The data of ethics

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THE LIBRARY

OF

THE UNIVERSITY

OF CALIFORNIA

LOS ANGELES

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GIFT OF

. E. F. Ducok

Digitized by the Internet Archive

in 2008 with funding from

Microsoft Corporation

http://www.archive.org/details/dataofethicsOOspen

THE

DATA OF ETHICS

BY

HERBERT SPENCER

DONOHUE BROTHERS

CHICAGO — NEW YORK

CONTENTS.

CHAPTER I.

PAGE

Conduct in General 1 1

CHAPTER II.

The Evolution of Conduct 17

CHAPTER III.

Good and Bad Conduct 32

CHAPTER IV.
Ways of Judging Conduct 62

CHAPTER V.
The Physical View 82

CHAPTER VI.

The Biological View 95

CHAPTER VH.

The Psychological View 127

CHAPTER VIII.
The Sociological View 162

CHAPTER IX.
Criticisms and Explanations 183

CHAPTER X.
The Relativity of Pains and Pleasures 210

CHAPTER XI.
Egoism versus Altruism •?•••« 223

1004813

vi CONTENTS.

CHAPTER XII.

PAGH

Altruism versus Egoism 241

CHAPTER XIII.
Trial and Compromise 261

CHAPTER XIV.
Conciliatiou 287

CHAPTER XV.
Absolute and Relative Ethics 306

CHAPTER XVI.
The Scope of Ethics , 33g

AUTHOR'S PREFACE.

A reference to the programme of the " System of
Synthetic Philosophy " will show that the chapters
herewith issued constitute the first division of the work
on the Principles of Morality, with which the System
ends. As the second and third volumes of the Prin-
ciples of Sociology are as yet unpublished, this install-
ment of the succeeding work appears out of its place.

I have been led thus to deviate from the order origi-
nally set down by the fear that persistence in conform-
ing to it might result in leaving the final work of the
series unexecuted. Hints, repeated of late years with
increasing frequency and distinctness, have shown me
that health may permanently fail, even if life does not
end, before I reach the last part of the task I have
marked out for myself. This last part of the task it
is to which I regard all the preceding parts as sub-
sidiary. Written as far back as 1842, my first essay,
consisting of letters on TJie Proper Sphere of G-overn-
ment, vaguely indicated what I conceived to be certain
general principles of right and wrong in political con-
duct, and from that time onward my ultimate purpose,
lying behind all proximate purposes, has been that of
finding for the principles of right and wrong, in con-
duct at large, a scientific basis. To leave this purpose

6 A UTIWR S PREFA CE.

unfulfilled, after making so extensive a preparation for
fulfilling it, would be a failure the probability of which
I do not like to contemplate, and I am anxious to pre-
clude it, if not wholly, still partially. Hence the step
I now take. Though this first division of the work
terminating the Synthetic Philosophy, cannot, of course,
contain the specific conclusions to be set forth in the
entire work, yet it implies them in such wise that*
definitely to formulate them requires nothing beyond
logical deduction.

I am the more anxious to indicate in outline, if I
cannot complete, this final work, because the establish-
ment of rules of right conduct on a scientific basis is
a pressing need. Now, that moral injunctions are los-
ing the authority given by their supposed sacred origin,
the secularization of morals is becoming imperative.
Few things can happen more disastrous than the decay
and death of a regulative system no longer fit, before
another and fitter regulative system has grown up to
replace it. Most of those who reject the current creed
appear to assume that the controlling agency furnished
by it may safely be thrown aside, and the vacancy left
unfilled by any other controlling agency. Meanwhile,
those who defend the current creed allege that in the
absence of the guidance it yields, no guidance can
exist: divine commandments they think the only pos-
sible guides. Thus, between these extreme opponents,
there is a certain community. The one holds that the
gap left by disappearance of the code of supernatural
ethics need not he filled by a code of natural ethics,
and the other holds thai it cannol be so filled. Both
contemplate a vacuum, which the one wishes and the
other fears. As the change which promises or threat-

AUTnORS PREFACE. 7

ens to bring about this state, desired or dreaded, is
rapidly progressing, those who believe that the vacuum
can be filled, and that it must be filled, are called on to
do something in pursuance of their belief.

To this more special reason I may add a more general
reason. Great mischief has been done by the repellent
aspect habitually given to moral rule by its expositors,
and immense benefits are to be anticipated from present-
ing moral rule under that attractive aspect which it has
when undistorted by superstition and asceticism. If a
father, sternly enforcing numerous commands, some
needful and some needless, adds to his severe control a
behavior wholly unsympathetic ; if his children have to
take their pleasures by stealth, or, when timidly looking
up from their play, ever meet a cold glance or more fre-
quently a frown, his government will inevitably be dis-
liked, if not hated, and the aim will be to evade it as
much as possible. Contrariwise, a father who, equally
firm in maintaining restraints needful for the well-being
of his children or the well-being of other persons, not
only avoids needless restraints, but, giving his sanction
to all legitimate gratifications and providing the means
for them, looks on at their gambols with an approving
smile, can scarcely fail to gain an influence which, no
less efficient for the time being, will also be permanent-
ly efficient. The controls of such two fathers symbolize
the controls of Morality as it is and Morality as it
should be.

Nor does mischief result only from this undue severity
of the ethical doctrine bequeathed us by the harsh past.
Further mischief results from the impracticability of its
ideal. In violent reaction against the utter selfishness
of life as carried on in barbarous societies, it has insisted

8 A UTUOR' S PHEFA CE.

on a life utterly unselfish. But just as the rampant
egoism of a brutal militancy was not to be remedied by
attempts at the absolute subjection of the ego in con-
vents and monasteries, so neither is the misconduct
of ordinary humanity, as now existing, to be remedied
by upholding a standard of abnegation beyond human
achievement. Rather the effect is to produce a despair-
ing abandonment of all attempts at a higher life. And
not only does an effort to achieve the impossible end in
this way, but it simultaneously discredits the possible.
By association with rules that cannot be obeyed, rules
that can be obeyed lose their authority.

Much adverse comment will, I doubt not, be passed
on the theory of right conduct which the following
pages shadow forth. Critics of a certain class, far from
rejoicing that ethical principles otherwise derived by
them, coincide with ethical principles scientifically de-
rived, are offended by the coincidence. Instead of rec-
ognizing essential likeness they enlarge on superficial
difference. Since the days of persecution, a curious
change has taken place in the behavior of so-called
orthodoxy toward so-called heterodoxy. The time was
when a heretic, forced by torture to recant, satisfied
authority by external conformity: apparent agreement
sufficed, however profound continued to be the real
reement! But now that the heretic can no longer
be coerced into professing the ordinary belief, his belief
is made to appear as much opposed to the ordinary as
ble. Docs he diverge from established theological
dogma? Then he shall be an atheist; however inad-
missible he considers the term. Does he think spirit,
ualistio interpretations of phenomena not valid? Then
he shall be classed as a materialist ; indignantly though

AUTHORS PREFACE. D

he repudiates the name. And in like manner, whal dif-
ferences exist between natural molality and super-
natural morality, it has become the policy to exaggerate
into fundamental antagonisms. In pursuance of this
policy, there will probably be singled out for reprobation
from this volume, doctrines which, taken by themselves,
may readily be made to seem utterly wrong. With a
view to clearness, I have treated separately sonic correl-
ative aspects of conduct, drawing conclusions either of
which becomes untrue if divorced from the other ; and
have thus given abundant opportunity for misrepresent
ation.

The relations of this work to works preceding it in
the series are such as to involve frequent reference.
Containing, as it does, the outcome of principles set
forth in each of them, I have found it impracticable to
dispense with re-statements of those principles. Fur-
ther, the presentation of them in their relations to dif-
ferent ethical theories, has made it needful, in every
case, briefly to remind the reader what they are, and
how they are derived. Hence an amount of repetition
which to some will probably appear tedious. I do not,
however, much regret this almost unavoidable result ;
for only by varied iteration can alien conceptions be
forced on reluctant minds.

June. 187 (J.

THE DATA OF ETHICS.

CHAPTER I.

CONDUCT IN GENERAL.

§ 1. The doctrine that correlatives imply one an-
other— that a father cannot be thought of without
thinking of a child, and that there can be no conscious-
ness of superior without a consciousness of inferior —
has for one of its common examples the necessary con-
nection between the conceptions of whole and part.
Beyond the primaiy truth that no idea of a whole can
be framed without a nascent idea of parts constituting
it, and that no idea of a part can be framed without a
nascent idea of some whole to which it belongs, there
is the secondary truth that there can be no correct idea
of a part without a correct idea of the correlative whole.
There are several ways in which inadequate knowledge
of the one involves inadequate knowledge of the other.

If the part is conceived without any reference to the
whole, it becomes itself a whole — an independent
entity ; and its relations to existence in general are
misapprehended. Further, the size of the part as com-
pared with the size of the whole must be misappre-
hended unless the whole is not only recognized as in-
cluding it, but is figured in its total extent. And

11

1 '2 TTTE T)A TA OF ETUICS.

again, the position which the part occupies in relation
to other parts cannot be rightly conceived unless there
is some conception of the whole in its distribution as
well as in its amount.

Still more when part and whole, instead of being
statically related only, are dynamically related, must
there be a general understanding1 of the whole before
the part can be understood. By a savage who has
never seen a vehicle, no idea can be formed of the use
and action of a wheel. To the unsymmetrically-
pierced disk of an eccentric, no place or purpose can be
ascribed by a rustic unacquainted with machinery.
Even a mechanician, if he has never looked into a
piano, will, if shown a damper, be unable to conceive
its function or relative value.

.Must of all, however, where the whole is organic,
does complete comprehension of a part imply extensive
comprehension of the whole. Suppose a being igno-
rant of the human body to find a detached arm. If not
misconceived by him as a supposed whole, instead of
being conceived as a part, still its relations to other
parts, and its structure, would be wholly inexplicable.
Admitting that the co-operation of its bones and mus-
cles tni'jlit be divined, yet no thought could be framed
of the Bhare taken by the arm in the actions of the un-
known whole it belonged to ; nor could any interpreta-
tion be put upon the nerves and vessels ramifying
through it, which severally refer to certain central
organs. A theory of the structure of the arm implies
a theory of the structure of the body at large.

And this truth holds not of material aggregates only,

but of immaterial aggregates — aggregated motions,

. thoughts, words. The moon's movements can-

CONDUCT IN GENERAL. 13

not be fully interpreted without taking into account
the movements of the Solar System at large. The
process of loading a gun is meaningless until tin' sub-
sequent actions performed with the gun an; known.
A fragment of a sentence, if not unintelligible, is
wrongly interpreted in the absence of the remainder.
Cut off its beginning and end, and the rest of a demon-
stration proves nothing. Evidence given by a plaintiff
often misleads until the evidence which the defendant
produces is joined with it.

§ 2. Conduct is a whole ; and, in a sense, it is an
organic whole — an aggregate of inter-dependent actions
performed by an organism. That division or aspect of
conduct with which Ethics deals, is a part of this
organic whole — a part having its components inextri-
cably bound up with the rest. As currently conceived,
stirring the fire, or reading a newspaper, or eating a
meal, are acts with which Morality has no concern.
Opening the window to air the room, putting on an
overcoat when the weather is cold, are thought of as
having no ethical significance. These, however, are
all portions of conduct. The behavior we call good
and the behavior we call bad, are included, along with
the behavior we call indifferent, under the conception
of behavior at largfe. The whole of which Ethics
forms a part, is the whole constituted by the theory
of conduct in general ; and this whole must be tinder-
stood before the part can be understood. Let us con-
sider this proposition more closely.

And first, how shall we define conduct? It is not
co-extensive with the aggregate of actions, though it is
nearly so. Such actions as those of an epileptic in a

14 THE DATA OF ETniCS.

fit are not included in our conception of conduct : the
conception excludes purposeless actions. And in recog_
nizing this exclusion, we simultaneously recognize all
that is included. The definition of conduct which
emerges is either acts adjusted to ends, or else the
adjustment of acts to ends, according as we contem-
plate the formed body of acts, or think of the form
alone. And conduct in its full acceptation must be
taken as comprehending all adjustments of acts to ends,
from the simplest to the most complex, whatever their
special natures and whether considered separately or in
their totality.

Conduct in general being thus distinguished from the
somewhat larger whole constituted by actions in gen-
eral, let us next ask what distinction is habitually made
between the conduct on which ethical judgments are
passed and the remainder of conduct. As already said,
a large part of ordinary conduct is indifferent. Shall I
walk to the waterfall to-day ? or shall I ramble along
the sea-shore ? Here the ends are ethically indifferent,
If I go to the waterfall, shall I go over the moor or take
the path through the wood? Here the means are
ethically indifferent. And from hour to hour most of
the tilings we do are not to be judged as either good or
bad in respect of either ends or means.

No less clear is it that the transition from indifferent
acts to acts which are good or bad is gradual. If a
friend who is with me has explored the sea-shore, but
ttot seen the waterfall, the choice of one or other
end is no longer ethically indifferent. And if, the
waterfall being fixed on as our goal, the way over the
moor is too long for his strength, while the shorter
way through the wood is not, the choice of means is

CONDUCT IN GEN Ell AL. 15

no longer ethically indifferent. Again, if a probable
result of making the one excursion rather than the
other, is that I shall not be back in time to keep an
appointment, or if taking the longer route entails this
risk while taking the shorter does not, the decision in
favor of one or other end or means acquires in another
way an ethical character ; and if the appointment is
one of some importance, or one of great importance, or
one of life-and-death importance, to self or others, the
ethical character becomes pronounced. These instances
will sufficiently suggest the truth that conduct with
which Morality is not concerned, passes into conduct
which is moral or immoral, by small degrees and in
countless ways.

But the conduct that has to be conceived scientific-
ally before we can scientifically conceive those modes
of conduct which are the objects of ethical judgments,
is a conduct immensely wider in range than that just
indicated. Complete comprehension of conduct is not
to be obtained by contemplating the conduct of human
beings only ; we have to regard this as a part of uni-
versal conduct — conduct as exhibited by all living
creatures. For evidently this comes within our defini-
tion— acts adjusted to ends. The conduct of the higher
animals as compared witli that of man, and the conduct
of the lower animals as compared with that of the
higher, mainly differ in this, that the adjustments of
acts to ends are relatively simple and relatively incom-
plete. And as in other cases, so in this case, we must
interpret the more developed by the less developed.
Just as, fully to understand the part of conduct which
Ethics deals with, we must study human conduct as a
whole ; so, fully to understand human conduct as a

16 THE DATA OF ETHICS.

whole, we must study it as a part of that larger whole
constituted by the conduct of animate beings in gen-
eral.

Nor is even this whole conceived with the needful
fullness, so long as we think only of the conduct at
present displayed around us. We have to include in
our conception the less-developed conduct out of which
this has arisen in course of time. We have to regard
the conduct now shown us by creatures of all orders,
as an outcome of the conduct which has brought life of
every kind to its present height. And this is tanta-
mount to saving that our preparatory step must be to
study the evolution of conduct.

THE EVOLUTION OF CONDUCT.

CHAPTER II.

THE EVOLUTION OF CONDUCT.

§ 3. We have become quite familiar with the idea of
an evolution of structures throughout the ascending
types of animals. To a considerable degree Ave have
become familiar with the thought that an evolution of
functions has gone on pari passu with the evolution
of structures. Now, advancing a step, we have to
frame a conception of the evolution of conduct, as
correlated with this evolution of structures and
functions.

These three subjects are to be definitely distinguished.
Obviously the facts comparative morphology sets forth,
form a whole which, though it cannot be treated in
general or in detail without taking into account tacts
belonging to comparative physiology, is essentially in-
dependent. No less clear is it that we may devote our
attention exclusively to that progressive differentiation
of functions, and combination of functions, which ac-
companies the development of structures — may say no
more about the characters and connections of organs
than is implied in describing their separate and joint
actions. And the subject of conduct lies outside the
subject of functions, if not as far as this lies outside the
subject of structures, still, far enough to make it sub-
stantially separate. For those functions which are
already variously compounded to achieve what wo
2

1 - TITE DATA OF ETHICS.

regard as single bodily acts, are endlessly recompounded
to achieve that coordination of bodily acts which is
known as conduct.

We arc concerned with functions in the true sense,
while we think of them as processes carried on within
the body; and, without exceeding the limits of physi-
ology, we may treat of their adjusted combinations,
BO long as these are regarded as parts of the vital
consensus. If we observe how the lungs aerate the
blood which the heart sends to them; how heart and
lungs together supply aerated blood to the stomach,
and so enable it to do its work ; how these co-operate
with sundry secreting and excreting glands to further
digestion and to remove waste matter ,• and how all of
them join to keep the brain in a fit condition for carry-
ing on those actions which indirectly conduce to main-
tenance of the life at large ; we are dealing with func-
tions. Even when considering how parts that act
directly on the environment — legs, arms, wings — per-
forin their duties, we are still concerned with functions
in that aspect of them constituting physiology, so long
as we restrict our attention to internal processes, and
to internal combinations of them.

But we enter on the subject of conduct when we

i to study such combinations among the actions
of sensory and motor organs as are externally niaiii-

d. Suppose that instead of observing those con-
traction- of muscles by which the optic axes are con-
verged and the foci of the eyes adjusted (which is a
portion of physiology), and that instead of observing

co-operation of other nerves, muscles and bones,
by which a hand is moved to a particular place and the
fingers closed (which is also a portion of physiology),

TUE EVOLUTION OF CONDUCT. 19

We observe a weapon being seized by a hand under
guidance of the eyes. We now pass from the thought
of combined internal functions to the thought of com-
bined external motions. Doubtless, if we could trace
the cerebral processes which accompany these, we
should find an inner physiological co-ordination cor-
responding with the outer co-ordination of actions.
But this admission is consistent with the assertion,
that when we ignore the internal combination and
attend only to the external combination, we pass from
a portion of physiology to a portion of conduct. For
though it may be objected that the external combina-
tion instanced is too simple to be rightly included
under the name conduct, yet a moment's thought shows
that it is joined with what we call conduct by insensible
gradations. Suppose the weapon seized is used to ward
off a blow. Suppose a counter-blow is given. Suppose
the aggressor runs and is chased. Suppose there comes
a struggle and a handing him over to the police.
Suppose there follow the many and varied acts consti-
tuting a prosecution. Obviously the initial adjustment
of an act to an end, inseparable from the rest, must be
included with them under the same general head ; and
obviously from this initial simple adjustment, having
intrinsically no moral character, we pass by degrees to
the most complex adjustments and to those on which
moral judgments are passed.

Hence, excluding all internal co-ordinations, our
subject here is the aggregate of all external co-ordina-
tions ; and this aggregate includes not only the sim-
plest as well as the most complex performed by human
beings, but also those performed by all inferior beings
considered as less or more evolved.

THE DATA OF ETIIICS.

v? 4. Already the question: What constitutes ad-
vance in the evolution of conduct, as we trace it up
from the lowest types of living creatures to the
highest ? has been answered hy implication. A few
examples will now bring the answer into conspicuous
relief.

We saw that conduct is distinguished from the
totality of actions by excluding purposeless actions ;
but during evolution this distinction arises by degrees.
In the very lowest creatures most of the movements
from moment to moment made, have not more recogniz-
able aims than have the struggles of an epileptic. An
infusorium swims randomly about, determined in its
course not by a perceived object to be pursued or
escaped, but, apparently, by varying stimuli in its
medium ; and its acts, unadjusted in any appreciable
way to ends, lead it now into contact with some nutri-
tive substance which it absorbs, and now into the neigh-
borhood of some creature by which it is swallowed and

ted. Lacking those developed senses and motor

;s which higher animals possess, ninety-nine in the
hundred of these minute animals, severally living for
but a few hours, disappear either by innutrition or by

iiction. The conduct is constituted of actions so
little adjusted to ends, that life continues only as long
ae the accidents of the environment are favorable'. But
when, among aquatic creatures, we observe one which,

rh still low in type, is much higher than the in-
fusorium— say a rotifer — we see how, along with larger
size, more developed structures, and greater power of
combining functions, there goes an advance in conduct.
We Bee how by its whirling cilia it sucks in as food
these small animals moving around ; how by its prehen-

THE EVOLUTION OF CONDUCT. 21

sile tail it fixes itself to some fit object; how by with-
drawing its outer organs and contracting its body, it
preserves itself from this or that injury from time to
time threatened; and how thus, by better adjusting its
own actions, it becomes less dependent on the actions
going on around, and so preserves itself for a longer
period.

A superior sub-kingdom, as the Mollusca, still better
exemplifies this contrast. When we compare a low
mollusc, such as a floating ascidian, with a high mol-
lusc, such as a cephalopod, we are again shown that
greater organic evolution is accompanied by more
evolved conduct. At the mercy of everymarine creat-
ure large enough to swallow it, and drifted about by
currents which may chance to keep it at sea, or may
chance to leave it fatally stranded, the ascidian dis-
plays but little adjustment of acts to ends in compari-
son with the cephalopod ; which, now crawling over the
beach, now exploring the rocky crevices, now swim-
ming through the open water, now darting after a fish,
now hiding itself from some larger animal in a cloud of
ink, and using its suckered arms at one time for anchor-
ing itself and at another for holding fast its prey; se-
lects and combines and proportions its movements from
minute to minute, so as to evade dangers which threaten,
while utilizing1 chances of food which offer : so showing
da varied activities which, in achieving special ends,
achieve the general end of securing continuance of the
activities.

Among vertebrate animals we similarly trace up,
along with advance in structures and functions, this
advance in conduct. A fish roaming about at hazard
in search of something to eat, able to detect it by smell

■2-2 TUE DATA OF ETHICS.

or sight only within short distances, and now and again
rushing away in alarm on the approach of a bigger fish,
makes adjustments of acts to ends that are relatively
few and simple in their kinds : and shows us, as a con-
sequence, how small is the average duration of life. So
few survive to maturity that, to make up for destruc-
tion of unhatched young and small fry and half-grown
individuals, a million ova have to be spawned by a cod-
fish that two may reach the spawning age. Conversely,
by a highly-evolved mammal, such as an elephant, those
general actions performed in common with the fish are
far better adjusted to their ends. By sight as well, prob-
ably, as by odor, it detects food at relatively great dis-
tances : and when, at intervals, there arises a need for
e, relatively great speed is attained. But the chief
difference arises from the addition of new sets of adjust-
ments. We Lav<- combined actions which facilitate nu-
trition— the breaking off of succulent and fruit-bearing
branches, the selecting of edible growths throughout a
comparatively wide reach; and. in case of danger, safety
can l»e achieved not by flight only, but, if necessary, by

: attack: bringing into combined use tusks,
trunk and ponderous feet. Further, we see various
subsidiary acta adjusted to subsidiary ends — now the
going into a river for coolness, and using the trunk as

■ if projecting water over the body; now the

employment of a bough for sweeping away flies from

the back ; now the making of signal sounds to alarm

the herd, and adapting the actions to such sounds when

Evidently, the effect of this more

highly-evolved conduct is to secure the balance of the

:iic actions throughout far longer periods.

And now, on studying the doings of the highest of

THE EVOL UTION OF COX I) Ui T. 23

mammals, mankind, we not only find that the adjust-
ments of acts to ends are both more numerous and bet-
ter than among lower mammals, but we find the same
thing on comparing the doings of higher races of men
with those of lower races. If we take any one of the
major ends achieved, we see greater completene-
achievement by civilized than by savage ; and we also
see an achievement of relatively numerous minor ends
subserving major ends. Is it in nutrition ? The food
is obtained more regularly in response to appetite ; it is
far higher in quality ; it is free from dirt ; it is greater
in variety ; it is better prepared. Is it in warmth ?
The characters of the fabrics and forms of the articles
used for clothing, and the adaptations of them to re-
quirements from day to day and hour to hour, are much
superior. Is it in dwellings ? Between the shelter of
boughs and grass which the lowest savage builds, and
the mansion of the civilized man, the contrast in aspect
is not more extreme than is the contrast in number and
efficiency of the adjustments of acts to ends betrayed in
their respective constructions. And when with the
ordinary activities of the savage we compare the ordi-
nary civilized activities — as the business of the trader,
which involves multiplied and complex transactions ex-
tending over long periods, or as professional avocations,
prepared for by elaborate studies, and daily carried on
in endlessly varied forms, or as political discussions and
agitations, directed now to the carrying of this measure
and now to the defeating of that — we see sets of adjust-
ments of acts to ends, not only immensely exceeding
those seen among lower races of men in variety and
intricacy, but sets to which lower races of men present
nothing analogous. And along with this greater elab-

•1 4 THE DATA OF ETHICS.

oration of life produced by the pursuit of more numer-
ous ends, there goes that increased duration of life
which constitutes the supreme end.

And here is suggested the need for supplementing
this conception of evolving conduct. For besides being
an improving adjustment of acts to ends, such as fur-
thers prolongation of life, it is such as furthers in-
creased amount of life. Reconsideration of the ex-
amples above given will show that length of life is not
by itself a measure of evolution of conduct; but that
quantity of life must be taken into account. An. oys-
ter, adapted by its structure to the diffused food con-
tained in the water it draws in, and shielded by its shell
from nearly all dangers, may live longer than a cuttle-
fish, which has such superior powers of dealing with
numerous contingencies; but then, the sum of vital
activities during any given interval is far less in (he
: than in the cuttle-fish. So a worm, ordinarily
sheltered from mosl enemies by the earth it burrows
through, which also supplies a sufficiency of its poor
food, may have greater longevity than many of its an-
nulose relatives, the insects ; but one of these, during
sxistence as larva and imago, may experience a
greater quantity of the changes which constitute life.
Nor is it otherwise when we compare the more evolved

with the less evolved among mankind. The difference

between ihe average Lengths of the lives of savage and
civilized La no true measure of the difference between
the totalities of their two Lives, considered as aggregates
of thought, feeling and action. Hence, estimating life

by multiplying its length into its breadth, we must say

lie augmentation of it. which accompanies evolu-
tion of conduct, results from increase of both factors.

THE EVOLUTION OF CONDUCT. 25

The more multiplied and varied adjustments of acts to
ends, by which the more developed creature from hour
to hour fulfills more numerous requirements, severally
add to the activities that are carried on abreast, and
Beyerally help to make greater tin' period through which
such simultaneous activities endure. Each further
evolution of conduct widens the aggregate of actions
while conducing to elongation of it.

§ 5. Turn we now to a further aspect of the phenom-
ena, separate from, but necessarily associated with, the
last. Thus far we have considered only those adjust-
ments of acts to ends which have for their final purpose
complete individual life. Now we have to consider
those adjustments which have to their final purpose the
life of the species.

Self-preservation in each generation has all along de-
pended on the preservation of offspring by preceding
generations. And in proportion as evolution of the con-
duet subserving individual life is high, implying high
organization, there must previously have been a highly-
evolved conduct subserving nurture of the young.
Throughout the ascending grades of the animal king-
dom, this second kind of conduct presents stages of ad-
vance like those which we have observed in the first.
Low down, where structures and functions are little de-
veloped, and the power of adjusting acts to ends but.
slight, there is no conduct, properly so named, furthering
salvation of the species. Race-maintaining conduct,
like self-maintaining conduct, arises gradually out iA'
that which cannot be called conduct : adjusted actions
are preceded by unadjusted ones.

Protozoa spontaneously divide and sub-divide, in con-

26 TUE DATA OF ETIIICS.

sequence of physical changes over which they have no
control ; or, at other times, after a period of quiescence,
break up into minute portions which severally grow into
new individuals. In neither case can conduct be al-
leged. Higher up, the process is that of ripening, at
intervals, germ-cells and sperm-cells, which, on occasion,
are sent forth into the surrounding water and left to
their fate : perhaps one in ten thousand surviving to
maturity. Here, again, we see only development and
dispersion going on apart from parental care. Types
above these, as fish which choose fit places in which to
deposit their ova, or as the higher crustaceans which
carry masses of ova about until they are hatched, ex-
hibit adjustments of acts to ends which we may properly
call conduct, though it is of the simplest kind. Where,
as ;unong certain fish, the male keeps guard over the
eggs, driving away intruders, there is an additional ad-
justment of acts to ends; and the applicability of the
name conduct is more decided.

Passing at once to creatures far superior, such as birds,
which, building nests and sitting on their eggs, feed
their broods for considerable periods, and give them aid
after they can fly ; or such as mammals which, suckling
their young for a time, continue afterward to bring them
fund or protect them while they feed, until they reach
at which they can provide for themselves; we are
shown how this conduct which furthers race-mainte-
nance evolves hand-in-hand with the conduct which
furthers self-maintenance. That better organization
which makes possible the last, makes possible the first
also.

Mankind exhibit a great progress of like nature.
Compared with brutes, the savage, higher in his self-

THE EVOLUTION OF CONDUCT. 27

maintaining conduct, is higher too in his race-maintain-
ing conduct. A larger number of the wants of off-
spring are provided for: and parental care, enduring
longer, extends to the disciplining of offspring in arts
and habits which fit them for their conditions of exist-
ence.' Conduct of this order, equally with conduct of
the first order, we see becoming evolved in a still
greater degree as we ascend from savage to civilized.
The adjustments of acts to ends in the rearing of chil-
dren become far more elaborate, alike in number of ends
met, variety of means used, and efficiency of their adap-
tations ; and the aid and oversight are continued
throughout a much greater part of early life.

In tracing up the evolution of conduct, so that we
may frame a true conception of conduct in general, we
have thus to recognize these two kinds as mutually de-
pendent. Speaking generally, neither can evolve with-
out evolution of the other ; and the highest evolutions
of the two must be reached simultaneously.

§ 6. To conclude, however, that on reaching a per-
fect adjustment of acts to ends subserving individual
life and the rearing of offspring, the evolution of con-
duct becomes complete, is to conclude erroneously. Or
rather, I should say, it is an error to suppose that either
of these kinds of conduct can assume its highest form,
without its highest form being assumed by a third kind
of conduct yet to be named.

The multitudinous creatures of all kinds which fill
the earth, cannot live wholly apart from one another,
but are more or less in presence of one another — are
interfered with by one another. In large measure the
adjustments of acts to ends which we have been con-

•N TllK DATA OF ETHICS.

sidering, are components of that "struggle for exist-
ence" carried on both between members of the same
species and between members of different species; and,
very generally, a successful adjustment made by one
creature involves an unsuccessful adjustment made by
another creature, either of the same kind or of a differ-
ent kind. That the carnivore may live herbivores must
die : and that Its young may be reared the young of
weaker creatures must be orphaned. Maintenance of
the hawk and its broods involves the deaths of many
small birds: and that small birds may multiply, their
progeny must be fed with innumerable sacrificed worms
ami larva1. Competition among member's of the same
species has allied, though less conspicuous, results.
The stronger of ten carries off by force the prey which
the vveaker h;is caught. Monopolizing certain hunting
grounds, the more ferocious drive others of their kind
into less favorable places. With plant-eating animals,
too, the like holds: the better food is secured by the
more vigorous individuals, while the less vigorous and
[i'i\, succumb either directly from innutrition or
indirectly from resulting inability to escape enemies.
That is to say. among creatures whose lives are carried
on antagonistically, each of the two kinds of conduct
delineated above, must remain imperfectly evolved.

in such few kinds of them as have little to fear

from enemies or competitors, as lions or tigers, there is
still inevitable failure in the adjustments of acts to ends
toward tin of Life. Death by starvation from

inability to catch prey, shows a falling short of conduct
from il a idi al.

This imperfectly-evolved conduct introduces us by
Lduct that is perfectly evolved. Con-

Til K E \ 'OL UTION OF COND UCT. 29

femplating these adjustments of acts to ends which miss
completeness because they cannot be made by one creat-
ure without other creatures being prevented from mak-
ing them, raises the thought of adjustments such that
each creature may make them without preventing them
from being made by other creatures. That the highest
form of conduct must be so distinguished, is an inevi-
table implication ; for, while the form of conduct is such
that adjustments of acts to ends by some necessitate
non-adjustments by others, there remains room for modi-
fications which bring cqnduct into a form avoiding this,
and so making the totality of life greater.

From the abstract let us pass to the concrete. Rec-
ognizing men as the beings whose conduct is most
evolved, let us ask under what conditions their conduct,
in all three aspects of its evolution, reaches its limit,
Clearly while the lives led are entirely predatory, as
those of savages, the adjustments of acts to ends fall
short of this highest form of conduct in every way.
Individual life, ill carried on from hour to hour, is pre-
maturely cut short ; the fostering of offspring often
fails, and is incomplete when it docs not fail ; and in
so far as the ends of self-maintenance and race-main-
tenance are met, they are met by destruction of other
beings of different kind or of Like kind. In social
groups formed by compounding and re-compounding
primitive hordes, conduct remains imperfectly evolved
in proportion as then continue antagonisms between
the groups and antagonisms between members of the
same group — two traits necessarily associated ; since
the nature which prompts international aggression
prompts aggression of individuals on one another.
Hence the limit of evolution can be reached by conduct

30 THE DATA OF ETHICS.

only in permanently peaceful societies. That perfect
adjustment of acts to ends in maintaining individual
life and rearing new individuals, which is effected by
each without hindering others from effecting like per-
fect adjustments, is, in its very definition, shown to con-
stitute a kind of conduct that can be approached only
as war decreases and dies out.

A gap in this outline must now be filled up. There
remains a further advance not yet even hinted. For
beyond so behaving that each achieves his ends without
preventing others from achieving their ends, the mem-
bers of a society may give mutual help in the achieve-
ment of ends. And if, either indirectly by industrial
co-operation, or directly by volunteered aid, fellow-citi-
zens can make easier for one another the adjustments
of acts to ends, then their conduct assumes a still higher
phase of evolution; since whatever facilitates the mak-
ing of adjustments by each, increases the totality of the
adjustments made, and serves to render the lives of all
more complete.

§ 7. The reader who recalls certain passages in First
Principles, in the Principles of Biology, and in the Prin-
ciples "J' Psychology, will perceive above a restatement,
in another form, of generalizations set forth in those
works. Especially will he be reminded of the proposi-
tion that Life is "the definite combination of hetero-
sis changes, both simultaneous and successive, in
correspondr-nce with external co-existences and se-
quences;" and still more of that abridged and less
specific formula, in which Life is said to be " the con-
tinuous adjustment of internal relations to external re-
lations."

THE EVOLUTION OF CONDUCT. 31

The presentation of the facts here made differs from
the presentations before made, mainly by ignoring the
inner part of the correspondence and attending ex-
clusively to that outer part constituted of visible actions.
But the two are in harmony ; and the reader who wishes
further to prepare himself for dealing with our present
topic from the evolution point of view, may advanta-
geously join to the foregoing more special aspect of the
phenomena, the more general aspects before delineated.

After this passing remark, I recur to the main prop-
osition set forth in these two chapters, which has, I
think, been fully justified. Guided by the truth that as
the conduct with which Ethics deals is part of conduct
at large, conduct at large must be generally understood
before this part can be specially understood ; and guided
by the further truth that to understand conduct at large
we must understand the evolution of conduct, we have
been led to see that Ethics has for its subject-matter
that form which universal conduct assumes during the
last stages of its evolution. We have also concluded
that these last stages in the evolution of conduct are
those displayed by the highest type of being, when he is
forced, by increase of numbers, to live more and more
in presence of his fellows. And there has followed the
corollary that conduct gains ethical sanction in propor-
tion as the activities, becoming less and less militant and
more and more industrial, are such as do not necessitate
mutual injury or hinderance, but consist with, and are
furthered by, co-operation and mutual aid.

These implications of the Evolution-Hypothesis, we
shall now see harmonize with the leading moral idea*
men have otherwise reached.

o2 T11E DATA OF ETHICS.

CHAPTER III.

GOOD AND BAD CONDUCT.

§ 8. By comparing its meanings in different connec-
tions and observing what they have in common, we learn
the essential meaning of a word ; and the essential
meaning of a word that is variously applied, may best
be learned by comparing with one another those applica-
tions of it which diverge most widely. Let us thus
ascertain what good and bad mean.

In which cases do we distinguish as good, a knife, a
gun, a house? And what trait leads us to speak of a
bad umbrella or a 1 Mil pair of boots? The characters
here predicted by the words good and bad, are not
intrinsic characters ; for apart from human wants, such
things have neither merits nor demerits. We call these
articles good or had according as they are well or ill
adapted to achieve prescribed ends. The good knife is
one which will cut; the good gun is one which carries
to' and time; the good house is one which duly yields
the shelter, comfort, and accommodation sought for.
Conversely, the badness alleged of the umbrella or the
pair of boots, refers 1" their failures in fulfilling the
of keeping <>IT the rain and comfortably protecting
the feci, with due regard to appearances.

is it when we pass from inanimate objects toinani-
actions. We call a day had in which storms pre-
vent us from satisfying certain of our desires. A good

GOOD AND BAV CONDUCT. 33

season is tho expression used when the weather has
favored the production of valuable crops.

If from lifeless things and actions we pass to living
ones, we similarly find that these words in their current
applications refer to efficient subservience. The goodness
or badness of a pointer or a hunter, of a sheep or an ox,
ignoring all other attributes of these creatures, refer in
the one case to the fitness of their actions for effecting
the ends men use them for, and in the other case to the
qualities of their flesh as adapting it to support human
life.

And those doings of men which, morally considered,
are indifferent, we class as good or bad according to
their success or failure. A good jump is a jump which,
remoter ends ignored, well achieves the immediate pur-
pose of a jump ; and a stroke at billiards is called good
when the movements are skillfully adjusted to the re-
quirements, Oppositely, the badness of a walk that is
shuffling and an utterance that is indistinct, is alleged
because of the relative non-adaptations of the acts to
the ends.

Thus recognizing the meanings of good and bad as
otherwise used, we shall understand better their mean-
ings as used in characterizing conduct under its ethical
aspects. Here, too, observation shows that we apply
them according as the adjustments of acts to ends are,
or are not, efficient. This truth is somewhat disguised.
The entanglement of social relations is such that men's
actions often simultaneously affect the welfares of self,
of offspring, and of fellow-citizens. Hence results eon-
fusion in judging of actions as good or bad ; since actions
well fitted to achieve ends of one order, may prevent
ends of the other orders from being achieved. Never-
3

34 TTLE DATA OF ETIIIGS.

tiheless, when we disentangle the three orders of end.-,
and consider each separately, it becomes clear that the
conduct which achieves each kind of end is regarded as
relatively good : and is regarded as relatively bad if it
fails to achieve it.

Take lirst the primary set of adjustments — those

subserving individual life. Apart from approval or

proval of his ulterior aims, a man who rights is

said to make a good defense, if his defense is well

adapted for self-preservation ; and, the judgments on

other aspects of his conduct remaining the same, he

brings down mi himself an unfavorable verdict, in so far

as his immediate acts are concerned, if these are futile.

The goodness ascribed to a man of business, as such, is

measured by the activity and ability with which he

buys and sells to advantage; and may co-exist with a

hard treatment of dependents which is reprobated.

Though, in repeatedly lending money to a friend who

sinks one loan after another, a man is doing that which,

considered in itself, is held praiseworthy; yet, if he does

it to the extent of bringing on his own ruin, he is held

blameworthy for a self-sacrifice carried too far. And

thus is it with the opinions we express from hour to

hour on those ads of people around which bear on their

i and personal welfare. "You should not have

■ : "" is I'n- reproof given to one who crosses the

amid a dangerous rush of vehicles. "You ought

banged your clothes ; ' is said to another who

aken cold after getting wet. "You were righl to

wrong to invest without

common criticisms. All such approving

and disapproving utterances make the tacit assertion

that, other things equal, conduct is right or wrong

GOOD AXD BAD CONDUCT.

according as its special acts, well or ill adjusted to
special ends, do or do not further the general end of
self-preservation.

These ethical judgments we pass on self-regarding
acts are ordinarily little emphasized; partly because
the promptings of the self-regarding desires, generally
strong enough, do not need moral enforcement, and
partly because the promptings of the other-regarding
es, less strong, and often overridden, do need
moral enforcement. Hence results a contrast. On
turning to that second class of adjustments of acta to
ends which subserve the rearing of offspring, we no
longer find any obscurity in the application of the
words good and bad to them, according as they are
efficient or inefficient. The expressions good nursing
and bad nursing, whether they refer to the supply of
food, the quantity and amount of clothing, or the due
ministration to infantine wants from hour to hour,
tacitly recognize as special ends which ought to he
fulfilled, the furthering of the vital functions, with a
view to the general end of continued life and growth.
A mother is called good who, ministering to all the
physical needs of her children, also adjusts her behavior
in ways conducive to their mental health ; and a bad
father is one who either does not provide the necessa-
ries of life for his family or otherwise acts in a manner
injurious to their bodies or minds. Similarly of the
education given to them, or provided for them. Good-
ness or badness is affirmed of it (often with little consist-
ency, however) according as its methods are so adapted
to physical andpsychical requirements, as to further the
children's lives for the time being, while preparing them
for carrying on complete and prolonged adult life.

:;•; the dAl.i or ethics.

Most emphatic, however, are the applications of the
words good and bad to conduct throughout that third
division of it comprising the deeds by which men affect
one another. In maintaining their own lives and fos-
tering their offspring, men's adjustments of acts to ends
are so apt to hinder the kindred adjustments of other
men, that insistence on the needful limitations has to
be perpetual; and the mischiefs caused by men's inter-
ferences with one another's life-subserving actions are
reat that the interdicts have to be peremptory.
Hence, the fact that the words good and bad have come
to be specially associated with acts which further the
complete living of others and acts which obstruct their
complete living. Goodness, standing by itself, sug-
. above all other things, the conduct of one who
aids the sick in re-acquiring normal vitality, assists the
unfortunate to recover the means of maintaining them-
selves, defends those; who are threatened with harm in
person, property,or reputation, and aids whatever pi an 1-
bo improve the living of all his fellows. Contrari-
. badness brings to mind, as its leading correlative,
On- conduct of one who, in carrying on his own life,
damages the lives of others by injuring their bodies,
oying their possessions, defrauding them, calum-
niating them.

Always, then, ads are called good or bad accord in g
as they are well or ill adjusted to ends; and whatever
inconsistency there is in our uses of the words arises
from inconsistency of the ends. Here, however, the
of conduct in general, and of the evolution of
conduct, have prepared us to harmonize these interpre-
tations. The foregoing exposition shows that the con-
duct to which we apply the name good, is the relatively

GOOD AND BAD CONDUCT. 37

more evolved conduct; and that bad is the name we
apply to conduct which is relatively less evolved. We
saw that evolution, tending ever toward self-preserva-
tion, reaches its limit when individual life is the great-
est, both in length and breadth; and now we see that,
leaving other ends aside, we regard as good the conduct
furthering self-preservation, and as bad the conduct
tending to self-destruction. It was shown that along
with increasing power of maintaining individual life,
which evolution brings, there goes increasing power of
perpetuating the species by fostering progeny, and that
in this direction evolution reaches its limit when the
needful number of young, preserved to maturity, are
then lit for a life that is complete in fullness and dura-
tion ; and here it turns out that parental conduct is called
good or bad as it approaches or falls short of this ideal
result. Lastly, we inferred that establishment of an
associated state, both makes possible and requires a form
of conduct such that life may be completed in each and
in his offspring, not only without preventing comple-
tion of it in others, but with furtherance of it in others ;
and we have found above, that this is the form of con-
duct most emphatically termed good. Moreover, just
as we there saw that evolution becomes the highest pos-
sible when the conduct simultaneously achieves the
greatest totality of life in self, in offspring, and in fel-
low men ; so here we see that the conduct called o-ood
rises to the conduct conceived as best, when it fulfills
all three classes of ends at the same time.

§ 9. Is there any postulate involved in these judg-
ments on conduct ? Is there any assumption made in
calling good the acts conducive to life, in self or others,

38 THE J) A TA OF ETHICS.

and bad those which directly or indirectly tend toward
death, special or general? Yes; an assumption of
extreme significance has been made— -an assumption
underlying all moral estimates.

The question to be definitely raised and answered be-
fore entering on any ethical discussion, is the question
of late much agitated: Is life worth living? Shall we
take the pessimist view? or shall we take the optimist
view? or shall we, after weighing pessimistic and op-
timistic arguments, conclude that the balance is in favor
of a qualified optimism ?

On the answer to this question depends entirely every
decision concerning the goodness or badness of conduct.
By those who think life is not a benefit but a misfortune,
conduet which prolongs it is to be blamed rather than
praised ; the ending of an undesirable existence being
the thing to be wished, that which causes the ending of
it must be applauded ; while actions furthering its con-
tinuance, cither in self or others, must be reprobated.
Those who, on the other hand, take an optimistic view,
or who. if not pure optimists, yet hold that in life the
good exceeds the evil, are committed to opposite esti-
: and must regard as conduct to be approved that
which fosters hie in self and others, and as conduct
to be disapproved that which injures or endangers life
if or othi

The ultimate question therefore is: lias evolution
been ;i mistake ; and especially that evolution which
improves the- adjustment of acts to ends in ascending
ini/.aiion? If it is held that there had
I not have been an)- animate existence at all, and
that the sooner it comes to an end the better; then one
bet of conclusions with respect to conduct emerges. If,

GOOD AND BAD CONDUCT. 30

contrariwise, it is held that there is a balance in favor of
animate existence, and if, still further, it is held that
in the future this balance may be increased ; then the
opposite set of conclusions emerges. Even should it be
alleged that the worth of life is not to be judged by its
intrinsic character, but rather by its extrinsic sequences
— by certain results to be anticipated when life has
pissed — the ultimate issue reappears in a new shape.
For though the accompanying creed may negative a de-
Liberate shortening of life that is miserable, it cannot
justify a gratuitous lengthening of such life. Legisla-
tion conducive to increased longevity would, on the pes-
simistic view, remain blameable, while it would be praise-
worthy on the optimistic view.

But now, have these irreconcilable opinions anything
in common? Men being divisible into two schools dif-
fering on this ultimate question, the inquiry arises — Is
there anything which their radically opposed views alike
take for granted? In the optimistic proposition, tacitly
made when using the words good and bad after the or-
dinary manner ; and in the pessimistic proposition overtly
made, which implies that the words good and bad should
be used in the reverse senses ; does examination disclose
any joint proposition — any proposition which, contained
in both of them, may be held more certain than either —
any universally asserted proposition ?

§ 10. Yes, there is one postulate in which pessimists
and optimists agree. Both their arguments assume it
to be self-evident that life is good or bad, according as
it does, or does not, bring a surplus of agreeable feeling.
The pessimist says he condemns life because it results
in more pain than pleasure. The optimist defends life

40 THE DATA OF ETHICS.

in the belief that it brings more pleasure than pain.
Bach makes the kind of sentiency which accompanies
life tlif test. They agree that the justification for life
as a state of being, turns on tins issue — whether the
average consciousness rises above indifference-point into
pleasurable feeling or falls below it into painful feeling.
Tin- implication common to their antagonist views is,
that conduct should conduce to preservation of the in-
dividual, of the family, and of the society, only suppos-
ing that life brings more happiness than misery.

(banging the venue cannot alter the verdict. If
cither the pessimist, while saying that the pains of life
predominate, or the optimist, while saying that the
pleasures predominate, urges that the pains borne here
are to be compensated by pleasures received hereafter;
and that bo life, whether or not justified in its immediate
results, is justified in its ultimate results; the implica-
tion remains the same. The decision is still reached by
balancing pleasures against pains. Animate existence
would be judged by both a curse, if to a surplus of
misery borne here were added a surplus of misery
to be borne hereafter. And for either to regard
animate existence as a blessing, if here its pains were
held to exceed its pleasures, he must hold that hereafter
its pleasures will exceed its pains. Thus there is no
escape from the admission that in calling good the con-
duct, which subserves life, and bad the conduct which
binders or destroys it, and in so implying that life is a
ing and not a curse, we are inevitably asserting
that conduct is good or bad according as its total effects
are pleasurable or painful.

One theory only is imaginable in pursuance of which
other interpretations of good and bad can be given.

GOOD AND BAD CONDUCT. 41

This theory is that men were created with the intention
that they should besources of misery to themselves;
and that they are bound to continue living- that their
creator may have the satisfaction of contemplating their
misery. Though this is noi a theory avowedly enter-
tained by many — though it- is not formulated by any in
this distinct way ; yet not a few do accept it under a
disguised form. Inferior creeds are pervaded by the
belief that the sight of suffering is pleasing to the gods.
Derived from bloodthirsty ancestors, such gods are
naturally conceived as gratified by the infliction of pain:
when living they delighted in torturing other beings;
and witnessing torture is supposed still to give them de-
light. The implied conceptions long survive. It needs
but to name Indian fakirs who hang on hooks, and
Eastern dervishes who gash themselves, to show that in
societies considerably advanced are still to be found
many who think that submission to anguish brings di-
vine favor. And without enlarging on facts and pen-
ances, it will be clear that there has existed, and still
exists, among Christian peoples, the belief that the Deity
whom Jephtliah thought to propitiate by sacrificing his
daughter, may be propitiated by self-inflicted pains.
Further, the conception accompanying this, that acts
pleasing to self are offensive to God, has survived along
with it, and still widely prevails ; if not in formulated
dogmas, yet in beliefs that are manifestly operative.

Doubtless, in modern days such beliefs have assumed
qualified forms. The satisfactions which ferocious
gods were supposed to feel in contemplating tortures,
has been, in large measure, transformed into the satis-
faction felt by a deity in contemplating that self-
infliction of pain which is held to further eventual

42 THE DATA OF ETIIICS.

happiness. But clearly those who entertain this modi-
fied view are excluded from the class whose position
we are here considering. Restricting ourselves to this
class — supposing that from the savage who immolates
victims to a cannibal god, there are descendants among
the civilized, who hold that mankind were made for
Buffering, and that it is their duty to continue living
in misery for the delight of their maker, we can only rec-
ognize the fact that devil-worshipers are not yet extinct.

Omitting people of this class, if there are any, as
beyond or beneath argument, we find that all others
avowedly or tacitly hold that the final justification for
maintaining life can only be the reception from it of
a surplus of pleasurable feeling over painful feeling ;
and that goodness or badness can be ascribed to acts
which subserve life or hinder life only on this sup-
position.

And here we are brought round to those primary

meanings of the words good and bad, which we passed

over when considering their secondary meanings. For

on remembering that we call good and bad the things

which immediately produce agreeable and disagreeable

lions, and also tin; sensations themselves — a good

wine, ;( good appetite, a bad smell, ;i bad headache — we

Bee that by referring directly to pleasures and pains,

meanings harmonize with those which indirectly

icfer to pleasures and pains. If Ave call good the

enjoyable slate itself, as a good laugh — if we call good

proximate cause of an enjoyable state, as good

— if we call good any agent which conduces

Immediately or remotely to an enjoyable state, as a

good shop, a good teacher — if we call good considered

intrinsically, each act so adjusted to its end as to

GOOD AND BAD CONDUCT. 43

further self-preservation and that surplus of enjo}'ment
which makes self-preservation desirable — if we call
good every kind of conduct which aids the lives of
others, and do this under the belief that life brings
more happiness than misery; then it becomes unde-
niable that, taking into account immediate and remote
effects on all persons, the good is universally the pleas-
urable.

§ 11. Sundry influences — moral, theological, and
political — conspire to make people disguise from them-
selves this truth. As in narrower cases so in this
widest ease, they become so preoccupied with the
means by which an end is achieved, as eventually to
mistake it for the end. Just as money, which is the
means of satisfying wants, comes to be regarded by a
miser as the sole thing to be worked for, leaving the
wants unsatisfied ; so the conduct men have found
preferable because most conducive to happiness has
come to be thought of as intrinsically preferable, not
only to be made a proximate end (which it should
be), but to be made an ultimate end, to the exclusion
of the true ultimate end. And yet cross-examination
quickly compels every one to confess the true ultimate
end. Just as the miser, asked to justify himself, is
obliged to allege the power of money to purchase desir-
able things, as his reason for prizing it; so the moralist
who thinks this conduct intrinsically good and that
intrinsically bad, if pushed home, has no choice but to
fall back on their pleasure-giving and pain-giving effects.
To prove this it needs but to observe how impossible it
would be to think of them as we do, if their effects were
reversed.

44 THE DATA OF ETHICS.

Suppose that gashes and bruises caused agreeable
sensations, and brought in their train increased power of
doing work and receiving enjoyment ; should we regard
assaull in the same manner as at present ? Or suppose
that self-mutilation, say by cutting off a hand, was
both intrinsically pleasant and furthered performance
of the processes by which personal welfare and the
welfare of dependents is achieved; should we hold as
now, that deliberate injury to one's own body is to be
reprobated? Or again, suppose that picking a man's
jjocket excited in him joyful emotions, by brightening
his prospects ; would theft bo counted among crimes, as
in existing law-books and moral codes? In these
extreme eases, no one can deny that what we call the
badness of actions is ascribed to them solely for the

• i thai they entail pain, immediate or remote, and
would not 1)-' so ascribed did they entail pleasure.

It" we examine our conceptions on their obverse side,
fchisgeneral fact forces itself on our attention with equal
distinctness, [magine that ministering to a sick per-
son always increased the pains of illness. Imagine that
an orphan's relatives who took charge of it, thereby
garily brought miseries upon it. Imagine that
liquidating another man's pecuniary claims on you re-
dounded to liis disadvantage. Imagine that crediting a

with uoble behavior hindered liis social welfare and
quent gratification. What should we say to these
acts which now fall into the class we call praiseworthy?
Should we not contrariwise class them as blameworthy?
rig, then, as our tests, these most pronounced forms
of good and had conduct, we find it unquestionable that
our ideas of their goodness and badness really originate

: our consciousness of the certainty or probability

GOOD AND BAD CONDUCT. 45

that they will produce pleasures or pains somewhere.
And this truth is brought out with equal clearness by
examining the standards of different moral schools; for
analysis shows that every one of them derives its author-
ity from this ultimate standard. Ethical systems are
roughly distinguishable according as they take for their
cardinal ideas (1) the character of the agent; (2) the
nature of his motive ; (3) the quality of his deeds ; and
(4) the results. Each of these may be characterized as
good or bad , and those who do not estimate a mode of
life by its effects on happiness, estimate it by the implied
goodness or badness in the agent, in his motive, or in
his deeds. We have perfection in the agent set up as a
test by which conduct is to be judged. Apart from the
agent we have his feeling considered as moral. And
apart from the feeling we have his action considered as
virtuous.

Thoufifh the distinctions thus indicated have so little
definiteness that the words marking them are used in-
terchangeably, yet there correspond to them doctrines
partially unlike one another ; which we may he recon-
veniently examine separately, with the view of showing
that all their tests of goodness are derivative.

§ 12. It is strange that a notion so abstract as that of
perfection, or a certain ideal completeness of nature,
should ever have been thought one from which a sys-
tem of guidance can be evolved ; as it was in a general
way by Plato and more distinctly by Jonathan Edwardee.
Perfection is synonymous with goodness in the highest
degree; and, hence, to define good conduct in terms of
perfection, is indirectly to define good conduct in terms
of itself, Naturally, therefore, it happens that tho

46 THE DATA OF ETHICS.

notion of perfection like the notion of goodness can be
framed only in relation to ends.

We allege imperfection of any inanimate thing, as a
tool, if it lacks some part needful for effectual action, or
if some part is so shaped as not to fulfill its purpose in
the best manner. Perfection is alleged of a watch if it
keeps exact time, however plain its case; and imperfec-
tion is alleged of it because of inaccurate time-keeping,
however beautifully it is ornamented. Though we call
things imperfect if we detect in them any injuries or
flaws, even when these do not detract from efficiency ;
yet we do this because they imply inferior workman-
ship, or that wear and tear, with which inefficiency
is commonly joined in experience : absence of minor
imperfections being habitually associated with absence
of major imperfections.

As a j >plied to living things, the word perfection has

ime meaning. The idea of perfect shape in a race-
horse is derived by generalization from those observed
traits of race-horses which have usually gone along with
attainment of the highest speed ; and the idea of per-
institution in a race-horse similarly refers to the
endurance which enables him to continue that speed for

ingest time. With men, physically considered, it

same : we are able to furnish no other test of per-

fection than that of complete power in all the organs to

fulfill their respective functions. That our conception

of perfect balance among the internal parts, and of per-

proportion among the external parts, originates

■ lade clear by observing that imperfection of

any \ . heart, or liver, is ascribed for no

other reason than inability to meet in full the demands

which the activities of the organism make on it ; and

GOOD AND BAD COXDUCT. 47

on observing that the conception of insufficient size, or

i great size, in a limb, is derived from accumulated

iences respecting that ratio among the limbs which

furthers in the highest degree the performance of all

needful actions.

And of perfection in mental nature we have no other
measure. If imperfection of memory, of judgment, of
temper, is alleged, it is alleged because of inadequacy to
the requirements of life ; and to imagine a perfect bal-
ance of the intellectual powers and of the emotions, is
to imagine that proportion among them which ensures
an entire discharge of each and every obligation as the
occasion calls for it.

So that the perfection of man considered as an agent,
means the being constituted for effecting complete
adjustment of acts to ends of every kind. And since,
os shown above, the complete adjustment of acts to ends
is that which both secures and constitutes the life that is
most evolved, alike in breadth and length ; while, as
also shown, the justification for whatever increases life
is the reception fromlife of more happiness than un-
it follows that conduciveness to happiness is the ulti-
mate test of perfection in a man's nature. To be fully
convinced of this it needs but to observe how the propo-
sition looks when inverted. It needs but to suppose
that every approach toward perfection involved greater
misery to self, or others, or both, to show by opposition
that approach to perfection really means approach to
that which secures greater happini

§ 13. Pass we now from the view of those who make
excellence of being the standard to the view of those
who make virtuousness of action the standard. 1 do not

48 'I (IE DATA OF ET3IC8.

refer to moralists who, having decided empirically
or rationally, inductively or deductively, that acts of cer-
tain kinds have the character we call virtuous, argue that
such acts are to be performed without regard to proxi-
mate consequences; these have ample justification. But
1 refer to moralists who suppose themselves to havecon-
ceptions of virtue as an end, underived from any other
end, who think that the idea of virtue is not resolvable
into simpler ideas.

