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DECISIVE BATTLES

SINCE

WATERLOO

THE MOST IMrOKTANT MII.HAKV EVENTS EROM

1815 TO I 887

TH U.MAS W. KXUX

Al'TMOR OP

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PREFACE.

In 1852 Professor (afterwards Sir Edward) Creasy pub-
lished a book, which is well described by its title, " The
Fifteen Decisive Battles of the World, from Marathon to
Waterloo." Professor Creasy's work has passed through
many editions, and has long since become a standard
authority among historical students. In the belief that
the decisive battles since Waterloo are worthy of record
in a similar form, the author has ventured to prepare the
volume, of which these lines are the preface.

Creasy justly says : " It is probable, indeed, that no
two historical inquirers would entirely agree in their lists
of the decisive battles of the world," and it is of course
still less likely that any unanimity of opinion could
be found among historical students of the present day
in the selection of the decisive battles since 181 5. There
is a wide difference of opinion concerning the battles
which assured English supremacy in India ; the battles
which decided the result of the civil war in America ; and
concerning those which have repeatedly changed the
political map of the valley of the Danube and the regions
contiguous to it. Several of the twenty-five battles which
are described in this volume could hardly be included if
the list were subjected to the crucial test of Hallam in
his comments upon the victory of Charles Martel, between
Tours and Poictiers, over the Saracens. In speaking of
that battle Hallam says : " It may justly be reckoned
among those few battles of which a contrary event would
have essentially varied the drama of the world in all _its
subsequent scenes." Thus w^hile the victory of the Eng-

iv PREFACE.

lish at Prome in Burmah, described in the second chapter
of this book, was " the beginning of the end " of the Bur-
mese kingdom, it by no means follows that their complete
defeat would have forever kept them outside the bounda-
ries of that semi-barbarous countr}^ It might have
delayed the conquest for several, perhaps many, years,
but would not have prevented it. Similar comments
might be made concerning the capture of Silistria by the
Russians in 1829, the battle of Gujerat twenty years
later, the battle of Sedan in 1870, and the conquest of
Khiva in 1873. The American Civil War will doubtless
lead to criticism of the battles selected as decisive ; it
would be difficult to find in any group of the men who
participated in that gigantic struggle perfect accord of
opinion as to the relative importance of the battles that
were fought between 1861 and 1865 for the preservation
or destruction of the Union. The author's reasons for
his selections will be found at the end of the chapter
wherein each battle is described.

In the preparation of this volume the author has exam-
ined a vast amount of military and other history, and is
indebted for his material to the works of many previous
writers. Of some of the battles described he had personal
knowledge, and he has been able to inspect certain of the
battle-fields referred to in the narrative. Among the
works his obligations to which he desires to acknowledge
may be mentioned the following : —

" A View of South America and Mexico " (Anonymous) ;
Soldan's " Historia del Peru Independente " ; " Journals of
Lord Cochrane in South America " ; Phayre's " Narrative
of the Burmese War " ; Histories of India by Malcolm,
IMill, Kaye, W^ilson, Elphinstone, and others ; Alison's
" History of Europe " ; Lady Bourcher's " Despatches of
Admiral Codrington " ; Histories of Greece* by Grote,
Cox, and others ; Count Von Moltke's " Russians in Bul-
garia and Roumelia " ; Chesney's " Russo-Turkish Cam-
paigns of 1828-29"; Poitevin's "Prise de la Citadelle

PREFACE. V

d'Anvers " ; Ripley's "History of the War with Mex-
ico " ; Bancroft's " History of the Pacific States of North
America " ; Malleson's " Decisive Battles of India," and
" History of the Indian Mutiny " ; Wright's " Northwest-
ern Provinces of India"; M'Ghee's "How We Got to
Pekin " ; Oliphant's "Lord Elgin's Mission to China";
Bordstacdt and Dwyer's " Franco-German War " ; Mark-
ham's " War between Peru and Chili " ; Gaffaret's " His-
toire d' Algcrie " ; King's " Europe in Storm and Calm " ;
Delord's " Histoire du Second Empire"; Sturmer's
" Der Tod des Grafen Dicbitsch " ; Schuyler's " Turkes-
tan " ; MacGahan's "Fall of Khiva"; Marvin's " Rus-
sians at the Gates of Herat"; Boulger's " Central Asian
Questions"; and Russell's "War in the Crimea." Har-
pers and the Century Magazines deserve acknowledg-
ment, and so do the files of the New York Tribune,
London Daily Xeics, London Times, Illustrated London
News, London GrapJiie, Augsburger Allgemeine Zeitung,
and other newspapers. The official records of the Amer-
ican Civil War have been examined, together with numer-
ous volumes of an unofficial character. In describing the
battle of Gettysburg the author has thought best to rely
mainly upon "The History of the Civil War in America,"
by the Comte de Paris. In so doing he has hoped to avoid
the charge of partialit}', which has been brought against
nearly every other of the numerous writers on the subject.
The battles here described possess an interest for the
student of military tactics and strategy. The book has,
however, for its further purpose, the idea of presenting
an outline survey of the history of the Nineteenth Cen-
tury, considered from the point of view of its chief
military events. It is the author's hope that the result of
his labors may help to make clear the character and rela-
tive importance of these events, and to indicate their
influence in shaping the history of our own times.

T. W. K.

New York, April, 18S7.

CONTENTS.

CHAPTER.
I.
II.
III.

IV.

VI.

VII.

VIII.

IX.

XI.

XII.
XIII.

XIV.

XV.

XVI.

XVII.
XVIII.

PAGB

Battle of Ayacucho — 1824 , . . i

Battle of Prome — 1825 .... 17

Battle of Navarino — 1S27 ... 29

Siege of Silistri.a. — 1829 .... 47
Battle of Staoueli and Fall of Algiers

— 1830 ........ 64

Capture of Antwerp and Liberation of

Belgium — 1832 77

Capture of the City of Mexico — 1847 . 91
Battle of Gujerat — 1849 . . . -117
Capture of the Malakoff and the Redan,

AND Fall of Sebastopol — 1855 . . 133

LUCKNOW AND CaWNPORE — 1857-8 . . 154

Capture of the Peiho Forts and Pekin

— 1858-60 177

Battle of Solferino — 1859 . . . 197
Battle between the Monitor and the

Merrimac — 1862 210

Battle of Gettysburg — 1863 . . . 230
Siege and Fall of Vicksburg — 1863 . . 260
Battle of Five Forks and Lee's Surren-
der— 1865 289

Battle of Koeniggratz (Sadowa) — 1866 . 308

Battle of Gravelotte — 1870 . . . 325

V^IU

CONTENTS.

CHAPTER.

XIX.
XX.

XXI.

XXII.

XXIII.

XXIV.

Battle .\nd Fall of Sedan — 1870

Fall of Khiva — 1873 - . . . .

Fall of Plevna — 1877 . ' . . .

Capture of Geok Tepe — 1881

Battle of Miraflores— 1881

El Obeid — Annihilation of Hicks Pasha's

Army— 1883

XXV. Fall of Khartoum — 1885 ....

PAGE

344
365
382

415
431

450
465

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MAPS AND PLANS.

Outline Map of Spanish America . . Frontispiece

Battle of Ayacucho ....... ii

Outline Map of British Burmah .... 17

Turkey in Europe ....... 29

Navarino, Battle Plan ...... 41

SiLiSTRiA, Siege Plan 51

Outline Map of Algeria ...... 65

Plan of the Fortifications of the City of Algiers, 67

Plan of Fortifications of Antwerp and Vicinity . 79

Plan of the Gates (Vera Cruz) .... 93

Siege of Vera Cruz ....... 95

Valley of Mexico ....... 97

Battle of Churubusco ...... 103

Battle of Molino del Rey 105

Storming of Chapultepec . . . . . .111

Outline Map of the Punjaub . . . . .119

Battle of Gujerat . 127

Plan of Sebastopol , ...... 133

Attack on the Malakoff ...... 135

Lines. OF Attack on the Malakoff and the Redan, 141

Sketch Plan of the Redan ..... 147

Position at Cawnpore ....... 157

Siege of Lucknow . . . . . . -171

River Pei-Ho 179

Forts on River Pei-Ho 183

Engaging the Takoo Forts ..... 189

MAPS AND PLANS.

Sketch Map of Northern Italy

Battle of Solferino

Plans of the Monitor and the Merrimac

Scene of the Battle between the Monitor

THE Merrimac ....

Monitor and Merrimac in Action
Gettysburg, Campaign Map
Positions at Gettysburg, Second of July
Positions at Gettysburg, Third of July
ViCKSBURG, Campaign Map No. i
ViCKSBURG, Campaign Map No. 2
ViCKSBURG, Siege Lines
Siege of Petersburg
Battle of Five Forks
Routes of March on Koeniggratz
Battle of Koeniggratz
Sketch Map of Region (Gravelotte)
Battle of Gravelotte, Positions, Morning
Battle of Gravelotte, Positions, Evening

Region about Sedan

Battle of Sedan, Positions Morning
Battle of Sedan, Positions Afternoon
Map of Territory around Khiva
First Battle of Plevna ....
Defence and Blockade of Plevna
Last Sortie from Plevna ....
Outline Map of Changes in Europe
Outline Map of Chan'ges in Asia
Expedition on Geok-Tepe ....
Battle of Miraflores. ....

Campaign of El Obeid, Sketch of Territory
Country from Korti to Khartoum ,

and

PAGB
199

213

221
223

273
283

293

311
321

325

335
339
347
353
361

365
391
403
407
409

413
419

433
451
467

DECISIVE BATTLES SINCE
WATERLOO.

CHAPTER I.

BATTLE OF AVACUCHO — 1 824.

The Napoleonic wars that terminated with the battle
of Waterloo reduced the nations of Europe to a state of
exhaustion, and for a considerable period thereafter there
was little occupation for the soldier. England, France,
Spain, Germany, and Russia were engaged in repairing
the ravages of war, and by common consent there was a
truce to arms and a halt in the work of organized destruc-
tion. But the wings of Peace, outstretched over Europe,
were folded on the other side of the Atlantic, throughout
all the vast region known as Spanish America. Mexico,
Peru, Chili, and the other trans-Atlantic provinces of Spain
sought to sever their connection with the Old World ;
one by one they achieved their independence through a
series of wars that deluged the land with blood and
threatened to leave it an uninhabited waste.

The final battle of the South American wars of inde-
pendence was fought at Ayacucho, Peru, December 9,
1824. Let us first glance at the events which led up to
that sanguinary conflict, and then consider the occur-
rences of the day which saw the Spanish power in Amer-
ica broken forever.

2 DECISIVE BATTLES SINCE WATERLOO.

It is a curious circumstance that the South American
revolutions had their beginning in the intense loyalty of
the people of the Spanish-American colonies, and partic-
ularly of the United States of Colombia, for their king.
In 1808 the armies of Napoleon were overrunning Spain ;
Ferdinand VII. was compelled to abdicate the throne,
and Joseph Bonaparte, brother of Napoleon, was pro-
claimed King of Spain and the Indies. Agents were im-
mediately sent, in the name of the new king, to announce
to the American colonies the abdication of Ferdinand and
the elevation of Joseph to the throne. Joseph shrewdly
promised to the viceroys and captains-general throughout
the colonies, that they should retain their places, provided
they acquiesced in the new order of things and induced
the people to accept it. But though the ofificials were
resigned to the situation, the people were not ; they pub-
licly burned the proclamations of King Joseph, expelled
his agents, and insulted all Frenchmen then living in the
colonies, so that most of them fled for safety.

In July, 1808, a French brig arrived at La Guayra, the
port of Caraccas, with intelligence of recent events in
France and Spain, including the abdication of Ferdinand
and the accession of Joseph Bonaparte. The captain of
the brig proceeded to Caraccas with despatches to the cap-
tain-general, and soon after his arrival the news from the
Old World became known among the people. An En-
glish ofificer who was there at the time writes as follows:

The city was immediately in arms, 10,000 of its inhabitants
surrounded the residence of the captain-general and demanded
the proclamation of Ferdinand the Seventh as their king, which
he promised the next day. But this would not satisfy them ;
they proclaimed him that evening by heralds, in form, through-
out the city, and placed his portrait, illuminated, in the gallery
of the town-house.

The French were first publicly insulted in the coffee-house
from which they were obliged to withdraw, and the French

BATTLE OF AYACUCHO. 3

captain left Caraccas, privately, about eight o'clock that night,
escorted by a detachment of soldiers, and so saved his life,
for, about ten o'clock, his person was demanded of the govern-
or by the populace, and when they learned that he was gone,
three hundred men followed him to put him to death.

About the same time a French brig arrived at Buenos
Ayres with an envoy from Napoleon carr^^ing despatches
to Liniers, the viceroy, who issued a proclamation an-
nouncing the events which had occurred in Spain, and ad-
vising the people to submit to the authority of Joseph
Bonaparte. The proclamation was coldly received by the
people ; the governor of Monte Video accused Liniers of
disloyalty, disregarded his proclamation, established a
junta^ or governing body for his province, and withdrew
it altogether from the authority of Liniers.

In spite of the efforts of the viceroys and other officials
to convince the colonies that every thing was quiet in
Spain, it became known among the people that the penin-
sula was in a state of insurrection against the authority
of Joseph Bonaparte, that in some provinces he was
openly defied, and provincial juntas had assumed the
management of affairs. The one at Seville proclaimed
itself the supreme junta of Spain and the Indies, and sent
deputies to the colonies requiring an acknowledgment
of its authority. In order to secure this acknowledg-
ment it announced that it was recognized and obeyed
throughout Spain, which was far from being the case. At
the same time the junta of the Asturias opposed that of
Seville ; the regency of Ferdinand claimed to have su-
preme authority ; and to complicate matters still further
Joseph Bonaparte had been proclaimed king. There were

^ Junta in Spanish means an association, and is usually applied to a body
of persons combined for any civil or political object. It formerly referred
more particularly to assemblies of representatives of the people meeting
without authority of the sovereign, but has latterly been extended to those
of the most strictly legal character.

4 DECISIVE BA TTLES SINCE IVA TERLOO.

therefore four kinds of authorities to which the colonies
were required to give allegiance ; they were ready to
recognize any proper authority of Spanish origin, and w hile
they differed as to their proper course between the various
juntas, they were all agreed in their hatred for the French.

The efforts of the viceroys and their subordinates to
secure colonial allegiance tu Joseph Bonaparte led to col-
lisions between the populace and the authorities in several
cities, and finally to oper warfare. Owing to the dis-
orders in Spain there was no central power which the
colonies could respect, and this circumstance led to the
formation of juntas of their own. The first was in Quito
in 1809, but it was suppressed by the viceroy ; the second
was at Santa Fe de Bogota in the same year, and many of
its members were imprisoned and afterwards massacred
in cold blood. Similar scenes were enacted in other parts
of the colonies, and tended greatly to weaken the authority
of the mother country. Naturally the colonists asked the
question, " What will become of us if Spain falls completely
under the domination of France ?" The discussion of the
question naturally led to independence, and it is easy to
see how a struggle which began in extreme loyalty to
Ferdinand VII. and the government he represented, could
develop into a battle for complete independence. From
1808 to 1812 the French armies gained ground in Spain.
There was little hope of a restoration of the Spanish
power and the expulsion of the Bonapartes, and long be-
fore the disasters of Napoleon in Russia, and the con-
sequent retreat of the French from Spain, the colonies
were on the high road to absolute freedom from the yoke
of their mother country.

The government of Joseph Bonaparte adopted repres-
sive measures towards the colonies ; troops were sent to
awe the people into submission, the province of Caraccas
was declared in blockade, and the colonial, rulers were
ordered to enforce obedience at whatever cost. After the

BA TTLE OF A YA CUCHO. 5

retirement of the French from Spain, the regency, which
succeeded to Joseph Bonaparte, and after it the restored
king, Ferdinand VII., continued the same measures,
totally ignoring the loyalty which the colonies had origi-
nally displayed at the beginning of the French occupation.
Nothing remained for the colonies but a war for inde-
pendence, a war which terminated, as already mentioned,
with the battle of Ayacucho, sixteen years after the first
outbreak at Caraccas.

The story of the South American war of independence
would fill many volumes. Juntas were established in
Caraccas, Buenos Ayres, Santiago, and other South Ameri-
can cities widely separated from each other, during 18 10,
and the repressive measures adopted by the colonial
authorities only added to the vigor of the movement. In
Buenos Ayres the viceroy was deposed, and the powers of
government were assumed by a junta acting in the name
of the deposed and captive king, Ferdinand VII. From
Buenos Ayres the disturbance extended to Chili, where
another junta deposed the viceroy and assumed the
reins of government ; about the same time there was an
insurrection in Upper Peru (now called Bolivia) and later
another in Peru. From a state of tranquillity, in 1808,
the whole of South America was in a condition of open
or partial revolt in less than four years, with the single
exception of Brazil.

Brazil was a colony of Portugal, not of Spain. In 1807,
when Napoleon declared war against Portugal, its king,
John VI., fled to Brazil, accompanied by many courtiers
and followed by numerous emigrants. After the fall of
Napoleon in 181 5, Brazil was raised to the rank of a king-
dom ; John assumed the title of King of Portugal, Al-
garve, and Brazil, and on the 26th of February, 1821, he
proclaimed the constitution. A revolutionary movement
took place in the following April ; Brazil was proclaimed
an independent empire ; it adopted a constitution in 1824,

6 DECISIVE BATTLES SINCE WATERLOO.

and its independence was acknowledged in 1825. Its
transition from a colony of a European government to an
independent state was far less turbulent than that of its
neighbors.

The revolution continued with varying success for more
than a decade, but with the advantages decidedly in favor
of the revolutionists. The progress towards independence
was retarded by dissensions among the revolutionists,
which frequently threatened to restore the royalist power;
ambitions and jealousies too often obscured patriotism,
and in many instances they led to open or secret assas-
sination. This was the case in Buenos Ayres, Chili, and
Peru to a veiy marked degree, and only to a minor extent
in other parts of the revolted countr}\ On several occa-
sions assistance to beleaguered garrisons or to armies in
the field was deliberately refused or withheld, for no other
reason than personal ill-feeling between general and
other officers who were engaged in a common cause of
patriotism.

West of the Andes the progress of the revolution was
less encouraging than in the countries to the eastward.
The royalists were practically in full control of Peru and
Chili in the earl}- years of the insurrection, and in the lat-
ter country they had banished many of the leading patri-
ots to the island of Juan Fernandez, and were exercising
extreme tyranny ov^er all the people. Early in 18 17 Gen-
eral San Martin, Governor of Mendoza, and an active pa-
triot of Buenos Ayres, conceived the design of crossing
the Andes with an army of liberation to assist the Chilian
patriots. Nearly a year was spent in organizing the army
and collecting the necessary materials and transportation.
The passage of the Andes by San Martin was a more dif-
ficult matter than that of Napoleon over the Alps ; it was
accomplished in thirteen days, with a loss of a few men
and of five thousand horses and mules, and was followed
by the battle of Chacabuco, in which the royalists were

BATTLE OF AYACUCHO. /

completely defeated. A junta was immediately formed
at Santiago, and the dictatorship was offered to San Mar-
tin, who declined it.

The royalist army of Chili fled to Talcahuano, and after
receiving reinforcements from the viceroy at Lima, re-
sumed the offensive. It encountered the patriot army on
the plains of Maypu, April 5, 1818, and the encounter
resulted in one of the most sanguinary battles on record,
when the number of men engaged is considered. Out of
eight thousand men comprising the Spanish army, two
thousand were killed or wounded, and three thousand cap-
tured. The general escaped with a portion of his cavalry,
but all the baggage, artillery, military chests, and supplies
fell into the hands of the patriots. The loss of the latter
was one thousand killed and wounded, out of an aggre-
gate of about seven thousand. The victory gave inde-
pendence to Chili, and turned attention towards Peru.
Steps were immediately taken to aid the Peruvians to gain
their independence, and for this purpose an army and a
naval force was organized.

Lord Cochrane, an English naval officer, arrived in Chili
in November, 1818, and was immediately appointed to the
command of the Chilian squadron. Great exertions were
made, and in the course of a year many captures were
effected, though not without some losses by the Chilian
squadron. On the 20th of August, 1820, a combined land
and naval expedition left Valparaiso for Pisco, about one
hundred miles south of Peru, where the land forces were
disembarked. The squadron proceeded to Callao, where
a Spanish frigate of forty guns with two sloops-of-war and
fourteen gun-boats were lying under the protection of the
batteries. On the night of November 5th, Lord Cochrane
succeeded in capturing the frigate, and this exploit was
practically the termination of the Spanish naval power in
the Pacific, so far as offensive measures were concerned.

An armistice of the land forces was made by request of

8 DECISIVE BATTLES SINCE WATERLOO.

the viceroy, but nothing came of it. The independent army
moved leisurely to the north of Lima, remaining for weeks
and sometimes months in camp engaged in recruiting and
in the dissemination of liberal ideas, and also in cutting off
the suppHes of the royalists in Lima. Later there was an-
other abortive armistice, and early in July, 1 82 1 , San Martin
threatened to move against Lima. Thereupon the viceroy
abandoned it, and on the 12th of the month San Martin
entered and was joyously received. The independence of
Peru was solemnly proclaimed on the 28th of July, and on
the 3d of August San Martin assumed the title of Protector
of Peru and issued a proclamation.

The liberating army remained inactive till the following
May, but the work of recruiting and making ready for the
field was actively continued. In July, 1822, San Martin
went to Guayaquil for an interview with Simon Bolivar,
the liberator of Colombia, and returned in August with a
contingent of Colombian troops.

On the 20th of September, 1822, the constitutional con-
gress of Peru was assembled and San IVIartin surrendered
his dictatorship which he had held for little more than a
year. The congress unanimously named him general and
commander-in-chief of the armies of Peru ; he accepted
the title, but declined the appointment on the ground that
such a position would be inconsistent with the authority of
congress. Shortly afterward he returned to Chili, and the
affairs of Peru were placed in the hands of a junta of three
prominent citizens. In November, 1822, an expedition
left Lima for the southern coast but it was defeated and
dispersed by the royalists in the following January. There-
upon the royalist army reoccupied Lima and the patriot
cause was in great danger.

About this time the United States of Colombia achieved
independence, after a long and devastating war which was
brought to a triumphal end by the genius and patriotism of
Simon Bolivar. Foreseeing that if the royalists obtained

BATTLE OF AYACUCHO. 9

control in Peru the independence of Colombia would be
endangered, and being invited by the Peruvians, Bolivar
proceeded to Lima at the head of a considerable force ; he
was joyfully welcomed and appointed dictator of Peru,
until such time as the Spaniards should be conquered or
driven out. The royalist army retired to the interior at
the approach of Bolivar and his army.

The royalists were in such numbers that Bolivar did
not dare to risk a battle until the arrival of reinforcements
from Colombia, and when threatened with an attack he re-
tired to Truxillo. In February, 1824, the royalists again
occupied Lima and Callao ; by the following June Boli-
var's forces were sufficiently strong to enable him to re-
sume the offensive, which resulted in a battle on the plains
of Junin, on the 6th of August, where the royalists were
defeated with heavy loss,' especially in cavalry, on which
great reliance was placed. From this time until the 9th of
December no important action was fought but there was
much skilful manoeuvring on both sides. The liberating
army, consisting of the united forces of Peru and Colombia,
was under the command of General Anton Jose de Sucre,
who had previously distinguished himself on the battle-
field and especially at Pichincha in 1822, where he de-
feated the Spaniards in a fiercely fought conflict.

Early in December General Sucre took a position at
Ayacucho in sight of the royalist army, which was posted
on a height. General Bolivar was not present ; he had
given full power to Sucre to do as he thought best, either
to give battle to the royalists or refuse it. In a letter
written' a short time before the battle of Ayacucho Boli-
var cautioned Sucre in the following words :

" Remember, that on your army corps depends the fate
of Peru, perhaps forever ; and with it, that of the whole
of America, perhaps for years. Considering the terrible
consequences which a battle lost may entail upon us,
every means of foresight and strategy is to be exerted so

lO DECISIVE BATTLES SINCE WATERLOO.

as not to make a move without gaining a decided and
absolute success."

Acting on this advice Sucre had advanced with great
caution. Several times the enemy offered battle, which
Sucre declined, as he was waiting the arrival of reinforce-
ments which were hurrying forward. There were several
skirmishes in which no decided advantage was gained by
either side, but the movements of the patriots frustrat d
some of the plans of the viceroy and compelled him .o
make many changes of position.

On the 4th of December, Lieutenant Colonel Medina,
adjutant of the liberator, Bolivar, came into Sucre's camp
with a final order that a decisive battle was to be ven-
tured. It was offered on that very day in the plain of Tam-
bo, but the Spaniards declined.

On December 8th both armies stood face to face. Every
thing told that they were on the eve of a great battle,
which neither could avoid by means of a retreat without
the risk of destruction. Sucre's position was at a con-
siderable distance from the friendly villages, and he was
opposed by an army accustomed to quick marches ; the
roads were rough, and his supplies were giving out.
Scarcely could he muster 5,780 men, and he had only one
small piece of artillery.

On the other hand the Spaniards were obliged to force
the fight. A retreat w^ould have been tantamount to a
rout, and their rations were alarmingly short. But they
were superior in numbers, as they counted 9,310 men of
all arms, with fourteen pieces of artillery.

The Spanish army was on the hills round about Con-
dorcanqui ; its right and left wings were protected by a
deep ravine, its rear-guard stood against the steep moun-
tain range, and its front was towards a plain half a mile in
width and a mile in length.

General Miller of the liberating army tiius describes
the battle-field :

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BATTLE OF AYACUCHO

12 DECISIVE BATTLES SINCE WATERLOO.

Quinua, an Indian village, is located on the farther side, to
the west of Ayacucho, almost square in shape and about a mile
in circuit, bordered right and left by deep and rugged ravines.
Back of the plain, or towards the east, it slopes off gradually
for two miles towards the high road from Guamanga to An-
anta, which runs right up to a perpendicular rock and ends
there. On the eastern side of the plain is Condorcanqui, on
a huge ledge of rock which runs from north to south. On
this ledge the royalist army v, as encamped.

The army of liberation formed in the plain, in front of
the Spaniards, about a half a mile away. They were drawn
up in close columns and awaited the onset of the royal-
ists. The corps of the independents were stationed in
the following manner :

Cordova's Division, (on the right wing)

Consisting of the regiment of Bogota,

" " " " Pichincha,

" " " " Skirmishers.

Miller's Division (in the centre)

Consisted of the Hussars of Junin,

" " " Grenadiers of Colombia,

" " " Hussars of

" " " Mounted Grenadiers of Buenos

Ay res.
In La Mar's Division (on the left)

Was the Peruvian Legion,
Battalion No. i.
" " 2.

« 3-
Lara's Division, (reserve)

Was made up of Camp-followers,
" " " Deserters,
" " " Riflemen,

Artillery one four-pounder.
The following account of the battle is abridged from
" Historia del Peru Independente."

BATTLE OF AYACUCHO. 13

On the memorable day, Thursday December 9, 1824, the
morning was clear and the sun brilliantly lighted the scene.
The trumpets and drums sounded. The officers moved in all
directions to take their orders : on the right, the young and
brave general of division, Cordova, a general of division at
twenty-five ; on the left the Peruvian body, sent by brave and
honest old La Mar ; the centre the gallant Lara commanded,
together with the remaining Colombian section. The cavalry
formed in the rear about the centre of the division ; it had
been moved up by orders of the famous Miller. Sucre, the head
of all, went to inspect the troops with a coolness that never
forsook him, leaving nothing undone that his genius and ex-
perience suggested. Down the whole line he rode, exhorting
the men with stirring words. Halting near the centre, he said
with deep emotion :

" By you, soldiers, present here, the fate of South America is to
be decided "y and noticing the hostile forces descending to
meet them he added : " This day luill crown your proiuess."

On the royalist side General Canterac, chief in command,
called up the generals and commanders of divisions and gave
out the orders of the day. General Valdez held the right of
the line, Monet the left, and Villalobolos the centre, while the
cavalry was formed in the rear.

It was ten in the morning when the fire opened, and the
action fairly began. At first the advantage was on the side of
the Spaniards, but General Cordova brought up his division
within a hundred yards of the enemy, where he ordered a vol-
ley and followed it with a bayonet charge. The attack was
successful, and the enemy fled in disorder. Charge followed
charge, and by one o'clock in the afternoon, victory was prac-
tically assured to the patriots.

The enemy rallied again on the heights of Condorcanqui,
and owing to the exertions of Canterac, Valdez, and other offi-
cers, somewhere near a thousand men were collected. A coun-
cil of war was called for by Canterac, who stated that Peru was
irretrievably lost since Olaneta, their only hope, had gone over
to the enemy, and was making terms for capitulation. This
fact was accepted by nearly all the royalist officers, and then

14 DECISIVE BATTLES SINCE WATERLOO.

Canterac asked for a truce of arms. Very soon General La
Mar came over, and assured them that Sucre would accept an
honorable capitulation.

The time was precious ; the sun had just gone down after
having shone upon the grandest day of America, and the routed
Spaniards would have had to perish in their flight or starve for
want of food. Canterac explained the straits in which they were,
and assured the Spanish commanders that there was no other
means of safety. It w^as decided that General Canterac should
convey the resolution, and settle the conditions of capitulation.

Sucre's greatness and generosity were shown in the condi-
tions of surrender. He might have imposed harsh or humili-
ating terms, but his way was not to crush his brave opponents.
Canterac handed over the minutes, consisting of eighteen arti-
cles, and they were ratified with slight modifications. Accord-
ing to the terms of capitulation, all troops, baggage, and am-
munition in Peru were handed over to the patriots ; all the
men of the Spanish army could freely go home at the expense
of Peru, and while they marched along with the Peruvians,
they would receive their pay ; those preferring the Peruvian
service might enter it. No one should be molested in person
or property for his former opinions, and all were free to leave
the country whenever they chose. Peru would take up the na-
tional debt contracted by the Spanish government in the coun-
try. The fortresses of Callao were to surrender within twenty
days, handing over formally their public parks, warehouses,
archives, etc. Vessels of war and tenders belonging to Spain
might remain for six months, to ship their provisions and get
ready for quitting the Pacific.

The prisoners taken in the battle included the Viceroy La
Serna, General Canterac, chief in command, fourteen other
generals, with numbers of subordinate officers, in addition to
the soldiers ; in short, those that were not killed on the battle-
field were captured. There were 1,400 dead, and 700 wounded,
on the Spanish side ; of the patriots, 300 were killed, and 609
wounded ; in all, about 3,016 hors de combat, almost the fourth
part of those engaged, which shows how fiercely the battle was
contested.

BATTLE OF AYACUCHO. 1 5

After burying the dead, the victorious army moved
southward from Ayacucho. Cuzco, Arequipa, and other
points were surrendered, but General Rodel, commanding
the fortress of Callao, refused to accept the terms of capit-
ulation. The fortress was immediately invested by the
Colombian and Peruvian troops, and blockaded by a naval
force which was lent to Bolivar by Chili. The fortress
held out for more than a year, and was not surrendered
until the garrison of five hundred men was at the point of
starvation. General Rodel embarked for Europe with the
soldiers that chose to accompany him, and the fall of Cal-
lao was the final event of the war.

As soon as the news of the victory at Ayacucho reached
Lima, Bolivar issued the following proclamation :

To the Soldiers of the Conquering Artny at Ayacucho :

Soldiers — You have carried liberty to South America, and
a quarter of the globe bears witness to your glory. Who could
have beaten you off ?

South America is full of the marks of your valor, but Ayacu-
cho, Chimborazo-like, rises above all.

Soldiers — Colombia owes you the laurels you have won, and
Peru its life, liberty, and peace, not to forget what La Pensa
and Chili owe you. The good cause, the cause of the rights of
men, has been vindicated by you, in a terrible battle against
the oppressors. See, then, the benefit you have conferred
upon the human race by your heroic sacrifices.

Soldiers — Accept the undying gratitude which I pronounce
in the name of Peru. You shall be rewarded before you return
to your beautiful home. No, no, never could an adequate re-
ward be found ; your services are beyond any price.

Peruvian soldiers — Your country will ever hold you among
the chief saviors of Peru.

Colombian soldiers — Hundreds of victories immortalize you.

Bolivar.

Head-quarters at Lima, Dec. 25, 1824.

Honors and rewards were showered upon the liberator's

DECISIVE BATTLES SINCE WATERLOO.

army. Each corps carried the adjunct of " Glorious Lib-
erators of Peru," with the further addition of " Well De-
servcdin the Highest Degree." Commanders, ofificers, and
men received medals, the widows and famiHes of those
fallen in the field were amply provided for; the wounded
continued to receive full pay for life, and Sucre became
Grand Marshal of Ayacucho. Many generals and other
officers were promoted, and a monument on the field of
Ayacucho reminds the visitor of the battle that terminated
the Spanish rule in South America.

CHAPTER II.

BATTLE OF PRO ME — 1 82 5.

From America \vc will pass nearly half way around the
globe in our search for the next decisive battle after that
of Ayacucho.

All students of history are well aware that the British
power in India in the first half of the present century was
represented by the East India Company. From an asso-
ciation of merchants trading to the East Indies in A. D.
1600, the Honorable East India Company grew to a colony
of national importance. It possessed an army and a navy,
it had the right of eminent domain, it had a commercial
monopoly the greatest ever known, and the people under
its control numbered many millions. It possessed the
powers of a state and likewise its ambitions ; it conquered
territories neighboring to its own and then looked for
more territories to conquer. Kingdoms and principalities
of India were brought under its sway, and there was hardly
a decade in the two hundred and fifty years of its existence
in which it was not at war with neighboring powers. It
generally came off victorious, thanks to the splendid fight-
ing qualities which British soldiers have displayed through
many ages, backed by the well-known British policy of
never submitting to temporary defeat at the hands of
Asiatics.

While the British in the early part of the present cent-
ury were extending their boundaries in the northwest
provinces of India, the kingdom of Burmah displayed a

1 8 DECISIVE BATTLES SINCE WATERLOO.

desire to aggrandize some of the region lying to the south
of the company's territories. About I/qS some 30,000
]\Iugs, inhabitants of Arracan, in Burmah, fled from the
oppression of their Burmese masters and sought refuge in
Chittagong, a possession of the British. Several attempts
were made by the Burmese to secure the return of these
fugitives, but without avail ; between 1800 and 1813 five
or six embassies were sent by the Burmese government
to that of India with this object in view, but all failed of
their purpose. Then all was quiet for a time, save that
there were occasional raids of very little consequence along
the frontier. In 1822 the Burmese adopted bellicose meas-
ures ; they seized the island of Shahporee, at the entrance
of the arm of the sea dividing Chittagong from Arracan,
overpowering the British by a night attack and taking
possession in the name of the Burmese goverment. When
asked to explain his action, the governor of Arracan an-
nounced that his government had annexed the island, and
unless the right of the Burmese to its possessions were ad-
mitted, the king of Burmah would send an army to invade
the British territory. This plan of proceeding was not
unlike that of more civilized countries, Great Britain
among them, in carrying on the work of annexation, but
when tried against the British it was certain to be resented.
The governor-general of India was not ready to assume
the offensive at once ; the Burmese mistook delay for tim-
idity and proceeded to invade British territory. Large
bodies of Burmese troops crossed the frontier from Assam
and Munnipore and established themselves in bamboo
stockades ; they were driven out by the British, but not
without considerable loss to the latter. These operations
took place in 1823 and '24 ; while the British were prepar-
ing to send a considerable force against the invaders, news
came to Calcutta that Maha Bandula, the favorite general
of the king of Ava, had penetrated the Britis'h territories
bordering Arracan with a large army, and was so confident

BATTLE OF PROME. 1 9

of success that he carried with him a set of golden fetters
in which the governor-general of India was to be carried
captive to Burmah. As soon as this news was known to
be authentic, Lord Amherst, the governor-general, pro-
claimed war and set his troops in motion.

Port Cornwallis in the Andaman Islands was named as
a point of rendezvous ; a division from Bengal was sent
there in April, and followed a month later by a division
from Madras. Sir Archibald Campbell was named the
commander-in-chief ; he had served with distinction in the
Spanish campaigns, but knew little about Oriental modes
of warfare. Commodore Grant commanded the naval
part of the expedition, which consisted of the Liffey,
Lame, Sophia, Slaney, and several smaller vessels. There
was one small steamboat, the Snake, and it is worthy of
remark that this boat, built at Bombay in 1820, had an
honorable career of sixty years, and was broken up in
1880.

The land forces comprised about 11,500 men of all arms,
the great majority being native troops of India. It was
the plan of the commander to move upon Rangoon, near
the mouth of the Irrawaddy, and by prompt action cap-
ture the city, and thus frighten the king into asking for
peace.

Detachments were sent to occupy Cheduba and Ne-
grais ; the rest of the command arrived off Rangoon ac-
companied by the whole fleet. The city, which was built
on the bank of the river, was found to be surrounded by a
stockade about twelve feet in height. The stockade was
built of teak timber in the form of a square, and defended
by batteries on the water front. These batteries opened fire
on the nearest ships, and the Liffey answered it immedi-
ately. The guns at the landing were speedily dismounted,
and the soldiers occupied the town, no enemy being in
sight. The governor of Pegu, the province in which
Rangoon is situated, had been commanded to come to

20 DECISIVE BATTLES SINCE WATERLOO.

the capital ; he died there, and his successor had not
arrived when the fleet appeared. The rewan, or com-
mander of the flotilla, was acting-governor ; he knew
nothing of the proposed attack and was therefore taken
by surprise. In order to render the prize of the English
of little value he forced the native inhabitants to leave
the town, allowing none of them to remain in or near it.
The guards who had been placed in charge of the few
Europeans and foreign residents soon fled, thus permit-
ting them to escape. The rainy season was approaching,
and, as the inhabitants had taken with them their boats,
cattle, and carts, the English general found himself una-
ble to secure, either by land or water, the necessary trans-
portation facilities for carrying on operations.

Immediately on landing in Rangoon General Camp-
bell occupied the Shoay Dagon or Golden Pagoda. The
pagoda is situated- about a mile and a half from the river
and stands on high ground. General Campbell found it
impossible to learn any thing of the movements of the
enemy, his force being entirely isolated. He sent a num-
ber of row-boats, well armed, to Kymyindaing to recon-
noitre. This town is distant by river about six miles from
Rangoon. Some shots were fired from several breast-
works which lined the shore. These breastworks were
attacked the next day, and carried by a small detachment
of soldiers and marines.

Within a few days the general, in person, made a sur-
vey of the country to the north of Shoay Dagon, taking
with him two guns, some native infantry-, and about three
hundred European soldiers. There was no road, and the
guns were soon abandoned because of the heavy rains
which prevailed, rendering an advance extremely difificult.
The troops, however, moved forward, leaving the artiller}',
which could not be dragged through the myd. At a dis-
tance of five or six miles from the great pagoda they saw
two stockades, four feet in height, with an interior trench

BATTLE OF PROME. 21

and a well-placed abatis. An attack was made, and the
stockades were carried at the point of the bayonet, the
muskets being useless on account of the rain. The Bur-
mese lost about three hundred men.

This was the first time the Burmese had ever fought
against European soldiers ; they were astonished at the
savage attack of the white soldiers, who carried the
stockades without firing a gun. Although the levies of
the country were near the forts, the rewan did not use
them. The British now held Kymyindaing as an out-
post, and for some weeks there were few hostile move-
ments. During these weeks the British army suffered
terribly from sickness. The climate and the constant ex-
posure to the rain brought fever and dyscnter}', which
crowded the hospitals and carried many victims to their
graves. It was feared at one time that it would be neces-
sary to retire altogether from Rangoon, as there threat-
ened to be not a single soldier able to defend it. Strong
efforts were made by the Burmese to oppose the British
army during the occupation of Rangoon. The plan was
simply to cut off all communication with the inhabitants
of Pegu who might be friendly to the invading forces, and
by overpowering numbers to capture the troops, or drive
them into the sea. They formed a complete cordon about
the British, who could learn very little through their
scouts, and as all the natives had been removed from
the neighborhood, there were no means of communica-
tion. It had been expected that the inhabitants of Pegu
would rise against their Burmese oppressors, but not a
word came to indicate that they contemplated any insur-
rection. Large levies of troops were made throughout
Burmah, and the numbers of the army surrounding Ran-
goon increased daily. The river was covered with boats
bringing men and provisions to the besieging army, and
by the end of May the Burmese considered themselves
strong enough to defy their enemies.

22 DECISIVE BATTLES SINCE WATERLOO.

Always on halting a Burmese army entrenches itself or
throws up a stockade, according to the condition of the
ground or the abundance of stockading material. In the
operations against the British not more than half the
Burmese soldiers were armed with muskets, the rest
carrying swords or spears and acting as pioneers. Within
a day's march of Rangoon, both on the river bank and in
the interior, there were several miles of strong stockades,
which the Burmese erected in their effort to isolate the
British in the city. General Campbell captured many of
these stockades, and at each capture there was a heavy
slaughter of Burmese. The king recalled Maha Bandula,
the ablest of the Burmese generals, from the threatened
invasion of Bengal, and ordered him to expel the invaders
from Rangoon.

By the end of November Maha Bandula had an army
of sixty thousand men, and appeared in force in front of
the Shoay Dagon, or Golden Pagoda. The British had es-
tablished a station at Kymyindaing, about seven miles up
the river, where they had captured a strong stockade, and
the first effort of the Burmese general was to capture this
stockade, in which he was unsuccessful. For three or
four days General Campbell allowed the Burmese to ad-
vance their outposts until they were within fifty yards of
his lines and out of the protection of the jungle which had
concealed their movements. As soon as he ascertained
that they had brought all their ammunition and provisions
out of the jungle and into their entrenchments he ordered
an attack ; there was severe fighting all along the line, re-
sulting in the defeat and flight of the Burmese, and the
loss of all the war material which they had brought to the
front of their lines. From the first to the fifteenth of
December it was estimated that six thousand Burmese
were killed, while the English loss in killed and wounded
was about six hundred.

Success being hopeless Maha Bandula retreated rapidly

BATTLE OF PROME. 23

to Donoobu, about sixty miles from Rangoon, taking with
him about one thousand of his men. The soldiers of the
investing army dispersed, and the force was broken up.
The British now occupied the southern districts of the
province without any opposition, including the ancient
port of Martaban, and all the coast of Tenasserim to the
south as far as Mergui. Sir Archibald Campbell was now
at liberty to continue operations by marching up the
Irrawaddy. The end of the year being at hand, and rein-
forcements having arrived from India, plans were formed
for marching on Prome, where it was hoped the Burmese
government would be ready to make terms of peace.

The British forces, finding themselves free to march up
the valley, were divided into two columns. General Wil-
loughby Cotton commanded one division, which was to
advance by the river. The other division was led by the
commander-in-chief in person. The former command con-
sisted of eight hundred Europeans, a small fleet of gun-
boats, a batallion of native infantry, and the steamer
Snake. No doubts of success were entertained, although
the number of men seemed small for the undertaking.
The rainy season was over ; the surface of the land was
dry, and the land force moved north to Hlaing and thence
to Sarawa on the Irrawaddy. It reached Donoobu about
March 25th, and found that Bandula was entrenched in a
stockaded enclosure on the right bank of the river. On
reconnoitring it appeared that Bandula's position was
strong, and an assault in force was deemed necessary. At
a distance of about three hundred yards from the north-
west angle trenches were opened and batteries erected.
General Cotton, who had come down the river, arrived
with his command ; the heavy guns and mortars were
placed in position, and firing was begun and continued
with little intermission for some hours. The assailants
were ready to storm the fort early in the morning of
April 25th, when it was found that the enemy had evacu-

24 DECISIVE BATl^LES SINCE WATERLOO.

ated during the night. Bandula had been slain, and his
brother, who succeeded him, could not hold the garrison
together. The victors found large stores of rice, some
guns and powder. The king and his court were filled
with terror at this overthrow. The court faction, of which
the queen and her brother were the leaders, persuaded
the king to remain firm.

General Campbell resumed his march into the interior
of Burmah, following the left bank of the river and
regulating his movements by those of the flotilla, which
was occasionally halted for the purpose of shelling out a
stockade or buoying the channel. Arriving at Prome, he
found it deserted and in flames ; the Burmese command-
er had driven out the inhabitants and fired the town, and
more than half of it was destroyed. As the rainy season
was approaching, the British force went into cantonment
at Prome and remained there for several months, and as
the Burmese were occupied with the work of assembling
another army, the invaders were not disturbed. The time
was utilized by the British in bringing up supplies and
ammunition and making every thing ready for a further
advance as soon as the dry season should set in. In the
middle of August General Cotton made a reconnaissance
up the river with the steamer, and at Myedeesaw a Bur-
mese force of about twenty thousand men drawn up in
line on the bank of the river.

Early in September the Burmese sent a flag of truce
with an officer to treat for peace; an armistice of forty
days was agreed upon to ascertain the terms on which the
British could be persuaded to leave the country, and later
on it was extended to the third of November. The terms
demanded at the end of the armistice were the cession
of the provinces of Arracan, Tavoy and Mergui to the
British, and the payment of a war indemnity of two
million pounds sterling. The Burmese replied that yield-
ing territory and paying money were not in accord with

BATTLE OF PROM E. 25

Burmese customs. They had succeeded in raising an
army and now felt that they could successfully cope with
the British.

Hostilities were resumed at once. The Burmese army
closed around Prome. A force of 3,000 Shans and 2,600
Burmese was stationed at Wattigan on the right bank of
the river, about twenty miles to the northeast. The
English commander decided to dislodge them immediately
in order that they might not be on his right flank in a
movement to the front. He advanced by night in three
columns and easily defeated the Shans. He had now to
attack the main force of the Burmese, about 20,000 strong-.
General Campbell's force for this attack comprised 2,500
Europeans and 1,500 native troops.

The Burmese army held a strong and well fortified
position on the heights. It was impossible for the artillery
to operate, owing to the nature of the ground, and the
position was carried by the infantry regiments unassisted.
The British loss was 12 officers and 160 men killed and
wounded. The Burmese in these engagements lost be-
tween 2,000 and 3,000 men. The Shans marched back to
their own territory, and three days later the Burmese
forces on the west side of the river were compelled to
retreat and marched northward, following their main army.
Leaving two regiments of native infantry to garrison
Prome, General Campbell continued his advance on
Myedee. He had 4,000 men and 28 guns, and the town
was taken without resistance. The terms of peace were
once more discussed and after two or three meetings an
agreement was signed by both sides and in order that the
king might be able to ratify the treaty, a cessation of
hostilities for fifteen days was decided upon. At the ex-
piration of this time no communication had been received
from the Burmese commissioners and hostile operations
were resumed by the British. Crossing the river in gun-
boats the fort was stormed, after a destructive cannonade.

26 DECISIVE BATTLES SINCE WATERLOO.

It was announced to the king that they would move for-
ward to Pugran, there to await the »-atification of the
treaty.

The war faction at Ava still entertained hopes of repair-
ing the losses they had sustained. A few more desultory
engagements were fought in which the natives were
defeated, and the British general halted at Pugan to
await the arrival of the detachments. Moving on he
arrived at Yandabo and formed a camp within four
marches of the capital. Although the king was ready to
fly northward he consented to the conclusion of a treaty
of peace. One fourth of the million sterling which was
levied to pay the costs of the war was handed over by the
Burmese commissioners who were willing to abide b\' the
general terms previously offered.

No discussion was made and the treaty was signed.
According to the agreement, Assam, Arracan, and the
coast of Tenasserim with the part of the state of Marta-
ban east of the Salwan River were given to the British
government. The king of Burmah promised to refrain
from interference in Kashar, Jyntia, and Manipur. It
was also determined to conclude a commercial treaty in
a short time. The British army marched back to Ran-
goon, where the troops remained until the second payment
of the money due for war expenses was made. This was
near the end of the year, and then the city was evacuated.

It is proper to remark that the Burmese soldier fought
under disadvantages which made it impossible for him to
win. These peasant-soldiers had no knowledge of military
drill and discipline, and lacked suitable arms, many of
them carrying only their native swords or spears. The
artillery corps of the army was even more poorly equipped
than the infantry. The artillery was made up of old guns
once used on ships, hardly any of them less than a century
old. As a general rule, the Burmese of^cers led their
soldiers only in flight. Yet, notwithstanding these draw-

BATTLE OF PKOME. 2/

backs, the poorly armed Burmese peasant feared not to
encounter the well-equipped Asiatic troops, commanded
by trained European officers. He was overcome only by
the European soldiers. The climate was a far more
formidable opponent of the invaders than were the Bur-
mese soldiery ; an English officer remarked of this cam-
paign, that if the climate of Burmah had been thoroughly
loyal to the king and performed its duty, the British would
have been compelled to turn back from Rangoon.

The engagement at Prome may be regarded as the de-
cisive battle of the first Burmese war. True, it was not a
brilliant affair, and in European warfare would rank as
little more than a skirmish, but a contrary- result would
have placed the British in a position of great danger.
The European troops were greatly reduced both in num-
bers and efficiency by the effects of the climate, and the
native troops could not be relied on for good work unless
with European support. A signal defeat at Prome would
have resulted in a retreat on Rangoon, and it has been
shown elsewhere how precarious was the hold on that city
in the early days of the invasion.

The first Burmese war was the beginning of the destruc-
tion of the kingdom which was once a power among Asi-
atic nations and a terror to its neighbors. In 1852 the
imprisonment of the master of a ship and other British
subjects led to the second Burmese war, which resulted in
the annexation of a considerable part of Burmese territory
to the British Indian possessions. The war began with
the bombardment of Rangoon, April 11, 1852, and its
capture three days later. Prome, Bassein, Martaban, and
other cities one after another fell into British hands ; the
British forces were almost invariably successful, and in a
few months peace was declared and the whole of the coast
provinces of Burmah passed under British sway.

The third Burmese war (1885) grew out of the inter-
ference of the king with the rights of British subjects in

DECISIVE BATTLES SINCE WATERLOO.

Burmah and his violation of the provisions of a commercial
treaty. He refused all reparation of the wrongs he had
committed, and thus rendered necessary an appeal to
arms. A British army invaded the country, and after a
few insignificant skirmishes occupied the capital and ended
the war. The king was deposed and sent to a designated
place of retirement on the Upper Irrawaddy ; the British
power was extended over the whole of Burmah, and the
dynasty of Alompra came to an end.

CHAPTER III.

BATTLE OF NAVARINO — 1 82/.

From 1815 to 1830 all the wars of Europe were with
the Mohammedans, except a few revolutionary and other
affairs of no great consequence. The English made an
attack on Algiers in 18 16 to punish the Algerines for
their piracies and for their cruelties to British subjects,
and fourteen years later the same place was captured by
the French and has since been held with a firm grasp.
The Greek revolution, which broke out in 1821, was the
revolt of Christians held in subjection by the Turks, the
Moslem conquerors of Southeastern Europe, who had
ruled the Hellenes with great oppression, and the struggle
was continued until the independence of Greece was
acknowledged. The war of Russia against the Persians,
in 1826, was also a fight between Christianity and Islam,
and so was the war between Russia and Turkey in 1828.
Even the English in India were contending against the
Moslems more than against warriors of other religions of
the great peninsula, especially in their campaign to the
north, when they penetrated the stronghold of Islam in
Central Asia. The exhaustion which followed the Napo-
leonic campaigns left Europe at peace with itself, but did
not restrain it from hostile encounters with the followers
of the Prophet of Mecca.

The Spanish revolution of 1820, which was speedily
followed by the revolutions of Naples, Sicily, and Pied-
mont., caused a great excitement throughout Europe, and

30 DECISIVE BA TTLES SINCE WA TERLOO.

paved the way for the Greek revolution of 1821. Since
the beginning of the century the Greeks had been pre-
paring for the struggle ; in fact, for more than fifty years
there had been a general movement in the direction of
independence through the spirit of nationality, which was
taught by the ablest writers and spread among the people
as widel}' as possible. There had been many insurrections
against the Turkish authorit}', but they were generally
suppressed without difficult}", though with the shedding
of much Greek blood. Nearly every village in Greece
suffered from pillage by the Turks, and the families were
comparatively few that did not mourn a father, son, or
brother, killed by the Turks or carried into sla\-ery, or a
daughter or sister transported to a Turkish harem. In
spite of four centuries of captivity, the Greeks had pre-
served their language, dress, religion, and other distinctive
features of nationality. In this they were greatly assisted
by the severity of the Turks and the difference in man-
ners, laws, religion, and customs between oppressor and
oppressed.

But notwithstanding their subjugation, many of the
Greeks were commercially prosperous, and a large part of
the traffic of the East was in their hands. They con-
ducted nearly all the coasting trade of the Levant, and a
few years before the revolution they had six hundred
vessels mounting six thousand guns (for defence against
pirates) and manned by eighteen thousand seamen. The
trade had grown enormously during the continental wars
which ended at Waterloo, as nearly all the nations of
Europe were so engrossed in military matters that there
was no chance for commerce. The large fleet of the
Greeks was dreaded by the Turks, and the islands where
most of the commerce was centred were not treated with
the severity which the Turks exercised towards those
dwelling on the mainland. The islands were shunned by
the pashas, who contented themselves with exacting an

BATTLE OF NAVARIXO. 3 1

annual tribute, and after its payment the inhabitants were
left to themselves. This was particularly the case with
Hydra, Ipsara, and Scio, the two former with thirty
thousand inhabitants each, and the latter having eighty
thousand. But their prosperity and happiness only
served to make plain to the people of the mainland how
much they were suffering at the hands of their Turkish
masters, and how vastly superior to their own was the
condition of the islanders.

In laying their plans for independence the Greeks re-
sorted to the formation of secret societies, and so well was
the scheme conducted that every thing was ripe for in-
surrection before the Turkish rulers had any suspicion of
the state of affairs. A great association was formed which
included Greeks everywhere, not only in Greece and its
islands, but in Constantinople, Austria, Germany, Eng-
land, and other countries, wherever a Greek could be
found. Men of other nationalities were occasionally ad-
mitted, but only when their loyalty to the Greek cause
was beyond question, and their ofBcial positions gave
them a chance to aid in the work. Several distinguished
Russians were members, among them Count Capo DTstria,
a Greek by birth, who held the office of private secretary
to the Emperor Alexander I. of Russia. The society was
known as the Hetaira, or Hetairist, and consisted of
several degrees or grades. The highest contained only
sixteen persons, whose names were not all known, and it
was impossible for any member of the lower classes to
ascertain them. Count Capo DTstria was one of the
exalted sixteen, and it was whispered that the Czar
Alexander was another of the highest members of the
order, together with the Crown Prince of Bavaria and
Wurtemberg, the Hospodar of Wallachia, and other im-
portant men of the day. In this matter of glorious un-
certainty regarding its highest members, the Hetaira was
not unlike secret societies of more modern times.

32 DECISIVE BATTLES SINCE WATERLOO.

The affairs of the society were managed by the sixteen
members of the highest class, who had their seat at Mos-
cow and maintained a ruling committee in almost perpet-
ual session. The second class was called the Priests of
Eletisis, and they were informed in a general way that the
time for struggle with the Turks was approaching, but
nothing more definite was told to them. This class
included nearly all the Greek priests, and also no less
than one hundred and sixteen prelates of their religion.
The third class was the Systemenoi, or Bachelors, selected
with care from the better classes of society ; they were
informed that the object of the society was to efTect a
revolution and separate Greece from Turkey. The lower
class, which included every Greek who wished to join it,
was by far the largest ; the only information that was
given to this class was that the object was to ameliorate
the condition of the people by the spread of education
and by securing changes in the laws. The secret of the
society was kept in the most remarkable manner ; though
having such a large membership it was betrayed but once,
and then in such a way that no suspicion was excited.
The Turks were as much astonished when the society
revealed itself in the outburst of the revolution of 1821
as though a volcano had opened under their feet.

All the Hetairists looked hopefully towards Russia,
partly in consequence of their community of religion,
and partly because of the fellow-feeling of the two
countries in cordially detesting the Turk. The Empress
Catherine excited two insurrections in Greece during the
latter part of the eighteenth century ; the Turkish fleet
had been burned by the Russians in the Bay of Tchesme ;
Constantine was christened by that name because the
empress designed him as the successor of Constantine
Paleologus, the last of the Caesars ; and the intervention
of the European powers in 1789 had alone prevented the
accomplishment of that design. The Greeks could hardly

BATTLE OF NAVARINO. 33

doubt that the Russians would help them when the strug-
gle came, and, furthermore, they could expect little aid
from other European powers, who were principally desir-
ous of maintaining the Turk in Europe in order that
Turkey might always engage the attention of Russia,
thereby keeping her away from attacks on the other
states.

An occurrence of 18 19 caused much attention through-
out Europe, and illustrated the devotion of the Greeks to
their country and their detestation of the Turks. The
town of Parga, on the sea-coast of the mainland, opposite
the Ionian Isles, was ceded to France by the treaty of
Tilsit in 1807, and transferred to England in 1814;
during these seven years it was occupied by a French
garrison, and its inhabitants learned to enjoy the advan-
tages of Christian protection. In the treaty of 18 15 no
mention of Parga was made, and it was stipulated that
the entire mainland of Turkey was to be ceded to the
Porte. This gave Parga to the Turks, and the govern-
ment of Constantinople notified the British governor of
the Ionian Islands that it was about to take possession.
Parga had then been held for a year or more by a British
garrison, and the governor of the Ionian Islands promised
that the garrison should not be withdrawn until the Turks
paid for the property of such as would not remain under
their rule.

All the inhabitants determined to emigrate to the
Ionian Islands. The amount of the compensation was
agreed upon by the commissioners, and one day, in June,
18 19, the inhabitants marched solemnly out of their
houses and proceeded to the cemetery, where they dug up
the bones of their ancestors and carried them to a large
pile of wood in front of the church. There these treas-
ured remains were consumed by fire, and while the pile
was burning scarcely a word was spoken. During the
ceremony some of the Turkish soldiers, who were about

34 DECISIVE BATTLES SINCE WATERLOO.

to enter, approached the gate, whereupon a deputation of
citizens went to the English governor and told him that
if a single Turk was admitted before the bones of their
ancestors were secured from profanation, and they and
their families were safely embarked, they would instantly
kill their wives and children, and die with arms in their
hands after slaughtering as many as possible of those who
had bought and sold their homes. The message was
conveyed to the Turks who did not renew their attempt
to enter until the whole party had embarked. When
they took possession of Parga they found but one inhabi-
tant remaining — a man far gone in a state of intoxi-
cation.

The immediate cause of the revolution, or rather the
excuse for it, was the death of the Hospodar of Wallachia,
January 30, 1821, followed by the appointment of his suc-
cessor. During the interregnum, which naturally left the
government in a weakened condition, the Hetairists de-
termined to strike their blow for liberty. A band of one
hundred and fifty Greeks and Arnauts, under the com-
mand of Theodore Vladimiruko, formerly a lieutenant-
colonel in the Russian service, marched out of Bucharest
and seized the small town of Czernitz, near Trajan's
Bridge, on the Danube. There Theodore issued a
proclamation, and such was the feeling of discontent
among the people, that in a few days he had a force of
twelve thousand men under his command. Soon after-
wards there was an insurrection in J assy, the capital of
Moldavia, headed by Prince Alexander Ipsilanti, an offi-
cer in the Russian service. He issued a proclamation in
which the aid of Russia was distinctly promised, and as
the news of this proclamation was carried to Greece, there
was a general movement in favor of insurrection. The
Russian minister assured the Porte that his government
had nothing to do with the insurrection, and the Patriarch
and Synod of Constantinople issued a proclamation em-

BATTLE OF NAVARINO. 35

phatically denouncing the movement, but in spite of this
assurance and proclamation the insurrection went on.

Count Nesselrode declared officially that Ipsilanti's
name would be stricken from the Russian army list, and
that his act was one for which he alone was responsible.
This announcement was the death-blow of the insurrec-
tion in Moldavia and Wallachia, as the forces of Theo-
dore and Ipsilanti were suppressed, after some sharp fight-
ing, by the hordes of Moslems that were brought against
them. The Russians on the Pruth and the Black Sea
were ordered to observe the strictest neutrality, and made
no interference whatever with the mov^ements of the
Turks. Nearly the whole of Greece was in full insurrec-
tion in a few months, and with far better prospects than
had the insurrection on the Danube. Turks and Greeks
were embittered against each other ; the war-cry of the
Turk was, " Death to the Christian ! " while that of the
Christian was, " Death to the Turk ! " The example was
set by the Turks, and, to the eternal disgrace of the Turk-
ish government, slaughter in cold blood was made official.

It was by the order and authority of the Porte that
Gregorj', Patriarch of Constantinople, a revered prelate,
eighty years of age, was seized on Easter Sunday, as he
was decending from the altar where he had been celebrat-
ing divine service, and hanged at the gate of his archiepis-
copal palace, amid the shouts and howls of a Moslem
mob. After hanging three hours, the body was cut
down and delivered to some Jews, who dragged it about
the streets and threw it into the sea, whence it was
recovered the same night by some Christian fishermen.

Some weeks later it was taken to Odessa and buried
with great ceremony. This act of murder was the more
atrocious on the part of the Turks, since the patriarch had
denounced the insurrection in a public proclamation, and
his life and character were most blameless and exemplary.

It is safe to say that this barbarity had more to do with

36 DECISIVE BATTLES SINCE WATERLOO.

fanning the fires of revolt than any other act of the Turk-
ish government. But it was by no means the only act
of the kind of which the Turks were guilty.

The Patriarch of Adrianople with eight of his ecclesias-
tics was beheaded, and so were the dragoman of the Porte
and several other eminent residents of Constantinople, de-
scended from Greek settlers of two or three centuries ago.
Churches were everywhere broken open and plundered;
Greek citizens of the highest rank were murdered, their
property stolen, and their wives and daughters sold as
slaves ; on the 15th of June five archbishops and a great
number of laymen were hanged in the streets, and four
hundred and fifty mechanics were sold and transported
into slavery ; at Salonica the battlements of the town
were lined with Christian heads, from which the blood
ran down and discolored the water in the ditch. In all
the great towns of the empire there were similar atroci-
ties ; some were the work of mobs, which the authorities
did not seek to restrain, but the greater part of them were
ordered by the governors or other of^cials, and met the
approval of the Porte. At Smyrna, the Christian popula-
tion was massacred by thousands without regard to age
or sex, and in the island of Cyprus, a body of ten thou-
sand troops sent by the Porte ravaged the island, exe-
cuted the metropolitan, five bishops, and thirty-six other
ecclesiastics, and converted the whole island into a scene
of rapine, bloodshed, and robbery. Several thousand
Christians were killed before the atrocities ceased, and
hundreds of their wives and daughters were carried into
Turkish harems.

These and similar outrages plainly told the Greeks that
no hope remained except in complete independence of the
Turks, and from one end of Greece to the other the fires
of insurrection were everywhere lighted. The islands, as
well as the mainland, were in full revolt, and' the fleet of
coasting vessels, nearly all of them armed for resisting

BA TTLE OF NA J \4 RI.VO. ^37

pirates, gave the Turks a great deal of trouble. Its first
operation was to destroy a Turkish seventy-four-gun ship
that had run aground in the Bay of Adramyti, together
with eight hundred men of her crew. The Turkish ad-
miral was so alarmed at the disaster that he retired with
the rest of his fleet to the Dardanelles, leaving the com-
mand of the archipelago and the coast of Greece to the
Greek cruisers.

On the land, battle followed battle in different parts of
the country, and the narration of the events of the insur-
rection would fill a bulky volume. It is not our purpose
to present a history of the Greek revolution ; we will give
briefly, a summary of the events between the opening of
the struggle and the battle of Navarino, which was prac-
tically the end of the war for independence.

During the latter part of i82i,the advantages to the
Greeks were sufficient to encourage them to proclaim
their independence, which was done in January, 1822,
In the same m.onth the Turks besieged Corinth, and in the
following April they besieged and captured Chios (Scio),
ending the capture with the slaughter of forty thousand
inhabitants, the most horrible massacre of modern times.
In July, the Greeks were victorious at Thermopylae ; in
the same month Corinth fell, with great slaughter of the
defenders. In April, 1823, the Greeks held a national con-
gress at Argos ; the victories of Marco Bozzaris occurred
in the following June, and in August he was killed in a
night attack upon the Turkish camp ; in August, too,
Lord Byron landed at Athens to take part in the cause
of Greece, which was attracting the attention of the
whole civilized world. The first Greek loan was issued
in England in February, 1824; Lord Byron died at Mis-
solonghi in the following April ; in August the Capitan
Pasha was defeated at Samos with heavy loss ; in October,
the provisional government of Greece was set up ; and the
fighting became almost continuous in the mountain dis-

2,S DECISIVE BA TTLES SINCE WA TERIOO.

tricts of Greece. In February, 1825, Ibrahim Pasha ar-
rived with a powerful army from Egypt, which captured
Navarino in May, and TripoHtza in June of the same
year. In July, the provisional government invoked the
aid of England; in the following April (1826), Ibrahim
Pasha took Missolonghi after a long and heroic defence ;
and nearly a year later Reschid Pasha captured Athens.

Down to the beginning of 1826, the Greeks had felt
seriously the deprivation of Russian sympathy and aid for
which they had been led to look before the revolution.
The death of Alexander I., and the accession of Nicholas
in December, 1825, caused a change in the situation. The
British government sent the Duke of Wellington to St.
Petersburg ostensibly to congratulate Nicholas on his ele-
vation to the throne, but really to secure concert of action
in regard to Greece. On the 4th of April a protocol was
signed by the Duke of Wellington, Prince Lieven, and
Count Nesselrode, which may be considered the founda-
tion of Greek independence.

Out of this protocol grew the treaty of July 6, 1827,
between England, Russia, and France, by which it was
stipulated that those nations should mediate between the
contending Greeks and Turks. They proposed to the
Sultan that he should retain a nominal authority over the
Greeks, but receive from them a fixed annual tribute, to
be collected by the Greek authorities, in whose nomina-
tion the Sultan should have a voice. All Mussulman
property in Greece was to be abandoned upon receipt of
an indemnity, and all fortresses were to be given up to
the Greek troops. If the Porte did not accept these
terms within a month, it was very plainly announced that
the powers would for their own security " come to an
approximation with the Greeks, which would consist in
establishing commercial relations with Greece, and receiv-
ing from it commercial agents." In very forcible terms
this meant that the independence of the Greeks would be
acknowledged.

BA TTLE OF NA VARINO. 39

The Sultan expressed the utmost astonishment at this
proposal, and declared his fixed determination to subdue
his rebellious Greek subjects. He refused to listen to the
scheme of mediation, and immediately made preparations
for a fresh campaign, and also for the defence of Turkey
in case of an attack. Ships and reinforcements were sent
from Constantinople, and the Egyptian fleet, consisting of
two 84-gun ships, twelve frigates, and forty-one transports,
was despatched from Alexandria with five thousand troops,
and reached Navarino towards the end of August, 1827.
The allied powers had foreseen the possibility of the Porte's
refusal of mediation, and taken measures accordingly ; an
English fleet under Admiral Sir Edward Codrington, and
a French fleet under Admiral De Rigny, were in the
Mediterranean, and were shortly afterwards joined by the
Russian fleet under Admiral Heiden. A final note was
presented to the Porte late in August, and as it had no
effect other than a refusal to permit mediation, the repre-
sentatives of the powers determined to take measures for
enforcing a suspension of hostilities.

The allied admirals held a conference, and decided to
notify Ibrahim Pasha that he must stop the barbarities of
plundering and burning villages and slaughtering their- in-
habitants. But Ibrahim would not listen to their remon-
strances, and to show his utter disregard for the powers,
he commanded four of his ships to sail to the Gulf of
Patras to occupy Missolonghi and relieve some Turkish
forts, in effect to clear those waters of every Greek man-
of-war which was stationed there. This he did easily, the
allied squadrons being temporarily absent. Admiral
Codrington pursued him and, without difficulty, drove him
back to Navarino. The flagship Asia (84 guns) was the
only vessel engaged. The admiral detained the Turkish
fleet at Navarino, and there he determined it should re-
main until a satisfactory agreement could be made be-
tween the Porte and the powers. Although some hos-

40 DECISIVE BATTLES SINCE WATERLOO.

tilities had occurred, no actual battles had yet been fought,
and the belief of a peaceful solution was entertained. As
a last resort Colonel Cradoch was sent by Admiral Cod-
rington to meet Ibrahim Pasha. The effort was useless ;
the Turkish commander could not be seen. A general
muster of all the ships was ordered by Admiral Codring-
ton, Commander-in-Chief of the squadron.

The strength of the combined squadron was as follows :

ENGLISH.

4 frigates,
I cutter,
4 brigs, and

3 line-of-battle ships, all under the command of Ad-
miral Codrington.

RUSSIAN.

4 frigates, and

4 line-of-battlc ships. Count Heiden commanding.

FRENCH.

1 double-banked frigate, ^

2 cutters, I commanded by Rear-Ad-

3 line-of-battle ships, and j miral De Rigny.
I frigate.

The Ottoman fleet was as follows :
13 frigates,

3 line-of-battle ships,

4 double-banked frigates,
28 brigs,

5 schooners,

30 corvettes, and

6 fire brigs, making a total of 89, excluding 41 trans-
ports.

The allied fleet mounted 1,324 guns, while the combined
Turkish and Egyptian fleet mounted 2,240 guns. To this
superiority in the number of guns on board must be added
the batteries on shore, which were all in the hands of the
Turks. But the Christians had a point in their favor in

42 DECISIVE BATTLES SINCE WATERLOO.

their superiority in ships of the line, of which they pos-
sessed ten, while the Turks had but three ; if the battle
had been fought in the open sea, it would have been of
brief duration, but this advantage was very much lost in
the Bay of Navarino, where the Turkish ships Avere
crowded together under the batteries in the form of a
semicircle, with their broadsides turned to the centre of
the bay. The Bay of Navarino is four miles long and two
miles wide. It is shaped like a horseshoe, and forms a
good-sized harbor. At the narrowing ends, about a mile
apart, were batteries, placed to sweep the entire plain in
front. The united Egyptian and Turkish fleet was an-
chored in this bay, disposed in the shape of a crescent, the
Egyptian portion being stationed in the centre.

The allied fleet entered the Bay of Navarino about two
o'clock on the afternoon of October 20, 1827. The ad-
vance was in two columns, the British and French forming
the starboard column and the Russians the port. Every
man was at his post, the decks were clear for action, the
gunners were ready with the implements of their occupa-
tion, and everybody waited the first shot from the Turks.
The batteries were silent as the fleet filed past them, and
not a shot was heard as the various vessels took up their
positions.

Admiral Codrington moored his flag-ship, the Asia,
directly opposite and between the Capitaii Bey and the
Jlloharcni Bey, the two largest ships of the Ottoman fleet.
Admiral Rigny took up a position to the windward of the
Egyptian ships, and the Russians moved to the leeward in
the bend of the crescent. The admiral ordered that the allies
should not fire a shot until they were fired upon by the
Turks. This order was rigidly obeyed. There was every
indication that the Turks meant to fight. While the rear
portion of the allied fleets was getting into position, a
boat containing Lieut, Fitz-Roy and some raen was sent
from the Dartmouth to reconnoitre a Turkish f^re-ship.

BA TTLE OF XA VAKINO. ' 43

Nearly at the same moment a boat Avas lowered from the
Asm to carry her pilot, Mitchell, with a flag of truce to
repeat to the Turkish commander that the desire of the
allies was for peace. Lieut. Fitz-Roy's boat, while ap-
proaching the fire-ship, received a volley of musketry.
The Asms pinnace, having on board the pilot and a flag
of truce, shared a like fate ; the guns opened fire, and the
fight became general.

During all the manoeuvring the two Turkish line-of-
battle ships which confronted the Asia maintained a per-
sistent silence. But as soon as the pinnace had been sunk,
they fired a broadside into the Asia, which heeled over for
a moment ; as she righted, she delivered her broadside
with splendid aim. The firing was rapid, and in a little
while the two antagonists of the Asia were helpless
wrecks. Both their cables had been shot away, and the
wind wafted them towards the entrance of the harbor.

But the Asia did not escape unharmed in her fight
with two of the enemy's ships at once. Both her broad-
sides were kept going as fast as possible, and very soon
she was so enveloped in smoke that nothing could be
seen. She received many shot in her upper works ; her
mizzen-mast was carried awa)- ; her other masts were in-
jured, and several of her guns were disabled. The disap-
pearance of her two antagonists exposed her to the fire
of the second and third line ; she maintained her position
until the end of the battle, and practically fired the last
shot. At one time she appeared to be in flames, and
there was great anxiety through the allied fleet. There
was corresponding relief when the smoke cleared awa\',
and it was found that an Egyptian ship near the Asia
had blown up and was on fire. Part of her crew had
escaped by swimming to the shore, and the rest had
perished. Cheer upon cheer went up from the allies when
it was found that the Asia was unharmed.

Almost simultaneously wath the attack upon the

44 DECISIVE BATTLES SIA'CE WATERLOO.

Asia's pinnace that brought on the battle, a cannon-
shot was fired from an Egyptian ship against the SirenCy
the flag-ship of the French admiral. The Sireiie im-
mediately replied, and soon made an end of her assailant ;
but during the fight the Turks sent a fire-ship against her,
and it is probable that she would have been destroyed,
had it not been for the intervention of Captain Fellowes
of the DartnioiitJi. On their side of the line, the Rus-
sians did some excellent \\ ork ; in fact, every ship of the
allied fleet was engaged, and it was not long before the
superior discipline and drill of the Christians had their
effect on the infidels. One after another the Ottoman
ships went down, or were drifted ashore, and in less than
four hours from the beginning of the contest the Ottoman
fleet had ceased to be. Every armed ship was burnt,
sunk, or destro}^ed ; the only remaining vessels belonging
to the Turks and Egyptians were twenty-five of the
smallest transports, which were spared by order of Ad-
miral Codrington. It was estimated that the loss in men
on the Turkish and Egyptian vessels was fully seven
thousand.

On the side of the allies, no vessels were destroyed,
but the Asia, Albion, and Genoa of the English fleet
were so much injured, that Admiral Codrington sent them
to Malta for repairs which would enable them to stand
the voyage home to England. Seventy-five men were
killed and 197 wounded on the British fleet, and the loss
of the French was 43 killed and 117 wounded. The Rus-
sian loss was not reported, and consequently was not sup-
posed to be great. On the Asia alone there were 16
killed and 26 wounded, one of the former being the son of
the Admiral. Captains Bathurst of the Genoa and
Bell of the Asia were among the killed, and also Lieu-
tenant Fitz-Roy, who was shot in the pinnace before the
opening of the battle. The Asia had 125 round shot
in her hull, 18 in her foremast, 8 in the bowsprit, and 25

BA TTLE OF NA VARINO. 45

in the mainmast. As before stated, her mizzen-mast was
carried away. The fleet remained at Navarino until the
25th. As soon as the battle was over, the correspondence
between the admirals was renewed, and it was agreed
that there should be no further hostilities ; indeed, there
could hardly be any, as the Turkish fleet had been placed
among the things of the past.

Ibrahim Pasha was absent on an excursion to Ryogos
at the time of the battle, but he returned on the 2ist,
early enough to see the smoking ruins of his fleet. He
had the good sense to see that the war was practically
over, and that Turkey must cease to hope for the subju-
gation of Greece. In case it should set about the equip-
ment of another fleet, the allied powers would follow their
example, and bring a larger fleet, together with an army,
that would make an end of the Ottoman empire with no
great loss of time. He immediately applied himself to
plans for the evacuation of Greece. By means of the
transports which had been spared by Admiral Codrington
he sent away his harem and five thousand sick and wound-
ed soldiers, who arrived early in Alexandria after a speedy
voyage.

It was feared that when the news of the event at Nava-
rino reached Constantinople, the lives of all Europeans in
that city, including the foreign ambassadors, would be in
great danger, but happily there was no violence on the
part of the Turks. The ambassadors pressed for an an-
swer to their note of August i6th, and at length the Sul-
tan replied : ** My positive, absolute, definitive, unchange-
able, eternal answer is, that the Sublime Porte does not
accept any proposition regarding the Greeks, and will per-
sist in its own will regarding them even to the last day of
judgment." The Porte even demanded compensation for
the destruction of the fleet, and satisfaction for the insult,
and that the allies should abstain from all interference in
the affairs of Greece. The reply of the ambassadors was to

DECISIVE BATTIES SIXCE WATERLOO.

the effect that the treaty of July obHged them to defend
Greece, and that the Turks had no claim whatever for
reparation for the affair of Navarino. The ambassadors
left Constantinople on the 8th December, and soon after-
wards Count Capo DTstria, w^ho had been elected Presi-
dent of Greece, took his seat, and issued a proclamation,
declaring" that the Ottoman rule over the countn.^ was at
an end after three centuries of oppression.

Thus was the independence of Greece established.
There was little fighting after the events of Navarino,
and early in 1828 Admiral Codrington and Ibrahim Pasha
held a convention and agreed upon measures for evacuat-
ing the land of the Hellenes. During the summer and
autumn Patras, Navarino, and Modon were successively
surrendered to the French, and the Morea was evacuated
by the Turks. Missolonghi was surrendered to Greece
early in 1829, and by the Treaty of Adrianople in Septem-
ber of the same year the Porte acknowledged the inde-
pendence of Greece, which was henceforth to be one in
the family of nations.

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CHAPTER IV.

SIEGE OF SILISTRIA— 1829.

The part taken by Russia in the destruction of the
Turkish fleet at Navarino was by no means disinterested.
Russia was then at war with Persia, in which the latter
was defeated and obhged to ask for terms of peace.
By this war and another which terminated in 18 13, Persia
lost the provinces of Georgia, Mingrelia, Erivan, Nakhitch-
even, and the greater part of Talish, the Russian frontier
beinsr advanced to Mount Ararat and the left bank of the
Aras River. The treaty which closed the second war was
signed February 22, 1828. Russia pressed the conclusion
of the treaty with great earnestness, as she was then
involved with Turkey in such a manner that a war on
a large scale was in the immediate future. In fact, hostili-
ties had almost commenced between the Russian and
Ottoman powers before the terms of peace between
Persia and Russia had been arranged.

Since the beginning of 1826, Russia had been strength-
ening her armies on the Turkish frontiers and evidently
making preparations for important military movements.
Preliminary to an invasion of Turkish territory, Russia
presented several demands, which related chiefly to the
Danubian principalities and their mode of government,
together with the responsibilities of the Porte for the
piracies on the Barbary coast, in which Russia, in common
with other Christian nations, had suffered considerably.
Turkey was then engaged with the suppression of the

48 DECISn'E BATTLES SINCE WATERLOO.

Greek rebellion and the overthrow of the Janizaries in
Constantinople ; she was powerless to resist the Russian
demands, and to the surprise of the Emperor Nicholas
and his entourage she acceded to the entire list, in a treaty
or convention which has since been known in history
as the Convention of Ackerman. The plenipotentiaries
signed it on the last day that had been allowed by
Nicholas ; some delay occurred in the ratification by the
Sultan, but it was finally ratified and became a binding
agreement between the two empires.

Subsequent events demonstrated that Turkey had no
intention of holding to the terms of the treaty, and
Russia wisely continued to augment her forces on the
frontier. Not only did the course of events demonstrate
the absence of good faith on the part of the Sultan, but
his determination to break the treaty when the proper
moment arrived ; further proof is found in an ofificial
circular, dated December 20, 1827.' The signing of
treaties without the intention of keeping them is by
no means rare among nations, but it is almost without
precedent in the annals of diplomacy that a reputable
government will openly confess in a public document,
as did Turkey on this occasion, that she had signed a
treaty solely for the purpose of gaining time, and without
intending to carry out its terms.

Numerous manifestoes abounding in accusations of bad
conduct were issued by Russia and Turkey during 1827
and early in 1828. The Porte accused Russia of secretly
fomenting the insurrection in Greece, of openly joining in
the destruction of the Turkish fleet at Navarino, with
violations of all the treaties she had ever signed with

^ " Les demandes faites par les Russes, I'an passe a Ackerman, au sujet
des inaemnites, et surtouta I'egard des Serviens, ne furent aucunement sus-
ceptible d'etre admises ; neanmoins, les circonstances et^nt pressantes, on y
acquies^a bon gre mal gre, et par necessite, afin de saisir I'occasion de con-
clure un traite pour le salut de la nation Mahometane."

SIEGE OF SI LI STRIA. 49

Turkey, including those of Bucharest and Ackerman, and
further accused it of giving aid to all malcontents through-
out the Ottoman dominions. Russia accused the Porte of
fomenting insurrections in the Caucasus and urging the
mountaineers of that region to embrace the religion of
Mohammed, of the violation of all the treaties it had
signed with Russia, and notably with violating the treaty
of Ackerman, and furthermore alleged that on several
occasions the Porte had summarily closed the Bosphorus
to Russian ships, to the great injury of the commerce of
the southern provinces of the empire. The balance of
grievances was decidedly in favor of Russia, but there can
be no doubt that the complaints of Turkey had good
foundation in fact.

Turkey had increased the garrison of her fortresses on
and near the Danube at the same time that Russia had
massed her armies on the frontier. General Diebitsch
was appointed to the command of the army on the
Danube, while General Paskievitch conducted the opera-
tions against Asiatic Turkey. At the beginning of April,
the Russian army on the Danube mustered on paper
something more than 108,000 men; it never contained
more than 100,000 effectives, and did not at any time
bring more than 80,000 men into the field. About 50,000
troops were added to this number during the summer and
later in the year another 50,000 was sent to join the main
body.

The passage of the Pruth, then the boundary between
the empires, was made on the 7th of May. The Turks
had only some cavalry videttes to watch the movements,
and these retired, in accordance with their orders, as soon
as the Russian advance began. In a few weeks the
Russians had possession of Jassy, Bucharest, and Galatz,
and were in position in front of Brailov and Widin ; in fact
the entire left bank of the Danube was in their control.^
' See map accompanying Chapter III.

50 DECISIVE BATTLES SINCE WATERLOO.

On the 2ist of July General Roth, commanding the
sixth corps, arrived before the Danubian fortress of Silistria
and immediately invested it. Once before (in i8io) it
had been entirely demolished, but had been restored by
the Turks. The town of Silistria is built in the form of a
half circle, the diameter two thousand yards long, being
turned to face the Danube. A fortification with ten
fronts, each five hundred and fifty yards in length sur-
rounds it. There are only a few fragments of permanent
outworks, except two narrow redans looking towards the
river. The glacis was built from two to four feet in
height, and the ditch was not more than eight to ten
feet deep. Rising above the interior slope of the ditch
was a scarp twenty feet broad and eight feet high, the
lower side of which was defended by palisades. The ex-
terior slope of the bastions was planted with wattles and
was very steep ; the slopes of the curtain were banked
with sods of earth. On the bastions were placed ten guns,
four on each front, leaving only one on each flank ; and
the lines of the ditch, which were very short, were poorly
defended. There were four gates, two opening on the
land and two on the riv^er. There existed no way of fill-
ing the ditch with water, as its bed was higher than the
level of the Danube, and there was no water running into
it. Around the front facing the land, a lunette about
nine feet deep, but quite dry, had been dug in the ditch
as a safeguard against Russian mines. General Roth
found himself besieging Silistria with an insufificient force
and almost no artiller\'; only one battering train having
been provided for carrying on a campaign in which four
sieges had to be undertaken. The Turks were defeated
in several sharp fights in which they engaged the Russians
when the latter were approaching Silistria. General
Roth's first position was srrictly defensive, his soldiers
being posted on the high ground in front of the fortress
and beyond the range of its guns.

52 DECISIVE BATTLES SINCE WATERLOO.

At a distance of two thousand yards from the fort the
Russians began their trenches. On the right the line
reached to the Danube, but the left couid not be brought
to the river, being still held by the Turks. For four
weeks the hostile armies retained this position ; except-
ing a few sallies of no consequence there was no break in
their relations. At midnight of August 28th the Russians
made an assault upon the Turkish forces encamped on
the two heights nearest them (A and B), and drove them
away. The Turks lost about five hundred men. On
August loth a fleet of thirty-six Russian ships appeared
before Silistria, but without engaging the fortress. The
besiegers were considerably reduced in numbers by the
withdrawal of two divisions, who were ordered to Shumla
on the 15th of September. The troops suffered from
disease, and besides they were poorly fed. There was
no ammunition, and the one hundred and twenty guns
which the Russians had were useless. Winter was near,
and the siege was raised on the loth of November, after a
desultory cannonade lasting forty-eight hours. Part of
the besieging force crossed the river with great difficulty,
and the rest retreated through a devastated territory, the
Turks following in pursuit. Thus ended the so-called
siege of Silistria in 1828. It was poorly planned in every
way, feebly carried on, and was in every way a failure.

OPERATIONS AGAINST SILISTRIA IN 1829.

The campaign was opened by General Diebitsch, who
laid siege to the fortress, which he deemed it necessary to
take, because it had a large garrison distant but a march
of two days and directly flanking the army in the Balkan
Mountains. As the shortest route (by Rassova) was im-
practicable by reason of floods, the rugged and circuitous
road by Kusgan was followed, and the army arrived
before Silistria on the 17th of May. The Russians had
learned at Brailov, during the preceding year, what was

SIEGE OF SILISTRIA. 53

meant by Turkish resistance behind walls, and no attack
by assault was attempted. The ditch being only thirty
feet wide by twelve feet deep, it was thought possible to
throw the counterscarp upon the main wall of the fortress
by means of two or three mines under the front of the
outer earthworks, and by entirely covering the revetement
to secure a practicable ascent. It was evident that an
attack could be made more easily on the southern front
(bastions five and six) than elsewhere. It could be raked
from D, and the attack could be maintained by batteries
rising in terraces on the slope of B. This side was
entirely without outworks. It was decided in council at
head-quarters to make the attack on the east side in order
to have the assistance of the fleet. Bastions two and
three were, therefore, the scenes of the real attack^
which was changed later in the siege to bastions five and
six, commencing with a feint. The Russians' guns num-
bered ninety-six ; sixty-five of their own, the remaining
thirty-one having been taken at Brailov.

At nine in the morning of the 17th of May, an advance
was made upon the fortress from Chernavoda by General
Diebitsch, commanding a part of the second and third
corps, divided into three columns. The Turks were in
possession of the works made the previous year by the
Russians, and for some unaccountable reason undestroyed
after the raising of the siege. They made a determined
opposition to the Russian advance, but were driven back
and the trenches fell into the Russian hands. The thirty-
one guns captured were placed by the Russians on the
left bank of the river, opposite the fortress, at a distance of
one thousand yards. The remainder were in readiness to
be shipped across the river. The 9th division of infantry,
two regiments of horse and three field batteries were in
position on the right wing. The centre was held by the
1st brigade of the 7th division of infantry with a single
field battery : stationed on the left were three regiments

54 DECISIVE BATTLES SINCE WATERLOO.

of horse, two brigades of the 6th division, and three field
batteries. \ battahon of chasseurs guarded the head-
quarters, which was behind the right wing ; the besieging
force was covered by the Cossacks. On the 19th and
20th of May several sallies w'ere attempted. The bat-
teries on the left were placed in position on the 23d and
26th of May at a distance of six hundred yards. A feint
enabled the Russians to cut a new trench from one to
five, this being the second parallel trench. The positions
already secured, together with the embankments and
waterways, were utilized, so that from the beginning the
works were protected and could be finished without loss.
The parallels were extended on tlie right to the road
to Bazardjik, and a communication was made betw^een
them.

On the left the attack was greatly assisted during the
night of June 3d by carelessness on the part of the Turks.
The Russians proposed to use a watercourse as a means
of communication with a half parallel, which they ex-
pected to establish two hundred yards in front of the
second parallel. But when the covering force took posi-
tion, it was ascertained that the Turks had no posts of
outlook in front of their positions, and that the working
party could move forward three hundred and twenty-four
paces, where a trench, only two hundred and fifty yards
away from the counterscarp, and on a line with it,
presented an admirable beginning for the third parallel.
Posts were planted below the Turkish lodgnients, and
work was immediately commenced. The garrison was
roused by the noise of the besiegers, and opened a sharp
fire at once, but it did little damage on account of the
darkness. It was a bold and successful attempt, and the
third parallel, FF, was brought to the right of the water-
way, to the graveyard, and completed in the same
night. A sortie on an extended scale was confidently ex-
pected on the night of the 4th, and precautions were

SIEGE OF SI LI STRIA. 55

taken against it. The Turks made a sally at nightfall.
They came out in strong force and encountered the 17th
chasseurs hand-to-hand, but were driven back at the point
of the bayonet by the Russians. Work on the parallel
could not be kept up that night, but a sap with traverses
was started.

The state of affairs in the Balkans made it necessary to
withdraw some of the besieging force. On the 5th of
June General Diebitsch quitted Silistria with the second
corps d'arm^e, leaving General Krassowski with twenty
battalions of infantr\-, a few squadrons of cavalry, and
two battalions of sappers, to carry on the work of the
siege. The besieging army did not now number more
than ten thousand or twelve thousand men ; the besieged
were doubtless in greater force. The Russians could hope
to win only by concealing the scarcity of their numbers,
and by pushing the work with the utmost speed, in order
to keep the Turks within the fortress, and to prevent any
new sallies.

The rain poured down in torrents for twenty-four hours,
filling the ditches until it became necessary to dig wells
to carry away the water, and altogether impeding the
siege operations until the 9th. The Russians, from their
positions in the terraces on the hills, raked, with a de-
structive fire, bastions five and six. The Rasgrad and
Shumla gates were totally demolished. A heavy discharge
of canister was kept up by the Turks from new embrasures
which they uncovered. It was said by deserters that
countermines had been sunk to oppose the attack on
bastions five and six, and that these mines were charged
and in readiness to be fired. Thinking still that their
numbers were not sufficiently strong, the Russians con-
tinued their work on the covered sap, moving forward
very slowly. News having been received in the evening
of the 13th of a Russian victory at Kouleftscha, they gen-
erously allowed it to reach the Turks. A strong fire and

56 DECISIVE BATTLES SINCE WATERLOO.

a discharge of musketry were immediately begun by the
besiegers amid loud cheers ; and the Turks, believing a
general attack would be made, manned their walls at once.

On the following day the commander of the fortress,
Mohammed Pasha, was ordered by General Krassowski to
surrender. He refused to do so, stating that " the law
enjoined him to make a defence to the last." On the
l6th, the first sap had been brought to the crest of the
glacis ; the Russians crowned the works, and the engineers
ordered shafts to be sunk for four double mines. It had
been determined to destroy the counterscarp fronting
them at that spot, without waiting for the other saps
against bastion six to be finished. As the Russians ap-
proached the Turkish positions, the defenders retired
slowly. The last saps reached the glacis on the 20th of
June. Mines were laid and shafts sunk at a distance of
thirteen feet from the revetement of the wall, and eight
feet below the bed of the trench. The mines were charged
with one ton of powder for every one hundred and forty
cubic feet of earth. When fired, they tore up the Turkish
countermines and filled the ditch. The earth thrown up
by the explosion of the mines nearly reached the edge of
the revetement, and gave two easy routes for storming.

But the Russians were not ready for an assault, owing
to their small numbers; and after the explosion of the
mines they made no attempt to profit by the confusion
of the' Turks. A sharp fusillade was maintained on both
sides. When the Turks saw the result of the explosion,
they directed their mines as a counter against the piles of
earth thrown up. The Russians fired two other mines,
the effect and the result being the same as before. At
one time the two parties of miners met in the works below
the ground, and entered into a hand-to-hand struggle,
which ended by the Turks retreating and stopping up the
gallery.

