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THE 

DECLARATION OF PARIS 

1856 



■ iHSs.*-' -■« i 



R FRANCIS PIGGOTT 



l> 






THE DECLARATION OF PARIS 

1856 



"LAW OF THE SEA" SERIES 
OF HISTORICAL AND LEGAL WORKS 



VoL I. Documentary Histoty of the Armed Neutralities, 
1780-1800. 



Vols. II., III. Documentary History of the French Wars, 
1793-1815. 
A. — 1793 to the Peace of Amiens. 
B. — Peace of Amiens to 1815. 



Vol. IV. The Declaration of Paris, 1856. A Study. 
Documented. 



Vols, v., VI. Principles governing the Relations of 
Belligerent and Neutral. 
A. — History as the Basis of the Law. 
B. — The Law as derived from History. 



THE DECLARATION 
OF PARIS 

1856 



A STUDY 

- DOCUMENTED - 



BY 

Sir FRANCIS PIGGOTT 



•'Law of the Sea " Series— Vol. IV 



LONDON 

UNIVERSJTY OF LONDON PRESS LTD. 

1 8 WARWICK SQUARE, E.G. 4 

1919 



The time has come at last when all theories as to the manner 
in which war ought to be waged are to be revised by the light 
of experience of war as it is, in fact, waged ; those especially 
which attempt to control the relations of the belligerents with 
the neutral merchant. It is essential therefore that the veil 
which for sixty years has surrounded the Declaration of Paris 
should be withdrawn, and its story told from Hansard, some 
few White Books, and documents preserved in the Public 
Record Office. 

The task of piecing together the scattered fragments has 
been made easier by the able assistance and energetic collabora- 
tion of Miss Sylvia Seeley. 

In telling the story I have found the need of a moderating 
influence, and Mr George A. B. Dewar, bringing an open mind 
to the subject, has supplied it. 

F. T. P. 

14 OiiD Square, Lincoln's Inn 



Digitized by the Internet Arciiive 

in 2007 with funding from 

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TABLE OF CONTENTS 

Part I.— HISTORICAL 

1854 
I 

PAGB 

The Dbolabations of the Neutrality of the Scandinavian 

Powers ......... 5 

II 

The General Position, 1853-54 19 

A. The Other Neutrals 19 

B. The Relations between England and France ... 22 

C. Political Opinion in England ..... 24 

III 

Discussions between England and France as to the Prin- 
ciples OF Maritime Law to be adopted during 
the War 27 

IV 
The Riga Despatch ........ 40 

V 

The Negotiations between England and France prior to 

the Declaration of War 56 

VI 

The Declarations to the Neutrals ..... 73 

The Instructions to the Fleets ...... 79 

The Answer of the United States : First Marcy Note . 80 

VII 

Mr Phillimore's Motion, 14th July 1854 .... 82 

▼ii 



viii The Declaration of Paris 

1855 
I 

PAOE 

The Debates in Parliament — Trading with the Enemy — 

Land Transport through Prussia ... 87 

II 
The Political Economists' Theory of War ... 93 

III 
Licences to Trade with the Enemy 102 

IV 
The Facts as described by Contemporary Writers . .110 



1856 

I 

The Congress of Paris and the Treaty of Peace . . 115 

II 
The Declaration of the Congress 117 

III 
The Debate in the House of Lords . . . .124 

IV 

The Powers which Adhered to the Declaration . .136 
Indirect Adherences to the Declaration . . . 140 

A. By Treaty with Italy 140 

B. By Treaty with France 141 

V 
The Refusal of the United States to Adhere . . 142 



Table of Contents ix 

1860-1862 
I 

PAQK 

The Report of the Horsfall Commission on Merchant 

Shipping, 1860 160 

II 

Questions and Answers in Parliament, 1861 . . .153 

III 
The United States and the Declaration of Paris during 

THE Civil War, 1861 154 

IV 
The Debate of 1862 161 

Part II.— COMMENTARY 

The Meaning and Effect of the Declaration of Paris . 173 

I 

The Nature of a Declaration : The Treaty-making 

Prerogative 174 

n 

The Constitutional Aspect of the Principles of the 

Declaration examined . . . . . .179 

III 
The Form in which the Principles are Stated . .183 

IV 

The Effect of War on Treaties, and especially on this 

Declaration ........ 189 

V 

The Effective Operation of the Declaration that " Free 

Ships make Free Goods " . . . .196 



X The Declaration of Paris 

VI 

^ PAOB 

The Conditions attached to Adherence to the Declara- 
tion : Indivisibiiity of the Principles . .197 



VII 
The Courts and the Declaration 

VIII 
The Declaration and the Law of Nations 



Conclusion 



. 202 

. 206 
. 214 



Part III.— DOCUMENTS 

Chronological Table of Chief Historical Events con- 
nected WITH the Russian War, 1854-1856 . .221 

1. Declarations of the Neutrality of the Scandinavian 

Powers 223 

A. Sweden to the Belligerents ..... 223 
Lord Clarendon's Reply ..... 225 

B. Denmark to the Belligerents ..... 225 
Lord Clarendon's Reply ..... 227 

C. Denmark to the United States (and other Neutrals) 228 

D. Sweden to the United States (and other Neutrals) . 229 

E. United States Secretary of State's Reply to Denmark 

and Sweden ....... 230 

2. The Riga Despatch 230 

3. Instructions of the British and French Governments 

FOR THE Mutual Protection of Subjects and 
Commerce ....... 231 

E. (1) Circular to British Diplomatic and Consular 

Agents ........ 231 

E. (2) Instructions to British Naval Of&cers . . 233 

F. (1) Circiilar to French Diplomatic and Consular 

Agents 234 

F. (2) Instructions to French Naval Officers . . 235 



Table of Contents 



XI 

PAOI 



4. Correspondence between Messrs Martin, Levin & 

Adler and the Board of Trade . . . 237 

5. Declarations to the Neutrals 240 

A. Great Britain 240 

B. France. (With Report of M. Drouyn de Lhuys) . 241 

6. Creation of Prize Courts 243 

A. English 243 

B. French 247 



7. Circular Despatches announcing the Declaration to 

THE Neutral Powers ..... 249 

A. British 249 

B, C. French 250, 251 

8. United States Despatches relating to the Declaration 

TO the Neutrals ...... 



9. Proclamations and Orders in Council 

10. Instructions to the Fleets 

A. English 

B. French 



252 

268 

280 
280 
283 



1 1 . Convention between Great Britain and France relative 
TO Joint Captures, with Instructions to the 







Fleets 


• 








. 289 


12. 


British Notifications of Blockades .... 298 


13. 


Correspondence relating to the Blockades . . 301 


14. 


Neutral Legislation as to Navigation during the War 305 




A. 


Brazil 305 




B. 


Bremen 










305 




C. 


Denmark 










307 




D. 


Haiti . 










315 




E. 


Hamburg 










316 




F. 


Hanover 










318 




G. 


Hawaiian Islands 










320 




H. 


Lubeck 










320 




I. 


Mecklenburg-Schwerin 










321 




J. 


Naples 










322 




K. 


Portugal 










323 




L. 


Spain 










324 




M. 


Sweden 










325 



Xll 



The Declaration of Paris 



16. Extracts from President Pierce's Message to Con- 
gress, 1854 329 

16. Conventions between the United States and other 

Countries as to Neutrals . . .331 

A. With Russia, 1854 331 

B. With the Two Sicilies, 1855 332 

C. With Peru, 1856 333 

17. Protocols of the Congress of Paris, 1856 . . 335 

18. French Promulgation of the Declaration of Paris . 346 

19. Adherences to the Declaration of Paris . . . 347 
Adherences to the Mediation Clause . . . 387 

20. Indirect Adherences 388 

A. Guatemala ........ 388 

B. Honduras 388 

C. Mexico 389 

D. Peru 389 

E. Salvador 391 

F. Sandwich Islands 392 

G. Siam 392 

21. United States : Second Marcy Note, 1856 . . . 393 

22. United States Proposals for a Convention, 1857 . 404 

23. Report of the Select Committee on Merchant Shipping, 

1860. Extract relating to Belligerent Rights 

at Sea 408 

24. The American Civil War and the Declaration of Paris : 

Correspondence . . . . . .411 

25. Observance of the Declaration ..... 435 
British Order in Council : Application of Declaration 

OF Paris in the Event of War by France and 

Great Britain against China, 1860 . . 435 

26. Observance of Principles of the Declaration . 437 

A. Proclamation by the United States . . 437 

B. Proclamation by Spain ..... 439 

Addendum to Correspondence relating to the Blockades 440 



Index 



442 



PART I 



HISTORICAL 






The immediate cause of the war which broke out in 1853 was 
a dispute which had arisen between France and Russia upon the 
custody of the Holy Places in Jerusalem. The real cause was the 
intention of Russia to hasten the dismemberment of the Turkish 
Empire. Nicholas, in a memorable conversation, actually suggested 
to the British ambassador at St Petersburg that England should 
receive Egypt and Crete as her own portion of the spoil. This con- 
versation, which took place in January 1853, was at once reported 
to the British Government. It undoubtedly prepared the way for 
future trouble. ... It had the effect of rendering the British 
Ministry suspicious of his intentions, at a moment when a good under- 
standing with this country was of the first importance to the Czar 
of Russia. . . . Almost at the same moment he affronted France 
by declining to call Napoleon " Monsieur mon frere." . . . Nicholas 
had the singular indiscretion to render a British Ministry suspicious 
of him, and a French Emperor angry with him, in the same month. 
Napoleon could easUy avenge the affront. . . . The Greek and 
Latin Churches both claimed the right of protecting the Holy Places 
of Palestine. Both appealed to a Mahometan arrangement in support 
of their claim : each declined to admit the pretensions of the other. 
The Latin Church in Palestine was under the protection of France ; 
the Greek Church was under the protection of Russia ; and France 
and Russia had constantly supported, one against the other, these 
rival claims. In the beginning of 1853 France renewed the contro- 
versy. She even threatened to settle the question by force. The 
man whom Nicholas would not call " mon frere " was stirring a contro- 
versy thick with trouble for the Czar of Russia. . . . The dispute 
about the Holy Places was soon superseded by a general demand of 
Russia for the adequate protection of the Christian subjects of the 
Porte. In the summer of 1853 the demand took the shape of an 
ultimatum ; and when the Turkish Ministers, declined to comply 
with the Russian demand, a Russian army crossed the Pruth and 
occupied the Principalities. In six months a miserable quarrel 
about the custody of the Holy Places had assumed dimensions which 
were clearly threatening war. At the advice of England the Porte 
abstained from treating the occupation of the Principalities as an act 
of war ; and diplomacy consequently secured an interval for arrang- 
ing peace. The Austrian Govermnent framed a note, which is known 
as the Vienna Note, as a basis of a settlement. England and the 
neutral Powers assented to the note ; Russia accepted it ; and it was 
then presented to the Porte. But Turkey, with the obstinacy which 
has always characterised its statesmen, declined to accept it. War 
might even then have been prevented if the British Government had 
boldly insisted on its acceptance, and had told Turkey that if she 
modified the conditions she need not count on England's assistance. 
One of the leading members of Lord Aberdeen's Ministry wished to 
do this, and declared to the last hour of his life that this covirse should 



have been taken. But the course was not taken. Turkey was 
permitted, or, according to Baron Stockmar, encouraged to modify 
the Vienna Note ; the modifications were rejected by Russia ; and 
the Porte, on the 26th of September, deHvered an ultimatum, and on 
the 4th of October 1853 declared war. These events excited a very 
widespread indignation in this country. The people, indeed, were 
only imperfectly acquainted with the causes which had produced 
the quarrel ; many of them were unaware that the complication had 
been originally introduced by the act of France ; others of them 
failed to reflect that the refusal of the Porte to accept a note which 
the four Great Powers — of which England was one — had agreed 
upon was the immediate cause of hostilities. Those who were better 
informed thought that the note was a mistake, and that the Turk 
had exercised a wise discretion in rejecting it ; while the whole nation 
instinctively felt that Russia throughout the negotiations had acted 
with unnecessary harshness. In October 1853, therefore, the country 
was almost unanimously in favour of supporting the Turk. The 
events of the next few weeks turned this feeling into enthusiasm. 
The Turkish army, under Omar Pasha, proved its mettle by winning 
one or two victories over the Russian troops. The Turkish fleet at 
Sinope was suddenly attacked and destroyed. Its destruction was, 
undoubtedly, an act of war : it was distorted into an act of treachery ; 
a rupture between England and Russia became thenceforward inevit- 
able. . . . — (Spencer Walpole, Foreign Relations^ ch. iii. pp. 99-102.) 



* 



So early as 28th of January 1853 the French Emperor perceived 
that his measures had effectually roused the Czar's hostility to the 
Sultan, and he instantly proposed to England that the two Powers 
should act together in extinguishing the flames which he himself 
had just kindled, and so endeavour to come to a joint understanding, 
with a view to resist the ambition of Russia. Knowing beforehand 
what the poUcy of England was, he all at once adopted, and proposed 
it to our Government in the very terms always used by English states- 
men. — (Kinglake, History of the Crimean War, i. p. 343.) 



La Russie, souveraine absolue de la Mer Noir, n'ayant qu'^ 
etendre la main pour toucher le Bosphore, pla9ait la Mediterranee 
sous la menace des flottes de Sebastopol ; du fond de ses ports in- 
accessibles, elle atteignait tous les empires et tons les royaumes. 

Les quatre grandes puissances europeennes s'unirent afin d'em- 
pecher une guerre qui semblait imminente, et dans le but, tout en 
sauvegardant I'amour propre de la Russie de sauvegarder aussi I'inde- 
pendance de la Turquie. 

Toutefois la France et I'Angleterre devant le developpement 
de I'aggression Russe tinrent leurs escadres h> portee de secourir efi&- 
cacement le Sultan. 

Le sort est jete : les dernieres croyances de paix sont evanouies, 
les relations diplomatiques de la France et de I'Angleterre ont cesse 
avec la Russie. Les declarations de guerres sont echangees, on se 
prepare a combattre. — (Bazancourt, U Expedition de Crimee, Intro- 
duction, xxvi, and t. i. ch. i.) 



i854 



The Declarations of the Neutrality of the Scandinavian 

Powers.^ 

Early in January 1854, the spread of the war begun between 
Turkey and Russia in the previous October appeared imminent. 
Lord Palmerston resigned from the Aberdeen Administration 
in December 1853, because he thought the Government's poHcy 
towards Russia was not firm enough. The British fleet was 
ordered to the Black Sea, and a few days later he resumed 
office. The coming of the Western nations to the assistance of 
the Porte then seemed certain ; and the neutrals began to take 
steps for fostering the commerce which follows in the train 
of war. The neutrals were the Scandinavian Powers, their 
people long-established traders in material essential to naval 
warfare ; the steps were those assertions of rights which had 
become a tradition among them. The spell of peace which had 
blessed the nations for forty years was about to be broken ; 
the supply of materials was fully equal to the heavy demands 
of the pending war ; the trade prospects were good ; there 
would certainly be the traditional difficulties in getting cargoes 
safe to belligerent ports. Turkey's allies were those two 
countries who in their great wars had wrangled over the rights 
of neutrals almost as strenuously as they had fought ; divided 
counsels on such vexed questions were more than probable. 
There were rumours, too, that a change had been gradually 
coming over certain sections of British public opinion ; prompt 
action was therefore advisable. If the rumours were true, 

* This chapter is based ahnost entirely on despatches preserved in the 
Public Record Office. 

These despatches, as well as those referred to in other chapters, are to 
be found in the official volumes as tinder : — 

Sweden : F.O. 73 ; Nos. 254, 259, 260, 261. 
Denmark : F.O. 22 ; Nos. 205, 207, 208. 
Prussia : F.O. 64 ; Nos. 359, 364, 367, 368, 369. 
France : F.O. 27 ; Nos. 996, 997, 1005-1012. 
B 



6 The Declaration of Paris 

even premature action was not likely to be resented, more 
especially as the advocates of the new ideas were in power. 
Moreover, although negotiations were still going on, although 
the scales which held peace and war had not yet dipped, 
Russia was taking steps to strengthen her position. The 
occasion seemed specially favourable for a forward policy. 

On 2nd January 1854, Sweden and Denmark presented 
identical despatches containing premature declarations of 
neutrality ^ which, in plain language, were polite but firm intima- 
tions to Britain, France, and Russia of what they might expect 
from these neutrals in the event of war. It was an ultimatum 
with the familiar burden, " respect for the neutral flag." The 
documents are true to the tradition of the Armed Neutralities, 
of which these two countries had been such prominent members. 
They were not couched in the old crude terms. There was no 
appeal to the applause of all Europe. A more sober diplomacy 
had intervened : but the old point, that the neutral claim was 
a *' right," was expressed in clear and unmistakeable language. 
The steadfast adherence to "a strict neutrality founded in 
good faith, impartiality, and an equal respect for the rights of 
all the Powers," would impose on the Kings of Sweden and 
Denmark certain obligations, and assure to them certain ad- 
vantages. The obligations were many — ^to abstain from parti- 
cipation, direct or indirect ; to admit to their ports the war- 
ships and merchantmen of the belligerents, with certain re- 
strictions ; to refuse admittance to privateers ; to accord to 
belligerent vessels facilities for the supply of stores, not contra- 
band of war ; to exclude prizes from their ports except in cases 
of distress. The terms in which these obligations were defined 
would not, on the face of them, cause any discussion. The 
time, indeed, appeared specially opportune for a strong line as 
to privateers. The " advantages " were comprised in a single 
sentence — " To enjoy " in their commercial relations with the 
countries at war " all security and all facilities " for their 
" vessels as well as for their cargoes, with the obligation at all 
times for such vessels to conform to the regulations generally 
established and recognised for special cases of declared and effec- 
tive blockade." There was, however, a touch of the old Armed 
Neutrality spirit in the concluding paragraph of the declarations : 
" Such are the general principles of the neutrality adopted by 
His Majesty the King ... in the event of war breaking out in 
Europe. His Majesty the King flatters himself that they will 
be acknowledged as in conformity with the Law of Nations." 

^ Document No. 1. 



Declarations of Neutrality of Scandinavian Powers 7 

Rumours of concerted action between Sweden and Denmark 
as neutrals in the event of war had reached London in the 
autumn of 1853, and Mr Grey, British Minister at Stockholm, 
was instructed on the 12th November to ascertain what 
arrangements had already been made. The King decMned to 
give Mr Grey the required information ; but he informed him 
that it was his intention to make a declaration of policy as 
soon as a communication had been received from Copenhagen. 
M. Lobstein, the French Minister, had, however, received im- 
portant intelligence from the King, which he communicated to 
Mr Grey. There were to be two chief points in the declaration 
of neutrality : (1) a specification of ports to be closed to the 
belligerents ; and (2) " que le pavilion neutre couvre la mar- 
chandise." With regard to the second point, it had been 
proposed by Sweden to Denmark, but Mr Grey adds : " I have 
reason to believe that there is not the same unanimity upon 
the subject. The King in his conversation with M. Lobstein 
told him that he took it for granted Russia would recognise 
the principle laid down in it, but I do not hear that he made 
any allusion to England." The following extract was enclosed 
from the Svenska Tidningen of the 18th November : — 

Russia is preparing for a European War, but we pre- 
pare for a neutrality in keeping with our rank and advan- 
tageous position — not one which may be trampled upon, 
or the honour of which may be impaired by anyone making 
use of our peaceable coast for their benefit. 

On the 19th December Mr Greyreported that Baron Stjerneld, 
the Swedish Minister of Foreign Affairs, had asked him if he 
knew the views of the British Government with regard to the 
neutral flag, dwelling on the injustice of refusing to admit that 
the flag protects the merchandise. Mr Grey thought that doubt 
as to the course the British Government would take had caused 
great distrust of England, and was the reason why he could 
obtain no information as to the forthcoming declaration of 
neutrality. The French Minister had told him that the matter 
of the declaration was entirely agreed upon between Sweden 
and Denmark. In the same despatch Mr Grey informed Lord 
Clarendon of a statement made to him by Baron Stjerneld, 
that " if England refused to admit the principle that the 
neutral flag protects the merchandise, before six months were 
over she would have a war with the United States." This state- 
ment might have been based on inferences drawn from the 
history of the early years of the century ; it might also have 
been based on information of actual negotiations on the subject 



8 The Declaration of Paris 

between Washington and Copenhagen. Mr Grey evidently had 
suspicions that such negotiations were in progress, and they were 
confirmed. He wrote on the 11th February 1854, that from 
conversations he had been led to believe that " the Swedish 
Government might endeavour to come to some understanding 
with the United States, in case of difficulties arising between 
Sweden and England, upon the question of the neutral flag." 

The declarations of neutrality had, in fact, been notified 
to the United States by Denmark on the 20th January,^ and 
by Sweden on the 28th, ^ as also to the other neutral Powers. 
The reason for this action was explained in the Danish Note 
to be that the King, having nothing more at heart than to 
maintain and cement the relations of friendship and under- 
standing which so happily reigned between him and all the 
Governments of Europe, regarded it "as a duty not to leave 
the allied and friendly Powers in ignorance of the line of policy " 
which he proposed to follow in the possible contingency of a 
maritime war. The body of the documents reproduced the 
Notes which had been sent to the belligerents. 

The American Secretary of State replied in both cases, on 
the 14th February,^ that the views expressed by the two Govern- 
ments were regarded by the President " with all the interest 
which the occasion demands." 

Mr Grey also wrote on the 11th February that he had been 
informed " that Sweden could not count upon the support of 
America upon this question, and the sympathies of the latter 
were certainly on the side of England in case of a war with 
Russia," an intimation which Baron Stjerneld was said to 
have received with some disappointment. This information 
was the more important, as our Minister understood that the 
American Charge d' Affaires had proposed on his own motion 
" that it might be advisable to send a small squadron to the 
Baltic in the spring, in the event of a war, for the protection 
of American commerce." 

The replies received from the other Powers, especially those 
from Prussia and Austria, were reported by Mr Grey to be 
" entirely satisfactory." 

Even more interesting information as to the attitude of 
the United States in the event of war came into the possession 
of the Government in February. The Czar had been endeavour- 
ing to obtain its consent to the issue of Russian letters of marque 
to United States citizens. The information had been received 
by the French Government, and was immediately reported to 

^ Docvunent No. 1 C. ' Document No. ID. • Docximent No. 1 E. 



Declarations of Neutrality of Scandinavian Powers 9 

London. M. Drouyn de Lhuys intended to address the United 
States, saying that the old cordial relations which had existed 
between the two countries assured him that the proposal would 
not be countenanced. Lord Cowley was instructed to inform 
the French Minister of the British Government's sympathetic 
concurrence with the despatch. 

Reports tend to show that public opinion in the United 
States was entirely favourable to the allies,^ but this question 
of serving in Russian privateers presented difficulties which 
stood in the way of its effective prohibition. On the 22nd 
March, Mr Mason, the United States Minister in Paris, in- 
formed the Secretary of State that it was the point on which 
most apprehension was felt.^ Lord Clarendon in the same 
month discussed the question of privateering generally with Mr 
Buchanan, the Minister in London, and the means of suppress- 
ing it, speaking in highly complimentary terms of the treaties 
which the United States had concluded with different nations 
" stipulating that if one of the parties be neutral and the other 
belligerent, the subjects of the neutral accepting commissions 
as privateers to cruize against the other from the opposing 
belligerent, shall be punished as pirates." Mr Buchanan added :^ 
" These ideas were doubtless suggested to his mind by the 
apprehension felt here . . . that our sailors will be employed 
to cruize against British commerce." The apprehension had 
not subsided in April, when Mr Marcy referred to it in a despatch 
to Mr Buchanan. Great Britain and France, he says, would 
both most readily enter into conventions, but in spite of the 
provision in existing treaties he did not think that the President 
" would permit it to be inserted in any new one." 

I have not come across any record of Americans having 
accepted Russian letters of marque ; but it will not be un- 
interesting to record Mr Mason's opinion on this question, and 
the somewhat ingenious way in which he links it up with the 
other question of the neutral flag. 

* ConsxjIj Bancroft to Lord Clarendon. 