This is the doctrine which appears to have been enter-
tained by Aristotle. I say, appears to have been, because
itements are far from consistent with one another.
Recognizing happiness as the supreme end of human
endeavor, it would at first sight seem that he cannot be
taken as typical of those who make virtue the supreme
(Mid. Yet he puts himself in this category by seeking
t<> define happiness in terms of virtue, instead of defin-
ing virtue in terms of happiness. The imperfect separa-
tion of words from things, which characterizes Greek
speculation in general, seems to have been the cause of
this. In primitive thought the name and the object
named are associated in such wise that the one is re-
garded ;is a part of the other — so muchso, that knowing
's name is considered by him as having some of
his being, and a consequent power to work evil on him.
This belief in a real connection between word and thing,
continuing through lower stages of progress, and long
surviving in the tacit assumption that Hie meanings of
words ;tre intrinsic, pervades thedialogues of I'lato, and
is traceable even in Aristotle. For otherwise it is not
vliy ho should have so incompletely dis-

iated the abstract idea of happiness from particular
forms of happine ,

GOOD AND BAD CONDUCT. 40

Naturally where the divorcing of words as symbols,
from things us symbolized, is imperfect, there must be
difficulty in giving to abstract words a sufficiently
abstract meaning. If in the first stages of language
the concrete name cannot be separated in thought from
the concrete object it belongs to, it is inferable that
in the course of forming successively higher grades of
abstract names, there will have to be resisted the ten-
dency to interpret each more abstract name in terms of
some one class of the less abstract names it covers.
Hence, I think, the fact that Aristotle supposes happi-
ness to be associated with some one order of human
activities, rather than with all orders of human activi-
ties. Instead of including in it the pleasurable feelings
accompanying actions that constitute mere living, which
actions he says man has in common with vegetables;
and instead of making it include the mental states which
the life of external perception yields, which he says man
has in common with animals at large, he excludes these
from his idea of happiness, and includes in it only the
modes of consciousness accompanying rational life.
Asserting that the proper work of man " consists in the
active exercise of the mental capacities conformably to
reason," he concludes that " the supreme good of man
will consist in performing this work with excellence or
virtue: herein he will obtain happiness." And he finds
confirmation for his view in its correspondence with
views previously enunciated : saying, " our notion nearly
agrees with theirs who place happiness in virtue ; for we
say that it consists in the action of virtue ; that is, not
merely in the possession, but in the use."

Now the implied belief that virtue can be defined
otherwise than in terms of happiness (for else the propo*
4

50 THE DATA OF ETHICS.

sit ion is that happiness is to be obtained by actions con-
ducive to happiness) is allied to the Platonic belief that
there is an ideal or absolute good, which gives to par-
ticular and relative goods their property of goodness ;
and an argument analogous to that which Aristotle uses
against Plato's conception of good, may be used against
his own conception of virtue. As with good so with
virtue— it is not singular but plural : in Aristotle's own
classification, virtue, when treated of at large, is trans-
formed into virtues. Those which he calls virtues must
railed in consequence of some common character
that is cither intrinsic or extrinsic. We may class things
together cither because they are made alike by all hav-
ing in themselves some peculiarity, as we do vertebrate
animals because they all have vertebral columns; or we
may class them together because of some community in
their outer relations, as when we group saws, knives,
mallets, harrows, under the head of tools. Are the vir-

classed as such because of some intrinsic commu-
nity of nature ? Then there must be identifiable a
ctmiinon trait in all the cardinal virtues which Aristotle
specifies, "Courage, Temperance, Liberality, Magna-
nimity. Magnificence, Meekness, Amiability or Friendli-

. Truthfulness, Justice." What now is the trait
I in common by Magnificence and Meekness?
and if any such common trait can be disentangled, is it
that which also constitutes the essential trait in Truth-
fulness'/ The- answer must be, No. The virtues, then,
not being such because of an intrinsic com-

munity of character, must be classed as such because of
something extrinsic ; and this something can be nothing

than the happiness which Aristotle says consists in
the practice of them. They are united by their common

GOOD AND BAD COKDUCT. 51

relation to this result; while they are not united by
their inner natures.

Perhaps still more clearly ma}- the inference be drawn
thus : If virtue is primordial and independent, no reason
can be given why there should be any correspondence
between virtuous conduct and conduct that is pleasure-
giving in its total effects on self, or others, or both;
and if there is not a necessary correspondence, it is con-
ceivable that the conduct classed as virtuous should lie
pain-giving in its total effects. That we may see the
consequence of so conceiving it, let us take the two vir-
tues considered as typically such in ancient times and in
modern times — courage and chastity. By the hypothe-
sis, then, courage, displayed alike in self-defence and in
defence of country, is to be conceived as not only entail-
ing pains incidentally, but as being necessarily a cause
of misery to the individual and to the state ; while, by
implication, the absence of it redounds to personal and
general well-being. Similarly, by the hypothesis, we
have to conceive that irregular sexual relations are
directly and indirectly beneficial — that adultery is con-
ducive to domestic harmony and the careful rearing of
children ; while marital relations, in proportion as they
are persistent, generate discord between husband and
wife and entail on their offspring suffering, disease and
death. Unless it is asserted that courage and chastity
could still be thought of as virtues, though thus pro-
ductive of misery, it must be admitted that the concep-
tion of virtue cannot be separated from the conception
of happiness-producing conduct ; and that as this holds
of all the virtues, however otherwise unlike, it is from
their conduciveness to happiness that they come to bo
classed as virtues.

52 THE DATA OF ETHICS.

£ 14. When from those ethical estimates which take
perfection of nature, or virtuousness of action, as tests,
we pass to those which take for test rectitude of motive,
Ave approach the intuitional theory of morals; and we
may conveniently deal with such estimates by a criti-
cism mi this theory.

By the intuitional theory I here mean, not that which
recognizes as produced by the inherited effects of con-
tinued experiences, the feelings of liking and aversion
we have to acts of certain kinds ; but I mean the the-
ory which regards such feelings as divinely given, and
as independent of results experienced by self or ances-
tors. - There is, therefore," says Hutcheson, "as each
one by close attention and reflection may convince
himself, a natural and immediate determination to ap-
prove certain affections and actions consequent upon
them;" and since, in common with others of his time,
he believes in the special creation of man, and all other
beings, this "natural sense of immediate excellence"
he c< insiders as a supernaturally derived guide. Though
vs that the feelings and acts thus intuitively
recognized as good, "all agree in one general charac-
ter, of tending to the happiness of others;" yet he is
obliged to conceive this as a pre-ordained correspond-
ence. Nevertheless, it ii lay be shown that conducive-
to happiness, here represented as an incidental
trail of the acts which receive these innate, moral ap-
provals, is really the test by which these approvals are.
•iize<l as moral. The inflationists place confidence
in these verdicts of conscience simpl}' because they
if not distinctly, perceive them to bo con-
sonant with the disclosures of that ultimate test.
Observe the proof.

GOOD AND BAD CONDUCT.

By the hypothesis, the wrongness of murder is
known by a moral intuition which the human mind
was originally constituted to }'ield ; and the hypothesis
therefore, negatives the admission that this sense of
its wrongness arises, immediately or remotely, from
the consciousness that murder involves deduction from
happiness, directly and indirectly. But if you ask an
adherent of this doctrine to contrast his intuition with
that of the Fijian, who, considering murder an honor-
able actioTi, is restless until he has distinguished him-
self by killing some one ; and if you inquire of him in
what way the civilized intuition is to be justified in
opposition to the intuition of the savage, no course is
open save that of showing how conformity to the one
conduces to well-being, while conformity to the other
entails suffering, individual and general. When asked
why the moral sense which tells him that it is wrong
to take another man's goods, should be obeyed rather
than the moral sense of a Turcoman, who proves how
meritorious he considers theft to be by making pil-
grimages to the tombs of noted robbers to make offer-
ings, the intuitionist can do nothing but urge that,
certainly under conditions like ours, if not also under
conditions like those of the Turcomans, disregard of
men's claims to their property not only inflicts imme-
diate misery, but involves a social state inconsistent
with happiness. Or if, again, there is required from
him a justiiieation for his feeling of repugnance to
lying, in contrast with the feeling of an Egyptian, who
prides himself on skill in lying (even thinking it praise-
worthy to deceive without any further end than that
of practicing deception), he can do no more than
point to the social prosperity furthered by entire trust

54 THE LATA OF ETBICS.

between man and man, and the social disorganization that
follows universal untruthfulness, consequences that are
necessarily conducive to agreeable feelings and disa-
greeable feelings respectively.

The unavoidable conclusion is, then, that the intui-
tionist does not, and cannot, ignore the ultimate deri-
vations of right and wrong from pleasure and pain.
However much he may be guided, and rightly guided,
by the decisions of conscience respecting the charac-
ters of acts, he has come to have confidence in these
decisions because he perceives, vaguely but positively,
that conformity to them furthers the welfare of him-
self and others, and that disregard of them entails in
the long run suffering on all. Require him to name
any moral-sense judgment by which he knows as right
some kind of act that will bring a surplus of pain,
taking into account the totals in this life and in any
assumed other life, and you find him unable to name
one; a fact proving that underneath all these intuitions
icting the goodness or badness of acts there lies
the fundamental assumption that acts are good or bad
according as their aggregate effects increase men's
happiness or increase their misery.

; 15. It is curious to see how the devil-worship of
the savage, surviving in various disguises among the
civilized, and Leaving as one of its products that
icism which in ninny forms and degrees still pre-
vails widely, is to be found influencing in marked
nun who have apparently emancipated them-
i only from primitive superstitions but from
more developed superstitions. Views of life and con-
duct which originated with those who propitiated

GOOT) AXD BAD CONDUCT.

deified ancestors by self-tortures enter even still into the
ethical theories of many persons -who have years since
cast away the theology of the past, and suppose them-
selves to be no longer influenced by it.

In the writings of one who rejects dogmatic Chris-
tianity, together with the Hebrew cult which preceded
it, a career of conquest costing tens of thousands of
lives is narrated with a sympathy comparable to that
rejoicing which the Hebrew traditions show us over
destruction of enemies in the name of God. You may
find, too, a delight in contemplating the exercise of
despotic power, joined with insistence on the salutari
ness of a state in which the wills of slaves and citizens
are humbly subject to the wills of masters and rulers —
a sentiment also reminding us of that ancient Oriental
life which biblical narratives portray. Along with tins
worship of the strong man — along with this justifica-
tion of whatever force may be needed for carrying out
his ambition — along with this yearning for a form of
society in which supremacy of the few is unrestrained
and the virtue of the many consists in obedience to
them, we not unnaturally find repudiation of the
ethical theory which takes, in some shape or other, the
greatest happiness as the end of conduct : we not un-
naturally find this utilitarian philosophy designated by
the contemptuous title of " pig-philosophy." And then,
serving to show what comprehension there has been of
the philosophy so nicknamed, we are told that not hap-
piness but blessedness must be the end.

Obviously, the implication is that blessedness is not
a kind of happiness ; and this implication at once
suggests the question — What mode of feeling is it? If
it is a state of consciousness at all, it is necessarily one

56 THE DATA OF ETHICS.

of three slates — painful, indifferent, or pleasurable.
it leave the possessor at the zero point of sen-
tieiicv'.' Then it leaves him just as lie would be if lie
had not got it. Does it not leave him at the zero
point? Then it must leave him below zero or above
zero.

Bach of these possibilities may be conceived under
two forms. That to which the term blessedness is
applied may be a particular state of consciousness —
one among the many states that occur ; and. on this
supposition we have to recognize it as a pleasurable
state, an indifferent state, or a painful state. Other-
wise, blessedness is a word not applicable to a particular
state of consciousness, but characterizes the aggregate
of its states; and in this case the average of the aggre-
gate is to be conceived as one in which the pleasurable
predominates, or one in which the painful predominates,
or one in which pleasures and pains exactly cancel one
another. Let us take in turn these two imaginable
applications of the word.

"Blessed are the merciful;" "Blessed are the
peace-makers;" "Blessed is he that considereth the
poor; "are sayings which we may fairly take as con-
veying the accepted meaning of blessedness. What
now shall we say of one who is, for the time being,

ed in performing an act of mercy? Is his mental
pleasurable? If so the hypothesis is abandoned:

edness is a particular form of happiness. Is the
indifferent or painful? In that case the blessed
man is 80 devoid of sympathy that relieving another
from pain, or the fear of pain, leaves him either wholly
unmoved, or gives him an unpleasant emotion. Again,
if one who is blessed in making peace receives no grati*

GOOD AND BAD CONDUCT. 57

fication from the act, then seeing men injure each other
does not affect him at all, or gives him a pleasure which
is changed into a pain when he prevents the injury.
Once more, to say that the blessedness of one who
"considereth the poor " implies no agreeable feeling, is
to say that his consideration for the poor leaves him
without feeling or entails on him a disagreeable feeling.
So that if blessedness is a particular mode of conscious-
ness temporarily existing as a concomitant of each
kind of beneficent action, those who deny that it is a
pleasure, or constituent of happiness, confess them-
selves either not pleased by the welfare of others or
displeased by it.

Otherwise understood, blessedness must, as we have
seen, refer to the totality of feelings experienced during
the life of one who occupies himself with the actions
the word connotes. This also presents the three possi-
bilities— surplus of pleasures, surplus of pains, equality
of the two. If the pleasurable states are in excess,
then the blessed life can be distinguished from any
other pleasurable life only by the relative amount, or
the quality, of its pleasures : it is a life which makes
happiness of a certain kind and degree its end ; and the
assumption that blessedness is not a form of happiness
lapses. If the blessed life is one in which the pleasures
and the pains received balance one another, so produc-
ing an average that is indifferent ; or if it is one in
which the pleasures are outbalanced by the pains, then
the blessed life lias the character which the pessimist
alleges of life at large, and therefore regards it as cursed.
Annihilation is best, he will argue, since if an average
that is indifferent is the outcome of the blessed life,
annihilation at once achieves it ; and if a surplus of

5S THE DATA OF ETHICS.

suffering is the outcome of this highest kind of life
railed blessed, still more should life in general be ended.
A possible rejoinder must be named and disposed of.
While it is admitted that the particular kind of con-
sciousness accompanying conduct that is blessed, is
pleasurable, it may be contended that pursuance of this
conduct and receipt of the pleasure, brings by the im-
plied self-denial, and persistent effort, and perhaps
bodily injury, a suffering that exceeds it in amount.
And it may then be urged that blessedness, character-
ized by this excess of aggregate pains over aggregate
pleasures, should nevertheless be pursued as an end,
rather than the happiness constituted by excess of pleas-
ures over pains. But now, defensible though this con-
ception of blessedness may be when limited to one in-
dividual, or some individuals, it becomes indefensible
when extended to all individuals; as it must be if
blessedness is taken for the end of conduct. To see
this we need but ask for what purpose are these pains
i?i excess of pleasures to be borne. Blessedness being
the ideal state for all persons, and the self-sacrifices
made by each person in pursuance of this ideal state,
having for their end t<> help all other persons in achiev-
ing the like ideal state, it results that the blessed
though painful state of each is to be acquired by fur-
ng the like blessed though painful states of others ;
tie- ble ed consciousness is to be constituted by the
contemplation of their consciousnesses in a condition of
uffering. Does anyone accept this inference?
If not. his rejection of if involves the admission that
the motive for beaiing pains in performing acts called
d. is not, the obtaining for others like pains of
sdness, but the obtaining of pleasures for others,

GOOD AND BAD CONDUCT. 59

and that thus pleasure somewhere is the tacitly implied
ultimate end.

In brief, then, blessedness has for its necessary con-
dition of existence, increased happiness, positive or neg-
ative, in some consciousness or other, and disappears
utterly if we assume that the actions called blessed are
known to cause decrease of happiness in others as well
as in the actor.

§ 16. To make clear the meaning of the general ar-
gument set forth in this chapter, its successive parts
must be briefly summarized.

That which in the last chapter we found to be highly
evolved conduct, is that which, in this chapter, we find
to be what is called good conduct ; and the ideal goal
to the natural evolution of conduct there recognized we
here recognize as the ideal standard of conduct ethically
considered.

The acts adjusted to ends which, while constituting
the outer visible life from moment to moment further
the continuance of life, we saw become, as evolution
progresses, better adjusted, until filially i\\ay make the
life of each individual entire in length and breadth, at
the same time that they efficiently subserve the rearing
of young, and do both these, not only without hindering
other individuals from doing the like, but while giving
aid to them in doing the like. And here we see that
goodness is asserted of such conduct under each of
these three aspects. Other things equal, well-adjusted
self-ccmserving acts we call good; other things equal,
we call good the acts that are well adjusted for bringing
up progeny capable of complete living; and other things
equal, we ascribe goodness to acts which further the
complete living of others.

60 THE DATA OF ETHICS.

This judging as good, conduct which conduces to life
in each and all, we found to involve the assumption
that animate existence is desirable. By the pessimist,
conduct which observes life cannot consistently be
called good : to call it good implies some form of
optimism. We saw, however, that pessimists and
optimists both start with the postulate that life is a
blessing or a curse, according as the average conscious-
ness accompanying it is pleasurable or painful. And
since avowed or implied pessimists, and optimists of
one or other shade, taken together constitute all men,
it results that this postulate is universally accepted-.
Whence it follows that if we call good the conduct con-
ducive to life, we can do so only with the implication
that it is conducive to a surplus of pleasures over pains.

The truth that conduct is considered by us as good
or bad, according as its aggregate results, to self or
others or both, are pleasurable or painful, we found on
examination to be involved in all the current judg-
ments on conduct : the proof being that reversing the
Applications of the words creates absurdities. And we
found that every other proposed standard of conduct
deriv- authority from this standard. Whether

perfection of nature is the assigned proper aim, or vir-
tuousness of action, or rectitude of motive, we saw
that definition of the perfection, the virtue, the recti-
tnde, inevitably brings us down to happiness experi-
enced in some form, at some time, by some person, as
fundamental idea. Nor could we- discover any
intelligible conception of blessedness, save one which
implies a raising of consciousness, individual or general,
to a happier state ; either by mitigating pains or increas-
ing pleasures.

GOOD AND BAD CONDUCT. 61

Even with those who judge of conduct from the
religious point of view, rather than from the ethical
point of view, it is the same. Men who seek to pro-
pitiate God by inflicting pains on themselves, or refrain
from pleasures to avoid offending him, do so to escape
greater ultimate pains or to get greater ultimate
pleasures. If by positive or negative suffering here,
they expected to achieve more suffering hereafter, they
would not do as they do. That which they now think duty
they would not think duty if it promised eternal misery
instead of eternal happiness. Nay, if there be any who
believe that human beings were created to be unhappy,
and that they ought to continue living to display their
anhappiness for the satisfaction of their creator, such
believers are obliged to use this standard of judgment ;
for the pleasure of their diabolical god is the end to
be achieved.

So that no school can avoid taking for the ultimate
moral aim a desirable state of feeling called by what-
ever name — gratification, enjoyment, happiness. Pleas-
ure somewhere, at some time, to some being or beings,
is an inexpugnable element of the conception. It is as
much a necessary form of moral intuition as space is a
necessary form of intellectual intuition.

62 TUE DA TA OF ETHICS.

CHAPTER IV.

WAYS OF JUDGING CONDUCT.

1 17. Intellectual progress is by no one trait so
Lately characterized as by development of the idea
of causation, since development of this idea involves de-
velopment of bo many other ideas. Before any way can
be made, thought and language must have advanced far
enough to render properties or attributes thinkable as
such, apart from objects ; which, in low stages of
human intelligence, they are not. Again, even the
simplest notion of cause, as we understand it, can be
reached only after many like instances have been
grouped into a simple generalization ; and through all
ascending steps, higher notions of causation imply
wider notions of generality. Further, as there musi be
clustered in the mind concrete causes of many kinds be-
the conception of cause, apart from
:ular causes, it. follows that]. i abstractness

of thought is implied. Concomitantly, there is implied
the recognition of constant relations among phenomena,
leas of uniformity of sequence and ot co-
— the idea of natural law. These advances
can go on only as fast as perceptions and resulting
thoughts are made definite by the use of measures, serving
to familiarize the mind with exact correspondence, truth,
nty. And only when growing science accumu-
exaraples of quantitative, relations, foreseen and

u .1 r8 OF JXJDGUtQ ro.VDUCT. C*Z

verifieci, throughout a widening range of phenomena,
does causation come to be conceived as necessary and
universal. So that though all these cardinal concep-
tions aid one another in developing, we may properly
say that the conception of causation especially depends
for its development on the development of the rest ; and
therefore is the Lest measure of intellectual development
at large.

How slowly, as a consequence of its dependence, the
conception of causation evolves, a glance at the evidence
shows. We hear with surprise of the savage who, fall-
ing down a precipice, ascribes the failure of his foothold
to a malicious demon ; and we smile at the kindred no-
tion of the ancient Greek, that his death was prevented
by a goddess who unfastened for lain the thong of the
helmet by which his enemy was dragging him. But
daily, without surprise, we hear men who describe them-
selves as saved from shipwreck by " divine interposi-
tion," who speak of having " providentially " missed a
train which met with a fatal disaster, and who called it
a " mercy " to have escaped injury from a falling chim-
ney-pot— men who, in such cases, recognize physical
causation no more than do the uncivilized or semi-civi-
lized. The Veddah who thinks that failure to hit an
animal with his arrow resulted from inadequate invoca-
tion of an ancestral spirit, and the Christian priest who
says prayers over a sick man in the expectation that the
course of his disease will so be stayed, differ only in re-
spect of the agent from whom they expect supernatural
aid and the phenomena to be altered by him : the neces-
sary relations among causes and effects are tacitly ig-
nored by the last as much as by the first. Deficient be-
lief in causation is, indeed, exeinplilied even in those

64 THE DATA OF ETHICS.

whose discipline has been specially fitted to generate
this belief — even in men of science. For a generation
after geologists had become uniformitarians in Geology,
they remained catastrophists in Biology : while recog-
nizing none but natural agencies in the genesis of the
earth's crust, they ascribed to supernatural agency the
genesis of the organisms on its surface. Nay more —
among those who are convinced that living things in
general have been evolved by the continued interaction
of forces everywhere operating, there are some who
make an exception of man ; or who, if they admit that
his body has been evolved in the same manner as the
bodies of other creatures, allege that his mind has been
not evolved but specially created. If, then, universal
and necessary causation is only now approaching full
recognition, even by those whose investigations are daily
re-illustrating it, we may expect to find it very little
recognized among men at large, whose culture has not
been calculated to impress them with it ; and we may
expect to find it least recognized by them in respect of
those classes of phenomena amid which, in consequence
of their complexity, causation is most difficult to trace
— the psychical, the social, the moral.

Why do I here make these reflections on what seems
an irrelevant subject? I do it because on studying the
various ethical theories I am struck with the fact
that they are all eharacterized either by entire absence
of the i<lea of causation, or by inadequate presence
of it. Whether theological, political, intuitional, or
utilitarian, they all display, if not in the same degree,
still, each in a large degree, the defects which result
from this lack. We will consider them in the order
named.

H.I )'s OP 3ULGINQ CONDUCT. 65

§ 18. The school of morals properly to be considered
as the still extant representative of the most ancient
school, is that which recognizes no other rule of conduct
than the alleged will of God. It originates with the
savage whose only restraint beyond fear of his fellow
man, is fear of an ancestral spirit; and whose notion of
moral duty as distinguished from his notion of social
prudence, arises from this fear. Here the ethical doc-
trine and the religious doctrine are identical — have in
no degree differentiated.

This primitive form of ethical doctrine, changed only
by the gradual dying out of multitudinous minor super-
natural agents and accompanying development of one
universal supernatural agent, survives in great strength
down to our own day. Religious creeds, established and
dissenting, all embody the belief that right and wrong
are right and wrong simply in virtue of divine enact-
ment. And this tacit assumption has passed from sys-
tems of theology into systems of morality ; or rather let
us say that moral systems in early stages of develop-
ment, little differentiated from the accompanying the-
ological systems, have participated in this assumption.
We see this in the works of the Stoics, as well as in the
works of certain Christian moralists. Among recent
ones I may instance the "Essays on the Principles of
Morality, by Jonathan Dymond, a Quaker, which makes
" the authority of the Deity the sole ground of duty,
and His communicated will the only ultimate standard
of right and wrong." Nor is it by writers belonging to
so relatively unphilosophical a sect only that this view
is held ; it is held with a difference by writers belonging
to sects contrariwise distinguished. For these assert
that in the absence of belief in a deity, there would be

66 THE DATA OF ETHICS.

no moral guidance ; and tins amounts to asserting that
moral truths have no other origin than the will of God,
which, if not considered as revealed in sacred writings,
must be considered as revealed in conscience.

This assumption, when examined, proves to be sui-
cidal. If there are no other origins for right and wrong
than this enunciated or intuited divine will, then, as
alleged, were there no knowlege of the divine will, the
acts now known as wrong would not be known as wrong.
But if men did not know such acts to be wrong because
contrary to the divine will, and so, in committing them,
did not offend by disobedience ; and, if they could not
otherwise know them to be wrong, then they might com-
mit them indifferently with the acts now classed as right :
the results, practically considered, would be the same.
In so far as secular matters are concerned, there would
be no difference between the two ; for to say that in the
affairs of life any evils would arise from continuing to
do the acts called wrong, and ceasing to do the acts
called right, is to say that these produce in themselves
certain mischievous consequences and certain benefi-
cial consequences: which is to say there is another
si mice for moral rules than the revealed or inferred
divine will : they may be established by induction from
■ observed consequences.

From this implication I see no escape. It must be
either admitted or denied that the acts called good and
the acts called bad, nal urally conduce, the one to human
well-being and the other to human ill-being. Is it ad-
mitted ' Then the admission amounts to an assertion
that the conduciveness is shown by experience ; and this
involves abandonment of the doctrine that there is no
origin lor morals apart from divine injunctions. Is it

WATS OF JUDGING CONDUCT. 67

denied that acts classed as good and bad differ in their
effect? Then it is tacitly affirmed that human affairs
would go on just as well in ignorance of the distinction ;
and the alleged need for commandments from God dis-
appears.

And here we see how entirely wanting is the concep-
tion of cause. This notion that such and such actions
are made respectively good and had simply by divine in-
junction, is tantamount to the notion that such and such
actions have not in the nature of things such and such
kinds of effects. If there is not an unconsciousness of
causation there is an ignoring of it.

§ 19. Following Plato and Aristotle, who make State
enactments the sources of right and wrong ; and follow-
ing Hobbes, who holds that there can be neither justice
nor injustice till a regularly constituted coercive power
exists to issue and enforce commands ; not a few mod-
ern thinkers hold that there is no other origin for good
and bad in conduct than law. And this implies the be-
lief that moral obligation originates with acts of parlia-
ment, and can be changed this way or that way by
majorities. They ridicule the idea that men have any
natural rights, and allege that rights are wholly results
of convention: the necessary implication being that
duties are so too. Before considering whether this
theory coheres with outside truths, let us observe how
far it is coherent within itself.

In pursuance of his argument that rights and duties
originate with established social arrangements, Hobbes
says :

•• Where no covenant hath preceded, there hath no right be«n
transferred, and every man has a right t« everything ; and conse*

63 THE DATA OF ETIIICS.

quently, no action can be unjust. But when a covenant is made,
then tn break it is unjust ; and the definitions of injustice is no
other than tin' not performance of covenant. And whatsoever is
nut unjust, is just. Therefore, before the names of just and unjust
can have place, there must lie some coercive power.to compel men
equally to the performance of their covenants, by the terror of
some punishment greater than the benefit they expect by the
breach of their covenant."*

Iii this paragraph the essential propositions are : jus-
tice is fulfillment of covenant; fulfillment of covenant
implies a power of enforcing it : "just and unjust can
have no place " unless men are compelled to perform
their covenants. But this is to say that men can not
perform their covenants without compulsion. Grant
that justice is performance of covenant. Now suppose
it to be performed voluntarily: there is justice. In
such case, however, there is justice in the absence of co-
ercion ; which is contrary to the hypothesis. The only
conceivable rejoinder is an absurd one — voluntary per-
formance of covenant is impossible. Assert this, and the
doctrine that right and wrong come into existence with.
the establishment of sovereignty is defensible. Decline
it, and the doctrine vanishes.

From inner incongruities pass now to outer ones.
The justification for his doctrine of absolute civil author-
ity as the source of rules of conduct, Hobbes seeks
in the miseries entailed by the chronic war between man
and man which must exist in the absence of society;
holding that under an}- kind of government a better life
tsible than in the state of nature. Now whether
we accept the gratuitous and baseless theory that men
surrendered their liberties to a sovereign power of some
kind, with a view to the promised increase of satisfac-
* Leviathan, ch. iv.

WAYS OF JUDGING CONDUCT. 00

tions; or whether we accept the rational theory, induc-
tively bused, thai a stale of political subordination
gradually became established through experience of the
increased satisfactions derived under it; it equally re-
mains obvious that the acts of the sovereign power have
no other warrant than their subservience to the purpose
for which it came into existence. The necessities which
initiate government, themselves prescribe the actions of
government. If its actions do not respond to the neces-
sities, they arc unwarranted. The authority of law is,
then, by the hypothesis, derived: and can never tran-
scend the authority of that from which it is derived. If
general good, or welfare, or utility, is the supreme end,
and if State enactments are justified as means to this
supreme end, then, State enactments have such author-
ity only as arises from conduciveness to this supreme
end. When they are right, it is only because the
original authority endorses them; and they are wrong if
they do not hear its endorsement. That is to say, con-
duct cannot be made good or bad by law; but its good-
ness or badness is to the last determined by its effects as
naturally furthering, or not furthering, the lives of
citizens.

Still more when considered in the concrete, than
when considered in the abstract, do the views of Hobbes
and his disciples prove to be inconsistent. Joining in
the general belief that without such security for life as
enables men to go fearlessly about their business, there
can be neither happiness nor prosperity, individual or
general, they agree that measures for preventing mur-
der, manslaughter, assault, etc., are requisite ; and they
advocate this or that penal system as furnishing the best
deterrents : so arguing, both in respect of the evils and

70 777E DA TA OF ETIJ!

the remedies, that such and such causes will, by the
nature of things, produce such and such effects. They
recognize as inferable d priori, the truth that men will
not lay by property unless they can count with great
probability on reaping advantages from it ; that con-
sequently where robbery is unchecked, or where a
rapacious ruler appropriates whatever earnings his sub-
do not effectually hide, production will scarcely
exceed immediate consumption : and that necessarily
there will be none of that accumulation of capital re-
quired for social development, with all its aids to well-
fare. In neither case, however, do they perceive that
they are tacitly asserting the need for certain restraints
on conduct as deducible from the necessary con-
ditions to complete life in the social state : and are
so making the authority of law derivative and not
original.

If it be said by any belonging to this school that cer-
tain moral obligations, to be distinguished, as cardinal,
must be admitted to have a basis deeper than legislation,
and that it is for legislation not to create but merely to
enforce them — if. I say, admitting this, they go on to
allege a legislative origin for minor claims and duties ;
then we have the implication that wl. ome kinds

of conduct do, in the nature of tilings, tend to work out
in kinds of results, other kinds of conduct do not,
in the nature of things, tend to work out certain kinds
alts. While of these ads the naturally good <>r
bad consequences tnusl 1»- allowed, it may be denied of
acts that they have naturally good or bad con-
sequences. Only after asserting this can it be consist-
ently asserted that acts of the last class are made right
or wrong by law. For if such acts have any intrinsic

WAYS OF JUDGING CONDUCT. 71

tendencies to produce beneficial or mischievous effects,
then these intrinsic tendencies furnish the warrant for
legislative requirements or interdicts ; and to say that
the requirements or interdicts make them right or wrong
is to say that they have no intrinsic tendencies to pro-
duce beneficial or mischievous effects.

Here, then, we have another theory betraying deficient
consciousness of causation. An adequate consciousness
of causation yields the irresistible belief that from the
most serious to the most trivial actions of men in society,
there must flow consequences which, quite apart from
legal agency, conduce to well-being or ill-being in
greater or smaller degrees. If murders are socially in-
jurious whether forbidden by law or not — if one man's
appropriation of another's gains by force brings special
and general evils, whether it is or is not contrary to a
ruler's edicts — if non-fulfillment of contract, if cheating,
if adulteration, work mischiefs on a community in pro-
portion as they are common, quite irrespective of pro-
hibitions ; then, is it not manifest that the like holds
throughout all the details of men's behavior? Is it not
clear that when legislation insists on certain acts winch
have naturally beneficial effects, and forbids others that
have naturally injurious effects, the acts are not made
good or bad by legislation ; but the legislation derives
its authority from the natural effects of the acts ?
Non-recognition of this implies non-recognition of
natural causation.

§ 20. Nor is it otherwise with the pure intuitionists,
who hold that moral perceptions are innate in the origi-
nal sense — thinkers whose view is that men have been
divinely endowed with moral faculties ; not that these

72 THE DATA OF ETHICS.

have resulted from inherited modifications caused by
accumulated experiences.

To affirm that we know some things to be right and
other things to be wrong, , by virtue of a supernaturally
given conscience ; and thus tacitly to affirm that we do
not otherwise know right from wrong ; is tacitly to deny
any natural relations between acts and results. For if
there exist any such relations, then we may ascertain
by induction, or deduction, or both, what these are.
And if it be admitted that because of such natural re-
lations, happiness is produced by this kind of conduct,
which is therefore to be approved, while misery is pro-
duced by that kind of conduct, which is therefore to be
condemned ; then it is admitted that the lightness or
wrongness of actions are determinable, and must finally
be determined, by the goodness or badness of the effects
that flow from them ; which is contrary to the hypothesis.

It may, indeed, be rejoined that effects are deliber-
ately ignored by this school ; which teaches that
courses recognized by moral intuition as right, must
be pursued without regard to consequences. But on
inquiry it turns out that the consequences to be disre-
garded are particular consequences, and not general
consequences. When, for example, it is said that prop-
erty 1" i by another ought to be restored, irrespective
of evil to tin; finder, who possibly may, by restoring it,
lose that which would have preserved him from starva-
tion, it is meant that in pursuance of the principle, the
immediate and special consequences must be disregarded,
not the diffused and remote consequences. By which
we are shown that though the theory forbids overt rec-
ognition of causation, there is anunavowed recognition,
of it.

WATS OF JUDGING CONDUCT. 75

And this implies the trait to which I am drawing
attention. The conception of natural causation is so
imperfectly devoloped that there is only an indistinct
consciousness that throughout the whole of human ((in-
duct necessary relations of causes and effects prevail,
and that from them are ultimately derived all moral
rules, however much these may be proximately derived
from moral intuitions.

§ 21. Strange to say, even the ultilitarian school,
which, at first sight, appears to be distinguished from
the rest by recognizing natural causation, is, if not so
far from complete recognition of it, yet very far.

Conduct, according to its theory, is to be estimated
by observation of results. When, in sufficiently numer-
ous cases, it has been found that behavior of this
kind works evil while behavior of that kind works
good, these kinds of behavior are to be judged as
wrong and right respectively. Now though it seems
that the origin of moral rules in natural causes, is thus
asserted by implication, it is but partially asserted. The
implication is simply that we are to ascertain by induc-
tion that such and such mischiefs or benefits do go along
with such and such acts; and are then to infer that the
like relations will hold in future. But acceptance of
these generalizations and the inferences from them does
not amount to recognition of causation in the full sense
of the word. So long as only some relation between
cause and effect in conduct is recognized, and not the
relation, a completely scientific form of knowledge has
not been reached. At present, utilitarians pay no atten-
tion to this distinction. Even when it is pointed out
they disregard the fact that empirical utilitarianism is

74 THE DATA OF ETHICS.

but a transitional form to be passed through on the way
to rational utilitarianism.

In a letter to Mr. Mill, written some sixteen years
ago, repudiating the title anti-utilitarian, which he had
applied to me (a letter subsequently published in Mr.
Rain's work on Mental and Moral Science), I endeav-
ored to make clear the difference above indicated; and
I must here quote certain passages from that letter.

The view for which I contend is, that Morality, properly so-called
— the science of right conduct — has for its object to determine how
and why certain modes of conduct are detrimental, and certain
other modes beneficial. These good and bad results cannot be ac-
cidental, but must be necessary consequences of the constitution of
things ; and I conceive it to be the business of Moral Science to de-
duce, from the laws of life and the conditions of existence, what
kinds of action necessarily tend to produce happiness, and what
kinds to produce unhappiness. Having done this, its deductions
are to be recognized as laws of conduct ; and are to be conformed
to irrespective of a direct estimation of happiness or misery.

Perhaps an analogy will most clearly show my meaning. During
its early stages, planetary Astronomy consisted of nothing more
than accumulated observations respecting the positions and motions
of the sun and planets ; from which accumulated observations it
came by and by to be empirically predicted, with an approach to
truth, that certain of the heavenly bodies would have certain posi-
tions at certain times. But the modern science of planetary As-
tronomy consists of deductions from the law of gravitation — deduc-
bowing why the celestial bodies necessarily occupy certain
places at certain times. Now, the kind of relation which thus ex-
ists between ancient and modern Astronomy is analogous to the
kind of relation which, I conceive, exists between the Expediency-
Morality and Moral Science, properly so called. And the objec-
tion which I have to the current Utilitarianism is, that it recognizes
no more developed form of Morality — does not see that it has
reached hut the initial stage of Moral Science.

Doubtless if utilitarians are, asked whether it can be
by mere chance that this kind of action works evil and

WAYS OF JUDGING CONDUCT. 75

that works good, they will answer — No : they will ad-
mit that such sequences are parts of a necessary order
among phenomena. But though this truth is beyond
question ; and though if there are causal relations be-
tween acts and their results, rules of conduct can become
scientific only when they are deduced from these causal
relations ; there continues to be entire satisfaction with
that form of utilitarianism in which these causal rela-
tions are practically ignored. It is supposed that in
future, as now, utility is to be determined only by ob-
servation of results ; and that there is no possibility of
knowing, by deduction from fundamental principles,
what condnct must be detrimental and what conduct
must be beneficial.

§ 22. To make more specific that conception of ethical
science here indicated, let me present it under a concrete
aspect, beginning with a simple illustration and compli-
cating this illustration by successive steps.

If, by tying its main artery, we stop most of the blood
going to a limb, then, for as long as the limb performs
its function, those parts which are called into play must
be wasted faster than they are repaired : whence event-
ual disablement. The relation between due receipt of
nutritive matters through its arteries, and due discharge
of its duties by the limb is a part of the physical order.
If, instead of cutting off the supply to a particular limb,
we bleed the patient largely, so drafting away the mate-
rials needed for repairing not one limb but all limbs,
and not limbs only but viscera, there results both a mus-
cular debility and an enfeeblement of the vital functions.
Here, again, cause and effect are necessarily related.
The mischief that results from great depletion, results

70 TUE DATA OF ETHICS.

apart from any divine command, or political enactment,
or moral intuition. Now advance a step. Suppose the
man to be prevented from taking in enough of the solid
and liquid food containing those substances continually
abstracted from his blood in repairing his tissues : sup-
pose he has cancer of the esophagus and cannot swallow
— -what happens? By this indirect depletion, as by di-
rect depletion, he is inevitably made incapable of per-
forming the actions of one in health. In this case, as in
the other cases, the connection between cause and effect
is one thai cannot be established, or altered, by any
authority external to the phenomena themselves. Again,
let us say that instead of being stopped after passing his
mouth, tl iiit which he would swallow is stopped before
reaching his mouth ; so that day after day the man is
required to waste his tissues in getting food, and day
after day the food he has got to meet this waste, he is
forcibly prevented from eating. As bef ore, the progress
toward death by starvation is inevitable — the connection
between acts and effects is independent of any alleged
theological or political authority. And similarly if, be-
ing forced by the whip to labor, no adequate return in
food is supplied to him, there are equally certain evils,
equally independent of sacred or secular enactment.

Pass now to those, actions more commonly thought of
as the occasions for rules of conduct. Let us assume
tin- man to he continually robbed of that which was given
him in exchange for his labor, and by which he was to
up for nervo-muscular expenditure and renew his
powers. No Less than before is the connection hctween

conduct and consequence rooted in the constitution of
things ; unchangeable by State-made law, and not need-
ing establishment by empirical generalization. If the

WATS OF JUDGING CONDUCT. 77

action by which the man is affected is a stage farther
away from the results, or produces results of a less de-
cisive kind, still we see the same basis for morality in
the physical order. Imagine that payment for his serv-
ices is made partly in bad coin ; or that it is delayed
beyond the date agreed upon ; or that what he buys to
eat is adulterated with innutritive matter. Manifestly,
by any of these deeds which we condemn as unjust, and
which are punished by law, there is, as before, an inter-
ference with the normal adjustment of physiological re-
pair to physiological waste. Nor is it otherwise when we
pass to kinds of conduct still more remotely operative.
If he is hindered from enforcing his claim, if class-pre-
dominance prevents him from proceeding, or if a bribed
judge gives a verdict contrary to evidence, or if a wit-
swears falsely, have not these deeds, though they
affect him more indirectly, the same original cause for
their wrongness ?

Even with actions which work diffused and indefinite
mischiefs it is the same. Suppose that the man, instead of
being dealt with fraudulently, is calumniated. There
i:>, as before, a hinderance to the carrying on of life-
sustaining activities; for the loss of character detriment-
ally affects his business. Nor is this all. The mental
depression caused partially incapacitates him for ener-
getic activity, and perhaps brings on ill-health. So thai
malieiously or carelessly propagating false statements
tends both to diminish his life and to diminish his ability
to maintain life. Hence its flagitiousness.

Moreover, if we trace to their ultimate ramifications
the effects wrought by any of these acts which morality
called intuitive reprobates — if we ask what results not
to the individual himself only, but also to his belongings

78 THE DATA OF ETHICS.

— if we observe how impoverishment hinders the rearing
of his children, by entailing under-feeding or inadequate
clothing, resulting perhaps in the death of some and the
constitutional injury of others ; we see that by the nec-
essary connections of things these acts, besides tending
primarily to lower the life of the individual aggressed,
upon, tend, secondarily, to lower the lives of all his family
and thirdly, to lower the life of society at large ; which
is damaged by whatever damages its units.

A more distinct meaning will now be seen in the
statement that the utilitarianism which recognizes only
the principles of conduct reached by induction, is but
preparatory to the utilitarianism which deduces these
principles from the processes of life as carried on under
established conditions of existence.

§ 22. Thus, then, is justified the allegation made at
tin- outset, that, irrespective of their distinctive char-
acters and their special tendencies, all the current
methods of ethics have one general defect — they neglect
ultimate causal connections. Of course I do not mean
that they wholly ignore the natural consequences of
actions ; but I mean that they recognize them only in-
cidentally. They do not erect into a method the as-
certaining of necessary relations between causes and
effects, and deducing rules of conduct from formulated
sments of them.

ry science begins by accumulating observations,
and presently generalizes these empirically ; but only
when it reaches the stage at which its empirical gen-
eralizations are included in a rational generalization,
does it heroine developed science. Astronomy has
already passed through its successive stages : first col-

WAYS OF JUDGING CONDUCT. 79

lections of facts ; then inductions from them ; and lastly
deductive interpretations of these, as corollaries from a
universal principle of action among masses in space.
Accounts of structures and tabulations of strata, grouped
and compared, have led gradually to the assigning of
various classes of geological changes to igneous and
aqueous actions; and it is now tacitly admitted that
Geology becomes a science proper, only as fast as such
changes are explained in terms of those natural processes
which have arisen in the cooling and solidifying earth,
exposed to the sun's heat and the action of the moon
upon its ocean. The science of life has been, and is
still, exhibiting a like series of steps ; the evolution of
organic forms at large is being affiliated on physical
actions in operations from the beginning ; and the vital
phenomena each organism presents are coming to be
understood as connected sets of changes, in parts formed
of matters that are affected by certain forces and dis-
engage other forces. So is it with mind. Early ideas
concerning thought and feeling ignored everything like
cause, save in recognizing those effects of habits which
were forced on men's attention and expressed in prov-
erbs; but there are growing up interpretations of
thought and feeling as correlates of the actions and re-
actions of a nervous structure, that is influenced by
outer changes and works in the body adapted changes :
the implication being that Psycholog}^ becomes a science
as fast as these relations of phenomena are explained as
consequences of ultimate principles. Sociology, too,
represented down to recent times only by stray ideas
about social organization, scattered through the masses
of worthless gossip furnished us by historians, is coming
to be recognized by some as also a science ; and such

80 mi: DATA or irnncs.

adumbrations of it as have from time to time appeared
in the shape of empirical generalizations, are now begin-
ning tn assume the character of generalizations made
coherent by derivation from causes lying in human
nature placed under given conditions. Clearly then,
Ethics, which is a science dealing with the conduct of
associated human beings, regarded under one of its
ts, has to undergo a like transformation: and, at
:it undeveloped, can be considered a developed
science only when it has undergone this transformation.
A preparation in the simpler sciences is pre-supposed.
Ethics has a physical aspect; since it treats of human
activities which, in common with all expenditures or
energy, conform to the law of the persistence of energy:
moral principles must conform to physical necessities.
It has a biological aspect; since it concerns certain
effects, inner and outer, individual and social, of the
vital changes going on in the highest type of animal.
It has a psychological aspect; for its subject matter is
rate of actions that are prompted by feelings
and guided by intelligence. And it has a sociological
' ; for these actions, some, of them directly and all
of them indirectly, affect associated beings.

What is the implication? Belonging under one
aspect to each of these sciences — physical, biological,
psychological, sociological — it can find its ultimate
interpretations only in those fundamental truths which
are common to all of them. Already we have con-
cluded in ;i general way that conduct at large, includ-
ing the conduct Ethics deals with, is to be fully under-
stood only as an aspect of evolving life; and now
we arc brought to this conclusion in a more special
way.

WA TB OF JUDGING roXDUCT. 81

§ 23. Hero, then, we have to inter on the considera-
tion of moral phenomena as phenomena of evolution;
being forced to do this by iinding that they form a
part of the aggregate of phenomena which evolution
has wrought out. If the entire visible universe has
been evolved — if the solar system as a whole, the earth
as a part of it, the life in general which the earth bears,
as well as that of each individual organism — if the
mental phenomena displayed by all creatures, up to the
highest, in common with the phenomena presented by-
aggregates of these highest — if one and all conform to
the laws of evolution ; then the necessary implication is
that those phenomena of conduct in these highest creat-
ures with which Morality is concerned, also conform.

The preceding volumes have prepared the way for
dealing with morals as thus conceived. Utilizing the
conclusions they contain, let us now observe what data
are furnished by these. We will take in succession —
the physical view, the biological view, the psychological

view, and the sociological view.
6

82 TEE DATA OF ETHICS,

CHAPTER V.

THE PHYSICAL VIEW.

§ 24. Every moment we pass instantly from men's
perceived actions to the motives implied by them ; and
so are led to formulate these actions in mental terms
rather than in bodily terms. Thoughts and feelings
are referred to when we speak of any one's deeds with
praise or blame j not those outer manifestations which
reveal the thoughts and feelings. Hence we become
oblivious of the truth that conduct as actually ex-
perienced consists of changes recognized by touch,
sight and hearing.

This habit of contemplating only the psychical face
of conduct is so confirmed that an effort is required to
contemplate only the physical face. Undeniable as it
is that another's behavior to us is made up of move-
ments of his body and limbs, of his facial muscles, and
of his vocal apparatus, it yet seems paradoxical to say
that these are the only elements of conduct really
known by us, while the elements of conduct which we
exclusively think of as constituting it, are not known
but inferred.

Here, however, ignoring for the time being the
infilled elements in conduct, we have to deal with the
perceived elements — we have to observe its traits con
sidered as a set of combined motions. Taking the
evolution point of view, and remembering that while

THE PHYSICAL VIEW. 83

an aggregate evolves, not only the matter composing
it, but also the motion of that matter, passes from an
indefinite incoherent homogeneity to a definite coherent
Heterogeneity, we have now to ask whether conduct as
it rises to its higher forms, displays in increasing
degrees these characters , and whether it does not dis-
play them in the greatest degree when it reaches that
highest form which we call moral.

§ 25. It will be convenient to deal first with the
trait of increasing coherence. The conduct of lowly-
organized creatures is broadly contrasted with the
conduct of highly-organized creatures in having its
successive portions feebly connected. The random
movements which animalcules make have severally no
reference to movements made a moment before ; nor
do they affect in specific ways the movements made
immediately after. To-day's wanderings of a fish in
search of food, though perhaps showing by their
adjustments to catching different kinds of prey at dif-
ferent hours, a slightly-determined order, are unrelated
to the wanderings of yesterday and to-morrow. But
such more developed creatures as birds, show us in the
building of nests, the sitting on eggs, the rearing of
chicks, and the aiding of them after they fly, sets of
motions which form a dependent series, extending over
a considerable period. And on observing the complex-
ity of the acts performed in fetching and fixing the
fibres of the nest or in catching and bringing to the
young each portion of food, we discover in the com-
bined motions, lateral cohesion as well as longitudinal
cohesion.

Man, even in his lowest state, displays in his conduct

84 TITE DATA OF ETHICS.

far more coherent combinations of motions. By the
elaborate manipulations gone through in making
weapons that are to serve for the chase next year, or
in building canoes and wigwams for permanent uses —
by acts of aggression and defense which are connected
with injuries long since received or committed, the
savage exhibits an aggregate of motions which, in
some of its parts, holds together over great periods.
Moreover, if we consider the many movements implied
by the transactions of each day, in the wood, on the
water, in the camp, in the family, we see that this
coherent aggregate of movements is composed of many
minor aggregates that are severally coherent within
themselves and with one another.

In civilized man this trait of developed conduct
becomes more conspicuous still. Be his business what
it may, its processes involve relatively numerous
dependent motions ; and day by day it is so carried on
as to show connections between present motions and
motions long gone by, as well as motions anticipated
in the distant future. Besides the many doings,
related to one another, which the farmer goes through
in Looking after his cattle, directing his laborers, keep-
i c\i- on his dairy, buying his implements, selling
his produce, etc., the business of getting his lease
involves numerous combined movements on which the
movements of subsequenl years depend ; and in manur-
ing hia fields with a view to larger returns, or putting
down drains with the like motive, he is performing acts
which are parts of a coherent combination rela-
tively extensive. That the Like holds of the shop-
keeper, manufacturer, banker, is manifest; and this
increased coherence of conduct among1 the civilize*}

TI1E PHYSICAL VIEW.

will strike us even more when we remember how its
parts are often continued in a connected arrangement
through life, for the purpose of making a fortune,
founding ;i family, gaining a seat in Parliament.

Now mark that a greater coherence among its com-
ponent motions broadly distinguishes the conduct we
call moral from the conduct we call immoral. The
application of the word dissolute to the last, and of the
word self-restrained to the first, implies this — implies
that conduct of the lower kind, constituted of disor-
derly acts, has its parts relatively loose in their rela-
tions with one another; while conduct of the higher
kind, habitually following a fixed order, so gains a
characteristic unity and coherence. In proportion as
the conduct is what we call moral, it exhibits com-
paratively settled connections between antecedents
and consequents ; for the doing right implies that
under driven conditions the combined motions const it ut-
ing conduct will follow in a way that can be specified.
Contrariwise, in the conduct of one whose principles
are not high, the sequences of motions are doubtful.
He may pay the money or he may not ; he may keep
his appointment or he may fail ; he may tell the truth
or lie may lie. The words trustworthiness and untrust-
worthiness, as used to characterize the two respectively,
sufficientlv imply that the actions of the one can be
foreknown while those of the other cannot : and this
implies that the successive movements composing
the one bear more constant relations to one another
than do those composing the other — are more coherent.

§ 26. Indefiniteness accompanies incoherence in con-
duct that is little evolved ; and throughout the ascwMi-

86 THE DATA OF ETHICS.

ing stages of evolving conduct there is an increasingly
definite co-ordination of the motions constituting it.

Such changes of form as the rudest protozoa show us,
are utterly vague — admit of no precise description ;
and though in higher kinds the movements of the
parts are more definable, yet the movement of the
whole in respect of direction is indeterminate : there
is no adjustment of it to this or the other point in
space. In such coelenterate animals as polypes we see
the parts moving in ways which lack precision; and
in one of the locomotive forms, as a medusa, the
course taken, otherwise at random, can be described
only as one which carries it toward the light where
degrees of light and darkness are present. Among
annulose creatures the contrast between the track
of a worm, turning this way or that at hazard,
and the definite course taken by a bee in its flight
from flower to flower or back to the hive, shows us
the same tiling; the bee's acts in building cells and
feeding larva- further exhibiting precision in the sim-
ultaneous movements as well as in the successive
ments. Though the motions made by a fish in
pursuing its prey have considerable definiteness, yet
they are 'if a simple kind, and are in this respect con-
tract, -d with the mail)' definite motions of body, head,
and limits gone through by a carnivorous mammal in
course "I waylaying, running down, and seizing
a herbivore; and further, the fish shows us none of
definitely adjusted sets of motions which in the
mammal subserve the rearing of young.

Much greater definiteness, if not in the combined
movements forming single acts, still in the adjustments
of many combined acts to various purposes, charac-

THE PHYSICAL VIEW. 87

terizes human conduct, even in its lowest stages. In
making and using weapons and in the maneuvering*
of savage warfare, numerous movements, all precise in
their adaptations to proximate ends, are arranged for
the achievement of remote ends, with a precision not
paralleled among lower creatures. The lives of civ-
ilized men exhibit this trait far more conspicuously.
Each industrial art exemplifies the effects of move-
ments which are severally definite ; and which are
definitely arranged in simultaneous and successive
order. Business transactions of every kind are char-
acterized by exact relations between the sets of
motions constituting acts, and the purposes fulfilled,
in time, place, and quantity. Further, the daily rou-
tine of each person shows us in the periods and
amounts of activity, of rest, of relaxation, a meas-
ured arrangement which is not shown us by the doings
of the wandering savage, who has no fixed times for
hunting, sleeping, feeding, or any one kind of action.

Moral conduct differs from immoral conduct in the
same manner and in a like degree. The conscientious
man is exact in all his transactions. He supplies a
precise weight for a specified sum ; he gives a definite
quality in fulfillment of understanding ; he pays the
full amount he bargained to do. In times as well as
in quantities, his acts answer completely to anticipa-
tions. If he lias made a business contract he is to the
day ; if an appointment he is to the minute. Similarly
in respect of truth : his statements correspond accu-
rately with the facts. It is thus too in his family life.
He maintains marital relations that are definite in
contrast with the relations that result from breach of
the marriage contract; and as a father, fitting his be-

88 THE DATA OF ETHICS.

liavior with care to the nature of each child and to

the occasion ; he avoids the too much and the too

of praise or blame, reward or penalty. Nor is

berwise in his miscellaneous acts. To say that

la equitably with those he employs, whether

they behave well or ill, is to say that he adjusts his

to their deserts ; and to say that he is judicious in
Lis charities, is to say that he portions out his aid with

imination instead of distributing it indiscriminately
to good and bad, as do those who have no adequate
Bense of their social responsibilities.

That progress toward rectitude of conduct is progress
toward duly-proportioned conduct, and that duly-pro-
portioned conduct is relatively definite, we may see from
another point of view. One of the traits of conduct we
call immoral, is excess ; while moderation habitually
characterizes moral conduct. Now excesses imply ex-
treme divergences of actions from some medium, while
maintenance of the medium is implied by moderation;
whence it follows that actions of the last kind can be de-
fined more nearly than those of the first. Clearly, con-
duct which, being unrestrained, runs into great and in-
calculable oscillations, therein differs from restrained
conduct of which, by implication, the oscillations fall
within narrower limits. And falling within narrower
limil itates relative definiteness of movements

17. That throughout the ascending forms of life,
with increasing heterogeneity of structure and
function, there goes increasing hel ty of conduct

— increasing diversity in the sets of external motions
and combined sets of such motions — needs not be shown
in detail. Xor need it be shown thut becoming relatively

THE PHYSICAL VIEW. 89

great in the motions constituting the conduct of the un-
civilized man, this heterogeneity lias become still greater
in those which the civilized man goes through.. We
may pass al once to that further degree of the like con-
trast which we see on ascending from the conduct of the
immoral to that of the moral.

Instead of recognizing this contrast, most readers will
be inclined to identify a moral life with a life little
varied in its activities. I5ut here we come upon a de-
fect in the current conception of morality. This <•< m-
parative uniformity in the aggregate of motions, which
goes along with morality as commonly conceived, is not
only not moral hut is the reverse of moral. The better
a man fulliils every requirement of life, alike as regards
his own body and mind, as regards the bodies and minds
of those dependent on him, and as regards the bodies
and minds of his fellow citizens, the more varied do his
activities become. The more fully he does all these
things, the more heterogeneous must be his movements.

One who satisfies personal needs only, goes through,
other things equal, less multiform processes than one
who also administers to the needs of wife and children.
Supposing there are no other differences, the addition of
family relations necessarily renders the actions of the
man who full fi Is the duties of husband and parent, more
heterogeneous than those of the man who has no such
duties to fulfill, or, having them, does not fulfill them ;
and to say that his actions are more heterogeneous is to
say that there is a greater heterogeneity in the combined
motions 1. e through. The like holds of social obli-
gations. These, in proportion as a citizen duly performs
them, complicate his movements considerably. If he is
helpful to inferiors dependent on hini, if he takes a part

90 THE DA TA OF ETHICS.

in political agitation, if lie aids in diffusing knowledge,
he, in each of these ways, adds to his kinds of activity
— makes his sets of movements more multiform ; so dif-
fering from the man who is the slave of one desire or
group of desires.

Though it is unusual to consider as having a moral
aspect, those activities which culture involves, yet to
the few who hold that due exercise of all the higher
faculties, intellectual and aesthetic, must be included in
the conception of complete life, here identified with the
ideally moral life, it will be manifest that a further
heterogeneity is implied by them. For each of such ac-
tivities, constituted by that play of these faculties which
is eventually added to their life-subserving uses, adds to
the multiformity of the aggregated motions.

Briefly, then, if the conduct is the best possible on
every occasion, it follows that as the occasions are end-
lessly varied the acts will be endlessly varied to suit —
the heterogeneity in the combinations of motions will be
extreme.

Involution in conduct considered under its moral
'. is like all other evolution, toward equilibrium.
I dn not mean that it is toward the equilibrium reached
at death, though this is, of course, the final state which
the evolution of the highest man has in common with
all lever evolution ; but I mean that it is toward a mo v-
in'_r equilibrium.

We have seen that maintaining life, expressed in
physical terms, is maintaining a balanced combination
of internal actions in face of external forces tending to
overthrow it; and we have seen that advance toward a
higher life, has been an acquirement of ability to main-

THE PT1YSICAL VIEW. 91

tain the balance for a longer period, by the successive
additions of organic appliances -which by their actions
counteract, more and more fully, the disturbing forces.
Here, then, we are led to the conclusion that the life
called moral is one in which this maintenance of the
moving equilibrium reaches completeness, or approaches
most nearly to completeness.