One of the Turkish countermines, by some accident,

I
I

SIEGE OF SILISTRIA. 57

exploded almost simultaneously with the mine of the
Russians ; the whole front of bastion number four was
thus completely opened, and the besiegers were conse-
quently able to occupy the bastion. After making an
ineffectual attempt to recover it, the Turks continued to
defend themselves in the fort by means of grenades,
stones, mines under the cunettc, and fire-pots, in addition
to an almost continuous fire of musketry. The fire-pots
were in frequent use during the siege, and on several oc-
casions they were effectual in driving the Russians out of
the ditch. They consisted of earthen pots with gun-
powder in the bottom and pitch above. The pitch was
ignited, and then the pots were thrown down ; they soon
exploded with such formidable effect that the enemy was
put to flight.

On the 25th of June the mine below the right angle of
bastion five was commenced, and in a short time that and
another mine were exploded. The Russian chasseurs
now moved in without resistance, and General Berg on
his own account assaulted and carried the two forts close
by which the besieged had almost abandoned. By this
time the besiegers had made five large openings, practi-
cable for assault, in the main wall of the fortress. When
the Russians were ready to fire another mine farther
down the line, Mohammed Pasha gave up and asked for
the conditions of capitulation. Some time was lost over
the terms of surrender, probably intentionally on the
Turkish side, for the purpose of throwing up more earth-
works, but a peremptory demand to either surrender or
refuse brought the Pasha to terms, and he came to the
Russian camp a prisoner of w^r. The fortress was sur-
rendered, 8,000 men laid down arms, and in the town
were found 8,000 people, besides 1,500 sick and wounded,
showing that the original strength of the garrison was not
far from 16,000 men. Two hundred and thirty guns on
the walls and thirty-one on board the gun-boats, together

58 DECISIVE BATTIES SINCE WATERIOO.

with forty standards, fell a prize to the victorious Rus-
sians.

During the siege the Turks displayed great bravery and
determination, but they also displayed great ignorance of
the art of war. The siege lasted forty-four days from the
first investment, thirty-five from the time the first parallel
was opened, twenty-five after the third parallel, and nine
days after the mines had made a perfectly practicable breach
under bastion number five. Twenty-nine thousand five
hundred and seventy-six shots were fired into the fort.
The chief causes of capitulation seem to have been lack
of harmony between the commanders and lack of provi-
sions. It is greatly to the credit of the Russians to have
forced an enemy outnumbering them two to one, and be-
hind walls, to surrender, especially with their insufficient
equipment. But the poor condition of the fort, the in-
competency and quarrels of the commanders, and the
miserable handling of the garrison assisted them material-
ly. The most remarkable fact was this : that but little
use was made of artillery, the reduction having been made
principally by sapping and mining. Silistria was taken at a
cost to the Russians of three thousand men and seven
weeks' time, a saving of men, certainly, since the loss in
one day's assault on the fortress of Brailov was greatly in
excess of this number.

Mention has been made of the withdrawal of a portion
of the investing army during the siege, and its employment
elsewhere. The main body of the Turkish army was at
Shumla under the command of Redschid Pasha, grand
vizier ; it numbered about forty thousand m.en, mostly
irregular troops, and by no means able to cope with a
corresponding force of Russians. At Rustchuk on the
Danube was Hussein Pasha, with eight or ten thousand
men, watching the course of events, and waiting to move
at the orders of the grand vizier. Varna fo the east of
Shumla was held by the Russians, and so was Pravadi,

SIEGE OF SILISTRIA. 59

where the Muscovites had maintained themselves without
interference during the winter.

Soon after the beginning of the siege the grand vizier
conceived a grand plan, which if successful would have
ended the campaign and driven the Russians to the north
of the Danube. His idea was to overwhelm the Russians
in detail, first by recapturing Pravadi with its garrison,
and then moving on the force investing Silistria, together
with the covering army, which was commanded by General
Diebitsch in person. With this object in view the grand
vizier on the 28th of Ma}' marched out of Shumla at the
head of thirty-six thousand men, leaving only a feeble
garrison to hold the place. General Roth, who com-
manded the Russians at and near Pravadi, strengthened
the garrison with two battalions, and then retired about
twenty miles to the northward with ten thousand men.
At the same time he despatched an officer with news of
the movement of the Turks, telling him to ride as for life
or death. The officer covered the distance of eighty
miles in twelve hours without changing his horse. The
Turks arrived in front of Pravadi on the ist of June, and
sat down leisurely with the intention of taking the place
in their own convenient time. Pravadi stands in a narrow
valley at the foot of the Balkans, and is a place of great
natural strength, so that an assault was quite inadvisable.

Immediately on hearing of the Turkish movements
General Diebitsch determined to move by forced marches
with the covering army near Silistria, and also with a part
of the besieging force, and check the plans of the grand
vizier, which he learned through an intercepted letter to
Hussein Pasha. By the 5th of June, he was in motion
with twenty thousand men, leaving General Krassowski to
continue the siege of Silistria and prevent reinforcements
reaching the garrison. This explains the weakness of the
besiegers during their operations against the fortress.
Diebitsch's plan was to move against the grand vizier's

6o DECISIVE BATTLES SINCE WATERLOO.

line of communication with Shumla, and not upon the
Turkish position in front of Pravadi. By so doing he
would compel the Turks to abandon Shumla to its fee-
ble garrison, in which event it would be taken without
serious opposition, or else fight their way back to it
through the Russian army under circumstances greatly
to their disadvantage. Though brave enough behind
defences, the Turkish troops were too recently organ-
ized to enable them to be satisfactorily handled in the
open field, and especially under fire. The Russian artil-
lery was moved by horses, while all the Turkish cannon
were transported by oxen. Diebitsch rightly calculated
that the Turkish guns, though greatly superior to the
Russians in numbers, would be of slight efificiency in
the field, when their motive power was by means of oxen
onl}-.

Count Pahlen, with the advance of the Russian army,
established himself on the 9th of June at a point between
Shumla and Pravadi, and was closely followed by the
rest of General Diebitsch's force. On the loth, General
Ross, who had skilfully concealed the Russian advance
by a thin curtain of Cossack videttes, made a forced
march and joined Diebitsch, thus making the available
force under the latter something more than thirty thou-
sand men with one hundred and thirty-six guns. The
grand vizier first learned that he was cut off from Shumla
by some prisoners captured in a skirmish on the evening
of the loth. Not aware that the whole Russian force was
in front of him, he started to retire to Shumla in full con-
fidence that he would be able to reach it.

The first onset between the opposing forces was an
affair of cavalry and artillery, in which the Russians were
the sufferers. The Turks sent three thousand horsemen,
the flower of their cavalry, which completely routed the
Russian battalion opposing them and captured five guns ;
they next assailed two battalions of infantry, which they

SIEGE OF SI LI STRIA. 6 1

cut down, and captured five more guns. The Russians re-
treated to their main body, the Turks pursuing, but halt-
ing judiciously and retiring when they found they were
facing great odds. The Russian stand was made at
Kouleftscha, where Diebitsch immediately concentrated
all his forces and drew victory out of defeat. As the bat-
tle continued, the superiority of the Russian artillery told
heavily against the Turks, who were thrown into disorder,
and lost heavily in men and guns. The grand vizier took
a circuitous route to Shumla, where he arrived with
eighteen thousand men and twelve guns ; he had marched
out a few days before with thirty-six thousand men and
fifty-nine guns. The Russian loss in the battle was sixty-
three officers and about twenty-five hundred men ; all the
artillery lost by them in the early part of the battle was
abandoned by the Turks later in the da)-.

Immediately after the fall of Silistria General Diebitsch
conceived the daring plan of crossing the Balkans, but he
carefully kept it to himself until every thing was ready.
He made great and ostentatious preparations for besieg-
ing Shumla, and so completely deceived the grand vizier
that the latter made no attempt at defending thie passes
of the mountains. Diebitsch formed a camp in front of
Shumla, and during every day detachments of troops
were arriving hourly with banners flying and bands pla}--
ing, while the soldiers already there greeted the new-
comers. But during the night other detachments, \\hich
were concealed by a chain of outposts, moved silently to
the left to reinforce the corps of Roth and Rudiger,
which had entered the valley of the Kamtjik with the
view of crossing the Balkan chain by the Aidos Pass.
The ruse was so successful that the Turks had only three
thousand men at the foot of the northern slope of the
ridge, and had done absolutely nothing in the way of
throwing up intrenchments or otherwise preparing for a
defence, when Roth and Rudiger were ready to move

62 DECISIVE BATTLES SINCE WATERLOO.

with twenty thousand men, carrying four days' rations in
their haversacks and ten days' additional rations in the
wagons Avhich followed each regiment.

The march for the passage of the Balkans began on the
17th of July, and so admirably was the movement con-
ducted, that the Turks were taken completely by surprise
and offered scarcely any resistance. Aidos, on the south-
ern side of the mountains, was full of military stores, which
were abandoned by the Turks as the Russians approached,
and other important captures of the same nature were
made. Communication was opened with the Russian
fleet at Bourgas and other points ; the Turkish troops
seemed panic-stricken and fled in dismay to the capital,
and altogether General Diebitsch had things pretty much
to his liking. But he was in a critical position, as his
army was much smaller than the Turks generally believed
it to be ; the Bulgarians had spread the rumor that the
Russians were countless as the leaves of the forest, and
the Turkish scouts reported them at least sixty thousand
strong, when they were really less than half that number.

The conquering army reached Adrianople August 20th,
and on the following morning entered the city without
bloodshed. Eight days later was signed the Treaty of
Adrianople, by which the former treaties of Ackerman,
Bucharest, and Kainardjii were ratified to their fullest
extent, together with the conventions relating to Servia.
The passage of the Dardanelles was declared open to
Russian merchant ships, in common with those of other
nations ; Turkey was to pay an indemnity of ^750,000
sterling to Russian subjects who had been despoiled of
their property, while the Russian government was to re-
ceive a war indemnity of ;^5,ooo,000 sterling, and the con-
quered provinces were to be held by the Russians until
the indemnity was paid. The Turkish provinces to the
north of the Danube were to be practically independent
of Turkey, and the Porte engaged not to maintain any

SIEGE OF SILISTRIA. 65

fortified post or Mussulman establishment within their
boundaries. A small tribute was to be paid to Turkey by
the principalities, but every Moslem subject of the Porte
north of the Danube was to sell his property and leave
the country within eighteen months. Russia was to have
the right to interfere in the affairs of the Danubian princi-
palities in case of any violation of the treaty on the part
of Turkey.

Russia gained additional territory in Asia as a return
for her successful operations in that region. She obtained
the fortress and pashalik of Akhaltiskh, with a portion of
the coast of the Black Sea ; Southern Caucasus and a part
of Armenia thus passed into Russian control, where they
have ever since remained, and several minor advantages
were obtained by the Czar in the Treaty of Adrianople
and the conventions which followed it. An officer of
rank was despatched to Asia immediately after the signing
of the treaty ; in less than a fortnight from the memorable
28th of August all hostilities were suspended, and shortly
afterwards peace was declared.

General Paskievitch, who commanded the Russian army
in Asia, was rewarded with the baton of a field-marshal,
A similar honor was given to General Diebitsch, in addi-
tion to the title " Zabalkanski " (Trans-Balkanian), in
commemoration of his daring march across that hitherto
impassable mountain chain. A major-general at twenty-
five, and lieutenant-general at twenty-eight, he was one
of the most remarkable soldiers w'hose names adorn the
military records of Russia. He was only in his fortj'-fifth
year when he became a field-marshal, after the peace of
Adrianople.

CHAPTER V.

BATTLE OF STAOUELI AND FALL OF ALGIERS — 1830.

Ix the year 454 of the Christian era, Genseric, the ruler
of Northern Africa, sent an expedition that ravaged the
coast of Sicily and Italy, captured Rome, A\hich was given
up to sack for fourteen days, and returned to Africa with
sixty thousand prisoners. The fleet of Genseric was the
precursor of the pirates and corsairs that ravaged the
Mediterranean from that time to the present century, and
the prisoners that were brought from Rome were the van-
guard of that vast array of foreign slaves who toiled
under Algerinc and other barbaric masters until the
French conquest of which we are about to speak.

Under the Turkish rulers of Algeria piracy became
a well-organized system, and was regarded as legitimate
a means of obtaining wealth as in our day we regard the
manufacture of woollen or cotton goods, or the shipment
of grain or other products to a profitable market. The
Moslems considered it entirely proper to hold all Chris-
tians in their power as slaves, and they made no distinc-
tion between prisoners of war, the crews of captured
merchant ships, or unhappy victims of their raids on the
European coast and islands. Furthermore, whenever any
European state attempted reprisals, it was the custom of
the Dey of Algiers to send to the galleys the consul of that
countr}', together with the crew of any merchant ship that
might have ventured into his ports for purposes of trade.
On many occasions hundreds of these peaceful traders

66 DECISIVE BATTLES SINCE WATERLOO.

were slaughtered in cold blood, simply as a matter of in-
timidation to the government to which they owed alle-
giance. The consuls were treated with great barbarity;
they were burned alive or blown from the mouths of can-
nons, and on one occasion on the approach of a French fleet
the French consul was thrown towards them from a mortar.
The various European governments made frequent at-
tempts to suppress this system of piracy and slavery, but
as they were constantly warring among themselves they
could not fix upon united action. Each was generally
content to see its neighbors preyed upon if it could secure
immunity for itself, and consequently the attempts to this
end were in the shape of tribute, partly in money and
very often partly in cannon, muskets, powder, shells, and
other munitions of war. As late as 1771 France bought
peace with Algiers, and one of the conditions was that
she should send over some cannon-founders to instruct
the pirates in their art. Spain, Holland, England,
Austria, and the United States of America were among
the tributary nations ; as late as 1805, all these countries
paid tribute to the dey as a condition of not being
molested, a condition, it is needless to say, that was
speedily violated.

In 1 8 16 England sent a fleet under Lord Exmouth
to compel the liberation of British subjects that were then
held in slavery. The dey refused to listen to terms, and
the result was the bombardment of Algiers, the destruc-
tion of its fleet and forts, and the conclusion of a treaty
by which Christian slavery should forever cease in the
dominions of the dey, all slaves then in bondage were to
be liberated immediately, all money received for the ran-
som of slaves since the beginning of the year was to
be returned, and the British consul who had been put in
irons was to receive reparation and an apology. But in
spite of the treaty, piracy and slavery continued, and after
a fresh rupture with England in 1824, which was patched

68 DECISIVE BATTLES SINCE WATERLOO.

up in a manner disgraceful to the latter, the insolence of
the Algerian authorities was without limit, and they
regarded treaties as of no more consequence than so
many sheets of waste paper.

During the Napoleonic wars, the Dey of Algiers sup-
plied grain for the use of the French armies ; it was
bought by merchants of Marseilles, and there was a dis-
pute about the matter which was unsettled as late as
1829. Several instalments had been paid; the dey
demanded payment in full according to his own figures,
while the French government, believing the demand ex-
cessive, required an investigation. In one of the numer-
ous debates on the subject, Hussein Pasha, the reigning
dey, became ver}^ angry, struck the consul with a fan,
and ordered him out of the house. He refused all repara-
tion for the insult, even on the formal demand of the
French government, and consequently there was no alter-
native but war. It was known that the Algerines had
replaced the fleet destroyed by Lord Exmouth, and
repaired and greatly strengthened the fortifications of the
harbor of Algiers. But their defences only looked
towards an attack by water, and they had quite neglected
the rear of the city, which was commanded by heights
behind it. Therefore the French determined upon a
land attack as the best mode of conquering the strong-
hold of the corsairs.

During the whole of April, the French government
pursued its preparations at Toulon, Brest, Havre, and
Cherbourg, and by the beginning of May all the fleet was
assembled at Toulon and ready for sea. The land forces
comprised 37,500 men, 3,000 horses, and 180 pieces of
artillery, mostly heavy guns for the reduction of Algiers,
in case a siege should be found necessary. The sea forces
included 1 1 ships of the line, 23 frigates, 70 smaller vessels,
377 transports, and 230 boats for landing troops. General
Bourmont, Minister of War, commanded the expedition.

BATTLE OF STAOUELI AND FALL OF ALGIERS. 69

which appeared in front of Algiers on the 13th of June,
1830. Though somewhat alarmed at the spectacle of the
vast fleet, Hussein Pasha thought he would be able to
defeat his assailants with little difficulty should they ever
attempt to land. He had previously asked for aid from
the Sultan of Turkey, but that wily ruler had blankly re-
fused. The beys of Tunis and Tripoli had also declined
to meddle with the affair, and he had only his vassals, the
beys of Oran, Constantine, and Tittery to fall back upon.
They were entirely confident that a descent on the coast
of Algiers was contemplated by the French, and stood
ready to meet them in strong force.

Admiral Duperre, the commander of the fleet, carefully
examined the coast and decided that the best place for
landing was at Sidi-Ferruch, about sixteen miles to the
west of Algiers, where there is a peninsula enclosed by
two deep bays. On the 14th the landing was partially
effected, rapidly and in excellent order. It was observed
that the ground rose rather steeply in a series of natural
terraces, covered with brushwood near the shore, and
considerably more wooded farther inland. The French
also perceived that every one of these terraces held a
swarm of Turks and Arabs partially concealed in the
bushes. They were not long in opening a lively fusillade
against the French, who replied without attempting to
advance. The Arabs mistook the deliberation of the
French for fear, and concluded that it would be an easy
matter to destroy the invaders at any desired moment.

Hussein's commander-in-chief was his son-in-law, the Aga
Ibrahim, who had 40,000 to 50,000 men under his com-
mand. Ibrahim was a very skilful and daring horseman,
but not much of a soldier. When the news came that the
French were landing at Sidi-Ferruch, Ibrahim marched
his army to the heights overlooking the bay, and en-
camped it on the table-land of Staoueli, which spreads out
from the crest of the hills. His troops were mostly ir-

yo DECISIVE BATTIES SINCE WATERLOO.

regulars, having come there merely for the purpose of
looting and with little stomach for battle. His horsemen
could not be called cavalry in any close sense of the word.
They were merely marks-men on horseback. Their mode
of fighting was to ride up at a gallop, discharge their guns,
and then wheel about and retire. Their numbers and the
fury of their onset, together with their fine horsemanship,
made them dangerous enemies.

Ibrahim assembled his men at Staoueli, in the belief
that the most arrant cowardice kept the French in their
camps, and that it would be an easy matter for him to
make a rush and drive the army, horse and foot, into the
]\Iediterranean. He did not observe the artillery that was
rapidly being landed by the French, nor did he see the
horses and ammunition wagons to move and supply the
guns. He was at first inclined to make an attack when
only a small part of the invaders had reached the shore,
but finally concluded to let the entire body come to land,
so that he would have but a single job of annihilation.

For five days the French continued their work of de-
barkation unmolested by the Algerines except by the
desultory attacks of horsemen coming singly or in small
groups to try conclusions with the pickets. A few strag-
glers and foraging parties were cut off, but on the whole
the loss to the French during the five days of the landing
was trifling. On the 19th General Bourmont was ready
for the advance, and gave orders for breaking up the camp
and moving in the direction of the enemy. There was
great scarcity of water in the camp until the i6th, when a
heavy rain flooded the country ; after this rain the soldiers
found plenty of water everj'where by digging a few feet
into the sand.

Ibrahim had made his camp on the plain of Staoueli,
drawing up his line in the form of a crescent, with his
right resting on the valley of the Madiffa', a small river
flowing from the Atlas Mountains, which here fill the

BATTLE OF STAOUELI AND FALL OF ALGLERS. 7 1

southern horizon, A redoubt was thrown up, and strong-
ly mounted, and behind the numerous knolls and hillocks
of the table-land many thousands of soldiers were lying in
wait. If Ibrahim had remained where he was, and calmly
awaited the attack, he would have shown some under-
standing of the ways of warfare, since he must have been
aware that his greatest strength always lay in acting on
the defensive. But such was the arrogance of the Al-
gerincs that his muddled brain did not suggest any better
plan than to let loose his hordes of horsemen, ride down
the French infantrv, and thus secure victory without de-
lay.

As the French began their advance the Moslems came
to meet them. The former had about thirty thousand
men under arms, while the latter were thought to be
not less than forty-five thousand — at least that was the
estimate of the conquerors. Twenty thousand Moslems
came rushing over the plain to attack General Berthezene's
division, and fifteen thousand more, led by Ahmed, the
Bey of Constantine, moved around Lovedo's division to
attack it in the rear, a manoeuvre which would have
placed the French between two fires.

The plan was an excellent one, but neither Ibrahim nor
Ahmed had the military genius to make it successful. A
short fusillade ensued, and a troop of Arabs dashed into
the French camp. A hand-to-hand fight followed, and
very soon the ground was strewn with the dead and
wounded. There was a time when the 21st regiment
of the line seemed to be severely shaken. The soldiers'
pouches were empty, and their ranks in too close order to
make an effective use of the bayonet.

The rally was sounded. General Bourmont called up
the reserves, and in a few minutes the tide of battle had
turned. The general, observing the eager onslaught of
his soldiers, and also the loose desultory system of the
Algerian attack, now ordered the three divisions to ad-

72 DECISIVE BATTLES SINCE WATERLOO.

vance at the double-quick upon the plateau of Staoueli.
An eye-witness says : " The soldiers had been waiting for
that order. Away now they dashed in three different
routes to meet at the enemy's intrenchment. At once
they carry the redoubt, cut down the gunners at the bat-
tery, and in their turn rush into the enemy's camps. The
furious onslaught of the soldiers reels the Arabs over , they
turn about as if in a whirlpool, give way, and are hurried
out of all their positions. For an instant they try re-
sistance, but too late ; they take to flight and run, never
halting till the sheltering walls of Algiers receive them."

The Algerines had made a fairly orderly retreat until
the French entered their camp and captured the artillery.
Orientals have a great respect for cannon ; its possession
is to them a proof of superiority, and its loss is almost
certain to cause a panic among them. It was so in the
present instance, and when their guns were in the hands
of the French, their hope of victory was gone. And
furthermore, the French guns, nearly one hundred in num-
ber, had been steadily pouring grai)e and canister in the
Moslem ranks at short range and steady aim, with a de-
structive effect that no irregular troops are able to with-
stand. The Arab loss in killed and wounded was about
three thousand, largely caused by the artillery fire of the
invaders, while the French loss was less than five hundred.
In little more than an hour the battle was over, and the
Osmanlis were in full and disorderly retreat.

General Bourmont remained where he was for several
days, strengthening his position and clearing out an old
Roman road for the transportation of his heavy artillery
to the rear of Algiers. On the day of the battle the de-
barkation of the heavy artillery had not been completed,
and the work was continued until every piece was on
shore. The French occupied and strengthened the former
camp of the Osmanlis at Staoueli, and took every precau-
tion against surprise. The Moslems recovered from their

BATTLE OF STAOUELI AND FALL OF ALGLERS. 73

fright, and after a few skirmishes, in which their wonderful
abihty on horseback was admirably displayed, they made
an attack (June 24th) on the French lines. Twenty
thousand men, most of them mounted, advanced to the
assault with loud shouts and riding close up to the
French position. The divisions of Berthezene and Lo-
vedo moved out to meet them in the same order as on
the 19th, and with the same result. The artillery moved
between the columns of infantr}-, and as the battle opened,
the cannon mowed down the Arabs with fearful effect by
means of grape and canister.

The assailants were repulsed with heavy loss, and pur-
sued about six miles from the scene of the battle. The
French loss was trifling, but the killed included Amadie
de Bourmont, son of the commander-in-chief, who fell
while leading his company of grenadiers.

The way to Algiers was now open to the French,
though their adv'ance was considerably impeded by the
light troops of the enemy, who disputed every point
where a stand could be made, and hovered so close on
the flanks of the column, that every straggler w^as instantly
cut off and slaughtered. The French advanced leisurely,
and on the 30th of June took th'^Jr position before, or
rather behind, the city, in front of the Emperor's Fort, a
quadrangular structure which occupied the ground where
the Emperor Charles V., three centuries earlier, made a
disastrous attack upon Algiers. It stands on the plateau
above the city, and commands every part of it ; the dey
thought it would be able to resist the invaders, and even
when they sat down before it his courage did not desert
him.

The French brought up their heavy guns and began the
attack, in which they w^ere joined by the light artillery.
The batteries were completed on the 3d of July, and fire
was opened on the following day. Not since the bom-
bardment by Lord Exmouth in 18 16 had such a contest

74 DECISIVE BATTLES SINCE WATERLOO.

raged at Algiers. The French ships of the line approached
the front of the city, and opened fire on the sea defences
almost simultaneously with the bombardment of the fort.
The French had one hundred guns in battery, while the
Algerines had more than double that number in the fort,
but all their artillery could not be brought to bear at once.
The Algerines serv^ed their guns bravely, but their fire was
greatly inferior to that of the French, and very soon the
excellence of the artillery practice of the latter was mani-
fest. One by one the defenders' guns were dismounted,
the walls were breached, the gunners were either killed or
wounded or driven from their batteries, and finally the
survivors sought refuge in a huge tower in the middle of
the fort. Shortly afterwards the tower blew up with an
explosion that reduced it to a mass of ruins and killed
nearly all those who had fled to it for protection. As
soon as they could form, the French grenadiers assaulted
and carried the fort, and the city of the deys was in the
possession of a Christian power.

The dey hoisted the white flag and offered to surrender,
for which purpose he sent an envoy to meet General
Bourmont in the Emperor's Fort. Hussein Pasha hoped
to the last moment to retain his country and its inde-
pendence by making liberal concessions in the way of in-
demnity for the expenses of the war, and offered to liberate
all Christian slaves in addition to paying them for their
services and sufferings. The English consul tried to
mediate on this basis, but his offers of mediation were
politely declined ; the French were determined on nothing
short of complete conquest and the utter demolition of
this nest of pirates, that had so long scourged the Medi-
terranean and the countries bordering on it. It was
finally agreed that the dey should surrender Algiers with
all its forts and military stores, and be permitted to retire
wherever he chose with his wives, children, and personal
belongings, but he was not to remain in the country under

BATTLE OF STAOUELI AND FALL OF ALGIERS. 75

any circumstances. On the 5th of July the French entered
Algiers in great pomp and took possession of the place ;
they respected private property, and in a proclamation
General Bourmont offered amnesty to all who had op-
posed him, provided they laid down their arms at once.

The spoils of war were such as rarely fall to the lot of
a conquering army, when its numbers and the circum-
stances of the campaign are considered. In the treasury
was found a large room filled with gold and silver coins
heaped together indiscriminately, the fruits of three
centuries of piracy ; they were the coins of all the na-
tions that had suffered from the depredations of the
Algerines, and the variety in the dates showed very
clearly that the accumulation had been the work of two
or three hundred years. How much money was con-
tained in this vast pile is not known ; certain it is that
nearly fifty million francs, or two millions sterling, actually
reached the French treasury, and it is not known that the
French officers and soldiers added any thing to the origi-
nal amount from their private purses.

On the walls and ships-of-war fifteen hundred and forty-
two cannon were found, of which six hundred and seventy-
were of bronze, and the entire value of the public property
turned over to the French government was estimated at
fifty-five million francs. The cost of the war was much
more than covered by the captured property ; in fact, the
money alone that was found in the treasury was sufificient
for that purpose. Many slaves were liberated, among
them the crews of two French brigs that had been cap-
tured not long before. The total loss of the French in
the campaign was six hundred killed and seventeen hun-
dred wounded, while that of the Algerines was estimated
at double those figures, the proportion of the killed being
greater in consequence of the deadly fire of the French
artillery.

The Algerine power was forever broken, and from that

•J^ DECISIVE BATTLES SINCE WATERLOO.

day Algeria lias been a prosperous colony of France. Hus-
sein Pasha embarked on the loth of July with a suite of
one hundred and ten persons, of whom fifty-five were
women. He proceeded to Naples where he remained for a
time, went afterwards to Leghorn, and finally to Egypt. On
his arrival in that country Mohammed Ali Pasha received
him with the consideration due to his high rank and mis-
fortunes, and showed him marked favor. But one day, after
a private audience with Mohammed Ali, Hussein retired
to his apartments and died in convulsions, probably from
a dose of poison administered b}- the hand of the slayer
of the Mamelukes.

On a marble slab over the principal entrance of the new
barrack at Sidi-Ferruch is the following inscription :

Ici

le 14 Juin, 1S30,

Par Tordre du Roi Charles X.,

Sous le commandement du General de

BOURMOXT,

L'Armee Fran^aise

\'int arborer ses drapeaux,

Rendre la Liberte aux mers,

Donner I'Aleerie a la France.

CHAPTER VI.

CAPTURE OF, ANTWERP AND LIBERATION OF BELGIUM —

1832.

The history of Belgium as an independent state dates
from its separation from the kingdom of the Netherlands
in 1830. It had prevaously been under the domination of
Spain, Austria, and France, and finally, in the general
peace which followed the wars of Napoleon, it was united
with Holland under Prince William Frederick of Orange-
Nassau. The union was not to the taste of the Belgian
people, who differed materially from the Dutch in lan-
guage, religion, and occupations. In the union Holland,
with 2,000,000 inhabitants, was to have an equal number
of representatives with Belgium's 4,000,000 ; furthermore,
the national debt of Belgium was only 4,000,000 florins,
while Holland had a debt of 1,200,000,000; the consoli-
dated debt was to be assumed by both countries, and would
naturally be a severe and unjust burden upon Belgium
with its superior population. In the convention which
passed the constitution containing these objectionable
provisions, the Belgians who dissented were in actual
majority, but all absent Belgians were held to have
assented, and so the vote was carried. The use of the
French language in judicial and other proceedings was to
be abolished, and there were other conditions equally ob-
jectionable.

Officials holding Belgian opinions were dismissed, a
severe press law was enacted, and several persons ob-

78 DECISIVE BATTIES SINCE WATER 100.

noxious to the government were banished. The revolu-
tions in Paris in 1830 caused much excitement in Belgium,
and in August of that year there was an outbreak in Brus-
sels, speedily followed by similar manifestations of discon-
tent in other cities of Belgium. Insurrection led to open
warfare ; Brussels, Mons, Ghent, Liege, and other places
passed into the hands of the Belgians, and by the end of
October only Antwerp remained in control of the Dutch.
General Chasse, the Dutch commander, occupied the
citadel of Antwerp, whence he subjected the city to a two
days' bombardment, doing great damage to property.
Belgium had already formed a provisional government,
and after the bombardment of Antwerp the quarrel was
appealed to a conference of the European powers at Lon-
don. The conference ordered an armistice and the retire-
ment of the troops of Belgium and Holland into their own
countries, acknowledged the independence of Belgium,
bound her to the payment of a portion of the state debt,
and left her to the management of her own affairs inde-
pendently of Holland.

In July, 1 83 1, Leopold of Saxe-Coburg was crowned
king of the Belgians under the title of Leopold I. Soon
after his coronation he found himself burdened with war,
as the Dutch in violation of the armistice had sent an
army across the frontier. With an unformed government,
a hastily organized army, and a kingdom in disorder, the
new king felt unable to oppose the invaders, and in his
dilemma he appealed to France for aid. The aid was
promptly given ; Marshal Gerard, accompanied by the
Duke of Orleans, marched into Belgium with 60,000 men,
whereupon the Dutch retired to their own boundaries.

The conference of the powers determined to compel
the Dutch to give up the citadel of Antwerp, which they
still held. Accordingly the army of Marshal Gerard ad-
vanced upon Antwerp, and a combined English and
French fleet entered the Scheldt to co-operate with the

80 DECISIVE BATTIES SINCE WATERLOO.

army. The army consisted of forty-eight thousand in-
fantry, nine thousand cavalry', and six thousand artillery,
the latter comprising a siege train for the special purpose
of reducing the Antwerp citadel. The British fleet com-
prised five ships of the line, the French fleet included three
ships of the linfe and five frigates, and these combined
armaments made their rendezvous on the coast of England
and sailed together for the Scheldt. It was an odd specta-
cle to see England and France co-operating in warfare
after centuries of enmity.

For more than a year the town of Antwerp had been in
the possession of Belgium while the citadel was held by
General Chasse, the Dutch commander, with a garrison of
five thousand men. It was commonly called the "citadel
du Sud " to distinguish it from the " citadel du Nord " on
the other side of Antwerp. This celebrated fortress was
separated from the city by an esplanade, and commanded
the harbor, as it was close to the bank of the Scheldt. It
was long considered one of the strongest places in Europe,
and owed its existence to the Duke of Alva, during the
war between Spain and the United Provinces in the six-
teenth century, to com.mand the navigation of the Scheldt
and be the principal frontier post toward Holland.
Napoleon added greatly to its strength when he formed
the design of invading England, and decided upon
Antwerp as his base. The invention of rifled cannon in
later times has rendered this citadel of less consequence
than formerly, and in 1874 it was dismantled, but not
until Antwerp had been provided with other and more
modern defences.

One side of the fortress (towards the west) was pro-
tected by the river ; towards the land it was covered by
several strong outworks, but these were of little avail at
the time of the siege, as the garrison was not sufficiently
large to man them all. The garrison,' five thousand
strong, was composed of veteran soldiers who were well

CAPTURE OF ANTWERP. 8 1

worthy of their leader, General Chasse ; the fort mounted
one hundred and eighty guns, most of them of heavy
calibre, and the fortress was well supplied with ammuni-
tion. Immense casemates and covered galleries and
lodgments for the protection of the troops had been
constructed, and the Dutch general was prepared for a
hard fight. The French army had an enormous battering
train, as it was well known that the siege of Antwerp would
be no holiday affair.

The French crossed the frontier at Charleroi on the
1 8th November, and arrived in front of Antwerp near the
end of the month. The preliminary work of the siege
was begun immediately, and at the same time there was a
correspondence between the Dutch and French generals
of a somewhat novel character. General Chasse insisted
that the French should not make use of the works of the
city in their siege operations, otherwise he should consider
the city taking part in the siege and would proceed to
bombard it. Marshal Gerard sent the following letter to
General Chass^ :

" Sir. — In the name of His Majesty the King of the Bel-
gains, I ask you to hand over the citadel and all the forts
along the Scheldt ; if not so disposed, I shall force you.
Whatever you do, mind not to fire on the city."

To this summons the Dutch commander replied as
follows :

" Sir. — I shall stick to my post as long as life will last.
The city is safe. Pray stop your siege works before
negotiations have come to an end, or else I shall fire."

For a time there was little prospect that the city could
be spared the horrors of war, and preparations were made
in Antwerp by barricading the streets and removing the
pavements so as to reduce as much as possible the
effects of the bombardment. Many people left the city
in anticipation of their worst fears being realized, but it
was finally agreed that the city with all its outworks should

82 DECISIVE BATTLES SINCE WATERLOO.

be considered neutral by both parties ; the fire of the
citadel was to be directed only to the open plain to the
southeast, and the approaches of the besiegers were to be
only from that direction. It was a novel spectacle — peace
reigning all around, the city neutralized, and the attack
and defence limited to cne side of the fort. It seemed
more a trial of military skill than an instance of actual
warfare.

Operations began on the 30th November. On that day
the following letters passed between the commanders :

To General Chasse.

Sir. — It is you that fired the first shot on my soldiers, hence
do not talk any longer about negotiations. Surrender, I say
again, in the name of humanity, and all will be well.

Gerard.

Head-quarters at Bouhem.

To Marshal Gerard.

Sir. — The fault is with you. I shall fight for the city, and it
will be safe as long as you will not force me. Chasse.

Citadel at Antwerp.

On the receipt of General Chasse's letter Marshal
Gerard began in dead earnest. The trenches were opened
and continued night and day amidst torrents of rain.
Soon the French had one hundred and four guns in posi-
tion, throwing solid shot and shell into the citadel. On
the 4th of December all the batteries began playing upon
the fortress with a steady, well-directed fire, which was
maintained for nineteen days without cessation.

The return fire was slow at first, but better in time and
admirably directed. Of course, no vessels or boats could
pass either up or down the river ; a few that tried it were
fired upon and taught to keep aloof. All communication
between citadel and city was cut ofif, and the garrison was
thus left unsupported.

CAPTURE OF ANTWERP. 83

In spite of the steady and well-directed fire of the
citadel, the besiegers made steady progress. Their third
and fourth parallels were directed against the lunette
Saint Laurent ; a mine was run under one of its bastions,
and sprung on the night of the 14th December, making a
practicable breach in the walls. Three companies of the
65th French regiment assaulted immediately, passed the
ditch without firing a shot, and carried the breach at the
point of the bayonet. At the same time a battalion of
grenadiers took advantage of the springing of the mine
and consequent confusion ; the)' scaled the walls of the
lunette on the opposite side, and the garrison of less than
three hundred men was compelled to retire to the citadel
with the loss of sixty prisoners, after making a most gal-
lant defence.

The capture of this position was of great advantage to
the French, as it enabled them to bring their approaches
close to the edge of the ditch on the summit of the
counterscarp. General Chass^ planned a sortie, which was
led by Captain Morr^. It resulted in the capture of five
mortars, and the levelling of some twenty-five yards of
the trenches, but the working force of French was
speedily strengthened, and the Dutch were beaten back
with the loss of their captain, who was killed. Other
sorties were made, the Dutch displaying great bravery,
but the retardation of the work of the besiegers was
hardly sufficient to compensate for the loss of men.
Night and day the bombardment continued, and so vigor-
ously was it carried on that as many as fourteen bombs
were seen in the air at once.

The immense casemates of the citadel were not strong
enough to stand the French fire. The casemates were
broken through by the weight of the falling bombs ; some
of the missiles penetrated to the hospitals, piercing the
six feet of earth piled upon the roofing of heavy timber,
and exploding in the midst of the sick and wounded.

84 DECISIVE BATTLES SINCE WATERLOO.

The garrison daily diminished from the effects of the fire
and the exhaustion of the men, who were obhged to be
almost constantly under arms ; forty heavy guns, mounted
on the edge of the counterscarp, converged their fire upon
the bastion of Toledo, and the high brick walls tumbled
in ruins from its effect.

On the 23d of December General Chasse wisely con-
cluded that he had prolonged the defence quite as long
as was required either by military honor or state policy,
and that further resistance was useless. He hoisted a
white flag, and the firing ceased immediately. Two
Dutch of^cers were sent to treat for terms and ask that
the garrison be allowed to retire witli the honors of war.
Marshal Gerard immediately granted the request, and the
rest of the matter was arranged in a few minutes. The
Dutch were to surrender the citadel, with the forts of
Lillo and Liefkenshock farther down the river and com-
manding navigation from the sea to Antwerp. The gar-
rison was to retire into Holland with its colors and arms,
but all government property inside the fort was to be
given up to Belgium. The commander of the Dutch
flotilla tried to break through the French lines, but finding
he could not do so, he burned his gun-boats rather than
surrender them to the enemy.

When the terms of the surrender were submitted to
the king of Holland, he refused to ratify them, so far as
the forts down the river were concerned, on the ground
that they were not under General Chasse's orders at the
time of the capitulation. Marshal Gerard then offered to
let the garrison of the citadel retire into Holland with
their arms upon the simple obligation not to serve again
against France or Belgium during the continuance of
hostilities, but General Chasse refused to do so. He said
it would not be in accord with the original terms of
capitulation, and therefore he and his 'men must be
treated as prisoners of war. At an appointed time the

CAPTURE OF ANTWERP. 85

garrison marched out and piled their arms, and were then
marched back into the citadel, where they took food with
their late antagonists, from whom they received every
courtesy. Afterwards they were taken to France as pris-
oners of war ; General Chasse wished to march with them,
but with his seventy years of age, added to the fatigues
and excitement of the siege, he was so broken down, that
he was unable to enter a carriage without assistance.

Rarely, if ever, was a siege conducted with so much
chivalry and courtesy as that of the citadel of Antwerp.
The stipulation regarding the neutrality of the city and
the restrictions of the line of fire of both parties are note-
worthy, and so well were they carried out, that not a
single non-combatant beyond the lines was harmed in
person or property. An eye-witness of the siege says
that when Marshal Gerard, in company with the Duke of
Orleans, entered the citadel to meet his opponent, General
Chasse, he found the latter standing near the casemates,
amidst a heap of ruins. " Quickly he walked forward,
extending his hand. 'Count,' he said, 'all these ruins
speak of your prowess.' But no reply fell from the lips
of the saddened old man, who was too much cast down
to be able to speak."

At the time the white flag was displayed all was ready
for the assault, which would have been made within a few
hours. The same eye-witness who is quoted above says:
" It was well that the surrender was made without a
previous assault ; for, according to the French officers,
there would have been a terrible slaughter following it.
' Friendly though we were with the Dutch the eve before,
exchanging courtesies,' said one of them, ' our soldiers
would have changed in a moment, sparing nobody. We
cannot help being so ; it is the nature of the soldier
everywhere.' ''

Commenting on the siege of Antwerp, the author of
" Alison's History of Europe," who was personally present

86 DECISIVE BATTLES SINCE WATERLOO.

in the latter part of the operations, pronounces it one of
the most memorable sieges of which the annals of Europe
make mention. " Such had been the intrepidity of the
governor and the courage of the garrison, that five thou-
sand men kept sixty thousand at bay during twenty-four
days of open trenches, during which the fire, both of
artiller}- and small-arms, was incessant, and besiegers and
besieged were alike standing to their guns day and night
through the severities of a rude season, in the depth of
winter. It is hard to say whether, in such circumstances,
there is most to admire in the vigor and perseverance of
the besiegers, or the devotion and constancy of the be-
sieged. Both sides made the utmost efforts during the
continuance of the operations. The besiegers opened up
14,000 fathoms of trenches. The artillery discharged
63.000 shots, and they took 5,000 men by capitulation.
The Dutch lost 90 killed, 349 wounded, and 67 prisoners
during the siege. But the losses of the besiegers were
much more considerable : they amounted to 608 killed
and 1,800 wounded."

The other forts, Lillo and Liefkenshock, were not
evacuated, and the French proposed to operate against
them ; King Leopold declared himself satisfied to hold
Limburg and Luxemburg against them, and so the French
army retired across the frontier into its own country. The
king of Holland refused to accept the situation, and
declared that he would continue the war, but the blockade
of the ports of his country by the combined fleets of
France and England, and the consequent paralysis of
Dutch commerce, were not long in bringing him to his
senses. England and France informed him in the most
emphatic terms that no interference with the march of
Belgium towards independence would be permitted, and
that at the first move he made in that direction the
French army would be summoned back again and the
consequences might be very serious for his kingdom. In

CAPTURE OF ANTWERP. 8/

the resumption of negotiations there was no difficulty in
settHng the principal points of the convention ; the agree-
ment turned chiefly on the minor points of trade and
commercial relations, in which Holland displayed the
obstinacy for which the Dutch are traditionally renowned.

On the 19th May, 1833, a convention was agreed to
and signed, and the long quarrel was practically over.
All Dutch vessels that had been seized by France or
England were to be released immediately and restored,
with their cargoes, to their owners, and all Dutch prisoners
were to be liberated. Holland agreed not to reopen hos-
tilities with Belgium, and the navigation of the Scheldt
was to be kept open as it had been prior to November i,
1832. The Meuse, which flows through Holland in the
lower part of its course, was also opened commercially
for Belgian vessels, on condition that certain duties fixed
for the states of the German Confederation should be paid.
It was further agreed that Holland and Belgium should
proceed to the negotiation of a treaty for a definitive and
permanent peace. As all the points of the treaty were
practically settled it was supposed that the negotiations
would present no difficulty, but as a matter of fact, owing
to the obstinacy of the king of Holland, it M-as not
completed until 1839. Even then it was only accom-
plished at the dictation of the European powers. Luxem-
burg and Limburg were divided between the contending
nations, Holland receiving the eastern divisions, with the
fortresses of Maestricht, Venloo, and Luxemburg. The
independence and neutrality of Belgium were guaranteed,
and the country was enabled to enter upon a career
of commercial and industrial prosperity.

Since the conclusion of the above-named treaty with
Holland, Belgium has had no taste of the horrors of war
within her borders, other than the use of the military
on several occasions for the suppression of disturbances
among workmen in mines or in manufacturing establish-

88 DECISIVE BATTLES SINCE WATERLOO.

ments. In all the wars of other powers Belgium has
maintained a strict neutrality. In the Franco-Prussian war
of 1870 she forbade the sale of war munitions to either of
the contending parties, and disarmed and interned all
soldiers of either army that entered her territory. Her
peace was seriously threatened at one time during that
war, but was saved through the conclusion of a triple
treaty between England. France, and Prussia, by which
the independence and neutrality of Belgium were guaran-
teed under the terms of the treaty of 1839.

For nearly fifteen years following the siege of Antwerp
and the establishment of Belgium as an independent king-
dom the general peace of Europe and America continued.
Spain suffered to some extent from civil war ; Don Carlos
in April, 1833, declared himself the legitimate successor
to the king, and the result was the Carlist war of that
period, which continued with varying fortunes until the
final overthrow of the pretender in 1839. -^^ 1840, and
the three succeeding years, there were various revolu-
tionary movements in Spain, most of them resulting in
bloodshed and some in hostilities of considerable magni-
tude, but in the final result the succession to the throne
was not disturbed, and Spain suffered no loss, or made no
increase, of territory.

Russia was at peace with her European neighbors. Her
impatient eyes were fixed upon Asia, and in 1839-40, she
sent an expedition for the conquest of Khiva. It had a
disastrous result, and for more than thirty years thereafter
Khiva retained her independence in the midst of the
desert sands of Central Asia.

In 1835 began the "opium war " between China and
England, growing out of the proclamation of the Chinese
emperor prohibiting the importation of the pernicious
drug into his dominions. Opium was the chief source
of revenue of the British in India, and consequently Eng-

CAPTURE OF ANTWERP. 89

land determined to foster her commerce regardless of the
consequences to China or its people. The war continued
until 1S42, when the treaty of peace was signed in front
of Nankin. By the terms of the treaty China paid an
indemnity of $21,000,000, opened the ports of Canton,
Amoy, Foochow, Ningpo, and Shanghai to foreigners,
and ceded the island of Hong Kong in perpetuity to
England.

England in 1839 ventured upon the Afghan war, which,
at first successful, terminated in disaster ; of 3,849 soldiers
and about 12,000 camp followers, composing the army of
General Elphinstone, only one European (Dr. Brydon)
and four natives succeeded in reaching the British lines.
General Sale's brigade was less unfortunate, as it held Jel-
lalabad until a fresh division could be sent from India to
enable it to retire without being destroyed. The attempt
of England upon Afghanistan ended in 1842. In the fol-
lowing year occurred the Scinde war, resulting in the
annexation of Scinde to the British possessions ; and in
1843, also, came the Gwalior war, in which the fortress of
Gwalior, the " Gibraltar of the East," fell into British
hands. In 1845 began the Sikh war, of which more will
be said elsewhere.

In 1831-33 Mohammed Ali Pasha, the sultan's viceroy
in Egypt, waged a war against Turkey in the effort to
obtain complete independence. He conquered Syria and
a great part of Asia Minor, and would have captured Con-
stantinople if the great powers had not interfered to pre-
vent the possible destruction of the Ottoman power in
Europe. A similar war took place in 1839, in which
jMohammed Ali Pasha fought to secure hereditary power.
England, Austria, Russia, and Prussia interfered for the pro-
tection of Turkey and expelled the Egyptians from Syria ;
Mohammed Ali was made hereditary viceroy of Egypt,
but his territory was reduced through the loss of nearly
all that he had gained in the first war against Turkey.

DECISIVE BATTLES SINCE WATERLOO.

During this period South America was the scene of a
few revolutionary movements, resulting in skirmishes and
small battles that had no material consequences to any
but the parties immediately concerned. No changes of
the maps occurred by reason of these disturbances, and
they are not even worthy of mention by name in our
chronicle of events.

CHAPTER VII.

CAPTURE OF THE CITY OF MEXICO — 1 847.

During three decades from the close of the war with
Great Britain in 181 2-1 5 the United States of America
remained at peace with the rest of the world. In the
early part of the third decade there was imminent danger
of another conflict with Great Britain, growing out of
a dispute about the boundary between Maine and New
Brunswick ; an appeal to arms was averted mainly through
the efforts of General Winfield Scott, and the quarrel was
effectually ended by the Ashburton treaty of 1842.

While this dispute with the mother country was in
progress, another and more serious quarrel, so far as re-
sults w^ere concerned, arose concerning our southwestern
boundary. The present State of Texas was formerly a
province of Mexico, having been ceded to Spain in 18 19,
before the separation of Mexico from the kingdom of
Castile and Leon. Many American citizens settled in
Texas while it was a Mexican possession, but owing to
the difference in the laws of the two countries they
earnestly desired to come under the protection of the
United States flag. The United States endeavored to
purchase the territory as far as the Rio del Norte, but
the Mexican government rejected the proposal. In 1830
the Mexicans forbade further colonization of Texas by
foreigners, but by this time the foreigners in Texas,
chiefly Americans, far outnumbered the Mexican in-
habitants. The bad state of feeling between Mexicans

92 DECISIVE BATTLES SINCE WATERLOO.

and Americans grew into insurrection, and insurrection
into revolution.

By the beginning of 1835 Texas and Mexico were
at war ; the former fighting for independence, and
the latter endeavoring to reduce its alleged subjects
to a proper acknowledgment of the Mexican authority.
Several battles were fought during the year, and by the
victory of San Antonio de Bexar, December loth, the
whole armed force of the Mexicans was driven from
Texas, which ten days later made a declaration of in-
dependence. The expulsion of the Mexicans was only
temporary; early in 1836 General Santa Anna came with
an army of seven thousand five hundred men well pro-
vided with provisions, artillery, and military stores, and
late in February he invested the Alamo, a strong fort near
San Antonio, garrisoned by Captain Travis and one
hundred and seventy-two men. The Alamo was besieged
for eleven days and then carried by storm ; the whole
garrison was slaughtered, only a woman, a child, and a
servant being spared. The massacre at the Alamo,
together with the massacre of Colonel Fannin's command
at Goliad, March 27th, in violation of the terms of sur-
render, roused the Texans to a high state of excitement,
and they would listen to nothing short of complete inde-
pendence of Mexico.

Near the end of April was fought the battle of San
Jacinto, in which the Mexicans were defeated with heavy
loss and General Santa Anna was made a prisoner. This
battle virtually ended the war for Texan independence,
which was acknowledged by the United States in 1837,
and by France, England, Holland, and Belgium in 1839-
40. Between 1841 and 1843 ^Mexico sent several maraud-
ing expeditions into Texas ; the Texans attempted
reprisals by three expeditions, which were unsuccessful,
many of those who participated being captured and
executed. After considerable negotiation, Texas was

94 DECISIVE BATTLES SINCE WATERLOO.

annexed to the United States in 1845, ^"d this annexation
led to a war between the United States and Mexico.
The war began in 1845 ^^d ended in 1848, the result
being highly favorable to the armies of the former country
and proportionally disastrous to those of the latter.

Hostilities did not actually begin until March, 1846,
when General Zachary Taylor's army crossed the Nueces
and marched in the direction of the Rio Grande. Mexico
denied that Texas extended to the Rio Grande, and per-
sisted in regarding the Nueces as the boundary. When,
therefore, General Taylor crossed the latter river the
movement was considered by the Mexicans an act of war,
and they made immediate preparations for resisting the
advance of the enem}-. Taylor's advance was a series of
almost uninterrupted successes, and in the early part of
1847 Northern Mexico lay at his feet. The American
flag floated over the fortress of Monterey, and the Mexi-
can army, four times the strength of its opponents, had
been defeated at Buena Vista. To complete the conquest
it was necessary to move upon the capital, a work
which was intrusted to General Winfield Scott, the com-
mander-in-chief of the armies of the United States.

On the 6th of March, 1847, the army destined for the
advance to the city of Mexico was concentrated near Vera
Cruz. It comprised the then standing army of the
United States — four regiments of artillery, eight of in-
fantry, one of mounted riflemen, and detachments of
dragoons, besides eight volunteer regiments of infantry
and one of cavalry. General Scott commanded in person,
with Generals Worth, Twiggs, and Patterson as his briga-
diers. Under the last named were Generals Quitman,
Pillow, and Shields, who were destined to make their
names known before the end of the campaign. The first
step in advancing upon the city of Mexico was.to capture
Vera Cruz, which was defended by the fortress of San
Juan d'Uloa, a fortress built on a reef in front of the city

96 DECISIVE BATTIES SINCE WATERLOO.

and having full command of the harbor. The fortress
was considered by the Mexicans to be impregnable ; it
mounted one hundred and twenty-eight guns of various
calibres, and its walls were regarded as proof against any
shot or shell the Americans could throw against it. On
the land side the city was defended by Avails mounting
ninety guns, and so sure were the Mexicans of their
ability to resist attack, that they neglected to provision
the fortress and city for a siege, and also neglected to
send away women, children, and other non-combatants.
The American troops landed without opposition about
three miles from the city and out of range of the guns,
and immediately prepared for the siege. By the evening
of the 1 2th of March the place was completely invested
by the troops, and the work of landing the siege artillery
was pushed as rapidly as possible.

By the 22d every thing was ready, and then General
Scott sent a summons to General Morales, the command-
er of the Mexican forces at Vera Cruz, to surrender the
city and the fortress. Immediately on receiving a refusal,
General Scott opened fire from his batteries, which had
been erected at a distance of eleven hundred yards. A
steady cannonade was maintained all through the
night and the next day. It was found that the bat-
teries were too light and too far away for breaching
purposes, and on the night of the 23d a new battery
considerably nearer the city was constructed and made
ready to open fire in the morning. The value and
importance of the new battery was evident in a few
hours after fire was opened. The walls were crumbling,
and the American guns had such perfect range of the
city that the whole place was covered by a destructive
fire. By the 26th there was a practicable breach, and the
troops for the assault had already been told off when a
white flag appeared on the walls, and soon afterwards the
fortress and the city were under the domination of the

98 DECISIVE BATTLES SINCE WATERLOO.

invaders. Officers and men were paroled not to serve
during the war unless exchanged ; the officers retained
their side-arms, but the muskets of the rank and file were
piled in front of the conquerors. All public property of
every name and kind was handed over with the surren-
dered place.

Nearly two weeks were required to get the army in
readiness for an advance into the interior, which was led
on the 8th of April by General Twiggs. The Mexicans
were severely defeated, and their army was cut up and
routed at Cerro Gordo, where Scott lost a total of four
hundred and thirty-one killed and wounded out of a force
of eighty-five hundred of all arms. The Mexicans left up-
wards of a thousand men dead on the field of battle. La
Hoya, Perote, and Puebla were occupied with little
opposition, and at Puebla General Scott waited for
reinforcements, which arrived during June and July.
Early in August, with a force of not quite eleven thou-
sand men, he advanced towards the valley of Mexico,
leaving Colonel Childs with a garrison of eleven hundred
men to hold Puebla. General Twiggs led the column
with his division, which found the ascent of the Cordil-
leras very difficult ; on the third day of the march the
division reached the crest of the ridge and looked down
into the valley of Mexico, where the soldiers camped that
night on the borders of Lake Chalco.

The delay of General Scott on the road from Vera
Cruz had been utilized by the Mexicans under the leader-
ship of Santa Anna, who had collected an army of 25,000
men to oppose and expel the invaders. The defences of.
the city had been strengthened, and all the natural advan-
tages of its position were utilized. Between the Ameri-
can army and the city lay the lakes Xochimilco and Chalco,
bordered by marshes which extended around the city on
the west and south. The only approaches were by cause-
ways, which had been fortified at several points ; on the

CAPTURE OF THE CITY OF MEXICO. 99

north side of the lakes was the National Road dominated
by El Pefion, a steep hill on which was a fort mounting
fifty-one guns. On the southern side of the lakes there
was a field of lava considered impassable by troops, in
addition to fortified positions at San Antonio, San Angelo,
and Churubusco, with an intrenched camp at Contreras,
which commanded the southern causeways and must be
passed before they could be reached. Beyond these posi-
tions were the castle of Chapultepec and the strong in-
closure of Molino del Rey protecting the approach to the
city gates. General Santa Anna had disposed his troops
so that all the positions were strongly garrisoned, and his
men outnumbered the Americans nearly three to one.

The engineers reported that the fortress on El Penon
would cost the loss of a third of the army to effect its cap-
ture. Reluctant to make this sacrifice, Scott decided to
move to the south of the lakes, and, accordingly, sent
General Worth in advance as far as San Augustin, about
nine miles from the city, where lay the pedrcgal, a large
field of lava which the Mexicans had considered impassa-
ble by the Americans. Two miles further on lay the forti-
fied position of San Antonio, which commanded the route
between the lake and the lava field, and about three miles
distant was the entrenched camp of Contreras, held by
General Valencia with a strong garrison and a heavy
battery. Scott determined to attack on both sides, and
sent Worth forward on the east while Pillow and Twiggs
went to the west. The latter advanced over the fields of
lava and thus astonished the Mexicans ; the way was dififi-
cult for infantry and next to impossible for artillery, but
Twiggs managed to get a couple of light batteries in posi-
tion by two o'clock in the afternoon of the 9th, with which
he opened fire on the camp. His movement was supported
by General Persifer Smith, who endeavored to turn the
Mexican left, and so well was the plan carried out that
Santa Anna, who was advancing to the relief of General

lOO DECISIVE BATTLES SINCE WATERLOO.

Valencia, was frightened into turning back. The ground
was so broken that he could not ascertain the strength of
the battle array that spread before him, and, believing it
much larger than it really was, he made haste to retire in
the direction of the city.

It rained during the night of the 19th of August, and
the troops were encamped in the mud without fires.
Early on the 20th operations were resumed, and before
five o'clock in the morning the fortified camp of Contreras
was in possession of the Americans. The only severe
fighting was in the camp itself, where the Mexicans made
a stout resistance before retiring. The American loss in
killed, wounded, and missing was about one hundred men,
while that of the Mexicans is thought to have been fifteen
hundred killed and wounded. One thousand Mexican
prisoners were taken, including four generals and eighty-
eight officers of other grades. General Valencia escaped
early in the battle, and was nowhere to be found.

After a brief halt to take breath, the army was again in
motion in the direction of Churubusco, which Santa Anna
considered the key to the city and was ready to defend
with twenty-five thousand men. There was a massive
stone convent in the village of Churubusco, which was
surrounded by a field-work having embrasures and plat-
forms for many cannon, and was the right point of the
Mexican line. The walls of the convent were pierced for
musketry, the parapets of the asoteas and windows
afforded good positions for troops, and there was an
abundance of ammunition stored in the building. Be-
yond the convent there extended a line of works, com-
manding the causeway of San Antonio and capable of a
strong resistance. Happily for the Americans, the Mexi-
cans were in great confusion at the time the former ad-
vanced, and only General Rincon's division, which held
the convent and the position immediately around it, was
ready for battle. The army which Santa Anna had led

CAPTURE OF THE CITY OF MEXICO. lOI

back from San Angelo was forming along the river Churu-
busco and in the cornfields to the north, but as there was
no expectation of a battle on that day, the Mexicans were
practically taken by surprise. But in spite of their sur-
prise and confusion, they made a vigorous defence ; they
outnumbered the Americans in the field fully five to one,
and should have been invincible from their numbers and
position. The incompetence of the officers and the in-
ferior character of the Mexican weapons were the chief
causes of their loss of the battle at Churubusco. Where
properly handled, they showed that they were not defi-
cient in bravery, and on several occasions during the
battle they came very near defeating and repulsing their
assailants.

Space is lacking to give in detail the movements at
Churubusco, which resulted in victory to the American
arms. According to General Santa Anna, the Mexican
loss was ten thousand men, or one third of his army ; one
fourth of this number were prisoners, the rest killed or
wounded. The American loss was over one thousand in
killed and wounded, of whom seventy-nine were ofificers.
General Scott might have marched against the city and
captured it on the following morning, or even on that
night, and taken possession before the Mexicans had
recovered from the shock of their defeat. But he was
anxious to shorten the war, and was told that Santa Anna
wished to negotiate ; he was furthermore assured that
the occupation of the city would destroy the last chance
of a peaceable settlement by rousing the national spirit
throughout Mexico and causing the rush of many thou-
sands to arms. The assurances to this effect came from
neutral foreigners residing in Mexico, and Scott does not
seem to have understood their interested motives for
saving the city from occupation. He offered an armistice,
which was eagerly accepted ; it lasted more than a fort-
night, and the time was vigorously utilized by the Mexi-

I02 DECISIVE BATTLES SINCE WATERLOO.

cans in making ready for the defence of the city. When
it expired, Santa Anna was not quite ready and sought an
extension, but the terms offered by General Scott were
considered too onerous, and the campaign was renewed.
Early in September the treachery of the Mexicans became
apparent in a letter from Santa Anna to General Scott,
and on the 7th of that month preparations for another
conflict were under way.

The American forces were distributed as follows during
the armistice : Worth occupied Tacubaya, Pillow was at
]\Iixcoac, and Twiggs near San Angelo, while Quitman
remained at Tlalpam. It had been suggested to General
Scott that there was a cannon foundry in operation at
Molino del Rey or the King's Mill. Worth was therefore
instructed to take possession of it, which was thought to
be an easy task. Afterwards, if successful there, he
could try an assault on Chapultepec, the southern fort
of IMexico. An examination of Molino del Rey showed
that the proposed attack would not be successful without
a reinforcement of artillery. The Molino consisted of a
range of massive stone buildings with crenellated walls
and parapeted roofs, commanded by the plunging fire of
Chapultepec at a distance of three thousand feet. There
was a smaller, but equally solid building, the Casa Ulata,
fifteen hundred feet to the west ; it was surrounded by a
bastioned field-work of a quadrangular shape. Between
those two points was a battery of three small guns, and
in front stretched a line of embankment with ditches.
There were patches of maguey, which screened the Mexi-
can force, numbering altogether more than four thousand
fighting men, besides the cavalry corps of Alvarez, which
w^as nearly four thousand strong.

Worth prepared for a vigorous assault on the Mexican
centre, to be followed by attacks on either flank. To this
end he assigned Major Wright to take the centre with
five hundred men, Garland's brigade with two light pieces

BATTLE or

CHURUBUSCO

AUGUST ZO^f 184-7

103

104 DECISIVE BATTIES SINCE WATERLOO.

taking position on the right to threaten the Molino and
cut off support from Chapultepec. Clarke's brigade under
Mcintosh with three light pieces faced the Mexican right,
which rested on the Casa Mata ; still farther to the left a
troop of cavalry was stationed to observe Alvarez, while
Cadwalader's division stood in reserve behind the centre.
This force amounting to three thousand five hundred
men advanced during the night and took position along
the clear and gently sloping ground in front of Molino
del Rey, where they waited for the coming day. With
its first faint gleam the artillery opens fire on the mill, and
the whistling of balls and the crashing of masonry follow
speedily. Not a shot comes from the Mexican lines, and
the Americans begin to believe that the place is deserted.
Wright's storming-party forms and rushes towards the
point, where the central battery was supposed to be. Its
position has been changed, however, and as they come
within range it opens upon them with round shot and
grape. The assailants pause, but only for an instant, and
then rush upon it with the cry of " Forward I " Once
more comes a shower of shot that mows a fearful swath,
disabling, of officers alone, eleven out of seventeen. But
there is no further halt. The remnant gains the batteries.
There is a brief struggle, hand-to-hand, and the guns are
seized, ready to be turned against the Mexicans.

It is now daylight. Colonel Echeagaraz of the third
light infantry observes the danger ; the garrison discharges
a well-aimed volley on the storming-party, and then rally-
ing hurls back the assailants in disorder and reoccupies the
battery. Worth is equally prompt. He orders forward
three companies of the light battalion and a part of the
reserve to support and rally the shattered column. Gar-
land moves from under the plunging fire of Chapultepec
upon the Mexican flank, while his battery pushes forward
to enfilade the recaptured point. Once more the Ameri-
cans charge simultaneously from centre and right, under

t^r;

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4 s • f'

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105

I06 DECISIVE BATTIES SINCE WATERLOO.

a raking volley of balls and bullets, especially from the
roofs. Their numbers and impetus prevail. They reach
the walls and begin almost unmolested to batter the gates.
The southern gate gives way and some men spring in,
while others climb the roof and assist in gaining the north-
western entrance. The Mexicans stoutly dispute the pas-
sage, but in a little while they waver and fall back, closely
pressed by the Americans, who force them into flight or
surrender. But for some time the result of the battle was
doubtful, as the operations on the left were not successful.

Mcintosh's brigade and Duncan's battery had advanced
to within six hundred yards of the Mexican lines when the
fire first opened on the storming-party. Duncan opened
fire with his guns and cannonaded the Mexican troops,
who soon ceased their fire upon his immediate front and
retired into Casa Mata and surrounding works. Duncan
was then ordered to cease firing and Mcintosh's brigade
went forward for the assault. The Mexicans opened fire
which was so well directed that the advance was checked
when the Americans were within thirty yards of the walls
of Casa Mata. Mcintosh fell mortally wounded, Lieut. -
Col. Martin Scott who succeeded him was shot dead, ]\Iajor
Waite was disabled, the men fell by platoons and com-
panies, and there was great confusion. The remnants of
the brigades held on till the order to fall back and rally on
the battery was given. Although one third the advan-
cing force had fallen, many of the ofificers refused to obey
the order, as they did not know from whom it proceeded.
The retreat consequently became greatly disordered and
during it the enemy added greatly to the number of killed
and wounded.

Instead of following up their advantages and turning the
retreat of the Americans into a rout, the Mexicans directed
their attention to the flank of the assailants of Molino del
Rey, They were stopped by Cadwalader's reserve which
came up just in time. It was now broad daylight, and

CAPTURE OF THE CITY OF MEXICO. lOJ

Colonel Duncan had observed a threatening movement on
the left. Santa Anna had ordered Alvarez to move down
on the American flank with his whole force. With a cloud
of cavalry in advance, Alvarez came on and was met by
the fire of Duncan's battery, which opened upon the Mexi-
cans within easy range. The cavalry halted, and after a
few discharges of the American guns had ploughed their
ranks they were thrown into confusion and retreated. Ma-
jor Sumner came up with his dragoons to accelerate the
Mexican retirement; before the dragoons had completed
their formation for a charge the Mexicans were in full re-
treat towards the Hacienda Morales. A twent)'-four-
pounder which had been sent up by Worth continued a
smart fire upon the Mexicans until they were out of range.
The dragoons held their position on the left till the end
of the action. As soon as the Mexicans were out of range
Duncan's guns were turned upon Casa Mata and the
enemy's troops around it. Under their fire the place was
soon abandoned, General Perez commencing his retreat by
the right as the fall of Molino del Rey had cut off his
direct communication with Chapultepec. His line of re-
treat kept him under the fire of Duncan's guns, w^hich in-
flicted a severe loss upon his troops. With the fall of the
Casa Mata the battle of Molino del Rey was ended and
the Americans were in full possession of the field.

But while they were exulting over their victory a Mex-
ican column, under General Barragan, advanced with the
evident intention of retaking the Molino ; it was met by
a heavy fire from the American guns, together with some
that had been captured from the Mexicans, and very soon
the Mexican column gave way and fled in disorder. A
little later another Mexican force advanced in the direc-
tion of Casa Mata, but this, like the other column, w^as
checked by the American artillery and a heavy volley
from the infantry. As the Mexicans retreated, the Ameri-
cans followed them several hundred yards along the road.

I08 DECISIVE BATTLES SINCE WATERLOO.

Molino del Re}' was untenable under the plunging fire
of Chapultepec, and General Scott sent orders for the
troops to ' fall back. Worth, Pillow, and other general
officers favored an assault upon Chapultepec before the
Mexicans had recovered from their disorder consequent
upon the events of the day, but General Scott positively
refused to permit it. Inside of the Molino were found a
few old moulds for cannon, but nothing to indicate that
the place had been recently used as a cannon foundry.
In the Casa Mata a large quantity of ammunition was
found ; a few wagon loads were removed, and orders were
given to destroy the rest. The force of the explosion
was miscalculated and resulted in the destruction of Cap-
tain Armstrong and some ten or twelve soldiers who were
in the vicinity of the building. The battle was the most
hotly contested of any battle of the war, and the propor-
tionate loss of officers and men engaged was very great.
The force in the field was 3,447, of which number 787
were killed or wounded, including 59 officers. The casu-
alties included nearh' one third the officers and one fourth
the rank and file, a conclusive proof that officers and
men did their whole duty. The loss to the enemy was
estimated to exceed two thousand ; about one half this
number were prisoners, and the remainder killed and
Avounded.

Though a brilliant feat of arms, the battle of Molino
del Rey was barren of results, as the place was im-
mediately abandoned in consequence of the plunging fire
from Chapultepec. No visible advantage was gained, and
notwithstanding the loss that had been sustained the cap-
ture of the capital city was apparently no nearer than
before the battle. It was the first battle in the war with-
out immediate advantages resulting from it, and the first
where the field gained had been immediately abandoned
to the enemy. The event caused much 'gloom in the
American camp, and many were the fears that it would

CAPTURE OF THE CITY OF MEXICO. 109

encourage the Mexicans to make a more sturdy defence of
the city than had hitherto been expected.

From the 8th to the 12th of September the time was
passed in preparing for the assault of Chapultepec and in
reconnoitring the enemy's position. It was difificult to
decide which side was most favorable for attack. The ma-
jority of the ofificers favored the southern side against the
comparatively unknown lines of the west. The newly
finished defences, however, decided Scott for the western
approaches and especially for the hill fortress, as he be-
lieved that its capture would materially hasten the sur-
render of the capital. Gen. Twiggs was accordingly
ordered to begin the demonstration against the east with
two batteries, while Pillow and Quitman, supported by a
portion of Worth's forces, took up a position to the west
and south of Chapultepec, and erected four batteries with
which to open fire upon the castle at daybreak on
the 13th.

Chapultepec is a picturesque hill whose fame has de-
scended in the dim traditions of the Aztecs, and in later
days has been consecrated to royalty. The northern side
is inaccessibly steep ; the east and south are a little better,
and there is a practicable slope only on the western side.
At a height of one hundred and sixty feet the summit
spreads into a nearly level table six hundred feet in
length, and surmounted along the northern edge by
a heavy but not ungraceful building. This building is
the citadel, protected by ten pieces of artillery. The
slopes of the hill were provided with walls, and on the
west with ditches, mines, and a midway redan. The ex-
terior fringe of the grove at the western fort was pro-
tected by an embankment with a ditch and redan facing
the Molino del Rey.

Pillow took possession of the unoccupied mill at dawn,
on the 1 2th, under an ineffective fusillade from the grove,
and at the same time the eastern batteries opened fire. A

no DECISIVE BATTLES SINCE WATERLOO.

severe cannonading was directed on the garrison, which
silenced several of their guns. A fearful fight followed,
which did not cease until darkness came again. Gen.
Scott ordered an assault both by Pillow and Quitman,
led by two picked storming-parties of two hundred and
fifty men each, at daybreak on the 13th.

With the dawn, the cannonade recommenced, both
from the batteries planted against Chapultepec, and from
Steptoe's guns, which were served against the southern
defences of the city in order to divert the attention of the
enemy from the real attack. At 8 A.M. the firing from
the former ceased, and the attack commenced. Quitman
advanced along the Tacubaya road, and Pillow from the
Molino del Rey, which he had occupied the previous
evening. Between the castle and the Molino del Rey there
was an open space, and then a grove, densely planted
with trees. Mexican sharp-shooters had been posted
among the trees, and they were further protected by an
intrenchment on the edge of the grove. General Pillow
sent Lieutenant-Colonel Johnstone with a party of rifle-
men to turn this position by a flank movement ; it was
handsomely accomplished, and just as the riflemen broke
through the redan. Pillow, witli the main body, charged it
in front and forced the Mexicans away from it. Having
gained possession of the grove. Pillow advanced to the
base of the rock; as the Mexican fire from the batteries of
the castle, crashing among the trees, seemed far more ter-
rible than it really was, and greatly disturbed the troops
of Pillow's column. The Mexicans had retired to a re-
doubt half-way up the side of the hill ; the riflemen sprang
up from rock to rock, discharging irregular volleys as they
pressed on, and were followed by Hooker, Chase, and
others, with detachments of infantry.

In a very short time the redoubt was gained, the gar-
rison was driven up the hill towards the castle, and Pil-
low's men were pressing them closely. As the latter

112 DECISIVE BATTLES SINCE WATERLOO.

came in range of the castle, the firing was very severe.
Colonel Ransom, of the Ninth, was killed, and General
Pillow v/as wounded. But the troops advanced steadily
till they gained the crest of the hill. At this point there
was some delay, as the scaling ladders had not arrived,
but during the delay two of Quitman's regiments and
Clarke's brigade reinforced the storming party. As soon
as the ladders came, the men rushed forward with them,
jumped into the ditch, and planted the ladders for the
assault on the castle. Lieutenant Selden was the first
man to mount. The Mexicans concentrated all their en-
ergies to repel this final attack. A furious and well-
aimed fire dashed the foremost of the stormers into the
ditch, killing Lieutenants Rogers and Smith, and clearing
the ladders of the men that were ascending. A new
storming-party advanced and mounted the ladders, and,
after a short struggle. Captain Howard, of the voltigeurs,
gained a footing on the parapet. McKenzie of the for-
lorn hope followed him, and close behind came a swarm
of voltigeurs and infantry, who, with loud shouts and
cheers, dashed in upon the garrison with the bayonet.

Almost simultaneously with the work just described,
Johnstone, of the voltigeurs, who had led a small party
round to the gate of the castle, broke it open, and forced
an entrance in the face of a furious fire from the southern
walls. The two parties united, and then followed a furious
conflict inside the building. The stormers were frenzied
by the remembrance of the murder of their wounded
comrades at Molino del Rey, and at first they showed
no quarter. The Mexicans were bayoneted or shot
without any heed to their appeals for mercy. Many
flung themselves over the parapet and down the hill-side,
and were dashed to death against the rocks. Others
fought with the fury of desperation, expending their last
breath in maledictions, and dying in the act of aiming
shots or blows upon their assailants. Streams of blood

CAPTURE OF THE CJTY OF MEXICO. II3

flowed through the doors of the college, and every room
and passage was the scene of a deadly struggle. After a
time the officers succeeded in putting an end to the con-
flict, and the remaining Mexicans having surrendered, the
stars and stripes were hoisted over the castle of Chapulte-
pec by Major Seymour.

While this was going on General Quitman had stormed
the batteries on the causeway to the east of the castle,
and after a desperate struggle, in which Major Twiggs,
who commanded the storming party, was shot dead at the
head of his men, the Mexicans retreated toward the city.
General Scott joined Quitman in person and ordered a sim-
ultaneous advance on the city, along the two roads leading
from Chapultepec to San Cosme and Belen gates. Worth
was to command the attack on the San Cosme gate, and
Quitman the attack on the Belen gate. Both were pre-
pared for defence by barricades, and behind these barricades
the Mexicans were posted in strong force. Fortunately
for the assailants there was an aqueduct, supported on
arches of solid masonry, along the middle of each causeway.
Keeping under cover of these arches, and springing quick-
ly from one to another. Smith's rifles and the South
Carolina regiment managed to advance close to the iirst
barricade on the Belen road with little loss, and pour in a
destructive fire on the Mexicans defending it. A flanking
fire from Duncan's guns added greatly to the discomfiture
of the Mexicans, and the barricade was carried. Without
halting more than to take breath, Quitman advanced in
the same manner on the garita San Belen, which was
held by General Torres with a strong garrison. Quit-
man's men stormed the garita, though met by a heavy
fire of grape and canister, and then advanced toward the
citadel.

Just as they did so General Santa Anna rode rapidly
down to where the Mexicans were defending themselves.
Furiously angry at the success of the Americans, he struck

114 DECISIVE BATTLES SINCE WATERLOO.

General Torres in the face, threw a strong force of infan.
try into the houses commanding the garita and the road,
ordered the batteries in the citadel to open fire, brought
up some additional guns to the Paseo, and so decidedly
enthused his followers that Quitman's advance was com-
pletely stopped. A terri<ic storm of shot, shell, and grape
was poured on the garita, where Captain Dunn had placed
an eight-pounder. Twice the gunners were shot down,
but their places were promptly taken by others. Then
Dunn himself fell, and immediately afterward Lieutenant
Benjamin and his first sergeant met the same fate. The
riflemen in the arches repelled sallies of the Mexicans, but
Quitman's position was one of much danger. He main-
tained it, however, until night caused a cessation of the
fighting.

Worth in the meantime had advanced in the same way
along the San Cosme causeway, forcing the Mexicans
from one barricade to another, until he was within two
hundred and fifty yards of the garita of San Cosme.
There he encountered quite as severe a fire as that which
stopped Quitman, but he was determined to carr}- out
Scott's orders to take the garita. Sending Garland's
brigade to the right, and Clarke's to the left, he ordered
them to break into the houses, burst through the walls,
and bore their way to the flanks of the garita. The plan
had succeeded perfectly at Monterey and was equally
successful in this instance. Slowly but steadily the sappers
pushed along from house to house, until at sunset they
had reached the point desired. Then Worth ordered the
attack. Lieutenant Hunt brought up a light gun and
fired it through the embrasure of the enemy's batter}-,
with its muzzle almost against that of the Mexican gun.
The infantry at the same moment opened a furious and
quite unexpected fire from the roofs and houses, and
McKenzie, at the head of the stormers, dashed at the bat-
tery, and carried it with very little loss. The Mexicans

CAPTURE OF THE CITY OF MEXICO. 115

considered furtlier defence useless, and fled precipitately
into the cit}-.

At eight o'clock that evening a council of war was held
at the citadel to consider the situation. Santa .Vnna demon-
strated that the army was wholly demoralized, and that
the citadel would soon be battered down, and perhaps the
entire city, burying in its ruins thousands of non-combat-
ing inhabitants. Accordingly the council decided to evacu-
ate the city. The cavalry, four thousand strong, was at
once sent away through the northern gate, and five thou-
sand infantry followed after midnight. The militia and ir-
regulars were disbanded. About one o'clock on the morn-
ing of the 14th a deputation from the city council arrived
at General Worth's head-quarters whence they were sent
to General Scott, at Tacubaya, of whom they demanded
guaranties for life and property. Scott refused to bind
himself to any terms, except such as were imposed by honor
and the customs of civilized warfare. General Worth hast-
ened to affirm this position by advancing at daylight to the
Alameda. Quitman received a white flag from the citadel,
which he immediately occupied, and then marched to the
central square and hoisted the stars and stripes above the
palace. Scott made his entry during the forenoon. The
city received the Americans w^th chilling silence and many
scowls and frowns. A shot was fired at General Worth,
and was followed by others; immediately the artillery was
ordered forward, and the troops charged upon the crowds
and stormed the dwellings whence the shots came. The
confusion grew into a panic and many families fled from the
city. The firing continued throughout the day and Scott
threatened to level the city. The Mexicans surrendered
the next morning.

The loss of the Americans in the valley campaign was
something more than two thousand seven hundred
killed and wounded. This heavy reduction of a force of
eleven thousand indicates a stout resistance on the part of

Il6 DECISIVE BATTLES SINCE WATERLOO.

the Mexicans, whose loss exceeded seven thousand alto-
gether. Their failure to repel the invaders was largely due
to bad generalship, which permitted the unopposed ad-
vance of the Americans across the mountains and around
Chalco Lake, and depended too much on the expectation
that the enemy would fall into traps and go exactly into
the positions the Mexicans desired. Another thing to be
considered is their defective organization, the rawness of
the troops, and the inferior arms with which they fought.
These circumstances add to the glory of the defence at
Churubusco, Molino del Rey, and Chapultepec, which
were certainly well defended.

After the capture of the capital city there were no mili-
tary operations of any consequence. General Scott asked
for reinforcements, which were sent forward slowly, and
there was some difficulty in maintaining communication
along the road to Vera Cruz in consequence of the activity
of guerillas. Negotiations for peace w^ere pushed, and on the
20th of February, 1848, the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo
was signed. B\^ the terms of the treaty the territories of
New Mexico and Upper California were ceded to the
United States, and Mexico relinquished all claim to Texas,
or the country east of the Rio Grande. In consideration
of the vast area of land given up to the United States, the
latter country was to pay fifteen millions of dollars to
]\Iexico, and in addition was to pay the claims of Ameri-
can citizens upon Mexico, amounting to five millions more.
There w-ere some minor stipulations concerning grants of
lands by Mexico within the ceded territories and Texas,
and others relating to protection against Indians on the
boundary, but they did not interfere with the general
terms of the treaty. Soon after the ratification of the
treaty the American troops were withdrawn from Mexico,
and the stars and stripes w^ere hoisted over the newly ac-
quired regions, which have since become' an important
part of the United States.

CHAPTER VIII.

BATTLE OF GUJERAT^l849.

One of the bravest and most powerful nationalities of
the many races and nations of India, during the early half
of the present century, was that of the Sikhs. Like most
other Oriental nations, they owe their origin to religious
belief, the • word " Sikh " signifying " Disciple." The
founder of their faith was a Hindoo named Nanek, who
was born about the middle of the fifteenth century of
the Christian era. His father intended him for a mer-
chant, but he felt an irresistible longing for religious
studies, which resulted in an uncontrollable dislike to the
Hindoo, the Moslem, and the Bhuddist forms of worship.
He taught the unity of God, the equality of all in the
sight of heaven, and inculcated universal kindness, char-
ity, and forbearance among men. He rejected the dis-
tinctions of caste, the burning of widows, and all other
peculiar features of the Hindoo religion, and at the same
time rejected the sensual paradise and devout observances
of the followers of Mohammed. The progress of the new
faith was steady, though in its early history it met with
much opposition ; for four centuries the Sikhs contended
with the enemies that surrounded them, and gradually
increased their power over the neighboring states. They
were emphatically a soldier race, and in the early part of
the present century, under the leadership of Runjeet
Singh, " The Lion of the Punjaub " the Sikh Confederacy

117

Il8 DECISIVE BATTLES SINCE WATERLOO.

included a population of seven million, with an army of
eighty thousand men, possessing three hundred guns.

It mubt not be supposed that this army was of the
ordinary character of Oriental forces in general. On the
contrary, it had been carefully drilled by French and
Italian officers, so that it was in a high state of efificiency
even when judged by the European standard. In addition
to this regular force the whole country contained a war-
rior people, and with its entire strength called out, it could
put more than a quarter of a million fighting men in the
field. The Sikhs are tall, robust, brave, and full of mili-
tary ardor ; they are the best native soldiers in Asia, and
would be more than a match for any other native troops
which the cradle of the world could bring to oppose them.
In the cavalry and artillery arms they are particularly
distinguished, but this remark should not lead the reader
to infer that they are inefficient as infantry. Their coun-
try is known as the Punjaub (Land of the Five Rivers),
and it has been celebrated through many centuries for its
richness and fertility. The rivers from which it takes its
name are the Indus, Jhelum, Ravee, Chenab, and Sutlej.
These rivers with their tributaries are available for pur-
poses of irrigation over a wide extent of country, whose
capital is Lahore, and chief city Umritzur. In the time of
Runjeet Singh, the province of Lahore contained four
million inhabitants, Mooltan one million four hundred
thousand ; Cashmere, six hundred thousand ; and por-
tions of Afghanistan which that fierce warrior had sub-
dued had a population of at least one million.

The British government in India, realized that it had
a dangerous neighbor on the north, but during the life-
time of Runjeet Singh there was no disturbance, and the
British were on the most friendly terms with " The Lion of
the Punjaub." His army clamored to be Jed against the
English, but the clamor was totally disregarded by the

rig

BATTLE OF GUJERAT. 121

ruler who dreaded the power of the British arms, and knew
that his best way to conquest was one that would not in-
terfere with the Europeans. In 1838 he began negotia-
tions for a closer alliance with the British, but died before
they were concluded. His death was followed by a weak
and distracted rule which bordered upon anarchy ; the
demand of the Sikhs to be led against the English became
steadily more and more fierce, and at length led to open
warfare.

The Sikhs in 1845 invaded British territory, and thus
brought on what is known in history as the first Sikh
war. They crossed the Sutlej, which had been estab-
lished by treaty as the boundary, and on the 14th of
December attacked the British at Ferozepore. The place
contained seven thousand five hundred men, and the
Sikh army numbered nearly sixty thousand. Had the
Sikhs made an immediate attack, Ferozepore must have
fallen, but they contented themselves with intrenching
within a safe distance of the fort and detaching twenty
thousand men to meet the British column that was advan-
cing to reinforce the garrison of Ferozepore. It was well
for the British that Runjeet Singh was in his grave and
not commanding the invading army.

The column of twenty thousand Sikhs was encountered
and defeated by fourteen thousand British troops at
Moodkee. The Sikhs lost heavily in men, and among the
spoils of battle were seventeen guns which they were
forced to abandon. The British army remained in camp
for two days, until joined by reinforcements from the
south, and then advanced upon the Sikh camp, having
previously arranged for the division in Ferozepore to join
at a point opposite the Sikh camp. The battle that fol-
lowed was favorable to the British, but it was desperately
contested by the Sikhs, and for a long time the result was
doubtful. The Sikh army retreated and recrossed the

122 DECISIVE BATTLES SINCE WATERLOO.

Sutlej. When the retreat began, the British artillery ammu-
nition was exhausted, and that of the infantry very nearly
so. The British cavalry and horse artillery were actually
moving to seek the shelter of the intrenched camp at
Ferozepore ; the Sikhs supposed it was a movement to
seize the fords of the river, and cut off their retreat, and
hence came the panic which gave the battle to the British
at a moment when all hope seemed lost.

For some time following this battle there were no active
hostilities, but the interval was occupied by the British in
bringing up all available forces till their strength exceeded
thirty thousand, with abundant supplies of ammunition
and stores. Late in January, 1846, occurred the battle of
Aliwal, and on the loth of February, the battle of Sobraon,
where the Sikhs had an intrenched camp of thirty thou-
sand men with one hundred and seventy guns. The camp
was on both sides of the river, and connected by a bridge.
The British attacked the camp on the south side, and were
desperately resisted by the Sikhs, who inflicted a loss of
nearly three thousand men on their assailants. The bat-
tle resulted in a British victory, and a loss to the Sikhs of
ten thousand men and sixty-seven pieces of artillery,
mostly of heavy calibre. The principal loss to the Sikhs
was made during an attempt to retreat over the bridge,
which was choked with people under the fire of the British
guns. The river had risen seven inches during the night
preceding the battle, and while it was easily fordable be-
fore the rising, thousands were drowned in the attempt to
cross it when swollen.

The battle of Sobraon was followed by an appeal on
the part of the Sikhs for peace, which was granted after
the customary negotiations. By the treaty the whole of
the territory between the rivers Beas and Sutlej was given
up to the British, and the Sikhs paid a crorq and a half of
rupees (^1,500,000) as an indemnity for the expenses of

BATTLE OF GUJERAT. 1 23

the war. All the guns which had been pointed at the
British were given up, and the army was to be reorganized
on the system that prevailed in the time of Runjeet
Singh, and on a scale to be arranged in connection with
the British government. The moderation of the British
was a surprise to the Sikhs, who had expected the con-
querors to take all they possessed, and leave them with-
out a vestige of a government or any thing else. In
common with most Orientals, they judged this moderation
to proceed from fear, and therefore were encouraged to
renew the struggle without great delay. In 1847 there
were several manifestations of turbulence, and in 1848 it
was plainly evident that war could not be long delayed.
The British made preparations accordingly, and when the
shock came they were far better prepared for it than at
the outbreak of the first Sikh war.

On the 1 8th of April two English officials in Mooltan
were set upon by a body of armed Sikhs and severely
wounded ; they were carried for safety to a small fort out-
side the citadel, but the Sikh garrison let in their assailants
and the two men were murdered. There was then a general
revolt, and the whole fortress of Mooltan, as well as the
small fort where the murder took place, fell into the
hands of the insurgents. This act precipitated the war,
as the English took immediate steps to avenge the
murder and accompanying insurrection. Several small
battles took place, the rising among the Sikhs spread with
great rapidity, they openly set up their standards, and
declared their determination for independence, and in a
few weeks they had a force of thirty thousand men ready
for battle. The British concentrated their forces on the
banks of the Chenab, and on the 21st November Lord
Gough took command in person of an army of twenty
thousand men. He immediately took the offensive by
advancing on the Sikh camp, the orders being given to be

124 DECISIVE BATTLES SINCE IVA7ERL00.

ready for marching on the morning of the 22d. The at-
tack resulted in the repulse of the British with considera-
ble loss, including three officers of high rank.

Both armies remained quiet for some time, each receiv-
ing reinforcements and preparing for another passage of
arms. In January, 1849, Lord Gough determined to at-
tack the Sikhs, and on the 12th of that month was fought
the battle of Chillianwallah, which was practical!}' a drawn
battle, as neither side had any thing to boast of in conse-
quence of it. The English were well advanced towards
victory, when a sudden panic, one of those unaccountable
occurrences in battles in all ages of the world's history,
caused a confusion in the ranks ; it led to the loss of all
the artillery which had been wrested from the Sikhs
earlier in the day, and, in addition, four guns were taken
from the British. On the British side there was a loss
of two thousand two hundred and sixty-nine in killed
and wounded ; the English assert that the Sikhs lost
three thousand killed and four thousand wounded, but
this assertion is open to question. The result was so un-
satisfactory that Lord Gough was removed and replaced
by Sir Charles Napier, but in the meantime he terminated
the war with the battle of Gujerat, which is now to be
considered.

The siege of Mooltan was ended by the surrender of its
garrison, and the besieging force immediately moved to
join the army of Lord Gough. With this and other ad-
ditions to his strength he had twenty-five thousand men
eager for battle ; he was also stronger in artillery than
were the Sikhs, as he had one hundred pieces to oppose
to fifty-nine. The Sikhs, who were commanded by Shere
Singh, had been recently reinforced until their number
reached sixty thousand, but notwithstanding this numer-
ical disparity. Lord Gough determined to attack them in
the position they had chosen. Colonel Malleson puts the

BATTLE OF GUJERAT. 1 25

actual fighting strength of the Sikhs at thirty-four thou-
sand, and says they were encamped as follows :

Their centre was formed back of the town of Kalrd ;
their left on a small stream called Katelah, which runs
into the Chenab; and the Dwarah, another small stream
of some width but nearly dry, protected their right. Not
far from the Khoree Pass, in the rear, was the city of
Gujerat. On a thorough examination of the position by
Lord Gough and his staff, it was seen that it lacked
strength. Nowhere did the right wing of the Sikh army
offer serious resistance to men or artillery. The left wing
on the Katelah was even weaker than the rest of the
position as it rested ''en Vair'' ; in fact, on no side was
there any serious protection against assault. It was de-
cided, therefore, to strike at the left and centre of the
Sikh position, and to force them back on their right.

To act upon this plan an advance of the heavy artillery,
formed in his centre, was ordered by Lord Gough ; the
right wing, made up of the divisions of Gilbert and Whish,
supported by the larger part of the field artillery, was also
to move forward. After these should have doubled in
the left and centre of the Sikh army, upon its right Camp-
bell's and Dundas' divisions, forming the British left wing,
were to come up and end the work. Then the cavalry
reserve were to come in to make the disaster to the Sikhs
irretrievable. The British line was to advance to the
enemy's position by following the bank of the Dwarah.
The British artillery, being much superior to the Sikh
forces, both in the number of guns and their calibre. Lord
Gough intended to delay the advance of his infantry to
close quarters until the guns had been freely used. The
British ofificers felt that a Pyrrhaean victory, as the hard-
fought battle of Chillianwallah had proved only five weeks
before, could not be afforded. The Sikhs as well as the
British wished for a decisive battle and were entirely con-
fident of victory.

126 DECISIVE BATTLES SINCE WATERLOO.

Although Lord Gough was certainly an able leader, he
had not that coolness in action which a Clive or a Well-
esley displayed under similar circumstances. On the con-
trary, a battle so excited him that his well-formed plans
were lost, and his sole aim was to attack with his infantry,
disregarding entirely the service of cavalry and artillery.

