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JAMES  THORNTON,     j 

;  1 33  and  41,  High  St.,  Oyford.1 


DARWIN    AND    HEGEL 

ETC. 


DARWIN   AND    HEGEL 


WITH  OTHER  PHILOSOPHICAL  STUDIES 


BY 


DAVID    G.   RITCHIE,   M.A. 

Fellow  and  Tutor  of  Jesus  College,  Oxford;  Author  of '"  Darwinism  and  Politics," 
"  The  Principles  of  State  Interference"  etc. 


SWAN    SONNENSCHE1N    &    CO. 

NEW  YORK:    MACMILLAN   &    CO. 

1893 


SUTLER  &  TANNER, 

THE  SELWOOD  PRINTING  Woiucs, 

FKOME,  ANO  LONDON. 


G45486 


PREFACE. 


THE  papers  collected  in  this  volume  have  pre 
viously  appeared  in  Mind,  The  Proceedings  of  the 
Aristotelian  Society,  The  Philosophical  Review,  The 
Economic  Review,  The  Political  Science  Quarterly, 
The  Annals  of  the  American  Academy  of  Political 
and  Social  Science,  and  The  International  Journal  of 
Ethics ;  and  I  have  to  thank  the  respective  Editors 
for  their  kindness  and  courtesy  in  permitting  repub- 
lication.  The  "  Notes  "  at  the  end  of  the  first  and 
third  essays  have  not  been  printed  before. 

Corrections  and  alterations  of  varying  importance 
have  been  made  ;  but  I  have  not  attempted  to  give 
these  essays,  written  at  different  times,  an  appearance 
of  greater  unity  than  belongs  to  them  from  the  fact 
that  the  diverse  subjects  are  looked  at  from  a  common 
point  of  view.  I  have  put  in  the  title  of  the  volume 
the  title  of  the  second  essay,  because  it  indicates 
with  sufficient  emphasis  what  that  point  of  view  is  ; 
it  expresses  my  endeavour  to  reconcile  a  qualified 
acceptance  of  the  general  principles  of  that  idealist 


VI  PREFACE. 

philosophy  which  is  based  on  Kantian  criticism  (but 
which,  at  the  same  time,  carries  us  back  to  Plato  and 
Aristotle)  with  a  full  recognition  of  the  revolutionary 
change  in  our  intellectual  universe  which  is  due  to 
the  historical  method  of  studying  ideas  and  institu 
tions,  and,  in  particular,  to  the  influence  of  the  bio 
logical  theory  of  natural  selection. 

"  Idealism"  and  "Materialism"  are  commonly 
spoken  of  as  antagonistic  types  of  philosophy  ;  and, 
in  a  sense,  they  are,  I  have  tried  to  show  that  one 
form  of  idealism  is  quite  compatible  with  that 
materialistic  monism  which  is  now-a-days  the  work 
ing  hypothesis  of  every  scientific  explorer  in  every 
department,  whatever  other  beliefs  or  denials  he 
may,  more  or  less  explicitly  and  more  or  less  consis 
tently,  superadd.  Materialistic  monism,  it  seems  to 
me,  only  becomes  false  when  put  forward  as  a  com 
plete  philosophy  of  the  universe,  because  it  leaves 
out  of  sight  the  conditions  of  human  knowledge, 
which  the  special  sciences l  may  conveniently  dis 
regard,  but  which  a  candid  philosophy  cannot  ignore. 
It  is  too  probable  that  my  Eirenicon,  like  other 
efforts  at  peacemaking,  may  only  result  in  provoking 
a  twofold  hostility,  and  that  "  Darwinians"  and 
"  Hegelians "  will  both  look  on  me  as  a  heretic. 
But  I  cannot,  as  yet,  see  any  other  way  out  of  a 
hopeless  controversy  than  that  towards  which  I 

1  Including,   perhaps,  even  Psychology,  as  that  is  commonly 
understood.     Cf.  below,  p.  104,  and  p.  9,  note. 


PREFACE.  Vll 

have  been  led,  especially  by  the  teaching  of  the  late 
Thomas  Hill  Green  on  the  one  side,  and  by  the  in 
fluence  of  scientific  friends  on  the  other.  And  this 
Idealist  Evolutionism  (if  a  label  is  necessary)  seems 
to  me  to  give  the  best  starting  point  for  an  examin 
ation  of  the  concrete  problems  of  ethics  and  politics, 
which  are,  after  all,  the  most  urgent  difficulties  with 
which  we  have  to  deal.  In  venturing  to  trespass  to 
some  extent  on  the  proper  domains  of  the  economist, 
the  lawyer  and  the  historian,  I  trust  that  lack  of 
special  knowledge  and  special  training  has  not  led 
me  into  grave  errors.  I  consider  such  applications  of 
philosophical  criticism  to  be  at  once  the  best  test  of 
the  value  of  general  philosophical  theories  and  the 
most  useful  service  which  the  student  of  philosophy 
can  render  to  those  who  are  pursuing  special  studies. 
I  hope  the  "  benevolent  reader  "  will  pardon  this 
brief  explanation.  I  must  not  make  it  longer,  lest 
by  preliminary  prolixity  I  should  only  add  to  the 
offence  (as  it  is  often  supposed  to  be)  of  publishing 
a  few  detached  essays  instead  of  waiting  to  inflict  a 
big  treatise  on  the  public.  I  will  only  ask  those, 
who  may  do  me  the  honour  of  considering  carefully 
what  I  have  to  say,  to  remember  that  I  wish  these 
papers,  though  written  at  intervals,  to  be  taken  as 
a  whole  ;  so  that  statements  in  one  essay  must  be 
understood  as  qualifying  those  in  another.  A  cer 
tain  amount  of  repetition  will  perhaps  be  excused, 
and  may  even  be  useful,  if  it  serves  to  remind  the 


Vlll  PREFACE. 

reader  of  this  unity  of  purpose.  It  is  not  possible 
to  put  the  whole  of  one's  philosophic  creed,  especi 
ally  when  it  is  but  partially  formulated,  into  every 
page  or  into  every  article.  In  fact,  a  formula  that 
professed  to  exhaust  the  truth  would  excite  very 
reasonable  suspicion. 

OXFORD, 

May  ist,  1893. 


CONTENTS. 


I.     ORIGIN  AND  VALIDITY         ...  .     1-3* 

Origin  supposed  to  determine  worth,  in  popular 
thought,  i,  2,  and  in  the  "metaphysical"  stage  of  re 
flection,  3-6.  The  philosophical  problem  distinct  from 
the  historical  and  psychological,  6-8.  What  is  of  most 
permanent  value  in  Kant's  Critical  Philosophy,  8-14- 
The  relation  between  Critical  Philosophy  (Theory  of 
Knowledge)  and  Speculative  Metaphysics,  14,  15.  Il 
lustrations  of  the  importance  of  distinguishing  questions 
of  origin  and  validity,  in  Logic,  16-22.  (Axioms,  17  ; 
the  Syllogism,  18-20  ;  Connotation  of  proper  names, 
20  ;  Analytic  and  synthetic  judgments,  21  ;  Inconceiv 
ability  of  the  opposite,  21,  22) ;  in  other  philosophical 
sciences  that  are  concerned  with  Ideals,  22-25  »  m 
Esthetics,  25,  26;  in  Ethics,  26,  27  ;  in  Politics,  27-30  ; 
in  Religion,  30,  31. 

NOTE   ON    HEREDITY    AS    A    FACTOR   IN    KNOW 
LEDGE         .....  .     32-37 

The  biological  controversy  between  Lamarckian  and 
Weismannite,  32-35.  Application  to  problem  of  know 
ledge,  35.  Relation  of  the  Evolution  theory  to  the 
Kantian  theory  of  knowledge,  36,  37. 


X  CONTENTS. 

PAGES 

II.     DARWIN  AND  HEGEL         .....     38-76 

Philosophy  always  affected  by  the  predominant  science 
of  the  time,  38-41.  The  idea  of  development,  especi 
ally  in  biology,  prevalent  during  Hegel's  youth,  41-44. 
His  preference  for  Emanation  over  Evolution,  44  ;  Ele 
ment  of  truth  in  this — the  lower  must  be  explained  by 
the  higher,  45-47.  Hegel  to  be  "read  backwards"; 
illustration  from  categories  of  "  Becoming  "  and  "  Simi 
larity,"  47-49.  Risk  of  misunderstanding,  when  a 
thought  process  is  stated  as  if  it  were  a  time  process, 
50,  51.  Hegel's  mode  of  exposition  due  to  (i)  influence 
of  idea  of  Emanation,  and  (2)  of  his  interpretation  of 
history,  especially  of  the  history  of  philosophy,  51-53. 

Hegel's  philosophy  of  nature,  53,  54.  How  it  could 
be  adjusted  to  Darwin's  theory  of  natural  selection,  55, 
56.  The  seeming  irrationality  of  nature  =  the  indefinite 
variability  presupposed  by  natural  selection,  57,  58. 
Modern  science  assumes  that  nature  is  not  alogical, 
59.  Restored  value  of  the  Aristotelian  concept  of  Final 
Cause,  60-62. 

Application  of  "  natural  selection "  in  ethics  :  Utili 
tarianism  corrected,  62,  63.  History  in  the  light  of 
natural  selection — a  dialectic  movement,  clearer  in  the 
higher  stages,  63-66.  Mr.  S.  Alexander's  analysis  of 
Punishment,  at  once  Darwinian  and  Hegelian,  66,  67. 
Hegel  agrees  with  evolutionist  ethics  (i)  in  denying  an 
ultimate  distinction  between  "  ought "  and  "  is  " — with 
some  exaggeration,  68  ;  "  The  Real  is  the  Rational," 
69-72  ;  (2)  in  repudiating  individualism  in  ethics,  72,  73. 
Self-consciousness  the  highest  category,  74.  Hegel's 
system  as  a  hypothesis  ;  reconciliation  of  "  materialis 
tic"  science  with  "mystical"  theology,  75,  76. 


CONTENTS.  XI 

PAGES 

III.     WHAT  is  REALITY? 77-I05 

Ambiguity  in  the  term:  (I.)  "Real"  used  for  every 
actual  psychical  event  (subjective  reality),  but  generally 
with  suggestion  of  an  objective  reference,  77-80.  (II.) 
Objective  reality  tested  by  coherence  in  our  own  ex 
perience  and  by  coherence  of  our  own  experience  with 
that  of  others,  80.  Are  feelings  more  real  than 
thoughts?  81-83.  Is  the  real  what  occupies  space? 
83,  84.  (III.)  Difference  between  reality  for  ordinary 
belief  and  for  science,  84,  85.  The  inconceivability  of 
the  opposite  as  a  test,  86,  87.  Identity  of  thought 
and  being  ;  in  what  sense  assumed  by  science,  87-89. 
Ordinary  antithesis  of  thought  and  things,  89,  91. 
Matter,  90.  (IV.)  The  "  real "  circle  =  the  perfect  circle, 
91,  92.  (V.)  "  Real,"  in  the  ethical  sense,  opposed  to 
"sham,"  92,  93.  What  is  an  atom  ?  93,  94.  The  "other" 
of  thought,  94,  95.  Distinction  of  thought  and  things 
falls  within  thought,  95,  96. 

Objection  that  the  individual  alone  is  the  real,  96. 
What  is  the  "  individual?"  (i)  Everything  that  can  be 
spoken  of  as  one  ?  96,  97.  (2)  That  which  can  be  ex 
pressed  by  a  singular  term  ?  97,  98.  (3)  Are  qualities 
real  as  individual  sensations  ?  98.  (4)  Is  the  conscious 
self  the  "real?"  What  is  the  "real  person"?  98-101. 
(5)  The  transcendental  ego  or  unity  of  the  cosmos? 
101.  Thought  implies  a  subject,  101,  102.  The  ulti 
mate  subject  of  the  logical  judgment,  102,  103.  The 
self  as  subject  and  as  object,  103,  104.  Psychology  and 
Philosophy,  104.  What  is  implied  in  saying,  e.g.,  that 
Matter  is  the  potentiality  of  Thought,  105. 

NOTE  ON  LOGICAL  NECESSITY        .  .     106-108 

(i)  The  necessity  of  the  causal  nexus,  106  ;  (2)  The 
necessity  of  axioms,  106,  107  ;  (3)  Necessity  in  regard 
to  human  actions,  108. 


Xll  CONTENTS. 

PAGES 

IV.     ON  PLATO'S  PHMDO 109-150 

(I.).  Plato's  "myths,"  how  to  be  understood,  109- 
126.  The  doctrines  of  (i)  Recollection,  110-114;  (2) 
Pre-existence,  114-117;  (3)  Transmigration,  117-120. 
The  "  myths  "  to  be  understood  as  approximations  to 
the  truth,  120-123.  Distinction  between  Platonism,  as 
interpreted  and  developed  by  Aristotle,  and  as  it  may 
have  existed  for  the  mind  of  Plato  himself,  123-126. 

(II.).  The  arguments  in  the  Phcedo  :  (i)  (a}  The 
alternation  of  opposites,  127-129  ;  and  (b~)  Recollection, 
129.  (2)  The  soul  simple,  not  composite  (Plato  does 
not  say  it  is  a  substance),  130-135.  Objection  that  the 
soul  is  a  Harmony,  135-137.  (3)  The  soul  partakes  in 
the  Idea  of  life,  137,  138.  Relation  of  the  soul  to  the 
Ideas,  138-142.  The  Arguments  of  the  Phtzdo  com 
pared  with  those  of  the  Phcedrus,  142  ;  and  with  those 
of  the  Republic,  143-146. 

(III.).  In  what  sense  did  Plato  hold  the  immortality 
of  the  soul?  146-150. 


V.     WHAT  ARE  ECONOMIC  LAWS?        .         .         .     151-177 

(I.).  Prof.  Cunningham's  objections  to  the  use  of  the 
terms  "  cause  "  and  "  law  "  in  economics,  151.  Ricardo's 
analysis  of  Rent  involves  the  conception  of  "  cause," 
Z52>  ltt-  {Note  on  Causation,  153,  154.]  (i)  What  is 
the  nature  of  scientific  laws?  155,  156.  (2)  What  is  the 
position  of  economics  among  the  sciences?  156-159. 
(3)  In  what  sense  there  can  be  laws  in  a  historical 
science,  159,  160.  All  scientific  laws,  in  different  de 
grees,  abstract  and  hypothetical,  160-163.  False  anti 
thesis  between  deductive  and  inductive  (or  historical) 
methods,  163-165. 


CONTENTS. 

PAGES 

(II.).  Difference  between  physical  and  sociological 
laws  :  the  element  of  conscious  purpose  in  human 
phenomena,  165-167.  Illustration  from  history  of 
language,  167-169  ;  from  history  of  political  institutions, 
169,  170.  The  volitional  element  (moral  factor)  in 
economic  evolution,  170-173.  The  "  spiritual  principle  " 
in  Nature,  173. 

(III.).  Economic  laws,  how  related  to  moral  laws, 

174-177. 

VI.     LOCKE'S  THEORY  OF  PROPERTY     .  .     118-195 

Locke  derives  property  from  labour,  178,  179.  Rela 
tion  of  the  Law  of  Nature  to  the  positive  laws  of  par 
ticular  societies,  180-185.  The  theories  of  Hobbes  and 
Locke  viewed  in  the  light  of  the  events  of  their  life 
time,  185,  1 86.  Their  theories  not  to  be  treated  as 
historical  but  as  logical,  187.  Logical  difficulties  in 
Locke's  theory  of  property,  188,  189.  Property  the 
product,  not  of  individual,  but  of  social  labour,  190-192. 
Locke's  theory  no  real  improvement  on  the  theories  of 
Grotius  and  Puffendorf,  the  distribution  of  wealth  de 
pending  on  arrangements  ("  compacts  ")  of  particular 
societies,  193-195- 

VII.     CONTRIBUTIONS  TO  THE  HISTORY  OF  THE  SOCIAL 

CONTRACT  THEORY  ..     196-226 

(I.).  The  theory  held  by  some  Greek  Sophists  and 
by  Epicurus,  not  by  Plato  and  Aristotle,  196-199. 

(II.).  In  the  middle  ages  the  idea  of  a  contract  be 
tween  king  and  people  due  to  influence  of  Old  Testa 
ment  and  of  Roman  Law,  200-203.  This  form  of  the 
theory  the  popular  one  in  the  sixteenth  and  seventeenth 
centuries,  203-205. 


XIV  CONTENTS. 

PAGES 

(III.).  Locke's  theory  not  that  of  a  contract  between 
king  and  people,  205,  206  ;  but  essentially  the  same  as 
Rousseau's,  206-208  ;  an  unconscious  return  to  that  of 
the  Greek  Sophists,  208,  209  ;  this  change  in  the  form 
of  the  theory  connected  with  Hooker,  210-212  ;  the 
Scottish  Covenant,  212,213;  the  "Mayflower"  com 
pact,  213,214;  Grotius,  215;  Milton,  215,  216.  Hobbes 
reverses  the  application  of  the  theory,  216,  217. 
Spinoza's  criticism  of  Hobbes,  217.  Was  Hobbes  in 
consistent  ?  218.  Locke's  difference  from  Hobbes  and 
similarity  to  Rousseau,  219,  220.  Rousseau's  theory 
adopted  by  Kant,  220-222  ;  and  by  Fichte,  222,  223. 

(IV.)  Criticism  of  the  theory  by  Hume,  223,  224  ; 
by  Bentham,  224.  Decay  of  the  theory  through  growth 
of  the  historical  spirit,  224,  225  ;  Burke  quoted,  225. 
Relative  truth  of  the  theory  recognised  by  Hegel  and 
M.  Fouillee,  226. 

VIII.     ON  THE  CONCEPTION  OF  SOVEREIGNTY          .     227-264 

Austin's  definitions  of  Sovereignty  and  Law,  227. 
These  conceptions  peculiar  to  English  Jurisprudence, 
228,  229.  Historical  objections,  229,  230.  Attempts  to 
obviate  them,  230-233.  Value  of  analytic  method,  231 ; 
but  danger  of  abstraction,  232,  233. 

Austin's  conception  applied  to  the  British  Constitu 
tion,  234-242.  Necessity  of  distinguishing  between  the 
nominal,  legal,  and  political  sovereigns,  as  Locke  does, 
238,  239.  Hobbes's  theory  of  sovereignty,  239,  240. 
The  ultimate  political  sovereign  not  a  determinate  body 
of  persons,  241,  242.  Austin's  conception  of  legal 
sovereignty  applied  to  the  United  States  of  America  : 
difficulty  in  finding  the  "determinate  persons,"  242- 
246.  The  nominal  sovereign  not  always  a  determinate 
person  or  body  of  persons,  246,  247.  Mr.  Spencer's 


CONTENTS.  XV 

PAGES 

objections  to  the  view  that  Sovereignty  is  unlimited, 
247-249.  Austin's  conception  of  sovereignty  as  un 
limited  avoids  confusions  such  as  those  of  Bluntschli, 
249,  250. 

The  ultimate  political  sovereign  —  "  Opinion  "  or 
"  Sovereignty  of  the  people,"  250-252.  Distinction  be 
tween  sovereignty  de  facto  and  de  jure,  252,  253.  How 
the  "General  Will"  may  express  itself,  253-255. 
Confusion  about  "  tyranny  of  majority"  and  "rights  of 
minority,"  255,  256.  Public  opinion,  257.  Might  and 
Right,  258-260. 

Limits  of  political  sovereignty,  260-264.  Sovereignty 
in  its  external  aspects,  260-262.  International  law,  262, 
263.  The  problem  of  the  Philosophy  of  History,  263, 
264. 

IX.     THE  RIGHTS  OF  MINORITIES  .         .         .     265-285 

In  the  past,  majorities  have  had  to  struggle  for  free 
dom,  265,  266.  As  against  modern  democracy,  rights 
are  claimed  for  minorities,  266-268.  Distinction  be 
tween  authority  of  the  few  in  scientific  and  in  practical 
matters,  269,  270.  Difference  in  practical  matters  with 
respect  to  means  and  ends,  271,  272.  Difficulties  in 
schemes  for  representation  of  minorities,  273,  274. 
Public  opinion,  its  power  and  organs,  275.  The  right 
of  spreading  opinions,  276,  277.  Toleration,  and  use  of 
discussion,  277-280.  Prof.  Bryce  on  "  the  tyranny  of 
the  majority"  and  "the  fatalism  of  the  multitude,"  280- 
282.  Resistance  to  law  never  a  right,  sometimes  a 
duty,  282-284.  Individual  responsibility  in  regard  to 
opinions,  284,  285. 


DARWIN    AND    HEGEL: 

WITH  OTHER  PHILOSOPHICAL    STUDIES. 


I. 
ORIGIN    AND  VALIDITY.1 

WHEN  Aristotle,  after  tracing  the  progress  of  human 
society  from  the  patriarchal  family  to  the  city-state 
of  the  Hellenes,  says  that  the  city-state  comes  into 
being  for  the  sake  of  life,  but  has  its  being  for  the 
sake  of  the  good  life,  he  gives  an  admirable  illustra 
tion  of  a  distinction,  which  he  is  always  ready  to 
recognise,  between  the  origin  of  anything  (its  ma 
terial  cause — e£  o$)  and  its  final  cause  (re'Ao?),  i.e., 
the  end  which  it  comes  to  serve  :  this  latter  must  be 
known  if  we  are  to  know  the  true  nature  of  a  thing 
(f\  <^e  <j)va-i$  re'Ao?  «rr/).  This  distinction  has  not  lost 
its  significance,  though  it  has  been  overlooked  in 
many  philosophical  and  other  controversies.  The 
question  that  sometimes  arises  in  social  circles  which 
are  careful  of  their  dignity:  "  Who  is  so-and-so  ?" 
is  frequently  solved  by  consultation  of  the  Peerage 
or,  at  a  lower  elevation,  of  some  old  lady  :  and  the 
oracle  answers  by  telling  who  his  great-grandfather 
or  great-grandmother  was,  the  value  of  a  man  (or 

1  Reprinted  from  Mind,  Vol.  XIIL,  No.  49  (1888). 
D.  H.  B 


2  ORIGIN    AND    VALIDITY.  [l. 

woman)  for  certain  purposes  of  society  being  sup 
posed  to  depend  not  on  what  he  himself  is,  but  on 
what  some  ancestor  had  the  reputation  of  being. 
Pride  of  birth  is,  indeed,  sometimes  supported  by 
the  scientific  doctrine  of  heredity,  though  it  is  apt 
to  be  forgotten  that  the  kind  of  eminence  which  has 
qualified  men  in  times  past  for  elevation  to  the 
peerage  has  not  always  been  such  as  to  make  the 
transmission  of  it  desirable  in  the  interests  of  the 
whole  social  organism  as  that  now  is.  And,  further, 
it  is  forgotten  that,  if  a  man's  great-great-grandfather 
was  a  really  great  person,  the  man  is  probably  only  in 
respect  of  one-sixteenth  part  of  himself  the  heredi 
tary  representative  of  that  ancestor.  And,  yet  again, 
it  is  forgotten  that  not  merely  inherited  capacity, 
but  a  favourable  environment  in  which  it  can  be 
exercised,  is  requisite  for  the  production  of  the  best 
type  of  individual  ;  and  that  such  favourable  en 
vironment  is  not  always  provided  by  an  atmosphere 
of  adulation  and  the  absence  of  the  stimulus  to  in 
dustry.  The  popular  respect  for  pedigrees  involves 
to  a  great  extent  the  confusion  of  origin  and  worth. 
11  He  is  nobody"  means,  being  translated,  he  is  with 
out  father  or  mother — of  note  :  and  when  such  a 
person  really  impresses  the  world,  it  is  often  found 
expedient  to  discover  for  him  some  dignified  descent, 
in  order  to  satisfy  the  popular  prejudice.  This 
prejudice  has  invaded  more  important  spheres.  The 
great  men,  not  of  Hellas  only,  came  to  be  looked  on 
as  the  sons  of  gods  and  demigods.  People  have 
found  it  difficult  to  believe  that  those,  whom  they 


I.]  ORIGIN    AND    VALIDITY.  3 

felt  to  be  immeasurably  above  them,  could  be  born 
of  ordinary  parents  and  according  to  the  ordinary 
laws  of  human  generation. 

There  are  many  estimable  persons  who  derive 
great  comfort  from  abusing  metaphysics  ;  and  it  is  a 
pity  that  they  should  not  be  able  to  indulge  their 
inclinations  in  a  harmless  way.  Therefore  it  would 
be  desirable  if  we  could  mark  off  a  certain  meaning 
of  "metaphysics"  and  "metaphysical"  in  which 
they  shall  denote  what  is  bad,  reserving  the  liberty 
to  employ  these  terms  also  for  something  that  is  not 
only  unobjectionable,  but  necessary.  Let  us  say 
then  that,  from  an  Idealist  point  of  view,  we  are 
ready  to  admit  all  the  hard  things  that  Comte  has  said 
of  the  old  Ontologies,  and  to  declare  that  we  are  as 
anxious  as  he  to  eliminate  the  influence  of  them 
from  theory  and  practice  ;  but  that  we  consider  such 
clearing  of  the  ground  will  be  even  more  effectually 
carried  out,  if  we  do  not  shirk  an  investigation  of 
the  conditions  under  which  knowledge  and  nature 
and  conduct  are  possible.  Nay,  we  are  prepared  to 
argue  that  just  those  persons  who  disclaim  meta 
physics  are  sometimes  the  most  apt  to  be  infected 
with  the  disease  they  profess  to  abhor — and  not  to 
know  when  they  have  it. 

One  of  the  chief  characteristics  of  the  "meta 
physical  "  stage  of  thought  is  its  anxiety  to  vindicate 
the  value  of  moral  and  other  ideas  by  tracing  them 
back  to  an  origin  which  can  be  regarded  as  in  itself 
great  and  dignified,  whether  the  greatness  and 


4  ORIGIN    AND    VALIDITY.  [l. 

dignity  be  such  as  come  from  the  clearness  of  reason 
or  such  as  is  supposed  to  come  from  the  darkness  of 
mystery.     Thus,  the  true  religion  has  been  repre 
sented    as   a  primitive  revelation   from   which   man 
afterwards   fell  away.       "  Degraded  savages"  have 
been  supposed  to  be  all  degraded  in  the  literal  sense 
—degenerate    from   an    originally   better   condition. 
There  has  been  a  preference  for  regarding  man  "  as 
a  fallen  archangel,  not  as   an  elevated  ape."     The 
natural  rights  of  man,  i.e.,  those   rights  which  it   is 
felt  man  ought  to  have  guaranteed  to  him  in  a  well- 
ordered   society,  have   been   thought  of,  or  at  least 
spoken  of,  as  if  they  had  been  originally  possessed 
by  him  and  stolen  away  by  the  wickedness  of  tyrants 
and    oppressors.      The   poet   uses  the  language  of 
such  "  Vorstellungen"  to  express  ideas  :  and  so  we 
find   Heine   saying  that  the   Holy   Spirit    "  renews 
ancient  rights  "  (erneut  das  alte  Recht\     Reform  has 
been  again  and  again  brought  in  under  the  guise  of 
restoration,  sometimes  indeed  (as  in  the  struggles  of 
the  English  Parliament  in  the  seventeenth  century) 
with  some  degree  of  historical  truth.     So  also  with 
regard  to  the  individual  mind.      Ideas,  whether   in 
logic  or  in  morals,  which  are  of  peculiar  importance, 
have  been  called  "innate,"     They  have  been  "im 
planted  by  God  (or  Nature)  in  our  breasts."     We 
have  only  to  look  deep  enough  to  find  them  beneath 
the  super-imposed  crust  of  prejudice,  experience  and 
conventional  belief.     The  voice  of  God  and  Nature 
may  be  heard  if  we  go  back  to  primitive  simplicity  : 
and  thus  we  have  the  "  noble  savage"  of  eighteenth 


I.]  ORIGIN    AND    VALIDITY.  5 

century  imagination  and  the  pseudo-Platonism  of 
Wordsworth's  "  Ode  on  Intimations  of  Immortality 
from  Recollections  of  Early  Childhood."  But  very 
little  can  be  found  by  the  searcher  after  primitive, 
uncorrupted  intuitions,  either  in  the  infant  or  in  the 
savage,  except  what  he  manages  to  read  into  their 
undeveloped  minds  out  of  his  own  theories.  Yet 
the  temptation  is  strong  to  regard  the  inexplicable 
(or  at  least  the  unexplained),  the  unanalysable  (or 
at  least  the  unanalysed),  with  peculiar  veneration, 
and  to  feel  jealousy  and  suspicion  of  any  attempt  to 
examine  the  elements  and  origin  of  anything  that  is 
valued  or  admired. 

"  I  ask  not  proud  philosophy  to  teach  me  what  thou  art," 

says  Campbell,  as  if  the  colours  of  the  rainbow 
became  less  beautiful  when  we  knew  scientifically 
how  they  arose,  than  they  seemed  when  supposed 
to  be  provided  by  a  mechanical  miracle  at  the  dis- 
embarcation  of  Noah.  To  the  poet,  certainly,  the 
physical  cause  of  the  rainbow  is  less  attractive  than 
its  use  as  the  symbol  of  a  message  of  peace  and 
promise.  But  such  feelings  are  out  of  place  when 
they  intrude  themselves,  as  they  sometimes  do,  into 
the  estimate  of  the  truth  of  a  scientific  theory.  The 
prejudice  against  the  Darwinian  theory  implies  that, 
if  the  higher  organism  be  the  product  of  the  lower, 
the  higher  loses  in  worth  and  dignity,  as  if  "  man 
came  from  a  beast"  implied  "  therefore  man  is  only 
a  beast."  The  prejudice  against  anthropological 
investigation  of  the  origin  of  religious  ideas  and 


6  ORIGIN    AND    VALIDITY.  [l. 

customs  and  of  institutions  such  as  marriage  has  a 
similar  source — a  prejudice  to  be  found  even  amongst 
those  who  have  themselves  done  notable  service  in 
the  application  of  comparative  and  historical  methods 
to  the  study  of  human  society  and  ideas.  It  is  sup 
posed  that  religion  would  lose  all  meaning  if  even 
its  highest  forms  had  an  ancestry  so  low  as  fetish- 
worship,  and  that  marriage  would  lose  its  ethical 
value  if  "  primitive  marriage  "  turned  out  to  be  a 
euphemism  for  promiscuous  sexual  relations.1 

Perhaps,  however,  there  is  an  element  of  truth  in 
the  suspicion  with  which  scientific  analysis  is  regarded 
by  most  poets  and  by  some  philosophers.  It  is  a 
true  instinct  which  warns  us,  that  we  have  not  suffi 
ciently  disposed  of  a  subject  when  we  have  given 
an  historical  account  of  how  it  came  to  be  what  it 
is  :  but  this  takes  a  false  form,  when  it  becomes  a 
denial  of  the  historical  account.  As  against  the 
"  metaphysical  "  theories  of  Nature,  Innate  Ideas, 
Inexplicable  Intuitions  (which  may  happen  to 
be  only  local  or  personal  prejudices),  the  scientific 
methods  of  analysis  and  theories  of  evolution  may 
be  completely  accepted,  and  it  may  yet  be  main 
tained  that  the  real  importance  of  ideas  in  logic,  in 
ethics  or  in  religion  is  not  affected,  though  it  has 
been  shown  that  they  have  a  history  in  the  minds 
of  the  race  and  of  the  individual.  This  history  is 

1  The  theory  of  an  original  "  promiscuity "  is  rendered  ex 
tremely  doubtful  by  the  habits  of  many  of  the  higher  animals. 
But  if  such  theories  were  completely  proved,  they  would  decide 
nothing  as  to  the  social  and  ethical  questions  of  our  day. 


I.]  ORIGIN    AND    VALIDITY.  J 

important  for  our  knowledge,  and  may  alter  many 
things  in  the  way  in  which  ideas  have  been  accepted 
and  institutions  regarded  ;  but,  over  and  above  this 
natural  history,  we  have  the  task  of  philosophy — of 
"  metaphysics  "  in  the  sense  in  which  the  world  never 
can  and  never  must  dispense  with  it.  This  is, 
of  course,  a  proposition  which  may  be  disputed. 
Either  it  may  be  denied  that  we  need  anything 
more  than  an  explanation  of  how  things  have  come 
to  be,  in  order  rightly  to  understand  what  they  are, 
or  it  may  be  denied  that  we  can  discover  any  an 
swer  to  the  questions  which  we  inevitably  find  our 
selves  asking  after  the  sciences  have  spoken  their 
last  word.  To  the  latter  position  (that  of  the  Posi- 
tivist)  the  objection  is  the  same  as  that  which  may 
be  made  to  all  theories  of  absolute  phenomenalism  : 
How  can  you  know  the  limitations  of  the  mind, 
unless  you  who  are  limited  are  also  in  some  way 
outside  your  limitation?  It  may  be  said:  "We 
find  out  our  limitations  only  too  surely  by  beating 
fruitlessly  against  the  bars  of  our  prison-house." 
But  why  do  we  do  so  ?  Why  have  mankind  always 
done  so,  if  it  is  not  from  the  instinct  that  a  larger 
life  is  their  natural  one,  in  the  sense  of  being  their 
due  ?  "  Yes,"  it  may  be  said,  "  but  we  learn  wisdom 
with  time  and  shall  give  up  trying  to  avoid  the  in 
evitable."  But  how,  if  in  every  step  of  advance 
made  within  the  limits,  there  are  already  involved 
assumptions  which  imply  that  we  in  some  way  set 
our  own  limits  ?  With  the  complete  sceptic  it  is 
impossible  to  argue  :  he  must  be  left  to  doubt  his 


8  ORIGIN    AND    VALIDITY.  [l. 

own  scepticism,  and  so  to  contradict  himself.  As 
sume  the  validity  of  the  processes  of  scientific 
knowledge.  Assume,  as  the  mathematician  does, 
the  absolute  certainty  of  his  processes  and  of  his 
results,  so  far  as  they  conform  to  his  processes. 
Assume,  as  the  student  of  nature  does,  the  relative 
certainty  of  his  methods  and  results.  How  can  we 
make  these  assumptions  about  the  necessities  of 
thought,  about  space,  about  the  orderliness  of  the 
physical  universe?  J.  S.  Mill  boldly  faced  this 
objection  to  the  satisfactoriness  of  psychological 
analysis  :  he  denied  the  certainty  of  mathematics, 
and  based  the  most  trustworthy  of  inductive  pro 
cesses  upon  the  least  certain — the  inductio  per  enu- 
merationem  sitnplicem.  But  this  mode  of  defence 
really  leads  to  a  complete  scepticism  or  to  a  com 
plete  surrender  of  the  problem  to  be  solved. 

The  lasting  and  permanent  contribution  of  Kant 
to  philosophy  is  his  recognition  of  what  the  real 
problem  of  the  theory  of  knowledge  is,  and  what 
are  the  conditions  of  its  solution.  Assuredly  there 
are  different  interpretations  of  Kant  and  different 
estimates  of  the  relative  importance  of  different  parts 
of  his  system  :  but  I  consider  that  the  point  on  which 
we  must  all  always  go  "  back  to  Kant "  and  on  which 
we  cannot  go  back  behind  him,  if  we  are  profitably 
to  face  the  problems  of  philosophy  now,  is  his  con 
ception  of  a  "  transcendental  proof,"  and  his  view  of 
the  a  priori  element  in  all  knowledge.  The  Kantian 
recognition  of  an  a  priori  element  in  knowledge  has 
almost  nothing  in  common  with  psychological  theo- 


I.]  ORIGIN    AND    VALIDITY.  9 

ries  of  intuitionism,  which  are  only  revivals  or  sur 
vivals  of  the  old  "  metaphysical "  (in  the  bad  sense) 
doctrines  of  innate  ideas.  The  name  a  priori  is 
unfortunate  because  it  suggests  a  reference  to  time, 
which  is  irrelevant  and  misleading.  Kant  does  not 
mean  that  the  individual  begins  with  certain  mental 
forms  and  then  goes  on  to  fill  them  up  with  a  content 
derived  from  experience.  If  that  were  the  a  priori 
theory,  as  it  is  often  supposed  to  be,  it  would  be  a 
theory  very  easy  to  refute,  and  a  very  absurd  de 
lusion  to  maintain.  "  The  baby  new  to  earth  and 
sky  "  does  not  start  with  a  knowledge  of  geometrical 
or  other  axioms.  The  psychologist  has  every  right 
in  saying  that  knowledge  begins  as  sensation.  That 
is  true  as  a  matter  of  mental  history.  He  is  only 
wrong  when  he  goes  on  to  say  that  knowledge  is 
nothing  but  sensation  and  the  products  of  sensation, 
unless  in  the  term  "products"  (or  any  equivalent  term) 
he  has  tacitly  implied  the  recognition  of  thought  as 
what  makes  the  development  of  knowledge  out  of 
sensation  possible.  Kant's  individualist  mode  of 
treating  the  problem  of  knowledge  certainly  seems 
to  countenance  a  psychological x  interpretation.  But 
so  far  as  it  does,  that  must  be  put  aside  as  the  per 
ishable  part  of  Kant's  theory.  I  may  be  interpret 
ing  wrongly  ;  but  I  take  the  essence  of  the  transcen 
dental  proof  to  be  what  I  am  going  to  state,  and  I 
cannot  see  that  such  a  proof  admits  of  any  refutation, 

1  If  the  meaning  of  Psychology  were  so  extended  as  to  cover 
Kant's  theory  of  knowledge,  that  would  involve  an  inconvenient 
deviation  from  the  general  use  of  the  word. 


IO  ORIGIN    AND    VALIDITY.  [l. 

except  from  the  consistent  sceptic,  who,  as  said 
before,  must  be  left  to  refute  himself.  It  is  not  en 
tirely  a  discovery  of  Kant's  :  Plato  and  Aristotle 
were  at  least  on  the  verge  of  it ;  and  the  various 
systems  of  Metaphysical  Idealism  may  all  be  con 
sidered  as,  amid  many  errors,  feeling  after  it. 

If  knowledge  be  altogether  dependent  on  sensation, 
knowledge  is  impossible.  But  knowledge  is  possible, 
because  the  sciences  exist.  Therefore  knowledge  is 
not  altogether  dependent  on  sensation.  It  is  no 
refutation  of  this  argument  to  say  :  "  Here  is  a  his 
tory  of  the  genesis  of  knowledge  from  sensation  "  ; 
because  the  argument  is  not  a  statement  of  a  fact 
in  psychology  (psychogenesis),  but  is  entirely  logical. 
The  denial  of  it  involves  all  our  experience  in 
contradiction.  That  is  the  ultimate  argument,  and, 
as  we  have  said,  it  can  be  denied  only  by  the  com 
plete  sceptic. 

What  this  non-sensational  element  is,  must  be 
discovered  by  taking  the  different  stages  and  kinds 
of  knowledge  separately.  And  there  is  no  reason 
why  Kant  should  be  right  at  every  step  here.  The 
details  of  the  Kantian  philosophy  may  come  to  have 
little  more  than  an  antiquarian  interest.  The 
simplest  act  of  knowledge  is  the  judgment.  Judging 
involves  comparison.  Comparison  requires  that  the 
different  sensations  should  be  held  together  in  unity. 
(This  follows  logically  without  any  reference  to 
psychology,  though  psychological  experience  may 
well  come  in  as  a  test.)  If  I  say  "  It  (i.e.,  anything 
what  is  presented  to  my  senses)  is  warm,"  I  am 


I.]  ORIGIN    AND    VALIDITY.  I  I 

asserting  an  identity  along  with  difference,  as  exist- 
ing  for  me.  One  sensation  could  make  no  know 
ledge,  nor  one  series  of  uniform  sensations  ;  nor  a 
series  of  different  sensations,  unless  they  could  be 
brought  together  for  comparison,  and  this  bringing 
together  cannot  be  actual,  but  must  be  ideal,  i.e.,  a 
Self  is  implied  in  the  simplest  act  of  knowledge.  If 
it  is  said,  "  It  is  true  that  as  we  know  now,  a  con 
scious  self  is  implied  in  our  knowledge,  but  that 
conscious  self  is  the  result  of  a  long  process  "• 
that  may  be  accepted  (or  not)  as  a  true  statement 
of  the  history  of  mental  development  ;  but  that 
does  not  do  away  with  the  logical  force  of  the 
argument.  It  is  not  asserted  that  at  an  elementary 
stage  human  beings  have  any  conception  of  self- 
consciousness  or  any  word  for  it,  nor  that  they 
have  reflected  on  it,  but  only  that  the  self-conscious 
ness  must  be  there  potentially,  implicitly.  "  But  what 
about  the  lower  animals  ?  If  we  cannot  draw  a 
hard  and  fast  line  between  lower  and  higher,  is  not 
the  recognition  that  man  may  be  developed  from 
lower  animal  forms  fatal  to  the  recognition  of  a 
non-sensational  element  in  human  knowledge  ? " 
To  this  it  may  be  answered  :  (i)  All  inferences 
about  the  "  knowledge"  possessed  by  the  lower 
animals  are  rendered  extremely  uncertain,  because 
we  have  no  means  whatever  of  communicating  with 
them  by  language,  and  consequently  interpret  their 
actions  on  the  analogy  of  externally  similar  actions 
done  by  ourselves.  All  tales  about  the  cleverness 
of  dogs,  etc.,  are  full  of  unscientific  anthropomor- 


12  ORIGIN    AND    VALIDITY.  [l. 

phism.  It  is  well  known  how  difficult  it  is  fairly 
to  interpret  the  ideas  of  lower  human  races,  because 
of  the  imperfections  of  their  language.  When 
language  is  wanting,  the  difficulty  becomes  in 
superable.  (2)  There  seems  no  objection  to 
admitting  that,  so  far  as  lower  animals  possess 
anything  that  can  be  called  knowledge,  i.e.,  so  far 
as  they  can  be  imagined  actually  to  make  judgments, 
as  in  applying  human  analogies  to  them  we  always 
suppose  them  to  do,  so  far  they  must  have  a  con 
sciousness  of  a  self,  though  at  a  lower  and  less 
explicit  stage.  If  we  say  their  life  is  one  of  mere 
sensation,  and  yet  ascribe  to  them  a  power  of 
making  judgments,  their  "  sensation "  must  be  a 
sort  of  "  obscure  thinking." 

Thus,  when  all  has  been  said  that  can  be  said  by 
physiology  and  psychology  about  the  way  in  which 
thought  arises  out  of  sense,  this,  however  true  as  a 
statement  of  historical  facts,  does  not  solve  the  pro 
blem  of  what  knowledge  is,  unless  it  be  regarded  as 
a  process  in  which  consciousness  (thought)  is  coming 
to  itself.  What  we  find  at  the  higher  stage  is  no 
new  element  suddenly  inserted  alongside  of  other 
elements,  nor  is  it  a  mere  chemical  product  of 
elements  different  from  it  (chemical  analogies  lie 
at  the  base  of  many  current  psychological  theories), 
but  it  is  what  we  are  logically  bound  to  regard  as 
present  throughout,  though  only  fully  realised  and 
known  at  the  higher  stages.  If  it  be  said  that  this 
is  only  importing  a  mystical  metaphysics  into  what 
was  already  clear,  then  we  must  answer  that  with- 


I.]  ORIGIN    AND    VALIDITY.  13 

out  this  mystical  metaphysics  the  theory  was  not 
clear,  because  it  could  only  be  expressed  by  the 
use  of  a  number  of  terms  which  had  not  been 
explained.  It  is  sometimes  thought  that,  by  saying 
"  The  lower  is  potentially  the  higher,"  or  "  contains 
the  potency  and  promise  of  the  higher,"  all  has  been 
said  that  need  be  said.  But  what  is  meant  by 
saying  "A  (e.g.,  the  acorn)  is  potentially  B  (e.g.,  the 
oak")?  If  it  merely  means  "  Here  you  have  A, 
afterwards  you  will  have  B,"  it  would  be  better 
simply  to  say  so  ;  for  then  it  would  be  made 
obvious  that  no  explanation  of  B  has  been  given, 
and  that  neither  A  nor  B  is  understood.  "A  is 
potentially  B,"  if  it  means  anything,  must  mean 
that  in  some  way  A  already  is  B,  and  that  B  is 
needed  to  explain  A.  The  late  G.  H.  Lewes 
was  not  prejudiced  in  favour  of  old  philosophies, 
but  he  most  fully  recognised  the  fact  that  we  can 
only  understand  the  lower  from  the  point  of  view 
of  the  higher :  "  We  can  only  understand  the 
Amoeba  and  the  Polype  by  a  light  reflected  from 
the  study  of  Man." *  So  that  even  within  the 
sciences  it  is  not  really  possible  to  "begin  at  the 
beginning."  The  attempt  to  do  so  will  generally 
mean  that  some  dimly  accepted  view  about  the 
"end"  is  influencing  the  observations  of  the  begin 
ning  ;  for,  as  Lewes  reminds  us,  "  our  closest 
observation  is  interpretation."  Even  for  the  study 
of  origins  an  examination  of  the  end  or  most 
complete  state  as  it  exists  is  not  superfluous,  and 
1  Study  of  Psychology,  p.  122. 


14  ORIGIN    AND    VALIDITY.  [l. 

such  an  examination,  apart  from  historical  methods, 
must  be  analytic,  or,  in  Kant's  phrase,  critical. 
Before  we  proceed  to  ask  what  history  tells  us, 
it  may  be  worth  while  to  ask  what  history  can 
tell  us.  By  knowing  what  something  was,  we  do 
not  always  know  what  it  is,  sometimes  only  what 
it  (now)  is  not. 

To  discover  the  a  priori  element  in  knowledge, 
i.e.,  that  element  wrhich,  though  known  to  us  only 
in  connection  with  sense-experience,  cannot  be 
dependent  upon  sense-experience  for  its  validity, 
is  the  business  of  a  philosophical  theory  of  know 
ledge.  And  if  we  call  that  a  part  of  Metaphysics, 
it  is  a  Metaphysics  with  which  we  cannot  dispense. 
Suppose  that  "  Self-consciousness,"  "  Identity," 
"  Substance,"  "  Cause,"  "  Time,"  "  Space,"  be 
amongst  the  "Categories"  so  discovered,  to  arrange 
these  categories  in  a  system,  to  see  their  relations 
to  one  another  and  to  the  world  of  nature  and  of 
human  action,  will  be  the  business  of  Philosophy 
or  Metaphysics  in  a  wider  sense.  "  Speculative 
Metaphysics,"  as  distinct  from  Critical,  we  might 
call  it,  because  the  method  it  must  adopt  can  never 
have  the  logical  precision  and  certainty  of  the 
Critical  Method.  The  only  test  of  the  validity 
of  a  system  of  Speculative  Metaphysics  must  be 
its  adequacy  to  the  explanation  and  arrangement 
of  the  whole  Universe  as  it  becomes  known  to 
us.  Thus  this  Metaphysics  can  never  be  complete, 
but  must  always  be  attempted  anew  by  each  thinker. 
The  Critical  examination  of  the  nature  of  knowledge 


I.]  ORIGIN    AND    VALIDITY.  15 

may  logically  precede  any  or  all  of  the  special 
sciences,  although  it  is  only  the  advance  of  science 
that  has  suggested  the  need  of  such  an  exami 
nation  ;  but  the  Metaphysician  in  this  second  sense 
can  never  be  independent  of  any  of  the  sciences  or 
of  any  branch  of  human  knowledge  or  effort.  They 
are  his  material.1 

To  make  knowledge  possible  there  must  (in 
Green's  phrase)  be  "a  comparing  and  distinguishing 
self"  ;  but  since  Time,  though  relatively  a  form  is 
yet  also  one  of  the  contents  of  knowledge,  this 
self  must  in  some  way  be  independent  of  Time.  I 
know  I  am  a  series  of  experiences  in  Time.  There 
fore,  in  some  way,  I  am  not  in  Time — but  an 
eternal  (i.e.,  time-less)  self-consciousness.  But  the 
Critical  Philosophy  can  tell  us  nothing  further,  can 
tell  us  nothing  as  to  what  this  eternal  self-conscious 
ness  is  or  how  it  is  related  to  our  individual  selves, 
which  are  the  subject  matter  of  Psychology.  The 
attempt  to  find  some  expression  for  this  relation,  i.e., 
to  show  how  an  eternal  self-consciousness  reveals 
itself  in  Time  and  in  Space  is  the  business  of 
Speculative  Philosophy  or  Metaphysics.  That  there 
is  an  eternal  self-consciousness  we  are  logically  com 
pelled  to  believe,  and  that  it  is  in  some  way  present 
in  our  individual  selves ;  but  in  what  way  is  a 
matter  of  speculation  :  and  it  is  still  quite  com- 

1  It  will  be  seen,  from  this,  that  while  ready  to  recognise  a 
distinction  between  Epistemology  and  Metaphysics,  I  recognise 
no  Metaphysics  as  sound  which  is  not  based  upon  Epistemology. 
Ontology,  as  an  independent  science,  is  a  sham  science. 


1 6  ORIGIN    AND    VALIDITY.  [l. 

petent  to  any  one  who  accepts  the  main  result  of 
the  critical  examination  of  knowledge  to  maintain 
that  this  latter  problem  is  altogether  insoluble ; 
although  it  is  a  problem  (or  rather  series  of  prob 
lems)  which  we  cannot  leave  alone,  because  we  are 
met  by  it  at  every  step  in  our  ordinary  experience, 
if  we  once  begin  to  reflect  on  the  meaning  and 
mutual  relations  of  the  conceptions  we  are  obliged 
to  use. 

It  is  not  my  present  concern  to  give  an  exhaus 
tive  list  of  the  a  priori  conceptions  and  principles 
which  are  involved  in  ordinary  knowledge  and  in 
the  procedure  of  scientific  investigation  and  proof. 
An  Intuitionist  Philosophy,  which  professes  to  get 
at  these  principles  by  a  simple  introspection  into  the 
contents  of  consciousness,  may  fairly  be  met  with 
the  challenge  to  produce  its  list  of  intuitive  prin 
ciples.  But  if  the  term  a  priori  be  understood  in 
the  way  which  has  been  explained  above,  no  such 
challenge  can  be  justly  made.  It  is  only  as  ex 
perience  progresses  that  we  can  become  fully  aware 
of  and  can  formulate  the  conceptions  and  principles 
which  that  experience  logically  involves.  Only  if 
knowledge  were  completed  could  we  know  all  that 
knowledge  implied  :  and  it  is  only  as  knowledge 
approximates  to  that  apparently  ever-receding  goal 
that  we  can  enlarge  our  view  of  what  has  been 
there  implicitly  from  the  first.  Thus,  in  the  very 
simplest  acts  of  thought  the  principle  of  Identity 
and  the  principle  of  Contradiction  (A  is  A  ;  A  is 
not  not-A)  are  involved  ;  and  yet  it  was  late  in  the 


I.J  ORIGIN    AND    VALIDITY.  IJ 

history  of  mankind  when  the  science  of  Logic  was 
first  enabled  to  discover  and  formulate  these  prin 
ciples.     Nevertheless  they  are  a  priori  in  the  sense 
that   without   them    all    knowledge   would    be    im 
possible.     So  it  is  with  the  axioms  of  the  science 
of  quantity.     That  "  Things  which  are  equal  to  the 
same  thing  are  equal  to  one  another  "  is  implied  in 
all    the   experience   which     Mill    thought    went    to 
prove  the  principle.     Every  carpenter  who  uses  a 
foot-rule,  every  barmaid  who  draws  off  half-a-pint, 
implies  the  principle  and  acts  on  it,  though   totally 
ignorant  of  the  elements  of  Geometry.      Similarly, 
the  rudest  ideas  about  Nature  imply  the  conception 
of  a   Cosmos,  of  an  order   of  nature,   though   that 
order  may  include  gods,  demons,  fairies,  and  goblins, 
of  whom  the  modern  scientific  man  takes  no  account, 
and  may  exclude  gravitation,  electricity,  and  other 
forces  which  he  has  come  to  recognise.     The  prin 
ciple  that  every  event  has  a  cause,  i.e.,  is  related  to 
some  other  event  (or  events)  without  which  it  would 
not   happen  and  with  which  it   must  happen, — the 
two  clauses  of  this  definition  of  cause  are  sometimes 
mistakenly  separated  as  the  principles  of  Causation 
and  Uniformity  of  Nature  respectively, — is  involved 
in   the  mental  action  of  the  savage  who  hears  the 
thunder  and  looks  round  for  an  explanation,  though 
he  may  be  quite  wrong  in  his  explanation,  and  though 
it  may  be  late  in  time  before  any  human  being  comes 
to  reflect  on   the   processes    of  experience  and  to 
formulate  its  principles.       But   the  history  of  how 
men  came  to  recognise  Uniformity  of  Nature  and 
D.  H.  c 


1 8  ORIGIN    AND    VALIDITY.  [l. 

how  their  conceptions  of  Cause  and  of  Nature  have 
varied  is  one  thing  :  the  logical  character  of  the 
presupposition  of  all  inductive  inference  is  another. 
The  former  is  a  question  of  historical  psychology  ; 
the  latter  is  a  question  of  philosophical  criticism. 
The  proposition,  "  Every  event  must  have  a  cause  " 
is  not  a  priori  because  it  convinces  every  person  the 
moment  he  understands  it,  but  because  no  know 
ledge  of  natural  events  is  possible  without  a  con 
nection  of  them  with  other  events  as  belonging  to 
one  system  of  nature.  That  nature  is  a  system  is 
the  assumption  underlying  the  earliest  mythologies  : 
to  fill  up  this  conception  is  the  aim  of  the  latest 
science.  A  capacity  for  discovering  true  causes 
may  be  capable  of  development  as  the  race 
advances  ;  so  may  be  a  capacity  for  philosophical 
analysis  ;  but  the  presupposition  of  all  investigation 
of  causes  cannot  itself  be  derived  from  the  experience 
either  of  the  individual  or  of  the  race.1 

The  question  for  the  logician  is  not  :  "  How  have 
I  (or  mankind  generally)  come  to  believe  this  ? " 
That  is  a  question  for  the  psychologist  and  the  socio 
logist.  The  logical  question  is  :  "  Why  am  I  or  any 
one  else  justified  in  believing  this  ?"  A  confusion 
between  these  two  questions  underlies  Mill's  famous 
attack  on  the  Syllogism.  The  essential  and  perma 
nently  significant  portion  of  the  Aristotelian  doctrine 
of  the  Syllogism  is  the  recognition  that  all  inference 
(and  a-vXXoyia-fjio?  just  means  "  inference  ")  implies  a 

1  See  Note  on  "  Heredity  as  a  Factor  in  Knowledge  "  at  the 
end  of  this  Essay. 


I.]  ORIGIN    AND    VALIDITY.  19 

Universal.  As  a  psychological  fact  there  may 
(though  even  this  may  be  questioned)  be  in  our 
minds  a  particular  proposition  and  then  immediately 
afterwards  another  particular  proposition  suggested 
by  it.  But,  if  the  one  can  be  described  as  an 
inference  from  the  other,  we  must  be  able  to  answer 
the  question,  how  we  get  the  one  from  the  other. 
And  the  answer  to  the  question  must,  if  we 
formulate  it,  take  the  form  of  a  universal  pro 
position,  of  which,  till  we  have  to  face  the  ques 
tion,  we  may  be  perfectly  unconscious,  and  it  will 
constitute  the  major  premiss  of  the  Aristotelian 
Syllogism  {Barbara  or  Darii  being  taken  as 
typical),  the  middle  term  being,  in  the  scientific 
inference,  the  cause  or  ground  (sufficient  reason)  of 
the  conclusion.  Thus  the  death  of  some  one  I 
know  may  suggest  to  me  my  own  mortality  ;  but 
the  reason  of  the  inference  is  our  common  possession 
of  the  attributes  of  human  and  so  of  animal  life. 
It  is  always  with  a  question  of  validity  that  the 
logician  as  such  has  to  deal:  "Are  we  justified  in 
inferring  that  ?  "  —not  with  the  psychological  pro 
cess  through  which  any  particular  person  or  persons 
have  gone  in  arriving  at  their  beliefs.  Psychological 
introspection  can,  therefore,  never  solve  logical 
difficulties.  The  formula  of  the  Syllogism  (major 
premiss,  minor  premiss,  conclusion)  is  not  an  expo 
sition  of  what  actually  takes  place  in  any  one's 
mind,  but  a  logical  exposition  of  that  to  which  any 
actual  inference  must  conform  in  order  to  be  correct. 
It  would  not  even  be  accurate  to  say  it  is  the  form 


2O  ORIGIN    AND    VALIDITY.  [l. 

according  to  which  the  normal  reasoner  actually 
reasons ;  because  a  man  may  reason  quite  correctly 
and  be  the  normal  reasoner,  while  quite  unconscious 
of  logical  analysis.  The  reasonings  of  the  normal 
reasoner  are  those  which  will  conform  best  to  the 
strict  syllogistic  form  when  they  are  so  analysed  by 
the  logician.  The  incorrectness  of  an  apparent 
inference  becomes  clear,  when  the  reasoner  is  com 
pelled  to  formulate  the  universal  according  to  which 
he  is  reasoning  though  without  being  aware  of  it. 
If  he  were  fully  aware  of  it,  he  could  not  commit 
fallacies.  If  we  were  fully  aware  of  everything  that 
every  proposition  implies,  we  could  not  assert  false 
propositions. 

Take  another  logical  illustration,  a  minor  matter. 
Mill  says  that  proper  names  have  no  connotation. 
It  may  be  true  enough  that  the  name  "  John  Smith  " 
suggests  nothing  to  me  or  to  you  ;  but,  if  I  am  a 
philological  ethnologist,  it  may  suggest  a  good  deal ; 
if  I  have  a  friend  of  that  name,  it  may  suggest  a 
good  deal  more.  These  are  matters  of  psychological 
interest,  and  no  definite  answer  independent  of  time, 
place,  circumstances  and  persons  can  be  given.  But 
the  name  of  an  individual,  not  as  a  mere  word,  but 
as  the  name  of  an  individual,  as  appropriated  (and 
that  is  what  "proper  name  "  ought  to  mean)  must 
logically  have  an  infinite  connotation.  That  we  can 
say  quite  definitely,  and  that  is  the  reason  why  the 
proper  name  cannot  be  defined.  Any  given  person 
may  be  unable  to  say  anything  about  any  given 
proper  name  ;  whether  he  can  or  not  is  a  matter  of 


I.]  ORIGIN    AND    VALIDITY.  21 

fact.  But  logic  has  to  do  with  the  ideal  possibilities 
of  definition.  And  we  can  answer  quite  certainly  : 
We  never  can  exhaust  the  signification  of  the  in 
dividual. 

The  controversy  whether  mathematical  judgments 
are  analytic  or  synthetic  is  of  a  similar  kind.  As  a 
psychological  question  it  is  a  matter  of  degree,  and, 
in  the  case  of  arithmetic,  will  depend  solely  on  the 
extent  to  which  a  person  has  learned  the  multiplica 
tion  table,  etc.  This  is  one  of  the  merely  psycho 
logical  distinctions  that  intrude  themselves  into 
Kant's  theory  of  knowledge.  Whether  any  pro 
position  conveys  any  new  information  to  a  person  is 
always  a  question  which  cannot  be  answered  irrespec 
tive  of  time,  place,  etc.  In  one  sense  nothing  we 
ever  can  learn  is  new,  else  we  could  not  learn  it :  it 
would  be  quite  irrelevant  to  our  already  existing 
knowledge.  (This  is  the  truth  in  the  old  Sophistic 
paradox.)  In  this  way  all  reasoning  is  reasoning  in 
a  circle  ;  but  it  is  a  circle  so  large— as  large  as  the 
Universe — that  we  need  be  under  no  immediate  fear 
of  completing  it.  To  omniscience  all  propositions 
must  be  analytic  (identical).  That  is  the  ideal  of 
knowledge,  and  it  is  the  standard  by  which  all  state 
ments  and  all  professed  inferences  are  ultimately 
judged.  This  amounts  to  saying,  in  other  words, 
that  the  inconceivability  of  the  opposite  is  the  ulti 
mate  test  of  all  truth.  But  it  is  a  test  that  we  can 
not  safely  apply  in  practice,  except  where  we  can  be 
perfectly  sure  that  we  have  eliminated  all  risks  of 
ambiguity  and  have  fully  realised  all  the  conditions 


22  ORIGIN    AND    VALIDITY.  [l. 

under  which  we  are  making  an  assertion.  Thus  we 
can  only  apply  it  safely  in  very  abstract  sciences, 
such  as  geometry.  We  know  exactly  what  we 
mean  and  what  others  will  understand  by  a  "  straight 
line  "  and  by  "enclosing  a  space":  and  therefore 
we  can  quite  certainly  say,  "Two  straight  lines  can- 
cannot  enclose  a  space "  ;  because  to  suppose  that 
they  do  involves  us  in  contradiction,  and  would 
make  us  assert  that  the  straight  line  was  also  not  a 
straight  line.  But  if  any  one  at  the  beginning  of 
this  century  had  said,  "  It  is  inconceivable  that  a 
message  should  be  sent  from  London  to  New  York 
in  a  few  seconds,"  his  statement  would  only  have 
been  correct  if  he  had  inserted  the  qualification  : 
"  the  modes  of  transmitting  messages  being  such  as 
I  know  of  "  ;  for  then  it  would  be  true  that  we  could 
not  really  think  of  the  carrier  pigeon,  being  what  we 
know  it  to  be,  traversing  space  with  such  velocity. 

Logic,  then,  is  concerned  not  with  what  actually 
goes  on  in  the  mind  of  any  individual  or  of  the 
average  individual.  That  is  the  business  of  psycho 
logy.  Logic  is  concerned  with  the  rules  or  ideal 
standards  to  which  the  mental  processes  of  every 
one  must  conform  if  they  are  to  attain  truth.  Parallel 
with  logic  there  are  at  least  two  other  "regulative" 
philosophical  sciences  (branches  of  philosophy)— 
concerned  respectively  with  those  rules  or  ideals 
which  must  be  fulfilled  for  the  attainment  of  beauty 
in  art,  and  with  those  which  must  be  fulfilled  for  the 
realisation  of  goodness  in  conduct.  The  presup 
position  of  knowledge  was  found  to  be  the  presence 


I.]  ORIGIN    AND    VALIDITY.  23 

of  a  Self  which  is  eternal  and  which  yet  is  never 
completely  realised  in  any  one  of  us,  and  which  thus 
remains  as  an  Ideal  (Sollen)  perpetually  urging  to  its 
realisation.  If  we  approach  the  study  of  mankind 
from  the  side  of  Nature,  we  find  everywhere  a 
"groaning  and  travailing,"  not,  as  has  been  too 
readily  supposed,  a  universal  pursuit  of  pleasure, 
but  a  universal  struggle  and  a  seemingly  hopeless 
struggle  to  escape  pain,  whether  the  pain  of  physical, 
emotional  or  intellectual  suffering.  A  dispassionate 
view  of  the  process  of  evolution  alone  seems  to  leave 
no  escape  from  a  philosophy  of  despair  ;  for,  as  the 
struggle  for  existence  eliminates  some  physical  evils, 
it  intensifies  the  acuteness  of  emotional  and  intel 
lectual  desires,  and  increases  the  ever-recurring  pain 
that  comes  from  the  perpetual  incapacity  of  satisfy 
ing  wants  and  cravings  which  grow  with  every 
satisfaction.  But,  if  the  necessity  of  endeavouring 
to  explain  how  knowledge  is  possible  compels  us  to 
recognise  an  eternal  Self  ever  demanding  realisation, 
may  we  not,  looking  back  now  from  the  standpoint 
of  the  Ideal,  regard  all  the  blind  struggle  of  Nature 
as  the  lower  and  unconscious  phases  of  this  process 
of  the  realisation  of  the  eternal  Self  ?  This  identi 
fication  would  be  a  hypothesis  of  Speculative  Philo 
sophy,  and  could  not  have  the  certainty  of  the  mere 
recognition  of  an  eternal  Self:  but  it  is  the  theory 
which  seems  best  to  explain  all  the  phenomena,  and 
it  does  not  conflict  with  any  scientific  fact,  although 
undoubtedly  incapable  of  scientific  verification. 
From  the  side  of  origins  the  struggle  seems  vain, 


24  ORIGIN    AND    VALIDITY.  [l. 

and  yet  we  can  only  pronounce  it  vain,  because  we 
have  in  us  an  ideal  standard  by  which  we  judge. 
We  can  only  know  that  the  crooked  is  crooked  if  we 
have  an  ideal  of  the  straight ;  we  can  only  know 
that  the  world  is  evil  if  we  have  in  us  an  ideal  of 
absolute  good.  We  know  our  ignorance,  because 
we  have  an  ideal  of  perfect  knowledge  ;  we  know 
the  ugliness  and  discord  of  the  world,  because  we 
have  an  ideal  of  perfect  beauty  and  harmony  ;  we 
know  its  wickedness,  because  we  have  an  ideal  of  a 
perfected  society  ;  we  are  conscious  of  sin,  because 
we  know  that  our  true  self  is  God,  from  whom  we 
are  severed.  How  these  various  ideals  grow  up  in 
the  minds  of  mankind,  and  how  their  content  varies 
at  different  periods,  are  matters  for  the  psychologist 
and  the  historian.  But  why  there  are  such  ideals  at 
all  can  only  be  explained  if  we  start  from  the  side  of 
philosophical  analysis — looking  at  things  as  a  whole. 
In  saying  that  we  have  ideals  of  knowledge,  of 
beauty,  of  goodness,  I  most  certainly  do  not  mean 
to  assert  that  they  are  the  same  for  all  human 
beings  at  all  times  and  in  all  places  :  that  would  be 
a  very  difficult  proposition  to  maintain,  in  the  light 
of  anthropology  and  history.  The  only  thing  that 
is  common  to  every  reflecting  and  yet  incomplete 
consciousness  is  the  presence  of  an  ideal,  confronting 
the  actual.  The  content  of  the  ideal  varies  with 
time,  place,  and  person.  The  form  of  "  ought  to 
be,"  as  distinct  from  "  is,"  is  alone  a  priori ;  and 
it  requires  something  more  to  explain  it  than  a 
"  natural  history  "  of  ideals.  The  contradiction  of 


I.]  ORIGIN    AND    VALIDITY.  25 

the  actual  by  thought,  which  is  involved  in  the  very 
existence  of  ideals,  raises  the  whole  question  of  the 
relation  of  thought  to  nature — the  one  question 
which,  in  all  its  various  aspects,  a  speculative  philo 
sophy  attempts  to  solve. 

^Esthetics  might,  on  grounds  of  etymology,  be 
considered  most  properly  to  be  concerned  with  the 
question,  how  we  (whoever  the  "  we  "  may  be)  have 
come  to  judge  this  or  that  to  be  beautiful — which  is 
a  question  of  psychology.  But  we  want  some  name 
for  the  philosophical  science  which  attempts  to  solve 
the  question,  why  this  or  that  is  beautiful ;  or  ratner, 
to  put  the  question  in  a  form  that  seems  better  to 
avoid  the  assumptions  of  the  old  ontological  meta 
physics  which  we  have  discarded,  why  this  or  that 
ought  to  be  considered  beautiful.  For  it  will  not  do 
to  say  :  "  That  is  beautiful  which  is  generally  con 
sidered  beautiful,"  since,  least  of  all  in  matters  of 
artistic  taste,  is  the  person  of  taste  ready  to  accept 
the  opinion  of  any  chance  persons.  If  we  say,  "That 
ought  to  be  considered  beautiful  which  is  considered 
beautiful  by  the  person  of  taste,"  we  have  only  trans 
ferred  the  ideal  to  the  person,  because  then  we  mean 
that  he  is  the  person  whose  judgment  ought  to  be 
accepted.  He  says  "  I  now  consider  this  beautiful, 
and,  if  I  am  right,  people  will  gradually  come  to 
acknowledge  it,"  i.e.,  he  gives  out  his  judgment  as 
his  own,  and  yet  not  as  a  judgment  of  a  mere  sub 
jective  liking,  but  as  one  that  has  a  claim  to  have  an 
objective  validity — to  be  valid  for  all,  if  they  could 
only  come  to  see  as  he  sees.  I  am  assuming  the 


26  ORIGIN    AND    VALIDITY.  [l. 

person  of  taste  to  be  a  healthy-minded  critic  who 
expects  and  wishes  his  judgments  to  be  accepted 
and  does  not  pride  himself  on  having  a  peculiar 
taste,  which  no  one  except  himself  and  his  own 
small  set  will  ever  share  ;  others  may  not  share  it 
as  yet,  but  unless  he  expects  others  to  share  it,  his 
judgment  only  claims  a  subjective  validity,  i.e.,  it 
means  only  "This  pleases  me,"  not  "This  is  beauti 
ful."  Neither  in  explaining  the  work  of  the  artist 
nor  in  explaining  the  judgment  of  the  lover  of  art 
can  we  leave  out  the  conception  of  an  ideal — an 
ought  to  be.  All  the  attempts  to  reduce  this  to  a 
statement  of  "  what  is  "  bring  in  the  conception  in 
some  concealed  form. 

Similarly  in  Ethics.  If  the  moral  law  be  ex 
pressed  as  "that  which  the  good  man  does"  (as  by 
Mr.  Leslie  Stephen),  then  in  "  good  man"  we  have 
brought  in  the  conception  of  ought  which  has  been 
eliminated  from  "law."  How  we  (the  race  or  the 
individual)  have  come  to  think  this  or  that  right  is 
a  matter  for  sociology  and  psychology — it  would  be 
the  history  of  moral  ideas  and  the  psychology  of  the 
moral  sentiments  ;  but  these  do  not  explain  why 
there  should  be  any  thinking  right  or  wrong  at  all. 
The  old  Intuitional  Ethics  assumes  certain  absolute 
principles  of  right  and  wrong,  and  thus  comes  into 
direct  conflict  with  scientific  investigations  into  the 
origin  of  moral  ideas.  The  theory  of  Idealism  for 
which  I  am  contending  only  maintains  that  all  ac 
counts  of  the  evolution  of  morality  are  inadequate 
to  supply  a  complete  theory  of  Ethics,  unless  the 


I.]  ORIGIN    AND    VALIDITY.  27 

presence  of  an  ideal  to  all  human  effort  be  recognised 
as  involved  in  the  presence  of  the  eternal  Self  which 
any  account  of  knowledge  or  conduct  presupposes. 
What  the  ideal  at  any  time  may  be,  i.e.,  the  content 
of  the  ideal,  is  a  matter  for  historical  investigation. 
And  it  is  on  the  evolution  of  this  content  that  the 
theory  of  natural  selection  has  thrown  so  much 
light.1  The  ideal  must  vary,  else  progress  would 
be  impossible.  But  there  must  be  an  ideal,  a 
judgment  of -"ought,"  else  morality  would  be  im 
possible. 

•  The  same  thing  becomes  clear  when  we  pass  to 
Politics.  Intuitions  as  to  natural  rights  only  prove 
delusive.  We  cannot  settle  in  that  way  what  the 
State  ought  to  do  and  what  not.  As  already  said, 
''natural  rights  "  is  a  misleading  phrase  if  supposed 
to  refer  to  some  original  rights  of  man  ;  practically  it 
can  only  mean  "What  man  ought  to  have."  So, 
too,  it  is  unhistorical  and,  what  is  worse,  illogical  to 
say  that  society  originated  in  a  contract  ;  for  contract 
presupposes  society.  But  there  may  be  a  very 
good  sense  in  saying  that  society  ought  to  be 
u  contractual  "  (M.  Fouillee's  phrase2),  i.e.,  that  mem 
bers  of  a  good  state  ought  to  feel  that  the  laws 
which  they  obey  are  not  the  commands  of  an  alien 
force  but  are  self-imposed,  so  that  obedience  to 
them  becomes  the  highest  realisation  of  freedom. 
Theories  which  treat  the  state  as  analogous  to  a 

1  In  the  following  essay  I  attempt  to  deal  briefly  with  the  rela 
tion  between  idealism  and  evolutionist  ethics.     See  p.  62  ff. 

2  See  below,  p.  226. 


28  ORIGIN    AND    VALIDITY.  [l. 

natural  organism  err  in  an  opposite  way  from  those 
which  regard  it  as  resulting  from  a  contract.  Theories 
of  contract  state  a  question  of  value  as  if  it  were  a 
question  of  origin.  Theories  which  apply  the  con 
ceptions  of  organism  and  evolution  to  society  as  if 
they  were  as  adequate  in  politics  as  in  biology, 
while  they  may  give  a  correct  account  of  the  origins 
of  society,  leave  us  without  a  criterion  by  which  to 
judge  of  the  goodness  or  badness  of  any  social  con 
dition.  The  only  logically  available  criterion  would 
be  the  ultimate  success  of  any  given  society  in  the 
struggle  for  existence.  In  practical  politics  we  can 
not  wait  for  that ;  we  are  safer  with  the  Utilitarian 
method.  But  why  ?  Just  because  it  brings  in  a 
standard  of  worth,  though  too  narrowly  conceived. 
It  estimates  goodness  by  the  end  to  which  a  society 
tends,  i.e.,  by  reference  to  an  ideal. 

