^> took in the situation at once, saw the quartermaster's 
little safe, took it out of the wagon and carried it into the woods for 
s short distance. Just then we heard the Confederate horsemen gal- 
loping after us, causing us to again hastily mount and away we went 
to Kingston AA'ith our enemy in close pursuit. I lost my cap on the 
road, and in our flight as we passed a house two women were stand- 
ing on the porch shouting. "Get. Yankees, get !" no doubt thinking 
this to be the end of our presence in Georgia. We did not stop now 
until we reached our outpost at Kingston. I sent Swain into town to 
get me a hat. With his return came Colonel Boj^d, the chief quar- 
termaster -of the Twenty-third Corps, with a section of artiller}'- from 
the Twenty-fourth Indiana battery, and about 500 men. With 
these we marched forward to see what had become of the others. 
We again passed the house where we received the admonition by the 
women to fly, but now no one greeted us on our return. Swain 
wanted to go in the house but I would not permit it. We finally 


reached Boyd's wagon, or what was left of it. His safe was gone, 
but one of his clerks sneaked around in the woods, and to his great 
delight, found the safe where Swain and I had rolled it. When 
Boyd examined the contents he found them untouched, and, there- 
fore, was highly delighted, but Swain was mad for he said that he 
had intended to come back, explode the safe, divide the contents, 
$125,000 with me, and let Boyd account for the money as "lost in 

We now proceeded to where the sutler had been, passing the 
run. We saw the dead horse that came so near making a lot of us 
prisoners, but oh, what a sight was the sutler's tent, not a thing left, 
only old shoes and dirty stockings marked the place where such a 
short time before the New York merchant had spread his wares, bent 
on making a fortune out of the men who ofifered their lives for their 
country. Now his money and stores all taken, and himself a 
prisoner for the rest of the war. We passed a little further and 
found a number of dead horses and mules covered with broken 
down wagons set on fire. We looked for our comrades of the bat- 
tery wagon and forge. Just then Corporal Pearman of our battery 
came out of the brush where he had been in hiding and informed 
me that Alexander Matlock and five others, the saddler of the bat- 
tery, and in charge of the forge, battery wagon and broken down 
horses, had been made prisoners, and that he, while hiding in the 
brush, had seen them driven off. The quartermaster of the 
One-hundred-and-twelfth Illinois Infantry had also been 
taken. We marched a little further and I exam- 
ined the woods close by, somewhat in advance of the others. 
Colonel Boyd sent a stafif officer after me, fearing I might go too far 
and be captured, I returned, and with Boyd's command, reached 
Kingston late in the evening. On my arrival at Kingston I reported 
to the post commander of what had occurred, and not finding any 
horses to draw, I, on the recommendation of the captain of the 
Twenty-fourth Indiana battery, was placed in charge of building a 
stockade, in an octagon form. Waiting several days for horses to 
arrive, and as none appeared, I asked for an order to return to the 
battery, as Swain had already returned, Pearman staying with me. 


On the morning of the 31st Corporal Pearman and myself 
started on our march to the battery. We had not far to go until an 


ambulance train heavily loaded with the wounded of the Twentieth 
Corps casualities rnet us, another and another followed at a respect- 
ful distance. The first one passed in silence, as though the occu- 
pants had already passed away. AVe probably made more than half 
the distance, when we passed in the woods a log cabin and found a 
young lady badly wounded in the leg. She related how she received 
the wound from a Confederate skirmisher that had taken protection 
behind the trees. The Confederate, of course, was driven off by the 
Federals, but they had wounded the fair lady while she looked on 
the exciting scene at the skirmish line. The wound had bled pro- 
fusely, but proved to be onl}^ a flesh wound. The main line of our 
army soon reached the place, and a surgeon had dressed her wound. 
This was three days ago. Since then many surgeons, and probably 
some not surgeons, had passed that way, and as they learned of the 
lady's wound, they each in turn insisted on dressing and redressing 
the same. 

At first she thought this necessar}'-, but by the advice of one 
elderly physician she declined future surgical treatment, and the 
young saw-bones who were so eager to dress her leg had to pass on 
to the front where their services were more in demand. 

We reached the batter}^ after an all day ride, Pearman on foot 
and in the wagons and partly on my horse, when I wanted to stretch 
my legs by walking. We found that the day before Frank Rose had 
been wounded by a sharp shooter in a peculiar place, that had ampu- 
tated a very useful member better than a surgeon's knife could have 
done, but it caused him to make a terrible howl. That same evening 
a spy had passed along our line and made many inquiries of such a 
nature that Lieutenant Harvey sent a notice of his action to division 
headquarters, then not far away ; but as he could show his credentials 
he was not disturbed in his search for information. After making 
some more inquiries, he walked at right angles from our battery over 
to the enemy's line, and just in sufficient time for the Confederates 
to bring several batteries forward to open a most terrific fire upon 
us, as a sure evidence that it was a spj^'s work, who would sell his 
information to both sides. 

The morning after my arrival I wanted to learn the lay of the 
land, and mounted my horse and took a ride off to the right. After 
passing some distance in the open woods and taking a good look at 
every point, without seeing our own line, I returned to what I 
thought the rear of our army. On the edge of an open field I rode 


along uncoiiGerned, until I reached a ravine. Here I was halted by 
an outpost of the Army of the Cumberland, and close by was Sut- 
termeister of the Eleventh Indiana Battery. I identified myself to 
the vidette and went to Sutterm.eister's guns. One of the lieuten- 
ants said he would not have made the exposed ride for $100,000, 
and as I was riding deliberately and slowly, did not see why 
the sharp shooters had not picked me off. They requested me to 
dismount at once, so as not to cause an attraction for the enemy, and 
after more greetings and looking through my glasses at the now 
plainly revealed enemy's line, they indicated how I could reach with 
safety my own battery. After such a narrow escape, I lost no time 
to get there. On my arrival at the battery I found a letter from 
my former schoolmate, Henry Brandt. He had been a resident of 
Texas, and the fortunes of war had made him a prisoner and sent 
him to Camp Morton. 

I seated myself beside a rock, and by taking a tray from the 
caisson limber, made a writing desk to answer his letter. For sev- 
eral hours we had no rain, and writing in full view of the enemy's 
line, it was not long before two bullets struck against the rock I was 
-writing on. I promptly changed to a more secure position, but it 
occurred to me as something strange, that they allowed me to ride in 
front of their line for nearly a mile without a shot being fired at me, 
and now while near secure quarters, they sought my destruction 
while writing to one of their comrades. 

On June 12th, when Cox's division marched on the Sandtown 
and Marietta roads from Picket's Mill to New Hope Church, Col- 
onel Cameron, then commanding a brigade, was ordered on a road 
parallel with the main road, but about three-fourths of a mile farther 
south. It was intended for him to draw the enemy's fire, if pos- 
sible. The Fifteenth Indiana Battery was ordered to accompany him. 
Colonel Cameron, at the head of his brigade, carried out the order. 
Shortly after the start was made Lieutenant Harvey joined Cam- 
eron. The latter ordered Harvey to remain with the battery, and 
see that the men were ready at a moment's notice for action. Har- 
vey deliberately told Cameron that neither he nor any men of the 
Fifteenth Indiana Battery were under his orders. After a few more 
words, Harvey came to see me and instructed me to pay no atten- 
tion to Cameron's orders. Cameron soon followed Harvey and 
placed him under arrest, and put me in command of the battery. As 
soon as we reached the end of the march, General Cox sent for me, 


and after cross-questioning me, ignored the whole trouble, which, 
if Cameron had persisted in, would have terminated very badly for 
Harvey, for early in the campaign, Sherman issued a circular from^ 
headquarters stating that if the question of rank came up where two 
or more officers happened to be together on duty, calling for a com- 
mon head, the officer highest in rank present must give the orders 
and be held responsible. As our reports had to be made to division 
headquarters, Harvey had the firm belief that we were not subject 
to the brigade commander's orders. Harvey had similar trouble 
with General Reiley, another brigade commander, in our division. 







In the latter part of May the several columns of Sherman's 
grand army were in motion for Dallas, and thence along the ridge 
that forms the water shed of the Chattanooga and the Etowah to- 
wards Kenesaw and Marietta. The enemy's cavalry was very 
active on the southeastern bank of the Etowah, but Schofield had 
sent Stoneman to look after Wheeler at Cass Station, which caused 
the latter's prompt withdrawal, as soon as he had destroyed and cap- 
tured a part of the disabled wagon train of the Twenty-third Corps^ 
which I have just described. The infantry column of the Army of 
the Ohio did not push on so fast after crossing the Etowah, as 
necessit}^ required that that corps was to remain in touch with the 
river for the protection of our left flank and rear until Johnston let 
go of the fastness of Allatoona. After Schofield crossed the Etowah 
on the 24th he marched east through Stilesborough, across Rich- 
land creek, and reached the road that runs from Cassville to Ma- 
rietta. Stoneman had crossed the river on the 22d, but the erratic 
movements of Wheeler had caused the former to recross to watch the 
Confederate horsemen that had detained the Union troopers for 
several days in the vicinity of Allatoona. The third division of the 
Twenty-third Corps having the lead, "under General Cox," marched 
on the Cassville and Marietta road to Sligh's Mill, to the forks of the 
road, one branch turning along the ridges to Burnt Hickory, a place 
about half way from Kingston to Dallas, where the Army of the 
Cumberland had rested for the night. Cox's and Hascall's division 
of the Twenty-third Corps camped at Sligh's Mill while Hovey's 


first division, with the trains, were on the road from Stilesborough, 
on Raccoon creek, several miles west of Sligh's Mill, protected by 
Cox and Hascall's division. McPherson's Army of the Tennessee 
was near Van Wert, west of the Army of the Cumberland, on 
the Rome and Dallas road. The two divisions of the Army of the 
Ohio remained at Sligh's Mill untl May 25th, in the evening, thus 
permittmg the center under Thomas, and the right wing, under 
McPherson, of the grand army, to swing forward and approach 
Dallas, while the Twenty-third Corps was to move in the same di- 
rection. When Johnston learned, through his cavalry leader, 
Wheeler, of the march of Sherman's army to Dallas, the Confeder- 
ate leader at once put his troops in motion and Hardee's corps, then 
leading, and his left wing, marched to Dallas, took position cover- 
ing the Atlanta road and formed in line to his right, towards New 
Hope Church. 

Hood's corps was placed in position to the right of the church 
and Polk's in the center on the main road from Allatoona, all along 
the ridge between the Pumpkinvine Creek and the Etowah, near 
the source of the Sweetwater and Powder Spring Creek. 

The Confederate movement was disclosed to Sherman by the 
capture of a dispatch which changed the Union leader's plans, so 
that he ordered Hooker to advance in the direction against the 
enemy at New Hope Church, instead of at Dallas. This caused 
the battle at the former place, between Hood, then on the defensive, 
and Hooker on the aggressive. The combat began at about 4 
o'clock in the afternoon and lasted until dark. This affair 
caused all the rest of the grand army to march forward, to be near 
the point of battle. vSchofield, by the way of Burnt Hickory, pushed 
the Twenty-third Corps forward, the rest of the Army of the Cum- 
berland coming to the support of Hooker, and McPherson continued 
his march to Dallas. 

The third division of the Twenty-third Corps marched at 5 p. 
m. from Sligh's Mill to Burnt Hickory, and then followed the roadj 
to Owen's Mill. On our march we were overtaken by a thunder! 
storm that lasted all night with a heavy downpour of rain. We] 
made great effort to get to the assistance of Hooker, but his wagons] 
blocked the road, causing a slow march that fatigued us to the last 
degree. At midnight we had not reached Pumpkinvine Creek, hni 
rested and waited for orders from Schofield, who had gone forward] 
to communicate with Sherman. On his way back he met with an' 


accident, by the fall of his horse, and General Cox, then the senior 
officer, was placed in charge of the corps and reported to Shemian 
after an hour's rest. The divisions continued the forward march 
and at break of day reached their position on the field, being formed 
in line on the left of the Fourth Corps, advancing through a terribly 
tangled forest, until near Brown's saw mill, to the front of Hooker 
and to our extreme left, ovoer the Dallas and Allatoona road. 

As Johnston was outflanked by the Army of the Ohio on his 
right, Sherman expected McPherson's movement to bring about 
similar results on our right, but the latter was not able to cover the 
distance, although Davis' division of the Fourteenth Corps was 
still with him, but he could not connect with Hooker's line. The 
isolated position of the Army of the Tennessee in front of Dallas 
was a dangerous one, and if Johnston had been able to take care of 
the advantages he could have destroyed McPherson. The Con- 
federates had formed their line along some branches of the Pump- 
kinvine Creek, and on the 27th McPherson moved toward his left 
to connect with Hooker, which brought Davis' division back to 
Palmer of the Fourteenth Corps, where it belonged. Two divis- 
ions that had been in reserve, one from the Fourth and the other 
from the Fourteenth Corps, were withdrawn and then pushed to our 
left to turn the enemy's right near Picket's Mill. The Confederates 
had already pushed themselves in the rear of our battery and we 
narrowly escaped capture by a brigade of the Twenty-third Corps 
being pushed forward to keep connection with the line of How- 
ard. On account of the dense forest the movement was necessarily 
slow, and when Howard reached the enemy's position he found them 
busy extending their line to the east. The assault of Howard's 
troops did not succeed in carrying the Confederate position held by 
Cleburne, but the ground gained near the mill covered all the roads 
toward the railroad. The left wing of the Twenty-third Corps con- 
inected with Howard's position, and strong intrenchments were made 
for all the troops in line. On the following day. May 28th, the 
Army of the Tennessee was moved from the right flank to the ex- 
treme left and there connecting with the railroad. As this move- 
ment was noticed by the enemy they made a. iierce assault upon our 
position at Dallas, but met a bloody repulse, with heavy loss. Mc- 
:Pherson delayed his movements so as not to give the appearance that 
he had been forced by the Confederates. Sherman's hope to meet 
Johnston's army in open battle, instead of continued flank move- 


ments, was not realized. This only caused the Confederates to give 
up more ground, but did not destroy their armies, neither side being 
willing to assault intrenched lines, so the campaign became monoto- 

After the battle of Resaca Sherman wrote to Halleck stating 
that the campaign progressed favorably, but he knew that before 
complete success was assured he must have battles which no doubt 
would have been at the time of the affairs at Hew Hope Church and 
Picket's Mill, but the dense forests of the country made it impracti- 
cable to deliver an attack by the whole army at once. Sherman was, 
therefore, forced to continue the systematic advance by flanking 
movements and avoid assaults on the enemy's intrenched position 
thus protected by dense forests. Sherman was quite well aware 
that Johnston could not retreat much farther, as the authorities in 
Richmond would not support a Fabian policy, and one not at all nec- 
essary had the campaign been in an open country, but Johnston also 
saw that if he offered battle to Sherman or assaulted the Union line, 
that the result would only end in disaster. He had, therefore, no 
other recourse than to continue the study of defense. Johnston was 
also aware that our movements on his right would cause him to 
abandon the position at New Hope Church, and he, therefore, had 
already selected the defences of Marietta, with Kenesaw Pine and 
Lost Mountain as salient points. As Sherman became better ac- 
quainted with the officers and men of his grand army, they had an 
opportunity to learn more of his methods, and sound judgment, and. 
of the untiring mind by which every problem was solved, rested on. 
indomitable courage and will, stimulated by obstacles, with the pur-j 
pose always to be on the initiative, by which he could come nearer] 
each day to a successful closing of the campaign. 

As Sherman now had his whole army well in hand Thomasj 
withdrew Hooker's corps from the line, and placed it in reserve. 

On the 2d the Twenty-third Corps received orders to march toj 
the left, .and beyond Howard's Fourth Corps, and turn the enemy's] 
flank upon the Burnt Hickory and Marietta road, then proceed to, 
another road leading from New Hope to Ackworth, in the rear of j 
the enemy's line, and qover our connection with the railroad soutl 
of the Etowah. By gaining this position we would be able to attact 
the enemy's line in reverse. Hooker's corps was ordered to support 
this movement. The cavalry of the Army of the Ohio were orderec 
to reach Allatoona Pass and hold it, until Blair's Seventeenth CorpsJ 

TO keNesaw mountain. 317 

then on the way from Alabama via Rome, would arrive to relieve 
them. As soon as Stoneman, with his cavalry, occupied Allatoona 
Pass he notified General Schofield that he would hold the gorge 
against a large force of the enemy. General Johnston, seeing that 
his position could no longer be held, gave instruction for the with- 
drawal, but as the right of our line was being changed he waited 
developments and remained in his position for several days longer. 

On the morning of the 2d, when all was ready, Schofield 
marched his Twenty-third Corps to the left to the Burnt Hickory 
and Marietta road, near the Burnt Church, then with that road as 
his left guide, he marched east through a dense thicket where noth- 
ing was visible two rods ahead, so that to keep the skirmishers in 
line in battle formation was impossible, and my pocket compass be- 
came of great value. On this march Cox's adjutant general, Cap- 
tain Saunders, was mortally wounded, while riding by the general's 
side. The scrub pines were so thick that it was hard to push a man 
or a horse through their interlaced branches, and in many cases the 
troops had to march around them. As the troops advanced, by 
company front, the right and left of the company was not visible by 
those in the center, so thick and dense was the tangled underbrush. 
As we had passed the divide that separates Pumpkinvine Creek and 
its branches from Allatoona creek, on our approach to the latter, the 
skirmishing, began to be very sharp. The day had nearly passed 
when we reached the creek, and just as the column advanced and had 
forded the stream, a most terrific thunder storm broke over us, 
aided by the enemy's artillery fire from an unseen position, a com- 
bination so terrific that the heavenly roar could not be distinguished 
from the Confederate guns in action. The advanced line moved up 
very close to the enemy's intrenchment without kowing its distance. 
I We had no opportunity to form in battery, but were halted in the 
thicket with the enemy's projectiles passing over head and pouring 
jdown, intermixed by such heavenly artillery, as thunder and light- 

General Hascall, then in command of the second division, 
marched past us to our left, to develop the enemy's line and works, a 
short distance away, not over three hundred yards, and the en- 
gineers of our corps quickly made some dugouts for the Nineteenth 
Ohio Battery, which they occupied and opened fire on the enemy 
lat short range. Paddock's Eighth Michigan Battery of Parrott 
guns were put in on the left of Shields, and these two batteries soon 



silenced the Confederates, but the heavenly artillery discharged itf 
volleys unconcerned as to who was handling the guns below. Dur- 
ing the progress of this firing the infantry kept busy on the skirmish 
lines and sometimes the volleys would be such as to indicate that a 
regular battle was on. Butterfield's division of the Twentieth 
Corps was in close support of Hascall's division, that officer being 
requested by Schofield to go in on his left. The latter was in- 
formed that his orders were to support. Butterfield also claimed 
to outrank Schofield. This heavy rain made the creek unfordable, 
and if the enemy had made an attack on the first line of the third di- 
vision then over the creek, they must surely have captured them as 
they could not have recrossed the creek, but with improvised foot 
bridges and good breast works, the division commander appears to 
have been satisfied that the second line could come to the support of 
the first in case the latter should be attacked. He had indicated that 
his headquarters would be in the center of the second line but, when 
he reached the place, it was in a dense thicket where no one could 
find him until a road had been cut and widened, a circular space, with 
a camp fire built near the trunk of a tree, where a part of his staff re- 
mained with him. As a momentary assault was expected General 
Cox notified all of his subordinates where to find him, and he re- 
mained under great inconvenience at the place during the night. 
The rain came down in such quantities that the mounted officers 
with their tall riding boots, found the water running out at the tops. 
General Cox and the others relieved themselves of the water by 
turning one leg in the air at a time. 

The fortunes of war had, up to the death of Captain Saunders, 
been favorable to the headquarters of the division and corps, but any 
one familiar with General Cox could at once see the gloomy thoughts 
for his lost friend and companion, by the general's brow, and his 
former confidence in immunity appeared to have been lost. Saun- 
ders was a favorite among the group of officers, and his death was 
a heavy blow to the general and staff, when they had time to reflect 
over it. 

On the following morning Hovey's division of the Twenty- 
third Corps that had been on detached service on our extreme right, 
was relieved by troops from General Thomas' center, and marched 
past our rear beyond Hascall to our extreme left. As the corps 
went forward, the Confederate intrenchments were outflanked, and| 
♦■he enem}'- abandoned his position as soon as threatened by our line. 


We, of course, took charge of their works at once. Hovey ad- 
vanced his division until he reached the Dallas and Ackworth road, 
near Allatoona Church. During this time Hascall and Cox held the 
cross-roads, on which the enemy's fortification was situated. Hook- 
er's corps marched past Hovey to the east, and covered the left 
flank of the grand army in that direction. The other part of the 
grand army was now hastened towards the railroad, and on the 
6th we were on the extreme right of Sherman's forces. Johnston 
had abandoned his position in our front on the night of the 4th, and 
taken position on his new line, selected with care, his left resting on 
Lost Mountain and his right on Brush Mountain in the rear of him. 
The abandonment of the enemy's line at New Hope Church gave us 
a chance to see and examine what preparations the enemy had made 
for our reception, and was closely inspected by all- who had an op- 
portunity to see them. They were of the most careful protection 
for both infantry and artillery, and finished with neatness, lined be- 
hind a dense forest where they could not be seen until we were 
right upon them and then Sherman saved probably thousands of 
lives by maneuvering the enemy out of them, and forcing them to 
a position where they had to assault our works. By the shifting 
of the grand army from the right to the left McPherson became the 
extreme left on Proctor's Creek, a branch of Allatoona Creek, in front 
of Ackworth on the railroad. Thomas' great Cumberland army was 
between Mount Olive and Golgotha, covering the roads from Cass- 
ville and Kingston to Marietta and Lost Mountain, the Army of the 
Ohio in Echelon, on the right, covering the hospitals and trains dur- 
ing its transit to the railroad, the third division. Twenty-third 
Corps, remaining for several days in the position that we had car- 
ried on the 3d, which separated us a mile from the other forces. As 
the railroad bridge, near Cartersville had not yet been rebuilt, a 
pontoon was constructed over that stream and General Blair, with 
his two divisions of the Seventeenth Army Corps, was ordered to 
Ackworth from Kingston- by that route. Blair's corps arrived in 
good time, and just about covered the losses in battle and sickness 
up to that date. We were now in a more open country, and the 
Union lines were hurriedly readjusted, preparatory to a decisive en- 
gagement expected with Johnston, at an early date. While these 
arrangements were being made General Alvin P. Hovey, in com- 
mand of the first division. Twenty-third Corps, wanted to resign his 
command and asked for a leave of absence, to await the President's 


action. As a reason for his action, he gave that an independent 
command had been offered him when he returned from Vicksburg 
in 1863, for services rendered at Champion Hih providing he re- 
cruited the men for such a command. Six regiments of infantry 
and five of cavalry had been organized during this time. The in- 
fantry were beardless boys, and organized into the first division of 
the Twenty-third Corps, and on account of their extreme youth 
were called the "Indiana Dough Faces." The mounted troops were 
divided in the commands of Generals Stoneman and Killpatrick. 
Hovey wanted the cavalry attached to his division, into one organi- 
zation under him, and further growled that the promotion promised 
him had not been forthcoming, Schofield appeared to have been 
dissatisfied with Ilovey at the early beginning of the campaign, but 
as the active work he was now engaged in made it inconvenient for a 
change, Schofield tried to please Hovey by trying to get more in- 
fantry for him, but all the infantry then at the disposal of Sherman 
were a regular part of other divisions, and as far as a mixed division 
of cavalry and infantry was at that stage of the war, when Grant 
and Sherman were fighting for big game, out of the question, a sol- 
dier of Hovey's intelligence ought to have known this. 

Sherman also tried to induce Hovey not tO' be hasty, and wait 
until the campaign was over, and not insist upon changes in face 
of the enemy, but the general in chief appealed without success and 
Sherman advised the War Department that Hovey's dissatisfaction 
was due because he had not been made a major general and that he 
.•should recommend the acceptance of the resignation and indorse the 
circumstances in full on Hovey's application to resign. As a ten- 
■der of a resignation in face of the enemy by an officer was sufficient 
cause for summary dismissal, the army was surprised, when, on July 
j25th, the commanding general received notice that Hovey and 
Osterhaus had each been promoted to major generals, Hovey by 
brevet, and the other to a full grade. 

Sherman, who had a few days previous asked that General 
Howard be transferred to the Army of the Tennessee, a place made 
vacant by the death of McPherson, and written the authorities that 
after the close of the. campaign he would name officers worthy of 
promotion and requested the President not to promote any officer, 
on leave of absence, or other causes than wounds in battle, but a dis- 
patch from the War Department was already on the way announcing 
the promotions. Sherman replied that in his opinion the promo- 


tions were an act of injustice to the officers who remained at their 
post, in face of danger and to advance such as Hovey and Osterhaus 
who left us in the midst of bullets, to go to the rear to get promotion. 
If the rear is the post of honor we should all turn in that direction. 
This vigorous protest called for a personal letter to Sherman from 
the President, admitting that it was well taken, but explained the 
reasons which were almost absolutely political and not military. He 
also referred to former recommendations of Grant and Sherman that 
had been given these officers in former campaigns, which he could 
not disregard. The President explained the Osterhaus promotion 
as being of high merit, and part of it on account of his nationality 
as a German, those people being the most loyal to the Union, and 
Indiana and Missouri were counted as doubtful States in the coming 
presidential campaign. No matter what excuses were given for the 
promotions they would have been wrong, by advancing a second 
lieutenant, and much more so by giving rank of the highest grade 
in such a campaign without consulting the highest general in the 
field ; and despite his protest that such action would have a depressive 
effect on the army in the field. 

As the number of major generals was limited by Congress these 
two appointments filled all the vacancies, and no other promotions 
of that rank in Sherman's army could be given, and when Atlanta 
was taken Sherman very properly recommended several officers for 
promotion to the higher grade, but not one of them ever received it. 
Sherman was indignant, and he was right, for he favored a good 
military administration. He explained to Mr. Lincoln more fully 
the ambition for militar)^ fame of designing politicians, and as- 
sured the President that every general in the army had agreed unan- 
imously that the promotions simply resulted from political influence, 
and not from ability or actual service, and also reminded him that as 
the campaign was not yet closed, he had not recommended any one. 
There were several vacancies of the rank of brigadier general, and a 
few were filled at this time, in the Army of the Potomac, leaving still 
four vacancies of that grade. Grant wanted Sherman to recom- 
mend such as were worthy of promotion. As to Osterhaus, Grant 
added, that the former had been a good soldier, but if not in the field 
he regretted his promotion, which would have relieved him, and the 
administration, of his former recommendation. 

