NATHAN FENBY
DEALING
WITH THE
DRAGON
A YEAR IN THE
NEW HONG KONG
Also by Jonathan Fenby
ON THE BRINK: THE TROUBLE WITH FRANCE
THE INTERNATIONAL NEWS SERVICES
PIRACY AND THE PUBLIC
THE FALL OF THE HOUSE OF BEAVERBROOK
DEALING
WITH THE
DRAGON
A Year in the
New Hong Kong
JONATHAN FENBY
-Ho
1 Spadina Crescent, Rm. Ill* Ibronto, Canada • M5S 1A1
LlTTLE, Brown and Company
A Little, Brown Book
First published in Great Britain in 2000
by Little, Brown & Company
Copyright © 2000 by Jonathan Fenby
PICTURE CREDITS
1: Ming/ South China Morning Post;
2, 6, 7, 8, 9, 12, 14, 15: Popperfoto/Reuters;
3, 4, 5, 10, 11, 16: AFP; 17: SCMP
The moral right of the author has been asserted.
All rights reserved.
No part of this publication may be reproduced,
stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted,
in any form or by any means, without the prior
permission in writing of the publisher, nor be
otherwise circulated in any form of binding or cover
other than that in which it is published and without
a similar condition including this condition being
imposed on the subsequent purchaser.
A CIP catalogue record for this book
is available from the British Library.
ISBN: 0 316 85415 8
Maps by Neil Hyslop
Typeset in Bembo by M Rules
Printed and bound in Great Britain by
Clays Ltd, St Ives pic
Little, Brown & Company (UK)
Brettenham House
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To Renee
Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2010 with funding from
Multicultural Canada; University of Toronto Libraries
http://www.archive.org/details/dealingwithdragoOOfenb
GuewqzJiou
'Macau HohSKom9
South China Sea
Note
At the time of writing, currency conversion rates were as follows:
£i = HK$i2.50
US$i = HK$7.78
Hong Kong
T
his is the story of a year in the life of a unique place, long known
for its material superlatives but now also the scene of an unparal-
leled political experiment. It also happens to be the last year of a
century in which Hong Kong grew from being a small, unconsidered
fragment of the predominant empire on the planet to a treasure house
whose wealth was proportionately greater than that of the colonial
master on the other side of the globe. More recently, it has undergone
a unique passage from being the final major possession of a liberal
democracy to becoming the freest city in the last major power ruled by
a Communist party. A meeting place of East and West at the crossroads
of the twenty-first century, this territory of only a thousand square
kilometres and 6.8 million people has a gross domestic product of
US$175 billion and the world's fourth largest foreign exchange reserves.
An accident of history and geography, it has become a theatre for
major questions of our times, not in theory but in everyday life.
Since British rule ceased at midnight on 30 June 1997, the Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region (SAR) of the Peoples Republic of
China has been the most advanced and richest city in the biggest devel-
oping nation on earth. As it boomed in the 1980s and 1990s on the
back of the opening-up of mainland China, what had once been dis-
missed as a rocky outcrop of little interest to Victorian empire-builders
attracted international companies in their thousands to make it one of
2 Dealing Wiih the Dragon
the great cosmopolitan metropolises. Apart from its 95 per cent Chinese
population and its own dealings with the mainland, it has long been the
unofficial capital of the diaspora of 100 million overseas Chinese, who
see Hong Kong as a safe haven for their money and as a gateway to the
mother country. Going in the other direction, it has been the main
conduit for funds coming out of China, legally or illegally, some
destined for licit investment, others moving through clandestine chan-
nels; and for spectacular criminals moving to and from the mainland.
Coming out of a long and deep slump, the SAR still has more bil-
lionaires than its former sovereign. Even in the depths of recession,
the best-known tycoon, Li Ka-shing, whose empire stretches from
property and container ports to supermarkets and mobile telephones,
took tenth place in the listing of the world's mega-rich by Forbes
magazine. Income tax is a flat 15 per cent, and only a quarter of the
population pays it. The wealthy are further comforted by the absence
of tax on dividends or capital gains. 'Here, the money we make, we
keep,' as the owner of a big Chinese herbal pill business puts it.
When it changed sovereign powers in 1997, Hong Kong made up 20
per cent of China's wealth, with 0.5 per cent of the mainland's pop-
ulation. The head of its government earns HK$287,i4i (-£23,000) a
month - more than his counterparts in the US, Britain or Japan. His
number two, the Chief Secretary for Administration, who heads the
civil service, is paid HK$229,7i3 a month, and the Financial
Secretary, the equivalent of the Chancellor of the Exchequer,
HK$2i7,i49. Dwarfing their pay, the golf-champion boss of the cen-
tral bank gets eight times as much as the chairman of the US Federal
Reserve Board. Leading barristers can pull in 45 per cent more than
their London counterparts. In the 1997 bull market, the stock
exchange was the sixth biggest in the world, and membership deben-
tures at the main golf club cost £1 million.
Despite a poor construction safety record, pollution, and bureau-
cratic blunders such as paying China the equivalent of £130 million a
year for water which overflows into the sea, Hong Kong is generally
a model of urban development. It has a superb infrastructure and a
spectacular new airport, reached over the world's longest two-level
suspension bridge to the mountainous island of Lantau. The harbour,
Hong Kong . . . 3
which has ranked as the world's most used container terminal in all
but three of the last twelve years, is a constantly shifting pattern of
slow ferries and fast ferries, jet foils, tugs and container barges, cargo
ships, rusting liners that ply up the China coast, sampans, powerboats
and yachts, cruise liners, corporate entertainment launches, visiting
warships, a big brightly-lit blue and white gambling craft which takes
punters on trips out of Hong Kong waters, and the emblematic green
and white Star Ferry shuttling endlessly between Hong Kong Island
and the Kowloon peninsula.
The local anthem is the sound of the pneumatic drill; the national
bird should be the crane. Sheer walls of apartment blocks perch on the
edge of steep slopes. Plans for new buildings rise a hundred floors up
into the sky. Though too many developments are unimaginative con-
crete, glass and steel towers designed to make the most money from
the allotted plot ratio, there is no finer office building in the world
than the triangular masterpiece designed by I. M. Pei for the Bank of
China which dominates the Hong Kong skyline. If road traffic is
increasingly caught in gridlock in busy areas, the territory's transport
network encompasses an underground system to put most others to
shame, along with surface trains, trams, minibuses, double-deckers,
shuttles, ferries, taxis, three cross-harbour tunnels, three tunnels
through the mountains, plus the funicular railway up the Peak tower-
ing over Hong Kong Island. Carrying half the territory's population
each day, the underground Mass Transit Railway (MTR) is the world's
most heavily used people-carrier, and probably the most efficient. As
for other means of getting around, taxis are cheap, the flat fare on the
tram is 16 pence, and you can cross the harbour on the upper deck of
the ferry for only a penny more.
Above ground is an amazing array of road bridges, overhead
pedestrian walkways and an 800-metre-long escalator system up the
slopes above the main business district. The sprawling squatter camps
without electricity or running water that once housed refugees and
were the scene of massive fires and landslip disasters have long gone.
But there are still indigent 'street sleepers' and 'cage homes' occupied
by unmarried, unemployed, unskilled men who live in railed-off
bunk spaces. The early housing estates with their shared toilets and
4 Dealing With the Dragon
communal cooking facilities belong to history. Still, space is often
woefully inadequate, with an average of under 500 square feet per
home. More than 100,000 people live in temporary accommodation.
But the vast blocks of public flats built on what were once rice pad-
dies or virgin land have made Hong Kong - for its size - the site of
one of the world's major urban housing developments.
Though the potential for fast or long driving is severely limited by
the small size and steep geography of the place, there are more luxury
limousines per head of population here than anywhere else on earth.
The owners of the flat on top of the apartment block my wife and I
lived in kept a black stretch limousine waiting permanently downstairs
but never seemed to use it. The son of the house switched between
Porsches and Ferraris with the occasional Maserati thrown in. The last
time we visited the home of the leader of one major political group,
he had a large Mercedes, a Porsche and a Ferrari in the driveway, and
a Rolls inside the garage.
Real-estate and textile barons rendezvous in secluded coves in the
South China Sea on Sunday afternoons aboard huge, personally
designed luxury boats made in Italy, with resident chefs and dining
rooms as big as the average flat: one can seat eighteen. Although the
boats could sail the globe, they generally don't venture far for fear of
pirates, and watchful crew members keep their eyes open for kidnap-
pers. One younger socialite doesn't go anywhere at all. He keeps his
yacht permanently moored in a bay on the south side of the island to
be used as a floating dining room: the champagne is Dom Perignon
and the cheese is flown in from France to order.
Hong Kong is home to more luxury hotels than any other place o£
its size, and almost certainly holds the record for atrium space. With
one eating establishment for every 650 inhabitants, it may well also
have the highest restaurant penetration, including five of the ten
busiest McDonald's outlets. Times Square in the Causeway Bay dis-
trict of Hong Kong Island is one of the world's two busiest shopping
centres, and few other cities have such a concentration of retail out-
lets - from the luxury stores of the Central District and the jostling
shops of Tsim Sha Tsui across the harbour to the streets round the
Wanchai market with their stalls selling meat, vegetables, fruit, dried
Hong Kong... 5
fish, shoes, women's panties, videos, watches, nuts, flowers, towels and
food from all over South-East Asia.
The streets are alive not only with the sound of people, but with
signs jutting out overhead: in the first hundred yards of Mody Road
in Tsim Sha Tsui, you walk under signs for Baron King's Tailor, Rio
Pearl, Nikon, Surge Restaurant, Hong Kong Fur, Spring Deer
Restaurant, Kam Chien Shoe Store, Tourist House, Maclary Fashions,
Holdrich Guest House, Laser People, Club 38, Sandalwood Club,
Fantastic Beauty and Image, Home Town Guest House and the Choy
Kee Cleaning Service.
While under British rule, Hong Kong created templates for popu-
lar culture - Cantopop and kung fu — that had absolutely nothing to
do with the colonisers, even if some of the stars took names like
Bruce, Aaron and Lionel. The territory's take-no-prisoners crime
epics made directors like John Woo into post-modernist icons.
Though the film output is only a quarter of what it was in the early
1990s, the major attraction, Jackie Chan, is one of the most popular
stars in the world. Chow Yun-fat, who was voted Premiere magazine's
'sexiest action star of 1999' before becoming the King of Siam to Jodie
Foster's Anna, was striking serious attitudes with a matchstick in the
side of his mouth well before Quentin Tarantino drew his inspiration
for Reservoir Dogs from Hong Kong gangster flicks.
This is media city incarnate. With a population equivalent to that
of London, it supports no fewer than fifteen newspapers. In the go-go
years around 1997, the dominant English-language daily made a pre-
tax profit equivalent to £60 million. Hong Kong is awash with
magazines, and the air buzzes with in-your-ears radio: one leading
talkshow host so offended somebody that he was the target of a severe
attack with a chopper that left him badly maimed. As for television, an
executive reckons Hong Kong's programmes are watched by 16 mil-
lion people across the border.
Business rules, and its practitioners are lords of the universe. There
is nothing new about this: the only public statue in the Central
District is of a Victorian general manager of the Hong Kong Bank.
Names of firms and buildings translated from Chinese reflect the as-
pirations and preoccupations of owners and inhabitants - Brilliant
6 Dealing With the Dragon
Trading, Joyful Construction, Good Luck Corrugated Carton, or
Tycoon Court, Wealthy Heights, Good Results, Prosperity Centre
and Everprofit.
A ranking of top wealth creators in Asia at the end of 1999 placed
seven Hong Kong firms in the top ten. Business figures regularly lead
polls of the territory's most admired people, and their interests stretch
across the globe. Apart from major investments on the mainland of
China, they own real estate by the Thames, the Hudson and the
Pacific coast of North America, luxury hotels from Tokyo to
Knightsbridge, textile works in Cambodia and Pringle knitwear in
Scotland, the Harvey Nichols store in London, sheep farms and elec-
tric power stations in Australia, palm oil plantations in Indonesia and
container ports in Felixstowe and the Panama Canal. Hong Kong
entrepreneurs turn out goods for top American brand names, operate
casinos in North Korea and ski resorts in Canada, and bankrolled
Donald Trump's latest development on the West Side of Manhattan.
They are renowned as flexible, on-the-ball traders. Few restrict
themselves to a single line of activity. Property, garments, shipping, the
Internet, mobile phones, retailing, the stock market and mainland
China: mix and match to maximise profits. As middlemen, they set up
deals around the globe at the drop of a fax, an e-mail or a telephone
call. They employ millions of people at factories in China turning out
export goods that have fuelled the mainland's economic rise. Costs at
home are too high to allow Hong Kong to compete. So what was
once a low-cost centre turning out cheap clothes, toys, watches, wigs
and a hundred other products has seen its manufacturing shrink dra-
matically, leaving a pool of middle-aged and elderly men and women
without work or a future.
The destiny of the once mighty textile industry stands as a measure
of the changes in the last two decades, and of the flexibility of Hong
Kong's business culture. In 1980 textiles accounted for 23 per cent of
the economy; now this is down to 6.5 per cent. The industry's work-
force of 93,000 in 1995 was 58,000 two years later. Holding a quota
licence to export textile goods to the West remains a ticket to riches,
but the sweaters and jeans and T-shirts do not have to be made in
Hong Kong. So the quota-holders either moved their factories to
Hong Kong... 7
southern China where wages were far lower, or subcontracted pro-
duction to others and pulled down their factories to make way for
real-estate developments.
From the heights of the Peak to people scrabbling with bank over-
drafts to get on the escalator to wealth, property dominates. Go out to
a friendly dinner, and the prices of flats - there are few houses here -
will inevitably come up at some point. Property tycoons are the mas-
ters of the city. Li Ka-shing is known simply as 'Superman'. Lee
Shau-kee of Henderson Land earned a cool US$1.1 billion from divi-
dends alone in 1997. A real-estate heiress, Nina Wang, was listed as the
richest working woman on earth with US$7 billion to her name.
Property companies constitute 30 per cent of stock market capitalis-
ation. Solicitors become multi-millionaires on conveyancing fees. Ask
many a Rolls-Royce or Mercedes owner where his money comes
from: he will name his business, but then add, 'Of course, the real
money's from property.' The Mass Transit Railway system is building
massive office and apartment blocks on top of its stations; the latest
project is for a 102-storey office tower in Kowloon. After the territory's
leading gangster was caught in 1998, he was found to own thirty-one
pieces of real estate. At the other end of the scale, tenants of public
housing are being urged to get into the game by buying leases on their
homes. In any case, demand usually exceeds supply. Apart from the
Anglican cathedral, all land belongs to the government, and it parcels
it out carefully at land auctions, drawing 40 per cent of its revenue from
sales of leases, redevelopment fees and stamp duty.
The result is both some of the highest prices in the world and great
population density. The Kwun Tong area of Kowloon has 54,000
people per square kilometre. Such is the pressure on space that Hong
Kong is riddled with 6,000 illegal structures. The soaring property
prices and the government's income from them are the territory's
hidden tax. It is not just a matter of housing: real-estate inflation
constitutes a major element in the high cost of shopping, eating out
or doing business.
Speculation is not confined to the rich. Visiting flats is a local pas-
time. Foreign property is snapped up sight unseen at exhibitions in
plush hotels. A software salesman and his secretary wife I know had
8 Dealing With the Dracon
three flats in Hong Kong during the mid-1990s bubble, plus a house
in Beijing. They also bought a one-bedroom flat in the former
County Hall in London at a property road show in Hong Kong, but
soon sold it, never having set eyes on their place by the Thames. Li
Ka-shing tells of being approached during an early morning golf
round by a greens sweeper wearing the traditional wide-brimmed hat
of the original inhabitants of Hong Kong, the Hakkas. She said the
flats she had bought from his company had been hit by the slump, and
asked him not to sue her if she fell behind with the payments. How
many flats had this woman bought? Four. 'I bluntly told her that she
should not do that with her income level,' Li concluded. 'And I asked
her not to disturb my golf game.'
Between 1984, when an agreement between Britain and China
removed uncertainty about Hong Kong's future, and the great Asian
crash of 1997, property values rose by 2,000 per cent, with the aver-
age price of luxury accommodation hitting £1,500 a square foot.
High inflation meant low, or even negative, real interest rates. The
currency was rock solid, pegged to the US dollar. Demand was
booming. No wonder that this small parcel of land bereft of natural
resources and without enough food or water to sustain itself came to
outstrip its colonial sovereign in the wealth stakes.
Geography has always been a key to success here. As the estate
agents say, what counts is location, location and location. Perched on
the flank of the great dragon of China, Hong Kong has been perfectly
placed as an entrepot city, a channel for goods, people and services. As
an outpost of "Western good practices, with a clean civil service and a
reliable legal system, it has benefited from a trust that the West is still
hesitant about extending to the mainland. Hence its eminence as a
container port, and its position as the centre for financial, legal and
managerial services for companies operating in China. If Hong Kong
became part of the People's Republic in 1997, geography still gives it
the destiny of being a bridge between the mainland and the rest of the
world. But that location also makes Hong Kong much more fragile
than such a rich and successful place should be. It is at the mercy of
events it cannot influence, far away in America, nearer at hand in
Tokyo, or across the border in the rest of China.
Hong Kong... 9
The currency link to the US dollar means that monetary policy is
made by the Federal Reserve in Washington. Changes in US policy
towards Beijing have major consequences for Hong Kong. Japan's
enormous weight in the Asian economy cannot be escaped. Most
of all, there is the China factor: increasingly, it cuts both ways. If
mainland economic development stalls, Hong Kong will feel the
repercussions first. If Beijing devalues its currency, could the Hong
Kong dollar resist the pressure to foDow suit? If, on the other hand,
the looming superpower-in-the-making relates to the world and
ploughs its own furrow in the international economy, there will be
much less need for the Hong Kong bridge.
If that happens, how many firms will follow the example of the
French communications company Alcatel, which has made Shanghai
its regional headquarters, or the electronics division of Philips, which
has moved its top management executives to the mainland? If
Shanghai can reinvent itself as a great world centre, with double the
population and the huge backdrop of the Yangtze basin, who needs
this pimple on the backside of the dragon to the north? If container
ports in southern China can undercut Hong Kong, why transport
goods through the SAR? An artificial place, created by refugees and
colonialists, Hong Kong could then move to the wings of China's
evolution. An early beneficiary of globalisation, it could be margin-
alised by the biggest global link-up of all between 1.2 billion
consumers and the rest of the planet.
Like any people living on the edge, the inhabitants of Hong Kong
have more than their share of contradictions. They are famed for
their entrepreneurial spirit, but local Chinese firms are run on a strict
top-down basis. Bosses command huge deference, and do not expect
to be argued with. Delegation is seen as a potential source of weak-
ness. The result can be a stultifying absence of initiative as
decision-making is referred upwards and executives avoid taking
responsibility for fear of incorrectly anticipating the wishes of the
man on high. Within companies, 'little potato' employees know their
place, though the more adventurous waste no time in striking out on
io Dealing With the Dragon
their own to fuel the constant flow of new businesses which give
Hong Kong its special dynamic.
However sophisticated the city may be, it is still subject to old
superstitions and new scares. Women with big mouths are considered
bad news because they 'eat' the family's luck and money. Various
foods are imbued with special powers. Eat lotus seeds to have a child
within the year; water chestnuts promise good fortune; candied
coconut stores up family togetherness down the generations; peach
blossoms denote longevity, jonquils prosperity, and camellias rebirth.
A massive apartment block on the south side of Hong Kong Island
has a large hole in the middle to allow evil spirits to pass through
without causing any damage. An executive of a start-up software firm
pointed down from his twenty-sixth-floor office at the traffic coming
and going on an expressway below as a sign that if money flowed out
it would certainly return. In 1997, Hong Kong's Chief Executive
used the supposed bad feng shui of the residence of the former col-
onial governors - which has the sharp edge of the Bank of China
building pointing directly at it - as an excuse for not moving in.
Asked by the South China Morning Post, the main English-language
newspaper, to rate major buildings in the middle of Hong Kong, an
expert who says he advises film stars, banks and the Hong Kong
Futures Exchange found that the Hong Kong Shanghai Bank would
benefit from the air passing beneath Sir Norman Foster's build for its
headquarters in Central, which has the additional safeguard of escala-
tors running diagonally to the sea so that the money will not go out
to the water.
The tradition of lucky and unlucky numbers is alive and well.
Eight is prized because it sounds like 'wealth' in Cantonese, and 9 is
good too because it sounds like the word for 'long-lasting'. But 4 is to
be avoided at all costs since it sounds like death. The lease of our flat -
number 4B - said it was also known as 3F, which does not exist. An
apartment block opposite has an Upper 3 floor, Upper 13 and Upper
23 - anything to avoid the dreaded 4.
There have been times in the past few years when Hong Kong has
needed all the good feng shui it could get. The handover year of 1997
saw a mysterious outbreak of a lethal virus called bird flu, carried by
Hong Kong ... n
poultry: all the chickens were slaughtered to stop the spread of the dis-
ease. 'Red tides' swept down the Pearl River from China from time
to time and killed the fish. In 1999, three people died from virulent
bacteria called Staphylococcus aureus, for which there is no known
treatment.
As befits a place that fancies itself to be at the cutting edge o£
modernity, Hong Kong puts a premium on smartness, not only
among the middle and upper classes who throng the charity galas and
fashion shows but also among office workers who preen themselves in
their frequently fake designer labels. Mingle with the lunchtime
crowd in Central and you will not see a hair out of place or a shoe
unshined. 'I can't imagine anybody getting married at this time of
year,' says a young woman before going to a wedding in hot and
humid June. 'Their make-up just has to run.'
The mood-swings from depression to optimism are extreme - and
extremely swift. Launch a new cake or a fresh brand of sunglasses and
the queues will form. Nobody wants to miss out anything, from the
crowds which besieged McDonald's to buy cut-price Snoopy dolls, to
the property companies that rushed pell-mell into Internet offerings
and the sober-suited bankers who lined up to lend money to less than
transparent mainland enterprises. When would-be immigrants from
the mainland formed a long line outside a government office in 1999
seeking authorisation to stay in Hong Kong, several locals joined the
queue in case something was being given away.
The essential attribute of the modern Hong Konger is, of course,
possession of a mobile phone. Only the Nokiaworld of Finland has
more per head of population. Hong Kong people simply cannot live
without them. The outcry when mobile phone companies owned by
some of the city's biggest tycoons tried to raise rates at the beginning
of 2000 was such that even they had to retreat. Ringing so disrupted
the opening night of Othello by the Royal Shakespeare Company in
1997 that the actors threatened to walk off if there was a repetition
during the second performance. A hospital surgeon was suspended
after being accused of discussing the purchase of a silver BMW with
another doctor over his mobile while operating on a patient's polyp;
distracted, he allegedly pierced the man's colon.
12
Dlai.ing Wrin THE Dragon
Not all the smart objects are genuine: this is a mecca for counter-
feit watches and imitation fashion goods, run up for a fraction of the
price of the real thing here or over the border in China. Half the
people of Hong Kong admit to buying fake goods. Forty per cent of
home videos sold in the SAR are rip-offs: in one raid police made
what they called the world's biggest seizure, of 22 million pirate video
compact discs. Some eighty factories churn out counterfeit music,
videos and software. In 1999, copies of the new Star Wars epic were
on sale within a day of the film's release in the USA.
In a different domain, it is increasingly hard not to see democracy
in Hong Kong as something of a counterfeit, too. At the apex of the
extraordinary political system under which Hong Kong has lived
since 1997 stands the Chief Executive, chosen by a carefully consti-
tuted and Beijing-friendly committee. He is advised by a secretive
Executive Council whose membership is for him to determine. Then
there is a raft of senior civil servants running government departments.
That may seem a quite straightforward example of an executive-led
government, perpetuating the old colonial system for the benefit of
Beijing rather than London. But then there is the legislature, which is
meant to represent the democratic element in the way Hong Kong is
run.
The Joint Declaration on Hong Kong's future signed by Margaret
Thatcher in Beijing in 1984 after tortuous negotiations said that the
Legislative Council (LegCo) was to be 'constituted by election'. That
formulation was acceptable precisely because it could be interpreted
differently by each of the consenting parties. When the agreement was
presented to the House of Commons, the British government could
allow MPs to imagine that 'election' meant Westminster-style polls.
The Chinese, for their part, could be reassured by the fact that in their
many elections since 1949 no Communist candidate had tailed to be
returned. As one former senior colonial official noted, the Chinese
didn't mind elections but they rather liked to know the result in
advance.
The pressure to introduce democracy became overwhelming in
Hong Kong in the late 1980s, particularly under the impact of the
massacre of demonstrators in Beijing's Tiananmen Square on 4 June
Hong Kong... 13
1989. There was a timid move to bring some independent voices
into the Legislative Council, which was appointed by the Governor
and used to sit in a government building. Then the last British
Governor, Chris Patten, delighted local democrats and horrified
Beijing by introducing genuine democracy at elections in 1995, which
produced a triumph for pro-democracy parties critical of China. It
was a key sign of how Hong Kong was growing up politically, of how
it was no longer simply an economic city, but was able to embrace
modern accountability, even if the administration continued to keep
a careful check on the powers of the legislature.
But the looming date of the handover meant that Patten's exper-
iment was bound to be short-lived, a bouncing baby condemned to
death by its morally laudable but practically untenable conception. In
the early hours of 1 July 1997, the elected legislature was dissolved and
replaced by a body with no popular legitimacy picked by a Beijing-
approved committee. Ten months later, in May 1998, a degree of
democracy crept back with a newly constituted legislature of sixty
members. But only twenty were elected by popular vote, the others
representing professional groups (known as functional constituencies)
or picked by yet another committee of friends of Beijing and the local
administration.
To limit the chances of its pro-democracy opponents in 1998, the
government introduced proportional representation and large con-
stituencies designed to handicap them. In most of the functional
constituencies, voting was handed back to professional organisations
rather than following the one-person-one-vote arrangement brought
in by Patten. All the same, and despite a tropical downpour,
Democrats took 70 per cent of the poll. But the system meant that,
for all their votes, they made up only a minority in the chamber and,
even then, were hamstrung by procedural rules which gave the func-
tional constituencies effective veto power.
Thus Hong Kong finds itself with a system in which candidates
who got nearly three-quarters of the popular vote are consigned to
opposition. At the same time, though the administration can count
on general support from a pro-Beijing group and many functional
constituency representatives, there is no government party as such.
14 Dealing With the Dragon
LegCo members have the power to summon officials and to quiz
them, but nobody expects anything to result. Legislators may censure
handling of the opening of the new airport or the health scares or the
lack of information supplied by the administration on major projects,
but the top civil servants who were responsible never resign. The
largely toothless body that resulted from the carefully undefined elec-
tions promised in 1984 is not quite an empty vessel full of sound and
fury and little else, but it comes pretty close. At the time of the 1998
election, I asked Martin Lee Chu-ming, leader of the main democ-
ratic party, what he would do with a majority of the votes but no
power. 'Make noise,' he replied. No wonder that some of Hong
Kong's brightest pro-democracy politicians are turning against run-
ning for re-election, preferring to pursue their goals outside the
legislature - and that the countervailing powers of the judiciary came
to be seen as the bulwark of the high degree of autonomy promised
at the handover.
The SAR's constitution, the Basic Law, lays down a ten-year road
from 1997 to the prospect of the popular election of a chief executive
and the legislature. Even that timetable may be delayed, and, as we
will see in this book, the tide since the handover has flowed towards
the strengthening of executive power and the marginalisation of any-
thing which might stand in its way. At the forefront of this process is
the Chief Executive, a shipping magnate called Tung Chee-hwa,
selected at the end of 1996 by a 400-strong committee approved by
Beijing. An avuncular figure with brush-cut hair who was formerly
the honorary consul for Monaco in Hong Kong, Tung studied at
Liverpool University, and supports both that city's football team and
the San Francisco 49ers. His father set up a firm called Orient
Overseas which made the family extremely wealthy, with assets of
US$i billion. Among his other business ventures, the elder Tung
bought the Queen Elizabeth liner, intending to convert it into a float-
ing university, but the ship sank in unexplained circumstances in 1971.
He died of a heart attack in 1982 while hosting a visit to Hong Kong
by Princess Grace of Monaco.
Three years later, the company nearly capsized in the deep
waters of a shipping recession. Some pin the blame on the father's
Hong Kong ... 15
over-expansion; others say his sons bought too many ships before the
market peaked. Wherever the responsibility lay, the firm had to be
bailed out with a loan from China organised by a long-time friend of
Beijing called Henry Fok Ying-tung. It was one of the biggest cor-
porate restructuring rescues seen up to that time, and inevitably raises
the question of whether Beijing thought it had Tung in its debt as a
result, making him an even safer choice to run Hong Kong.
There is a duality about the tycoon chosen to run the SAR. He
celebrates two birthdays each year, on 27 May according to the
Chinese calendar and then again on 7 July according to the Western
calendar used in Hong Kong. Asked how his family described the
Communist entry into Shanghai in 1949 which sent them fleeing to
Hong Kong, Tung says that they called it both 'liberation' and 'fall' -
'it depended on whom we were talking to'. He has strong links in the
West, and the family firm used to be close to Taiwan. But he exhorts
Hong Kong to be 'more Chinese', which gave a special edge to a
remark by Bill Clinton at a dinner party in 1998 about how pleased he
was that all the Chief Executive's children were US citizens.
Tung believes in running things the old way according to 'good tra-
ditional Chinese values'. One of his officials describes him as a
'righteous' man in the Confucian tradition. More to the point, per-
haps, is that he was brought up in a prosperous family firm, assured of
wealth, a man who ran a company which would wait upon his de-
cisions, and who moved in a small and cosy circle where favours
were exchanged and the mutual well-being of the plutocracy was
paramount. In keeping with that background, he came to office on
the basis of a public handshake from Chinese President Jiang Zemin
and the support of a section of the business community led by Li Ka-
shing, who had taken Tung's family firm as his partner in the
Felixstowe container port - a connection which worried those who
thought that Hong Kong's 'Superman' already had quite enough
influence.
Nobody knows how much Hong Kong's leader consults the
mainland. Some stories say his telephone line only connects him
with middle-ranking functionaries in the central capital; but others
say he has the rank of a provincial governor. Senior members of his
16 Dealing With the Dragon
administration insist that they rarely contact their colleagues in Beijing.
They contrast the old colonial days, when the telegrams came in from
Whitehall in the morning and had to be answered by the evening, with
the new situation in which, they say, they never hear from the new
sovereign power. But would they really act off their own bat in ways
that would annoy the central government? Not if one is to go by
examples that arose during the year described in this book.
The duality persists in the public and private faces of the man in
charge of the SAR. Tung works long hours, earning the nickname of
'Mr Seven-Eleven', and listens politely to whoever is talking to him.
But he seems to find it hard to make decisions, and reserves the right
to take no notice. If he cannot make up his mind, nobody else in
Hong Kong can decide for him. When he seeks counsel or support,
it is from a small, select circle drawn from the business establishment
and made up of people trusted by Beijing, or international business
magnates. The awkwardness and irritations and demagogy of democ-
racy are not for him. Nor is the assertion that ordinary people have as
much right to determine their futures as does the elite. He has a
talent for sounding the wrong note, as when he says the Tiananmen
massacre belongs to the 'baggage' of history. Too often, his reactions
to events are slow, evasive or formulaic. Popular leadership is not his
forte. Tung is a patriarch, and patriarchs are there to be respected: the
people should acquiesce or, as the Cantonese put it, shoe-shine, as an
increasing number of civil servants do with growing acumen.
This paternalistic style does strike a chord with one strand of Hong
Kong's mentality. Though they are cosmopolitan and international,
people here keep up traditions of deference and strong family loyalties
from the bottom of the social scale to the boardroom of one of the
biggest property firms, where the chairman's brother, sister, daughter,
two sons and son-in-law sit as directors. The elderly get respect, and
children are treated with a pride and affection that has grown rare in
the West. 'Uncle Tung' fits neatly into this pattern, the Chief
Executive who is also chief executive officer of Hong Kong Inc. and
aspires to be head of its six-million-strong family.
But that chord is becoming increasingly outdated. The family
structure is fraying and the social environment changing. The number
Hong Kong ... 17
of child abuse cases recorded by the Welfare Department virtually
doubled between 1996 and 1999. Half of them involve physical abuse,
and a third sexual abuse. Officials put the blame on the strains of mar-
ital life and the emotional problems of parents. Though Hong Kong
feels a safe place in which to live, the crime rate rose by 4 per cent in
1999. There were kidnappings, including a spate of child abductions,
and domestic murders of horrifying violence. The city is a centre for
some fifty Triad gangs, operating in legitimate business as well as the
traditional pastures of extortion, prostitution, illegal gambling and
drugs - and with links across the globe. In 1999, police busted a pro-
tection racket run in school playgrounds by apprentice Triads as
young as twelve. There are court cases that come straight out of 1920s
Chicago: in one, a string of key prosecution witnesses suddenly all lost
their memories as they went into the box, and the accused business-
man drove away in his gold Rolls-Royce with a starlet girlfriend.
Lower down the scale, local government workers have been found
stealing valuables from coffins, and a conman bamboozled three
women to pay him HK$66o,ooo for pills he said would protect them
from the Y2K bug.
Violent, pornographic Japanese comics are sold freely. Chinese
dailies print pictures of dismembered bodies or corpses stuffed into
cardboard boxes which would never figure in British or American
tabloids. Press photographers snapped the head of a woman who had
been decapitated by her son, and the skinless skull of a teenage kidnap
victim whose body had been found on a hillside. Prostitution by local
women and mainlanders thrives in Triad-run 'vice villas' or the bars
and karaoke clubs of Yeung Long, Kam Tin and Mongkok, where the
going rate is HK$4.oo a trick. The women serve a dozen clients a day.
After one early morning raid, a policeman sighed and said, 'They'll be
back in business tonight.' Until recently, two leading popular news-
papers ran regular reviews of the sex services on offer.
At the same time, the establishment and those connected with it
can be decidedly prudish. On one evening in 1997, a prominent pro-
China figure presided over an evening of French culture. Visiting
Paris, he had been much impressed by the spectacle at the Crazy
Horse Saloon, so he decided to bring this particular aspect of Gallic
i8 Dealing Wiiii the Dragon
art to Hong Kong for a gala charity evening in the ballroom of a
major hotel. Leading businessmen paid large sums to take tables. The
Deputy Director of the Xinhua News Agency, China's de facto repre-
sentative office in Hong Kong, was the guest of honour, seated at the
top table right in front of the stage.
Twenty-four hours before the occasion, alarm bells started to ring.
What if the press photographed the Xinhua man with bare Crazy
Horse bosoms beside him? The dancers were told to cover up. The
photographers who normally immortalise such occasions for the soci-
ety pages were banned. As the show began, the embarrassment level
mounted. The diners were with their wives and found it difficult to
show enthusiasm for the showgirls, whose idea of a cover-up was
hardly modest. To make things worse, they strutted out in one poli-
tically incorrect number wearing busbies and very scanty costumes as
British Grenadiers.
The applause grew increasingly tepid. When the interval came,
coffee was suddenly served, and the Xinhua official was called up to
pick the lucky draw. That traditionally marks the end of a charity do
in Hong Kong. So everybody was free to leave. On the way out, I
passed the man who had thought up the idea of bringing the Crazy
Horse to the party. 'I hope you enjoyed yourself,' he said. 'And I hope
you did, too,' was all I could reply.
A watchdog body called the Obscene Article Tribunal once fined
a newspaper for running an advertisement showing Michelangelo's
statue of David. Faced with an outbreak of women being touched by
men on the underground railway system, a police chief advised them
to wear 'conservative clothing'. Rock concerts are banned from the
open-air Hong Kong Stadium because they might make too much
noise. When an Elton John performance was mooted, the local coun-
cil suggested that the sound should be piped to the audience through
headphones, and that gloves should be issued to muffle any clapping.
The concert did not go ahead.
The Cantonese, among whom the people of Hong Kong count
themselves despite their highly varied origins, are not generally seen
Hong Kong ... 19
as having played much of a role in China's history. This is unfair. Some
researchers believe the first inhabitants of the country arrived from the
west in the Pearl River Delta, but that is heresy to official thinking,
which insists that the Chinese sprouted up in China and owe their
origins to nobody else. A Dominican friar, Gaspar da Cruz, who vis-
ited Canton - now known as Guangzhou - in the sixteenth century,
noted their prowess at duck farming and their taste for tea, 'a kind of
warm water which they call cha . . . made from a concoction of
somewhat bitter herbs'. He also observed foot binding, blind prosti-
tutes and the prevalence of 'unnatural vice'. Intrepid sailors and
smugglers from the Pearl River opened up Asian trading routes. A
Cantonese scholar called Kang Yu-wei drew up the first coherent
programme to modernise the collapsing Qing dynasty, which led the
last but one Emperor of China to issue twenty-seven decrees in a hun-
dred days before the fearsome Empress Dowager had her son
imprisoned and probably poisoned while ordering Kang to suffer
death by a thousand cuts, a fate he avoided by escaping to Japan.
Soon afterwards, another Cantonese, Sun Yat-sen, who used Hong
Kong as a refuge, headed the revolutionary movement to establish a
modern republic in China, which led to the establishment of the
Kuomintang (KMT) government and the rise of Chiang Kai-shek.
The KMT's main power centre, Canton, was the scene of bloody
internal battles between different factions of Sun's movement. It was
from the great southern trading city that he set out on his last voyage
to Beijing before dying of cancer in the old imperial capital, and it was
from there that Chiang led the Northern Expedition of 1926-28
which made him ruler of China. Twenty years later, the KMT found
its final redoubt in the South before the retreat to Taiwan.
The Cantonese are not much loved outside their home region.
They have the reputation of being rude, and interested only in com-
merce. Their slang is known for its inventiveness and its use of sexual
references: a local editor, Terry Cheng, reckons it may be the dirtiest
dialect in China. Their cockiness gets up the noses of northerners,
who may envy their material success but harbour no warm feelings for
the country's newest region. 'How can you live with such people?'
asks a snooty Beijinger. 'The Shanghainese are bad enough, but all the
20 Dealing With the Dragon
Cantonese think about is making money.' Or as Jonathan Mirsky, the
former East Asia editor of The Times, put it in one of his last dis-
patches from the city: 'The Cantonese are used to living and working
in cramped and crowded conditions. They give no mercy to each
other and are no more courteous to tourists.'
Sure enough, Hong Kong people work hard: a report by the
International Labour Organisation found that they averaged 2,287
hours a year, or 44 hours a week. Between 1980 and 1996, their pro-
ductivity rose by 90 per cent. They also count the dollars and cents
assiduously, and, for all the conspicuous consumption, put a lot aside -
the savings rate is double that in Britain. But they are also great gam-
blers, wagering tens of millions of pounds on an ordinary mid-week
race meeting. Even in the depths of recession, the average bet was
$318 (£2$), and the big dividend on the last day of racing brought
$2.15 million for a $10 stake. Betting tax contributes 5 per cent of
government revenue, covering expenditure on housing, the police
and the environment. On top of this, the Jockey Club foots the bill
for extensive spending on schools, clinics and charities. Legal betting
is restricted to the horses, a weekly lottery and a few licensed mahjong
parlours. Anything else entails a trip to the former Portuguese colony
of Macau or further: a couple who run a garment factory flew to Las
Vegas and lost US$4 million in two weeks; they then went to court
claiming a 50 per cent discount on their losses.
You certainly have to watch your place in Hong Kong queues, and
know what you want when you reach the counter. Getting on and off
the MTR underground, or into a lift, can test both willpower and
endurance. In business, the game is played to the bitter end, and there
may still be a twist in the Cantonese tail. Getting repairs done to a
rented flat can be a marathon process that only ends when you with-
hold the rent: one tenant I know refused to pay for thirteen months
until he got some action from the landlord.
On the money-making front, the inhabitants live up to their repu-
tation all through the social scale. Many have two jobs, or more - the
Financial Secretary says that if they have only one nine-to-five job,
they get withdrawal symptoms. They play the markets and watch
interest rates like hawks. Early on in my time in Hong Kong, I learned
Hong Kong... 21
that I had better know the late-morning close on the Hang Seng
index before I went out to meet anybody for lunch: a quick discussion
of how the market is doing takes the place of the weather in Britain
as a conversational ice-breaker. Even at the depths of the 1999 reces-
sion, there was a constant buzz about the place. Taxi drivers don't wait
for a tip; they are too busy driving off after the next passenger.
But this temple of wealth and conspicuous consumption is also a
city of rag pickers and old women who scrape a living collecting
waste paper and discarded soft-drink cans. At a landfill on a hillside in
the New Territories which receives 8,000 tonnes of waste a day,
dozens of men paid the equivalent of £30 for a twelve-hour shift sort
their way through the rubbish, retrieving anything which can be
recycled for a profit by their employers: they call their pickings
'curry'. One early sign of the economic crisis was when the people
who comb through the garbage by the old airport reported a distinct
decline in the quality and quantity of what was being thrown away.
The income disparity is among the highest on earth as shown by
the tax figures. Six per cent of the population pays 80 per cent of the
total income tax bill, while a similar proportion of corporate tax
comes from 5 per cent of taxable businesses. It is not simply that the
poor are poor (and sometimes do not claim welfare for reasons of
pride), but that the rich are so rich. The mansions on the Peak are
huge and protected by security systems costing hundreds of thousands
of pounds; the public housing estates elsewhere on the island or across
in the New Territories contain some of the most crowded accom-
modation in the world.
Contrasts are everywhere. Sandwiched between shining high-rise
towers of chromium and glass stand tenements with peeling walls and
washing hanging out of the windows. Small stalls of while-you-wait
cobblers and locksmiths line an alley beside some of the city's smartest
stores. Near gleaming skyscrapers, a 76-year-old woman pays HK$700
a month for a tiny space in which she keeps a kerosene stove, cook-
ing utensils, clothes, plastic bags stuffed with her belongings and a big
metal box. She has never fully stretched out her legs when she sleeps.
Her cubicle is part of a 500-square-foot unit where thirteen other
people live.
22 Dealing Wiiii i m- Dragon
The pay of company directors races far ahead of inflation: in the
boom time of 1997, it jumped by an average of 42 per cent. But a
survey by the Hong Kong Social Security Society the next year
reported that 856,700 people - 14 per cent of the population - were
below the poverty line, double the number a dozen years earlier. And
that was before unemployment hit a record 6 per cent under the
impact of the recession.
As the economy dropped, loan sharks thrived, often using brutal
methods to recover their money. Debts were the motivation for a
growing number of suicides: in one case in the summer of 1999 a
market cleaner and his wife asphyxiated themselves and their three
children with the smoke from a charcoal fire because they could not
pay back their loans. Their neighbours quickly collected HK$20,ooo
to pay for a spirit-cleansing ceremony outside the flat where they
died.
Personally, I find the people of Hong Kong invigoratingly up-
front, smart and anxious to get on with life, rather like the Parisians,
who attract similar reactions from Anglo-Saxon visitors and superior
French provincials. Yes, they hustle and keep their eye on the main
chance. True, commercialism and the making of money are the main
reasons for most people's existence. Yes, the very rich can show an
ostentatious superficiality as they parade their wealth, but that can also
have its endearing side: the his and hers Rolls-Royces, the real plea-
sure at showing off an £8,000 magnum of claret in the cellar, the
surge of power as the Italian-made boat kicks into top gear and every-
thing on deck goes flying, and the endless glossy charity balls that fill
the society pages but do raise a lot of money for good causes.
It is perfectly true that the inhabitants can be insensitive and intol-
erant as they bustle and jostle their way through life. Hong Kong
funeral parlours are brusque, vertically integrated industrial establish-
ments, from the white-garbed professional mourners on the ground
floor to the cofEns being made on the roof. The religious service at
a cremation I attended in the New Territories was interrupted halfway
through by a manager who told us our time was up and we should
make way for the next body. In a different register, a television net-
work ran a promotion in the mid-1990s saying that advertising with
Hong Kong . . . 23
it could have helped Hitler to achieve his 'final solution'. Prejudice is
alive and well: many Chinese take a dim view of Indians. In 1999, a
survey of people aged between twelve and twenty-five reported that
a quarter regarded homosexuals as abnormal or mentally disturbed. A
report in the South China Morning Post revealed that six funeral par-
lours were refusing to handle the bodies of people who had died
with HIV, while local residents in one part of Kowloon waged a long
and bitterly abusive campaign against a nursing home for Aids suffer-
ers in their street, driving a third of the nurses away with their abuse.
On the other hand, their trading links make the business people of
Hong Kong admirably internationally minded, a trait strengthened,
for some, by the acquisition of foreign passports in case things went
wrong after the return to China: at the last count, Hong Kong con-
tained 32,500 people with Canadian passports as well as 29,000
American and 20,000 Australian. They cannot afford to be insular:
their raison d'etre is bound up with the wider world, over the border
in China for some but through the rest of Asia, in North America and
Europe for many more. While the tycoons are the big players inter-
nationally, ordinary Hong Kongers often have property abroad, plus
relations across the Pacific and in the Chinatowns of Asia and Europe.
The airport has a special importance as the gateway to an outside
world that cannot be reached in any other way. The goods they buy,
the fashions they wear, the food they eat, make the people of the SAR
citizens of the globalised world with an immediacy which ensures the
liveliness of the place: if the place lacks depth, skating across its surface
is nevertheless exhilarating.
One result of the concentration on the here and now, rather than
on the past or future, is a notable lack of care for the physical
environment. Air pollution regularly reaches dangerous levels. The
harbour is a sewer strewn with waste. All the assurances from colonial
and post-handover administrations that something must be done have
not halted, or even slowed down, the degradation: the fine for smok-
ing in a taxi is HK$5,ooo, but the penalty for the vehicle emitting
filthy diesel-fume exhaust is less than a tenth as much.
The march of development has left precious little room for the
preservation of history. Elegant books of photographs of old Hong
24 Dealing With the Dragon
Kong sit on coffee tables, but just 70 out of an estimated 7,000 pre-
war buildings have been granted official protection from destruction.
There is a 'heritage trail' which visitors can follow: but, as a local
historian, Jason Wordie, says, it consists largely of a series of signs
teDing you what used to be.
Here and there, you find survivors amid the tower blocks. Elegant
white Flagstaff House is the oldest colonial building still standing,
dating from 1846. The former home of British military commanders,
it is now a teapot museum on the edge of Hong Kong Park, sur-
rounded by skyscrapers. Outside, you can sometimes catch a glimpse
of white cockatoos descended from birds that escaped from a Japanese
aviary during the occupation of 1941-45. Down below, along busy
Queen's Road East, which used to mark the waterfront before recla-
mation stretched Hong Kong Island out into the harbour, Tai Wong
temple constructed back into the hillside has stood its ground since
the 1 840s. At the end of a nearby cul-de-sac is a small shrine to the
Earth God, who sits in a three-sided red wooden box with a taper
burning in a two-handled cup: it has been in this spot for more than
a century, a relic of the village customs of people from southern
China, like a wayside cross in Catholic Europe. Further along Queen's
Road East, the old one-storey whitewashed post office has been pre-
served as an environmental centre and there are a few 'shop houses',
built in the 1920s and advertised at the time as being rat-proof. Off on
the right as you head towards the bustling market streets, a corner of
four-storey houses has survived from the turn of the twentieth cen-
tury, with grilled balconies, high ceilings and staircases going straight
to the first floor without taking a turn.
Further up the hill, at the top of a long flight of steps, past a restau-
rant that serves only snake dishes, there stands a fine brick mansion
with an arched gateway, colonnaded balconies, floors of patterned
tiles, and round Chinese windows. A high wall shelters it from the
outside world. Once the home of a wealthy family, it was used as a
'comfort house' brothel for Japanese officers in the Second World
War. Now, it is abandoned, the wallpaper is peeling, a bathtub stands
in what was the dining room, graffiti surrounds the doorway, and the
garden is a wilderness. A similar house, used by the Japanese for the
Hong Kong . . . 25
same purpose for ordinary soldiers, has been demolished; all that
remains is the retaining wall and the balustrade that bounded its
grounds. Thus does Hong Kong treat its past.
This lack of concern was only to be expected of a population
whose main priority was to establish itself, make a living and raise a
family. There was little time to worry about the environment, about
whether a colonial mansion should be preserved rather than being
torn down for housing, or about the way new high-rise blocks blot-
ted out the views of the mountains. If some old tenement buildings
survive alongside new towers, it is often because ownership is frag-
mented between warring family clans or has simply been obscured
amid waves of migration. Reclamation of the harbour has enabled the
main business district and the container port facilities to expand, to
the general well-being of the community as a whole. Several huge
apartment blocks stand on what were oil depots, shipping terminals
and power stations whose disappearance nobody can lament. The
enormous shopping-hotel-office complex of Pacific Place was built
on the former British military cantonment. I. M. Pei's Bank of China
tower stands on what used to be the soldiers' Mess.
Traditions are not destroyed as easily as buildings. Chinese festivals
are celebrated, temples kept up, and graves swept on the appointed
dates. Models of jumbo jets, limousines, and houses with furniture
and cardboard figures of maids are burned after funerals to accompany
the departed to the next world. The clatter of mahjong tiles is one of
the sounds of the place. Individual streets remain the home for certain
trades, as they have done for a century or more: flowers in Mongkok,
dried fish in Western, furniture on Queen's Road East.
Though an overwhelmingly Chinese city, Hong Kong has a vivid
mix of other races which adds to its internationalism. Some are
second and third generation - Eurasians, Indians, Pakistanis and Sri
Lankans, Parsees, the Jewish community that came largely from
Shanghai, and, older than any of those, the Scots and the English who
sailed here for profit and to join in the opium trade in the mid-
nineteenth century. Then there are more recent arrivals, from Japan,
the Americas, Australia, New Zealand and Europe. And almost
150,000 serving maids, mainly from the Philippines.
26 Dealing Wiiii the Dragon
Another sign of Hong Kong's internationalism is the range of food
on offer. Chinese cuisine naturally predominates, but the dishes of the
rest of Asia are readily available, not to mention American fast-food
outlets, steak houses, sports bars and an English fish and chips estab-
lishment. On Hanoi Road in Tsim Sha Tsui, across from Hong Kong
Island, a short stretch takes you past La Pasion de Espaiia Bodega, the
Biergarten German pub and the Valentino Ristorante Italiano. The
Trou Normand with its exposed brickwork and red and white striped
tablecloths stands nearby at the corner of Carnarvon Road.
The prosperity on which all this rests is supposed to have been built
on an economic policy of 'positive non-intervention'. Developed in
the 1970s by a long-time Financial Secretary and Chief Secretary,
Philip Haddon-Cave, it made Hong Kong the idol of free marketeers
round the globe. Haddon-Cave, who disliked Chinese food and
insisted on eating steak at banquets, earned the nickname of Choy
Sun, God of Fortune. In fact, the non-interventionism has not been
as simple or as all-embracing as its boosters like to proclaim.
The colonial administration pursued an active public housing
policy, which was taken up in 1997 by the new Chief Executive with
a pledge of 80,000 new units a year. Its ultimate ownership of land
means that the government has always had its grip on a key element
in Hong Kong's economy. The sale of most of that land to a small set
of developers has given them a stranglehold, and untold wealth into
the bargain. Far from opening up the market, the government's non-
intervention precluded it from taking measures to break up the cartels
that riddle the city. Interlopers are sent packing if they try to break
cosy retail arrangements. When a freebooting entrepreneur tried to
undercut the supermarket duopoly by direct home sales, some whole-
salers simply refused to supply him with goods.
An entente among banks to avoid competition over mortgage rates
will only be dismantled in 2002. A year later, controls on rice imports,
introduced during the Korean War, will finally end. At the New Year
of 2000, five of the six mobile telephone networks raised fees on the
same day and by the same amount: pure coincidence, they insisted
before cancelling the increases amid public anger and after the
Director-General of Telecommunications had identified 'a tacit
Hong Kong ... 27
understanding among them'. Soon afterwards, it emerged that Hong
Kong had the world's highest pre-tax petrol prices, which might not
be unconnected with the way in which three companies own 80 per
cent of the filling stations and charge the same rates.
But all this is done between consenting businessfolk and, for many
abroad, the headline appeal of 15 per cent income tax seems to count
for a lot more than the dominant power of a business establishment for
which economic freedom often simply means the freedom to play the
game by their own rules. As we will see, the year in question shows
quite vividly how far the reality is from the image that wins Hong
Kong awards as the world's freest economy.
This is just one of a set of contradictions that spring up at every
corner, even setting politics and economics aside. A first-world city in
many respects, the SAR has third-world population growth due
largely to immigration: 89 per cent of the increase of 500,000 in-
habitants since 1995 is due to the influx of mainlanders and to Hong
Kong emigrants returning home. Though the birth rate is low, these
factors are expected to push the population up to 8.9 million by 2016.
The United Nations says Hong Kong is about to age rapidly, with the
median age shooting up from the present 36.2 to 52.2 by the middle
of the twenty-first century. At 78.5 years, life expectancy is high, and
infant mortality among the lowest on earth.
How the ageing squares with the official vision of a bustling young
city is an open question. But then age has never been an incentive to
relinquish power and authority here. Just look at the serried ranks of
tycoons in their seventies, or go to a lunch where the assembled
company sits in silent deference to the old man at the head of the
table.
The local food is good and healthy, but affluence has boosted meat
consumption and medical problems. Western fast food is making big
inroads. The cholesterol level among seven-year-olds is the second
highest in the world. Almost a fifth of Hong Kong babies are over-
weight and 13 per cent of boys between six and eighteen are classed as
obese. An expert estimates that 90 per cent of university students
suffer from myopia, and that the proportion in the population as .1
whole is 50 to 60 per cent - double that in New York. Perhaps as a
28 Dealing With rHE Dragon
result of the demand resulting from the high incidence of weak eye-
sight, this is one of the cheapest places in the world to buy spectacles.
The position of women involves another of the many paradoxes of
Hong Kong. Concubinage was abolished only in 1971. But there is a
distinct tradition of what might be called open marriages Chinese-
style. A landmark legal case in 1999 showed that SAR men had
fathered scores of thousands of illegitimate children on the mainland.
Back at home, the power of the matriarch remains strong inside many
households, even if proper deference is paid to the menfolk in public.
Daughters-in-law are traditionally kept at the bottom of the pile,
patiently waiting their turn to lady it over their sons' wives one day.
Despite the flashing female stars in retail, fashion and the charity
round, business remains almost exclusively male-dominated. There are
very few women at the top of companies, though the daughters of
dead tycoons form discreet networks: the four daughters of the late
shipping magnate Sir Y. K. Pao are married respectively to the chair-
man of a major conglomerate founded by their father, the head of his
cargo company, a Japanese businessman, and the director of the gov-
ernment's policy unit who previously chaired the stock exchange.
On the other hand, the top levels of the administration show no
shortage of women in high places, known, inevitably, as the 'handbag'
brigade. Two years after Hong Kong rejoined China, the Chief
Secretary for Administration, the Secretary for Justice, the Secretary
for Security and the directors of education, health and trade were
women. So was the President of the Legislative Council and three
leading pro-democracy politicians, the head of the Urban Council,
and four members of the Chief Executive's inner council, not to
mention the Director of Broadcasting and the head of the powerful
anti-corruption commission.
The physical surroundings are not all they may appear to the casual
visitor. It is easy to get the impression that Hong Kong is just a place
of concrete and glass, of soaring towers and crowded tenements, of
often foul air and jostling crowds. Still, 40 per cent of the land area lies
in twenty-one country parks. There are more than 200 outlying
islands, mostly uninhabited. Mai Po marshes, up by the border with
the mainland, are a major staging post for bird migration, with at least
Hong Kong... 29
325 species having been recorded in the 300 hectares of mangroves.
The flora and fauna of both Hong Kong Island and the New-
Territories are exceptional. Householders on the Sai Kung peninsula
find their birdcages raided by snakes, and there are quiet walks, trop-
ical trees and temples hidden along narrow paths only a few hundred
yards up the hill from the teeming streets of the Central District.
Just before writing this, I went on a four-hour hike with friends up
steep slopes, along ridges and down to the sea opposite a suburb of the
mainland city of Shenzhen. Across the water were garish pink towers
and lines of cranes to unload containers; over the hills behind them
loomed high-rise buildings. From the revolving restaurant on the top
of one, you get a 180-degree vista of a classic modern urban landscape,
followed by 180 degrees of empty countryside. The first is Shenzhen;
the second the New Territories of Hong Kong. Not what you might
expect if you spent all your time in the SAR amid the canyons of
Central.
On that walk, the path led through small villages with old women
straight out of a photograph of Imperial China. The rice paddies
were overgrown with lush green vegetation. We could still make out
the walls that once divided them, and the lines of agricultural terrac-
ing on the hillside. The mountains soared into the clouds. The
butterflies were enormous. There were wandering water buffalo and
packs of stray dogs. In one stream, we counted the crabs and the
shrimps and the crayfish. By the sea, three men and a woman sat play-
ing mahjong alongside an abandoned school, one room of which
had been turned into a temple. At the top of a hill, graves and small
mausoleums stood up from the long grass. In the whole four hours,
we passed one Chinese walking group and a solitary Westerner.
China
The country across the heavily guarded frontier with Hong Kong
has more than its share of superlatives and contradictions, too.
This is the nation that considered itself the centre of the world for
centuries, and whose first Communist leader was responsible for the
deaths of more of his fellow citizens than any other ruler in history.
The size of a continent and symbolised by the figure of the dragon,
China is bounded in the west by the Himalayas and in the east by the
seas of the Pacific. Stretching from steamy southern jungles to the
frozen frontier with Russia, it is a country of mountains and deserts,
rice paddies and soaring cities. Despite a long campaign of birth con-
trol and limiting urban families to a single child, its population of
more than 1.2 billion rose by almost 12 million in 1998 alone, an
increase equivalent to all the people of Belgium.
Although Beijing's time zone rules throughout its 3.7 million
square miles, China is a collection of vast regions held together by a
power structure that can often have only a hazy idea of what is going
on in its domain. Immense distances and the backwardness of much of
the countryside mean that, even in an age of air travel, many places are
cut off from the rest of the nation - villages like Liuyi in southern
Kunming province, where the women went on binding their feet a
generation after the rest of the country had given up regarding a 7.5-
centimetre-long 'Golden Lotus' foot as the epitome of desirability.
... China 31
The tradition of paying obeisance to the emperor over the moun-
tain, and then getting on with your business locally, is deeply
entrenched. So is the often futile attempt by central governments
over the millennia to pretend that their people are animated by de-
votion to the rulers in their palaces in the capital, be they dynastic
tyrants or Leninist apparatchiks in business suits.
Half the nation which Hong Kong re-joined in 1997 is populated
by people of different race, culture, traditions and religion from the
dominant Han Chinese. On one side, Shanghai, with its soaring sky-
scrapers, the world's biggest trading floor and the highest per capita
income in the country (equivalent to £2,100 a year); on the other, the
backward settlements of the interior, the laid-off factory workers with
no jobs to go to, and the village in Anhui province where 60 per cent
of the girls have moved to work as entertainers in the southern boom
city of Shenzhen. On the eastern coast, get-rich-quick entrepreneurs
hustle deals on mobile phones. Thousands of miles to the west,
poachers roam roadless mountain plateaux where there is no water
and the temperature falls to minus 45 degrees centigrade in winter.
This a country where the fiftieth anniversary of the Communist
victory is marked by the execution of 200 people in one province
alone, and where the livers of the dead are offered for sale to patients
from Hong Kong for HK$30o,ooo (£23,000) a time. Television sta-
tions transmit celebrity game shows and soap operas inspired by
Hollywood while old women scour the banks of the Yangtze river for
coal dropped from barges and children aged under ten sing for their
supper at flashy restaurants. In Beijing, Cherie Booth and other
British legal luminaries attend earnest seminars on spreading the rule
of law, but down south in Guangdong province, a shop security man-
ager armed with a kitchen knife hacks off four fingers from a woman
accused of shoplifting a packet of ginseng - two of the fingers were
later re-attached in hospital. The 'little emperor' sons of single-
offspring families lord it in the cities, while in the countryside,
children are kidnapped and sold as farm labourers. The new rich
aspire to smart modernity as they crowd into techno clubs and
sweeten their vintage claret with Sprite, while stolen cats are served at
Beijing restaurants and the Handsome Wild Life Farming and
32 Dealing Wiiii i 1 1 1 -: Dragon
Development Park outside the tourist centre of Guilin fed live pigs
and calves to tigers in front of spectators before killing the tigers to
offer their meat and distilled 'restoration bone wine' to the visitors.
Outside the Han domain, Tibet and the Xinjiang region in the
west cover 2.4 million square kilometres, or almost half the land mass
of China. The province of Inner Mongolia has more goats than
Australia has people. The repression of Tibet is one of those things
that the world's leaders have decided they can do nothing about what-
ever the pressure from Hollywood stars and street demonstrators, the
twinkling appeal of the Dalai Lama, the destruction of a traditional
culture (including its serfdom and superstitions), the blatant abduction
of the child who was to be divine and the decision of the third-
highest-ranking spiritual leader to walk across the Himalayas in the
depths of the winter to refuge in India at the age of fourteen. In
Xinjiang, where the army keeps watch and Beijing tries to dilute the
Muslim natives by shipping in Han Chinese, there are occasional
ethnic riots, bombings and the execution of separatists.
All of which raises the question of what constitutes 'China' and
'the Chinese' - and where the new SAR of Hong Kong fits into it.
Is China a purely geographical entity which has regained Hong Kong
and Macau but still has to pine for Taiwan? In which case, what
about the many millions of overseas Chinese who think of them-
selves as Children of the Yellow Emperor even if they live in Soho,
Manchester or Vancouver? Are the Chinese a single people? If so,
what about the Uigurs and Tibetans and all the other fifty-four
minorities living from the frozen north to the sweaty border with
Burma? Is it a culture bound by a single language? But, though
China has a national written language, there are still a multitude of
dominant dialects, the Cantonese who cannot understand the
Beijingers, or the inhabitants of coastal towns who speak more easily
with second-generation emigrants to Singapore than with their com-
patriots in Sichuan province. And if being Chinese means belonging
to an ancient culture and society, what about the growing gulf
between the Confucian tradition and the children of the computer
age?
Faced with so many questions to which there are so few answers, it
...China 33
is not surprising if the believers in scientific socialism who hold the reins
of political power fall back on dogmatic statements about national unity
and lock up anybody who asks what it means to be Chinese today. But
until such questions can at least be broached, the prospects of China
unravelling must be all the greater as economic progress, social unrest
and the Internet eat away at the glue of totalitarian nationalism.
The nationalist spirit is something that the powers in place play on
at regular intervals in their desire to lead a reversal of the decline and
shame which enveloped the country with the decay of the nineteenth
century, the loss of Hong Kong and the Treaty Ports to rapacious
Westerners, and the humiliation by the Japanese conquest of great
swathes of territory. Four centuries ago, China was the biggest and
most advanced nation on earth, with a finely developed bureaucracy
and an intricate imperial system. But then the country that had
invented silk, gunpowder, paper and porcelain fell steadily behind the
fast-developing West and its eager pupils in Tokyo. Mao restored
national pride at an unacceptable cost in lives; the next paramount
leader, Deng Xiaoping, moved to the market with all the prestige of a
Long March veteran. Now their successors have to maintain the coun-
try's status and self-belief while making it a big international player.
The debate about the scope of the mainland's progress in the past
two decades remains open, particularly when comparisons are made
with the advance of the economy and living standards in the United
States. For all the leaps forward since Deng led the way to market, its
problems are still as great as its achievements. Does that mean China
is a 'theoretical power', as the late British commentator Gerald Segal
put it, exercising diplomatic theatre to give an impression of strength
that does not exist in reality? Despite 2.5 million men in uniform and
the testing of neutron bombs and intercontinental missiles with minia-
turised warheads, China's military power lags far behind the military
might of the West. The heirs of the Middle Kingdom live in a sea of
outdated dogma, nationalistic pretensions and doctored economic
statistics. The question is whether this will always hold them back, as
they cling on to power, or whether they can enable the country to
make a decisive - and highly dangerous - move towards modernity,
giving teeth to the warning delivered by an imperial minister to a
34 Dealing Wmi the Dragon
British envoy: 'You are all too anxious to awaken us and start us on a
new road, and you will do it, but you will regret it for once awakened
and started, we shall move faster and further than you think; much
faster than you want.'
Such matters will be a key element in the rest of this book. The vital
point as the new century begins is that, for the first time in its history,
China is engaging with the world in politics, economics and other
domains. The relationship is prickly, constantly thrown off course by
Beijing's reluctance to give ground and by enduring, and often well-
founded, suspicions about its motives. As we will see, conservatives in
Beijing are anxious to slow down the process of entering the inter-
national mainstream. But the dynamic unleashed by Deng Xiaoping in
the late 1970s seems unstoppable, even if the speed of change has been
considerably over-estimated by optimistic Western businessmen and
politicians dazzled by the potential of this mystery wrapped in an
enigma rendered unique by the sheer numbers involved.
At lunch in Beijing one day, the Education Minister spoke about
her domain: a mere 230 million school pupils and university students,
10 million teachers and 1 million education establishments. China has
the biggest army in the world, and a steel industry with 6,000 separate
firms. The state employs 8 million civil servants. The Three Gorges
Dam project along the Yangtze is the biggest development on earth,
and the new boundaries of the city of Chongqing upstream on the
river have turned it into the largest city on the planet, with 30 million
inhabitants.
China faces environmental and natural problems on a massive scale.
Eight of the ten most polluted cities in the world lie within its
borders. Beijing is surrounded by 4,700 rubbish dumps. Hundreds of
lakes in Qinghai province which feed the Yellow River have been
reduced to caked mud with devastating effects on the country's second
longest waterway, whose silt has traditionally provided land for crops
along its course. In Tibet, glaciers have disappeared, leaving only
boulders and pebbles. Parts of northern China are becoming danger-
ously short of water in a country where 70 per cent of cereal output
is from irrigated land. Elsewhere, flooding makes millions homeless
most years, claims thousands of lives and causes damage running into
...China 35
billions of pounds. Mining in river beds and deforestation could well
be adding significantly to the man-made disasters looming over a
land where environmental concerns have taken second place to crude
economic development.
On the human front, the number of migrants moving about in
search of work is estimated at 100 million; about the same number are
unemployed in rural areas; by coincidence, around 100 million
Chinese are reckoned to suffer from hypertension. HIV victims are
put at 1 million. China has as many smokers as all the people in
Britain, Germany, France, Italy and Spain: unless abstinence spreads,
3 million are likely to die of tobacco-related illnesses each year by the
middle of the twenty-first century.
China manufactures half the world's output of kettles, and is the
fastest growing market for mobile telephones - the government
expects 200 million to be in use by the year 2010. The Communist
Party has as many members as there are inhabitants of France. Despite
the atheist credentials of the regime, officially approved Protestant
and Catholic churches count as many adherents as the population of
Canada, and there are reckoned to be at least as many others who
worship unofficially. By the middle of the twenty-first century, 440
million Chinese will be aged over sixty, and there will be 70 million
young people without siblings as a result of the one-child policy.
When the government ordered a campaign against crime in 1999,
it was estimated that it would have to target no fewer than 7,000
underground gangs, some with as many as 30,000 members. An anti-
prostitution drive two years earlier led to the arrest of a quarter of a
million women.
The programme to reform state enterprises has no parallel in its
scope and social implications. The share of the economy represented
by the state sector has fallen to 42 per cent from 56 per cent when
Deng Xiaoping's reforms began in the late 1970s. But there are still a
multitude of mammoth enterprises which act more as sources of
employment than as competitive enterprises. If they now have to
shed their excess labour, will this mean another three million people
out of work, or five million, or even more? What is to become of the
one million workers being laid off by a single oil company? How will
36 Dealing With the Dragon
cities and towns which depended on the old state sector survive? No
wonder that the 'remnant Maoists', as the old men are known, have
been mounting a rearguard action, seeing mass unemployment as the
greatest threat to the Communist Party's grip on power.
They could be right. After Mao won in 1949, the Chinese lived
with an 'iron rice bowl' of cradle-to-grave protection guaranteeing
food, accommodation, education, health care and other benefits. The
food may have been of low quality, the housing in dormitories and
the hospitals primitive. But the system was there, to be relied on in
bad times. Now, the safety net is being taken down, and hundreds of
millions fear the chill.
The scale of economic and social re-engineering surpasses anything
else seen in the world since the initial revolution in China. The
market reforms introduced by Deng under the banner of 'Socialism
with Chinese characteristics' require formidable levels of growth to be
maintained into the new millennium. Given the extent of the prob-
lems China accumulated for itself through the twentieth century,
there can be no letting up. But even the most determined cyclist may
run out of energy, lose control and hit a brick wall.
The reform drive has to deal with an economy whose main aim for
half a century has been to maintain the public sector, whatever the price
and however badly it was serving consumers. Official reports say that
twenty years after Deng launched his changes in the late 1970s, subsidies
to the state sector were still three times as big as its profits. When it
announced China's largest stock market flotation at the end of 1999, a
state oil firm disclosed that 70 per cent of the money to be raised
would be used to pay off" debts and fund lay-offs. At the other end of the
industrial scale, seventy-nine of the eighty-one state enterprises in the
county town of Fengje in Sichuan province were reckoned to be losing
money. Excess capacity in factories may be as high as 60 per cent. A
Western consultant tells of going to inspect a steel plant in the middle
of China. He calculated that the plant could run with 2,000 workers. It
had 15,000 and, through their families, supported 50,000 people in all.
China probably has some 50 million workers who are surplus to its
requirements, not to mention hordes of local officials who are, at
best, in make- work jobs. Once it was a factory's business to keep the
...China 37
surrounding town in work, and to support the families of its employ-
ees as well, floating, if necessary, on a sea of state cash. Now, a new
logic prevails. Tens of millions of would-be workers move around the
country illegally, congregating at railway and bus stations in Shanghai,
Guangzhou, Beijing and scores of other cities. A report by the New
York-based organisation 'Human Rights in China' says that several
million are locked up each year in 700 detention centres, where con-
ditions are filthy and inmates are physically abused: one man was
battered to death after he tried to bargain down the price of a card-
board box which the warders were selling him to sleep in.