We  have  heard  much  lately  of  the  historical 
method  in  politics — so  much  that  it  is  time  to  hear 
something  on  the  other  side.  The  historical  method 
has  done  great  services  to  the  study  of  human 
society  in  ridding  us  of  the  "metaphysical"  fictions 
of  a  Law  of  Nature,  State  of  Nature,  Original 
Contract,  Natural  Rights,  etc.  ;  but  those  who  are 
strongly  possessed  by  the  historical  spirit  are  some 
times  disposed  to  think  that,  when  they  have  shown 
how  an  institution  came  into  being,  they  have 
said  all  that  is  worth  saying  on  the  matter.  It  is  a 
mistake  to  suppose  that,  because  an  institution  now 
serves  certain  purposes,  it  was  created  for  these 
purposes  ;  but,  when  we  know  how  an  institution 


I.]  ORIGIN    AND    VALIDITY.  29 

came  into  being,  we  have  still,  as  practical  persons, 
to  ask  ourselves  :  "  What  purposes  does  it  now 
serve?"- — else  we  do  not  estimate  it  rightly.  Be 
cause  the  House  of  Lords  was  not  invented  as  a 
check  on  legislation,  it  does  not  follow  that  the 
House  of  Lords  is  not  a  check  on  legislation — for 
good  or  for  evil.  Because  the  English  State  never 
at  any  moment  in  history  selected  a  certain  religious 
body  and  gave  it  certain  endowments  and  privileges, 
it  does  not  follow  that  the  phrases  "  State  Church," 
"  Established  Church  "  are  altogether  meaningless 
as  representing  the  present  relation  of  the  Church  to 
the  State.  And  it  is  this  present  relation,  and  not 
historical  facts  about  the  Church  in  the  time  of  the 
Heptarchy  or  the  proceedings  of  Convocation  in  the 
time  of  Henry  VIII.,  which  the  practical  politician 
has  to  take  into  account.  He  is  concerned  with 
value,  not  with  origins.  Again,  when  it  is  asked  by 
what  right  an  individual  owns  half  a  county,  history 
may  lead  us  back  to  the  dissolution  of  the  monas 
teries,  the  Norman  conquest,  the  Saxon  invasion, 
and  so  on,  till  we  come  to  the  first  blue-painted 
barbarian  who  stuck  a  rude  spade  into  the  ground, 
half  cleared  from  brushwood.  But  all  this,  however 
interesting,  is  irrelevant  to  the  question,  how  far 
the  present  system  of  land  tenure  can  be  justified  or 
not.  Existing  rights  may  be  explained  by  reference 
to  the  past,  but  can  only  be  justified  if  it  is  shown  that 
they  subserve  social  well-being  now  and  are  likely  to 
do  so  in  the  future.  Similarly  with  the  whole  ques 
tion  of  endowments.  "  What  was"  must  not  blind 


30  ORIGIN    AND    VALIDITY.  [l. 

us  to  "what  ought  to  be,"  though  of  course  the  in 
convenience  of  disturbing  customs  and  expectations, 
where  that  is  unnecessary,  has  always  to  be  taken 
into  account.  The  practical  reformer  will  move,  as 
far  as  possible,  in  the  line  of  least  resistance.  But 
it  is  a  pity  when  a  scientific  theory  or  the  spirit  of 
antiquarianism  interferes  with  the  removal  of  abuses. 
Philosophy  performs  a  useful  function  in  criticising 
the  conceptions  which  are  being  used  :  in  default  of 
a  sound  metaphysics,  strong  practical  instincts  and 
a  sense  of  humour  are  the  best  safeguards. 

Lastly,   I    must    refer  to    the  application  of   this 
distinction    between    questions    of    origin    and    of 
validity  in  the  domain  of  Religion.     The   theory  of 
knowledge  obliges  us  to  assume  the  existence  of  an 
eternal  Self-consciousness  partially  revealed   in  our 
selves.     This,   which   is  the  ideal   of  knowledge,  of 
beauty,  of  goodness,  is  the  God  of  religion.      It  is 
not  asserted  that  there  is  an  intuitive  knowledge   of 
the  existence  of  one  God.      Such   an   assertion   is 
difficult  to  maintain  in  the  face  of  what  we  know  of 
the  history  of  religions.     The  idea  of  God,  as  held 
by    the   religious   thinkers  of  the   highest  types   of 
religion,   is  of  slow  and   late  growth.     The   identi 
fication  of  a  power  (or  powers)  outside  us  with  our 
highest    ideals    of    knowledge,    of    beauty,    and    of 
goodness  is  not  dreamt   of  by  the  primitive  savage, 
just  because  he  has   not  our  ideals.      Nor   can  the 
idea  be  completed  till   these   ideals  are  completed, 
i.e.,  the  growth  of  the  idea  of  God,  which  we  may  call 
the  revelation  of  God,    is   continuous  and   is  com- 


I.]  ORIGIN    AND    VALIDITY.  31 

mensurate  with  human  progress.  The  criticism  of 
science  must  be  allowed  full  weight  as  against  the 
belief  that  religious  truth  was  conveyed  by  some 
inexplicable  means  to  certain  individuals  at  a  definite 
time,  and  then  handed  down  like  some  treasure  of 
silver  or  gold.  The  prejudice  against  Biblical 
Criticism  and  against  the  scientific  study  of  re 
ligions  implies  that  the  value  of  a  religious  idea 
is  altogether  derived  from  the  channel  through 
which  it  was  first  conveyed  to  mankind — a  prophet, 
a  sacred  book,  an  infallible  church.  But  the  value 
of  a  religious  idea  cannot  be  dependent  upon  an 
external  authority  of  any  kind,  but  solely  on  its  own 
adequacy  to  express,  in  a  manner  fitted  to  appeal  at 
once  to  the  intellect  and  the  emotions,  the  highest 
possible  beliefs  of  the  time.  This  is  implicitly  re 
cognised  by  Christian  apologists,  when  they  appeal 
to  the  excellence  of  Christian  morality  ;  but  what 
is  the  value  of  such  an  appeal  if  the  morality  is 
itself  dependent  for  its  validity  upon  the  authority 
of  miraculous  persons  or  writings  ?  So  far  as 
Christianity  is  a  system  of  spiritual  doctrines  and 
beliefs  about  the  relation  between  the  soul  of  the 
individual  and  that  Divine  Spirit  which  is  ever 
operating  in  the  universe,  it  finds  a  philosophical 
counterpart  and  an  intellectual  interpretation  in 
Idealism  ;  but,  so  far  as  it  is  represented  as  neces 
sarily  including  certain  statements  about  alleged 
matters  of  fact,  Idealism  can  lend  no  support  to 
the  apologist  in  his  controversy  with  historical 
critics. 


32  NOTE    ON    HEREDITY 

NOTE   ON    HEREDITY   AS  A   FACTOR  IN 
KNOWLEDGE.1 

WE  cannot  face  the  question  of  the  degree  to  which  know 
ledge  consists  in,  or  depends  upon,  inherited  elements,  till 
we  know  what  heredity  means  and  what  things  can,  and 
what  cannot  be  inherited  :  and  therefore  the  question  must 
be  carried  back  from  psychology  into  biology.  This  is 
unfortunate  for  the  psychologist  who  is  hasting  to  lay  the 
foundations  of  all  philosophy ;  but,  in  this  matter,  he  must 
wait  till  the  biological  controversy  between  Lamarckian  and 
Weismannite  is  settled.  As  to  the  biological  question,  I 
think  it  is  important  to  distinguish  between  the  negative 
and  the  positive  part  of  Weismann's  theory.  If  Weis- 
mann's  theory  of  the  continuity  of  the  germ- plasm  be 
accepted,  the  hereditary  transmission  of  "acquired  char 
acters  "  is  impossible ;  but  apart  altogether  from  this  special 
theory,  and  without  accepting  any  theory  to  explain  the 
fact  of  heredity,  it  is  possible  to  hold  that  the  hereditary 
transmission  of  acquired  characters  is  "  not  proven."  And 
I  shall  not  attempt  to  maintain  anything  more  than  this 
negative  position.  The  onus  probandi  lies  with  those  who 
maintain  the  doctrine  of  "  Use-inheritance  "  (to  adopt  the 
convenient  abbreviated  formula  suggested  by  Mr.  W.  Platt 
Ball).  Entia  non  sunt  multiplicanda  prceter  necessitate™. 

Lin  the  first  place,  the  consensus  humani generis,  though  it 
may  be  an  important  consideration  in  matters  of  conduct, 
is  no  argument  whatever  in  regard  to  a  scientific  belief. 
The  very  fact  that  the  traditional  pre-scientific  bias  is  in 
favour  of  the  Lamarckian  theory  seems  to  me  a  reason  why 
we  should  be  especially  strict  in  our  examination  of  any 
"  facts  "  alleged  in  support  of  it.  "  The  fathers  have  eaten 

1  Originally  written  as  part  of  a  "  Symposium "  for  the 
Aristotelian  Society  (London).  Printed  with  some  omissions.  In 
the  revision  of  this  Note  I  am  indebted  to  Mr.  E.  B.  Poulton, 
F.R.S.,  for  some  valuable  suggestions. 


AS    A    FACTOR    IN    KNOWLEDGE.  33 

sour  grapes,  and  the  children's  teeth  are  set  on  edge." 
Such  sayings  and  the  many  legends  about  inherited  curses, 
etc.,  predispose  people  to  accept  the  Lamarckian  view 
without  sufficient  grounds  :  and  the  popular  versions  or 
travesties  of  what  is  supposed  to  be  Darwinism  are 
generally  Lamarckian  in  character. 

II.  So  far  as  I  am  able  to  judge,  no  undoubted  fact  has 
yet  been  brought  forward  which  can  only  be  explained  on 
the  Lamarckian  theory.  Natural  selection,  the  cessation  of 
natural  selection  (Weismann's  panmixia},  the  effects  of 
imitation,  training,  and  other  influences  of  the  environ 
ment  within  the  individual  lifetime — seem  to  be  adequate 
causes  to  account  for  facts,  which  might  of  course  also 
be  explained  by  the  transmitted  effects  of  use  and  disuse, 
were  such  transmission  otherwise  certainly  proved  to  take 
place.  Thus,  if  a  cat  is  taught  to  beg  and  her  kittens 
spontaneously  beg,  it  is  still  possible  that  the  kittens 
may  have  inherited  the  combined  tendency  of  their 
parents  to  beg,  apart  from  special  instruction.  Against 
such  cases  (supposing  them  all  reported  with  perfect  ac 
curacy)  we  must  put  the  experience  of  horse-breeders,  that 
the  foals  of  trained  jumpers  are  not  more  easily  trained  to 
be  good  hunters  than  the  foals  of  horses  that  have  never 
been  trained  to  jump  but  whose  general  build  is  what  is 
desired  for  a  good  hunter.  My  authority  for  this  statement 
is  an  article  on  "  Hunter's  Dams  "  in  the  Saturday  Review 
a  year  or  two  ago,  the  writer  of  which  evidently  believed 
that  he  had  started  a  puzzle  for  the  "  Darwinians  !  "  He 
was  clearly  not  a  scientific  student  but  a  hunting  man.  If 
acquired  characters  (bodily  or  mental)  were  transmissible, 
breeders  would  surely  have  made  use  of  the  fact,  whereas 
(whatever  theories  any  of  them  may  have  held)  they  have 
depended  entirely  in  practice  on  the  judicious  pairing  of 
sires  and  dams — as  on  Weismann's  theory  they  must  do. 

That  young  birds  in  some  species  are  at  once  able  to 
feed  themselves  on  coming  out  of  the  shell,  is  quite  ex- 

D.  H.  D 


34  NOTE    ON    HEREDITY 

plicable  by  the  working  of  natural  selection  alone.  Mr. 
Platt  Ball  (to  whom  I  have  already  referred)  has  made  a 
searching  examination  of  all  the  cases  brought  forward  by 
Spencer  and  Darwin  in  support  of  Use-inheritance,  and 
decides  that  it  is  "  not  proven."  ( The  Effects  of  Use  and 
Disuse  in  "  Nature  Series  "  :  London,  1 890.) 

The  biological  controversy  must  be  fought  out  in  the 
realm  of  subhuman  organisms.  Because  (a)  with  regard  to 
human  beings,  it  is  so  much  more  difficult  to  distinguish 
what  is  due  to  biological  inheritance  and  what  to  socio 
logical  inheritance.  A  child  is  not  only  the  child  of  its 
parents,  but  as  a  rule  is  brought  up  with  its  parents  or 
among  those  of  the  same  family.  (&)  The  prolongation  of 
infancy  and  the  possibility  of  transmitting  experience 
independently  of  race-inheritance  would,  on  the  principles 
of  natural  selection  and  panmixia,  tend  to  make  heredity 
relatively  less  important  than  in  the  lower  animals,  where 
heredity  is  the  only  means  of  transmitting  any  favourable 
variations,  (c)  It  is  more  possible  to  study  the  question  in 
regard  to  the  lower  animals  without  bias. 

III.  Lastly,  the  argument  sometimes  used  from  preva 
lent  psychological  theories  to  a  biological  theory  seems  to 
me  entirely  illegitimate.  If  it  be  true,  as  Mr.  Spencer 
thinks,  that  the  past  experience  of  the  race  has  produced 
innate  ideas  and  feelings,  Weismann's  denial  of  Use- 
inheritance  would  be  refuted.  Certainly :  but  it  is  just 
possible  that  Mr.  Spencer's  theory  is  not  true. 

It  needs  perhaps  to  be  pointed  out  that  there  will  often, 
for  practical  purposes,  be  sufficient  agreement  between 
Lamarckian  and  "  Weismannite."  Neither  would  recom 
mend  marriage  with  the  descendant  of  a  long  line  of 
lunatics,  or  drunkards,  or  criminals,  though  the  Weisman 
nite  would  insist  on  discriminating  more  exactly  than  the 
Lamarckian  between  the  inherited  taint  and  the  effects  of 
bad  education. 

Mr.   Sully  (Outlines  of  Psychology r,  4  edit,  p.  61)  says  : 


AS    A    FACTOR    IN    KNOWLEDGE.  35 

"  When  we  talk  of  inherited  mental  tendencies,  we  mean 
that  the  transmitted  tendency  is  a  result  of  ancestral  ex 
perience."  This  of  course  is  the  Spencerian  view.  And  on 
p.  482  he  argues  that  the  infant's  pleasure  at  the  sight  of 
familiar  faces  and  fear  at  the  sight  of  strange  faces  are 
probably  due  to  the  experience  of  its  ancestors.  But  it  is 
much  more  likely  that  the  child  inherits  these  tendencies 
from  animals  whose  young  were  less  completely  helpless 
and  less  cared  for  by  others  than  the  human  infant,  and 
whose  instinctive  fears  and  confidences  have  thus  been 
directed  into  advantageous  channels  by  the  working  of 
natural  selection. 

Now,  to  limit  myself  to  the  special  problem  of  the  in 
fluence  of  heredity  in  knowledge — (i)  first  of  all,  we  must 
endeavour  to  mark  off  what  is  due  to  the  experience  which 
takes  place  in  the  life-time  of  the  individual,  a  factor  that 
counts  for  a  good  deal  even  in  the  case  of  birds  and  other 
animals  lower  than  man  (cf.  Wallace,  Darwinism,  p.  442). 
(2)  We  must  note  that  in  human  beings  the  acquisition  of 
knowledge  by  the  individual  is  enormously  facilitated  by 
what  G.  H.  Lewes  calls  "  the  social  factor  "  (see  his  Study 
of  Psychology,  pp.  78-80).  We  are  apt  to  ignore  the 
"  inheritance  "  of  ideas  that  comes  to  us  e.g.  in  the  language 
we  are  taught  to  speak.  Difference  in  language  makes  a 
vast  difference  in  the  mental  habits  of  different  peoples. 
Thus  we  find  that  a  Frenchman  thinks  differently  from  a 
German.  We  are  not  entitled  at  once  to  say,  this  is  because 
the  one  is  a  "Celt"  and  the  other  a  "Teuton."  Our 
Frenchman  might  happen  to  be  mostly  of  Teutonic  race, 
and  our  German  might  happen  to  be  a  mixture  of  Jew  and 
Slav  :  and  yet  each  "  inherits  "  a  type  of  thinking  in  the 
language  he  is  taught  to  speak  and,  therefore,  in  the  books 
and  in  the  persons  to  whose  influence  that  language  ex 
poses  his  mind.  (3)  Only  the  residual  phenomena  can  be 
ascribed  to  heredity  ;  and  the  inherited  or  "  connate " 


36  NOTE    ON    HEREDITY 

element  in  knowledge  can,  I  think,  be  adequately  explained 
by  "  natural  selection  "  without  calling  in  the  help  of  Use- 
inheritance. 

Lewes  and  Spencer  consider  it  the  special  trimuph  of 
their  theory  of  heredity  as  a  factor  in  knowledge,  that  they 
are  able  to  reconcile  the  theories  of  the  a  priori  and  a 
posteriori  schools.  This  opinion  seems  to  me  a  complete 
ignoratio  elenchi.  Kant's  "  critical  "  theory  is  not  psycho 
logical  but  logical.  The  name  a  priori  is  of  course  most 
unfortunate  :  it  suggests  priority  in  time.  What  Kant  urges 
is,  that  the  possibility  of  science,  or  in  fact  of  anything  that 
we  can  call  "knowledge,"  implies  certain  necessary  elements. 
Hume  had  already  shown  that  sense-experience  can  never 
give  necessity.  Therefore,  argues  Kant,  this  necessity 
comes  from  the  very  nature  of  thought.  Let  me  take  the 
usual  illustration— Causality.  J.  S.  Mill  says  (in  effect)  : 
"  I  seem  to  be  unable  to  think  of  any  event  as  altogether 
isolated,  because  I  happen  to  have  found  that  A  was  always 
followed  by  B,  C  by  D,  etc."  Spencer  says  (in  effect) :  "  I 
am  unable  to  think  of  any  event  as  isolated,  because  my 
great-grandfathers  found  out  that  A  was  the  cause  of  B, 
C  of  D,  etc."  Now  suppose  Use-inheritance  possible,  if  all 
my  great-grandfathers  and  great-grandmothers  had  spent 
all  their  lives  in  scientific  investigation,  this  might  make 
me  better  able  than  the  average  person  to  find  the  real 
cause  of  particular  events,  but  it  could  never  explain,  why 
I  cannot  think  events  as  isolated.  Even  the  lowest  savage 
does  not  and  cannot.  That  is  the  very  reason  for  his 
grotesque  mythologies.  They  are  his  attempts  to  satisfy 
the  demands  of  his  thinking,  which  requires  him  to  believe 
that  whatever  happens  is  necessarily  linked  to  other  things. 
Now  this  incapacity  of  really  thinking  of  anything  without 
thinking  of  it  as  connected  with  other  things,  must  already 
exist  in  germ  among  the  higher  animals  below  man,  though 
of  course  we  only  recognise  it  distinctly  in  the  highest 
human  thought.  It  forms  part  of  what  thinking  implies. 


AS    A    FACTOR    IN    KNOWLEDGE.  37 

And,  if  we  are  considering  the  appearance  of  thinking 
(reflection)  as  an  event  in  time,  there  seems  no  reason  why 
it  may  not  be  sufficiently  accounted  for  by  natural  selec 
tion.  The  Kantian  criticism  deals  not  with  our  beliefs, 
ideas,  etc.,  as  events,  but  with  their  character  and  value. 
The  distinction  between  a  priori  and  a  posteriori  would  be 
better  expressed  as  the  distinction  between  the  necessary 
or  universal  element  and  the  particular  element  which 
varies  with  time,  place  and  person.  Understood  in  this 
way,  the  Kantian  theory  of  knowledge  contains  nothing 
which  the  theory  of  heredity  can  either  explain  or  destroy. 


II. 

DARWIN  AND  HEGEL.1 

IN  every  age  philosophy  has  been  affected  by  the 
sciences,2  i.e.,  the  methods  and  conceptions  which 
are  used  in  the  attempt  to  make  some  particular 
province  or  aspect  of  the  Universe  intelligible  have 
exercised  a  fascination  over  those  who  are  seeking  to 
understand  the  universe  as  a  whole.  And  this  is 
only  natural  :  for  the  philosopher,  who  is  really  the 
philosopher  of  his  own  age  and  not  the  survival 
from  an  earlier  epoch,  is  the  product  of  the  same 
intellectual  movement  which  has  led  to  the  adoption 
of  new  methods  and  new  conceptions  among  those 
who  are  pursuing  special  branches  of  knowledge. 
The  difference  between  the  genuine  philosopher  and 
the  average  seeker  for  "completely  unified  know 
ledge  "  is  that  the  former  has  a  fuller  and  clearer 
consciousness  of  the  methods  and  conceptions  he  is 

1  Read  before  the  Aristotelian  Society  (London),  and  published 
in  their  Proceedings,  Vol.  I.,  No.  4,  Part  II.  (1891). 

2  1  do   not  mean  that  the  sciences  alone  have  determined  the 
character  and  object  of  philosophy,  which  are  affected  by  every 
thing  that  concerns  man's  spiritual  life — religion,  art,  politics  ;  but 
only  that  the  method  and  leading  conceptions  of  philosophy  are 
specially  affected  by  the  sciences. 

3* 


II.]  DARWIN    AND    HEGEL.  39 

using,  and  is  less  likely  to  apply  them  uncritically 
and  in  disregard  of  the  subject-matter  to  which  he 
is  applying  them. 

Mathematics  was  the  only  science  that  had  out 
grown  the  merest  infancy  among  the  Greeks.  And 
in  the  Pythagoreans  we  have  an  example  of  philo 
sophers  who  were  completely  carried  away  by  the 
fascination  of  the  conceptions  of  number  and  figure. 
In  defining  justice  as  "a  square  number,"  the  Py 
thagoreans  were  for  the  first  time  attempting  to 
make  ethics  "  scientific,"  i.e.,  to  lift  reflection  on 
human  conduct  out  of  the  region  of  proverbial 
moralising  by  applying  to  it  the  most  scientific  cate 
gories  of  which  they  knew.  Plato  has  puzzled  many 
generations  of  commentators  by  those  mystic  num 
bers  which  he  introduces  into  his  philosophy  ;  in  all 
likelihood  he  only  half  believed  in  them  (if  so  much 
as  that),  and  he  seems  to  be  playing  an  elaborate 
and  rather  cruel  joke  on  literal-minded  persons, 
hinting  all  the  while  at  the  inadequacy  of  the  Pytha 
gorean  symbols.  Aristotle  introduced  mathematical 
formulae  into  ethics,  but  only  with  carefully  ex 
pressed  modifications.  His  conception  of  scientific 
method  comes,  indeed,  too  exclusively  from  mathe 
matics  ;  but  he  is  in  advance  of  many  modern 
moralists  in  seeing  that  human  conduct  at  least  is 
too  complex  to  be  studied  by  mathematical  methods. 

It  might  be  objected,  that  in  mediaeval  philosophy 
the  principle  I  have  laid  down  did  not  hold,  but  that 
the  reverse  was  the  case,  that  philosophy  was  not 
affected  by  the  sciences,  but  that  the  sciences  were 


4O  DARWIN    AND    HEGEL.  [ll. 

"  corrupted  by  metaphysics."  The  study  of  nature, 
however,  was  by  no  means  that  on  which  the  medi 
aeval  intellect  exercised  itself.  There  were  in  truth 
only  two  "  sciences "  in  which  the  mediaeval  mind 
took  a  living  interest,  viz.,  moral  theology  and  law 
—that  is  to  say,  the  application  of  a  supposed  divine 
code  to  the  particular  cases  of  human  conduct,  and 
the  application  in  the  same  way  of  a  human  code 
assumed  to  be  of  supreme  excellence.  Physics  was 
only  a  tradition  (of  course  I  am  speaking  roughly  of 
what  is  true  "  on  the  whole  ").  The  words  of  Aris 
totle  or  of  Galen  were  accepted  on  authority.  In 
these  sciences,  however,  where  authority  is  a  matter 
of  necessity,  the  utmost  ingenuity  of  mind  could  be 
exercised  in  bringing  general  principles  to  bear  on 
particular  cases.  Thus  the  abstract,  deductive,  and 
argumentative  method  actually  employed  in  the 
sciences  of  legal  and  moral  casuistry  reacted  on  the 
interpretation  given  to  Aristotelian  logic  and  on  the 
general  theory  of  method  adopted.  Aristotelian 
logic  was  itself  based  on  the  method  of  geometry. 
Add  to  this  the  mediaeval  habit  of  bowing  to  the 
authority  of  the  written  word  in  every  department 
of  thought  and  life,  and  we  can  easily  see  the  source 
of  the  mediaeval  conception  of  system  in  philosophy. 
In  the  seventeenth  century  the  effect  of  geomet 
rical  method  on  Hobbes  and  on  Spinoza  is  suffi 
ciently  conspicuous.1  The  conceptions  of  mechanical 

1  With  regard  to  Hobbes,  compare  Aubrey's  story,  quoted  by 
Professor  G.  Croom  Robertson,  Hobbes^  p.  31  :  "  He  was  forty 
years  old  before  he  looked  on  geometry,  which  happened  acciden- 


II.]  DARWIN    AND    HEGEL.  4! 

physics  assert  themselves  throughout  this,  and  still 
more  in  the  following  century,  even  where  the  philo 
sopher,  in  the  interests  of  literary  form,  is  careful 
to  eschew  the  appearance  of  science.  John  Stuart 
Mill's  phrase,  "  mental  chemistry"  {Examination  of 
Hamilton,  p.  357,  ed.  5),  suggests  a  new  set  of  cate 
gories  which  raise  the  "  association  "  psychologists 
above  the  level  of  their  predecessors  who  used  the 
categories  of  mechanics.  In  the  present  age  the 
most  conspicuously  advancing  science  is  biology  ; 
and  the  categories  of  organism  and  evolution  are 
freely  transferred  to  philosophy  with  the  great  ad 
vantage  of  lifting  it  out  of  the  more  abstract  concep 
tions  of  mathematics  or  mechanics,  but  too  often 
with  insufficient  consciousness  of  what  is  being  done, 
so  that  striking  metaphors  are  mistaken  for  indis 
putable  facts  or  laws. 

Now,  there  were  "  evolutionists  "  before  Darwin, 
and  even  before  Mr.  Herbert  Spencer,  who  seems 
to  wish  to  take  out  a  patent  for  the  invention  of  the 
theory,  and  conspicuously  calls  the  attention  of  a 
careless  public  to  the  fact  that  his  essay  on  Progress  : 
its  Law  and  Cause,  appeared  in  April,  1857,  where 
as  the  Origin  of  Species  did  not  see  the  light  till 
October,  1859  (see  preface  to  4th  edition  of  First 


tally  :    being  in  a  gentleman's  library  in ,  Euclid's  Elements 

lay  open,  and  it  was  the  47th  Prop.,  Lib.  I.  So  he  reads  the  pro 
position.  '  By  G — ,'  says  he,  '  this  is  impossible  ! '  So  he  reads 
the  demonstration,  which  referred  him  back  to  another,  which  he 
also  read,  et  sic  deinceps,  that  at  last  he  was  demonstratively  con 
vinced  of  that  truth.  This  made  him  in  love  with  geometry." 


42  DARWIN    AND    HEGEL.  [ll. 

Principles).  Evolution  is  in  every  one's  mouth 
now,  and  the  writings  of  Mr.  Spencer  have  done  a 
great  deal  (along  with  the  discoveries  of  Darwin)  to 
make  the  conception  familiar.  But  nothing  grows 
up  quite  suddenly.  During  the  latter  half  of  last 
century  many  isolated  thinkers  had,  in  this  or  that 
department  of  science,  come  to  apply  the  idea  of  de 
velopment.  Though  in  Kant  as  a  philosopher  the 
idea  of  evolution,  and  indeed  the  whole  conception 
of  historical  growth,  is  conspicuously  absent,1  yet  the 
same  Kant,  as  a  man  of  science,  was  the  author  of 
the  nebular  hypothesis.  Vico  and  Montesquieu  had, 
still  earlier,  suggested  a  way  of  looking  at  human 
institutions,  which  was  not  fully  understood  till 
several  generations  had  passed.  Above  all,  in  bio 
logy,  Erasmus  Darwin  (Zoonomia,  1794)  fore 
shadowed  the  work  of  his  grandson.  Buffon, 
Geoffrey  St.  Hilaire,  Lamarck,  had  all  attacked  the 
orthodox  dogma  of  immutable  species  ;  and  perhaps 
Lord  Monboddo  should  not  be  forgotten,  for  his 
speculations  on  the  origin  of  man  became  widely 

1  Of  course  such  a  statement  is  only  relatively  true — i.e.,  if  we 
compare  Kant  with  Hegel  and  other  philosophers  of  this  century. 
Kant  does  maintain  the  idea  of  progress  in  human  society,  and 
explains  it  as  due  to  the  "unsocial  sociability  of  men  " — by  which 
he  clearly  means  "  repulsion  "  and  "  attraction "  (concepts 
borrowed  from  physics).  He  is  quite  aware  that  the  "original 
contract "  never  took  place  as  a  matter  of  fact  in  history,  but  he 
prefers  to  think  out  problems  of  politics  with  the  help  of  these 
unhistorical  fictions.  Here,  as  everywhere,  the  abstract  line  which 
Kant  draws  between  what  is  a  priori  and  what  is  a  posteriori — 
between  the  form  of  thought  and  the  matter  of  experience — pre 
vents  him  from  seeing  a  thought  process  in  the  time-process. 


II.]  DARWIN    AND    HEGEL.  43 

familiar,  since  the  very  shallowest  wits  could  raise  a 
laugh  about  them.  Goethe,  who,  as  an  old  man  of 
eighty-one,  was  more  excited  by  the  news  of  the 
dispute  between  Cuvier  and  St.  Hilaire  than  by  the 
news  of  the  July  Revolution,  had  forty  years  before 
(1790)  published  his  Metamorphoses  of  Plants. 
Thus  Hegel  grew  up  in  an  intellectual  atmosphere 
in  which  the  conception  of  evolution,  and  especially 
of  biological  evolution,  was  no  inconsiderable  ele 
ment.  For  Goethe's  general  view  of  nature  he  had 
the  greatest  sympathy — so  much  so  indeed  that  he 
was  led  to  defend  Goethe's  theory  of  colour  against 
the  Newtonian  theory,  a  defence  which  has  brought 
Hegel  into  much  discredit  with  the  modern  scientific 
mind.  What  attracted  Hegel  in  Goethe's  view  of 
nature  (as  Mr.  S.  Alexander  has  well  pointed  out  in 
Mind,  xi.  p.  511),  was  that  sense  of  unity  or  totality 
in  nature  which  the  poet's  feeling  grasps,  but  which 
is  apt  to  escape  the  analysis  of  the  scientific  under 
standing  (cf.  N at  iir phi  Los  op  hie,  pp.  317,  318,  483)  : 
and  it  was  perhaps  worth  while  to  remind  the  world 
that  to  regard  light  as  composed  of  different  colours 
is  only  a  way  of  making  the  concrete  facts  of  nature 
intelligible  to  ourselves.  In  the  same  spirit  Hegel 
complains  (p.  489)  that  the  botanists  of  his  time  did 
not  appreciate  Goethe's  Metamorphoses  of  Plants, 
and  "  did  not  know  what  to  make  of  it,  just  because 
what  was  represented  therein  was  a  totality  (eben 
weil ein  Ganzes  darin  dargestellt  Wurde)"  Goethe 
gets  behind  the  difference  which  to  the  ordinary  eye 
and  mind  splits  up  a  plant  into  a  combination  of  un- 


44  DARWIN    AND    HEGEL.  [ll. 

like  parts  (root,  stem,  branch,  leaves,  blossoms,  fruit) 
and  sees  all  these  as  the  differentiations  of  an  iden 
tical  nature  (Grundwesen). 

In  his  Zur  Morphologic  (written  in  1795,  pub 
lished  in  1807)  Goethe  formulates  the  law  that  "  the 
more  imperfect  a  being  is  the  more  do  its  individual 
parts  resemble  each  other,  and  the  more  do  these 
parts  resemble  the  whole.  The  more  perfect  the 
being  is,  the  more  dissimilar  are  its  parts.  In  the 
former  case  the  parts  are  more  or  less  a  repetition  of 
the  whole  ;  in  the  latter  case  they  are  totally  unlike 
the  whole.  The  more  the  parts  resemble  each 
other,  the  less  subordination  is  there  of  one  to  the 
other.  Subordination  of  parts  indicates  high  grade  of 
organisation"  (Lewes,  Life  of  Goethe,  p.  358).  We 
are  familiar  with  this  in  another  form  :  "the  change 
from  an  indefinite  incoherent  homogeneity  to  a 
definite  coherent  heterogeneity."  Goethe  has  an 
ticipated  Von  Baer's  law,  enunciated  in  respect  of 
embryology  (1828),  which  forms  the  essential  part 
of  the  formula  that  Mr.  Spencer  as  a  philosopher 
has  applied  to  the  whole  universe. 

Evolution  was  thus  familiar  to  Hegel,  both  the 
theory  and  the  word.  Everywhere  in  Hegel  we 
read  about  Entwickelung ;  but  of  Evolution  he  does 
not  speak  in  so  friendly  a  manner.  "  The  two  forms 
in  which  the  series  of  stages  in  nature  have  been  ap 
prehended  are  Evolution  and  Emanation  "  (Natur- 
phil.,  p.  34).  By  the  first,  he  explains,  is  meant  the 
process  from  the  less  perfect  to  the  more  perfect  ; 
by  the  second  the  process  from  the  more  perfect  to 


II.]  DARWIN    AND    HEGEL.  45 

the  less  perfect.  Of  the  two  he  prefers  the  concep 
tion  of  Emanation,  because  it  explains  the  lower 
from  the  point  of  view  of  the  higher,  whereas  Evolu 
tion  carries  one  back  "  into  the  darkness  of  the 
past,"  and  only  gives  us  a  series  of  stages  following 
one  another  in  time.  "  The  time-difference  has  no 
interest  whatever  for  thought "  (p.  33).  This  is  un 
doubtedly  a  hard  saying.  The  man  who  can  prefer 
the  Oriental  conception  of  Emanation  to  the  modern 
scientific  conception  of  Evolution  might  seem  to  be 
more  fit  to  be  expounded  by  the  Theosophical 
Society  than  to  be  seriously  considered  by  the  con 
temporaries  of  Mr.  Herbert  Spencer.  "  We  must 
interpret  the  more  developed  by  the  less  developed," 
says  Mr.  Spencer  (Data  of  Ethics,  p.  7)  ;  and  at 
least  ninety-nine  out  of  every  hundred  scientific 
students  would  cry  "  Amen."  But  is  this  what  they 
are  themselves  doing  ?  They  tell  us  about  the  less 
developed  organisms  or  societies  (or  whatever  may 
be  the  subject  of  investigation),  and  then  they  go  on 
to  tell  us  about  the  more  developed.  But  are  they 
really  interpreting  the  higher  by  the  lower  ?  Let  us 
listen  to  another  philosopher  who  approached  philo 
sophy  from  the  side  of  biology.  In  his  Study  of 
Psychology,  G.  H.  Lewes  writes  as  follows  : — "Once 
recognising  the  necessity  of  observing  the  sentient 
activities  of  men  and  of  animals,  and  of  interpreting 
these  by  reference  to  their  organic  conditions,  what 
more  natural  suggestion  than  that  our  study  should 
begin  with  animals  ?  The  comparative  simplicity  of 
their  organisms  and  their  manifestations  would  seem 


46  DARWIN    AND    HEGEL.  [ll. 

to  mark  them  as  furnishing  the  safest  prolegomena 
to  Human  Psychology.  I  have  already  stated  (in 
the  preface  to  Problems  of  Life  and  Mind]  that  in 
1860  I  was  led  to  collect  materials  with  this  view, 
but  that  fuller  consideration  showed  it  to  be  imprac 
ticable.  To  show  why  it  was  impracticable  will  be 
an  answer  to  my  Russian  critic,  M.  Wyrouboff,  who 
objects  to  my  '  sin  against  scientific  method '  in  not 
proceeding  from  phenomena  that  are  general  and 
simple  to  those  that  are  special  and  complex  ;  I 
ought,  he  thinks,  to  have  made  the  exposition  of  the 
simpler  cerebral  phenomena  in  animals  precede  that 
of  the  more  complex  phenomena  in  man.  This  was 
my  own  opinion  till  experience  proved  its  mistake. 
I  found  myself  constantly  thwarted  by  the  fallacies  of 
anthropomorphic  interpretation.  It  was  impossible, 
even  approximately,  to  eliminate  these  before  a  clear 
outline  of  the  specially  human  elements  was  secured," 
etc.  (pp.  1 1 8,  119).  Farther  on  he  says:  "  It  is 
clear  that  we  should  never  rightly  understand  vital 
phenomena  were  we  to  begin  our  study  of  Life  by 
contemplating  its  simplest  manifestations  in  the  ani 
mal  series  ;  we  can  only  understand  the  Amceba  and 
the  Polype  by  a  light  reflected  from  the  study  of 
Man"  (p.  122).  What  makes  it  seem  possible  for 
the  scientific  investigator  "  to  begin  at  the  beginning" 
is  the  fact  that  he  is  not  doing  so.  The  student  of 
the  Amoeba  happens  to  be,  not  an  Amoeba,  but  a 
specimen  of  a  highly  developed  vertebrate,  and 
knows  at  least  something  about  the  differentiated 
organs  and  functions  of  his  own  body.  Professor 


II.]  DARWIN    AND    HEGEL.  47 

Freeman  "explains"  the  English  Constitution  by 
quoting  Tacitus  about  the  Germans,  and  by  describ 
ing  the  Landesgemeinden  of  Uri  and  Appenzell,  etc., 
etc.  :  but  then  we  all  know  something  about  our 
present  constitution. 

Now  this  I  take  to  be  the  element  of  truth  in 
Hegel's  preference  for  Emanation  over  Evolution. 
We  only  understand  a  part  of  anything  when  we 
can  look  at  it  as  the  part  of  a  whole,  and  we  only 
understand  the  elementary  stages  when  we  know 
them  as  the  elementary  stages  of  something  more 
highly  developed.  This  is  true  in  each  special 
branch  of  knowledge,  and  it  is  true  in  the  attempt 
to  think  the  universe  as  a  whole. 

Hegel's  "development"  ( Entwickelung]  is  not  a 
time-process,  but  a  thought-process ;  yet  Hegel's 
method  of  exposition  is  such  that  the  thought- 
process  is  apt  to  be  read  as  if  it  were  meant  to  be 
a  time-process.  To  avoid  misunderstanding  him  we 
must,  as  has  been  said,  "read  Hegel  backwards." 
;'  He  presents  everything  synthetically,"  says  Pro 
fessor  Seth  (Hegelianism  and  Personality,  p.  90),* 
"  though  it  must  first  have  been  got  analytically  by 
an  ordinary  process  of  reflection  upon  the  facts  which 
are  the  common  property  of  every  thinker."  There 
has  been  much  innocent  laughter  over  Hegel's 
absurdity  in  saying  that  Being  is  the  same  thing  as 
Nothing,  and  that  Being  and  Nothing  between  them 
produced  Becoming.  But,  if  we  take  the  concep 
tion  of  "Becoming"  and  analyse  it,  we  find  that  it 
1  p.  96,  in  edit.  2. 


48  DARWIN    AND    HEGEL.  [ll. 

does  imply  both  Being  and  Not-being.  That  which 
becomes  is  that  which  was  not  but  now  is.  The 
Eleatics  were  puzzled  by  the  conception  of  Motion, 
just  because  they  were  trying  to  think  the  whole  of 
reality  under  the  category  of  Being,  and  did  not  see 
that  Not-being  was  involved  as  well.  So,  on  the 
other  hand,  the  Heracleiteans  seemed  to  make  every 
thing  slip  away  in  a  flux,  because  they  took  the  cate 
gory  of  Becoming  as  ultimate  and  did  not  recognise 
that  it  implied  the  category  of  Being.  The  begin 
ning  of  Hegel's  Logic  is,  among  other  things,  a 
memorandum  of  Plato's  solution  of  these  old  con 
troversies.1 

So  again,  if  we  are  told  that  Identity  passes  over 
into  Difference,  and  that  the  two  produce  Likeness 
and  Unlikeness  (I  am  not  attempting  to  follow  the 
minutiae  of  Hegel's  statement  here),  we  shall  see 
the  point  of  this  better  by  taking  the  concept  of 

1  In  his  learned  and  admirable  work  on  Early  Greek  Philo 
sophy,  Professor  J.  Burnet  has  argued  forcibly  for  the  view  that 
the  Eleatics  and  Heracleitus  were  materialists,  as  much  as  the 
early  lonians.  But  even  if  his  contention  be  fully  admitted, 
there  is  a  great  difference  between  "  materialism  "  before  there  was 
any  philosophy  that  was  not  materialistic,  and  the  conscious  and 
explicit  materialism  of  those  who  are  in  revolt  against  idealism 
of  any  kind.  In  other  words,  though  we  admit  that  the  early 
philosophers  were  conscious  only  of  discussing  cosmological 
questions,  yet  they  were  incidentally  discussing  logical  and  onto- 
logical  questions  also  (just  as  many  religious  and  some  political 
controversialists  have  discussed  metaphysics  without  knowing  it) : 
and  it  was  the  logical  and  ontological  aspects  of  their  philosophies 
which  had  most  interest  for  Plato  and  for  Aristotle — and  for 
Hegel. 


II.]  DARWIN    AND    HEGEL.  49 

Likeness  and  asking  what  it  implies — a  question 
that  is  by  no  means  superfluous,  for  English  philo 
sophy  has  tended  to  take  the  category  of  similarity 
as  if  it  were  ultimate.  Thus  J.  S.  Mill  says, 
"  Likeness  and  Unlikeness  cannot  be  resolved  into 
anything  else "  (Logic,  i.  p.  75).  Hume  in  his 
Treatise  of  Human  Nature,  resolves  ''identity" 
into  "  resemblance."  "  This  propension,"  he  says, 
"  to  bestow  an  identity  on  our  resembling  perceptions 
produces  the  fiction  of  a  continued  existence "  (p. 
209,  edit.  Selby-Bigge).  In  treating  of  the  Laws  of 
Association,  Mr.  Spencer  aims  at  reducing  contiguity 
to  similarity  (Principles  of  Psychology,  §  120,  vol.  i., 
p.  267).  Mr.  Bosanquet  has  pointed  out  that  "  Mr. 
Spencer  is  more  of  an  atomist  than  any  one  else 
has  ever  been,  for  he  says  that  the  syllogism  must 
have  four  terms,  i.e.,  the  middle  term  is  not  identical 
in  its  two  relations,  but  only  similar  "  (Essays  and 
Addresses,  p.  167).  Mr.  Bosanquet  is  working  out 
the  subject  from  the  other  side,  attacking  the  delu 
sion  of  English  philosophers  that  identity  necessarily 
excludes  difference.  It  is  because  of  their  abstract 
conception  of  identity  that  some  of  them  have  been 
led  on  to  attempt  to  get  rid  of  identity  altogether  in 
psychology  and  logic. 

If,  then,  we  read  Hegel  backwards,  wre  find  that 
his  logic  and  the  whole  of  his  philosophy  consist  in 
this  perpetual  "  criticism  of  categories,"  i.e.,  in  an 
analysis  of  the  terms  and  concepts  which  ordinary 
thinking  and  the  various  special  sciences  use  as  cur 
rent  coin  without  testing  their  real  value.  But  the 

D.  H.  E 


5O  DARWIN    AND    HEGEL.  [ll. 

results  of  this  "criticism  of  categories"  Hegel 
arranges  so  as  to  present  the  appearance  of  a  com 
pleted  system — the  self-development  of  thought  from 
the  simplest  to  the  most  complex  stages,  the  less 
adequate  conceptions  showing  their  imperfections, 
and  so  by  criticising  themselves,  as  it  were,  leading 
us  on  to  the  more  adequate,  fuller,  and  "truer," 
ways  of  thinking.  This  is  Hegel's  manner  of  satis 
fying-  the  demand  for  "  completely  unified  know 
ledge."  But  because  of  this  method  of  exposition 
he  is  peculiarly  liable  to  be  misunderstood  and  mis 
represented.  The  tendency  to  mistake  a  thought- 
process  for  a  time-process  arises  from  our  desire  to 
substitute  the  easier  form  of  picture-thinking  for  the 
more  difficult  effort  of  grasping  the  separate  elements 
in  their  totality.  And  it  is  a  tendency  which  may 
mislead  even  philosophers  themselves  and  still  more 
their  followers.  Thus  Aristotle  carefully  defines  the 
logical  term  as  that  "  into  which  the  proposition  is 
resolved "  («V  ov  Sia\verai  tj  TTporaa-i^.  But  when 
" terms"  come  to  be  treated  of  as  the  first  part  of 
logic,  then  the  temptation  is  to  explain  the  propo 
sition  as  arising  out  of  a  combination  of  terms.  So 
again,  when  the  process  of  inference  has  been 
analysed  into  premises  and  conclusion,  the  premises 
come  to  be  regarded  as  if  they  existed  first  in  time 
and  as  if  the  conclusion  was  afterwards  tacked  on  to 
them — a  piece  of  picture-thinking  which  has  exposed 
to  unmerited  attack  the  Aristotelian  analysis  of 
reasoning.  So,  too,  because  we  can  think  of  society 
as  recognising  certain  rights  in  its  members,  the  in- 


II.]  DARWIN    AND    HEGEL.  51 

dividuals  with  their  rights  come  to  be  pictured  as 
existing  prior  to  the  formation  of  society,  in  an 
imaginary  state  of  nature.  To  take  an  example 
from  another  region — Space  is  analysed  into  its 
three  dimensions;  then  the  geometrician,  for  method's 
sake,  treats  of  two  dimensions  first  and  afterwards 
goes  on  to  treat  of  three  dimensions.  And  so  some 
people  fancy  that  you  can  go  on  to  spaces  of  four, 
five,  or  any  number  of  dimensions  ;  whereas,  there 
is,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  no  "  going  on"  at  all- 
Space  of  one  or  of  two  dimensions  with  which  we 
are  supposed  to  start  is  an  abstraction  from  the  only 
real  space. 

Why,  it  may  be  asked,  did  Hegel  adopt  this 
treacherous  mode  of  exposition  ?  Two,  reasons 
may  be  given.  In  the  first  place,  he  was  influenced, 
as  we  have  seen,  by  the  Neoplatonic  idea  of  Ema 
nation  ;  but  there  is  this  all-important  difference 
between  Hegel  and  the  Neoplatonists,  that  he  gets 
beyond  the  idea  of  differentiation  as  mere  loss  or 
evil,  and  sees  in  it  a  necessary  step  in  the  move 
ment  to  a  higher  unity.  Thus  the  idea  of  Emana 
tion  in  his  hands  passes  over  into  the  idea  of 
development  from  the  abstract  to  the  concrete. 
But,  in  the  second  place,  this  development  or 
thought-process  does  show  itself  as  a  time-process. 
Hegel's  remark  in  the  Natur philosophic  (p.  33) 
must  not  be  taken  to  mean  anything  more  than  that 
a  mere  after-one-another  in  time  is  of  no  philosophical 
or  scientific  interest;  thus,  e.g.,  the  scientific  his.- 
torian  will  not  write  mere  annals.  Annals  are  the 


52  DARWIN    AND    HEGEL.  [ll. 

materials  for  history,  and  are  not  yet  history. 
Above  all  in  the  history  of  philosophy  does  the 
connection  between  the  thought-process  and  the 
time-process  come  to  the  surface.  The  history  of 
philosophy  gave  Hegel  his  clue  to  the  logical 
development  of  the  categories.  The  simpler  and 
more  abstract  categories  come  first  in  time  in  the 
process  by  which  the  human  consciousness  becomes 
gradually  aware  of  the  conceptions  underlying 
ordinary  thought  and  language.  In  the  history  of 
philosophy  we  have  a  development  from  the 
simpler  to  the  more  complex,  like  that  which 
Evolutionists  see  in  the  physical  universe.  Pro 
fessor  Wallace  has  well  compared  Hegel's  discovery 
of  the  self-development  of  thought  by  means  of  the 
clue  given  him  in  the  history  of  philosophy  to 
Darwin's  discovery  of  the  process  of  evolution  in 
the  organic  world  by  the  help  of  the  clue  given 
him  by  "  artificial  selection."  "  Philosophy,"  says 
Professor  Wallace,  "  is  to  the  general  growth  of 
intelligence  what  artificial  breeding  is  to  the  varia 
tion  of  species  under  natural  conditions  "  ( The  Logic 
of  Hegel,  Prolegomena,  p.  ex.). 

I  should  quite  agree  with  Prof.  Seth  (Hegelianism 
and  Personality,  p.  lyoj1  that  Hegel's  greatest 
strength  lies  just  in  his  interpretation  of  history— 
i.e.,  of  the  process  of  human  evolution  in  all  its 
departments.  But  Prof.  Seth  blames  Hegel  for 
transferring  to  the  development  in  time  the  thought- 
process  described  in  the  Logic,  without  any  justifica- 

1  p.  179  in  edit.  2. 


II.]  DARWIN    AND    HEGEL.  53 

tion  except  the  ambiguity  in  the  word  " development " 
(p.  I59).1  I  have  just  tried  to  show  that  the  his 
tory  of  philosophy  itself  is  Hegel's  justification 
for  the  transference  ;  and  I  think  that  if  he  is  to  be 
blamed  at  all,  it  should  rather  be  for  stating  the 
thought-process  in  the  Logic,  so  that  it  looks  like  a 
time-process. 

I  suppose  the  belief  still  prevails  about  Hegel  that 
he  is  an  a  priori  metaphysician  who  spins  theories 
out  of  his  head  regardless  of  facts.  And  this  re 
proach  is  held  to  apply  with  special  force  to  his 
Philosophy  of  Nature.  What  Hegel  himself  says  is 
something  very  different.  "  Not  only  must  philo 
sophy  be  in  harmony  with  experience,  but  empirical 
natural  science  is  the  presupposition  and  condition 
of  the  rise  and  formation  of  the  philosophical 
science  of  nature."  2  The  synthetic  thinking  of  the 
philosopher  must  follow  after  and  depend  upon  the 
results  of  the  analytic  process  of  scientific  research. 
This  being  so,  it  must  be  remembered  in  respect  of 
Hegel's  Philosophy  of  Nature,  that  much  of  the 
natural  science  which  supplied  him  with  his  material 
and  his  problems  is  now  out  of  date  ;  so  that  his 
Philosophy  of  Nature  cannot  have  the  same  interest 
and  value  for  us  as  his  /Esthetic,  or  his  Philosophy 
of  Religion,  or  his  Philosophy  of  History,  though 
even  in  these  departments  we  occasionally  feel  that 
the  philosopher  is  working  with  somewhat  antiquated 
materials,  and  not  always  dealing  with  what  have 

1  p.  1 68  in  edit.  2. 

2  Naturphilosophie^  p.  u. 


54  DARWIN    AND    HEGEL.  [ll. 

come  to  be  our  chief  problems.  Secondly,  Hegel's 
warmest  admirers  must  admit  that  Hegel  has  his 
prejudices — patriotic  prejudices  in  the  main.  His 
sympathy  with  Goethe's  conception  of  nature  was, 
on  the  whole,  a  beneficial  influence  ;  but  it  helped  to 
make  him  unappreciative  of  Newton.  And,  thirdly, 
Hegel  has  less  interest  in  nature  than  in  the  works 
of  the  human  mind.  He  is  undergoing  the  reaction 
against  the  deification  of  Nature,  as  something 
higher  and  better  than  man.  "  Vanini  says  that  a 
straw  is  enough  to  reveal  the  being  of  God  "  ;  but 
adds  Hegel,  "any  idea  of  the  mind,  the  poorest  of 
its  fancies,  the  play  of  its  most  accidental  moods, 
every  word  is  a  more  excellent  reason  for  recog 
nising  the  being  of  God  than  any  single  natural 
object  whatever"  (Natiirp  kilo  sop  hie,  p,  29).  Again, 
"  Even  an  arbitrary  volition — nay,  even  a  bad  voli 
tion — is  infinitely  higher  than  the  regular  movements 
of  the  stars  or  than  the  innocence  of  the  plants  ;  for 
a  wrong  human  volition  is  the  error  of  a  thinking 
spiritual  being"  (#.,  p.  13. )* 

Grant  all  this,  it  may  be  said,  and  what  then  is  the 
use  of  bringing  Hegel's  name   into  connection  with 


1  Cf.  the  passage  near  the  beginning  of  the  "  Introduction  "  to 
the  ^Esthetic:  "  If  we  look  at  informally — i.e.,  only  considering 
in  what  way  it  exists,  not  what  there  is  in  it — even  a  silly  fancy 
such  as  may  pass  through  a  man's  head  is  higher  than  any  product 
of  Nature ;  for  such  a  fancy  must  at  least  he  characterised  by  - 
intellectual  being  and  by  freedom."  (Bosanquet's  Translation, 

p.  3.) 


II.]  DARWIN    AND    HEGEL.  55 

Darwin's  ?  There  might  be  some  reason  for  con 
sidering  his  attitude  to  evolution,  as  he  saw  it  repre 
sented  in  the  Biologic  (1802-5)  of  Treviranus  and 
in  the  Philosophic  Zoologique  (1809)  of  Lamarck, 
and  some  reason,  perhaps,  for  blaming  him  for  his 
want  of  appreciation  of  the  first  beginnings  of  the 
great  scientific  revolution  of  this  century.  I  think, 
however,  it  is  worth  while  to  see  whether  we  can 
get  any  help,  not  from  details  in  Hegel,  but  from 
his  general  method  and  spirit  of  philosophising,  in 
making  the  attempt  to  think  nature  and  human 
society  as  they  present  themselves  to  us  now,  in 
the  light  of  Darwin's  theory  of  natural  selection.  Of 
evolution  Hegel  had  heard — somewhat  impatiently, 
perhaps — but  not  of  natural  selection.  But  neither 
had  Treviranus  nor  Lamarck;  neither  had  Mr. 
Herbert  Spencer  when  he  elaborated  the  ground 
work  of  his  system.  Even  in  the  fifth  edition 
(1884)  of  First  Principles,  "natural  selection  "  is 
only  allowed  to  appear  in  a  footnote,  which  footnote 
is  intended  to  minimise  the  importance  of  Darwin's 
discovery  (p.  447).  Now  it  is  "  natural  selection  " 
which  seems  to  me  the  really  epoch-making  scientific 
theory:  it  is  this  that  has  produced  that  "change 
of  categories  "  which,  as  Hegel  says  {Naturphil.>  p. 
19),  is  the  essential  thing  in  all  revolutions,  whether 
in  the  sciences  or  in  human  history.  Evolution  in 
the  form  in  which  Mr.  Spencer,  for  instance,  formu 
lates  it,  is  only  a  further  carrying  out  of  an  idea  which 
may  be  traced  back  to  the  Ionian  hylicists;  "natural 
selection  "  introduces  a  quite  new  method  of  looking 


56  DARWIN    AND    HEGEL.  [ll. 

at  nature,  and  it  has  the  further  advantage  of  being, 
not  a  metaphysical  speculation,  but  an  undeniable 
fact. 

What,  then,  is  the  effect  of  the  theory  of  natural 
selection  on  Hegel's  philosophy  ?  Hegel's  method 
of  philosophising  Nature  could  adjust  itself  quite 
easily  to  the  new  scientific  theory.  The  factors 
which  Darwin  assumes  for  his  theory  are — Varia 
tion,  Heredity,  Struggle  for  Existence.  Now  are 
not  Heredity  and  Variation  just  particular  forms  of 
the  categories  of  Identity  and  Difference,  whose 
union  and  interaction  produce  the  actually  existing 
kinds  of  living  beings,  i.e.,  those  determinate  simila 
rities  and  dissimilarities  which  constitute  "species"  ? 
But  this  result — definite,  clearly  marked  kinds — 
comes  about  through  struggle,  i.e.,  through  nega 
tion,  the  constant  elimination  of  the  less  fit.  Sur 
vival  of  the  fittest,  on  Darwin's  theory,  comes  about 
only  through  the  negative  process  of  destruction. 
In  the  stage  of  mere  Nature  this  negativity  is  me 
chanical  and  external.  In  the  higher  stage  of  con 
sciousness  (spirit)  this  negativity  is  self-determined, 
free — as  I  shall  try  to  show  later  on. 

This  attempt  at  Hegelianising  natural  selection 
may  seem  fanciful.  We  know  that  Hegel's  formulae 
have  been  read  into  Shakespeare's  plays  and  into 
various  inconsistent  types  of  religious  creed  :  and 
people  become  suspicious  of  formulae  so  very  elastic. 
I  think,  however,  my  interpretation  is  valid  so  far 
as  it  goes,  though  it  would  not  count  for  much 
except  for  reasons  I  now  go  on  to  consider. 


II.]  DARWIN    AND    HEGEL.  57 

There  is  one  matter  on  which  I  think  that  most 
admirers  of  Hegel,  unless  they  be  of  the  very 
straitest  orthodoxy,  would  allow  that  his  view  of 
Nature  needs  some  correction.  I  mean  his  con 
ception  of  "  the  Contingent  "  (das  Zufallige}.  That 
infinite  variety  which  is  sometimes  praised  as  "  the 
freedom  of  Nature,"  or  even  as  "  the  divinity  of 
Nature,"  Hegel  regards  as,  not  the  glory,  but  the 
defect  and  impotency  of  Nature.  (NaturphiL,  p. 
37  ;  cf.  the  small  Logic  ;  Werke,  vi.  pp.  288,  290  ; 
Wallace's  Translation,  pp.  227,  228.)  Thought  has 
in  nature  gone  out  of  itself  into  its  "  other"-—  its 
extreme  opposite — irrationality.  And  that  is  why 
nature  is  like  a  wild  Bacchantic  god  (Naturphil.^ 
p.  24). 

This  conception  of  the  "  contingency "  and 
"weakness"  of  nature  is  a  survival  in  Hegel  of 
the  Platonic  and  Aristotelian  conception  of  matter. 
In  Plato's  view  the  world  in  space  and  time  must, 
just  because  it  is  in  space  and  time,  fall  short  of 
what  its  Artificer  wished.  So  with  Aristotle, 
"Chance"  is  an  objective  cause  working  in  rerum 
natura,  not  a  name  for  our  ignorance.  Professor 
Seth  seems  to  hold  that  nature  is  illogical  or  non- 
rational,  but  that  Hegel  falls  into  a  "most  trans 
parent  fallacy "  in  saying  that  contingency  is  itself 
a  category — a  form  of  the  Idea  which  "  has  no  less 
than  other  forms  of  the  Idea  its  due  office  in  the 
world  of  objects."  "  To  say  that  a  thing  is  con 
tingent  or  accidental,"  argues  Professor  Seth,  "  is 
to  say  in  so  many  words  that  we  can  give  no 


5  8  DARWIN    AND    HEGEL.  [ll. 

rational  account  of  why  it  is  as  it  is,  and  not  other 
wise.  "    (Hegelianism  and  Personality,  p.  1 3  7. x ) 

In  this  criticism  I  think  that  Professor   Seth  has 
approved    of  the  more   defective   part    of   Hegel's 
statement,   and  has   condemned   the  part  in  which 
Hegel    shows    most   insight.      Darwin's    theory    of 
natural  selection  seems  to  me,  while  helping,  as  all 
modern  science  does,  to  correct  the  despair  of  giving 
a  rational  account  of  what  appears  to  us  merely  ac 
cidental,    at    the    same    time    completely    to  justify 
Hegel  in  regarding  this  seeming  non-rationality  of 
nature  as  itself  a  form  of  the  rational.     The   theory 
of  natural    selection  presupposes    (it    is   sometimes 
even  made  an  objection  to   it  that  it  does  so  pre 
suppose)  a  tendency  to  variation  in  nature.     There 
must  be    this    for   natural   selection   to   work  upon. 
Thus  the  non- rationality  (indefinite  variability)  has 
its  reason — in  a  sense  in  which  that  was  never  re 
cognised  before.     Of  course  this  tendency  to  varia 
tion  is  of  itself  a  fact  to  be  explained  ;  and  biologists 
feel  themselves  obliged   now  to  face  problems  that 
might  have  been  put  aside  as  insoluble  in  the  days 
before    this    new    conception    of    natural    selection 
revolutionised  their  science. 

Professor  Seth  asks:  "What  logical  connection  is 
there  between  the  different  qualities  of  things — be 
tween  the  smell  of  a  rose,  for  example,  and  its  shape; 
or  between  the  taste  of  an  orange  and  its  colour?"2 

1  p.  146,  in  edit.  2. 

2  P.  133   in  edit,    i ;  p.  142   in  edit.  2.     Prof.  Seth  would,  I 
believe,  defend  his  question  by  laying  stress  on  the  term  "logical"; 


II.]  DARWIN    AND    HEGEL.  59 

This  seems  to  me  rather  an  unlucky  question.  We 
feel  sure  now  that  there  must  be  some.  The  scent 
of  flowers,  the  taste  of  fruits,  their  colours,  shapes, 
etc.,  are  not  regarded  now  as  "accidental  "  results  of 
a  fortuitous  concourse  of  atoms  or  as  the  mere  fancy- 
work  of  a  capricious  maker,  but  as  connected  in 
some  way  with  the  means  through  which  the  plant 
is  reproduced,  and  the  species  aided  in  its  compe 
tition  with  others  by  the  insects  which  carry  its 
pollen  and  the  birds  which  carry  its  seeds.  Thus, 
in  some  plants,  successive  adoption  of  self-fertili 
sation  and  insect-fertilisation  can  be  read  off  from 
the  complicated  shape  of  the  corolla.1  I  do  not 
know  whether  the  particular  problems,  suggested  by 
Professor  Seth,  about  the  rose  and  the  orange  have 
been  solved.  But  quite  analogous  problems  have 
been,  such  as — Why  do  white  flowers  often  give 
out  their  scent  only  by  night  ?2  Cats  and  red  clover 
might  seem  to  have  no  more  logical  connection  than 

we  cannot  infer  the  smell  (e.g.}  from  the  shape  of  a  flower.  If 
we  cannot,  it  is  only  because  of  our  ignorance  in  respect  of  the 
particular  problem.  From  the  parallel  veins  in  the  leaf  of  a 
flowering  plant  I  can  infer  that  its  petals  will  be  arranged  in  three's 
or  in  multiples  of  three,  in  the  same  sort  of  way,  if  not  with 
quite  the  same  certainty,  with  which  I  infer  that,  if  one  •  angle  of 
a  rectilineal  triangle  is  a  right  angle,  the  sum  of  the  other  angles 
must  be  a  right  angle.  To  assume  that  logical  connection  is 
something  absolutely  different  in  kind  from  the  connection  between 
things  (real  connection)  seems  to  me  to  make  scientific  knowledge 
impossible.  See  Note  at  the  end  of  next  essay. 

1  Cf.  A.  R.  Wallace,  Darwinism,  p.  331. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  316.     "White  flowers  are  often  fertilised  by  moths, 
and  very  frequently  give  out  their  scent  only  by  night." 


6O  DARWIN    AND    HEGEL.  [ll. 

Tenterden  Steeple  and  Goodwin  Sands ;  but  Mr. 
Darwin  has  shown  how  the  flourishing  of  red  clover 
depends  on  the  flourishing  of  cats,  who  eat  the 
field-mice,  who  eat  the  humble-bees,  who  fertilise  the 
red  clover.1 

What  distinguishes  Darwin's  theory  from  other 
theories  of  evolution  is  the  kind  of  explanation  it 
gives.  Hegel  complains,  and  I  think  justly,  that 
merely  to  go  back  "  into  the  darkness  of  the  past," 
or  merely  to  say,  "  first  there  was  the  simple  and 
then  the  complex  was  evolved  out  of  it,"  and  so  on, 
is  not  to  explain  nature  ;  it  is  only  to  give  a  chrono 
logical  table  of  events — real  or  imaginary.  We 
want  to  know  "  Why?"  To  refer  us  back  to  the 
homogeneous  and  undifferentiated  is  to  give  "  the 
material  cause  "  (TO  e£  o5)  of  what  has  happened  :  it 
is  not  to  explain  why  what  has  happened  has  hap 
pened.  But  the  theory  of  natural  selection  does 
explain  "  Why."  Such  a  form  or  characteristic  has 
been  of  advantage,  of  utility  to  the  species,  and 
therefore  has  favoured  its  continuance.  Darwin 
restores  "  final  causes "  to  their  proper  place  in 
science — final  causes  in  the  Aristotelian,  not  in  the 
Stoic  or  "  Bridge  water  Treatise,"  sense.2 

"  The  Good"  as  a  means  of  explanation  thus  re 
gains  the  importance  which  Plato  claimed  for  it. 
He  makes  Socrates  complain  that  Anaxagoras,  after 
asserting  that  Reason  was  the  cause  or  principle  of 

1  Darwin,  Origin  of  Species -,  pp.  57,  58. 

2  Cf.  Hegel's  small  Logic,    Werke,  vi.  pp.  378,  379  ;  Wallace's 
Transl.,  p.  299. 


II.]  DARWIN    AND    HEGEL.  6 1 

all  things,  went  on  to  assign  only  "  material"  causes 
of  things,  whereas  if  we  are  to  give  a  rational  ex 
planation  we  must  do  so  by  showing  how  the  good 
was  realised  in  the  world  (Phcedo,  97,  98).  Plato 
was  too  hastily  trying  to  see  everything  in  the  light 
of  the  one  supreme  good— the  end  of  the  universe 
as  a  whole.  And  Aristotle's  caution  was  not  unne 
cessary — "the  good  for  man  is  not  the  same  as  the 
good  for  fishes  "  (Et/i.  NIC.,  vi.  7,  §  4).  This  con 
ception  of  Final  Causes,  which  the  theory  of  Natural 
Selection  restores,  is  not  the  cruder  form  of  teleology 
which  attempts  to  explain  everything  in  the  universe 
by  showing  that  it  serves  the  good  of  man.  Each 
species  has  come  to  be  what  it  is  by  pursuing  (if 
we  may  speak  metaphorically)  its  own  good.  Each 
individual  is  preserved  by  its  own  good.  In  the 
conflict  between  individuals  and  between  kinds 
that  which  is  better  equipped  for  the  particular 
struggle  is  selected.  From  many  points  of  view, 
e.g.,  from  ours — ours  either  as  the  species  of  human 
beings,  or  ours,  as  members  of  this  or  that  society, 
or  ours,  as  individuals — what  happens  may  be  very 
far  from  what  we  consider  our  good,  yet  it  must  be 
the  better  adapted  for  success  which  succeeds.  This 
is  a  truism  when  stated  thus :  but  from  this  it 
follows  that  the  explanation  of  structures,  habits, 
etc.,  must  be  found  in  the  end  or  purpose  that  they 
serve.  This  substitution  of  Final  Cause  for  Efficient 
or  Material  Cause  as  the  more  important  category 
is  as  significant  for  us  now  as  it  seemed  to  be  to 
Aristotle.  And  of  all  modern  philosophers  Hegel 


62  DARWIN    AND    HEGEL.  [ll. 

has  recognised  most  fully  this  significance  of  the 
conception  of  End.  On  this  head  his  critic,  Pro 
fessor  Seth,  allows  that  he  represents  "  what  is 
profoundest  and  best  in  modern  philosophy  "  (Hege- 
lianism  and  Personality,  p. 


Let  me  trace  some  consequences  of  the  theory  of 
natural  selection  in  Ethics  —  where  the  applications 
of  it  are  perhaps  the  most  interesting  to  us.  In 
Ethics  the  theory  of  natural  selection  has  vindicated 
all  that  has  proved  most  permanently  valuable  in 
Utilitarianism,  while  correcting  those  parts  of  the 
theory  which  made  the  negative  work  of  the  Intui- 
tionalist  critic  very  easy.  Right  and  wrong  appear 
now  as  what  help  or  hinder  the  good  of  the  society 
—whatever  the  society  may  be.  The  happiness  of 
the  individual,  as  Professor  Clifford  pointed  out 
(Lectures  and  Essays,  ii.  p.  173),  is  of  no  use  to  the 
community,  except  in  so  far  as  it  makes  him  a  more 
efficient  citizen.  Thus  ethics  is  again,  as  to  Aristotle 
and  to  Hegel,  closely  bound  up  with  politics.  The 
ethical  end  for  the  individual  must  be  a  social  end  — 
a  common  good  (whatever  the  community  may  be). 
Natural  selection  (as  I  have  tried  to  show  more 
fully  elsewhere)  2  is  a  perfectly  adequate  cause  to 
account  for  the  rise  of  morality  —  in  that  same  sense 
of  "  cause  "  in  which  we  use  the  term  in  scientific 

1  p.  89  in  edit.  2. 

2  Art.  on  "  Natural  Selection  and  the  Spiritual  World,"  in  West 
minster  Review,  May,  1890,  reprinted  in  2nd  edit,  of  Darwinism 
and  Politics  (1891).    See  esp.  pp.  96-106. 


II.]  DARWIN    AND    HEGEL.  63 

explanations  of  natural  phenomena.  Regarded  as 
events  in  time,  the  appearance  of  consciousness  and 
the  capacity  for  language  with  the  consequent  possi 
bility  of  storing  up  the  results  of  experience,  may  be 
accounted  for  by  natural  selection,  i.e.,  they  favoured 
in  the  struggle  for  existence  those  species  which 
happened  to  possess  them.  The  facts  of  conscious 
ness,  of  reflection,  of  self-consciousness,  however, 
make  an  enormous  difference  in  the  character  of  this 
struggle.  Natural  selection  in  its  lower  stages— 
those  with  which  the  naturalist  is  familiar — works 
solely  by  the  destruction  of  the  less  favourably  cir 
cumstanced  organisms  and  species.  Natural  selec 
tion  among  "  articulate-speaking,"  thinking  mortals, 
who  can  "  look  before  and  after,"  works  in  other 
ways  as  well.  Morality,  to  begin  with,  means  those 
feelings  and  acts  and  habits  which  are  advantageous 
to  the  welfare  of  the  community.  Morality  comes 
to  mean  the  conscious  and  deliberate  adoption  of 
those  feelings  and  acts  and  habits  which  are 
advantageous  to  the  welfare  of  the  community  ; 
and  reflection  makes  it  possible  to  alter  the  con 
ception  of  what  the  community  is,  whose  welfare 
is  to  be  considered. 

In  human  history,  except  where  there  has  been 
retrogression,  we  find  an  advance  in  the  ideals  of 
life,  i.e.,  man  has  been  coming  to  a  fuller  and  fuller 
consciousness  of  the  end  or  good  at  which  from 
the  first,  merely  as  a  social  animal,  he  has  been 
blindly  striving.  It  is  worth  while  referring  to 
retrogressions,  because  such  cases  show  us  to  what 


64  DARWIN    AND    HEGEL.  [ll. 

an  extent  morality  and  all  other  differences  between 
man  and  the  animals,  between  the  highest  and  the 
lowest  races  of  human  beings,  are  due  to  the  in 
fluence  of  social  institutions  and  not  to  any  original, 
innate,  or  inherited  instincts.  Long  centuries  of 
civilisation  do  not  prevent  mankind  from  reverting 
to  a  condition  not  far  from  that  of  the  lowest 
races,  where  circumstances,  such  as  a  terrible  pesti 
lence,  long-continued  warfare,  a  barbarian  invasion 
or  life  among  savages,  have  removed  the  ordinary 
restraints  of  civilisation.  Still  these  are  exceptional 
conditions.  What  may  appear  to  be  a  general 
breakdown  and  return  to  barbarism  may  be  the 
transition  to  a  new  and,  in  some  respects,  higher 
type  of  social  organisation.  For  in  human  evolu 
tion  we  are  forcibly  reminded  that  progress  does  not 
go  on  in  a  straight  line  ;  but,  just  because  thought 
enters  into  the  process,  at  each  step  there  is  an 
attempt  to  correct  the  one-sidedness  of  the  preceding 
stage. 

In  the  history  of  philosophy  this  "  dialectic  move 
ment  "  comes  clearly  to  the  surface.  The  philo 
sopher  who  is  not  a  mere  echo  of  what  has  become 
a  dogmatic  system  is  driven,  by  reflection  on  the 
prevalent  manner  of  thinking,  to  lay  stress  on  the 
aspects  of  truth  which  have  been  neglected.  But 
the  criticism  he  applies  to  his  predecessors  must  in 
due  time  be  applied  to  him.  The  great  constructive 
philosophers  seem  indeed  to  gather  up  into  their 
thought  all  the  elements  that  existed  scattered  in 
preceding  systems ;  but  the  time  comes  when  a 


II.]  DARWIN    AND    HEGEL.  65 

new  criticism  and  then  a  new  reconstruction  are 
needed,  if  philosophy  is  to  remain  living  and  not 
to  be  fossilised  in  a  traditional  dogma.  "  Let 
us  follow  whithersoever  the  argument  leads  us"  ; 
and,  if  we  do  not  let  ourselves  become  "  misolo- 
gists,"  we  must  hold  fast  this  Athenian  faith  in  the 
value  of  the  perpetual  conflict  of  ideas,  which  is  the 
highest  form  of  the  struggle  for  existence. 