In the case of Hovey it may be said that Indiana had three brig- 
adier generals, in the Twenty-third Corps, Hovey was the youngest 


in rank, and had seen the least active service during the campaign. 
Manson was wounded in the battle of Resaca, while leading his bri- 
gade, in a charge, and never fully recovered from the injury. Has- 
call distinguished himself at every step of the campaign, and both 
were serving to the close of the war without any further promotion, 
for neither were favored by the then Governor Oliver P. Morton, 
who was the almighty political power in that State. Hovey never 
was called on to enter the field again, but served his time out as 
Commander of the District of Indiana. Osterhaus soon returned to 
his post in the Fifteenth Army Corps and served in Sherman's com- 
mand to the close of the war. Hovey's division was divided be- 
tween Cox's third and Hascall's second, of the Twenty-third Army 

The heavy rain, during the month of June, made the dirt roads 
for the large army wagons and artillery almost impassable, and as 
the drivers would try and catch a dry place to the right and left the 
mud ruts would spread far and wide, thus making the roads as wide 
as the hill would permit, so much so that the original road could 
not be distinguished. On inspection of the enemies' works, that 
were now in our possession, they were found to be of immense di- 
mension and great strength, and the Federal commander appeared 
to be pleased that at no place had he been led to a direct assault 
against them, and since the Confederates had abandoned them it 
was hoped that Johnston had now retreated beyond the Chatta- 
hoochie. To be able to follow the Confederates it was necessary 
to prepare ourselves, in rebuilding the bridge over the Etowah and 
to establish a depot of supplies at Allatoona, also to fortify the South- 
ern gorge at that place, and put it in a defencable condition, to be 
held by a small garrison, and as a provisional base to be abandoned 
at will when a wide turning movement would become necessary. It 
was soon learned that Johnston had only fallen back to his strong 
l.ine along Kenesaw, Marietta and Lost Mountain, covering the 
railroad to his rear. At first Johnston had left the impression that 
he intended to retreat across the Chattahoochie, and Sherman had 
in his mind's eye the movement to capture Atlanta and Mobile at 
the same time, the latter by the ships of Farragut and General Canby 
of the Southwestern Army, but the attention of the Washington 
authorities had been on the affairs of Grant on the Chickahominy 
and Cold Harbor, where Grant was fighting one of the bloodiest 
battles of the war, and the movement against Mobile was not 


thought of. The bloody assault on unknown fortifications in the 
wild woods of Virginia had caused the other army commanders to 
advance with caution against the breastworks of the enemy, and 
Sherman referred to this when he wrote the authorities at Wash- 
ington, in the early part of June, that he would have to fight Joe 
Johnston in a pitched battle, but would not run up and against his 
covered fortifications. 

On tlie 7th the Federal fines had been readjusted, and the whole 
army position had been completely reversed, from that of June 2d, 
with McPherson on the left, Thomas in the center and Schofield on 
the right. By the continuous rain the roads had become so bad that 
communication with Kingston was over a deep mire, through which 
the beef cattle were driven, but the wagons that hauled the hard 
bread were not able to supply us and we w^ere cut short on our allow- 
ance; but other rations, coffee and sugar, were issued in full. In 
ordering Blair to the front, by the way of Kingston, with his Seven- 
teenth Corps, Sherman had remarked that he intended to be in^ 
Marietta on Wednesday, but by the operation of General Joe John- 
ston it took several Wednesdays before we reached there, but our 
confidence in the final success was never doubted. 

From the 5th to the 9th w^e changed camp daily, getting nearer 
Johnston\s new line by moving from one hill to the other, and 
crossing one creek after another, and forcing back the enemy's left, 
skirmishing, unlimbering and firing as we marched forward, almost 
always in a drenching rain, when an hour of sunshine was a rarity. 
At this time our division was increased by several regiments, of the 
very best fighting material; the First Tennessee and the Eleventh 
and Twelfth Kentucky, the Sixty-fifth Illinois, Colonel Cameron 
(Scotch regiment, returned from a veteran furlough) and a new 
brigade, with the Fifth Tennessee added, was formed, and General 
W. C. McLean, from the second division, assigned to command it. 
Colonel Cameron, then the senior officer, was assigned to the second 
brigade. On June 9th, Barter's brigade of Hovey's division, re- 
ported to General Cox. The breaking up of the first division has 
been already referred to by Hovey's promotion. During these few 
days w^hich we may call lest (although we were in action every day, 
as these dense forests through which we passed had to be continually 
developed on the skirmish line) , we had an inspection of our harness, 
as a requisition for a new outfi.t had been filed with the ordnance de- 
partment, just as we left Knoxville, but could not be waited for. The 


same reached us here, and our old harness, not altogether in a bad 
condition, except for some oiling, was ordered to be thrown in a 
nearby well, with rocks on top, so if found by the enemy they could 
not resurrect it. A fresh supply of horses were also at our disposal, 
and Captain Cockerill of Battery D, First Ohio Artillery, and myself 
were ordered to select them in a corral, near the railroad at Allatoona. 
It occurred to me again that my selection for this duty was wrong, 
as I never was an expert on horses, but somehow a pacer was among 
the selections, and as soon as I reached camp with the animals, Lieu- 
tenant Harevy appropriated the dun pacer and settled with the quar- 
termaster for the same, acquiring title thereto, and although this 
horse was in many close calls, he lived to a good old age, and fifteen 
years after the war I saw him roaming over green pastures near In- 

As General Wheeler had captured our brilliant uniforms, packed 
away in the battery wagon, all of which went to the enemy on his 
raid, at Cassville, we v/ere reduced to a blouse, and reinforced blue 
riding pantaloons, issued to the troops by the quartermaster, but we 
were content and had no cause to complain. Our orders were en- 
forced and discipline was maintained just as easily, without the 
shoulder straps. 

On the 9th the whole division moved two miles, to the Sand- 
town road, then south to Camp Mill, where we found the enemy in 
position. The division was placed in position, the right brigade, 
McLa\\''s, connected with Hascall's second division, and Barter and 
Reilly's brigade continued the line to the left, near to the Twentieth 
Corps, and Cameron's brigade was in reserve B, by the holding of 
Pine Mountain and a chain of hills to the east. Instead of retreating 
across the Chattahoochie river, as Sherman had expected the Con- 
federate leader to do, it plainly indicated that another flanking con- 
test was inevitable, around the mountain spurs that covered Marietta 
on the north and the west. 

Garrard's divisic^ of mom. led troops, were on the left of Mc- 
pherson, Stoneman's cav^alry division of the Army of the Ohio on 
the right of the Twenty-third Corps, and McCook's horsemen of the 
Army of the Cumberland were protecting the crossing of the Etowah, 
while the Army of the Cumberland was in the center. 

The loth of the month was the date when the whole army 
advanced to come in close contact with the enemy. Blair's recently 
arrived Seventeenth Corps mrrched down on the Ackworth and 


Marietta road, through the village of Big Shanty, on to Brush 
Mountain, where they found the enemy in force. On the south 
side of Noonday creek Logan's Fifteenth Corps and Dodge's Six- 
teenth were held in Clay's column, on the right of Blair, ready to 
move to the assistance of the Seventeenth Corps if occasion required 
it. The Army of the Cumberland had gone forward in three col- 
umns. Palmer's Fourteenth on the left, and next to McPherson, on 
the road to Newton's Mills; Howard's .Fourth Corps in the center 
and Hooker's Twentieth Corps on the right, connecting with Scho- 
field's Twenty-third and marchmg straight upon Pine Mountain. 
The Army of the Cumberland operated in the upper waters of Proc- 
ter's Creek, which has its source between Kenesaw and Pine 
Mountain, and runs parallel to Noonday and Allatoona Creek, all 
three having their outlets into the Etowah. Johnston having noticed 
the movements of the Federal forces on his left flank, at once divined 
its meaning, and formed his line of infantry between Gilgal and 
Brush Mountain. Hardee's left was at the Church and Bate's divsion 
on Pine Mountain, on the right of Hardee's corps. Polk's corps ex- 
tended to the right, across the railroad by the Ackworth and Mari- 
etta wagon road wdth Noonday creek covering part of Polk's right 
flank; Hood's corps on the extreme right along the foot of Brush 
Mountain, behind Noonday creek, while Wheeler's cavalry on the 
Confederate right, and Jackson covered their left. The country in 
the front of the left and center of the Union line was mountainous 
and rough, but the right, although hilly, was less difficult to operate 
in. The Confederate line could only be approached by crossing the 
ravines parallel to Johnston's front. The general course of these 
little valleys run in a northeast and southwesterly direction. East 
of Marietta the country is more open and favorabale to approach, 
and it appeared at one time that Sherman intended to move in that 
direction, but the railroad in his rear, would have been a great deal 
exposed as it runs for several miles parallel to the river, and by mov- 
ing the Federal forces to the east, the numerous fords across the Eto- 
wah would have been exposed, and nearer to Johnston than Sher- 
man. This considered, the National commander determined to op- 
erate by the right flank. From the continuous heavy rains the roads 
for army trains and artillery were impassable, and by reason of the 
swollen streams, water-soaked woods and fields, active operations 
became almost impossible. With the cold chilling winds from the 
east, came the continuous showers from the ocean, entirely at vari- 


ance from what we had expected, in the sunny clime of Georgia. 
The continuous skirmishing along the whole line furnished excite- 
ment, and the bad weather did not receive the notice it would have 
otherwise, as the hills and rolling grounds in which we operated gave 
protection for the limbers and caissons, the guns of the corps bat- 
teries were often pushed right up on the skirmish line. Colone) 
Wright, in charge of the bridge construction, had completed tht 
Etowah railroad bridge, and on the nth the whistle of the locomo- 
tive gave notice to friend and foe that it had neared Big Shanty, 
and full supplies were now in our rear and close to Sherman's 
grand army, so it was but natural that the noise of the locomotive 
was greeted with prolonged cheers. 

About the 7th were were annoyed by several small detachments 
of cavalry that had approached very close to our lines, on account of 
the peculiar formation of the country we operated in, and skirmishes 
were an hourly occurrence, so much so that Schofield determined to 
break it up. He therefore sent Hascall's division, under its able 
leader, on a reconnoissance to the right, with Cox's third division 
in close support. The Twenty-third Corps, by this movement, 
had developed and pushed back Johnston's left wing of his army, 
so much so in the two days of the 8th and 9th, that Sherman, on 
the loth, pushed his whole army forward. 

This brought our division (Cox's) to the extreme right of 
Sherman's forces, and about 9 o'clock that morning we started on 
our march, from near Allatoona Church, and marched five miles on 
the Sandtown road on Allatoona Creek. The battery was brought 
forward, unlimbered and fired a few shots, letting the enemy know 
that we were near. Expecting a night attack we rested, sleeping as 
we had often done before, at our post, ready for action at a mo- 
ment; the horses remaining harnessed. 

On the morning of the nth we found the enemy had not re- 
treated, but instead started a bickering fight, supported by deep- 
toned and crashing artiller}^ which was kept up until 4 p. m., when 
our division again made a short advance. As the lines were very 
close together the firing by the infantry, as also the artillery, was at 
point blank range, and the mortality great, as the regiments in the 
front suffered severely. During the night the lines did not change, 
but the outposts were very busy on both sides, digging for protec- 
tion, and on the morning of the 12th were so close together as to be 
within speaking distance, both sides hugging to their pits behind pro- 


lection, as exposure resulted only either in being made a corpse or 
given a furlough. The position of the division was not changed 
during the 1 3th and the same destructive skirmish was carried on all 
day, on one part or another of the dividing line. The skirmishers of 
the Fourth Corps occupied one side of the log house, the Confeder- 
ates the other side. At daybreak the Confederates, noticing the two 
Dunlaps (boys from Franklin, Indiana, and members of the Seventy- 
ninth Indiana, Colonel Fred Kuefler's regiment), leveled their 
guns at the Hoosiers. They, too, offered resistance, and there would 
have been at least two corpses, but just then Henry Witte of the 
same Hoosier regiment, came up in the rear of the Johnnies and de- 
manded their surrender. They looked into the muzzle of the guns. 
Of course the gallant Confederates had no recourse, turned over 
their arms and were marched to secure quarters in the Union line. 
There were no doubt many similar occurrences, but this one shows 
how interlaced the opposing forces were on those rainy June days. 
The possession by either side of the log house would have been a 
citadel to them. 

The skirmishers were pushed forward from one hill to another, 
with the main line of infantry and artillery closely following. The 
whole front of Sherman's line now reached, from right to left, a 
distance of ten miles. Sherman's headquarters were at Big Shanty, 
on the railroad, but at an early hour he was in the saddle to inspect 
the line himself to see if he could not find a weak place in Johnston's 
defenses where we might break through. At about lo o'clock in 
the, morning he reached Howard's Fourth Corps in front of Pine 
Mountain. With glasses in hand he viewed the Confederate posi- 
tion, and discovered a group of men similarly engaged to see what 
they could of the Federals. General Howard being near, he asked 
that officer to bring a battery (Captain Simonson's Fifth Indiana) 
forward and fire a few rounds at the group. This was done and 
the aim so well taken that the group dispersed, but left General Polk 
dead on the ground. 

Sherman continued on his inspection, reaching our position 
about 2 p. m. At that time some signal officer, able to read the Con- 
federate code, had figured out that Polk had been killed. This was 
confirmed by prisoners captured, of which there were an abun- 
dance on that day; among these, the Fourteenth Alabama, 360 
strong. The whole army pushed forward, but at no place was there 
an assault made on the enemy's fortifications which were of the same 


design as ours. Part of the Army of the Cumberland, un- 
der General Palmer, on his right, and Howard's Fourth Corps on 
the left, pushed in an angle between Pine Mountain and the Confed- 
erate defences east of it, while the wings of our army also pushed 
forward and crowded back the enemy's outpost and intrenched close 
to the Confederate lines, so close, in fact, that the Southerners, from 
their higher points, could overlook our movements and camps. 
After Sherman's inspection, orders had been issued to advance, on 
tlie morning of the 15th, all along the line and to press the weak 
points. The Army of the Cumberland, in the center, soon discov- 
ered that Pine Mountain was abandoned, and the Confederate line 
had been concentrated between Kenesaw and Lost Mountain. 
During the last few days our battery had been having several little 
affairs with the enemy's artillery, who seemed to be well supplied 
with ammunition, but used it not with best results. 

On the 15th the center lines of the grand army moved forward 
beyond Pine Mountain. Our division, next to the right of Butter- 
field's of the Twentieth Corps, made a successful forward move- 
ment, aided by Hascall's second division, driving the enemy from 
his trenches, and by noon had full possession of them. They had 
erected very defensive works for their artillery, but the cross-fire 
from the batteries of the third and second divisions of the Twenty- 
third Corps caused the Confederates to vacate. We occupied the 
place and Butterfield's infantry, with the Seventieth Indiana, Col- 
onel Benj. Harrison's regiment, who, with fixed bayonets, went in 
on a charge just before dark. The enemy being well protected be-- 
hind a line of breastworks, gave them a bloody reception, but they 
held their ground. During the meantime we were in heavy action, 
sustaining them on their right, and the other batteries of the third 
and second divisions of the Twenty-third Army Corps, with an en- 
filading cross fire on the enemy's intrenchments, did likewise. The 
work of the battery had been heavy all that day and the number of 
rounds fired by the Fifteenth Indiana was 320 shrapnell and shell, 
while the other corps batteries fired no less. About 10 o'clock in 
the morning a little incident occurred that I had to be a witness of 
and have never forgotten. Just as we had pulled into position and had 
opened fire, a young staff officer that was on the staff of either Gen- 
eral Hascall's division or of one of his brigades, being lost, came up ' 
to our battery. General Cox was then in between our guns and 
taking a view of the enemy's positions, was asked by him as to the 


location of Hascall's division. It was plainly visible that the young 
officer had increased his courage by some stimulants. Cox directed 
him where to find Hascall, and told' him that Hascall's left was on 
Cameron's right, and Cameron was advancing in the woods on 
the right of the road, but the proper way would be to reach Has- 
call by a detour to the lear. The officer took in the situation, and 
as he did not know the word rear, he gave his horse the spurs and 
off he went where Cameron's brigade was to be looked for. He 
had gone about three hundred yards and ran right into a pile o5 
fence rails in the middle of the road, behind which were the enemy's 
skirmishers. They fired at him and he fell bleeding, to the ground. 
We fired at the rail pile. The skirmishers, those that were left, re- 
treated and an ambulance was sent forward and as the wounded 
officer passed us, his blood trickling from his wound, cried most piti- 
fully for his mother. The horse, also bleeding, was led after him. 
Who he was, and whether he lived through the war, I have never 

Another little incident occurred about noon that day. The 
Confederates had possession of an abandoned log house, close to and 
near Allatoona creek, and kept up a very destructive fire at our out- 
post. We made it a mark for our guns. Of course the balls and shells 
crashed through it, but did not dislodge the sharp shooters. Gen- 
eral Cox, unconcerned, moved about the guns and closely viewed 
every part of the enemy's line, and thus exposed himself. I looked 
through my glasses, noticed three of the enemy pointing their guns 
at us not over three hundred yards away. I called the attention of 
General Cox to this and he stepped forward toward me, away from 
a tree against which he had just leaned, and in a moment came the 
shell which took the bark off the tree just where the general had 
been standing. 

As Cameron's brigade, on our right, in the woods had out- 
flanked the enemy, the skirmishers were either captured or re- 
treated. We promptly marched forward and occupied the now 
deserted works of the Confederates, by changing the face of the 
embrasure from the north to the south. The advantages gained 

on our right by Schofield's Twenty-third Corps were greatly as- 
sisted by the forward movement of the Fourth and Fourteenth 
Corps, in the center, by pressing the Confederate line south of 
Noonday Creek, and on our extreme left. The enemy was forced 
by Logan and Blair's corps, of the Army of thd Tennessee, to 


withdraw, and move his hnes around the east side of Kenesaw 
Mountain. We had been in position on the left of the Gilgal and 
Marietta road on the evening of the 15th, but early on the morn- 
ing of the 1 6th, Hascall's division on our right was pushed for- 
ward to some open and high ground. We followed with the 
right of our division until we reached a position for the battery, 
now on the right of the road, where we immediately opened fire 
and were able to sweep the Gilgal and Marietta road for a consid- 
erable distance, while the Second Division Batteries on our right 
were having a most complete cross fire on the Confederate left 
flank, under General Hardee. 

We had moved from one knoll to another, following up the 
enemy, always firing and advancing, expecting him not to make 
a stand and show fight until he reached his new entrenchments on 
the south side of Mud Creek, but as the unexpected will always 
happen, so here. The Confederates moved slowly, and just as 
we had taken another advance, shortly before dark, we found 
ourselves in front of a Confederate battery of about twenty pieces. 
We had scarcely unlimbered and fired a few rounds sufficient for 
the enemy to locate our position, when we received volley after 
volley from their artillery. Our horses, limbers and caissons were 
not exposed and did not suffer, so to expose the men was useless, 
and we kept under cover until the Southerners got tired of spend- 
ing their ammunition. 

The greatest damage done was the knocking to pieces of 
either Schofield's or Cox's mess tent, but as they fired solid shot, 
their balls plowed the ground, bounded and rebounded in the air, 
where they struck, but injured no one. Gilliland, one of the can- 
noneers on gun No. 3. made a most miraculous escape from being 
ripped to pieces. Just as I gave the command to lie down, he 
obeyed, but stretched cross ways. Not finding the position com- 
fortable, he drew in his legs to the length of the guns, not a second 
too soon, for a solid shot plowed the ground where his feet had 
just been. We remained in position all night, and at early dawn, 
Major Wells, the division chief of artillery, ordered us to fire a few 
volleys at the enemy's position of the night before, to see if the 
Confederate artiller}^ battalion was still there. As we could elicit 
no response, the whole division moved forward, as also did the 
second division, under Hascall, to develop the enemy's new line 
along the east bank of the creek, with a bend to the south, to the 


crossing of the direct road from Marietta to New Hope Church, 
by the way of Lost Mountain. The Confederates at this point 
were under command of General Hardee, and were withdrawn 
.about two miles, during the night of the i6th, leaving Jackson's 
cavalry to retard our advance, but as the whole Federal army had 
its eyes open, the forward movement was promptly made and the 
noise of the batteries from one position to another did not leave 
the enemy in doubt as to our coming right along on the Sandtown 

At the Derby plantation we reached the road to Marietta, 
Cox's division leading, and trying to find the enemy's flank. As 
we reached the open ground we found ourselves on the western 
side of Mud Creek, where that stream runs almost due south. 
Along the eastern side, on the high cliffs and on the extreme left 
flank of the Confederates, Hardee bad placed his artillery in com- 
manding positions, for over a mile or more in length, along which 
the creek and also the road runs in parallel lines. The banks on 
each side of the stream are hilly, with one hill higher than the 
other, which rose in its solitary position to overlook the rest on the 
south and southeast, and for miles distant in the clear low lands 
of Mud Creek. This hill was a regular Mamalon, 

Our battery had been in advance the evening before, and as 
already stated, shelled the woods early in the morning on the right 
of the road on which the division now advanced. As soon as the 
division reached the edge of the timber with the open valley of 
Mud Creek in view. Cox's skirmishers were pushed forward close 
up to the creek, and Battery D, First Ohio Artillery, at a full 
gallop, crossed the field and up on the aforesaid high hill took posi- 
tion and opened fire. Before they had reached their place the head 
of the column of our battery emerged from the woods and Major 
Wells, the chief of artillery, indicated to me the position where to 
form. I ordered the cannoneers mounted and gave the signal 
"forward into line," at full interval, trot, march, etc. The second 
piece would trot, the third gallop, and the fourth run as fast as 
the horses could move. In this line we passed through and over 
some abandoned cotton fields and came to an action at right an- 
gles with Battery D. We were lustily engaged in destroying the 
Confederate wagon train, then retreating in confusion on the 
Sandtown . road. Battery D fired directly south. 

Tlie Confederates, with a larger number of guns, soon had a 


flank fire on us. I was just then giving the order to change two 
pieces, to fire to the left, when Lieutenant Harvey came up greatly- 
excited and demanded of me to withdraw the battery. I ex- 
plained to him that this could not be done, as my orders were ex- 
ecuted according to General Cox's and his Chief of Artillery in- 
structions. He remarked something about us all being killed if 
we stayed, and I replied that that was what we had come to Georgia 
for, either to kill or to be killed. He being my superior officer 
could have ordered the battery to retire, but instead, paced at a 
rapid rate towards where General Cox and staff were halting, 
and, after making a spectacle of himself, again came forward in 
company with the Chief of Artillery. 

The latter seeing that we were greatly exposed, ordered me 
to withdraw for protection, out of the line of flank fire from the 
enemy behind the Maraalon, on which Battery D was making 
the fight against the enemy's guns, east of Mud Creek. 

The crest of the hill formed an excellent protection, over 
which the muzzle of the guns of the Ohio battery were only visi- 
ble. Battery D maintained the fight for several hours in a mosi 
brilliant style. As the enemy's column had withdrawn on the 
Sandtown road, there was nothing for us to do but to await de- 
velopments. Just then, on our right, through the open field, 
marched Hascall's second division, with banners flying in an align- 
ment seldom seen and never forgotten; that was truly an inspiring 

As we were now resting, I rode up to where the Ohio boys 
had their guns. The distance across Mud Creek to the enemy's 
line was about eight hundred yards. The enemy's artillery still 
kept up fire at an interval, but appeared to be husbanding their 
ammunition. Just then, and right down in front of us, appeared 
a man on horseback accompanied by a single orderly. The ground 
that he surve}'ed was about three hundred yards distant from us 
and nearer to the enemy. From the ravine he was in, he rode 
up to the crest to look over at the enemy's guns, about five 
hundred yards away, but just then a ball from the Confederate 
sharpshooters struck him in the foot. In hot haste, his orderly 
following him, he rode back. The wounded man proved to be 
General Hooker. 

Soon two six-gun batteries appeared and were pushed into 
position by hand, overlooking the crest within point blank range 


of the enemy's line. When all was ready they fired by volleys and 
silenced the enemy's guns at that point. 

In the afternoon a battalion of engineers appeared and con- 
structed some breastworks for our battery, but the labor was in 
vain, as we were no longer exposed. Hascall's division advanced 
on our right and gained the position on the crest, between Mud and 
Nose Creek. The enemy's line made a short turn to the left 
with strong fortification in the angle which proved easily held by 
them during the next day. On our left the Confederate new line, 
under Hardee, in connecting with the old line, had caused. a salient 
angle, and by the hills in front of Palmer and Howard, Thomas 
had an enfilading fire on the enemy's works, making Johnston'? 
position no longer tenable. 

The Confederate engineers were already at work on the 17th 
for a new line of fortification around Marietta. Early on the morn- 
ing of the 1 8th movements of the enemy indicated that he was pre- 
paring to withdraw. Howard having noticed this, pushed Wood's 
and Newton's divisions forward and with a rush carried the line in 
their front, capturing some prisoners. The Confederates made coun- 
tercharges, expecting to capture our works, but were repulsed. The 
Army of the Cumberland lost no time in bringing their artillery into 
position, and with daylight on the i8th, a brigade of Newton's div- 
ision. Fourth Corps, deployed its skirmishers to hold the ground 
already gained, but now the whole division moved forward. The 
trench carried was the connection between the old and the new works 
and a Confederate advance position which they vainly tried to hold, 
as a salient point in their line. As night had overtaken Newton's 
operation, the men were making their position secure within a hun- 
dred yards of the enemy's line. Howard's position induced the en- 
emy to withdraw his lines in his newly prepared trenches, closer to 
Marietta, while a strong Confederate skirmish line was left in charge 
to retard our advance. 

. The key to the situation was Kenesaw Mountain, from whose 
top the water runs down its forest covered sides into deep ravines, 
making the holding an impregnable military position, and from the 
summits of which the Confederates could overlook every part of our 
line, making all concealments as to Sherman's movements impossi- 
ble. During the 18th the activity of Sherman's army from early 
morning, was one continuous roar of artillery, and it appeared that 
every gun on the Federal side was in action. With the interming- 


ling of the wide awake skirmishers the day became as memorable as 
forty-nine years previous at the battle of Waterloo, where the maps 
of the European world were changed. The same great effort was 
made on this day by the southerners but without success. Lieut. 
Palmer of Ba4:tery D called my attention to the vibration and de- 
tonation of the battle noise. I agreed with him that it was awful, 
yet sublime, remarking that the day was as great a day of battle 
as my ancestors had fought at Waterloo, with Blucher. Palmer 
remarked, "You have a quite a taste for history, Fred, and you 
ought to note down events as they occur now, for you may want 
to write a narrative in your old age." I little thought then that 39 
years later I would be bringing my recollections to the front. The 
thundering caimonade of Sherman's invincible army was inter- 
mixed with heavenly artillery during a large part of the day, so that 
it was difficult to distinguish one from the other, and way up on 
Mud Creek where the bottoms were clear, the puffs of Thomas' 
guns could be seen in active service. On account of the open country 
along the creek the battle field was more in view than on any other 
part of the Atlanta campaign, and to see the performances of the 
game of war on this day was worth a life time to any man, and once 
seen could never be forgotten. At times the rain fell in torrents 
and continued so during most of the night. During the firing of 
the artillery on the 17th the 112th Illinois music band, of about 
15 pieces, pla5^ed several times from its position in the open field, 
and within plain hearing of the enemy's artillery. While the engi- 
neers and infantry were preparing some breastworks for our bat- 
tery, several of them were wounded. As the enemy's left had 
now been considerably outflanked by our cavalry Hascall's divi- 
sion had gone forward to press them still further to the rear and 
if possible to assault their lines. We expected a serious battle next 
day, but during the night of the i8th the Confederates abandoned 
their Mud Creek line, a defense of six miles in length, of as fine 
breastworks as were ever constructed during the Civil War, re- 
treating behind Nose Creek with his left, and resting his right 
behind Noonday Creek. With this contraction of his lines, Johns- 
ton was able to send Hood's corps from his extreme right to his 
left, he believing that we were getting, by that route, on the line 
of his communication. When these movements took place the 
Federal leaders thought that Marietta was being abandoned, but 
Lorring, who was then in command of Polk's Confederate corps 


had extended his Hne to the right, protecting the angle that covered 
Marietta with the Kenesaw Mountain. The whole of the Con- 
federate position from Marietta on the right to Hardee's left was in 
the form of a semi-circle, with Kenesaw Moimtain in the center, 
facing to the west with lunettas and works on spurs and command, 
mg hills, covered with abatis and entanglements of forest trees. 
As soon as the enemy's withdrawal became known our army was 
on its feet to follow them. Although the rain had ceased the 
country we operated in was a quagmire, and the streams, usually 
dry at this season of the year were swollen and offered the greatest 
obstruction. The lagoons were filled up with quick sand, and dan- 
gerous to the artillery and wagons of being engulfed. If new tracks 
were made for the supply wagons, along a supposed solid ground, 
the passing of the few trains would make them utterly impassable, 
and the rear of the Army of the Cumberland in the center and the 
Army of the Ohio on the right, from Mud Creek to Allatoona, 
found no road visible. 