This truth is clearly disclosed on observing how those
physiological rhythms which vaguely show themselves
when organization begins, become more regular, as well
as more various in their kinds, as organization advances.
Periodicity is but feebly marked in the actions, inner
and outer, of the rudest types. Where life is low ther&
is passive dependence on the accidents of the environ-
ment ; and this entails great irregularities in the vital
processes. The taking in of food by a polype is at in-
tervals now short, now very long, as circumstances de-
termine ; and the utilization of it is by a slow dispersion
of the absorbed part through the tissues, aided only by
the irregular movements of the creature's body ; while
such aeration as is effected is similarly without a trace
of rhythm. Much higher up we still find very imper-
fect periodicities ; as in the inferior molluscs which,
though possessed of vascular systems, have no proper
circulation, but merely a slow movement of the crude
blood, now in one direction through the vessels and
then, after a pause, in the opposite direction. Only
with well-developed structures do there come a rhyth-
mical pulse and a rhythm of the respiratory actions.
And then in birds and mammals, along with great rapid-
ity and regularity in these essential rhythms, and along
with a consequently great vital activity and therefore
great expenditure, comparative regularity in the rhythm

92 THE DATA OF ETHICS.

of the alimentary actions is established, as well as in the
rhythm of activity and rest; since the rapid waste to
which rapid pulsation and respiration are instrumental,
tolerably regular supplies of nutriment, as
well as recurring intervals of sleep during which repair
may overtake waste. And from these stages the mov-
ing equilibrium characterized by such interdependent
rhythms, is continually made better by the counteract-
ing of more and more of those actions which tend to
perturb it.

So is it as we ascend from savage to civilized find
from the lowest among the civilized to the highest.
The rhythm of external actions required to maintain
the rhythm of internal actions becomes at once more
complicated and more complete, making them into a
better moving equilibrium. The irregularities which
their conditions of existence entail on primitive men,
continually cause wide deviations, from the mean state
of the moving equilibrium — wide oscillations; which
imply imperfection of it for the time being, and bring
about its premature overthrow. In such civilized men
call ill-conducted, frequent perturbations of the
moving equilibrium are caused by those excesses char-
acterizing a career in which the periodicities are much
broken ; and a common result is that the rhythm of
the interna] actions being often deranged, the moving
equilibrium, rendered by so much imperfect, is gener-
ally shortened in duration. While one in whom the
oal rhythms are bei t maintained is one by whom
the external actions required to fulfill all needs and
duties, 1\ performed on the recurring occasions,

conduce to a moving equilibrium that is at once in«
volved and prolonged.

THE PHYSICAL VIEW. 03

Of course the implication is that the man who thus
reaches the limit of evolution, exists in a society con-
gruous -with his nature, is a man among men Similarly
constituted, who are severally in harmony with that
social environment which they have formed. This is,
indeed, the only possibility. For the production of the
highesi tj^pe of man can go on only pari passu with the
production of the highest type of society. The implied
conditions are those before described as accompanying
the most evolved conduct — conditions under which each
can fulfil] all his needs and rear the due number of pro-
geny, not only without hindering others from doing the
like, but while aiding them in doing- the like. Anil
evidently, considered under its physical aspect, the con-
duct of the individual so constituted, and associated
with like individuals, is one in which all the actions,
that is the combined motions of all kinds, have become
such as duly to meet every daily process, every ordinary
occurrence, and every contingency in his environment.
( oniplete life in a complete society is but another name
for complete equilibrium between the co-ordinated ac-
tivities of each social unit and those of the aggregate
of units.

£ 29. I'". wn to readers of preceding volumes, and still
more to other readers, there will seem a strangeness,
or even an absurdity, in this presentation of moral con-
duel in physical terms. It has been needful to make
it, however. If thai re-distribution of matter and mo-
tion constituting evolution crocs on in all acrsTeeates,

O O go O

its laws must be fulfilled in the most developed being
as in every other thing; and his actions, when decom-
posed into motions, must exemplify its laws. This wo

94 THE DA TA OF ETHICS.

find that they do. There is an entire correspondence
between moral evolution and evolution as physically
defined.

Conduct, as actually known to us in perception, and
not as interpreted into the accompanying feelings and
ideas, consists of combined motions. On ascending
tlnough the various grades of animate creatures, we
find these combined motions characterized by increasing
coherence, increasing definiteness considered singly and
in their co-ordinated groups, and increasing heteroge-
neity ; and in advancing from lower to higher types of
man, as well as in advancing from the less moral to the
more moral type of man, these traits of evolving conduct
become more marked still. Further, we see that the
increasing coherence, definiteness, and heterogeneity, of
the combined motions, are instrumental to the better
maintenance of a moving equilibrium. Where the evo-
lution is small this is very imperfect and soon cut short ;
with advancing evolution, bringing "greater power and
intelligence, it becomes more steady and longer con-
tinued in face of adverse actions ; in the human race at
large it is comparatively regular and enduring ; and its
regularity and enduringness are greatest in the highest.

THE BIOLOGICAL VIEW. 95

CHAPTER VI.

THE BIOLOGICAL VIEW.

§ 30. The truth that the ideally moral man is one in
whom the moving equilibrium is perfect, or approaches
nearest to perfection, becomes, when translated into
physiological language, the truth that he is one in whom
the functions of all kinds are duly fulfilled. Each func-
tion has some relation, direct or indirect, to the needs of
life : the fact of its existence as a result of evolution,
being itself a proof that it has been entailed, imme-
diately or remotely, by the adjustment of inner actions
to outer actions. Consequently, non-fulfillment of it in
normal proportion is non-fulfillment of a requisite to
complete life. If there is defective discharge of the
function, the organism experiences some detrimental re-
sult caused by the inadequacy. If the discharge is in
excess, there is entailed a reaction upon the other func-
tions, which in some way diminishes their efficiencies.

It is true that during full vigor, while the momentum
of the organic actions is great, the disorder caused by
moderate excess or defect of any one function, soon dis-
appears— the balance is re-established. But it is none
the less true that always some disorder results from ex-
cess or defect, that it influences every function, bodily
and mental, and that it constitutes a lowering of the life
for the time being.

Beyond the temporary falling short of complete life

Till: DATA OF ETIIICS.

implied by undue or inadequate discharge of a function,
there is entailed, as an ultimate result, decreased length
of life. If some function is habitually performed in ex-
if the requirement, or in defect of the requirement;
and if, as a consequence, there is an often repeated per-
turbation of the functions at large, there results some
chronic derangement in the balance of the functions.
issarily reacting on the structures, and registering
in them its accumulated effects, this derangement works
a general deterioration; and. when the vital energies be-
gin to decline, the moving equilibrium, further from
perfection than it would else have been, is sooner over-
thrown : death is more or less premature.

Hence the moral man is one whose functions — many
and varied in their kinds, as we have seen — are all dis-
charged in degrees duly adjusted to the conditions of
existence

1. Strange as the conclusion looks, it is never-
theless a conclusion to be here drawn, that the per-
formance of every function is, in a sense, a moral obli-
gation.

It is usually thought that morality requires us only
strain such vital activities as, in our present state,
ten pushed to excess, or such as conflictwith aver-
elfare, special or general ; but it also requires us
i ry on these vital activities up to their normal
All the animal functions, in common with all
the higher functions, have, as thus understood, their
While recognizing the fact that in our
osition, characterized by very imperfect
adaptation of constitution of conditions, moral obliga-
tions of supreme kinds often necessitate conduct which

TT7E BIOLOGICAL VIEW. 07

is physically injurious : we must also recognize the fact
that, considered apart from other effects, it is immoral
BO to treat the body as in any way to diminish the full-
ness or vigor of its vitality.

Hence results one test of actions. There may in every
case be put the questions — Does the action tend to main-
tenance of complete life for the time being? and does it
tend to prolongation of life to its full extent ? To
answer yes or no to either of these questions, is im-
plicitly to class the action as right or wrong in respect
of its immediate bearings, whatever it may be in respect
of its remote bearings.

The seeming paradoxicalness of this statement results
from the tendency, so difficult of avoidance, to judge a
conclusion which presupposes an ideal humanity, by its
applicability to humanity as now existing. The fore-
going conclusion refers to that highest conduct in which,
as we have seen, the evolution of conduct terminates —
that conduct in which the making of all adjustments of
aits to ends subserving complete individual life, together
with all those subserving maintenance of offspring and
preparation of them for maturity, not only consist with
tin- making of like adjustments h}' others, but furthers
it. And this conception of conduct in its ultimate form
implies the conception of a nature having such conduct
for its spontaneous outcome — the product of its normal
activities. So understanding the matter, it becomes
manifest that under such conditions any falling short of
faction, as well as any excess of function, implies devia-
tion from the best conduct or from perfectly moral con-
duct.

§ 32. Thus far in treating of conduct from the bio-
7

98 THE DATA OF ETUICS.

logical point of view, we have considered its constituent
actions under their physiological aspects only ; leaving
out of sight their psychological aspects. We have
recognized the bodity changes and have ignored the
accompanying mental changes. And at first sight it
seems needful for us hereto do this; since taking ac-
count of states of consciousness apparently implies an
inclusion of the psychological view in the biological
view.

This is not so however. As was pointed out in the
Principles of Psychology, §§ 52, 53, we enter upon
psychology proper only when we begin to treat of men-
tal states and their relations considered as referring to
external agents and their relations. While we concern
ourselves exclusively with modes of mind as correlatives
of nervous changes, we are treating of what was there
distinguished ;is aestho-physiology. We pass to psy-
chology only when Ave consider the correspondence be-
tween the connections among subjective states and the
connections among objective actions. Here, then, with-
out ti ing the limits of our immediate topic, Ave
may deal with feelings and functions in their mutual
dependencies.

We cannol omit doing this; because the psychical
changes which accompany many of the physical changes
in the organism arc biological factors in two ways.
Those feelings, classed as sensations, which, directly
initiate! in the bodily framework, go alongwith certain
states of the vital organs and more conspicuously with
ates of the external organs, now serve mainly
tide to the performance of functions, but partly as
stimuli, and now serve mainly as stimuli, but in a
smaller degree as guides. Visual sensations which, as

THE BIOLOGICAL VIEW. 99

co-ordinated, enable us to direct our movements, also, if
vivid, raise the rate of respiration ; while sensations of
cold and heat, greatly depressing or raising the vital
actions, serve also for purposes of discrimination. So,
too, the feelings, classed as emotions, which are not
Localizable in the hodily framework, act in more general
ways, alike as guides and stimuli — having influences
over the performance of functions more potent even
than have most sensations. Fear, at the same time that
it urges flight and evolves the forces spent in it, also
affects the heart and the alimentary canal ; while joy,
prompting persistence in the actions bringing it simul-
taneously exalts the visceral processes.

Hence, in treating of conduct under its biological
aspect, we are compelled to consider that interaction of
feelings and functions which is essential to animal life
in all its more developed forms.

§ 33. In the Principles of Psychology, § 124, it was
shown that necessarily throughout the animate world at
large, "pains are the correlatives of actions injurious to
the organism, while pleasures are the correlatives of
actions conducive to its welfare ; " since " it is an in-
evitable deduction from the hypothesis of Evolution,
that races of sentient creatures could have come into
existence under no other conditions." The argument
was as follows:

If we substitute for the word Pleasure the equivalent phrase — a
feeling which we seek to bring into consciousness and retain there,
and if wo substitute for the word Pain the equivalent phrase — a
feeling which we seek to get out of consciousness and to keep out ;
we see at once that if the states of consciousness which a creature
endeavors to maintain are the correlatives of injurious actions, and
if the states of consciousness which it endeavors to expel are the

100 THE DATA OF ETHICS.

correlatives of beneficial actions, it must quickly disappear through
persistence in the injurious, and avoidance of the beneficial. In
other words, those races of beings only can havesurvived in 'which,
on the average, agreeable or desired feelings went along with activ-
ities conducive to the maintenance of life, while disagreeable and
habitually avoided feelings went along with activities directly or
indirectly destructive of life ; and there must ever have been, other
things equal, the most numerous and long-continued survivals
among races in which these adjustments of feelings to actions were
the best, tending ever to bring about perfect adjustment.

Fit connections between acts and results must estab-
lish themselves in living things, even before conscious-
ness arises ; and after the rise of consciousness these
connections can change in no other way than to become
better established. At the very outset, life is maintained
by persistence in acts which conduce to it. and desist-
ance from acts which impede it ; and whenever senti-
ency make its appearance as an accompaniment, its forms
must be such that in the one case the produced feeling
i: of a kind that will be sought — pleasure, and in the
other case is of a kind that will be shunned — pain. Ob-
serve the necessity of these relations as exhibited in the
concrete.

A plant which envelops a buried bone with a plexus
of rootlets, or a potato which directs its blanched shoots
toward a grating through which light comes into the
cellar, shows us that the changes which outer agents
themselves set up in its tissues are changes which aid
the utilization of these agents. If wc ask what would
happen if a plant's roots grew not toward the place where
there was moisture, but away from it, or if its leaves,
enabled by light to assimilate, nevertheless bent them-
selves toward the darkness, we see that death would re-
sult in the absence of the existing adjustments. This

TT1E BIOLOGICAL VTEW. 101

general relation is still better shown in an insectivorous
plant, such as the Dioncea muscipula, which keeps its
fcrap dosed around animal matter, but not round other
matter. Here it is manifest that the stimulus arising
from the first part of the absorbed substance itself sets
up those actions by which the mass of the substance is
utilized lor the. plant's benefit.

When we pass from vegetal organisms to unconscious
animal organisms, we see a like connection between
proclivity and advantage. On observing how the ten-
tacles of a polype attach themselves to, and begin to
close round, a living creature, or some animal substance,
Avhile they are indifferent to the touch of other sub-
stance, we are similarly shown that diffusion of some of
the nutritive juices into the tentacles, which is an in-
cipient assimilation, causes the motions effecting pre-
hension. And it is obvious that life would cease were
these relations reversed.

Nor is it otherwise with this fundamental connection
between contact with food and taking in of food, among
conscious creatures, up to the very highest. Tasting a
substance implies the passage of its molecules through
the mucous membrane of the tongue and palate ; and
this absorption, when it occurs with a substance serving
for food, is but a commencement of the absorption car-
ried on throughout the alimentary canal. Moreover,
the sensation accompanying this absorption, when it is
of the kind produced by food, initiates at the place
where it is strongest, in front of the pharnyx, an
automatic act of swallowing, in a manner rudely anal-
ogous to that in which the stimulus of absorption in a
polype's tentacles initiates prehension.

If from these processes and relations that imply

102 TEE DATA OF ETHICS.

contact between a creature's surface and the substance
it takes in, we turn to those set up by diffused particles
of the substance, constituting to conscious creatures its
odor, we meet a kindred general truth. Just as, after
contact, some molecules of a mass of food are absorbed
by the pari touched, and excite the act of prehension,
so are absorbed such of its molecules as, spreading
through the water, reach the organism; and, being
absorbed b}r it. excite those actions by which contact
with tin- mass is effected. If the physical stimulation
caused by the dispersed particles is not accompanied
by consciousness, still the motor changes set up must
conduce to survival of the organism, if they are such
as end in contact ; and there must be relative innutri-
tion and mortality of organisms in which the produced
contractions do not bring about this result. Nor can
it be questioned that whenever and wherever the
physical stimulation has a concomitant sentiency, this
must be such as consists with, and conduces to, move-
ment toward the nutritive matter: it must be not a
repulsive but an attractive sentiency. And this which
holds with the lowest consciousness, must hold through-
out ; as we see it <h> in ;ill such superior creatures as are
drawn to their food by odor.

I; jides those movements which cause locomotion
which erred seizure must no less certainly become
thus adjusted. The molecular changes caused by
absorption of nutritive matter from organic substance
in contact, or from adjacenl organic substance, initiate
motions which are indefinite where the organization is
low, and which become more definite with the advance
of organization. At the outset, while the undifTereri*
tiated protoplasm is everywhere absorbent and every-

TTIE BIOLOGICAL VIEW. 103

where contractile, the changes of form initiated by the
physical stimulation of adjacent: nutritive matter are
vague, and ineffectually adapted to utilization of it;
but gradually, along with the specialization into parts
that are contractile and pails that are absorbent, these
motions become better adapted; for necessarily indi-
viduals in which they are least adapted disappear
faster than those in which they are most adapted.
Recognizing this necessity we have here especially to
recognize a further necessity. The relation between
stimulations and adjusted contractions must be
such that increase of the one causes increase of the
other; since the directions of the discharges being
once established, greater stimulation causes greater
contraction, and the greater contraction causing closer
contact with the stimulating agent, causes increase of
stimulus and is thereby itself further increased. And
now wre reach the corollary which more particularly
concerns us. Clearly as fast as an accompanying
sentiency arises, this cannot be one that is disagree-
able, prompting desistance, but must be one that is
agreeable, prompting persistence. The pleasurable
sensation must be itself the stimulus to the contraction
by which the pleasurable sensation is maintained and
increased; or must be so bound up with the stimulus
that the two increase together. And this relation
which we see is directly established in the case of a
fundamental function, must be indirectly established
with all other functions ; since non-establishment of it
in any particular case implies, in so far, unfitness to the
conditions of existence.

In two ways then, it is demonstrable that there exists
a primordial connection between pleasure-giving acts

104 THE DATA OF ETHICS.

and continuance or increase of life, and, by impli-
cation, between pain-giving acts and decrease or loss of
life. On the one hand, setting out with the lowest
living things, we see that the beneficial act and the act
which there is a tendency to perform, are originally
two sides of the same ; and cannot be disconnected,
without fatal results. On the other hand, if we con-
template developed creatures as now existing, we see
that each individual and species is from day today kept
alive by pursuit of the agreeable and avoidance of the
disagreeable.

Thus approaching the facts from a different side, anal-
ysis brings us down to another face of that ultimate truth
disclosed by analysis in a preceding chapter. We found
it was no more possible to frame ethical conceptions
Erom which the consciousness of pleasure, of some kind,
;it some time, to some being, is absent, than it is pos-
sible to frame the conception of an object from which
the consciousness of spare is absent. And now we see
that this necessity of thought originates in the very
nature of sentient existence. Sentient existence can
evolve only on condition that pleasure-giving acts are
life-sustaining acts.

§ 34. Notwithstanding explanations already made,
the naked enunciation of this as an ultimate truth, un-
. ing all estimations of right and wrong, will in
many, if not in most, cause astonishment. Having in
view certain beneficial results that are preceded by
disagreeable states of consciousness, such as those com-
monly accompanying labor; and having in view the
injurious results that follow the receipt of certain gratis
. -u'li as those which excess in drinking pro-

THE BIOLOGICAL 71 B W. 105

duces; the majority tacitly or avowedly believe that
the bearing of pains is on the whole beneficial, and that
the receipt of pleasures is on the whole detrimental.

The exceptions so fill their minds as to exclude the
rule.

When asked, they are obliged to admit that the pains
accompanying wounds, bruises, sprains, are the con-
comitants of evils, alike to the sufferer and to those
around him; and that the anticipations of such pains
serve as deterrents from careless or dangerous acts.
They cannot deny that the tortures of burning or scald-
ing, and the miseries which intense cold, starvation,
and thirst produce, are indissolubly connected with
permanent or temporary mischiefs, tending to in-
capacitate one who bears them for doing things that
should be done, either for his own welfare or the welfare
of others. The agony of incipient suffocation they are
compelled to recognize as a safeguard to life, and must
allow that avoidance of it is conducive to all that life
can bring or achieve. Nor will they refuse to own that
one who is chained in a cold, damp dungeon, in dark-
ness and silence, is injured in health and efficiency, alike
by the positive pains thus inflicted on him and by the
accompanying negative pains due to absence of light, of
freedom, of companionship.

Conversely, they do not doubt that notwithstanding
occasional excesses the pleasure which accompanies the
taking of food goes along with physical benefit; and
that the benefit is the greater the keener the satis-
faction of appetite. They have no choice but to
acknowledge that the instincts and sentiments which
so overpoweringly prompt marriage, and those which
find their gratification in the fostering of offspring,

106 TIIE DATA OF ETHICS.

■work out an immense surplus of benefit after deducting
all evils. Nor dare they question that the pleasure
taken in accumulating property, leaves a large balance
of advantage, private and public, after making all
drawbacks. Yet many and conspicuous as are the cases
in which pleasures and pains, sensational, and emotional,
serve as incentives to proper acts and deterrents from
improper ads, these pass unnoticed; and notice is taken
only of those cases in which men are directly or in-
directly misled by them. The well-working in essential
matters is ignored ; and the ill-working in unessential
matters is alone recognized.

Is it replied that the more intense pains and pleas-
. which have immediate reference to bodily needs,
guide us rightly ; while the weaker pains and pleasures,
not immediately connected with the maintenance of
liff. guide us wrongly? Then the implication is that
the system <>f guidance by pleasures and pains, which
has answered with all types of creatures below the
human, fails with the human. Or rather, the admis-
sion Icing that with mankind it succeeds in so far as
fulfillment of certain imperative wants goes, it fails in
ct of wants that are not imperative. Those who
think this are required, in the first place, to show us
how the line is to be drawn between the two; and
then i<> show us why the system which succeeds in the
r will not succeed in the higher.

5. Doubtless, however, after all that has been said,
there will be raised afresh the same, difficulty — there
will be instanced the mischievous pleasures and the
beneficent pains. The drunkard, the gambler, thethief,
who severally pursue gratifications, will be named in

THE BIOLOGICAL VIEW. 107

proof that the pursuit of gratifications misleads ; while
the self-sacrificing relative, the worker who perseveres
through weariness, the honest man who stints himself to
pay his way, will be named in proof that disagreeable
modes of consciousness accompany acts that are really
beneficial. But after recalling the fact pointed out in
§ 20, that this objection does not tell against guidance
by pleasures and pains at large, since it merely implies
that special and proximate pleasures and pains must bo
disregarded out of consideration for remote and diffused
pleasures and pains; and, after admitting that in man-
kind, as at present constituted, guidance by proximate
pleasures and pains fails throughout a wide range of
cases ; I go on to set forth the interpretation Biology
gives of these anomalies, as being not necessary and per-
manent, but incidental and temporary.

Already, while showing that among inferior creatures,
pleasures and pains have all along guided the conduct
by which life has been evolved and maintained, I have
pointed out that since the conditions of existence for
each species have been occasionally changing, there have
been occasionally arising partial misadjustments of the
feelings to the requirements, necessitating readjustments.
This general cause of derangement, operating on all
sentient beings, has been operating on human beings in
a manner unusually decided, persistent, and involved.
It needs but to contrast the mode of life followed by
primitive men, wandering in the forests and living on
wild food, with the mode of life followed by rustics,
artisans, traders, and professional men in a civilized com-
munity, to see that the constitution, bodily and mental,
well-adjusted to the one, is ill-adapted to the other.
It needs but to observe the emotions kept awake

TIIF DATA OF ETHICS.

in each savage tribe, chronically hostile to neigh-
boring tribes, and then to observe the emotions
which peaceful production and exchange bring into
play, to see that the two are not only unlike, but
opposed. And it needs but to note how, during social
evolution, the ideas and sentiments appropriate to the
militant activities carried on by coercive co-operation
have been at variance with the ideas and sentiments
appropriate to the industrial activities, carried on by
voluntary co-operation, to see that there has ever been
within each society, and still continues, a conflict be-
tween the two moral natures adjusted to these two un-
like modes of life. Manifestly, then, this readjustment
of constitution to conditions, involving readjustment of

ures and pains for guidance, which all creatures
from time to time undergo, has been in the human race
during civilization especially difficult, not only be-
cause of the greatness of the change from small nomadic
groups to vast settled societies, and from predatory
habits to peaceful habits, but also because the old life
of enmity between societies has been maintained along
with the new life of amity within each society. While
two ways of life so radically opposed as

militant and the industrial, human nature cannot
become properly adapted to either.

That hence results such failure of guidance by pleas-

and pains as is daily exhibited, we discover on
observing in what parts of conduct the failure is most

icuous. As above shown, the pleasurable and
painful sensations are fairly well adjusted to the per-
emptory physical requirements: the benefits of conform-
ing to tl • ions which prompt us in respect of
nutrition, respiration, maintenance of temperature, etc.,

77/ /•; BIOL OGICA L VIEW. 109

immensely exceed the incidental evils, and such mis-
adjustments as occur may be ascribed to tbe change
from the outdoor life of the primitive man to the in-
door life which the civilized man is often compelled to
lead. It is the emotional pleasures and pains which
are in so considerable a degree out of adjustment to the
needs of life as carried on in society, and it is of these
that the readjustment is made in the way above shown,
so tardy because so difficult.

From the hiological point of view, then, we see that
the connections between pleasure and beneficial action
and between pain and detrimental action, which arose
when sentient existence began, and have continued
among animate creatures up to man, are generally dis-
played in him also throughout the lower and more com-
pletely organized part of his nature ; and must be more
and more fully displayed throughout the higher part
of his nature, as fast as his adaptation to the conditions
of social life increases.

§ 36. Biology has a further judgment to pass on the
relations of pleasures and pains to welfare. Beyond
the connections between acts beneficial to the organism
and the pleasures accompanying performance of them,
and between acts detrimental to the organism and the
pains causing desistauce from them, there are connec-
tions between pleasure in general and physiological ex-
altation, and between pain in general and physiological
depression. Every pleasure increases vitality : even-
pain decreases vitality. Every pleasure raises the tide
of life; every pain lowers the tide of life. Let us con-
sider, first, the pains.

By the general mischiefs that result from submission

110 TITE DATA OF ETHICS.

ins, T do not mean those arising from the diffused
effects of local organic lesions, sucli as follow an aneur-
ism caused by intense effort spite of protesting sensa-
tions, or such as follow the varicose veins brought on
by continued disregard of fatigue in the legs, or such
low the atrophy set up in muscles that are per-
sistently exerted when extremely weary; but I mean
tlx' general mischiefs caused by that constitutional dis-
turbance which pain forthwith sets up. These are con-
spicuous when the pains are acute, whether they be sen-
sational or emotional.

Bodily agony long borne produces death by exhaus-
tion. More frequently, arresting the action of the heart
for a time, it causes that temporary death we call faint-
On other occasions vomiting is a consequence.
And where such manifest derangements do not result,
ill, in the pallor and trembling, trace the general
prostration. Beyond the actual loss of life caused by
subjection to intense cold there are depressions of vi-
tality less marked caused by cold less extreme — tempo-
rary enfeeblement following too long an immersion in
i<v water ; enervation and pining away consequent on
inadequate clothing. Similarly is it with submission
: we have lassitude reaching occasionally
baustiorj ; we have, in weak persons, fainting, suc-
1 by temporary debilitation ; and in steaming trop-
ical jungles Europeans contract fevers which, when
not fatal, often entail life-long incapacities. Consider,
again, the evils that follow violent exertion continued
in spite of painful feelings — now a fatigue which de-
stroys appetite or arrests digestion if food is taken, im-
plying failure of the reparative processes when they are
raoot needed ; and now a prostration of the heart, here

Ill i; BIOLOGICAL VIEW. Ill

lusting- for a lime and there, where the transgression
h;is been repeated day after day, made permanent: re-
ducing the rest of life to a lower level.

No less conspicuous are the depressing effects of
emotional pains. There are occasional cases of (hath
from grief ; and in other cases the mental suffering which
a calamity causes, like bodily suffering, shows its effects
by syncope. Often a piece of bad news is succeeded
by sickness ; and continued anxiety will produce loss of
appetite, perpetual indigestion and diminished strength.
Excessive tear, whether aroused b}^ physical or moral
danger, will, in like manner, arrest for a time the pro-
cesses of nutrition ; and, not unfrequently, in pregnant
women brings on miscarriage ; while, in less extreme
cases, the cold perspiration and unsteady hands indicate
a general lowering of the vital activities, entailing par-
tial incapacity of body or mind or both. How greatly
emotional pain deranges the visceral actions is shown
us by the fact that incessant worry is not unfrequently
followed by jaundice. And here, indeed, the relation
between cause and effect happens to have been proved
by direct experiment. Making such arrangements that
the bile-duct of a dog delivered its product outside the
body, Claude Bernard observed that so long as he petted
the dog and kept him in good spirits, secretion went on
at its normal rate; but on speaking angrily, and for a
time so treating him as to produce depression, the flow
of bile was arrested.

Should it be said that evil results of such kinds are
proved to occur only when the pains, bodily or mental,
are great, the reply is that in healthy persons the
injurious perturbations caused by small pains, though
jiot easily traced, are still produced; and that in those

112 THE DATA OF ETHICS.

whose vital powers are much reduced by illness, slight
physical irritations and trifling moral annoyances, often
cause relapses.

Quite opposite are the constitutional effects of pleas-
It sometimes, though rarely, happens that in
feeble persons intense pleasure — pleasure that is almost
pain— gives a nervous shock that is mischievous; but
it d<»es no1 do this in those who are undebilitated by
voluntary or enforced submission to actions injurious to
the organism. In the normal order, pleasures, great and
small, are stimulants to the processes by which life is
maintained.

Among the sensations may be instanced those pro-
duced by bright light. Sunshine is enlivening in com-
parison with gloom — even a gleam excites a wave of
pleasure; and experiments have shown that sunshine
- the rate of respiration: raised respiration being
an index of raised vital activities in general. A warmth
thai is agreeable in degree favors the heart's action, and
furthers the various functions to which this is instru-
mental. Though those who are in full vigor and fitly
clothed can maintain their temperature in winter, and
can digesl additional food to make up for the loss of
it is otherwise with the feeble; and, as vigor
decline-, the beneficence of warmth becomes conspic-
That benefits accompany the agreeable sensa-
tions produced by fresh air, and the agreeable sensa-
tions thai accompany muscular action after due rest,
and the agreeable sensations caused by rest after exer-
tion cannot he questioned. Receipt of these pleasures
conduces to the maintenance of the body in fit condi-
tion for all the purposes of life.

More manifest still are the physiological benefits of

THE BIOLOGICAL VIEW. IP;

emotional pleasures. Every power, bodily and mental,
is increased by "good spirits," which is our name for
a general emotional satisfaction. The truth that the
fundamental vital actions — those of nutrition — are
furthered by laughter-moving conversation, or rather
by the pleasurable feeling causing laughter, is one of
old standing ; and every dyspeptic knows that in
exhilarating company, a large and varied dinner, includ-
ing not very digestible things, may be eaten with
impunity, and, indeed, with benefit, while a small,
carefully chosen dinner of simple things, eaten in soli-
tude, will be followed by indigestion. This striking
effect on the alimentary system is accompanied by
effects, equally certain though less manifest, on the
circulation and the respiration. Again, one who,
released from daily labors and anxieties, receives
delights from fine scenery or is enlivened by the novel-
ties he sees abroad, comes back showing by toned-up
face and vivacious manner, the greater energy with
which he is prepared to pursue his avocation. Invalids
especially, on whose narrowed margin of vitality the
influence of conditions is most visible, habitually show
the benefits derived from agreeable states of feelino;.
A lively social circle, the call of an old friend, or even
removal to a brighter room, will, by the induced cheer-
fulness, much improve the physical state. In brief, as
every medical man knows, there is no such tonic as
happiness.

These diffused physiological effects of pleasures and
pains, which are joined with the local or special physi-
ological effects, arc, indeed, obviously inevitable. We
haye seen {Principle* of Psychology, §§ 123-125) that
while craving, or negative pain, accompanies the under-

1U Tin: DATA OF ETHICS.

activity of an organ, and while positive pain accompa*
its over-activity, pleasure accompanies its normal
activity; We have seen that by evolution no other rela-
tions could be established; since, through all inferior
types of creatures, if defect or excess of function pro-
duced no disagreeable sentiency, and medium function
no agreeable sentiency, there would be nothing to insure
a proportioned performance of function. And as it is
one of the laws of nervous action that each stimulus,
1 id a direct discharge to the particular organ acted
on, indirectly causes a general discharge throughout
the nervous system (Prin. of Psy., §§ 21,39), it results
that the rest of the organs, all influenced as they are
by the nervous system, participate in the stimulation.
So that beyond the aid, more slowly shown, which the
organs yield to one another through the physiological
division of labor, there is the aid, more quickly shown,
which mutual excitation gives. While there is a ben-
efit to be presently felt by the whole organism from
the due performance of each function, there is an im-
te benefit from the exaltation of its functions at
i caused by the accompanying pleasure; and from
pains, whether of excess or defect, there also come
these double •.•fleets, immediate and remote.

7. Non-recognition of these general truths vitiates
moral speculation at large. From the estimates of right
and wrong habitually framed, these physiological effects
wroughl "!i the actor by his feelings are entirely omitted.
It is tacitly assumed that pleasures and pains have no
ions on the body of the recipient, affecting his
i for the duties of life. The only reactions recog-
nized are those on character ; respecting which the cur-

THE BIOLOG ICA I VIEW. 11 5

rent supposition is, that acceptance of pleasures is det-
rimental and submission to pains beneficial. The
notion, remotely descended from the ghost-theory of
llic savage, that mind and body arc independent, has,
among its various implications, this belief that states of
consciousness are in no wise related to bodily states.
" You have had your gratification — it is past ; and
you are as you were before," says the moralist to one.
And to another he says, " You have borne the suffering
— it is over; and there the matter ends." Both state-
ments are false. Leaving out of view indirect results,
the direct results are that the one has moved a step
away from death and the other has moved a step toward
death.

Leaving out of view, I say, the indirect results. It
is these indirect results, here for the moment left out
of view, which the moralist has exclusively in view,
being so occupied by them that he ignores the direct
results. The gratification, perhaps purchased at undue
cost, perhaps enjoyed when work should have been
done, perhaps snatched from the rightful claimant, is
considered only in relation to remote injurious effects,
and no set-off is made for immediate beneficial effects.
Conversehv, from positive and negative pains, borne
now in the pursuit of some future advantage, now in
discharge of responsibilities, now in performing a gen-
erous act, the distant good is alone dwelt on and the
proximate evil ignored. Consequences, pleasurable and
painful, experienced by the actor forthwith, are of no
importance; and they become of importance only when
anticipated as occurring hereafter to the actor or to other
persons. And further, future evils borne by the actor
are considered of no account if they result from self*

11(5 TUK DATA OF ETHICS.

denial, and are emphasized only when they result from
self-gratification. Obviously, estimates so framed are
erroneous; and obviously, the pervading judgments of
conduct based on such estimates must be distorted.
Mark the anomalies of opinion produced.

[f, as the sequence of a malady contracted in pursuit
of illegitimate gratification, an attack of iritis injures
vision, the mischief is to be counted among those en-
tailed by immoral conduct; but if, regardless of protest-
ing sensations, the eyes are used in study too soon after
ophthalmia, and there follows blindness for years or for
life, rut ailing not only personal unhappiness, but a bur-
den on others, moralists are silent. The broken leg
which a drunkard's accident causes counts among those
miseries brought on self and family by intemperance,
which form the ground for reprobating it ; but if anxiety
to fullill duties prompts the continued use of a sprained
knee spite of the pain, and brings on a chronic lameness
involving lack of exercise, consequent ill-health, ineffi-
ciency, anxiety, and unhappiness, it is supposed that
ethics has no verdict to give in the matter. A student
who is plucked because he has spent in amusement the
time and money that should have gone in study, is
blamed for thus making parents unhappy and preparing
for himself a miserable future; but another who, think-
ing exclusively of claims on him, reads night after night

with hot or aching head, and, breaking down, cannot

. but returns home shattered in health

and unabl iport himself, is named with pity only,

il subjeei to any moral judgment; or rather, the

moral judgment passed is wholly favorable.

Thus recognizing the evils caused by some kinds of
conduct only, men at large, and moralists as exponents

THE BIOLOGICAL VIEW. 117

of their beliefs, ignore the suffering and death daily
caused around them by disregard of that guidance which
has established itself in the course of evolution. Led
by the tacit assumption common to Pagan stoics and
Christian ascetics, that we are so diabolically organized
that pleasures are injurious and pains beneficial, people
on all sides yield examples of lives blasted by persisting
in actions against which their sensations rebel. Here is
one who, drenched to the skin and sitting in a cold wind,
pooh-poohs his shiverings and gets rheumatic fever, with
subsequent heart-disease, which makes worthless the
short life remaining to him. Here is another who, dis-
regarding painful feelings, works too soon after a debili-
tating illness, and establishes disordered health that lasts
for the rest of his days, and makes him useless to him-
self and others. Now the account is of a youth who^
persisting in gymnastic feats spite of scarcely bearable
straining, bursts a blood-vessel, and, long laid on the
shelf, is permanently damaged ; while now it is of a man
in middle life who, pushing muscular effort to painful
excess, suddenly brings on hernia. In this family is a
case of aphasia, spreading paralysis and death, caused by
eating too little and doing too much ; in that, softening
of the brain has been brought on by ceaseless mental
efforts against which the feelings hourly protested : and
in others, less serious brain affections have been con-
tracted by over-study continued regardless of discomfort,
and the cravings for fresh air and exercise.* Even with-
out accumulating special examples, the truth is forced
on us by the visible traits of classes. The careworn man
of business too long at his office, the cadaverous barris-

*I can count up more thau a dozen such cases among those per-
sonally well known to me.

118 THE DATA OF ETHICS.

fcer poring half the night over his briefs, the feeble fac-
tory hands and unhealthy seamstresses passing long
hours in bad air, the anaemic, flat-chested school-girls,
bending over many lessons and forbidden boisterous
play, no less than Sheffield grinders who die of suffo-
cating dust, and peasants crippled with rheumatism due
(tsnie. show us the widespread miseries caused by
ivering in actions repugnant to the sensations and
neglecting actions which the sensations prompt. Nay,
the evidence is still more extensive and conspicuous.
What are the puny malformed children, seen in poverty-
stricken districts, but children whose appetites for food
and desires for warmth have not been adecpuately satis-
lied ? What are populations stinted in growth and pre-
maturely aged, such as parts of France show us, but
populations injured by work in excess and food in de-
fect : the one implying positive pain, the other negative
pain ? What is the implication of that greater mortality
which occurs among people who are weakened by priva-
tions, unless it is that bodily miseries conduce to fatal
' Or once more, what must we infer from the
frightful amount of disease and death suffered by armies
in the field, fed on scanty and bad provisions, lying on
damp ground, exposed to extremes of heat and cold, in-
adequately sheltered from rain, and subject to exhaust-
ing efforts; unless it be the terrible mischiefs caused by
continuously subjecting the body to treatment which the
feelings protest against?

It matters not to the argument whether the actions
entailing such effects are voluntary or involuntary. It
matters not from the biological point of view whether
the motive-- prompting them are high or low. The vital
functions accept no apologies on the ground that neglect

TT1E BIOLOGICAL VIEW. 119

of them was unavoidable, or that the reason fo neglect
was noble. The direct and indirect sufferings utused by

non-conformity to the laws of life are the same whatever
induces the non-conformity; and cannot be omitted in
any rational estimate of conduct. If the purpose i E
ethical inquiry is to establish rules of right living ; and
if the rules of right living are those of which the total
results, individual and general, direct and indirect, are
most conducive to human happiness ; then it is absurd
to ignore the immediate results and recognize only the
remote results.

§ 38. Here might be urged the necessity for prelud-
ing the study of moral science by the study of biologi-
cal science. Here might be dwelt on the error men
make in thinking they can understand those special
phenomena of human life with which Ethics deals, while
paying little or no attention to the general phenomena
of human life, and while utterly ignoring the phenomena
of life at large. And, doubtless, there would be truth
in the inference that such accpuaintance with the world
of living things, as discloses the part which pleasures
and pains have played in organic evolution, would help
to rectify these one-sided conceptions of moralists. It
cannot be held, however, that lack of this knowledge is
the sole cause, or the main cause, of their one-sidedness.
For facts of the kind above instanced, which, duly at-
tended to, would prevent such distortions of moral
theory, are facts which it needs no biological inquiries
to learn, but which are daily thrust before tl
all. The truth is, rather, that the general conscious
is so possessed by sentiments and ideas at variance with
the conclusions necessitated by familiar evidence that

120 THE DATA OF ETHICS.

the evidence gets no attention. These adverse senti-
ments and ideas have several roots.

There is the theological root. As before shown, from
the worship of cannibal ancestors who delighted in
witnessing tortures, there resulted the primitive concep-
tion of deities who were propitiated by the bearing of
pains, and. consequently, angered by the receipt of
pleasures. Through the religions of the semi-civilized,
in which this conception of the divine nature remains
conspicuous, it has persisted, in progressively modified
forms, down to our own times; and still colors the be-
both of those who adhere to the current creed and
of those' who nominally reject it.

There i.s another root in the primitive and still-surviv-
ing militancy. While social antagonisms continue to
generate war, which consists in endeavors to inflict pain
and death while submitting to the risks of pain and
death, and which necessarily involves great privations,
it is needful that physical suffering, whether considered
in itself or in the evils it bequeaths, should be thought
little of, and that among pleasures recognized as most
worthy should be those which victory brings.

Nor does partially developed industrialism fail to
furnish a root. With social evolution, which implies
ition from the life- of wandering hunters to the life
of settled peoples engaged in labor, and which therefore
entails activities widely unlike those to which the abo-
il constitution is adapted, there comes an under-
of faculties for which the social slate affords no

, and an overtaxing of faculties required for the

the one implying denial of certain pleas*

and the other submission to certain pains. Hence,

along with that growth of population which makes the

THE BIOLOGICAL VIEW. 121

struggle for existence intense, bearing of pains and sac-
rifice of pleasures is daily necessitated.

Now always and everywhere, there arises among men
a theory conforming to their practice. The savage
nature, originating the conception of a savage deity,
evolves a theory of supernatural control sufficiently
stringent and cruel to influence his conduct. With sub-
mission to despotic government severe enough in its
restraints to keep in order barbarous natures, there
grows up a theory of divine right to rule, and the duty
of absolute submission. Where war is made the busi-
ness of life by the existence of warlike neighbors, vir-
tues which are required for war come to be regarded as
supreme virtues; while, contrariwise, when industrial-
ism has grown predominant, the violence and the decep-
tion which warriors glory in come to be held criminal.
In like manner, then, there arises a tolerable adjustment
of the actually accepted (not the nominally accepted)
theory of right living, to living as it is daily carried on.
If the life is one that necessitates habitual denial of
pleasures and bearing of pains, there grows up an an-
swering ethical system under which the receipt of pleas-
ures is tacitly disapproved and the bearing of pains
avowedly approved. The mischiefs entailed by pleas-
ures in excess are dwelt on, while the benefits which
normal pleasures bring are ignored; and the good re-
sults achieved by submission to pains are fully set forth,
while the evils are overlooked.

But while recognizing the desirableness of, and indeed
the necessity for, systems of ethics adapted, like religious
systems and political systems, to their respective times
and places, we have here to regard the first as, like the
others, transitional. We must infer that like a purer

122 TTTE DATA OF ETTTICS.

creed and a better government, a truer ethics belongs to
a more advanced social state

Led, d priori^ to conclude that distortions must exist,
we are enabled to recognize as such the distortions we
find: answering in nature, as these do, to expectation.
And there is forced on us the truth that a scientific mor-
ality arises only as fast as the one-sided conceptions
adapted to transitory conditions are developed into both-
sided conceptions. The science of right living has to
take account of all consequences in so far as they affect
happiness, personally or socially, directly or indirectly;
and by as much as it ignores any class of consequences,
by so much does it fail to be science.

§ 39. Like the physical view, then, the biological
view corresponds with the view gained by looking at
conduct in general from the standpoint of Evolution.

That which was physically defined as a moving
equilibrium, we define biologically as a balance of
functions. The implication of such a balance is that
the several functions, in their kinds, amounts, and com-
binations, are adjusted to the several activities which
maintain and constitute complete life; and to be so ad-
I is to have reached the goal toward which the evo-
lution of conduct continually tends.

I' jsing to the feelings which accompany the perform-
ance of functions, we see that of necessity during the
evolution of organic life, pleasures have become the con-
comitants of normal amounts of functions, while pains,
positive and negative, have become the concomitants of
and defects of functions. And though in every
species derangements of these relations are often caused
by changes of conditions, they ever re-establish them-

THE BIOLOGICAL VIEW. 123

selves : disappearance of the species being the alterna-
tive.

Mankind, inheriting from creatures of lower kinds,
such adjustments between feelings and functions as con-
cern fundamental bodily requirements ; and daily forced
by peremptory feelings to do the things which maintain
life and avoid those which bring immediate death ; has
been subject to a change of conditions unusually great
and involved. This has considerably deranged the guid-
ance by sensations, and has deranged in a much greater
degree the guidance by emotions. The result is that in
many cases pleasures are not connected with actions
which must be performed, nor pains with actions which
must be avoided, but contrariwise.

Several influences have conspired to make men ignore
the well-working of these relations between feelings and
functions, and to observe whatever of ill-working is seen
in them. Hence, while the evils which some pleasures
entail are dilated upon, the benefits habitually accom-
panying receipt of pleasures are unnoticed ; at the same
time that the benefits achieved through certain pains are
magnified while the immense mischiefs which pains
bring are made little of.

The ethical theories characterized by these perversions
are products of, and are appropriate to the forms of
social life which the imperfectly adapted constitutions
of men produce. But with the progress of adaptation,
bringing faculties and recpuirements into harmony, such
incongruities of experience, and consequent distortions
of theory, must diminish ; until, along with complete
adjustment of humanity to the social state, will go
recognition of the truths that actions are completely
right only when, besides being conducive to future hap-

124 THE DATA OF ETHICS.

piness, special and genera], they are immediately pleas-
urable, and that painfulness, not only ultimate but
proximate, is the concomitant of actions which are
wrong.

So that from the biological point of view, ethical
science becomes a specification of the conduct of associ-
ated men who are severally so constituted that the vari-
ous self-preserving activities, the activities required for
rearing offspring, and those which social welfare de-
mands, are fulfilled in the spontaneous exercise of duly
proportioned faculties, each yielding when in action its
quantum of pleasure, and who are, by consequence, so
constituted that excess or defect in any one of these
actions brings its quantum of pain, immediate and
remote.

Note to § 33. In his Physical Ethics, Mr. Alfred Barratt lias
expressed a view which here calls for notice. Postulating Evolu-
tion and its general laws, he refers to certain passages in the Prin-
ciples nf Psychology (1st ed. Pt. III. ch. viii. pp. 395, sqq. cf. Pt.
IV. ch. iv.) in which I have treated of the relation between irrita-
tion and contraction which " marks the dawn of sensitive life ;"
have pointed out that " the primordial tissue must be differently
affected by contact with nutritive and with innutritive matters" —
the two being for aquatic creatures respectively the soluble and the
insoluble; and have argued that the contraction by which a pro-
truded part of a rhizopod draws in a fragment of assimilable matter
'• is caused by a commencing absorption of the assimilable matter.''
Mr. Barratt, holding that consciousness " must lie considered as an
invariable property of animal life, and ultimately, in its elements, of
the material universe" (p. 43), regards these responses of animal tis-
sue to stimuli, .-is implying feeling of one or other kind. " Some
kinds of impressed force," hesays, " are followed by movements of
retraction and withdrawal, others by such as secure a continuance of
the impression. These two kinds of contraction are the phenomena
and external marks of pain and pleasure respectively. Hence the
tissue acta so as to secure pleasure and avoid pain by a law as truly
physical and natural as that whereby a needle turns to the pole, or

THE PHYSICAL VIEW. 125

a tree to the light" (p. 53). Not without questioning that the raw
material of consciousness is present even in undifferentiated pro-
toplasm, and everywhere exists potentially in that Unknowable
Power which, otherwise conditioned, is manifested in physical
action (Prin. of Psy., % '-272-8), I demur to the conclusion that it at
first exists under the forms of pleasure and pain. These, I con-
ceive, arise, as the more special feelings do, by a compounding of
of the ultimate elements of consciousness (Prin. of Psy., §§60, 61) :
being, indeed, general aspects of these more special feelings when
they reach certain intensities. Considering that even in creat-
ures which have developed nervous systems, a great part of the
vital processes are carried on by unconscious reflex actions, I see
no propriety in assuming the existence of what we understand by
consciousness in creatures not only devoid of nervous systems but
devoid of structures in general.

Note to § 36. More than once in the Emotions and the Will,
Dr. Bain insists on the connection between pleasure and exaltation
of vitality, and the connection between pain and depression of vital-
ity. As above shown, I concur in the view taken by him ; which
is, indeed, put beyond dispute by general experience as well as by
the more special experience of medical men.

When, however, from the invigorating and relaxing effects of
pleasure and pain respectively, Dr. Bain derives the original ten-
dencies to persist in acts which give pleasure and to desist from
those which give pain, I find myself unable to go with him. He
says: "We suppose movements spontaneously begun, and acci-
dentally causing pleasure ; we then assume that with the pleasure
there will be an increase of vital energy, in which increase
the fortunate movements will share, and thereby increase the
pleasure. Or, on the other hand, we suppose the spontane-
ous movements to give pain, and assume that, with the pain,
there will be a decrease of energy, extending to the move-
ments that cause the evil, and thereby providing a remedy"
(3d ed. p. 315). This interpretation, implying that " the fortunate
movements'" merely share in the effects of augmented vital energy
caused by the pleasure, does not seem to me congruous with obser-
vation. The truth appears rather to be that though there is a con-
comitant general increase of muscular tone, the muscles specially
excited are those which, by their increased contraction, conduce
to increased pleasure. Conversely, the implication that desistance
from spontaneous movements which cause pain, is due to a general

126 THE DATA OF ETFllCfi.

muscular relaxation shared in by the muscles causing these par-
ticular movements, seems to me at variance with the fact that the
retractation commonly takes the form not of a passive lapse but
of an active withdrawal. Further, it may be remarked that de-
pressing as pain eventually is to the system at large, we cannot
say that it at once depresses the muscular energies. Not simply,
as Dr. Main admits, does an acute smart produce spasmodic move-
mints, but pains of all kinds, both sensational and emotional,
stimulate the muscles {Essays, 1st series, p. 3G0, 1, or 2d ed. Vol.
I. p. 211,12). Pain, however (and also pleasure when very intense),
simultaneously has an inhibitory effect on all the reflex actions ;
and as the vital functions in general are carried on by reflex
actions, this inhibition, increasing with the intensity of the pain,
proportionately depressesthe vital functions. Arrest of the heart's
action and fainting is an extreme result of this inhibition ; and the
viscera at large feel its effects in degree's proportioned to the de-
grees of pain. Pain, therefore, while' directly causing a discharge
of muscular energy as pleasure does, eventually lowers muscular
power by lowering those vital processes on which the supply of
energy depends. Hence we cannot, I think, ascribe the prompt
ince from muscular movements causing pain, to decrease in
the flow of energy ; for this decrease is felt only after an interval.
Conversely, we cannot ascribe the persistence in a muscular act
which yields pleasure to the resulting exaltation of energy; but
must, as indicated in § 33, ascribe it to the establishment of lines
of discharge between the place of pleasurable stimulation and those
contractile structures which maintain and increase the act causing
the stimulation — connections allied with the reflex, into which they
pass by insensible gradations.

THE 1'SYCllOLOGICAL VIEW. 127

CHAPTER VII.

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL VIEW.

§ 40. The last chapter, in so far as it dealt with feel-
ings in their relations to conduct, recognized only their
physiological aspects : their psychological aspects were
passed over. In this chapter, conversely, we are not
concerned with the constitutional connections between
feelings, as incentives or deterrents, and physical bene-
fits to be gained, or mischiefs to be avoided; nor with
the reactive effects of feelings on the state of the organ-
ism, as fitting or unfitting it for future action. Here we
have to consider represented pleasures and pains, sensa-
tional and emotional, as constituting deliberate motives
— as forming factors in the conscious adjustments of
acts to ends.

§ 41. The rudimentary psychical act, not yet differ-
entiated from a physical act, implies an excitation and a
motion. In a creature of low type the touch of food
excites prehension. In a somewhat higher creature the
odor from nutritive matter sets up motion of the body
toward the matter. And where rudimentary vision ex-
ists, sudden obscuration of light, implying the passage
of something large, causes convulsive muscular move-
ments which mostly carry the body away from the source
of danger. In each of these cases we may distinguish
four factors. There is (a) that property of the external

1 28 THE DATA OF ETHICS.

object which primarily affects the organism — the taste,
smell, or opacity ; arid connected with such property
there is in the external object that character (b~) which
renders seizure of it, or escape from it, beneficial.
Within the organism there is (>) the impression or sen-
sation which the property (a) produces, serving as
stimulus ; and there is connected with it, the motor
change (t7) by which seizure or escape is effected.

Now Psychology is chiefly concerned with the connec-
tion between the relation a 6, and the relation c d, under
all those forms which they assume in the course of evo-
lution. Each of the factors, and each of the relations,
grows more involved as organization advances. Instead
of being single, the identifying attribute a, often be-
comes, in the environment of a superior animal, a cluster
of attributes ; such as the size, form, colors, motions,
displayed by a distant creature that is dangerous. The
factor 1>, with which this combination of attributes is as-
sociated, becomes the congeries of characters, powers,
habits, which constitute it an enemy. Of the subjective
factors, e becomes a complicated set of visual sensations
co-ordinated with one another and with the ideas and
Feelings established by experience of such enemies, and
constituting the motive to escape ; while d becomes the
intricate and often prolonged series of runs, leaps,
doubles, dives, etc., made in eluding the enemy.

In human life we find the same four outer and
inner factors, still more multiform and entangled in
their compositions and connections. The entire assem-
blage of physical attributes a, presented by an estate
that is advertised for sale, passes enumeration; and
the assemblage of various utilities, b, going along with
these attributes, is also beyond brief specification. The

THE PBTCItOLOGICAL VIEW. 129

perceptions and ideas, likes and dislikes, <\ set up by
the aspeet of the estate, and wliieli, compounded and re-
compouncled, eventually form the motive for buying it,
make a whole too large and complex for description;
and the transactions, legal, pecuniary, and other, gone
through in making the purchase and taking possession,
are scarcely Less numerous and elaborate.

Nor must we overlook the fact that as evolution pro-
gresses, not only do the factors increase in complexity,
but also the relations among them. Originally, a is
directly and simply connected with b, while c is directly
and simply connected with <1. But eventually, the con-
nections between a and Z>, and between c and cZ, become
very indirect and involved. On the one hand, as the
first illustration shows us, sapidity and nutritiveness are
closely bound together ; as are also the stimulation
caused by the one and the contraction which utilizes
the other. But, as we see in the last illustration, the
connection between the visible traits of an estate and
those characters which constitute its value, is at once
remote and complicated ; while the transition from the
purchaser's highly composite motive to the numerous
actions of sensory and motor organs, severally intricate,
which effect the purchase, is through an entangled
plexus of thoughts and feelings constituting his de-
cision.

After this explanation will be apprehended a truth
otherwise set forth in the Principles of Psychology.
Mind consists of feelings and the relations among feel-
ings. By composition of the relations, and ideas of
relations, intelligence arises. By composition of the
feelings, and ideas of feelings, emotion arises. And,
other things equal, the evolution of either is great in
9

130 THE DATA OF ETHICS.

proportion as the composition is great. One of the
necessary implications is that cognition becomes higher
in proportion as it is remoter from reflex action; while
emotion becomes higher in proportion as it is remoter
from sensation.

And now of the various corollaries from this broad
view of psychological evolution, let us observe those
which concern the motives and actions that are classed
as moral and immoral.

§ 42. The mental process by which, in any case, the
adjustment of acts to ends is effected, and which, under
its higher forms, becomes the subject-matter of ethical
judgments, is, as above implied, divisible into the rise
of a feeling or feelings constituting the motive, and
the thought or thoughts through which the motive is
shaped and finally issues in action. The first of these
elements, originally an excitement, becomes a simple
sensation ; then a compound sensation ; then a cluster
of partially presentative and partially representative
sensations, forming an incipient emotion; then a clus-
ter of exclusively ideal or representative sensations,
forming an emotion proper ; then a cluster of such clus-
ters, forming a compound emotion ; and eventually be-
comes a still more involved emotion composed of the
ideal forms of such compound emotions. The other
elemeni, beginning with that immediate passage of a
single stimulus into a single motion, called reflex action,
presently comes to be a set of associated discharges of
stimuli producing associated motions, constituting in-
stinct. Step bystep arise more entangled combinations
of stimuli. hat variable in their modes of union,

leading to complex motions similarly variable in their

ttte Psychological view. 131

adjustments ; whence occasional hesitations in the sen-

sori-motor processes. Presently is reached a stage at
which the combined clusters of impressions, not all
present together, issue in actions not all simultaneous ;
implying representation of results, or thought. After-
ward follow stages in which various thoughts have time
to pass before the composite motives produce the ap-
propriate actions. Until at last arise those long de-
liberations during which the probabilities of various
consequences are estimated, and the promptings of the
correlative feelings balanced, constituting calm judg-
ment. That under either of its aspects the later forms
of this mental process are the higher, ethically con-
sidered as well as otherwise considered, will be readily
seen.

For from the first, complication of sentiency has ac-
companied better and more numerous adjustments of
acts to ends ; as also has complication of movement,
and complication of the co-ordinating or intellectual
process uniting the two. Whence it follows that the
acts characterized by the more complex motives and
the more involved thoughts, have all along been of
higher authority for guidance. Some examples will
make this clear.

Here is an aquatic creature guided by the odor of
organic matter toward things serving for food; but a
creature which, lacking any other guidance, is at the
mercy of larger creatures coming near. Here is
another which, also guided to food by odor, possesses
rudimentary vision ; and so is made to start spasmod-
ically away from a moving body which diffuses this
odor, in those cases where it is large enough to produce
sudden obscuration of light — usually an enemy. Evi-

1 32 THE DA TA OF ETHICS.

dentlv life will frequently be saved by conforming to
the Later and higher stimulus, instead of to the earlier
and lower.

Observe at a more advanced stage a parallel conflict.
This is a beast which pursues others for prey, and,
either lacking experience or prompted by raging hun-
ger, attacks one more powerful than itself, and gets
destroyed. Conversely, thai is a beast which, prompted
by a 1 1 unger equally keen, but either by individual ex-
perience or effects of inherited experience, made con-
scious of evil by the aspect of one more powerful than
itself, is deterred from attacking, and saves its life by
subordinating the primary motive, consisting of crav-
ing sensations, to the secondary motive, consisting of
ideal feelings, distinct or vague.

Ascending at once from these examples of conduct in
animals to examples of human conduct, we shall see
that the contrast between inferior and superior have
habitually the same traits. The savage of lowest type
devours all the food captured by to-day's chase, and,
hungry on the morrow, has perhaps for days to bear the
paries of starvation. The superior savage, conceiving
more vividly the entailed sufferings if no game is to be
found, is deterred by his complex feeling from giving
way entirely to his .simple feeling. Similarly are
two contrasted in the inertness which goes along
with lack of forethought, and the activity which due
forethought produces. The primitive man, idly
inclined, and ruled by the sensations of the moment,
will not exert himself until actual pains have to be
•d ; but the man somewhat advanced, able more
. ctly to imagine future gratifications and suffer-
ings, is prompted by the thought of these to overcome

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL VIEW. 133

his love of ease : decrease of misery and mortality re-
sulting from this predominance of the representative
feelings over the presentative feelings.