At half-past seven in the morning of that remarkable
day of February 21, 1849, ^'"'^ British army was ready to
advance to battle. The morning was bright, and the
advancing columns made very little dust. The camp of
the Sikhs was sharply outlined against the snow-capped
ranges of the Himalaya behind Gujerat. At the call of
" Forward, march ! " sounding swiftly down the line, the
British advanced to meet their enemy. Shortly after
passing the town of Harivvald, a halt of a few moments
was made to re-form the lines and close the ranks. The
Sikhs, seeing the British resting, opened with their artil-
lery, but their fire did not reach the enemy's lines, for
the distance was fully two thousand yards, or something
more than a mile. The heavy guns of the British were
used in return, but the range was too great to be effective.
It was necessary to approach more closely, and again the
British advanced.

Suddenly, out rode the British cavalry, dashing into the
very muzzles of the Sikh guns in the face of a fierce storm
of shot and shell. The horse artillery now followed them,
unlimbering within short range, and discharging their
volleys with great rapidity and with telling force into the
Sikh lines. The effect of this artillery charge was so
great that the Sikhs, unable to withstand the English fire,
retired to occupy a position farther back, beyond the
villages of Barra Kalra and Chota Kalra. General Gough
ordered the storming of the villages by the infantry, and
away started the two British divisions for the work, but
the stubborn opposition of the Sikhs made the attempt

^X ^ Zunpuf

THE BATTLE OF

au J E RAT

FEB.Zr^fS49

Scale ofMiles

127

128 DECISIVE BATTLES SINCE WATERLOO.

almost useless, and nearly resulted in a repulse. The
Sikhs met the columns of the advancing British front to
front, and inch by inch the British infantry made good
its ground, until the first line gave way to fall back on
the second. The British lost three hundred men in
carrying the town of Barra Kalra ; and in the storming
of Chota Kalra, one half of the first brigade was killed or
disabled, without counting the great loss of the horse
artillery in aiding the assault. One troop was nearly
anniJiilatcd.

Meanwhile Colonels Campbell and Douglas, command-
ing the left wing, kept carefully in line with the advance
movement of the right, but in a manner much more
cautious. They ordered their men to lie upon the ground
when halted, and advancing by slow degrees they reached
a point from which they could command the head of the
Dwarah creek. In a few minutes the creek was cleared
of the Sikh infantry, and the ground was occupied by
Campbell, the loss of men being only trifling. This was
the natural ending of the first part of the battle. The
advance of the British had been made with success along
the entire line. On the right two important positions had
been won, while the enemy had been driven from the
nullah, or dry rivulet, on which they were resting, by the
operations of the left wing.

Lord Gough was confidently believing that the battle
had been won, but such was far from being the case. The
Sikhs, alert to observe a weak point or a false move of
the enemy, quickly ascertained that the English, in swing-
ing their left upon the right wing of the Sikhs to gain
that ground, had left a great gap between their left and
the centre. To rush in and make a passage through this
gap was their opportunity, for their line of retreat was
already seriously threatened. The Afghan cavalry had
not only given way before a brave charge of the British,

BATTLE OF GUJEKAT. 1 29

but there was a brigade moving toward the Sikh rear. If
the Sikhs could make their way through the British cen-
tre, the day might yet be turned in their favor. It was a
desperate chance, but the only one. Forming their men
in line, the Sikh leaders marched them forward for this
forlorn attack — a brave stroke for success. The fate of
the day was hanging in the balance.

The probability as well as the danger of this movement
had been weighed by the English commander. He had
ordered up two companies of horse artillery, but as they
went into position it was discovered that they were out
of ammunition. Time was lost in sending to the rear for
a fresh supply. The silence of the British artillery gave
courage to the Sikhs, and had it not happened that the
officer nearest the gap was a ready leader, a cool-headed,
watchful soldier, and a man of great resources, India
might have been wrested from English hands by this one
movement. Colonel Campbell perceived the great peril
of the situation, and promptly directed the fire of a part
of his artillery on the advancing Sikhs. The latter at
once realized that the advance could not be continued
except at the risk of their flank being exposed to the full
fire of Campbell's artillery. This was more than they
could stand, and they retreated in sore dismay, protected
by their cavalry. They did so not a moment too soon,
for the English right wing was already hemming them in.
No alternative remained but to leave the field to the
British.

By one o'clock Lord Gough had routed the Sikh army,
crowding it in large and disorganized masses upon a line
of retreat which, if rightly followed up, gave no chance to
the discouraged fugitives of support or escape. And it
was followed up with great vigor. Cavalry and horse ar-
tillery were despatched in pursuit, and followed as closely
as possible by the wearied infantry. During all the rest

130 DECISIVE BATTLES SINCE WATERLOO.

of the day the defeated army suffered all the terrors of
almost continuous attacks. It could not retain its cohe-
sion under the strain, and the country for miles around
was filled with scattered and fleeing Sikhs, and covered
with guns, cattle, carts, tents, and standards left in the
haste of a wild flight. At last night came on and the
pursuit was ended twelve miles beyond Gujerat. The
victory of the British was complete.

Fifty-seven guns, thirty-two standards, and the whole
Sikh camp with ammunition and baggage fell into the
hands of the British. The loss to the British was ninety-
two killed and six hundred and eighty-two wounded ; that
of the Sikhs was estimated at five or ten times the British
loss, in addition to the destruction and dispersal of an
army of sixty thousand men.

Early next morning Lord Gough despatched a force of
fifteen thousand men, consisting of horse and foot artil-
lery, some infantry, and all the cavalry, to intercept the
flight of the Sikhs through the Khoree Pass towards the
Jhelum. But the Sikhs, to the number of nine thousand,
with ten guns, had already got through the pass ; the
British followed, and when they reached the Jhelum Shere
Singh made proposals for surrender. He was informed
that nothing short of unconditional surrender would be
accepted, and accordingly he laid down his arms and his
men became prisoners of war. The surrender occurred on
the 1 2th of March, near Horrmuck. Nearly ten thousand
soldiers gave themselves up, the rest of those who sur-
vived the battle having fled to their homes. Forty-one
guns were surrendered, including those taken by the Sikhs
at Chillianwallah. The British authorities gave each man
a rupee for his expenses to his home, and the cavalry were
allowed to retain their horses, which were their own prop-
ert)- ; but all the arms, ammunition, standards, and all
other materials of war were retained by the British.

BATTLE OF GUJERAT. 131

The repeated acts of insubordination of the Sikh sol-
diery and the evident and serious risks to which they had
exposed the British power in India, determined the gov-
ernor-general to put a final end to them. On the 29th of
March a proclamation was issued which recounted how
the long peace and alliance which had been in force be-
tween the two governments had been twice broken through
the treachery of the Sikh troops. Consequenth-, it had
become necessary, the proclamation stated, to declare
" the kingdom of the Punjaub at an end, and that all the
territories of Maharajah Dhuleep Singh are now and
henceforth a portion of the British empire in India."
The proclamation promised due honor to the Maharajah
and the few chiefs who had not engaged in hostilities
against the British, and guaranteed to all the people,
whether Mussulman, Hindoo, or Sikh, the free exercise of
their own religion, but forbade any one to interfere with
that of another.

The Sikhs accepted the inevitable, and submitted grace-
fully to the superior power of the British. The event
made less excitement in Hindostan than in England,
where the greatness of the addition to the British empire
in India by the conquest of the Punjaub was appreciated
at its full value. Since that time the Sikh soldiers have
proved themselves the best and most faithful of all the
Asiatics serving under the English banners in India. Dur-
ingthe mutiny of 1857, they remained to a man loyal, and
their splendid fighting qualities undoubtedly saved to
Great Britain her possessions in the Indian peninsula, or at
any rate preserved her from any serious reverses.

At present, the population of the Punjaub is not far
from twenty-three million, additions having been made to
the original territory. The country is one of the richest
and most prosperous of all the Indian possessions of Great
Britain, and covers an area of nearly two hundred thou-

132

DECISIVE BATTLES SINCE WATERLOO.

sand square miles. In the north the whole surface is trav-
ersed by spurs from the Himalayas enclosing deep val-
leys, while in the south the country is unbroken by any
important elevation with the exception of the Salt Range
of mountains, about two thousand feet high, between the
Indus and the Jhelum. Smce its annexation by the Brit-
ish the Punjaub has progressed more rapidly than in any
similar period of its histor>', and its agricultural and manu-
facturing products are known throughout the civilized
world.

CHAPTER IX.

CAPTURE OF THE MALAKOFF AND REDAN, AND FALL
OF SEBASTOPOL — 1 85 5.

The Crimea was conquered by Russia in the time of
Catharine the Great, and immediately after the conquest
the Russians began to fortify the harbor of Sebastopol
(Sacred City). When they went there they found a mis-
erable Tartar village called Akhtiar ; they created one of
the finest naval and military posts in the world, and built
a city with broad streets and handsome quays and docks.
In 1850 it had a population of about fifty thousand, which
included many soldiers and marines, together with work-
men employed in the government establishments.

In that year there was a dispute between France and
Russia relative to the custody of the holy places in Pales-
tine ; there had been a contention concerning this matter
for several centuries, in which sometimes the Greek Church
and sometimes the Latin had the advantage. In 1850, at
the suggestion of Turkey, a mixed commission was ap-
pointed to consider the dispute upon it.

The Porte, as the Turkish government is officiall}' desig-
nated, issued in March, 1852, a decree that the Greek
Church should be confirmed in the rights it formerly held,
and that the Latins could not claim exclusive possession
of any of the holy places. It allowed them to have a key
to the Church of the Nativity at Bethlehem, and to cer-
tain other buildings of minor importance.

France accepted the decision, though she did not like
it ; Russia continued to demand that the Latin monks

133

134 DECISIVE BATTLES SINCE WATERLOO.

should be deprived of their keys, and finally insisted that
the Czar should have a protectorate over the Greek Chris-
tians in Turke\-. The Porte said such a protectorate would
interfere with its own authority, and refused the demand ;
thereupon the Russian Minister left Constantinople on
the 2 1st of May, 1853.

This may be considered the beginning of the war be-
tween Russia and Turkey, though there was no fighting
for several months.

France came to the aid of Turke}' ; England came to
the aid of Turkey and France. Representatives of Eng-
land, France, Austria, and Prussia met at Vienna and
agreed upon a note which Russia accepted ; Turkey de-
manded modifications which Russia refused ; Turkey de-
clared war against Russia on the 5th of October, and
Russia declared war against Turkey on the 1st of Novem-
ber.

A Turkish fleet of twelve ships was lying at Sinope, a
port on the southern shore of the Black Sea. On the
30th of November the Russians sent a fleet of eleven ships
from Sebastopol which destroyed the Turkish fleet, all
except one ship that carried the news to Constantinople.
Then the allied fleets of the French and English entered
the Black Sea, and the war began in dead earnest. For
some months it was confined to the Danubian principali-
ties and to the Baltic Sea. On the 14th of September,
1854, the allied army landed at Eupatoria, in the Crimea,
and the extent of their preparations will be understood
when it is known that forty thousand men, with a large
number of horses and a full equipment of artiller\% were
put on shore in a single day I

On the 20th of September the battle of the Alma was
fought by fifty-seven thousand English, French, and
Turkish troops, against fifty thousand Russians. The
battle began at noon, and four hours later the Russians
were defeated and in full retreat. The Russians lost five

136 DECISIVE BATTIES SINCE WATERICO.

thousand men, and the AUies about three thousand four
hundred. The Allies might have marched into Sebastopol
with very little resistance, but their commanders were un-
certain as to the number of troops defending the city,
and hesitated to make the attempt.

On the 17th of October the siege began. A grand at-
tack was made by the Allies, but was unsuccessful, and
eight days later the famous charge of the Light Brigade
at Balaklava was made. On the 5th of November the
Russians attacked the Allies at Inkerman, and were re-
pulsed. The battle of Inkerman was fought in a fog by
forty thousand Russians against fifteen thousand French
and English. The latter had the advantage of position
and weapons. The Allies frankly credited the Russian
troops with the greatest bravery in returning repeatedly
to the attack as their battalions were mowed down by the
steady fire of the defenders.

During the winter the siege was pushed, and the allied
army suffered greatly from cholera, cold, and sickness.
The siege continued during spring and summer ; the Allies
made an unsuccessful attack on the Malakoff and Redan
forts on the i8th of June, 1855, and all through the long
months there were daily conflicts between the opposing
armies.

The Russians sunk several ships of their fleet in the
harbor of Sebastopol soon after the battle of the Alma,
but retained others for possible future use. On the 8th
of September the French captured the Malakoff fort, the
English at the same time making an unsuccessful attack
on the Redan. The fall of these forts was followed by
the evacuation of Sebastopol, the objective point of the
war, and was therefore the decisive event of the campaign.

An incident of the siege, though forming no part of its
military history, has been so admirably told by Bayard
Taylor, that it is worthy of repetition in this narrative.
It is as follows :

CAPTURE OF THE MALAKOFF AXD REDAN. 1 37

THE SONG OF THE CA^.T'.

"Give us a song I " the soldiers cried,

The outer trenches guarding,
When the heated guns of the camps allied
Grew -vveary of bombarding.

The dark Redan, in silent scoff,

Lay, grim and threatening under ;
And the tawny mound of the Malakoff

No longer belched its thunder.

There was a pause. The guardsman said :

" We storm the forts to-morrow ;
Sing while we may, another day

Will bring enough of sorrow."

They lay along the batter}"s side.

Below the smoking cannon :
Brave hearts from Severn and from Clyde,

And from the banks of Shannon.

They sang of love, and not of fame ;

Forgot was Britain's glor}- :
Each heart recalled a different name,

But all sang " Annie Laurie."

Voice after voice caught up tbe song,

Until its tender passion
Rose like an anthem, rich and strong, —

Their battle-eve confession.

Dear girl, her name he dared not speak.

But, as the song grew louder,
Something upon the soldier's cheek

Washed off the stains of powder.

Beyond the darlening ocean burned

The bloody sunset's embers,
W^hile the Crimean valleys learned

How English blood remembers.

And once again a fire of hell

Rained on the Russian quarters,
With scream of shot, and burst of shell

And bellowing of the mortars.

138 DECISIVE BATTIES SINCE WATERLOO.

And Irish Nora's eyes are dim

For a singer, dumb and gory ;
And English Mary mourns for him

Who sang of " Annie Laurie."

Sleep, soldiers ! still in honored rest

Your truth and valor wearing :
The bravest are the tenderest, —

The loving are the daring.

The following account of the sixth and last bombard-
ment of the defences of Sebastopol was written by an
eye-witness within the British lines. The bombardment
began on the morning of September 5th, three days
before the MalakofT and Redan were assaulted.

There were wreaths of clouds and vapors hanging over
the valleys, and on the lines of buildings inside the defences
that have kept the armies watching so long in front of
Sebastopol. The waters of the bay were as smooth as an
inland lake and reflected the hills at their borders, and the
vessels that lay at anchor. Out on the Black Sea the French
and English fleets were lying quite idle between Kasatch and
Constantine.

Looking from Cathcart's Hill, the view included the defences
of the Quarantine and the Flagstaff batteries, together with the
trenches and approaches made by the French, quite up to where
their parallels joined on the English left attack in a ravine at
the end of the Dockyard Creek. One standing at this point
could take in at a single glance the lines of the Flagstaff bat-
teries, the ruined dwellings in the suburbs, or rather the sites
of the dwellings, which had formerly been long streets, but had
been destroyed by the fire of the French batteries. The great
mass of the ruins was enclosed between the sea-wall, and the
Flagstaff batteries, and farther beyond could be seen the city
itself, rising apparently in terraces along the hill-sides, display-
ing fine dwellings, public edifices of red or white sandstone,
and magnificent churches, the whole liberally sprinkled with
gardens, and with rows of trees growing in the promenades.

CAPTURE OF THE MALAKOFF AND REDAN. 1 39

These fine buildings were closely surrounded in many instances
by little houses covered with whitewash, occupied by the
soldiers of the garrison or the poorer class of the civilian resi-
dents of the city. The hill presenting this view of the city is
at the rear of the Flagstaff battery, and some two hundred feet
above it, the face toward the Dockyard Creek, and is quite
steep ; it then turns toward the roadstead and descends quite
rapidly to its level at the rear of the southern range of forts.
From our point of view we could not see the houses on this
face of the hill, but those along the eastern face, or the slope
toward the Dockyard Creek, were fully visible. There was a
slobodka, or poor suburb, at the base of the hill, and from this
the houses stood in terraces, with winding roads and ranges of
steps leading quite up to the brow of the hill. Looking care-
fully, one could see that the bombardment was having a severe
effect on these buildings. The roof of a church, decorated with
many small turrets and pinnacles at the angles had been struck
by the shells and quite broken in ; some of the best of the pri-
vate residences were completely blown up, while others had
their walls so cracked that there was no need of windows to
admit the daylight ; shot holes were apparent in many others,
and in some instances the light showed through them from side
to side. Columns, pillars, and doors were broken down or
shattered near the Flagstaff works. In the rubbish of the
slobodka there were several batteries which were in good con-
dition, and although the Allies had thrown their fire severely
upon them, they seemed to be in thoroughly good order. They
formed part of the outlying works of the second line of the
defences. Not all of them could be seen from Cathcart's hill,
but the line of their position could be traced with comparative
ease.

All at once, quite near the Flagstaff battery, between bas-
tions 7 and 8, we saw three jets of flame curling up, followed
by three pillars of dirt and dust fully one hundred feet into
the air, and receiving a ruddy tint from the bright rays of the
morning sun. We had been looking for these explosions, but
the moment they came they took us by surprise. They were
caused by the French, who had fired three mines, partly to

140 DECISIVE BATTLES SINCE WATERLOO.

destroy the counterscarp, and partly to give a signal for the
opening of the cannonade. A moment after, all the way from
the Dockyard Creek to the shore of the sea there was a burst
of fire which seemed to run along as though a fuse had been
fired. This stream of fire was fully three miles long ; it ran
from battery to battery, and was followed instantly by great
clouds of white smoke. It resembled more than any thing else
the white clouds rising from Vesuvius or Etna just previous to
an eruption of those famous mountains. The smoke in the
still morning air covered the whole lines of the French trenches
as though a great cloud had fallen upon them, while the slight
breeze of the morning whirled them in jets and bunches, much
as you see a cloud on the summit of a mountain driven about
in a thunder-storm. The wind was blowing from our direction,
and consequently the sound of the tremendous explosions was
much less than we had expected. For the reason that it was
so slight in the British camp, it must have been corresponding-
ly terrible in the city. On the Russian lines, toward which the
storm of shot and shell was directed, there were jets and clouds
of earth and dust arising from the faces of the earthworks,
and from the parapets that in some instances seemed to be
swept almost away, and also from the mass of ruined houses
just behind the Russian batteries. The front distance cov-
ered by this shower of iron was nearly four miles in extent.
It swept the entire length of the Russian lines, and reached
into the very heart of the city. It is probable that few vol-
leys so immensely powerful, and at the same time so sud-
denly discharged, were ever known before since artillery was
invented.

The suddenness of the shock, together with its magnitude,
seemed for a time to have paralyzed the defenders of Sebasto-
pol. Their batteries were not sufficiently manned to enable
them to reply with any vigor to such a tremendous fire, and
the French prevented in great measure any movement to man
the batteries by the energy and celerity with which they con-
tinued the iron hail which began so suddenly. They had more
than two hundred pieces of artillery in position, all of heavy
calibre, and worked with the greatest possible rapidity. The

(

PLAN OF SEBASTOPet

eHOWINC THE LINES OF ATTACK ON THK

MALAKOFF AND REDAN

y^-

141

142 DECISIVE BATTLES SINCE WATERLOO.

great cloud of smoke rolling from these batteries was turned
towards Sebastopol and seemed to envelop the entire city.
Notwithstanding the veil which was thrown over the place, the
cannonade continued with great fury. After a time there was
a slight lull, but it broke out again almost immediately. Some-
times all these long lines of artillery seemed to be discharged
almost simultaneously, then only a few guns at a time, then a
few moments of silence, then another burst, and so on like the
cadences of the movements of the waves of the ocean on a
sandy beach. Watching with our glasses, we could see walls
of stone go down as if they were made of sawdust. Clouds of
dust rose every moment from the front of the earthworks.
The Russian cannon were dismounted, and we could see every-
where along the lines that the French fire was telling with
terrific effect.

The Russians were compelled to keep to their bomb proofs,
so that scarcely a man was visible along their entire line. For
a little while it seemed as if the French would be able to sweep
away the whole place without encountering any resistance, but
after a time the Russian gunners began to reply ; but they
fired very slowly, taking accurate aim, as though ammunition
was scarce and they did not intend to waste a single shot.
The fire of the Russians seemed to stimulate the French rather
than to discourage them, as their volleys were given faster than
before the Russian fire commenced. Some of their guns were
aimed at the line of Russian defences and others directly at
the city. Meantime the English naval brigade and siege train
were working away at the face of the Redan and the Malakoff
in the same quiet manner in which they had been working for
days. They gave material aid to the French by keeping up a
steady fire of shells on the batteries between the Redan and
the Dockyard Creek. Occasionally the mortars in the rest of
the English batteries threw their ten- and thirteen-inch shells
behind the Russian lines and accompanied these shells with
shot from the heavy siege guns.

The French batteries were far superior in the number of
their guns to the English, as the following table taken on the
5th of the month will show :

CAPTURE OF THE MALAKOFF AND REDAN. I43

ENGLISH BATTERIES.

13-inch mortars
lo-inch "

8-inch "
Cohorns

8-inch guns
lo-inch "
32-pounders
68-pounders

Total English

FRENCH BATTERIES.

Left Attack — Against Flagstaff Bastion
" Central

Quarantine"

Right Attack — Against Malakoff, etc. .
Total French

GUNS

34
27
10
20
37

7
61

202

GUNS
129

134
83

346

627

The French continued their fire for nearly three hours with-
out cessation. Then they stopped almost as suddenly as they
began, in order to give the guns a chance to cool. The Rus-
sians instantly took advantage of the lull in the fire by coming
out to repair damages. They emptied bags of sand and earth
on the outside of their parapets, rolled out gabions, and did
other work usual in the reparation of artillery fire. Their
artillerymen also took advantage of the lull by opening fire on
the batteries of the naval brigade in the English lines, and de-
livered their shot with such precision as to cause the English
in that locality a good deal of trouble. About 10 o'clock the
French renewed their fire quite as rapidly as at first, and they
preceded it by exploding some fougasses. With the same ob-
ject as before, this fire was maintained until midnight, and
succeeded in dismounting so many of the Russian guns that
they had only a few remaining with which they could reply.
They were sending men and carts with great rapidity back and

144 DECISIVE BATTLES SINCE WATERLOO.

forth across the bridge in the harbor, and about 9 o'clock a
large force of infantry crossed the bridge, evidently preparing
to resist the assault which was expected, and at the same time
there was a movement toward Inkerman on the part of the
army encamped in that locality.

When the French firing began in the morning, the working
parties which crossed daily from the south to the north side
were evidently ordered back again, with the expectation that an
assault would be made during the course of the forenoon.
From noon until five p.m., there was not much firing ; then
the French broke out again as vigorously as ever and contin-
ued the cannonade until half past seven, when darkness made
it impossible to take accurate aim. Then there was a brief lull.
Later in the evening, along the whole line, French and Eng-
lish, all the siege guns and mortars opened again and continued
the fire throughout the night. Of course, accuracy of aim
was out of the question during a night bombardment. The
object was to prevent the Russians repairing their defences,
and we knew that a shot fired in their direction would fall
somewhere within the Russian lines, even though it might not
hit a particular earthwork or make a hole through any spe-
cified building.

Orders were issued for all the batteries to begin an active
bombardment as soon as daylight permitted, each gun being
limited to fifty rounds. The whole line of the batteries, from
Inkerman to the Quarantine, opened the cannonade at 5.30
A.M. This was continued for three hours ; then there was a
cessation until ten o'clock ; then the firing was renewed until
noon ; then came a cessation until five o'clock, and there was
another lull from half past six until seven. It must be under-
stood that some firing was maintained during these lulls ; had
it been otherwise the silence would have been almost painful.

When the sun went down on Thursday night the bombardment
began again and was kept up without cessation until an hour
before daylight on Friday morning. Musketry fire was added
to that of the artillery, the orders being to keep up a steady
fusillade along the Russian front, about two hundred thousand
rounds of cartridges being used every night after the bombard-

CAPTURE OF THE MALAKOFF AND REDAN. I45

ment began. The cannonade was resumed on Friday as
before. The Inkerman batteries replied vigorously, but
along the Russian centre there was very little response. The
wind blew from the north and great clouds of dust were blown
from the town along with the smoke of the batteries so that it
was not easy to ascertain the effect of the fire. Occasionally
the clouds lifted, and whenever we obtained glimpses of the
city or the defences it was evident that the result was severe.

A council of generals was held at the English head-quarters
at noon, General Pelissier and General Delia Marmora being
present. As soon as the council had broken up, the surgeons
were ordered to clear the hospitals of patients and get ready
for the reception of the wounded. Those in the hospitals who
could bear the transportation were sent as fast as possible to
Balaklava or to the field hospital in the rear of the camp.

The cannonade was continued on the seventh in about the
same manner, and we could see hour by hour that the city was
terribly shattered by the bombardment. The greater part of
the houses within range of our guns were either in complete
ruin or so injured that they were uninhabitable. There was
great activity along the bridge crossing the harbor. It was
crowded at all hours of the day with men and carts passing in
both directions, but generally from south to north. In the
evening there was a bright light, owing to the head of the
dockyard shears being on fire, whether by accident or design
no one could say. A large ship was set on fire and completely
burnt, and we could see that a steamer was towing a line-of-
battle ship to the dockyard, where it would be out of range of
our fire.

There was another council of the generals at noon, and after
the council was over it was whispered through the camp that the
defences would be assaulted at noon on the eighth, after a vig-
orous cannonade and bombardment. Noon Avas selected
because it was known that the Russians usually took a rest at
that hour. There was an explosion some time in the night
behind the Redan. It alarmed the camp for a short time and
then was quite forgotten. During the night of the seventh
there was a sudden change in the weather. Up to that time it

146 DECISIVE BATTLES SINCE WATERLOO.

had been fine, but on the morning of the eighth it was ex-
tremely cold ; there was a strong, sharp wind blowing from
the north side of Sebastopol ; the bright sun was gone, and
in its place there rose above us a canopy of a dull leaden
gray.

The arrangement was that the French should assault the
Malakoff at mid-day, and in case their attack was successful
the English were to storm the Redan immediately. A diver-
sion was to be made on the English left by strong columns of
French who were to threaten the line of the Flagstaff and Quar-
antine batteries. The cavalry sentries were posted soon after
eight o'clock; the Light Division and also the Second were sent
into the trenches and out into the advance parallels as quietly
as could be done.

About that time General Simpson and his staff took their
position in the second parallel of the Greenhill battery, which
had been designated by the engineer officers. Sir Henry
Jones was too ill to walk and was carried on a litter into the
trenches, where he remained until the attack was ended. Gen-
eral Simpson and Sir Richard Airey, the quartermaster-general,
remained with him. The Duke of Newcastle took a position
at Cathcart's Hill during the forenoon, and later went to the
picket house near the Woronzoff road.

Exactly five minutes before our watches indicated noon the
French swarmed out of their trenches where they were nearest
the Malakoff, went up the face of the fort and through the
embrasures almost in a moment. Their advance trenches
were only seven metres from the fort and consequently only a
few moments at the pace they ran were required to carry them
to their destination. They drifted out, battalion following
closely on battalion, and in a minute or so after the head of
their column came out of the ditch their flag was flying over
the Korniloff bastion of the fort. They took the Russians
completely by surprise. Very few of them were in the Mala-
koff at the time. There was a very slight fire of musketry for
a few minutes but the Russians were not long iH recovering
from their astonishment and very soon fell vigorously on their
assailants. From a little past noon until nightfall the French

147

148 DECISIVE BATTIES SINCE WATERLOO.

were kept quite actively engaged in repulsing the attempts of
the Russians to regain the position. The slaughter of the
Russians was very great, and when night came the Russian
commander withdrew his forces very skilfully and prepared to
evacuate the position.

The French attack on the left was a failure and caused a
heavy loss to the assailants. As soon as the French flag was
hoisted on the parapet of the Ma/akoff, rockets were sent up
from the English advance trencher as a signal for the English
assault on the Redan. The French had made their assault on
the Malakoff with four divisions of their Second Corps, two
divisions forming as storming columns. The English attacked
the Redan with only two divisions, one being held in reserve
and practically not engaged. It was only a few minutes after
12 o'clock when the order was given for the advance upon the
Redan. The troops were obliged to cross a distance of 230
yards from the advance trenches to the parapet of the
Redan. Their loss was heavy, especially in officers. The
fire was more deadly during the earlier part of the advance
from the trenches than when the assailants were near the
fort. The abatis in front of the fort had been torn to pieces
by the artillery fire, so that it really formed no obstruction to
the advance of the men. The light division directed its
movements toward the salient angle of the Redan. There
was little opposition to the troops as they crossed the ditch
and scrambled up the face of the fort, as the Russians had re-
tired to their traverses and were making ready to receive the
English as soon as they reached the top of the work.

The storming columns of the Second Division followed
closely after the Light Division, and as they approached the
fort made a slight bend to the right flank of the Light Divi-
sion so as to attack the face of the Redan simultaneously.
The first embrasure they reached was on fire ; at the next
they climbed the parapet without opposition and entered the
embrasure which had been left undefended by the Russians.
Inside the face of the Redan there was an inner parapet which
was intended to protect the artillerymen while at work from
the fragments of shell bursting inside the fortification. There

CAPTURE OF THE MALAKOFF AND REDAN. 149

were several openings through this inner parapet so that the
men could easily seek shelter whenever circumstances justified
their so doing. As the storming column entered the Redan
from the embrasures the Russians retreated behind the breast-
work, and from it they poured a deadly fire upon the storming
party. Instead of advancing, the stormers halted and returned
the fire of the Russians without seeking to dislodge them by
the use of the bayonet.

The whole inside of the Redan seemed to swarm with Rus-
sians, Avho kept up a persistent fire upon the English. The
Russians came in great force from the barracks behind the
Redan, and while the number of the English was rapidly
diminishing that of the Russians steadily increased. The
English officers sought to encourage the men to advance, but
were unable to do so. It had been rumored through the camp
that the Redan was everywhere mined, and that if once occu-
pied by the English it would be blown up. A panic seemed
to seize some of the men, while others acted bravely and
rushed forward to obey the orders of their officers. They
were not sufficiently strong in numbers to perform the work,
and as fast as they advanced they w^ere swept down by the
Russian fire. The supports which came up from the advanced
trenches reached the Redan in disorder in consequence of the
fire which swept the plain in front of the Redan, and their
presence only seemed to add to the confusion and slaughter.
For a full hour this terrible work went on.

Now and then the bayonet was used, and fierce combats
occurred between little groups of English and Russians. The
ground was covered with the bodies of English and Russians,
frequently locked in an embrace which death made all the
closer. They were found the next day in great numbers
scattered through the part of the work which was temporarily
occupied by the English. The steady increase of the Russian
numbers was too much for the small force of English in the
assaulting column. Slowly the assailants were pressed back,
and in a little while the Russians were again masters of the
Redan. The ditch was crowded with dead and wounded. As
the Russians obtained possession of the interior of the fort.

I50 DECISIVE BATTLES SINCE WATERLOO.

they came to the front and not only discharged volleys of mus-
ketry at the struggling mass below, but pelted them with stones,
grapeshot, and other missiles that were near at hand. A sup-
porting column came up from the trenches, and under their
fire the Russians were temporarily cleared from the front of
the Redan, while the few English that survived from the
assault were enabled to make good their retreat to the trenches.
When the English abandoned the assault the fire slackened
from the Redan, and the Russians who had been engaged at
that fortress were drawn off to the Malakoff to assist in beat-
ing back the French ; but with all the force they brought to
bear they were unable to retake that stronghold. Clouds of
smoke surrounded the Malakoff, but now and then when they
lifted the French flag could be seen waving defiantly above the
inner parapet. The battle was furious all around it, and
though the Russians made assault after assault, all their efforts
were in vain. The supporting columns poured steadily over
from the approaches and joined their fellows who were making
a bold front against the Russians, although the latter were re-
ceiving fresh reinforcements almost continuously. Hour after
hour the fight went on, but the issue was unchanged. When
the sun went down the tricolor still floated above the Malakoff,
and the fall of Sebastopol was assured.

In the capture of the Malakoff the French lost 1,646
killed, of whom 5 were generals, 24 superior, and 116 in-
ferior officers, 4,500 wounded, and 1.400 missing. In the
attack on the Redan the English lost 385 killed, 29 being
commissioned and 42 non-commissioned officers, 1,886
wounded and 176 missing.

During the night between the 8th and 9th the Russians
abandoned the Redan, which the capture of the Malakoff
rendered untenable, and the occupation of the forts by
the allies made it impossible for the Russians to remain
in Sebastopol. During the night and early morning the
Russians crossed over to the north side of 'the harbor,
leaving the city in flames. All through the night there

CAPTURE OF THE M A LA K OFF AND REDAN. 151

were loud explosions, caused by the blowing up of maga-
zines where the Russians had immense stores of ammuni-
tion which they were unable to remov^e. The city was
set on fire in many places, and when the Allies took pos-
session on the 9th they found little more than a mass of
ruins. Several of the Russian ships had been destroyed
during the bombardment, and such as remained were
burned or sunk during the night of the evacuation.

The Allies never made any serious attempt to disturb
the Russian forces on the north side, and their communi-
cations with the interior were not interrupted. The two
armies confronted each other for some time, but there
was never any fighting of consequence after the fall of
Sebastopol. Other warlike operations were conducted
along the Russian shores of the Black Sea. Proposals of
peace were made by Austria with the consent of the Al-
lies, and finally, on the 30th of March, 1856, the treaty of
peace was signed at Paris. The Allies had begun the de-
struction of the docks at Sebastopol, but so extensive
were those works that with all the engineering skill at
their command they were not through with it until July
9th, when they evacuated the Crimea.

According to English authorities the British loss during
the Crimean war was about 27,000 men. The loss of the
French was said to be 63,000, and that of the Russians
nearly half a million. The English killed in action or
died of wounds were about 3,500, died of cholera 4,244,
and of other diseases 16,000. The remainder of the
27,000 were permanently disabled. Exact figures of the
Russian losses have never been published.

By the treaty of Paris Russia was required to surrender
the city and citadel of Kars to the Sultan, and at the
same time the allied powers were to evacuate all the
positions they occupied in the Crimea. Turkey was ad-
mitted to a place among the powers of Europe ; the
signatory powers at the conference agreed to respect the

152 DECISIVE BATTLES SINCE' WATERLOO.

independence and territorial integrity of the Ottoman
Empire, and to guarantee the observance of this condition
by each other. Turkey agreed to ameliorate the condi-
tion of its Christian subjects, but it was stipulated that
this condescension was not to authorize the other powers,
either collectively or sepaiately, to meddle with the re-
lations between the Porte and its subjects or in the in-
terior administration of the empire. The Bosphorus and
the Dardanelles were to be closed to all ships of war of
foreign powers as long as the Porte was at peace, and the
Black Sea was to be neutralized. Turkey and Russia
were limited to a naval force of six steam vessels of not
more than eight hundred tons, and four steam vessels of
not more than two hundred tons. Both nations were pro-
hibited from establishing any naval arsenal on the shores
of the Black Sea. In Europe, Russia was required to
surrender certain portions of Bessarabia to the Porte, and
in Asia the boundaries were to be established as they ex-
isted before the outbreak of the war. France, England,
and Austria entered into a separate treaty to guarantee
the integrity and independence of Turkey, and agreed
that they would consider any infraction of the stipulation
of this treaty a casus belli.

Taking advantage of the overthrow of France by Ger-
many in 1 87 1, Russia abrogated the treaty of 1856, and
regained nearly all the rights of which she had been de-
prived by that document. She immediately began the
restoration of her naval arsenals on the shores of the
Black Sea, and laid the keels of an iron-clad fleet to con-
trol those waters. Since 1871 Sebastopol has been slowly
rising from her ruins ; her dockyards have been partially
restored, and an arsenal has been established at Nicolaieff,
but it will yet be many years before the traces of that
terrible bombardment of September, 1855, wjll have been
removed, and the streets of the " sacred city " present
the appearance they did before the Allies began their

CAPTURE OF THE MALAKOFF AND REDAN. 153

work of destruction. There are still entire blocks of ruins
in the heart of Sebastopol, and at almost every step the
visitor of to-day is reminded of the memorable siege, and
the devastation it created. A railway connects the city
with Moscow and St. Petersburg, and the port has as-
sumed a commercial importance that bids fair to surpass
that of Odessa. In 1885-86 its population increased more
rapidly than at any time since the war, partly in conse-
quence of the activity of the government in restoring its
naval supremacy on the Black Sea, and partly owing to
large shipments of wheat and other Russian products.

CHAPTER X.

LUCKNOW AND CAWNPORE — 1 857-8.

On the 23d of June, 1757, Lord Clive defeated the
army of Surajah Dowlah, Nabob of Bengal, on the field
of Plassey, in a battle which ranks as one of the decisive
battles of India. Fifty years thereafter the Hindoo as-
trologers predicted that the year 1857, the centenar}' of
Plassey, would witness the termination forever of the
British power in India. Down to 1857 they continued to
make this prediction, and early in that year it was evident
that a mutinous spirit prevailed in the army of Bengal.
The Bengal army at that time comprised 22,698 Europeans,
including the officers of native regiments, and 118,663
sepoys, or native soldiers. The military authorities had
decided to arm the sepoys with Enfield rifles, and a new
kind of cartridge, which was greased in order to adapt it
to the improved weapon. These cartridges had to be
torn with the teeth, in accordance with the manual of
arms, and the report was spread among the natives that
the grease was a mixture of lard and cows' tallow. The
pig is an unclean beast in the eyes of the Hindoo, and
also the Moslem, while the cow is sacred ; consequently,
both Hindoo and Moslem would be defiled by biting the
fat of the pig, and the Hindoo would commit sacrilege in
biting cows' fat.

There was great excitement in all the barracks, which
was temporarily allayed by the substitution of the old or
ungreased cartridge for the new one. The native soldiers
had a general impression that they were about to be de-

154

LUCKNOW AND CAIVNPORE. 155

prived of their caste, and there were numerous malcon-
tents who encouraged this behef. Every concession by
the government was regarded as part of the scheme, and
it was useless to argue against it. Discontent grew stead-
ily, and on the night of the 19th February the Nineteenth
Native Infantry at Burhampore broke open the place
where the arms were kept, and were only restrained from
a bloody mutiny by the presence of a small force of cav-
alry with two guns. The regiment was disbanded on the
30th March at Barrackpore. On the previous evening a
sepoy of the Thirty-fourth Regiment at Barrackpore had
fired upon and severely wounded the adjutant and ser-
geant-major, thus shedding the first blood of the mutiny.

On the loth May there was a formidable rising at
Meerut, the rebels slaughtering every English man,
woman, and child on whom they could lay hands, and
then pillaging and setting fire to the buildings. When
they had finished their terrible work they marched in the
direction of Delhi, killing every European whom they
met on the road, or in their entrance to the city. The
native garrison of Delhi were easily persuaded to join
them, and a butchery of Europeans followed immediately.
The rebels proclaimed the restoration of the Mogul
dynasty, and from that time onward acted in the name of
the King of Delhi, who took an active part in the revolt,
and made Delhi the rallying-point of the rebels of the
northwest provinces.

The native troops of the kingdom of Oude mutinied
on the 30th and 31st May. Elsewhere the rising was of
a purely military character ; but in Oude the people sym-
pathized with the rebellion, and accordingly it took the
form of a popular movement for independence. Warn-
ings of the impending troubles had been received at
Cawnpore earlier than in the other stations of the north-
west province. About the end of April straggling parties
of the Nineteenth Native Infantry, which had been dis-

156 DECISIVE BATTLES SINCE WATERLOO.

banded at Burliampore for mutinous action, as already
stated, passed through Cawnpore en route to their homes
in the country, and spread the rumors that fanned the
flame of the insurrection. The reputation of Cawnpore
was by no means good. Lying just over the Ganges
from the kingdom of Oude, it had been for a long time a
city of refugees, and also the halting-place whence offend-
ers against the laws in British territory found it conven-
ient to make their escape into Oude. The native popula-
tion of Cawnpore was not far from 100,000. Out of this
number the 40,000 who dwelt in the military bazaars had
the worst reputation. There was an unusually large force
of native troops at Cawnpore, including the First, Fifty-
third, and Fifty-sixth regiments of native infantry, the en-
tire Second regiment of native cavalry, and a full company
of native artillery. Of British troops there were only
about 200, comprising a few small detachments of Bengal
artillery, the company's first Madras Fusiliers, and Her
Majesty's Thirty-second and Eighty-fourth foot. Major-
General Sir Hugh Wheeler was in command at Cawn-
pore. Over seventy years of age, it is fair to say that he
had seen his best days, and he was on the most friendly
terms with Nana Sahib, the adopted son of the last Peishwa
of the Mahrattas. Nana Sahib had a deadly hatred of
the English, but managed to conceal most completely his
real feelings. He entertained the of^cers and others at
his palace, which was filled with European furniture and
bric-a-brac, and his way of living was more European than
Asiatic.

Tidings of the insurrection at Meerut and Delhi were
received at Cawnpore on the 14th May. They not only
increased the excitement among the native inhabitants
and the native soldiery, but caused great alarm among
the European residents. General Wheeler telegraphed
to Lucknow that he feared there was danger, and he sus-
pected disaffection among the men of the Second Cavalry.

157

158 DECISIVE BATTLES SINCE WATERLOO.

Accordingly a reinforcement of fifty men of the Thirty-
Second was sent to him. It was considered desirable to
establish a place of refuge for the English residents in
case of an insurrection. General Wheeler selected for
this purpose the depot of the Thirty-Second Regiment,
not far from the Dragoon Hospital. This place was des-
tined to be the scene of one of the most heroic defences
that ever took place since the world began.

Two squadrons of Oude Irregular Cavalry mutinied on
the 27th May, killing all their officers, and then sending
messengers to all the rest of the native soldier}- telling
them what had been done. The other native regiments
followed their example, and then laid siege to the en-
trenchments which General Wheeler had prepared. When
the proper moment for his purpose arrived, Nana Saliib
threw off the mask and openly placed himself at the
head of the rebellion. Under his direction the siege of
General Wheeler's position was conducted ; it lasted
from the 6th to the 27th June, and is thus described
by an historian :

"It was a siege the miseries of which to the besieged have
never been exceeded in the history of the world. All the
wonted terrors of a multitudinous enemy without, of a feeble
garrison and scant shelter within, of the burden of women
and children and sick people, with little to appease their wants
or allay their sufferings, were aggravated by the burning heat
of the climate. The June sky was little less than a great
canopy of fire ; the summer breeze was as the blast of a fur-
nace ; to touch the barrel of a gun was to recoil as from red-
hot iron. It was the season when European strength and
energy are ever at their lowest point of depression — when
military duty in its mildest form taxes the power of English-
men to the utmost, and English women can do little more than
sustain life in shaded apartments, with all appliances at hand
to moderate the temperature and mitigate the suffering. But
now, even under the fierce meridian sun, this little band of

LUCKNOW AND CAWNPORE. 1 59

English fighting men were ever straining to sustain the strenu-
ous activity of constant battle against fearful odds ; while
delicate women and fragile children Avere suddenly called to
endure discomforts and privations, with all the superadded
miseries peculiar to the country and climate, which it would
have been hard to battle with in strong health under their
native skies. . . . And never since war began — * never in
the brave days of old ' when women turned their hair into bow-
strings— has the world seen nobler patience and fortitude than
clothed the lives and shone forth in the deaths of the wives
and daughters of the fighting men of Cawnpore. Some saw
their children slowly die in their arms ; some had them swept
from their breasts by the desolating fire of the enemy. There
was no misery -which humanity could endure that did not fall
heavily upon our Englishwomen. Day by day the little gar-
rison diminished, struck down by the insurgents' shot or the
fierce rays of the sun. Water was scarce, and could only be
obtained from the well at the risk of life. The air was tainted
by the foul gases from the carcases of horses or oxen ; the
bodies of the slain were thrown into a dry well to avoid
contagion."

While the siege was in progress Nana Sahib captured
several bands of English fugitives from other stations,
who were making their way in the direction of Calcutta,
among them one party of a hundred men, women, and
children from Futtyghyr. The men were put to death
with various kinds of torture, while the women and chil-
dren were retained as prisoners. On the twenty-first day
of the siege one of the prisoners was sent to General
Wheeler bearing a letter from Nana Sahib, in which he
offered safe conduct to Allahabad to all who would Ia>
down their arms. At first General Wheeler refused the
terms, but after some deliberation they were accepted,
and it was arranged that sufficient boats were to be at
the landing-place on the morning of the 27th June. On
that morning a mournful procession of two hundred worn,
emaciated sufferers filed out of the entrenchments and

l6o DECISIVE BATTLES SINCE WATERLOO.

moved slowly towards the river. The sick and wounded
were carried in palanquins supplied by Nana Sahib, and
the baggage was piled upon elephants. No order was
observed in boarding the boats, which lay a few feet from
the shore ; each boat was to push off when loaded, but
when the cargoes were on board it was found that every
boat Avas fast in the sand.

At a signal from the shore the crews of the boats
jumped ov^erboard and made for the shore, and then the
rebels opened upon the doomed band with small-arms
and artiller}-. Before leaving the boats the crew had man-
aged to secrete burning coals in the thatch roofs, and
very soon they were found to be on fire. Two boats got
away at last, but a murderous fire was maintained upon
them. Of the whole party of two hundred and more,
only four escaped ; those who were not killed by the
enemy's shot or drowned in the river were taken back to
Cawnpore, where they were held as prisoners until the
massacre, w^hich preceded the arrival of the relieving
column of General Havelock on the i6th July. In that
massacre some two hundred English and half-castes,
mostly women and children, were slaughtered and thrown
into a well by orders of Nana Sahib.

General Havelock marched up the Grand Trunk road
in the direction of Cawnpore with 1,400 European soldiers
and 8 guns. As soon as news of his advance was received
at Cawnpore, Bala Ras went out with every available
man in the endeavor to stop him. Nana Sahib's brother
was defeated at Aong, in Futtypore. The bridge over
the Pandu was carried after a sharp fight, and on the 15th
of July the English triumphantly entered the District of
Cawnpore. Bala Ras retreated to Cawnpore, carrying
the news of his own repulse and sufTering severely from a
wound received in the fight.

On the 1 6th July, Havelock halted his men at noon at
Ahirwan, a station on the Grand Trunk road, about three

LUCKNOW AND CAWNPORE. l6l

miles southeast of Cawnpore. His troops had already
marched nearly twenty miles that day. They were greatly
wearied, and in no way ready for action. The rebel entrench-
ments were about a mile in front of their position, directly
across the junction of the Grand Trunk road and the
side road which leads into Cawnpore. The rebel force
was about 5,000 strong. Their right and left wings rested
upon villages, surrounded by strong walls and defended
by heavy guns, while the rebels were stationed in groves
of trees, which gave them excellent; protection. In their
centre they had a small battery of light artillery, and
their position was very much like that of the right and
left wing. Both in numbers and artillery they were far
superior to the English, and it seemed almost like inviting
defeat for the latter to advance along the road against
the well-arranged front which the rebels presented. Gen-
eral Havelock carefully reconnoitred their position and
very wisely determined to outflank., it. Moving across
the country toward the right, and passing from grove to
grove, he attacked the enemy's left flank. Previously to
doing so, he drew a plan in the dust of the road, using
the end of his scabbard for a pencil, and explained his
intended manoeuvre to all his officers, so that it could be
carried out in case of any accident to himself. The order to
advance was given at about half-past two in the afternoon.

The small force of Sikh cavalry who had remained
loyal and performed excellent service, was ordered to
advance and make a feint upon the enemy's front, but
not to engage him. The ruse was completely successful.
The rebels concentrated their fire upon the cavalry, and
the flanking movement of the infantry was almost com-
pleted before the rebels discovered what was going on.

An opening of the trees showed them what the move-
ment was. The English artillery was still in the rear, and
the rebels used their old field-pieces against the assailants
with considerable effect. With their overweening confi-

l62 DECISIVE BATTLES SINCE WATERLOO.

dence in their artiller)-, the rebels felt entirely sure of
their position, and they derisively ordered the bands to
play " Cheer, Boys, Cheer ! " The Seventy-eighth High-
landers advanced partly to this music and parth- to their
own instruments, for which Scotland is celebrated. They
charged upon the rebels, closely followed by the 64th
Regiment. In a very few minutes the rebel music was
entirely silenced, and the rebel left wing was in full flight ;
their guns were captured, and the villages where they had
been so strongly posted were in English hands. Many
of the sepoys retreated eastward and westward, and not
in the direction of Cawnpore. They had had quite
enough of fighting, and were decidedly anxious to reach
their homes. Those who did not flee rushed to strengthen
the centre of the rebel position. General Havelock halted
his men briefly to enable them to take breath, and then
after a short but stirring speech ordered another advance.
The cavalry now came to the support of the infantry.
A brief contest followed, and then a loud cheer, running
along the whole British line, told that the centre of the
rebel forces had been broken in. The cavalry retained its
position at the centre with the captured rebel howitzer,
while the infantry advanced toward the rebel right. The
same good-fortune followed them. They broke the rebel
infantry line, and captured two cannon. The enemy's
original line of battle was thus completely broken up. Al-
though success had crowned the efforts of the wearied lit-
tle army of British troops, its work was by no means
over. A little in the rear of the first position of the
rebels was a village, surrounded by a wood, and here the
Nana's force rallied again. Their remaining artillery
opened a destructive fire upon the British advance.
Havelock rode up, and in a loud, clear voice asked w^hat
regiment would undertake the capture of the village. No
answer was given in words ; but the infantry advanced
rapidly, and the village was soon in their possession.

LUCKNOW AND CAWNPORE. 1 63

The rebels seemed to be in full retreat towards Cawn-
pore after this misfortune, and the wearied soldiers lay
down upon the ground to have a brief rest. Again
the rebels rallied, led by the Nana in person. He
liad stationed 3 guns, one of them a 24-pounder,
upon the branch road leading to Cawnpore, and as the
British advanced they received a severe fire from these
guns. The rebel cavalry advanced, followed closely by
the rebel infantry, and accompanied by the trumpets and
bands of music. The English advanced again ; but well-
directed volleys of grape and canister cut down many of
their numbers. As they were moving forward under the
leadership of General Havelock's son, who was serving
on his staff, the infantry charged and captured the 24-
pounder, and simultaneously four British guns were
brought forward, and opened fire on the rebels. The fire
of thrse guns threw the sepoys into consternation, and
tliey fled rapidly towards Cawnpore.

Havelock's men were too weary after their day's march-
ing and fighting to pursue the enem}', and they went into
camp about two miles from the city. During the evening
Nana Sahib fled from Cawnpore towards Bitheer. On the
17th July Havelock entered Cawnpore, and encamped
within what had formerly been the British lines. The
massacre of the prisoners took place on the evening of
the 1 6th at the time of Nana Sahib's flight from Cawn-

pCM'C.

At Lucknow, the capital of the lately annexed king-
dom of Oude, the sepoys openly mutinied at the canton-
ment, four miles from the city, on the 30th May, 1857.
.Sir Henry Lawrence, the Chief Commissioner, immediate-
ly placed the Residency and a wide enclosure around it in
a state of defence, and was occupied with this work
through the greater part of June. Hearing that a large
force of rebels was encamped a few miles distant on
the Fyzabad road, he started to attack them on the

164 DECISIVE BATTLES SINCE WATERLOO.

morning of the 30th June with 700 men and ir
guns. He fell into an ambush near Chinhut, and was
compelled to retire before an overwhelming force and
seek safety in his entrenchments. Weakened by losses
he determined to abandon all outworks, and after destroy-
ing a large amount of ammunition and military stores to
prevent their capture by the enemy, he assembled all the
European population wn'thin the enclosure of the Resi-
dency. This retirement to the Residency took place on
July 1st, the day following the Chinhut disaster, and may
properly be considered the beginning of the rebel siege.
The rebels immediately surrounded the place, and on the
2d July Sir Henry Lawrence was mortally wounded by a
shell, and died two days afterwards. Before his death he
named Major Inglis his military successor, and IMajor
Banks Chief Commissioner.

The Residency now contained 900 Europeans and 700
loyal natives. The siege lasted for twelve weeks, and in-
cluded all the horrors of that of Cawnpore already told.
Overwork, exposure, bad provisions, cholera, dysentery,
fever, and other diseases were busy, in addition to the
bullets and shells of the 50,000 besiegers. The women
and children, being less inured to hardships, suffered
more than the men, and many of them sickened and died
before the end of those terrible twelve weeks. The
rebels maintained a steady fire on the Residency; they
ran mines beneath some of the buildings, and on several
occasions stormed the entrenchments. Constant vigi-
lance was necessary for the little band of defenders, and
they looked anxiously for relief. On the 25th July a spy
brought a letter from General Havelock, saying they would
be relieved in a few days ; but the promised succor did
not reach them until two months later.

Immediately after capturing Cawnpore, Havelock turned
his attention to the relief of Lucknow, fifty-five miles dis-
tant, but the rebel force between Cawnpore and Luck-

LUCKNOW AND CAWNPORE. 1 65

now was so great that his advance was impossible.
Cholera had broken out in his camp, and his fighting men
were less than a thousand, while the rebels between him
and Lucknow were fully 30,000 strong. During August
and early September he was unable to move forward,
though he did not remain idle, as he was constantly at-
tackinsr detached bands of rebels wherever he could hear
of them. On the 15th of September he was joined by
Sir James Outram and 1,700 European soldiers, and four
days later he crossed the Ganges in the face of the enemy
and advanced upon Lucknow. After severe fighting, in
which there was a great slaughter of the rebels and
heavy losses by the English, the forces of Havelock and
Outram entered the Residency. The relief thus brought
to the besieged was more in name than any thing else ; it
was the intention to escort the garrison to Cawnpore, but
the unexpected strength of the rebels and the heavy loss
sustained in the entrance made a safe retirement impossi-
ble. There was nothing to do but wait for other British
troops to come to their relief. Havelock's arrival gave
additional strength to the number of the defenders, but
there were more mouths to feed, and the entire garrison
was put on very short rations.

The rebels continued their siege, but by this time the
fall of Delhi had released a considerable force of troops
that might be employed elsewhere. Through October
the siege went on, and on the 9th November Sir Colin
Campbell left Cawnpore with a force of 4,000 men, partly
European and partly Sikhs who had remained loyal to the
British. By the evening of the 15th he was within three
miles of Lucknow, and on the next day he assaulted the
rebel lines and entered the Residency. The retirement
with the women and children was accomplished by
strategy ; the rebels held nearly the whole city and sur-
rounding positions, and the line of retirement resembled
a tortuous lane with many points of attack.

1 66 DECISIVE BATTLES SINCE WATERLOO.

A vigorous fire was directed against one of the strong
points of the rebels as though the British were about to
assault it. The fire was maintained until a practicable
breach had been made and every thing was read}' for the
assault. Then at midnight on the 22d the English silently
retired in the opposite direction, carrying away the entire
garrison and all the valuable stores from the Residency.
So completely were the rebels deceived that they kept up
their fire on the Residency until daylight. General Have-
lock died of dysentery and exhaustion on the third day
of the retreat from Lucknow.

When Delhi fell the government considered the rebel-
lion broken, but it very soon learned its mistake. The
relief of the garrison of Lucknow was simply a saving of
life ; the city was in the hands of the rebels, and nearly
the whole of the province of Oude was controlled by
them. While Sir Colin Campbell was retiring from Luck-
now with the relieved garrison, he was called to disperse
the " Gwalior Contingent " that had rebelled and was ad-
vancing in the direction of Cawnpore, near which place it
had already defeated General Windham, who commanded
the garrison there and marched out to meet them.

During December Cawnpore was attacked by a well-
appointed army of rebels 25,000 strong, which was re-
pulsed with heavy loss. To defeat it, Sir Colin was
obliged to draw from near Lucknow a portion of the force
with which he was preparing to besiege the place ; the
government had determined that the rebels in Oude must
be crushed at all hazards, and were hurrying men and
munitions to Sir Colin as fast as possible.

At the end of February, 1858, the total strength at Sir
Colin Campbell's disposal for the siege of Lucknow
amounted to 20,000 men, with iSo pieces of artillery'.
He had made a thoroughly scientific plan Jor the cap-
ture of Lucknow, and one which would spare as much as
possible the blood and lives of his men. The city of

LUCKNOW AND CAWNPORE. 167

Lucknow stands on the right bank of the Gumti Riv^er, in
the form of a parallelogram from west to east. It is
nearly five miles long, and its greatest width on the west
side is about one and one half miles. The east side is not
over one mile in width. Over the Gumti there are two
bridges, one of iron and the other of masonry, which
bring the business of the country from the north side of
the river into the centre of the city. On the east and
south sides of Lucknow there is a canal deeply cut into
the earth. It bends around in a southwesterly direction,
leaving the country on the western side of the city quite
open. It is intersected with ravines toward the northeast,
near the point where it unites with the Gumti ; the banks
of the canal slope gently and are passable for footmen and
cavalry.

At the time of Sir Colin Campbell's advance upon
Lucknow, the principal positions inside the city were the
Kaiser Bagh, the Residency, the ruins of the Machi Ba-
wan, which commanded the masonry bridge, the Musa
Bagh, the Imambara, and a series of palaces which extend
towards the canal from the Kaiser Bagh. On the east
side of the city and beyond the canal was the Martinifere,
a curious palace, or collection of palaces, built by a
Frenchman former)}- in the employ of the old King of
Oude, and occupying a commanding position in full view
of the city. Still higher than the Martiniere, on the edge
of a stretch of table-land, was the Dilkusha Palace.

Learning Avisdom by their experience of the previous
year, the rebels had gradually strengthened their de-
fences by means of breastworks which showed that they
did not stint their labor. Believing that the English
would advance by the same line as before, they had
flanked with strong bastions the former route which Sir
Colin took across the canal where its banks were sloping.
The rebels had no less than three lines of defence at the
juncture of three principal roads. The outer line of de-

l68 DECISIVE BATTLES SINCE WATERLOO,

fence was supported by a strong battery of 9 guns ; the
second line consisted of bastioned rampart and parapet
with its right resting on the Imambara; from this im-
mense building it continued to the Mess House, and
reached the bank of the Gumti close by the Moti Mahal.
The third line covered the front of the Kaiser Bagh.
Altogether they had 100 guns protecting this defence.
Furthermore, all the principal streets of Lucknow were
barricaded and bastioned, and every building of conse-
quence had its walls loop-holed for musketry, besides
earthworks to protect its entrance.

Numerous spies were sent out to obtain as accurately
as possible a statement of the condition of the defences.
Basing his opinion upon their reports. Brigadier Napier
thought that the attack should be made on the east side,
for the reason that it presented the smallest front, was
the nearest approach to the Kaiser Bagh, and that the
ground was favorable for establishing batteries. Argu-
ments were advanced opposing his opinion, but at one
time it prevailed, and the decision was taken to make
the attack on the eastern side of Lucknow. The rebels
did not fortify the northern side, because they had rea-
soned that since neither General Havelock nor Sir Colin
in the previous year had approached the Gumti they would
not be likely to do so in the present instance, and there-
fore the river side was neglected. As soon as this error
in their defences was discovered. Sir Colin naturally de-
cided to take advantage of it. He arranged to send an
entire division of all arms across the Gumti, and then, by
marching up the bank of the river, they could take the
rebel position in reverse, and by a vigorous use of artil-
lery make it untenable.

Bright and early on the 2d of March, General Campbell
began the execution of his plans. He advanced on the
Dilkusha Park with the following-named forces : The Third
and Fourth Brigades of infantry, which included the

LUCKNOW AND CAWNPORE. 1 69

Thirtieth, Thirty-eighth, and Fifty-third Regiments ; the
Fourth Brigade, which included the Forty-second and
Forty-ninth Highlanders; the Fourth Punjaub Rifles;
the artillery divisions of Sir A. Wilson and Colonel
Wood ; three troops of horse artillery ; two 24-pounders,
two 8-inch howitzers of the Naval Brigade, and a corps
of sappers and miners. After passing the fort of Jal-
alabad, Sir Colin encountered the rebel pickets, which he
drove in, and then captured one piece of artillery. The
palace was immediately occupied as an advance picket on
the right of the line. The enemy's guns which were
placed along the canal completely dominated the plateau
where the Dilkusha Palace stands, and it was found im-
possible to bring up the main force of the infantry.
Accordingly, Sir Colin ordered batteries to be erected at
Dilkusha to silence the enemy's fire. The batteries were
established during the night of the 2d, and were ready for
operations at daylight on the 3d. As soon as their fire
began, that of the enemy slackened materially.

Then the infantry was brought up, massed around the
Dilkusha, and enabled the British to establish a new line.
This line rested its right on the Gumti at the village
of Bibiapur. From this village, extending toward the
left, it touched the Dilkusha and extended in the direction
of Jalalabad to within two miles of that fort. The line
was completed by Brigadier-General Franks with a force
of English and Nepaulese troops. While General Franks
was getting into position. Sir Colin ordered two pontoon
bridges to be thrown over the Gumti near Bibiapur, and
this work was accomplished by the morning of the 6th.
Anticipating the completion of the bridges. Sir Colin or-
dered General Outram to cross to the left bank of the river
at two o'clock in the morning with a strong division
of all arms.

The night was very dark, and over the broken ground
intersected with ravines and waterways, Outram's men

I/O DECISIVE BATTLES SINCE WATERLOO.

were greatly troubled to find their way. Outram went
on ahead to the bridges, where he sat on the ground and
waited for the troops to come up, well knowing that his
officers were doing every thing possible to bring them for-
ward at the time appointed. It was not until four o'clock
that the cavalry advance, the Second Punjaub, arrived at
the bridges. The crossing began immediately, and the
whole force was over the river by daylight. Forming his
command in three lines, Outram advanced along the left
bank of the Gumti for about a mile, and then marched
directly towards the city. He met with no opposition
and formed his camp that evening about four miles from
Lucknow.

The /th and 8th of !March were mainly passed in re-
connoitring and light skirmishes. The rebels were re-
pulsed every time they advanced. Outram retained the
position where he had encamped for his main force, but
steadily during the day pushed his pickets forward.
During the night he threw up earthworks and mounted
two batteries with heav}' guns about six hundred }-ards
from the rebel works on the old race-course.

His attack began at daybreak on the 9th. General
Walpole forced back the enemy's left from the villages
and jungles that covered their position, while Outram did
the same on their right. News of the success of the
movement was conveyed to Sir Colin by displaying the
colors of the First Fusiliers from the top of the Yellow
House. As soon as the colors were displayed. Sir Colin
advanced and very speedily formed a junction with the
right wing. Then the entire line was halted while three
heavy guns and a howitzer were brought forward to en-
filade the works behind the Martiniere. General Camp-
bell had waited patiently at the Dilkusha during the time
Outram was making the movements which, formed an
important preliminary to the attack upon Lucknow. Fire
was opened on the Martiniere and steadily kept up from

1/2 DECISIVE BATTLES SINCE WATERLOO.

daylight until two in the afternoon, when Sir Colin
ordered Hope's Brigade, supported by the Fifty-third and
Nintieth Regiments, to adv^ance against the Martiniere.
Aided by Outram's enfilading batteries, they carried it
without opposition, the rebels fleeing ov^er the river, but
taking their guns along witl"" them. Both lines of opera-
tion Avere successful, Outram being fairly established on
one side of the parallelogram, and thus enabling Sir Colin
to advance on its other side.

The next movement was on the loth. when the two
sides of the parallelogram were practically completed by
the storming and capture of Banks' House. The next
move was to pierce the centre of the rebel line, which ex-
tended from Banks' House to a point on the Kaiser Bagh.
Outram was ordered to assail the positions which covered
the iron and masonry bridges. The iron bridge led to
the Residency and the masonry one to the Machi Bawan.
The same plan was followed as in the capture of the
Martiniere and the Dilkusha. Batteries were established
to enfilade the enem}-'s works, and at the same time throw
a vertical and direct fire upon the Kaiser Bagh. On the
nth, General Outram advanced General Walpole's divi-
sion to a position which commanded the iron bridge.
Pushing through the suburbs, he occupied the Mosque,
about a thousand yards from the bridge, and there he left
the First Fusiliers. From the Mosque he went on to the
head of the stone bridge, but found the position un-
tenable wnth infantry, as it was commanded by the rebel
guns, and therefore he withdrew again to the Mosque.
In the meanwhile, a battery had been established close
to the iron bridge.

While these movements were taking place on the right,
the heavy batteries on the left had opened a fire of shot
and shell on the Bakum Kothi. The line of palaces
known by that name were very strongly built, and if well
garrisoned and properly defended they were capable of

LUCKNOW AND CAWNPORE. 1 73

making a long resistance, even against the well-equipped
British forces. Sir Colin knew the character of the peo-
ple against whom he was making war. He knew that in
fighting against Asiatics an immense superiority is always
given to an advancing force, and this is an element which
is of far greater consideration in Asia than in any other
part of the world. Although the position seemed a very
strong one, Sir Colin did not hesitate to order an assault
at once. The approach was decided to be practical, and
the order was given to storm.

The storming party consisted of the Fourth Punjaub
and the Ninet}'-third Highlanders, the same who had
stormed the Sikander Bagh in the previous year. Having
taken part in Sir Colin 's first movement upon Lucknow,
they deserved the honor of leading the advance in the
second and final seige. The buildings to be stormed were
surrounded by a breastwork, with a deep ditch, and cqn-
sisted of several palaces and court-yards, one inside the
other. The breastwork and the wall of the outer court-
yard had been breached by the fire of the batteries ; but
most of the inner walls had not been greatly injured.
The indications were that their sepoy garrison was not
less than 5,000 strong.

General Hope led the assault at 4 in the afternoon,
the Highlanders in the advance and the Punjaubees in
support. At the opening in the breastwork they met
with a fierce resistance, and for a while success seemed
doubtful, owing to the greatly superior numbers of the
sepoys. But British valor could not be easily overcome,
and the fighting continued steadily. When the sepoys
were driven back from the breach they seemed to have
lost heart, and to make but a feeble resistance at their
other strong positions. The Highlanders and the Pun-
jaubees fought like tigers. Not a sepoy asked for quar-
ter, and no quarter was offered by the British soldiers.
When the last survivor of the garrison of the Bakum

174 DECISIVE BATTIES SINCE WATERLOO.

Kothi fled from it, there were fully 600 corpses inside the
space surrounded by its ditch. During the whole siege
there was no severer fight than this. The way was now
opened for Brigadier Napier to proceed by the sap and
heavy guns.

"Thenceforward," says Sir Colin, in his report, " he
pushed his approach with the greatest judgment through
the enclosures, the troops immediately occupying the
ground as he advanced, and the mortars being moved
from one position to another as ground was won on which
they could be placed."

By the close of the day, on the 13th, the engineers had
completed their work. All the great buildings on the
left of the line as far as the Imambara had been sapped
through. The artillery, which had been steadily playing
on the walls of the Imambara, had made a breach which
was considered practicable for an assault. The firing was
continued through the night of the 13th, and on the
morning of the 14th the heavy guns, at only thirty yards
distance, pounded steadily away. The sepoys did not re-
ply with artillery, but they kept up a steady fire of mus-
ketry from the tops of the walls. At 9 in the forenoon
the order for the assault was given. The men went for-
ward with a rush, and very speedily were in full posses-
sion of the palaces. They did not stop there, but pursued
the rebels until they gained a position which commanded
the Kaiser Bagh.

The engineers wanted to stop the advance of the
troops ; but this was easier to say than to do. The Sikhs
of Brasyer's regiment were almost uncontrollable. They
climbed through an embrasure into a bastion, and then
made their way into a court-yard close to the Kaiser Bagh.
The Tenth Foot advanced, and turned the third line of
the defence by passing through the bazaars i;i the rear of
the Tara Kothi. Re-inforcements were sent for, and Gen.
Franks advanced immediately with all the men he could

LUCKNOIV AND CAWNPORE. 1 75

muster. An important question was at issue whether it
would be safe, with all the advantages then gained, to
storm the Kaiser Bagh, or wait until the batteries had
forced a breach. The intention was on that morning,
March 14th, only to attack the Imambara; but the im-
petuosity of the troops and the feeble defence of the
sepoys had not been counted on. Considering all the
circumstances, and that the rebels seemed to have been
overcome by panic, it was considered advisable to push
on while the defenders were still disordered, and the
storming forces were still enthusiastic for the advance.
Franks and Napier, after weighing all the conditions of
the situation, decided to advance. They asked for rein-
forcements, which were not long in coming up, the troops
on the right advancing and occupying the Moti Mahal
with very little resistance. At the same time Franks
pushed his column through the court-yard of Sadat All's
Mosque directly into the Kaiser Bagh, which is a rectan-
gular palace about 400 yards square. The enclosure in-
cludes a series of gardens and courts, through which
marble summer-houses are scattered. The whole place
swarmed with sepoys, who poured a heavy musketry fire
on the British, not only from the summer-houses and
various parts of the palace, but from the roofs of the
neighboring dwellings.

But the British having gained a footing in the garden,
the cause of the rebels was hopeless. The Kaiser Bagh
was captured with a great slaughter of the insurgents who
defended it. One historian of the Indian mutiny says
that after the massacre at Cawnpore the soldiers divided
among them the tresses of a murdered girl, and swore
that for every hair of her head one sepoy should die. As
far as possible they kept their word. In Sir Colin Camp-
bell's relief of Lucknow and in the siege which has just
been described, no quarter was given. If any fallen
sepoy ventured to ask it, ** Cawnpore ! " was hissed in his

176

DECISIVE BATTLES SINCE WATERLOO.

ear and the word was accompanied or instantly followed
by a shot or the thrust of a bayonet.

The siege and fall of Lucknow formed the prelude to
the end of the rebellion. There was considerable fighting
in various parts of India during 1858 and early in the fol-
lowing year, but the battles were of no great moment
and an almost continuous series of defeats for the rebels.
In the autumn of 1858 th ; rule of the East India Com-
pany came to an end, after an existence of more than two
hundred and fifty years, and the control of the Indian
empire passed to the British government.

CHAPTER XI.

CAPTURE OF THE PEIHO FORTS AND PEKIN — 1858-60.

The empire of China claims an antiquity of about fiv^e
thousand years, but for the first thousand years of this
period its history is of a mythical character. According
to its chronology, one of its early rulers is said to have
reigned one hundred and fourteen years, and another is
credited with the conduct of affairs for one hundred and
forty years, duringwhich he introduced medical science and
agriculture. Through many dynasties China was troubled
with external and internal wars, chiefly the latter, but in
all ages down to the present she maintained her seclusion
from the rest of the world. In the seventeenth century,
the Dutch and other European nations endeavored to
gain admission to the country, but their efforts were suc-
cessfully resisted, though they were allowed to trade un-
der numerous restrictions in the waters near Canton.
England, Russia, and other countries sent embassies at
different times, the East India Company had a trading
concession, but all attempts at oflficial and commercial
intercourse were practically unsuccessful. About 1834
began the opium dispute, w^hich led to troubles between
England and China. These troubles grew into wars,
which resulted unfavorably to the Chinese, and led to
the opening of various ports, not only for commercial
purposes, but for the permanent residence of foreign
merchants.

By the treaty of Nankin in 1843, China was to pay to

177

178 DECISIVE BATTLES SINCE WATERLOO.

England an indemnity of $21,000,000 for the cost of the
war ; five ports were thrown open for commerce and resi-
dence ; Hong Kong became British soil ; and there was
to be lasting peace and friendship between the two em-
pires. The peace lasted until 1856, when the seizure of
the opium smuggler ArroiJ, by the Chinese, led to dis-
putes, and the disputes into another war which lasted for
nearly two years. It ended in the capture of Canton
early in 1858, and the capture of the Peiho forts a few
months later, and a treaty of peace signed at Tien-Tsin,
by Lord Elgin on the part of England, and Baron Gros
on that of France, Commissioner Keying acting for the
Emperor of China. By this treaty Pekin was to be open
to foreign ambassadors, there should be freedom of trade
throughout the empire under certain restrictions con-
nected with the customs duties, Christianity was to be
tolerated, the expense of the war to be paid by China,
the tariff to be revised, and the term " barbarian " not to
be applied any longer to Europeans.

As this treaty formed the practical opening to the rest
of the world of the great empire that had been secluded
for fifty centuries, the capture of the Peiho forts, which
led to the treaty of Tien-Tsin, is worth}' of a place among
the decisive battles of the century. The account of this
event is derived from the journals of Mr. Oliphant, the
private secretary of Lord Elgin, and subsequently the
historian of the embassy.

On his way northward from Canton Lord Elgin stopped
at Shanghai, where he sought to meet the governor of
that city, and asked that a letter be forwarded to the im-
perial government at Pekin. The governor received him
outside the town of Soochow, near Shanghai. That high
ofhcial took the letter, which he read in the street, sur-
rounded by a crowd of people, who looked over his shoul-
ders and perused the document at the same time. After
the reading was ended, the governor politely asked the

179

I So DECISIVE BATTLES SINCE WATERLOO.

British ambassador to leave the town immediately, and
also to prev'ent any members of his party from walking
through the streets. In due course of time a reply came
to the letter. It was from Prime-Minister Yuh, signed by
the Vermilion Pencil (Emperor). The substance of the
reply was, that in the first place the British ambassador
should go straight back to Canton, as that was the only
point from which negotiations could be received. This was
not the kind of reply Lord Elgin had desired. He did
not wish to use force in getting near the imperial throne,
but could see no other way out of the difficulty. Accord-
ingly he determined to pass the forts at the mouth of the
Peiho River, then advance to Tien-Tsin, and make another
effort to communicate with the imperial government.
The representatives of the other powers supported him
in this design, particularly the Russian minister. Count
Poutiatine, who thought that even this measure would
fail, and that nothing short of a powerful naval and mili-
tary' force could break through the obstinacy of the
emperor and those who surrounded him.

Light-draught boats were ordered up and the fleet pro-
ceeded through the Yellow Sea to the mouth of the
Peiho. As they entered the Gulf of Pechele, they en-
countered strong gales, which turned that body of water
into a substance resembling boiling pea-soup. Occasion-
ally the cold gales from the northeast suddenly ceased
and were followed with hot blasts filled with impalpable
sand from the great desert of Gobi. Ten fathoms was
found to be the average depth of the Gulf of Pechele.
As the fleet neared the coast the water shoaled, and sud-
denly the leadsmen announced only four fathoms. Im-
mediately the ships were brought to anchor.

The position of the fleet was nearly in front of the en-
trance of Peiho, " The River of the North." A bar
extends into the gulf at least a mile from the mouth
of the river. This bar has eleven feet of water upon it

CAPTURE OF THE PEIHO FORTS AND PEKIA\ l8l

at high tide ; at half tide it protrudes in some places,
and in its shallowest places is not over two feet deep.
The bottom is smooth and hard, and appears to be quite
level. The channel of the river is marked by stakes,
from which the fishermen hang bunches of nets. The
French, Russian, and American ships anchored close in
with the British fleet, and the question arose whether the
forts would permit the passage of the Peiho or make an
attack necessary. Upon a general consultation, it was
decided to send another letter to the Chinese prime-min-
ister, telling him that four plenipotentiaries had arrived
at the mouth of the Peiho and desired a meeting at
Takoo, either on land or on shipboard. It was further
stated that the}' would allow six days for an answer, and
if no answer came within that time, they would regard
themselves at liberty to take whatever action they pleased.
Takoo was named as a place of meeting rather than Tien-
Tsin because it was more convenient, not being so far in-
land.

The four plenipotentiaries embarked in a small boat
towed by a steamer, which carried them across the bar.
This was the first time that the Northern Chinese had
ever seen the " outside barbarians " advancing up their
river. Long lines of people stood on the low banks of
the river, manifesting no apparent emotion, and evidently
actuated only by curiosity. As the steamer and the boat
in tow advanced up the river, they met a junk bearing a
mandarin of the rank of the Transparent Blue Button.
He ordered the boat to return immediately, but promised
to be responsible for the safe transport and delivery of
the letter. The interview with the mandarin enabled the
officers on the steamer to obtain a good view of the forts.
As near as they could discover, there were about fifty
pieces of cannon posted along the banks of the river, most
of them of iron, the rest of brass, and some of a very great
calibre. On the left bank of the river the forts seemed to

IS2

DECISIVE BATTIES SINCE V/ATERLOO.

be nothing but heaps of mud. They had ramparts only
on the river side, their rear being quite unprotected, and
therefore open to assault from that direction. All the
forts were covered with banners, these banners being of a
triangular shape with serrated edges, and white spots on
a blue or yellow ground. As a result of the reconnoi-
tring, it was found that there were three forts on the south
bank and two on the north, connected by a line of mud
batteries, and in many instances half buried beneath the
flags that waved over the parapets and embrasures. The
foreign fleet which lay outside the mouth of the river in-
cluded thirty vessels as follows :

English.

Guns
84

Men
700

Ves'ls

Calcutta,

French,

Pique,

270

' Minnesota

Furious, paddle-steamer,

220

American -

Mississippi

Nimrod, despatch Govt, vessel,

120

Antelope

Cormorant,

Russian,

Surprise,

160

Fury,

Slaney, gunboat,

Leven,

English,

Bustard,

Oppossum,

Staunch,

Firm,

Coromandel,

Hesper, storeship.

15 Vessels.

1909

Total,

The answer to the letter was duly received and was
quite in the vein that had been expected. Tan, the High
Commissioner, evidently intended to negotiate without
full powers to do so. Then the plenipotentiaries sent an
ultimatum demanding that a commissioner with full pow-
ers should be sent, and positively stating th^t no others
would be received. The limit of time for their recep-
tion was fixed for May 19th, and in case the Chinese

1 84 DECISIVE BATTLES SINCE WATERLOO.

should decline the British offer of occupying the forts
temporarily^ force would be employed to take possession
of them. To this letter no reply was received, and ac-
cordingly the ships made ready to act.

At ten o'clock in the forenoon of May 20th, the signal
was displayed for the ships co move into position. The
Cormorant, Mitraille and Fiisce had been assigned to
assail the two forts on the northern bank, while the Nivi-
rod, Avalanche, and Dragonnc were to attack the three
forts on the southern bank and their connecting line of
mud batteries. The scene just before the signal of attack
was hoisted, was an animated one. The Cormorant was
the ship farthest in advance up the river, Avhere she lay
impatiently letting off little puffs of steam as she stood in
readiness to dash through the bamboo barrier, which the
Chinese had stretched across the river, and face the line
of fire of the forts to which she would be exposed before
reaching her position. The Nimrod was close behind the
Cormorant, with her decks clear for action, all the men
at their posts and every thing ready for active work.
The English and French gunboats were at some distance
behind the Nhnrod, and their decks were crowded with
men.

Hardly had the signal flag touched the truck of the
Slancy before the engines of the Cormorant were in mo-
tion and she started off to her destination, her men lying
flat on the deck and only her commander and two or
three ofificers visible. Scarcely was she under way before
there was a puff of smoke at one of the ports and a round
shot came whistling close to the steamer. This shot was
followed by another and another, and in a few moments
all three of the southern forts were firing at her with all
their guns. The Cormorant did not reply. Suddenly
there was a shock ; the course of the vessel was partially
stopped, then she went on ahead again and, with a little
struggle, broke the barrier, which consisted of five seven-

CAPTURE OF THE PEIHO FORTS AiVD PEKIiW 185

inch cables of bamboo that were buoyed from one side of
the river to the other. There was nothing now to pre-
vent her going into position. She fired a single gun
at the batteries on the south bank, evidently desiring to
recognize the courtes}- they had shown her, and then con-
centrated the force of her batteries on the northern forts,
which she completely silenced in less than twenty minutes.
Just as she had finished her work, two other French boats
came up to assist her, but their help was not needed.

In the meanwhile, the A7;//rt^c/ had followed close after
the Cormorant, and opened a furious fire on the forts on
the southern bank. Owing to her position she began her
work before the Cormorant reached the duty assigned to
her, and the Nimrod no doubt saved the Cormorant from
several shots by drawing them in her own direction. For
fullv fifteen minutes these two steamers were engasrine
all the forts on the southern bank without any assistance.
Very soon however, the four French gunboats came up,
two of them instructed to support the Cormorant and the
other two the Dragonne and the Avalanche. They were
considerably hindered by the strong tide which was then
running and by the sinuosities of the channel. The power
of these boats was not sufificient for such work and they
were decidedly clumsy in their movements, but as soon as
they were in position they fired away very accurately at
the forts. For fully an hour the Chinese retained their
positions at their guns, better than the English ofificers
had expected the}' would. Though not deficient in
bravery, they were not skilled in artillery practice, as
nearly all their shots passed high above the assailing ships.
The French boats lost four ofificers killed and two men,
probabh- due to the fact that the of^cers on the bridge or
poop of the boat were more exposed than the men. The
practice of the Chinese gunners does not make it easy to
silence a battery. It is their habit after discharging a gun
to retire into a bomb proof and await the enem}''s return

1 86 DECISIVE BATTLES SINCE WATERLOO.

shot ; when tliis is given, they wait a few moments, then
creep out as stealthily as possible, load and fire the gun
without exposing themselves, and then run back to the
bomb proofs. Of course, artillery practice of this kind is
very slow, but as the Peiho batteries had nearly one hun-
dred and fifty guns in position, they could do a good deal
of shooting when taken in the aggregate.

About an hour before noon the admirals, followed by
their gunboats, advanced up the river. The Chinese gave
them a liberal number of shots on the way; but very few
struck the vessels. The attention of the forts was drawn
toward the fleet scattered along the river, and the garrison
seemed totally unaware that the storming parties were
landing just above the line of forts, partially concealed by
the gunboats and smaller craft grouped together. They
were not aware that it was the custom of European sol-
diers to take batteries by assault, but supposed that a
battery was to be fired upon only on its front, where it
was best prepared to resist attack. To all appearances
they were completely surprised at the manoeuvre of the
outside barbarians, and as the distance was very small, the
men were inside the forts in a very short time. As the
leaders of the storming party sprang into the battery
there seemed to be a panic among all the defenders,
and a wild rush for safety followed immediately. The
storming parties chased the fleeing Chinese ; but the
latter were too swift for them ; terror added wings to
their flight, and in a few minutes not a Chinese soldier was
to be seen. Occasionally some of them halted as if to
show fight, but the gleam of the English sabres made
their hearts sink, and they renewed their flight with
greater precipitation than before.

Less than fifteen minutes after the first sailors and
marines landed, the whole garrison of the forts was dis-
persed. Their loss was not very great ; they fled so
quickly that there was little chance to harm any of them,

CAPTURE OF THE PEIHO FORTS AND PEKIN. 187

Once inside the batteries the officers perceived how com-
pletely the whole garrison might have been taken in a
trap, from which not a single man could have escaped. If
a reasonable force had been sent around to the village of

Takoo, the forts would have been completely under the
control of the invaders. A little farther away there w^ere
two entrenched camps, defended by some guns in posi-
tion, and also by a small force of cavalry. These camps
were flanked by the storming party, and their occupants
were immediately seized wnth the same panic that had
caused the garrison to flee so hastily. The artillery
found in the camps included four brass cannon {6Z-
pounders), ten or twelve iron guns, and some twenty-five
6-pounder light guns. Each battery was served and sup-
ported by not less than 1,000 men. There were many tents
and a good deal of camp equipage inside the entrenchment ;
but there was not much that was worth carrying away.

The Chinese government has a summary way of deal-
ing with its representatives who do not succeed in the
work assigned to them. This was the fate of the unfor-
tunate Tan, the Imperial Commissioner, who had been
instructed to drive out the barbarians and send them to
their homes, or, at least, to Canton. A few days later the
Pekin Gazette announced in the following terms the pun-
ishment of this unfortunate official :

" Whereas, Tan-Ting-Siang, already degraded from the
office of Governor-General of Chih-Li, has been found not
guilty of cowardice and desertion, but in that his opera-
tions were without plan or resource, his ofTence is not the
less without excuse. Let him be banished to the frontier
(confines of Siberia), there to redeem his guilt by his
exertions."

The 2 1 St of May was devoted to resting the men and
to an. inspection of the Chinese works and the villages
near them. On the 22d the fleet moved up the river, the
allied admirals taking the lead and the plenipotentiaries

1 88 DECISIVE BATTLES SINCE WATERLOO.

remaining behind in consequence of Lord Elgin's fear
that the presence of the cHplomats might complicate mat-
ters in case the admirals were obliged to use force in
reaching Tien-Tsin. The river was crowded with junks,
and the steamers had some difificult)' in forcing their way
through this floating barrier, but they managed to do so
without accident. After a few miles, a line of junks was
found stretching across the river and forming a regular
barrier which it did not take long to remove. Other bar-
riers of the same sort were encountered, and small groups
of cavalry came down to observe the strange vessels pro-
pelled by steam, which for the first time were making
the ascent of the Peiho. When fired upon the cavalrj'
invariably scampered away ; no forts were visible on this
part of the river, and the people did not seem inclined to
show any hostility.

On learning of the arrival of the allied fleet at Tien-Tsin
the Pekin government at once determined to send ambas-
sadors to treat for peace, and on the 29th May the pleni-
potentiaries, French and English, started from Takoo to
Tien-Tsin where they were to meet the Chinese represen-
tative. The negotiations consumed a month, the Chinese
using every artifice to secure delay and modif}- the condi-
tion which the foreigners were forcing upon them, while
the latter, knowing their strength, were disinclined to re-
cede from their demands. The Chinese commissioner,
Keying, said that the foreigners were holding a knife at
the throat of China and compelling her to do something
that was totally foreign to her wishes. While the ambas-
sadors would not admit the truth of this assertion, they
could hardly deny the fact except in a diplomatic sense.
Lord Elgin's diar}' shows that his private opinion on this
subject was materially different from the one he professed
in public. Personally he had a great deal of sympathy for
the Chinese, but ofificially he could do nothing else than
zzxry out the orders of his sovereign.

IQO DECISIVE BATTLES SINCE WATERLOO.

After the signing of the treaty the allies left Tien-Tsin
and proceeded down the river, greatly to the delight of the
imperial government, who feared that the ambassadors
would demand permission to visit Pekin and have a per-
sonal audience with the emperor. The ratification of the
treaty was delayed on various pretexts, and in a general
way matters did not run smoothly. In June, 1859, ^'I^-
Bruce, the British envoy, was stopped in the Peiho River
while on his way to Pekin. Admiral Hope attempted
to force a passage, but was repulsed with a loss of 81 killed
and about 400 wounded. The emperor had decided to
repudiate the treaty made with Lord Elgin the previous
year, and the forts had been put in a stronger condition
than ever before.

Mr. Bruce proceeded to Shanghai and waited instruc-
tions; the French minister did likewise, but the American
representative went to Pekin by a route indicated by the
Chinese commissioners; his reception was unsatisfactory,
as he refused to prostrate himself before the emperor, and
was therefore denied the privilege of seeing his Majesty.
Matters assumed a warlike phase ; the British and French
ministers were instructed by their governments to demand
an apology for the occurrences at the mouth of the Pei-
ho, to receive any friendly messages in a conciliatory
spirit, to decline any ceremonial unless it recognized the
equality of the governments, and to further inform the
Chinese government that force would be used if necessary
to secure acceptance of the terms proposed.

The ultimata of the two governments were delivered to
the Chinese government in March, i860, and in the follow-
ing month a reply was received definitely refusing the de-
mands of the English and French. Diplomacy having ex-
hausted itself nothing remained, but force. Lord Elgin and
Baron Gros arrived at Shanghai in June ; a miljtary and na-
val force was formed for the purpose of moving on Pekin,
and by the end of July every thing was ready. On the first

CAPTURE OF THE PEIHO FORTS AND PEKIN. 19I

day of Aug'ust a land force of five thousand men was
landed at the mouth of the Pehtang, a small stream which
reaches the sea about ten miles north of the mouth of the
Peiho. The forts of the latter, river had been greatly-
strengthened in the expectation that the foreigners would
seek an entrance by the river as in 1858 and 1859. Peh-
tang was found to be deserted, and consequently the
troops landed without opposition. Reinforcements ar-
rived steadily until the combined strength of the allies
exceeded 20,000 men.

Three weeks were consumed in getting ashore all the
material of war, provisions, etc., and making every thing
ready for an advance into the interior. The forts of the
Peiho were taken in the rear with but little opposition,
and Tien-Tsin was occupied on the 24th, under similar
circumstances. The Chinese were greatly surprised at the
failure of the allies to walk into the trap that had been set
for them, and some of their generals suggested that they
had not been fairly treated.

As soon as the allies were fairly in Tien-Tsin, the
Chinese showed a disposition to negotiate. Commission-
ers appeared from Pekin and said they had full power to
make terms of peace ; negotiations began and a treaty was
drawn, but when it was nearly ready for signatures the
commissioners said they could not stipulate that it would
be carried out unless it was ratified before signing. This
very unusual proceeding convinced the English and
French ambassadors that the Chinese were insincere in
their pretensions and only seeking to gain time. Accord-
ingly the order was given to march on Pekin, and very
speedily the army was in motion. Small bodies of Tartar
cavalry harassed the troops at various times, but practi-
cally there was little opposition and only trifling loss of
life or blood. While the army was in motion, new pro-
posals came from Pekin, and it was finally agreed that the
army should halt at Tungchow, twelve miles from the

192 DECISIVE BATTLES SINCE WATERLOO.

capital, and there wait the arrival of commissioners who
should have full power to negotiate without hindrance.

To make arrangements for the reception of the am-
bassadors at Tungchow, gain a camping-place, and
negotiate for provisions, the British consul, Mr. Parkes,
(afterwards Sir Harry Parkes), with 23 others, went forward
on the 2 1st of September, under a flag of truce, but soon
after they had passed the British lines the}' were seized
as prisoners, thrown into a filthy prison, and afterwards
carrried in cages to Pekin, where they were shown to the
populace by whom they were treated with the greatest
indignity. Two of the party. Captain Brabazoru and
Abbe De Luc were beheaded and their bodies were
thrown into the canal ; eleven others were either killed or
died from the effects of the treatment they received.
Those who survived were frequently at the point of death
by starvation or cruelty, and none of them ever expected
to see their friends again.

In consequence of the treacherous seizure of Mr. Parkes
and his party, the allies marched directly upon Pekin ; they
were resisted by the Chinese, and the resistance followed so
closely upon the violation of the flag of truce as to leave
no room for doubt of the faithlessness of the Pekin gov-
ernment. A battle ensued in which the Chinese were
completely routed, and then came another proposal to
halt to which no attention was given.

On Friday, October 5th, the English forces arrived at
the brick kilns, about three miles from the northeast
corner of the walls of Pekin, and there went into camp.
At daybreak, on the morning of the 6th, the advance was
renewed. Information had reached Sir Hope Grant, the
commander, that a large Tartar army was encamped near
the city, and had a strong defensive position quite close
to the walls. Sir Hope consequently made, a sweep to
the right, thus moving towards the city from the north,
in order to flank any works which might be in that locali-

CAPTURE OF THE PEIHO FORTS AND PEKIN. 1 93

ty. Although the precaution was an excellent one, it
turnd out that there was no occasion for it.

After a march of not far from two miles, the army
came to a halt in a level plain which was quite open — in
fact, more so than the rest of the region round about, on
which there are many clumps and clusters of trees.
Looking out for the tallest brick kiln, the general climbed
it, in order to ascertain the character of the plain, and
possibly get a sight of the Tartar army, which had not
yet made its appearance, not even by a skirmishing line.
The French army was on the left of the rear of the Eng-
lish, while the cavalry, with the single exception of a
squadron of Dragoon Guards, was on the right flank. The
roads were narrow and quite deeply sunken. They were
fairly passable for cavalry and infantry, but abominable for
any thing with wheels. Had the Chinese chosen to oppose
the advance, they could have given a great deal of trouble.
The sunken character of the roads would have made it
very difificult for troops to manoeuvre, and furthermore,
the numerous clumps of trees and the thick brushwood
would have furnished concealment for skirmishers, even
had they been armed with nothing better than the Chinese
match-locks. A careful watch was kept, and occasionally it
was whispered along the line that the Chinese were drawn
up in front, and a battle was near at hand. After a time
the rumor proved to be correct, as a line of Tartar troops
really appeared in front of the advancing column. The 60th
Rifles were deployed into a skirmishing line in the hope
of outflanking the Tartars, but the deployment had not
been completed before the brave defenders of their coun-
try disappeared as though they had melted into thin air.