On the morning of the 19th of June the whole line on our 
right moved forward and skirmishing was very brisk during that 
day, following the enemy from his old position to his new line. 
On the 20th, Blair's extreme left moved forward and General Leg- 
gett sent Forces' brigade to a hill east of the line, to advance, and 
by a brisk skirmish car^^ed the crest, from where they had a full 
view of the tierce cavalry combat then going on between Wheeler 
on the Confederate side and Garrard in charge of the Union horse. 
Leggett Vvas just in time to assist the Federal cavalry with a battery 
that he brought up, but he advanced so far to the front that the 
other wing of Blair's corps took Leggett for the enemy and fired 
on him with artillery from his rear. A messenger was sent with 
speed and explained the mistake but no great damage kad been 
done. The Fifteenth and Sixteenth Corps moved forward, keep- 
ing up the alignment v/ith Blair's Seventeenth Corps and reached 
the enemy's position on Kenesaw Mountain and close to them, un- 
der a heavy lire. Next in line, and to the right of the Army of the 
Tennessee was Palmer's Fourteenth Corps oi the Army of the Cum- 
berland, while Howard's Fourth Corps was on a road from Gil- 
gal ChLirch to Marietta. Hooker's Twentieth Corps was held in 
the vicinity where tiie road crosses from Lost Mountain to Mar- 
ietta. In crossing Mud Creek, Geary's division of the Twentieth 
Corps used a bridge, much out of repair, and the swollen stream 


threatened to carry it away. Butterfield's and Williams' men 
crossed on the same bridge and the corps were massed in columns 
of brigades, the skirmishers in the advance. On the 20th, part of 
the Fourth Corps relieved Williams' division of the Twentieth 
Corps. The latter in turn moved to the right of the Twentieth 
Corps. Stanley advanced and took possession of two hills in its 
front. One known as Bald Knob Hill was occupied by a small 
force of Kirby's brigade. The other was wooded and Whitaker 
intrenched himself there. The enemy made a vigorous effort to 
retake Bald Knob Hill, and Kirby's force was driven off. During 
the 2ist the shifting of the forces was to the right, and the Army 
of the Tennessee in part relieved the Army of the Cumberland and 
the whole of the grand center, under Thomas, was extended to 
come in close connection with Schofield's Army of the Ohio. How- 
ard made an eff'ort to retake and hold Bald Knob, on Stanley's 
right, and for an hour all the available artillery in his corps was di- 
rected against the hill and the two brigades went forward and the 
enemy driven oft' with the loss of a considerable number of pris- 
oners. Bald Knob was intrenched under the hot fire of the Confed- 
erate artillery, by a forvx'ard movement of a brigade of Wood's divis- 
ion. They occupied a hill, farther to the south, which caused the 
enemy to abandon his strong skirmish line and thereby relieved the 
pressure on Bald Knob. The position now occupied by the Fourth 
Corps brought them in view of an open field several hundred yards 
wide. Hooker's Corps advanced on Howard's right to an important 
position on Culp's farm, which brought them in connection with Has- 
call's left. 

The morning of the 19th disclosed to the Twenty-third Corps 
that the enemy had left their presence. The two divisions. Cox's and 
Hascall's, were at once put in motion to seek a crossing of the creek. 
As already stated, the ground to our right was open country for 
a mile or more to our south and west, and then began a thick 
woods, with underbrush that no eye could see through over five 
yards ahead, covering the west bank of Mud Creek, until the bridge 
was reached. It had been expected that the enemy would fire the 
bridge on his retiring across it, but our skirmishers had followed 
so close that he had no time to take such advantage. Colonel Case- 
ment, at the head of his regiment, had moved through the thick 
woods, between the road and the river, and was now close up to the 
bridge, but it v^as dark and further progress could not be made that 


rliy. On the morning of the 20th we were still with our battery 
in our water soaked position on the Sandtown road in the rear of the 
"Mamalon."" Skirmishing opened briskly at the break of day all 
alor.g ]\Iud Creek, and we were hitched and ready to move at the 
command. At about 10 o'clock Major Wells, the division chief 
of artillery came and said: "Fout, mount your cannoneers and 
bring your section forward." The command was given, we started 
on a gallop on the road and for the brush, and after about a mile 
through the v/oods came to a dead halt. The artillery chief com- 
manded me to leave the caissons and mount a sufficient number of 
cannoneers on the guns, each with a fixed canister in hand, and 
at a gallop to go forward until I reached a clearing on rising 
g-round, then come to an action left and send the canister on each 
side and through the bridge which we would find about 100 yards 
to our front. Three cannoneers and the gunner crowded on the 
limber and one cannoneer sat astride the gun at the trunions, each 
with a round of canister in hand, and at a full gallop reached the 
higher ground indicated by Major Wells, on the right of the road. 
The work of unlimbering, loading and firing was that of a moment, 
and the astonished soldiers that had protected the bridge kept in 
hiding, while the bridge over which our Twenty-third Corps passed 
was saved to us. Shortly after this Lieut. Kuntz came up with the 
other section of the Fifteenth Indiana and his fire of canister was 
added to our action. 

The two streams, Mud Creek and Nose Creek, unite a short 
distance above the bridge and at the bridge the stream is known 
as Nose Creek only. We were not to enjoy the fruits of our bril- 
liant action very long for the enemy brought forward two batteries 
on the opposing high ground and opened with a double number 
of guns on us. One battery was to our left oblique and the other 
to the right. The two were about 400 yards apart and now opened 
with a cross fire at a distance not exceeding three hundred 
and fifty yards. The enemy's guns on our left, and in direct line 
of the bridge, received our first attention and with the assistance 
of Col. Casement's skirmishers, which he led in person, close up 
to the bridge, the Confederates very soon slackened their fire, but the 
other battery, right on the road, with guns and limbers protected, 
gave us the best of their service, and Lieut. Kuntz' s section suffered 
the most. He lost a Vv^heel of the 4th piece, had two horses killed and 
Cannoneer Perry of the 4th piece was wounded. The rising ground 


on which we were was not over four feet high, from the bed of the 
road, therefore offering no protection for either hmbers or can- 
noneers. Some of tlie trees were also obstructive to our range of 
fire. A Httle after noon the engineer battahon of the division ar- 
rived and made some dugouts for our guns. This gave the men a ht- 
tle more protection, but not the horses and limbers. Under the pro- 
tection of our fire Col. Casement, by his indomitable will, sent Capt. 
C. Hayes with a detail from his regiment across the bridge, he 
himself soon following on the stringers. The flooring had been 
taken up, he and men crawled over and he soon had a solid line of 
skirmishers on the other side, and under the cover of the bank ad- 
vanced and made, the bridge safe by driving the enemy's skirmishers 
to the rear. And we had taken care of the enemy's artillery; they 
withdrev; their guns which enabled the other part of Cameron's 
brigade to follow across the bridge. As soon as Casement had a 
solid footing the engineers appeared with timber, refloored the 
bridge and made entrenchments on the higher ground of the em- 
bankment. Thus ended a most brilliant artillery charge, saving a 
bridge tiiat enabled the right wing of Sherman's army to secure 
a footing on Johnston's left which caused that Confederate leader, 
a week later, to withdraw from Kenesaw Mountain. Colonel Case- 
ment, if he had done no other brave act during the war, this alone 
would entitle him to a mommient equal to any of the leaders in our 
Civil War in his own state. The action of our battery, at this 
point, certainly filled the brightest page in the history of the Indiana 
soldiers, but not a line has been found in the records, only that it 
was a "Twenty-third Corps battery that by over matching the ene- 
my's artillery and saved the bridge". On the 21st the whole of the 
Twenty-third boys crossed, Cox's division leading, and Hascall 
turned the head of the column of his division to the left 
where they soon connected with Hooker's right. Our cavalry, 
part of Stoneman's horse, met the Confederate mounted troops, 
under Jackson, in considerable force out on the Powder Springs 
roac", and as the cavalry detachment under Colonel Adams became 
hard pressed, the Twelfth Kentucky Infantry and two guns of Bat- 
tery D First Ohio Artillery were sent to his assistance. On June 
22(1 we moved forward to the junction of Powder Springs and Ma- 
rietta Roads, and were placed close to where the Confederate battery 
on our right had been stationed. Here was a young Confederate, cold 
in death with his right hand holding his musket, and his left hand 


holding a large part of a loaf of bread towards his mouth. In this 
position a piece of shell had struck him and carried part of his head 
away. Not far distant was a doctor of the One-hundred-eighteenth 
Ohio straddling over a man and hunting with his probe for a bullet 
in the right breast of the soldier. He soon found the missile and sent 
the volunteer to the rear. The strong resistance that Hascall's skirm- 
ishers met with indicated that the enemy was near. Hooker's 
army corps was now close to the Maretta and Powder Spring 
Roads and the Twenty-third Corps would soon be crossing 
it. As the enemy's line, under Hardee, was considerably 
stretched, Hood's Corps that had ben in close column near 
Marietta, was sent from the Confederate right to his left, 
leaving Wheeler with cavalry to take care of the Confederate 
right and Lorring's Corps stretched to the right to support Wheeler. 
Hood had marched all night and on the morning of the 22d was on 
the road to Powder Spring, at Zions Church, and not far from 
Culp's Farm. As Hood was by nature aggressive, our forces under 
General Hascall, did not have long to wait to learn of his presence 
and with his men made a fierce as.«ault with a two division front, 
and one in reserve, but as the attack had not been made until in 
the afternoon, the Twenty-third Corps was well prepared to receive 
them. In the morning before the assault Cox's division had marched 
south on the Sandtown Road, to a crossing from Marietta to Powder 
Springs village at Chaney's house. Hascall's division was on the 
march to the left, on the road from Powder Springs' Church to 
Marietta. Hascall reached his place at noon and Cox then crossed 
the road to Powder Spring, at Zion's Church, and not far from 
creek, a stream that had its source in the plateau at Marietta. 
Reiley's brigade was moved up close to the Valley of Olley's Creek, 
and the other three brigades of the division covered the flanks and 
rear of the first brigade, which was in an isolated position, fully 
a half mile in advance. Hooker's whole corps was in touch with 
the left of Hascall, and Howard's Fourth Corps connected his right 
with Hooker. The right of the Twentieth Corps was strongly in- 
intrenched and well supported by artillery. The enemy had just va- 
cated a short time before the defenses now occupied by Hooker, and 
the latter had made close connection with Schofield's left when Hood 
burst upon them. Williams' division of the Twentieth Corps formed 
in columns of brigades, pressed forward, reaching the left flank of 
Hascall's on the Marietta Road, near Culp's Farm. Small runs 


and ravines ran at right angles through WiUiams' and Geary's hne 
into Noses Creek. Hascall's division was on a ridge, south' of 
the Marietta Road, his right facing the valley of Olley's creek and 
covered Cox's division, then on the road from Culp's to Cheney's. 
The close contact of the opposing forces caused a number of pris- 
oners to be made by the Federal advance belonging to both Hood's 
and Hardee's Corps. Hooker had Williams' division prepared itself 
for defense and Schofield gave orders to Hascall to throw up 
breastworks, but hardly had the line been formed and a beginning 
at the breastworks been made when Hood's impetuous assault, as 
already stated, was made. The formation of Williams' division of 
the Twentieth Corps was in a convex form, this causing Hood's 
right division (Hindmon's) to strike the center of Williams, and 
the right of Geary's, of the Twentieth Corps, and the other division 
tmder Stevenson reached and assaulted Hascall's Twenty-third 
Corps division. Through the ravines and hollows the Confed- 
erates gained some ground between Williams' and Geary's, but 
Knipe's brigade south of the Marietta rOad held its ground. As 
soon as the Confederates reached the open they were received by 
three six-gun batteries of the Twentieth Corps with a con- 
verging fire of canister, shrapnell and shell that stunned the 
exposed enemy and gave Williams and Geary the opportunity to 
reform their line. After a few volleys of musketry, the enemy left 
the field and sought his intrenchment. As Butterfield's division 
of Hooker's Corps occupied a position in the trenches of Howard's 
line, the latter sent the reserve regiments of his corps relieving 
Eutterfield early in the night, the latter was placed in reserve of Wil- 
hams' division. Hood's left, along the Marietta Road, reached 
through the thick woods past Ruger's brigade of the Twentieth 
Corps, and opened the combat with Hascall's division. Hascall con- 
nected on Hooker's right, and continued to hold on to 
a ridge which covered the road upon which he advanced, 
and a branch road that led off to General Cox's position 
at the Cheney House. The two divisions of the Twenty-third 
Corps formed an angle of atriangle by the roads on which they 
had advanced, and the road which connected them, as stated, but 
as Hascall noticed a desirable ridge in his front on which a new 
hne for an advance could be formed, he sent Colonel Gallup of the 
Fourteenth Kentucky with the skirmishers forward to occupy it, and 
hnd the three brigades of his division throw up the breastworks on 



the main line. As the skirmishers advanced they captured some pris- 
oners and from them it was learned that Hood's Corps was on the 
march, from the enemy's extreme right and forming to assault. 
This was reported to Hascall and Schofield, the two were together 
and the Confederates immediately followed with the attack, but 
Gallup lost no time in making slight defenses and was able to hold 
the Confederates (part of Stevenson's division) back for a time, 
and then retired to the main line, but as his own volley had terrible^ 
effect in his front, his men held on until peremptory orders were 
given them to retire, which these brave Kentuckians did, in good 
order, leaving sixty-five Confederate dead as evidence of having 
done their duty. As soon as Gallup was out of the way, the Nine- 
teenth Ohio battery and Paddock's Eighth Michigan battery from 
their well selected positions, raked the Confederate lines with canis- 
ter, aided by the Infantry fire from behind their hastily constructed 
defenses, and cleared the field. As Hood's attacks were always deter- 
mined and persistent, Schofield late in th*e afternoon ordered Cox to 
bring the three brigades of his division from. Cheney's Farm so sup- 
port Hascall. The order was promptly executed, but by the time of 
Cox's arrival the battle in front of Hascall was over. Soon the 
third division was in line with a refused right, and on the open 
ground for a mile or more distant, in the valley of the Olley Creek, 
were Rei ley's brigade on the far right and front, which position 
was covered by pickets and patrols to watch the enemy's move- 
ments. The Twenty-third Indiana battery v/as with Reiley's brigade 
at the time. The enemy could have easily made a capture of the 
whole brigade, but we shall soon see the good judgment of General 
Schofield in taking the risk. The Third division batteries were put 
in line with those of the second division overlooking a large field 
and protecting the left wing of Reiley's exposed brigade. 

The useless losses without any results to the Con- 
federates were admitted by Johnston to be about i,ooo, the 
Union losses mostly in Knipe's Brigade of the Twentieth Corps 
and in Williams' division were about 130. Hascall of the 
Twent3^-third Corps had about the same number, other casual- 
ties m Hooker's corps were probably 75 more. The assault seems 
to have been made by Hood on his own responsibility. He had 
hoped to outflank the Union army and could assail them while 
marching in column, and gain advantages such as Jackson claimed 
to have made at Chancellorsville. Although his idea was a good 


one he was disappointed and his generalship in this case did not 
succeed. The interior by which he marched from in front of Mc- 
Pherson to the left of Hardee gave him many advantages and he 
had reason to believe that our solid columns were not extended so 
far south and east and that an inferior force he would soon be able 
to brush away ; but, finding our line extended and not to be shaken, 
deranged his plans, and he found the northern youth that opposed 
him equal in courage to his own and as they were led with intelli- 
gence and skill, he had to withdraw his battered divisions, and in 
his report failed to give it the importance the engagement deserved. 
There were several lessons learned by both sides, in attack and de- 
fense, in this wooded country, surrounding the field of operation. 
While Hood's attack on the north of the road fell on Knipe's bri- 
gade, there were but few casualties in the rest of the division. The 
same on the south of the road in Hascall's division was where the 
most fierce and determined assault was made. The rest of the di- 
vision, while the Confederates advanced, was able to inflict great 
loss, without suffering in return. If the Federal officers had re- 
sorted to the Confederate style of reporting similar affairs, they 
could with truth claim that two brigades of the Federal forces had 
repulsed Hood's whole Confederate army corps, but in a so densely 
wooded country where the field is not visible and the attack is made 
on a salient point, one brigade can check a whole line, for the fear 
of the assailants being themselves assaulted by a concealed enemy, 
makes them cautious, and they seldom go in after their connection 
has been broken, and those on the defensive know the value of cov- 
ered flanks. The near support, also, is a large element in battle to 
be considered on both sides as to the whole number, in supporting 
distance. From prisoners captured by Geary's division, the corps 
commander. Hooker, was made to believe that he was being as- 
saulted by three corps of Johnston's army and had repulsed them, 
but he was worried about his right flank. This he reported 
to the General-in-Chief. At this news Sherman, became 
concerned about Schofield not having carried out the spirit 
of his instruction, and next morning came to the church in the 
woods near Kolb's house where he met both Schofield a'nd Hooker. 
On his way to this place he had found Butterfield's division in re- 
serve. As soon as Schofield learned of Hooker's message, he be- 
came indignant and declared the message wrong, without any ex- 
cuse and wanted Sherman and Hooker to go to the front of Hascall 


for the evidence of his assertion. Hooker was reminded that Johns- 
ton's whole army contained only three corps, and if these had at- 
tacked him the enemy's line would have extended over a larger 
front than two brigades, in his corps, by which he plainly indicated 
his dislike for such sensational reports as had been sent by Hooker, 
and which were unjust to Schofield. After the enemy had been 
repulsed and Butterfield's division close at hand, an officer of Hook- 
er's experience ought to have been less concerned about his flank, 
as he had expressed himself in his dispatch, even if the Twenty-third 
Corps had not been present. The incident concerned only the two 
officers, but it is these little things that make up the whole and pre- 
sent to us in full view Hooker's character, which had great influence 
later in his final withdrawal from the army. 

During the time that Hood made the attack nearly every gun 
• on both sides had been in action and the cannonade was most ter- 
rific. From the left to the right, the active demonstration all along 
the lines, disclosed no change, except Hood's corps, and the exten- 
sion of Lorring's Corps to occupy part of Hood's old position, on 
Johnston's right, and as McPherson made some demonstration 
against that flank he found Wheeler supported by infantry and 
strongly intrenched in his front. 

Just at this time things began to look rather blue for Sherman. 
Hood's assault had checked the flanking movement on the part of 
the Army of the Ohio. Johnston had been enabled to stretch his 
right beyond McPherson, and a direct assault would insure no 
promise of success, and Sherman's subordinates were against any 
further stretching of their lines. 

Thomas suggested the contraction and strengthening of the 
lines on our left. The Confederate cavalry had crossed the Etowah, 
and with the aid of torpedoes had derailed and destroyed trains 
loaded with army supplies. The Federal cavalry under Garrard, 
on Schofield's right, reported the Confederate horse much stronger 
than his own, and as Sherman's expectations from that arm had not 
been realized, the outlook was not encouraging, something Sher- 
man could not easily endure. In a humorous way he wrote to 
Thomas : "I suppose Joe Johnston, with a smaller force, intends to 
surround us." Believing that the enemy's force was now so stretched 
that their lines could be broken by the main strength of the Fed- 
erals, he was willing to try it, and demonstrations were kept up on 
both flanks to attract the enemy's attention away from the center. 


On the 27th Thomas was ordered to attack in the center. Mc- 
Pherson was to make a feint with cavalry and infantry, on his 
extreme left, and also to assault a point south and west of Kenesaw. 
Schoneld was to continue his demonstration on the extreme right, 
and attack a point near the Powder Spring Road, close to the scene 
of the 22d. The army commanders were left to carry out the 

On the 25th Sherman visited Schofield's right and accompanied 
the active reconnoissance, the Twenty-third Corps was then making.- 
They found the enemy had strengthened his works by preparing pro- 
tection for three batteries, with embrasure on the Powder Spring's 
Road, with a line that extended as far as could be seen to the right, 
through timber and open ground, up to Schofield's right flank, on 
the other side of Olley's Creek. The instructions to Schofield were 
changed, and instead of making an assault in force, he was ordered 
to make a strong demonstration to attract the enemy's attention 
to the right wing of the army, and in this way rgider assistance to 
Thomas and McPherson. 

Sherman was not inclined to assault Johnston's line in the 
front. He had intended to employ a force equal to the enemy to 
keep the latter in his trenches around Kenesaw, and with the rest 
of our forces move to our right and crush Johnston's left. Sherman 
believed that when we secured possession of Noses' Creek and our 
advance on the Powder Springs and Marietta Roads, he could bring 
the army of the Cumberland into such a position, aided by Scho- 
field's corps, and Stoneman's cavalry, as to draw the enemy's atten- 
tion on his flank, so that Johnston would let go of Kenesaw and 
seek protection south of the Chattahoochie. 

But the mire and terrible condition of the roads made the move- 
ment slow. Up to the morning of the 22d, the enemy had only cav- 
alry with which to oppose Schofield's advance on the Powder 
Springs and Marietta roads, but Johnston, ever watchful of danger, 
had ordered Hood from his position on the right, to march to his 
extreme left, to surround, and, if possible, crush our right, but was 
defeated. Sherman examined his line and continued on to Mc- 
Pherson, advising Thomas to take advantage of any change in the 
enemy's front, and keep Schofield posted. As the latter was under 
continued orders to keep in touch with the Army of the Cumberland, 
up to that time all things were coming Sherman's way. With the 
enemy's left exposed, and the Marietta Road in our possession, with 


an opportunity to use it,gave us every advantage wished for. If 
our troops under Hooker and Hascall could have reached Zion 
Church ahead of Hood, Johnston would have abandoned Kenesaw 
and taken position along the line of Nickajack, and Sherman's as- 
sault on Kenesaw Mountain, on the 27th, would not have been made. 
The message of Hooker to Sherman about his right flank, on 
the 22d of June, naturally annoyed the latter; that the situation 
by one of his able Corps Commanders had been so exaggerated. 
Thomas received a similar message from Hooker with a request 
that re-enforcement be sent at once. The former thought that 
Hooker had been stampeded and sent him a division from the Fourth 
Corps. But when the truth was revealed it was found that only 
one brigade of Hooker and one of Schofield's had met with the 
severe loss of but 300, while the enemy had to record over three 
times that number. Hooker's report caused Sherman to fear that 
the army in its flanking operation would lose its energy and become 
less aggressive, and would probably not profit by the opportunity 
for decisive action, if offered. To this must be added the great 
difficulty to supply the right wing, then at a great distance from 
the railroad. Believing that Johnston held his army'-by a very thin 
defense, it was not strange that the Federal Commander thought 
it about time to strike, and break through the Confederate lines and 
rout their forces. This was plausible in the wooded country we 
were operating in; in an open country the attack would have been 
tactical, both as to method and the points to be assaulted. But if» 
Sherman's army had approached the Confederates by a regular sap, 
and one line carried, two or three others would have been found 
behind them. Heretofore he had steadily gained ground, and seen 
where the enemy had abandoned formidable works that we had 
out-flanked, and to stop now, and let the enemy interrupt our com- 
munication of supplies would only demoralize our troops. With 
a fair chance for success by an assault at some part of the line, the 
same should be made, and, if successful, it would be a decisive event ; 
if a failure, it was ventured on sound military principles. Sherman, 
therefore, made preparation for the serious effort to break through 
entrenchments on some part of the enemy's lines. 

On Monday morning, June 27th, at 8 o'clock, a general ad- 
vance was ordered, McPherson on the extreme left, with Garrard's 
cavalry, who should be demonstrative and busy making an attack 
at the south and west of Kenesaw. Strong skirmish lines were to 


be advanced to take any advantage during the combat, and, if pos- 
sible, get to the crest of the mountain. Thomas was to select the 
point of assault in the center, and with demonstrations to the right 
and left, assist them. Schofield was to attack on the Powder Springs 
and Marietta Road, and threaten the extreme flank of the Confed- 
erates, any advantages gained to be followed up rapidly. 

The day previous Schofield had been ordered to make a strong 
demonstration with the right, and, if possible, to induce the enemy 
to strengthen that wing at the relief of our center and left wing, 
which would ease the attack of Thomas and McPherson on the 
morrow. By order of Schofield, General Cox pushed Reiley's bri- 
gade, then in front of Cheenay's, forward to Olley's Creek, brush- 
ing away anything he might find to oppose him. Reiley advanced, 
and by brisk skirmish soon found himself in possession of the 
higher ground, closer to the creek; the Fifteenth and the Twenty- 
third Indiana Batteries protecting him. He was opposed by the 
enemy's dismounted cavalry, under Jackson, intrenched on the right 
of the road beyond the creek, with artillery in position and covered 
by an intrenched hill, which was the prolongation of a fortified line, 
on the higher ground beyond Olley's Creek, which separates it from 
Nickajack. Reiley was directed to push his guns forward, intrench 
them in the very strongest position, support them with his brigade 
as well as possible, and make a great demonstration wit hthe artil- 
lery fire, so as to attract the attention of the enemy. Two guns of 
the Twenty-third Indiana remained in position, supported by the 
One Hundredth and One Hundred and Fourth Ohio, but the Six- 
teenth Kentucky, the Eleventh Illinois, the Eighth Tennessee and 
the Fifteenth Indiana Battery and with the other two guns of the 
Twenty-third Indiana marched forward on a private road that led 
by the plantation of a Mr. Cox, with the intention to cross Olley's 
Creek and turn the enemy's position on his left, but the column was 
now up to an impassable swamp, and Reiley was compelled to biv- 
ouac for the night. Early on the morning of the 27th, the Eighth 
Tennessee leading, we marched to the right of the swamp, on a by- 
road, and found the enemy opposing. The batteries moved for- 
ward into position, the section of the Twenty-third Indiana, close to 
our right, and soon we had the enemy cleared out of the road, and 
that part of the brigade we were with was was the first to cross Ol- 
ley's Creek. 

The One Hundredth and One Hundred and Fourth Ohio Vol- 


Linteers crossed on the Atlanta road, and One Hundred and Twelfth 
Illinois and the Sixteenth Kentucky advanced on the farm road, 
drove the enemy out of his works and crossed there. The Sec- 
ond Brigade was still further on our left and of great assistance 
in helping push the enemy to the rear from our crossing. We 
now marched up the Atlanta road, about one mile from the creek, 
into a strong position and intrenched there. When the second 
Brigade, under Col. Byrd, crossed Olley's Creek, they reached a 
point that was on the line of height on which Hood's left flank 
rested. The rising was partly isolated and well situated for a de- 
fense. Byrd was ordered to lose no time, and immediately in- 
trench on all sides, as the place was to be held as a separate re- 
doubt against all comers. He extended his pickets to his right, 
until connected with Reiley's while on his left were the rest of the 
Third Division of the Twenty-third Corps ; the space between Byrd's 
right and left flank being an open valley. The sections of the bat- 
tery that had covered the movement under Byrd were now making 
themselves useful reaching for the enemy, on the intervening 
ground, with their well directed fire. 

According to Confederate reports our movements had caused 
them considerable uneasiness, and the aggressive action of the army 
of the Tennessee and that of the Cumberland along the whole line 
convinced Johnston and Hood that they had no troops to spare to 
re-inforce their left flank, sufficiently strong to resist our advance. 

Schofield had the warm approval of Sherman for what he had 
done on the right flank, but the latter cautioned him that it was 
necessary for the isolated brigade to use the greatest watchfulness, 
while separated from support. The temporary bridge that Byrd 
had crossed was made reliable, and operations on that flank were 
continued early in the morning. General Cox, with the rest of the 
brigades moved forward down on the Sandtown Road, and Hascall, 
then on the extreme right flank of the solid lines that connected 
with the right flank of the army of the Cumberland, was trying to 
advance on the Marietta Road, from Culp's Farm. 