Out in the vast rural spaces of China, where 60 per cent of the
population still lives, often on unproductive soil and facing harsh cli-
mates, the disparity with urban progress and the rich coastal regions is
even greater. Official statistics report that 50 million people are below
the poverty line, which China sets at the level of US$24 a year. By the
World Bank's higher standard, that figure jumps to 124 million. Some
25 million women in rural areas aged between fifteen and forty are
illiterate. According to one expert at an anti-poverty workshop in
Beijing, more than 20 million people lack proper water supplies. In
some areas, villagers pay the equivalent of a couple of pounds a month
to live in caves.
Given the uncertainties of the present and future, it is not surpris-
ing that savings rates are astronomical, reaching an estimated US$720
billion in 1999. 'We have to keep as much money as possible for our
children's education, and in case we fall ill,' as a young and upwardly
mobile professional in Shanghai put it to me. Thanks to all that saving,
domestic demand is not as high as it should be to fuel the growth
China needs. The property boom on which so much was banked is
hollow. One of the first Dengist development zones, on the island of
Hainan, had 7 million square metres of empty space by the end
of 1999. In the showpiece city of Shanghai, 60 per cent of office
buildings in the new business district of Pudong are unoccupied,
together with 150 million square feet of residential accommodation.
Completion of what was to have been the world's tallest building, the
94-floor Shanghai World Financial Centre, has been delayed for at
least four years.
38 Dealing With the Dragon
As factories close, disgruntled workers increasingly stage public
protests at lay-offs and delayed wage payments. In Beijing at the end
of 1999, dismissed staff shut down a department store by occupying
the building for five days, something which would have been
unthinkable a few years ago. Elsewhere, workers have blocked railway
lines and roads, staged marches and held local officials hostage to
show their discontent. In one case, farmers who had lost their money
in failed government-backed investment funds were suspected of
having removed the bolts on the track of the main north-south rail-
way, derailing a train.
'Workers are no longer as docile as before,' President Jiang noted at
an economic meeting, according to a source quoted by Willy Lo-lap
Lam of the South China Morning Post. 'In many cities, they barge into
government offices, smash things up and paralyse the local adminis-
tration . . . Should the disturbances recur, the party and state may be
dealt a fatal blow.'
But a multitude of individual entrepreneurs still prosper. There is
Nian Guangjiu, the melon-seed king, who experienced a switch-
back of fortune and political persecution before building up a chain of
ninety-six shops across the country; and Chen Jiashu, who produces
badges in an eastern coastal town for US police forces, Lions clubs and
Ghana's customs officers. Shen Qing is making a fortune marketing a
patented baked pig's head. Zhang Ruimin, president of the German-
sounding Haier household appliance group, has gone beyond his
initial leap into the US and European markets in the 1990s by build-
ing a factory to turn out the company's goods in South Carolina. And
then there is Liu Chuanzhi of Legend computers, the best-selling
brand in Asia outside Japan, which more than trebled profits in
1998-99 as sales soared by 60 per cent in six months.
The new breed of businessmen look to a huge national market to
replace the old system by which provinces produced and sold within
their own boundaries, sheltering local industries from competition.
They are penetrating the international market, too, and have no
doubts about China's ability to become an economic superpower in
the new millennium. 'The twentieth century was the American cen-
tury, the twentieth-first will be ours,' a young entrepreneur told me as
... China 39
we left a crowded restaurant in Beijing where he had joked about
police listening devices in the overhead lights. This is the new world
in which China's central bank invests in the Long Term Capital hedge
fund in the United States. The personal opportunities offered by the
opening up of the economy provide the only reason to live with the
antiquated political structure: following Deng Xiaoping's dictum, it is
now officially glorious to become rich, and some have made the
most of their positions to live up to his urgings.
Contacts — or guanxi, as they are known — are one of the keys to the
Chinese way of doing business, built up and exploited by perfectly
honest companies as well as by people on the make. Family connec-
tions are important, so it is not surprising to find the son of the
President running a nascent telecommunications empire out of his
father's power base of Shanghai, or the son of the former premier
chairing a power company with an American listing. With parentage
like that, they can attract investors and surf through the bureaucracy.
There is nothing illegal in any of this; it is simply that the clout of
having a powerful father counts for even more in the Chinese system
than it does in the West (though nobody has suggested that Jiang
Zemin's son might run for the office his father holds, Bush-style).
Corruption has been a tradition of Chinese life from the days of the
emperors. It ran rampant under the Kuomintang, went into hiding
during the early days of Communism and then reappeared, boosted
by a two-tier price system under which officials could buy subsidised
goods cheaply and sell them on at a profit. Now, graft has emerged as
a major obstacle to the government's drive to reform industry and
agriculture, and induces a weary cynicism throughout society. China
as a whole is, indeed, getting a lot richer, but too much of the wealth
is going to those who use their official or party status to fill their own
pockets while hundreds of millions of the poor remain stuck at the
bottom of an increasingly unforgiving social and economic system.
The government is busy injecting money into backward provinces to
try to spur growth, but it does little good if it ends up in the bank
accounts of Communist cadres. The figures involved are staggering for
a country that is still relatively poor.
Individual cases run into the equivalent of tens of millions of
40 Dealing Wiiii mi: Dragon
pounds. Overall, audits of graft reach tens of billions. In Guangdong,
across the frontier from Hong Kong, six officials from the state Bank
of China used their position to conspire with the manager of a bowl-
ing alley to make the equivalent of £100 million in a foreign
exchange fraud. In the city of Wuhan, four people earned £110 mil-
lion from a scam involving fake receipts for non-existent imported
chemicals. A story in the Asian Wall Street Journal in 1999 quoted a
report to the Prime Minister as estimating that enough money had
disappeared in the grain sector alone to build a million schools, 10,000
factories or a second Three Gorges Dam.
Grain officials at one town in the north-east siphoned off the
equivalent of £3.5 million by faking 3,000 receipts for purchases
that were never made. In central Shaanxi province, a manager of a
grain warehouse embezzled ^2 million. In the spring of 1999, a
Shanghai newspaper quoted government figures showing that
shoddy public building projects cost the country the equivalent of
£7.5 billion a year, and that a fifth of those still standing do not meet
state quality standards. A hundred thousand cases of corruption had
been uncovered involving public projects, 63 per cent of them in
construction.
Vice-Premier Li Lanqing calls the amount of money involved in
graft 'shocking' and warns that 'the manner in which the violations
occur is getting increasingly covert'. In Guangxi province alone,
more than 400 officials were put under investigation in 1999, includ-
ing a vice-chairman of the Chinese parliament, the former chairman
of the provincial government and a police chief alleged to have
received bribes worth some 10 million yuan (.£800,000). Nothing
was sacred. The national auditor's office discovered that funds ear-
marked for flood-prevention measures had been misappropriated
by officials, who set up a bank account, invested in property and
shares, and converted a flood-monitoring centre into a hotel and
commercial offices. Such is the endemic nature of corruption that
when a 6,000-strong security force was formed to combat smug-
gling, watchdog units were installed to make sure that it was free of
graft.
'Not fighting corruption would destroy the country; fighting it
... China 41
would destroy the party,' a Communist Party elder of the Maoist days,
Chen Yun, remarked. The huge sums raked off by officials contrasts
with the abysmally low salaries of most Chinese: this is, after all, a
country where a teacher in a rural area earns the equivalent of £2$ a
month, and hundreds of millions make less. Some will aspire to emu-
late the fast-money men riding in imported limousines, but many
more will resent the yawning gap between rich and poor, and the way
those on the take have amassed their wealth. The very legitimacy of
the all-embracing party is at stake as the government is forced to get
to grips with the graft.
In the most spectacular case to date, the former Beijing mayor and
party chief, Chen Xitong, was sentenced to sixteen years in jail in
1998 for corruption and dereliction of duty. The assumption is that he
used the threat of disclosing embarrassing dirt to avoid the death
penalty. Aged sixty-seven, he certainly looked unconcerned when
the sentence was passed.
The mayor, who had played a role in the Tiananmen massacre, was
once talked of as a possible national leader after rising under Deng
Xiaoping. Some of Hong Kong's biggest property developers worked
with him on their projects in the capital. Following an investigation led
by a Communist Party graft-buster in her sixties, he was specifically
accused of misappropriating twenty-two gifts worth the equivalent of
^41,000. His deputy, who died in a mysterious shooting incident, is
said to have spent the equivalent of jQj million on a house. A woman
with whom Chen was involved fled to Hong Kong and the United
States reportedly with US$40 million. Chen was also alleged to have
conspired to use public funds for two luxury villas at which, according
to the Chinese news agency, he enjoyed 'extravagant wining, dining
and personal entertainment'. He also became the central figure in a
book published at the time which did not mention him by name but
was generally taken as an officially approved roman ci clef. In the book,
the central character is in love with his sister-in-law, a lion-tamer who
appears in figure-hugging sequin costumes and puts her head into the
mouths of the animals at the Municipal Circus: she eventually dies
when a lion bites offher head after its senses were irritated by a chem-
ical mixed into her hairspray by persons unknown.
42 Dealing With the Dragon
If prominent mayors can be the target of attack, so can the once
invulnerable police, who are listed by a popular verse as one of the
'seven vicious wolves' of China, alongside judges, prosecutors, state
and local taxes, Triads and bar hostesses. At the end of 1999, the
Minister of Public Security acknowledged that members of the
1.5 million-strong force were guilty of accepting bribes, abusing their
power, negligence, illegal use of weapons, dereliction of duty, incom-
petence, protecting smugglers, drug-trafficking, torture, collusion
with criminals, and corruption ranging from arbitrarily stopping cars
and demanding money to involvement in major graft. He added that
3,000 officers had already been fired. In one city in Sichuan, 586 guns
were confiscated from police who were 'subject to irritable temper
and alcoholism'.
In such an atmosphere it is not surprising that get-rich-quick scams
have proliferated. Fly-by-night finance outfits masquerading as offi-
cially approved companies offer depositors interest rates as high as 48
per cent and then go bust, or make off with the money. In one north-
ern province, 10,000 people signed up for a short-lived scheme which
promised payments of 100 yuan every five or ten days to investors
who put up 300 yuan to enable a stuffed pancake company to use a
'new business practice imported from Japan'. At the end of 1999,
three women were sentenced to death in coastal Zhejiang province for
an illegal savings fund that netted 200 million yuan G£i6 million).
More than 100 people were reported to have been sent to prison for
such scams in the Yangtze city of Chongqing, some of them local offi-
cials. Bilked investors stage regular protests. In Chongqing, they
blocked train lines and organised a 2,000-strong rally; the city gov-
ernment promised to arrange compensation. In eastern Henan
province, a train conductor who tried to sue over a 900 million yuan
scam was less lucky. He was locked up in a mental hospital and only
freed after protests by fellow investors.
Enterprises are floated with little more motive than the desire of
officials and their friends to get rich. Sales of state land offer big
opportunities to siphon off cash. So does the flotation of companies
like Tibet Holy Land. Its shares were 400 times oversubscribed, but
the firm still ran into financial trouble after its scheme to make a
... China 43
smart new drink out of holy water from a spring beneath a mountain
monastery went wrong. In the countryside, meanwhile some rural
officials have taken to selling jobs in the bureaucracy to people who
then exploit their new position to squeeze money out of locals.
Some of the money has gone abroad, or been recycled through
banks in Hong Kong. One estimate puts the amount exported ille-
gally from China in recent years at the equivalent of £35 billion.
After a large investment trust crashed in 1999 with a gap of £1.4 bil-
lion between assets and liabilities, I asked a lawyer in China who
follows such things where he thought the missing money had gone.
He suggested that it would be interesting to trawl through the land
registries in Southern California.
Up and down the country, rural credit establishments which were
meant to fuel the growth of local enterprises are going out of business
because of poor investments or fraud. The losers are the peasants who
entrusted their money to such organisations. Managers of some state
enterprises have also played fast and loose with pension funds, using
them to cover their firms' losses or to speculate in shares and property.
As a result, their retired workers have had to wait months for their
pension payments - when they got them at all — provoking demon-
strations that represent a further threat to President Jiang Zemin's
dreams of social stability.
The extent of government concern about corruption is shown by
the way stories about it now appear frequently in the press, such as the
saga of the port city of Zhanjiang in Guangdong province. With the
best deep-water harbour on China's southern coast and access to
sugar and rubber crops, oil, coal and timber, Zhanjiang became one of
the first fourteen mainland cities opened to foreign investment in the
1980s. Instead of turning into a boom industrial city, it grew into a
honeypot for corruption and contraband. Local businessmen say vir-
tually anything could be purchased at a discount through the
government-backed rackets. 'They would come around and ask us
what we needed,' one local manufacturer told Matthew Miller of the
South China Morning Post. 'It was quite simple - you paid them and
they provided fake invoices.' After raids in September 1998 involving
thousands of police, more than sixty officials were arrested and found
44 Dealing With the Dragon
guilty, among them the former Communist Party secretary, the cus-
toms chief, the deputy mayor and leading members of the police. Six
were sentenced to death. Apart from the illegality, corruption on
such a scale shelters inefficient industries. When the bubble bursts, the
effects are catastrophic. In Zhanjiang's heyday, its biggest company, a
car firm called Three Stars Enterprises, assembled 25,000 vehicles a
year. Visiting the city a year after the police raid, Miller reported that
the factory, with its 3,000 workers, stood idle. So did the second-
biggest state enterprise, an electrical appliance outfit.
Take any big project and you are likely to find at least a whiff of
corruption in the air. 'To get rich, first make the holes,' as a comment
on an Internet site in Guangdong put it. Or, in the official words of
the Chinese news agency, Xinhua: 'A large number of projects, which
should have gone through extensive processes of design, feasibility
study, experts' studies and approval, were built purely because some
senior bureaucrats had given their endorsement. This has opened the
door of convenience to those cadres who have fallen because of their
greed to deal with unscrupulous contractors.' The extent of poor
work has given rise to a new phrase, 'torn' constructions, as if they had
been made of bean curd, such as a 72-kilometre highway in the south
which gave way eighteen days after it was opened.
No project is as big as the Three Gorges Dam on the Yangtze, the
pet scheme of the former Prime Minister Li Peng, who is pictured on
cruise ships beaming as he observes the great walls of concrete going
up on the river. The total cost will be more than £40 billion, and
anywhere from 1.5 to 2 million people will be moved as the waters
rise to create a huge reservoir, flooding towns and cities and covering
30,000 hectares of agricultural land. Environmentalists worry about its
effects, particularly a build-up of sediment on the river bed which will
push up the water level and make flooding of the surrounding area
more likely. Human-rights monitors say many local residents are being
moved against their will.
Massive destruction of forests which used to absorb monsoon rain-
fall upstream of the dams has increased the danger of catastrophic
flooding. The electricity generated from the project may not find the
expected number of customers since provinces due to use its energy
. . . China 45
are building their own power stations. Even the tourists seem to be
growing cool about the trip through the 100-metre-high gorges.
When we made the voyage in 1998, the boat was full of people. Now,
the ships are three-quarters empty. 'Tourists have concluded that the
Three Gorges have already disappeared,' says the captain of the Yangtze
Angel cruise boat.
But whatever the doubts, the project has been a godsend for some.
The corporation running it has reported a 25 billion yuan (£2 billion)
shortfall, equivalent to one-third of the budget needed to complete
the second phase, due for 2003. One report says that at least 232 mil-
lion yuan G£i8 million) has been diverted from resettlement funds
alone. The Nanfang Weekly recounted how a local office pocketed
one-third of the funds allocated by Beijing for building road bridges.
Contractors have used poor materials for dams, and paid the peasant
workers half the stipulated amount. One builder had been construct-
ing roads and bridges for thirty years, but had never been subject to
any quality checks.
The bigger the job, the greater the take. So some officials simply
enlarge projects under their control. Buildings have been erected on
ground which could not properly support their weight. Investigations
showed that seventeen out of twenty bridges in one area in Sichuan
province had 'quality problems'; five were so dangerous that they had
to be destroyed. Such scams arouse the particular anger of the Prime
Minister, Zhu Rongji, who insisted in 1999 that officials must 'not
divert funds to other uses'. He was a bit late, but his ire mounted as
inspection trips uncovered more and more of what he called 'con-
structions made of beancurd and turtle eggs'. 'How can corruption
reach such a stage?' he exclaimed on one trip. Another time, he
sacked 100 officials on the spot.
This is typical of a man dubbed a fellow reformer by Tony Blair.
Zhu himself says he is an 'ordinary Chinese with a bad temper'. His
nickname in Hong Kong is 'iron face', and he can bear a distinct
resemblance to the fierce and implacable gods of classic Chinese sculp-
ture. He is said to have been the target of several assassination
attempts.
Not known for his willingness to take prisoners, the Premier is a
46 Dealing Wrin nil. Dracon
man in a hurry. When he got the job in 1998, he vowed to surmount
'a multitude of minefields and 30,000 abysses' in his drive to reform
the economy and cut the 8-million-strong civil service in half. A
quip circulating in Beijing about Zhu and his predecessor, Li Peng,
says that 'one guy with middling intelligence has left the State
Council, to be succeeded by a smart madman'. How far the 'smart
madman' can go in reforming China will be a theme of the year of
1999, with deep implications not only for Hong Kong but also for the
mainland's whole relationship with the rest of the world.
Born in Hunan province in 1928, Zhu had a hard childhood: his
father died before he was born and his mother when he was nine. She
was buried under a simple heap of soil - in keeping with his austere
image, Zhu has given orders that the family graves are not to be
adorned in any special fashion. Married in 1956, he was purged
during the Cultural Revolution as a rightist and reduced to menial
work. Rehabilitated, he became a key lieutenant to Jiang Zemin
when the future President was Mayor of Shanghai. Zhu then became
mayor himself before being called to Beijing to squelch China's gal-
loping inflation. Gaining the sobriquet of 'economic tsar', he prepared
a massive programme to carry on Deng's crusade, and was the obvi-
ous candidate to succeed Li Peng as head of the government, though
he has still not been able to rout critics who hanker for the Maoist
ways.
Hong Kong's Chief Executive likens a session with the Prime
Minister to a manager meeting his sharp-eyed, no-nonsense company
chairman who has the accounts open in front of him and will pick up
on any weakness. The reformist, market-minded character of Zhu's
economic policies has done nothing to diminish his orthodoxy in
other domains. He is the embodiment of the regime's insistence that
economics and politics can be kept apart and, understandably, hates to
be described as China's Gorbachev.
To make reform meaningful and produce a more level playing
field, Zhu and Jiang have had to attack one of the sacred elements of
the system — the People's Liberation Army (PLA) and its involvement
in industry and business. Ranking just below the Communist Party at
the historic pinnacle of the regime, the military— commercial complex
... China 47
was reckoned to stretch over 50,000 companies with earnings of more
than US$5 billion. One major enterprise, China Poly, built up more
than 100 subsidiaries. The PLA's General Political Department bought
an Australian mining firm as well as companies listed in Hong Kong
and Toronto. The Logistics Department runs a big pharmaceutical
enterprise, and the Staff Department is into electronics and telecom-
munications.
As a sop for their drive to take the army out of business, Jiang and
Zhu boosted the military budget to ensure the loyalty of officers who
claim the heritage of the Long March and the victory of 1949 - and
their sons: China Poly is headed by the offspring of a revolutionary
elder. The President, in particular, went out of his way to listen to the
generals, to safeguard their powers and privileges, and to sing the
PLA's praises. Dealing with the army was also vital to Zhu's drive
against corruption and smuggling. Army officers had grown accus-
tomed to using their position to cover part of China's vast contraband
network, which is estimated to have been costing the central govern-
ment as much as £10 billion a year in customs revenue, taking in
everything from tobacco and drinks, food oil and machinery to Viagra
and pornography, not to mention human cargo shipped out in con-
tainers for a new life in North America or Australia.
Apart from getting the army to clean up its act, the campaign is
confronting some of China's toughest nuts. In the port of Leizhou, a
local gang thought nothing of shooting policemen and attacking cus-
toms officers; finally, more than a thousand security men had to be
sent in to arrest the underworld bosses, three of whom were executed.
Pirates regularly board ships and kill the crews before smuggling the
cargoes. In one attack in 1998, they beat the twenty-three sailors on
a Hong Kong-owned ship to death one by one and threw the bodies
into the sea off the Shanghai coast. Less lethally, pirates stole a couple
of cars in Taiwan in 1999 and smuggled them across the Strait, com-
plete with the sleeping drivers, who were so drunk that they didn't
know what was happening until they came round on the mainland.
Cracking down on corruption and smuggling is essential it China
is to regain its lure as the last great business frontier for Western com-
panies. The statistics of the past two decades are impressive enough.
48 Dealing With 1111. Dragon
with 324,000 foreign-investment projects that will involve a total of
US$572 billion if they are all completed. But few businessmen now
share the starry-eyed vision of the late chairman of Coca-Cola of the
profits to be made from putting a drinks can into the hands of every-
body in China. For much of the 1990s, foreign investment rose by 40
per cent or more a year. In 1993, it almost tripled as China accounted
for nearly half of all foreign investment in developing countries. But
in 1999, the inflow of funds began to fall.
The question being asked in boardrooms in New York, Tokyo,
London and Paris is very simple: where are the returns and when are
they going to start showing up? The turn of the century saw a fren-
zied rush for China-related Internet companies. But for more
mundane goods, there are even cheaper manufacturing centres than
China these days: for really cut-price labour go to Cambodia. The
low level of domestic spending on the mainland, the rudimentary dis-
tribution system, and mentalities bred by decades during which
production took precedence over the wishes of consumers mean that
the market is still something of a mirage for many searchers after the
Chinese holy grail. A study by City University in Hong Kong has
found that while new private Chinese companies had a return on
equity of 19 per cent, foreign firms were making just a sixth of that.
The consultants A. T Kearney report that only 41 per cent of firms
which have invested in China say they are showing a profit, and that
about a quarter of multinationals are pulling out of at least one main-
land venture.
After the collapse of the big Gitic investment trust in Guangdong
province in 1999, foreign bankers have become all too aware of the
dangers involved in pumping money into Chinese companies, even if
the state body they wrongly thought was acting as a guarantor rejoiced
in the acronym of SAFE - the State Administration of Foreign
Exchange. To add to the worries, the huge state banking sector is
awash with debts after decades of being used to keep public sector
enterprises afloat. A junior banker from Fujian province was singled
out in 1999 as the 'national model of the financial system' because
there had not been a single default on any of more than 3 ,000 loans
he approved in an eighteen-year career. But Moody's Investment
China
49
Services estimates that bad loans issued by less rigorous managers
could amount to a trillion yuan, or -£75 billion, equal to the main-
land's entire fiscal revenue for 1998.
For optimists, the conversion to market economics and growing
internationalism will produce a new China. Despite the backwardness
of vast regions, there is no doubt of the enormous social progress in
the last decade; or of the earlier advances in education, health, welfare
and the equality of women. Despite the oppressive political rule of the
Communist Party, most individuals are now far freer in their everyday
lives than they have been for four decades. For many Western busi-
nessmen investing in China, the stability provided by one-party rule
is greatly preferable to the uncertainties of democracy. On such a
view, modernity will sweep the country along with it, a new gener-
ation of leaders will shake off the heritage of Mao, a thousand efficient
factories will bloom, Taiwan and the mainland will co-exist, and the
world will acquire a new major partner to balance the power of the
United States in a positive manner.
Pessimists see a paranoid, self-centred state which will not give up
an inch of its internal power, a government intent on exerting its
authority over free and democratic Taiwan, a regime incapable of
real evolution. As for the economy, consider two sets of statistics:
official annual growth is put at 7 to 8 per cent, but electricity con-
sumption, a good gauge of economic expansion, is only rising by 2
per cent. And with three-quarters of state firms surveyed in 1999
admitting to falsifying their figures, who can believe in the statistics in
any case? As one banker remarked: 'It's the last great illusion.' But
great illusions live by their own logic, and China's logic is all its own.
So, welcome to China and its administrative region of Hong Kong,
and to the concept of one country, two systems.
One Country, Two Systems
At the stroke of midnight on 30 June 1997, China regained sover-
eignty over the mountainous island of Hong Kong, the bigger
area of Kowloon and the New Territories, and the 235 outlying
islands scattered round one of the world's finest harbours. The
Chinese national flag was raised at midnight, and the soldiers of the
People's Liberation Army rolled into Hong Kong standing ramrod stiff
in the rain on the back of their trucks. But life went on as usual the
next morning in the new Special Administrative Region of the
People's Republic of China as Deng Xiaoping's formula of one coun-
try, two systems was put to the test.
The soldiers were quickly hidden away in their barracks.
Democratic critics of Beijing climbed to the balcony of the Legislative
Council building in the early hours to make defiant speeches for the
crowd below and the television cameras of the world. The President
and Prime Minister of China came and sat on the platform at the cer-
emonies. The Prince of Wales sailed off into the humid night with the
last Governor on the Royal Yacht. And, up the road through the New
Territories, past the paddy fields abandoned by owners who make
more from leasing them out as container dumps, the border remained
as closely guarded as ever. But still the illegal immigrants kept head-
ing for the mecca of Hong Kong, following a pattern which gave a
special irony to the decolonisation.
One Country, Two Systems 51
Most inhabitants of the new SAR are of refugee stock. The coun-
try which they, or their parents, fled was China, particularly after the
Communist victory of 1949. Some came legally; others were smug-
gled in by land or sea, or swam across to the New Territories. More
recently, Hong Kong has taken in 150 mainlanders a day. Families
from China have dominated Hong Kong for years. Many come from
Shanghai, Asia's most international city in the days of the defeated
Kuomintang: textile tycoons who brought their machinery with
them, shipping magnates like the Chief Executive's father, film pro-
ducers and entrepreneurs by the thousand. Before the handover, all
but one of the four serious candidates for the post of Hong Kong's
first Chief Executive traced their roots back to the city which loomed
as an eventual rival to Hong Kong.
Other refugees came from Fujian up the coast, or from the neigh-
bouring southern province of Guangdong whose dialect is the
territory's principal tongue. Fleeing China did not mean rejecting
mainland roots. Apart from Cantonese, some dialects from across the
border still enjoy more currency in the SAR than the official main-
land language of Putonghua. There are mutual aid organisations for
those from the different provinces. Restaurants offer the cuisine of all
parts of China; only the traditional food of the original Hakka inhab-
itants of Hong Kong, with its salt-baked chicken and marinated fatty
pork, is hard to find.
The feelings of this essentially refugee population about returning
to the sovereignty of the country which they or their parents fled have
been more mixed than the patriots would like to pretend, even if the
term 'reunification' has come increasingly into official vogue. There
was a notable absence of rancour towards the colonialists who were
leaving after 156 years, or of any great rush to follow the Chief
Executive's exhortation to become more Chinese. True, a few com-
mentators and a couple of politicians did play the anti-colonial card,
and some of those who had gratefully accepted knighthoods stopped
calling themselves 'Sir'. Memories of the opium trade and the con-
struction of great Scottish and English fortunes were evoked
repeatedly in the more mainland-minded media at the time of the
handover. Beijing suspected that lucrative contracts had been given to
H >
IA1
52 Dealing Wiiii iiii-; Draijon
British firms in order to sluice money out of the territory, though
there proved to be no foundation to rumours of a submarine hidden
in a secret dock beneath the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank, ready to
spirit away its wealth to London at midnight on 30 June. And yes, over
the decades, Hong Kong had served as an easy source of enrichment
for second-raters from the colonial power immortalised in the
acronym FILTH - Failed In London, Try Hong Kong.
But although the British influence never reached deeply into the
lives of the mass of the population, too many members of the terri-
tory's establishment had ties with the former sovereign power for the
usual end-of-empire sentiments to take much hold outside old left-
ist circles. The movers and shakers of Hong Kong have homes in
London, children at public schools, links with the City, horses run-
ning at Ascot. Lower down the social scale, however badly the
British had behaved towards the Chinese earlier in the century, the
freedom to live as one wished meant that there was little reason for
resentment. It wasn't even as if the departing power had converted
most of the people of Hong Kong to speaking its language, the low
level of English fluency being a constant source of surprise to visitors
and concern to the administration and internationally minded
businesses.
In a display of political correctness before the handover, officials
referred to Hong Kong as a 'territory' rather than a colony. One sea-
soned British official says this was not so much out of respect for the
colonised natives as to avoid antagonising Beijing, which did not wish
to be reminded that part of China was still held by European imperial-
ists. What used to be the Royal Hong Kong Golf Club has dropped
the adjective. The flag is no longer hoisted at dawn at the Cenotaph
in Central, built as a replica of the memorial in Whitehall, nor does
the government arrange a Remembrance Day ceremony there.
Still, the relics of the past are all around. A leading hotel has kept its
Churchill Room. A large portrait of the Queen and Prince Philip in
ceremonial dress hangs in the Windsor Room of the Hong Kong
Club. The table mats in the dining room at the Chief Executive's
offices during the handover showed English hunting scenes. An
elderly radio presenter called Ralph Pixton continued to run a Sunday
One Country, Two Systems 53
phone-in show redolent of the Light Programme of the 1940s. The
official residence of the Chief Secretary of the Special Administrative
Region is still called Victoria House. Ladies in white hats enjoy games
of bowls at their club in Kowloon; the police band in Macintosh
tartan plays traditional British tunes at national day ceremonies, and
you can post letters in boxes with the royal crest (even if the paint has
been changed from red to green or purple). At the military head-
quarters building, the metal lettering of the name on the cream tower
has been removed, but the words - The Prince of Wales Building —
can clearly be read from indentations in the concrete as if carved
there for perpetuity.
Anglican services are celebrated in the Gothic-revival Cathedral of
St John's. The quiet residential streets of the Kowloon Tong district
still bear the names of English counties; in the Central district there is
a street called Lambeth Walk. The new office complex in which I
used to work has towers with the names of Dorset, Somerset, Devon,
Warwick and Lincoln. In a nearby club, old Punch covers hang in the
men's lavatory. A British company, Stagecoach, runs many of Hong
Kong's buses. The underground rolling stock is from Cammell Laird.
The Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation and Standard
Chartered Bank, both with their ultimate headquarters in London,
issue banknotes for the SAR as they did for the colony. And when it
comes to the world game, Manchester United are the most popular
team, drawing a capacity crowd in high summer heat in 1999.
For individuals, adopted English names persist, though some would
raise eyebrows in London. The head waiter at the Hong Kong Club
is called Paprika. Two women flight attendants on a trip to Shanghai
had name badges telling passengers they were Keith and Aegean.
Then there are Fruit the film director, Garidge and Diesel the pho-
tographers, Starboard the yachtsman, Charcoal the businessman and
Garment and Echo the television executives. One of the two public
statues on Hong Kong Island is of Queen Victoria, in a park which
still carries her name. At the fashionable China Club, the telephone in
the library is an old British apparatus in black Bakelite, its dial
engraved with 'Emergency Calls for Fire Police Ambulance Dial 999'
and the number Barnet 8235. Two of the senior officials shaping the
54 Dealing With the Dragon
government's legal policies are British, and one of them found him-
self acting as Solicitor-General when the administration failed to
come up with a local candidate for the job. Most High Court cases are
still heard in English before judges wearing horsehair wigs.
The colonial era was not democratic until the last gasp of Chris
Patten's opening-up of the electoral franchise. But British rule was
generally benign in its later days, particularly compared with what was
going on across the border. As the Queen's portrait was taken down
at the Central Post Office, few people could remember the days when
Chinese had not been allowed to live on the heights of the Peak,
when a magnate bequeathed money to a hospital on condition that it
would not treat Chinese patients, or when senior civil servants could
not take local wives.
The key difference from other colonies from which Britain with-
drew was that Hong Kong did not move to independence. Instead,
London handed it over to the sovereignty of another nation. Indeed,
it can be argued that what happened on i July is best seen as a trans-
fer of colonialism with the old system of government that had
pertained before Patten's reforms. In that scenario, the Chief
Executive of the SAR became the heir of the pre-Patten Governor,
with institutions like his Executive Council, the civil service and the
legislature carried on intact from one era to another and a business
elite calling the shots when it mattered. The provisional legislature
sworn in to replace the elected body of late Patten days echoed the era
when the Governor appointed legislators. The difference is that before
1997, the man in charge had been the emissary of a liberal democracy
ultimately responsible to the House of Commons; now, the line runs
to the Communist rulers in Beijing.
Nobody could pretend that the choice of Tung Chee-hwa as Chief
Executive in 1997 was a matter of popular consultation. If they had
had a free choice, the people of Hong Kong would almost certainly
have picked Anson Chan Fang On-sang, the first local Chief Secretary
appointed by Patten to head the civil service. But that was not to be,
as Tung moved smoothly to centre stage, resigning from the
Governor's Executive Council and hewing to the party line on any
controversial issues. When one criticised the extremely restricted
One Country, Two Systems 55
nature of the selection committee that chose Tung to rule Hong
Kong, the response was that at least they numbered 400 and were
from Hong Kong. Critics of the Patten reforms rarely miss an oppor-
tunity to point out that Britain had left it till the very last moment to
introduce democracy, and had been unable to do anything to ensure
its preservation. At one point, Margaret Thatcher had wondered wist-
fully if Hong Kong could, indeed, be given its freedom when Britain's
treaties or ownership expired in 1997. But China would never have
agreed, and would British troops have been deployed to hold back the
PLA? Not a chance, as was brought home forcefully in 1996 when the
American fleet sailed through the Taiwan Strait after China staged war
games to try to intimidate the breakaway island. Who could imagine
Ark Royal dropping anchor in the harbour to defend Hong Kong?
Power politics aside, there was the simple fact that the territory
depended on the mainland for its water and most of its food. The
contents of the beautiful Plover Cove reservoir in the New Territories
come from over the border — 770 million cubic metres a year
compared to 280 million cubic metres collected from rainfall. Econo-
mically, the link has been with China since Deng launched the move
to the market in the south. Hong Kong companies have signed some
180,000 investment contracts in the mainland amounting to the
equivalent of ^Tn billion, most of it in the Pearl River Delta, where
they are now reckoned to employ about three million people.
Property companies from the SAR have put up towering office and
accommodation blocks in Beijing and Shanghai. One of the big con-
glomerates set out to turn the city of Wuhan into 'China's Chicago'.
Others constructed mainland expressways and shopping malls.
Tycoons went back to their native towns and villages and spread the
manna of capitalism in the form of hospitals and schools. SAR resi-
dents make 40 million trips across the frontier each year. Some 50,000
vehicles will cross each day by the year 2005.
At the same time, the Hong Kong establishment did not wait for
the handover to move closer and closer politically to the mainland.
The British could no longer offer anything, and one country, two sys-
tems covered the disparity between Hong Kong's capitalism and the
creed still professed up north. If the date for change had not been
56 Dealing With the Dragon
fixed, there might have been more equivocation. But i July was set,
and, since Beijing would be in the driving seat, it was clearly advan-
tageous to board its vehicle. Soon after arriving in the territory in
1995, I naively asked a local businessman one evening on his corpo-
rate boat how he thought Britain was handling the change of
sovereignty. 'But it is us and Beijing who are handling the handover,'
he replied with a smile.
If few people actively disliked the departing colonial power, there
was no definable 'pro-British' sentiment. Nor did independence
figure high in the polls. Even the most died-in-the-wool democratic
opponents of Beijing could not deny that they were Chinese. What
mattered was what you meant by that description: could a line be
drawn between belonging to the Chinese race and counting yourself
a subject of the Leninist Yellow Emperors in Beijing? In all the cele-
bration of the preservation of the Hong Kong system it was easy to
forget about the first two words of the formula — one country — but
nobody who knew how the People's Republic functioned could
doubt that the new sovereign power would give them precedence.
Opinion polls in 1997 showed a high degree of anxiety about how
Beijing would act. There was little of the popular exuberance that
accompanied the end of colonialism in Africa. For all the official
rejoicing, the SAR has no Reunification Square or Motherland
Avenue. Rather, there was a general recognition in the public that a
historic turning point had been reached, a tentative welcome at re-
joining the Chinese nation, but also an insistence that Hong Kong
must remain Hong Kong, and a corresponding concern about the
behaviour of the new sovereign and whether the Tung government
would stand up for its citizens. Such concerns had fuelled a rush for
foreign nationalities and passports after Britain imposed strict immi-
gration restrictions on Hong Kong people. For many, however,
acquiring a passport was an insurance policy, not a final decision to
live in Canada, Australia or the USA. Though some made the move
permanent, many others went for long enough to qualify for pass-
ports, and then returned.
The worry about what Beijing would do had. been a significant
factor in the emergence of the Democratic Party as the main political
One Country, Two Systems 57
force after the Tiananmen Square massacre of 1989. Equally, its main
rival, the Democratic Alliance for the Betterment of Hong Kong
(DAB), suffered from being seen as a 'pro-Beijing' movement. To vote
Democrat was also to vote for Hong Kong's separate identity, epito-
mised by the way people tend to describe themselves. Opinion surveys
carried out in 1999 by an academic group called the Hong Kong
Transition Project showed that 46 per cent regarded themselves as
'Hong Kong people', 27 per cent as 'Hong Kong Chinese' and 21 per
cent simply as 'Chinese'. In another poll among 6,500 students, those
who regarded themselves as being purely Hong Kongers outnumbered
those who saw themselves as solely Chinese by nearly three to one.
Just as the government in Beijing describes the mainland's hybrid
state-market economy as 'socialism with Chinese characteristics', so
the best description of the inhabitants of Hong Kong may be 'Chinese
with Hong Kong characteristics'. Those characteristics enjoy the
underpinning of the agreement reached in 1984 between China and
Britain, known as the Joint Declaration, and of the Basic Law which
acts as Hong Kong's constitution. There is to be a fifty-year span in
which the concept of one country, two systems will prevail, with
Beijing taking charge of foreign and military affairs but otherwise
leaving Hong Kong with its way of life basically intact. This gives the
Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China a
degree of autonomy unknown anywhere else in the world.
Which other region of a unitary state has its own constitution, cen-
tral bank, legal code, tax system and civil service structure? Or a
currency pegged to that of another country, and note-issuing banks
with their group headquarters on the other side of the world? In
which other region do you have to dial an international code to tele-
phone the capital? Where else does only 1 per cent of the population
use the national language as its usual means of expression, and where
else would a poll show 90 per cent of teachers against the idea of con-
ducting lessons in the national tongue?
Over the border, you cannot move about legally without a permit,
let alone travel abroad; in Hong Kong, you go to the airport and fly
wherever you like. There, the currency is not convertible; here, you
dial instructions to your bank to move your money into US dollars.
58 Dealing With the Dragon
euros or whatever. There, the stock market is in its highly volatile
infancy and the banking system opaque; here is a world-class, largely
transparent financial structure. On the mainland, corruption has been
a way of life as a means of supplementing low official salaries; in
Hong Kong, civil servants are among the highest paid on earth and
investigators of the anti-corruption body haul in eminent suspects at
will. In the rest of China, freedom of political expression is severely
limited; here you can say what you want. On the mainland, any airing
of the Taiwanese government's point of view is taboo; in Hong Kong,
the idea of a ban on such views attracts only 20 per cent support. The
Beijing government has an awful human rights record; despite criti-
cism from a United Nations hearing in 1999, a poll in the SAR
showed that 94 per cent of people thought human rights were being
respected.
The mainland lives with a heavy burden of history; in Hong Kong,
Tiananmen apart, there is little feeling of the past, no legacy of emper-
ors, civil war, the Communist victory, the Great Leap Forward,
famine, the Cultural Revolution or the Gang of Four. And as for the
instant history providers of the media, on the mainland they are part
of the political apparatus run by the state and the Communist Party;
in Hong Kong, most are commercially driven. There, the media hail
the patriotism of the army in 1989; here, newspapers run huge front-
page photographs of the Hong Kong vigil to commemorate the dead
of 4 June. There independent media politics are still taboo; here a lead
letter in the main English-language daily declares: 'The Chinese
Communist Party is a failure. It has lasted fifty years only through dic-
tatorial rule, employing tactics of terror, secrecy, suppression and fear.'
In China, tiny groups of dissidents are subject to persecution and
long prison terms: the authorities say 2,000 people are locked up for
subversion but human rights groups put the number at 10,000. In
Hong Kong, anti-government demonstrations are a regular occur-
rence, and democrats attack the regime in the Legislative Council
rather than in jail. On the mainland, the parliament is a one-party
body; here, despite large imperfections in the electoral system, anti-
government candidates won most of the popularly elected seats at
the first post-handover poll. On the mainland, the Communist
One Country, Two Systems 59
Party rules; here the Chief Executive cannot even count on a pro-
government party, while the Communists have no official status and
are run by a secret cell in a liaison office. For China, the idea of an
independent judiciary is strange and foreign. In Hong Kong, it is
central. On the mainland, freedom of worship is strictly controlled,
and the government insists that the ordination of Catholic bishops is
a matter for the Patriotic Catholics' Association, in which the Vatican
has no say. In Hong Kong, religions of all kinds flourish. The
Financial Secretary and several senior government colleagues are
Catholics, as is the leading opposition figure.
In the summer of 1999, the mainland authorities banned a mystic,
deep-breathing sect which claims 70 million members in China; in
Hong Kong, local practitioners sat freely in the lotus position outside
the Chinese news agency in protest. Across the border, urban couples
were for years only allowed to have one child; here you can have as
many offspring as you wish. In China, despite the lessening of state
control in recent years, everything from possession of satellite dishes to
the permitted size of dogs is subject to official restrictions. Even the
weather reports were doctored to pretend that the heat never rose
above 37 degrees. In Hong Kong, the administration cannot even
clamp down on illegal smoky exhausts, and regularly loses in court
when it tries to impose laws against spitting.
All this is summed up in the concept of one country, two systems
launched by Deng Xiaoping as the panacea for the intractable prob-
lem of how to recover Hong Kong without undermining its success,
which would add so much to China's wealth. The concept was both
a recognition of reality and a bargain. Hong Kong would be left to
pursue its internationalist, capitalist ways, but at the same time, it
would become part of China, and so must not threaten the system on
the mainland, in particular the primacy of the Communist apparatus.
In one place, freedom was to go on as before; in the other, an auto-
cratic, outmoded power structure was to be preserved based on a mix
of oppression and economic opportunity.
Then politics raised its head. This was most troublesome, tor Deng
had decreed that Hong Kong was an economic, not a political, city.
But the demonstration and ensuing massacre at Tiananmen Square
60 Dealing With i he Dragon
changed Hong Kong for ever. A fifth of the population took to the
streets in support of the protest. Large amounts of money were raised.
Tents and aid flowed north to give fresh resources to the students.
After the killings, Hong Kong became a key staging post for dissidents
smuggled out of the mainland.
What 4 June 1989 brought was the chilling realisation that eight
years, three weeks and five days later, Hong Kong would become part
of the country whose leaders had called in the army against their own
citizens for daring to challenge their power. But the handover clock
could not be stopped. Nobody in London was going to go back on
the Joint Declaration. Just two years after the killings, Britain's Prime
Minister was the first Western visitor to go to Beijing since the mas-
sacre, shaking hands with the Chinese as he signed an agreement on
Hong Kong's new airport and inspected an honour guard of the army
that had crushed the demonstrators.
One man came to symbolise Tiananmen. Of stocky build, he has
thick black hair, heavy dark spectacles and a signal lack of charisma. Li
Peng, Prime Minister of the People's Republic until 1998, was gen-
erally believed to have been the man who executed Deng Xiaoping's
orders to suppress the 1989 protest. That made him a hate figure
among Hong Kong democrats. The feeling was mutual. Li Peng made
his first visit to Hong Kong for the handover. While he sat in the
shiny new Convention Centre on the waterfront, shouting demon-
strators outside waved banners denouncing 'the Butcher of
Tiananmen'. But the Premier heard nothing, thanks to a policeman
called Dick Lee, and a pragmatic decision he made that night.
A history graduate, Lee spoke twice to Jonathan Dimbleby for his
book on the Patten years, The Last Governor. In 1992, he said that after
the handover, 'we are afraid that we will be ordered to do things that
we don't want to do'. He added that he would 'stand up and say no'.
Four years later, he defined his job as 'enforcing the laws of Hong
Kong. Whatever the law says, we carry out.' Even if the law was
unjust? 'If the new government changes the law, then the police have
to enforce it.' As 30 June turned into 1 July the Deputy Commissioner
responsible for Security Affairs had a problem not with unjust laws but
with a matter of immediate practicality.
One Country, Two Systems 6i
The protestors in the street were within their rights, but if Li Peng
heard them he might take umbrage, which would not be the best
birth gift for the SAR. So Lee decided that loud music should be
played to alleviate the strain for his men of watching over the protest.
What better than a spot of Beethoven? As the protest chants rose, the
Fifth Symphony came over the loudspeakers at high volume, drown-
ing out their noise. Questioned about the incident later, Lee got into
a spot of trouble for insisting on his cultural cover story. A document
showing his real motivation came to light, and he was criticised for
not telling the truth. Some thought this bore out Dimbleby's fears of
back-sliding. For myself, I saw it as a pretty good example of the way
Hong Kong can square the circle.
In 1997, such pragmatism seemed to ensure that everything would
sail along in the SAR more smoothly than anybody had the right to
expect. But nothing can be set in stone, particularly not in a place as
exposed to the currents of the world as Hong Kong. Those who had
forecast trouble after 1 July had concentrated on politics, freedom of
expression and media. There were scary predictions of tanks in the
streets, democrats under house arrest, censors in newspaper offices.
But the first challenge came from a very different direction, when the
East Asian economic crisis broke, starting with the devaluation of the
currency in Thailand. At first, Hong Kong showed remarkable insou-
ciance. As the crisis toppled currencies and economies throughout
South-East Asia, the Financial Secretary even advised that it was time
to start buying shares, and thought that a crash on Wall Street might
help the SAR by sending funds in its direction.
Ignoring his advice, the market plunged. So did property prices,
with all that entailed. As 1998 drew on, the golden goose of Hong
Kong turned into a squawking turkey. A sure-fire bet for speculators
was to take a short position in the market by betting on a fall and
contracting to buy shares at a future date below their prevailing
price. Then sell large amounts of Hong Kong dollars. Given the cur-
rency peg, this automatically forces up interest rates. That drags
down share prices. So all you have to do is to clean up on your short
positions, and you're in the money. It was done time and again in the
summer of 1998, not just by cowboy outfits but by well-established
62 Dealing With the Dragon
international banks. Officials feared that the index could be brought
down to a third of its existing value. To prevent that, Joseph Yam, the
head of the Monetary Authority, Hong Kong's de facto central bank,
proposed going into the market. It was something he had been
thinking of since huge rises in overnight interest rates at the start of
the Asian crisis showed how vulnerable Hong Kong could be to out-
side pressure. Yam worked on the plan for two weeks with Donald
Tsang, the Financial Secretary. It was presented to the Chief
Executive, who gave the go-ahead. A trial run was done with trusted
brokers. The next day the government of free-market Hong Kong
plunged in massively to buy leading stocks, followed by some over-
due tightening of regulations a little later. The index shot up, the
speculators were defeated, and the world was left wondering what
had happened to Hong Kong's hallowed non-interventionist princi-
ples.
It was hardly what Deng, who died four months before China
regained Hong Kong, had been expecting from the freewheeling
capitalist icon that was meant to be a model for China's march to
market economics. But after a pause following the handover, the
course of events in the SAR had begun to take on its own momen-
tum, played out against the imposing backdrop of China's meeting
with the world and the mainland's engagement with the greatest eco-
nomic and social challenge on earth. The two processes — Hong
Kong and China, China and the world — are symbiotically linked. The
SAR is both a part of the emerging nation to the north, and its
bridge to the rest of the planet, as well as being a vital place which has
to retain its own identity as a region of a monolithic power preaching
an outdated political ideology that runs counter to everything that has
made Hong Kong what it is. How one of the world's most extraordi-
nary places deals with its vast dragon sovereign in the last year of the
century says much about how men and women, institutions and
society react when they become a testing ground for a unique exper-
iment.
January
i— 14 January
Eighteen months after Hong Kong returned to Chinese sovereignty,
the wife of the chairman of one of the old British companies, the
Swire Group, fires the traditional midnight gun in Causeway Bay to
welcome in 1999. It is as if nothing had changed in 1997. Immediately
afterwards, the other great colonial hong, Jardine s, holds its New
Year party in the penthouse of its headquarters overlooking the har-
bour, with the host attired in a clan tartan kilt. It may be New Year
but, this being Hong Kong, business is never too far away. At the
Jardine's party, the boss of a big financial group comes up to ask me
about the prospects of one of his clients buying into the South China
Morning Post, the newspaper I edit.
Three babies are born on the stroke of midnight. There is a 600-
metre swimming race on the south side of the island, and thousands
gather in Victoria Park for a 'Family Fun Carnival'. The ballroom of
the Grand Hyatt Hotel is turned into Camelot, with papier-mache
medieval decor, attendants in armour and champagne to wash down
the caviar and lobster.
A New Year opinion poll reports that the number of people who
are pessimistic about the future has fallen to 34.6 per cent from 42 per
cent a year ago. Still, concern about the economy remains strong amid
continuing recession. On the radio, the Chief Executive advises the
64 Di- Aung With the Dragon
unemployed to take jobs even if it means accepting a wage cut. 'My
own experience shows the most important thing is maintaining con-
fidence and to keep strengthening yourself,' adds Tung Chee-hwa.
The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region is about to face a
year of truth. It will not take the form of the drama foretold so loudly
by journalists and some politicians in 1997. It will be much more
subtle, largely escaping scrutiny from abroad, a process with profound
implications for the experiment being conducted here. The advance
signs are there to be picked up, but most people are too busy wel-
coming 1999 and getting on with their lives to pay much notice.
After all, a report from the European Union tells us that our basic
rights and freedoms have been upheld since the handover.
Politically, the gulf between the government and the most popular
political party grows greater by the day. To mark the end of 1998, the
chairman of the Democrats calls Tung Chee-hwa 'a benign dictator',
and his party gives the administration a 30 per cent rating. The
Secretary for Constitutional Affairs tells a visiting American delegation
that the people of Hong Kong are not really interested in democracy
and that the Democrats are in an extreme minority. The linchpin of
the administration, Anson Chan, warns of the destabilising effect of
speculation about her own future.
In his New Year radio appearance, the Chief Executive advises
people that 'destiny is in your hands'. That is going to become a major
issue for the year ahead, with a long-running legal and political con-
troversy which will bring a key element in the foundations of the
SAR into question. The first tremors are already apparent as the gov-
ernment makes it known that it is going to ask the territory's supreme
court to consider referring a human rights case involving mainland
migrants to the Chinese parliament. The issue of the relationship
with Beijing takes on another form during the New Year holiday
when a nineteen-year-old demonstrator is arrested for defacing the
Chinese national flag; two other men have already been charged for a
similar offence. Given the central government's sensitivities over any-
thing involving national sovereignty, how the courts will handle these
incidents has a particular significance.
Up in the capital, President Jiang Zemin and Prime Minister Zhu
January 65
Rongji attend a New Year performance of Beijing opera and shake
hands with the stars in their ornate ceremonial costumes afterwards.
Zhu's future - and that of one-fifth of humanity - is riding on his abil-
ity to push through the biggest economic reform programme on earth.
If he had a free hand, his task would be great enough. But much
more is at stake than increasing industrial efficiency, expanding services
and cutting down the bloated state sector. The politics of mainland
economics provide an obstacle course that are bound to produce some
extreme variations of fortune in the coming twelve months. Zhu's
deeply entrenched opponents warn that the very foundations of the
regime are at stake. They see the drive to modernise and open up the
economy, including agreeing to abide by the rules of the World Trade
Organisation, as deeply subversive for the maintenance of the
Communist power which celebrates its fiftieth anniversary this year.
Above all, Zhu has to convince his master that China can take the pain
without cracking apart. President Jiang is a cautious, calculating man.
Whether he is committed to thorough economic change is an open
question. But his first priority is to retain power for himself and for the
party which has cocooned his adult life. If that is threatened, Zhu can
expect little support, however high his international star rises.
In his New Year address, Jiang pledges to 'continue to deepen
reform and expand our opening to the outside world'. But reports by
the South China Morning Post's well-informed China editor, Willy
Lo-lap Lam, do not provide much comfort for reformers. At a meet-
ing of the Central Economic Work Committee, Jiang is said to have
sounded a familiar theme - the need to preserve social calm above all
else. Every worker must have rice in his bowl, the President insisted.
The authorities are particularly concerned about the appearance of
underground trade unions. The performance of officials at national
and local levels is to be judged by their ability to maintain stability.
Jiang's concern not to rock the boat any more than is absolutely
necessary leads to a series of emollient decisions. Factories which had
been due to be shut down at the Lunar New Year in February have
been given a grace period. The move away from subsidised state
housing and free medical care has been postponed. The jobless will
get a special New Year payment to help tide them over. There is a
66 Dealing With thl; Dragon
stick to go with these carrots: the full force of the state security appa-
ratus is to be deployed to prevent trouble. One source says the public
security budget is being doubled this year because of the number of
potentially troublesome occasions over the next twelve months,
including the tenth anniversary of the Tiananmen massacre.
A poet called Ma Zhe has just been jailed for seven years for sub-
version after setting up a movement called 'Cultural Renaissance' to
press for political reform and literary freedom. In Shanghai, two mem-
bers of the China Democracy Party are sent to prison for nine months
for allegedly visiting prostitutes. One says he was dining with a business
partner in a hotel room when two women came in and took their
clothes off; the police arrived immediately afterwards. The other says
he went drinking with a friend one night and woke up in custody.
In the city of Chongqing above the Yangtze Gorges, a bridge col-
lapses on 4 January killing forty people. A senior official in the local
Communist Party is arrested and accused of taking a bribe to steer the
construction contract to a former school classmate, who then sub-
contracted to builders ready to pay the highest amount. The Chinese
news agency says that nearly every building regulation had been vio-
lated. The official wanted the bribe to pay for his children to go to a
good school.
In the Portuguese enclave of Macau across the Pearl River estuary
from Hong Kong, a crime wave gathers force. A suspected Triad
who ran a private casino gambling room is killed in a New Year
shooting at an aquarium shop. The deputy chief of the main jail is hit
by bullets in the face and shoulder; a little while ago, one of his
warders was shot dead in a cafe. In December, Macau will follow
Hong Kong to become a region of China. The gangsters are carving
out turf before the handover.
Further up the Pearl River, the family of a Hong Kong man hacked
to death in Guangdong province says the local morgue is demanding
payment of 12,000 yuan to hand over the body. This is a lot more than
mainlanders would pay, but the morgue insists that there is a special rate
for bodies of SAR people. The family takes the matter to the Hong
Kong government. It says the response is that 'because of one country,
two systems, it is not proper for us to interfere in mainland affairs'.
January 67
Divisions between an appointed government and a popularly
elected opposition; the economy; the Chief Executive's pleas for
people to look on the bright side; a looming challenge to the rule of
law and the autonomy of the SAR; mainland migrants and flag dese-
cration; the travails of Hong Kong residents on the mainland; Triad
crime in Macau; China's balancing act between change and stability.
A series of patterns is being set for the coming twelve months as the
former colony moves towards its real handover in a year of its great-
est change and challenge - and the mainland decides if there is to be
such a thing as a truly new China.
15 January
A couple of the kind of incidents that so worry President Jiang are
reported today. Outside Changsha city in Hunan province, 1,500
troops and police had to be called in to deal with thousands of vil-
lagers protesting against taxes and corruption. One demonstrator bled
to death after being hit by a tear-gas canister. Reports from the area
tell of a flood of incidents involving farmers, including attempts to
break into banks and post offices. In Beijing, meanwhile, angry
investors who lost money in the default of a brokerage affiliated with
the army have been out demonstrating on the streets.
To counter such discontent, Jiang is shown on television announc-
ing new moves against corruption, including banning officials from
holding meetings in well-known tourist spots. As a sign that nobody
is safe, a Vice-Minister of Public Security with the rank of lieutenant-
general has been arrested for graft. 'The party faces some of the most
serious challenges in history,' the President warns. The Prime
Minister, who has forbidden his relatives to get involved in financial or
property deals, repeats a mantra at a meeting of senior officials: 'We
will kiU, kill, kill.'
16 January
The SAR may be insulated from the mainland by a high and heavily
guarded fence on the border at Shenzhen and by the promise of one
68 Dealing Wuh the Dragon
country, two systems, but when it comes to the economy, the two are
umbilically linked, for good or ill. Figures from the Hong Kong
Monetary Authority today show that bad debts held by banks tripled
last year. Most of that is because of mainland borrowers who cannot
meet their obligations. Exposure of the local banks to Chinese firms
has reached the equivalent of £26 billion.
One particularly jarring piece of bad news from the mainland is the
sudden collapse of a big investment vehicle called Gitic in Guangdong
province. Investors from Hong Kong and abroad had thought that
their loans to Gitic were guaranteed by the Chinese state. This turns
out not to be the case. Though the books still have to be combed
through, it is evident that billions of dollars have vanished.
1 j January
Unemployment in Hong Kong has reached its highest total ever, at
5.8 per cent. Two years ago it was 2.5 per cent. Worst-affected sectors
are building, manufacturing, import-export and retail. Companies are
laying people off as never before. The government talks of creating
100,000 new jobs. But inflation is hovering around negative territory,
shops are empty and everybody worries about their bonus at Chinese
New Year in a month's time. There is little retraining for many of
those losing their jobs. Manufacturing is unlikely to pick up even if
the economy improves because factories have moved across the border
to the mainland.
The Chief Executive keeps urging people to remain confident and
to strengthen themselves. But as a unionist legislator says today, 'I ask
Mr Tung: if you were out of work for three months, then for four
months and then for six months, I would like to see if you wouldn't
lose hope of getting a job.' This is a new experience for many people,
who grew up in the boom years. It is altering the psychology of the
place. Hong Kong will, undoubtedly, recover. It is, after all, a city of
survivors; as one top businessman puts it: 'This place is like bamboo;
it bends with the storm, but it never snaps - and always bounces
back.' But the experience of the current recession has made its mark,
which will not evaporate for a long time.
January 69
19 January
First- wo rid infrastructure, third-world environment: the story of a city
that grew so fast it didn't have time to worry about the air and water
around it. Pollution readings hit record levels in the New Territories
today. A foul yellow mist spreads across the city. Ships are on alert as
visibility closes in.
There is a meteorological explanation: low winds and a tempera-
ture inversion which traps the air. But the truth is that nobody with
the power to act cares enough about the environment to stop it being
steadily degraded. Sometimes the atmosphere is so filthy that people
with breathing problems are advised to stay at home. The incidence of
bronchitis has more than doubled in five years. The cost of pollution-
related illnesses is estimated at ^300 million a year. One day last
September, air quality fell to the level of Mexico City, the most pol-
luted metropolis on earth.
The causes are well known: pollution blown across the frontier
from Guangdong, buses and cars that keep their engines idling for the
air-conditioning even on cool winter days, and diesel taxis using ille-
gal high-sulphur industrial fuel, much of it smuggled in from the
mainland or diverted from construction sites and sold by the roadside
under Triad control.
It is not only the air that gets filthy. Picnic sites end the weekends
deep in litter. Debris is strewn across beaches. Household appliances
are discarded at random: the government once produced a television
commercial to advise people not to throw their old sets out of the
windows of their flats. The harbour that first attracted the British is
awash with rubbish, industrial debris and the outpourings of ships'
engines. Levels of chemical and metal waste flushed out into the
water reach danger levels. Some t .75 million tonnes of partially
treated sewage are pumped into the sea every day; a proper system will
not go into service until 2001, four years behind schedule. A few old
fishermen cast their lines from sampans by the shore just down from
my office, and you can still take a boat to see pink dolphins playing in
the sea. But marine life is dying, and if you are unlucky enough to tall
into the harbour, it's best to have a quick jab.
70 Dealing With the Dragon
20 January
Three executives of the Hong Kong Standard newspaper are jailed for
a fraud involving the inflation of sales figures. There is a saying about
'statistics, lies - and newspaper circulation figures', but this is much
more than an everyday story of press folk as it sets off the first of a
series of politico-legal storms that will blow through Hong Kong
during the year, involving senior officials and leading figures of the
SAR establishment.
Two and a half years ago, a fax arrived in the management offices
of the South China Morning Post. 'You may be interested to learn how
the Hong Kong Standard is cheating advertisers and the ABC Audit
system by creating phoney circulation figures,' it began. The method
was to supply 15,000 copies a day to a distributor, who delivered the
papers to a warehouse from which they were shipped off for recycling
without ever having been offered to the public. The Standard charged
the distributor the normal wholesale price, and so could include them
in its sales figure. Approved by the Audit Bureau of Circulation, this
formed the basis for advertising charges. What the ABC did not
know was that the distributor submitted an invoice to the paper for
'Promotional Activities' amounting to precisely the sum it was paying
for the unsold copies.
We were not the only ones to get the tip-off. The Independent
Commission Against Corruption - the much-feared ICAC - was
also on the case. Our management did not want to run the story, fear-
ing that we would be seen as bullying a much weaker rival and
opening a can of worms about newspaper circulation practices. I
thought we should publish, but before I could argue the toss, the
ICAC swooped on the Standard, questioned managers and the owner,
and charged three people, making the story subjudice. The raid caused
sharp intakes of breath in the Hong Kong establishment if only
because of the identity of one of the people interrogated.
This was Sally Aw Sian, proprietor of the Standard and of a
Chinese-language newspaper group. She was a grande dame of Hong
Kong and the international press world. Her father, Aw Boon Haw,
had made a fortune out of a widely used camphor-and-menthol
January 71
ointment called Tiger Balm. Originally from Burma, he drove a car
with the bonnet styled like a tiger's head, branched out into the
press, and built Tiger Balm Gardens in Hong Kong and Singapore
full of fearsome Chinese mythical figures. In 193 1, he and the second
of his four wives adopted the five-year-old daughter of a distant rel-
ative, changing her name from She Moi to Sian, or Goddess.
In 1951, Aw Boon Haw's eldest son was killed in a plane crash. Two
years later, the patriarch himself died. Sally Aw Sian inherited the
Hong Kong newspapers. She established a Chinese-language press
chain in North America and Europe. Her main paper, Sing Tao, grew
rich on property advertising. She became prominent in the world of
international publishers, inviting famous foreign figures to join her
advisory boards and sitting on committees of the great and the good.
A local shipping magnate called Tung Chee-hwa was one of her non-
executive directors, and she was appointed to Beijing's rubber-stamp
Chinese People's Political Consultative Committee.
Rich as she was, the stout, bespectacled Sally Aw was famous for
watching the pennies. She signed company cheques personally and
checked reporters' expenses herself, returning them when she saw a
taxi fare for a journey she felt could have been made by public trans-
port. Unusually for a person in her position in Hong Kong, she rarely
went out to social occasions. Unmarried, her main confidante
appeared to be her adoptive mother, who had the next door office at
Sing Tao. The two women lived in a gloomy, dark house in Tiger
Balm Garden. By one account, when they flew abroad, they would
drive by Rolls-Royce to the airport and then sit in economy-class
seats or haggle for an upgrade. 'I go straight home after work and
seldom go out,' Sally Aw once said. 'Sometimes I make a short trip by
chauffeur-driven car accompanied by my mother. But otherwise,
most nights I am working on my administration.' When I met her for
the first time in Hong Kong, it was in a conference room with a
wooden frieze of her father's heroic days on one wall and a huge
Mickey Mouse doll on a side table.
After her initial successes, business became less promising. A mer-
curial manager, Sally Aw worked with faithful underlings who never
queried her decisions, even when they made no sense. 'She will say
72 Dealing With the Dracon
yes to a project in the morning and no in the afternoon,' one former
executive told Asiaweek magazine. Her empire was highly extended,
ranging from property to dental clinics. She also ran into problems
with the Hong Kong financial regulators.
A combination of bad investments and the 1997 economic crash
forced Aw to sell off assets, including the Tiger Balm Garden, which
went to the tycoon, Li Ka-shing. In 1998, she relinquished control of
her big Chinese-language Canadian operations to the Toronto Star. By
the following year, she was being sued over a HK$300 million debt as
she negotiated to cede a minority stake in Sing Tao while trying to
hang on to power and the chairmanship. It was an impossible dream,
and she finally sold out to the investment bank, Lazard Asia. Not that
Sally Aw did too badly out of the deal. She was taken on as an adviser
at HK$9 million a year for six years, and given a loan of HK$58 mil-
lion — exactly half of the group's annual loss.
It was no secret that, after questioning Sally Aw about the fraud, the
ICAC was anxious for her to be charged, along with the Standard's
general manager, finance manager and a former circulation director.
She was mentioned as a co-conspirator in the charge sheet for the
other three, but was not brought to court. Some well-informed
observers think that the Chief Executive, who had previously sat on
her board, felt sorry for Aw, and that the Secretary for Justice would
have picked up the vibes from her boss. 'She was old, her business was
doing badly so he would have taken pity on her,' as one former
member of the Executive Council puts it to me later in the year.
'There's a Cantonese saying: "Take pity on her this time." It would
have been enough for Tung to have said that.'
For its part, the Justice Department, as is usual in such cases, refuses
to give any details of why it did not charge Sally Aw, beyond saying
that there were insufficient grounds to do so. That explanation runs
into an immediate problem when the South China Morning Post prints
a page-one story reporting what Aw said during her ICAC question-
ing. One of our excellent court reporters had seen a copy of the
transcript. We held the story until the case had finished, and then ran
it on the front page beside the report of the sentences handed down
to the three Standard managers.
January 73
'I just wanted to raise the circulation figures,' Sally Aw is quoted as
saying. 'This was a commercial decision, that is to get more advertis-
ers.' She denied knowing that what was being done could be fraud or
deception, and said she had left the detailed implementation to her
staff. 'I agree [sic] to it, but I did not do it,' she added, 'because it was
done by them.'
21 January
One of the most closely watched Chinese women in the world is in
town. Wendy Deng, a 31 -year-old vice-president of the STAR satel-
lite television station, is staying in a HK$8,ooo-a-night suite at the
Shangri-La Hotel. There has been much speculation in the inter-
national press about the tall, young woman, and whether she has
significant connections with the mainland. Nobody has come up
with much on her except that she was educated in the United States,
and is hard-working, upwardly mobile and perhaps on the verge of
marriage. The Hong Kong press shows more interest in her clothes
than her political connections as she steps out in a burgundy jacket
and black trousers with a grey bag slung over her left shoulder and a
slightly shy smile on her face. A fashion designer sniffs that she looks
'very common, like a housewife'. Another leaps to her defence saying
there is no reason she can't wear the same clothes as an ordinary
woman. 'She isn't using the way she dresses as a statement about her-
self- she doesn't need to,' he adds.
In the evening, Deng returns to her hotel suite to change into a
smart black dress with diaphanous sleeves and accompanies her smil-
ing partner in a limousine with white-draped seats to a dinner with
the Chief Executive. At sixty-seven, he is more than twice her age.
His name is Rupert Murdoch.
The media magnate is in Hong Kong as part of a panel of inter-
national bigwigs who have been asked by Tung Chee-hwa to advise on
how the SAR can improve its position as a world-class commercial and
financial centre. Others on the team are from the USA, Europe and
Japan. After six hours of deliberations, they tell us Hong Kong is too
expensive, that the air is too dirty and that we need better education,
74 Dealing With the Dragon
good financial services and more tourists. One does not wish to be
inhospitable, but I think we knew this already. Their prediction that
Hong Kong's main markets in the US and Europe will remain
restrained in 1999 raises some doubts about their powers as crystal-ball-
gazers, given the robustness of the American economy and the
resurgence of European growth. They will return at the end of the year
at the taxpayers' expense with more sage counsel. The general opinion
is that this is window-dressing which is not going to do much to help
the SAR, and that Mrs Murdoch-to-be could do with some fashion
advice.
24 January
Albert Ho Chun-yan, a tubby, determined solicitor, is elected vice-
chairman of Hong Kong's biggest political party, the Democrats. He
replaces an academic who was forced to resign last month for being
too moderate. The change reflects a big problem facing the party
which is going to have a major effect on the political landscape of
Hong Kong.
Like the old Labour Party in Britain, the Democratic Party is a
coalition between the working-class rank-and-file, middle-class pro-
fessionals and deeply motivated intellectuals. It draws strength from
long-time campaigners such as the intense veteran, Szeto Wah, who
heads the post-Tiananmen movement, the Hong Kong Alliance in
Support for Patriotic Democratic Movements in China. Its voting
numbers come from the grass roots, but the leadership is mainly
middle-class, symbolised by Martin Lee Chu-ming, its lawyer chair-
man with his cut-glass English.
The party grew out of a union of pro-democratic groups for whom
the massacre in Tiananmen Square was a great spur to action. In the
pre-handover period, its main platform was the defence of Hong
Kong against oppression from the mainland. That proved a winning
plank at the 1995 election. At the time of the handover, the
Democrats were flavour of the month with the international media as
speculation mounted as to whether its chairman would end up as
'Martyr Lee'. He announced that, whatever happened, he would not
January 75
leave Hong Kong, and liked to stress that he was not anti-China, just
against the regime in Beijing. The grim picture he painted of the
future provoked the incoming administration to deplore those who
'poor-mouthed' Hong Kong to international audiences.
After the interregnum of the appointed provisional legislature,
which sat for a year after the handover, the Democrats did well again
in the limited number of popularly elected seats contested in the
legislative election of 1998. But there were warning signs. Though
they easily maintained their position as Hong Kong's most popular
political movement, they stood more or less still in terms of their share
of the vote, whereas the pro-Beijing populist party, the DAB,
increased its slice significantly, and the indomitable Emily Lau racked
up a huge plurality with her hard rhetoric and street-cred flair. The
danger for the Democrats is that if fear of the mainland decreases, their
appeal as the party which will stand up to Beijing will diminish while
other groups attract voters who want a more radical approach or who
feel that the DAB represents a pragmatic choice for the future.