Without dwelling on the fact that among the civi-
lized, those who lead the life of the senses are contrasted
in the same way with those whose lives are largely
occupied with pleasures not of a sensual kind, let
me point out that there are analogous contrasts be-
tween guidance by the less complex representative
feelings, or lower emotions, and guidance by the more
complex representative feelings, or higher emotions.
When led by his acquisitiveness — are-representative
feeling which, acting under due control, conduces to
welfare — the thief takes another man's property ; his act
is determined by certain imagined proximate pleasures
of relatively simple kinds, rather than by less clearly
imagined possible pains that are more remote and of
relatively involved kinds. But in the conscientious
man, there is an adequate restraining motive, still
more re-representative in its nature, including not only
ideas of punishment, and not only ideas of lost reputa-
tion and ruin, but including ideas of the claims of
the person owning the property, and of the pains which
loss of it will entail on him : all joined with a general
aversion to acts injurious to others, which arises from
the inherited effects of experience. And here at the
end we see, as we saw at the beginning, that guidance
by the more complex feeling, on the average, conduces
to welfare more than does guidance by the simpler
feeling.

The like holds with the intellectual co-ordinations
through which stimuli issue in motions. The lowest
actions, called reflex, iu whieh an impression made on

134 THE DATA OF ETHICS.

an afferent nerve causes by discharge through an
efferent nerve a contraction, shows us a very limited
adjustment of acts to ends : the impression being
simple, and the resulting motion simple, the internal
co-ordination is also simple. Evidently when there are
several senses which can be together affected by an
outer object; and when, according as such object is
discriminated as of one or other kind, the movements
made in response are combined in one or other way ;
the intermediate co-ordinations are necessarily more
involved. And evidently each further step in the evo-
lution of intelligence, always instrumental to better
self-preservation, exhibits this same general trait. The
adjustments by which the more involved actions are
made appropriate to the more involved circumstances,
imply more intricate, and, consequently, more deliber-
ate and conscious co-ordinations; until, when we come
to civilized men, who in their daily business, taking
into account many data and conditions, adjust their
proceedings to various consequences, we see that the
intellectual actions, becoming of the kind we call judi-
cial, are at once very elaborate and very deliberate.

Observe, then, what follows respecting the relative
authorities of motives. Throughout the ascent from
low creatures up to man, and from the lowest types of
man up to the highest, self-preservation has been
increased by the subordination of simple excitations to
compound excitations — the subjection of immediate(
lions to the ideas of sensations to come — the over-
ruling of presentative feelings by representative feel-
ings, and of representative f'-clings by re-representative
feelings. As life has advanced, the accompanying
lentiency has become increasingly ideal; and among

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL VIEW. 135

feelings produced by the compounding of ideas, the
highest, and those which have evolved latest, are the
re-compounded or doubly ideal. Hence it follows that
as guides, the feelings have authorities proportionate to,
the degrees in which they are removed by their com-
plexity and their ideality from simple sensations and '
appetites.

A further implication is made clear by studying the
intellectual sides of these mental processes by which
acts are adjusted to ends. Where they are low and
simple, these comprehend the guiding only of imme-
diate arts by immediate stimuli — the entire transaction
in each case, lasting but a moment, refers only to a
proximate result. But with the development of intel-
ligence, and the growing ideality of the motives, the
ends to which the acts are adjusted cease to be exclu-
sively immediate. The more ideal motives concern
ends that are more distant ; and with approach to the
highest types, present ends become increasingly sub-
ordinate to those future ends which the ideal motives
have for their objects. Hence there arises a certain
presumption in favor of a motive which refers to a
remote good, in comparison with one which refers to a
proximate good.

§ 4:',. In the last chapter I hinted that besides the
several influences there named as fostering the ascetic
belief that doing things which are agreeable is detri-
mental while bearing disagreeable tilings is beneficial,
there remained to be named an influence of deeper
origin. This is shadowed forth in the foregoing para-
graphs.

For the general truth that guidance by such simple

136 TIJE DATA OF ETHICS.

pleasures and pains as result from fulfilling or denying
bodily desires, is, under one aspect, inferior to guidance
by those pleasures and pains which the complex ideal
feelings yield, lias led to the belief that the promptings
of bodily desires should be disregarded. Further, the
general truth that pursuit of proximate satisfactions is,
under one aspect, inferior to pursuit of ultimate satis-
factions, lias led to the belief that proximate satisfac-
tions must not be valued.

In the earl)- stages of every science, the generaliza-
tions reached are not qualified enough. The discrimi-
nating statements of the truths formulated, rise after-
ward, by limitation of the undiscriminating statements.
As with bodily vision, which at first appreciates only
the broadest traits of objects, and so leads to rude
classings, which developed vision, impressible by minor
differences, has to correct, so with mental vision in
relation to general truths, it happens that at first the
inductions, wrongly made all-embracing, have to wait
for skepticism and critical observation to restrict them,
by taking account of unnoticed differences. Hence, we
may expect to find the current ethical conclusions too
sweeping. Let us note how, in three ways, these
dominant beliefs, alike of professed moralists and of
people at Large, are made erroneous by lack of qualifi-
cal ions.

In the first place, the authority of the lower feelings
rides is by no means always inferior to the authority
of the higher feelings, but is often superior. Daily
occur occasions on which sensations must be obeyed
rather than sentiments. Let any one think of sitting
all night naked in a snow-storm, or going a week with-
out food, or letting his head be held under water for

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL VIEW. 137

ten minutes, and he will see that the pleasures and
pains directly related to maintenance of life may not
be wholly subordinated to the pleasures and pains in-
directly related to maintenance of life. Though in
many cases guidance by the simple feelings rather than
by the complex feelings is injurious, in other cases
guidance by the complex feelings rather than by the
simple feelings is fatal ; and throughout a wide range
of cases their relative authorities as guides are indeter-
minate. Grant that in a man pursued, the protesting
feelings accompanying intense and prolonged effort,
must, to preserve life, be overruled by the fear of his
pursuers; it may yet happen that, persisting till ho
drops, the resulting exhaustion causes death, though,
the pursuit having been abandoned, death would not
otherwise have resulted. Grant that a widow left in
poverty must deny her appetite that she may give
enough food to her children to keep them alive ; yet
the denial of her appetite pushed too far may leave
them not only entirely without food but without
guardianship. Grant that, working his brain unceas-
ingly from dawn till dark, the man in pecuniary diffi-
culties must disregard rebellious bodily sensations in
obedience to the conscientious desire to liquidate the
claims on him ; yet he may carry this subjection of
simple feelings to complex feelings to the extent
of shattering his health, and failing in that end
which, with less of this subjection, he might have
achieved. Clearly, then, the subordination of lower
feelings must be a conditional subordination. The
supremacy of higher feelings must be a qualified
supremacy.

In another way does the generalization ordinarily

138 THE DATA OF ETHICS.

made err by excess. With the truth that life is high
in proportion as the simple preservative feelings are
under the control of the compound representative
feelings, it joins, as though they were corollaries, cer-
tain propositions which are not corollaries. The cur-
rent conception is, not that the lower must yield to
the higher when the two conflict, but that the lower
must be disregarded even when there is no conflict.
This tendency which the growth of moral ideas has
generated, to condemn obedience to inferior feelings
when superior feelings protest, has begotten a tendency
to condemn inferior feelings considered intrinsically.
" I really think she does things because she likes to do
them," once said to me one lady concerning another :
the form of expression and the manner both implying
the belief not only that such behavior is wrong, but
also that every one must recognize it as wrong. And
there prevails widely a notion of this kind. In
practice, indeed, the notion is very generally inoperative.
Though it prompts various incidental asceticisms, as
of those who tliink it alike manly and salutary to go
without a great-coat in cold weather, or to persevere
through the winter in taking an out-of-door plunge,
yet, generally, the pleasurable feelings accompanying
due fulfillment of bodily needs, are accepted : accept-
ance being, indeed, sufficiently peremptory. But
oblivious of these contradictions in their practice, men
commonly betray a vague idea that there is something
degrading, or injurious, or both, in doing that which
ible and avoiding that which is disagreeable.
"Pleasant but wrong," is a phrase frequently used in a
way implying that the two are naturally connected.
As above hinted, however, such beliefs result from a

THE -PSYCHOLOGICAL VIEW. 139

confused apprehension of the general truth that the
more compound and representative feelings are, on the
average, of higher authority than the simple and pre-
sentative feelings. Apprehended with discrimination,
this truth implies that the authority of the simple,
ordinarily less than that of the compound but occasion-
ally greater, is habitually to be accepted when the com-
pound do not oppose.

In yet a third way is this principle of subordination
misconceived. One of the contrasts between the earlier
evolved feelings and the later evolved feelings, is that
they refer respectively to the more immediate effects of
actions and to the more remote effects ; and speaking
generally, guidance by that which is near is inferior to
guidance by that which is distant. Hence has resulted
the belief that, irrespective of their kinds, the pleasures
of the present must be sacrificed to the pleasures of the
future. We see this in the maxim often impressed on
children when eating their meals, that they should re-
serve the nicest morsel till the last : the check on im-
provident yielding to immediate impulse, being here
joined with the tacit teaching that the same gratifica-
tion becomes more valuable as it becomes more distant.
Such thinking is traceable throughout daily conduct ;
by no means indeed in all, but in those who are dis-
tinguished as prudent and well regulated in their con-
duet. I lurrying over his breakfast that he may catch
the train, snatching a sandwicli in the middle of the day,
and eating a late dinner when he is so worn out that he
is incapacitated for evening recreation, the man of busi-
ness pursues a life in which not only the satisfactions of
bodily desires, but also those of higher tastes and feel-
ings, are, as far as may be, disregarded, that distant

L40 111 E DA TA OF ETHICS.

ends may be achieved; and yet if you ask what are
these distant cuds, you find (in eases where there are no
parental responsibilities) that they are included under
the conception of more comfortable living in time to
come. So ingrained is this belief that it is wrong to
seek immediate enjoyments and right to seek remote
oiks only, that you may hear from a busy man who has
been on a pleasure excursion a kind of apology for his
conduct. He deprecates the unfavorable judgments of
his friends by explaining that the state of his health had
compelled him to take a holiday. Nevertheless, if you
sound him with respect to his future, you find that his
mill )it inn is ly-and-byto retire and devote himself wholly
to the relaxations which he is now somewhat ashamed
of taking.

The general truth disclosed by the study of evolving
conduct, sub-human and human, that for the better pre-
servation of life the primitive, simple, preservative feel-
ings must l»c i on trolled by the later-evolved, compound,
and representative feelings, has thus come, in the course
of civilization, to be recogn.iz.ed by men ; but necessarily
at first in too indiscriminate a way. The current con-
ception, while it errs by implying that the authority of
the higher over the lower is unlimited, errs also by im-
plying thai the rule of the lower must be resisted even
when it does not conflict with the rule of the higher,
and further ens by implying that a gratification which
forms a proper aim if it is remote, forms an improper
aim if it is proximate.

.' 11. Withoul explicitly saying so, we have been

tracing the genesis of the moral consciousness.

For unquestionably the essential trait in the moral com

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL VIEW. 141

sciousness is the control of some feeling or feelings by
some other feelinc: or feelings.

Among the higher animals we may see, distinctly
enough, the conflict of feelings and the subjection of
simpler to more; compound ; as when a dog is restrained
from snatching food by fear of the penalties which may
come if he yields to his appetite; or as when lie desists
from scratching at a hole lest he should lose his master,
who has walked on. Here, however, though there is
subordination, there is not conscious subordination —
there is no introspection revealing the fact that one
feeling has yielded to another. So is it even with
human beings when little developed mentally. The
pre-social man, wandering about in families and ruled
by such sensations and emotions as are caused by the
circumstances of the moment, though occasionally sub-
ject to conflicts of motives, meets with comparatively
few cases in which the advantage of postponing the
immediate to the remote is forced on his attention ; nor
has he the intelligence requisite for analyzing and gen-
eralizing such of these cases as occur. Only as social
evolution renders the life more complex, the restraints
many and strong, the evils of impulsive conduct marked,
and the comforts to be gained by providing for the
future tolerably certain, can there come experiences
numerous enough to make familiar the benefit of subor-
dinating the simpler feelings to the more complex ones.
Only then, too, <]nt^ there arise a sufficient intellectual
power to make an induction from these experiences,
followed by a sufficient massing of individual induc-
tions into a public and traditional induction impressed
on each generation as it grows up.

And here we are introduced to certain facts of pro-

14-2 THE DATA OF ETHICS.

found significance. This conscious relinquishment of
immediate and special good to gain distant and general
good, while it is a cardinal trait of the self-restraint
called moral, is also a cardinal trait of self-restraints
other than those called moral — the restraints that origi-
nate from fear of the visible ruler, of the invisible ruler,
and of society at large. Whenever the individual re
trains from doing that which the passing desire prompts
lest he should afterward suffer legal punishment, <y
divine vengeance, or public reprobation, or all of tbfarn.
lie surrenders the near and definite pleasure rath?/ /".liar,
risk the remote and greater, though less definite, pains.,
which taking it may bring on him ; and, conversely,
when he undergoes some present pain, that Wi may reap
some probable future pleasure, political , religious, or
social. But though all these four kinds (J, internal con-
trol have the common character that the simpler and
less ideal feelings are consciously overruled by the mora
complex and ideal feelings ; and though, at first, they
are practically co-extensive and undistinguished, yet, iti
the course of social evolution, tl'.ey differentiate ; and,
eventually, the moral control, with its accompanying
conceptions and sentiments, emerges as independ-
ent. Let us glance at the leading aspects of the
process.

While, as in the rudest groups, neither political nor
ions rule exists, the leading check to the immediate
satisfaction of each desire as it arises, is consciousness of
the evils which the anger of fellow-savages may entail,
if satisfaction of the desire is obtained at their cost. In
this early stage the imagined pains which constitute the
ning motive are those apt to be inflicted by beings
of like nature, undistinguished in power : the political,

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL VIEW. 143

religious, and social restraints are as yet represented
only by this mutual dread of vengeance.

When special strength, skill or courage, makes one of
them a leader in battle, he necessarily inspires greater
fear than any other, and there comes to be a more de-
cided check on such satisfactions of the desires as will
injure or offend him. Gradually as, by habitual warfare,
chieftainship is established, the evils thought of as likely
to arise from angering the chief, not only by aggression
upon him, but by disobedience to him, become dis-
tinguishable both from the smaller evils which other
personal antagonisms cause, and from the more diffused
evils thought of as arising from social reprobation. That
is, political control begins to differentiate from the more
indefinite control of mutual dread.

Meanwhile there has been developing the ghost
theory. In all but the rudest groups the double of a
deceased man, propitiated at death and afterward, is
conceived as able to injure the survivors. Consequently,
as fast as the ghost theory becomes established and
definite, there grows up another kind of check on im-
mediate satisfaction of the desires — a check constituted
by ideas of the evils which ghosts may inflict if offended ;
and when political headship gets settled, and the ghosts
of dead chiefs, thought of as more powerful and relent-
less than other ghosts, are especially dreaded, there
begins to take shape the form of restraint distinguished
as religious.

For a long time these three sets of restraints, which
their correlative sanctions, though becoming separate
in consciousness, remain co-extensive, and do so because
they mostly refer to one end — success in war. The
duty of blood-revenge is insisted on even while yet

I I [ THE DATA OF ETHICS.

nothing to be called social organization exists. As the
chief gains predominance, the killing of enemies becomes
a political duty: and as 1 lie anger of the dead chief
comes to be dreaded, the killing of enemies becomes a
religious duty. Loyalty to the ruler while he lives and
after he dies is increasingly shown by holding life at his
disposal for purposes of war. The earliest enacted pun-
ishments are those for insubordination and for breaches
of observances which express subordination — all of them
militant in origin. While the divine injunctions,
in iginally traditions of the dead king's will, mainly refer
to the destruction of peoples with whom he was at
enmity, and divine anger or approval are conceived as
determined by the degrees in which subjection to him is
.shown, directly by worship and indirectly by fulfilling
these injunctions. The Fijian, who is said on entering
the other world to commend himself by narrating his
successes in battle, and who, when alive, is described
as sometimes greatly distressed if he thinks he
lias not killed enemies enough to please his gods,
.shows ns the. resulting ideas and feelings, and reminds
us of kindred ideas and feelings betrayed by ancient
race-.

To all which add that the control of social opinion,
besides being directly exercised, as in the earliest stage,
by praise of the brave and blame of the cowardly, comes
t<> be indirectly exercised with a kindred general effect
by applause of loyalty to the ruler and piety to the god.
So that the three differentiated tonus of control which
ii]! along with militant organization and action,
while enforcing kindred restraints and incentives, also
enforce one another j and their separate and joint dis-
ciplines have the common character that they involve

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL VIEW. 145

the sacrifice of immediate special benefits to obtain more
distant and general benefits.

At the same time there have been developing under
the same three sanctions, restraints and incentives of
another order, similarly characterized by subordination
of the proximate to the remote. Joint aggressions upon
men outside the society cannot prosper if there are many
aggressions of man on man within the society. War
implies co-operation; and co-operation is prevented by
antagonisms among those who are to co-operate. We
saw that in the primitive ungoverned group, the main
check on immediate satisfaction of his desires by each
man, is the fear of other men's vengeance if they are in-
jured by taking the satisfaction; and through early

s of social development this dread of retaliation
continues to be the chief motive to such forbearance as
exists. But though long after political authority has
become established the taking of personal satisfaction
for injuries persists, the growth of political authority
gradually checks it. Tin.' fact that success in war is
endangered if his followers fight among themselves,

3 itself on the attention of the ruler. He has a
strong motive for restraining quarrels, and therefore for
preventing the aggressions which cause quarrels; and
a- his power becomes greater he forbids the aggressions
and inllicts punishments for disobedience. Presently,
politieal restraints of this class, like those of the preced-
ing class, are enforced by religious restraints. The
sagacious chief, succeeding in war partly because he
thus enforces order among his followers, leaves behind
him a tradition of the commands he habitually gave.
Dread of Iris ghost tends to produce regard for these
commands ; and they eventually acquire sacredness.

10

140 THE DATA OF ETHICS.

With further social evolution come, in like manner,
further interdicts, checking aggressions of less serious
kinds; until eventually there grows up a body of civil
laws. And then, in the way shown, arise beliefs con-
cerning the divine disapproval of these minor, as well
as of the major, civil offenses : ending, occasionally, in
of religious injunctions harmonizing with, and en-
forcing, the political injunctions ; while simultaneously
there develops, as before, a social sanction for these
rules of internal conduct, strengthening the political
and religious sanctions.

But now observe that while these three controls, polit>
ical, religious, and social, severally lead men to sub*
ordinate proximate satisfactions to remote satisfactions ;
and while they are in this respect like the moral control,
which habitually requires the subjection of simple pre~
sentative feelings to complex representative feelings and
postponement of present to future ; yet they do not
constitute the moral control, but are only preparatory
t'» it — are controls within which the moral control
evolves. The command of the political ruler is at
first obeyed, not because of its perceived rectitude,
but simply because it is his command, which there
will be a penalty for disobeying. The check is not a
mental representation of the evil consequences which
orbidden act will, in the nature of things, cause :
but it is a mental representation of the factitious evil
consequences. Down to our own time we trace in
ises, the original doctrine that the aggression
of one citizen on another is wrong, and will be punished,
> much because of the injury done him, as because
of the implied disregard of the king's will. Similarly,
the sinfulness of breaking a divine injunction was

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL VIEW. 147

universally at one time, and is still by many, held to
consist in the disobedience to God, rather than in the
deliberate entailing of injury; and even now it is a com-
mon belief that acts are right only if performed in con-
scious fulfillment of the divine will : nay, are even
wrong if otherwise performed. The like holds, too, with
that further control exercised by public opinion. On
listening to the remarks made respecting conformity to
social rules, it is noticeable that breach of them is con-
demned not so much because of any essential impropriety
as because the world's authority is ignored. How im-
perfectly the truly moral control is even now differen-
tiated from these controls within which it has been
evolving, we see in the fact that the systems of morality
criticised at the outset, severally identify moral control
with one or other of them. For moralists of one class
derive moral rules from the commands of a supreme po-
litical power. Those of another class recognize no other
origin for them than the revealed divine will. And
though men who take social prescription for their guide
do not formulate their doctrine, yet the belief, fre-
quently betrayed, that conduct which society permits is
not blameworthy, implies that there are those who think
right and wrong can be made such by public opinion.

Before taking a further step we must put together the
results of this analysis. The essential truths to be car-
ried with us, respecting these three forms of external
control to which the social unit is subject, are these :
First, that they have evolved with the evolution of
society, as means to social self-preservation, neces?arv
under the conditions ; and that, by implication, they are
in the main congruous with one another. Second, that
the correlative internal restraints generated in the social

148 THE DATA OF ETHICS.

unit are representations of remote results which are in-
cidental rather than necessary — a legal penalty, a super-
natural punishment, a social reprobation. Third, that
results, simpler and more directly wrought by per-
gonal agencies, can be more vividly conceived than can
the results which, in the course of things, actions natu-
rally entail : and the conceptions of them are, therefore,
more potent over undeveloped minds. Fourth, that as
with the restraints thus generated is always joined the
thought of external coercion, there arises the notion of
obligation ; which so becomes habitually associated with
the surrender of immediate special benefits for the sake
of distant and general benefits. Fifth, that the moral
control corresponds in large measure with the three con-
trols thus originating, in respect of its injunctions ; and
corresponds, too, in the general nature of the mental
processes producing conformity to those injunctions ;
but differs in their special nature.

§ 45. For now we are prepared to see that the re-
straints, properly distinguished as moral, are unlike
jtraints out of which they evolve, and with
which they are long confounded, in this — they refer not
to the extrinsic effects of actions but to their intrinsic
effects. The truly moral deterrent from murder is not
constituted by a representation of hanging as a conse-
quence, or by a representation of tortures in bell as a
quence, or bjr a representation of the horror and
hatred excited in fellow-men ; but by a representation
of the neces »ary natural results, the infliction of death'
agony on the victim, the destruction of all his possibili-
f happiness, the entailed sufferings to Lis belongings.
Neither the thought of imprisonment, nor of divine

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL VIEW. 149

anger, nor of social disgrace, is that which constitutes
the moral check on theft; but the thought of injury to
the person robbed, joined with a vague consciousness of
the general evils caused by disregard of proprietary
rights. Those who reprobate the adulterer on moral
grounds have their minds idled, not with ideas of an ac-
tion for damages, or of future punishment following the
breach of a commandment, or of loss of reputation ; but
the}T are occupied with ideas of nnhappiness entailed on
the aggrieved wife or husband, the damaged lives of
children, itml the diffused mischiefs which go along with
disregard of the marriage tie. Conversely, the man who
is moved by a moral feeling to help another in difficulty,
does not picture to himself any reward here or here-
after ; but pictures only the better condition he is trying
to bring about. One who is morally prompted to fight
against a social evil has neither material benefit nor
popular applause before his mind, but only the mischiefs
he seeks to remove and the increased well-being which
will follow their removal. Throughout, then, the moral
motive differs from the motives it is associated with in
this, that instead of being constituted by representations
of incidental, collateral, non-necessary consequences of
acts, it is constituted by representations of consequences
which the acts naturally produce. These representa-
tions are not all distinct, though some of such are
usually present ; but they form an assemblage of indis-
tinct representations accumulated by experience of the
results of like acts in the life of the individual, super-
posed on a still more indistinct but voluminous con-
sciousness due to the inherited effects of such experiences
in progenitors, forming a feeling that is at once massive
and vague.

L50 THE DATA OF ETHICS.

And now we see why the moral feelings and correla-
tive restraints have arisen later than the feelings and
restraints that originate from political, religions, and
social authorities, and have so slowly, and even yet so
incompletely, disentangled themselves. For only by
these lower feelings and restraints could be maintained
the conditions under which the higher feelings and re-
straints evolve. It is thus alike with the self-regarding
feelings and with the other-regarding feelings. The
pains which improvidence will bring, and the pleasures
to be gained by storing up things for future use, and by
laboring to get such things, can be habitually contrasted
in thought, only as fast as settled social arrangements
make accumulation possible ; and that there may arise
such settled arrangements, fear of the seen ruler, of the
unseen ruler, and of public opinion, must come into play.
Only after political, religious and social restraints have
produced a stable community can there be sufficient ex-
perience of the pains, positive and negative, sensational
and emotional, whieh crimes of aggression cause, as to
generate thai moral aversion to them constituted by con-
sciousness of their intrinsically evil results. And more
manifest still is it that such a moral sentiment as that of
acl equity, which is offended not only by material
injuries don.; to men, but also by political arrangements
that place them at a disadvantage, can evolve only after
the social stage reached gives familiar experience, both
of the pains flowing directly from injustices, and also of
those flowing indirectly from the class privileges which
make Lnj easy.

That til- feelings called moral have the nature and
origin alleged is further shown by the fact that we as-
sociate the name with them in proportion to the degree

THE PSYCnOLOGICAL VIEW. 151

in which they have these characters — firstly, of being
re-representative ; secondly, of being concerned with
indirect rather than with direct effects, and generally
with remote rather than immediate ; and thirdly, of re-
ferring to effects that are mostly general rather than
special. Thus, though we condemn one man for ex-
travagance and approve the economy shown by another
man, we do not class their acts as respectively vicious
and virtuous. These words are too strong ; the present
and future results here differ too little in concreteness
and ideality to make the words fully applicable. Sup-
pose, however, that the extravagance necessarily brings
distress on wife and children — brings pains diffused
over the lives of others as well as of self, and the vi-
ciousness of the extravagance becomes clear. Suppose,
further, that prompted by the wish to relieve his family
from the misery he has brought on them, the spendthrift
forges a bill or commits some other fraud. Though,
estimated apart, we characterize his overruling emotion
as moral, and make allowance for him in consideration
of it, yet his action, taken as a whole, we condemn as
immoral : we regard as of superior authority the feel-
ings which respond to men's proprietary claims — feel-
ings which are re-representative in a higher degree and
refer to more remote diffused consequences. The dif-
ference, habitually recognized, between the relative
elevations of justice and generosity, well illustrates this
truth. The motive causing a generous act has reference
to effects of a more concrete, special, and proximate
kind than has the motive to do justice, which, beyond
the proximate effects, usually themselves less concrete
than those that generosity contemplates, includes a con-
sciousness of the distant, involved, diffused effects of

152 TUK DATA OF ETHICS.

maintaining equitable relations. And justice we hold
ti» be higher generosity.

Comprehension of this long argument will be aided
by here quoting a further passage from the before-named
letter to Mr. Mill, following the passage already quoted
from it.

"To make any position fully understood, it seems needful to
add that, corresponding to the fundamental propositions of a de-
veloped Moral Science, there have been, and still are, developing
in the race, certain fundamental moral intuitions ; and that, though
these moral intuitions are the results of accumulated experiences
of Utility, gradually organized and inherited, they have come to
be quite independent of conscious experience. Justin the same
way that I believe the intuition of space, possessed by any living
individual, to have arisen from organized and consolidated experi-
ences of all antecedent individuals who bequeathed to him their
slowly developed nervous organizations — just as I believe that this
intuition, requiring only to be made definite and complete by per-
sonal experiences, lias practically become a form of thought, ap-
parently quite independent of experience ; so do I believe that the
experiences of utility organized and consolidated through all past
generations of the human race, have been producing correspond-
ing nervous modifications, which, by continued transmission and
accumulation, have heroine in us certain faculties of moral intui-
tion— certain emotions responding to right and wrong conduct,
which have no apparent hasis in the individual experiences of
utility. I also hold that jusl as the space intuition responds to the
demonstrations of (ieometry, and has its rough conclusions
interpreted and verified by them ; so will moral intuitions respond
to the demonstrations of Moral Science, and will have their rough
conclusions interpreted and verified by them."

To this, in passing, I will add only that the evolution-
hypothesis thus enables us to reconcile opposed moral
theori enables us to reconcile opposed theories

of knowledge. For as the doctrine of innate forms of
lectual intuition falls into harmony with the experi-
ential doctrine, when we recognize the production of

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL VIEW. 153

intellectual faculties by inheritance of effects wrought
by experience ; so the doctrine of innate powers of
moral perception becomes congruous with the utilitarian

doctrine, when it is seen that preferences and aversions
are rendered organic by inheritance of the effects of
pleasurable and painful experiences in progenitors.

§ 40. One further question has to be answered — How
does there arise the feeling of moral obligation in gen-
eral ? Whence comes the sentiment of duty, considered
as distinct from the several sentiments which prompt
temperance, providence, kindness, justice, truthfulness,
etc.? The answer is that it is an abstract sentiment
generated in a manner analogous to that in which ab-
stracl ideas are generated.

The idea of each color had originally entire concrete-
ness given to it by an object possessing the color; as
some of the unmodified names, such as orange and vio-
let, show us. The dissociation of each color from the
object specially associated with it in thought at the
outset, went on as fast as the color came to be associated
in thought with objects unlike the first, and unlike one
another. The idea of orange was conceived in the
abstract more fully in proportion as the various orange-
colored objects remembered, cancelled one another's
diverse attributes, and left outstanding their common
attribute.

So is it if we ascend a stage and note how there arises
the abstract idea of color apart from particular colors.
Were all things red the conception of color in the
abstract could not exist. Imagine that every object
was either red or green, and it is manifest that the
tal habit would be to think of one or other of these two

154 THE DATA OF ETHICS.

colors in connection with anything named. But multi-
ply the colors so that thought rambles undecidedly
among the ideas of them that occur along with any ob-
ject named, and there results the notion of indetermi-
nate color — the common property which objects possess
of affecting us by light from their surfaces, as well as
by their forms. For evidently the notion of this com-
mon property is that which remains constant while im-
agination is picturing every possible variety of color. It
is the uniform trait in all colored things; that is — color
in the abstract.

Words referring to quantity furnish cases of more
marked dissociation of abstract from concrete. Group-
ing various things as small in comparison either with
those of their kind or with those of other kinds, and
similarly grouping some objects as comparatively great,
t the opposite abstract notions of smallness and
greatness. Applied as these are to innumerable very
diverse things — not objects only, but forces, times,
numbers, values — they have become so little connected
with concretes, that their abstract meanings are very
vague.

Further, we must note that an abstract idea thus
formed of ten acquires an illusive independence; as we
may perceive in the case of motion, which, dissociated,
in thought from all particular bodies and velocities and
ions, is sometimes referred to as though it could
be conceived apart from something moving.

Now all this holds of the subjective as well as of
the objective; and among other states of conscious-
holds of the emotions as known by introspection.
By the grouping of those re-representative feelings
above described, which, differing among themselves in

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL VIEW. 155

other respects, have a component in common, and by
the consequent mutual canceling of their diverse com-
ponents, this common component is made relatively
appreciable, and becomes an abstract feeling. Thus is
produced the sentiment of moral obligation or duty.
Let us observe its genesis.

We have seen that during the progress of animate
existence, the later evolved, more compound and more
representative feelings, serving to adjust the conduct
to more distant and general needs, have all along had
an authority as guides superior to that of the earlier
and simpler feelings — excluding cases in which these,
last are intense. This superior authority, unrecogniza-
ble by lower types of creatures which cannot generalize,
and little recognizable by primitive men who have but
feeble powers of generalization, has become distinctly
recognized as civilization and accompanying mental
development have gone on. Accumulated experiences
have produced the consciousness that guidance by feel-
ings which refer to remote and general results is
usually more conducive to welfare than guidance by
feelings to be immediately gratified. For what is the
common character of the feelings that prompt honesty,
truthfulness, diligence, providence, etc., which men
habitually find to be better prompters than the appetites
and simple impulses ? They are all complex, re-repre-
sentative feelings, occupied with the future rather than
the present. The idea of authoritativeness has, there-
fore, come to be connected with feelings having these
traits: the implication being that the lower and simpler
feelings are without authority. And this idea of
authoritativeness is one element in the abstract con-
sciousness of duty.

156 THE DATA OF ETHICS.

But there is another element — the element of coer-
civeness. This originates from experience of those
several forms of restraint that have, as above described,
established themselves in the course of civilization —
the political, religious and social. To the effects of
punishments inflicted by law and public opinion on
conduct of certain kinds, Dr. Bain ascribes the feeling
of moral obligation. And I agree with him to the
extent of thinking that by them is generated the sense
of compulsion which the consciousness of duty includes,
and which the word obligation indicates. The exist-
ence of an earlier and deeper element, generated as
above described, is, however, I think, implied by the
fact that certain of the higher self-regarding feelings
instigating prudence and economy, have a moral au-
thority in opposition to the simpler self-regarding feel-

. showing that apart from any thought of factitious
penalties on improvidence, the feeling constituted by
representation of the natural penalties has acquired an
acknowledged superiority. But accepting in the main
tin; view that fears of the political and social penalties
Cto which, I think, the religious must be added) have
generated that sense of coerciveness which goes along
with tin.- thought of postponing present to future and

mal desires to the claims of others, it here chiefly
concerns us to note that this sense of coerciveness be-
comes indirectly connected with the feelings distin-
guished as moral. For since the political, religious
and social restraining motives are mainly formed of
• I future results ; and since the moral restrain-
ing motive is mainly formed of represented future re-

: it happens thai flie representations, having much
in common, and being often aroused at the same time,

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL VIEW. Vol

the fear joined with three sets of them becomes, by
association, joined with the fourth. Thinking of the
extrinsic effects of a forbidden act, excites a dread
which continues present while the intrinsic effects of
the act are, thought of; and being thus linked with
these intrinsic effects causes a vague sense of moral
compulsion. Emerging as the moral motive does but
slowly from amidst the political, religious and social
motives, it long participates in that consciousness of
subordination to some external agency which is joined
with them ; and only as it becomes distinct and pre-
dominant does it lose this associated consciousness —
only then does the feeling of obligation fade.

This remark implies the tacit conclusion, which will
be to most very startling, that the sense of duty or
moral obligation is transitory, and will diminish as fast
as moralization increases. Startling though it is, this
conclusion may be satisfactorily defended. Even now
progress toward the implied ultimate state is traceable.
The observation is not infrequent that persistence in
performing a duty ends in making it a pleasure ; and
this amounts to the admission that while at first the
motive contains an element of coercion, at last this
element of coercion dies out, and the act is performed
without any consciousness of being obliged to perform
it. The contrast between the youth on whom diligence
is enjoined, and the man of business so absorbed in
affairs that he cannot he induced to relax, shows us how
the doing of work, originally under the consciousness
that it ought to be done, may eventually cease to have
any such accompanying consciousness. Sometimes,
indeed, the relation comes to be reversed ; and the man
of business persists in work from pure love of it when

J58 THE DATA OF ETHICS.

told that he ought not. Nor is it thus with self-regard-
ing feelings only. That the maintaining and protecting
of wife by husband often result solely from feelings
directly gratified by these actions, without any thought
of must; and that the fostering of children by parents
is in many cases made an absorbing occupation without
any coercive feeling of ought ; are obvious truths which
show us that even now, with some of the fundamental
other-regarding duties, the sense of obligation has
retreated into the background of the mind. And it is
in some degree so with other-regarding duties of a
higher kind. Conscientiousness has in many outgrowp.
that stage in which the sense of a compelling power k
joined with rectitude of action. The truly honest man,
here and there to be found, is not only without thought
of legal, religious, or social compulsion, when he dis-
charges an equitable claim on him, but he is without
thought of self-compulsion. He does the right thing
with a simple feeling of satisfaction in doing it ; and is,
indeed, impatient if anything prevents him from having
the satisfaction of doing it.

Evidently, then, witli complete adaptation to the
social state, that element in the moral consciousness
which is expressed by the word obligation, will disap-
pear. Tin' higher actions required for the harmonious
carrying on of life will be as much matters of course
as .no those lower actions which the simple, desires
prompt. In their proper times and places and propor-
tions, the moral sentiments will guide men just as spon-
taneously and adequately as now do the sensations.
And though, joined with their regulating influence
when this is called for, will exist latent ideas of the
evils which nonconformity would bring ; these will

THE I'syt'UOLOGICAL VIEW. 1 .".'.*

occupy the mind no more than do ideas of the evils of
starvation at the time when a healthy appetite is being
satisfied by a meal.

§ 47. This elaborate exposition, which the extreme
complexity of the subject has necessitated, may have its
leading ideas restated thus :

Symbolizing by a and 6, related phenomena in the
environment, which in some way concern the welfare of
the organism ; and symbolizing by c and d, the impres-
sions, simple or compound, which the organism
receives from the one, and the motions, single or com-
bined, by which its acts are adapted to meet the other ;
we saw that psychology in general is concerned with
the connection between the relation a b and the rela-
tion c d. Further, we saw that by implication the
psychological aspect of Ethics, is that aspect under
which the adjustment of c d to a 6, appears, not as an
intellectual co-ordination simply, but as a co-ordination
in which pleasures and pains are alike factors and
results.

It was shown that throughout Evolution, motive
and act become more complex, as the adaptation of
inner related actions to outer related actions extends in
range and variety. Whence followed the corollary
that the latter evolved feelings, more representative
and re-representative in their constitution, and referring
to remoter and wider needs, have on the average, an
authority as guides greater than have the earlier and
simpler feelings.

After thus observing that even an inferior creature is
ruled by a hierarchy of feelings so constituted that
general welfare depends on a certain subordination of.

THE DATA OF ETHICS.

iw that in man. as he passes into
the s ises the need for sundry addi-

tional subordinations of lower to higher: ccroperation
- made possible only by them. To the restraints

-entations of the intrinsic
. which, in their simpler forms, have
Lving from the beginning, are added the re-
straints caused by mental representations of extrinsic
j, in the shape of political, religions, and social
penal

With the evolution of society, made possible by
it ions maintaining order, and associating in men's
minds the sense of obligation with prescribed acts and
with desistances from forbidden acts, there arose oppor-
tunities t the had consequences naturally flow-
ing from the conduct interdicted and the good conse-
quences from the conduct required. Hence eventually
grew up morally aversions and approvals: experience
of the intrinsic effects necessarily here coming later than
experience of the i • effects, and therefore produc-
ing its results lat

The thoughts and feelings constituting these moral

I approvals, being all along clos< ly con-

dwith the thoughts and feelings constituting fears

of political, religious, and social penaltii . sarily

te in the accompanying sense of obli-

:. The coercive element in the consciousm

Ived by <-o\ . ith external

d ties, diffusa '1 itself by

■ n tlirough that coi sss of iJw.y. properly

i moral, which is occupied within trinsic results

■ .

But this self-compulsion, which at a relatively high

TIIF PSYCHOLOGICAL VIEW. 101

stage becomes more and more a substitute for compul-
sion from without, must itself, at a still higher b\
practically disappear. If some action to which the
special motive is insufficient, is performed in obedience
to the feeling of moral obligation, the fact proves that
the special faculty concerned is not yet equal to its
function — lias not acquired such strength that the re-
quired activity has become its normal activity, yielding
its due amount of pleasure. With complete evolution
then, the sense of obligation, not ordinarily present in
consciousness, will be awakened only on those extraor-
dinary occasions that prompt breach of the laws other-
wise spontaneously conformed to.

And this brings us to the psychological aspect of that
conclusion which, in the last chapter, was reached under
its biological aspect. The pleasures and pains which
the moral sentiments originate will, like bodily pleas-
ures and pains, become incentives and deterrents so id-
justed in their strengths to the needs that the moral

conduct will be the natural conduct.
U

162 THE DATA OF ETHICS.

CHAPTER VIII.

THE SOCIOLOGICAL VIEW.

§ 48. Not for the human race only, but for every
race, there are laws of right living. Given its environ-
ment and its structure, and there is for each kind of
creature a set of actions adapted in their kinds, amounts,
and combinations, to secure the highest conservation its
nature permits. The animal, like the man, has needs
for food, warmth, activity, rest, and so forth, which must
be fulfilled in certain relative degrees to make its life
whole. Maintenance of its race implies satisfaction of
special desires, sexual and philo-progenitive, in due pro-
portions. Hence there is a supposable formula for the
activities of each species, which, could it be drawn out,
would constitute a system of morality for that species.
But such a system of morality would have little or no
reference to the welfare of others than self and offspring.
Indifferent to individuals of its own kind, as an inferior
creature is, and habitually hostile to individuals of other
kinds, the formula for its life could take no cognizance
of tin- lives of those with which it came in contact; or
rather, such formula would imply that maintenance of
its lii ' variance with maintenance of their lives.

lint cm ascending from beings of lower kinds to the

ind of being, man ; or, more strictly, on ascend-

rom man in his pre-social singe to man in his social

stage, the formula has to include an additional factor.

THE SOCIOLOGICAL VIEW. 103

Though not peculiar to human life under its developed
form, the presence of this factor is still, in the highest
degree, characteristic of it. Though there are inferior
species displaying considerable degrees of socialit}r, and,
though, the formulas for their complete lives would have
to take account of the relations arising from union, yet
our own species is, on the whole, to be distinguished as
having a formula for complete life which specially rec-
ognizes the relations of each individual to others, in
presence of whom, and in co-operation with whom, he
has to live.

This additional factor in the problem of complete liv-
ing is, indeed, so important that the necessitated modi-
fications of conduct have come to form a chief part of
the code of conduct. Because the inherited desires
which directly refer to the maintenance of individual
life are fairly adjusted to the requirements, there has
been no need to insist on that conformity to them which
furthers self-conservation. Conversely, because these
desires prompt activities that often conflict with the ac-
tivities of others ; and because the sentiments respond-
ing to others' claims are relatively weak, moral codes
emphasize those restraints on conduct which the pres-
ence of fellow-men entails.

From the sociological [joint of view, then, Ethics be-
comes nothing else than a definite account of the forms
of conduct that are fitted to the associated state, in such
wise that the lives of each and all may be the greatest
possible, alike in length and breadth.

§ 49. But here we are met by a fact which forbids us
thus to put in the foreground the welfares of citizens,
individually considered, and requires us to put in the

1G4 THE DATA OF ETHICS.

foreground the welfare of the society as a whole. The
life of the social organism must, as an end, rank above
the lives of its units. These two ends are not harmo-
nious at the outset ; and, though the tendency is toward
harmonization of them, they are still partially conflict-
ing.

As fast as the social state establishes itself, the
preservation of the society becomes a means of pre-
serving its units. Living together arose because, on
the average, it proved more advantageous to each than
living apart ; and this implies that maintenance of
combination is maintenance of the conditions to more
satisfactory living than the combined persons would
otherwise have. Hence, social self-preservation be-
comes a proximate aim taking precedence of the
ultimate aim, individual self-preservation.

This subordination of personal to social welfare is,
however, contingent : it depends on the presence of
antagonistic societies. So long as the existence of a
community is endangered by the actions of communi-
ties around, it must remain true that the interests of
individuals must be sacrificed to the interests of the
community, as far as is needful for the community's
Balvation. But if this is manifest, it is, by implication,
manifest, thai when social antagonisms cease, this need
for sacrifice of private claims to public claims ceases
also; or rather, there cease to be any public claims at
variance with private claims. All along, furtherance
of individual lives has been the ultimate end ; and, if
this ultimate end has been postponed to the proximate
end of preserving the community's life, it has been so
only because tins proximate end was instrumental to
the ultimate end. When the aggregate is no longer in

THE SOCIOLOGICAL VIEW. 165

danger, the final object of pursuit, the welfare of the
units, no longer needing to he postponed, becomes the
immediate object of pursuit.

Consequently, unlike sets of conclusions respecting
human conduct emerge, according as we are concerned
with a state of habitual or occasional war, or are con-
cerned with a state of permanent and general peace.
Let us glance at these alternative states and the alter-
native implications.

§ 50. At present the individual man has to carry on
his life with due regard to the lives of others belong-
ing to the same society ; while he is sometimes called
on to be regardless of the lives of those belonging to
other societies. The same mental constitution, having
to fulfill both these requirements, is necessarily incon-
gruous ; and the correlative conduct, adjusted first to
the one need and then to the other, cannot be brought
within any consistent ethical system.

Hate and destroy your fellow-man is now the com-
mand; and then the command is, love and aid your
fellow-man. Use every means to deceive, says the one
code of conduct ; while the other code says, be truth-
ful in word and deed. Seize what property you can
and burn all you cannot take away, are injunctions
which the religion of enmity countenances; while by
the religion of amity, theft and arson are condemned
as crimes. And as conduct has to be made up of parts
thus at variance with one another, the theory of con-
duct remains confused.

There co-exists a kindred irreconcilability between
the sentiments answering to the forms of co-operation
required for militancy and industrialism respectively.

166 THE DATA OF ETHICS.

While social antagonisms are habitual, and while, for
efficient action against other societies, there needs great
subordination to men who command, the virtue of
loyalty and the duty of implicit obedience have to be
insisted on ; disregard of the rulers will is punished
with death. But when war ceases to be chronic, and
growing industrialism habituates men to maintaining
their own claims while respecting the claims of others,
loyalty becomes less profound, the authority of the
ruler is questioned or denied in respect of various
private actions and beliefs. State dictation is in many
directions successfully defied, and the political inde-
pendence of the citizen comes to be regarded as a
( laim which it is virtuous to maintain and vicious
to yield up. Necessarily during the transition, these
opposite sentiments are incongruously mingled.

So is it, too, with domestic institutions under the two
rSgimes. While the first is dominant, ownership of a
slave is honorable, and in the slave submission is praise-
worthy : hut as the last glows dominant, slave-owning
becomes a crime and servile obedience excites contempt.
Nor is it otherwise in the family. The subjection of
women to men, complete while war is habitual but
qualified as fast as peaceful occupations replace it,
comes eventually to be thought wrong, and equality
before tin- Law is asserted. At the same time the opin-
ion concerning paternal power changes. The once un-
questioned right of the father to take his children's
is denied, and the duly of absolute submission
to 1 1 i in. long insisted on, is changed into the duty of
obedience within reasonable Limits.

Were the ratio between the life of antagonism with
alien societies, and the life of peaceful co-operation

THE SOCIOLOGICAL VIEW. 107

within each society, a constant ratio, some permanent
compromise between the conflicting rules of conduct
appropriate to the two lives might bo reached. But
since this ratio is a variable one, the compromise can
never be more than temporary. Ever the tendency is
toward congruity between beliefs and requirements.
Either the social arrangements are gradually changed
until they come into harmony with prevailing ideas
and sentiments ; or, if surrounding conditions prevent
change in the social arrangements, the necessitated
habits of life modify the prevailing ideas and sentiments
to the requisite extent. Hence, for each kind and de-
gree of social evolution determined by external conflict
and internal friendship, there is an appropriate com-
promise between the moral code of enmity and the
moral code of amity: not, indeed, a definable, con-
sistent compromise, but a compromise fairly well un-
derstood.

This compromise, vague, ambiguous, illogical, though
it may be, is nevertheless for the time being authori-
tative. For if, as above shown, the welfare of the
society must take precedence of the welfares of its com-
ponent individuals, during those stages in which the
individuals have to preserve themselves by preserving
their society, then such temporary compromise between
the two codes of conduct as duly regards external de-
fense, while favoring internal co-operation to the great-
est extent practicable, subserves the maintenance of life
in the highest degree : and thus gains the ultimate sanc-
tion. So that the perplexed and inconsistent moralities
of which each society and each age shows us a more
or less different one, are severally justified as being
approximately the best under the circumstances.

J68 THE DATA OF ETHICS.

But such moralities are, by their definitions, shown to
belong to incomplete conduct ; not to conduct that is
fully evolved. We saw that the adjustments of acts to
c\u\> which, while constituting the external manifesta-
tions of life, conduce to the continuance of life, have
been rising to a certain ideal form now approached by
the civilized man. But this form is not reached so
long as there continue aggressions of one society upon
another. Whether the hinderances to complete living
result from the trespasses of fellow-citizens, or from the
trespasses of aliens, matters not; if they occur there does
not yet exist the state defined. The limit to the evolu-
tion of conduct is arrived at by members of each society
only when, being arrived at by members of other so-
3 also, the causes of international antagonism end
.simultaneously with the causes of antagonism between
individuals.

And now having from the sociological point of view
recognized the need for, and authority of, these chang-
es of ethics, proper to changing ratios between
warlike activities and peaceful activities, we have, from
the same point of view, to consider the system of ethics
proper to the state in which peaceful activities are
undisi iirbed.

1. [f, excluding all thought of danger or hinder-

Erom causes external to a society, we set ourselves

to specify those conditions under which the life of each

person, and therefore of the aggregate, may be the great-

ome upon certain simple ones which, as

-luted, assume the form of truisms.

For, as we ha \ e seen, the definition of that highest life

opanying completely evolved conduct, itself ex-

THE SOCIOLOGICAL VIEW. 1 09

eludes all ;u(s of aggression — not only murder, assault,
robbery, and the major offenses generally, but minor
offenses, such as libel, injury to property and so forth.
While directly deducting from individual life, these in-
directly cause perturbations of social life. Trespasses
against others rouse antagonisms in them ; and if these
are numerous the group loses coherence. Hence, whether
the integrity of the group itself is considered as the end,
or whether the end considered is the benefit ultimately
secured to its units by maintaining its integrity, or
whether the immediate benefit of its units taken sepa-
rately is considered the end. the implication is the same :
such acts are at variance with achievement of the end.
That these inferences are self-evident and trite (as in-
deed the first inferences drawn from the data of every
science that reaches the deductive stage naturally are)
must not make us pass lightly over the all-important fact
that, from the sociological point of view, the leading
moral laws are seen to follow as corollaries from the defi-
nition of complete life carried on under social condi-
tions.

Respect for these primary moral laws is not enough,
however. Associated men pursuing their several lives
without injuring one another but without helping one
another, reap no advantages from association beyond
those of companionship. If, while there is no co-opera-
tion for defensive purposes (which is here excluded by
the hypothesis) there is also no co-operation for satisfy-
ing wants, the social state loses its rni^<ni d'etre — almost,
if not entirely. There are, indeed, people who live in a
condition little removed from this: as the Esquimaux.
But though these, exhibiting none of the co-operation
necessitated by war, which is unknown to them, lead

170 THE DATA OF ETHICS.

lives such that each family is substantially independent
of others, occasional co-operation occurs. And, inde< d,
thai families should live in company without ever yield-
ing mutual aid, is scarcely conceivable.

Nevertheless, whether actually existing or only ap-
proached, we must here recognize as hypothetically pos-
sible a state in which these primary moral laws are
conformed to; for the purpose of observing, in their un-
complicated forms, what are the negative conditions to
harmonious social life. Whether the members of a social
group do or do not co-operate, certain limitations to their
individual activities are necessitated by their associa-
tion; and, after recognizing these as arising in the
absence of co-operation, we shall be the better prepared
to understand how conformity to them is effected when
co-operation begins.

§ 52. For whether men live together in quite inde-
pendent ways, careful only to avoid ag .' ; or
whether, advancing from passive association to active
iation, they co-operate, their conduct must be such
that tin- achievement of ends by each shall at least not
be hindered. And it becomes obvious that when they
(■><-< perate there must not only be no resulting hinder-
bu1 there musl be facilitation : since, in t!,(; absence
of facilitation, there can be no motive to co-operatei
What shape, then, must the mutual restraints take when
co-operation begins? or rather— What, in addition to
lutual restraints already specified, are those
secondary mutual restraints required to make co-opera-
tion possibk '

' I e who, living in an isolated way, expends effort in
pursuit of an end, gets compensation for the effort by

THE SOCIOLOGICAL VIEW. 171

securing the end, and so achieves satisfaction. If lie
expends the effort without achieving the end there
results dissatisfaction. The satisfaction and the dis-
satisfaction are measures of success and failure in life-
sustaining acts ; since that which is achieved by effort
is something which directly or indirectly furthers life,
and so pays for the cost of the effort ; while if the effort
fails there is nothing to pay for the cost of it, and so
much life is wasted. What must result from this when
men's efforts are joined ? The reply will be made clearer
if we take the successive forms of co-operation in the
order of ascending complexity. We may distinguish as
homogeneous co-operation (1) that in which like efforts
are joined for like ends that are simultaneously en-
joyed. As co-operation that is not completely homoge-
neous we may distinguish (2) that in which like efforts
are joined for like ends that are not simultaneously en-
joyed. A co-operation of which the heterogeneity is
more distinct is (3) that in which unlike efforts are
joined for like ends. And lastly comes the decidedly
heterogeneous co-operation (4) that in which unlike
efforts are joined for unlike ends.

The simplest and earliest of these in which men's
powers, similar in kind and degree, are united in pursuit
of a benefit which, when obtained, they all participate-
in, is most familiarly exemplified in the catching of
game by primitive men : this simplest and earliest form
of industrial co-operation being also that which is least
differentiated from a militant co-operation ; for the co-
operators are the same, and the processes, both destruc-
tive of life, are carried on in analogous ways. The con-
dition under which such co-operation may be sir
fully carried on is that the co-operators shall share alike

172 Tin: DATA OF ETHICS.

in the produce. Bach thus being enabled to repay him-
self in food for the expended effort, and being further
enabled to achieve other such desired ends as mainte-
nance of family, obtains satisfaction: there is no ag-
gression of one on another, and the co-operation is
harmonious. Of course the divided produce can be but
roughly proportioned to the several efforts joined in ob-
taining it. but there is actually among savages, as we
see that for harmonious co-operation there must be, a
recognition of the principle that efforts when combined
shall severally bring equivalent benefits, as they would
do if they were separate. Moreover, beyond the taking
equal shares in return for labors that are approximately
equal, there is generally an attempt at proportioning
it to achievement, by assigning something extra, in
the shape of the best part of the trophy, to the actual
slaver of the game. And obviously, if there is a wide
departure from this system of sharing benefits when
there has been a sharing of efforts, the co-operation will
Individual hunters will prefer to do the best
they can i<>v themselves separately.

Passing from this simplest case of co-operation to a

nut quite so simple — a case in which the homo-

geniety is incompletx — let us ask how a member of the

group may be Led without dissatisfaction to expend

: in achieving a benefit which, when achieved, is
enjoyed exclusively by another? Clearly he may do
this on condition thai the other shall afterward expend
a like effort, the beneficial result of which shall be
similarly rendered up by him in return. This exchange
of equivalents of effort is tin' form which social co-
ition takes while yt there is little or no division
of labor, save that between the sexes. For example,

THE SOCIOLOGICAL VIEW. 173

the Bodo and Dhimals " mutually assist each other for
the nonce, as well in constructing their houses as in
clearing their plots for cultivation." And this prin-
ciple— I will help you if you will help me — common in
simple communities where the occupations are alike
in kind, and occasionally acted upon in more advanced
communities, is one under which the relation between
effort and benefit, no longer directly maintained, is
maintained indirectly. For whereas when men's activities
are carried on separately, or are joined in the way
exemplified above, effort is immediately paid for by
benefit, in this form of co-operation the benefit achieved
by effort is exchanged for a like benefit to be afterward
received when asked for. And in this case as in the
preceding case, co-operation can be maintained only by
fulfillment of the tacit agreements. For if they are
habitually not fulfilled, there will commonly be refusal
to give aid when asked ; and each man will be left to do
the best he can by himself. All those advantages to be
gained by union of efforts in doing things that are
beyond the powers of the single individual, will be
unachievable. At the outset, then, fulfillment of con-
tracts that are implied if not expressed, becomes a con-
dition to social co-operation, and therefore to social
development.

From these simple forms of co-operation in which
the labors men cany on are of like kinds, let us turn
to the more complex forms in which they carry on
labors of unlike kinds. "Where men mutually aid in
building huts or felling trees, the number of days'
work now given by one to another is readily balanced
by an equal number of days' work afterward given by
the other to him. And no estimation of the relative

174 TIIE DATA OF ETIIICS.

values of the labors being required, a definite under-
standing is Little needed. But when division of labor
5 —when there come transactions between one
who makes weapons and another who dresses skins for
clothing, or between a grower of roots and a catcher of
ii>h — neither the relative amounts nor the relative
qualities of their labors admit of easy measure; and
with the multiplication of businesses, implying numer-
ous kinds of skill and power, there ceases to be any-
thing like manifest equivalence between either the
bodily and mental efforts set against one another, or
between their products. Hence the arrangement can-
not now be taken for granted, as while the things ex-
changed are like in kind : it has to be stated. If A
allows B to appropriate a product of his special skill,
on condition that he is allowed to appropriate a differ-
ent product of B's special skill, it results that as equiv-
alence of the two products cannot be determined by
direct comparison of their quantities and qualities,
there must be a distinct understanding as to how much
of the one may be taken in consideration of so much of.
the other.

Only Under voluntary agreement, then, no longer
tacit and vague, but overt and definite, can co-opera-
tion be harmoniously carried on when division of labor
becomes established. And as in t lie simplest co-opera-
tion, where like efforts are joined to secure a common
good, the dissatisfaction caused in those who, having
expended their Labors do not get their shares of the
. prompts them to cease co-operating; as in the
ed co-operation, achieved by exchanging
equal labors of like kind expended at different times,
aversion to co-operate is generated if the expected

THE SOCIOLOGICAL VIEW. t7;'(

equivalent of labor is not rendered; so in this devel-
oped co-operation, the failure of either to surrender to
the other that which was avowedly recognized as of
.like value with the labor or product given, tends to
prevent co-operation by exciting discontent with its
results. And evidently, while antagonisms thus caused
impede the lives of the units, the life of the aggregate
is endangered by diminished cohesion.

§ 53. Beyond these comparatively direct mischiefs,
special and general, there have to be noted indirect
mischiefs. As already implied by the reasoning in the
last paragraph, not only social integration but also
social differentiation, is hindered by breach of contract.

In Part II of the Principles of Sociology, it was
shown that the fundamental principles of organisation
arc the same for an individual organism and for a
social organism ; because both consist of mutually de-
pendent parts. In the one case as in the other, the
assumption of unlike activities by the component mem-
bers, is possible only on condition that they severally
benefit in due degrees by one another's activities. That
we may the better see what are the implications in
respect of social structures, let us first note the impli-
cations in respect of individual structures.

The welfare of a living body implies an approximate
equilibrium between waste and repair. If the activities
involve an expenditure not made good by nutrition,
dwindling follows. If the tissues are enabled to take
up from the blood enriched by food, fit substances
enough to replace those used up in efforts made, the
weight may be maintained. And if the gain exceeds
the loss, growth results.