But  what  comes  out  clearly,  and  with  some  con 
sciousness  on  the  part  of  those  concerned,  in  the 
history  of  philosophy  is  also  going  on  in  all  other 
parts  of  human  evolution.  If  natural  selection 
operated  among  human  beings  exactly  as  in  the 
lower  organic  world,  there  would  be  no  advance 
except  by  the  destruction  of  all  the  individuals 
composing  an  unsuccessful  form  of  social  organism. 
In  the  lower  stages  of  human  history  that  must  have 
happened  often  enough.  In  the  higher  stages  the 
organism  may  change  without  the  members  of  it 
being  destroyed  ;  the  race  (the  merely  natural 
element)  is  not  inseparably  linked  to  the  fate  of 
all  its  institutions,  its  language,  religion,  form  of 
government,  etc.  A  vigorous  race  may  live 
through  many  political  and  social  institutions  ;  on 
the  other  hand,  successful  institutions  may  become 
the  possession  of  many  races.  Now  in  the  history 
of  civilisation  generally  we  can  see,  though  not  in 
every  respect  so  clearly  as  in  the  history  of  philo 
sophy,  this  criticism  of  customs  and  ideas  going  on. 
Revolutions,  peaceable  or  otherwise,  are  the  transi 
tions  from  one  stage  to  another,  provoking  generally 

D.  H.  F 


66  DARWIN    AND    HEGEL.  [ll. 

a  counter-revolution,  but  in  progressive  societies, 
helping  the  forward  movement  through  whatever 
apparently  zigzag  courses.  Mr.  Herbert  Spencer 
thinks  that  the  movement  of  human  progress  is  all 
in  one  direction — from  status  to  contract.  Any  at 
tempts  to  get  rid  of  some  of  the  anarchy  of  individ 
ualism  he  can  only  interpret  as  a  return  to  militancy. 
A  follower  of  Hegel  would  agree  with  the  average 
man  that  it  is  no  such  thing.  We  are  not  returning 
to  the  Middle  Ages,  but  advancing  to  a  new  stage 
which  shall  reconcile  both  elements.  Of  course  this 
new  stage  will  not  be  final — though  we  are  always 
apt  to  look  on  the  stage  just  ahead  of  us  as  if  it 
were  final,  because  it  is  what  to  us  seems  most 
needed.  Defects,  one-sidedness  in  it,  will  show 
themselves  and  need  correction,  perhaps  at  first  by 
opposite  exaggerations.  The  correction  may  take 
place  more  and  more  through  peaceful  debate,  in 
stead  of  through  fighting.  A  still  higher  stage 
would  be  reached  when  people  themselves  made 
the  correction  instead  of  leaving  it  to  a  rival  party 
to  do  so  :  the  dialectic  movement  may  go  on 
within  the  soul. 

This  seems  to  me  a  type  of  interpretation  of  human 
evolution  which  is  in  entire  accordance  with  Darwin's 
theory  of  natural  selection,  and  which  yet  admits  of 
what  is  most  valuable  in  Hegel's  dialectic  method. 
The  analysis  of  the  conception  of  punishment  in  Mr. 
Alexander's  Moral  Order  and  Progress  (pp.  3 2  7-3  33) 
seems  to  me  a  most  admirable  example  of  such  a 
reconciliation  of  Darwinian  and  Hegelian  evolution. 


II.]  DARWIN    AND    HEGEL.  67 

''Punishment  in  man,"  says  Mr.  Alexander,  "corre 
sponds  to  the  struggle  of  the  dominant  variety  with 
other  varieties.  .  .  .  We  punish  in  order  to  ex 
tirpate  ideals  which  offend  the  dominant  or  general 
ideal.  But  in  nature,  conflict  means  the  extinction 
of  individual  animals  ;  in  punishment  it  is  sufficient 
that  the  false  ideal  is  extinguished,  and  it  is  not 
necessary  always  that  the  person  himself  should  be 
destroyed."  Punishment,  as  Mr.  Alexander  puts  it 
in  summing  up,  has  three  characters  :  "It  is  retri 
butive  in  so  far  as  it  falls  under  the  general  law  that 
resistance  to  the  dominant  type  recoils  upon  the 
resistant  or  guilty  creature  :  it  is  preventive  in  so 
far  as,  being  a  statutory  enactment,  it  aims  at 
securing  the  maintenance  of  the  law  irrespective  of 
the  individual's  character.  But  this  latter  charac 
teristic  is  secondary,  and  the  former  is  compre 
hended  under  the  third  idea,  that  of  reformation, 
which  is  the  superior  form  under  which  retribution 
appears  when  the  type  is  a  mental  ideal  and  is 
affected  by  conscious  persons."  This  account  of 
Punishment  is  Darwinian  in  its  application  of  the 
concept  of  natural  selection.  It  is  Hegelian  in  its 
recognition  of  the  diverse  elements  that  enter  into 
the  idea  of  punishment,  unlike  the  rival  one-sided 
theories  on  the  subject  ;  and  it  is  Hegelian,  above 
all,  in  its  recognition  that  what  seem  the  extreme 
opposite  theories  of  retribution  and  reformation  are, 
after  all,  different  stages  of  the  same  concept. 

Hegel's  treatment  of  ethical  questions  agrees  with 
that  of  the  evolutionists  in  two  main  respects — both 


68  DARWIN    AND    HEGEL.  [ll. 

of  which  have  been  made  grounds  of  objection  to  his 
philosophy.  (i)  The  complete  separation  which 
Kantian  ethics  and  the  ethics  of  the  Intuitionalist 
school  make  between  "  ought  "  and  "is"  tends  to 
disappear.  Hegel  protests  vigorously  against  the 
philosophical  weakness  of  Fichte's  perpetual  Sollen, 
and  seems  to  take  up  an  almost  "  Philistine  "  attitude 
towards  the  enthusiasm  of  the  romantic  dreamer  or 
of  the  reformer  indignant  with  the  abuses  of  society. 
Similarly  we  know  that  a  very  general  consequence 
of  the  evolutionary  and  historical  view  of  society  has 
been  to  aid  the  reaction  against  the  revolutionary 
appeal  to  "  natural  rights,"  and  to  support  a  political 
and  social  conservatism  of  the  type  so  brilliantly 
illustrated  in  this  country  by  Burke.  And  in  ethics 
the  evolutionary  moralists  tend  to  do  away  with  the 
distinction  between  moral  laws  and  laws  of  nature, 
to  treat  moral  action  as  not  distinct  in  kind  from 
action  in  general.  (2)  Hegel's  ethics  are  a  part  of 
his  "  Philosophy  of  Law"  ;  the  familiar  separations 
between  politics  and  ethics,  between  society  and 
the  individual,  appear  only  as  aspects  of  what  can 
not  properly  be  thought  of  apart  from  each  other. 
So,  too,  ethics  to  the  evolutionist  is  a  branch  of 
sociology.  And  to  both  Hegel  and  the  evolutionist 
the  reproach  is  sometimes  made  that  they  ignore  the 
significance  of  personality. 

Now,  first,  as  to  Hegel's  too  passive  acquiescence 
in  fact,  let  me  admit,  once  for  all,  that  that  is  the 
great  flaw  in  his  practical  philosophy.  All  wisdom 
seemed  to  culminate  in  Hegel's  Encyclopedia,  all 


II.]  DARWIN    AND    HEGEL.  69 

history  in  the   Prussian  bureaucracy  of  1820;  and 
Hegel's  orthodox  disciples  were  ready  to  weep  that 
there  remained  no  more  realms  for  the  world-spirit 
to  conquer.      But  this  4< finality"  is  an  inconsistency 
in  Hegel's  application  of  his  philosophy.     The  same 
dialectic  movement,  which  had  brought  the  human 
spirit  to  the  stage  at  which  Hegel  found  it  and  inter 
preted  it,  must  urge  man  onwards.     Yet  Hegel's  error 
is  only  the  exaggeration  of  his  perfectly  sound  feel 
ing  that  the  philosopher  as  such  has  mainly  to  do  with 
what  has  already  come    into  existence — the  same 
sound  feeling  which,  as  I  have  already  shown,  makes 
him  insist  that  the  philosophy  of  nature  must  follow 
and  cannot  anticipate    the    course    of  the    physical 
sciences.      Hegel's  famous  dictum,  "The  Real  is  the 
Rational,"  has  been  a  stumbling-block  to  many,  in 
spite  of  what  he  himself  says  in  explanation  of  it  (in 
the  Introduction  to  the  Encyclopedia).     Mere  exist 
ence  is  a  very  different  thing  from  reality.    Professor 
Seth  (Hegelianism  and  Personality,  p.  203)  1  treats 
this    distinction  as   a   "quibble"   on    Hegel's    part. 
Surely  it  is  a  perfectly  legitimate  use  of  that  fatally 
ambiguous  word  "  real."     The  use  of  "  real "  in  anti 
thesis  to  "  sham  "   is  common  enough  ;    and,  as  a 
matter  of  fact,  it  is  more  of  a  quibble,  when  those 
who  boast  themselves  "  Realists  "  in  philosophy  take 
advantage  of  this  popular  moral  connotation  of  the 
term  "  real  "  to  claim  support  for  themselves  in  their 
polemic  against  Idealism,  when  e.g.  they  tell  us  that 
an    atom  is  something  more  real    than  a  thought. 
1  p.  213  in  edit.  2. 


/O  DARWIN    AND    HEGEL.  [iL 

This  is  true  in  the  sense  that  the  atom  must  be 
thought  of  as  being  in  space  ;  but  the  ordinary  mind 
takes  it  as  if  it  meant  that  the  atom  is  more  import 
ant.  That  "  the  real  is  the  rational "  is  a  doctrine 
which  is  implied  in,  and  may  be  well  illustrated  by, 
the  theory  of  natural  selection.  All  sorts  of  variations 
occur,  i.e.,  they  exist ;  but  only  those  that  prove  to  be 
of  some  value  persist.  Whatever  maintains  itself  must 
do  so  because  of  some  rationality  that  it  has  or  had. 
When  the  rationality  ceases,  we  have  an  appearance 
and  not  a  reality,  a  sham  that  is  doomed  to  perish. 
This,  as  we  know,  is  the  one  lesson  that  Carlyle 
read  in  history. 

Hegel's  temperament  and  his  circumstances  led 
him  to  lay  less  stress  on  the  converse  of  his  propo 
sition  :  "  The  Rational  is  the  Real."  It  does  not 
matter  how  few  hold  an  opinion  now,  if  their 
opinion  is  what  makes  for  the  greater  well-being  of 
society,  they  have  got  "the  root  of  the  matter"  in 
them,  and  their  opinion  will  ultimately  prevail.  The 
Idea,  as  Hegel  himself  would  say,  cannot  remain  a 
mere  "  ought  to  be,"  it  must  make  itself  real.  It 
may  take  a  long  time  ;  but  time  is  indifferent  to  it. 
Similarly,  the  evolutionist  is  apt  to  decry  all  at 
tempts  to  better  the  world.  He  knows  that  all 
institutions,  practices,  etc.,  that  have  established 
themselves  must  have  done  so  because  of  some 
value  they  had  (some  rationality) ;  but,  occupied  as 
he  is  in  studying  past  and  existing  forms,  he  is  apt 
not  to  see  the  promise  in  new  variations.  Certainly 
of  these  new  variations  (i.e.,  new  ideals,  new  pro- 


II.]  DARWIN    AND    HEGEL.  71 

jects,  etc.)  a  great  many  will  fail.  Even  a  man  of 
inventive  genius  may  make  a  lot  of  "unreal"  in 
ventions.  It  needs  a  sort  of  prophetic  intuition  to 
see  what  makes  for  welfare  in  the  future.  But,  on 
the  principle  of  natural  selection,  whatever  institu 
tion  or  type  of  conduct  ceases  to  serve  the  well- 
being  of  society  is  doomed  to  perish  by  the  working 
of  those  same  forces  of  struggle  which  at  one  time 
gave  it  reality  and  predominance.  Whether  it 
perishes,  dragging  with  it  the  happiness  and  the 
lives  of  human  beings  or  not,  will  depend  on 
whether  it  perishes  by  the  mere  natural  struggle,  or 
is  peaceably  set  aside  by  the  conscious  act  of  the 
reformer,  anticipating  on  behalf  of  his  society  and 
obviating  the  cruel  process  of  mere  natural  selec 
tion. 

Hegel's  philosophic  endeavour  to  see  the  ration 
ality  of  all  established  institutions  has  sometimes 
been  condemned  as  an  unreasoning  optimism.  But 
we  have  seen  that  he  does  not  mean  that,  "  What 
ever  is,  is  right."  And  his  optimism  is  no  more 
than  that  faith  in  the  ultimate  rationality  of  the 
universe,  which  is  the  presupposition  (however  un 
expressed  or  unrecognised)  of  all  scientific  interpre 
tation  and  of  all  practical  effort.  Hegel  takes  this 
presupposition  quite  seriously,  and  states  it  explicitly, 
by  constructing  his  Encyclopedia  ;  he  has  the  true 
ideal  of  a  philosophic  system  as  the  attempt  to  state 
the  whole  truth  about  the  universe.  He  errs  in  so 
far  as  he  seems  to  claim  to  have  himself  completed 
"  an  absolute  system."  It  is  philosophical  to  hold 


72  DARWIN    AND    HEGEL.  [ll. 

that  the  universe  is  rational  ;  for  all  the  sciences 
presuppose  it,  and  all  serious  human  conduct  pre 
supposes  it  :  it  is  rash  to  be  too  confident  about  any 
particular  interpretation  of  the  rationality  of  the 
small  portions  of  the  universe  that  the  sciences  (in 
cluding  history)  have  as  yet  explored,  or  to  be  too 
confident  of  the  adequacy  of  any  particular  institu 
tions  to  the  demands  of  the  reason,  which  partly  re 
veals  itself  to  us  and  in  us,  in  the  development  of 
human  society.1  Hegel,  as  I  have  said,  gives  up 
too  rashly  the  rationality  of  nature  ;  he  also  inter 
prets  too  rashly  the  rationality  of  human  society. 
Yet  our  very  dissatisfaction  with  existing  institu 
tions,  if  it  leads  to  serious  attempts  to  better  them, 
implies  a  belief  (however  little  formulated)  that 
human  life  is  based  on  reason  and  not  on  chaos  or 
deception. 

To  come  to  the  second  great  objection  made  to 
Hegel — Professor  Seth  complains  (and  with  wide 
spread  sympathy)  that  in  Hegel's  system  there  "is 
room  only  for  one  Self-consciousness  :  finite  selves 
are  wiped  out,  and  nature,  deprived  of  any  life  of 
its  own,  becomes,  as  it  were,  the  still  mirror  in 
which  the  one  Self-consciousness  contemplates  it 
self"  (Hegelianism  and  Personality,  p.  i62).2  The 

1  Prof.  Seth  says  (in  his  2nd  edit  p.  213,  note):  "An  absolute 
system  cannot  afford  to  leave  any  nook  or  cranny  of  existence 
unexplored."      I  only  defend  Hegel's  ideal  of  a  philosophical 
system ;  and  that  ideal  may  surely  be  right,  though  we  have  to 
admit  the   inadequacy  of  any  particular   performance — even   if 
it  be  that  of  Hegel  himself. 

2  p.  171  in  edit.  2. 


II.]  DARWIN    AND    HEGEL.  73 

individual  is  supposed  to  be  a  fatal  objection  to 
Hegel's  system  ;  he  will  get  in  the  way  of  it  and 
throw  it  off  the  rails.  But,  perhaps,  we  may  recall 
George  Stephenson's  answer  to  the  objection  about 
the  cow  getting  in  the  way  of  the  steam-engine  : 
44  It  would  be  very  awkward  for  the  coo."  And  this 
conception  of  the  abstract  individual — the  favourite 
idolon  of  popular  philosophy — is  destroyed  by  the 
logic  of  Idealism,  whether  in  the  region  of  Meta 
physics  or  of  Ethics.  Of  course  each  of  us,  if  we 
had  been  making  the  universe,  might  have  made 
his  own  individual  self  the  centre  of  it  ;  but  logic 
teaches  us  that  we  cannot  think  the  universe 
rightly  from  our  individual  point  of  view,  and  life 
teaches  us  that  we  must  not  live  it  from  our  indi 
vidual  point  of  view.  If  we  try  to  do  so  to  any 
very  great  extent,  our  neighbours  may  be  obliged 
to  shut  us  up  in  an  asylum  or  to  hang  us,  in  the  in 
terest  of  something  that  is  greater  than  the  indi 
vidual  self.  And  so  we  find  that  the  real  individual 
is  not  the  individual  in  isolation  from  and  in  distinc 
tion  from  all  other  individuals,  but  is  a  synthesis  of 
the  universal  and  particular  self. 

The  scientific  study  of  nature  shows  us  that  not 
only  is  nature  "  careless  of  the  single  life,"  but  that 
even  the  type  or  species  is  transitory,  that  the  in 
finite  diversity  of  kinds  and  individuals  does  not 
exclude  the  essential  unity  of  nature.  And  thus  the 
modern  man  of  science,  if  he  takes  to  philosophy,  is 
generally  able  to  appreciate  Spinoza.  Hegel,  how 
ever,  has  risen  above  the  category  of  substance. 


74  DARWIN    AND    HEGEL.  [ll. 

Self-consciousness   is  to  him  the   highest  category, 
and,  as  Professor  Seth  admits  (p.  89 *),  is  "our  best 
key  to  the  ultimate  nature  of  existence  as  a  whole." 
But  what  is  this  "  Self-consciousness  "  ?     Is  it  God 
or  is  it  the  individual  self,  or   is   it  a  mere  abstract 
universal  ?     Is  the  critic,  who  asks  these  questions, 
quite  sure  what  he  means  by  "  God,"  and  by  the  in 
dividual   "  self,"  and   that  what   he  means  by  these 
terms  represents  an  intelligible  reality,  and  not  merely 
the  picture-thinking  of  ordinary  beliefs  ?    Is  it  not,  at 
least,  a  hypothesis  worth  taking  account  of,  that  in  our 
consciousness  of  self  we  have  the  clearest  manifesta 
tion  of  the  unity  which  science  presupposes  in  the  uni 
verse  ?     Hegel  admits — in  perfect  accord  with  the 
most  materialistic  science — that   spirit  comes  from 
nature  ;   nature  is  the  potentiality  of  spirit.      But,  if 
we  take  this  conception  of  potentiality  quite  seriously, 
will  it  not  be   nearer  the  whole   truth  to  say,  with 
Hegel,    that    spirit,    being   out    of  itself,    estranged 
from  itself  in  nature,  comes  to  itself  in  human  con 
sciousness  ?     The  separateness  and  isolation  of  one 
self-conscious  being  from  another  is  only  a  necessary 
consequence  of  the  manifestation  of  spirit   in  space 
and   time.      It   is  the    negativity  which   makes  the 
manifestation    possible.       But    the    "  truth"  of  our 
separate  selfhoods  is  only  to  be  found  in   our  ulti 
mate  unity,  which  religion  calls  "  God,"  which  ethics 
calls  "  goodness  " — a  unity  which  is  not  the  abstract 
"  One  "  of  the  Neoplatonist,  but  an  organic  unity 
realised  in  a  society  which  is  not  a  mere  aggregate 
1  P-  95  of  edit.  2. 


II.]  DARWIN    AND    HEGEL.  75 

of  individuals,  but  a  spiritual  body  animated  by  that 
love  which  is  the  highest  religious  conception  of 
Deity. 

Let  me  recall  what  I  said  before  about  the  con 
cept  of  "  Final  Cause,"  or  "  the  Good."  Might  not 
a  philosophical  theology  substitute  this  concept  for 
that  of  "  First  Cause  "  ?  I  shall  not  enquire  how 
far  the  consequences  might  be  favourable  to  ortho 
doxy  (of  any  particular  species)  or  not ;  but  at  least 
such  a  theology  would  be  more  in  accordance  with  a 
truly  ethical  religion. 

Hegel's  critics  are    puzzled  by   what   seems    the 
union  of  mystical  theology  with  "  the  crudest  ma 
terialism."     Regard  his  system   in   its  general  out 
lines  (I  am  not  thinking  of  details  or  applications) 
as  a  great  speculative  hypothesis — is  it  not  a  strong 
argument  in  favour  of  this  hypothesis  that  it  can  at 
the  same  time  accept  without  reserve  the  results  of 
scientific  discovery,  however  materialistic  they  may 
seem,   and    can    yet    explain,   and    to    some    extent 
justify,    the    speculations    of    those    great    religious 
thinkers  who  have  attempted  sincerely,  but  perhaps 
too   boldly,  to  grasp  in  their  thought  of  God  the 
whole  secret  of  the  universe  ?     If  we  may  judge  by 
past   experience,  all  attempts  on  the   part  of  "  In- 
tuitionists "  to   meet  Evolutionists   on   questions  of 
"  origins "   are    doomed    to    failure :   one   untenable 
position  has  to  be  surrendered  after  another.     The 
Idealist  makes   no  such  attempt.      He  only  insists 
that,  after  we  have  had  as  complete  a  history  as  can 
be  given  of  how  things  have  come  to  be  what  they 


76  DARWIN    AND    HEGEL.  [ll. 

are,  we  are  justified  in  looking  back  from  our  van 
tage  ground  and  seeing  in  the  past  evolution  the 
gradual  "unrolling"  of  the  meaning  that  we  only 
fully  understand  at  the  end  of  the  process.  The 
process  is  not  completed ;  and  therefore  this  attempt 
has  to  be  renewed  for  each  generation.  But  at 
every  stage  it  is  in  the  highest  that  we  know  that 
we  must  seek  the  key  to  the  philosophical  interpre 
tation  of  nature  and  of  man. 


III. 

WHAT    IS    REALITY?1 

THE  critics  of  Idealism,  so  numerous  at  the  present 
time,  seem  to  me  more  ready  to  uphold  against  the 
claims  of  thought  the  superior  dignity  of  the  Real, 
than  to  explain  what  they  mean  by  that  very  am 
biguous  term.  Our  "  Realists  "  nowadays  are  too 
cautious,  or  too  polite,  to  speak  about  "  the  Vul 
gar  "  ;  I  am  compelled  to  think,  however,  that  like 
their  predecessors  of  last  century,  the  Scottish  Com 
mon-Sense  School,  they  are  playing  off  the  vulgar 
against  the  philosophers.  Nevertheless,  I  believe 
that  the  vulgar  are  being  deceived  by  words,  and 
that  not  "  Realism  "  but  "  Idealism"  corresponds  to 
what  the  plain  man  really  holds,  if  he  can  only  be 
induced  to  go  behind  the  deceptive  forms  of  or 
dinary  speech  and  think  the  matter  thoroughly  out. 
This  may  seem  a  very  rash  statement,  and  I  must 
endeavour  to  prove  it.  What,  then,  does  "  real  " 
mean  ? 

I.  There  is,  first  of  all,  a  sense  in  which  every 
sensation  or  feeling  or  idea  may  be  described  as 
"  real,"  if  it  actually  occurs  as  a  psychical  event  in 

1  Reprinted  from  the  Philosophical  Review,  May,  1892. 

77 


78  WHAT    IS    REALITY  ?  [ill. 

the  experience  of  any  one.  In  this  sense — it  is  a 
sense  rather  in  favour  with  some  Realist  philoso 
phers  than  with  the  plain  man — the  real  is  what 
ever  is  truly  in  any  one's  experience  and  is  not 
falsely  alleged  to  be  so.  If  a  person  really,  i.e. 
truly,  sees  "  blue  devils,"  they  are  real  to  him  at  the 
time  he  sees  them,  although  they  become  unreal  to 
him  when  he  recovers  health,  and  although  through 
out  they  are  unreal  to  other  persons.  So,  too,  one's 
dreams,  however  absurd  they  may  be,  are  real  to  one 
at  the  time — more  or  less.  But  how  do  we  dis 
tinguish  dreams  from  reality  ?  Is  it  not  by  the  test 
of  coherence  or  persistence  in  our  experience  ?  If 
one's  dream-experience  in  any  one  dream  were  to 
be  perfectly  coherent  with  itself,  and  if  the  events 
of  one  dream  were  always  to  follow  in  an  intelligible 
sequence  on  the  events  of  the  preceding  dream,  un 
doubtedly  our  dream-life  would  be  as  real  as  our 
waking  life.  But  these  are  two  pretty  big  "  ifs," 
and,  consequently,  all  sane  and  normal  persons  are 
able  to  distinguish  between  the  merely  temporary 
and  subjective  reality  of  dream-events  and  the  ob 
jective  reality  of  what  are  commonly  called  real 
events.  It  must  be  noted  that  subjective  reality  is 
equally  predicable  of  all  feelings  and  thoughts  which 
we  actually  have,  whether  or  not  the  content  or  ob 
jective  reference  of  these  feelings  and  thoughts  turn 
out  to  be  valid  or  not.  A  distinction,  however, 
must  be  made  :  (a)  I  may  form  a  mental  image  of  a 
dragon,  while  fully  aware  that  no  such  creature 
exists  and  that  it  is  a  mythical  animal ;  but  (b)  people 


III.]  WHAT    IS    REALITY  ?  79 

who  believed  in  the  actual  existence  of  dragons 
would,  in  forming  the  mental  picture  of  a  dragon, 
add  the  idea  of  its  reality.  Its  essence  would  for 
them  involve  existence  :  to  us  it  involves  fabulous 
existence.  Now  subjective  reality  would,  I  fancy, 
be  generally  limited  to  (b),  the  actual  occurrence  of 
a  thought  with  the  added  suggestion  of  its  objective 
reference.  When  we  know  that  we  are  dreaming, 
we  are  near  waking.  When  we  know  that  our  hal 
lucinations  are  hallucinations,  we  are  on  the  way  to 
get  rid  of  them.  It  is  said,  correctly  I  believe,  that 
if  a  person  sees  a  ghost  sitting  in  a  chair,  but  can  be 
induced  to  sit  down  boldly  as  if  the  ghost  were  not 
there,  the  ghost  will  take  offence  and  go  away.  I 
am  not  personally  acquainted  with  the  habits  of 
ghosts  :  so  I  speak  under  correction.  With  regard 
to  feelings,  I  do  not  think  we  can  make  the  same 
distinctions  as  with  regard  to  mental  images  or 
general  conceptions  which  imply  some  sort  of  image 
or  picture  to  help  them  out.  I  cannot  have  a  feel 
ing  of  pain,  unless  that  feeling  is  subjectively  real  to 
me.  I  may  have  a  memory  or  an  image  of  myself 
as  having  pain  ;  but  that  cannot  be  described  as  a 
feeling  of  pain.  In  ordinary  language  more  is 
meant  by  the  reality  of  a  pain,  than  the  fact  that  a 
person  has  a  feeling  of  pain  :  it  is  implied  that  the 
feeling  has  causes  or  grounds  such  as  other  persons 
would  regard  as  sufficient  to  produce  the  feeling  of 
pain  in  them.  Thus,  when  any  one  is  induced  to 
admit  that  "imaginary  pains  are,  after  all,  real 
pains,"  or  that  "  sentimental  grievances  are,  after 


80  WHAT    IS    REALITY  ?  [ill. 

all,  real  grievances,"  the  admission  is  made  with  the 
consciousness  that  the  phrase  is  an  oxymoron. 

II.  Of  objective  reality  we  have  a  further  test 
than  coherence  in  our  own  experience  :  and  that  is 
the  experience  of  other  persons.  If  A  seems  to 
himself  to  see  a  mouse  run  across  the  floor,  but  if 
B,  C,  D,  E,  and  F,  being  all  present,  having  good 
eyesight,  and  looking  in  the  same  direction,  main 
tain  truly  that  they  saw  nothing,  A  may  well  doubt 
the  reality  of  that  mouse,  though  no  one  need  doubt, 
if  A  be  a  trustworthy  person,  that  he  really  had  the 
perception  of  a  mouse,  i.e.,  some  affection  of  the 
nerves  of  sight  plus  a  judgment.  To  settle  the 
question  it  might  be  convenient  to  obtain  the  opinion 
of  a  sane  and  fairly  hungry  cat,  whose  sense  of  smell 
would  confirm  or  contradict  the  visual  perception  of 
A.  Macbeth  sees  Banquo's  ghost  ;  but  nobody  else 
does.  Banquo's  ghost,  therefore,  has  no  objective 
reality. 

The  objectively  real  is  not  that  which  stands  out 
side  everybody's  mind  (if  that  phrase  could  have 
any  meaning),  but  that  which  has  a  validity  or  pos 
sible  validity  for  the  minds  of  several  persons  who 
can  agree  as  to  the  content  of  their  mental  ex 
perience.  The  agreement  between  the  inferences 
drawn  from  the  experience  of  our  different  senses, 
the  agreement  between  the  judgments  of  different 
persons,  and  the  harmony  of  present  experience 
with  the  results  of  our  and  their  previous  experience, 
constitute  between  them  the  test  of  reality.  In  all 
practical  affairs  of  life  we  consider  ourselves  justified 


III.]  WHAT    IS    REALITY?  8 1 

in  regarding  any  alleged  reality  with  suspicion,  if  it 
cannot  be  shown  to  harmonise  with  the  experience 
of  sane,  healthy,  and  normal  persons.  What  does 
not  so  harmonise  can  claim,  at  the  most,  only  sub 
jective  reality,  i.e.,  reality  for  the  persons  having 
such  abnormal  experiences. 

The  opposition  between  the  "  real "  and  the 
"  imaginary  "  is  very  often  supposed  to  correspond 
to  the  opposition  between  "  sensation "  and  mere 
"  thinking."  Mere  thinking  may  of  course  mean 
imagining,  and  then  the  opposition  is  to  some  extent 
the  same  ;  but  only  to  some  extent  even  then. 
Because  there  may  be  sensations  (in  the  psycho 
logical  sense)  or  feelings  which  we  may  come  to 
discover  to  be  unreal  in  exactly  the  same  sense  as 
thoughts  may  be  unreal  ;  i.e.  they  may  not  fit  in 
with  the  rest  of  our  experience  and  with  the  experi 
ence  of  sane  and  healthy  persons.  The  antithesis 
between  sensations  (in  the  psychological  sense)  and 
thoughts  cannot  be  an  absolute  one.  If  by  sensation 
be  meant,  not  simply  the  excitation  of  a  nerve  (which 
may  not  be  felt  and  so  is  not  psychologically  a  sensa 
tion),  but  a  sensation  as  felt,  and,  moreover,  felt  as 
this  or  that  sensation,  i.e.,  discriminated,  here  we 
already  have  an  act  of  judgment  (Aristotle  defines 
ala-Ova-is  as  SUVCL/ULIS  KpiriKr'i)  ;  and  it  is  this  judgment 
which  we  pronounce  to  be  true  or  false  according  as 
it  corresponds  or  not  to  reality  (i.e.,  the  rest  of  our 
experience  and  the  experience  of  other  people).  A 
person  hypnotised  may  be  made  to  feel  a  sensation 
of  heat,  when  there  is  no  cause  external  to  his  organ- 

D.  H.  G 


82  WHAT    IS    REALITY  ?  [ill. 

ism  to  produce  the  sensation,  and  not  to  feel  the 
prick  of  a  pin  where  there  is  an  external  cause.  In 
such  cases  the  sensation,  or  absence  of  sensation, 
not  being  such  as  persons  in  a  normal  condition 
would  experience,  is  not  considered  to  correspond  to 
reality. 

I  fancy  that  to  some  persons  a  sensation  might 
seem  to  have  more  reality  than  a  thought,  because 
the  organism  is  affected  in  an  obvious  way  in  the 
case  of  sensation,  either  by  some  external  or  internal 
stimulus,  whereas  a  thought  does  not  so  obviously 
depend  on  any  organic  process,  and  was  in  old- 
fashioned  psychological  theories  supposed  to  occur 
independently  of  anything  happening  in  the  brain. 
But  all  scientific  psychologists  would,  I  imagine, 
admit  now  that  thoughts  must  have  their  physiologi 
cal  equivalents  just  as  much  as  sensations,  although 
in  the  former  case  what  happens  in  the  brain  is 
much  more  complex,  obscure  and  difficult  to  dis 
cover. 

Pleasure  and  pain  seem  to  have  reality  in  a  special 
degree  :  pain  in  particular  forces  itself  on  our  con 
sciousness  in  a  way  which  may  make  mere  thoughts 
or  ideas  seem  unreal  in  comparison.  But  pleasure 
and  pain  are  purely  subjective  feelings.  As  psychi 
cal  events  they  have  no  more  reality  than  thoughts 
as  psychical  events.  When  people  try  to  argue  one 
out  of  a  feeling  of  pleasure  or  of  pain,  they  do  so  by 
saying  that  it  is  not  real ;  i.e.,  it  is  unimportant,  it  is 
not  connected  with  what  is  permanent  and  persistent 
in  our  experience,  it  is  not  such  as  the  sane  or 


III.]  WHAT    IS    REALITY  ?  83 

healthy  man  would  feel.1  That  is  to  say,  so  far  as 
the  meaning  of  reality  is  concerned,  pleasures  and 
pains  are  real  or  unreal  just  as  thoughts  are — sub 
jectively  real  if  they  are  actually  experienced  by  any 
one,  objectively  real  if  they  fit  in  with  the  rest  of 
experience,  i.e.  if  they  belong  to  a  coherent  and  in 
telligible  system  of  thought-relations.  Thinking 
is,  therefore,  the  test  of  objective  reality. 

Such  a  sentence  seems  far  from  the  plain  man's 
mode  of  expression,  and  I  fancy  the  objection  would 
be  made  here  that  I  am  ignoring  an  important  dis 
tinction  :  that  which  is  in  space  is  real  in  a  sense  in 
which  that  which  does  not  occupy  space  is  not. 
Real  things,  it  will  be  said,  are  different  from  ideas. 

First  of  all,  let  us  observe  that  this  statement 
about  reality  is  quite  inconsistent  with  that  just 
noticed  about  the  superior  reality  of  feelings.  Feel 
ings  are  not  in  space  :  and  yet,  as  we  have  just  seen, 
feelings  are  very  real.  It  is  true  that  sensations 
and  feelings  imply  a  physiological  process  that  must 
take  place  in  space  and  a  body  that  must  be  in  space. 
But  in  exactly  the  same  sense  thoughts  imply  a 
brain  which  is  extended,  and  they  also  imply  a 
society  of  human  beings  living  and  moving  in  space. 
Thus  the  distinction  between  sensations  and  thoughts 
is  not  parallel  to  the  distinction  between  what  is 
in  space  and  what  is  not  in  space. 

Clearly,  however,  this  notion  of  filling  space  is  a 
notion  very  commonly  attached  to  the  real.  Let  us 

1  The  fifth  meaning  of  Reality,  the  ethical  meaning,  comes  in 
also,  however,  in  reference  to  pleasure  and  pain. 


84  WHAT    IS    REALITY  ?  [ill. 

see  what  it  implies.  The  sensation  of  resistance  to 
muscular  movement  gives  us  probably  our  earliest 
notion  of  reality — notion,  I  mean,  as  distinct  from 
mere  feeling,  Resistance  is  offered  by  one  part  of 
our  body  to  another,  and  yet  both  feel  :  so  our 
body  as  both  resisting  and  feeling  is  specially  real  to 
us.  What  does  not  resist,  or  resists  only  in  a  way 
not  easily  recognised,  is  not  thought  to  be  real. 
Thus  air  seems  to  be  emptiness — empty  space. 
"Airy"  is  a  synonym  for  "  unreal,"  "  imaginary." 
Yet  to  the  scientific  mind,  air  is  real  and  space-filling, 
besides  being  not  unimportant  to  human  life.  To 
the  scientific  mind  the  space  between  our  earth's 
atmosphere  and  the  stars  is  not  empty,  but  filled  by 
what  is  called  the  luminiferous  aether.  To  the 
unscientific  mind  this  does  not  seem  to  be  real  quite 
in  the  same  way  as  stone  or  clay  is  real.  The  more 
resisting  seems  the  more  real.  "Solidity"  and 
reality  are  used  as  convertible  terms. 

III.  Our  attention  is  thus  called  conspicuously  to 
the  fact  that  the  real  world  of  ordinary  belief  and 
the  real  world  of  scientific  belief  are  very  different. 
Colours,  sounds,  etc.,  are  translated  into  their  physio 
logical  and  then  into  their  physical  "causes";  i.e., 
they  are  represented  as  movements  in  space.  The 
primary  qualities  of  matter  thus  seem,  from  the 
scientific  point  of  view,  to  have  greater  reality  than 
the  secondary.  Not  that  which  is  felt,  but  that 
which  can  be  thought  in  terms  of  mathematical  con 
ceptions,  has  the  greater  reality  to  the  scientific 
mind.  A  thing  really  is  (to  the  scientific  mind) — that 


III.]  WHAT    IS    REALITY  ?  85 

way  of  thinking  about  it  which  fits  it  into  its  place 
in  an  intelligible  system  of  the  universe. 

This  difference  between  ordinary  and  scientific 
reality  is  not  the  antithesis  between  the  "  phenome 
nal  "  and  the  "  real."  The  real  with  which  science 
has  to  do  is  what  would  be  the  phenomenal,  if  we 
had  keener  vision  ;  e.g.,  what  appears  at  rest  to  the 
naked  eye  is  seen  to  be  in  motion  if  we  look  through 
a  microscope.  If  by  reality  were  meant  things-in- 
themselves,  and  not  phenomena  or  possible  phe 
nomena,  then  reality  would  be  identical  with  the  un 
knowable.  Ultimate  reality  may  be  the  unknowable 
to  us,  as  well  as  the  unknown,  but  it  must  be  that 
which  would  appear  to  a  being  possessing  complete 
knowledge.  Complete  knowledge  is  to  us  a  mere 
ideal  :  but  the  most  real  world  we  can  know  must 
be  what  the  world  means  when  we  come  to  think  it 
out.  Thus  when  science  comes  to  put  aside  any 
theory,  such  as,  e.g.,  the  corpuscular  theory  of  light, 
this  means  that  the  light-corpuscles  are  considered 
unreal,  because  their  existence  conflicts  with  the  less 
rapid  transmission  of  light  in  water  than  in  a  vacuum, 
etc.  The  logical  tests  of  the  value  of  any  scientific 
theory  always  imply  that  that  alone  can  be  real 
which  is  coherent,  which  forms  part  of  an  intelli 
gible  system.  To  say  that  thinking  is  the  test  of 
reality  may  seem  to  open  up  the  way  to  the  most 
mischievous  and  unscientific  delusions  of  meta 
physics  :  metaphysicians  being  supposed  to  be 
persons  who  evolve  the  world  out  of  their  inner 
consciousness,  instead  of  making  their  minds  the 


86  WHAT    IS    REALITY?  [ill. 

passive  mirrors  of  reality  (whatever  that  may  mean). 
But  we  are  familiar  with  this  test  of  reality  in  its 
negative  form — the  inconceivability  of  the  opposite. 
This  test  has  sometimes  been  discredited  for  two 
reasons : — 

( i )  Conceiving  has  been  taken  to  mean  represent 
ing  in  a  mental  image  or  picture,  whereas  it  is  only 
in  the  sense  in  which  conceiving  means  thinking 
that  inconceivability  can  be  the  test  of  truth.  (2) 
We  are  very  apt  to  suppose  we  can  or  cannot  think 
something,  simply  because  we  have  not  taken  all  the 
conditions  into  account.  Thus,  (i)  when  the  infinity 
of  time  or  space  is  discussed,  our  incapacity  to  form 
a  mental  picture  of  infinite  time  or  space  has  been 
taken  as  if  it  were  a  consideration  that  weighed 
against  our  incapacity  to  think  a  limit  in  time  or  in 
space  without  contradiction.  (2)  People  used  to  think 
the  Antipodes  inconceivable,  because  they  thought 
of  gravity  as  a  force  acting  in  the  direction  of  an  ab 
solute  down  :  that  human  beings,  constituted  in  any 
such  way  that  we  could  consider  them  human  beings, 
should  be  able  to  walk  on  the  lower  side  of  the  world 
meant,  to  the  disbelievers  in  the  Antipodes,  the  same 
sort  of  thing  as  if  it  were  said  that  we  here  could 
walk  like  flies  on  the  inside  of  the  roof  with  our 
heads  down.  Change  the  meaning  of  gravitation, 
change  the  meaning  of  up  and  down,  and  it  becomes 
inconceivable  that  a  man  walking  in  New  Zealand 
should  fall  off  into  the  air,  since  falling  off  would 
mean  falling  up,  which  is  a  contradiction.  The  obvi 
ous  difficulty  of  applying  the  test  safely  comes  simply 


III.]  WHAT    IS    REALITY  ?  87 

from  the  difficulty  of  being  sure  that  we  have  ex 
hausted  all  the  relevant  conditions.  And  that  is  why 
we  can  only  apply  the  test  easily  in  very  abstract 
matters,  where  we  have  purposely  eliminated  all 
except  the  very  simplest  conditions,  e.g.,  in  the  mathe 
matical  sciences.  In  the  case  of  more  complex 
subjects  the  inconceivability  of  the  opposite  remains 
rather  the  ideal  to  which  our  knowledge  approxi 
mates.  The  more  thoroughly  we  understand  any 
thing,  the  more  we  see  that  it  must  be  so  and  not 
otherwise.  To  the  savage  or  the  child  anything 
may  happen,  anything  may  account  for  anything  :  to 
the  scientific  mind  the  world  appears  more  and  more 
as  a  necessary  system  of  thought-relations,  "  a 
materialised  logical  process,"  as  Professor  Huxley 
has  described  the  course  of  nature.1 

But,  I  maybe  reminded,  "a  materialised  logical 
process  "  implies  a  difference  between  thought  and 
existence.  "What  things  are,"  it  will  be  said,  "is 
one  thing  ;  what  we  may  think  about  them  is  another, 
and  so  is  what  we  may  say  about  them.  No  one,  at 
least  no  careful  person,  would  confuse  what  we  say 
about  things  with  the  real  existence  of  them.  Why 
should  you  confuse  what  we  think  about  them  with 
their  real  existence  ?" 

Now  what  we,  i.e.,  any  particular  "we,"  may 
happen  to  think  about  them  is  certainly  not  their 
reality.  Their  reality  is  what  we  ought  to  think 
about  them  and  would  think  about  them  if  we  knew 
them  completely.  That  is  a  big  "  if"  ;  for  to  know 
1  See  Note  at  the  end  of  this  essay  on  "Logical  Necessity." 


88  WHAT    IS    REALITY  ?  [ill. 

any  one  thing,  the  "  flower  in  the  crannied  wall,"  or 
even  a  mere  atom  completely,  would  be  to  know 
everything.  And,  if  we  think  out  the  conception  of 
omniscience,  we  shall  find  that  it  is  identical  with 
omnipotence.  In  theological  language,  the  will  of 
God  cannot  be  separated  from  the  intellect  of  God 
without  making  God  cease  to  be  God  and  become  a 
finite,  imperfect  being  with  things  to  be  learned  and 
ends  to  be  attained  outside  his  own  nature.  The 
thoughts  of  God  are  the  ultimate  nature  of  things, 
as  Kepler  recognised  when  he  said  he  was  "  thinking 
the  thoughts  of  God  after  him."  The  identity  of 
thought  and  being-  does  not  imply  the  identity  of  any 
particular  thought  with  any  particular  thing  (e.g., 
that  my  idea  of  one  hundred  dollars  is  one  hundred 
dollars)  but  that  the  ultimate  reality  of  things  is  only 
to  be  found  in  thought.  Even  the  reality  of  the 
hundred  dollars  consists  not  in  their  being  merely 
space-occupying  things,  but  in  their  meaning,  their 
significance  for  the  thought  of  more  than  one  human 
being  ;  i.e.,  their  reality  is  their  ideality. 

I  think  I  hardly  need  recur  to  the  suggestion  that 
reality  must  be  what  is  in  space  ;  for  that  would 
make  our  feelings  unreal.  Nevertheless  reality,  to 
beings  constituted  as  we  are,  must  appear  spread  out 
in  space  and  in  time.  Yet  the  very  fact  that  we 
know  space  as  space  and  time  as  time,  i.e.,  that  we 
recognise  the  outside-one-another  of  things  and  the 
after-one-another  of  events,  proves  that  in  some 
sense  or  other  (whether  we  can  explain  it  or  not)  we 
are  not  in  space  and  time.  Space  and  time  exist 


III.]  WHAT    IS    REALITY  ?  89 

for  thought  as  forms  in  which  we  must  perceive 
things.  But  if  we  ascribe  to  them  an  absolute  ex 
istence,  independent  of  any  one's  thought,  we  are 
speaking  about  what  we  cannot  possibly  know.  Be 
cause  if  we  did  know  them  as  absolutely  existing, 
they  would  no  longer  exist  absolutely.  Thought 
cannot  grasp  anything  outside  itself,  "  outside 
thought"  being  simply  a  metaphorical  way  of  saying 
"not  thought  about  at  all."  My  thought  is,  of 
course,  incomplete  ;  coming  to  know  more  of  reality 
means  that  our  thought  comes  to  be  more  coherent, 
that  it  comes  to  itself. 

Ordinary  language  does  indeed  always  suggest  a 
dualism  of  thought  and  things.  Knowing  is  distin 
guished  from  the  known.  And  the  distinction  is 
necessary  for  our  ordinary  thinking,  which  is  picture- 
thinking,  and  takes  different  aspects  as  if  they  were 
separable  in  fact.1  But  any  philosophical  theory  of 
dualism  raises  more  difficulties  than  it  solves.  If 
thought  and  reality  are  ultimately  separated,  then  we 
have  to  face  the  question  how  they  can  be  combined. 
How  can  we  ever  know  anything,  if  thought  and  re 
ality  are  ultimately  distinct  from  one  another  ?  Scep 
ticism  is  the  logical  outcome  of  dualism,  as  the  history 
of  philosophy  has  sufficiently  proved. 

Is  it   necessary  nowadays  to   discuss  the  idea  of 

1  The  acceptance  of  the  antithesis  between  thought  and  being, 
as  a  permanent  antithesis  for  philosophy  (however  convenient  and 
necessary  in  psychology  and  in  ordinary  language)  seems  to  me 
just  one  of  those  "  abstract  accounts  "  or  "  reductions  to  simpler 
categories  "  against  which  Prof.  Seth  so  strongly  protests  (Hegelian- 
ism  and  Personality,  p.  93,  in  edit.  2). 


9O  WHAT    IS    REALITY  ?  [ill. 

material  substance  as  something  existing  apart  from 
and  independently  of  thinking  ?  Matter  either 
means  (i)  sensations  and  mental  images  referred  in 
thought  to  past  or  future  sensations — and  this  is  what 
matter  means  to  the  ordinary  person — or  (2)  it  means 
the  metaphysical  hypothesis  of  an  unknown  and  un 
knowable  matter-in-itself.  But  if  matter  means  sen 
sations,  present,  past,  and  future,  it  can  have  no  real 
existence  except  for  a  thinking  being  which  can 
relate  these  sensations  and  images  to  one  another. 
As  already  said,  if  sensation  means  anything  more 
than  a  psychical  event,  it  implies  judgment ;  i.e.,  an 
act  of  thought.  On  the  other  hand,  to  attempt  to 
think  an  unknown  and  unknowable  material  sub 
stance  is  to  try  to  get  outside  thought,  which  is  as 
impossible  as  to  get  outside  one's  skin  and  yet  re 
main  alive. 

It  might  be  said,  however,  that  the  element  of 
matter  in  things  is  the  as  yet  unknown  element. 
This,  I  suppose,  is  the  Aristotelian  view.  But  can 
we  then  say  that  matter  is  the  real  ?  If  we  did,  we 
should  be  left  with  this  difficulty,  that  as  knowledge 
grows,  reality  diminishes — a  position  which  the  plain 
man  would  hardly  be  inclined  to  take  up.  If  the 
reality  of  things  be  not  their  intelligibility,  but  just 
that  element  in  them  which  cannot  be  known  and 
cannot  be  expressed,  should  we  not  go  on,  in  the 
fashion  of  Gorgias,  to  argue  that  nothing  exists,  that 
reality  is  that  which  is  not  ? 

The  sciences  ultimately  refuse  to  recognise  dual 
ism.  The  world  is  only  intelligible  by  science  on  the 


III.]  WHAT    IS    REALITY?  91 

assumption  that  it  forms  one  coherent  system.  A 
philosophy  based  on  the  special  sciences  cannot  re 
cognise  anything  outside  the  material  universe.  But 
then  an  examination  of  the  nature  of  science  (a 
criticism  of  the  conditions  of  knowledge)  shows  us 
that  the  material  universe  can  mean  nothing  except 
for  thought.1  Science  leads  us  to  Monism ;  and 
Monism,  to  be  philosophic,  must  be  idealistic. 

When  all  this  is  said,  the  feeling  somehow  comes 
up  that  there  must  be  some  confusion  between  things 
and  thoughts,  between  fact  and  theory.  This  feel 
ing  I  believe  to  be  entirely  due  to  fallacies  of  lan 
guage,  to  the  habit  of  picture-thinking  and  to  the 
influence  of  old  philosophical  theories.  What  are 
facts  (to  put  the  question  about  reality  in  a  different 
form)  ?  Facts  are  theories.  Is  sunrise  a  fact  ?  It 
is  a  theory,  now  discarded,  to  explain  some  of  our 
sensations.  The  reality,  we  know,  is  not  sunrise 
but  the  rotation  of  the  earth  :  and  yet  we  are  in  the 
habit  of  speaking  as  if  sunrise  were  the  reality  and  the 
rotation  of  the  earth  the  theory.  But  if  we  think 
the  matter  out,  we  see  that  the  reality,  by  which  we 
explain,  to  which  we  refer,  our  sensations,  is  an  ob 
ject  of  thought  and  not  of  sensation  at  all.  And  I 
have  already  shown  that  objectivity  means  coherence 
of  my  thinking  with  that  of  others. 

IV.   One  sense  of  the  term  real  need  not  detain  us 

1  The  two  views  are  not  parallels  standing  on  the  same  plane  ; 
because  materialism  logically  presupposes  idealism.  The  dis 
tinction  between  thought  and  matter  falls  within  thought,  as  will  be 
pointed  out  later. 


92  WHAT    IS    REALITY  ?  [ill. 

long — the  sense  in  which  we  speak  of  "  a  real  circle," 
meaning  a  perfect  circle.  In  this  sense  "the  real" 
is  confessedly  "  the  ideal."  We  call  a  figure  of  wood 
or  stone  or  iron  a  circle  only  in  so  far  as  we  can 
think  it  under  the  form  of  a  perfect  circle  ;  we  admit 
that  the  material  figure  existing  in  actual  space  is  not 
the  real  circle. 

V.  Connected  with  this  use  of  reality,  is  that  in 
which  real  is  used  in  a  moral  sense,  the  sense  in 
which  it  is  held  that  "  The  Real  is  the  Rational." 
People  have  scoffed  at  this  utterance  of  Hegel's  ;  but 
it  expresses  a  truth  constantly  recognised  in  practical 
life — a  truth  which  people  ignore  at  their  hazard. 
The  real  is  distinguished  from  the  sham.  We  go 
behind  the  phenomenal  existence  of  institutions  to 
examine  their  ethical  content,  and  we  pronounce 
them  real  or  unreal.  Now  this  sense  fits  in  with  the 
main  sense  of  reality  as  the  coherent  and  intelligible, 
except  that  we  bring  in  a  moral  standard  of  value,  so 
that  what  is.  real,  in  the  sense  of  not  being  imaginary, 
may  yet  be  unreal,  in  the  sense  of  being  absurd  or 
mischievous.  The  precise  relationship  between 
reality  in  this  sense  of  rationality,  and  reality  in  the 
general  sense  of  intelligibility,  is  the  initial  question 
of  the  science  of  ethics  :  what  is  the  relation  between 
being  and  well-being  ?  Does  well-being  differ  from 
being  except  in  having  respect  to  more  permanence 
and  to  a  more  complex  system  of  relations  ?  These 
are  questions  I  need  not  discuss  at  length  now. 
Enough,  if  it  is  clear  that  the  real  in  the  sense  in 
which  it  is  said  to  be  the  rational,  is  at  least  a  further 


III.]  WHAT    IS    REALITY  ?  93 

carrying  out  the  principle  that  the  real  is  the  intelli 
gible. 

The  real  as  the  rational  differs  from  the  merely 
existent  (the  objectively  real — the  second  sense 
noted)  just  as  definite  species  in  plants  or  animals 
differ  from  "  sports  "  and  from  "  survivals."  If  a 
variation  proves  advantageous,  it  gives  rise  to  a  new 
species  :  when  a  survival  comes  to  be  distinctly  dis 
advantageous,  the  individuals  in  which  it  exists  tend 
to  disappear.  The  distinction  between  simple  ob 
jective  reality  and  reality  as  rationality  thus  corre 
sponds  to  the  distinction  between  simple  causality  and 
teleology.  In  the  purely  physical  sense  the  real  is 
what  can  be  thought  of  and  must  be  thought  of  in 
the  causally  connected  system  which  we  call  the 
nature  of  things.  In  the  moral  sense  the  real  is 
what  can  be  and  must  be  thought  of  as  serving  an 
end,  as  having  a  value. 

This  moral  sense  of  reality  is  extremely  common 
in  ordinary  language.  "  Real  jam  "  (to  quote  a  vul 
gar  expression)  is  the  genuine  article  with  no  hum 
bug  about  it.  Now  when  the  Realist  Philosopher 
insists  that  an  atom  is  more  real  than  a  thought,  the 
vulgar  are  deceived  ;  for  they  fancy  that  this  means 
that  an  atom  is  more  important  than  a  thought, 
whereas  all  that  it  means  is  that  an  atom  occupies 
space,  while  a  thought  does  not.  A  thought,  even 
a  foolish  thought,  belongs  to  a  higher  type  of  exist 
ence  than  an  atom. 

Yes,  it  will  be  said,  but  does  not  such  a  phrase 
admit  that  existence  is  wider  than  thought,  if  thought 


94  WHAT    IS    REALITY  ?  [ill. 

is  only  some  particular  kind  of  existence  ?  This 
merely  quantitative  way  of  stating  the  problem  might 
well  be  objected  to.  But  passing  that  over,  let  us 
admit  that,  from  the  point  of  view  of  the  physicist,  if 
the  ultimate  physical  reality  of  material  things  were 
to  be  found  in  atoms,  then  it  would  be  true  that 
there  could  be  no  thought  without  atoms  ;  so  that 
thought  would  be  resolved  into  atoms  as  the  ultimate 
reality.  That  would  be  true,  from  the  point  of  view 
of  the  physicist  ;  but  philosophy  is  the  endeavour 
to  speak  not  merely  the  truth,  but  the  whole  truth. 
And  so  we  have  to  go  further  and  ask  what  an  atom 
would  be  except  for  thought  ?  Will  any  Realist 
undertake  to  tell  us  what  an  atom  is,  unless  it  is 
either  a  way  of  thinking  which  we  find  convenient 
in  trying  to  think  out  the  nature  of  things,  or  an 
unknown  and  unknowable  which  he  can  neither 
think  nor  express  ?  l 

That  within  reality  we  can  make  a  distinction  be 
tween  greater  and  less  reality  may  be  used  as  an 
argument  to  prove  that  the  universe  contains  an  ele 
ment  which  cannot  be  rational :  in  other  words  that 
Thought  finds  itself  confronted  by  an  irrational 
"  Other"  (Oarepov).  So  that  we  seem  thrown  back 

1  Cf.  Prof.  K.  Pearson's  Grammar  of  Science^  pp.  210,  215, 
where  it  is  said  that  an  atom  is  a  conception,  a  mode  by  the  aid  of 
which  the  scientist  resumes  the  world  of  sense.  Prof.  Pearson's 
plentiful  abuse  of  metaphysicians  may  commend  his  (unacknow 
ledged)  Neo-Kantianism  to  scientific  readers  :  I  call  it  7V£<?-Kan- 
tianism,  because  it  is  a  sort  of  Kantianism  minus  "  things-in-them- 
selves."  By  "  Grammar  of  Science "  Prof.  Pearson  evidently 
means  a  criticism  of  scientific  categories. 


III.]  WHAT    IS    REALITY?  95 

on  the  Platonic  dualism.  And,  if  this  argument  be 
combined  with  the  feeling  which  lurks  even  in  the 
mind  of  the  convinced  idealist — that  thought  and 
things  are  not  ultimately  identical — does  not  this 
dualism  seem  to  have  good  grounds  ? 

It  must  be  admitted  that,  unless  thought  had  an 
other  over  against  it,  we  never  could  call  anything 
in  our  experience  imperfect  or  evil — nay  more,  we 
could  have  no  knowledge  of  the  kind  we  now  have. 
The  problem  of  knowledge  seems  to  leave  us  with 
this  dilemma : — If  thought  has  ultimately  an  alien 
something  to  confront  it,  there  can  be  knowledge  ; 
but  if  thought  merely  thinks  itself,  there  can  be  no 
knowledge.  Of  this  dilemma  I  can  see  only  one 
solution— and  it  is  one  which  I  know  many  persons 
will  consider  nonsensical — the  metaphysical  hypo 
thesis  that  thought  makes  its  own  other,  i.e.,  that  the 
distinction  falls  within  the  identity.  I  have  called 
this  a  metaphysical  hypothesis,  but  I  believe  it  to 
be  much  more,  and  to  be  the  ultimate  fact  to  which 
every  avenue  in  philosophy  leads.  In  Logic,  abstract 
identity  brings  us  to  a  deadlock  :  so  would  abstract 
difference.  Identity  cannot  exclude  difference  nor 
difference  identity.  In  the  evolution  of  the  physical 
universe,  the  rationality  of  the  process  can  only  be 
manifested  in  the  chaotic  multiplicity  and  variability 
of  nature.  We  cannot  know  anything  except  by 
thought  getting  its  material  from  sensation  and 
feeling.  Good  has  no  meaning  to  us  save  in  reference 
to  imperfection  and  evil.  But  all  these  distinctions 
fall  within  thought — in  its  widest  sense.  In  theo- 


96  WHAT    IS    REALITY  ?  [ill. 

logical  language,  God  is  both  transcendent  and 
immanent  :  nothing  in  the  world  is  outside  God  and 
yet  God  is  not  simply  the  sum  of  particular  exist 
ences.  This  idea  of  Thought  realising  itself  in 
nature,  its  own  "  other,"  in  order  to  return  into 
itself,  seems  the  only  way  out  of  the  difficulties  of  the 
philosophical  problems.  If  it  is  asked  "Why  should 
the  Absolute  be  this  self-differentiating  unity  ? "  l 
I  cannot  answer  that  question,  because  to  explain 
the  whole  universe  would  mean  that  one  could  get 
outside  the  whole  universe,  which  is  impossible  and 
absurd. 

I  come  now  to  what  may  be  thought  the  most 
formidable  objection  of  all,  though  an  answer  to  it 
seems  to  me  to  be  contained  in  what  has  just  been 
said.  As  all  thought  has  to  work  with  universals, 
thought,  it  is  urged,  never  can  be  adequate  to  the 
fulness  of  Reality.  "  The  individual  alone  is  the 
real."  2 

Very  good  ;  but  what  is  the  individual  ?  In  what 
sense  are  we  to  take  this  old  Nominalist  objection  ? 

(i)  Is  everything  to  be  called  an  individual  that 
can  be  thought  of,  or  spoken  of,  as  "  one  ?"  I  have 
heard  of  a  preacher  who  wished  to  prove  that  all 
nature  testified  to  Unity — a  very  good  thesis — but 
he  tried  to  get  at  his  conclusion  by  a  short  cut. 

1  I  do  not  say  "Why  should  the  Absolute  differentiate  itself?  " 
because  that  might  imply  that  the  Absolute  could  be  a   unity 
without  difference. 

2  Cp.   Prof.  Seth,  Hegelianism  and  Personality,  p.  128   [in  ed. 
2,  P-  I35]- 


III.]  WHAT    IS    REALITY  ?  97 

"  There  is  one  sun,  there  is  one  moon,  there  is  one 
great  multitude  of  stars."  The  one  great  multitude 
of  stars,  nay,  even  our  one  solar  system,  is  only  one 
in  the  same  sense  that  humanity  is  one,  or  a  nation 
is  one  (though  a  nation  or  a  solar  system  is  one  in 
a  much  fuller  sense  than  a  mere  multitude  is).  If 
the  individual  is  identical  with  the  real,  it  must 
follow  either  that  the  great  multitude  of  stars  is  an 
individual  or  that  it  is  not  real.  I  suppose  it  would 
be  answered  "  The  individual  star  is  real ;  the  collec 
tive  unity  is  merely  a  creation  of  our  thought." 

(2)  Well,  then,  is  the  individual  whatever  can  be 
expressed  by  a  single  term  ?  Popular  belief,  would, 
I  fancy,  consider  a  noun  substantive  to  express 
greater  reality  than  an  adjective,  because  the  real 
is  thought  of  as  substance  rather  than  as  attribute. 
But,  if  the  real  is  the  individual,  we  are  limited  to 
singular  terms — not  the  horse,  but  this  horse.  But 
if  this  horse  be  allowed  to  be  an  individual,  what  is 
to  be  said  of  this  lump  of  clay  ?  Is  that  more  an 
individual  than  this  great  multitude  of  stars  ?  Are 
we  not  falling  a  prey  to  the  popular  habit  of  speak 
ing  of  every  thing  as  if  it  were  an  ultimate  reality 
incapable  of  analysis  ?  What  is  any  individual 
thing  except  a  meeting  point  of  universal  attributes  ? 
Qualities  are  all  universals  :  are  we  then  to  say  that 
they  are  not  real  ?  This  would  be  in  strange  con 
flict  with  what  the  plain  man  believes.  If  the 
redness  and  the  heaviness  and  the  stickiness  of  the 
lump  of  clay  are  put  aside  as  being  only  universals, 
what  remains  except  that  metaphysical  phantom  of 

D.  H.  H 


98  WHAT    IS    REALITY  ?  [ill. 

the  thing-in-itself  ?  Even  if  we  deal  with  the 
organic,  the  individual  organism  for  science  and  for 
ordinary  belief  is  an  individual  only  from  some 
points  of  view  ;  it  is  a  collection  of  units  from  other 
points  of  view.  This  horse  is  an  individual  ;  but  so 
is  this  hair  out  of  this  horse's  tail.  So  is  every  cell 
of  which  its  body  is  composed.  If  we  take  "in 
dividual"  strictly  we  must  get  back  to  atoms.  But 
the  qualities  of  the  atoms,  if  they  have  any,  must  be 
universals.  If  they  have  no  qualities,  not  even 
impenetrability  nor  indivisibility,  are  they  even 
atoms  ?  Are  they  not  fictions  of  our  minds — con 
venient  or  otherwise  ? 

(3)  It  might  be  answered  that  qualities  are  real, 
but   only  as  individual   sensations.      I    have   already 
shown  that  the  individual  sensation  is  not  at  all  what 
the    plain    man    understands    by    reality.     The    in 
dividual  sensation  is  an  abstraction,  a  metaphysical 
phantom,  except  as  my  sensation  or  your  sensation, 
and  except  as  discriminated   from  other  sensations, 
i.e.  except   as  interpreted   by  thought.     The  feeling 
of  the  moment  is   real    only   in  that   sense  of  the 
term  which  is  least  familiar  to  the  unsophisticated 
mind. 

(4)  Well,   then,    is    the   individual   the   conscious 
self  which  has  sensations  ?    Are  the  ultimate  "reals  " 
monads    or    spiritual    atoms  ?     This    is    a   possible 
metaphysical   speculation,  and   by   the   help  of  it  a 
very  pretty  picture  of  the  universe  may  be   made, 
a  sort  of  glorified  or  "animated"  atomism.1     But  is 

1  For  an  excellent  example  of  such  a  speculation  see  Riddles  of 


III.]  WHAT    IS    REALITY  ?  99 

it  not  a  speculation  which  results  simply  from  taking 
literally  the  popular  Vorstellung  of  independent 
individual  persons,  while  discarding  the  popular 
Vorstellung  of  independent  individual  things  ? 
Berkeley  applied  analysis  to  material  substances  and 
resolved  them  into  "ideas"  (i.e.,  sensations //z/s 
images  of  sensations)  ;  and  yet  he  left  a  world  of 
individual  spiritual  substances  existing  alongside  of 
one  another.  Hume  applied  to  mind  the  same 
analysis  which  Berkeley  had  applied  to  matter,  and 
resolved  mind  into  its  component  parts  also.  If  by 
the  "  self"  we  mean  the  person  who  is  born,  grows 
up,  dies — the  concrete  phenomenal  ego — what  the 
ordinary  man  would  call  the  "real  person  " — is  this 
strictly  individual  ?  In  the  waste  and  restoration  of 
the  bodily  tissues  there  is  a  constant  transition  be 
tween  the  organism  and  the  environment  :  and  the 
same  holds  with  respect  to  the  mind  or  spirit.  So 
much  is  inherited,  i.e.,  represents  a  mere  part  of 
a  continuous  stream  ;  so  much  is  constantly  being 
acquired  from  the  physical  and  social  environment. 
Self-identity  is  not  an  immediate  datum  of  conscious 
ness  :  it  is  a  matter  of  inference.  I  think  of  myself 
as  the  permanent  substance  of  which  particular 
actions,  feelings,  etc.,  are  predicable.  But  the  real 
self  is  not  a  bare  unity  :  the  real  human  individual 

the  Sphinx,  by  "  A  Troglodyte."  (Published  by  Sonnenschein, 
London,  1891.)  To  this  work,  as  well  as  to  that  of  Prof.  Seth, 
just  quoted,  I  may  refer  the  reader  who  cares  to  know  what 
objections  to  Idealism  I  had  specially  before  my  mind  in  writing 
this  paper. 


IOO  WHAT    IS    REALITY  ?  [I1L 

is  his  ancestry  and  his  age  epitomised.  What  we 
call  "  originality  "  is  a  new  combination  of  elements 
already  there.  If  there  is  any  difference  between 
a  person  and  a  thing  in  respect  of  individuality, 
it  is  a  difference  in  degree  only  and  not  in  kind. 
Spiritual  substance,  like  material  substance,  is  either 
simply  a  meeting  point  of  universal  qualities  or  a 
metaphysical  phantom  1 — like  the  geometrical  ab- 

1  Prof.  Seth  in  a  ?wte'm  the  2nd  edition  of  his  Hegelianism  and 
Personality,  p.  136,  objects  to  this  statement  that  it  would  imply 
that  my  own  existence,  for  myself,  "  is  no  more  than  a  cluster  of 
abstractions."  By  no  means:  my  existence  "for  myself"  is  not 
that  of  a  spiritual  substance  but  of  a  conscious  subject  (as  recog 
nised  throughout  this  paper.)  The  real  self,  the  self  which  feels 
and  knows,  in  distinction  from  the  self  we  talk  about  as  an  object, 
cannot  correctly  be  represented  as  a  substance  or  thing.  Prof. 
Seth,  in  another  note  added  to  his  2nd  edition  (p.  231),  clearly 
disclaims  the  metaphysical  theory  of  "  isolated  self-existent  reals." 
"  Each  finite  individual,"  he  says,  "  has  its  place  within  the  one  real 
universe,  or  the  one  real  Being,  with  all  the  parts  of  which  it  is 
inseparably  connected.  But  the  universe  is  itself  an  individual  or 
real  whole,  containing  all  its  parts  within  itself  and  not  a  universal 
of  the  logical  order  containing  its  exemplifications  under  it."  Now 
this  is  practically  identical  with  what  I  say  in  the  next  paragraph 
about  the  ultimate  real  individual  which  =  the  universe.  I  am 
glad  to  see  that,  after  all,  I  am  on  the  same  side  with  Prof.  Seth 
as  against  "the  realist."  If  p.  64  of  Prof.  Seth's  ist  edition  be 
compared  with  the  corresponding  p.  69  of  the  2nd,  a  very  con 
siderable  modification  in  expression  will  be  observed.  Instead  of 
speaking  of  separate  individuals  as  being  "  absolutely  and  for 
ever  exclusive,"  he  now  writes  "  whatever  may  be  the  mode  of 
their  comprehension  within  the  all-containing  bounds  of  the 
Divine  life,  it  is  certain  that,  as  selves,  it  is  of  their  very  essence 
to  be  relatively  independent  and  mutually  exclusive  centres  of 
existence."  With  the  revised  version  of  this  passage  I  am  de 
lighted  to  find  myself  in  agreement. 


III.]  WHAT    IS    REALITY  ?  IOI 

straction  of  a  point  treated  as  if  it  were  a  real  thing. 
"But,"  it  will  be  said,  "there  is  the  difference  of 
consciousness."  Well,  if  by  reality  be  meant  con 
sciousness,  an  idealist  is  not  likely  to  quarrel  with 
the  statement.  But  then,  I  suspect,  the  realist  means 
by  consciousness  simply  an  attribute  of  a  substance  : 
he  has  got  his  Vorstellung  of  spiritual  substance  in 
the  background. 

(5)  If,  however,  the  self  be  taken  to  mean,  not 
an  object  existing  among  other  objects,  but  the 
siibject  logically  implied  in  all  knowledge,  the 
"Transcendental  Ego"  which  we  never  can  know 

o 

as  an  object,  and  which  therefore  we  never  can 
"get  behind,"  that  may  be  allowed  to  be  the  ulti 
mate  reality.  But  that  is  individual  only  in  the 
sense  in  which  the  unity  of  the  cosmos  is  individual  : 
and  that,  I  fancy,  is  hardly  what  the  realist  means 
to  mean.  "  Nothing  in  the  world  is  single " — 
except  the  whole  world  itself:  and  that  is  not  "in" 
the  world. 

We  often  hear  it  argued  "  thought  implies  a 
thinker."  True,  but  a  thinker  is  not  necessarily 
a  thinking  substance  :  a  thinker  is  a  thinking  sub 
ject.  All  that  is  immediately  given  in  conscious 
ness  is  the  mere  Ego,  the  mere  self-ness,  a  unique 
and  individual  appearance  in  the  moment  of  feeling 
or  thinking  or  willing.1  As  already  said,  a  feeling 
is  only  real,  in  the  lowest  sense  of  reality,  as  my 

1  In  the  act  of  judgment,  involved  in  all  perception,  I  compare 
and  put  together  the  experiences  of  different  times,  but  only  as 
present  now  to  my  consciousness. 


IO2  WHAT    IS    REALITY?  [ill. 

feeling,  a  thought  as  my  thought.  This  absolute 
subjectivity  is  the  ultimate  reality  :  we  never  can 
get  behind  it.  That  other  persons  are,  each  of 
them,  subjects  in  the  same  way  we  know  only  by 
inference.  That  the  "  I  "  is  the  same  in  different 
moments  of  our  own  experience  we  know  only  by 
inference.  It  is  an  inference  also,  that  the  transcend 
ental  Ego  is  identical  in  any  way  with  the  pheno 
menal  Ego  (what  we  call  our  "  real  self,"  though  it 
is  not  the  self  that  knows,  but  the  self  as  object). 
The  mode  of  that  identity  is  a  matter  of  speculative 
hypothesis,  as  is  also  the  question  whether  or  in 
what  way  it  is  the  same  or  different  in  different 
persons.  "  I  "  is  experienced  directly  ;  or  rather  it 
is  "  I  "  alone  that  experiences.  "  You"  is  a  matter 
of  inference.  The  relation  of  "  I  "  to  "you,"  "  they," 
etc.,  is  a  matter  of  hypothesis. 

An  analysis  of  the  nature  of  the  logical  judgment 
gives  the  same  result.  The  subject  of  every  logical 
judgment  is  ultimately  "  I."  "  I  am  such  that  A  is 
B."  "  I  experience  (I  feel  or  I  think)  A  B"  Recent 
writers  on  logic  generally  lay  down  that  "  Reality  " 
is  the  ultimate  subject.  "  Reality  is  that  which 
.  .  .  ,"  or  "  Reality  is  such  that  .  .  ."  This 
comes  to  the  same  thing.  The  only  fault  I  can  find 
with  the  latter  formula  for  the  ultimate  logical  judg 
ment,  is  that  reality  is  a  notion  capable  of  farther 
analysis,  whereas  the  mere  "  I  "  is  not.  Whether 
we  say  that  judgment  always  contains  a  reference  to 
and  implies  "  Reality  "  or  "  the  unity  of  the  cosmos  " 
or  "  I  "  is  a  matter  of  indifference  to  the  science  of 


III.]  WHAT    IS    REALITY?  IO3 

logic.  The  last  term  seems  to  me  preferable  philo 
sophically,  simply  because  then  the  judgment  is 
expressed  in  a  way  that  corresponds  most  exactly 
to  our  actual  experience.  Thus,  if  we  examine 
judgment  in  its  simplest  form,  where  it  is  just  be 
coming  differentiated  from  mere  inarticulate  cries,  we 
find  a  predicate  such  as  "  hot,"  "  hungry,"  "  happy," 
44  sore,"  "[it]  hurts."  Now  the  subject  of  these 
predicates,  the  x  which  may  be  expressed  in  our 
language  by  the  impersonal  pronoun,  but  which  in 
many  languages  is  not  expressed  at  all,  may  be  de 
scribed  as  being  either  "  the  nature  of  things  "  or 
"I,"  but  "  I  "  seems  to  me  nearer  the  exact  truth 
of  experience. 