Cincinnati, 5th Jvly 1855. 

Public opinion in this city and State and the adjacent States, and 
generally, and I might say universally, throughout the interior, where 
the true American opinion is best to be gathered, is decidedly favourable 
to Great Britain in respect to the Russian war. This favourable opinion 
pervades all classes. I speak only of the interior, as it is my Consular 
district, leaving those on the seaboard to report according to their in- 
formation : but I can confidently affirm that the favourable feeling is 
persistent throughout the whole of the United States. — {State Papers, 
vol. xlvii. p. 360.) 

» Document No. 8 C. * Docvunent No. 8 D. 



10 The Declaration of Paris 

The point on which most apprehension is felt, is the 
engagement of citizens and vessels of the United States in 
privateering under the Russian flag. I have urged that, 
with every disposition to prevent such unlawful proceed- 
ings by our people, the Government would find much 
difficulty in enforcing its laws, unless sustained by public 
opinion in the United States, and aided by the people, as 
well as by officers of Government ; that with the vast 
extent of sea-coast of the United States, the Government 
could not have information of the preparation of vessels for 
such enterprizes, in all cases, in time to suppress them, unless 
the people felt an anxious desire that the laws should be 
executed ; that if the allies adopted just and liberal measures 
in regard to neutral rights, it would give profitable returns 
to a safe business, and the entire mercantile community of 
the United States would, from a sense of justice and of 
national duty, as well as of their own interest, be found 
ready to aid the Government in executing the laws ; that, 
tempting as might be the offers to engage under the Russian 
flag, to cruize against the commerce of the allies, the 
danger of the service, the difficulty of realizing their prizes 
by adjudication, and, above all, the actual profit of lawful 
trade, under equitable and fair rules in respect to neutral 
rights, and the public satisfaction at seeing just principles 
established among nations, would probably prevent our 
citizens, however bold and adventurous, from taking part 
in the assaults on the commerce of the allies. 

The second question discussed in the preliminary conversa- 
tions related to the closing of the Baltic ports. It was reported 
that Russia had demanded, in the event of war, that Swedish 
ports should remain open to her but closed to England and 
France. According to another report, Russia's demand was 
that all the ports of Sweden should be closed to all belligerents, 
including herself. According to yet another, that she should 
have permission to carry her prizes into Carlscrona, and also 
into Slito in case of necessity, the same favour not to be accorded 
to England and France. These demands, whichever might 
have been the true one, were refused. Sweden declared that 
she would only close those ports the entrance to which she could 
defend ; but the whole question, as Mr Grey's despatch of 30th 
January pointed out,^ caused the King great anxiety lest Russia 
should be tempted to support her demands by force. 

* Mb Gbby to Lobd Clabendon. 

Stockholm, Jan. 30, 1854. 

After reporting that the arrival of the Rxissian courier, M. Daschkoff, 
aroiised public curiosity in Stockholm, and that M. DaschkofE had read 



Declarations of Neutrality of Scandinavian Powers 11 

If Russia could persuade Sweden to close all her ports, she 
would place the allies at a great disadvantage. If some of them 
remained open it would enable the English and French ships 
to refit, whereas if all were closed, Russia would suffer no in- 
convenience, for she had her own Baltic ports to rely on. It 
was worth a diplomatic discussion to press the assumption of 
the international lawyers that the conditions of perfect neu- 
trality require that neutral action must be equal on both sides : 
what is granted to one belligerent must be granted to the other. 
So the question was seriously raised by Russia that this condi- 
tion of equal treatment would not be fulfilled if the allies derived 
a benefit from the action of Sweden of which she need not avail 
herself ! Therefore all the ports must be closed. 

A question of the same nature arose on the other side. The 
allies pressed for the closing of Copenhagen by Denmark. Her 
Majesty's Government could not consent to be excluded from 

to them a despatch to the King of Sweden, expressing the Emperor of 
Russia's desire that Sweden should close all her ports to all belligerents 
in the event of war, Mr Grey continues : "This demand was founded upon 
the disadvantage imder which Riissia would lie if the English and French 
fleets were allowed to enter the Swedish ports. The demand was made 
in temperate and conciliating language, and the King of Sweden's answer 
will be sent from here to-morrow. That answer is a decided negative, 
and both Baron Stjemeld and Baron Manderstrom said to me that they 
were convinced Her Majesty's Government would be satisfied with it. 
The King had desired that the greatest reserve should be observed with 
regard to the Corps Diplomatique at Stockholm, in order that it might 
never be alleged that his answer to Russia had been dictated by foreign 
influence, for though Sweden was a small Power, she was an independent 
one. The Swedish Government were, however, bound not to lose sight 
of the fact that whatever might be the issue of the war, if war there was, 
Russia would always be the neighbour of Sweden, and that it was therefore 
doubly important to the latter to avoid giving offence to the former. In 
the present instance, it could not be denied that the attitude of Sweden 
would, in the event of a war, be more advantageous for England aJid 
France than for Russia, but they could not alter her geographical position, 
and there was no hesitation on the part of the King, whose refusal to 
comply with the demands of Russia was most decided. 

" There appears to me to be a very general dread among the Swedes 
of a sudden attack being made by Russia upon the Island of Gottland. 
The Crown Prince has repeatedly expressed to me his alarm with regard 
to the position of Gottland, and he- lately gave me to understand that 
the Russian forces were being increased in Finland. I accordingly asked 
Baron Manderstrom to-day if he had heard of reinforcements being sent 
to that quarter. He answered, ' Not yet, but they are being sent,' and he, 
I am bound to say, added that he had no apprehension as regards Gottland, 
but that he feared the Russians might mean to take possession of a portion 
of Finnmark, where there were ports which were never closed by ice. He 
mentioned particularly the Waranger Fiord. Baron Manderstrom is, 
however, the only person I have seen who has expressed this opinion, 
and the fact of two regiments being now under orders to march for Gott- 
land as soon as the weather admits, is a proof that the Government see 
the necessity of being on their guard in that quarter." 



12 The Declaration of Paris 

those fortified ports in the Baltic which would be convenient 
to the allies, while the only Danish port which they could not 
use was to be left open for the use of our enemies. The ques- 
tion was ultimately settled, and Copenhagen was closed as 
far as necessary for the safety of the town and arsenal. 

The Prussian ports were not closed because, not being 
a naval power, Prussia had no means of enforcing her 
neutrality. 

To revert to the Scandinavian declarations, the interest of 
which centres in the advantage to be assured by their neutrality 
to the subjects of Sweden and Norway and Denmark. They 
were " to enjoy all security and all facilities for vessels belonging 
to them, as well as for their cargoes " : in other words, their 
" free ships " were to make " free goods." On the receipt of 
these declarations one of two courses might have been adopted, 
either of which would have been appropriate to the occasion. 
A curt reply might have been sent pointing out that as a state 
of war did not in fact exist, neither did a state of neutrality, 
and therefore the questions raised were premature ; or a 
polite intimation might have been given that the declarations 
had been received and note taken of their contents — an accusS 
de reception, — leaving the consideration of them to a more 
convenient hour. 

But from the unpublished despatches it appears that the 
British and French Governments had been informed in the 
autumn of 1853 that Sweden and Denmark intended to make a 
declaration, and that they were particularly anxious to ascer- 
tain what attitude the allied Governments intended to adopt 
towards the neutral flag. The allies were themselves anxious 
to know what would be the attitude of the Scandinavian Powers, 
and they had a very clear intimation that they intended to 
press for the recognition of " free ships free goods." 

Yet another curious point will presently appear. The Kjng 
of Sweden seems to have been more ready to impart information 
to the French than the English Minister. M. Lobstein, however, 
at once passed on all that he had learnt to Mr Grey. And yet 
the French Government appears to have been in the dark as 
to Lord Clarendon's intentions. M. Drouyn de Lhuys wrote 
twice to Count Walewski, the French Ambassador in London, on 
the subject : on the 4th January, instructing him to ascertain 
what those intentions were ; on the 12th more particularly to 
try and discover what answer to Sweden and Denmark would 
be given by Great Britain. He would give much, he said, 
for Lord Clarendon's answer to be in the same terms as 
his own. 



Declarations of Neutrality of Scandinavian Powers 13 

M. Drouyn de Lhuys to Count Walewski. 

1854, Jan. 4. 
Tachez de connattre k cette occasion, quelles sent les 
dispositions actuelles du gouvernement anglais en ce qui 
concerne les neutres. C'est une mati^re sur laquelle a 
r^gne jusqu'ici entre I'Angleterre et nous une grande dif- 
ference d'opinions. J'ai d'ailleurs sujet de penser, d'apr^s 
un commencement de polemique que j'ai remarque dans 
les journeaux anglais, que le commerce serait peu favorable 
a I'application des anciennes doctrines du gouvernement 
britannique dans toute leur rigueur. Je vous prie, tout 
en evitant d'entamer une discussion pr^matur^e sur la 
question de droit, de recueillir sur ce point des informations 
aussi exactes que faire se pourra, et de chercher a savoir 
notamment a quelles obligations le cabinet de Londres croit 
le Danemarck et la Su^de tenus envers lui dans I'exercice 
de la neutralite. Lord Clarendon n'ignore pas, sans doute, 
que la Russie eprouve un vif mecontentement de I'attitude 
de ces deux puissances, et en particulier de celle de la 
Suede. C'est une raison de plus pour nous, ce me semble, 
de croire a la sincerity des resolutions des cabinets de 
Copenhague et de Stockholm et de ne pas augmenter, par 
de trop grandes exigences, les embarras de leur position. 

1854, Jan. 12. 
J'attacherais un grand prix a ce que la reponse de 
lord Clarendon fut con9ue, autant que possible, dans le 
meme sens que la notre, et put tranquilliser entierement la 
Suede et le Danemarck sur I'exercice de leur neutrality. 
Je sais que le gouvernement anglais n'est pas prepare a 
se departir de ses anciennes maximes en mati^re de droit 
maritime ; mais je desire qu'au moins dans la pratique il 
mette sa conduite d'accord avec la notre, si la guerre vient 
a eclater. Tout prouve en effet que ce sera le meilleur 
moyen d'accroitre les sympathies que nous temoignent les 
deux Cours scandinaves, et a cause de notre bon droit dans 
la question generale, et a cause des exigences blessantes 
que le cabinet de Saint-Petersbourg a mises en avant 
aupr^s d'elles. La neutralite meme est un acte d'inde- 
pendance envers la Russie que leurs liens de famille et les 
6v6nements de ces dernieres annees rendent tres-meritoire 
et dont leur puissant voisin ne se dissimule pas le caract^re 
peu bienveillant. C'est done une attitude qui peut les 
rapprocher plus encore de nous dans certaines eventualites, 
et qu'il faut menager avec soin. Trop de rigueur au con- 
traire dans la surveillance des relations commercials que 
le pavilion marchand de la Suede et du Danemarck tachera 
d'entretenir avec les ports russes, pourrait refroidir des 



14 The Declaration of Paris 

sentiments qui sont en ce moment tels que nous devons les 
desirer et amener les discussions d'une nature facheuse. 
Je sais que la Su^de compte avec confiance sur la liberte 
du commerce sous pavilion neutre. 

Apparently the English answer was sent without having been 
communicated to France ; and a despatch from Mr Grey, of the 
30th January, shows that the French answer was not so explicit 
in its acceptance of the principles put forward by Sweden and 
Denmark, and did not give entire satisfaction. The non-receipt 
of the English reply is difficult to follow, as Lord Clarendon's 
despatch was dated the 20th January; it should have been 
received in Stockholm on the 30th. On the 6th February, 
however, the King of Sweden wished Mr Grey to report " the 
satisfaction of the Swedish Government at receiving so friendly 
a reply to their Declaration." There was another despatch, 
dated the 23rd February, which will be referred to presently. 

Mr Grey to Lord Clarendon. 
My Lord Stockholm, 30 Jan. 1854. 

Mr Lobstein, the French Minister, communicated on 
the 24th inst. to the Swedish Government the reply of the 
French Government to the Swedish Declaration of Neu- 
trality. The Government have expressed themselves as 
being satisfied with it as far as it goes, but they would have 
wished it to be more explicit, and I am informed that Count 
Lowenhielm, the Swedish Minister at Paris, will be instructed 
to apply for a further communication on the subject. 
Baron Stjerneld said to me to-day that he was most 
anxious to receive the reply of Her Majesty's Government, 
and begged me to write to Your Lordship to that effect. 
He said that the Swedish merchants were somewhat alarmed 
on account of the doubt which existed as to the course 
England would take as regards the privileges of the 
Neutral flag.^ 

^ Doubts as to the sincerity of the allies' promises in their Declarations 
seem to have been felt in Sweden. The United States Charg6 d' Affaires 
forwarded to the Secretary of State from Stockholm on the 10th April 
a translation of the new Swedish Ordinance [Docimaent No. 14 K] relative 
to contraband of war. His comments on the Declaration throw a cxirious 
light on the gratitude of neutrals for benefits received : 

" You will best know what reliance may be safely placed upon 
the equitable promises which have been held out to neutrals by the 
belligerent Powers ; seemingly triumphs of the enlightened age 
over historic reminiscences of war. It would Ul become me to offer 
an opinion of the realities to be looked for ; but the forebodings of 
the more intelligent men of the country weigh upon this commvmity ; 
and, although xinconfessed by Government, they are the real con- 
trolling influences in the Council of State." — [Dociunent No. 8 G.] 



Declarations of Neutrality of Scandinavian Powers 15 

It is difficult to reconcile all these inconsistencies. But the 
policy of a Government must be judged by its public statements. 
Even in January some of the problems of maritime law which 
the war would bring in its train must have been apparent. If 
war were declared, England and France would be in alliance : 
it would be in one of its aspects a maritime war : the principles 
of maritime law recognised by the two countries were not 
uniform. But, seeing that joint action was inevitable, con- 
sultation with our ally was essential. It was impossible 
for Lord Clarendon to take upon himself to assert that he 
intended to adhere to the traditional British belligerent policy 
of seizing enemy goods on neutral ships : equally impossible 
for him to accept the proposition that the principle asserted 
by the Scandinavian Powers was in conformity with the Law 
of Nations, or to say without further consideration that in the 
circumstances it would be acquiesced in. When the views of 
France had been ascertained, the policy which would be adopted 
during the war, should it break out, would then be decided. 
But Lord Clarendon adopted the one course which was in 
direct opposition to the traditional policy of the country ; and 
apparently without consulting the French Government. The 
Note had received the best attention of Her Majesty's Govern- 
ment, and he was " glad to express the satisfaction with which 
they have learned the neutral policy " which it was the intention 
of the Scandinavian Powers " to pursue," and the measures 
"adopted for giving effect to that policy." Her Majesty's 
Government did not doubt " that if war should unfortunately 
occur, the engagements taken will be strictly and honourably 
fulfilled," and would use their best endeavours *' in support of 
the neutral position" that these Powers proposed "to maintain." 

The matter was not referred to in Parliament until the 10th 
February, when the Earl of Ellenborough asked in the House 
of Lords whether any communication had been received from 
the Scandinavian Powers "as to their intentions with respect 
to their utter neutrality, or modified neutrality, in the event of 
hostilities occurring in the Baltic." Lord Clarendon replied : — 

Yes, they have announced their intention of preserv- 
ing a strict and perfect neutrality, and given a list of ports 
and fortified places to which ships of war of the belligerents 
could not be admitted. Our answer was that we approve 
the system of policy which they propose to adopt, and the 
manner in which they intend to carry it out. I may also 
say that we shall respect that neutrality. 

In answer to a further question whether " exception had 
been taken with respect to certain Baltic ports essential to the 



16 The Declaration of Paris 

practical action of our fleet," as "we stood on great inequality 
with Russia, whose fleet could shelter in her own ports in stress 
of weather, while we had no refuge at hand," Lord Clarendon 
said that, " no exception has been taken by us to any part 
of the communication, and the naval authorities were consulted 
before our answer was sent." He added that great exception 
had, however, been taken by Russia. The House being still 
in the dark as to the nature of the communication, papers were 
asked for on the 13th February, and there being no objection, 
the Scandinavian notifications, together with the answers, were 
issued in a White Paper.^ 

The terms used in these despatches are worthy of note. 
Sweden and Denmark had informed the prospective belligerents 
that they as neutrals intended to adopt certain principles, 
asserted to be in conformity with the Law of Nations, which 
would assure to them certain advantages. Lord Clarendon 
expressed satisfaction with the policy, and the measures adopted 
for giving effect to that policy, and stated that the British 
Government would support the neutral position which these 
States proposed to maintain, and had taken no exception to 
any part of the communication. So far as concerned the obliga- 
tions which neutrality imposes on non-belligerents, the terms 
used by Sweden and Denmark were justified ; but so far as the 
advantages which a neutral would derive from it, the last word 
rests with the belligerents. In Lord Clarendon's opinion, how- 
ever, it is permissible for neutral Governments to lay down prin- 
ciples on which belligerents are to conduct the war in so far as the 
commerce of those neutrals may be affected. And, further, the 
principle which Sweden and Denmark required the belligerents 
to adopt was " free ships free goods." It is therefore clear that 
Lord Clarendon, after full warning of the intention of these 
Powers to claim the benefit of the principle, and after full con- 
sideration, had adopted this principle by the middle of January. 

Lord Clarendon appears to have consulted Lord Cranworth, 
the Lord Chancellor, whose view was that the attitude of Sweden 
and Denmark was " one of which we cannot complain." The 
Queen's Advocate was Sir J. D. Harding. 

Lord Cranworth to Lord Clarendon. 

40 Upper Brook Street, 
16 J any. 1854. 
My dear Lord Clarendon, 

I send you back the Swedish and Danish Declarations 
of Neutrality, with the Queen's Advocate's opinion on 

^ Document No. 1. 



Declarations of Neutrality of Scandinavian Powers 17 

them. There can be no doubt but that he is right in saying 
that the course of conduct which Sweden and Denmark 
prescribe for themselves will be one of perfect neutrality, 
and one of which we cannot complain. I doubt whether in 
such circumstances it would be wise to ask these States to 
modify the regulations which they have proposed for them- 
selves. But this must depend on the degree of disadvantage 
which, in a naval and military point of view, we shall be 
likely to incur from having the ports in question left open 
to both belligerents. Unless it is very apparent, I should 
be inclined not to interfere with their own proposals. 

It would be very desirable to get these States to treat 
coal as contraband of war. It is not, as I believe, one of the 
articles so agreed to be treated in the existing conventions, 
and, if I am right, then it is hy treaty an article which is not 
contraband of war. If they will not agree to add it to the 
articles now forbidden as contraband, it will be for considera- 
tion whether the altered state of things since the dates of 
the existing treaties, does not warrant us in saying we shall, 
in spite of the treaties, prevent its importation into an 
enemy's port. But this would be a strong measure, and 
not to be resorted to until all other measures fail. I think 
you should ascertain what are the existing treaties with 
Sweden and Denmark (if any) as to what articles are and 
what are not contraband. The Queen's Advocate would, 
I dare say, tell you at once. — Very truly Yours, 

Cranworth. 

I have so far considered the Scandinavian declarations of 
neutrality solely as an incident which preceded the outbreak 
of the war with Russia, and from these points of view : their 
prematurity, their pretensions, and the acceptance of these 
pretensions by Lord Clarendon. There^ is another and more 
important aspect — ^their historical relation, already hinted at, to 
the Armed Neutralities. In the manner of putting forward 
the claim, in the assumption that these two Kings were the 
infallible interpreters of the Law of Nations, these documents 
were so reminiscent of the claims made, and of the manner of 
the documents issued by the League of the Northern Neutrals, 
that their inspiration must have been palpable even to the 
least profound student of history.^ There was more ; it was the 
traditional attitude of Sweden towards Great Britain at war. 

At the outbreak of the war in 1793, in accordance with their 
plan for isolating revolutionary France, Sweden, with other 

^ See vol. i. of this series — The Documentary History of the Armed 
Neutralities ; and vol. v., where the history of the Leagues will be dealt 
with at length. 

2 



18 The Declaration of Paris 

countries, had been invited by Russia and Great Britain to join 
their aUiance. The offer was rejected, the King's intention 
to preserve the strictest neutrahty being conveyed through 
Holland. But rumours getting abroad in Haarlem and other 
towns giving an erroneous interpretation of his attitude, an 
instruction on the subject was issued by the King renewing his 
intention of observing " la neutralite la plus stricte tant envers 
les Puissances combinees qu'envers la France." The document ^ 
concluded with this sentence : — 

Sa Majeste attend de meme, que le Pavilion Suedois 
sera duement respecte durant la presente guerre, et en 
suffrira pas la moindre insulte, mais au contraire eprouvera 
toute assistance possible, et ne sera point trouble dans ce 
commerce, auquel un pavilion neutre est autorise. 

There is no mistaking the meaning of this declaration ; it 
was an intimation that Sweden expected the belligerents to 
respect the principle " free ships free goods." The intention 
expressed by Sweden and Denmark in their convention of 1794 
to protect their ships in the exercise of rights based on treaties, 
or founded in the Droit des Gens Universel, " dont la jouissance 
ne sauroit etre disputee a des Nations neutres et independantes," ^ 
was a more circuitous method of saying the same thing. 

In the earliest stages, therefore, of the story of the Declara- 
tion of Paris, Lord Clarendon put himself in this dilemma : either 
he had forgotten the history of our troubles with the neutrals 
in 1780 and 1800, or he had deliberately ignored it in favour of 
the new opinions which had begun at this time to gain ground — 
that our policy during those periods was wrong, and the neutral 
contentions right. It seems probable that the new policy was 
deliberately adopted. It is not surprising that it was vigorously 
attacked by those who believed that England's position in the 
world depended, and rightly depended, on the principles on 
which her belligerent action was based. 

* Swedish Declaration of Neutrality, 5th March 1793. De Martens, 
RecueU, v. p. 237 : (2nd ed.) v. p. 567. 

* Convention, 27th March 1794, art. iv. ; De Martens, RecueU, v. p. 274 : 
(2nd ed.) v. p. 606. 



The General Position, 1853-54 19 

II 

The General Position, 1853-54. 

A. — The Other Neutrals. 

The declarations of neutrality issued by the Scandinavian 
Powers were too much infected with the spirit of the Armed 
Neutralities for this question not to present itself to other 
neutral Governments — Were they not bound in their own 
interests to follow the lead ? Indeed, the formation of an 
armed neutrality by the German States seems at one time to 
have been considered possible.^ 

Yet another unusual question arose. It is the right of 
nations that are not parties to the quarrel to remain neutral : 
it is customary for them to make a formal statement of their 
intentions. But the premature issue of these declarations, 
stating the conditions which the belHgerents were required to 
observe towards these neutrals, gave them an opportunity to 
say whether they agreed ; and they did, in fact, answer as if the 
declarations were in order. But then, almost inevitably, this 
led to discussion whether the answers received from the belli- 
gerents were satisfactory. The Russian answer was considered 
unsatisfactory. The neutrals were thus allowed to take charge. 
The records are incomplete and do not throw too much light on 
this curious position ; and the general principles of neutrality 
are confused with the question already alluded to, the closing 
of the Baltic ports. The geographical position of the Scandi- 
navian countries, lying midway between the belligerents in the 
northern area of the conflict, the proximity of Sweden to Russia, 
the certainty that there would be fighting in the Baltic, made 
the question of the neutral ports one of grave concern to both 
belligerents as well as to the neutral countries. In the absence 
of any definite guiding principle, a triangular discussion became 
inevitable between nations who were not yet neutrals and nations 
who were not yet belligerents ; and it was accentuated by the 
efforts made by each belligerent to invest the neutrality of 
the other States of Europe with the appearance of friendliness 
to its cause. For the allies had persuaded themselves that they 
were embarking on a holy war ; and, though the invitation to 
other countries to join them in the crusade was not so formal as 
that given by England and Russia to join the alliance against re- 
volutionary France, the hope that their neutrality might at least 
be benevolent was conveyed par voie diplomatique. M. Drouyn 

1 See p. 20. 



20 The Declaration of Paris 

de Lhuys, in a Memoire ^ published in 1868, referring to the 
joint poHcy which was clearly traced for the allies, says : 
*' Elles devraient done veiller a ce que rien dans leur conduite 
ne vint blesser les neutralites bienveillantes qu'elles desiraient 
transformer en concours avoue." On the part of Russia there 
were counter-efforts to eliminate from it anything in the nature 
of covert friendliness, and make it " rigorous." Prussia and 
Austria were the uncertain factors in the situation. Nominally 
they were linked by the common interests of the Germanic 
Confederation of which Austria was the leading Power, but 
the long-standing elements of discord between them affected 
the discussions. Austria very early in the year had proposed 
to Prussia that the smaller States of Europe should be invited 
to associate themselves with the two leading German Powers 
in a declaration of neutrality, urging the necessity of consolidat- 
ing the whole of Central Europe into one united body whose 
combined military force would enable it to withstand an 
attack from any quarter. Baron Manteuffel seems to have 
treated this suggestion as referring to political neutrality, and 
to have ignored any commerical bearing which might have been 
intended. He replied that "the concert and the union which 
was most efficacious was that of the four Powers [England, 
France, Austria, and Prussia] which was at present most com- 
pletely attained in the Congress at Vienna." Lord Clarendon 
learned of this answer with much satisfaction. 