During the time the English were advancing upon the
city the French were at the famous summer palace, Yuen-
Min-Yuen, about six miles away, which they reached by a
flanking movement in the rear of the English. The latter
continued their advance towards the city, while the

194 DECISIVE BATTLES SINCE WATERLOO.

French were making themselves at home in the summer
palace. The English came in sight of Pekin when not
more than a half a mile from it. A long street shaded by
trees led from the suburb directly to one of the gates.
At the entrance to the long street there was a large Bud-
dhist temple, and around it was a strong wall at least
twelve feet high, and easily capable of defence. The gates
were closed and barred on the inside. No one appeared
to open them ; but a beam of timber was brought forward
and used as a battering-ram until the bars gave way.
There was no opposition to the entrance of the English.
Not a single Chinese soldier was in sight. Lord Elgin,
and his staff, and Sir Hope Grant, also accompanied by
his staff, made this gate their head-quarters. The artillery
head-quarters were outside of the gate, and the artillery
was parked close up in order to be in readiness on short
notice when it was wanted. General Grant changed his
head-quarters into a temple near by, leaving Lord Elgin
and his stafT in sole possession of the gate. The " Queen's
Own " regiment was ordered to a position half way to
the city gate, on the right of the street, and close to Sir
Robert Napier. The Fifteenth Punjaubee was a little
farther forward on the same street, and the Eighth held
the position of rear guard.

Preparations were made for an assault upon Pekin in
case it should be necessary to make one, in order to ob-
tain possession of the gate which had been demanded.
On the left front of the allied position there was a broad
open plain, about a mile and a half square, which was ordi-
narily used as a parade ground for the Tartar army.
Looking towards the city on the right this plain was bor-
dered by a broad road which led to the North or Anting
Gate. This was the gate of which the allies demanded
possession. Farther on, and to the left of the suburb,
was the magnificent Temple of the Earth, surrounded by
a strong wall eighteen feet high, which embraced an en-

CAPTURE OF THE PEIHO FORTS AND PEKIN. 1 95

closure fully a quarter of a mile square. The siege guns
were immediately brought up to this temple. This place
was about three hundred yards from the great wall of the
city, an admirable position for making a breach in case of
necessity. Work was pushed as rapidly as possible, and
the battery was completed in a few days. When every
thing was ready a proclamation was issued, in which the
allies threatened to shell the city unless the Chinese
surrendered the Anting Gate within twenty-four hours.
According to their custom, when the pressure is so great
that resistance is no longer possible, the Chinese surren-
dered. The proclamation was issued on the 12th of
November, and on the 13th the gate was given up, and
the British colors were hoisted above it.

While the English were securing the northern gate of
the city and preparing for an assault, the French were in
possession of the summer palace of Yuen-Min-Yuen,
about six miles from Pekin." Mr. Parkes and some of his
companions were restored to the British on the 6th Octo-
ber, under the impression that their return would induce
the hostile forces to retire, at least to Tungchow. The
ambassadors decided that the destruction of the summer
palace, while it would do little harm to the people, would
be a severe blow to the emperor and government, and
that nothing else they could do would be so effectual in
humbling Chinese pride. Accordingly the order was given,
and on the i8th October the palace, with all its vast
series of outbuildings, was destroyed by fire, after being
thoroughly looted by the French and English soldiers.
The French had by far the best of the looting, as they
were at the palace for several days before the English
joined them. The destruction of the palace has been
severely criticised ; but there is certainly excellent foun-
dation for the argument of the ambassadors. The Chinese
were directly informed that the destruction was in retalia-
tion for the murder of the prisoners who had been so

196 DECISIVE BATTLES SINCE WATERLOO.

treacherously taken while under a flag of truce. The
bodies of two of these victims of treachery, Mr. De Nor-
man and Mr. Bowlby, were buried with solemn services
in the Russian cemetery at Pekin on the day before the
destruction of Yuen-Min-Yuen.

Before the capture of the city the emperor fled to Mon-
golia, and left his brother. Prince Kung, to make terms
with the invaders. The prince was v6ry reluctant to ac
cept the terms offered by the ambassadors, and only
yielded when they threatened to destroy the city. One
gate was placed in the possession of the English, and an-
other in the hands of the French, and the prince was
plainly told that he must come to a decision at once.
Under this pressure he ratified the treaty of Tien-Tsin,
which had been extorted two years before at the muzzle
of the allied cannon, and signed a new treaty, in which
there were additional humiliations for his country. The
emperor expressed his regref at the occurrence at the
Peiho forts; the right of England to keep a resident
minister at Pekin was acknowledged ; the Chinese paid
an indemnity of $15,000,000, and promised to keep the
peace faithfully in the future ; Tien-Tsin was opened to
trade ; Chinese were allowed freely to emigrate to the
British colonies; Kowloon, opposite Hong Kong, was
ceded to the British; and the immediate operation of the
treaty and convention was provided for.

Since March, 1861, Pekin has been the residence of the
foreign ministers ; embassies have been sent to foreign
powers ; and the empire so long secluded from the rest of
the world has been open to the visits of foreigners whether
in prosecution of commercial enterprises or in search of
health or pleasure. China has adopted many foreign in-
ventions and adapted them to her own use, and though
still conservative she is no longer isolated. Thp end of her
isolation may be fairly dated from the passage of the Peiho
forts in 1858 and the capture of Pekin two years later.

CHAPTER XII.

BATTLE OF SOLFERINO — 1 8 59.

In the revolutions which blazed over Europe in 1848,
Charles Albert, King of Sardinia, presented himself as
the champion of Italian independence. He gave military
aid to the insurgents in Lombardy, Parma, and Piedmont,
and refused offers of assistance from the French with the
reply that Italy would help herself. At first he was suc-
cessful and defeated the Austrians on the fields of Pas-
trenga and Goito, but later he was defeated at Custozza,
and forced into full retreat ; his reverses resulted in an
armistice, and on its expiration he renewed hostilities, re-
lying on the simultaneous attack of the Hungarians upon
the Austrians. On the 23d March, 1849, he was utterly
defeated at Novara, and the Austrian rule upon Italy was
confirmed and made stronger than ever before. The hope
which Italy had based upon his efforts was utterly lost ,
Charles Albert surrendered the crown to his son, Victor
Emanuel II., and retired to Oporto, where he died four
months after his abdication.

A statesman who had much to do with Sardinia's decla-
ration of war against Austria in 1848 and '9, was Camilio
Benso Cavour, better known as Count Cavour. In 1850
he was called to the Cabinet of Victor Emanuel, and two
years later was named President of the Council. All his
energies were bent in the direction of renewing the strug-
gle with Austria in the hope of uniting all Italy under
the rule of the king of Sardinia. By joining France,

197

IqS decisive battles since WATERLOO.

Turkey, and Eng^land in the war against Russia in 1854,
he gave Sardinia a place among the nations, and made
sure that she would be represented at any conference to
settle upon a treaty of peace. In conjunction with the
Marquis Villamarina, Count Cavour represented Sardinia
at the Treaty of Paris, in 1836, and during the conference
he succeeded in winning Louis Napoleon almost complete-
ly to his purposes. In consequence of Orsini's attempt
upon the life of the Emperor of the French, Cavour
caused Sardinia to enact a special law against " suspects."
The passage of this law was considered indicative of the
intimate relations existing between Sardinia and France ;
Austria endeavored to create a better feeling for herself
by a series of liberal measures and promises. Events in-
dicated that a triple alliance against Austria was being
formed by Russia, France, and Sardinia, and consequently
there was much uneasiness.

On New Year's Day, 1859, the foreign ambassadors in
Paris made their customarj' calls upon the emperor. The
latter received the Austrian representative with his usual
courtesy, and in the course of the interview said : " I re-
gret that our relations with your government are not as
good as formerly, but I beg of you to tell the emperor
that my personal sentiments for him have not changed."

These few words caused excitement in diplomatic cir-
cles all over Europe. Austria and France pushed their
preparations for war, and the Emperor of Austria replied
to Louis Napoleon in much the same terms that the lat-
ter had used on New Year's Day when speaking to the
Austrian ambassador. On the ^oth of January Prince
Napoleon was married to Princess Clothilde of Sardinia,
and immediately thereafter the Austrian armies in Italy
were increased, and the banks of the Ticino, the boun-
dary between Sardinia and the Italian provinces of Aus-
tria, were fortified. In March and April Sardinia and
France prepared for war ; Russia sought to intervene and

199

200 DECISIVE BATTLES SINCE WATERLOO.

proposed a Congress, but there were disputes regarding
the admission of Sardinia and nothing came of the pro-
posal. On the 23d April, Austria demanded that within
three days Sardinia should disarm, and dismiss the volun-
teers from other States ; Sardinia refused on the 26th,
and on the same day the Austrians crossed the Ticino.
The French troops which had been massing on the fron-
tier entered Piedmont on the 27th April, and on the Sth
of May Napoleon III. made formal declaration of war,
announcing his purpose to be nothing more than the ex-
pulsion of the Austrians from Italy.

For some two or three weeks there were no actual hos-
tilities, the Austrians being occupied with plundering the
part of Italy they had entered, and the French using
every exertion to bring up their troops and make ready
for battle. The Austrian left wing was defeated near
Montebello on the 20th May ; on the 31st May and ist
June the Austrians were again worsted at Palestro and
driven across the Ticino. On the 4th June was fought
the battle of ]\Iagenta,in which the Austrians were routed
with a loss of about 20,000 (including 7,000 prisoners\
the French losing about 7,000 killed and wounded. The
Austrians took up a position along the line of the Mincio ;
the armies of Austria and France were commanded by
their emperors in person, and for the next twenty days
they were manoeuvred in such a way as to bring them in
collision at Solferino, whose battle-field has become his-
toric.

On the 23d of June 151,000 French and Sardinians
stood facing 160,000 Austrians, the latter having 650 guns
and the former nearly as many. The Austrian right and
centre occupied strong defensive positions, their left wing
standing on a plain waiting to begin the attack. It was
intended, since the opportunity seemed to be offered, to
push the French out of their encampments beyond the
Chiese and up to the base of the mountains. A consider-

BATTLE OF SOLFERINO. 20I

able portion of the ground between the Chiese and the
Mincio was level and full of earthworks and strong posi-
tions; the remainder was a plain or slightly undulating
land, covered with vineyards, small gardens, cornfields, and
orchards of fruit-trees. The more broken ground behind
this position extends from Volta to Sonato, closing
around the plain in a half-circle. Just above the hills
rises the village of Solferino. The plain is broken by fis-
sures in many places, which interfere with the rapid
movement of troops. There are also many long stone
walls bounding the farms.

The only place for manoeuvring large bodies of troops
is the plateau of San Martino, which is seen in the dis-
tance, and its northern and western sides are so steep as
to render it a very powerful position. A valley running
to the south of Solferino widens into a marsh. The high-
ways from Castiglione and Carpendolo extend along the
hills, and not far off is the square between Pozzolengo,
Volta, Medola and Rivoltella, the field where the battle
of Castiglione was fought in 1796.

At daybreak on the 24th the French and Sardinians
broke up their encampments, marching in close array.
The 1st corps, commanded by Marshal Baraguey
d'Hilliers, was to attack the Austrians in their position on
the heights of Solferino ; the 2d corps, which was to
advance on the village, had been on the way since three
o'clock, in the morning. The 1st division was ordered
to support the right wing of the 2d ; it started at four
o'clock, moving on towards Castiglione. The ist division
was to be followed by the 3d, which was not to move
from Esenta before six o'clock. A great deal of time was
lost in these movements, in consequence of the rugged
nature of the ground to be crossed and the lack of knowl-
edge of the plans and positions of the Austrians. The
1st division under General Forey encountered the Aus-
trian outposts near the little town of Fontana and forced

202 DECISIVE BATTLES SINCE WATERLOO.

them back. When the 5th Austrian corps learned defi-
nitely that the French were moving up, they took position
on the western edge of Solferino. In attempting to carry
the hills in front of that point, the French found that the
Austrians were in front in great strength ; they were re-
pulsed with heavy loss, and the 3d corps was stopped also
close by Casa Morino, a very strong farm-house on the
road between Medola and Solferino.

The 2d French corps then formed in readiness for bat-
tle without trying to advance farther to the front. Mar-
shal MacMahon sent couriers to head-quarters to report
that he was in front of the entire Austrian army in posi-
tion on the line of Solferino to Carriano. He did not
dare to risk an attack, and therefore remained in position
waiting for orders from the emperor and for information
regarding the whereabouts of the 4th corps, which he de-
pended on to cover his right flank. This corps had start-
ed from Carpendolo at three o'clock taking the road to
Medola. It was temporarily commanded by General Niel,
and had at the end of a two-hours' march encountered
some squadrons of Uhlans who were speedily driven back.
When the Austrian commander learned that the French
were advancing in full strength on Medola, he dispatched
two brigades to oppose them. Marshal Canrobert, com-
manding the 3rd corps, was to go into camp at Medola,
but to avoid crossing the lines of the 4th corps he left the
direct line of advance and proceeded by a long and cir-
cuitous route around Acqua Fredda and Castel Goffredo.
When the 3d corps haci crossed the Chiese near Visano
they encountered a regiment of hussars whom they drove
back.

Marshal Canrobert wanted to go to the support of the
4th corps, and on learning that General Luy's division
was menaced on its flank he turned his command towards
Ceresana, but was delayed by the Chiese, whose crossing
consumed two hours. The three Piedmontese divisions

BATTLE OF SOLFERINO. 203

were on the extreme left of the front of the allied army.
These divisions were making a reconnoissance of the fields
between Lake Garda and Pozzolengo towards Peschiera,
and seeing the Austrians posted on a ridge they advanced
to attack them. At first they drove them back, but a re-
inforcement of Austrians came up and the Piedmontese
in their turn were compelled to retire. General Benedek
had 25,000 men occupying a large expanse of country.
Two brigades were at some distance from the main
body, but the Piedmontese made no attempt to take
advantage of this insecure position. When General Bene-
dek had dispersed their advance guard he sought to
cut off their line of retreat, but General Mollard coming
on with the 3d Piedmontese brigade took up the fight
and marched to the attack on San Martino. The steep
height was twice scaled by 6,000 Piedmontese and
twice they were driven back, followed and crowded upon
Rivoltella, thus losing all the advantages they had pre-
viously gained.

While these encounters were taking place Marshals
MacMahon and Baraguey d' Hilliers notified head-quarters
that the Austrians were throwing out heavy columns on
the hills of Solfcrino and Carriano. Therefore the em-
peror left Montichiaro and took a new position at Cas-
tiglione, accompanied by his staff and personal escort. The
advancing columns of the French were spread out at too
great a distance to render one another any effective sup-
port. The 3d corps was sent to support the 4th corps
and to stop an Austrian corps which was marching from
Mantua upon Ossola. The 2d Piedmontese division
turned from the Solferino road to find their 3d and 5t]i
divisions defeated at San Martino, but their assistance was
of no avail as the ranks were already badly broken and
scattered.

Marshal Baraguey d' Hilliers, thus unsupported on his
left wing and menaced on his right makes ready for the

204 DECISIVE BATTLES SINCE WATERLOO.

assault on the formidable works of Solferino. Upon the
result of this assault will depend the issue of the battle.
One brigade under General Forey moves into the plain
while another is ordered to occupy a position on the
heights against Solferino village, with the voltigeurs
of the Guard in readiness to support them. The artiller)-
of the Guards is unlimbered in front of the Austrian po-
sition, at a distance of 300 yards. The Imperial Guards
rest on a line with General Forey's division.

It is now eleven o'clock. This twofold assault, properly
aided by the reserve artillery of the ist corps together
with the three columns resting on Monte Fenile, ought to
make success certain on the centre of the line. The Em-
peror of Austria had likewise transferred his head-quar-
ters, going to Volta, where he learned that the French had
begun the attack in earnest. At 9.12 A.M. he issued the
following command :

*' General Slick, the commander of the 2d army, is to hold
Solferino as long as he ran. The 8th corps, after folding
back the Piedmontese upon Lake Garda, will send detachments
in support of the 3d corps. The ist army will keep its direc-
tion and disengage the centre attacked by the enemy."

The 2d brigade of Forey moves forward at a double
quick to climb the nearest height to the east of Solferino,
but it is driven back by superior numbers. After this re-
pulse General Maneque advances with 3 battalions of vol-
tigeurs. He is more successful, and drives the Austrians
upon the base of Monte Sacre, where a fierce battle is be-
ing waged. Forey with his 2d brigade finds it impossible
to turn the Austrian right flank at the tower of Solferino;
his ranks are cut by the shot and shell of Austrians who
stubbornly hold the position. The division of General
L'Admirault now advances to make its attack, which is
chiefly directed on the cemetery and on the castle, but this
also is met by a killing fire. The marshal now calls upon

205

2o6 DECISIVE BATTIES SINCE WATERIOO.

the Division Bazaine for aid, while the Austrians stand
waiting for their 2d corps, which never arrived.

Baraguey d'HiUiers perceives that progress from this
side is impossible ; accordingly he orders his men to attack
the cemetery from the rear, and the hill is taken at last.
While the 1st French corpc is actively engaged, the 2d
corps engages the ist Austrian corps. The Austrians
capture Cassiano and Carriano, threatening to cut off Mac-
Mahon's retreat. But success at Solferino gives the French
some men to spare. The assault is again taken up and the
Austrians are forced back. General Maneque holds his
position on the high ground of Monte Sacre and General
Noel advances on San Cassiano. Marshal MacMahon is
enabled to protect his flanks and even to assume the offen-
sive. About five o'clock a strong body of Austrian hussars
try to turn MacMahon's left. They advance at a charge
and force their way through some French cavalry patrols,
through a battalion of Decaen's division, and crowd back
some of the imperial cavalry, but do not succeed in break-
ing the French line.

When Marshal MacMahon learned that General Noel
intended to advance on Carriano, he took the offensive,
pushing forward the ist division on Solferino to join the
grenadiers protecting San Cassiano. General La Motte-
Rouge turning from the riglit of San Cassiano proceeded
to attack the Austrians who were strongly posted there.
The Chasseurs d'Afrique headed the column but were
driven back, and a second attempt had a similar result.

Even after losing his position at Solferino the Aus-
trian emperor hoped for victory. He believed that on
the plateau of Carriano the issue of the day might be
changed, and therefore he moved there with his head-quar-
ters. By a movement of General Wimpffen the 1st and
2d French corps w-ere separated ; the emperor then or-
dered Wimpffen to combine his forces on Castiglione and
to press the French as vigorously as possible. The Aus-

BATTLE OF SOLFERINO. 20/

trians moved towards Medola, but were held in check. The
9th Austrian corps attacked Casanuova but did not suc-
ceed in capturing it. Opposed to 45.000 French is a force
of 65,000 Austrians.

The key of the French position is Casanuova for which
they stubbornly contend. Marshal Niel, supported by
the 1st brigade of General Trochu, goes out towards Giu-
dizzolo, but is attacked by overpowering numbers, and is
on the point of being captured when three fresh battalions
come up and save him from defeat. It was four o'clock when
General Wimpffen was driven back and Niel was rescued ;
this advantage was obtained by a loss of 5,000 men killed
and wounded.

The Austrians could hold their positions no longer ;
their centre was scattered and their right wing in danger.
They formed a new line behind the Mincio, harassed by
MacMahon, General Benedek still maintained himself
at San Martino. The Piedmontese had suffered severely
at his hands, and he was threatening to turn the left of the
ist French. Baraguey d'Hilliers ordered General Mollard
to guard against the attack and support the French, but
before the blow was struck Benedek suddenly withdrew,
in obedience to a command from the emperor to follow
the army behind the Mincio.

It was now nine in the evening ; no enemy was in view on
the plain, and the French passed the night in bivouac on
the battle-field. The sun rose next morning on an awful
scene ; for all of the vast plain on which the two armies
had contended the day before was thickly strewn with
dead and wounded. The moans and cries of the wounded
were heard for miles around. The front of the battle ex-
tended nearly fifteen miles from the extreme ends. The
fighting was most severe at the village of Solferino, which
both parties considered the key of the position ; the loss
was heaviest at that point, but elsewhere it was far from
lisht.

208 DECISIVE BATTLES SINCE WATERLOO.

The losses of the French in the battle amounted to
12,000 killed and wounded of non-commissioned officers
and soldiers ; 150 commissioned officers were killed and
570 wounded ; 7 colonels and 6 lieutenant-colonels were
killed, and among the wounded there were the Generals
L'Admirault, Forey, Auger, Dieu, and Douay. The Sar-
dinian army had 5,525 killed, wounded, and missing, of
which 642 were killed. Of Sardinian oiTicers killed there
were 49, and 167 of^cers were wounded. The Sardinian
army captured five pieces of cannon ; the French took
thirty pieces of cannon, four flags, and 6,000 prisoners.
The Austrian losses were said to be 20,000 killed and
wounded, including 630 ofificers, while the prisoners,
missing, and stragglers were fully 10,000 more. The
Austrians retired beyond the Mincio and took up their
position under the shelter of their great quadrilateral of
fortesses, where it was considered doubtful if the French
would be able to contend Avith them successfully.

There was a pause in hostilities after the battle. Three
days were required for burying the dead who fell in the
conflict, but it was fully a week before the peasantry of the
country, who had been summoned for the work, had buried
or burned the carcases of the cavalry and artillerj^ horses
that strewed the ground for long distances. Negotiations
for an armistice were begun immediately, and on the 6th
July it Avas agreed upon. On the i ith of the same month
the two emperors met at Villafranca and signed the pre-
liminaries of peace. It was stipulated that Lombard}',
with the exception of the fortresses of Mantua and Pes-
chiera, should be ceded to Sardinia ; Venetia was to re-
main in possession of Austria ; the restoration of the
Grand Duke of Tuscany and the Duke of Modena were
stipulated ; and an Italian confederation was proposed to
be formed.

The defeat of the Austrians at Solferino was the founda-
tion of the united Italy of later days. Within less than a

BATTLE OF SOLFERIXO.

209

year after the memorable battle came the revolutions
which preceded the solemn proclamation of Victor Eman-
uel as King of Italy, and a few months later the flight of
Francis II. to Gaeta and the capture of that stronghold
gave the new ruler the control of the southern part of the
peninsula. France was compensated for her part in the
war of 1859 t>y the cession of Savoy and Nice ; later events
(in 1866 and '70), which will be considered elsewhere, com-
pleted the work of unification, and produced the " Italia
Irridenta " which was the dream of Cavour and for centu-
ries the ardent hope of millions of his countrymen.

CHAPTER XIII.

BATTLE BETWEEN THE MONITOR AND THE MERRIMAC — ■

1862.

The battle that was fought in Hampton Roads on the
9th March, 1862, was the first encounter of iron-clad ships
of war. It revolutionized the navies of the world and was
the death-knell of the " wooden walls " that had ruled the
ocean for centuries.

Down almost to i860 all nations had relied upon
wooden ships for their navies ; a few iron ships had been
constructed, but the models had not materially changed
from those of half a century earlier. There was a ten-
dency to reduce the number of decks, and it was evident
that the great four-deckers of form.er times were to be set
aside for ships more easy of manceuvring. The paddle
had made way for the screw as a means of propulsion.
With paddle engines a portion of the machinery was ex-
posed to an enemy's shot, while with a screw steamer
every thing was below the water level ; besides, the screw
left the whole broadside free for fighting or other pur-
poses, which before was considerably enroached upon by
the paddle-boxes. The general shape of the ship was the
same as of old, and for cruising purposes most war ships
made use of their sails far more than steam.

The idea of protecting the sides of vessels with ar-
mor of some kind is very old, dating almost as far back
as the invention of gunpowder. Indeed some of the Ro-
man galleys and other vessels before gunpowder was

210

MONITOR AND MEKKIMAC. 211

thought of had their sides protected with leather, cordage,
wooden beams, heavy planking, or with plates of iron,
brass, or other metals. Floating batteries with armored
sides were used in the siege of Gibraltar in 1782, and other
batteries were constructed at different epochs. The first
steam vessel of war was built by Robert Fulton for the
United States government ; she was launched in October
1814 and completed in the following \-ear. Her sides are
said to have been protected by thin plates of iron, but
they were doubtless not sufificienth' thick to entitle her to
be classed as an armored ship.

In 1826 an anonymous French writer proposed the con-
struction of iron or iron-clad war-ships, their walls being
sufficiently thick to resist the cannon-shot of those days.
Some experiments were made in France in 1834 to ascer-
tain the resisting power of iron against shot and shell, and
for several years the proposals for building armored ships
were much discussed both in France and England. In
1S42 Robert L. Stevens of New Jersey proposed to the
United States government to construct iron-clad steam
batteries which should be capable of going to sea and able
to resist artillery projectiles. It was decided to construct
one battery upon Stevens' plan, but work was not com-
menced upon it until 1854. The battery was never com-
pleted, and in 1874 it was sold at auction.

The English government made several experiments
with armor plating, but the conclusions were unfavorable
to its adoption. To France belongs the credit of the first
iron-plated steam frigate of the first class. In the Crimean
war she constructed and used four small gun-boats with
armor plating ; in March, 1858, work was begun on La
Gloirc, a sea-going frigate carrying thirty-six guns, and
protected amidships with plates of iron four and a half
inches thick, with a backing of two feet of solid timber.
La Gloire was the precursor of the iron-clad fleet of
France, and virtually of the iron-clad fleets of all nations

212 DECISIVE BATTIES SINCE WATERLOO.

of the globe. Shortly after she Avas begun the French
laid the keels of the Normandie and the Invincible on the
same plans. England could not afford to lie idle under
these circumstances; her naval authorities ordered the
building of the Warrior and shortly afterwards of the
Black Prince, Defence, and Qticen.

In 1861 the seizure of the lower Mississippi by the
Confederates rendered the construction of armored ships
a necessity, and it was undertaken, not by the Navy, but
by the War Department. The first of the iron-clad gun-
boats were designed and built by James B. Eads, an engi-
neer of St. Louis, and in a very short time he turned out
the St. Louis, Carondelet, Cairo, Louisville, Mound City,
PittsbiirgJi, Cinciimati, and Benton. These boats were
plated with iron 2^ inches thick on a backing of 4 inches of
wood placed at an angle of 45 degrees in order to glance
off horizontal shot ; they were not impenetrable to heavy
guns, but were safe against field-batteries and smaller
cannon, and did excellent service in the work for which
they were intended. Several other boats of the same
kind were built during the course of the war.

Early in 1861, Norfolk, Virginia, was abandoned by the
national government and occupied by the Confederates,
The retiring garrison set the navy-yard on fire in several
places, and much valuable property was destroyed, includ-
ing several ships. The steam frigate Mcrriniac was par-
tially burned and then sunk ; she was of 3,500 tons burth-
en, and carried forty guns. After her hull had lain for
several w'eeks under the water, one of the Confederate
naval officers proposed to raise her and convert her into
an iron-clad gun-boat. The plan was approved by the
Navy Department. The Merrimac was raised and cut
down to her old berth deck, and at each end of the ship
seventy feet of distance was covered over, so that it was
only a few inches above the surface of the water when
the Merrimac was ballasted for fighting. She was re-

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214 DECISIVE BATTLES SINCE WATERLOO.

named the Virginia, but as she has gone into history by
her old appellation she will be called the Mcrrimac
throughout this brief history of her performances.

On the midship section of the Mcrrimac her new de-
signer placed a structure somewhat resembling the roof
of a house. It was 175 f^et long, and 7 feet clear in
height, A\hilst its width was flush with the sides of the
hull. This roof sloped at the sides and ends at an angle
of 45 degrees; it was of pine and oak, 24 inches thick,
and had a plating of iron on the outside 4 inches thick,
in two layers of 2 inches each. The sides of the roof
were straight, but the ends were rounded so as to give a
wide sweep to the bow and stern guns. At the top there
was a flat surface about 20 feet wide, covered with a grating,
which admitted air and light to the interior of the en-
closed space. The prow was fitted with a beak for ram-
ming purposes ; the engines were the engines of the old
MerriiJiac ; the smoke-stack or chimney rose in the centre
of the armored space, and the pilot house was at the for-
ward end and covered with 4 inches of iron at the same
angle as the sides.

The armament of the Merriuiac consisted in all of ten
guns. There were two 7-inch rifles for the bow and stern
pivots, two 6-inch rifles, and six smooth-bore broadside
guns. The ship drew 22 feet of water, and was very slow
and unwieldy. The maximum of her speed under her new
conditions did not exceed five knots an hour, and with her
great length it took fully half an hour to turn her around.
There were many delays in fitting her out, owing partly to
the great demand for war material of all kinds, and part-
ly in consequence of the inexperience of everybody con-
cerned. It was not until the 7th of March that the
Mcrrimac was cast loose from the dock and started down
Elizabeth River on what was supposed by many specta-
tors to be only a trial trip. She was commanded by Flag
Officer Franklin Buchanan, and her executive and ord-

MONITOR AND ME R RIM AC. 21$

nance officer was Lieutenant Catesby Jones. She had a
full staff of officers and a crew of 300 men.

Let us now look at the Monitor, which was so soon to
be the antagonist of the Merriviac.

On the 3d August, 1861, the Congress of the United
States enacted a law directing the Secretary of the Navy
to appoint a board of three naval officers to investigate
plans and specifications for iron-clad steamships or bat-
teries, and in case of a favorable report by the board, the
Secretary was authorized to cause one or more armored
steam-batteries or steamships to be built. The sum of
$1,500,000 was appropriated to pay the cost of the experi-
ment. Many plans were offered, but only three were ac-
cepted by the naval board, the others being rejected for
various reasons.

The first place on the list was given to the proposal of
Captain John Ericsson, of New York, and on the approv-
al of Congress a contract was made for the construction
of a battery on this novel plan. The contract stipulated
for the completion of the battery within lOO days from
the signing of the contract (October 5, 1861), and the
extraordinary provision was introduced, that the test of
the battery, upon which its acceptance depended, should
be its withstanding the fire of the enemy's batteries at the
shortest ranges, the United States agreeing to fit out the
vessel with men, guns, etc.

The following is a detailed description of this vessel ;
it will interest the nautical, naval, or historical student,
and may be skipped by the indolent or unscientific reader.
It was written at the time the vessel was delivered to the
United States Government, March 5, 1862.

The hull is formed by two distinct parts, a lower and upper,
both of which are flat-bottomed ; the lower one built of -|-inch
iron, 124 feet long, 34 feet wide at the top, and 6| feet deep.
The sides incline at an angle of about 51 degrees with a verti-
cal line, and terminate in sharp ends, the bow projecting and

2l6 DECISIVE BATTLES SINCE WATERLOO.

coming to a point at an angle of 80 degrees. Tlie upper hull
is 174 feet long, 41 feet 4 inches wide, with perpendicular sides
5 feet high. It juts over the lower hull on each side 3 feet 7
inches, and at each end 25 feet. The sides of this portion are
built of white oak, 2\ feet thick, covered with 6 inches of iron
plates on the outside, and a |-'nch plating of iron within ; the
object of the latter being to arrest splinters in case of a ball
penetrating the sides. The top is covered with a bomb-proof
flat deck unprotected by any railing or bulwark. This deck
consists of oak beams, 10 inches square and 26 inches apart,
covered with 8-inch plank, and this with 2 layers of iron, each
an inch thick. The draught of water is 10 feet, leaving only
iS inches above the surface. The projecting ends of the up-
per hull serve as a cover for the propeller and rudder in the
stern and the anchor in the bow. The former are entirely out
of reach of shot ; and the latter is carried in the upper hull,
from which it is readily lowered, and into which it is hoisted
again by men working below, without any exposure or sign of
their movements on the outside. The lower hull is so situated
beneath the upper, that it can only be reached by a ball after
this has passed through at least 25 feet of water, and the incli-
nation of the sides would then prevent its penetration ; and
the upper is impregnable in its 6 inches of iron, backed with
30 inches of white oak, and the inner lining of -l-inch iron.

The prominent object upon the deck in the middle of the
boat is the turret or castle, a cylinder of 20 feet diameter
within, and 9 feet high, built of 8 thicknesses of i-inch plates,
bolted securely one over another with overlapping joints, and
lined with an additional layer of iron an inch thick, thus mak-
ing 9 inches in all. The weight of the turret is about 100
tons, and its support is a circular bed plate of composition
metal firmly secured to the deck. Upon this it is supported
except in time of action, when the weight is taken by a verti-
cal central shaft of iron, with which it is made to revolve as
desired, the motive power being a steam-engine specially de-
signed for this service, as also for working the blewers for the
fires, and for ventilation. On the top, the turret is covered
with iron beams and perforated iron, shell-proof. This, while

MONITOR AND MERRIMAC. 21/

it affords protection, admits the circulation of air necessary in
working the guns. Small sliding iron hatchways are also pro-
vided, to afford an entrance for the men through this portion.

The turret is constructed for two heavy guns, which con-
stitute the whole armament of the battery. They are placed
precisely parallel with each other, and both are directed out
the same side of the turret. Those selected for the first trial
were ii-inch Dahlgren smooth-bore guns, carrying i68 lb.
round shot. Some wrought-iron shot were provided for the
first encounter, but their use was forbidden for fear of their
bursting the guns, by reason of their weight, being 15 lbs.
greater than that of the shot used in proving the guns. The
port-holes are circular openings, 3 feet above the deck, just
large enough to admit the muzzle of the gun, and kept closed
by a sliding shutter, managed on the inside, and removed only
when the gun is run out to be fired. The gun-carriages are of
wrought iron and run on slides very accurately constructed.
The sighting of the guns was designed to be not over their
line through the port-holes ; but four holes were pierced
through the turret at the height of the eye for telescopes, and
just outside of the holes reflectors were fixed, which bent the
ray of light coming in a direction parallel with the guns
through the axis of the telescope. In action, however, the
ordinary mode of sighting was adopted.

The turret is caused to revolve to the right or left, by the
movement of a small wheel which controls the action of the
steam, and is turned by the gunner or his assistants, and a
scale is provided by which the elevation of the guns is also
adjusted. When ready for firing, the shutter is triced up by
the gunner, the piece is run out, fired, and instantlv returns by
the recoil, a friction clamp upon the sides of the ways arresting
it at any desired point. On this side of the turret is an addi-
tional thickness of iron plating of sbout 3 inches.

The pilot or wheel-house, as originally constructed, was
a square box formed of bars or beams of wrought iron, 9 inches
by 12, interlocked at the corners, and covered with heavy pla-
ting. Elongated horizontal apertures at the sides afford the
only look-out for the helmsman. These apertures may also be

2l8 DECISIVE BATTLES SINCE WATERLOO.

used as loopholes for musketry if desirable. In the place of
chimneys bomb-proof gratings are set in the deck, and through
these the smoke of the fires is driven out by the blowers ; low
temporary chimneys are however provided, which are removed
in time of action. The deck is thus entirely free of all incum-
brances, and the men who woik the vessel and handle the guns
are all entirely out of sight, beneath the invulnerable plating.
All access into the interior is securely shut off, so that if the
battery were boarded, the men could not be reached, and no
harm could be done the vessel itself. Its sharp and powerful
iron prow will enable it to sink with ease any wooden vessel
it can reach, and its light draught allows of its running into
shoal waters either for offensive operations or to retire, if
necessary, to a distance from more powerful vessels of deeper
draught. Her complement of men consists of 60 in all, of
whom 1 1 are officers. The battery is evidently designed for
harbor and river operations, and not for encountering heavy seas.

At the suggestion of Capt. Ericsson, her designer, the
new ship was named the j\Ionitor. Until the very hour
of her departure from New York the workmen were busy
upon her, and several things remained unfinished or in-
complete when she sailed. The government was aware of
the changes that had been made in the Merrimac, and
there was great anxiety to have the Monitor at Hampton
Roads at the earliest possible date. She left New York
in the forenoon of March 6th in tow of the tug-boat SctJi
Lozv and using her own engine. She was commanded by
Lieut. John L. Worden, and her executive officer was
Lieut. S. D. Greene. During her entire career of less than
a year Lieut. Greene remained the executive officer of
the Monitor, though she had in the same period no less
than five commanders. She had a full complement of
other officers, and her crew was selected from the crews of
the North Carolina and Sabine, then at the Brooklyn
Navy-yard.

The Monitor narrowly escaped foundering during her

MONITOR AND MERRIMAC. 219

voyage from New York to Fortress Monroe. On the 7th
March a light breeze sprang up and demonstrated the cor-
rectness of the theory that the Monitor was not adapted
for sea-going voyages. A great deal of water entered at
the base of the turret, and, to use the language of one of
her officers, " she leaked like a sieve." The water came in
through the holes of the blower-pipes, through the chim-
neys, and into the top of the turret and it even dashed
into the peep-holes of the pilot house with such force as
to knock the helmsman away from the wheel. The belts
of the blower engines slipped in consequence of their wet-
ting, and there was not sufficient draught for purposes of
combustion. Two officers and several men of the crew
were overcome by the noxious gases that formed in the
engine room, and narrowly escaped suffocation. At one
time the fires were nearly extinguished, the engine room
was half filled with water, and only the cessation of the
breeze saved the Monitor from going to the bottom of the
Atlantic before she had an opportunity to fire a single
shot at the enemy.

During the night of the 7th rough water was again en-
countered, and the same troubles arose. The darkness
added to the danger, and to make matters worse the wheel
ropes became jammed, and the hawser that connected the
Monitor with the tow-boat was the only safety of the former.
If it had given way she would have inevitably been lost.
At 4 A.M. on Saturda\-, March 8th, the Monitor passed
Cape Henry, and her crew heard the booming of the guns
that betokened trouble in the vicinity of Fortress Monroe,
about twenty miles distant. Capt. Worden immediately
ordered all preparations made for battle, and when the
Monitor anchored in Hampton Roads at nine o'clock she
was ready for earnest work.

It was about noon on the 8th of March when the Merri-
mac steamed down from Norfolk in the direction of the
Union fleet, which was anchored near Fortress Monroe and

220 DECISIJ'E BATTLES SINCE WATERLOO.

at Newport News, seven miles above. At the former
anchorage were the frigates Minnesota, Roanoke, and St.
Lawrence ; the first two being 40-gun steam frigates, and
the St. Lawrence a saiHng ship carrying 50 guns. Near
Newport News the Congress, 50 guns, and the Ciimbcrland,
30 guns, were anchored under the protection of the shore
batteries. Fire was opened on the Merrimac from these
vessels and the shore batteries, but the shot glanced off
without doing any damage. The Merrimac did not reply
until she was in short range, when, with a single dis-
charge from her forward pivot gun, she disabled the after
pivot gun of the Ciunbcrland. Then she passed near the
Congress and rammed the Cnviberland, making a great hole
in her side and admitting so much water that the ship
sank in little more than half an hour, carrying down many
of her crew. She continued to fight to the last, and some
of her guns were fired at the Merrimac just as the water
reached them. Her flag remained in its position after the
hull reached the bottom, fifty-four feet below the surface
of the water.

The Congress slipped her anchor and dropped her fore-
topsail, but in attempting to get away she ran aground.
She continued to fight for more than an hour after the
sinking of the Cnvdierland, the Merrimac choosing her
position about two hundred yards away and pouring in a
destructive fire as fast as her guns could be worked. Find-
ing the contest was hopeless, the commander of the Con-
gress ran up the white flag and the firing ceased.

Commander Buchanan ordered the gun-boats Beaufort
and Raleigh, that accompanied the Merrimac, to remove
the crew of the Congress, and then set her on fire, not
daring to risk the Merrimac in the shoal water where the
Congress had grounded. The Union batteries on shore con-
tinued their fire, so that the gun-boats could not perform
their allotted work without great danger. The Confeder-
ates reported that two ofificers of the Raleigh were killed

SCALC OF MILLS

PORTSMOUTH}:

SCENE OF THE BATTLE BETWEEN THE MONITOR AND MERRIMAC.

222 DECISIVE BATTLES SINCE WATERLOO.

while attempting to remove the wounded from the Con-
gress; accordingly the Confederate gun-boats retired, and
the crew of the Congress escaped to the shore by swimming
or were taken off in small boats. The Congress was then
fired by red-hot shot from the Mcrriviac and was soon in
flames. Commander Buchanan was wounded, and the
command of the Mcrrimac fell upon Lieutenant Jones.
The Merriniac had twenty men killed and wounded in the
action; her smoke-stack and steam-pipes were carried away,
and so were railings, boat-davits, and stanchions. But her
machinery was not damaged, none of her guns was dis-
mounted, and there were no serious injuries to her armor.

Sunset was approaching, and it was not deemed wise to
attack the Minnesota at that late hour of the day and with
the then condition of the tide, especially as she was
aground and they would be sure of their prey in the morn-
ing. Accordingly the Merriuiac steamed away to Nor-
folk, repaired her damages as much as possible, and pre-
pared for the work of the next day.

The intention was for the Merriniae to destroy the
Minnesota and then attack the other ships near Fortress
Monroe. She steamed in the direction of the Mimiesota,
and as she approached that vessel the Monitor came out
from behind the Minnesota's great hull and offered battle.
The "cheese-box on a raft " had such an insignificant ap-
pearance that it was thought she could be easily disposed
of. But as soon as the battle began the Merrimac' s com-
mander found the novel craft a most formidable foe. The
Monitor drew twelve feet of water and the Merriniac
twenty-three ; the former was able to choose her position,
while the Merriniac dared not venture where there was a
possibility of taking the ground. On two or three occa-
sions she touched bottom, but hung there only a few mo-
ments at a time.

The Monitor fired much more slowly than the Merriniac,
but her shot told with some effect, though they could

223

224 DECISIVE BATTLES SINCE WATERLOO.

not disable her antagonist. Each boat tried to ram the
other, but neither was successful. When the Merriviac
approached close to the Monitor with the intention of
sinking her by ramming, the latter fired twice, and partially
forced in the side of the Merrimacs shield, knocking
down several of her crew ; her executive of^cer said that
another shot at the same point would have penetrated
the side. The Monitor was hit repeatedly on the turret,
but with no other effect than to make several indentations.
Finding that no impression could be made in this way,
the commander of the Merrimac ordered her fire to be
concentrated on the Monitor s pilot house, and with very
good effect. One shot partially destroyed the pilot house
and disabled Captain Worden. He was blinded by the
force of the blow, and blood poured from his face. He
was thought at the time to be fatally injured, but he
recovered in a few weeks and returned to duty. After
Captain Worden was disabled, Lieutenant Greene took
command and held it through the rest of the fight.

The position of the pilot house was found inconv^enient,
for the reason that the guns in the turret could not be
fired directly ahead without the risk of hitting the pilot
house and knocking it to pieces. Subsequently it was
placed directly over the turret, and this was the position
of the pilot house in all the later ships of the Monitor
pattern. Lieutenant Greene, in an article in the Coitury
magazine, said that it was very dif^cult to maintain com-
munications with the pilot house, as the speaking-tube
between it and the turret was broken early in the battle.
Word was passed by the assistant paymaster and the
captain's clerk, but as both were landsmen, the nautical
phrases transmitted through them often became unintelli-
gible before reaching their destination.

In the turret it was dif^cult to make out the position
of the Merrimac ; marks had been placed on the deck,
before the action, to indicate the direction of bow and

MONITOR AND MERRIMAC. 22$

stern, and starboard and port, but these marks were
obliterated after a little while, so that the bearings were
unknown. At first there was considerable difficulty in
manipulating the turret, as the machinery did not work
smoothly, and when the marks alluded to were obliterated,
the only way of working was to load the guns and then
start the turret on its revolution until the M err imac zoxAdi
be seen through the port-holes. Then the shot would be
delivered, the gun run in, and the heavy shields over the
ports dropped to prevent the entrance of an enemy's shot
or shell.

The orders to Captain Worden were to defend the
Minnesota and not to pursue the Merriniae, if such pursuit
should leave the Minnesota exposed. Consequently, the
Monitor refused to go far away from the latter ship, and
she declined all efforts of the Merriniae to draw her in the
direction of Sewall's Point, where the Confederate land
batteries were ready to pour their iron storm upon her.
The fight between the Monitor and the Merrimac lasted
from eight in the morning until two in the afternoon, when,
finding it impossible to destroy the Minnesota or reach
the other Union ships near Fortress Monroe, the Merri-
mac retired. Though not disabled she was leaking badly,
her machinery was difficult to manage, her ammunition run
low, and her crew were quite worn out with two days of
fighting. In obedience to her orders, the Afonitor remained
that night near the Minnesota, Captain Worden being
sent on a tug to Washington for medical treatment. The
next day was a day of rest, as the Merrimae did not
appear.

The Confederates claimed that the battle was a drawn
one so far as the two ships were concerned, as neither ves-
sel had disabled or captured the other. The officers of
the Monitor claimed that they had won a great victory, as
they had beaten off the Merriniae and totally prevented
her continuing the work of destruction which she began

226 DECISIVE BATTLES SINCE WATERLOO.

the day before. Undoubtedly the ad\'antages of the day's
fighting were with the Monitor, as she saved the fleet of
wooden ships from destruction and utterly checked the
course of Confederate victory.

During the next two months the JMonitor lay in Hamp-
ton Roads carefully guarding the entrance of Chesapeake
Bay, or rather preserving it against any raid of the Mcri'i-
mac. Twice in these two months the Merriuiac came out
of Elizabeth River in the evident hope of provoking a
battle, but she did not venture as far as the Monitor s an-
chorage.

The commander of the Monitor had positive orders not
to venture into the shoal water above Hampton Roads
where the Union fleet could not support her, and the
Merriniac had equally positive orders from the Confed-
erate Navy Department not to go beyond a certain point,
through fear that she might be disabled by the fire of the
forts where no aid could reach her.

Norfolk was evacuated early in May, 1862, and as the
Merrimac drew too much water to ascend the James River,
her commander ordered her destruction ; the crew escaped
to the shore and the vessel was burned and blown up.
And so ended the Merrimac.

The Monitor afterwards had a brief engagement with
the fortifications at Drewry's Bluffs. She was unable to
silence the guns or destroy the earthworks, but on her part
she suffered no damage. In December, 1862, she was
thoroughly repaired and ordered to Beaufort, North Caro-
lina, in tow of the steamer Rhode Is/and. On the night of
December 30th she went down at sea in a gale ; forty-nine
ofificers and men were saved by the boats of the steamer,
but four officers and twelve men were drowned. Lieut.
Greene said it was impossible to keep her clear of water,
and the ofificers thought that the two hulls had become
separated by the bumping of the heavy sea.

Though the Monitor was the design of Capt. Ericsson,

MONITOR AND MERRIMAC. 22/

her important feature, the turret, was the invention of
another head than his. In 1841 Theodore R. Timby made
a model of an iron turret, and two years later he filed a
caveat in the U. S. Patent Ofifice " for a revolving metallic
tower, and for a revolving tower for a floating battery to
be propelled by steam." In the same year (1843) he made
and exhibited an iron model which combined all the es-
sential principles of his invention, and a short time later
another which he sent to the Emperor of China at the
hands of the American ininister, Mr. Gushing. A com-
mittee of Congress made a report to the Secretary of War
in 1848, recommending the adoption of the Timby system.
Nothing was done in the matter until the outbreak of the
civil war, when Timby brought out a new model and secured
a patent for " a revolving tower for offensive and defensive
warfare, whether used on land or water." His original
plan was for a revolving turret 40 feet in diameter, to be
pierced for six guns and to make a complete revolution in
one minute, the guns to be fired as they came in range of
the object to be reached. In accordance with this plan a
shot would be delivered ev^ery ten seconds. The construc-
tors of the Monitor recognized the validity of Mr. Tim«
by's claim and paid him liberally for the right to use his
invention.

In England in 1855 Captain Cowper Coles invented and
patented a cupola or turret which was afterwards applied
to the war steamer Royal Sovereign, a wooden vessel origi-
nally built as a three-decker. Owing to the fact that the
Royal Sovereign was not purposely built for use as a turret
ship, the new principle was tried under disadvantages ; in
1864 she was put out of commission and ordered to be
placed among the reserved ships, although many ofificers
contended that she was then the most powerful ship in the
British navy. In 1866 Lord Derby's government ordered
the construction of four iron-clad turret ships of 4,000
tons burthen each and corresponding steam power. The

228 DECISIVE BATTLES SINCE WATERLOO.

Monarch, the iirst of the British iron-clad turret-ships, was
launched in 1868, and the Captain shortly after the Moji-
arcJi. By some naval experts the Captain was thought to
be top-heavy, and this opinion was verified by her capsizing
and foundering off Finisterre on the 7th September, 1870.
Four hundred and seventy-two lives were lost, including
that of Captain Coles, her designer. She was overturned
in a heavy squall and went down in three minutes ; her
overturning was caused by her very low freeboard and the
great weight of her masts, hurricane, deck, and turret. In
1866 the Monadnock, one of the American monitors, made
the voyage from New York to San Francisco, by way of
the Straits of Magellan, and in the same year another of
these vessels, the Miantonoiiwh, crossed the Atlantic and
went to Cronstadt, returning safely to the United States.
It was thus demonstrated that turret ships were capable
of making long sea voyages ; since that time many sea-
going iron-clads have been constructed by most of the
European nations, and their success is fully established.

Probably no naval conflict in the history of the world
ever attracted as much attention as did the battle in
Hampton Roads, between the Monitor and th.Q Merrijnac.
It revolutionized the navies of the world, and showed that
the wooden ships, which had long held control of the
ocean, were of no further use for fighting purposes.
Commenting upon the news of that event, the London
Times said : " Whereas we had available for immediate
purposes one hundred and forty-nine first-class war ships,
we have now two, these two being the Warrior and her
sister Ironside. There is not now a ship in the English
navy, apart from these two, that it would not be madness
to trust to an engagement with that \\tt\Q Monitor.'' Eng-
land and all other maritime powers immediately proceeded
to reconstruct their navies, and the old-fashioftd three and
four-decker line-of-battle ships were condemned as useless.
Not only in ships, but in their armament, there was rapid

MONITOR AND MERRIMAC.

229

progress, and so great has been the advance in marine
artillery that the Monitors of 1862, and the subsequent
years of the American war, would be unable to resist the
shot from the guns of iSSo-'S/. The most recent war
steamers of England, France, Russia, and Italy are claimed
to be as great an improvement upon the American Moni-
tors as were those vessels upon their wooden predecessors.

CHAPTER XIV.

BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG — 1 863.

It is not our purpose to trace the causes of the civil
war in the United States of America, in the years from
1 86 1 to 1865, a war which deluged the land with blood
and brought mourning into many thousands of homes
from one end of the country to the other. Each side
battled for what it believed to be the right, and each dis-
played, valor, determination, and heroism, that will for-
ever be the pride of all Americans, without distinction of
creed or party. From its commencement in 1861 the
war progressed with varying fortunes until the event of
which this chapter treats.

With its smaller population and its limited resources,
the South had been compelled to see the war confined
to its own area. In the West the Union armies had
steadily advanced into the Southern territory ; in the
East the ports of the South were blockaded, while
the land forces chiefly confined their operations to Vir-
ginia, one of the foremost of the slave-holding States,
and an ardent supporter of the cause of secession.
In September, 1862, the Confederate army of Northern
Virginia crossed the Potomac with the intention of invad-
ing the Northern States, but the result of the battle of
Antietam, in Maryland, caused its commander. General
Lee, to retreat to Virginia, and abandon, for the time, his
cherished design.

Early in June, 1863, General Lee had again decided on

2",0

BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG. 23 1

a campaign which was to give the Northern States a taste
of the horrors of war. Hitherto the fighting had all been
on Southern soil, but now it was to be carried straight
into the heart of Pennsylvania, amid the rich farms and
prosperous towns of that sober commonwealth. Instead
of waiting for the Army of the Potomac under Fighting
Joe Hooker to attack him, Lee proposed to dodge it, and
to push forward towards Maryland by the valley of the
Shenandoah. If he could conceal his movements for
some time from the national army he might be able to
get well on his way before ef^cient measures could be
taken to oppose him. His plan was to detain the Union
army before Fredericksburg by a large display of troops,
then to turn its right wing and push up the Shenandoah
Valley under cover of the Blue Ridge Mountains.

He had a veteran army on which he could depend, its
effective force being some 80,000 men, of whom 68,352
were infantry. This was about the strength of the
army under Hooker. The armies were thus equal, but
Lee had one great advantage, he had absolute authority
and could do what he saw was best at the moment, while
Hooker was continually hampered by orders from Wash-
ington.

On June 3d Longstreet's ist division moved forward
into the Wilderness, and the other divisions followed
closely, until on the evening of the 7th, the ist corps had
reached the neighborhood of Culpepper Court-House.
Ewell's 2d corps started in the same direction on the
4th. Gen. A. P. Hill's 3d corps was the only one left
to occupy the positions where the army had passed the
winter, and it had to string out very thinly in order to
conceal the departure of two thirds of the army.

These great movements could not entirely escape the
•attention of the Unionists, but they were at a loss to
know what was on foot. Hooker believed that Lee in-
tended to resume the campaign of the preceding year,

232 DECISIVE BATTLES SINCE WATERLOO.

and to push forward over the Rappahannock to Manassas.
Beheving that Lee's army was stretched along the Cul-
pepper road he determined to attack the weakened line at
Fredericksburg. Two pontoon bridges were thrown over
the river at Franklin's Crossing, and on June 6th Howe's
division crossed. Hill's corps advanced in opposition and
Lee prepared to recall Ewell if he found it necessar)\
When Hooker saw this display of force he checked his
advance, and failed to learn how small was the force op-
posed to him. Learning that the Confederate cavalr}'
under General Stuart was stationed at Culpepper, Howe
determined to make a cavalry reconnoissance on a large
scale in that direction. His object was to learn whether
Stuart meditated a raid or was trying to cover the move-
ments of infantry. In the meantime Longstreet arrived
at Culpepper and joined Stuart.

Lee's plan of invasion was now in full operation.
Stuart was to conceal the movements of the infantry by
menacing the Unionists near Warrenton, while the army
was to proceed to the northwest by way of Sperryville
and Thornton's Gap and so reach the valley of the Shen-
andoah. This would leave the Union army in the rear.

At daybreak of the 9th, Pleasanton's two columns,
seven thousand five hundred cavalry and three thousand
infantr}% crossed the Rappahannock. The Confederates,
deeply occupied with their own plans, and suspecting
nothing, w^ere taken by surprise, and Stuart narrow^ly es-
caped losing his artillery. He was driven back and lost
his baggage, and in it were found instructions revealing
Lee's plans.

Stuart was preparing to attack Buford's division, when
he learned that Greggs' division, having crossed the river
unobserved, was coming up in his rear and was then
engaged with Robertson's brigade at Fleetwood Hill.
Leaving the brigades of \V. H. F. Lee and Fitzhugh Lee
to resist Buford, Stuart hurried back and attacked Gregg.

BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG. 233

There was desperate fighting, and Gregg was compelled
to fall back. He did so none too soon, for as he was leav-
ing Brandy Station he could see the head of Ewell's corps
debarking from a train which Lee had sent over in great
haste from Culpepper.

Buford and Gregg joined forces and retreated over the
river.

The importance of the engagement of Brandy Station
lies chiefly in the fact that it disclosed a part of Lee's
plans to Hooker. It was also the first time that the Union
cavalry had boldly attacked the Confederate cavalry.

It did not change Lee's plans, nor did it trouble Stuart
very much. While Hooker knew that Lee with much of
his army was at Culpepper, he still did not know how far
he intended to go. He extended his right wing along the
upper Rappahannock so as to meet Lee's change of base,
and be prepared for any emergency.

Lee proceeded with his campaign with his usual vigor.
Ewell's corps was pushed forward into the valley of Vir-
ginia, marching on the loth. It was in light order and
advanced rapidly, crossing the Blue Ridge at Chester Gap,
and reaching the banks of the Shenandoah at Cedarville
on the 1 2th. The Unionists knew nothing of this move-
ment, and Ewell took advantage of their ignorance to
press forward against McReynolds' Union brigade under
Milroy, at Winchester. Milroy was taken by surprise and
overwhelmed by numbers. He was driven out of Win-
chester on the 14th, and was attacked on his retreat. The
retreat became a rout and his men scattered. Some es-
caped to Harper's Ferry, but nearly 4,oco were captured.
The fleeing men created a panic in Pennsylvania, and
caused a profound sensation in the North.

Hooker learned on the 12th that Ewell's corps had
■passed Sperryville, and on the following day he moved
the 2d, 6th, and 12th corps to Fairfax Court-House.

When Hill saw that the Unionists had withdrawn he

234 DECISIVE BATTLES SINCE WATERLOO.

joined Longstreet at Culpepper. Pleasanton was still
watching Stuart near Warrenton.

Ewell pushed his troopers as far forward as Williams-
port on the Potomac. The population of the neighbor-
ing Maryland towns fled in terror, carrying off their valua-
bles and driving their herds before them on their way to
Harrisburg. The greatest excitement prevailed in that
city.

On June i6th Jenkins' troopers entered Greencastle, the
first Pennsylvania village and then marched forward to
Chambersburg. The Northern farmers now had an expe-
rience with which their Southern countrymen were en-
tirely familiar. Horses, cattle, fodder, and provisions
were confiscated, or, what was as bad, paid for in Confed-
erate money. Free negroes were seized and sent South
to be sold as slaves. There was, however, no plundering
or bad behavior on the part of the soldiers.

This was as far as Jenkins dared go, and he returned to
Williamsport, where Ewell was awaiting the arrival of the
two other corps.

In order to learn clearly what Lee intended to do
Hooker sent Pleasanton to the foot of the Blue Ridge,
with instructions that if he did not meet the enemy to
push forward by way of Leesburg to Harper's Ferry.

This was on June 17th, and on the same day Stuart
hastened to occupy the passes of the Bull Run Mountains.
The two forces were therefore moving in the same direc-
tion, and they met near Aldie, where Kilpatrick, with the
Second New York, at once charged Munford's brigade and
drove it before him. Col. Duffie's division surprised Stuart
at Middleburg, and gave him barely time to make his
escape. Stuart returned with Robertson's brigade and
forced Duffie to fall back.

These minor engagements showed the direction in which
the greater portion of Lee's army was moving, and caused
Hooker to move his army westward that he might be pre-

BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG. 235

pared to cross the Blue Ridge or the Potomac, as might
be required.

It was not long before Pleasanton and Stuart were
fighting again. On the 19th the former attacked Stuart
at Middleburg and drove him out. This victory was fol-
lowed up, and Stuart was driven back eight miles to Up-
perville. The Union scouts were now able to climb the
peaks of the Blue Ridge, where they had a full view of the
whole lower valley of the Shenandoah, and saw Ewell's
corps marching towards the Potomac.

On the 2 1st Lee ordered Ewell to march on Harrisburg,
and on the 23d sent the other two corps forward. They
passed into Pennsylvania, and requisitions of ever>^ kind
followed. The Confederates, accustomed to their impov-
erished lands, were amazed at the richness of the country.
They were able to fit themselves out anew with ever>^ thing
they needed. Ewell reached Carlisle on the 27th and his
scouts reconnoitred Harrisburg, where the citizens were
making desperate preparations for defence.

As Lee was marching away from Washington, it was
necessary to guard his flank from an attack from that
quarter, and Early was sent east of the mountains. On
June 26th he bivouacked at Gettysburg, after driving out
a thousand Pennsylvania militia. Gordon pushed forward
to cross the big wooden bridge at Wrightsville, but it was
burned before he could do so.

When Hooker learned of the arrival of Ewell at Hagers-
town, he sent three army corps to Poolesville to hold the
left bank of the Potomac and to guard Washington, and
he prepared to follow Lee into Maryland with the remain-
der of his army. He crossed the Potomac on the 26th,
and the two armies were now only 40 miles apart. Lee
heard nothing of this movement. He relied on Stuart for
information, but that enthusiastic ofificer had started off
on a raid of his own, and was out of reach. Stuart pro-
posed to make a circuit of the Federal army by passing

236 DECISIVE BATTLES SINCE WATERLOO.

between it and Washington. He might have succeeded
if the army liad been stationary, but it was on the move
and he had frequent encounters with detached bodies.
He had fights at Haymarket with the 2d corps, pushed
on and crossed the Potomac at Dranesville, entered
Maryland and destroyed the canal, captured a large supply
train at Rockville, and then moved on towards Hanover,
where he had hopes of finding Early. Here he met
Pleasanton's cavalry and a sharp fight followed. Night
came on, and Stuart, by a forced march, reached Dover,
and then passed on to Carlisle, where he arrived on July
1st, only to find that Early had gone. His men and
horses were worn out, and he had done no real harm to
the enemy. Orders here reached him to march immedi-
ately on Gettysburg, where the battle had begun. When
Lee learned that Hooker had crossed the Potomac he
determined to push on towards Baltimore, so as to threaten
its communication witli the North and compel the Union
army to follow him. He hoped to lead them to the north,
and possibly to engage them near Philadelphia. With
this intent he directed his three army corps to assemble
at Gettysburg, having no reason to suppose that Meade
was moving in that direction.

Ewell was recalled from before Harrisburg, and marched
to Scotland on a road connecting w^ith the Gettysburg
turnpike. Longstreet's corps moved forward from
Chambersburg and Hill's corps from Fayetteville. On
June 30th, Pettigrew's brigade pushed on to Gettysburg
and was about to enter the place, when Buford's advance
compelled him to fall back. Hill then advanced on
Gettysburg with his whole division.

Hooker was preparing to follow Lee, when he was suc-
ceeded in command by General Meade, who made no
change in the plans. His first idea was to prevent Lee
from crossing the Susquehanna and marching on Balti-
more, and to do this he hurried the army forward and

GETTYSBURG CAMPAIGN MAP.

237

238 DECISIVE BATTLES SINCE WATERLOO.

took positions at Emmettsburg, Taneytown, and Frizzell-
burg, and so held the whole breadth of the valley. Pleas-
anton's cavalry covered the march and watched the move-
ments of the enemy. Meade had now learned of Lee's
intention to concentrate at Gettysburg, and he made
preparations for battle.

The two armies were moving towards one point and
they must soon meet. Lee did not know that Meade
also proposed to concentrate his forces at Gettysburg.
The coincidence was quite accidental, and it brought on
the conflict between the two armies earlier than had been
expected.

A description of the surroundings of Gettysburg will
be of value in understanding the details of one of the
bloodiest and most important battles of modern times.
The battle-field is between two small streams, Willoughby
Run and Rock Creek, to the west and east, respectively, of
the city. The ground is broken up by two groups of hills,
each with three ridges, of which the central one is the
highest. In the first group, northwest of Gettysburg, are
Oak Hill, Seminary Hill, and the Seminary Ridge running
north and south. The second group is to the southeast
of the first. It starts with Cemetery Hill, and runs along
as Cemetery Ridge until it suddenly rises again and forms
the hills called Round Top and Little Round Top.
Gettysburg is situated in the valley between these two
groups, and its streets run to the base of Cemetery Hill.
It is naturally the centre of all roads, so that three turn-
pikes and seven other roads pass into the town. East of
Cemetery Hill is Gulp's Hill, well wooded.

Suspecting that the Confederates might move to Gettys-
burg, Meade directed Buford to occupy the place and
defend it until the arrival of the 1st corps. Buford
reached there just in time to frighten away' Pettigrew's
brigade. He soon learned that Hill was advancing on
him in force, and perceived the advantage in holding the

BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG. 239

strong positions around Gettysburg. He dismounted his
men and deployed them as infantry in such positions as
would best conceal their numerical weakness. Of his 4,200
men, one quarter had to be withdrawn to look after the
horses, so that really only about 3,000 were prepared to
oppose Lee's advance. They were disposed in a circular
arc from west to northeast of Gettysburg, with Gamble's
brigade on the left and Devin's on the right.

On the morning of July ist Buford's scouts reported
that Heth's division (Confederate) was rapidly advancing
from the direction of Cashtown. The battle was immi-
nent. Heth deployed his two advance brigades south of
the Chambersburg road, and at eight o'clock his line, pre-
ceded by skirmishers, passed down the slopes on the
right bank of Willoughby Run. Buford opened fire, and a
fierce struggle followed on the banks of the stream. Bu-
ford's fire was so well sustained that Heth thought he had
an infantry corps opposed to him. This idea prevented
him from advancing to take possession of Gettysburg and
he waited for Pender's troops to reinforce him.

Buford was terribly overmatched, and realizing that he
could not resist much longer, he eagerly watched the Em-
mettsburg road for signs of Reynolds, Hill and Pender
were pushing forward, when the signalman stationed in
the belfry of the seminary on Seminary Hill discovered
a large column of infantry moving forward on the Em-
mettsburg road where only friends could come.

It was Reynolds whom the sound of battle had hurried
forward at his utmost speed. Wadsworth's division soon
followed. Reynolds rode on ahead and met Buford on
the stairs of the belfry. A moment suflficed to tell of the
critical situation. Reynolds ordered Wadsworth's divi-
sion to relieve Gamble's men, who had suffered greatly.
He sent word to the other two divisions to hasten, and
also notified Howard, requesting him to hurry forward
with the nth corps.

240 DECISIVE BATTLES SINCE WATERLOO.

There were still far too few troops on the ground to
resist the Confederate army for any length of time, but
Reynolds determined to hold it in check as long as
possible, until help could come. He led his troops down
the Cashtown road, to cut off all passage there. j\Iere-
dith made a dash for the wood where Archer had entered,
and Reynolds hastened to join the Iron Brigade in its
attack.

While encouraging the soldiers, General Reynolds was
shot through the head and fell dead. He was one of the
ablest of Meade's officers, and his death was a great loss
to the national cause.

It was then 10.45. ^leredith adv^anced with such ra-
pidity that he captured one thousand prisoners, and drove
the enemy down the slope at the point of the bayonet.
Wadsworth's three regiments were attacked b}' Davis, and
compelled to fall back to the Oak Hill Ridge, where they
took shelter in a thick wood. Doubleday sent the Sixth
Wisconsin to them, and, by a sharp attack on Davis' lines
threw them into confusion, and captured two entire regi-
ments with their colors.

Heth moved up to take the place of Archer and Davis,
while Doubleday formed his lines anew and awaited events.
He was gladdened by the arrival of Rowley and Robin-
son's divisions.

The Confederate army now moved forward again.
Brockenbrough tried to out-flank Biddle on the left, while
Pettigrew hurled himself on Stone. The latter's brigade
was formed of Pennsylvania lumbermen, called " Buck-
tails," from the ornaments attached to their hats. They
were fighting on their native soil, and this filled them
with an enthusiasm which laughed at death. Their posi-
tion was exposed, and many were slain, but they held
their ground and shouted " We 've come to stay."

It was no use attacking such men as these, and the
Confederates again fell back discomfited. An artillery

BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG. 24 1

duel followed, and as the Confederates had far more guns,
the Union army got the worst of it.

Howard, with his three divisions, was now hurrying
from Emmettsburg. He rode on ahead, and found that
by the death of Reynolds the command had fallen into
his hands. He also realized the importance of holding
the town, and sent urgent instructions to the 3d and
iith corps to push forward. The latter arrived at 12.45
o'clock, Schurz leading with his division. Rodes' Con-
federate division made a detour, and came in from the
north to take possession of Oak Hill. Howard prepared
for the attack by sending Schimmelpfennig's division, into
the woods of Oak Hill, with two batteries of artillery.

At 2.15 Rodes advanced and occupied Oak Hill before
Schimmelpfennig could get there ; he immediately opened
fire on the Union line with five batteries. Schurz, who
had succeeded Howard in command of the iith corps,
pushed on to intercept him. Three of Rodes' brigades
crossed the Mummasburg road and attacked Cutler's
troops ; O'Neil attacked Baxter and was repulsed with
heavy loss. Iverson fell savagely on Robinson's two bri-
gades, only to find that he had run into a trap. Cutler
moved from the wood and took him on the flank. The
Confederates fought bravely, but they were overmatched,
many were killed and more than one thousand were taken
prisoners. Daniel came up too late to save Iverson, but
threw himself from the north on Stone at the railway cut,
and drove him out of it. Brockenbrough attempted to
drive Meredith from McPherson's wood but was himself
routed.

It was 2.45 o'clock, and the Confederates had been re-
pulsed all along the line, but the battle had now reached
a turning point and was soon to assume a different aspect.

Daniel was reinforced by Ramseur, and Heth by three
brigades of Pender's division, — fresh men who had not been
under fire that day.

242 DECISIVE BATTLES SINCE WATERLOO.

The first national misfortune of the day fell to Schim-
melpfennig's division. His two brigades advancing near
the Oak Hill slopes were battered on the flank by Rodes'
artillery, and thrown into great disorder. Dole's division
fell upon them and drove them for some distance. Early's
division advanced on the Heidlersburg road, and its artil-
lery opened fire on Barlow who was trying to relieve
Schimmelpfennig. Gordon's brigade charged on A^on Gil-
sa's position, and forced him and Barlow back at the point
of the bayonet; Hays and Hoke took them on the flank,
and the retreat became a rout. Howard ordered the iith
corps to retreat, but it had already been driven back.

Pender fell with his whole division on the tired and de-
pleted brigades of Stone, INIeredith, and Biddle. Ramseur's
brigade, with the remnants of Iverson's and O'Neil's bri-
gades, and supported b}' a heavy fire of artillery, descended
on Robinson, whom the retreat of the nth corps had
left isolated. Robinson fell back on the wood occupied
by Cutler. Doubleday's men were outnumbered and over-
powered and he recalled them to Seminary Hill, and,
joined by Biddle's men, they stationed themselves in the
trenches which had been thrown up around the seminary.
Supported by a few cannon they succeeded in checking
the advance of the enemy.

Howard saw that this resistance could not be main-
tained. It was useful only in assisting the retreat. He
ordered the abandonment of Seminary Hill, and as the
1st corps, with ranks greatl}' thinned, marched down the
eastern slopes. Hill occupied the position. Doubleday
found Gettysburg filled with the fugitives of Barlow's and
Schimmelpfennig's divisions. Their condition was ver}^
perilous, as Ewell was advancing on the town from the east-
ward. Howard abandoned the town and fell back on
Cemetery Hill. The ist corps reached there safely, all but
Stone's brigade, which was mixed up with the fugitives in
the streets of the town. The Confederates dashed in with

BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG. 243

a rush, the fugitives scattered in every direction, but nearly
4,000 were taken prisoners. General Schimmelpfennig hid
himself under a load of wood and so managed to escape.
Ewell found two cannon abandoned in the streets.

The national troops were now in a very critical situa-
tion. With 16,500 men against 22,000 Confederates, they
had made a good fight. They had now only five thou-
sand fighting men left. Five thousand had been taken
prisoners, four thousand were dead or wounded, and the
rest were scattered. The latter hurried to Taneytown
and Westminster, and greatly discouraged the regiments
which were moving up from that direction.

The Union forces were thus routed and disorganized,
and in actual danger of complete extermination when a
new factor appeared on the field. Hancock arrived at
four o'clock. Meade, on learning of the serious nature of
the battle, had hurried him forward to take the place of
the slain Reynolds. He assumed command and at once
sought to restore order. The iith corps reformed
around Von Steinwehr on Cemetery Hill. Wadsworth
was stationed on Culp's Hill and Doubleday on the left.
These manoeuvres consumed an hour. Lee might easily
have prevented it, but he was cautious and w^aited for the
rest of his army to arrive. He could see that Howard
was well intrenched on Cemetery Hill, and supposed that
reinforcements must have arrived. In truth they did not
arrive until 5.15 P.M., when Sickles and Birney came up
from Emmettsburg with a division of the 3d corps.
Graham and Ward's brigades followed, and soon after-
wards Slocum appeared with the 12th corps. Slocum
started to occupy Wolf's Hill, but gave up the idea when
he learned that the enemy held Gettysburg. Geary's
division arrived at Cemetery Hill at 5.30.

Slocum assumed the command, and Hancock went to
Taneytown to inform Meade of the situation. Meade
had already determined to concentrate his army between

244 DECISIVE BATTLES SINCE WATERLOO.

Gettysburg and Taneytown. Hancock met the 2d
corps marching towards Gettysburg. The 5th corps
was marching from Union, and the 6th from Man-
chester.

Meade hastened to Gettysburg, arrived at Cemetery
Hill at I A.M., and at once began preparations for the
great battle which must follow in the morning. He real-
ized the full importance oi the result. If he was defeated,
the North was open to invasion, and Philadelphia and
Baltimore would be liable to capture.

It was the morning of the 2d of July — a date which
is now borne by thousands of white headstones in the
national cemetery at Gettysburg. The midsummer sun
rose about four o'clock and Meade was able to survey the
field more clearly. All of the army that had not arrived
was pushing on by forced marches and was expected very
shortly. By nine o'clock they were all present, excepting
15,000 men of the 6th corps who were sure to arrive
before the day was over. The ist and nth corps still
occupied their old positions on Cemetery Hill. The
2d was on the left of the ist. Hay's division was
on the right, resting on Ziegler's grove; Gibbon's division
was in the centre. Caldwell's division extended along the
water-line between Plum Run and Rock Creek. The
3d corps was also on the left. The left of the army
rested on the Round Tops, which were farthest to the
south, the centre on Cemetery Hill and Cemetery Ridge,
and the right on Gulp's Hill. The " Orchard" hill to the
northeast of the Round Tops was a commanding position,
as it would prevent the enemy from making a flank move-
ment on the left, but it was weak in other respects, as it
was commanded by Seminary Hill on the north, and by
the Warfield Ridge on the west.

The right on Gulp's Hill was nearest the enemy, and
seemed to be in the most danger. Meade sent Geary to
occupy the slopes of Gulp's Hill to the right of Wads-

SCALf or MtLCS

GETTYSBURG
THE POSITIONS ON THE SECOND OF JULY

UfJION

C0NFKT1£RATE

245

246 DECISIVE BATTLES SINCE WATERLOO.

worth. Sickles occupied the positions on the slopes of
Little Round Top, but owing to some misunderstanding
of orders he did not occupy the summit.

Lee was also busy in gathering his forces. Early was
in the centre, facing the ridge which connects Gulp's Hill
with Cemetery Hill, Ewell was on the left with Johnson,
who was on Benner's Hill, Rodes was occupying the town
at the foot of Cemetery Hill, his right touching the 3d
corps on Seminary Hill. Pender was on the left above
the seminary, Heth on the right, along the ridge. The
other divisions not yet placed were marching towards the
town from the north. By nine o'clock the army was all
there, excepting Stuart's cavalry and 6,000 men of Pick-
ett's and Law's divisions who were on the wa}-.

The early part of the day was wasted in preparations,
and Meade, astonished at this delay, took advantage of it
to strengthen his lines. Sickles, not liking his position,
moved forward and took possession of the Emmettsburg
road as far as the peach orchard, whose exposed position
has already been described. To extend his line to cover
his new position he was obliged to abandon the slopes of
Little Round Top, which was thus left entirely unprotect-
ed. Ward occupied the wood which covered the flank of
Devil's Den, with his left on Plum Run and his right run-
ning to the summit of the wheat field. De Trobriand's
line connected him with Graham, who was on the summit
of the hillock. Humphreys covered the right of the
division.

Lee ordered Longstreet to attack the Union army on
the right wing, the point where they least expected it. At
half-past three o'clock Longstreet moved forward. The
battle opened with an artillery duel between the Union
batteries in the orchard and the Confederate batteries in the
Warfield woods. Wilcox threw out skirmishers on one
side, and Graham on the other, and the rattle of musketry
soon became continuous. Meade visited Sickles' position.

BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG. 247

and seeing its weak points, directed General Warren to
support him. Law moved on Little Round Top, and
Robertson on Devil's Den. They advanced with the
Southern yell, and attacked Ward, who resisted them
with five regiments. A savage struggle on the slopes fol-
lowed. Ward was falling back, when he was assisted by
De Trobriand, who took Robertson on the flank. The
First Texas, which threatened to capture Smith's battery,
was driven back with great slaughter. Anderson advanced
to strike De Trobriand's centre, was repulsed and in
danger of capture, when he was saved by the arrival of
Benning, whose three brigades renewed the attack with
Cfreat visfor. Ward and De Trobriand, assisted bv Smith's
and Winslow's batteries, contested every foot of the way,
but they were over-matched and began to fall back.

Law made a dash for the Round Tops with his Texas
and Alabama veterans. The Fourth Maine, F"ortieth
New York, and Sixth New Jersey were waiting him in
ambuscade, and resisted stoutly. All to no use, however,
as the Confederate veterans advanced steadily. Ward
weakened his line in supporting the retreat, and this forced
De Trobriand to extend his left, leaving only two small
regiments in his centre. They managed to repel Ander-
son's second assault, but fell back before Benning, who
captured three pieces of Smith's artillery.

In the meantime McLaw's division was moving across
the Emmettsburg road. At 5.30 Kershaw attacked the
wooded hill occupied by De Trobriand's centre, and the
Confederate guns fired from the Warfield Ridge against
Humphreys' and Graham's brigades. Kershaw met
Sweitzer's and Tilton's brigades, which Sykes had sent
forward to reinforce De Trobriand, and drove them back
in confusion. Warren, following Meade's instructions,
climbed Little Round Top, and surveyed the country.
He saw the Confederates advancing to capture it, and
knew that it was undefended. Directing the signal

248 DECISIVE BATTLES SINCE WATERLOO.

officers to remain on the crest so as to make the enemy
believe that it was defended, he hastened after the 3d
brigade of Ayres' division, which he saw moving some
distance away. Weed, who was in command, directed
Colonel O'Rorke to lead the One Hundred and Fortieth
New York to the summit and defend it at all hazards.

Colonel Vincent with Barnes' 3d brigade had just
reached the southern slope of Little Round Top, and was
preparing to oppose Law's advance. A moment later
Hood's soldiers dashed forward with a yell and attacked
him. Vincent's men were well sheltered behind rocks
and made a vigorous resistance. Law swooped down on
his left, and driving the Sixth ^Michigan before him,
pressed on to the summit. Fortunately O'Rorke's sol-
diers, going at full run, reached the summit a moment
before him. Before they had time to catch their breath
or form in line of battle, Law was upon them.

O'Rorke ordered a charge, and his men dashed forward
amid a sharp musketry fire, and captured some of the
foremost men of the enemy. Vincent came to their assist-
ance, and Hood was checked. O'Rorke and many of his
men were killed, but Little Round Top was saved. Haz-
lett's battery had been dragged to the summit by the
most extraordinary exertions, but the guns could not be
depressed to reach the enemy on the slope, so Hazlett
shelled the Confederate reserve in the valley. Law re-
newed his attack on the summit, and was repulsed by
Vincent, who fell in the defence.

Sweitzer and Tilton were retreating before Kershaw,
and Ward and DeTrobriand before Benning. The hill of
Devil's Den was abandoned, strewn with corpses. Smith
saved his three remaining guns with great difficulty. The
Confederates drove Winslow's battery from the wheat field
and threatened De Trobriand's rear. The latter, assailed
in front by Anderson, and out-flanked by Kershaw, re-
treated with greatly thinned ranks. The Eighth South

BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG. 249

Carolina dashed for Clark's and Bigelow's guns, and were
repulsed by the One Hundred and Forty-first Pennsyl-
vania. Just then Caldwell's division of the 2d corps
arrived, having been hurried forward by Meade. Cross'
brigade supported De Trobriand, and Kelly's brigade
supported Ward. The latter was Meagher's old Irish
brigade ; it rushed into the fight with its well-known gal-
lantry, and at once stopped Anderson's advance. Cross
advanced against Kershaw, and forced him back on Sem-
mes' brigade. Cross was killed. Semmes' fresh troops re-
turned the attack but were met by Caldwell's second line,
composed of Zook's and Brook's brigades, and driven
back with Kershaw to the other side of the ravine.

Weed relieved O'Rorke's tired men, and reached the
summit of Little Round Top just as Vincent fell. Law
pushed forward to a third attack, and tried to out-flank
the Union line by way of the eastern side of the ridge.
He was met by the hardy backwoodsmen of the Twentieth
Maine and forced back in a hand-to-hand encounter.

The field of battle now grew more extensive. McLaws
advanced against the orchard, which Graham occupied
with two brigades. Barksdale attacked the west flank and
Wofford the south front.

Graham found himself in a very hot position, and his
loss was great. He was wounded and taken prisoner, and
his troops were driven from the orchard and down the slope.
Sickles hastened to his aid, when a bullet struck him in the
leg and he was forced to transfer the command to Birney.

The Union batteries on the right, along the Emmetts-
burg road, retired sullenly, firing as they went. Barksdale,
following up his victory, pushed in between Humphreys
and Barnes, while Wofford attacked their flank on the east.
Anderson's three brigades moved against Humphreys'
front. Humphreys retreated with his two brigades in good
order. He left nearly half of his men dead and wounded
on the field.

250 DECISIVE BATTLES SINCE WATERLOO.

Wofford attacked Tilton's division and forced it back.
Kershaw and Semmes again assailed Svveitzer and Zook
and drove them out of the wood. Zook was killed and
there was a great loss in the rank and file of his command.
Finally the Union troops were pushed in disorder to the
left bank of Plum Run. Bigelow's battery, unsupported,
took position in front of the Trostle House, and fired
canister until nearly all the gunners and 80 out of 88
horses were killed. The guns were captured.

Ayres with Day's and Burbank's brigades occupied the
crest of Devil's Den, and sustained the attack of Hood
and McLaws. He retired slowly, losing nearly half his
men, and took position on the northern base of Little
Round Top. Fighting had gone on continuousl}^ on the
summit. Weed was shot down, and Hazlett, bending over
to speak to him, was mortally wounded. Many other
superior officers were either killed or wounded, but the
men held their positions until the enemy was worn out.
Colonel Chamberlain then charged, drove them back, and
captured three hundred prisoners. Just then Crawford
arrived with IMcCandless' brigade and assisted in driving
the enemy to the other side of Plum Run. Ayres' posi-
tion deterred them from making a fresh attack on Little
Round Top.

There was danger of Barksdale and Wofford separating
the Union left from the rest of the army. They advanced
rapidly, driving every thing before them. To fill in the
gap Hancock despatched two regiments of Hay's division
and one of Willard's brigades. Alexander's Confederate
batteries were shelling Humphreys' lines, and McGilver\-'s
brigade of artillery established itself on the left bank of
Plum Run and replied with vigor. Aided by Hancock's
artillery it retarded the Confederate movements. Meade,
realizing the danger, hurried to the field, and directed re-
inforcements to hasten from the right. Williafns' division,
General Lockwood's two regiments, Candy's brigade, and

BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG. 25 1

Bartlett's brigade all pushed forward to the rescue. United
they were superior in number to the enemy in front of the
position, but there was danger of their being beaten in de-
tail as they arrived.

Anderson's three brigades continued their advance, con-
fident of victory. But the way was not an easy one.

Meade in person led Lockwood's soldiers at the left
against him, in the wood north of the Millerstown road, and
McCandless' brigade supported him. Bartlett's, Eustis',
and Nevin's brigades of the6th corps arrived and reinforced
the 5th on the line between Little Round Top and Mc-
Gilver\-'s batter}-.

Barksdale and many of his men fell before one of Bur-
ling's regiments. Wilcox scaled the slopes and attacked
Humphreys and Gibbon. Wright captured a battery on
the edge of a wood above Gibbon's front. Webb's bri-
gade dashed forward, destroyed two thirds of his division
and recaptured the battery. Wilcox was taken in flank
by McGilvery's artillery, and was vigorously met by
Humphreys and Hancock. He lost a third of his men and
withdrew to the Emmettsburg road. The attack had been
a failure all along the line. If it had been supported by
Posey's, Mahone's, or Pender's divisions the result might
have been far different.

While this desperate fighting was taking place on the
left, Ewell was not idle on the right. His orders were to
move forward when he heard Longstreet's guns, but owing
to a contrary wind he did not hear them until five o'clock.
His six batteries on Benner's Hill opened against the
Union entrenchment on Gulp's Hill, but being entirely
unprotected, were quickly silenced. Johnson attempted
to turn the Union position on Gulp's Hill by moving in
the gorges of Rock Greek on the southeast. The 12th
corps was abandoning this position, and on their way to
the right, when Johnson attacked it. A few detachments
of Green's brigade alone defended the intrenchments, and

252 DECISIVE BATTIES SINCE WATERLOO.

Stewart's brigade had no difficulty in occupying all that
part south of the ravine. He continued to advance and
drove Green before him. Night came on and he halted,
ignorant that the Baltimore turnpike was only a short dis-
tance away, and that to capture it would endanger the
Union line of retreat.

Jones was not so successful in his attack on Green's left.
He found it ambushed on the steep slopes of Gulp's Hill,
and lost many men in a vain attempt to dislodge it. A
brigade from Schurz' division and also Kane's brigade
came to reinforce Green, and Nichols was pushed back.
While they had thus gained some ground, the Confederates
had obtained no material advantage.

This was only a portion of Ewell's attack. When he
had set Johnson in motion he gave the order of attack to
Early and Rodes. Early was quick to march, while
Rodes hung back for some reason, and the effect of a
united movement was thus lost.

Hoke's and Hays' brigades ascended the eastern slope of
Cemetery Hill under a terrific fire of artillery. As they
approached nearer they fell under the volleys of Barlow's
men ; but their gallant advance was not stopped, and
they drove the Unionists from the first line back to the
intrenchments on the top of the hill. They followed
them there, and penetrated into the works. Steinwehr
and Schurz, who were guarding the opposite slopes, were
obliged to about face and assist Barlow. Although the
Unionists were greater in number, the Confederate vet-
erans were a match for them, and held the northern side
of the hill. Rodes failed to come to their assistance,
while Hancock, learning of the situation, sent Carroll's
brigade to aid Howard. It arrived at an opportune mo-
ment, recaptured the northern side, and drove back
Hoke. Early fell back defeated.

While the infantry and artillery were battling as thus
described, the cavalry was also busy. Kilpatrick tried to

BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG. 253

head off Stuart, and had a brisk encounter with Hamp-
ton's brigade at Hunterstown. He then moved to a
point on the extreme left. Gregg stationed himself on
the right. Johnson in his advance sent a detachment to
reconnoitre Brinkerhoff's ridge, and Gregg met them and
repulsed them.

When night ended the battle, it was hard to say on
which side the advantage lay. Lee occupied a portion of
Gulp's Hill ; he had held Cemetery Hill and Little Round
Top for a short time ; he had routed the Unionists in the
peach orchard, and these advantages he considered suffi-
cient to warrant him in continuing the battle on the next
day. Only seventeen of his brigades had been in action.

Although Meade had repulsed all attacks, his situation
was still alarming. Forty-two of his fifty-two brigades
had been engaged. He had lost over 20,000 men in the
two days' fighting, and hundreds of men were straggling
towards Baltimore. He looked forward with apprehen-
sion to the next day of battle, and made every prepara-
tion for retreat. He called a council of war, and it was
decided to remain and defend the position.

The night was passed in reforming the lines and pick-
ing up the wounded. The 12th corps marched back
from the right to its old position, to find it occupied by
Stewart. Kane's brigade joined them. Shaler's and
Neill's brigades were stationed on the extreme right on the
east side of Rock Creek. Lockwood reinforced Williams.
The 5th corps was placed on the left on the steep
slopes of Great Round Top, and the disabled 3d was
held in reserve. Caldwell's division was again stationed
on the left of the 2d corps. Wadsworth was on Gulp's
Hill, Robinson on Cemetery Hill. Stannard occupied
the small wood where Perry had been driven out.

Lee made no change in his plan of battle. He intended
to resume his tactics of the previous day — a double attack
on both wings.

254 DECISIVE BATTLES SINCE WATERLOO.

Johnson on the left was reinforced by Smith's brigade.
Rodes' old brigade and Daniels' came to support his left.
The Power and McAllister Hills commanded his position
in the wood, and Williams, having planted his artillery
there, began a destructiv^e fire on the morning of the 3d
July, and demolished Johnson's weak entrenchments.
Williams pushed forward his infantry to the attack, and
Johnson's infantry, without waiting, dashed forward to
meet them. This enabled them to catch sight of the
turnpike crowded with wagons, and stragglers, and the
sight spurred them to great exertions.

A savage hand-to-hand fight followed among the rocks.
Meade's artillery poured in a terrible fire on the Confed-
erates, who had no guns with which to reply. Lockwood
moved to Gear\''s assistance. After seven hours' fighting
Stewart led a charge on Ruger, who threatened his left.
It was all in vain, and in turn Geary and Ruger advanced,
drove Stewart from the slopes of Gulp's Hill, and captured
three stand of colors and five hundred prisoners.

It was eleven o'clock. The Unionists were completely
victorious on their right wing and the turnpike was safe.
On the extreme left Farnsworth made a gallant charge on
Laws' lines, and was met and annihilated by Robertson's
brigade.

It was just about this time that Pickett, who was sta-
tioned on the strip of ground between Warfield Ridge
and Seminary Hill, set fire to the Codon House, and ex-
changed shots with the enemy. This amounted to little,
and it was not until one o'clock that the battle really
began.

Two cannon-shots gave the signal, and a 'moment later
one hundred and thirty-eight Confederate guns opened a
concentrated fire on Cemetery Hill. Eighty Union guns,
posted on Cemetery Hill and Cemetery Ridge replied. It
was the greatest artillery duel of the whole war. It cre-
ated immense havoc in the Union lines, but they main-

SCALE or NilLES
GETTYSBURG
THE POSITIONS ON THE THIRD OF JULY

UA/fON

CONrEDElRATE

255

256 DECISIVE BATTLES SINCE WATERLOO.

tained their positions brav^ely. Finally Meade silenced
his guns in order to draw the enemy to the attack. Pick-
ett believing the guns to be disabled, threw his soldiers
forward on Ziegler's grove. Kemper moved on his right
and Armistead on his left.

McGilvery reopened with his battery of forty pieces,
and taking Pickett's line in flank did tremendous damage.
This did not stop the intrepid Southerners, and Pickett's
three brigades advanced on the run, making one of the
most magnificent charges in the history of war. Garnett,
who led his brigade, fell dead with many of his men, be-
fore the withering fire of Gibbon's division.

The Unionists were intrenched behind rocks and fences,
where bullets could not reach them. Still Pickett pressed
on, and crossed bayonets with Gibbon's men. Stannard's
soldiers opened a murderous fire on Armistead's right. It
recoiled, and Armistead threw it upon the brigades of
Webb and Harrow. It pierced the first line and drove
the Unionists back upon their second line of earthworks.
Hancock and Gibbon sent forward their reserves. Har-
row advanced his left and took Pickett in the rear.

Armistead pressed on, and captured Cushing's battery,
which was posted in a clump of trees, and was killed with
Gushing in the fight. Pettigrew, Archer, Scales, and
Lane, who had advanced on Pickett's left, broke through
the first Union line, and ascending the slopes, threw them-
selves against Hays' line. They could not pierce it and
were driven back in confusion, leaving two thousand
prisoners and fifteen stand of colors. Some of their
regiments joined Pickett, who was still fighting.

The entire fire of the Unionists was now concentrated
on Pickett's men, and the division v/as simply annihilated ;
three thousand five hundred men and twelve stand of
colors were lost.

Wilcox, who should have assaulted Gibbon's right, had
wandered off too far to the right, and had reached the

BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG. 257

foot of the slope on which the 3d corps (Union) was
stationed. He was preparing to resume his march when
Stannard attacked him on the flank and the Union artil-
lery opened fire. Finding himself unsupported he re-
treated.

The whole Confederate line was now in retreat. The
reserve was not near enough to support it, and the artil-
lery alone aided it. It drew off slowly, and Meade was
too cautious to take the offensive. McCandless advanced
on Kershaw, had a brief engagement, and captured a few
prisoners. The battle of Gettysburg was ended.