It is not surprising, therefore, that the Young Turks among the
Democrats are getting fed up. They see the proceedings at the
Legislative Council as a charade into which their chiefs have been
sucked. What is the point of winning half the popular vote if the gov-
ernment ignores you? The leadership is seen as being unrepresentative,
too middle class and too male. Some of the most prominent and
forceful pro-democracy politicians are women, but they do not
belong to Lee's party.
The Young Turks dismiss the comfortable chairs and parliamentary
rules of LegCo. They want to go out on the streets instead. Some
would like to provoke a real confrontation. This leaves Martin Lee
with a distinct problem. As a man who burned the Basic Law after
Tiananmen and has never wavered in standing up for Hong Kong's
rights, he has the weight of democracy on his side. But it is no longer
sufficient to say, as his former vice-chairman did in a private discussion
last year, that all the Democrats need to do is to tell voters they stand
for democracy. After almost a decade of political debate in Hong
Kong, Lee and partners have to explain the benefits of democracy and
the practical disadvantages caused by its absence. The eight months
76 Dealing With the Dragon
since the 1998 election having shown scant evidence of the concrete
effects of a dose of democracy, how much easier it may seem to the
more radical party members to stage demonstrations, pick up single
issues and keep the pot boiling against an administration prone to
being wrong-footed.
But Hong Kong is not a radical place. An ideologically led protest
compaign would scare off much of the middle class which votes
Democrat and pays the bills. So it is not surprising if Lee says he still
prefers a broad movement for democracy, and insists that he will not
abandon the middle class, while carefully adding that support for the
party derives principally from its willingness to speak up for the
deprived. His new deputy is less academic than his predecessor, with
stronger grass-roots links and a combative style. Taking up the job,
Albert Ho talks about how healthy it is for different members to have
different views. His appointment is acceptable to both sides in the
party, but the Democrats face a big test in defining their own identity.
Simply being on the side of the angels is no longer enough.
25 January
Just how cheap the mainland can be for Hong Kong manufacturers is
shown by the Four Seas Handbag Company, owned by a couple from
the SAR. Attention has focused on the firm's 200- worker factory in
the boom city of Shenzhen after a packager and loader called Xu
Zhangshu died in his sleep. Aged twenty-seven, Xu had tuberculosis,
but colleagues say he was killed by exhaustion after working fourteen-
hour shifts with only half a day off each week.
The daily rate for such workers is HK$io, equivalent to 80 pence.
The minimum monthly wage in Shenzhen is meant to be HK$43o;
Xu would had to have put in forty-three days to meet that. Sewing
workers at the factory earn HK$i.50 (12 pence) an hour. Four of Xu's
fellow workers told Cindy Sui of the South China Morning Post that
they couldn't quit because they had to wait twenty-five days to be paid
each month. They say the managers have a quota of how many people
they want to quit: 'Once they meet that quota, they won't give you
your money so you can't leave.'
January 77
Many of the women workers in Shenzhen have arrived in the past
couple of years from inland provinces. They put in fourteen- or
fifteen-hour shifts and are closely supervised. At one plant with SAR
owners, the girls are searched when they leave for the day. They pay
100 yuan a month to sleep in locked quarters patrolled by guards with
electric batons. A Hong Kong academic who spent six months work-
ing with them reckons that there are 6 million such women in the
Pearl River region. They get no health care and are often overcharged
by local shops. They are resented for taking jobs from longer-estab-
lished workers, and face problems when they go home to their rural
villages with their urban way of life.
The hardships they face can become lethal. A couple of years ago,
eighty-seven workers died in an inferno at a Hong Kong-owned toy
plant where the windows were sealed and escape routes blocked. In
another fire at a Taiwanese-owned factory making electric fans, thick
smoke killed sixteen workers because the windows were covered by
metal screens to prevent theft. Sixty-eight died in an earlier blaze in
nearby Dongguan. 'There was this girl who was only fifteen,' the
Hong Kong academic recalls. 'Every part of her body was charred
except for her cherubic face.'
Ironically - for me at least - the story about the Four Seas Handbag
Company appears in the Post on the same day as an investigation I had
launched into conditions in the Pacific island of Saipan. This little-
known place has a unique status as part of an American-administered
territory called the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands.
That means it escapes textile import quotas and can label goods 'Made
in USA'. But it is not bound by American labour laws. So garment
manufacturers have set up there using workers flown in from China
who get around half the US minimum wage to turn out goods for
celebrated brand names and retail chains. Many of the manufacturing
firms are from Hong Kong. One SAR company, headed by a busi-
nessman called Willie Tan Wai-li, is the biggest manufacturer on
Saipan, as well as owning cinemas, freighters, hotels, ice-cream dis-
tribution and slot machines. The Post's Glenn Schloss, who went
down to Saipan to investigate, found that the workers had to promise
to pay up to HK$33,500 to mainland officials and middlemen before
7$ Dealing With the Dragon
leaving China. As a result, they were often deeply in debt to money-
lenders. Having been told they would be working in the United
States, they found themselves in sweatshop conditions in the middle
of the Pacific, sleeping in rudimentary dormitories, charged high
prices for their food and, according to one lawyer working for them,
treated like indentured labourers.
But bad as conditions are in Saipan, what goes on there doesn't
look quite so awful when you compare it with what is happening just
across the frontier from Hong Kong. The money in Willie Tan's
plants may be less than on the US mainland, but it is far above any-
thing the women could make back home. In Saipan, garment workers
get US$3.05 an hour. At the Four Seas factory, a seamstress would
have to work fifteen hours to earn as much.
29 January
If you stand in the main square in the middle of Hong Kong and look
up the narrow street between the metal and glass headquarters of the
Hongkong Shanghai Bank and the old stone premises of the Bank of
China, you see, neatly framed by the two high buildings, a red-brick
edifice on a promontory. Once, this was the French mission. Since 1
July 1997, it has housed Hong Kong's top judicial body, the Court of
Final Appeal (CFA). Sitting up there above Central, with the Anglican
cathedral to its left and the main government offices behind it, the
building looks almost iike a fortress. As things are turning out, that is
exactly what it is becoming, a stronghold where the fate of one of the
vital elements of one country, two systems will be decided.
Up the wooden stairs inside, behind the green shutters, all is peace
and solemnity. It lacks the scale and echoing corridors of the law
courts in London, but in this small chamber under a white dome, his-
tory is being made, or unmade. The judges, who arrive in official
white cars, are august figures. The Chief Justice is a member of a
major Hong Kong family with relatives scattered through banking,
academia, the Bar and politics. One sits on the board of my newspa-
per; another will appear in his court to plead against the government;
a third was a candidate for Chief Executive. Another of the justices
January 79
behind the wide wooden desk on a raised platform in the CFA cham-
ber takes a lively interest in promoting French literature and culture;
one evening, I find myself sitting beside him as we read passages from
books about VHexagone at the Alliance Francaise.
The court proceedings are irredeemably old-fashioned, with the
barristers' wigs and black court dress, references to obscure legal
points and orotund speeches. What, one wonders, can the people
whose case is being heard make of it all? They are would-be migrants
from the mainland who want to come to live in Hong Kong. For
them, the issue is simple. But the government's determination to
keep them out is setting in train a process that goes far beyond the
straightforward matter of their fate.
The Court of Final Appeal was born from controversy. It was
needed after the handover to replace the Privy Council in London,
which acted as the ultimate court in colonial days. Those who feared
that it might not be fully independent pressed for a majority of
common-law judges to come from outside Hong Kong. That always
seemed a pretty far-fetched demand: which sovereign country would
accept a majority of foreign judges on the top court in one of its
regions? China initially refused any idea of foreigners. There was
deadlock with London. Then business made its voice heard. At a
meeting with a senior mainland official, a group of tycoons stressed
the need for a supreme court to ensure the rule of law and the con-
tinuation of the common law for commerce and finance. Soon
afterwards, Beijing agreed to one foreign judge sitting on the court's
bench at any one time alongside four local justices. That clinched a
compromise, but enraged the Chairman of the Democratic Party.
I met Martin Lee for the first time soon after the agreement had
been announced. Over lunch in the placid surroundings of the Hong
Kong Club, he put down his chopsticks, stared at me across the table
and said: 'Mr Fenby, you are an Englishman. Can you explain to me
how that man can sleep at night?' Which man? I asked. The Governor,
he replied. Lee told me that he had been leaving a reception at
Government House when Chris Patten had buttonholed him and said
that if the Chinese thought he had been a tough opponent in the past,
'they ain't seen nothing yet' over the composition of the Court of Final
80 Dealing With the Dragon
Appeal. A few days later came the compromise. 'That man betrayed
me,' Lee said over our lunch. Better no court at all, he went on, than
a flawed court. I had to disagree. If, for instance, the Post was accused
of subversion, I would prefer to have my day in court than being sub-
ject to an administrative decision in a closed tribunal.
It was said that Patten confided to aides that the compromise had
caused him a sleepless night. But his administration showed no hesi-
tations about throwing its weight behind the deal. The Governor's
press spokesman called me on the afternoon of the agreement to 'dis-
cuss' some lines I might like to consider for the next clay's editorial.
Somewhat annoyingly, most of what he suggested was already in the
leader up on my screen.
For the first eighteen months of its existence, the court attracted
little attention, but now it is at the very centre of things because it has
found for the mainlanders and against the government. The case con-
cerns children of Hong Kong residents born on the mainland. The
court gives them the unrestricted right to come to live in the SAR. It
extends this to all offspring of Hong Kong residents whenever they
were born, including illegitimate children. The judgement rests on its
interpretation of the Basic Law, Hong Kong's mini-constitution since
the handover. That is likely to prove a red rag to the Beijing bull,
which insists that the power of interpretation lies with its parliament,
the National People's Congress (NPC).
The government argued for a far more restrictive approach, want-
ing to limit the right of abode to children born after their parents had
become Hong Kong citizens. One of the judges tells me later that the
administration's case was so badly put together that the court had no
alternative but to find as it did: 'As judges we can only go on what is
presented to us.' Not that the Department of Justice is too worried.
One of its top British legal officers says: 'We have ways of dealing with
this.'
February
2 February
A senior government chemist, Dr Ting Ti-lun, has a disagreeable sur-
prise when he gets home to his fifth-floor government flat. The rod
from which a valued Chinese painting had hung is broken. The
Indonesian maid, Rukiyah, says his wife, Maria Mui Yuk-ming, is
responsible. At that, Mui goes for the maid, hitting her over the head
with the rolled-up painting. Dr Ting intervenes to take the painting
from his wife. But she then slaps Rukiyah on the face. Finally, she
grabs a broom and hits the maid in the stomach. 'It sounded like
someone was getting a damn good hiding,' says a neighbour.
Charged with assault, Mui is fined HK$500 GC+o). The case has
special resonance because of recurrent complaints of mistreatment of
maids, of whom there are some 184,000 in Hong Kong. After the
court hearing, Rukiyah says her daily diet consisted of an egg, a bowl
of rice and two slices of bread - 'Sometimes I got a chicken wing.'
She was not allowed hot water, and had to wash from a bucket. She
adds that she was slapped regularly, given no holidays and told she
would have to pay HK$5 a day if she wanted a light bulb in her
room.
Some 135,000 of the maids are from the Philippines. They are
generally referred to as 'domestic helpers', which is considered more
polite than 'maids', or by the old Indian term of 'amah'. Filipinas are
82 Dealing With the Dragon
popular because they speak English to the children of the house,
though some of their charges also grow up with a smattering of
Tagalog, their national language.
On Sunday, they have their day off and flock to the streets, open
spaces and walkways, particularly in the Central District of Hong
Kong Island. The space under the Hongkong Bank sounds like an
aviary as it is filled with their voices. Chater Road running through
Central is shut to traffic every Sunday as the Filipinas take over.
They play cards, write to their families, eat, have their pictures
taken, show one another snaps, sing, play Scrabble, listen to tape
machines, read, sit under sunshades, sell cheap clothes, buy towels
and enormous teddy bears from Indian hawkers, practise line danc-
ing, do one another's hair, compare lipsticks, send money home,
read the tabloids flown in from Manila, and attend revivalist religious
meetings.
A stranger to Hong Kong might wonder what all this was about.
Indeed, one visiting British newspaper editor asked me where all the
Filipinas' husbands and children were. The answer is that if the amahs
have husbands and offspring, they are back in the Philippines, living
on the remittances from Hong Kong and all the other places where
Filipinas do domestic work. In the SAR, they can earn more as maids
than professionals make in Manila. Some are content with one job;
others work for several employers. Some people think their monthly
minimum wage of HK$3,86o (,£300) is too generous. A local coun-
cillor suggests that a 20 per cent cut would be in order, and that the
working day should be set at sixteen hours. She says she gets 'com-
plaints from several employers saying their domestic helpers start
around 8 a.m. and are going to their room at 9 p.m. and will not do
any more work'. A letter- writer to the South China Morning Post
laments that Filipinas are 'so well-organised and so well-educated
about their numerous rights that employers are often at a disadvan-
tage'. A legislator proposes that they should pay a special tax for the
use they make of government services, and for the cost of cleaning up
after their Sundays in town.
Discrimination comes from other sources, too. When Hongkong
Telecom advertised a service enabling subscribers to block calls from
February 83
certain numbers automatically, it helpfully listed those you might want
to shut off as ex-lovers, loan sharks and your amah's friends. Employers
are sent the results of health checks on maids and can choose whether
to pass them on to the women: last year, one amah only learned that
she was HIV-positive when her employer gave her the news.
The foreign workers have replaced Cantonese maids, known as
'black and white' from their black trousers and white Chinese blouses,
and ma-jeh, or 'mother-sister'. At the time of the handover, there was
speculation about a return of the 'black and whites' in the form of
mainland women coming in from the Pearl River delta to take over
from the foreign amahs. This has not happened, though a few locals
have taken a government training course for domestic workers. Most
of the maids probably have as happy a life as one can have as an eco-
nomic refugee living apart from family and friends. But there are
plenty of horror stories like Rukiyah's around. Welfare groups
reported sixty-seven cases of beatings of maids in a year, thirty-four
cases of more serious assault, including attacks with hot irons, and
nearly 400 complaints of being overworked. There is an urban myth
about the employer who says yes, of course her amah has a shower,
that's where she sleeps. Indonesians seem to be particularly badly
done by, probably because they speak little English and do not have
the self-help networks set up by the Filipinas over the past decade.
One twenty-year-old told of being slapped and shouted at during her
nineteen-hour day, which began at 5.30 a.m., and of being bilked of
her pay by an employment agency.
Indians and Nepalese have joined the hunt for domestic jobs, and
also suffer from exploitation. A 44-year-old woman from Bombay is
seeking compensation, saying she was paid HK$200 G£i6) a month
for a year by her Indian employer here. She worked fourteen hours
a day and slept on the floor of the room occupied by the family's
grandmother, whom she had to take to the toilet several times a
night. Not that all the complaints are to be believed, or all the tales
of petty thieving are to be dismissed. One amah faked the kidnapping
of herself and her four-year-old charge to try to get a HK$200,ooo
ransom. An Indonesian was filmed by a secret camera in the home
where she worked punching the two-year-old son of the house on
84 Dealing With the Dragon
the face and thigh, throwing him on to a sofa and leaving him alone
crying.
A letter-writer to the South China Morning Post told of a Filipina
who got a wage 30 per cent above the minimum and other perks for
agreeing to accompany her employer to England, but reneged on the
bargain at the last moment. 'I find myself paying for out-of-season
strawberries (which I hate), cosmetics (which I don't use), French
mineral water (which I never drink) and anything else my helper
thinks she is entitled to bully me for,' the letter went on. 'If the living
is so bad here, why bellyache? Go home! I would certainly not hesi-
tate to employ a legal mainlander if that option were available to me
rather than put up with all the lies and deceit.'
Today, the maids learn that they are going to have to join in the
financial pain of recession. The administration decrees that their fixed
wage will be cut by 5 per cent. If they get their money at all, that is.
It emerges that Rukiyah was receiving only a fraction of the stipulated
HK$3,86o a month. The rest was kept by the recruitment agency that
placed her with the Tings.
4 February
The Sally Aw case comes back with a vengeance, moving from the legal
to the political arena. Leaving a meeting of the Executive Council, the
Secretary for Justice repeats that there was not enough evidence to
charge the newspaper owner. Then, despite having been warned by
aides not to say this, the Secretary adds: 'At the time, the Sing Tao group
was facing financial difficulties and was negotiating restructuring with
banks. If Aw Sian had been prosecuted, it would have been a serious
obstacle for restructuring. If the group should collapse, its newspapers
would be compelled to cease operations. Apart from losing employ-
ment, the failure of a well-established important media group at that
time could send a very bad message to the international community.'
This raises a couple of questions: can company bosses expect to
escape prosecution if this might endanger their plans to rescue their
firms from commercial decline — and are media groups immune to
laws that apply to others? If so, that seems calculated to send a 'bad
February 85
message to the international community' about double standards
before the law.
The woman who delivers the message will figure prominently in
the events of the year to come. Elsie Leung is even less of a natural
political animal than the Chief Executive. A demure woman in her
early sixties, the Secretary for Justice could have stepped out of the
pages of a Victorian novel, with her conservative clothes and neatly
parted black hair. She won public sympathy last year when she was the
victim of a medical leak: after she had gone into hospital supposedly
with a minor stomach complaint, an employee at the hospital sent a
newspaper a copy of her medical records showing that she was in fact
being treated for cancer. An invasion of privacy, no doubt, though, as
a leading television executive pointed out, should the government
have been allowed to get away with lying about the health of one of
its leading members?
A specialist in Chinese family law, Leung is among those who are
particularly anxious for us to understand China better. On one occa-
sion, she said that if anti-subversion legislation was introduced in
Hong Kong, it should take account of mainland norms. Asked why
she came in for so much press criticism, she responded by pointing to
the support she received from a paper called Wen Wei Po, which is
financed by Beijing. Everybody insists that Elsie Leung is 'really very
nice'. With her shy smile and gracious manner, she does not seem like
somebody who would say boo to a goose, but she rarely engages in
real discussion about what she is doing in the vital area of the law,
backed by two British law officers who use their skills to press the
government case.
The Chairman of the Bar Association calls her last statement incon-
ceivable. 'If you are a rich man and you run a lot of companies, you
are immune, but if you are poor you are fair game,' comments a law
professor at Hong Kong University. Even the pro-business Liberal
Party has to reject the notion of one law for employees and another
for bosses. Margaret Ng, the representative of the legal constituency in
the Legislative Council, tables a motion of no confidence in the
Secretary. A big political drama is about to unfold, all because a news-
paper played around with its sales figures.
86 Dealing With the Dragon
8 February
The first major challenge to the supremacy of the courts in Hong
Kong starts to take shape. A group of mainland legal experts warns
that the Court of Final Appeal's verdict last month in favour of main-
land migrants violates the Basic Law, and amounts to an attempt to
turn Hong Kong into an independent political entity. The final word,
the experts insist, must lie with the National People's Congress in
Beijing, whose legislation and decisions are not subject to challenge or
refutation. The experts say that the judgement was 'in direct opposi-
tion to the interests of Hong Kong residents and has hindered efforts
to maintain stability and prosperity'. Their views are made known by
the official Xinhua news agency.
The Chairman of the Hong Kong Bar Association, Ronny Tony,
warns that 'it will be a great disaster if the rule of law turns out to be
the rule of man'. Martin Lee, himself a lawyer, warns of a constitu-
tional crisis if the NPC overrules the court. There is irony in the
mainland position; in closed-door talks with the British, Beijing
repeatedly promoted the idea of the reunion of Chinese people on
both sides of the border. But that was then, and this is now. At a
reception in the capital, a State Council official sounds the same tune
as the experts, and wonders why the Tung administration doesn't
simply change the law. Instead, the SAR government plays for time,
saying it will study what the experts have said.
15 February
A 5 5 -year-old woman called Gao Yu is freed from prison on the
mainland today. She was arrested in 1993, two days before she had
been due to leave China to become a visiting scholar at the Columbia
School of Journalism in New York. After being held for a year, she
was sentenced to six years for 'divulging state secrets overseas' by
writing for a magazine and a newspaper in Hong Kong. Gao was no
stranger to jails, having spent fourteen months in prison after the
Tiananmen Square demonstration in 1989.
Now she has been freed on medical parole and is allowed to rejoin
February 87
her family for the Lunar New Year starting tomorrow. Her son says
she is suffering from high blood pressure, heart disease and kidney
problems. A dozen other mainland journalists are in jail for reporting
material that would provoke no official action in Hong Kong. The
press freedom group, Reporters Sans Frontieres, ranks China second
only to Ethiopia in the number of journalists behind bars. Some have
been imprisoned since the early 1990s.
One condition of Gao's release is that she must not talk to the press.
This is a familiar stipulation. Xi Yang, a mainland reporter for a Hong
Kong newspaper who spent three years in detention for writing about
official economic statistics, has not been heard from since being sent
off to a new life by his employers after he was freed, probably in
Canada. The US Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, will be in
Beijing in ten days, and President Jiang Zemin is due to go to Europe
shortly. The central government has a way of releasing a prominent
dissident or two just before such visits, hoping to blunt attacks on its
awful human rights record.
The freeing of Gao Yu does not signal any loosening of control of
the media. Some mainland publications have grown slick and glossy.
An increasing number have been able to undertake investigative
reporting, but usually only in spheres where the authorities want to
show up wrong doing, like corruption. A daily in Guangzhou, the
New Express, has pioneered a mix of sensational crime coverage and
political debate, seeking readers with 'youth, knowledge and wealth'.
But experiments are tightly controlled, and as a general rule, the con-
tradiction between the desire to raise revenue from advertising and the
dead hand of politics is as heavy as was evident at a dinner which a
group from the South China Morning Post had in Beijing last year.
The setting for the meal was quite an honour: the hallowed sanc-
tum of the Great Hall of the People on Tiananmen Square. After our
credentials were checked at the door of the huge, dimly lit mau-
soleum-like building, we were escorted to a lift which rose
automatically to the first floor. There, young ladies wearing white
gloves brought us tea, and I visited the lavatory, its door marked
'Gents' in English over the outline of a European head. After a suit-
able delay, we were escorted into a big square room with chandeliers
88 Dealing With the Dragon
hanging at each corner and an even larger one in the middle. We sat
in a semi-circle of brown armchairs round our host, Ding Guan'gen,
a squat, bespectacled man with no evident charisma who is said to
have owed his rise up the ladder of power to having been Deng
Xiaoping's bridge partner. After running the railways, he became
head of China's Propaganda Department, though that evening he was
introduced as Director of the Publicity Department.
Whatever his title, Ding is the chief propagator of the thoughts of
President Jiang Zemin. He tells cadres that they should 'sing praises to
the motherland, socialism and reform loudly, encourage further reform
and maintain social stability, satisfy the spiritual needs of the people, and
adopt the right attitude about the world, life and values'. In a homily
worthy of Eric Idle, he exhorts them to 'do more to channel the opin-
ion of the public to the bright side, persuade them patiently, clear their
doubts, heighten their awareness and unify people's thoughts'.
When the women attendants had poured boiling water from thermos
flasks on to the tea leaves in cups on tables beside our armchairs, Ding
gave us the party line about the development of the economy, and asked
us what lessons we drew from the South-East Asian crisis. He mentioned
the film Titanic several times. Jiang is particularly keen on the movie, and
would like China to be able to undertake productions of similar scope.
Dinner followed in the Beijing Hall. There were twelve courses,
including lobster and duck, accompanied by tea and orange juice
served from a plastic bottle. I can't tell you what it all tasted like. I had
contracted a bout of dysentery from bad seafood at lunch, and had no
appetite. My stomach rumbled ominously as I shifted the food on my
plate in a vain effort to pretend to be eating. Each time I could feel a
major explosion coming on, I moved my chair noisily, drawing sur-
prised looks from our host across the table. I had to hurry off to the
lavatory several times. I can't imagine what those who would write
the report on the dinner made of my behaviour.
One of the participants on Ding's side of the table steered the con-
versation to the prospects for expanding advertising in the mainland
media, for which he could see limitless possibilities if publications
could become more attractive to readers. Later, we were told that he
had been a minor press photographer in southern China a couple of
February 89
years ago, but now had official backing to turn a group of newspapers
there into money-makers. Ding listened quietly. All this talk of adver-
tising and colour printing and popular journalism sat ill with his
definition of the media's role as being to 'resolutely develop the leit-
motif of patriotism, collectivism and socialism; and to combat the
influence of corrupt and decadent thoughts'.
Before long, our host swung the conversation up the table to an
elderly man who turned out to have been a former military officer but
was now a senior editor of People's Daily. Commercialism was forgotten
as this venerable figure mouthed platitudes about the role of the media
in building socialism, and the need for 'objectivity', a phrase much used
to mean that the official viewpoint should be amply represented. Ding
suggested to me that I might like to have a discussion of professional
topics with the fellow editor. Apart from the anxiety caused by my
stomach, I must admit that I did not quite see the two of us conduct-
ing a debate on the merits of eight-column photographs, or putting
sport on the back page. The ex-general nodded politely at me. I half
smiled back. Ding said how pleased he was to have brought us together,
and we trooped out into the evening air.
The sharper mainland editors know that the stilted diet of political
news they are allowed to serve up has scant public appeal. Before the
handover, the boss of one big mainland daily in Guangdong showed
me the different sections of his paper. Here was sport, he said, and
here were the entertainment pages; here was local news, here was for-
eign news. And what's that at the bottom of the pile? I asked. Oh,
that's political news. What do you put there? I enquired. What the
government tells us to, he replied, just as you print what the Governor
tells you to. A Cantonese colleague explained that this was not quite
the Hong Kong way.
So, extremely welcome as Gao Yu's release is, she is only one of a
number of proverbial pawns. The international climate has certainly
softened towards Beijing. After inveighing against George Bush for
cosying up to the butchers of Beijing in his first presidential campaign.
Bill Clinton has 'de-linked' human rights and trade. The Europeans
tut-tut about the treatment of people like Gao Yu while getting on
with winning contracts and exchanging high-level visits. Still, human
90 Dealing With the Dragon
rights will not go away, in large part because of Beijing's obduracy.
The dissidents may be pitifully few and far between but the central
government cannot give up suppressing any sign of discord which
might threaten its authority in any way. So long as that remains the
case and orthodox ideologues like Ding stay on top of the power
structure, China cannot expect to be fully accepted into an inter-
national community that professes to regard the exercise of individual
rights as an integral part of modern civilisation.
16-17 February
kung hei fat choy: Get Rich. That's the greeting for the Lunar New
Year as we say goodbye to the Year of the Tiger and hello to the Year
of the Rabbit. Forget the worst recession the territory has known.
This is a time for celebration and fireworks. Julio Iglesias performs at
the main indoor venue for an audience that includes the Chief
Secretary, Anson Chan, and her retired police commander husband.
'Go back and make love like rabbits . . . and if you have a baby, call it
Julio,' the crooner tells the crowd.
Elsewhere in town, the Chief Executive's matronly wife comes
under flak for having 'abused' a goldfish while playing a game at a car-
nival which involved transferring the fish from one blue plastic bowl to
another. The Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals says the
game might give the impression that people in Hong Kong do not
respect animals. Betty Tung expresses her deep regret at the incident,
and her unease at the suffering she has caused. Presumably the SPCA
does not spend too much time in the markets, where fish are scooped
out of tanks to be taken off wriggling in plastic bags and chickens have
their necks slashed to make sure customers get fresh meat. But our First
Lady has her sensitive side. Once, she telephoned me at home after a
mildly embarrassing story about her appeared in the Post. She asked
how she could avoid such awkwardness. It comes with the territory, I
replied. She said she took the point, but she still sent me a letter and
documentation to try to show that she was being badly treated.
The Lunar New Year is when you are meant to clear the decks, pay off
debts, clean the dust from homes and give bank notes in paper packets to
February 91
unmarried young people: the packets are red, the colour of prosperity. It
is a time for family gatherings, prayers, feasts and everything that sounds
lucky. At a lunch at the Chinese Chamber of Commerce, oysters and
fungus are on the menu: the name of the dish in Cantonese sounds like
Kung Hei Fat Choy. 'I'm not superstitious, of course,' says a banker sitting
beside me, 'but I like to eat it all the same at this time of the year.'
Having been born under the sign of the horse in the twelve-animal
Chinese zodiac, I am told that this is going to be a good year for me
as regards work, family and money. I will be lucky with investments
between April and November, but should keep an eye out for gastric
problems. Those born under the sign of the monkey will have a bad
time with off-shore investments; roosters and oxen should keep clear
of meeting the sick and the bereaved; tigers may undergo law suits as
a result of betrayal by friends. As for rabbits, it is to be a year of self-
destruction, bloodshed and financial loss.
The Lunar New Year would be nothing without fireworks. The
Chinese invented them, after all. On the mainland, however, individ-
ual firecrackers are banned in many major cities for safety reasons. But
the Cantonese go on celebrating. Ten thousand fireworks are let off in
Guangzhou up the Pearl River. Hong Kong easily outdoes that, with
31,388 being fired in a 23-minute display in the harbour. Great arcs of
colour criss-cross the sky under the moon amid the rat-tat-tat of
explosions. Each burst, each fountain of falling stars draws an appre-
ciative 'Wah!' from the crowd. Barges sprout sparkling cascades of
light. Rings of fire appear in the heavens, followed by cascades of
silver rain. And then, as suddenly as it started, the show is over.
What remains is the blaze of lighting on the tall buildings along the
harbour, decked out with displays to welcome the Year of the Rabbit.
But even here, recession is making itself felt. Two years ago, the light-
ing king of Hong Kong, Terence Wong, put 60,044 bulbs on one
office block in the Wanchai district at Christmas. Now, his business is
down by 35 per cent. Some companies have gone in for the ultimate
cost-cutting step of simply replacing December's Santa Claus with
February's Chinese God of Money, taking out the reindeer and
putting in rabbit outlines instead.
On the mainland, a New Year television programme called Spring
92 Dealing With the Dragon
Festival Evening Party is said to have attracted a 93 per cent audience for
five hours of singing, dancing and comedy. Guangzhou has chosen the
occasion to inaugurate its 18.5 kilometre-long underground railway:
unfortunately, cracks appeared in the tunnels just before the opening,
and a local newspaper reports that passengers left 10 tonnes of rubbish
a day in the trains, on the platform and in ticket lobbies; later in the
year, its manager will be arrested for alleged corruption. In Guangxi
province in the south-west, the authorities begin the Year of the Rabbit
by setting up anti-pornography 'training centres' in major cities,
destroying 78,000 videotapes and 80,000 compact discs. In Hebei
province, south of Beijing, 100,000 laid-off workers are given free food.
18 February
Hidden away behind the buildings which the lighting king Mr Wong
has illuminated so brightly for the Christmas and Lunar New Year
periods in Hong Kong, 350 mainlanders camp out on the paving
stones of the courtyard of the principal government building. They
are 'overstayers': that is to say, they remained in the SAR after the
expiry of permits issued for them to visit their families. Some 50,000
mainlanders settle legally in Hong Kong each year. In addition, an
average of 2,000 mainlanders cross the border daily on two-way per-
mits. Around 100 are estimated to overstay at any one time. The
government wants this group of 350 to go back over the border to
join the queue of others waiting to come across legally. They have
refused to leave, and squat in front of the Central Government Office
demanding to be allowed to remain.
By any definition, they are illegal immigrants. Most Hong Kong
people would undoubtedly like to see the back of them; one local
Chinese newspaper calls them 'repulsive'. For all the official talk about
the need for Hong Kong to draw closer to the mainland, migrants are
not popular. A poll by Hong Kong's Chinese University shows that
between 60 and 80 per cent of those who replied regard them as un-
educated, unhygienic welfare scroungers out to take jobs from locals.
After lunch with a government official one day which included a
lecture on how Hong Kong people should not feel so superior
February 93
towards their fellow Chinese, my host glanced at a group of men in
boxy suits getting out of the lift and murmured: 'Mainlanders. You
can tell from the way they dress.' Many immigrants are from poor
rural areas, country bumpkins who do menial jobs and find it hard to
integrate into an advanced society. A recurrent jibe involves their
supposed unfamiliarity with Western toilets. How do you know a
mainlander has been there before you? By the footprints on the seat.
The presence of the overstayers in the courtyard of the main gov-
ernment offices is a testament to the strength of the rule of law. As
long as their case is going through the courts, they will not be
deported. Eighteen have even got what are called 'walkabout permits',
allowing them to leave their camp and move about freely pending the
outcome of the legal process.
Their authorisation to protest outside government headquarters
on Lower Albert Road was obtained by two unlikely figures: a silver-
haired Italian Catholic priest and a doughty Scottish grandmother.
Born in Milan, Franco Mella came to Hong Kong in 1974, the year
of his ordination. He was soon involved in defending the rights of
squatters. For a time, he worked in a garment factory. A veteran of
arrests and hunger strikes, he tells reporters: 'I am blessed by the Lord
to be able to help give a voice to the poor, to the weak and to those
who are fighting for basic human rights. In the Kingdom of God all
people are equal, men, women, rich, poor, and this is how it should
be on earth.' Although he crossed to work on the mainland in 1991,
he remains a familiar figure at protests in Hong Kong and became the
subject of a film called Ordinary Heroes. He wears faded clothes, has his
hair in a headband, beds down with the protestors, and goes to the
house of the Foreign Religious Missions every few days for a shower.
The mainlanders' other friend and protector is a lawyer from
Britain who is pushing seventy and was previously best known for her
defence of the Vietnamese boat people washed up in Hong Kong.
Pam Baker, a wartime evacuee to South Africa who doesn't count the
cigarettes she smokes each day and was divorced after twenty-seven
years of marriage, came to Hong Kong in 1982. She worked for the
Legal Aid Department for nine years. Then came the Vietnamese.
With them largely gone, she decided she had had enough and closed
94 Dealing With the Dragon
her law office, intending to write, be a grandmother and relax. But
then the overstayers' case emerged, and she rushed to the barricades.
Baker is a woman who relishes a fight on behalf of idealism and
human rights. Her tenacity drives the authorities crazy. Mother of six
children, she has been a Nonconformist, an Anglican and a Catholic.
Now she counts herself as an agnostic. As she explained in an inter-
view with my colleague, Fionnuala McHugh, this came about after
she visited one of her daughters, who had joined the Moonies. 'I used
to be allowed to visit - they smiled all the time and, of course, there
was no drinking and no smoking, I had to go into the woods with my
hip flask and fags. I started reading everything I could on organised
religion, and I realised they were all the same. So that's when I became
an agnostic' Adrenalin, she adds, is a great cure for Alzheimer's.
Protected by their permit, the protestors sit on the cobbles watched
by two bored policemen. On one side are tall black railings erected after
the handover. On the other are waist-high crush barriers hung with the
demonstrators' red, white and yellow banners adorned with slogans in
Chinese characters. Some of the overstayers sleep on mats or card-
board. Others listen to Walkmans, or talk on mobile phones. Three
young women share a meal from plastic boxes. One has bundled up her
belongings in a big bag labelled 'Tough City, Tough Jeans'. Two smart
young men in dark suits circulate. A few yards away, a cashier takes
money from motorists leaving an underground parking garage. A
throng gathers when a television reporter arrives with a cameraman to
check out the situation. A child walks daintily out of the crowd and puts
a plastic bag of rubbish into a wicker refuse basket by the railings.
In their way, these people are the heirs of the millions who have
come to Hong Kong from China ever since it began to look like a
more attractive place in which to live than the mainland. Since
China's border opened up, there has also been movement the other
way, though in more temporary form. During this month's Lunar
New Year holiday, hundreds of thousands of people from Hong Kong
cross through the checkpoint at Lo Wu. Among the few who cannot
cross the frontier to see their families, buy bargains or get cheap sex
are democrats on the mainland's black-list: Martin Lee joked at break-
fast the other day that Hong Kong women were happy for their
February 95
husbands to join his party because they knew that this would prevent
them setting up with a mistress in Guangdong.
20 February
An anniversary to remember, but one recalled by few people in Hong
Kong.
Two years ago today, I had just gone to bed when the telephone
rang. Our night crime reporter had received a call from a contact at a
Beijing-funded Chinese-language newspaper which had been told to
put a black border round the front page. That could mean only one
thing. Deng Xiaoping, the veteran of the Long March and the
Communist triumph, who then launched China on its course of
economic liberalisation, conjured up the one country, two systems
concept for Hong Kong and presided over the crushing of the
Tiananmen demonstration, had been allowed to die after being kept
alive on a life-support machine for months. The official report from
the Xinhua news agency at 2.41 a.m. said he had died from
Parkinson's disease, lung infection and the failure of his respiratory-
circulatory functions at 9.08 p.m. the previous night. One could only
wonder what went through the doctor's mind as he switched off the
life support, after getting the word from on high.
We ran four pages on Deng wrapped round the main section of the
paper. A huge black and white photograph of the patriarch covered
most of the front. We followed that with a special lunchtime edition,
and ten pages in the following day's paper. I later learned that our use
of a black and white picture was seen in Beijing as a suitable sign of
respect; as far as I was concerned, it was simply much more striking
than a colour shot. I was also told that the propaganda chief, Ding
Guan'gen, had waved these editions at mainland editors demanding to
know why they couldn't do as well. It was not a recommendation I
planned to make too much of. Later that year, a mainland journalist
asked me how our editorial board had been able to decide so quickly
on the coverage on the night. I told him that we did not have an edi-
torial board, and that it wouldn't have had time to meet if it had
existed. One country, two media systems.
96 Dealing With the Dragon
That afternoon in 1997, everybody who was anybody in the
Chinese community went to the bleak building opposite the main
racecourse in Happy Valley which housed the office of Xinhua, the
mainland's de facto embassy in Hong Kong. With less than five months
to go until the handover, everybody who wished to be on good
terms with the new sovereign turned up, among them the cinema
tycoon Sir Run Run Shaw, Macau casino boss Stanley Ho Hung-sun,
old China friend Henry Fok Ying-tung, and tycoons Li Ka-shing,
Peter Woo Kwong-ching and my newspaper's chairman, Robert
Kuok. The Chief Executive-designate went to pay tribute, wearing a
black armband. Outside the building, a clutch of demonstrators
shouted their 'grief-stricken mourning for the butcher of democracy'.
Chris Patten drove to Happy Valley to join the throng, bowing three
times before the altar set up for the occasion and shaking hands with
the hardline Xinhua chief.
Deng had as much influence on as many people as anybody except
Mao. He never visited Hong Kong (though his widow attended the
handover), but as the prophet of economic modernisation, he could
only be fascinated by the contrast between what his fellow Chinese
had done here and their failure to achieve anything equivalent at
home. It was under his aegis that the village of Shenzhen on the
border grew into a money-chasing city of several million inhabitants.
The patriarch who told the Chinese that it didn't matter what colour
a cat was so long as it caught the mice made his last public appearance
there in January 1992, and a huge colour picture of him posed against
a blue sky still stands on its main street.
On the first anniversary of his death, the man who had introduced
market forces to the mainland was honoured as the nation's 'symbol,
banner and soul'. Jiang Zemin assured the editor-in-chief of the Time
magazine empire that Deng had taught China the need to 'open its
doors and establish economic links with the capitalist, developed world'.
The National People's Congress is to enshrine Deng Xiaoping Theory
in the constitution. The role of the private sector will be affirmed. In
Shenzhen, a local newspaper says people have been visiting the giant
poster to 'cherish the memory and take pictures'. But in a country
where the size of photographs and the placing of stories still has a
February 97
Kremlinological importance, nobody can fail to notice that the main
newspaper, the People's Daily, did not mention today's anniversary.
The way is being carefully prepared for Jiang Zemin to join the
Mao-Deng pantheon. As well as the page-one photographs of the
President opening industrial plants, giving his imprimatur to devel-
opment projects, smiling at folklore groups and greeting visitors from
overseas, the human side of Jiang is also being revealed to the waiting
world. We know he is a dab-hand at karaoke, once singing along with
Elvis's 'Love Me Tender' during an evening party at a Pacific region
summit. He also likes to show off his knowledge of foreign languages,
though what he said to Prince Charles in a brief one-to-one remark
during the handover ceremony in Hong Kong remains unknown.
The President is keen on quoting from Chinese poetry, and on letting
visitors know about his familiarity with European classical music. To
console himself for Deng's death, which he must have authorised, he
is said to have read Tang Dynasty poems and listened to Mozart.
As he has grown into the job, Jiang has developed a taste for foreign
travel. His vanity has bloomed, but he can also betray his insecurities.
A stocky man with a pudgy face and heavy black spectacles, he was
embarrassingly photographed giving his jet-black hair a last going-
over with a comb before being ushered in to see the King of Spain.
On a visit to the United States in 1998, he had a 'look-at-me-now'
smile as he rang the bell at the New York Stock Exchange, donned a
revolutionary-era tricorne and went through the publicity hoops.
But he never matched the folksy appeal achieved by Deng when the
pint-sized Long Marcher put on a ten-gallon hat at a rodeo or was
dwarfed meeting the Harlem Globetrotters.
Protests that would not ruffle a Western leader can rouse Jiang to
indignation. Visiting Switzerland, he warned the President of the
Confederation that her country had 'lost a good friend' when pro-
Tibetan demonstrators appeared in Berne. China's main official
newspaper describes Jiang as a 'principal violinist', which leaves open the
question of who holds the conductor's baton. He is the epitome of feng-
pai, people who move with the prevailing breeze, mainland Vicars of
Bray. The President is most at home with his cronies in the 'Shanghai
faction' whom he has brought from that city to surround him in Beijing.
98 Dealing With the Dragon
One biographer, Willy Wo-lap Lam, describes him as possessing the
haipei personality attributed to inhabitants of the city where he was
mayor before moving to the capital. Their traits include 'an expansive,
outward-going style bordering on the unctuous; an ability to handle one-
self to good advantage in public arenas; a soft spot for lavish ceremonies
and big feasts; and a concern for public relations rather than substance'.
Born in 1926 into a comfortably-off family in the Yangtze Valley
city of Yangzhou, Jiang went through an orthodox classical education,
but then joined the underground Communist Party in 1946 while
studying engineering. He worked in a soap factory and for an
American-owned firm that made popsicle sticks. In the 1950s, Jiang
went to Moscow to the Stalin vehicle factory, where he learned the
Russian he still uses on visitors from the former Soviet Union.
Another trip took him on an engineering mission to Romania. Back
in Beijing, he worked his way up the Ministry of Machine Building,
keeping his head down in the Cultural Revolution.
The end of that upheaval and the fall in 1976 of the Gang of Four
who had spearheaded it led to Jiang being sent to their former bastion
of Shanghai, where he took charge of the city's industry and began to
emerge as a political leader, involving himself in the development of
the Special Economic Zones, or SEZs, which Deng Xiaoping
launched to spearhead economic progress. Becoming head of the
Ministry of Electronics in 1983, he forged ahead politically as a new
member of the 200-strong Central Committee of the Communist
Party. In 1985, Jiang rose to become Mayor of Shanghai, and went
into the streets himself to argue with the first student protestors in
1986. His orthodoxy was not in doubt, but troops were not used in
Shanghai as they were in Beijing to suppress the protests of 1989.
Twenty days after the Tiananmen massacre, Jiang was officially
named General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party. With the
genius of a high-level survivor, he has confounded the sceptics who did
not expect him to last long. Starting out by beating a neo-Maoist
drum, he developed into a self-styled team-playing 'chief engineer'.
Unlike Mao and Deng, Jiang does not give off a historic aura. Though
his vanity is growing and he clearly revelled in the royal pomp of his
visit to Britain in 1999, he has none of the imperial mystery which is
February 99
meant to surround Chinese rulers. That does not mean that he is
short of cleverness or great ambition. 'Behind the Buddy Holly glasses,
Jiang is a very intelligent and shrewd politician,' remarks an American
academic who used to play bridge with him in Shanghai.
The man is the system incarnate, ready to sacrifice everything to
put off the day of reckoning between the party, the state and the eco-
nomic demons unleashed by Deng. The contradictions would boggle
the mind of anybody not steeped in the switchbacks of China's
ideology. While his Prime Minister pushes on with plans to disman-
tle the state sector, the President instructs cadres to raise the level of
their Marxist righteousness, and his protege, Vice-President Hu
Jintao, says they should 'check if they truly follow the mass direction
as enshrined by Marxism'.
Obsessed with the paramount need to maintain stability, the 'chief
engineer' may be as much the prisoner of the apparatus he heads as its
master, a ruler who sits on top of the tree of party and state, but who
cannot be sure of controlling the branches below him, a consummate
trimmer who lacks final authority because of his care not to be caught
out on a limb, a leaf that rose seamlessly in the wind as revolution gave
way to administration.
The first direct sight Hong Kong had of the man in charge of the
country it was about to rejoin came at the 1997 handover. Jiang
walked stiffly like a man-sized doll; there was speculation that he was
wearing a bulletproof corset. On the platform at the Convention
Centre, it was the Chief Secretary, Anson Chan, who seemed to
dominate, resplendent in red on a throne-like seat above the throng of
dignitaries. On his second visit, a year later, the President was more at
ease. He seemed to be positively enjoying himself as he surveyed
China's newest region. He attended a gala performance that ranged
from mask dancers to Cantopop stars and the soprano saxophone
player Kenny G. He made an optimistic speech, and then presided
over the opening of the new airport, leaving the administration of
Tung Chee-hwa to deny that its haste to open the project in time for
his visit was responsible for systems failures that began almost as soon
as the President had left.
Jiang had every reason to be pleased as he headed home. It had
ioo Dealing Wn n ini Dragon
been under his command that China had undone the shame of seeing
Hong Kong under Western colonial rule. He had installed his trusted
man in charge of the SAR, and if the economy there was not bound-
ing along as it had done in the past, the transition had gone smoothly.
That, Jiang well knew, had an importance stretching beyond Hong
Kong. As he had told a pre-handover secret meeting across the border
with tycoons from the territory, if things went wrong in Hong Kong,
it would greatly complicate China's aim of recovering the island of
Taiwan, the ultimate prize for his presidency. Though the Taiwanese
reject any comparison with ex-colonial Hong Kong, Jiang sees a suc-
cessful SAR as one of the keys to the full reunification of China. But
can such a product of the system that has run China since 1949 under-
stand how Hong Kong really works? It is the question the SAR has to
live with as it watches the way the wind is blowing from the north.
21 February
The overstayers from the mainland are allowed to remain a while
longer. In Immigration Tower in the Wanchai district, they are
handed cards giving them temporary immunity from arrest and
deportation.
At a meeting of the government's main think-tank, the Central
Policy Unit, some members criticise the administration for the
absence of a contingency plan to deal with legal decisions that could
open the door to a flood of migrants. Officials reply that they hadn't
planned on losing. That is part of their problem: they find it hard to
imagine that they will make mistakes, and show an arrogance inher-
ited from the Whitehall way of doing things. The civil service is
sometimes referred to as a Rolls-Royce. Previously, they had a chauf-
feur on call by the Thames. Now it is self-drive.
Talking about the administration's performance one evening, a
Hong Kong woman in her thirties says she does not think much of
the Chief Executive. Who would do better? I ask. Well, she replies,
Tung clearly isn't listening to his Chief Secretary, Anson Chan, and
Anson seems resigned to that. As for the others, she doesn't think
much of them either. So finally she concludes that maybe Chris
February ioi
Patten would have handled it all much better. 'But that's not a good
thing for me to say as a Chinese,' she adds with a smile and an intake
of breath that whistles over her teeth.
26 February
As a first move over the Court of Final Appeal's verdict against it in
the mainland migrants' case, the government is asking the judges for
a 'clarification' - in particular, how they see their prerogatives vis-a-vis
China's National People's Congress (NPC). The proceedings have
had their lighter moments. When the government's lawyer asks the
Chief Justice to clarify the verdict, the SAR's top judge replies, to
chuckles from those in the courtroom, that this is exactly what has
been done on page five of the judgement.
'It may be argued that this is what the judgement says anyway,' the
lawyer blunders on. 'It may cause laughter . . .'
'We could do with a bit of light relief,' the Chief Justice remarks.
The court could have stood on its dignity and refused to give the
requested clarification. That would have been politically provocative,
and the judges are not by nature trouble-stirrers. So they come back
with a carefully calibrated response. While saying that the court had
not intended to challenge the NPC, their position does not basically
shift. They acknowledge that they 'cannot question the authority of
the National People's Congress ... to do any act which is in accor-
dance with the provisions of the Basic Law and the procedure
therein'. But this does not mean they feel any need to alter their ver-
dict. The ball is back in the government's court, and over cognac at a
dinner, a senior official expresses deep concern at what lies in store.
The government simply cannot accept the decision, he says. The
court got the Basic Law wrong. The practical effects of its verdict
would be horrendous in terms of immigrant numbers. If the court
persists, the government will have to go to the NPC. There is no way
of knowing what precedents may be set, opening the door to main-
land interference in Hong Kong and giving the impression of an
administration that needs Beijing to do its job for it. But if this is the
price to be paid, so be it.
March
i March
The annual Spring Reception at Government House, former home
of British rulers of Hong Kong, for which a new name has not been
found twenty months after the handover. The Chief Executive is
smiling affably as he says he has so many problems to deal with, so
many fronts calling for action. Not just the economy, but also
tourism and the environment. He is keen on the idea of Hong
Kong finding a new role for itself neither upstream nor downstream
in high tech but in midstream, taking innovation by others and
applying it to production. This sounds much like its traditional mid-
dleman role.
Tung says he was much impressed by what he saw in Israel on a
recent visit on his way home from the World Economic Forum in
Davos. After getting back, he took a couple of days off over the Lunar
New Year to go walking. He enthuses over Hong Kong's country
parks and trails. Recalling his days in Britain, he recalls the smog that
meant you couldn't see more than an arm's length in front of you.
Now it has been cleared up in Britain; the same should be done here.
Indeed - and as Chief Executive, he is better placed than anybody else
to get things done. But there are depressing precedents. Chris Patten
promised a clean-up that never materialised. Officials say one has to be
patient; the environment will certainly figure prominently in the
March 103
Chief Executive's annual Policy Address. That will be delivered in
October. Meanwhile the air gets steadily worse.
2 March
Hong Kong may be special, but it is increasingly feeling the pressure
from another small enclave built by refugees from China -
Singapore. The Lion City, as it is known, has been busy attracting
high-tech companies and getting its economy into leaner shape to
meet the challenge of the recession. Eleven per cent of its GDP
comes from electronics, and major international computer firms are
being lured south by cheaper rents and tax breaks. The government
there is decidedly interventionist in what it sees as the country's best
interests in a way that would be impossible in Hong Kong. There
are business links between the two - one of the big Hong Kong
property firms is run by Singaporeans. But from time to time, SAR
officials go public with their feelings about the other former British
colony. The Trade and Industry Secretary, Chau Tak-hay, has just set
off a row by telling a Legislative Council panel of Singapore's 'four
great advantages'.
'First, the government has complete control of the legislature,
which always supports it. Second, the media never criticise the gov-
ernment. Third, the government has complete control of the trade
unions. Fourth, the people never dare openly criticise the govern-
ment.' Singapore's highly active Consul-General calls those remarks
inaccurate and misinformed. 'His assertion of compulsion and control
shows a lack of understanding of how Singapore works,' he adds.
Chau is unabashed. 'Of course we are different from Singapore,' he
says. 'The opposition parties in Singapore do not raise opposition. If
they do raise opposition, they might be arrested [but] our Legislative
Council has sixty opposition members.'
Still, the attractions of the Lion City model are undeniable for
some people here. Tung Chee-hwa is a warm admirer of its Senior
Minister, Lee Kuan-yew. Sitting beside Lee on a platform at the
World Economic Forum in Davos, the Chief Executive showed pal-
pable deference to the older man. For his part, Lee lets it be known
104 Dealing With the Dragon
that he thinks the people running Hong Kong are good men and
women, but lack experience.
Around the time of the handover, there was some speculation that
Tung might try to impose a Singapore-style system, though that
would be difficult under the Basic Law and would be strongly resisted.
'It's like a nice prison,' said one middle-class Hong Konger when I
asked her what she thought of the other city. At a deeper level, the
inventiveness and individuality that lie behind Hong Kong's success
would die a lingering death in a society where dissent is frowned upon
and consensus rules. Yet Tung clearly cannot get the lure of the Lion
City out of his mind. At lunch with a group of editors, he reflects on
the criticism he faces, and says he can't help being jealous of
Singapore. 'But don't quote me on that,' he adds with a smile. 'Or else
everybody will think I'm going to bring in their system here.'
3 March
The Financial Secretary, Donald Tsang, is driven to the Catholic
cathedral this morning in his green BMW. Then he goes on to his
office. The mainland migrants are camped just opposite. After lunch,
Tsang goes down the hill to the Legislative Council chamber to
deliver his fourth Budget. The spiritual preparation has become a
habit. He also likes to invoke the titles of films in speeches: having
spoken of Godzilla and The Silence of the Lambs in the past, he now
likens Hong Kong's situation to Saving Private Ryan.
It is, most people agree, a good Budget. Tsang certainly shows a
deft political touch. A year ago, he telephoned me from his car after
delivering a more orthodox package to offer an assurance that he 'felt
the people's pain' but could not divert from the tradition of balancing
the books. Since then, things have changed. The government has left
the strict path of non-intervention, and it is no secret that the Chief
Executive wants a spot of reflation. So, Tsang's Budget is out to inject
some optimism into the place.
There is to be a one-off 10 per cent income tax rebate; govern-
ment fees and charges will not rise for six months after their last
settlement; pay will be frozen for 330,000 civil servants and public
March 105
sector staff; one of the jewels in Hong Kong's crown, the Mass
Transit Railway Corporation, is to be partially privatised. Nego-
tiations are going on to build a Disneyland on Lantau Island. This
is a very popular idea, which was first publicly launched in an arti-
cle in the South China Morning Post by the entrepreneur who
developed the city's main restaurant and bar area in an old ware-
house section of town. Some people wonder why, if Disneyland is
such a good idea, the project is not being done in traditional
fashion as a purely private-sector deal. Others fear that the govern-
ment's public enthusiasm may put it at a disadvantage in
negotiations. But the Financial Secretary appears to have achieved
his aim of lifting people's spirits.
In keeping with the vogue for high-tech development, the budget
also contains a surprise announcement that a 'Cyberport' will be put
up on a previously protected 26-hectare site by the sea on Hong
Kong Island. It is not quite clear what this HK$I3 billion project
involves: it seems to be a cluster of 'intelligent buildings' equipped
with all the latest technology, which will attract foreign companies,
create a local technological seedbed and catapult the SAR into a
high-tech future. The project has been agreed with a company called
Pacific Century, headed by Richard Li Tzar-kai, son of the great
tycoon, Li Ka-shing.
The younger Li has had an eventful career, setting up the Star
satellite television station and subsequently selling out to Rupert
Murdoch at a good profit, investing in real estate in Tokyo and always
pursuing his dreams of becoming a king of advanced technology.
Nobody can have anything against his ambitions, particularly when
Cyberport is due to create 12,000 jobs on completion in eight years'
time. But two things arouse concern.
One is that the project includes a luxury residential development
attached to it on prime, and previously unavailable, land. It turns out
that as well as three office buildings and a 'cyber mall', there will be 30
blocks containing a total of 2,932 flats, plus a hotel and a tower of ser-
viced apartments. So this is a big property play as well as a leap into
the cyberfuture. But the real departure is that the development was
not put out to tender as is customary. The government is not meant
106 Dealing With the Dracon
to seal deals like this in private. Other developers are soon up in
arms. They get an audience with Anson Chan, but the Chief
Secretary can only say they should trust the government and that
clear guidelines will be drawn up for the future.
I can't help thinking back to a flight from Hong Kong to Zurich at
the end of January. In the first-class Cathay Pacific cabin were the
Chief Executive and a group of prominent Hong Kong figures,
including Richard Li. They were on their way to the Davos
Economic Forum. Li made the mistake of travelling on his SAR pass-
port, and was held up at the Zurich immigration desk because it did
not have a Swiss visa. After Davos, the party went on to Israel to study
the high-tech industry there. Now Richard Li's company has got the
Cyberport project without other firms having a chance to compete,
much to their annoyance.
5 March
A jolly evening at the annual dinner of the Pacific Rim wine soci-
ety. As always, the occasion is presided over by the Deputy Chief
Justice, a very tall New Zealander who revels in auctioning choice
bottles for charity at outrageous prices. The police band marches
through the hotel dining room, dressed in white helmets, white
coats and blue trousers as though they were on the parade ground
rather than a parquet floor. They play 'John Peel' and 'Rule
Britannia' and 'Land of Hope and Glory'. A visitor from Britain
seated at our table says he didn't think that this kind of thing would
be allowed now that Hong Kong was part of China. By then, the
Deputy Chief Justice and an eminent wine merchant from Bristol
are on their feet singing along to Elgar.
ii March
If we were worried about the way things are going with the rule of
law and Cyberport, a third shoe has just fallen with the case of the
non-prosecution of the newspaper owner, Sally Aw Sian, which
reaches its political conclusion today. The no-confidence motion in
March 107
the Secretary for Justice tabled by Margaret Ng, the representative of
the legal constituency in the Legislative Council, speaks volumes
about the way politics works when the chips are down. The story so
far has taken us through the decision not to prosecute Sally Aw, the
sentencing of three of her underlings and Elsie Leung's remark that
one reason she was not charged was because of the effect that might
have had on her business. But now the tale gets a fresh twist.
To explain how this happens, it is first necessary to describe the
arcane nature of the voting procedure in the Legislative Council. To
pass, the motion put forward by the terrier-like Ng not only has to
get an absolute majority in the chamber, but also the support of a
majority of the thirty functional constituency members. That would
normally condemn any anti-government motion to defeat, since most
functional constituency representatives can be counted on not to rock
the governmental boat. But in this case, the pro-business Liberal Party,
which has ten functional seats, has already expressed its opposition to
the Secretary for Justice's statement. The pro-democracy camp can
muster twenty votes, mainly in the popularly elected seats, but also
including a few functionals. Then there are some independents who
may back Ng. Even if she falls short among the functional con-
stituencies, a 31—29 vote for her motion in the chamber as a whole
would represent a huge moral defeat for the government in its biggest
test in the legislature since the handover.
In today's four-and-a-half-hour debate, Anson Chan delivers a
strong speech which implicitly acknowledges the scope of concern as
she widens her defence to take in the Court of Final Appeal. The rule
of law is the foundation for the community, the Chief Secretary says.
'I can assure members that we have acted out of principle, not ex-
pediency; that we have acted not to undermine the rule of law but to
observe it; that we have acted not to challenge the independence of
the judiciary but out of respect for it. We know precisely what is the
rule of law.' This does not explain why Sally Aw is free at her home
in the Tiger Balm Garden while the manager to whom she gave the
green light is in jail.
Knowing the impact a defeat would have, officials have gone to
work on the businessmen who pull the strings of the functional
io8 Dealing Wiih the Dragon
constituencies represented by Liberal Party members. The business-
men do their duty. It could be argued that they are only exercising
their democratic rights, just as voters might petition their MP to back
the government on a no-confidence motion in the Commons. But
these are not ordinary constituents. They are a small group of men
who enjoy political influence because of the business and financial
muscle they are now flexing on behalf of the administration.
At the last minute, the Chairman of the Liberals announces that the
party has decided to abstain, after all. 'If all civil servants were to resign
for their mistakes then the whole top tier of government might go,' he
remarks in what sounds like considerably less than a ringing endorse-
ment. The decision is particularly embarrassing for a prominent Liberal
who lobbied the main Chamber of Commerce to distance itself from
the Secretary for Justice. One party member, Ronald Arculli, a well-
known solicitor, prefers to walk out rather than remain in the chamber
and abstain. He is in tears as he leaves. 'Whatever the result, there are no
winners,' he says. 'The loser is Hong Kong.'
There are two ironies in this. Arculli is on the board of the South
China Morning Post. At a lunch of the board in a seafood restaurant
back before the handover, his impending appointment to the Tung
administration was the subject of congratulations and toasts. The job
he was supposed to have got was that of Secretary for Justice. A year
later, the Post ran a story about how a property developer was using
shelf companies to increase his influence in a functional constituency
on behalf of his favoured candidate - who was none other than the
man who walked out of the Legislative Council rather than follow the
pressure to stay and abstain.
The volte-face by other Liberals means that Ng's motion goes down
to a 29—21 defeat, with ten Liberal abstentions. If the abstainers had
voted as originally planned, the outcome would have been a narrow
victory for Ng in the chamber as a whole.
The computerised voting system breaks down, so the Liberals have
to raise their hands to abstain rather than pressing the buttons on
their desks. Elsie Leung's supporters are beaming. A senior official in
her department, Greville Cross, says the SAR is fortunate to have such
a dedicated public servant. Sounding a familiar theme, the Chief
March 109
Executive hails the result as a vote of confidence in the integrity of the
legal system. One pro-China legislator says that Ng, not Leung,
threatens the rule of law; another talks of terrorism and the danger of
'handing over the jewels to Hitler', whatever that means. Business has
spoken in an unusually open manner, but there is also an intriguing
suggestion in a remark by a legislator to a reporter some time later.
'Only once,' he says, 'was I lobbied by Chinese officials: not to vote
for the motion of no confidence on Elsie Leung.'
20 March
Recession may still have us in its grip, but the rich aren't doing too
badly. The wealth of Henderson Land's Lee Shau-kee is reckoned to
have grown by US$1.9 billion in the past twelve months. 'The worst
is behind us,' he tells Forbes magazine. 'But like a patient recovering
from a serious illness, it will be a gradual process.' Although corporate
profits are generally down, the Hang Seng stock market index is up by
22 per cent so far this year. Sentiment is clearly shifting, and money
returning. Who needs to bother about politics?
Another big beneficiary of this is 'Superman' Li Ka-shing, now
estimated to be worth some £7.5 billion. At the end of last year, he
caused a shock by letting it be known that he was worried about the
'unfavourable political environment' here, and was unlikely to go
ahead with an unspecified big project as a result. It was hard to see
what was causing such concern to K.S., as his fellow businessmen
call him. Even less so when shares in his main company have
doubled from their low of last year. The archetypal poor-boy-made-
tycoon is as much king of the big deal as ever, and is about to get the
recognition of an honorary degree at Cambridge, to which he has
donated tens of millions of pounds. Opinion polls regularly place the
dapper Li as the man Hong Kong people most admire. Starting out
as a manufacturer of plastic products, he rules an empire stretching
from Britain via the most strategic waterway in the Americas to
Beijing's biggest building site. Li was the first Chinese to take over
a big British trading company, Hutchison Whampoa. His other
main firm, which originated with the plastics business he set up in
iio Dealing With the Dragon
1950, is called Cheung Kong after the Cantonese words for a long
river.
In public, Li, who looks much younger than his seventy-one years,
strikes a graceful, courteous pose in keeping with his status in the
community. He makes a point of attending ceremonies and funerals
and staying to the end. Though he has a garden and swimming pool
outside his seventieth-floor office on top of a tower in Central, he is
not ostentatious about his wealth. His sleek black and white boat,
Concordia A, is relatively modest by the standards of the Hong Kong
mega-rich, though the bodyguards are very much in evidence - for
good reasons, as we will see. When the great and good of Hong Kong
gather for an important national occasion, he lines up on the platform
with Tung Chee-hwa, Anson Chan and the director of the Xinhua
news agency. In private, he is intensely focused on the deal at hand,
symbolised by his purchase of a controlling stake in Hongkong Electric
back in 1985 in just seventeen hours, including eight for sleep.
I first met Li in the autumn of 1995 when the South China Morning
Post opened its new printing plant in the New Territories. As he went
to make his speech, the chairman of the newspaper, Robert Kuok,
said: 'Look after my friend Mr Li, will you, Jonathan?' There stood a
slim, immaculately dressed man with black-rimmed spectacles and a
friendly smile.
He said he had to go to a meeting shortly, but wanted to do Kuok
the courtesy of staying and listening to his speech. So we stood on a
gallery and watched the proceedings. At one point, Li sidled through
the crowd and tried to use a telephone: wasn't the owner of the
Orange network carrying a mobile? He seemed to be having trouble,
so I went over and pressed the button to get an outside call. Li smiled,
dialled and spoke briefly.
As the speeches finished, Li walked off, waving to me to stay
behind. But he was heading in the wrong direction, straight on for the
press hall where printing was in full swing. I had a vision of Hong
Kong's best-known businessman wandering out on to a gantry, top-
pling over the railings and being chewed up with the next day's front
page. I went after him, and guided him down to the front entrance
and into his Mercedes. Do you want to go back to Central? he asked.
March hi
No, I said, I am staying for dinner (which ended with another noted
local property tycoon downing a glass full of Scotch in one go, think-
ing it was beer).
A while later, I found myself walking out of Government House
with K. S. Li after a dinner for John Major in the dying days of colo-
nialism. Again, he asked me if I wanted a lift in his limousine. My red
Honda was waiting in the line down the drive, so I declined. I seem
fated to become the man who always turns down a ride with Li Ka-
shing. Other offers came after a couple o£ dinners, and once at the
opening of the new airport in 1998. Maybe I have lodged in Li's
mind as a earless journalist.
Despite his offers of a lift, the Post seems to have fallen foul of Li's
empire, though we have not suffered in the same way as a press group
which lost advertising from his companies after one of its magazines
ran several pages of photographs of the tycoon with a homely-look-
ing woman at the airport. One of Li's senior executives told me
outright in the spring of 1999 that we would never get an interview
with his boss because the Post was regarded as 'unfriendly'. A little
later, Li himself spoke of critical remarks about him and his family's
projects in the 'English-language press'. When a columnist criticised
the group, the matter was taken up directly with the paper's chairman.
Li's lieutenants say they cannot understand why anybody is concerned
about his influence. 'If you ever want to get anything done in this
town, you always make your dispositions in advance,' as one of them
put it.
23 March
Anson Chan Fang On-sang's term as Chief Secretary of the SAR is
renewed until 30 June 2002, when the Chief Executive's term also
ends. This will take her two and a half years beyond the normal
retirement age of sixty. She and Tung appear together to make the
announcement today. It is all smiles and expressions of mutual esteem.
Tung says he did not ask for Beijing's approval but 'informed' the
Central Government of his decision. Answering questions, Chan tells
reporters that there are occasions when she does not agree with Tung,
ii2 Dealing With the Dragon
as there were times when she didn't agree with Chris Patten. But their
relationship is 'based on trust and frankness'.
Chan is a tough administrator with a flashing dimpled smile who is
always impeccably dressed. Married to a former senior policeman, she
was born into a distinguished Chinese family in January 1940. One of
her forebears was a leading general. Her mother is a well-known
painter. As she rose through the civil service, she ran into a major
controversy over a five-year-old girl whom Chan, as Director of
Social Welfare, ordered to be taken from her mother. Social workers
broke down the door of their home and put the child into care. The
mother was placed in a mental ward.
In 1993, Chan was appointed by Chris Patten as the first local
Chief Secretary. Two years ago, Tung's decision to keep her in her job
was a sine qua non for confidence in Hong Kong. She has been the
most vital single element in the administration so far, regularly push-
ing the two systems button when the Chief Executive or the Secretary
for Justice sounds off about how we should put the one country first.
Although a natural conservative, she shows a real respect for democ-
racy and diversity as key elements in Hong Kong's character. A
ferociously hard worker, she tops popularity polls and is genuinely
respected. But some wonder if the agreement to stay on means she
will find herself following the Chief Executive's agenda willy-nilly. A
couple of members of her coterie of female civil servants say she is
finding life with Tung and his proteges increasingly difficult. 'We all
know how the power is flowing,' says one. But there is talk that she
harbours hopes of succeeding him, and so will grow less ready to
make waves.
Chan would have been the best choice for Chief Executive in
1997. But she didn't get anywhere near the starting gate at the time,
if only because of her links with the British and her loyalty to
Patten. Beijing is said to think well of her as a firm manager who has
the keys to the Rolls-Royce government machine. Loyalty, even if
it was to the last Governor, is a quality much prized in China.
Beside the slow-moving, indecisive Tung, she cuts a brisk and reas-
suringly businesslike figure. Or is this all just a story that is being
spread in an attempt to fan her ambition and to ensure that she keeps
March 113
in line in the hope of future advancement? As for her own approach
to life, Chan says, 'The most important thing is that you keep an
optimistic attitude and do not make a fuss about little things.' She
has taken to exercising in her office, and relaxes with an occasional
turn on the ballroom floor - her twin sister used to run a dancing
school. But a week after the announcement that she was staying on,
she collapses as she leaves the Legislative Council chamber after
delivering her speech in the Budget debate. She has to be taken out
of the building in a wheelchair, and driven to hospital where the
Chief Executive and other government officials visit her. A doctor
says she is suffering from Meniere's syndrome, an imbalance of fluid
in the middle ear that causes dizziness, hearing loss and nausea. She
will be up and back to work in a week's time. But it is a reminder of
the mortality of the pillar of the administration, who looks pretty
much irreplaceable.
28-29 March
Hong Kong is not the only European colony to return to China as the
millennium looms. Today we cross to Macau for the night, a hover-
craft ride past the islands in the bay, across the mouth of the Pearl
River delta and under a huge bridge to the landing stage of Europe's
oldest possession on the Asian mainland. Deng Xiaoping dreamed of
all China being reunited by the end of the century. Taiwan is still far
from returning to the fold. But on the night of 19—20 December,
Beijing will recover the smallest of its lost lands, with 410,000 people
in 19.3 square kilometres, as the Portuguese fly home for Christmas
for the last time.
Macau used to be known as a haven from the modern world, a
place dotted with casinos and Portuguese restaurants under a sleepy
administration, set on a somewhat seedy course of decline. Errol
Flynn tried to introduce cock-fighting in the 1930s, and Portugal's
neutral status in the Second World War made the enclave a
Casablanca-like refuge from the all-conquering Japanese. More
recently, there have been recurrent rumours of money being funnelled
back secretly from Macau to fund the Socialist Party in Portugal: a
ii4 Di-Ai.iNc; Wnn the Dragon
local newspaper is launching a signature campaign for an investigation
into the allegations.