The King of Prussia was wavering : firm while he relied on 
his Foreign Minister, Baron Manteuffel ; weak when his brother- 
in-law, the Czar, used his influence over him, which he did 
without remorse. For the Scandinavian Powers a joint declara- 
tion of neutrality from Prussia and Austria would evidently be 
a source of strength. It was the policy of the Czar to separate 
them. Sir Augustus Loftus reported from Berlin on the 2nd 
December that the King's rejection of the joint declaration 
had given rise to the suspicion that he " was about to take an 
opposite course of action to Austria with regard to the Eastern 

1 The Memoire read before the Acad^mie des Sciences Morales et 
Politiques by M. Drouyn de Lhuys in April 1868, is entitled " Les Neutres 
pendant la Guerrd d' Orient." It contained a full account of the negotia- 
tions between England and France from January to March 1854, relative to 
the Declaration issued to the neutrals at the outbreak of war, together 
with copies of his own despatches to Count Walewski, French Ambassador 
in London. Copies of the pamplilet have entirely disappeared in England ; 
but I was fortunate enough to obtain a copy from Paris through the exer- 
tions of my friend Mr J. T. B. Sewell, Solicitor to the British Embassy. 
Subsequently I discovered that a translation of it had been included in 
the Appendix to the Report of the Royal Commission on Neutrality, pub- 
lished in 1868. Mr David Urquhart wrote of it with characteristic 
vehemence in the Diplomatic Review. 



The General Position, 1853-54 21 

question." For Prussia the success of either side would be 
the inevitable prelude of the reconstitution of the kingdom of 
Poland. The British Ambassador had no fear that the King 
would place himself at the mercy of Russia so long as Baron 
Manteuffel remained at the head of affairs ; " but the Russian 
party at Court had lately brought great pressure to bear on 
the King and others, by describing the danger to which Prussia 
would be exposed if she did not make common cause with the 
Emperor Nicholas." At a special interview Baron Budberg 
pressed the Russian case with so much success that Baron 
Manteuffel interrupted the conversation, asking the King how 
Russia would prevent the 1200 Prussian ships which were 
dispersed over the world from being captured by British 
cruisers, and how Russia would prevent the destruction that 
would no doubt instantly fall on the Prussian ports in the Baltic, 
of which sea the English would soon be masters. He thought 
that instead of the Emperor coming to the defence of Prussia, 
he would probably be unable to defend himself, and his capital 
would not be safe. The Czar wrote privately to the King, 
" and used arguments almost amounting to menaces if he would 
not agree to some distinct declaration of neutrality." More 
astutely he requested the services of some Prussian officers, 
which were, however, refused. The King had shown great 
distrust of England, and had caused the British Government to 
be informed that he could not go against Russia " if England 
continued in the path which she was now doing " — her high- 
handed demand that Russia should withdraw from the Danubian 
Principalities. Her Majesty's Government expressed disappoint- 
ment that Prussia was not prepared to go to war, but hoped 
she would be influenced by the conduct of Austria. The 
utmost that Baron Manteuffel could promise was that Prussia 
might be depended on to strike a decisive blow later. So the 
King wavered to and fro — " a reed shaken by the wind," as 
the Prince Consort described him to Baron Stockmar — as fear 
of Russia and distrust of England alternately got the upper 
hand : between alliance with Russia, individual neutrality, 
joint neutrality. When joint neutrality seemed almost inevit- 
able, Count Orloff was instructed to endeavour to induce Prussia 
and Austria " to bind themselves by a declaration that what- 
ever the consequences of their neutrality might be, nothing 
should make them take part against Russia." ^ 

^ Ultimately, on the 20th April 1854, Austria and Prussia entered into 
a treaty mutually guaranteeing each other's territories, and agreeing to 
give mutual assistance in case of aggression. An invitation was to be 
issued to all Governments of the German Confederation to accede. In 
an additional article it was declared that Austria and Prussia regarded 



22 The Declaration of Paris 

The joint neutrahty of Austria and Prussia being essential, 
the King of Sweden, urged by the Crown Prince, and possibly 
encouraged by Austria, decided to send a message to the Diet 
" asking for supplies to enable him to take the necessary 
measures to maintain the declaration of neutrality." Declara- 
tions of neutrality in theory fell within its province. But 
Denmark, represented in the Diet in respect of the Elbe Duchies, 
was uncertain as to the advisability of the step. The Ministry 
did not see how it would be of service in promoting the object 
of Austrja, and thought that a joint declaration of neutrality 
on the Eastern question by the Diet would never be obtained ; 
but it might save Denmark from embarrassment with regard to 
Holstein. The Diet did, in fact, adhere, on the 24th July 
1854, to the treaty of alliance between Austria and Prussia, 
concluded on the 20th April. ^ 

The attitude of the Crown Prince of Sweden was entirely 
favourable to the allies. He suggested that the best way of 
bringing the King of Prussia's wavering to an end would be 
to include the Prussian Baltic ports in the blockade ; supported 
France when she made the definite suggestion, a few days after 
the declaration of war, that Sweden should throw in her lot 
with the allies and recover the provinces wrested from her by 
the House of Holstein. A proclamation of neutrality was, 
after all, not necessarily permanent. 

Thus it came about that this premature declaration of 
neutrality before a state of belligerency existed, though ap- 
parently intended only to ensure the safety of neutral com- 
merce, developed into a question of a general European 
neutrality, stirring all the Chanceries to open up some of the 
most critical problems iri European politics. Smouldering ques- 
tions, which might or might not have been affected by the terms 
of the peace, were fanned into a flame before the war began. 

B. — The Relations between England and France. 

The interest of the question of belligerent and neutral centres 
in the relations of England and France. For good or evil they 
were allies. The alliance created two hostile currents of public 

the occupation of the Lower Danube by Rxissia as dangerous, but that 
they understood that the troops would be withdrawn in accordance with 
concessions made to the Christian subjects of the Porte. By a further 
separate article Austria was to request Russia to stop her invasion of 
Turkish territory, and to guarantee the evacuation of the Danubian 
Principalities. Prussia was to support the request, and should Russia refuse, 
the article of the treaty providing for mutual assistance in case of aggres- 
sion was to be put in force, 

* See Table of Historical Events at the commencement of the 
Docvunents. 



The General Position, 1853-54 23 

opinion. A strange influence pervaded non-political England in 
the middle of the nineteenth century, yielding to the glamour, 
indefinable but very real, of a memory, of a name — " Napoleon." 
The third Napoleon mantled himself with all the virtues of the 
First ; and the recognition, characteristically English, of the 
greatness of the great enemy they had at last vanquished, 
enabled him to manufacture the glamour that surrounded in 
this country the name he bore. The Emperor of the French 
and the English Prime Minister were " the idols of the public." 

But there was also strenuous unbelief in any hereditary 
virtues having descended to the " Man of December." The 
views of those who held this opinion find expression in Mr 
Herbert Paul's bitter statement that " England was not her 
own mistress, but was tied and bound, not to France, but to 
the man who had made France his own." ^ That sardonic 
historian declared that for the purpose of these negotiations 
Palmerston was as much Napoleon's Minister as Walewski 
himself.^ How far the English Ambassador was under the in- 
fluence of the French Minister of Foreign Affairs we shall be able 
to judge when we come to deal with the negotiations between 
the allies in regard to their attitude towards the neutrals. There 
is an uncomfortable humility about Lord Cowley's own version 
of his discussions with M. Drouyn de Lhuys which makes the 
reading of his despatches most unsatisfactory. But whatever 
were the undercurrents, French opinion was clear : the world 
was to be impressed with the solidarity of the alliance. " On 
se rappelle," writes M. Drouyn in his Memoire, " le prodigieux 
^lan de ces jours de resolution 6nergique et de cordiale confiance. 
Les gouvernements, animes du meme esprit qui entrainait les 
deux nations I'une vers I'autre, s'attachaient a faire dis- 
paraitre, au profit de la civilisation et de I'humanite, les traces 
de divisions seculaires." And all means which could promote 
its success were taken. The Consular officers of the two nations, 
the Consuls of their respective colonies, and their naval officers, 
were to give reciprocal protection to each other's subjects in 
different parts of the world ^ : — " Ainsi, aux yeux des nations 
6trangeres, la France et I'Angleterre confondaient leurs dra- 
peaux." On one point only there seemed to be a possibility 
of friction. When war should be declared there would be joint 
action at sea ; but the laws of the two countries differed radically 
on fundamental points of prize law. England seized enemy 
property on the sea, but paid great respect to neutral property ; 
if the enemy property was ships they were seized, and any 

^ Herbert Paul, History of Modern England, vol. ii. p. 6. 
• Document No. 3. 



24 The Declaration of Paris 

neutral property on board was restored to its proprietors ; if 
the enemy property was cargo and the ship neutral, the cargo 
was confiscated and the ship released with freight. France, 
on the other hand, since 1778, had paid more regard to the flag 
than to the property carried under it. If the flag was neutral, 
the cargo, even if it belonged to the enemy, was allowed to 
pass ; if the flag was enemy, the cargo, even if it belonged to 
neutrals, was confiscated. France believed in the virtue of one 
formula — " free ships free goods," but took the benefit of 
another, " enemy ships enemy goods." England asserted the 
bare fact — she seized enemy property. How were these con- 
flicting principles to be reconciled, and the two fleets act in 
harmony ? 

This is not the moment to discuss the merits of the respective 
principles ; it was not the moment, in M. Drouyn de Lhuys' 
opinion, to discuss them on the eve of war : " I'opposition . . . 
^tait tellement radicale, qu'en les dressant les uns en regard 
des autres, on se condamnait a une contradiction sans issue." ^ 
A compromise was essential, because the action of fleets acting 
in concert must be uniform. A compromise, a common de- 
claration, if only the rHaction could be successfully settled, 
would be more satisfactory to all parties concerned, especially 
the neutrals. It would redound to the glory of the alliance 
if they could achieve " une seule declaration . . . qui, en 
constatant mieux notre parfait accord, frapperait plus forte- 
ment les esprits." 

C. — ^Political Opinion in England. 

In the letter which M. Drouyn de Lhuys wrote, 4th January 
1854, to Count Walewski, French Ambassador in London,^ he 
said that he had reason to think, " d'apr^s un commencement 
de polemique que j'ai remarque dans les journaux anglais," that 
the commercial world in England was unfavourable to the 
rigorous application of the ancient doctrines of her maritime 
law.* 

It would be out of place here to attempt to analyse the 
various springs from which the different political parties in 
England drew their inspiration ; but it is material to note how 
far that inspiration conduced to the acceptance of the Declara- 
tion of Paris, and there are certain facts, to be developed in due 

^ This sentence in the Memoire is quoted in full on p. 28. 
* This letter is set out on p. 13. 

' I have unfortunately been unable to trace the discussion referred to 
in the file either of The Times or of the Manchester Chmrdian. 



The General Position, 1853-54 25 

course, which throw Hght upon the question. The most impor- 
tant fact to note is that pubhc opinion as a whole did not support 
it ; it cannot claim to accord with what is called the " trend of 
political thought." Nor, except in so far as party supports its 
leaders in accepting the accomplished fact, can it be said to 
have been treated as a party question. It seems rather to have 
been the result of the coalition of different sections of thinkers, 
each acting under the influence of temperament released from 
the hard pressure of fact. On the merits of the war itself 
the public supported the policy of the Cabinet, but there was 
a small section bitterly hostile. As to the method of con- 
ducting war at sea there was a considerable division of opinion, 
and it was here that temperament ultimately got the better of 
sound judgment based on knowledge of the necessities of war. 

The forty years of peace had influenced men's minds in 
different ways. Those who called themselves practical men of 
business espoused the cause of commerce. To the Manchester 
school successful commerce was the noblest aim of existence, 
its creed that " the one object of foreign policy was the advance- 
ment of trade." To that school were allied the pacifists of those 
days, whose doctrine was parodied by the formula, " All war is 
wrong, therefore this war is wrong." More accurately, as 
proclaimed by its greatest exponent, John Bright, it took 
form in the belief that the blessings of peace being so great, 
the curses of war so terrible, man, as a reasonable being, when 
left undisturbed must naturally so yearn for peace that eventu- 
ally war would become impossible.^ 

But there were others with more dangerous views. As the 
facts receding into the distance became dimmer, they subjected 
the causes of past wars to cold analysis. Professing to search 
for right in the abstract, they assumed the semblance of wisdom, 
and were treated as philosophers. The tendency of such 
inquiries is towards self-examination, a process which detects 
flaws in one's own conduct, the conclusion almost inevitably 
taking the common form " perhaps after all we were wrong." 
The Philosophical Radicals, as they were curiously called, boldly 
passed 'from their legitimate occupation of bettering the people 
into the region of foreign relations, for which they were not 
too well equipped. Disregarding the facts of history, they did 
not hesitate to give their verdict against England. That which 
passes as " independence of thought " enabled them to assume 
an attitude of detachment from the affairs of their country, 
and this, coupled with an intense conviction in the virtues of 



^ See John Bright's speech in the debate of 1862 : " 1862," Chap. IV 



26 The Declaration of Paris 

the age in which they Hved, brought them to regard what others 
called the " glorious past " as an " age of barbarism." 

The biographies of these learned Radicals leave us in the 
dark as to the reasons which induced them to espouse the cause 
of the neutrals. Certainly neither the scientific method nor the 
historical research on which they prided themselves warranted 
the conclusions to which they came. It looks as if it were no 
more than a crude application of the doctrine that the criterion 
of right and wrong is the promotion of happiness of the greatest 
number. The neutrals represented the greatest number, their 
happiness depended on enhanced profits, therefore they were 
right. No sounder argument is discernible in the speeches of 
their spokesman, Sir William Molesworth. 

The Philosophical Radicals based their theories on Bentham. 
For Bentham war was " mischief on the largest scale " ; it was 
the greatest curse on the greatest number, and this was prob- 
ably the connecting link between the two sections of the Radicals. 
Gibraltar, they thought, was held contrary to " every law of 
morality and honour " ; and supremacy at sea meant arrogance 
and the assumption of dictatorial power, and the sooner it 
became obsolete the better.^ These ideas prepared their minds 
for acquiescing in the claims of the neutrals, who also asserted 
that England was the arrogant dictator of the seas. 

To these were added those, persistent in political life, who, 
not in the pride which apes humility, but in humility itself, 
believed that we were worse, not better, than other men. 

The Declaration of Paris was the product of temperament. 
The grave problems which it professed to settle were not argued 
on their merits in the open ; the two sides of the question were 
never discussed ; the conclusions were come to in secret. 

One result of these different currents of thought has already 
been emphasised. Consciously or unconsciously, the theories 
which the Armed Neutralities had put forward against England 
came to be acceptable to English politicians. Another still more 
curious result was that they accepted the story of the Napoleonic 
Wars in a humble, apologetic sort of way, and thought it their 
duty to the world to express contrition for our victory. These 
men deliberately advocated, though without acknowledging 
their authorship, as principles of the highest political morality, 
the very doctrines by which Bonaparte sought to wrest from 
England the supremacy of the sea, and reduce this presump- 
tuous little island to its true position of having no part nor lot 
in the destinies of Europe. 

* The English Radicals, C. B. Roylance Kent, p. 386. 



Discussion of Allies' Attitude towards Neutrals 27 



III 

Discussion between England and France as to the Prin- 
ciples of Maritime Law to be adopted during the War. 

The Scandinavian declarations of neutrality had made one 
thing perfectly clear : the question of the neutrals, traditionally 
difficult in our own belligerent relations with them, would be 
doubly difficult in a war, with France as our ally, on the sea as 
well as on the land. The two fleets had already operated to- 
gether. On the 2nd June 1853 Admiral Dundas had been 
ordered to sail from Malta to Besika Bay to join the French 
fleet and put himself under the orders of Stratford Canning, 
British Ambassador at Constantinople. On the 22nd October 
the two fleets had entered the Dardanelles, and on the 4th 
January they were in the Black Sea. Joint action at sea 
against Russia was inevitable should war break out ; it would 
not be fair to the neutrals if the laws on which their instruc- 
tions would be respectively based were radically different. 
The British fleet would stop neutral ships with enemy pro- 
perty on board, which the French fleet would let go on their 
courses ; the French fleet would seize neutral cargo on enemy 
merchantmen, which the British fleet would return to its 
owners. The neutrals would have a most legitimate grievance. 
All questions of their asserted rights apart, they were clearly 
entitled to know with certainty what would happen to them 
in the event of war. It was obvious that some arrangement 
must be come to before war was finally decided on. The 
French Government realised at once the importance of the 
question. In the two despatches set out in Chapter I.^ from 
the French Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador in 
London he betrays his anxiety. Count Walewski is to ascer- 
tain what are the views of the British Government on the sub- 
ject. He does not conceal his hope that public opinion in 
England may be coming round to the French view ; but his 
policy is uninfluenced by this hope ; there should be no discus- 
sion on the merits of the two systems. 

As was natural, the question formed the subject of many 
discussions " des les preniiers jours de Janvier " between M. 
Drouyn de Lhuys and Lord Cowley, British Ambassador in 
Paris, the substance of which were given by him in the Memoire 
already referred to. 

^ See p. 13. 



28 The Declaration of Paris 

M. Drouyn dwelt on the importance of a public manifesta- 
tion of agreement for the purposes of the war between the two 
countries on a question of such great moment as their relations 
with the neutral Powers. In order to achieve this end the 
enunciation of absolute principles was to be avoided, " car 
I'opposition entre ceux que I'Angleterre maintenait avec une 
Anergic traditionelle, et ceux que nous faisions gloire de defendre, 
^tait tellement radicale, qu'en les dressant les uns en regard 
des autres, on se condamnait a une contradiction sans issue." 
It was necessary to find some ground of common action ; these 
particular theories could be reserved, and only considered in 
case of need. This was only possible on one condition : 

C'est que chacun renon9at au moins pour la dur6e de 
la guerre, a user des facult^s que I'un des deux s'estimait 
permises, mais que proscrivait I'autre. II est concevable 
en effet que, sans repudier un droit, sans se departir d'une 
pretention, Ton s'abstienne pour un temps de les faire valoir, 
tandis qu'on ne saurait, sans inconsequence, exercer meme 
exceptionnellement des actes dont on conteste la legitimite. 
Ce mode de transaction, laissant intactes les doctrines, ne 
heurtait aucun principe, ne soulevait aucun embarras. 
Destine d'ailleurs a etre accueilH avec reconnaissance par 
les puissances non belligerantes, il etait conforme aux 
interets comme aux intentions liberales des allies. 

This would mean the abandonment of certain privileges 
claimed by the French marine, but it would be in harmony 
with the national traditions, always favourable to the rights of 
neutrals and the freedom of the seas. The general situation, 
M. Drouyn said, encouraged us to take this course. European 
opinion was for the most part favourable to France and England 
marching to the assistance of an oppressed ally ; this was in 
itself an element of strength, which might possibly, in the times 
to come, be developed into a still more effective assistance. 
It would enable the alliance to be thrown open to all States 
which might desire to adhere. The allies were bound, therefore, 
to do nothing to wound a benevolent neutrality which they 
desired to transform into an open assistance. 

The German Courts would have, M. Drouyn thought, a 
considerable influence on the progress of events, but they had 
been for too long under the ascendancy of Russia ; great and 
little States were attached to her by many bonds. Prudence 
counselled us to be careful in our dealings with Prussian 
commerce ; it counselled us similarly in regard to the Scandi- 
navian Powers, owing to their geographical position, which made 



Discussion of Allies' Attitude towards Neutrals 29 

their friendship precious, their hostility disturbing, to both 
parties. The memories of the Armed Neutralities — " ces deux 
grandes manifestations " — were among the principal traditions 
which bound Stockholm and Copenhagen to Petersburg. If 
we revived these old pretensions might we not revive the old 
resistance, and throw into the arms of Russia the nations which 
in those days had acted on her instigation ? The United States 
caused us similar preoccupation. Russia had made a bid for 
its sympathy, and was in agreement with that Government as 
to the interpretation of the law of the sea, for the Republic of the 
New World from all time had maintained the rights of the 
neutral flag. Was it wise to give our enemy an opportunity of 
rallying the United States to its side and turning her against us ? 
The reference in the Memoire to these political arguments 
concludes with this ominous sentence, which contains the key 
to the policy of secrecy adopted by the Cabinet : — 

L'Angleterre n'etait pas insensible a ces considerations, 
mais elle les combattait en alleguant I'impossibilite ou 
serait son gouvernement d'abandonner, en face du paySy 
les regies inviolables de son vieux droit maritime. 

It would appear, however, that Lord Cowley had dwelt 
particularly on the British Government's fear that the United 
States would go against us and lend her seamen to Russia. 
In order to prevent this danger arising, and to conciliate the 
American Government, the Cabinet had submitted, not only 
to the States, but to France and to all the maritime Powers, a 
proposal to enter into an agreement for the suppression of 
privateers, declaring that in event of war any one furnished with 
letters of marque would be treated as a pirate. In a letter 
to Lord Shaftesbury, Lord Clarendon claimed to be the author 
of this proposal, but the idea seems to have been abandoned. 
In regard to it M. Drouyn says that while France agreed that 
privateering ought to be abolished as inconsistent with the 
customs of civilised nations, she thought nevertheless that it 
was desirable to ensure at the same time similar progress in 
other branches of the law of the sea. In his recollections of 
the conversation M. Drouyn adds this reflection, that the 
common practice which we proposed that the allies should 
adopt in this war with Russia seemed to us the best step that 
could be taken towards bringing about a collective reform on 
many points which in our opinion were correlative one with 
the other. The opinion of the French Government is noted 
at this place, because it had an undoubted bearing on the agree- 
ment arrived at after the war in 1856. It must be observed, 



30 The Declaration of Paris 

however, that nowhere during the negotiations in 1854 was 
the point insisted on. On the contrary, M. Drouyn de Lhuys' 
poHcy throughout was to keep this opinion in the background. 

Conversations on such an important question would natur- 
ally be reported to London by the Ambassador ; as M. Drouyn 
suggests in one of his despatches, there must have been daily 
letters. The only document that a thorough search in the 
Public Record Office has disclosed is a despatch from Lord 
Cowley to the Foreign Office, dated the 9th February 1854, and 
the general tenor of it shows unmistakeably that it was the first 
written record of the impression left on Lord Cowley's mind 
of what M. Drouyn had said to him, and of his recollection of 
his OAvn replies. The despatch and Lord Clarendon's reply 
were as follow : — 



Lord Cowley to Lord Clarendon. 
150. 