Before the day's battle had begun Stuart had received
orders to move round the Union right and strike the
Union column on the Baltimore turnpike if it should re-
treat in that direction. He wished to create a panic in the
Union rear, and he gathered his four brigades commanded
by Chamblin, Jenkens, Fitzhugh Lee, and Hampton, on
the western slopes of Cress Ridge.

Kilpatrick's division was on the other side of the ridge,
and prepared to oppose him. A vigorous engagement
took place on the Rummel farm east of the ridge. The
opposing cavalry crossed sabres several times ; the battle
ended in Stuart being defeated, and he withdrew to cover
the retreat of Lee's army.

The battle had thus occupied July ist, 2d, and 3d.
Meade's effective force was from 82,000 to 84,000 men,
and 300 guns. Lee's effective force was about 69,000
men, and 250 guns. Each side lost 23,000 men, killed,
wounded, and missing. Considering the number of men
engaged, about 69,000 Confederates, to 80,000 on the
Union side, the percentage is enormous ; being 36 per
cent, for the former, and 27 for the latter. The official
report gave the Union loss 2,834 killed, 13,709 wounded,
and 6,645 prisoners, or 23,188 in all. The Confederate
total was 23,028, and included 2,665 killed and 12,599
wounded. Fully one thousand of those reported wounded

258 DECISIVE BATTLES SINCE WATERLOO.

on the Union side died soon after, and the same was the
case with the Confederates. The Union army lost 20
generals, i6 wounded, and four killed. The Confederates
lost 17 generals, 13 wounded, three killed, and one cap-
tured.

After its defeat at Gettysburg, the Confederate army
retreated to Northern Virginia, closely followed b}' the
Union forces. During the remainder of 1863 there were
no important movements on either side.

A contrary result to the battle of Gettysburg would
have been fraught with disaster to the Union cause, far
beyond the loss of men and material during the clash of
arms. It would have uncovered Baltimore and Philadel-
phia to the advance of the Confederate army, and enabled
Lee to establish himself in the rich region of Eastern
Pennsylvania, whence he could gather abundant supplies
for his army, while it rested from the fatigue of the long
march, and repaired the ravages of battle. Washington
would have been endangered, and it was Lee's plan to
give a crushing defeat to the Union army, and then oc-
cupy the capital and dictate terms of peace. He was well
aware of the discontent that prevailed at the North, and
the opposition that politicians and others were making to
the prosecution of the war for the suppression of the
rebellion. He counted confidently upon an uprising in
the North, in case he could carry the war into its territory in-
stead of confining it, as it had been thus far and was ever
after confined, to the Southern States. Between the
opposition influences and the fears of the people, he hoped
to create a sentiment in favor of peace, and with his ad-
vantage of position he believed he would be able, in a
great measure, to dictate its terms.

His confidence cannot be wondered at when it is re-
membered that he had, not long before, defeated the
Union army of Virginia, at Chancellorsville, and, previous
to Chancellorsville, had inflicted other defeats of equal

BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG. 259

importance. His army was composed of the very flower
of the Southern troops, and in order to strengthen it and
prepare for the invasion of Pennsylvania, he had drawn
Longstreet's corps from North Carolina, when it was
greatly needed for strengthening Bragg, and enabling him
to take the offensive against Rosecrans, and also for pre-
venting the disaster which overtook the Confederates at
Vicksburg. By their defeat at Gettysburg, the Confed-
erates suffered as heavily in morale as in material, and from
that time onward, to the close of the war, the invasion of
the North was not again possible. In all its aspects the
battle of Gettysburg is entitled to rank as one of the
great and decisive battles in the history of the nineteenth
century.

CHAPTER XV.

SIEGE AND FALL OF VICKSBURG — 186;.

At the very outset of the civil war in America the im-
portance of the possession of the Mississippi River was
perceived by the leaders on both sides of the conflict. The
Confederates sought to close the great water highway by
the erection of powerful batteries at Columbus, Kentuck}',
twenty miles below the junction of the Ohio and IMissis-
sippi at Cairo, and at the same time they obstructed its
mouth by seizing the forts below New Orleans. Immedi-
ately there arose throughout all the region drained by the
mighty stream and its numerous tributaries a demand
that this great artery of commerce should be opened.
Never were a people moved by a stronger and more united
impulse than were the dwellers in the great valley that the
Father of Waters, should be restored to peaceful naviga-
tion. No more stirring prophecy was ever made than that
of General Logan when he declared that " the men of the
West will hew their way to the Gulf of Mexico with their
swords."

The earliest military movements of any magnitude in
the Western States were undertaken with a view to open-
ing the navigation of the ^Mississippi. While General
Lyon was making efforts for retaining possession of Mis-
souri on behalf of the nation, a military* force was gathered
at Cairo under command of General PrentiSs, to protect
that important point and prevent as far as possible the
further descent of boats laden with supplies. Many of

260

SIEGE AND FALL OF VICKSBURG. 26 1

the merchants and steamboat owners of St. Louis were in
sympathy with the secession movement, and in the early
days of the blockade at Cairo numerous boats succeeded in
passing safely down the stream, never to return. Gun-
boats were hastily improvised and added to the efificiency
of the blockade, and in the autumn of 1861 General Grant,
who had been placed in command at Cairo, led an expedi-
tion for the capture of Belmont, a small town opposite
Columbus. The Confederate camp at that point was cap-
tured and destroyed, but the Union forces were compelled
to retreat owing to the fire of the heavy guns from the
heights of Columbus, and the overwhelming number of
troops that were sent across the river to reinforce the fee-
ble garrison of Belmont. The losses on the Union side
were about four hundred in killed, wounded, and captured,
and about six hundred on that of the Confederates. The
battle had no strategic importance, but it ranks in history
as the first aggressive movement for the opening of the
Mississippi.

The Confederate position at Columbus was on a high
bluff commanding the river, and the batteries were so
powerful and so well planted that their reduction by the
gun-boats of the river was not a possibility. In the early
part of 1862 the army and fleet were ready to move, but
instead of making a direct attack as the Confederates had
expected. General Grant proceeded to a flank movement
up the Cumberland and Tennessee rivers. Forts Henry
and Donelson fell, and Columbus, no longer tenable, as it
could be easily assailed from the rear, was evacuated by
the Confederates, who took a new position at Island
Number Ten, 25 miles farther down the river. The gun-
boats and a strong land force assailed the batteries on this
island, but were unable to capture it. It held out for
nearly a month, and in the meantime the Confederates
were assembling an army at Corinth, Mississippi, with a
view to demolishing the forces of General Grant, who had

262 DECISIVE BATTLES SEANCE WATERLOO.

moved up the Tennessee River after the capture of Fort
Donelson, and taken position at Pittsburg Landing. The
Confederate army attacked General Grant on the 6th
April, and the battle of Shiloh ensued. General Grant's
army was saved by the opportune arrival of a portion of
General Buell's army which had been marching to join it,
and the Confederates retreated to Corinth. Their defeat
rendered Island Number Ten untenable, and it was ev'acu-
ated on the 7th ; part of the garrison retiring to Fort
Pillow, 130 miles farther down the river, and apart falling
into the hands of General Pope as prisoners of war.

Fort Pillow was bombarded by the gun-boats for several
weeks, but it could not be attacked from the land side as
long as the Confederates held possession of Corinth. At
the end of May they evacuated Corinth, and the evacua-
tion of Fort Pillow followed immediately. The Union
fleet then steamed down the river, 70 miles to Memphis,
where a Confederate fleet of seven gun-boats waited to de-
fend the city. After a sharp battle, which was witnessed
by the population of Memphis from the bluff on which
that city stands, the Confederate boats were captured or
destroyed, and the Union forces were in possession of the
place.

Shortly after the capture of Memphis the Union flotilla
descended the river to Vicksburg, finding no obstructions
other than occasional light batteries which fired upon the
gun-boats from the banks. While the army and flotilla
had been making its way southward a national fleet, com-
manded by the intrepid Farragut, had passed the forts
near the mouth of the Mississippi, emerged victorious
from op.e of the greatest naval battles of the war, and com-
pelled the surrender of New Orleans. A land force under
General Butler arrived and took possession of the city,
and soon afterwards Admiral Farragut sent a portion of
his fleet under Commander Lee to ascertain what obstruc-
tions there might be to the navigation of the great river

SIEGE AND FALL OF VICKSBURG. 263

farther up. Commander Lee reached \^icksburg on the
1 8th May and judged that he could not successfully cope
with the batteries. He reported thus to Admiral Farra-
gut, and waited for reinforcements, which arrived during
the latter part of May. Early in June a bombardment
was begun, but without serious effect ; during June the fleet
was strengthened, and by the end of the month Admiral
Farragut arrived with his entire squadron, and accompa-
nied by an infantry force of four regiments under General
Williams.

The gun-boat flotilla from above and the naval fleet
from below met in front of Vicksburg, which was now the
only point firmly held by the Confederates along the
whole course of the Mississippi. On the 27th and 28th
June the lower fleet bombarded the defences for several
hours, and seven of the vessels passed the batteries and
joined the fleet above. The bombardment had very little
effect on the defences of Vicksburg ; shot and shell were
occasionally thrown into the town until the 15th Jul)-,
when the Confederate ram Arkansas, which had been con-
structed at Yazoo City, came out of the Yazoo River, and
after disabling two of the Union gun-boats, was safely
moored under the Confederate batteries at Vicksburg.

Fearing that this vessel might destroy his mortar boats
anchored below the city, Farragut again descended the
river, passing the forts in the night, and towards the end
of the month retired altogether from the vicinit}-. The
land force had been endeavoring to dig a canal across the
tongue of land known as Young's Point, directly opposite
Vicksburg. The canal was a failure, as water could not
be made to run through it, and the land force retired at
the same time as the lower fleet. The upper gun-boats
also went away, and before the first of August there was
no enemy in sight of Vicksburg. This first siege lasted
altogether more than two months, and though 25,000 shot
and shell were thrown into the place from the Union

264 DECISIVE BATTLES SINCE WATERLOO.

guns, the loss or damage to the Confederates was trifling;
they reported altogether 7 killed and 15 wounded.

During the latter half of 1862 no material advance tow-
ards the opening of the Mississippi was made. The
Confederates resumed the offensive, sending the larger
part of the army that withdrew from Shiloh to reinforce
the army that was defending Chattanooga. The Army
of the Ohio, under General Buell, was forced back through
Tennessee and Kentucky ; the Army of the Tennessee,
under General Grant, advanced along the line of the Mis-
sissippi Central Railway and was making good progress
towards a position on the line in the rear of Vicksburg.
General Pemberton commanded the Confederate forces
opposed to General Grant ; he held the line of the Tal-
lahatchie River, and in order to drive him from it General
Grant sent a cavalry force under Generals Washburne and
Hovey to cut the line of railway and menace Pemberton's
communications. This movement caused him to abandon
the line of the Tallahatchie and fall back to Grenada, and
as soon as he had done so the Union line was advanced
through Holly Springs to Oxford, where head-quarters
were established on the 3d December.

Grant proceeded to accumulate large quantities of
stores and munitions of war at Holly Springs preparatory
to another advance. Realizing the danger of a long line
of railway through an enemy's country, he decided to
make an attempt to establish a position in the rear of
Vicksburg, which would enable him to cut loose from his
line of railway and advance, en V air, until he could con-
nect with the new base and thus have a secure position
from which to prosecute the siege of Vicksburg. To
establish this base he ordered the corps which formed his
right wing to be embarked on transports and convoyed by
the gun-boat fleet to the mouth of the Yazoo River a
few miles above Vicksburg. Ascending the river some
ten or twelve miles, it was to land and occupy Haines'
Bluff, a commanding position in the rear of the city.

266 DECISIVE BATTLES SINCE WATERLOO,

The fleet of gun-boats and transports started from Mem-
phis on the 20th December, and on the 26th the troops
debarked on the south bank of the Yazoo River near the
mouth of Chickasaw Bayou. The whole day was con-
sumed in landing, and on the 27th the Confederate lines
were attacked. That day and the next passed in skirm-
ishes and small encounters of no great consequence. But
on the 29th an assault was made on the Confederate
works, in which there was heavy loss of life with no ad-
vantage to the Union side. The charge up the hillsides
seamed with rifle pits, covered with abatis, and raked by
artillery and small arms, was most heroic ; it was per-
formed by the division of General Morgan, reinforced by
the brigades of Generals Blair and Thayer from Steele's
division. General Thayer's brigade reached the edge of
the Confederate entrenchments side by side with that of
General Blair, but the fire was so furious that it could not
be met, and the storming party was driven back, leaving
the ground strewn with dead and wounded. The Union
loss in the attack on Haines' Bluff was 1,929 killed,
wounded, and missing ; that of the Confederates was 209.

The failure of the movement was due partly to the
delay in making the assault, and partly to the fact that on
the very day the expedition left Memphis General Grant's
line of communication was cut by the Confederate cav-
alry under General Van Dorn. That energetic offlcer
had been sent by Pemberton to attack Holly Springs,
which was insufificiently defended, having a garrison of
only 1,200 men under a commander who was soon after-
wards dismissed for incompetence. Van Dorn seized the
place and remained there several hours engaged in de-
stroying the immense stores which had been accumulated.
Then he rode away without molestation, having upset all
of General Grant's plans. Grant was compelled to retire
to Holly Springs, and his retirement gave opportunity
for Pemberton to send reinforcements to Vicksburs and

SIEGE AND FALL OF VICKSBURG. 267

enable the commander there to cope successfully with the
Union forces that attacked the forts at Haines' Bluff.

On the 2d January the troops at Chickasaw Bayou were
re-embarked. They left the Yazoo and ascended the
Mississippi to Milliken's Bend, about 12 miles above
Vicksburg, and there on the 4th January, General
M'Clernand assumed command. To restore in as great
measure as possible the morale of the troops disheartened
by the failure at Haines' Bluff, General M'Clernand order-
ed an attack upon Fort Hindman at Arkansas Post, on
the Arkansas River, a short distance from its mouth. This
fort commanded the navigation of the Arkansas River and
was a convenient striking point from which to interfere
with the safe navigation of the Mississippi by the Union
boats. Two transports had been captured by sallies of the
Confederates from Fort Hindman ; its garrison was known
to be small and the capture would not be a difficult matter
for the forces under General M'Clernand.

Fort Hindman was a regular, square bastioned work,
300 feet on each exterior side, with a parapet 18 feet high
and a ditch 15 feet deep. It mounted 12 guns, two of
them 8-inch and one 9-inch. The garrison comprised
about 6,000 troops under command of Brigadier-General
Churchill.

During the evening of the loth January, the gun-boats
bombarded the fort for about half an hour, from a distance
of 400 yards. On the nth, a combined attack of the
army and navy was made, the army having been landed
during the night and taken a position in the rear of the
fort. The battle lasted for four hours ; attack and defence
were ably conducted, and when further resistance was
useless, the Confederates displayed the white flag and the
works were occupied by the Union forces. Seven thousand
prisoners, 8,000 stand of arms, 20 pieces of artillery, and a
large amount of ammunition and commissary stores were
taken. The Union loss was 120 killed and about 480

268 DECISIVE BATTLES SINCE WATERLOO.

wounded; the Confederate loss in killed and wounded was
much less, owing to the shelter which the fort afforded.
Expeditions were sent to capture Des Arc and Duval's
Bluff, where there were small military posts ; the main
body of M'Clernand's command returned down the river
to Napoleon, Arkansas, and a few days later received
orders from General Grant to proceed to Young's Point,
just below Milliken's Bend.

Soon after the raid of Van Dorn upon Holly Springs,
General Grant determined to abandon the line of advance
by way of Grenada and Jackson, and to assault Vicksburg
with the river as his base. Leaving sufficient forces to
hold important points in Tennessee and Mississippi, he
transferred his army to Memphis by rail, and sent it thence
in steamboats to Milliken's Bend and Young's Point. The
transfer occupied the greater part of Januar)% and on the
2d February the General arrived in person at Milliken's
Bend and assumed command. The attack upon the works
at Haines' Bluff had demonstrated the impossibilit}- of
taking Vicksburg from that direction, and the General
proceeded to make plans for transferring the army below
the city.

Operations were resumed in the canal which General
Williams attempted to dig in the pre\'ious year, but the}'
were hindered b}' the rapid rise of the river and the inces-
sant rains. The earth taken from the canal was piled on
its western side to prevent the flooding of that part of the
country when the water was let in, as it is below the level
of the Mississippi at a high stage. An embankment at
the upper end of the canal was intended to keep out the
water until the work was completed.

On the night of the 8th March, this embankment gave
way and the river poured a torrent into the canal, carrying
away the digging implements, and flooding the camps of
the troops that were located near by. Several regiments
were obliged to gather their camp equipage and make a

SIEGE AND FALL OF VICKSBURG. 269

rapid run for the levee, and some of the troops that were
on the lower side of the peninsula had to be ferried over
to join the main body of the army. Attempts were made
to repair the damages, but the water was so high that they
were ineffectual, and it was evident that the canal could
not be utilized for its intended purpose.

While the work on the canal was progressing. General
Grant ordered a channel to be cut from the Mississippi
into Lake Providence, on the west side of the river, in the
hope of opening a route by which he might send trans-
ports and gun-boats to co-operate with General Banks
farther down. He also sent an expedition to the Cold-
water River, by way of Yazoo Pass, in the hope of getting
into the Yazoo River and destroying some transports and
partially completed gun-boats at Yazoo Git)-. The Con-
federates had established a navy-yard at that point, and it
was from there that the ram Arkansas descended in 1862
and created the havoc and alarm already described.

Neither of these and two or three similar enterprises
amounted to any thing further than to furnish occupation
for idle troops and keep the Confederates in considerable
alarm for their communications, and doubts as to the in-
tentions of the Union commander. The Confederates
had a steamboat, the City of Vicksbiirg, lying at the levee
in front of the town, and the Union commander desired
to destroy her. Colonel Ellet, commanding the ram,
Queen of the JTest, volunteered to undertake the danger-
ous task, and at the same time run below Vicksburg and
destroy other boats which the enemy were using for the
transport of troops and supplies across the river. To pro-
tect her as much as possible three hundred bales of cotton
were placed in such a position as to partially shield her
engines, and her steering wheel was removed from the
usual position and placed under shelter. But it was found
that with this arrangement she steered so badly that the
wheel was put back in its old place ; the necessity of the

270 DECISIVE BATTLES SINCE WATERLOO.

change delayed her starting, and instead of getting off at
daybreak, as first intended, it was full sunrise before she
was in front of Vicksburg. A hundred guns opened fire
upon her as soon as she came in range, but only a few
shots struck her.

She delivered a blow with her iron prow upon the side
of the City of Vicksburg, but owing to the broad guards
of the latter, the force of the impact was broken and the
hull was not injured. Circumstances did not permit de-
lay for a second blow, and the Queen of the JFi?.?/ continued
her journey down the stream after discharging some in-
cendiary shells into the enemy's boat. The cotton on the
Queen was fired by the enemy's shells, but all hands were
set to work to extinguish the flames and no serious dam-
age occurred. The steamer was soon out of range and
tied up to the shore on the southerly side of Young's
Point, where her commander was warmly greeted by the
ofificers of the troops stationed there.

The boat was struck about a dozen times, but all dam-
ages were repaired in a few hours. She then steamed
down the river. She burned several Confederate trans-
ports, returned for a supply of coal, and then started up
the Red River on an expedition in which she captured
one steamer, but was herself captured, having been run
ashore under the guns of a fort through the treacher\^ of
her pilot. Part of the crew was taken with the boat, but
the remainder, including Colonel Ellet, escaped to the
steamer De Soto, a tender of the Queen. On the latter
steamer the party descended the Red River to where the
Era, one of the captured boats, was lying. The De Soto
unshipped her rudder and could not be steered ; she was
blown up to prevent her falling into the hands of the
enemy, and the Era made good her escape and ascended
the river to the position of the army near Vicksburg.

Soon after the descent of the Queen of tJie West in front
of Vicksburg the gunboat Indianola followed her ; she

SIEGE AND FALL OF VICKSBURG, 27 1

drifted past the batteries with the force of the current
and was not discovered until in front of the town. The
batteries opened upon her, but she escaped unharmed, and
the success of the movement prompted General Grant to
make further attempts in the same direction. The Indi-
anola was captured in a fight with the Confederate gun-
boat Webb and the Qiiccn of the West, which had been
repaired and placed in the service of her captors. Soon
afterwards a coal-barge was disguised to resemble a gun-
boat and allowed to drift past the batteries of Vicksburg
in the night. Her pilot house was a small shed taken
from a plantation, and her smoke-stacks were made of
barrels piled endwise on top of one another, the topmost
one containing a kettle of burning tar.

A tremendous fire was opened from the batteries, but
the coal-barge, with not a soul on board, drifted along as
though nothing had happened, and passed beyond the
reach of the guns. The Indianola was being repaired a
few miles below, and fearing the supposed gun-boat would
recapture her, the Confederates sent a courier with orders
that she should be set on fire. By the time the ruse was
discovered and an order countermanding the burning
could be sent, the Indianola had been destroyed. She
burned and blew up and not even a gun was saved from
her.

Preparations were now made by General Grant for
transferring his army to a point on the Mississippi below
Vicksburg, and for this purpose General McClernand, on
the 29th of March, moved with the 13th corps to New
Carthage, distant by land from Milliken's Bend about
thirty-five miles. The movement was slow, as the roads
were bad ; the i6th corps followed, accompanied by long
trains of wagons transporting supplies and ammunition.
While the movement was going on preparations were
made for running several gun-boats and a fleet of trans-
ports past the batteries of Vicksburg. Eight gun-boats

2/2 DECISIVE BATTLES SINCE iVATERLOO.

and three transports were assigned for the effort ; the
plan was for the gun-boats to drift down at about a hun-
dred yards from each other and engage the batteries as
soon as they were discovered, but not before. The night
of the 1 6th of April was selected for the undertaking.
Under cover of the smoke of the cannonade the trans-
ports were to endeavor to slip through with a full head of
steam.

The gun-boats were fairly in front of the city before
there was any sign of life on shore. Suddenly two guns
were fired from the extreme right of the Vicksburg bat-
teries, and then the cannonade commenced along the
whole line of the works. The fleet immediately replied,
and a great cloud of smoke soon hid the boats from view.
Then the transports started at full speed, in the cover of the
smoke ; the Forest Queen, the foremost transport, was dis-
abled by a shot through her steam drum, and the Henry
Clay, which followed, was set on fire by a shell. The
Forest Queen drifted out of range, and was picked up by
a gun-boat ; the crew of the Henry Clay escaped in their
yawl, all except the pilot, who remained at his post till
the flames were around him, and finding that his signals
to the engineer were not answered, he jumped overboard
and was saved by one of the gun-boats. The Henry Clay
was burned, and drifted down the river a mass of flames.
The Silver Wave, the third transport, was not touched by
the Confederate shot and shell.

The success of this enterprise encouraged a similar one,
and on the night of the 22d of April, six transports were
sent down with barges of forage fastened to their sides to
protect them from artillery fire. Five of them got
through somewhat damaged, and full}- half the forage on
the barges was saved. The damaged transports were re-
paired, and supplied the desired facilities for moving the
army across the river and making ready for the attack on
Vicksburg. But the number was limited, and General

VICKSBURC

CAMPAIGN MAP- A/9 2

273

274 DECISIVE BATTLES SINCE WATERLOO.

Grant found it necessary to order the army to concentrate
at Hard Times, nearly opposite the town of Grand Gulf,
at the mouth of the Big Black River.

The batteries of Grand Gulf were engaged by the gun-
boats, but owing to the commanding position the Confed-
erates had the advantage, and it was not deemed prudent
to attempt to carry the place by assault after the bom-
bardment. The troops were marched across the point
from Hard Times, the gun-boats and transports ran past
the batteries of Grand Gulf in the night of the 29th of
April, and on the morning of the 30th the work of ferry-
ing the troops across was begun. They were landed at
Bruinsburg, supplied with three days' rations, and sent on
the road to Port Gibson, where a force of the enemy was
known to be posted.

General McClernand's corps had the advance, and stead-
ily drove back the enemy until within three or four miles
of Port Gibson. The Confederates made a stand on the
bank of Bayou Pierre, but were promptly defeated on the
1st May, and fled in the direction of Vicksburg. Grand
Gulf was abandoned on the 2d, the gun-boats finding it
deserted on the morning of the 3d. Considerable quan-
tity of ammunition and several heavy guns were captured
here ; the fortifications were very strong. If they had
been completed and properly garrisoned it would have
been impossible for any fleet to take them.

General Grant's plan of campaign was now evident to
every one, and the army moved forward with the anima-
tion that is developed by hope of success. The plan was
to advance along the valley of the Big Black River, and
the road to Jackson, until fairly in the rear of Vicksburg.
When this position was gained the army could close in
on the town, and at the same time cut off the arrival of
reinforcements or supplies for the garrison. But there was
a dangerous feature about the movement, that the army,
on leaving the Mississippi, would have to cut loose from

SIEGE AND FALL OF VICKSBURG. 2/5

its base, and in case of defeat its retreat again to the river
would be full of peril. It was necessary to strike out for a
new base, which General Grant decided should be at
Haines' Bluff, in the rear of Vicksburg. By swinging
around to that point he expected to open communication
to the banks of the Yazoo, where he could meet the gun-
boat and transport fleet.

On the same day that Grant crossed from Hard Times
to Bruinsburg, the 15th corps, which had been left at
Milliken's Bend, was ordered to make a demonstration on
Haines' Bluff, as though with a serious intent of capturing
it. General Blair's division, accompanied by several gun-
boats, and carried on ten transports, was sent up the
Yazoo to a point near the scene of the disaster in Decem-
ber. A vigorous demonstration was made during the
whole of the 30th, the troops being landed in full view of
the enemy, only to be re-embarked when night came on.
Similar demonstrations were made the next day at other
points on the Yazoo, and then the 15th corps proceeded
to follow the rest of the army to the crossing at Grand
Gulf as rapidly as possible. The demonstration had the
desired effect of drawing the attention of the Confederates
from the movements at Grand Gulf, and prevented their
despatching reinforcements to the menaced points.

All through the month of March and down towards the
end of April General Pemberton believed that General
Grant would be forced to abandon his attempt to take
Vicksburg, and he certainly had good reason for his belief
in the invulnerability of the place after so many and
futile attempts at its occupation. Pemberton was in
constant communication with General Joe Johnston, who
had chief command over the armies of Bragg and Pem-
berton, with head-quarters at Tullohoma, and steadily ad-
vised his superior that Vicksburg was in no danger ; but
when the gun-boats and transports passed the batteries,
and the Union army assembled in front of Grand Gulf,

276 DECISIVE BATTLES SINCE WATERLOO.

Pemberton saw that there was a sudden and disagreeable
change in the situation. On the 29th he telegraphed to
Johnston : " The enemy is at Hard Times in large force,
with barges and transports, indicating a purpose to attack
Grand Gulf with a view to Vicksburg." Before Johnston
had time to reply and give instructions how to prevent
Grant from crossing the river, the Union forces had
reached the east bank, and were pushing on towards
Vicksburg.

On May ist Pemberton telegraphed: "A furious battle
has been going on since daylight just below Port Gibson.
... I should hav^e large reinforcements. Enemy's
movements threaten Jackson, and, if successful, cut off
Vicksburg and Port Hudson." Johnston replied with in-
structions for Pemberton to unite all his forces and beat
Grant, which Pemberton found was much easier to say
than to do. He did his best ; but the enemy were too
strong for him. After the defeat at Port Gibson his
forces withdrew in the direction of Vicksburg. General
Grant advanced in pursuit to where the road from Port
Gibson to Vicksburg crosses the Big Black River at Hank-
inson's Ferry.

Here the Union army halted from the 3d to the 8th of
]\Iay, waiting for supplies from Grand Gulf and for the
arrival of the 15th corps, which was hastening on from
Milliken's Bend. Demonstrations were made in the di-
rection of Vicksburg, which was twenty miles away, as
though a direct attack was intended ; but that was not
General Grant's plan. His real design was to keep his
forces on the east bank of the Big Black, and strike the
Vicksbui'g and Jackson Railwa)^ about midway between
the two places, thus severing the connection with Pember-
ton and any reinforcements that might come to him from
the east. This would he done with the le'ft and centre
of the army, while the right wing would make a detour
eastward through Raymond to Jackson. After destroy-

SIEGE AND FALL OF VICKSBURG. 2//

ing the stores at that point and disabling the railway, the
right wing (McPherson's corps) would march westward to
join the rest of the army for moving on Vicksburg.

Four days were occupied in carrying out these move-
ments ; but unforeseen circumstances caused a change of
plan. On the I2th of May, when approaching Raymond,
McPherson's corps encountered two Confederate brigades,
which were defeated after a fight of two hours. They
retreated on Jackson, and were followed by ]\IcPherson,
who was confident of capturing the place without much
difficulty, when news came during the night that John-
ston was momentarily expected in Jackson to take com-
mand in person, and that troops were being concentrated
there with a view to strengthening Vicksburg. General
Grant immediately ordered the left and centre of the
army to march on Jackson, where it would join the right
wing, and be able to cope with whatever force might be
assembled there. Pemberton was at Edwards Station,
on the Vicksburg and Jackson Railway, and waiting to
deliver battle on the appearance of the enemy. But the
latter turned eastward before the railway was reached.

Johnston arrived at Jackson on the night of the 13th,
and immediately perceived the danger of the situation,
with the Union army between himself and Pemberton.
He immediately sent orders for the latter to move east
to Clinton, and attack Ihe rear of the Union army, while
he engaged it in front. Pemberton had 17,000 men at
Edwards Station, while Johnston had some 10,000 or
12,000 in Jackson. If these had co-operated there was a
possibility of defeating the Union army, though hardly a
probability. But without co-operation there was no hope
of success. Pemberton did not move as ordered, and
when McPherson's and the 15th corps reached Jack-
son on the 14th, all that Johnston could do was to engage
in a sort of rear guard fight for two hours or so, while he
removed the stores, or as much of them as possible, along

278 DECISIVE BATTLES SINCE WATERLOO.

the road to Canton. After destroying what they had no
use for, disabling the railway, and burning bridges, the
Union troops faced westward, and marched near the line
of the railway in the direction of Vicksburg.

Meantime Pemberton, after disregarding Johnston's
orders to move on Clinton, called a council of war of his
ofificers ; the majority of them favored moving as John-
ston had directed, which would enable the column, in case
of defeat, to connect with Johnston by making a detour
to the north from Clinton. But Pemberton was opposed
to any movement which would separate him from Vicks-
burg, which he considered his base, though it was obvi-
ously untenable in the then position of the Union army.
He advised a movement towards Raymond to sever
Grant's communications with his base at Grand Gulf, and
was supported by a minority of the ofificers forming the
council. He accordingly directed all his available forces,
about 17,500, to move in the direction of Raymond on
the afternoon of the 15th.

Under ordinary circumstances the movement was a
good one, but Grant had foreseen the possibility of it,
and on the iith he telegraphed to General Halleck that
he should communicate with Grand Gulf no more unless
it became necessary to send a train with a heavy escort.
" You may not hear from me again for several weeks,"
the despatch concluded, and thus Ihe army had dropped
its base and was moving en Fair. Therefore when Pem-
berton marched on the 15th to sever Grant's communica-
tions with Grand Gulf, there were none to sever. On the
same day McClernand was ordered to move his corps to
Edwards Station and continue the advance till he could
feel the enemy, but not to bring on a general engagement
unless he was confident of victory. General Blair's divi-
sion of the 15th corps was moved with McClernand, and
the rest of the 15th, together with McPherson's corps,
was ordered to join McClernand as rapidly as possible.

SIEGE AND FALL OF VICKSBURG. 279

By night the Union troops were within a few miles of
Edwards Station, and so close to Pemberton's army on the
Raymond road that their pickets were within speaking
distance. Pemberton on the morning of the i6th re-
ceived orders from Johnston to march northward, but he
soon found he could not do so without being met by the
Union army, which was interposing between him and
the direction of the Polar Star. He took up a strong posi-
tion at Champion Hill and prepared for battle: his left,
Stevenson's division, occupying Champion Hill ; the cen-
tre, Bowen's division, extending across Baker's Creek ; and
his right, Loring's division, stretching to the southward
among thick woods and deep ravines with sharply
sloping sides. Champion Hill is thickly wooded, and in
front of it is a cleared valley, the clearing extending a
short distance up the side of the hill.

Hovey's division of McClernand's corps was the first
to engage the enemy, which it did by coming up on the
Confederate left. Grant saw that a general battle was
imminent, and gave orders for Hovey not to engage seri-
ously until the rest of McClernand's corps could come
up, and also McPherson's, w^hich w^as pushing forward as
rapidly as possible. McPherson's corps was thrown to
the right so as to envelop the Confederate left and
threaten his rear, wdiile McClernand's divisions (other
than Hovey's) were marching towards the Confederate
right and centre. The firing between Hovey's division
and the Confederate skirmishers gradually increased, and
by eleven o'clock the skirmishing had swelled into a bat-
tle. The odds were against Hovey's division ; one bri-
gade and then another of Crocker's division of McPher-
son's corps were sent to assist Hovey, while Logan's
division (of McPherson corps) was effectively striking
against the Confederate rear and distracting his work in
front. In spite of this diversion, the Confederates were
able, with their superior numbers, to push back Hovey

28o DECISIVE BATTLES SINCE WATERLOO.

and those who came to his support ; but the line retreated
slowly, and ultimately gained a position where it could
pour a fire of artillery upon the Confederate line and
force it back in turn.

Logan's division worked so well around to the enemy's
rear that Pemberton realized his danger of being cut off
from Vicksburg and ordered a retreat. Stevenson's and
Bowen's divisions made good their escape, but Loring's
division was cut off and compelled to retire to the south-
ward, abandoning all its guns and losing many men, who
were captured. Loring found it impossible to retreat
into Vicksburg, but by making a wide detour south and
east he reached Jackson three days later (on the 19th),
and reported to Johnston with what he had saved from
his command.

The Union loss in this battle (Champion Hill) was 426
killed, 1,842 wounded, and 189 missing. The Confeder-
ates lost quite as heavily in killed and wounded, about
2,000 prisoners, 15 or 20 guns, and three or four thousand
small-arms. The battle was fought mainly by Hovey's
division, which lost about 1,200 in killed and wounded, as
it was engaged for several hours before the other divisions
could come to its aid. This assertion is not intended to
detract in any way from the other divisions, as all fought
gallantly as soon as they reached the field. The 15th
corps was too far away to be of service, as it was still
marching from Jackson, and only three divisions of
McClernand's corps could come up before the battle ended.
Two divisions (Carr's and Osterhaus') of McClernand's
corps pursued the fleeing enemy until dark, capturing
many wagons and adding considerably to the number of
prisoners.

The result of the battle of Champion Hill was to sever
completely the communications between Johnston and
Pemberton, and shut the latter up in Vicksburg. It was
virtually the beginning of the siege.

SIEGE AND FALL OF VICKSBUKG. 28 1

Next morning (i/th) the enemy was vigorously pur-
sued to the banks of the Black River, where they made a
stand to cover the passage of their train and artillery
across that stream. Besides the railway bridge, Pember-
ton had a bridge which consisted mainly of three steam-
boats, but he was not able to get all his impedimenta over
the river. Carr's division and Lawler's brigade carried
the Confederate defences after a fight of about two
hours, and Pemberton fled in the direction of Vicksburg,
leaving 18 guns, 1,500 prisoners, several thousand stand of
arms, and large quantities of commissary stores, to fall
into the Union hands. The loss of Grant's forces in the
affair of the Black River was 29 killed and 242 wounded.
Pemberton burned the bridges as he retired, and thus de-
layed pursuit. McClernand and McPherson built bridges
during the night, and the 15th corps, which had the only
pontoon train, crossed at I^ridgeport several miles above.

Each corps began crossing at eight A.M. on the i8th,
the 15th pressing forward to within i\ miles of Vicksburg,
when it turned to the right and occupied Walnut Hills to
open communication with the Yazoo. McPherson fol-
lowed the route of the 15th corps to where it turned off
to the right, and there he halted for the night. McCler-
nand advanced on the direct road from Jackson to Vicks-
burg, and when near the city turned to the left. On
the morning of the 19th the investment of the city was
practically completed, though there were several gaps to
be filled in the lines of the besiegers. Vicksburg was in
a state of siege.

Communication was opened with the gun-boat fleet,
which had been guarding the front of Vicksburg and pre-
venting the receipt of supplies by river. The gun-boats
then ascended to attack Haines' Bluff, which the Confed-
erates immediately evacuated, as their position was no
longer tenable with the Union forces in their rear. The
fortifications at Haines' Bluff were found to be strongly

282 DECISIVE BATTLES SINCE WATERLOO.

constructed, and abundantly supplied with material of
war, the ammunition being sufficient for a long siege.
The author of " The American Conflict " says : " It would
hardly be credited on other testimony than his own, that
our admiral proceeded to destroy this inestimable material
of war with full knowledge that Grant's triumphant army
was at hand to defend and utilize it."

General Grant, apprehending an attack by Johnston's
relieving force from Jackson, and counting much on the
demoralization of Pemberton's command, ordered an as-
sault on the 20th, at 2 P.M. The Union flag was planted
on the Confederate earthworks by Blair's division of the
15th corps, but an entrance was not effected owing to the
severity of the Confederate fire. A second assault on a
larger scale w^as made on the 22d, at 10 A.M., and to make
sure of a simultaneous movement, the corps commanders
set their watches by General Grant's. The gun-boats co-
operated by opening fire in front, and at the appointed
time the assault was general along the whole line.

Sergeant Griffith and 11 men of the 22d Iowa infantry,
of McClernand's corps entered one of the bastions of a
fort in front of jMcClernand's position, but all except the
sergeant were killed or captured. In two instances at
other points regimental flags were planted on the bastions,
but that was all. The whole attack was repulsed with a
loss of nearly 3,000 in killed, wounded, and captured. At
one time General McClernand thought his attack had
been successful, and sent word to that effect to General
Grant, and at the same time he asked reinforcements,
which were sent. Colonel Boomer commanding one of
the reinforcing brigades was killed just as his men went
into action, and shortly afterwards the assaulting force
was hauled off.

It was evident that Vicksburg could only be taken by
siege, and General Grant sat down in front of it for that
purpose. When he invested the place his forces were

scALC or MIL£:.S

VICKSBURC

SHLTCH PLAN OF SIEGE LINES

284 DECISIVE BATTIES SINCE WATERLOO.

about equal to those of Pemberton whom he was besieging ;
each had not far from 30,000 men, and it has been claimed
by some historians that the Confederates were numerically
superior. Be this as it may, the relative conditions of the
two armies was vastly different. The Union forces were
flushed with victory, while the Confederates were disheart-
ened by defeat ; the Union forces were well fed and cloth-
ed, having opened communications with their heavily
laden transports in the Yazoo, while the Confederates were
poorly supplied and had starvation staring them in the
face. Grant had an abundance of ammunition, while Pem-
berton was but poorly supplied, and of his 30,000 men
there were 6,oco in hospital, so that he could hardly mus-
ter more than 15,000 effectives.

Reinforcements, provisions, munitions, artillery, and in-
trenching tools were sent down the river to Grant, and the
men set to work with a will to dig their vv^ay into Vicks-
burg. The rugged hills, which afforded excellent ground
for constructing works of defence before the siege, were
utilized by the besiegers while they prosecuted their enter-
prise. Day and night the cannon rained shot and shell
into the doomed cit\', the land forces under Grant being
seconded vigorously by the gun-boats and mortar rafts of
the flotilla. Mine after mine was run under the enemy's
works, and met by countermines, which were often so close
that the diggers were separated only by thin curtains of
earth and could plainly hear the blows of pick and spade.
Portions of the defensive works were blown up, but no
practicable breach was made to justif)' an assault in force.

Famine was busily at work inside the walls of Vicksburg,
and knowing the state of affairs there. General Grant was
willing to wait patiently for the result. A Confederate
officer thus tells the stor}- :

About the thirty-fifth day provisions began to get very
scarce, and the advent of General Johnston's relieving force
was anxiously and momentarily looked for. Mule meat was

SIEGE AND FALL OF VICKSBURG. 285

the common fare of all alike, and even dogs became in request
for the table. Bean meal was made into bread, and corn meal
into coffee, and in these straits the garrison patiently dragged
on the weary length of one day after another, under a scorch-
ing sun, the stench from the unburied corpses all around alone
causing the strongest-minded, firmest-nerved, to grow impa-
tient for the day of deliverance. The enemy pushed their
works ; they blew up several forts, and with them the garrison,
and attempted to charge ; but the meagre and famished yet
steadfast garrison still defiantly held the key to the Mississippi.
But every thing must have an end. General Pemberton
learned from General Johnston that he could not afford him
relief, and as the garrison was too famished and reduced to cut
its way out, he determined to capitulate.

During the siege Johnston made great efforts to gather
an army to relieve Vicksburg, but he was unable to do so
until too late. On the 29th June he left Jackson with
about 24,000 men, and marched in the direction of the Big
Black, in the hope of creating a diversion sufificient to
enable Pemberton's army to cut its way out. On the 3d
July he sent word to Pemberton to hold out until the 7th,
when such a diversion would be made, but already Pem-
berton had begun negotiations for surrender.

On the morningof the 3d July, after 45 days of isolation.
General Pemberton ordered a white flag displayed on the
bastion of one of the earthworks. The flag was shown in
front of General A. J. Smith's division, and firing ceased
at that point. An of^cer went to ascertain the reason for
the display of the flag, and found that General Bowen, who
commanded one of the Confederate divisions, and Colonel
Montgomery of General Pemberton's staff had a com-
munication for General Grant. They were blindfolded
and taken to the tent of General Burbridge, whence the
letter was forwarded to the commander-in-chief. It
proved to be an application for an armistice with a view
to arranging terms for capitulation. General Grant replied

286 DECISIVE BATTLES SINCE WATERLOO.

that he could Hsten to nothing short of unconditional sur-
render, but expressed a willingness to meet General Pem-
berton during the afternoon at any hour he might name.
Three o'clock was appointed for the conference, and orders
were given to cease firing along the whole line at that
hour.

The conference was begun in presence of several officers
of both armies, but it had not progressed far before Gen-
eral Grant invited General Pemberton to walk away a little
distance where they would be unheard by others. They
sat down under a tree and talked for about an hour. The
conference was ended without any agreement as to the
details of the surrender, General Grant agreeing to send
in his proposals that evening. They were sent in accord-
ingly, General Grant demanding the surrender of the works
and city, prisoners to be paroled, private soldiers to be al-
lowed all their clothing but no other property, and offi-
cers to retain their side arms, private baggage, and one
horse to each mounted officer.

Pemberton replied, accepting the terms in a general
way, but making several stipulations to which Grant re-
fused to accede. In his reply to Pemberton, Grant said
that if the terms were not accepted by 9 A.M. on the fol-
lowing day, they would be considered rejected. Accept-
ance could be signified by the display of white flags along
the Confederate lines before that hour.

The white flags were displayed and the long siege was
over. At 9 A.M. General McPherson rode into Vicksburg
to receive the surrender ; he met Pemberton half a mile
inside the lines, where they were soon joined by Grant.
Gen. Logan went in to establish a provost guard ; the stars
and stripes were hoisted over the court-house, and the
soldiers sang " Rally round the Flag " with an enthusiasm
which had a double force in view of the triumph and the
fact that the surrender took place on the Fourth of July,
the anniversary of the nation's birth. Early in the after-

SIEGE AND FALL OF VICKSBURG. 287

noon the Union fleet of gun-boats and transports was tied
along the levee of Vicksburg, and the citizens, who had
been hiding in caves and living in constant terror of shot
and shell for six long weeks, were able to walk about
without danger.

General Grant reported his losses, from the day he
landed at Bruinsburg until the surrender, at 943 killed,
7,095 wounded, and 537 missing, a total of 8,575, ^^ whom
4,236 fell before Vicksburg, the most of them in the assault
of May 22d. Twenty-seven thousand prisoners were pa-
roled in Vicksburg, of whom only 1 5,000 were effective for
duty. The loss of the enemy in the whole campaign, from
Bruinsburg to the surrender, was 37,000 prisoners, among
them 15 general officers, and at least io,ooo killed and
wounded, including 3 generals. Arms and munitions for
an army of 60,000 men were taken, besides a large amount
of other public property, such as railway cars, locomotives,
steamboats, cotton, etc. A vast amount was destroyed
to prevent its capture.

Immediately after the surrender of Vicksburg, General
Grant ordered the division of General F. J. Herron to go
to aid in the siege of Port Hudson, which was being con-
ducted by General Banks. Port Hudson is 200 miles
below Vicksburg, and was invested about the time General
Grant drew his lines around Vicksburg. General Gardner,
its commander, heard of the surrender of Vicksburg, and
sent a flag of truce to General Banks to ascertain the cor-
rectness of the report. The latter sent a copy of General
Grant's despatch announcing the momentous event, and,
on being satisfied of its correctness, General Gardner
made a formal surrender of Port Hudson and its garrison,
6,000 strong. General Banks received General Gardner's
sword, and immediately returned it in consideration of the
gallantry its owner had displayed in the defence of the
post intrusted to his charge.

News of the surrender of Port Hudson arrived just as

288 DECISIVE BATTLES SINCE WATERLOO.

General Herron's division had embarked. Consequently
its destination was changed to the Yazoo River, which it
ascended to Yazoo City, where it captured one steamboat
and some other property. Twent}--two steamboats had
been carried farther up th'" Yazoo, where they were burned
or sunk by the Confederates to save them from capture.
Herron captured and brought away 300 prisoners, 6 heavy
guns, 250 small-arms, 800 horses, and 2,000 bales of cotton
belonging to the Confederate government.

In its consequences the capture of Vicksburg, naturally
and imperatively followed by that of Port Hudson, was of
the highest importance. The Mississippi River was opened
from its mouth to the head of navigation, and "The
Father of Waters flowed unvexed to the sea." The Con-
federacy was split in two, and its western half could no
longer send supplies of cattle, salt, provisions, and other
needed articles to the armies in the east. The 37,000
prisoners taken in the campaign, together with the 10,000
killed and wounded, were an army which the Confederacy,
already heavily overmatched by the Union forces, could
sadly afford to lose. It was an army to which the gov-
ernment at Richmond had confided the defence of the
Mississippi, and with its surrender was gone the hope of
holding any point on the great river.

In a speech at Jackson, Mississippi, in December, 1862,
the President of the Confederacy urged the citizens to
go to Vicksburg to " assist in preserving the Mississippi
River, that great artery of the country, and thus conduce,
more than in any other way, to the perpetuation of the
Confederacy, and the success of the cause." It is fair to
say that this view of the value of the possession of the
mighty stream was shared by all the people of the South,
and no less by those of the North. Consequently the fall
of Vicksburg was an irreparable loss to the one and a gain
of immense importance to the other. It was beyond all
question one of the most decisive events of the war.

ST^^^^ ^V^3lC '-^Sg^^.-^^^fi^^S^^^ {,J^i:U^ CiJV.

CHAPTER XVI.

BATTLE OF FIVE FORKS AND LEE's SURRENDER— 1 865.

In the latter part of May, 1865, a steamer which had
left New York two months before for San Francisco,
by way of the Straits of Magellan, touched at Callao,
Peru. Her passengers were anxious for news from home.
Hurrying on shore, one of them found a man who
had just arrived from New York by steamer from that
port to Aspinwall, and the English mail steamer from
Panama. " What has happened in the last sixty days,
and how is the war getting on ? " was the passenger's
inquiry.

" Oh, nothing much," was the reply. " Richmond 's
taken, Lee and Johnston's armies have surrendered, Lin-
coln has been assassinated, and Jeff. Davis is captured."
It is not an overstatement to say that the listener was
deprived of the power of speech for fully a minute, so
great was his astonishment at this momentous intelligence.

The closing scenes of the rebellion were dramatically
rapid in their movement, hardly less so than represented
by the terse declaration quoted above. The battle that
compelled t'ne evacuation of Petersburg and Richmond
was fought on the first day of April, the evacuation took
place on the 2d and 3d, Lee surrendered his army on the
9th, President Lincoln was assassinated on the 15th, John-
ston's army surrendered on the 26th, General Dick Taylor's
army surrendered May 4th, President Davis was captured
on the nth, on the 22d May a proclamation of President

289

290 DECISIVE BATTLES SINCE WATERLOO.

Johnson opened the Southern ports to commerce as of
old, and on the 29th a proclamation of general amnesty
was issued, — and all this within two short months.

The battle of Five Forks may be regarded as the decisive
battle that ended the war, as its result compelled the re-
treat, and led to the capture of Lee and his gallant army,
that had so long defended Virginia against the Northern
forces. For four years Lee had prevented the capture of
Richmond ; for four years he had repeatedly driven back
the Union army whenever it sought to advance, and on two
occasions he had crossed the Potomac and endeavored to
carry the war into the Northern States. Since his defeat at
Gettysburg many a battle had been fought and many a
noble life expended in the effort to capture or defend the
capital of the Confederacy. But the end was approaching.

The Northern press and public clamored for the cap-
ture of Richmond, and down to near the close of the war
that rebellious city was the goal which the commanders
of the Army of the Potomac struggled to reach. Seven
in all had made the attempt, McDowell, McClellan, Pope,
Burnside, Hooker, Meade, and last of all Grant. After
the fall of Vicksburg, he had been summoned to Wash-
ington, and placed in command of the Army of the Poto-
mac, under fewer restrictions than had been given to the
commanders who preceded him. All his predecessors had
been overruled and hampered in their movements by
orders from Washington ; Grant declined the command
unless he could have it without interference, and, doubt-
less with great reluctance, his demand was conceded by
the Washington authorities.

Between Gettysburg and Five Forks great progress had
been made towards the suppression of the rebellion.
Savannah, Wilmington, and Charleston successively fell
into Union hands. Mobile was securely blockaded, and
the Confederates were without a port of consequence
alone their entire coast line of ocean and gulf. After the

BA TTLE OF FIVE FORKS AND LEE 'S SURFEA'DEK. 29 1

opening of the Mississippi by the capture of Vicksburg
and Port Hudson, the army which had accomplished that
great task was drawn to the eastward, and marched to the
sea through Tennessee and Georgia, gaining victories at
Chicamauga, Chattanooga, Atlanta, and other points.
Hood's Confederate army was practically annihilated by
Thomas at Nashville, and the armies of Hardee, Bragg,
and Beauregard had been gradually assembled under Joe
Johnston, and formed a veteran force which was not to
be lightly considered.

And now, early in 1865, while the Northern press and
public clamored as loudly as ever for the capture of
Richmond, that event was the very thing which Gen-
eral Grant did not desire. For the capture of Richmond
meant the retirement of Lee's army to a junction with John-
ston, and the combination of those armies under two such
wily commanders would be a serious danger to the Union
" Army of the Mississippi," which, having made its march
to the sea, was now advancing northward, through the
Carolinas, to attack Johnston. That it could defeat him
single-handed there was no reasonable doubt, but with
Lee's army added to Johnston's, there was great danger
of a serious reverse to the Union arms. Consequently
Grant's great desire was to keep Lee in Richmond until
the Union army could be so disposed that escape would
be impossible.

Since the early days of March, Lee had been planning
to retire from Richmond and join his army with that of
Johnston, and information of this design had been brought
to General Grant. Lee and Johnston had made their
preliminary arrangements, and the route by which the
army would retreat was already laid out. The Richmond
papers demanded that the city should be held at all haz-
ards, and the Confederate government was unwilling
that the fact that a retirement had been thought of
should be known. The most emphatic denials were given

292 DECISIVE BATTLES SINCE WATERLOO.

to the rumor when it first went abroad, and to show the
intention of holding on to the place new fortifications
were constructed at several points. But Grant was not
to be deceived, and he pushed his preparations for taking
the Confederate army in a trap.

With 10,000 cavalry Sheridan moved like a whirlwind
through the Shenandoah Valley and made a wide sweep
to the left of the Army of the Potomac, meeting little
opposition, and demonstrating that all troops that could
possibly be withdrawn from isolated points had been sent
to Richmond. Wilson, with 13,000 men in his command,
swept through Alabama and Georgia ; and about the same
time Stoneman advanced from Knoxville, Tennessee, with
a strong column of cavalry, with which he devastated West-
ern North Carolina. These various raids demonstrated
that the Confederacy was but a shell whose kernel had
been exhausted. All men capable of bearing arms had
gone to the war, and there was no remaining material for
the formation of new armies.

Though much larger on paper, Lee's army was not over
50,000 strong in effectives, while that of Johnston could
not muster more than 30,000. Against Lee, Grant could
bring a force of double the number, and while the former
planned to escape and join Johnston, with whom he
hoped to deliver a crushing blow to the Army of the Mis-
sissippi before Grant could overtake him, the latter was
quietly studying to prevent the escape. Lee's plan was
to retire by the Cox road, south of the Appomattox, and
in order to cover his movement he made on the 25th of
March an attack on Fort Steadman, on the Union right.
Grant was in position in front of Petersburg, so that his
army extended nearly to, but did not cover, the Cox road.
Lee thought that the troops near the Cox road would be
drawn away to support the attack on Fort Steadman.
The attack was made by two divisions of Gordon's corps,
and the fort was carried in fine style. But the attack was

293

294 DECISIVE BATTLES SINCE WATERLOO.

not supported, and the result was the Confederates were
compelled to retire after heavy losses in killed and wound-
ed, and nearly 2,ooo prisoners.

The Union forces were not withdrawn from the Cox
road as Lee had expected, and consequently he could not
carry out his plan of escaping b}' that route. Realizing
that Lee must have withdrawn men from other parts of
his lines in order to attack Fort Steadman, Gen. Meade
ordered an adv^ance of the 6th and 2d corps, who were in
position to the left of Fort Steadman. He found what
he had expected, and the Union troops took possession of
the Confederate picket line and permanently held it.
Thus Lee's movement, which was intended to cut the
Union army in two by the occupation of Fort Steadman
and the works behind it, and thus afford him an opportu-
nity to escape, was not only a failure, but resulted in his
loss of important points.

This affair did not in the least interfere with Grant's
plans, which were for a general movement on the 29th
March. He proposed to swing a portion of his army
around " by the left," and enable it to turn completely the
Confederate right. By the success of this movement Lee
would be effectually cut off from escape to the southward.

Three divisions of the Army of the James, which had
long been h'ing in front of Richmond, were brought
around to the left of the Union lines facing Petersburg.
As soon as they were in position the 5th corps (Warren's)
and the 2d corps (Humphreys') were ordered to the
southwestward till they had crossed Hatcher's Run ; then
they faced northward and advanced till they could feel the
Confederate right. On the extreme left was Sheridan
with 10,000 cavalry, acting under orders direct from Gen-
eral Grant. Warren's corps had a slight encounter with
the enemy, in which about 400 men were' killed and
wounded on the Union side ; the Confederates lost about
the same in casualties, with the addition of 100 prisoners.

BA TTLE OF FIVE FORKS AND LEE 'S SURRENDER. 295

During the night and all the next day (30th), rain fell
heavily and the ground became unfit for the execution of
movements of any consequence. Warren remained in
the position he had taken on the 29th in front of the
Confederate intrenchments ; Humphreys and Sheridan
moved up a little so as to bring them well towards the
intrenchments, but did not endeavor to bring on a battle.
Sheridan brought his cavalry in front of Five Forks, where
he found the Confederates strongly posted, and after
surveying the ground carefully he rode back to Dinwiddle
Court-House where Grant was waiting to see him. Grant
ordered Warren to support Sheridan, and placed him
under the latter's command.

The ground was still so soaked on the next morning that
Grant proposed to do nothing, but Lee was not so inclined.
Leaving Longstreet with 8,000 men to hold the works in
front of Richmond, he marched the rest of his infantry to
the support of his right, which was so seriously threatened
by Sheridan and the 5th and 2d corps. Sheridan had com-
pletely isolated the Confederate cavalry, which had been
posted on Stony Creek, and it was compelled to make a
long detour to enable it to join the rest of Lee's forces.

Unaware of Lee's intention to attack, Warren had sent
skirmishers on his left to seize the White Oak road which
was beyond the Confederate right, and ordered Ayres to
send one brigade to support the movement. About half-
past ten o'clock in the forenoon, Lee suddenly appeared
on the flank and rear of Ayres' division, and struck so
vigorously that the whole column was thrown back in
confusion. The confusion was conveyed to Crawford's
division, which also broke and retired in disorder, and for
a little while it looked as though Lee was having decid-
edly the best of it.

Griffin's division stopped the Confederate advance, en-
abling Ayres and Crawford to rally behind it. This being
done, Warren advanced, supported by Humphreys, and

296 DECISIVE BATTLES SINCE WATERLOO.

the Confederates were soon in retreat, having lost heavily
in killed, vx'ounded, and prisoners. The Confederates re-
tired to their intrenchments, which they defended so
desperately that several attempts failed to dislodge them.
While this was going on, Sheridan advanced from Dinwid-
dle C.-H. to Five Forks, which he carried while Lee's in-
fantry was engaged with Warren.

But he was not allowed to stay there long, as Lee turned
from the fight wdth Warren as soon as the attack had
failed, and sent two divisions along the White Oak road
to Five Forks, where they encountered Devin's division
and Davies' brigade of cavalry, whom they drove out in
disorder towards Dinwiddle C.-H. They followed in pur-
suit until they presented their flank and rear to Sheridan's
main body, from which they had separated Devin. Sheri-
dan charged with two brigades, and fighting continued till
dark, after which the Confederates withdrew, Lee rightly
concluding that his two divisions ran great risk of being
taken in flank and rear b}- Warren, w'hile engaging
Sheridan.

There was some alarm at head-quarters when it was
learned that the Confederates had driven Sheridan back
from Five Forks to Dinwiddle C.-H., and had a good
chance of routing him ; Sheridan probably was not easy
in his mind until he found about midnight that the enemy
was retiring. Then he felt perfectly secure, and made his
plans for advancing on the morrow.

Sheridan, supported by A}Tes, moved at daybreak
April 1st, and was joined about 7 A.M. by Warren, with
his two other divisions. By 2 P.M. he had fought his
way to Five Forks, and driven in the enemy with the
aid of his cavalry alone, leaving Warren's corps in the
rear waiting for orders. When the Confederates were
fairly within their intrenchments at Five Forks, Sheridan
ordered Merritt's cavalry division to turn their right,
Sheridan pressing in front, and sending Warren's corps on

BA TTLE OF FIVE FORKS AND LEE 'S SURRENDER. 297

his (Sheridan's) right, along the White Oak road, so as to
come in on the enemy's flank. Then by a left-wheel
movement Warren was to fall back upon that flank in full
force, McKenzie, with the cavalry from the army of the
James, covering Warren's right so that Lee could not
draw reinforcements from Richmond.

Owing to the nature of the ground Warren could not
move rapidly, thereby incurring the censure of Sheridan.
It was 4 P.M. before the troops were in position for the
charge, and when the order was given the movement was
gallantly executed. Ayres' division was broken at one
time by the severity of the enemy's fire, and there was
great danger that it would be forced to fall back, but by a
prompt order Sheridan sent Grif^fin's command to its re-
lief, and the disorder was only momentary.

The turning movement was successful, the Confederates
being taken in front and flank almost simultaneously.
Their position was important, and they fought desper-
ately, but superior numbers forced them back, as they
were only two divisions, Pickett's and Bushrod Johnson's.
Ayres' division carried their flank intrenchments and cap-
tured about one thousand prisoners, while Grififin struck
them in the rear and took as many more. Meantime Craw-
ford pushed ahead to the Ford road, which ran northward
from the Confederate centre, and cut ofT their retreat
towards the rest of their army. Crawford captured four
guns and several hundred prisoners, and at the same time
the cavalry, pressing on the other flank of the Confederates,
turned their left and put all that remained of the enemy
to flight. The cavalry pursued until darkness made it
impossible to follow farther. The Union loss in the day's
fighting was about 1,000, while that of the Confederates
amounted to 5,000 prisoners, not counting killed and
wounded, which were estimated equal to those of the
Union forces.

Sheridan sent GrifTfin to move eastward with two divi-

298 DECISIVE BATTLES SINCE WATERLOO.

sions of infantry to Gravelly Church, and open communi-
cation with the rest of ihe army. Another division went
to support McKenzie's cavalry, which had advanced on
the Ford road up to Hatcher's Run. At 10 p.m. a gen-
eral cannonade was begun along the whole line by order
of General Grant, and continued through the night.

At daybreak on the 2d April there was a general as-
sault along the Confederate line by the 2d, 6th, 9th, 24th,
and 25th corps. The fire of the enemy was destructive
and retarded the advance at several points, but could not
stop it. The 6th corps carried the works in its front, and
one division (Seymour's), broke through to the South-Side
railway and began to tear it up. The 24th corps was also
successful, and so were the 2d and 9th. The 9th had
probably the hardest fighting of the day, in which it cap-
tured Fort Mahone, on the Jerusalem plank road ; the
enemy tried to retake it, and was nearly successful, when
the 6th corps came to the aid of the 9th, and the dearly
obtained position was saved. A Confederate brigade
(Harris'), which defended one of the forts, was 250 strong at
the beginning of the battle, and lost 220 men before it
was over.

Along nearly the whole line the outer defences were
entirely in the hands of the assailants, and though Lee
still held the city of Petersburg he saw that his position
was no longer tenable. Accordingly, at 10.30 a.m. he
telegraphed as follows to President Davis :

My lines are broken in three places. Richmond must be
evacuated this evening.

Mr. Davis was in church when this dispatch was hand-
ed to him. He rose and walked out quietly, and the ser-
vice went on as though nothing had happened. But
there was a deathly silence over the whole congregation,
and every one felt that something awful was about to
happen. After the services were over the news spread

£A TTLE OF FIVE FORKS AND LEE 'S SURRENDER. 299

rapidly, and before noon everybody who cared to know
was aware that Richmond was about to be occupied by
the enemy.

There was great excitement in the city all through the
afternoon, many persons desiring to go with the Confed-
erate government and follow its fortunes. Wagons and
carriages rose to an enormous price, as much as $100 in
gold or Union currency being offered for a conveyance
for a single day. The streets were filled with a mass of
fugitives carrying trunks, boxes, and all sorts of recep-
tacles. As a precautionary measure the City Council
ordered the destruction of all intoxicating liquors in
Richmond, and hundreds of barrels were rolled out and
their contents poured into the gutters. General Ewing
ordered the burning of the four principal tobacco ware-
houses in spite of the protests of the Mayor and Council,
who feared that the whole business part of the city would
be destroyed. As was expected, the fire caused great de-
struction, and the first work of the Union troops that
entered Richmond was to extinguish the flames. The
Confederate gun-boats were blown up and burned, and all
the steamers at the dock were burned with the exception
of a single flag-of-truce boat.

The government wagons removed as much as possible
from the commissary depot, and then the place was
thrown open to the public to help themselves. Bacon,
flour, etc., by the ton were thus distributed to many who
had long stood in sore need of it. As usually happens in
such cases, the strong overpowered the weak, and it is
said that several persons were trampled to death in the
rush that followed the opening of the doors.

During the night of the 2d the evacuation went on, and
about 3 A.M. a negro came from Richmond into the
Union lines and announced that the Confederates had
gone. General Weitzel rode in about 6 A.M. Threading
his way carefully ove; the ground, which was thickly

300 DECISIVE BATTLES SINCE WATERLOO.

planted with torpedoes, and accompanied by his staff, he
reached the centre of the city in advance of his troops,
and hoisted the American flag over the capitol. The
Confederate works were found to be of great strength,
and those who saw them did not wonder that the Union
army had so long been kept at bay, when they remem-
bered that the defences were manned by Lee's tried and
trusty veterans.

The evacuation of Petersburg was simultaneous with
that of Richmond, and was conducted so quietly that the
Union pickets, only a few yards away, were unaware of it
until da}'light showed that the Confederates had gone.
The Confederates had a start of several miles, marching
out along the Danville Railway, and the direct road to
Lynchburg, by which Lee still hoped to effect a junction
with Johnston, and again take the offensive either against
Grant or the Army of the Mississippi. Unfortunately
for him, he was compelled to take the north side of the
Appomattox, as the forces of Grant were mainly on the
south side of that river, and completely barred his retreat
in that direction.

With his army reduced to less than 35,000 men, Lee
pushed as rapidly as possible to Amelia C.-H., where he
had ordered supplies sent from Danville. By a mistake
in the execution of the order, the train laden with these
supplies had been sent to Richmond, and consequently
the weary and famished soldiers were compelled to forage
on the already exhausted country and find what food they
could. Here he rested on the 4th and 5th April and then
prepared to advance, still hoping to reach Lynchburg
before the enemy could interfere with him. But his plans
were rudely frustrated.

By following directly after Lee and engaging him in
battle, Grant would still leave the Confederate general an
open way to Lynchburg in case of defeat. His object
was not to defeat, but to capture Lee with his whole army,

BA TTLE OF FIVE FORKS AND LEE 'S SURRENDER. 30!

and with this object in view he sent Sheridan with the
cavalry and the 5th corps to move as rapidly as possible
by roads considerably south of the one through Amelia
C.-H., and thus get in front of Lee and intersect his
movements. Sheridan executed the order with the dash
for which he was famous ; he struck the line of the
Richmond and Danville Railway at Jetersville, where he
planted himself, prepared to resist the whole of Lee's
forces until Grant and Meade could come up and deliver
a crushing blow in the rear. Late in the afternoon of the
5th, Meade arrived with the 2d and 6th corps, while Lee
was still at Amelia C.-H., which he left on the night of
the 5th.

Lee marched around the position of Meade and Sheri-
dan at Jetersville, aiming for Farmville, where he hoped
to recross the Appomattox and escape. But General
Davies, with his cavalry brigade, had advanced to the road
and struck Lee's train in advance of his infantry, destroy-
ing 180 wagons and capturing 5 guns and many prisoners.
Two other cavalry brigades came to the relief of Davies,
who was hard pressed by the enemy. They fell back to
Jetersville, whence they continued the pursuit the next
day (6th), striking the enemy's line at Sailor's Creek,
where a brilliant engagement was fought ; 400 wagons
were destroyed, and 16 guns and a considerable number
of prisoners were taken. The Confederate line was pierced ;
General Ewell's division, 6,000 strong, being cut off from
the rest and compelled to surrender, though it fought as
long as there was any chance of escape.

On the evening of the 6th, Lee crossed the Appomattox
at Farmville, his rear being so closely pressed that he was
unable to destroy the bridge of the wagon road, though
he succeeded in burning the railway bridge. The rear-
guard retired just as General Barlow's division arrived, and
so rapid was the retreat that the Confederates abandoned
18 guns and many wagons. The pursuit was kept up

302 DECISIVE BATTLES SINCE WATERLOO.

through the 7th and 8th with no engagement of conse-
quence. The 2d and 6th corps under Meade followed
directly in the trail of Lee and his fugitive companions,
while Sheridan's cavalry pushed on to head off Lee,
followed by Ord's and Griffin's infantry divisions, who
could not, of course, keep pace with the horses. As it
was now impossible for Lee to make for Danville, Sheridan
took a position to head him off from Lynchburg, which
was now his only place of refuge. Sheridan learned that
four trains laden with supplies for Lee's starving soldiers
had been sent from Lynchburg and were at Prospect
Station, five miles from Appomattox C.-H. Making a
forced march of twenty-eight miles, he captured these
trains, and then sent Custer's division forward, which
soon found itself in front of Lee's advance.

Custer fought until darkness put an end to the combat,
driving the advance back on the main body of the army,
and capturing 25 guns, a hospital train, and a large number
of wagons, and making many prisoners. Sheridan brought
up the rest of the cavalry, and planted it right in front
of Lee's army, and sent couriers to Grant, Grif^n, and Ord,
saying that the capture of Lee's whole army was now
certain. Griffin and Ord with their corps and one division
of the 25th corps made a forced march during the night
and reached Appomattox at daylight on the 9th.

And now came one of the most dramatic incidents of
the war — an incident which dwarfs to littleness the most
magnificent spectacle ever presented on the theatrical
stage.

On the morning of that memorable 9th of April, Lee's
army of ragged, starving, wearied soldiers, was drawn up
in battle array in front of Sheridan's cavalry. Their ranks
had been terribly reduced by the events of the past ten
days, and out of the 50,000 that held the' trenches of
Petersburg and Richmond on the 28th March, little more
than 10,000 remained actually effective for battle. But

304 DECISIVE BATTLES SINCE WATERLOO.

though few in number, worn, wear\% and suffering from the
pangs of hunger, they were ready to meet their adversaries
and prepared without flinching to charge upon Sheridan's
troopers. It was the last charge of the Army of Northern
Virginia.

By Sheridan's order the cavalry in line of battle dis-
mounted and gave way gradually, though all the while
showing a steady front, in order to give time for the
wearied infantry of Ord's and GriiTfin's corps to take up
their position. When this had been accomplished the cav-
alry remounted and moved rapidly to the right, so as to
come in upon the Confederate left for a flanking charge.
As the cavalry thus drew away from its former position,
the Confederate commander saw to his astonishment the
long and solid lines of the Union infantry, lines of blue
tipped with the steel of flashing bayonets, and stippled at
intervals with the muzzles of cannon, with the artillery-
men in their places ready for their death-dealing work.

The hopelessness of the charge was apparent to every
Confederate officer who saw that mass of infantry waiting
for the assault. The advance was stopped and in a few
minutes a white flag was displayed in front of General
Custer, who was leading Sheridan's cavalry column, and
preparing for a charge upon the Confederate left. With
the white flag came the information that the Confederates
were ready to surrender. General Sheridan immediately
rode over towards the Confederate lines, where he was
met by General Gordon, v.ho asked that hostilities be
suspended. He added that Generals Grant and Lee were
already negotiating for a capitulation, and said he had no
doubt that the terms would be speedily arranged.

The capitulation had been discussed among the Con-
federate officers on the night of the 6th around a camp-
fire. General Lee was not present, but the opinion of his
officers was conveyed to him by General Pendleton. The
decision was unanimous that a surrender was inevitable, as

BA TTLE OF FIVE FORKS AND LEE 'S SURRENDER. 305

the army had been terribly reduced in numbers, and the
men who remained were so weakened by famine that large
numbers of them had thrown away their guns, being too
feeble to carry them. Even if they could escape from
their pursuers they could only do so by abandoning all
theii artillery and heavy munitions and they had already
lost a large part of their wagon train.

On the 7th General Grant took the initiative and thus
saved General Lee the mortification of proposing a sur-
render. He wrote a letter couched in the following lan-
guage :

April 7, 1865.

General : — The result of the last week must convince you
of the hopelessness of further resistance on the part of the Army
of Northern Virginia in this struggle. I feel that it is so ; and
regard it as my duty to shift from myself the responsibility of
any further effusion of blood by asking of you the surrender of
that portion of the Confederate States army known as the
Army of Northern Virginia.

U. S. Grant, Lt. -General.

Gen. R. E. Lee.

General Lee received the letter late in the afternoon,
and replied briefly, asking the terms of surrender, though
not admitting the hopelessness of the further struggle.
Grant replied on the 8th to the effect that the only terms
he could accept were unconditional surrender, the men
and ofificers surrendered being disqualified from taking up
arms until properly exchanged. Lee responded on the
same evening, saying he did not think the emergency had
arisen for the surrender of the army, that he did not in-
tend to propose it, but only wished to know the terms
that would be demanded. He declined meeting General
Grant for the purpose of negotiating a surrender, but ex-
pressed a wish to meet him with a view to the restoration
of peace.

On the morning of the 9th General Grant wrote again

306 DECISIVE BATTLES SINCE WATERLOO.

to General Lee to the effect that he had no authority to
treat for peace and the proposed meeting could therefore
do no good. He added that the terms on which peace
could be obtained were well understood, that the South
must lay down its arms, and by so doing would save thou-
sands of human lives and hundreds of millions of property
not yet destroyed.

Immediately after the stoppage of the last charge of
the Army of Northern Virginia in the manner previously
described, General Grant rode to Sheridan's head-quarters,
and while on his way there received a note from General
Lee, asking for an interview with reference to the surrender
of the army. Hostilities had been suspended, and the in-
terview of the two commanders took place in half an hour
after the receipt of the note. It was held at the house of
Mr. \V. McLean, near the court-house of Appomattox,
and was over in a short time, as the business was easily
arranged. Officers and men were paroled not to take up
arms again until properly exchanged, all public property,
arms, and artiller)' to be parked and stacked, and turned
over to the officers appointed to receiv^e them. The offi-
cers were allowed to retain their side arms, horses, and per-
sonal baggage, and though not mentioned in the ofificial
documents, General Grant afterwards permitted the caval-
ry soldiers to retain their horses, remarking as a reason for
his leniency, that they would " be useful in putting in a
crop." Twenty-seven thousand men were said to have
been included in Lee's capitulation but not more than
10,000 were actually in line of battle with their arms on
the morning of the 9th April.

The victory of Five Forks was the prelude to the sur-
render at Appomattox, and that surrender was practically
the end of the war. One after another the remaining arm.ies
of the Confederates submitted to the fortune of war and
laid down their arms, and in ever}- instance the terms ac-
corded were almost identical with those arranc^ed between

BATTLE OF FIVE FORK'S AXD LEE'S SURREiVDER. 307

Grant and Lee. No great battle was fought after Lee's
surrender, and of the few colHsions that occurred before
the wings of peace were outstretched over the whole
country, there were none of consequence. The last battle
of the war was fought in Texas, May 13th, resulting in a
loss of about thirty killed and wounded on the Union
side, some forty or fifty taken prisoners, and four or five
wounded on the Confederate side.

The number of men paroled in the Confederate armies,
at the close of the war, was 174,223, and at the same time
98,802 Confederate prisoners of war were held in Northern
prisons or depots. The aggregate Union force on the mus-
ter rolls of the Union armies on March I, 1865, was 965,591,
and on the first of May the number exceeded 1,000,000.
On that date all enlistments were suspended, and shortly
afterwards the work of disbanding the army began. By
the end of November more than 800,000 men had been
mustered out of the service and returned to the occupa-
tions of civil life. The sudden termination of the war was
unexpected by the great mass of the public on both sides,
though to the thoughtful leaders, who knew the conditions
against which they were contending, the result was ap-
parent months and months before.

CHAPTER XVII.

BATTLE OF KOENIGGRATZ (SADOWA) — 1 866.

Space will not here permit the discussion of the Schles-
wig-Holstein difficulties which led to the war between
Prussia and Austria in 1866, and the victory of Prussia at
Sadowa. Briefly we may say that since the time of
Charlemagne, Schleswig was a disputed possession be-
tween the Germans and the Danes, while Holstein has
been practically in the same category. Reams of paper
by the hundred have been covered with the diplomatic
correspondence growing out of the various claims to these
disputed provinces, and on several occasions the contend-
ing parties have resorted to the arbitrament of war. The
war of 1863-4, between Denmark and Prussia, resulted in
the defeat of the former. It was followed by the peace of
Vienna, in which the king of Denmark resigned the
duchies to Prussia and Austria, and agreed to a rectifica-
tion of his frontier. He was also to pay an indemnity
for the expenses of the war.

Hardly was the ink dry on the treaty of peace before
Prussia and Austria began to quarrel over the possession
of the duchies ; the quarrel was partially stifled by the
convention of Gastein (August 14, 1865), in which it was
agreed that Austria should have the temporary govern-
ment of Holstein, and Prussia that of Schleswig. Prus-
sia adhered to the terms of the convention just long
enough to secure from Napoleon III. a guaranty of the
neutrality of France in case of a war between Prussia and

30S

BA TTLE OF KOENIGGRA TZ. 309

Austria, and a treaty of alliance with Italy, who bore any
thing but good-will to the Austrian government.

On the nth March, 1866, Prussia published a decree
asserting her jurisdiction over Holstein, and on the 24th
of the same month she issued a circular calling upon the
German states to declare whether they would support
Austria or Prussia in case of war. Both countries pre-
pared for war. In April and May, Austria called on
Prussia to disarm, and the latter replied with a counter
demand. There was much incriminatory correspondence
between Bismarck and Mensdorff (the Prussian and Aus-
trian ministers) ; the Federal Diet met at Frankfort ; the
Prussians occupied Holstein and the Austrians retired ;
Prussia, on the 14th June, announced the confederation
dissolved, and on the next day she declared war against
Hanover and Saxony.

On the 1 8th June Prussia declared war against Austria.
Nearly all the northern states of Germany pronounced in
favor of Prussia, while the southern ones sided with Aus-
tria. The two great armies advanced to meet each other,
the Austrian northern army, under command of Field
Marshall Benedek, entering Silesia, where it was joined by
the Saxons. At the same time the southern army of
Austria, commanded by Archduke Albrecht, faced the
Italians. The Prussian army moved with astonishing ce-
lerity, and thus was able to fight the great battle of the
campaign on Austrian soil. Prince Frederick Charles
with the First Army and the Army of the Elbe, the latter
commanded by General Herwarth von Bittenfeld, en-
tered Bohemia on the 23d of June; he was victorious in
severe engagements at Liebenau, Turnau, and Podall, on
the 26th, Hoehnewasser on the 27th, Munchengratz on
the 28th, and Gitschin on the 29th June.

The Crown Prince with the Second Army entered Bo-
hemia on the 22d June, was repulsed at Trautenau the
27th, victorious at Saar and Trautenau the 28th, and at

3IO DECISIVE BATTLES SINCE WATERLOO.

Koningenhof on the 29th. On the 30th communication
was opened between the two armies ; the king assumed
command on the ist July, and movements were im-
mediate!}' made to deUver a crushing blow to the Aus-
trian army. By the success of the blow the Austrians
would be crushed between the armies of Prince Frederick
Charles and the Crown Prince.

Prince Frederick Charles, commanding the First Army,
halted on Monday, July 2d, at Kommenitz, to give time
for the Crown Prince to advance to Miletin, \vhich is
about five miles to the eastward of Kommenitz, and also
to learn exactly what movements the Austrians were
making. Reconnoitring parties were sent out, and as
soon as he had received the reports of their commanding
officers, Prince Frederick Charles decided to attack the
Austrians. He ordered an immediate advance of his
own army beyond Horwitz, and wrote to the Crown
Prince an urgent request to advance in the morning from
Miletin and attack the Austrian right flank at the same
time that the First Army attacked the Austrians in
front. By ten o'clock at night the troops were in full
movement.

The general staff did not leave Kommenitz until an hour
past midnight. The night was cloudy, but not dark, as
the clouds were thin and the moon occasionally came out
distinctly. The whole country was dotted with the re-
mains of the bivouac fires where the First Army had been
encamped. An eye-witness of the scene says these fires
looked like large will-of-the-wisps, as their flames flickered
in the wind, and they stretched out for many a mile, as
the First Army alone contained 150,000 soldiers, and
necessarily the camp of so large a force covered a ver}^
wide area. The clouds thickened during the night, and
about daylight there came on a drizzling rain, which con-
tinued all the forenoon and for some hours after mid-day.
To add to the discomfort of the troops, the wind steadily

312 DECISIVE BATTLES SINCE WATERLOO.

increased and considerably affected the soldiers, who had
had little sleep and scanty food for the past two days.

At daylight, the various corps and divisions of the First
Army had formed their line for attacking the Austrians.
The main body of the army was at Milowitz, which is a
small village on the road from Koeniggratz to Horwitz.
General Franseky, commanding the 7th division Avas at
Cesekwitz, holding the left, while the 4th and 5th divi-
sions were at Pristan and Psauch, these divisions forming
the right of the line. General Herewarth von Bittenfeld
with the 8th and part of the 7th corps held the extreme
right about ten miles from Milowitz. At four o'clock in
the morning the advance began, and the army marched
slowly up the first declivity between Milowitz and
Dub, five miles nearer Kommenitz. The ground being
soaked by rain, which had been falling for several hours,
was difficult for the advancing army. The skirmishers man-
aged to move ahead without much trouble, but the bat-
talions advancing in closer order struggled more slowly
along, while the wheels of the gun carriages sank heavily
into the sticky mud, and the horses of the artillery were
frequently brought to a halt.

By six o'clock the whole army was quite near Dub,
vv^here it halted for a time somewhat below the summit
of the slope, as the ridge on which the village is built had
completely masked all the movements of the troops. The
Austrians were known to be on the other side of the ridge,
and they were probably unaware that any Prussians were
in the vicinity other than the advanced pickets. The
Prussian cavalry videttes had been sent forward the pre-
vious evening and held the crest of the ridge, so that the
Austrians were unable to come up and ascertain what was
going on behind this thin screen of mounted soldiers.
After a halt of nearly an hour to enable the' columns to
close up. Prince Frederick Charles ordered the advance of
the horse artillery and cavalry. They moved forward as

BATTLE OF KOENIGGRATZ. 313

fast as the condition of the ground would permit, keeping
their Hnes in splendid formation, when all the circum-
stances are considered. The Uhlans in advance had a
dishevelled and bedraggled appearance, as the flags on
their lances were soaked with rain and either clung
closely to the staves or flapped sluggishly against them.
When the bottom of the hill was reached, the trumpets
sounded, the cavalry and horse artillery pushed toward
the river Bistritz, and then the movement became fully
apparent to the Austrians. Their guns opened quickly
upon the advancing Prussians from a battery stationed
in a field near the village of Dub, where the main highway
crossed the Bistritz. The great battle which was to de-
cide the relations between Austria and Prussia was now
fully begun.

The battle opened at about half-past seven o'clock in the
morning. The Prussian horse artillery replied promptly
to the Austrian cannon, but neither side fired rapidly, and
for fully thirty minutes the encounter consisted mainly of
occasional shots. The king of Prussia reached the field a
little before eight o'clock, and soon after his arrival the
horse artillery was strengthened by the advance of other
batteries, and orders were given for a rapid fire to be
opened upon the Austrians. A rain of shot and shell was
poured in upon them. Immediately after the beginning
of this rapid fire on the part of the Prussians, the Austri-
an batteries came out in great force from all directions
and returned the fire quite as vigorously as it had begun.
The Austrian concentration of artillery was admirable, as
the batteries appeared quickly from every village and
every road all along the whole front of the Austrian line,
which extended from Mockrowens on the right to Bena-
tek on the left. The flashes of fire from the mouths of
the cannon formed a continuous line, and the guns were
evidently aimed with great precision ; the shot and shell
were dropped among the Prussian guns, occasionally dis-

314 DECISIVE BATTLES SINCE WATERLOO.

mounting a piece of artillery, blowing up a caisson, kill-
ing men and horses, and certain to have created great
confusion in any but a thoroughly disciplined army. The
Austrian fire was not alone directed to the Prussian artil-
lery, as their shells were thrown up the slope in front of
them, towards Dub, and one shell fell into a squadron of
Uhlans who were close at the king's side. It buried it-
self in the ground, and then threw up clumps of mud
some twenty feet in the air, and its explosion killed some
two or three men.

As soon as the cannonading became furious, the guns
of the Prussian 7th division opened upon the village
of Benatek, which formed the Austrian right. For some
time an artillery duel took place at this point, shot being
given for shot, and neither side advancing or retreating.
The same was the state of affairs in the centre ; each side
pushed many batteries into position and kept up a severe
cannonading. The artillery fire was as even as it was pos-
sible to make it. The number of guns appeared almost
precisely the same, and shot seemed to be given for shot,
although the fire was so rapid that the reports followed as
quickly together as in file firing with musketry. Con-
siderable havoc was created on both sides, officers and
men fell very rapidly, and a great many horses were killed
or disabled. The Prussians pushed forward their batteries
' as fast as they could be brought up from the rear, and
after a time their fire was considerably stronger than that
of the Austrians.

Finally the Austrian batteries between Dohelnitz and
Dohalicha were withdrawn a short distance up the slope,
but the guns at Mockrowens remained in position, and at
no point had the Prussians thus far been able to cross the
Bistritz. As soon as the Austrians retired up the hill, as
just before mentioned, the Prussian batteries turned their
fire upon Miletin, with the result that by ten o'clock the
battery at that village was also compelled to retire. Dur-

BATTLE OF KOENIGGRATZ. 315

ing the progress of this cannonading some of the infantry
had been moved forward towards the river, and while
waiting to be brought into action they sheltered them-
selves under all convenient undulations of the ground.
The 8th division advanced on the left side of the road,
and, shielded by the rising ground, put its columns in posi-
tion for an attack upon the village of Sadowa, while the
third and fourth divisions on the other side of the road
were put in readiness for storming Dohelnitz and Mock-
rowcns.

Before their preparations were completed, it was ob-
served that the village of Bistritz on the Austrian right
had taken fire. The 7th division was ordered to take
advantage of this circumstance and secure possession of
the village, but the Austrians had not been driven out by
the flames of the burning buildings, and made a stubborn
resistance. Up to this time the fighting had been
by the artillery only, but now it was hand to hand on the
part of the infantry. The attack was led by the 27th
regiment, who first forced their way into the orchards
surrounding the village. The Austrians were on the
other side of the burning buildings, and volley after vol-
ley was poured through the flames upon the assailants.
While the 27th regiment engaged the Austrians in
front, other regiments managed to flank the village,
and by taking the Austrians in the rear, compelled them
to retire with the loss of many of their number, who re-
mained prisoners in Prussian hands.

It was about ten o'clock when the attack on Dohelnitz
and Mockrowens was ordered. There was little opposi-
tion to the advancing columns until they reached the
bank of the Bistritz ; but from that point every inch of
ground was stubbornly contended for. The Austrian in-
fantry were in strong force at the approaches to the vil-
lages, and they poured a destructive fire upon the
Prussians as they advanced. The latter were at great

3l6 DECISIVE BATTLES SINCE WATER LCD.

disadvantage, as the road was narrow^ and the Austrians
were shielded by the villages and detached houses, so
that they were able to inflict considerable damage on the
Prussians while losing comparatively little themselves.
The Prussian rifles were fred more rapidly than were
those of the Austrians, but the latter were so shielded by
the houses, trees, and smoke that the Prussians were
rarely able to take accurate aim, A great deal of blind
firing was done by the Austrians. They judged by the
sound the positions of the attacking columns, and simply
fired in the direction whence the sounds came. The
cloud of smoke in the drizzly rain lay heavily on the
ground, and for a considerable time it was impossible to
see any thing through it, but, though slowly, the Prussians
advanced steadily, losing men at every step, and in some
places literally leaving the ground covered with their dead
and wounded.

The fighting among the villages continued for nearly
an hour ; then the Prussians having reinforced their col-
umns, made a dash upon the Austrian infantry, whom
they drove back, but not far, the Austrians simply retir-
ing a short distance up the slope until they were in line
with their own batteries. The wood above Sadowa was
full of Austrian infantry, while the wood between Sadowa
and Benatek was equally well held, and it seemed next to
impossible for the Prussians to be able to break through
the barrier before them. General Franseky sent his in-
fantry to attack the wood, and directed his artillery to
open a vigorous fire upon the Austrian batteries. The
infantry for a few minutes fired directly into the wood,
but very soon discovered that their shots were practically
wasted, as the Austrians were concealed behind the trees
and suffered little from the Prussian bullets. Finding the
musketry fire useless, General Franseky ordered a bayo-
net charge, and his men went at the wood with great
vigor. The Austrians held to their position, and in this

BA TTLE OF KOENIGGRA TZ. 317

wood was fought the severest hand-to-hand battle
known during the entire day. When the 27th Prussian
regiment went into battle on that eventful morning,
it had a strength of 3,000 men and 90 officers ; when
it emerged from the wood on the other side, having
driven out the Austrians, there were less than 400
men in line and only 2 officers. All the rest were
either killed or wounded. Every regiment of the divi-
sion suffered nearly as m.uch, though not quite as heavily,
but they accomplished their purpose and forced the Aus-
trians out of that strong defence.

The Austrian line had now been driven in on both
flanks, but a new line of battle was formed round Lipa, a
short distance farther up the hill and including the wood
which lies above Sadowa. While this line was being
formed, the Prussian artillery crossed the Bistritz and
opened fire upon the new position of the Austrians. At
the same time the smoke of General Herewarth's advance
toward the Austrian left was distinctly visible. He had
crossed the Bistritz at Nechawitz, about seven miles be-
low the point where the 7th division crossed. There
he found some Austrian cavalry and a brigade of Saxon
troops, which he drove in the direction of Lipa. The
Austrian commander seemed determined to retain his
position, and his cavalry and infantry were massed in
great force on the most favorable part of the hill.

The Prussian infantry which had occupied Sadowa and
Dohelnitz was now sent to assault the wood above Sa-
dowa, and skirting the wood between Sadowa and Lipa
as they advanced against it, they lost heavily. The Aus-
trians were in concealment, as in the wood which had
already been taken, and they were supported by a battery
at one end of the wood, which poured a destructive fire
upon the advancing Prussians. Although the fire against
them was very severe, the Prussians steadily fought their
way forward, and finally dashed at the wood with the

3l8 DECISIVE BATTLES SINCE WATERLOO.

bayonet. The fighting was hand to hand as before,
the .\ustrians disputing the possession of every tree and
falHng in great numbers. As the Austrians retired some-
what from their position, a chance was given for other
batteries to come into play against the Prussians. About
midway in the wood the latter suffered so terribly that
the fight became a stationary one.

The Austrian artillery performed such effective work in
this position that it seemed, a little after mid-day, as though
the Prussians would be unable to advance any farther.
They were obliged to fight very hard to retain the posi-
tion they had gained. At one time most of their guns
had been dismounted by the Austrian artillery fire, and
where the ground was thickly wooded the needle-gun
could not be used to advantage, so that the infantry fight
was about even. Prince Frederick Charles ordered for-
ward the 5th and 6th divisions which had been held in
reserve. They piled their knapsacks and helmets on the
ground before crossing the river. As they advanced,
they passed the king, who had remained near the Bis-
tritz, and in doing so they greeted him with loud cheers.
They passed rapidly over the ridge of Sadowa and entered
the wood, where very soon the increased rattle and roar
of musketry told that they were actively engaged. The
Austrian artillery poured volley after volley among them,
and they only succeeded in advancing a few hundred
yards. At one time they fell back, and for a little while
there were great fears that the day was lost. They were
torn and mangled by the fragments of the shells that
dropped among them, and crushed by the splinters and
fragments of the trees which the artillery fire tore
away and dropped among them. Some of the officers
and soldiers said after the battle that these splinters of
wood were even more fearful than the shells.

On the right it seemed as if General Herewarth was
checked, as the cloud of smoke from his artillery and in-

BATTLE OF KOENIGGRATZ. 319

fantry did not advance, but remained in one position.
Franseky's division had suffered so terribly that it was not
in condition to be sent forward to attack the Sadowa
wood. In addition to the fearful losses they had sus-
tained, they would have been exposed to the risk of being
taken in rear by the artillery on the right of the Austrian
line of battle before Lipa. All the Prussian artillery, ex-
cepting eight batteries, was engaged. These eight bat-
teries were held in reserve in case of a reverse. At one
time the firing in the Sadowa wood and of the Prussian
artillery on the slope seemed to be retiring in the direc-
tion of the river.

It was very certain that the Pirst Army was checked in
its advance, even if it had not been actually driven back.
Prince Frederick Charles became anxious, and sent couriers
to the left to ascertain about the advance of the Crown
Prince. In a little while it was found that some of the
Austrian artillery near Lipa were firing toward the Prus-
sian left, and the hope was anxiously entertained that this
fire was against the advanced guard of the Second Army.

Prince Frederick Charles and his generals were greatly
disturbed at the situation. They drew the infantry out
of the battle and formed their cavalry in such a manner
that it would be available either in pursuing the Austrians
in case of victory or for retarding the pursuit in the event
of defeat. General von Rhetz, the chief of the stafT,
went away with an escort to look for the Second Army.
He returned very soon, bringing the joyous intelligence
that the Second Army was forming for an attack on Lipa,
and that the Austrian artillery on the right had been firing
against the Crown Prince's advance. The word was
passsed from one to another, and where gloom had settled
shortly before, was now to be seen the expression of de-
light and hope. The infantry and cavalry were sent again
at the Sadowa wood, which they carried, and the battery
beyond it was stormed and taken.