I first came here from Vietnam in 1965, and stayed at a dowdy,
shabby hotel where I drank vinho verde on the balcony and was eaten
alive by mosquitoes before spending the night playing blackjack at a
floating casino: I seem to remember getting out just about even. In
those days, the 64-kilometre crossing took several hours by ferry boat.
Now, there is Cantopop on the screens above our heads in the jetfoil,
and Macau is just forty-five minutes away from Hong Kong. There
are tower blocks on the waterfront and on the adjoining island of
Taipa. But the casinos and the decaying colonial atmosphere still give
the place a special character.
When we first arrived in Hong Kong in 1995, we left our super-
efficient hotel one weekend to spend a couple of days in one of
Macau's superior establishments. In our room overlooking the har-
bour, the television didn't work; the wash basin was cracked; the
headboard threatened to tip over on to us, and it took so long to
check out that we missed the hovercraft back. Welcome to southern
Europe, we said as we waited to zip back to modernity in Hong
Kong. But the atmosphere was mellow, the food was excellent and I
found my favourite barber's shop in Asia at the back of the main
square. We walked among the once-grand ochre buildings, through
the shaded parks and along Shrimp Paste Alley, Knife's Lane, Pig's
Lane and Straw Street. We admired the facade of the burned-out
cathedral and climbed to the Portuguese fort on the hill above the
church with its old cannons pointing out to repel any invaders. We ate
Portuguese pastries and bought anti-itching powder in an old phar-
macy. 'A weed from Catholic Europe,' wrote Auden. 'Nothing serious
can happen here.'
The Portuguese arrived in 1513, and formally took charge of the
place in 1557. The Dutch tried to invade, but fled after a cannonball
fired by a priest hit a barrel of gunpowder in their midst and caused
havoc. The Jesuits established the first Western-style university in
Asia, the College of the Mother of God, in 1594. Their great church
of St Paul's, with its Chapel of the Eleven Thousand virgins, was
consecrated in 1623. Francis Xavier died here, after failing to get into
March 115
China. The diocese of Macau stretched across China, Japan and
Korea, and down to Timor and Malacca.
As a trading centre, Macau dealt in spices, silk, pepper, cloves,
silver, sandalwood, tea, ginger, nutmeg and plates - the fine new
museum up the hill from St Paul's contains a porcelain bidet from
Canton, reminding one of where china got its name from. The
Portuguese settlers also prospered from taking silks and porcelain to
Japan and returning with silver which they sold to China at highly
advantageous rates. A foundry set up in 1625 was so good that it
received orders for cannons and bells from Europe. Later, Macau
became famous for its fireworks, with names like Roaring Lion,
Camel, Elephant, Polar Bear, Black Hawk Extra Loud Firecrackers -
and the ne plus ultra Supercharged Flash Firecrackers Super Zoo
Brand. Matches were also a big industry. But both had died out by the
early 1960s, and the place became a backwater, with its pink and
white government buildings, its decaying colonial houses, its
Portuguese restaurants, its Buddhist monastery with a vegetarian can-
teen, and its many ornate churches.
For some, Macau means the annual Grand Prix motor race run
through the winding city streets. For others, the magnet is Fernando s
restaurant in a bare brick edifice behind the black sand beach on the
island of Coloanne, where the prehistoric inhabitants of Macau lived.
Fernando 's serves enormous portions of grilled, garlicky food from
Portugal and its other former possessions: the chicken comes from
Brazil, the sardines from the home country. The other island, Taipa,
has an ornate church on a hill, and a restored colonial residence below
that reflects a strait-laced life many thousand miles from home. In the
city on the mainland, the Club Militar has been given a facelift, and
outsiders can rub elbows with the colonial elite in its stylish dining
room. Reclamation and development have ruined the gracious old
waterfront, but there are still the small pastelaria round the main square
in the middle of the old town, and the beautiful lines of the churches
and the nearby Senate building.
At the back of the square lies the Shanghai Barberia, with its
revolving red, white and blue pole, old reclining chairs in faded imi-
tation leather and equally aged attendants, one with a huge powder
i i () Dealing With the Dragon
puff of white hair who cuts my thin topping strand by strand this
afternoon with all the attention of a brain surgeon. Inexplicably, the
bibs they put round customers' necks used to be printed with a map
of the Arctic; equally inexplicably, they have been replaced with bibs
bearing advertisements in French and Japanese for a cafe in Tokyo
called Bananas, which offers 'a meeting of European and Japanese
cakes'. On the television set installed on the wall above my chair, a
noisy Hong Kong gangster film is showing a fight in a warehouse. A
man with a blowtorch confronts a man with a revolver. The blow-
torch melts the revolver barrel, which bends downwards. The gunman
abandons the pistol on top of a packing case. Another man picks it up,
not noticing the state of the barrel. A minute later he points the gun
at an adversary and fires, literally shooting himself in the foot. I laugh.
The puftDall barber holds his scissors aloft for a moment and then goes
on cutting my hairs one by one. The cost is one-fifth of what you'd
pay in Hong Kong.
We are here this weekend for the closing of a Macau monument,
the Bela Vista. Launched as a hotel by an English boat captain at the
end of the nineteenth century, it has served many purposes over the
years, but has recently been a small jewel of a place on a hill, run by
a Hong Kong company, with its elegantly furnished bedrooms, its
cool dining room, its terrace overlooking the harbour and its none
too distinguished food. Now it is to close as a hotel in order to
become the residence of the Portuguese consul to China's last re-
acquisition of the twentieth century. On this Saturday night, the
superb bedrooms are thrown open as though the Bela Vista was just
opening and soliciting guests. There is a sumptuous buffet and a big
band that plays show tunes and a bit of swing before launching into a
Latin American medley. As the strains of the tango and paso doble waft
out towards the sea, a Chinese couple take the floor. They perform
perfectly, each movement synchronised on best dance-school lines.
They know how good they are, pausing to look at the spectators and
elicit applause. They could have danced all night, for sure, but at
2 a.m. it is time to wander down the hill to the Mandarin hotel and
casino, where the punters are heading for the VIP room and a couple
of heavy-looking fellows are keeping watch outside.
March 117
For, despite all its legacies from a past that set Macau apart from the
pace and prosperity of Hong Kong, one industry dominates.
Gambling is the lifeblood of this place, and the bloodstream is far from
pure.
Macau's gaming tradition reaches back for more than a century,
boosted in 1872 by the ban on gambling in Hong Kong except for the
horses and a few mahjong parlours (and, more recently, a weekly lot-
tery). The Portuguese started taxing gambling in the 1850s. They
used the money not only to cover local expenditure, but also to
finance the colony of East Timor, which was administered from
Macau. A monopoly casino franchise was instituted in 1937, and was
held for many years by a Hong Kong Chinese family, some of whose
members live in the same apartment block as us. In 1962, the family
dropped out (one story has it that they netted US$350 million for
giving up the franchise). They were succeeded by a company which
may be regarded as the real master of present-day Macau.
The Sociedade de Turismo e Diversoes de Macau (STDM) is
headed by the dapper Stanley Ho, a member of a celebrated family
which rose to fame and fortune as compradors, or local go-betweens,
for Jardine's, the Hongkong and Shanghai Bank and other big ex-
patriate firms. There were five brothers Ho, and they speculated
jointly in shares and went badly wrong when Jardine's stock slumped -
two of the brothers committed suicide. Stanley, who likes to be
referred to as 'Dr Ho' for his honorary doctorate from the Macau
University of East Asia, is also head of the property-owners' associa-
tion in Hong Kong, where his Shun Tak company owns three big
sites. In Macau, he was originally associated with a tycoon called Yip
Hon whom he described at his funeral as the 'God of Gambling'.
Now it is Ho who is the gambling king of the enclave. Indeed, given
the STDM's position in the place, you might say that he is the real
governor of Macau.
The casino takings account for a quarter of the territory's gross
domestic product, and provide billions of dollars in taxes, even if the
government's revenue fell by 13 per cent in 1999 due to the Asian
recession. Five per cent of the workforce is directly employed by the
casinos; many more depend on the tourists gambling attracts. Dr Ho's
1 1 8 Dealing With the Dragon
company has its own bank and a fleet of thirty-two high-speed ferries.
It built the garish Hotel Lisboa, with its golden cupolas, industrial
gaming areas for the ordinary punters and carefully protected VIP
rooms on the upper floors for the high rollers. It runs horse and
greyhound racing. It recently completed a major development project
of roads and new buildings round the main waterfront. The French
may know Macau as ll'enfer dujeu, but, for the territory's people, the
roulette, blackjack and fan-tan tables are more of a source of deliver-
ance from an economy that would otherwise have even less to offer
since trade and manufacture moved elsewhere.
The STDM has also tested the gambling waters in Vietnam and
opened the first casino in the North Korean capital of Pyongyang.
The minimum bet there is US$10, or half a week's earnings for a local
worker. Not that locals are allowed into the establishment, which has
cost some US$30 million. It is part of a wider attempt by Macau to
forge links with Pyongyang. North Korea's airline is due to run a
weekly service to the Portuguese colony. Unfortunately, the flights
will only go once a month due to limited demand.
The company invited 100 guests from Macau and Hong Kong to
the opening of the Pyongyang casino in 1999. Among them was a
flamboyant figure from the SAR, Albert Yeung Sau-shing, chairman
of a conglomerate called the Emperor Group. The President of the
Legislative Council, Rita Fan, worked for two years as the group's
general manager. Yeung was the man mentioned earlier who was
freed after a string of witnesses lost their memories when called to
give evidence against him. In the course of his career, he has been
jailed for attempting to pervert the course of justice, banned from
being a director of a listed company because of insider trading, and
fined for illegal bookmaking. Now he is launching North Korea's
second casino in a US$180 million hotel complex in a trade zone on
the border with China and Russia.
The future of the casino franchise after Macau's return to China has
not been settled, but the STDM holds it until 2001. The territory's
Basic Law contains an explicit provision that its government may
'define its own policies on the tourism and amusement sector' —just in
case any officials in Beijing were tempted to meddle with the principal
March 119
source of amusement. Dr Ho is sure to play the game with all the skill
bred from a lifetime of experience as a high-level go-between.
Born in 192 1, he has a house in Hong Kong with James Bond-
style protection gadgets. A big philanthropist, he is vice-president of
the local Girl Guides. A pledge to contribute large sums of money
to the Franklin Roosevelt Memorial campaign got him coffee with
Bill Clinton at the White House. When a Hong Kong newspaper
asked its readers who they would most like to be, Ho came second
to the mega-tycoon Li Ka-shing. Ho's cash, women and good looks
were seen as his most attractive qualities. With his slicked-back
black hair and elegant frame, he looks the part of the superb ball-
room dancer he is. A couple of years ago, he won two business-class
return tickets to Paris in the lucky draw at a French Chamber of
Commerce gala dinner. The other guests wondered what Stanley
would want with mere business class when he has his own US$18
million private jet, named after his mother, Florinda, on which he
likes to watch videos and catch up on sleep as he spends 400 hours
a year in the air.
After the share slump in the 1930s and the suicide of two of his
brothers, Ho's father fled to Saigon. 'I was so broke, dead broke,'
Stanley recalls. He worked his way through a scholarship education at
the University of Hong Kong, and then moved to Macau when the
Japanese occupied the British colony. As a possession of Axis-friendly
Portugal, Macau was left alone. Ho made his first small fortune deal-
ing in rice, beans and kerosene. Back in Hong Kong after the end of
hostilities, he earned a much bigger fortune from real estate and trad-
ing. A report commissioned by the government into a big takeover
which was kept secret for years found that one of his close associates
funded the purchase of three properties in New York with money
borrowed from the STDM by cashing gambling chips from a room at
the Lisboa casino.
In his home on the south side of Hong Kong Island, Ho has a col-
lection of multi-carat jewelled objects bought from the best Western
suppliers. On his office sideboard, there sits a golden beast studded
with diamonds and emeralds for eyes. He buys a new animal each
year. Last year, it was a tiger. A week ago it was reported that his
120 Dealing Wiiii rHE Drac.on
fourth wife, Angela, was expecting his sixteenth child - she has
already had three sons and a daughter. Asked about Viagra, Ho was
reported to have replied, 'I have absolutely no need for such things.'
The good doctor holds a 20 per cent stake in STDM. Behind him
stands the formidable figure of Henry Fok Ying-yung, a long-time
China power-broker who has risen from a childhood on a junk to
great wealth and a vice-chairmanship of the Chinese People's Political
Consultative Congress. After the Second World War, Fok built up a
shipping business, and smuggled embargoed goods into the mainland
during the Korean War; the grateful Chinese government later
granted him a sand monopoly. Known, as a result, as 'the Sandman',
Fok found that his China connections earned him a bad name with
the British authorities, which was one reason he turned his attentions
to Macau and southern China.
Slight and small-eyed, with his skin drawn tightly over his skull, he
built China's first luxury hotel, the White Swan in Guangzhou, which
still hands guests postcards of Queen Elizabeth's stay there. He also
organised the China-backed US$120 million loan that bailed out the
family shipping firm of Tung Chee-hwa when it ran into financial dif-
ficulties. Long a critic of the British - 'I feel more free,' he said at the
handover - Fok is believed to have played a role in the subsequent ele-
vation of the Chief Executive. To be sure, when people speak of Stanley
Ho, they do so with proper respect. But Henry Fok counts for even
more, even if the degree of his current involvement in Macau is opaque.
Gambling is 'a very special kind of business', as Stanley Ho told
Greg Torode of the South China Morning Post in an interview in 1998.
'It is not good publicity to tell the world how much money we make,'
he added. 'It might scare away our big clients. My God, I have been
a sucker contributing so much, they might say. You need confiden-
tiality very much, so you really need your own people.'
Ho's 'own people' have been none too fortunate. His first wife,
Clementina, was seriously injured in a road accident in Portugal in
1972, and now lives in seclusion in a house in Macau on the ridge
overlooking the strip of water that separates the colony from the
mainland. His eldest son, Robert, died with his wife in another car
crash in 198 1. His right-hand man, Thomas Chung Wah-tin, bled to
March 121
death in minutes after being slashed on his arms and legs on his way
to a tennis game in the Mid-Levels district of Hong Kong in 1986: the
crime remains unsolved. In 1992 a US Senate Committee hearing
alleged links with associates involved in organised crime. In 1993
police raided Ho's Hong Kong mansion during investigations into the
empire of the Australian businessman, Alan Bond. 'As we say in
Chinese, real gold is not afraid of the fire of the furnace,' Ho said. 'I
have done nothing wrong. I am very happy with what I am . . . No
regrets, no regrets.'
He says he is not worried about the Triads fighting and killing one
another, even if it does give Macau a bad name. 'At most, there might
be a few dozen people killed,' Ho told reporters on a visit to Beijing
earlier this month. 'It's none of our business.' What really worries him
and other big businessmen in Macau is the threat of being kidnapped.
There has been a series of unreported abductions, he says, with the vic-
tims not informing the police for fear of reprisals. Ho insists he does not
know a single Triad member. 'I don't need them and I don't like them.'
No doubt. But, as a Macau police cliche has it, as light attracts mos-
quitoes so casinos attract criminals. Elsewhere, it is the Mafia; in this
part of the world it is the Triads. Ho's company says it keeps a firm
grip on its own operations. As for corruption, he once remarked:
'The whole world is corrupt. It's only a matter of degree.'
The practice of leasing out rooms at the casinos where high-stakes
games are played is an obvious magnet for the criminals, as is the traf-
fic in gambling chips and the pickings from prostitution and
protection rackets. There are also the high rollers who fly in and
want to be entertained, and the losers who need to borrow money for
that elusive big hit. Traditionally, the big gamblers have come from
Hong Kong and Taiwan, but some are now arriving from the main-
land, like the deputy mayor of a big city who has been accused of
gambling away the equivalent of £2.5 million from municipal funds
when he was meant to be attending a study course at the Central
Party School in Beijing.
Loan-sharking is a favoured Triad activity, and one that fits in
neatly with gambling. Freelance dealers in casino chips offer them on
credit at extortionate daily interest rates. In one terrible case, a Hong
122 Dealing Wiih the Dragon
Kong woman went across to Macau while her husband was away
sweeping the graves of his ancestors on the mainland during the
season of family mourning. She lost all their savings. She borrowed
money from loan sharks. She lost that, too. She went home and tried
to kiU herself and her children with gas, rat poison and, eventually, by
slitting their veins. The father returned to a scene of carnage. His wife
was taken to court and sentenced to jail - she had to be put in a spe-
cially protected area of the prison because the Triad loan sharks were
still after her for their money.
Prostitution is another underworld mainstay. Smart hotel lobbies
have their contingent of elegantly turned-out Russian tarts. In less
plush establishments, saunas, nightclubs and on the streets, the young
women are from the mainland, several thousand of them. They turn
tricks for a couple of hundred local dollars, and give most of their
money to pimps who provide them with hotel rooms. Many send
much of their remaining earnings to their families, telling their parents
they have jobs as waitresses or shop assistants.
When times were good in Macau and there was enough loot to
keep everybody happy, each Triad gang kept to its own turf. Now the
Asian economic crisis means that less money is being spent on gam-
bling, and the hoods are at one another's throats for what there is. In
a series of gangland killings, underworld figures have been shot or
chopped to death. The last Portuguese Governor describes the cur-
rent violence as 'unprecedented'. Nobody seems safe. A senior
gambling inspector was shot dead and one of his superiors wounded
twice in the head. A government prosecutor involved in fighting the
Triads and casino crime was shot and wounded in the chest by two
men on a motorcycle who also hit his pregnant wife in the hip.
Journalists have been warned that if they write about the main Triad
gang, 'bullets will have no eyes and knives and bullets will have no
feelings'. In one incident, three men in a green van tried to kidnap the
grandson of Stanley Ho's late partner, the God of Gambling, shooting
him in the stomach before he forced them to flee by returning fire.
Though the numbers are, by their nature, unverifiable, Triads may
outnumber the 4,300 members of the police and security forces.
They are used to moving with relative impunity across the border
March 123
with Guangdong province, but now police have pulled in 622 alleged
Triads in a three-day operation. Half the inmates of Macau jails come
from outside the colony. A leading local gang boss celebrated for his
crime wave on both sides of Macau's border with Guangdong hails
from Hong Kong. Some of the other hoods come from Taiwan, or
from the mainland.
The threat from foreign mobsters is such that four local Triad
bosses are said to have hatched a plan to unite their gangs to fight the
interlopers. Before that could happen, the most prominent of the
locals, a 45-year-old known as Broken Tooth, was arrested in the
Lisboa Hotel after a bomb was set off under the car of the head of the
Judicial Police while he was out jogging. Broken Tooth, whose real
name is Wan Kuok-koi, has not been accused of that bombing, but
rather of being the head of the much-feared 14K Triad gang, com-
manding associates known as Smuggling Queen, Fat Woman, Big
Sister, Terrible Ghost, Scarface and Fishmonger. The head of the
Judicial Police says that 14K carried out a string of attacks on officials
and underworld murders including the sensational killing of a Hong
Kong Triad boss known as the 'Tiger of Wanchai' during the 1993
Macau Grand Prix motor race. In another incident, three of Wan's
leading lieutenants were shot in the street in 1997.
Wan, who has been described as a psychopath, is thought to have
believed that he could shoot and bomb his way to control of the Macau
underworld. Starting out as a seller of chicken wings, he ended up with
more than twenty bank accounts and a string of properties, including a
nightclub called Heavy Di with a large swastika and a skull and cross-
bones on its facade. A visitor recalls seeing a life-sized mannequin in a
police uniform hanging from the ceiling at the end of a noose. Broken
Tooth lost the use of two fingers in a chopper attack and has been shot
twice. An inveterate high-stakes punter, he was once caught on security
camera footage jumping on to a gambling table and flinging chairs
round the room after he had suffered a bad streak.
In a crazy act of self-glorification, he produced a film called Casino,
studded with incriminating depictions of violence and soft porn
scenes. He was watching a documentary about himself when he was
picked up. He denies being anything more than a businessman and
124 Dealing With the Dragon
high-stakes gambler, and says his fortune is based on a big win at the
Lisboa casino. Still, Wan has been charged with weapons trafficking,
illegal gambling, loan-sharking, blackmail, unlawful detention and
possession of fake identity documents, as well as being a member of
the illegal 14K Triad organisation. At his home, police found a scan-
ner which could have been used to listen in to their radio
wavelengths: Wan says it was a gift from 'a fat woman who died in a
shipwreck in China'. A former Portuguese gambling inspector who
was shot twice in the head by two motorcycle gunmen in 1996 says
Wan told him the 14K was 'my group'. The gang is alleged to have
gone to China and Vietnam to hire killers to carry out revenge mur-
ders in Macau in the mid-1990s. Police reports say Broken Tooth had
planned to establish a weapons factory in Cambodia and to buy tanks,
missiles and rockets from arms dealers.
The main prison where he was first held is described as being out
of control. Although there is one guard for every three prisoners,
Triads rule the roost behind the twenty-foot walls. Wan is said to have
run his gang from inside the jail by mobile telephone, and to have
held all-night parties with drink and drugs. When he and eight other
men were moved to a special high-security unit nearby, 300 police
guarded them. The Judicial Police director says Broken Tooth pro-
vided another prisoner with Ecstasy pills during his birthday party
earlier in the year: the man overdosed and died. The judge who was
originally to have heard his case has decided to take retirement. A sub-
stitute has been sent from Portugal; he is rarely seen without a
bodyguard. New prison guards have also been drafted in from Europe.
Their families have stayed behind - it's safer that way.
The Broken Tooth case apart, the future of Macau's legal system is
murky. Very few Chinese understand it. Many judges are new
appointments. Most of the senior policemen will be going back to
Europe. No wonder that officials in Beijing roll their eyes when the
matter of law and order in the Portuguese colony is raised. Stanley Ho
once suggested that Hong Kong might take responsibility for such
matters after the handover in December.
That will not happen. On the other hand, if the Triads keep up
their present level of activity, the Chinese army garrison in Macau
March 125
might find itself as the ultimate arbiter of public security. They may
not be on the streets in Hong Kong, but what price a PLA detach-
ment fighting crime in Macau? Would a savvy Triad then claim
democratic credentials and become a political martyr? Stranger things
have happened.
From 20 December, this will be a problem for the new Chief
Executive of Macau, a well-connected banker called Edmund Ho
who has adopted the hopeful slogan 'advancing from adversity to
opportunity'. Ho should have a much smoother political passage than
his counterpart in Hong Kong. Portugal was ready to hand back
Macau after its own revolution in 1974, particularly when local leftists
flexed their muscles during the Cultural Revolution. But Beijing had
other things on its mind, and didn't want Macau just then. So the
Portuguese took the line that Macau was Chinese territory being
administered by Europeans for the time being.
This meant that though the Governor has formally ruled from his
pink palace, virtually nothing was done that would not find favour
with the mainland authorities. China's influence is felt throughout the
community, from the meetings of the local legislature in the Senate
building to the decision to remove an equestrian statue of a nine-
teenth century Portuguese governor from a square opposite Stanley
Ho's main casino because it was regarded as a politically incorrect
piece of colonial symbolism.
The veneer of Portuguese rule has become even thinner than that
of the British in their last years in Hong Kong. The President of
Portugal, who did not get on politically with the more right-wing
Governor, was reported to have thought of appointing Edmund Ho
to run the colony back in 1996. There are around 2,000 'continentals'
in Macau. Only a few hundred will stay after the end of the year.
Most civil service jobs have already been transferred to local people.
Though there are some 10,000 Macanese born from unions between
local Chinese and Portuguese, particularly soldiers from the garrison
who used local marriages as a way of avoiding being posted to the
awful colonial wars in Angola and Mozambique, this is a Chinese city.
Macau has always felt strong identification with the mainland, be it
under the Kuomintang regime or the Communists. In recent years,
126 Dealing With the Dragon
money has flowed into Macau from China, funding the building of
empty tower blocks by the waterfront. The neighbouring city of
Zhuhai has had its eye on the colony.
When the Portuguese go, they will leave their mark, but it seems
unlikely to endure to any great extent. Nine months before it rejoins
a motherland it never knew, Macau remains a fascinating, outlandish
place, with its casino bosses and Graham Greenesque officials, its
Russian prostitutes and its sardines from the Atlantic, but it seems des-
tined to become a true backwater, with a name that people recognise
but cannot quite place on the map any more. Still, Dr Ho is not
giving up. He is opening a tenth casino on Taipa island, making sure
that he schedules the ceremony for an auspicious date. He is also
diversifying into the Philippines. The share price of an obscure com-
pany there soared when Ho's interest in it became known, and he had
a floating restaurant towed in from Hong Kong: speculation that one
floor would be turned into a casino was dampened down after the
Cardinal Archbishop of Manila said that this would destroy families
and bankrupt homes. He is also pushing a big property redevelopment
scheme in Hong Kong -just in case things go wrong across the bay
in the place where nothing is ever supposed to happen.
31 March
The tax rebates promised in the Budget have been sent out with
cheques worth HK$8.5 billion. But all the evidence suggests that
rather than rushing out to spend and giving the economy a kick-start,
people are putting the money in the bank.
April
i April
Mobile telephone ownership in the SAR has passed three million, or
nearly three-quarters of adults. This is the second highest penetration
in the world after Finland. Today the system has been made easier to
use: if you switch telephone companies, you no longer have to get a
new number. Advertisements proclaim this to be 'Independence Day'.
To encourage people to sign up with it, firms offer free noodles, a
yoghurt drink, cash and discounts. Spending on advertising mobiles
has jumped by 70 per cent in the first quarter of the year. A television
station prudently decided not to show a documentary on the possible
health dangers involved in using them.
On the mainland, the poor state of land lines makes the jump to
mobiles a sensible, if expensive, step. In Guangzhou last year, I
watched a young woman praying at a temple. Her mobile rang. She
took it from her pocket and conducted a conversation without miss-
ing a single bow towards the altar. In Hong Kong, the fixed-line
system is perfectly good and local calls are free, but mobiles have
become an inherent part of everybody's life. Being a non-owner is
roughly akin to not being interested in making money. Such people
do exist, but they are rare. There are jokes not a million miles from
reality about diners at adjoining restaurant tables conversing over their
telephones, or ordering the next course on a mobile. When a plane
128 Dealing With the Drag on
lands in Hong Kong, passengers rush to get out the telephones and
make a call. So that small children don't feel left out, toy shops sell
rubber mobile phones. One woman says her daughter rejects the toy
and is only content with the real thing. The other day, a workman
balanced on top of a bamboo scaffolding outside our flat was talking
busily into his mobile without any visible means of support hundreds
of feet above the ground.
Last summer, I lunched with a major Hong Kong property devel-
oper in the dining room of his penthouse office. He insisted on
accompanying me down to street level when I left. Did I need a lift
back to my office? he asked. No, I said, I had an office car coming to
pick me up. Why didn't I call the driver to make sure I didn't waste
any time waiting? I said I didn't have a telephone with me. Shocked,
he handed me his. Two hours later, he sent a mobile round to my
office as a gift.
2 April
The Yancheng Evening News reports that ioo condom dispensers are to
be installed in Guangzhou city, selling a box of two contraceptives for
the equivalent of 14 pence. They will be made theft-proof with spe-
cial 'drill-in screws'. This follows a bad experience in the city of
Chengdu where similar machines had a habit of 'disappearing during
the night', the newspaper says.
5 April
Today is Ching Ming, the Festival of Pure Brightness or the Festival
of the Dead. Like Easter, with which it coincides, it is a time to con-
template death, resurrection and the afterlife, for which the Chinese
ensure that the departed enjoy worldly comforts by burning fake
paper money and models of cars, houses, boats and mobile telephones
which are wafted aloft in the smoke. This is a time at which Hong
Kong people flood to the mainland, to visit family graves there:
140,000 people went through the frontier today.
Some 400 fires started by people burning paper money or leaving
April 129
smouldering incense sticks at graves are blazing on the hillsides of
Hong Kong. Most are in the New Territories. Government heli-
copters are busy water-bombing the flames. Dozens of people have to
be rescued. Almost 9 million square metres and 5,400 trees are
affected. A photograph of a fire on the crest of Kowloon Peak makes
such a dramatic front-page image that some readers mistake it for the
latest picture from the war in Yugoslavia. On the mainland, news-
papers report that more than 50 people were killed and 205 injured in
similar fires this week.
6—7 April
Some crime and economic news from China.
A restaurant owner in Henan province has been sentenced to
death for pouring nitric acid into a vat of donkey soup at a rival
establishment. In all, 148 people received hospital treatment after
drinking it.
On the border between Guangdong and Guanxi provinces, police
with rocket cannons have finally got the better of a twenty-strong
gang that has been indulging in murder, robbery and drug trafficking
for five years. The police were initially outgunned, but their 400-
strong force triumphed after an eight-hour battle.
And on the economic front, a television price war has broken out.
Like many Chinese companies, manufacturers are suffering from
excess production, low domestic demand and slumping exports. Last
year the mainland made 35 million sets, double the 1994 figure. In
the first quarter of 1999, output has shot up by another 46 per cent.
Five new producers have entered the market. But sales are still slug-
gish.
The biggest producer, a former military factory in Sichuan
province which makes 6.7 million sets a year, announces price cuts of
between 10 and 33 per cent. Sounding for all the world like British
newspapers inveighing against Rupert Murdoch's tactics, the general
manager of another manufacturer calls on the government to 'act
against this vicious cycle of competition and move against firms that
sell below production cost to ensure a level playing field'. But within
130 Dealing With the Dragon
two weeks, the other companies follow the Sichuan approach. Still,
the depth of consumer caution is such that few people rush out to
buy. Many city-dwellers either own or have access to a set. And
even at the knock-down prices, televisions are still too expensive for
most people in country areas. When rural incomes average 2,160
yuan a year, even a cut-price set at 1,800 yuan is an unattainable
luxury.
9 April
The need to give the mainland economy a serious kick-start forms the
backdrop to the most important foreign visit ever undertaken by the
Prime Minister, Zhu Rongji, who is in the United States. The cool-
ing of relations since Bill Clinton's trip to China last summer, in
which he spoke of a new strategic partnership with Beijing, means
Zhu's journey is an on-off affair till the very last moment, when it is
approved by an emergency meeting of the Politburo. 'President Jiang
made me come,' Zhu says in Washington. 'He is China's Number
One. Of course I obeyed his order.' Thus does the Prime Minister fix
final responsibility with Jiang.
In Washington, Zhu unveils an extraordinary set of concessions
aimed at getting the US to agree to admit China into the World
Trade Organisation, thereby sealing its economic relationship with the
rest of the world. Although the Europeans get a trifle shirty when
WTO membership is seen as being a matter for Washington to
decide, the Chinese know who matters most in this process. So Zhu
offers to slash import duties on a big range of products, from food and
chemicals to cars and mobile phones. He says China will allow foreign
ownership in telecommunications, hotels and insurance companies, a
significant expansion in the activities of foreign banks, and the elim-
ination of tariffs on computers and agricultural products. A leading
American China expert, Nicholas Lardy, calls the offer 'breathtaking'.
Business Week magazine describes it as an 'amazing deal'. Zhu jokes
that if the extent of the concessions is made public back home, he will
face a revolt. Before long, the Clinton administration will turn the jest
into reality.
April 131
Despite his pre-emptive remark about Jiang, Zhu is taking a con-
siderable personal gamble, given the residual strength of Chinese
conservatives who disagree with his policies. But Clinton lets him
down. Some senior presidential aides, including the Secretary of State,
the National Security Adviser and the US Chief Trade Negotiator, are
for an immediate deal. Yet, bowing to a mixture of congressional anti-
China pressure and arguments from Wall Street, which wants even
more, the President refuses to respond. Then his administration makes
things far worse by posting the Prime Minister's terms on the Internet
where they can be read by his enemies back home. According to the
Wall Street Journal, a new phrase is born: to be 'Zhu'd' means having
the rug pulled from under you at the last moment.
The Sino-US climate has already been soured by allegations of
Chinese political funding and by continuing arguments over human
rights. Blaming the 'bad political atmosphere' in the United States for
the breakdown, Zhu gamely insists that the differences do not amount
to much. Clinton stresses that he still wants a deal by the end of the
year, and is ready to send an emissary to Beijing to re-open talks. But
can Zhu offer anything more?
In his post-Washington travels, the Premier dons a ten-gallon hat,
pitches a football at the Denver Broncos training camp and gives
commodity dealers a Chinese hand signal for good fortune. In
Chicago he says, 'It's like I am in a department store and I want to buy
everything I see. But I do not have enough money in my pocket.' He
asks his American hosts how stock options work, and quotes from the
free-market philosopher Friedrich von Hayek. But some remarks are
more pointed. Zhu says China is seeking improvement in human
rights every day 'but the US isn't working as quickly to improve
theirs'. On occasion, he goes off the screen altogether, calling
Lincoln's opposition to the Confederacy 'a model, an example' for
Beijing's policy towards Taiwan.
11 April
For anybody unacquainted with Hong Kong's popular Chinese-
language press, today provides a good introduction to what you may
132 Dealing With the Dragon
expect on page one. At the time of the handover, the independence
of the media and their ability to criticise Beijing and the SAR gov-
ernment exercised politicians, press freedom bodies and foreign
correspondents. Now, it is their ethics and standards that give cause for
concern. This morning's front pages show why.
Readers of the main popular papers were greeted with photographs
of the body of a twenty-year-old woman found in a cardboard box on
the stairway of a public housing estate, her mouth bound with tape.
The photographers, who monitor the police radio, arrived in time to
snap close-up pictures before the corpse was taken away. These show
the twisted body in the box, with the thick platform heels of black
patent-leather shoes sticking up in the air. One newspaper, Apple
Daily, also runs a close-up of the woman's disfigured face across half
the top of the page. (For the record, my paper did a two-paragraph
story at the foot of the front page, with no photograph.)
Dumbing down and page three in the Sun have nothing on what is
happening in Hong Kong. The popular press here has never been
noted for restraint, but the launch of Apple in 1995 set off a full-
blooded press war, which is being fought with sensationalism,
paparazzi pursuit of celebrities, intrusion, price-cutting, advertising
deals and the occasional use of faked photographs. Polls show the
credibility of the media at an all-time low, with magazines ranked as
the worst products on the market in Hong Kong. One particular
incident has stoked concern. It involves a man whose wife threw
herself and their two children off the top of a building after finding he
had mistresses in China. Apple subsequently paid for him to make a
trip to the mainland that ended with him posing in bed with two
young women for the paper's photographers. As the outrage mounted
and a rival newspaper castigated the man as 'human scum', Apple
devoted its front page to an apology for having been led astray by mis-
guided zeal to serve its readers.
The paper's owner, Jimmy Lai Chee-ying, is one of those arche-
typal Hong Kong figures who rose from being a penniless refugee to
great wealth. Born on the mainland in 1948, he was smuggled in at
the age of twelve. After working in garment sweatshops, he made his
first serious money by stock market speculation. Then he built up a
April 133
successful rag trade business, copying European designs and manufac-
turing techniques. From there, it was a natural jump into retailing
with a chain called Giordano, modelled on Benetton.
Moving into the media, Lai launched a successful glossy, gossipy
magazine called Next, and brought new life to the daily press with
Apple in 1995. Awash with colour, graphics, sensationalism, short
news items and consumer service tests, the paper was an immediate
hit. It quickly soared to a circulation of 400,000, within spitting dis-
tance of the market leader, the Oriental Daily. Apple reflected the
street-smart attitude of a man who eats at three-star restaurants in Paris
but is in his element wolfing down Chinese-Malaysian food in a bare
walk-up in the back streets. The stocky, crew-cut, jeans-clad Lai,
who likes to read the abridged thoughts of great philosophers,
appeared in his paper's launch television commercials in person. He
stood with an apple on his head in a circle of shadowy enemies firing
arrows. The clip ended with him munching the fruit, unharmed.
Lai has been the target of mainland enmity ever since he wrote a
celebrated article in Next magazine describing the then Premier, Li
Peng, as a 'turtle's egg' who should drop dead. His journalists are
banned from crossing the border. When Lai tried to float his group on
the Hong Kong stock exchange around the time of the handover,
established finance houses were strangely unwilling to take him on.
One underwriter withdrew at the eleventh hour, and it was not until
the autumn of 1999 that he finally obtained a listing with a reverse
takeover of a printing group. 'Controversy has been my nature,' he
says. That has helped to make him a democratic hero, even if he did
run brothel reviews in his newspaper as a reader service.
Lai tells me that his publications are successful because he does not
come from a press background. 'I don't see newspapers any differently
from the T-shirts I was selling at Giordano,' he says. 'I just wanted to
go against City Hall. We advocate freedom and democracy, and we
also have the sex columns. I don't see any contradiction there.' Still,
Lai's critics have a point when they see the launch of Apple as a
moment when the popular Chinese-language press headed for the
gutter in a vicious war for readers. In March 1999, the Oriental Daily
brought out a sister paper called the Sun to undercut Apple. One of
134 Dealing With the Dkacon
the new daily's senior executives describes it to me as 'a children's
paper for childish adults'. It has a drawing of the chairman's son on the
masthead: when the news is good he smiles; when it is bad he frowns.
The only thing uniting Lai and the owners of the Oriental is their
insistence that they are just giving the public what it wants. Still,
pressure is growing for a press council to rein in the excesses. There
are two snags with this. First, any such body might try to extend its
activities to put a gag on stories which need to be covered but which
inconvenience people of influence. Secondly, to imagine Apple and
the Oriental sitting on the same committee is about as feasible as
Jimmy Lai interviewing President Jiang.
Anyway, Apple's proprietor is already off pursuing another career
with a direct sales firm called AdMart, which enables customers to
order goods through his publications, the Internet, telephones and
fax. The established supermarkets are being forced to follow suit.
They are also withdrawing advertising from Lai's newspaper and mag-
azine. As if this was not enough of a headache, AdMart runs into a
spot of bother when it is found to be unwittingly selling poor-quality
wine in bottles with the Mouton Cadet claret label.
13 April
In another part of the Hong Kong media forest, I have been reading
on the Internet about a sad wreck of a journalist who shows how jus-
tified fears were about the way the media would go after the
handover. A pitiable victim of guilt-ridden obsessions, this refugee
from London has turned his newspaper into a biased, stuffy, misin-
formed, hypocritical pro-China propaganda rag in return for hush
money from a Beijing bagman. Fat and greedy, he possesses the ethics
of a Mafia lawyer and the selective memory of a Latin American dic-
tator. His news agenda is decided by a censor from the mainland or by
the government's information services as he reels back from lunch and
sleeps off the gin and tonics. Even his private life is a ruin: Hong
Kong's dullest man, he is so boring that his wife has left him.
I must meet this pathetic figure some day, particularly since his
name is Jonathan Fenby.
April 135
The depiction ofme is to be found on an Internet website run by
a man called George Adams, who used to teach teachers at the Hong
Kong Institute of Education, and whose offer to write a column in
the South China Morning Post I declined. I have never encountered
Adams in person, but he describes himself in lonely-hearts style on his
website as being six foot in height, of 'muscular' build, interested in
swimming, running, cinema, music and the Internet; he dislikes cats,
lawyers and 1997. He styles himself 'Dr' for his academic achieve-
ments, and fancies his talents as a satirist. He says the board of the Post
has ordered me not to reply to his attacks, as if the paper's directors
have the slightest idea of his existence.
All this would be just another example of a wayward, ego-boosting
mind let loose on the Internet, except that, in his outlandish way,
Adams represents the reductio ad absurdum of a process that has been
going on around me since I arrived in Hong Kong in May 1995. One
of my early surprises was to discover how "western correspondents in
Hong Kong, local democrats, media watchdog bodies and Govern-
ment House all seemed to have made a point of poor-mouthing
the Post.
If we ran a photograph of the President of China on page one, it
was a sign of kowtowing to Beijing. If I decided to use a text from
China's news agency as a matter of record on a meeting between
Jiang Zemin and a group of Hong Kong tycoons, I was met with
sarcastic speculation about whether the Post was going to print
Xinhua reports as a matter of course from now on. Martin Lee told
a big media lunch in the United States that the bridge column was
the 'only independent and interesting thing' in the paper, which
presumably ruled out our extensive political news coverage, the
regular columns by three pro-democracy politicians and the op-ed
article we commissioned for handover day, by none other than the
Chairman of the Democrat Party. Emily Lau accused us of cen-
soring her out of the paper, although I gave her statistics to show
that she was the single most reported politician in the pages of the
Post.
Then there was the Governor, a politician who had masterminded
the Conservative general election campaign of 1992 with its 'Double
136 Dealing Wiiii im. Dragon
Whammy' assault on the Labour Party. In the past, British rulers had
been able to count on the loyal support of the Post as a pillar of the
colonial establishment. But the sale of the paper in 1993 by Rupert
Murdoch to a Malaysian-Chinese tycoon with strong mainland links
made it suspect. So officials looked with a kindly eye on plans by the
Oriental Press Group to set up a rival daily which would be more
dependably in tune with official thinking.
The new paper saw the light of day in 1994, before I arrived in
Hong Kong. Called the Eastern Express, it set out to be the Independent
of the South China Sea, with a bold design, big photographs, long for-
eign features and an excellent sports section. Its editor was a British
journalist, Stephen Vines, who had been the Hong Kong stringer for
the Guardian and the Observer. Unfortunately, its local news was patchy,
and it led with an embarrassingly wrong 'scoop' in its first issue. Despite
Martin Lees jibe, the main pro-democracy columnists stayed with the
Post. Before long, Vines was replaced, and called on me to give evi-
dence to get him his pay-off. A succession of subsequent editors tried
to find a vocation for the Express, but in the summer of 1996, the
owners reserved a big space on the front page to announce its closure.
There was no doubt about the government's interest in the Express.
The Post's political editor was invited up to tea at Government House
to be urged by one of Patten's civil servants to move to the new
paper; she decided not to go. There were reports of official advice
over other senior appointments. The Oriental group's boss made a
number of visits to Government House. Patten went to the Oriental
headquarters. One of his senior aides made enquiries about which
British newspapers the Oriental group might buy, specifically men-
tioning the Independent and Observer.
The motivation for all this activity may have been purely and laud-
ably pro-democratic, but the Express was a newspaper which sought to
compete in the marketplace with the Post and the Hong Kong Standard.
That could have led to some pointed questions had civil servants
acted in a similar manner back in Britain, but this was Hong Kong,
and back home, Patten walked on water, with many friends in the
media who brushed aside such behaviour as being quite normal for a
faraway place of which they knew little.
April 137
But that left the question of what the bosses of the Oriental may
have expected in return for launching the Eastern Express. Two of the
group's founding members had been forced to leave Hong Kong for
Taiwan in the late 1970s to escape drug trafficking charges. Reports at
the time said they were alleged to be at the head of the biggest nar-
cotics ring the territory had known. One had subsequently died. But
the family members remaining in Hong Kong, who were never the
subject of any drug allegations, wanted the other to be allowed to
come home to die in peace.
In the mid-1990s, the head of the group, C. K. Ma, a nephew of
the founders, was reported to have donated hundreds of thousands
of pounds to the British Conservatives, and to have bought a print-
ing press to turn out posters and leaflets for the party. The Sunday
Times reported that Ma was known at Central Office as 'Golden
Boy'. To thank him for his generosity, John Major issued an invita-
tion to tea at Downing Street. Ma established links with a number
of Tory MPs, and acquired prestigious properties in London. He
mused about getting a British honour and sending his sons to Eton.
He hired the former Cabinet minister, David Mellor, as his con-
sultant.
It was against this background that C. K. Ma launched the
Eastern Express, with a strongly pro-Patten editorial line. When
the British turned down an application for his uncle to be allowed
to come home shortly before the handover, Ma revealed details of
the collaboration over the Express, noting each of his visits to
Government House and a trip by Patten across to the Oriental
headquarters on the Kowloon side of the harbour. Some senior
local civil servants took a decidedly dim view of the administration
having anything to do with the Oriental group. Interestingly, there
is no mention of the episode in Jonathan Dimbleby's otherwise
exhaustive account of the last Governor's years in Hong Kong. In
his own book about Hong Kong, the founding editor of the Express
economically refers to his proprietors simply as 'controversial',
without any elucidation for readers unfamiliar with the Ma family
saga.
Whether it was because he felt he had to justify his backing for the
\}X Dealing With the Dracon
Express or simply that he needed a media punching bag, the
Governor seemed unable to find a good word to say about the Post.
The falling-out had begun under my predecessor, a leading
Australian journalist, who had certainly not adopted a line of uncrit-
ical support and once ordered an editorial telling Patten to shut up.
On the fundamental issues, the Post never budged while I was editor
in its support for freedom, human rights, democracy and the rule of
law. That did not stop Patten poor-mouthing us to guests from
London even as we printed his speeches as op-ed pieces. When one
of his leading critics, the former diplomat Sir Percy Cradock, became
a non-executive director of the Post a year before the handover,
Government House took this as proof that we were in the enemy
camp. (Cradock contributed a couple of articles, but never tried to
get involved in the paper's contents.)
Patten's friend and chronicler, Jonathan Dimbleby, told me that
the Governor simply had 'a blind spot' as far as the paper was
concerned. Appearing at the Legislative Council early in 1997,
Patten attributed views to us which were the exact opposite of an
editorial we had written a few days earlier. When I objected, I was
told that the Governor was entitled to say whatever he wanted. On
another occasion, his Information Co-ordinator gatecrashed
a lunch with the Financial Secretary and, to the evident em-
barrassment of my guest, launched into a lengthy denunciation of
my failure to stand up for press freedom - shortly after I had writ-
ten a 1, 200- word editorial explaining why press freedom was so
important to Hong Kong. (The official in question went on to
take a job with the information service of the new regime after the
handover.)
Correspondents, commentators and press freedom bodies, some
of whom never read the paper, picked up the tune. In an unex-
pected bout of imperial nostalgia, a British Labour MP, Denis
MacShane, told the Commons that the Post was a mere shadow of
what it had been in the 1980s, when it had faithfully carried the
official colonial line. The Lonely Planet guide informed its readers
that the paper was 'known as the Pro China Morning Post' and
vaunted the merits of the Hong Kong Standard, which was pursuing
April 139
a more patriotic line. The Observers Peter Hillmore reported that we
were well prepared for the kowtow when it came to reporting
Chinese dissidents: this was after we had devoted the front of our
Saturday Review section to letters smuggled out of prison by the
leading dissident Wei Jingsheng. On handover day, a BBC television
presenter opened an interview with me by saying: 'Now, your
paper's gone pretty soft,' waving a feature supplement as if it was the
front page. In another BBC programme, a well-known British jour-
nalist and the founder of Index on Censorship referred to our
'pre-emptive cringe'.
The bottom line, which did not speak too well about my trade,
was that the story was too simple and too appealing to be resisted.
After the handover, Hong Kong was bound to go down the drain.
For that to be true, the media had to be headed for the plughole,
with the Post in the vanguard. The way we reported, commented
on and analysed events was taken as a barometer of how Hong
Kong was moving. 'You are the canary in the coalmine for Hong
Kong,' as a visiting American editor put it to me. And since the
bad-news story was the one that would sell, the view had to be
negative.
Even when the Post was named best English-language paper in
Asia and Democrats publicly praised our record, some still stuck to
their guns. Stephen Vines, stringing for the Independent, has
declared that the Post had been 'neutralised', which was satisfactory
enough for Beijing. Jonathan Mirsky, the former East Asia Editor
of The Times, told a meeting in London that it had been the
'drip, drip, drip' of criticism in the first eighteen months after
Rupert Murdoch sold the paper which had pushed me back on to
the high road. 'It's a very good example of shame directing an
editor,' he added. This overlooked the fact that the editor in ques-
tion had been at the Observer in London during those eighteen
months.
All things considered, I preferred the copy of an election poster
Martin Lee sent me in 1998 inscribed, 'Thank you for your defence
of press freedom in Hong Kong! Yours democratically, Martin.'
140 Dealing Wnn the Dragon
16 April
The stock market powers on despite otherwise gloomy economic
figures. Foreign investors have decided that they may have overdone
the flight from Asia, and want to hedge their bets in case the Wall
Street bubble bursts. The Hang Seng index soars through the 12,000-
point level, ending the week at a seventeen-month high. Property
prices have slumped, but the share prices for big developers have
more than doubled. Traditional valuations have gone out of the
window. The Asian Development Bank forecasts more pain for Hong
Kong. But who cares about such predictions any more?
The Hong Kong dollar has stood firm against the tide of devalu-
ations all around it, and the Government has done well out of its
intervention in the market last August: the overall value of its holdings
has increased by 61 per cent for a paper gain of ^6.5 billion in eight
months. The Financial Secretary waves his hands in embarrassment
when I refer to him at an awards ceremony as Hong Kong's biggest
and most successful fund manager. But he still talks about the gov-
ernment's pile of cash in rather personal terms. 'I have over ninety
billion US dollars in reserves and no debt,' he tells a meeting of pen-
sion fund gurus.
Donald Tsang, who has taken to describing the market move as 'an
incursion', says he hates what has happened, and never wants to live
through such an experience again. 'Faced with the prospect of a
market set to implode through manipulative activities,' he adds, 'I
decided it was better to have a market in which to invest than to have
no market at all.' Now the question is how the government is going
to get rid of the shares to prove that this was an incursion, not an inva-
sion.
18 April
A day trip by train to Shenzhen. The half-hour journey is like any
commuter shuttle. There is no sense of going anywhere special, even
when the loudspeaker announces, 'Welcome to China', as the train
pulls into the frontier station of Lo Wu. At the crossing point, there
April 141
are duty-free shops, Chinese soldiers in olive-green uniforms, and a
special channel for 'VIP Honorary Citizens The Elderly and
Handicapped'. A health form asks if you suffer from 'rash, HIV, VD
or psychosis': one wonders who would reply in the affirmative. As my
entry form is being checked, a young woman in uniform at the immi-
gration counter picks up a New Yorker from a bunch of magazines I
brought along to read on the journey. She points out the fashion
advertisements to a colleague.
The Shenzhen river which marks the border stinks: a boy from
Hong Kong holds his nose demonstratively on the way across the
bridge into the mainland. It is the weekend, and most of the other
passengers on the Kowloon and Canton Railway Corporation train
are seeking bargains - cheap Chinese-manufactured goods, low-price
hairdos and massages, fake handbags and watches handed over in per-
fectly imitated Chanel and Cartier bags.
The retail competition from Shenzhen is causing problems for
Hong Kong shops. So much so that there are suggestions of impos-
ing a departure tax on the SAR side of the border to make
bargain-hunting dearer as well as to raise revenue. Outside the sta-
tion, an avenue of stalls and shops sells everything under the sun.
Curtains made to measure are in particular demand. Big department
stores and arcades stand on one side of the road; lines of massage par-
lours and beauty salons on the other. One group of masseuses is
kitted out in blue dungarees and red T-shirts; those at the Mang
Bing Massage service wear red dresses with yellow sashes and hand
out leaflets assuring potential clients in English, 'You are Welcome'.
In some establishments, you can be pummelled by the feet of
women hanging above you from metal bars. Hairdressing shops are
a well-known euphemism for brothels - the 'human scum' widower
in the notorious story in Apple Daily picked up the two young
ladies in one. But Hong Kong women genuinely come to Shenzhen
to have their hair done: in a hairdresser's near the station this after-
noon my wife spent a tenth of what she would have paid in Hong
Kong.
Boosted by low tax rates for companies, Shenzhen's industrial and
technology parks are forging ahead in electronics, computers and
142 Dealing Wiiii ini-. Dragon
software at a speed that should give the SAR pause for thought about
its own ambitions to become a hi-tech centre. It now accounts for 44
per cent of the mainland's high-tech output, with exports in the
sector rising 60 per cent a year. While Hong Kong sank into recession
in 1998, Shenzhen reported 15 per cent growth, though its economy
is still only a fraction of the SAR's. Most of the technology enterprises
are funded by private Chinese investors, or from Hong Kong and
Taiwan; only 10 per cent of the finance has come from the Chinese
government. Twelve overseas venture capital funds have put money
into local start-ups. Shenzhen's container ports comfortably undercut
the rates in Hong Kong, and have boosted business nearly fourfold in
the past three years. If other mainland cities could expand as fast, Zhu
Rongji remarked on a visit, China's economy might surpass the USA
and Japan.
The buildings along the main avenues are high and gleaming, the
streets crowded and busy. The suburbs and adjoining towns house
some of China's largest companies. A flashing display board at the
Agricultural Bank of China gives the latest rate for the euro. There is
a New York, New York disco and a championship golf club in the
hills outside town. But for all its progress from a country village to a
metropolis that has attracted millions of workers from all over China,
Shenzhen is still far, far behind Hong Kong.
The pavements are cracked; stinking rubbish is loaded into open
trucks; there is a fetid smell in the air. The weekend store promotions
are flashily tacky, with young women in bright bathing suits teetering
about uneasily on high heels outside the Shenzhen International
Arcade. The big household appliance stores are yawningly deserted.
Girls as young as six from poor provinces sing in the streets and restau-
rants, handing over their takings to employers who dole them out a
small salary at the end of each month. Later, some become hostesses,
and boost their money sleeping with clients.
The area is notorious as a sexual playground for Hong Kong men,
who keep 'second wives' there or simply play the field of prostitutes
and karaoke girls. It is also becoming a magnet for Hong Kong drug-
users, who find law enforcement less of a problem than at home,
despite the higher penalties if they are caught and convicted. A couple
April 143
of SAR politicians were forced to resign recently after being spotted
up to high jinks with bar girls over the frontier. A local newspaper
reports that Zhu Rongji has ordered that the law be changed to face
men from the SAR patronising prostitutes with the threat of six
months in a labour camp. It sounds highly unlikely. Whatever the
Premier's moral feelings, why would Shenzhen cut off the flow of
money? This is, after all, a country where visitors to Mao Tse-tung's
home village are offered sex as soon as they check in at the guest
house.
If the queue of mainlanders who want to move to Hong Kong is as
big as ever, Shenzhen women seem to be cooling on the idea of mar-
rying Hong Kong men: cross-border marriages are running at half the
peak of 1 ,069 a year at the start of the decade. A 24-year-old shop
assistant told Cindy Siu of the South China Morning Post earlier in the
year: 'My mum wants me to marry a Hong Kong man because she
thinks they are rich. But to me their standard of living is not very
high. My home seems better than a lot of Hong Kong homes.' 'You
can't trust Hong Kong men,' says another. 'One of my friends has just
found out that her father, a Hong Kong man, has a separate family in
Hong Kong.'
For lunch today, we take a taxi driven by a migrant from north-
ern China to a Muslim Chinese restaurant in a back street. The
menu has the usual quaint translations of the dishes: 'insensitive
slices of meat' and 'strongly fried sheep's heart'. We have neither.
Nor do we taste the steamed sheep's head or the 'snow mountain
camel's feet', having tried that last delicacy on a trip to the Muslim
north-west of China last year and decided that it wasn't up to much.
Instead we eat dumplings, kebabs, chapatis and aubergines. The
head waitress recognises Monica Lewinsky on the cover of Time in
the pile of magazines I am carrying. The bill for two comes to a
little over two pounds. Outside, we buy three big bunches of aspara-
gus for the equivalent of £1.50; it's a rip-off by local standards, but
at those prices, who cares?
Later in the day, we have a couple of cups of coffee in the Shangri-
La Hotel near the station where the rich people gather on a weekend
afternoon. A woman with her black hair in a perfect 1940s perm toys
144 Dealing Wiiii the Dragon
with an iced cappuccino. The band plays 'Just the Way You Are'. In
the driveway, a Mercedes festooned with pink ribbons and carnations
waits for the bride and groom. Our two coffees cost four times as
much as our lunch.
This is a place where local officials on minimal salaries turn up at
the golf course in black limousines with all the clubs any professional
could wish for, and where the sewing workers at the Four Seas
Handbag Factory earn 12 pence an hour; where fortunes are being
made and village girls sing for their supper. Hong Kong is not the
only place where Deng Xiaoping has left a legacy of one country,
two systems.
19 April
An unexpected visitor flies in to Hong Kong for an interview
with CNN - Wan Azizah Ismail, wife of Anwar Ibrahim, the
former Deputy Premier of Malaysia jailed for six years last week on
corruption charges after one of the most dubious and sensational
trials of a politician in Asia for a long time. That she comes here
demonstrates another continuing special feature of Hong Kong;
you can say just about whatever you like, whoever you are and
wherever you hail from. Whether anybody takes notice is another
matter.
There was no question of Dr Azizah doing the phone-in from the
state-run studios back home in Kuala Lumpur: they have a habit
there of interrupting transmission when politically sensitive material is
being put out by foreign broadcasters. The Prime Minister, Dr
Mahathir, does not like critical US television stations. This is the
man who blames the Jews for the Asian economic crisis, and who
thinks governments which do not curb the activities of currency
traders should be overthrown. (When I asked him how he squared this
with his own central bank's past speculative activities, he replied: 'But
we lost.' I don't think it was a joke.)
In Singapore, the local broadcasting station refused to help with the
interview. Bangkok and Jakarta also declined. So Dr Azizah, who has
emerged as a strong political figure in her own right at the head of a
April 145
new party, came to Hong Kong. 'We brought her here because we
didn't have to ask anybody,' says a CNN source.
At lunchtime, a limousine takes Azizah to lunch with the leading
Malaysian-Chinese inhabitant of Hong Kong, Robert Kuok. Kuok,
the chairman of the Post, became close to Mahathir as he built up his
fortune. But I am told that he has always admired Azizah, so it is nat-
ural for him to see her during her visit to Hong Kong, whatever
might be read into the meeting. A couple of years ago, a tea party was
held in a suite at Kuok's Shangri-La Hotel on Hong Kong Island for
Anwar to set out his ideas to a small group of journalists, an exposition
studded with quotations from Shakespeare and references to Western
literature.
That was before the Mahathir-Anwar rift and at a time when the
chairman of the South China Morning Post had been most anxious to
look after the Prime Minister. Mahathir's crusade against the forces of
international finance had earned him considerable derision, and when
he came to the annual meeting of the World Bank and the
International Monetary Fund in Hong Kong in September 1997,
Kuok arranged an interview in which the Prime Minister could reply
to his critics. I was a bit leery about the motivation behind this, but
the opportunity of an exclusive interview with the man who was
going to be a star turn at the conference could not be passed up. I
planned to run it as the page-one splash in the paper on the opening
day of the meeting, a Monday.
On the previous Saturday evening, I and another journalist drove
up to Robert Kuok's house in the hills of Hong Kong. The chairman
was not there, and we waited by the pool with members of his family
for an hour or so, sipping iced water and making polite conversation.
Then Kuok arrived with Mahathir. The Prime Minister, my col-
league and I went into a side room. We set up a tape machine on a
table. Is this on the record? I asked. Yes, said the Prime Minister,
before launching into a denunciation of currency trading, which
could not be allowed to go on 'because there is no benefit to us'. He
spoke forcefully but without raising his voice. Regulations would be
introduced in Malaysia on Monday to limit currency trading to
financing trade, he said. Then he got up, smiled, and went through to
146 Dealing With the Dragon
join Robert Kuok, Anson Chan and the other guests for dinner.
Time for the journalists to leave. The story was too strong to hold for
Monday. It led the Sunday edition.
The next morning, Anwar Ibrahim was handed a copy of Sunday's
Post as he arrived in Hong Kong a day ahead of the IMF-World
Bank meeting. The lead story came as quite a shock to him. He had
not expected such an outburst before Mahathir's speech to the con-
ference. The clampdown on currency trading would cause havoc
when markets opened on Monday.
The Malaysian consulate had already issued a denial. No interview
had been on Mahathir's schedule. The Post must have made the whole
thing up. The Malaysian Finance Ministry weighed in, saying that the
Prime Minister had been misquoted. A press conference was arranged
at the IMF conference hall at 3 p.m. to denounce this latest tissue of
media lies. Anwar also issued a denial, and made it known that he
would be at the press conference.
At lunchtime, I went along to the Convention Centre with our
tape recording of the interview, and my colleague's shorthand notes.
I sent word to the Malaysian delegation that if the briefing went
ahead, I would be happy to play the tape of the Prime Minister's
remarks. The press conference was cancelled.
By then, it appeared, Anwar had spoken to Mahathir. The Prime
Minister told his deputy for the first time about the Saturday night
interview, confirmed our story, and said he had no desire to retract
what he had said. Anwar managed to get the currency measures put
off, though they came into effect after his own downfall. I was told
subsequently that his denial sharpened Mahathir's antagonism towards
him. In a conversation two years later, Mahathir told me that Anwar
'brought it on himself by the way he behaved; he was in too much of
a hurry and thought he knew it all'.
The interview caused problems for me, too. After our story was
widely picked up by international news agencies and foreign media,
I was told that Robert Kuok felt humiliated by the storm it set off.
He appeared to feel that his hospitality had somehow been betrayed
by me, that he had unwittingly led Mahathir into a trap. Much was
made of the fact that we had originally planned to hold the story for
April 147
the Monday paper, but had run it on Sunday. I couldn't see how that
changed anything, but it was advanced as proof of my bad faith. Nor
were matters improved when the Post's main headline on the open-
ing of the conference reported George Soros calling Mahathir a
'moron'.
Since the Prime Minister was quite happy with what he had said,
the complaints were somewhat hard to follow. Robert Kuok's pain
was only understandable if he himself was embarrassed by his guest's
remarks. In our conversation in 1999, after he had imposed capital
controls, Mahathir asked: 'I said what I thought, what's wrong with
that?' Having rejected the IMF rescue package adopted by South
Korea, Thailand and Indonesia, he went on to plough his own furrow
in defiance of international conventional wisdom, and was able to
report revived growth and an improved trade position within a year.
He felt no reason to worry about what he had said that evening at
Kuok's home. But that did not stop a management executive at the
paper telling me that the chairman felt he could never trust me again.
20 April
Despite his new shoes and a suit, Li Yuhui has his hands tied as he
appears in court in the mainland city of Shantou at 9.30 a.m. today.
The rope is knotted over his heart as if it could be the target for a
firing squad.
A former lorry-driver, Li is known in Hong Kong as the Telford
Gardens Poisoner, after a block of flats where, posing as a feng shui
master, he killed three women and two girls with 'holy water' laced
with cyanide at a 'life-lengthening' ceremony. Neighbours recalled
that the curtains were always closed, and that a wok with a pair of scis-
sors and a brush tied to it had been hung outside the door as a
cabalistic sign. After the women's deaths, Li walked away with
HK$i.2 million of their money.
A mainlander, Li was caught across the border, and brought to
court in his home city of Shantou. The trial began in a local dialect
which one of the defence lawyers could not understand, not to men-
tion the pack of reporters from Hong Kong. The judge switched the
1 48 Dealing With mm Dragon
proceedings to the national language of Putonghua. But then it turned
out that Li could not speak Putonghua too well, so he was allowed to
revert to dialect. Since everybody knew what the outcome would be,
this all seemed something of a nicety.
After Li was found guilty, his wife, a hairdresser, with whom he was
not on the best of terms, came up with 2,000 yuan for an appeal. Li
claims that the murders were carried out in a ritual Zen ceremony by
a mysterious monk who subsequently disappeared. When his appeal
is rejected this morning, Li frowns, and asks to see his elderly mother
and two children. The request is refused. He is not allowed to see his
wife, either. His lawyer enquires whether the condemned man may
give his last wishes. The judge says the officers at the execution site
will take them down. His property is confiscated; some of it will be
given to the relatives of his victims. In a typical final mainland gesture,
he is deprived of his political rights.
Following the usual procedure, Li is driven in a convoy of vehicles
to the shooting field immediately after the verdict has been read out.
The Shantou City Intermediate People's Court formal execution
ground is regarded as too public, given the crowd of Hong Kong
journalists waiting there. So three policemen wearing white gloves
take Li to an open space nearby. Two hold him. The third shoots him
twice, at 10.15 a.m., three-quarters of an hour after he entered the
court to hear the result of his appeal. 'Three pairs of white gloves
donned by security officers and another one worn by the pathologist
were abandoned on the ground afterwards,' writes the Post's reporter,
Stella Lee. Blood stains the earth. The body is burned in the local cre-
matorium. The ashes will be returned to his family.
Local people in Shantou cannot understand the interest the Hong
Kong media is showing in the case. After all, China executes at least
2,000 people each year. The authorities say this 'satisfies popular
demand'. But Li's case involves a wider concern in Hong Kong fol-
lowing another headline-grabbing case which aroused deeper worries
about the relationship between the SAR and the mainland, and the
conduct of some rich and famous people.
That case starred Hong Kong's best-known gangster, Cheung Tse-
keung, also known as Big Spender. Cheung was a pretty spectacular
April 149
criminal by any standards. An ardent gambler, he was surrounded by
stories of wild jaunts that took him from Macau to Las Vegas, of
nights when he staked HK$200 million and of debts that rose to three
times that figure. He became a celebrity after being charged in con-
nection with one of the world's biggest cash robberies, the haul of
HK$i67 million from a security van at the airport in 1991. He was
convicted, and then acquitted on a technicality — and then re-acquit-
ted at a retrial. Outside the court, he posed for photographers in a red
and white spotted short-sleeved shirt and white trousers, grinning and
punching the air, his mobile telephone hooked to his designer belt.
Cheung was at the centre of a web of gangs. One became infamous
for armed raids on gold and jewel shops, spraying bullets from AK47
rifles as it went into action. Other associates kidnapped Hong Kong
men visiting the mainland and demanded ransoms amounting to the
equivalent of £1.5 million. Another group, with assault rifles and in
military uniforms, staged highway robberies on the mainland, killing
eight truck drivers.
Cheung had all the trappings of a famous hood. He posed lying on
top of his yellow V12 Lamborghini Diabolo with pop-up headlights
that cost ^250,000 in the showroom. He also had a string of
Mercedes limousines. Driving fast, he said, 'makes me orgasm'. In one
of his many homes, he kept a life-sized metal bust of himself. At
social occasions, he appeared as a Cantonese Godfather, a caring
family man who was kind to his two young children, a well-spoken,
non-smoking teetotaller, however much vintage brandy he bought for
his guests. He had two sphinx statues made with the face of his
common-law wife, who had been working in the control room of the
security company at the time of the 199 1 airport robbery. He filled his
flat with golden religious images to bring him luck. True to the Hong
Kong style, Cheung bought thirty-one residential and commercial
sites. In the middle of 1996, he went into a new line of business, grab-
bing very rich people.
Hong Kong has always been the scene of some spectacular kidnap-
pings. But Big Spender was in a different league. On 23 May 1996,
one of his men posted outside the offices of the tycoon Li Ka-shing
called Cheung on his mobile telephone to say that Li's son, Victor Li
150 Dealing Wiiii the Dragon
Tzar-kuoi, had left for the day. Victor, an intense, bespectacled man,
was a major figure in his own right; he was in the process of taking
over the running of the family's property empire. As Victor drove up
the narrow road towards his home on the south side of Hong Kong
Island, Cheung and an associate came up on either side in separate
cars, and pinned his limousine between them.
The two gangsters, wearing bulletproof vests and carrying AK47
assault rifles and pistols, bundled Li into a waiting van, taped his
mouth, bound him and drove him off to a safe house in the New
Territories. Cheung then went to the home of Victor's father, made
his demands and spent two days waiting for the ransom to be paid.
One report had it that he insisted on the money being stowed in
designer bags. At one point, Cheung was said to have been asked if he
wanted to count the money. He lifted the bag, weighed it in his hand
and said it seemed to be about right. As to why he had kidnapped the
son and not the father, he remarked that Li Ka-shing could come up
with more cash than Victor - HKI1.3 billion or £100 million
Cheung kept a quarter, and left the gang to divide up the rest.
The Lis said nothing, but rumours spread. Sitting next to Victor at
a business lunch, I ventured to ask him if there was anything in them.
He stared at me impassively from behind his glasses and said flatly:
'There is no truth in such rumours.'
Sixteen months later, Walter Kwok Ping-sheung, chairman of
another big property company called Sung Hung Kai, was picked up
outside his office by the harbour. The gang had been following him
for seven months. Kwok, a big, reserved man, is one of three broth-
ers who were all raised in the real-estate business. Their father's idea
of a Sunday outing was to take the three boys round his property
developments; after his death, the brothers still showed their mother
major sites for her approval.
Big Spender had forked out HK$i.4 million to set up the Victor Li
kidnapping, including the purchase of weapons. For Kwok, his outlay
rose to HK$2 million. Both victims were taken to an isolated hut up
near the border with China and put into a wooden box with air
holes punched in it. Their eyes were masked and they were given roast
pork and rice to eat through the openings. Victor Li was said to have
April 151
been kept overnight with his legs in chains and his mouth covered
with bandages.
Walter Kwok was held for six days stripped to his underwear and
with his hands tied. Then his ransom was paid: half that of Victor Li
at a mere HK$6oo million. Again the victim made no complaint to
the police. Nor did the family raise the alarm when he was kid-
napped. Cheung took half the ransom and told his gang to 'swim
across the river like a Chinese bullfrog' , which meant they should flee
individually and not meet again. According to mainland police, they
managed to buy more than fifty pieces of property in China, and a
fleet of luxury cars.
Now we enter the realms of the generally believed probability
which remains unprovable. Cheung and his gang, many of whom
were mainlanders, had dodged back and forth across the border at
will. They met in hotels in Shenzhen to plan their coups. There was
speculation that their weapons had been bought from the People's
Liberation Army in southern Yunan province, a region celebrated for
its lawlessness. Cheung was also said to have purchased explosives in
Guangdong province and to have smuggled them into Hong Kong by
boat. But, in Li Ka-shing, he had bitten off even more than he could
chew.