Paris, Feb. 9th, 1854. 
My Lord, 

I have had some conversation with M. Drouyn de 
Lhuys on the delicate subject of the rights of neutral 
Powers. It appears that some of the smaller States, pos- 
sibly prompted by Russia, who knows the differences of 
opinion which exist between Great Britain and France on 
the subject of these rights, have either intimated to the 
French Government their intention to remain neutral, or 
have asked advice of the French Government whether they 
should declare themselves neutral or not. M. Drouyn de 
Lhuys informed me with great frankness and friendliness 
of manner of the language which he had held, and which 
he had since introduced into a circular sent to the French 
Missions abroad. He had strongly dissuaded, he said, 
any of those States from making any declaration of neutral- 
ity. In the first place they would remain neutral, he ob- 
served, without declaring themselves to be so. Nine times 
out of ten a declaration of neutrality implied partiality for, 
and was intended to be favourable to, one of the belligerents. 
Secondly, he argued, that it would be a dangerous proceed- 
ing for the smaller States to put forth declarations, which 
might provoke counter-declarations on the part of any one 
of the belligerents. If it was hoped to sow dissensions be- 
tween France and England by raising questions on which 
it was known they were not agreed the plotters would be 
disappointed, for both nations would know how to regulate 
their conduct in respect of this matter so as not to impede 
the prosecution of the common object which they had in 
view. Thirdly, the less the smaller Powers put forward 



Discussion of Allies' Attitude towards Neutrals 81 

their opinions on this subject, the more likely was the war 
to be confined to the East. If divisions became apparent 
among the European Powers, if some were tacitly neutral 
and others declared themselves to be so, if some put forward 
one doctrine and others another, the revolutionary party 
would profit by these dissensions to advance their own 
schemes, and a war would be kindled of which no one could 
foresee the end, whereas unanimity on the part of the 
Western States would confine the seat of war to the East. 
Lastly, it would be impolitic in neutral Powers to make de- 
clarations, when France, the great champion of the rights 
of neutrals, could not and would not take part with them. 

It might be argued, M. Drouyn de Lhuys continued, 
that this language had not been held to Sweden and Den- 
mark, but the case was not the same. England and France 
now knew that that declaration had been made partly from 
a desire to escape from the pressure of Russia in a different 
sense upon those two Governments, and it could not be 
denied further that if war broke out, it was more than 
likely that some of the principal operations would be 
carried on in the Baltic, and consequently in the immediate 
neighbourhood of those countries. 

Nothing could be more amicable than the language 
with which M. Drouyn de Lhuys treated this very delicate 
question with me, and particularly the points on which he 
thought I might take umbrage. He said that the two 
countries must be mutually forbearing, that France would 
abstain from asserting any principles to which we could 
not assent, and that he was sure that we would not have 
recourse to measures calculated to provoke discussion. 
He had no doubt that Russia counted upon setting the two 
Governments at variance upon this point, and he had as 
little doubt that she would be disappointed. 

I said that I was sure that your Lordship would do 
full justice to the frank and loyal manner in which M. 
Drouyn de Lhuys had expressed himself, and that every 
precaution would be taken by Your Lordship's Government 
to prevent the question of the rights of neutrals becoming 
a source of entanglement to any future operations under- 
taken by the Government in common. 

Lord Clarendon to Lord Cowley. 

87. Confidential. 

,, T Feb. lUh, 1854. 

My Lord, 

Her Majesty's Government have learnt with extreme 

satisfaction, from your Lordship's despatch. No. 150, the 

frank and friendly manner in which M. Drouyn de Lhuys 



32 The Declaration of Paris 

has discussed with you a question upon which so much 
difference has existed between the two countries, and upon 
which no doubt in various quarters the hope of future dis- 
sension is founded ; but nothing will more tend to frus- 
trate such expectations than the wise and judicious advice 
given by M. Drouyn de Lhuys to those States which have 
sought the opinion of the French Government respecting their 
neutrality. Her Majesty's Government approve and confirm 
the assurances which Your Excellency gave to M. Drouyn 
de Lhuys, who may rely that upon this particular question, 
as in all others, no effort on the part of Her Majesty's 
Government will ever be wanting to preserve the perfect 
harmony that now exists between France and England. 

It is difficult to believe that Lord Cowley's despatch refers 
to the same conversation which M. Drouyn has reported, and 
which is supported by the despatches printed in his Memoire. 
Its contents seem to indicate that Lord Cowley's memory must 
have been singularly at fault. The first statement is difficult 
to follow. Do Governments, either of small States or large, 
ask the advice of a country on the verge of going to war, much 
less of one of two countries in alliance, " whether they should 
declare themselves neutral or not " ? If they had, would a 
statesman of M. Drouyn's experience have given them the 
advice attributed to him : that a declaration of neutrality, 
nine times out of ten, " implied partiality for, and was intended 
to be favourable to, one of the belligerents " : that it would be 
dangerous for them " to put forth declarations which might 
provoke counter-declarations on the part of any one of the 
belligerents " : and that " the less the smaller Powers put 
forward their opinions, the more likely was the war to be con- 
fined to the East " ? Sweden and Denmark had not sought 
advice ; nor had their declarations provoked counter-declara- 
tions. They had indeed been singularly successful in obtaining 
recognition of their own views of neutrality. 

The rest of the despatch, which relates to the relations 
between England and France " on the delicate subject of the 
rights of neutral Powers," is most disconcerting. It is difficult 
to understand the frame of mind of a British Ambassador who 
could find it necessary to emphasise the fact that the language 
used by the French Foreign Secretary was " amicable," that 
he had expressed himself in a " frank and loyal " manner, 
particularly in regard to " the points on which he thought I 
might take umbrage " ; or what grounds he had for adopting 
without any qualification, or at least reporting without comment 
M. Drouyn's statement that France was " the great champion 



Discussion of Allies' Attitude towards Neutrals 33 

of the rights of neutrals." These remarks create the impression 
that Lord Cowley read into M. Drouyn's conversation a homily 
on the impropriety of England's conduct in the past, and that 
it found an echo in his own conscience, weighted with a sense 
of the national guilt. Lord Cowley evidently belonged to that 
school of thought to which reference has already been made, 
which held England to have been in the wrong, and the neutrals 
in the right, in their old disputes, and whose adherents after- 
wards openly proclaimed their views in Parliament. 

With regard to the law of France, although " free ships 
free goods " was incorporated into it in 1778, so long as she 
maintained " enemy ships enemy goods " she denied the right of 
free commerce with the enemy, as much as England did, when 
it tended to the assistance of the enemy. France's historical 
position will be fully examined in subsequent volumes. It was 
no more than this, that as a belligerent she found the principles 
advocated by the neutrals suited her purpose, and she sup- 
ported them. But that was forty years before these friendly 
conversations. There is no correspondence on record to show 
that this question of the neutrals had ever been discussed be- 
tween France and England after 1815. France might certainly 
have entered a protest, as a potential neutral, when Canning 
refused to ratify a treaty negotiated with Brazil which con- 
tained a " free ships free goods " clause, and with character- 
istic emphasis asserted our ancient principle.^ 

But diplomatists equally matched do not " take umbrage " 
at what is said when they are discussing wars in which their 
countries were involved nearly half a century before. It is 
quite consistent with perfect friendship for each courteously to 
maintain that his country was right in the past, and to pass 
on to the more important questions of the present. 

The most extraordinary thing, however, is that, according 
to M. Drouyn's version of their conversation, these remarks 

^ "The riile of maritime law which Great Britain has always held on 
this subject is the ancient law and usage of nations ; but it differs from 
that put forth by France and the Northern Powers of Eiu-ope, and that 
which the United States were constantly endeavouring to establish. 
England had braved confederacies and sustained wars rather than give 
up this principle ; and whenever, in despair of getting the British Govern- 
ment to surrender it by force, recourse had been had to proposals of 
amicable negotiations for the purpose of defining, limiting, or qualifying 
the exercise of the right of search, Great Britain had uniformly declined 
all such overtures from a conviction of the impracticability of qualifying, 
limiting, or even defining in terms that would be acceptable to the other 
party the exercise of a right without impairing, if not sacrificing, the 
right itself." — (From Canning's despatch to Sir Charles Stewart: quoted 
by Lord Derby, 22nd May 1856. Hansard, cxlii. col. 53.) 

3 



84 The Declaration of Paris 

were not made. They are inconsistent with the poUcy which 
he had decided to adopt, not to raise any question on the 
respective merits of the two laws, and the subsequent corre- 
spondence shows that he loyally abided by that decision. 

But, taking M. Drouyn's own version of the conversations 
as accurate, there were many historical points on which Lord 
Cowley could have set M. Drouyn right. 

He might have reminded him that, so far from the memories 
of the Armed Neutralities being among the principal traditions 
which bound Stockholm to Petersburg, Sweden and Russia had 
been at war soon after the League of 1780 had been dissolved, 
and each had abandoned the famous principles. He might 
have reminded him that, so far had the Republic of the New 
World been from maintaining " from all time " the rights of 
the neutral flag, the principle of seizing enemy property on 
neutral ships had been expressly recognised in the Jay Treaty 
with England in 1796. He might have reminded him too of 
Jefferson's well-known answer to France : — 

The French complain " that the English take French 
goods out of American vessels, which is " said to be " against 
the law of nations, and ought to be prevented by us. On 
the contrary, we suppose it to have been long an established 
principle of the law of nations, that the goods of a friend 
are free in an enemy's vessel, and an enemy's goods lawful 
prize in the vessel of a friend. The inconvenience of this 
principle . . . has induced several nations latterly to stipulate 
against it by treaty, and to substitute another in its stead 
that free bottoms shall make free goods. ... As far as it 
has been introduced, it depends on the treaties stipulat- 
ing it, and forms exceptions in special cases to the general 
operation of the law of nations. We have introduced it 
in our treaties with France, Holland, and Prussia ; the 
French goods found by the latter nations in American 
bottoms are not made prize of. It is our wish to establish 
it with other nations. But this requires their consent also, 
as a work of time ; and in the meanwhile they have a right 
to act on the general principle, without giving to us, or to 
France, cause of complaint." ^ 

There was also the earlier despatch from Secretary of State 
Pinckney to the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, dated the 
27th January 1789 :— 

According to the law of nations, the goods of an enemy 
found on board the ship of a friend are liable to capture, 

1 Letter from Mr Jefferson to M. Genet, 24th July 1793 ; see Letters of 
Hiaioricus, p. 79. 



Discussion of Allies' Attitude towards Neutrals 35 

and the goods of a friend found on board the ship of an 
enemy are safe. The United States and France have con- 
sented to change this rule as between themselves. They 
have agreed that the goods of an enemy found on board 
the vessels of either party shall be safe, and that the goods 
of either found on board the vessel of an enemy shall be 
liable to capture. The one part of this rule is in conse- 
quence of and dependent on the other. The one part cannot 
on any principle of justice be abandoned while the other 
is maintained. In the treaty with England the United 
States retain unchanged the law of nations. 

The reference of M. Drouyn de Lhuys to the proposal made 
by the British Government to the maritime Powers to abolish 
privateering is borne out by a letter from Lord Clarendon to 
Lord Shaftesbury, written on the 2nd March 1854,^ in which 
he says : — 

I take exactly your view of Letters of Marque, and 
I some time ago addressed myself privately to the Govern- 
ments of France and of the United States saying that, 
as we had been driven into the brutal and barbarous 
methods of settling differences, we should at least endeavour 
to mitigate its horrors, and thus pay homage to the civilisa- 
tion of the times we live in, and that I could see no reason 
why a licence should be given for robbery by sea, any more 
than by land, &c. &c.- 

The proposal has been met in a corresponding spirit, and 
I hope shortly to settle some change in international law, 
for that will be necessary ; but the three greatest maritime 
Powers of the world have a right to effect such a change in 
the interests of humanity. 

I am not yet prepared, however, to make any public 
announcement on the subject, because I wish, at the same 
time, with the privateering system, to bring our law, or 
rather practice, respecting neutral flags more in harmony 
with the practice and expressed wishes of other maritime 
nations. 

M. Drouyn himself might have written the last sentence. 
It expresses his views, as recorded many years afterwards, of 

* Hodder's Life oj Lord Shaftesbury, vol. ii. p. 467. 

' Lord Clarendon would appear to have had several conversations 
on the subject of abolishing privateering with the United States Minister. 
Mr Buchanan records one in his despatch already referred to, of the 24th 
March. The conversation was general, and Lord Clarendon did not 
propose the conclusion of a treaty for its suppression, though " it was 
evident that this was his drift." According to M. Drouyn de Lhuys, 
however, the proposal for a convention had already been made to all 
the maritime States some months previously. 



86 The Declaration of Paris 

what he had hoped ultimately to achieve, but which he thought 
it inadvisable to press the British Government to accept, and 
did not press till the war was over. And here was the British 
Foreign Secretary ready to accept the new doctrines, but not 
openly, not " in the face of the people." He is conducting the 
negotiations " privately," arid he tells M. Drouyn the reason — 
he dare not conduct them openly. 

This letter throws a flood of light on all the dark places in 
the story ; the absence of despatches in January ; the non- 
publication of anything that was ever written on the subject ; 
all the secrecy and the mystery that have surrounded it from 
that day to this. But although M. Drouyn knew the secret, he 
took no advantage of it. It may possibly be put no higher 
than this : that as an experienced statesman he saw the danger 
which the British Government were running, was not willing 
to run the risk of the people in England getting to know what 
was afoot, and so he took the game out of the hands of the 
British Ministers, and tried to play it for them in the only way 
in which there lay any chance of success. But it is a fact that 
throughout the negotiations he makes believe that the Cabinet 
is reluctant to accept any modification of the ancient law. Only 
their perversity, as we shall see, well-nigh baffled him. 

I find no record in any biography of the men of the period, 
not even in Lord Clarendon's recently published Life, of his 
conversion, nor who was responsible for it — most probably 
Mr Milner Gibson and Sir William Molesworth. 

The secrecy of February was broken on the 27th by what has 
all the appearance of a ballon d'essai sent up by Mr Milner 
Gibson. Sir William Wray was anxious to know whether Russian 
ships chartered by British merchants, laden with corn, would 
be allowed to pass British and French men-of-war, having been 
already permitted to pass the Bosphorus by the Sultan's firman. 
The answer was in the affirmative ; whereupon Mr Milner 
Gibson irrelevantly asked this further question : — " Whether the 
Government had come to a decision, and whether they will 
announce that decision, whether free ships are to make free 
goods and neutral flags to be respected ? " The question 
could hardly have been so worded unless the questioner had 
known that the matter was under consideration. Possibly he 
was impatient at his pupil's dilatoriness, and thought it 
necessary to force the pace, as he ought by now to be prepared 
to make a public announcement. Lord John Russell replied 
that the question was one of the greatest importance and was 
under consideration, but that an answer would be given before 
the declaration of war. Immediately the answer was reported to 



Discussion of Allies* Attitude towards Neutrals 37 

Paris, M. Drouyn de Lhuys wrote a despatch to Count Walewski. 
He had put the matter so plainly before the British Govern- 
ment, the settlement of the question for the duration of the 
war, whatever might happen afterwards, was so logically simple, 
that he could not understand the delay in coming to a decision. 
Lord John Russell's answer seemed to suggest that the question 
was being considered independently of the French Government. 
Nothing could have a worse effect than a want of unanimity 
between the allies. A controversy such as Lord Cowley had 
indicated as possible was unnecessary if only the course he 
had suggested were followed. Once more M. Drouyn de 
Lhuys insisted on the wisdom of it. Time pressed, and he was 
impatient. 

M. Drouyn de Lhuys to Count Walewski. 

Mars 1, 1854. 

Je regretterais vivement que I'Angleterre proc6dat a 
une mesure de cette importance sans se concerter prealable- 
ment avec nous. II serait du plus mauvais effet, au d6but 
d'une guerre faite en commun, que les deux pays parussent 
divises sur des theories, lorsque dans la pratique ils doivent 
agir ensemble. Veuillez appeler de nouveau I'attention 
de lord Clarendon sur cet objet. II me semble que, sans 
reveiller une controverse qui alarmerait des interets que 
tout nous conseille de menager avec soin, il serait suffisant 
de rediger pour les commandants de nos batiments des in- 
structions strictement calcul6es d'apr^s les necessites de la 
guerre actuelle et de nature a rassurer les neutres, particu- 
li^rement ceux que les habitudes de leur commerce portent 
a navigeur de preference dans la mer Noire ou dans la mer 
Baltique. De cette fa§on, I'Angleterre et la France reser- 
veraient chacune leur doctrine, et leur action se confondrait 
dans une meme pratique, que Ton serait toujours maitre 
de rendre plus s6v^re, pendant le cours des hostilites, si 
les circonstances venaient a I'exiger. 

An interview with the British Ambassador followed, in which 
the necessity for concerted action between the allies was again 
insisted on. M. Drouyn expressed the hope " that no decision 
might be taken, and, above all, no declaration on the subject 
published, without previous consultation with the French Govern- 
ment." The matter was reported by Lord Cowley, with a curious 
sense of detachment, on the 6th March, as having been " men- 
tioned a day or two ago." From the rest of this despatch it 
might be imagined that the proposal for dealing with the rights 
of neutrals had emanated from the British Government, and that 



38 The Declaration of Paris 

they had omitted to consult their ally. By the light of Lord 
Clarendon's letter to Lord Shaftesbury the suggestion in the 
last sentence is disingenuous, that " it will be for your Lordship 
to consider whether an attempt may not now be made to set this 
question at rest as far as is in the power of the two Governments 
for ever." 

Lord Cowley to Lord Clarendon. 
285. 

Paris, March QtK 1854. 
My Lord, 

Mons. Drouyn de Lhuys mentioned to me, a day or 
two ago, that he had heard that Her Majesty's Govern- 
ment was occupied, at the present moment, in consider- 
ing the delicate question of the rights of neutrals, and he 
expressed the hope that no decisions might be taken, and, 
above all, no declarations on the subject published, without 
previous consultation with the French Government. 

I promised M. Drouyn de Lhuys to inform Your Lord- 
ship of his wishes, and I could not resist remarking how 
desirable it was that the friendly intercourse so happily 
subsisting between the two Governments should be further 
cemented by an understanding upon a question, on"^ which, 
until now, they had been unfortunately divided. M. Drouyn 
de Lhuys responded with much cordiality to this remark, 
and it will be for Your Lordship to consider whether an 
attempt may not now be made to set this question at 
rest, as far as is in the power of the two Governments, 
for ever. 

Lord Clarendon replied by the following despatch : — 

Lord Clarendon to Lord Cowley. 
170. 

March 9th, 1854. 
My Lord, 

The subject to which Your Excellency adverts in your 
despatch. No. 285, of 6th March, relative to the rights 
of neutral flags in time of war, is under the consideration 
of Her Majesty's Government, but no decision will be taken 
nor any declaration published without previous communi- 
cation with the French Government. 

The facts recorded in the foregoing pages bear out the 
statement that Lord Clarendon fulfilled his intention of keeping 
the proposals he was going to make in due course secret. The 
French Government, though they knew the plan, were in the 
dark as to how it would be carried out. It is curious, therefore, 



Discussion of Allies' Attitude towards Neutrals 89 

to turn to a small collection of despatches which passed between 
the United States and the European Powers, both belligerent 
and neutral, in the early months of 1854, respecting the questions 
in issue. ^ From this correspondence we find that the United 
States Government were informed at all stages of the intentions 
of the Cabinet, though the intimate character of the negotia- 
tions with France do not seem to have been disclosed. 

On the 23rd February, that is, three days before Mr Milner 
Gibson's question in the House, Mr Buchanan, United States 
Minister in London, informed Mr Marcy that he had asked 
Lord Clarendon whether the Government had determined on 
the course they would pursue in the impending war, in regard 
to neutrals, and whether they would adopt " free ships free 
goods." It was of the greatest importance that merchants in 
America should know the decision as speedily as possible. Mr 
Buchanan was informed that the Cabinet had not yet come to 
a decision ; but Lord Clarendon had told him that he " should 
be the very first person to whom he would communicate the 
result." He then intimated a desire to converse with the 
American Minister upon the subject " informally and un- 
officially." Mr Buchanan had no instructions, but, as an 
individual, he was willing frankly to express his opinions. 
He would consider it a breach of confidence to report Lord 
Clarendon's private opinions on a question still pending before 
the Cabinet, " and on which its members are probably divided." 
He had, however, no objection to repeat the substance of his 
own observations. 

The United States Courts, he said, have recognised the right 
of capturing enemy property on neutral ships, and the duty to 
restore neutral property on enemy ships. From a very early 
period of our history the Government had sought, in favour 
of neutral commerce, to change the rule by treaties with 
different nations, and to adopt instead the principle of the flag, 
the main object being to reduce the occasions on which the 
right of search would be exercised. He thought that this would 
be best achieved by adopting " free ships free goods " and 
" enemy ships enemy goods." The reason why the United 
States had not recently concluded any treaties on these lines, 
he presumed, was " that until the strong maritime nations, 
such as Great Britain, France, and Russia, should consent to 
enter into such treaties, it would be but of little avail to con- 
clude them with the minor Powers." He would not, however, 
be astonished if the British Government " should yield their 

^ Printed in State Papers, vol. xlvi. pp. 821-843 [Docviment, No. 8]. 



40 The Declaration of Paris 

long-cherished principle " and adopt the rule of the flag. He 
knew positively that Sweden, Denmark, the Netherlands, and 
Prussia were urging this upon them ; " but what I did not 
know until the day before yesterday, was that the Government 
of France was pursuing the same course." He apparently did 
not know that Great Britain and France were working together 
as allies to come to some common form for their declaration ; 
nor that a favourable answer had already been given to Sweden 
and Denmark. 

The other despatches in this correspondence will be referred 
to at the different stages of the negotiations with France to 
which they are relevant. 



rv 

The Riga Despatch. 

The position of affairs at the beginning of March 1854, is 
now clear. Lord Clarendon had decided in his own mind " to 
bring our law, or rather practice, respecting neutral flags more 
in harmony with the practice and expressed wishes of other 
maritime nations," not for the purposes of the war only, 
but permanently. He had confided his wish to his friend Lord 
Shaftesbury. M. Drouyn de Lhuys also knew his secret. 
Further, he had talked " informally and unofficially " with the 
United States Minister, who had drawn his own conclusions. 
Lord Clarendon did not think, however, that it was necessary 
to obtain an expression of the wishes of the maritime nation 
to which he belonged, in the usual way, through Parliament. 

Being in favour of the greater and permanent change, he 
must also, " privately," have been in sympathy with the French 
proposal for the lesser, and temporary, change ; and he cannot 
fail to have been impressed with the logic of M. Drouyn's 
argument as to the manner in which that change should be 
effected. He was still, however, not prepared to make a public 
announcement, and two despatches to Lord Cowley, set out 
in the following chapter, are entirely non-committal. 

Ministers who propose, on their own motion, to make altera- 
tions in the ancient laws of England are not entirely free agents. 
They are guardians of their own consciences ; but the Law 
Officers are guardians of the law, and, when they are consulted, 
guide the public utterances of the Ministers. Custom has pre- 
scribed the occasions on which the Law Officers must be con- 



The Riga Despatch 41 

suited. The Attorney-General at the time was Sir Alexander 
Cockburn. 

The northern trade of Europe was largely in the hands of 
British merchants. Subsequent debates dealing with the com- 
mercial aspects of the war supply us with some interesting facts 
which are pertinent to the question now to be discussed. 

Russia's trade with Great Britain was ten times greater than 
with any other country ; it amounted to thirteen millions 
annually ; and it was no exaggeration to say that her commodi- 
ties were produced mainly by the aid of British money. The 
intimate commercial relations between the two countries was 
probably a relic of the old days of British factories. It is not 
difficult to imagine that the business houses established in Riga 
and the Baltic ports were in direct descent from their commercial 
ancestors who traded under the protection of the factory system. 
The trade consisted principally in flax and tallow : Ireland re- 
ceived large quantities of flax seed for her cotton industry. It 
was said authoritatively that as a result of the custom of cash 
payments the Russian interest in consignments did not exceed 
15 per cent. What the proper designation of such trade is, 
whether " enemy " or " British," and how it should be dealt 
with in war, were serious questions which would inevitably have 
to be faced by the Government. Russia had assured the mer- 
chants of her protection ; it is not surprising, therefore, that they 
should inquire, so soon as war was seen to be inevitable, what 
protection they would receive from their own country. We learn 
from Mr Mitchell's speech in the House of Commons on the 
4th July, that Lord Clarendon had in December 1853, with 
" absence of official reserve," informed our merchants that " it 
would be highly unsafe to make the usual advances to Russia." ^ 

^ The question of subscribing to Russian loans also arose immediately 
after the war broke out, and the British Consul -General to the Hanse 
towns was instructed to send the following circular to the Vice-Consuls 
explaining the law as to contributing to the foreign loan which the 
Russian Government proposed to contract. The circvilar was laid before 
Parliament on July 24, 1854 : — 
«i gjj^ " Hamburgh, June 30, 1854. 