176 THE DATA OF ETHICS.

That which is true of the whole in its relations to the
external world, is no less true of the parts in their re-
lations to one another. Each organ, like the entire
organism, is wasted by performing its function, and has
to restore itself from the materials brought to it. If
the quantity of materials furnished by the joint agency
of the other organs is deficient, the particular organ
dwindles. If they are sufficient, it can maintain its
integrity. If they are in excess, it is enabled to in-
crease. To say that this arrangement constitutes the
physiological contract, is to use a metaphor which,
though not true in aspect is true in essence. For the
relations of structures are actually such that, by the
help of a central regulative system, each organ is sup-
plied witli blood in proportion to the work it does. As
was pointed out (Principles of Sociology, § 254) well-
developed animals are so constituted that each muscle or
viscus, when called into action, sends to the vaso-motor
centres through certain nerve-fibres, an impulse caused
by its action; whereupon, through other nerve-fibres,
there comes an impulse causing dilatation of its blood-

Ls. Thai is to say, all other parts of the organism,
when they jointly require it to labor, forthwith begin to
pay it in blood. During the ordinary state of physiolog-
ical equilibrium, the loss and the gain balance, and the

i does hoi sensibly change. If the amount of its
function is increased within such moderate limits that
the local blood-vessels can bring adequately-increased
supplies, the organ grows: beyond replacing its losses
by its gains, it makes a profit on its extra transactions;
bo being enabled by extra structures to meet extra de-
mands. But if the demands made on it become so
great that the supply of materials cannot keep pace

THE SOCIOLOGICAL VIEW. 177

with the expenditure, either because the local blood-ves-
sels are not large enough, or for any other reason, then
the organ begins to decrease from excess of waste over
repair; there sets in what is known as atrophy. Now,
since each of the organs has thus to he paid in nutri-
ment for its services by the rest, it follows that the due
balancing of their respective claims and payments is
requisite, directly for the welfare of each organ, and
indirectly for the welfare of the organism. For in a
whole formed of mutually dependent parts, anything
which prevents due performance of its duty by one part
reacts injuriously on all the parts.

With change of terms these statements and inferences
hold of a society. That social division of labor which
parallels in so many other respects the physiological
division of labor, parallels it in this respect also. As
was shown at large in the Principles of Socioh><j;i, Pari
II, each order of functionaries and each group of pro-
ducers, severally performing some action or making
some article not for direct satisfaction of their own
needs but for satisfaction of the needs of fellow-citizens
in general, otherwise occupied, can continue to do this
only so long as the expenditures of effort and returns
of profit are approximately equivalent. Social organs,
like individual organs, remain stationary if there come
to them normal proportions of the commodities produced
by the society as a whole. If because the demands
made on an industry or profession are unusually great,
those engaged in it make excessive profits, more citizens
Hock to it and the social structure constituted by its
members grows ; while decrease of the demands and
therefore of the profits, either leads its members to
choose other careers or stops the accessions needful to

13

178 III)' DATA OF ETTIICS.

replace those who die, and the structure dwindles.
Thus is maintained that proportion among the powers
of the component parts which is most conducive to the
welfare of the whole.

And now mark that the primary condition to
achievement of this result is fulfillment of contract.
If Erom the members of any part payment is frequently
withheld, or falls short of the promised amount, then,
through ruin of some and abandonment of the occupa-
tion by others, the part diminishes; and if it was before
not more than competent to its duty, it now becomes
incompetent, and the society suffers. Or if social needs
tli row on some part great increase of function, and the
members of it are enabled to get for their services un-
usually high juices; fulfillment of the agreements to
give them these high prices, is the only way of drawing
to the pari such additional number of members as will
make it equal to the augmented demands. For citizens
will not come to it if they find the high prices agreed
upon are not paid.

Briefly, then, the universal basis of co-operation is
the proportioning of benefits received to services
rendered. Without this there can be no physiological
division of labor; without this there can be no socio-
d division of labor. And since division of labor,
physiological or sociological, profits the whole and
each pari ; it results that on maintenance of the arrange-
ments necessary to it. depend both special and general
welfare. In a society such arrangements are main-
tained only if bargains, overt or tacit, are carried out.
So that beyond the primary requirement to harmonious
istence in a society, that its units shall not directly
aggress on one another; there comes this secondary

THE SOCIOLOGICAL VIEW. 179

requirement, that they shall not indirectly aggress by
breaking agreements.

§ 54. But now we have to recognize the fact that
complete fulfillment of these conditions, original and
derived, is not enough. Social co-operation may be
such that no one is impeded in the obtainment of the
normal return for effort, but contrariwise is aided by
equitable exchange of services , and yet much may
remain to be achieved. There is a theoretically possi-
ble form of society, purely industrial in its activities,
which, though approaching nearer to the moral ideal in
its code of conduct than any society not purely indus-
trial, does not fully reach it.

For while industrialism requires the life of each
citizen to be such that it may be carried on without
direct or indirect aggressions on other citizens, it does
not require his life to be such that it shall directly
further the lives of other citizens. It is not a necessary
implication of industrialism, as thus far defined, that
each, beyond the benefits given and received by ex-
change of services, shall give and receive other benefits.
A society is conceivable formed of men leading per-
fectly inoffensive lives, scrupulously fulfilling their
contracts, and efficiently rearing their offspring, who
yet, yielding to one another no advantages beyond those
agreed upon, fall short of that highest degree of life
which the gratuitous rendering of services makes pos-
sible. Daily experiences prove that every one would
suffer many evils and lose many goods did none give
him unpaid assistance. The life of each would be more
or less damaged had he to meet all contingencies single-
handed, Further, if no one did for his fellows any-

180 TH K DA /'. 1 OF ETHICS.

tiling more than was required by strict performance of
contract, private interests would suffer from the absence
of attention to public interests. The limit of evolution
of conduct is consequently not reached, until, beyond
avoidance of direct and indirect injuries to others, there
are spontaneous efforts to further the welfare of others.
It may be shown that the form of nature which thus
to justice adds beneficence, is one which adaption to the
social state produces. The social man has not reached
that harmonization of constitution with conditions form-
ing the limit of evolution, so long as there remains
.spate for the growth of faculties which, by their ex-
ercise, bring positive benefit to others and satisfaction
to self. If the presence of fellow-men, while putting
certain limits to each man's sphere of activit}-, opens
certain other spheres of activity in which feelings, while
achieving their gratifications, do not diminish, but add
to the gratifications of others, then such spheres will
inevitably be occupied. Recognition of this truth does
not, however, call on us to qualify greatly that concep-
tion of the industrial state above set forth, since sym-
pathy is the root of both justice and beneficence.

5. Thus the sociological view of Ethics supple-
ments the physical, the biological, and the psychological
jlosing those conditions under which only

ited activities can be so carried on, that the com-
plete living of each consists with, and conduces to, the
complete living of all.

first the welfare of social groups, habitually in

• >nism with other such groups, takes precedence
of individual welfare ; and the rules of conduct which
athoritative for the time being, involve incomplete-
ness of individual life that the general life maybe main-

THE SOCIOLOGICAL VIEW. 181

tainecl. At t lio same time the rules have to enforce the

claims of individual life as far us may be, since on the
welfare of the units the welfare of the aggregate largely
depends.

In proportion as societies endanger one another less,
the need for subordinating individual lives to the gen-
eral life, decreases ; and with approach to a' peaceful
state, the general life, having from the beginning had
furtherance of individual lives as its ultimate purpose,
comes to have this as its proximate purpose.

During the transitional stages there are necessitated
successive compromises between the moral code which
asserts the claims of the society versus those of the in-
dividual, and the moral code which asserts the claims
of the inividual versus those of the society. And evi-
dently each such compromise, though for the time being
authoritative, admits of no consistent or definite ex-
pression.

But gradually as war declines — gradually as the com-
pulsory co-operation needful in dealing with external
enemies becomes unnecessary, and leaves behind the
voluntary co-operation which effectually achieves in-
ternal sustentation, there grows increasingly clear the
code of conduct which voluntary co-operation implies.
And this final permanent code alone admits of being
definitely formulated, and so constituting ethics as a
science in contrast with empirical ethics.

The leading traits of a code, under which complete
living through voluntary co-operation is secured, may be
simply stated. The fundamental requirement is that
the life-sustaining actions of each shall severally bring
him the amounts and kinds of advantage naturally
achieved by them, and this implies firstly that he shall

182 THE DATA OF ETHICS.

Buffer no direct aggressions on his person or propt-, ; ,
and, secondly, that lie shall suffer no indirect aggres-
sions by breach of contract. Observance of these nega-
tive conditions to voluntary co-operation having facili-
tated life to the greatest extent by exchange of services
under agreement, life is to be further facilitated by ex-
change of services beyond agreement: the highest life
being reached only when, besides helping to complete
one another's lives by specified reciprocities of aid, men
otherwise help to complete one another's lives.

CRITICISMS AND EXPLANATION 8. 183

CHAPTER IX.

CRITICISMS AND EXPLANATIONS.

§ 56. Comparisons of the foregoing chapters, with
one another, suggest sundry questions which must be
answered partially, if not completely, before anything
can be done toward reducing ethical principles from
abstract forms to concrete forms.

We have seen that to admit the desirableness of con-
scious existence is to admit that conduct should be such
as will produce a consciousness which is desirable — a
consciousness which is as much pleasurable and as little
painful as may be. We have also seen that this neces-
sary implication corresponds with the a priori inference,
that the evolution of life has been made possible only
by the establishment of connections between pleasures
and beneficial actions, and between pains and detrimental
actions. But the general conclusion reached in both of
these ways, though it covers the area within which our
special conclusions must fall, does not help us to reach
those special conclusions.

Were pleasures all of one kind, differing only in de-
gree ; were pains all of one kind, differing only in de-
gree ; and could pleasures be measured against pains
with definite results, the problems of conduct would be
greatly simplified. Were the pleasures and pains serv-
ing as incentives and deterrents, simultaneously present
to consciousness with like vividness, or were they all

1 - [ THE DATA OF ETHICS.

immediately impending, or were they all equidistant in
time; the problems would be further simplified. And
they would be still further simplified if the pleasures
and pains were exclusively those of the actor. But
both the desirable and the undesirable feelings are of
various kinds, making quantitative comparisons difficult;
some are present and some are future, increasing the
difficulty of quantitative comparison; some are entailed
on self and some are entailed on others; again increasing
the difficulty. So that the guidance yielded by the
primary principle reached is of little service unless sup-
plemented by the guidance of secondary principles.

Already, in recognizing the needful subordination of
presentative feelings to representative feelings, and the
implied postponement of present to future throughout a
wide range of cases, some approach toward a secondary
principle of guidance has been made. Already, too, in
recognizing the limitations which men's associated state
puts to their actions, with the implied need for restrain-
ing feelings of some kinds by feelings of other kinds,
we have come in sight of another secondary principle of
guidance. Still, there remains much to be decided
respecting the relative claims of these guiding princi-
ple, genera] and special.

Some elucidation of the questions involved will be
obtained by here discussing certain views and arguments
set forth by past and present moralists.

§ o7. Using the name hedonism for that ethical
theory which makes happiness the end of action, and
distinguishing hedonism into the two kinds, egoistic and
universalistic, according as the happiness sought is that
of the actor himself, or is that of all, Mr. Sidgwick

CBITICISMS AND EXPLANATIONS. 185

alleges its implied belief to be that pleasures and pains
are commensurable. In his criticism on (empirical)
egoistic hedonism he says :

"The fundamental assumption of Hedonism, clearly stated, is
that all feelings considered merely as feelings can be arranged in
a certain scale of desirability, so that the desirability or pleasant-
ness of each hears a definite ratio to that of all the others." — Meth-
ods of Ethics, 2d ed. p. 115.

And asserting this to be its assumption he proceeds
to point out difficulties in the way of the hedonistic
calculation ; apparently for the purpose of implying
that these difficulties tell against the hedonistic theory.

Now, though it may be shown that by naming the
intensity, the duration, the certainty, and the proxim-
ity, of a pleasure or a pain, as traits entering into the
estimation of its relative value, Bentham has com-
mitted himself to the specified assumption ; and, though,
it is, perhaps, reasonably taken for granted that
hedonism, as represented by him, is identical with
hedonism at large ; yet it seems to me that the hedon-
ist, empirical or other, is not necessarily committed to
this assumption. That the greatest surplus of pleasures
over pains ought to be the end of action is a belief
which he may still consistently hold after admitting
that the valuations of pleasures and pains are com-
monly vague and often erroneous. He may say th;it
though indefinite things do not admit of definite
measurements, yet approximately true estimates of
their relative values may be made when they differ con-
siderably, and he may further say, that even when their
relative values are not determinable, it remains true
that the most valuable should be chosen. Let us listen
to him.

1SG THE DATA OF ETHICS.

'• A debtor who cannot pay me offers to compound for
his debt by making over one of sundry things he pos-
— a diamond ornament,' a silver vase, a picture, a
carriage. Other questions being set aside I assert it to
he my pecuniary interest to choose the most valuable of
these, but I cannot say which is the most valuable.
Does the proposition that it is my pecuniary interest to
choose the most valuable, therefore, become doubtful?
Musi I not choose as well as lean, and if I choose wrongly
must I give up my ground of choice ? Must I infer
that in matters of business I may not act on the principle
that, other tilings equal, the more profitable transaction
is to be preferred, because, in many cases, I cannot say
which is the more profitable, and have often chosen the
less profitable? Because I believe that of many danger-
ous courses I ought to take the least dangerous, do I
make k the fundamental assumption ' that courses can be
arranged according to a scale of dangerousness, and
must I abandon my belief if I cannot so arrange them?
if I am not by consistency bound to do this, then I am
no more by consistency bound to give up the principle
that the greatest surplus of pleasures over pains should
be the end of action, because the ' commensurability of
pleasures and pains' cannot be asserted."

At the close of his chapters on empirical hedonism,
Mi. Sidgwick himself says he docs "not think that the
common experience of mankind, impartially examined,
really sustains the view that Egoistic Hedonism is neces-
sarily suicidal ; " adding, however, that the "uncertainty
of hedonistic calculation cannot be denied to have
weight." But here the fundamental assumption
of hedonism, that happiness is the end of action, is still
supposed to involve the assumption that "feelings can

CRITICISMS AN I) EXPLANATIONS. 187

be arranged in a certain scale of desirability." This we
have seen it does not : its fundamental assumption is in
no degree invalidated by proof that such arrangement
of them is impracticable.

To Mr. Sidsrwick's argument there is the further ob-
jection, no less serious, that to whatever degree it tells
against egoistic hedonism, it tells in a greater degree
against universalistic hedonism, or utilitarianism. He
admits that it tells as much; saying "whatever weight
is to be attached to the objections brought against this
assumption [the commensurability of pleasures and
pains] must of course tell against the present method."
Not only does it tell, but it tells in a double way. I do
not mean merely that, as he points out, the assumption
becomes greatly complicated if we take all sentient be-
ings into account, and if we include posterity along with
existing individuals. I mean that, taking as the end to
be achieved the greatest happiness of the existing in-
dividuals forming a single community, the set of diffi-
culties standing in the way of egoistic hedonism, is com-
pounded with another set of difficulties no less great,
when we pass from it to universalistic hedonism. For
if the dictates of universalistic hedonism are to be ful-
filled, it must be under the guidance of individual judg-
ments, or of corporate judgments, or of both. Now any
one of such judgments issuing from a single mind, or
from any aggregate of minds, necessarily embodies con-
clusions respecting the happiness of other persons ; few
of them known, and the great mass never seen. All
these persons have natures differing in countless ways
and degrees from the natures of those who form the
judgments; and the happiness of which they are sever-
ally capable differ from one another, and differ from the

1 vs THE DATA OF ETUICS.

happinesses of those who form the judgments. Conse-
quently, if against the method of egoistic hedonism there
is the objection that a man's own pleasures and pains,
unlike in their kinds, intensities, and times of occurrence,
are incommensurable ; then against the method of uni-
versalistic hedonism it may be urged that to the incom-
mensurability of each judge's own pleasures and pains
(which he must use as standards) has now to be added
the much more decided incommensurability of the pleas-
ures and pains which he conceives to be experienced by
innumerable other persons, all differently constituted
from himself and from one another.

Nay more — there is a triple set of difficulties in the
way of universalistic hedonism. To the double inde-
terminateness of the end has to be added the indeter-
minateness of the means. If hedonism, egoistic or uni-
versalistic, is to pass from dead theory into living
practice, acts of one or other kind must be decided on
to achieve proposed objects ; and in estimating the two
methods we have to consider how far the fitness of the
acts respectively required can be judged. If, in pur-
suing his own ends, the individual is liable to be led by
erroneous opinions to adjust his acts wrongly, much
more liable is he. to be led by erroneous opinions to
adjust wrongly more complex acts to the more complex
ends constituted by other men's welfares. It is so if he
operates singly to benefit a few others; and it is still
more so if lie co-operates with many to benefit all.
Abiking general happiness the immediate object of pur-
suit, Implies numerous and complicated instrumental-
itii-s officered by thousands of unseen and unlike per-
sons, and working on millions of other persons unseen
and unlike. Even the few factors in this immense

CRTTICT*VK AND EXPLANATIONS. 189

aggregate of appliances and processes which are known,
are very imperfectly known, and the great mass of
them are unknown. So that even supposing valua-
tion of pleasures and pains for the community at large
is more practicable than, or even as practicable as, valua-
tion of his own pleasures and pains by the individual ;
yet the ruling of conduct with a view to the one end is
far more difficult than the ruling of it with a view to
the other. Hence, if the method of egoistic hedonism
is unsatisfactor}', far more unsatisfactory for the same
and kindled reasons, is the method of universalLstic
hedonism, or utilitarianism.

And here we come in sight of the conclusion which
it has been the purpose of the foregoing criticism to
bring into view. The objection made to the hedonistic
method contains a truth, but includes with it an un-
truth. For while the proposition that happiness,
whether individual or general, is the end of action, is
not invalidated by proof that it cannot under either
form be estimated by measurement of its components ;
yet it may be admitted that guidance in the pursuit of
happiness by a mere balancing of pleasures and pains,
is, if partially practicable throughout a certain range of
conduct, futile throughout a much wider range. It is
quite consistent to assert that happiness is the ultimate
aim of action, and at the same time to deny that it can
be reached by making it the immediate aim. I go with
Air. Sidgwick as far as the conclusion that "we must at
least admit the desirability of confirming or correcting
the results of such comparisons [of pleasures and pains]
by any other method upon which we may find reason
to rely ; " and then I go further, and say that through-
out a large part of conduct guidance by such compari-

190 TIIE DA TA OF ETHICS.

sons is to be entirely set aside and replaced by other

guidance.

§ 58. The antithesis here insisted upon between the
hedonistic end considered in the abstract, and the method
which current hedonism, whether egoistic or universal-
istic, associates with that end; and the joining accept-
ance of the one with rejection of the other ; commits us
to an overt discussion of the two cardinal elements of
ethical t 1km >ry. I may conveniently initiate this discus-
sion by criticising another of Mr. Sidgwick's criticisms
on the method of hedonism.

Though Ave can give no account of those simple pleas-
ures which the senses yield, because they are undecom-
posable, yet we distinctly know their characters as states
of consciousness. Conversely, the complex pleasures
formed by compounding and re-compounding the ideas
of simple pleasures, though theoretically resolvable into
their components, are not easy to resolve; and in pro-
portion as they are heterogeneous in composition the
difficulty of framing intelligible conceptions of them in-
creases. This is especially the case with the pleasures
which accompany our sports. Treating of these, along
with tin- pleasures of pursuit in general, for the purpose
of showing thai k- in order to get them one must forget
them," Mr. Sidgwick remarks :

•• A mas who maintains throughout an epicurean mood, fixing
In- aim on his own pleasure, does not catch the full spirit of the
chase; his< never gets just the sharpness of edge which

imparts to the pi • t and flavor. Here comes into

view what we ma; <••.:!] the fundamental paradox of Hedonism,
that the impulse toward pleasure, if too predominant, defeats its
own aim. This effect i-> not risible, or al any rate is scarcely visi-
ble, in the case of passive sensual pleasures. But of our active en-

CRITICISMS AND EXPLANATIONS. 101

joyments generally, whether the activities on which they attend

an- classed as ' bodily ' or as ' intellectual ' (as well as of many
emotional pleasures), it may certainly be said that we cannot at-
tain them, at least in their best form, so long as we concentrate
our aim on them." — Methods of Ethics. 2d ed. p. 41.

Now I think wo shall not regard this truth as para-
doxical after we have duly analyzed the pleasure of pur-
suit. The chief components of this pleasure are : First,
a renewed consciousness of personal efficiency (made
vivid by actual success and partially excited by impend-
ing success) which consciousness of personal efficiency,
connected in experience with achieved ends of every
kind, arouses a vague but massive consciousness of re-
sulting gratifications ; and second, a representation of
the applause which recognition of this efficiency by
others has before brought, and will again bring. Games
of skill show us this clearly. Considered as an end in
itself, the good cannon which a billiard player makes
yields no pleasure. Whence, then, does the pleasure
of making it arise ? Partly from the fresh proof of
capability which the player gives to himself, and partly
from the imagined admiration of those who witness the
proof of his capability: the last being the chief, since
he soon tires of making cannons in the absence of
witnesses. When from games which, yielding the
pleasures of success, yield no pleasure derived from the
end considered intrinsically, we pass to sports in which
the end has intrinsic value as a source of pleasure, we
see substantially the same thing. Though the bird
which the sportsman brings down is useful as food, yet
his satisfaction arises mainly from having made a good
shot, and from having added to the bag which will
presently bring praise of his skill. The gratification of

192 THE DATA OF ETHICS.

self-esteem he immediately experiences ; and the grati-
fication of receiving applause he experiences, if not im-
mediately and in full degree, yet by representation; for
the ideal pleasure is nothing else than a faint revival of
the real pleasure. These two kinds of agreeable excite-
ment present in the sportsman during the chase consti-
tute the mass of the desires stimulating him to continue
it ; for all desires are nascent forms of the feelings to be
obtained by the efforts they prompt. And though while
seeking more birds these representative feelings are not
so vividly excited as by success just achieved, yet they
are excited by imaginations of further successes ; and so
make enjoyable the activities constituting the pursuit.
Recognizing, then, the truth that the pleasures of
pursuit are much more those derived from the efficient
use of means than those derived from the end itself, we
see that " the fundamental paradox of hedonism " dis-
appears.

These remarks concerning ends and means, and the
pleasure accompanying use of the means as added to the
pleasure derived from the end, I have made for the pur-
pose of drawing attention to a fact of profound signif-
icance. During evolution there has been a superposing
of new and more complex sets of means upon older
and simpler sets of means, and a superposing of the
pleasures accompanying the uses of these successive sets
of means, with the result that each of these pleasures
;^elf eventually become an end. We begin with a
simple animal which, without ancillary appliances, swal-
srach food as accident brings in its way; and so, as
we may assume, stills some kind of craving. Here we
have the primary end of nutrition with its accompany-
ing satisfaction, in their simple forms. We pass to

Criticisms .1 VD i:\rLA\ATIONS. 10.1

higher types having jaws for seizing and "biting — jaws
which thus, by their actions, facilitate achievement of
the primary end. On observing animals furnished with
these organs, we get evidence that the use of them be-
comes in itself pleasurable irrespective of the end:
instance a squirrel which, apart from food to be so ob-
tained, delights in nibbling everything it gets hold of.
Turning from jaws to limbs we see that these, serving
some creatures for pursuit and others for escape, simi-
larly yield gratification by their exercise ; as in lambs
which skip and horses which prance. How the com-
bined use of limbs and jaws, originally subserving the
satisfaction of appetite, grows to be in itself pleasur-
able, is daily illustrated in the playing of dogs. For
that throwing down and worrying which, when prey is
caught, precedes eating, is, in their mimic fights, carried
b}' each as far as he dares. Coming to means still more
remote from the end, namely, those by which creatures
chased are caught, Ave are again shown by dogs that
when no creature is caught there is still a gratification
in the act of catching. The eagerness with which a
dog runs after stones, or dances and barks in anticipa-
tion of jumping into the water after a stick, proves that
apart from the satisfaction of appetite, and apart even
from the satisfaction of killing prey, there is a satis-
faction in the successful pursuit of a moving object.
Throughout, then, we see that the pleasure attendant
on the use of means to achieve an end, itself becomes an
end.

Now if we contemplate these as phenomena of conduct
in general, some facts worthy of note may be discerned
— facts which, if we appreciate their significance, will

aid us in developing our ethical conceptions.
13

194 TEE DATA OF ETHICS.

One of them is that among the successive sets of
means, the later are the more remote from the primary
end ; are, as co-ordinating earlier and simpler means, the
more complex ; and are accompanied by feelings which
are more representative.

Another fact is that each set of means, with its accom-
panying satisfactions, eventually becomes in its turn
dependent on one originating later than itself. Before
the gullet swallows, the jaws must lay hold; before the
jaws tear out and bring within the grasp of the gullet a
piece fit for swallowing, there must be that co-operation
of limbs and senses required for killing the prey ; before
this co-operation can take place, there needs the much
longer co-operation constituting the chase ; and even
before this there must be persisted activities of limbs,
eyes, and nose in seeking prey. The pleasure attending
each set of acts, while making possible the pleasure at-
tending the set of acts which follows, is joined with a
representation of this subsequent set of acts and its
pleasure, and of the others which succeed in order ; so
that along with the feelings accompanying the search
for prey, are partially aroused the feelings accompanying
the actual chase, the actual destruction, the actual de-
vouring, and the eventual satisfaction of appetite.

A third fact is that the use of each set of means in
due order, constitutes an obligation. Maintenance of
its lift,- being regarded as an end of its conduct, the
creature is obliged to use in succession the means of
finding prey, the means of catching prey, the means of
killing prey, the means of devouring prey.

Lastly, it follows that though the assuaging of hunger,
directly associated with sustentation, remains to the last
the ultimate end ; yet tho successful use of each set of

CBFTICISMS AND EXPLANATIONS. 195

means in its turn is the proximate end — the end which
takes temporary precedence in authoritativene

§ 59. The relations between means and ends thus
traced throughout the earlier stages of evolving conduct,
are traceable throughout later stages and hold true of
human conduct, up even to its highest forms. As fast
as, for the better maintenance of life, the simpler sets of
means and the pleasures accompanying the uses of them,
come to be supplemented by the more complex sets of
means and their pleasures, these begin to take precedence
in time and in imperativeness. To use effectually each
more complex set of means becomes the proximate end,
and the accompanying feeling becomes the immediate
gratification sought; though there maybe and habitually
is, an associated consciousness of the remoter ends and
remoter gratifications to be obtained. An example will
make clear the parallelism.

Absorbed in his business the trader, if asked what is
his main end. will say — making money. He readily
grants that achievement of this end is desired by him
in furtherance of ends beyond it. He knows that in
directly seeking money he is indirectly seeking food,
clothes, house-room, and the comforts of life for self
and family. But while admitting that money is but a
means to these ends, he urges that the money-getting
actions precede in order of time and obligation, the
various actions and concomitant pleasures subserved
by them ; and he testifies to the fact that making
money has become itself an end, and success in it a
source of satisfaction, apart from these more distant
ends.

Again, on observing more closely the trader's pro-

196 THE DATA OF ETFLICS.

ceedings, we find that though to the end of living com
fortably he gets money, and though to the end of get-
ting money he buj-s and sells at a profit, which so
becomes a means more immediately pursued, yet he is
chiefly occupied with means still more remote from
ultimate ends, and in relation to which even the selling
at a profit becomes an end. For leaving to subordinates
the actual measuring out of goods and receiving of pro-
ceeds, he busies himself mainly with his general affairs —
inquiries concerning markets, judgments of future prices,
calculations, negotiations, correspondence : the anxiety
from hour to hour being to do well each one of these
things indirectly conducive to the making of profits.
And these ends precede in time and obligation the
effecting of profitable sales, just as the effecting of profit-
able sales precedes the end of money-making, and just
as the end of money-making precedes the end of satis-
factory living.

His bookkeeping best exemplifies the principle at
large. Entries to the debtor or creditor sides are being
made all through the day ; the items are classified and
arranged in such way that at a moment's notice the
state of each account may be ascertained; and then,
from time to time, the books are balanced, and it is
required that the results shall come right to a penny :
iction following proved correctness and annoy-
being caused by error. If you ask why all this
elaborate process, so remote from the actual getting of
money, and still more remote from the enjoyments of
life, the answer is that keeping accounts correctly is
fulfilling a condition t<> the end of money-making, and
in itself a proximate end — a duty to be dis-
charged, that there may be discharged the duty of get>

CttttlClBitB AM) L.\ /'LAXATIONS. 19?

ting an income, that there ma}* he discharged the duty
of maintaining self, wife and children.

Approaching as we here do to moral obligation, are
we not shown its relations to conduct at large ? Is it
not clear that observance of moral principles is fulfill-
ment of certain general conditions to the successful
carrying on of special activities ? That the trader may
prosper, he must not only keep his books correctly, but
must pay those he employs according to agreement, and
must meet his engagements with creditors. May we
not say, then, that conformity to the second and third
of these requirements is, like conformity to the first, an
indirect means to effectual use of the more direct means
of achieving welfare ? May we not say, too, that as the
use of each more indirect means in due order becomes
itself an end, and a source of gratification ; so, event-
ually, becomes the use of this most indirect means ?
And may we not infer that thou di conformity to moral
requirements precedes in imperativeness conformity to
other requirements ; )ret that this imperativeness arises
from the fact that fulfillment of the other requirements,
by self or others, or both, is thus furthered ?

§ GO. This question brings us round to another side
of the issue before raised. When alleging that empir-
ical utilitarianism is but introductory to rational utili-
tarianism, I pointed out that the last does not take
welfare for its immediate object of pursuit, but takes
for its immediate object of pursuit conformity to certain
principles which, in the nature of things, casually deter-
mine welfare. And now we see that this amounts to
recognition of that law, traceable throughout the evolu-
tion of conduct in general, that each later and higher

198 THE DATA OF ETIIICS.

order of means takes precedence in time and authorita-
tiveness of each earlier and lower order of means. The
contrast between the ethical methods thus distinguished,
made tolerably clear by the above illustrations, will be
made still clearer by contemplating the two as put in
opposition by the leading exponent of empirical utili-
tarianism. Treating of legislative aims, Bentham writes :

" But justice, what is it that we are to understand by justice :
and why not happiness but justice ? What happiness is, every
man knows, because, what pleasure is, every man knows, and
what pain is, every man knows. But what justice is — this is what
on every occasion is the subject-matter of dispute. Be the mean-
ing of the word justice what it will what regard is it entitled to
otherwise than as a means of happiness." *

Let us first consider the assertion here made respect-
ing the relative intelligibilities of these two ends, and
let us afterward consider what is implied by the choice
of happiness instead of justice.

Bentham's positive assertion that, " what happiness is
every man knows, because, what pleasure is, every man
knows,'' is met by counter-assertions equally positive.
"Who can tell," asks Plato, "what pleasure really is,
or know it in its essence, except the philosopher, who
alone is conversant with realities."! Aristotle, too,
after commenting on the different opinions held by the
vulgar, by the political, by the contemplative, says of
happiness that, "to some it seems to be virtue, to others
prudence, and to others a kind of wisdom : to some
again, these, or some one of these, with pleasure, or at
least, not without pleasure ; others again include ex-

* Constitutional ( ode, chap, xvi, Supremo Legislative — Section
vi, Omnicompt U
f Rejjublic, Bk. bu

CBITJCI8M8 AND EXPLANATIONS. 109

ternal prosperity."* And Aristotle, like Plato, comes
to the remarkable conclusion that the pleasures of the
intellect, reached by the contemplative life, constitute
the highest happiness ! f

How disagreements concerning the nature of happiness
and the relative values of pleasures, thus exhibited in
ancient times, continue down to modern times, is shown
by Mr. Sidgwick's discussion of egoistic hedonism,
above commented upon. Further, as was pointed out
before, the indefiniteness attending the estimations of
pleasures and pains, which stands in the way of egoistic
hedonism as ordinarily conceived, is immensely in-
creased on passing to universalistic hedonism as ordi-
narily conceived ; since its theory implies that the
imagined pleasures and pains of others are to be esti-
mated by the help of these pleasures and pains of self
already so difficult to estimate. And that any one after
observing the various pursuits into which some eagerly
enter, but which others shun, and after listening to the
different opinions concerning the likeableness of this or
that occupation or amusement, expressed at every table,
should assert that the nature of happiness can be fully
agreed upon, so as to render it a fit end for direct legis-
lative action, is surprising.

The accompanying proposition that justice is unin-
telligible as an end is no less surprising. Though prim-
itive men have no words for either happiness or justice,
yet even among them an approach to the conception of
justice is traceable. The law of retaliation, requiring
that a death inflicted b}T one tribe on another, shall be
balanced by the death either of the murderer or some

* Xicomaelican Ethics, Bk. i. chap. 8. f Bk. x. chap. 7.

200 TUE DATA OF XTIITCS.

member ofhis tribe, shows us in a vague shape that notion
of equalness of treatment which forms an essential ele-
ment in it.

When we come to early races who have given their
thoughts and feelings literary form we find this con-
ception of justice, as involving equalness of action, be-
coming distinct. Among the Jews, David expressed in
words this association of ideas when, praying to God to
" hear the right," he said, "Let my sentence come forth
from thy presence ; let thine eyes behold the things that
are equal ; " as also, among early Christians, did Paul
when to the Colossians he wrote, " Masters, give unto
your servants that which is just and equal." Comment-
ing on the different meanings of justice, Aristotle con-
cludes that " the just will, therefore be the lawful and
the equal, and the unjust the unlawful and the unequal.
But since the unjust man is also one who takes more
than his share," etc. And that justice was similarly
conceived by the Romans they proved by including
under it such meanings as exact, proportionate, impartial,
severally implying fairness of division, and still better
by identification of it with equity, which is a derivative
of ceqwm: tin; word cpquu* itself having for one of its
meanings just or impartial.

This coincidence of view among ancient peoples re-
Bpecting the oature of justice, has extended to modern
peoples : who by a general agreement in certain cardi-
nal principles which their systems of law embody, for-
bidding direcl aggressions, which are forms of unequal
action-, and forbidding indirect aggressions by breaches
of contract, which are other forms of unequal actions,
one and all show us the identification of justice with
equalness. Bentham, then, is wrong when he says — -

CBITICIBM8 AND EA'l'L ANA TIONS. 20 1

"But what justice is — this is what on every occasion is
tin- subject-matter of dispute."' He is more wrong, in-
deed, than has thus far appeared. For, in the first
place, he misrepresents utterly by ignoring the fact in
ninety-nine out of every hundred daily transactions
between men, no dispute about justice arises ; but the
business done is recognized on both sides as justly done.
And in the second place if, with respect to the hun-
dredth transaction there is a dispute, the subject matter
of it is not "what justice is," for it is admitted to be
equity or equalness; but the subject matter of dispute
always is what, under these particular circumstances,
constitutes equalness? — a widely different question.

It is not then self-evident, as Bentham alleges, that
happiness is an intelligible end while justice is not; but
contrariwise examination makes evident the greater in-
telligibility of justice as an end. And analysis shows
why it is more intelligible. For justice, or equity, or
equalness, is concerned exclusivel}- with quantity under
stated conditions; whereas happiness is concerned with
both quantity and qualify under conditions not stated.
When, as in case of theft, a benefit is taken while no
equivalent benefit is yielded — -when, as in case of adul-
terated goods bought or base coin paid, that which is
agreed to be given in exchange as of equal value is not
given, but something of less value — when, as in case of
broken contract, the obligation on one side has been dis-
charged while there has been no discharge, or in-
complete discharge, of the obligation on the other; we
see that, the circumstances being specified, the injustice
complained of refers to the relative amounts of actions,
or products, or benefits, the natures of which are recog-
nized only so far as is needful for saying whether as

202 THE DATA OF ETHICS.

much has been given, or done, or allowed, by each con-
cerned, as was implied by tacit or overt understanding
to be an equivalent. But when the end proposed is hap-
piness, thr circumstances remaining unspecified, the prob-
lem is that of estimating both quantities and qualities,
unhelped by any such definite measures as acts of ex-
change imply, or as contracts imply, or as are implied
by t lie differences between the doings of one aggressing
and one aggressed upon. The mere fact that Bentham
himself includes as elements in the estimation of each
pleasure or pain, its intensity, duration, certainty, and
proximit}', suffices to show how difficult is this problem.
And when it is remembered that all pleasures and pains,
not felt in particular cases only but in the aggregate of
cases, and severally regarded under these four aspects,
have to be compared with one another and their relative
values determined, simply by introspection ; it will be
manifest both that the problem is complicated by the
addition of indefinite judgments of qualities to indefinite
measures of quantities, and that it is further compli-
cated by the multitudinousness of these vague estima-
tions to be gone through and summed up.

But now passing over this assertion of Bentham
that happiness is a more intelligible end than justice,
which we find to be the reverse of truth, let us note the
several implications of the doctrine that the supreme
lative body ought to make the greatest happiness
of the greatest numltcr its immediate aim.

It implies, in the first place, that happiness may be
compassed by methods framed directly for the purpose,
without any previous inquiry respecting the conditions
that must be fulfilled; and this pre-supposes a belief
that there are no such conditions. For if there are any

CRITICISMS AND EXPLANATIONS. 203

conditions without fulfillment of which happiness can-
not be compassed, then the first step must be to ascertain
these conditions with a view to fulfilling them ; and to
admit this is to admit that not happiness itself must be
the immediate end, but fulfillment of the conditions to
its attainment must be the immediate end. The alter-
natives are simple : Either the achievement of happiness
is not conditional, in which case one mode of action is as
good as another, or it is conditional, in which case the
required mode of action must be the direct aim and not
the happiness to be achieved by it.

Assuming it conceded, as it will be, that there exist
conditions which must be fulfilled before happiness can
be attained, let us next ask what is implied by proposing
modes of so controlling conduct as to further happiness,
without previously inquiring whether any such modes
are already known ? The implication is that human in-
telligence throughout the past, operating on experiences,
has failed to discover any such modes ; whereas present
human intelligence may be expected forthwith to dis-
cover them. Unless this be asserted, it must be admit-
ted that certain conditions to the achievement of hap-
piness have already been partially, if not wholly, ascer
tained ; and if so, our first business should be to look for
them. Having found them, our rational course is to
bring existing intelligence to bear on these products of
past intelligence, with the expectation that it will verify
the substance of them while possibly correcting the form.
But to suppose that no regulative principles for the
conduct of associated human beings have thus far been
established, and that they are now to be established de
novo, is to suppose that man as he is differs from man as
he was in an incredible degree.

204 THE DATA OF ETHICS.

Beyond ignoring the probability, or rather the cer-
tainty, that past experience generalized by past intelli-
gence, must })y this time have disclosed partially, ii
not wholly, some of the essential conditions to the
achievement of happiness, Bentham's proposition ignores
the formulated knowledge of them actually existing.
For whence come the conception of justice and the
answering sentiment. He will scarcely say that they
are meaningless, although his proposition implies as
much ; and if he admits that they have meanings, he
must choose between two alternatives either of which
is fatal to his hypothesis. Are they supernaturally
caused modes of thinking and feeling, tending to make
men fulfill the conditions to happiness? If so, their
authority is peremptory. Are they modes of thinking
and feeling naturally caused in men by experience of
these conditions ? If so, their authority is no less per-
emptory. Not only, then, does Bentham fail to infer
that certain principles of guidance must by this time
have been ascertained, but he refuses to recognize these
principles as actually reached and present to him.

And then after all, he tacitly admits that which he
overtly denies, by saying that — " Be the meaning of the
word justice what it will, what regard is it entitled to
otherwise than as a means of happiness? For if justice
means having happiness as its end, then justice
musl take precedence of happiness, as every other means
ace of every other end. Bentham's own
elaborate polity is a means having happiness as its end,
as jn ' n admission, a means having hap-

L If. then, we may properly skip jus-
. and go directly to the end happiness, we may prop-
erly fckip Bentham's polity, and go directly to the end

fXTICISMB A.XD EXPLANATIONS. 205

happiness ' In short, we are led to the remarkable con-
clusion i! X in all cases we must contemplate exclusively
the end and must disregard the means.

§ CI. This relation of ends to means, underlying all
ethical speculation, will be further elucidated if we join
with some of the above conclusions, certain conclusions
drawn in the last chapter. We shall see that while
greatest happiness may vary widely in societies which,
though idly constituted, are subject to unlike physical
circumstances, certain fundamental conditions to the
achievement of this greatest happiness, are common to
all such societies.

Given a people inhabiting a tract which makes no-
madic habits necessary, and the happiness of each indi-
vidual will be greatest when his nature is so molded
to the requirements of his life, that all his faculties find
their due activities in daily driving and tending cattle,
milking, migrating and so forth. The members of a
community otherwise similar, which is permanently
settled, will severally achieve their greatest happiness
when their natures have become such that a fixed hab-
itat, and the occupations necessitated by it, supply the
spheres in which each instinct and emotion is exercised
and brings the concomitant pleasure. The citizens of a
large nation, industrially organized, have reached their
possible ideal of happiness, when the producing, dis-
tributing, and other activities, are such in their kinds
and amounts, that each citizen finds in them a place for
all his energies and aptitudes, while he obtains the
means of satisfying all his desires. Once more we may
recognize as not only possible but probable, the eventual
existence of a community, also industrial, the members

206 TI1E DATA Of- ETHICS.

of which, having natures similarly respond^ • to these
requirements, are also characterized by dominant
aesthetic faculties, and achieve complete happiness only
when a large part of life is rilled with aesthetic activities.
Evidently these different types of men, with their dif-
ferent standards of happiness, each rinding the possibil-
ity of that happiness in his own society, would not find
it if transferred to any of the other societies. Evidently,
though, they might have in common such kinds of
happiness as accompany the satisfaction of vital needs,
they would not have in common sundry other kinds of
happiness.

But now mark that while, to achieve greatest happi-
ness in each of such societies, the special conditions to
be fulfilled must differ from those to be fulfilled in the
other societies, certain general conditions must be ful-
filled in all the societies. Harmonious co-operation, by
which alone in any of them the greatest happiness can
be attained, is, as we saw, made possible only by re-
spect for one another's claims : there must be neither
those direct aggressions which we class as crimes against
in and property, nor must there be those indirect
aggressions constituted by breaches of contracts. So
that maintenance of equitable relations between men is
the condition to attainment of greatest happiness in all
. however much the greatest happiness attain-
able iu each may differ in nature, or amount, or both.

And here a physical analogy may fitly be used to
give the greatest definiteness to this cardinal truth. A

of matter, of whatever kind, maintains its state of
internal equilibrium, so long as its component particles

illy stand toward their neighbors in equidistant
positions. Accepting the conclusions of modern phys-

CRITICISMS AND EXPLANATIONS. 207

icists, vJich imply that each molecule moves rhyth-
mically, fi*.en a balanced state implies that each performs
its movements within a space bounded by the like spaces
required for the movements of those around. If the
b' ' 3S have been so aggregated that the oscillations
aome are more restrained than the oscillations of
others, there is a proportionate instability. If the
number of them thus unduly restrained is considerable,
the instability is such that the cohesion in some parts is
liable to fail, and a crack results. If the excesses of
restraint are great and multitudinous, a trifling disturb-
ance causes the mass to break up into small fragments.
To which add that the recognized remedy for this un-
stable state is an exposure to such physical condition
(ordinarily high temperature) as enables the molecules
so to change their relative positions that their mutual
restraints become equal on all sides. And now observe
that this holds whatever be the natures of the molecules.
They may be simple ; they may be compound ; they
may be composed of this or that matter in this or that
way. In other words, the special activities of each mole-
cule, constituted by the relative movements of its units,
may be various in their kinds and degrees ; and yet, be
they what they may, it remains true that to preserve in-
ternal equilibrium throughout the mass of molecules,
the mutual limitations of their activities must be every-
where alike.

And this is the above-described prerequisite to social
equilibrium, whatever the special natures of the asso-
ciated persons. Assuming that within each society such
persons are of the same type, needing for the fulfillment
of their several lives kindred activities, and though these
activities may be of one kind in one society and of an-
other kind in another, so admitting of indefinite varia-

208 TEE DATA OF ETHICS.

tion, this condition to social equilibrium doesl.-ot admit
of variation. It must be fulfilled before cojnplete life,
that is greatest happiness, can be attained in any society;
be thf particular quality of that life, or that happiness,

what it may.*

§ <')2. After thus observing how means and ends in
conduct stand to one another, and how there emerge
certain conclusions respecting their relative claims, we
may sec a way to reconcile sundry conflicting ethical
theories. These severally embody portions of the truth ;
and simply require combining in proper order to embody
the whole truth.

Tin: theological theory contains a part. If for the
divine will, supposed to be suj)ernaturally revealed, we
substitute the naturally revealed end toward which the
Power manifested throughout Evolution works ; then,
since Evolution lias been, and is still, working toward
thf highesl life, it follows that conforming to those
principles by which the highest life is achieved, is fur-
thering that end. The doctrine that perfection or ex-
cellence of nature should be the object of pursuit, is in
one sense true : fin- it tacitly recognizes that ideal form
of being which the highest life implies, and to which
EvolutioD tends. There is a truth, also, in the doctrine
that, virtue must he the aim ; for this is another form of
the doctrine that the aim must be to fulfill the condi-
tion- 1.) achievement of the highest life. That the in-
1 nit ions of a moral faculty should guide or conduct, is a
proposition in which a truth is contained; for these in-
tuitions are the slowly organized results of experiences

*This universal requirement it was which I had in view when
chixwing for my first work, published in 1850, the title Social
Static*.

CRITICISMS AND EX I'LANATIO 200

receive'^, by the race while living in presence of these
condit'ons. And that happiness is the supreme end is
beyond question true ; for this is the concomitant of
that highest life which every theory of moral guidance
has distinctly or vaguely in view.

So understanding their relative positions, those ethical
systems which make virtue, right, obligation, the car-
dinal aims, arc seen to he complementary to those ethical
systems which make welfare, pleasure, happiness, the
cardinal aims. Though the moral sentiments generated
in civilized men by daily contact with social conditions
and gradual adaptation to them, are indispensable as
incentives and deterrents ; and though the intuitions
corresponding to these sentiments have, in virtue of
their origin, a general authority to be reverently recog-
nized ; yet the sympathies and antipathies hence origi-
nating, together with the intellectual expressions of them,
are, in their primitive forms, necessarily vague. To
make guidance by them adequate to all requirements,
their dictates have to he interpreted and made definite
by science ; to which end there must be analysis of those
conditions to complete living which they respond to,
and from converse with which they have arisen. And
such analysis necessitates the recognition of happiness
for each and all, as the end to be achieved by fulfillment
of these conditions.

Hence, recognizing in due degrees all the various
ethical theories, conduct in its highest form will take as
guides innate perceptions of right duly enlightened and
made precise by an analytic intelligence, while conscious
that these guides are proximately supreme solely because
they lead to the ultimate supreme eud, happiness spe-
cial and general.
14

lilO THE DATA OF ETHICS.

CHAPTER X.

THE RELATIVITY OF PAINS AND PLEASURES.

§ 63. A truth of cardinal importance as a datum of
Ethics, which was incidentally referred to in the last
chapter, must here be set forth at full length. I mean
the truth that not only men of different races, but also
different men of the same race, and even the same men
at different periods of life, have different standards of
happiness. Though there is some recognition of this by
moralists, the recognition is inadequate, and the far-
reaching conclusions to be drawn when the relativity of
happiness is fully recognized, are scarcely suspected.

It is a belief universal in early life — a belief which in
most people is but partially corrected in later life, and in
vi'i y few wholly dissipated — that there is something in-
trinsic in the pleasantness of certain things, while other
things are intrinsically unpleasant. The error is analo-
to, and closely allied with, the error crude realism
makes. Just as to the uncultured mind it appears self'
evident that the sweetness of sugar is inherent i» sugar,
that sound as we perceive it is sound as it exists in the
externa] world, and that the warmth from a fire is in
itself what it seems; so does it appear self-evident that
the sweetness of sugar is necessarily grateful, that there
is in a beautiful sound something that must be beautiful
to all creatures, and that the agreeable feeling produced

2ELATIVITY OF PAINS AND PLEASURES. 211

by warmth is a feeling which every other consciousness
must find agreeahle.

But as criticism proves the one set of conclusions to
be wrong, so does it prove to be wrong the other set.
Not only are the qualities of external things as intel-
lectually apprehended by us, relative to our own organ-
isms ; but the pleasurableness or painfulness of the
ie< lings which we associate with such qualities, are also
re? itive to our own organisms. They are so in a
d<. ible sense — they are relative to its structures, and
+)j y are relative to the states of its structures.

f hat we may not rest in a mere nominal acceptance
fl these general truths, but may so appreciate them as
do see their full bearings on ethical theory, we must
here glance at them as exemplified by animate creatures
at large. For after contemplating the wide divergences
of sentiency accompanying the wide divergences of
organization which evolution in general has brought
about, we shall be enabled the better to see the diver-
gences of sentiency to be expected from the further
evolution of humanity.

§ 64. Because they can be most quickly disposed of,
let us first deal with pains : a further reason for first
dealing with pains being that we may thus forthwith
recognize, and then leave out of consideration, those
sentient states the qualities of which may be regarded
as absolute rather than relative.

The painfulness of the feelings produced by forces
which tend to destroy organic structures, wholly or in
part, is of course common to all creatures capable of
feeling. We saw it to be inevitable that during evolu-
tion there must everywhere be established such connec*

2 ! 2 THE DATA OF ETHICS.

turns l),t ween external actions and the modes of con-
Bciousness they cause, that the injurious ones are accom-
panied by disagreeable feelings and the beneficial ones
by agreeable feelings. Consequently, pressures or
strains which tear or bruise, and heats which burn or
scald, being in all cases partially or wholly destructive,
are in all cases painful.

lint even here the relativity of the feelings may in
one sense be asserted. For the effect of a force of
given quantity or intensity varies partly with the size
and partly with the structure of the creature exposed to
it. The weight which is scarcely felt by a large animal
crushes a small one ; the blow which breaks the limb of
a mouse produces little effect on a horse : the weapon
which lacerates a horse leaves a rhinoceros uninjured.
And with these differences of injuriousness doubtless
go differences of feeling. Merely glancing at the illus-
trations of this truth furnished by sentient beings in
general, let us consider the illustrations mankind fur-
nish.

Comparisons of robust laboring men with women or
children show us that degrees of mechanical stress which
the first bear with impunity, produce on the others
Injuries and accompanying pains. The blistering of a
tender skin by an amount of friction which does not
even redden ;i coarse one, or tin; bursting of superficial
blood . and consequent discoloration, caused in a

person of lax tissues by a blow which leaves in well-
toned tissues no trace, will sufficiently exemplify this
conti

Not only, however, are the pains due to violent in-
. relative' to the characters or constitu-
tional qualities of the parts directly affected, but they

JiELA TIVITY OF I'M V 8 AND PI. EA 8 ERE*. -J 1 3

are relative in equally marked ways, or even in more
marked ways, to the characters of the nervous struct-
ures. The common assumption is that equal bodily in-
juries excite equal pains. But this is a mistake. Pull-
ing out a tooth or cutting off a limb, gives to different
persons widely different amounts of suffering : not the
endurance only, hut the feeling to he endured, varies
greatly; and the variation largely depends on the de-
gree of nervous development. This is well shown by
the great insensibility of idiots — blows, cuts, and ex-
tremes of heat and cold, being borne by them with in-
difference.* The relation thus shown in the most
marked manner where the development of the central
nervous system is abnormally low, is shown in a less
marked manner where the development of the central
m is abnormally low ; namely, among in-
ferior races of men. Many travelers have commented
on the strange callousness shown by savages who have
been mangled in battle or by accident ; and surgeons in
India say that wounds and operations are better borne
by natives than by Europeans. Further, there comes
the converse fact that among the higher types of men,
larger brained and more sensitive to pain than the
lower, the most sensitive are those whose nervous de-
velopments, as shown by their mental powers, are the
highest : part of the evidence being the relative intoler-
ance of disagreeable sensations common among men of
genius,f and the general irritability characteristic of
them.

* On Idiocy and Imbecility, by William W. Ireland, M. D., pp.

t For instances see Fortnightly Review, Vol. XXIV. {New SeriesX
p. 712.

2U TBE DATA OF ETHICS.

That j viin is relative not to structures only, but to
their states as well, is also manifest — more manifest
indeed. The sensibility of an external part depends on
its temperature. Cool it below a certain point and it
becomes, as we say, numb ; and if by ether spray it is
made very cold, it may be cut without any feeling being
produced. Conversely, heat the part so that its blood-
vessels dilate, and the pain which any injury or irrita-
tion causes is greater than usual. How largely the
production of pain depends on the condition of the part
affected, we see in the extreme tenderness of an inflamed
sin face — a tenderness such that a slight touch causes
shrinking, and such that rays from the fire which ordi-
narily would be indifferent become intolerable.

Similarly with the special senses. A light which
eyes that are in good order bear without disagreeable
feeling, cannot be borne by inflamed eyes. And be-
yond the local state, the state of the system as a whole,
and the state of the nervous centres, are both factors.
Those enfeebled by illness are distressed by noises
which those in health bear with equanimity; and men
with overwrought brains are irritated in unusual de-
li v annoyances, both physical and moral.

Further, the temporary condition known as exhaus-
tion enters into the relation. Limbs overworn by
prolonged exertion, cannot, without aching perform acts
which would at oilier times cause no appreciable feeling.
After reading continuously for very many hours, even
stron begin to smart. And noises that can be

ted to for a short time with indifference, become, if
there is no ce nation, causes of suffering.

So that though there is absoluteness in the relation
between positive pains and actions that are positively

BEL A TIT IT Y OF PAINS AND PLEA S URES. 2 1 5

injurious, in so far that wherever there is sentiency it
exists ; yet even here partial relativity may be asserted.
For there is no fixed relation between the acting force
and the produced feeling. The amount of feeling varies
with the size of the organism, with the character of its
outer structures, with the character of its nervous
system ; and also with the temporary states of the part
affected, of the body at large, and of the nervous centres.

§ 65. The relativity of pleasures is far more con-
spicuous ; and the illustrations of it furnished by the
sentient world at large are innumerable.

It needs but to glance round at the various things
which different creatures are prompted by their desires
to eat and are gratified in eating — flesh for predaceous
animals, grass for the herbivora, worms for the mole,
flies for the swallow, seeds for the finch, honey for the
bee, a decaying carcass for the maggot — to be reminded
that the tastes for foods are relative to the structures of
the creatures. And this truth, made conspicuous by a
survey of animals in general, is forced on our attention
even by a survey of different races of men. Here human
flesh is abhorred, and there regarded as the greatest del-
icacy ; in this country roots are allowed to putrefy before
they are eaten, and in that the taint of decay produces
disgust : the whale's blubber which one race devours with
avidity, will in another by its very odor produce nausea.
Nay, without looking abroad we may, in the common
saying that "one man's meat is another man's poison."'
see the general admission that members of the same
socity so far differ, that a taste which is to these pleasur-
able is to those displeasurable. So is it with the other
senses. Assafoetida, which by us is singled out as

■2 1 6 TI1E DA TA OF ETHICS.

typical of the disgusting in odor, ranks among the
Esthonians as a favorite perfume, and even those around
us vary so Ear in their likings that the scents of flowers
grateful to some are repugnant to others. Analogous
differences, in the preferences for colors, we daily hear
expressed. And in a greater or less degree the like holds
with all sensations down even to those of touch: the
feeling yielded by velvet, which is to most agreeable,
setting the teeth on edire in some.

It needs but to name appetite and satiety to suggest
multitudinous facts showing that pleasures are relative
not only to the organic structures but also to their states.
The food which yields keen gratification when there is
great hunger ceases \<> be grateful when hunger is satis-
fied, and if then forced on the eater is rejected with

ion. So, too, a particular kind of food, seeming
when firs! tasted so delicious that daily repetition would

source of endless enjoyment, becomes, in a few days,
not only unenjoyable but repugnant. Brilliant colors
which, falling on unaccustomed e}res give- delight, pall
on the sense if long looked at, and there is relief in get-
ting away from the impressions they yield. Sounds
in themselves and sweet in their combinations
which yield to unfatigued ears intense pleasure, become,
at the end of a long concert, not only wearisome hut, if
from them, causes of irritation. The
like bolds down even to such simple sensations as those
of heat and cold. The file so delightful on a winter's

is, in hot weather, oppressive ; and pleasure is then

i in the cold water from which, in winter, there
would be shrinking. Indeed, experiences lasting over

out a few moments suffice to show how relative to the
: the structures are pleasurable sensations of

RELATIVITY OF I'AI.XS A .V l> PLEASURES. 217

these kinds ; for it is observable that on dipping the cold
hand into hot water, tin: agreeable feeling gradually
diminishes as the hand warms.

These few instances will cany home the truth, mani-
fest enough to all who observe, that the receipt of each
agreeable sensation depends primarily on the existence
of a strnetnre which is called into play; and, second-
arily, on the condition of that structure, as fitting it or
unfitting it for activity.

§ 6G. The truth that emotional pleasures are made
possihle, partly by the existence of correlative structures,
and partly by the states of those structures, is equally
undeniable.

Observe the animal which, leading a life demanding
solitary habits, has an adapted organization, and it
gives no sign of need for the presence of its hind.
< observe, conversely, a gregarious animal separated from
the herd, and you see marks of unhappiness while the
separation continues, and equally distinct marks of joy
on joining its companions. In the one case there is no
nervous structure which finds its sphere of action in
i lie gregarious state, and in the other case such a
structure exists. As was implied by instances cited in
the last chapter for another purpose, animals leading-
lives involving particular kinds of activities, have he-
come so constituted that pursuance of those activities,
exercising the correlative structures, \ ields the associated
pleasures. Beasts of prey confined in dens, show us by
their pacings from side to side the endeavor to obtain,
as well as they can. the satisfactions that accompany
roaming about in their natural habitats, and that grati-
fication in the expenditure of their locomotive enerj

213 TUE DATA OF ETHICS.

shown us by porpoises playing round a vessel, is shown
us by the similarly unceasing excursions from end to
end of its cell which a captured porpoise makes. The
perpetual hoppings of the canary from bar to bar of its
cage, and the ceaseless use of claws and bill in climbing
about its perch by the parrot, are other activities which,
severally related to the needs of the species, have sever-
ally themselves become sources of agreeable feelings.
Still more clearly are we shown by the efforts which a
caged beaver makes to build with such sticks and pieces
of wood as are at hand, how dominant in its nature has
become the building instinct, and how, apart from any
advantage gained, it gets gratification by repeating, as
well as it can, the processes of construction it is organ-
ized to cany on. The cat which, lacking something to
tear with her claws, pulls at the mat with them, the
confined giraffe which, in default of branches to lay
hold of wears out the upper angles of the doors to its
house by continually grasping them with its prehensile
tongue, the rhinoceros which, having no enemy to fight,
plows ii]) the ground with his horn — all yield us analo-
gous evidence ( llearly, these various actions performed
by these various creatures are not intrinsically pleasur-
able, for they differ more or less in each species and are
often utterly unlike. The pleasurableness is simply in
the exercise of nervo-muscular structures adapted to
the performance of the actions.