We  may  picture  the  universe  as  a  multitude  of 
centres  of  circles,  recognising  that  every  one  is  the 
centre  of  his  own  universe — just  as  each  of  us  sees 
a  different  rainbow  ;  but  such  a  picture  is  the  result 
of  inference  and  hypothesis.  In  strict  truth  (and 
that  is  what  Philosophy  is  concerned  with)  we  never 
get  outside  one  circle,  nor  away  from  one  centre.  I 
may  admit  the  truth  of  judgments  about  other  persons 
and  other  things,  when  stated  without  any  reference 
to  my  consciousness  ;  but  strictly  speaking  they  are 
only  true  to  me  (and  that  is  what  I  mean  by  truth) 
when  this  reference  is  introduced. 

The  distinction,  noticed  at  the  beginning  of  this 
essay,  between  subjective  and  objective  reality  is  a 
distinction  which  falls  within  what  one  may  call  the 
absolute    subjectivity  (or   the    essential    relativity— 
they  mean  the  same  thing)  of  all  reality.     When  we 


IO4  WHAT    IS    REALITY  ?  [ill. 

distinguish  the  particular  self,  the  self  with  a  history 
in  time,  from  the  not-self  generally  and  from  other 
selves,  then  we  distinguish  between  the  subjective 
and  the  objective.  But  this  particular  self  is,  as  I 
have  shown,  not  an  individual  incapable  of  further 
analysis,  but  like  other  things  it  is  a  unity  of  the 
manifold,  an  identity  with  differences  in  it.  The 
ultimate  subject  of  knowing,  the  ultimate  reality,  is 
incapable  of  further  analysis,  in  the  sense  that  we 
cannot  get  behind  or  round  it  :  we  cannot  know  it 
as  an  object  like  other  objects.  But  on  the  other 
hand  it  only  becomes  properly  "  real,"  knowledge 
only  passes  from  mere  possibility  into  actuality,  by 
the  recognition  of  differences,  of  a  manifold,  within 
consciousness. 

When  the  "I"  is  treated  psychologically,  it  is  made 
into  an  object.  We  are  not  any  longer  dealing  with 
the  strict  truth  or  genuine  reality  of  it  ;  we  are  deal- 
with  an  abstracted  material  as  in  all  the  other  special 
sciences.  Philosophy  must  take  account  of  the  fact 
that  everything  we  can  know  is  within  the  "  I." 
The  knowledge  of  reality  is  thus  the  "  I  "  coming  to 
know  itself,  i.e.,  its  content.  "  God  "  must  be  thought 
of  as  the  "  I  "  completely  actualised,  the  absolute 
"  subject-object."  We  are  aware  that  we  never  can 
know  anything  fully.  The  "  I  "  is  always  striving 
for  a  more  complete  realisation,  seeking  to  become 
"real,"  in  the  moral  sense,  i.e.,  to  be  more  adequate 
to  what  it  professes  to  be. 

Except  as  to  this  ultimate  question  we  need  have 
no  quarrel  with  the  realist,  and  are  quite  as  ready  to 


III.]  WHAT    IS    REALITY  ?  IO5 

talk  of  "  thought  conforming  to  reality  "  as  we  are 
to  talk  of  sunrise  and  sunset,  although  in  both  cases 
we  have  accepted  the  "  Copernican  "  theory.  We 
might  even  get  at  the  same  ultimate  result,  although 
we  accepted  provisionally  the  point  of  view  of 
ordinary  language  and  of  the  special  sciences.  If 
we  abstract  from  the  mode  in  which  alone  we  can 
know  the  world,  we  may  talk  of  phenomena  as 
having  behind  them  a  thing-in-itself,  and  we  may 
call  that  the  ultimate  reality.  The  tendency  of 
modern  science  is  to  regard  all  the  various  phenomena 
of  nature  as  different  manifestations  of  one  "  Energy." 
Consciousness  or  thought  is  then  simply  the  highest 
form  of  energy  which  we  know.  (Will  itself  is  not 
the  highest  form  :  for  rational  volition  implies 
thought.)  If  we  call  energy  (or  material  substance 
or  anything  else)  the  potentiality  of  which  thought 
is  the  realisation,  and  if  we  take  these  notions  of 
potentiality  and  realisation  quite  seriously,  we  are 
arriving  from  a  starting  point  of  "  dogmatic  materia 
lism  "  at  the  same  result  as  if  we  started  with  a 
philosophical  theory  of  knowledge  :  the  ultimate 
reality  is  thought.  But  unfortunately  the  uncritical 
metaphysics  of  the  ordinary  and  of  the  scientific 
understanding  does  not  generally  take  the  notion  of 
potentiality  quite  seriously.  Hence  it  is  necessary 
to  follow  the  longer  route  of  philosophical  criticism.1 

1  Criticisms  on  this  paper  by  Mr.  F.  C.  S.  Schiller,  a  reply  by 
myself  and  a  rejoinder  by  Mr.  Schiller  will  be  found  in  the  Philo 
sophical  Review,  Vol.  I.,  No.  5,  and  Vol.  II.,  No.  2.  Save  for  two 
slight  explanatory  phrases,  which  I  have  inserted  to  meet  some 


IO6  NOTE    ON    LOGICAL    NECESSITY. 

NOTE    ON    LOGICAL    NECESSITY. 

WHEN  John  Stuart  Mill  maintains  that  there  is  no  neces 
sity  except  the  necessity  of  logical  inference,1  he  seems  to 
me  to  maintain  what  is  perfectly  true,  although  he  does 
not  recognise  the  full  implication  of  what  he  has  said,  and 
although  he  has  himself,  in  his  theory  of  inference,  elimin 
ated  the  very  element  of  necessity  which  he  here  seems  to 
assert. 

(1)  Physical  necessity,  or   the    necessity  of  the    causal 
nexus  (If  A  happens,  B  must  happen)  is  simply  equivalent 
to  a  necessity  of  inference  from  A   to  B.     The  supposition 
of  a  force  or  power  in  A  to  move  B — the  view  of  causality 
against  which  Hume  and  Mill  rightly  protest — is  a  survival 
of  primitive  animism,     We  fill  up  the  content  or  connota 
tion  of  cause  ex  analogia  hominis.    We  think  of  one  billiard 
ball  giving  the  other  a  shove,  etc.     In  scientific  thought 
and  speech,  we  only  assert  that  A   and  B  are  so  related 
within  the  system  of  nature  that  from  A  we  can  certainly 
infer  B.     There  is  no  absolute  gap  between  "  reasons  "  in 
geometry  and  causes  in  physics  [cf.  p.  153,  note]. 

(2)  What  then  of  axioms  ?     Their  necessity  is  not  any 
mere   psychological  readiness  to  believe  them  (the  theory 
which  Mill  supposes  to  be  the  a  priori  theory  he  has  to 
overthrow) ;  their  necessity  consists  in  their  being  logically 
involved  in  the  possibility  of  any  science  whatever.     They 
are  proved  per  impossible  (Kant's  "  transcendental "  proof 

objections  of  my  critics,  I  leave  the  paper  (apart  from  purely 
verbal  corrections)  as  originally  printed,  as  I  do  not  yet  feel 
driven  to  desert  the  position  adopted  in  it.  I  could  not  attempt 
to  deal  with  all  objections,  without  making  it  unduly  lengthy. 

1  Cf.  Logic,  Book  II.  ch.  v.  §  i.  Edit.  8,  Vol.  I.  p.  262  :  "The 
only  sense  in  which  necessity  can  be  ascribed  to  the  conclusion 
of  any  scientific  investigation,  is  that  of  legitimately  following 
from  some  assumption,  which,  by  the  conditions  of  the  inquiry,  is 
not  to  be  questioned." 


NOTE    ON    LOGICAL    NECESSITY.  1 07 

— a  most  unhappy  adjective).  Logical  necessity  is  the 
necessity  of  consistency,  of  coherence  in  thought.  Con 
sistency  is,  as  I  have  said,  our  negative  test  of  reality. 
Complete  consistency  (to  us  a  mere  ideal)  would  be  a  posi 
tive  test.  To  say  that  through  natural  selection  our  minds 
have  become  such  that  they  require  to  believe  in  the 
uniformity  of  nature,  is  to  give  what  seems  the  most 
probable  historical  account  of  the  development  of  human 
thought  ;  but  it  is  no  logical  solution  of  the  question 
about  the  ultimate  relation  of  thought  to  reality,  it  only 
restates  the  fact  that  Nature,  in  the  only  sense  which  it 
can  have  for  the  scientific  man,  is  a  rational  system,  whose 
"laws"  are  the  logical  necessities  of  our  thought.  If  we 
ask  why  this  should  be  so,  there  is  first  of  all,  an  answer 
with  which  some  persons  profess  to  be  satisfied  :  The  neces 
sity,  it  is  held,  is  merely  subjective  ;  what  "  nature  "  really 
is,  we  do  not  know.  Observe,  it  is  generally  assumed,  that 
we  know  somehow  (but  how  ?)  that  there  is  a  reality  "  be 
hind  "  the  phenomena— a  survival  from  old  metaphysics  in 
the  minds  of  those  who  boast  that  they  are  not  meta 
physicians.  It  seems  to  me  an  odd  use  of  the  word  "real " 
to  make  it  mean  what  stands  in  no  relation  to  our  lives. 
Secondly,  dissatisfied  with  this  "positivism"  or  subjective 
idealism,  with  or  without  a  hypothetical  "  realism  "  in  the 
background,  we  may  be  content  to  fall  back  upon  the 
dualism  of  popular  language,  and  assume  a  "  parallelism  " 
between  our  thought  and  the  nature  of  things.  But  the 
demands  of  philosophical  criticism  will  hardly  allow  us  to 
rest  satisfied  with  this  metaphor  of  parallelism,  which  easily 
leads  us  back  into  the  other  metaphors  of  mirrors,  waxen 
tablets,  etc.  Knowledge  is  not  possible,  if  thought  and 
things  confront  each  other  as  alien  substances.  Is  it  not 
the  better  hypothesis  (not  to  call  it  anything  more)  that 
our  thought  is  in  some  way  identical  with  the  reason  in 
things  ?  Logical  necessity  is  the  necessity,  not  merely  of 
this  or  that  individual  mind,  nor  of  a  sum  of  individual 
minds,  but  of  thought  as  such,  and  therefore  of  the  universe. 


108  NOTE    ON    LOGICAL    NECESSITY. 

(3)  In  regard  to  human  actions,  Mill  shows  quite  well 
(Logic,  Book  VI.  ch.  ii.)  that  the  necessity  presupposed  by 
any  science  such  as  psychology  or  sociology,  is,  as  with 
physical  phenomena,  simply  necessity  of  inference.  On 
the  other  hand,  moral  necessity  (if  the  phrase  be  used  for 
a  moral  precept,  "  You  must,  i.e.,  ought  to,  do  so  and  so  ") 
is  a  totally  different  thing.  A  political  or  moral  law  is  the 
statement  of  an  ideal  ;  it  puts  forward  one  motive  for  con 
duct  among  other  motives.  It  is  through  association  with 
this  sense  of  "  must"  (implying  a  command  with  threats  of 
penalties)  that  our  understanding  of  physical  necessity  is 
apt  to  be  vitiated  (see  below,  pp.  174-177). 


IV. 
ON  PLATO'S  PHAEDO.1 

I. 

BEFORE  we  can  answer  the  questions  :  "What  are 
Plato's  arguments  about  the  soul's  nature  and  des 
tiny?"  "  What  is  their  relation  to  one  another?" 
"  What  is  their  value  ?  "  we  are  obliged  to  consider 
how  far  the  expressions  used  by  him  are  to  be  under 
stood  literally. 

Plato's  visions  of  another  world  have  fixed  them 
selves  indelibly  in  the  common  consciousness  of 
Western  civilisation.  We  hardly  know,  without  the 
most  careful  examination,  how  many  of  those  beliefs 
that  are  often  spoken  of  as  if  they  were  peculiar  to 
Christianity,  are  due  directly  or  indirectly  to  Platonic 
influence.  Thus,  even  if  it  should  be  the  case  that 
the  mythical  element  in  Plato  is  (as  Hegel 2  holds) 
quite  unessential  in  his  philosophy,  or  (as  Teich- 
miiller3  holds)  not  believed  in  at  all  by  Plato  him- 

1  Read  before  the  Aristotelian  Society  (London)  on   Nov.  30, 
1885,  and  published  in  Mind,  Vol.  XL,  No.  43. 

2  Geschichte  der  Phil.,  ii.  207  ff. 

3  Studien  zur  Gesch.  der  Begriffe  and  Ueber  die  Unsterblichkeit 
der  Seek.     Some  criticisms  of  the  late  Prof.  Teichmiiller's  on  this 
paper  of  mine  will  be  found  in  his  Religionsphilosophie  (Breslau, 

109 


no  ON  PLATO'S  PHAEDO.  [iv. 

self,  this  mythical  element  would  still  deserve  the 
attention  of  all  students  of  human  thought,  both  as 
taking  up  previous  Pythagorean,  Orphic,  probably 
Egyptian  and  perhaps  Indian  ideas,  and  as  influenc 
ing  all  the  Hellenic  and  Roman  world,  i.e.,  what  we 
commonly  call  the  whole  world.  And,  in  any  case, 
the  mythical  form  of  expression  must  throw  some 
light  on  Plato's  habitual  manner  of  thinking  ;  for  we 
cannot  abstractly  separate  form  and  content,  expres 
sion  and  thought. 

Let  us  take  the  three  characteristic  Platonic  "  doc 
trines  "  of  Recollection,  Pre-existence  and  Transmi 
gration,  and  endeavour  to  discover  in  what  sense 
they  are  to  be  understood. 

i.  The  doctrine  of  Recollection  (ai/a/^o-t?)  occurs 
both  in  the  Meno  and  the  Phcedo.  "  Knowing  is 
remembering."  This  theory  seemed  to  obviate  the 
Sophistic  puzzle  about  the  impossibility  of  learning  : 
— We  either  learn  what  we  already  know  or  what 
we  don't  know  :  in  the  first  case  we  don't  learn  ;  in 
the  second  case,  we  can't  (cf.  Meno,  80  E).  This 
is  just  one  of  those  instances  where  the  Aristotelian 
distinction  of  potentiality  and  actuality  comes  at 

1886),  p.  502.  Prof.  Vera  in  his  monograph  entitled  Platone  e  Fim- 
mortalita  dell'  anima  (Naples,  1881),  to  which  Dr.  J.  Hutchison 
Stirling  kindly  directed  my  attention,  maintains  a  theory  very 
much  like  Teichmiiller's,  except  that  he  would  treat  Plato's 
"myths"  as  approximations,  "serious  jests" — the  world  itself 
being  such.  "  II  giuoco  e  1'involucro,  la  parvenza  dell'  idea,  cioe 
la  poesia."  But,  as  he  says  philosophy  is  essentially  "  esoteric," 
his  general  attitude  to  Plato  comes  to  be  the  sain  e  as  that  of 
Teichmiiller. 


iv.]  ON  PLATO'S  PHAEDO.  1 1 1 

once  to  our  help,  We  learn  what  we  are  capable  of 
knowing  :  we  cannot  learn  what  is  quite  alien  to  us. 
But  the  knowledge,  which  in  some  form  is  there 
already,  is  there  only  virtually,  and  requires  the  effort 
of  what  we  call  learning  to  become  actual,  to  be 
realised,  to  become  what  we  can  properly  call  know 
ledge.  Plato  in  the  Thecetetiis  (which  in  many  re 
spects  may  be  called  the  most  "  modern"  of  all  his 
dialogues,  for  in  it  he  discusses,  not  the  usual  ancient 
question  of  Being,  but  the  modern  question  of  Know 
ing)  does  arrive  at  this  Aristotelian  distinction  in  his 
recognition  of  the  difference  between  "  possessing  " 
and  "having  or  holding,"  illustrating  it  by  the  birds 
in  a  cage  (Thecet.y  197)  ;  but  it  remained  for  Aris 
totle  to  grasp  the  full  significance  of  this  distinction, 
which  has  become  so  much  a  commonplace  of  our 
language  and  our  thought  that  it  requires  an  effort  to 
see  its  importance  and  to  understand  how  the  prob 
lems  of  knowledge  presented  themselves  before  the 
time  of  Aristotle.  Now,  this  is  just  the  philosophic 
truth  of  Plato's  theory  of  Recollection:  in  learning 
the  mind  is  not  filled  with  something  alien  to  it, — as 
popular  language,  now  as  then,  is  inclined  to  assume, 
and  as  even  some  philosophers  have  been  apt  to 
suppose,  e.g.,  when  they  ask  how  Mind  can  know 
Matter,  after  defining  Matter  in  such  a  way  that  it  is 
of  its  very  essence,  as  the  exact  antithesis  of  Mind, 
that  it  cannot  be  known.  According  to  Plato,  in 
learning  the  soul  recovers  its  own.  This  is  more 
than  a  theory  of  knowledge  merely.  In  the  Phcedrus 
it  becomes  a  theory  of  art  and  morality  as  well.  The 


ii2  ON  PLATO'S  PHAEDO.  [iv. 

ideal  of  beauty,  the  ideal  of  goodness,  is  figured  as 
something  we  have  once  known  and  have  to  regain. 
And  are  we  not  all  ready  to  speak  and  think  in  this 
way  ?  What  is  the  meaning  of  the  phrase  "  Natural 
Rights,"  which  popular  politicians  have  not  yet 
given  up,  and  which  even  Mr.  Herbert  Spencer  de 
fends  against  Bentham  and  Mr.  Matthew  Arnold  ? 
We  have  come  to  form  an  ideal  of  society,  and  we 
speak  as  if  that  were  a  state  from  which  we  had 
fallen  away.  We  transfer  the  "ought  to  be"  to 
"  once  upon  a  time" — a  golden  age,  "a  past  that 
never  was  a  present,"  The  same  tendency  of  imagin 
ation  may  be  found  in  the  treatment  of  the  term 
"a  priori!'  A  priori  conceptions,  in  Kant's  use  of 
the  term,  are  those  which  are  necessarily  implied  or 
presupposed  in  knowledge.  How  often  is  the 
Kantian  theory  of  knowledge  criticised  as  if  Kant 
had  meant  that  the  infant  comes  into  the  world  with 
a  ready-made  logic  ?  We  become  explicitly  con 
scious  of  the  necessary  conditions  of  our  thinking 
very  late,  if  at  all  ;  but  the  conditions  are  there  im 
plicitly  all  the  same.  In  the  word  "  presupposed  " 
there  again  slips  in  the  suggestion  of  priority  in  time. 
The  doctrine  of  Recollection  has  been  made  most 
familiar  to  us  by  Wordsworth's  Ode.  But  this,  we 
may  well  say  with  J.  S.  Mill  (though  I  know  not 
whether  in  his  sense),  is  "  falsely  called  Platonic." 
Wordsworth  makes  life  a  gradual  decline  :  Plato 
makes  it  a  progress.  To  Wordsworth  it  is  a  for 
getting  :  to  Plato  a  remembering.  In  Wordsworth 
the  child  is  nearer  heaven  than  the  full-grown  man  : 


iv.]  ON  PLATO'S  PHAEDO.  1 1 3 

in  Plato  the  full-grown  man,  if  he  has  used  his  time 
well,  has  regained  much  of  what  he  lost  by  birth.1 
Wordsworth's  beautiful  fancy  owes  more  to  the 
sentimentalism  of  Rousseau  than  to  Plato's  ideal 
ism. 

How  far  was  Plato  conscious  that  his  doctrine  of 
Recollection  was  only  a  Vorstellung  representing  a 
Begriff,  an  expression  in  terms  of  a  history  in  time 
of  what  is  really  a  logical  development  ?  The  theory 
of  Education  in  the  Republic  seems  to  supply  an 
answer.  It  is  sometimes  said  that  in  the  Republic 
Plato  applies  the  theory  of  ideas  at  which  he  was 
arriving  in  the  Meno,  but  that  he  has  given  up  the 
doctrine  of  Recollection  at  least  as  an  essential  part 
of  his  theory  of  knowledge  (though  it  is  alluded  to 
in  the  "  myth  "  at  the  end,  621  A).  Now  I  shall 
assume  as  a  canon  of  interpretation  in  the  case  of 
Plato,  as  of  any  other  philosopher,  that  we  must 
start  with  the  supposition  that  his  thinking  is 
coherent,  and  that  we  must  begin  by  looking  for 
agreement  rather  than  for  disagreement.  On  the 
other  hand,  we  cannot  put  the  canon  in  the  form  in 
which  Prof.  Teichmuller  and  Mr.  Archer- Hind  put 
it — "That  any  interpretation  of  Plato  which  attri 
butes  inconsistency  to  him  stands  self-condemned."2 
Consistency  is  a  very  poor  virtue  to  ascribe  to  Plato: 

1  This  has  been  pointed  out  by  Mr.  Archer-Hind  in  his  edition 
of  the  Phcedo,  p.  85. 

2  Edition  of  the  Phczdo,  p.  24.    Mr.  Archer-Hind  cannot  mean 
this  to  be  taken  too  literally,  because  he  certainly  admits  a  de 
velopment  in  Platonic  doctrine. 

D.  H.  I 


ii4  °N  PLATO'S  PHAEDO.  |_iv. 

it  would  imply  that  his  system  sprang  ready-made 
from  his  head  and  that  it  admitted  of  no  growth — a 
view  seriously  maintained  by  Schleiermacher,  who 
regards  the  order  (i.e.,  the  order  which  he  conjectur- 
ally  prefers)  of  the  dialogues  as  representing  an 
order  adopted  for  purposes  of  exposition  and  not  an 
order  of  development  in  the  writer's  mind.  When, 
therefore,  in  the  Republic,  we  find  Education  de 
scribed  as  "  the  turning  round  of  the  eye  of  the 
soul  to  behold  the  truth,"  :  it  seems  reasonable  to 
identify  this  with  the  theory  of  Recollection  divested 
of  its  mythical  setting  :  but  we  are  not  therefore 
justified  in  arguing  that  this  mythical  setting  never 
had  any  real  significance  for  Plato  himself. 

2.  If  the  doctrine  of  Recollection  be  merely  a 
figurative  way  of  expressing  the  logical  nature  of 
knowledge,  what  becomes  of  the  Pre-existence  of 
the  Soul  about  which  so  much  is  said,  not  only  in 
the  Meno,  Phcedo  and  Phcedrus,  but  in  the  end  of  the 
Rep^cblic  itself?  The  pre-existence  of  the  soul  is 
"  proved"  in  \he.Phado  sooner  and  more  easily  than 

1  Rep.,  vii.  518  B,  C.  "Certain  professors  of  education  must 
be  mistaken  in  saying  that  they  can  put  a  knowledge  into  the  soul 
which  was  not  there  before,  like  sight  into  blind  eyes.  .  .  . 
Whereas  our  argument  shows  that  the  power  (Swa/ws)  is  already 
in  the  soul ;  and  that  as  the  eye  may  be  imagined  unable  to  turn 
from  darkness  to  light  without  the  whole  body,  so  too,  when 
the  eye  of  the  soul  is  turned  round,  the  whole  soul  must  be 
turned  round  from  the  world  of  becoming  into  that  of  being,  and 
learn  by  degrees  to  endure  the  sight  of  being  and  of  the  brightest 
and  best  of  being,  or,  in  other  words,  of  the  Good."  (Jowett's 
Translation,  according  to  which  most  of  the  other  quotations  in 
this  paper  are  given.) 


iv.]  ON  PLATO'S  PHAEDO.  1 1 5 

its  existence  after  death  ;  and  all  the  arguments  in 
the  Pkcedo,  as  well  as  the  argument  in  the  Pkce- 
drus,  prove  existence  after  death  only  in  such  a  way 
that  existence  before  birth  is  necessarily  implied  also. 
This  is  not  the  case  with  the  argument  in  the 
Republic,  although  the  "Vision  of  Er"  introduces 
pre-existence  as  much  as  do  the  Apocalypses  of  the 
Ph<zdo  and  Phadrus.  Mr.  Archer- Hind  goes  so 
far  as  to  say  :  "It  is  in  fact  impossible  to  bring  for 
ward  any  sound  arguments  for  the  future  existence 
of  the  soul  which  do  not  also  involve  its  previous 
existence,  its  everlasting  duration.  The  creational 
theory  is  matter  of  dogmatic  assertion,  not  of  philo 
sophical  discussion  "  (p.  19).  The  idea  of  pre-exist 
ence  was  rejected  by  most  Christian  theologians, 
because  it  seemed  inconsistent  with  the  creation  of 
the  human  soul  by  God.  (It  was  accepted  by 
Origen  ;  but  then  Origen  was  not  accepted  by  the 
Church.)  Quite  consistently,  the  idea  of  a  necessary 
immortality  of  the  soul  was  rejected  by  most  of  the 
early  Christian  theologians.  It  is  only  later  theology 
that  has  fallen  back  on  the  metaphysical  doctrine  of 
immortality. 

As  «we  have  obviously,  in  the  ordinary  sense  of 
the  term,  no  recollection  of  having  existed  before 
our  birth,  it  might  be  argued  that,  since  Plato  puts 
the  existence  of  the  soul  after  death  on  the  same 
level  with  its  existence  before  birth,  either  (i)  he  did 
not  seriously  hold  the  immortality  of  the  soul  at  all, 
or  (2)  the  immortality  in  which  he  believed  was  not 
what  people  ordinarily  mean,  or  think  they  mean,  by 


1 1 6  ON  PLATO'S  PHAEDO.  [iv. 

immortality,  since  it  does  not  imply  consciousness 
and  memory  ;  Plato,  it  might  be  said,  maintains  an 
individual  but  not  a  personal  immortality,  i.e.,  the 
individual  soul  remains  permanently  self-identical, 
but  consciousness  and  memory  pass  away  at  death.1 
It  is  somewhat  strange  that  Plato  should  have  made 
no  reference  to  this  very  obvious  objection,  that  if 
after  death  we  are  as  little  conscious  of  an  identity 
with  our  present  selves  as  we  are  now  of  any  identity 
with  a  self  before  our  birth,  the  immortality  of  the  soul 
cannot  matter  to  us.  As  Hume  says  :  "  The  soul  if 
immortal  existed  before  birth  :  and  if  the  former 
existence  noways  concerned  us,  neither  will  the 
latter"  (Essay  ''On  the  Immortality  of  the  Soul"). 
Yet  the  objection  evidently  was  made  in  ancient 
times,2  because  there  is  an  attempted  answer  in  a 
fragment  of  Aristotle's  lost  dialogue  Eudemus,  pre 
served  to  us  by  Proclus  :  "  Aristotle,"  says  Proclus, 
"  tells  us  the  reason  why  the  soul  coming  hither  from 
the  other  world  forgets  what  she  there  has  seen,  but 
going  hence  remembers  her  experience  here.  Some 
who  journey  from  health  to  sickness  forget  even 
their  letters,  but  this  happens  to  no  one  who  passes 

1  In  this  sense   of  the  terms  Teichmiiller  (Unsterblichkeit  der 
Seek,  pp.  147-149)   maintains  that  individual  immortality  can  be 
apodeictically  proved,   but  that  personal  immortality  cannot  be 
apodeictically  proved  or  disproved.     He  holds,   however,  as  we 
shall  see,  that   Plato's  idealism  prevents  him   maintaining  even 
individual  immortality. 

2  It  is  to  be  found  in  Athenaeus,  Dcipnosophistac,  xi.  117  (507 
e,  f).    Cf.  Lucretius,  III.  830-869.    But  the  fragment  of  Aristotle, 
if  genuine,  is  the  earliest  evidence  of  this  objection. 


iv.]  ON  PLATO'S  PHAEDO.  117 

from  sickness  to  health.  Now  the  life  without  the 
body,  being  the  natural  life  of  the  soul,  is  like  health, 
the  life  in  the  body  like  disease.  Whence  it  is  that 
they  who  come  from  the  other  world  forget  what  is 
there,  but  they  who  go  thither  remember  what  they 
experiencd  here"  (Arist,  1480  b.  5,  Fr.  35,  Edit. 
Berol.).  We  cannot  say  how  far  Aristotle,  when  he 
wrote  the  Eudemus>  may  have  seriously  or  half- 
seriously  meant  what  he  said.  We  cannot  cer 
tainly  decide  whether  in  his  opinions  about  the  soul 
he  passed  through  an  early  "Platonic"  stage  (as 
Zeller  thinks,  Arist.,  p.  602),  or  whether  he  was 
writing  a  Platonic  dialogue  more  or  less  as  a  literary 
exercise,  or  whether  the  dialogues,  being  (as  Bernays 
thinks)  merely  ''exoteric  discourses,"  must  not  be 
taken  as  evidence  of  Aristotle's  genuine  philosophical 
views.  We  know  of  course  from  the  De  Anima 
that  Aristotle  held  no  doctrine  of  either  individual  or 
personal  immortality.  But  the  passage  quoted  by 
Proclus  may  be  taken  as  representing  the  answers 
which  would  have  been  made  in  a  Platonic  dialogue 
to  an  objector.  It  certainly  agrees  perfectly  with 
the  position  of  the  Pk&do,  according  to  which  this 
life  is  a  temporary  imprisonment  of  the  soul. 

3.  The  idea  of  Metempsychosis  or  Transmigration 
has  been  more  widely  held  than  any  other  view  about 
the  destiny  of  the  soul,  and  has  even  in  modern  times 
been  regarded  as  that  most  capable  of  philosophical 
defence.  Thus  Hume  says,  in  the  Essay  I  have 
already  quoted  :  "The  Metempsychosis  is  the  only 
system  of  this  kind  that  Philosophy  can  hearken  to." 


1 1 8  ON  PLATO'S  PHAEDO.  [iv. 

Hume  may  be  writing  ironically,    maintaining    the 
doctrine  least  acceptable  to  his  enemies,  the  theo 
logians,    to   be   the   most   plausible.      But    no    such 
suspicion  attaches  to  the  famous  passage  in  which 
Lessing  at  the  close  of  his  Erziehung  des  Menschen- 
geschlechtes  (§§  93-100)  says  :   "  Why  may  not  each 
individual  man  have  been  more  than  once  present 
in  this  world  ?     Is  this  hypothesis  so  ridiculous  be 
cause  it  is  the   oldest?     .     .     .      It   is  well   that  I 
forget  that  I  have  already  been  here.     The  recollec 
tion  of  my  previous   condition  would   only  let   me 
make  a  bad  use  of  my  present.     And  what  I  must 
forget  for  the  present,  have   I    forgotten  for  ever? 
.     .      .      Is  not  all  eternity  mine?" 

Plato's  accounts  in  his  different  dialogues  are 
certainly  not  easy  to  reconcile  with  each  other  even 
in  important  points.  Thus  (a)  we  may  doubt  how 
far,  according  to  Plato,  any  human  soul  can  ever 
exist  without  a  body  of  some  sort :  perhaps  the 
completely  free  existence  is  only  an  ideal,  never  quite 
attained,  although  approximated  to  by  the  philo 
sopher.  In  the  myth  in  the  Phcedrus  (246  D)  even 
the  gods  have  a  body.  So  in  the  Timceus  the 
created  gods  are  compounded  of  body  and  soul.  In 
the  Laws  however  (x.  899  A)  the  incorporeal  exist 
ence  of  the  soul  (he  is  speaking  especially  of  the 
soul  of  the  gods)  is  put  forward  as  an  alternative. 
Again  (b)  in  the  Timceus  (41  D,  ff.)  it  is  said  that 
the  soul  is  necessarily  implanted  in  bodily  forms  : 
whereas  in  the  Phczdrus  (248)  the  descent  into  a 
body  is  spoken  of  as  resulting  from  forgetfulness 


iv.]  ON  PLATO'S  PHAEDO.  119 

and  vice,  i.e.,  as  being  a  punishment  for  sin.  This 
difficulty  may  be  put  aside  :  it  is  only  one  form  of 
the  contradiction  between  the  conception  of  Neces 
sity  and  Freedom  which  appears  in  all  human 
thought,  in  all  philosophies  and  in  all  theologies. 
Man  falls  by  free-will,  and  yet  the  fall  is  regarded 
as  necessary.  (c)  Zeller  (Plato,  Engl.  Transl.,  p. 
410,  n.  55)  has  raised  a  difficulty  about  the  migration 
of  a  human  soul  into  lower  animals.  "How  can 
man,"  he  asks,  "to  whose  nature  the  capability  of 
forming  concepts,  according  to  Phczdrus,  249  B, 
essentially  belongs,  become  a  beast  ? "  To  this  it 
might  quite  well  be  answered,  within  the  limits  of 
the  Transmigration-doctrine,  that  Plato  means  that 
because  man  knows  by  universals,  his  soul  must 
once,  i.e.,  when  "in  heaven,"  have  seen  them:  a 
soul  which  to  begin  with  was  a  beast's,  and  so  only 
a  beast's,  could  not  rise  to  be  a  man's.  A  soul  may 
sink  from  among  the  gods  to  man,  and  then  to  beast, 
and  rise  again  to  be  with  the  gods,  only  because  at 
first  it  was  with  the  gods.  The  rest  of  Zeller's  ob 
jections  may  be  met  in  a  similar  way.  Thus,  when 
he  asks  how  can  the  life  of  the  beast  serve  to  purify 
the  soul,  the  answer  would  be  found  in  the  concep 
tion  of  expiation  by  suffering.  When  the  soul  came 
to  choose  again,  it  would  have  been  taught  the  evil 
of  the  merely  animal  life.  And  even  among  beasts, 
as  the  Buddhists  recognise,  there  are  degrees  of 
moral  quality.  Again  Zeller  asks  :  "Are  the  souls 
of  the  beasts  (ace.  to  Tim.,  90  E.,  ff.)  all  descended 
from  former  human  souls  and  so  all  intelligent  and  im- 


I2O  ON  PLATO'S  PHAEDO.  [iv. 

mortal  according  to  their  original  being,  or  (Ph<zdr., 
249  B)  only  some  of  them?"  Plato  might  answer 
that  all  souls,  which  are  now  souls  of  beasts,  may 
quite  well  once  have  been  human.  The  passage  in 
the  Phadrus  only  implies  that,  if  there  were  any 
soul  of  a  beast  that  had  never  been  human,  it  could 
never  become  human.  Thus,  though  it  may  repre 
sent  a  different  view  from  that  of  the  Timaus,  it  is 
not  necessarily  inconsistent  with  it.  But  the  want 
of  formal  consistency  in  the  mythology  may  be  taken 
as  indicating,  what  Plato  himself  suggests  at  the 
beginning  of  the  Timceus  (29  C),  that  it  is  not  to 
be  taken  too  literally.  We  have  here  only  "prob 
ability,"  not  truth. 

The  key  to  the  interpretation  of  Plato's  myths 
seems  to  be  given  us  in  the  Republic  (382  C,  D), 
where,  after  condemning  altogether  "the  lie  in  the 
soul,"  i.e.,  ignorance,  he  allows  that  "the  lie  in 
words"  may  be  used  in  two  cases  :  (i)  as  a  medicine 
((j)dpfjiaKov)  against  enemies  and  to  deceive  men  for 
their  own  good,  as  we  do  with  sick  persons  and 
madmen  ;  (2)  as  an  approximation  to  the  truth  : 
where  it  is  impossible  to  express  the  truth  exactly, 
we  may  give  something  which,  though  false,  re 
sembles  the  truth  as  far  as  possible.  Teichmtiller1 
holds  that  the  myths  about  the  soul  belong  to  the 
first  class,  like  the  myth  of  the  earth-born  men 
(Rep.,  414  C  ff.)  which  justifies  the  caste-system. 
The  story  of  the  earth-born  men  is  obviously  a 
dogma  to  be  imposed  authoritatively  by  the  legis- 
1  Studien  zur  Geschichte  der  Begriffc,  p,  163. 


iv.]  ON  PLATO'S  PHAEDO.  121 

lator  on  the  ignorant  classes  ;  but  the  accounts  of 
the  origin  and  destiny  of  the  soul  seem  to  me  to  be 
'permissible  lies'  of  the  second  kind,  as  is  suggested 
by  the  passage  just  referred  to  in  the  Timceus  and 
in  the  end  of  the  Phcedo  itself  (114  D)  :  "  A  man 
of  sense  ought  not  to  say,  nor  will  I  be  too  confident, 
that  the  description  which  I  have  given  of  the  soul 
and  her  mansions  is  exactly  true.  But  I  do  say  that, 
inasmuch  as  the  soul  is  shown  to  be  immortal,  he 
may  venture  to  think,  not  improperly  or  unworthily, 
that  something  of  the  kind  is  true.  The  venture  is 
a  glorious  one,  and  he  ought  to  comfort  himself 
with  words  like  these,  which  is  the  reason  why  I 
lengthen  out  the  tale."  There  is  certainly  a  passage 
in  the  Laws  (959  A),  to  which  Teichmtiller  refers, 
that  seems  to  favour  his  view.  With  regard  to  the 
burial  of  the  dead  it  is  there  written  :  "  Now  we 
must  believe  the  legislator  when  he  tells  us  that  the 
soul  is  in  all  respects  superior  to  the  body,  and  that 
even  in  life  that  which  makes  each  one  of  us  to  be 
what  we  are  is  only  the  soul ;  and  that  the  body 
follows  us  about  in  the  likeness  of  each  of  us,  and, 
therefore,  when  we  are  dead,  the  bodies  of  the  dead 
are  rightly  said  to  be  our  shades  or  images  ;  for  that 
the  true  and  immortal  being  of  each  one  of  us,  which 
is  called  the  soul,  goes  on  her  way  to  other  Gods, 
that  before  them  she  may  give  an  account — an  in 
spiring  hope  to  the  good,  but  very  terrible  to  the 
bad,  as  the  laws  of  our  fathers  tell  us,  which  also 
say  that  not  much  can  be  done  in  the  way  of  helping 
a  man  after  he  is  dead.  But  the  living — he  should 


122  ON  PLATO'S  PHAEDO.  [iv. 

be  helped  by  all  his  kindred,  that  while  in  life  he 
may  be  the  holiest  and  justest  of  men,  and  after 
death  may  have  no  great  sins  to  be  punished  in  the 
world  below."  This  passage  does  seem  to  rest  the 
doctrine  about  the  soul  merely  on  the  authority  of 
the  legislator.  But  while  Plato  holds  that  for  the 
mass  of  mankind,  who  have  only  "opinion"  or  "belief" 
on  all  matters,  such  authority  is  sufficient,  surely  he 
does  not  mean  us  to  think  that  the  Socrates  of  the 
Phczdo,  who  is  dying  as  a  condemned  heretic,  holds 
the  doctrine  of  immortality  only  as  something  im 
posed  by  old  tradition.  If  so,  all  the  lengthy  argu 
ments  would  be  very  much  out  of  place.  Though, 
in  the  Laws,  Plato  puts  the  views  about  the  future 
life  as  "  a  medicinal  myth "  for  the  multitude,  they 
may  still  be  "a  myth  of  approximation"  for  the  philo 
sopher  :  a  traditional  belief  may  be  the  stammering 
expression  of  a  true  and  vital  idea.  And  in  any 
case,  the  Laws  cannot  be  taken  as  certain  evidence 
of  what  Plato  held  when  he  wrote  the  Phczdo. 

Let  me  assume,  then,  that  what  is  said  about  the 
life  before  and  after  the  present  life  is  intended  as  an 
approximation  to  the  truth.  The  difficulty  remains 
to  decide  where  myth  ends  and  where  logic  begins. 
Critics  have  been  too  apt  to  suppose  that  Plato 
himself  could  always  have  drawn  the  line  exactly. 
Our  language  and  our  thinking  are  conditioned 
by  our  ordinary  experiences  ;  and  when  we  have  to 
speak  of  that  which  belongs  to  the  insensible,  we 
find  ourselves  compelled,  however  much  we  try  to 
avoid  it,  to  use  phraseology  belonging  properly  only 


iv.]  ON  PLATO'S  PHAEDO.  123 

to  the  sensible.  We  have  to  talk  of  the  mind,  which 
we  know  not  to  be  in  space,  as  if  it  were  in  space 
and  had  parts  and  divisions  ;  and  we  have  to  apply 
to  what  our  logic  compels  us  to  recognise  as  inde 
pendent  of  time  conceptions  and  images  which  have 
strictly  no  meaning  except  as  applied  to  what  Plato 
calls  "the  moving  image  of  Eternity."  In  illustra 
tion  one  need  only  refer  again  to  such  phrases  as 
"  a  priori"  "//-^supposed,"  to  see  how  we  ourselves 
are  obliged  to  use  "the  verbal  lie."  Philosophy 
cannot  dispense  with  metaphor.  But  we  should  try 
to  use  our  metaphors  with  as  full  a  consciousness 
as  possible.  It  is  metaphors  which  escape  notice 
that  are  dangerous.  Besides  being  subject  to  this 
common  necessity  of  human  thought,  Plato  is  essen 
tially  a  poet ;  and  thus  to  him  the  language  of  myth 
is  natural.  His  notions  clothe  themselves  readily  in 
sensuous  imagery.  And  we  cannot  make  a  sharp 
distinction  between  Plato  the  poet  and  Plato  the 
philosopher  (as  Teichmliller  tries  to  do,  Studien, 
p.  158).  As  already  said,  we  cannot  completely 
separate  the  form  and  the  content  of  his  thinking. 

We  can  no  longer  hold,  as  used  often  to  be  held, 
that  there  is  a  fundamental  antithesis  between  Plato 
and  Aristotle.  The  agreement  between  them  is  far 
more  fundamental  than  the  difference.  The  severe 
and  often  captious  criticisms  of  Aristotle  must  not 
blind  us  to  the  fact  that  almost  every  Aristotelian 
doctrine  is  to  be  found  implicitly  in  Plato.  As  Sir 
A.  Grant  admirably  said,  "  Aristotle  codified  Plato." 
In  that  phrase  there  is  an  expression  at  once  of  the 


124  ON  PLATO'S  PHAEDO.  [iv. 

essential  agreement  in  thought  and  of  the  obtrusive 
difference  in  manner.  There  is  of  course  a  Platonic 
system  of  philosophy,  in  the  sense  in  which  every 
great  philosopher,  every  thinker  who  is  more  than  a 
mere  brilliant  penseur,  has  a  system  ;  but  Plato's 
manner  of  working,  not  merely  his  manner  of  writing, 
is  artistic  rather  than  scientific.  The  difference  be 
tween  Plato  and  Aristotle  is  not  that  Plato  is  an 
idealist  and  Aristotle  a  realist — Aristotle  is  as  much 
an  idealist  as  Plato— but  that  Plato  is  a  religious 
poet  and  Aristotle  a  scientifically  trained  physician. 

Let  us  recognise,  then,  as  fully  as  possible,  that 
the  philosophic  truth  of  Plato  is  to  be  found  in 
Aristotle.  But  it  does  not  therefore  follow  that 
Plato  himself  would  have  accepted  Aristotle's  doc 
trines  as  his  own.  The  student  of  Kant  feels  that 
Kant  himself  did  not  fully  recognise  the  philosophic 
significance  of  many  of  his  own  positions.  He  re 
tained  much  of  the  phraseology,  and  along  with  it 
not  a  little  of  the  way  of  thinking,  of  the  Leibnitio- 
Wolffian  School,  and  would  not  have  admitted  the 
interpretation  given  to  his  doctrines  by  Fichte  and 
Hegel.  So  too  in  Plato  there  is  retained  much 
Pythagorean  phraseology  belonging  to  a  stage  of 
thought  beyond  which  he  had  really  advanced,  and 
he  would  certainly  not  have  recognised  the  Aristo 
telian  developments  as  his  own.  I  am  quite  aware 
that  this  is  a  way  of  treating  the  history  of  philo 
sophy  which  does  not  commend  itself  to  a  great 
many,  especially  among  English,  students  of  philo 
sophy  ;  but  it  seems  to  me  the  only  way  in  which  the 


iv.]  ON  PLATO'S  PHAEDO.  125 

history  of  philosophy — nay,  in  which  any  history 
becomes  intelligible  at  all.  Rousseau  might  not  have 
recognised  his  own  work  in  the  French  revolution  ; 
and  yet  none  the  less  it  was,  in  certain  of  its  aspects, 
only  an  attempt  to  translate  his  ideas  into  facts. 
Luther  might  have  been  horrified  at  the  modern 
theology  and  philosophy  of  Germany  ;  and  yet  they 
are  the  direct  product  of  his  revolt  from  ecclesiastical 
authority.  No  man,  not  even  the  greatest  and 
wisest,  can  fully  understand  the  significance  of  what 
he  is  doing. 

Thus,  while  admitting  and  insisting  that  Aristo- 
telianism  is  "the  truth,"  or,  in  other  words,  gives  the 
philosophical  interpretation  of  Platonism,  we  must  not 
suppose  that  Plato  himself  would  have  admitted  it. 
We  must  distinguish  between  the  Platonism  of  Aris 
totle  and  Platonism  as  it  existed  for  the  mind  of  Plato 
himself.  Hence,  however  much  we  feel,  with  Hegel, 
that  the  mythical  element,  the  picture-thinking,  is  , 
not  of  the  essence  of  Platonism,  we  must  not  go  on 
to  say,  with  Teichmliller,  that  Plato  himself  did  not 
hold  any  of  it  at  all.  To  say  this  is  to  imply  that 
Plato  had  an  exoteric  and  an  esoteric  philosophy,1 
and  that  when  he  argued  for  the  immortality  of  the 
soul  he  was  deliberately  deceiving  his  readers  by  "a 
noble  lie,"  such  as  he  allows  his  rulers  to  use  towards 
the  lower  classes  in  the  state.  But  surely  such  a 
"  deception"  is  quite  foreign  to  Plato's  spirit.  No 
philosopher  does  his  thinking  more  openly  before 

1  This  Prof.  Vera  expressly  says.    See  his  Platone  e  rimmortalita 
deir  ant'ma,  pp.  33  seq. 


126  ON  PLATO'S  PHAEDO.  [iv. 

the  public — that  public,  at  least,  to  which  he  appeals. 
Because,  as  we  have  shown,  the  truth  of  the  doctrine 
of  Recollection  is  to  be  found  in  that  theory  of  know 
ledge  which  presupposes  an  identity  of  Thought 
and  Being,  it  does  not  follow  that  Plato  himself  did 
not  in  his  own  mind  figure  the  soul  as  having 
existed  previously  to  birth  and  as  recovering  again 
in  this  life  some  part  of  the  knowledge  it  had  pos 
sessed  before.  However  conscious  Plato  was  that 
such  language,  in  terms  of  time,  was  inadequate  to 
express  the  exact  truth,  the  frequent  use  of  such 
language  must  be  taken  as  showing  a  habit  of  think 
ing  and  not  merely  an  artificial  mode  of  expression. 

II. 

Let  us  now  consider  separately  the  arguments  for 
immortality  in  the  Ph&do.  It  has  been  much  de 
bated  how  many  they  are.1  They  may  be  con- 

1  It  may  be  convenient  to  state  briefly  the  distribution  of  the 
arguments  according  to  Sir  W.  Geddes  and  Mr.  Archer-Hind  re 
spectively,  their  editions  being  those  most  likely  to  be  in  the 
hands  of  the  English  reader. 

Geddes.  Archer-Hind. 

I.   tti/TctTroSoa-ts  (70  C — 72  D).  ~) 

II.    aW//,v?7oris  (72  E — 76  D).  } 

III.  The  soul  is  simple,   not  composite,  in  nature     II. 
(78  B— 80  E). 

IV.  Objection  of  Simmias,  that  the  soul  is  a  Har 

mony,  refuted  (85,  86,  91-95). 
Objection  of  Cebes,  that  the  soul  may  outlast  the 
body  but  not  be  immortal,  refuted  (86-88). 

V.  The  soul  partakes  in  the  idea  of  life,  and  therefore  III. 

cannot  perish  (100  B — 107  B). 


iv.]  ON  PLATO'S  PHAEDO.  127 

veniently  treated    as    three    in    number,  though   all 
really  form  steps  in  one  great  argument. 

i.  There  is  an  old  tradition  that  souls  come  back 
from  Hades  and  live  again  (cf.  Meno,  81).  This 
Plato  explains  and  vindicates  by  the  doctrine  that 
opposites  come  from  opposites  (OVK  a\\o6ev  j  CK  TWV 
evavriwv  TO.  evavria).  Mr.  Archer-Hind  (p.  73)  says 
that  Plato  appeals  to  the  uniformity  of  nature  and 
has  seized  on  the  principle  of  the  conservation  of 
energy,  and  "  has  applied  to  spirit  the  axiom  which 
previous  philosophers  laid  down  for  matter."  Is  not 
this  misleading  language  ?  Plato  knows  nothing 
of  " laws  of  nature"  in  the  modern  scientific  sense  : 
it  is  not  a  formula  with  which  he  works.  He  does 
not  get  the  conservation  of  energy  as  a  "  natural 
law"  and  read  it  into  "  the  spiritual  world."  The 
conservation  of  energy,  if  we  can  use  the  phrase 
at  all  to  express  a  conception  of  Plato's,  is  to  him 
a  necessity  of  thought,  a  logical  law,  not  primarily 
a  law  of  nature.  Omnia  mutantur,  nil  interit  and 
Ex  nihilo  nihil  fit  were  axioms  arrived  at  from  the 
logical  impossibility  of  thinking  either  an  absolute 
beginning  or  an  absolute  ending,  not  established 
like  what  we  call  laws  of  nature  by  a  combination 
of  hypothesis  and  experiment.  And  these  axioms 
appear  in  Plato  in  the  form  :  "If  generation  were 
in  a  straight  line  only,  and  there  were  no  compen 
sation  (d  w  ael  avravohJoitj,  etc.)  or  circle  in  nature, 
no  turn  or  return  of  elements  into  one  another, 
then  all  things  at  last  would  have  the  same  form 
and  pass  into  the  same  state,  and  there  would  be 


128  ON  PLATO'S  PHAEDO.  [iv. 

no  more  generation  of  them"  (72  A,  B).  We  can 
easily  see  that  this  principle  by  itself  does  not  prove 
the  immortality  of  the  soul  in  the  sense  in  which  the 
term  is  generally  understood.  It  would  be  accepted 
by  the  Democritean  atomist  and  would  be  more  than 
satisfied  by  Aristotle's  conception  of  nature  attaining 
immortality  in  the  species,  though  not  in  the  indi 
vidual  (De  Anima,  ii.  4).  Yet,  of  course,  if  from 
other  sources  we  can  get  any  arguments  for  the 
indestructibility  of  the  individual  soul,  this  principle 
of  the  movement  from  life  to  death  and  death  to  life 
will  fit  in  with  them.  This  argument  may  perhaps 
be  compared  with  Fechner's  idea — not  that  the  idea 
is  peculiar  to  Fechner — that  as  the  life  (of  the  em 
bryo)  before  birth  is  to  the  life  in  the  body  as  it 
now  is,  so  is  this  present  life  to  that  after  death.1 
Yet  there  is  a  most  noteworthy  and  characteristic 
difference.  Plato  thinks  of  birth  as  an  "  eclipsing 

1  G.  T.  Fechner,  On  the  life  after  death  (Engl.  Transl.  by 
Wernekke),  ch.  i.  Cf.  the  passage  in  the  Autobiography  of  Lord 
Herbert  of  Cherbury  :  "  And,  certainly,  since  in  my  mother's 
womb  this  plastica,  or  formatrix,  which  formed  my  eyes,  ears,  and 
other  senses,  did  not  intend  them  for  that  dark  and  noisome  place, 
but,  as  being  conscious  of  a  better  life,  made  them  as  fitting  or 
gans  to  apprehend  and  perceive  those  things  which  should  occur 
in  this  world  ;  so  I  believe,  since  my  coming  into  this  world  my 
soul  hath  formed  or  produced  certain  faculties  which  are  almost 
as  useless  for  this  life  as  the  above-named  senses  were  for  the 
mother's  womb ;  and  these  faculties  are  hope,  faith,  love,  and  joy, 
since  they  never  rest  or  fix  upon  any  transitory  or  perishing  object 
in  this  world,  as  extending  themselves  to  something  further  than 
can  be  here  given,  and  indeed  acquiesce  only  in  the  perfect,  eternal 
and  infinite."  (Edition  in  "Camelot  Series,"  p.  21.) 


iv.]  ON  PLATO'S  PHAEDO.  129 

curse  "  :  he  thinks  of  the  soul  as  passing  through  cycles 
of  existence.  Fechner  is  thinking  of  a  continuous 
development.  The  idea  of  a  cycle  conditions  all  the 
thinking  of  Plato,  and  of  Aristotle  too,  both  in  regard 
to  the  individual  and  in  regard  to  society.  We  may 
indeed  say  that  the  conception  of  continuous  progress 
is  absent  alike  from  their  Ethics  and  their  Politics. 

This  argument  from  the  alternation  of  opposites  is, 
however,  not  allowed  to  stand  alone.  It  is  at  once 
supplemented  by  the  doctrine  of  Recollection.  Mr. 
Archer-Hind  insists  that  these  must  be  considered 
as  making  up  together  only  one  argument,  avraTroSoa-is 
proving  the  existence  of  the  soul,  avd/mvrjcris  its  pos 
session  of  intelligence  (consciousness)  apart  from  the 
present  bodily  life.  We  may  note  that  Plato  himself 
(73  A,  coo-re  K  al  TavTri  aQdvarov  rj  \l/v^  TI  eoiKev  etVcu) 
seems  to  treat  them  as  distinct  arguments.  But  the 
question  is  not  of  much  importance.  In  truth  all 
the  arguments  lead  up  finally  to  the  argument  from 
the  theory  of  ideas,  and  this  reference  to  the  doctrine 
of  Recollection  already  brings  in  that  theory.  We 
have  previously  considered  this  doctrine  of  Recollec 
tion  and  seen  that  it  necessarily  implies  only  the 
presupposition  in  knowledge  of  an  eternal  element, 
i.e.,  an  element  not  dependent  on  temporal  con 
ditions  :  it  implies  the  eternal  character  of  thought, 
not  the  continued  duration  of  the  individual  human 
person,  although  Plato  himself,  at  least  at  some  part 
of  his  life,  may  quite  well  have  interpreted  it  in 
connection  with  an  actual  belief  in  continued  personal, 
or  at  least  individual,  existence. 

D.  H.  K 


130  ON  PLATO'S  PHAEDO.  [iv. 

2.  The  next  argument  is,  that  the  soul  being 
simple  and  not  composite,  is  indissoluble  :  it  cannot 
perish  by  being  decomposed.  It  may  be  supposed 
that  this  is  the  same  argument  which  has  been 
largely  used  since  Plato's  time  and  which  is  criticised 
by  Kant l — viz.,  that  the  soul  is  permanent  because 
it  is  a  simple  substance.  But  the  conception  of  the 
soul  as  " substance"  is  an  addition  to  Plato's  view 
which  we  do  not  find  in  Plato  himself.2  If  we  are  to 
compare  this  position  of  Plato's  with  any  modern 
position,  we  might  rather  compare  it  with  a  view 
such  as  results  from  Kant's  criticism,  viz.,  that  the 
soul  is  the  unity  of  self-consciousness.  But  in  truth 
the  conception  of  self-conscious  subject  is  equally 
absent  from  Plato's  psychology  with  the  conception 
of  thinking  substance.  Rather  we  should  regard 
Plato  as  having  taken  the  Pythagorean  mathematical 
conception  of  Unity  to  explain  the  soul,  using  the 
Pythagorean  conception  as  suggestion  and  starting- 
point  for  his  theory  of  ideas.  The  soul  which  is 
invisible,  he  argues,  is  akin  to  (eruyyevj?)  the  un 
changing  and  incomposite,  the  invisible  world  of 
ideas,  not  the  changing  and  manifold  world  of  sense. 

1  Crit.  of  Pure  Reason,  "  Transcend.  Dial,"  book  ii.,  chap,  i., 
"  Refutation  of  the  Argument  of  Mendelssohn  for  the  Substan 
tiality  or  Permanence  of  the  Soul." 

2  It  might  indeed  seem  to  receive  countenance  from  the  words 
in   92  D,  wcrTrep  O.VTTJS  tcrnv  fj  ova-La  e^ovcra,  ri/v   CTrwvv/xtav  ryv  TOV  o 
eo-Ttv,  which  appear  to  make  absolute  existence  the  substance  of 
the  soul.     But  if  the  words  mean  this,  they  stand  in  contradiction 
to  all  that  is  said  elsewhere  in  Plato.     And  Schanz  is  probably 
justified  in  altering  avr^s,  of  the  MSS.,  into 


iv.]  ON  PLATO'S  PHAEDO.  131 

Thus  the  soul  is  likely  to  be  at  least  more  permanent 
than  the  body  and  nearly  or  altogether  indissoluble. 
There  may  be  good  ground  for  holding  that  the 
view  of  the  soul  as  a  substance  conjoined  with  the 
body  is  very  much  due  to  the  language  of  Plato's 
Phczdo,    as    ordinarily   understood    and    popularised 
through  the  medium  of  Stoicism,  which  tended  more 
and  more  to  assimilate  or  adopt  Platonic  phraseology. 
It  is  a  view  which  gained  currency  especially  among 
materialistic  Christians  like  Tertullian,  who  regarded 
soul   and   body  as   two   substances    or  things,   both 
material,  though  the  soul  might  be  of  finer  matter, 
which  could  be  joined  together  and  separated,  ex 
ternally  and  as  it  were  mechanically1 — a  view  which 
has  naturally  led  to  the  question,  Where  is  the  soul  ? 
But  Plato  must  not  be  made  responsible  for  the  crude 
dogmatism  of  unphilosophical  writers  who  have  been 
influenced  directly  or  indirectly  by  his  words.      As 
we  have  seen,  the  soul's  permanence  of  existence  is 
not  by  him  made  absolute  (as  in  the  metaphysical- 
substance  theory  which  Kant  attacked)  but  is  depen 
dent  on  its  affinity  to  the  ideas,  to  the  divine.     This 
being  so,    as  already  suggested,    it  would   be    less 
erroneous  to  say  that  he  thinks  of  the  soul's  existence 
as  a  necessary  condition  of  knowledge,  though  he 
rather  puts  it  in  the  reverse  way.      Indeed  he  some 
times  speaks  as  if  the  philosopher,    the  man   who 

1  Aristotle,  De  An.  i.,  3  fin.,  objects  to  the  Pythagorean  "  tales  " 
of  transmigration,  that  they  make  any  soul  fit  any  body.  But  the 
"  tales  "  as  Plato  gives  them  always  insist  at  least  on  some  con 
nection  in  character  between  the  soul  and  body. 


132  ON  PLATO'S  PHAEDO.  [iv. 

knows,  who  reflects  and  lives  in  the  true  world  of 
ideas,  had  a  better  chance  of  life  apart  from  the  body 
than  the  ordinary  man  whose  soul  is  sunk  amid  the 
sensible  and  changing  {Phcedo,  80  E-8i  E).  The 
true  life  of  knowledge  is  not  dependent  upon  material 
things,  and  the  soul  which  lives  this  true  life  can 
therefore  exist  independently  of  the  body, 

Teichmiiller  (in  his  book  Ueber  die  Unsterblichkeit 
der  Seele)  applies  to  every  theory  about  the  soul 
what  in  appearance  is  a  very  simple  question  :  "Is 
the  soul  according  to  this  view  a  substance  or  is 
it  not  ?  If  it  is  not  a  substance,  it  is  illogical  to  hold 
any  doctrine  of  immortality.  The  Materialist  makes 
soul  a  mere  function  of  body  ;  the  Idealist  regards  it 
only  as  the  subject  of  knowledge,  and  holds  the  eter 
nity  of  thought  but  cannot  hold  the  immortality  of 
the  soul."  Let  us  ask,  what  is  meant  by  calling  the 
soul  a  substance.  Substance  in  its  simplest  meaning 
is  nothing  more  than  that  which  has  qualities,  the 
permanent  siibject  of  which  we  can  predicate  attributes. 
But  probably  most  persons  who  use  the  word  sub 
stance  about  the  soul,  only  mean  by  it  reality. 
Primitive  man  did  not  regard  soul  as  substance. 
Rather  the  body  was  thought  of  as  the  real  self  or 
person,  the  soul,  spirit  or  ghost,  being  only  a  sort  of 
shadow  or  emanation  given  off  by  him.  Because 
the  dead  and  absent  appeared  in  dreams,  the  appear 
ance  was  supposed  to  be  some  emanation  from  the 
person.  The  ghost  had  a  less  real  existence  than 
the  man  while  living  ;  and  there  were  ghosts  or  souls 
of  other  animals  and  even  of  things.  We  have  good 


iv.]  ON  PLATO'S  PHAEDO.  133 

examples  of  this  primitive  "Animism"  in  the  Ho 
meric  poems.  The  slain  warriors  themselves  are  a 
prey  to  dogs  and  birds,  while  their  spirits  are  sent  to 
Hades.1  With  Plato  this  is  completely  changed. 
Socrates  is  asked  how  they  shall  bury  him.  "  You 
cannot  bury  me.  Only  my  body  will  remain.  I 
shall  go  away  "  (Pk&do,  115).  The  spirits  whom 
Odysseus  visits  have  a  very  feeble  and  shadowy 
existence,  not,  as  Plato  puts  it,  a  more  real  and  true 
existence  than  men  living  on  earth,  so  that  the  life 
of  the  wise  man  becomes  "  a  practising  of  death" 
{Pkczdo,  64  A).  This  Animism  of  course  still  sur 
vives  in  the  co-existence  of  a  belief  that  the  ghosts 
of  the  dead  flit  about  near  graves  and  their  old 
haunts  (cf.  Ph&do,  81  C,  D  ;  Laws,  865  D),  along 
with  the  idea  that  their  souls  are  in  another  world. 
The  differentiation  of  the  words  "  soul  "  and  "  ghost" 
(\l/v%toi>  o-Kioetdrj  (fiavrda-jmaTa  in  Phczdo,  8 1  D)  helps  to 
keep  two  distinct  views  alongside  of  one  another. 
The  distinction  in  Christian  psychology  between 
"spirit"  (TTveCjuLa)  and  "soul"  (^v#0  was,  in  the 
hands  of  the  more  philosophical  writers,  parallel 
to  the  Greek  distinction  between  "  reason  "  (you?) 

'//.  i- 3,4: 

TroAAa?  8*  tyOifjiOvs  \f/v)(as  "Ai'Si  Trpoiaif/ev 
rjpwwv,  a  v  T  o  u  s  8e  cAwpia  TCV^C  K 
otcoi/ouri'  T€  Tracrt. 

xvi.  855,  xxii.  362  : 

u>5  apa  jjnv  ei7rdj/Ta  reXos  Oa.va.roio  Ka 
iftv\r)  8*  CK  p 

ov  TTOTfAOv  yodaxra,  XITTOVO-'  dSpor^ra  KCU  rj 
T  o  v  K 


134  ON  PLATO'S  PHAEDO.  [iv. 

and  "soul";  the  adoption  of  "  spirit "  rather  than 
"reason"  for  the  highest  element  in  the  soul  indi 
cating  the  abandonment  of  Greek  intellectualism  and 
the  preference  for  the  ethical  and  emotional  over  the 
intellectual.  But  the  Christian  psychology  allowed 
the  old  Animism  to  spring  up  again,  and  our  word 
"spirit"  hovers  between  the  meanings  of  the  Ger 
man  "  Geist"  and  the  English  "ghost." 

Plato,  then,  does  think  of  the  soul  as  being  that 
which  is  most  real  and  permanent  in  a  man,  but  he 
does  not  express  this  by  making  the  soul  a  "sub 
stance."  The  category  of  substance,  being  applicable 
properly  only  to  what  we  perceive  in  time  and  space, 
is  an  inadequate  conception  for  soul,  as  Kant  showed 
in  fact,  though  he  writes  as  if  it  were  in  a  way  a  mis 
fortune  that  we  could  not  prove  the  soul  to  be  a 
substance  in  relation  to  its  experiences  in  the  same 
sense  in  which  in  a  physical  body  we  distinguish  the 
substance  from  the  properties.1  Self-conscious  sub 
ject  is  a  higher  and  better  conception  for  soul  ;  and 
if  the  soul  is  called  a  substance,  it  can  only  be  this 
that  is  meant.  Lotze  applies  the  term  "substance" 
to  the  soul,  but  explains  himself  as  only  meaning  by 
substance  "  everything  which  possesses  the  power  of 

1  Kant  argued  that  identity  of  self-consciousness  need  not  imply 
identity  of  substance.  Thus  the  same  movement  is  transmitted 
through  a  series  of  elastic  balls ;  the  substances  change,  the  move 
ment  is  the  same.  And  so,  conceivably,  the  self-same  conscious 
ness  might  be  transmitted  through  a  series  of  substances. 
(Note  on  " Third  Paralogism  of  Transcendental  Psychology"  in 
first  edition.) 


iv.]  ON  PLATO'S  PHAEDO.  135 

producing  and  experiencing  effects,  in  so  far  as  it 
possesses  that  power."  Again  he  says  :  "The  fact 
of  the  unity  of  consciousness  is  eo  ipso  at  once  the 
fact  of  the  existence  of  a  substance  "  \Metaphysicl  pp. 
426,  427,  Engl.  Transl.).  Thus  Lotze  does  not 
maintain  that  the  soul  is  a  substance,  in  the  sense  in 
which  Kant  denies  that  we  can  know  it  to  be  a  sub 
stance,  and  according  to  which  alone  Teichmiiller 
seems  to  think  the  soul's  immortality  can  be  logically 
held,  but  only  in  a  sense  with  which  there  is  nothing 
in  Plato  to  conflict.  Plato,  as  we  have  already  said, 
has  not  this  conception  of  self-consciousness  to  work 
with  ;  but  he  considers  the  essential  element  in  the 
soul  to  be  its  knowing  rather  than  its  merely  existing. 
And  so  (if  we  are  to  yield  to  the  inevitable  tempta 
tion  of  interpreting  him  in  terms  of  modern  contro 
versies),  if  he  is  not  yet  Kantian,  he  is  at  least  free 
from  the  metaphysical  assumption  against  whose 
validity  Kant  argued. 

The  argument  which  Socrates  directs  against  the 
objection  of  Simmias  that  the  soul  is  the  Harmony 
of  the  body,  and  as  such  cannot  outlast  the  destruc 
tion  of  the  body,  has  been  sometimes  treated  as  a 
separate  argument  for  the  immortality  of  the  soul 
(e.g.,  by  Ueberweg  and  Sir  W.  Geddes).1  This 
Mr.  Archer- Hind  denies  ;  rightly,  if  we  consider 
only  the  formal  nature  of  the  argument.  But  it  con 
tains  the  assertion  of  the  priority  and  independence 

1  Cf.  Teichmiiller  (Studien  zur  Geschichte  der  Begriffe,  p.  118), 
who  puts  the  argument  in  the  form  :  The  ideal  principle  is  prior 
to  the  becoming  and  not  a  product  of  it. 


1 36  ON  PLATO'S  PHAEDO.  [iv. 

of  the  soul,  and  thus  does  really  advance  the  general 
argument  of  the  dialogue.  ( i )  The  doctrine  of  har 
mony  is  shown  to  be  inconsistent  with  the  already 
accepted  doctrine  of  Recollection  (91  €-92  D).  A 
harmony  can  only  come  into  existence  after  that  which 
produced  it.  (2)  A  harmony  is  dependent  upon  the 
materials  that  produce  it,  and  is  more  or  less  of  a 
harmony  according  to  their  condition  ;  whereas  the 
soul  as  such  (i.e.,  in  its  ultimate  essence,  as  we  might 
say  the  mere  "  I"  which  is  the  condition  of  any  know 
ledge)  does  not  admit  of  degrees.  The  virtuous 
soul  is  not  more  a  soul  than  the  vicious,  though  it 
may  be  called  more  of  a  harmony  (92  £-94  B).  (3) 
The  soul  rules  the  body,  whereas  a  harmony,  as  be 
fore  said,  is  dependent  on  its  materials  (94  6-95  A). 
The  harmony-theory  is  also  criticised  by  Aristotle 
(in  the  De  Anima,  i.  4),  who,  like  Plato,  speaks  of  it 
as  widely  held.  It  is  impossible  for  us  to  find  out 
with  whom  the  theory  originated.  It  may,  to  begin 
with,  have  been  nothing  more  than  a  poetical  image 
popularly  accepted.  Plato's  main  argument  against 
it  is  the  first  one — that  it  is  inconsistent  with  the 
theory  which  alone  explains  knowledge.  On  this 
position  the  other  two  depend. 

J.  S.  Mill  (Essays  on  Religion,  p.  197)  considers 
this  argument  of  Simmias  to  be  that  which  a  modern 
objector  would  naturally  make  to  Plato's  argument, 
viz.,  "  that  thought  and  consciousness,  though  men 
tally  distinguishable  from  the  body,  may  not  be  a  sub 
stance  separable  from  it,  but  a  result  of  it,  standing 
in  a  relation  to  it  like  that  of  a  tune  to  the  musical 


iv.]  ON  PLATO'S  PHAEDO.  137 

instrument  on  which  it  is  played."1  We  may  com 
pare  Voltaire's  question  whether  the  song  of  the 
nightingale  can  live  when  the  bird  has  been  devoured 
by  an  eagle.  It  should  be  noticed  that  ap^ovla  means 
properly  a  succession  of  notes,  and  so  is  equivalent  to 
our  word  "  tune  "  or  ''air,"  rather  than  to  "  harmony." 
This  being  so,  does  not  the  illustration  of  the  lyre 
tell  the  other  way  ?  A  tune  certainly  cannot  exist 
apart  from  the  notes  of  which  it  is  composed.  They 
are,  in  Aristotelian  phrase,  the  matter  of  which  it  is 
the  form.  But  the  same  tune,  i.e.,  the  same  combi 
nation  of  notes  may  be  played  on  many  instruments, 
and  so  the  analogy  would  not  prove  the  mortality  of 
the  soul,  unless  the  soul  be,  as  in  Aristotle's  view,  the 
form  or  realisation  of  the  body.  If  the  body  be  analo 
gous  to  the  notes  of  the  tune,  the  soul  perishes  with 
the  body  ;  if  the  body  be  analogous  to  the  musical 
instrument,  it  need  not.  It  may  seem  strange  that 
Plato  should  not  have  noticed  this  way  of  turning 
aside  the  objection.  Perhaps  the  whole  harmony- 
theory  seemed  to  him  to  deny  too  much  the  essential 
unity  of  the  soul. 

3.  We  can  now  pass  to  the  third  great  argument, 
to  which  all  the  others  lead  up,  that  which  makes 
the  question  of  the  soul's  immortality  expressly  and 
directly  depend  on  the  doctrine  of  Ideas.  It  is  im 
possible  here  to  go  through  the  complicated  and 

1  Mr.  J.  M.  Rigg  in  Mind^  vol.  xi.,  p.  89,  says  :  "  The  modern 
analogue  of  the  harmonic  theory  is  the  attempt  made  by  biologists 
to  identify  the  soul  with  a  special  form  of  that  correspondence  be 
tween  organism  and  environment  in  which  life  is  held  to  consist." 


138  ON  PLATO'S  PHAEDO.  [iv. 

difficult  details  of  the  argument.  The  difficulties 
are  partly  matters  of  interpretation  of  language  and 
must  be  left  to  the  philologer  ;  partly  they  depend  on 
the  whole  problem  raised  by  the  different  forms  in 
which  the  theory  of  ideas  appears  in  Plato.  We  are 
at  a  loss  to  know  how  far  we  may  take  as  a  guide 
the  presentation  of  the  theory  in  other  dialogues.1 
The  main  argument  in  its  briefest  form  is  this.  The 
soul  partaking  in,  or  manifesting  in  itself,  the  idea  of 
life  cannot  partake  in  the  opposite  idea,  that  of  death, 
just  as  fire  which  partakes  in  the  idea  of  heat  cannot 
admit  the  idea  of  cold,  and  as  the  abstract  number 
three,  which  is  odd,  cannot  admit  the  idea  of  even. 
Cold  fire,  even  three,  dead  soul  would  imply  cold 
heat,  even  odd,  dead  life,  and  so  involve  a  contradic 
tion  in  terms. 