" Her Majesty's Government having taken the opinion of the Law 
Officers of the Crown as regards the nature of the crime, and the degree 
of penalty which any subject of Her Majesty would render himself liable 
to in contributing to the foreign loan which the Government of Russia 
propose to contract, I am therefore informed by the Earl of Clarendon 
that a British subject contributing to a loan raised on behalf of a sovereign 
at war with Great Britain, will be guilty of High Treason, as adhering 
to the Queen's enemies. 

"I have accordingly to instruct you to give every publicity to this fact 
within your Vice-consular district. — I am, etc. 

" British Vice-Consul at . . . G. Lloyd Hodges." 



42 The Declaration of Paris 

But the question was more formally raised in February by the 
Board of Trade, and was referred to Lord Clarendon. ^ The result 
was a despatch sent on the 16th February * to the Consul at 
Riga, for the information of the British merchants, in which, 
after consultation with the Law Officers, the law as to trading 
with the enemy was explained. Persons resident and trading 
in an enemy country are treated as enemies, and their property 
is liable to seizure on the sea, even if on board a neutral vessel, 
" whether such persons be by birth neutral, allies, enemies, or 
fellow-subjects." Clearly then at this point the Attorney- 
General's opinion on the law overrode any question of policy. 
This is a harsh doctrine, but it is embedded in our law of 
war, and it is not necessary to discuss it. I shall confine myself 
to making one suggestion. The position of a merchant who 
establishes a business in the ordinary course in a foreign country 
seems to differ in many respects from that of a merchant who 
has so established himself with the implied authority of his 
Government ; to the latter it does not seem necessarily to follow 
that the same harsh principle of the law should apply. Such an 
authority would be implied where British merchants had estab- 
lished themselves in a country where " by treaty, capitulation, 
grant, usage, sufferance, or other lawful means," the King exer- 
cises foreign jurisdiction. The modern principle of exterritoriality 
is based on the old factory system, and, if I am right in my sugges- 
tion that the British merchants in Russia were lineal descendants 
of the old factory merchants, it would not have been unreasonable 
to modify the old principle of the law in their favour. ^ 

1 Lord Clarendon on the 17th March said that the question was referred 
to him " about a month ago." But, allowing for the reference to the Law 
Officers, the consideration of their report, and the drafting of the despatch 
to Riga, it cannot have been later than the beginning of February. 
• Document No. 2. 

' The " factory system " was, as pointed out in the text, the forenniner 
of the modem system of consular jurisdiction which exists in certain 
Oriental countries, of which the chief remaining example is China. In 
virtue of the commercial treaties the subjects of other coimtries enjoy the 
privilege of exterritoriality, by which, speaking very generally, they remain 
subject to their own laws, and to the jurisdiction of their own Consvils. 
The difference between the exterritorial and the factory system is that, under 
the latter and older system, the whole personnel of the factory, irrespective of 
nationality, was subject to the Consul's jurisdiction. It was to all intents 
and piirposes a separate colony. Very little is known of the foundation 
of the system in Russia ; the following article of the Treaty of Commerce 
of 1787 between Russia and Portugal will therefore be of interest : — 

'* V. — Les sujets des deux Puissances contractantes povirront dans les 
Etats respectifs s'assembler avec leur Consul en Corps de Factorie, 
at faire entr'eux pour I'interet commun de la Factorie, les arrangemens 
qui levir conviendront en tant qu'ils n'auront rien de contraire aux 
loix, statuts et rfeglemens du paj^B, ou de Tendroit otiils seront ^tablis." 
— (De Martens, Recueil, iii. 306: (2nd ed.) iv. 315.) 



The Riga Despatch 48 

It was, however, decided that the law was to be applied. 
As Lord Clarendon said, one of the Riga merchants had inti- 
mated his intention of continuing his residence in Russia, and 
" he had been told the consequences." The consequences were 
stated with almost brutal frankness : their property was by 
law " enemy property " ; the old doctrine of seizing enemy 
property on neutral ships would be adhered to in the impend- 
ing war : in other words, free ships would not make free goods. 

Lord Clarendon had now put himself in a curious dilemma. 
In so far as his own personal views were concerned, or even his 
intention, as confided to Lord Shaftesbury, to change the law, 
he was right to maintain the law officially. But within a month 
of his accceptance of the Scandinavian Powers' intimation that 
they expected that their free ships were to make free goods, he 
informed the Riga merchants that their goods, being enemy 
goods, should not be free on free ships. Yet Riga is a 
Baltic port, and it was conceivable that the merchants of 
Riga might charter Danish or Swedish vessels to bring their 
flax seed and tallow to England. The foundations of a 
policy of confusion were thus well and truly laid even 
before war began. 

The Swedish Government itself appears to have been puzzled, 
and to have asked for, perhaps received, explanations ; for, on 
the 23rd February, Mr Grey wrote that he had spoken to Baron 
Stjerneld on the question of the neutral flag, and had been assured 
that the Swedish Government was content not to press for any 
explicit answer on the subject from Her Majesty's Government. 
The answer of 16th January had not been " explicit " in the fact 
that Lord Clarendon had not stated, in so many words, that he 
accepted " free ships free goods." 

So far as the English law of war was concerned, however, 
the principle was clear, and seemed to be clearly stated. But 
a firm of London merchants, Messrs Martin, Levin & Adler, 
saw difficulties, and put this question to the Board of Trade : 
whether " Russian goods imported from neutral ports would 
be considered contraband, or would they be fairly admissible 
into England ? " The question had little relation to the point 
referred to in the Riga despatch, and the firm was informed ^ 
" that, in the event of war, every indirect attempt to carry on 
trade with the enemy's country will be illegal ; but, on the other 
hand, bona- fide trade not subject to the objection above stated, 
will not become illegal, merely because the articles which form 
the subject-matter of that trade were originally produced in an 

^ See letter by Mr Emerson Tennent, Docvunent No, 4 (4). 



44 The Declaration of Paris 

enemy's country." The letter ^ laid down two further principles 
of war law : first, that trading with the enemy, indirect as well 
as direct, is illegal ; secondly, that the produce of an enemy 
country, commonly called goods " of hostile origin," are not per 
se tainted either as " enemy property "or as contraband. This 
point had been formally admitted by Great Britain in the treaty 
with Russia in 1801, and there had not since then been any 
question that it was the English view of the general law, quite 
apart from treaty arrangements. 

The provision in the treaty with Russia was that goods of 
hostile origin which had become bond-fide neutral property were 
exempt from seizure, though, by a supplementary article, 
colonial produce was excepted. The same principle would 
obviously apply when such goods had become the property 
of British subjects. 

The firm, however, thought they had detected a flaw in the 
official reasoning. " It appears," they wrote, " that a British 
subject buying (by his agents) Russian produce in Russia, and 
importing the same via Germany (a neutral country), will be 
acting illegally, and goods seized on arrival here ; but that a 
neutral subject buying Russian goods and consigning them to 
this country from a neutral port will be considered as carrying 
on a bond-fide trade, and his merchandise will be admitted for 
consumption into England. This would give such a decided 
advantage to the neutral over the British subject, that we 
cannot believe such to be the intention of the Government." 

It is possible that the combined results of the two rules 
might have been as the merchants stated. The rule treating 
British subjects in certain circumstances as if they were enemies 
is clearly arbitrary, but it is rendered necessary by the exigencies 
of war. Its consequences may not be very logical. It may well 
be that these consequences appear to be hard when compared 
with the consequences of another rule which is based on sound 
principle ; they can only be avoided by a rigorous adherence 
to the spirit as well as to the letter of the law. The Board 
of Trade could do no more than refer the firm to the general 
principle stated in the former letter, and repeat " that in 
the case of articles originally produced in Russia, but since 
purchased from neutrals at a neutral port, and in the ordi- 
nary course of trade with such port by British merchants, the 
fact of their having been originally produced in Russia will be 
immaterial." 

To revert to the Riga despatch. It was referred to in the 

^ The correspondence with the Board of Trade is printed as Document 
No. 4. 



The Riga Despatch 45 

House of Commons on the 13th March, when a somewhat irregular 
discussion arose out of a question put by Mr Mitchell, Member 
for Bridport. He hoped that the Government would shortly 
state their intentions with respect to the neutrals, because a 
statement made on a previous occasion by the Secretary to the 
Treasury " appeared to be irreconcilable with the document 
issued by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs." 

Sir Charles Wood, President of the Board of Control, said 
that the Government would make a statement at the earliest 
possible moment ; whereupon Mr Milner Gibson " took the 
liberty " of drawing the attention of the House to the fact that 
a public declaration of policy had already been made in the Riga 
despatch, and dwelt on the hardship it would cause to British 
commerce if it were insisted on. He hoped they were not to con- 
sider the despatch of Lord Clarendon as the rule that was to be 
adopted in the Baltic, because, " not only would it be calculated 
to cause collision with friendly Powers, not only would it have 
no effect in bringing the war to a close, but it would rather, on 
the contrary, have the effect of prolonging it." Then, taking 
up the thread of the hints he had dropped on the 27th February, 
he indicated the policy which he and a section of the House 
were prepared to urge on the Government. Unless the question 
of the neutrals " should be dealt with in a different spirit from 
that which was manifested in former times, it might bring this 
country into a collision with the United States of America." 
The principle laid down in the Riga despatch would authorise 
the boarding and rummaging of every United States ship by 
British officials " to see if they could find some bale or package 
in which there might be, directly or indirectly, a Russian interest" 
which would lead to its condemnation. He was " in hopes 
that the sounder policy would be adopted, that free ships would 
make free goods, and that the country would be spared the 
risk of being brought into collision with the friendly Powers." 

The Secretary to the Treasury (Mr J. Wilson) then explained 
his previous statement. The question put to him, he said, had 
nothing to do with imports to or exports from Russia. It was 
solely a commercial question which had been decided by the 
Treasury — whether Russian produce imported by a neutral 
Power in a neutral ship the property of a neutral subject would 
be held sacred or be liable to seizure ; which was an entirely 
different question from any which might arise with respect to 
direct trade with Russia. Apparently the Treasury answer was 
that such produce would be held " sacred." 

On the 17th March the question was formally raised in both 
Houses of Parliament : in the Lords, by the Marquis of Clanri- 



46 The Declaration of Paris 

carde, on a motion for copies of correspondence which had led 
up to the Riga despatch ; in the Commons, on a motion by 
Mr Milner Gibson, that instructions be given to British cruisers 
not to interfere with neutral vessels carrying enemy property 
not contraband of war. 

Lord Clanricarde did not question the law laid down in the 
despatch, but objected to the indistinct and abrupt terms in 
which it was couched. He was, however, anxious to know 
whether it was to be taken as " representing the positive decision 
of the Government " ; and he presumed that it was not in- 
tended to convey the opinion of the Government in regard to 
the rights of the neutrals. " So grave a subject as that, and one 
which had led to so much controversy, ought not to be discussed 
in that sort of incidental correspondence." 

Lord Clarendon replied in the Lords. Coming at this time, a 
speech from the Foreign Secretary must have been looked forward 
to with anxiety, as well by those who believed that no change 
ought to be made in our maritime practice as by the British 
merchants whose trade was in jeopardy. With the war practi- 
cally certain, all parties would naturally expect that the policy 
in regard to the neutrals would by this time have been decided. 

Lord Clarendon had not seen the Emerson Tennent letter.^ 
But he justified the Riga despatch, regretting that it should 
seem to have been expressed with " unnecessary curtness or 
severity." On receipt of the Board of Trade letter, he said, 
" I immediately took advantage of all the means at my command 
to ascertain what the law really was in reference to it, and 
having ascertained it, I stated it as clearly and concisely as I 
could in my despatch. In such despatch I explained to him [the 
Consul at Riga] that by the law and practice of nations a belli- 
gerent has a right to consider as enemies all persons who reside 
in a hostile country, or who maintain commercial establishments 
therein, whether such persons are by birth neutrals, allies, 
enemies, or fellow-subjects ; that the property of all such 
persons exported from such country is res hostium, and, as such, 
is looked upon as lawful prize of war. Such property, I said, 
would in fact be condemned as prize, although its owner might 
be a native-born subject of the captor's country, and although 
it might be in transitu to that country, and the fact of its being 
laden on board a neutral ship would not protect it." 

But the hard case of the Riga merchants had not been over- 
looked. " It has not been possible hitherto to determine on 
what principle the dispensing power of the Crown will be exer- 

1 See p. 43. 



The Riga Despatch 47 

cised, whether licences or Orders in Council shall be resorted 
to." Being for the first time engaged with a naval ally in war, 
" it is our duty," he added, " to be very clear as to the principles 
we are about to adopt, and the departure which we shall sanction 
from our former law and practice . . . before we can call on 
the French Government to adopt those principles, and to 
protect British commerce and property in a way that the French 
might not in ordinary circumstances see to be right." He 
concluded by saying that he had endeavoured to give all the 
information in his power ; " but your Lordships will under- 
stand that great caution is necessary in doing so . . . not to 
commit the Government to courses which may involve great 
responsibility. I think we are nearly in a position to determine 
the principle on which we shall allow licences." ^ 

This part of the speech refers entirely to the question of 
British merchants in Russia, and to the grant of licences to 
allow them to continue their trade. It is necessary to consider 
it separately from the second part, because the departure from 

^ In a bundle of loose Miscellaneous Papers preserved in the Public 
Record Office, there are many half sheets which bear witness to the fact 
that the question of licences was at that time seriously engaging Lord 
Clarendon's attention. It appeals from a memorandum in his own hand- 
writing, dated the 1st March, that for some time the Government were 
determined to avoid having recourse to licences, " as calculated to produce 
fraud and undue favour to individuals." But there is a slip on which a 
query is written, also in Lord Clarendon's hand, " Whether Russian 
produce from over the frontier to Prussian ports and shipped from thence 
by British or Neutral vessels will be subject to seizure and confiscated by 
H.M. cruisers ? " This is enclosed in an office inquiry dated 20th March : — 

" Lord Clarendon wishes to have the inclosed Query submitted in form to 
the Q's Ad^ being a query put to Ld. Clarendon by the Deputation to-day. 

" Ld. Clarendon wishes also to obtain a Jorm of Licence for the free 
passage of ships laden with Russian produce, etc. He asked me whence 
such licences were issued. I said I beheved from the CouncU Office. But 
I apprehend that the Law Officers must be first consulted as to the pro- 
priety of the wording. They must know at the Admiralty whence such 
licences are issued how they are worded." 

It would not be legitimate to reconstruct a policy on such very slender 
foundations : but some inferences may reasonably be drawn from these 
fragments. The memorandum of the 1st March has the word " super- 
seded " written on it in pencil. It wotild therefore appear that the 
question of licences was being again considered in connection with the 
Prussian transit trade ; and it is possible that at the time Lord Clarendon 
made the statement given in the text he was hopeful that licences would 
fvimish the remedy for what was going on in Prussia. 

This memorandum was followed by another in Lord Clarendon's hand, 
dated 26th March, evidently deaUng with an appUcation for a Licence : — 

" I think the answer to this sd. be that his case with others of a like 
kind shall be taken early into consideration. 

" A Comee of P.C. and B. of T. will be appointed for granting licences, 
and to them I apprehend we ought to refer all the cases we have rec^ 
together with the opinion of the Law Officers upon them. 

M. 26/54. « C." 



48 The Declaration of Paris 

" our former law and practice " relates only to the system of 
licences adopted during the Napoleonic Wars, which was as 
much criticised at home as abroad. The statement of the 
position is unexceptionable. Being engaged with an ally in 
war, obviously the principles on which the licences were to be 
granted needed clear definition, for the French cruisers would 
be required to recognise British licences, and so to protect 
British commerce and property ; manifestly the system could 
only be adopted by mutual agreement, for British cruisers 
would have in a similar way to protect French commerce and 
property. The point made in the speech that "the French 
might not in ordinary circumstances " agree to affording this 
protection, is not quite intelligible. Napoleon had resorted to 
licences to as large an extent as the British Government ; he 
had indeed developed the system into the far more dangerous 
one known as " neutralisation," by which enemy ships were 
transferred to the neutral flag.^ The difficulty that the French 
Government might not approve the reintroduction of the 
system in its simple form, which would enable our Own mer- 
chants to get their cargoes home to England, was probably 
illusory. Possibly something might depend on whether the 
resulting benefit would be entirely for the British merchants, 
or whether the French trade with Russia was sufficiently con- 
siderable to make it an important factor in the situation ; but 
this was not a question which should weigh with a loyal ally. 
As a matter of fact, practically all the Orders in Council and 
French ordonnances relating to trade with Russia were identical. 
It is doubtful whether any serious discussion on the question 
of licences really took place with France. The English des- 
patches which are extant are not complete enough for any 
statement to be based on them, but M. Drouyn de Lhuys' 
Mimoire does not allude to it. 

But the moment had apparently at last arrived when Lord 
Clarendon thought it advisable to make a public statement as 
to his new opinions in regard to neutral rights. Having dis- 
posed of the Riga merchants, he proceeded to lift the veil to 
prepare the country for what was going on. I assume that 
the " we " in his statement refers to the French and English 
Governments conjointly. 

" With respect to the rights of neutrals," he said, " and in 
respect to letters of marque, I trust we are about to set an 
example of liberality by which we shall be able to show that, 
as far as it is in our power, it is our intention to mitigate the 

^ The Licence System is more fully explained in Chapter III. of " 1855." 



The Riga Despatch 49 

calamities of war, and to act in a manner that shall be con- 
sistent with the humanity and civilisation of the age." 

This statement requires very particular attention, coming, as 
it does, immediately after the defence of the Riga despatch, 
and specially because it contains no indication that the con- 
templated change was to be limited to the duration of the war. 
It is possible that the cautious reference in the earlier part of 
the speech to a " departure from our former law and practice " 
was zeugmatic, and that it was intended to relate as well to 
the seizure of enemy goods on neutral ships as to the licence 
system. ThaCt, however, may be passed over in view of the 
much more serious confusion of two very distinct subjects in 
this short sentence. The " example of liberality " which was 
about to be set, the " calamities of war " which were about to 
be mitigated, the action which was albout to be taken "consistent 
with the humanity and civilisation of the age," were referred in- 
discriminately to the rights of neutrals and to letters of marque. 
But these epithets are not applicable alike to both these subjects ; 
none of them indeed are properly applied to the rights of neutrals. 
To abandon the English practice of seizing enemy property on 
neutral ships might be described as an act of " liberality " to 
the enemy ; to the neutral it was a concession to their con- 
venience and to their importunity, nothing more. The abandon- 
ment by the French of their practice of confiscating neutral 
property on enemy ships was a similar concession. The delay, 
the inconvenience, even the financial loss to neutrals resulting 
from these practices, could not be described as " calamities of 
war." And neither the English nor the French practice could by 
any stretch of language be referred to inhumanity or attributed 
to want of civilisation. " I do not see," Sir Edward Grey said 
in a debate in 1908, " that humanity has anything to do with 
seizing enemy property on neutral ships." On the other hand, 
to abandon privateering could not by the most imaginative 
person be described as an " act of liberality." But the excesses 
to which the system had given rise certainly were a " calamity 
of war " ; according to the view held in many countries, it 
was inconsistent " with the humanity and civilisation of the 
age." There was undoubtedly a very strong feeling in this 
country against privateering. A petition had been presented 
from the Liverpool Chamber of Commerce praying that British 
ships should no longer be commissioned as privateers. The 
privateers were perpetually bringing us trouble, endless trouble, 
during the Seven Years' War. Sir JuUan Corbett ^ says : — 

1 England and the Seven Years' War, vol, ii. p. 7. 



50 The Declaration of Paris 

What the King's cruisers did might possibly have been 
borne, but the action of our privateers was outrageous be- 
yond endurance. Every year it had been growing worse, 
and it is not to be denied that at this time there was a 
swarm of smaller privateers in the Narrow Seas who were 
not to be distinguished from pirates. 

Pitt was honestly doing his best to check the abuses, 
but the privateers were incorrigible. What oppressed his 
mind from the first was a vision of the three Northern Powers 
uniting to protect their trade. He saw how easily on such 
a pretence they might gather a powerful combined fleet to 
escort their convoys down Channel, and then^ having seen 
them clear, it would be open to them to run into Brest, 
join hands with the French fleet, and declare war. We 
should then be unable to keep command of the Channel or 
the North Sea, and the threatened invasion would become 
a real danger. 

The vision does credit to Pitt's long sight and acute 
perception. It was far from fanciful. France was doing 
all she could at this time to tempt Sweden into taking a 
hand in her invasion project, and Denmark was actually 
approaching Holland as to the possibility of forming a 
maritime union and taking common action for the assertion 
of neutral rights. Pitt, who knew how to make concessions 
as well as to be bold, met the danger by bringing pressure 
to bear on the Prize Courts to release as many ships as 
possible, and by restraining the excesses of the privateers 
by administrative action. 

. . . By these means the air was cleared. The neutral 
Powers were pacified, and the special danger passed. 

There is indeed little doubt that the privateers were at the 
root of almost all the troubles we ever had with the neutrals. ^ 
But to apply these high-flown terms to the seizure of enemy 
property on neutral ships was an abuse of language. What, 
then, was Lord Clarendon's object in linking together two 
perfectly distinct subjects by inappropriate epithets ? Was 
he not quite master of his subject, speaking to men even 
less well - informed than himself ? It certainly succeeded 

* The following example may be cited : — 

In March 1801 the Danish Minister in London complained of certain 
*' atrocities " deliberately committed by British privateers. Lord Hawkes- 
bury replied that a searching inquiry had been ordered into the conduct 
of the persons accused of violence and inhumanity. If the charges were 
substantiated, their conduct would receive the strongest marks of the 
Government's disapproval : " attendu que c'est le voeu uniforme de 
Sa Majesty, que, meme dans les cas d'hostiht^s ouvertes, toute espece 
de cruaut6 ou de s6v6rit6 non n6cessaire soit scrupulevisement 6vit6e par 
toutes les personnes, employees au service de Sa Majesty." — (De Martens, 
Becueil, Supplement, ii. p. 445.) 



The Riga Despatch 51 

in producing a mystification, which has prevailed even to 
this day. 

On the same day, 17th March, in the House of Commons, 
Mr Milner Gibson developed his previous hints in a long speech 
in support of his motion that 

an humble address be forwarded to Her Majesty that 
she will be graciously pleased to give special instructions 
to the officers commanding Her Majesty's cruisers, in the 
event of war, to abstain from interfering with the neutral 
vessels on account of any goods or property, not contraband 
of war, that may be contained therein, and praying Her 
Majesty to direct Her Ministers to consider a policy of 
entering into treaty stipulations with the United States of 
America, and any other foreign country willing to entertain 
the same, on the principle that free ships shall make free 
goods, and the neutral flag give neutrality to the cargo. 

Like most of his speeches on the subject, it was singu- 
larly confused, the good being obscured by vague and useless 
generalities, such as this : "It must be obvious to everyone 
that after forty years of peace the usages which might have 
been adapted to the last war may not be equally adapted now. 
. . . Opinions have changed, and we all know that that mighty 
power, steam, has been introduced since the last war, and 
effected important alterations in maritime communications." 

One result of the introduction of that mighty power seems 
to have escaped his attention. It had promoted neutral 
activities, and suggested important alterations in their methods 
of getting cargoes to belligerents, as the " broken voyages " 
at Nassau and Matamoros were soon to demonstrate. The 
time was hardly opportune to suggest that belligerents should 
relax their efforts to counteract these activities. 