Logan with his corps that was to lead the principal attack on 
the crest of little Kenesaw to the south and west, assisted by Blair 
and Dodge with feints and demonstrations in front of their corps, 
ordered the attack to be made by Morgan L. Smith's Division, con- 
sisting of the brigades of Giles A. Smith and Lightburn, supported 
by Walcott's Brigade of Harrow's Division. The formation of 


attack was made in two lines, and were to go forward with the army 
of the Cumberland, at a given signal. By the shifting of the lines, 
the army of the Cumberland had gained ground to the right, bring- 
ing Palmer's Fourteenth Corps in the center and Howard's Fourth 
Corps on the left. 

The only point in the front of this the last named corps favor- 
able to attack was in front of Stanley's Division. There the ground 
permitted the formation of the assaulting columns outside of the 
trenches, and under cover, the Corps Commanders had to perform 
the duties of selecting position to be assaulted and order the details 
of the troops to carry the positions. Newton was ordered to pre- 
pare for an advance in the morning, in two columns. This brought 
Harker's and Wagner's brigades to the front and Kimbal's in re- 
serve. They were formed in two columns of regiments, about a 
hundred yards apart; part of Stanley's and Wood's Division being 
held for support. 

The Commander of the Fourteenth Corps selected Davis' Di- 
vision to make the assault, at a point in front of Stanley and the 
latter s right. Davis was withdrawn frorri his place in the line, and 
during the night of the 26th lay in bivouac in the rear of Stanley. 

Early at break of day, on the 27th, Davis and his Brigade Com- 
manders were in the saddle and selected a place for assault in front 
VVhittaker's Brigade of Stanley's Division, where the enemy's line 
presented a salient point, not covered by entanglement. The di- 
vision of Davis was advanced to within six hundred yards of the 
enemy's trenches, just far enough not to be reached by the enemy's 
fire; McCook and Mitchel's Brigades in front, Morgan in reserve, 
and Baird's Division in close support of both Stanley and Davis, 
with the Twentieth Corps on the right, ready to come to the assist- 
ance of either Howard or Palmer, if a favorable contingency should 

The movement of Cox's Division on the 26th, had brought 
such favorable results, that Schofield, with Sherman's approval, 
limited the attack of Hascall's Division to a strong demonstration^ 
while Cox was to continue to forward the movement on the Sand- 
town Road. 

Early on Monday morning Cameron's brigade of Cox's Divi- 
sion opened the aggressive movement on the right and crossed 
Olley's Creek by the bridge constructed by Byrd the day before, and 
advanced through the valley to the slopes in the rear of Byrd's 


position. Byrd who had only straddled the hill during the night, 
now formed line and pushed a strong line of skirmishers up the 
creek in the direction of where Hood had refused his lines and 
trenches. Cameron changed to the right and down the stream, 
facing towards the enemy in front of Reiley who was held here 
hy the enemy's artillery, that commanded the road and broken 
bridge across. Olley's Creek. As Reiley now had the most advanced 
position, Cameron moved forward and by a sharp skirmish caused 
the enemy to give way in haste. Cameron formed connection with 
Reiley's left and extended along the ridge until he connected with 
Byrd's right, who was on higher ground to the north. 

These movements had taken place early in the morning of the 
27th and before the hour of battle fixed for the main line, and while 
we were active in strengthening our line for the artillery and in- 
fantry, the deafening cannonade was heard off to our left and away 
in the rear. As the enemy had no time or men to give any attention 
to the movement of the si^iall Twenty-third Corps, General Cox took 
the advantage to move Reiley's Brigade forward, following the re- 
treat of the enemy's cavalry for two miles or more, near a cross-road 
that rounds the south spur of a hilly ridge which separates Olley's 
Creek from the Nickajack, and leads into the principal Marietta and 
Sandtown Road on the Chattahoochie River. The occupation of 
this position was of the greatest importance. The lines of the hills 
that line the Nickajack, prevented any extension of the Confederate 
line in that direction, and the road was open to us to reach the rail- 
road, near Smyrna Camp ground, five miles south of Marietta. 

A single division had hardly the streng'th to make the position 
defensible, but the ridge aided Byrd to connect with Reiley, by a 
strong line of skirmishers to give it more strength, and Cameron's 
Brigade was put in between the two. The Division Commander 
reported the position to General Schofield, who ordered General 
Cox to intrench the line and hold it. In advance of this intrench- 
ment was a rising ground, in open timber, about three-fourths of 
a mile to the front, and our battery, the Fifteenth Indiana, supported 
by one regiment of infantry, were placed on this ground. The Battal- 
ion of Engineers was at once sent forward, and with great industry 
had sufficient protection for us to open on the enemy's dismounted 
cavalry, of which the woods to the left and right were full. Several 
men while at work building this lunette were wounded and killed. 
Lieut. Harvey complained of this advanced position at Division 


Headquarters, and several times went forward and back, exposing 
himself and horse to get an order for our withdrawal, but no 
attention was paid to him on that point; it was our duty to be there, 
and we remained. 

The Lieutenant little knew the important position we occupied, 
f^ven if we had been sacrificed. Such would have been justified as 
had often been done in war before and since, and I am proud to 
say that we were not disturbed, for this position gave us a chance, 
if it had been required to fire across Johnston's rear. We were now 
around him in the form of a horseshoe and were on the extreme 
right flank, that annoyed the enemy most. It was true that we 
were separated by a long interval from the rest of the brigade or 
division by Olley's Creek, but while the army of the Ohio was skir- 
mishing, bloody engagements assuming the general character of 
a oattle were going on elsewhere. The batteries of the Army of the 
Tennessee, 90 guns, opened on the rocky spur of Little Kenesaw. 
The advance of the columns of the army of the Cumberland along 
the Burnt Hickory and Marietta road, that leads from Gilgal Church 
to Marietta, was preceded by a general artillery fire of Thomas' army 
of 160 guns, and at a given signal joined by the Fourth and Four- 
teenth Corps. About 9 o'clock the columia advanced. At the same 
time the skirmishers of the whole army, on every part of the field 
became active, but on the selected points of attack the solid columns 
of the Fourth and Fourteenth Corps rushed forward, cheering as 
they went, and led and followed by such devotion and courage as is 
rarely shown. Newton's column reached the entanglement; the for- 
mation was lost in struggling to get through, and the infantry and ar- 
tillery fire was too hot to be endured, and the men protected them- 
.^elves as best they could by the fallen timber, and opened a returning 
frre on the enemy in their intrenchments. 

General Marker, gallantly leading his brigade to a renewed 
rssault, was mortally wounded, and hundreds of brave men and 
' ifficers following him, fell also. 

Davis' Division of the Fourteenth made an equally heroic effort 
vith no better result. The Confederates credit the assaulting columns 
ivith the most determined and persistent bravery they ever met. 
Davis led his men over rocky and rough ground, covered with 
forest and tangled under-growth. His enthusiastic division march- 
ed too fast at first, and by the time they crossed the distance to the 
enemy's work they were blown, and had no strength for the final 


effort to assault the parapet. Colonel McCook and Colonel Hannon, 
while leading their brigades, fell in the assault with a heavy list 
of casualties of officers and men in each brigade to bear them com- 
pany. They reached the point of their object, but as the narrow 
front of their column now came in view of the enemy, a concen- 
trated fire of musketry and canister from the enemy's artillery pre- 
vented any further advance. They had to lie upon the ground and 
protect themselves as best they could, and by General Thomas' con- 
sent intrenched themselves under a terrible fire, for it was safer to 
remain than to return over the ground and be swept by the enemy's 
artillry. The little digging that they were able to make, enabled 
them to hold on until night, when their trenches would be made 
permanent, enabling them to remain close to the enemy's line resting 
on their arms for several days and nights. 

The assaulting column of the army of the Tennessee, under 
Smith, upon Little Kenesaw, had been at first more successful and 
with a rush carried the enemy's line of intrenchment, but then 
found that they were right up against the slope of a steep and rocky 
mountain, the thick entanglement formed by trees, caused a slow 
advance, and the men had to resort to climbing instead of marching. 

Logan's assault reached the left of Lorring's Corps, and How- 
ard attacked Cleyburn's Division, then being the center of Hardee. 

Lorring's skirmishers, sorhe six hundred yards in advance of 
his line, kept up a rapid fire on Smith's column until close quarters 
were reached, and they retired to the main intrenchment. The Fed- 
eral troops continued their advance, but were now met by the ene- 
my's infantry fire in the front and on their flanks,- and surrounded 
on each side by the enemy's batteries, yet they kept on with a steadi- 
ness and determination that won the admiration of the enemy, and 
they held the advance ground under the most destructive fire of 
shot and shell, where the Great Captain of all battles gave them his 
natural protection from total destruction on the forest-covered field. 

As no further results could be obtained, Logan ordered a with- 
drawal of the advanced division to the line of rifle pits first captured, 
and these were strengthened and held. Seven Regimental Com- 
manders had fallen in this charge, and one. Colonel Burnhill of the 
14th Illinois, within twenty feet of the enemy's principal work. 

Howard's Fourth Corps met with no better success against 
Cleyburn's line, and the Confederates' batteries swept their front. 

Palmicr's Fourteenth Corps assault reached Cheatam's Division 


of Hardee's Corps, and had pierced the enemy's hue, but a fresh re- 
serve brigade was brought forward, just in the nick of time, and 
saved the Confederate hne at this point. 

Twenty-five hundred of the brave boys of the North failed to 
answer to their names at roU call next morning, and five hundred 
equally brave, as only Americans can be on the field of battle, caused 
the mothers to mourn the loss of their sons in the Sunny South. 

In the early part of the campaign each division had an organ- 
ized battalion of pioneers, composed of two or three hundred men 
of runaway slaves. They received by an act of Congress $10.00 
per month and rations. As soon as night would come, this bat- 
talion would be set to work to dig intrenchments. The infantry 
would rest and be fresh for action next morning, and during the 
day the colored pioneer would rest. When Sherman reviewed this 
work he remarked : "Who ever runs up against this will get hurt." 

As the southern people on both sides of the Chattanooga and 
Atlanta railroad had given up planting, at least for that year, for 
as one remarked : "They all believed that Sherman's invincible army 
would just march that way," most of them on account of their loy- 
alty to the southern cause, and for the safety of their slaves, hail 
put the latter at Johnston's disposition, who had organized them 
the same as had Sherman, into an engineer Battalion. These had 
built the most skillful works for us to run up against, which Sher- 
man had carefully avoided until he reached Kenesaw, and as he 
predicted got badly hurt himself, which was so much admired by 
our southern friends, the enemy, that they have here complimented, 
in their reports, the northern bravery. 

It was well that only three points had been selected for attack, 
in front of Tennessee and Cumberland Army, and the ground over 
which the center column marched, admitted each only to be of two 
company's front without hardly any flank protection. When the 
columns became checked by the obstruction and concentrated ar- 
tillery fire, they became conscious of having lost the necessary im- 
petus to carry the works, and the Division Commanders became 
convinced that further efforts at those salient points would only be 
an unnecessary loss of life. However they maintained such a rapid 
fire that the enemy had no time to think of a counter-charge. 

In almost every case the forest ran right up to the enemy's 
trenches. This gave the thoughtful soldier such protection, as he 
by his coolness and intelligence could take advantage of. 


When the enemy became aware that our advancing column 
was in the form of a wedge, he gave the edge of this, as they ad- 
vanced, his serious attention, and understood quite well that the 
rest of the combat was only a demonstration to cover the assaults, 
and as they were equally brave, concentrated their artillery upon 
the heads of the assailants, and the reserves were rushed to the 
j>oint of danger, and everybody knew unless the first rush was a 
success any other effort would be a complete failure. The number 
of casualties might have been largely increased, but it was impos- 
sible to have led the column any better, as they never halted until 
progress was out of the question. 

The effort to crush the Confederate line had been tried and 
failed, and it would have been unjustifiable to have caused further 
'~ss without corresponding results. 

The opposing armies had the same experience and found that 
a veteran with a rifle, in atrench, was equal to five in his front. 
In attacking a line the charging column would see little more than 
a sheet of flame, coming between the head logs of a parapet while 
they marched against an unforseen foe. In this case the situation 
demanded to hunt for an open place, but the Division and Corps 
Commanders knew when the effort had failed. 

The weakness of narrow and deep columns of attack against 
such intrenchments had ben fully tested by both armies at the 
affairs near New Hope Church and again at Marietta. Our copies 
of the French tactics had taught us that the formation of a column 
of Division, with a two company front, v\^as the proper form in 
which to attack, but Wellington had shown that over an open coun- 
try such a column had melted away before the British, armed with 
nothing better than the old blunderbuss, loaded with buck and ball, 
yet the traditional charging column, as organized by Napoleon was 
held on to. Our assaulting column was of the same formation, and 
in the wooded country did not give front enough to make a break 
in the enemy's line, and only oft'ered the greatest mark to the ene- 
my's concentrated and flanking fire, without the least possible 
chance to inflict a corresponding punishment on our opponent in 

As soon as we were securely situated in our Lunetta and had a 
little time to survey the lay of the land, it became evident that we 
were upon some separate hills that connected on our left with the 
principal ridge, upon which Johnston's army was lined, and by 


holding these, Schofield would be able to control the lower part of 
the Nickajack Valley, through which the Marietta Road ran. The 
division batteries occupied the position which was across the road 
we had advanced on. 

An aid of General Cox, Lieut. Couchlin, one of the most daring 
and intelligent officers that the state of Kentucky sent to the field," 
passed along the direct and shortest line, from Byrd to Cameron 
and Reilly, reported a continuous ridge and that it would afford 
an excellent line for pickets to be placed on, that could give us 
ample warning of an hostile advance. We now kept up a continuous 
fire across the enemy's rear in the direction of Marietta, but these 
affairs that we had had, from early morning on the 27th, were small 
to be compared with the later terrible assault on Kenesaw Mountain 
by the Army of the Tennessee and Cumberland Army. The advan- 
tages of stretching the right of our army could not be seen when 
Sherman made the reconnoissance, on the 25th, for the Confederate 
line then stretched across the Powder Spring Road, and beyond 
our right. When Gen. Cox reported the possession of the ridge, 
he assured Gen. Schofield that the enemy could not extend his linr 
along it, as he was in a position to infilade it by a flanking fire, and 
only asked that the thinly stretched line of his division, now so dis- 
tant from support, should be strengthened by troops not needed on 
other parts of the line, to make his right safe and available for 
future movements, if so desired. Cox only suggested this as an 
impression from his own observation. The front of the third divi- 
sion was now over three miles long, from Barter's left to Reilly's 
right, the former covering the right of the continuous line of the 
army intrenchments ; and, in extending the brigades of his division 
it was certainly a great risk, but the withdrawal of his right would 
have been a great disappointment. Schofield at once saw the im- 
portance of Cox's position, and as Sherman's movements had been 
a failure elsewhere, he determined to take advantage of what had 
been gained, and Stoneman's cavalry was promptly ordered up to 
picket the interval, and help hold the ground. The details were 
reported by Schofield to Sherman, and the latter at once remarked 
supplies while we would be away from the railroad. The weather 
that if we had our supplies well up he would move by the right 
flank, but we now must cover our railroad for a few days. One 
brigade and battery were left in the much exposed position in the 
lunette, while every effort was made to accumulate several days' 



had begun to be more favorable and the hot sun soon dried up he 
oads Sherman's chief engineer, Captain Poe, reconnoitered the 
position in our front, and his report confirmed the army command- 
ers' purpose of making our lunette the pivot of the -mgmg move- 
men of the whole army. The position occupied by om battery 
was once again one of the most important in the whole campaigr^ 
ZZ. ime is found m the pubhc records of that duty, so well 
performed, yet the senior officer of the battery had ample time to 

''^^'"on°the'29th a tour of inspection was made by Schofield and 
Cox, in company with Generals Thomas and Howarcl, to arrange 
the details of the grand swing of the army. A brigade of dismounted 
cavalry arrived on that day to help stretch out Cox s line. On July 
ist Hooker relieved Hascall, and the whole 23rd Corps moved 
forward a mile on the Marietta Road, toward Ruff's Mill. 

The Confederate Commander was now quite well aware that 
his position was already turned, and on the 28th, his engineers 
with a heavv detail of the Georgia militia, under General Gustavus 
W Smith (himself an engineer), and a lot of impressed negroes, 
fortified two lines north of the Chattahoochie, one crossing the rail- 
road at Smyrna, on a ridge running from the northeast to the south- 
west with its left curved to the south, following the Nickajack 
Creek- the other closer to the river, covering two miles of the rail- 
road on the western side of the ChattahObchie Bridge, which was 
in the deep southerly bend of the river, thence turning at right 
angles and crossing a ridge, reaching the Nickajack again which 
takes its course for several miles parrallel to the Chattahoochie. 
The Confederates were equally industrious in improving the fortifi- 
cations expecting that we would attempt to break the line of the 
Chattahoochie. The intrenchments were perfection of engineering 
skill, but nature was again on the side of the Federal commander. 
The weather had so improved the road that it gave Sherman free- 
dom of movement to maneuver the Confederates out of these two 
positions with an ease and rapidity that astonished and alarmed 
ihe Confederate government in Richmond, and caused ^^m to re- 
lieve Johnston of his command, and now place at the head of their 
armv before us, General John B. Hood. 

'in our advanced position in the lunette, on the night of June 
08th while wide awake and expecting the enemy to assault us, we 
i^eard the sounds of moving railroad trains, passing between Ma- 


rietta and the river, indicating that materials of war were being 
sent by Johnston to the rear. Sherman improved the time by bring- 
ing siippHes to the front to accomplish something decisive, and ar- 
ranging for the preliminary movements. By the stretching to the 
right, from its position in front of Kenesaw, the Army of the Cum- 
berland was able to relieve Hascall's division of the Army of the 
Ohio. This brought the whole of the 23rd Corps together, by which 
Schofield was enabled to cover all the direct roads to Marietta, and 
the railroad in the Nickajack Valley, reaching a ridge beyond Ol- 
ley's Creek, on the left, and some rising ground near Nickajack. 
"vvhere the Marietta and Sandtown Road connects with the highway 
on which the movements had been made. On the evening of the 
29th a new addition to the 23rd Corps artillery arrived, in the 22nd 
Indiana battery, reporting to Hascall's division. They had, up to 
that time, been detained at Knoxville and met the fate that we had 
feared so much. This battery spent the 30th in getting itself ad- 
justed to the new conditions in the field. 

Our own division occupied a ridge, or rising, as already de- 
ccribed, the 15th Indiana battery was- in position across the road, 
KascalFs whole division had marched through and pushing the}^ towards Ruff's station on the railroad. Just about noon 
Caplain Denning and Lieut. Nicholson, with two pieces of 12 pound 
Nc-ipolcon guns, passed through the lines of our guns, on the road 
to the front. Knowing each other we greeted. The officers had 
gone forward to where Captain Schields, the 2nd division chief of 
artillery, had. selected a place for them. While directing the pieces 
to their position, for their first time in action during the war, Cap- 
tain Denning became the target of the enemy's sharp shooters, he 
soon sank from his horse, mortally wounded, and died on the 3rd 
of Jul3^ It is strange but true, that the first effort this officer made 
to do his dut}^ cost him his life. Captain Meyers of the 23rd In- 
diana took matters much easier. Just before we left for the field, 
on May ist, from Knoxville, this worthy and trusty of Governor 
Morton had charges preferred against him for drunkenness, num- 
erous misdemeanors and general worthlessness. His battery having 
a good personal and an able first lieutenant, Wilbur was sent to 
the field under that ^officer and did excellent service. The Captain 
never rejoined his battery until in February '65, when, to our dis- 
gust, he became the leading spirit and boon companion of our own 
Lieut. Harvey, and, from all that I saw of him, his morals did not 


improve during his arrest and trial, for, after Lee's surrender he 
made himself prominent by abusing paroled prisoners, and when 
I called his attention to it it came very near bringing on a personal 
conflict. On July 2nd Smith's Division of Loga'n's Corps, arrived 
from its position in front of little Kenesaw, and temporarily re- 
ported to Schofield, and was placed on the latter's right flank. 






Stoneman's cavalry had reached Sandtown on the Chattahoo- 
chie, McPherson, with the rest of the Army of the Tennessee, moved 
to the right of Schofield, which left Garrad's cavalry, the only Fed- 
eral force to protect the railroad near Marietta. On the night of 
July 2nd Johnston evacuated his strong works on Kenesaw, and took 
possession of his well prepared intrenchraents, in the rear of the 
Nickajack. The Army of the Cumberland was ordered to advance 
through Marietta, and anlong the railroad, until this column reached 
Ruff's station, where the enemy's line was developed. General Mc- 
Pherson, with the Army of the Tennessee, filed in on our extreme 
right and bivouaced near the army of the Ohio. That afternoon, 
about 3 P. M., while we halted with our battery on the road, ready 
to get in action, McPherson and Sherman met Schofield where we 
halted, and, for the first time I saw the Commander of the Tennessee 
army, with his ever smiling face, mounted on his horse. He made 
a fine impression, and little did we think that in the next great bat- 
tle this general, as straight as an arrow, would be one of the vic- 

Thomas and McPherson were now close up to Johnston and the 
line of Federal skirmishers had the strength of a battle line, with 
artillery at every available place and prominent point. Stoneman's 
cavalry far out on our right, was in possession of some of the cross- 
ings of the Chattahoochie. Schofield massed his 23rd Corps in 


columns, to march in any direction, Garrard's cavalry was sent up 
to Ross Mills, about 15 miles up the river, and the trains with sup- 
plies unloaded at Marietta. Johnston, on the night of the 4th, again 
retreated ; with his flanks intrenched on the river, covering the rail- 
road bridge and several ferries for a distance, from left to right, of 
about six miles. With his well-known prudence, he had these works 
prepared by the old men and boys of the Georgia militia and slaves. 
About three miles from the river there is a fork of the roads, one 
runs parrallel with the railroad on the right hand, while the left 
one leads straight for Atlanta, via Paice's Ferry. The right road 
was covered by the strongest and best finished field fortifications 
that we met during the entire war. Generals Thomas and McPher- 
son promptly followed the extreme right road, the latter reaching 
the Chattahoochie River below Turner's Ferry. Stoneman's cavalry 
reached as far to the right as Sandtown, while the left hand or 
straight Atlanta road was unoccupied and unguarded, and How- 
ard's 4th Corps reached the river by that route at Paice's Ferry. 
Stoneman supposed that Johnston occupied his last line for the 
protection of his train, and to gain time to get them out of the 
way, and Thomas had orders to assault the enemy's last line, ex- 
pecting to make a good capture before the Confederates crossed the 
river. Sherman had been deceived by Johnston's strong resistance, 
and the severe fighting that Thomas had to engage in, so he per- 
sonally reconnoitered the enemy's strong redoubts and abattis, 
which satisfied him that Johnston was well prepared to receive him 
where he was. While he was on this tour of inspection, with Gen- 
eral Davis, a negro came out of the enemy's abatis, frightened near- 
ly to death. He claimed to have been hidden under a log all day, 
with shot, shell and musket balls going over him, and, during a lull 
had crept to our skirmishers and made himself known, and who, 
in turn, sent him to Sherman and Davis, and gave them the informa- 
tion that he and a thousand more slaves had been at work for a 
month on these lines, that reached the river about a mile above, to 
Turner's Ferry below, a total length of about six miles. 

As Johnston was now in his last lines, north of the Chatta- 
hoochie, Sherman was highly elated, as he was now on a high 
ground that enabled him to overlook the enemy's movements in the 
valley of the Chattahoochie, instead of the Confederates looking 
down on us, as they had been able to do on Kenesaw Mountain. 
The hill just back of Vining's Station, afforded a view by which 


the houses in Atlanta could be seen, nine miles away, and the prepa- 
ration observed for our reception, also the camps of soldiers and 
the large covered wagon trains. Sherman, of course, believed that 
Johnston with his army had crossed the Chattahoochie, and had 
left only a rear guard to cover the bridges, but the truth was that 
only the Confederate cavalry and trains had crossed. A large part 
of the enemy's line west from Paice's Ferry was covered by dense 
woods, which came near being the cause of General Sherman riding 
right into the enemy's camp, as Frank Sherman, an officer on How- 
ard's staff, actually did later in the day. He was taken to Atlanta 
and the enemy believed they had General Sherman, our Commander 
in Chief. 

The 23rd Corps, in its reserve position at Smyrna Camp ground, 
were able to make a few purchases for our mess from the commis- 
sary. Lieut. Pease of Battery D, and myself, took a ride to Ma- 
rietta to see if we could not enlarge our supplies from sutlers, but 
none had reached that place as yet. We were, howevei% able to get 
our canteen filled at the commissary. Outside of this we had only 
the regular rations and some condensed potatoes. Since the 28th 
we had what we called comparative rest, although in action every 
day except the 5th, 6th and 7th of July, while in reserve. We moved 
on the 8th, with the division, about eight miles up the river to 
Soap Creek, where a pontoon was to be laid for our crossing, by 
Colonel Buell's pontooneers, of the Army of the Cumberland. To 
reach the place, we marched on by roads some distance from the 
river, to prevent our being seen by the enemy. As our division was 
in the lead, we were placed m the angle of the creek and river, near 
a paper mill. No camp fires, or exposure of men and horses were 
permitted. The pickets were pushed towards the river, concealed 
from the videttes on the other side, and about a mile distant, up the 
river from the mill, was a dam which, at low water stage, enabled 
a crossing, but as the river was still up, the ford was difficult and 
dangerous, more so, on account of the rough stones, that had been 
placed in the current. The main reliance, therefore, to cross the 
river was on the pontoons. Soap Creek, for some distance, runs 
parallel with the river, and then, by a sharp curve, turns into the 
larger stream. The ground between the river and the creek is a 
ridge several hundred feet high, and of about the same height as 
the ridges on the other side. As soon as the pontoon train came 
within reach of the creek, five hundred men were detailed to set up 


the canvass boats and launch them. Byrd's brigade was ordered to 
lead in crossing, and the 12th Kentucky regiment was to be ferried 
over in boats.' The rest of the brigade deployed along the river, to 
protect them, with their fire, as soon as the boats should start. The 
regiment, in charge of Lieut. Col. Rousseau, was not to fire, but 
to form as quickly as he could reach the shore and charge any force 
he might find in his front, and, if possible, seize the ridge above 
the river and form connection with the brigade of Col. Cameron, 
who had been ordered to cross Soap Creek, march to and conceal his 
men at the fish dam, push an advance guard over it, and, if the 
river could be forded, cross at the appointed time, with his brigade, 
and make a junction with those that would cross on boats, and over 
the pontoons. The crossing of Soap Creek was dangerous, but 
Cameron's men overcame the obstacle and picked their way across 
the slippery lish dam. At half past three in the afternoon a recon- 
noissance, from the top of our ridge, showed no signs or symptoms 
of alarm on the other side of the river. A vidette post, with a piece 
of artillery, was all that appeared on the heights in front of the 
mouth of Soap Creek, known as Phillip's Ferry. The notice to 
advance was given, and Col. Casement with the one hundred and 
third Ohio, of Cameron's brigade, crossed at the fish dam, by 
scrambling along the broken rocks, through a swift current, and 
were the first troops to cross the Chattahoochie of Sherman's in- 
vincible army. Just then twenty white pontoon boats shot out from 
Soap Creek, pulled by expert oarsmen, selected from Hascall's divis- 
ion and loaded with Rousseau's Kentuckians, of Byrd's brigade of 
the 3rd division, crossed over, pushed forward and covered the 
cotton lands, in line, on the edge of the stream. The enemy's out- 
post fired one single cannon shot, the gun was reloaded, but before 
it could be fired again, Rousseau's men were up and at them with 
their rifles, and no one was left to aim and fire it. The Confederate 
cavalry sized up the situation, and galloped away to carry the news. 
As the crossing only required a few moments, Rousseau had charged 
up the steep ridge and captured the gun without the loss of a man. 
The cannoniers had followed the mounted men in their retreat. 
Cameron's brigade came down the river and joined Rousseau's posi- 
tion, covering the ferry. The rest of Byrd's brigade was soon fer- 
ried over, and quick work was made to lay the pontoon bridge, 
which was completed just before dark, and our battery, the 15th In- 
diana, was the first artillery that crossed over. The second bridge 


was already in progress and soon completed. It was dark and we 
halted in the bottom. The farrier had began to shoe some of the 
horses, while waiting for the pontoons, but as we crossed with the 
work not fully completed they now set to work and finished. The 
battery had been formed in park, at close interval, expecting orders 
to unhitch. Close to the rear lay the river, not over ten yards dis- 
tant. The day had been extremely hot and the road dusty. The 
pure clear water of the Chattahoochie was inviting to the men for 
a bath. We had waited for an hour, and were still awaiting orders, 
when one after another of the men stripped off their clothing and 
jumped into the stream. When about all were in, here came the 
orders to bring the battery onto the ridge. There was no bugle to 
be sounded, so at the top of my voice I yelled the command "drivers 
mount," but no drivers stood to horse. In a minute the drivers 
quickly appeared and mounted, most of them in birthday attire with 
not even the traditional fig leaf. With their wearing apparel held 
in front of them they urged the jaded horses forward, and onto 
the hill we went, executed a left about and formed in battery. For 
the night, nearly all the non-commissioned officers were placed 
under arrest, and remained there for several days. 