What,  according  to  Plato,  is  the  relation  of  the 
soul  to  the  ideas  ?  Teichmtiller  argues  that,  because 
the  soul  is  not  an  idea,  and  because  in  Plato's  system 
only  the  ideas  really  exist,  therefore  the  soul  does  not 
exist.  That  the  particular  soul  does  not  exist  in  the 
same  way  as  the  ideas  we  may  agree.  But  (i)  it 
may  be  doubted  whether  Plato  and  his  critic  are 
using  "  existence  "  (being)  in  the  same  sense.  As 
Lotze  has  very  well  pointed  out  (Logic,  Eng.  Tr.,  p. 
440),  when  Plato  speaks  of  the  ideas  as  ra  OI/T<»?  oi/ra 
he  really  means  that  they  are  alone  valid,  not  that 
they  are  existent  things  ;  but  the  Greek  language 
does  not  admit  of  a  distinction  between  validity  and 

1  The  questions  of  interpretation  will  be  found  most  •  carefully 
discussed  in  Mr.  Archer-Hind's  edition. 


iv.]  ON  PLATO'S  PHAEDO.  139 

being.1  Plato's  ideas  are  not  to  be  thought  of  as  equi 
valent  to  Leibniz's  monads,  though  Leibniz  himself 
strangely  thought  so  (Epist.  ad Hanschiiim,  1 707,  Ed. 
Erdmann,  p.  445).  Rather  they  are  the  equivalent 
in  Plato  to  what  we  call  laws  of  nature.  The  idea 
of  the  Good  is,  in  Plato's  system,  "God";  and 
Leibniz  makes  God  the  monad  of  monads.  But  is 
not  this  just  the  final  difficulty  of  Leibniz's  system  ? 
If  we  are  to  explain  a  universe  of  monads,  God 
must  be  the  totality  and  unity  of  the  relations 
between  the  monads  ;  but,  if  so,  Leibniz  would  be 
nearer  Spinoza  than  he  thought.  (2)  The  soul  has 
not  indeed  the  same  absolute  significance  or  value 
that  the  ideas  have,  but  it  has  a  significance  or  value 
which  the  composite  man  or  animal  has  not.  It  is, 
as  has  already  been  argued,  "  nearer  to  "  or  "  more 
akin  to  "  the  ideas,  because  it  is  what  knows,  and  so 
is  ultimately  of  the  same  nature  with  what  is  known, 
i.e.y  the  ideas.  The  identity  of  the  knowing  and  the 
known  is  thus  the  logical  truth  at  the  bottom  of  the 
ideal  theory,  as  we  have  already  seen  in  the  special 
case  of  the  doctrine  of  Recollection. 

The  soul  not  being  an  idea,  may  we  say  that  there 
is  an  idea  of  the  soul  ?  We  talk  of  souls  as  we  talk 
of  other  classes  or  kinds  of  existences  ;  so  that,  ac 
cording  to  the  view  of  the  ideal  theory  which  we  have 
in  the  Republic,  there  ought  to  be  an  idea  of  the 

1  When  Aristotle  says  :  o  Trao-t  SOKCL  TOVT'  eu/at  <f>dp.€v  (Eth.  Nic., 
x.  2,  §  4)  he  means  that  universal  opinion  has  worth  or  validity •, 
that  there  is  in  it  (an  element  of)  rationality,  as  in  the  parallel  pas 
sage  in  Eth.  NIC.,  vii.  13,  §  6,  Trarra  <£vW  l^ct  TL  Odov. 


ON  PLATO'S  PHAEDO.  [iv. 

soul.  Plato  certainly  never  uses  the  phrase.  But 
Mr.  Archer- Hind  thinks  it  necessary  in  the  argument 
in  the  Pluzdo  to  assume  this  "  metaphysical  mon 
strosity,"  as  he  calls  it.  "  We  have,"  he  says,  "the 
following  terms  ;  (i)  the  idea  of  life,  (2)  the  idea  of 
soul,  which  carries  the  idea  of  life  to  particular  souls, 
(3)  the  particular  soul,  which  vivifies  the  body,  (4) 
the  body  in  which  is  displayed  this  vivifying  power." 
In  the  argument  soul  is  treated  of  as  parallel  to  the 
triad  (the  abstract  three),  and  Plato  does  use  the 
phrase  ^TOH/  rpiwv  idea  (104  D)  ;  so  that  there  would 
seem  no  escape  from  this  conclusion.  But  surely,  if 
we  are  to  argue  from  the  view  of  the  theory  of  ideas 
in  the  Republic,  Plato  does  not  place  the  abstract 
conceptions  of  mathematics  on  the  same  level  with 
the  ideas,  but  in  an  intermediate  region  between  the 
particular  things  of  sense  and  the  ideal  world.  The 
Pythagorean  doctrine  of  numbers  served  Plato  as 
suggestion  and  starting-point  for  his  theory  of  ideas  ; 
and  the  relation  of  abstract  numbers  to  concrete 
numbered  things  serves  as  an  illustration  of  the  rela 
tion  of  ideas  to  things  (cf.  Arist.,  Met.,  i.  6).  Might 
I  suggest,  therefore,  that  "the  idea  of  three"  is 
here  not  to  be  taken  too  literally  ?  In  any  case  the 
number  "  three  "  is  not  an  idea  in  the  same  sense  or 
of  the  same  dignity  as  the  quality  "  odd  "  :  and  simi 
larly  soul  belongs  to  a  region  intermediate  between 
the  idea  (of  life — the  living)  and  the  concrete  living 
animal.  We  might  then  compare  the  position  as 
signed  to  the  world-soul  in  the  Timceus  as  "  the 
mediatising  principle  between  the  Idea  and  the 


iv.]  ON  PLATO'S  PHAEDO.  141 

Phenomenon,  the  first  form  of  the  existence  of  the 
idea  in  multiplicity"  (Zeller).  Nothing  is  said  about 
the  world-soul  in  the  Phoedo,  but  we  are  justified  in 
expecting  that  Plato,  even  if  the  Timceus  represents 
a  different  stage  of  his  thinking,  should  treat  it  analo 
gously  to  the  human  soul. 

The  chief  difficulty  which  meets  us  in  Plato's 
theory  of  ideas  is  the  relation  of  the  ideas  to  one 
another.  We  feel  that  they  ought  to  be  all  organi 
cally  connected  with  one  another  and  with  the  idea  of 
the  Good.  But  the  science  of  dialectic  which  should 
do  this  exists  for  him  only  as  a  possible  science,  as 
an  ideal.  We  are  puzzled  by  his  recognising  ideas 
of  qualities,  of  concrete  things  in  nature,  of  works  of 
art,  all  separately,  just  as  occasion  requires  ;  and  we 
do  not  know  exactly  how  the  idea  of  "  the  just,"  for 
instance,  stands  related  to  the  idea  of  "  man  "  or  the 
idea  of  "  table  (I  am  referring  only  to  the  forms  in 
which  the  theory  appears  within  the  limits  of  the 
Republic].  Some  of  these,  we  feel,  are  more  properly 
"ideas"  than  others.  This  difficulty  is  partly  due, 
doubtless,  to  the  tentative  and  ''sceptical"  character 
of  -Plato's  philosophy  ;  partly  perhaps  to  the  influ 
ence  of  the  undogmatic  and  vague  character  of  popu 
lar  Greek  polytheism.  The  relation  of  the  various 
gods  to  one  another  and  to  the  supreme  god  is 
left  undetermined.  Plato  and  Aristotle  themselves 
talk  indifferently  of  TO  Oeiov,  6  0eo?,  ol  Oeoi  Plato  is 
anxious  to  prove  that  God  is  good,  and  the  author 
of  good  only  (Rep.,  ii.)  :  it  seems  to  be  a  matter  of 
indifference  to  him  whether  God  is  one  or  many. 


142  ON  PLATO'S  PHAEDO.  [iv. 

The  Timaus  does  indeed  suggest  a  hierarchy  of 
divine  beings  ;  but  then  the  Timceus  stands  by  itself 
in  its  Pythagorean  dogmatism.  The  result  of  the 
whole  discussion  in  the  Phcedo  then  amounts  to  this : 
that  the  particular  concrete  man  (composed  of  body 
and  soul)  passes,  as  we  saw,  from  life  to  death  and 
death  to  life  (cf.  70  C,  103  A-C)  ;  the  soul  which 
makes  him  live  is  always  living.  It  cannot  admit 
death,  and  is  therefore  indestructible.  This  result 
may  indeed  appear  to  be  a  purely  verbal  statement  : 
"  Anima  est  animans  "  ;  but  its  significance  comes 
from  the  connection  established  between  the  soul 
and  the  ideas. 

Neither  in  the  Phcedrus  nor  in  the  Republic  do  the 
argitments  used  for  immortality  turn  on  the  theory 
of  ideas.  The  argument  in  the  Phczdrus,  which 
is  put  forward  as  the  prominent  argument  by  Cicero 
(in  his  Tusc.  Disp.,  i.  23. — also  translated  by  him 
in  De  Rep.,  vi.  25),  may  however  be  connected  with 
the  concluding  argument  of  the  Pk&do.  "  The  soul 
is  immortal  because  it  is  self-moving"  {Phczdr.,  245 
C) *  may  be  considered  as  only  one  form  of  stating 
the  argument  from  the  idea  of  life.  If  we  look  for  a 
modern  parallel,  we  may  perhaps  find  it  in  the  argu 
ment  from  freedom  (criticised  by  Lotze,  Met.,  Engl. 
Transl.,  p.  420) — an  argument  which  of  itself  will  not 
prove  a  personal  or  even  an  individual  immortality. 
Only  "  Thought"  is  free,  and  even  Thought  in  its 
use  by  us  is  conditioned  by  material  phenomena. 
1  Cf.  Laws,  X.  896  A,  XII.  966  E. 


iv.]  ON  PLATO'S  PHAEDO.  143 

The  argument  in  Republic  x.1  is  that  nothing  can 
be  destroyed  except  by  its  own  proper  evil.  The 
body  is  destroyed  by  its  proper  evil,  disease.  The 
evil  of  the  soul  is  wickedness  ;  but  men  do  not  die 
simply  by  being  wicked,  else  wickedness  would  be  a 
less  terrible  thing  than  it  is,  and  there  would  be  no 
need  of  the  executioner.  Thus  the  soul,  not  being 
destroyed  by  its  own  evil,  cannot  be  destroyed  at  all. 
The  argument  is  so  far  the  converse  of  the  argument 
in  the  Phcedo.  There  it  is  argued  that  the  soul, 
because  not  admitting  death,  is  indestructible  :  here 
that  the  soul,  because  not  in  fact  destroyed,  does  not 
admit  of  death.  By  itself  it  seems  a  very  feeble 
argument.  It  would  only  prove  that  in  this  life  the 
soul  is  not  destroyed  ;  and  though  it  might  suggest 
a  future  life,  it  would  not  prove  immortality,  because 
the  destruction  of  the  soul  by  wickedness  might  go 
on  after  death.  Indeed  from  the  position  in  Rep.  i., 
that  evil  is  a  principle  of  weakness  and  dissolution,  it 
might  be  argued  that  evil  must  in  course  of  time 
destroy  the  soul.  It  has  been  ingeniously  suggested 
to  me  by  a  friend  that  it  might  be  retorted  to  Plato 
that  if  sin  does  not  destroy  the  soul,  sin  cannot  be  the 
evil  of  the  soul  but  must  be  proper  and  natural  to  it. 
On  the  other  hand,  we  find  a  German  writer,  Julius 
Miiller  (quoted  by  Sir  W.  Geddes,  p.  xxvi.),  using  a 
parallel  argument  to  Plato's  :  "  So  indestructible  is 

1  Teichmiiller  (pp.  121,  127)  considers  Rep.  611  C  and  612  an 
argument :  "  The  ideal  principle  is  divine  "  ;  also  Rep.,  61 1  A-C  : 
"  The  becoming  remains  always  identical  in  quantity."  Surely 
these  are  not  "  Beweise  "  ? 


144  ON  PLATO'S  PHAEDO.  [iv. 

the  Personal  Individual,  that  it  is  able  to  place  itself 
through  that  which  is  wicked  in  the  most  enduring 
contradiction  with  itself,  without  at  the  same  time 
compromising  its  existence.  That  the  human  crea 
ture  can  surrender  itself  to  that  which  is  wicked  with 
full  determination,  without  annihilating  itself,  is  in 
fact  one  of  the  most  powerful  and  tremendous  wit 
nesses  for  the  Indestructibility  of  Personal  Exist 
ence."  But  here  we  see  that  a  conception  of  the 
self-conscious  Person  is  assumed  before  the  argu 
ment  from  wickedness  is  applied  ;  and  so  it  might  be 
said  for  Plato  that,  as  he  assumes  the  necessary  con 
nection  between  the  soul  and  the  eternal  ideas,  the 
fact  that  its  own  evil  does  not  destroy  the  soul  is  a 
confirmation  of  its  immortality.  Yet  it  is  striking, 
and  characteristic  of  his  way  of  working,  that  the 
arguments  in  the  Phcedrus,  Phcedo  and  Republic, 
which  we  may  fairly  suppose  all  to  belong  to  the 
same  general  stage  of  his  philosophy,  are  stated  in 
complete  independence  of  one  another. 

The  special  interest  of  the  Republic  in  connexion 
with  our  question  is  that  here  Plato  comes  most  dis 
tinctly  face  to  face  with  the  ethical  significance  of 
the  conception  of  immortality  ;  and  it  is,  therefore, 
perhaps  fitting  that  the  argument  should  be  rather 
ethical  than  metaphysical.  Plato  does  not  use  at  all 
the  ethical  argument  as  we  have  it  in  Kant,  an  argu 
ment  which  is,  so  far,  the  converse  of  Plato's  argument 
from  Recollection.  Plato's  argument  might  become  : 
We  have  ideals  by  which  we  judge  the  imperfections 
of  our  present  life  ;  therefore  we  must  have  known 


iv.]  ON  PLATO'S  PHAEDO.  145 

them  in  a  previous  state.  Kant's  argument  may  be 
put  in  the  form  :  We  have  ideals  which  we  cannot 
realise  in  this  present  life  ;  therefore  we  must  exist 
in  a  future  state.  And  it  is  to  be  observed  that 
Plato's  argument  turns  on  the  character  of  knowledge 
even  in  moral  matters,  Kant's  on  the  nature  of  con 
duct. 

In  the  early  part  of  the  Republic   Plato  is   com 
pelled   to  protest  against  the   demoralising  effect  of 
popular  and  of  Orphic  ideas  about  a  future  life,  and 
appears  therefore   to  reject   altogether  the   ordinary 
beliefs  about  rewards  and   punishments   in-  another 
world.      But  having  shown  that  justice  in  itself,  irre 
spective  of  consequences  in  this  world  or  the  next, 
is  better  than  injustice,   he  now   feels  able  to  restore 
the  element  of  truth,  which   he  recognises  in  these 
old  traditions,   in   a  way  which,   so   far  from  being 
demoralising,  shall  be  morally  educative.      It  would 
be  misunderstanding  him,  however,  to  suppose  that, 
either  here  or  in  the  P/uzdo,  he  considers  the  moral 
value  of  the   doctrine  an    argument    for    its    truth. 
Plato  is  perfectly  true  to  the  Greek  faith  in  Reason  : 
having  established  the  truth  of  the  doctrine,  as  he 
thinks,  independently,  on  intellectual  grounds,  he  is 
ready  to  accept  its  moral  value.     Thus  the  visions  of 
a  future  life  at  the  end  of  the  Republic  and  of  the 
Pkado  lead  to  the  practical  lesson  of   the  immense 
importance  of  knowledge  and  conduct  in  this.      Life 
is  thus  regarded,  not  as  a  time  of  probation  to  deter 
mine  once  for  all  the  eternal  destiny  of  man,  but  as 
a  time  of  education  to  prepare  him   for  the  life  or 
D.  H.  L 


146  ON  PLATO'S  PHAEDO.  [iv. 

lives  to  come — a  view  which  has  nowhere  been  so 
forcibly  expressed  in  modern  times  as  in  some  of 
Browning's  poems  (e.g.  "Apparent  Failure,"  "  Eve 
lyn  Hope,"  "  Christina ":  not  so  distinctly  in  the 
argumentative  "  La  Saisiaz,"  where  the  idea  of  pro 
bation  is  made  use  of,  though  not  in  the  ordinary 
dogmatic  way). 

III. 

In  what  sense  does  Plato  hold  immortality  ? 
What  part  of  the  soul  is  immortal  ?  To  these  ques 
tions  it  is  not  easy  to  find  a  consistent  or  uniform 
answer  in  Plato's  dialogues.  In  the  Phadrus  the 
soul  is  imaged  as  a  charioteer  driving  two  horses. 
This  image  we  may  fairly  interpret  in  accordance 
with  the  psychology  of  the  Republic  as  representing 
the  three  elements  of  Reason,  Spirit  (TO  OvpoeiSes) 
and  Desire.  All  these  elements,  then,  are  in  the 
Phcedrus  spoken  of  as  belonging  to  the  immortal 
soul  and  as  existing  apart  from  the  body. 

In  the  Timceus  the  different  parts  of  the  soul  are 
localised  in  different  parts  of  the  body.  In  the 
Republic  (ix.  588)  we  have  the  soul  described  as  a 
complex  creature — man,  lion,  hydra,  all  enclosed  in 
the  form  of  a  man.  [Can  this  be  taken  as  a  recog 
nition  that  the  Reason,  the  highest  element,  is  the  true 
self? — as  Aristotle  says  :  So^eiev  a*/  TO  voovv  e/cao-To? 
eTvai  (Eth.  NIC.,  ix.  4,  §  4) — or  does  it  only  mean  that 
every  individual,  though  apparently  one,  is  really 
complex?]  In  Rep.,  6n  C,  D,  the  true  and  im 
mortal  soul  is  said  to  be  ordinarily  crusted  over  and 


iv.]  ON  PLATO'S  PHAEDO.  147 

concealed  by  impurities.  And  so  in  the  Ph&do  the 
soul  of  the  philosopher  is  spoken  of  as  free  from 
passion  and  desire.  Again,  Plato  seems  to  waver 
between  the  view  of  the  Phtsdrus  and  Republic,  that 
the  soul  of  the  good  man  is  that  in  which  the  lower 
elements  are  under  control,  and  the  more  ascetic 
view  of  the  Pktzdo,  that  the  good  man  is  free  from 
passions  and  desires  altogether.  Of  course  it  is 
obvious  that  all  turns  on  what  is  meant  by  desire. 
Plato  often  tends  to  regard  desire  as  an  altogether 

o  o 

irrational  element,  though  he  sometimes  sees  that 
Reason,  in  order  to  act,  necessarily  implies  desire  (or 
at  least  the  element  of  Ou/xo'?  or  impulse).  In  the 
Phczdo  the  desires  are,  indeed,  distinctly  ascribed  to 
the  body,  whereas  in  the  Philebus  (35  C)  they  are 
ascribed  to  the  soul.  These  apparent  inconsistencies 
arise  very  much  from  our  tending  to  understand 
Plato  too  literally,  when  he  speaks  of  parts  of  the 
soul.  Indeed  it  should  be  noted  that  he  more  often 
says  eiSr)  or  ^vr\  ("  forms  "  or  "  kinds,"  "  aspects  "  as 
we  might  say)  than  fiepij.  We  may  reconcile  all 
these  passages,  more  or  less,  as  follows  : — The  soul 
in  its  essence  is  Reason  (vovs).  By  admixture  with 
the  body  it  shows  itself  in  the  forms  of  passion 
and  desire,  which  we  may  therefore  ascribe  to  the 
soul  or  to  the  body,  according  as  we  are  thinking  of 
the  soul  as  embodied  or  as  distinct  from  the  body. 
When  the  soul  in  a  future  life  is  spoken  of  as  being 
punished,  it  must  be  the  soul  as  having  desires. 
The  soul  escapes,  i.e.,  does  not  need,  punishment, 
just  in  so  far  as  it  is  free  from  desire  (appetite, 


148  ON  PLATO'S  PHAEDO.  [iv. 


Only  the  soul  of  the  tyrant  which  is  alto 
gether  given  over  to  desire  is  punished  for  ever. 
(This  is  a  characteristically  Hellenic  touch,  and  need 
not  be  rejected,  as  by  Mr.  Archer-Hind.  It  is  not 
more  fanciful  than  any  other  part  of  the  myths  in  the 
Gorgias  and  Republic.  The  tyrant  is  Plato's  ideally 
bad  man,  opposed  to  the  ideally  good  man,  the 
philosopher.) 

If  then  it  is  asked  whether  Plato  thinks  bodily 
existence  necessary  for  the  particular  human  soul,  we 
can  only  answer  by  distinguishing  the  meanings  of 
the  words  "body"  and  "soul."  If  by  body  be 
meant,  as  is  ordinarily  meant,  our  body  as  it  exists 
now,  then  Plato  does  hold  that  the  soul  can  exist 
apart  from  the  body.  If  by  soul  be  meant  the  soul 
as  we  know  it  with  its  passions  and  desires,  then 
evidently  some  sort  of  body  must  be  supposed  for  it, 
else  there  would  be  no  passions  and  desires.  If  we 
ask  whether  Plato  believes  in  a  personal  immor 
tality,  we  should  need  to  ask  ourselves  further  what 
we  mean  by  personality  ;  and  we  should  note  that 
it  is  not  a  conception  which  has  become  at  all  pro 
minent  in  ancient  ethics.  We  might  perhaps  expect 
that  a  consistent  Platonist  would  have  held  that,  just 
in  so  far  as  the  soul  becomes  purified  from  passion 
and  desire,  it  loses  its  materiality,  its  element  of 
otherness  (Odrepov),  and  thus  becomes  reunited  to  its 
divine  source.  This  is  an  interpretation  which  the 
mythical  element  in  Plato  might  suggest.  Yet  Plato 
himself  argues  (in  Rep.,  x.  61  1  A)  that  the  number  of 
the  souls  remains  always  the  same  ;  and  the  greatest 


iv.]  ON  PLATO'S  PHAEDO.  149 

of  the  Neo-Platonists,  Plotinus,  holds  explicitly  that 
there  exists  a  real  plurality  of  souls,  the  highest 
being  the  soul  of  the  world,  of  which  the  others  are 
not  mere  parts.  Was  this  position  retained  out  of 
respect  for  the  authority  of  the  divine  Plato,  or  was 
it  rather  from  an  intuition  that  the  Universal  apart 
from  individual  manifestation  is  a  logical  abstraction  ? 
Personality,  however,  is  something  more  than 
mere  individual  existence.  The  person  in  the 
ethical  sense,  the  subject  of  rights  and  duties,  must 
be  the  member  of  an  organised  society.  And  it 
might  be  argued  that  it  is  only  in  so  far  as  any  one 
ceases  to  be  a  mere  individual,  that  he  becomes  in 
the  true  sense  a  person,  only  in  so  far  as  he  identi 
fies  himself  with  something  wider  and  higher  than 
self.  In  his  theory  of  ethics,  as  expounded  in  the 
Republic,  Plato  sees  this  fully.  It  is  not  because  he 
makes  his  citizens  merge  their  lives  in  the  life  of  the 
community  that  his  ethics  is  inadequate,  but  because 
his  conception  of  the  community  is  too  abstract  and 
too  much  limited  by  the  prepossessions  of  aristocratic 
Hellenism.  In  his  visions  of  another  world,  so  far 
from  his  neglecting  the  value  of  the  individual,  it 
might  even  be  contended  that  he  exaggerates  the 
significance  of  the  mere  individual  existence  so  much 
in  his  doctrine  of  metempsychosis,  as  to  neglect  the 
greater  ethical  significance  of  the  person,  which,  as 
just  said,  depends  on  membership  of  a  society.  He 
speaks  indeed  of  the  good  man  in  the  evil  state  as 
being  the  citizen  of  a  heavenly  city  ;  but  in  his 
accounts  of  the  life  free  from  the  trammels  of  the 


150  ON  PLATO'S  PHAEDO.  [iv. 

body,  there  is  no  hint  of  a  perfected  community. 
His  ideal  in  the  Phczdo,  and  even  in  the  Republic,  is 
only  an  ideal  for  the  philosophic  few  that  escape 
from  among  the  multitude  who  are  "  unworthy  of 
education."  May  we  not  say,  though  it  may  sound 
paradoxical,  that  Plato  has  no  adequate  conception 
of  personality  just  because  his  conception  of  the  soul 
is  too  individualistic  ? 

And  yet  individualism  is  not  a  fair  charge  to  bring 
against  Plato's  doctrine  of  the  soul.  As  we  have 
seen,  the  soul  is  not  conceived  of  by  him  as  a  self- 
subsistent  monad  or  atom.  The  soul  is  dependent 
for  its  life  and  its  immortality  on  the  eternal  ideas, 
ultimately  therefore  on  the  Idea  of  the  Good.  So 
that,  as  Prof.  Jowett  has  said  (Plato,  vol.  i.  420  J),  his 
ultimate  argument  is  equivalent  to  this  :  "  If  God 
exists,  then  the  soul  exists  after  death."  That  is, 
Plato  himself  like  most  of  the  older  Christian  theo 
logians,2  and  unlike  many  who  have  supposed  them 
selves  Platonists,  did  not  hold  that  the  soul  was 
immortal  per  se,  but  only  because  and  in  so  far  as  it 
partakes  in  the  divine  nature  and  has  the  divine 
nature  manifested  in  it.  Immortality  to  him  also  was 
a  hope  (Si  €\7rts  jmeydX^  Phczdo,  1  14  C),  not  a  dogma. 


1  Edit.  2  :  =  vol.  ii.  186  in  edit.  3. 

2  I  have  advisedly  not  complicated  this  statement  by  any  refer 
ence  to  the  doctrine  of  the  resurrection,  which,  from  the  point  of 
view  of  philosophy,  may  be  regarded  as  the  assertion  of  the  con 
tinued  existence  of  human  personality//^  the  assertion  that  such 
personality  will  be  connected  with  an  organism  of  some  sort  — 
analogous  to  the  present  body  according  to  popular  belief,  alto 
gether  different  from  it  according  to  St.  Paul  (i  Cor.  xv.  35-50). 


V. 
WHAT  ARE  ECONOMIC  LAWS?1 


THE  phrase  "  Economic  Laws  "  has  been  used  by 
theoretical  students  as  implying  the  claim  of  Politi 
cal  Economy  to  be  a  science  like  the  sciences  of 
nature.  It  has  been  used,  or  misused,  by  practical 
persons  to  imply  that  they  possess  rules  or  maxims 
to  guide  them  in  social  and  political  affairs.  People 
have  debated  as  to  the  amount  of  respect  which  eco 
nomic  laws  deserve — whether  they  ought  to  be  rele 
gated  to  Saturn  or  fulfilled  on  this  earth.  It  would 
have  been  wiser  to  ask  first,  what  economic  laws 
mean,  or  can  mean.  Whether  they  can  mean  any 
thing  at  all  has  certainly  not  been  a  usual  question. 
But  in  the  January  number  of  the  Economic  Review 
(for  1892) 2  Professor  Cunningham  has  propounded 
the  thesis,  "that  economics  is  not  a  science  of 
*  cause  '  and  effect,  but  a  pure  science,  like  logic  or 

1  Reprinted,  with  a  few  alterations,  from  the  Economic  Review^ 
July,  1892. 

2  Art.   "  A  Plea  for  Pure  Theory."     In  my  article,  as  originally 
written,  I  somewhat  over-stated  Prof.   Cunningham's  views.     In 
the  light  of  his  "  Reply"  in  the  October  number,  I  have  modified 
some  phrases  and  omitted  others. 


152  WHAT    ARE    ECONOMIC    LAWS?  [v. 

geometry,  where  this  conception  of  '  cause  '  is  not 
appropriate  "; l  and  in  accordance  with  this  view  he 
wishes  to  get  rid  of  the  phrase  "  economic  laws  " 
altogether.2 

Professor  Cunningham  speaks  of  the  gratitude  we 
owe  to  Ricardo  for  giving  a  precise  meaning  to  the 
term  rent?  and  says  that  the  economic  historian  has 
his  work  simplified  for  him  by  the  progress  of  pure 
theory.  But  is  there  any  meaning  whatever  in 
Ricardo's  definition  of  rent  (let  me  call  it  a  definition 
and  not  a  law,  reserving  discussion  of  the  relation 
between  these  terms)  apart  from  the  question,  What 
is  the  cause  of  rent  ?  The  definition,  as  (according 
to  Aristotle)  every  good  scientific  definition  should 
do,  states  the  cause  of  rent,  i.e.  explains  how  eco 
nomic  rent  arises.  This  is  the  very  service  which 
economic  theory,  even  though  it  may  seem  to  be 
merely  concerned  with  disputes  about  the  meaning 
of  words,  renders  to  the  ordinary  practical  discussion 
or  to  the  historical  investigation  of  economic  ques 
tions.  Take  a  familiar  illustration  of  the  way  in 
which  an  economic  theory  helps  us  to  get  beyond 
the  confusions  of  ordinary  thought  and  language. 
A  shopkeeper  in  a  fashionable  and  much-frequented 
street  will  say  that  he  charges  high  prices  becaiise  he 
has  to  pay  a  high  rent  ;  and  if  one  does  not  go  be 
yond  the  facts  present  to  his  mind  when  he  says 
this,  he  may  be  said  to  be  speaking  correctly,  so  far 
as  he  means  that  his  high  prices  and  his  high  rent 
go  together.  Particular  cases  might  even  occur 
1  Page  33.  2  Page  41.  3  Page  29. 


V.]  WHAT    ARE    ECONOMIC    LAWS?  153 

where  he  had  to  raise  his  prices  after  his  rent  had 
been  raised  ;  and  such  cases  would  certainly  confirm 
the  notion  that  the  high  rent  caused  the  high  prices, 
though,  of  course,  the  owner's  motive  for  raising  the 
rent  is  his  knowledge  of  what  can  be  paid.  Scien 
tific  theory  must,  however,  go  farther  back,  and  ask 
why  a  high  rent  can  be  paid — why  a  shop  in  a 
fashionable  thoroughfare  brings  to  its  owner  a  higher 
rental  than  a  shop,  which  it  costs  an  equal  sum  to 
build  and  keep  in  repair,  in  an  unfashionable  and 
little-frequented  street.  The  owner  of  the  pre 
mises  may  explain  that  he  has  to  charge  a  higher 
rent  to  make  his  investment  in  house  property 
"pay  "  :  he  had  to  pay  so  much  more  for  the  site, 
or  he  has  to  pay  so  much  more  ground-rent.  The 
theorist  must  still  ask,  Why  does  the  ground-land 
lord  get  more  in  one  place  than  in  another  ?  and  the 
answer  must  contain  something  like  the  essential 
element  in  Ricardo's  theory  of  rent,  difference  in 
convenience  of  situation  taking  the  place  of  differ 
ence  in  fertility  of  soil.  We  thus  arrive  at  the  con 
ception  of  economic  rent  as  distinct  from  interest 
on  capital,  etc.  Now,  is  not  such  an  analysis  an 
investigation  of  "  causes,"  quite  as  much  as  in  any 
natural  science  ?  In  pathology  there  may  be  the 
same  initial  difficulty  in  distinguishing  causes  and 
effects,  as  in  the  case  we  have  been  considering. 
What  appear  "causes"  to  the  patient  maybe  re 
garded  as  only  symptoms,  i.e.  effects,  by  the  scien 
tific  physician.1 

1  One  reason  which  Professor  Cunningham  gives  for  denying 


1 54  WHAT   ARE    ECONOMIC    LAWS  ?  [v. 

Professor  Cunningham's  thesis  appears  to  me  to 
make  it  worth  while  asking  :  (i)  What  is  the  nature 
of  scientific  "laws"  generally?  (2)  What  is  the 
position  of  economics  among  the  sciences  ?  (3)  In 
what  sense  can  we  have  "  laws  "  in  a  historical 
science  ? 


that  economics  deals  with  causes  seems  to  me  very  curious.  The 
conception  of  cause  as  invariable  antecedent,  the  conception 
usual  in  physics  (at  least,  in  the  opinion  of  many  English  logicians, 
and  in  the  words  of  most  English  scientific  men  who  have  got 
their  logic  from  that  quarter),  is,  according  to  Professor  Cunning 
ham,  "  not  appropriate,  because  it  is  inadequate.  The  economist 
must  endeavour  to  grasp  at  one  view  '  manifold  mutual  action  ' 
[Professor  Marshall's  phrase].  Such  mutual  and  simultaneous 
action  cannot  be  satisfactorily  treated  by  looking  at  it,  first  from 
one  side  and  then  from  another,  as  a  sort  of  double  causation. 
Kant  has  taught  us  that  we  must  apply  a  different  category  alto 
gether,  and  deal  with  it  as  a  case  of  reciprocity  "  (p.  33).  The 
inadequacy  of  the  popular  theory  of  causation  does  not,  however, 
prove  that  the  conception  of  cause  which  was  applicable  in  physics 
is  inapplicable  in  economics ;  still  less  does  it  prove  that  econo 
mics  must  be  treated  on  the  analogy,  not  of  physics,  but  of  the 
more  abstract  sciences  of  geometry  and  "  pure  "  logic.  It  would 
be  an  argument  for  applying  to  economics  less  abstract  "cate 
gories  "  (i.e.  fundamental  conceptions)  than  are  applied  in  physics, 
and  certainly  not  for  applying  more  abstract  "  categories."  A 
sounder  logic  and  metaphysics  than  those  of  popular  language 
and  popular  science  might  make  the  physical  conception  of  cause 
less  inadequate  to  economics,  but  should  hardly  lead  us  to  thrust 
the  conception  out  of  economics  altogether.  Nay,  if  we  come  to 
see  that  causality  is  not  one  isolated  relationship  among  others, 
but  that  causality  ultimately  implies  the  relationship  of  every 
phenomenon  to  every  other  in  the  universe,  so  far  from  denying 
causality  in  economics,  we  should  have  to  recognise  it  in  geometry. 
So  that  even  the  analogy  of  geometry  will  not  put  an  end  to  eco 
nomic  "causes"  and  economic  "laws." 


V.]  WHAT   ARE    ECONOMIC    LAWS?  155 

i.  We  seem  to  have  lost  somewhat  our  sense  of 
the  unity  of  scientific  method  by  the  modern  use  of 
the  terms  "  law  "  and  "  cause."  There  is,  indeed, 
a  great  difference  between  a  geometrical  formula, 
applicable  irrespective  of  time,  and  a  theory  in 
geology  or  biology,  which  cannot  be  expressed  at 
all  without  bringing  in  a  reference  to  time ;  but 
nevertheless  there  is  something  common  to  both. 
The  Aristotelian  logic  of  science,  formulated  with 
special  regard  to  geometry  as  the  type  of  science, 
is  still  applicable,  though  not  fully  adequate,  to 
science  generally.  Atriov,  which  we  translate 
"  cause,"  was,  in  Aristotle's  view,  not  inapplicable 
in  geometry.  The  geometrician  asks  "  the  why"  of 
spatial  phenomena  which  the  practical  craftsman 
may  have  discovered.  The  scientific  "  definitions  " 
in  which  a  science  culminates,  as  distinct  from  the 
mere  nominal  definitions  or  explanations  of  terms 
with  which  it  begins,  are  what  we  should  call 
"  laws."  Thus  the  law  of  gravitation  is  our  defini 
tion  of  gravitation,  a  definition  which  gives  not 
merely  the  fact  but  the  reason,  by  connecting  the 
fall  of  an  apple  here  and  now  with  all  the  matter  in 
the  universe  ;  just  as  a  proposition  in  geometry  con 
nects  one  fact  of  space-relations  with  others,  e.g.  the 
properties  of  the  parallelogram  with  those  of  the 
triangle.  Darwin's  theory  of  natural  selection  may 
be  called  a  definition  of  "species,"  superseding  the 
older  definition,  which  is  descended  from  Plato's 
theory  of  ideas  through  the  mediaeval  doctrine  of 
infima  species.  Suppose  we  agreed,  then,  that  eco- 


156  WHAT    ARE    ECONOMIC    LAWS?  [v. 

nomics  had  to  do  only  with  definitions,  that  would 
not  prevent  its  having  to  do  with  "  laws "  and 
"  causes." 

2.  Even  "  pure "  logic,  which  must  mean  an 
analysis  of  the  forms  of  thought,  cannot  be  profit 
ably  pursued  without  some  reference  to  the  language 
in  which  our  judgments  are  formulated,  and  there 
fore  cannot  quite  avoid  recognition  of  the  influences 
of  time  and  place,  or  does  so  only  at  the  cost  of 
ceasing  to  be  a  genuine  analysis  of  actual  human 
thought.1  Much  more  is  this  the  case  with  a  science 
that  deals  with  wealth,  i.e.  with  the  instruments  for 
the  maintenance  and  enjoyment  of  human  life  and 
human  society.  Wealth  has  necessarily  varied  in 
character  according  to  the  other  conditions,  natural 
and  social,  of  human  living.  Even  the  exchange  of 
wealth  cannot  be  properly  or  profitably  studied,  as 
it  were,  in  vacuo,  apart  from  the  conditions  which 

1  I  cannot  here  discuss  the  question,  in  what  sense  logic  is  a 
"  pure  "  science.  I  would  only  point  out  that  the  more  fruitful 
developments  of  modern  logic  have  not  been  brought  about  by 
assimilating  logic  to  a  branch  of  algebra,  but  by  introducing  into 
the  analysis  of  logical  forms  some  of  the  vivifying  conceptions  of 
biology.  I  may  refer  to  Mr.  Bosanquet's  Logic,  where  the  forms 
of  judgment  are  classified  on  a  genetic  principle.  This  may  not 
be  "  pure  "  logic.  It  is,  however,  more  like  logic  worked  at  in 
the  spirit  of  the  Analytics  than  the  mechanical  treatment  of  ab 
stract  formulae  without  any  examination  of  the  concrete  living 
judgments  which  actual  human  beings  think,  and  which  they  ex 
press  in  this  or  that  language.  Even  in  logic  it  seems  a  pity  that 
so  little  account  has  generally  been  taken  of  the  diversities  of  lan 
guage.  How  much  of  Aristotle's  logic  is  explicable  by  reference 
to  Greek  idioms,  and  would  have  been  differently  phrased  by  any 
one  using  a  different  language  ! 


V.]  WHAT    ARE    ECONOMIC    LAWS?  157 

make  different  commodities  desirable  in  different 
degrees  to  different  persons.  The  attempt  to  con 
struct  a  pure  theory  of  economics  equally  applicable 
at  all  times  and  in  all  places,  must  necessarily  result 
in  the  economist  taking  certain  phenomena  of  his 
own  time  in  isolation  from  their  social  context,  and 
formulating  principles  which  can  only  be  made 
rigidly  true  and  universal  by  being  gradually  di 
vested  of  all  reference  to  any  reality,  so  that  they 
finally  become  absolutely  identical,  i.e.  purely  verbal 
propositions.  The  interest  of  such  formulae  can 
only  be  restored  by  replacing  them  in  the  historical 
environment  which  produced  them.  Ricardian  eco 
nomics  and  Austinian  jurisprudence,  similar  in  their 
abstractness  and  in  their  endeavour  to  reach  absolute 
universality,  require  to  be  looked  at  in  the  light  of 
the  particular  conditions  of  English  industry  and  of 
English  legislation  in  the  earlier  part  of  the  century.1 
The  attempt  to  escape  history  in  dealing  with  human 
phenomena  makes  the  restoration  of  the  particular 
historical  background  of  the  theorist  essential  to  the 
understanding  of  the  professedly  abstract  theory. 
Those  who  have  treated  the  laws  of  economics  as 

1  Bagehot,  in  his  brilliant  essay  on  The  Postulates  of  English 
Political  Economy  (p.  5  in  Prof.  Marshall's  edition),  points  out 
the  analogy  between  "  political  economy  as  it  was  taught  by 
Ricardo,"  and  "jurisprudence  as  it  was  taught  by  Austin  and 
Bentham,"  and  remarks  on  the  similar  fate  which  has  befallen 
both  :  they  have  remained  "  insular."  In  each  case  the  attempt 
to  work  out  "pure  theory,"  unadulterated  by  history,  has  resulted 
in  the  "  theory "  being  unintelligible  and  inexplicable  except  in 
the  immediate  surroundings  of  those  who  have  enunciated  it. 


158  WHAT   ARE    ECONOMIC    LAWS?  [v. 

analogous  to  those  of  physics  are  not  wrong  in  treat 
ing  the  science  as  too  concrete,  but  in  not  treating  it 
as  concrete  enough.  Its  place  is  among  the  social 
sciences,  and  it  fully  shares  the  difficulties  and  com 
plexities  which  attend  the  study  of  human  beings 
when  we  consider  them  as  more  than  mere  animals, 
i.e.  when  we  pass  from  biology  to  sociology.  Eco 
nomics  has  certainly  an  advantage  over  certain  other 
branches  of  sociology  in  dealing  with  a  subject  that 
admits  of  quantitative  measurement.  The  quanti 
tative  measurement  of  pleasures  and  pains  (the  as 
sumption  of  the  older  Utilitarians)  is  an  illusion  ;  but 
the  objects  of  desire  admit  of  quantitative  measure 
ment  by  whatever  medium  of  exchange  is  adopted. 
The  possibility  of  obtaining  an  object  of  desire  by 
exchange  permits  and  compels  the  person  desiring 
it  to  quantify  his  demand  precisely.  A  man  climbing 
a  mountain  under  a  hot  sun  may  say  vaguely  that  he 
would  give  "  anything  "  for  a  glass  of  beer  ;  but  the 
presence  of  a  refreshment-hut  may  prove  that  his 
demand  does  not  really  amount  to  one  franc.  This 
possibility  of  expressing  economic  desires  quantita 
tively,  and  this  alone,  gives  economics  the  appear 
ance  of  being  more  closely  related  to  the  mathema 
tical  sciences  than,  e.g.,  jurisprudence  or  politics. 
Statements  about  value  have  an  air  of  mathematical 
exactness,  and  consequently  of  detachment  from  a 
historical  environment  which  does  not  belong  to 
propositions  about  the  relation  between  crime  and 
punishment,  or  about  the  differentiation  of  the 
sovereign  power  in  a  community.  But  this  facility 


V.]  WHAT   ARE    ECONOMIC    LAWS?  159 

of  general  statement  has  in  it  something  illusory. 
As  has  just  been  said,  many  propositions  can  be 
made  perfectly  and  universally  true  in  proportion  as 
they  are  removed  from  definite  and  particular  appli 
cation.  We  might  extend  the  money  measurement 
into  morals,  and  say  that  every  man  has  his  price  ; 
but  to  make  the  proposition  true  we  should  have  to 
add  that  there  have  been  some  men,  the  price  of 
whose  corruption  by  certain  temptations  would  be 
something  more  than  all  the  kingdoms  of  this  world. 
The  maxim  then  simply  means  that  every  one  is 
induced  to  act  in  any  given  way  by  the  motives 
which  are  strong  enough  to  make  him  act  in  that 
way — which  is  certainly  true,  but  is  somewhat  point 
less,  and  is  not  quite  what  the  royal  cynic  meant. 

3.  History  stands  apart  from  other  sciences  in 
being  concerned  with  things  that  happen  once  for 
all  :  in  this  aspect  it  is  not,  strictly  speaking,  a 
"  science,"  science  being  concerned  with  universals, 
with  statements  not  about  "  this,"  but  about  "  the."1 
Yet  of  history  we  may  say  that  it  is  always  "  wish 
ing"  or  striving  to  be  a  science,  to  see  the  universal 
in  the  particular — whilst  giving  a  true  picture  of  the 
events  which  have  happened,  to  give  also  a  true 
picture  (as  Thucydides  says)  "of  the  like  events 
which  may  be  expected  to  happen  hereafter  in  the 
order  of  human  things."  2  The  scientific  and  philo- 

1  Cf.  Aristotle's  well-known  saying  about  poetry  being  more 
philosophic  than  history,  because  it  deals  more  with  the  universal, 
with  "  what  might  occur  "  (Poet.,  c.  9). 

2  Thucydides,  i.  22. 


160  WHAT    ARE    ECONOMIC    LAWS?  [v. 

sophic  historian  of  the  English  or  of  the  French 
Revolution  is  dealing  with  general  problems  of 
human  nature  and  human  society,  as  they  appear 
at  a  particular  time,  and  in  a  particular  country. 
Besides  the  mere  investigation  of  particular  events, 
there  is  a  possible  "  political  science  "  (or,  at  least, 
a  possible  ideal  of  such  a  science),  which,  based 
upon  history,  shall  attempt  to  arrive  at  some  general 
"  laws"  about  the  nature  and  functions  of  the  State  ; 
i.e.,  to  give  "definitions  "  of  political  concepts,  which 
shall  be,  wherever  possible,  genetic,  assigning  causes, 
and  so  taking  the  subject  explained  out  of  its  iso 
lation  and  showing  its  connection  with  other 
phenomena  of  social  life.  Thus,  an  analysis  of 
"  representative  government  "  should  contain  a 
recognition  both  of  its  origin  and  of  the  purposes 
which  it  serves — in  Aristotelian  language,  of  its 
material,  efficient,  and  final  causes.  (That  a  good 
definition  gives  the  "  formal  cause "  goes  without 
saying.)  If  economic  history  deals  with  particular 
events  and  series  of  events,  is  there  not  also 
conceivable  an  economic  science  which  deals  with 
the  "laws  "  of  the  production,  exchange,  distribution 
and  consumption  of  wealth — in  other  words,  which 
gives  scientific  definitions  (in  the  sense  already  ex 
plained)  of  economic  concepts,  such  as  value,  rent, 
interest  ? 

In  order  to  get  economic  laws,  however,  we  must, 
it  may  be  urged,  abstract  from  the  concrete  facts  ; 
we  must  make  hypotheses.  Our  laws  are  not, 
therefore,  generalisations  from  observation  of 


V.]  WHAT    ARE    ECONOMIC    LAWS?  l6l 

economic  facts,  but  deductions  from  the  assumption 
of  certain  facts  of  human  nature — assumptions  made 
by  popular  psychology,  supplemented  (and  this  must 
not  be  forgotten)  by  certain,  usually  tacit,  assump 
tions  as  to  stage  of  civilisation,  etc.  Granted  that 
economic  laws  are  hypothetical  in  their  character, 
that  makes  no  difference  between  them  and  laws  of 
nature.  Laws  of  nature  are  commonly  supposed  to 
be  generalisations  from  observation  of  facts.  They 
rest  upon  certain  facts,  it  is  true  ;  but  they  are 
general  only  because  they  are  hypothetical.  If  they 
are  not  mere  "  empirical  laws,"  i.e.  mere  generalisa 
tions  of  experience,  but  true  "  laws  of  nature,"  they 
contain  some  fact  of  causation,  they  assert  a  neces 
sary  connection,  and  therefore  they  would  be  most 
correctly  formulated  as  hypothetical  propositions. 
The  true  universal  judgment,  i.e.  the  judgment 
which  asserts  necessity  of  connection,  and  which  is 
not  a  mere  summation  of  observed  particulars,1  is 
best  expressed  in  the  hypothetical  form.  Thus  : 
"  All  triangles  [not  merely  "  all  these  triangles,"  but 
' 'all  triangles  qua  triangles"]  have  their  angles  to 
gether  equal  to  two  right  angles,"  means,  "  If  this, 
or  any  figure,  is  a  triangle,  it  must  have  its  angles 
together  equal  to  two  right  angles  ;  it  has  this 
property  because  it  is  a  triangle.  The  triangularity 
is  the  'cause'  of  its  having  this  property."  And 
this  proposition,  this  "  law,"  if  we  care  to  call  it 
such,  would  be  true,  although  no  actual  perfect 
triangle  could  ever  be  "observed." 

1  I.e.  the  judgment  which  is  true  xaloAov  and  not  merely  Kara 
Travros. 

D.  H.  M 


1 62  WHAT    ARE    ECONOMIC    LAWS  ?  [v. 

The  same  holds  in  physics.  The  first  law  of 
motion  asserts  that,  "  if  a  body  be  in  motion,  it  will 
move  in  a  straight  line  and  with  a  uniform  velocity, 
unless  acted  on  by  some  external  force."  Where 
are  the  "observations"  from  which  this  could  be 
said  to  be  a  "  generalisation  "?  The  "law"  is  a 
statement  of  what  is  never  realised  in  our  experi 
ence.  Its  necessity  and  its  hypothetical  character 
go  together.  In  formulating  laws  of  nature,  we  are 
simplifying  nature  for  ourselves  ;  not  attempting  to 
follow  facts,  which  are  too  complex  to  be  grasped 
in  their  entirety  all  at  once,  but  seeking  to  interpret 
facts.  The  laws  of  economics  claim  to  be  laws  in 
the  same  sense.  They  are  hypothetical  propositions 
stating  what,  under  certain  conditions,  would  happen. 
(The  mischief  is,  that  "  the  practical  man  "  is  apt  to 
run  off  with  the  statement  of  a  tendency,  and  to 
forget  the  qualifying  conditions.)  These  "  certain 
conditions  "  may  be  more  or  less  far  removed  from 
anything  that  can  be  observed  or  realised  in  our 
experience.  The  conditions  for  observing  the  law 
of  gravitation  in  operation  are  not  so  difficult  to 
fulfil  as  the  conditions  for  observing  the  first  law  of 
motion.  To  observe  the  first  law  of  motion  (at 
least,  the  part  of  it  I  have  here  quoted)  in  operation 
is  strictly  impossible.  In  economics  we  can  find 
cases  where  the  condition  of  absolutely  free  compe 
tition  is  approximately  realised  ;  but  it  is  only  an 
approximation  at  the  best.  On  the  other  hand, 
such  a  condition  as  the  "  transferability  "  of  labour 
(to  use  Bagehot's  expression),  i.e.  the  possibility  of 


V.j  WHAT    ARE    ECONOMIC    LAWS?  163 

its  being  transferred  from  one  occupation  to  another, 
cannot  be  even  approximately  realised,  except  within 
very  narrow  limits,  or  unless  we  take  into  account 
a  long  period  of  time. 

It  is  customary  to  oppose  the  abstract  and  de 
ductive  method  to  the  historical  and  inductive. 
Neither  of  these  methods  can  exist  in  absolute 
isolation  from  the  other,  though  the  opinion  that 
they  can  is  apt  to  prevail,  and  to  cause  misunder 
standing.  If,  to  simplify  some  economic  problem, 
we  set  up  a  fictitious  "  economic  man,"  a  human 
being  actuated  solely  by  the  desire  to  obtain  the 
greatest  possible  wealth,  we  must  place  him  in  an 
environment  of  similar  individuals — and  these  similar 
individuals  must  be  thought  of  as  held  together  in  a 
community,  though  it  be  merely  a  community  based 
on  economic  interests.  We  must  presuppose  a 
certain  minimum  amount  of  mutual  trust  and  con 
fidence,  even  as  the  basis  of  the  most  purely  com 
mercial  relation.  That  is  to  say,  we  borrow  our 
notion  of  the  economic  man  from  the  business  world 
which  is  known  to  us,  leaving  out  of  sight  the  other 
aspects  and  relationships  of  the  individuals.  The 
fact  that  it  is  possible  to  construct  illustrations  of  the 
most  abstract  economic  laws,  shows  that  there  is, 
even  in  deductive  political  economy,  an  element  of 
induction,  i.e.  of  verification  in  experience,  though 
it  may  be  fictitious  experience  ;  for  all  our  fictions 
must  be  borrowed  from  facts,  although  by  a  process 
of  abstraction.  These  tales  of  the  economic  text 
books  ("  Place  two  men  on  a  desert  island,"  etc.)  are 


164  WHAT    ARE    ECONOMIC    LAWS?  [v. 

the    very    imperfect    substitutes    for   the   laboratory 
experiments  of  physics  and  chemistry. 

On  the  other  hand,  mere  inductive  generalisation, 
unmixed  with  hypothesis,  is  impossible.  Even  in 
collecting  statistics,  we  must  have  some  rough  guid 
ing  idea  to  determine  us  what  sort  of  "  facts"  to 
collect.  If  in  collecting  information  about  London 
pauperism,  we  find  out  how  many  of  the  paupers  are 
town-born  and  how  many  country-born,  we  do  so 
under  guidance  of  the  hypothesis,  suggested  to  us  by 
our  ordinary  practical  knowledge  of  human  nature, 
that  there  may  be  some  connection  between  the  two 
sets  of  facts,  e.g.  that  the  town-born  may  be  of  in 
ferior  physique  and  brought  up  under  worse  con 
ditions,  or  that  the  country-born  may  have  less 
capacity  of  adapting  themselves  to  town  life.  The 
falsehood  of  a  hypothesis,  as  logicians  have  often 
pointed  out,  does  not  prevent  it  from  being  useful  ; 
the  important  thing  is  that  a  hypothesis  should  be 
capable  of  at  least  approximate  proof  or  disproof. 

It  is  obvious  that  the  historian  in  searching  for 
the  causes  of  social  phenomena  must  have  hypotheses 
in  his  mind,  just  as  much  as  the  physician  in  making 
a  diagnosis  of  a  case.  Here  comes  in  the  value  of 
the  trained  imagination.  The  historian  of  the 
French  revolution  would  not  make  a  study  of  the 
literature  of  the  eighteenth  century,  or  of  the  opinions 
then  prevalent  about  the  English  constitution,  or  of 
the  American  revolution,  except  under  the  idea  that 
these  subjects  had  some  connection  with  the  main 
subject  of  his  research. 


V.]  WHAT    ARE    ECONOMIC    LAWS?  165 

The  difference  between  the  method  of  pure  theory 
and  the  historical  method  can  only  be  one  of  degree. 
The  ideal  of  an  absolutely  pure  theory  unmixed 
with  any  empirical  element  is  as  impossible  as  the 
ideal  of  an  absolutely  pure  logic  unmixed  with  any 
reference  to  the  actual  judgments  and  actual  in 
ferences  made  by  human  beings.  And  such  an  ideal 
seems  the  more  out  of  place  in  a  science  which  pro 
fesses  to  deal  with  social  phenomena.  Mere  history, 
on  the  other  hand, — if  we  may  apply  the  term  "  his 
tory  "  to  a  mere  empirical  collection  of  facts  un 
mixed  with  any  element  of  hypothesis,  any  attempt 
to  find  causal  connections, — is  impossible  :  except, 
perhaps,  to  some  kinds  of  lunatics.  Any  approach 
to  it  seems  ludicrous,  as  in  the  irrelevancies  of  Juliet's 
nurse,  or  in  that  sentence  of  Burnet's,  ridiculed  by 
Swift :  "  Upon  the  King's  death,  the  Scots  pro 
claimed  his  son  king,  and  sent  over  Sir  George 
Wincan,  that  married  my  great  aunt,  to  treat  with 
him  while  he  was  in  the  Isle  of  Jersey."  Swift  asks, 
in  the  margin  of  his  copy,  "  Was  that  the  reason 
why  he  was  sent  ? "  The  reader  expects  a  causal 
connection,  and  finds  a  statement  that  has  a  mere 
private  interest  to  the  writer. 

II. 

So  far  I  have  considered  only  the  resemblance 
between  economic  laws  and  laws  of  nature  (in  the 
sense  in  which  that  term  is  used  in  physics,  chemistry, 
biology,  etc.).  I  must  now  ask  whether  there  is 
any  difference  between  a  physical  and  a  sociological 


1 66  WHAT    ARE    ECONOMIC    LAWS  ?  [v. 

law  ?  This  question  involves  the  most  important 
of  all  philosophical  questions,  what  is  the  relation  of 
man  to  nature  ? — a  question  which  is  ambiguous 
with,  at  least,  all  the  ambiguity  of  the  word  "  nature." 
In  one  sense  it  may  be  said  to  be  a  presupposition 
of  any  scientific  study  of  human  phenomena,  whether 
in  psychology  or  in  any  of  the  social  sciences,  that 
man  is  a  part  of  nature,  i.e.  that  his  actions  may  be 
regarded,  like  other  events,  as  belonging  to  a 
coherent  and  intelligible  system  of  things — in  more 
familiar,  though  perhaps  less  accurate  words,  that 
they  present  certain  uniformities  of  co-existence  and 
sequence,  capable  of  being  discovered  and  expressed 
in  generalisations.  If  we  are  to  have  psychology  or 
any  social  science  at  all,  we  must  recognise  the 
universality  of  the  causal  nexus.  But  while  this  is 
admitted,  we  must  not  lose  sight  of  the  difference 
between  (i)  events  in  which  the  agents  attain  ends 
without  purposing  them,  and  (2)  events  in  which 
the  agents  attain  ends  which  they  have  more  or 
less  purposed  to  attain.  A  great  part  of  human 
phenomena  belongs,  as  much  as  do  the  non-human 
phenomena  of  nature,  to  the  former  class  ;  and  even 
where  purpose  comes  in,  it  comes  in  in  very  different 
degrees.  In  all  parts  of  social  evolution,  many  of 
the  most  striking  results  have  been  those  which  the 
agents  did  not  intend.  If  human  phenomena  did 
not,  to  some  extent  at  least,  belong  to  the  non- 
purposed  class,  we  should  often  have  to  count  the 
persecutors  of  a  religion  among  its  supporters. 
Even  where  the  result  is  in  the  direction  of  that 


V.]  WHAT    ARE    ECONOMIC    LAWS?  167 

which  was  designed,  it  often  contains  elements 
which  are  due  to  some  stronger  forces  than  the 
volitions  of  the  individual  actors,  forces  of  the  same 
kind  as  those  operating  among  plants  and  animals. 
Nevertheless,  we  are  not  viewing  the  facts  of  human 
evolution  aright,  if  we  fail  to  recognise  the  occasional 
presence  of  conscious  and  deliberate  purpose  among 
the  causes  at  work.  Reflection  and  effort  are  causes 
which  may  be  explained  and  traced  back  to  their 
causes  like  any  others,  but  they  make  a  difference 
between  the  regions  where  they  are  present  and 
those  where  they  are  not. 

The  first  effect  of  applying  scientific  methods  and 
conceptions  to  human  phenomena,  and  so  lifting 
them  out  of  the  domain  of  chance  or  arbitrariness, 
has  generally  been  to  produce  a  feeling  of  the  help 
lessness  of  individual  and  even  of  social  effort,  in 
the  presence  of  great  natural  forces  and  tendencies. 
The  recognition  of  order  (i.e.  of  what  is  order  to  the 
scientific  understanding,  not  necessarily  to  the  moral 
sense)  has  been  apt  to  mean  the  abdication  of 
rational  endeavour.  It  is  therefore  worth  calling 
attention  to  the  differences  which  gradually  show 
themselves  between  social  and  merely  natural 
phenomena. 

Some  instructive  illustrations  of  the  resemblance 
and  difference  between  human  and  physical  science 
may  be  found  in  the  case  of  language.  It  has  been 
argued  that  language  has  a  life  and  growth  of  its 
own  with  which  men  cannot  interfere.  In  support 
of  this  view,  Professor  Max  Miiller  has  brought 


1 68  WHAT    ARE    ECONOMIC    LAWS  ?  [v. 

forward  the  famous  examples  of  the  Emperor 
Tiberius  being  unable  to  give  Roman  citizenship 
to  a  word  not  recognised  by  grammarians,  and  of 
the  Emperor  Sigismund  being  unable  to  make 
schisma  feminine  at  the  Council  of  Constance.  But 
can  it  be  inferred  frpm  this  that  the  development  of 
language  is  a  purely  natural  process?  In  the  first 
place,  an  absolute  ruler  can  permanently  alter  very 
little  of  anything,  unless  he  has  a  strong  current  of 
public  opinion  with  him.  As  has  been  said  of  the 
Emperor  of  China,  "  Le  fils  du  ciel  peut  tout — mais 
a  condition  de  ne  vouloir  que  ce  qui  est  connu  et 
traditionnel."  These  stones  of  Tiberius  and  Sigis 
mund  do  not  prove  language  a  natural  growth  in 
dependent  of  human  volition,  any  more  than  any 
admitted  "  institutions,"  such  as  laws,  social  usages, 
fashions  of  dress,  etc.  Secondly,  while  it  is  obviously 
true  that  the  will  of  an  individual^  however  highly 
placed,  can  do  very  little,  yet  many  changes  in 
language  are  ultimately  dependent  on  the  will  of 
individuals.  Who  gives  nicknames  ?  Who  invents 
slang  ?  Generally  it  is  impossible  to  discover  ;  and 
yet  we  know  that  some  one  person  must  have  used 
the  new  term  first  of  all,  just  as  much  as  in  the  case 
of  new  technical  terms,  where  the  originator  can  be 
more  easily  traced.  Introductions  of  new  words  or 
phrases,  which  we  may  observe  within  our  own 
experience,  are,  however,  only  specimens  of  the 
nature  of  a  process  which  has  always  been  going  on 
in  language.  The  new  ''variation"  must  originate 
with  some  individual.  If  it  proves  convenient,  or  in 


V.]  WHAT    ARE    ECONOMIC    LAWS?  169 

any  way  suits  the  fancy  of  others,  it  takes  root  and 
spreads  ;  if  not,  it  withers  and  dies  out.  The  rise 
of  literature  gives  greater  fixity  to  language  :  the 
establishment  of  schools,  the  recognition  of  certain 
usages  as  "  classical,"  the  making  of  grammars  and 
dictionaries  increase  the  force  of  the  check  imposed 
on  "  natural,"  i.e.  simply  unconscious,  phonetic 
change.  But  such  fixity  is  produced  by  more  or 
less  deliberate  human  institutions.  The  most  con 
spicuous  case  of  what,  by  contrast,  might  be  called 
merely  natural  change,  is  where  a  people,  adopting 
a  new  language  (e.g.  that  of  a  conquering  tribe), 
modify  sounds  that  are  difficult  or  unfamiliar  to 
them.  Here  the  resultant  language  might  almost 
be  compared  to  a  chemical  combination.  But  there 
is  no  limit  to  fas. possible  changes  in  language  that 
may  be  made  on  conscious  individual  initiative, 
except  the  limit  of  the  capacities  of  the  human  voice. 
No  fashion  could  induce  men  to  speak  with  the 
tongues  of  nightingales  or  larks. 

Political  institutions  supply  other  illustrations  of 
the  relation  between  the  volitional  and  the  merely 
natural  element  in  human  history.  That  "  constitu 
tions  are  not  made,  but  grow,"  is  accepted  as  so 
much  a  commonplace  that  people  forget  to  ask, 
"How  do  they  grow  ?  "  At  least,  they  grow  not 
exactly  like  weeds,  but  like  cabbages  that  have  to 
be  planted.  Besides,  the  most  ingenious  political 
schemes  come  to  nothing,  if  not  adapted  to  the 
people  and  the  time  ;  they  are  unsuccessful  ''varia 
tions."  But  every  change  in  law  or  custom  must 


1  7O  WHAT    ARE    ECONOMIC    LAWS  ?  [v. 

originate  in  some  person  doing  or  abstaining  from 
doing  some  particular  thing.  So  that  the  "growth" 
of  constitutions  does  not  exclude  the  "making"  of 
various  parts  of  them.  The  idea  of  "  natural 
selection  "  will  apply  perfectly  to  human  evolution, 
if  we  remember  that  the  variations  on  which  natural 
selection  works  in  human  phenomena  arise,  not 
merely  (i)  "spontaneously"  or  "accidentally"  (the 
words  we  use  to  express  our  refusal  or  our  incapacity 
to  pursue  the  question  farther),  but  (2)  by  imitation 
— which  is  at  least  a  half-conscious  process — and 
(3)  by  deliberate  effort,  as  the  result  of  reflection, 
with  a  view  to  obtain  certain  ends.  Where  such 
reflection  has  really  anticipated  what  is  advantage 
ous,  natural  selection  seems  to  be  superseded  in 
successful  artificial  or  rational  selection.1  The  limits 
of  deliberate  constitutional  change  are  sufficiently 
obvious  ;  they  are,  chiefly,  geographical  conditions 
(though  the  effect  of  these  may  be  very  much 
modified  by  mechanical  inventions)  and  the  in 
tellectual  and  moral  capacities  of  any  particular  race 
(though  these  may  be  greatly  affected  by  the  dis 
cipline  of  education  and  religion). 

Changes  in  the  economic  condition  of  a  people 
are,  it  is  clear,  very  largely  dependent  on  circum 
stances  over  which  man's  control  is  limited.  The 
duration  and  hardiness  of  human  life,  climate,  the 
supply  of  minerals,  the  fertility  of  the  soil,  the 

1  On  this  subject  I  may  refer  to  what  I  have  said  at  greater 
length  in  Darwinism  and  Politics,  second  edition.  See  especially 
pp.  24-36,  99-106,  126-131. 


V.]  WHAT    ARE    ECONOMIC    LAWS?  \J\ 

facilities  of  communication,  are  all  in  different 
degrees  incapable  of  modification.  There  are, 
further,  obvious  limitations  to  the  possibility  of 
human  effort  and  endurance,  though  these  may  be 
greatly  modified  by  improved  methods,  by  economy 
of  labour,  etc.  There  are  also  certain  necessary 
limits  to  the  extent  to  which  any  given  occupation 
may  be  adopted  by  the  members  of  a  community. 
Thus,  to  take  an  old  and  extreme  instance,  every 
body  could  not  subsist  by  taking  in  everybody  else's 
washing. 

But  there  are  very  many  economic  phenomena 
which  are  dependent  on  individual  action  and  social 
approval,  e.g.  the  different  forms  of  land-tenure,  the 
degree  in  which  freedom  of  bequest  is  permitted,  the 
kind  of  contracts  which  are  sanctioned  by  law  and 
custom.  All  these  may  be  and  have  been  altered— 
not  indeed  by  the  arbitrary  will  of  individuals  acting 
in  isolation,  but  by  the  will  of  individuals  approved 
of  by  the  general  consent,  or  submitted  to  by  the 
general  acquiescence  of  the  community. 

Such  matters  as  the  hours  of  labour,  the  standard 
of  comfort,  the  health  conditions  of  industrial  oc 
cupations,  are  partly  dependent  on  natural  necessities 
which  can  only  be  affected  through  mechanical 
inventions,  but  partly  also  on  custom,  which  may  be 
affected  by  moral  and  political  changes.  Thus, 
while  it  has  been  proved  that  the  hours  of  labour 
can,  in  many  cases,  be  diminished  to  some  extent, 
without  a  necessary  diminution  in  the  product  of 
labour,  it  is  clear  that  this  diminution  cannot  go  on 


1/2  WHAT    ARE    ECONOMIC    LAWS?  [v. 

indefinitely ;  else  with  no  work  at  all,  as  much 
would  be  produced  as  with  a  great  deal  of  work. 
But  what  amount  of  commodities  are  required,  and 
what  kind  of  commodities,  are  questions  which 
depend,  to  a  large  extent,  on  demands  which  are 
not  permanently  fixed  by  the  nature  of  things,  but 
are  partly  dependent  on  moral  causes.  Such  ques 
tions  are  surely  proper  subject-matter  for  scientific 
inquiry ;  if  they  are  not  the  subject-matter  of 
economics — "applied  economics"  let  it  be  called,  if 
necessary — to  what  science  do  they  belong  ?  They 
cannot  belong  purely  to  economic  history  ;  for 
history  has  to  do  only  with  what  has  been,  and  here 
we  are  dealing  with  questions  as  to  what  economic 
conditions  are  possible,  and  what  are  their  usual  or 
probable  effects  on  human  well-being. 

The  recognition  of  a  "moral  factor"  in  economic 
law  need  not  therefore  vitiate  the  scientific  character 
of  the  study  :  it  will  only  make  the  difference  between 
a  less  abstract  and  a  more  abstract  "law."  The 
more  conditions  our  law  takes  account  of,  the  more 
likely  are  we  to  be  able  to  verify  it  in  experience. 

Political  history  and  the  history  of  morals  also 
have  gained  from  the  recognition  of  the  economic 
factor.  It  is  essential  to  have  the  connection 
pointed  out  between  political,  moral,  and  even 
intellectual  revolutions  on  the  one  side,  and  eco 
nomic  changes  on  the  other,  to  see  how  economic 
pressure  has  often  brought  about  what  moral 
efforts  alone  could  not  effect.  But  it  would  be  quite 
a  perversion  of  truth  to  resolve  everything  solely 


V.]  WHAT    ARE    ECONOMIC    LAWS?  173 

into  its  economic  conditions  :  and  it  would  be  to 
misunderstand  those  economic  conditions  them 
selves.  Economic  wants  are  dependent  on  the 
whole  social  environment  in  which  people  live  ;  and 
therefore  moral,  religious,  intellectual,  artistic  con 
ditions  must  be  taken  account  of  in  order  to  explain 
them  fully.  Man  cannot  live  without  bread  or  some 
equivalent  ;  but  man  cannot  live,  and  never  has 
lived,  by  bread  alone. 

If  "Nature"  be  taken  to  include  the  whole  of 
human  phenomena,  then  it  is  inconsistent  to  exclude 
from  nature  anything  that  may  be  done  by  con 
scious  and  deliberate  human  effort.  If  we  say  "  All 
that  is  is  nature,"  we  must  include  in  our  conception 
of  nature  the  spiritual  ideals  as  well  as  the  material 
necessities  of  man.  But,  if  so,  it  is  inconsistent  to 
deny  intelligence  or  a  "spiritual  principle"  in  what 
we  call  nature,  since  this  intelligence  or  spiritual 
principle  shows  itself  in  human  beings.  It  is  in 
consistent  science  to  regard  man  as  entirely  within 
nature,  and  yet  to  exclude  from  nature,  in  the 
widest  sense,  the  highest  intelligence  and  the 
highest  goodness  that  have  shown  themselves  in 
man.  And  it  is  surely  an  inconsistent  "  natural 
theology  "  which  sees  God  in  natural  forces  and  yet 
refuses  to  recognise  the  clearer  revelation  of  wisdom 
and  justice  in  the  history  of  social  institutions  and  of 
philosophical  and  religious  ideas — which  sees  God 
in  the  earthquake  and  the  whirlwind,  and  yet 
refuses  to  hear  when  He  speaks  writh  the  human 
voice  of  legislator,  sage,  and  prophet. 


1 74  WHAT    ARE    ECONOMIC    LAWS  ?  [v. 

III. 

To    recognise    the    existence    of    economic    laws 

o 

analogous  to  laws  of  nature  does  not  require  us  to 
exclude  from  them  the  moral  factor.  But  this  re 
cognition  of  the  moral  factor  does  not  turn  economic 
laws  into  moral  laws.  Moral  laws  are  precepts  re 
specting  conduct  :  the  phrase  "  moral  laws  "  implies 
that  morality  is  regarded  on  the  analogy  of  a  legal 
code.  The  term  "  laws"  is  used  in  the  same  sense 
as  that  in  which  it  is  used  by  lawyers — as  an  ex 
pression  for  what  is  expected  to  be  done,  not  for  what 
necessarily,  under  certain  conditions,  must  happen. 
If  the  word  "  must  "  is  used  in  expressing  "  moral 
laws,"  it  means  "ought  to,"  and  not,  as  in  laws 
of  nature,  "  cannot  but."  In  both  senses,  indeed, 
"law"  implies  uniformity.  Law,  in  the  juridical 
sense,  though  it  may  nowadays  be  thought  of  as  a 
command  issued  by  a  sovereign,  was,  in  primitive 
times,  simply  the  custom  of  the  tribe,  which  every  one 
was  expected  to  follow,  and  which  almost  all  persons 
did,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  follow.  And.  in  the  ethical 
sense,  though  moral  laws  may,  among  the  higher  re 
ligions,  be  regarded  as  enjoined  by  a  divine  legislator, 
primitive  ideas  of  right  mean  the  observance  of  the 
customs  of  our  fathers.  But,  in  spite  of  this  resem 
blance,  laws  in  the  moral  and  juridical  sense  cannot 
be  completely  assimilated  to  laws  of  nature,  not 
even  if  we  introduce  the  sanction  of  them.  "If  you 
commit  murder,  you  will  be  hanged,"  is  not  like 
a  law  of  nature  ;  because  a  murderer  may  escape 
hanging.  "  Murderers,  if  caught  and  convicted,  are 


V.J  WHAT    ARE    ECONOMIC    LAWS?  175 

generally  hanged,"  would,  indeed,  be  a  sociological 
law,  analogous  to  a  law  of  nature,  expressing  the 
prevailing  custom.  But  in  any  formula  which  ex 
presses  a  moral  or  juridical  law  there  must  be  an 
expression,  not  of  simple  fact,  but  of  something 
which  is  expected  as  right,  although  it  may  be  that 
which  is  not  always  done.  Even  if  ethics  be  looked 
at  entirely  from  the  point  of  view  of  the  natural 
sciences  and  "  metaphysics  "  rigidly  excluded  from 
it,  it  is  still  necessary  to  recognise  the  distinction 
between  moral  laws  and  sociological  laws.  "  If 
society  is  to  hold  together  and  prosper,  its  members 
must  keep  faith  with  one  another."  This  may  be 
called  a  sociological  law ;  it  may  be  reached  by 
deduction  from  some  obvious  psychological  facts, 
supplemented  by  inductions  from  our  ordinary 
experience  and  from  history.  It  expresses  the  fact 
that  human  beings  have  to  recognise  the  "  moral 
law "  which  enjoins  fidelity  to  one  another.  The 
liar,  the  fraudulent  person,  and  the  various  violators 
of  this  moral  law  do  not,  and  cannot,  violate  the 
sociological  law  :  they  illustrate  it.  A  healthy 
society  wars  against  them  ;  because  if  they  become 
abundant,  any  society  will  go  to  pieces.  "  In  primi 
tive  conditions  of  society  rigid  observance  of  custom 
is  essential  to  cohesion  "•  —this  is  a  sociological  law, 
on  which  Bagehot  has  written  luminously  in  his 
Physics  and  Politics.  The  "  moral  law  "  belonging 
to  this  stage  of  society  would  be,  "  Thou  shalt 
not  be  eccentric" — a  law  which,  in  the  form,  "  Thou 
shalt  strictly  follow  the  fashion,"  still  holds  among 


176  WHAT    ARE    ECONOMIC    LAWS?  [v. 

various  groups  of  civilised  persons  who,  for  many 
purposes,  are  in  the  mental  condition  of  barbarians. 
This  sociological  law  is  a  law  of  the  same  kind  as 
the  biological  law,  that  animals  in  a  state  of  nature 
(i.e.  not  domesticated  by  man)  do  not  exhibit  un- 
symmetrical  markings,  because  those  with  unsym- 
metrical  markings  are  crushed  out  by  natural  selec 
tion.  The  moral  law  corresponding  to  this  would 
be  the  precept,  "  Thou  shalt  not  have  unsymmetrical 
markings"-— which  sounds  meaningless,  because  the 
tiger  or  the  leopard  cannot  at  will  change  his  stripes 
or  his  spots. 