But the conclusion to which Mr Milner Gibson had come was 
that this was " a most favourable moment for entertaining the 
question whether great changes may not be introduced into 
the principles of international law," which was the view Lord 
Clarendon had expressed to Lord Shaftesbury. " We are on 
terms of the most perfect amity with France and the United 
States, two of the most important naval and commercial Powers 
in the world besides ourselves, and therefore we might probably 
obtain their assent to such an alteration of the international 
law upon this subject as would be befitting the times in which 
we live, and as would give liberal scope for commercial trans- 
actions in time of war. I ask you to consider whether [this] 
war cannot be carried on without infringing to the same 
extent as formerly on the rights of commerce and private 



52 The Declaration of Paris 

property." ... He believed that there was " very good ground 
for considering at the present time the policy of entering into 
a treaty with the United States and other foreign countries, in 
order that free ships may make free goods." 

It is singular that a statesman of the standing of Mr Milner 
Gibson, who was undertaking to guide the country into a new 
way of conducting its wars, should have betrayed so little grasp 
of his subject as to suggest that England might obtain the assent 
of France and the United States to such a change in the law. 
A very slight knowledge of the history of the subject would have 
told him that our assent to such a change was the one thing that 
those Powers had always been anxious to obtain, and that with- 
out that assent there was no possibility of the principle being 
recognised as a part of international law. 

The point mainly insisted on, however, was that this maxim, 
the adoption of which would give " liberal scope for commercial 
transactions in time of war," was more suited to the " times in 
which we live." No more specific reason was given why the 
times had changed since Catherine of Russia had put forward 
the same argument, than the introduction of steam. She had 
advocated the same doctrine ; she also was anxious to foster 
" commercial transactions in time of war," and did not hesitate 
to explain what she meant — commercial transactions between 
neutral and the enemy. She was certain, she wrote to Count 
Pouschkin, her Minister at Stockholm, that the real reason why 
England had attacked Holland in 1781 was that the States- 
General had adhered to the Armed Neutrality, " d'autant plus, 
que par la elle [la Republique d'Hollande] mettoit parfaitement 
a convert la navigation et I'industrie commer9ante de ses 
sujets, exerc6e pour la plus part en faveur des ennemis de 
I'Angleterre." ^ 

Mr Milner Gibson seemed unconscious that he was advocat- 
ing no new doctrine, only a very old one which had been asserted 
by the neutrals from 1752 to 1815, and on which at times they 
had threatened to insist by force of arms. 

When he had aired his favourite theory Mr Milner Gibson 
was on more solid ground in dealing with the practical question 
of the moment. Although it had been pressed as a perma- 
nent principle suited to the times in which we live, the House 
must have been surprised to find him continuing in a lower 
key : " I do not propose to give up any of our maritime rights." 
He admitted that our practice in war was in accordance with 
the Law of Nations ; he desired only a modification of the Riga 

1 Rescript of the Empress to Count Pouschkin, 1781 : Secret History oj 
the Armed Neutrality, by a German nobleman (Coimt Goertz), 1792, p. 209. 



The Riga Despatch 58 

despatch ; he considered that " searching neutral ships for 
enemy goods is totally nugatory for the purposes of this war,'* 
because the bulk of Russian produce on the high seas was not 
Russian property. He asked simply that special instructions 
should be issued that the right be not exercised during the war ; 
and he reinforced his arguments by words which might have 
been, had in fact been, written by M. Drouyn de Lhuys. If 
such instructions were issued we should " make no surrender of 
principle — we do not deprive ourselves of the power of exercising 
those extreme rights whenever we think fit." 

Lord Clarendon had just made an announcement in the other 
House as to the Government policy. Mr Milner Gibson promised 
to address the House again should that announcement have fallen 
short of the principle which he believed to be the only safe one. 

Mr Horsfall seconded the motion, and " could not conceive 
how any Government could think otherwise." 

Lord John Russell said that the Government would " issue 
in some shape or other " a document which should declare its 
policy. 

Mr J. L. Ricardo said that the Riga despatch and the Board 
of Trade correspondence ^ were totally at variance. He then 
started a new point, of which more was to be heard in subsequent 
debates. Dwelling on the injury to our own manufacturers if 
we " prevented the imports of Russia coming into this country," 
he hoped we should not be governed " by old and antiquated 
notions," but abide by the " sounder and fairer notions " we 
had adopted in regard to commerce. Mr T. Baring complained, 
more practically, of the injury to trade caused by the delay in 
the announcement of the Government decision. 

John Bright spoke a few words. He hoped the Government 
would " take a wise course " and change the law. If they did 
not, our commerce would be overtaken by the United States ; 
" otherwise war with the United States was inevitable." As 
for the law, he never could see " any justice in what we called 
the Law of Nations on this subject." Then, not weighing his 
words with his customary care, he declared that " The property 
on board a neutral ship should be as sacred from the intrusion 
of enemies as the property of a neutral on shore." 

Lord John Russell requested the forbearance of the House. 
The question was being considered, and a document was being 
prepared which required very especial care, as France had to 
be communicated with. He added the important statement : 
Though the views of the Government are decided, " it was 

1 Document No. 4. 



54 The Declaration of Paris 

necessary to see whether they were agreeable to the Government 
of France." 

These two debates of the 17th March taken together, as well 
as the preliminary discussions on the 13th, are incomprehensible. 
As we shall see in the next chapter, negotiations had been for 
some time going on with France as to the policy which the allies 
were to adopt with regard to the neutrals. They had reached a 
difficult stage, and the utmost circumspection was necessary. 
A debate in Parliament is often the least circumspect of dis- 
cussions. It was eminently undesirable at the moment ; it 
was obviously premature, as the allied policy had not been 
definitely decided ; and it might lead to evasive statements by 
Ministers, which the House of Commons dislikes. But the 
parliamentary tradition recognises the expediency of caution 
when delicate negotiations are pending, and the House would 
certainly have acquiesced in the forbearance which Lord John 
Russell requested at the end of the debate if he had more boldly 
asked for it at the beginning. As it was, he made a statement 
which, if it had been true in fact instead of being very wide of 
the mark, might have jeopardised the whole of the negotiations : 
" The views of the Government are decided." They were, most 
unfortunately, very undecided. The result was a general dis- 
cussion in Parliament of a policy not yet determined, than which 
nothing is more likely to bring either parliamentary debate or 
diplomatic discussion into disrepute. But the debate gave 
Lord Clarendon the opportunity to lift the veil. 

On the 16th March he had done something more than lift 
the veil to the United States Minister. It transpired from a 
letter of Mr Buchanan to the Secretary of State at Washington 
that Lord Clarendon had explained to him exactly how the 
question stood. This important letter will be considered in 
the next chapter, in connection with the then-pending negotia- 
tions with the French Government. 

The remarkable feature about the debate, however, is not so 
much what was said as what was left unsaid. The merchants 
were in real alarm at the consequences threatened by the Riga 
despatch ; they were unreasonably alarmed at the Board of 
Trade correspondence ; the subject was evidently one of great 
complexity, which it was difficult to explain in official corre- 
spondence. But there was not one word said in either House, 
by speakers on either side, referring to the answer which had 
been given to the Scandinavian Declarations of Neutrality. The 
correspondence had been published in a White Paper ^ in 

* Document No. 1. 



The Riga Despatch 55 

February. Had nobody read it ? Or, reading it, had no one 
understood ? Undoubtedly the law laid down in the Riga 
despatch was harsh, but it was the law of war. Mr Milner 
Gibson could have made a strong case for mitigating it if he 
had reminded the House of the answers given to Sweden and 
Denmark. His vague allusions to international law would have 
been unnecessary if he had referred to Government action 
actually taken, to opinions which seemed to have been actually 
formed, to promises actually made to the important neutrals 
of the North, all of which were at variance with the despatch. 
Yet he did not mention them. Still more extraordinary, those 
— and there must have been many — who objected to the 
concessions made to Sweden and Denmark, who knew that the 
Riga despatch did accurately state the ancient law of war against 
trading with the enemy, might have effectively contrasted the 
two policies, and pointed out the manifest variance between 
them. Yet they omitted all reference to the documents but 
lately issued for their information. 

There is much that is incomprehensible in every stage of 
the story ; it is perhaps not surprising that this characteristic 
should show itself thus early in the course of events. 



Tfie Negotiations between England and France prior to 
the Declaration of War. 

Lord John Russell's statement at the close of the debate on 
the 17th March — that a document was being prepared, but that 
the French Government had to be communicated with — did not 
give a definite idea that negotiations with France had been going 
on for some time. The further statement that the views of the 
British Government " were decided " suggested that the Govern- 
ment had made up its mind, but that the delay in making its 
views public arose from this necessity of consulting the French 
Government and persuading it to adopt those views. Lord John 
wisely, and more accurately, added : " There are other causes 
for unavoidable delay." 

During the first week of March, as we have seen, M. Drouyn 
de Lhuys was urging prompt concerted action between the 
allies in regard to the neutrals, and dwelling on the bad effect 
which would be produced if separate and contradictory action 
were taken. M. Drouyn's anxiety can hardly have been relieved 



56 The Declaration of Paris 

by Lord Clarendon's dilatory reply that the Law Officers were 
being consulted, but that no declaration would be published 
without consultation with the French Government. The roles 
of the two Governments had in some curious way become in- 
verted. The discussion had been initiated in Paris in the early 
days of January, the attention of the British Government had 
been called to the extreme urgency of united action, the simplest 
and speediest way of arriving at united action had been pointed 
out — but so far in vain. February passed, and nothing had been 
done ; but at the beginning of March the British Government 
had apparently taken the matter into its own hands — might, 
for all M. Drouyn knew, be deciding in favour of separate action. 
Hence his urgent message to Count Walewski. The only con- 
solation vouchsafed to him was that " no decision will be taken 
nor any declaration published without previous communication 
with the French Government": not "without previous consul- 
tation," but " without previous communication." M. Drouyn, 
however, interpreted this to mean sans se concerter, and con- 
tinued to negotiate. His narrative gives us an insight into 
what the British Government had been doing. Although by no 
means exhaustive, it is illuminating. A draft for the declaration 
to the neutrals had been prepared, and on the 14th March Lord 
Cowley presented it to the French Government, intimating that 
it had been the subject of much discussion in London, in order 
to make it conform as far as possible with French doctrines. 

M. Drouyn gives a summary of the draft and of the im- 
portant concessions which had been made. Reserving the 
question of law, the British Government undertook to confine 
visit on the high sea to the verification of a ship's nationality, 
and to the steps necessary to establish the absence of contraband 
of war, and of enemy despatches : it would admit that the 
neutral flag covered enemy property, and neutral goods under 
the enemy flag were to be untouched : letters of marque would 
not be issued, and British subjects accepting them would be 
treated as pirates. 

M. Drouyn rejoiced especially at the acquiescence in " free 
ships free goods." Enlightened as to the political side of the 
question, the British Government, he says, saw the necessity 
of reassuring the neutral Powers. Writing in 1868, he cannot 
resist giving us his version of the age-old dispute ; and after his 
interviews with Lord Cowley, as recorded by him, it is hard to 
say he was not justified. 

Eclair^ sur le cote politique de la question, le gouverne- 
ment britannique avait senti la n^cessite de rassurer les 
puissances neutres, qu'effrayait le souvenir de la violation 



Negotiations between the Allies prior to War 57 

constante de leur pavilion par ses croiseurs pendant les 
derni^res guerres, et de toutes les vexations qu'avait 
entrainees I'exercice du droit de visite pousse a outrance. 
Quand ee droit en effet impliquait la recherche de toutes 
les marchandises auxquelles pouvait etre attribuee une 
provenance ennemie, il revetait la forme la plus intolerable, 
et I'emploi qu'en avait fait la Grande Bretagne etait de 
nature a repandre I'effroi parmi les nations non belligerantes. 

But M. Drouyn was not satisfied. The " right of search," 
even as restricted in the draft declaration, seemed to him to 
leave the door open to abuses, and the French Government 
thought that its exercise should be surrounded with guarantees 
giving greater protection to the neutrals. Discussions with 
Lord Cowley on this subject, as well as on several other details, 
having taken place, the draft was sent back to London, recast 
in such a form that it was hoped it might be used by both Govern- 
ments. The date of its despatch is put by M. Drouyn as the 
20th March. There is, however, a telegram from Lord Cowley 
to the Foreign Office, despatched at 11.55 a.m. on the 19th, 
which gives a different account of the interviews. 

Telegram from Lord Cowley to Foreign Office. 

Drouyn stated to me yesterday that I should have a 
copy of the proposed French declaration in regard to neutrals 
this evening. I asked him several questions with a view 
to ascertaining whether there was any hitch. The general 
impression left upon my mind was that the declaration 
would be substantially the same as ours, but that it would 
be accompanied by a Note " to Her Majesty's Government " 
explaining the French view of certain passages. 

The words in inverted commas were added by a further 
telegram sent later on the same day. 

The reference to " several questions " put " with a view to 
ascertaining whether there was any hitch " is inconsistent with 
the idea that the new draft was the result of collaboration, but 
it is not necessary to unravel this discrepancy. From the first, 
as we have already seen from his January despatches. Lord 
Cowley's recollections of his intentions differed radically from 
those of the French Minister. It will be sufficient to give M. 
Drouyn's despatch to Count Walewski concerning the draft, in 
which he makes a very explicit statement as to its joint author- 
ship. He again emphasised the principle on which the draft 
rests — that the fundamental principles of the two countries were 
left intact. In this way he hoped to achieve the joint declara- 



58 The Declaration of Paris 

tion, so essential for bringing home to the world the fact of 
the alliance. 

From M. Drouyn de Lhuys to Count Walewski. 

Mars 20, 1854. 
Ce projet a ete prepare entre lord Cowley et moi dans 
des entretiens confidentiels sur cette matiere delicate. Je 
viens d'en donner communication a M. le Ministre de la 
Marine en le priant de me faire connaitre son opinion le 
plus tot possible. Nous avons, ce me semble, a opter entre 
une declaration commune qui, s'appliquant uniquement a 
la presente guerre, n'engagerait pas les maximes deri'Angle- 
terre et dans laquelle nous n'abandonnerions pas les notres, 
ou deux declarations simultan^es qui, annon9ant les memes 
intentions quant a la conduite et aux instructions donnees 
aux commandants des forces navales respectives, r^ser- 
veraient egalement la difference de nos doctrines : mais 
j'inclinerais pour une seule declaration, qui serait plus 
satisfaisante pour les neutres, et qui, en constatant mieux 
notre parfait accord, frapperait plus fortement les esprits. 

On the 24th March, in answer to a question by Sir Fitzroy 
Kelly, Lord John Russell said that the document, to the exist- 
ence of which he had referred in the debate of the 17th, 
would be ready " very shortly." He added that there would 
probably be an Order in Council or a Declaration, but he was 
not sure whether it might not be necessary to introduce a Bill 
into Parliament. 

It it difficult to make out exactly what Lord John meant by 
this answer. The draft as recast must have been received in 
London ; " very shortly " could have no other meaning than 
that in its new form it had been practically accepted by the 
Cabinet. The facts, however, were very different. 

On the 24th, M. Drouyn sent a second and fuller despatch 
to Count Walewski on the subject of the draft, in which he 
developed the points already alluded to in the short despatch 
of the 20th. It seems probable that this second despatch, 
elaborating the position taken up by the French Government, 
was prompted by the invertebrate debates in Parliament on 
the 17th March, the report of which would not have reached 
him till after the short despatch of the 20th had been posted. 
With so clear a perception of what the necessities of the case 
demanded, he must have been in dismay at reading the speeches 
of Mr Milner Gibson and his friends urging the Government to 
take a step at once which he, M. Drouyn, knew they had already 
decided to take in due course of time, and at finding no frank 



Negotiations between the Allies prior to War 59 

statement of the fact made by the Minister : and puzzled to 
understand the meaning of Lord Clarendon's circumlocutions. 
It must have appeared to him necessary to bring the Foreign 
Secretary back to the realities of the position : to remind him 
that, though he knew his secret desire to change the English 
practice in regard to the neutrals, though he sympathised with 
this desire, while regretting the necessity for keeping it secret, 
there was not then time to bring about the change even by 
indirect methods. It certainly, at that moment, was not the 
wish of France to bring that question to the front. Knowing 
the secret, that Lord Clarendon dared not, he was too astute a 
diplomatist not to know that, if the ulterior desire were to be- 
come generally known, it might wreck the temporary arrange- 
ment he contemplated making for the war. Hence, it seems 
to me, this second despatch was written : Count Walewski must 
once more remind Lord Clarendon of the real position taken up 
by the French Government. 

It will be well fully to appreciate that position. The point 
insisted on from the first was again emphasised : whatever 
course of joint action was decided on, it must preserve intact 
the fundamental principles, so widely divergent, of the two 
countries : in this way only a joint declaration would be possible. 
But if the British Government wished to indicate that it reserved 
the right to apply such and such principle for the present, 
thus insisting that that principle was a recognised right, then 
two declarations would become necessary, similar in principle 
but different in form. It would be impossible for the French 
Government to say that it renounced a right the existence of 
which it had always contested. This was a question of form : 
the essential thing was that the two Governments should agree 
as to the principles to be applied. 

M. Drouyn then dwelt on the fact that his Government was 
ready to abandon the practice of confiscating neutral property 
on enemy ships, in spite of the delicate nature of the question. 
It was to be feared that enemy goods on board enemy ships 
might escape capture by means of the old trick so familiar to 
the neutrals in former wars, lending the neutral flag to the 
enemy's ship, known as " neutralisation " ; ^ and possibly a law 
would be required to give effect to this new arrangement, more 
especially as it would deprive the French marine of a consider- 
able portion of their prize money. He would, however, consult 
the Minister of Marine so soon as he knew definitely the pro- 
posals of the British Cabinet. 

^ See the chapter on the " Licences to trade with the Enemy," Chapter 
III. of " 1855." 



60 The Declaration of Paris 

M. Drouyn thought that the abandonment of this practice 
would sufficiently counter-balance the abandonment of the 
British practice of seizing enemy goods on neutral ships. On 
the face of it, and accepting M. Drouyn' s estimate of its 
value, the bargain seemed to be the only possible one ; it fell 
within the broad principle of mutual surrender of divergent 
principles which he had laid down at the commencement of 
the negotiations, and apparently the British draft had been 
based upon it.* 

» From M. Dbouyn de Lhtjys to Count Walewski 

Mars 24, 1854. 

Les observations que lord Cowley m'a presentees siir le projet de 
declaration relatif a la neutrality, que j'ai eu I'honneur de vous adresser 
le 20 de ce mois, donnent lieu, de notre part, a certaines remarques sur 
lesquelles je crois utile d'appeler votre attention. 

Pour parvenir a faire une declaration commune, on devait se bomer 
a formuler ce que les deux nations entendaient admettre ou repousser 
pendant la dur6e de la guerre actuelle. Les theories de la France et de 
I'Angleterre 6tant differentes, il etait indispensable d'6viter tout ce qui 
pouvait ressembler a une sorte de declaration de principes. Le projet que 
je vous ai communique etait une transaction entre les systemes des deiix 
pays ; il ne faisait prevaloir ni I'une ni I'autre de ces doctrines. 

Si le gouvemement anglais desire que sa declaration indique qu'il 
reserve I'application de tel ou tel principe ou qu'il renonce, quant k present, 
k I'exercice de tel ou tel droit, en indiquant ainsi qu'il considere ce principe 
comme reconnu, et ce droit comme lui appartenant, il faudra necessaire- 
ment en venir a faire deux declarations, semblables quant au fond, mais 
differentes quant a la forme ; car evidemment le gouvernement frangais 
ne pent dire qu'il renonce a I'exercise d'un droit dont il a toujours contest^ 
1 'existence, ou qu'il reserve I'application d'un principe, quand il a sans 
cesse refuse de la reconnaitre. Ceci du reste n'est qu'une simple question 
de forme ; ce qui importe le plus en realite, c'est que les deux gouverne- 
ments soient d'accord quant aux regies pratiques qui devront etre 
appliquees. 

Je passe a I'examen de deux points importants et svir lesquels je vous 
invite a appeler plus specialement I'attention de lord Clarendon. 

Le premier est relatif aux marchandise neutres saisies k bord de navires 
ennemis. Le projet que je vous ai envoy6 dedarait que la confiscation 
n'en serait pas prononcee ; c'est la vme question tres-grave en eile-meme, 
tres-deiicate surtout pour le gouvernement frangais. II est a craindre en 
effet, que les marchandises ennemis chargees a bord de navires ennemis 
n'arrivent k naviguer sans danger, au moyen de neutralisations simuiees ; 
et d'autre part, les lois frangaises, pronongant la confiscation des navires 
ennemis sans admettre d'exception pour les marchandises neutres, il 
faudra peut-etre xine loi nouvelle pour enlever aux marins qui ont des 
droits k exercer, cette part souvent tres -considerable de letirs prises. C'est 
une question du reste au sujet de laquelle j'aurai a m'entendre, comme 
BUT toutes les autres, avec M. le Ministre de la Marine. Mais je ne puis 
le consulter utilement sur ces divers points que lorsque j'aurai ete officielle- 
ment et completement inform6 des propositions definitives du cabinet 
britannique. 

Le gouvemement anglais paratt insister pour que le projet de declara- 
tion defende axix neutres de se livrer, pendant la guerre, soit au commerce 
colonial, soit au cabotage, s'ils sont reserves pendant la paix. 



Negotiations between the Allies prior to War 61 

We learn from this despatch, however, for the first time, 
that the British Government had raised in their draft a new 
and highly contentious point, which, curiously enough, was 

Je n'ai pas besoin de voiis rappeler avec quelle persistance le gouveme- 
ment franQais, a toutes les 6poques, a soutenu les rlclamations nombreuses 
et vives que I'adoption de cette regie souleva, des Torigine, de la part des 
nations neutres. La France est done li6e pax ses pr6c6dents historiques ; 
elle Test 6galement par des trait^s faits avec plusieurs Etats, done elle 
s'est engagee a laisser les navires naviguer librement en temps de guerre, 
meme entre deux ports ennemis. Comment pourrions-nous aujoiird'hui 
nous associer k une disposition qui refuserait aux neutres xm. droit que 
nous avons toujoiirs revendiqu6 poiu* eux, et que nous avons meme pro- 
clam6 solennellement dans nos traites ? 

Je n'indique qu'en passant I'interet particulier que cette question 
pr^sente pour la France, et les consequences diSerentes que I'adoption 
de la regie proposee aurait pour les deux pays. L'Angleterre, qui admet 
en tout temps les pavilions etrangers a prendre part au cabotage et au 
commerce des colonies, n'a rien a craindre de I'application qui poturait 
lui en etre faite ; la France au contraire, qm reserve encore ces naviga- 
tions au pavilion national, pourrait avoir 6ventuellement a souffrir de la 
regie qu'on I'invite a proclamer. 

Je me demande du reste, s'il y a un int6ret considerable, povir la guerre 
actuelle, a inserer dans la declaration luie disposition semblable. La 
Russie, il est vrai, reserve en temps de paix le cabotage et le cormnerce 
des colonies ; mais, dans la Baltique, le cabotage ne se fait qu' entre vox 
petit nombre de ports, qu'il sera facile aux flottes de fermer completement 
au moyen d'un blocus effectif. II en est de meme de la mer Noire, sur 
laquelle les flottes combinees dominent. Quant au commerce de 1' Amerique 
russe, qui est le monopole d'une compagnie, s'il vient a etre exerce par 
les vaisseaux des Etats-Unis, il on poiwrait r^sulter, dans xin interet minime, 
des complications graves, que la France a d'autant plus le desir d'eviter 
sur cette question, que son traite de 1778 avec les Etats-Unis est vm de 
ceux oil le droit des neutres de se livrer, pendant la guerre, aux commerces 
reserves, a ete formellement stipule. 