Though races of men are contrasted with one an-
other so much less than genera and orders of animals
as we saw in the last chapter, along with
visible differences there go invisible differences, with
accompanying likings for different modes of life.
Among some, as the Mantras, the love of unrestrained

RELATIVITY OF PAINS AND PLEASURES. 219

action and the disregard of companionship are such
that they separate if they quarrel, and hence live scat-
tered ; while among others, as the Damaras, there is
little tendency to resist, but instead, an admiration for
any one who assumes power over them. Already when
exemplifying the indefiniteness of happiness as an end
of action, I have referred to the unlike ideals of life
pursued by the nomadic and the settled, the warlike
and the peaceful — unlike ideals which imply unlike-
nesses of nervous structures caused by the inherited
effects of unlike habits accumulating through genera-
tions. These contrasts, various in their kinds and
degrees among the various types of mankind, every one
can supplement by analogous contrasts observable
among those around. The occupations some delight in
are to those otherwise constituted intolerable; and
men's hobbies, severally appearing to themselves quite
natural, often appear to their friends ludicrous and
almost insane : facts which alone might make us see
that the pleasurableness of actions of this or that kind
is due not to anything in the natures of the actions but
to the existence of faculties which find exercise in
them.

It must be added that each pleasurable emotion, like
each pleasurable sensation, is relative not only to a
certain structure but also to the state of that structure.
The parts called into action must have had proper
rest — must be in a condition fit for action ; not in the
condition which prolonged action produces. Be the
order of emotion what it may, an unbroken continuity
in the receipt of it eventually brings satiety. The
pleasurable consciousness becomes less and less vivid, and
there arises the need for a temporary cessation during

220 THE DATA OF ETHICS.

which the purls that have been active may recover
their fitness for activity, and during which also the
activities of other parts and receipt of the accompanying
emotions may find due place.

^ 67. 1 have insisted on these general truths with
perhaps needless iteration, to prepare the reader for
more fully recognizing a corollary that is practically
ignored. Abundant and clear as is the evidence, and
forced though it is daily on every one's attention, the
conclusions respecting life and conduct which should
be drawn are not drawn, and so much at variance are
these conclusions with current beliefs, that enunciation
of them causes a stare of incredulity. Pervaded as all
pasl thinking has been, and as most present thinking
is, by the assumption that the nature of every creature
has been specially created for it, and that human
nature, also specially created, is, like other natures,
fixed — pervaded too as this thinking has been, and is,
by the allied assumption that the agreeableness of cer-
tain actions depends on their essential qualities, while
other actions are by their essential qualities made dis-

able; it is difficult to obtain a hearing for the
doctrine that the kinds of action which are now pleas-
urable will, under conditions requiring the change,

to be pleasurable, while other kinds of action will
become pleasurable. Even those who accept the doc-
trine of Evolution mostly hear with skepticism, or at

with Dominal Eaith, the inferences to be drawn

from it !• g the humanity of the fut ure.

And yet as shown in myriads of instances indicated

by the few above given, those natural processes which

produced multitudinous forms of structure

RELATIVITY OF PAIXS AXD PLEASURES.

adapted to multitudinous forms of activity, have simul-
taneously made these forms of activity pleasurable.
And the inevitable implication is that within the
limits imposed by physical laws, there will be evolved;
in adaptation to any new sets of conditions that may
be established, appropriate structures of which the
functions will yield their respective gratifications.

When we have got rid of the tendency to think that
certain modes of activity are necessarily pleasurable
because they give us pleasure, and that other modes
which do not please us arc necessarily unpleasing ; we
shall see that the remolding of human nature into
fitness for the requirements of social life, must event-
ually make all needful activities pleasurable, while it
makes displeasurable all activities at variance with
these requirements. When we have come fully to rec-
ognize the truth that there is nothing intrinsically
more gratifying in the efforts by which wild animals
are caught, than in the efforts expended in rearing
plants, and that the combined action of muscles and
senses in rowing a boat are not by their essential
natures more productive of agreeable feeling than
those gone through in reaping corn, but that every-
thing depends on the co-operating emotions, which at
present are more in accordance with the one than with
the other ; we shall infer that along with decrease of
emotions for which the social state affords little
or no scope, and increase of those which it persist-
ently exercises, the things now done with dislike from
a sense of obligation will be done with immediate
liking, and the things desisted from as a matter of
duty will be desisted from because they are repugnant.

This conclusion, alien to popular beliefs and in

222 THE DATA OF ETHICS.

ethical speculation habitually ignored, or at most rec-
ognized but partially and occasionally, will be thought
by the majority so improbable that I must give
further justification of it; enforcing the a priori ar-
gument by an a posteriori one. Small as is the atten-
tion given to the fact, yet is the fact conspicuous that
the corollary above drawn from the doctrine of Evolu-
tion at large, coincides with the corollary which past
and present changes in human nature force upon us.
The leading contrasts of character between savage
and civilized are just those contrasts to be expected
from the process of adaptation.

The life of the primitive man is passed mainly in
the pursuit of beasts, birds and fish, which yields him
a gratifying excitement ; but though to the civilized
man the chase gives gratification, this is neither so
persistent nor so general. There are among us keen
sportsmen, but there are many to whom shooting and
fishing soon become wearisome, and there are not a
few to whom they are altogether indifferent or even
distasteful.

Conversely, the power of continued application,
which in the primitive man is very small, has among
ourselves become considerable. It is true that most
are coerced into industry by necessity ; but there are
sprinkled throughout society men to whom active
occupation is a need — men who are restless when away
from business and miserable when they eventually
give it up; men to whom this or that line of investi-
gation is so attractive that they devote themselves to
it day after day, year after year; men who are so
deeply interested in public affairs that they pass lives
of labor in achieving political ends they think advan-

RELATIVITY OF I'Al.XS AND I'LKASURES. 223

tageous, hardly giving themselves the rest necessary
for lical th.

Yet again, and still more strikingly, does the change
become manifest when we compare undeveloped with
developed humanity in respect of the conduct prompted
by fellow feeling. Cruelty rather than kindness is
characteristic of the savage, and is in many cases a
source of marked gratification to him ; but though
among the eivilized are some in whom this trait of the
savage survives, yet a love of inflicting pain is not
general, and besides numbers who show benevolence,
there are those who devote their whole time and much
of their money to philanthropic ends, without thought
of reward either here or hereafter.

Clearly these major, along with many minor, changes
of nature conform to the law set forth. Activities
appropriate to their needs which give pleasures to
savages have ceased to be pleasurable to many of the
civilized ; while the civilized have acquired capacities
for other appropriate activities and accompanying
pleasures which savages had no capacities for.

Now, not only is it rational to infer that changes
like those which have been going on during civiliza-
tion, will continue to go on, but it is irrational to do
otherwise. Not he who believes that adaptation will
increase is absurd, but he who doubts that it will in-
crease is absurd. Lack of faith in such further evolu-
tion of humanity as shall harmonize its nature with its
conditions, adds but another to the countless illustrations
of inadequate consciousness of causation. One who,
leaving behind both primitive dogmas and primitive
ways of looking at things, has, while accepting scientific
conclusions, acquired those habits of thought which

224 TTIE DATA OF ETIUCS.

Bcience generates, will regard the conclusion a1>ove
drawn as inevitable. He will find it impossible to be-
that the processes which have heretofore so molded
all beings to the requirements of their lives that they
satisfactions in fulfilling them, will not hereafter
continue so molding them, lie Mill infer that the type
of nature to which the highest social life affords a spin- re
such that every faculty has its due amount, and no more
than the due amount, of function and accompanying
gratification, is the type of nature toward which progress
cannot cease till it is reached. Pleasure being pro-
ducible by the exercise of any structure which is ad-
justed to its special end, he will see the necessary im-
plication to be that, supposing it consistent with
maintenance of life, there is no kind of activity which
will not become a source of pleasure if continued ; and
that therefore pleasure will eventually accompany every
mode of action demanded by social conditions.

This corollary I here emphasize because it will pres
ently play an important part in the argument.

EGOISM VERSUS ALTRUISM. 225

CHAPTER XI.

EGOISM VERSUS ALTRUISM.

§ 08. If insistence on them tends to unsettle estab-
lish.•<! systems of belief, self-evident truths are by most
people silently passed over; or else there is a tacit re-
fusal to draw from them the most obvious inferences.

Of self-evident truths so dealt with, the one which
hnc concerns us is that a creature must live before it
can act. From this it is a corollary that the acts by
which each maintains his own life must, speaking gen-
erally, precede in imperativeness all other acts of
which he is capable. For if it be asserted that these
other acts must precede in imperativeness the acts
which maintain life ; and if this, accepted as a general
law of conduct, is conformed to by all, then by post-
poning the acts which maintain life to the other acts
which make life possible, all must lose their lives.
That is to say. Ethics has to recognize the truth, rec-
ognized in unethical thought, that egoism comes before
altruism. The acts required for continued self-preserva-
tion, including the enjoyment of benefits achieved by
such acts, are the first requisites to universal welfare.
Unless each duly cares for himself, his care for all
others is ended by death ; and if each thus dies, there
remain no others to be cared for.
15

223 7BE DATA OF ETHICS.

This permanent supremacy of egoism over altruism,
made manifest by contemplating existing life, is further
made manifest by contemplating life in course of evolu-
tion.

§ * 10. Those who have followed with assent the
recent course of thought, do not need telling that
throughout past eras, the life, vast in amount and
varied in kind, which has overspread the earth, has
progressed in subordination to the law that every indi-
vidual shall gain by whatever aptitude it has for ful-
filling the conditions to its existence. The uniform
principle lias been that better adaptation shall bring
greater benefit ; which greater benefit, while increasing
the prosperity of the better adapted, shall increase also
its ability to leave offspring inheriting more or less its
better adaptation. And, by implication, the uniform prin-
ciple lias been that the ill-adapted, disadvantaged in the
struggle for existence, shall bear the consequent evils :
either disappearing when its imperfections are extreme,
or else rearing fewer offspring, which, inheriting its
imperfections, tend to dwindle away in posterity.

Tt has been thus with innate superiorities; it has

been thus also with acquired ones. All along the law

has been that increased function brings increased

:: and that therefore such extra activities as aid

welfare in any member of a race, produce in its struct-

iter ability to cany on such extra activities : the

derived advantages being enjoyed by it to the heighten-

of its life. Conversely, as lessened

function ends in Lessened structure, the dwindling of

unused faculties lias ever entailed loss of power to

achieve the correlative ends : the result of inadequate

EGOISM VERSU8 ALTRUISM. 227

fulfillment of the cuds being diminished ability to main-
tain life. And by inheritance, such functionally pro-
duced modifications have respectively furthered or
hindered survival in posterity.

As already said, the law that each creature shall take
the benefits and the evils of its nature, be they1 those
derived from ancestry or those due to self-produced
modifications, has been the law under which life has
evolved thus far ; and it must continue to be the law
however much further life may evolve. Whatever
qualifications this natural course of action may now or
hereafter undergo, are qualifications that cannot, with-
out fatal results, essentially change it. Any arrange-
ments which in a considerable degree prevent supe-
riority from profiting !)}• the rewards of superiority, or
shield inferiority from the evils it entails — any arrange-
ments which tend to make it as well to be inferior as to
he superior, are arrangements diametrically opposed to
the progress of organization and the reaching of a higher
life.

But to say that each individual shall reap the bene-
fits brought to him by his own powers, inherited and
acquired, is to enunciate egoism as an ultimate prin-
ciple of conduct. It is to say that egoistic claims must
take precedence of altruistic claims.

§ 70. Under its biological aspect tins proposition
cannot be contested by those who agree in the doctrine
of Evolution ; but probably they will not at once allow
that admission of it under its ethical aspect is equally
unavoidable. "While, as respects development of life,
the well-working of the universal principle described
is sufficiently manifest; the well-working of it as re-

228 THE DATA OF ETI7ICS.

spects increase of happiness may not be seen at once.
But the two cannot be disjoined.

Incapacity of every kind and of whatever degree
causes unhappiness directly and indirectly — directly
by the pain consequent on the overtaxing of inadequate
faculty, and indirectly by the non-fulfillment, or imper-
fect fulfillment, of certain conditions to welfare. Con-
versely, capacity of every kind sufficient for the require-
ment conduces to happiness immediately and remotely
— immediately by the pleasure accompanying the normal
exercise of each power that is up to its work, and
remotely by the pleasures which are furthered by the
ends achieved. A creature that is weak or slow of foot,
and so gets food only by exhausting efforts, or escapes
enemies with difficulty, suffers the pains of overstrained
powers, of unsatisfied appetites, of distressed emotions;
while the strong and swift creature of the same species
delights in its efficient activities, gains more fully the
satisfactions yielded by food as well as the renewed
vivacity this gives, and has to hear fewer and smaller
pains in defending itself against foes or escaping from
them. Similarly with duller and keener sense-, or
r and Lower degrees of sagacity. The mentally-
inferior individual of any race suffers negative and
positive miseries ; while the mentally-superior Lndivi lual
es uegal ive and positive gratifications. Inevitably,
then, ihis law in conformity with which each memberof
a species takes the consequences of its own nature ; and
in virtue of which the progeny of each member, par-
ticipating in its nature, also takes such consequences ;
• • thai tends ever to raise the ite happiness

of the , by furthering the multiplication of the

happier and hindering that of the less happy.

EGOISM VXSBU8 ALTRUISM. 229

All this is true of human beings as of other beings.
The conclusion forced on us is that the pursuit of indi-
vidual happiness within those limits prescribed by social
conditions, is the first requisite to the attainment of the
greatest general happiness. To see- this it needs but to
contrast one whose self-regard has maintained bodily
well-being, with one whose regardlessness of self has
brought its natural results ; and then to ask what must
be the contrast between two societies formed of two
such kinds of individuals.

Bounding out of bed after an unbroken sleep, singing
or whistling as he dresses, coming down with beaming
face ready to laugh on the smallest provocation, the
healthy man of high j towers, conscious of past successes
and by his energy, quickness, resource, made confident
of the future, enters on the day's business not with
repugnance, but with gladness ; and from hour to hour
experiencing satisfactions from work effectually done,
comes home with an abundant surplus of energy remain-
ing for hours of relaxation. Far otherwise is it with
one who is enfeebled by great neglect of self. Already
deficient, his energies are made more deficient by constant
endeavors to execute tasks that prove beyond his
strength, and by the resulting discouragement. Besides
the depressing consciousness of the immediate future,
there is the depressing consciousness of the remoter
future, with its probability of accumulated difficulties and
diminished ability to meet them. Hours of leisure which,
rightly passed,' bring pleasures that raise the tide of life
and renew the powers of work, cannot be utilized: there is
not vigor enough for enjoyments involving action, and
lack of spirits prevents passive enjoyments from being
entered upon with zest. In brief, life becomes a burden.

230 THE DA 7 A OF ETHICS.

X.>w if. as must be admitted, in a community composed
of individuals like the first, the happiness will be rela-
tively great, while in one composed of individuals like
the last, there will be relatively little happiness, or
rather much misery; it must be admitted that conduct
causing the one result is good, and conduct causing the
other is bad

But diminutions of general happiness are produced by
inadequate egoism in several other ways. These we
will successively glance at.

§ 71. If there were no proofs of heredity — if it were
the rule that the strong are usually begotten by the
weak, while the weak usually descend from the strong,
that vivacious children form the families of melancholy
parents, while fathers and mothers with overflowing
spirits mostly have dull progeny, that from stolid peas-
ants there ordinarily come sons of high intelligence,
while the sons of ih<- cultured are commonly fit for
nothing but following the plow — if there were no trans-
mission of gout, scrofula, insanity, and did the diseased
habitually give birth to the healthy and the healthy to
the diseased, writers on Ethics might be justified in
ignoring those effects of conduct which are felt by pos-
terity through the natures they inherit.

A it i-;. however, the current ideas concerning the
relative claims of egoism and altruism are vitiated by
the omission of this all-important factor. For if
health, strength ami capacity are usually transmitted ;
and if disease, feebleness, stupidity, generally reappear
in descendants ; then a rational altruism requires in-
sistence on thai egoism which is shown by receipt of the
satisfactions accompanying preservation of body and

EGOISM VER8TJ8 ALTRUISM. 231

mind in the best state. The necessary implication is
that blessings are provided for offspring by due self-
regard, while disregard of self carried too far provides
curses. When, indeed, we remember how commonly it
is remarked that high health and overflowing spirits
render any lot in life tolerable, while chronic ailments
make gloomy a life most favorable circumstanced, it
becomes amazing that both the world at large and writ-
ers who make conduct their study, should ignore the
terrible evils which disregard of personal well-being in-
tra the unborn, and the incalculable good laid up
for the unborn by attention to personal well-being. Of
all bequests of parents to children the most valuable is
a sound constitution. Though a man's body is not a
property that can be inherited, yet his constitution may
fitly be compared to an entailed estate ; and if he rightly
understands his duty to posterity, lie will see that he is
bound to pass on that estate uninjured if not improved.
To say this is to say that he must be egoistic to the ex-
tent of satisfying all those desires associated with the
due performance of functions. Nay. it is to say more.
It is to say that he must seek in due amounts the vari-
ous pleasures which life offers. For beyond the effect
these have in raising the tide of life and maintaining
constitutional vigor, there is the effect they have in pre-
serving and increasing a capacity for receiving enjoy-
ment. Endowed with abundant energies and various
tastes, some can get gratifications of many kinds on op-
portunities hourly occurring; while others are so inert,
and so uninterested in things around, that they cannot
even take the trouble to amuse themselves. And unless
heredity be denied, the inference must be that due ac-
ceptance of the miscellaneous pleasures life offers, con-

•2:1 -2 THE DATA OF ETIIICS.

duces to the capacity for enjoyment in posterity ; and
that persistence in dull, monotonous lives by parents.
diminishes the ability of their descendants to make the
best of what gratifications fall to them.

§ 72. Beyond the decrease of general happiness which
results in this indirect way, if egoism is unduly subordi-
nated, there is a decrease of general happiness which re-
sults in a direct way. He who carries self-regard far
enough to keep himself in good health and high spirits,
in the first place, thereby becomes an immediate source
of happiness to those around, and, in the second place,
maintains the ability to increase their happiness by al-
truistic actions. But one whose bodily vigor and men-
tal health are undermined by self-sacrifice carried too
far, in the first place becomes to those around a cause of
sssion, and, in the second place, renders himself
incapable, or less capable, of actively furthering their
welfare.

In estimating conduct we must remember that there
are those who by their joyousness beget joy in others,
and that there are those who by their melancholy east a
-loom on every circle they enter. And we must remem-
hat by display of overflowing happiness a man of
the one kind may add to the happiness of others more
than by positive efforts to benefit them, and that a man
of tlm other kind may decrease their happiness more by
his presence than he increases it byhis actions. Full of
vivacity the one is ever welcome. For his wife he has
smiles and jocose speeches ; for his children stores of
fun and play ; for his friends pleasant talk interspersed
with the sallies of wit that come Erom buoyancy. Con-
trariwise, the other is shunned. The irritability result-

EGOISM VERSUS ALTRUI-M. 233

Ing now from ailments, now from failures caused by
feebleness, his family has daily to bear. Lacking ade-
quate energy for joining in them, lie has at best but a
tepid interest in the amusements of his children, ana he
is called a wet blanket by his friends. Little account
as our ethical reasonings take note of it, yet is the fact
obvious that since happiness and misery are infectious,
such regard for self as conduces to health and high
spirits is a benefaction to others, and such disregard of
self as brings on suffering, bodily or mental, is a male-
faction to others.

The duty of making one's self agreeable by seeming
to be pleased, is indeed, often urged, and thus to gratify
friends is applauded so long as self-sacrificing effort is
implied. But though display of real happiness gratifies
friends far more than display of sham happiness, and
has no drawback in the shape either of hypocrisy or
strain, yet it is not thought a duty to fulfill the con-
ditions which favor the display of real happiness.
Nevertheless, if quantity of happiness produced is to be
the measure, the last is more imperative than the first.

And then, as above indicated, beyond this primary
series of effects produced on others there is a secondary
series of effects. The adequately egoistic individual
retains those powers which make altruistic activities
possible. The individual who is inadequately egoistic
loses more or less of his ability to be altruistic. The
truth of the one proposition is self-evident, and the
truth of the other is daily forced on us by examples.
Note a few of them.

Here is a mother who, brought up in the insane
fashion usual among the cultivated, has a physique not
strong enough for suckling her infant, but who, know-

234 THE DATA OF ETIIICS.

ing that its natural Eood is the best, and anxious for its
welfare, continues to give it milk fora longer time than
her system will bear. Eventually the accumulating re-
action tells. There comes exhaustion running, it may
be, into illness caused by depletion; occasionally ending
in death, and often entailing chronic weakness. She
becomes, perhaps for a time, perhaps permanently, in-
capable of carrying on household affairs; her other
children suffer from the loss of maternal attention;
and where the income is small, payments for nurse and
doctor tell injuriously on the whole family.

Instance, again, what not unfrequently happens with
the father. Similarly prompted by a high sense of
obligation, and misled by current moral theories into
the notion that self-denial may rightly be carried to any
extent, he daily continues his office work for long hours
regardless of hot head and cold feet; and debars him-
self from social pleasures, for which he thinks he can
afford neither time nor money. What comes of this en-
tirely unegoistic course? Eventually a sudden col-
iapse, sleeplessness, inability to work. That rest which
he would not give himself when his sensations prompt-
ed, he has now to take in long measure. The extra
earnings Laid by for the benefit of his family are quickly
swept away by costly journeys in aid of recovery, and

by the many expenses which illness entails. Instead of
increased ability to do his duty by his offspring, there
comes now inability. Life-long evils on them replace

hoped-for L>oods.

And so is it, too, with the social effects of inadequate

mi. All grades furnish examples of the mischiefs,

positive and negative, inflicted on society by excessive

»f self, Now the case is that of a laborer who,

EGOISM VERSUS ALTRUISM. 2?,r,

conscientiously continuing his work under a broiling
sun, spite of violent protest from his feelings, dies of
sunstroke ; and Leaves his family a burden to the parish.
Now the case is that of a clerk whose eyes permanently
fail from overstraining, or who, daily writing for hours
after his lingers are painfully cramped, is attacked with
"scrivener's palsy," and, unable to write at all, sinks
with aged parents into poverty which friends are called
on to mitigate. And now the case is that of a man de-
voted to public ends who, shattering his health by cease-
less application, fails to achieve all he might have
achieved by a more reasonable apportionment of his time
between labor on behalf of others and ministration to
his own needs.

§ 73. In one further way is the undue subordination of
egoism to altruism injurious. Both directly and indirect-
ly unselfishness pushed to excess generates selfishness.

Consider first the immediate effects. That one man
may yield up to another a gratification, it is needful
that the other shall accept it ; and where the gratifica-
tion is of a kind to which their respective claims are
equal, or which is no more required by the one than by
the other, acceptance implies a readiness to get gratifi-
cation at another's cost. The circumstances and needs
of the two being alike, the transaction involves as much
culture of egoism in the last as it involves culture of
altruism in the first. It is true that not unfrequentlv,
difference between their means or difference between
their appetites for a pleasure which the one has had
often and the other rarely, divests the acceptance of this
character; and it is true that in other cases the bene*
factor manifestly takes so much pleasure in giving picas-

236 THE DATA OF ETHICS.

urc thai the .sacrifice is partial, and the reception of it
not wholly selfish. But to see the effect above indi-
cated we must exclude such inequalities, and consider
what happens where wants arc approximately alike, and
where the sacrifices, not reciprocated at intervals, are
perpetually on one side. So restricting the inquiry all
can name instances verifying the alleged result. Every
one can remember circles in which the daily surrender
of benefits by the generous to the greedy has caused
increase of greediness, until there has been produced an
unscrupulous egoism intolerable to all around. There
are obvious social effects of kindred nature. Most think-
ing people now recognize the demoralization caused by
indiscriminate charity. They see how in the mendicant
is, besides destruction of the normal relation be-
tween Labor expended and benefit obtained, agenesis of
the expectation that others shall minister to his needs;
showing itself sometimes in the venting of curses on
those who

st consider the remote results. When the egois-
tic claims are so much subordinated to the altruistic as
to produce physical mischief, the tendency is toward
itive decrease in the number of the altruistic, and
Eore an increased predominance of the egoistic.
Pushed to extremes, sacrifice of self for the benefit of
> leads occasionally to death before the ordinary
! of m; leads sometimes to abstention

in i isters of charity ; leads sometimes
i ill-health or a loss of attractiveness which prevents
marriage; leads sometimes to non-acquirement of the
pecuniary m ded for marriage; and in all these

ore, ill", unusually altruistic leave no de-
scendants. "Where the postponement of personal welfare

EGOISM VERSUS ALTRUISM. 237

to the welfare of others has not been carried so far as t<>
prevent marriage, it yet not unfrequently occurs that
the physical degradation resulting from years of self-
neglect causes infertility ; so that again the most
altruistically natured leave no like natured posterity.
And then in less marked and more numerous cases, the
resulting enfeeblement shows itself by the production
of relatively weak offspring ; of whom some die early,
while the rest are less likely than usual to transmit the
parental type to future generations. Inevitably, then,
by this dying out of the especially unegoistic, there is
prevented that desirable mitigation of egoism in the
average nature which would else have taken place.
Such disregard of self as brings down bodily vigor below
the normal level, eventually produces in the society a
counterbalancing excess of regard for self.

§ 74. That egoism precedes altruism in order of im-
perativeness, is thus clearly shown. The acts which
make continued life possible, must, on the average, be
more peremptory than all those other acts which life
makes possible, including the acts which benefit otliers.
Turning from life as existing to life as evolving, we are
equally shown this. Sentient beings have progressed
from low to high types, under the law that the superior
shall profit by their superiority and the inferior shall
suffer from their inferiority. Conformity to this law
has been, and is still, needful, not only for the con-
tinuance of life but for the increase of happiness : since
the superior are those having faculties better adjusted
to the requirements — faculties, therefore, which bring
in their exercise greater pleasure and less pain.

More special considerations join these more general

THE DATA OF ETHICS.

ones in showing us this truth. Such egoism as pre-
serves a vivacious mind in a vigorous body furthers the
happiness of descendants, whose inherited constitutions
make the labors of life easy and its pleasures keen ;
while, conversely, unhappiness is entailed on posterity
by those who bequeath them constitutions injured by
self-neglect. Again, the individual whose well-con-
1 Life shows itself in overflowing spirits, becomes,
by his mere existence, a source of pleasure to all around ;
while the depression which commonly accompanies ill-
health diffuses itself through family and among friends.
A farther contrast is that whereas one who has been
duly regardful of self retains the power of being helpful
to others, there results from self-abnegation in excess,
not only an inability to helj} others but the infliction of
positive burdens od them. Lastly, we come upon the
truth that undue altruism increases egoism, both directly
in contemporaries and indirectly in posterity.

And now observe that though the general conclusion
enforced by these special conclusions is at variance Avith
nominally accepted beliefs, it is not at variance with
actually accepted beliefs. While opposed to the doctrine
which men are taught should be acted upon, it is in
harmony with the doctrine which they do act upon and
dimly see must be acted upon. For omitting such
abnormalities of conduct as are instanced above, every
one, alike by deed and word, implies that in 1 lie business
of life personal welfare is the primary consideration.
The laborer looking for wages in return for work done,
no less than the merchant who sells goods at a profit,
the doctor who expects fees for advice, the priest who
calls the scene of his ministrations "a living," assumes
as beyond question the truth that selfishness, carried to

EGOISM VERSUS ALTRUISM. 239

the extent of enforcing his claims and enjoying the re-
turns his efforts bring, is not only legitimate but essen-
tial. Even persons who avow a contrary conviction
prove by their acts that it is inoperative. Those who
repeat with emphasis the maxim, *' Love your neighbor
as yourself," do not render up what they possess so as
to satisfy the desires of all as much as they satisfy their
own desires. Nor do those whose extreme maxim is,
"Live for others," differ appreciably from people around
in their regards for personal welfare, or fail to appro-
priate their shares of life's pleasures. In short, that
which is above set forth as the belief to which scientific
ethics leads us, is that which men do really believe, as
distinguished from that which they believe they believe.
Finally, it may be remarked that a rational egoism, so
far from implying a more egoistic human nature, is con-
sistent with a human nature that is less egoistic. For
excesses in one direction do not prevent excesses in the
opposite direction ; but rather, extreme deviations from
the mean on one side lead to extreme deviations on the
other side. A society in which the most exalted prin-
ciples of self-sacrifice for the benefit of neighbors are
enunciated, may be a society in which unscrupulous sac-
rifice of alien fellow-creatures is not only tolerated but
applauded. Along with professed anxiety to spread
these exalted principles among heathens, there may go
the deliberate fastening of a quarrel upon them with a
view to annexing their territory. Men who every Sun-
day have listened approvingly to injunctions carrying
the regard for other men to an impracticable extent,
may }-et hire themselves out to slay, at the word of com-
mand, any people, in any part of the world, utterly in-
different to the right or wrong of the matter fought

THE DATA OF ETHICS*.

about. And as in these cases transcendent altruism in
theory co-exists with brutal egoism in practice, so con-
v. a more qualified altruism may have for its con-
comitant a greatly moderated egoism. For asserting the
due claims <>i' self, is, by implication, drawing a limit
beyond which tin; claims are undue; and is, by conse-
quence, bringing into greater clearness the claims of
others.

ALTRUISM VERSUS EGOISM. 241

CHAPTER XII.

ALTRUISM VERSUS EGOISM.

§ 75. If we define altruism as being all action which,
in the normal course of things, benefits others instead of
benefiting self, then, from the dawn of life, altruism has
been no less essential than egoism. Though, primarily,
it is dependent on egoism, yet, secondarily, egoism is
dependent on it.

Under altruism, in this comprehensive sense, I take
in the acts by which offspring are preserved and the
species maintained. Moreover, among these acts must
be included not such only as are accompanied by con-
sciousness but also such as conduce to the welfare of
offspring without mental representation of the welfare —
acts of automatic altruism as we may call them. Nor
must there be left out those lowest altruistic acts which
subserve race-maintenance without implying even auto-
matic nervous processes — acts not in the remotest sense
psychical, but in a literal sense physical. Whatever
action, conscious or unconscious, involves expenditure
of individual life to the end of increasing life in other
individuals, is unquestionably altruistic in a sense, if not
in the usual sense, and it is here needful to understand
it in this sense that we may see how conscious altruism
grows out of unconscious altruism.

The simplest beings habitually multiply by sponta-
neous fission. Physical altruism of the lowest kind, dif-
16

2 I J THE LATA OF ETHICS.

ferentiating from physical egoism, may, in this case, be
considered as not yet independent of it. For since the
two halves which, before fission, constituted the individ-
ual, do not on dividing disappear, we must say that
though the individuality of the parent infusorium or
other protozoon is lost in ceasing to be single, yet the
old individual continues to exist in each of the new in-
dividuals. When, however, as happens generally with
smallest animals, an interval of quiescence ends in
tin- breaking up of the whole body into minute parts,
each of wliich is the germ of a young one, we see the
parent entirely sacrificed in forming progeny.

Here might be described how among creatures of
higher grades, by fission or gemmation, parents bequeath
parts of their bodies, more or less organized, to form
offspring at the cost of their own individualities. Numer-
ous examples might also be given of the ways in which
the development of ova is carried to the extent of mak-
ing the parental body little more than a receptacle for
them : the implication being that the accumulations of
nutriment which parental activities have laid up are
disposed of for the benefit of posterity. And then might
be dwell on the multitudinous cases where, as generally
throughout the insect-world, maturity having been
reached and a new generation provided for, life ends :
death follows the sacrifices made for progeny.

But leaving these lower types in which the altruism
is physical only, or in which it is physical and automati-
cally psychical only, Let us ascend to those in which it is
also, to a considerable degree, conscious. Though, in
birds and mammals, such parental activities, as are
guided by instinct, are accompanied by either no repre-
sentations or but vague representations of the benefits

ALTRUISM VER8U8 EGOISM. 243

which the young receive, yet then" are also in them ac-
tions which we may class as altruistic in the higher
sense. The agitation which creatures of these cl:
show when their young are in danger, joined often with
efforts on their behalf, as well as grief displayed after
loss of their young, make it manifest that in them pa-
rental altruism has a concomitant of emotion.

Those who understand by altruism only the conscious
sacrifice of self to others among human beings, will
think it strange, or even absurd, to extend its meaning
so widely. But the justification for doing this is
greater than has thus far appeared. I do not mean
merely that in the course of evolution there has been
a progress through infinitesimal gradations from purely
physical and unconscious sacrifices of the individual for
the welfare of the species, up to sacrifices consciously
made. I mean that from first to last the sacrifices are,
when reduced to their lowest terms, of the same essen-
tial nature : to the last, as at first, there is involved a
loss of bodily substance. When a part of the parental
body is detached in the shape of gemmule, or egg, or
foetus, the material sacrifice is conspicuous : and when
the mother yields milk by absorbing which the young
one grows, it cannot be questioned that there is also a
material sacrifice. But though a material sacrifice is
not manifest when the young are benefited by activities
on their behalf ; yet, as no effort can be made without
an equivalent waste of tissue, and as the bodily loss is
proportionate to the expenditure that takes place with-
out reimbursement in food consumed, it follows that
efforts made in fostering offspring do really represent a
part of the parental substance; which is now giren
indirectly instead of directly

'J [ 1 THE DA TA OF ETHICS.

Self-sacrifice, them, is no less primordial than self-
preservation. Being in its simple physical form abso-
lutely necessary for the continuance of life from the
aning; and being extended under its automatic
form, ;is indispensable to maintenance of race in t}7pes
considerably advanced; and being developed to its
semi-conscious and conscious forms, along with the con-
tinued and complicated attendance by which the off-
spring of superior creatures are brought to maturity,
altruism has been evolving simultaneously with egoism.
As was pointed out in an early chapter, the same supe-
riorities which have enabled the individual to preserve
better, have enabled it better to preserve the indi-
viduals derived from it; and each higher species, using
its improved faculties primarily for egoistic benefit,
has spread in proportion as it has used them second-
arily for altruistic benefit.

The imperativeness of altruism as thus understood
is, indeed, no less than the imperativeness of egoism
was shown to be in the last chapter. For while, on the
one hand, a falling short of normal egoistic acts entails
enfeeblemenl or loss of Life, and therefore loss of ability
to perform altruistic acts, on the other hand, such de-
l'.-ei of altruistic acts as causes death of offspring or in-
adequate development of them, involves disappearance
from future generations of the nature that is not altru-
ist i.- enough — so decreasing the average egoism. In
short, every species is continually purifying itself from
the unduly egoistic individuals, while there are being
i it the unduly altruistic individuals.

§ 76. As there has been an advance by degrees from
Unconscious parental altruism to conscious parental

ALTRUISM VERSU8 EQ0I8M. 245

altruism of the highest kind, so Las there been an
advance by degrees from the altruism of the family to
social altruism.

A fact to be first noted is that only where altruistic
relations in the domestic group have reached highly-
developed forms, do there arise conditions making- pos-
sible full development of altruistic relations in the
political group. Tribes in which promiscuity prevails,
or in which the marital relations are transitory, and
tribes in which polyandry entails in another way in-
definite relationships, are incapable of much organiza-
tion. Nor do peoples who are habitually polygamous
show themselves able to take on those high forms of
social co-operation which demand due subordination of
self to others. Only where monogamic marriage has
become general and eventually universal — only where
there have consequently been established the closest
ties of blood — only where family altruism has been
most fostered, has social altruism become conspicuous.
It needs but to recall the compound forms of the Aryan
family, as described by Sir Henry Maine and others, to
see that family feeling, first extending itself to the gens
and the tribe, and afterward to the society formed of
related tribes, prepared the way for fellow feeling among
citizens not of the same stock.

Recognizing this natural transition, we are here
chiefly concerned to observe that throughout the latter
stages of the progress, as throughout the former,
increase of egoistic satisfactions has depended on growth
of regard for the satisfactions of others. On contem-
plating a line of successive parents and offspring, we
see that each, enabled while young to live by the sacri-

246 THE DATA OF ETHICS.

| predecessors make for it, itself makes, when adult,
equivalent sacrifices for successors, and that, in default
of this general balancing of benefits received by benefits
given, the line dies out. Similarly, it is manifest that
in a society each generation of members, indebted for
such benefits as social organization yields them to pre-
ceding generations, who have by their sacrifices elabo-
rated this organization, are called on to make for succeed-
ing generations such kindred sacrifices as shall at least
maintain this organization, if they do not improve it :
the alternative being decay and eventual dissolution of
the society, implying gradual decrease in the egoistic
satisfactions of its members.

And now we are prepared to consider the several
ways in which, under social conditions, personal welfare
depends on due regard for the welfare of others. Already
the conclusions to be drawn have been foreshadowed.
As in the chapter on the biological view were implied
the inferences definitely set forth in the last chapter, so
in the chapter on the sociological view were implied the
inferences to be definitely set forth here. Sundry of
these are trite enough, but they must, nevertheless, be
specified, since the statement would be incomplete
without them.

§ 77. First to be dealt with comes that negative
altruism implied by such curbing of the egoistic im-
pulses as prevents direct aggression.

As before shown, if men instead of living separately

0 unite for defense or for other purposes, they

must severally reap more good than evil from the union.

On the average, each must lose less from the antagonisms

of those with whom he is associated than he gains by the

ALTRUISM VERSUS EGOISM. 247

association. At the outset, therefore, that increas
egoistic satisfactions which the social state brings, can
be purchased only by altruism sufficient to cause some
recognition of others' claims : if not a voluntary rec-
ognition, still, a compulsory recognition.

While the recognition is but of that lowest kind due
to dread of retaliation, or of prescribed punishment,
the egoistic gain from association is small, ami it
becomes considerable only as the recognition becomes
voluntary — that is, more altruistic. Where, as among
some of the wild Australians, there exists no limit to
the right of the strongest, and the men fight to get
possession of women while the wives of one man fight
among themselves about him, the pursuit of egoistic
satisfactions is greatly impeded. Besides the bodily
pain occasionally given to each by conflict, and the
more or less of subsequent inability to achieve per-
sonal ends, there is the waste of energy entailed in
maintaining readiness for self-defense, and there is the
accompanying occupation of consciousness by emotions
that are on the average of cases disagreeable. More-
over, the primary end of safety, in presence of external
foes, is ill-attained in proportion as there are internal
animosities, such furtherance of satisfactions as indus-
trial co-operation brings cannot be had, and there is
little motive to labor for extra benefits when the
products of labor are insecure. And from this early
stage to comparatively late stages we may trace in the
wearing of arms, in the carrying on of family feuds,
and in the taking of daily precautions for safety, the
ways in which the egoistic satisfactions of each are
diminished by deficiency of that altruism which checks
overt injury of others.

248 THE DATA OF ETHICS.

The private interests of the individual are on the
average better subserved, not only in proportion as he
himself refrains from direct aggression, but also, on the
average, in proportion as he succeeds in diminishing the
aggressions of his fellows on one another. The prev-
alence of antagonism among those around impedes the
activities carried on by each in pursuit of satisfactions ;
and by causing disorder makes the beneficial results of
activities more doubtful. Hence, each profits egoisti-
cally from the growth of an altruism which leads each
to aid in preventing or diminishing others' violence.

The like holds when we pass to that altruism which
restrains the undue egoism displayed in breaches of
contract. General acceptance of the maxim that hon-
esty is the best policy, implies general experience that
gratification of the self-regarding feelings is eventually
furthered by such checking of them as maintains
equitable dealings. And here, as before, each is per-
sonally interested in securing good treatment of his
fellows by one another. For in countless ways evils
are entailed on each by the prevalence of fraudulent
transactions. As every one knows, the larger the
number of a shop-keeper's hills left unpaid by some
customers, the higher must be the prices which other
customers pay. The more manufacturers lose by de-
e law materials or by carelessness of workmen,
the more must, they charge for their fabrics to buyers.
The Less trustworthy people are, the higher rises the
of interest, the Larger becomes the amount of
capital hoarded, the greater are the impediments to
industry. The further traders and people in general
go beyond their means, and hypothecate the property of
others in speculation, the more serious are those com-

ALTRUISM VERSUS EGOISM. 240

mercial panics which bring disasters on multitudes and
injuriously affect all.

This introduces us to yet a third way in which such
personal welfare as results from the proportioning of
benefits gained to labors given, depends on the making
of certain sacrifices for social welfare. The man who,
expending his energies wholly on private affairs, refuses
to take trouble about public affairs, pluming himself on
his wisdom in minding his own business, is blind to the
fact that his own business is made possible only by
maintenance of a healthy social state, and that he loses
all round by defective governmental arrangements.
Where there are many like-minded with himself — where,
as a consequence, offices come to be filled by political
adventurers and opinion is swayed by demagogues —
where bribery vitiates the administration of the law and
makes fraudulent slate transactions habitual, heavy
penalties fall on the community at large, and, among
others, on those who have thus done everything for self
and nothing for societ}-. Their investments are insecure ;
recovery of their debts is difficult, and even their lives
are less safe than they would otherwise have been.

So that on such altruistic actions as are implied, firstly
in being just, secondly in seeing justice done between
others, and thirdly in upholding and improving the
agencies by which justice is administered, depend, in
large measure, the egoistic satisfactions of each.

§ 78. But the identification of personal advantage

with the advantage of fellow-eiti/.ens is much wider than
this. In various other ways the well-being of each rises
and falls with the well-being of all.

A weak man left to provide for his own wants, suffers

12T.0 THE DATA OF ETHIC8.

t ting smaller amounts of food and othemecessaries
than he might get were he stronger. In a community
formed of weak men, who divide their labors and ex-
change the products, all suffer evils from the weakness
of their fellows. The quantity of each kind of product
is made deficient by the deficiency of laboring power;
and tin- share each gets for such share of his own product
as he can afford to give, is relatively small. Just as the
maintenance of paupers, hospital patients, inmates of
asylums, and others who consume but do not produce,
leaves to be divided among producers a smaller stock of
commodities than would exist were there no incapables ;
so must there be left a smaller stock of commodities to
be divided, the greater the number of inefficient produ-
or the greater the average deficiency of producing
power. Hence, whatever decreases the strength of men
in general restricts the gratifications of each by making
the means to them dearer.

More directly, and more obviously, does the bodily
well-being of his fellows concern him ; for their bodily
ill-being, when it takes certain shapes, is apt to bring
similar bodily ill-being on him. If he is not himself
attacked by cholera, or small-pox, or typhus, when it
invades his neighborhood, he often suffers a penalty
through his belongings. Under conditions spreading
it. his wife catches diphtheria, or his servant is laid up
with scarlet fever, or his children take now this and now
that infectious disorder. Add together the immediate
and remote evils brought on him year after year by
epidemics, and it becomes manifest that his egoistic
satis! ire greatly furthered by such altruistic

render disease less prevalent.

With the mental, as well as with the bodily, states of

AlT&UISM V&R8VB XQOlBlt. 251

fellow-citizens, his enjoyments are in multitudinous
ways bound up. Stupidity like weakness raises the cost
of commodities. Where farming is unimproved, the
prices of food are higher than they would else be ; where

antiquated routine maintains itself in trade, the needless
expense of distribution weighs on all; where there is no
inventiveness, every one loses the benefits which im-
proved appliances diffuse. Other than economic evils
come from the average unintelligence — periodically
through the manias and panics that arise because traders
rush in herds all to buy or all to sell ; and habitually
through the mal-adnhnistration of justice, which people
and rulers alike disregard while pursuing this or that
legislative will-o'-the-wisp. Closer and clearer is the
dependence of his personal satisfactions on others'
mental states, which each experiences in his household.
Unpunctuality and want of system are perpetual sources
of annoyance. The unskillfulness of the cook causes
frequent vexation and occasional indigestion. Lack of
forethought in the housemaid leads to a fall over a
bucket in a dark passage. And inattention to a message
or forgetfulness in delivering it, entails failure in an im-
portant engagement. Each, therefore, benefits egois-
tically by such altruisism as aids in raising the average
intelligence. I do not mean such altruism as taxes rate-
payers that children's minds may be filled with dates,
and names, and gossip about kings, and narratives of
battles, and other useless information, no amount of
which will make them capable workers or good citizens ;
but I mean such altruism as helps to spread a knowl-
edge of the nature of things and to cultivate the power
of applying that knowledge.

Yet again, each has a private interest in public morals

252 THE DATA OF ETHICS.

and profits by improving them. Not in large ways only,
by aggressions and breaches of contract, by adulterations
and short measures, does each suffer from the genera]
unconscientiousness ; but in more numerous small ways.
Now it is through the untruthfulness of one who gives
a good character to a bad servant ; now it is by the
recklessness of a laundress who, using bleaching agents
to save trouble in washing, destroys his linen ; now it
is by the acted falsehood of railway passengers who, by
dispersed coats, make him believe that all the seats in a
compartment are taken when they are not. Yesterday
the illness of his child due to foul gases led to the dis-
covery of a drain that had become choked because it
was ill-made by a dishonest builder under supervision of
a careless or bribed surveyor. To-day workmen em-
ployed to rectify it bring on him cost and inconvenience
by dawdling; and their low standard of work, deter-
mined by the unionist principle that the better workers
must not discredit the worse by exceeding them in
efficiency, be may trace to the immoral belief that the
unworthy should fare as well as the worthy. To-morrow
it turns out that business for the plumber has been
provided by damage which the bricklayers have done.
Thus the improvement of others, physically, intel-
lectually and morally, personally concerns each; since
their imperfections tell in raising the cost of all the
commodities he buys, in increasing the taxes and rates
he pays, and in the losses of time, trouble and money,
daily brought on by others' carelessness, stupidity, or
unconscientiousness.

§ 70. Very obvious are certain more immediate con-
nections between personal welfare and ministration to

ALTRUISM VERSUS EGOISM. 253

tlie welfare of those around. The evils suffered by
those whose behavior is unsympathetic, and the benefits
to self which unselfish conduct brings,,show these.

That any one should have formulated his experience
by saying that the conditions to success are a hard
heart and a sound digestion, is marvelous considering
the man}- proofs that success, even of a material kind,
greatly depending as it does on the good offices of
others, is furthered by whatever creates good will in
others. The contrast between the prosperity of those
who, to but moderate abilities join natures which beget
friendships by their kindliness, and the adversity of
those who, though possessed of superior faculties and
greater acquirements, arouse dislikes by their hardness
or indifference, si ion Id force upon all the truth that
egoistic enjoyments are aided by altruistic actions.

This increase of personal benefit achieved by bene-
fiting others is but partially achieved where a selfish
motive prompts the seemingly unselfish act: it is fully
achieved only where the act is really unselfish. Though
services rendered with the view of some time profiting
by reciprocated services, answer to a certain extent;
yet, ordinarily, they answer only to the extent of bring-
ing equivalents of reciprocated services. Those which
bring more than equivalents arc those not prompted by
an}'- thoughts of equivalents. For obviously it is the
spontaneous outflow of good nature, not in the larger
acts of life only but in all its details, which generates
in those around the attachments prompting unstinted
benevolence.

Besides furthering prosperity, other regarding ac-
tions conduce to self-regarding gratifications by gener-
ating a genial environment. With the sympathetic

254 7727? DA TA OF ETITICS.

being every one feels more sympathy than with others.
All conduct themselves with more than usual amiability
to a person who hourly discloses a lovable nature.
Such a one is practically surrounded by a world of bet-
ter people than one who is less attractive. If we con-
trast the state of a man possessing- all the material
means to happiness, but isolated by his absolute egoism,
with the state of an altruistic man relatively poor in
means but rich in friends, we may see that various
gratifications, not to be purchased by money, come in
abundance to the last and are inaccessible to the first.

While, then, there is one kind of other reerardino' ac-
tion, furthering (lie prosperity of fellow-citizens at large,
which admits of being deliberately pursued from mo-
tives that are remotely self-regarding — the conviction
being that personal well-being depends in large meas-
ure on the well-being of society — there is an additional
kind of other regarding action having in it no element
of conscious self-regard, which nevertheless conduces
greatly to egoistic satisfactions.

§ 80. Yet other modes exist in which egoism un-
qualified by altruism habitually fails. It diminishes
tin- totality of egoistic pleasure by diminishing in sev-
eral directions the capacity for pleasure.

Self-gratifications, considered separately, or in the
regate, lose their intensities by that too great per-
sistence in them which results If they are made the ex-
clusive objects of pursuit, The law that function en-
tails waste, and that faculties yielding pleasure by their
>n cannot act incessantly without exhaustion and
•mpanying Batiety, has the implication that intervals
fluring istic activities absorb the energies.

ALTRUISM VERSUS EGOISM. 2&S

are intervals during which the capacity for egoistic
pleasure is recovering its full degree. The sensitive-
ness to purely personal enjoyments is maintained at a
higher pitch by those who minister to the enjoyments
of others than it is by those who devote then. selves
wholly to personal enjoyments.

This which is manifest even while the tide of life is
high, becomes still more manifest as life ebbs. It is in
maturity and old age that we especially see how, as
egoistic pleasures grow faint, altruistic actions come in
to revive them in new forms. The contrast between
the child's delight in the novelties daily revealed, and
the indifference which comes as the world around grows
familiar, until, in adult life, there remain comparatively
few things that are greatly enjoyed, draws from all the
reflection that as years go by pleasures pall. And to
those who think it becomes clear that only through
sympathy can pleasures be indirectly gained from things
that have ceased to yield pleasures directly. In the
gratifications derived by parents from the gratifications
of their offspring, this is conspicuously shown. Trite
as is the remark that men live afresh in their children,
it is needful here to set it down as reminding us of the
way in which, as the egoistic satisfactions in life fade,
altruism renews them while it transfigures them.

We are thus introduced to a more general considera-
tion— the egoistic aspect of altruistic pleasure. Not,
indeed, that this is the place for discussing the question
whether the egoistic element can be excluded from
altruism, nor is it the place for distinguishing between
the altruism which is pursued with a foresight of the
pleasurable feeling to be achieved through it, and the
altruism which, though it achieves this pleasurable feel*

266 THE J) ATA OF ETHICS.

ing, does not make pursuit of it a motive. Here we
are concerned with the fact that, whether knowingly or
unknowingly gained, the state of mind accompanying
altruistic action, being a pleasurable state, is to be
counted in the? sum of pleasures which the individual
can receive, and in this sense cannot be other than
egoistic. That we must so regard it is proved on ob-
serving that this pleasure, like pleasures in general, con-
duces to the physical prosperity of the ego. As every
other agreeable emotion raises the tide of life, so does
the agreeable emotion which accompanies a benevolent
deed. As it cannot be denied that the pain caused by
the sight of suffering depresses the vital functions —
sometimes even to the extent of arresting the heart's
action, as in one who faints on seeing a surgical opera-
tion, so neither can it be denied that the joy felt in
witnessing others' joy exalts the vital functions.
Hence, however much we may hesitate to class altruistic
pleasure as a higher kind of egoistic pleasure, we are
obliged to recognize the fact that its immediate effects,
in augmenting life and so furthering personal well-be-
ing, are like those of pleasures that are directly egoistic.
And the corollary drawn must be that pure egoism is,
even in its immediate results, less successfully egoistic
than is the egoism duly qualified by altruism, which,
besides achieving additional pleasures, achieves also,
through raised vitality, a greater capacity for pleasures
in general.

Thai the range of aesthetic gratifications is wider for
the altruistic nature than for the egoistic nature is also
a truth not to be overlooked. The joys and sorrows of
human beings form a chief element in the subject-
matter of art, and, evidently, the pleasures which art

ALTRUISM VERSUS EQ0I8M. 25?

gives increase as the fellow-feeling with these joys and
sorrows strengthens. If we contrast early poetry
occupied mainly with war and gratifying the savage
instincts by descriptions of bloody victories, with the
poetry of modern times, in which the sanguinary forms
but a small part, while a large part, dealing with the
gentler affections, enlists the feelings of readers on
behalf of the weak ; we are shown that with the
development of a more altruistic nature there has been
opened a sphere of enjoyment inaccessible to the callous
egoism of barbarous times. So, too, between the fiction
of the past and the fiction of the present, there is the
difference that while the one was almost exclusively
occupied with the doings of the ruling classes, and
found its plots in their antagonisms and deeds of
violence, the other, chiefly taking stories of peaceful
life for its subjects, and to a considerable extent the
life of the humbler classes, discloses a new world of
interest in the every-day pleasures and pains of ordinary
people. A like contrast exists between early and late
forms of plastic art. When not representing acts of
worship, the wall-sculptures and wall-paintings of the
Assyrians and Egyptians, or the decorations of temples
among the Greeks, represented deeds of conquest ;
whereas in modern times, while the works which glorify
destructive activities are less numerous, there are an
increasing number of works gratifying to the kindlier
sentiments of spectators. To see that those who care
nothing about the feelings of other beings are, by
implication, shut out from a wide range of resthetic
pleasures, it needs but \<» ask whether men who delight
in dog-fights may be expected to appreciate Beethoven's
17

•258 TEE DATA OF ETUICS.

Adelaida, or whether Tennyson's In Memoriam would
greatly move a gang of convicts.

§ 81. From the dawn of life, then, egoism has been
dependent upon altruism as altruism has been depend-
ent upon egoism, and in the course of evolution the
reciprocal services of the two have heen increasing.

The physical and unconscious self-sacrifice of parents
to form offspring, which the lowest living things dis-
play from hour to hour, shows us in its primitive form
the altruism which makes possible the egoism of indi-
vidual life and growth. As we ascend to higher grades
of creatures, this parental altruism becomes a direct
yielding up of only part of the body, joined with an
increasing contribution from the remainder in the
shape of tissue wasted in efforts made on behalf of
progeny. This indirect sacrifice of substance, replac-
ing more and more the direct sacrifice as parental
altruism becomes higher, continues to the last to repre-
sent also altruism which is oilier than parental ; since
this, too, implies loss of substance in making efforts that
do not bring their return in personal aggrandizement.

Ain-r noting how among mankind parental altruism
and family altruism pass into social altruism, we
observed that a society, like a species, survives only on
condition that each generation of its members shall
yield to ib<- next, benefits equivalent to those it has
received from the last. And this implies that care for
the family must be supplemented by care for thesociety.

Fullness of egoistic satisfactions in the associated

depending primarily on maintenance of the

norma] relation between efforts expended and benefits

obtained, which underlies all life, implies an altruism

ALTRUISM VERSUS EG0I8M. 259

which both prompts equitable conduct and prompts
the enforcing of equity. The well-being of each is
involved with the well-being of all in sundry other
ways. Whatever conduces to their vigor concerns
Mm, for it diminishes the cost of everything he buys.
Whatever conduces to their freedom from disease con-
cerns him, for it diminishes his own liability to dis-
ease. Whatever raises their intelligence concerns him,
for inconveniences are daily entailed on him by others'
ignorance or folly. Whatever raises their moral char-
acter concerns him, for at every turn he suffers from
the average unconscientiousness.

Much more directly do his egoistic satisfactions
depend on those altruistic activities which enlist the
sympathies of others. By alienating those around, self-
ishness loses the unbought aid they can render, shuts out
a wide range of social enjoyments, and tails to receive those
exaltations of pleasure and mitigations of pain which
come from men's fellow-feeling with those they like.

Lastly, undue egoism defeats itself by bringing on
an incapacity for happiness. Purely egoistic gratifi-
cations are rendered less keen by satiety, even in the
earlier part of life, and almost disappear in the later ;
the less satiating gratifications of altruism are missed
throughout life, and especially in that latter part when
they largely replace egoistic gratifications; and there
is a lack of susceptibility to aesthetic pleasures of the
higher orders.

An indication must be added of the truth, scarcely
at all recognized, that this dependence of egoism upon
altruism ranges beyond the limits of each society,
and tends ever toward universality. That within each
society it becomes greater as social evolution, imply-

260 THE DATA OF ETI1ICS.

ing increase of mutual dependence, progresses, needs
not be shown ; and it is a corollary thai as fast as de-
pendence of societies on one another is increased by
common ial intercourse, the eternal welfare of each
becomes a matter of concern to the others. That the
impoverishment of any country, diminishing both its
producing and consuming powers, tells detrimentally
on the people of countries trading with it, is a com-
monplace of political economy. Moreover, we have
had of late years, abundant experience of the indus-
trial derangements through which distress is brought
on nations not immediately concerned by wars be-
tween other nations. And if each community lias the
egoistic satisfactions of its members diminished by
aggressions of neighboring communities on one an-
other, still more does it have them diminished by its
own aggressions. One who marks how, in various
parts of the world, the unscrupulous greed of conquest,
cloaked by pretenses of spreading the blessings of
British rule and British religion, is now reacting to
the immense detriment of the industrial classes at
home, alike- by increasing expenditure and paralyzing
trade, may see that these industrial classes, absorbed
in questions about capital and labor, and thinking
themselves unconcerned in our doings abroad, are
suffering from lack of that wide-reaching altruism
which should insist on just dealings with other peo-
sivilized or savage. And he may also see that
id these immediate evils, they will for a genera-
tion to come suffer the evils that must flow from
citating the type of social organization which

produce, and from ihe lowered

• - ■.■ cQmpaniment

TRIAL AND COMPROMISE. 2G1

CHAPTER XIII.

TRIAL AND COMPROMISE.

§ 82. In the foregoing two chapters the case on
behalf of Egoism and the case on behalf of Altruism
have been slated. The two conflict ; and we have now
to consider what verdict ought to be given.

If the opposed statements are severally valid, or
even if each of them is valid in part, the inference
must be that pure egoism and pure altruism are both
illegitimate. If the maxim, kk Live for self," is wrong,
so also is the maxim, "Live for others." Hence, a
compromise is the only possibility.

This conclusion, though already seeming unavoidable,
I do not here set down as proved. The purpose of
this chapter is to justify it in full, and I enunciate it
at the outset because the arguments used will be better
understood, if the conclusion to which they converge is
in the reader's view.

How shall we so conduct the discussion as most
clearly to bring out this necessity for a compromise ?
Perhaps the best way will be that of stating one of
the two claims in its extreme form, and observing the
implied absurdities. To deal thus with the principle
of pure selfishness would be to waste space. Every
one sees that an unchecked satisfaction of personal
desires from moment to moment, in absolute disregard

262 TEE DATA OF ETHICS.

of all other beings, would cause universal oonflict and
social dissolution. The principle of pure unselfishness,
less obviously mischievous, may therefore better be
chosen.