Lieut. Harvey wanted to reduce them to the ranks, but as Lieut. 
Kuntz and myself advised against this, it was not done and they 
were all restored to duty. 

The ridge south of the Chattahoochie made a natural bridge 
head and Cox's division of five brigades, Cameron, Byrd, Reilly, 
Barter's and Crittenden's dismounted cavalry brigades prepared in- 
trenchments to hold it against all comers. As evidence of the com- 
plete surprise to the Confederates, was a letter found in a deserted 
camp of the Confederates, wherein the soldier, in trying to allay 
the fears about his safety, said that he felt as free of peril, as if 
he was at home on his plantation, that the solitude was not even 
broken by a single horseman on the other side of the river, but before 
he had completed the letter, the apparition of Byrd's Union loving 
Tennesseeans lined the banks of the river, and in solid column ad- 
vanced upon the now completely surprised Confederates, who left 
their half cooked supper and unfinished letters, for other eyes than 
those for whom they were written. Johnston appears to have been 
badly served by his mounted force, on this occasion, for the cross- 
ing at the Fish dam, and the two bridges at Isham's Ford, were laid 
with little opposition, and Cox's division intrenched, before the 


Confederates could concentrate in his front. He lost no time to test 
our strength with cavalry at this point, for he realized that Sher- 
man's army had now crossed the Chattahoochie in force. He there- 
fore abandoned the northern bank of the river, selected the line of 
Peach Tree Creek, as the next stop for the defense of Atlanta, while 
the railroad and other bridges behind him were destroyed by fire. 
; The Confederate horsemen under Wheeler, in the vicinity of Ross- 
well, had been withdrawn, and when Garrard's mounted troops ad- 
vanced there he found no one to oppose him. Sherman at once 
sent Howard's 4th and Dodge's i6th Corps to Rosswell to intrench 
on the south side of the river, and to build a bridge in place of the 
one the enemy had burned. As Sherman, at his headquarters near 
Vinin;^; Station, was able to view the Confederate movement, he 
notic'^d the flutter in the enemy's camp, the meaning of which he 
could not divine as it might mean a concentration against Schofield, 
or a retreat to a new position. The Federal commander needed a 
little time to bring forward supplies and recruits. He also waited 
for Rousseau's mounted division to reach him from Decatur, Ala- 
bama, which had been ordered to strike the railroad between Mont- 
gomery and Atlanta. Stoneman was ordered to cross the Chatta- 
hoochie above Campbletown and strike the railroad southwest of 
iVtlanta, on a week's raid. Johnston was well prepared to withdraw 
across the Chattahoochie. He had, for each corps, two bridges and 
the railroad bridge, maintained a bold front, but in the night of the 
9th withdrew^ his three corps, and held ofif the attacks of Thomas and 
McPherson by a bold skirmish line. Early in the morning of the 
loth the pontoons were removed, and his rear guard burned the 
railroad and wagon bridges. Howard's 4th Corps was immediately 
ordered to support Schofield at Phillips Ferry, and Dodge's i6th 
Corps, with Newton's division, remained at Rosswell. For several 
days McPherson kept up his demonstration at Turner's ferry, near 
the mouth of Nickajack, creating a doubt, as to which flank Shx^i- 
man's invincible army would now move. Schofield, at Phillip's 
Ferry, built a bridge by which he released the pontoons, to be used 
elsewhere. The same was done by Dodge at Rosswell, 650 feet long. 
The ford at that place was rough, and the water deep. Cox's di- 
vision received a support of two more brigades, and then marched 
forward to another ridge, fully a mile distant, from where we crossed 
the river. The division batteries were placed in position and the 
engineer battalion was put to work to prepare suitable intrenchments 


for US. Johnston had anticipated Sherman in his retreat, before 
the latter had prepared suitable plans to follow him, but, on the nth, 
Sherman was able to communicate to his subordinates what the 
next move would be. On the 12th Thomas was to cross at Power's 
Ferry, and build a bridge, head on to the south bank. On the ic^h 
McPherson, with Logan, was to be at Rosswell, to join Dodge, and 
Newton's division was to rejoin the 4th Corps near Schofield at 
Phillip's Ferry, and on the return of Stoneman from his raid, Blair 
was to join the Army of the Tennessee, at Rosswell. Stoneman did 
not reach the railroad near Atlanta, but burned bridges and boats 
along the Chattahoochie, towards Newman, and was back on the 
15th. On the 1 6th a general advance all along the line was ordered. 

General Steadman was placed in command of the district of the 
Etowah, including northern Georgia, and took good care of Sher- 
man's rear with his mounted infantry under Watkins and Croxton. 
These two defeated General Pillow, of Fort Donaldson fame, while 
the latter tried to reach the railroad at Lafayette. Stoneman's force 
was increased by a division of the 15th corps, under Gen. R. E. 
vSmith, which made Sherman's rear secure against raids. Sherman 
was not as quick as usual to reach a decision, as to whether it would 
be best to cross the Chattahoochie above or below the railroad bridge. 
From Rosswell to the railroad the river runs almost due south, and 
below the bridge its course is southwest, while Sandtown is south 
of Atlanta, and situated ten miles from the river, by railroad, upon 
a high plateau, with streams descending in all directions, which run 
in the southeast to the Ocmulgee, then to the ocean and in the north- 
west and southwest into the Chattahoochie. The ridge upon which 
Decatur and Atlanta rests runs parallel with the Chattahoochie 
river, and a number of small streams run at right angles from the 
town to the river. On account of these streams it would have been 
difficult for Johnston to make a defense close to the river, for the 
deep ravines would have made the movement of troops impossible 
for one to support the other. 

Sherman's movement of attack was necessarily governed by the 
shortest way to reach Johnston's communication, as the Montgom- 
ery and Macon railroads both leave the city by the same route, to 
the southwest, until they reach East Point. The former continues 
parallel to the river, and the latter makes a right angle to the south- 
east. This was the route by which to reach Johnston's communica- 
tions, but with Sherman's invincible army between Sandtown and 


Campbletown, they would have been in the rear of Atlanta, which 
would have compelled the Confederates to have abandoned the town, 
and relied on getting supplies by the Decatur road, retaining com- 
munication with Richniond, and retreating towards Augusta. The 
streams between the Chattahoochie and the Augusta railroad are 
somewhat different from those west and southwest of Atlanta, and 
instead of running at right angles into the river, run parrallel to it 
and the three larger ones known as Peach Tree Creek, Nancy Creek, 
and Little Peach Tree Creek, that run nearly due west and enter 
the Chattahoochie by a wide and muddy bed, close to the railroad 
bridge. The ridges of these creeks afforded the best kind of posi- 
tion for the Confederate defense, but as Johnston feared to be out- 
flanked by the National armies, between his forces and the Augusta 
railroad, he selected the south bank of Peach Tree Creek, near At- 
lanta, anticipating that Sherman would cross above him, which was 
done. There were many reasons why Sherman chose the upper 
route to get at Johnston. If he had adopted the Sandtown and 
Campbletown route, he would have given the enemy's cavalry an 
opportunity of crossing the river, almost in our rear, where they 
would have broken up the railroad, stopped our supplies and de- 
stroyed our communication for nearly twenty miles. At the same 
time information had been received by Sherman that the enemy was 
withdrawing twenty thousand men, under Early, from the Shenan- 
doah valley, to be sent to Johnston, and that the Augusta railroad 
should be destroyed as soon as possible, to prevent its further use 
by the enemy between Atlanta and Richmond. As soon as Sher- 
man had decided from which side to approach Atlanta, he ordered 
Schofield from near the river, by the way of Cross Keys, direct to 
Decatur, and the Army of the Tennessee, under McPherson, to the 
east of Decatur towards Stone Mountain, with Garrard's cavalry, 
still further east, destroying the railroad and telegraphs, up to Cov- 
ington, and Thomas with the heavy columns of the Army of the 
Cumberland, on several roads from Pace's and Phillip's Ferries, 
direct to Atlanta. The latter' s right flank would reach that town 
first, after which a wheel to the right would be executed by the Army 
of the Ohio and Tennessee, encircling the city from the three sides, 
north, east and southeast, which would cover the railroad and the 
bridge over the Chattahoochie then to be rebuilt and fortified by a 
bridgehead. To execute the wheel, as Sherman had designed it, 
would require only one day's march for Thomas to reach his posi- 


tion, while McPherson on the outer flank, had fully four days march- 
ing, before he could cover the intended distance. While these move- 
ments were going on the enmy might be induced to attack Thomas's 
right flank, if it was presented to them, but the Army of the Cum- 
berland in itself was sixty thousand strong, commanded by an offi- 
cer that enjoyed the greatest military reputation for unflinching 
courage, which fact gave Sherman the confidence that Thomas could 
hold his own against the whole of Johnston's army, until the Army 
of the Tennessee and Ohio had completed their part in the game. 
Johnston's personal knowledge of the lay of the land gave him great 
advantage over the imperfect chart that Sherman had to rely on, 
and the Confederate commander was confident that Sherman's right 
wing would be exposed as soon as it should cross Peach Tree Creek 
and be in motion. Their well prepared intrenchments began at the 
railroad, about two miles from the river, and extended east for six 
miles until they reached the Pea Vine, at its connection with Peach 
Tree Creek, and then south to the Georgia railroad, between Atlanta 
and Decatur. This was a well chosen position, and with the best of 
intrenchments. But Johnston's continued retreating had brough 
about such a condition between himself and the Confederate Gov- 
ernment, that he was not to give us battle in his well chosen lines; 
and as duty required, he had regularly reported the movements of 
his army in his dispatch, announcing the crossing of the Chatta- 
hoochie, he briefly said, *'as a result of the enemy's advance to our 
left, we took this position, which is slightly intrenched." In answer 
to this the Confederate president telegraphed his fears, pointing out 
the danger of the position, reminding him that other points had 
been stripped of troops to assist him, and that any further re-enforce- 
ments were out of the question, and that with the army he now 
commanded success was expected. 

This intentional rebuke, or otherwise, was spread over the 
country by telegraph, and Johnston's feelings were not calmed 
thereby. The latter answered that he had had no opportunity for 
battle, except to assault intrenchments, and asked to have the 
mounted troops under Forrest and others, in Alabama and Missis- 
sippi, sent to him to break up Sherman's communication and force 
him to retreat. Davis answered that no such force was in the west, 
or available to the Confederate cause ; advising Johnston to use the 
cavalry, then with him, for that purpose. 

On the evening of the 8th Johnston announced to the Rich- 


mond authorities that we had crossed the Chattahoochie, and in- 
trenched at Isham Ferry, and was two miles from the river. On 
the eleventh of the month he recommended that all the prisoners at 
Andersonville prison should be sent elsewhere, thus indicating that 
he would probably retreat from Atlanta without a battle, which 
the importance of the position demanded. President Davis now 
felt justified in his conclusions, but before acting he dispatched 
General Bragg, of Chickamauga fame, to Atlanta to examine the 
true condition of affairs. Bragg reached the place on the 13th and 
advised Mr. Davis of what he saw, and indicated that Atlanta would 
be evacuated. The army was ten thousand less than on June loth, 
and could find no encouragement for success. Bragg remained near 
Johnston and paid the latter several visits which were courteously 
and kindly received, but Bragg added, "he has not sought my advice 
and I did not volunteer it, and apparently he has no plans for the 
future." "We expect to meet the enemy three miles from here, and 
he impresses the troops that he is now inclined to fight." "The enemy 
under Sherman, is very cautious, and intrenches on taking every 
new position." "The opposing forces are reduced alike by the hard 
campaign, though the mortality of our army is reported slight." 
The above dispatch by Bragg of the i6th, decided the Confederate 
President to make the change in the Commander of the Army, and 
on the next day Hood was appointed General in the provisional 
Army of the Confederacy and ordered to relieve Johnston. Hood 
declined the responsibility and suggested delay until the Atlanta 
campaign should be decided, but Mr. Davis' reply permitted of no 
delay and stated that he regretted the necessity for a change, but 
it was the only alternative of continuing a policy which had proven 
so disastrous. As he had been reluctant to make the change, there 
could be but one question either could entertain, and this was as to 
what was best for the public good, and for this both had sacrificed 
personal considerations. Before Johnston parted company with 
Hood, he explained to him his plans, which were to attack Sherman 
when his army was divided crossing Peach Tree Creek, and if suc- 
cessful to press the advantage; if unsuccessful, to hold the lines until 
Governor Brown's militia could occupy Atlanta, and then draw the 
army through the town, and with his three corps march out against 
one of Sherman's flanks, and, even if this attack did not succeed, he 
could hold Atlanta forever. He should have given his plans to the 
Confederate President, as fully as he now gave them to Hood, for 


when pressed for an inquiry on the i6th as to what his plans were, 
he repHed, "The enemy has double our number which compels us to 
be on the defensive, and my operation must depend upon that of the 
enemy, and must watch for an opportunity to fight to advantage. 
We will try and hold Atlanta with the militia, and the army move- 
ments will be freer and wider." 

Had he furnished the details of his purpose to the Confederate 
President, as he now did to General Hood, and maintained a good 
understanding with his Government, it is safe to say he would not 
have been removed, but, if we read the dispatch he sent, we find 
that the Confederate President was not unreasonable in confirming 
his previous apprehension, or, if Johnston had frankly told Bragg 
what his plans were, the latter would have influenced Mr. Davis's 
decision. As an excuse, Johnston referred to the retreat of Lee 
in Virgina, which had been more rapid than his own, and deeper into 
Virginia than into Georgia, and that the confident language of a 
military commander could not be regarded as evidence of his com- 

Johnston was very kind to his successor and assisted him, on 
the 1 8th, to complete the movement to Peach Tree Creek, and issued 
all orders, through his chief of staff, to carry out his well laid plans 
to crush Sherman's right wing, while the invincible army was in 
motion crossing that difficult stream; urging on Hood, if successful, 
to press the advantage to decisive results, and, if unsuccessful to let 
Governor Brown's militia hold Atlanta and then to take the three 
corps, march through the town in the night and attack and crush 
our left flank, and if that did not succeed hold Atlanta, as he did not 
believe we could ever completely invest it. This plan and arrange- 
ment of Johnston, on the part of the Confederates, was all right but 
let us see what Sherman's move was. 

There had been some delay in getting a pontoon over the Chat- 
tahoochie at Pace's Ferry for Thomas to cross his troops on, but, 
on the 17th, a division of Howard's 4th Corps had crossed at Pow- 
ers' Ferry, and then marched down to Pace's Ferry, driving off the 
enemy and skirmishers protecting the laying of the bridge at Pace's 
Ferry, who then rejoined the corps at Buckhead. Palmer's 14th 
and Hooker's 20th Corps crossed at Pace's Ferry, the 14th Corps 
became the right, the 20th Corps the center, and the 4th Corps the 
left of the Army of the Cumberland. When Palmer had marched 
about a mile from the Chattahoochie, he reached Nancy Creek, just 


a little distance above where that stream joins Peach Tree Creek, 
which became the extreme right flank and the pivot of the army 
on which the great wheeling movement was to be made. The left 
wing of the Cumberland Army was at Buckhead, under Howard, 
next to his right was Hooker, while Schofield, on the left of Howard, 
marched through Cross Keys south to the north fork of Peach Tree 
Creek. Sherman had stretched his tent fly, known as his head- 
quarters on that campaign with Schofield for that night. During the 
day one of Schofield's skirmishers captured a Confederate outpost 
and on him found an Atlanta paper of that morning, announcing the 
change in Confederate commanders. After Schofield read the paper 
he handed it to Sherman. The latter asked Schofield if he knew 
Hood, and what kind of a fellow he was. Hood had been Schofield's 
classmate and they knew each other well, and he told Sherman that 
Hood was bold to rashness, and before he knew it "Hood would hit 

him like h 1 !" This already occurred on the 20th, when Hood 

assaulted the Army of the Cumberland. On the i8th McPherson 
reached the Augusta railroad, two miles from Stone Mountain, and 
seven from Decatur. There Smith's division of Logan's corps, and 
Garrard's cavalry destroyed several miles of the railroad. On the 
19th the three armies moved forward and met but feeble resistance. 
The right of the Army of the Cumberland on that day rested at 
Howell's mill, the left was swinging across Peach Tree Creek near 
the south fork, and connected with Schofield, who was approaching 
Decatur from the north, while McPherson was marching on the 
same place from the east. Thomas held on, well to his right, with 
Hooker close up to the 14th Corps, and Howard close on to Hooker, 
v/ith a thin line stretched on Howard's left to reach Schofield. There 
seems to have been an error on the map indicating two Howell's 
Mills, one on the Nancy Creek, the other on Peach Tree, which 
causes a difference in the line of nearly two miles. This left a gap 
between the Army of the Ohio and that of the Cumberland, and two 
divisions in Howard's corps were shifted to his left to help close it, 
while Schofield edged to his right and marched to Colonel Howard's 
house, on the road to the distillery, which aided in closing the gap 
between the two armies. Thomas crossed Peach Tree Creek, in line 
of battle, and was compelled to build bridges for every division de- 
ployed. McPherson was astride the Augusta railroad, and kept lined 
up with Schofield. On the 20th Sherman kept his headquarters 
with Schofield. We had advanced from early morning and rested 


in an open field, on the right of the road for the noon hour. About 
two hundred yards to our front the field was curtained by a thick 
woods on the west of us, and another thick timbered woods due 
south of us. Just across the road from the field we were halting in 
and just beyond our left was another open field, but neither field 
was in cultivation that year. The division was in columns of regi- 
ments, and the points where the fields and the woods joined was high 
ground. Some one remarked that the church spires in the city of 
Atlanta could be seen from the rising in our front. My curiosity 
got the better of me and I mounted my sorrel to see about it. When 
T reached the crossroads of the woods and the field, I rode along a 
little further and soon found myself right in rear of our own vidette 
post, on the left of the road. Not having noticed them, I remained 
on the road, and to my horror and surprise, not over fifty yards 
distant, found a platoon of the enemy's cavalry charging on me. I 
wheeled around and to my great relief saw our vidette and infantry 
outpost open fire on the Confederate scouts. At a gallop I crossed 
the point of the open field, expecting to get back to our battery 
quickest by that route. As I reached the road which runs to Howell 
Mills there appeared another Confederate scouting party that met 
a similar fate as the one on the distillery road. I rode into the woods 
and finally reached the battery, a badly scared soldier, but cured of 
seing Atlanta's church steeples alone and in front of the enemy. 
Just as I returned, and a little after noon, a fearful cannonade was 
heard on our right, in the direction of the Army of the Cumberland, 
which lasted for about two hours. soon learned that Schofield's prediction about Hood 
had been correct, for the enemy had made a furious assault on 
Hooker's Corps, also on Johnston's division of the 14th Corps and 
Newton's division of the 4th Corps, just after they had crossed 
Peach Tree Creek, and were resting in line of battle, when the enemy, 
without notice, came pouring down upon them and got mixed into 
such close quarters, that, in many places they fought hand to hand. 
General Thomas happened to be near Newton's division, placed a 
number of field batteries in a good position on the north side of 
Peach Tree Creek and directed a furious fire on the solid column of 
the nemy, then exposing his flank as he passed around Newton's 
flank. The combat lasted for several hours, during which it was 
hard and close. The Confederates retired to their trenches in the 
city, having carried out the first part of Mr. Davis's aggressive plans. 


by leaving their dead and many wounded in our hands on the field. 
The losses to Johnston's and Newton's division were light, as 
they had a protected parapet. Hooker's corps fought in the open 
field and had to record a loss of about fifteen hundred. He reported 
four hundred dead of the enemy and fully four thousand more 
wounded, but this was guesswork. Most of the enemy's wounded 
reached their own lines. As Sherman's right had successfully met 
the bold sally of the enemy, it was a complete defeat for the Con- 
federates, and as future operations were to be on the same line, it 
placed Sherman's whole army on guard to meet the unexpected from 
the new commander of the Confederate forces. This sally, as re- 
lated, had been carefully planned by General Joe Johnston, but he 
was not left to carry it out. It showed, however, that he had in- 
tended to fight and hoped to destroy us outside of the city of Atlanta. 
The line and front of the Army of the Cumberland that received 
this assault was in a campact mass of a mile in length, while the 
Army of the Ohio and Tennessee covered a distance of eight miles, 
but instructions were at once given for the left and center of our line 
to advance in close columns up to the finished intrenchments of the 
enemy's line. This caused our forces to overlap them considerably 
on the left. Although houses and churches in Atlanta were now 
plainly visible, strong parapets, with ditches and abattis, prepared 
long in advance by the best of Confederate engineers, were be- 
The 15th Corps advanced astride the Augusta railroad, the 17th 
had deployed to its left, the Army of Ohio was to the right of 
tween us. 

Logan's corps, then came the Army of the Cumberland with How- 
ard's Hooker's and Palmer's corps, in close connection, on the ex- 
treme right. Each corps had its own strong reserves, and their 
trains in the rear. McPherson's trains were at Decatur, under th 
protection of a brigade commanded by Colonel Sprague of the 63rd 
Ohio. General Dodge's i6th Corps had been pushed out on the 
right of McPherson by contracting the line of investment, and the 
17th Corps had pushed its operation on the day before south of the 
Augusta railroad to Leggett's Hill, a rising piece of ground that 
General Leggett's division had carried by assault, in which General 
Gresham was badly wounded, also Col. Tom Reynolds wounded in 
the leg, who saved the same from being amputated by a joke. He 
was of Irish birth, hence full of native wit. When the doctors were 
debating the propriety of relieving him of his leg to save his life, 


he begged the doctors to "spare the leg as he considered it a most 
valuable leg since it had been imported." The surgeons thought 
that if he was still able to crack a joke, they could trust his vitality 
to save his limb. 

Wheeler's cavalry had made a most desperate effort to hold back 
the advancing divisions of Blair's corps, but at six o'clock that even- 
ing he was within the fortification of the city, Cheatham had 
stretched his line as much as he could, but Hood was compelled to 
order Hardee with a division to support the cavalry. 

Cleburne received the order, and his division moved into the 
breastworks, on the rising ground, including Bald (Leggett's) Hill, 
south of the railroad, where Wheeler's cavalry made their last effort 
just before night. The order for Hardee to send a division to the 
support of Wheeler, to keep McPherson out of Atlanta, can best be 
understood by explaining a little more of the enemy's movement 
at Peach Tree Creek batttle. The assault of Stewart's corps was 
west of Shoal Creek, with his right entering the angle between 
Ward and Geary's division, and his left extending beyond Williams. 
Hardee marched down between Shoal and Clear Creek, with only 
Newton's division to oppose him, but Ward supported Newton's 
right flank. Bate's division was Hardee's right, Walker's in the 
center and Maney's on the left with Cleburne in reserve. As the 
enemy approached, Newton's right brigade fronted to the right and 
rear, and Walker's division was the first to strike the Union breast- 
works which met, as usual, when defences are assaulted, with a 
bloody repulse, and become so shattered, that it was not able to be 
put again into action. 

Bates' Confederate division had marched around, in the woods, 
to find a way to Newton's left flank, and Cleburne's division from 
Hardee's reserve had taken the place of Walker's defeated column, 
with orders to renew the assault on Newton, but. just then a call 
was made by Wheeler and Cheatham, for re-enforcements to keep 
McPherson's left wing of the invincible army from capturing At- 
lanta, so Cleburne was sent. Hardee, with great prudence, delayed 
further attack, until Bates could take Cleburne's place, but by then 
night had come on and a merciful God stopped the useless slaughter 
of the southern boys for that day. In Hood's report, which was not 
made until January, 1865, he unjustly blames Hardee for his com- 
plete failure in the Peach Tree Creek battle. Hood, as also his officers, 
had intended that this should have been a decisive engagement, and 


his troops had been ordered to make a desperate assault on anything 
they should find in their front, and make an end of the campaign. 
By the showing he made in killed and wounded, he certainly ex- 
pected better results. If he had made the assault at one o'clock in- 
stead of at three, his repulse would have still been easier, for at that 
time Palmer with his whole corps was in position and in front of 
Hardee and Stewart, but Hardee's further attack on that evening 
was cut short by Hood's order to send re-enforcements to Wheeler, 
which was made necessary as stated, because McPherson was upon 
Cheatham's flank, thus preventing Hood from taking any advantage 
of the gap in the Federal line. If Wheeler had not been re-enforced 
by Cleburne's division, McPherson would have followed the Con- 
federate horsemen and captured the city that very night. 