Laws  of  nature,  then,  including  sociological  laws, 
cannot  be  violated.  If  a  law  of  nature  seems  to  be 
violated,  either  it  has  been  incorrectly  formulated,  or 
else  we  are  speaking,  incorrectly,  of  violating  a  law 
of  nature  when  we  really  mean  violating  some  pre 
cept  of  prudence  based — or  supposed  to  be  based— 
on  a  knowledge  of  the  law.  The  man  who  dies  from 
wilfully  eating  poison  has  violated  the  precepts  of 
health  :  he  illustrates  the  laws  of  physiology.  Econo 
mic  laws,  being  sociological  laws,  are  not  precepts  ; 
in  the  strict  sense  they  cannot  be  violated.  Those 
who  boast  that  they  "  believe  in  economic  laws " 
can  only  mean  that  they  believe  in  a  certain  form  of 
society  as  desirable  ;  and  it  would  be  less  misleading 
if  they  said  so  openly.  Economic  laws  are  true  or 
false.  They  are  to  be  believed  or  disbelieved  ; 
they  are  not  an  ideal  which  can  be  believed  in.  It 
is  necessary  to  protest  strongly,  and  even  at  the  risk 
of  repeating  truisms,  against  this  common  confusion 


77 


V.]  WHAT    ARE    ECONOMIC    LAWS  ? 

of  language  about  economic  laws.  The  protest  is 
necessary  both  in  the  interests  of  science  and  in  the 
interests  of  practical  politics.  The  student  of  eco 
nomic  science,  as  such,  does  not  provide  social 
precepts  ;  it  is  his  business  to  study  the  phenomena 
in  the  same  spirit  as  that  in  which  the  physiologist 
and  pathologist  study  the  phenomena  of  health 
and  disease.  The  practical  physician  is  dependent 
on  their  discoveries  ;  and  the  relation  of  the  practical 
politician  or  social  reformer  to  the  economic  theorist 
ought  to  be  of  the  same  kind,  and  of  the  same  kind 
only.  The  physician  is  concerned  with  the  life- 
history  of  microbes,  with  a  view  to  the  safe-guarding 
of  human  health  ;  and  similarly  the  politician  is  con 
cerned  with  the  operation  of  economic  forces,  not  in 
order  that  he  may  necessarily  always  give  them  a 
free  field  to  operate  in,  but  in  order  that  he  may 
further  them,  check  them,  or  direct  them  into  new 
channels,  so  far  as  it  is  possible  for  him  to  do  so,  in 
the  interests  of  social  health.  It  is  not  meant,  ot 
course,  that  the  functions  of  the  scientific  economist 
and  of  the  social  reformer  cannot  be  combined  in 
the  same  person,  but  simply  that  the  functions  are 
distinct  from  one  another,  and  that  the  most  careful 
student  of  facts  is  the  least  likely  to  confuse  socio 
logical  'Maws"  with  moral  ideals  or  precepts  of 
political  practice. 


D.  H. 


N 


VI. 
LOCKE'S    THEORY  OF    PROPERTY.1 

u  THE  great  and  chief  end  of  men's  uniting  into 
commonwealths  and  putting  themselves  under 
government  is  the  preservation  of  their  property." 
This  opinion  of  Locke  may  to  some  readers  appear 
to  express,  with  an  air  of  unintended  satire,  the 
principles  of  the  Whig  statesmen  who  carried  out 
that  glorious  and  peaceable  Revolution  of  1688,  of 
which  the  "  Treatise  of  Civil  Government  "  is  the 
theoretical  defence.  We  should,  however,  be 
misinterpreting  Locke  and  those  whose  ideas  he 
represents,  did  we  not  attend  to  his  own  explanation 
of  the  term  "  Property."  A  man's  property  means, 
according  to  him,  "his  life,  liberty,  and  estate"  (II. 
§§  87,  123).  "By  property,"  he  says  elsewhere 
(§  J73)>  "I  must  be  understood  to  mean  that 
property  which  men  have  in  their  persons  as  well 
as  goods."  Property,  in  the  sense  of  "estate"  or 
possessions,  is  not  to  Locke,  as  indeed  it  could 
hardly  be  to  any  philosopher  or  thoughtful  person, 
an  ultimate  category,  a  conception  standing  in  need 

1  Reprinted  from  the  Economic  Review,  January,  1891. 

2  Treatise  of  Civil  Government,  II.  §  124. 

T78 


vi.]  LOCKE'S  THEORY  OF  PROPERTY.  179 

of  no  further  justification.      It   is   derived  from   the 
conception  of  human  personality. 

"  Though  the  earth  and  all  inferior  creatures  be  common  to  all 
men,  yet  every  man  has  a  property  in  his  own  person.  This  no 
body  has  any  right  to  but  himself.  The  labour  of  his  body  and 
the  work  of  his  hands  we  may  say  are  properly  his.  Whatsoever, 
then,  he  removes  out  of  the  state  that  Nature  hath  provided  and 
left  it  in,  he  hath  mixed  his  labour  with,  and  joined  to  it  something 
that  is  his  own,  and  thereby  makes  it  his  property.  It  being  by  him 
removed  from  the  common  state  Nature  hath  placed  it  in,  it  hath 
by  this  labour  something  annexed  to  it  that  excludes  the  common 
right  of  other  men.  For  this  labour  being  the  unquestionable 
property  of  the  labourer,  no  man  but  he  can  have  a  right  to  what 
that  is  once  joined  to,  at  least  where  there  is  enough  and  as  good 
left  in  common  for  others  "  (II.  §  27). 

Thus,  in  this  apology  for  the  most  conservative  of 
revolutions,  we  seem  to  come  upon  the  theoretic 
basis  of  modern  Socialism  —  that  to  the  labourer 
rightfully  belongs  the  product  of  his  toil.  But  we 
need  not  go  far  in  Locke  to  find  inconsistencies,  or 
at  least  difficulties,  in  the  working  out  of  his  theory. 
At  the  end  of  the  very  next  section  (§  28)  he  says  : 

"  The  grass  my  horse  has  bit,  the  turfs  my  servant  has  cut,  and 
the  ore  I  have  digged  in  any  place  where  I  have  a  right  to  them 
in  common  with  others,  become  my  property  without  the  assigna 
tion  or  consent  of  anybody." 


horse  and  wy  servant  are  thus  equally  with  my 
labour  the  means  by  which  I  acquire  property  ;  so 
that  the  capitalist  employer  of  labour  would,  accord 
ing  to  this  clause,  be  fully  entitled  to  the  entire 
product  created  by  his  servants,  if  he  can  manage  to 
get  it. 


i8o  LOCKE'S  THEORY  OF  PROPERTY.  [vi. 

The  qualifying  clause  at  the  end  of  §  27,  "  At  least 
where  there  is  enough  and  as  good  left  in  common  for 
others"  suggests  an  endless  series  of  difficulties.    We 
can,  indeed,  easily  think  of  occasions  on  which  "  the 
state   of    Nature "    allows    this    qualification    a    real 
practical  value.     Thus,  men    on  a   desert  island  or 
travelling  through  unoccupied  territory  need  impose 
no  limit  on  their  use  of  the  fruits  and  game  they  can 
obtain,  save  a  consideration  for  each  other's  needs. 
But  does  such  a  principle  afford  us  help  as  a  criterion 
for  estimating  the  value  of  positive  laws  or  the  con 
duct    of    established    governments  ?      Thus,    when 
Locke   says   (§32),    "As  much   land  as  a  man  tills, 
plants,  improves,  cultivates,  and  can  use  the  product 
of,  so  much  is  his  property,"  this  may  be  considered 
an  excellent  maxim  for  legislation  in  a  new  country, 
but  would  certainly  seem  to  condemn  the  land-system 
of   England.       Locke,    however,    does    not    regard 
positive  law  as  condemned  simply  because  it  is  not 
identical  with  "  the  law  of  Nature."     The  convenient 
fiction  of  a ''tacit  agreement"   allows   him  to  take 
positive  law  out  of  the  range  of  a  too   revolutionary 
criticism.     That  most  land  is  actually  appropriated, 
and   that  only  the  ocean  is  the  "great  and  still  re 
maining  common  of  mankind  "   (§  30),  are  facts  due 
to  the  Social  Compact.     Locke  does  not  hold,  like 
Hobbes,  that  in  the  state  of  Nature  every  man  has 
a  right  to  everything,  but  only  that   every  man  has 
a  right  to  as  much   as  he  can  use  without  depriving 
others  of  a  similar  advantage.     Thus,  if  every  one 
were  peaceably  disposed  and  considerate  of  others, 


vi.]  LOCKE'S  THEORY  OF  PROPERTY.  181 

mankind  might  apparently  have  remained  in  the 
state  of  Nature.  But  as  every  one  does  not  obey 
the  law  of  Nature,  the  state  of  Nature  has  its  incon 
veniences  ;  there  are  no  judges  to  pronounce  sentence 
on  those  who  have  violated  the  law  of  Nature,  and 
no  officials  to  carry  out  the  sentences  (§§  87,  124- 
126).  The  aggrieved  individual  must  either  be 
judge  and  executioner  himself,  or  submit  in  patience 
to  the  encroachments  of  the  covetous  and  violent. 
"  Every  man  his  own  law-court,  and  every  man  his 
own  policeman,"  would  be  an  awkward  maxim  ; 
and  Locke's  state  of  Nature  turns  out,  in  the  long 
run,  to  be  not  much  better  than  that  of  Hobbes. 
To  avoid  its  inconveniences,  men  have  "  incorpor 
ated  "  themselves  into  a  body  politic,  "  wherein  the 
majority  have  a  right  to  act  and  conclude  the  rest  " 
(§  95).  The  right  of  majorities  Locke  bases  simply 
on  the  preponderance  of  force.  "It  is  necessary," 
he  says,  "the  body  should  move  that  way  whither 
the  greater  force  carries  it,  which  is  the  consent  of 
the  majority  "  (§  96).  The  admirable  phrase  of  Sir 
James  Fitzjames  Stephen,  "  We  agree  to  try 
strength  by  counting  heads  instead  of  breaking 
heads,"1  suggests  that  Locke  might  have  based  this 
right  of  majorities  on  an  express  or  tacit  compact, 
rather  than  on  mere  force,  which  in  many  cases  does 
not  reside  with  the  numerical  majority. 

Political  societies  having  come  into  existence,  and 
having  entrusted  the  power  of  the  communities  thus 
formed  to  governments  (of  whatever  type)  in  order 
1  Liberty ',  Equality,  Fraternity,  p.  31  (Edit.  2). 


1 82  LOCKE'S  THEORY  OF  PROPERTY.  [vi. 

to  carry  out  the  purposes  for  which  political  society 
exists,  might  it  not  seem  as  if  the  <(  property"  which 
should  be  preserved  by  governments  ought  to  be 
the  property  which  is  in  accordance  with  the  law  of 
Nature  ?  A  government  that  confiscated  all  land 
in  excess  of  what  the  owner  could  himself  "  till  and 
use  the  product  of"  might  seem  to  be  doing  more 
for  the  preservation  of  "  property"  (in  Locke's  sense 
of  the  term)  than  a  government  that  encouraged  the 
formation  of  large  estates.  Locke  is  not  unprepared 
for  this  objection,  though  he  never  expressly  faces 
it.  f^Although  men  are  "  by  Nature  all  free,  equal 
and  independent "  (§  95),  yet— 

"it  is  plain  that  men  have  agreed  to  a  disproportionate  and  un 
equal  possession  of  the  earth,  they  having,  by  a  tacit  and  voluntary 
consent,  found  out  a  way  how  a  man  may  fairly  possess  more  land 
than  he  himself  can  use  the  product  of  by  receiving  in  exchange 
for  the  overplus  gold  and  silver,  which  may  be  hoarded  up  with 
out  injury  to  any  one,  these  metals  not  spoiling  or  decaying  in  the 
hands  of  the  possessor.  This  partage  of  things  in  an  inequality 
of  private  possessions  men  have  made  practicable  out  of  the 
bounds  of  society  and  without  compact,  only  by  putting  a  value 
on  gold  and  silver,  and  tacitly  agreeing  in  the  use  of  money  ;  for 
in  Governments  the  laws  regulate  the  right  of  property,  and  the 
possession  of  land  is  determined  by  positive  constitutions  "  (§  50). 1 

This  appears  to  mean  that,  apart  from  the  social 
compact  and  from  the  positive  laws  of  any  given 
community,  gold  and  silver  possess  a  value  as 

1  In  the  original  edition  of  Locke's  Treatise  (followed,  ap 
parently,  by  Professor  Morley  in  his  edition  of  1884,  in  the 
"  Universal  Library "  Series),  this  passage  is  in  great  confusion. 
In  the  preface  to  the  collected  edition  of  Locke's  Works  of  1714 


vi.]  LOCKE'S  THEORY  OF  PROPERTY.  183 

money  l  by  the  consent  of  mankind  ;  and  since 
money  makes  it  possible  to  enlarge  possessions 
without  offending  "  against  the  common  laws  of 
Nature"  (§§  36,  37),  as  is  done  by  accumulating 
perishable  goods,  such  as  rotting  fruits  or  putrefying 
venison,  it  would  seem  that  inequality  of  property 
is  not  contrary  to  the  law  of  Nature.  But  such  in 
equality  as  leaves  to  some  persons  an  insufficient 
amount  must  be  contrary  to  the  law  of  Nature  as 
understood  by  Locke  ;  it  cannot  be  supposed  to  be 
due  to  a  general  consent  of  mankind,  and  must 
therefore  be  entirely  due  to  the  action  or  inaction  of 
the  governments  to  which  mankind  have  entrusted 
the  preservation  of  their  lives,  liberties,  and  estates. 
Now,  Locke  accepts  the  existing  institutions  of  any 
given  society  as  binding  on  those  who  enjoy  its 

it  is  said  that  the  Treatises  on  Civil  Government  are  for  the  first 
time  printed  from  a  copy  corrected  by  himself.  I  have  quoted 
the  passage  according  to  this  revised  version  (which  is  followed 
by  Professor  Morley  in  his  edition  of  Book  II.  in  CasselFs 
"  National  Library  " — 1889).  In  the  clause  immediately  preced 
ing  the  words  quoted,  Locke  says,  "Since  gold  and  silver  .  .  . 
has  its  value  only  from  the  consent  of  men,  whereof  labour  yet 
makes,  in  great  part,  the  measure."  I  suppose  that  "whereof" 
refers  to  "  value. "  Locke  seems  to  mean  that  the  value  of  money 
is  not  entirely  arbitrary  or  conventional,  but  depends  partly  on 
the  labour  of  procuring  the  precious  metals.  The  greater  scarcity 
of  gold  would,  I  suppose,  be  expressed  by  him  as  the  greater 
"labour  "  or  difficulty  of  finding  it. 

1  Money  is  defined  in  §  47  as  "some  lasting  thing  that  men 
might  keep  without  spoiling,  and  that,  by  mutual  consent,  men 
would  take  in  exchange  for  the  truly  useful  but  perishable  supports 
of  life." 


184  LOCKE'S    THEORY    OF    PROPERTY.  [vi. 

privileges,  even  where  these  institutions  deviate 
very  considerably  from  the  law  of  Nature.  Thus 
he  holds  that,  by  the  law  of  Nature,  a  man's  children 
(when  of  full  age)  are  "  as  free  as  himself,  or  any  of 
his  ancestors  ever  were,  to  choose  what  society  they 
will  join  themselves  to,  what  commonwealth  they 
will  put  themselves  under  "  (§  73)  ;  and  he  holds 
also  that,  by  the  law  of  Nature,  children  have  a 
right  to  inherit  the  goods  of  their  parents  (Book  I. 
§  88)  :  nevertheless,  he  allows  that  a  government 
may  make  political  allegiance  a  necessary  condition 
of  the  inheritance  of  property  (II.  §  73),  so  that  the 
"  natural  rights  "  of  children  "  vanish  into  thin  air  " 
before  the  positive  law  of  particular  societies.  The 
right  of  inheritance  Locke  bases  on  the  instinct  of 
self-preservation  and  the  instinct  of  propagating  the 
species.  "  Men  being  by  a  like  obligation  bound  to 
preserve  what  they  have  begotten,  as  to  preserve 
themselves,  their  issue  come  to  have  a  right  in  the 
goods  they  are  possessed  of"  (Book  I.  §  88). 1  It  is 
not  said  whether,  by  the  law  of  Nature,  all  children 
inherit  equally,  as  we  should  suppose  must  be  the 
case.  "  Every  man,"  we  are  told  in  Book  II.  §  190, 
"  is  born  with  a  double  right.  First,  a  right  of 
freedom  to  his  person,  which  no  other  man  has  a 
power  over,  but  the  free  disposal  of  it  lies  in  him 
self.  Secondly,  a  right,  before  any  other  man, 
to  inherit,  with  his  brethren,  his  father's  goods." 

1  All  the  other  references  in  this  article  are  to  Book  II. 
Book  I.  is  entirely  occupied  with  the  refutation  of  Filmer's 
Patriarcha. 


vi.]  LOCKE'S  THEORY  OF  PROPERTY.  185 

Whether  "with"  means  "  equally  with,"  Locke  does 
not  say  ;  he  certainly  wishes  to  exclude  primo 
geniture  from  the  law  of  Nature,  in  opposition  to  Sir 
Robert  Filmer's  argument  for  the  Divine  right  of 
kings.  But  on  the  analogy  of  the  passage  in  Book 
II-  §  73>  we  should  infer  that  Locke  does  not  con 
sider  primogeniture  a  sufficient  departure  from  the 
law  of  Nature  to  justify  revolution.  Those  who 
do  not  like  it  may  go  elsewhere.  The  landless,  the 
portionless,  and  the  disinherited  must  find  what 
consolation  they  can  in  this  natural  birthright  of 
exile. 

To  deal  fairly  with  the  fictitious  formulas  in  which 
the  thinkers  of  the  seventeenth  century  clothe  their 
political  principles,  we  must  translate  their  phrases 
back  into  the  political  feelings  to  which  these  phrases 
give  an  abstract  intellectual  expression  ;  we  must  re 
place  their  theories  in  their  original  setting  of  facts. 
Thus  when  Hobbes  says,  availing  himself  of  etymo 
logy,  that  Rebellion  is  a  return  to  the  state  of  Nature 
which  is  the  war  of  all  against  all,  what  he  feels  is 
that  any  strong-  established  government  which  will 
secure  peace  is  to  be  preferred  to  the  possible  risk  of 
anarchy.  When  Locke  lays  down  that  government 
exists  for  the  preservation  of  the  natural  rights  of 
man,  he  is  not  bringing  the  fierce  light  of  the  law  of 
Nature  to  bear  on  the  intricate  mysteries  of  the  law 
of  England  ;  he  has  no  grievance  against  "  promul 
gated  standing  laws  and  known  authorised  judges," 
but  only  against  "extemporary  arbitrary  decrees" 
(Cf.  II.  §136).  His  theory  of  revolution  does  not 


1 86  LOCKE'S  THEORY  OF  PROPERTY.  [vi. 

go  beyond  the  quarrel  of  Parliament  with  the  King. 
It  is  true  he  suggests  a  reform  of  the  "gross  absur 
dities"  of  a  parliamentary  representation  which 
allowed  "the  bare  name  of  a  town,  of  which  there 
remains  not  so  much  as  the  ruins,"  to  "  send  as  many 
representatives  to  the  grand  assembly  of  law-makers 
as  a  whole  county  numerous  in  people  and  powerful 
in  riches"  (§  157).  His  remedy,  curiously  enough, 
is  a  stretch  of  the  royal  prerogative  "for  the  public 
good"  (§  158).  He  does  not  seem  to  think  that 
Parliament  could  or  would  reform  itself.  But  when 
a  revolution  is  needed  to  secure  a  parliamentary 
government  at  all  and  an  impartial  administration 
of  the  customary  law  of  the  land,  it  is  hardly  to  be 
expected  that  either  practical  statesmen  or  political 
philosophers  should  be  much  occupied  with  the  per 
fecting  of  valuable  institutions  whose  very  existence 
was  at  stake.  The  distribution  of  property  in  Eng 
land  might  or  might  not  be  in  accordance  with  the 
common  good,  but  it  was  better  that  it  should  be  in 
the  hands  of  an  English  Parliament  needing  reform, 
and  of  English  judges  administering  antiquated  law, 
than  at  the  arbitrary  disposal  of  the  pensioner  of  a 
foreign  king  or  the  submissive  penitent  of  foreign 
priests. 

Let  us  return,  however,  to  Locke's  derivation  of 
the  right  of  property  from  labour,  and  consider  some 
further  points  in  the  way  he  works  it  out.  It  might, 
indeed,  be  suggested  that  such  inquiries  are  a  mere 
waste  of  time  ;  that  the  historical  method  alone  can 
give  fruitful  results,  and  that  it  would  be  more  profit- 


vi. J  LOCKE'S  THEORY  OF  PROPERTY.  187 

able  to  examine  the  practices  of  primitive  societies 
and  the  vestiges  of  primitive  law,  in  the  endeavour 
to  discover  the  actual  origin  of  the  right  of  property 
among  different  portions  of  the  human  race.  But 
there  is  a  meaning  in  the  philosophical  question  that 
Locke  attempts  to  answer — a  question,  not  as  to 
the  historical  origin,  but  as  to  the  logical  basis  of 
the  institution.  It  is  not  a  properly  relevant  criticism 
of  the  Social  Contract  theory  to  say  that  no  such 
contract  ever  did  take  place,  that  (as  Carlyle  puts  it) 
the  date  has  not  been  fixed  by  Jean  Jacques.  Hume, 
with  his  usual  acuteness,  saw  that  a  logical  refutation 
of  the  theory  was  needed  as  well  ;  and  his  argument, 
that  it  is  absurd  to  base  the  obligation  to  obey  the 
laws  on  the  obligation  not  to  break  one's  word,  is 
more  fatal  to  the  value  of  this  famous  and  hard-dyin^ 
theory  than  the  observation  that  the  early  stages  of 
a  political  society  are  just  those  in  which  there  is 
least  scope  for  contract.1  Locke  indeed  rather  lays 
himself  open  to  the  historical  criticism  by  bringing 
in  "examples  of  history"  (§§  102-104);  but  we 
should  not  be  treating  him  fairly,  if  we  laid  much 
stress  on  the  imperfections  of  the  argument  from 
"the  beginning  of  Rome  and  Venice,"  beyond  point 
ing  out  that  the  original  settlers  of  a  city  community 
must  be  removed  by  several  degrees  from  a  state 
of  Nature. 

And  so  with  the  theory  of  property.      We   must 
treat  it  as  a  logical  analysis  of  the  right  of  property, 
undertaken  with  a  view  to   discover  its  basis  in  the 
1  See  Hume's  Essay,  Of  the  Original  Contract. 


1 88  LOCKE'S  THEORY  OF  PROPERTY.  [vi. 

law  of  Nature,  and  we  must  understand  by  the  state 
of  Nature,  not  some  actual  state  antecedent  in  time 
to  existing  societies,  but  the  abstraction  which  would 
remain  were  we  to  strip  off  from  mankind  all  the 
positive  institutions  of  society.  "  The  state  of 
Nature,"  says  Locke,  "has  a  law  of  Nature  to 
govern  it,  which  obliges  every  one ;  and  reason, 
which  is  that  law,  teaches  all  mankind  who  will  but 
consult  it,  that,  being  all  equal  and  independent,  no 
one  ought  to  harm  another  in  his  life,  health,  liberty, 
or  possessions "  (§  6).  This  means  that  Locke's 
political  thinking  starts  with  the  abstract  individual 
as  a  basis.  The  individual  is  supposed  to  exist 
apart  from  society,  and  yet  to  be  possessed  of  rights 
of  person  and  property,  such  as  are  only  intelligible 
in  society,  unless  by  "  rights "  we  simply  mean 
"mights."  Locke's  individuals  in  the  state  of 
Nature  are  really  members  of  a  sort  of  society,  if 
their  right  to  liberty  and  property  is  limited  by  a 
consideration  for  others.  The  "state  of  Nature" 
of  Hobbes  and  Spinoza  is  a  conception  that  is  at 
least  not  self-contradictory  ;  "  right"  in  it  is  "might," 
and  nothing  else.  Locke's  "state  of  Nature"  is 
neither  a  correct  representation  of  what  would  exist 
if  we  abstract  from  all  society  ;  nor,  again,  is  it  an 
ideal  to  which  he  would  demand  conformity  on  the 
part  of  actual  societies  (which  is  what  is  generally 
meant  by  those  who  talk  about  their  "  natural 
rights  ").  Locke's  "  state  of  Nature  "  is  a  hopeless 
mongrel  of  the  two.  It  is  more  plausible  than  a 
more  consistent  conception,  just  because  it  contains 


vi.]  LOCKE'S  THEORY  OF  PROPERTY.  189 

nothing  to  startle  ordinary  thinking,  which  always 
avoids  the  trouble  of  being  thorough.  Put  a  few 
Englishmen,  not  being  confirmed  criminals,  on  a 
desert  island,  without  any  definite  authority  to 
govern  them,  and  the  probability  is  that,  even  if 
they  are  rather  a  rough  lot,  they  will  act  on  the 
whole  according  to  Locke's  law  of  Nature.  They 
will  divide  the  island  among  themselves,  so  that 
each  has  some  share ;  they  will  each  think  it  right 
to  defend  his  own  life  and  goods  against  the  rest  ; 
but  they  will  be  ready  to  help  each  other  in  sickness 
or  danger,  and  they  will  probably  let  a  man's  son 
inherit  his  father's  lot.  They  will  do  all  this  just 
because  they  are  not,  and  never  were,  in  a  state  of 
Nature,  but  are  Englishmen,  the  products  of  centu 
ries  of  social  evolution.  Theories  which  attempt  to 
explain  society  on  the  basis  of  individual  rights  pre 
suppose  the  society  they  profess  to  explain. 

The  most  instructive  difficulty  in  Locke's  account 
of  property  remains  to  be  noticed.  He  sees  that 
property  is  not  all  the  product  of  labour  :  he  claims, 
however,  on  "  a  very  modest  computation,"  that  "  of 
the  products  of  the  earth  useful  to  the  life  of  man, 
nine-tenths  are  the  effect  of  labour "  —though  in 
most  cases  he  would  put  ninety-nine  hundredths  "to 
the  account  of  labour  "  (§  40).  The  exact  propor 
tion  does  not,  indeed,  matter,  because  Locke  holds 
that  to  have  "  mixed  his  labour  with  it"  (§27)  is 
enough  to  turn  into  a  man's  own  property  what 
was  previously  the  gift  of  God  to  mankind  in  com 
mon  (§25). 


LOCKES    THEORY    OF    PROPERTY.  vi. 

Nature,  however,  will  not  dispute  ownership  with 
man,  not  at  least  in  the  same  sense  in  which  his 
fellow-men  may  ;  and  how  is  this  dispute  between 
man  and  man  to  be  avoided  ? 

"  'Tis  not  barely  the  ploughman's  pains,  the  reaper's  and 
thresher's  toil,  and  the  baker's  sweat  is  to  be  counted  into  the 
bread  we  eat ;  the  labour  of  those  who  broke  the  oxen,  who 
digged  and  wrought  the  iron  and  stones,  who  felled  and  framed 
the  timber  employed  about  the  plough,  mill,  oven,  or  any  other 
utensils,  which  are  a  vast  number  requisite  to  this  corn,  from  its 
sowing  to  its  being  made  into  bread,  must  all  be  charged  on  the 
account  of  labour,  and  received  as  an  effect  of  that.  Nature  and 
the  earth  furnished  only  the  almost  worthless  materials  as  in  them 
selves  "  (§  43). 

Locke  sees  that  we  must  go  even  further,  and  that 
it  would  be  almost  impossible  to  reckon  up  all  the 
different  forms  of  industry  that  directly  or  indirectly 
go  to  the  making  of  a  loaf  of  bread.  So  many  men 
have  "mixed  their  labour"  with  Nature.  But 
whose,  then,  is  the  loaf  ? 

The  solitary  hunter  may  clearly  be  said  to  acquire 
a  natural  right  to  the  game  he  secures  by  his 
strength  and  skill  :  he  did  not  make  the  bird  or 
beast,  but  he  makes  it  "his."  This  is  the  simplest 
case  of  the  acquisition  of  property.  Here  man  is 
nearest  to  the  mere  animals.  But  what  of  the 
weapons  the  hunter  uses  ?  These  he  may  also  have 
himself  made  out  of  the  materials  with  which  Nature 
provides  him;  but  they  may  be  made  by  others,  and 
in  a  more  advanced  stage  of  human  life  they  are 
certain  to  be  the  product  of  many  men's  work. 


vi. J  LOCKE'S  THEORY  OK  PROPERTY.  191 

Whose,  then,  are  they  ?  The  makers  or  the 
user's?  Implements  of  hunting,  including  horses 
and  dogs,  were  in  ancient  Lacedsemon  available  for 
common  use  j1  and  this  is  a  recognition  as  "right" 
of  what  is  always  true  as  "  fact,"  viz.  the  social 
character  of  almost  all  products  of  human  effort 
among  human  beings  living  in  any  sort  of  society. 
Locke,  as  we  have  seen,  enumerates  some  of  the 
various  forms  of  labour  which  go  to  the  making  of 
a  loaf  of  bread.  But  others  might  be  added  even 
to  the  indefinite  list  of  handicrafts  that  he  suggests. 
The  soldiers  that  guard  a  country  from  invasion,  so 
that  harvests  can  be  reaped  in  peace;  the  magis 
trates  who  are  a  terror  to  evil-doers  ;  all  those  who 
increase  the  knowledge,  quicken  the  intelligence, 
and  raise  the  character  of  the  community,  and  so 
make  complicated  industrial  relations  more  possible 
between  human  beings  ; — all  these  might  claim  a 
part  in  the  making  even  of  a  loaf  of  bread.  That  is 
to  say,  the  loaf  is  not  merely  the  product  of  Nature 
plus  Labour,  but  of  Nature //?«  Social  Labour;  and 
this  social  labour  is  not  merely  an  aggregate  of  the 
labour  of  various  individuals,  but  it  is  the  labour  of 
individuals  working  in  an  organised  society.  It  is 
not,  therefore,  the  individuals  as  individuals  that 
have  "  mixed  their  labour"  with  Nature,  but  the 
individuals  as  members  of  a  society.  Therefore,  if 
we  translate  the  facts  into  Locke's  phraseology,  we 
must  say  that,  by  the  law  of  Nature,  i.e.  according 
to  reason,  apart  from  any  explicit  or  tacit  consent  of 
1  Cf.  Aristotle,  Pol.,  II.  5,  §  7  ;  Xen.,  De  Rep.  Lac.,  c.  6. 


LOCKE'S    THEORY    OF    PROPERTY.  [vi. 

the  individuals  composing  the  community,  the  loaf 
belongs  to  the  society  as  a  whole,  and  not  to  this  or 
that  individual.  To  what  individual  it  belongs  must 
depend,  not  on  natural  law,  but  on  the  positive  law 
of  the  land  ;  and  it  is  the  natural  right  of  the  in 
dividuals  to  see  to  it,  that  the  positive  law  of  the 
land  is  in  accordance  with  the  common  good  of  the 
society. 

We  cannot,  therefore,  treat  "  property  "  as  a  cate 
gory  independent  of  society,  except  by  a  false 
abstraction.  Whether  property  belongs  to  individ 
uals  or  not,  or  in  what  degree,  depends  on  the 
arrangements  of  the  particular  society  ;  and,  of 
course,  whatever  a  society  leaves  untouched  it  must 
be  supposed  to  sanction.  And  the  true  criterion  by 
which  to  judge  these  arrangements  is  not  the  ab 
straction  of  natural  rights,  but,  as  Locke  himself 
practically  recognises,  the  common  good  of  society. 
By  a  happy  inconsistency,  Locke  again  and  again 
moves  away  from  the  region  of  metaphysical  fictions 
about  Nature  to  what,  in  a  wide  sense  of  the  term, 
we  may  call  the  utilitarian  standard  of  the  common 
good.1  Near  the  outset  of  the  second  book  of  the 
Treatise  on  Civil  Government  we  find  a  safer  de 
scription  of  the  end  of  government  than  is  given 
later  on  :— 

"  Political  power  I  take  to  be  a  right  of  making  laws  with  penal 
ties  of  death,  and  consequently  all  less  penalties,  for  the  regulating 

1  Cf.  Leslie  Stephen,  English  Thought  in  the  Eighteenth  Century, 
vol.  ii.  p.  138. 


vi.]  LOCKE'S  THEORY  OF  PROPERTY.  193 

and  preserving  of  property,  and  of  employing  the  force  of  the 
community  in  the  execution  of  such  laws,  and  in  the  defence  of 
the  commonwealth  from  foreign  injury,  and  all  this  only  for  the 
public  good"  (§3). 

Property  is  not  merely  to  be  preserved,  but  regu 
lated ';  not  the  maintenance  of  individual  rights,  but 
the  common  good,  is  the  ultimate  end  of  law  and 
government. 

Locke  has  received  great  praise  for  his  theory  of 
property.  M  'Culloch  says  of  him  that  "  he  has  given 
a  far  more  distinct  and  comprehensive  statement  of 
the  fundamental  principle  that  labour  is  the  grand 
source  of  value,  and  consequently  of  wealth,  than  is 
to  be  found  even  in  the  Wealth  of  Nations.  It 
was  but  little  attended  to  by  his  contemporaries  or  by 
subsequent  inquirers.  He  was  not  himself  aware 
of  the  vast  importance  of  the  principle  he  had  devel 
oped  ;  and  three-quarters  of  a  century  elapsed  before 
it  began  to  be  generally  perceived  that  an  inquiry 
into  the  means  by  which  labour  might  be  rendered 
most  efficient  was  the  object  of  that  portion  of 
political  economy  which  treats  of  the  production 
of  wealth."1  But  was  Locke's  inquiry  the  same  as 
Adam  Smith's  ?  Adam  Smith  holds  that  wealth  is 
the  result  of  labour  ;  Locke  was  dealing,  not  with 
wealth  in  general,  but  with  property,  i.e.  with  wealth 
appropriated.  And  we  have  seen  how  little  indi- 

1  Literature  of  Political  Economy  (p.  4),  quoted  by  Professor 
Fraser,  in  his  valuable  little  book  on  Locke  (in  the  series  of 
Philosophical  Classics  for  English  headers)  which  appeared  just 
two  hundred  years  after  the  publication  of  Locke's  chief  works 
[1890]. 

D.  H.  0 


194  LOCKE'S  THEORY  OF  PROPERTY.  [vi. 

vidual  labour  explains  private  property.  To  have 
stimulated  the  thought  of  Adam  Smith  is  indeed  to 
have  rendered  a  greater  service  than  if  Locke  had 
avoided  some  difficulties  and  inconsistencies  by 
keeping  within  the  limits  of  the  theory  of  property 
which  he  inherited  from  Grotius  and  Puffendorf. 
But  I  think  that  Hallam  has  said  what  is  the  reverse 
of  the  truth,  when  he  speaks  of  "  the  superiority  in 
good  sense  and  satisfactory  elucidation  of  his  principle, 
which  Locke  has  manifested  in  this  important  chap 
ter,"  over  these  writers.1  Grotius  and  Puffendorf  do 
not  attempt  to  go  behind  the  theory  of  an  agreement 
or  pact,  express  or  tacit,  by  which  men  consent  to  a 
division  of  what  was  originally  common.2  Locke, 
seeking  to  get  further  back,  has  treated  the  matter 
too  slightly,  whether  from  the  point  of  view  of  history 
or  of  logical  analysis  ;  and  has,  in  the  meantime,  lost 
sight  of  the  valuable  element  of  truth  contained  in 
this  theory  of  compact.  The  theory,  applied  to 
government,  gave  a  convenient  expression  to  the 
conviction  that  rulers  are  not  responsible  to  God 
alone,  in  any  sense  which  excludes  their  responsibility 
to  human  society.  This  was  the  political  principle 
that  had  to  be  fought  for  with  sword  and  pen  in  the 
sixteenth  and  seventeenth  centuries.  Constitutional 
questions  are  less  urgent  now  than  economic  ;  but 
may  we  hope  that  the  social  nature  of  wealth,  and 

1  Hallam,  Introd.  to  the  Literature  of  Europe  in  the  Fifteenth, 
Sixteenth,  and  Seventeenth  Centuries,  III.,  p.  442  (4th  edit.). 

2  Grotius,  De  Jure  Belli  et  Pads,  II.,  cap.  ii.,  §ii.  5  ;  Puffendorf, 
Dejure  Naturce  et  Gentium,  IV.  iv.,  §  4. 


vi.]  LOCKE'S  THEORY  OF  PROPERTY.  195 

the  responsibility  to  the  community  of  those  who  hold 
the  means  of  its  production,  will  become  a  part  of 
the  general  conscience  without  the  necessity  of  so 
severe  a  struggle  ?  Moral  conviction,  however,  is 
not  quite  enough ;  constitutional  safeguards  are 
necessary  against  the  misgovernment  of  rulers  who 
might  be  inclined  to  say,  "  Letat,  c'est  moi,"  and  so 
may  legal  safeguards  be  necessary  against  the  self 
ishness  of  those  who  claim  a  "right"  to  do  what 
they  like  with  what  they  call  "  their  own." 


VII. 

CONTRIBUTIONS  TO  THE  HISTORY  OF 
THE  SOCIAL  CONTRACT  THEORY.1 

I. 

THE  theory  of  the  social  contract  belongs  in  an 
especial  manner  to  the  political  philosophers  of  the 
seventeenth  and  eighteenth  centuries.  But  it  did 
not  originate  with  them.  It  had  its  roots  in  the 
popular  consciousness  of  mediaeval  society.  As  a 
philosophical  theory  it  had  already  been  anticipated 
by  the  Greek  Sophists. 

The  intellectual  movement  of  Hellas  in  the  period 
following  the  Persian  war,  though  more  rudimentary 
and  less  complex,  is  of  the  same  type  with  the  re 
awakening  of  the  spirit  of  rationalism  and  criticism 
after  the  slumber  of  the  middle  ages — a  slumber  less 
profound  than  we  are  sometimes  apt  to  imagine. 
Institutions  come  to  be  questioned  instead  of  being 
simply  accepted  ;  the  rights  of  the  individual  are 
made  the  measure  and  standard  of  their  value. 
Aristotle 2  refers  to  Lycophron  the  Sophist  as  having 

1  Reprinted,  with  some  corrections,  from  the  Political  Science 
Quarterly \  December,  1891. 

2  Politics,  III.  9,  §  8. 

196 


VII.]  THE    SOCIAL    CONTRACT    THEORY.  197 

held  that  law  is  merely  a  "  contract,"  a  surety  for  the 
mutual  respecting  of  rights,  and  not  capable  of  making 
the  citizens  good  and  just.  Here  we  have  in  germ 
what  used  to  be  called  the  theory  of  the  Rechtsstat 1— 
the  theory  that  the  function  of  government  is  limited 
to  the  protection  of  the  rights  of  individuals.  This 
is  the  doctrine  which  Professor  Huxley,  criticising 
Mr.  Herbert  Spencer,  has  called  "Administrative 
Nihilism."  In  the  second  book  of  Plato's  Republic, 
Glaucon,  representing  the  opinion  of  the  new  enlight 
enment,  gives  an  account  of  the  origin  of  civil  society 
which  is  identical  with  part  of  the  theory  of  Hobbes.'2 
All  men,  according  to  Glaucon,  naturally  try  to  get 
as  much  as  they  can  for  themselves — "  to  encroach," 
in  the  phrase  of  Hobbes.  To  escape  the  evils  that 
arise  from  this  mutual  aggression,  they  make  a  com 
pact  to  abstain  from  injuring  each  other,  and  this 
compact  constitutes  what  we  call  "  justice,"  or  law.8 
Socrates,  in  Plato's  Crito,  refuses  to  listen  to  his 
friends  who  urge  him  to  escape  from  prison  :  he 
argues  that  the  Athenian  citizen,  through  having 
enjoyed  the  privileges  of  protection  from  Athenian 
law,  has  made  a  practical  agreement  (a  "  tacit  con- 

1  Cf.    Bluntschli,  Theory  of  the  State,  Book  V.  ch.  iii.  (English 
translation,  Edit.  2),  p.  315  ;  Holtzendorff,  Principien  der  Politik, 
p.   213.     Holtzendorff  distinguishes  clearly  from  this  use  of  the 
term  Rechtsstat  the  frequent  modern  use  of  it  simply  in  the  sense 
of  "  constitutional "  as  distinct  from  "  arbitrary  "  government. 

2  The  views  of  Thrasymachus  the  Sophist,  in  the  first  book,  are 
identical  with  the  other  part  of  Hobbes's  theory,  namely,  the  con 
ception  of  right  as  based  on  the  command  of  the  sovereign. 

3  Republic,  359. 


198  THE    SOCIAL    CONTRACT    THEORY.  [vil. 

tract,"  we  might  call  it)  to  obey  the  laws  of  Athens, 
even  when  he  considers  them  unjust. 

"  The  laws  will  say  :  Consider,  Socrates,  if  we  are  speaking  truly, 
that  in  your  present  attempt  you  are  going  to  do  us  an  injury. 
For,  after  having  brought  you  into  the  world,  and  nurtured  and 
educated  you,  and  given  you  and  every  other  citizen  a  share  in 
every  good  which  we  had  to  give,  we  further  proclaim  to  every 
Athenian  that  if  he  does  not  like  us,  when  he  has  come  of  age  and 
has  seen  the  ways  of  the  city  and  made  our  acquaintance,  he  may 
go  where  he  pleases  and  take  his  goods  with  him.  .  .  .  But 
he  who  has  experience  of  the  manner  in  which  we  order  justice 
and  administer  the  state,  and  still  remains,  has  entered  into  an 
implied  contract  [literally,  *  has  agreed  in  fact ']  that  he  will  do 
as  we  command  him.  "  l 

The  argument,  that  the  citizen  is  bound  to  obey 
a  law  he  may  dislike  because  he  is  free  to  leave  the 
state  if  he  choose,  is  exactly  similar  to  that  of 
Locke : 

"Every  man's  children  being  by  nature  as  free  as  himself  or  any 
of  his  ancestors  ever  were,  may,  whilst  they  are  in  that  freedom, 
choose  what  society  they  will  join  themselves  to,  what  common 
wealth  they  will  put  themselves  under.  But  if  they  will  enjoy  the 
inheritance  of  their  ancestors,  they  must  take  it  on  the  same  terms 
their  ancestors  had  it,  and  submit  to  all  the  conditions  annexed 
to  such  possession."  a 

Hume,  in  his  essay  Of  the  Original  Contract, 
ignores  the  passage  I  have  referred  to  in  Plato's 
Republic,  saying  : 

"  The  only  passage  I  meet  with  in  antiquity  where  the  obligation 
of  obedience  to  government  is  ascribed  to  a  promise,  is  in  Plato's 

1  Crito,  51,  Jowett's  translation. 

2  Locke,  Treatise  of  Civil  Government,  II.,  §  73. 


VII.]  THE    SOCIAL    CONTRACT    THEORY.  199 

Crito,  where  Socrates  refuses  to  escape  from  prison  because  he 
had  tacitly  promised  to  obey  the  laws.  Thus  he  builds  a  Tory 
consequence  of  passive  obedience  on  a  Whig  foundation  of  the 
original  contract." 

The  whole  tendency  of  the  political  philosophy  of 
Plato  and  Aristotle  is  to  get  beyond  this  artificial 
way  of  regarding  society,  Neither  of  them  uses  the 
phrase  ''social  organism,"  but  both  have  the  idea. 
Plato's  ideal  of  society  is  that  all  the  citizens  should 
be  members  of  one  body.1  According  to  Aristotle, 
the  state  is  not  a  mere  "alliance,"  which  the  indi 
vidual  can  join  or  leave  without  being  permanently 
affected  thereby.2  When  Aristotle  says  :  "  Man  is 
by  nature  a  political  animal,"  he  embodies  a  profound 
meaning  in  the  phrase.  The  individual  separated 
from  his  state  is  not  the  same  as  the  individual 
belonging  to  it.  A  hand  severed  from  the  body  is  a 
hand  only  in  a  different  sense  ; 3  and  so  the  individual 
apart  from  the  state  is  not  the  individual  citizen— 
the  person  with  rights  and  duties. 

Greek  popular  philosophy  did  not,  however,  remain 
at  the  Aristotelian  level.  Epicurus  had  ceased  to 
believe  in  the  moral  significance  of  the  city-state, 
which  in  his  time  had  ceased  to  be  a  reality  ;  and  in 
Epicurus  we  find  a  return  to  individualism  and  the 
contract  theory.  Civil  society  is  an  association  into 
which  men  enter  to  avoid  pains.  Justice  arises  from 
a  contract  "neither  to  injure  nor  to  be  injured," 
as  in  the  Sophistic  theory  represented  by  Glaucon.4 

1  Republic,  462.  2  p0utics^  in.  9,  §  ii. 

3  Ibid.,  I.  2,  §  13.  *  Diog.  Laert.,  X.,  §  150. 


2OO  THE    SOCIAL    CONTRACT    THEORY.  [vil. 

II. 

In  the  earlier  Christian  centuries  the  strictly  ecclesi 
astical  mind  regarded  all  civil  society  as  a  consequence 
of  the  fall  of  man,  Sin  brought  government  into  the 
world  ; *  Cain  and  Nimrod  were  its  founders.  Philo 
sophically  regarded,  this  is  the  equivalent  of  the 
modern  anarchist's  opinion  that  government  is  an 
evil,  at  the  best  a  necessary  evil.  But  from  the 
thirteenth  century  onwards  the  political  philosophy 
of  the  middle  ages  was  leavened  by  a  wholesome 
element  of  worldly  wisdom,  introduced  through  the 
influence  of  Aristotle's  Politics.  That  "  man  is  by 
nature  a  political  animal,"  we  might  almost  say,  be 
came  a  dogma  ;  and  consequently  the  Sophistic  and 
Epicurean  theory  finds  a  place  neither  in  the  De 
Regimine  Principum  of  Thomas  Aquinas  and  his 
followers2  nor  in  the  De  Monarchist,  of  Dante, — 
neither  among  the  champions  of  the  ecclesiastical 
nor  among  the  defenders  of  the  imperial  power. 
But  in  the  popular  consciousness  of  the  middle  ages 
and  among  the  writers  on  the  ecclesiastical  side  there 
grew  up  that  particular  form  of  the  contract  theory 
which  has  fixed  itself  most  prominently  in  the  minds 
of  ordinary  men  and  of  politicians  struggling  with 
despotism — the  idea  of  a  contract  between  govern- 

1  Cf.  St.  Gregory,  quoted  by  Suarez,  De  Leg.,  III.  c.  i. 

2  ^Egidius  Romanus  in  his  De  Reg.  Princ.^  III.  i.  c.  6,  recognises 
agreement  (concordid)  as  one  form  of  the  origin   of  the   state, 
growth  from  the  family  being  the  "  more  natural "  form ;  but  this 
is  not  the  social  contract  theory. 


VII.]  THE    SOCIAL    CONTRACT    THEORY.  2OI 

ment  and  people.1  The  Bible  and  Aristotle  supplied 
the  intellectual  food  of  mediaeval  thinkers.  Aristotle, 
as  we  have  just  seen,  gave  no  encouragement  to  the 
contract  theory  ;  but  the  same  cannot  be  said  of  the 
Old  Testament. 

"  So  all  the  elders  of  Israel  came  to  the  King  to  Hebron  ;  and 
King  David  made  a  covenant  with  them  in  Hebron  before  the 
Lord;  and  they  anointed  David  King  over  Israel."2 

Such  passages  as  this  furnished  a  formula  under 
which  the  mutual  obligations  of  ruler  and  subject 
could  conveniently  be  thought  of,  and  under  which 
the  responsibility  of  kings,  not  only  to  God  but 
to  their  subjects,  could  be  asserted  and  maintained. 
The  Old  Testament  supplied  the  mediaeval  eccle 
siastics,  as  it  did  the  Puritans  afterwards,  with  a 
corrective  to  the  doctrine  of  submission  to  "  the 
powers  that  be,"  which  had  come  down  from  the 
early  Christians  who  lived  under  the  irresistible 
despotism  of  the  Caesars. 

Furthermore,  in  the  middle  ages  men  were  more 
prone  than  at  any  other  time  to  think  in  terms  of 
the  Roman  conception  of  a  "  contract  quasi  ex 
consensu." 3  The  idea  of  contract4  is  the  most 
important  of  the  contributions  to  the  world's 

1  For  this  cf.  Th.  Aq.,  De  Reg.,  I.  c.  6.,  where  the  word  "pac- 
tum"  is  used  to  express  the  relation  between  a  constitutional 
king  and  his  people. 

2  2  Samuel  v.  3. 

3  Cf.  Maine,  Ancient  Law,  pp.  343  et  seq. 

4  I  mean,  of  course,  the  idea  as  carefully  thought  out.     In  one 
sense,  wherever  there  have  been  human  beings  there  have  been 


2O2  THE    SOCIAL    CONTRACT    THEORY.  [vil. 

thinking  made  by  Roman  Law.  A  feudal  com 
munity  differs  from  a  true  archaic  community  (such 
as  a  Celtic  clan)  just  through  this  element  of  contract 
added  to  barbaric  custom.1  The  formula  according 
to  which  the  nobles  of  Aragon  are  said  to  have 
elected  their  king,  even  if  it  be  not  authentic,  re 
presents  at  least  the  principle,  in  an  extreme  form, 
of  feudal  monarchy.  "  We  who  are  as  good  as  you 
choose  you  for  our  king  and  lord,  provided  that 
you  observe  our  laws  and  privileges  ;  and  if  not, 


not."2 


"Though  from  the  twelfth  century  [says  Hallam]  the  principle  of 
hereditary  succession  to  the  throne  superseded  in  Aragon  as  well 
as  Castile  the  original  right  of  choosing  a  sovereign  within  the 
royal  family,  it  was  still  founded  upon  one  more  sacred  and  funda 
mental,  that  of  compact.  No  King  of  Aragon  was  entitled  to 
assume  that  name  until  he  had  taken  a  coronation  oath,  ad 
ministered  by  the  justiciary  at  Saragossa,  to  observe  the  laws 
and  liberties  of  the  realm.3 


Mr.  R.  L.  Poole  in  his  Illustrations  of  Medieval 
Thought  (page  232)  quotes  a  very  interesting 
passage  from  a  letter  written  by  Manegold,  a  priest 
of  Lutterbach  in  Alsatia,  in  defence  of  Pope  Gregory 
VIL: 

contracts ;  but  it  is  with  the  Romans  that  "  contract "  becomes  a 
conspicuous  "  category  "  of  thought. 

1  Maine,  Ancient  Law,    pp.    364,    365.     Cf.   Hallam,   Middle 
Ages,  chap.  ii.  pt.  2.,  vol  i.  p.  187,  ed.  1878. 

2  Robertson,   Charles    V.,    "  View  of  the  Progress  of  Society, 
etc.,"  note  xxxii.  ;  Hallam,  Middle  Ages,  vol.  ii.  p.  43. 

3  Middle  Ages,  II.  45. 


VII.]  THE    SOCIAL    CONTRACT    THEORY.  203 

"  King  is  not  a  name  of  nature  but  a  title  of  office  :  nor  does 
the  people  exalt  him  so  high  above  it  in  order  to  give  him  the 
free  power  of  playing  the  tyrant  in  its  midst,  but  to  defend  him 
from  tyranny.  So  soon  as  he  begins  to  act  the  tyrant,  is  it  not 
plain  that  he  falls  from  the  dignity  granted  to  him  ?  since  it  is 
evident  that  he  has  first  broken  that  contract  by  virtue  of  which 
he  was  appointed.  If  one  should  engage  a  man  for  a  fair  wage 
to  tend  swine,  and  he  find  means  not  to  tend  but  to  steal  them, 
would  one  not  remove  him  from  his  charge  ?  .  .  Since  no 
one  can  create  himself  emperor  or  king,  the  people  elevates  a 
certain  one  person  over  itself  to  this  end,  that  he  govern  and 
rule  it  according  to  the  principle  of  righteous  government ;  but 
if  in  any  wise  he  transgress  the  contract  by  virtue  of  which  he 
is  chosen,  he  absolves  the  people  from  the  obligation  of  submis 
sion,  because  he  has  first  broken  faith  with  it." 

This  mediaeval  form  of  the  contract  theory  is  that 
which  appears  in  works  of  the  sixteenth  century 
which  were  written  in  defence  of  the  principle  that 
people  might  depose  tyrannical  kings,  and  it  finds 
its  way  into  public  and  official  documents.  Thus— 

"  the  Scots,  in  justification  of  their  deposing  Queen  Mary,  sent 
ambassadors  to  Queen  Elizabeth,  and  in  a  written  declaration 
alleged,  that  they  had  used  towards  her  more  lenity  than  she 
deserved ;  that  their  ancestors  had  heretofore  punished  their  kings 
by  death  or  banishment ;  that  the  Scots  were  a  free  nation,  made 
king  whom  they  freely  chose,  and  with  the  same  freedom  un 
kinged  him,  if  they  saw  cause,  by  right  of  ancient  laws  and 
ceremonies  yet  remaining,  and  old  customs  yet  among  the  High 
landers  in  choosing  the  head  of  their  clans  or  families ;  all  which, 
with  many  other  arguments,  bore  witness  that  regal  power  was 
nothing  else  but  a  mutual  covenant  or  stipulation  between  king 
and  people." 

I    quote    these   words   from   Milton's    Tenure    of 
Kings  and  Magistrates.     Buchanan,  in  his  dialogue 


204  THE    SOCIAL    CONTRACT    THEORY.  [vil. 

De  Jure  Regni  apud  Scotos  and  in  the  speech  which, 
in  his  History,  he  puts  into  the  mouth  of  the  Re 
gent  Morton,  maintains  the  theory  of  the  Scottish 
monarchy  to  which  Milton  here  refers.  In  fact 
Milton  follows  the  very  words  of  Buchanan.  The 
coins  stamped  at  the  coronation  of  the  infant  King 
James  VI.,  in  1570,  bear  on  the  reverse  a  drawn 
dagger  and  the  motto  PRO  ME  si  MEREOR  IN  ME — a 
grim  version  of  the  theory  of  contract.1  The  phrase 
is  said  to  have  been  used  by  Trajan  when  handing  a 
sword  to  the  prefect  of  the  Praetorian  guard.  This 
story  is  expressly  alluded  to  in  Buchanan's  version 
of  Morton's  speech.  And  we  may  perhaps  conjec 
ture  that  Buchanan  had  something  to  do  with  the 
use  of  it  as  a  motto  on  the  coins  of  the  Stuart  king, 
who,  being  only  four  years  of  age,  was  not  yet  able 
to  give  distinct  utterance  to  his  own  opinions  about 
government.  The  True  Law  of  Free  Monarchies, 
which  James  afterwards  wrote  in  answer  to  the 
revolutionary  theories  of  his  old  tutor,  contains  very 
different  doctrine.  But  even  King  James  himself 
used  the  phraseology  of  the  contract  theory  in  ad 
dressing  the  English  Parliament  of  1609  : 

"  The  king  binds  himself  by  a  double  oath  to  the  observation  of 
the  fundamental  laws  of  his  kingdom.  Tacitly,  as  by  being  a 
king,  and  so  bound  to  protect  as  well  the  people  as  the  laws  of 
his  kingdom,  and  expressly  by  his  oath  at  his  coronation ;  so  as 
every  just  king,  in  a  settled  kingdom,  is  bound  to  observe  that 
paction  made  to  his  people  by  his  laws,  in  framing  his  government 

1  Becoming  even  more  grim  in  the  hands  of  Milton  (Tenure 
of  Kings  and  Magistrates)^  who  omits  the  words  "Pro  me." 


VII.]  THE    SOCIAL    CONTRACT    THEORY.  205 

agreeable  thereunto,  according  to  that  paction  which  God  made 
with  Noah  after  the  deluge.  .  .  .  And  therefore  a  king 
governing  in  a  settled  kingdom  leaves  to  be  a  king  and  degene 
rates  into  a  tyrant  as  soon  as  he  leaves  off  to  rule  according  to 
his  laws."  i 

This  phraseology  about  compact  faded  from  royal 
and  royalist  lips  before  those  extreme  assertions 
about  "  divine  right  "  and  the  duty  of  non-resistance, 
which  the  Anglican  bishops  too  often  made  the  most 
prominent  part  of  their  religion.  But  the  words  came 
back  as  a  Nemesis  upon  the  last  of  the  Stuart 
kings,  when  the  Convention  Parliament  of  1688 
declared  that  James  had  "  endeavoured  to  subvert 
the  constitution  of  the  kingdom  by  breaking  the 
original  contract  between  king  and  people." 

III. 

Locke  published  his  Treatise  of  Civil  Govern 
ment  in  defence  of  the  principles  of  the  revolution 
of  1688,  and  it  is  very  commonly  believed  that  he 
maintained  this  theory  of  a  contract  between  king 
and  people.  Locke  is  not  a  lucid  writer,  and 
misunderstandings  of  his  theory  of  political  obliga 
tion,  as  of  his  theory  of  knowledge,  are  excusable. 
Thus  Josiah  Tucker,  Dean  of  Gloucester,2  criticises 
Locke  for  alleging  that  there  must  be  an  actual 
contract  between  king  and  people.  The  Dean 
admits,  however,  that  there  is  a  "  quasi-contract," 

1  Quoted  by  Locke,  Treatise  of  Civil  Government^  II.,  §  200. 
*  In  his  Treatise  concerning  Civil  Government  (London,  1781), 
p.  142. 


2O6  THE    SOCIAL   CONTRACT    THEORY.  [vil. 

because  government  is  to  be  considered  a  "  trust" 
to  be  exercised  in  the  interests  of  the  governed. 
But  this  is  Locke's  very  phrase.1  As  we  have  seen, 
Locke  quotes  King  James  I.  about  the  "paction" 
between  king  and  people  ;  but  the  original  compact 
on  which  he  basis  civil  government  is,  just  as  with 
Hobbes  and  with  Rousseau,  a  compact  between 
individual  and  individual,  not  between  king  (or 
whatever  else  may  be  the  government)  and  people. 

"Whosoever  [he  says]  out  of  a  state  of  nature  unite  into  a 
community  must  be  understood  to  give  up  all  the  power  necessary 
to  the  ends  for  which  they  unite  into  society,  to  the  majority  of 
the  community,  unless  they  expressly  agreed  in  any  number 
greater  than  the  majority.  And  this  is  done  by  barely  agreeing 
to  unite  into  one  political  society,  which  is  all  the  compact  that  is, 
or  needs  be,  between  the  individuals  that  enter  into  or  make 
up  a  commonwealth."  2 

Civil  society  is,  in  Locke's  view,  "  incorporated " 
for  a  certain  purpose,  viz.  to  secure  the  rights  of  the 
individual  better  than  they  can  be  secured  in  a  state 
of  nature.  This  is  the  "  original  compact."  Society, 
thus  formed,  retains  always  a  supreme  power.3  It 

1  See  Treatise  of  Civil  Government,  II.,  §§  136,  142,  156.     In 
§  149  he  speaks  of  "the  legislative"  as  "being  only  a  fiduciary 
power  to  act  for  certain  ends." 

2  Treatise  of  Civil  Government,  II.,  §  99.     In  a  footnote  in  the 
English  translation  of  Bluntschli's    Theory  of  the  State  (Oxford, 
1885),  p.  276 — a  footnote  for  which  I  am  responsible — I  followed 
the  usual  fashion  of  contrasting  Locke  and  Rousseau.     Further 
study  of  Locke  has  convinced  me  that  there  is  no  essential  dif 
ference  between  them  in  this  matter.     The  error  has  been  avoided 
in  the  second  edition  (1892) :  see  p.  294. 

3  Treatise  of  Civil  Government,  II.,  §  149. 


VII.]  THE    SOCIAL    CONTRACT    THEORY.  2O7 

does  not  treat  with  king,  or  other  form  of  govern 
ment,  as  one  of  two  contracting  parties  :  it  entrusts 
the  work  of  government  (legislative,  executive, 
judicial)  to  this  or  that  person  or  persons  ;  and  if 
such  person  or  persons  fail  to  do  their  work  to  the 
satisfaction  of  the  whole  body  of  the  people  (which, 
as  Locke  has  explained,  means  the  majority),  they 
may  be  dismissed  and  others  put  in  place  of  them. 
Such  an  act  of  "revolution"  may  be  inexpedient, 
but  the  people  always  retains  its  "  supreme  power." 
This  seems  to  me  a  perfectly  fair  statement  of  what 
is  most  essential  in  Locke's  theory  ;  and  it  will  be 
obvious  that  it  is  identical  with  what  is  most  essential 
in  Rousseau's.  Rousseau's  "  inalienable  sovereignty 
of  the  people"  is  just  Locke's  "supreme  power  that 
[in  spite  of  the  institution  of  a  form  of  government] 
remains  still  in  the  people."  Rousseau  says  explicit 
ly  that  the  institution  of  government  is  not  a  con 
tract  :  the  social  contract  by  which  the  sovereign 
people  is  constituted  excludes  every  other.1  The 
institution  of  a  government  results  from  a  law  made 
by  the  sovereign  that  there  shall  be  a  government 
of  such  and  such  a  form,  and  from  an  act  of  the 
sovereign  nominating  certain  persons  to  fill  the 
various  magistracies  thus  created.2  What  the  sove 
reign  people  has  done  it  can  alter  if  it  sees  fit. 
Rousseau  ascribes  to  his  "sovereign,"  which  can 
only  consist  of  all,  the  same  attributes  that  Hobbes 
had  bestowed  on  his,  which  might  consist  of  one, 
some,  or  all — though  Hobbes's  personal  preference 
1  Contrat  Social,  III.  16.  2  Ibid.,  17. 


2O8  THE    SOCIAL    CONTRACT    THEORY.  [vil. 

was  obviously  for  one.  But  though,  as  Mr.  John 
Morley  has  put  it,  Rousseau  has  the  "  temper"  of 
Hobbes — his  clear,  if  somewhat  narrow,  logical 
intellect — he  has  done  nothing  more  than  apply  this 
"  temper"  to  the  political  principles  of  Locke.  It 
is  the  custom  of  English  writers  to  draw  a  contrast 
between  Locke  and  Rousseau.  There  is  a  contrast 
between  their  styles,  between  their  temperaments 
and  between  the  temperaments  of  the  audiences 
they  addressed.  But  if  we  are  considering  simply 
their  theories  of  the  basis  of  political  society  and 
the  grounds  of  political  obligation,  and  their  views 
about  the  abstract  Tightness  of  revolution,  there  is 
no  difference  between  them.  And  Rousseau  has  the 
advantage  over  Locke,  that  he  avoids  altogether 
the  attempt  to  make  out  an  historical  justification  for 
the  idea  of  social  contract.1 

Thus  the  political  philosophers  of  the  seventeenth 
and  eighteenth  centuries,  who  held  the  social  con 
tract  theory,  held  it  in  the  same  form  as  did  Epi 
curus  and  certain  Greek  Sophists  before  him.  The 
position  maintained  by  Socrates  in  the  Crito  might 
seem  more  comparable  with  the  mediaeval  and  popu 
lar  theory  of  a  contract  between  government  and 
people  ;  but  the  contract  Socrates  is  thinking  of  is 
a  contract  between  the  individual  citizen,  on  the  one 
hand,  and  all  the  citizens,  on  the  other — a  conception 
which  has  more  affinity  with  the  views  of  Rousseau 
than  with  the  ideas  of  feudalism.2  Greek  political 

1  Contrat  Social,  I.  i. 

2  When  Rousseau  szys  (Contrat  Social,  II.  6) :  "  Tout  gouverne- 


VII.]  THE    SOCIAL    CONTRACT    THEORY.  2OQ 

theory  was  the  product  of  republican  institutions,  in 
which  the  free  citizen  felt  himself  a  part  of  the 
sovereign  body  and  not  a  mere  subject.  In  feudal 
Europe  every  man  found  himself  somewhere  in  a 
scale  of  subordination  ;  he  was  some  one's  "  man." 
This  scale  mounted  up  through  nobles  and  kings 
to  emperor  and  pope  ;  and  emperor  and  pope  were 
thought  of  as  holding  directly  of  God, — or  else  the 
emperor  of  the  pope,  and  the  pope  alone  directly  of 
God.  But  allegiance  rested  everywhere,  as  we  have 
seen,  on  mutual  obligation.1  Even  the  relation  of 
God  to  man  was  thought  of  in  terms  of  contract. 
God  had  bound  Himself  to  man  and  man  to  Himself 
by  covenants  and  solemn  promises.  The  Hebrew 
idea  of  covenant  was  supplemented  by  the  Roman 
legal  idea  of  contract,  and  the  distinctive  theology  of 
the  Western  Church  was  the  consequence.2 

The  political  philosophers  of  the  seventeenth  cen 
tury  did  not  borrow  their  theories  directly  from  the 
Greeks.  How  then  did  their  view  of  the  original 
contract  come  to  differ  from  the  mediaeval,  which  had 

ment  legitime  est  republicain,"  he  only  means  the  same  thing 
which  Aristotle  expresses  when  he  denies  that  a  tyranny  is  a  "con 
stitution  "  at  all.  In  the  opinion  of  both  a  king,  as  distinct  from 
a  tyrant,  is  subordinate  to  the  law.  In  Rousseau's  language,  he  is 
the  minister  of  the  sovereign  people ;  for  them  he  governs  and 
from  them  his  power  comes. 

1  In   1683   the  University  of  Oxford   condemned,  along  with 
other  subversive  opinions,  the  doctrine  that  there  is  a  mutual  con 
tract  between  a  prince  and  his  people.     A  contract  with  all  the 
obligation  on  the  side  of  the  people  would  have  been  no  political 
heresy.     Cf.  Cooke,  History  of  Party,  I.  346  seq. 

2  Cf.  Maine,  Ancient  Law,  pp.  365  et  seq. 

D.  H.  T 


2IO  THE    SOCIAL    CONTRACT    THEORY.  [vil. 

become  the  popular,  view  ?  The  existence  of  this 
difference  has  seldom  been  clearly  pointed  out,1  and  so 
far  as  I  know,  the  cause  of  it  has  never  been  fully 
explained.  Attention  has  been  called  to  the  subject 
in  a  very  interesting  article  by  M.  Charles  Borgeaud 
in  the  Annales  de  I E cole  Libre  des  Sciences  Poli- 
tiques  of  April,  1890.  He  contrasts  the  Biblical 
and  mediaeval  form  of  the  theory  which  we  find  in 
the  Vindicice  contra  Tyrannos  of  "Junius  Brutus" 
(Languet  or  Duplessis  Mornay  ?)  and  in  the  writings 
of  Buchanan  and  others,  with  the  theory  of  a  contract 
between  individuals  which  we  find  in  Rousseau,  but 
before  him  in  Locke,  in  Hobbes  and  in  Hooker. 
The  last-named  is  apparently  the  first  political  writer 

1  It  has,  indeed,  been  proposed  by  some  recent  writers  to  dis 
tinguish  the  "political  contract "  between  government  and  people 
from  the  "social  compact "  by  which  a  political  society  is  formed. 
The  distinction  is,  as  I  am  endeavouring  to  show,  of  primary  im 
portance  ;  but  I  do  not  think  we  gain  anything  by  attempting 
nowadays  to  distinguish  "  contract"  and  "compact  "  in  discussing 
the  historical  aspects  of  the  theory.  It  may  be  true,  as  Professor 
Clark  suggests  (Practical  Jurisprudence,  p.  144),  that  the  word 
"  compact "  was  preferred  by  some  writers  as  seeming  to  avoid 
the  absurd  idea  that  the  agreement  in  question  was  legally  en 
forceable.  But  since  Hobbes  and  Rousseau  both  use  the  term 
"  contract "  for  the  same  agreement  which  Locke  calls  "  compact," 
it  only  introduces  confusion  to  attempt  to  keep  up  a  distinction  be 
tween  these  terms.  Furthermore,  as  I  point  out,  neither  Hobbes 
nor  Locke  nor  Rousseau  allows  that  the  relation  between  govern 
ment  and  people  is  one  of  "  contract,"  while  on  the  other  hand 
the  English  Convention  Parliament  of  1688  speaks  of  "the 
original  contract  between  king  and  people."  It  seems  to  me, 
therefore,  that  an  historical  solution,  and  not  a  mere  distinction 
in  words,  is  necessary  to  clear  up  the  confusion. 


VII.]  THE    SOCIAL    CONTRACT    THEORY.  211 

after  the  Greeks  in   whom  this  form   of  the  theory 
can  be  traced. 

"Two  foundations  there  are  [says  Hooker]  which  bear  up  public 
societies :  the  one,  a  natural  inclination  whereby  all  men  desire 
sociable  life  and  fellowship ;  the  other,  an  order  expressly  or 
secretly  agreed  upon  touching  the  manner  of  their  union  in  living 
together.  ...  To  take  away  all  such  mutual  grievances,  injuries 
and  wrongs  [sc.  as  prevailed  when  there  were  no  civil  societies], 
there  was  no  way  but  only  by  growing  into  composition  and  agree 
ment  amongst  themselves,  by  ordaining  some  kind  of  government 
public,  and  by  yielding  themselves  subject  thereunto  ;  that  unto 
whom  they  granted  authority  to  rule  and  govern,  by  them  the 
peace,  tranquillity  and  happy  estate  of  the  rest  might  be  procured."1 

In  the  first  of  these  propositions  Hooker  was  pro 
bably  not  conscious  of  going  beyond  Aristotle,  who 
in  the  Politics  2  recognises  the  work  of  the  maker  of 
the  state  ("the  legislator")  in  addition  to  the  natural 
impulse  of  mankind  towards  political  society.  But 
he  has  laid  stress  on  the  element  of  consent  or  agree 
ment  in  a  way  which  suggests  the  theories  of  Hobbes 
and  Locke.  Hooker  probably  had  not  particularly 
in  mind  the  mediaeval  theories  of  a  compact  between 
ruler  and  subject,  but  was  unconsciously  influenced 
by  the  traditional  habit  of  thinking  about  govern 
ment  under  the  formula  of  contract.  Again,  holding 
that  the  church,  i.e.  society  in  its  religious  aspect, 
has  agreed  upon  its  form  of  government,  he  naturally 
conceived  of  the  state  as  fashioned  in  the  same  way. 
Further,  Hooker  inherited  from  the  ecclesiastical 
politicians  of  the  middle  ages  the  doctrine  of  "  the 
sovereignty  of  the  people,"  i.e.  the  doctrine  that 
1  Ecclesiastical  Polity,  L,  c.  10.  2  I.  2,  §  15. 