Hong Kong's 'Superman' has powerful contacts in Beijing. When
Jiang Zemin came to the SAR for the first anniversary of the hand-
over, his generally anodyne speech was punctuated by a single sharp
sentence vowing that contempt for the law would not be permitted.
At the time, people thought he was referring to the upsurge in gang
violence in Macau. Later, it seemed he was talking about Cheung
Tse-keung.
The President handed the Big Spender case to the Vice-Minister of
Public Security in Beijing. According to a mainland newspaper, offi-
cers from Hong Kong and Guangdong met in the capital on 10
January 1998. Two days later, three Public Security Bureau officials
flew south. In Guangdong, they found that police were already on Big
Spender's trail, investigating whether he was linked with the death of
a police informer from Hong Kong who had been shot dead in the
street in Shenzhen.
152 Dealing Wiiii the Dracon
While all this was going on across the border, Cheung and his
associates were keeping busy in Hong Kong. On 8 January, police
hiding in bushes near one of his safe havens in the New Territories
filmed him unloading big white boxes from a van into a Mercedes.
Dressed only in white underwear, and wearing gloves, the crime boss
is seen on the video making three trips to move the boxes. After
Cheung had left for the last time, police emerged from the shrubbery
to take soil samples. These showed that the boxes contained 800 kilos
of explosives which Cheung was said to have ordered from mainland
contacts at a meeting in the Lisboa Hotel and casino in Macau. The
cargo was smuggled into the SAR, transferred from the van to the
Mercedes and buried under a deserted container parking lot. On a
subsequent trip to the scene, police arrested three men, but Big
Spender had gone across the border.
On 23 January, an underworld associate from Hong Kong known
as 'Old Fox' flew into Guangzhou city from Thailand. Police followed
him to a meeting with Big Spender. The two men drove off in a
Mercedes . Apparently noticing the tail, they abandoned the car and
hijacked a taxi. Two hundred police were alerted, and the pair were
nabbed half an hour later.
Both Cheung and the white-haired Old Fox gave false names.
Later, Big Spender told one of his lawyers that he never imagined he
would face a mainland court. He 'believed he would have to return to
Hong Kong to be tried', the lawyer added. 'If he had known the law,
he would never have dared to step over the border.'
News of his capture was not made public until July, though his 36-
year-old wife did receive an anonymous call at the time saying he was
being held on the mainland. After holding out for some time, Big
Spender cracked when he learned that other members of his gang had
been caught, and that one had grassed. Police said he told them that
he had had a premonition of trouble when a big jade pendant he was
wearing broke shortly before his arrest.
Video footage showed Big Spender dressed in a white singlet
and looking relaxed as he was presented with an arrest statement.
'What is my offence?' he asked. A police officer replied, 'Explo-
sives.' 'Explosives? Not smuggling?' Cheung said, before signing
Victory day: the Chief Executive jubilates as Beijing overrules the Hong Kong courts, watched by
right) the Chief Justice and fellowjudges, and (left) Emily Lau, Martin Lee and, with pen, the author.
3. Tears in the night: Chris Patten consoles his daughters as they leave, and Hong Kong reverts to
Chinese sovereignty.
mm.-
Ll:..\l)I-R
4. Follow the leader: Chief Executive
Tung Chee-hwa shows the way.
5. The proprietor: Robert Kuok, a discreet
billionaire who found the ways of the press
puzzling.
6. Do it ni)' way:
Premier Zliu Rongji
lays down the law.
7. One government, two views: Chief Secretary
Anson Chan (left) and Justice Secretary
Elsie Leung.
8. High hopes: Financial Secretary Donald Tsang.
9. Justice and the law: Chief Justice Andrew Li, whose judgment set off Hong Kong's greatest crisis.
i
/
i
10. My husband lives: Nina Wang, a true Hong Kong original.
1. Paper tiger: Sally Aw, the newspaper boss at
lie centre oi a legal-political storm.
12. Rule of law: Margaret Ng, the journalist-
turned-barrister who became the symbol of
legal integrity.
13. Unexpected threat: a Falun (long
practitioner is lifted away by police
at Macau's return to China.
14. Palace meeting: Queen Elizabeth gives
a state banquet for the President of the last
major Communist state in the world.
15. Face-off: Charlene Barshefsky launches into the vital WTO negotiations in Beijing. Beside her is
presidential adviser Gene Sperling; opposite, the Chinese Trade Minister and his team.
6. Big Spender: high roller and mega-kidnapper ( "hciing Tse-keung, who ended up with .1 bullet
I'll his head after a string of spectacular crimes.
17. The real handover: government, business and China come together as Chief Executive
Tung Chee-hwa, tycoon Li Ka-shing (left) and top mainland representative Jiang Enzhu raise
their glasses to the fiftieth anniversary of Mao's victory.
April 153
the statement with a smile and putting his thumbprint on it. In a
later interview shown in a mainland television documentary, he
told police, 'You take the credit. I've lost.' The documentary said
that he planned to use the 800 kilos of explosives which he had
been filmed transporting in the New Territories for 'threatening
the Hong Kong government, bombing Hong Kong prisons and
continuing to kidnap Hong Kong tycoons'. Cheung was said to be
particularly keen to spring an associate who had been crippled
when shot by police and was serving a long jail term.
In fact, the charges were more wide-ranging, and included having
planned the kidnappings of Victor Li and Walter Kwok while on the
mainland. But there was still no evidence from the two high-profile
victims; everything connected with those crimes rested on the alleged
confessions of Cheung and his associates. In other words, there would
not have been enough evidence for a case to have been brought
under the law in Hong Kong, which may have been another reason
for dealing with him across the border.
Aged forty-three, Cheung stood trial in a closed court in
Guangzhou with three dozen alleged accomplices, seventeen of them
from Hong Kong. As the hearing opened, the first of two hastily-
made films about Big Spender went on show in Hong Kong. On the
train to Guangzhou, you could buy a video on 'China's biggest crim-
inal case in the twentieth century'. Armed paramilitaries surrounded
the court. Snipers crouched on nearby roofs. A barber's shop opposite
the court was suddenly closed down 'for renovations'. The corridor
leading to the hall where the hearing was held was curtained off.
On 12 November 1998, all the defendants were found guilty.
Cheung, in an open-necked white shirt, a mauve cardigan and tan
trousers, stood impassively behind a metal barrier at the front of the
crowded court. Policemen wearing white gloves held each of his
arms. One of his lawyers flew to London to try to drum up support
for an appeal, which was rejected by a Guangdong judge known by
the nickname of 'Iron Fist'.
Big Spender was shot at an execution ground surrounded by hills
and wild grass outside the city. The following day, ten police guard-
ing the site turned away the pregnant widow of one of the gang
154 1)i:ai i nc; W i i !i mm Dragon
members who had gone there to burn paper offerings to comfort her
husband's soul in the beyond.
A reporter who visited the site wrote that it was littered with the
shoes of dead men, used cartridges, gloves discarded by the firing
squad and cardboard signs hung round the convicts' necks recording
their names and crimes. The execution procedure is simple: one
policeman fires a single shot from behind. If that does not prove fatal,
a second shot follows. Inevitably, the story quickly spread that Big
Spender had needed two bullets to finish him off. His body was
wrapped in canvas and taken to a crematorium close by. The ashes
were then placed in an urn, which was given to a member of his
family. The urn had no lid, and the relative brought it back to Hong
Kong with a baseball cap on top to keep the contents from flying
away.
Apart from providing the Hong Kong media with a top story, the
Big Spender case aroused a number of concerns. One was whether
you had to be rich and powerful and well connected to get justice in
China. Another was that the Lis and the Kwoks had not informed the
legal authorities. When Anson Chan and other senior officials took
them to task for not at least reporting the crimes, Li Ka-shing com-
plained of 'something like harassment'.
The third, and greatest, concern was why Cheung had not been
brought back to the SAR to stand trial. He might have planned his
crimes while on the mainland, but the main offences — the actual kid-
nappings and the handling of explosives at the hide-out in the New
Territories - had been committed in Hong Kong by Hong Kong
criminals against Hong Kong residents. The Guangzhou court seemed
to recognise the problem: in delivering its verdict, it stressed the
explosives, which involved illegal purchase on the mainland and
smuggling to Hong Kong.
Then there was the nagging question as to why the Hong Kong
police who had videotaped him in January had not carried out an
arrest on the spot, but waited until Cheung had flown the coop
before nabbing three much less important gang members. The Hong
Kong authorities insisted that they had not had enough evidence.
But it was only a short speculative jump to imagining that somebody
April 155
had decided to leave him to the mainland police. After all, execution
on the shoe-littered killing field outside Guangzhou would provide a
much more conclusive end than a lifetime jail sentence.
And if Cheung had been brought back, just imagine the circus
which would have followed, with Big Spender using the ransom
money to buy a top legal team to perform in open court. Much
better for Cheung and his gang to be shot in China without any of
the embarrassment of a trial in Hong Kong. But what does this mean
at a deeper level for the rule of law, and the relationship with the
mainland? Not that Beijing can be fingered as the prime mover in this
breach of the autonomy of the SAR. As is proving to be the case
rather too often, the initiative came from Hong Kong itself.
The SAR government insists that there is 'no question of the inde-
pendence of our judicial system being eroded or the mainland
interfering with Hong Kong's jurisdiction'. But, as the chairman of
the Hong Kong Bar observes: 'The issue is whether, putting aside the
possible kidnapping charges, the fact that the Hong Kong government
made no attempt to seek the return of some of these defendants in
relation to possible robbery or firearms charges may give people the
false impression that the judiciary and the rule of Hong Kong is
somehow subordinate to that of the rest of China, and thus indirectly
cast a question mark over the concept of "one country, two systems".'
An epilogue to Cheung's days of fame and fortune comes when his
yellow Lamborghini is put on sale. Far from attracting a buyer for the
notoriety of its late owner, it fetches less than 30 per cent of the
showroom cost. Hong Kong people like to latch on to the latest fash-
ion, but buying dead people's effects is not for them. If it had been Li
Ka-shing's limousine, that would have been a different story.
25-27 April
There are two sets of true believers in Beijing at the beginning of this
week. The great proponents of globalisation, or globality as it is now
known, are at the China World Hotel for a session of the World
Economic Forum devoted to China. Up the avenue, a very different
event is taking place on the edge of Tiananmen Square. Some 10,000
156 Dealing Wiiii the Dragon
members of a mystical deep-breathing cult called Falun Gong have
come out of nowhere on a Sunday evening to demonstrate silently
outside the high walls of the Zhongnanhai leadership compound
beside the old imperial Forbidden City. Many are middle-aged
women. They want to speak to the government about better treat-
ment for their movement. They do not get anywhere, and disperse
peacefully. But there is no doubt about the shock they have caused.
It is amazing that so many people were able to assemble in one of
the most heavily policed places in the world without the authorities
being aware of what they were planning. The cult, whose members
perform deep-breathing meditation, claims 70 million practitioners in
China: if that sounds like a big overstatement, even a movement one-
tenth that size would be a force to be reckoned with. Explaining
how they mobilise, an English adherent explains: 'A network of com-
munication forms organically through the fact that practitioners know
so many other practitioners. The numbers are so great and the com-
mitment to their beliefs so strong that word spreads very quickly and
practitioners act very quickly.' That sounds rather like Mao's peasant
army. No wonder it spooks leaders who never forget the Great
Helmsman's warning about a spark being enough to set off a forest
fire. For all their control mania, the men behind the walls of
Zhongnanhai don't have any idea what to do about a movement that
is difficult to tar with any of the usual brushes of splittism, democracy
or anti-party activism - though the fact that the Falun Gong leader
lives in the United States lends the sinister touch of foreign influence.
At the Economic Forum, meanwhile, participants are divided
between their desire to see China develop and their worries about
what is actually happening in the economy. The path ahead is strewn
with uncertainty, bad debts, corruption, unreliable statistics and the
awesome task of pulling China into the modern era, not just in the
showplace cities but in the millions of towns and villages caught in
rural backwardness where peasants say that they can't keep the size of
their families down because, without electricity, there is nothing to do
at night except have sex.
After a couple of days in the capital, the Forum moves to Shanghai.
The director of that city's Economic Commission says industrial
April 157
output has risen by 11. 6 per cent in the first four months of 1999, and
exports by 18 per cent. Another speaker predicts that Chinese mem-
bership of the World Trade Organisation will bring a boom on the
scale of the expansion set off by Deng's initial market reforms.
Nowhere will benefit more than Shanghai; hasn't Zhu Rongji said it
will be China's New York?
On the great Bund waterfront avenue, the old buildings that once
housed foreign banks and the British-administered customs service are
being carefully restored. The garish nightlife, the opium dens and the
powerful criminal gangs have given way to karaoke parlours, high-
priced claret and party members on the make; but local residents say
there is still plenty of vice to be found if you know where to look.
Those nostalgic for the heyday of the Paris of the East can still find
ornate buildings from the 1920s or visit the hotel from which the
Green Gang ran the city. Across from the Bund, vertiginous towers
sprout in the new business area of Pudong. Richard Branson is sched-
uling the first direct flight from London, and Hong Kong's Chief
Executive notes that some Western companies may start to go directly
to Shanghai instead of using the SAR as a staging post. An American
lawyer who has worked in both places finds Shanghai more go-ahead
than the SAR - 'like Hong Kong used to be'.
The city has a fine new opera house and a stunning museum.
Pudong is getting its own airport. A branch of a smart Hong Kong
restaurant high above the Bund seems to be packed every night. In
what was the French concession of the city before the Communists
took over, you can eat lemon peppered duck and lobster in citrus
juice in the former church of St Nicholas, built by White Russians
and dedicated to the memory of the last Tsar. Light streams in
through the stained glass. There are icons under the majestic dome
and paintings of naked Western women in classical poses on the walls.
The proprietors are a Frenchman and a Swiss entrepreneur who serves
wine from a South African vineyard he owns.
Back by the Bund, on the street outside the old Peace Hotel with
its art deco friezes and antediluvian jazz band, a young man
approaches me saying he wants to practise his English. Where are you
from? he asks. Hong Kong. Ah, Victoria Peak, Kowloon, Central
158 Dial inc With the Dragon
District, he says. I nod. And then he launches into a tale of a family
art collection which I can pick up at bargain prices if I will advance
him some money to get it out of hock. I decline this once-in-a-life-
time opportunity, and cross the road. Looking back, I see that he has
already approached another Western passer-by.
As everywhere on the mainland, the crust of prosperity is per-
ilously thin. More than half the new office space in Pudong is empty.
Shanghai Volkswagen rolls out 235,000 cars annually, but the city had
only 9,000 private cars at the end of last year. One-third of state
sector workers are surplus to requirements. More than a million jobs
have disappeared in the 'dragon head' of the Yangtze since 1990 as
old industries contracted. The director of the city's Economic
Commission says 200,000 more will have to go in the next two years.
Forty per cent of displaced workers are not expected to find new jobs.
In such a world, the appeal of the Falun Gong and of other cults is
all too evident. Many Gongists grew up in the cult of Mao, assured
that the iron rice bowl would never crack, accustomed to following
predictable orders from a great prophet. Decisions were made for
them from cradle to grave. Now the old ways are vanishing, and
everybody is for themselves, poverty take the hindmost. Chinese offi-
cials, naturally, react with horror to any comparison of the cult's
appeal with old-style communism. 'How can anyone compare trash to
a huge mountain?' asks the Director-General of State Administration
of Religious Affairs. But an uncertain old age is looming for many of
these people. Health care has to be paid for. Jobs are disappearing. The
iron rice bowl is cracked.
In the World Economic Forum conference hall, the brittle, excit-
ing vistas opened up by Deng Xiaoping and Zhu Rongji; out on the
streets of Beijing, an older world seeking reassurance. One country,
two faiths.
27 April
At the reception desk of the Shangri-La Hotel in Pudong last night,
I ran into a member of Hong Kong's Executive Council, the Chief
Executive's secretive advisory body. Anthony Leung Kam-chung, a
April 159
banker who is the Exco member responsible for education, could
hardly contain himself. The council, he said, had just made an impor-
tant decision. He couldn't tell me what it was, but insisted several
times that the public reaction would be vital. Then he picked up his
electronic room key and headed off for the lift.
28 April
Now I know what Anthony Leung was talking about in Shanghai.
Regina Ip, the Secretary for Security, gives the Legislative Council
scary figures for how many mainland immigrants would be able to
enter Hong Kong under the Court of Final Appeal's ruling -
1,675,000, or a quarter of the SAR's current population. That could
push the number of people here to 10 million by the year 201 1. The
population pressure would be intolerable, as well as the strain on
housing, health, education, transport and welfare.
It is enough to make any normal person agree that the judges were
out of their minds to let those people in. A cartoon in the Standard
shows a Japanese tidal wave labelled 'Mainlanders' arching over the
harbour front. It's a bit reminiscent of the stories in Britain of a wave
of black and brown migrants about to swamp the country, or, indeed,
the fears of what would happen if the people of Hong Kong were all
given British passports before the handover. Critics point out that the
government figure for illegitimate children is three times the total in
an earlier official estimate. It means Hong Kong men have fathered
more children in China than at home. And then there is the question
of how many of the 1.6 million would want to move to the SAR: the
legislator Margaret Ng points to 'a great arrogance — and ignorance'
in assuming that all mainlanders are longing to come here. And would
the mainland authorities allow so many people to leave? All in all, this
looks like a dodgy exercise. But it is politically savvy. Apart from
painting the judges as men who do not put the community's interests
first, it sets the government's political critics on the back foot.
New legislative elections are due next year. Which grass-roots
politician would want to go to the voters arguing that the rule of law
takes precedence over keeping 1.6 million people from crowding into
160 Dealing Wiiii the Dragon
Hong Kong? The Democrats are caught while the pro-Beijing DAB
will be able to combine its inclination to back the administration
with a stance of saving Hong Kong from a human invasion. No
wonder the man from Exco was smiling as he picked up his room key
in Shanghai.
May
7 May
Nato bombs the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in its Kosovo campaign
against President Slobodan Milosevic. The building, which formerly
housed a local government body, is destroyed. Three people inside
die. Many others are injured. Sino-US relations are already tense over
the Nato attack on Yugoslavia, which Beijing sees as a major challenge
to the cherished sanctity of national sovereignty. The Foreign Minister
calls it an ominous precedent. If Washington can take it upon itself to
interfere in the affairs of a nation in defence of an oppressed minority,
might it be tempted to help the Tibetans or the Muslims in China's
Far West? And what about Taiwan?
The embassy bombing has made things far worse. The Americans
give various explanations — the embassy moved a couple of years ago;
the map used in the attack was out of date; faulty aiming techniques
were employed. Less officially, there is talk of electronic transmissions
from the building which could have been taken for military signals, or
even of Chinese help for the Milosevic regime. Beijing waves all this
aside. Building on genuine popular anger, the authorities bus in well-
orchestrated crowds to stone the US embassy; for a while, the
ambassador is trapped inside. China demands the punishment of the
guilty, and substantial compensation. Washington wiD pay some money,
but it will take its own time to discipline any wrongdoers. Conservative
162 Dealing Wiiii iiii-: Dracon
critics of rapprochement with the United States are jubilant. In Hong
Kong, Martin Lee calls the bombing a 'mistargeting' and regrets that
mainlanders had not been told about the ethnic cleansing in Kosovo. A
column in the Oriental Daily says that 'people who see this kind of trai-
tor on the street should spit on him and throw eggs at him'.
As well as Kosovo and the bombing, there is another considerable
shadow over Sino-US relations, in the shape of a report by Congress-
man Christopher Cox alleging Chinese spying of US nuclear secrets.
The report veers on to the wild side. Much of what it says Beijing
stole is available on the Internet or from American whistleblowers. Its
suggestion that all Chinese who visit the United States should be
regarded as potential spies mixes racism and paranoia. The journalist
Lars-Erik Nelson writes in the New York Review of Books about spec-
ulation that Beijing might have provoked the whole affair to create a
wave of anti-Chinese feeling which would lead its scientists in the
United States to return home with the secrets in their heads. Still, for
all its exaggerations, the Cox report chimes in with growing
American suspicions of China, including accusations about lavish
donations to political campaigns. Whatever happened to the relation-
ship hymned by Clinton in China less than a year ago?
For the man in the White House, that may be a matter for con-
cern - but he has many other concerns to deal with. For Zhu Rongji,
facing the Sisyphean challenge of licking into shape an economy that
has never marched to the modern beat, the cooling of relations holds
an even deeper threat, particularly after the way he went out on a limb
with the World Trade Organisation concessions he offered in April. In
the intensely political context surrounding him, he cannot afford to
see too many more things go wrong. The Prime Minister has admir-
ers, but few acolytes in a system which thrives on such people. No
wonder he sometimes cuts an eminently lonely figure as he follows his
favoured pastime of walking in the wooded hills outside Beijing.
15 May
My contract as editor of the South China Morning Post expires today.
At the end of January, I was told that the owners had decided not
May 163
to renew it. No reason was given. The paper is doing well. We have
expanded and redesigned it year by year. Circulation is resisting the
recession, and profits are moving up. The Post took nearly all the
prizes available to it in the two Hong Kong press awards, and has just
been named the best English-language newspaper in Asia by a
regional publishers' association.
This might not seem a recipe for dropping the editor, but I have no
chance to make my case. Neither Robert Kuok nor his son, Ean, who
has succeeded him as chairman, has spoken to me. I am told that their
decision is irrevocable. Still, I have been asked to stay on until the end
of the year while a new editor is found, preferably a Chinese journal-
ist who 'understands' China and the region. It was suggested that I
might help in the search.
I had come to the Post in May 1995 after eighteen months editing
the Observer in London. Inheriting a paper in a dire state, we had
hoisted sales back above the half-million mark, cut the losses and
won a dozen awards, including Newspaper of the Year. But Hugo
Young, chairman of the Scott Trust, which owns the Guardian and
Observer, told me that the decision had been made to grant Peter
Preston, editor of the daily, his long-standing wish to become editor-
in-chief of both papers, and to sack me. The manner of the parting
was abrupt: Young ordered me to leave the building immediately
without speaking to any of my colleagues.
The evening after Young told me to go, I received a telephone call
from Andrew Knight, who edited The Economist when I worked for
it in the 1980s. He knew the South China Morning Post and its chief
executive from his days as a top executive of the Rupert Murdoch
empire, which had then included the Hong Kong paper. Now he
had been asked if he knew anybody suitable to edit the Post. The
owners who had bought Murdoch's shares fourteen months earlier
specifically wanted a British editor to succeed the Australian incum-
bent.
The next morning, my wife and I drove across London to go for
a long walk in Richmond Park to discuss the idea. When we were
furthest from our car, cold January rain came down. Sodden and
shivering, we went to Soho and ate a bad Chinese meal. Let's go
164 Dealing With the Dragon
where the rain is soft and the Chinese food good, we decided. A
month later, I flew to Hong Kong and was offered the job after a 45-
minute conversation with the chairman, Kuok Huok Nien - more
generally known as Robert Kuok. A neat and utterly polite man in
his early seventies, he proffered chocolates from a large box and
waved away my ignorance of Hong Kong and China. My predeces-
sor was to leave when I was fully installed. In fact, he stayed on in
Hong Kong for nearly a year, but I began editing almost as soon as I
arrived.
The Post was one of the most lucrative papers in the world. The
peak year of 1997-98 saw a pre-tax profit equivalent to £60 million,
with a profit-to-turnover ratio of over 40 per cent. On several occa-
sions, it ran 200 pages of classified advertising in the Saturday edition.
The main news section was awash with retail and fashion advertising,
and the business pages with corporate announcements. When I was
offered the job, the Post had two English-language rivals, but com-
manded around 80 per cent of the market; after the Eastern Express
died a year later, the market share went to 90 per cent. Some readers
talked of 'the paper' as if there was no other.
One factor in the Post's financial health was its attention to costs.
Still, there were not many publications with a circulation of just over
100,000 that had an editorial staff of 280, and four to five daily sec-
tions. The reassuring thing amid the blizzard of advertising was that
the Post was a serious newspaper which had evolved out of its old
status as a colonial gazette. The readership was split more or less
equally between Chinese and non-Chinese, as were the editorial staff.
It was the only Hong Kong newspaper with staff bureaux in mainland
China. The China editor, Willy Wo-Lap Lam, was a leading China-
watcher with an enviable record of scoops about the inner workings
of the regime. Its Beijing bureau was the best in the business. The
paper had comprehensive local political coverage, a strong raft of
columnists and some fine original writers. An early user of editorial
colour, it also launched on to the Internet in time for the 1997 hand-
over.
The chairman and principal shareholder was a legendary figure in
Asian and international business. In rankings of Asia's rich and
May 165
powerful, Robert Kuok regularly figures well up in the top twenty.
The American business magazine, Forbes, put him on its cover with
the headline 'The world's shrewdest businessman'. Born in 1923 as
the son of a Malaysian-Chinese businessman in the town of Johore
Bahru just across from Singapore, he was educated at one of that
city's best schools, where he was a classmate of the Asian elder states-
man, Lee Kuan Yew. During the Second World War, he worked for
a Japanese company, rising to head its rice department. That led him
into commodities, in particular sugar. Trading from a room at the
Grosvenor House Hotel in London, where he acquired a taste for
fine claret, he was said to have controlled 10 per cent of the world's
sugar stock at one point. 'I risked everything without realising it,' he
told Forbes. 'It was all rhythm. Have you ever seen [the basketball ace]
Michael Jordan play when he's on a rhythm run? It was exactly like
that.'
While branching out into other commodities, Kuok also built up
Asia's biggest luxury hotel chain, went into property and insurance,
and bottled Coca-Cola in China. He was known equally for his
discretion and his wealth, and for his impeccable business and
political connections. Despite being Chinese in a country which
was promoting its Malay citizens, he developed strong links with the
government, and went into Indonesia, where the Chinese are the
regular target of racial hostility. As a leading member of the Chinese
diaspora, Kuok was one of the earliest and biggest investors on the
mainland, moving from commodity deals to big hotel and property
projects. One of his lieutenants told me that few of these actually
turned a profit, but it was the presence and commitment that
counted.
A long-term player wherever he goes, Kuok won many brownie
points from the Central Government when he did not let the
Tiananmen Square massacre affect his investment plans. He was, as he
said, a businessman who went wherever he could see a promising
opportunity. He took the ways of the region in his stride, not neces-
sarily approving but accepting them as the way of life in this part of
the globe. He was also well known for his highly developed sense of
privacy. When he complained about a book written about him in
166 Dealing Wiiii the Dragon
Malaysia which he said was full of lies, I asked him if he would issue
a rebuttal. He laughed at the idea of revealing himself to the world in
such a manner.
Kuok and a Malaysian business associate bought Murdoch's stake in
the Post at the end of 1993. Kuok's Kerry Media company (it has
nothing to do with Ireland, having simply been bought as a shelf
company) had 34.9 per cent, the most you can own of a company in
Hong Kong without making a general offer for the rest of the shares.
His partner, a conglomerate called Malaysian United Industries, had
21 per cent. MUI subsequently sold 12 per cent of its stake to the US
fund Templeton Franklin to raise money in the face of the Asian
crisis and its losses in other investments, such as the Laura Ashley busi-
ness. With 34.9 per cent and the chairmanship of the Post, Robert
Kuok was seen everywhere as the proprietor of Hong Kong's domi-
nant English-language newspaper.
The acquisition set plenty of alarm bells ringing. Because of Kuok's
mainland investments and his friendship with the likes of Li Peng, it
was natural for observers and officials round Chris Patten to jump to
the conclusion that the Post would become a mainland mouthpiece.
Hence their involvement in the launch of the Eastern Express. That
paper's first editor, Stephen Vines, later reported that a senior main-
land official told two visiting Hong Kong businessmen shortly after
Kuok's purchase that China was pleased to have 'got the Post in the
bag'. A British newspaper correspondent was assured by a source
close to the Hong Kong government that the deal had been financed
by the Bank of China, though Kuok was quite rich enough not to
need any help.
Patten was right to see the Post's new chairman as an opponent.
He was a member of the Hong Kong business world, which also
included a number of prominent British figures who disliked the
political reforms brought in before decolonisation. For them, Patten's
methods were bad enough; but they objected particularly to his aims.
Hong Kong, they insisted, could only suffer from becoming a more
politicised city, which would upset its position as a business centre
and lead to social discord. 'These days, the mood in Hong Kong is
regrettably neither harmonious nor happy,' Kuok said in a speech in
May 167
1995. 'The British government's decision suddenly to launch in
October 1992 a drive for much fuller democracy in Hong Kong,
without consultation with China, was in my opinion ill-timed and
misconceived. China's reaction to having her pitch queered in this
fashion has not been surprising.' He went on to lament the polarisa-
tion of society, the 'great and needless tensions', the effect on small
businessmen and entrepreneurs, and 'the unfortunate tendency of the
media to pounce upon and magnify any display of acrimony or hos-
tility between the parties'.
Apart from their political differences, Kuok loathed what he
regarded as Patten's arrogance and colonial condescension. Whether
the fact that Kuok's brother was killed by the British as a rebel during
the insurgency in Malaya fuelled his dislike of somebody he saw as a
latter-day imperial representative is best left to the psychiatrists.
Patten's Westminster wit grated with the local grandees, who took it
for Western superiority. Irony is not a quality much in evidence
among the Hong Kong establishment. Even some democrats could
find the Governor patronising and self-centred. Though it was, pre-
sumably, none of his doing, the headline on the Sunday Times
serialisation of Jonathan Dimbleby's insider account of the Patten
years — 'the last democrat' — raised more than a few hackles among
those who would be fighting that fight in Hong Kong long after he
had left.
When I mentioned the apparent cultural gulf between the
Governor and the tycoons to one of Patten's aides, the response was
that people like Kuok were just trading on their supposed irritation as
an excuse to cover their opposition to democracy and their desire to
be left free to go on making as much money as possible. But watch-
ing a big local figure who was a major Conservative donor being left
to wander round a Government House reception for John Major, or
overhearing a bumbling Downing Street official asking the head of
another major conglomerate in Bertie Woosterish tones, 'Are you in
business, Mr Woo?' pointed either to a condescending lack of prepa-
ration or to yet another manifestation of the sense of superiority felt
by both the British and the Chinese which can make relations
between them so difficult.
1 68 Dealing With mm Dragon
Correct as he was to see Kuok as a stern critic, I was determined to
draw a line between the chairman's views and the newspaper's edit-
orial approach. The Post could not follow the model of British
newspapers which the Governor had known in his previous incarna-
tion, where a word from the owner was sufficient to dictate the
editorial policy. This created a strange situation. In public, basing
myself on what appeared in the paper, I strongly rejected allegations
that the new ownership had made it sell out to Beijing or had turned
it into a puppet of China. But that was exactly what I found myself
fighting against. By its nature, this tussle had to remain private. A
moment's fleeting glory as a champion of the freedom of the press
would do no good for the thing that mattered: what was printed in
the newspaper each day. There was also a question which involved a
certain degree of ego on my part. If I walked out or made my dis-
agreements with the owner and management so public that I was
sacked or had to resign, who would take my place? Various names of
more pliant or politically reliable successors were mentioned from
time to time. I had to think that my departure would be a bad thing
for the Post, and gamble that, when I threatened to go if the owners
and managers insisted on doing things I felt would be wrong, I would
win — and live to fight another day, even if this meant boxing in the
shadows and side-stepping questions about proprietorial influence.
My first tussle came almost immediately after I arrived in Hong
Kong, on a Tuesday. The following day, I was told that a decision had
been taken the previous weekend to merge the editorial operations of
the daily and Sunday papers, which had been run separately up to
then. Twenty-five jobs would be cut. The board wanted to exert
control over editorial spending now that the Eastern Express had
proved no challenge to the Post.
As part of the changes, my predecessor set off a storm by dropping
a cartoon strip called 'Lily Wong', which regularly lampooned the
mainland and forecast the worst after the handover. The cartoonist, an
American called Larry Feign, had just done a set of strips on alle-
gations that Chinese officials were selling the organs of executed
prisoners. Feign, who was not on the staff, was well paid, and an
economic reason for dropping him was given. But, naturally, the
May 169
charges of political censorship flared up. Not having been involved in
the decision, I cannot deliver a definitive judgement. My own feeling
was that finance certainly counted, but that my predecessor had fallen
out of love with the strip and found the cartoonist highly irritating.
Sometimes, editors simply decide they don't like something in their
paper and drop it.
The list of the twenty-five staff journalists who were to go in the
merger of the editorials was sent to the deputy chairman, Roberto
Ongpin, a former member of the Marcos government in the Philip-
pines who was a business associate of Robert Kuok. When it came
back, on Friday afternoon, the name of a leading journalist at the
paper had been added. He would have been a grievous loss. The
only possible reason for dropping him would have been to curry
favour with China, where the Post was involved in a project for a busi-
ness paper.
On Saturday morning, I met the paper's chief executive, Lyn
Holloway, for coffee in the deserted bar of the Hong Kong Club. I
told him that if this individual sacking went through, I would pack my
bags and return to London immediately. If this was how the paper was
to be run, I would not take up the editorship. The decision was
abandoned. The journalist worked for the Post throughout my time as
editor though Ongpin, in particular, kept coming back to his sup-
posedly negative effect.
This was the first of a series of such incidents over the following
years as I received instructions which could only be refused. I was
told that Kuok and his son, who succeeded him as chairman in
1998, were particularly annoyed by the way the paper described
political figures who backed the mainland government as 'pro-
China' or 'pro-Beijing'. One afternoon in 1998, at a weekly
meeting with senior managers, I was asked how I was feeling. Fine,
I said. You'd better be, they replied; the Kuoks had blown up yet
again about the paper having called somebody 'pro-Beijing'. This
practice must stop, they insisted. Wearily, I said that this was ridicu-
lous, and I was surprised it was still being brought up. Did the
Kuoks think there was something wrong with being pro-China or
pro-Beijing? Did they regard friendship with the mainland as a
170 Dealing Wmii ini-, Draoon
badge of shame? There was no way I was going to ban the phrase
from the Post. All right, said the managers equally wearily, we will
tell them that is your view.
At one point, I was advised to submit editorials about Malaysia and
the Philippines so that they could be vetted by Kuok and Ongpin -
even if it had been acceptable, this was a highly impractical suggestion
given the amount of travel they did. On half a dozen occasions, I was
told to sack or move staff journalists whose writing displeased the
owners. Sometimes I refused outright; on a couple of occasions, I tap-
danced round the edge of a problem until the storm passed. On one
occasion, I let myself be boxed into a corner.
In the spring of 1997, a Saturday morning telephone call from
Robert Kuok as he drove to China ordered the dismissal of a
columnist who had referred to the publisher Jimmy Lai having
called the former Prime Minister, Li Peng, a 'turtle's egg'. I said no,
as I had to previous suggestions that the man in question should be
fired. But a few months later, urged on by senior colleagues, I
decided to move the writer from his column because I felt it was not
good enough, and was full of items that did not fit in its place in the
business pages. Just before he was to be moved, he wrote a column
containing two items which I thought were particularly silly, and
fully justified shifting him. One linked the new SAR regime to the
murderous military dictatorship in Nigeria; the other said that Tung
Chee-hwa and his colleagues should go round with condoms on
their heads because they acted like 'male appendages'. Sod's law
dictated that Robert Kuok was having lunch that day with a visitor
from Singapore. Kuok vaunted the merits of the Post compared to
the other city's Straits Times. His visitor pointed to the 'male
appendages' item and asked if that was what Kuok regarded as
quality journalism. The lunch over, the chairman called the paper's
chief executive and demanded that the columnist be fired from the
paper immediately.
As in the past, I refused to do so. But there was a problem, since I
was going to move him a week later in any case. So I told the chief
executive that he would no longer be doing the column, but that I
was planning to move him to a lighter column elsewhere in the paper.
May 171
He was duly replaced as previously planned, but I was then told that
Kuok still insisted he was sacked. A new column was out of the ques-
tion. After several weeks of stalemate, the journalist came to my office
and said he had a solution: we should pay him six months' money, and
he would leave the staff and write as a contributor on a monthly
retainer. That was done — though he didn't get six months' pay. He
wrote two columns at the weekend for eighteen months before leav-
ing the paper, joining the opposition Standard and setting himself up
as an avenging angel to denounce the evils of the Post. This seemed
somewhat bizarre since he had taken management guidance on the
contents of his column at a time when I was insisting on editorial
independence, had sent me an unbidden and unwanted message assur-
ing me that he would be a 'flexible friend' in sensitive matters, and
had written to me congratulating me on our defence of press freedom
and saying how 'superb' our front pages had been. Hell hath no fury
like a columnist scorned.
The main battle at the time of the handover in 1997 involved a
Monday political column written by the pro-democracy passionaria
Emily Lau, a former journalist and popularly elected legislator who
led a political group called The Frontier. Robert Kuok was adamant
that she must go; I was equally adamant that she must stay. This had
its ironic side, given her recurrent expressions of concern that the Post
was exercising self-censorship and a bias against the democratic camp.
Although she had been a journalist, her columns were rarely pearls
of editorial writing, and occasionally recycled her radio talks or
speeches. Still, whatever my reservations about her writing, or her
economy with the truth, I could not think of dropping Lau's column.
The abolition of the elected legislature on 1 July meant that repre-
sentatives of the democratic camp like her lost their main platform.
They had not been defeated by the electorate, but had been arbitrar-
ily deprived of their seats in favour of a provisional legislature selected
by a committee chosen by another pro-Beijing body without the
voters having a chance to express their views, and in defiance of the
findings of every opinion poll. In my view, this rolling-back ot
democracy gave the press a special role to play, and made it essential to
go on running columns by Lau and two other pro-democracy
172 Dealing With the Dragon
legislator-columnists, Christine Loh and Margaret Ng. We also
approached the Democratic Party chairman, Martin Lee, to write
for the paper regularly, but he said he preferred to reserve himself for
big occasions.
Later, when a new legislature gave popularly chosen members a
chance of getting back in, I changed our line-up of regular columnists
to avoid giving electoral advantage to any of them. But in 1997-98,
Emily Lau had to stay in defiance of the angry telephone calls from
Robert Kuok to the paper's chief executive, which were duly passed
on to me.
I was told that somebody was employed at Kerry Holdings to go
through the paper for anything that the chairman might find objec-
tionable. But Robert Kuok rarely spoke to me directly. Since his
views were more often expressed through his subordinates, it was
not always clear whether they represented his full and considered
opinions or were the work of executives operating like Henry II 's
knights rushing off to do their master's bidding on Thomas a
Becket.
On one occasion, the approach was considerably more direct. One
evening in June 1997 when I was out of the office for a couple of
hours, the chief executive, Lyn Holloway, called my deputy up to his
office and told him to issue an instruction that the Tiananmen Square
crackdown should no longer be described as a 'massacre'. When I got
back to the paper and was told of this, I rescinded the order. Later that
night, I faxed a letter saying I would resign if the instruction was
allowed to stand. The next day, I was asked if I could keep the word
out of headlines at least. No, I said. That was that, for the moment. I
never knew if a call from Robert Kuok had been behind the whole
thing or if this had been the initiative of an underling: I doubted,
however, that it contravened the chairman's wishes. Some time later,
the issue came up again, but was not pursued when I recalled what
had happened in 1997.
That did not stop correspondents and press freedom bodies stating
as a matter of fact that 'massacre' had been banned from the Post. In
fact, as anybody reading the paper could see, the M word kept appear-
ing - 168 times in one twelve-month period. But such things never
May 173
go away. Some time later, I was presented with a list of do's and
don'ts typed in a series of numbered points on one side of a sheet of
A4 paper. They included the prohibition of 'massacre' and sanctions
against out-of-favour staff. Once again, I declined to carry them out.
Once again, the order was not pressed — and the pressure later eased
after the appointment of a new senior manager who, though a loyal
Kuok man, also knew the importance of democracy and the rule of
law.
In the spring of 1997, Kuok appointed a man called Feng Xiliang
as a consultant to the Post. White-haired and self-effacing, Feng was
the offspring of a well-to-do family in Shanghai. Born in the 1920s,
he attended that city's most famous school of the pre-communist era,
St Joseph's. After the war, he went to the United States to study jour-
nalism at the University of Missouri. Returning to China, he worked
on English-language propaganda magazines, and is said to have suf-
fered badly during the Cultural Revolution.
Rehabilitated, he became the first editor of the mainland's English-
language newspaper, China Daily, in the early 1980s. Later, he went
back to the United States as its representative in New York. He was
not in Beijing at the time of the Tiananmen demonstration, when a
delegation from China Daily marched to the square wearing hats
emblazoned with the newspaper's masthead. There are differing
accounts of when he returned to Beijing and how he behaved when
he got back. But in 1991, Feng went off again as a Mass Media Fellow
at the East- West Center in Hawaii. He developed a liking for
California, acquiring a house in ultra-right-wing Orange County.
But he then came to Hong Kong to advise a pro-Beijing magazine
called Window, set up by T. S. Lo, a sad-faced lawyer who wanted to
become Chief Executive and nurtured a deep dislike for the Post.
Lo's feelings cannot have been warmed by the polls we were print-
ing at the time. In the absence of a popular election, I felt they were
the only way of letting opinion be articulated, even if the choice of
candidates was severely limited. For T. S. Lo, they were a killer. He
hardly managed to scrape up 1 per cent support, and duly dropped
out, closing his magazine and depriving his adviser of a job.
Survivors don't stay unemployed for long, and Feng's name was
174 Dealing Wiiii the Dragon
mentioned as a deserving case to Robert Kuok, supposedly by Lu
Ping, the head of China's Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office,
who had been a classmate in Shanghai. Kuok took Feng, now well
into his seventies, under his wing, and decided that he was just
what the Post needed. Like officials I met in Beijing, the chairman
said that the paper should 'understand' China better. And who
better to enable us to 'understand' the mainland than Feng Xiliang,
a man who had earned himself a seat in the upper house of China's
parliament?
I was told of Feng's appointment after it had been signed and
sealed. As it happened, I was going to Thailand for a week's holiday
the following day. I spent some time walking up and down the beach
trying to decide if this was the break point. The timing was acute:
there was less than three months to go to the handover. Somewhere
along the sand, I decided to take Feng's position literally. He had
been taken on as a consultant. So I wouldn't consult him.
News of the appointment hit the headlines in London, Paris and
New York. I could insist till I was blue in the face that a consultant
is a consultant is a consultant, and that I was still the editor. To no
avail, 'big brother keeps an eye on the media underlings' warned
the Independent. In France, Liberation called Feng 'the man para-
chuted in by Beijing'. The International Herald Tribune ran the story
on the front page under the banner 'new hong kong editor: he
edits what, exactly?'. When I telephoned the Herald Tribune to ask
why it had promoted Feng to an editor's job, the reply was that
'consultant isn't a headline word'. Going a step further, the New
York Times described Feng as 'senior editor'. The Asian Wall Street
Journal noted that 'suspicion that the 76-year-old Mr Feng is a real-
life political commissar is sending shivers up the spines of journalists
all over Hong Kong, who are asking themselves: what if this is
only the thin end of the wedge?'. In London, The Times linked
fears about Feng with 'concerns from Hong Kong's pro-democracy
faction that the Post is shying away from extensive coverage of the
territory's political issues'. The Times correspondent could not
have been reading the paper too closely: in the previous three
days we had run twenty-four pieces, including three front-page
May 175
splashes and two editorials, on proposed changes to civil rights
legislation.
Feng's location became a particular cause for comment. I had
installed him in a windowless room opposite my own office. I put him
there precisely so that I could keep an eye on what he was doing. If
he called in journalists to tell them how to 'understand' the mainland
better, I wanted to know. But the foreign correspondents reported
that Feng had been put in a 'specially built office' to keep watch on
me. The Financial Times had him 'set to take a desk alongside Jonathan
Fenby'. The Guardian went a step further: Feng was taking over my
office as I was moved to new premises - presumably in a mainland
thought-reform institute.
As if it makes a difference where anybody sits in this electronic age.
Only one person, a journalist at the Post, asked me the key question:
was Feng going to be logged on to the editorial computer system?
The answer was no. Without that, he had no access to copy. There
were some other relevant questions that were never asked. Would he
attend editorial conferences? (No.) Would I talk to him about the
contents of the paper? (No.) Would he be involved in discussions of
coverage of mainland China or Hong Kong? (No.)
Of course there were fears about what the appointment meant. I
felt them more keenly than anybody else. I had made it clear that if
Feng did try to interfere, and was backed up by the chairman or the
paper's management, I would go. Still, as a journalist with thirty-five
years in the trade, I was hardly surprised if those fears took precedence
in the reporting over my account, even if it was personally wounding
that some correspondents now ranked me as an editor willing to
work under a political Big Brother. Around this time, a leading British
business figure in Hong Kong said after dinner at his house high on
the Peak that I seemed to be having a hard time with the foreign press
corps. Yes, I agreed: you told them the truth, but they wouldn't
believe it. My host, who had sometimes taken issue with our cover-
age of his company, patted me on the knee and said with a smile: 'You
see what it's like, Jonathan.'
If consultant Feng had been meant to whip us into line, he did a
lousy job. Soon after his appointment, we devoted the front of our
176 Dealing With the Dragon
Saturday Review section to the letters smuggled out of prison over
the years by dissident Wei Jingsheng. Reporting and comment in the
Post went on just as before. On handover day, my front-page editor-
ial stressed the importance of democracy and freedom. The Beijing
bureau continued to file hard-hitting reports from the mainland.
Emily Lau wrote her columns, as did other pro-democracy politicians
who lost their seats at the handover. Post correspondents visited Tibet
and other sensitive areas of China, and filed straightforward reports of
what they saw and were told by locals. In Hong Kong, the paper
revealed how the government planned to put Chinese state bodies
above the law, and reported on secret Chinese arms-dealing through
the territory. We were regularly banned from distribution on the
mainland when we ran photographs of dissidents, the Dalai Lama or
President Lee Teng-hui of Taiwan. And Tiananmen was still a mas-
sacre.
But some people stuck to the party line, continuing to see Feng
Xiliang as a censor and me as a man who dared not tell the tuth.
Asked in a radio discussion about my insistence that the consultant
was not influencing the contents of the paper, Jonathan Mirsky o£The
Times replied, 'He would say that, wouldn't he? If he said that this
man is that kind of person, he'd be out of a job.'
Throughout all this, Feng padded discreetly in and out of his
office, took trips to California, and made arrangements for occa-
sional visits to Beijing by senior executives. The controversy stirred
up by his appointment had clearly shaken him. 'There's so much
talk,' he told an Australian journalist, Alan Knight. 'I begin to
wonder why I am doing this.' Some of the hundred or so corre-
spondents who came to interview me during the handover peered
across the passage outside my office to catch a glimpse of Big
Brother. His room was usually empty. When Feng was there, he sat
alone reading newspapers and making telephone calls. To begin
with, one or two members of the editorial staff dropped in to speak
to him and to try to take the measure of the newcomer. Feng
seemed grateful for the company, but the visits soon tailed off. I
started to feel almost sorry for the small elderly man with well-
combed white hair and a quietly courteous manner. I wondered
May 177
what he would do if, just once, I invited him to an editorial con-
ference, or asked what he thought of a column criticising the
central leadership.
Feng's most useful role was in helping to set up a meeting shortly
before the handover with China's Foreign Minister, Qian Qichen,
who was overseeing Hong Kong policy. Before the interview in an
official guest house in a garden in Beijing, Qian greeted Feng as an
old friend. The Minister's answers to my questions came as if by rote
until I asked about some hard-line statements he had made on the
freedom of expression after the handover. How could they be
reconciled with the promise that the Hong Kong system would
continue unchanged after 1 July? I wondered. Oh, the Minister
replied, he had just been expressing a personal opinion. As a
member of the Chinese government, he naturally did not approve of
criticism. But so long as the law was not broken, people in Hong
Kong could say whatever they liked. Martin Lee called the interview
the most important statement by a mainland official before the
handover.
Eventually, in the autumn of 1998, Feng packed up his belongings
and left for the management floor above to pursue purposes unknown
to me. His departure from the editorial and his total lack of any effect
on the paper was not mentioned by any of the correspondents who
had reported his arrival so breathlessly. But the penny had dropped
with one man. 'You've sidelined Feng,' Robert Kuok remarked one
day with a notable lack of pleasure in his voice.
This was far from being the tycoon's first expression of disquiet.
When we met for the first time in 1995, he had said that the Post
should be independent, and could criticise the government in Beijing
by all means. But he did not want it to be anti-Chinese in the sense
of being against the Chinese as a people or a race. Over the following
years, it became clear that, for him, the Chinese people and the
Chinese authorities were increasingly lumped together. To begin
with, he objected to what he saw as our pro-Patten slant, which
might have amused the Governor. Given the passage of events, this
eventually faded into insignificance beside other concerns - the
paper's reporting and comment on mainland China, its attitude
178 Dealing Wiiii 1 1 j 1 -. Dkacon
towards the new administration and the business community in Hong
Kong, and its support for democratic politicians. Even more funda-
mental, I believe, was Kuok's complaint that the paper was out of his
control.
He did not keep his views to himself, asking why couldn't the Post
toe the line? Why didn't it do what it was told? Why was it so anti-
China? Why was this the only asset he owned which he could not
control? His position was delicate. As a leading member of the Hong
Kong-Beijing establishment, he had sat on the Preparatory
Committee set up by China to map out the future of the former
British colony. The head of the mainland's Hong Kong and Macau
Affairs Office, Lu Ping, went golfing at a Kuok-owned country club
across the border. When leading politicians from the north visited
Hong Kong, they saw Kuok. But there was his newspaper criticising
the Preparatory Committee, urging Lu to change his tune, laying in
to the new administration in Hong Kong, and writing about problems
on the mainland which Beijing denied existed. To people from a
system where the media follow orders, this must have been distinctly
puzzling.
The billionaire head of a major conglomerate of his own creation,
Robert Kuok was used to having his way. As a non-executive direc-
tor remarked to me one evening: 'The Kuoks have 34 per cent of the
company but they act as though they own it. They don't. But who's
going to remind them of that?' The problem was that the Post edito-
rial had a life of its own, and this had to be maintained. If that was the
case before the handover, it became even more so after 1 July, partic-
ularly when the democratically elected legislators were deprived of
their seats and the rule of law was brought into question. Kuok
insisted that he did not want the Post to become a party-lining organ,
like the Straits Times in Singapore, which he regularly lambasted. But
the instructions I received would have led it to go that way and would
have undermined its spirit. Kuok liked the idea of a paper that was
independent, but was uncomfortable with the prickliness which this
inevitably aroused.
What is surprising is that I was not fired much earlier, as certainly
would have happened under a Western press baron. But now the
May 179
yellow light is flashing with the non-renewal of my contract. Given
this, should I stay on till the end of the year as suggested, or leave
immediately? I have no doubt. Apart from wanting to remain in
Asia a while longer, this is turning out to be an extremely important
time in the short history of the SAR. Two years on from the hand-
over, the real game is beginning: not in the stark terms predicted in
1997 but on a more subtle plane. That is not attracting much atten-
tion outside Hong Kong: tanks in the streets are much easier to
comprehend than the steady advance of weak-kneed consensus, the
over-riding exercise of authority by the executive and the erosion of
the rule of law. Western governments are anxious not to let problems
in Hong Kong get in the way of a good relationship with Beijing. As
was apparent from before the handover, the SAR is on its own in
dealing with the dragon it joined in 1997. In these circumstances,
editing the Post has taken on a special edge, and I want to go on for
as long as I can.
18 May
A prime example of what is happening comes when the government
of Hong Kong makes it known that it is going to ask the Standing
Committee of China's parliament, the National People's Congress
(NPC), to issue its interpretation of what the Basic Law says on the
right of abode case which the SAR administration lost at the Court of
Final Appeal. The government's argument is that the interpretation by
the court was not in accordance with the 'legislative intent' of the
framers of the Basic Law. Determining what that intent was nine
years later is a tricky question, particularly since some sources say that
the mainland was keen at the time for all Chinese to be treated
equally, thus implying that it might well have wanted a wide defini-
tion of who could come to Hong Kong.
One recalls a remark by Chris Patten about China's desire to have
a mechanism for a 'post-remedial verdict' on Court of Final Appeal
decisions: the Governor characterised this as 'if we don't like the
result we've got to find some way to overturn it'. Now that is being
done not by Beijing directly, but by the administration here.
i8o Diaiinc; Willi Mil- Dkacion
19 May
There is a debate in the Legislative Council today about the govern-
ment's decision to go to the NPC. The democratic camp tries to get
more time for discussion. It fails. So 19 members, headed by Martin
Lee, walk out of the chamber. They have dressed in black for the
occasion. Lee speaks of 'a dagger striking at the heart of the rule of
law'. Margaret Ng of the legal constituency warns of the beginning of
the end of the rule of law. But the pro-Beijing DAB party insists that
the rule of law will be strengthened, and Liberals say the government
has public support. After the walk-out, the motion backing the gov-
ernment is passed by 35 votes to 2.
I remember the time I asked Martin Lee what he would do if his
electoral victory brought him no more influence and he replied,
'Make noise.' That's the way it has become. But who is listening?
20 May
The Post's strong criticism of the government for going to Beijing to
over-rule the Court of Final Appeal earns us a visit from Anson Chan.
The Chief Secretary's office calls in the late morning and says she has
to see me before the day is out. She argues that we must realise that
this is an exceptional case and must trust the administration. There has
been a thorough debate, with very strongly held views on both sides.
Some may see referral to the National People's Congress as an erosion
of the independence of the judiciary and the high degree of auton-
omy promised to Hong Kong. But the rule of law underpins
everything here and has not been undermined. Yes, there is legitimate
concern about the mechanism by which judicial decisions could be
referred, but the Central Government has made it clear it does not
wish to interfere. 'It would prefer for Hong Kong to sort it out but,
if we could not do that, they were ready to help,' as one official says.
Thank you very much.
When questioned, officials say no guarantee that this will be a
one-off event could be promised — 'just watch this space'. The
Chief Executive and his administration are not likely to act in an
May 181
arbitrary way, we are assured. And then comes a return to a famil-
iar mantra of trust.
Trust us, but don't observe how we finessed last year's electoral
arrangements to handicap the democrats, or how we treat the
legislators or the Court of Final Appeal. Forget about the decision
not to prosecute Sally Aw, and how we put the muscle on func-
tional constituency members. Don't regard the award of the
Cyberport project as anything untoward, and turn a blind eye to
how hard we find it to defend Hong Kong people arrested on the
mainland.
As I accompany Anson Chan to her green BMW, I ask her if this
is the first of a series of visits to newspapers which have criticised the
government. 'No,' she says with her trademark smile. 'You are the
only one who matters.'
I do not write a recanting editorial. In fact, there is very little news
on the whole reinterpretation issue. After having given it pages one,
two and three for the last two days, the story goes inside tonight.
22 May
The paper which appears the day after Anson Chan's visit is, I am
told, taken by the weekly meeting of senior brass as a sign that a
sudden descent by a top official can shut the Post up. My informant,
who is well versed in the ways of government and the media,
chuckles as he tells me this at a lunchtime party for the departing
head of the Swire conglomerate, Peter Sutch, a man who knows
how to enjoy himself as a human being while rising at dawn to do
his job, and who gave British business a good name after the hand-
over.
It is a hot and steamy day, and some people drink too much out
on the lawn of the Swire residence, Taikoo House, high on the
Peak. Since I am working that day, I'm on mineral water. A society
lady with a red face upbraids me for the paper's attention to the
right of abode issue. Is anybody really interested in that, she asks.
Face it, we don't want all those people from the mainland to come
here, do we?
182 Dealing With the Dragon
23 May
Civil servants take to the streets in the biggest labour demonstration
seen in Hong Kong since the handover. Waving bright yellow banners
and wearing yellow headbands, an estimated 10,000 of them - the
organisers say 26,000 - march through the centre of Hong Kong
Island to the Central Government offices.
In the courtyard where the mainland overstayers camped, they
chant denunciations of plans to reform their working conditions and
make them subject to efficiency criteria, with fixed-term contracts in
place of lifetime employment and performance-related pay instead of
automatic annual increases. 'Fake reform, real exploitation,' they cry.
There is talk of strikes if the government does not back off. Hong
Kong's civil service may be admirable in many ways, but it has lived
a protected life for much too long. Salaries, allowances and condi-
tions are out of step with the times. Private sector companies have
cut wages and bonuses and laid off staff. But the civil service has
remained immune. Now the pressures are catching up with them.
The recession is real, even for the men and women in the bureau-
cratic Rolls-Royce.
24 May
Dinner with a generally pro-government member of the Legislative
Council. Surprisingly, our host lays into the administration. He is no
radical, and voted to save Elsie Leung from the no-confidence
motion. But tonight he unsparingly criticises the Chief Executive for
lack of leadership, and backs the concern we have expressed in the
Post about the rule of law. Foreign businessmen he meets are starting
to wonder how solid Hong Kong is, he adds. Who would have
thought that a test case for mainland migrants could have ended up
having such an effect?
26 May
I am handed a letter setting out the company's plans for the Post. It has
May 183
been decided that, after I leave, an editorial director will be appointed
as well as a new editor. The new arrangement is to be announced
next week. If I stay on as editor till the end of the year, as agreed ear-
lier, I would be the longest lame duck in newspaper history. I have to
go right away. Anyway, the new editorial director is sitting in the
office opposite mine - an American former editor of the Asian Wall
Street Journal in both Asia and Europe, who was hired by the Kuoks
and the Post's management as my deputy the previous summer, with-
out my being consulted. When I had objected, I was informed that
the management had the right to do as it liked in editorial appoint-
ments, and that the hiring of Robert Keatley was a no-go area. This
meant there had been a Kuok laying-on of hands, with which nobody
should presume to argue. Still, when I dug my heels in, my manage-
ment colleagues 'implored' me to 'try to find a way of making this
thing work'. I flew to Washington to see Keatley and we agreed that
he would join the paper as senior associate editor, but would not
replace my extremely effective deputy.
Keatley arrived in Hong Kong in October 1998, and moved into
Feng Xiliang's old office. We got on well enough, but the Kuoks'
back-channel contacts soon sprang into life. Robert Kuok's son, who
had become chairman, discussed editorial matters with Keatley with
no reference to me. At the instigation of the management, Keatley
canvassed in New York for a new business editor without my being
informed — the search ended in fiasco after the existing incumbent of
the job was tipped off about the approach and I kicked up another
stink. Throughout, Keatley assured me that he did not want my job,
but now he is to become editorial director. Although he is not due to
take up the post till the end of the year, the announcement has - for
some inexplicable reason - to be made right away. Do the Kuoks want
to nail things down this time, and make sure there is no slip-up in
getting their man into the job? Anyway, I clearly have to resign as
editor, though I will stay in the job until 3 1 July and then serve out
the agreed six months' notice as a writer and consultant. There is a
final ironic twist in September when I am asked to go back to edit the
paper half a dozen times. More farewell performances than Frank
Sinatra.
1 84 Dealing With the Dracon
29 May
Arriving at the Shangri-La Hotel for a website competition cere-
mony at which he and I are to present the prizes, the Financial
Secretary looks at me and says: 'Jonathan, I don't want you to think
that I necessarily agree with my colleagues who think you have gone
bonkers.' Presumably he is referring to our criticism of the Tung
administration. But he also insists that he never reads the Post except
for one columnist whom he likes. His press secretary stands behind
him with a perspex folder filled with newspaper clippings, many of
which are from the Post.
At lunch, after the awards have been handed out, Tsang appears
rather more familiar with the contents of the newspaper as he takes
me to task over an editorial criticising the government's economic
forecasting. 'Nobody blames the Observatory if a typhoon hits' he
says: I bet they would if it predicted a calm and sunny day.
Tsang, who looks much younger than his fifty-four years, has had
an interesting political career since 1997. Before the handover, he
called in our political editor to give a brave interview defending the
Bills of Rights that the incoming regime was going to emasculate.
The general conclusion was that Hong Kong's first Chinese Financial
Secretary was about to lose his job. But he hung on, and spent the
early stages of the economic crisis insisting on the need to maintain
Hong Kong's traditional low-spending, budget-surplus policies, even
if the results caused him considerable personal anguish.
After that, Tsang seemed to be fighting an increasingly difficult
battle, since the Chief Executive and some of his advisers clearly
thought it was time to let out the fiscal belt. Now this has been done,
and he has used the crisis to introduce some significant changes which
he hopes will contribute to making Hong Kong the premier financial
centre in its time zone. Last year's stock market intervention followed
by this year's Disneyland deal - which he lists as a 'project of hope' -
gave a fresh fillip to Tsang, another of Hong Kong's excellent ball-
room dancers who has taken to wearing a red lapel badge depicting
the Hong Kong and Chinese flags. He finds Beijing's sovereignty
'benign' and is one of those senior civil servants who likes to illustrate
May 185
the point by contrasting the colonial hours spent reading and drafting
telegrams from and to London with the absence of any messages from
the Central Government. For a short while there was speculation
that his star was riding so high that Tung was toying with the idea of
promoting him to succeed Anson Chan as Chief Secretary for
Administration and number two in the government. But the story is
that Beijing came down for Chan to continue driving the adminis-
tration's Rolls-Royce.
Tsang's standing with the public is good, though he insists that he
will always chose patriotism over popularity. But he has times when
he tires of life at the top. And the combination of criticism from
politicians with little grasp of economics and the need to play to the
gallery cannot sit too easily with a man who finds it endearingly hard
to hide his human side and whose skin can be reassuringly thin.
June
2 June
Dinner at the official residence of the Chief Secretary on the Peak. It
is one of a round of farewells for Peter Sutch, the gregarious chairman
of the British Swire group, which owns Cathay Pacific Airlines. His
departure coincides with a dispute with the pilots, who are resisting
new working terms. As a negotiating tactic, they have hit on the
device of calling in sick just before they are due to go on duty, using
doctors' certificates saying the stress of the dispute makes them unfit
to fly. The Post takes a dim view of this, provoking furious e-mails
from anonymous pilots on their website.
The Post 'is no more a real paper than Pravda was in the eighties',
says one. Its journalists have been bought by big business and 'must
live with the shame of having sold out'. 'For them, money is more
important than facts,' says another. A third warns that the editor's
'legacy will follow him wherever he goes (we will make sure of that),
but maybe his upcoming job in Russia, Libya, Chile or Saudi Arabia
will further increase his financial gain'. Could I find myself one day in
a Cathay plane with a pilot who remembers my name ordering me to
be ejected without a parachute?
June 187
3 June
Hong Kong may be deep in recession, but the rich are still spending.
James Tien, leader of the Liberal Party, is a very wealthy man who
moved at the right moment from the family business of making
clothes to property and finance. Tonight he and his wife, Mary, throw
another goodbye dinner for the Sutches at their new home just down
the road from Anson Chan, with a spectacular view over Hong Kong
harbour. The Tiens are proud of their plantation-style mansion with
its huge wide-open rooms, wooden panels, mahogany, tiled floors
with inlaid patterns, sofas and chairs scattered about, a terraced garden
and an illuminated swimming pool. They have spent three years doing
the house up, building a road down to it, having a US$i million
security system installed and setting up a wine cellar, which houses
2,000 bottles including some 1947 clarets.
A slim, sharp man who looks much younger than his sixty years,
Tien is yet another offspring of Shanghai, whose parents made their
money in the garment trade after moving down to Hong Kong. His
mother watched the business like a hawk, going into the factory
seven days a week to check on the work rate. In the early 1990s, Tien
and his brother decided not to join the exodus to southern China.
Instead they went into property, the export business, a big marina and
other higher-margin avenues of profit. Tien became chairman of the
General Chamber of Commerce and a legislator for its functional
constituency. After the leader of the Liberals failed to win a popularly
elected seat in the Legislative Council in 1998, he took over as leader
of the party which has 10 members in the legislature, none of them
chosen by a geographical constituency.
The Post has been steadily critical of the party over its lack of con-
sistency, and regularly takes Tien to task. But he stays friendly, and asks
nothing in return for his hospitality. We are far apart in our beliefs, not
to mention our ways of life and the wine we drink. But it is still pos-
sible to have a civilised relationship even if he once said he believed
Hong Kong should be run by a natural elite of a couple of hundred
people.
[88 Dealing Wmi the Dragon
4 June
'I just want her to know about history,' says a middle-class Hong
Kong mother looking down at her three-year-old daughter. The child
has no idea what is going on. But for the mother, and tens of thou-
sands of other people, this is the day on which the difference between
Hong Kong and the rest of China is most tangible, and most moving.
Today marks the tenth anniversary of the Tiananmen Square mas-
sacre, and the annual vigil is being held in Victoria Park amid the
skyscrapers of Causeway Bay. Last year was a test occasion, the first
commemoration since Hong Kong rejoined China. As such, it was an
opportunity for people to assert themselves, but nobody really
believed the claim by the organisers that 40,000 turned out (the police
have refused for some time to give their estimate). The tenth anniver-
sary gives the vigil a special significance. But maybe Hong Kongers
are growing bored, and will heed the advice of the Chief Executive to
relegate Tiananmen to the baggage of history.
Tung Chee-hwa is going to be disappointed. Seventy thousand
people gather, sitting on concrete football pitches and holding candles
in paper triangles to remember the dead. A statue of the Goddess of
Liberty modelled on one which stood in Tiananmen Square rises
from one section. In the middle of the crowd, Queen Victoria sits on
her plinth.
Black flags with white inscriptions flutter in the air. On the stage at
one end of the park, bands and singers perform in front of more ban-
ners and a giant video screen where images of 1989 play over and over
again. Police mingle with the crowd, but there is no aggravation.
Everybody gets to their feet as a flowered wreath with a black and
white ribbon is carried through the throng. The veteran pro-democ-
racy campaigner and legislator, Szeto Wah, walks beside it. With
other leaders of the remembrance movement, the bespectacled,
elderly Szeto mounts to the platform as a stringed lament arches
through the warm air. A teenager carrying a burning torch moves to
join them, and the torch is used to light a commemorative flame in a
large urn. The line of men on the platform lead the singing of a dirge.
Modern synthesiser music takes over. The dissident Wan Dan talks to
June 189
his mother in Beijing on a hook-up from the USA through Hong
Kong.
Tonight, this is the only place in China where the truth about
1989 is being told in public. But the vigil does not stop life going on
around it. Trams rumble by, the passengers peering out at the scene.
Tennis-players keep up their game on the courts in another part of the
park. Shoppers pile into late-night stores on adjoining streets. There
is a scuffle outside a night spot called STIX, and the usual rush for
taxis.
'This is what China could be like, if only they would let it,' the
mother says. The crowd is mourning for what might have been, for a
brief spark of hope extinguished, as so often in China's history, by
autocrats for whom life can only be lived on their terms. In Beijing,
Hong Kong reporters ask Zhu Rongji about the anniversary.
Mockingly, he thanks them for reminding him of the date: he says he
had forgotten what day it was. Police arrest a lone man who tries to
wave a banner in Tiananmen Square. The People's Daily says the
army's action in 1989 had been very timely and very necessary, to pro-
tect China's independence, dignity, security and stability. The central
authorities have ordered the Bank of China to freeze donations sent
by Chinese students in Germany for the families of victims.
To jolly along mainland punters, a series of measures has been
announced to pump up the stock market, which has duly risen by 40
per cent in two weeks. Such action might strike a bell with one of the
leaders of the protest ten years ago. On the eve of the massacre, a
young woman called Chai Ling was filmed telling a Western reporter
that blood would have to be shed, though not hers. When the tanks
rolled into the square, she was gone. After hiding in China, she was
smuggled out through Hong Kong. Now established in Boston, she is
launching an Internet software company calledjenzabar.com. A press
release recalls how she led 'thousands of students against a Communist
government more ruthless than Microsoft'. Chai Ling, it adds, is 'a
dynamic personality who has found many similarities between run-
ning a revolution and an Internet start-up'. She has 'used the
techniques and charisma of a true revolutionary to impress CEOs to
back Jenzabar'.
190 Dealing Wiiii the Dragon
Later, I hear that the Central Government was none too pleased
with the way foreign and Hong Kong media remarked on the unique
nature of the vigil in the park, and on the space given to it here. The
Post ran the usual big photograph of the occasion on page one with a
descriptive story, and I wrote an editorial and a column arguing that
Tiananmen should not be relegated to the baggage of history what-
ever the Chief Executive might say.
Sjune
The website 'Not The South China Morning Post' has a capitalised
headline, 'LATEST POST EDITOR FENBY TO BE REPLACED
BY WALL STREET JOURNAL MAN SAY SOURCES'. Maybe I
have underrated Dr Adams.
10 June
The legal saga over the right of abode rolls on. The State Council in
Beijing accepts Hong Kong's request for an interpretation from the
National People's Congress. The Secretary for Justice makes it plain
that local courts will have to abide with whatever the NPC decides.
Whatever the 'trust us' officials may say, the dragon's breath is getting
hotter.
ii June
Press matters.
At the annual gala of the Journalists' Association, Anson Chan
does a karaoke song on stage in return for donations of tens of thou-
sands of dollars to the organisation from the guests. The Association's
chairperson delivers a lecture on falling press standards. 'Reading
newspapers is no longer an enjoyable exercise,' he tells us. 'Bloody
explicit pictures displayed prominendy are challenging our level of
tolerance every day. Sex and violence seem to be the only activities
worth mentioning in Hong Kong. This undesirable trend poses a
grave danger to the standard of professionalism of journalism.' The
June 191
audience snickers in the knowledge that he has just left his job on the
editorial page of the respectable Economic Times to join the sensational
Apple Daily.
The next day, the Post wins eleven of thirteen English-language
prizes in awards organised by Amnesty International, the Journalists'
Association and the Foreign Correspondents' Club.
Two days later, the paper's directors are told that I am going. I had
informed two of them whom I met socially in the last few weeks.
They both expressed shock and regret. One tells me he understands
the Kuoks were 'under a lot of pressure'. He does not say who from,
but it isn't hard to guess.