During the night we halted in the field, the division was de- 
ployed in line of battle, and the batteries in position. The distance 
from Atlanta, which could be seen from some parts of the line, was 
about four miles. On the. 21st the Armies of the Ohio and Cumber- 
land advanced and intrenched on the skirmish lines, as near as possi- 
ble to the nemy's intrenchments. By the forward movement of 
General Wood's division of the 4th Corps, Howard was able to pre- 
sent a solid front from Schofield's corps on his left to Hooker's 20th 
Corps, while McPherson quickly reached Schofield's left with Lo- 
gan's 15th Corps, Blair's left rested on Leggett's Hill, a mile south 
of the railroad, which Cleburne's men had so desperately defended 
the evening before, and had only been driven off with a heavy loss 
on our side. The hill, under the enemy's cross fire, was at once in- 
trenched, though the weather was intensely hot, and many of the 
officers and men on that day suffered from sun stroke. The fortifi- 
cations on Leggett's Hill were of the best design, with traverses to 
protect the guns which proved of great value next day. The city 
of Atlanta, from this point, was in full view and the rolling mill 
was within range of McPherson's guns. As Hood's flanks had be- 
come insecure, he retired during the night from his Peach Tree 
Creek line, but upon inspection of his works in the northern part of 
the city, his chief engineer reported the defenses to be badly located, 
and a new line in higher ground had to be selected and fortified dur- 
ing the night by Cheatham's and Stewart's corps, also Smith's Geor- 


gia state militia of old men and boys. Into these new trenches the 
defeated troops were withdrawn and placed in position, except 
Hardee's corps of four divisions. These marched through the city 
and by a long detour toward the Stone Mountain where they hoped 
to make an attack on the extreme flank and rear of the Army of the 
Tennessee and crush it, expecting to follow up any success by ad- 
vancing Cheatham's corps due east from the city upon Schofield, 
with the hopes of annihilating Sherman's army from the south and 

Hood's original intention had been to attack McPherson from 
the south on the McDonough Road, but Blair's corps had intrenched 
with his right resting on Leggett's Hill, and his left refused, faced 
south and southeast, causing Hood to make a change in his orders. 
Hardee withdrew from his position in the line, two and a half miles 
north of the city, then marched through the town and by a circuit 
of fifteen miles northeast towards Decatur. When within two and 
a half miles of that town he halted to have his troops closed up and 
rested, then forming to face to the northwest. That Sherman's 
whole army would be on the lookout for unexpected blows from 
Hood was but natural, after his assault of the previous day on 
Thomas, and no one knew Hood better than Schofield. On the 21st 
we had advanced on the distillery road, about one and a half miles 
closer to Atlanta, and had kept up the alignment with McPherson 
and Thomas. That evening, as we halted, the chief of artillery, 
Major Wells, came to me, asking to follow him with my section. 
I did so and he took me about six hundred yards into a dense woods, 
had me unlimber and a company of pioneers ready to throw up a 
little breastworks for the two guns, but with no protection for horses 
and limbers, while the caissons remained with the rest of the bat- 
tery. The Major instructed me to load the guns with canister and 
fire at anything that approached from that direction, enjoining us to 
keep the greatest silence, but how could we see anything approaching 
us in a dense woods and on a pitch dark night. I must confess that 
my fears were that our time had come and that we had been chosen 
to be sacrificed in order to give the alarm of a night attack, and my 
fears were well grounded, while we, in dead silence, listened for an^ 
noise; my fears were such had my hair inclined to be white, they 
would surely have been such in the morning. With lanyard in hand, 
and primer in the vent. No. 4 leaned on the wheel all night, ready 
to pull at the approaching noise, but as none came, at 4 a. m. our 


chief called me and had us withdraw our charges of canister, and 
thtn we returned to camp to enjoy a little rest with the others of the 
battery. The enemy had been in our front not over two hundred 
yards distant, but at i a.m. had left and retreated into the fortifi- 
cations in the city. As soon as daylight had fully arrived Cox's 
division moved forward, on the distillery road, and after a march 
of two miles reached the Howard house. Schofield and Sherman, 
with the head of the column, soon had their telescopes strapped to a 
tripod and with the enemy working like beavers in full view of all 
that cared to look. Scarcely had our appearance attracted the ene- 
my when some well directed shells of the siege guns exploded 
where we were. Sherman, on foot, walkd right in on the road, 
and Captain Cockerel! of Battery D noticed that these shells created 
the greatest danger. He followed Sherman for about fifty yards and 
called his attention to the danger. The General appeared to be in 
deep thought, but returned with Cockerell, and, as some of his staff 
officers had returned, kept himself busy with them. Captain Dan- 
iels of the signal corps soon had a station fixed on the top of the 
turret, in the Howard house, and the waving of the flags brought 
several general officers to the spot, among them McPherson, Dodge 
and Logan. We halted in the road, the 1 5th Indiana battery lead- 
ing the division artillery column. Major Wells called on me to 
bring the guns forward, file the head of column to the left, and come 
to an action right and fire at the enemy, then busy perfecting their 
breastworks, some nine hundred yards distant. This was as promptly 
complied with as the commands could be given, and the first shot 
from that positon under Sherman's, Schofield's, McPherson's, Dod- 
ges' and Logan's very eyes were sent to the doomed city- by our 
guns, but the enemy's line was still some three quarters of a mile 
from the city, and an ordinary shot could not reach the town, so, 
without orders, one of the number 6's prepared a case shot with a 
double charge and a twenty seconds fuse, unknown to me and the 
gun sergeant. A higher elevation was given and the shell went on 
its way to the center of the city. This and the recoil of the gun had 
been noticed by the general officers then around our guns. The 
chief of artillery, in great anger was beside me and wanted to know 
why I had fired into the city, and not confined myself, as ordered, 
to the line of the enemy's defense. I stammered an excuse that I 
was as ignorant as he was, and feared my shoulder straps would be 
lost. This shot was the first that reached the heart of the city, and 


I have evidence from reliable witnesses that it struck the Trout 
House, a hotel, near the depot. As nothing came of the incident I 
was enabled to retain my rank. Cockerill's battery D took position 
next to us and for several hours we enjoyed the privilege of chasing 
the Georgia militia over the breastworks whenever they appeared. 
At the same time there appeared a general officer on the Con- 
federate side with his staff and escort. He became a prominent 
mark for our practice, and we had the satisfaction to see him change 
position about as often as he came in sight of us. He proved later 
to be General Hood, taking a survey of our position, also waiting 
for Hardee to make his assault on the rear of Sherman's left and 
crush the Army of the Tennessee. Their skirmishing, by the op- 
posing outpost, especially on the distillery road, west of Clear Creek 
became very lively. Sherman and the aforenamed officers were in 
and about our limbers and caissons with map in hand tracing the 
lines occupied, sometimes standing, then sitting on the porch of the 
Howard House, and finally McPherson and Sherman were seen a 
little off to our right still tracing over their maps, while seated be- 
neath a tree. Just then the skirmishing on our extreme left and 
rear became very hot and lively and with this, about ii a.m., was 
mingled the deep roar of artillery. In the direction of Decatur and 
south of us near Bald Hill, McPherson, dressed in a full Major Gen- 
eral's uniform with gauntlet gloves incasing his hands, high top 
riding boots, mounted his horse sitting as erect as an arrow and with 
staff and escort following him, rode off in a gallop to the left of his 
line. The volume of the firing, both infantry and artillery, on that 
part of the field increased for the distance of about five miles, and 
the enemy inside of Atlanta was very active, and the thundering 
cannonade of the heavy guns on both sides, aided by the rattling vol- 
leys of the infantry were deafening. This soon became more ag- 
gressive and nearing our lines rapidly. We, of course, were active 
and gave the Confederates prompt reply with the best practice that 
we knew how. Some provisional breastworks, about three feet high, 
had been erected, which afforded little protection, but we were saved 
by the bad markmanship of the enemy and their extremely bad pow- 
der that refused to carry their projectiles far enough to reach us. 
Our line was now continuous, from Thomas' right flank to the left 
of McPherson, including Bald Hill, occupied by Leggett on the 
previous day. As the extreme right gave protection to the railroad 
crossing of the Chattahoochie, the work of rebuilding the bridge 


was progressing rapidly. During the time we were engaging the 
enemy with our rifle guns, Logan's corps filed in on the left of us, 
and formed a straight line from our left, due south to the Augusta 
railroad. One regiment, for lack of space in the lines lay close 
m rear of our battery, and for the first time during the war I found 
a soldier having his wife with him in the field. The woman, un- 
mindful of the shrieknig shells set at once about her work to pre- 
pare a meal for her husband's mess, while the battle with all its 
fury was in progress. She was treated by officers and men with 
the courtesy due a lady, and had proven herself such. 

The storm of combat had lasted about a half hour, when Sher- 
man, who was still near our guns, received word that McPherson 
had 'been killed. McPherson had left Sherman at the Howard 
House and in a gallop had ridden to the railroad where he met 
Logan and Blair between their lines, and Dodge's i6th Corps. The 
heavy firing of the last named corps indicated a large force of the 
enemy in our rear. Logan and Blair rode to their corps in a gallop 
and McPherson to Dodge's corps. 

To reach Fuller's and Sweeny's division of that corps, the 
enemv had to cross an open field, and as Fuller was on the right 
he was reached first and though at first repulsed, renewed the as- 
sault with great determination. Just then Welker's Missouri bat- 
tery, supported by the 14th Ohio infantry, swept the front of Fuller 
and Sweeney, permitting the Confederates under Walker and Bates 
to cross the field. McPherson just now on Fuller's right had or- 
dered the trains away, and received a message from Blair that his 
flank had been attacked. A brigade of Logan's reserve, under Gen. 
Wangelin, was near, and the latter received a personal order from 
General McPherson to fill the gap between Dodge and Blair. This 
satisfied him that Dodge could hold his position and he started at 
a gallop for Blair's line over a road which had been clear of the 
enemy, but he had not advanced over a hundred yards when he 
ran into Cleburne's Confederate skirmish line, then advancing. 
They called on him to halt and surrender, but, instead, he saluted 
and'wheeled to gallop away. The enemy fired a volley and the 
great general with the traditional smile on his face sank from his 
horse, mortally wounded. As his staff were busy carrying orders, 
he was alone .with an orderly. The latter was wounded and cap- 
tured, but a wounded soldier nearby got away and gave the infor- 
mation of the great loss that the invincible army had sustained. 


In a short time the tide of battle shifted in another direction and 
the general's body was recovered before it was cold. His pockets, 
however, had been rifled of valuable papers and letters of instruc- 
tion given him on the previous day, and in the morning while in 
conversation v/ith Sherman. The body was soon brought by an 
ambulance to the Howard house, but, as that place was now in the 
line of the enemy's fire, Sherman sent a personal staff and escort 
to Marietta, and from there forwarded it to Glide, Ohio, where the 
dead general was buried with military honors. General Fuller be- 
ing near the place where McPherson fell sent the 64th Ohio infantry 
forward to cover that flank. This organization was armed with 
Henry rifles, and were able to check Gleburne's skirmishers with 
great loss, capturing a flag and about forty prisoners, and with 
them McPherson's equipments and his pocket dispatch book, with 
letters from Sherman and details of plans of that day and future 

\ In his advance Hardee brought out his left, in full view of 
Atlanta, and lapped over Blair's front and left wing, while Morgan 
L. Smith's division, protected by a line of works, had no trouble 
to repel the enemy's movements, inflicting terrible loss, as Cle- 
burne's and Maney's remaining troops tried with great courage 
to cross the open field. They were attacked from several sides, 
and many killed and others made prisoners. The time did not 
permit to make a movement to change front except to face about. 
This was performed by Smith's division, leaping over the works 
and firing from the other side. The enemy's advance pressed on 
and reached Bald Hill and tried to assault Force's brigade, now 
holding the ground which they had taken the day before. They, 
too, were obliged to fight from the reverse of their works, but de- 
termined to hold the hill, and several officers of high rank were 
wounded in the effort. As the ground over which Hardee's corps 
had advanced was a dense forest, considerable time was consumed 
in making the described movements, which caused some of the 
Union organization to be broken into squads, but with the true 
western instinct of a frontiersman, the disjointed platoons of Sher- 
man's invincibles, sought such natural protection as made Hardee's 
intrepid troopers pay dearly for every foot of ground he was ad- 
vancing over. Wangelin's brigade, of Logan's corps, had reached 
-the line on Dodge's right as intended in the last order given by 
McPherson, while living, and was of great assistance in covering 


Blair's change of front, of which Bald Hill had become th*» pivot 
and the scene of stubborn fighting for the new line. 

Wangelin's connection between Dodge and Blair made i con- 
tinuous line, which the further assaults of the enemy was unable 
to shake. General Sherman promptly placed Logan in temporary 
comm.and of the Army of the Tennessee, and in a message en- 
couraged him by expressing great confidence in him and his troops. 
As Sherman heard of Wheeler's assault on Sprague's brigade that 
guarded the wagon train at Decatur, he ordered Schofield to send 
an additional brigade, to guard his own train behind the Pea Vine 
Creek and assist Sprague, also to send re-enforcements to the left 
flank of Dodge's corps, on the Augusta railroad. 

Reilley's brigade was sent to the Pea Vine Creek and General 
Cox, at the head of Barter's and Cameron's brigade, with the 15th 
Indiana battery, was sent on the direct Decatur road tc support 
Logan. As we reached the flank Dodge requested one of the bri- 
gades to be placed in his line, expecting a momentary renewal of 
the assault, and Barter was sent him. Cameron and the 15th In- 
diana were taken to a rising ground, within a mile and a half of De- 
catur, and intrenched. Sprague in Decatur was soon hard pressed 
by Wheeler, but Reilly being near the two drove off the Confed- 
erate troopers, who now retired in our direction to join the right 
flank of Hardee, but finding us ready to meet him, drew off in the 
woods toward Stone Mountain, and did not disturb our lines any 
further that day. We had been in action all the morning until with- 
drawn for the just described movement, when about one o'clock 
the infantry brigades being already well on the way, Major Wells 
ordered us to limber up and follow him. We did as ordered, and, 
at a gallop, with cannoneers mounted, passed along the west side 
of Pea Vine Creek. About a half mile distant from our starting 
point, on the east side of the creek, was the field hospital with a 
corps of surgeons and operating tables; for the bloody work was 
performed in the open, and, oh/ what a sight. Here were arms 
and legs piled up in tiers, as we were accustomed in the good old 
days to pile up the winter wood, after being sawed to length for 
stoves or fire places. There lay a number of men (or boys as we all 
then were) with faces covered over, dead, having passed away un- 
der the surgeon's knife. Others, sitting on the ground waiting 
their turn on the operating table, and still others dressed and mov- 
ing about with bandages. Again others, laid on the stretcher, and 


ready to be placed in the ambulance to be sent to hospital in the 
rear. Such a sight will probably never be seen again on the Ameri- 
can continent. This was only the field hospital of one division, 
and there were many divisions in action that day. But what we had 
seen was nothing to what we now saw, as we advanced at a full 
gallop. We reached the place where Hardee's right had first struck 
Dodge's corps in the flank on the left. On the right of the road was 
an open woods and Hardee's troops while crossing the fence, by 
a left wheel, had received the full fire from one of the i6th Corps 
reserve divisions, that had been able to deliver a charge at close 
interval. Some of the officers, mounted on fine steeds, were killed 
while crossing the fence. The horses astride the rails, and the offi- 
cers lying in a helpless heap near by. The Confederate dead were 
thick along the linei but a little further where Dodge's reserve had 
made the stand were a corresponding number of our northern boys 
down on the ground to rise no more. In the woods lay the Con- 
federate division preparing to assault the Union veterans before 
them and drive them to the open field, that had been our left at the 
Hovv'ard house. We passed their right at a pace that would put a 
present day fire apparatus as they fly through the streets of our 
large cities badly behind in a race with our guns. The drivers were 
urging* their horses at the greatest speed, leaning forward with' 
whip in hands and spurring the poor animals, that seemed to smelJ 
the battle from afar, knowing their presence was needed, and they 
themselves sped on bleeding at the nostrils, mouths covered with 
foam and ears pointed to the front to catch the full noise of battle. 
Not a spoke was visible, and the races of the old Roman chariots 
in their coliseums were but puerile as compared to our effort to 
reach the line of battle. The dust covered the whole battery, and 
the leading carriage could scarcely be seen by the one following. 
We soon reached the railroad, passing the head of the column, to the 
left, and kept on flying along tlie mud road to Decatur where Cam- 
eron's brigade had formed a line astride the railroad and the mud 
road, and we came to an action front, which was the work of a 
minute, and the engineers hastily prepared a little piece of breast- 
works for our protection. In this position we awaited the assault 
of Wheeler's cavalry. He soon pushed his skirmishers in our di- 
rection, but, seeing the position held with firmness and determina- 
tion, he m.arched off towards the south to rejoin, late in the even- 
ing,- the rest of Hood's defeated veterans. We remained in this po- 


sition until next morning when we returned to our former position, 
near the Howard House. Hardee's first assault had spent its force 
and from the hours of one to three p. m. both sides appeared to be 
readjusting their lines. The enemy's right division was in the 
thicket of the timber, advancing to the open ground in Logan's rear. 
The latter' s line extended from the Howard House to the railroad 
cut, and a little south of it was a knoll on which De Grasse's bat- 
tery had taken position, close to a dwelling house, which should 
have been burned early in the morning, for the reason that the enemy 
used it in the afternoon as a citadel. If the enemy had faced to the 
rear as we passed their position in the woods on our way to De- 
catur they could have destroyed us by one volley, but instead were 
bent on getting to Dodge's rear, and followed the latter's reserve 
to the open ground, hoping to carry out the plan to destroy the 
Army of the Tennessee. Sherman was w^ell aware of Hardee's 
right, as he was still with Schofield at the Howard house, and in 
person ordered all the 23rd Corps batteries into position, at right 
angles, facing from our position, in line, south, to await the ad- 
vance of Hardee's right and Cheatham's corps making assault from 
Atlanta through the open field. Sherman had gathered about thirty 
pieces, well manned, south of the Howard house, and about three 
o'clock the enemy's right appeared at the edge of the woods in the 
open field and with a yell went forward to Logan's rear. As the 
Southerners offered their right flank the 23rd Corps artillery did 
their best and the Confererates received such a terrible destructive 
fire that they halted and sought safety in retreat to the railroad cut 
and the woods. The southern boys were re-formed and again urged 
forward, but again and again the canister, shrapnell and shell of 
,the 23rd Corps' artillery was too destructive for them. At the 
time these efforts took place, Logan's men changed front, crossed 
the breastworks and opened a fire on their pursuers, which caused 
the enemy not reached by the 23rd Corps guns to leave, with the 
ground covered with dead and wounded. 

As soon as General Hood 'in Atlanta saw his troops in the open 
field in front of Blair's line he ordered Cheatham's corps over the 
breastworks and pushed them forward to the front, attacking Blair 
on his right and rear and assaulting the Federal line between Logan 
and Blair. 

By getting possession of a large house near the railroad before 
mentioned, and from the cover of this house they were able to kill 


every horse in De Grasse's battery and push a column forward to 
capture that battery, but several guns of their 20 pound Parrott pat- 
tern were spiked before they fell into the enemy's hands. Dodge's 
1 6th Corps, as also Blair's 17th Corps, were assaulted by Cheat- 
ham's advance, and quite a gap was made, the Confederates charg- 
ing to the right and left as they passed the railroad track. General 
Morgan L. Smith had sent Col. Jones of the 53rd Ohio with two 
regiments and a section of artillery well to the front. The Con- 
federates under Cheatham were soon on their flank, causing Jones 
to withdraw to the principal lines. In this movement Cheatham 
had the advantage of the railroad embankment and the large house 
already referred to. Leggett had just driven off Hardee's assault 
from his rear by crossing to the front of the breastworks, when 
Cheatham forced them to seek the other side and again defend 
their proper front. Blair being on the higher ground, south of the 
railroad, had considerable advantage in holding the ground, and 
with most desperate fighting drove off the enemy, but part of the 
15th Corps, to the north, was taken in reverse by the enemy's ar- 
tillery, now stationed at the edge of the woods where McPherson 
had been killed, and scrambled away to and near the railroad track 
where, with courage and determination, they formed a new line. 
Jones, in command of Lightburne's brigade had made a desperate 
fight to drive the enemy from his front, but just then Hardee's fire 
in his rear reached the reserve of Morgan L. Smith's division, and 
Cheatham, having possession of the railroad cut and the house on 
the hill, was able to reach Jones from his right flank and rear, by 
rushing through the railroad cut, forcing the Federals to retire and 
spike the guns of the Illinois battery. Under the same movement 
the second line retreated, and for a time De Grasse's battery was in 
the hands of the enemy. Wood's division, then the right of the 
J 5th Corps, closely connected with Schofield's 23rd Corps and by 
the enemy edging through the railroad had passed through the 
gap and in the rear line of the 1 5th Corps. Sherman having noticed 
the separation of his old corps from his lookout at the Howard 
House directed in person the artillery that now operated on the 
enemy's flank, as it came into view, while charging to the east. 
This was done, and the batteries of the 23rd Corps had the advan- 
tage to reach Cheatham's flank at short range, while he crowded 
along the railroad. Under this fire Cheatham's left flank crumbled 
to pieces, and, by now making a counter charge the enemy was 


routed from his advanced position by the 1 5th Corps and the guns, 
except two, were recaptured and the 15th Corps intrenchments re- 
occupied and the Hne restored. 

The two corps of the enemy that made these movements were 
operating on two sides of an angle which caused their commanders 
to be miles apart and which prevented them from making a joint 
attack. This enabled the Federals, under Blair and Logan, first to 
repel Hardee from the front and later Cheatham from the rear, and, 
during the lull while Cleburne and Manney were reorganizing their 
lines for another attack, Blair was able to have his men make a light 
line of breastworks, that connected Bald Hill with Dodge's line. 
The latter had also perfected a line of defense, sufficiently strong! 
to enable him to hold it against all comers. Although the enemy 
repeated the attacks the chances of success for them had disappeared 
and further efforts only added to their list of casualties, by which 
the position of the left wing of Sherman's invincible army, now 
under Logan, was no longer imperiled. The effort of the Georgia 
militia to storm the heights at the Howard House was easily re- 
pulsed by Schofield's single line. General Thomas had been looking 
for a weak spot in the enemy's line, in front of the Army of the 
Cumberland, but found Stewart's Confederate corps behind an 
elaborately prepared breastworks, to receive him, and it would have 
been the height of folly to assault them. 

As night now came on Hardee withdrew his right, and the 
whole Confederate line that faced to the east were on a ridge, be- 
tween Sugar Creek and Entrenchment Creek, which connected with 
the salient points in the Atlanta fortification. Hood had expected 
that Sherman would operate by that flank to reach the Macon rail- 
road, but Sherman's mind had at this stage of the campaign another 
game in view. To carry this out he increased the distance of de- 
struction of the Augusta railroad for fully ninety miles east, (to 
his rear), so that no re-enforcements from Richmond could be in 
easy reach of Hood, while Sherman operated against that city, 
but while the cavalry under Garrard had been very active towards 
Covington, his advance had enabled Hood to have Hardee appear 
upon the flank of the Army of the Tennessee, without warning, al- 
though the attack was equal in numbers, four division against four, 
and the odds were in favor of a rear attack, aided by another rear 
attack, under Cheatham, with overwhelming numbers against Blair, 
which he, however, repulsed with heavy loss under circumstances 


that made it necessary to reform his Hne after the unexpected assault 
of Hardee's corps and, as he was able to present an impregnable 
front, he developed fighting qualities in his troops that have seldom 
been equaled and never excelled. 

The impulsive tactics of Hood's aggressive campaign, for the 
few days he had been in command, cost the national army on this 
day 3,521 killed, wounded and missing, and a loss of ten pieces 
of artillery, De Grasse's battery was recaptured and the other guns 
lost were Murray's regular battery, which was captured while on 
the march, and two guns of battery C, ist Illinois artillery from 
Morgan L. Smith's division of Logan's corps. These guns were 
dragged from the field by the enemy. 1,000 dead of the enemy 
were delivered to Hood under the flag of truce, in front of Blair's 
corps, and 422 of the brave southern boys were buried in front of 
Dodge's corps, while 700 young men heroes of the lost cause were 
found dead in front of Logan. Blair believed that the dead in 
front of his other division would number a thousand more, making 
a total of 3,200 with a liberal deduction for mistakes. We may 
claim at least 2,500 dead of Hood's army, equal to Lee's and Meade's 
loss at Gettysburg, in three days, out of 75,000 each engaged, and 
these were recorded in the batle of Atlanta in the short hours from 
eleven ;•.. m. until the sunset on that day which showed the kind of 
stuff Sherman's invincibles were made of. 

After his failure Hood complained of Hardee being too slow, 
and the movement had not been made far enough to the east, and 
the attack lacking in vigor, but, as Hardee had traveled 15 miles 
in seven hours during the dark of the night and had been halted 
by a passing cavalry column then forming, and moving through a 
thicket for miles, over a broken country, without being able to see 
in advance, not knowing the line of his opponent, so that he could 
dress his own line accordingly. If we take all of this in considera- 
tion, then Hardee's movements could not have been improved on. 
When Hardee's right struck Dodge's corps which saved Sherman's 
left flank, this attack was made as early as could have been expected, 
and for all time to come the movement of his troops on that event- 
ful day in the woods will be considered as a fine piece of military 
maneuver by any military student who may study it. 

inuring the early morning of the 22nd, before McPherson, 
Dodge or any other of the generals of the Army of the Tennessee 
arrived at the Howard House, General Sherman and others noted 


tbcct tlie troops in Atlanta were moving to the south. We could 
alsc sec people in great numbers among them, women on the tops 
of the houses watching the Yankee army, and to view the impending 
battle. Such craning of the neck and risk at exposure, plainly indi- 
cated tc the veterans that they were out for sight seeing and it was 
probably due to this, that caused the chief of artillery, Major Wells, 
to demand that we fire at the lines, and not into the city. 

The silence of the enemy's guns up to that time, made our 
officeis believe. General Sherman also, that Hood was preparing to 
abandon y\tlanta. So closely had we invested the city that McPher- 
son joined in the belief. Shortly after noon, during the time that 
Sherman was giving his personal attention to Schofiield's artillery, 
the latter prepared part of his corps and a large part of Hascall's 
division, to make a counter charge along Clear Creek, if the enemy 
should break through, and get in between Cheatham and the city; 
but as this movement would have been of assistance to the Army of 
the Tennessee, and as Thomas was not prepared to send any part 
of his reserve to assist Schofield, Sherman remarked that it would 
be well to let the Army of the Tennessee fight its own battle. Had 
Schofield' s plan been supported by Thomas and encouraged by 
Sherman, we would have cut Hood's army in two, and by overpow- 
ering nimibers would have destroyed it, and captured the city of 
Atlanta before night ; but the opportunity was not taken advantage 
cf . and the chances for this brilliant movement on Atlanta from the 
east, passed by, the object of the movement having been accom- 
plished by the destruction of the Augusta railroad for nearly 90 
miles, in such a manner that the same could not be rebuilt on short 
notice, so as to be of any benefit to the Confederates; and, as sup- 
plies played an important part with Sherman's invincible army, 
the Commanding General decided to move by the right flank, in- 
stead of to the Macon railroad by the rough and ready station. 
The absence of Garrard's mounted troops, and also Rousseau's di- 
vision that had destroyed the Montgomery railroad near Opelika, 
was awaited before making any further movements. On our ar- 
rival from Decatur early on the morning of the 23rd, we were as- 
signed to our old positon in front of the Howard House. During 
the night good breastworks with embrasures had been prepared 
for us, and some buildings on the Howard plantation had been dis- 
mantled to make platforms for the guns. Our firing was kept up 
at slow intervals not alone on the enemy's parapet, but into the city. 


During this cannonade, one of my men made an offensive re- 
mark, which, with revolver ready, I resented, and serious results 
would have probably ensued, had not Lieut. Harvey relieved me. 
I should simply have enforced my orders of discipline, and I have 
ever since regretted my action as to this incident. During the 
night we had a detail of cannoneeers, by relays, who continued to 
fire, and just after dark Capt. Daniels and his assistants touched 
off a fine piece of fire works for signal purposes. This was seldom 
seen and must have been very impressive to our friends, the enemy, 
in the city and around Atlanta, as it was inspiring to our men 
watching the foe behind the powder burned breastworks of the 
doomed city. 