There are two aspects under which the doctrine that
others' happiness is the true ethical aim presents itself.
The " others " may be conceived personally, as indi-
viduals with whom we stand in direct relations, or
they may be conceived impersonally, as constituting
the community. In so far as the self-abnegation
implied by pure altruism is concerned, it matters not
in which sense " others " is used. But criticism will
be facilitated by distinguishing between these two
forms of it. We will take the last form first.

§ 83. This commits us to an examination of " the
greatest happiness principle," as enunciated by Ben-
tham and his followers. The doctrine that "the
general happiness " ought to be the object of pursuit,
is not, indeed, overtly identified with pure altruism.
But as, if general happiness is the proper end of
action, the individual actor must regard his own share
of it simply as a unit in the aggregate, no more to be
valued by him than any other unit, it results that
since this unit is almost infinitesimal in comparison
with the aggregate, his action, if directed exclusively
to achievement of general happiness, is, if not abso-
lutely altruistic, as nearly so as may be. Hence the
theory which makes general happiness the immediate
object of pursuit may rightly be taken as one form of
the pure altruism to be here criticised.

Both as justifying this interpretation and as furnish-
ing a definite proposition with which to deal, let me

TRIAL AND COMPROMISE. 2G3

set out by <| noting a passage from Mr. Mill's
Utilitarian is in :

"The Greatest I [appiness Principle," he says, "is a mere form of
words witliout rational signification, unless one person's happiness, -
Bupposed equal in degree (with the proper allowance made for
kind), is counted for exactly as much as another's. Those condi-
tions being supplied, Bentham's dictum, 'everybody to count for
one, nobody for more than one,' might be written under the prin-
ciple of utility as an explanatory commentary " (p. 91).

Now, though the meaning of " greatest happiness," as
an end, is here to a certain degree defined, the need
for farther definition is felt the moment we attempt to
decide on ways of regulating conduct so as to attain
the end. The first question which arises is, must we
regard this " greatest happiness principle " as a princi-
ple of guidance for the community in its corporate
capacity, or as a principle of guidance for its members
separately considered, or both ? If the reply is that
the principle must be taken as a guide for governmental
action rather than for individual action, we are at once
met by the inquiry, what is to be the guide for indi-
vidual action ? If individual action is not to be regu-
lated solely for the purpose of achieving " the greatest
happiness of the greatest number," some other princi-
ple of regulation for individual action is required, and
" the greatest happiness principle" fails to furnish the
needful ethical standard. Should it be rejoined that
the individual in his capacity of political unit is to take
furtherance of general happiness as his end, giving his
vote or otherwise acting on the legislature with a view
to this end, and that in so far guidance is supplied to
him, there comes the further inquiry, whence is to
come guidance for the remainder of individual eon-
duct, constituting by far the greater part of it? If

2G4 THE DATA OF ETHICS.

this private part of individual conduct is not to have
general happiness as its direct aim, then an ethical
standard other than that offered has still to be found.
I fence, unless pure altruism as thus formulated con-
3 its inadequacy, it must justify itself as a sufficient
rule for all conduct, individual and social. We will
firsl deal with it as the alleged right principle of public
policy ; and then as the alleged right principle of pri-
vate action.

§ 84. On trying to understand precisely the state-
ment that when taking general happiness as an end,
the rule must be — " everybody to count for one, nobody
for more than one," there arises the idea of distribu-
tion. We can form no idea of distribution without
thinking of something distributed and recipients of this
something. That we may clearly conceive the proposi-
tion we must clearly conceive both these elements of
it. Let us take first the recipients.

" Everybody to count for one, nobody for more than
one." Does this mean that, in respect of whatever is
proportioned out, each is to have the same share what-
ever his character, whatever his conduct? Shall he if
passive have as much as if active? Shall he if useless
have as much as if useful? Shall he if criminal have
as much as if virtuous? If the distribution is to be
made withoul reference to the natures and deeds of the
recipients, then it must be shown that a system which
equalizes, as far as it can, the treatment of good and
had. will be beneficial. If the distribution is not to be
indiscriminate, then the formula disappears. The some-
thing distributed must he apportioned otherwise than
by equal division. There must be adjustment of

TRIAL AM) COMPROMISE. 265

amounts to deserts ; and we are left in the dark as to
the mode of adjustment — we have to find other guid-
ance.

Let us next ask what is the something to be dis-
tributed? The first idea which occurs is that happi-
ness itself must be divided out among all. Taken
literally, the notions that the greatest happiness should
be the end sought, and that in apportioning it every-
body should count for one and nobody for more than
one, imply that happiness is something that can be cut
up into parts and handed round. This, however, is an
impossible interpretation. But after recognizing the
impossibility of it, there returns the question — What
is it in respect of which everybody is to count for one
and nobody for more than one ?

Shall the interpretation be that the concrete means
to happiness are to be equally divided? Is it intended
that there shall be distributed to all in equal portions
the necessaries of life, the appliances to comfort, the
facilities for amusement? As a conception simply, this
is more defensible. But passing over the question of
policy — passing over the question whether greatest
happiness would ultimately be secured by such a pro-
cess ( which it obviously would not) it turns out on
examination that greatest happiness could not even
proximately be so secured. Differences of age, of
growth, of constitutional need, differences of activity
and consequent expenditure,, differences of desires and
tastes, would entail the inevitable result that the ma-
terial aids to happiness which eaeli received would be
more or less unadapted to his requirements. Even if
purchasing power were equally divided, the greatest
happiness would not be achieved if everybody counted

266 THE DATA OF ETHICS.

for one and nobody for more than one ; since, as the
capacities for utilizing the purchased means to happi-
ness would vary both with the constitution and the
stage of life, the means which would approximately
suflice to satisfy the wants of one would be extremely
insufficient to satisfy the wants of another, and so the
greatest total of happiness would not be obtained : means
might be unequally apportioned in a way that would
produce a greater total.

But now if happiness itself cannot be cut up and
distributed equally, and if equal division of the mate-
rial aids to happiness would not produce greatest happi-
ness, what is the thing to be thus apportioned ? What
is it in respect of which everybody is to count for one
and nobody for more than one ? There seems but a
single possibility. There remain to be equally dis-
tributed nothing but the conditions under which each
may pursue happiness. The limitations to action —
the degrees of freedom and restraint, shall be alike
for all. Each shall have as much liberty to pursue his
ends as consists with maintaining like liberties to
pursue their ends by others ; and one as much as an-
other shall have the enjoyment of that which his efforts,
carried on within these limits, obtain. But to say that
in respect of these conditions everybody shall count for
(in.; and nobody for more than one, is simply to say that
equity shall be enforced.

Thus, considered as a principle of public policy,
Bentham's principle, when analyzed, transforms itself
into the principle he slights. Not general happiness
becomes the ethical standard by which legislative
action is to be guided, but universal justice. And so
the altrustic theory under this form collapses.

TRIAL AND COMPROMISE. 267

§ 85. From examining the doctrine that general
happiness should be the end of public action, we pass
now to examine the doctrine that it should be the end
of private action.

It is contended that from the standpoint of pure
reason, the happiness of others has no less a claim as
an object of pursuit for each than personal happiness.
Considered as parts of a total, happiness felt by self
and like happiness felt by another are of equal values ;
and hence it is inferred that, rationally estimated, the
obligation to expend effort for others' benefit is as
great as the obligation to expend effort for one's own
benefit. Holding that the utilitarian system of morals,
rightly understood, harmonizes with the Christian
maxim, " Love your neighbor as yourself," Mr. Mill
says that " as between his own happiness and that of
others, utilitarianism requires him to be as strictly
impartial as a disinterested and benevolent spectator n
(p. 24). Let us consider the alternative interpretations
which may be given to this statement.

Suppose, first, that a certain quantum of happiness
has in some way become available, without the special
instrumentality of A, B, C, or D, constituting the
group concerned. Then the proposition is that each
shall be ready to have this quantum of happiness as
much enjoyed by one or more of the others as by him-
self. The disinterested and benevolent spectator
would clearly, in such a case, rule that no one ought
to have more of the happiness than another. But here,
assuming as we do that the quantum of happiness has
become available without the agency of any among the
group, simple equity dictates as much. No one having
in any way established a claim different from the claim*

TI1K DATA OF ETHICS.

of others, their claims are equal; and due regard for
justice by each will not permit him to monopolize the
happiness.

Now suppose a different case. Suppose that the
quantum of happiness lias been made available by the
efforts of one member of the group. Suppose that A
Las acquired by labor some material aid to happiness.
lie decides to act as the disinterested and benevolent
spectator would direct. What will he decide ? — what
would the spectator direct? Let us consider the pos-
sible suppositions, taking first the least reasonable.

The spectator may be conceived as deciding that the
labor expended b}- A in acquiring this material aid to
happiness, originates no claim to special use of it ; but
that it ought to be given to B, C, or D, or that it ought
to be divided equally among B, C, and 1), or that it
ought to be divided equally among all members of the
group, including A, who has labored for it. And if the
spectator is conceived as deciding thus to-day, he must
be conceived as deciding thus day after day; with the
result that one of the group expends all the effort, get-
ting either none of the benefit or only his numerical
share, while the others get their shares of the benefit
without expending any efforts. That A might con-
ceive the disinterested and benevolent spectator to
decide in this way, and might feel bound to act in con-
formity with the imagined decision, is a strong supposi-
tion; and probably it will be admitted that such kind

of impartiality, so tar Prom being conducive to the gen-
eral happiness, would quickly be fatal to every one.
But this is not all. Action in pursuance of such a decis-
ion would in reality be negatived by the very principle
enunciated. Tor not only A, but also B, C, and D,

TRIAL AND COMPROMISE. 269

have to act on this principle. Each of them must
behave as he conceives an impartial spectator would
decide. Docs P> conceive the impartial .spectator as
awarding to him, B, the product of A's labor? Then
the assumption is that B conceives the impartial spec-
tator as favoring himself, B, more than A conceives him
as favoring himself, A ; which is inconsistent with the
hypothesis. Does B, in conceiving the impartial spec-
tator, exclude his own interests as completely as A
does? Then how can he decide so much to his own
advantage, so partially, as to allow him to take from A
an equal share of the benefit gaind by A's labor, toward
which he and the rest have done nothing?

Passing from this conceivable, though not credible,
decision of the spectator, here noted for the purpose of
observing that habitual conformity to it would be im-
possible, there remains to be considered the decision
which a spectator really impartial would give. He
would say that the happiness, or material aid to hap-
piness, which had been purchased by A's labor, was to
be taken by A. He would say that B, C, and D had no
claims to it, but only to such happiness, or aids to hap-
piness, as their respective labors had purchased. Con-
sequently, A, acting as the imaginary impartial specta-
tor would direct, is, by this test, justified in appropria-
ting such happiness or aid to happiness as his own
efforts have achieved.

And so under its special form as under its general
form, the principle is true only in so far as it embodies
a disguised justice. Analysis again brings out the
result that making %* general happiness" the end of
action, really means maintaining what we call equit-
able relations among individuals. Decline to accept in

270 TUE DATA OF ETUICS.

its vague form " the greatest-happiness principle," and
insist on knowing what is the implied conduct, public,
or private, and it turns out that the principle is mean-
ingless save as indirectly asserting that the claims of
each should be duly regarded by all. The utilitarian
altruism becomes a duly qualified egoism.

§ 86. Another point of view from which to judge
the altruistic theory may now be taken. If, assuming
the proper object of pursuit to be general happiness,
we proceed rationally, we must ask in what different
way the aggregate, general happiness, may be com-
posed ; and must then ask what composition of it will
yield the largest sum.

Suppose that each citizen pursues his own happiness
independently, not to the detriment of others, but with-
out active concern for others , then their united happi-
nesses constitute a certain sum — a certain general happi-
ness. Now suppose that each, instead of making his
own happiness the object of pursuit, makes the happi-
ness of others the object of pursuit; then, again, there
results a certain sum of happiness. This sum must be
less than, or equal to, or greater than, the first. If it
is admitted that this sum is either less than the first,
or only equal to it, the altruistic course of action is
confessedly either worse than, or no better than, the
tic. The assumption must be that the sum of
happiness obtained is greater. Let us observe what is
involved in this assumption.

If each pursues exclusively the happiness of others ;
and if each is also a recipient of happiness (which he
must be, for otherwise no aggregate happiness can be
formed out of their individual happinesses) ; then the

TRIAL AND COMPROMISE. 271

implication is that each gains the happiness due to altru-
istic action exclusively ; and that in each this is greater
in amount than the egoistic happiness obtainable by
him, if he devoted himself to pursuit of it. Leaving
out of consideration for a moment these relative
amounts of the two, let us note the conditions to the
receipt of altruistic happiness by each. The sympa-
thetic nature gets pleasure by giving pleasure ; and the
proposition is that if the general happiness is the object
of pursuit, each will be made happy by witnessing
others' happiness. But what in such case constitutes
the happiness of others ? These others are also, by the
hypothesis, pursuers and receivers of altruistic pleasure.
The genesis of altruistic pleasure in each is to depend
on the display of pleasures by others ; which is again
to depend on the display of pleasures by others ; and
so on perpetually. Where, then, is the pleasure to
begin ? Obviously there must be egoistic pleasure
somewhere before there can be the altruistic pleasure
caused by sympathy with it. Obviously, therefore, each
must be egoistic in due amount, even if only with the
view of giving others the possibility of being altruistic.
So far from the sum of happiness being made greater if
all make greatest happiness the exclusive end, the sum
disappears entirely.

How absurd is the supposition that the happiness of
all can be achieved without each pursuing his own hap-
piness, will be best shown by a physical simile. Sup-
pose a cluster of bodies, eacli of which generates heat,
and each of which is, therefore, while a radiator of
heat to those around, also a receiver of heat from
them. Manifestly each will have a certain proper heat
irrespective of that which it gains from the rest ; and.

272 Tin; data of ethics.

each will have a certain heat gained from the rest
irrespective of its proper heat. What will happen?
So loii^ as each of the bodies continues to be a gener-
ator of heat, each continues to maintain a temperature
partly derived from itself and partly derived from
others. Bu1 if each ceases to generate heat for itself
and depends on the heat radiated to it by the rest, the
entire cluster becomes cold. Well, the self-generated
heat stands for egoistic pleasure; the heat radiated and
received stands for sympathetic pleasure; and the dis-
appearance of all heat if each ceases to be an originator
of it, corresponds to the disappearance of all pleasure if
each ceases to originate it egoistically.

A further conclusion may be drawn. Besides the
implication that before altruistic pleasure can exist,
egoistic pleasure must exist, and that if the rule of
conduct is to be the same for all, each must be egoistic
in due degree; there is the implication that, to achieve
the greatest sum of happiness, each must be more

tic than altruistic. For, speaking generally, sym-
pathetic pleasures must eve]' continue less intense than
the pleasures with which there is sympathy. Other
things equal, ideal feelings cannot be as vivid as real
feelings. It is true that those having strong imagina-
tions may, especially in cases where the affections are

fed, feel the moral pain if not the physical pain
of another, as keenly as the actual sufferer of it, and

participate with like intensity in another's pleas-
ure; sometimes even mentally representing the received
pleasure a greater than it really is, and so getting re-
are greater than the recipients' direct pleasure.
Such cases, however, and cases in which even apart
from exultation of sympathy caused by attachment,

TRIAL AND COMPROMISE. 27S

there is a body of feeling sympathetically aroused equal
in amount to the original feeling, if not greater, are
jsarily exceptional. For in such cases the total
consciousness inclndes many other elements besides the
mentally-represented pleasure or pain — notably the
luxury of pity and the luxury of goodness ; and genesis of
these can occur but occasionally; they could not be
habitual concomitants of sympathetic pleasures if all
pursued these from moment to moment. In estimating
the possible totality of sympathetic pleasures, we must
include nothing beyond the representations of the
pleasures others experience. And unless it be asserted
that we can have others' states of consciousness per-
petually reproduced in us more vividly than the kindred
slates of consciousness are aroused in ourselves by their
proper personal causes, it must be admitted that the
totality of altruistic pleasures cannot become equal to
the totality of egoistic pleasures. Hence, beyond the
truth that before there can be altruistic pleasures there
must be the egoistic pleasures from sympathy with
which they arise, there is the truth that to obtain the
greatest sum of altruistic pleasures, there must be a
greater sum of egoistic pleasures..

§ 87. That pure altruism is suicidal may be yet other-
wise demonstrated. A perfectly moral law must be one
which becomes perfectly practicable as human nature
becomes perfect. If its practicableness decreases as
human nature improves ; and if an ideal human nature
necessitates its impracticability, it cannot be the moral
law sought.

Now opportunities for practicing altruism are numer-
ous and great in proportion as there is weakness, or
IS

27 J THE DATA OF ETHICS.

incapacity, or imperfection. If we passed beyond the
limits of the family, in which a sphere for self-sacrificing
activities must be preserved as long as offspring have to
ixed ; and if we ask how there can continue a social
sphere for self-sacrificing activities, it becomes obvious
that the continued existence of serious evils, caused by
prevalent defects of nature, is implied. As fast as men
adapt themselves to the requirements of social life, so
fast will the demands for efforts on their behalf dimin-
ish. And with arrival at finished adaptation, when all
persons are at once completely self-conserved and com*
pletely able to fulfill the obligations which society im-
poses on them, those occasions for postponement of self
to others, which pure altruism contemplates, disappear.
Such self-sacrifices become, indeed, doubly impracti-
cable. Carrying on successfully their several lives,
men not only cannot yield to those around the oppor-
tunities for giving aid, but aid cannot ordinarily be
given them without interfering with their normal ac-
tivities, and so diminishing their pleasures. Like every
inferior creature, led by its innate desires spontaneously
to do all that its life requires, man, when completely
molded to the social state, must have desires so adjusted
to his needs that lie fulfills the needs in gratifying
the desires. And if his desires are severally gratified
by the performance of required acts, none of these can
be performed for him without balking his desires. Ac-
ceptancefrom others of the results of their activities can
take plaee only on condition of relinquishing the pleas-
lerived from his own activities. Diminution rather
than increase of happiness would result, could altruistio
action in such ease be enforced.

TRIAL AND COMPROMISE. 275

And here, indeed, we are introduced to another base-
less assumption which the theory makes.

§ 88. The postulate of utilitarianism as formulated in
the statements above quoted, and of pure altruism as
Otherwise expressed, involves the belief that his possible
for happiness, or the means to happiness, or the con-
ditions to happiness, to be transferred. Without any
specified limitation the proposition taken for granted is,
that happiness in general admits of detachment from
one and attachment to another — that surrender to any
extent is possible by one and appropriation to any extent
is possible by another. But a moment's thought shows
this to be far from the truth. On the one hand, sur-
render carried to a certain point is extremely mischiev-
ous and to a further point fatal ; and on the other hand,
much of the happiness each enjoys is self-generated and
can neither be given nor received.

To assume that egoistic pleasures may be relinquished
to any extent, is to fall into one of those many errors
of ethical speculation which result from ignoring the
truths of biology. When taking the biological view
of ethics we saw that pleasures accompany normal
amounts of functions, while pains accompany defects or
excesses of functions ; further, that complete life de-
pends on complete discharge of functions, and therefore
on receipt of the correlative pleasures. Hence, to yield
up normal pleasures is to yield up so much life ; and
there arises the question — To what extent may this be
done? If he is to continue living, the individual must
take certain amounts of those pleasures which go along
with fulfillment of the bodily functions, and must avoid
the pains winch entire non-fulfillment of them entail*

276 TIIE DATA OF ETHICS.

Complete abnegation means death ; excessive abnega-
tion moans illness ; abnegation less excessive means
physical degradation and consequent loss of power to
fultill obligations, personal and other. When, therefore,
we attempt to specialize the proposal to live not for self-
satisfaction but for the satisfaction of others, we meet
with the difficulty that beyond a certain limit this can-
not be done. And when we have decided what decrease
of bodily welfare, caused by sacrifice of pleasures and ac-
ceptance of pains, it is proper for the individual to make,
there is forced on us the fact that the portion of hap-
piness, or means to happiness, which it is possible for
him tn yield up for redistribution, is a limited portion.
Even more rigorous on another side is the restriction
put upon the transfer of happiness, or the means to hap-
piness. The pleasures gained by efficient action — by
successful pursuit of ends, cannot by any process be
parted with, and cannot in any way be appropriated by
another. The habit of arguing about general happiness
sometimes as though it were a concrete product to be
portioned out, and sometimes as though it were co-
extensive with the use of those material aids to pleasure
which may be givenand received, has caused inattention
to the truth that the pleasures of achievement are not
transferable. Alike in the boy who has won a game of
marbles, the athlete who has performed a feat, the
::ian who has gained a party triumph, the inventor
who has devised a new machine, the man of science who
ed a truth, the novelist who has well de-
lineated a character, the poet who has finely rendered an
emotion, we see pleasures which must, in the nature of
things, be enjoyed exclusively by those to whom they
And if we look at all such occupations as men are

TRIAL AM) COMPROMISE. '217

not impelled to by their necessities — if we contemplate
the various ambitions which play so large a part in life ;
■we are reminded that so long as the consciousness of
efficiency remains a dominant pleasure, there will re-
main a dominant pleasure which cannot be pursued
altruistically hut must be pursued egoistically.

Cutting off. then, at the one end, those pleasures
which arc inseparable from maintenance of the physique
in an uninjured state; and cutting off at the other end
the pleasures of successful action ; the amount that re-
mains is so greatly diminished as to make untenable the
assumption that happiness at large admits of distribution
after the manner which utilitarianism assumes.

§ 80. In yet one more way may he shown the incon-
sistency of this transfigured utilitarianism which regards
its doctrine as embodying the Christian maxim — " Love
your neighbor as yourself," and of that altruism which,
going still further, enunciates the maxim — "Live for
others. "

A right rule of conduct must be one which may with
advantage be adopted by all. "Act according to that
maxim only, which you can wish, at the same time, to
become a universal law," says Kant. And clearly,
passing over needful qualifications of this maxim, we
may accept it, to the extent of admitting that a mode of
action which becomes impracticable as it approaches
universality, must be wrong. Hence, if the theory oi
pure altruism, implying that effort should be expended
for the benefit of others and not for personal benefit, is
defensible, it must be shown that it will produce good
results when acted 141011 by all. Mark the consequences
if all are purely altruistic.

278 THE DATA OF ETR1CB.

First, an impossible combination of moral attributes
is implied. Each is supposed by the hypothesis to re-
gard self so little and others so much, that he willingly
sacrifices his own pleasures to give pleasures to them.
But if this is a universal trait, and if action is univer-
sally congruous with it, we have to conceive each as
being not only a sacrificer but also one who accepts
sacrifices. While he is so unselfish as willingly to yield
up the benefit for which he has labored, he is so selfish
as willingly to let others yield up to him the benefits
they have labored for. To make pure altruism possible
for all, each must be at once extremely unegoistic and
extremely egoistic. As a giver, he must have no
thought for self ; as a receiver, no thought for others.
Evidently, this implies an inconceivable mental consti-
tution. The sympathy which is so solicitous for others
as willingly to injure self in benefiting them, cannot at
the same time be so regardless of others as to accept ben-
efits which they injure themselves in giving.

The incongruities that emerge if we assume pure al-
truism to be universally practiced, may be otherwise ex-
hibited thus. Suppose that each, instead of enjoying
such pleasures as come to him, or such consumable appli-
isure as he has worked for, or such occasions
for pleasure as reward his efforts, relinquishes these to
j !•• other, or adds them to a common stock from
which others benefit, what will result? Different an-
- may be given according as we assume that there
;■ are not, additional influences brought into play.

Suppose there are no additional influences. Then,

h transfers to another his happiness, or means to

happine -. or occasions for happiness, while some one

else does the like to him, the distribution of happiness

TRIAL AXD COMPROMISE. 279

is, on the average, unchanged ; or if eacli adds to a
common stock his happiness, or means to happiness, or
occasions for happiness, from which common stock each
appropriates his portion, the average state is still, as be-
fore, unchanged. The only obvious effect is that trans-
actions must be gone through in the redistribution; and
loss of time and labor must result.

Now suppose some additional influence which makes
the process beneficial ; what must it be ? The totality
can be increased only if the acts of transfer increase the
quantity of that which is transferred. The happiness,
or that which brings it, must be greater to one who de-
rives it from another's efforts than it would have been
had his own efforts procured it ; or otherwise, supposing
a fund of happiness, or of that which brings it, has been
formed by contributions from each, then each, in appro-
priating his share, must find it larger than it would have
been had no such aggregation and dispersion taken
place. To justify belief in such increase two conceivable
assumptions may be made. One is that though the sum
of pleasures, or of pleasure-yielding things, remains the
same yet the kind of pleasure, or of pleasure-yielding
things, which each receives in exchange from another,
or from the aggregate of others, is one which lie appre-
ciates more than that for which he labored. But to
assume this is to assume that each labors directly for the
thing which he enjoys less, rather than for the thing
which he enjoys more, which is absurd. The other
assumption is that while the exchanged, or redistributed
pleasure of the egoistic kind, remains the same in amount
for each, there is added to it the altruistic pleasure
accompanying the exchange. But this assumption is
clearly inadmissible if, as is implied, the transaction is

280 TIIE DATA OF ETUICS.

Universal —is one through winch each becomes giver and
receiver to equal extents. For if the transfer of pleas-
ures, or of pleasure-yielding things, from one to another
or others, is always accompanied by the consciousness
that there will be received from him or them an equiv-
alent ; there results merely a tacit exchange, either
direct or roundabout. Each becomes altruistic in no
greater degree than is implied by being equitable ; and
each, having nothing to exalt his happiness, sympathet-
ically «>r otherwise, cannot be a source of sympathetic
happiness to others.

§ 90. Thus, when the meanings of its words are
inquired into, or when the necessary implications of
its theory are examined, pure altruism, in whatever
form expressed, commits its adherents to various ab-
surdities.

If " the greatest happiness of the greatest number,"
or in other words, " the general happiness," is the
proper end of action, then not only for all public action
1ml for all private action, it must be the end; because,
otherwise, the greater part of action remains unguided.
Consider its fitness I'm' each. Jf corporate action is to
be guided by the principle, with its interpreting com-
ment, "everybody to count for one, nobody for more
than one," there must bean ignoring of all differences
of character and conduct, merits and demerits, among
citizens, since no discrimination is provided for, and,
moreover, since thai in respect of which all are to count
alike cannot be happiness itself, which is indistributable,
and since equal sharing of the concrete means to hap-
. besides failing ultimately would fail proximately
to produce the greatest happiness; it results that equal

TRIAL AND COMPROMISE. 281

distribution of the conditions under which happiness
may be pursued is theonly tenable meaning: a\u discov-
er in tlic principle nothing but a roundabout insistence
on equity. If, taking happiness ;it large as the aim of
private action, the individual is required to judge be-
tween his own happiness and that of others as an im-
partial spectator would do, we sec that no supposition
concerning the spectator save one which suicidally
ascribes partiality to him, can bring out any other re-
sult than that each shall enjoy such happiness, or ap-
propriate such means to happiness, as his own efforts
gain : equity is again the sole content. When, adopting
another method, we consider how the greatest sum of
happiness may be composed, and, recognizing the fact
that equitable egoism will produce a certain sum, ask
how pure altruism is to produce a greater sum ; we are
shown that if all, exclusively pursuing altruistic pleas-
ures, are so to produce a greater sum of pleasures, the
implication is that altruistic pleasures, which arise from
sympathy, can exist in the absence of egoistic pleasures
with which there may be sympathy — an impossibility ,
and another implication is that if, the necessity for
egoistic pleasures being admitted, it is said that the
greatest sum of happiness will be attained if all indi-
viduals are more altruistic than egoistic, it is indirectly
said that as a general truth, representative feelings are
stronger tnan presentative feelings— another impossibil-
ity. Again, the doctrine of pure altruism assumes that
happiness may be to any extent transferred or redis-
tributed; whereas the fact is that pleasures of one older
cannot be transferred in large measure without results
which arc fatal or extremely injurious, and that pleasures
of another order cannot be transferred in any degree.

282 TTIE DATA OF ETIIICS.

Further, pure altruism presents this fatal anomaly, that
while a right principle of action must be more and more
practiced as men improve, the altruistic principle be-
comes less and less practicable as men approach an ideal
form, because the sphere for practicing it continually
decreases. Finally its self-destructiveness is made mani-
fest on observing that for all to adopt it as a principle of
action, which they must do if it is a sound principle,
implies that all are at once extremely unegoistic and
extremely egoistic — ready to injure self for others' ben-
efit, and ready to accept benefit at the cost of injury to
others ; trails which cannot co-exist.

The need for a compromise between egoism and
altruism is thus made conspicuous. We are forced to
recognize the claims which his own well-being has on
the attention of each by noting how, in some directions
we come to a deadlock, in others to contradictions, and
in others to disastrous results, if they are ignored.
Conversely, it is undeniable that disregard of others by
each, carried to a great extent, is fatal to society, and
carried to a still greater extent is fatal to the family,
and eventually to the race. Egoism and altruism are
I herefore co-essential.

§ 91. What form is the compromise between egoism
and altruism to assume ? how are their respective claims
to be satisfied in due degrees ?

It is a truth insisted on by moralists and recognized
in common life, that the achievement of individual hap-
piness is not proportionate to the degree in which indi-
vidual happiness is made the object of direct pursuit;
but there has not yet become current the belief that,
in like manner, the achievement of general happiness

TRIAL AND COMPROMISE. 283

is not proportionate to the degree in which general
happiness is made the object of direct pursuit. Yet
failure of direct pursuit in the last case is more reason-
ably to be expected than in the first.

When discussing the relations of means and ends, we
saw that as individual conduct evolves, its principle be-
comes more and more that of making fulfillment of
means the proximate end, and leaving the ultimate end,
welfare or happiness, to come as a result. And we saw
that when general welfare or happiness is the ulti-
mate end, the same principle holds even more rigor-
ously ; since the ultimate end under its impersonal form
is less determinate than under its personal form, and
the difficulties in the way of achieving it by direct
pursuit still greater. Recognizing, then, the fact that
corporate happiness still more than individual happi-
ness, must be pursued not directly, but indirectly, the
first question for us is — What must be the general
nature of the means through which it is to be achieved.

It is admitted that self-happiness is, in a measure, to
be obtained by furthering the happiness of others. May
it not be true that, conversely, general happiness is to
be obtained by furthering self-happiness ? If the well-
being of each unit is to be reached partly through his
care for the well-being of the aggregate, is not the
well-being of the aggregate to be reached partly through
the care of each unit for himself ? Clearly, our con-
clusion must be that general happiness is to be achieved
mainly through the adequate pursuit of their own hap-
piness by individuals ; while, reciprocally, the happiness
of individuals is to be achieved in part by their pur-
suit of the general happiness.

And this is the conclusion embodied in the progress-

28 l THE DATA OF ETHICS.

Lng ideas and usages of mankind. This compromise
between egoism and altruism has been slowly establish-
ingitself; and toward recognition of its propriety;
men's actual beliefs, as distinguished from their nominal
beliefs, have been gradually approaching. Social evo-
lution has been bringing about a statein which the
claims of the individual to the proceeds of his activi-
ties, and to such satisfactions as they bring, are more
and more positively asserted; at the same time that
insistence on others' claims, and habitual respect for
them have been increasing. Among the rudest savages
personal interests are very vaguely distinguished from
the interests of others. In early stages of civilization
the proportioning of benefits to efforts is extremely
rude: slaves and serfs get for work arbitrary amounts
of food and shelter : exchange being infrequent, there
is little to develop the idea of equivalence. But as
civilization advances and status passes into contract
there comes daily experience of the relation between
advantages enjoyed and labor given : the industrial
system maintaining, through supply and demand, a
due adjustment of the one to the other. And this
growth of voluntary co-operation, this exchange of
services under agreement, lias been necessarily accom-
panied by decrease of aggressions one upon another,
and increase of sympathy : leading to exchange of
services beyond agreement. That is to say, the more
distinct assertions of individual claims, and more rig-
orous apportioning of personal enjoyments to efforts
expended, has gone hand in hand with growth of that
altruism shown in equitable conductand that
positive altruism shown in gratuitous aid.

A higher phase of this double change has in our own

TRIAL AM) COMPROMISE. 2s.">

times become conspicuous. If, on the one hand, we
note the struggles for political freedom, the contests
between labor and capital, the judicial reforms made
to facilitate enforcement of rights, we see that the
tendency still is toward complete appropriation by
each of whatever benefits are due to him, and conse-
quent exclusion of his fellows from such benefits. On
the other hand, if we consider what is meant by the
surrender of power to the masses, the abolition of
class-privileges, the efforts to diffuse knowledge, the
agitations to spread temperance, the multitudinous
philanthrophic societies; it becomes clear that regard
for the well being of others is increasing pari passic
with the taking of means to secure personal well
being.

What holds of the relations within each society
holds to souk; extent, if to a less extent, of the rela-
tions between societies. Though, to maintain national
claims, real or imaginary, often of a trivial kind, the
civilized still make war on one another; yet their
several nationalities are more respected than in past
ages. Though by victors portions of territory are
taken and money compensations exacted ; yet conquest
is not now, as of old, habitually followed by entire
appropriation of erritories and enslavement of peoples.
The individu aliti d of societies are in a larger measure
preserved. Meanwhile the altruistic intercourse is
greater: aid is rendered on occasions of disaster by
flood, by fire, by famine, or otherwise. And in inter-
national arbitration as lately exemplified, implying the
recognition of claims by one nation upon another, we
see a further progress in this wider altruism. Doubtless
there is much to bo said by way of set-off; for in the

286 THE BAT A OF ETHICS.

dealings of the civilized with the uncivilized little of
this progress can be traced. It may be urged that the
primitive rule, " Life for life," has been developed by us
into the rule, " For one life many lives," as in the cases
of Bishop Patterson and Mr. Birch, but then there is the
qualifying fact that we do not torture our prisoners or
mutilate them. If it be said that as the Hebrews
thought themselves warranted in seizing the lands God
promised to them, and in some cases exterminating the
inhabitants, so we, to fulfill the "manifest intention of
Providence," dispossess inferior races whenever we want
their territories ; it may be replied that we do not kill
many more than seems needful, and tolerate the exist-
ence of those who submit. And should any one point
out that as Attila, while conquering or destroying
peoples and nations, regarded himself as " the scourge
of God," punishing men for their sins, so we, as repre-
sented by a High Commissioner and a priest he quotes,
think ourselves called on to chastise with rifles and
cannon, heathens who practice polygamy ; there is the
rejoinder that not even the most ferocious disciple of
the teacher of mercy would carry his vengeance so far
as to depopulate whole territories and erase scores of
cities. And when, on the other hand, wc remember
that there is an Aborigines Protection Society, that
there are commissioners in certain colonies appointed to
protect native interests, and that in some cases the lands
of natives have been purchased in ways which, however
unfair, have implied some recognition of their claims ;
we may say that little as the compromise between
egoism and altruism has progressed in international
affairs, it has still progressed somewhat in the direction
indicated.

kV02i' CILlATlOxW 2*7

CHAPTEU XIV.

CONCILIATION.

$ 02. As exhibited in the last chapter, the com-
promise between the claims of self and the claims of
others seems to imply permanent antagonism between
the two. The pursuit by each of his own happiness
while paying due regard to the happiness of his fellows,
apparently necessitates the ever-recurring question —
How far must the one end be sought and how far the
other : suggesting, if not discord in the life of each, still,
an absence of complete harmony. This is not the inevit-
able inference however.

When, in the Principles of Sociology, Part III, the
phenomena of race-maintenance among living things
at large were discussed, that the development of the
domestic relations might be the better understood, it
was shown that during evolution there has been going
on a conciliation between the interests of the species,
the interests of the parents, and the interests of the
offspring. Proof was given that as we ascend from the
lowest forms of life to the highest, race-maintenance is
achieved with a decreasing sacrifice of life, alike of
young Individuals and of adult individuals, and also
with a decreasing sacrifice of parental lives to the lives
of offspring. We saw that, with the progress of civiliza-
tion, like changes go on among human beings ; and that

THE DATA OF ETHICS.

the highest domestic relations are those in which the
conciliation of welfares within the family becomes
greatest, while the welfare of the society is best sub-
served. Here it remains to be shown that a kindred
conciliation has been, and is, taking place between the
interests of each citizen and the interests of citizens at
large ; tending ever toward a state in which the two
become merged in one, and in which the feelings
answering to them respectively, fall into complete
concord.

In the family group, even as we observe it among
many inferior vertebrates, we see that the parental
sacrifice, now become so moderate in amount as to con-
sist with long-continued parental life, is not accompanied
by consciousness of sacrifice ; but contrariwise, is made
from a direct desire to make it : the altruistic labors on
behalf of young are carried on in satisfaction of parental
instincts. If we trace these relations up through the
grades of mankind, and observe how largely love rather
than obligation prompts the care of children, we see the
conciliation of interest to be such that achievement of
parental happiness coincides with securing the hap-
3 of offspring: the wish for children among the
childless, and the occasional adoption of children, show-
ing how needful for attainment of certain egoistic satis-
ms are these altruistic activities. And further
evolution, causing along with higher oature diminished
fertility, and therefore smaller burdens on parents, may
ted to bring a state in which, far more than
now, the pleasures of adult life will consist in raising
offspring to perfection while simultaneously furthering
the immediate happiness of offspring.

Now though altruism of a social kind, lacking cer*

CONCILIATION. 289

tain elements of parental altruism, can never attain the
same level, yet it may be expected to attain a level at
which it will be like parental altruism in spontaneity — -
a level such that ministration to others' happiness will
become a daily need — a level such that the lower egoistic
satisfactions will be continually subordinated to this
higher egoistic satisfaction, not by any effort to subor-
dinate them, but by the preference for this higher ego-
istic satisfaction whenever it can be obtained.

Let us consider how the development of sympathy,
which must advance as fast as conditions permit, will
bring about this state.

§ 93. We have seen that during the evolution of life,
pleasures and pains have necessarily been the incen-
tives to, and deterrents from, actions which the condi-
tions of existence demanded and negatived. An implied
truth to be here noted is, that faculties which, under
given conditions, yield partly pain and partly pleasure,
cannot develop beyond the limit at which they yield a
surplus of pleasure : if beyond that limit more pain
than pleasure results from exercise of them, their growth
must be arrested.

Through sympathy both these forms of feeling are
excited. Now a pleasurable consciousness is aroused
on witnessing pleasure ; now a painful consciousness is
aroused on witnessing pain. Hence, if beings around
him habitually manifest pleasure and but rarely pain,
sympathy yields to its possessor a surplus of pleasure ;
while, contrariwise, if little pleasure is ordinarily wit-
nessed and much pain, sympathy yields a surplus of
pain to its possessor. The average development of
sympathy must, therefore, be regulated by the average

id

200 THE DATA OF ETHICS.

manifestations of pleasure and pain in others. If the
life usually led under given social conditions is such that
suffering is daily inflicted, or is daily displayed by
associates, sympathy cannot grow: to assume growth
of it is to assume that the constitution will modify
itself in such way as to increase its pains and therefore
depress its energies ; and is to ignore the truth that
bearing any kind of pain gradually produces insensi-
bility in that pain, or callousness. On the other hand,
if the social state is such that manifestations of pleasure
predominate, sympathy will increase; since sympathetic
pleasures, adding to the totality of pleasures enhancing
vitality, conduce to the physical prosperity of the most
sympathetic, and since the pleasures of sympathy exceed-
ing its pains in all, lead to an exercise of it which
strengthens it.

Tin,' first implication is one already more than once
indicated. We have seen that along with habitual
militancy and under the adapted type of social organ-
ization, sympathy cannot develop to any considerable
height. The destructive activities carried on against
external enemies scar it; the state of feeling maintained
causes within the society itself frequent acts of aggres-
sion or cruelty; and further, the compulsory co-opera-
tion characterizing the militant rSgirne necessarily
repre apathy — exists only on condition of an un-

sympathetic treatment of some by others.

But even could the militant rSgime forthwith end,
the hinderance to development of sympathy would still
be great. Though cessation of war would imply in-
d adaptation of man to social life, and decrease of
sundry evils, yet there would remain much non-adapta-
tion aud much consequent unhappiness. In the first

CONCIL I A TION. 201

place, that form of nature which has generated and still
generates wars, though by implication raised to a
higher form, would not at once be raised to so high a
form that there would cease all injustices and the pains
they cause. For a considerable period after predatory
activities had ended, the defects of the predatory nature
would continue: entailing their slowly diminishing
evils. In the second place, the ill-adjustment of the
human constitution to the pursuits of industrial life,
must long persist, and may be expected to survive in a
measure the cessation of wars : the required modes of
activity must remain for innumerable generations in
some degree displeasurable. And in the third place,
deficiencies of self-control such as the improvident
show us, as well as those many failures of conduct due
to inadequate foresight of consequences, though less
marked than now, could not fail still to produce suffer-
ing.

Nor would even complete adaptation, if limited to
disappearance of the non-adaptations just indicated,
remove all sources of those miseries whioh, to the ex-
tent of their manifestation, check the growth of sym-
pathy. For while the rate of multiplication continues
so to exceed the rate of mortality as to cause pressure
on the means of subsistence, there must continue to
result much unhappiness; either from balked affections
or from overwork and stinted means. Only as fast as
fertility diminishes, which we have seen it must do
along with further mental development {Principles of
Biology, §§ 367-377), can there go on such diminution
of the labors required for efficiently supporting self and
family, that they will not constitute a displeasurable
t.ix on the energies.

2 ! 1 2 THE DA TA OF ETHICS.

Gradually then, and only gradually, as these various
causes of unhappiness become less can sympathy be-
come greater. Life would be intolerable if, while the
causes of misery remained as they now are, all men
were not only in a high degree sensitive to the pains,
bodily and mental, felt by those around and expressed
in the faces of those they met, but were unceasingly
conscious of the miseries everywhere being suffered as
consequences of war, crime, misconduct, misfortune,
improvidence, incapacity. But, as the molding and
re-molding of man and society into mutual fitness
progresses, and as the pains caused by unfitness de-
crease, sympathy can increase in presence of the pleas-
ures that come from fitness. The two changes are in-
deed so related that each furthers the other. Such
growth of sympathy as conditions permit, itself aids
in lessening pain and augmenting pleasure : and the
greater surplus of pleasure that results makes possible
further growth of sympathy.

§ 94. The extent to which sympathy may develop
when the hinderances are removed, will be better con-
ceived after observing the agencies through which it is
excited, and setting down the reasons for expecting
those agencies to become more sufficient. Two factors
have to be considered — the natural language of feeling
in tin; being sympathized with, and the power of inter-
preting that language in the being who sympathizes.
We may anticipate development of both.

Movements of the body and facial changes are visible
effects of feeling which, when the feeling is strong, are
uncontrollable. When the feeling is less strong, how-
ever, be it sensational or emotional, they may be wholly

CONCILIATION. 293

or partially repressed ; and there is a habit, more or less
constant, of repressing them ; this habit being the
concomitant of a nature suchthat it is often undesirable
that others should see what is felt. So necessary with
our existing characters and conditions are concealments
thus prompted, that they have come to form a part of
moral duty ; and concealment for its own sake is often
insisted upon as an element in good manners. All this
is caused by the prevalence of feelings at variance with
social good — feelings which cannot be shown without
producing discords or estrangements. But in proportion
as the egoistic desires fall more under control of the
altruistic, and there come fewer and slighter impulses
of a kind to be reprobated, the need for keeping guard
over facial expression and bodily movement will de-
crease, and these will with increasing clearness convey
to spectators the mental state. Nor is this all. Re-
strained as its use is, this language of the emotions is at
present prevented from growing. But as fast as the
emotions become such that they may be more candidly
displayed, there will go, along with the habit of dis-
play, development of the means of display ; so that
besides the stronger emotions, the more delicate shades
and smaller degrees of emotion will visibly exhibit
themselves ; the emotional language will become at once
more copious, more varied, more definite. And obviously
sympathy will be proportionately facilitated.

An equally important, if not a more important,
advance of kindred nature, is to be anticipated. The
vocal signs of sentient states will simultaneously evolve
further. Loudness of tone, pitch of tone, quality of
tone, and change of tone, are severally marks of feeling ;
and, combined in different ways and proportions, serve

294 THE DATA OF ETHICS.

to express different amounts and kinds of feelings.
As elsewhere pointed out, cadences are the comments
of the emotions on the propositions of the intellect.*
Not in excited speech only, but in ordinary speech, we
show by ascending and descending intervals, by degrees
of deviation from the medium tone, as well as by plac&
and strength of emphasis, the kind of sentiency which
accompanies the thought expressed. Now the manifesta-
tion of feeling by cadence, like its manifestation by
visible changes, is at present under restraint; the
motives for repression act in the one case as they act in
the other. A double effect is produced. This audible
language of feeling is not used up to the limit of its
existing capacity; and it is to a considerable degree
misused, so as to convey other feelings than those
which are felt. The result of this disuse and misuse is
to check that evolution which normal use would cause.
We must infer, then, that as moral adaptation pro-
gresses, and there is decreasing need for concealment
of the feelings, their vocal signs will develop much
further. Though it is not to be supposed that cadences
will ever convey emotions as exactly as words convey
thoughts, yet it is quite possible that the emotional
language of the future may rise as much above our pres-
ent emotional language, as our intellectual language
lias already risen above the intellectual language of the
st races.
A simultaneous increase in the power of interpreting
Loth visible and audible signs of feeling must be taken
into account. Among those around we see differences
both of ability to perceive such signs and of ability to

•See Essay on " The Origin and Function of Music.''

CO XCIL I A TIOX. 295

conceive the implied mental states and their causes ;
here, a stolidity unimpressed by a slight facial change
or altered tone of voice, or else unable to imagine what
is felt ; and there, a quick observation and a penetrat-
ing intuition, making instantly comprehensible the state
of mind and its origin. If we suppose both these
faculties exalted — both a more delicate perception of
the signs and a strengthened constructive imagination —
we shall get some idea of the deeper and wider sympathy
that will hereafter arise1. More vivid representations of
the feelings of others, implying ideal excitements of
feelings approaching to real excitements, must imply a
greater likeness between the feelings of the sympathizer
and those of the sympathized with ; coming near to
identity.

By simultaneous increase of its subjective and objec-
tive factors, sympathy may thus, as the hinderances
diminish, rise above that now shown by the sympathetic
as much as in them it has risen above that which the
callous show.

§ Oo. What must be the accompanying evolution of
conduct? What must the relations between egoism
and altruism become as this form of nature is neared?

A conclusion drawn in the chapter on the relativity
of pleasures and pains, and there emphasized as one to
be borne in mind, must now be recalled. It was
pointed out that, supposing thern to be consistent with
continuance of life, there are no activities which may
not become sources of pleasure, if surrounding condi-
tions require persistence in them. And here it is to
be added, as a corollary, that if the conditions require
any class of activities to be relatively great, there will

296 THE DATA OF ETHICS.

arise a relatively great pleasure accompanying that class
of activities. What bearing have these general in-
ferences on the special question before us ?

That alike for public welfare and private welfare
sympathy is essential we have seen. We have seen
that co-operation and the benefits which it brings to
each and all, become high in proportion as the altruistic,
that is the sympathetic, interests extend. The actions
prompted by fellow-feeling are thus to be counted among
those .demanded by social conditions. They are actions
which maintenance and further development of social
organization tend ever to increase, and, therefore, actions
with which there will be joined an increasing pleasure.
From the laws of life it must be concluded that unceas-
ing social discipline will so mold human nature that
eventually sympathetic pleasures will be spontaneously
pursued to the fullest extent advantageous to each and
all. The scope for altruistic activities will not exceed
the desire for altruistic satisfactions.

In natures thus constituted, though the altruistic
gratifications must remain in a transfigured sense
egoistic, yet they will not be egoistically pursued — will
not be pursued from egoistic motives. Though pleasure
will be gained by giving pleasure, yet the thought of
the sympathetic pleasure to be gained will not occupy
consciousness, but only the thought of the pleasure
given. To a great extent this is so now. In the truly
sympathetic, attention is so absorbed with the proximate
end, others' happiness, that there is none given to the
prospective self-happiness which may ultimately result.
An analogy will make the relation clear.

A miser accumulates money, not deliberately saying
to himself, " I shall by doing this get the delight which

CONCILIATION. 297

possession gives." lie thinks only of the money and
the means of getting it, and he experiences incidentally
the pleasure that comes from possession. Owning
properly is that which he revels in imagining, and not
the feeling which owning property will cause. Simi-
larly, one who is sympathetic in the highest sense, is
mentally engaged solely in representing pleasure as ex-
perienced by another, and pursues it for the benefit of
that other, forgetting any participation he will have in
it. Subjectively considered, then, the conciliation of
egoism and altruism will eventually become such that
though the altruistic pleasure, as being a part of the
consciousness of one who experiences it, can never be
other than egoistic, it will not be consciously egoistic.

Let us now ask what must happen in a society com-
posed of persons constituted in this manner.

§ 9(5. The opportunities for that postponement of self
to others which constitutes altruism as ordinarily con-
ceived, must, in several ways, be more and more limited
as the highest state is approached.

Extensive demands on the benevolent presuppose
much unhappiness. Before there can be many and
large calls on some for efforts on behalf of others, there
must be many others in conditions needing help — in
conditions of comparative misery. But, as we have
seen above, the development of fellow-feeling can go on
only as fast as misery decreases. Sympathy can reach
its full height only when there have ceased to be fre-
quent occasions for anything like serious self-sacrifice.

Change the point of view, and this truth presents
itself under another aspect. We have already seen that
with the progress of adaptation each becomes so eon-

298 THE DATA OF ETUICS.

stitutcd that he cannot be helped without in some way
arresting a pleasurable activity. There cannot be a
beneficial interference between faculty and function
when the two are adjusted. Consequently, in propor-
tion as mankind approach complete adjustment of their
natures to social needs, there must be fewer and smaller
opportunities for giving aid.

Yei again, as was pointed out in the last chapter, the
sympathy which prompts efforts for others' welfare must
be pained by self-injury on the part of others ; and must,
therefore, cause aversion to accept benefits derived from
their self-injuries. What is to be inferred ? While
each, when occasion offers, is ready, anxious even,
to surrender egoistic satisfactions ; others, similarly
natured, cannot but resist the surrender. If any one,
proposing to treat himself more hardly than a disin-
terested spectator would direct, refrains from appro-
priating that which is due ; others, caring for him if he
will not care for himself, must necessarily insist that lie
shall appropriate it. General altruism then, in its de-
veloped form, must inevitably resist individual excesses
of altruism. The relation at present familiar to us will
be inverted, and instead of each maintaining his own
claims, others will maintain his claims for him: not, in-
deed, by active efforts, which will be needless, hut by

-.-fly resisting any undue yielding up of them.
There is nothing in such behavior which is not even

to be traced in our daily experiences as beginning.
In business transactions among honorable men there is
usually a desire on either side that the other shall treat
himself fairly. Not unfrequently there is a refusal to
take something regarded as the other's due, but which
the other offers to give up. In social intercourse, too,

CONCILIATION. 299

the cases are common in which those who would surren-
der their shares of pleasure are not permitted hy the
rest to do so. Further development of sympathy cannot
but make this mode of behaving increasingly general
and increasingly genuine.

Certain complex restraints on excesses of altruism
exist, which, in another way, force back the individual
upon a normal egoism. Two may here be noted.

In the first place, self-abnegations often repeated im-
ply on the part of the actor a tacit ascription of relative
selfishness to others who profit by the self-abnegations.
Even with men as they are there occasionally arises a
feeling among those for whom sacrifices are frequently
made, that they are being insulted by the assumption
that they are ready to receive them, and in the mind of
the actor also, there sometimes grows up a recognition
of this feeling on their part, and a consequent check on
his too great or too frequent surrenders of pleasure.
Obviously, in more developed natures, tins kind of
check must act still more promptly.

In the second place, when, as the hypothesis implies,
altruistic pleasures have reached a greater intensity than
they now possess, each person will be debarred from un-
due pursuit of them by the consciousness that other
persons, too, desire them, and that scope for others' en-
joyment of them must be left. Even now may be ob-
served among groups of friends, where some competition
in amiability is going on, relinquishments of opportuni-
ties for self-abnegation that others may have them.
" Let her give up the gratification, she will like to do
so;'" "Let him undertake the trouble, it will please
him ;" are suggestions which, from time to time, illus-
trate this consciousness. The most developed sympathy

300 THE DATA OF ETHICS.

will care for the sympathetic satisfactions of others as
well as for their selfish satisfactions. What may be
called a higher equity will refrain from trespassing on
the spheres of others' altruistic activities, as a lower
equity refrains from trespassing on the spheres of their
egoistic activities. And by this checking of what may
be called an egoistic altruism, undue sacrifices on the
part of each must be prevented.

What spheres, then, will eventually remain for altru-
ism as it is commonly conceived ? There are three.
One of them must to the last continue large in extent;
ami the others must progressively diminish, though they
do not disappear.

The first is that which family life affords. Always
there must be a need for subordination of self-regard-
ing feelings to other-regarding feelings in the rearing of
children. Though this will diminish with diminution
in the number to be reared, yet it will increase with the
greater elaboration and prolongation of the activities on
their behalf. But as shown above, there is even now
partially effected a conciliation such that those egoistic
satisfactions which parenthood yields are achieved
through altruistic activities — a conciliation tending ever
toward completeness. An important development of
family altruism must be added: the reciprocal care of
parents by children during old age — a care becoming
lighter and better fulfilled, in which a kindred concilia-
tion may be Looked for.

Pursuit of social welfare :il large must afford here-
after, ;is it (hies now, scope for the postponement of
» unselfish interests, but a continually
ipe ; because as adaptation to the social
state progresses the needs for those regulative actions

CO N CILIA TION. 30 1

by which social life is made harmonious become less.
And here the amount of altruistic action which each
undertakes must inevitably be kept within moderate
bounds by others; for if they are similarly altruistic,
they will not allow some to pursue public ends to their
own considerable detriment that the rest may profit.

In the private relations of men, opportunies for
self-sacrifice prompted by sympathy, must ever in some
degree, though eventually in a small degree, be af-
forded by accidents, diseases, and misfortunes in
genera] ; since, however near to completeness the adap-
tation of human nature to the conditions of existence
at large, physical and social, may become, it can never
reach completeness. Flood, fire, and wreck must to the
last yield at intervals opportunities for heroic acts ; and
in the motives to such acts, anxiety for others will be
less alloyed with love of admiration than now. Ex-
treme, however, as may be the eagerness for altruistic
action on the rare occasions hence arising, the amount
falling to the share of each must, for the reasons given,
be narrowly limited.

But though in the incidents of ordinary life, post-
ponements of self to others in large ways must become
very infrequent, daily intercourse will still furnish mul-
titudinous small occasions for the activity of fellow
feeling. Always each may continue to further the wel-
fare of others by warding off from them evils they can-
not see, and by aiding their actions in ways unknown
to them; or, conversely putting it, each may have, as
it were, supplementary eyes and ears in other persons,
which perceive for him things he cannot perceive him-
self: so perfecting his life in numerous details, by
making its adjustment to environing actions complete.

THE DATA OF ETHICS.

$ 97. AT ust it then follow that eventually, with this
diminution of the spheres for it, altruism must diminish
in total amount? By no means. Such a conclusion
implies a misconception.

Naturally, under existing conditions, with suffering
widely diffused and so much of effort demanded from
the more fortunate in succoring the less fortunate, al-
truism is understood to mean only self-sacrifice ; or, at
any rate, a mode of action which, while it brings some
pleasure, has an accompaniment of self-surrender that
is not pleasurable. But the sympathy which prompts
denial of self to please others is a sympathy which also
receives pleasure from their pleasures when they are
otherwise originated. The stronger the fellow-feeling
which excites efforts to make others happy, the stronger
is the fellow-feeling with their happiness however caused.

In its ultimate form, then, altruism will be the
achievement of gratification through sympathy with
those gratifications of others which are mainly pro-
duced by their activities of all kinds successfully carried
on — sympathetic gratification which costs the receiver
nothing, but is a gratis addition to his egoistic gratifi-
cations. This power of representing in idea the mental
Btates of others, which, during the process of adapta-
tion has had the function of mitigating suffering, must,
as tin' Buffering falls to a minimum, come to have
almost wholly the function of mutually exalting men's
enjoyments by giving every one a vivid intuition of his
ijoyments. While pain prevails widely,
it is undesirable that each should participate much in
the consciousness of others; but with an increasing
predominance of pleasure, participation in others' con'
m irjusiK- -.,« is becomes, a gain of pleasure to all.

CONCILIATION. 303

And so there will disappear that apparently perma-
nent opposition between egoism and altruism, implied
by the compromise reached in the last chapter. Sub-
jectively looked at, the conciliation will be such that the
individual will not have to balance between self-regard-
ing impulses and other-regarding impulses ; but, instead,
those satisfactions of other-regarding impulses which
involve self-sacrifice, becoming rare and much prized,
will be so unhesitatingly preferred that the competition
of self-regarding impulses with them will scarcely be
felt. And the subjective conciliation will also be such
that though altruistic pleasure will be attained, yet
the motive of action will not consciously be the attain-
ment of altruistic pleasure ; but the idea present will be
the securing of others' pleasures. Meanwhile, the con-
ciliation objectively considered will be equally complete.
Though each, no longer needing to maintain his egoistic
claims, will tend rather when occasion offers to sur-
render them, yet others, similarly natured, will not per-
mit him in any Luge measure to do this, and that ful-
fillment of personal desires required for completion of
his life will thus be secured to him ; though not now
egoistic in the ordinary sense, }ret the effects of due
egoism will be achieved. Nor is this all. As, at an
early stage, egoistic competition, first reaching a compro-
mise such that each claims no more than his equitable
share, afterward rises to a conciliation such that each
insists on the taking of equitable shares by others; so,
at the latest stage, altruistic competition, first reaching
a compromise under which each restrains himself from
taking an undue share of altruistic satisfactions, event-
ually rises to a conciliation under which each takes care
that others shall have their opportunities for altruistic

THE LATA OF ETHICS.

satisfactions: the highest altruism being that which
ministers not to the egoistic satisfactions of others only,
but also to their altruistic satisfactions.

Far off as seems such a state, yet every one of the
factors counted on to produce it may already be traced
in operation among those of highest natures. What
now in them is occasional and feeble, may be expected
with further evolution to become habitual and strong;
and what now characterizes the exceptionally high may
be expected eventually to characterize all. For that
which the best human nature is capable of, is within the
reach of human nature at large.

§ 98. That these conclusions will meet with any con-
siderable acceptance is improbable. Neither with cur-
rent ideas nor with current sentiments are they suffi-
ciently congruous.