17— 21 June
The South China Morning Post enjoys a great advantage as the only
Hong Kong newspaper, except for those funded by Beijing, allowed
to have staff correspondents on the mainland. That is a relic of colo-
nial days, when it was regarded as British and its reporters were put on
a par with foreign correspondents in China. As a result, it comes
under the Foreign Ministry, and the Ministry is regarded as being
somewhat more flexible than the Hong Kong and Macau Affairs
Office or the official Xinhua news agency which oversee the main-
land access of other Hong Kong publications.
But now an official calls in one of our Beijing correspondents to say
some people are unhappy with this state of affairs: not because of our
coverage of the mainland but because of our attitude towards the
Hong Kong government. Before the handover the Post had supported
the Hong Kong government, she adds. But now it is an opposition
paper. The mainland Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office
(HKMAO) and Xinhua are angry about this. They say the Post should
not oppose what is being done in the SAR, and want to take it under
their wing.
There is also word from Beijing that the paper's coverage of^ the 4
June vigil in Hong Kong came in for criticism in the capital. My
column arguing that the history of Tiananmen Square must not be
buried is seen as having 'gone too far'. When I bump into a mainland
192 Di-Ai.iNG Wrin nil'. Dragon
official in Hong Kong and he asks if I will still write for the paper after
stepping down as editor, I wonder if it is an entirely innocent question.
24 June
The first thing most post-colonial governments do is to rename build-
ings that reek of imperial days. But not only has the SAR left Victoria
Park and Queen's Road unchanged, it has also taken an eternity to
decide what to call the former home of the British proconsuls. Finally
it has been determined that the residence of twenty-five governors
since 1855 will become Heung Kong Lai Bun Fu, meaning a place for
greeting guests. The new name was chosen from more than 2,300
submissions. The legislator representing the travel industry says it is
less attractive than the old name; he predicts that tour guides will still
call it by the Chinese term for 'former Governor's house'.
The Chief Executive will not move into the white mansion, with
its tower built by the Japanese during the Occupation, the grass tennis
courts where Chris Patten used to play in the morning, and the
kitchens which have recently undergone an .£800,000 renovation.
Tung Chee-hwa has occasional lunches there, and the house is used
for receptions and formal gatherings. But the twenty-eight domestic
staff have relatively little to do, and the heavy metal gates remain
closed most of the time.
Government House was the scene of two memorably symbolic
events at the end of colonial days. In the first, the Chief Executive-
designate paid a visit to Chris Patten. After their meeting, the two
men exchanged platitudes for the press outside. As Patten walked
back inside, Tung stayed to talk more to the reporters. The photo-
graph - of the Governor's back and Tung's face smiling to the
cameras; of the old and the new - made the front page.
And then on the last afternoon of colonial rule, the mansion on
Upper Albert Road was the backdrop for what I found the most
moving single moment of the handover. Although his final speech in
the rain that evening had a simple grandeur, it was Patten's departure
from Government House which brought the tears to my eyes. As he
stood in front of the building, the Union flag was hauled down,
June 193
neatly folded and handed to him. The last Governor blinked back his
emotion. Then he went inside to escort his family out to a big black
car flying his standard. The Daimler had been due to make three turns
round the driveway to signify an eventual return. It did not.
25 June
On the mainland, more than 100 people are executed to mark United
Nations anti-drug day. Calls for the abolition of the death penalty cut
no ice in Beijing. China sees a lot of bullets in the head as the best way
to deal with its mushrooming narcotics problem. And it is quite a
problem. Seizures of heroin on the mainland rose by one-third last
year. Police reported arresting 34,200 drug suspects; 27,000 were
found guilty. Drug-related crimes have soared. The number of regis-
tered addicts is almost 600,000. Seventy per cent of the 400,000 HIV
carriers have been infected through needles.
26 June
The National People's Congress delivers its verdict on the migrants'
case today. As expected, it reverses the decision of the Court of Final
Appeal. This means that only mainlanders born after one of their par-
ents became a permanent resident of Hong Kong will be eligible for
the right of abode here. A senior NPC official takes the Court of Final
Appeal to task for not having consulted the Chinese parliament in the
first place.
The government exults. The Secretary for Justice castigates those
who have expressed concern about the whole procedure as scare-
mongers out to 'destroy their own fortress'. Such critics should drop
their 'arrogance' and 'open their eyes and learn more about the main-
land systems', she adds. They must accept that there is now a new
constitutional order. An NPC deputy from Hong Kong invites his
friends to tea 'to celebrate as Hong Kong is about to rid itself of a dis-
aster'. A senior British official from the Department of Justice says the
administration can ask for an interpretation from the NPC whenever
it wishes - before, during or after a court hearing.
194 Dealing Wiiii THE Dragon
By coincidence, a seminar on the common law is being held in the
Shangri-La Hotel today with local lawyers and bigwigs from London.
The Chief Justice, Andrew Li, makes a brief appearance, but is clearly
anxious not to discuss anything to do with the NPC. A red-faced legal
eagle from London says heartily during the tea break that he's happy
to see how well everything is going. Reacting to the decision is a
tricky matter for London and Washington. They know how sharply
Beijing will object if they are seen to be interfering in SAR internal
affairs. The US State Department worries about the potential of the
NPC ruling 'to erode the independent authority of the Hong Kong
judiciary'. The British statement is diplomatic, but clear that 'the
principles of independent judicial power and of final adjudication are
integral to Hong Kong's high degree of autonomy'.
Not being bound by the niceties of diplomacy, I write an editorial for
the next day's paper headed 'Much more than interpretation at stake':
What happened yesterday is as simple as it is important. If it means
anything, the rule of law means the law is above politics. The law
may be changed by politicians operating through a legislature. But
those politicians cannot act as judges in interpreting it. Nor can they
appeal to a political body for redress when the decision of the high-
est court goes against them.
But that is what the Hong Kong government has done. The
National People's Congress is a political body. The Hong Kong gov-
ernment has chosen not to seek to change the law, as would have
been the normal common law process. Instead, it decided to ask the
NPC to hand down an interpretation of the Basic Law in order to
overturn a Court of Final Appeal verdict.
The administration here will now invoke that interpretation to
define the Hong Kong law on mainland migrants, clearly placing the
supreme court in Hong Kong in a subservient position to the NPC.
Equally, the ruling given in Beijing today will no doubt be chal-
lenged in a string of law suits. At the end of that process, the Court
of Final Appeal will have to decide whether it accepts the reversal of
its own judgment - and agrees that it was wrong not to seek prior
interpretation. If it does accept that, it will have recognised the
June 195
supremacy of the NPC and invalidated its own arguments; if it does
not, a further crisis will follow.
The air is full of assurances from the government that the rule of
law remains inviolate. Naturally, officials will downplay the signifi-
cance of what has happened. But nobody in the administration will
rule out a similar procedure being followed in other cases. Indeed, a
senior legal official has said the government may seek intervention on
any provisions in the Basic Law it sees fit to raise before, during or
after a trial.
So, two years after the handover, the major challenge to Hong
Kong's system has come not in the political arena, as many had
expected, but in the legal field. In a sense, this makes what has hap-
pened all the more serious.
Politics are a relatively recent phenomenon in Hong Kong, and
the Basic Law lays down a timetable for moving towards democracy.
The preservation of the legal system acted as a counterweight to
that slow process, with the courts enjoying backing across the polit-
ical spectrum - including, crucially, the business community, which
may take a leery view of democracy but knows the importance of
maintaining the status of the law in Hong Kong.
But now what had appeared to be a bedrock of Hong Kong's way
of life as guaranteed under the Joint Declaration and the one coun-
try, two systems concept has become subject to an essentially political
process. The NPC ruling was a stark statement of where power lies.
By taking the court to task for not requesting an interpretation by the
NPC before issuing its verdict, it laid down another benchmark
which undermines the court's independence and authority.
Within Hong Kong itself, there is a very real danger that applica-
tion of the rule of law is becoming a partisan issue. Being for or
against the interpretation route will be seen as a gauge of being for or
against the government. On Friday, the Secretary for Justice branded
those who make a link between interpretation and the rule of law as
scaremongers who were destroying their own fortress. That way lie
witch hunts that would do Hong Kong gre.it damage and add to the
polarisation of society. As Elsie Leung Oi-sie rightly said, foreign
investors believe that a sound legal system is a great advantage of
iy6 Dealing Wiih iiii Dragon
Hong Kong. But this does not mean everybody has to tamely accept
whatever the government ordains. Indeed, the Chief Executive has
spoken positively of the contribution that the noise' of debate makes
to Hong Kong.
The legal arguments will continue for months, if not years. But
the basic point cannot be evaded. At the time of the handover, there-
was an understandable tendency here to put the emphasis on the
preservation of the Hong Kong system under Deng Xiaoping's cel-
ebrated formula. Now, the Secretary for Justice has made it plain that
the one country comes first followed by the two systems. This has led
the government to apply for legal interpretation to a 'one country'
political body which is used to supervising the mainland courts in a
completely different legal system from ours, and to humiliate the
supreme judicial body in Hong Kong in the process.
The administration may deploy strong practical arguments for
what it has done. It may bring out legal advice filled with learned ref-
erences to sections of the Basic Law. But it cannot pretend that there
has not been a major political shift with potentially far-reaching
implications for the autonomy of Hong Kong and the relationship
with the Central Government as the SAR enters its third year.
28 June
I am invited to join a South China Morning Post directors' lunch
after a board meeting. It is held in a private room of an excellent
Chinese restaurant on the harbour front. The chopsticks are gold-
plated. Before the eating starts, the chairman says a single, short
sentence of appreciation for my work as editor which is lost in the
general chit-chat round the table. Then he leans forward, takes a
dim sum dumpling from the dish in front of us and places it on my
plate.
30 June
A successful surveyor and rising politician, C.Y. Leung, takes over the
significant post of convenor of the secretive, thirteen-member
June 197
Executive Council which advises Tung Chee-hwa on policy issues.
His predecessor, an elderly man with thick glasses, was a pillar of the
old regime and received a knighthood before adapting to the new
order in the seamless manner of so many members of the Hong Kong
establishment.
Tall and self-assured, Leung is seen as a face of the future. His
well-groomed head rising above the crowd of much shorter
Cantonese reporters as he fends off their questions is a familiar sight at
official occasions. He is thought to have ambitions to become Chief
Executive. At forty-five, he can wait out two Tung terms. Leung has
managed to balance making money with political correctness. Unlike
his predecessor, he kept well clear of the British and concentrated on
building up connections with the Central Government.
Though few people would bet against him being at the helm of the
SAR in the next century, his performance so far has not been exactly
impressive. In particular, he was the main force behind a government
pledge to build 85,000 housing units a year which has had to be
watered down. Given his involvement in property, some opposition
politicians raised conflict of interest questions, but as one Liberal Party
member remarked, any prominent figure chosen as Exco convenor by
the present administration is likely to have business connections.
July
i July
The second anniversary of the handover. Last year, Jiang Zemin came
to mark the occasion and to open the new airport. He and his
entourage occupied 141 rooms in one of Li Ka-shing's hotels, and
were ferried around in six armour-plated Mercedes-Benz limousines.
This year, Jiang contributes some verses to a commemorative pillar
inscribed with Chinese poetry, but does not make the trip south
himself. Instead, he sends a protege, Vice-President Hu Jintao, who
declares that 'The previous social and economic systems as well as the
way of life in Hong Kong remain unchanged.' As usual, politics is left
out of the list. There are some small protest demonstrations. When
Hu takes a boat trip, he is shadowed by a group angry at having been
bilked in a mainland property deal.
A poll by Hong Kong Chinese University shows the percentage of
people happy with the government has fallen to 25 per cent. The pro-
portion who are dissatisfied has risen from 12 per cent in 1997 to 20
per cent in 1998 and now to 46 per cent. Forty-three per cent say that
the rule of law has deteriorated and democracy has been eroded,
around double the figure of a year ago.
The head of the main pro-Beijing political party refuses to join
other party leaders in contributing his thoughts on the anniversary to
the Post because of the way we have handled the right of abode
July 199
controversy. And on a social note, the editor has been dropped from
the invitation list to the anniversary ceremonies. Last year, there was
a card for them all, including the opening of the new airport. Today,
nothing. My social acceptability seems to be about as low as in Patten's
last days. Or maybe the fact that I am on my way out speaks sufficient
volumes in this status-conscious town.
On page one, we run a photograph from an anniversary occasion
showing the Secretary for Justice, Elsie Leung, who has been stressing
the importance of the one country, and the Chief Secretary, Anson
Chan, who insists on the two systems. The two women wear very
similar blue suits, but look in opposite directions. My handover day
editorial starts from there.
The evident differences of views between the Chief Secretary for
Administration and Secretary for Justice about the balance between
one country and two systems could not have come at a more appo-
site time. Their divergence may be awkward for the administration in
which they both sit, but it points up more sharply than ever the cru-
cial issue facing Hong Kong two years after the handover.
On July 1, 1997, this newspaper wrote in a front-page editorial
that Tung Chee-hwa had to keep reminding Chinese leaders that
they must respect the two systems. Now, two years on, the question
is whether the Chief Executive himself and some of his senior col-
leagues are the ones who need reminding.
It was, after all, the administration which Mr Tung heads that
decided to ask the National People's Congress to over-rule the Court
of Final Appeal. The remarks by the Secretary for Justice before the
NPC handed down its judgment underlined fears that it is senior fig-
ures here who will undermine the preservation of the system we
were promised two years ago.
Having been on a visit to North and Central America at the time
of the NPC" decision and the rule of law controversy, Anson Chan
Fang On-sang was particularly well placed to judge the extent of
international concern at the erosion of Hong Kong's autonomy th.it
is implicit in the administration's approach. The government may
argue with all the force at its command that the rule of law remains
200 Dealing With the Dragon
unaffected; that is not the way many overseas observers see things.
Some of them are businessmen for whom one great attraction of
Hong Kong was that its legal system was not subject to vagaries of
interpretation by a political body outside its control. As Mrs Chan
noted, Hong Kong cannot take the goodwill which it has earned
since the handover for granted.
The problem is compounded by the way in which the govern-
ment has been ready to put expediency - or its own interests -
ahead of some of the long-standing principles on which the Hong
Kong system has been based. This is not to decry change. The SAR
should not be a static society, and a process as unique as the one
launched in 1997 is bound to bring diversions from the road map laid
down in the Joint Declaration and the Basic Law. But those changes
need to be spelled out clearly and to be connected to the broad
thrust of policy to explain where the government is heading.
The present danger is one of drift interspersed with sudden shocks
to the system. Two years on from the handover, there are some basic
questions which need to be addressed. How is the economy to be
diversified from its dependence on property and the stock market? Is
more government intervention necessary in more complex times? Does
the executive have any real desire to improve relations with the legisla-
ture? Is democracy just window dressing to keep Western opinion
happy? Is all the talk about improving the environment just that - talk?
In a sense, the undemocratic administration which rules Hong
Kong has shown itself much more responsive to public feelings than
might be expected from such an essentially conservative executive.
Measures such as the stock market intervention or the halting of a
tide of mainland migrants have undoubtedly been popular.
What has been lacking has been a broad policy theme to make
clear where the administration and the SAR are heading. The gov-
ernment spokesman gives the administration credit for taking difficult
decisions, but the reality is that it has usually sought the pragmatic
way out, almost as though it actually had to run for election.
This does not mean such decisions are necessarily wrong — prag-
matism can be a valuable quality. Reliance on pragmatism does,
however, mean that when the big tests come - notably over one
July 201
country, two systems - the experience is that the administration
finds it hard to stand on principle.
2 July
Three people from Hong Kong are in Inner Mongolia hoping to
bring home a 63 -year-old businessman from the SAR. Lok Yuk-sing
has been held in prison without proper charges by the Public Security
Bureau in the town of Dingsheng since 12 June last year. He was
detained at gunpoint in a hotel restaurant in southern China because
of debts to a mainland company owed by a cashmere firm for which
he used to work. When he saw the armed men, he thought he was
being kidnapped. In many ways, he was. Lok's former boss has disap-
peared. The ultimate owner of the firm, a big Hong Kong group
called Lai Sun, washes its hands of him. So Lok remains locked up,
suffering from ill health and extremes of climate, and subsisting on the
mainland prison diet.
I became aware of the case when his son-in-law sent me an e-mail
about Lok's plight. We led the Sunday edition with the story, and then
sent a reporter, Cynthia Wan, to Inner Mongolia with Lok's relatives
in the spring, when they were allowed only a brief meeting with him.
Now the family has been told by its legal representative that Lok is
going to be freed for the second anniversary of the handover. Two
family members have gone to collect him. Cynthia Wan is with them.
Lok's former firm owed its mainland creditor HK$4 million. Two
security officials tell his relatives that they will have to pay a HK$4-7
rnillion bail to get him out of prison. You people in Hong Kong are
rich, the officials explain. They also denounce the family for telling the
press about the case, and produce clippings from the Post. Some have
Cynthia's picture byline. Fortunately, the officials do not recognise her.
Cases like this obviously cause more concern than the fate of gang-
sters and murderers. A growing number of Hong Kong people are
involved in cross-border business, and fear being locked up without
trial because of commercial problems. Another man has been held
since March in Guangzhou over a customs declaration for ten lifts. He
has been denied bail. His company has paid legal fees of HK$ 100,000,
202 Dealing Wiiii the Drac.on
but sacked him in May. His wife says their five-year-old son calls out
in his sleep for his father.
Apart from cases involving Hong Kong people, an Australian-Chinese
businessman, who was grabbed from Macau in a disagreement with a
relative of Deng Xiaoping, has been held for more than five years. A city
councillor from Taiwan and her boyfriend were kidnapped last year in
northern China over a business row. After being kept for two days
bound and sedated, the man escaped, but the woman died when she was
overdosed with sleeping pills. Another Taiwanese who disappeared in
Shenzhen is thought to have been murdered by business associates.
The SAR government is moving with extreme caution in Lok's case.
This is in striking contrast to its attitude towards the boss of Lai Sun, the
ultimate owner of the trading firm for which Lok had worked. When
the 84-year-old chairman was accused of bribery in Taiwan, Hong
Kong's Chief Executive used his influence to get the old man freed on
bail to return home before sentence was passed. When it is a matter of
the mainland and an ordinary Hong Konger, concern seems a lot less.
The government also seems to take what it is told by mainland
police at face value. In Lok's case, the Secretary for Security says she
has been assured by the Beijing authorities that no bail request was
made, though Cynthia Wan witnessed the demand. On his return to
Hong Kong, Lok's son-in-law, John Wong, sends me another e-mail,
saying 'At least HK SAR government now treats it more seriously
than before . . . We need media who are able to speak out and fight
for justice for the HK citizen, particularly post-handover.'
3 July
In the city of Chengdu, a sperm bank has been set up which will
accept only donors who have at least a master's degree. A philosophy
professor called Yu Ping-zhe objects that sperm from well-educated
people may not be any better than that of ignorant folk. Anyway,
clever people are often ugly, so good looks should be a criterion, too.
The bank responds that it can charge high prices for sperm from
intellectuals who can provide 'intelligent and healthy sperm'. 'Our
sperm is vintage,' a spokeswoman says.
July 203
Sjuly
Farewell reception for the departing US Consul-General and a one-
day-late 4 July party at his residence on the Peak. The low level of
attendance from the government is striking. Tung Chee-hwa has
made it known that he is going to leave most foreign national-day
celebrations to Anson Chan and Donald Tsang. He gave the Consul-
General a dinner a few days ago, but he might also have turned out
tonight, given the importance of the US for Hong Kong. Chan
comes early, but does not stay to make the speech, which is delivered
by the Secretary for Financial Services, hardly a top figure. Only a
handful of other officials attend.
That is in interesting contrast to a seventh anniversary party for the
pro-Beijing Democratic Alliance for the Betterment of Hong Kong
(DAB) this week at a hotel in Central. The Chief Executive's presence
is enough to ensure that a flock of top bureaucrats attend. Tung joins
the party bigwigs in cutting an anniversary cake.
Led by an earnest, intelligent head teacher, Tsang Yok-sing, who
says he gained his Chinese patriotism on a trip across the border as a
teenager, the DAB aims to become the ruling party in Hong Kong.
The party leader's brother, who was imprisoned by the British for
involvement in anti-colonial protests and then edited a newspaper
financed from the mainland, is joining the government's think-tank.
Having done well at the legislative elections last year, the DAB is
establishing itself as a populist rival to the Democrats. Like them it has
internal strains, though of a very different nature. On the one hand,
it wants to profit from increased democratisation, but it also owes loy-
alty to Beijing, which backs the drawn-out development of the
political system laid down in the Basic Law. Equally, it is torn between
the temptation to become the government's most potent ally in the
legislature, and the benefits to be had from criticising an administra-
tion that is fast shedding its initial popularity.
There can, however, be little doubt that the DAB will strengthen its
position as the year goes on. Membership of Hong Kong parties is
tiny, so with 1,300 signed-up adherents, it can already claim to be the
biggest political group in the SAR. It aims to boost its numbers to
204 Di-ai.inc; Willi THE Dracon
30,000 by 2006, and to become the Labour Party of Hong Kong:
whether old or new style is not yet clear.
7 July
In Los Angeles, Chinese football players face the might of the United
States in the final of the women's World Cup.
China has done well, hitting home nineteen goals and crushing the
reigning champions, Norway, 5-0 in the semi-final to face the home
team for the title. Their goal-scoring knack evaporates in a nil-nil
draw in the final. The United States win the penalty shoot-out 5-4.
Some of the Chinese are in tears as they receive runners-up medals.
Vice Premier Li Lanqing telephones the team to tell them, 'I hope
you can learn from the experience and make a new contribution to
our country's sport.' The White House spokesman talks of a tradition
of sport helping to build bridges stretching back to the ping-pong
diplomacy before Richard Nixon recognised the mainland. China's
propaganda department warns the media not to politicise the game for
fear of sparking off anti-American demonstrations. But newspapers
quickly show that suspicions about US skulduggery are not confined
to the bombing of the embassy in Belgrade.
Indeed, one mainland press report draws a direct link between the
two events. It notes that the Chinese team was put up in Los Angeles
at the Ambassador Suite Hotel, whose name amounted to 'spiritual
torture' for the players by reminding them of the bombing. A Beijing
soccer fan is quoted as pointing out that the Chinese team was at a
disadvantage because the final was held in the afternoon, and they had
not played any afternoon games before.
Ignoring the pollution back home, the Sports Daily newspaper
writes that the fumes from vehicles in Los Angeles would have tired
the visitors. The Beijing Morning Post notes that the Chinese flew
20,400 kilometres, crossing from coast to coast four times, whereas the
home team covered less than half that distance. When video film
shows that the US goalkeeper moved off her line too early for a vital
save during the shoot-out, China's sporting ire soars.
July 205
8 July
The Chief Executive says he is determined to do something about the
worsening air pollution. Leaders of political parties say they will make
it a big issue. We all know that exhaust fumes from diesel vehicles are
a major cause of foul air. But today the Legislative Council votes by
47 to 7 to back a government proposal that will block attempts to
increase the fine for smoky vehicles from the present paltry HK$450
(£35), which is just one tenth of the fine for smoking inside a taxi.
The argument against boosting the fine is that it would be unfair at
a time when other official fees and charges are frozen because of the
recession. Fear of antagonising the powerful taxi and transport lobby
is more germane to the way the Democrat and DAB parties line up
with the administration.
9 July
For half a century, the island of Taiwan, to which Chiang Kai-shek
fled as head of the Republic of China in 1949, has been a running sore
for the mainland. Today, its President, Lee Teng-hui, makes himself
even more of a 'criminal for a thousand years' in Beijing's eyes.
After the Kuomintang arrived across the Taiwan Strait and consol-
idated its power with a massacre of the local inhabitants, the island
became a tightly controlled fortress that the mainland could not con-
quer, holder of China's seat in the United Nations, defended by
Washington, shot through with corruption. Then, as the old KMT
dictatorship crumbled, it grew into the most democratic part of
greater China, and the home of a bustling high-tech economy. With
21 million inhabitants, it built a gross national product of US$271 bil-
lion, and foreign exchange reserves of US$100 billion. Its economy
has been relatively less hard hit than others in the region by the Asian
economic crisis, maintaining annual growth of 6 per cent and increas-
ing exports by almost 10 per cent. Its political culture has grown
increasingly vibrant. Money politics are still important, but locally
born politicians have supplanted the ruling class that accompanied the
Generalissimo across the Strait fifty years ago. Though Chiang's
206 Di-Ai.iNG Wnn the Dragon
dreams of reconquering the mainland evaporated long ago, it is not
surprising if many Taiwanese see their island as a model for China in
the twenty-first century, or as a place that should simply be left to get
on with its own life. One economist at a big Japanese research insti-
tute observes: 'If you asked the Taiwanese where they'd like to be
located, they'd probably say off California.'
The irony is that as Taiwan has grown and prospered and become
more democratic, so it has become more isolated as the world commits
itself to a 'one China' policy ushered in by Richard Nixon's recog-
nition of Beijing. Taipei is reduced to paying large amounts of money
for recognition from small states, and staging gimmicky exercises to
assert its existence which usually end up annoying the international
community. As it made clear by sending its fleet to the Taiwan Strait in
reaction to mainland war games in 1996, the US is not going to allow
an invasion of the island. Nor, despite the fortune Taiwan spends on
lobbying in Washington, does it want Taipei to upset the Sino-
American relationship. Balancing those two objectives is a major
problem. Clearly Taiwan is not going to give up what it has achieved.
Equally clearly Beijing is not going to blink first. So all Washington can
do is to pray that the two will not step over the brink.
That prayer is not aided by President Lee Teng-hui's habit of cut-
ting through the fudge which the rest of the world would like to pour
over his island. Having been brought up in the Japanese system during
the occupation of the island, Lee is the subject of deep suspicion in
Beijing. Officials there tell you, as proof of his perfidy, that when he
dozes off at a dinner he sometimes comes round speaking Japanese.
Not that Lee does much to exclude the idea that his real agenda is
independence. His latest sally is to say that relations between Taiwan
and the mainland should be on a 'special state-to-state basis'. In fact,
the island does have all the attributes of a state except for international
recognition. Inevitably, however, Lee's remark enrages China.
A Beijing-funded newspaper in Hong Kong reports that fighting
against Taiwan's independence has been listed as the main task of the
Chinese army, and quotes a mainland expert as saying that the PLA
always undertakes military action once an objective has been set. 'A
war will surely break out if Lee Teng-hui continues to act wilfully,' the
July 207
expert goes on. To which a member of the Chinese Academy of
Military Sciences adds his opinion that the Taiwanese President is 'an
abnormal test-tube baby bred by international anti-China forces in
their political lab'.
10 July
An Internet stock called China.com, which was listed on the Nasdaq
stock market in New York this week, has trebled its share price in a
single day. The company, whose owners include a Hong Kong prop-
erty firm, China's official Xinhua news agency and America Online,
offers Internet access in China, Taiwan and Hong Kong. There is not
much there at present, and it only ranks as the seventeenth most pop-
ular website on the mainland. But put the words China and Internet
together and you have a goldmine.
14 July
The World Economic Forum places Hong Kong in third place in
world competitiveness, behind the United States and Singapore. But
when the report moves from government policy and the big picture
to the microeconomic ways in which firms actually work, the SAR
slips down to twenty-first place. The analysts have noticed aspects of
the economy which are usually concealed by the sheen of small gov-
ernment and low taxes, such as the array of non-competitive practices,
cartels and antiquated management.
Then Standard and Poor's rating agency weighs in with a negative
verdict on Hong Kong's long-term outlook. It says the SAR is vul-
nerable to loss of confidence because of regional developments,
potential political mismanagement and the government's appeal to the
NPC.
16 July
A further sign of Beijing's view of the proper role of the Hong Kong
media. The Deputy Director of the Hong Kong and Macau Office,
2o8 Dealing With the Dragon
Liu Mingqi, tells a visiting party of journalists from the SAR that the
Tung government deserves support. There is, he notes, a suggestion
that the Chief Executive's popularity has dropped. But 'public opin-
ion has been misled. Over the past two years, Mr Tung has shown
good leadership. Hong Kong people should feel lucky they have a
good Chief Executive.'
In the past, mainland officials avoided commenting on the Hong
Kong press in deference to one country, two systems. But now Liu
Mingqi shows no inhibitions. Speaking about the right of abode issue,
he says that 'Some people, including some newspapers, have fuelled
the row and caused all the controversy.' He singles out the faithfully
pro-Beijing newspapers, Ta Kung Pao and Wen Wei Po, as having done
well. 'They helped explain government policies. News media should
explain government policies . . . Some people have taken to the
streets to say "Down with this or that." It's like the behaviour of
some people during the Cultural Revolution.'
20— 22 July
The authorities in Beijing have launched a major campaign against the
Falung Gong sect. Thousands of practitioners are rounded up as they
demonstrate for better treatment for their movement, or carry out
their deep-breathing exercises in public. Most are released after short
detention. Some undergo what one mainland newspaper calls 'per-
suasion tactics' by police.
Sects and secret societies have a long history in China. The two
major figures of the Kuomintang regime, Sun Yat-sen and Chiang
Kai-shek, were both associated with such shadowy movements, which
often merged into the world of the Triads. There is no way the
authoritarians in Beijing will allow the deeply suspect Falun Gong to
continue.
One adherent who was detained for two weeks with ten others in
the northern industrial city of Dalian reports that when they did their
exercises in jail, 'the guards took our trousers down and gave each of
us fifteen lashes with a leather whip. Our buttocks were covered in
blood.' He says they were also hit in the face, beaten with rubber
July 209
truncheons and handcuffed to window frames for hours. In Shandong
province, a woman farmer arrested while working in the fields died in
prison. The Falun Gong website says she was tortured with electric
batons and rubber clubs and 'electrified with old-style rotary tele-
phones'. The semi-official China News Service blames her death on
a heart attack after falling in a toilet.
China has issued instructions for the arrest of the sect's founder, Li
Hongzhi, who lives in the New York suburb of Queens. It asks
Interpol to help bring him in, but gets a negative response. The state
media put out stories about a practitioner who cut himself open with
a penknife believing that he had the sacred wheel of the law in his
stomach, another who killed his wife because of the Falun Gong's
teaching, and 743 people whose deaths are blamed on the cult. Li is
vilified as a charlatan who has milked his followers for money; the
mainland media say the only thing anybody remembers about his
childhood was that he played the trumpet - badly.
A former low-level employee of a state grain enterprise in Jilin
province which adjoins North Korea, Li developed a big following
with his lectures during the 1990s. The authorities say he was born in
1952, but Li dates his birth a year earlier, coinciding with the birthday
of Buddha. He left China for the US in the spring of 1998, a year
before the Falun Gong staged its sudden protest outside the leadership
compound in Beijing. The Youth Daily newspaper reports that when
police raided his former two-bedroom, two-bathroom flat in Jilin
they found a big television set, an audio and video system, a leather
sofa and a safe containing seven imported watches, rings, bracelets,
jade earrings and gold-plated pens. In an adjoining office, beside a fax,
a copying machine and a shredder, was a receipt for a Volkswagen
Jetta. All of which is used to back up the charge that Li was sucking
in money from the practitioners, who were said to have paid 92,520
yuan (.£7,400) for a three-hour talk he gave in 1994. It certainly
couldn't have all been paid for from his salary at the grain office and
his wife's earnings from her work at a public baths.
The creed which Li propagates involves deep-breathing and med-
itation exercises that claim to raise consciousness and to harness
natural forces to the human body. It draws on a long tradition of Asian
210 Dealing With the Dragon
mysticism: one of the founder's portraits shows him in a dark suit,
standing in front of the inverted swastika used in Zoroastrianism and
other ancient religions. Li says it promotes good health and morality.
There are also some more unusual claims associated with the move-
ment, such as the ability to reverse the menstrual cycle and to enable
followers to see out of the back of their heads, though it is not clear
if they are put forward by the Falun Gong itself or associated with it
by those who wish to discredit the sect. Li is said to have offered
ardent practitioners the prospect of being able to fly to heaven by
transforming the molecular make-up of their bodies. Asians will go to
one heaven, Caucasians to another. A video made by Li and shown by
Chinese authorities has the founder describing the earth as a rotten
apple which has been destroyed 81 times, and asserting that he is the
only person left in China who can save it.
A former follower from Hong Kong has circulated a report saying
that the founder claims to be the Supreme Buddha of the Cosmos,
with a status superior to that of all other deities, who is now presid-
ing over the final 'clean-up' of the planet. After which, a new human
race will appear, made up mainly of Falun Gong adherents. In the
meantime, according to this report as published in the South China
Morning Post, Li has revealed that he helped the Virgin Mary to reach
Heaven after she spent 2,000 years going through various reincar-
nations on earth. He is also said to attribute the progress of computers
to intervention by aliens, who have given a serial number to all
human users.
Alien intervention or not, Li and followers have shown themselves
adept at using computerised communications. They have set up web-
sites, and operate by e-mail through servers outside China which are
beyond the reach of the authorities. It is a very end-of-century meet-
ing of an old Chinese cult of spiritual healing and modern
information technology, and one which frightens a regime that faces
a major problem in trying to extend its control to cyberspace. This is
still a country where a businessman in Shanghai was recently impris-
oned for supplying e-mail addresses to a Chinese-language electronic
newsletter based in Washington.
One particular governmental worry about the Falun Gong is that
July 211
it has practitioners in the administration and armed forces. The Beijing
Daily says a former deputy director at the Ministry of Public Security,
who is among those recently detained, protected Li from arrest when
he was still in China, and helped him leave for the United States. A
retired officer who was deputy director of the military's general health
department has been identified as an adherent. Sources quoted by the
Washington Post say a retired major-general on the general staff depart-
ment was a practitioner. Thousands of soldiers are believed to have
joined in its activities in the Dalian area of the north.
As well as trying to suppress the Gongists, the regime is maintain-
ing its crackdown on political dissent this summer. Liu Xianbin, a
3 1 -year-old organiser for the tiny China Democracy Party, from
Sichuan province, has been charged with 'subverting state power' and
will get thirteen years in prison. One piece of evidence used against
Liu were letters he wrote to President Jiang and Prime Minister Zhu
calling for the release of other members who had been jailed. A
founder of the group who requested that it should be made legal the
day Bill Clinton arrived in China for his visit in 1998 was sent down
on a similar sentence. Two other members have received eleven-year
terms. A dissident in Sichuan got twelve. In all, over 200 democracy
activists have been taken in this summer, and thirty-five are still held,
according to the Hong Kong-based Information Centre of Human
Rights and Democratic Movement in China.
The Central Government is anxious to deal with opponents before
the celebrations of the fiftieth anniversary of the Communist victory
on 1 October, counting on protests from the West being muted by
embarrassment over the bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade.
But it doesn't like its crackdown to become too widely known: a rail-
way employee has been sent to jail for ten years for 'illegally providing
intelligence to foreign organisations' about labour unrest - that is,
telling foreign journalists about protests by workers complaining
against not being paid or about corruption.
The fiftieth anniversary is also the occasion for a more general
anti-crime campaign. Strike Hard is its name. The official press
announces 35,000 arrests injury. China Daily says the aim is to 'elim-
inate latent threats to social stability' and to create a safer environment
212 Dealing Wiiii the Dragon
for the celebrations. The Public Security Ministry calls on citizens to
denounce suspects and offers rewards for information leading to
arrests.
Still, angry workers are reported to have blocked more train lines
after not getting their pensions or pay. There have been fresh rallies
against corruption and bad local government. One of those stories
which probably isn't true but should be goes as follows. Instructions
have been sent from Beijing to station masters in the industrial north
of the country. If they see groups of workers heading for the capital,
they are to stop the trains and order them to disembark. So you will
be able to gauge the extent of industrial unrest by the number of
empty trains arriving late from the north.
23 July
Lunch with a senior Hong Kong policy-making official. He asks why
the media, and in particular the Post, are always so negative about the
government, and why the Post has become 'so sensational'. His line is:
of course, the administration makes mistakes, but a family should not
hang out its dirty washing for all to see. Singaporean overtones are
unmistakable. We're all in this together, so let's all pull together for the
general good.
As for our supposed sensationalism, I ask him to give me an exam-
ple. He cites a recent front page which featured three stories reporting
government reversals in the courts. The main headline read: 'day of
defeats for tung' and each of the cases was highlighted with a red
and black bar. That certainly wouldn't have been regarded as sensa-
tional in a British broadsheet. Perhaps it just made its point about the
government's discomforture rather too well. As another senior official
says: 'You may be right, but don't show us up so much.'
24 July
A long conversation with a rising Hong Kong Chinese solicitor. He
had been doing well in London, but had wanted to come home to join
in the development of the SAR. Now he is thinking of returning to
July 213
Britain. He is disillusioned with the way the government operates,
with the lack of vision, with it not standing up for Hong Kong and
with the way the old business establishment rules. And despite the
recession, prices here are still so high that he reckons he could live just
as well, if not better, in the UK. This is the kind of voice that provides
a backdrop to the political, legal and economic debate - and which the
government ignores at its peril.
25 July
We may feel hot and humid in Hong Kong, but the mainland media
reports that the temperature in Beijing has gone above 40 degrees
Celsius. What is striking is not the heat, but the fact that it was accu-
rately reported.
For decades, the temperature on the mainland never officially rose
above 37 degrees. There was a general belief that if it was any hotter,
outdoor workers were entitled to a day off. So the official temperature
report stayed below 37 degrees. Now the truth is out. Officials deny
that there is any entitlement to a day off. The China Youth Daily says
the new veracity is 'a very important step towards constructing the
rule of law.'
31 July
Today is a routine Saturday at the Post, except that it is my last day as
editor. The paper is in good shape. Though the sniping will never
cease, we have established our independence in the post-handover
Hong Kong. Pre-tax profit for the financial year that has just ended
was equivalent to £35 million, or 36 per cent of turnover. When
asked why I am going, I reply that I have been given no explanation,
but can only surmise that the Kuoks want somebody with whom they
feel more comfortable.
The New York Times runs a 1,000- word piece under the headline 'a
free-spoken editor won' 1 be back' and with a pull-quote declaring,
'At a tense time in Hong Kong, a voice is silenced.' The story says that
the 'murky circumstances of Mr Fenby's exit have prompted a rash of
214 Dealing Wiih the Dragon
speculation that he is a victim of Hong Kong's tightening political
atmosphere'. It quotes the legislator Margaret Ng saying she 'strongly
suspects that this is motivated by his wanting to be more independent
than the owners are willing to be'.
That is enough for the government's information service to put in
an urgent weekend call to the Post to make it clear that it had noth-
ing to do with my going. If, indeed, there was an agreement that the
editorship of the Post should be changed, it would have been done at
a different level, or without any obvious reference to officialdom.
Which tycoon would talk to the government information service
about repositioning the pieces on his chess board?
The Guardian reports that attention will now be focused on the
future of the Post. Its correspondent notes how the paper's indepen-
dence 'helped to allay fears that the Hong Kong media would be
muzzled once the territory returned to China'. Newsweek lists my
departure as a sign of Hong Kong's 'fading autonomy', and an edito-
rial in The Economist about the future of Hong Kong remarks:
'Worryingly, the editor of a newspaper that was sharply critical of the
[legal reinterpretation] decision has since had his contract terminated.'
As for myself, I write a valedictory piece for the Independent on my
four years at the Post. Later, I am told that it 'ruffled feathers' with the
owners. Then it is time to do my weekly editorial page column. In
the past, it has been called 'Letter from the Editor'. Only the tide need
change.
August
i August
Whatever one's worries about the rule of law and accountability
and the executive's power, a reality of one country, two systems is
out on the street in Happy Valley, opposite the main racecourse. On
the mainland, thousands of Falun Gong practitioners have been
detained in recent weeks. But the Hong Kong government has
authorised a demonstration today by some 200 adherents outside
the office of the Chinese news agency, Xinhua. On a hot summer
afternoon, they stand silently doing their movements, and disperse
peacefully.
9 August
The South China Morning Post reveals that Beijing has rejected
approaches from the Vatican for Pope John Paul II to be allowed to
visit Hong Kong. It is a pointed reminder of how the one country
part of Deng's formula works.
Apart from traditional communist distaste for Catholicism, the
Papacy is in bad odour on the mainland because it maintains a diplo-
matic mission in Taiwan. The idea of a papal visit to Hong Kong was
apparently seen by the Vatican as a means of enabling the Pontiff to
preach on Chinese soil without needing to resolve differences with
216 Dealing Wiiii the Dkacon
Beijing. But Tung Chee-hwa says that this is a foreign affairs matter
which falls under the authority of the Central Government. He adds
that his own officials are united in disapproving of the idea, including
the Financial Secretary, who is a Catholic.
15 August
Just in case anybody thought things were going to quieten down in
Macau as the return to China approaches, a nail bomb kills two sus-
pected Triads as they drive to the casino after a late night restaurant
meal. A simultaneous arson attack damages two cars and a dozen
motorcycles elsewhere in town.
Across the border, another gang boss, Ip Seng-kin, is tried for rob-
bery and arms-smuggling. Known as Macau's equivalent of Big
Spender, Hong Kong-born Ip and two associates are led from the
court in Zuhai city with black hoods over their head after being sen-
tenced to death. Back in Macau, the trial of his peer, Broken Tooth,
opens with the defence lawyer storming out of the courtroom in
protest at the way in which the trial is conducted. The joke going the
rounds is that his client wants a quick verdict so that, if found guilty,
he can arrange to escape before the PLA comes in and deals with
him.
18 August
A major stock market flotation is being prepared in Beijing.
Managers, consultants, auditors, bankers and lawyers fill a hotel
owned by the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC),
the world's fifth biggest oil firm. They work in specially fitted-out
offices on the lower floors and sleep in rooms above. They are fash-
ioning a new company with CNPC's prize assets, US$i billion less
in costs and one-third of its 1.5 million employees. Fifteen per cent
of its shares will be floated in New York and Hong Kong in
February. What is left unsaid is what happens to the remaining hulk
of the old company with its million employees and assets the world
does not want.
August 217
22 August
An airliner from Taiwan's China Airlines crashes in flames while land-
ing at Chek Lap Kok airport during a typhoon. Investigators find that
the Italian pilot did not reduce his speed sufficiently during the
approach. The plane turned over and caught fire. Passengers hung
upside-down in their seat belts, some for hours. The miracle was that
only three died.
The typhoon, called Sam, is the first really serious storm to hit
Hong Kong for several years. It kills one villager, buried under three
metres of mud. Twenty-eight people are hurt. There are landslides and
flooding in the New Territories.
27 August
The government announces second-quarter growth of 0.5 per cent. Is
the recession over? After over-enthusiastic forecasts in the past, the
Financial Secretary is cautious. But the green shoots of recovery seem
to be sprouting all around. Malaysia announces strong expansion.
Retailers in Thailand say trade was up 20 per cent in July. South
Korea is bounding ahead. So is Singapore.
There is, however, another side of the slate. The unravelling of the
giant chaebol groups in Korea is taking much longer than expected;
Malaysia has been living behind a wall of controls; there is a major
bank scandal in Indonesia; and changing the business culture in
Thailand is going to take time. For Hong Kong, there is the question
of whether China can maintain the growth it needs to power its way
into the world economy and to avoid major social stresses that could
threaten the system - and of what is going to happen with its stalled
bid to join the World Trade Organisation.
30 August
Indignation is rising over a redevelopment scheme for the waterfront
in Central which would mean the end of the old Star Ferry piers.
They would be moved along the harbour. Nobody could claim that
/
2i8 Dealing Wiiii the Dkacdn
the current piers are things of beauty, but they are an integral part of
Hong Kong life, particularly at rush hours, when passengers crowd on
to the squat boats to cross the 1,480 metres between Central and
Tsim Sha Tsui. The ferry is efficient, practical and cheap - HK$2.20
(17 pence) for the upper deck and $1.70 (13 pence) down below for
the seven-minute crossing. At any moment during the day, one or
other of the thirteen boats will be plying back or forth across the
water, riding on the wake of more powerful boats and making a crab-
like approach to the quays on either side.
The view from the water in mid-voyage is spectacular, particularly
at night when the lights are gleaming. Set up by a Parsee at the end of
the last century and now run by a big conglomerate, the green and
cream ferries have come to be a seminal emblem of the city, even if
Richard Branson has recently taken over one and repainted it Virgin
red. 'Here's the real Hong Kong,' writes the journalist and long-time
local observer Kevin Sinclair. 'The smell of salt water (try not to look
at the surface) and the odour of wet rope, the tang of diesel fuel, the
clank as the gangway crashes down, the whistle to tell you you've
missed the boat . . .'
The government has already changed its mind about a development
and reclamation scheme in the harbour. Perhaps it can be persuaded
to think again one more time.
September
i—8 September
Architecture, culture, the economy, corruption, and China's great
wild west.
Beijing has picked a design by a French architect for its new
national theatre and opera house. The glass and titanium building is
shaped, according to which simile you prefer, like a giant bubble or a
squashed duck's egg or a space ship from a science fiction film. It will
sit in the middle of an artificial lake in a park alongside the Great Hall
of the People and opposite the Forbidden City in the centre of the
capital. Inside the building, which will be reached through a tunnel
under the lake, will be a 2,700-seat opera hall, a smaller concert hall
and two theatres. Covering 100,000 square metres, the project will
cost US$360 million.
The news has been confirmed by officials to foreign correspon-
dents, but has not been announced domestically. The authorities
might find it a trifle embarrassing to explain to their people why
none of the twenty-four architects from China and Hong Kong who
submitted designs was chosen.
On the economic front, the mainland Finance Minister is quoted
as saying that he is 'not over-optimistic' about halting deflation despite
a programme of fresh spending. The government is pumping in
an additional 54 billion yuan (£4 billion) in wages, pensions and
220 Dealing Wiih the Dragon
unemployment benefits. All this means that the budget deficit has
nearly doubled to reach an unprecedented 1N0 billion yuan (£14 bil-
lion).
Some people have been spending regardless of deflation or anything
else. A mainland prosecutor identified only as 'Du' has been found
dead with his mistress at a luxury villa near the city of Shenyang in the
north. It appears to have been a case of suicide. Du had been regarded
as a model puritanical bureaucrat. He did not drink or smoke or go to
karaoke bars. He had been with the prosecutor's department for thir-
teen years, and never earned more than 900 yuan (jC7S) a month. But
it now turns out that he had spent more than a million yuan of public
funds on the villa and a luxury car for his mistress. 'The whole city
was shocked by the news,' say the mainland newspapers.
On the other side of the country, the Central Government is
reported to be imposing yet another crackdown on separatists in the
vast Xinjiang region, on the frontier with Central Asia, with its dozen
different nationalities, its great mineral resources and its 13 million
Muslim Uigur people. It is an area of enormous contrasts: the urban
expanse of Urumqi and the great Taklamakan Desert, where camel
trains used to disappear in sandstorms; the painted caves of the
Flaming Mountains and the Lop Nor test site, where Beijing let off its
nuclear explosions. (A vineyard in a nearby oasis produces a pleasant
light red wine; one hopes that it hasn't been nurtured on fallout.) The
Turpan depression on the Silk Road is the second lowest point on the
planet, and a tourist attraction for ancient sites nearby - a photograph
in a hotel lobby of Bill Gates on a visit is even bigger than the picture
of Jiang Zemin. Down the road, the Atex restaurant and dance hall is
crowded with a bizarre mixture of local yuppies and increasingly soz-
zled old men in thick boots and fur hats. A local painter in two-tone
shoes executes perfect waltzes and foxtrots with visiting ladies.
To the west, in the shadow of some of the highest mountains on
earth, lies the great trading centre of Kashgar, the gateway to Central
Asia, with its mosques and alleyways and huge Sunday market where
the carpet traders track black-market rates for US dollars on cellular
telephones while women walk round with big brown knitted veils
completely covering their heads. In the nineteenth century, this was
September 221
a key watching post for the British and Russians in the Great Game
for influence over the approaches to imperial India. For twenty-eight
years, George Macartney, a diplomat with a Chinese mother, presided
over the British consulate, immortalised by the memoirs of his wife,
whom he plucked from Victorian London to live in one of the more
isolated of diplomatic posts at the end of a gruelling six- week overland
journey across Russia and through the Himalayas. Today, the con-
sulate is part of a modern hotel, as is the rival Russian mission where
Catherine Macartney was taken aback by the drinking habits of the
Tsar's representatives, especially when one poured champagne down
her dress as he tried to make a toast.
A huge statue of Mao Tse-tung still points the way ahead in the
centre of the city, but the religion here is Islam not communism. The
mosque in the middle of town is the biggest in China. A sign in the
courtyard advises visitors in English that 'breaking wind and speaking
loudly is forbidden. The intimate action is not welcome in this
mosque.'
Beijing has encouraged Han Chinese from other parts of the coun-
try to move to the region to try to alter the racial balance, but there
has been no assimilation to speak of and most of the newcomers live
in the capital city of Urumqi or are PLA soldiers. On a Sunday after-
noon walk through the streets of Kashgar, I counted only half a dozen
Han among the thousands of pedestrians, plus two driving by in a
People's Liberation Army jeep. If you ask how many soldiers are sta-
tioned in the area, you get either a huge number or a shrug of the
shoulders.
A Uigur joke goes as follows. An American, a Japanese, a Uigur
and a Han are in a train compartment. The American gets up, opens
the window and throws out all his cigarettes, shouting, 'Too many
Marlboros.' A bit later, the Japanese stands up, opens the window and
throws out several Sony tape machines he is carrying, shouting, 'Too
many Walkmans.' A little further on, the Uigur gets up, opens the
window and throws out the fourth man in the compartment, shout-
ing, 'Too many Han.'
Chinese rulers have tried to assert control for two millennia.
Following Muslim rebellions in the 1860s and 1870s, Xinjiang became
222 Dealing With the Dragon
an imperial province in 1884, but broke away again at the end of the
Qing dynasty in 1911. For a while after the Second World War, it
became the Eastern Turkestan Republic. Since 1955, it has been an
autonomous region of the People's Republic of China. Now there is
talk of economic revival, of opening up the Silk Road as a major land
route between Central Asia and China. But a trip along the main
Karakoram Highway through the shimmering lakes and vast open
foothills of the Pamir mountains shows how primitive it remains.
Great heaps of boulders that have slid down the slopes reduce the car-
riageway to single file in places. The road surface is rutted with deep
crevices. Somewhere over the peaks are the Talibans of Afghanistan.
Beijing is deeply worried at the prospect that Muslim fundamen-
talists could stir up revolt in the region whose 600,000 square miles
constitute one-sixth of the country's landmass. There are stories of
groups from Afghanistan distributing audio cassettes in Kashgar; our
trip westwards along the Silk Road in 1998 was halted after three
hours' driving on the Karakoram towards Pakistan for fear of terror-
ists lying ahead. Last year, an internal instruction to China's security
departments named the region's pro-independence movement as the
greatest threat to national political stability. The region's Communist
Party secretary worries that 'what happened in Kosovo today will
happen in Xinjiang tomorrow'. Police recently raided a meeting of
Uigurs alleged to have been planning to sabotage China's national-day
celebrations on 1 October. Bomb blasts in Beijing have been blamed
on militants from the far west.
This autumn brings a series of executions of Uigurs. Some were
found guilty of manufacturing explosives or 'illegal religious prose-
lytism'. Others were condemned for murder, robbery and arms
offences. One group was accused of having set up a 'party of Allah'
among migrants in Guangdong province across from Hong Kong.
According to a Xinjiang newspaper, this group carried out murders in
three mainland cities, and its leader was preparing to transport more
than 260 detonators to Xinjiang. A Uigur accused of having killed
two policemen and six civilians died in hospital this month after
taking a three-year-old boy hostage and throwing a grenade before
being shot by security forces.
September 223
The search for local heroes to put on a pedestal as approved role
models led the central authorities to promote a Uigur woman
called Rebiya Kadeer. Born into a poor family, she built a highly
successful business career, urged Uigur women to follow her exam-
ple and became a member of a provincial political body. But she
married a former political prisoner who went to the United States.
To make matters worse, she let her sons join their father. Her fail-
ure to come out against her husband lost her the political post last
year. Now aged fifty-three, she has been arrested on her way to a
meeting with an American congressional delegation carrying with
her a list of political prisoners, and accused of revealing state infor-
mation to foreigners. An official newspaper says one of her offences
was to have sent clippings from Chinese newspapers to her hus-
band, who is campaigning for Uigur rights from his base in
Oklahoma.
5 September
Four lonely diplomats are holed up in the Wanchai district by the
waterfront on Hong Kong Island. The area is a mixture of office
buildings, residential blocks and girlie bars. However, the diplomats
are unlikely to be visiting the Club Hot Lips, the Pussy Cat or the
Club Venus. They have come to Hong Kong to open a consulate for
North Korea.
The Central Government has decided to agree to the opening of
the mission. It is also going to let Iran reopen its consulate, which
was closed after the fatwah against Salman Rushdie. Both deci-
sions, revealed by Post reporter Glenn Schloss, have caused
concern, given Pyongyang's reputation for everything from drug-
running to supporting terrorism, and allegations that Iran has used
Hong Kong as a channel for arms shipments from China, includ-
ing parts for missile and fighter plane guidance systems, nerve-gas
technology and chemical weapons components. But, as in Beijing's
refusal to let the Pope visit the SAR, the local government has no
say in the matter, and the Tung administration remains character-
istically quiet.
224 Dealing With the Dracon
8 September
A postscript to the decline and fall of the Sally Aw empire, and
another sign of how nothing lasts for long in Hong Kong if it can
be turned into a property play. Li Ka-shing's Cheung Kong prop-
erty firm, which bought the Tiger Balm Gardens from Aw last
December, is proposing to put up high-rise luxury apartments on
what was one of Hong Kong's top tourist attractions a decade ago.
A small part of the old gardens will be kept as a theme park, with
its temples and grottos and demon statues. The rest will be covered
by a 700,000 square foot residential development. The gardens had
been losing their appeal to tourists in the face of more modern
attractions: last year only 8 per cent of visitors bothered to see
them.
11 September
Bill Clinton is wearing a good-ole-boy smile as he greets Jiang Zemin
at a Pacific summit meeting in New Zealand. For his part, the
Chinese President calls his American counterpart 'my good friend'
before handing him booklets in Chinese and English setting out the
evils of the Falun Gong. Officials say relations between Washington
and Beijing are back on track. Jiang speaks of a strategic partnership.
Clinton reiterates support for China's membership of the World Trade
Organisation. On the diplomatic front, Beijing's approval of a new US
ambassador is taken as a sign that the deep freeze in relations after the
Belgrade embassy bombing is thawing.
Still, you have to ask how much has really changed. The two pres-
idents clash on Taiwan. Pro-democracy activists are still being locked
up in China. And as for the strategic partnership, Jiang keeps inveigh-
ing against Washington for seeking to create a 'unipolar world' over
which it will hold sway. Last month, he attended a meeting in Central
Asia at which he exchanged bear hugs with Boris Yeltsin despite his
dim view of the way Russia has gone since the fall of communism.
China is to buy thirty Russian jet fighters. The Russian and Chinese
leaders are said to have agreed that Yeltsin will try to stop Nato
September 225
moving further eastwards while Jiang will attempt to prevent the
formation of an 'Asian Nato' based on strengthened defence agree-
ments between Japan and the US. China is also busy developing
relations with oil-rich nations in Central Asia to assure itself of energy
supplies, and to try to counter the spread of fundamentalism across its
western borders. Jiang is about to pay visits to South-East Asia and
Europe. China is, clearly, stepping out on the world stage, and is not
going to depend on US approval.
12 September
Margaret Ng, the legal constituency representative in the Legislative
Council and the hammer of the Secretary for Justice, is turned back
at Hong Kong airport when she tries to fly to Beijing to attend a legal
conference there. She put her name down for the meeting last month,
but the airline has been shilly-shallying all week about confirming her
flight. Today, arriving at the Dragonair counter in her black legal
suit, white shirt and pearls, she is told that her visa has been revoked.
The mainland frontier police have sent word that she will not be
allowed in. As usual in visa-refusal cases, no reason is given. Ng holds
a British passport, but that does not help her.
Around thirty other pro-democracy figures have been barred in the
past. Two were stopped from flying to Beijing to talk to mainland
authorities about the right of abode. In July, a Democratic legislator
had his permit to enter the mainland confiscated and was detained for
ninety minutes as he tried to cross the frontier for a weekend with his
wife and daughter. Ng's case seems to be the most serious to date. The
conference is not a political occasion. As well as sitting in the legis-
lature, Ng is a practising barrister and a member of the executive
committee of the Hong Kong Bar Association. Seventy other local
lawyers have had no trouble getting to Beijing, and there is no ques-
tion of the organisers having turned down Ng's application to
participate. It is not clear where the ban originated. One report says
that the State Security Bureau was in favour of allowing her in, but
that the Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office was against the idea
and carried the day.
226 Dealing With mm. Dragon
The decision raises obvious concern about Beijing's attitude
towards its Hong Kong critics. There are those who think that the
terrier-like Ng goes too far. But, under the Hong Kong system, she
has the right to say what she thinks, to table a no-confidence motion
against the Secretary for Justice or to lead a silent march against the
decision to go to the National People's Congress for a reinterpretation
of the Basic Law. A prominent American expert, Joseph Cohen of
New York University, who backs the reference to the NPC, says he
considered not giving his speech at the conference to protest at the
banning of Ng. The Bar Association calls on the government to 'allay
any fear that might arise that people in Hong Kong cannot express an
opinion on a rule of law issue without fear of attracting some adverse
reaction from the central or the Hong Kong SAR governments'.
On the other hand, a local NPC deputy says he thinks the problem
is Ng's 'overall political stance'. The pro-Beijing newspaper, Ta Kung
Pao, goes further. 'Those who hold different views and those who have
acted to oppose "one country, two systems" and undermine the rule
of law in the SAR are different in nature,' it writes. As Professor
Cohen observes, however, a good application of one country, two
systems would be to allow those who have been blacklisted by main-
land immigration to cross the border. The legislator herself wonders if
her case means 'the opening of a new phase of more naked and relent-
less attack on people like me. Once the kid glove is off, the rest will
follow' The episode casts an ironic light on the urgings of the Secretary
for Justice that people like Ng should get to know the mainland legal
system better: if they can't even get there, how can they gain a better
understanding of the way things are done over the border?
From the summit in New Zealand, the Chief Executive observes
blandly that travel arrangements to and from the mainland are at the
discretion of the Central Government, and have to be respected.
Tung Chee-hwa certainly has no reason to want to help Ng as a
politician. But as a citizen of the SAR, does she not have the right to
expect the government to go in to bat for her? The list of Hong Kong
people who find themselves without open official backing in matters
involving the mainland is growing all the time.
Evidently sensing the growing disquiet, Anson Chan telephones
September 227
Ng and then says publicly that she understands the concerns. She is
sure that Tung will pursue the case at the first opportunity after he
returns to Hong Kong. It is another case of the Chief Secretary step-
ping into the breach. But Ng says she is told by the Chief Executive's
office that he is 'too tired and too busy' to see her when he gets back.
She writes to him twice, but is told by the private secretary to the
Chief Executive's private secretary that he will not be available for at
least three weeks.
Matters are not improved when a mainland professor advises the
NPC that even though the Court of Final Appeal is entitled to inter-
pret sections of the Basic Law relating strictly to the SAR, 'this does
not mean that it has the final interpretation'. Indeed, he adds, China's
parliament has a duty to supervise Hong Kong courts, and to step in
if it considers a verdict not to be in accordance with what it takes to
have been the original intentions of the framers of the Basic Law. As
a judge says after hearing this: 'So, all that will be left for us is to do
what we are told.'
Amid all this, Anson Chan lines up to raise her glass with Tung in
front of a large heroic painting of Mao at the first of many celebrations
of China's impending national day. The Chief Secretary stands on one
side of the platform; Tung, the head of the Xinhua news agency and
Li Ka-shing on the other. The placing carries its own symbolism,
intended or otherwise.
14 September
Willy Lam, the Post's China editor, reports that Jiang Zemin has taken
over top-level responsibility for reform of state-owned enterprises
from Zhu Rongji. One of the President's long-time associates from
Shanghai, Wu Bangguo, will run the restructuring on a day-to-day
basis. Wu is likely to be less forceful than the Prime Minister. On a trip
to the provinces last week, he proclaimed that state enterprises were
actually doing rather well. In another move to divert power from Zhu,
a rising star in the government, Vice-Premier Wen Jiabao, is to look
after development of the stock market and regional development.
Willy Lam's source says the Prime Minister is still in charge of
228 Dealing Wrni the Dragon
'macro-economic adjustments and controls'. But it looks like a big
setback after a dreadful year. First Clinton let him down on member-
ship of the World Trade Organisation. Then there was the bombing
of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, and the row over allegations
about nuclear spying in the United States. All the while, deflation at
home sapped the zeal for reform. Zhu can bang heads in the state
sector till the cows come home. He can crusade against corruption,
and announce plans to slash the ranks of the bureaucracy. He can
receive the plaudits of the world for not revaluing the yuan. What he
cannot do is to make Chinese consumers spend to provide the growth
the regime so badly needs - or prevent booming harvests lowering the
price of agricultural goods on the market.
How different from five years ago, when retail sales were rising by
30 per cent a year, and iron man Zhu was called in to clamp down on
inflation. Once, consumer goods were such a novelty that nobody
who could afford them cared too much about the price. Now the
novelty has worn off and people shop around for bargains. Prices
have fallen for two years, creating the belief that they will go down
even further. The Chinese are also hoarding for the day when their
iron rice bowl cracks, and they have to pay for services they used to
get for free.
So the economy remains bogged down, and the inventories in
warehouses build up. The number of unsold television sets was put at
15 million earlier in the year. In the boom city of Shenzhen, big
household appliance stores are virtually empty. Signs proclaim the
bargains on offer. A saleswoman tries to interest me in a video
recorder. When I shake my head, she points hopefully towards a
washing machine.
After cutting interest rates seven times in three years, the Central
Government is now about to slap a special tax on earnings from bank
deposits to try to dissuade saving. There is even an ironic suggestion
that the best way out would be to create a scare about an impending
currency devaluation: fearing higher prices as a result, people would
start buying.
The Asian Development Bank forecasts growth will fall below the
target of 7 to 8 per cent this year, and drop to 6 per cent next year,
September 229
when it expects the trade surplus to be cut in half. Meanwhile, the
huge problem of the black hole in lending looms over the financial
system. Although the head of the Central Bank spent a lot of time in
an interview drawing distinctions between really terrible and less
awful debts, the bottom line is that 25 per cent of loans are non-per-
forming, and many more are questionable.
On top of which, the Prime Minister's policies are being criticised
for their internal contradictions. Reduce corruption, and you reduce
spending by the corrupt, which feeds deflation. Cut the civil service,
and you cut the spending power of bureaucrats. Ban time-wasting
banquets paid for from public funds, and you reduce the earnings of
restaurants and hotels.
Zhu has always appeared as a solitary figure without any power base
other than his own policies. Now his isolation seems to be growing.
One of his business proteges, who ran a go-ahead company called
China Everbright, has been sacked. Rumours that the Prime Minister
had himself offered to resign swept through the markets in the
summer. Stories are doing the rounds that he has been ill, and had to
go to a provincial city to recuperate during the summer. Zhu-watch-
ers note that on a recent trip to the provinces, he restricted himself to
talking about such general subjects as the environment, with no more
of his 'kill, kill, kill' exhortations. His wife accompanied him, which
is unusual. She was photographed with him, gazing up at trees by the
Yangtze River. This, the watchers say, is a sign that she needs to be
close by her husband because of his poor health.
Jiang must know, however, that his increasingly cherished place
in history alongside Mao and Deng can only be achieved as a
reformer. That means he needs Zhu, however many protective
measures he may take on a temporary basis to placate the conserv-
atives. So when the President returned from the Pacific summit in
New Zealand this week, the official state photographic agency put
out a colour shot of him and the Prime Minister in smart dark suits,
white shirts and pale ties, shaking hands as if to tell everybody that
they are as one.
Still, sources in Beijing say Jiang has singled out Vice-President Hu
Jintao, whom he sent to attend the second anniversary celebrations of
230 Dealing With the Dragon
the SAR in July, as the coming man. Hu, trained as an engineer, made
his mark when he was dispatched to help run affairs in Tibet. After
holding a series of senior positions in Beijing from 1992 onwards, he
became Vice-President last year. As befits a Jiang lieutenant, he looks
more of an apparatchik than a man with clear policy views of his own.
He has taken a significant step up the ladder by being appointed
Vice-Chairman of the Central Military Commission, which Jiang
heads. Hu is also reported to be acting as a mediator between Zhu and
his conservative predecessor, Li Peng. At the same time, the propa-
ganda department has told the media that coverage of fifty years of
Communist rule should not let the achievements of the past two
decades 'refute' the first thirty years under Mao. Editors have been
instructed to mention the 'vigorous development' of the 1960s,
notably China's atom bomb and long-range rockets.
This is all part of Jiang's characteristic spider's web, with himself sit-
ting in the middle, minimising the risks and holding the strands. At a
Central Committee meeting, for instance, he speaks the language of
reform, but the communique notes the need to maintain 'dominant'
state control over major industries. The constitution bars the President
from serving a third term, so one line of speculation is that Jiang will
hand over to Hu Jintao when his mandate ends in 2003 but will try to
hang on to his command of the Communist Party for another five
years. That prospect arouses opposition from both the more liberal
and the hardline conservative factions. But the slogans about Jiang
being at 'the core' of the leadership carry with them an implication
that, whoever holds the presidency, the 'chief engineer' will remain at
the heart of the regime. It is against such a background of personal
ambition and scheming that the autumn and winter will be played
out, with all the consequences this brings, not only for the mainland
but also for the administrative region down south and for the wider
relationship between China and the world.
15 September
A star of Hong Kong's boom years is stepping down. Having lost his
own firm, Peregrine, a couple of years ago, Philip Tose is leaving the
September 231
American investment company, Templeton, where he found employ-
ment after the crash. At its height, Peregrine was a glamour finance
house, working with Li Ka-shing and pioneering the floating of
mainland 'red chip' companies on the local stock market. A dapper
former racing driver with a glamorous wife and appropriate lifestyle,
Tose appeared in the company portrait beside a big golden sculpture
of the bird that gave his firm its name. He was a tough, fast operator
who didn't like my newspaper at all. Twice he went after us for sto-
ries he insisted were libellous, once screaming so loudly on the
telephone to a reporter that you could hear his voice from yards away.
In each case, Peregrine failed to sustain its complaint, but left us with
legal bills.
At one point after the economic crisis had broken, we held a lunch
with Tose and his senior colleagues to get their views. They served up
nothing but gloom and doom. Eventually I asked if there was any-
where that one could invest one's grandmother's savings in the region.
A Korean-American called Andre Lee to whom Tose had bounced
many of our questions said yes, there was a taxi company in Indonesia
called Steady Safe, a good business with connections to the ruling
Suharto regime and plenty of potential. At that, Lee got up to go to
the airport, and the lunch broke up.
A bit later, Steady Safe turned into a US$250 million black hole. In
October 1997, Peregrine ran newspaper advertisements denying
rumours of potential losses. In December, Tose assured shareholders
that 'the directors were not aware of any material adverse changes in the
financial or trading position of the group'. But after a deal with a big
insurance company fell through at the last moment, Peregrine collapsed.
Tose went to work for Templeton, which had held 10 per cent of
his company. Minority shareholders began legal action against
Peregrine over the reassuring statements issued before it crashed. The
government hired a former member of Britain's Financial Services
Authority to investigate the collapse.
I bumped into Tose recently at the opening of a Louis Vuitton shop
in Central. He looked pale and was positively restrained compared to
his bullish days; he even laughed thinly when I said that, given the
legal bills we had to pay from Peregrine's litigation, the paper should
232 Di-aiinc; Willi mi. Dracon
be listed among the firm's creditors. Andre Lee is punting an Internet
company in Korea. Other Peregrine executives are scattered round the
financial world. Nobody is burdened with self-doubt. That is not the
Hong Kong way, which is one strong reason why it bounces back so
quickly from adversity.
1 6 September
The worst typhoon for sixteen years, called 'York', hits Hong Kong.
The sky grows dark; debris flies through the streets; flat-owners batten
down their balconies, scaffolding comes crashing down. There is
widespread flooding. Four cargo ships sink or run aground. A hun-
dred windows are punched out at immigration and tax headquarters,
but officials insist there are no confidential papers among the docu-
ments blown out on to the street. Four thousands trees are uprooted.
More than 14,000 homes lose electricity. Thousands of container
trucks back up at the port terminals. Two hundred fish farms report
serious damage. Yachts are overturned and washed up on to the shores
of marinas. Schools shut, but the airport stays open; however, after the
China Airlines crash last month, operators cancel all scheduled flights.
A few crazy windsurfers go out for the thrill, and one doesn't come
back. Plucky villagers in the New Territories refuse to leave their
homes; one old woman dons a construction worker's hard hat to sit it
out in her home.
The cost will be tens of millions of dollars. But apart from the
surfer, only one person is killed - a security guard hit by flying
debris - though nearly 500 are injured. By the next morning, most
things are back to normal. Vegetable and fish prices are up by 20 per
cent. If you want choi sum greens or kale, you pay double the usual
rate. Normal enough in a traders' town.
17 September
No sooner has York moved away than another storm touches Hong
Kong. The Taiwan Strait tension has spilled over on to us.
The idea of the SAR being attacked from Taiwan in the event of
September 233
conflict between the island and the mainland may seem outlandish.
But Hong Kong is part of the People's Republic now, and President
Lee Teng-hui warns that if there is a mainland attack on his island, the
consequences would be disastrous not just for Beijing and Shanghai -
but also for Hong Kong.
The People's Liberation Army troops stationed here have been put
on alert. Their commander says his men are 'ready in full battle array'
in case the city comes under attack. He tells the Post that the alert is
like a typhoon signal: 'it will go up according to the situation'.
Armoured personnel carriers have carried out target shooting exer-
cises with live ammunition, according to a mainland army newspaper.