By the death of McPherson that afternoon, Sherman was under 
the necessity of appointing another commander for the Army of 
the Tennessee. Hooker, by his senior rank, would have been en- 
titled to the command. Logan expected the promotion, but as he 
was only a volunteer General, and heavily engaged in politics just 
then, that class of generals were -not sought after as Department 
Commanders, and the West Point graduate was more favorably 
thought of, although Logan had won his advanced position by 
bravery, and his valuable services were highly considered. How- 
ever, like many volunteer officers he delighted to quarrel with his 
superiors about commands given him, but in the execution of his 
instruction in battle, he would, with brilliancy and great gallantry, 
see the work done well, and in the larte battle Sherman was profuse 
in his praises of Logan, and disclaimed any depreciation of Logan's 
high merit, in appointing another to the command of the Army of 
the Tennessee. With General Hooker the matter was different. 
He held the senior rank, to both Sherman and Thomas, and there- 
fore claimed the right of the appointment, but from June 22nd, the 
date that Hooker sent his message to Sherman concerning the right 
flank, there had been quite a breach, continuedly increasing between 
the two great generals, causing Sherman to doubt whether he could 
rely on the co-operation of Hooker to such an extent as to insure 
the success of this campaign. This placed Hooker out of line of 
promotion "although Sherman repudiates the intimation that he 
favored officers bred in the regular army, but with our knowledge 
at that time of the military affairs, we then believed that West Point 
had considerable influence in determining the appointment of a new 
commander of the Army of the Tennessee, and by doing so, Sher- 


man believed that he was securing the best for the organization of his 
invincible army. In the matter of appointment Thomas appears to 
have been consulted by Sherman, and the two agreed to recommend 
Howard. The president acted upon this recommendation and How- 
ard received the permanent appointment as Commander of the 
Army of the Tennessee. This assignment caused Hooker to ask 
to be relieved. As Howard had served under Hooker with the 
nth Corps, at the battle of Chancellorsville, where the former had 
been surprised and overrun by Stonewall Jackson, in his flank move- 
ments, causing the disaster, and Hooker declined to serve any 
longer with that army, where he sometimes might be thrown under 
the command of his former subordinate. Major General Slocum, 
who had come west with this 12th Corps, was, upon consolidation 
of the I ith and 12th into the 20th Corps, sent to Vicksburg, to com- 
mand at that place. When Hooker resigned he was called to com- 
mand the 20th Corps, and assumed command about the latter part 
of -August 

By the appointment of Howard, the agreeable association of the 
army commanders continued as it had been, when McPherson was 
at the head of the Army of the Tennessee. All three were true to 
their commander-in-chief, and at all times carried out Sherman's 
views, wn'thout hesitation, and entirely free from jealousy, each 
giving the closest attention to the administration and handling of 
his own troops. Next to Sherman, Thomas enjoyed the highest 
respect and confidence of his junior companions. Schofield and 
Howard both highly respected the hero of Chickamauga. As How- 
ard's promotion had left a vacancy in the command of the 4th Corps, 
Major General David S. Stanley, a former division commander, and 
of the regular army, was placed in command. On the 24th we re- 
ceived about fifteen recruits, led by a young man that had served 
in Colonel Streight's 51st Indiana, but had been discharged for 
disability. The men were of the best that the state of Indiana had 
sent to the field. They had received considerable bounty and no 
doubt had enlisted for the money that there was in it. They were 
assigned as drivers, and made first-class teamsters in our battery. 
We continued the fire into the city during the whole of that day, 
but received little reply and did not see any more citizens on the 
roofs of the houses, as on the 22nd. We fired during the night and 
the next day without saving any ammunition of which we had a 
plentiful supply, since the railroad was in running order. As the 


houses in the city were no longer tenantable the residents built them- 
selves "bomb proofs," a hole dug in the ground, then covered with 
beams and earth about six feet thick for a covering and in this the 
family would move and be safe from the artillery fire. 

Sherman was considerably annoyed by the proposed promotions 
of General Osterhaus and Hovey. Their cases have already been 
told, in detail, in this narrative, but Sherman's protest did not avail. 
It was a year of politics and policies had to be followed to get most 
votes. The greatest wrong done by these political promotions at 
that time was suffered by Colonel Poe, Sherman's chief engineer, 
a man of the greatest ability, who would have worn Major General 
shoulder straps, if promotion had been the reward of merit, but the 
President's list of appointments was full to overflowing, and the 
Congressional limit of General officers filled, and if a vacancy oc- 
curred, the politicians were quickly scrambling to fill it, long before 
Generals Grant or Sherman would hear of it. Col. Poe had no such 
aid, hence his deserved promotion did not come to him, and at one 
time he had been so far crowded out that he held but the rank of 
a campany officer in the engineer corps, this after having demon- 
strated his ability in the field as a general officer. But Sherman 
recognized his ability and talent and made him his Chief Engineer, 
with the rank of a Colonel. 

In his correspondence with Washington about the Osterhaus 
and Hovey promotions, Sherman did not mince matters, but frankly 
said if the rear be the post of honor, then we had all better change 
front on Washington. These facts no doubt were remembered 
when Morton of Indiana, in 1876, tried to get the presidential nom- 
ination at Cincinnati. Morton was the promoter of Hovey's com- 
mission. Osterhaus's promotion would no doubt have come to 
him, after Atlanta had fallen, for he was a fighter and deserving. 
When Hood made his far reaching charge against General Hardee 
having been timid at the battle of Peach Tree Creek, by cautioning 
his men to look out for breastworks and again in the battle of At- 
lanta on the 22nd, when he charges Hardee with not having car- 
ried out his orders, to go farther to the rear of Sherman's army. 
Hardee handed in his resignation to the Confederate authorities, 
but at the request of Mr. Davis he withdrew the same, and for the 
time being retained the command of his old corps. Ge^al Stephen 
D. Lee, who had been in command in ihis native state, Mississippi, 
was called and placed in command of Hood's old corps. This 



brought Cheatham back to his division, in Hardee's corps. The 
division of General Walker, who was killed in the battle of the 
22nd, had been so reduced by heavy losses on that day, that it was 
broken up and assigned to other divisions. On the 25th the Ross- 
well line of supply for Sherman's army was abandoned, and the 
left wing was ordered to send its trains and hospitals near the rail- 
road, on Peach Tree Creek, to which the troops of the Army of 
the Tennesse were to follow on the 27th, thus becoming the extreme 
right of our army, while the Army of the Ohio, under Schofield, be- 
came the extreme left. As the left flank of the 23rd Corps was now 
refused, looking almost due east, we were able to occupy the enemy's 
breastworks that they had held on the 20th, against the Army of the 
Cumberland. At the same time Stoneman had organized a force 
of about six thousand five hundred mounted troops at Decatur, with 
v^'hich he intended to break the Macon railroad, and with part of 
these he intended to go to Macon and Andersonville which would 
have been plausible under a very energetic and able leader but at 
the very start Stoneman weakened himself by leaving Garrard at 
Jonesboro. Early on the morning of the 27th the several expi- 
ditions were in motion, Dodge's i6th corps was the first to leave its 
position, marching in the rear of the rest of the army, until it 
reached Davis' Division of the 14th corps, which formed the right 
of the Army of the Cumberland, which brought the i6th Corps 
under Dodge across the Lick Skillet road that runs from Elliott's 
Mill to the Mount Ezra Church, on a ridge which faced Proctor's 
Creek. The 15th Corps followed and marched all night, and the 
17th Corps passed in rear of Dodge and formed on the latter's right 
flank, early in the morning of the 28th. The line now extended 
to the church, where the north and south road, better known as the 
River Road, crosses the Atlanta and Lick Skillet Road. The Macon 
and West Point railroad, then the only one open to Hood for sup- 
plies from the south side, left the city at the race course and then 
both ran on the same track for five miles, to East Point. On ridges 
of several creeks, among them Proctor, Utoy and Camp, that rise 
in ravines and run north and west to the Chattahoochie River. 
There were other creeks and hilly ridges that ran parrallel to the 
line of the railroad close to where the Lick Skillet road leaves the 
city. The Confederates had strongly fortified themselves with a 
salient and a bastion and then extended their line a little to the 
east, of south, for a mile, then crossing the railroad, and for a half 


mile further their fortification ran close to the track. This brought 
Blair's 17th Corps right within about one and a half miles of the 
railroad, which gave Sherman the hope that if Hood could confine 
himself to the line of defense around the city, he would be able, by 
his larger force, to reach the railroad within a day or two, but 
Hood's engineers were already at work to construct a new line that 
would leave the city at the bastion already described, and then run 
southwest for more than four miles, crossing the Utoy Creek, and 
then curving on some prominent hills, protected by broken ground 
in front. Close to where the road runs from Atlanta to Sandtown, 
on the Chattahoochie, the defense line had left the railroad at the 
Bastion, and when it reached the Sandtown road was nearly two 
miles to the west of it. This caused Sherman to repeat his flanking 
movements which he had practised so well against Johnston on the 
north side of the river. 

The terrible losses that Hood had met with in the battle of 
Peach Tree Creek, on the 20th, and again in the battle of Atlanta 
on the 22nd, had satisfied his men for any more bloody battles, but 
as he had been placed in command of the army, to change the tac- 
tics of his predecessor, he could only continue the assault on what- 
ever was in his front, which induced him now to make another 
effort to crush Sherman's flank, while in motion, and before defences 
had been erected. Stephen D. Lee, the newly arrived commanded" 
of Hood's old corps, was to try and prevent Sherman from extend- 
ing his lines past the Lick Skillet road where it crosses the river 
road. Loring and Walthal's division of Stewart's corps were to 
support Lee, and Stewart, with the other divisions of his corps, 
was to remain in position, if needed, and next morning the 29th to 
move beyond Lee's left; and with the aid of French's division to at- 
tack Howard's right and rear, and thus crush the Army of the 
Tennessee. Hardee's troops and the Georgia state troops were to 
remain in the trenches, opposing Schofield and Thomas. The 
whole was a repetition of Hardee's movement of the 22nd, but did 
not have the brilliant chances of success, as the assault by Lee now 
on the 28th, would put the Army of the Tennessee in particular, and 
Sherman's invincibles on guard against the unexpected and impul- 
sive movements of Hood, and so the chances of success for them 
were exceedingly small. 

L-ogan's army corps of the Army of the Tennessee had left its 
position on the left of our line just north of the Augusta railroad 


and after marching all night with many halts formed line of battle 
near Ezra Church with the 4th division on his flank, partly refused, 
and the other divisions extending the line to the east. Davis's di- 
vision of the 14th had passed the line to the rear of Logan and by 
a considerable circuit was expected to be inposition to strike Lee's 
corps, in flank and rear, during the latter's assault on Logan. The 
15th Corps had reached their place early in the morning, but val- 
uable time was taken up bringing the troops into position. The 
right of the corps extended to Ezra church and was then refused 
to connect with Blair's 17th Corps. This gave the 2nd division 
some open ground in front of which Wangelin's brigade had the 
most prominent position. As no other material for the breastworks 
were at hand they took the church benches and filled them with their 
knapsacks and then coming down on their knees they awaited the 
, gallant advance of the Confederates and with their usual bravery 
repulsed them. They were quickly reformed with officers in ad- 
vance leading the brave southern boys who, according to some re- 
ports, charged seven times, but with no success. The brunt of the 
assaults had been on the salient angle of Logan's 4th division and, 
Wangelin's brigade of the 2nd division. The latter had many val- 
uable officers killed and wounded. To help Lee General Stewart 
moved forward two of his divisions, and to encourage their men 
the general officers exposed themselves. Stewart, Loring, Brown 
and Johnson left the field wounded and disabled. During the 
lull caused by the reformation of the enemy's line, the Federals 
strengthened their defenses, while each Confederate assault became 
less vigorous, with less chance for success than the previous one. 
The reserves of Blair and Dodge's corps were sent to support Logan. 
The artillery of the Army of the Tennessee were placed in po.sition 
from which they could sweep the open field on the enemy's flanks. 
The fierce combat lasted until the sun refused its further light to 
the slaughter, causing the Confederates to withdraw out of range 
of the Federal guns with a loss of about 5,000 killed, wounded and 
missing, while the Army of the Tennessee had only to record 600 
casualties in defeating Lee's efforts. In their last attack the men 
could be plainly seen from our breastworks, refusing to follow their 
officers. Davis's 14th Corps division had been expected to make 
a rear attack upon the flank of the enemy, but by a misleading map 
had gotten upon a wrong road and was unable to reach the field 
in time. The division of Harrow and Morgan L. Smith had received 


the assaults of Lee, but the Federal line was never shaken. Hood 
claims the battle to have been a drawn affair, where neither side 
gained the objective ppint, but as he intended to crush Sherman's 
right flank, in which he did not succeed, he should have recorded 
it as a defeat; and the third of the kind since he resumed command 
of the army. It is also claimed that he had ordered Hardee to go 
to the front, and assume command of both corps, which did not 
include Hardee's own, but as the day was nearly passed and the 
troops no longer in a fighting condition, further efforts ceased. This 
showed that Hood still had considerable confidence in Hardee's en- 
ergy and ability to fight a battle. Hood called on Lee to give his 
opinion about the moral and fighting qualities of his corps. Lee 
claims that some of the troops actually refused to do their duty. 
This if true is not to be wondered at, for the American soldier will 
never be a machine that soldiers of Europe are made to be, but like 
the American business men who will invest if it pays, so will the 
American soldier oft'er his life for success, but if he sees with open 
eyes the cause for which he is to give his life is going to pieces, he is 
not to be blamed if he becomes reluctant.. Hood further claims 
that Johnston's policy had made the troops timid. This is not true 
as the prisoners captured by us freely expressed themselves that the 
slaughter of the 20th, 22nd and 28th was looked upon as useless, 
and during the lulls the skirmishers would cheer each other. The 
Federals would inquire, "how many are left of you after this bat- 
tle?" When the answer would come, "Enough for another killing." 
This was about the opinion of the Confederate army, under Hood, 
composed of the bravest of men on the American continent. If 
these battles, as Hood reasoned, restored the morals and courage of 
the men of his command, he should have continued the practice, 
but for four weeks he quietly awaited our coming, until Sherman 
reached Jonesboro on his rear. Mr. Davis, the Confederate Presi- 
dent, had become appalled at the fearful losses, and wrote Hood 
on the 5th of August that in order to avoid such losses it would be 
necessary not to meet us behind our intrenchments. Johnston in 
two weeks after being relieved was completely vindicated in his 
generalship. As the 15th Corps withdrew from our left, between 
the Howard House and the railroad, on the 27th, we withdrew a 
little north of the distillery road into an earthworks that had been 
changed but offered us little protection from the city, and as they 
noticed the withdrawal, the Confederate home guards or State 


troops kept up a heavy fire from their big guns and sent us shells 
of 8 inches in diameter. Some of the engineers had left their tools 
on the outside of the bastion that we occupied, and so close was 
the fire that they accurately planted many shells into this little 
earthwork, and none of the working parties could be induced to go 
for their tools. Finally Sommerfield, a cannonier of our battery, 
with many wounds, stepped to the front and voluntarily gathered 
the tools and brought them in. During the night these heavy and 
large shells as they came flying in their curves from the city looked 
like comets. On the morning of the 28th the bombardment as well 
as their reply continued, and a ball fired by the enemy struck the 
middle teams on one of the Caison's. The driver that held the team 
by the bridles was one of the new men recently arrived. Of course 
the horses were both killed and a new team brought forward and 
such of the harness as still serviceable was taken from the dead ani- 
mals. While inspecting the new team the young recruit of only 
three days' service in the field asked me, "Lieutenant, will I have 
to pay for those horses and harness, too?" I looked surprised, 
but the sergeant had instructed him that on inspection he must 
show every part of the property intrusted to him, or it would 
be charged against his pay. Seeing the horses killed and the har- 
ness ripped to pieces, he thought that the Government and state 
had played him a trick by paying him as an inducement to enlist in- 
cluding the local bounties, fifteen hundred dollars, and that since they 
had him they wanted to get their money back by charging the losses 
up to him. This started me to thinking that the man had enlisted for 
the money there was in it. He served, however, to the end, 
and I have since learned that at his death he was a very wealthy 
man. .After Logan's corps had all passed, the firing on that part 
of the line was continued at a slower interval but the roar of ar- 
tillery and the rattling of musketry in the direction of Ezra church 
indicated that another battle was on, as already related. At the 
same time that Stoneman and Garrard made their movement from 
Decatur, McCook with his mounted force marched down the west 
bank of the Chattahoochie to Campbelltown, and crossing the river 
proceeded by quick movements to Love Joy Station, on the Macon 
railroad, a distance about thirty miles below Atlanta expecting to 
make a junction with Stoneman, but heard nothing of him. To the 
delight of the Confederate quartermaster, he burned a large number 


of wagons, among them the vouchers and receipts of the commis- 
sary and quartermaster stores. He also destroyed the railroad, 
and some trains, and marched off with four hundred prisoners, 
but on his return he was met by a brigade of Confederate infantry 
and some cavalry, and had a spirited fight to save himself from 
capture, but lost his prisoners and about six hundred of his own 

Stoneman had left Garrard at Flat Rock, east of Decatur, 
crossed the Ocmulgee river near Covington, and marched for the 
Macon and Augusta railroad, reached Griswold and destroyed a 
large amount of railroad property at that place, and thence struck 
for the east to burn the bridge over the Oconee, and then met with 
the rest of his detachment- before Macon. His entry to that city 
was prevented by the river, and after shelling the town moved 
toward Clinton, where he believed himself surrounded by a large 
force. He authorized his subordinates to cut their way out, while 
lie, with a small force, held the enemy so that the others could 
escape. This was very selfsacrificing, but he had been badly 
deceived by the enemy, and there had been no necessity for his sur- 
render. Garrard's failure and Stoneman's defeat caused Sherman 
to rate the usefulness of his cavalry very low. During the last of 
July we pounded away at regular intervals, during night and day, 
at the city of Atlanta, which probably resulted only in non-com- 
batants hunting their quarters in the dugouts and bomb proof, under 
ground; for every house, shed and stable above the ground was 
riddled with cannon balls and offered no protection or shelter. 





On the first of August the scenes were again shifted and this time 
the 23rd Corps moved from the left, near the distillery road, to 
the right of the two divisions of the Army of the Cumberland, then 
beyond the flank of the Army of the Tennessee. This brought 
Ward's and Davis's division on the Lick Skillet road, and the Army 
of the Tennessee wheeled forward to bring itself in line with them. 
On the morning of the 2nd the twenty-third Corps reached the 
banks of the north fork of Utoy Creek, with the Tennessee Army 
coming forward to connect with Schofield's corps. By this move- 
ment Sherman gained nearly a mile of ground on that flank. The 
14th Corps, under Palmer, was relieved by Ward's divisltm of the 
twentieth Corps and Palmer with his other troops joined Davis's 
division of his corps, which was already on the right. As Sher- 
man believed to be now near the railroad he intended for Schofield 
to reach that point, but as the twenty-third Corps was the smallest 
in the invincible army he had not troops enough to fight a battle. 
For this reason Palmer was ordered, with his 14th Corps, to report 
to Schofield and be subject temporarily to the latter's orders. Pal- 
mer's commission outdated that of Schofield, so the fourteenth 
Corps commander at once raised the question of rank, although both 
commissions, or rather the muster of them, bore the same date. 
Schofield had however been senior to Palmer, in previous grades, 
and now was department commander, which caused Sherman to de- 
cide in favor of Schofield. Palmer of course hunted up Sherman 


and found him in and around our guns, near Utoy Creek, then in 
battery, and the two walked up and down between the horses' heads 
and the trail spikes of the guns, all the time in earnest conversation. 
Palmer's orderly was with the general's horse, in the rear, near 
our caissons. Finally the conversation grew a little louder and 
when they reached the right gun of our battery they stopped and 
Sherman remarked in an audible tone, "Let us fight this out and 
compare notes afterwards." Palmer in a very distinct tone, an- 
swered, "No, sir, I will quit now," and with this remark passing 
his lips, he walked to the road, only 20 paces distant, called for his 
horse and rode awa}^ Up to that time we had not been firing, but 
directions were given us where the enemy was supposed to be, and 
just as we were about to open fire, General Sherman with several 
of his staff officers walked in front of our embrasures and a moment 
later would have been in the line of our fire. Two days of valuable 
time had been lost over the quarrel of rank, an immense amount of 
ammunition had been expended by the 14th and 23rd Corps artillery 
that had been continually in action from the time the movement 

General Palmer of course was relieved as he requested to be 
and General Jefferson C. Davis was assigned by the President to 
the corps command, with the rank of Brevet Major General, as 
recommended by both Sherman and Thomas. The orders for Pal- 
mer's 14th Corps to co-operate with the 23rd Corps, under Scho- 
eld were issued on the morning of the 3rd. The object was to 
force a crossing of the north fork of Utoy* Creek. Hascall's di- 
vision of the 23rd Corps and Baird's of the 14th were to perform 
this duty. Hascall promptly executed the order and occupied the 
high ridge on the south and east of Heron's Mill, gaining ground 
to th^ left until that flank touched the creek in its curve to the 
south. Baird was to follow Hascall and file in on his Hght, but 
did not move on account of the disputes between Palmer and Scho- 
field uhtil five o'clock in the evening, when Sherman in person or- 
dered the division over, and when in position its right rested on the 
south curve of the creek. On the following morning our division 
(Cox's) crossed the creek and formed in rear of Baird to support 
the advance of the latter. Palmer was to move Baird's division of 
his corps on the ground gained, swinging the same to the south and 
east; but as the 14th Corps commander's heart was not in this 
movement, unpardonable delays occurred until evening when Glea- 


son's brigade of Baird's division captured 25 prisoners with a loss 
of 26 killed and wounded, but the rest of the division took no part 
in the movement. Two divisions of the Fourteenth Corps were 
further to the right, but kept close together so they could support 
each other. - 

Scofield's instructions to Palmer for the Fifth were for Baird's 
division to carry the position in its front and drive the enemy back 
to his principal works. Morgan's division was to be placed on 
Baird's left and continue the line to the right, while Johnson's 
division was to form on the right of Morgan, advancing in echelon 
to the front. Hascall's division of the Twenty-third Corps was 
in a position where he could not advance, but was to support the 
left flank of Baird. Cox's (our) division was to go forward and 
support Johnston's division. 

The time for these several divisions to be on the move was set 
for six o'clock in the morning. As Schofield was to make sure that 
his orders would reach Palmer's division, duplicates were sent to 
each of them, but hardly had Baird been notified of his part of the 
game when he sent word to Schofield that he, too, could not recog- 
nize his authority, and had not been informed by his corps com- 
mander that the Fourteenth Corps was under Schofield's orders. 
Baird in his report states that at the time the orders reached him 
from his corps commander, he did not know the position of Mor- 
gan's division, on his right, but it was now eight o'clock, and he 
courageously advanced on the enemy's skirmish line, which he 
carried with considerable loss, .but he captured 140 prisoners from 
the enemy. Morgan connected on the right of Baird, and John- 
ston formed on the right of Morgan, taking position on a ridge 
overlooking the head waters of Utoy Creek. Cox's (our) divis- 
ion was close in support of Johnston and we could plainly see the 
whole of the latter's division resting oii their guns in line of bat- 
tle,- with no effort to advance over the creek. 

That evening Schofield made a v'ery discouraging report to 
General Sherman, and stated that he had completely failed to get 
any fight out of the Fourteenth Corps. Cox's (our) division re- 
lieved Johnson, who in turn occupied Hascall's position. The lat- 
ter was placed in reserve, off the right of Cox's division. 

During the night the enemy had been very busy strengthen- 
ing their defences, by cutting trees along the east side of the creek. 
Behind these the Confederate infantry held a strong position, which 


was easily defended, as the Confederates had received considerable 
encouragement by General Palmer's dispute of rank, which had 
caused a delay in the assault. They determined to entrench the 
line along the Sandtown road and Hardee's Corps was placed there 
to hold it, making a Jine across the forks of Utoy Creek about two 
miles long and then down on the east side of the principal tribu- 
tary stream. General Cox received orders to make a reconnois- 
sance, and about eleven o'clock Reilly's brigade, having been on 
their feet from about 3 130 a. m., now moved forward in battle 
line, with the One Hundredth Ohio on the left and the One Hun- 
dred and Twelfth Illinois, under Col. Henderson, who had recently 
rejoined his brigade after wounds received at Resaca, in the center; 
and the One Hundred and Fourth Ohio, General Reilly's own regi- 
ment, on the right, with the Sixteenth Kentucky to protect the right 
flank with the Eighth Tennessee in reserve. Col. Casement, now in 
command of Cameron's brigade, supported the movement and a 
strong skirmish line was advanced on a charge across the creek, sup- 
ported by the rest of the brigade. 

Amidst a shower of bullets the line advanced until they reached 
the entangled trees. Some few reached the enemy's breastworks, 
which was solid construction, from the right to the left, and strong- 
ly held by Confederate infantry. Reilly's reserve, the Eighth Ten- 
nessee, went forward, but the works could not be carried. Case- 
ment's brigade then went across the valleys and covered the with- 
drawal of Reilly's brigade, leaving a well-supported skirmish line, 
close up to the abatis, where they remained during the rest of the 
day. Reilly had to report a loss of 333 killed, wounded and miss- 
ing. The 87 killed and many of the wounded were left on the field. 
The defence on the part of the enemy was made by Bate's Tennes- 
see division. During this time Hascall marched two of the bri- 
gades of his division past the rear of Cox, to the main stream of 
Utoy Creek, and there met the enemy's cavalry in a sharp combat, 
and drove them of¥ a position by which he could enfilade Bate's Con- 
federate line, causing the latter to retire during the night into the 
prepared strong fortification along the hills, on the north fork of 
Utoy Creek, and south across the Sandtown road, and then fol- 
lowed the hilly ridges, behind the trenches of Utoy Creek, until a 
mile south of it, reaching the railroad beyond East Point. 

During these movements on the right, the other corps of the 
army had not been idle. The Fourth Corps, now under Stan- 


ley, had advanced its skirmishers to the entrenched picket post of the 
enemy. The Twentieth Corps, now under WilHams, had also been 
very active and Howard's, with the Army of the Tennessee, had 
pushed forward close to the enemy, with good results. The Four- 
teenth and Twenty- third Corps were giving the enemy no rest, 
and when our lines, under Cox, advanced and occupied the hills 
around Willis' Mill-Pond, with Hascall on our right and rear, and the 
Fourteenth Corps on our left, we had only about three hundred 
and fifty yards air line to the enemy's fortifications. These move- 
ments were made on all parts of the line, by a considerable noise of 
artillery, but as strong breastworks protected both sides the cas- 
ualties were but few, as a reward for the ammunition expended. 
The rattling noise of the musketry and the roar of artillery far and 
near had become monotonous, so' one morning, while watching 
the foe from behind our head logs, the music band of the One Hun- 
dred and Twelfth Illinois began to play, and for the time being all 
firing on both sides, as if by common consent, ceased. After sev- 
eral pieces had been given to the air, the band stopped, and a little 
while later our Confederate friends brought forward a band of a 
larger number of pieces, and returned the . compliment by playing 
some lively southern airs, among them "Dixie," "Bonnie Blue Flag" 
and "Maryland" (or the proper name, "O Hannaman, O Hanna- 
man Zieh due die Wasser Stiefel on.") Matters began to become 
very agreeable between us, and it seemed as if war was miles 
away. As the southerners had probably given us a little better 
music they were joyful, but just then a band of the Eighteenth 
United States regulars, with a full number of pieces and in fine 
practice, belonging to Johnson's division of the Fourteenth Corps, 
began to play the national airs, "The Star Spangled Banner," "The 
Red, White and Blue," and others, and discounted our southern 
friends to a considerable extent. 

Just about the time they stopped playing, Corporal Schultz, 
of the first gun, was looking over his piece at the enemy, when 
a Confederate sharpshooter took deadly aim at him. Instead of 
striking Schultz in the breast, as it had been intended, the ball 
struck the gun just about the trunnion and bounded over Schultz's 
head, so close that he ducked. Having seen from whence the ball 
was fired, and as all had been silent on account of the music, 
Schultz had the gun loaded and let fly at the enemy's picket post, 
whic]- was demolished and the sharpshooter ^^'ho fired the shot. 


Now that the artillery had reopened the whole outfit on both 
sides became the more active, as though they had to make up for 
lost time on account of the music. Close by to where our battery 
was in position one of the nearby citizens had made a bomb proof, 
and during our occupation of the line he and his family (old man, 
wife and daughter) lived therein. A few days before this a cap- 
tain's commission reached Lieut. Harvey and he promptly sought 
the mustering officer. 

The battery had made a poor exchange for an able artillery 
officer of the highest attainment. We had exchanged for a brave 
man with a captain's commission, but unable to- know the army 
regulations or artillery tactics, for to my knowledge during our 
association he never looked at either of them, but no one was to 
blame but ourselves. We had plenty of resources in selecting the 
old captain again, after his muster out, or to have our new captain 
brought before a board, that would have found the deficiencies as 
I have narrated them, but there was not a man mean enough in our 
battery to seek relief by that source, and as the men were well in- 
structed by the former captain, their patriotism and devotion to 
duty gave it the highest standing in the corps. 