320 DECISIVE BATTLES SINCE WATERLOO.

The Crown Prince's columns were visible about half-
past three in the afternoon advancing against Lipa across
the slope in front of him. His artillery had silenced that
of the Austrians, and General Herewarth again began to
press against the Austrian left wing. For half an hour,
perhaps, the Crown Prince's infantry vigorously engaged
the Austrians at Lipa. The increasing volume of sound
from their rapid volleys showed that they were advancing
and that the Austrians were in full retreat. Then the
order was given for the First Army to advance in full
force. The artillery was sent up the slope at a gallop,'
coming into action whenever opportunity presented, and
pouring a vigorous fire against the retreating columns,
while the infantry which had carried the wood pressed
forward at double quick and made a vigorous pursuit.

Prince Frederick Charles led his own regiment across
the Sadowa bridge and along the road, and was followed
closely by all his light cavalry. As he reached the top of
the slope the retreating squadrons and battalions of the
Austrians were within range of the Prussian artillery and
crossed a depression lying between Lipa and Streselitz, a
village about two miles farther southward. On the crest
of the Lipa Hill the Prussian artillery halted and fired
with great rapidity at the dense masses of fugitives. The
cavalry was sent to press the retreat, but was prevented
by the Austrian artillery, which fired vigorously from the
Streselitz ridge. The cavalry charged repeatedly upon
the Austrians, but their battalions could not be broken.

The Prussian artillery fire was now much more heavy
than that of the Austrians, and had succeeded in driving
the Austrian batteries away from the ridge. Some of the
retreating Austrians moved in direction of Koeniggratz
and others in that of Pardubitz, and the Prussians
went in pursuit along both roads. The ground was
thickly covered with dead and wounded. The wounded
shrieked with fear as they saw the cavalry galloping tow-

321

322 DECISIVE BATTLES SINCE WATERLOO.

ard them. They expected to be trampled to death in a
moment, but by an order of Prince Frederick Charles, the
cavalry moved around to the right in order to avoid them.
At one time the Prince checked the pursuit to give time to
reconnoitre the ground and make sure that no wounded
Austrians were lying there.

Many of the Austrian infantry were captured by the
pursuing cavalry. The pursuit was continued until nine
o'clock in the evening and did not stop until it had
reached the banks of the Elbe. The main body of the
army came to a halt about seven o'clock. When the
Prince returned from the pursuit, he was loudly cheered
by all his soldiers. He immediately gave an order that
every attention should be shown to the wounded and no
discrimination between Prussians and Austrians.

During the battle the troops on both sides displayed
the greatest bravery, and no distinction could be made
in favor of one or the other so far as personal and sol-
dierly valor is concerned. About 1,500 pieces of artillery
were in action, almost equally divided between Prussians
and Austrians. The victory was due to the Crown
Prince's attack on the left flank of the Austrians com-
bined with the attack in front, which had been of great
effect and materially absorbed the fighting abilities of the
Austrians. The latter had been engaged since daybreak,
and after fighting until three in the afternoon were assailed
by the fresh troops of the Crown Prince, which came up
at that hour. The steady maintenance of the attack in
front by the First Army precluded the possibility of the
Austrians being able to repulse the attack in flank by the
Second Army. The Prussians had not far from 250,000
men engaged in both their armies. The Austrians were
slightly more numerous than the Prussians. The Prus-
sians took 174 cannon and 14 flags ; they admit in their
official reports a loss of 10,000 killed and wounded, while
the total loss of the Austrians was placed at 40,000, of

BATTLE OF KOENIGGRATZ. 323

whom 18,000 were prisoners. There were many strag-
glers, and the route followed by the retreating army was
strewn with knapsacks, muskets, provisions, clothing,
munitions of war, and kindred material, such as can al-
ways be found in the wake of a retreating and demoral-
ized force.

The rapid firing of the needle-gun was an important
factor in winning the battle of Sadowa. But the superior
organization of the Prussians, their admirable strategy
before the battle and equally admirable tactics during its
progress, and the carefully timed junction of the First and
Second Armies at the proper moment, were of more con-
sequence than the operation of the weapon which has
revolutionized the armament of the infantry soldier all
over the civilized globe.

It was several days before the Austrians were able to
collect their scattered battalions and put their army once
more into any thing like a fighting condition. All the
northern provinces of Austria were abandoned to the
enemy, and the army retreated upon Vienna, halting oc-
casionally to hold the advancing Prussians in check, but
delivering no severe blow or offering any great obstacle
to their progress. On the 30th July an armistice was
granted, and two days later the king of Prussia reviewed
his army fifteen miles from Vienna. After the review
the Prussians started on their return, while negotiations
for peace were rapidly pushed.

On the 23d August the treaty of peace was signed at
Prague. By its articles Austria consented to the breaking
up of the German confederation, and to Prussia's annexa-
tion of Hanover, Hesse-Cassel, Nassau, and Frankfort.
She also gave up Holstein and her pohtical influence in
Northern Germany, and made other concessions of minor
importance. About the same time Austria made a truce
wdth Italy, and on October 3d a definitive peace, by which
the union of Venetia and Lombardy with Italy was rec-

324

DECISIVE BATTLES SINCE WATERLOO.

ognized on condition that their debts should be assumed
by Vict<.'r Emanuel's government. As a further result of
her defeat, Austria was compelled to give legislative inde-
pendence to Hungary; in 1867 the emperor of Austria
was crowned king of Hungary, and the Austro-Hungarian
monarchy was formed.

On the i6th July the ling of Prussia invited the states
of North Germany to form a new confederation. They
responded with alacrity to the invitation, impelled perhaps
by profound respect for the kingdom that had carried
its victorious arms almost to within sight of the Austrian
capital. The confederation lasted until the establish-
ment of the German empire in 1871, and this empire may
be said, in some respects, to owe its establishment to the
victory of Sadowa.

CHAPTER XVIII.

BATTLE OF GRAVELOTTE — 1870.

The Franco-Prussian war of 1870-71 had its origin in
the traditional ill-feeling between French and Germans,
a feeling that has long existed, but has been particularly
bitter since the Napoleonic wars at the end of the last
and the beginning of the present century. In March,
1867, a dispute arose between France and Prussia relative
to the possession of Luxembourg. The emperor of
France proposed purchasing the province from the king
of Holland ; Prussia earnestly opposed the purchase, since
Luxembourg had formed part of the dissolved Germanic
Confederation. The air was filled with rumors of war, and
the affair was only quieted by a conference at London of
the representatives of the great powers, by whom it was
decreed that the fortress of Luxembourg should be de-
molished and the perfect neutrality of the province
guaranteed.

For three years from this time there was no disturb-
ance of the peace, but both France and Prussia made
preparations for war. On the 4th of July, 1870, Prince
Leopold of Hohenzollern consented to become a candi-
date for the then vacant throne of Spain, and as soon as
the fact was known there was great excitement in France
in consequence. Threatening speeches were made in the
French Chambers by the Due de Grammont, Minister of
Foreign Affairs, but after some negotiation and the inter-
vention of England, Prince Leopold on July 12th volun-

325

326 DECISIVE BATTLES SINCE WATERLOO.

taril}- retired from the candidacy, and declined the crown
that had been offered him. On the 13th France de-
manded from Prussia a guaranty that no such offer
should be accepted in future ; Prussia was naturally irri-
tated by the demand, aad refused it, whereupon the
French minister, Count Benedetti, retired from Prussia,
and almost immediately thereafter the Prussian minister
left Paris.

The emperor declared war on the 15th of July, with the
hearty concurrence of the great majority of the French
Chambers. After his surrender the emperor told Count
Bismarck that he did not desire war, but had been forced
into it by public opinion. He was evidently greatly de-
ceived as to the strength and condition of his army, and
equally deceived as to the forces that Prussia could bring
into the field. Though vastly more numerous on paper,
the French had hardly more than 300,0CXD men ready
for the field, while the Germans had treble that num-
ber. Including their reserves and landwehr, or mi-
litia, the Germans had, on the first of August, 1870, a
grand effective of 944,000 men, Avhile on the peace foot-
ing, a month earlier, they had but 360,000. To the total
on the war footing given above must be added the forces
of Bavaria, Wurtemburg, and Baden, which gave a grand
total for the German strength of 1,124,000 men. Napo-
leon had counted on the neutrality of the southern states
of the North German Confederation, if not on their active
hostility to Prussia, and is said to have been greatly dis-
concerted when, on the 19th Jul}-, the parliament met at
Berlin and resolved to support Prussia in the war.

Impartial observers predicted at the beginning of the
contest that the result would be disastrous to France.
Commenting upon the war the Quarterly J^cficzv sa\'s :
" The causes of the early ruin of the French army were:
(i) The enormous superiority of the Germans in regard to
numbers ; (2) the absolute unity of their command and

BATTLE OF GRAVELOTTE. 327

concert of operation ; (3) their superior mechanism in
equipment and suppHes ; (4) the superior intelligence,
steadiness, and discipline of the soldiers ; (5) superior edu-
cation of the officers, and the dash and intelligence of the
cavalry." The French and Germans were equally brave,
but the French generals seemed to act often upon im-
pulse, while every move of the Germans was the result of
a carefully elaborated plan. From the beginning to the
end Von Aloltke seems to have leiL nothing to chance, and
whatever his instructions to his subordinates they were
faithfully carried out.

Both armies were massed on their frontiers ; that of the
Germans being assembled much more rapidly than the
army of the Rhine, which constituted the French force to
advance upon Berlin. It is doubtful if the latter exceeded
270,000 effectives, though it had a nominal strength 01
310,000, while the Germans had an active force of 447,000,
divided into three armies, commanded respectively by
General Von Steinmetz, Prince Frederick Charles, and the
Crown Prince of Prussia. The armies confronted each
other at the end of July, when the chief command of the
French was taken by the emperor, and that of the Ger-
mans by King William of Prussia. On the 2d of August
active hostilities began with an encounter at Saarbruck, the
offensive being taken by the French, and the conflict re-
sulting in their favor. On the same day the German
armies began their advance, and on the 4th the battle of
Weissenburg resulted in their favor, as the French were
driven from the field after five hours of fighting, during
which General Douay, the French commander, was killed.
On the 6th was fought the battle of Woerth, in which the
French made a stubborn resistance, but were compelled to
retire. Weissenburg and Woerth were fought with the
Crown Prince's army ; meantime the armies of Steinmetz
and Prince Frederick Charles had effected a junction, oc-
cupied Saarbruck and Forbach, and on the 6th had

328 DECISIVE BATTLES SINCE WATERLOO.

defeated the French at Spicheren, occupying the heights
and driving General Frossard both from his first line of
battle and from the position he afterwards tried to take
near St. Avoid.

The result of the movements of the Germans and the
victories above mentioned was to drive Frossard in the
direction of IMetz, where Bazaine's corps was joined by
L'Admirault's from Thionville, and b)- divisions under
Bourbaki and Canrobert. There was now no obstacle
to the junction of the three Prussian armies, and by
the I ith they formed an unbroken line, with head-quarters
in Saarbruck. On the 14th the first army was in the neigh-
borhood of Metz,and frustrated the attempt of the French
to retreat to the line of the ]\Iarne. The defeat of the French
at Courcelles on the 14th, and at Vionville, or Mars-la-Tour,
on the i6th, completed the cutting off of Bazaine's com-
mand from junction with other French forces, though it
cost heavily to the Germans in loss of men. Bazaine now
massed his troops at a position between Gravelotte and St.
Privat le Montagne, and made ready for a battle that
should be decisive. Winning it he would break through
the German lines and retreat to the Marne, while by losing
it he would be shut up in Metz, or at all events separated
from the rest of the French army.

At the break of day on the 17th, the movement of the
French army into its new position began. Late at night
on the 1 6th one division of the 3d corps had reached the
battle-field of Vionville, and this division was ordered into
position betw'een the Bois des Ognons and IMalmaison, in
order to cover the retreat of the left wing, which was the
most exposed. There was great difficulty in moving the
enormous train, as there w^as but a single w^ay open for it,
the road from Gravelotte to Metz. The French officers
saw that the road was so blocked, and the wagons so
closely crowded and in such a state of confusion, that a
panic would have followed the appearance of even a few
squadrons of German cavalry.

BATTLE OF GRAVELOTTE. 329

On the morning of the 17th Prince Frederick Charles,
who had spent the night after the battle of the i6th at
Porze, rode along the lines to make a personal inspection
of the ground held by his forces. The enemy's skirmish-
ing line was clearly visible in front of Rezonville. It
stretched out for a long distance, and there was evidently
a strong force behind it, to judge by the frequent trumpet
calls that were wafted by the morning breeze. About six
o'clock in the morning, King William arrived with his
staff and occupied the new head-quarters which had been
selected.

On the 15th of August the right wing was advancing,
the 1 2th infantry division being near Arracourt, the 2d
division corps on the Nancy road, and the ist Bavarian
corps not far from Einville. In the centre of the Prussian
line was the 5th corps, supported by the Wurtemburg
division. It advanced to Dombasle on the Meurthe, and
took a strong position on the left bank of that stream.
On the extreme left the i ith corps rested on the Moselle
at Bayon. The iith infantry division was at Henning
supporting the left wing, the 2d cavalry division was far-
ther advanced, being nearly five miles more to the front.
The 4th cavalry division was at Nancy, and examining
carefully the country towards Toul, but without encoun-
tering any considerable bodies of the French. They met
a few bands of fj-anc-tircurs, which were easily scattered.
By great efforts on the part of the of^cers superintending
the transportation department, all the trains of the differ-
ent divisions were brought up closer to the rear and put
in readiness for any further movement.

There was very little movement of the Third Army on
the i6th, as it was necessary to wait for developments in
and around Metz before ordering the army of the Crown
Prince to push any farther forward. The 4th cavalry
division was brought forward from Nancy on the i6th in
order to have it in proper position in case the army should

330 DECISIVE BATTLES SINCE IVATERLOO.

be advanced towards St. Dizier. The right wing of the
army, the 2d Bavarian corps, remained in the vicinity of
Nancy. On the 17th the head-quarters of the Third Army
were changed to Nancy, and the 1st Bavarian corps moved
forward to St. Nicholas, which is on the left bank of the
Meurthe. The nearest objective point of the Third Army
w^as the fortress of Toul. The 6th corps had been some-
what scattered, and on the i6th and 17th the various di-
visions were brought together, so that they reached Bayon
on the 1 8th. The Prussian army was arranged — previous
to the decisive battle of Gravelotte, so that one portion
of it could attack Metz, while another could continue the
advance on Paris.

The Second Army arrived at the Moselle on the i6th.
The 4th corps and the Prussian Guards moved in the
direction of Toul, the former going to Siazeray, and the
other to Bernecourt. It was by no means certain whether
the French army would retreat to Verdun, or give battle at
Metz, or in its neighborhood. The latter alternative was
forced by the attack made by the 3d and 9th corps, and
consequently it was advisable for the Germans to concen-
trate as much as possible before the opening of the final
battle.

Orders were issued by Prince Frederick Charles during
the evening of the i6th for the concentration of the Sec-
ond Army on the battle-field of that day. The 12th corps
was ordered to move immediately from Pont-a-Mousson to
Mars-la-Tour, and the Saxon corps was brought to a point
not far from Mars-la-Tour. The longest march of the
Second Army was performed by the Guards, who had a
distance of nineteen miles to travel from Bernecourt, which
they accomplished in ten hours.

Nearly all the French troops had been concentrated on
the left bank of the Moselle, and consequently there was
no great danger of a sortie from Metz towards the east or
south. The German commanders decided that a single

BATTLE OF GRAVELOTTE. 331

corps was sufficient to observe the city itself, and conse-
quently withdrew all but the 1st corps. The 7th and 8th
corps were sent over the Moselle and placed behind the
9th corps, where they formed the extreme right of the
German army. The 8th corps and the ist cavalry divi-
sion, which were at the west of the St. Arnould wood, the
7th corps, occupying the valley between theBois desVaux
and the Bois des Ognons, were ordered to remain in their
positions. A few scouting parties of the French encoun-
tered the pickets of the 7th corps. Some sharp firing en-
sued but no serious damage was done, and the Germans
had strict orders not to bring on a battle. General von
Steinmetz made a reconnoissance on the Bois des Ognons,
south of Gravelotte, and found that the French were in
strong force in the vicinity of Gravelotte. Their num-
ber was estimated at fully three army corps, and from the
commanding positioi where General von Steinmetz made
his observation, it was easily perceived that the villages
and farm-houses of St. Hubert and Point de Jour were
occupied and surrounded by infantry and artillery. There
were also many mitrailleuses, which fired vigorously on
every Prussian skirmishing party that came within reach.
The positions allotted to the French forces on the 17th
were not changed. Marshal Bazaine simply ordered the
commanders to fortify themselves as much as possible.
The slope of the left bank of the Moselle from the water's
edge to the heights of St. Quentin and Plappeville is quite
steep, and covered with a thin forest. There are two nar-
row valleys, or gorges, that cross this slope, both of them
with very steep sides ; one of them is about three hundred
paces from the crest of the slope, while the other, farther to
the west, is a deep ravine, running first in a southerly direc-
tion and afterwards towards the east. The French army
was posted on the range of hills between these two valleys.
The main road between Metz and Gravelotte passes
through the southern part of this slope, with a great many

332 DECISIVE BATTLES SINCE WATERLOO.

windings, and in places cut deeply into the earth. The
slope is, for the most part, regular, and not at all steep ;
consequently the ground was favorable for the erection of
batteries in tiers, one above the other. The French had
taken advantage of this position, and thrown up a liberal
number of batteries. Behind the crest of the ridge there
were many positions, covered by bits or stretches of for-
est, and also intersected with small ravines and valleys,
all of which furnished excellent cover for a defending
force. The assailing party would thus be obliged to make
his attack over sloping ground, which offered no cover,
while the defenders were comparatively well sheltered.

The slopes of the valley through which the Meuse
passes were covered with wood, but not sufficiently to
interfere with the view from the French position, or de-
tract from the effect of their fire.

Canrobert's corps, the 6th, formed the right wing of the
French position. The line it occupied was known as that
of Amanvillers. The 4th corps, commanded by De
L'Admirault, continued the line from that of the 6th
corps to Montign}"-la-Grange, and had an advanced post
at Champenois. The centre was formed by the 3d corps,
while the 2d corps, Frossard's, had a strong position on
the left. The Imperial Guards were in the rear of the left
wing at Bau St. Martin, and formed the main reserve.
Along the line of heights from St. Ouentin to Plappeville,
already described, 120 pieces of artillery were ready for
action ; but the forts of St. Ouentin and Des Carrieres
were not mounted with guns. The position gave a fine
view over the whole region. Marshal Bazaine established
his head-quarters there on the morning of the i8th, and
remained there throughout the battle.

The French front was about seven miles long, and the
position was an admirable one for a defending army. The
left wing was especially strong, as it occupied a steep
height, which was almost inaccessible, while the right

BATTLE OF GRAVELOTTE. 333

wing was not so well protected, as it had no fortification
to rest upon. It is generally believed that Marshal
Bazaine was still confident of escaping with his army from
Metz. He was ready for an attack, and hoped that the
superiority of his position, the destructive fire of his artil-
lery, small-arms, and machine guns would be able to repel
the enemy, and bring him victory. As soon as this was
accomplished the time would be propitious for making
his retreat. The entire arrangement of the French for
the battle of the i8th was purely a defensive one, and in
no manner did they intend to make it offensive. The
strictest orders were issued to the corps commanders not
to advance, but to retain their positions as long as pos-
sible, no matter how great might be their loss.

The German armies well understood that the battle
must be an offensive one, and fought under great disad-
vantages of position. A concentration had been made in
such a manner as to afford the greatest possible celerity
in supporting any parts of the line that might be in dan-
ger. Briefly summarized, the positions were as follows :

At Mars-la-Tour, the Prussian Guards and 12th corps,
with cavalry between them.

Between Trouville and Vionville, the 3d and loth corps,
with 5th and 6th cavalry divisions.

South of Rezonville, the 9th and 8th corps, with first
cavalry division.

Between Bois des Ognons and Bois des Vaux, the 7th
corps, forming the right wing.

At Ars-sur-Moselle, the 26th infantry brigade.

The two contingencies for which the Germans were
prepared were, first, that the French might try to retire
on the 1 8th by the northern road ; and, secondly, that
they might accept a battle close to the walls of Metz, and
with their rear in the direction of the German frontier.
King William issued a general order on the afternoon of
the 17th as follows :

334 DECISIVE BATTLES SINCE WATERLOO.

"The second army will get under arms to-morrow
morning, August i8, at 5 o'clock, and advance with the
object of cutting off the enemy's line of retreat to Verdun,
and attack him wherever he may be encountered, march-
ing in echelons."

The king personally assumed the command of the whole
forces. The 12th and 9th corps moved at the appointed
time, and their advance was at the Gravelotte-Conflans
road. At 8.30 A.M. they had halted to wait further orders.
Patrols were sent out, but they did not encounter any
French. While the men were preparing for breakfast, a
little after ten o'clock, orders to advance were received.
The 8th, 7th, and 3d corps remained in position where
they were. It was now pretty certain, as no French had
been encountered, chat they were not seeking to retreat
from Metz to the west by way of Conflans, but had de-
cided on the second alternative, a battle in the neighbor-
hood of Metz. The French right wing was supposed to
be at Amanvillers. It was necessary, in order to reach
that position, for the three leading corps of the Second
Army of the Germans to wheel to the right : a little more
reconnoitring showed that the battle was to be on the
broad plateau embraced between Amanvillers, Leipsic, and
Moscou.

As the Germans advanced, they found that the French
right extended considerably beyond Amanvillers, and
hence the Guards came first into contact with the enemy.
Prince Frederick Charles ordered the advance to Verne-
ville to be continued, and fire was opened on the French
about noon. This may practically be said to have been
the beginning of the great battle. Verneville is in the
open ground between the Bois de la Casse and the Bois
des Perivaux, only the latter of these woods' having been
occupied by the French. The Bois de la Casse was im-
mediately occupied by the Germans, and they opened an
artillery fire against the French, though they were a good

336 DECISIVE BATTLES SINCE WATERLOO.'

deal troubled by a flank fire from machine guns and small-
arms. The fight at this point was maintained for at least
two hours by the nth corps, when it was relieved by the
artillery of the Prussian Guards Corps which came in on
the north.

While this was going on, the French attacked the 25th
division with a furious artillery fire to the westward of
Bois de la Casse. They were strongly posted at St. Priv^at
and Amanvillers, and it was very evident that here some
very hard fighting would be required to drive them out.

About noon, the Prussian Guards renewed the advance
from Doncourt and Caulre-Ferme. The extension of the
French right beyond Amanvillers made it necessary for
the entire corps of the Guards to make a larger sweep
than had been originally contemplated, in order to attack
the French right wing in flank and double it up. Accord-
ingly, Prince Frederick Charles, who had reached Verne-
ville about one o'clock, ordered the Guards to march on
Habonville, in order to make the movement which has
been designated. The 12th corps had by this time brought
its advance to Battilly. Constant reconnoissances showed
that the French right extended beyond St. Privat, and
that Marie aux Chenes was also strongly held. Prince
August of Wurtemburg received orders to engage the
enemy in his front with artillery, only keeping back his
infantry until the 12th corps had been brought up. The
loth corps was at that time advancing to Battilly, and the
3d corps towards Verneville.

General von Steinmetz waited until the sound of the
cannonade from Verneville indicated that the 9th corps
was engaged. He then commanded the 8th corps to ad-
vance into line of battle by way of Rezonville and Grave-
lotte. This occurred about mid-day, and befdre one o'clock
the position east and south of Gravelotte had been oc-
cupied by the Germans, and they opened fire on the French
with fifty guns. The machine guns and chassepots at St.

BATTLE OF GRAVELOTTE. 337

Hubart and at Point de Jour opened an effective fire upon
them, but it was not sufficient to drive them out or to di-
minish the rapidity, vigor, and precision of their artillery
practice.

A little before two o'clock, orders were given to ad-
vance the infantry in order to drive the French out of the
southern part of theBoisdes Perivaux. The 15th infantry
division of the 8th corps made a rush for the wood, where
they encountered four battalions of French infantry. They
occupied the southern part of the wood, but farther along
they were stoutly resisted by the French and made very
little progress. As soon as the cannonade began, General
von Zastrow advanced on Gravelotte and the Bois des Og-
nons. They opened a vigorous fire, which relieved in
great measure the 8th corps. By two o'clock, the artillery of
the Guards and of the 9th corps on the German left and of
the 7th and 8th corps on the right were in full play. Nearly
250 cannon were being fired w'ith rapidity and precision,
but only one division, the i6th, had been able to take the
offensive. The two infantry divisions of the 9th corps
were quite inactive, as it w^as necessary for them to wait
until the left wing of the Second Army had completed its
deployment.

The artillery combat was vigorously maintained for
several hours, and as vigorously opposed. By four o'clock
some fifteen or twenty guns had been dismounted or in
some way became useless, and most of the batteries had
exhausted their ammunition. Several times the French
endeavored to compel the artillery to retire, but each at-
tempt to do so was successfully resisted. A little after
four o'clock, the artillery fighting on the left wing became
more advantageous for the Germans. The French fire at
St. Privat and also at Amanvillersand Montigny had been
pretty nearly silenced by the fire of no less than fourteen
full batteries of the Germans. Some of the German divi-
sions suffered severely by the steady fire of shell and can-

338 DECISIVE BATTLES SINCE WATERLOO.

ister which were poured in by the French batteries ; in spite
of this they held to their position and showed no signs
whatever of retreating.

There was a severe fight at St. Marie aux Chenes be-
tween three battalions of French and the 5th and 6th
Saxon regiments together with the first division of the
Guards. The Germans attacked under very great disad-
vantages. The ground in the vicinity of St. Marie is
quite open, and the men had no cover whatever against
the French fire. The bullets from the chassepots and
machine guns poured like hail across this ground as soon
as the Germans began their advance. Their only way
was to make a rush c*" perhaps one hundred or two hun-
dred paces, then thro'v themselves flat on the ground
and begin firing ; and as soon as they had taken breath,
rise and repeat the movement. Rush after rush was
made in this wa}'. Many of the Germans were killed and
wounded, but the advance continued. When the Ger-
mans were within one hundred yards of the village, the
French evacua*"ed it, not caring to wait for the last rush.

At five o'clock ni the afternoon, the French army was
holding all 'ts principal positions from one end of the line
to the other, and had only lost a few unimportant points.
The 6th corps on the right wing held its ground at St.
Privat and Roncourt. The 4th corps was also unmoved
in its position at Amanvillers and Montigny-la-Grange ;
but the 3d corps had been compelled to evacuate the Bois
dcs Vaux in front of its left wing, although it was still in
its strong position on the Moscou Heights. In front of
the 2d corps, every attack of the Germans had been re-
pulsed. The Imperial Guard was still held in reserve and
was impatient to be brought forward. Marshal Bazaine
was confident that the day would end in a victor}- for the
French, in view of the circumstance that the Germans had
lost much more heavily than his own army and had
gained no position of consequence.

339

340 DECISIVE BATTLES SINCE WATERLOO.

But he was not aware that up to that time the Germans
had only brought about half their disposable forces into
action, and that a large body of German troops was ready
to adv^ance on both wings, especially on the left. Except-
ing the artillery, only one infantry brigade of the I2th
corps and the Prussian Guards had been in action at St.
Marie, while the two reserve corps of the left wing were
ready to be brought forward. The 7th and 8th corps on
the left wing and the i6th infantry division and the 2d
corps with parts of other divisions and brigades were
ready to be brought into action whenever desired. In
brief, it may be said that three corps had been in action,
while there were five corps, including the Prussian Guards,
which were practically fresh for the fight.

For five hours the battle had been steadily raging on
the right of the Guards without any gain on one side or
the other. The day was ending, and if the Germans were
to secure a victory prompt action was necessary. Unless
the battle could be made decisive before the sun went
down, it was possible that the French army during the
night would concentrate and occupy a still stronger posi-
tion on the next day than they were occupying on the
morning of the i8th. Prince Augustus, of Wiirtemburg,
determined to send the Guards to the attack without
waiting for the arrival of the Saxon corps, which had been
marching to join him. Consequently, three brigades of
the Guards were sent to assault the French position at St..
Privat.

This position at St. Privat was a very strong one,
and any commander of troops would be justified in
hesitating to attack it. Close behind the crest of the hill
the ground slopes quite steeply in the direction of Metz,
while on the west side the slope is gradual and regular for
a distance of two thousand paces, and offering no cover of
any kind to an advancing force. Furthermore, all the
houses of St. Privat had been loopholed, so that the place

BATTLE OF GRAVELOTTE. 341

formed a sort of fortress. The attacking army was
obliged to advance over this wide open space, and fully-
half the distance they would be unable to use their rifles,
but at the same time would be under fire of the French
machine guns and artillery.

The assault was led by the 4th brigade. The skirmish-
ers were thrown out on the front and the batteries fol-
lowed closely. The French were ready for them, and as
soon as they were within range, the artillery, machine
guns, and small-arms opened upon them with full vigor,
cutting wide swaths in their ranks and covering the
ground with dead and wounded. But the advance was
continued in spite of this furious fire ; the commanders
and their staff officers remained on horseback in order
that they might better control the troops, but so many of
them were killed that they soon dismounted. The slaugh-
ter became so great that the commander ordered a halt,
fearing that the brigade would be annihilated before
reaching the line of the enemy. Just then the Saxon
corps was seen adv'ancing at double quick to the north of
St. Privat, and immediately the order to advance was re-
newed. The soldiers made a tremendous rush, each man
endeavoring to get at close quarters with the enemy.
The French defended every position, fighting desperately,
but they were beaten at last. The Saxon and German
columns had so closely timed their movements that they
met in the streets of St. Privat. In a little while they
had driven out the French and were in full possession of
the place.

By this time it was nearly dark. The French took up
fresh positions in the woods a little distance away, and
also in the quarries at the edge of the woods. The Ger-
mans were unable to pursue, partly on account of their
great loss and partly because of the darkness. The re-
verse of the French in the capture of St. Privat soon be-
cafme known alono- the whole line of Marshal Bazaine's

342 DECISIVE BATTLES SINCE WATERLOO.

army. The effect was demoralizing, and the French soon
began to retreat in disorder, abandoning their arms, tents,
and equipage, and seeking safety inside the walls of Metz.
But the darkness which prevented the advance of the
Germans also made it impossible for Marshal Bazaine to
send the Imperial Guard to drive back the assailants. The
battle was over. As soon as night set in all advance of
the Germans was suspended. They encamped on the
field and cared for the wounded.

The loss of the Germans was very much greater than
that of the French, as they had been throughout the day
the attacking party. The German loss was given at 904
officers and 19,000 men, while that of the French was stated
to be 809 ofBcers and 11,000 men. On the German side
310 ofificers and 4,000 men were killed ; among them were
22 field officers. One hundred and tweive of the slain offi-
cers belonged entirely to the corps of the Guards.

The fighting forces of the armies in the battle of Grav-
elotte were 211,000 Germans, of whom 146,000 were in
the first line and 65,000 in the reserve. The French were
estimated at 112,000 in strongly entrenched positions.
The losses were, consequently, one eightJi of the men in
action for the French, and somewhat more than one sev-
enth of the Germans.

The defeat of the French at Gravelotte caused Bazaine's
army to retire within the fortifications of Metz, where it
was besieged by a portion of the German forces, while the
remainder, which comprised the greater part of the First
and Second Armies, were free to pursue MacMahon, whose
army was reorganizing at Chalons, reinforced by Failly's
corps, a part of Felix Douay's, and a great body of re-
serves. Bazaine made several ineffectual attempts to
break through the investing forces, and finally surrendered
on the 27th of October, the surrender including 3 mar-
shals, 66 generals, 6,000 officers, and 173,000 men. There
were delivered up, as prizes of war, 400 pieces of artillery,

BATTLE OF GRAVELOTTE.

343

lOO mitrailleuses, and 53 standards, besides the amount of
small-arms appropriate to the strength of the capitulated
army. The battle of Gravelotte carried momentous
consequences in its result. It was the prelude to the
fall of Sedan, and with Sedan fell the empire of Napoleon
Third.

CHAPTER XIX.

BATTLE AND FALL OF SEDAN — 1 8/0

As soon as possible Marshal MacMahon moved north-
ward from Chalons with the evident intention of relieving
Marshal Bazaine, but he was intercepted by the Germans,
and after several engagements the French retreated be-
yond the Meuse, and massed at Sedan to make ready for
battle. The emperor had joined MacMahon at Chalons,
and accompanied him to Sedan, though he left the com-
mand of the army to the marshal. The Germans were
between Mac^Iahon and Bazaine, and as Bazaine was se-
curely cooped up in Metz, the army of MacMahon was
compelled to rely upon itself. The Germans greatly out-
numbered the French, having about 240,000 men, while
the latter mustered not much more than 150,000. The
German plan was to double up the French line by swing-
ing round upon it '' left shoulder forward " ; it was ar-
ranged at the Crown Prince's head-quarters, and like all
other plans of the Germans, was kept a rigid secret until
the movement began.

According to the German .calculations, it was believed
that by making extraordinary efforts in marching, the
French designs of relieving Bazaine at Metz might be
completely overthrown by a concentration of the 5th and
nth Prussian corps with the Wurtemburgers and Bavari-
ans. It was hardly thought that it would be possible for
the 6th corps to swing in its great circle to the westward,
and reach the battle-field in time to take any part in the ac-

344

BATTLE AND FALL OF SEDAN. 345

tion, but, nevertheless, it would be useful in protecting the
German left flank, and serving as a support in case the
time of the movement should be protracted.

It was unfortunate for the French that they had no
strong corps of observation southward to Vitry. Had
they possessed such a corps from 80,000 to 100,000 strong,
the German "wheel around" would have been a very
risky performance. In place of such a corps there were
only a few badly organized bodies of militia, which the
Prussians naturally regarded with the greatest contempt.
The Crown Prince did not deign to give them the least
attention, and so with the 6th corps covering his left, he
swung in upon Sedan.

The ground near Sedan which the French occupied and
defended is nearly five miles in extent from south to
north, and about two miles from east to west, running
into a narrow point toward the south. The fortress of
Sedan, which has a small citadel on its northeasterly front,
is situated in low ground near the Meuse. On the right
bank of the river its walls extend to the first slopes of the
higher ground where the old entrenched camp was located.
Southeast of Sedan, and forming a suburb of it, is the
village of Bazeilles. It is on the right bank of the Meuse,
and on low ground. After passing Bazeilles to the north
and east, we find ourselves on rising ground. The slope
is at first gentle, but as we go toward the north it becomes
steeper, and thus continues to the summits of the Ardennes,
which are covered with wood. The broken ground on the
north, where the battle was fought, embraces a deep valley
or ravine that has steeply sloping sides, and a general di-
rection from north to south. In this valley are the vil-
lages of Moncelle, Givonne, and Daigny. To the north-
west this same broken ground is bordered by the valley of
the Illy, a small rivulet along whose banks are the villages
of Illy and Floing. On the right bank of the Meuse
there is a strip of low ground, about 6,000 feet broad,

346 DECISIVE BATTLES SINCE WATERLOO.

which extends from Bazeilles to Sedan along the river,
and on the left bank the high grounds are close to the
edge of the Aleuse from Vadelincourt to Romilly. The
most important feature of the battle-field, so far as its
topography is concerned, is the Bois de Garenne, which is
about 3,000 yards in length north and south, by 2.00G
yards broad. Scattered through the wood are several
open spaces. From Sedan to the frontier of Belgium, as
the crow flies, is a distance of about seven English miles.
The correspondent of the London Daily News, who ac-
companied the Germans, thus describes the advance to
Sedan :

Hard marching it was, and the day was lovely. The bayo-
nets of the infantry glittered in the sunshine. The valleys full
of armed men, the white straight roads with rumbling trains of
artillery and great masses of cavalry far to the front, where the
first patches of woodland grew indistinct among the red and
brown fields. The whole country southward of the road from
Beaumont to LaChesse is alive with German troops. The Ba-
varians are in Beaumont. The 4th Prussian corps is further to
the right, and closely round upon the line of the Meuse ; the
5th Prussian corps is pushing toward Stonne and Chemery.
Suddenly flashes of artillery are seen near Beaumont. Then
an active cannonade begins on the distant ridge behind that
place. The ist Bavarian corps has surprised a French divi-
sion in the little town, capturing a good deal of baggage. White
puffs of smoke break out in all directions. The French are
replying. There is evidently a sharp struggle on our right
front about Beaumont, and Mouzon. It grows fiercer, and the
troops bivouacked on the hill near Stonne are eager to be
among the combatants ; but they cannot get there to-night, but
must rest in their position. With that dull rolling and grum-
bling of the cannonade, this fight was the preparation for the
decisive closing in of August 31st.

The Germans were in light marching order, their knap-
sacks being carried in wagons which followed closely

347

348 DECISIVE BATTLES SINCE WATERLOO.

behind their regiments. They were weary, and hungry,
and thirsty, but they pressed on without complaint. They
presented a fine appearance, although they were covered
with the dust which rose in clouds from the roads along
which they travelled. Every man of the infantry, cavalrj',
and artillery, seemed to understand the necessity of fast
marching, and to entertain the hope that a victory in the
battle about to come Avould be the end of the war. The
plan had not, of course, been unfolded to the soldiers, or
even to any but the highest officers, but somehow it
seemed to be understood throughout the entire army,
rank and file, that a great and decisive battle was at hand.
It was an enormous half circle closing in to make a
complete circle around the doomed city of Sedan,
On the hill above Donchery was the Crown Prince, while
the 5th and i ith Prussian corps were pressing to the north
in order to sweep around to the left. The 6th corps is
pressing forward, but too far away on the left rear to come
into the battle. The Wurtemburgers who are consider-
ably in advance of the 6th corps also, but holding the left,
will have better fortune, if better fortune it may be called,
to take part in the battle and sufTer severely. The mead-
ows near Sedan have been artificially flooded, but this
flooding will be no serious interruption to the movements
of the Prussians. The two Bavarian corps are on the
right of the hill above Donchery. The ist corps of the
Bavarians is the only one which has to take part in the
great battle. Beyond them are the troops commanded by
the Crown Prince of Saxony, the 6th Saxon, the 4th
Prussian, and the corps of Prussian Guards. The circle is
steadily closing around Sedan, and before the battle begins
in full vigor, the ring will be complete. As there are two
German armies present, the Third Army of the Crown
Prince of Prussia, and the " combined arm}' " of the Crown
Prince of Saxony, King William takes the supreme com-
mand. The king and his staff make their head-quarters

BATTLE AND FALL OF SEDAN. 349

on some high ground behind the position of the Bavari-
ans. Count Bismarck and General von Moltke remain
with the Prince.

In the battle of September ist, the position of the
French army was peculiar. It was posted so as to nearly
surround Sedan at a general distance of about two miles.
Sedan was in its centre, and it fronted practically to all
the cardinal points of the compass. Unfortunately, the
fortress of Sedan was poorly supplied with provisions.
The fortress was not properly armed, in fact, no provision
had been made for a vigorous defence, and especially for
a siege. Besides, the position of the place was an un-
happy one. Its fortifications were built long before any
one had dreamt of the range of modern artillery, and it
was dominated in every direction by high ground, from
which a destructive fire could be poured without any pos-
sibility of replying to it with effectiveness. It was of no
advantage whatever to the French army in any thing like
an aggressive movement, and in case of a disaster, it was
utterly useless as a rallying point for retreating troops.
The position of MacMahon at Sedan was certainly not
aggressive, and with any liberal use of the word it could
hardly be called defensive. The character of the ground,
the position and condition of the town and its fortifica-
tions, gave every advantage to the Germans with a total
lack of advantage to the French. Every line of retreat
had been cut off, and a defeat to the French meant an
utterly overwhelming disaster to them.

At the very outset of the battle, Marshal MacMahon was
severely wounded by a fragment of a shell which exploded
near him, and his wound compelled him to give up the
command. For several reasons the wounding of Marshal
MacMahon thus early in the day was a terrible misfortune
to the French. He was greatly beloved by the soldiers,
and their confidence in him was implicit ; consequently the
information that he was wounded, caused a general de-

350 DECISIVE BATTLES SINCE WATERLOO.

spondency. Furthermore, he had not confided his plan
of battle to any one ; even the orders which he had issued
for the movements of the morning did not reveal his
plans ; consequently, when he was carried back to Sedan,
all the high officers were entirely ignorant of his intentions.
The marshal gave the command of the army to General
Ducrot, who was not the senior general then on the ground.
That honor belonged to General De Wimpffen, who had
arrived only two days before from Algeria, and was conse-
quently not acquainted with the army and its condition.
An eye-witness says :

This arbitrary act of passing over General De Vimpffen
was destined to exercise the most baneful influence on the
whole course of the action, more as since the strateg'.cal views
of Ducrot and De Wimpffen, on which the tactical conduct of
the battle depended, were altogether at variance.

General Ducrot took command at 7.30 A.M., and imme-
diately ordered the whole army to concentrate at Illy to
force its way to Mezieres. While the movement was being
executed. General De Wimpffen, acting on his orders from
the war ministry, assumed command and ordered the
troops back to their old position, which they reached about
10 A.M. The time lost in these movements was admir-
ably utilized by the Germans. They closed up both wings
of the French army and removed the last chance of forcing
a passage through their lines in any direction whatever.
And furthermore, these changes of command and these
advance and retrograde movements had a bad effect on
the French troops. A feeling of insecurity was engendered,
the men lost their courage, and ultimately they refused
to obey their commanders and rebelled against any author-
ity whatever.

The first Bavarian corps near Bazeilles was in front of
the right wing of the French, which consisted of the 12th
corps, ranging along from Bazeilles, Balan, and La Mon-

BATTLE AND FALL OF SEDAN. 35 1

celle, with its front toward the south. North of this posi-
tion, the high ground and also the bottom' of the valley
at Givonne and Daigny was held by the ist French
corps, who were faced by the 12th Prussian corps and the
Prussian Guards. The portion of the line at Illy was held
by the 7th corps, who were supported by the iithand 5th
corps. Later in the day, in the centre and rear of the
French position, the 5th corps was posted to serve as a re-
serve that might be moved in any direction. To guard
against any attempt of the French to force a way out of
Sedan toward the south, the 2d Bavarian corps, which had
its own artillery, and that of the ist corps, stood in the
way. The 4th German corps was held in reserve in the
early part of the day, but was brought into the battle be-
fore it ended. One division of the 4th corps was sent to
Bazeilles to support the Bavarians, while the other division
stood in reserve at Mairy. Altogether, for attacking the
principal points of the French line, the Germans had a
much larger number of men than their antagonists.

The battle was opened by the Bavarians. It was in-
tended to begin the fire at daylight, and General Von der
Tann, who commanded the 1st Bavarian corps, was all
ready for action with the first streak of daylight, but a
thick fog hung over the valley of the Meuse and prevent-
ed the tactical action which he intended. During the
night, General Von der Tann had sent his artillery to the
left bank of the Meuse while the principal part of his
corps bivouacked between Romilly and Augecourt. He
had been instructed to attack Bazeilles, in order to prevent
the escape of the French without giving battle, the great
fear being that the French, knowing the numerical supe-
riority of their antagonists, would attempt to retire from
Sedan before the lines around it could be completed. The
Bavarian vanguard advanced at 4 A.M. and thirty minutes
later it was in possession of the Romilly station south of
Bazeilles. On passing to the village they found that the

352 DECISIVE BATTLES SINCE WATERLOO.

French held it in force. When the fog that had been
hanging over the valley lifted a little about six o'clock, the
Bavarians were discovered and the French artillery opened
a heavy fire upon them. The fire was rapid and well di-
rected, and it caused much havoc among the Bavarians
while they advanced over the cleared ground in front of
Bazeilles. Report having been received that a serious
engagement was going on at Bazeilles, the emperor and Mar-
shal ]\Iac]\Iahon started immediately in the direction of that
village. On the way thither the marshal was wounded, as pre-
viously stated, and obliged to leave the field. The emperor
examined the position at Bazeilles, and being satisfied
that his troops could maintain themselves, then proceeded
to make a tour of inspection along the whole line, partly
for his own information and partly to encourage the sol-
diers by his personal presence.

The fighting at Bazeilles continued steady from 6 A.M.,
the German vanguard being reinforced by the main body
of the 1st Bavarian division, and afterwards by the 2d
division. The French commander held his position gal-
lantly, and was greatly astonished when, about 8 A.M., he
received orders from General Ducrot to move his com-
mand towards Illy. He protested against the order as
most unwise, for the double reason that Bazeilles was an
important position, and that a retreat in the middle of a
battle would be demoralizing to the troops. General
Ducrot explained that it was an imperative necessity, and
the march must begin at once with all the forces not actual-
ly engaged in defending Bazeilles. The emperor, returning
from an examination of the position at Moncelle, met
these very troops that he had seen shortly before strongly
posted, and asked General Ducrot what this n,ew movement
meant. The latter answered : '* The enemy is only amusing
us at Bazeilles ; the real battle will be fought at Illy." Not
wishing to interfere with General Ducrot's plans, the
emperor said nothing. It was at this juncture that Gen-

354 DECISIVE BATTLES SINCE WATERLOO.

eral De Wimpffen assumed command and sent the troops
back to their old positions.

The attack on Bazeilles was vigorousi}' pushed and as
vigorously defended. Three times the Bavarians stormed
it only to be beaten back ; the Germans alleged that the
inhabitants joined in the fighting, firing out of loopholed
houses and from cellars, and perpetrating atrocious bar-
barities on the wounded Bavarians who were left behind
after each repulse. The French denied the German alle-
gations, and accused their opponents of wanton cruelty in
mercilessly slaughtering all the inhabitants of the village
who fell into their hands. After the war there was much
controversy on the subject, the French declaring that of
nearly 2,000 inhabitants scarcely 50 remained alive. In
July, 1 87 1, General Von der Tann officially declared that
the number of deaths had been grossly exaggerated ; he
denied the cruelties charged against the Germans, and said
there had been much provocation on the part of the in-
habitants. Probably the truth lies between the extremes ;
this much is certain, — that Bazeilles was burned, but
whether set on fire by shell or torch is not positively
known. Driven out by the flames, the French retired
from the village, but continued their resistance in the
neighboring fields and gardens and on the contiguous
hills. By 10 A.M. Bazeilles was destroyed.

The vanguard of the 12th German corps engaged the
1 2th French corps at La Moncelle, farther on to the right.
A little past six o'clock, the principal part of the corps
piled its knapsacks on the ground, leaving them in charge
of a guard, b}' whom the)^ were subsequently placed in
wagons, and then marched up the high road from Douzay.
They left the road, turning at La Rulle to^the right, and
a little past seven o'clock came in at the position assigned
them. The French did not seem to be in force at La
Moncelle, and consequently there was not much opposi-
tion to the advancing Germans. The latter fortified the

BATTLE AND FALL OF SEDAN. 355

village as soon as they took possession, and opened fire
with one battery of artillery upon the long lines cf the
French that were drawn up on the heights to the west.
As soon as the fire was opened the French responded with
five batteries. In half an hour three other German batteries
came up, and the fight became more equal. Immediately
following this artillery fight, strong bodies of Zouaves and
Turcos from the first French corps attacked the German
lines, but were driven back. When the advance of the
division L'Artignes were crossing the valley of Daigny,
the Saxons were already in possession of the wood. The
Saxon supports came up rapidly and gave sufTficient
strength for an offensive movement. The Saxons steadily
pushed on towards the edge of the valley. There was a
sharp fight at Daigny, which resulted in the capture of
200 Zouaves, 3 mitrailleuses, and 3 guns. The Saxons
halted at Daigny because their ammunition was running
low, and the ammunition wagons were too far in the rear
to enable them to get a fresh supply immediately. They
held on to their position until ten o'clock, when the
batteries of the Prussian Guards came up, formed in line
with them, and thus gave them relief.

While this was going on, the French were pushing the
Bavarians severely, and there was great fear that the
French would succeed in breaking through the German
lines between Montville and La Moncelle. The Bavarian
commander sent a request for the Saxons to come to his
aid. The latter complied with the request, and not a
moment too soon. Just in time they closed the gap be-
tween their own left and the right of the Bavarians. The
French made another furious attack, but were repulsed
by the artillery and several divisions of infantry that were
brought forward by ten o'clock or a little later. The en-
tire valley of the Givonne, the Bazeilles rivulet, and the
rivulet between Bazeilles and Daigny, had been given up
by the French and occupied by the Saxons and Bavarians,

356 DECISIVE BATTLES SINCE WATERLOO.

This side of the line was now considered perfectly secure.
There was no fear that the French could force a passage,
and there was no evidence that they intended to make
an attempt farther to the north. The Prussian Guards
were steadily forcing back the first corps of the French.

The advance of the two infantry divisions of the Prus-
sian Guards arrived late at night on the 31st August, near
Pouru St. Reny and Pouru au Bois, and at the same time
the main body of the corps came to a halt northward of
Carignan. At five in the morning of September ist they
moved out in two columns, the right advancing on Villers
Cernay, and the left on Francheval. At Villers Cernay
they encountered the French line, and having brought
their artillery into position on the high ground above the
Givonne rivulet, they opened fire upon a body of cavalry
and a number of trains on the opposite side of the valley.
A few shells, not over a dozen probabl}', sufficed to throw
both cavalry and trains into a panic. Wagons and horses
stampeded in all directions, and the wildest confusion
followed.

The other division moved toward the southward, and
at nine o'clock went to support the Saxon troops in the
vicinity of Daigny. As already stated, another division
of the Prussian Guards remained in reserve. It was about
10.30 A.M. when the Saxons and Guards together took
possession of Daigny and captured a considerable number
of prisoners. About this time the French were making
the retrograde movement on Illy, in accordance with
General Ducrot's order.

As already mentioned, the confused movements of the
French in consequence of the difference of opinion be-
tween Ducrot and De Wimpffen proved of great advantage
to the Germans. By the time the French returned from
the movement upon Illy, the Saxons and Bavarians with
the Prussian Guards had obtained firm possession of the val-
ley of the Givonne. The best that the French could then

BATTLE AND FALL OF SEDAN. 357

do was to take position on the high ground beyond the
west bank of the valley, the artillery in front and the in-
fantry lying down to the rear of the artillery line. The
position was a bad one, as it was under the direct fire of
the Saxon, Bavarian, and Prussian artillery, whose guns
were much more numerous and of greater weight of
metal, but it was also enfiladed on the right by several
batteries posted on the left bank of the Meuse. The
French losses by the artillery fire were very heavy, and
increased so rapidly as to threaten a panic among the
troops. The Emperor Napoleon rode through" the battle-
field towards Sedan about ten o'clock, in order to consult
with Marshal MacMahon, in case the condition of the
marshal's wound would allow a consultation. General
De Wimpffen rode out to the front and was soon con-
vinced that the enemy's barrier of artillery was too strong
to be broken down or forced. Finding that the 7th corps
had lost very heavily, he abandoned the thought of break-
ing the German line, and sought only to hold his position
until nightfall, when fortune might give an opportunity
for the retreat of a portion at least of his army.

The nth corps, forming part of the German left wing,
was moving on the evening of August 31st to occupy
Donchery. Early on the morning of the next day it was
ordered to take up a position that would prevent the pos-
sibility of a French retreat upon Mezieres. The move-
ment began a little before six o'clock, and the whole corps
was very soon to the north of Donchery, and on the right
bank of the Meuse. About nine o'clock it encountered
the French pickets which were along the high ground
around St. Manges. The pickets were easily driven in
and the ground occupied. Then the corps advanced to
Floing, through the narrow defile of St. Albert. Floing
was already occupied by the 5th corps, and as there was
no room for the two to march abreast, the i ith corps halted.
The French had a strong position on the Plateau d'Algerie.

358 DECISIVE BATTLES SINCE WATERLOO.

The wings of the French position touched the villages of
Illy and Floing, while the line between them had steep
sides to the valley directly in its front. The 7th French
corps and two reserve cavalry divisions occupied this
plateau.

The Bois de Garenne, which was in the rear of the
right wing of this part of the French line, was occupied
by a strong force, which was intended to maintain con-
nection Avith the first corps. The artillery of the 5.th
and nth corps opened fire on this wood, which was
crowded with French troops, among whom great havoc
was caused by the German guns. Sev^eral times the
French brought batteries to the edge of the wood, and
attempted to reply ; but every battery that came thus to
the front was immediately silenced by the concentrated
fire of the German batteries. A French officer who was
taken prisoner described the German fire as " five kilo-
metres of artillery." General De Wimpffen's line of bat-
tle had now assumed the very rare condition along its
east front of being broken into two portions that fronted
in nearly opposite directions.

Let us now return to the right wing of the German
army, which we left soon after ten o'clock. When the
sound of the cannonade in the direction of Illy reached
the Prussian Guards, the generals concluded that the
turning columns in that direction had closed the line of
battle. Prince Augustus, of Wiirtemberg, who com-
manded the Prussian Guards, ordered the artillery fire to
be opened on the Bois de Garenne, which \vas vigorously
assaulted over nearly its whole extent. All the troops
which the French had assembled there were compelled to
stay inside the wood. As soon as a column made its ap-
pearance anywhere at the edge of the wood it was cut
down by the German fire. Then an advance of the
Guards was ordered, so that every possibility of an escape
of the French in the direction of Belgium was completely

BATTLE AND FALL OF SEDAN. 359

cut off. An order was sent for the Bavarians to advance ;
but in consequence of their terrible losses at Bazeilles
they were not in condition for the offensive, and were un-
able to occupy Daigny. The order was then given to the
Saxons, who executed it in fine style, and advanced later
on to Fond de Givonne in the rear of the Guards.

The position of the right wing of the French, which was
personally commanded by General De Wimpffen, was now
perfectly hopeless. As a last resort he sent a request to the
emperor to come and lead the troops in person, as they
would consider it an honor to cut a way for him through
the German lines. The emperor was unwilling to sacrifice
the lives of so many soldiers in order to save himself, and
therefore he declined the invitation. General De Wimpf-
fen then went over to Balan to find whatever troops there
might be remaining from the 12th and 1st corps ; but none
could be found. He was alone, unaccompanied by a single
staff ofificer, and then rode to the gate of Sedan in the
hope of being able to rally some of the disordered troops.
General Ducrot proposed to make a last effort to cut
through the German lines, and for this purpose ordered a
general charge of cavalr>\

Marguerittc's reserve cavalry division (the 4th) was
selected ; it advanced by echelons east of Floing and was
intended to overthrow everything before it, after which it
would fall to the right and double up the enemy's line. The
charge was as gallant as that of the French cavalry at
Waterloo— and as unfortunate •, it swept on like a tornado,
but never reached the German lines. The artillery and
infantry mowed great swaths in the advancing columns,
and covered the ground with the fallen heroes. Three
times was the charge made and three times repulsed.
The dead and wounded actually lay in heaps in front of
the German lines.

Ducrot's effort to save the day was a failure, and the
cavalry had been sacrificed. Then he ordered the infantry

360 DECISIVE BATTLES SINCE WATERLOO.

to make the same dash for liberty, but utterly disheart-
ened and worn out with fatigue, they refused to obey his
orders.

It was now three o'clock and a great stream of fugitives
had been for some time flowing to the town. General
Ducrot rode there too, in order to get a few more troops
together, but when he saw the state of things there he
abandoned all hope. The streets and squares throughout
the town were packed with all kinds of wagons, gun car-
riages, caissons, etc., and crowded with terror-stricken men
who had thrown away their guns and were intent only on
finding shelter and food, with safety for their lives. All
discipline was gone, and evidently the defeat of the French
was complete and crushing.

A French officer who was with the army in Sedan thus
describes the state of affairs in the town near the end of
the battle :

Meanwhile shells were flying in the direction of our street
and hotel. Everybody stood under the vaulted stone entrance
as the safest place of shelter. While we waited, watching
patiently for the shells which might have sent us altogether
into another world, General De Wimpffen came past making a
vain effort to rally and inspirit his fleeing troops. He shouted,
Vive la France ! eji avant ! but there was no reply. He cried
out that Bazaine was attacking the Prussians in the rear. This
news, which had been current all the morning, coming from
the mouth of General De Wimpffen, came to be believed, and
a few thousand men were rallied and followed him out of the
town. People began to have hope, and for one brief moment
we believed the day might be saved. Need I say that this in-
telligence was a patriotic falsehood of the brave general, made
with anguish; and, in direct opposition of the emperor's orders,
he had resolved to rally what men he could and make a stand.
He could not have known that he was bound in the grasp of
at least 300,000 men. The bugle and trumpet ring out on all
sides, a few thousand men hearken to the sound. They went

362 DECISIVE BATTLES SINCE WATERLOO.

out at the Port de Balan. The houses of the suburb were
already full of Prussians, who fired on the French out of every
window. The church especially is thoroughly garrisoned, the
heavy doors are closed. The general sent an officer to fetch
two pieces of cannon. These soon arrived, and with them the
door of the church is blown in. Two hundred Prussians are
captured and brought back with the French, who, in spite of
all their efforts, are forced to retire again into the town. It
was the last incident of the battle — the last struggle.

By four in the afternoon the Germans were masters of
the situation and the defeat of the French was absolutely
certain. The Germans had contracted their circle close
around Sedan, their artillery held possession of all the
heights, and it was in their power to destroy the town
and the army at pleasure if only their ammunition held
out.

The battle of Sedan was chiefly carried on with
artillery, in which the Germans were superior in numbers,
weight, range, and precision. The field, after the surren-
der, presented a worse spectacle than any other of the
war, owing to the terrible work of the artillery.

The impossibility of further assistance was evident, and
the white flag was displayed from the walls of Sedan.
Immediately the German fire ceased and the negotiations
for surrender began. At first General De Wimpffen re-
fused the terms offered, but on the next day, September
2d, he signed the capitulation of -Sedan, and the whole
army, including the emperor, who became a prisoner of
war. In his interview with the king the emperor was
downcast but dignified. From Sedan he was sent to the
castle of Wilhelmshohe, near Cassel, and so ended his
career as ruler of France. Two days later came the revo-
lution in Paris, the overthrow of the empire, the flight of
the empress, and the formation of the republic.

About 25,000 prisoners were taken during the
battle of Sedan, and 83,000 surrendered the next day.

BATTLE AND FALL OF SEDAN, 363

Among the captured material of war were 400 pieces
of field artillery, 150 fortress guns, and 70 mitrailleuses.
About 14,000 French wounded were found lying in Sedan
and in the neighborhood, and 3,000 French escaped into
Belgium, and laid down their arms. The great Army of
the North thus passed out of existence.

Amongst the prisoners there were i marshal (MacMa-
hon), 40 generals, 230 field-officers, and 2,595 ofificers of
other grades.

The losses of the Germans were :

1,310 killed,

6,443 wounded,

2,107 missing.

Total 9,860.

The losses of the French according to their own state-
ments were, exclusive of prisoners and missing,
3,000 killed,
10,000 wounded.

Total 13,000.

The strategical feat of the Germans by which an army
of more than 200,000 men made a w^onderfully accurate
" wheel to the right " by means of which the entire force
was concentrated after a march of four days on a point
upwards of 47 miles from where the left wing previously
stood, is probably without a parallel in military history.

The result of the battle of Gravelotte was to imprison
Bazaine's army in Metz, where it remained until its sur-
render. The imprisonment of Bazaine's army made pos-
sible the capture of Sedan with the forces under MacMa-
hon, the surrender of the emperor, the fall of the empire,
the advance upon the French capital, the siege and capture
of Paris, and the great triumph of the German army. At
Versailles, on the 1st of January, 1871, King William of
Prussia was proclaimed Emperor of Germany amid the roar

3^4

DECISIVE BATTLES SINCE WATERLOO.

of the cannon b}- which haughty Paris was reduced to
humihation. Two months later the war came to an end
with the preHminary treaty of peace, and on the loth of
May was signed the definitive treaty by which France sur-
rendered portions of her territory to the conquerors, and
paid an indemnity of five milhards of francs for the ex-
penses of the war.

CHAPTER XX.

FALL OF KHIVA — 1 873.

While England has been pursuing a career of conquest
in the great Indian peninsula and adjacent countries,
Russia has been doing likewise in Northern Asia. Yermak,
a Cossack chief, crossed the Ural Mountains, and invaded
Siberia in 1580 ; nineteen years later was formed the East
India Company, which laid the foundation of the present
British Empire in India. England's course of conquest
has carried her arms to the northward, while those of
Russia have steadily pushed to the south. Now they
confront each other on the plains and among the moun-
tains of Afghanistan, and on more than one occasion in
the past few years a hostile encounter has been imminent.

In her southward march over the plains of Central Asia,
Russia successfully conquered numerous tribes and khan-
ates of greater or less importance, and in most instances
the conquests were bloodless. The Russians are superior
to the British in their knowledge of Oriental character and
Oriental ways of dealing; and for this reason they are
often able to accomplish by diplomacy what the latter can
only gain by fighting. Having a good deal of the Asiatic
in their composition, they are better fitted than any other
European people for dealing with the inhabitants of that
part of the world, which has been claimed to be the cradle
of the human race. The Russians usually try diplomacy
before resorting to arms, but the arms are generally close
at hand during the negotiations, and whenever they are
needed there is no delay in their use.

365

366 DECISIVE BATTLES SINCE WATERLOO.

The khanate of Khiva resisted both the diplomacy and
the arms of Russia until a very recent period. It occu-
pied an area of about 200,000 square miles in the great
plain of Turkestan, but 01 this area only a small part was
under cultivation or capable of being cultivated. The chief
oasis in which the capital Khiva is situated, stretches from
the mouth of the Alnou Darya or Oxus, about two hundred
miles along its banks, and is watered by canals drawn from
that stream. This fertile area is about 3,000 square miles
in extent, and has a population of a quarter of a million.
Geographically Khiva is of no great importance, but it has
a prominent place in the political world, and the events of
1873 drew towards it the attention of all nations. Russia
had long sought to possess the khanate, but, protected
by the desert sands that surround them, the Khivans
were able to bid defiance to their northern enemies.

It is a curious circumstance that the first expedition for
this purpose actually succeeded in conquering the khan-
ate and holding it for two or three months. It was or-
ganized and conducted by a chieftain of the Yaik or Ural
Cossacks, and was simply a plundering expedition on a
large scale. Finding the Khan unprepared for war, the
chieftain drove him out, seized his capital, and took pos-
session of his treasure and his wives. The Cossack de-
clared himself khan, ruled the country, converted the
Khan's favorite wife to Christianity and married her. But
finding, after ten or twelve weeks of power, that the Khan
was assembling an army to re-conquer his capital, the
Cossack determined to retreat to the Urals, and started
with a large caravan loaded with plunder. The Cossacks
were overtaken by the Khan, and so severely were they
handled that only five or six escaped alive, to the Urals.
The Cossack chieftain killed his newly converted bride when
he saw that escape was hopeless, and then died fighting
among a heap of slain Khivans who had fallen beneath his
sword.

FALL OF KHIVA. 367

Two similar freebooting expeditions were undertaken
by Cossacks, but both were disastrous. One of them
made a dash upon Kuna-Urgench, whence they carried off
about one thousand Khivan women, whom they wanted
for wives, together with other booty. The Khan overtook
them on their retreat, and slew the invaders to almost the
last man. The other expedition was met about half way
across the desert and forced to retire after heavy loss.

Peter the Great sent an expedition against Khiva in
1717. It was composed of about 4,000 regular and irregu-
lar troops, and attempted to cross the desert in the mid-
dle of summer. About one fourth of the number died of
illness on the way, and the rest, greatly worn out, were
slaughtered by the Khan's army almost in sight of the mua
walls of the capital. Of the whole 4,000 who started only
40 escaped, and thus ended the fourth expedition against
Khiva.

For more than a century from this date the situation
was changed, the Cossacks who had formerly plundered
the Khivans being themselves the victims of Khivan plun-
dering. Hundreds of Cossacks and other Russians were
carried to Khiva and sold into slavery, and caravans on
their way to trade in Central Asia were attacked and
plundered almost daily. By 1839 these raids had become
intolerable to the Russians, and the government at St.
Petersburg determined to send an expedition against
Khiva. It was commanded by General Perovski, and
consisted of about 5,000 men, 22 guns, and a transport
train of 10,000 camels. As it was thought impossible to
cross the desert in summer, the expedition started from
Orenburg December i, 1839.

The winter proved to be exceptionally severe, and by
the middle of December the thermometer showed 40°
below zero, and the mercury froze when exposed to the
air. The snow was very deep, and before the expedition
was half way to Khiva half the camels were dead or dis-

368 DECISIVE BATTLES SIN'CE WATERLOO.

abled and many of the men were frostbitten and unable
to move without assistance. The camels were dying at
the rate of one hundred a day, and as the effective force
was reduced to less than 2,000 men, General Perovski de-
cided to retreat. The remnant of the expedition arrived
at Fort Emba in February and remained there until
spring, but the attempt to capture Khiva was not then
renewed.

The next expedition to Khiva was that of General
Kaufmann in 1873, which resulted in the conquest of the
khanate and the transfer of its rule to Russia. We will
now consider the details of the expedition.

General Kaufmann, Governor-General of Turkestan,
had been for tv\o years planning the expedition and get-
ting ready for it before he asked the permission of the
government at St. Petersburg to attack the khanate of
Khiva. But there were other aspirants than Kaufmann
for the honor of capturing Khiva, and as the distances
were very great and nobody was able to say with certainty
which route offered the best chances of success, the em-
peror, after due consideration of the subject, decided to
send four expeditions from as many different points. The
first was to go from the Caucasus under command of
Colonel Markosoff ; the second was to march from Oren-
burg under General Verevkin ; the third was from Kin-
derly Bay, on the Caspian Sea, under Colonel Lomakin ;
and the fourth was from Tashkend under General Kauf-
mann. A fifth column was to start from Kazala, or Fort
No. I, on the Syr Daria, under command of Grand Duke
Nicholas, and join General Kaufmann en rotite. Marl:o-
soff's expedition never reached Khiva ; it suffered terribly
in the desert, and when within 120 miles of 'the oasis was
compelled to turn back.

The governor of Orenburg did not receive his orders to
prepare the expedition until the first days of January.
By the 27th of February he had his troops in readiness

FALL OF KHLVA. 369

with the proper ammunition, equipment, tents, and cloth-
ing, for a march of 1,100 miles through a desert country.
In spite of the severe cold the column reached Fort Emba,
on the river of the same name, 400 miles from the start-
ing-point, near the end of March, without the loss of a
man. The column consisted of nine companies of infan-
try : 1,600 men; nine sotnias (squadrons) of Cossacks:
1,200 men ; eight pieces of artillery, a rocket and a mor-
tar battery, with three times the ordinary store of amuni-
tion. The transport train consisted of 5,000 camels.
Supplies were taken for two months and a half, and the
entire column had felt tents for every twenty men.

The Kinderly column contained 1,800 men with ten
pieces of artillery. It was provisioned and equipped sim-
ilarly to the Orenburg column, which it was intended to
join at Lake Aibugir. It suffered terribly in the desert,
partly from the intense heat of the middle of the day
and partly from great scarcity of water. There were few
wells along the route, and such water as could be found
was very bad for men and animals. Sunstroke, dysentery,
and general debility were prevalent, and fever was so
common that nobody seemed to mind it. On two or
three occasions the whole expedition was in peril of death
from thirst: one march of three days was made with
practically no water, the Turcomans having poisoned the
only well on the route by throwing into it the carcases of
putrefying animals. The march ended with the entrance
into the oasis near Kungrad, and the joy of the soldiers
can be imagined when they found green pastures and
flowing water after a journey of two months across the
desert and terrible suffering from thirst. The columns of
General Verevkin and Colonel Lomakin joined near Kun-
grad, which was taken without a blow. And hereby hangs
an interesting incident.

Up to their arrival at Kungrad neither of the columns
met any opposition from the Khivans. They showed

370 DECISIVE BATTLES SINCE WATERLOO.

themselves a few times, and their commanders sent inso-
lent messages to the Russian leaders, to which no answers
were vouchsafed. The day before General Verevkin en-
tered Kungrad, he received a letter from the governor of
that place asking that the Russians would dela}' their ad-
vance for three days so that he could have his cannon
ready and give them battle. He threatened that if they
pushed blindly forward before that time he would simply
refuse to fight. They continued to advance, and the
Khivan governor of Kungrad kept his word by abandon-
ing the place just before the Russians entered it.

But from Kungrad onward the Russians were harassed
by the Turcomans, who hung on their flanks, making at-
tacks or feints at all hours and keeping the invaders in
such a state of alertness that they were unable to get any
rest at night. The Turcomans were well mounted, and
both men and horses showed themselves capable of won-
derful endurance. In spite of the opposition of the Tur-
comans the united column advanced steadily in the direc-
tion of Khiva, the capital, having numerous skirmishes
with the enemy's cavalr>' and an occasional encounter in
which artillery was used. On the 9th of June they ar-
rived in front of Khiva, but in consequence of the high
walls of the gardens and the forests of fruit-trees they
were within two hundred yards of the walls of the place
before they were aware of its proximity. Nothing had
been heard from Kaufmann beyond vague reports from
prisoners that there was a Russian column approaching
Khiva on the other side.

General Verevkin and his staff were leading the advance
along a road not more than twelve or fifteen feet wide,
bordered by high walls. Suddenly there w<is a crash of
musketry accompanied by the deep growl of artillery ; the
bullets from the small-arms and the shot from the cannon
passed over their heads, as the Khivans had made the mis-
take of aimincT too hiijh. Discharge after discharge fol-

FALL OF KHIVA. 37 1

lowed, and in a little while the Khivans obtained a better
range, and their fire began to tell. The Russians then found
they were under the walls of Khiva ; retreat was inconveni-
ent if not impossible, and General Verevkin gave the order
to advance. The infantry went forward at a run, and soon
came into an open field in front of one of the gates, which
was defended by a breastwork with four guns. Two com-
panies of infantry under Major Burovstoff dashed over the
breastworks and bayonetted the gunners ; the breastwork
was about 100 yards from the walls of the town, and from
these walls the Khivans poured such a deadly fire that it
was not possible to drag away the guns until the Russian
artillery had opened fire and compelled the slackening of
that of the Khivans.

Three of the guns were taken awa}-, but the fourth was
spiked and left behind. In retiring to their own lines the
Russian storming party was compelled to haul the guns
one by one over a narrow bridge and across an open field,
exposed all the time to Khivan cannon-shot. Then a
regular bombardment set in, which was temporarily sus-
pended on a request from the Khan, in which he proposed
terms of capitulation. Hardly had his messenger left the
camp before the Khivan fire again reopened, and there-
upon the Russians renewed theirs. It was afterwards
ascertained that the Khan was unable to restrain his Turco-
man forces, and the fire had been reopened contrary to his
orders.

About sunset a messenger arrived from General Kauf-
mann announcing that he was about nine miles away on
the other side of the city, and ordering the suspension of
the fire. It was obeyed with considerable reluctance, as
General Verevkin was confident that Khiva would soon be
within his grasp. It was certainly a remarkable circum-
stance that three columns starting from different points a
thousand miles apart should have arrived before Khiva
almost simultaneously. We will now make a flying leap

3/2 DECISIVE BATTLES SINCE WATERLOO.

to Tashkend and accompany Kaufinann's column from
that city to Khiva.

Kaufmann had about 2,500 men in his column with a
baggage train of 4,000 camels. His force consisted of
eleven companies of infantry (1,650 men), one company of
sappers and miners, four pieces of horse artillery, and six
pieces of foot artillery, half a battery of mountain howit-
zers, a battery and a half of rockets, and 600 Cossack caval-
ry. His artillery was of the newest model of breech-load-
ers, and the mountain battery was of the kind that can be
quickly taken to pieces and packed on horseback. The
column left Tashkend on IMarch 15th, and Djizzak ten
days later. The troops suffered much from cold on the
march, but as the season advanced the weather grew
warmer, and the column reached the well of Arystan-Bel-
Kuduk on the 13th April.

On the 6th ]\Iay Kaufmann reached Khala-Ata where
he was joined by the column under Grand Duke Nicholas.
It left Kazala March nth, and by the original plan it was
to have joined Kaufmann at Bukali, in the Bukan-Tau
mountains. Fearing that the Kazala column might be too
weak to meet the enemy alone, General Kaufmann sent
word for the Grand Duke to join him at Khala-Ata instead
of Bukali. This change of plan caused some dela}-, as the
Kazala column was compelled to make a detour that lost
about two weeks of valuable time, and caused the latter
part of the march to be made after the summer heats had
come upon the desert and dried up some of the wells.
Several days were spent in reconnoitring the country be-
fore them, and on the 12th of I\Iay the united column
started from Khala-Ata. The Kazala column, which had
joined that from Tashkend, was about 1,400 strong, with
half a battery of rockets, half a battery of mountain pieces,
two mitrailleuses, and 1 50 Cossacks.

The first encounter with the enemy was at Adam-Kur-
ulgan, to which point Kaufmann advanced on the 12th

FALL OF KHIVA. 373

May, leaving a small garrison at Khala-Ata. Several
wells were dug, and as this was the last point where water
could be obtained before reaching the Oxus, preparations
were made for carrying a supply sufificient for the jour-
ney. No positive information could be obtained as to the
distance, but it was thought that the river was not more
than two or three days away, and accordingly a supply
for three days was deemed sufficient. The weather was
getting so hot that it was impossible to march in the mid-
dle of the day. The plan was to march from very early
in the morning until about nine o'clock, and then halt until
late in the afternoon, when the route would be resumed
till nine or ten at night.

On the first day on this part of the desert it had been
expected that the column would cover thirty miles, but
the camels were so much enfeebled and retarded the move-
ments so greatly, that only fifteen miles were accomplished.
It was found that nearly the whole supply of water was ex-
hausted, and the consequent predicament was very serious.
To retire to Adam-Kurulgan might be the signal for the
whole of Central Asia to rise against the invaders.
These people more than any other in the world believe in
the old proverb " Nothing succeeds like success." The
slightest retrograde movement of their enemies is con-
strued into fear or incapacity, and gives encouragement
accordingly. Kaufmann could not wait where he was and
send back for water, and without it he could not go for-
ward. Retreat or advance w^as alike impossible.

But it was necessary to choose between the two dire
alternatives, or everybody would perish. Kaufmann was
about to give the order to retire to Adam-Kurulgan when
one of the guides came to him and said he thought h,e
could find water in the neighborhood, although all the
other guides persisted that there was none nearer than the
Oxus. Kaufmann handed his pocket flask to the fellow,
and said : " Bring that full of water and I '11 give you a

374 DECISIVE BATTLES SINCE WATERLOO.

hundred roubles." A good horse was given to the man,
and he was off at full speed ; in an hour he was back with
the flask filled with water which he had obtained from a
well about four miles from the route ; he said there were
three wells there, unknown to the caravans, and they con-
tained water sufficient for the army. Kaufmann imme-
diately ordered the march in the direction of the wells,
and when the army arrived there three more wells were
dug. The water was very bad, and the quantity so limit-
ed, that the men were allowed only a pint a day each, and
there was none for the camels. The place has since been
known as Alty-Kuduk, or " Six Wells."

Kaufmann sent the camel train back to Adam-Kurulgan
to enable the camels to drink and bring a supply of fresh
water for a second attempt to cross the desert. The
camel train had an escort of 600 men ; this escort was at-
tacked by the Turcomans at daylight on the i8th of May,
the latter rightly concluding that if they could capture
the camels it would not be possible for the Russians to
cross the desert. The Turcomans came on with great
bravery, but their sabres could avail nothing againt the
Russian breech-loaders, and they were driven back in dis-
order. So enfeebled were the camels, and so great were
the delays, that a week was consumed in the journey to
Adam-Kurulgan and back to Alty-Kuduk. Meantime the
army suffered greatly, but the water gradually grew better
and more plentiful, and Kaufmann once more prepared to
advance.

But the camels were so reduced, that instead of carry-
ing their full loads of 600 pounds, they could not now
average 200 pounds each. Nearly the whole of the bag-
gage was left at Alty-Kuduk, under a small garrison, which
threw up a small entrenchment around the wells. Two
pieces of artillery were left, and also four of the six iron
boats that Kaufmann had prepared for passing the Oxus.
The march was made as rapidly as possible, and at the

FALL OF KHIVA. 375

end of the third day the Oxus was in sight. During all
the last day the Turcoman cavalry hung on their flanks
and continually harassed them, but the breech-loading
rifles emptied a good many saddles, and prevented any
thing like a charge. Many of the Turcoman horses were
killed by the Russian sharp-shooters. A Turcoman on
foot is the most pitiable of beings, and utterly useless as
a soldier, so that the killing of a horse was equivalent for
the time being to the slaughter or disabling of a man.

The discipline of the Russian soldier is well illustrated
by the conduct of the men when the water was reached.
Though the soldiers were wild with thirst, not one of them
broke ranks to get at the water until permission was given.
Kaufmann spoke of their conduct almost with tears in his
eyes, and said he did not believe the soldiers of any other
army in the world could thus be restrained. The neces-
sity for keeping them in the ranks after reaching the
water was caused by the need of holding the Turcomans
at a respectful distance : they hung close to the army, and
were evidently prepared to take advantage of the disorder
that was naturally expected when the water was reached.

When General Kaufmann reached the bank of the Oxus,
and before tasting of the water, he crossed himself devoutly,
and each officer of his staff did the same. Part of the
soldiers were detailed to carry water to the rest, and in
a few minutes the parched and burning throats of the men
and animals were moistened, the enemy being held at bay
in the meantime. As soon as the safety of the column
»vas made sure, the Russians changed from the defensive
to the offensive. Shells were thrown among the Turco-
mans ; the Russian cavalry charged and pursued their late
assailants several miles along the bank of the river. They
captured a dozen " kayuks " or boats, so that General
Kaufmann had no more regrets about the iron boats he
was forced to leave behind before crossing the desert.
Down to this time he had been greatly distressed on the

376 DECISIVE BATTLES SINCE WATERLOO.

subject, as it was necessary to cross the river in order to
get to Khiva.

On the morning of the 30th May, Kaufmann began
crossing his army to the other bank of the Oxus. The
spot selected for the crossing was at Sheik-Arik, where a
canal, diverted from the river, enters the oasis. The oasis
of Khiva practically begins at Sheik-Arik, though there is
considerable cultivation higher up the river. The ground
from here to the Aral Sea is intersected with numerous
ditches and canals, which are the existence of the gardens
for which the country is famous. Khiva resembles Lower
Egypt in its dependence upon the river that runs through
it. Should the river cease to flow, the entire oasis would
soon become like the desert which now surrounds it, and
was for so long its protection against invasion.

The boats were capable of carrying fifty men each ; the
river is here about three-quarters of a mile wide, with a fair
but not powerful current, and the crossing occupied about
twenty minutes. But in going over and returning the boat
was drifted far down the stream, so that it took some time
to drag it up to the point where the troops were to enter
it. After their march through the desert, the soldiers
greatly enjoyed the opportunit}' of sporting in the water.
The horses came in for their share of delight, and the
animals generally made no opposition to swimming behind
the boats. There was a good deal of doubt as to whether
the passage would be disputed by the Turcomans, but to
the delight of the Russians not a single enemy appeared,
and the crossing was unmolested. If the Turcomans had
made ever so feeble an attempt they would have troubled
the Russians a good deal, as they had a fortification on the
other bank of the river which could have been easily de-
fended. The first of the Russians that crossed took
possession of this fort ; four small cannon were sent over,
and in two or three hours after the first boat-load had
crossed, the Russians were strongly posted and able to
take care of themselves.

FALL OF KHIVA. 2)77

All day long the crossing continued, but at nightfall the
work was not completed. During the night the Oxus rose
about six feet, and a portion of the Russian camp was
drowned out, but happily it was only the camp and not
any of its occupants. The next day the crossing was com-
pleted, and the camels, well laden with water and refreshed
and strengthened by their brief stay in the rich valley of
the Oxus, were sent back to bring up the detachment and
baggage that had been left at Alty-Kuduk. General
Kaufmann issued a friendly proclamation to the Khivans,
and induced them to open a bazaar near his camp for the
sale of food. He announced that all who remained at
home would not be molested in person or property, and
that the Russians would pay for all the provisions and
forage they wanted when it was brought into camp. But
he added that if they were obliged to go out and hunt for
their supplies, they would take whatever they wanted
without paying for it, and would pillage and burn every
abandoned house. The proclamation had the desired effect,
and the Khivans brought in a plentiful supply of flour,
fruit, chickens, sheep, rice, sugar, tea, and other things of
which the Russians were in great need. They demanded
and received four or five times the ordinary prices of what
they sold. As they had expected the Russians would take
every thing without payment, such being their own practice
on their forays, they were greatly surprised at the conduct
of their conquerors, and good feelings were established at
once.

Things went on in this way for three days, when the
Khivans suddenly stopped bringing in supplies, in conse-
quence of an order from the Khan that anyone who gave
or sold provisions to the Russians should be put to death.
A foraging party was sent out and had a slight skirmish
with the Turcomans, and on the next day General Kauf-
mann decided to advance. He had received a letter from
General Verevkin, giving notice of his approach from

378 DECISIVE BATTLES SINCE IVATEKLOO.

Kungrad, and very naturally he did not wish his inferior in
rank to have the honor of being the first to enter the capital.

Hazar-Asp, a strong fortification capable of a vigorous
defence, was surrendered without a blow, somewhat to the
disappointment of the younger ofificers, who were anxious
for a fight. The fortification encloses a village of about
5,000 inhabitants, and covers some three acres of ground.
It is 10 miles back from the river and about 40 from
Khiva. A small garrison was left to hold the place and
the rest of the army encamped near the river, waiting for
the whole column to arrive from Alty-Kuduk before ad-
vancing upon Khiva. On the morning of the 8th June
the Alty-Kuduk detachment had arrived, and the whole
camp was broken up for the march to the capital. No
opposition was made to the advance, and by the evening
of the 9th the army was within 10 miles of Khiva when a
messenger brought a letter from the Khan, offering his
submission and proposing to surrender himself and his
capital immediately.

This message was the result of the bombardment of the
other side of the city by General Verevkin's column,
w'hich has been described already. Kaufmann immedi-
ately sent orders for Verevkin to stop his bombardment,
which the latter obeyed as a matter of course, though
much against his will.

Next morning, Kaufmann wrote to the Khan, telling
him to march out on the Hazar-Asp road with 100 of his
followers and listen to the terms of surrender. During
the night the Khan fled from the city and was not at
hand to receive the letter, which was responded to by his
uncle, Said Emir Ul-Umer, who surrendered the city.
While these negotiations were going on, several reports of
cannon were heard ; they continued at varied intervals
until Kaufmann's troops were actually entering the city
at the Hazar-Asp gate. It turned out that the Turcomans
had renewed the fight with Verevkin's troops, and the

FALL OF KHIVA. 379

latter were not slow to reply. With their artiller\- they
battered down the Hazavat gate, and then Colonel
Skobeleff and Count Shuvaloff, with about 1,000 men,
made a dash into the city and kept up a running fight to
the Great Square and the palace of the Khan.

They had been there about five minutes when they
heard that the Tashkend column was entering at the
Hazar-Asp gate with drums beating and colors flying.
Waiting an instant to catch the strains of the music,
Colonel Skobeleff gave the order to retreat, and his men
left Khiva by the gate by which they had entered. Great
pains were taken to prevent publicity to this incident, as
it was but natural that the commanding general would
not wish to cede the honor of the capture of Khiva to a
subordinate.

The Tashkend column marched to the Great Square,
and was drawn up in line to receive General Kaufmann,
who shortly entered, accompanied by the officers of his
staff. The band played the national air of Russia, the
colors were saluted, and solemn possession was taken in the
name of the Czar. The Khivans received their conquer-
ors in silence, but great numbers of them brought peace-
offerings in the shape of dried fruit and similar articles of
food. On being assured that no harm would come to any
who remained quietly at home, they seemed content, and
before nightfall had opened a bazaar and were doing an
excellent business with the Russians.

The warmest welcome was given to the Russians by the
Persian slaves. Khiva has been for many decades one of
the great slave markets of Asia ; thousands of Persians
and many Russians have been sold there into perpetual
bondage, and when once in the possession of a Khivan
master, their escape or redemption was hopeless. They
had heard that wherever the Russians went there was no
more slavery, and when the Muscovites took possession of
the city hundreds of these unhappy captives crow^ded

380 DECISIVE BATTLES SINCE WATERLOO.

around them to have their chains removed. This is no
figure of speech, as it was the custom of the Khivans to
load their slaves with chains to prevent their running
away. The sound of chisel and hammer, as the links
were cut, or the grating of the file opening the rivets, were
audible all over Khiva for several days after the arrival of
the Russians. Slavery in the oasis was at an end. The
Russian slaves in Khiva were liberated just before Kauf-
mann started from Tashkend, but too late to prevent the
departure of the expedition.

A few days after taking possession of the city, General
Kaufmann drafted a treaty to be made between the
Khan and the Emperor. It was sent to St. Petersburg,
where it received the imperial sanction, and was then
returned to the general. On the 23d of August it was
signed by General Kaufmann and the Khan in presence
of the full staff of the former and a proportionate number
of Khivan dignitaries.

By the terms of the treaty, the Khan became a vassal
of the Emperor, surrendering the right of holding direct
5elations with neighboring khans and potentates, declaring
war, or making commercial treaties, without the Emperor's
permission. The boundaries were carefully defined ; the
Oxus was to be navigated exclusively by Russian vessels ;
the Russians had the right to establish ports and posts
wherever they pleased ; could build warehouses for the
storage of goods, and all Russian merchants could have
their commercial agents in Khiva, or other towns of the
khanate. Slavery was to cease forever, and the khanate
agreed to pay a war indemnity of 2,200,000 roubles in
twenty annual instalments, with interest at five per cent.

The conquest of Khiva pushed the boundary of Russia
some 300 miles to the south, annexed a territory of
many thousand square miles, and gave complete control
of the navigation of the Oxus. The moral advantages
of the conquest were of more consequence to Russia

FALL OF KHIVA. 38 1

than the material ones, though the latter were by no
means small. Khiva had been considered inaccessible
and impregnable. Its fall exerted a powerful influence
upon the Moslem inhabitants of Central Asia, by showing
them that the Russians were invincible. Khiva was the
last stronghold of Islam in Central Asia after the fall of
Bokhara, and its capture was necessary to the spread of
Russian influence in the direction of India. And however
jealously the conquest may have been regarded by British
statesmen, there can be no dispute that humanity gained
greatly by the result of Kaufmann's victory.

Whatever shortcomings there may be in the rule of the
Czar, it is far preferable to that of the Khan. Human life
is no longer disregarded ; tortures and wholesale decapita-
tions are no more permitted ; raids for purposes of plun-
der are things of the past, and the inhabitants of neigh-
boring districts are no longer in constant peril of being
carried into slavery. Before the arrival of Kaufmann the
Great Square of Khiva was the scene of terrible spectacles.
Vambery describes how he witnessed there in 1863 the
payment for the heads of men slain in battle, the execution
of prisoners, the sale or bestowal of others into slavery,
and how several aged men, useless as slaves, were thrown
on the ground, and firmly held while the executioner
gouged out their eyes, and coolly wiped his dripping
knife on their beards. If nothing else was required,
the abolition of these wanton cruelties was a complete
justification of the Russian conquest of the Oasis of the
khans.

CHAPTER XXI.

FALL OF PLEVNA — 1 877.

Ever since Turkey obtained a footing in Europe the
Christian inhabitants of her territories have been the vic-
tims of oppression. The extent of this oppression has
varied from time to time according to the caprices of the
rulers at Constantinople or in the provincial capitals, and
is no doubt greatly influenced by the conduct of the sub-
ject people. They are naturally opposed to Moslem rule
even under its mildest forms, and whenever it becomes
severe their first thoughts are for insurrection.

Russia has been for a century and more the champion
of the Christian populations groaning under the Turkish
yoke, and her wars with Turkey have grown out of her
sympathy for the suffering Christians of that country and
its dependencies. The war of 1827-28 came from the aid
which Russia had given to the Greeks in their war for in-
dependence ; the Crimean war grew out of a quarrel over
the custody of the holy places in Palestine, and the refusal of
Turkey to place certain of her Christian subjects under
Russian protection ; and the war of 1877-78 was brought
about by the barbarities of the Turks in the Danubian
provinces, where the Christian inhabitants were numeri-
cally greater than the Moslems.

The success of Turkey against Russia in the Crimean
war, owing to the aid of England, France, and Sardinia,
added to the insolence of the Turks, and led to cruelties
to their Christian subjects. Heavy taxes were laid upon

382

FALL OF PLEVNA. 383

the Christian peasants throughout the rural districts of
Servia, Montenegro, and the other Turkish provinces ;
the Porte requiring the provinces to contribute a certain
amount of money annually, which was extorted from the
people by the local rulers. And not only was this tax ex-
torted, but the local rulers generally added large sums for
their own pockets, and each subordinate concerned in the
collection did the same. The consequence was that the
people were severely oppressed, and found it impossible,
even with the greatest industry and the closest economy,
to satisfy the demands of those who ruled over them.

This state of affairs naturally led to insurrection, which
the Turks proceeded to put down with an iron hand. The
revolted provinces were overrun by Turkish troops, and
though they fought bravely the armies of the insurgents
were conquered. The most horrible reprisals were taken
on the villagers throughout Bulgaria and Servia, especially
in the former. Men, women, and children were ruthlessly
slaughtered by the Turks or by their irregular cavalry,
known as " Bashi-Bazouks." Hundreds of villages were
wiped out of existence ; the inhabitants, without regard to
age or sex, being killed or driven away, and the houses
burned to the ground. The whole country threatened to
become a desert, unless, perhaps, it should be re-populated
by Moslems. The accounts of the Bulgarian atrocities
caused great excitement in England in 1876. Many meet-
ings were held to protest against further support of Turkey
by England, and the question became an important one
in diplomacy. The British government issued, in April,
1877, a proclamation of neutrality in the war which then
seemed imminent between Russia and Turkey.

At the suggestion of Russia, the great powers of Europe
united in a convention, with the avowed object of preserv-
ing peace between the governments of the Czar and the
Sultan. After much deliberation a protocol was drawn up,
in which a reciprocal disarming of Russia and Turke}' was

384 DECISIVE BATTLES SINCE WATERLOO.

proposed, and Turkey on her part should give a guaranty
for the proper treatment of her Christian subjects. Evi-
dently the signatory powers had little faith in the efficacy
of the protocol, as three of them made separate declarations
before signing it. Their lack of faith was justified by the
result, as on the 9th April Turkey indignantly rejected the
protocol, and verj- plainly declared her intention of ignoring
" what had been decided without her and against her."

Russia had alread}" massed large numbers of troops on
her frontier, and Turkey was also engaged in the work of
mobilization. On the 24th April the Emperor of Russia
issued a manifesto to his subjects, in which he recited the
interest of the empire in the Christian population of the
Balkan peninsula, and the general desire that their condi-
tion should be ameliorated. He declared that all efforts at
peace had been exhausted, and he found himself compelled
by the haughty obstinacy of the Porte to proceed to more
decided acts. He had given the orders for the army to
cross the frontier, and the advance upon Turkey was begun
without delay. Every thing had been in readiness for some
time, and the army moved promptly when the long-expected
order was given.