The garrison consists of an infantry brigade and naval and air force
units which are said by the Liberation Army Daily to be able to fight a
'high-technology regional war'. They have half a dozen cruise mis-
siles, ship-to-ship missiles and shore-to-ship missiles. Their helicopters
conduct regular 'city patrols', and troops practise landing exercises
from them. General Xiong Ziren defines the priority for his men as
'ideological cultivation, the continuous strengthening of military skills,
the requirement of abiding by the law, and maintaining the brave and
majestic image of the army'. To celebrate its role, the garrison is
opening a museum devoted to itself. At the inauguration, Tung Chee-
hwa is photographed with his arm outstretched pointing a pistol at an
unseen target. China Daily says the museum aims 'to deepen Hong
Kong people's understanding of the motherland's military defence
forces and the role of the PLA in the SAR'. But visits are only by
prior arrangement.
The sparring across the Taiwan Strait has become sharper with
news that more than 100 PLA officers on the mainland are being
investigated on charges of spying for Taipei. A major-general from the
Logistics Department has been shot for selling secrets to Taiwan. The
conflict has also moved into cyberspace. Taipei says mainland hackers
have broken into government networks on the island. One report puts
the number of attacks at 72,000 in one month, of which only 165
were successful. Going the other way, hackers from Taiwan have got
into mainland tax and railway networks. According to the Liberty
Times newspaper, Taiwan's army has developed 1,000 viruses to use
234 Dealing With the Dracon
against the PLA if necessary. The Economist says the Pentagon reckons
two computer viruses which damaged mainland computers at a cost
of US$120 million originated from across the Strait.
China's former Foreign Minister, Qian Qichen, who remains an
influential figure in the mainland's dealings with Hong Kong, turns
the spotlight back to the SAR by warning the media here not to
advocate the Taiwanese cause. This is an issue which senior mainland
officials have raised from time to time in the past. As it happens, no
newspaper or broadcasting station in Hong Kong backs independence
for the island, but the Central Government cannot shed the fear of its
newest region becoming a seedbed for pro-Taiwanese sentiment, pro-
paganda and 'splittism'.
Naturally, the Tung administration is most anxious to avoid any
such thing happening. The Chief Executive periodically warns against
his domain turning into a base for anti-mainland subversion. Last year,
immigration officers began to stamp the travel documents of visitors
arriving from Taiwan with a warning that they should not embarrass
the SAR during their time here. Now a storm has been set off by the
appearance on Radio-Television Hong Kong (RTHK) public radio of
the island's de facto representative here who masquerades as the head of
its travel bureau, just as the mainland's representatives and controllers of
the underground Communist Party used to masquerade in colonial
days as members of a news agency.
In the broadcast, Taipei's man repeats the call by Lee Teng-hui for
'state-to-state' relations. This brings a rejoinder from the Hong Kong
government spokesman that he would do better to confine himself to
tourism matters, and a blast from a pro-Beijing politician that RTHK
should not give a platform to 'splittist views'. As for the Chief
Executive, he believes the activities of Taiwanese bodies here 'must be
regulated by Vice-Premier Qian Qichen's guidelines' since it is a
matter for Beijing, not the SAR.
That still leaves a large grey area as far as the media are concerned.
If reporting is okay but advocacy is not, where does the first end and
the second start? Editors here may make a clear distinction between
the news columns and the opinion pages. But for those brought up in
a system where the choice of stories and the placing of photographs
September 235
are political matters, the distinction may be less evident. The Post has
not been distributed on the mainland when it has run Lee Teng-hui's
picture on page one.
18 September
China Daily says 115,000 people have been arrested on bribery and
embezzlement charges since 1997. Over 3,000 of the corruption cases
involve sums equivalent to £75,000 or more. Nearly 12,000 smug-
gling cases have been brought to light this year.
This information appears in a story which leads with the case of
a senior official in the coastal city of Ningbo who has been expelled
for having helped his son and his wife in a series of illicit schemes
running to a billion yuan. Xu Yunhong, an alternate member of the
Communist Party's Central Committee, is the highest-ranking party
functionary to have been excluded since Beijing mayor Chen
Xitong. Ningbo, one of the original foreign Treaty Ports in the
nineteenth century, seems to be quite a den of thieves. Prosecutors
have also uncovered a multi-million-yuan racket there involving
forty local officials. An even bigger corruption ring is being probed
in Fujian province, elsewhere on the commercially driven eastern
coast, involving up to 200 people and takings of up to 10 billion
yuan.
In Shaanxi province, meanwhile, officers have made a pre-emptive
strike against the government's instruction to the army to get out of
business by turning PLA firms into private enterprises under their
control. They then used the firms to raise large amounts of money.
Some of this was funnelled into property development in China and
some was sent abroad illegally.
19 September
Today, an extraordinary general meeting of the Democrat Party lead-
ership in Hong Kong votes on whether to back the introduction of a
minimum wage. In the past, such an idea would have run contrary to
the Hong Kong tradition. But the economic crisis has changed that,
236 Dealing With the Dracon
and makes the debate a test of strength in the SAR's most popular
political party.
The Young Turks who want the Democrats to take a more radical
stance and shed their middle-class inhibitions see a minimum wage as
both necessary and a vote-winner. They lose, but only by 114 to 94.
They will be back. They say the party's mainstream group is trying to
suppress them in 'June 4 Massacre' fashion. It is not a comparison
Martin Lee can relish.
21 September
A huge earthquake kills nearly 2,500 people in Taiwan. More than a
thousand buildings collapse, some toppling over intact on their sides.
Some had been built by contractors who stuffed 'torn' walls with
empty plastic bottles and newspapers instead of concrete and bricks.
Ninety per cent of electricity supplies are cut off. Corpses rot in the
heat. The prices of high-tech electronic components rise inter-
nationally as factories in Taiwan stop working. Manufacturers
elsewhere in Asia rush to gear up extra production.
International aid teams fly in from round the world. Hong Kong's
contribution is an unhappy one. Its sixteen-man rescue team takes
three days to make the hour-long journey to Taipei. When it arrives,
it is told it is not needed; and its equipment is not what is required.
Why did it take so long to be mobilised? Was it simply a matter of
bureaucratic delay or was there some political hesitation given the
state of cross-Strait relations?
When it comes to the mainland, those relations intrude with a
vengeance. China offers aid. President Jiang Zemin says the people on
either side of the Taiwan Strait are 'as close as flesh and blood'. But
Beijing also instructs overseas Red Cross bodies to notify it before
sending aid to the island. Taiwan says this holds up desperately needed
help. China then takes it upon itself to thank foreigners for their
assistance on Taipei's behalf, and compounds matters by asking the
Taiwanese if they want the mainland to petition the United Nations,
whose Secretary-General offers condolences to the people of 'the
Taiwan Province of China'.
September 237
The Foreign Ministry in Beijing says that, however great its sym-
pathy for the victims, the disaster will not lessen its hostility to Lee
Teng-hui and his 'two states' policy. For its part, Taiwan insists that all
it will accept from the mainland is financial help, not medical staff. Its
message to the Chinese Red Cross is short and simple: 'Thank you.
Please pass this on: "Don't bother." '
22 September
A meeting takes place at the United Nations in New York which
many people in Hong Kong would have wagered against seeing. On
one side of a gleaming table sit China's Foreign Minister, Tang
Jiaxuan, and his staff. On the other side are three senior officials from
Europe. One of them is the new Foreign Affairs Commissioner of the
European Commission, Chris Patten.
The photographs of the encounter show the former Governor
grinning as the Foreign Minister sits back and looks at him with a
half-smile. They are discussing reopening discussions on China's
membership of the World Trade Organisation, which the European
Union has always been anxious should not become a purely American
concern. The meeting ends with expressions of optimism that the
black period after the Belgrade embassy bombing is past. Unlike the
time he wore a tie with dinosaurs on it to show what he thought of
the Chinese rulers, Patten sports red neckwear.
But the Foreign Minister shows some things haven't changed.
While Patten hopes China will move forward on human rights,
Tang says that putting human rights above sovereignty is a hege-
monistic ploy amounting to 'a new interventionism'. Addressing
the General Assembly later, he insists that any violation of the prin-
ciples of sovereignty and non-interference would amount to a
'gunboat policy' which would endanger international peace and
stability. President Jiang may be out to cut an international figure for
himself and his country, but Beijing will go on locking up dissidents
and keeping its tight grip on Tibet or Xingjiang for as long as it sees
fit.
238 Dealing With the Dragon
23 September
The economic recovery is further confirmed when the International
Monetary Fund predicts that Hong Kong wiD grow by 1.2 per cent in
1999 and 3.6 per cent next year. The SAR is on its way to posting its
first monthly trade surplus since the beginning of 1998. As officials
keep reminding us, it is early days yet, but the figures are pointing the
right way. The question is when the feel-better factor will percolate
through to a population shaken by the first recession most of them
have known, and the first interruption of a prosperity which many
thought was inviolable.
24 September
Tung Chee-hwa does a U-turn and agrees to see the lawyer-politician
Margaret Ng about the ban on her going to the mainland. His deci-
sion comes as 162 lawyers and legal academics send him an open
letter describing the barring as 'a blatant example of political perse-
cution and the Central Government's intolerance of dissenting voices'.
The letter urges the Chief Executive to dispel fears that legitimate and
lawful activity in Hong Kong could bring political retaliation from
Beijing.
Not that the meeting does much good. Tung issues a statement
afterwards saying that he told the legislator that Hong Kong was a
pluralistic society, and that the government 'welcomes different opin-
ions on issues of common concern'. He adds that he is committed to
safeguarding rights and freedoms contained in the Basic Law. As for
the point at issue, he says that the authorities in Beijing have given
him to understand that the decision 'was made in accordance with
mainland laws'.
Ng says Tung told her that he believed the ban was not connected
with her opposition to the overturning of the Court of Final Appeal's
verdict. So why was she kept out? 'I got the impression . . . that he
rather thought I should re-examine myself as to whether I could
become a different person,' she adds. 'I found that rather chilling' - an
echo of the Cultural Revolution, when people were not told why
September 239
they were being punished but were advised to reflect on their crimes
themselves.
25 September
An interesting insight into the administration's standards of represen-
tativity. The SAR is sending a 200-strong delegation to Beijing for
China's national day on 1 October. A list of names has gone to the
central authorities for a decision on who should be included. The
Secretary for Justice says those on the list were chosen 'not because of
their political affiliation but [according to] whether they are repre-
sentative of the Hong Kong community'. Many of them sat on the
committees set up by Beijing to dismantle Patten's democratic
reforms. Among nineteen current legislators invited, there are no
pro-democracy politicians. Democrats who came out even before
the Joint Declaration of 1984 in favour of China regaining sover-
eignty do not get a look-in. But locals who accepted knighthoods
from Britain and cosied up to the colonial establishment are there as
'instant noodle patriots' who changed tack as 1997 loomed.
Naturally, the biggest single group in the party comes from business.
Several of the Chief Executive's personal favourites are along for the
ride. So is a representative of Jardines, which moved its domicile from
Hong Kong in late colonial days and has not returned. The British law
officer who played a leading role in the over-ruling of the Court of
Final Appeal is invited. Whatever sophistry may be employed, it is hard
to maintain that they are more representative of the community than
politicians who win 70 per cent of the popular vote.
Though there are eighteen members of the media, including my suc-
cessor as editor of the Post, neither of the two biggest-circulation
Chinese-language newspapers is represented. Nor is the Director of
Radio-Television Hong Kong among the ten broadcasting figures in the
group, who include the chairman of Rupert Murdoch's Phoenix satel-
lite channel. It's like the heads of commercial broadcasting organisations
in Britain being invited to join an official delegation, and the Director-
General of the BBC being absent. The speculation is that RTHK's
recent decision to allow the Taiwanese de facto representative to defend
240 Dealing With the Dragon
Lee Teng-hui's 'state-to-state' policy on the airwaves has made it persona
non grata. Whether Beijing would actually have said anything on this
score is beside the point. Tung Chee-hwa's self-defence mechanism is
tuned finely enough to avoid any prospect of a gaffe.
28 September
Five hundred company bosses, mainly from the United States, fly
into Shanghai for Fortune magazine's conference of chief executive
officers of major world companies. Fleets of locally made Buicks
meet them at the new airport and whisk them to the smart new
hotels of the Pudong business district along streets decked with red
lanterns. In the £50 million conference centre, Jiang Zemin gives
a twenty-minute address, saying Chinese enterprises 'must go out
and temper themselves in the winds and storms of economic glo-
balisation'. He stoutly defends China's human rights record, and
says Beijing will not renounce the use of force over Taiwan —
unconfirmed reports say the State Council has set aside funds to
build two aircraft carriers to match the US Seventh Fleet in the
Strait.
That does not stop this being a gathering of China bulls. 'I love
China and I love the Chinese people,' proclaims one long-term
enthusiast, Maurice Greenberg, of the insurance giant American
International Group. But the backdrop is hardly encouraging. A
report by the State Taxation Administration shows that only one-third
of mainland enterprises with foreign investors reported profits in 1998,
a drop of 5.5 per cent on the previous year. On government orders, a
telecommunications group, China Unicom, has cancelled contracts
with 40 foreign firms amounting to US$1.4 billion. Power contracts
have been renounced because demand is too low to fund the pay-
ments due to the foreigners. Even Western consumer goods
companies which have marched in like Protestant missionaries of the
past bearing brand names instead of bibles may be given pause for
thought by a Gallup poll showing the Chinese prefer domestic brands
by a margin of four to one.
Ma Yu, a senior research fellow at the Academy of International
September 241
Trade and Economic Co-operation, worries about the 'severe chal-
lenge' of keeping up the inflow of funds which have gone to more
than 150,000 enterprises, creating jobs for over 20 million people and
importing much-needed technology and equipment - as well as pro-
viding a fast-growing source of tax revenue. Now, he calculates,
contracts for overseas investments have fallen by 20 per cent in the first
half of the year compared with 1998.
Speak to many on-the-ground managers of foreign investments in
China and you will hear a litany of the problems of operating joint
ventures, from simple red tape to outright fraud. Products are ripped
off by Chinese partners. Lucrative sub-contracts are handed out to
friends and relations. One overseas Chinese I know had a promising-
looking agreement to build warehouses in a development zone. But
his partners in the local city authorities did not link an agreed road to
the site, so the warehouses remained empty. Eventually he sold his
share to locals with friends in high places, after which the road mate-
rialised and the warehouses were in business. 'Officials have made it
clear that China now has no shortage of every type of fraud imagin-
able: distribution fraud, bank fraud, forex fraud, tax fraud, customs
fraud, letter of credit fraud, intellectual property fraud, grey market
and parallel import scams,' the chief mainland representative of the
investigators Kroll Associates writes in the Wall Street Journal. 'There
is hardly a significant foreign company in China that has not been the
victim of one of these types of fraud.'
It is not only individual companies that suffer. Singapore has just
had a nasty surprise over a business park in which it invested heavily
in Suzhou near Shanghai. The foreigners thought they were assured of
President Jiang's personal backing, but the local authorities favoured a
development of their own, and undermined the Singapore project,
which has virtually collapsed. Probably with that in mind, the city
state's Senior Minister, Lee Kuan Yew, takes to the platform at the
Shanghai meeting to warn that unless the Chinese system can adjust,
its legitimacy will be brought into question. 'The most pernicious
problem of all is corruption that has become embedded in the admin-
istrative culture; hard to eradicate,' he adds. 'Not only will corruption
severely impede economic progress, but more dangerously it is a
242 Dealing Wiiii the Dragon
political powder keg, a grievance around which anti-government
sentiment can easily coalesce.'
There is an embarrassing reminder of mainland realities for the
organisers of the conference, Time Warner. Two of its magazines,
Time and Asiaweek, are banned from China as the meeting opens (so
is Newsweek). Apparently the authorities do not appreciate the way
their latest issues on the fiftieth anniversary of the Communist victory
include articles by the Dalai Lama and dissidents Wei Jingsheng and
Wang Dan, and accounts of prison camp life, the Great Famine and
the unrest in the Far West. The chairman of Time Warner seeks to
put a brave face on it. The company points out that its magazines are
still available in Shanghai, on the conference's own Internet site.
One of the chief executives at the meeting boasts that his firm is 'an
ambassador for China . . . much more effective than any diplomats'. He
counsels global media companies to be aware of 'the politics and atti-
tudes of the governments where we operate', such as in China.
Journalistic integrity must prevail in the final analysis, 'but that doesn't
mean that journalistic integrity should be exercised in a way that is
unnecessarily offensive to the countries in which you operate'. It all
depends what you mean by 'unnecessarily': Beijing's definition would
hardly be the same as that of a US editor. What lends the remarks spe-
cial resonance is that the speaker is Sumner Redstone, boss of the
entertainment group Viacom, which claims to reach 43 million homes
in China with its MTV music channel. Redstone's company hopes to
bring the Nickelodeon children's channel and a second music service to
China. It is also in the process of acquiring the CBS television network.
So, naturally the question arises of whether a Viacom-owned CBS
would follow the pattern set by Rupert Murdoch dropping Chris
Patten's book on Asia a couple of years ago for fear of offending
Beijing. Would CBS have to weigh up whether reports about dissi-
dents being jailed or the Falun Gong being oppressed or about the
jockeying for power below Jiang Zemin might give 'unnecessary'
offence? If a Hong Kong media-owner had made a statement like
Redstone's, the cry of self-censorship would have rung from the
rooftops. But such is the business sex appeal of American media mag-
nates that his remark evokes only passing attention.
October
i October
National day in China. Time for Jiang Zemin and a finely tuned
crowd of half a million to mark the fiftieth anniversary of the day on
which Mao Tse-tung stood on a dais looking out over Tiananmen
Square to proclaim the People's Republic of China. A giant portrait
of Jiang making a speech is borne through the streets of Beijing on top
of a lorry, setting him alongside Mao and Deng Xiaoping. In a gesture
of sartorial symbolism, Jiang is the only member of the leadership to
wear a Mao jacket at the ceremony. And he alone stands in the car
which drives past the troops drawn up for review - a very conscious
evocation of a celebrated one-man inspection by Deng at the last mil-
itary parade in Beijing back in 1984. As he passes the troops, he calls
out, 'Comrades, are you well?' and 'How hard you are working!'
They chant in unison, 'Hello, Comrade Chairman. We are serving
the people.'
The television commentaries go as far as to say that Jiang has
moved ahead of Deng and Mao in maintaining stability, achieving
economic growth, accelerating national unity, strengthening the
PLA and establishing an activist foreign policy. Still, there is one
obvious contrast to be noted. The classic painting of Mao address-
ing the crowd in 1949 depicts him in full oratorical flood, the
Great Helmsman urging his people on to a new dawn. The portrait
244 Dealing Wiiii the Dragon
of Jiang on top of the lorry shows him in a dark suit, white
shirt and red tie, holding a sheet of paper from which he is read-
ing a report to the microphones of the 1997 Communist Party
Congress.
Echoing the Soviet Union's parades in Red Square, China's mili-
tary might is wheeled out. There is a fresh generation of nuclear
missiles, a new fighter-bomber, surface-to-air rockets and recently
developed artillery. PLA soldiers goose-step past the reviewing stand,
followed by massed ranks of machine-pistol-bearing women from the
capital's civilian militia in red outfits with short skirts and black boots.
To make sure calls of nature do not interfere with the parade, some
of the paraders are kitted out with adult-sized nappies. After the
military, the civilians have their moment of glory. Children file by
bearing boards proclaiming, 'Our motherland will be more glorious
tomorrow.' Fashion models strut their stuff. Agricultural workers
march by got up to look like wheat or sunflowers. And there is a
bevy of brides and grooms in formal Western wedding gear. At the
end, more children rush towards Jiang releasing red balloons and
doves into the air.
One unnoticed sideshow takes place among the foreign guests.
After hosting the Fortune conference in Shanghai, the boss of the
Time Warner media empire, Gerald Levin, has travelled to the
Chinese capital with a number of fellow American businessmen.
Among them is Stephen Case of the Internet giant AOL. 'We stood
together watching the tanks, the planes, and the fireworks,' Case
recalls later. The next month, he telephones Levin to propose buying
Time Warner in the biggest-ever takeover. The Beijing backdrop to
the deal fits in neatly with China's new appreciation of the world of
business.
The fiftieth anniversary celebrations reflect the robotic attitude of
the leadership. Nothing spontaneous is permitted. The crowds are
carefully drilled. The intense rehearsals with tanks rolling through
Tiananmen Square conjure up chilling memories of 1989. The veneer
of the occasion extends to the city itself. Apart from a general clean-
up of buildings, a handful of Falun Gong adherents were dragged from
Tiananmen yesterday as they tried to perform their exercises. Three
October 245
hundred thousand unregistered workers have been cleared out of the
city, and 18,000 vagrants detained. Tens of thousands of trusted in-
habitants have been enrolled into neighbourhood watch squads,
complete with red armbands.
Despite all the refurbishment along the main avenues, it is going to
take a superhuman effort to turn Beijing into an attractive place.
There are still pleasant parks and some fine relics of another age. The
official guest houses and the leadership compound beside the
Forbidden City are extremely agreeable so long as you can put up
with the rhetoric served up by your hosts. In a pavilion by a lake,
attendants in white gloves serve French wine while the breeze ripples
through the trees and a minister discourses about the non-negotiability
of mainland sovereignty over Taiwan. In a courtyard complex reno-
vated by the Hong Kong businessman David Tang as the Beijing
version of his Hong Kong China Club, one may admire the architec-
ture and peer at the manuscripts on the shelves as an official from the
State Council tells you that a giant container ship being launched by
a Japanese firm is in fact a secret warship which can be converted into
an aircraft carrier at a moment's notice with planes hidden below
decks.
Some interesting alleys, lakes and gardens and small shops survive,
along with the Forbidden City. There is the overwhelming expanse of
Tiananmen Square, and, an hour's drive away, the Great Wall and the
Ming Tombs. But this is an imperial city that reflects the character of
its emperors, and the most recent breed has been more interested in
power and material progress than in preserving the past. Mao
destroyed much of its old character, tearing down historic districts,
rearranging the city to fit his vision of communist modernity and
installing smoke-belching factories. Fumes from a vast old-fashioned
steel plant to the south add to the exhaust of huge traffic jams. Rows
of featureless, shabby blocks of flats line the ever-expanding circles of
ring roads. The destruction of the old continues relentlessly. Social
and economic divisions grow wider by the year. Hordes of migrant
workers collect garbage as upwardly mobile Beijingers crowd into the
Hard Rock Cafe or take chauffeur-driven limos to play golf in the
surrounding hills.
246 Dealing With ihi. Dracon
2 October
Canadian newspapers are running a story about an operation that
'tracked a myriad of companies linked to Asian tycoons to determine
whether they were fronts for Chinese espionage activities'. The papers
report that the study, carried out by Canada's Security Intelligence
Service and the police between 1994 and 1996, also looked at 'hun-
dreds of thousands of dollars' said to have been pumped into political
parties to see if lawmakers were being influenced. As so often with
such reports, there was no answer to the question it posed. One
Canadian newspaper quoted sources as saying that 'political influence
nixed the project'. The story was picked up by international news
agencies and sent to Hong Kong, but no local paper used it despite -
or because of- the presence of so many well-known names.
4 October
A Hong Kong man called Eric Ho from Shatin in the New
Territories crossed the border to Shenzhen today. In a letter to the
Hong Kong Standard, he tells of what happened as he and three friends
walked back to the frontier train station at Lo Wu.
We were suddenly surrounded by six men claiming to be mainland
police. One of them showed his warrant card and said we were
involved in a gang fight in Shenzhen the previous night.
They demanded we go to a particular restaurant for an identity
parade. I was suspicious and we refused.
They shouted at us that they only wanted money and would stab
us to death if we did not go.
At a VIP room in the restaurant, they searched us and forced us to
tell them our credit card passwords. I was punched by one of them in
the chest.
Unfortunately, my password was not correct and one guy with a
northern Chinese accent hit me twice in the back with an iron
hammer. He asked me for the password again. I could only tell him
a possible one and let God decide my fate.
October 247
The robbers warned us that we would die if the password was still
wrong. My friend was also beaten. One of the men went out to
withdraw cash from my account.
A call was then received indicating that my bank password was
correct.
After the call, two robbers indicated that we would be released as
long as we had handed over all our money and belongings.
We handed over cash and mobile phones, and they let us go. We
got to Lo Wu train station about 11.30 p.m. We were in a hurry to
run to the Hong Kong side and report this brutal crime to the police.
We were told that our case was not unusual and that this sort of
thing happened frequently across the border.
We were very lucky to have escaped greater injury compared
with other cases.
The truth of that last sentence was shown a month later. A press
photographer and a reporter who went across the border for a night
out met a nineteen-year-old girl in the street. She gave them her
pager number. They invited her to join them in a nightclub. She
turned up with a female friend. The two women took the men to a
flat in a village on the outskirts of town.
Waiting inside were three men with knives and iron bars. They
told the Hong Kongers to hand over their money and valuables.
When the photographer resisted, he was stabbed and left to bleed to
death. The reporter was tied up, and forced to give his bank code
number before the attackers fled with the two women. Two weeks
later, they were arrested in a city up the coast when the nineteen-
year-old's identity document was checked and found to be a fake.
They still had the credit cards and jewellery belonging to the dead
man.
6 October
Today is the Chief Executive's big day. Like British governors, he goes
to the Legislative Council to deliver his programme for the coming
twelve months in his Policy Address. This is Hong Kong's equivalent
248 Dealing With mm. Dragon
to the Queen's Speech. Chris Patten's final address was notable for set-
ting down a set of benchmarks by which the SAR was to be judged.
The colonialist overtones of this rubbed some democrats up the
wrong way and the Council refused to pass the traditional vote of
thanks. Not that this made any difference: what might be a resignation
matter elsewhere, or at least cause for embarrassment, cuts little ice in
executive-led Hong Kong, then or now.
As expected, Tung Chee-hwa sets out an environmental pro-
gramme as his main theme. Having campaigned in the Post for
four years for effective measures against pollution, I can only say
that it is about time. Apart from the high health costs of bad air,
businesses have become increasingly concerned at the deterrent
effect on foreign executives they want to hire. There is a distinct
illogicality in promoting Hong Kong as an attractive tourist centre
while letting the environment deteriorate so badly. Tung's ten-year
programme involves spending the equivalent of £2.5 billion. The
target is to raise air quality to the levels of London and New York.
The import of diesel cars is to stop; owners of polluting diesel
vehicles — mainly taxis and minibuses — will get financial incentives
to fit cleaner engines; smoky vehicles are to face higher fines; there
will be more pedestrian zones; cross-border co-operation is to be
expanded; and work will start on improving the water of the Pearl
River.
Tung's 142-minute speech also puts forward proposals to improve
education, create sports and performance venues and enhance the
look of the harbour. He will set up an urban renewal body that would
be able to acquire old real estate and get it redeveloped without
having to pay the large premiums currently levied; this could have a
major effect on the property market and lead to the renovation of
jam-packed inner urban tenements where living conditions are
unworthy of a city as rich as Hong Kong. Looking across the border,
he wants to explore ways of tapping into the potential of the Pearl
River delta region.
Overall, the aim is to make the SAR into a 'world class city' and 'an
Ideal Home'. This would mean fostering pride and confidence in the
place, something the administration appears to consider achievable by
October 249
gauche slogans rather than by encouraging civil society to develop.
Improving the environment will certainly make Hong Kong a more
pleasant place in which to live and work. But if its people feel that
their home is losing its individuality as one country encroaches on
their system, all the cleaning up of the air will not make them walk tall
in the new century.
7 October
In an ideal world, the Chief Executive could expect his Policy Address
to dominate the agenda for a while. But twenty-four hours later, he
finds himself embroiled in a row with the Democrats on that most
sensitive of issues - the 4 June vigil for the dead of Tiananmen Square.
Tung has nobody but himself to blame. His taste for walking into
minefields is a source of wonder.
The incident starts as he appears in the Legislative Council today
for the traditional question-and-answer session after the Policy
Address. The chubby-faced vice-chairman of the Democrats, Albert
Ho, raises the matter of the mainland ban on various legislators,
including himself. He asks the Chief Executive if he feels he has a
duty to put their case to Beijing. Tung replies that he is 'very willing
to try in that respect'. Instead of stopping there, he can't refrain from
delivering a little lecture.
'I hope the Democratic Party and the democratic camp will
improve their understanding of the country,' he says. 'I have men-
tioned my hope that you can prove your worth in every respect, but
I've looked again and again and seen nothing.' When another
Democrat asks what Beijing is looking for, Tung digs himself deeper
into a hole. 'I haven't talked to Beijing leaders about the issue in this
way,' he says. 'But I've talked to several of your leaders and I specifi-
cally mentioned that I hoped there could be a demonstration . . . I'm
still waiting for that.' What does he mean by 'demonstration'? 'Perhaps
you should ask your colleagues,' Tung replies.
This enables Ho to reveal to reporters that the Chief Executive had
a secret lunch meeting earlier in the year with the veteran democracy
leader, Szeto Wah, the key figure in the Tiananmen vigil and in the
250 Dealing With the Dragon
Hong Kong Alliance in Support of Patriotic Democratic Movements
in China. According to Ho, Tung told Szeto the 4 June commem-
orations should be stopped if pro-democracy politicians wanted to
improve relations with Beijing. In particular, he asked Szeto not to
hold this year's tenth anniversary event.
The revelation sets all the old alarm bells ringing about freedom of
expression, and Tung's obeisant attitude towards those who chose
him for his post. 'If that is what he meant by proving our worth and
we did as he requested in return for permission to visit the mainland,
I think Hong Kong's reputation as one of the freest cities in the world
would be badly tarnished,' Ho says. In keeping with a recent pattern,
the Chief Secretary jumps in to try to pour some oil on the waters. 'I
am sure the Chief Executive does not mean to imply there ought to
be self-criticisms,' Anson Chan says. 'Improving relationships by
common definition is a two-way thing.'
But the Democrats have the bit between their teeth. The chance to
steal Tung's thunder a day after his speech is irresistible. They grab the
headlines. Which newspaper is going to rake over the details of the
environment programme when presented with a story that has it all:
secret contacts, freedom, kowtowing, and the most emotional event of
the year? Even then, Tung can't stop digging a hole for himself. He
insists he wasn't telling Szeto to stop the vigils, only repeating his
theme of it being time to put down the baggage of 4 June. But how
could the organisers of the vigil put down the baggage of the massacre
and go ahead with the commemoration?
The whole episode shows either a startling naivete or simple bull-
headedness on Tung's part. The idea of the austere, dedicated Szeto
Wah agreeing to stop the vigils in the hope of being allowed to visit
the mainland is laughable. The whole lunch must have been a major
exercise in non-communication. Szeto, who prides himself on his
patriotism to China, if not to its current regime, didn't even like the
Western food he was served.
The deeper danger of all this is that it will further worsen the
already frosty relations between the administration and the major
popularly elected political party. The Chief Executive's link-man with
the Democrats, Paul Yip Kwok-wah, says talks between them will go
October 251
on. He insists that the Tung-Szeto conversation was merely about
'conceptual and philosophical aspects of ruling Hong Kong'. But the
reaction from the Democrats is unyielding. Martin Lee says he guesses
Tung would like them to 'behave in such a way that the Beijing
leaders will believe we are obedient children'. This sums up the
administration's approach pretty well, but Hong Kong is not a place
that got where it is today by keeping its head down in class. The trou-
ble is that those who are running the class don't seem to realise this.
8 October
Apart from the alarm about being swamped by new mainland
migrants, there is already quite a problem in coping with the existing
influx of children from China, which averages sixty a day. A survey by
the Education Department reports that between 15 and 20 per cent of
these children are behind in mathematics and Chinese. The figure
soars to 60 per cent where English is concerned. The government
offers grants for sixty hours of tutoring for young immigrants. But as
the principal of a school with one-third of its pupils from the main-
land says: 'How can a student from a rural school who doesn't even
know his ABC catch up with the rest of the class in sixty hours?'
10 October
Today is the eighty-eighth anniversary of the overthrow of China's
imperial dynasty. The Double Tenth, as it is known, is a day of cele-
bration in Taiwan, though this year's ceremonies have been truncated
because of the earthquake. In Hong Kong, 200 people go to a former
Kuomintang centre to pay their respects to the father of republican
China, Sun Yat-sen, and 1,300 gather in a hotel to mark the occasion.
In the Mongkok district in Kowloon, police take down a Taiwanese
flag in the street. A spokeswoman says this is 'to protect the principle
of one China'. The Chief Executive's special adviser adds that the
decision is following the guidelines for relations with Taiwan set out
by Vice-Premier Qian Qichen. Before the handover, hundreds of
Taiwanese flags flew on the Double Tenth, but now one China rules.
252 Dealing Wiih the Dragon
i i October
A mainland newspaper reports that a vice-mayor in Guangdong
province has been tried for siphoning off the equivalent of ^800,000
to buy Hong Kong and Macau properties. He must have invested well
as he more than doubled his money — which does not save him from
a suspended death sentence.
13 October
Despite urgings from both the Democrats and the pro-Beijing DAB
party, which increasingly fancies its chances at the polls, the Secretary
for Constitutional Affairs makes it plain that there will be no speeding-
up of the long march towards full democracy, which will be
considered - no more - in the year 2007. It is all a bit reminiscent of the
verdict of a spokesman for the foreign Treaty Ports in China in the
1920s, who declared that elected assemblies and democratic institutions
had no place because the Chinese were 'manifestly incapable of self-
government'. Then it was the foreigners who delivered such verdicts;
now it is the masters of China and their chosen officials in Hong Kong
who do so, maintaining that one of Asia's most advanced societies will
not be sufficiently mature to face the issue for another eight years.
Inevitably, there are some sour comparisons with what is happen-
ing in Indonesia. There, to general acclaim, parliamentary elections
have been held, East Timor has been able to vote on its future and a
president will soon be chosen by the new legislature. Apparently the
rulers of Hong Kong regard their people as being politically less
mature than the inhabitants of Java, Sumatra or Timor. Nor is there
any mechanism for amending the Basic Law drawn up at a time when
politics in Hong Kong were in their infancy, the memory of
Tiananmen Square was fresh in China's mind and democracy had
not begun to unfurl itself over South-East Asia. The SAR is stuck in
a time warp. This may be a source of comfort for both Beijing and the
Chief Executive, but one can only agree with the legislator Christine
Loh when she asks if Tung takes the people of the SAR and their rep-
resentatives for simpletons.
October 253
19 October
A prominent pro-Beijing politician began to raise complaints eighteen
months ago about the way the government was being criticised on the
SAR's public broadcaster, Radio-Television Hong Kong (RTHK).
He said at the time that the Chief Executive assured him the matter
would be handled 'slowly, slowly'. Today, the slow movement goes
into overdrive. An announcement is made that the Director of
Broadcasting for the past thirteen years, Cheung Man-yee, is to leave
the station to become Hong Kong's trade representative in Tokyo.
The government insists there is nothing political in the move. It is
indeed true that the Tokyo post carries with it a higher ranking,
taking her annual salary to the equivalent of ^162,000. The Director,
who is in Northern Ireland visiting one of her predecessors from
British days, says she has been assured editorial independence will
continue. The Chief Executive declares that this is fundamental gov-
ernment policy. Cheung's deputy will be appointed to succeed her as
soon as the appropriate boards can meet.
Why then does the New York Times run a big story, and the
Committee to Protect Journalists in New York call on the Chief
Executive to act quickly to allay fears about the station being com-
promised? It is not just that Cheung Man-yee is a high-profile,
popular figure whose looks belie her fifty-three years and who was
part of the formidable 'handbag gang' round Anson Chan. After the
handover, she came to personify media independence in a way that
was all the more striking because of RTHK's status. A framework
agreement with the government drawn up in 1993 gives its Director
responsibility for fair, balanced and objective programming — editor-
ial independence was added two years later. But its employees, up to
the Director, are all civil servants.
Not surprisingly, hardliners in the pro-Beijing camp have long dis-
liked the way that these government staff give air time to democrats
and to critics of the administration. They wonder why RTHK is not
whipped into line, shedding its BBC inheritance as the baggage of
colonialism. In March last year, an old leftist called Xu Simin kicked
up a storm by attacking the station for being anti-government and a
254 Dealing Wiiii 1111 Dracon
'remnant of British rule'. Recently, pressure has been building up. In
August, a Hong Kong member of the National People's Congress
called for RTHK to avoid propagating 'splittist' views. Soon after-
wards came the appearance of Taiwan's representative to put forward
his government's 'state-to-state' view of relations with the mainland.
After that, the local NPC delegate suggested it might be time to
bring in anti-subversion legislation. As for Tung Chee-hwa, well-
placed sources say he was irked by the extensive RTHK coverage of
the 4 June Tiananmen vigil. It was also noticed that he took two years
to accept an invitation to appear on RTHK radio to answer listeners'
questions; he did a similar programme for a commercial station eight
months earlier. And Cheung Man-yee was not among the guests at
the national day celebrations in Beijing.
All the while, Tung and his colleagues were passing on the criticism
they heard to the station, and suggesting new jobs for its Director.
Cheung turned them down, and seemed intent on seeing out the last
two years of her term. Apparently she counted on a combination of
her own status and reputation, her long-standing association with
Anson Chan, and an awareness of the negative reaction at home and
abroad if she was seen to have been pushed out. But now she has
clearly accepted a deal, if only to ensure that her deputy succeeds her.
She remains a civil servant and so cannot speak out, even if she wishes
to. Politics apart, some wonder if the days of old-style BBC rectitude
are numbered, as broadcast sensationalism and show business march
forward hand in hand. A Chinese-language television station has just
taken on a former Miss Hong Kong with no journalistic experience
to present its main evening news programme.
There is talk of Cheung having been sent into 'internal exile'.
Martin Lee declares 'the beginning of the end of freedom of expres-
sion'. To which the leftist Xu Simin, who started the row in 1998,
expresses his hope that the station will now transmit 'constructive
opinions' about the government. 'It should assist the SAR govern-
ment and Hong Kong people, but has not done that,' he adds. 'There
is an end to every banquet.' For RTHK, the proof will he in what it
puts out. Sudden changes are unlikely. The new boss is a good man,
and a broadcasting professional. But will his reporters now think
October 255
twice before asking piercing questions, and will producers find them-
selves forgetting to invite troublemakers on to the airwaves?
20 October
A story in the New York Times spotlights the price of following your
religious beliefs in China if you happen to stray from the official path.
Seven weeks ago, a 37-year-old Christian called Gou Qinghui gave
birth to a son. She lost her job as a bible teacher at a government-
controlled theological seminary in 1994, and has been involved with
'house churches' consisting of Christians who meet privately instead
of joining officially approved religious organisations. The regime is
cracking down on them. An underground Catholic bishop was
arrested this summer. Seven Catholics have been jailed for threatening
social order.
Gou's husband is also a devout Christian and a pro-democracy
activist. In the mid-1990s, he was detained for three years; he now
lives in what the couple call 'soft imprisonment' under police scrutiny
and deprived of the identification papers needed to get a job or to
travel. In April, when Gou was five months pregnant, police arrived
at her home with an arrest warrant, but her husband managed to dis-
suade them from taking her away.
Now, Gou tells Eric Eckholm of the New York Times that hospital
officials in Beijing are refusing to provide a birth certificate for her
seven-week-old son. That means the child cannot be registered, and
will not be eligible to go to school or, later, to get legal employment.
'He's an innocent victim,' Gou says. 'I'm not really a political
activist, I'm just interested in spreading the Gospel.'
21 October
The change in leadership at RTHK does nothing to prevent a half-
hour panel discussion on the station about the right to demonstrate
in the SAR, in which even pro-Beijing politicians come out in
favour of free expression in the streets. Generally, protests in the
SAR are small and well-behaved. Skirmishes on 1 October at the
256 Dealing Wiiii the Dragon
flag-raising ceremony for Chinese national day led to nothing more
than two slight injuries to the forces of law and order and the loss of
loudhailers confiscated from the demonstrators. Police, who meet the
organisers of rallies in advance to agree the guidelines and the plac-
ing of the protest, usually turn out in force. On 1 October, a site was
agreed 100 metres away from the ceremony. Around 100 police were
deployed for sixteen activists.
Hong Kong's champion demonstrator, a pigtailed Trotskyite who
single-handedly keeps the Che Guevara T-shirt tradition alive in this
temple of market capitalism, has had to work hard to get arrested. He
succeeded after standing up and shouting from the public gallery in
the Legislative Council. Even then, the court only gave him a sus-
pended sentence. So he went out for some more demonstrating and
may end up in jail as a result. When I joined him in a television dis-
cussion, he smiled and said, 'It's become a way of life.' A secretary
commented, 'He's like a little boy.'
The contrast between the freedom to demonstrate here and the
clampdown in democracies when Jiang Zemin goes visiting them is
ironic given the handover-era fears that freedom to protest would be
scaled back in the SAR. Even the firebrand legislator Emily Lau
admits that, in this respect, 'maybe we are a little bit better than the
United Kingdom'. The Assistant Commissioner who speaks for the
police on tonight's panel might surprise those who imagine that law
and order here has become a Chinese matter since 1997. His name is
Mike Dowie. He speaks with a broad Scottish accent.
22 October
The demonisation of Hong Kong as a front for mainland China is
racing ahead in Senate hearings in Washington on the Panama Canal.
Li Ka-shing, it appears, is a threat to US security. A quarter of a mil-
lion people have signed a petition delivered to Capitol Hill expressing
their disquiet.
The outrage runs as follows. Li's Hutchison Whampoa company
controls a firm called Panama Ports, which has beaten several
American companies to win fifty-year leases to run container ports at
October 257
either end of the canal when the US withdraws on 31 December. As
a result, Republicans are talking darkly about the waterway falling
under Beijing's influence.
Li Ka-shing's links with the mainland are no secret; he has just
opened a huge shopping plaza in the capital. From there, it is an easy
jump for some in Washington to see him as the front man for the
PLA. The Republican majority leader in the Senate, Trent Lott,
thunders that 'US Naval ships will be at the mercy of Chinese-con-
trolled pilots and could even be denied passage through the canal by
Hutchison, an arm of the People's Liberation Army' Ronald Reagan's
Defence Secretary, Caspar Weinberger, warns that China has acquired
a 'beachhead' in Panama, and calls for constant vigilance over the
activities of the Hong Kong firm. While Beijing doesn't interfere
with Hutchison on a daily basis, he adds, 'If there was something it
wanted to do, this company would not be able to survive without
doing just those things.' A former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, Admiral Thomas Moorer, says: 'My specific concern is that the
company is controlled by the communist Chinese. And they have vir-
tually accomplished, without a single shot being fired, a stronghold on
the Panama Canal.' Later, he predicts a China-US clash over the canal
which 'will need to be rectified with the blood of brave young sol-
diers, sailors and marines some day in the future'.
The smell of US domestic politics is in the air, with a Red Peril
scare as a convenient weapon. The presidential hopeful, Steve Forbes,
warns that 'having Chinese companies managing both ends of this
strategic chokepoint ... is simply unacceptable to American security'.
A Republican congressman, Dana Rohrabacher, intones: 'If we do
nothing, I can guarantee you that within a decade a communist
Chinese regime that hates democracy and sees America as its primary
enemy will dominate the tiny country of Panama and the Panama
Canal.'
Another undercurrent is that Panama recognises Taiwan, not
Beijing. The island's Evergreen group is also involved in the canal. But
the mainland is wooing Panama, and one can imagine the reaction if
this leads to diplomatic recognition. On top of which, sources not a
million miles from Hutchison note that Caspar Weinberger, who is
258 Dealing Wrui j hi. Dragon
chairman of Steve Forbes' eponymous family magazine, used to work
for the American company Bechtel, which failed to get the Panama
licences. Bechtel denies any continuing link with Weinberger. Still,
the suspicion in Hong Kong is that a touch of commercial sour grapes
may be at work.
Li Ka-shing calls it all 'a very, very funny story'. Imagine, he goes
on, that you owned an apartment at either end of the main tunnel
under Hong Kong harbour. 'Can people say you are controlling the
tunnel? How can we control the canal?' Anyway, he is on a roll,
Hutchison having just made US$14.5 billion from selling its stake in
the British mobile telephone operator, Orange, to Mannesmann of
Germany.
There is a footnote when a member of the Forbes family pays a
visit to Li. In the lift, he hands a copy of the latest issue of the maga-
zine to one of Superman's lieutenants. It contains a piece by
Weinberger raising questions about Hutchison and the canal. The
embarrassment is entirely on the Forbes side. Li is photographed smil-
ing even more widely than usual. With critics like that, who needs
friends?
23 October
Lok Yuk-shing, the 63-year-old man from Hong Kong held in jail in
China for 487 days without trial or being properly charged, is released
and flies home. In the summer he was moved from prison to a guest
house run by the Public Security Bureau where conditions were
better. His family have paid HK$50,ooo to gain his release, far less
than the $4 million demanded by the Inner Mongolia officials when
they went there to try to get him freed in the summer. Lok's former
company, whose debts were responsible for his arrest, says it will con-
sider reimbursing the family. But it declines any responsibility for
what happened to its former employee.
Over dinner in a Shanghainese restaurant in Central, Lok tells of his
months in handcuffs and leg chains in a cell with ten others on the
edge of the Gobi Desert. 'A fellow inmate who was a northern gang-
ster encouraged me to stay tough,' he adds. 'If I had given up or died
October 259
in jail, my name would never have been cleared. The SAR govern-
ment should speak up more for us.'
But the government, which said it would be 'inappropriate and
impossible' for it to intervene on his behalf, remains as unforthcoming
on the case as ever. 'We understand the mainland authorities acted in
accordance with mainland laws,' a spokesman says. The government
adds that it 'followed the case closely and related the family's requests
to the mainland authorities'. For his part, Lok doesn't know what, if
anything, the authorities here did to help him. Instead he says that if
it hadn't been for the Post's reporting and campaigning on his case, he
would still be in prison. 'Although the police didn't say anything
about it, the way they behaved showed me they knew that your news-
paper and later other media were reminding people about my
situation,' he adds.
As he returns and relaxes by looking after his plants and cooking,
Lok sounds a true Hong Kong note. Would he go back to the main-
land? asks our journalist Cynthia Wan, whose outstanding reporting
brought the case to public attention. 'It all depends if there are any
business opportunities there,' he replies. 'I'm not afraid to go back.'
Still, he needs a bladder operation as the result of the poor diet he was
fed in prison. To make sure the homecoming is not disturbed, his
family lights a fire in a metal container at the door of his apartment to
ward off bad luck and evil spirits.
The number of Hong Kong people detained on the mainland over
commercial matters is a matter of some dispute. The government put
it at forty-five earlier in the year, but now says twenty have been
released. Of the forty-five, it reports that twenty had been in custody
for more than six months. Other sources place the total as high as
eight-five. One woman says her husband has been locked up since
April in Henan province over a debt owed by his former company.
She says mainland authorities asked for $2 million in bail for his
release. The Hong Kong Inland Revenue threatened to slap a sur-
charge on her husband's unpaid tax bill, she adds.
The SAR Security Bureau says it is drawing up plans for ;i notifi-
cation system so that it will know when Hong Kong people are
arrested on the mainland. But will that enable it to do anything about
260 Dealing Wiih im. Dragon
their treatment, or to ensure that they are either charged or released
according to Chinese law? The answer seems evident from the
Bureau's insistence that the Hong Kong authorities cannot 'interfere
with the mainland's judiciary system and procedures under the prin-
ciple of one country, two systems' - even, it appears, when its citizens
are being treated in defiance of mainland law.
24 October
Dressed in a long blue raincoat, his head thrown back in a broad grin,
Jiang Zemin takes the blonde woman in front of him by the hand and
sweeps her into an impromptu dance. Her husband smiles. The accor-
dionist beside them concentrates on playing a local folk tune. The
assembled officials laugh, and Jiang's dancing partner expresses her
delight.
The scene is a small local museum near the country chateau of
President Jacques Chirac of France. Jiang is his weekend guest.
Arriving at the museum, the Chinese leader was presented with a
'China blue' accordion on which a few notes of a Chinese tune were
played before the accordionist went into the song that got the visitor
dancing with Bernadette Chirac. At a model farm later in the day,
Jiang feeds a lamb from a bottle, noting the warmth of the milk as he
does so. Clearly he is enjoying himself, though Chirac is attacked by
human rights groups for coddling a dictator.
Jiang is on a lengthy tour of Europe, North Africa and Saudi
Arabia. Many contracts are signed, or promised. The Chinese
President outlines his vision of a multi-polar world, and damns the
evils of the Falun Gong. At a state banquet in Lisbon, he sings a
Chinese song without musical accompaniment.
Before crossing to France Jiang had been in London, where he
stayed at Buckingham Palace and exchanged numerous toasts with
the Queen. They are the same age, but how much else they have in
common is a matter for doubt. The Economist remarked that: 'Britain
has to deal with the China that exists, not the China it would like to
exist. But does that really mean honouring Mr Jiang with a state
visit? . . . For once it makes you feel sorry for the Queen, for being
October 261
used in this way.' Heavy-handed policing to ensure that demon-
strators did not inconvenience the visitor went down badly, even if
they were taken for granted by the Chinese. 'For the past few days
the world has been treated to the bizarre spectacle of the British
police tearing the banners out of the hands of demonstrators who are
there, after all, to protest at the inability of the Chinese people to
stage just such demonstrations,' as the Daily Telegraph's Christopher
Lockwood noted.
The Chinese spokesman observed that Free Tibet demonstrators
in London had 'long noses', an observation roughly on a par with the
Duke of Edinburgh's remark on a visit to China about the natives'
slitty eyes. But this being a time when everybody wants to avoid any
unpleasantness with Beijing, nobody objected to the spokesman's
characterisation, or to his blaming British imperialism for problems
in Tibet. There was also royal controversy when the Prince of Wales
preferred a private dinner engagement to a banquet given by the
Chinese.
Still, the visit to Britain, like the rest of the trip, was counted a
success, another Jiang step on to the world stage. Yet he drew no
crowds. If Mao had gone to London or Paris, the streets would have
been lined with true believers or those who were appalled with the
carnage he had wreaked - or simply those who wanted to see a his-
toric figure. Jiang aspires to similar status but his constituency is
business-minded politicians. Though he insisted at one point in Paris
on the importance of maintaining communism, this tour is as good
a sign of the death of ideology as you could wish for - on both sides.
27 October
The Chief Executive can heave a sigh of relief. The Legislative
Council has passed the motion of thanks for his Policy Address. But
the vote is not quite as straightforward as government backers would
like to present it. The motion was passed due to the votes of repre-
sentatives of the functional constituencies and of the hand-picked
election committee. A big majority of members elected by popular
vote came out against it. No wonder the administration is so opposed
262 Dealing Wiih the Dragon
to any speeding-up of democratisation in Hong Kong. Much safer to
be able to count on the representatives of business and the pro-Beijing
lobby.
29 October
China can be very prickly over what it sees as interference in the
affairs of Hong Kong by other countries. Or it can be completely
laid-back. The degree of reaction depends a lot on who is talking.
The Chinese Foreign Ministry Commissioner in the SAR, who
used to be ambassador in London, is very het-up about a speech by
the new American Consul-General which included mild remarks
about democratisation, the rule of law and media freedom. This, says
the Commissioner's Office, against a background of deteriorating
relations with Washington, was inappropriate, irresponsible and unjus-
tifiable.
Earlier in the week, another speaker from a foreign government
told a dinner here that Hong Kong's political system should be
changed to give politicians running in elections responsibility for ful-
filling their campaign pledges. That would be the biggest upheaval
seen since the establishment of the SAR, requiring, as the speaker
said, an adaptation of the Basic Law.
Strangely enough, this speech drew no criticism from the Chinese,
though it could be seen as a plain interference in Hong Kong's inter-
nal affairs. But the second speaker was the Senior Minister of
Singapore, Lee Kuan Yew, whom the Chief Executive greatly admires.
One can only imagine the reaction if such remarks had been made by
the US Consul-General. It ain't what you say, it's the person you are
that counts. One place, two reactions.
30 October
China's parliament, the National People's Congress, passes legislation
outlawing the Falun Gong movement, which the China Daily has
described as a 'devil cult'. Penalties start at three years for demon-
strating or disrupting social order, and run all the way up to execution
October 263
for using cult activities to attempt to subvert the socialist system or
split the nation.
It is now six months since members of the movement suddenly
materialised outside the leadership compound in Beijing. Despite the
subsequent crackdown, police say the Gongists have staged 300
protests since April. The authorities allege that practitioners have
breached national security by being in possession of twenty 'top
secret' documents and thirty-nine others ranked as 'classified', some of
which had been passed on to people abroad. But the definition of
national security in China is so wide that almost anybody who knows
anything can be accused of being a spy.
Nearly eight million books and five million videotapes produced by
the sect have been seized in just two cities. Ten managers of printing
presses have been arrested for turning out Gongist texts. The State
Council has warned civil servants and workers at state-owned enter-
prises that they will be 'severely penalised' if they are practitioners.
Inveighing against an 'anti-society, anti-science and anti-human-
being' movement, Jiang Zemin compares it to the Branch Davidians
of the United States and the Aum Shinri Kyo in Japan, and blames it
for the deaths of more than 1 ,400 people, for driving others insane
and for ruining families.
Broadening their campaign, the authorities have generally banned
people from carrying out slow-moving, deep-breathing qi gong exer-
cises in streets, railway and bus stations, government and military
establishments, ports, schools and other 'important public places'. Qi
gong groups must register with the authorities, and can only operate
in small local units.
Officials say they are just after Falun Gong leaders, and will be
lenient with the rank-and-file. Though the authorities in one part of
Guangdong province have adopted a gentle approach by encouraging
elderly practitioners to take up traditional dance and shadow boxing
instead, police behaviour elsewhere shows what leniency means in
Chinese terms. Three thousand practitioners have been detained in
Beijing alone this week. Hundreds of police, in uniform and plain
clothes, are patrolling Tiananmen Square. Some of those taken away
in police buses have been kept in custody; some have been handed
264 Dealing With the Dragon
over to provincial security forces who have come to the capital to
move them to regional detention centres. Still others have been driven
to the outskirts of town and dumped there after being told never to
return.
About 100 women have been punished in the north; according to
a Hong Kong human rights group, twelve school teachers in the
founder's home province of Jilin have been sent to labour camps. In
neighbouring Liaoning province, a former senior housing official
hanged himself after fasting in protest at the clampdown; his
Communist party membership was removed posthumously.
Elsewhere, functionaries have been told their performances will be
judged on how well they wipe out the influence of sects.
In the capital, police are busy raiding shops for subversive Falun
Gong literature, and combing small lodging houses for practitioners.
Hotel operators who put them up are fined. Falun Gong practitioners
report that a hostile article from the People's Daily has been posted on
their websites in Europe. One man in New York says hacking has
been traced back to the Public Security Bureau. In Shandong
province, police stage a street bonfire of Gongist books and posters,
while railway authorities in the south have taken to searching the lug-
gage of passengers for sect literature or tapes.
The rhetoric from the official media reaches a frenzied volume.
Beijing television warns that if Falun Gong had been allowed to con-
tinue freely, all the economic reforms would have been stopped. The
Xinhua news agency calls the sect's challenge 'unprecedented in the
history of the People's Republic in terms of the size of its organis-
ation, its influence, number of illegal publications as well as the
damages it brought to the society'.
A small group of practitioners bravely holds a clandestine press
conference in Beijing, and insists that China's leaders would realise the
merits of their beliefs if they only knew the truth. 'We just want a
peaceful place in which to practise,' says a man from Fujian province.
Two of those giving the press conference are former policemen. They
say they were forced to choose between keeping their jobs and fol-
lowing the Falun Gong.
The American media report widely on the crackdown, and a row
October 265
erupts when police question five reporters, including two Americans,
who attended the press conference. Their credentials and residence
permits are confiscated on the grounds that they violated regulations.
President Jiang is angry: more than 1,000 police have been deployed
to track the conference's location to a small Buddhist temple in the
suburbs of the capital.
Whatever the truth about the Falun Gong, there is no doubt that
China is home to more than its share of charlatans, nor of the extent
of their appeal. Another group hit by police this month was founded
by a former peasant who claimed to be able to see through solid
objects and hear heavenly voices. He is said to have run sixty centres
in twenty-two provinces, including an outfit called the China School
of Supernatural Powers in Sichuan with more than 10,000 students.
Then there is a newspaper report about the founder of a different sect,
with a mere 900 followers, who promised he could help adherents
reach enlightenment if they had sex with him, and raped at least four
women. In Hunan province, a court has sentenced to death a self-pro-
claimed resurrected god who presented himself as a supreme being
able to lead his followers to salvation. Disciples from fifteen provinces
gathered for a congress he held in 1997. 'Nowadays, people blindly
believe in gods and spirits,' he was quoted as saying. 'If you flaunt a
divine banner, people believe in you and are willing to dedicate every-
thing they have to you.' Growing rich, he bought expensive suits, a
motorcycle and several mobile telephones. He also took some young
women followers to bed. In his confession, he ruminated: 'If I were a
god, would I be here today?'
Hong Kong is drawn into the repression of the Falun Gong in a
minor but unexpected way. Like many other SAR firms, paging com-
panies have moved a lot of their operations across the border where
staff are cheaper. But it emerges that one paging outfit is not passing
on messages which mention the Falun Gong. A company supervisor
says that may be due to human error, transmission failure or reception
problems. Or perhaps to staff on the mainland having heard about the
ban on the sect and deciding that discreet censorship is the better part
of valour.
The whole saga is adding to complaints about China's human rights
266 Dealing Wiih the Dracon
record and its persecution of the home church movement. The
Clinton administration makes its concern known, and the Senate
Foreign Affairs Committee has adopted a resolution calling for an
immediate end to repression of religious groups. Naturally, that brings
a rejoinder from Beijing expressing 'strong resentment and firm oppo-
sition' to such a 'flagrant interference in China's internal affairs'. What
a strange turn of events if a deep-breathing movement started by a
clerk in a grain organisation now living in Queens ends up by caus-
ing more havoc for the regime than all the dissidents in China.
November
i November
Mou Qizhong, once a star of the mainland business world, is on trial
in the city of Wuhan. Ten years ago, he shot to fame by bartering 500
railway wagons full of food, clothes, shoes, thermos flasks and other
products for four Russian passenger planes which he sold to China's
Sichuan Airlines in a p£ioo million deal. His motto was 'There is
nothing in the world that can't be done, only that which can't be
thought of Forbes magazine named him as the fourth wealthiest man
in the mainland. He was going to blow a 48-kilometre-wide gap
through the Himalayas to change the climate in north-west China so
that arid land would sprout crops, dam great rivers to provide water
supplies, lease Russian rockets to Western communications firms, and
develop the fastest computer chip in the world. He claimed to be able
to raise enormous sums in the West to buy into 13,000 state compa-
nies, and was going to build a 'Hong Kong of the north' on the
Russian border.
Now, Mou is accused of having used phoney documents to
obtain US$75 million in foreign currency. He is alleged to have got
the money through a state import-export company in Hubei
province which pretended to have imported goods and presented
a local state bank with thirty-three credit documents. The bank
issued foreign currency against the certificates. The import-export
268 Dealing Wuii rHE Dragon
firm passed the money to Mou, with suitable greasing of palms in
return.
His career epitomises the mainland's get-rich-quick tycoons who
use political connections and bribery to borrow large sums from state
banks and companies. Born beside the Yangtze in 1941 to the maid of
his father's third wife, Mou was sentenced to death for a book he
wrote during the Cultural Revolution, but was saved from execution
by Mao's death and the subsequent policy switches. After building up
a business by buying and selling clocks from the military, he spent
another year in prison for speculative activities, but was able to borrow
7 million yuan m 1984 to launch the investment company that
clinched the airliner barter.
In 1989, the bombastic Mou, a short man with a round head and
deep forehead who bears more than a passing resemblance to Mao,
denounced the demonstrators in Tiananmen Square before the out-
come of the confrontation was evident. That won him points with the
regime. He was singled out for praise in the official media and pho-
tographed with national leaders: like American executives, upwardly
mobile Chinese love to show off snaps of themselves with those in
power. Apart from anything else, it makes getting loans from state
banks so much easier.
Mou traded on his connections for a US$75 million letter of credit
from the Bank of China branch in Wuhan to import computers. In fact,
the money went to finance a scheme to launch satellites on rockets from
China's Central Asian neighbour of Kazhakstan. Mou does not seem to
have made anything from the project. In fact, he was plunging further
and further into debt. Eventually, three lieutenants welshed on him.
Although his passport was confiscated, he tried to leave the country but
was stopped at Beijing airport and charged with fraud.
According to one newspaper, Mou wrote a letter to the authorities
after his arrest proclaiming that he and he alone could 'do in the East
what oil barons and steel kings did in the West this century'. He also
claimed to have an agreement to sell 5,000 tonnes of gold for a British
company that would have earned him £15 million. A best-selling
book entitled Great Swindler of the Mainland quoted some of his
business tips, among them: 'Use one daughter to marry eight men
November 269
[i.e. borrow from eight banks for the same project]' and the more
familiar 'If you owe the bank 10,000 yuan, you are their grandson. If
you owe them 10 million, you are their grandfather.' The fraud
charges could land him in jail for life.
2 November
Hong Kong's Disneyland agreement is signed. The Chief Executive
poses with people in Mickey and Minnie Mouse costumes at
Government House. 'I wish it was Confucius he was embracing,' says
the businessman and socialite, David Tang. The government hopes
the 125-hectare site will boost economic activity by as much as 1 per
cent, and attract crowds of tourists. But the taxpayers will foot most
of the bill. The deal is undoubtedly popular. Still, it is being presented
as an infrastructure project just in case anybody gets the idea that the
government is switching to an interventionist course.
4 November
Small and doll-like, with a helmet of black hair, Nina Wang could be
a figure from a tableau. Standing in the middle of a reception given by
a French bank tonight, she says her aluminium handbag is very useful
for beating off attackers. Dressed in a bright red and green designer
Chinese outfit with pointed shoes and a red clip in her hair, she
laughs at her own joke. The crowd in the ballroom of the J. W.
Marriott hotel gives her the celebrity-look once-over. She is one of
those Hong Kong people everybody has heard of, but few have actu-
ally seen in the flesh. 'Is that Nina Wang?' says one. 'I thought she
wore plastic mini-skirts.'
That was the Nina of old. In the days when she was ranked as the
fourth richest woman in the world, she was famous for her short red
vinyl skirts and bobby socks. In those days, with her hair in plaits, she
bore more than a passing resemblance to a late-middle-aged version of
the Icelandic songstress Bjork. Short and feisty, rejoicing in the
Cantonese nickname of Little Sweet Sweet, Nina has always cut an
unusual figure in the buttoned-down male business world. Tonight,
270 Dealing With mi: Dracon
attended by a silent, smiling director of her company, she giggles a lot,
but is no longer the tearaway who was photographed disco-dancing,
and told her husband, Teddy Wang Teh-huei, that she would only
join the board of his family firm if she could bring along her German
shepherd dog.
Nina has built up quite an empire, not only in Hong Kong, but also
in the mainland, the United States, Taiwan and Britain, where she
owns a golf course and was involved in an unsuccessful pub game
scheme. At one point, she planned to build a 522 metre-high Nina
Tower in Kowloon. In America, she gave US$50,000 to the Clinton
Birthplace Foundation to help restore the President's boyhood home
in Hope, Arkansas. She also donated US$7 million to the Kennedy
School of Government at Harvard to pay for courses for Chinese of-
ficials and soldiers. But she has just failed in a major cause - preventing
her father-in-law from declaring her husband dead.
The Wang fortune was based on a business called Chinachem
which her father-in-law started in Shanghai before the Communist
victory. Moving to Hong Kong, Chinachem grew into the territory's
biggest privately held property concern. In 1983 her husband hit the
headlines for a different reason when he was grabbed by kidnappers
and stuffed into a refrigerator in a flat near the old airport. Nina
handed over a ransom of HK$85 million. Teddy was freed. The kid-
nappers were arrested and jailed.
Nina's husband went back to business, and made himself Hong
Kong's fifteenth richest man, with a fortune estimated at HK$i5 bil-
lion. Despite the kidnapping, he didn't bother to employ bodyguards.
There were those who said he was too mean to spend the money.
Instead, according to a story I was told by somebody who had known
him, he had a radio transmitter embedded into the heel of his shoe so
that he could always be traced. But he was grabbed again in 1990. The
transmitter was useless: the kidnappers made him take off his fancy
footwear before they forced him on to a fishing boat that headed out
to sea. Had they been tipped off, my informant asked breathlessly; was
this an inside job of some kind?
On the boat, Teddy was trussed up in a net with a metal weight
attached to his feet. The kidnappers contacted Nina, who paid over
November 271
some HK$26o million as a first instalment. She never saw her husband
again.
So long as Teddy was not declared dead, his last known will could
not be executed. This was a matter of some importance for Nina since
she did not figure in it. To prevent her father-in-law gaining control
of his son's estate, Nina had to disprove the idea that her husband was
dead. This was a bit tricky, since a member of the kidnap gang had
testified that over tea one day, a man he called 'the chief had told him
that the captive had been thrown overboard while the boat was being
chased in Chinese waters by mainland froritier guards. But Nina
insisted that Teddy had contacted her after the second kidnapping.
She also claimed that he had given her power of attorney back in
1963, and had drawn up a new will after a riding accident. She spoke
of a sealed envelope which might contain this fresh will. But nobody
has found the envelope or the new will.
Now, after a hearing in chambers, Teddy's father, a frail old man
wearing a beret, who has to be helped into court by two aides, is
given authority to declare his son dead. So the will which does not
name Nina can be executed. When I mention this to her at tonight's
reception, she laughs and says something about the story not being
over yet. Whatever happens, Nina is another of Hong Kong's high-
level survivors, aluminium handbag and all.
5 November
Colonial days may have gone, but even the best known of the main-
land 'princelings' in Hong Kong can get caught up in controversies in
the former sovereign power. Larry Yung is quite a figure in the SAR,
a well-built, immaculately dressed man with greying hair who is a
prominent racehorse owner and keen golfer. More important, he is
the son of a former Vice-President, Rong Yiren, who may be the
richest man in the mainland at the head of a business empire called
China International Trust and Investment Company, or Citic. The
family were rich industrialists before the Communists won power, and
decided to remain in China. Rong Yiren worked with Deng
Xiaoping to open up the mainland market. He set up Citic in [978.
272 Dealing With the 1)ka<;on
His son runs its local offshoot, Citic Pacific, which is one of the
biggest investors in the SAR. Among many other things it has a large
stake in Cathay Pacific and Dragon Air airlines. In a rare interview
before the handover, Yung said that the danger for Hong Kong was
that greedy people would come down from the north and try to grab
Hong Kong's wealth. That has not happened, but Citic has put up a
shiny building by the harbour on the site of an old British naval base
to show that it is here to stay. The South China Morning Post's biggest
shareholder, the Kuok group, has a substantial holding in Yung's firm,
and occupies floors 20 to 22 of Citic Tower.
Yung's 19 per cent stake in Citic is worth US$i billion. He has a
spread in Vancouver, and spent an estimated £5 million buying
Harold Macmillan's 335 acre estate, Birch Grove, in East Sussex, com-
plete with its own golf course and shooting grounds, where he slips
on the mantle of a country gentleman for a few weeks each year.
What would be more normal than for such a man to contribute
money to a British rural organisation? Last month, Nick Rufford of
the Sunday Times reported that Yung had given up to £650,000 to the
Countryside Alliance, which is challenging plans to ban fox hunting.
The South China Morning Post picked up the story. Yung was not
pleased. Senior executives from the newspaper were called to the
Citic offices to be told that the story was incorrect. As though Yung
couldn't speak for himself, the Jockey Club wrote a letter to the Post
saying that this prominent member denied having given money to the
Alliance. Today the Post runs an item on page two noting that Yung
has stated that he has not contributed to the Countryside Alliance and
has not been involved in promoting its activities. The Sunday Times
makes no apology.
6 November
The Hong Kong government has started to unload its shares in the
territory's biggest public offering. After a major publicity blitz, more
than HK$22 billion has been subscribed to a fund called TraHK,
known as the Tracker, which contains a slice of the shares bought by
the administration fourteen months ago to defend the currency. The
November 273
offer has been sweetened with discounts and a loyalty premium.
Pundits worry that it will draw liquidity out of the market, and that
it does not include soaraway technology stocks. But the public has
scented a bargain, and that is enough. After Disneyland, another boost
to public confidence.
9—16 November
A thirteen-year saga is reaching its moment of truth in a huge, bleak
building in Beijing. A ten-strong team from Washington sits behind a
long brown wooden table at the Ministry of Foreign Trade and
Economic Cooperation (Moftec). Opposite, the Chinese delegation is
at an identical brown wooden table. Between them stands a row of
potted plants. The two delegation leaders, sitting in the middle of
their teams, are a study in physical contrast - the thin, intense
Charlene Barshefsky with her trademark scarf round her neck, and the
rotund, balding trade minister, Shi Guangsheng. Bill Clinton's eco-
nomic adviser, Gene Sperling, is in the US delegation as a sign of how
deeply the President is committed. At Shi's side is a serious-looking
bespectacled man with a neat parting in his jet black hair: Long
Yongtu has been involved in these negotiations from the start.
The subject at issue is American backing for China's membership
of the World Trade Organisation, the body that sets the rules of inter-
national commerce. On the table are issues such as access to mainland
markets, US quotas on imports of textile goods and how many years
China can continue to be treated as a developing country. The impli-
cations go much deeper. China's economic reformers see WTO
membership as a key element in pushing their programme. As well as
forcing major changes in the financial and industrial structure to
accord with what are essentially American-dictated ways of running
an economy, membership would mean the mainland becoming sub-
ject to regulations set elsewhere, and to the rule of law. The Chinese
would want to start availing themselves of freedoms granted to for-
eigners while competition from more advanced economies would
lead to millions more workers being thrown out of jobs, initially at
least. So conservatives like former Premier Li Peng take a leery view
274 Dealing Wiih the Dragon
of joining the high church of globalisation, not only for its economic
effects but for the threat it poses to the power structure built up since
1949. For its part, the United States could live without Beijing getting
a seat at the WTO. But the benefits for American companies of a
major opening-up of the Chinese market would be enormous, and
agreement would be a great foreign policy prize for a president who
needs as many laurels as he can gather in his last year in the White
House. So the outcome of the Barshefsky-Shi talks at Moftec will
mean much more than the easing of textile quotas or the lifting of
limits on how many Hollywood films can be shown in Beijing or
Shanghai.