As the lines of the invincible army had now been stretched as 
far as could be done, Sherman intended to try the bombardment 
with heavy artillery and reach the enemy's fortification by parallels. 
The enemy had a number of heavy guns in position in works oppo- 
site Thomas' line. These were in charge of the state militia of 
Georgia and well handled by them. So much so that Hood could 
use his regular troops to move to any threatened point along his 
line, that confronted the Federals on any other part of the field. 
Sherman had ordered some four and a half Parrott guns from Chat- 
tanooga and placed Capt. Suttermeister, of the Eleventh Indiana 
battery, in charge, who put them in battery on Thomas' line and 
a general cannonade with these guns, as also with the rest of the 
artillery of the invincible army, was engaged upon the enemy's 
forts for several days. Schofield, then on the extreme right of 
the grand army, kept on extending his line to that flank, and on 
the 8th, General Hascall pushed a brigade over Utoy Creek and in- 
trenched on a hill, and two days later the other brigades of Hascall's 
division followed. 

Cox's division was ordered to reconnOiter in force to the junc- 
tion of the Campbletown and East Point road, but it was soon 


learned that the enemy was further to the front than Sherman or 
Schofield were aware of. Our division continued its advance posi- 
tion on the right and rear of Hascall's and the position vacated by 
us was occupied by some troops of the Fourteenth Corps, with a 
front that now reached Utoy Creek. On the 15th, Cox's division 
was pushed forward to the crossing of the Campbletown and East 
Point roads, and on the i8th was again advanced, this time nearly 
a mile, in a southeasterly direction, in the form of a semi-circle, 
the left resting on the upper valley of Utoy Creek and the right 
on Camp Creek, protected by heavy earth works that could not be 
shaken by the enemy's assault, as it was expected he would do, 
crushing us in our isolated position. On the extreme right of 
Sherman's invincible army, just as we had done at Olley's Creek on 
the right of Kenesaw, these advances had been made under a con- 
tinued heavy skirmish and heavy artillery fire of the division bat- 

Each succeeding day we dared Hood to come out and assault 
us, as on former • flank movements, but which he declined tO' re- 
peat, and on the 19th a most furious bombardment, from every 
gun in position, was made and lasting during the whole day. 

Sherman now made one more effort to* break the Macon rail- 
road, by sending Kilpatrick, with his large division of mounted 
troops, by the way of West Point and Fairburn to Jonesboro, on 
the Macon railroad. Just at this time Lieut. Bartlett, of Scho- 
field' s staff (the latter' s brother-in-law) came to me and asked if 
I desired to make about a week's trip with my section on a cavalry 
raid. I promptly replied that if it was an order I would do my 
duty, but as a volunteer I could not ask the men to take the risk. 
As my former service with a cavalry corps had left a very unfavor- 
able impression, he replied it would have to be voluntarily, and of 
course, I declined. When Kilpatrick reached Jonesboro he met a 
division of the Confederates that had been sent there tO antici- 
pate him, and by brilliant fighting succeeded in destroying a con- 
siderable part of the railroads, but was unable to make the inter- 
ruption permanent, as the Confederates were running cars into the 
city two days after Kilpatrick retired from the raid. During this 
raid Sherman's invincible army continued to demonstrate all along 
the line, and our outpost on the right flank, on the 21st, was pushed 
as far as Camp Creek church, and close to the forts in front of East 
Point station, where the Macon and Montgomery railroad sepa- 


rates. The continuous firing of our battery and the rest of the artil- 
lery at the enemy's line had become the same every day. The in- 
fantry enjoyed themselves while resting beliind the works, and at 
ease by playing chuck-luck or poker. In one of the Kentucky regi- 
ments the colonel and some of his men had been interrupted at the 
game, when an order came for the division to march forward a 
mile, as already stated. The regiment filed in line next to our bat- 
tery. No sooner had the brave Kentuckians stacked arms when the 
colonel and his four privates resumed their interrupted game, played 
it to a finish, and to the great delight of the colonel, his men had 
beat him, which he tried hard to avoid. 

While in position on our pivot I decided one day to get out 
to the front, in the edge of the woods, where our advance vidette 
post was. As soon as I came in sight of the outpost one of the 
men called on me to dismount, as I was drawing the enemy's fire. 
I left my horse in the thicket and then advanced tO' a pile of rails 
that served as a protection for the few men doing duty there. A 
detail of the One Hundred and Twelfth Illinois Infantry held the 
post. No sooner had I reached the rail pile when several bullets 
from the enemy's rifle pit made the splinters fly around us. The 
distance between us was not great. Seeing from where the enemy 
fired, I asked the One Hundred and Twelfth trooper to lend me 
his gun. Not having been in practice with that kind of an arm, 
I watched the next shot and then took deadly aim at our enemy 
and pulled my gun. Immediately thereafter two men walked away 
from the enemy's rifle pit, one leaning on the other, badly wounded. 

The total failure of Kilpatrick to destroy the enemy's commu- 
nication convinced Sherman that to insure permanent results, he 
would be required to move his whole force, by a grand left wheel, 
on Hood's line of supply. The first of such a movement had been 
successfully carried out by Grant at Vicksburg. Sherman then 
had opposed such a risk, but now was willing to try it himself. His 
subordinates, Thomas, Schofield and Howard, were advised of his 
plans and orders were issued to intrench the Twentieth Corps north 
of the Chattahoochie railroad bridge, and swing the rest of his in- 
vincible army to the south of Atlanta. With reduced baggage 
and ten days' full rations, to last twenty, the movement was pre- 
pared to be executed. On the 14th, Hood had sent Wheeler to 
operate in Sherman's rear on the railroad, north of the Chatta- 
hoochie. He reached Dalton, where he attacked the garrison, un- 


der Col. Laiboldt and Arnold Beck, of the Second Missouri Infan- 
try, but Wheeler was held until Gen. Steadman, from Chattanooga, 
came to the assistance of the garrison, and Wheeler was driven off. 
Of course he had cut the railroad and telegraph, but the damage 
was small and soon repaired. Wheeler then switched off into 
East Tennessee, without doing anything to affect the resources of 
Sherman's supply or retarding the campaign. This gave Sherman 
the assurance that no mischief could be done by the enemy's mount- 
ed troops in his rear and he therefore began the execution of his 
grand tactics, and on August 25th, Stanley's Fourth Corps, now 
the Federal left flank on the north of Atlanta, marched to the rear 
of William's Twelfth, and the dismounted cavalry of Garrard's 
filed in and held the Fourth Corps line. Next day Stanley reached 
Utoy Creek, in rear of Davis' Fourteenth Corps, which in turn 
left its line to its skirmishers and formed in column of mass, near 
Stanley. During the night William's Twentieth Corps crossed 
the Chattahoochie, took position in its work prepared for them, 
where Slocum took charge of the corps. The Army of the Ten- 
nessee, under Howard, marched in rear of Thomas to the village 
of Utoy, facing south, and forming the right of the army. The 
Sixteenth Corps (Dodge's), provisionally under command of Gen. 
Ransom, was on the extreme right, Garrard's cavalry protected the 
rear and Schofield's Twenty-third Corps was now the extreme left, 
near the Confederate line, at East Point, where we kept up a con- 
tinuous demonstration in our front and flanks. Sherman's invin- 
cibles, except the Twentieth Corps, were now on the road between 
Atlanta and Sandtown. Hood had not interfered with Sherman's 
movements, but his cavalry, with its depleted ranks, were skir- 
mishing with Garrard's cavalry, on the north of the grand army^ 
and with Kilpatrick to the south of them. This gave Hood accu- 
rate information of the position of Sherman's invincibles, which 
caused the Confederate leader to believe that Wheeler had crippled 
our communication, and that we were in full retreat across the 
Chattahoochie, via the Sandtown road and short of supplies. In" 
this illusion he was sustained by an old woman, who had called 
on Hardee's troops for something to eat, and to sustain her appli- 
cation stated that she had been at Cox's headquarters, of Scho- 
field's Corps, and had been cursed and refused food by the general^ 
as we had not enough for ourselves. Those who knew Gen. Cox 
best never heard an oath pass his lips, and also that no hungry man 


or woman ever left his presence as long as he had a loaf to divide 
with them. This is at least the way I knew Gen. Cox, and others 
will bear me out in this statement. 

But such information came as glorious news to the enemy, just 
such as they had been loking for and the woman was sent to Har- 
dee's headquarters, who also wanted to furnish Hood with the lat- 
est news from the front, and so she was sent to the Confederate 
general-in-chief, where she repeated her story. 

Hood, of course, believed anything that would favor him, 
and exclaimed : "Sherman is out of rations and recrossing the 
Chattahoochie at Sandtown," and so for 48 hours the old woman's 
story proved the basis of his actions, but when the truth was re- 
vealed to him it was too late to formulate a plan that would keep 
Sherman off the railroad in his rear. To keep the movement of 
nearly a hundred thousand men secret from his adversary proved 
that Sherman handled his troops well and that the Confederate 
commander was not being well served by his mounted troops, scouts 
and spies. Had these suspected and reported the truth to Hood 
he could have barred Sherman's way by placing two of his corps, 
Stewart's and Lee's, in front of Red Oak and Fairburn, the places 
at which Sherman reached the West Point railroad, and with the 
Confederate right resting at East Point, another flanking move- 
ment would have become necessary and had it been made by the 
east, Atlanta would have been captured, just the same as Altoona 
Pass, but that would not have given Sherman the opportunity to 
destroy the railroad, for these with the junction at East Point 
would still have been held by Hood. 

Sherman's wagon trains were wedged in between the Fourth 
and Fourteenth Corps of the Army of the Cumberland, and the 
Twenty-third Corps still held on to its line, in front of Hardee, 
until Thomas had neared the Mount Gilead Church, which is about 
four miles southwest of East Point, on the road to Red Oak, a sta- 
tion on the West Point railroad. 

The Army of the Cumberland, with the wagon trains, stopped 
near the above named church and camped. On the night of the 
28th the Army of the Tennessee, under Howard, reached Fairburn 
five miles further southwest, on the same road. As soon as Thomas' 
and Howard's troops reached the railroad they devoted their time 
the whole day of the 29th to the destruction of the railroad, by 
burning the ties and twisting the rails into all sorts of shapes, so 


they never could be used again until rerolled. About noon on the 
28th, Schofield's corps our (Cox's) division withdrew a little 
from our line in front of Hardee. Immediately thereafter a Con- 
federate came over their breastworks to see where we had gone. 
They did not have far to come, when they still found us in line of 
battle waiting their approach, but, during the afternoon and even- 
ing we retired in column ready for defence, until we reached within 
a short distance of Mt. Gilead church, close to the left flank of 
Stanley's Fourth Corps. On the 29th, while the army was busy 
breaking up the West Point railroad, our quartermaster sergeant 
went out with several teams to gather corn. They did not have far 
to go until they reached a large field and were busy engaged in fill- 
ing the wagons, when one of the men spied the Confederates in the 
other corner of the field on the same mission. They did not disturb 
each other, but some of the men were highly excited over their 
escape from going to Andersonville for the rest of the war, but they 
had presence of mind enough to bring in a good supply of pump- 
kins, then just getting ripe, this in addition to the heavy loads of 
corn in each wagon. On the next day the army made its left wheel, 
between the two railroads (Macon and West Point), Schofield's 
Corps being the pivot, moved from Red Oak station towards East 
Point, which covered the movement of the army train. This sepa- 
rated Schofield fully three miles from the rest of the army, and 
gave Hood a favorable opportunity to strike the former a blow, 
but nothing approached us in our isolated position other than a 
cavalry reconnoitering, which caused the Twenty-third Corps to 
throw up light entrenchments in defence of more serious expecta- 
tions of heavier work. 

Hood's dream that Sherman's invincibles were flying north 
for want of supplies on account of the raids of Wheeler and Forrest, 
soon passed away, and when he realized that Sherman was march- 
ing with only two corps on his communication, to oppose these, 
he ordered Hardee and to Jonesboro to attack the national 
forces next morning at early daylight. 

The ridge on which the Macon railroad runs south separates 
Flint River on the west, and Ocmulgee to the east, and Hardee was 
instructed to drive the enemy back over Flint River, if they had 
crossed. As Hardee was in supreme command of the two corps, 
Gen. Pat Cleburne was placed in command of Hardee's old corps. 
Finding Howard already upon the road by which Cleburne ex- 


pectecl to reach his right, the former had to cut a new road and was 
not able to be in a position until after lo a. m., on the morning of 
the 31st, and the other Confederate corps, under Lee, did not get 
up until two hours later. This had given Howard's troops time to 
intrench. As the Confederate situation was now somewhat com- 
plicated Hardee seiit for Hood to come and take command in per- 
son but the latter believed that his presence was needed in Atlanta. 
On the advance from Fairburn to Jonesboro the Army of the Ten- 
nessee was continually opposed by the enemy's cavalry, and made a 
strong resistance which gave Hardee time to reach Jonesboro. 
On the close of the day of the 30th, the army under Howard had in- 
tended to stop at Renfro, but as there was no water at that place 
Howard decided to march to Flint River, where water enough for 
the troops could be had. The troops advanced in two columns, 
Logan's on the left and Ransom on the right and moved forward so 
rapidly, and Kilpatrick's cavalry was so active that the Confed- 
erate horsemen were unable to make a stand so as to injure the 
bridge over Flint River, and Hazen's division crossed it with a 
dash. With the head of Logan's columns over the stream, they gave 
the enemy no time to rally and Howard's forces promptly ad- 
vanced to the ridge between the river and the railroad and en- 
trenched, Flazen's division on the left, Harrow's on the right and 
Osterhaus's in reserve. Ransom's Sixteenth Corps remained on 
the west side of the river, facing south, opposite Logan's right, 
Blair's corps reached the river early in the morning, and placed 
on Logan's left, facing northeast, but also remained on the west of 
the river. 

At the early morning, on the 31st, some few changes were 
made in Logan's line and bridges built to connect with Ransom and 
Blair, and the three corps were now in supporting distance and 
ready for a further advance. The noise of the trains on the rail- 
road had been sufficient notice to the Army of the Tennessee that 
the enemy was concentrating during the night in their front. 

This made Howard, in his exposed position, somewhat uneasy, 
as he did not know that the rest of Sherman's invincible army was 
in supporting distance. He kept his men very busy, strengthening 
their position and communicated with Sherman. The latter was 
with Thomas, and unaware of the new move of the Confederate 
commander. This important news only reached him late in the 
day, about the same time when he heard the roar of artillery, in- 


dicating a heavy battle at Jonesboro. About three o'clock in the 
afternoon Hardee made a furious attack on Logan's whole front, 
while one division of Ransom's corps and C. R. Wood's division 
from Blair's corps, was sent across the river to support Logan and 
with their usual gallantry the Southern boys under Cleburne and 
Lee, made a fierce attack, but their, efforts were not as determined 
as former assaults during July had been. They were most persist- 
ent, however, in front of Hazen's division, but all along the line 
they were repulsed, leaving four hundred dead, and about eleven 
hundred badly wounded on the field, mostly belonging to Lee's 
■corps, who apparently had ordered the advance before Cleburne 
was ready. Cleburne had been kept very busy to prevent Kilpatrick 
from crossing the river on Howard's right, in which he was suc- 
cessful, by crossing to the west side of the river after Kilpatrick, 
but Blair was ordered to send a division of his corps to assist our 
horsemen on the right of Ransom. 

On the 31st Schofield marched early past Morrow's Mill in the 
direction of the Macon Railroad, about a mile south of Rough and 
Ready Station. The Fourth Corps moved about a half mile further 
•south on the parallel road, both driving the strong opposition of the 
enemy's cavalry before them. As our (Cox's) division was lead- 
ing, we were sometimes halted and just about noon, in a broiling 
■sun, the battery pulled into a shady grove on the road, having been 
in the saddle from early morning, and the cannoneers and drivers 
were soon asleep. Lieut. Kuntz had been detached, and marched 
with the advance without being notified. 

After a good hour's rest, Bugler Jake Traub grabbed me by 
the arm, and called my attention to the fact that the division had 
marched and left us. I at once mounted drivers and cannoneers 
and, with refreshed horses and men, we started after the division. 
In an hour we came into our proper place in the advance. Just 
then three prisoners had been captured, close by in the brush, pre- 
paring their roasting ears. They were Germans of Hebrew de- 
scent. As Col. Casement's brigade had made the capture, they 
were brought to him while halting near our battery. Casement 
liad a good deal of fun at their expense, and asked them if they de- 
sired to take the oath of allegiance. They replied in the negative 
and asked to be sent north as soon as possible. 

In asking their status at home (they were from Mobile), they 
•said thev were cotton nifrchants, and as soon as this trouble was 


over, they would go back to Mobile and follow their business, 
which they could not do if they took the oath of allegiance, as their 
interests and their hearts were in Mobile. They appeared to be de- 
lighted with their capture, but as that place, they said, was entirely 
too hot with so many Yankees around them, they again requested 
to be sent north at once. 

It was now nearly 3 o'clock when we reached the railroad, and 
our battery was at once placed to the east of the road and Cockrell's 
Battery D to the west of the track. The noise of a coming railroad 
train was heard. We had loaded, and, as the train headed around 
the curve, a short distance from Rough and Ready Station, we 
fired. The engineer at once reversed his engine and steamed back 
to Atlanta. As the telegraph wires had been cut, and Hardee's 
couriers were not able to get through. Hood received the first no- 
tice that we were on his line of communication, by the returning 
railroad train, and Atlanta was doomed. We marched towards 
Rough and Ready Station and encamped for the night. Hascall's 
division was in line next to us on the road, and the whole corps at 
once began the complete destruction of the ties and the rails. 

The Fourth Corps joined Hascall on the right, and performed 
its part of the destruction of Hood's last line of communication, 
with great neatness and dispatch. Next to Stanley's corps came 
the Fourteenth Corps, later in the evening, and the track was de- 
stroyed that day to within four miles of Jonesboro. The news 
that Sherman's army was marching north towards Atlanta had cre- 
ated the greatest consternation in that city, and seemed to have car- 
ried Hood away in the excitement, to the belief that Sherman had 
moved by his right flank and was now advancing towards the en- 
emy. He was unaware of Hardee's battle against Howard, and 
therefore sent orders at once for Lee's corps to return to the city, 
and Hardee was left to do the best he could, to cover the railroad 
and trains at Jonesboro. 

In his dispatches to Hardee, Hood expressed himself that there 
were indications of an attack on Atlanta from Rough and Ready 
Station, and expected a battle at East Point next day. Lee's corps 
marched north, but it never reached Atlanta, for the condition of 
things had changer, and other orders reached Lee on the road. Har- 
dee's situation was desperate, as he had to stretch his one corps in 
trenches intended for the two, but resorted to the old style of de- 
ception, by advancing a heavy skirmish line to the front, and, as 


he was a good tactician, he kept his reserves in position to move 
to threatened points. He promptly advised Hood of his situation 
at Jonesboro, and kept Howard in the behef that he still had two 
corps in line before him, for it could not be supposed that Hood 
would recall one of the corps to Atlanta. 






On the evening of that day the railroad from Rough and Ready- 
Station to near Jonesboro was in possession of Sherman's invin- 
cible army, and as Hardee and Lee were at Jonesboro, the com- 
m.ander-in -chief of the Union army had reason to believe that 
Hood's whole army would be in his front at Jonesboro next day. 
Slocum, in command of the Twentieth Corps, north of the Chatta- 
hoochie, was ordered to be active to find the true condition of things 
in Atlanta, and, if possible, enter the place. Davis's Fourteenth 
Corps was ordered to march to Howard's left and destroy the rail- 
road, as he advanced. The Fourth Corps was also instructed to 
follow Davis to Jonesboro and Schofield was to bring up the rear 
from Rough and Ready Station. Both of the last-named corps 
were to employ their talent and manual labor by destroying the 
railroad as they advanced, which indicated to the thinking observer 
that the invincible army was not to follow Hood to the south, oth- 
erwise the railroad track would have to be preserved for future 

The great object of the campaign had been to first capture the 
city of Atlanta, and the destruction of Hood's army later on. At- 
lanta would give us the possession of the railroad connections, and 
as he believed that Ploward had the principal part of Hood's army 
in his front, he urged the troops forward to Howard's assistance, 
but on the way the road was thoroughly destroyed. As soon as 
Sherman reached Howard, with the head of Davis's corps, he 




learned that Lee's corps had disappeared, and only Hardee's troops 
were opposing him. He at once dispatched orders for the concen- 
tration of the Army of the Cumberland, with a view to surround Har- 
dee, in his isolated position, and capture him with his corps. Stan- 
ley was at once ordered to Jonesboro, Davis's Fourteenth Corps 
was formed on the left of Howard's to overlap Hardee's right and 
rear. Blair was to send two divisions to the right, and upon the 
railroad, in the rear of Hardee and south of Jonesboro. Schofield 
at this time, by order of Gen. Sherman, was under command of 
Gen. Stanley, and followed the Fourth Corps. 

During the night of the 31st, while the Fourth and Twenty- 
third Corps were encamped along the railroad, facing north to- 
wards Atlanta, at Rough and Ready Station, Gen. Sherman sent no- 
tice to Schofield and Stanley that, as the two corps would probably 
be called on to operate together, and as they were too far away to 
receive orders from him or Gen. Thomas, the highest commander 
present would issue the orders, and Stanley, having the older com- 
mission, was to be considered in command, and for Schofield to re- 
port to Stanley for orders. Schofield replied that he differed with 
him in opinion about the rank, but would obey, for the present, hi^ 
decision and execute his orders. Early next morning, before Scho- 
field was able to report to Stanley, the latter appeared at Schofield's 
headauarters much disturbed by Sherman's order," claimed Sher- 
man was wrong, that he was not entitled to the command and did 
not want it, and urged Schofield to let him act under the former's 
orders. Schofield replied that Sherman's orders were imperative, 
and Stanley must execute them, and that there was no remedy, and 
he must do the best he could. As Stanley's corps was in the lead, 
Schofield, with the Twenty-third Corps, could only support him, 
which he did with all his energy. The two corps advanced and 
destroved the railroad on the way to reach Thomas' left, near 
Tonesboro. Sherman sent orders to Thomas and Schofield to 
march at once with their whole force to Jonesboro, but the orders 
did not reach Schofield in time to be of much service. As soon as 
Schofield heard the sound of battle, he rode forward to the head of 
Stanley's Fourth Corps, which had halted and was not advancing. 

S'chofield inquired the cause of the halt, which elicited the re- 
sponse that Stanley had gone forward to find Gen. Thomas to get 
orders. Schofield at once returned to his corps, led it out of the 
road through woods and fields, to reach the enemy's flank and rear. 


and just a little before dark we were put into action near a cotton 
gin and opened fire on the enemy from his rear and right. About 
the time we reached the enemy's right and rear, the Fourth Corps 
reached the field on our right, and moved forward in its usual gal- 
lant style. 

For about a half hour before sundown the rattling of musketry 
and roar of artillery made that part of the line one of the ugliest in 
that battle. Some years later I had the honor to meet Hardee's 
chief of artillery on the Indianapolis Board of Trade. The con- 
versation naturally turned to the Atlanta campaign, and the battle 
of Jonesboro in particular. He related that just about the time (a 
half hours before sundown) they had felt at ease; that they had 
kept Howard's troops off, and expected an undisturbed retreat to 
Lovejoy Station; all at once to their right and rear a large line of 
guns opened a furious artillery fire. One of the shots cut the cross 
beams of Gen. Hardee's headquarter tent, and left the canvas in a 
heap. They, of course, tried at once to oppose us by a division in 
reserve, but as we were too many for them, they could only hold 
out until dark, and then retreat, as intended. So the night put an 
end to the fighting for that day, and but for Sherman's blunder in 
putting Stanley in command, would have commenced the fight two 
hours earler. 

We made ourselves comfortable for a night's rest, having 
straw, fodder and water for our teams in easy reach. We slept on 
the ground, the cannoneers at their post and the drivers with halter 
strap in hand. That we did not receive the full fruits of the vic- 
tory at Jonesboro was due to the early blunders in the campaign 
about rank, which, in this case, had been forced upon untried and 
unwilling shoulders, and Stanley was not to be blamed that, as 
soon as he reached the vicinity of General Thomas, he reported to 
him for orders, but which lost us the two hours for good and suc- 
cessful fighting. 

Hardee, with tactical accuracy, had formed his lines to meet 
Howard, as the latter moved forward. The extreme right of the 
enemy made a sharp turn towards the railroad to the southeast di- 
rection, protected by a small stream and a valley. Cleburne's divi- 
sion was formed on this part of the enemy's line. On the Union 
side Morgan's division of Davis's corps approached this part of the 
Confederate line and connected on its right with the left of the 
Army of the Tennessee. Stanley's corps, of the Army of the Cum- 


berland, was now badly wanted, and Sherman had started Thomas 
in person, on a gallop, to bring it up, while at the same time Stan- 
ley had halted the corps, as already stated, and gone hunting after 
Thomas for orders. During the meantime Davis was not idle, 
and Edie's brigade of Carlin's division had gained the ridge. Be- 
yond the salient angle in the enemy's line the rest of Carlin's divi- 
sion moved to the left of Edie's and Morgan's division of the same 
corps, formed on the right. Baird's division was in reserve be- 
hind Carlin, Carlin's artillery was pushed forward to Edie's ridge, 
and, able to enfilade the enemy's angle, destroying a number of 
Confederate guns, and making the position untenable. Davis 
moved forward in two lines to the enemy's angle, with a two-divi- 
sion front, but was much impeded by the tangled woods and broken 
character of the ground. Edie, who was already on the flank of 
the salient, moved forward in the most gallant style as the West- 
ern boys so well knew how, and carried the line, but with terrible 

The enemy were of the same mettle and rallied and drove off 
Edie, whose support had failed to reach him in time; to hold the 
works he had gained Edie reformed his line at the foot of a hill, 
that was crowned by the enemy's breastworks, and Este's brigade 
of Baird's division was ordered to support Carlin's right, subject 
to the latter's order. The whole line was now ordered forward 
and Este's brigade stormed the salient and carried it with a dash, 
but the enemy was so well prepared to receive him that Este lost 
fully one-third in a fevv^ minutes by the enemy's fire. Carlin now 
swept forward on the left and Morgan on the right. They sur- 
rounded Govan with his brigade and two batteries of artillery, and 
captured them. This caused the enemy to form a new line on his 
extreme right and rear, by the brigades of Lewis and Cranberry, 
showing a bold front. Just then Stanley and Schofield advanced 
against them, but as the day had passed, darkness ended the active 
operation at Jonesboro. The loss in Davis' Fourteenth Corps 
was about one thousand killed and wounded in the three divisions. 
The Confederates left over three hundred dead on the field and 
nearly one thousand surrendered, with Gen. Govan. Next day over 
one thousand badly wounded were left by the Confederates in the 
hospitals at Jonesboro, added to the list of prisoners. Hood soon 
discovered his blunder in having Lee's corps returned to Atlanta, 
and sent orders directing the latter to cover the movement of Stew- 


ard's regular corps and Smith's Georgia militia, from Atlanta, and, 
as nothing more could be saved, eighty cars, loaded with ammuni- 
tion and six locomotives were destroyed by the enemy's rear guard. 
During the night Hardee left our front, and on September 2d 
formed, with such of Hood's troops as had reached him, a new line 
of battle for defense at Lovejoy Station. About 2 a. m. a continu- 
ous explosion of shells was heard in the direction of Atlanta, which 
recurred for fully two hours at short and long intervals, plainly 
telling all that had faith in our invincible army t