212  THE    SOCIAL    CONTRACT    THEORY.  [vil. 

kings  and  other  rulers  derive  their  power  from  the 
people.  Thomas  Aquinas  (quoted  by  the  late  Dean 
Church  in  a  note  on  Hooker)  lays  it  down  that  "  to 
order  anything  for  the  common  good  belongs  either  to 
the  whole  multitude  or  to  some  one  acting  in  place 
of  the  whole  multitude."1  In  adopting  such  ideas 
Hooker  uses  the  words  " consent,"  ''agreement," 
etc.,  and  thus  implicitly  unites  the  two  distinct  theories 
that  political  society  is  based  upon  a  contract  and 
that  the  people  is  sovereign — the  theories  held  by 
Locke  and  formulated  with  startling  clearness  by 
Rousseau.  Hooker,  we  may  say,  is  the  medium 
through  whom  the  mediaeval  doctrine  of  the  sove 
reignty  of  the  people  reaches  Locke;  but  he  transmits 
it  in  words  which  easily  suggest  the  phraseology  of 
contract.  Locke,  it  is  to  be  observed,  purposely 
bases  his  political  thinking  upon  Hooker,  because 
Hooker  was  an  authority  acceptable  to  the  Anglican 
Tories  against  whom  Locke  had  to  argue. 

But  quite  apart  from  the  quiet  meditations  of 
Hooker,  circumstances  were  already  making  the 
idea  of  a  compact  between  individual  and  individual 
familiar  to  the  minds  of  many  men  in  the  early 
seventeenth  century.  The  Scottish  Covenant  was 
a  solemn  pact  made  "  before  God,  His  angels  and  the 
world"  by  "the  noblemen,  barons,  gentlemen,  bur 
gesses,  ministers  and  commons,"  i.e.  by  the  Scottish 
people  in  their  various  ranks  and  stations  ;  it  was  a 
covenant  in  which  the  king  might  join,  but  it  was 
not  a  pact  between  king  and  people.  The  nobility 
1  Summa,  i,  2,  qu.  90,  art.  3. 


VII.]  THE    SOCIAL    CONTRACT    THEORY.  213 

and  gentry  of  Scotland,  says  Mr.  Gardiner,1  had 
been  in  the  habit  of  entering  into  ''bands"  or  obli 
gations  for  mutual  protection.  In  1581  King  James 
had  called  on  his  loyal  subjects  to  enter  into  such  a 
"  band  "  when  the  country  was  threatened  by  a  con 
federacy  of  Catholic  noblemen.  This  was  the  basis 
of  the  National  Covenant  of  1638.  The  absence  of 
a  firm  government  in  Scotland  had  driven  men  to 
form  compacts  among  themselves  in  order  to  escape 
the  evils  of  perpetual  lawlessness  and  warfare.  It 
was  an  easy  step  from  this  actual  condition  to  the 
theory  that  contract  is  universally  the  means  by 
which  men  pass  from  the  non-social  state  into  that 
of  orderly  and  peaceful  society.  The  comparative 
powerlessness  of  the  Scottish  kings  had  allowed  the 
mediaeval  theory,  which  based  kingly  authority  on 
contract,  to  maintain  itself ;  and  the  turbulence  of 
the  Scottish  nobility  was  thus  likewise  one  main 
source  of  the  more  revolutionary  theory,  which  based 
all  society  on  contract  between  man  and  man. 

But  by  far  the  clearest  case  of  what  seemed  the 
actual  formation  of  a  political  society  by  a  mutual 
agreement  was  the  action  of  the  emigrants  on  board 
the  Mayflower,  when  they  found  themselves  off ''the 
northern  parts  of  Virginia,"  where  there  was  no 
existing  government  under  whose  authority  they 
would  come.  Although  formally  acknowledging 
themselves  "  the  loyal  subjects  of  our  dread  sove 
reign  King  James,"  for  all  the  practical  and  immedi 
ate  purposes  of  government  they  think  of  themselves 
1  History  of  England^  1603-1640,  VIII.  329. 


214  THE    SOCIAL    CONTRACT    THEORY.  [VII. 

as  constituting  a  new  political  society.  In  the 
familiar  and  famous  words  they  declare,  that  "  we 
do  solemnly  and  mutually,  in  the  presence  of  God 
and  of  one  another,  covenant  and  combine  ourselves 
together  into  a  civil  body  politic."  It  has  become 
a  commonplace  to  speak  of  the  social  contract  as 
"  unhistorical  "  ;  but  it  must  be  admitted  that  it  has 
more  justification  of  fact  and  of  historical  precedent 
in  the  declaration  of  rights  of  an  American  state- 
constitution  than  anywhere  else  in  the  world.  When 
Carlyle  objects  that  Jean  Jacques  could  not  fix  the 
date  of  the  social  contract,  it  would  at  least  be  a 
plausible  retort  to  say  that  that  date  was  the  iith 
of  November,  i62o.1 

1  The  influence  of  Calvinism,  and  especially  of  the  "  Inde 
pendent  "  theory  of  church  government,  on  the  political  ideas  of 
the  seventeenth  century,  is  traced  in  Prof.  H.  L.  Osgood's  recent 
articles  on  "The  Political  Ideas  of  the  Puritans"  in  the  Political 
Science  Quarterly,  March  and  June,  1891,  as  well  as  in  the 
articles  by  M.  Charles  Borgeaud,  already  referred  to.  (An  Eng 
lish  translation  of  M.  Borgeaud's  articles  is  in  preparation.) 
Much  light  is  thrown  on  the  various  political  theories  current  at 
the  time  by  the  publication  of  the  discussions  carried  on  in  the 
Parliamentary  army  in  1647,  preserved  in  the  Clarke  Papers, 
which  Mr.  C.  H.  Firth  has  just  edited  for  the  Camden  Society. 
While  Cromwell  speaks  of  the  king  being  "  king  by  contract," 
Mr.  Pettus  gives  a  version  of  the  contract  theory  identical  with 
that  afterwards  maintained  by  Locke.  Men  were  naturally  free, 
but  they  "agreed  to  come  into  some  form  of  government  that 
they  who  were  chosen  might  preserve  property"  (p.  312).  Rain- 
borow  and  Wildman  maintain  that  "  all  government  is  in  the  free 
consent  of  the  governed."  In  contrast  with  them  Cromwell  and 
Ireton  manifest  toward  theories  of  abstract  rights  a  conservative 
distrust  with  which  Burke  might  have  sympathised. 


VII.]  THE    SOCIAL    CONTRACT    THEORY.  215 

While  practical  needs  were  driving  some  men  to 
base  orderly  government  •  on  mutual  agreement, 
political  theory  was,  in  the  minds  of  those  friendly 
to  liberty,  moving  in  the  same  direction.  Grotius, 
living  under  republican  institutions,  expresses  the 
doctrine  of  a  social  compact  in  terms  which  seem  to 
recognise  both  the  forms  of  the  theory. 

"  Since  it  is  conformable  to  natural  law  to  observe  contracts 
\stare  pactis\  .  .  .  civil  rights  were  derived  from  this  source, 
mutual  compact.  For  those  who  had  joined  any  community  or  put 
themselves  in  subjection  to  any  man  or  men,  those  either  expressly 
promised  or  from  the  nature  of  the  case  must  have  been  under 
stood  to  promise  tacitly,  that  they  would  conform  to  that  which 
either  the  majority  of  the  community  or  those  to  whom  the  power 
was  assigned  should  determine."  l 

This  passage  is  rather  an  adaptation  of  the  medi 
aeval  theory  to  suit  the  case  of  republics  as  well  as 
monarchies,  than  a  clear  recognition  of  the  contract 
between  individual  and  individual.  But  in  the  great 
literary  champion  of  English  liberty  the  theory  of 
Locke  and  Rousseau  is  clearly  expressed.  We  have 
already  seen  that  Milton  quotes  Buchanan's  account 
of  the  contractual  character  of  the  Scottish  monarchy, 
but  Milton's  own  theory  is  expounded  earlier  in  his 
treatise  : 

"  No  man  who  knows  aught  can  be  so  stupid  to  deny  that  all 
men  naturally  were  born  free,  being  the  image  and  resemblance  of 
God  Himself,  and  were,  by  privilege  above  all  creatures,  born  to 
command  and  not  to  obey ;  and  that  they  lived  so,  till  from  the 


1  Dejure  Belli  et  Pads  (1625),  Proleg.   §  15,  Whe well's  trans- 
ation. 


2  1 6  THE    SOCIAL    CONTRACT    THEORY.  [vil. 

root  of  Adam's  transgression  falling  among  themselves  to  do 
wrong  and  violence,  and  foreseeing  that  such  courses  must  needs 
tend  to  the  destruction  of  them  all,  they  agreed  by  common 
league  to  bind  each  other  from  mutual  injury  and  jointly  to  de 
fend  themselves  against  any  that  gave  disturbance  or  opposition 
to  such  agreement.  .  .  .  The  power  of  kings  and  magistrates  is 
only  derivative,  transferred  and  committed  to  them  in  trust  from 
the  people  to  the  common  good  of  them  all,  to  whom  the  power 
yet  remains  fundamentally,  and  cannot  be  taken  from  them  with 
out  a  violation  of  their  natural  birthright." l 

This  is  precisely  Locke's  theory ;  expressed  in 
Milton's  impassioned  language,  it  reveals  its  iden 
tity  with  the  theory  of  Rousseau.  Milton,  like 
Locke,  gives  the  theory  a  setting  of  Biblical  history. 
Remove  this  setting,  and  we  have  the  theory  as  it 
appears  in  Rousseau. 

The  position  of  Hobbes  becomes  clearer  if  we 
consider  it  in  the  light  of  what  has  been  said.  With 
peculiar  ingenuity  he  took  the  theory  that  had  so 
often  served  to  justify  resistance  and  applied  it  in 
such  a  way  as  to  make  it  the  support  of  "  passive 
obedience "-  —nay,  of  active  obedience  in  almost 
every  case— to  "  the  powers  that  be."  Hobbes  did 
this  by  explicitly  denying  the  possibility  of  any 
"  covenant "  between  king  and  subject,  or  of  any 
covenant  between  man  and  God  (except  through 
the  mediation  of  the  sovereign,  who  is  God's  lieu 
tenant),  and  by  maintaining  that  the  covenant  which 
constitutes  civil  society  is  a  covenant  of  every  man 
with  every  man.2  According  to  Hobbes  men  can- 

1  For  the   term   "  birthright "  in   this   connection,  cf.    Clarke 
Papers,  pp.  lx.,  Ixi.,  322-325. 
3  Leviathan,  c.  18. 


VII.]  THE    SOCIAL    CONTRACT    THEORY.  21J 

not  pass  from  the  state  of  nature,  which  is  a  state  of 
war  of  all  against  all,  into  the  state  of  orderly  society 
except  by  handing  over  their  natural  rights  (with 
what  seems  the  inconsistent  exception  of  the  right  to 
self-preservation  *)  to  a  sovereign — one,  some  or  all. 
The  sovereign  is  not  a  party  to  the  contract,  but 
is  created  by  it.  Hence  to  resist  the  sovereign 
is  to  return  to  the  state  of  anarchy.  If  we  translate 
Hobbes's  practical  thought  out  of  the  phraseology 
of  the  contract  theory,  it  becomes  simply  this  :  Any 
evils  are  better  than  the  risk  of  anarchy.  Locke 
thought  that  continued  misgovernment  might  be 
worse  than  anarchy,  "  the  inconvenience  being  all  as 
great  and  as  near,  but  the  remedy  farther  off  and 
more  difficult."2 

The  acutest  criticism  upon  Hobbes  is  that  impli 
citly  passed  on  him  by  his  great  contemporary, 
Spinoza.  Spinoza  leaves  alone  the  fiction  of  con 
tract,  but,  working  with  Hobbes's  conception  of 
natural  right  as  simply  equivalent  to  might,  argues 
that  the  right  of  the  sovereign  is  also  simply  equiva 
lent  to  his  might.3  This  theory  of  government, 
however  inadequate  it  may  be,  is  at  least  self-con 
sistent.  On  Hobbes's  theory,  whence  comes  the 
obligation  to  abide  by  the  terms  of  the  social  con- 

1  See  Leviathan,  c.   14.     Many  Englishmen  of  Hobbes's  time 
would  have  been  disposed  to  argue  :  "  You  take  my  life,  if  you  do 
take  the  means  whereby  I  live  " ;  and  others  did  think  that  the 
right  of  worshipping  God  after  what  they  thought  the  true  fashion 
was  more  precious  than  life  itself. 

2  Treatise  of  Civil  Government,  II.,  §  225. 

3  Epistle  50. 


2l8  THE    SOCIAL    CONTRACT    THEORY.  [vil. 

tract  ?  This  contract  is  made  not  in  the  civil  state 
but  in  the  state  of  nature,  and  is  therefore  binding 
only  by  the  law  of  nature.1  Hobbes  would  probably 
have  defended  his  theory  by  arguing  that  the  natural 
right  of  self-preservation,  which  he  holds  is  inalien 
able — i.e.  the  natural  instinct  to  strive  for  self-preser 
vation — constitutes  a  sufficient  obligation  to  adhere 
to  the  terms  of  the  social  contract.  It  might  be  to 
a  person  of  Hobbes's  own  temperament ;  but  how 
could  such  an  answer  be  applicable  to  any  one  who 
argued,  like  Locke,  that  continued  misgovernment 
might  be  a  worse  evil  than  anarchy  itself  ? 

Again,  supposing  a  successful  revolution  to  take 
place  and  a  new  government  to  be  established,  strong 
enough  to  maintain  itself  and  to  preserve  that  peace 
for  which  Hobbes  cared  above  everything,  what  is 
a  conscientious  Hobbist  to  do  ?  The  new  sove 
reign  (one,  some  or  all)  is  not  the  sovereign  to  whom 
every  individual  was  previously  supposed  to  have 
handed  over  his  rights  irrevocably,  and  yet  this  new 
sovereign  is  fulfilling  the  function  for  which  alone 
men  have  given  up  their  natural  rights.  The  sup 
position  was  for  Hobbes  himself  not  altogether  an 
imaginary  one  ;  and  perhaps  Hobbes  was  not  acting 
inconsistently  with  his  theories  in  submitting  to  the 
Council  of  State  in  1651,  in  order  to  come  to 
London  and  get  his  Leviathan  published  under  a 
government  sufficiently  tolerant  to  allow  its  publi 
cation,  and  sufficiently  strong  to  protect  the  author. 
The  average  royalist  showed  a  wise  instinct  in  re- 
1  Cf.  T.  H.  Green,  Philosophical  Works,  II.,  p.  370. 


VII.]  THE    SOCIAL    CONTRACT    THEORY.  2IQ 

garding  as   a    very  suspicious  ally  the    intellectual 
ancestor  of  both  Rousseau  and  Bentham.1 

Locke  nowhere  expressly  denies  that  there  is  a 
contract  between  king  and  people,  but,  as  I  have 
shown,  prefers  to  use  the  same  phraseology  as  Milton 
and  to  speak  of  the  king  as  having  power  intrusted 
to  him  by  the  always  sovereign  people.  Locke's 
chief  difference  from  Hobbes  lies  in  his  insisting  that 
the  dissolution  of  a  government  is  not  the  same  thing 
as  the  dissolution  of  a  society.2  A  "politic  society  " 
is  constituted  by  the  original  compact,  and  the  ap 
pointment  of  this  or  that  set  of  persons  to  do  the 
business  of  government  is  a  subsequent  matter.  As 
I  have  already  pointed  out,  this  theory  is  identical 
with  that  of  Rousseau.  Rousseau,  like  Hobbes, 
expressly  denies  that  there  is  any  contract  between 
ruler  and  people.  Hobbes  does  so  in  order  to  repel 
the  claims  of  the  aggrieved  subject.  Rousseau  does 
so  in  order  to  maintain  the  supremacy  of  the  sove 
reign  people.  One  particular  form  of  Hobbes's 
"  sovereign  "  is  the  only  one  that  Rousseau  allows— 
the  sovereignty  of  all.  Hobbes  passes  lightly  over 
this  form,  because  he  thinks  of  the  sovereign  as  iden 
tical  with  the  government.  Rousseau's  sovereign 
is  a  power  perpetually  behind  every  form  of  govern 
ment.  Hobbes  regards  civil  society  as  only  possible 

1  Mr.  C.  H.  Firth  has  called  my  attention  to  a  passage  in  Clar 
endon's  Survey  of  the  Leviathan  (1676),  p.  92,  in  which  Clarendon 
alleges  that  "  Mr.  Hobbes  his  book  "  and  still  more  his  conver 
sation  induced  many  persons  to  submit  to  Cromwell  as  to  their 
legitimate  sovereign. 

'2   Treatise  of  Government,  II.,  §  211. 


22O  THE    SOCIAL    CONTRACT    THEORY.  [vil. 

when  the  individual  surrenders  his  natural  rights. 
In  the  less  mechanical  thinking  of  Rousseau  the 
individual  by  the  social  contract  gains  for  himself  the 
protection  of  the  whole  force  of  the  community  and 
yet  obeys  only  himself  (i.e.,  his  "common  self")  and 
remains  as  free  as  before.1  When  Rousseau  goes  on 
to  argue  as  if  the  sovereign  people  could  only  act  in 
a  mass  assembly,  he  forgets  his  own  distinction 
between  the  volontd  gtntrale  and  the  volontd  de  toiis, 
and  fails  to  grasp  the  full  meaning  of  his  own  for 
mula  ;  for  in  the  words  in  which  he  enunciates  the 
nature  of  the  social  pact,  he  has  risen,  without  fully 
knowing  it,  to  the  conception  of  society  as  organic  ; 
and  in  the  idea  of  a  "common  self"  higher  than 
the  individual  self,  he  has  anticipated  the  teaching  of 
German  idealism,  or  perhaps  I  should  rather  say,  he 
has  adopted  a  practical  principle  which  requires  for 
its  explanation  a  profounder  philosophy  than  his  age 
had  as  yet  provided. 

For  the  purposes  of  political  philosophy  the  his 
tory  of  the  social  contract  theory  ends  with  Rous 
seau.  Kant  and  Fichte  only  repeat  the  theory  in 
Rousseau's  form,  with  a  rather  more  complete  con 
sciousness  of  what  it  implies. 

"  The  act  [says  Kant]  by  which  a  people  is  represented  as  con 
stituting  itself  into  a  state,  is  termed  the  original  contract.  This 
is  properly  only  an  outward  mode  of  representing  the  idea  by 
which  the  rightfulness  of  the  process  of  organising  the  constitution 
may  be  made  conceivable.  According  to  this  representation,  all 
and  each  of  the  people  give  up  their  external  freedom  in  order  to 


1   Contrat  Social,  I.  6. 


VII.]  THE    SOCIAL    CONTRACT    THEORY.  221 

receive  it  immediately  again  as  members  of  a  commonwealth. 
The  commonwealth  is  the  people  viewed  as  united  altogether  into  a 
state.  And  thus  it  is  not  to  be  said  that  the  individual  in  the  state 
has  sacrificed  a  part  of  his  inborn  external  freedom  for  a  particular 
purpose ;  but  he  has  abandoned  his  wild  lawless  freedom  wholly, 
in  order  to  find  all  his  proper  freedom  again  entire  and  undimin- 
ished,  but  in  the  form  of  a  regulated  order  of  dependence,  that 
is,  in  a  civil  state,  regulated  by  laws  of  right.  This  relation  of  de 
pendence  thus  arises  out  of  his  own  regulative  law-giving  will."  * 

In  this  passage  it  will  be  seen  that  Kant  agrees  with 
Rousseau  and  differs  from  Locke  in  recognising  that 
the  theory  of  the  original  contract  is  not  an  historical 
account  of  how  political  society  grew  up,  but  a  logical 
analysis  of  the  basis  on  which  political  society  rests. 
Hobbes,  as  has  been  pointed  out  by  Prof.  Croom 
Robertson,2  by  calling  "natural"  the  kind  of  society 
that  is  formed  by  acquisition,  "not  obscurely  sug 
gests  that  the  institutive  is  first  only  in  the  logical, 
not  in  the  historical,  order."  Kant,  however,  takes 
pains  to  bring  out  this  unhistorical  character  of  the 
theory  more  clearly  than  any  of  his  predecessors. 
The  "original  contract,"  he  says  (in  his  essay  On 
the  saying  that  a  thing  may  be  right  in  theory,  but 
worthless  in  practice)— 

"  is  merely  an  idea  of  reason  ;  but  it  has  undoubtedly  a  practical 
reality.  For  it  ought  to  bind  every  legislator  by  the  condition 
that  he  shall  enact  such  laws  as  might  have  arisen  from  the  united 
will  of  the  people  ;  and  it  will  likewise  be  binding  upon  every  sub- 


1  Kant,  Rechtslehre,    Part  ii.,  §  47  (Werke,  IX.,  p.    161,  Ed. 
Rosenkranz),  Mr.  W.   Hastie's  translation  (Kanfs  Philosophy  of 
Law\  pp.  169,  170. 

2  Hobbes,  p.  145. 


222  THE    SOCIAL    CONTRACT    THEORY.  [vil. 

ject,  in  so  far  as  he  will  be  a  citizen,  so  that  he  shall  regard  the 
law  as  if  he  had  consented  to  it  of  his  own  will."  1 

Thus  Kant  explicitly  recognises  that  the  conception 
of  contract  is  a  standard  by  which  to  judge  institu 
tions,  not  an  account  of  the  manner  in  which  they 
came  into  existence.  Kant  may  seem  to  avoid  the 
assertion  of  the  sovereignty  of  the  people  which  is 
prominent  in  Rousseau  ;  but  in  his  Zum  ewigen 
Frieden  he  lays  down,  just  as  Rousseau  does,  that 
"  the  republican  constitution  is  the  only  one  which 
arises  out  of  the  idea  of  the  original  compact  upon 
which  all  the  rightful  legislation  of  a  people  is 
founded."  2 

Fichte  in  his  Grundlage  des  Natitrrechts  (1796) 
makes  the  social  contract  theory  in  Rousseau's  form 
solve  the  contradiction  between  the  "thesis"  that 
"  whatever  does  not  violate  the  rights  of  another 
each  person  has  the  right  to  do,  each  person  having 
the  right  to  judge  for  himself  what  is  the  limit  of  his 
free  action  "- —the  usual  assumption  of  "  individual 
ists"-—  and  the  antithesis  "that  each  person  must 
utterly  and  unconditionally  transfer  all  his  power  and 
judgment  to  a  third  party,  if  a  legal  relation  between 
free  persons  is  to  be  possible" — which  is  Hobbes's 
theory.3  Fichte  does  not  mention  either  Hobbes 
or  Rousseau  in  this  passage  ;  but  his  own  theory 

1  Werke,  (Ed.  Rosenkranz),  VII.,  p.  209.     Mr.  Hastie's  transla 
tion  under  title  Kanfs  Principles  of  Politics,  p.  46. 

2  Werke,    VII.,    p.  241.      Mr.    Hastie's    Kanfs   Principles  of 
Politics,  p.  89. 

3  Werke,  III.,  p.  101.    Kroeger's  transl.,  Science  of  Rights,  p.  149. 


VII.]  THE    SOCIAL    CONTRACT    THEORY.  223 

does  not  in  any  essential  point  differ  from  that  of  the 
latter,  to  whom  he  refers  elsewhere.  His  "will  which 
is  an  infallible  power,  but  only  when  in  conformity 
with  the  will  of  the  law,"  is  identical  with  Rousseau's 
volontt gtntrak,  which  cannot  err.1  Fichte  prepares 
the  way  for  Hegel ;  but  Hegel's  recognition  of  the 
element  of  truth  in  Rousseau's  theory  can  be  most 
conveniently  referred  to  after  we  have  considered 
the  criticism  and  decline  of  the  theory. 

IV. 

The  most  important  and  the  most  instructive  criti 
cism  passed  upon  the  social  contract  theory  is  that 
of  Hume  ;  for  Hume's  thinking  belongs  to  the  same 
type  as  that  of  Locke.  Already  in  his  Treatise  of 
Human  Nature  (i74o)2  Hume  had  assailed  the 
theory,  and  his  criticisms  are  repeated  in  his  essay 
Of  the  Original  Contract  (1752).  Rousseau's 
Contrat  Social  did  not  appear  till  1762.  But  his 
tory  is  not  the  same  thing  as  chronology  ;  and  in 
tracing  the  growth  of  ideas  we  sometimes  find  that 
the  criticism  of  an  opinion  has  begun  even  before 
the  opinion  has  reached  its  fullest  and  completest  ex 
pression.  Hume  does  not  content  himself,  like 
many  later  opponents  of  the  theory,  with  urging  that 
society  did  not  as  a  matter  of  fact  originate  in  con 
tract — an  argument  which  we  have  seen  would  be 
valid  against  Locke,  but  not  against  Hobbes,  Rous- 

1  Contrat  Social,  II.  3. 

2  The    "First    Part"  was  published  in    1739;  the    "Second 
Part,"  which  deals  with  ethics  and  politics,  in  the  following  year. 


224  THE    SOCIAL    CONTRACT    THEORY.  [vil. 

seau  or  Kant.  Hume  does  not  neglect  the  historical 
argument,  and  what  he  says  about  the  function  of 
war  in  the  making  of  nations  is  in  entire  accordance 
with  the  conclusions  of  recent  sociology.  But  the 
more  valuable  part  of  Hume's  criticism  consists  in 
his  bringing  out  the  logical  inconsistency  in  a  theory 
which  bases  allegiance  upon  promise.  Why  are  we 
bound  to  keep  our  promises  ?  The  answer  must 
be  :  Because  otherwise  society  would  not  hold  to 
gether.  But  does  not  this  same  answer  explain  the 
need  of  obedience  to  the  law  ?  The  obligation  to 
keep  promises  must  be  based  either  on  the  law  of  an 
already  formed  society  or  simply  on  force. 

Bentham,  in  his  Fragment  on  Government,  refers 
approvingly  to  Hume's  "  demolition "  of  the 
"  chimera";1  but  Bentham  himself  treats  the  con 
tract  theory  only  in  its  "mediaeval"  and  popular 
form  of  contract  between  king  and  people.  When 
asked  "to  open  that  page  of  history  in  which  the 
solemnisation  of  this  important  contract  was  re 
corded,"  the  lawyers  confess  that  it  is  a  fiction.  But 
Bentham  is  impatient  of  fictions.  "I  bid  adieu  to 
the  original  contract  ;  and  I  left  it  to  those  to  amuse 
themselves  with  this  rattle,  who  could  think  they 
needed  it." 

History  does  not  refute  a  theory  which  is  un- 
historical.  But  the  growth  of  the  historical  spirit 
and  the  application  of  the  historical  method  to  the 
study  of  institutions  diminish  our  appreciation  of  a 
way  of  representing  facts  which  jars  at  every  mo- 
1  The  metaphors  are  Bentham's ;  see  chap,  i.,  §  36. 


VII.]  THE    SOCIAL    CONTRACT    THEORY.  225 

ment  with  ideas  that  have  become  commonplaces 
to  us,  however  unfamiliar  to  most  political  thinkers 
in  the  last  century.  The  method  of  Montesquieu 
predominates  over  the  method  of  Rousseau,  and  Sir 
Henry  Maine  and  others  have  addressed  ears 
already  prepared  to  accept  their  arguments. 

There  is  a  passage  in  Burke' s  Reflections  on  the 
Revolution  in  France,  in  which  he  uses  the  phrase 
ology  of  the  contract  theory  in  order  to  rise  above 
it  to  the  conception  of  society  as  an  organic 
growth  : 

"  Society  is  indeed  a  contract.  Subordinate  contracts  for  objects 
of  mere  occasional  interest  may  be  dissolved  at  pleasure  ;  but  the 
state  ought  not  to  be  considered  as  nothing  better  than  a  partner 
ship  agreement  in  a  trade  of  pepper  and  coffee,  calico  or  tobacco, 
or  some  other  such  low  concern,  to  be  taken  up  for  a  little  tem 
porary  interest,  and  to  be  dissolved  by  the  fancy  of  the  parties. 
It  is  to  be  looked  on  with  other  reverence ;  because  it  is  not  a 
partnership  in  things  subservient  only  to  the  gross  animal  exist 
ence  of  a  temporary  and  perishable  nature.  It  is  a  partnership 
in  all  science}  a  partnership  in  all  art;  a  partnership  in  every 
virtue  and  in  all  perfection.  As  the  ends  of  such  a  partnership 
cannot  be  obtained  in  many  generations,  it  becomes  a  partnership 
not  only  between  those  who  are  living,  but  between  those  who 
are  living,  those  who  are  dead,  and  those  who  are  to  be  born." 

The  idea  of  organic  growth,  which  is  here  only 
-suggested,  has  now  become  one  of  the  common 
places  about  society.  Wherever,  indeed,  there  are 
federal  institutions  the  phraseology  of  the  contract 
theory  is  more  natural  j1  and  in  such  institutions  we 

1  Through  the  kindness  of  the  editors  of  the  Political  Science 
Quarterly  I  have  been  enabled  to  see  an  interesting  dissertation 
by  Mr.  J.  F.  Fenton,  The  Theory  of  the  Social  Compact  and  its 
D.  H.  Q 


226  THE    SOCIAL    CONTRACT    THEORY.  [vil. 

find  the  political  justification  of  the  theory  as  repre 
senting  that  side  of  the  truth  about  human  society 
which  the  historical  antiquarian  and  the  evolutionary 
sociologist  are  apt  to  ignore.  Hegel,  in  his  Philo 
sophic  des  Rechts?  recognises  fully  the  merit  of 
Rousseau's  theory  in  making  will  (consent)  the 
principle  of  the  state.  A  merely  historical  account 
of  what  has  been  in  the  past  is  no  sufficient  philo 
sophical  explanation  of  a  political  society.  M.  Alfred 
Fouillee2  has  endeavoured  to  express  the  truth  of 
both  ways  of  regarding  society  by  saying  that  the 
highest  form  of  it  must  be  an  "  organisme  con- 
tractuel" — a  formula  that  may  perhaps  gain  more 
general  acceptance  than  anything  expressed  in  the 
phraseology  of  German  idealism.  The  time  has 
surely  come  when  we  can  be  just  to  Montesquieu 
and  Burke  without  being  unjust  to  Locke  and 
Rousseau. 

Influence  upon  the  American  Revolution.  The  chief  matter  in 
which  I  should  be  inclined  to  disagree  with  Mr.  Fenton  is  in 
what  concerns  the  distinction  between  Locke  and  Rousseau. 
Locke,  as  I  have  pointed  out,  does  not  speak  of  "  a  contract 
between  the  people  and  an  hereditary  line  of  kings,"  and  his 
theory  is  on  the  whole  identical  with  "  the  rabid  doctrines  of 
Rousseau." 

1  §  258.          2  In  his  Science  Sociale  Contemporaine. 


VIII. 

ON  THE  CONCEPTION  OF 
SOVEREIGNTY.1 

AUSTIN'S    famous    definition    of  sovereignty   is  ex 
pressed  by  him  in  the  following  sentence  : 

"  If  a  determinate  human  superior,  not  in  a  habit  of  obedience 
to  a  like  superior,  receive  habitual  obedience  from  the  bulk  of 
a  given  society,  that  determinate  superior  is  sovereign  in  that 
society,  and  the  society  (including  the  superior)  is  a  society 
political  and  independent." — Lectures  on  Jurisprudence,  Lecture 
VI.,  vol.  i.  p.  226  (Edit.  4,  1879). 

The  definition  of  a  positive  law,  which  is  the 
counterpart  of  the  definition  of  sovereignty,  is  given 
toward  the  close  of  the  same  prolonged  "lecture  "  : 

"  Every  positive  law  (or  every  law  simply  and  strictly  so  called) 
is  set,  directly  or  circuitously,  by  a  sovereign  individual  or  body, 
to  a  member  or  members  of  the  independent  political  society 
wherein  its  author  is  supreme." — Ibid.,  p.  339. 

It  is  thus  the  fundamental  assumption  of  the 
English  school  of  jurisprudence  and  of  the  English 
writers  on  political  science  who  follow  in  the  path 

1  Read  originally  before  the  Aristotelian  Society  (London), 
February  3rd,  1890,  and  afterwards  submitted  to  the  "American 
Academy  of  Political  and  Social  Science"  (November  i3th,  1890), 
and  printed  in  their  Annals,  January,  1891.  It  is  here  reprinted 
with  considerable  alterations. 


228          ON    THE    CONCEPTION    OF    SOVEREIGNTY.       [vill. 

marked  out  by  Hobbes,  Bentham,  and  Austin,  that 
in  every  political  society  sovereign  power  always 
resides  in  certain  determinate  persons  (one,  few,  or 
many),  and  that  all  true  laws  (i.e.  laws  which  the 
law  courts  would  recognise  as  such)  may  be  regarded 
as  the  commands  of  this  sovereign.  A  consequence 
of  this  conception  of  sovereignty  is  that  the  classi 
fication  of  the  forms  of  government  becomes  rigidly 
precise,  simple,  and,  it  must  be  added,  quite  remote 
from  the  ordinary  use  of  language  either  among 
practical  politicians  or  among  the  most  scientific  of 
political  historians.  The  phrases  "  mixed  govern 
ment"  and  "limited  monarchy"  are  abominations 
to  Austin  and  Cornewall  Lewis,  as  much  as  the 
facts  supposed  to  correspond  to  these  phrases  were 
to  their  great  precursor,  Hobbes.  Hobbes  had 
political  prejudices,  as  well  as  logical  reasons,  for  his 
antipathy.  In  the  case  of  Austin  the  motive  force 
is  the  intense  disgust  provoked  by  that  vagueness 
and  obscurity  of  Blackstone  which  had  already 
called  forth  Bentham's  Fragment  on  Government. 
Vague  uses  of  the  term  "law "and  traditional 
laudations  of  mixed  government  and  of  the  sur 
passing  perfection  of  the  British  Constitution  in 
evitably  caused  a  reaction ;  and  the  confused 
prolixity  of  Blackstone  must  serve  as  the  excuse 
for  the  seemingly  precise  prolixity  of  Austin. 

The  Austinian  jurisprudence,  which,  in  spite  of 
Austin's  German  studies,  is  thoroughly  English  in 
its  antecedents  (except  in  so  far  as  we  regard  the 
theories  of  Hobbes  as  due  to  the  influence  of  Bodin), 


VIII.]       ON    THE    CONCEPTION    OF    SOVEREIGNTY.         22Q 

has  produced  a  great  effect  on  English  legal  and 
political  thinking  ;  but  outside  of  England  and  some 
British  colonies  it  has  produced  no  effect  whatever 
— none  certainly,  in  France  or  Germany  or  Italy  ; 
none  in  Scotland,  nor,  with  very  slight  exceptions, 
in  the  United  States  of  America.1  Its  dominant 
authority  in  England  has  finally  begun  to  be  weak 
ened  by  the  introduction  of  the  historical  method 
into  the  study  of  law — above  all  by  the  great  work 
done  and  the  ideas  suggested  by  the  late  Sir  Henry 
Maine.  Sir  Henry  Maine  has  pointed  out,  that 
throughout  the  greater  part  of  the  world  and  during 
the  greater  part  of  human  history  there  have  been 
no  such  sovereign  legislating  bodies  as  Austin  sup 
poses  ;  and  that,  where  we  might  consider  all  the 
conditions  of  sovereignty,  according  to  Austin's 
conception,  to  be  found,  as,  for  instance,  in  the  case 
of  Runjeet  Singh,  the  Sikh  despot  of  the  Punjaub, 
such  a  sovereign  ruler  never  made  a  single  law  in 
Austin's  sense,  (Early  History  of  Institutions,  p. 
380.)  As  Professor  Clark  puts  it  :  "  That  the  sove 
reign  makes,  or  sets,  such  rules  in  the  first  instance 
is  contrary  alike  to  philology,  history,  and  legal  tra 
dition,  all  of  which  indicate  an  element  of  original 
approval  or  consent  by  the  whole  community." 
(Practical  Jurisprudence  :  A  Comment  on  Austin, 
pp.  167,  1 68.)  "If  we  look  at  the  history  of  all  early 

1  Cf.  an  article  on  "  National  Sovereignty,"  in  the  Political 
Science  Quarterly  [New  York]  for  June,  1890,  by  Mr.  J.  A. 
Jameson,  who  mentions  only  two  American  writers  as  followers 
of  the  "  analytical  jurists." 


230         ON    THE    CONCEPTION    OF    SOVEREIGNTY.       [vill 

societies,"  says  Sir  William  Markby,  who  is  not  un 
friendly  to  Austin  (Elements  of  Law,  edit.  2,  p.  24), 
"  we  find  that  the  principal  duty  of  the  sovereign, 
in  time  of  peace,  is  not  the  making  of  law,  but  the 
decision  of  law-suits."  Law  is  older  than  sove 
reignty  ;  primitive  law  is  the  custom  of  the  tribe, 
and  the  earliest  type  of  sovereignty  is  exhibited, 
apart  from  leadership  in  battle,  in  pronouncing 
judgments,  not  in  making  laws.  That  one  person 
or  a  determinate  body  of  persons  should  make  laws 
would  be  a  profane  and  monstrous  idea  in  the  eyes 
of  the  members  of  primitive  societies.  The  legis 
lative  activity  of  the  sovereign  comes  very  late  in 
the  process  of  political  development  ;  and  the  great 
historical  interest  of  the  writings  of  Bentham  and 
Austin  is  just  that  they  are  contemporary  with,  and 
supply  a  theoretical  justification  for,  the  quickening 
of  legislative  activity  in  England. 

Historical  considerations  are,  however,  in  them 
selves  no  argument  against  the  Austinian  concep 
tions  of  law  and  sovereignty — any  more  than  it  is 
an  argument  against  the  social  contract  theory  to 
point  out  that  the  date  of  the  original  contract  has 
not  been  fixed  by  Jean  Jacques.  A  perfectly 
unhistorical  theory  may  be  useful  as  a  means  of 
analysis.  Hobbes  supplied  the  principle  according 
to  which  the  Austinian  conception  must  be  inter 
preted.  "  The  legislator  is  he  (not  by  whose 
authority  the  law  was  first  made,  but)  by  whose 
authority  it  continues  to  be  law  "  (quoted  by  Austin, 
Jurisprudence,  i.  p.  337).  Thus,  where  a  rule  of 


VIII.]       ON    THE    CONCEPTION    OF    SOVEREIGNTY.          23! 

English  common  law  has  not  been  interfered  with 
by  parliamentary  statute,  we  may  regard  it  as  "  set " 
by  Parliament,  because  Parliament  could  interfere 
with  it,  should  such  interference  be  considered  ex 
pedient.  What  is  permitted  or  suffered  to  continue 
we  may,  by  a  little  twisting  of  language,  by  one  of 
those  fictions  so  dear  to  the  conservative  legal  mind, 
consider  to  be  commanded.  Of  course,  when  we 
extend  this  principle  of  interpretation  from  highly 
developed  political  societies,  where  the  sovereign 
is  constantly  legislating,  to  more  primitive  societies, 
where  there  is  no  legislative  activity,  the  extreme 
artificiality  of  the  procedure  is  forced  on  our  notice. 
It  becomes  absurd  to  say  that  the  Great  King  of 
Persia  at  one  time  commanded  the  Jews  to  keep 
the  Sabbath,  because  he  did  not  forbid  them  to  do 
so.  The  application  of  the  historical  method  and 
the  genuine  scientific  study  of  the  origins  and 
sources  of  law  do  not  refute  a  professedly  un- 
historical  theory,  but  they  tend  to  weaken  our  sense 
of  its  importance.  And  yet  we  must  not  allow  the 
glamour  of  the  historical  method  to  blind  us  to  the 
value  of  the  analytic.  As  Professor  Dicey  reminds 
us  : 

"  The  possible  weakness  of  the  historical  method  as  applied  to 
the  growth  of  institutions,  is  that  it  may  induce  men  to  think  so 
much  of  the  way  in  which  an  institution  has  come  to  be  what  it 
is,  that  they  cease  to  consider  with  sufficient  care  what  it  is  that 
an  institution  has  become." — The  Law  of  the  Constitution,  pref. 
to  first  edition. 

But  the  value  of  the  analytic  method  is  not  neces- 


232         ON    THE    CONCEPTION    OF    SOVEREIGNTY.       [vill. 

sarily  the  same  thing  with  the  value  of  the  analytic 
method  as  practised  by  Austin. 

"The  procedure  of  the  analytical  jurists,"  says  Sir  Henry 
Maine  (Early  History  of  Institutions,  pp.  360,  361),  "is  closely 
analogous  to  that  followed  in  mathematics  and  political  economy. 
It  is  strictly  philosophical,  but  the  practical  value  of  all  sciences 
founded  on  abstractions  depends  on  the  relative  importance  of 
the  elements  rejected  and  the  elements  retained  in  the  process 
of  abstraction.  Tried  by  this  test,  mathematical  science  is  of 
greatly  more  value  than  political  economy,  and  both  of  them 
than  jurisprudence  as  conceived  by  the  writers  I  am  criticising." 

This  comparison  between  the  English  school  of 
jurisprudence  and  the  characteristically  English 
school  of  political  economy  is  admirable.  If  com 
petition  be  perfectly  unfettered  by  either  law  or 
custom  or  the  force  of  habit  or  the  presence  of 
ordinary  human  feelings,  if  capital  be  absolutely- 
transferable,  and  if  (what  is  still  more  impossible) 
labour  be  absolutely  transferable,  then  the  Ricardian 
political  economy  would  represent  actual  facts.  But 
with  a  sufficient  number  of  "  ifs,"  it  would  be  pos 
sible  to  write  any  number  of  scientific  works,  every 
sentence  in  which  might  be  as  painfully  and  use 
lessly  true  as  the  Proverbial  Philosophy  of  Martin 
Tupper.1 

But  is  this  method  of  abstraction  inseparable  from 
an  analysis  of  what  is  ?  And  is  Maine  right  in 
calling  it  "strictly  philosophical  "  ?  Aristotle  would 

1  Bagehot,  in  his  Postulates  of  English  Political  Economy,  com 
pares  the  insularity  of  the  Ricardian  political  economy  and  the 
Austinian  jurisprudence.  Cf.  above,  p.  1 5  7  note. 


VIII.]       ON    THE    CONCEPTION    OF    SOVEREIGNTY.          233 

have  objected  that  to  be  strictly  philosophical  we 
must  adapt  our  methods  to  the  subject-matter  of  our 
study,  and  that  the  methods  available  in  mathe 
matics  are  not  applicable  in  the  study  of  the  science 
of  wealth  and  of  the  science  of  law,  which  are 
branches  of  the  great  science  of  human  society.  If 
we  try  to  get  strict  accuracy  and  precision  where  the 
subject-matter  does  not  admit  of  it,  we  shall  find 
ourselves  left  with  mere  empty  words  and  abstract 
formulae  which  give  us  no  insight  into  reality,  al 
though  they  may  indeed  be  valuable  as  a  means 
of  criticising  the  more  confused  and  less  conscious 
abstractions  of  common  talk  or  of  so-called  popular 
philosophy.  And,  as  a  mere  matter  of  terminology, 
is  it  not  rather  the  business  of  the  "  philosopher  " 
to  correct  the  one-sided  "  abstractions "  inevitable 
in  ordinary  language  and  indispensable  in  the  pro 
cedure  of  the  various  special  sciences  ?  At  least, 
we  may  reasonably  expect  from  a  philosophy  of  law, 
and  even  from  a  science  of  jurisprudence,  that  it 
shall  have  some  applicability,  if  not  to  primitive 
societies,  at  least  to  the  states  which  the  theorist 
had  before  his  eyes. 

Now,  this  is  the  restricted  claim  made  on  behalf 
of  Austin  by  his  apologists  at  the  present  day.  As 
Professor  Holland  puts  it  :  "  It  is  convenient  to 
recognise  as  laws  only  such  rules  as  are  enforced 
by  a  sovereign  political  authority,  although  there  are 
states  of  society  in  which  it  is  difficult  to  ascertain  as 
a  fact  what  rules  answer  to  this  description."  {Juris 
prudence,  edit.  2,  p.  43.)  Let  us  see,  then,  how  the 


234         ON    THE    CONCEPTION    OF    SOVEREIGNTY.       [vill. 

Austinian  conception  may  be  applied  to  the  British 
Constitution.  Here  there  is  a  noteworthy  difference 
between  Austin  and  his  follower,  Sir  George  Corne- 

o 

wall  Lewis.  Austin  finds  the  sovereign  in  the 
United  Kingdom  in  king,  lords,  and  commons — 
meaning  by  "commons"  the  electors  of  the  House 
of  Commons.  "  Speaking  accurately,"  he  says 
0-  P-  253)>  "tne  members  of  the  commons'  house 
are  merely  trustees  for  the  body  by  which  they 
are  elected  and  appointed  ;  and  consequently,  the 
sovereignty  always  resides  in  the  king  and  the  peers, 
with  the  electoral  body  of  the  commons."  Lewis, 
on  the  other  hand,  agrees  with  Blackstone  that  "the 
sovereignty  of  the  British  Constitution  is  lodged  in 
the  three  branches  of  the  Parliament"  ( Use  and  Abuse 
of  Political  Terms,  ed.  by  Sir  R.  K.  Wilson,  p.  49), 
i.e.,  in  the  King,  the  House  of  Lords,  and  the  House 
of  Commons.  As  we  are  here  expressly  dealing 
with  a  question  of  jurisprudence  and  not  of  history, 
it  would  be  idle  to  discuss  the  question  sometimes 
debated  between  lawyers  and  historians  whether  the 
king  is  or  is  not  a  part  of  parliament.  The  his 
torian  would  indeed  find  it  difficult  to  write  of  the 
political  struggles  of  the  seventeenth  century,  if  he 
might  not  follow  ordinary  usage  and  speak  of  par 
liament  as  a  body  distinct  from  and  excluding  the 
king.  But  the  constitutional  lawyer  must  be  allowed 
to  retain  the  phraseology  of  Blackstone,  and  to 
define  parliament  as  including  all  the  parties  whose 
assent  is  necessary  in  legislation,  so  that  he  can 
speak  accurately  of  "  the  sovereignty  of  parliament  " 


VIII.]       ON    THE    CONCEPTION    OE    SOVEREIGNTY.          235 

(cf.  Dicey,  Law  of  the  Constitution,  ed.  3,  p.  37).1 
Lewis's  editor,  Sir  R.  K.  Wilson,  points  out  that 
what  Lewis  himself  has  laid  down  as  one  of  the 
"  marks  of  sovereignty,"  viz.  "  irresponsibility,"  is 
most  certainly  to  be  found  in  the  body  of  the  electors 
(Use  and  Abuse  of  Political  Terms,  p.  47,  note). 
"  Irresponsibility  "  does  certainly  seem  in  a  fuller 
sense  to  belong  to  the  elector  than  to  the  member 
of  Parliament.  Neither  is  indeed  legally  responsible 
for  the  way  in  which  he  uses  his  right  of  voting  : 
the  "  moral  "  responsibility  of  the  member  to  his 
constituents  is  forcibly  brought  home  to  him  when 
a  dissolution  is  at  hand,  whereas  no  determinate 
persons  (unless  it  be  landlords  or  employers  who 
"  put  on  the  screw  ")  force  his  responsibility  on  the 
notice  of  the  free  and  independent  elector.  There 
is  always  a  penalty  in  the  former  case,  but  not 
always  (fortunately)  in  the  latter.  But  the  other 

1  The  lawyer,  moreover,  as  the  late  Mr.  Freeman  pointed  out 
to  me,  can  claim  in  this  matter  to  have  on  his  side  the  original 
meaning  of  the  word  "  parliament  "  ;  it  is  "  a  talking  "  between 
the  king  and  the  wise  men  whom  he  has  summoned  to  advise 
him.  On  the  question  whether  the  king  is  a  part  of  parliament, 
see  the  translators'  note  in  the  second  edition  of  Bluntschli's 
Theory  of  the  State  (Engl.  edit.),  pp.  501,  502.  As  the  British 
Constitution  has  only  been  written  in  our  colonial  imitations  or 
adaptations  of  it,  it  is  interesting  to  note  that,  whereas  in  the 
written  Constitution  of  the  Dominion  of  Canada  (The  British 
North  America  Act,  1867)  Parliament  is  expressly  denned  as 
consisting  of  "  the  Queen,  an  Upper  House  styled  the  Senate, 
and  the  House  of  Commons,"  in  Victoria  (Australia),  by  colonial 
legislation,  the  two  houses  are  officially  designated  "  The  Parlia 
ment  of  Victoria."  (See  E.  Jenks,  The  Government  of  Victoria, 
p.  236.) 


236        ON    THE    CONCEPTION    OF    SOVEREIGNTY.       [vill. 

mark  of  sovereignty  laid  down  by  Lewis  is  "  ne 
cessity  of  consent."  On  this  his  editor  remarks  : 
"  When  the  sheriff  returns  a  member  as  duly  elected, 
is  it  not  a  public  act  to  which  the  consent  of  the 
electors  is  necessary  "  ?  This  seems  a  rather  forced 
application  of  the  conception,  compared  with  the 
fact,  on  which  Lewis  insists,  that  the  House  of 
Commons  must  consent  to  the  passing  of  a  law. 
The  electors  need  not  consent  in  order  that  the 
law  should  be  sufficiently  a  true  law  to  be  enforced 
by  a  law  court.  Thus,  one  of  Lewis's  "  marks " 
seems  to  suit  the  electors  better,  and  the  other,  the 
elected. 

This  difficulty,  and  the  divergence  of  view  be 
tween  Austin  and  Lewis,  force  on  our  attention  the 
fundamental  confusion  in  Austin's  apparently  clear 
and  precise  theory.  Recent  apologists  of  the 
English  school  of  jurisprudence  have  generally  put 
forward  the  defence  that  the  sovereign  body — in 
Austin's  sense — is  the  body  behind  which  the  lawyer 
qua  lawyer  does  not  look.  Mr.  Frederic  Harrison 
has  summed  up  Austin's  analysis  of  sovereignty  and 
law  in  the  two  following  propositions  : 

"I.  The  source  of  all  positive  law  is  that  definite  sovereign 
authority  which  exists  in  every  independent  political  community 
and  therein  exercises  de  facto  the  supreme  power,  being  itself  un 
limited,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  by  any  limits  of  positive  law. 

"  II.  Law  is  a  command  relating  to  the  general  conduct  of  the 
subjects,  to  which  command  such  sovereign  authority  has  given 
legal  obligation  by  annexing  a  sanction,  or  penalty,  in  case  of 
neglect."  (Art.  on  "The  English  School  of  Jurisprudence," 
Fortnightly  Review,  vol.  xxx.  pp.  484,  485.) 


VIII.]       ON    THE    CONCEPTION    OF    SOVEREIGNTY.          237 

Now,  if  this  is  to  be  the  interpretation  of  Austin, 
if  we  are  only  to  consider  what  the  sovereign  is  for 
the  purposes  of  the  lawyer,  Austin  is  quite  wrong 
in  going  behind  the  House  of  Commons  to  the 
electorate.  For  the  lawyer  qua  lawyer  a  law  is 
good  law  though  it  were  passed  by  a  Parliament 
which  had  abolished  the  Septennial  Act  and  had 
gone  on  sitting  as  long  as  the  Long  Parliament, 
quite  as  much  as  if  the  law  were  passed  by  a  newly- 
summoned  parliament,  of  the  elected  part  of  which 
an  overwhelming  majority  had  been  returned  ex 
pressly  pledged  to  vote  for  this  very  law.  With  the 
wishes  or  feelings  of  the  electors  the  lawyer  as  law 
yer  has  nothing  whatever  to  do,  however  much  they 
may  affect  him  as  a  politician  or  as  a  reasonable 
man.  The  luminous  exposition  of  this  point  by 
Professor  Dicey  (Law  of  the  Constitution,  ed.  3, 
pp.  68-72)  makes  it  unnecessary  to  say  more.  As 
Professor  Dicey  points  out,  Austin's  doctrine  is 
"absolutely  inconsistent  with  the  validity  of  the 
Septennial  Act."  "  Nothing,"  he  adds,  "  is  more 
certain  than  that  no  English  judge  ever  conceded, 
or  under  the  present  Constitution  can  concede,  that 
Parliament  is  in  any  legal  sense  a  '  trustee '  for  the 
electors."  (P.  71.) 

If  any  one  were  to  object  that  our  supposition  is 
an  impossible  one,  and  to  urge  that  no  Parliament, 
now  at  least,  could  prolong  its  existence  indefinitely 
— nay,  that  no  Parliament  now,  elected  under  a 
Triennial  Act,  could  pass  a  Septennial  Act,  without 
first  "going  to  the  country"  on  that  very  question, 


238         ON    THE    CONCEPTION    OF    SOVEREIGNTY.       [vill 

and  if  we  were  to  ask  such  an  objector  "Why?" 
would  not  the  answer  be  :  "  Because  the  country 
would  not  stand  it"?  That  is  to  say,  behind  the 
sovereign  which  the  lawyer  recognises  there  is 
another  sovereign  to  whom  the  legal  sovereign 
must  bow.  The  "  legally  despotic"  sovereign,  if 
that  means  our  "  omnipotent  "  Parliament,  is  very 
strictly  limited  in  some  ways.  It  is  essential,  there 
fore,  to  distinguish  between  the  "  legal  sovereign  " 
and  the  "  ultimate  political  sovereign."  Or,  rather, 
to  make  the  distinction  complete  at  once,  let  us  dis 
tinguish  (i)  the  nominal  sovereign,  (2)  the  legal, 
and  (3)  \^^  political.  This  distinction  would  serve 
to  obviate  a  great  many  ambiguities.  It  is  no  new 
distinction  :  it  is  to  be  found  formulated  in  Locke's 
second  Treatise  of  Civil  Government,  ch.  xiii.  §§  149, 


"Though  in  a  constituted  commonwealth,  standing  upon  its 
own  basis,  and  acting  according  to  its  own  nature  —  that  is,  acting 
for  the  perservation  of  the  community  —  there  can  be  but  one 
supreme  power,  which  is  the  legislative,  to  which  all  the  rest  are 
and  must  be  subordinate  ;  yet  the  legislative  being  only  a  fiduciary 
power  to  act  for  certain  ends,  there  remains  still  in  the  people  a 
supreme  power  to  remove  or  alter  the  legislative,  when  they  find 
the  legislative  act  contrary  to  the  trust  reposed  in  them.  .  .  . 
In  some  commonwealths,  where  the  legislative  is  not  always  in 
being,  and  the  executive  is  vested  in  a  single  person,  who  has 
also  a  share  in  the  legislative,  there  that  single  person,  in  a  very 
tolerable  sense,  may  also  be  called  supreme,  not  that  he  has  in 
himself  all  the  supreme  power,  which  is  that  of  law-making,  but 
because  he  has  in  him  the  supreme  execution  from  whom  all 
inferior  magistrates  derive  all  their  several  subordinate  powers, 
or,  at  least,  the  greatest  part  of  them  ;  having  also  no  legislative 
superior  to  him,  there  being  no  law  to  be  made  without  his  con- 


VIII.]       ON    THE    CONCEPTION    OF    SOVEREIGNTY.          239 

sent,  which  cannot  be  expected  should  ever  subject  him  to  the 
other  part  of  the  legislative,  he  is  properly  enough  in  this  sense 
supreme." 

In  these  passages  we  have  the  distinction  between 
what  I  have  called  the  legal  sovereign,  the  political 
sovereign,  and  the  nominal  sovereign,  expressed  in 
a  manner  applicable  to  the  English  Constitution. 
Locke,  it  will  be  observed,  does  not  shirk  the  verbal 
paradox  of  saying  that  there  are  three  supremes, 
and  yet  these  are  not  one  supreme.  Here  at  least 
he  makes  an  analysis  of  institutions  without  adopt 
ing  a  method  of  abstraction  which  sacrifices  truth 
and  convenience  to  the  mere  appearance  of  precise 
arid  consistent  terminology. 

Hobbes,  from  whom  the  Austinian  conception  of 
sovereignty  comes,  purposely  identifies  all  the  three 
meanings  of  sovereign.  I  do  not  wish  to  deny  for 
a  moment  the  immense  value  in  political  philosophy 
of  the  unflinching,  though  narrow,  logic  of  Hobbes. 
Hobbes's  theory  of  sovereignty  is,  of  course,  equally 
applicable  to  aristocracies  and  democracies  ;  but, 
with  regard  to  England,  as  is  obvious  enough  from 
the  curious  dialogue,  or  rather  catechism,  which  goes 
by  the  name  of  Behemoth,  his  theory  may  be  de 
scribed  as  that  of  a  political  nominalist,  in  the  sense 
that  he  argues  from  names  to  things.  Because  the 
King  of  England  is  called  "  sovereign,"  therefore 
there  is  no  other  "legal  sovereign" — the  Parlia 
mentarian  lawyers  were  only  talking  what  Austin 
would  have  called  "jargon."  That  there  is  no  other 
"  political  sovereign  "  Hobbes  seeks  to  prove  by  his 


240          ON    THE    CONCEPTION    OF    SOVEREIGNTY.       [vill. 

ingenious  adaptation  of  the  social  contract  theory, 
which  in  all  other  political  writers  had  served  the 
purpose  of  vindicating  the  right  of  a  people  to  resist 
tyrants.  Hobbes,  like  Thrasymachus  in  Plato's 
Republic,  makes  all  laws  (legal  and  moral)  depen 
dent  on  the  will  of  a  sovereign  ;  in  the  phraseology 
of  his  own  theory  he  allows  no  natural  rights  (with 
the  inconsistent  exception  of  the  right  of  preserving 
one's  life)  to  persist  in  civil  society.  If  we  translate 
his  thought  out  of  the  fictions  in  which  it  is  formu 
lated,  the  practical  lesson  which  he  wishes  to  teach 
is  this  :  There  are  only  two  alternatives — a  strong 
government  or  anarchy.  It  is  better  to  submit  to 
any  kind  of  authority,  however  much  you  dislike  it, 
than  to  face  the  worse  evils  of  universal  war. 

Locke's  threefold  distinction  in  the  meaning  of 
sovereignty  allows  him  to  escape  the  conclusion  of 
Hobbes,  and  prepares  the  way  for  Rousseau.  Ac 
cording  to  Hobbes,  natural  rights  are  transferred 
to  the  legal  sovereign  (and  the  legal  sovereign  is 
identified  with  the  nominal) ;  according  to  Rousseau, 
the  legal  sovereign  is  only  the  minister  of  the  sove 
reign  people,  to  whom  the  natural  rights  of  each 
individual  are  transferred  without  being  lost.1 

Austin  brushes  aside  the  historical  use  of  "  sove- 


1  "  Trouver  une  forme  dissociation  qui  defende  et  protege  de 
toute  la  force  commune  la  personne  et  les  biens  de  chaque  associe, 
et  par  laquelle  chacun,  s'unissant  a  tous,  n'obeisse  pourtant  qu'a 
lui-meme,  et  reste  aussi  libre  qu'auparavant."  Tel  est  le  probleme 
fondamental  dont  le  contrat  social  donne  la  solution. —  Contr. 
Soc.  I.  c.  vi. 


VIII.]       ON    THE    CONCEPTION    OF    SOVEREIGNTY.          24! 

reignty"  for  the  sovereignty  of  a  prince.  The 
historically  true  and  very  convenient  phrase  "  limited 
monarchy "  makes  him  and  his  followers  almost 
angry.  As  we  have  seen,  his  apologists  generally 
understand  his  sovereign  in  the  sense  of  the  legal 
sovereign  ;  but  he  himself,  by  including  the  elec 
torate  in  the  sovereign  of  Great  Britain,  has  gone 
behind  the  sovereign  for  the  lawyer  qua  lawyer. 
When  Austin  speaks  of  the  "bulk"  of  the  com 
munity  being  in  the  "  habit "  of  obedience,  he 
indicates  that  a  vague  consent  of  an  indeterminate 
number  of  persons  is  necessary  to  the  real  power  of 
the  legal  sovereign,  thus  practically  recognising  a 
sovereignty  behind  the  legal  sovereign  ;  but  Austin 
will  not  apply  the  term  sovereign  at  all  except  to 
a  determinate  number  of  persons.  Now  the  elec 
torate  of  Great  Britain  is  certainly  a  determinate 
number  ;  but  is  it  true  to  say  that  it  is  solely  by  the 
consent  of  the  electorate  that  the  House  of  Commons 
has  its  power  ?  Can  we  say  that  Austin  has  indi 
cated  the  ultimate  political  sovereign  in  Great 
Britain?  It  is,  of  course,  true  that  the  electors 
have  an  easy  and  constitutional  way  by  which  to 
make  the  members  of  the  House  of  Commons  feel 
that,  though  legally  irresponsible,  they  are  actually 
or  politically  responsible.  The  electorate  has  the 
power  of  creation  and  annihilation.  It  can  make  a 
not-M.P.  into  an  M.P.,  and  it  can  determine  that  an 
M.P.  shall  in  future  sit — outside  the  House.  But 
this  only  represents  the  constitutional  relation  of  the 
electorate  to  the  House  of  Commons.  As  a  matter 

D.  H.  R 


242         ON    THE    CONCEPTION    OF    SOVEREIGNTY.       [vill. 

of  fact,  can  we  say  that  it  was  to  the  electorate  of 
the  House  of  Commons  that  King  and  Lords  gave 
way  in  1832  ?  Even  persons  who  are  not  electors 
can  always  make  a  riot,  and  sometimes  a  revolution. 
But  when  we  pass  outside  a  body  such  as  the 
electorate,  we  are  no  longer  dealing  with  "  deter 
minate  persons." 

If  we  turn  from  the  British  Constitution  to  the 
Constitution  with  which  it  is  always  most  profitable 
to  compare  it  —  the  Constitution  of  the  United 
States  of  America — the  contrast  with  regard  to  the 
''legal  sovereign"  is  obvious,  and  has  been  clearly 
brought  out  by  Professor  Dicey.  The  lawyer  qua 
lawyer  can  go  behind  an  Act  of  Congress  or  an  act 
of  the  legislature  of  one  of  the  States  to  the  Con 
stitution  of  the  United  States,  or,  in  matters  affect 
ing  a  particular  State  and  not  reserved  to  the 
government  of  the  United  States,  to  the  Constitu 
tion  of  that  particular  State.  No  English  court  can 
set  aside  an  Act  of  Parliament  as  bad  law  ;  if  an 
Englishman  says  anything  that  Parliament  does  is 
unconstitutional,  he  only  means  that  he  does  not 
approve  of  it,  or  that  he  thinks  it  contrary  to  what 
he  considers  "  the  spirit  of  the  Constitution  "  :  he  is 
merely  expressing  his  own  private  opinion.  But  an 
American  court  can  refuse  to  give  judgment  in 
accordance  with  an  Act  of  Congress  which  seems  to 
it  to  violate  the  Constitution  ;  and  when  an  American 
says  an  Act  of  Congress  is  unconstitutional,  he  is 
saying  something  that  (whether  true  or  false)  has  a 
perfectly  definite  meaning  for  the  lawyer  qnd  lawyer. 


VIII.]       ON    THE    CONCEPTION    OF    SOVEREIGNTY.          243 

Now  Austin,  on  the  look-out  for  determinate  persons, 
could  not  be  content  to  call  the  written  Constitution 
sovereign,  but  finds  sovereignty  in  those  persons 
who  have  the  power  of  altering  or  amending  the 
Constitution. 

"  I  believe,"  he  says  (Jurisprudence,  i.  p.  268),  "  that  the 
common  government,  or  the  government  consisting  of  the  con 
gress  and  the  president  of  the  united  states,  is  merely  a  subject 
minister  of  the  united  states'  government.  I  believe  that  none  of 
the  latter  is  properly  sovereign  or  supreme,  even  in  the  state  or 
political  society  of  which  it  is  the  immediate  chief.  And,  lastly, 
I  believe  that  the  sovereignty  of  each  of  the  states,  and  also  of 
the  larger  state  arising  from  the  federal  union,  resides  in  the 
states'  governments  as  forming  one  aggregate  body  :  meaning  by  a 
state's  government,  not  its  ordinary  legislature,  but  the  body  of 
its  citizens  which  appoints  its  ordinary  legislature,  and  which,  the 
union  apart,  is  properly  sovereign  therein."  l 

With  regard  to  the  non-sovereignty  of  Congress 
and  President  and  of  the  States'  legislatures  within 
each  State  there  is  no  dispute.  If  anyone  were  to 
point  out  that  within  each  State  the  body  of  the 
electors  is  sovereign  in  all  those  matters  not  ex 
pressly  reserved  by  the  Constitution  of  the  United 
States,  an  Austinian  would  answer  that,  since  the 
Constitution  may  conceivably  be  altered,  the  makers 
of  State  Constitutions  are  subject  to  the  makers  of 
the  Constitution  of  the  United  States — which  seems 
a  sufficiently  good  answer,  though  it  would  compel 
one  to  give  up  the  phraseology  of  the  Federalist, 

1  The  pedantic  absence  of  capitals  is  Austin's  own,  and  implies 
no  intention  of  insult.  Austin  might  have  added  that  the 
electors  in  a  State  are  (the  Union  apart)  sovereign,  because  they 
can  alter  the  constitution  of  the  State. 


244         °N    THE    CONCEPTION    OF    SOVEREIGNTY.       [viIL 

according  to  which  a  portion  of  sovereignty  remains 
in  the  individual  States  (No.  Ixii.).  Instead  of 
"remains  in,"  we  must  say  "is  delegated  to."  The 
analytic  method  would  invert  the  historical  theory 
of  the  Constitution.  That,  however,  is,  as  we  have 
already  allowed,  no  argument  against  its  value. 
But  is  the  body  which  can  alter  the  Constitution  of 
the  United  States  the  legal  sovereign  behind  which 
the  lawyer  qua  lawyer  cannot  go  ?  Austin  draws 
his  inference  from  Article  V.  of  the  Constitution, 
which  provides  the  mechanism  for  the  amendment 
of  the  Constitution  ;  but  he  stops  his  quotation 
without  giving  the  last  clause  of  the  Article,  which 
is  as  follows  : 

"  Provided  that no  State,  without  its  consent, 

shall  be  deprived  of  its  equal  suffrage  in  the  Senate." 

Now  there  can  be  no  doubt  that  those  who 
framed  this  clause  intended  that  it  should  be  un 
alterable  by  that  amending  body  which  can  make 
other  changes  in  the  Constitution.  It  was  intended 
that,  in  this  respect  at  least,  a  few  written  words 
should  be  legally  supreme  over  those  determinate 
persons  whom  Austin  considers  to  be  the  sovereign 
in  the  United  States  of  America  :  so  that  if  an 
Austinian  lawyer  objects  to  speak  of  a  document  as 
the  legal  sovereign,  he  must  wander  about  in  his 
search  for  "  determinate  persons,"  until  he  finds 
George  Washington,  Alexander  Hamilton,  Benja 
min  Franklin,  James  Madison,  and  others — all  of 
whom  are  now  dead.  But  these  makers  of  the  Con- 


VIII.]       ON    THE    CONCEPTION    OF    SOVEREIGNTY.          245 

stitution,  it  appears,  have  provided  no  mechanism 
for  enforcing  legally  this  intended  limitation  of  the 
amending  power.  Each  house  of  the  legislature  is, 
by  Article  I.,  Sec.  5,  constituted  supreme  judge  in 
regard  to  the  qualifications  of  its  own  members  :  and 
therefore,  if  an  amendment  were  carried  in  the 
manner  sufficient  for  any  other  amendment,  pro 
viding  that  certain  small  States  should  in  future 
have  only  one  member  in  the  Senate,  the  other 
States  having  two  or  more,  and  if  one  of  these  small 
States  should  refuse  to  consent,  such  aggrieved 
State  would  have  no  means  of  bringing  its  griev 
ance  before  a  court.1  Thus  this  clause  in  Article 
V.,  which  served  the  important  purpose  of  concilia 
ting  the  smaller  States,  is  out  of  place  in  a  legal 
document  :  it  has  only  a  moral  force,  and  is  like  the 
clause  in  the  present  French  Constitution,  which 
declares  that  the  republican  form  of  government 
shall  never  be  subject  to  revision  (Amendment  of 
August,  1884) — a  clause  which  is  condemned  by  an 
American  writer  on  Constitutional  Law  as  "  a  bit  of 
useless  verbiage."  Perhaps  Austin  was  aware  of 
the  defect  in  this  clause  of  Article  V.  of  the  Ameri- 

1  I  am  indebted  to  Prof.  William  A.   Dunning,  of  Columbia 
College,   New  York,   for  pointing  this    out    to    me.     Misled  by 
English  analogies,   in  a  matter  so  foreign   to    English    political 
usage,  I  had  thought  that  the   excluded  Senator  might  sue  the 
government  for  his  salary,  or  in  some  other  way  compel  a  court 
to  decide  on  the  constitutional  legality  of  the  amendment  which 
deprived  his  State  of  its  equal  suffrage. 

2  Prof.  J.  W.  Burgess  in  his  Political  Science  and  Comparative 
Constitutional  Law,  vol.  I.,  p.  172. 


246         ON    THE    CONCEPTION    OF    SOVEREIGNTY.       [vill. 

can  Constitution  from  a  legal  point  of  view.  But  let 
us  suppose  that  the  Constitution  did  provide  some 
means  for  enforcing  legally  the  rights  of  the  smaller 
States  here  solemnly  guaranteed  (e.g.  by  making  the 
Supreme  Court  the  judge  in  cases  of  disputed 
elections),  should  we  not  then  have  to  regard  as  the 
legal  sovereign  the  written  Constitution  itself,  or,  if 
we  must  have  determinate  persons,  its  original 
makers  or  their  ghosts  ? 

Of  course  it  may  be  said  that  such  a  violation  as 
I  have  suggested  of  the  last  clause  of  Article  V.  is 
impossible  in  America,  just  as  the  substitution  of 
the  Septennial  Act  for  the  Triennial  Act,  without  a 
general  election,  would  now  be  impossible  in  Eng 
land.  That  may  be  true  ;  but  it  is  irrelevant,  if  we 
are  looking  for  the  legal  sovereign,  as  explained  by 
Austin's  apologists.  Behind  the  legal  sovereign 
there  are  such  feelings  as  reverence  for  the  past, 
imperative  needs  in  the  present,  and  hopes  for  the 
future — which  feelings,  however,  are  to  be  found  in 
indeterminate,  and  not  in  determinate  persons.  The 
ultimate  political  sovereign  is  not  a  determinate 
body  of  persons.  And  we  have  just  seen  that  there 
might  be  cases  where  legal  sovereignty  could  not  be 
found  in  a  determinate  body  of  persons. 

With  regard  to  the  nominal  sovereign,  it  must 
also  be  clear  that  this  is  not  always  a  determinate 
person.  No  constitutional  monarchy  has,  indeed, 
as  yet  followed  the  suggestion  of  Condorcet  and 
employed  an  automaton  on  the  throne — "  to  put 
the  dots  on  the  is"  In  a  republic  it  may  be  con- 


VIII.]       ON    THE    CONCEPTION    OF    SOVEREIGNTY.         247 

venient  to  have  an  individual  at  the  head  of  the 
executive  ;  but  there  might  be  a  republic  without  a 
president.  In  the  Swiss  Confederation,  the  Presi 
dent  is  practically  only  the  chairman  of  an  execu 
tive  board.  The  President  of  the  United  States, 
though  more  powerful  in  some  respects  than  any 
constitutional  king,  and  though  he  takes  a  place  in 
public  prayers  and  in  the  drinking  of  toasts  parallel 
to  that  occupied  by  emperors  and  kings,  is  certainly 
not  the  nominal  sovereign.  "  The  United  States 
of  America "  is  the  nominal  sovereign  in  regard 
to  certain  matters,  and  "  the  Commonwealth  of 
Massachusetts,"  "the  State  of  New  York,"  etc., 
in  regard  to  others.  "  The  French  Republic"  is  the 
nominal  sovereign  in  France,  and  was  so  for  some 
time  after  the  First  Napoleon  and  his  imitator  had 
called  themselves  "  Emperors,"  just  as  in  ancient 
Rome  "  the  Senate  and  People  "  was  the  nominal 
sovereign  during  the  rule  of  the  Senatorial  oligarchy 
and  during  the  despotism  of  the  Caesars. 