Such a view will not be agreeable to those who lament
the spreading disbelief in eternal damnation ; nor to
those who follow the apostle of brute force in thinking
that because the rule of the strong hand was once good
good for all time ; nor to those whose reverence for
one who told them to put up the sword, is shown by
using the sword to spread his doctrine among heathens.
From the ten thousand priests of the religion of love,
who are silent when the nation is moved by the religion
of hate-, will come no sign of assent; nor from their
bishops who, far from urging the extreme precept of the
r they pretend to follow, to turn the other cheek
when one is smitten, vote for acting on the principle —
strike lest ye be struck. Nor will any approval be felt
by legislators who, after praying to be forgiven their
tsses as they forgive the trespasses of others, forth*

CONCILIATION 305

with decide to attack those who have not trespassed
against them, and who, after a Queen's Speech has in-
voked -i the blessing of Almighty God" on their coun-
cils, immediately provide means for committing political
burglary.

P>ut, though men who profess Christianity and prac-
tice Paganism can feel no sympathy with such a view,
there are some, classed us antagonists to the current
creed, who may not think it absurd to believe that a
rationalized version of its ethical principles will event-
ually be acted upon.
20

THE DATA OF ETU1CS.

CHAPTER XV.

ABSOLUTE AND RELATIVE ETHICS.

§ 90. As applied to Ethics, the word "absolute " will
by many be supposed to imply principles of right con-
duct that exist out of relation to life as conditioned on
the Earth, out of relation to time and place, and inde-
pendent of the Universe as now visible to us, " eternal "
principles as they are called. Those, however, who
recall the doctrine set forth in First Principles, will
hesitate to put this interpretation on the word. Right,
us we can think it, necessitates the thought of not right,
or WTong, for its correlative, and hence, to ascribe right-
to the acts of the Power manifested through phenom-
ena, is to assume the possibility that wrong acts may
be committed by this Power. But how come there to
. apart from this Power, conditions of such kind
thai subordination of its acts to them makes them right
and insubordination wrong. How can Unconditioned
Being be subject to conditions beyond itself?

If, for example, any one should assert that the Cause
of Things, conceived in respect of fundamental moral
attributes as like ourselves, did right in producing a
Universe which, in the course of immeasurable time,
ivin origen to beings capable of pleasure, and
would have done wrong in abstaining from the produc-
tion of such a Universe ; then, the comment to be made

ABSOLUTE AND RELAT1 /: ETHICS. 307

is that, imposing the moral ideas generated in his finite
consciousness, upon the Infinite Existence which tran«
scends consciousness, lie goes behind that Infinite Exist-
ence and prescribes for it principles of action.

As implied in foregoing chapters, right and wrong
as conceived by us can exist only in relation to the
actions of creatures capable of pleasures and pains ;
seeing that analysis carries us back to pleasures and
pains as the elements out of which the conceptions are
framed.

But if the word " absolute," as used above does not
refer to the Unconditioned Being — if the principles of
action distinguished as absolute and relative concern
the conduct of conditioned beings, in what way are the
words to be understood? An explanation of their
meanings will be best conveyed by a criticism on the
current conceptions of right and wrong,

§ 100. Conversations about the affairs of life habitu-
ally imply the belief that every deed named may be
placed under the one head or the other. In discussing
a political question, both sides take it for granted that
some line of action may be chosen which is right, while
all other lines of action are wrong. So, too, is it with
judgments on the doings of individuals ; each of these
is approved or disapproved on the assumption that it is
definitely classable as good or bad. Even where quali-
fications are admitted, they are admitted with an im-
plied idea that some such positive characterization is to
be made.

Nor is it in popular thought and speech only that we
see this. If not wholly and definitely, yet partiall)'
Slid by implication, the belief is expressed by moralists.

30 S THE DATA OF ETUICS.

In his Methods ofMhics (1st Ed., p. 6) Mr. Sidgwick
says : " That there is in any given circumstances some
one thing which ought to be done and that this can be
known, is a fundamental assumption, made not by phil-
osophers only, but by all who perform any processes of
moral reasoning.''* In this sentence there is specifically
asserted only the last of the above propositions ; namely,
that, in every case, what " ought to be done " " can be
known." But though that "which ought to be done"
is not distinctly identified with "the right," it may be
inferred, in the absence of any indication to the con-
trary, that Mr. Sidgwick regards the two as identical;
and doubtless, in so conceiving the postulates of moral
science, he is at one with most, if not all, who have
made it a subject of study. At first sight, indeed, noth-
ing seems more obvious than that if actions are to be
judged at all, these postulates must be accepted. Never-
theless they may both be called in question, and I think
it may be shown that neither of them is tenable. In-
stead of admitting (hat there is in every case a right
and a wrong, it maybe contended that in multitudi-
nous cases no right, properly so-called, can be alleged,
but only a least wrong ; and further, it may be con-
tended that in many of these cases where there can be
alleged only a least wrong, it is not possible to ascer-
tain with any precision which is the least wrong.

A gfeal part of the perplexities in ethical speculation

from neglect of this distinction between right and

least wrong — between the absolutely right and the rel-

* I do not find this passage in the second edition ; but the omis«
son of it appears to have arisen not from any change of view, but
lid not naturally come into the recast form of the argu»
merit wlhch the section contains.

ABSOLUTE AND RELATIVE ETHTCS. '.', >D

atively right. And many further perplexities are due to
the assumption that it cfin, in some way, be decided iu
every case which of two courses is morally obligatory.

§ 101. The law of absolute right can take no cogni-
zance of pain, save the cognizance implied by negation.
Pain is the correlative of some species of wrong — some
kind of divergence from that course of action which
perfectly fulfills all requirements. If, as was shown in
an early chapter, the conception of good conduct always
proves, when analyzed, to be the conception of a conduct
which produces a surplus of pleasure somewhere ; while,
conversely, the conduct conceived as bad proves always
to be that which inflicts somewhere a surplus of either
positive or negative pain ; then the absolutely good, the
absolutely right, in conduct, can be that only which
produces pure pleasure — pleasure unalloyed with pain
anywhere. By implication, conduct which has any con-
comitant of pain, or any painful consequence, is par-
tially wrong; and the highest claim to be made for
such conduct is that it is the least wrong which, under
the conditions, is possible — the relatively right.

The contents of preceding chapters imply throughout
that, considered from the evolution point of view, the
aets of men during the transition which has been, is
still, and long will be, in progress, must, in most cases,
be of the kind here classed as least wrong. In propor-
tion to the incongruity between the natures men inherit
from the pre-social state, and the requirements of social
life, must be the amount of pain entailed by their
actions, either on themselves or on others. In so far as
pain is suffered, evil is inflicted; and conduct which
inflicts any evil cannot be absolutely good.

810 TIIE LATA OF ETHICS.

To make clear tlie distinction here insisted upon
between that perfect conduct which is the subject*
matter of Absolute Ethics, and that imperfect conduct
which is the subject-matter of Relative Ethics, some
illustrations must be given.

§ 102. Among the best examples of absolutely right
actions to be named are those arising where the nature
and the requirements have been molded to one another
before social evolution began. Two will here suffice.

Consider the relation of a healthy mother to a healthy
infant. Between the two there exists a mutual depend-
ence which is a source of pleasure to both. In yielding
its natural food to the child, the mother receives grat-
ification ; and to the child there comes the satisfaction
of appetite — a satisfaction which accompanies further-
ance of life, growth and increasing enjoyment. Let
the relation be suspended, and on both sides there is
Buffering. The mother experiences both bodily pain
and mental pain, and the painful sensation borne by
the child brings as its result physical mischief and some
damage to the emotional nature. Thus the act is one
that is to both exclusively pleasurable, while abstention
entails pain on both ; and it is consequently of the kind
avc here call absolutely right.

hi the parental relations of the father we are fur-
nished with a kindred example. If lie is well consti-
tuted in body and mind, his boy, eager for play, finds
in him a sympathetic response, and their frolics, giving
mutual pleasure, not only further the child's physical
welfare, but strengthen that bond of good feeling
between the two which makes subsequent guidance
easier. And then if, repudiating the stupidities of

ABSOLUTE AND RELATIVE ETHICS. 311

early education as at present conceived and unhappily
State-enacted, lie has rational ideas of mental develop-
ment, and sees that the second-hand knowledge gained
through books should begin to supplement the first-hand
knowledge gained by direct observation, only when a
good stock of this has been acquired, he will, with
active sympathy, aid in the exploration of the surround-
ing world which his boy pursues with delight; giving
and receiving gratification from moment to moment
while furthering ultimate welfare. Here, again, are
actions of a kind purely pleasurable alike in their
immediate and remote effects — actions absolutely right.
The intercourse of adults yields, for the reason as-
signed, relatively few cases that fall completely within
the same category. In their transactions from hour
to hour, more or less of deduction from pure gratifica*
tion is caused on one or other side by imperfect fitness
to the requirements. The pleasures men gain by labor-
ing in their vocations and receiving in one form or
other returns for their services usually have the draw-
back that the laborers are in a considerable decree
displeasurable. Cases, however, do occur where the
energies are so abundant that inaction is irksome ; and
where the daily work, not too great in duration, is of
a kind appropriate to the nature ; and where, as a con-
sequence, pleasure rather than pain is a concomitant.
When services yielded by such a one are paid for by an-
other similarly adapted to his occupation, the entire
transaction is of the kind we are here considering1 : ex-
change under agreement between two so constituted
becomes a means of pleasure to both, with no set-off
of pain. Bearing in mind the form of nature which
social discipline is producing, as shown in the contrast

812 THE DATA OF ETHICS.

1)tt ween savage and civilized, the implication is that
ultimately men's activities at large will assume this
character. Remembering that in the course of organic
evolution, the means to enjoyment themselves event-
ually become sources of enjoyment ; and that there is
no form of action which may not through the devel-
opment of appropriate structures become pleasurable;
the inference must be that industrial activities, carried
on through voluntary co-operation, will in time acquire
the character of absolute lightness as here conceived.
Already, indeed, something like such a state has been
reached among certain of those who minister to our
aesthetic gratifications. The artist of genius — poet,
painter, or musician — is one who obtains the means of
living by acts that are directly pleasurable to him, while
they yield, immediately or remotely, pleasures to others.
Once more, among absolutely right acts may be
named certain of those which we class as benevolent.
I say certain of them, because such benevolent acts as
entail submission to pain, positive or negative, that
others may receive pleasure, are, by the definition, ex-
cluded. But there are benevolent acts of a kind yield-
ing pleasure solely. Some one who has slipped is
saved from falling by a by-stander : a hurt is pre-
vented and satisfaction is felt by both. A pedestrian
is choosing a dangerous route, or a fellow-passenger is
about to alight at the wrong station, and, warned
against doing so, is saved from evil : each being, as a
. gratified. There is a misunderstanding
sen friends, and one who sees how it has arisen
explains, the result being agreeable to all. Services to
those around in the small affairs of life, may be, and
often are, of a kind which there is equal pleasure in

A BSOL l ' IK . 1 -Y D R EL , I Tl I ' E El HICS. 3 1 3

giving and receiving. Indeed, as was urged in the last
chapter, the actions of developed altruism must habit-
ually have this character. And so, in countless ways
suggested by these few, men may add to one another's
happiness without anywhere producing unhappiness—
ways which arc therefore absolutely right.

In contrast with these consider the many actions
which from hour to hour are gone through, now with an
accompaniment of some pain to the actor and now bring-
ing results that are partially painful to others, but which
nevertheless are imperative. As implied by antithesis
with cases above referred to, the wearisomeness of pro-
ductive labor as ordinarily pursued, renders it in so far
wrong; but then far greater suffering would result,
both to the laborer and his family, and therefore far
greater wrong would be done, were this wearisomeness
not borne. Though the pains which the care of many
children entail on a mother form a considerable set-off
from the pleasures secured by them to her children and
herself, yet the miseries immediate and remote, which
neglect would entail, so far exceed them that submission
to such pains up to the limit of physical ability to bear
them becomes morally imperative as being the least
wrong. A servant who fails to fulfill an agreement in
respect of work, or who is perpetually breaking crockery,
or who pilfers, may have to suffer pain from being dis-
charged ; but since the evils to be borne by all concerned
if incapacity or misconduct is tolerated, not in one case
only but habitually, must be much greater, such inflic-
tion of pain is warranted as a means to preventing
greater pain. Withdrawal of custom from a tradesman
whose charges are too high, or whose commodities are
inferior, or who gives short measure, or who is unpunc-

314 THE DATA OF ETHICS.

tual, decreases his welfare, and perhaps injures his
belongings; but as saving him from these evils would
imply bearing the evils his conduct causes, and as such

i fur his well-being would imply disregard of the
well being of some more worthy or more efficient trades-
man to whom the custom would else go, and as, chiefly,
general adoption of the implied course, having the effect
that the inferior would not suffer from their inferiority
nor the superior gain by their superiority, would pro-
duce universal misery, withdrawal is justified — the act
is relatively right.

§ 103. I pass now to the second of the two proposi-
tions above enunciated. After recognizing the truth
that a large part of human conduct is not absolutely
right, but only relatively right, we have to recognize
the further truth that in many cases where there is no
absolutely right course, but only courses that are more
or less wrong, it is not possible to say which is the least
wrong. Recurrence to the instances just given will
show this.

There is a point up to which it is relatively right for
a parent to cany self-sacrifice for the benefit of off-
spring, and there is a point beyond which self-sacrifice
cannol be pushed without bringing, not only on himself
or herself, but also on the family, evils greater than
those to be prevented by the self-sacrifice. Who shall
say where this point is? Depending on the constitutions
and needs of those concerned it is in no two cases the
same, and cannot be bjr any one more than guessed.
The trail as or short-comings of a servant vary

from the trivial to the grave, and the evils which dis-
charge may bring range through countless degrees from

AH SOLUTE AND RELATIVE ETHICS. 315

sliglit to serious. The penalty may be inflicted for a
very small offense, and then there is wrong done, or,
after numerous grave offenses, it may not be inflicted,
and again there is wrong done. How shall be deter-
mined the degree of transgression beyond which to
discharge is less wrong than not to discharge? In like
manner with the shopkeeper's misdemeanors. No one
can sum up either the amount of positive and negative
pain which tolerating them involves, nor the amount of
positive and negative pain involved by not tolerating
them, and in medium cases no one can say where the
one exceeds the other.

In men's wider relations frequently occur circum-
stances under which a decision one or other way is im-
perative, and yet under which not even the most sen-
sitive conscience, helped by the clearest judgment, can
decide which of the alternatives is relatively right. Two
examples will suffice.

Here is a merchant who loses by the failure of a man
indebted to him. Unless he gets help he himself will
fail, and if he fails he will bring disaster not only on his
family but on all who have given him credit. Even if
by borrowing he is enabled to meet immediate engage-
ments, he is not safe; for the time is one of panic, and
others of his debtors by going to the wall may put him
in further difficulties. Shall he ask a friend for a loan?
On the one hand, is it not wrong forthwith to bring on
himself, his family, and those who have business relations
with him, the evils of his failure ? On the other hand,
is it not wrong to hypothecate the property of his
friend, and lead him too, with his belongings and
dependants, into similar risks ? The loan would prob-
ably tide him over his difficulty, in which case would

316 THE DATA OF ETHICS.

it not be unjust to his creditors did lie refrain from
asking it? Contrariwise, the loan would very possibly
fail to stave off his bankruptcy, in which case is not his
action in frying to obtain it practically fraudulent?
Though, in extreme cases, it may be easy to say which
course is the least wrong, how is it possible in all those
medium cases where even by the keenest man of
business the contingencies cannot be calculated ?

Take, again, the difficulties that not unfrequently
arise from antagonism between family duties and social
duties. Here is a tenant farmer whose political prin-
ciples prompt him to vote in opposition to his landlord.
If, being a liberal, he votes for a conservative, not only
does he by his act say that he thinks what lie does not
think, but he may perhaps assist what he regards as bad
legislation : his vote may by chance turn the election,
and on a parliamentary division a single member may
decide the fate of a measure. Even neglecting, as too
improbable, such serious consequenees, there is the
manifest truth that if all who hold like views with him-
self are similarly deterred from electoral expression of
them, there must result a different balance of power and
a different national policy ; making it clear that only by
adherence of all to their political principles can the
policy he thinks right be maintained. But now, on the
other hand, how can he absolve himself from responsi-
bility for the evils which those dependingon him may
Buffer if he fulfills what appears to bea peremptory public
duty? Is not his duty to his children even more
peremptory? Does not the family precede the State;
and does not the welfare of the State depend on the
welfare of the family? May he, then, take a course
which, if the threats uttered are carried out, will eject

A P. sol. UTE . 1 YD RELA Tl VE ETHICS. 317

him from his farm; and so cause inability, perhaps
temporary, perhaps prolonged, to feed his children.
The contingent evils are infinitely varied in their ratios.
In one ease the imperativeness of the public duty is
great and the evil that may come on dependants small ;
in another case the political issue is of trivial moment
and the possible injury which the family may suffer is
great ; and between these extremes there are all grada-
tions. Further, the degreesof probability of each result,
public and private, range from the nearly certain to the
almost impossible. Admitting, then, that it is wrong to
act in a way likely to injure the State; and admitting
that it is wrong to act in a way likely to injure the
family, we have to recognize the fact that in countless
cases no one can decide by which of the alternative
courses the least wrong is likely to be done.

These instances will sufficiently show that in conduct
at large', including men's dealings with themselves, with
their families, with their friends, with their debtors and
creditors, and with the public, it usually happens that
whatever course is taken entails some pain somewhere ;
forming a deduction from the pleasure achieved, and
making the course in so far not absolutely right. Further,
they will show that throughout a considerable part of
conduct, no guiding principle, no method of estimation,
enables us to say whether a proposed course is even
relatively right; as causing, proximately and remotely,
specially and generally, the greatest surplus of good
over evil.

§ 104. And now we are prepared for dealing in a
systematic way with the distinction between Absolute
Ethics and Relative Ethics.

313 THE DATA OF ETUICS.

Scientific truths, of whatever order, are reached by
eliminating perturbing or conflicting factors, and rec-
ognizing only fundamental factors. When, by dealing
with fundamental factors in the abstract, not as pre-
sented in actual phenomena, but as presented in ideal
separation, general laws have been ascertained, it be-
comes possible to draw inferences in concrete cases by
taking into account incidental factors. But it is only
by first ignoring these and recognizing the essential
elements alone that we can discover the essential truths
sought. Take, in illustration, the progress of mechanics
from its empirical form to its rational form.

All have occasional experience of the fact that a
person pushed on one side beyond a certain degree
loses his balance and falls. It is observed that a stone
ih ing, or an arrow shot, does not proceed in a straight
line, but comes to the earth after pursuing a course
which deviates more and more from its original course.
When trying to break a stick across the knee, it is
found that success is easier if the stick is seized at
considerable distances from the knee on each side than
if seized close to the knee. Daily use of a spear draws
attention to the truth that by thrusting its point under
;i stone and depressing the shaft, the stone may be
raised the more readily the further away the hand is
toward the end. Here, then, are sundry experiences,
eventually grouped int.. empirical generalizations, which
to guide conduct in certain simple eases. How
mechanical science evolve from these experiences?
To reach a formula expressing the powers of the lever,
it -iij.j)!. er which does not;, like the stick, admit

(.f being bent, but is absolutely rigid, and it supposes a
rum not having a broad surface, like that of on«

ABSOLUTE AND RELATIVE ETHIC8. 319

Ordinarily used, but a fulcrum without breadth, and it
supposes that the weight to be raised bears on a definite
point, instead of bearing over a considerable portion
of the lever. Similarly with the leaning body, which,
passing a certain inclination, overbalances. Before the
truth respecting the relations of centre of gravity and base
can be formulated, it must be assumed that the surface
on which the body stands is unyielding, that the edge
of the body itself is unyielding, and that its mass, while
made to lean more and more, does not change its form —
conditions not fulfilled in the cases commonly observed.
And so, too, is it with the projectile : determination of
its course by deduction from mechanical laws, primarily
ignores all deviations caused by its shape and by the
resistance of the air. The science of rational mechanics
is a science which consists of such ideal truths, and can
come into existence only by thus dealing with ideal
cases. It remains impossible so long as attention is re-
stricted to concrete cases presenting all the complica-
tions of friction, plasticity and so forth.

But now, after disentangling certain fundamental
mechanical truths, it becomes possible by their help to
guide actions better, and it becomes possible to guide
them still better when, as presently happens, the com-
plicating elements from which they have been disen-
tangled are themselves taken into account. At an ad-
vanced stage the modifying effects of friction are allowed
for, and the inferences are qualified to the requisite ex-
tent. The theory of the pulley is corrected in its
application to actual cases by recognizing the rigidity of
cordage ; the effects of which are formulated. The
stabilities of masses, determinable in the abstract by
reference to the centres of gravity of the masses in re-

320 THE DATA OF ETHICS.

lation to the bases, come to be determined in the concrete
by including also their characters inrespect of cohesion.
The courses of projectiles, having been theoretically-
settled as though they moved through a vacuum, are
afterward settled in more exact correspondence with
fact by taking into account atmospheric resistance.

And thus we see illustrated the relation between
certain absolute truths of mechanical science, and cer-
tain relative truths which involve them. We are shown
that no scientific establishment of relative truths is
possible until the absolute truths have been formulated
independently. AVe see that mechanical science, fitted
for dealing with the real, can arise only after ideal
mechanical science has arisen.

All this holds of moral science. As by early and
rude experiences there were inductively reached, vague
but partially true notions respecting the overbalancing
of bodies, the motions of missiles, the actions of levers ;
so by early and rude experiences there were in-
ductively reached, vague but partially true notions
respecting the effects of men's behavior on themselves,
on one another, and on society : to a certain extent
serving in the last i ;ase, as in the first, for the guidance
of conduct. Moreover, as this rudimentary mechani-
cal knowledge, though still remaining empirical, be-
comes during early stages of civilization at once more
definite and more extensive; so during early stages
of civilization these ethical ideas, still retaining their
empirical character, increase in precision and multiplic-
ity. But just as we have seen that mechanical knowl-
edge of the empirical sort can evolve into mechanical
science only by first omitting all qualifying circum-
stances, and generalizing in absolute ways the funda-

A^SOijl fE A Xl> RELATIVE ETHICS. 321

mental laws of forces; so here we have to see that
empirical ethics can evolve into rational ethics only by
first neglecting all complicating incidents, and formulat-
ing the laws of right action apart from the obscuring
effects of special conditions. And the final implication
is that just as the system of mechanical truths, conceived
in ideal separation as absolute, becomes applicable to
real mechanical problems in such way that making
allowance for all incidental circumstances there can be
reached conclusions far nearer to the truth than could
otherwise be reached ; so a system of ideal ethical truths,
expressing the absolutely right, will be applicable to the
questions of our transitional state in such ways that,
allowing for the friction of an incomplete life and the
imperfection of existing natures, we may ascertain with
approximate correctness what is the relatively right.

§ 105. In a chapter entitled " Definition of Morality "
in facial Statics, 1 contended that the moral law, prop-
erly so-called, is the law of the perfect man — is the
formula of ideal conduct — is the statement in all cases of
that which should be, and cannot recognize in its prop-
ositions any elements implying existence of that which
should not be. Instancing questions concerning the
right course to be taken in cases where wrong has
already been done, I alleged that the answers to such
questions cannot be given " on purely ethical principles."
I argued that :

' No conclusions can lay claim to absolute truth, but such as
depend upon truths that are themselves absolute. Before there
can be exactness in an inference, there must be exactness in the
antecedent propositions. A geometrician requires that the straight
lines with which he deals shall be veritably straight ; and that his
circles, and ellipses, and parabolas shall agree with precise deftni •

til

322 THE DATA OF ETHICS.

ticns — shall perfectly ami invariably answer to specified equations.
If you put to him a question in which these conditions are not com-
plied with, he tells you that it cannot be answered. So likewise
is it with the philosophical moralist. He treats solely of , the straight
man. lie determines the properties of the straight man : describes
how the straight man comports himself ; shows in what relation-
ship he stands to other straight men ; shows how a community of
straight men is constituted. Any deviation from strict rectitude
he is obliged wholly to ignore. It cannot be admitted into his prem-
ises without vitiating all his conclusions. A problem in which a
crooked man forms one of the elements is insoluble to him."

Referring to this view, specifically in the first edition
of the Methods of Mhies, but more generally in the
second edition, Mr. Sidgwick says :

" Those who take this view adduce the analogy of Geometry to
show that Ethics ought to deal with ideally perfect human rela-
tions, just as Geometry treats of ideally perfect lines and circles.
But the most irregular line has definite spatial relations with which
Geometry does not refuse to deal : though of course they are more
complex than those of a straight line. So in Astronomy, it would
be more convenient for purposes of study if the stars moved in
circles, as was once believed ; but the fact that they move not in
circles but in ellipses, and even in imperfect and perturbed ellipses,
ot take them out of the sphere of scientific investigation: by
patience and industry we have learned how to reduce to principles
and calculate even these more complicated motions. It is, no
doubt, a convenient artifice for purposes of instruction to assume
thai the planets move in perfect ellipses (or even— at an earlier
Btage of study— in circles): we thus allow the individual's knowl-
edge to ],: ass through the same graftal ions in accuracy as that of

the race has done. But what we want, as astronomers, toknowis
the actual motion of the stars and its causes: and similarly as
moralists we naturally inquire what ought to be done in the actual
world in which we live." (P. 19, 2d. ed.)

Beginning with the first of these two statements,
winch concerns Geometry, I must confess myself sur-
| 1. to find my propositions called into question; and

AliSOL UTE AND U EL ATIVE ETHICS. 323

after full consideration I remain at a loss to under-
stand Mr. Sidgwick's mode of viewing the matter.
When, in a sentence preceding those quoted above, I
remarked on the impossibility of solving "mathemati-
cally a scries of problems respecting crooked lines and
broken-back curves," it never occurred to me that I
should be met by the direct assertion that " Geometry
does not refuse to deal " with " the most irregular
line." Mr. Sidgwick states that an irregular line, say
such as a child makes in scribbling, has " definite
spatial relations." What meaning does he here give
to the word " definite ? " If he means that its rela-
tions to spaee at large are definite in the sense that by
an infinite intelligence they would be definable, the
reply is that to an infinite intelligence all spatial rela-
tions would be definable ; there could be no indefinite
spatial relations — the word "definite" thus ceasing to
mark any distinction. If, on the other hand, when
saying that an irregular line has "definite spatial rela-
tions," he means relations knowable definitely by human
intelligence, there still comes the question, how is the
word " definite " to be understood ? Surely anything
distinguished as definite admits of being defined ; but
how can we define an irregular line? And if we cannot
define the irregular line itself, how can we know its
"•spatial relations" definite? And how, in the absence
of definition, can Geometry deal with it? If Mr.
Sidgwick means that it can be dealt with by the
" method of limits," then the reply is that in such case,
not the line itself is dealt with geometrically, hut certain
definite lines artificially put in quasi-definite relations
to it, the indefinite becomes cognizable only through the
medium of the hypothetically definite.

324 THE DATA OF ETHICS.

Turning to the second illustration, the rejoinder to
be made is that in so far as it concerns the relations
between the ideal and the real, the analog}'- drawn
does not shake but strengthens my argument. For
whether considered under its geometrical or under its
dynamical aspect, and whether considered in the nec-
essary order of its development or in the order histor-
ically displayed, Astronomy shows us throughout that
truths respecting simple, theoretically-exact relations,
must be ascertained before truths respecting the com-
plex and practically inexact relations that actually exist
can be ascertained. As applied to the interpretation of
planetary movements, we see that the theory of cycles
and epicycles was based on pre-existing knowledge of
the circle : the properties of an ideal curve having been
learned, a power was acquired of giving some expression
to the celestial motions. We see that the Copernican
interpretation expressed the facts in terms of circular
movements otherwise distributed and combined. We
see that Kepler's advance from the conception of circular
movements to the conception of elliptic movements was
made possible by comparing the facts as they are with
the facts as they would be were the movements circular.
We see that the subsequently-learned deviations from
elliptic movements were learned only through the pre-
supposition that the movements are elliptical. And we
see, lastly, that even now predictions concerning the
exact positions of planets, after taking account of per-
turbations, imply constant references to ellipses that are
regarded as their normal or average orbits for the time
being. Thus, ascertainment of the actual truths has been
made possible only by preascertainment of certain ideal
truths, To be convinced that by no other course could

ABSOLUTE AND RELATIVE ETHICS. 325

the actual truths have been ascertained, it needs only to
suppose any one saying that it did not concern him, as
an astronomer, to know anything about the properties
of circles and ellipses, but that he had to deal with the
Solar System as it exists, to which end it was his busi-
ness to observe and tabulate positions and directions
and to be guided by the facts as he found them.

So, too, is it if we look at the development of dynam-
ical astronomy. The first proposition in Newton's
Principia deals with the movement of a single body
round a single centre of force ; and the phenomena of
central motion are first formulated in a case which is
not simply ideal, but in which there is no specification
of the force concerned: detachment from the real is
the greatest possible. Again, postulating a principle of
action conforming to an ideal law, the theory of gravita-
tion deals with the several problems of the Solar System in
fictitious detachment from the rest ; and it makes certain
fictitious assumptions, such as that the mass of each
body concerned is concentrated in its centre of gravity.
Only later, after establishing the leading truths by
this artifice of disentangling the major factors from the
minor factors, is the theory applied to the actual prob-
lems in their ascending degrees of complexity ; taking
in more and more of the minor factors. And if we ask
whether the dynamics of the Solar System could have
been established in any other way, we see that here, too,
simple truths holding under ideal conditions, have to be
ascertained before real truths existing under complex
conditions can be ascertained.

The alleged necessary precedence of Absolute Ethics
over Relative Ethics is thus, I think, further elucidated.
One who has followed the general argument thus far,

326 THE DATA OF ETHICS.

will not deny that an ideal social being may be con-
ceived as so constituted that his spontaneous activities
are congruous with the conditions imposed by the
social environment formed by other such beings. In
many places, and in various ways, I have argued that
conformably with the laws of evolution in general, and
conformably with the laws of organization in particular,
there has been, and is, in progress, an adaptation of
humanity to the social state, changing it in the direc-
tion of such an ideal congruity. And the corollary
before drawn and here repeated, is that the ultimate
man is one in whom this process has gone so far as to
produce a correspondence between all the promptings
of his nature and all the requirements of his life as
carried on in society. If so it is a necessary implica-
tion that there exists an ideal code of conduct formu-
lating the behavior of the completely adapted man in
the completely evolved society. Such a code is that
here called Absolute Ethics as distinguished from Rela-
tive Ethics — a code the injunctions of which are alone
to be considered as absolutely right in contrast with
those that are relatively right or least wrong; and
which, as a system of ideal conduct, is to serve as a
standard for our guidance in solving, as well as we can,
the problems of real conduct.

§ 10.",. A clear conception of this matter is so impor-
tant thai I must he excused for bringing in aid of it a
further illustration, more obviously appropriate as being
furnished by organic science instead of by inorganic
science. The relatioD between morality proper and
morality, as commonly conceived, is analogous to the
relation between physiology and pathology ; and the

ABSOLUTE AND RELATIVE ETUTCS. 327

course usually pursued by moralists is much like tbe
course of one who studies pathology without Tjrevious
study of physiology,

Physiology describes the various functions which, as
combined, constitute and maintain life; and in treating
of them it assumes that they arc severally performed in
right ways, in due amounts, and in proper order ; it rec-
ognizes only healthy functions. If it explains diges-
tion, it supposes that the heart is supplying blood and
that the visceral nervous system is stimulating the
organs immediately concerned. If it gives a theory of
the circulation, it assumes that blood has been produced
by the combined actions of the structures devoted to its
production, and that it is properly aerated. If the re-
lations between respiration and the vital processes at
large are interpreted, it is on the presupposition that
the heart goes on sending blood, not only to the lungs
and to certain nervous centres, but to the diaphragm
and intercostal muscles. Physiology ignores failures in
the actions of these several organs. It takes no account
of imperfections, it neglects derangements, it does not
recognize pain, it knows nothing of vital wrong. It
simply formulates that which goes on as a result of com-
plete adaptation of all parts to all needs. That is to
say, in relation to the inner actions constituting bodily
life, physiological theory has a position like that which
ethical theory, under its absolute form as above con-
ceived, has to the outer actions constituting conduct.
The moment cognizance is taken of excess of function,
or arrest of function, or defect of function, with the
resulting evil, physiology passes into pathology. We
begin now to take account of wrong actions in the inner

328 THE DATA OF ETHICS.

life analogous to the wrong actions in the outer life
taken account of by ordinary theories of morals.

The antithesis thus drawn, however, is but prelimi-
nary. After observing the fact that there is a science
of vital actions normally carried on, which ignores
abnormal actions, we have more especially to observe
that the science of abnormal actions can reach such
defmiteness as is possible to it only on condition that
the science of normal actions has previously become
definite ; or rather, let us say that pathological science
depends for its advances on previous advances made
by physiological science. The very conception of dis-
ordered action implies a preconception of well-ordered
action. Before it can be decided that the heart is
beating faster or slower than it should, its healthy rate
of beating must be learned ; before the pulse can be
recognized as too weak or too strong, its proper
strength must be known, and so throughout. Even
the rudest and most empirical ideas of diseases pre-
suppose ideas of the healthy states from which they
are deviations, and, obviously, the diagnosis of diseases
can become scientific only as fast as there arises
scientific knowledge of organic actions that are un-
diseased.

Similarly, then, is it with the relation between abso-
lute morality, or the law of perfect right in human
conduct, and relative morality which, recognizing
wrong in human conduct, lias to decide in what way
the wrong deviates from the right, and how the right is
to be most nearly approached. When, formulating
normal conduct in an ideal society, we have reached a
■cience of absolute ethics, we have simultaneously
reached a science which, when used to interpret the

ABSOLUTE AND RELATIVE ETHICS. 32f+

phenomena of real societies in their transitional states,
full of the miseries due to non-adaptation (which we
may call pathological states) enables us to form approxi-
mately true conclusions respecting the natures of the
abnormalities, and the courses which tend most in the
direction of the normal.

§ 106. And now let it be observed that the concep-
tion of ethics thus set forth, strange as many wTill think
it, is one which really lies latent in the beliefs of moral-
ists at large. Though not definitely acknowledged it
is vaguely implied in many of their propositions.

From early times downward we find in ethical specu-
lations, references to the ideal man, his acts, his feelings,
his judgments. Well-doing is conceived by Socrates
as the doing of " the best man," who, " as a husband-
man, performs well the duties of husbandry; as a
surgeon, the duties of the medical art ; in political life,
his duty toward the commonwealth." Plato, in Minos,
as a standard to which State law should conform, " postu-
lates the decision of some ideal wise man," and in
Laches the wise man's knowledge of good and evil is
supposed to furnish the standard: disregarding v- the
maxims of the existing society "as unscientific, Plato re-
gards as the proper guide, that " Idea of the Good which
only a philosopher can ascend to." Aristotle (EtJi. Bk.
iii. ch. 4), making the decisions of the good man the
standard, says : " For the good man judges everything
rightly, and in every case the truth appears so to him.
. . . And, perhaps, the principal difference between
the good and the bad man is that the good man sees the
truth in every case, since he is, as it were, the rule and
measure of it." The Stoics, too, conceived of " coin-

THE DA TA OF ETHICS.

plete rectitude of action" as that "which none could
achieve except the wise man" — the ideal man. And
Epicurus had an ideal standard. He held the virtuous
to 1 a tranquil, undisturbed, innocuous, non-
competitive fruition, which approached most nearly to
the perfect happiness of the gods," who " neither suffered
vexation in themselves nor caused vexation to others." *

If, in modern times, influenced by theological dogmas
concerning the fall and human sinfulness, and by a
theory of obligation derived from the current creed,
moralists have less frequently referred to an ideal, yet
references are traceable. We see one in the dictum of
Kant — " Act according to the maxim only, which you
can wish, at the same time, to become a universal law."
For this implies the thought of a society in which the
maxim is acted upon by all and universal benefit recog-
nized as the effect: there is a conception of ideal con-
duet under ideal conditions. And though Mr. Sidgwick,
in the quotation above made from him, implies that
Ethics is concerned with man as he is, rather than with
man as lie should he: yet, in elsewhere speaking of
Ethics as dealing with conduct as it should he, rather
than with conduct as it is, he postulates ideal conduct
and indirectly the ideal man. On his first page, speak-
ing of Ethics along with Jurisprudence and Polities, he
that they are distinguished " by the characteristic
that they attempt to determine not the actual but the
ideal — what ought to exist, not what does exist."

I' i only that these various conceptions of an

ideal conduct, and of an ideal humanity, should be
made consistent and definite, to bring them into agree-

* Most of these quotations I make from Dr. Bain's Mental and
Moral Science.

ABSOLUTE AND RELATIVE ETTIICS. 331

ment with the conception above set forth. At pr<
such conceptions are habitually vague. The ideal man
having been conceived in terms of the current morality,
is thereupon erected into a moral standard by which the
goodness of actions may he judged; and the reasoning
becomes circular. To make the ideal man serve as ;i
standard, he has to he defined in terms of the conditions
which his nature fulfills — in terms of those objective
requirements which must be met before conduct can be
right ; and the common defect of these conceptions of
the ideal man is that they suppose him out of relation
to such conditions.

All the above references to him, direct or indirect,
imply that the ideal man is supposed to live and act
under existing social conditions. The tacit inquiry is,
not what his actions would be under circumstances
altogether changed, but what they would be under pres-
ent circumstances. And this inquiry is futile for two
reasons. The co-existence of a perfect man and an im-
perfect society is impossible ; and could the two co-exist,
the resulting conduct would not furnish the ethical
standard sought.

In the fust place, given the laws of life as they are,
and a man of ideal nature cannot be produced in a
society consisting of men having natures remote from
the ideal. As well might we expect a child of English
type to be born among Negroes, as expeel that among
the organically immoral, one who is organically moral
Avill arise. Unless it be denied that character results
from inherited structure, it must be admitted that since,
in any society, each individual descends from a stock
which, traced back a few generations, ramifies every-
where through the society, and participates in its aver*

332 THE DATA OF ETHICS.

age nature, there must, notwithstanding marked in-
dividual diversities, be preserved such community as
prevents any one from reaching an ideal form while the
rest remain far below it.

In the second place, ideal conduct such as ethical
theory is concerned with, is not possible for the ideal
man in the midst of men otherwise constituted. An
absolutely just or perfectly sympathetic person, could
not live and act according to his nature in a tribe of
cannibals. Among people who are treacherous and
utterly without scruple, entire truthfulness and open-
ness must bring ruin. If all around recognize only the
law of the strongest, one whose nature will not allow
him to inflict pain on others must go to the wall. There
requires a certain congruity between the conduct of each
member of a society and other's conduct. A mode of
action entirely alien to the prevailing modes of action
cannot be successfully persisted in — must eventuate in
death of self, or posterity, or both.

Hence it is manifest that we must consider the ideal
man as existing in the ideal social state. On the evo-
lution hypothesis, the two presuppose one another;
and only when they co-exist can there exist that ideal
conduct which Absolute Ethics has to formulate, and
which Relative Ethics has to take as the standard by
which to estimate divergencies from right, or degreea
of wrong.

THE SCOPE OF ETIIICH. 333

CHAPTER XVI.

THE SCOPE OF ETHICS.

§ 107. At the outset it was shown that as the con-
duct with which Ethics deals is a part of conduct at
large, conduct at large must be understood before this
part can be understood. After taking a general view
of conduct, not human only but sub-human, and not only
as existing but as evolving, we saw that Ethics has for
its subject-matter the most highly-evolved conduct as
displayed by the most highly-evolved being, Man — is a
specification of those traits which his conduct assumes
on reaching its limit of evolution. Conceived thus as
comprehending the laws of right living at large, Ethics
has a wider field than is commonly assigned to it. Be-
yond the conduct commonly approved or reprobated as
right or wrong, it includes all conduct which furthers
or hinders, in either direct or indirect ways, the welfare
of self or others.

As foregoing chapters in various places imply, the
entire field of Ethics includes the two great divisions,
personal and social. There is a class of actions directed
to personal ends, which are to be judged in their rela-
tions to personal well-being, considered apart from the
well-being of others: though they secondarily affect
fellow-men these primarily affect the agent himself,
an4 must be classed as intrinsically right or wrong

THE DATA OF ETHICS.

according to their beneficial or detrimental effects on
him. There are actions of another class which affect
fellow-men immediately and remotely, and which,
though their results to self are not to be ignored, must
be judged as good or bad mainly by their results to
others. Actions of this last class fall into two groups.
Those of the one group achieve ends in ways that do or
do not unduly interfere with the pursuit of ends by
others — actions which, because of this difference, we
call respectively unjust or just. Those forming the
oilier group are of a kind which influence the states of
others without directly interfering with the relations
between their labors and the results, in one way or the
other — actions which we speak of as beneficent or mal-
eficent. And the conduct which we regard as beneficent
is itself subdivisible according as it shows us a self-re-
lod to avoid giving pain, or an expenditure of effort
to give pleasure — negative beneficence and positive
beneficence.

Bach of these divisions and subdivisions has to be
considered first as a part of Absolute Ethics and then
as a part of Relative Ethics-. Having seen what its in-
junctions must be for the ideal man under the implied
ideal conditions, we shall be prepared to see how such
injunctions are to be most nearly fulfilled by actual men
under existing conditions.

§ 108. For reasons already pointed out, a code of
perfect personal conduct can never be made definite.
Many forms of life-, diverging from one another in con-
siderable . may be so carried on in society as
entirely to fulfill the conditions to harmonious co-oper-
ation. Aiid if various types of men, adapted to various

THE SCOPE OF ETHICS. 335

types of activities, may thus lead Lives that are severally
complete after their kinds, no specific statement of the
activities universally required for personal well-being is
possible.

But, though the particular requirements to be ful-
filled for perfect individual well-being must vary along
with variations in the material conditions of each society,
certain general requirements have to be fulfilled by the
individuals of all societies. An average balance be-
tween waste and nutrition has universally to be pre-
served. Normal vitality implies a relation between
activity and rest falling within moderate limits of vari-
ation. Continuance of the society depends on satisfac-
tion of those primarily personal needs which result in
marriage and parenthood. Perfection of individual life
hence implies certain modes of action which are approxi-
mately alike in all eases, and which, therefore, become
part of the subject matter of Ethics.

That it is possible to reduce even this restricted part to
scientific definiteness, can scarcely be said. But ethical
requirements may here be to such extent affiliated upon
physical necessities, as to give them a partially scientific
authority. It is clear that between the expenditure of
bodily substance in vital activities, and the taking in of
materials from which this substance may be renewed,
there is a direct relation. It is clear, too, that there is
a direct relation between the wasting of tissue by
effort, and the need for those cessations of effort
during which repair may overtake waste. Nor is it less
clear that between the rate of mortality and the rate of
multiplication in any society, there is a relation such
that the last must reach a certain level before it can
balance the first, and prevent disappearance of the

836 THE DATA OF ETHICS.

society. And it may be inferred that pursuits of other
leading ends are, in like manner, determined by certain
natural necessities, and from these derive their ethical
sanctions. That it will ever be practicable to lay down
precise rules for private conduct in conformity with
such requirements, may be doubted. But the function
of Absolute Ethics in relation to private conduct will
have been discharged when it has produced the warrant
for its requirements as generally expressed ; when it
has shown the imperativeness of obedience to them ;
and when it has thus taught the need for deliberately
considering whether the conduct fulfills them as well
may be.

Under the ethics of personal considered in relation to
existing conditions, have to come all questions concern-
ing the degree in which immediate personal welfare
has to be postponed, either to ultimate personal welfare
or to the welfare of others. As now carried on, life
hourly sets the claims of present self against the claims
of future self, and hourly brings individual interests
face, to face with the interests of other individuals,
taken singly or as associated. In many of such cases
the decisions can be nothing more than compromises ;
and ethical science, here necessarily empirical, can do
no more than aid in making compromises that are the
least objectionable. To arrive at the best compromise
in any case, implies correct conceptions of the alterna-
tive results of this or that course. And, consequently,
in so f;ir as the absolute ethics of individual conduct
can be made definite, it must help us to decide between
conflicting personal requirements, and also between the
needs for asserting self and the needs for subordinating
»elf.

THE SCOPE OF ETniCS. 337

§ 100. From that division of Ethics which deals with
the right regulation of private conduct, considered
apart from the effects directly produced on others,
we pass now to that division of Ethics which, consider-
ing exclusively the effects of conduct on others, treats
of the right regulation of it with a view to such effects.

The first set of regulations coming under this head
are those concerning what we distinguish as justice.
Individual life is possible only on condition that each
organ is paid for its action by an equivalent of blood,
while the organism as a whole obtains from the envi-
ronment assimilable matters that compensate for its
efforts; and the mutual dependence of parts in the
social organism necessitates that, alike for its total life
and the lives of its units, there similarly shall be main-
tained a due proportion between returns and labors:
the natural relation between work and welfare shall be
preserved intact. Justice, which formulates the range
of conduct and limitations to conduct hence arising, is
at once the most important division of Ethics and the
division which admits of the greatest defmiteness.
That principle of equivalence which meets us when
we seek its roots in the laws of individual life, involves
the idea of measure; and on passing to social life, the
same principle introduces us to the conception of
equity or equalness, in the relations of citizens to one
another: the elements of the questions arising are
quantitative, and hence the solutions assume a more
scientific form. Though, having to recognize differ-
ences among individuals due to age, sex, or other
cause, we cannot regard the members of a society as
absolutely equal, and therefore cannot deal with

problems growing out of their relations with that
22

33 8 THE HA TA OF ETHICS.

precision which absolute equality might make possi-
ble: yet, considering them as approximately equal in
virtue of their common human nature, and dealing
with <[ nest ions of equity on this supposition, we may
reach conclusions of a sufficiently definite kind.

This division of Ethics, considered under its absolute
form, has to define the equitable relations among
perfect individuals who limit one another's spheres of
action by co-existing, and who achieve their ends by
co-operation. It has to do much more than this. Be-
yond justice between man and man, justice between
each man and the aggregate of men has to be dealt
with by it. The relations between the individual and
the State, considered as representing all individuals,
have to be deduced — an important and a relatively
difficult matter. What is the ethical warrant for gov-
ernmental authority ? To what ends may it be legiti-
mately exercised ? How far may it rightly be carried ?
Up to what point is the citizen bound to recognize the
collective decisions of other citizens, and beyond what
point may he properly refuse to obey them ?

These relations, private and public, considered as
maintained under ideal conditions, having been formu-
lated, there come to be dealt with the analogous rela-
tions under real conditions — absolute justice being the
standard, relative justice has to be determined by con-
sidering how near an approach may, under present
circumstances, be made to it. As already implied in
various places, it is impossible during stages of transi-
tion which necessitate ever changing compromises, to
fulfill the dictates of absolute equity ; and nothing
beyond empirical judgments can be formed of the
extent to which they m;iy be, at any given time, ful-

TIIE SCOPE OF ETHICS. 339

filled. "While war continues and injustice is done
between societies, there cannot be anything like com-
plete justice within each society. Militant organization,
no less than militant action, is irreconcilable with pure
equity ; and the inequity implied by it inevitably
ramifies throughout all social relations. But there is
at every stage in social evolution a certain range of
variation within which it is possible to approach
nearer to, or diverge further from, the requirements
of absolute equity. Hence these requirements have
ever to be kept in view that relative equity may be
ascertained.

§ 110. Of the two subdivisions into which benefi-
cence falls, the negative and the positive, neither can
be specialized. Under ideal conditions the first of
them has but a nominal existence; and the second of
them passes largely into a transfigured form admitting
of but general definition.

In the conduct of the ideal man among ideal men,
that self-regulation which lias for its motive to avoid
giving pain, practically disappears. No one having
feelings which prompt acts that disagreeably affect
others, there can exist no code of restraints referring to
this division of conduct.

But though negative beneficence is only a nominal
part of Absolute Ethics, it is an actual and considerable
part of Relative Ethics. For while men's natures
remain imperfectly adapted to social life, there must
continue in them impulses which, causing in some
cases the actions we name unjust, cause in other cases
the actions we name unkind — unkind now in deed and
now in word; and in respect of these modes of be-

340 THE DATA OF ETHICS.

havior which, though not aggressive, give pain, there
arise numerous and complicated problems. Pain is
sometimes given to others simply by maintaining an
equitable claim ; pain is at other times given by refus-
ing a request ; and again at other times by maintain-
ing an opinion. In these and numerous cases sug-
gested by them, there have to be answered the
questions whether, to avoid inflicting pain, personal
feelings should be sacrificed, and how far sacrificed.
Again, in cases of another class, pain is given not by
a passive course, but by an active course. How far
shall a person who has misbehaved be grieved by
showing aversion to him ? Shall one whose action is
to be reprobated have the reprobation expressed to
him or shall nothing be said ? Is it right to annoy by
condemning a prejudice which another displays ?
These and kindred queries have to be answered after
taking into account the immediate pain given, the
possible benefit caused by giving it, and the possible
evil caused by not giving it. In solving problems of
this class, the only help Absolute Ethics gives is by
enforcing the consideration that inflicting more pain
than is necessitated by proper self-regard, or by desire
for another's benefit, or by the maintenance of a
general principle, is unwarranted.

Of positive beneficence under its absolute form
nothing more specific can be said than that it must
become co-extensive with whatever sphere remains for
it ; aiding to complete the life of each as a recipient
of services and to exalt the life of each as a Tenderer
of services. As with a developed humanity the desire
for it by every one will so increase, and the sphere for
exercise of it so decrease, as to involve an altruistic

THE SCOPE OF ETHICS. 341

competition, analogous to the existing egoistic competi-
tion, it may be that Absolute Ethics will eventually
include what we before called a higher equity, prescrib-
ing the mutual limitations of altruistic activities.

Under its relative form, positive beneficence presents
numerous problems, alike important and difficult,
admitting only of empirical solutions. How far is self-
sacrifice for another's benefit to be carried in each
case ? — a question which must be answered differently
according to the character of the other, the needs of the
other, and the various claims of self and belongings
which have to be met. To what extent under given
circumstances shall private welfare be subordinated to
public welfare ? — a question to be answered after con-
sidering the importance of the end and the seriousness
of the sacrifice. What benefit and what detriment will
result from gratuitous aid yielded to another ? — a ques-
tion in each case implying an estimate of probabilities.
Is there any unfair treatment of sundry others., involved
by more than fair treatment of this one other ? Up to
what limit may help be given to the existing generation
of the inferior, without entailing mischief on future
generations of the superior ? Evidently to these and
many kindred questions included in this division of
Relative Ethics, approximately true answers only can
be given.

But though here Absolute Ethics, by the standard it
supplies, does not greatly aid Relative Ethics, yet, as in
other cases, it aids somewhat by keeping before con-
sciousness an ideal conciliation of the various claims in-
Tolved; and by suggesting the search for such com-
promise among them, as shall not disregard any, but
shall satisfy all to the greatest extent practicable.

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A tale of South America.

37 ST. GEORGE FOR ENGLAND,

A tale of Croissey and Poitiers.

28 THROUGH THE FRAY,

A story of the Luddite Riots.

39 TRUE TO THE OLD FLAG,

A tale of the American War of Independence.

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Les niserables.

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Shakespeare's
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SHAKESPEARE'S PLAYS.

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All's Well that

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Twelfth Night.

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Cymbeliue.

King Henry VIII.

Romeo and Juliet.

Julius C'es.ir.

Macbeth.

As You Like It.

Hamlet.
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Much Ado

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Venice.

King John.

King Henry V.

King Richard II.

The Comedy of Errors

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»BT Archdeacon Farrajl

Ho. Titlb.

I Eric, or Little by Little. A Tale «f Roslyn School.

a Julian Home. A Tale of College Life.

3 St. Winifred's, or The World of School.

Bx Thomas IIxtohes.

4 Tom Brown's School Days at Rugby.

5 Tom Brown at Oxford.

•These stories of school life by the famous author or the "Life of
ChriHt" are not surpassed Id Interest and high moral tone by any boys*
Itories written. They picture in an eloquent and exceedingly fasclnatiag
Planner life at school, Its temptations, struggles, and rewards.

Published by JJONOHUE BROS.,

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HENTY SERIES.

new Edition, Beautifully Bound in Extra Cloth, wit*
New Design. Illustrated. $0.75.

BY G. A. HENTY.

*. A. r imal Reckoning : A Tale of Bush Life in Austfall*.

• All boys will read this story with eager and unflagging interest
The episodes are in Mr. Henty's best vein, graphic, exciting, rea-
listic."— Birmingham Post.

«t Boy Knight, The : A Tale of the Crusade.

"What boy will not wish to read about Richard the Lion-HeartedF*

3. Bonnie Prince Charlie : A Tale of Fontenoy and Culloden.

" For freshness of treatment and variety of incident, Mr. Hentjr
has here surpassed himself." — Spectator.

4. Bravest of the Brave, or With Peterborough in Spain.

"Mr. Henty never loses sight of the moral purpose of his work,
to enforce the doctrine of loving-kindness and mercy, courage and
truth." — Daily Telegraph.

5. By England's Aid, or The Freeing of the Netherlands

(1585-1604).
"Told with great animation. The historical material is most
effectively combined with a most excellent plot" — Saturday Review.

6. By Pike and Dyke: A Tale of the Rise of the Dutch Re-

public.
" Told with vividness and skill." — Academy.

7. By Right of Conquest, or With Cortez in Mexico.

" The nearest approach tc a perfectly successful historical tale
that Mr. Henty has yet written." — Academy.

8. By Sheer Pluck : A Tale of the Ashantee War.

" Setting before the boys a bright and bracing ideal.'*— ChrtiHmm
Leader. 1

HENTY SERIES.

9. Cat of Bubastes : A Story of Ancient Egypt.

" Skilfully constructed and full of exciting adventures. — Satur.
any Review.

10. Cornet of Horse.

n. Captain Bayley's Heir : A Tale of the Gold-fields of Cali-
fornia.

"Just the book a healthy and intelligent lad should delight in. *
— Standard.

13. Dragon and the Raven, The, or The Days of King

Alfred.
"A story which may be justly styled remarkable."— Schoolmaster.

13. Facing Death : A Tale of the Coal Mines.

"This is the book we would recommend for any bo\ worth his
salt. — Standard.

14. Friends, Though Divided : A Tale of the Civil War in

.England.

15. For Name and Fame, or Through Afghan Passes.

"A rousing story, replete with all the varied forms of excitement
of a campaign." — Glasgow Herald.

16. For the Temple : A Tale of the Fall of Jerusalem.

" One of Mr. Henty's cleverest efforts." — Graphic.

17. In Freedom's Cause: A Story of Wallace and Bruce.

" Full of stirring action." — Athenccum.

18. In Times of Peril : A Tale of India.

19. In the Reign of Terror: The Advent ares of a West-

minster Boy.
" Will delight boys : one of Mr. Henty's best" — Saturday Review.

20. Jack Archer : A Tale of the Crimea.

ar. Lion of the North, The: A Tale of Gustavus Adolphus and
the Wars of Religion.
" Pictures the great deeds of the Scotch Brigade."— Athenccum.

aa. Lion of St. Mark, The : A Tale of Venice in the Four-
teenth Century.

"Mr. Henry has never produced a story more delightful whole-
some or vivacious." — Saturday Review.

23. Maori and Settler : A Story of the New Zealand War,

" A book which all young people, especially boys, will read wicb
avidity." — Alhenawii. „

HENTY SERIES.

•4. Orange and Green : A Tale of the Boyne and the Limerick.
" Should be in the hands of every young s'.udent of Irish history.*
—Belfast Ac u &

25. One of the 28th: A Tale of Waterloo.
" Graphic, picturesque and dramatically t
Henty at his best and brightest." — Observer.

" Graphic, picturesque and dramatically effective. Shows us Mr
at his be

26. Out On the Pampas : A Tale of South America.

"Bright, interesting and instructive."

27. St. George for England: A Tale of Cressy and Poitiers.

" A story of very great interest for boys."— Pall Mall Gazette.

28. Through the Fray : A Story of the Luddite Riots.

"One of the best of the many good books Mr. Henty has pro-
duced."

29. True to the Old Flag: A Tale of the American War ot

Independence.
"Mr. Henty undoubtedly possesses the secret of writing sue
cessful historical tales." — The Times.

30. Under Drake's Flag: A Tale of the Spanish Main.

"There is not a dull chapter, nor indeed a dull page, in the book"
— Observer.

•£., With Clive in India, or The Beginning of an Empire.
"Among writers of stories of adventure, Mr. Henty stands in the
very front rank." — Academy.

32. With I,ee in Virginia: A Story of the American Civil

War.
"Capital and full of variety, and presents us with many scenes ot
Southern life.' —Times.

33. With Wolfe in Canada, or The Winning of a Con-

tinent.
■ A model of what a boy's book shoula ^,e.* — School Guardian

34. Young Carthaginian, The : A Story of the Times of

Hannibal.

" From first tr last nothing stays the interest of the narrative' —
Saturday Review.

35. Young Buglers : A Tale of the reninsular War.

36. Young Franc-Tireurs : A Tale of the Franco Prussian

War.

37. Young Colonists, The.

A Glance Tirol! the Bond to Win Series for Boys.

BOUND TO BE AN ELECTRICIAN; or, Franklin Bell's Suc-
cess. By Edward Stratka»ykr.

Although Mr. Stratemeyer has penned many books for
boys, he has turned out nothing better than this tale of the
doings of a manly young fellow who was bound to become
an electrician. Franklin Bell starts out under many diffi-
culties. He is poor and has no friends to assist him in
advancing himself. But a showing of what pluck can do
at a most perilous moment gains for him the opening he
geeks, and from that time ort his advancement is steady.
From the east he is sent to Chicago by his employer, where
he experiences several remarkable adventures on Lake
Michigan, and clears up a business complication involving
a large sum of money. His enemies endeavor to capture
him, and what Franklin does when confronted makes such
reading as no wide-awake boy would care to miss.

THE SCHOOLDAYS OF FEED HABLEY- or Blvals for A1K

Honors. By Arthub M. ^Witivjvld.

A bright, lively, and thoroughly up-to-date American
school story :s this account of the doings of Fred Harley
and his chums at the Maplewood school. Never was there
a more popular fellow than Fred, whether on the ball field,
in the schoolroom or on the river, and the manner in which
he turns upon his enemies, and saves them from grave
perils, teaches a lesson not easily forgotten. The boye
from a rivnl school are also introduced, and the pranks and
plots on both sides are both comical and thrilling, while
the boat-house secret is one which is sure to awaken deep
interest. Every youth who reads this book will wiafc l&
knew Fred Uarley and could shake iuaa by the &sa&

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA LIBRARY

Los Angeles
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