The Turks had not been idle, though their preparations
were by no means as complete as those of Russia. They
had massed heavy bodies of troops along the Danube, and
were prepared to resist the movements of the Russians
south of that stream ; they were confident of victory, their
confidence having been greatly inspired by their previous
victories over the Servians, who were assisted by many
Russian volunteers in the Servian rank and file, and by a
goodly number of Russian officers, who tendered their
services with the full approval of the CzaV. Rustchuk,
Widin, and Silistria were strongly garrisoned, and the forti-
fications which still remained from the Crimean war and
the war of 1827-28 were made more formidable than ever
before. It was estimated that Rustchuk alone would require

FALL OF PLEVNA. 385

an army of 80,000 men for at least three months to effect
its reduction, while Widin and Silistria would each require
as many more. On the other hand, the Russians were
equally certain of success. They did not propose to sit
down in siege-working, but, while leaving a small force
sufficient to keep the Turkish garrisons from venturing too
far from their walls, they would move to the rear of the
fortresses and advance upon the Balkans.

At the outset Russia miscalculated her powers. She
thought she would be able to conduct the campaign with
200,000 men, and this was the force at hand when she
made her first move. Turkey had at that time 250,000
men under arms, of whom fully 1 50,000 were available for
service on the Danube at the time war was declared. Four
months later Turkey had 220,000 men facing the Russians,
and the latter were compelled to make a fresh levy and
bring up their reserves.

The " Army of the South," as the Russian invading
force was called, was under the immediate command of the
Grand Duke Nicholas, and consisted of seven army corps
with two brigades of rifles. The field artillery amounted
to about 800 guns, most of them breech-loaders, and there
was a powerful siege train which was expected to be use-
ful in the reduction of the works that barred the way to
Constantinople. The infantry was armed with breech-
loaders which had been made from muzzle-loaders, con-
verted by the Krenk (Austrian) system, which had been
declined by other governments. Against it the Turks
brought the Peabody rifle, an American weapon of far
greater range than the Russian one ; the latter was only
effective at 1,200 yards, while the Peabody could be re-
lied upon for good work up to at least 2,000 \'ards. The
infantry arms played an important part in the resistance
which the Turks made to the Russian advance.

The Russian artillery was equally inferior to that of the
Turks. The Turks had steel guns manufactured by Krupp,

386 DECISIVE BATTIES SINCE IVATERIOO.

while the Russian guns were of bronze, and of less range
and accuracy than those of the Krupp system. The cav-
alry of the Russians was superior to that of the Turks,
both in strength and efficiency. A division of cavalry
was attached to each army corps, and in every cavalry di-
vision there was a full regiment of Cossacks. The Cossacks
are the same that they have been through all the wars of
Russia, irregular troops serving without pay, their service
being given in place of taxes. The men are the owners
of the horses they ride, and also of their clothing and
equipments, their arms being furnished b\' government.
They are probably the finest light cavalry in the world,
and the amount of marching they can do is something
astonishing. Horses and men can undergo an amount of
fatigue that would paralyze any other horsemen in the
world with the possible exception of the North American
Indians and the Guachos of South America. The Cos-
sacks are fine riders, and their horses are trained to lie
down at the word of command and remain perfectly still,
while their owners fire over them in repelling a real or
imaginary attack of the enemy. The Cossacks have an
allowance for provisions and forage, and generally manage
to save something, although they keep themselves and
their chargers in good condition. Their reputation for
living off the enemy is equal to that of irregular cavalry
generally, though not as bad as that of the Bashi-Bazouks.
The Bashi-Bazouks of the Turks were recruited among
the Bulgarians and Roumelians, and a goodly portion of
them were originally thieves and local guerillas. In
several instances robber chiefs who were " wanted" by the
authorities were pardoned for their past offences, on con-
dition that they would enlist men for the service, and take
commands in the field, and it is easy to see what kind of
marauders would thus be created when they had military
authority for their actions. They were a terror to the
Christian inhabitants of the country, as they did not scru-

FALL OF FLEIWA. 387

pie to add murder to robbery when the individual who
was the victim made any protestations. Most of the mas-
sacres in Bulgaria before the war broke out were the work
of the Bashi-Bazouks, and while the war was in progress
they proved nearly as great a pest to the Moslem inhabi-
tants as they did to the Christians. The Nizam, or regu-
lar troops of the Turkish arm)-, were of very good material ;
many of them came from the Asiatic provinces of Turkey,
and when well drilled they made excellent soldiers. The
faith of Islam teaches that a Moslem who dies fighting
for the preservation of his religion, goes straight to para-
dise, according to the teachings of Mohammed, the Rus-
sian is an infidel, and consequently the war with Russia
had a religious aspect. Under these circumstances it is
no wonder that the Turkish soldiers manifested an almost
stoical indifference to death, and fought bravely to the
last.

Russia was at a disadvantage in one respect. She had
no fleet of war ships to cope with the ironclad fleet of the
Turks, and consequently the latter had practically the con-
trol of the Black Sea. Without transports and a fleet of
war ships to protect them, Russia was compelled to march
her troops by land and across the Danube, where she ran
the risk of an encounter with the Turkish gun-boats
which patrolled that river. Early in the war two of the
Turkish gun-boats on the Danube were destroyed by tor-
pedoes, and in a little while the Russians filled the lower
Danube with such a net-work of torpedoes, that the Turk-
ish gun-boats dared not venture among them.

From the frontier the line of advance for the Russians
was by the railway to Galatz and thence to Bucharest, the
capital of Roumania. The Roumanians made hearty
cause with the Russians, whom they joined in declaring
war on Turkey, and sent a contingent to the field. From
Bucharest a line of railway reaches to Giurgevo on the
Danube ; Giurgevo is opposite to Rustchuk, whence the

388 DECISIVE BATTLES SINCE WATERLOO.

Turks had a railway to Varna, an important military and
naval station. Where the Danube would be crossed was
a mystery which the Russians concealed with the skill
for which they are famous. If a Russian does not wish
to tell you any thing he will be exasperatingly courteous
under all your interrogatories, but the extraction of the
information is far more difficult than the historical process
of drawing sunbeams from cucumbers. Batteries were
erected opposite Rustchuk, and for days and da}-s the
Russians kept up a steady fire upon that towm and its for-
tifications. Meantime, the preparations for the crossing
went on ; the Russian divisions were massed at several
points on the river's bank, and hundreds of pontoons were
made ready.

The first crossing was made at Galatz, on the 22d June,
by General Zimmermann, who went over with two regi-
ments in pontoons and drove out the Turks who were
posted on the heights on the opposite shore. Having
obtained a footing in the Dobrudja, as the peninsula be-
tween the Danube and Black Sea is called, the Russians
were able to throw bridges over the great stream, by
which the whole left wing of the army moved across.
Meantime the right wing, on the 26th June, sent a pon-
toon force over the Danube from Simnitza, under com-
mand of General Skobeleff, who drove out the small force
of Turks posted there, though not without hard fighting.
More pontoons followed, and then a bridge was thrown
across on which the army could march. It is related of
Skobeleff that he urged his father, a lieutenant-general of
Cossacks, to swim his whole division over the Danube.
The elder Skobeleff refused, whereupon the younger swam
the river accompanied by a Kirghese servant and three
Russian orderlies. The three orderlies and their horses
were drowned, but Skobeleff and the Kirghese got over
safely.

By the first week of July the whole Russian army was

FALL OF PLEVNA. 389

safely encamped on the southern bank of the Danube,
and getting in readiness to assume the offensive. It took
some days to accumulate the needed supplies and bring
them over, so that the advance did not begin in force
until after the middle of the month. But before that
time General Gourko, with the advance and the 8th
corps, had pushed forward on the road to the Balkans,
heading first for Tirnova. The Russians had determined
to follow the lines of the Yantra and Vid rivers in their
advance to the south ; both flow from the mountains in a
northerly direction to reach the Danube, the Yantra com-
ing in to the east of Sistova, and the Vid beyond Nicopo-
lis to the westward.

On the 5th July the cavalry occupied Biela, which lies
on the great road, and on the 7th Gourko was in posses-
sion of Tirnova. The plan was for the I2th and 13th
corps to form the left of the army and ascend the valley
of the Yantra, while the centre followed the Great Road
leading to the passes of the Balkans. The 9th corps was
to compose the right flank, and after capturing Nicopolis,
go up the valley of the Vid. The nth and 4th corps
were to form the reserve, and be sent wherever they might
be most needed. The Emperor joined the army at Biela
on the 8th or 9th. Gourko was soon reported past the
Balkans; Nicopolis was captured by Baron Krudener ;
and every thing seemed to be progressing favorably for the
Russians, who had not thus far met any considerable
force of the enemy. News came from Constantinople
that the Turkish government was greatly alarmed at the
successful passage of the Danube by the Russians, and
had removed and banished the commander of the army,
Abdul Kerim Pasha.

The first check of the Russians was at Plevna. They
had previously captured Nicopolis with its garrison of
7,000 men, havir.g themselves lost about 1,300 officers and
men killed and wounded. Orders had been given to oc-

390 DECISIVE BATTLES SINCE WATERLOO.

cupy ricvna as soon as possible, and Baron Krudener
sent forward General Schilder-Schuldner to carry out the
orders. There had been reports of the advance of a
Turkish army from Widin, marching on the Russian
flank, under command of Osman Pasha, and other re-
ports of a column moving from Sophia. Due credence
seems not to have been given to these reports, and Baron
Krudener was not aware of the Turkish advance until it
was close upon him. Schilder-Schuldner had 6,500 men
and 46 guns in the division with which he went to capture
Plevna ; he was attacked by a vastly superior force of
Turks before he had reached his objective point, and the
first battle of Plevna was disastrous to the Russians.

A brigade of Don Cossacks had been ordered to join
Schilder-Schuldner's command. They were taking their
dinner on the 19th, when the cannonade opened about
eight miles to the southeast, right in the direction they
were going. As soon as possible they hurried on in the
hope of finding him, but found themselves cut off by a
column of Turkish infantry, which lay stretched across the
road. There Avas some sharp fighting with the infantry
and artillery of the command, and when night came on
neither party had any decided advantage. On the morn-
ing of the 20th the Turks began the fighting at Bukova,
just north of Plevna, where they engaged the Russian
right. The Russian centre attacked the heights of Griv-
itza, to the east of Plevna, and after a hard struggle drove
out the Turks from some of their positions, and forced
them fairly into Plevna. On the Russian left the Turks
were driven back, but not without heavy losses by the
Russians, and some of the regiments suffered so severely
that they were put in retreat.

While the Russians were considering the fight nearly
over, and thinking that another attack would put them in
possession of Plevna, the streets of that town seemed to
vomit forth Turkish troops by the thousand. On and on

FIRST BATTLE OF PLEVNA

HU HUSSIA/\/S

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Wtm TURKS

)) SHIHMISN£fiS

1000 soo O

3000

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Scale of Yards

30 1

392 DECISIVE BATTLES SINCE WATERLOO.

they came till the hills were covered with red caps, and
it was speedily apparent that they far outnumbered the
Russians. Ten, twenty, }'es, forty thousand Turks were
there to confront the Russian column, less than ten
thousand strong, and having the advantage of position on
the hills above the Russians. The latter made a heroic
defence, but it was of no use. Nearly 3,000 men and 74
of^cers were killed or wounded, and so many artillery
horses were killed that the Russians abandoned seventeen
caissons and several guns. The Russians retired to
Nicopolis, and the Turks set to work to strengthen Plevna,
as they realized that the Russians would speedily attempt
its capture.

A few days sufficed to put Plevna in condition to resist
attacks, as the Turks are adepts in the construction of
fortifications. Careful students of the military operations
in Bulgaria in 1877-78 say that the Turks far excelled the
Russians in this line of work ; the Turkish soldier fights far
better behind entrenchments than in the open field, while
the matter of protection does not make a great difference
to the Russian. In this campaign the Russians found
what they had never before encountered — the long-range
rifles in the hands of the Turks did effective work before
the Russian breech-loaders could get within shooting dis-
tance. The Russians learned a lesson in intrenching and
protecting themselves behind cover, but they did not
learn it until after many a good soldier had bitten the
dust.

From the 20th to the 30th of July the Russians were en-
gaged in bringing up reinforcements and getting ready for
another attack. An order came for the assault of the Turk-
ish position; Baron Krudener did not believe the assault
advisable, but the command of the Grand Duke Nicholas
left him no discretion. The baron and his engineers had
studied the Turkish position with great care, and realized
that there would be a heavy loss of men in attacking the

FALL OF PLEVXA. 393

Turkish defences, behind which were 40,000 soldiers under
command of Osman Pasha and armed with the far-reach-
ing Peabody rifle. The Turkish entrenchment h'ne ran
through a series of villages, lying in a semicircular order
round Plevna, about five miles distant from it, and touch-
ing the river Vid on both flanks.

General Skobeleff (the younger) was assigned to the
temporary command of the brigade of Cossacks in Prince
Schahofskoy's division, and sent to occupy, if possible, the
town of Loftcha, an important position between Plevna
and the Balkans. It was a dangerous movement for the
brigade, as the march would be on the flank of the enemy
and likely to meet with resistance both at its destination
and while en route. But Skobelcff was ready for it, as he
was always ready for any hazardous enterprise, and in a
very short time after receiving his orders he was prepared
to move.

The night between the 29th and 30th was spent in com-
pleting preparations for the assault, but on the morning
of the latter day it was decided to postpone it for another
twenty-four hours in order to give the troops further time
for rest. A council of wf.r was held in the afternoon, at
which it was arranged that the attack should be made
at 5 A.M. on the 31st; it was to be concentric, and as
nearly simultaneous as possible. The night was very wet
and the troops could not begin their advance before six
o'clock in consequence of the ground being heavily soaked.
In all there was an attacking force of about 32,000 infan-
try, with three brigades of cavalr)', and 160 guns. Baron
Krudener held the right, with the whole 31st division in
his fighting line, and three regiments of the 9th division in
reserve. He was to assault in two columns, with a brigade
in each column, and fall upon the Turkish left flank from
Grivitza towards the Vid River.

Prince Schahofskoy held the Russian left with a fight-
ing line of one brigade from the 32d division and one

394 DECISIVE BATTLES SINCE WATERLOO.

from the 30th. He was to assault the Turkish left from
Radisova, and had one brigade of the 30th division in re-
serve at Pelisat. Skobeleff was on the flank of the left
attack with one brigade of Cossacks, a battalion of in-
fantry, and a battery, to watch the line between Plevna
and Loftcha, and prevent a movement of the Turks for
outflanking Schahofskoy. General Lazareff occupied a
similar position on Baron Krudener's right to prevent a
flanking movement in that direction. The odds against
the Russians were very great, as they were inferior to the
Turks in number, while the latter had the advantage of
fighting behind defences and their arms were superior to
those of the Russians. But the order had been given and
it must be obeyed.

Another circumstance to the Russian disadvantage was
that a wide gap existed between Krudener and Schahof-
skoy, and another between the latter officer and Skobeleff.
Krudener and Schahofskoy were fully two miles apart,
too far for prompt communication, especially when it is
remembered that the Turkish position was in the form of
a horse-shoe, and a courier riding between the two attack-
ing columns would be compelled to make a wide detour
to be out of the Turkish line of fire. Thus the two
assaulting forces were practically independent, and a dis-
aster to one could not be promptly known to the other,
while the Turks, with their short interior line, would have
great advantages.

Plevna stands in the hollow of a valley with a general
trend from north to south, except where it falls off in a
plain on the old Sophia road. It is surrounded by hills
and rugged ravines at all points of the compass, and every
inch of ground had been utilized by the Turks for the
construction of breastworks and rifle-pits. Generally
speaking, there were three lines of defence, one within
the other, so that if the Turks should be driven from the
outer line, they would by no means be conquered. The

FALL OF PLEVXA. 395

bastions bristled with guns and swarmed with men, and in
the httle plain at the edge of the town, Osman Pasha had
a reserve of 20,000 men, which he could move in any
desired direction. South of the town runs the road to
Loftcha, and it was this road which Skobeleff was
appointed to watch.

The advance began simultaneously on both wings of
the Russian army, about seven o'clock. By eight o'clock
the right centre had come within range of the Turkish
fire, but it did not halt until it was within 3,000 yards of
the front of the redoubt and could bring its artillery into
action. In a little while five batteries were in full action,
and though the Turkish fire was rendered somewhat
irregular, it was not by any means stopped. The artillery
was kept in play for several hours, the infantry not being
advanced to the assault until after one o'clock. Schahof-
skoy made better progress than did Krudener, the former
being well up to the Turkish front, while the latter was
still pounding away at the longest range of his artillery.
Schahofskoy grew impatient and ordered an assault.

Away went the Russian infantry in a solid line, straight
for the Turkish defences. The Turkish artillery plowed
the advancing line with shells, and though numbers of
men fell, the advance was steadily maintained. The
Turkish artillery is supported by that of the Turkish
infantry, to which the Russians reply, and the roar of the
musketry is terrific and continuous. The Russian line
becomes disorganized during the advance, but there is a
concentration about a hundred yards in front of the
Turkish line, and then with a wild shout the Russians are
into the ditch and over the first line of works. The flee-
ing Turks are bayoneted by the Muscovites, and were
there no second line of works to be carried the Russians
would be masters of the situation.

The fire of the Turks was so severe that the Russians
were unable to stand up against it. There had been a

396 DECISIVE BATTLES SINCE WATERLOO.

terrible loss of men, the ground was cov'ered with dead
and wounded, the Peabody rifles in Turkish hands poured
out volley after volley so rapidly that it was literally a
rain-storm of bullets that fell upon the Russians. The
bravest troops in the world could not live in such a storm,
and in disorder the late assailants fell back across the un-
dulating ground, over which they had advanced. Schahof-
skoy's column was completely broken, and though he
brought up his reserves and made another attempt, it was
evident to all that the capture of Plevna on this side was
hopeless.

On the other side of the Russian line, Baron Krudener
had begun the attack with his artillery, and followed it
about two in the afternoon with an advance of the infantry.
When they were fully a mile distant from the Turkish
redoubt the men began falling before the bullets of the
Peabody rifles, and the column was obliged to advance in
this way until it had reached a point where its own Krenk
rifles could be made to tell. By the time it reached the
foot of the redoubt the ranks had been terribly thinned,
but the Russians with a loud cheer carried the first line of
works. They would have been driven out immediately
had it not been for the rush of the 2d battalion, which
came to their support, and not a moment too soon. The
Russians carried the second line in the same way as they
had taken the first, and drove the Turks up the slopes of
the Grivitza redoubt. From this redoubt a furious fire
was opened and prevented a further advance of the now
greatly weakened Russians. Nay, more, it turned the
advance into a retreat, and the retreat left behind it great
numbers of dead and wounded.

Later in the day another assault was m^de, but to no
purpose, other than to add to the number of the killed and
disabled. It was a useless slaughter of brave men, with
scarcely a hope of success.

Meantime SkobelelT had pushed his reconnaissance

FALL OF PL.EVNA. 397

towards the Loftcha road, getting possession of the Green
Hills after considerable hard fighting. He obtained a
position whence he could look into Plevna and see the
force that the Turks still held in reserve, a force sufBcient
to take the offensive and follow up the Russians so vigor-
ously as to make doubtful the escape of Schahofskoy's
shattered battalions. After the repulse of the Russians
the Turks pushed forward several brigades that threatened
to separate Krudener and Schahofskoy, and at one time
the latter was completely enveloped on three sides. Had
it not been for Skobeleff he might have been caught on
the fourth side, and his line of retreat altogether cut off.

As soon as SkobelefT saw the Turkish strength in re-
serve he comprehended the peril of the situation. Scha-
hofskoy's left and rear might be imperilled by a swing to
the south of a Turkish division, and SkobelefT determined
not to give them a chance to undertake it. With a few
squadrons of Cossacks, supported by a light battery, he
dashed forward, as though ready to give battle. The
Turkish division which might have cut off Schahofskoy was
compelled to fight this insignificant force, which kept it
occupied all through the afternoon.

Previous to this affair Skobeleff had been in disfavor
with the Emperor in consequence of stories affecting his
conduct in Central Asia, stories which his enemies had
persistently circulated. After the passage of the Danube
the Emperor embraced the other officers who took part in
it, but turned on his heel when Skobeleff stood before
him. After the brilliant service thus described, together
with other exploits that made his name famous, the Em-
peror made public acknowledgment of his appreciation by
rising at a banquet and proposing the health of General
Skobeleff. The immediate cause of the Emperor's change
of heart was the skill and daring displayed by Skobeleff
in leading the assault upon the Turkish position in
Loftcha on the 3d September.

398 DECISIVE BATTLES SINCE WATERLOO.

The losses of the Russians in the attack on Plevna on
the 31st July were 170 officers and 7,136 men. Of the
latter 2,400 were shot dead on the battle-field, and many
of the wounded were murdered by the Bashi-Bazouks.
The 126th regiment that led the assault under Schahof-
skoy lost 725 killed and 1,200 wounded, or 75 per cent,
of its total strength. The I2ist regiment, which led the
assault under Krudener, lost almost as heavily, and nei-
ther regiment was able to re-form until the next morning.
The entire command was in no condition to remain in
front of Plevna, as it could not have combated success-
fully an attack by the Turks. Orders were given to fall
back to the line of the river Osma, which enters the
Danube near Nicopolis. The repulse of Krudener's col-
umn threatened the safety of the bridge at Sistova, and
the movements of the retiring columns were planned with
a view to protect that important crossing over the Danube.

There was nothing for the Russians to do but send for
reinforcements, and wait until they arrived. The ad-
vance into Turkey had received a severe check, from which
recovery was not easy. From the offensive the Russians
were thrown upon the defensive, and all as the result of
a single battle of six or eight hours' duration. Happily
for Russia, the Turkish army had no competent leader, or
the army of the Czar might have been captured or
drowned in the Danube. The Turks had three armies, in
the field, with an aggregate strength of more than
150,000; they were near enough together to render
concentration possible, and with such an army the
weakened Russians would have fared badly. Mehemet
Ali was at Shumla with 65,000 men ; Osman Pasha
at Plevna, with 50,000, and Suleiman Pasha at Yeni
Zagra, with 40,000. Suleiman was engaged in watching
Gourko, and that astute general, on hearing of the dis-
aster at Plevna, was considerably concerned for his line
of retreat.

FALL OF PLEVNA. 399

The order of the Czar for reinforcements was quickly
issued, and resulted in the despatch of 120,000 regulars and
180,000 militia for the front. With these reinforcements
went 460 pieces of artillery with the necessary ammuni-
tion, and the railways were taxed to the utmost of their
ability for the transport of provisions and material of war.
The militia were incorporated into the old regiments to take
the places of the men whose bodies were rotting on the
slopes of Plevna, the Turks taking no trouble to bury their
enemy's dead. General Gourko took up his position in
the Shipka Pass Avhence Suleiman Pasha sought in vain to
dislodge him, losing far more men than the Russians lost in
the same time. Towards the end of August the Russian
reinforcements were assembled in such numbers that an ad-
vance could again be ventured, and accordingly the Mus-
covite columns were once more pushed out into Bulgaria.

The Russians were getting ready for their third attack
upon Plevna, aided by the Roumanians, who had sent near-
ly 40,000 men into the field. The first move in the attack
was to send Generals Imeretinsky and Skobeleff to cap-
ture Loftcha, which was accomplished in fine style, the
Turks being driven out of the forts at that point, and
3,000 men of their retreating column lanced or sabred by
the Cossacks during their flight for safety. Having Loft-
cha in their possession, the Russians proposed to encircle
Plevna, and gradually draw in their lines till they forced a
surrender. The total Russian and Roumanian force for
the attack of Plevna amounted to 90,000 men and 440
guns, while the Turks were estimated to have about
56,000 men — and Osman Pasha. Prince Charles of Rou-
mania was assigned to the command of all the Russo-
Roumanian forces around Plevna, with General Zotoff as
second in command. The Grand Duke Nicholas ordered
an attack at as early a date as possible, and was confident
that the great superiority in numbers would this time
bring victory. The Emperor and the Grand Duke Nicho-

40O DECISIVE BATTIES SIiYCE WATERIOO.

las came in person to witness the assault, establishing theii
head-quarters near those of Prince Charles.

The attack began with a bombardment on the 6th Sep-
tember, the Russians bringing a large part of their artillery
into play, including the heavy siege guns which had been
slowly dragged by oxen from the banks of the Danube to
the points where they were mounted. The Russian fire
was sev^ere, and if it had been directed against stone forti-
fications would have battered them down in a little while.
But the military engineer knows the comparatively slight
effect of artillery upon earthworks, and as all the defences
of Plevna were simply the earth of which the hills were
composed, the Russian fire did little more than dismount
some of the Turkish cannon, and keep the men confined
to their bomb-proofs, with the exception of those who were
working the guns that replied to the assailants. The Turk-
ish fire was slow but steady ; the Turks did not seem in-
clined to be in a hurry, and they evidently felt that they
could afford to let the Russians pile tons and tons of iron
inside their works, and add the solid masses of metal to the
earth which formed the bastions and redoubts.

Since the repulse of Krudener and Schahofskoy on the
30th of July, Osman Pasha had greatly strengthened the
defences of Plevna. When Krudener's assault failed there
were no fortifications on the Grivitza knoll east of Plevna,
nor on the Krishin heights a mile and a half southwest of
the town. The Green Hills which Skobeleff carried and
held for a time during the second battle of Plevna were
also without fortifications at that time, but by the 1st of
September all these commanding positions had been
crowned with works and were connected by a series of rifle-
pits and trenches. It was evident that the Turkish engi-
neers were thoroughly competent for their work, and they
had thrown around Plevna a line of defences that would
certainly give the Russians a great deal of trouble. And
so the sequel proved.

FALL OF PLEVNA. 4OI

The bombardment lasted with varying intervals of a few
hours at a time from the 6th to the i ith September, com-
paratively little use being made of the infantry and cavalry
on most parts of the line. The general positions were
much the same as at the time of the second battle of
Plevna, Skobeleff having the extreme left. The Rouman-
ian army was posted among the hills to the northwest of
Grivitza, while Krudener with the 9th corps was to the
south of Grivitza, with his line extending round to Radis-
chevo. General Kryloff with the 4th corps was to the left
of Baron Krudener, while General SkobelefT, as before
stated, held the extreme left, which extended round to the
Loftcha road.

The Russians were disappointed at the slight effect of
their artillery on the Turkish redoubts,especially where the
siege train under Krudener had been pounding all day at
the Grivitza defences. On the extreme left Skobeleff was
impatient at the slow work of the artillery, and deter-
mined to make use of his other forces. After firing awhile
with his heavy guns at the redoubts on the Krishin heights,
he closed in within short range, and then sent the 5th
and 8th regiments to attack the Turkish infantry, which
was deployed along the line of the Green Hills. He drove
back the Turks until he was fairly within range of
the guns of Krishin, which of course made his position un-
tenable, and he was forced to retire. At one time he was
within 1,500 yards of Plevna, but he could not retain his
position as long as the Turks were still in possession of
their redoubts. But he hung on to the southern knoll of
the Green Hills in spite of repeated attempts to dislodge
him.

The 8th and 9th passed without any important change
in the relations of the contending armies. The Turks on
the Grivitza ridge did not reply to the Russian fire on the
9th, and consequently Prince Charles thought they might
have been driven out; or possibly the guns were disabled.

402 DECISIVE BATTLES SINCE WATERLOO.

He ordered an assault with infantry, but it was met with
such a heavy fire of small-arms that the Russians were
driven back before they reached the foot of the earth-
works. It was afterwards learned that the Turks had
ceased firing because they were short of ammunition, and
wished to utilize as much as possible the scanty stock that
remained to them. On the loth their batteries were
nearly all silenced, but any movement on the part of the
Russian infantry showed that the Turks were fully aliv^e
to the situation, and when the occasion demanded, their
works swarmed with men.

After repulsing the infantry attack on the Grivitza re-
doubt, the Turks made an assault upon SkobelefT, at the
Green Hills, but were driven back in disorder by the in-
fantry commanded by that dashing ofificer. On the morn-
ing of the loth, Skobeleff determined to occupy the
second knoll in front of the Krishin redoubt, the place he
had taken and briefly held on the first day of the attack.
His men made a rush, and then rapidly threw up an earth-
work behind which they could bid defiance to the Turkish
riflemen. As soon as the earthwork was completed
Skobeleff brought his guns forward and made ready for
the w^ork of the next day — the grand assault.

The plan was to open the day with a heavy bombard-
ment, which was to be continued until three in the after-
noon, the time set for the infantry assault. But all
through the afternoon and night of the loth it rained
heavily, and the ground became a mass of mud in which
it was difficult to move. In the morning of the nth
there was a heavy fog which hung over the entire valley;
the Turks took advantage of it b}' pushing out a column
of infantry to drive Skobeleff from the position he had
taken the previous day, but they were unsuccessful. The
fighting was not severe, as the Turks retired on finding
their opponents were ready for them, and the Russians
did not pursue through fear of falling into a trap. Both

ra >-■ Costwckt

Jliahi JViny — ^a^on Kfudene'-

PLAN or THC

DZFENCE AND BLOCKADE

PLEVNA

ttD BUSSIANTBOOPS

TUFtH/5H TROOPS
flCDOUBTS
i^ii^^ '• TRdNCHElS

Scale of Miles

403

404 DECISIVE BATTLES SINCE WATERLOO.

sides evidently wished to wait until the fog lifted, but by
ten o'clock SkobelefT grew impatient, and sent his men to
capture a third knoll still nearer the Krishin redoubt,
though then protected from its fire by the fog.

Skobeleff's men were somewhat disturbed by the Turks
in the neighboring rifle-pits, and there was a good deal of
firing between them. While this fight was going on, the
Turks made a sortie in the direction of Kryloff's front ;
under cover of the fog they were fairly within the Russian
lines before they were perceived, but as soon as the firing
began they were promptly repulsed. The 63d regiment
met and defeated them ; it was joined by the ii/th, and
together they not only drove the Turks back, but followed
them into their redoubts. Here they found themselves
caught in a trap, as the redoubts were full of men, and a
terrible fire of bullets was poured on the Russians from
all sides. Fully half the men and most of the officers
were killed or wounded, and only a small contingent out
of those two regiments managed to make its way back to
the Russian lines. It was a severe blow to Kryloff, as it
completely paralyzed his left wing.

The Roumanians with two divisions attacked the Griv-
itza redoubt from the north and east, while a Russian
brigade attacked it from the south. In spite of the assault
on three sides, the Turks were able to hurl back their as-
sailants. By some miscalculation the Roumanian and
Russian assaults were not delivered simultaneously; there
was an interval of half an hour between the assaults of
the two Roumanian divisions, while the Russian assault
was still half an hour later. The columns were beaten in
detail and with heavy loss, especially in ofificers, until
about five o'clock when the redoubt was* carried. The
losses of the allies in the afternoon's battle were nearly
4,000, including 78 officers. Repeated assaults were made
upon redoubt No. 10, but though they lost iiooiTficers
and 5,200 men, the Russians were unable to carry it. The

FALL OF PLEVNA. 405

Turks stoutly defended their position and made every
shot tell.

Skobeleff was for a time more successful than the other
generals directing the attack, as he clung to the positions
he had gained in spite of the Turkish fire that raked his
lines from three directions. Mounted on a white horse,
and dressed in a white uniform, such as he always wore
when going into battle, he led the charge against a
double redoubt in the bend of the Loftcha road, close to
Plevna. All his escort were killed or wounded, his horse
was killed beneath him, and his sword was cut in two by
a cannon-shot. But onward he pushed, and carried the
redoubt, losing 3,000 men in the efTort.

And now came the question of holding the redoubt. It
w'as taken about six o'clock in the afternoon, and Skobeleff
sent immediately for reinforcements, but they never came.
All through the night he retained his position, and in the
morning he was heavily assailed by masses of Turkish in-
fantry, who advanced under cover of the artillery fire from
the Krishin redoubt. The Turks were repulsed, but they
returned to the assault as soon as they could re-form and
fresh troops could join them. Five times did they attack
Skobeleff's rapidly diminishing forces, and five times were
they driven back. Towards the close of the day they
attacked for the sixth time, and as their battalions came
surging on, Skobeleff was at his tent on a wooded hill
near the redoubt. When word came that the Turks were
assaulting, he mounted his horse and rode towards the
redoubt, out of which his men came streaming in a disor-
ganized, straggling mass. They were dying of thirst,
hunger, and fatigue, and worn out with almost continuous
fighting for forty-eight hours. The repulse of the Russians
at other parts of the line had enabled the Turks to gather
an overwhelming force to drive Skobeleff out of the re-
doubt, and at last they succeeded. One bastion was held
to the last by a young ofificer, w^ho was slaughtered with
all his men around him.

406 DECISIVE BATTLES SINCE WATERLOO.

A correspondent of the Daily News met Skobeleff just
after this occurrence, and thus describes him :

He was in a fearful state of excitement and fury. His uni-
form was covered with mud and filth ; his sword broken ; his
Cross of St. George twisted around on his shoulder ; his face
black with powder and smoke ; his eyes haggard and blood-
shot, and his voice quite gone. I never before saw such a
picture of battle as he presented. I saw him again in his tent
at night. He was quite calm and collected. He said : " I have
done my best ; I could do no more. My detachment is half
destroyed ; my regiments do not exist ; I have no ofificers left ;
they sent me no reinforcements, and I have lost three guns."
" Why did they refuse you reinforcements ? " I asked ; " who
was to blame ? " "I blame nobody," he replied. " It is the will
of God."

Military critics commenting on this battle say that the
Russians had abundant troops that had not been under
fire, and there was no real dif^culty about sending Skobe-
leff sui^cient reinforcements to enable him to hold his
position. If he could have held it until the heavy artillery
was placed in position, the captuie of Plevna was practi-
cally assured. But the Russian commanders had found
themselves so severely handled that they had enough of
fighting, and determined that Plevna could be taken by
siege better than by assault. The Russian killed and
wounded were estimated at i8,000 to 20,000, and the
Turkish about 5,000 less than the Russian.

The capture by assault having been given up, the Rus-
sians sat down to invoke the aid of that engine, more
powerful than all their batteries, the engine of starvation.
Osman Pasha was to be starved into surrender, and for
this purpose the Guards were called from Russia and the
army of the Czar was strengthened in the same way it had
been strengthened after the disaster of the second attack
on Plevna. One by one the roads leading into Plevna were
occupied, but it was nearly two months from the terrible

407

408 DECISIVE BATTLES SINCE WATERLOO.

battle of the nth September before the routes for supplies
and reinforcements destined for Osman Pasha could be
secured. The investment was completed on the 3d No-
vember; 120,000 Russians and Roumanians were around
Plevna, and the siege works were pushed with all the skill
and vigor that engineering science and autocratic power
could bring to bear. Osman Pasha and his 40,000 soldiers
were shut up in Plevna and cutoff from all communication
with the rest of the Turkish forces.

Elsewhere the Turkish armies were busy with movements
for the relief of Plevna, and sanguinary encounters took
place between them and the Russian forces in the valley
of the Lom and among the Balkans. But as all these
enterprises failed of their object, though the Russians were
made to suffer severely, they did not affect the one great
object in view — the capture of Plevna.

Starvation was at work from the 3d of November, when
the investment was completed. Spies brought intelligence
that the men were on reduced rations and every available
article of food was being devoured. Ammunition was
scarce, and the Turks rarely replied to the Russian artillery
fire. It became known to the Russians that Osman Pasha
was preparing for a sortie, and the Russian trenches were
kept full of men day and night. All the outposts were
doubled or trebled, and every precaution was taken against
surprise.

On the 9th December a spy brought the news that
three days' rations had been issued to the troops in Plev-
na, together with one hundred and fifty cartridges and a
new pair of sandals to each man. About ten o'clock at
night another spy came in and said that the Turkish
troops were concentrating near the bridge over the Vid,
and about the same time a telegram from the Russians
on the other side of Plevna reported the movements of a
great number of lights in the town, an unusual occurrence.
Evidently the hour of the sortie was approaching.

409

4IO DECISIVE BATTIES SINCE WATERIOO.

At eight o'clock on the morning of the loth another
spy brought the news that the Krishin redoubt had been
abandoned. He was so confident of the truth of his as-
sertion that he offered to go along with the Russians and
lead the way into the redoubt at the risk of being killed
if his statement were false. General Skobeleff ordered a
cautious advance in the direction of the Krishin redoubt,
and in a short time the Russians were in possession of it,
no resistance being offered. It was now certain that the
sortie was to begin at daybreak, and word was sent along
the whole Russian line to be ready for it. Skobeleff or-
dered the captured positions to be put immediately in a
state of defence in case the Turks should fail in the sor-
tie and then tr\^ to retake them.

In the gray of the morning the stillness was broken
suddenly by the booming of some thirty or fort}' cannon,
that announced the aggressive action of the Turks. They
were trying to cut their way out of Plevna, and this was
the opening of the movement. During the night they
had withdrawn their troops from their various positions,
all the way from Grivitza to the Green Hills, and concen-
trated for one last attempt. If they should fail, surrender
was inevitable, for it would be impossible for them to
retake the Krishin and other redoubts, into which the
Russians had thrown their own men and were ready to
pour a destructive fire all over Plevna.

The Russian artiller\' replied with great promptness,
and then came the rattle of the infantry fire as the Turk-
ish masses deployed and came out to the front of the
Russian line. The attack was directed against the posi-
tion of the grenadiers north of the Sophia road, and was
made under cover of the wagon-train, whith the Turks
brought with them as a sort of moving breastwork. So
many of the bullocks drawing the wagons were killed or
frightened into running away that this strategy did not
long avail, and then the Turks made a dash upon the line

FALL OF PLEVNA. 4II

of trenches held by the Siberian regiment. It was Hke
one of Skobeleff' s charges, and was so impetuous that the
Turks carried the hne of trenches and the batteries,
bayoneting the artillerymen and capturing all the guns
inside the line of works. The Siberian regiment was
almost annihilated, and had it not been for the promptness
of the Russian generals, who immediately brought up the
iirst brigade of grenadiers, the attempt to break the Rus-
sian investment might have succeeded.

The fighting was as fierce as any that had taken place
in all the previous struggles for the possession of Plevna;
the Turks held on to the guns with all the obstinacy of
their race, and equally obstinate were the Russians in
their efforts to retake them. The Russian grenadiers
poured swiftly in ; by half-past eight o'clock the sortie
was repulsed, and the few Turks that remained alive and
uninjured were fleeing back in the direction of the town.

The sortie had been stopped, but the fighting continued
for several hours, though there were no great losses after
the contest for the possession of the battery, as both par-
ties were under cover. The Russians expected the Turks
would make another assault and were determined to de-
feat it, while the Turks were apprehensive that the Rus-
sians would charge and drive them into the gorge where
the town stands.

Towards noon the firing gradually died away and only an
occasional shot broke the stillness. About half-past twelve
a white flag was displayed on the Turkish front and was
greeted with a loud shout of triumph that rolled along
the entire Russian lines. The long agony was over, and
Plevna was about to be surrendered.

A Turkish ofificer bearing a white flag rode out towards
the Russian lines, and after some parley returned to Plev-
na to send out an ofificer of Osman Pasha's staff. The
latter came and was met by General Skobeleff, and after
a little delay the surrender of Plevna was made. It was

412 DECISIVE BATTLES SINCE WATERLOO.

an unconditional surrender. In fact, under the circum-
stances, neither side could have expected less. The Grand
Duke and all the Russian generals complimented Osman
Pasha on the splendid defence he had made, and he was
treated with every courtesy that could be shown to one
whom they earnestly respected for his valor and his mili-
tary genius.

With the fall of Plevna and the surrender of its garrison
of 40,000 men, the Turkish opposition practically ceased.
Within a month from that event General Gourko had cap-
tured Sophia, and General Radetsky took the village of
Shipka, in the Shipka Pass, and compelled the surrender
of a Turkish army of 23,000 men, 4 pashas, 92 guns, and
10 standards. Gourko and Skobeleff advanced upon Phil-
ippopolis by different routes and narrowly missed captur-
ing Suleiman Pasha with his entire force. Skobeleff ad-
vanced upon Adrianople, which the Turks abandoned, and
Slivno and Yeni-Zagra were occupied, all inside of thirty
days. Plevna had made the Russians the masters of the
situation and they advanced upon Constantinople, the
Turks retiring before them, and occasionally making a
feeble resistance.

Turkey asked the mediation of England, and finally, de-
spairing of her aid, signed an armistice that became the
basis of the treaty of San Stefano, which was signed by
the treaty powers on the 3d of March, 1878. The treaty
guaranteed the erection of Bulgaria into an autonomous
tributary principality, with a national Christian govern-
ment and a native militia ; the independence of Monte-
negro, with an increase of territory ; the independence of
Roumania and Servia with a territorial indemnity ; the
introduction of administrative reforms into Bosnia and
Herzegovina ; and lastly, an indemnity in mone)" to Rus-
sia for the cost of the war.

By the subsequent Congress of Berlin Russia was strip-
ped of some of the fruits of her conquest, Turkey receiv-

'^Pi

ccn

T^RRETOHY QLAIMLO by treaty or SA// STEPAf/O
I. CCOED - „ „ BERLIN

^ " TO PERS/A.

PREVIOUS BOUNDARY +♦*■»■♦

■SO

S.0O

Scale of Miles
OUTLINE MAP
PRESENTING CHANCES IN ASIA

BY THE TREATY OF BERLIN

413

414

DECISIVE BATTLES SINCE WATERLOO.

ing back again about 2,000,000 of population and 30,000
square miles of territory. The treaty of San Stefano was
modified in several other features, — Batoum was made a
free commercial port, and the treaty of Paris was held to
be maintained in all the points where it was not modified
by the Congress of Berlin. Altogether Russia had good
reason to complain that she was not allowed to enjoy
what she had won by the force of arms, and the way was
left open for troubles in the not distant future.

Russia is said to have lost nearly 100,000 men in the
campaign of 1877-78, and to have expended not less than
;^ 1 20,000,000. The cost of the war on the Turkish side,
both in men and money, is said to have been about three
fourths that of the Russians, but the exact figures have
never been published on either side.

CHAPTER XXII.

CAPTURE OF GEOK TEPE — 1 88 1.

Down to 1869 the Russian advance into Central Asia
was conducted from Orenburg and the various military
posts of Western Siberia. Year by year the frontier was
pushed to the southward, and the map of the Asiatic pos-
sessions of Russia required frequent revision. The long
chain of the Altai Mountains passed into the control of
the Czar ; the Aral Sea became a Russian lake ; and vast
territories with a sparse population were brought under
Russian rule. As mentioned previously, in the account
of the fall of Khiva, most of this conquest was a bloodless
one, as it was fought chiefly by the diplomatist, though
backed alwa}-s by the military power.

The Kirghese, who occupy the region immediately south
of the Altai Mountains, and are still found on the south-
ern confines of the Baraba Steppe, are broken into many
independent tribes ; they are nomadic in their habits,
wandering from place to place in search of pasturage for
their immense flocks and herds. In winter they frequent
the valleys among the outlying hills of the Altai Moun-
tains, and in summer descend upon the plains. IMany of
the tribes live altogether on the plains, and their range
covers many thousands of square miles.

Quarrels were numerous among them, chiefly growing
out of disputes about pasturage or water, and in these
quarrels the Russians interfered, both in the interest of
humanity and the spread of their power. They usually

415

41 6 DECISIVE BATTLES SINCE WATERLOO.

took the side of the weaker party, who was ahvays glad to
have their assistance, but found when too late that he was
altogether dependent upon them. In case of their retire-
ment he would be subject to the revenge of his late antag-
onists, and whenever the Russians proposed to go away
they Avere earnestly urged to remain. Thus they obtained
a secure footing in the country and speedily became mas-
ters of the situation.

Frequently the disputes between the tribes led to raids
for purposes of plunder; quite as frequently one tribe
would make a raid on another with which it was at peace
for the sole object of robbery. Attacks were generally
made at night, and if they were successful the robbers
would drive off the flocks and herds of the tribe assailed.
Men, women, and children were taken to be sold into
slavery in the markets of Khiva or Bokhara, or kept
among their captors. These slaves were treated with the
greatest cruelty ; they were severely beaten for the slight-
est offence or failure to perform what had been ordered,
were poorly fed, and often compelled to wear chains.
They were generally maimed for life, by means of a horse-
hair run through the heel, in order to prevent their escape
from captivity.

All this business was brought to an end by the Russians
when they occupied the Kirghese country. They com-
pelled the tribes to live peaceably with each other, and if
any dispute arose about water or pasturage it was referred
to the Russian commander of the district for adjustment.
If one tribe made a raid on another it was compelled to
give up the stolen property, and furthermore a heavy fine
was levied upon the raiders — half going to the Russian
government and half to the injured tribe. The Russians
generally made the fine heavy enough to furnish a per-
centage for the officers who took the trouble to adjust the
differences.

Russian goods were introduced among these nomadic

CAPTURE OF GEOK TEPE. 417

people, markets were opened, and every facility was
offered for the increase of commerce. Long caravans
were constantly in motion between Orenburg, Sempola-
tinsk, and other points in Russian territory, and Khiva, Bok-
hara, and Samarcand, far to the east. They traversed the
Kirghese and Turcoman country, and wherever they went
they found a material difference in the matter of safety,
whether the territory was under Russian rule or remained
independent. If the latter, the caravans were constantly
liable to attack and plunder; if the former, they were in-
variably free from molestation.

The capture of Bokhara, Samarcand, and Khiva reduced
the slave markets of the Turcoman raiders, but by no
means put an end to their plundering expeditions. The
independent Turcomans were estimated to be about a
million in number, divided into several tribes, who some-
times warred upon each other, but constantly upon the
Persians and other peaceable people. In the wars between
Khiva and Bokhara, Samarcand and Kokan, they took sides
with those who would pay the most for their services.

Down to very recently the whole of Northern Persia
was subject to Turcoman raids, and agriculture was car-
ried on under great difficulties. The raids were some-
times carried up to within 1 00 miles of Teheran, or about
500 miles inside the Persian boundary. They were or-
ganized months beforehand, and sometimes as many as
5,000 or 6,000 men were engaged in a single enterprise.
A raid was called a " chapow " by the Persians; in the
Turcoman language it was an " alaman."

A Turcoman leader would announce his intention of
making an alaman, but the route was always kept secret
through fear of betrayal. The Turcomans are splendid
horsemen, and while organizing an expedition they put
their steeds under a system of training to enable them to
make long and swift marches whenever occasion required.
When every thing was ready the party started ; it travelled

4l8 DECISIVE BATTIES SINCE WATERIOO.

slowly until it reached the Persian frontier, and was often
weeks on the way.

Passing the frontier, the hard work of the campaign
began. The region selected for the raid was reached
as soon as possible ; then the invading force was di-
vided into small parties, and each had a particular vil-
lacfe assigned to it. Their movements were made so as
to catch the people at work in the fields, and capture the
cattle before they could be driven into a place of safety.
Not only the cattle, but all the men, women, and children
that could be seized were taken. The old and useless
were slaughtered without mercy ; the young and able-
bodied were carried off to be sold into slavery. A wealthy
Persian was held for a heavy ransom, but the poor man
had no chance of redemption. The plundering was kept
up as long as there was any thing to steal, and then the
expedition returned to its own territor}\ Sometimes in
a single raid as many as a hundred thousand horses, sheep,
goats, and other animals were captured, and a thousand or
more people were carried into slavery.

The Persian government made very little provision
for the protection of its people. The Persian troops were
in the cities and large towns, which the Turcomans never
attacked, and as there was no telegraph through the coun-
try, the raiders almost invariably got to a safe distance
before a pursuit could be started. Very often the Persian
ofificials on the frontier connived at the raids, and the
people were forced to rely upon themselves for protection,
which was almost wholly of a defensive character.

Their villages are built of mud, and are practically forts.
The v.-alls are from twenty to thirty feet thick, and about
fort}' in height ; they form a quadrangle, or circle, where
cattle can be driven at night, and there is only a single
door-way, too low to permit the passage of a man on
horseback. The raiders never stop to besiege a place ; all
their work :s done by a sudden dash, and the Turcoman

419

420 DECISIVE BATTLES SINCE WATERLOO.

would never think of dismounting to pass the low door-
way. Inside there is a stone door which may be closed to
prevent ingress ; it is thick and strong, and once inside of
their mud village the people are safe.

To further protect themselves, they had towers of ref-
uge in their fields, where they could run in case of danger.
Some of the towers had ladders on the outside, which were
drawn up as the Turcomans approached, while others were
entered by narrow door-ways similar to those of the villa-
ges. On the hills there were signal-towers where watch-
men were stationed ; when the dust of an approaching
alaman was seen, the watchmen gave warning and the
people fled for safety.

Thus these Turcoman thieves hampered agriculture, and
they also restricted commerce by plundering the caravans.
Merchants travelled with an armed escort and in large
numbers. Even this did not save them from attack, as a
great caravan was unwieldy, and often the robbers would
dart in and seize a few camels laden with merchandise,
while the escort was so far away in another part of the
line that it could not rush to attack the marauders until
they had finished their w^ork and departed.

The Turcoman country extends westward as far as the
Caspian Sea. To put a stop to the organized thieving of
the Turcomans, and more especially to increase the extent
of territory under their control, and open the land route
to India, the Russians occupied the eastern shore of the
Caspian in 1869. A military expedition was landed at
Krasnovodsk where it built a fort, and took permanent
possession of the country in the name of the Czar. Points
on the eastern coast of the Caspian had been occupied
during the time of Peter the Great, and again during the
reign of Nicholas I., but the occupation of the region was
only temporary. The force which established itself at
Krasnovodsk consisted of a few companies of infantry, two
sotnias of Cossacks, and half a dozen pieces of artillery.

CAPTURE OF GEOK TEPE. 42 I

Three men who afterwards obtained considerable prom-
inence in the affairs of Central Asia, and one of whom
gained a world-wide reputation as a soldier, were attached
to this expedition. The last was Skobeleff, the hero of
Plevna and the Russo-Turkish campaign of 1877-78. The
others were Stolietoff and GrodekofT ; Stolietoff was a gen-
eral, while the other two were captains, and down to that
time had had no opportunity for distinguishing themselves.
Skobeleff was perhaps the man of least promise; as he
was looked upon as a wild sort of fellow, with a great
fondness for conviviality, which was constantly getting him
into trouble, and he was so reckless that his elders pre-
dicted he would be killed in the first battle, or the first
skirmish of any magnitude.

It was the Russian plan to make haste slowly in con-
quering the Turcoman country. Reconnoitring expedi-
tions were sent out from the fort at Krasnovodsk, but no
other point was immediately occupied.

The Yomut Turcomans in the Caspian region made no
resistance ; they are far less warlike than the Tekke
Turcomans farther to the east, who afterwards became the
defenders of Geok Tepe. A short time before his death,
Skobeleff said to a friend : " We made a great mistake
when we landed at Krasnovodsk ; instead of going ahead
we dawdled about reconnoitring the country. The
result Avas we gradually taught the Turcomans how to
fight, and at last they fought so well that it needed a series
of great campaigns tc crush them."

From 1869 to 1873 there were numerous skirmishes and
reconnoitrings, during which the steppes were pretty
well explored as far as Kizil-Arvat. General Stolietoff
was in command until 1872, when he was succeeded by
Colonel Markusoff, who pushed his explorations to the
wells of Igdy, then bending to the southwest, he passed
Kizil-Arvat on his return to Krasnovodsk. There appeared
to be no obstacle to a Russian advance into the heart of

422 DECISIVE BATTLES SINCE WATERLOO.

the country. But when General Lomakin was ordered
there during the years between 1873 and '79, he found
that beyond Kizil-Arvat were the Tekke Turcomans, who
seemed determined to make a decided opposition to the
Muscovite designs. A regular campaign was required, and
General Lazareff was ordered to push back the Turco-
mans and occupy as a base of operations the first culti-
vated oasis east of Kizil-Arvat. Lazareff, early in the
campaign died, and the command fell upon General
Lomakin, who undertook to execute the order. This
general, who had so easily conquered, if conquering it
may be called where no opposition is offered, the Yomut
Turcomans along the borders of the Caspian, mistakenly
thought he might deal in the same way with the Tekkes.
He advanced with 4,000 men and reached Geok Tepe
without resistance, but no sooner was he in front of it
than the Turcomans fell upon him. He was severely
defeated and made a hasty retreat to Krasnovodsk with
the remnant of his army.

General Tergukasoff was next appointed to the com-
mand, but when he saw the difficulties confronting him
he resigned. He w^as succeeded by General Petrussovitch
under the chief command of Skobeleff. Thus from
Stolietoff to SkobelefT there were no fewer than seven
generals Avho had tried to conquer the Tekke Turcomans.

Skobeleff, seeing the vast difficulties of the situation,
matured a skilful and scientific plan of operations,
for which he obtained the imperial sanction by making
a personal visit to Livadia, where the Emperor
was then sojourning. His next step was to telegraph
to General Kuropatkin, who was then on the Kuldja
frontier, to join him with a detachment of troops
from Turkestan. Kuropatkin marched from Tashkend
to Khiva and thence to Bami, where he was to join
Skobeleff ; in spite of the difficulties of the route across
the desert, he brought his troops through in fine condition

CAPTURE OF GEO A' TEFE. 423

and secured the profound admiration of all military men
for his remarkable achievement. He was twenty-six
days covering the distance between Khiva and Bami;
the route was but little known and for much the greater
part of the way it lies through a sandy desert where water
can only be found at long intervals.

When SkobelefT took command in the middle of March,
1880, the position of the Russians was this: — -Their base
was Tchikishlar and Krasnovodsk, their direct aim Geok
Tape, where Lomakin had be^n so disastrously defeated
the previous year. Their outposts were in '79 at Douz-
Aloum, in the valley of the Sumbora, a tributary of the
Atrek. Skobeleff's first work was to secure a safe trans-
port, establish a regular line of steamers across the
Caspian, to build suitable docks, secure 20,000 camels,
and build a railway from Michaelovsk to Kizil-Arvat.
Michaelovsk is a small bay near Krasnovodsk and better
suited as a harbor than the latter place. Skobeleff's first
reconnoitring convinced him that Geok Tepe could only
be taken by a regular siege. He started from Douz-
Aloum, personally leading the advance, took Khodshom-
Kala on June loth, and then marched on Bami, which
afforded him an admirable base, 120 versts from Geok
Tepe. On the 13th July, he started with 1,600 men to
reconnoitre Geok Tepe, which he reached in five days,
amidst constant and severe attacks by the Tekkes. He
reached Bami again July 22d, having marched 250 versts in
ten days, constantly harassed by the enemy. This con-
cluded the first stage of his operations.

From July to December the Russians abstained from
offensive operations. The Douz-Aloum-Bami line was re-
peatedly attacked, and several night assaults were made on
Bendessen and Khodshom-Kala, but each attack of the Tur-
comans was repulsed. Meantime, General Kuropatkin left
Amou Darya and marched by Igdy, and Kizil-Arvat to Bami,
a distance of 400 versts, which he made in eighteen days.

424 DECISIVE BATTLES SINCE WATERLOO.

Supplies, munitions, and siege artillery were accumulated
at Bami ; they were nearly all brought by the Tshikishlar
route, as Skobeleff could not wait for the completion of
the railway to Kizil-Arvat. By the beginning of Decem-
ber the Russians were ready to take the offensive, and the
advance upon Geok Tepe was ordered.

Geok Tepe, sometimes called Goek Tepe ("The Green
Hills"), is situated on the Akhal oasis, in the Turcoman
steppes, 387 versts (250 miles), east of the Caspian Sea.
The chain of hills called the Kopet-Dag, lies south and
southwest of Geok Tepe, and on the other side it touches
the sandy desert of Kara Kum, with the hill of Geok on
the east. The Turcomans, or rather the Tekke Turco-
mans, who held it, are the most numerous of the nomad
tribes in that region. They are reported to count about
100,000 kibitkas, or tents ; reckoning 5 persons to a kibit-
ka, this would give them a strength of half a million.
Their great strength in numbers and their fighting abili-
ties enabled them to choose their position and settle on
the most fertile oases along the northern border of Persia
for centuries. These oases have been renowned for their
productiveness, and in consequence of the abundance of
food, the Tekkes were a powerful race of men, and were
feared throughout all that part of Asia. Their principal
stronghold was Geok Tepe, which lies in a depressed hol-
low near the hill of Geok, as already described. It is
traversed by many irrigating canals, which, towards the
north, convert the ground into a marsh, and make it almost
inaccessible for troops.

The fortress of Geok Tepe at the time of the Russian
advance consisted of walls of mud 12 or 15 feet high
towards the north and west, and 6 or 8 fe'et thick. In
front of these walls was a ditch, 6 feet deep, supplied by
a running stream, and behind the walls was a raised plat-
form for the defenders. The space between the first and
second interior wall was from 50 to 60 feet wide, and OC'

CAPTURE OF GEO A' TEFE. 425

cupied by the kibitkas of the Tekke Turcomans and their
famihes. The second wall was exactly like the outer one,
with a ditch and enclosing space inside, and bridged on
one corner to allow the passage of the stream. The
kibitkas were sunk into the ground, and in order to pro-
tect them against shot, they were covered with earth to a
depth of several inches. On the south and east the walls
were less high and much thinner, without ditches and
without the second interior wall. Outworks (kalas) had
been thrown up in front, and one of them was connected
with the main fortification. The walls of these outworks
were much higher and stronger than those of the fortress
itself.

In 1878 Tekme Sirdar, a Turcoman chief, submitted to
the Russians and was received into their camp at Kras-
novodsk. He remained there several months, and then,
for some real or fancied injury, fled from the camp, and
collected his followers with the determination to make
war on the invaders. He made good use of his eyes while
at Krasnovodsk, and when the Tekkes determined to make
a stand at Geok Tepe, he superintended the construction
of the fortress, which he made to resemble the Russian
one at Krasnovodsk as much as possible.

Reconnoitring in force on the ist January, 1881, Sko-
beleff decided that the most favorable plan for attack was
on the Yanghi-Kala, to the southeast of Geok Tepe.
Ordering up the two assaulting columns under Colonel
Koselkoff and General Kuropatkin, General Skobelef?
advanced in person with the main body to repulse
the Turcoman sallies. During the reconnoissance of the
fortress Skobeleff ordered his men to throw some shells
among the enemy's cavalr)-. The first of these shells
upset its carriage and fell in the midst of the Russian
detachment. There was a momentary panic, and the
detachment seemed on the point of being thrown into
confusion, when Skobeleff forced his horse to where the

426 DECISIVE BATTLES SINCE WATERLOO.

shell lay on the ground. It burst ; the animal was terri-
bly wounded, but its rider escaped unhurt. On seeing his
figure reappear through the smoke after the explosion,
the soldiers recovered their confidence and resumed their
advance upon the Turcoman position.

Next day there was a reconnoissance with cavalry which
completely encircled the fortress, and was bravely met
by the Turcomans. Nothing now remained but to cut
the trenches. The first parallel within 800 yards of
the walls was successfully cut by January 4th. From that
date it was a regular siege, interrupted occasionally by
sallies of the Tekkes within the fort or attacks by those
outside. In one of these fights General Petrussovitch was
killed. The besieging army was about 10,000 strong, while
the besieged were from 30,000 to 40,000.

The parallel was armed with cannon on January iith.
General Skobeleff in his report stated that on January
i6th " the positions of the enemy forty yards in front of
us were successfully taken by assault, and the enem}% who
had attacked our centre and left flank, beaten back after
a most stubborn fight all along the line. The losses on
their side were very great. The work in trenches is diffi-
cult, because we are ten times weaker than the enemy.
Head of sap is now thirty yards from walls of the strong-
hold."'

Throughout the siege the Turcomans made frequent
sallies and there was almost continuous fighting. Some-
times the Turcomans drove the Russians from the
outposts, and if they had been as well armed as their
besiegers it is highly probable that Skobeleff would have
fared no better than did Lomakin in his disastrous cam-
paign. The Turcoman weapons were no hiatch for the
breech-loading rifles of the Russians, and in every strug-
gle the latter were victorious, their loss being small in
comparison with that of the Tekkes. The Russians had
sixty-nine pieces of artillery, while the Turcomans had no

CAPTURE OF GEOK TEPE. 427

cannon to oppose them with. Skobeleff found that his
cannon made Httle impression upon the clay walls of the
fort, so he ordered his artillery to fire over the walls and
into the enclosed space, in order to demoralize the people
within as much as possible. In fighting against Asiatics
artillery always has a prominent part. Its moral effect in
frightening them is certainly ten times as great as its
destructive power.

Kuropatkin had charge of the advanced work and dis-
played extraordinary coolness and courage. Skobeleff
was everywhere among the soldiers, encouraging them by
word and deed and carefully watching the progress of the
sapping and mining operations. When an officer accom-
plished a specified portion of the tunnelling in less than
the time fixed for it, he was complimented in the presence
of the soldiers, kissed and caressed, and perhaps treated
to a bottle of champagne, while the soldiers were praised
as " molodyetz ! " good fellows. If the officer failed to
make the required progress within the time, he was sure
to be roundly abused and threatened with disrating.

The storming columns were ordered to be ready for
work on January 24th. They were as follows :

1st — Under Kuropatkin, consisting of 5 companies and
I battalion of infantry, \ company of sappers, i detach-
ment of volunteers, I sotnia of foot Cossacks.

2d — Under Kosclkoff, of 2 battalions of infantry, I
platoon sappers, i marine volunteers, i artillery.

3d — Under Gaidaroff, of i battalion infantry, i platoon
sappers, i detachment marine volunteers, i section of
mountain artillery.

4th — III reserve, there were 21 companies, among whom
were 3 companies of foot dragoons and 24 guns.

At 7 o'clock in the morning of the 24th, Gaidaroff ad-
vanced to attack the first fortification on the south front,
supported by 36 guns. The wall had already been half
crumbled down by an explosion of powder and completely

428 DECISIVE BATTLES SINCE WATERLOO.

broken b}' the firing of a dynamite mine. At 11.20 the
assault took place, and during the action the mine on the
east front was exploded. It was laid with 125 cwt. of
gunpowder, and in its explosion completely buried hun-
dreds of Tekkes. The firing of this mine was the signal
for the columns of Kuropatkin and Koselkoff to advance.
The interv^al between the two explosions was ten minutes.
A furious hand-to-hand fight followed, which lasted one
hour, and only with great difificulty could the Tekkes be
pushed down the walls. Samur's battalion scaled the
walls between the breaches. All defenders on the walls
were cut down.

About 1.30 P.M. Gaidaroff carried the southwestern part
of the walls, and a battle raged in the interior. Half an
hour later the Russians were in possession of Denghil-
TejDe, the hill redoubt commanding the fortress of Geok
Tepe. The Tekkes then seemed to be panic-stricken, and
took to flight, leaving their families and all their goods
behind. One division of dragoons, 4 sotnias of Cossacks,
6 companies of infantry, and 4 long-range field guns went
in pursuit, and the fleeing Tekkes were followed for about
15 versts. The ditches to Geok Tepe were filled with
corpses, and there were 4,000 dead in the interior of the
fortress. The loss of the enemy was enormous. In the
pursuit the Russians are said to have cut down no less than
8,000 fugitives. The total loss of the Tekkes during the
siege, capture, and pursuit was estimated at 40,000.

During the siege the artillery fired from 100 to 500 shots
daily, and the infantry used from 10,000 to 70,000 rounds
of ammunition in the same time. During the assault and
pursuit the infantry fired 273,804 rounds, thecavalrj^ 12,510,
and the artillery 5,864; 224 military rockets were also used.*

The Turcoman leaders, Tekme Sardar and Makdum
Kali, escaped and fled to Merv. SkobelefT pushed on in
pursuit as far as Askabad, the capital of the Akhal Tekkes,

* Marvin's " The Russians at the Gates of Herat."

CAPTURE OF GEO A' TEPE. 429

2y miles east of Geok Tepe, and from Askabad he sent
Kuropatkin with a reconnoitring column half-way across
the desert to Merv. Skobeleff wanted to capture Merv,
but with his columns considerably shattered with the siege
and capture of Geok Tepe and the near exhaustion of his
supply of ammunition, he did not feel strong enough to
make the attempt. Kuropatkin was recalled to Askabad,
which remained the frontier post of the Russians for several
months, until circumstances favored the advance upon
Sarakhs and the Tejend, and the subsequent swoop upon
Merv, with its bloodless capture.

The siege and capture of Geok Tepe was the most im-
portant victory every achieved by the Russians in Central
Asia. It opened the \\'ay for the Russian advance to the
frontier of India, and carried the boundaries of the empire
southward to those of Persia. In the interest of humanity,
it was of the greatest importance, as it broke up the system
of man-stealing and its attendant cruelties, which the Turco-
mans had practised for centuries. The people of Northern
Persia no longer live in constant terror of Turcoman raids ;
the slave markets of Central Asia are closed, and doubtless
forever. The Turcoman barrier against western progress
was broken completely when the Russian flag floated in
triumph over the Green Hills of the Tekkes.

It is an interesting circumstance that the Turcomans,
now that they are forbidden to indulge in raiding, have
turned their attention to steady industry, and promise to
make good citizens. Whatever may be their faults, they
are not a lazy people ; they gave up their raiding habits
very unwillingly ; but when once convinced that they must
live by industry, they seem to have accepted the situation.
Many of them have entered the Russian service, and
already several battalions of Turcoman cavalr}^ have been
organized, armed, and drilled after the European system.
Their subordinate ofificers are of their own race ; for the
present the commanders are Russians, but in course of

430 DECISIVE BATTLES SINCE WATERLOO.

time it is quite likely that all the ofificers will be Turcoman.
In the British army only British ofificers can aspire to the
highest positions, but the Russians have no such prejudices.
Some of the most prominent ofificers in the Russian ser-
vice are Asiatics ; of these may be mentioned Generals
Tergukasoff and LazarefT, who commanded divisions in
the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78, and General Loris
Melikofif, whose position was for several years only second
to that of the Czar.

In his campaign against the Turcomans, Skobeleff prof-
ited by the experience of his predecessors, and the knowl-
edge of the country and people that had been gained by
them since the landing at Krasnovodsk in 1869. He made
his plans with great care, and completed all his preparations
before striking a blow other than was necessary to keep
open his lines of communication and protect his advanced
position at Bami. The Turcoman does his best work in
summer, while the reverse is the case with the Russian.
The Russian army was well fed, and its camp was in as
comfortable a condition as circumstances would permit.
The Turcomans w^ere huddled with their families inside
the fortress of Geok Tepe, and poorly supplied with pro-
visions ; they had no previous experience in warfare of
this kind, and were unacquainted with commissariat re-
quirements. Skobeleff understood the necessities of the
campaign, and the character and habits of his enemy, better
than did his predecessors, and hence his victory.

The Trans-Caspian railway, which owed its commence-
ment to Skobeleff's campaign against the Turcomans, has
been pushed far into Central Asia. It has reached Merv,
and perhaps before these pages are presented to the public
gaze, the whistle of the Russian locomotive will have re-
sounded in Samarcand or Tashkend. A branch from Sar-
akhs or IVIerv to Herat and the frontier of India is in the
near future, and it is easily possible that the Russian and
Indian railway systems will be connected before the new
year of 1890.

CHAPTER XXIIL

BATTLE OF MIRAFLORES — 1881.

When the South American republics gained their in-
dependence in the early part of the present century, there
was a general agreement that their boundaries should be
established according to those of the Spanish provinces of
1 8 10. In accordance with this agreement, the Bolivian
province of Atacama on the Pacific coast extended to the
southern limit of Peru on one side, and the northern limit
of Chili on the other. The northern limit of Chili w^as at
latitude 25° south, and the province of Atacama in Bolivia
was then a desert tract of no particular value. In course
of time it was found that the desert contained inexhaust-
ible stores of nitrate of soda and borax, that there w'ere
deposits of guano along the coast, and the mountain
portions of the province possessed some of the richest
silver mines in the world. In consequence of these dis-
coveries, troubles arose between Bolivia and Chili ; they
afterwards extended to Peru, and out of them grew the
war of 1879-81.

Chili laid claim to all territory south of the 23d parallel.
After considerable discussion and negotiation, the Presi-
dent of Bolivia in 1866 signed a treaty, conceding Chili's
right as far north as the 24th parallel, but the treaty was
never ratified by the Bolivian Congress. In return for this
supposed concession, it was stipulated that Chili should
receive half the customs duties collected between the 23d
and 24th parallels, while Bolivia should have half of the

431

432 DECISIVE BATTLES SINCE WATERLOO.

duties collected between the 24th and 25th parallels.
This was an admirable arrangement for Chili, as the richest
deposits of nitrates are north of the 24th parallel, and she
would be entitled to a considerable revenue every year
without the trouble and expense of collecting it.

As a matter of fact, the customs dues were not properly
paid, and Chili found in this circumstance a new cause of
grievance. In 1870 rich silver mines were discovered at
Caracoles, north of the 24th parallel, and the Bolivian
government granted a concession to a company to work
these mines and also the nitrate deposits. The company
was under English management, backed by English and
Chilian capital ; it paid $10,000 to the government for the
concession, and built a railway from the port of Antofa-
gasta. The company began operations, and soon fell into
disputes with the Bolivian government, relative to the ex-
port duties on the nitrates, which it was sending to foreign
countries.

In 1873 a treaty of alliance between Peru and Bolivia
was signed and approved by the National Assemblies of
the two countries. It provided for a mutual guaranty of
the independence of the two countries, and defence against
aggression from others. It was agreed in the treaty that
all conciliatory measures were to be tried to prevent war,
and that arbitration through a third party was to be sought
whenever possible. In 1S78 the Bolivian government
called upon the Antofagasta company to pay the duties
which had accumulated on its exports ; the company re-
fused payment, whereupon the government ordered the
seizure and sale by auction of enough of the company's
property to pay the claims. Immediately the Chilian
government proceeded to hostilities, but did not declare
war, by seizing the Bolivian ports of Antofagasta, Cobija,
and Tocapilla. Peru offered her services as mediator, but,
as too often happens to the arbiter in cases of mediation,
it was speedily involved in trouble with Chili. This trouble

IS?

433

434 DECISIVE BATTLES SINCE WATERLOO.

was, in part, attributable to unwise legislation by Peru,
relative to the nitrate deposits in her southern province
of Tarapaca, which borders upon Atacama.

In consequence of her financial difficulties, Peru in 1873
made the nitrate deposits of Tarapaca a government mon-
opoly, the state paying i. fixed price to producers, and
being herself the sole exporter. The nitrate deposits were
being exploited by Chilian and English capital, and the
labor employed in the work was mostly Chilian. Under
these circumstances. Chili protested on behalf of her sub-
jects, whose interests were seriously interfered with, and
finding the law a failure, Peru abandoned it, substituting
another authorizing the government to buy up all the
nitrate works. There was a great deal of diplomatic cor-
respondence, and it is impossible to harmonize all the
statements contained in the voluminous papers. The end
of the affair was that Chili declared war upon Peru on the
5th April, 1879.

Chili was in far better condition for war than either of
her adversaries. Owing to the character of the Pacific
coast of South America, the strip of land between the
Andes and the ocean consisting of waterless desert with
occasional valleys, every thing depends upon the possession
of the sea. Chili had been increasing her navy, while that
of Peru had not been augmented. The Chilians had 2
powerful iron-clads of the newest pattern, the Almirante
CocJirane and Blattco Encalada, which were alone capable
of destroying the entire Peruvian fleet. In addition to
these she had 4 corvettes, each carrying from i to 3
i5C)-pounder, 7-ton Armstrong guns, 2 wooden gun-boats
heavily armed, and 10 transports. The Peruvians had i
turret-ship, the Huascar, but her armor cooild easily be
pierced by the shot of the Chilian iron-clads, and her arma-
ment consisted of 2 lo-inch Dahlgren guns and 2 40-
pounder Whitworths. She had also a broadside iron-clad
of the old type, the Independencia, and 2 wooden corvettes.

BATTLE OF MIRAFLORES 435

Two monitors purchased from the United States at the end
of the civil war cannot be classed among the sea-going ships
of Peru, as they were permanently stationed, one at Callao
and the other at Arica.

In land forces, the armies of the two countries were pro-
portionately the same as their navies, Chili being superior
in numbers, drill, discipline, effectiveness, and equipment.
Chili had provided herself with Krupp breech-loading
field-guns, while Peru had nothing else than the old-fash-
ioned muzzle-loading smooth-bore cannon, of a range far
inferior to that of the Chilian Krupps. At the outbreak
of the war Bolivia was very poorly provided for active
operations. Her army, small in numbers, liad only 1,500
Remington rifles, the rest of her small-arms being old-
fashioned flint-lock muskets.

In February, 1879, ^^""^ Chilians seized the Bolivian port
of Antofagasta, and from there sent a force to the silver
mines of Caracoles. On receiving news of the invasion,
the President of Bolivia declared war against Chili, and
prepared to defend his territories as best he could. The
first encounter of the war w-as on the 23d March at Calama,
a small village about eighty miles from the coast, and
nearly due north of Caracoles. The Chilians attacked it
with 600 men, the defence being in the hands of about
one fourth that number. The defenders fought for about
three hours, killing several Chilians, but were compelled
to retire, ow'ing to the superiority of the assailants in num-
bers and equipment.

Immediately after the declaration of war between Peru
and Chili, on the 5th April, the Chilian fleet appeared off
the Peruvian forts, occupying those that were undefended
and blockading others. Wherever there was any show of
resistance, the towns were bombarded, and some of them
were laid in ruins. For some weeks the war was conducted
principally by the navy ; one of the Chilian corvettes was
destroyed by the Peruvian iron-clad Huascar, and shortly

436 DECISIVE BATTIES SINCE WATERLOO.

afterwards the Independencia was decoyed on the rocks by
a ChiHan gun-boat, and lost. From this time the Peruvian
fleet acted chiefly on the defensive, as the preponderance
of the ChiHan navy was overwhelming. On the 8th Octo-
ber the Huascar was captured by the Chilian fleet off
Mejillones, after a gallant fight of 6 hours. As this was
the first battle ever fought on the open ocean between
iron-clads of the modern type, it may be worth our while
to digress briefly in order to study the peculiarities of the
combat.

Miguel Grau, the commander of the Huascar, was a
Colombian by birth, and his father was a captain under
Bolivar at the battle of Ayacucho. At the time the war
broke out he had been 29 years in the Peruvian navy,
and reached the rank of rear-admiral. After the loss
of the Indcpendaicia, the Huascar and the corvette Union
cruised in company for the purpose of capturing Chilian
transports, or any other vessels that came in their way and
were not too strong to cope with. On the ist October a
Chilian fleet of 2 iron-clads and several other vessels, all
carefully cleaned and refitted, left Valparaiso for the pur-
pose of capturing the Huascar. Arriving off Arica, the
Chilian admiral learned that the Huascar and Union were
cruising to the southward ; the Huascar had not been
cleaned for some time, and her speed was inferior to that
of the Chilian iron-clads, who would thus be able to choose
their distance in case they could catch her in the open sea.

On the morning of the 8th, when a fog lifted, Admiral
Grau found himself caught between the two divisions of
the Chilian fleet, one consisting of the iron-clad Blanco d.nA
the gun-boat Covadoiga, with a transport, and the other of
the iron-clad Cochrane, the corvette O'Higgins, and the
gun-boat Loa. Either of the Chilian iron-clads was superior
to the Huascar, and now that he was between both, and
they had the gun-boats and corvette to aid them, the
Peruvian admiral's chance of escape was hopeless. Finding

BATTLE OF MIRAFLORES. 437

that he could not get away, owing to his inferior speed, he
determined to fight, first ordering the ^'w/f/^ to leave as fast
as possible, since she would be the only naval hope of Peru
in case of the Huascars loss. As she was of superior
speed, she had no difificulty in getting away, though her
commander greatly regretted parting company with the
Hnascar in the time of the latter's danger.

At 25 minutes past nine o'clock the Hnascar fired the
first shot at a distance of about 3,000 yards ; it was aimed
at the Cochrane and fell short. A second and a third shots
were fired with the same result ; the Hnascar s fourth shot
penetrated the armor plating of the Cochrane, and passed
through the galley, and then the Cochrane began to return
her adversary's fire. Her fourth shot struck the Hnascar s
turret and temporarily disabled it, but it was soon in order
again. The Hnascar s turret was worked by hand, while
that of the Cochrane was operated by steam. The fifth shot
from the Hnascar struck the armor of the Cochrane but
did not penetrate it, and then, as the ships had closed con-
siderably. Admiral Grau tried to ram his adversary.

The manoeuvre was defeated by the Cochrane, which
turned very quickly by using her twin screws ; she could
turn in half the space required by the Hnascar, and her
commander. Captain Latorre, showed great judgment
and coolness in handling her. The ships were now fight-
ing at distances varying from 300 to 50 yards, and a steady
fire from rifles and machine guns was maintained on both
sides. Exactly half an hour after the first shot was fired
a shell from the Cochrane exploded in the Hjiascar's pilot
tower, in which were Admiral Grau and one of his lieu-
tenants. Both were killed, and so terrific was the explosion
that the bodies were literally blown into fragments, the
largest piece of the gallant admiral that was afterwards
found and recognizable being a portion of one leg.

Up to the time of the bursting of the shell in the pilot
tower the Hnascar had been skilfully handled ; the firing

438 DECISIVE BATTLES SINCE WATERLOO.

on both sides had not been particularly noteworthy as only
a small percentage of the shots had taken effect. A few-
minutes after ten o'clock the Blanco came within range and
fired her first shot at the Hiiascar from a distance of 600
yards. On board the latter ship her senior surviving offi-
cer, Don Elias Aguirre, had assumed command on the
death of Admiral Grau ; a few minutes later his head was
taken off by a shell from the Blanco, and the next officer
in rank, Captain Carbajal, was severely wounded by the
same shell. Lieutenant Rodriguez next took the com-
mand, but he too was killed before many minutes. Lieu-
tenant Palacios succeeded him, but before the action was
over he was severely wounded, and the command fell to
Lieutenant Garezon. By this time the Hiiascar was quite
disabled.

Her steam-steering gear was rendered useless by the
same shell that killed the admiral, and from that time she
was steered by tackles managed below ; there were no
speaking tubes from the deck to w^here the tackles were
operated, and orders had to be passed by messengers,
which caused much confusion and totally prevented rapid
evolutions. One of the turret guns was disabled, and the
turret could not be turned. The flag of the Hiiascar was
shot away, and there w'as a cessation of hostilities, which
were resumed as soon as the flag went up again ; she
made several attempts to ram her opponents, but each
one failed, and the same was the case with the Chilian
endeavors to destroy her in the same way. Both sides
kept up a severe fire with machine guns, the Hiiascar be-
ing equipped with the Catling while the Chilians carried
the Nordenfeldt. Her machine-gun fire was silenced;
whether by the superiority of the number of the Chilian
guns, or their effectiveness, is a matter of dispute between
the advocates of the rival systems.

At eleven o'clock, one hour and a half after the action
began, the Hiiascar s flag was hauled down, and she was

BATTLE OF MIRAFLORES. 439

boarded by a boat from the Cochrane. Lieutenant Gare-
7.on surrendered to the boarding officers, who found that
there were three feet of water in the ship's hold, and the
lining of the pilot turret had caught fire. Dead and
wounded were lying in every direction, their bodies fear-
fully mutilated, and the captain's cabin was literally filled
with corpses. Upper and lower decks were alike drenched
in blood and strewn with dead and wounded. The Huascar
went into action with 193 ofificers and men ; of this number.
64, almost exactly one third, were killed or wounded, and
the oflficer by whom the ship was surrendered was the
sixth in rank when the battle began, only 90 minutes be-
fore. The five who ranked him had been killed or mor-
tally wounded !

No torpedoes were used in the fight, and of all the at-
tempts at ramming none were successful. The contest
was thus confined to artillery, with the exception of the
use of small-arms and machine guns when the vessels were
at close quarters. The Cochrane fired 46 rounds, and the
Blanco 31, using Palliser shells. Of these yj shots fired by
the Chilians, onh' 24 touched the Hnascar ; the shells burst
after penetration, showing that the 4|-inch plating of
the Huascar was useless. The Huascar fired about 40
rounds, and her guns were served rapidly but without good
aim. Only a few of her shot struck the Cochrane. Those
that struck her at a distance of 600 yards and at an angle
of 30 degrees penetrated about three inches, but were
broken by the force of the impact. They broke an iron
beam and started some of the bolts and inner linings,
but compared with the effect of the Chilian shells on the
Huascar they were of no serious consequence. The armor
of the Chilian iron-clad is 9 inches thick at the water line,
and 7 or 8 inches round the battery.

With the capture of the Huascar the Chilians obtained
practically the control of the sea, and could send their
troops where they pleased. They could despatch a fleet

440 DECISIVE BATTLES SINCE WATERLOO.

with sealed orders, and the Peruvians would be unable
even to guess at what point it was directed. The Peru-
vians had a coast line of 1,400 miles to defend, and the
peculiar formation of the country made the defence of
this long line impossible. It must be borne in mind that
the coast of Peru is rainless, and its fertile valleys occur
at long intervals, between tracts of waterless deserts. The
railways in Peru do not skirt the coast, but run from it to
the interior; in the southern part of Peru the deserts
cover nearly the whole of the area of the country, and are
backed at distances varying from 30 to lOO miles by the
Cordilleras, or outlying chain of the Andes. With the
ports blockaded, it is thus impossible to move troops from
one threatened point to another, in any time that would
render them of avail.

It was necessary to make preparations for defence along
the whole line, or, failing this, to defend the most impor-
tant points. No one could tell where the attack would be
made, whether on the capital and its seaport, Callao, on
the Tacna region, or on the district containing the depos-
its of nitrates, about which the war had arisen. The gen-
eral belief in government circles was that the first move-
ment would be on Tarapaca, the most southern province,
where the difficulties of a defending force would be great-
er than at most other points.

Accordingly great efforts were made to concentrate a
force in Tarapaca before communication by sea should be
cut off, and Peruvian troops arrived there during March,
April, and May. The Bolivian army, 4,000 strong, reached
Tacna, in Peru, on the 30th April, under command of the
President of Bolivia, and about three weeks later the
Peruvian President, as commander-in-chief oT the military
forces, arrived in Arica, the port of Tacna, to organize the
army of Tarapaca. There was a total of 9,000 men alto-
gether, but the cavalry was badly mounted, and the
artillery (16 guns) was of the old-fashioned kind, and

BATTLE OF MIKAFLORES. 44 1

quite inefficient against the breech-loading pieces of the
Chilians.

The Chilians assembled at Antofagasta an army of
10,000 men, with 850 well-mounted cavalry, and 32 long-
range field-guns of the newest pattern. This force was
embarked on four men-of-war and fifteen transports, and
sailed on the 28th October for an unknown destination,
which afterwards proved to be Pisagua, 274 miles from
Antofagasta. By a blunder the medical stores and ambu-
lances were left behind, and as a consequence most of the
Chilians wounded in the attack on Pisagua died of ne"--
lect. Pisagua was defended b}' a force of less than 1,000
altogether; they succeeded in killing 235 of the invaders
before retreating from the place, but their own loss was
greater, owing to the heavy fire of the Chilian men-of-war.
Pisagua was occupied by the Chilians on the 2d Novem-
ber, and before the end of the month the combined armies
of Peru and Bolivia had been defeated in two battles, one
near Iquique and the other at Tarapaca. They retreated to
Arica, which they reached on the i6th December, and
found blockaded by the Chilian fleet.

The province of Tarapaca was thus wrested from Peru
in a single short campaign, and Chili was in possession of
the much-coveted nitrate districts. In February, 1880, a
second campaign was undertaken, and a fleet sailed from
Pisagua for the conquest of the Tacna region. The plan
was for the Chilians to make a landing north of Arica, the
port of Tacna, where the allied army was concentrated,
and thus cut off the line of retreat. When this was ac-
complished the allies would be attacked in their isolated
position, where escape would be next to impossible.

The plan was carried out by landing 14,000 men at Ylo,
Pacocha, and Islay, and taking possession of the lines of
railway extending into the interior. Tacna was taken,
and after it Arica, the defeated allies being driven to the
mountains. Arica was taken by a combined naval and

442 DECISIVE BATTLES SINCE WATERLOO.

land attack; its garrison made a vigorous defence, and
only yielded to superior numbers and weight of metal.
Meantime Callao was blockaded, and there was great
alarm in Lima. General Pierola was named dictator of Peru,
and a levy en masse of all able to bear arms was ordered.
It was impossible for the Peruvians, without a navy, to
raise the blockade of Callao, but they showed considerable
ingenuity in destroying one of the blockaders.

One afternoon a small vessel laden with fruit was cap-
tured while trying to steal her way along the coast, about
i6 miles from Callao. Her crew dropped the anchor
and fled to the shore in a row-boat as they saw their cap-
tors approaching. The Chilians took her alongside the
armed transport Loa, and began removing her cargo, — a
welcome prize to men who had been living for weeks on
salt provisions. As the last package was removed there
was a terrific explosion, which blew a large hole in the
side of the Loa, and sent her to the bottom of the ocean
in 5 minutes, with her captain, 3 officers, and 50 men ; 38
of the crew were saved by boats from neutral men-of-war,
lying about 4 miles away. It is supposed that there was
a case of 250 pounds of dynamite, fired by mechanism so
arranged that the removal of the weight above it would
set it off.

A few weeks later the Chilian armed steamer Covadonga
was destroyed by another ingenious trick of the Peruvians.
She had been sent to blockade the port of Chancay, and
her captain, seeing a smart-looking gig anchored in the
harbor, about 300 yards from the mole, sent a mid-
shipman with a boat to bring it away. It was freshly
painted and fully equipped, and was a life-boat, with air-
boxes at both ends. The boat pleased the captain so
much that he determined to use her for a gig, and accord-
ingly gave orders that she should be hoisted at the davits
of the Covadonga.

Hardly were the tackles hauled taut when she exploded,

BATTLE OF MIRAFLORES. z^3

blowing such a hole in the side of the ship that she sank
in 3 minutes; 115 persons perished, including the cap-
tain; 15 men escaped in one of the boats, and 50 who
climbed into the rigging were saved by Peruvian boats
from the shore. It is supposed that the air-boxes con-
tained dynamite, which was fired by the pull on the tackles,
but the character of the mechanism is not known.

In October, 1 880, mediation between the contending
countries was undertaken by the United States of Amer-
ica, but was unsuccessful. A conference was held on board
the U. S. corvette Lackawanna, in the harbor of Arica,
Peru, Bolivia, and Chili each sending a commissioner,
while the representatives of the United States for the
respective countries were present.

Immediately after the unsuccessful issue of the confer-
ence, Chili despatched an expeditionary force of 30,000
men for the conquest of Peru, its operations being in-
tended to capture the capital. The exact strength of the
army was 1,202 officers and 24,956 men, of all arms, with
103 cannon, J'j mountain pieces, 8 Catlings, and 3 Norden-
feldt's. It was in three divisions and a reserve. One di-
vision landed at Pisco and marched overland, 107 miles,
to Curayaco and Chilca, where the rest of the expedi-
tionary force was put on shore. Chilca is only 25 miles
from Lima and about 10 from the rich valley of Lurin,
one of the garden spots of Peru. To oppose this army
of well-equipped invaders the Peruvians, had four divi-
sions of a nominal aggregate strength of 20,000. Less
than 3,000 were worthy of consideration as veterans. The
greater part of the army of the defence was composed of
raw and badly armed troops, procured by the levy en
masse of all males in Lima between the ages of sixteen
and sixty and capable of bearing arms. The artillery was
numerically about equal to that of the Chilians, but vastly
inferior in range and effectiveness.

General Pierola, dictator and commander-in-chief of the

444 DECISIVE BATTLES SINCE WATERLOO.

military forces of Peru, decided upon a line of defences
along the sandy hills at the edge of the desert, extending
from the Morro Solar and Chorillos to the mountains on
the east, and about ten miles from Lima. The line was
fully six miles long, and broken b}- barren hills and gul-
lies. Breastworks were hastily thrown up, ditches dug,
and guns mounted, but in many places the obstructions
to an adv^ance of the enemy were of little consequence
owing to the shallowness of the ditches and the insuf-
ficiency of the breastworks.

A second line about four miles long and six miles from
Lima was prepared just outside Miraflores. Behind the
defences, as the Chilian army approached, General Pierola
assembled his forces, which consisted of the hastily as-
sembled people of the capital, raw recruits from the in-
terior, and the few soldiers he had been able to gather
from the remnants of the armies defeated at Tarapaca
and Tacna. Many of the guns that were mounted in the
defences were actually unserviceable, and some of the
newest of those made at Lima had not been sighted.

The first division of the Chilian army which landed at
Pisco marched northward on the 13th December to unite
with the force that disembarked at Curayaco, as already
stated. Their advance was unopposed until the 23d,
when they encountered some Peruvian cavalry, by which
they were harassed for two or three days, as the road
offered concealment in the shape of trees and bushes.
The second division reached Curayaco on the 22d, and the
landing occupied two days. The cavalry was sent for-
ward to occupy the valley of the Lurin, and on the 27th
it surprised and captured a Peruvian cavalry detachment,
the same that had impeded the march of the' Chilian first
division. This was a serious disaster for the Peruvians, as
their whole cavalry force defending Lima did not exceed
600 men.

The valley of the Lurin was devastated by the Chilians

BATTLE OF MIRAFLORES. 445

in their leisurely march upon Lima, the soldiers commit-
ting the excesses usually attributable to an advancing
army in an enemy's country. The Chilians remained
three weeks in the Lurin valley, the time being spent in
collecting provisions, getting every thing in readiness for
the advance, maturing plans for the capture of Lima, and
ascertaining as fully as possible the strength and position
of the Peruvians.

From the upper part of the Lurin valley there is a road
following the foot of the mountains, and crossing a strip
of desert to Ate, a little village in a corner of the valley
in which Lima is situated. The Chilian commander sent
a reconnoitring expedition as far as Ate, to ascertain the
state of the defences in that region ; as this road passed
around the extreme left of the Peruvian line, it was con-
templated to turn completely the Peruvian position by
marching around to Ate and reaching Lima by the rear.
After careful deliberation the plan was rejected, as there
is not a drop of water for fifteen miles over the desert ; the
debouch into the plain in face of an enemy would have
been difficult, and the inland route would prevent all co-
operation by the fleet. A direct attack was decided upon.

The 1st Chilian division under General Lynch formed
the left wing of the attacking army. It was to assault
the line of defence between Morro Solar and Santa Teresa,
and then push against Chorillos, which lies on the coast
about half-way between the two lines of defence. The
2d division under General Sotomayor was to break the
line in front of San Juan, and then co-operate with Lynch
against Chorillos. The 3d division, commanded by Colonel
Lagos, was on the extreme right ; it was to hold the Peru-
vian left in check, or support the centre as cirumstances
might require, and the reserve, under Colonel Martinez,
was in the space between the left and centre, ready to
move in whatever direction it was ordered.

The Peruvian commander-in-chief had his head-quarters

446 DECISIVE BATTLES SINCE WATERLOO.

at Chorillos, and his army was encamped behind the lines
of defence. Colonel Iglesias with 5,000 men held the right
of the line under the brow of the Morro Solar. General
Caceres held the centre, which was stationed at the hills
of Santa Teresa and San Juan, while General Da\'ila held
the left. The division of Suarez formed the reserve. The
Chilian plan was to march from Turin on the evening of
the I2th January, and attack the line of Peruvian defen-
ces at daylight on the 13th. The three divisions marched
accordingly, and bivouacked at midnight on a plateau
about two miles in front of the Peruvian position.

At davv'n they all advanced. The 1st division, the one
nearest the sea, had the shortest distance to move, and by
5 A.M. it was smartly engaged with the Peruvians. The
Chilian men-of-war hauled in as near the shore as they
could with safety, and began to throw shot and shell
among the Peruvians. The latter held their positions gal-
lantly in spite of the preponderance against them, until
the Chilian reserve was brought up with orders to attack
on the flank of the Peruvian right wing, which was then
forced back but not broken. At 6 A.M. the Chilian 2d
division attacked the defences in front of San Juan, and
carried them at the point of the bayonet ; at the same
time the 3d division attacked the Peruvian left, who held
their position until 7.30, when the line wavered and re-
treated. The Chilian cavalry was then started along the
road to Tebes, and cut down the fugitives in great num-
ber. Those who escaped from the attack of the Chilian
3d division fled in the direction of Lima, while the divi-
sion of Caceres fell back upon Chorillos.