Mr.  Herbert  Spencer  (The  Man  versus  the  State, 
p.  81),  while  apparently  accepting  Austin's  concep 
tion  of  sovereignty  as  residing  in  certain  determinate 
persons,  strongly  objects  to  sovereignty  being  con 
sidered  unlimited.  "Austin,"  he  remarks,  "was 
originally  in  the  army "  ;  and  this  serves  him  as  a 
psychological  explanation  of  Austin's  theory.  "He 
assimilates  civil  authority  to  military  authority." 
Now,  Mr.  Spencer  seems  to  me  to  find  fault  just 
with  what  is  permanently  valuable  in  Austin's  concep 
tion  of  sovereignty.  That  a  sovereign  is  supreme  is 


248         ON    THE    CONCEPTION    OF    SOVEREIGNTY.       [vill. 

indeed  an  identical  proposition,  but  a  proposition 
which  it  was  very  important  to  assert.  If,  with 
Austin's  apologists,  we  assurrte  that  the  attributes  of 
sovereignty  belong  to  the  legal  sovereign,  then  the 
only  escape  from  endless  ambiguities,  both  in  theory 
and  practice,  is  to  insist  that  the  sovereign  in  every 
state  is,  in  Austin's  striking  phrase,  "legally  des 
potic."  I  shall  consider  afterwards,  whether  in  any 
sense  the  ultimate  political  sovereign  can  be  said  to 
be  limited.  The  nominal  sovereign  need  not  cause 
a  difficulty,  because  the  nominal  sovereign,  whether 
an  individual  person  or  a  name,  is  only  the  represen 
tative  of  the  legal  and  political  sovereigns.1  The 
legal  despotism  of  the  legal  sovereign  means  only 
that  the  legal  sovereign  cannot  be  made  legally  re 
sponsible  without  a  contradiction  in  terms.  As  Aris 
totle  would  say,  "Otherwise  we  must  go  on  to  in 
finity."  But  this  brings  out  the  more  clearly  the 
responsibility  of  the  legal  sovereign  to  moral  influ 
ences  and  to  physical  force.  Hobbes  did  a  great 
service  to  civil  liberty  by  making  men  fully  aware 
of  what  the  sovereignty  of  a  monarch  implied.  And 
Austin  appropriately  cites  the  declaration  of  Alger 
non  Sidney,  that  no  society  can  exist  without  arbi 
trary  powers.  "  The  difference  between  good  and 
ill  governments  is  not  that  those  of  one  sort  have 

1  As  Locke  puts  it,  in  the  latter  part  of  §  151  of  his  second 
Treatise  of  Civil  Government:  He  "is  to  be  considered  as  the 
image,  phantom,  or  representative  of  the  commonwealth,  acted 
by  the  will  of  the  society,  declared  in  its  laws,  and  thus  he  has  no 
will,  no  power,  but  that  of  the  law."  This  is  true  a  fortiori  of  a 
nominal  sovereign  that  is  not  a  person  or  body  of  persons. 


VIII.]       ON    THE    CONCEPTION    OF    SOVEREIGNTY.          249 

an  arbitrary  power,  which  the  others  have  not ;  but 
that  in  those  which  are  well  constituted,  this  power 
is  so  placed  as  it  may  be  beneficial  to  the  people." 
(Observe,  he  does  not  say  merely  "  exercised  bene 
ficially  for  the  people,"  but  "  so  placed  as  it  may 
be,"  etc.)  Austin  clearly  sees  what  Mr.  Spencer  is 
unable  to  realise,  that  without  the  legal  restraints 
enforced  by  a  supreme  government  there  cannot  be 
civil  liberty.  In  Locke's  words,  "  where  there  is  no 
law  there  is  no  freedom."  * 

Bluntschli,  who  by  no  means  shares  Mr.  Spencer's 
antipathy  to  the  State,  shares  his  objection  to  un 
limited  sovereignty.  (Theory  of  the  State,  Eng. 
tran.,  p.  464.2)  But  we  may  safely  say  that  no  one 
trained  in  the  Austinian  jurisprudence  could  have 
fallen  into  the  confusions  of  a  passage  in  Bluntschli 
(ibid.,  p.  508  3),  where  he  declares  that  "in  no  case 
can  an  official  be  bound  to  render  obedience  which 
would  violate  the  higher  principles  of  religion  and 
morality,  or  make  him  accomplice  in  a  crime.  Such 
acts  can  never  be  the  duty  of  his  office.  The  servant 
of  the  State  cannot  be  required  to  do  what  a  man 
would  refuse  from  humanity,  a  believer  from  religion, 
or  a  citizen  from  regard  to  the  criminal  law  of  the 
land."  What  does  he  mean  by  "bound"?  An 
official  cannot  be  legally  bound  to  break  "  the  law 
of  the  land  "  ;  but  he  cannot  legally  claim  to  disobey 
a  command,  which,  though  not  contrary  to  the  law 

1  Treatise  of  Civil  Government,  ii.,  §  57. 

2  P.  494  in  ed.  2. 

3  P'  539  in  ed-  2. 


250         ON    THE    CONCEPTION    OF    SOVEREIGNTY.       [vill. 

of  the  land,  he  considers  contrary  to  his  morality  and 
his  religion,  and  yet  to  remain  an  official.  Morally, 
of  course,  he  may  consider  himself  bound  to  break 
the  law  of  the  land  :  and  there  are  even  cases  where 
such  protest  may  be  made  most  effective  by  an 
official  breaking  a  law  which  violates  the  moral  feel 
ings  of  the  community,  and  leaving  to  the  authorities 
the  moral  odium  of  removing  or  punishing  him. 
Bluntschli's  confusion  is  perhaps  more  excusable 
than  it  appears  to  an  English  reader,  because  of  the 
distinction  in  Germany  between  Administrative  Law 
and  the  ordinary  law  binding  on  non-officials.  In 
England,  as  Professor  Dicey  has  clearly  pointed 
out,  we  have  no  droit  administratif.  But,  at  the 
best,  such  a  dictum  as  Bluntschli's  can  do  no  good, 
theoretical  or  practical,  and  only  helps  to  make  people 
more  tolerant  of  tyrannical  laws  and  tyrannical  ad 
ministration  than  they  ought  to  be.  It  is  only  a 
device  of  despotism  to  mix  up  a  little  pious  talk 
about  morality  and  religion  with  an  unpalatable  legal 
pill.  It  is  much  better  that  the  law  in  all  its  harsh 
ness  and  its  makers  in  all  their  legal  irresponsibility 
should  stand  out  clearly  before  the  eyes  of  those  who 
are  required  to  obey.  For  then  there  is  most  like 
lihood  of  the  moral  responsibility  of  the  legal  sove 
reign  being  stringently  enforced. 

Let  us,  then,  leave   to  the   lawyer  qua  lawyer  his 

legal    sovereign,  and  go  on  to  consider,   what  is  a 

matter  not  of  jurisprudence  but  of  political  philosophy 

—the    nature    of  the   ultimate    political    sovereign. 


VIII.]       ON    THE    CONCEPTION    OF    SOVEREIGNTY.         251 

What  has  kept  the  Constitution  of  the  United 
States  more  unaltered  for  over  a  hundred  years 
than  that  of  any  country  of  Europe  ?  What  prevents 
the  British  Parliament  from  introducing  a  Decennial 
Act  in  the  same  fashion  in  which  the  Whigs  of  1716 
introduced  the  Septennial  Act  ?  What  restrains  the 
Sultan  from  ordering  his  subjects  to  burn  the  Koran 
and  eat  pork  ?  In  every  case  it  is  not  a  determinate 
person  or  persons,  but  opinion. 

"  As  Force  is  always  on  the  side  of  the  governed,  the  governors 
have  nothing  to  support  them  but  opinion.  It  is  therefore  on 
opinion  only  that  government  is  founded,  and  this  maxim  extends 
to  the  most  despotic  and  most  military  governments,  as  well  as 
to  the  most  free  and  most  popular."— Hume's  Essays,  Part  I., 
Ess.  iv. 

With  this  passage  of  Hume  we  may  compare  the 
remarks  of  Professor  Bryce  in  his  discussion  of 
"  Government  by  Public  Opinion."  (The  American 
Commonwealth,  chap.  77.) 

"Governments  have  always  rested,  and,  special  cases  apart, 
must  rest,  if  not  on  the  affection,  then  on  the  reverence  or  awe,  if 
not  on  the  active  approval,  then  on  the  silent  acquiescence  of  the 
numerical  majority." 

This  is  the  truth  which  is  contained  in  the  famous 
doctrine  of  "  the  sovereignty  of  the  people  " — a  doc 
trine  which  by  no  means  originated  in  the  revolu 
tionary  brain  of  Rousseau,  but  was  well  known  at 
the  time  of  the  Reformation  to  both  Catholics  and 
Protestants,  and  was  frequently  used  by  one  or  the 
other  to  justify  the  deposition  and  even  the  assassina- 


252         ON    THE    CONCEPTION    OF    SOVEREIGNTY.        [vill. 

tion  of  rulers — -who  belonged  to  the  opposite  faith.1 
It  is  the  doctrine  expressed  by  Locke  in  the  words  : 
"  There  remains  in  the  people  a  supreme  power  to  re 
move  or  alter  the  legislative. "  Austin  himself  accepts 
the  statement  "  that  every  government  continues 
through  the  people's  consent"  if  interpreted  as 
follows  : 

"  That  in  every  society,  political  and  independent,  the  people 
are  determined  by  motives  of  some  description  or  another,  to 
obey  their  government  habitually ;  and  that,  if  the  bulk  of  the 
community  ceased  to  obey  it  habitually,  the  government  would 
cease  to  exist." — Jurisprudence,  i.  p.  305. 

The  "  sovereignty  of  the  people"  is  vague:  and 
it  is  generally  possible  for  the  historian,  if  not  for  the 
contemporary  politician,  to  point  out  some  definite 
person  or  body  of  persons,  to  whom  the  bulk  of 
the  community  are  habitually  rendering  the  sort  of 
obedience  which  in  an  accepted  absolute  monarchy 
is  rendered  to  the  titular  monarch  :  e.g.  we  might 
speak  of  the  Senate  having  been  practically  sove 
reign  in  Rome  at  the  time  of  the  Punic  wars,  or  of 
Augustus  being  practically  sovereign  in  spite  of  re 
publican  forms.  We  can  often  intelligibly,  though 
it  may  be  with  some  exaggeration,  speak  of  "  un 
crowned  kings  "  and  "  unofficial  ministers."  But  in 
all  such  cases  the  person  or  body  of  persons  rules 
only  as  expressing  the  general  will.  Still  we  might 
conveniently  make  a  further  distinction  in  sovereignty 
and  call  the  de  facto  sovereign,  as  distinct  from  the 

1  See  Janet,  Histoire  de  la  Science  Politique,  Liv.  Ill  ch.  iii.  and  iv. 


VIII.]       ON    THE    CONCEPTION    OF    SOVEREIGNTY.         253 

de  jure  sovereign  (or  legal  sovereign),  that  person  or 
body  of  persons  which  at  any  time  can  effectively 
obtain  and  compel  obedience  in  the  name  of  the 
nation.1 

The  problem  of  good  government  is  the  problem 
of  the  proper  relation  between  the  legal  and  the 
ultimate  political  sovereign.  Under  primitive  con 
ditions,  when  the  political  sovereign  is  as  yet  un 
conscious  of  his  sovereignty,  the  fitting  form  of 
government  is  the  rule  of  the  one,  the  absolute  king, 
who  administers  justice  according  to  supposed  im 
memorial  or  divinely-instituted  custom.  When  a 
people  begins  to  become  conscious  of  its  political 
existence,  a  want  of  harmony  may  show  itself  between 
the  mass  of  the  people  and  the  despotic  rulers,  who 
will  be  ruling  now  in  accordance  with  the  opinion 
of  past  generations  and  not  of  their  actual  subjects. 
Then  the  old  system  is  on  the  verge  of  a  revolution, 
peaceable  or  otherwise.2  Representative  institutions, 
petitions,  public  meetings,  a  free  press,  are  various 
means  through  which  the  political  sovereign  can 
assert  itself.  When  refused  such  means,  and  when 
yet  sufficiently  vigorous  to  use  them,  it  will  assert 
itself  by  armed  rebellions,  or,  if  that  is  not  possible, 
by  secret  conspiracies  and  by  assassinations,  which 
being  approved  by  the  general  conscience,  are 
morally  different  from  ordinary  murders.  Political 

1  This  distinction  was  suggested  by  some  remarks  in  a  lecture 
of  Prof.  Bryce's.   But  I  must  not  make  him  responsible  for  my  way 
of  fitting  it  into  my  own  theory  as  here  expressed. 

2  Cf.  Bryce,  The  American  Commonwealth,  iii.  pp.  16,  17,  chap.  77. 


254         ON    THE    CONCEPTION    OF    SOVEREIGNTY.       [vill. 

assassination  is  a  clumsy  and  generally  ineffective 
method  of  moving  a  vote  of  censure  on  the  govern 
ment  in  countries  where  the  opposition  has  no  con 
stitutional  means  of  expression.  When  discontent  is 
"  driven  beneath  the  surface,"  if  sufficiently  strong  it 
will  produce  political  earthquakes.  Statesmanship  has 
been  defined  as  "  the  art  of  avoiding  revolutions," 
and  this  is  so  far  true  that  the  wise  statesman  will 
make  revolution  impossible  by  making  it  unnecessary, 
or  else  certain  of  failure,  because  not  supported  by 
the  ''general  will."  But  the  "general  will,"  or 
ultimate  force  of  public  opinion,  does  not  reside  in  a 
determinate  number  of  persons.  Rousseau  falls  into 
an  error,  from  which  he  himself  has  provided  a  way 
of  escape,  when  he  inclines  to  think  that  the  general 
will  (the  volontd  ge'ne'rale  which  he  expressly  distin 
guishes  from  the  volonte1  de  tous)  can  only  be  properly 
exercised  by  all  the  individuals  collectively.  A  great 
deal  may  indeed  be  said  on  behalf  of  the  direct 
exercise  of  political  power,  as  among  the  citizens  of 
Uri  and  Appenzell  :  a  great  deal  may  be  said  on 
behalf  of  the  democratic  device  of  the  referendum  as 
an  excellent  conservative  check  upon  the  "  hasty 
legislation "  of  an  elected  assembly  ;  but  the  sove 
reignty  of  the  people  is  not  exercised  only  in  direct 
democracies.  It  may  be  and  is  exercised  in  many 
cases  through  an  absolute  monarch,  or  a  dictator,  or 
a  small  assembly  of  public-spirited  and  far-sighted 
nobles  or  ecclesiastics.  Owing  to  the  tendencies  of 
human  selfishness,  want  of  imagination,  and  narrow 
ness  of  view,  the  probability  is  that  the  interests  of 


VIII.]       ON    THE    CONCEPTION    OF    SOVEREIGNTY.          255 

the  unrepresented  will  not  be  properly  nor  system 
atically  cared  for.  When  a  prince  really  cares  for 
his  people,  when  an  aristocratic  assembly  overcomes 
the  prejudices  of  caste-feeling,  there  is  admiration 
as  at  some  rare  and  curious  phenomenon.  But  only 
a  bigoted  belief  in  the  forms  of  democracy  can  pre 
vent  a  historian  from  recognising  that  the  "general 
will  "  has  frequently  found  expression  through  the 
legal  sovereignty  of  the  very  few. 

The  same  habit  of  looking  for  political  sovereignty 
in  determinate  persons  leads  to  a  great  many  of  the 
prevalent  confusions  about  majorities  and  minorities. 
It  seems  a  plausible  argument  when  it  is  said  that 
there  is  very  little  gain  if  the  tyranny  of  a  majority 
is  substituted  for  the  tyranny  of  a  minority,  and  a 
decided  loss  if  the  tyranny  of  an  unenlightened 
majority  is  substituted  for  the  tyranny  of  an  en 
lightened  minority.  Quite  true — if  the  rule  of  the 
majority  is  a  tyranny.  But  "tyranny  of  the  majority" 
requires  definition.  "  A  majority  is  tyrannical,"  says 
Professor  Bryce  (The  American  Commonwealth, 
chap.  85),  "when  it  decides  without  hearing  the 
minority,  when  it  suppresses  fair  and  temperate 
criticism  on  its  own  acts,  when  it  insists  on  restraining 
men  in  matters  where  restraint  is  not  required  by  the 
common  interest,  when  it  forces  men  to  contribute 
money  to  objects  which  they  disapprove,  and  which 
the  common  interest  does  not  demand."  !  Apart  from 
such  tyranny,  the  rule  of  the  majority  has  the  import- 

1  See  below,  p.  281,  note. 


256         ON    THE    CONCEPTION    OF    SOVEREIGNTY.       [vill. 

ant  advantage,  pointed  out  in  the  memorable  phrase  : 
"  We  count  heads  to  save  the  trouble  of  breaking 
them."  Counting  heads — even  if  they  be  foolish 
heads — is  an  invention  which,  on  the  whole,  has 
promoted  human  well-being.  The  important  right 
of  a  minority  is  the  right  to  turn  itself  into  a  majority 
if  it  can.  And  if  the  right  of  free  expression  of 
opinion  and  of  association  for  the  purpose  of  pro 
moting  opinion  be  secured  to  a  minority,  we  cannot 
reasonably  say  there  is  tyranny.  If  a  majority  be 
lieves  in  the  reasonableness  of  its  position,  it  need 
not  fear  the  free  discussion  of  it ;  and  if  a  minority 
believes  in  itself  and  in  the  reasonableness  of  its 
position,  it  requires  nothing  more.  To  give  every 
elector  or  every  member  of  an  elected  assembly  an 
equal  vote  is  a  convenient  device  ;  it  promotes 
security  by  preventing  the  feeling  on  the  part  of  the 
majority  that  there  is  a  grievance,  and  in  the  long 
run  it  leads  to  votes  being  not  merely  counted,  but 
weighed.  Men  hold  their  opinions  with  very  differ 
ent  degrees  of  strength  and  conviction.  Ten  persons 
who  are  firmly  convinced  of  the  social  expediency  of 
their  policy  can,  if  they  stick  together  and  are  allowed 
freedom  of  association  and  of  expression,  very  speed 
ily  turn  themselves  into  ten  thousand,  when  they  have 
only  lukewarm  and  half-hearted  antagonists.  (Of 
course,  I  am  not  referring  to  scientific  opinion  as  to 
what  is,  but  to  practical  opinion  as  to  what  ought  to 
be  done.}  We  talk  of  people  having  opinions  ;  in  the 
majority  of  cases  it  is  the  opinions  that  have  the 
people.  A  political  idea,  a  national  sentiment,  the 


VIII.]       ON    THE    CONCEPTION    OF    SOVEREIGNTY.          257 

spirit  of  the  age,  do  not,  certainly,  float  about  like 
clouds  in  the  air ;  they  can  only  exist  in  the  minds 
of  individuals,  but  they  exist  in  the  minds  of  indi 
viduals  with  very  different  degrees  of  intensity,  and 
the  individuals  differ  very  much  in  the  degree  in 
which  they  are  conscious  of  them.  The  man  in  whom 
an  idea,  that  is  only  vaguely  present  in  the  minds 
of  others,  rises  into  distinct  consciousness,  and  who 
can  give  expression  to  that  idea  in  such  a  way  as  to 
awaken  others  to  the  consciousness  of  it  and  of  its 
importance — such  an  one  is  a  leader  of  men.  The 
practical  leader,  as  is  often  noticed  by  historians  and 
politicians,  must  not  be  too  much  in  advance  of  his 
contemporaries  ;  but  if  he  have  not  a  more  distinct 
consciousness  of  the  aims  for  which  others  are  blindly 
or  half-blindly  striving,  he  is  in  no  sense  a  leader. 
Sir  Robert  Peel,  a  statesman  not  incapable  of  popular 
sympathies,  described  ''public  opinion"  (in  a  letter 
written  in  1820)  as  "that  great  compound  of  folly, 
weakness,  prejudice,  wrong  feeling,  right  feeling, 
obstinacy,  and  newspaper  paragraphs."  In  the  same 
generation  Hegel  said  :  "  In  public  opinion  are  con 
tained  all  sorts  of  falsehood  and  truth."  So  far  he 
only  says  the  same  thing  as  Peel  ;  but  he  goes  on  to 
add  :  "  To  find  the  truth  in  it  is  the  business  of  the 
great  man.  He  who  tells  his  age  what  it  wills  and 
expresses,  and  brings  that  to  fulfilment,  is  the  great 
man  of  the  age."  (Pkil.  des  Rechts,  §  318,  p.  404.) 
The  great  man  must  be  able  to  discern  between  the 
real  and  growing  forces  in  public  opinion,  and  the 
mere  seeming  and  transitory  or  decaying  elements  in 
D.  H.  s 


258         ON    THE    CONCEPTION    OF    SOVEREIGNTY.       [vill. 

it.1  But  the  man  whose  ideas  and  sentiments  are 
out  of  all  relation  to  those  of  his  own  age  cannot 
exercise  any  effect  upon  it. 

When  we  say  that  the  legally  irresponsible  legal 
sovereign  is,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  responsible  (morally 
and  physically)  to  the  ultimate  political  sovereign, 
does  not  this  mean  that  the  ultimate  political  sove 
reign  is  the  mere  incarnation  of  the  force  of  the 
majority  ?  Physical  force  may  be  disguised  behind 
the  mechanism  of  voting  ;  but  it  is  force  in  the  last 
resort.  As  Locke  puts  it,  "  It  is  necessary  that  the 
body  should  move  whither  the  greater  force  carries 
it,  which  is  the  consent  of  the  majority."  (Civil 
Government,  II.,  c.  viii.,  §  96.)  This  force  may  be 
guided  by  wise  or  by  foolish  leaders  ;  but  it  is  force 
nevertheless.  Whether  a  government  maintains 
itself  or  is  overthrown,  it  is  force  that  decides. 
Well,  so  it  is.  All  ultimate  questions  of  political,  as 
distinct  from  mere  legal,  right  are  questions  of  might. 
The  repugnance  to  this  conclusion  arises  simply  from 
the  ambiguity  of  language.  The  word  "force"  seems 
to  suggest  mere  brute  strength,  exclusive  of  spiritual 
elements.  But  the  force  which  can  operate  among 
human  beings  successfully  and  continuously  is  never 
mere  brute  strength.  Discipline,  skill,  self-control, 
fidelity,  are  elements  necessary. to  the  success  even 
of  what  we  call  "  the  force  of  arms  "  ;  and  these  are 

1  This  is  what  is  implied  in  the  words  in  Hegel  which  follow 
those  quoted  :  "  He  does  and  makes  real  what  is  the  inner  essence 
of  his  age :  and  he  who  does  not  know  how  to  despise  public  opinion, 
as  he  hears  it  here  and  there,  will  never  attain  to  what  is  great." 


VIII.]       ON    THE    CONCEPTION    OF    SOVEREIGNTY.         259 

all  spiritual  elements.  And  a  great  deal  more  than 
these  is  necessary  in  order  to  establish  a  secure 
government.  "  You  can  do  anything  with  bayonets 
— except  sit  on  them."  All  government  must  have 
force  at  its  disposal  ;  but  no  government  can  last 
which  has  merely  force  at  its  disposal,  even  the  force 
of  a  veteran  army  of  professional  soldiers.  All 
government  implies  consent  as  well  as  force. 1  These 
are  the  two  elements  which  are  recognised  separately 
and  in  one-sided  fashion  in  the  theory  of  social  con 
tract  on  the  one  hand,  and  in  the  theory  of  law  and 
sovereignty  maintained  by  Thrasymachus,  Hobbes, 
and  Austin  on  the  other.  A  law,  to  be  a  law  in  the 
true  sense,  must  have  the  regulated  force  of  the 
community  behind  it ;  but  in  order  to  be  habitually 
obeyed  and  permanently  enforced,  it  must  be  recog 
nised  not  merely  as  "  good  law  ''  (in  the  lawyer's 
sense),  but  as  a  good  law  (in  the  layman's  sense),  i.e., 
it  must  be  in  accordance  with  the  "general  will,"  it 
must  be  thought  to  promote  the  common  good  ;  or, 
at  least,  its  tendency  to  injure  the  common  good 
must  not  yet  be  recognised.  It  is  not  necessary  that 
every  law  should  be  explicitly  approved  by  everyone 
who  obeys  it  ;  that  is  the  impossible  demand  of  in 
dividualism,  which,  carried  to  its  logical  issues,  is 
anarchy,  and  makes  all  law  alike  impossible  or 
superfluous.  But  the  great  majority  of  those  who 
habitually  obey  must  recognise  the  general  expedi- 

1  Cf.  Rousseau,  Contrat  Social,  I.,  c.iii.  "  Le  plus  fort  n'est 
jamais  assez  fort  pour  etre  toujours  le  maitre,  s'il  ne  transforme 
sa  force  en  droit,  et  1'obeissance  en  devoir." 


260         ON    THE    CONCEPTION    OF    SOVEREIGNTY.       [vill. 

ency  of  the  law,  or,  if  not,  they  must  feel  themselves 
able  to  obtain  its  alteration,  or  else  they  must  not  yet 
have  awakened  to  the  need  of  any  alteration. 

Is  there  no  limitation  to  this  ultimate  political 
sovereignty  ?  Within  the  nation  it  might  be  said 
there  was  such  in  the  responsibility  of  a  people  to 
its  own  future.  But  that  responsibility  is  part  of 
what  we  include  in  the  "  general  will  "  :  the  ultimate 
political  sovereign  is  not  the  determinate  number  of 
persons  now  existing  in  the  nation,  but  the  opinions 
and  feelings  of  these  persons  ;  and  of  those  opinions 
and  feelings  the  traditions  of  the  past,  the  needs  of  the 
present,  the  hopes  of  the  future,  all  form  a  part.  But 
may  there  not  be  a  limitation  outside  of  the  nation  ? 
We  are  thus  led  to  consider  the  external  aspect  of 
sovereignty.  In  Austin's  definition,  the  words  "  in 
dependent  "  and  "  not  in  a  habit  of  obedience  to  a 
like  superior "  were  expressly  inserted  by  him  to 
obviate  the  objections  he  found  to  Bentham's  defini 
tion  of  a  political  society,  on  which  his  own  is  based 
more  directly  than  on  any  other.  The  external 
aspect  of  sovereignty,  however,  came  to  be  recog 
nised  and  debated  in  modern  times  before  the  in 
ternal  aspect  was  much  considered.  The  external 
aspect  of  sovereignty  is  a  negative  aspect  (as  is 
sufficiently  expressed  by  Austin's  word  "  indepen 
dent  "),  and  for  that  reason  allows  of  precise  defini 
tion.  The  Greek  term  ai/roVo/xo?  expresses  the 
absence  of  obedience  to  any  external  authority,  but 
it  also  suggests  a  self-governing  community,  and 


VIII.]       ON    THE    CONCEPTION    OF    SOVEREIGNTY.         26 1 

would  not  have  been  applied  to  the  empire  of  the 
Persian  king.  The  Greeks  started  their  political 
life,  or,  at  all  events,  they  started  their  political 
thinking  with  the  assumption  of  the  isolated  city- 
state  as  the  true  political  society.  A  larger  society 
than  the  city  represents  to  Aristotle  an  inferior,  and 
not  a  higher,  stage  of  political  development.  Ties 
of  religious  observance  and  of  sentiment,  as  well  as 
a  common  language  and  a  common  culture,  bound 
together  the  whole  Hellenic  world  as  distinct  from 
"  the  barbarians."  But  the  independence  of  the 
city-state  was  too  deeply  rooted  in  Greek  ways  of 
thought  and  life  to  allow  of  the  absorption  of  these 
numerous  societies  under  a  strong  central  govern 
ment.  Such  an  absorption  meant  the  extinction  of 
freedom.  The  experiment  of  federation — the  only 
method  of  reconciling  autonomy  and  union — came  too 
late,  and  was  not  tried  under  favourable  conditions. 
The  nations  of  modern  Europe,  on  the  other  hand, 
grew  up  under  the  shadow,  or  the  ghost,  of  the  Roman 
Empire,  and  were  held  together  by  the  more  real 
unity  of  the  Catholic  Church.  The  modern  idea  of 
national  sovereignty,  i.e.,  of  complete  independence 
of  external  authority,  only  gradually  won  its  way, 
and  the  assertion  of  national  sovereignty  went  along 
with  the  decay  of  the  Holy  Roman  Empire  and  the 
revolt  of  the  Northern  nations  against  the  authority 
of  the  Pope.  On  the  external  side  a  "sovereign 
prince  "  means  a  "  sovereign  nation  "  ;  though,  of 
course,  a  sovereign  nation  may  be  a  sovereign,  i.e., 
independent,  republic.  The  internal  significance  of 


262         ON    THE    CONCEPTION    OF    SOVEREIGNTY.       [vill. 

sovereignty  became  a  prominent  theoretical  and 
practical  question  only  after  the  external  question 
had  been  settled. 

The  recognition  of  international  law  may  seem 
in  a  certain  sense  a  limitation  on  the  absolute 
sovereignty  of  the  nation  ;  but  it  is  no  legal  limita 
tion,  because  it  is  a  limitation  which  is  self-imposed. 
The  independent  nation,  as  Austin  and  his  school 
rightly  insist,  has  no  legal  superior.  But  the  recog 
nition  on  the  part  of  a  nation's  representatives  that 
the  nation  is  one  of  a  community  of  nations,  with 
moral,  though  not  legal,  claims  on  one  another, 
which  are  backed  up  by  the  irregular  penalties  of 
war,  does  impose  a  moral  check  on  the  unlimited 
independence  of  a  nation,  in  the  same  sense  in 
which  the  recognition  of  the  will  of  the  ultimate 
political  sovereign  imposes  a  moral  check  on  the 
legal  sovereign. 

When  Austin  and  his  followers  insist  that  inter 
national  law  is  not  law,  the  plausibility  of  the 
remark  is  mainly  due  to  the  fact  that  the  English 
language  possesses  no  equivalent  for  Jus,  Droit, 
Recht.  International  law  is  not  Lex  :  it  is  Jus. 
But  the  Austinian  criticism  does  good  service  by 
indirectly  calling  attention  to  the  fact  that  only  the 
growth  of  international  morality  makes  possible  the 
growth  of  international  law.  International  law  is 
law  of  the  primitive  type  :  it  is  custom.  And  the 
sanctions  which  deter  from  violating  it  are  the  anger 
and  hatred  of  other  nations,  which  may  possibly  or 
very  likely  result  in  the  use  of  physical  force.  In 


VIII.]       ON    THE    CONCEPTION    OF    SOVEREIGNTY.          263 

the  rudest  societies  of  men  there  are  customs 
enforced  by  no  regular  judicial  penalties,  but  rigidly 
observed  through  fear  of  the  consequences  of 
violating  them  ;  and  so  it  is  in  the,  as  yet,  rude 
society  of  nations.  They  are  in  the  pre-political 
state  ;  and  if  we  call  it  the  "  state  of  nature,"  we 
must  recognise  that  that  is  no  longer  always  the 
"  state  of  war."  The  community  of  nations  is  as 
yet  only  an  idea  :  it  has  no  legal  or  political  exist 
ence.  But  it  is  an  idea,  and  as  such  it  forms  the 
basis  of  international  law. 

The  relations  of  the  several  nations  to  the  whole 
of  humanity  is  the  problem  with  which  a  Philosophy 
of  History  attempts  to  deal,  and  from  which  the 
practical  statesman  cannot  escape.  The  several 
nations  are  not  permanent,  self-identical,  mutually 
exclusive  units.  The  evolution  of  humanity  causes 
new  groups  to  form  themselves  by  union  and 
division  out  of  those  already  existing.  Statesmen, 
trained  in  despotic  ideas,  and  endeavouring  to 
regulate  national  boundaries  from  above  and  from 
without,  have  often  separated  those  whose  spirit 
was  seeking  unity  and  united  those  who  could  not 
be  fused  into  a  homogeneous  people.  The  history 
of  Europe  since  the  Congress  of  Vienna  is  a  com 
mentary  on  the  impossibility  of  fixing,  by  external 
authority,  what  are  "  independent  political  societies." 
A  people  in  becoming  conscious  of  itself  insists  on 
marking  off  its  own  limits  as  well  as  on  determining 
the  character  of  its  government. 

When  we  speak  of  humanity  as  something  behind 


264         ON    THE    CONCEPTION    OF    SOVEREIGNTY.       [vill. 

every  particular  sovereign  nation,  this  is  no  empty 
phrase.  The  movements,  whether  economic,  in 
tellectual,  moral,  religious,  or  political,  going  on  in 
one  nation,  affect  the  movements  going  on  in  others. 
No  nation,  for  instance,  can  be  freed  or  enslaved, 
enriched  or  impoverished,  without  other  nations 
feeling  the  consequences.  Thus,  in  the  light  of 
history,  no  nation  is,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  ultimately 
irresponsible  to  the  future  and  to  other  nations.  If 
it  is  responsible,  what,  then,  is  the  sanction  ?  It  is 
the  penalty  of  death — the  penalty  of  perishing 
by  internal  dissensions  or  by  foreign  conquest. 
"Natural  selection"  determines  in  the  last  resort 
which  nations  shall  survive,  what  groupings  of 
mankind  are  most  vigorous,  and  what  organisations 
are  most  successful.  Die  Weltgeschichte  ist  das 
Wellgericht. 

Just  as  it  is  the  business  of  the  ordinary  statesman 
so  to  guide  the  legal  sovereign  that  it  does  not 
provoke  the  displeasure  of  the  ultimate  political 
sovereign,  it  is  the  business  of  the  greatest  states 
man  so  to  guide  the  whole  people  that  they  may 
adopt  those  forms  which  will  insure  their  continuance 
and  their  progress.  The  really  great  leader  will 
anticipate  on  behalf  of  his  people  what  painful 
experience  might  otherwise  teach  too  late. 


IX. 
THE    RIGHTS    OF    MINORITIES.1 

IN  times  past  government  has  generally  meant  the 
rule  of  minorities  over  majorities.  Even  the  most 
democratic  governments  of  the  ancient  world  were 
aristocracies  of  slave-owners.  The  free  citizens  of 
Athens  were  a  democracy  among  themselves,  but 
an  aristocracy,  if  we  think  of  all  the  human  beings 
inhabiting  Attica.  And,  even  in  cases  where 
"inhabitants"  and  "free  citizens"  have  been  nearly 
convertible  terms,  cities  and  states  governing  them 
selves  democratically  have  yet  denied  political  rights 
to  subject  peoples.  The  free  citizens  of  Uri  allowed 
their  bailiffs  to  rule  despotically  the  inhabitants  of 
the  Ticino  valley.  Thus,  the  struggle  for  freedom 
has  in  the  past  generally  been  the  struggle  of  the 
majority  against  a  privileged  minority.  Where 
there  has  been  no  such  struggle,  this  has  been 
because  the  majority  have  acquiesced  in  their 
political  subordination  or  have  never  yet  awakened 
to  a  sense  that  anything  else  is  possible  except 
blind  obedience  to  the  one  or  the  few.  Such 

1  Reprinted  from  the  International  Journal  of  Ethics  (Phila 
delphia),  January,  1891.  The  substance  of  this  paper  was 
originally  given  as  a  lecture  to  an  Ethical  Society. 

365 


266  THE    RIGHTS    OF    MINORITIES.  [iX 

political  torpor  can  continue  more  easily  where  all 
alike  are  the  slaves  of  an  absolute  despot.  Where 
the  practices  of  free  government  (i.e.,  government 
by  discussion,  instead  of  government  merely  by 
force)  prevail  even  among  a  limited  number,  an 
example  is  set,  which  the  many  in  course  of  time 
will  desire  to  imitate.  It  is  therefore  more 
dangerous  for  a  republican  than  for  a  monarchical 
government  to  practise  tyranny  or  claim  exclusive 
privilege.  The  history  of  ancient  Rome  is  the 
history  of  a  gradual  extension  of  citizenship  to  those 
previously  excluded, — an  extension  won  by  party- 
struggles. 

Democracy,  in  the  full  modern  sense,  means  the 
rule  of  the  majority.  For  practical  purposes  the 
majority  must  be  taken  as,  for  the  time  being,  the 
representative  of  all.  If  all  cannot  have  their 
wishes  gratified,  it  is  the  less  evil  to  adopt  the  view 
of  the  greater  number.  This  is  democracy  in  its 
lowest  terms  ;  in  its  ideal  it  means  a  great  deal  more 

o 

than  a  machine  for  carrying  into  effect  the  wishes 
of  the  majority.  It  may  be  urged  that  it  is  very 
absurd  to  expect  the  whole  to  yield  to  the  decision 
of  half  phis  one  :  and  a  democracy  may  limit  itself 
by  requiring  that  important  changes  can  only  take 
place  with  the  consent  of  two-thirds  or  three-fourths 
of  the  persons  voting  or  even  of  the  persons  entitled 
to  vote.  But  no  practical  person  will  go  so  far  as 
to  require  unanimity  in  large  bodies.  To  expect 
unanimity,  as  is  done  in  a  Russian  village  com 
munity,  belongs  to  a  very  crude  stage  of  political 


IX.]  THE    RIGHTS    OF    MINORITIES.  267 

thinking  and  is  apt  to  mean  the  tyranny  of  the  most 
obstinate.  In  judicial  matters  it  is  somewhat 
different  ;  there  may  be  good  arguments  for  re 
quiring  unanimity  in  a  jury,  but  I  am  not  concerned 
to  defend  the  English  system.  Yet,  even  with 
regard  to  that,  one  has  heard  of  the  Irishman  who 
accused  the  other  eleven  of  being  ''  obstinate  "  ;  he 
knew  how  to  assert  the  rights  of  minorities. 
Obstinacy  is  a  very  good  thing  in  its  way,  as  I  shall 
have  occasion  to  point  out  afterwards  ;  but,  on  the 
whole,  one  is  likely  to  get  a  more  rational  expression 
of  opinion  by  recognising  the  principle  of  "counting 
heads."  Thus  there  inevitably  remains  a  minority 
whose  wishes  are  overridden.  Of  course  this  mino 
rity  may  be  a  different  one  on  different  questions  ; 
but  the  effect  of  party  government  is  to  make  a 
great  number  of  questions  run  together. 

The  claims  of  a  minority  to  consideration  may  be 
merely  a  survival  of  claims  to  exclusive  privilege. 
The  dethroned  rulers  may  not  "give  way  with  a 
good  grace,"  and  may  expect  in  a  changed  constitu 
tion  to  retain  their  old  pre-eminence.  The  extent  of 
the  change,  which  has  taken  place,  may  be  disguised 
from  them  by  the  way  in  which  it  has  come  about, 
as  in  those  countries  that  have  been  fortunate 
enough  to  grow  gradually  out  of  one  form  into 
another.  Birth  and  wealth,  with  the  advantages  of 
education  and  position  which  they  may  carry  with 
them,  give  a  person  prestige  in  a  community,  how 
ever  formally  democratic  it  may  be  ;  but  the  person 
of  birth  or  wealth  may  go  on  to  demand  an  express 


268  THE    RIGHTS    OF    MINORITIES.  [iX. 

recognition  of  his  advantages.  Now  such  a  claim 
on  the  part  of  a  minority  a  democracy  cannot 
recognise  without  defeating  its  very  principle  ;  and 
it  may  be  questioned  how  far  any  such  recognition 
ultimately  benefits  the  minority  itself.  An  express 
and  formal  superiority  awakens  jealousy  and  dis 
like  ;  1  an  actual  superiority  of  any  obvious  kind  gets 
in  a  democratic  country  abundant  opportunities  of 
asserting  itself,  —  in  the  case  of  wealth  only  too 
abundant  opportunities. 

It  is  a  claim  of  a  very  different  and  more  important 
kind  which  is  made  in  Mill's  Liberty,  —  a  claim  for 
the  minority,  put  forward,  however,  not  so  much  on 
behalf  of  the  interests  of  the  minority  themselves  as 
on  behalf  of  the  future  and  general  well-being  of 
mankind.  All  great  movements  of  progress,  it  is 
pointed  out,  have  begun  with  minorities  ;  and  thus, 
if  the  opinions  arid  efforts  of  a  minority  are  repressed 
and  thwarted,  progress  may  be  hindered  and  future 
generations  suffer.  Others,  again,  go  further  and, 
echoing  Carlyle's  words,  urge  that,  as  the  population 
consists  mostly  of  fools,  to  allow  the  majority  to  rule 
is  to  allow  the  fools  to  rule.  Knowledge,  except  of 
the  loosest  and  most  meagre  kind,  is  the  possession 
only  of  the  few  ;  and  so,  it  is  argued,  we  must  turn 
to  the  experts,  and  disregard  the  clamour  of  the  many. 


.g.>  the  Prussian  "  three-class  system,"  according  to  which 
all  primary  voters  are  distributed  into  three  classes  according  to 
the  amount  of  direct  taxes  they  pay,  —  classes  of  unequal  size,  but 
with  equal  voting  power.  The  system  was  vigorously  denounced 
by  Lassalle. 


IX.]  THE    RIGHTS    OF    MINORITIES.  269 

On  this  subject  of  the  authority  of  the  few  and 
the  many  respectively  considerable  confusion  shows 
itself  every  now  and  then.  It  may  be  as  well  to  try 
to  clear  it  up  a  little.  On  the  one  hand,  it  is  un 
doubtedly  true  that  scientific  truth  is  scientifically 
known  only  by  a  few  experts  ;  others  must  accept  it 
on  their  authority.  On  the  other  hand,  there  has 
always  been  a  tendency  to  believe  that  the  mass  of 
mankind  cannot  be  entirely  in  the  wrong  ;  that  there 
must  be  some  truth  in  what  is  generally  believed. 
And  the  actual  growth  of  democracy  and  of  the 
democratic  spirit  might  seem  to  have  enormously  in 
creased  the  force  of  the  authority  of  general  consent. 
To  escape  from  this  apparent  contradiction  we  must 
carefully  distinguish  between  the  grounds  on  which 
we  accept  scientific  truth  and  the  grounds  on  which  we 
adopt  practical  maxims.  The  vast  mass  of  mankind 
have  believed  that  the  sun  goes  round  the  earth, 
have  believed  in  witchcraft,  in  ghosts,  etc.  And 
this  universality  of  belief  is  sometimes  urged  as  an 
argument  in  favour  of  the  truth  of  such  opinions.  It 
does  prove  that  the  scientific  disbeliever  is  bound  to 
show,  not  merely  that  such  beliefs  are  erroneous, 
but  also  how  they  can  have  arisen  and  become  pre 
valent.  In  the  case  of  the  relation  of  sun  and  earth, 
that  is  easy  enough.  The  popular  view,  which  still 
survives  as  often  as  the  most  scientifically-minded 
person  talks  of  sunrise  and  sunset,  is  the  first  obvious 
interpretation  of  the  impressions  of  sense.  And 
similarly  (though  the  matter  is  often  much  more 
complex)  a  knowledge  of  the  mental  history  of  the 


270  THE    RIGHTS    OF    MINORITIES.  [iX. 

human  race — a  knowledge  enormously  increased  of 
late  by  the  careful  study  of  lower  races — will  ex 
plain  the  wide  acceptance  of  beliefs  which  the  growth 
of  science  tends  to  discredit.  But  in  all  such  cases 
the  minority  of  trained  minds  has  an  authority  that 
does  not  belong  to  the  majority  of  untrained  minds. 
This  legitimate  authority  of  the  expert  is  often 
used  as  an  argument  that  government  must  be  in 
the  hands  of  a  select  class.  It  is  sometimes  even 
used  as  an  argument  for  an  hereditary  aristocracy,  — 
which  of  course  it  does  not  support  at  all.  It  might 
seem  to  support  the  rule  of  an  intellectual  aristocracy, 
if  we  could  get  together  such  a  body, —  Plato's 
"  philosopher  kings."  On  the  strength  of  this  argu 
ment  the  Fellows  of  the  Royal  Society  might  claim 
to  teach  us  lessons  in  the  art  of  government.  But 
the  argument  rests  on  a  confusion  between  what  is 
true  for  the  intellect  and  what  is  practically  ex 
pedient.  If  the  majority  of  a  people  have  a  strong, 
though  it  may  seem  to  the  educated  observer  a 
perfectly  unreasonable,  belief  in  monarchical  insti 
tutions, — are  ready  to  die  for  their  king, — then, 
however  superior  we  many  think  republican  institu 
tions,  it  would  be  folly  to  impose  them  from  without 
upon  an  unwilling  people.  It  is  of  no  use  to  give 
any  people  the  best  constitution  (or  what  we  think 
such)  unless  we  convince  them  that  it  is  the  best,  so 
that  it  becomes  the  best  for  them.  All  government 
is  based  upon  opinion.  This  is  the  dictum  of  the 
cautious  conservative  Hume  as  well  as-  of  the  demo 
cratic  prophet  Rousseau.  Matters  of  detail  can 


IX.]  THE    RIGHTS    OF    MINORITIES.  271 

indeed  be  best  decided  by  experts,  and  cannot  be 
properly  decided  at  all  except  by  them  (they  must, 
however,  be  experts  in  the  art  of  administration,  and 
not  merely  in  some  theoretical  science).  But  the 
mass  of  a  nation  must  be  convinced  of  the  value  of 
the  general  principle  which  is  being  carried  out;  else 
what  we  might  judge  the  most  salutary  changes  will 
be  ineffectual.  Of  course  the  existence  of  an  institu 
tion  is  often  itself  an  important  factor  in  producing 
the  opinion  favourable  to  it  ;  but  it  is  the  favourable 
opinion,  and  not  the  mere  legal  existence  of  the 
institution,  that  makes  the  institution  of  any  value. 
If  the  mass  of  a  people  believe  a  law  to  be  unjust,  it 
matters  not  that  a  few  highly-cultured  gentlemen  at 
the  head  of  affairs  are  perfectly  satisfied  of  its 
justice  ;  to  the  people  it  is  an  unjust  law,  and  has 
none  of  the  binding  force  of  law  on  their  sentiments 
and  conscience.1  And  laws  which  people  generally 
(I  do  not  mean  a  few  stray  persons  here  and  there) 
think  it  right  to  violate  are  producing  the  very 
opposite  moral  effect  from  that  which  good  laws 

1  In  practice  the  most  difficult  cases  are  those  where  legislation 
has  to  deal  with  some  matter  (e.g.  of  health)  on  which  none  but 
the  scientific  expert  can  in  the  first  instance  form  a  sound  judg 
ment.  It  is  only  too  possible  that  democratic  societies  may, 
through  popular  distrust  of  scientific  opinion,  fall  in  some  respects 
behind  societies  under  enlightened  despotisms.  The  remedy  is 
not  despotism,  but  popular  enlightenment.  The  scientific  specia 
list  is  bound,  therefore,  by  patriotism  as  well  in  the  interests  of 
his  own  science,  to  lend  what  aid  he  can  to  that  popularisation  of 
science  from  which  he  is  too  apt  to  recoil :  it  is  the  sole  antidote 
to  ignorance  and  pseudo-science.  Those  whom  science  neglects, 
fanaticism  and  quackery  will  claim  for  their  own. 


272  THE    RIGHTS    OF    MINORITIES.  [iX. 

ought  to  produce.  That  this  or  that  law  or  institu 
tion  is  suitable  for  us  or  the  reverse  is  not  a  pro 
position  of  the  same  kind  with  the  proposition 
that  such  and  such  things  do  or  do  not  happen  in 
the  course  of  nature  or  history.  That  the  Romans 
lived  under  such  and  such  a  constitution  is  a  propo 
sition,  with  regard  to  whose  truth  or  falsehood  the 
opinion  of  the  scientific  historian  outweighs  any 
amount  of  popular  belief  or  tradition.  But  that  such 
and  such  a  law  or  constitution  is  good  for  us  is  only 
true  if  we  think  it  so,  after  a  fair  trial.  (The  qualifi 
cation  is  essential.)  To  use  a  familiar  illustration,  it 
is  the  wearer  of  the  shoe  that  knows  whether  the 
shoe  pinches.  The  scientific  shoemaker  alone  may 
know  why  it  pinches,  and  how  to  remedy  the  mis 
chief.  But  if  the  scientific  shoemaker  were  to  con 
vince  you  that  the  shoe  did  not  pinch,  he  would 
convince  your  intellect  only,  if  the  shoe  continued  to 
hurt  your  foot;  and  you  would  be  apt  to  go  in  future 
to  the  unscientific  shoemaker  who  could  give  you 
comfort  even  without  science.  So  it  is  with  consti 
tutions  and  laws.  Those  who  have  to  wear  them 
must  judge  whether  or  not  they  fit ;  and  therefore 
they  must  have  the  decisive  voice  as  to  the  general 
principles,  though,  as  already  said,  details  had  better 
be  left  to  experts.  Ends  must  be  approved  by  the 
feeling  of  the  many  ;  the  means  must  be  chosen  by 
the  intellect  of  the  few.  This  is,  in  fact,  the  raison 
d'etre  of  representative  democracy,  —  the  many 
choose  the  few  to  carry  out  their  wishes. 

These  distinctions — -first,  between  scientific  and 


IX.]  THE    RIGHTS    OF    MINORITIES.  273 

practical  matters,  secondly,  between  judgments  about 
ends  and  about  means — may  seem  almost  too  obvious 
to  need  statement.  But  obvious  distinctions  are  apt 
to  be  overlooked  ;  and  it  is  worth  uttering  truisms, 
if  we  can  get  rid  of  the  fallacious  argument  that 
because  the  few  may  be  wiser  than  the  many,  there 
fore  the  few  should  rule  the  many,  otherwise  than  as 
their  ministers  and  stewards. 

Those  who  are  ready  for  all  practical  purposes 
to  accept  the  will  of  the  majority  as  decisive  yet 
sometimes  think  it  necessary  to  propose  various 
expedients  for  securing  what  is  called  "  the  repre 
sentation  of  minorities."  The  danger  of  the  non- 
representation  of  minorities  seems  to  me  to  be  a 
good  deal  exaggerated  by  Mill  and  other  advocates  of 
"  proportional  representation  "  and  similar  schemes. 
It  would  indeed  not  be  difficult  to  make  out  a.  primd 
facie  case  for  the  absurdity  of  the  whole  system  of 
representative  government,  if  we  attended  merely 
to  the  arithmetical  possibilities  of  its  mechanism. 
Thus,  in  Great  Britain,  the  determining  power  lies 
with  the  majority  of  a  Cabinet,  which  is  supported 
by  a  majority  of  the  House  of  Commons,  which  is 
elected,  it  may  be,  by  a  bare  majority  of  the 
electors  ;  so  that  the  representative  system  seems, 
when  carried  out,  to  defeat  itself  and  to  put  power 
into  the  hands  of  a  very  small  minority  of  the  whole 
population,— ultimately  perhaps  into  the  hands  of 
"  the  odd  man."  But  this  seeming  absurdity  results 
from  an  abstract  and  artificial  way  of  looking  at  the 
matter.  The  will  of  these  few  persons  is  only  effec- 

D.  H.  T 


274  THE    RIGHTS    OF    MINORITIES.  [iX. 

tive  because  they  do  represent  (or  at  least  did,  at 
some  time,  represent)  something  very  much  more 
than  a  small  fraction  of  the  population.  No  scheme 
that  can  be  constructed  by  human  ingenuity  will 
make  a  representative  chamber  a  quite  perfect  mirror 
of  all  the  various  sets  of  opinion  in  the  community. 
It  is  only  a  question  of  more  or  less  ;  and,  what  is 
very  important,  any  arrangement  that  is  adopted 
must  have  the  merit  not  merely  of  being  simple  to 
work,  but  of  looking  simple.  Even  the  suspicion  of 
trickery  must  be  avoided.  This  is,  of  course,  the 
great  advantage  of  the  system  of  equal  electoral 
districts  with  single  members,  and  "  one  man  one 
vote."  Even  so,  it  may  indeed  happen  that  a 
majority  of  the  elected  chamber  may  represent  a 
minority  of  the  electors, — if  one  party  have  ex 
tremely  large  majorities  in  some  places  and  be 
defeated  by  extremely  narrow  majorities  in  others. 
Accidents  of  that  sort  will  happen  in  the  best  regu 
lated  constitutions;  but  the  chances  are,  certainly, 
against  their  happening  to  any  very  great  extent. 
But  when  such  arithmetical  possibilities  are  insisted 
on,  it  is  forgotten,  in  the  first  place,  that  each  indivi 
dual  member  has  many  other  attributes  besides  being 
the  member  for  so-and-so,  and,  in  the  second  place, 
that  there  are  elements  in  the  living  constitution  of 
a  country  besides  those  written  down  by  constitu 
tional  lawyers.  An  elected  assembly  is  powerful 
indeed.  It  may,  like  the  British  Parliament,  be 
legally  "  omnipotent  ;  "  and  yet  there  is  a  power 
behind  it,  a  power  that  acts  not  merely  at  the  time 


IX.]  THE    RIGHTS    OF    MINORITIES.  275 

of  a  general  election,  but  continuously, — the  power 
of  public  opinion.  The  newspaper  and  the  public 
meeting  and  the  petition  are  real  factors  in  a  modern 
constitution.  It  is  easy  enough  to  see  the  defects 
of  each  of  these  organs  of  public  opinion,  easy 
enough  to  throw  ridicule  upon  them.  But  that  is  to 
miss  their  true  significance.  The  newspaper  ought 
to  represent  the  power  of  intellect  applied  to  prac 
tical  matters  ;  it  is  too  apt  to  represent  largely  the 
power  of  money — not  merely  the  capital  that  is 
needed  to  float  it,  but  the  money  that  comes  in 
through  advertisements.  The  political  and  moral 
consequences  of  advertising  would,  however,  be  too 
long  a  story  to  begin  now  ;  to  have  named  it  may 
suffice.  Then,  as  to  public  meetings :  there  are 
many  people  who  scoff  at  them.  "  Got-up  agitations," 
"  power  of  the  strongest  lungs,"  and  so  on.  Those 
who  talk  in  this  way  seem  to  forget  that,  though 
you  may  make  a  "  flare-up  "  with  a  few  shavings  and 
a  lucifer-match,  to  keep  up  a  steady  heat  you  need 
coals  as  well.  There  cannot  be  such  a  thing  as  an 
agitation  that  lasts,  grows,  and  for  which  people 
sacrifice  a  great  deal,  and  which  is  nevertheless 
merely  "  got  up."  A  continuous  agitation  is  not  a 
cause  but  a  symptom  of  discontent.  Public  meet 
ings,  petitions,  pamphlets,  newspaper  articles,  are, 
however  imperfectly,  organs  of  public  opinion,  and 
much  better  and  more  effective  organs  than  assas 
sination  or  even  than  epigrams,  which  take  their 
place  in  despotically  governed  countries.1 

1  Public  meetings,  petitions,  etc.,  are  indeed  very  rudimentary 


276  THE    RIGHTS    OF    MINORITIES.  [iX. 

Where  there  exist  such  organs  of  public  opinion 
and  a  tolerably  sound,  even  though  not  ideally  per 
fect,  representative  system,  any  minority  which  has 
really  got  life  and  vigour  in  it  can  make  itself  felt. 
I  do  not  think  that,  if  it  were  possible,  it  would  be 
desirable  to  construct  any  political  machinery  for 
giving  a  prominent  place  to  the  opinions  of  minori 
ties  that  will  not  take  the  trouble  to  assert  and  to 
spread  these  opinions.  The  all-important  and 
essential  right  of  minorities  is  the  right  to  turn 
themselves  into  majorities  if  they  can  ;  this  means 
freedom  of  the  press,  freedom  of  association,  freedom 
of  public  meeting.  "  Give  me,"  said  Milton,  "  the 
liberty  to  know,  to  utter,  and  to  argue  freely  accord 
ing  to  conscience,  above  all  other  liberties."  Minori 
ties  that  grumble  at  the  whole  world  round  them 
and  have  no  desire  and  no  hope  of  convincing  other 
people  are  not  a  valuable  factor  in  political  or  social 
life.  They  are,  in  all  probability,  the  decaying  sur 
vivals  of  a  past  type,  and  not  the  first  germs  of  a 
new. 

In  a  genuinely  democratic  government  votes 
are  nominally  merely  counted  ;  in  reality  they  are 
weighed.  Not  indeed  in  the  sense  that  wisdom 
always  weighs  the  heaviest — in  what  constitution, 
outside  Utopia,  does  that  happen  ? — but  in  the  sense 
that  the  energy  and  contagious  enthusiasm  of  a  few, 
who  represent  some  living  and  growing  idea,  far 

"  organs  "  of  popular  sovereignty  compared  with  the  Swiss  "  re 
ferendum"  and  "initiative,"  which  seem  to  work  well — in 
Switzerland,  at  least. 


IX.]  THE    RIGHTS    OF    MINORITIES.  277 

outweigh  the  indifference  and  apathy  of  great 
numbers.  Great  movements  begin  with  small 
minorities ;  but  these  minorities  must  consist  of 
persons  who  wish  to  make  others  share  their  convic 
tions.  From  this  follows  all  that  can  be  laid  down 
in  general  terms  about  the  rights  and — what  we  are 
less  apt  to  think  of — the  duties  of  minorities. 

The  right  of  spreading  one's  opinions  implies  two 
things,  neither  of  which  must  be  absent  :  first,  cer 
tain  legal  and  constitutional  securities  ;  and,  secondly, 
a  certain  condition  of  public  sentiment.  Without 
the  latter  the  former  cannot  be  obtained  unless 
exceptionally,  as,  for  instance,  under  an  enlightened 
despotism  ;  and  that  is  really  no  exception,  for  secu 
rities  dependent  on  the  strong  will  of  one  enlightened 
and  big-minded  man  can  hardly  be  called  constitu 
tional,  and  are  an  uncertain  bulwark  of  liberty.  On 
the  other  hand,  without  explicitly  recognised  legal 
safeguards  public  sentiment  is  a  somewhat  fickle 
protector  of  liberty.  Outbursts  of  fear,  fanaticism, 
and  intolerance  are  only  too  possible  ;  and  a  good 
deal  may  be  said  even  for  the  merely  moral  force  of 
a  formal  "  declaration  of  rights."  A  people  in  its 
calm  or  its  generous  moments  may  well  protect  itself 
against  its  own  lower  moods  :  it  is  something  to  be 
able  to  appeal  from  the  people  drunk  to  the  people 
sober.  And  the  strong  hand  of  the  state  is  often 
needed  to  protect  the  individual  against  undue  social 
pressure. 

I  do  not  think  that   the  subject  of  the  ethics  of 
toleration  has  ever  been  adequately  treated.    Tolera- 


2/8  THE    RIGHTS    OF    MINORITIES.  [iX. 

tion  is  often  supposed  to  arise  solely  from  indiffer 
ence.  This  is  not  the  case.  In  fact,  indifference 
makes  toleration  superfluous.  Toleration,  shown 
by  those  who  "  care  for  none  of  these  things," 
is  no  virtue,  though  it  may  be  a  public  duty  in 
a  magistrate  "indifferently  administering  justice." 
The  toleration  of  contempt  may,  indeed,  be  very 
useful  to  those  who  are  zealous  and  in  earnest.  The 
kind  of  toleration  which  is  most  valuable,  which  can 
only  exist  in  a  morally  healthy  society,  and  which 
will  help  to  keep  the  society  healthy  and  make  it 
healthier,  is  toleration  shown  by  those  who  have 
faith  in  the  reasonableness  of  their  own  beliefs  and 
who  are,  therefore,  willing  to  face  the  full  light 
of  criticism.  Persecution, — and  by  persecution  I 
mean  here  not  what  any  aggrieved  individual  may 
call  such,  but  the  forcible  suppression  of  opinions 
(every  society  is  obliged  to  use  force  for  the  suppres 
sion  of  certain  overt  actions,  and  the  line  between 
expedient  and  inexpedient  compulsion  will  be  drawn 
differently  by  different  persons), — persecution  arises 
mainly  from  two  sources, — fear  and  a  particular  form 
of  belief  in  the  supernatural.  If  people  do  seriously 
believe  that  they  and  they  alone  are  in  possession 
of  truth  guaranteed  to  them  by  other  authority  than 
that  of  human  reason,  of  course  they  will  not  accept 
the  free  use  of  reason  as  a  test ;  and  there  is 
always  a  risk  that,  if  sufficiently  powerful,  they  will 
endeavour  to  repress  the  spread  of  what  they  con 
scientiously  regard  as  dangerous  opinions.  Those 
who  believe  that  Divine  truth  is  something  different 


IX.]  THE    RIGHTS    OF    MINORITIES.  279 

from  human  truth  will  be  apt  to  believe  that  the 
civil  magistrate  must  defend  the  Deity  by  the  power 
of  the  sword.  This  type  of  belief  is  really  a  form  of 
fear, — it  is  fear  of  human  reason  ;  and,  only  as  this 
belief  becomes  rarer  or  weaker  by  the  secularising, 
or,  to  speak  more  correctly,  the  humanising  of  politics, 
does  toleration  become  possible.  But  fear  may 
make  even  those  who  appeal  to  reason  persecutors  in 
self-defence.  It  is  difficult,  if  we  are  quite  just  in 
our  historical  judgments,  to  condemn  entirely  the 
harsh  measures  employed  by  small  societies  hold 
ing  new  beliefs, — antagonistic  to  those  of  firmly  es 
tablished  and  powerful  communities,  —  such  small 
societies,  for  instance,  as  the  Calvinists  of  Geneva  or 
the  founders  of  the  Commonwealth  of  Massachusetts.1 
When  a  society  is  struggling  to  exist  at  all,  cohesion 
is  so  essential  that  it  may  well  require  uniformity  of 
belief.  A  rigid  bond  of  custom  is  necessary  to  its 
earlier  stages.  Only  after  cohesion  has  been 
obtained  is  freedom  of  discussion  possible  and 
advantageous.  Furthermore,  complete  freedom  of 
discussion  is  only  possible  and  is  only  valuable, 
when  there  is  a  general  diffusion  of  education,  and 
when  the  habit  of  settling  matters  by  discussion, 
instead  of  by  force,  has  become  establishedi  In 
admitting  this  we  must  not,  however,  forget  that 
discussion  itself  is  one  of  the  most  important  means 
of  education.  There  are  indeed  people — •"  misolo- 

1  Even  the  most  rigid  sects  of  Protestants  do  in  some  sense 
professedly  appeal  to  reason  instead  of  ecclesiastical  authority,  as 
the  interpreter  of  Scripture. 


280  THE    RIGHTS    OF    MINORITIES.  [iX. 

gists,"  Plato  would  have  called  them — who  say  : 
"  Controversy  is  of  no  use.  Those  who  take  part 
in  it  go  away  holding  the  same  beliefs  as  before,  only 
holding  them  more  dogmatically  as  the  result  of 
having  had  to  fight  for  them."  If  the  fighting  is 
physical,  this  is  nearly  always  the  case  ;  it  is  not  true 
of  intellectual  controversy  fairly  carried  on.  During 
the  actual  discussion,  indeed,  each  may  stick  to  his 
opinion  :  it  might  even  be  said  that,  unless  people 
showed  some  obstinacy,  a  debate  would  always  be  a 
failure.  For  minds  in  a  perfectly  flabby  condition 
discussion  is  impossible  :  it  implies  a  certain  amount 
of  mutual  resistance.  But  if  people  are  really  in 
earnest  and  care  more  for  truth  than  for  victory,  it 
will  be  found  that  after  any  serious  discussion  both 
parties  have  probably  modified  their  opinions,  and 
out  of  the  conflict  of  two  opposing  principles  may 
spring  a  new  one,  victorious  over  both.  It  is  by 
the  conflict  of  ideas  that  intellectual  progress  is 
made. 

Professor  Bryce  in  his  great  work  on  The 
American  Commonwealth  has  made  clear  a  very 
important  distinction  between  "  the  tyranny  of  the 
majority"  and  "the  fatalism  of  the  multitude," 
which  is  often  confused  with  it.  "A  majority  is 
tyrannical,"  he  says  (vol.  iii.  p.  133),  "when  it 
decides  without  hearing  the  minority,  when  it 
suppresses  fair  and  temperate  criticism  on  its  own 
acts,  when  it  insists  on  restraining  men  in  matters 
where  restraint  is  not  required  by  the  common 
interest,  when  it  forces  men  to  contribute  money  to 


IX.]  THE    RIGHTS    OF    MINORITIES.  28 1 

objects  which  they  disapprove  and  which  the  com 
mon  interest  does  not  demand.1  The  element  of 
tyranny  lies  in  the  wantonness  of  the  act, — a 
wantonness  springing  from  the  sense  of  overwhelm 
ing  power,  or  in  the  fact  that  it  is  a  misuse  for  one 
purpose  of  power  granted  for  another." 

Simply  because  the  minority  disapprove  of  the 
enactments  of  the  majority,  they  cannot  rightly 
describe  the  rule  of  the  majority  as  "  tyrannical." 
In  a  democratic  constitution,  with  elections  recur 
ring  sufficiently  often,  and  proper  safeguards  for 
liberty  of  expressing  and  spreading  opinions,  the 
right  of  the  minority  is,  as  I  have  said,  to  turn 
themselves  into  a  majority  if  they  can  ;  and  it 
must  be  added,  it  is  their  duty  also,  if  they  continue 
to  believe  in  themselves.  But  here  comes  in  that 
"fatalism,"  which  is  so  often  wrongly  described  as 
the  tyranny  of  the  majority  ;  the  apathy  of  minori 
ties  is  one  of  the  frequent  weaknesses  in  democratic 
communities.  As  Professor  Bryce  has  put  it,  "the 
belief  in  the  rights  of  the  majority  lies  very  near 
to  the  belief  that  the  majority  must  be  right"  (ib., 
p.  124).  To  give  way  for  the  time  to  the  legally 
expressed  will  of  the  majority  is  a  necessary  and 

1  I  assume  that  the  "and"  is  emphatic,  and  that  this  clause 
must  be  taken  as  qualifying  the  previous  clause.  If  a  tax  is 
legally  imposed  by  the  majority  for  a  purpose  which  the  common 
interest  (in  their  judgment)  demands,  a  minority  may  disapprove 
this  purpose,  but  they  have  no  moral  right  to  refuse  payment  of 
the  tax,  unless  they  are  conscientiously  convinced  that  such  an 
act  of  rebellion  is  their  duty,  as  the  best  means  of  bringing  about 
what  they  regard  as  a  better  state  of  affairs. 


282  THE    RIGHTS    OF    MINORITIES.  [iX. 

salutary  consequence  of  popular  government ;  but 
to  lose  heart  and  give  up  effort  is  an  illegitimate 
and  evil  consequence  of  it.  It  is  the  duty  of  a 
minority  to  obey,  unless  conscience  absolutely  for 
bids  ;  in  which  extreme  case  it  may  become  a  duty 
to  resist.  If  we  are  using  language  strictly,  there 
never  can  be  a  right  of  resistance.  Rights  are  the 
creation  of  society,  and  there  can  be  no  right  of  the 
individual  or  of  any  number  of  individuals  against 
the  society  of  which  they  are  members.  When  we 
speak  of  "natural  rights,"  we  really  mean  those 
rights  which  we  think  to  be  the  very  least  that  a 
well-organised  society  should  secure  to  its  members. 
In  the  American  "Declaration  of  Independence" 
the  time-honoured  phrase  about  the  right  of  resist 
ance  is  wisely  supplemented  by  the  addition  of  the 
better  and  truer  word,  "duty." 

Resistance  may,  in  extreme  cases,  be  the  only 
way  of  protesting  against  what  we  hold  to  be  an 
unjust  and  mischievous  law  and  the  only  way  of  get 
ting  it  altered.  But  the  problems  of  practical  ethics 
involved  in  this  question  are  not  easy.  The  limits 
of  justifiable  compromise  cannot  be  laid  down  in 
any  hard  and  fast  a  priori  rules.  If  it  really  goes 
against  a  man's  conscience  to  obey  a  laiv  (I  am  not 
speaking  of  arbitrary,  illegal  commands,  where  the 
right  and  duty  of  disobedience  are  clear  enough),  he 
can,  if  we  use  language  strictly,  claim  no  right  to 
disobey,  but  it  is  his  duty  to  disobey,  at  what 
ever  cost  ;  if  he  obeys  against  his  conscience, 
he  loses  his  own  self-respect  and  lowers  his  cha- 


IX.]  THE    RIGHTS    OF    MINORITIES.  283 

racter.  Only  let  him  be  perfectly  sure  that  it 
is  his  conscience  that  urges  him  and  not  some 
merely  selfish  motive  of  personal  dislike  or  offended 
pride.  To  justify  this  statement  and  this  distinc 
tion,  it  would  of  course  be  necessary  to  explain 
what  is  meant  by  "  conscience."  Suffice  it  to  say 
for  the  present — and  I  think  the  supporters  of  most 
ethical  systems  would  agree  with  this  statement— 
that  the  dictates  of  a  man's  conscience  will  on  the 
whole  correspond  to  the  better  spirit  of  the  com 
munity  round  him,  or  at  least  to  what  he  regards  as 
such  ;  and  therefore  the  man,  who  disobeys  a  law 
"for  conscience  sake"  is  acting  in  the  interests  of 
what  he  conceives  to  be  the  future  well-being  of 
society.  Of  course  a  man's  conscience  may  corre 
spond  to  a  superseded  social  type,  but  it  will  not  be 
a  superseded  type  in  his  own  judgment.  Posterity 
may  come  to  disapprove  many  actions,  and  yet 
bestow  admiration  on  the  motives  of  those  who  did 
them.  Even  where  an  individual  has  no  conscien 
tious  objection  to  render  obedience  himself,  it  may 
occasionally  be  his  duty,  in  the  interests  of  the 
future  well-being  of  society,  to  join  others  in  resist 
ing  and  even  in  rebelling,  provided  that  there  is  no 
reasonable  hope  of  getting  a  bad  law  or  a  bad  con 
stitution  altered  by  peaceable  means,  and  provided 
also  that  there  is  a  reasonable  hope  that  the  resist 
ance  or  rebellion  will  be  so  successful  as  to  lead  to 
an  alteration  in  the  right  direction.1  Such  is  the 

1  On  the  Ethics  of  Resistance,  see  T.  H.  Green,  Philosophical 
Works,  ii.  p.  455,  Se4> 


284  THE    RIGHTS    OF    MINORITIES.  [iX. 

terrible  duty  that  occasionally  falls  on  the  shoulders 
of  a  minority,  to  bear  the  brand  of  the  criminal  now 
that  others  in  time  to  come  may  render  a  willing 
obedience  to  better  laws.  Society  is  apt  to  make 
mistakes,  to  number  the  patriot  or  the  saint  among 
transgressors,  to  crucify  a  prophet  between  two 
thieves.  But  the  individual  is  apt  to  make  mistakes 
also,  and  there  have  been  honest  martyrs  for  bad 
causes. 

If,  however,  democracies  prove  at  all  true  to  their 
ideal,  if  they  live  according  to  the  ethics  of  the  age 
of  discussion  and  not  according  to  those  of  the 
earlier  ages  of  force,  this  duty  of  resistance  should 
become  less  and  less  needed.  If  majorities, 
while  requiring  obedience  to  laws  constitutionally 
passed,  after  full  and  free  deliberation,  in  what  they 
sincerely  believe  to  be  the  interest  of  the  whole 
community,  sacredly  preserve  the  liberty  of  thought 
and  discussion  both  by  express  legal  securities  and 
by  a  general  sentiment  of  toleration,  it  is  the  duty 
of  a  minority,  while  yielding  a  loyal  obedience  to 
the  opinion  that  has  prevailed  for  the  time  (except 
in  those  rare  cases  to  which  I  have  referred),  if  not 
convinced  of  its  excellence,  to  continue  a  peaceable 
agitation  till  their  own  opinion  prevails.  If  we  are 
really  in  earnest  about  our  opinions,  it  is  a  duty  to 
endeavour  to  get  others  to  accept  them  by  means 
of  the  appeal  to  reason  ;  it  is  also  a  duty,  and  often 
a  very  hard  one,  to  give  them  up  candidly,  if  we  are 
genuinely  convinced  that  we  have  been  in  the 
wrong.  It  is  a  duty  to  assert  our  opinions,  wisely 


IX.]  THE    RIGHTS    OF    MINORITIES.  285 

of  course,  and  with  toleration  for  others,  even  if 
those  others  be  in  the  majority  ;  but  it  is  a  prior  duty 
to  use  all  the  care  we  can  to  make  sure  that  our 
opinions  are  right,  that  what  we  assert  eagerly  and 
persistently  is  really  worth  asserting.  It  is  utterly 
untrue  to  say  that  we  are  not  responsible  for  our 
opinions.  That  was  a  bad  argument  used  for  a  good 
purpose, — the  attack  upon  religious  persecution. 
Opinions  are  not  trivial  matters.  What  is  quietly 
thought  and  talked  about  now  will  affect  what  is 
done  very  soon.  The  opinions  of  a  few  in  one 
generation  may,  in  the  next  generation,  become  the 
sentiments  or  the  prejudices  of  the  many.  Ethical 
legislation  is  constantly  going  on  in  our  every-day 
conversation,  wherever  two  or  three  are  gathered 
together — to  discuss  the  conduct  of  their  neigh 
bours.  And  we  cannot  escape  our  responsibility 
for  our  share  in  this  ethical  legislation,  however 
insignificant  we  may  feel  ourselves  in  presence  of 
the  great  multitudes  of  our  fellow-mortals.  To 
these  great  multitudes  each  of  us  is  responsible  ; 
and  we  owe  it  to  them  to  oppose  them,  then  and 
then  only,  when  reason  and  conscience  urge  us  to 
do  so. 


Butler  &  Tanner,  The  Selwood  Printing  Works,  Frome.  and  London. 


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