Je me plais a reconnaitre, du reste, tous les efforts que le gouverne- 
ment anglais a faits pour se rapprocher autant que possible des doctrines 
de la France, et vous pouvez assvirer de nouveau lord Clarendon de notre 
d^sir sincere d'entrer dans la voie des transactions mutuelles. Nous en 
avons donne la preuve sur la question des marchandises neutres a bord 
des navires ennemis. Mais, en ce qui conceme le droit des neutres de se 
livrer aux navigations r6serv6es, lord Clarendon reconnaitra, j'en sviis 
certain, que la concession ne saurait venir de notre part. Le gouverne- 
ment anglais, en effet, qui regarde la prohibition comme fondle sur le 
droit des gens, peut bien reconcer a s'en prevaloir, tout en r^servant son 
systeme, tandis que la France ne saxui'ait proclamer une regie que, d'apres 
ses principes, elle ne se croit pas autorisee k appliquer. 

Telles sont les observations que je vous prie de presenter a lord 
Clarendon. J'espere qu'elles le determineront a ecarter de la declaration 
anglaise une regie que la France ne pourrait faire figurer dans la sienne. 
Jusqu'ici les deux gouvemements ont saisi toutes les occasions de faire 
ressortir la solidarite complete qui unit si heureusement les deux nations ; 
il importe que cette meme pens^e continue de se reveler j usque dans les 
regies a 6tablir poiu* les questions secondaires. Si, sur certains points, 
les deux pays ne peuvent adopter les memes principes, il me parait du 
moins tres- desirable qu'ils 6vitent, surtout dans une declaration solennelle, 
d'en proclamer de differentes. 

Vous voudrez bien me faire connaitre le plus t6t qu'il vous sera 
possible, le r^sultat de I'entretien que vous aurez eu avec lord Clarendon . 



62 The Declaration of Paris 

omitted from M. Drouyn's summary of it. A clause had been 
introduced prohibiting neutrals from participating in the 
enemy's colonial and coasting trade ; in other words, the 
British Government proposed to insist on the " Rule of 1756." 
Against this M. Drouyn de Lhuys vehemently protested. He 
recalled the persistence with which France had supported the 
frequent protests of the neutrals against this Rule. France was 
therefore pledged against it by historical precedents, as well as 
by her treaties with many States. How was it possible for her 
now to associate herself with a provision which denied to neutrals 
a right she had always claimed for them ? 

Coming to the merits of the question, he pointed out that 
the provision would result in different consequences to France 
and England, for England allowed foreign flags to participate 
in her colonial and coasting trades, while France, according to 
the old monopoly system, reserved those trades for the national 
flag. But, he added, after all, was it a practical question ? In 
the Baltic the coasting trade — le cabotage — only existed between 
a few ports, and both in this sea and in the Black Sea a 
blockade by the joint fleets would be equally efficacious. In 
regard to Russian trade with its own dependencies in America 
it was in the hands of a Company, and, if it should be carried 
on by American vessels, questions might arise with the United 
States which France would desire to avoid, especially as, in 
her treaty of 1778, the right of the neutrals to participate in 
these trades during war had been expressly recognised. 

M. Drouyn acknowledged the efforts made to bring the views 
of the Cabinet into harmony with French doctrines, but Lord 
Clarendon must realise that it was impossible to ask France to 
make this concession. 

This despatch of M. Drouyn de Lhuys has an importance 
outside the special circumstances in which it was written. It 
is commonly assumed that the " Rule of 1756 " is a doctrine of 
the past ; it is certainly true that since the Declaration of Paris 
we have heard little of it. We now learn, and I believe 
M. Drouyn's account of these negotiations to be the only docu- 
ment which contains the information, that the Law Officers in 
1854 considered it a very live doctrine. 

This is not the place to enter into a long examination either 
of the Rule itself or of the vital principle which underlies it. 
That will be undertaken in a subsequent volume ; but in view 
of the fact that its introduction into the English draft came near 
to wrecking the negotiations between England and France in 
1854, a brief explanation of the " Rule " is necessary in order 
to understand the nature of the discussions which then took 



Negotiations between the Allies prior to War 68 

place in regard to it. It is unfortunate that only one side of 
them remains. It would have been interesting to have read 
what Sir Alexander Cockburn had to say on the subject, and 
why he thought it necessary to revive it — as some would say — 
at so critical a time. But only M. Drouyn's comments upon it 
remain for our enlightenment, and a discussion of them is neces- 
sary to the understanding of the deadlock which was avoided 
by so narrow a margin of time. 

There is another important question which will be considered 
in due course — how far the signing of the Declaration of Paris 
destroyed a Rule which Was fundamental to the whole system 
of our maritime law. For the moment it is sufficient to note 
Mr Hall's comment, written some years after the Declaration 
was in force : It is not " easy to see that the question has 
necessarily lost its importance to the degree which is sometimes 
thought." 1 

The " Rule of 1756," as stated and enforced by the Prize 
Courts, is that a neutral has no right in war to participate in a 
trade of the enemy which is closed to him in peace. The special 
applications of the Rule were to the enemy's colonial and coast- 
ing trades. The examination of the decisions involves the 
larger question whether this is a complete statement of the 
Rule, or whether these are not merely two specific applications 
of a far wider principle. The judgments in the Immanuel ^ and 
the Whilelmina ^ as to the colonial trade, and in the Emanuel * as 
to the coasting trade, seem to indicate very clearly what that 
principle is : the right of the belligerent to prevent neutral 
assistance to the enemy. 

It is sufficient here to refer to a few points which are incon- 
testable : first, that during the Seven Years' War, and in sub- 
sequent wars, we seized neutral ships which were participating 
in the enemy's colonial and coasting trades, establishing thereby 
the " Rule " as a principle of our belligerent practice ; secondly, 
that this Rule was one of the principles on which England 
acted which the Armed Neutralities sought to abrogate by 
their first contention — " Que les vaisseaux neutres puissent 
naviguer librement de port en port et sur les cotes des nations 
en guerre " ; ^ thirdly, that the same clause was introduced 
into several treaties subsequently entered into, among them 
many to which France was a party ; but fourthly — this on the 

^ Hall, IntematioruU Law, 7th ed., p. 682. 
a 2 C. Rob., 186. 

* 4 C. Rob., App., p. 4. * 1 C. Rob., 296. 

^ Russia and Denmark, Armed Neutrality Convention, 1780, art. iii. 
De Martens, Recueil, ii. 103 : (2nd ed.) iii. 189. 



64 The Declaration of Paris 

authority of Mahan — that underlying the Rule there was a 
principle which inspired many of the English Orders in Council 
and French decrees during the Napoleonic Wars. If, therefore, 
we accept either of the theories often advanced, that during 
those wars France was seized by a madness which rendered her 
not accountable for her actions, but that England, remaining 
sane, was accountable ; or, that both nations were mad simul- 
taneously, and that their misdeeds must be regarded as flagrant 
violations of the Law of Nations ; then so much of M. Drouyn 
de Lhuys' statement as referred to France being bound to oppose 
the Rule by her treaties with many States was irreproachable. 
But with regard to the objection to it — " La France est 
done liee par les precedents historiques " — this cannot be put 
upon the same high plane, for the protests of France against 
the Rule were those of a belligerent. It is quite true that 
France with great persistence " a toutes les epoques, a soutenu 
les reclamations nombreuses et vives que I'adoption de cette 
regie souleva, des I'origine, de la part des nations neutres " ; but 
reduced to a simpler expression this amounted to no more than 
that she did her best, by encouraging the neutrals in their 
protests, to diminish the rigour of British practice at sea which 
deprived her of their assistance. He was possibly, however, 
on safer ground when he pointed out that a rigorous blockade 
of the Baltic ports would render recourse to the Rule un- 
necessary in this war. 

We may now continue the narrative of the negotiations. 

The draft Declaration as recast in Paris was despatched on 
the 20th March. M. Drouyn de Lhuys had evidently seen the 
Ambassador after posting his long despatch to Count Walewski 
on the 24th, and on the 25th Lord Cowley sent the following 
telegram to the Foreign Office : — 

Telegram from Lord Cowley to Foreign Office. 

Drouyn presses for a decision on the neutral question. 
If you agree to adhere to the first draft, he will make his 
declaration as near to it as possible, leaving out the coasting- 
trade clause. If you adopt any other, he begs to have it 
without loss of time, as he is asked questions on all sides, 
which he avoids answering as yet. 

Following on the interview, perhaps not quite satisfied with 
Lord Cowley's share in it, M. Drouyn sent a further short 
despatch to Count Walewski instructing him to insist once 
more on the importance of a joint declaration, and begs for a 
decision. 



Negotiations between the Allies prior to War 65 

M. Drouyn de Lhuys to Count Walewski. 

Mars 26, 1854. 
Insistez sur les tr^s-graves inconv6nients d'une de- 
claration separ^e qui ferait douter de I'entente des deux 
pays, alarmerait les neutres, et am^nerait d'involontaires 
et inevitables conflits entre les commandants. Si lord 
Clarendon accepte le principe d'une declaration commune, 
sauf a regler le detail par des instructions separ6es, priez-le 
de me faire communiquer son pro jet pour que je puisse 
m'entendre avec le Ministre de la Marine et arriver a une 
conclusion. 

The next day a second and more detailed despatch followed, 
in which M. Drouyn dwells on the fact that he has had many 
conferences with Lord Cowley, and that Lord Clarendon must 
therefore have received almost daily information of his views, 
and again refers to the counter-project which he had prepared 
with the British Minister.^ Again he expresses the hope that 

^ M. Drouyn de Lhuys to Count Walewski. 

Mars 27, 1854. 

Mes entretiens avec lord Cowley ont et6 consacres depuis quelques 
temps, & rexamen de rimportante et delicate question des droits des 
neutres. Lord Clarendon a du etre informe presque joumellement de 
I'objet de ces discussions, et je sais que M. TAnabassadeur d'Angleterre 
lui avait dej&, transmis le pro jet de declaration dont nous avons pose les 
bases ensemble. Ce Ministre se trouvait ainsi tout pr6par6 a recevoir la 
communication que je vous chargeais de lui faire par ma d^peche du 24 
de ce mois, et dont le but 6tait de I'amener k emettre une opinion definitive 
sur des points qu'il a eu le temps d'examiner. Ma d6peche t61egraphique 
d'hier vous aura prouv6 I'int^ret que le gouvemement de I'Empereur 
attache a sortir d'une ind6cision qui, aujourd'hui que I'^tat de guerre 
est proclame, ne saurait se prolonger sans les plus graves inconvenients. 
J'espere que vos efforts auront d6termin6 le principal secretaire d'Etat de 
S.M. Britannique k renoncer au systfime pour lequel il avait laisse percer 
ses preferences et qui consisterait dans la publication de deux declarations, 
non-seulement separees, mais distinctes quant avix principes qui y seraient 
emis ou reserves. Ce n'est qu'avec le plvis vif regret que nous verrions 
I'Angleterre adopter une marche qui, des le principe meme d'vine guerre 
faite en commun, accrediterait I'opinion d'une divergence entre les deux 
gouvemements et affaiblirait, aux yeux de nos adversaires, I'effet politique 
de I'union intime et complete qui a donne a notre diplomatic la force qu'il 
est maintenant plus necessaire que jamais de conserver pour nos actes. 

Si de I'ensemble nous descendons aux details, les dangers ne sont 
pas moins grands. Entre la declaration de la France et celle de I'Angleterre, 
les neutres feront un choix et nul doute qu'ils ne se rangent plus volontiers 
autovu" de la puissance qui, par sa fideiite k des traditions auxquelles ils 
sont inviolablement attaches, leur apparaitra comme le champion de leur 
propre cause. Ne serait-il pas preferable de leur raontrer leur sm-ete 
dans I'union des deux marines et d'eviter avec soin de raviver une vieille 
querelle qui alarmerait lenrs interets, exciterait leurs passions et les 
reporterait peut-etre moralement dans \in autre camp que le ndtre ? 

D'un autre c6te, et ce n'est pas une des moindres objections a faire 

5 



66 The Declaration of Paris 

the idea of separate declarations has been abandoned, dwelling 
on the advantages which the neutrals would derive from a 
single document. He has recourse to yet another argument. 
The United States would assume the role of protector of the 
neutrals. A treaty of commerce had been proposed to France 
in which the principles maintained by both Governments would 
be affirmed. If the allies were now publicly to declare different 
principles, it would not be possible for France to reject the 
proposal. But if they came quickly to an agreement, the con- 
sideration of it might very well be postponed. He suggests one 
way out of the difficulty : so long as the declarations were 
uniform, the Instructions to the fleets might deal with the 
details in a modified way — provided they were settled jointly 
— in the event of special doctrines being referred to in them 
by either country. 

Without drawing too largely on the imagination, what had 
happened to call for yet another long despatch, another reitera- 
tion of the old arguments, is fairly clear. On the 26th or 27th 

au systeme indique par lord Clarendon, comment concevoir qu'en presence 
de deux declarations distinctes etablissant vine separation theorique entre 
les gouvemements, leurs amiraux et leurs ofificiers de mer s'entendent dans 
la pratique ? II siu-gira entre eux, je ne veux pas dire des conflits, mais 
des divergences involontaires et inevitables qui nuiront aux succes de 
leurs operations. 

Les fitats-Unis enfin sont prets, je ne saurais en douter, a revendiquer 
le r61e que nous d^clinerions et a se faire les protecteurs des neutres, qui 
eux-memes recherchent leur appui. Le cabinet de Washington nous 
propose en ce moment de signer un traits d'amiti6, de navigation et de 
commerce oii il a insert une s6rie d'articles destines a affirmer avec une 
autorit^ nouvelle les principes qu'il a toujours soutenus et qui ne different 
pas des notres. Le pi'incipal secretaire d'Etat de S.M. Britannique com- 
prendra que nous n'aiu-ions aucun moyen de ne pas repondre favorable- 
ment k I'ouverture qui nous est faite, si la France et I'Angleterre, bien que 
se trouvant engagees dans une meme entreprise, affichaient publiquement 
des doctrines oppos6es. Que les deux gouvemements, au contraire, 
s'entendent sur les termes d'une declaration commmie, et nous pouvons 
alors ajoumer I'examen des propositions des Etats-Unis. II me parait 
difficile que ces considerations ne frappent pas 1' esprit de lord Clarendon, 
et j'espere qu'il se d6cidera a accepter un projet, qui, se bornant a tenir 
compte des conditions de la guerre actuelle, laissera de c6t6 des principes 
qu'il est d'autant moins opportun de soulever ou de rappeler que leur 
application serait inutile, et dont les effets, comme dans la question du 
cabotage sur les cotes des pays ennemis, par example, peuvent etre rem- 
plac6s par I'emploi de mesures pratiques au sujet desquelles tout le monde 
est d'accord. Les instructions donn^es aux commandants des batiments 
de guerre des deux pays suppl^eraient naturellement a ce qu'il y aurait 
d'incomplet dans la declaration identique ; il serait toutefois necessaire, 
meme dans le cas oh ces instructions devraient conserver quelques traces 
des doctrines particulieres de la France et de I'Angleterre, qu'elles fussent 
concert6es en commun, et vous donnerez k lord Clarendon I'assurance 
que M. le Ministre de la Marine emploierait tous ses soins k se rapprocher 
autant que possible de I'Amiraute dans les directions qu'il transmettrait 
a noa amiraux. 



Negotiations between the Allies prior to War 67 

March, Count Walewski had received the despatch, dated the 
24th, and on that very night in Parliament Lord John Russell 
had said that the document would be ready " very shortly," and 
talked vaguely about Orders in Council, or Acts of Parliament. 
Knowing what was passing in the Minister's mind, Count 
Walewski probably telegraphed this speech to Paris, and its 
uncertainty must have impelled M. Drouyn to write once more 
upon the old theme. 

We have now reached a point when cross-purposes obtained 
the upper hand : on the 24th March the Russians crossed the 
Danube and invaded Turkey, and war had become a question 
of hours. But, in spite of its imminence, projects and counter- 
projects from London and Paris crossed one another so fre- 
quently that it is impossible to maintain a sequence in the 
narrative of events. The 26th was a Sunday. There must 
have been an informal meeting of some of the Ministers, for 
at 11 a.m., in reply to Lord Cowley's of the 25th, the following 
telegram was sent to Lord Cowley : — 

Telegram from Foreign Office to Lord Cowley. 

(11 A.M.). 

We have endeavoured to meet the views of the French 
Government as far as possible, and I do not think we can 
make further changes in the draft sent to you last night. 
I believe the Declaration will not be published before 
Thursday ; 

followed at 9.30 p.m. by a second : 

Telegram from Foreign Office to Lord Cowley. 
(9.30 P.M.). 

Further alterations have been made in the Declaration 
which will be satisfactory to France, though we cannot 
abandon our principle. I will send a messenger with it 
to-morrow. 

Meanwhile M. Drouyn had not been idle. After sending his 
long despatch to Count Walewski, he sent a new draft for the 
Declaration prepared in conjunction with the Minister of Marine, 
in which he endeavoured to approximate as much as possible 
to the English view. This draft has not been preserved, but 
it appears to have been based on the idea suggested in the 
despatch of the same day, that the Declaration should contain 
a statement of principles only, leaving the details to be worked 
out in the Instructions to the fleets. 



68 The Declaration of Paris 

M. Drouyn de Lhuys to Count Walewski. 

Mars 27, 1854. 
Cette declaration, que j'ai concert^e d6finitivement avec 
M. le Ministre de la Marine, ne consacre que les prin- 
cipes essentiels sur lesquels il importe de constater raccord 
des deux gouvernements ; des instructions separees, qui 
pourront d'ailleurs etre r6ciproquement eommuniqu^es, 
r^gleront Tapplication de ces principes suivant la legislation 
de chacun des deux pays et resoudront, sous ce point de 
vue speciale, les difficultes sur lesquelles la divergence des 
doctrines respectives ne permet pas un accord patent, du 
moins immediat. 

This counter-project crossed one sent from London which 
appears to be the draft referred to in the first of the two Sunday 
telegrams, for M. Drouyn says that it contained a coasting-trade 
clause ; and that on the 28th Lord Cowley informed him that 
it had been definitely adopted by the Cabinet. The maintenance 
of the clause made it impossible for the French Government to 
accept it. Lord Cowley sent a telegram to London to that 
effect : — 

Telegram from Lord Cowley to the Foreign Office, 

28th March. 

It is impossible to get an answer respecting the In- 
structions to naval commanders to-day. Drouyn will say 
nothing without consulting the Minister of Marine, but 
that part of them restricting neutrals from the exercise of 
the coasting trade will, I fear, not be agreed to. 

The reasons for the French attitude were explained by M. 
Drouyn to Count Walewski on the 28th.^ From this despatch 

1 M. Drouyn de Lhuys to Count Walewski. 

1854, Mars 28. 

Je regrette, qu'en rappelant dans cet acte des theories qui ne sont 
pas les ndtres, et en y insurant I'interdiction du commerce de cabotage 
ainsi que le principe de la limitation du commerce des neutres au seul 
commerce permis en temps de paix, le gouvemement britannique nous 
place dans la n^cessite de faire une declaration separee. Cette declara- 
tion comprendra tous les points indiqu6s dans le projet joint a ma depeche 
d'hier, sauf le pr^ambxole, dont j'ai fait I'objet d'un rapport a I'Empereur. 
J'ai obtenu, ainsi que vous le verrez, I'assentiment de M. le Ministre de 
la Marine k la regie qui exempte de la saisie la marchandise neutre a bord 
d'un navire ennemi. 

Lord Cowley m'a communique en meme temps le projet des instructions 
destinies aux commandants des batiments de guerre anglais, en m'anon- 
9ant qu'il 6tait sur le point d'etre sign4. Des lors il est superflu de relever 
les questions qu'il tend k r6soudre dans un sens oppos6 k nos principes 



Negotiations between the Allies prior to War 69 

it appears that the Instructions to the British Fleet also had 
been presented with the intimation that they were on the point 
of being signed. It only remained therefore for independent 
Instructions to the French Fleet to be prepared, which M. 
Drouyn hoped would not create great inconvenience. 

The Times records that a meeting of the Cabinet was held on 
Monday, the 27th March, at which all the Ministers were present, 
and that it lasted two hours. M. Drouyn gives the result of 
it as reported to him : — 

Au dernier moment, le conseil fut assemble de nouveau. 
Apres une longue discussion, il fut decide que I'article qui 
avait provoqu6 nos objections serait raye de la declaration 
anglaise. D^s lors I'entente etait complete. Pour arriver 
a une identite absolue, il nous etait facile de plier notre 
projet aux formes traditionnelles que doivent revetir les 
ordres en conseil emis au nom de la reine du Royaume-Uni. 
En quelques heures, grace au telegraphe, les deux cabinets 
purent constater leur accord et aviser a la publication 
immediate de leur declaration commune. 

Here the story ends, but there is one other source of informa- 
tion from which some of the innumerable gaps may be filled in — 
the American despatches which have already been referred to. 

We have seen, from Mr Buchanan's despatch of the 24th 
February,^ that Lord Clarendon had taken the United States 
Minister unofficially into his confidence. He would be the first 
to whom the decision of the Cabinet would be communicated. 
On the 16th March ^ Lord Clarendon sent for the Minister and 
read to him " the declaration which had been prepared for Her 
Majesty, specifying the course she had determined to pursue 
towards neutral commerce during the war." A summary was 
sent to Washington the next day. " Free ships free goods " 
had been adopted, and neutral cargoes were to be free on enemy 
ships. The subject of blockades was dealt with in an " entirely 

et a notre legislation. II ne nous reste qu'a rediger, a notre point de vue, 
les instructions destinees a nos propres croiseiirs. Je viens de prier M. 
le Ministre de la Marine de preparer ce travail, que j'aurai soin de vous 
communiquer pour etre porte a la connaissance du gouvemement 
britannique. J'ai I'espoir que, dans I'execution, cette divergence des 
instructions n'entrainera pas d'inconvenients graves, car nous sommes 
d'accord sur les points les plus essentiels, et je reconnais particulierement 
I'esprit de liberality avec lequel le gouvemement anglais s'est rapproche 
de nos principes en matiere de blocus. Cependant, si quelque dissenti- 
ment se presentait, je n'aurais qu'a regretter d'autant plus les retards 
qu'ont eprouves la preparation et la communication des projets sur 
lesquels \xcie entente pr6alable aurait 6t6 si desirable. 
1 See p. 39. 2 Document No. 8 B. 



70 The Declaration of Paris 

unexceptional " manner, and in conformity with Americaif 
principles. No letters of marque would be issued. 

" His Lordship then asked me," continued Mr Buchanan, 
" how I was pleased with it ; and I stated my approbation of 
it in strong terms. I said that in one particular it was more 
liberal towards neutral commerce than I had ventured to hope, 
and this was in restoring the goods of a friend, though captured 
on the vessel of an enemy." 

Lord Clarendon also informed the Minister that he had 
repeated to the Cabinet the conversation he had had with him, 
" and this had much influence in inducing them to adopt their 
present liberal policy towards neutrals." He hoped that this 
would prove satisfactory to the United States, "and I assured him 
that I had no doubt it would prove highly gratifying to them." 

Permission had been given to communicate the substance of 
the declaration to Washington, which Mr Buchanan interpreted 
to include the publication of a notice informing the shipping 
interest of the new practice. One other sentence in this despatch 
is of great importance. The draft " had not yet undergone the 
last revision of the Cabinet ; but the principles stated in it 
had received their final approbation and would not be changed." 
This throws light on Lord John Russell's statement on the 17th 
March, that " the views of the Government are decided." ^ 

The draft read to the United States Minister must have been 
the one presented to the French Government by Lord Cowley 
on the 14th March. Mr Buchanan's summary of it practically 
coincides with that given by M. Drouyn de Lhuys, though he 
refers to some additional details. 

Lord Cowley's telegram of the 19th clearly indicates that 
the coasting-trade clause was included in the first draft ; and a 
despatch of the 13th April from the United States Secretary of 
State also mentions it. So that Mr Buchanan must have over- 
looked it, or seeing it had approved. Mr Marcy refers to the 
declaration as " distinct in interdicting to neutrals the coasting 
and colonial trade with the belligerent, if not enjoyed by them 
previous to the war " ; and after glancing at the use to which 
the " Rule of 1756 " was put during the French wars, " which 
this country held to be in violation of the law of nations," he 
enters an emphatic protest against its revival by Great Britain. 
" Should she still adhere to those principles in the coming con- 
flict in Europe, and have occasion to apply them to our com- 
merce, they will be seriously controverted by the United States, 
and may disturb our friendly relations with her and her allied 

* See p. 64. 