Colonel Iglesias held the Morro Solar, and the Chilians
proceeded to attack him in front with their 1st division,
while the reserve came in upon the Peruvians on the op-
posite side. The 2d Chilian division advanced upon Chor-
illos by the San Juan road, and the rest of the troops
were held in waiting near the houses of San Juan. Igle-

BATTLE OF MIRAFLORES. 44 J

sias maintained himself for several hours, but was finally
driven to the point of Chorillos where he surrendered in
order to prevent further slaughter. The reserve under
Suarez should have reinforced Iglesias, but owing to a con-
flict of orders it did not. A portion of the reserve was
engaged with the Chilian 2d division, but was driven back,
and by 2 P.M. the fighting was over and Chorillos was in
possession of the Chilians, who speedily sacked and burned
it.

The losses of the Chilians were reported at 2,000 killed
and wounded, and the Peruvian loss was placed at double
that number. As soon as the defence of Chorillos became
hopeless, General Pierola and his stafT with their escort
retired to Miraflores, where they busied themselves with
endeavors to put the second line of defence in condition
to repel the advance of the Chilians.

No advance was made on the 14th January. On the
15th, the diplomatic corps in Lima endeavored to prevent
further bloodshed, and asked for a suspension of hostilities,
which was granted, though the Chilian commander insist-
ed upon carrying out a movement of troops that had been
commenced. The armistice was to last until midnight of
the 15th, but it was broken by a collision of the troops of
the contending armies, through a misunderstanding of
their commanders at one point. From this collision the
action became general.

The second line of defence was stronger than the first,
as it was better mounted with artillery, and the water-
courses were utilized as far as possible to serve as ditches
in front of the breastworks. There were five redoubts on
this line mounted with artillery and with intrenchments
between them. The line was defended by about 12,000
Peruvians, and the assaulting force was about 13,000
strong. Miraflores was the central point of the position,
and between Miraflores and the sea the line was con-
tinued to a semicircular redoubt on the extreme right of

448 DECISIVE BATTLES SINCE WATERLOO.

the Peruvians. This redoubt was mounted with two
heavy Rodman guns from Callao, and was called the
Alfonso Ugarte fort, in honor of an officer who fell in
the defence of Arica. General Caceres commanded this
fort, while General Pierola was in a redoubt on the left.

The battle began at 2.45 P.M. The Chilians opened
with artillery on the Ugarte fort, which was enfiladed
by the Chilian fleet, consisting of two ironclads and three
corvettes. They speedily dism.ounted the Rodman guns
and rendered the fort untenable by their well-directed
fire, but the Peruvians continued the defence until, after
a long bombardment, the Chilian 3d division advanced
against them. At 4.30 P.M. the Peruvians had exhausted
their ammunition and fell back to join the centre, thus
yielding the Ugarte fort to the Chilians. The Peruvian
left was defended with such vigor that at one time the
Chilians wavered, but, reinforcements coming up, they
carried the redoubts with the bayonet, and the last hope
of Lima was gone. The centre redoubt was carried at
5.45 P.M., and thus ended the battle of INIiraflores for the
defence of Lima. When the last redoubt was carried,
General Pierola rode from the field and retired to the
village of Canta in the mountains. By 6.45 Mirafiores
was in flames and nearly all the houses in it were de-
stroyed.

On the i6th the municipal alcalde surrendered the city
to the Chilians, and on the 17th the army entered and took
possession. The foreign ministers interfered to prevent
further destruction of property, and were backed in their
intervention by the foreign fleets in the harbor of Callao.
The dangerous classes threatened to run riot during the
night of the i6th, and would have caused great damage to
the city had it not been for the foreigners, who formed a
volunteer corps for the preservation of order and property.
The Chilian losses in the capture of Chorillos and Mira-
flores were reported at 1,299 l^illed and 4,144 wounded.

BATTLE OF MIRAFLORES. 449

The Peruvian losses were estimated at 6,(X)0 killed and
3,000 wounded, but owing to the confusion the exact
figures were never ascertained.

The battle of Miraflores decided the fate of Peru,
though it was some time thereafter before the war came
to an end. Expeditions were sent to various points in
the interior, and there was considerable fighting, though
no battles of consequence took place. In January a
treaty of peace was made between Chili and Bolivia, by
which the latter surrendered her coast provinces to Chili
and agreed to break off relations with Peru. In the
following year, after long negotiations, Chili and Peru
agreed upon terms of peace, the latter ceding her south-
ern provinces and paying a war indemnity that left the
country sadly impoverished. Peru was already heavily
burdened with debt in consequence of her enormous
expenditures for railways and other public improvements.
She is slowly emerging from the depressed condition in
which she was thrown by the war, but it will be many
years before she recovers her former position among the
republics of South America.

CHAPTER XXIV.

EL OBEID^ — ANNIHILATION OF HICKS PASHA'S ARMY—

1883.

Soudan is an Arabic word abbreviated from Biled-es-
Soudan, " The Country of the Blacks." On the map of
Africa it stretches nearly across the continent between
the sixth and sixteenth degrees of north latitude, and in-
cludes a vast area. The Egyptian Soudan, which is the
Soudan of this chapter, includes the region drained by the
White Nile and its immediate tributaries, the Blue Nile,
the Atbara and Sobat rivers, together with the country
between the Nile and the Red Sea, north of the boundary
of Abyssinia. It may be roughly said to have an area of
2,500,000 square miles, with a population of about 12,-
000,000. One fourth of the inhabitants are Arabs and
kindred tribes, and the remaining 9,000,000 are negroes.
All the Arabs and many of the negroes are Moslems, but
it is probable that fully half of the inhabitants of the Sou-
dan do not belong to the religion of Mohammed, though
it has made rapid strides among them during the last
twenty years.

From the days of Moses to the present time the rulers
of Egypt have been the reverse of mild in their treatment
of their subjects. In all ages the Egyptian peasantry have
been regarded as the property of the sovereign; the many
changes of dynasty have made little difference in the lot
of the laboring classes in the most fertile land of the
globe. From the heights of the pyramids " forty centuries

450

451

452 DECISIVE BATTIES SINCE WATERLOO.

look down upon us," and they are forty centuries of almost
unvarying oppression. In the fourth dynasty of the an-
cient empire the pyramids were built by the unpaid labor
of the people, and in the same way the great canal con-
necting Alexandria with the Nile was made by Moham-
med Ali Pasha, the founder of the dynasty which now
occupies the khedivial throne. The splendors of the an-
cient rulers have been imitated by those of modern times,
and the result is that the country is oppressively burdened
with taxation and hopelessly involved in debt. At present
the foreign debt of the country exceeds iJ" 1 00,000,000, or
$500,000,000, without including the Moukabalah, or forced
interior debt, which amounts to many millions more. The
population of Egypt proper is a little more than 5,000,000,
so that the national indebtedness exceeds $100 for each
and every man, woman, and child in the country. The
land is wonderfully fertile, producing ordinarily three
crops a year ; but even with this fertility it is impossible
to meet the expenses of a costly government and pay the
interest on the enormous debt.

Mohammed Ali Pasha, who came to Egypt as a Turkish
captain in 1799, and became ruler of the land and founder
of the dynasty, was fond of war, and spent large sums of
money in its prosecution. He began the conquest of the
Soudan by sending his son to conquer Nubia and Sennaar ;
in 1822 he founded Khartoum, at the junction of the Blue
and White Nile, and long before his death in 1848 he had
the satisfaction of knowing that the flag of Egypt waved
over a large area that it did not dominate when he ascended
the throne. Except in war, he was not specially extrava-
gant, but the same cannot be said of his successors. Abbas
and Said Pashas. Abbas gave little attention' to the affairs
of the government ; he spent a great deal of money on
palaces, abolished the educational institutions which
Mohammed Ali had established, and dissolved the army
in order to have for his personal use the money which a

EL OBEID. 453

military system would require. His successor, Said Pasha,
was peacefully inclined, and undertook several public works.
The Suez Canal was begun during his reign, and his
memory is preserved in the name of Port Said, the arti-
ficial harbor at the Mediterranean entrance of the canal.
But he had the mania for extravagancies which character-
ized his predecessor, and at his death in 1863 he left a
legacy of debt to his successor, Ismail.

Little was done under Abbas Pasha and his successor,
Said, for the extension of Egyptian dominion beyond
what had been left by Mohammed Ali. The fever of
conquest broke out anew with Ismail, and soon after his
accession to the throne he sent his armies into the regions
of the Upper Nile, which he rapidly added to his dominions.
From Khartoum, which had been, since its foundation in
1822, the frontier city, his dominion was rapidly pushed
into the Soudan, and in the ten years between 1868 and
1S78 the Egyptian flag was carried more than 1,000 miles
southward, till it floated on the shores of the Central
African lakes. Mohammed All's conquests were under-
taken largely with the view of obtaining soldiers for his
army. The men of the Soudan were sent captive to Cairo
and converted into soldiers, under the training of French
ofificers ; during and since Mohammed All's time the flower
of the Egyptian army has been the Soudanese portion, and
at times there have been not less than 25,000 or 30,000
soldiers under the flag, every man of whom came from the
provinces of the Upper Nile. The Soudanese are naturally
warlike, can endure heat, fatigue, and privation, and in
every way are vastly superior to the fellaheen of Lower
Egypt, whose courage and fighting qualities were extin-
guished centuries ago by the oppression under which they
lived. The Soudanese did not specially object to being
converted into soldiers, and if the pashas had been content
with a few thousands of them annually, had kept the slave
trade under proper restrictions, and avoided the imposition

454 DECISIVE BATTLES SINCE WATERLOO.

of enormous taxes and the cruelties accompanying their
collection, Egypt would to-day be in possession of Central
Africa down to the shores of Lake Victoria Nyanza.

A few years of Eg}'ptian rule in the conquered provinces
of Central Africa, served to rouse a spirit of hostility
among the inhabitants, and make them read}' for revolt.
On the appearance of El Mahdi, in the summer of i88i,
thousands flocked to his standard. He was a sheikh named
Mohammed Achmet, the son of a carpenter, and a native
of Dongola. He was born in 1842, and educated in a
village near Khartoum. According to Moslem custom,
religion was his principal study. In 1870 he became a
sheikh, and after a brief sojourn at Korka, near Fashoda,
he established himself on the island of Abba, in the White
Nile. Here he set up as a holy man, or dervish, of the
highest class, and soon obtained a great reputation for
sanctity. After a while a considerable number of dervishes
gathered around him, and his fame spread rapidly. He
extended his influence and power by marrying daughters
of the principal chiefs of the Baggara Arabs, the powerful
tribes who inhabit the country west of the White Nile and
southeast of Kordofan and Darfur. They were constantly
at war with each other, and by his tact and influence
Mohammed Achmet succeeded in bringing the various
tribes into harmony.

In May, 1881, when living at Marabieh, near the island
of Abba, he suddenly proclaimed himself to be the Messiah,
or Prophet, whose coming had been foretold by Moham-
med. His followers styled him El-Mahdi, an Arabic word,
meaning simply a "leader," or "guide," and not found in
the Koran. The Ulema of Khartoum' promptly pro-
nounced against Mohammed Achmet ; he' was likewise
repudiated at Cairo and Constantinople, and soon became
known in Egypt and Turkey as the " False Prophet."

' The Ulema is a body corresponding to the Synods in Christendom. They
are appealed to by the Sultan respecting the right application of precepts of
the Moslem faith.

EL OBEID. 455

The intentions of Mohammed Achmet, as set forth in
various proclamations, were as follows:

To gain over the whole of the Soudan to his cause, then
march on Egypt, and overthrow the false-believing Turks, and
finally, to establish the Thousand Years' Kingdom in Mecca,
and convert the whole world.

He taught universal law and religion, and community of
goods. All who opposed his mission were to be destroyed,
whether Christian, Mohammedan, or Pagan.

General Gordon gave his view of the Mahdi to the editor
of the Pall Mall Gazette, in London, on January 8th,
1884, saying : " I strongly suspect that he (the Mahdi) is a
mere puppet put forward byElyas, Zubair's father-in-law,
and the largest slave-owner in Obeid, and that he has
assumed a religious title to give color to the defence of
the popular rights." Probably the suppression of the
slave-trade had much to do with the insurrection, as most
of the supporters of the Mahdi, more especially the Baggara
tribes, owe all their wealth to the traf^c in slaves, which
the Egyptian government has for many years been taking
measures to suppress or greatly curtail.

The Soudan rebellion was an echo of the revolt of
Arabi Pasha in Lower Egypt. Arabi Pasha was the leader
of the national party, which protested against the control
of Egypt by foreigners, the exemption of foreigners living
in Egypt from taxation, the diversion of the revenues of
the country to the foreign creditors of Egypt while the
officers of the army and other public servants remained
unpaid, the employment of foreigners in public places when
the same work could be done by Egyptians at one fifth the
cost, and the general tyranny and oppression of the Turkish
rulers of the country. The movement of the Mahdi
began in the same way as that of Arabi, and, though it
soon assumed a religious aspect, it was practically political
at the start. The misrule of the Egyptians had made an

456 DECISIVE BATTLES SINCE WATERLOO.

intolerable state of things, and when the Mahdi raised the
flag of rebellion the oppressed people, whether Pagans or
Moslems, flocked around him. The best \yar cry for a
rebellion in any part of the world is a religious one, and
the Mahdi shrewdly proclaimed himself the divine mes-
senger. Not long after his trial and banishment to Ceylon,
Arabi Pasha said to an English visitor: " Rely on it, if
Ceylon had been governed like the Soudan, }'ou would
have had your Mahdi to deal with ; and had the Soudan
been governed like Ceylon, we should never have heard of
the Mahdi."

The time which the Mahdi had selected for rising was
after the garrisons of the Soudan had been diminished for
economical reasons. In July, 1881, the attention of Raouf
Pasha, Governor-General of the Soudan, was drawn to the
Mahdi's claims and demands, and he sent a commission of
inquiry from Khartoum to see the Mahdi at Marabieh,
and learn the exact state of affairs. On the return of this
commission, it was decided to send a military force of about
200 men to bring the Mahdi to Khartoum. The expedi-
tion started early in 1882, and reached the residence of
the Mahdi, where it was attacked and defeated by his
followers, 120 men and 2 officers being killed or captured.
Another expedition met the same fate, being driven back
with loss, and in June, 1882, Yussuf Pasha's army of the
Soudan of 6,000 men was practically destroyed, all the
soldiers, save a few hundreds, being killed or captured.
The Mahdi then took the offensive ; he attacked Bara, but
was repulsed, and three times he attacked El Obeid, the
capital of Kordofan. Finally, he captured Bara, and then
El Obeid surrendered, most of the Egyptian garrison
taking service watlv their captor.

On the 20th February, 1883, the Pashas Ala-ed-Deen and
Suleiman Nyasi arrived at Khartoum. The latter was to
take command of the troops ; the duties of the former
were not announced, though it was whispered that he was

EL OBEID. 457

to be appointed Governor-General of the Soudan. On the
4th of March Colonel Hicks (late of Bombay Staff Corps),
with 6 other English of^cers, arrived at Khartoum. Col-
onel Hicks had been appointed Chief of the Staff of the
Army of the Soudan, with the local rank of Major-General.
It was really intended that he should direct and be respon-
sible for all preparations and movements. Practically,
he was commander-in-chief, though ostensibly holding
a subordinate position. The Mahdi's movement being,
theoretically at least, a religious one, it was not considered
advisable to place a foreigner and a non-Mussulman in
command of the Egyptian forces, as the insurgent leader
might use this circumstance to arouse the fanaticism of his
adherents.

Suleiman Nyasi, whose military career dated back to the
time of Alohammed AH, was named commander-in-chief,
but with the understanding that he was to follow and
execute implicitly General Hicks' instructions and plans.
Suleiman was old, stupid, and lazy, and also hostile to the
work before him, and jealous of General Hicks. The
result was, that he frequently acted quite contrary to the
spirit of the instructions he had received at Cairo.

On the 1 8th March Major Farquhar, Hicks' companion
officer, returned to Khartoum from a reconnoissance up
the White Nile, and reported that the people along the
western bank of the river were hostile. Four thousand
five hundred rebels and 1,800 Baggara Arab cavalry were
assembled at Marabieh and Abu Dynma, while at Jebel-
Ain there was a considerable force from Kordofan. The
news came from the latter country that the Mahdi's force
was 100,000 strong; it was scattered at various points, but
could be speedily brought together. The chiefs met at El
Obeid once a week for orders and consultation, but the
sheikhs of the Baggara tribes did not attend these meet-
ings, owing to a quarrel with the Mahdi concerning the
booty taken at El Obeid. At the loot of El Obeid, in

458 DECISIVE BATTLES SINCE WATERLOO.

January, 1SS3, the Mahcli was said to have taken more
than ;^ 100,000 from the officials and notables, which he
kept to himself, distributing nothing among his followers.
On account of this worldly performance, many began to
waver in their belief in his sanctity. In the hope of util-
izing this discontent. General Hicks endeavored to open
communications with the Baggara chiefs, and arrange a
meeting with them.

On the 26th March Ala-ed-Deen Pasha was proclaimed
at Khartoum as Governor-General of the Soudan, and on
the same day Hussein Pasha left for Sennaar to relieve
Abd-el-Kader Pasha of his military command. By this
time the Mahdi had made rapid progress with his revolt.
He had taken possession of Kordofan, Sennaar, and Darfur,
and the forces under his command were variously esti-
mated at from 100,000 to 200,000 strong.

General Hicks and staff left Khartoum by steamer on
the 3d April, and arrived at Kawa on the 6th. An army
of about 5,000 had been collected at Kawa, consisting of
5^ battalions of regular infantry, i^ battalions of negroes,
5 guns, 2 Nordenfelts, and a squadron of Bashi-Bazouks.

On the loth April General Hicks made a reconnoissance
up the Nile. After steaming about an hour and a half,
the boat was fired on from the western bank. As it ad-
vanced, many shots were fired at it, especially from a point
opposite the island of Abba, where the rebels were behind
trenches. On the 14th the general telegraphed to Cairo
that he was anxious to get to Jebel-Ain, where the rebels
were concentrating, but that he had great difficulty in
obtaining supplies of food and ammunition.

It was not till the 23d April that the Egyptian army,
nearly 5,000 strong, started to ascend the Nile from Kawa.
Shots were fired from the banks almost continuously, and
General Hicks learned from the chief of a Shillook village
that the rebels were getting ready to attack the Egyptians
on the march from Kawa. Havine satisfied himself of the

EL OBEID. 459

correctness of this information, General Hicks steamed
back to the fort at Abu-Zea, to inform Tahier Bey, the
commander of the Bashi-Bazouks, of the situation, and then
joined the army, which was encamped opposite the
northern end of the island of Abba, in expectation of an
attack. On the 25th April some Arab cavalry appeared,
but was put to flight by a few shells. On the night of the
27th there were several alarms, but no fighting of conse-
quence.

The march was renewed on the 28th. On the 29th the
rebels were reported about 2 miles distant, and advancing
rapidly. They soon appeared in considerable force, both
cavalry and infantry, and deployed into a long line, with
the evident intention of attacking the angles of the square
in which the Egyptian troops were formed. But the rebel
cavalry scattered as soon as the shells began dropping
among them, and fled in great confusion. In less than
30 minutes the whole rebel force was completely disorgan-
ized and in full flight. Their numbers were placed at 5,000
men, of whom they lost 500 in the battle, while the
Egyptians lost only 2 killed and 5 wounded.

On the 1st of May it was ascertained that the rebels
were crossing the river in strong force about 10 miles
below Jebel-Ain. General Hicks sent Suleiman Pasha to
intercept them, but he could not overtake them for want of
cavalry ; the infantry marched so slowly that it required two
days to cover a distance of 12 miles. By the time General
Hicks reached Jebel-Ain, he found that the whole district
had been evacuated. He decided to return immediately to
Duem, and prepare for an attack on Schatt, where the
rebels were said to be assembling in large force, but before
the Egyptians were ready to move the rebels again
dispersed, and the western bank of the river was announced
free from all but a few hostile bands.

The expedition to Kordofan could not be undertaken
till after the rains, as the most of the wells in the desert

460 DECISIVE BATTLES SINCE WATERLOO.

would not be full until that time. To carry out the expedi-
tion successfully General Hicks asked the Khedive for full
powers, which arrived on the 20th August. He was ap-
pointed commander-in-chief of the expedition to Kordo-
fan, with the rank of General of Division. General Hicks'
plan was to leave Khartoum early in September and march
up the banks of the White Nile to Berair (16 miles below
Duem) with 8,600 infantry, 1,400 cavalry and Bashi-
Bazouks, I battery of Krupp field-guns, 2 batteries of
mounted guns, i battery of Nordenfeldts, and 5,000
camels.

Leaving the river at Berair, he intended to advance on
Bara, and then on El Obeid ; leaving some of his troops in
garrison on the v\ay, he would reach El Obeid with 7.000
men, whom he considered sufficient to defeat the rebel
forces.

He started accordingly on the 8th September and reach-
ed Zeraig about 30 miles from Duem on the last day
of the month. A despatch from General Hicks, sent to
Khartoum and telegraphed to Cairo on the 17th October,
reported as follows : " The anriy has arrived within 28
miles of Sarakhna. We found water, but cannot establish
military posts and lines of communication. The place is
evacuated ; the health of the troops is good but the heat
is intense."

The last despatch received from General Hicks is dated
October 3, 1883, and reads as follows :

I left Duem on the White Nile and established military posts
of 200 men each in strongly fortified places, along the line of
march. We rnarched to Schatt, and before reaching Zeraig I
was informed by the governor-general of the Soudan that it
was useless for me to expect any supplies to be pUshed up from
Duem ; that the post would not guard the convoys ; that the
Arabs, although now absent from our line of route, would re-
turn after we had passed, and that they would be numerous,
and the garrisons of the posts would not consider themselves

EL OBEID. 461

Strong enough to forward the supplies ; that it would be dan-
gerous, and I would find they would not run the risk. The
governor-general requested me to give up the idea of having
this line of posts, to abandon my line of communication and
line of retreat, and to advance with the army en Fair, with 50
days' supply only, the Arabs closing in our rear.

I am naturally averse to this, and have therefore called a
council, have had the matter explained, and requested the mem-
bers to record their opinions.

For several weeks after the receipt of the foregoing
despatch no news of the expeditionar}^ force was received.
Messengers were sent from Duem, along the various routes
to Kordofan, but, for a long time, none of the few who
came back brought any authentic news.

Finally, on the 19th November, a messenger, who had
been unable to deliv^er his despatches to Ala-ed-Deen Pa-
sha returned to Duem, bringing information of the total
destruction of General Hicks' army. The discouraging intel-
ligence was soon confirmed by Arab merchants and others
who came from Kordofan. The events which terminated
with this terrible disaster to the Egyptians are still to a
certain extent shrouded in mystery. Nothing definite has
ever been received from any of the Europeans accompany-
ing the expedition, nor from any of the Egyptian staff of-
ficers, of a later date than General Hicks' despatch on the
3d October, quoted above.

The first account that appeared to be trustworthy was
given by a camel-driver who went as servant to a native
officer. He stated that the army on leaving Duem soon
met the rebels, and engaged in skirmish with them, the
Mahdi's men being beaten. It reached Rahad where
there is a lake, and then marched to Alouba, where an
encounter with the enemy was favorable to General Hicks,
On the 2d of November the army left Alouba, and while
marching through a forest, was surprised by a large force
of rebels. The Egyptians formed square, and after fights

462 DECISIVE BATTLES SINCE WATERLOO.

ing all day finally defeated them and drove them off.
On Saturday, 3d November, the march was resumed, M'a-
ter becoming scarce. The rebels again appeared in force
and surrounded the army. A serious engagement ensued
with heavy losses on both sides, but the rebels were once
more beaten. On their march next day they were heavily
fired upon by large numbers of the enemy. The troops
were suffering from thirst, but nevertheless fought the
whole day. On the 5th, when the}' were approaching the
wells on the road to Razghib, only half an hour distant,
the rebels, who had been concealed in the forest, suddenly
attacked the column on all sides. The Egyptians returned
their fire, and a great battle raged. Towards mid-day, the
entire force of the rebels made a general charge with guns,
swords, and spears, and General Hicks and his whole army
perished, except 200 Egyptian soldiers and a few negro
servants, most of whom were wounded.

Besides the European officers believed to have perished,
there were two newspaper correspondents, Edmund
O'Donovan and Frank Vizetelly, who accompanied the
expedition and have not since been heard of.

An extract of a letter from the Mahdi's Emir at Berber
to Zubair, the greatest slave-dealer in the Soudan, has
this information :

Compliments — . . . We established order in Kordofan ;
we punished the backsliders at Jebel Khadir ; we destroyed
Jusuf Pasha with his army of 8,000 men, and slaughtered Ala-ed-
Deen Pasha, and his army of 36,000 men, which was altogether
destroyed in a quarter of an hour. It was a fearful fight, in
which you heard only the slashing of swords into the bodies.
. . , Know, my friend, that the world is turned upside down
. . . be on your guard against the covetousness of the world.

In 1886, the Cairo correspondent of the London Daily
News discovered among the Egyptian police a man who
says that he fought in the battle in which Hicks Pasha and
his army were destroyed, and related a tale which the corre-

EL OBEID. 463

spondent believed to be true. This man said that Hicks
Pasha was misled, he believes purposely, into some brush-
wood while in search of water, and that while there he
heard firing in the direction of half his army, which he
had placed under the command of Ala-ed-Deen Pasha.
Scouts reporting that the Arabs were attacking, Hicks
Pasha closed up the square in which his troops had been
marching, with the cavalry and camels in the centre, and
the guns placed at proper intervals around. While the
brushwood in front of the square was being cut the enemy
appeared.

They had no rifles, nor were shots fired at us, except from
a gun. They fired shell at us from this, but these fell without
exploding. They had now increased rapidly in numbers —
some on foot, others on horse — and poured forth from among
the bush and over two low mounds. The horses were on their
right, the foot scattered all over to our right and front. The
mitrailleuse now commenced upon them so heavily that they
were unable to advance. We also kept up a tremendous fusil-
lade with our rifles. Being unable to get at us, they wheeled
to their left and streamed down upon our right flank. They
dashed upon the right angle and right centre ; but the Krupp
and mitrailleuse there made great havoc with them, upon which
they wheeled round again and made straight at the right angle
of the rear face, where there was only a muzzle-loader. Here
they broke into the square ; the right, left, and front faces
then turned inwards and commenced pouring in a heavy fire
upon them. They got in among the camels. The smoke and
dust were now so thick I could not see what was going on ;
but it seemed to me that fighting was going on for an hour.
When all the ammunition was spent the men used their bayo-
nets. I forgot to mention that on sight of the enemy Hicks
Pasha ordered his English officers to draw their swords and
have their revolvers ready. A hand-to-hand fight continued
for an immense time. Seeing all was up, Hicks Pasha gathered
his English officers around and other mounted men. They
fought to the last with desperation, bringing down many.

464 DECISIVE BATTLES SINCE WATERLOO.

Closely examined, the speaker explained that Hicks
Pasha was at the commencement on a red horse, but
when all his men were falling he changed and got on a
white horse, because his first horse was tired. Hicks
Pasha and his six officers fought for half an hour alone ;
the battle lasted two hours and a half. The soldier who
tells this story says that he escaped death, along with
about 150 others, by declaring himself a Mussulman, and
he was afterwards told by one of the Arabs : " Hicks Pasha
was a terrible man ; he killed a great many of us, and so
did the other English officers." Other men talked with
wonder of how this little English band kept them at bay.
Two Englishmen who did not wear uniforms were amonsf
the killed. " One sketched, was a stout man, eagle-like
nose, elderly, and gray hair. The other was a spare, tall
man, with dark-brown hair, and narrow thin face " — evi-
dently Vizetelly and O'Donovan. The correspondent's
informant went on to say that, escaping to Khartoum, he
became an orderly to General Gordon, that being sent
down to meet the relieving force at Metemneh, he accom-
panied Sir Charles Wilson to near Khartoum, that after-
wards he marched to Korti, and was sent thence to Cairo
with four or five other soldiers who had come from
Khartoum.

The destruction of Hicks Pasha's army gave the Mahdi
control of all the country south of the junction of the
Blue and White Niles, with the exception of a few unim-
portant posts whose garrisons held out. In 1884 he
extended his power to the Red Sea, waged war with the
British in and around Suakim, blockaded General Gordon
at Khartoum, rejecting the title of " Sultan of Kordofan"
which Gordon offered him, and compelled" England to
send an army under Lord Wolseley to Khartoum for the
relief of Gordon.

CHAPTER XXV.

FALL OF KHARTOUM — 1 885.

It has been stated elsewhere that Mohammed AH
Pasha began the conquest of the Soudan in order to in-
crease the possessions of Egypt. In 1822 he sent his son,
Ismail Pasha, to Shendy, then the capital of the Soudan
country, to demand the submission of Mek Nemr, the
king of Ethiopia, who was surnamed " The Leopard," on
account of his ferocity. Ismail Pasha made his camp out-
side the walls of Shendy, and sent for the king to come
and see him. The king came, and the visitor demanded
hay for his horses and camels and food for his troops.

The king said it was impossible to meet the demand, as
his people were poor and the season had been very bad.
The Egyptian became furiously angry, and struck the king
over the head with the stem of his chibouk. The king
bowed his head as if in submission, and said the Egyp-
tians should have all they had asked for, and more besides.

All night long his people were busy piling hay around
the Egyptian camp, the largest piles being in front of the
pasha's tent and the tents of his officers. Suddenly, at
daybreak, the whole circle of hay was in a blaze, having
been fired by orders of the king. As the Egyptians en-
deavored to save themselves, they were speared by the
Ethiopian warriors, and not one of Ismail Pasha's expe-
ditionary force escaped.

When Mohammed Ali heard of the occurrence, he sent
an army to destroy Shendy, not leaving one stone upon

465

466 DECISIVE BATTLES SINCE WATERLOO.

another. The " Leopard " fled at the approach of the
avengers and was not captured, but the town was razed
to the ground. Mohammed AH ordered the estabhsh-
ment of a town at the junction of the Blue and White
Niles, which should be the capital of the Soudan country
in place of Shendy. His orders were carried out, the new
town (Khartoum) gained rapidly in importance, and from
an insignificant village of a few dozens of people it became
a commercial centre, with a population of more than
20,000 in less than a quarter of a century. Its later his-
tory, as well as that of its origin, has been written in blood.

Immediately after the destruction of Hicks Pasha's
army, the Mahdi's forces advanced upon Khartoum, and
laid siege to it. Khartoum is on the tongue of land be-
tween the Blue and White Niles; it fronts upon the Blue
Nile, where there are several stone enbankments which
form landing-places for the steamers, at the edge of a low
bluff. Towards the south there is a mud wall, which sepa-
rates the city from the plain, and there is a similar wall
on the eastern side. Against modern artillery the walls
of Khartoum could offer little resistance, but they are an
important defence against the small-arms of the Arabs.
The Mahdi's forces were held at bay by the walls, though
they vastly exceeded in numbers the garrison within.
They had a few small cannon, captured from the Egyptians,
but they were short of ammunition, and even with an
abundance of it they did not have the necessary skill for
its proper utilization. They contented themselves with
firing occasional shots at the town ; but what was more
serious, they cut off the supplies of provisions, so that the
garrison and inhabitants were on verj' short rations.

The Egyptian government had appealed* to England
for assistance in re-conquering the Soudan, but that coun-
try refused its aid, though it had been ready enough to
bombard Alexandria and suppress Arabi Pasha's revolt,
which was almost identical with the Mahdi's rebellion.

;^68 DECISIVE BATTLES SINCE WATERLOO.

Lord Granville stated in Parliament that " the government
was in no way responsible for the operations which had
been undertaken on the authority of the Egyptian gov-
ernment, or for the appointment of General Hicks."
When the news of the annihilation of Hicks Pasha's army
reached England there was great excitement, and the gov-
ernment felt called upon to do something to extricate the
garrisons of Khartoum, Kassala, Berber, and other places
that were besieged by the Mahdi's forces, as his fanatical
followers would not be likel}' to spare any lives in case of
success, and, least of all, the lives of any foreigners in the
Egyptian service. In its emergency the government ap-
pealed to General Charles G. Gordon, better known as
" Chinese " Gordon, to aid in the solution of the difficult
problem.

Gordon had been living in the Holy Land for several
months, and had just been invited by the king of the
Belgians to go to the Congo and assume command of the
Congo Free State, which Stanley had organized. He
reached Brussels on New Year's day, 1884, completed his
arrangements with King Leopold, and then started for
the Congo. On the i6th January, while on his way, a
telegram from London called him to start at once for
Khartoum, to settle the affairs there. He reached Lon-
don on the morning of the i8th, and left on the evening
of the same day for Egypt.

The Soudan was familiar ground to General Gordon, as
he had been its governor-general from 1877 to 1880. in
the service of Ismail, Khedive of Egypt. From 1874 to
1877 he was Governor-General of the Equator, so that he
passed altogether six years in the regions of the Upper
Nile. During the period of his administration,'he did much
to improve the condition of the people, and their regard
for him was so great, that the British government had
good reason to believe that he could make terms with the
Mahdi, and secure the safe retreat of the garrisons of

FALL OF KHARTOUM. 469

Khartoum and other points. Accordingly he was sent to
Khartoum to arrange for the evacuation of the Soudan.
During the voyage from Brindisi to Port Said, he prepared
a report, in which he carefully reviewed his instructions,
and called attention to some of the difficulties and com-
plications which would probably arise in carrying out the
policy of the British government. He asked for the support
and consideration of the Foreign Office, in the event that
he should be unable to fulfil their expectations in every
respect. Colonel Stewart wrote at the same time, and
sue^ested that the wisest course would be to rely on
General Gordon's discretion and his knowledge of the
country and people.

General Gordon reached Khartoum on February i8th
to carry out the instructions of the British government for
the safe evacuation of the country. But it occurred to
him to make provision for the government of the country
after the retirement of the Egyptian troops, as he foresaw
anarchy and general ruin in case the country went into the
control of the Mahdi and his fanatics. His plan was to
restore the rule of the petty sultans who were in power at
the time of Mohammed All's conquest, and whose families
still existed, and in places where there were no ruling
families, he proposed that the people should choose their
own sultans. It was hardly to be expected that the Mahdi
would approve this plan and, therefore it would be neces-
sary to defeat him. His defeat would require a larger
expeditionary force than England was prepared to send,
and consequently the government declined the scheme.

General Gordon roused the antagonism of the anti-
slavery party in England hy issuing a proclamation, in
which he promised non-interference with the slave-trade,
after he had done every thing in his power, during his
six years of authority, for its suppression. Zubair Pasha,
the king of the slave-traders in that region, had been sent
to reside in Cairo, and forbidden to return to the Soudan ;

4/0 DECISIVE BATTLES SINCE WATERLOO.

Gordon asked the Khedive to send this man to him, with
the next position in rank, and explained that Zubair had
vast influence over the people of the Soudan, and could do
more than any other man to bring about the desired result.
The Khedive refused to do as Gordon wished in this matter,
and Zubair remained in Cairo. Gordon was greatly dis-
appointed at the Khedive's refusal, and also at that of
the British government to send the necessary- forces to
crush the Mahdi.

Things went wrong elsewhere in the Soudan. Colonel
Valentine Baker, who, under the title of Baker Pasha, had
been sent with a Turkish force to Tokar, was severely
defeated on February 4th ; and a week or two later the
garrison of Sinkat was slaughtered almost to a man, while
trj^-ing to cut its way through the lines of Osman Digma,
the Mahdi's commander in the region bordering the Red
Sea. Another small force, under command of Colonel
Stewart, had been massacred, and, altogether, the whole
sky was gloomy. Naturally, General Gordon grew im-
patient and despondent, as is very evident from his diary.
He avowed his intention not to leave the country until
order was restored, and he deprecated the coming of an
English expedition, except for the purpose of saving all the
garrisons and establishing some form of government.

When it was fully realized in England that Gordon was
in danger, there was a great clamor for his relief. It grew
day by day, and finally became so loud that the government
was forced to act. On the 5th August an appropriation
of iJ"300,ooo was made for his relief, and Lord Wolseley
was appointed to command the expedition. Messengers
were immediately sent out to inform Gordon that help
was near, but unfortunately these messengers were unable
to reach him, and hence came his belief that he had been
altogether abandoned by his country.

It was resolved to use the railway around some of the
cataracts of the Nile, and for this purpose material was

FALL OF KHARTOUM. 47 1

sent out. A portion of the proposed line had been
made several years before by the Egyptian govern-
ment, in its endeavors to improve communication with
the Soudan, but had never received its equipment. The
advance was to be along the Nile valley, and 400 boats of
light draft were ordered for the expedition. Preparations
were pushed for the departure of troops from London,
and orders were sent for troops from India to go to Egypt.
The expedition included 8,000 British troops, 2,500 Egyp-
tians, and a flotilla of over 900 boats. A contingent of
600 Canadian boatmen was enlisted by the Marquis of
Lansdowne, Governor-General of the Dominion of Can-
ada, and sent to Egypt as speedily as possible.

On the lOth September Lord Wolseley arrived at Cairo,
1,500 miles from Khartoum. He ordered the relieving
army to ascend the Nile by steamers to Wady-Halfa ;
the 1st battalion of the Sussex regiment arrived there
November 2d, and then the actual advance on Khartoum
may be said to have begun. There were some delays on
the way connected with the difficulties of the transport
department, and the movement to Ambukol, and thence
to Korti, was slow. From Korti General Wolseley de-
termined to march by two roads. One column under
General Earle was to follow the river, while the other,
under General Herbert Stewart, would go straight across
the Bayuda Desert, 178 miles, and reach the Nile again at
Metemneh. Scattered on the desert were several oases
where water could be obtained ; the most difficult part of
the route was from the Gadkul Wells to the Abu Klea
Wells, a distance of 45 miles, where no water could be
procured, and therefore it was necessary to carry a supply
for horses and men.

General Stewart, with his detachment of 1,150 men, 350
Guards and marines, 300 native soldiers, and 2,000 camels,
began his march at 3 P.M. on Tuesday, Dec. 30th, and
reached the Gadkul Wells, 97 miles from his starting-point,

472 DECISIVE BATTLES SINCE WATERLOO.

in 65 hours, during which time the camels were not once
watered. Owing to the terrific heat of the daytime the
marching was done at night. As the column approached
Abu Nafki, after the first stage of marching, there was
some excitement among the troops, owing to the uncer-
tainty of their whereabouts and the anticipation of
hostility. Finding a very scanty supply of water at the
Hasheen Wells, the advance continued after a brief halt.
On Thursday, the second night's march, being New Year's
day, the troops gave a ringing cheer, which drew another
cheer, and following it was the cry of "Wells ahead!"
At eight o'clock the men again mounted their camels and
continued their march to the Gadkul Wells, capturing on
their way a quantity of spoil, and making prisoners of all
the natives they found. Friday morning at seven o'clock
they reached Gadkul Wells and found that all the natives
had disappeared. The Arabs had been there a few days
before, but left hastily on learning of the advance of the
British.

It was now considered wise to strengthen the number
of fighting men, as it was positively ascertained that the
Mahdi's force in front of them was from 8.000 to 10,000
strong. To ensure the greatest despatch. General Stewart
went back to Korti, and in a few days had about 2,000
fighting men under his command. There was now a long
march of 45 miles across the waterless desert to the Abu
Klea Wells, and on Friday, Jan. i6th, the head of the col-
umn was within a few miles of the wells. The exhausted
troops were hoping for a halt and rest at the wells, after
which they would have only two short marches to
Metemneh.

Suddenly the Hussars, who were scouting ahead,
brought the news that the enemy were in possession of
the Wells. The whole column was immediately formed
in close fighting order, the Guards camel corps on the
left, the heavy division in the centre, and the mounted

FALL OF KHARTOUM. 473

infantry on the right. Thus arrayed the column ad-
vanced until within three miles of the Wells. As the
Arabs gave no indication of advancing or retiring, the
troops were halted, and immediately went to work to
make a zareba, or entrenchment, which should protect
them in case of a night attack, and serve as a stronghold,
where the camels and baggage would be left under guard,
when the main body advanced to battle in the morning.
An abattis was formed around the camels and baggage,
and a breastwork of stone and earth was thrown up some
hundreds of yards in front, suflficient to check the first
rush of the Arabs. The enemy's camp could be plainly
seen about four miles away ; it contained several tents,
and appeared to be fortified. While the English were
entrenching they were watched by mounted Arabs, who
were stationed on some high hills on the left front.

About six o'clock in the evening the enemy fired from
a distance ; but immediately retired when the artillery' re-
plied with a few rounds from the light guns. During the
night a few shots were fired into the camp, killing nobody
and wounding one man slightly. On Saturday, January
17th, the Arabs advanced in two divisions ; each division
numbered about 5,000 men, who had been gathered
from Berber, Metemneh, and Omdurman. They moved
forward, with drums beating and flags flying, halting oc-
casionally to see what the English troops were going to
do. General Stewart remained for a while in the position
he had entrenched, hoping to induce the enemy to attack
him there ; but finding that they would not attack, he
formed his line of battle, and advanced to meet the Arabs.
The British troops were dismounted, the camels being
left in the inclosure under guard of a portion of the Sus-
sex regiment and some mounted infantry.

The English advanced in square, with the mounted in-
fantry, the artillery, and a portion of the Guards in the
front line. Another detachment of Guards and a part

474 DECISIVE BATTLES SINCE WATERLOO.

of the Sussex regiment formed the right flank, and a
portion of the heavy cavalry and some mounted infantry
were on the left. The naval brigade and the rest of the
heavy corps formed the rear, while the Gardner machine-
guns were in the centre, so that they could be used in any
direction. The fighting force thus formed in square in-
cluded about 1,500 men. As the British advanced, the
Arabs manoeuvred until the British had reached a position
which the enemy deemed favorable for their attack.
Then, leaving their standards waving to mask their
movements, they disappeared from view, and, advancing
under cover of some depressions of the ground, suddenly
charged upon the square.

The destructive fire poured in by the front line checked
the Arabs, but did not drive them back ; sweeping round,
they assaulted the rear of the square, where the heavy
cavalry were in position. For a moment the English
could not withstand the furious attack. Their formation
was broken and the Arabs began to pour into the interior
of the square. But the heavy cavalry rallied quickly,
and then followed a desperate hand-to-hand fight. The
troops on the other faces maintained their formation, and
poured a tremendous fire upon the masses of the Arabs,
which prevented the latter from following up the advan-
tage they had gained. The Guards, the mounted infan-
\.ry, and the naval brigade concentrated their fire on the
Arabs, covering the ground with dead and wounded, and
driving away the survivers, so that the square again
closed up.

By this time the enemy were fully defeated, and were
soon in full retreat. The wells were now open to the
troops, who immediately advanced and took possession.
The loss of the English were: 9 of^cersand65 men killed,
and 9 officers and 85 wounded. The enemy left 800 dead
around the square, and prisoners reported the number of
their wounded to be very large.

FALL OF KHARTOUM. 475

General Stewart established a strong post at Abu Klea
Wells and left there about 4 P.M. the next day (Jan.
1 8th). Avoiding the wells at Shebacut, he moved to
the right, to establish himself on the Nile between Me-
temneh and Khartoum. About 7 A.M. Jan. 19th, when
the British were 3 or 4 miles from the river, the Arabs
again appeared in force. A halt was made for breakfast,
and a strong zareba was constructed. During the fight
at this point General Stewart was mortally hit by a bullet,
and a heavy fire was encountered. Colonel Sir Charles
Wilson, as senior ofificer, assumed the command. The
force, leaving wounded and impedimenta in the zareba,
marched about 3 P.M. to the gravel ridge which overlooks
the Nile, where a large force of the enemy waited to meet
them. Led by several emirs on horseback the Arabs
charged, but none were able to get nearer than within
about 30 yards of the square. They were repulsed with
severe loss, 5 emirs and about 250 other dead being left
on the ground.

The British reached the Nile at Gubat, 2 miles above
Metemneh and 98 miles below Khartoum. They fortified
the camp and prepared to rest and wait for General Earle's
column, which was advancing by the river route. Three
steamers with 500 soldiers and a message from General
Gordon came down the river from Khartoum. On the
24th January Sir Charles Wilson, with two steamers carry-
ing 20 English soldiers and 320 Soudanese (some of those
who came down from General Gordon), started for Khar-
toum.

All the way up the river the boats were fired upon from
both banks. On nearing Khartoum, General Wilson found
that every point was in possession of the enemy, and when
the steamers approached within 800 yards of the town a
dozen cannon opened upon them, followed by a thousand
or more rifles in the hands of the Arabs, who everywhere
covered the walls. It was evident that Khartoum had

47^ DECISIVE BATTLES SINCE WATERLOO.

fallen, and as it was impossible to land in face of the ar-
tillery and small-arms in the hands of the Arabs, General
Wilson reluctantly gave the order to return to Gubat. On
the way down the river both the steamers were wrecked
through the treachery of the pilots, but the men escaped.

The relief expedition reached Khartoum two days too
late. The city had fallen into the hands of the Mahdi,
and General Gordon was dead. Many stories have been
told concerning the capture of Khartoum, but the full de-
tails are not and probably never will be known. The
stories are contradictory of each other, but they generally
concur in the assertion that the surrender was due to
treacher}'.

An Arab servant of General Gordon stated that Khar-
toum was delivered to the rebels by Faragh Pasha, the
commander of Gordon's Soudanese troops, who early on
January 27th treacherously opened the gate in the southern
wall. By previous arrangement the Mahdi's fighting men
were waiting outside, and immediately rushed into the
city. General Gordon, hearing the noise, went out armed
with a sword and an axe, and accompanied by Ibrahim
Bey, the chief clerk, and 20 men. On his way to the pal-
ace he met a party of the Mahdi's men, who fired a volley
that killed General Gordon. The Arabs then rushed on
with their spears and killed the chief clerk and 9 of the
men ; the rest escaped. The greater number of the inhabi-
tants fraternized with the Mahdi's men, and there was
no fighting elsewhere in the city. No women or children
were killed, and all who surrendered and gave up their
valuables were allowed to leave without further molesta-
tion. The Mahdi's troops were too much engaged with
the looting of the town to think of moving against Gubat.
The Mahdi did not enter Khartoum until three days after
its capture, and then only made a brief stay.

Another story is that Gordon was not shot, but was
killed with swords and spears, the soldiers having con-

FALL OF KHARTOUM. 477

suited among themselves whether to take him alive or not.
They decided to kill him, because, as they said, if they
took him alive to the Mahdi he would be spared, and, as
he was the cause of all the trouble, he ought to be killed.
There is another story, that the INIahdi allowed Gordon to
escape to the southward, and on more than one occasion
it has been asserted that this remarkable soldier of fortune
is yet living in the equatorial region of Central Africa, but
so closely watched that he cannot communicate with the
outer world.

After the fall of Khartoum and the death of Gordon, the
English made no attempt to advance farther up the Nile.
The troops were slowly withdrawn, the construction of the
Suakim-Berber railway was suspended, and the British for-
ces in Egypt contented themselves with retaining posses-
sion of such portions of the country as were not embraced
in the conquests of Mohammed AH and his successors.
By the fall of Khartoum, the Soudan was restored to its
former independence and relieved from the misrule and
oppression of the pashas. The dominion of Egypt has
been driven from the region of the equatorial lakes to
that of the lower Nile, and the time is probably far distant
when it will be restored.

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INDEX.

Abba Island (Nile), 454
Abbas Pasha, 454
Abu Dynma, 457
Abu Klea Wells, 471
Abu Nafki, 472
Abu-Zea, 459

Ackerman, Convention of, 48
Acqua Fredda, 202
Adam Kurulgan, 373
Adramyti, 37
Adrianople, 62
Afghanistan, 118
Ahirwan, 160
Aibugir Lake, 369
Aidos Pass, 61
Airy, Sir Richard, 146
Akhal oasis, the, 424
Akhal Tekkes, the, 429
Akhaltiskh, 62
Akhtiar (Tartary), 133
Alaman, an, 417
Alameda, the, 115
Alamo fort, gS
Aldic, 234

Alexander I. (Russia), 31
Alexandria, 450, 466
Alfonso Ugarte Fort, 448
Algiers, siege of, 73, 74 ; assault and
capture, 74 ; terms of capitulation,

74
Aliwal, 122
Allahabad, 159
Alma, battle of the, 133
Alompra dynasty, the, 28
Alouba, 461
Altai Mountains, 415
Alty-Kuduk, 374
Amanvillers, 332
Ambukol, 471
Amelia C.-H., 300
Amherst, Lord, 19

Amou Darya, 423

Amoy, 89

Ananta, J2

Andaman Lslands, 19

Anting Gate (Pekin), 194

Antofagasta, Company, 432 ; port,
432, 435

Antwerp, description of fortress, 80,
81 ; siege, 82 ; surrender of citadel,
84 ; convention signed, 87 ; rati-
fied, 87 ; terms of capitulation, 84

Aong, 160

Arabi Pasha, 455, 466

Aral Sea, 376, 415

Ardennes, the, 345

Arequipa P'ort (S. Am.), 15

Argos, 37

Arica port, 436, 440

Arkansas, Post, 267 ; River, 268

Arracan, 18, 24

Arracourt, 329

Ars-sur-Moselles, 333

Arystan-Bel-Kuduk Well, 372

Aspinwall, 289

Assam, 10, 26

Atacama, 431

Atbara River, 450

Ate, 445

Atlanta, 291

Atlas Mountains, 70

Atrek River, 423

Ava, 26

Ayacucho, battle-field, 10 ; army, 12 ;
capitulation of Royalists at, 14 ;
terms, 14

Azoteas, the, 99

Baggara Arabs, 455
Baker Pasha (Valentine), 470
Bakum Kothi, 172
Balaklava, 136

479

48o

INDEX.

Balan, Port de, 350, 359, 362

Balkans, the, 389

Baltimore, 236 ; turnpike, 252

Bami, 422

Bara, 456

Baraba Steppe, 415

Barrackpore, 155

Bashi-Bazouks, 3S3 ; their recruit-
ment, 386 ; their occupation, 386 ;
in the Soudan, 458

Bassein, 27

Batoum, 414

Battilly, 337

Bau St. Martin, 332

Bayon, 329

Bayou, Pierre River, 274

Bayunda Desert, 471

Bazardjik, 54

Bazeilles, 345

Beas River, 155

Beaufort, N. C, 226

Beaumont, 346

Belgium, 17

Belmont, Missouri, 261

Benatek (Bohemia), 313

Bengal, 19

Benner's Hill, 246

Berair, 460

Berber, 462, 468, 473, 477

Bernecourt, 329

Bexar, San Antonio de (Texas), 92

Biela, 389

Big Black River valley, 274

Biled-es-Soudan, 450

Bistritz River, 313

Bitheer, 160

Blue Ridge Mountains, 231 ; at Ches-
ter Gap, 234

Bois de la Casse, 334 ; Bois de Ga-
renne, 334, 358 ; Bois des Ognons,
328 ; Bois des Perivaux, 334 ; Bois
de Pouru, 356 ; Bois des Vaux, 334

Bokhara, 38 1, 416

Bolivia, 431

Bourgas, 62

Bozzaris, Marco, 37

Brailov (Turk), 49
' Brandy Station, 233

Brindisi, 469

Brinkerhoff's Ridge, 253

Bruce, Sir Richard, 190

Bruinsburg, 275, 287

Brussels, 468

Bucharest, 49, 3S7

Bucktails, the, 240

Buena Vista, 114

Bukali, 372

Bukova, 390

Bulgaria, 383, 412

Bull Run Mountains, 234

Burhampore, 155

Burmah, kingdom of, 17 ; climate,
27 ; the soldiers, 26 ; stockades,
19, 20, 21, 22, 23 ; its annexation,

27
Byron, Lord, 37

Cairo, 260, 453, 454, 471

Calama, 440

Calcutta, 18

Callao, 7, 9

Canta, 448

Canton (China), 89, 178 ; (No. Am.),
278

Capo DTstria, Count of, 31, 46

Caraccas, 2

Caracoles, 432, 435

Carignan, 356

Carlisle, 235

Carpendolo (Ft.), 201, 204

Carriano (Ft.>, 201, 203

Casa Mata (Mexico), 104

Casa Moi-ino (Ft.), 202

Casanuova (Ft.), 207

Cashmere, 119

Cashtown, 239

Cassel, 362

Castiglione, 201

Castile, 91

Cathcart Hill, 134

Cavour, 197

Cawnpore, 154 ; assault of, 173 ; fiU
of, 176

Cedarville, 234

Cemetery Hill, 238

Cemetery Ridge, 238

Ceresano, 202

Cesekwitz, 312

Ceylon, 456

Chacabuco, 6

Chalco, 98, 116

Chalons, 342, 344

Chambersburg, 235 .

Champenois, 332

Champion Hill, 279

Chancellorsville, 258

Chapon, 417

Chapultepec, 99 ; description of cita-
del, 109; siege, no; storming of,
112 ; capture, 113

INDEX.

481

C'narleroi, 81

Charles Albert, 197

Charleston, 291

Chattanooga, 264, 291

Cheduba, 18

" Cheese-box on a raft" the Moni-
tor, 222

Chenab River, 118

Chernavoda Fort, 53

Chicamauga, 291

Chickasaw Bayou, 266

Chiese River, 200

Chilca, 443

Chili, 431, 436, 437

Chillianwallah, 124

Chinhut, 164

Chios (Scio), 37

Chittagong, 17

Chorillos, 444

Churubusco, 99 ; battle of, loo

Clinton, 277

Cobija, 432

Cochrane, Lord, 7

Coldwater River, 269

Coles, Capt. Cowper, 227

Colombia, 3

Columbus, Ky., 260

Columbus Heights, 261

Condorcanqui, 12

Conflans, 333

Congo River, 468

Constantinople, 382

Contreras, 99

Corinth (Or.), 17; (Am.), 278

Cornwallis, port of, 19

Cossacks, the Yaik or Ural, 366 ; ir-
reg. troops, their organization, etc.,
386

Courcelles, 328

Cox Road, 292

Cradoch, Col., 40

Cress Ridge, 257

Culpepper, 231

Culp's Hill, 238

Curayaco, 443

Cushing, Caleb, 227

Custozza, 197

Cuzco, 15

Czernitz, 34

Daigny, 345, 356
Danube River, 49
Danville, 300
Darfur, 454

Davis, Jefferson, 289
Delhi, 155
Des Arc, 268
Des Carrieres, 332
Devil's Den, 246
Dilkusha Park, 168
Dinwiddle C.-H., 292
Djizzak, 372
Dockyard Creek, 139
Dohalicha, 314
Dohelnitz, 314
Dombasle, 329
Donchery, 348, 357
Doncourt, 336
Donelson, 261
Donghil-Tepe, 428
Dongola, 454, 471
Donoobu, 23
Douz-Aloum, 423
Douzay, 354
Dover, 236
Dranesville, 23b
Drewry's Bluff, 226
Dub, 314
Duem, 459
Duval's Bluff, 268
Dwarah, 125

Eads, James B., 212

East India Company, 165, 176

Edwards Station, 276

Einville, 329

Eleusis, priests of, 32

Elgin, Lord, 66

El Mahdi, 454, 468

El Obeid, 455

El Penon, 99

Elyas, 455

Emmettsburg, 236

Esenta, 201

Eupatoria, 134

Exmouth, Lord, 66

Fairfax Court-House, 234
Farmville, 301
Fashoda, 454
Fayetteville, 236
Fellaheen, 457
Feragh Pasha, 476
Fitz-Roy, Lieut., 42, 44
Five Forks, 296
Ferozepore, 121

482

INDEX.

Fleetwood Hill, 232
Floing, 345, 357
Forbach, 327
Ford Road, 298
Fontana, 201
Foochow, 89
Francheval, 356
Franklin's Crossing, 232
P'redericksburg, 231
Frizzelburg, 23S
Fulton, Robert, 211
Futtyghyr, 159

Gadkul Wells, 471

Gaeta, 209

Galatz, 49, 387

Ganges River, 165

Geok Tepe, 424 ; how situated, 424 ;
the Russian positions, 423 ; assault
and capture, 427

Georgia, 291

Gettysburg, 235 ; its neighborhood,
23S ; relative position of armies,
230 ; battle of, 244 ; an adverse
result considered, 256

Gibson Fort, 274

Gitschin, 309

Giudizzolo, 207

Givonne, 345, 356 ; Fonde de, 359

Gnachus, the, of South America, 386

Gobi Desert, 180

Gofifredo Castel, 202

Goito, 197

Goliad, 92

Gordon, Gen., 455 ; "Chinese" G.,
468 ; his mission, 468 ; arrival at
Khartoum, 469 ; fall of Khartoum
and Gordon's death, 470

Grand Gulf, 274

Gravelly Church, 298

Gravelotte, 328 ; the French and \
Germans compared, 327 ; plan of
Prussian movements, 328 ; the
French positions at Metz, 331 ; the I
German order of battle, 333 ; bat-
tle, 337 ; St. Privat carried by the
Prussians, 341 ; list of losses, 342

Greece and the Greeks, 29-46 ; their !
oppression by the Turks, 29 ; flour- 1
ishing state of Greece, 29 ; the He-
taira (secret society), 31 ; priests of
Eleusis, 32 ; Parga, 33, 34 ; fate
of Gregory, 35 ; revolts, 36 ; inde-
pendence proclaimed, 37 ; massacre j

at Chios, 37 ; nat. congress at Ar-
gos, 37 ; Lord Byron takes part,
his death, 37 ; protocol signed, 38 ;
preliminaries of battle at Navarino,

39 ; muster of combined squadron,

40 ; comparison of superiority, 42 ;
the bay of Navarino, 42 ; battle,
42-45 ; Turks evacuate Greece, 45 ;
independence established, 46

Greencastle, 234

Gregory, Patriarch of Constantinople,
35 ; Patriarch of Adrianople, 36

Grenada, 264

Grivizza Heights, 390

Gros, Baron, 178

Guamanga, 12

Guano deposits in Chili, 431

Gubat, 475

Guirgevo, 387

Gujerat, 117, 124 ; the Sikh soldiers,
117 ; battle of, 128 ; Gough, as
commander, 129 ; defeat of Sikhs,
129 ; surrender and terms, 131 ; the
Punjaub, 131 ; success of annexa-
tion, 132

Gumti River, 167

Guns and arms : flintlock muskets
435 ; the Krenk system, 385 ; Pea-
body rifle, 385 ; Remington, 435 ;
cannofi, smooth-bore, 214, 435 ;
bronze, brass, iron, 187, 386 ;
Krupp, 385, 435 ; Whitworth,
430 ; Armstrong, 430 ; Dahlgren,
217, 430 ; Nordenfeldt, 438 ; Rod-
man, 448 ; Machine guns, Gat-
ling, 438 ; Gardner, 458 ; Mitrail-
leuse, 458 ; mountain pieces, 443

Habonville, 337

Hagerstown, 235

Haines' Bluff'. 264

Hampton Roads, 219

Hanover, 236

Hankinson's Ferry, 276

Hard Times, 274

Hariwald, 126

Harper's Ferry, 234 •

Harrisburg, 234

Hasheen Wells, 472

Hatcher's Run, 292

Havelock, Gen., 160; his march to

Cawnpore, 160 ; entry, 164 ; his

death, 166
Haymarket, 235

INDEX.

483

Hazar-Asp fort, 378 ; gate, 378

Heidlersburg Road, 241

Henning, 329

Henry, Cape, 219 ; fort, 261

Hetaira, the, 31

Hicks Pasha, 457 ; arrival at Khar-
toum, 457 ; reconnoissance, 467 ;
expedition against El Mahdi, 459 ;
last news, 461

Himalaya Mountains, 126, 132

Hindman Fort, 267

Hlaing, 23

Hoehnewasser, 309

Holly Springs, 264

Holstein, 308

Hong Kong, 178

Horrmuck, 126

Horwitz, 310

Hunterstown, 253

Hydra Island, 31

Ibrahim Bey, 476

Igdy Wells, 421

Illy River, 345, 358

Imambara River, 168

Indus River, 1 18

Inkerman, 136

Ipsara Island, 31

Ipsilanti, Prince Alex, of, 24

Iquique, 441

Irrawaddy River, 19

Islay, 441

" Italia irridenta" 209

Jackson, 276
James River, 226, 292
Jebel River, 457
Jerusalem plank road, 29S
Jetersville, 301
Jhelum River (Ind.), iiS

Kaisar Bagh Palace, 167, 175

Kalas, 425

Kalra, 125

Kamtjik, 61

Kara Kum Desert, 424

Kashar, 26

Kassala, 468

Kawa, 458

Kayuk (boat), 375

Kazala, 372

Kazelah Stream, 125

Khala-Ata, 372, 373

Khartoum, its foundation, 452 ; Gor-
don's entry, 469 ; in hands of the
Arabs, 475 ; fate of Khartoum, 476

Kibitkas (tents), 425

Kirghese, the, their location, country,
and characteristics, 415, 416

Khiva, location, 366 ; advance of,
Russians, 370 ; slave-market, 416

Khodshom-Kala, 423

Khoree Pass, 130

Kinderley Bay, 368

Kizil-Arv'at, 421

Knoxville, 292

Kokan, 417

Kommenitz, 310

Koniggratz (Sadowa) the Prussian ad-
vance, 314 ; battle, 316 , check of
Pr. , 319 ; arrival of Crown Prince,
320 ; defeat of Austrians, Treaty
of Prague, 323

Koningenhof, 310

Kopet-Dag Hills, 424

Kordofan, 454

Korka, 454

Korniloff bastion, 146

Korti, 471

Kouleftscha, 55

Kowloon, 196

Krasnovodsk, 420, 425

Krishin heights, 401

Kuldja, 422

Kuna-Urgench, 367

Kungrad, 369, 378

Kusgan, 52

Kymyindaing, 20

La Chesse, 346
Lago Garda, 203
La Guayra, 2
Lahore, 118
La Hoya, 98
La RuUe, 354
La Serna, Viceroy, 14
Leesburg, 234
Leipsic plateau, 334
''leopard" 464
Liebenau, 309
Liefkenshoek Fort, 34
Lieven, Prince, 38
Lillo Fort, 84
Lima, 7, 9

484

INDEX.

Lincoln assassinated, 289

Liniers, Viceroy, 3

"Lion," 124

Lipa, 314

Loftcha forts, 399

Lorn River, 408

Lucknow, mutiny, 163 ; siege, 164; re-
tirement of British garrison, women
and children, 165 ; position of, 167;
advance upon, by Sir Colin Camp-
bell, 167 ; its fortifications, 168 ;
Outram's attack, 170 ; assault, 173,
I74> 175 i capture and relief, 175,
176

Lurin Valley, 443

Lynchburg, 300

MacAllister Hills, 254

Machi Bawan, 172

Madiffa River, 70

Magenta, 197

Mahone Fort, 298

Mairy, 350

Malakoff, siege, 136 ; account of
bombardment, 138-150 ; list of Eng-
lish and French batteries, 143 ; cap-
ture, 150 ; losses in war, 151 ; treaty
of Paris, 151

Malmaison, 328

Manassas, 232

Manchester, 243

Mantua, 203

Marabieh, 454

Marie-aux-Chenes, 337

Marne River, 328

Mars-la-Tour, 328

Martaban, 23

Martiniere, la, 167

Maryland, 233

Maypu, plains of, 7

McPherson's wood, 241

Medola, 201

Meeiut, 155

Mejillones, 436

Mendoza, 6

Memphis, 261

Mergui, 23

Merrimac, the, iron-clad steam frigate,
212 ; her mishap, 212 ; her propor-
tions and armament, 214 ; battle
with the Monitor, 219-222 ; losses,
222 ; her fate, 226

Metemneh, 464, 471

Metz, 328

Meurthe River, 329
Meuse River, 344

Mexico, war with Texas, 92 ; war with
U. S., 94; siege of Vera Cruz, 96 ;
surrender, 96 ; camp of Contreras
taken, 100 ; fall of Casa Mata and
Molino-del-Rey, 108 ; the fortress
of Chapultepec, 109 ; assault and
capture, 110— 113 ; advance on the
capital, 114; surrender, 115 ; treaty
of Guadalupe Hidalgo, 116

Mezieres, 346

Middleburg, 234

Miletin, 310

Millerstown Road, 251

Milliken's Bend, 267

Milowitz, 310

Mincio River, 200

Miraflores, conditions of Peru and
Chili, 432 ; declaration of war, 435;
their fleets, 436 ; naval battle, 436-
439 ; land operations, 440 ; battle of
Miraflores, 447 ; Miraflores surren-
ders to Chilians, 448 ; losses, 449

Mississippi River, 212, 260

Missolonghi, 37

Mixcoac, 102

Mobile, 290

Mockrowens, 313

Modon, 46

Molino del Rey, its strength, 102 ;
storming of, 104 ; fall of, 107

Molodyetz (good-fellows, Russ.), 427

Moncelle, 344, 350

Monitor, the, iron-clad turret, de-
tailed description, 215 ; her pecul-
iar armament, 217 ; battle with the
Merrimac, 224 ; her fate, 226

Monroe Fort, 219

Montebello, 97

Monterey, 114

Monte Sacre, 204

Monleville, 355

Montichiero, 203

Montigny-la-Grange, 332, 337

Moodkee, 121

Mooltan, I18

Morales, Hacienda, 107

Morro Solar, 444 •

Moscow plateau (Metz). 334

Moselle River, 329

Mouzon, 346

Mummatburg Road, 241

Munnipore, 18

Munchengratz, 309

Myedee, 24

INDEX.

485

Nancy, 329

Nankin, 89, 177

Navarino, allied fleet before, 39 ;
strength of combined squadron,
40 ; description of bay, 42 ; en-
trance of the fleet, 42 ; their posi-
tion and disposition of Turkish and
Egyptian fleet, 42 ; battle of, 43 ;
losses on both sides, 44

Negrais Cape, 19

Nesselrode, Count, 35, 38

New Carthage, 270

New Orleans, 260, 262

Newport News, 220

Nicolaieff, 146

Nicopolis, 389

Nile River, 452

Ningpo, 89

Nizam, the, 3S7

Novara, 197

Nubia, 452

Nueces, Las, 94

Number Ten Island, 261

Oak Hill, 23S ; Ridge, 239

O'Donovan, Edmund, 462

Officers,^ generals, and others,
American : Confederate. — Alexan-
der, 250 ; Anderson, 247 ; Archer,

239 ; Armistead, 256 ; Barksdale,
249 ; Beauregard, 291 ; Benning,
247 ; Bowens, 279 ; Bragg, 240 ;
Brockenbrough, 247 ; Chamberlin,

240 ; Daniel, 241 ; Daniels, 253 ;
Devin, 233 ; Van Dorn, 266 ; Early,
233 ; Ewell, 235 ; Ewing, 298 ;
Gamble, 233 ; Gardner, 287 ; Gar-
nett, 256 ; Gordon, 233, 292, 304 ;
Hampton, 240, 252 ; Hardee, 291 ;
Harris, 298 ; Hays, 241 ; Heth,
233 ; Hill, A. P., 231 ; Hoke, 241 ;
Hood, 248, 291 ; Iverson, 240 ;
Jenkins, 234 ; Johnson, A. S., 246 ;
Johnson, Bushrod, 297 ; Johnston,
Joe, 275, 291 ; Kemper, 256 ; Ker-
shaw, 247 ; Lane, 245 ; Law, 246 ;
Lee, Fitzhugh, 232-240 ; Lee, R.
E., 231 ; Lee, W. H. F., 232 ;
Longstreet, 231, 395 ; Loring, 279 ;
McLaw, 247 ; Mahone, 251 ; Mont-

* Where a name occurs many times only
the first reference is given.

Officers — Continued.

gomery, Col., 285 ; Mumford, 233 ;
Nichols, 252 ; O'Neil, 240 ; Petti-
grew, 233, 246 ; Pemberton, 261 ;
Pender, 233; Pendleton, 304: Pick-
ett, 246, 297 ; Posey, 251 ; Robert-
son, 232, 233, 254; Ramseur, 241 ;
Rodes, 240 ; Scales, 256 ; Semmes,
249 ; Smith, 247 ; Stevenson, 279 ;
Stewart, 252 ; Stuart, 231 ; Taylor,
Dick, 2S8 ; Wadsworth, 239 ; Wil-
cox, 246 ; Wilson, 247 ; Wofford,
249 ; Wright, 251
Union. — Ayres, 246, 295 ; Banks,
267 ; Barlow, 241 ; Barnes, 249 ;
Bartlett, 250 ; Baxter, 240 ; Biddlc,
240 ; Biglow, 249 ; Birney, 243 ;
Blair, 278 ; Boomer, 2S2 ; Brook,
249 ; Buell, 261 ; Buford, 232 ;
Burbank, 249 ; Burbridge, 2S5 ;
Burling, 250 ; Butler, 261 ; Cald-
well, 246 ; Candy, 250 ; Carr, 279 ;
Carroll, 253 ; Chamberlain, Col.,
249 ; Churchill, Gen., 267 ; Clark,

249 ; Crawford, 249, 295 ; Crocker,
279 ; Cross, 249 ; Gushing, 256 ;
Custer, 299 ; Cutler, 240 ; Davis,
256, 296 ; Day, 249 ; Devin, 296 ;
Dole, 241 ; Doubleday, 239 ; Duf-
fle, Col., 234; Eustis, Gen., 256;
Farnsworth, 254 ; Geary, 246, 253 ;
Gibbon, 246 ; von Gilsa, 241 ; Gra-
ham, 243, 248 ; Grant, 261 ; Green,
251 ; Gregg, 232, 253 ; Grifiin,
295 ; Hall, 256 ; Halleck, 278 ;
Hancock, 243 ; Harrow, 256 ; Hay,

250 ; Herron, F. J., 287 ; Hazlett,
24S ; Hooker, 231 ; Hovey, 264 ;
Howe, 232 ; Howard, 239, 240, 253 ;
Humphreys, 246, 294 ; Jones, 252 ;
Kane, 256 ; Kelly, 249 ; Kilpatrick,
232, 234 ; Lawler, 281 ; Lock-
wood, 250 ; Logan, 261 ; Lyon,
261 ; McCandless, 249 ; McCler-
nand, 267 ; McGilvery, 250 ; Mc-
Kenzie. 297 ; McPherson, 275 ; Mc-
Reynolds, 233 ; Meade, 232, 294 ;
Meagher, 249 ; Meredith, 239 ;
Merritt, 296 ; Milroy, 233 ; Morgan,
264 ; Neill, 253 ; Nevin, 250 ; Ord,
299 ; O'Rorke, 248 ; Osterhaus,
280 ; Perry, 253 ; Pleasanton, 232 ;
Pope, 261 ; Prentiss, 261 ; Robin-
son, 239, 253 ; Rosecrans, 259 ;
Rowley, 239 ; Ruger, 254 ; Schurz,
240 ; Schimmelpfennig, 240 ; Sey-

486

INDEX.

Office rs — Contin ued.

mour, CoL, 298 ; Shaler, Gen., 253 ;
Sheridan, 292 ; Sickles, 243 ; SIo-
cum, 246 ; Smith, J. A., 282 ; Stan-
nard, 253 ; Steele, 278 ; Von Stein-
wehr, 243 ; Stone, 240 ; Stoneman,
292 ; Sweitzer, 246 ; Sykes, 246 ;
Thayer, 266 ; Tilton, 247 ; de Tro-
briand, 246 ; Vincent, Col., 248 ;
Ward, Geti.^ 243, 246 ; Warren, 246,
294 ; Washburne, 264 ; Webb, 251,
256 ; Weed, 246 ; Weitzel, 299 ;
Willard, 250 ; Williams, 249, 267 ;
Wilson, 293 ; Winslow, 248 ; Zook,
249

In Alexico. — Armstrong, Capt.,
108 ; Chase, no ; Childs, Col,, 98 ;
Clarke, Gen., 108 ; Duncan, Col.,
106 ; Dunn, Capt., II4 ; Fannin,
Col., 92 ; Garland, Gen., 102 ;
Hooker, no ; Howard, Capt., in ;
Johnston, Lt.-Col., no ; Mcintosh,
104 ; McKenzie, in ; Pillow, 98 ;
Quitman, gS ; Ransom, Col., 92 ;
Rogers, It., in ; Scott, Martin,
Lt.-Col., 106 ; Scott, Winfield, 91 ;
Selden, It , in ; Seymour, Alaj.,
113 ; Smith, Lt., in ; Smith, Per-
sifer, 99 ; Sumner, Maj., 107 ;
Taylor, Zachary, 94 ; Travis, Capt.,
92 ; Twiggs, gS ; Waite, Maj., 106 ;
Worth, 98 ; Wright, Maj., 102
English. — Banks, Maj., 164 ;
Brasyer, 172 ; Campbell, Col., 12S ;
Campbell, Sir Arch., ig ; Camp-
bell, Sir Colin, 165 ; Clive, Lord,
154; Cotton, Willoughby, 23;
Douglas, Capt., 128 ; Dundas, 124 ;
Earle, Gen., 471 ; Farquhar, J/a/'.,
457 ; Franks, Brig.-Geti., i6g ;
Gilbert, Capt., 124 ; Gordon, Chas.
G., 46S ; Gough, lord, 128 ; Have-
lock, Gen., 160 ; Hicks, Col., 457 ;
Hope, 172 ; Inglis, Maj., 164 ;
Malleson, Col., 124 ; Outram, Sir
James, 165 ; Simpson, Gen., 146 ;
Stuart, Herbert, 471; Walpole, 170 ;
Wheeler, Sir Hugh, 156 ; Whish,
Capt., 124; Wilson, Sir K., i6g ;
Wilson, Sir Charles, Col., 475 ;
Windham, 166 ; Wolseley, lord,
470; Wood, Col., i6g
Fre?ich. — Auger, 20S ; Baraguey
d'Hilliers, 201 ; Bazaine, Marshal,
202, 328 ; Berthezone, 71 ; Bour-
baki, 328 ; Bourmont, 70 ; Can-

Officers — Continued.

robert. Marshal, 202, 328 ; Decaen,

206 ; Dieu, Gen., 208 ; Douay, Fe-
lix, 20S, 327 ; Ducrot, 350 ; Failly,
328 ; Forey, 204 ; Frossard, 328 ;
Gerard, 78 ; L'Admirault, 20S, 328 ;
La Motte-Rouge, 206 ; L'Artignes,
355 ; Lovedo, 71 ; Luy, 202 ; Mac-
Mahon, Marshal, 203, 344 ; Man-
eque, 202 ; Niel, 202 ; Noel, 206 ;
Pelissier, Marshal, 145 ; Trochu,

207 ; Wimpffen, de, 206, 350
German. — Crown Prince of Prussia,
3og, 327, 344 ; Crown Prince of
Saxony, 348 ; King William of
Prussia, 313, 327, 349 ; Prince
Frederick Charles, 309, 327 ; Prince
Franseky, 312 ; Herwarth von Bit-
tenfeld, 309 ; Von Moltke, 327,
349 ; Von Rhetz, 3ig ; Von Stein-
metz, 327 ; Von der Tann, 351 ;
Zastrow, 337

Austrian. — Archduke Albrecht,
30g ; Benedek, F. Marshal, 203,
30g ; Stick, Gen., 204
Italian. — Delia Marmora, 145 ;
Mollard, 203

Dutch. — Chasse, Gen., 78 ; Morre,
Capt., 83

Russian. — Berg, 37 ; Diebistch,
4g ; Gaidaroff, 427 ; Gourko, 3Sg ;
Grand Duke Nicholas, 368 ; Gro-
dekoff, 421 ; Imeretinsky, 399 ;
Kaufmann, 367 ; Koselkoff, 425 ;
Krassowsky, 55, 56, 59 ; Krudener,
Baron, 389 ; Kryloff, 4(.'0; Kuro-
patkin, 422 ; LazarefF, 294, 422 ;
Lomakin, 422 ; Loris Melikoff,
430 ; Markusoff, 368, 421 ; Pas-
kievitch, 49 ; Perovsky, 367 ; Pe-
trussovitch, 422 ; Radetsky, 412 ;
Ross, 60 ; Roth, 50 ; Rudiger,
61 ; Samur, 428 ; Schilder-Schuld-
ner, 390 ; Shahofskoy, Prince, 395 ;
Skobeleff, Col., 2il9, 393. 421 ;
Skobeleff, Gen., 393; Stolietoff,
421 ; Tergukasoff, 422 ; Verevkin,
36S ; Zimmermann, 3S8 ; ZotofI, 399
Roumania. — Charles, Ptince, 399
South American' atid Mexican. —
Alvarez, 102 ; Barragan, 107 ; Ca-
ceres, 446 ; Canterac, 13 ; Cordova,
12 ; Davila, 446 ; Echeagaraz, 104 ;
Iglesias, 446 ; Lagos, 445 ; La
Mar, 12 ; Lara, 12 ; La Serna
( Viceroy) 14 ; Liniers, 3 ; Lynch,

INDEX.

487

Officers — Continued.

445 ; Martinez, Col., 445 ; Miller,
12 ; Monet, 13 ; Morales, g6 ;
Olaneta, 13 ; Perez, 107 ; Pierola,
442 ; Rincon, 100 ; Rodel, 15 ;
Santa Anna, 92 ; San Martin, 6 ;
Sotomayor, 445 ; Suarez, 446 ;
Sucre, 9 ; Torres, 113 ; Valdez, 13 ;
Villalobolos, 13 ; Valencia, 99
Indian. — Bala Ras, 160 ; Dhuleep
Singh, 131 ; Surajah Dowlah, 154 ;
Nana Sahib, 158 ; Runjeet Singh,
118 ; Shere Singh, 124
Turkish. — Abdul Kerim Pasha,
389 ; Hussein Pasha, 58 ; Ibrahim
Pasha, 38 ; Mehemet Ali, 398 ;
Mohammed Pasha, 56 ; Osman
Pasha, 390 ; Redschid Pasha, 38,
58 ; Suleiman Pasha, 398
Soudanese. — Abd-el-Kader Pasha,
458 ; Abbas Pasha, 454 ; Ala-ed-
Deen, 456 ; Arabi Pasha, 455,
466; Baker Pasha (Valentine), 470;
El-Mahdi (Moh. Achmet), 454 ;
Faragh Pasha, 476 ; Ibrahim Bey,
476 ; Ismail Khedive, 452 ; Ismail
Pasha, 465 ; Mek Nemr, " the
Leopard," 465 ; Mohammed Ali
Pasha, 465 ; Raouf Pasha, 455 ;
Said Pasha, 354 ; Suleiman Nyasi,
456 ; Suleiman Pasha, 459 ;
Tahier Bey, 459 ; Zubair Pasha,
469 ; Vussuf Pasha, 455
Biirnicse. — Maha Bandula, 18
Khivan. — Said Emir Ul-Umer, 378
Turcoman Chiefs. — Tekme Sarda,
425 ; Makdum Kali, 428
Algerine. — Aga Ibrahim, 69;
Ahmed, Bey of Constantine, 71 ;
Beys of Oran and Tittery, 69 ;
Hussein Pasha, Dey, 68

Ohio River, 260

Omdurman, 473

Orenburg, 367, 415, 417

Ossola, 203

Oude, 155

" Outside Barbarians," iSi

Pacocha, 441
Pandu River, 160
Pardubitz, 320
Parga, 33
Pastrenga, 197
Patras, Gulf of, 39
Pechele, Gulf of, 180

Pedregul, the, 99

Pegu, 19, 21

Peiho River, description of the estu-
ary, I So; reconnoitring of the
forts, iSi, 1S2 ; number of ships in
foreign fleet, 182 ; attack and re-
ply, 184, 185 ; landing of Euro-
peans, 186 ; rout of Chinese, 1S6 ;
Chinese entrenched camps, 1S7

Pekin, 194 ; march of England upon,
193 ; their positions before, 194 ;
capture of northern gate, 195 ;
prepare to assault, 196 ; the ver-
milion pencil ratifies treaty of Tien-
Tsin, 196 ; gains to the British, 196

Pelisat, 394

Perote, 98

Peschiera Fortress, 203

Petersburg, 289, 29S

Pillow Fort, 262

Pisagua, 441

Pisco, 443

Pittsburg Landing, 262

Plappeville, 331

I'lateau d' Algerie, 357

Plevna, check of the Russians, 389 ;
attack of Grivitza Heights, 390 ; re-
pulse, 392 ; description of defences,
394 ; renewed assault, 395 ; failure
of third attack, 397, 398; Skobeleff's
grand assault, 405 ; Turks, reduced
by starvation, surrender, 411 ;
treaty of San Stefano, 412

Plum Run, 244

Podall, 309

Point de Jour, 331

Polar Star, 279

Pont-a-Mousson, 331

Poolesville, 235

Porte, the, 33, 34, 35, 48, 133. 383

Port Hudson, 287

Port Said, 467

Porze, 328

Potomac River, 233, 234, 290

Poutiatine, Count, 180

Power Hills, 254

Pozzolengo, 201

Pravadi Fort, 58

Pristan, 310

Prome, 24 ; Gen. Campbell's march
to, 24 ; position of Burmese, 25 ;
defeat of Shans and Burmese, 25 ;
the characteristics of Burmese sol-
diers, 26 ; the resulting events of a
British defeat at Prome considered,
27

488

INDEX.

Providence Lake, 269
Psauch, 312
Puebla, gS
Pugan, 26
Punjaub, the, 40

Quinua, 12
Quito, 4

Radischevo, 401

Radisova, 394

Rahad, 461

Rangoon, ig

Rappahannock River, 232

Rassova, 52

Ravee River, 1 13

Razghita, 462

Redan Fort, assault by English, 14S ;
description of fort, 143, 149 ; re-
pulse of English, 150; losses, 150

Rewati, the, commander of Burmese
flotilla, 20

Rezonville, 329

Richmond, 290 ; the advance of the
Army of the Mississippi, 29 [ ;
strength of both armies, 292 ; plan
of campaign, 294 ; Sheridan's move,
296, 297 ; the outer defences of
Richmond taken, 2gS ; occupation
by Union troops, 2gg ; Lee closely
pushed, 301 ; state of Lee's army,
302 ; terms of surrender, 305 ; ca-
pitulation, 306

Rio del Norte, 3gi

Rio Grande, 94

Rivoltella, 201, 203

Rock Creek Stream, 238

Rockville, 236

Romilly, 334, 331

Roncourt, 338

Round Top Hill, 23S ; Round Tops,
246

Rustchuck, 388

Ryogos, 45

Sadowa (see Koniggratz), 320 ; Sa-

doua Wood, 314
Sailor's Creek, 301
St. Albert, 356 ; St. Arnould Wood,

331; St. Avoid, 328 ; St. Dizier,

330 ; St. Hubert, 331, 337 ; St.

Manges, 356 ; St. Nicholas, 329 ;

St. Quentin Fort, 331 ; St. Privat-
le-Montagne, 328 ; St. Privat, 340 —
location and strength, 341 — assault
of Prussian Guards, 341 — the diffi-
culties of storming, 341 — carried by
Prussians and Sa.xons, 341 — St.
Reny, 356

Salt Range Mountains, 132

Salwan River, 26

Samarcand, 417

.Samos, 17

San Angelo, 99 ; San Antonio, 99 ;
San Augustin, 99 ; San Cassiano,
204; San Cosme, 114; .San Ja-
cinto, 92 ; San Juan (Peru), 445 ;
San Juan d' Uloa, 94 ; San Mar-
tino Plateau, 201 ; ,San Stefano,
treaty of, 412

Santa 'Peresa, 445 ; Santa Fe de Bo-
gota, 4

Sarakhna, 460

vSarakhs, 429

Sarawa, 23

Savannah, 2go

Schatt, 459

.Scheldt River, 78

Scinde, 89

Scio, 31

Sebastopol (Sacred City), 133 ; de-
scription of fortifications, 133 ; as-
sault (see Malakoff and Redan).

Sedan Fortress, 344 ; movements of
French, 344 ; the German plan of
attack, 344, 345 ; location of the
fortress, 345 ; positions of the
French, 349 ; battle, 351-362 ;
losses on both sides, 363

.Seminars' Hill, 238 ; Seminary Ridge,
238

Sempolatinsk, 417

Sennaar, 452

Sewall's Point, 225

Shebacat Wells, 475

Sheik-arik, 376

Shenandoah Valley, 231, 292 ; Shen-
andoah River, 231, 292

Shendy, 464

Shiloh. 264

Shipka Pass, sgg

Ships in action :

American. — Atitelope, 182; Ar-
kansas, ram, 263 ; City of Vicks-
burg, 269 ; Congress, 220 ; Ciim-
berland, 220 ; Merritnac, 214 ;
Minnesota, 182, 220 ; Monitor,
Roanoke, 220 ; St. Lawrence, 220

INDEX.

489

Ships in action — Continued.

Chilian. — Almirante Cochrane,
434 ; Blanco Encalada, 434
English. — Albion, 182; Asia,

39 ; Brisk, Bustard, Calcutta,
182 ; Cambrian, Cormorant, Coro-
mandel, 182; Dartmouth, 40; Fuiy,

18 ; Genoa, 40 ; Glasgow, 40 ;
Lame, Leven, 182 ; Liffey, 19 ;
Mosquito, 40 ; Nimrod, 182 ; O/^j--
j?<;«, 1S2 ; Philomel, 40 ; Pigul,
1S2 ; y?^j-^, 40 ; Sophia, 19 ; Slaney,

19 ; Staunch, 182 ; Surprise, 1S2 ;
Talbot, 40

French. — Alcyone, 41 ; Armidc,
Avalanche, 184 ; Breslau, 40 ;
Daphne, 40 ; Dragonne , 182 ;
Fridens, 40 ; Fusee, 182 ; Scipion,

40 ; Sirene, 40

Peri'VIAN. — Z(^?/(7Jc<7r (turret), 434 ;
Independencia, 434 ; O' Higgins ,
436

RUSSLA.N. — Alexatider, Asoff, Cas-
tor, Constantine, Exekiel, Ilan-
houdd, Helena, Provoutioy, 41
Turkish. — Capitan Bey, Moharem
Bey, :i,'2.

Ships and fleets, commanders of :
Aguirre, Admiral, 43S ; liuchanan,
Admiral, 214, 220 ; Codrington,
Admiral, 39 ; IJuperre, Admiral,
69; Carbajal, Capt., 43S ; Grant,
Commodore, Ig ; Heiden, Admiral,
39 ; Hope, Admiral, igo ; CJreene,
S. D., Z^., 218 ; Grau, Adtniral,
436; Jones, Catesby, Z/.. 215;
Latorre, Capt., 437 ; de Rigny, y^r/-
miral, 39; Wordeu, John L., ZA,
218 ; comparison Ijetween iron-
clads and wooden ships, 228 ; con-
struction of floating batteries, 211 ;
" the wooden walls," 210

Shoay Dagon (Golden Pagoda), 20 ;
its occupation by Gen. Campbell,

20 ; battle and defeat of Burmese,
22

Siazeray, 330

Sidi-Ferruch, 69

Sikander Bagh, 173

Silistria, Fortress, 50; its construction,
50 ; operations against, 52 ; Rus-
sian-mode of siege, 54-56 ; surren-
der, 57 ; strength of garrison and
armament, 57

Simoritza, 388

Sinkat, 407

Sinope, 134

Slobodka (Russian, poor suburb), 139

Sobraon 122

Solferino, 200 ; position of French
and Austrians, 200, 201 ; battle,
202, 203 ; assault, 204 ; Austrians
forced to retire, 206, 207 ; the field
the morning after l)attle, 207 ; loss-
es, 208 ; treaty of \'illafranca, 2o3

Sonato, 200

Soudan, geography of, 450 ; charac-
teristics of Soudanese, 453 ; the
Mahdi, 454 ; his purpose and move-
ments, 455

Sperryville, 233

Spicheren, 328

Staoueli, 69; marshalling of Alg. horse-
men, 70 ; their fighting qualities
overweening confidence of Ibrahim
P., 70, 71 ; battle, 71, 72 ; defeat
and losses ; 72 ; the French march
on Algiers, 73

Steadman P'ort, 2g2

Stewart, Col., 46g

Stewart, tien. Herbert, 471 ; marches
across the Bayuda desert, 472-474
his death, 475

Stockades (Burmese), ig-23

Stonne, 246

StonyCreek, 295

Streselitz, 320

Suakim, 464, 477

Sumbora River, 423

Surajah Dowlah, 154

Susquehanna River, 236

Sutlej River, iiS

Syr Daria River, 36S

Systemcnoi, the (Bachelors), 32

Tacna, 440
Tacubaya, 112
Takoo, 181
Talcahuano, 7
Tallahatchie River, 264
Taneytown, 237
Tang-Tin-Siang, 182
Tara Kothi, 174
Tarapaca, 432, 446
Tashkend, 422
Tavoy, 24

Tchesme, Bay of, 32
Tchikibhlar, 423
Tebes, 446
Teheran, 417

490

INDEX.

Tejend River, 429

Tekkes, the, 421 ; their kibitkas and
strength, 424 ; their characteristics,
424 ; their change, 429

" Temple of the Earth," 194

Tenasserim, 23

Tennessee, 291

Texas, 91

Thionville Fortress, 328

Thornton's Gap, 233

Ticino River, igS

Tien-Tsin, treaty of, 190

Timby, Theodore R., 227

Tirnova, 386

Tocapilla, 432

Tokar, 470

Toledo bastion, 84

Torpedoes, 3S7, 438

Toul, fortress, 329

Toulon, 68

Transparent Blue Button, the, iSi

Trautenau, 309

Tripolitza, 38

Trostle House, 250

Trouville, 333

TuUohoma, 275

Tungchow, 191

Turcomans, the, their numbers, 417 ;
alamans,\\'] ; their occupation, vil-
lages, national characteristics, 418 ;
extent of country, 420 ; Tekke Tur-
comans (see above) ; Yomut Turco-
mans, 421

Turkey, teaching of the faith of
Islam, 3S7 ; fighting qualities of
Turkish soldiers, 392 ; do not bury
the enemy's dead, 399 ; their ob-
stinacy, 411; compliments paid
by Russia on their splendid de-
fence, 412

Turkestan, plain of, 366

Turnau, 309

U
Union, 343
Upper\-ille, 234
Ural Mountains, 365

Vadelincourt, 346

Varna Fortress, 58

Venloo, 87

Verdun, 329, 333

Vermilion pencil (Emp. of China),

180
Verneville, 334

Versailles, 362
Vicksburg, 259, 261
Victoria-Nyanza Lake, 454
Vid River, 389
Villafranca, treaty of, 208
Villers Cernay, 356
Vionville, 328
Visano, 202
Vitry, 345

Vizetelly, Frank, 462
Vladimiruko, Theodore, 34
Volta, 200, 201

Walnut Hills, 281

Warfield Ridge, 247, 254

AVarrenton, 232

Wattington, 25

Westminister, 243

White Oak, 295

Wilhelmshohe, 362

Williamsport, 234

Willoughby Run Stream, 238

Wilmington, 2go

Wmchester, 234

Windham, General, 166

Wissenburg, 327

Woerth, 327

Wolf's Hill, 243

Wolseley, Lord, his mission to Egj'pt,

464 ; appointed commander, 470 ;

arrival at Cairo, 471 ; at Korti, 471
" Wooden walls," the, 210

Xochimilco Lake, 98

Yandabo, 26
Yanghi-Kala River, 425
Yantra River, 389
Yazoo City, 261
Yazoo River, 261
Yellow Sea, iSo
Yeni Zagra, 398
Yermak, Cossack chief, 365
Ylo, 441

Young's Point, 261
Yuen-Min-Yuen, 173
Yuh, Prime-Minister, 180
Yussuf Pasha, 456

Zareha, 473, 475
j Zeigler's grove, 244

Zeraig, 460
I Zubair Pasha, 469

1 V <MM

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