This is not simply a Sino-US matter: the other members of the
WTO will have to sign up to any agreement to let China enter the
organisation. But if the Americans get a deal for themselves, and
establish normal trading relations with the mainland, nobody
believes the Europeans or anybody else would scupper a compre-
hensive arrangement for Chinese membership. Time presses because
ministers from the WTO nations meet in Seattle at the end of this
month to draw up the guidelines for a new round of world trade
talks.
It has been a rough seven months since Bill Clinton pulled the rug
from under Zhu Rongji in April. The President's regrets for what he
had done were swamped by Kosovo, the bombing of the Chinese
embassy in Belgrade and the tension over Taiwan and human rights,
plus the allegations of Chinese spying on US nuclear secrets. In the
late summer, however, Clinton sent Senator Diane Feinstein of
California to deliver a handwritten letter to Jiang Zemin suggesting
the resumption of WTO talks. A Chinese delegation visiting
Washington gave a positive response. The President wrote again, and
again got a good reply. When he and Jiang met in the early autumn
at the Asia-Pacific summit in New Zealand, Clinton pressed the case
for new WTO talks. Jiang agreed that the negotiators should convene.
The Chinese leader played a characteristically careful and calculat-
ing game, edging forward but avoiding giving the conservatives in
Beijing a stick with which to beat him. Zhu had put himself out on
a limb in the spring and suffered badly as a result. It is not in Jiang's
November 275
nature to take any such risk, even if he can see that an agreement
could burnish his place in history.
So when the negotiators Barshefsky and Shi met in Auckland the
day after the session between their two presidents, the Chinese took
a harsh line, halving the offers made by Zhu in some vital areas.
Barshefsky ruled out any easing of Washington's demands: 'It's all up
to China now,' she said.
Beijing went silent. Undeterred, Clinton telephoned Jiang on 16
October to draw attention to the looming WTO deadline. The
Chinese leader said he was about to embark on a trip to Europe,
North Africa and Saudi Arabia, and would reply when he returned.
But he did not do so, playing hard-to-get like any object of desire.
Showing his persistence as a suitor, Clinton took the unusual step
of sending a set of position papers to Beijing outlining six concessions
which the US was ready to make. There was still no response. At the
end of October, the new Treasury Secretary, Lawrence Summers,
travelled to Lanzhou, capital of northern Gansu province, where a ses-
sion of the Sino-US economic committee was being held. At a
meeting with Zhu, Summers said Washington did not regard China's
huge trade surplus with the US as an immediate problem, but that
China really did need to open up its markets before long and that
there was only a month left for WTO agreement.
On 6 November, Clinton was back on the telephone for a 45-
minute conversation. Jiang indicated that an agreement should be
possible. He is said to have got Politburo agreement that a deal could
be made on three conditions: that China should enter the WTO as a
developing nation with all the accompanying advantages of such
status, that foreign access to finance and service industries would be
gradual, and that the US would open its textile market and reject
quotas.
Two days after Clinton's second call, Barshefsky's team fly to
Beijing. They tell reporters they aim to wrap up the talks in a couple
of days. They arrive amid some good omens for Sino-US relations: a
new American ambassador has been approved and Beijing has agreed
that the command ship of the Seventh Fleet can visit Hong Kong in
December. But the planned two days turn into an epic knife-edge
276 Dealing With mm Dragon
marathon of tough talking and shadow boxing during which neither
side gets much sleep - one of the American team is said not to have
closed his eyes throughout, though the Chinese have the bonus of
being able to relax in sitting rooms at the ministry. The US delegation
also has to contend with the thirteen-hour time difference with
Washington. But no sign of weakness can be allowed. At one point,
Barshefsky is seen to be nodding off over a meal. When a waitress jogs
her elbow, she retorts: 'I'm awake.' She and Clinton's adviser, Sperling,
seek solace in music, beginning each day by deciding on a song for the
day. Among those they choose are 'Please Release Me', 'Ain't No
Mountain High Enough' and 'Oklahoma'. They might have done
better with 'The Long and Winding Road'.
Day One: At the opening session, Sperling refers to his own presence
as a sign o( the historic nature of the opportunity ahead of them. In
April, he had been among those who counselled Clinton not to
accept Zhu's offers. For China, Shi Guangsheng repeats the cliche
about this being 'a win-win situation' for all concerned. After open-
ing pleasantries, the two sides turn to financial markets and services.
Day Two: Sperling tells reporters that the talks are more substantial and
more detailed than before. China has accepted the six concessions
which Clinton sent in October. But it wants more. The negotiations
are extended for an additional day. Everybody feels happy. Stock mar-
kets rise. In Hong Kong, a rumour spreads that a pro-Beijing
newspaper has reserved a full page for the next clay's edition for an
important announcement. The guessing is that it will be about a
WTO deal. It turns out to be a property advertisement.
Day Tluee: The climate changes abruptly as journalists stamp in the
winter cold outside the Moftec building and the US embassy. A meet-
ing scheduled for the morning is put off till the afternoon at Chinese
request. The embassy tells reporters Barshevsky is 'discouraged'. At
the ninety-minute afternoon session, the Chinese produce a new set
of demands. Barshefsky looks grim as she rides off in an imported
Lincoln limousine.
November 277
The vital telecommunications sector is one sticking point: China
insists on limiting foreign ownership to 49 per cent, but the
Americans want to be entitled to 51 per cent, as offered by Zhu.
Another major difficulty concerns video and audio entertainment: the
Americans want a much freer ride for Hollywood and US music
companies than China is willing to concede. The two sides are also
some way apart on mainland exports of textile goods.
'We came here hoping to make progress,' says Barshefsky. 'We are
discouraged that progress has not been made at this point.' A
spokesman says she will fly home in the morning. The White House
spokesman briefs reporters that the talks are over. Still, the lights
remain on into the night at the Moftec building, and Trade Minister
Shi stays in his office. All is not quite as it appears: sources say a draft
agreement has been shown to President Jiang who has approved it.
Barshefsky asks to see Zhu Rongji. If this is refused, the US side will
take it as a sign that the main proponent of a deal on the Chinese side
has been sidelined, and so they might as well leave.
Day Four. Shi telephones Barshefsky at the Palace Hotel at 3 a.m. He
urges her not to leave. An hour later, she is at Moftec. Then she is
invited to meet Zhu in the leadership compound. This is, in Sperling's
word, 'pivotal'. Barshefsky asks for a clear indication that China wants
an agreement. Zhu says he wishes the negotiations to go on, that time
is not limited, and that he seeks progress which will not put too great
a penalty on the Chinese people.
Day Five: In the morning, it is all frowns. Both sides lay on the atmos-
pherics, if only to let the world know the hill they are climbing.
Neither the hardliners in Beijing nor the Republicans in Washington
will be able to say that their side was a push-over. At one point, the
US team leaves an Italian restaurant through the kitchen, going out of
the back door to avoid the media. Their mobile telephones are
switched off, and they let it be known that they are packing their bags
for the second time. China Daily reports that the problem is the US is
demanding too much.
Barshefsky and Shi have three meetings lasting a total of four and .1
278 Dealing W1111 nil'. Dragon
half hours. After each, the Americans drive back to the embassy to
confer with Washington. At one point, seven pizzas are brought round
on delivery scooters. 'I feel like an expectant mother,' says Clinton,
who has left the US for a visit to Turkey. In Hong Kong, Martin Lee
writes to him backing China's membership, saying it would help the
development of the legal system on mainland. His letter is distributed
to Republicans, who regard him as a guiding light of freedom.
Day Six: The Americans cancel their breakfast booking to arrive early
at Moftec. The Chinese are still obdurate. Barshefsky gives them 'an
exceptionally strong response'. China's former Trade Minister, Wu Yi,
a key Zhu ally, approaches her to say, 'Premier Zhu is here and he
wants to talk.' Vice-Premier Qian Qichen is also on hand. The
Chinese are ready to deal.
Barshefsky and Sperling see Zhu. Agreement is reached. On
telecommunications, they meet halfway. There is also a compromise
on video and audio entertainment. China gets an offer it can accept
on textiles. The Americans go to the women's toilet to call Clinton in
Turkey. It is the most secure place they can think of. But there is a
problem at the other end. The President is in the shower. His
National Security Adviser, Sandy Berger, goes into the bathroom to
tell him a deal has been struck. Clinton takes the telephone. 'We
were talking bathroom to bathroom,' Barshefsky says later.
At 1.40 p.m. the semi-official China News Service puts out a story
saying that a bilateral agreement was signed ten minutes earlier.
Moftec issues a denial. In fact, the Chinese still made a last effort, call-
ing on Barshefsky in her hotel room to try to wring out some final
concessions. She tells Time magazine she replied: 'Oh please. Too
complicated. Can't possibly deal with it. What time is the signing?'
Back at Moftec, Barshefsky, Sperling, Shi Guangsheng and Long
Yongtu put their names to the document as reporters rush into the
room. An attendant tells the cameramen to get down off the chairs.
Barshefsky and Shi clasp hands and smile contentedly. Their aides clap.
Barshefsky calls Shi 'my all-time friend'. They are like two boxers
who pummel the hell out of one another in the ring and then throw
their arms round each other's shoulders in a display of camaraderie. To
November 279
the television cameras, Sperling calls Barshefsky a 'most skilled and an
excellent and smart trade negotiator'. To which she replies: 'I hope
my mother's watching.'
Jiang receives Barshefsky in the leadership compound. They are
pictured grinning broadly, sitting on dark brown wooden chairs with
red flowers on the table between them. The formal signing cere-
mony in a pavilion at the Zhongnanhai leadership compound is
attended by Jiang, Qian Qichen, Wu Yi and Barshefsky. From Turkey,
Clinton says that China 'embraces principles of economic openness,
innovation and competition that will bolster economic reforms and
advance the rule of law'.
Clearly, much of the drama of the past days has been orchestrated
at a high level. One report says that when a White House official told
the reception desk at the delegation's Palace Hotel early on that the
team would be leaving the following day, he was told by the Chinese
that the reservation was for six days - exactly how long it took to
clinch an agreement. But now the tension and the playing to the
gallery evaporates. Jiang is all smiles as he takes Barshefsky on a little
tour to show her the view of the lake outside the pavilion. Zhu
Rongji is nowhere to be seen.
The deal gets a euphoric reaction in Hong Kong, even though the
opening-up of China could pose major problems for the territory in
the long term. If the mainland adopts modern commercial and indus-
trial practices, builds up a twenty-first century financial system,
develops its services and accepts the rule of law, the SAR's raison d'etre
could be gravely compromised. That, however, is for the day after
tomorrow. Right now, shares boom, everybody feels happy and few
wait to see the small print.
It is plain that China will not join the WTO in Seattle; the nego-
tiating process over this year has taken too long for that, and
agreements still have to be made with the Europeans. But it should be
in the organisation in good time to join in the process of hammering
out any new world trade deal which will go well into the opening
decade of the twenty-first century. At the annual Central Economic-
Work Conference in Beijing this week, Jiang talks of using foreign
capital to boost progress. Government departments are lined up in
280 Dealing Wriii the Diucon
support, including the formerly recalcitrant telecommunications and
agriculture ministries. The National Statistics Bureau produces an
amazing instant poll to show that 93 per cent of urban residents fol-
lowed the negotiations, 94 per cent say China deserves membership
and 80 per cent think it will improve their standard of living.
Still, there are already discordant notes. Government departments
are studying the deal for the possible infiltration of 'bourgeois-liberal
ideas'. China Business Information Times notes that technical standards,
anti-subsidy and anti-dumping methods could be used to restrict
imports in several industries. The bumps on the road to the market
were shown last month when the China National Offshore Oil
Corporation was forced to withdraw a share offer because foreign
banks thought the price was too high. One day after the agreement,
the US Commerce Department approves retroactive anti-dumping
duties on imports of Chinese apple juice concentrate. The AFL-CIO
labour organisation says it will 'wage a full and vigorous campaign'
against the agreement because of the threat to American jobs from
more Chinese imports.
After their six days on the treadmill, the participants in the nego-
tiations scatter, like rival gangs of cowboys who fight and then make
up and ride out of town to their next port of call. The thirteen-year
veteran of the WTO beat, Long Yongtu, heads south to Guangzhou
to address a set of seminars. Tickets cost 1,500 yuan, but the demand
is such that they change hands for 2,500 (£200). When he speaks at
the Sun Yat-sen memorial hall in the city, 3 ,000 people attend: busi-
ness is the new song of China and he is one of its stars. Shi, the Trade
Minister, goes to Canada to wrap up WTO negotiations with Ottawa.
Zhu Rongji starts an official visit to Malaysia, swearing that Beijing
'will unswervingly stick to its programme of reform and opening up,
and keep to the road that suits its national conditions'. Barshefsky and
Sperling fly to Washington and launch into briefings to laud the deal,
which will require Congress to grant China Normal Trading
Relations (NTR) status before it can come into effect. Republicans
are already making links with human rights. The administration
clearly has a fight on its hands in an election year when relations
with Beijing may be a factor in the race for the White House.
November 281
Though the detailed text of the agreement is not yet available, the
broad lines commit China to cut tariffs progressively on both indus-
trial and farm goods. Most changes are staged, but there is no escaping
the magnitude of what the mainland has agreed to. Non-tariff quotas
are to be abolished within five years. The duty on imported cars will
fall from the current 80-100 per cent to 25 per cent by 2006. The oil
and petrol market will be opened up. Foreign firms will be able to
conduct local currency business. They will be allowed 50 per cent
stakes in telecommunications two years after China joins the WTO.
Foreign securities will be able to take 49 per cent stakes in joint ven-
ture fund management companies three years after accession.
Investment in mainland Internet services will be allowed. In return,
Washington has shown understanding on China's developing nation
status and has given concessions on textiles.
There are some twists in the tale that may be less palatable to for-
eign investors and go-go mainland entrepreneurs. As a result of the
agreement, preferential tax arrangements for overseas firms and for
special development zones like Shenzhen will be phased out. That
will create a level playing field, but the effect could be devastating as
all those overseas Chinese investors find they have to pay as much to
the state as domestic industries.
The big question is enforcement. Will China live up to its side of
the bargain, or will it slide into non-compliance which will make a
mockery of the past week? As sceptics point out, China has been the
target of many more dumping complaints from the WTO than any
other country.
After the signing ceremonies, Jiang is keeping his counsel. Perhaps
he knows that the deal represents more concessions to the foreigners
than China has known since the days of the Treaty Ports. There is no
great speech to mark the occasion, no symbolic visit to a foreign
joint venture factory. Even if he has played his hand brilliantly, the
President remains profoundly risk-averse. Given the politics involved,
he needs to box clever to keep his position on top of whatever tran-
spires. So the great weathervane of the People's Republic makes a
contradictory statement, insisting that reform will continue but
extolling communist orthodoxy as he seeks to limit the dangers of this
282 Dealing Wiiii the Dragon
huge leap into the dark. Still, in the end, the leap has been made, and
if it is carried through, China will never be the same again.
12 November
As a sign that economic reform does not signify any let-up in the con-
trol of the party and the state, trials of Falun Gong practitioners have
started in Hainan province. A local sect leader who is accused of
using the cult to violate the law, instigating protests and escaping
from police custody gets twelve years. Three others are sent to prison
for between two and seven years. The trial is televised in prime time.
The presenter warns that 'anybody who violates the interests of the
masses will certainly face the legal consequences'. One of the accused,
wearing a short-sleeved blouse and with her hair pulled back severely,
stares at the judges with a deeply sad expression, like a medieval
martyr contemplating her fate.
13 November
More signs of recovery in the SAR. Over 5,000 people turn out for
the sale of a new block of 550 flats, the biggest buying crowd seen for
two years. Police have to use barricades to control them.
16 November
Elsewhere in Hong Kong, police are confronting a different kind of
crowd, using tear gas against demonstrators armed with iron bars and
a machete. One of the protestors holds a cigarette lighter to a gas can-
ister and threatens to blow himself up. Others ignite barricades of
flaming furniture and lob Molotov cocktails. Three of the 300 black-
helmeted police are set on fire despite their protective Perspex shields
and riot gear.
This rare instance of a violent confrontation is over the clearing of
a village up towards the mainland border as part of an anti-flooding
scheme. The villagers think they are not getting enough compen-
sation or good enough alternative housing. One complains that the
November 283
quality of the paintwork on the door of his new flat is not up to
scratch. After the police, bulldozers go in and most of the houses
come down. Villagers who were not arrested spend the night sleep-
ing in the remains of their destroyed houses.
18 November
Another Hong Kong man held on the mainland is released. Peter
Leung Wing-sum, forty-two, was kidnapped in Henan province in
April after his former Hong Kong employer failed to pay a debt to
a mainland ceramics firm. The assumption is that workers from the
state-owned enterprise grabbed him. Leung says he was tortured,
and fed once every two days as he was moved between different
locations. 'It seemed like a movie,' he adds. 'I thought I might be
killed if the mainland police failed to arrest the person they wanted
[the former mainland manager of the company].' After four months,
the manager was caught, and Leung was handed over to the local
public security bureau, which held him for three months until an
investigation cleared him, and a mainland businessman put up
HK$ 100,000 bail.
The Hong Kong government says his release is a tribute to 'effec-
tive communication' between the SAR authorities and the mainland.
It claims Leung was found in September thanks to its contacts with
the mainland. But by that time, his wife had persuaded the Chinese
authorities to allow her to see her husband. Leung says he is now rel-
ishing the taste of Coca-Cola and coffee. As he does so, a 36-year-old
Hong Kong woman tells of the plight of her husband, a partner in a
mainland joint venture to produce parts for television sets, who has
been held for a year accused of deception. She has been asked to pay
HK$27 million for his release. 'I phoned the government and the
Chief Executive's office and asked for help,' she says. 'But they just
told me there wasn't much they could do.'
In another case, a Hong Kong man has been arrested because of
complaints about the failure of a bankrupt employment agency called
Superwealth for which he worked. He was held in the late summer in
a town in Guangdong province. Police there asked his relatives in
284 Dealing Wiiii the Dragon
Hong Kong to pay HK$8 00,000 for his release. They reduced this to
$600,000, which his wife raised by selling a house they owned across
the border and borrowing from a finance company. Instead of freeing
the man, police took him to a prison in another town where another
$1 million was demanded. His wife says there is no question of raising
more cash: she is having to borrow money just to support the family.
A Public Security Bureau official on the mainland tells the South
China Morning Post: 'We are acting according to the law' In Hong
Kong, the Security Bureau says it is contacting the mainland authori-
ties, but an official there repeats the line that 'We are acting according
to the law'
There is a happier outcome in a long-running case involving a
Chinese-Australian called James Peng who has just been freed from a
mainland jail after being held for six years. Peng was abducted from a
hotel in Macau in 1993, taken to Shanghai and sentenced to sixteen
years. His lawyers say the charges were trumped up as part of a dispute
with his business partner, a niece of Deng Xiaoping. His release
comes soon after a visit to Australia by President Jiang. The rumour
in Hong Kong is that in order not to embarrass either the Portuguese
or the Chinese, Peng signed a statement that he had crossed the
border from Macau voluntarily.
Beside these businessmen who got into trouble, Wu Man is a more
equivocal figure. His case is causing some friction between Britain,
China and Thailand, with the SAR keeping its head down. A Hong
Kong resident, he is wanted on the mainland for crimes allegedly
connected to the Big Spender gang. Like some three million other
people in the SAR, Wu holds a travel document called a British
National (Overseas) pass, a device used by London when it wanted to
avoid granting citizenship but felt it had to save a bit of face by pro-
viding Hong Kong residents with something to use when they left
home. Wu was travelling on his BNO papers in Thailand when police
there picked him up and handed him over to the Chinese. He is cur-
rently in jail in Guangdong, where Big Spender was shot a year ago.
John Battle, the British minister with special responsibility for
Hong Kong, who happens to be in town today, says the Thai immi-
gration authorities have admitted they made a mistake in not telling
November 285
the embassy in Bangkok of the arrest. The Chinese contend that
Battle is 'completely wrong'. Everything is in order, they insist. All
Battle can respond is that he will ask the British embassy in Beijing to
make enquiries.
If he goes the same way as Big Spender and the Telford Gardens
poisoner, nobody in Hong Kong is going to shed a tear for Wu. But
the legislator Emily Lau, a staunch critic of Britain on the passports
issue, has written to Tony Blair about the case. As she says: 'It is wor-
rying if Hong Kong residents travelling on BNO passports are
assumed to be Chinese and can be picked up in third countries.' The
problem for Britain is that its fudge to give Hong Kong people a
figleaf after deciding to slam the door on most of them leaves it with-
out a leg to stand on in dealing with the unyielding mainland defence
of its legal sovereignty.
And what about the Hong Kong government? Nothing is being
heard from that quarter. Even a local deputy to the National
People's Congress says the SAR authorities have not done enough
to help those detained on the mainland. But the head of the
Security Bureau hits back by having lunch with my former col-
leagues to tell them that the Post's publicity about the detained
grandfather, Lok Yuk-sing, and others hindered their release. Lok's
own view that the media reports were more helpful than the gov-
ernment is waved aside. Still, his son-in-law e-mails me: 'I am glad
to read news on Mr Leung's return to HK. SCMP helped not only
ours & Mr Leung's families, it actually raised the public & govern-
ment attention to this kind of unfair treatment to HK citizens.
Hopefully we can see more HK citizens to be released in the
coming future.' Regina Ip, the tough-cookie Secretary for Security,
and I look past one another when our paths cross at a couple of
receptions and dinners.
19 November
The Christmas decorations are up at Ocean Centre in Kowloon and
Christmas songs are on the muzak in Central. For the past four years,
I have been a guest at the launch of a big Christmas charity drive. The
286 Dealing Wiih the Dracon
occasion is broadcast live, and I once got to sing a few bars on the air
in company with some Cantopop stars and the Director of Radio-
Television Hong Kong. Last year we did it with the Chief Executive s
wife, who much enjoys such occasions. The ceremony is always a
touch surreal as a children's choir sings of crisp and even snow in a
shiny office plaza in the warm Hong Kong night. This year, no longer
being editor of the Post, I'll miss the pleasure, and so will the RTHK
boss, who is off to her new trade job in Tokyo. I doubt if the listen-
ers will mind not hearing my out-of-tune carolling.
20 November
Another spectacular step in China's modernisation - the launching of
an unmanned spacecraft. The dome-shaped Shenzhou, or 'Magic
Vessel', went up on a Long March rocket from a satellite launch
centre in north-western Gansu province. It landed twenty-one hours
later in Inner Mongolia after orbiting the earth fourteen times.
Among the objects inside was the future flag of Macau, dark green
with a white floral design and light stars in the centre. Mainland
newspapers were delayed to bring readers the news. President Jiang,
who gave his personal stamp to the development of a manned space
programme in 1992, chose the craft's name. He dons his military uni-
form to inspect the vessel when it is brought to Beijing. The next big
step will be to send up cosmonauts: that seems on the cards for next
year.
21 November
This being Sunday, Central is packed with maids. Today is Migrants'
Day, and the weekly gathering is enlivened by a show in the bright
winter sunshine. There are dances, singing, and sketches about the
amahs' lives. One starts by acting out the saga of a young woman
going through the formalities before leaving the Philippines. 'Birth
certificate, identity certificate, death certificate,' says the commen-
tary, to laughter from the crowd. After she arrives in Hong Kong,
her employer puts her to work immediately, scolds her mercilessly
November 287
and then sacks her for being five minutes late when her bus was
delayed.
Another sketch begins with a woman tearfully handing over her
daughter to a member of her family before flying to Hong Kong to
become a maid; she puts on a piece of cardboard inscribed with the
words 'Domestic Helper'. Her pantomime of cooking and cleaning
draws fresh laughter from the crowd. There is particular merriment as
she mimes the evening chore of taking out the dog with a newspaper
in which to collect the animal's droppings. When she has finished her
day, two companions join her. One wears a strip of cardboard
inscribed 'Child Bride'. The other brings the house down by doing a
raunchy bump-and-grind dance from the girlie bars of Wanchai.
Then a fourth woman appears with the name of an employment
agency on her piece of cardboard. They all grab placards from the
ground and parade around to uproarious applause. On the placards are
written 'No to 20% tax' - a reference to a proposal to make the
amahs pay for cleaning up after them on Sundays. They seem likely to
win on that one: as has been pointed out, if people in Hong Kong
were forced to pay for cleaning up after them, what would the
Cantonese have to contribute for despoiling the environment and
littering country parks on Sunday picnics?
22 November
Visiting Beijing, Tung Chee-hwa hears from Zhu Rongji about wor-
ries over a loophole in the mainland anti-corruption drive - Hong
Kong. Although the SAR is now part of China, there is no extra-
dition agreement between the sovereign power and its region. Any
such arrangement would immediately raise concerns that Beijing
might haul back dissidents who have found refuge in Hong Kong.
What worries Zhu is that the current state of affairs means that main-
landers suspected of corruption or fraud may be skipping across the
border, and escaping mainland justice. To prevent that, a rendition
agreement is being worked out. However it may help the anti-graft
crusade, it is also likely to make some dissidents think about leaving
the territory.
288 Dealing Wiiji mm-. Dragon
23 November
Not a good day for Macau's gangsters. The top Triad in town, Wan
Kok-koi, a.k.a. Broken Tooth, is sentenced to fifteen years in jail for
belonging to the underworld organisation, money-laundering, loan-
sharking and telephone-tapping. Wearing a blue and white striped
suit, he smiles and waves as he arrives in court. But when the sentence
is announced, he jumps on to a bench and shouts, 'You've taken
dirty money. All you guys took bribes. This is the worst verdict of the
century.' Wan puts his fingers to his head like a gun and swears. Then
he tells his mother: 'Don't cry. Don't be afraid. Steel yourself.'
Security guards click handcuffs on him and take Wan, forty-five,
away in a convoy of vehicles to solitary confinement in a windowless
cell in a new high-security prison. Relatives and associates in the
crowded courtroom shout abuse when the judge announces that
property worth millions of dollars seized after his arrest will remain
confiscated. Eight of Wan's colleagues are sentenced to between eigh-
teen months and ten years. In Beijing, where a calligrapher has just
written the largest-ever Chinese character on a 1,999 square-metre
piece of silk to celebrate the impending return of the Portuguese
colony, Vice-Premier Qian Qichen calls the verdicts 'good for
Macau's stability'.
The following day, a Eurasian former police officer called Artur
Chiang Calderon, who is said to have been the consigliere of the gang,
is sentenced to ten and a half years for criminal association, loan-
sharking and illegal gambling. The shaven-headed Calderon, who
was born in Peru and was forced out of the Macau police because of
his links with Wan, smiles at the judge as the sentence is announced.
At least Wan and Calderon won't lose their lives. Another Macau
gang boss who originated from Hong Kong is less fortunate. Found
guilty of murder, armed robbery, kidnapping and illegal possession of
arms in the neighbouring mainland city of Zhuhai, he is shot later in
the day. A similar fate may well await another alleged Triad from
Macau, arrested in Guangzhou in connection with the kidnapping of
a Hong Kong man by a gang in the Portuguese enclave last year. They
are alleged to have grabbed the man from his office, beaten him,
November 289
bound, gagged and blindfolded him and demanded a ransom of HK$2
million. They eventually settled for HK$30o,ooo which was later
stolen by a member of the gang. When the victim called out for help,
he was killed. His body was dismembered and left in a rubbish bin.
Nobody questions why a Macau gangster who killed a Hong Kong
man is being tried on the mainland. Who cares?
24 November
Hong Kong's richest political party leader stands on the pavement of
Garden Road leading from the Central District up towards the Peak
where he has his home, waving at motorists returning home this
evening. No, James Tien, Chairman of the Liberal Party, is not hitch-
ing a lift. In a dark suit with a yellow sash, he is after votes.
Tien is seeking election to Hong Kong's new district councils.
Instead of relying on the usual distribution of leaflets, he is out on the
streets. There is something faintly ridiculous about this very wealthy
businessman waving at cars which thunder past in the dark, most of
them unaware of his presence. But Tien needs to win this election. In
the past, pro-business Liberals have depended on their connections to
gain seats in the legislature for functional constituencies. But now they
feel a need for a wider legitimacy. Two other prominent Liberals are
also running in the council elections.
The hustings do not come naturally to a party which has been the
epitome of U-turns and cosy deals. But Tien's pitch in seeking the
Peak seat on the council is that he is a man who can get things done —
though many of the inhabitants of the constituency are sufficiently
well connected to get things done on their own. Tien reckons he
knows 1,000 voters personally, and has also been hitting the tele-
phone to whip up support. Every vote counts as the Liberals flirt with
direct democracy.
26 November
We fly to the eastern city of Hangzhou for the opening of an art
gallery and to see the city whose huge man-made West Lake makes it
290 Dealing Wiih mm. Dracon
one of China's showplaces. Marco Polo found the market here stocked
with 'roebuck, partridge, quails, fowls, capons, and so many ducks and
geese that more could not be told' as well as red deer, fallow deer,
hares and rabbits, giant white pears weighing 10 pounds each, oranges,
mandarins, apricots and grapes. The city now has 1.5 million perma-
nent inhabitants and a transient population of 800,000. It is not
industrial or commercial on the scale of nearby Shanghai, but it is one
of China's richest cities, and high-rise buildings tower at one end of
the lake.
The beauty of the local women was such that emperors came here
to select concubines. A senior official at the Xinhua office in Hong
Kong before the handover used to punctuate dinner conversations by
assuring us that there was no better city in China, with the 5.5 kilo-
metre-long lake, a thirteen-storey pagoda, and an intricate set of
gardens and temples to the memory of an imperial servant who was
traduced and executed after saving his master. The epitaph on his
tomb reads: 'If the state officials were not greedy for money and their
military counterparts did not flinch at death, the whole country
would be at peace.' And, the man from Xinhua liked to add as he
raised his glass for yet another toast, the women of Hangzhou were
still the most beautiful in the land.
An Indian on the bus in from the airport spends the journey on his
mobile, conducting an intense negotiation in his native language
between a mainland supplier and his office back in Hong Kong over
goods unknown. English words - 'net price', 'final offer', 'best rate' -
pepper his side of the conversation. At one point he exclaims, 'The
price has gone to a dollar forty,' and snaps the telephone off in exas-
peration. At the hotel, he is still negotiating on the telephone as he
signs in at the reception desk.
The weather is foul. Cold rain, fog and early dusk. My wife says it
is a dry run for our return to London in January. After a gallery
opening organised by Tung Chee-hwa's sister for a show of paintings
by a Chinese artist, we walk along the lakeside to an official dinner
for a couple of hundred guests. A sign outside a shop proclaims that
it sells 'Antiques and their imitations'. In the restaurant, snakes lie
sleeping in a glass case outside the cavernous main dining room. The
November 291
meal, served by waitresses in mauve costumes, moves through sixteen
courses: meats, chicken, lobster, soup, bamboo shoots, a local special-
ity of chunks of gammon with a thick layer of fat baked in little pots,
rabbit cooked with chillis in tinfoil, crab, noodles, vegetables,
dumplings, more lobster, salty and sweet consommes, pastries and
fruit. To drink, there is beer and tea and rice wine that tastes like
tawny port. There are many toasts. An elderly man in a dark suit walks
by our table and introduces himself as the director of archaeological
relics at the city museum. He hands me a card. It says he is a member
of the National People's Congress. I do not ask him what he thinks
about the over-ruling of the Court of Final Appeal.
The next morning, we visit the West Lake Dragon Well tea plan-
tation outside the city which produces one of the best green teas in
the country, sent to Beijing to be served for the leadership. In the
entrance hall, there is a photograph of Queen Elizabeth in a yellow
dress with a yellow hat looking as though she has just been bitten.
'She is surprised. Why is the tea so good, she asks,' a guide explains.
We start by being given a demonstration of tea-making (use water
which is just below boiling point; put some leaves in the bottom of
the glass and pour in a little water - never fill it to begin with since
that is like saying goodbye; move the kettle up and down three times
as you pour; the guests tap the table with two fingers to express
thanks; the same leaves can be used five times during the day). Then
we buy four extremely expensive tins of the lightest-coloured 'im-
perial' leaves. The prices are higher than at the hotel and the airport,
but the attendants at the Dragon Well point out that they pack the tins
in front of us, whereas elsewhere you might get a covering of good
leaves on top and inferior growths below, or simply a counterfeit tin
full of old rubbish. As usual, beneficial side effects are mentioned: the
tea acts against cholesterol and cancer, and dissolves body fat; the
used leaves can be mixed with egg white for a wrinkle-defeating face
cream. Dried leaves put into a pillow help with sleep.
That night, we eat with two friends at a vast multi-storey restaurant
which epitomises the flash of money in China today. There are thirty
tanks in a side room from which to choose fish and lobsters - and the
inevitable snake box. A young woman in a long black dress plays
292 Dealing Wiiii mm-. Dragon
light classics at a white grand piano on an island in the middle of a
pool of water in the centre of the room. Before taking a break, she
glides through 'Auld Lang Syne'. A wedding party spends the evening
taking photographs of one another. When I put my jacket on the back
of the chair, a waitress hurries up and protects it with a plastic cover.
The noise is enormous. Everybody seems to be having a good time.
It is like a boisterous Saturday night in Kowloon.
In the street outside, the taxi drives off while one of our friends still
has a foot on the ground. The driver laughs and says, 'No problem.'
Back at the hotel, an elderly flautist is playing 'Ave Maria' in a bar
decorated with photographs of Richard Nixon and lesser luminaries
who have visited Hangzhou. Elsewhere in the city, four members of
the China Democracy Party are reported to have been sentenced to
between five and eleven years in jail for subversion. Among their
crimes was the posting of information about their movement on an
Internet bulletin board.
28 November
In the elections for Hong Kong's new district councils, the Democrats
increase their seats from 75 to 83, but the real winner is the pro-
Beijing DAB, which increases its representation from 37 to 83. In a
telephone conversation, Martin Lee says he was about to call the
result a defeat for the Democrats, but decided on second thoughts to
describe it simply as 'a pass'. After all, they still got more votes than
any other party.
The Liberal leader, James Tien, is rewarded for his waving from the
pavement by being elected on the Peak. However, one of his best-
known colleagues is surprisingly defeated, which may give the party
second thoughts about plunging into popular elections.
The Democrats made some tactical mistakes during the campaign,
and were hit by their stance over the rule of law which made it seem
as though they are in favour of massive immigration from the main-
land. Lee also complains about the large amounts of money he says
the DAB is getting from donors who see it as a pro-administration
group - a view which is borne out when the party indulges in some
November 293
extraordinary voting U-turns in the Legislative Council to prevent the
government from being defeated. It is clear that party politics in
Hong Kong is now a two-horse race. Not, of course, that this reduces
the overwhelming power of the executive.
The new councils replace two separate local government bodies
which tarnished their reputations by their inept handling of crises
such as the bird flu outbreak, and were stigmatised for the junkets
undertaken by their members. But the new system represents a further
dilution of democracy, since 100 members of the councils will be
appointed by the administration.
A poll by the Hong Kong Transition project shows satisfaction
with Tung dropping from 46 to 39 per cent, the lowest since the
handover. Another poll has him at 56 per cent but this is still the
lowest in the records of that survey. Dissatisfaction with the govern-
ment rises from 46 to 53 per cent.
30 November
The right-wing, free-market Heritage Foundation from the United
States comes to town with reassuring news for Hong Kong. The
SAR is once again hailed as the world's freest economy. Last year,
there was a warning that Singapore might be about to take the title.
But a senior SAR official at the award dinner whispers that Hong
Kong has acquainted the Foundation with various interventionist
aspects of the way the Lion City is run.
The dinner in a French brasserie in the Conrad Hotel is an oc-
casion for high-level celebration. As well as Tung Chee-hwa, the
Chief Secretary and the Financial Secretary attend. One understands
their pleasure. Still, there is something ironic about the award after the
government's intervention in the stock market, the decision to go to
Beijing to overrule the Court of Final Appeal, the Cyberport deal
with Li Ka-shing's son, and the administration's assumption of the
main role in financing Disneyland. Any of these may be defended, but
when they are added to the government's ownership of all land and
the pervasive presence of cartels, one wonders at the persuasive power
of a flat 15 per cent income tax on the prophets of economic liberty.
294
Dealing With the I) a a (.on
Few local figures are ready to touch on such questions. But the
night after the Heritage award, a thoughtful local businessman,
Robert Dorfman, raises the eyebrows of his audience in a speech at
another dinner in the Mandarin Hotel which enunciates a home
truth the 'freest economy in the world' does not like to hear.
'Hong Kong's domestic marketplace is dominated by restrictive
practices, especially in areas which impact on people's daily lives,' he
says. 'Apart from the well-publicised areas like property, this is also
true of many professional services, important parts of the retail sector,
petroleum products and on policy on parallel imports. The reaction
from established groups to innovators has often been to use their
power to stifle the competitive threat rather than seeking to emulate
and outdo it. We do not always practise the free-market principles we
preach.
'Hong Kong is a community that has thrived on change. But there
are formidable obstacles - such as a refusal to acknowledge openly that
the problem of cartelised markets exists. Prominent interest groups -
including the government in the case of the property market - are
understandably reluctant to change a system that has served them
well.'
But when I ask the main author of the Heritage Foundation report
about the less than free market developments of the past year, and the
underlying matters of land ownership and cartels, he pauses over his
veal to say that his organisation could not detect a pattern.
December
i December
On the mainland, advertisements advocating the use of condoms fall
foul of the law. The cartoons transmitted on state television show a
contraceptive locked in combat with the Aids virus and other sexually
transmitted diseases. The captions read, 'Avoid unwanted pregnancies'
and 'Use a condom, no trouble.' The mainland has some 400,000
HIV carriers. But the State Advertisment Law rules that sex products
cannot be advertised, so the cartoons are withdrawn. The organiser of
the campaign, the Family Planning Propaganda and Education
Centre, says it understands the decision.
3 December
The Court of Final Appeal delivers its verdict in the latest case involv-
ing the rights of migrants to settle in Hong Kong. As expected, the
government wins this time, avenging its defeat in January. More
important, bowing to the verdict from Beijing, the court recognises
the right of China's National People's Congress to do as it wishes in
interpreting the Basic Law, and to do so retrospectively to 1 July
1997. The rule of law in Hong Kong has now been made subject to
the rule of a political body made up of people approved by the cen-
tral regime. That is a bad enough attack on one country, two systems,
296 Dealing Wiiii iiii-. Dragon
but much worse is that this has been brought about with the active
complicity of the government in Hong Kong. The United Nations
Human Rights Committee in its first report on the SAR since the
handover says it is 'seriously concerned' at the implications for judi-
cial independence of the administration going to the NPC. The
interpretation 'could be used in circumstances that undermine the
right of a fair trial'. Or, as I write in a column in the Post, the recog-
nition by the Court of Final Appeal of the unqualified right of the
National People's Congress to interpret the Basic Law consolidates the
most fundamental and dangerous shift in the short life of the SAR.
The fact that it was widely expected should not be allowed to mask its
significance.
Ever since the Joint Declaration in 1984, there was a general
assumption that the courts of Hong Kong would continue to enjoy
primacy, with the Court of Final Appeal taking the place of the Privy
Council at the apex of the structure. Article Two of the Basic Law
assured the SAR of 'independent judicial power, including that of
final adjudication'. This was seen as key to the fifty-year guarantee of
Hong Kong's system and way of life.
For those who lamented the turning back of the democratic clock
on 1 July, the Basic Law appeared to provide comfort in the con-
tinuation of the rule of the law. Article Eight specified that the
maintenance of laws in force in Hong Kong meant the common law.
Now all this has been thrown into jeopardy. The comforting belief
that if the NPC did exercise its powers on interpretation it would do
so only on matters involving the mainland has been cast into doubt by
the unqualified nature of the authority recognised by the Court of
Final Appeal today. A mainland academic, Professor Wang Lei from
Beijing University, says that any citizen has the right to ask for inter-
pretation. So we could find losing parties in disputes between Hong
Kong companies or individuals trying to approach the NPC.
They might get short shrift. That is beside the point. What matters
is that the court meant to be Hong Kong's supreme judicial organ
now acknowledges itself to be subject to appeal to a mainland politi-
cal body. It is hard to see how this can be anything less than a major
change in the system that was meant to be maintained until 2047.
December 297
That raises the intriguing thought that the judgment may itself be
in contravention of the Basic Law. One can imagine the outcry from
Beijing if Chris Patten had gone to the House of Commons to over-
rule a Privy Council verdict against him. That would not have
happened under the pre-handover system, so its equivalent should not
happen now if the Basic Law is to be respected. But we know that the
government has driven a cart and horses through a fundamental ele-
ment in the system it should be preserving for the good of Hong
Kong. The criteria for reference to the NPC promised by senior
officials in the summer have not materialised - and it is hard to forget
the assertion by a senior legal officer that reference can be made
before, during or after a case. This leaves Hong Kong in a state of
maximum peril, under arbitrary decisions by the government and
with final adjudication no longer, in effect, in the hands of a local
court, but subject to the dictates of Beijing's parliament.
The Basic Law was meant to remove doubts and to provide solid
foundations for vital elements in Hong Kong's life and prosperity.
Instead, the process started by the government after the January right
of abode verdict has led to a significant moving of the goal posts, with
all the attendant uncertainties. Whatever the administration says, the
power of the executive over the judicial process has now been asserted
and accepted. Is a change as fundamental as that not in contravention
of the Basic Law?
The court is also hearing another major case which the govern-
ment's lawyer, Gerard McCoy, says 'may be a defining moment in our
constitutional law'. At issue is the action of two men who were con-
victed of desecrating the Chinese and SAR flags after they cut a hole
in the middle of the SAR emblem, blacked out the stars on the
national flag with ink, and wrote the Chinese character for 'shame' on
both during a procession from Victoria Park to Central on 1 January
1998. Their conviction was based on legislation rushed through
immediately after the handover. The magistrate said flags were 'sacred'
symbols of a nation which should remain respected by all Chinese
regardless of their social, political or philosophical beliefs. But an
appeal court then found that the laws were unconstitutional because
they contravened international human rights agreements to which
298 Dealing Wiiii iin- Dragon
Hong Kong is a signatory. The government says that laws protecting
symbols of state over-ride the right to freedom of speech set out in the
Basic Law, and that the rights of the community as a whole must be
considered as well as the rights of individuals. Its barrister also extends
his argument to claim that freedom of expression does not extend 'to
allow you to be contemptuous of the Chief Executive in his existence
as head of the SAR'. Counsel for the two men calls the government's
argument 'the start to the road of destroying freedom of speech as we
know it in Hong Kong because there is no limit to it. Once you start
by saying that the state has the power to protect its symbols, you
don't stop at the flag.'
Again, the court finds for the government. What takes many
people aback is that the scholarly, reasonable Chief Justice quotes at
length in his judgment from the sayings of Jiang Zemin. To which the
chairman of the Basic Law Drafting Committee adds that the five stars
on the SAR flag 'symbolise the fact that all Hong Kong compatriots
love their motherland'.
But there is another point of view which is highly relevant, even if it
would be seen as deeply subversive across the border. 'What if the flag
itself is the message?' asks a column by a constitutional law professor,
Yash Ghai, in the Hong Kong Standard. The Chinese national flag is the
flag of the Communist revolution. 'One could say, unkindly but not
inaccurately, that the Chinese national flag is the symbol of a political
party, one moreover which has never been popularly elected in free and
fair elections,' Yash Ghai goes on. So what sanctity does such a symbol
have in a place where a different system is meant to hold sway?
9 December
Hong Kong's Antiquities Advisory Board has decided to allow an 850-
year-old village in Kowloon to be razed to make way for a commercial
development by Li Ka-shing's Cheung Kong company. The decision
comes after a long fight to save one of the last relics of the rural past.
The village of low houses and a red-tiled temple is already hemmed in
by skyscrapers. Apart from the merits of preserving history, the deci-
sion flies in the face of a plan by the Tourist Authority to build up the
December 299
SAR's heritage appeal. But the Board decided that many of the village
houses were too dilapidated to be suitable for preservation. Rather than
suggesting repairs, it calls for detailed records to be kept of the village
so that they may be used in a future development. In a Disneyland
theme park, perhaps.
10 December
The WTO agreement with Washington has done nothing to make
Jiang Zemin less suspicious of the United States. Today, he and Boris
Yeltsin wind up a summit in Beijing with a ringing declaration against
foreign interference on human rights. The Russian president expresses
support for 'China's principled stand on Taiwan' and Russia is
reported to have agreed to sell Beijing fighter jets worth US$i billion.
Jiang says that the impending return of Macau will make the Taiwan
issue 'more pressing'.
And on the trade front, the collapse of the WTO's ministerial
meeting in Seattle under the twin impact of hostile demonstrations
and yawning differences between governments raises the question of
just what kind of organisation China has signed up to join. The
demonstrators have got Beijing in their sights. The main planner
behind the Seattle protests warns, 'China: we're coming.' Anti-WTO
groups are confident of mustering enough support in Congress to
block Normal Trading Status for Beijing. Human rights, the en-
vironment, Tibet, religious freedom — there is no shortage of issues on
which to hang China out to dry. Bill Clinton talks of China rep-
resenting 'globalisation with a human face', whatever that means.
But as the year draws to a close, Zhu Rongji could be excused for
thinking that fate has got it in for him. After everything else, the
WTO itself is under siege. It's enough to make a man pack his bags
and go home to Hunan.
19—20 December
On the stroke of midnight, the red and gold starred flag of China rises
over Macau. The ceremony on the stage of the brightly lit conference
300 Dealing With the Dragon
centre by the waterfront lasts just sixteen minutes. Outside, the
weather is unusually cold. Only a thousand or so people gather for
celebrations in the main square. Inside the vast hall, everything goes
like clockwork. For those who were in Hong Kong on the night of 30
June two years ago, there is a certain familiarity. The proceedings have
been choreographed by an American who organised the SAR cere-
mony, and now repeats it for Macau.
The new Chief Executive of the Macau Special Administrative
Region calls it a joyous, proud and glorious moment. Portugal's pres-
ident says Macau will endure as a meeting point of Europe and Asia.
Jiang Zemin stresses that the implementation of one country, two sys-
tems in Hong Kong and Macau should pave the way for an 'early
settlement of the Taiwan question and the complete national reunifi-
cation'. The unimpressed Taiwanese point out that they are not a
colony to be handed back.
Tung Chee-hwa is present in Macau as part of the mainland dele-
gation. Anson Chan heads the Hong Kong contingent. As with
China's national day celebrations eleven weeks ago, nobody from the
pro-democracy camp is invited to join the 45-strong party. A couple
of militants who come across on the ferry are quickly sent back home.
Chris Patten attends in his role as a European Union Commissioner.
The man described only recently by China Daily as a China-hating
Cold Warrior is photographed shaking hands with Jiang Zemin, both
smiling broadly.
The PLA sweeps across the border in armoured cars. Broken
Tooth's lawyer tells the South China Morning Post's Niall Fraser that his
client, who is kept in his tiny cell for twenty-one hours a day, is in a
deep depression. The lawyer has filed a 150-page appeal, and written
to the United Nations Commission for Human Rights. But nobody
expects him to get anywhere. A handful of local democracy activists
are called in by police, and let go after they promise to behave. Police
are more concerned about Falun Gong practitioners exercising out-
side the Lisboa Hotel and Casino on Jiang's route in from the airport.
About forty are arrested, among them a six-year-old girl from Korea
and a nine-year-old boy from Hong Kong. A man in a yellow wind-
cheater is carried off by two policemen still in his meditating position.
December 301
Like the British during Jiang's visit in the autumn, the Macanese are
anxious to avoid doing anything to annoy the chief engineer.
21 December
The number of Hong Kong civil servants recommended for disci-
plinary action by the anti-corruption commission has risen by 61 per
cent so far this year. A third of them are police. The total of 300 is not
high in absolute terms, and only 183 were, in fact, disciplined. But this
was 28 per cent more than in 1998. The chairperson of the ICAC
Operations Review Committee thinks the increase may be due to the
recession. Still, the trend is distinctly worrying for a place that has
always prided itself on having a clean civil service.
22 December
An intense winter monsoon with a mass of cold air from Siberia
moving across China has sent temperatures plunging. On the highest
peak in the New Territories the thermometer has gone below freez-
ing. Temporary shelters are opened for street sleepers. Thirty-four
people die as a result of the chill. An 84-year-old grandmother is in a
critical condition with burns after setting fire to newspapers in her
home to keep warm.
26 December
The mainland crackdown on the Falun Gong is becoming even
harsher. In Beijing, four practitioners are sent to prison for between
seven and eighteen years. The sentences are heavier than those meted
out to democracy activists, showing what the regime perceives as the
bigger threat to its authority. The four were charged with organising
and using the sect to obstruct justice, causing deaths in the process of
organising the cult and illegally obtaining state secrets. Their trial was
twice delayed when hundreds of Gong members gathered outside the
court, and were removed on buses by police. The sentences are based
on anti-cult legislation passed in the autumn by the National People's
302 Dealing With the Dragon
Congress. At least some of the offences pre-date those laws. But who
cares about a bit of retrospective justice when the President has
thrown his full weight behind the crusades?
The contrast with Hong Kong remains striking, though the climate
may be shifting. Nine hundred practitioners from around the world
gathered in the SAR last week for a three-day session in which they
performed exercises outside the headquarters of the Xinhua news
agency and walked through the streets with big yellow banners. They
did nothing to infringe the law, but the nervousness they aroused was
palpable, amid fears by the authorities of Hong Kong becoming a base
for what the mainland regime sees as subversion. 'What do they mean
in getting overseas Falun Gong followers here?' asks China's Foreign
Ministry Commissioner in the SAR, an urbane diplomat with a core
of steel. 'Their aim is crystal clear, isn't it? It is because Hong Kong is
part of China and Hong Kong is so close to the mainland. They can't
deny it.' The Xinhua director says the SAR must not be used by the
Falun Gong to infiltrate the mainland. Tung Chee-hwa refers to
reports from Beijing that the sect had caused loss of life and social dis-
order. Practitioners must not act in any way against the interests of
China, Hong Kong or one country, two systems, he adds.
For all the repression, Gongists are not going to give up. Their faith
passes all understanding. An Australian-Chinese practitioner visiting
Hong Kong tells of how she and eight others were arrested and taken
to a detention centre when they arrived at the Beijing train station to
express their worries about the ban on the sect. The fifty-year-old
woman, now in a wheelchair, tells the Hong Kong Standard that she
had suffered from concussion, impaired hearing and other ailments,
but that her health had greatly improved since she took up Falun
Gong. She had gone to Beijing as a mission to recognise what the
sect's founder had done for her. After being held, she jumped out of
a second-floor window in the detention centre, and says she lay bleed-
ing on the pavement with a fractured knee for half an hour before
police came out to help. She intends to return to the capital when she
is well again. She expects this to happen within days because the
cult's founder will visit her in a dream to heal her injuries. 'That is the
usual way he communicates with his followers,' she explains.
December 303
30 December
One argument which the Hong Kong government likes to use against
a faster pace for democracy is that the existing institutions represent
the community. A good example of how it measures such representa-
tivity is given today when the Chief Executive unveils the list of
ninety-eight members he is appointing to join the 390 members of
district councils elected last month.
The government says the ninety-eight were selected in their
personal capacity for their 'enthusiasm and familiarity' with com-
munity affairs. Evidently, Democrats and like-minded people lack
those qualities. Despite having come top of the popular electoral poll,
not one of them is on Tung's list. This means that the Democrats have
a chance of getting the chairmanship of just one of the eighteen
councils. On the other hand, Tung allocates twelve seats to members
of the DAB, which finished second in the voting. Such is the Hong
Kong way with democracy thirty months after the handover as we
move into the new year.
The Year of the Dragon
While cities from Paris to Sydney shimmer for the coming millen-
nium, Hong Kong has a horse race, some not very spectacular
fireworks and a show featuring the singer Sarah Brightman. It is pretty
downbeat compared with the past extravaganzas on which the SAR
has prided itself, for the handover or Chinese New Year which will
bring us to the Year of the Dragon in six weeks' time. Out of habit, a
crowd has gathered by the harbour, expecting the usual pyrotechnic
display. But even if they turn their gaze inland, they can catch little of
the Happy Valley illuminations because of the wall of skyscrapers in
between. You can watch it on television, of course, but it's not quite
the same as oohing and aahing at the multicoloured cloudbursts and
curtains o£ silver rain that usually mark festive moments in Hong
Kong. 'If India could afford a proper celebration, what excuse does
Hong Kong have?' asks a reader's letter in the South China Morning Post.
The hot New Year ticket in town is not to join the Chief Executive
and the Chief Secretary at the Happy Valley racecourse, but for the
Convention Centre, where several thousand people crush into a hall
for a party underwritten by the younger son of Li Ka-shing, the
cyber-tycoon Richard Li. The star is the American pop diva Whitney
Houston, who has swept into Hong Kong at the head of a fifty-
strong entourage. Li stands staring at the stage, a slightly shy smile on
his lips.
The Year of the Dragon 305
The hall where Jiang Zemin and Prince Charles ushered Hong
Kong back to China is full to bursting with the Hong Kong glitterati.
Tung Chee-hwa comes on from Happy Valley and applauds politely as
Houston swans about the stage. If the degree of security a person has
around him is a measure of his importance, Li Ka-shing's son outranks
Tung tonight. Ordinary mortals can get through the crowd to shake
the Chief Executive's hand; when you venture towards Li, a burly
Western guard in a dark suit keeps you at a safe distance. But then,
anybody who has built an Internet company out of nothing to a
HK$30 billion valuation within a year and is about to bid for the
Hong Kong telephone system deserves all the protection he desires
By the time Houston launches into a series of lovestruck duets with
her husband, the singer Bobby Brown, the Chief Executive has left,
but the crowd stays on till dawn, downing oceans of champagne and
shouting above the din. There are also the usual lavish parties in smart
hotels replete with millennium dinners and dancing. On top of the
Jardine's building, the senior executives are in their traditional kilts and
trews as they eat breakfast and dance the old century away. A couple
of hours' sleep and then it is time to cross the harbour for eggnogs at
the Peninsula Hotel, accompanied by the police band in Scottish tar-
tans playing 'Auld Lang Syne'. There may not have been much of a
show for the people, but the rich and famous have seen in the mil-
lennium with some style.
At the same time, on the mainland, five Protestants are reported to
have been arrested in Beijing as they prepared for a New Year prayer
meeting. One, a doctor, was detained as he left the night shift at his
hospital. In Fujian province, an eighty-year-old Catholic archbishop,
who has already spent thirty years in jail for refusing to join the offi-
cial Church, is re-arrested - one of eight senior prelates being
detained on the mainland. In Jiangsu province, a nineteen-year-old
man is given a three-year jail sentence for writing an open letter to
President Jiang urging the regime to fight against corruption. In
Wuhan, three organisers of the China Democratic Party are sen-
tenced to between eleven and thirteen years in prison. In Tiananmen
Square, fifteen Falun Gong practitioners are arrested as they medi-
tate; in all, 5,000 devotees are now said to have been sentenced to
306 Dealing Wiih the Dragon
administrative detention without trial. According to a human rights
organisation in Hong Kong, an official in central China who prac-
tised Falun Gong has got four years in jail merely for having told
other members of the cult about a critical speech by Jiang Zemin.
The heaviest sentence yet against a Falun Gong member is reported
to have been given to a retired air force general aged seventy-four
who has been jailed for seventeen years at a secret court martial. Yu
Changxin, a former ace pilot who had rank equivalent to a provin-
cial governor, is the most senior person sentenced in connection
with the movement. President Jiang is said to have been personally
involved in deciding on the sentence because of suspicions that Yu
masterminded the April protest outside Zhongnanhai which first
brought the Falun Gong to public attention. But the Hong Kong
human-rights group says he had nothing to do with the demonstra-
tion, and fellow generals are reported to be angry at the verdict.
Mainland journalists are instructed not to dwell on 'the dark side of
society'. This is not always easy. China Daily tells us that children are
getting taller, but the National Surveillance Network reports that
'excess weight has emerged as a major health problem for children,
especially well-off urbanites who eat more high-calorie food'.
Revelations about corruption and smuggling continue to pour out: a
report to the National People's Congress says the number of cases
investigated last year rose by 9 per cent to 38,382, and that 15,700
people were sentenced as a result. A ring which was uncovered in the
port of Xiamen on the eastern Fujian coast is now said to involve
goods worth between US$6 and 10 billion. As well as the usual oil,
cars and weapons, the smugglers brought in telecommunications
equipment under the auspices of the local government, and managed
to build up debts of more than US$600 rnillion to SAR and mainland
banks with bad investments in Hong Kong property. Two hundred
people are being questioned in the city; some have been held incom-
municado by police in a hotel for six months. Among them are senior
police and customs officers and two top local bankers. Reports in
mid-January say the former wife of a member of China's twenty-two-
strong Politburo is also suspected of having played a central role -
though this is followed by a blanket denial of her involvement. Her
The Year of the Dragon 307
former husband, who divorced her after police began the crackdown,
is a major political figure in Beijing and a close associate of Jiang.
Wherever you look in the prosperous parts of China, the new cen-
tury is arriving with a bang. The anti-smuggling campaign has
boosted state revenue significantly. The Legend computer firm is
about to start selling television set-top boxes with Microsoft software
to allow users to access the Internet and trade securities through a
Chinese brokerage. To assuage the people of the restive north-west,
spending there is to be boosted on transport links, power, telecom-
munications, radio and television, and natural gas pipelines.
Jiang may have finessed them over the WTO, but the conservatives
will not give up. An aged hardliner called Deng Liqun circulates a
paper warning that the party could lose the basis of its rule in under
ten years if the private sector goes on expanding. He deplores the fact
that local officials are becoming more susceptible to the wishes of the
private sector and foreign firms, warning that the way in which they
are providing more and more of the tax revenue could increase their
influence over the administration of the provinces. As the new mil-
lennium begins, tight controls are imposed on China's 9 million
Internet users, prohibiting the 'publication of state secrets' on the
Web: in China just about anything can be classified as a state secret. In
another move to restrict new technology, some conservatives in the
leadership suggest that the Windows system should be banned as a
security threat.
For all the talk of reform, the state still controls between 60 and 70
per cent of firms with shares on the mainland stock exchanges. At a
time when markets have been booming elsewhere in Asia, the
Shanghai and Shenzhen indexes have fallen by 20 per cent in six
months. The government is planning to close half the country's trust
and investment companies because of their inefficiency. The Economic
Daily reports that local opposition is delaying a key plan to swap the
debts of state enterprises for equity. Last year, 400 billion yuan was
meant to have been transferred, but in fact the total only amounted to
72 billion. Two state companies floated on the Shanghai stock
exchange, one manufacturing motorcycle parts and the other tyres,
have been undersubscribed by 18 and 26 per cent. And the Minister
308 Dealing Wiiii 1111 Dkacon
of Labour and Social Security says as many as 12 million workers in
state-owned enterprises will lose their jobs in this year.
Despite an official growth forecast of 7 per cent for the new year,
all this comes against a background of continuing uncertainty about
China's ability to go on expanding fast enough to win Jiang's bet that
the economic boom will ward off any threat to one-party rule. While
income from exports rose by 6 per cent to US$194.9 billion in 1999,
imports shot up in value by 18 per cent to US$165.8 billion - the fig-
ures boosted by goods which were previously smuggled in now being
declared instead. As a result, the trade surplus fell by 33 per cent.
Without strong demand m North America, which took 10 per cent
more exports from China than in 1998, the economy would be head-
ing for serious trouble.
In Washington, Bill Clinton launches an all-out campaign to get
congressional agreement for the World Trade Organisation deal, but
opposition to giving China Normal Trading Status is rising from both
the Republicans and the trade unions. To show that trade is not its
only concern, Washington announces that it will put forward a
motion at the UN condemning China's human-rights record. Early in
his presidency, Clinton sought to link economic relations and human
rights. Now, the administration is putting them in separate boxes, and
crossing its fingers that domestic critics will be placated. Beijing
understands. 'I think these are entirely different things,' a Foreign
Ministry spokesman says, knowing that the UN motion can be
blocked by procedural manoeuvres. So the regime can go on locking
up Falun Gong practitioners and Christians, and sending the Uigur
businesswoman, Rebiya Kadeer, to jail for eight years for sending
press clippings to her husband in America without any fear that this
will give Bill Clinton second thoughts about the WTO deal - though
a vocal number of Congressmen may have different ideas and Beijing's
harsh line on Taiwan always risks bedevelling its links with the West.
In Hong Kong, the turnout for the annual New Year pro-democracy
march is pitifully small, at under 100 people. The pro-Beijing DAB
party joins the Democrats in pressing for early discussion of political
development. The party leader, Tsang Yok-sing, says: 'If there is one
thing we can be certain about our present system of government, it is
The Year of the Dragon 309
that the system is unsustainable.' But the government will not entertain
any idea of change, however unrepresentative, unaccountable and inco-
herent the present set-up may be. On a phone-in programme, Tung
Chee-hwa rules out the idea of introducing a ministerial system with
politicians or recruits from the private sector taking on responsibility for
policy. 'I feel the way forward is an executive structure with the civil
service as its main trunk,' he says. 'The direction is not going to change.'
As for democratisation, the Chief Executive intones the mantra of deep
conservatism. Discussion of the issue can wait until ten years after the
handover. The year 2007 will be the appropriate time 'to consider the
next step in accordance with our development'.
To mark the New Year, the Hong Kong branch of the Chinese
news agency, Xinhua, is renamed the Liaison Office of the Central
People's Government. Democrats fear that the renaming may betoken
more interference by Beijing. Martin Lee says Tung and senior of-
ficials sometimes ask Xinhua to help lobby members of the Legislative
Council. 'Those words are irresponsible,' the Chief Executive
responds. 'Of course there is no such thing.' Xinhua's role in running
the Communist Party in Hong Kong remains unacknowledged, but it
has become known that it has acquired a new senior official whose job
is to investigate corruption by mainland companies here, in line with
Zhu Rongji's concern that the SAR has become a bolt-hole for cor-
rupt mainlanders sheltering behind the absence of an extradition
agreement.
Hong Kong's economy is improving steadily. Retail sales rise by 12
per cent in January, the first increase in value terms since the crash of
1997. Richard Li is poised to make a spectacular US$38 billion takeover
of Hong Kong Telecom from Cable & Wireless in a deal which will
move control of the main telephone company from British to local
ownership - with Beijing's evident approval. Not to be outdone by his
son, Li Ka-shing is marching into cyberspace with a Chinese-language
start-up that produces scuffles between would-be buyers and is over-
subscribed more than 600 times when it offers shares to the public.
The stock market boom, fuelled by a dot-com craze, makes people
feel happier, of course. Hong Kong is very good at bouncing from
depression to euphoria, but the experience of recession still lurks in
310 Dhaiinc Wnii Mil- Dragon
the popular psychology. The manager of a luxury goods store notes
that clients are buying more reasonably priced goods these days -
HK$i ,000 silver chains rather than $10,000 gold ones. A senior exec-
utive at a big supermarket chain says price counts for more than it did
a couple of years ago. Despite the crisis, adds just about everybody,
Hong Kong is still too expensive. Back office services are being moved
to the mainland or elsewhere in Asia. A sizeable Internet start-up
keeps its headquarters in the SAR but moves all its programming
work to Manila. 'I can get ten people there for the price of one here,'
explains the founder. And why, wonders a pillar of the business com-
munity, is Hong Kong building a new container terminal when
competitors over the border offer their services for a fraction of the
price?
For all the talk about surfing the wave into the new millennium,
and Richard Li's emergence as the face of the future, the real dynamic
for change does not reach very deep, while the government has taken
a paradigm shift away from its old rectitude. That has proved popular,
and the businessmen who run Hong Kong can go on making enor-
mous gains from the property system and from their privileged place
in a low-tax structure. Politics has been shoved aside, at least in the
sense that popular votes make a difference. For all the T-shirted
appearances at community occasions by the Chief Executive and
Chief Secretary, the administration becomes ever more distant, and is
now losing some of its brightest members to the private sector, where
the money is even better and there is not the daunting prospect of
being grilled by the likes of Emily Lau and Martin Lee.
The prevailing political correctness of brotherhood and sisterhood
with the mainland obscures the reality that China is Hong Kong's
greatest competitor. The doctrine of loving the motherland sounds
horribly like a rerun o{ Babes in the Wood. Officials may allude to it
in private, but nobody in the administration could come out in
public to say that if Beijing regards Hong Kong as a potential base for
subversion, the SAR ought to see Shanghai as a very real base for
undermining its position. Talk to people on the mainland, particu-
larly away from the southern Cantonese belt, and you will not find
much love for Hong Kong. 'You did well from mixing British
The Year of the Dragon 311
colonialism with China's opening to the market,' a mainlander who
combines official and private business said one night. 'Now you have
lost the first, and we control the second. We need you to raise the
money which we will spend for our future. When we have built our-
selves up, we will not need you any more.' Then he laughed, and
poured us both another drink. And then he laughed again, as if to
signify that what he had just said was all a huge joke. But it was not.
In a sign of the times, the big French telecommunications company
Alcatel, which employs 10,000 people in the region, announced in
January that it was putting its Asian headquarters in Shanghai.
As chroniclers of the Asian collapse and recovery like to remind us,
the Chinese character for crisis contains ideograms for both danger
and opportunity. The question is whether the danger is for Hong
Kong and the opportunity for China. If that turns out to be the case,
it will be because of what Hong Kong and China each does. On the
one hand, a Chief Executive whose government kowtows at a time
which calls for political leadership and audacity to match the leader-
ship and audacity that made Hong Kong one of the world's great
business centres; on the other, a Prime Minister in Beijing who is
riding a dragon and a President who is playing politics at the very
highest level.
For a brief time, there was the prospect that Hong Kong could
become a world city. The Chief Executive still likes to promote a
vision of New York for the Americas, London for Europe and Hong
Kong for Asia. That is not an impossible dream. But it involves a great
deal more than those in power in the SAR seem able to envisage.
Above all, it means creating a far-reaching civil society that engages its
citizens and the rest of the world. Disneyland and other palliatives are
not enough. The chance was there: the reality may be that nobody
wanted to grasp it, that Hong Kong retreated into itself after the
handover and missed its destiny as it merely waited for economic
good times to return. What is left is still amazing for a place with so
few natural advantages - and the taste for a quiet life may be under-
standable enough when the rulers come from a family business or the
civil service, and when rocking the boat could affect business. But in
the end, the turn-of-century lesson is that the population which
312 Dealing With the Dragon
made Hong Kong what it is were not trusted by the old elite to make
it something even more extraordinary.
It is easy to underestimate the role of democracy and account-
ability and the independent rule of law and a truly civil society - or
to take them for granted where they have deeper roots than they do
in the SAR. It is also easy to see Hong Kong in purely materialistic
terms as a city where all that counts is financial success and keeping
out of trouble with the sovereign power to the north. There's noth-
ing to worry about, is there, as the British Foreign Secretary asked me
almost imploringly on a visit in 1998. No, in one sense there is,
indeed, nothing to worry about: life goes on, the city works, money
is made and nobody is locked up for their beliefs. But the change of
sovereignty should have meant more than the transfer of a small
stretch of land to new ownership. The meeting of an essentially free
place with an essentially unfree country gave the handover a very spe-
cial resonance, and opened up possibilities of demonstrating the
strengths and benefits of liberty in a positive rather than a passive
manner, even if that meant confronting the prospects of disagree-
ment and dispute with a central government which has always refused
to brook dissent.
The game would have been hard and dangerous, but the potential
prize was immense, building on the positive inheritance of the colo-
nial period to forge a new relationship which would buttress and
extend Hong Kong's unique place in the world. Instead, the way in
which the SAR heads into the new millennium is a demonstration of
what happens when challenges are ducked, corners cut, bulwarks
demolished and coherence abandoned. Life can remain very pleasant
and exciting, fortunes can be made and the stock market can boom.
But dealing with the dragon to the north has been allowed to take its
toll. The spirit which could have made something exceptional out of
one country, two systems - with all the associated risks - has been sti-
fled, without the people who could have given it life being allowed a
chance to make the difference.
4- ■""■ "
-
Since it was handed over to China by Britain on 1 July 1997, Hong Kong has been the
scene of a unique experiment as a free region of the last major Communist power on
earth. This book charts a vital year in the life of that experiment, with implications
reaching far beyond the tiny, immensely rich former colony.
Written by the former editor of the territory's leading English-language newspaper,
Dealing With the Dragon presents the inside story of the crucial political, legal and
human battles which followed Britain's departure. It covers the deals and policies which
undermined the hopes of 1997, and highlights the personalities who make Hong Kong
such a vivid place - tycoons and Triads, fixers and gangsters, and individuals from
Chinas 'Iron Face Prime Minister to the arms dealer embarrassed by the bare breasts on
display in the Crazy Horse Saloon.
A fascinating portrait of a vibrant city which finds itself in a position with no equal in
the world, Dealing With the Dragon is the story of a place which epitomises the
challenges of the new millennium, and the age-old conflict between liberty and control.
Praise for On the Brink by Jonathan Fenby:
'A wonderful and moving book. I've learned so much from it' Jan Morris
A fascinating account of modern France, a mixture of history, geography,
social analysis and vivid journalism' Roy Jenkins
'Fenby brings an inexhaustible curiosity and gift for telling detail to an
already fascinating subject. A superb book' Bill Bry son
150 2709001
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DRAGON: PICTURES COLOUR LIBRARY
HONG KONG SKYLINE: CORBIS
ISBN 0-316-85415-
78031 6"8541 53