Negotiations between the Allies prior to War 71 

belligerents." The liberal spirit, he adds, which she had indi- 
cated in the other principles with reference to neutral ships and 
cargoes " gives an implied assurance that she will not attempt 
again to assert belligerent rights, which are not well sustained 
by the well-settled principles of international law." 

Mr Marcy then expressed the opinion that in some respects 
the law of blockade is " unreasonably rigorous towards the 
neutrals," and that when they had visited a port " in the 
common freedom of trade," they ought to be allowed to take 
in cargo after the blockade is established, and freely depart. 
He concludes with a brief commentary on the right of search 
" so freely used, and so much abused, to the injury of our com- 
merce, that it is regarded as an odious doctrine in this country, 
and, if exercised against us harshly in the approaching war, will 
excite deep and widespread indignation." Caution in its exercise 
by the belligerents would therefore be " a wise procedure." He 
alludes to the " settled determinations of the English Admiralty," 
that persistent resistance to a search renders a vessel confiscable : 
" It would be much to be regretted if any of our vessels should 
be condemned for this cause, unless under circumstances which 
compromitted their neutrality." 

Mr Marcy 's despatch was written (13th April) before the 
receipt of a copy of the Declaration which was posted by the 
Minister in London on the 31st March. The difficulty of clearly 
understanding the whole story is increased by Mr Buchanan's 
statement in his covering letter, that the Declaration was 
" substantially the same as that which I informed you it would 
be in my despatch of the 17th instant." 

The British Minister at Washington communicated the 
Declaration to the United States Government officially on the 
21st April, intimating the confident hope that it would, " in the 
spirit of just reciprocity," give orders that Russian privateers 
should not be equipped or victualled, or admitted with their 
prizes into United States ports, and that its citizens should 
rigorously abstain from taking part in armaments of this nature, 
or in any other measure opposed to the duties of a strict neu- 
trality. This communication was acknowledged by what is 
commonly known as the First Marcy Note, of the 28th April. 

Before we consider the terms of the Declaration itself, we 
must realise the strange fits of indecision through which, on 
the eve of war, the Cabinet passed before agreement was come 
to as to the attitude to be adopted to the neutrals. 

There was, as I read it, a conflict between Lord Clarendon, 
supported by such of the Ministers as were in his confidence, 
and those members of the Cabinet who, having no pronounced 



72 The Declaration of Paris 

views of their own on the subject, were probably influenced by 
the opinion of Sh* Alexander Cockburn. When he was con- 
sulted, the strict letter of the law maintained the upper hand ; 
when his opinion was dispensed with, the predilections of Lord 
Clarendon prevailed. The Riga despatch was, as Lord Clarendon 
declared, written on the advice of the Law Officers. The drafts 
of the proposed Declaration were naturally prepared by them ; 
the insistence of the " Rule of 1756 " was obviously due to their 
advice. We may be quite sure that the final decision not to 
insist on its retention in the draft was come to by the yielding 
of the Cabinet to the wishes of its " governing member," as Lord 
Clarendon has been called. But the influence of the Attorney- 
General is, I think, visible in the two Sunday telegrams. They 
contain a point of considerable difficulty which I shall not 
attempt to solve, but it is too important to overlook. In the 
morning no further changes can be made. In the evening, further 
alterations have been made—" though we cannot abandon our 
principle." Had these two telegrams stood alone we might 
reasonably assume that the alteration made was the temporary 
adoption of " free ships free goods " ; the principle that 
could not be abandoned, the seizure of enemy property on neutral 
ships. The reference to " the coasting-trade clause " in Lord 
Cowley's telegram of the 25th (which the copying clerk turned 
into " the coaling-trade clause ") would have remained mys- 
terious. But we now know that this clause was included in 
the earliest draft, and the meaning of the Sunday evening tele- 
gram is clear : the practice would be waived during the war, 
but the " Rule of 1756 " on which it rested could not be per- 
manently abandoned. The Rule was, as we shall see in Chapter 
VI., suspended by the Order in Council of the 15th April 1854, 
which put the Declaration in force. 

As to the effect of the United States Minister's opinion on 
the Cabinet when it was reported by Lord Clarendon, the one 
point which is clear from the correspondence analysed above is, 
that it may have induced the dissenting members to accept 
" free ships free goods," but that it did not bring about the 
suspension of the " Rule of 1756." Mr Marcy's strong protest 
was not written till the 13th April. 

Thus far, then, the influence of the Law Officers seems to be 
unmistakeable. But when Lord Clarendon acted independently 
of them he gave full rein to his intention ; he had accepted 
" free ships free goods " directly the Scandinavian Declarations 
of neutrality gave him the opportunity. It is equally clear 
that he did not intend to make a public announcement of his 
new faith until he was compelled, and it was too late for him to 



The Declarations to the Neutrals 73 

be forced by Parliament to draw back. It would not be fair 
to say that the confusion of his speech on the 17th March 
was deliberate ; but the only other explanation of it is that he 
had but the haziest notion of the meaning or of the far-reach- 
ing effect of the new doctrines he had espoused, and that he was 
hypnotised by the invocations of humanity and civilisation in 
which Mr Milner Gibson and the Philosophical Radicals so freely 
indulged. 



VI 

The Declarations to the Neutrals. 

The Declaration by the Queen to the neutrals was issued on 
Tuesday, the 28th March, and was followed immediately by the 
declaration of war. 

The Declaration to the Neutrals. 

Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of 
Great Britain and Ireland having been compelled to take 
up arms in support of an ally, is desirous of rendering the 
war as little onerous as possible to the Powers with whom 
she remains at peace. 

To preserve the commerce of neutrals from all unneces- 
sary obstruction Her Majesty is willing, for the present, 
to waive a part of the belligerent rights appertaining to her 
by the Law of Nations. 

It is impossible for Her Majesty to forgo the exercise 
of her right of seizing articles contraband of war and of 
preventing neutrals from bearing the enemy's despatches, 
and she must maintain the right of a belligerent to prevent 
neutrals from breaking any effective blockade which may 
be established with an adequate force against the enemy's 
forts, harbours, or coasts. 

But Her Majesty will waive the right of seizing enemy's 
property laden on board a neutral vessel unless it be contra- 
band of war. 

It is not Her Majesty's intention to claim the confisca- 
tion of neutral property, not being contraband of war, 
found on board enemy's ships, and Her Majesty further 
declares that, being anxious to lessen as much as possible 
the evils of war, and to restrict its operations to the regularly 
organised forces of the country, it is not her present inten- 
tion to issue letters of marque for the commissioning of 
privateers. 

Westminster, 28th March, 1854. 



74 The Declaration of Paris 

The French Declaration, in identical terms, was approved by 
the Emperor on the 29th March, and appeared in the Moniteur 
of the 30th April, accompanied by a Report of M. Drouyn 
de Lhuys.^ 

On the same day M. Drouyn wrote to Count Walewski in 
terms of great enthusiasm at the successful termination of the 
negotiations which had so nearly come to an untimely end : — 

M. Drouyn de Lhuys to Count Walewski. 

1854. 
Je me felicite vivement de la preuve eclatante que la 
France et I'Angleterre viennent de donner de leur bon 
accord dans la question si importante des droits reserves 
aux neutres pendant la guerre actuelle. L'harmonie qui 
s'est etablie entre les deux cabinets sur un point ou I'on 
aurait pu croire qu'il leur serait, malgre leur sincere envie 
d'y parvenir, extremement difficile de s'entendre, produira 
partout la meilleure impression et conciliera aux puissances 
auxquelles appartient I'initiative de cette genereuse resolu- 
tion les sympathies des nations commer9antes dans le monde 
entier. Veuillez dire a lord Clarendon que le gouverne- 
ment de I'Empereur apprecie comme il le doit I'esprit qui 
a preside aux deliberations du gouvernement de la reine 
Victoria sur un sujet qui lui tenait particulierement a cceur, 
et qu'il en considere le reglement, dans les termes ou il s'est 
fait, comme un des meilleurs resultats de I'intime alliance 
des deux pays. 

On the 30th a circular despatch was sent to the French 
diplomatic and consular authorities in neutral countries. ^ It 
dwelt on the advantages which the solicitude of the allies had 
conferred upon the neutrals, and took the opportunity of im- 
pressing upon them the advisability of the neutral Governments 
taking all necessary steps to prevent their subjects engaging 
in any enterprise inconsistent with the duties of a rigorous 
neutrality, this being the condition and the guarantee that the 
advantages conferred on them would be maintained. The British 
Government was congratulated on having been animated by 
the same desires as the Government of the Emperor, and already 
penetrated with the idea of leaving the neutrals in possession 
of all the advantages which the indispensable necessities of the 
war did not make it a duty to restrict. In reciting these advan- 
tages, the Minister of Foreign Affairs pointed out that they were 
to be enjoyed only during this war ; but he did not fail to note 
that, when the war should be over, " cette declaration commune 

^ Document No. 5 B. * Document No. 7 B. 



The Declarations to the Neutrals 75 

demeurera comme un precedent considerable acquis a I'histoire 
de la neutralite." 

The circular letter was followed on the 5th April by a more 
formal notification to be addressed by the diplomatic agents 
to the Governments to which they were accredited. ^ The point 
was emphasised that in making the concessions to the neutrals 
the allies had restrained within very narrow limits the exercise 
of their rights as belligerents. A similar notification was sent 
to the British agents. ^ 

Instructions to the fleets followed.^ From M. Drouyn's 
account it appears that although the fundamental principles 
had been settled in common, some difficulties in their applica- 
tion on secondary points had arisen. He treats these differences 
as inevitable, and as having their origin in the practice of the 
two countries which had for so long been opposed. The 
Instructions, therefore, were intended to minimise the effect of 
these differences, and appeared to have been the result of a 
complementary series of amicable explanations between the 
two Governments. M. Drouyn de Lhuys concludes his survey 
of the negotiations in exuberant language : — 

Places a I'abri des violences de la guerre, ils [les neutres] 
n'avaient plus a craindre d'etre entraines dans la querelle 
d'autrui, et ils demeuraient libres de poursuivre en paix, 
au milieu de combats auxquels ils etaient etrangers, leur 
commerce accoutume, pourvu qu'aucune fraude n'appelat 
sur eux la severite des belligerantes. 

Les neutres profiterent largement de toutes les facilit^s 
qui leur etaient accordees. Ils n'en abus^rent point, et 
pendant toute la duree de la guerre la France et I'Angle- 
terre n'eurent pas a regretter leur genereuse initiative. 
Cette experience, comme on devait s'y attendre, fut con- 
cluante. Le progres des moeurs secondant la reforme des 
doctrines, les nouvelles regies, eprouvees par la pratique 
des deux grandes puissances maritimes, furent universelle- 
ment acceptees comme un bien pour toutes les nations. 
En Angleterre comme en France, les classes commer9antes, 
loin de voir avec jalousie la securite que ce regime liberal 
donnait a des int^rets rivaux, se fehcitaient du developpe- 
ment general des transactions qui en etaient les consequences, 
et sentaient que tous etaient appeles a y trouver egalement 
leur avantage. L'Exposition universelle de 1855 organisee 
a Paris pendant que nos armees de terre et de mer com- 
battaient en Crimee et dans la Baltique, fournit, on s'en 
souvient, une preuve eclatante de la vigueur et du succ^s 

1 Document No. 7 C. ^ Document No. 7 A. 

' Documents No. 10 A and B. 



76 The Declaration of Paris 

avec lesquels les travaux de la paix etaient poursuivis au 
sein meme d'une guerre acharnee. Un tel spectacle etait 
une gloire pour le si^cle ou il se produisait pour la premiere 
fois, et il devait inspirer une juste confiance dans I'avenir 
des ide6s dont il signalait le triomphe. De plus en plus les 
cruelles necessites de la guerre etaient circonscrites dans 
un cercle etroitement trace, en dehors duquel I'humanite 
pacifique et industrieuse gardait ses droits. 

How far the actual events justified or falsified his rhapsody ; 
how far this picture of a commercial Arcadia, where no one 
thought of the war which the foolish world outside was 
waging, much less of mixing in the quarrel, where each pursued 
his own business in peace, is true to fact will be seen in due 
course. 

The identical Declarations which resulted from the tedious 
negotiations between the allied Courts require careful study. 
In view of M. Drouyn de Lhuys' determined effort to avoid a 
recognition in the French Declaration of any principle against 
which France had always protested — " evidemmentle gouverne- 
ment fran9ais ne peut dire qu'il renonce a I'exercice d'un droit 
dont il a toujours contests I'existence, ou qu'il reserve I'applica- 
tion d'un principe quant il a sans cesse refuse de le reconnaitre " — 
he seems, in his anxiety to achieve absolute uniformity, perhaps 
in the hurry of the final drafting, to have waived the point : 
" Sa Majeste consent pour le present, a renoncer a une partie 
des droits qui lui appartiennent comme puissance belligerante 
en vertu du droit des gens." 

One of the belligerent rights thus renounced for the purposes 
of the war was the seizure of enemy property (other than contra- 
band) on neutral ships. This was a declaration of an absolute 
principle. The right of the neutrals which it was assumed to 
infringe, freedom of enemy goods on board their free ships, was 
one of those " que nous nous faisions gloire de defendre." Yet 
here was a positive assertion that this was a belligerent right 
recognised by the Law of Nations ! Similarly, in the Queen's 
declaration there is a positive assertion that the right to seize 
neutral goods on enemy ships was a belligerent right recognised 
by the Law of Nations which was not to be enforced during 
the war. 

It is impossible to exaggerate the importance of this sentence 
in the Declarations. It annihilated in advance all the declama- 
tion in Parliament against the English principle of seizure as 
not warranted by the Law of Nations. The answer which 
might have been given by anyone who had read the documents 
carefully was : The French Government has recognised it as a 



The Declarations to the Neutrals 77 

belligerent right which the Law of Nations approves ; has only 
asked for it to be held in suspense during the war. 

The point will be elaborated hereafter ; but it is well to note 
at once that the common ground of belligerent right on which 
both these principles of seizure rest can only be the prevention 
of neutral assistance to the enemy. The French practice was 
aimed at one form of assistance, loading neutral goods on enemy 
ships, because of the possibilities of fraud which it opened up, 
by means (as M. Drouyn de Lhuys pointed out) of " neutralisa- 
tion " ; the English practice was aimed at another but less 
occult form of assistance, openly carrying the enemy's goods. 

It is interesting to note in passing that the French Declaration 
led to a voluminous, and not uninstructive, correspondence 
between the Sheffield Foreign Affairs Committee and the Lord 
Advocate. 1 His statement that the French law accepted " free 
ships free goods " was challenged by the chairman, Mr Jacob 
Ironside, who contended that, in the face of this paragraph in 
the French Declaration, the statement could not be correct. 
It was an ingenious but inaccurate contention. The Lord 
Advocate's replies were not very illuminating ; he supported 
his statement as to the law of France by reference to an American 
text-book, Lawrence's edition of Wheaton ! 

Thus far we have been dealing with theory only ; there was 
a practical question behind it — that question to which Lord 
John Russell had alluded on the 24th March, how these new 
principles of maritime law ought to be put into force in 
England. 

M. Drouyn de Lhuys was conscious of the same difficulty in 
regard to the alteration of the maritime law of France. Would 
it not be necessary to legalise the new regulation as to the non- 
confiscation of neutral goods on enemy ships, for it would deprive 
the French sailors of part of their prize money ? The question 
was really the same in both countries ; but we are specially con- 
cerned with its solution as it affects England. The English 
question is indeed more complex, because, though France has 
adopted in her organic laws the principles of the British Consti- 
tution, the mere fact of reducing them to a written law elimi- 
nated all those thousand and one minute details of constitutional 
principle — more especially those relating to the prerogative — 
which, being unwritten in our own case perplex the English 
statesman. 

The issue of the Declaration to the neutrals on the 28th 

^ " The Part of France and Russia in the Surrender by England of the 
Right of Search," Sheffield Foreign Affairs Committee (London, 1866). 



78 The Declaration of Paris 

March was not the solution of the difficulty propounded by Lord 
John Russell. The constitutional effect of that Declaration had 
to be determined. This question arises again in connection with 
the Declaration of Paris, and the discussion will be more con- 
venient when we have the whole case before us. In connec- 
tion with the Declaration of 1854, however, the Government 
took definite action : an Order in Council was issued on the 
15th April. 

The marginal note to the White Paper describes it as " in 
furtherance of " the Declaration. It carried the Declaration 
into effect, and at the same time explained its practical opera- 
tion. After reciting its terms, it proceeded : — 

Now it is this Day ordered, by and with the Advice 
of Her Majesty's Privy Council, that all Vessels under a 
neutral or friendly Flag, being neutral or friendly Property, 
shall be permitted to import into any Port or Place in Her 
Majesty's Dominions all Goods and Merchandise whatso- 
ever, to whomsoever the same may belong ; and to export 
from any Port or Place in Her Majesty's Dominions to any 
Port not blockaded any Cargo or Goods, not being Contra- 
band of War, or not requiring a special Permission, to whom- 
soever the same may belong. 

And Her Majesty is further pleased, by and with the 
Advice of Her Privy Council, to order, and it is hereby 
further ordered, that, save and except only as aforesaid, 
all the Subjects of Her Majesty and the Subjects or Citizens 
of any neutral or friendly State shall and may, during and 
notwithstanding the present Hostilities with Russia, freely 
trade with all Ports and Places wheresoever situate which 
shall not be in a State of Blockade, save and except that no 
British Vessel shall under any Circumstances whatsoever, 
either under or by virtue of this Order or otherwise, be 
permitted or empowered to enter or communicate with any 
Port or Place which shall belong to or be in the Possession or 
Occupation of Her Maj.esty's Enemies. 

Eliminating all superfluous words, and inserting some which 
are of necessity implied, we arrive at the meaning of these very 
complicated provisions : — 

First. — All neutral or friendly vessels may import into the 
British dominions all goods, whether of enemy origin or enemy 
property ; and may export from the British dominions to any 
enemy port not blockaded all goods, not contraband of war, 
even if they be enemy property. 

This is a practical expansion of the formula " free ships 
free goods." 



The Declarations to the Neutrals 79 

Second. — Subject to the exception of contraband of war, 
British subjects and subjects of neutral or friendly States may 
trade freely with enemy ports which are not blockaded, not- 
withstanding the war. 

There is no limitation in respect of the port of departure ; 
therefore, so far as neutral and friendly vessels are concerned, 
it includes trading with the colonial or coast ports of the 
enemy, and is, therefore, a suspension of the " Rule of 1756." 
But— 

Third. — No British vessel may (under any circumstances, 
either under the Order or otherwise) enter or communicate with 
an enemy port. 

This excludes British vessels from the privileges granted to 
neutral or friendly vessels under the second provision. It also 
excludes them from the privileges granted to neutral or friendly 
vessels under the second part of the first provision, but includes 
them in the privileges granted to such vessels under the first 
part of that provision so long as it did not involve communi- 
cating with enemy ports ; in other words, a British vessel 
was limited to carrying enemy property to the British 
dominions from any port which was not Russian. To this 
extent they were " free ships," and enemy property on board 
became " free goods." 

French vessels were accorded all the privileges granted to 
neutral vessels. 

But although the privileges of British vessels were limited, 
it would seem that British traders were under no restrictions ; 
for, quite apart from the somewhat vague terms of the trading 
privileges in the second provision, the very large terms in which 
" free ships free goods " had been stated in the first provision, 
both in regard to import and export, to whomsoever the goods 
might belong, enabled the neutrals to carry the trade of British 
merchants. 

The Instructions to the Fleets. 

There remained one more document to be issued by each 
Government to its fleets, the Instructions to enable the sailors 
to carry out the policy of the Government. They had been 
referred to on many occasions in the correspondence, and at 
one time M. Drouyn de Lhuys thought that the solution of the 
difficulty in coming to an agreement might be found by relegating 
all details to the Instructions, which would not be published to 
the world at large. He was anxious, however, that the two sets 
should be uniform. This idea could not be carried out, as the 



80 The Declaration of Paris 

English Instructions were signed simultaneously with the issue 
of the Declaration. The only article which need be noticed 
is Art. 7, which provided that neutral ships should not be 
stopped because they had enemy goods on board, and that 
enemy goods on neutral ships should not be seized.^ 

The French Instructions, ^ issued on the 31st March 1854, are 
somewhat more detailed, and at one or two points seem to go 
beyond what the circumstances required. Thus Art. 6 lays 
down the general principle : " Les neutres etant autorises par le 
droit des gens a continuer librement leur commerce avec les puis- 
sances belligerantes. ..." Neutral vessels, therefore, were only 
to be stopped for breaking blockade, or when carrying contra- 
band of war to the enemy, or on enemy account, official 
despatches, or soldiers or sailors. In these cases both the ship 
and cargo were declared to be confiscable, unless the contraband 
should be less than three-fourths of the whole cargo, in which 
case the contraband only was confiscable. 

There appears to have been no attempt to come to an agree- 
ment on this point, as under English maritime law the ship 
is not confiscated on account of her cargo, unless she belongs 
to the owner of the contraband. It would seem as if the general 
principle had been expressly asserted, in view of the discussion 
which had taken place with regard to, and as a direct denial 
of, the Enghsh " Rule of 1756." 

The other articles dealt with the " effective blockade " and 
its violation (Art. 7), the definition of contraband (Art. 8), and 
the recognition of the right of convoy (Art. 14). In none of these 
cases was there a similarity between French and English practice, 
nor apparently had there been any attempt to arrive at an 
agreement. 

The Answer of the United States : 
First Marcy Note. 

On receipt of the Declaration the United States Govern- 
ment sent, on the 28th April, a formal acknowledgment in what 
is known as the " First Marcy Note." ^ It expressed the Presi- 
dent's satisfaction that " free ships make free goods, which the 
United States has so long and so strenuously contended for as 
a neutral right, and in which some of the leading Powers of 
Europe have concurred, is to have a qualified sanction by the 
practical observance of it in the present war by both Great 
Britain and France — two of the most powerful nations of 

1 Docvunent No. 10 A. * Docviment No. 10 B. 

' Document No. 8 J. 



The Declarations to the Neutrals 81 

Europe." The sincere gratification at the Declaration would 
have been enhanced if Great Britain had announced that she 
would observe it in every future war. The unconditional 
sanction of the rule by Great Britain and France " would cause 
it to be henceforth recognised throughout the civilised world 
as a general principle of International Law." The same con- 
sideration which had induced the concession in the present war 
— the desire to preserve the commerce of neutrals from all 
unnecessary obstruction — would, it was presumed, have equal 
weight in any future war. With the object of settling the 
question once and for all, so that it should never again be called 
in question, the United States suggested that the Powers should 
unite in a declaration that it should be observed hereafter as 
a rule of international law. The President was also pleased to 
observe that Great Britain did not intend to bring into question 
during the war the exemption of neutral goods on enemy ships 
from seizure. Finally, the United States, while claiming full 
enjoyment of these rights as a neutral Power, would observe the 
strictest neutrality towards each and all the belligerents. 

A similar but shorter note was sent to the French Govern- 
ment on the 23rd May. As France was already an adherent 
to the " free ships free goods " principle, a homily on the im- 
propriety of the opposite practice was not required. The 
paragraph in the Note to Great Britain referring to the freedom 
of neutral goods on enemy ships was out of place, for the seizure 
of such goods had never formed part of her maritime law. For 
the sake of consistency, a homily on the impropriety of this 
practice might have been addressed to France. 

It may also be noted that the statement that the United 
States had " so long and so strenuously " contended for the 
freedom of enemy goods on neutral ships " as a neutral right " 
is not quite consistent with the fact that in the Jay Treaty ^ the 
opposite is expressly recognised ; and from the long period of 
contention for " free ships free goods " must be omitted the 
time when President Jefferson emphasised, in answer to the 
complaints of France, the fact that it depended solely on mutual 
agreement and could in no sense be regarded as a right. ^ 

^ Treaty between Great Britain and the United States, 19th Nov. 1794, 
art. xvii. (De Martens, vi. 338: (2nd ed.), v. 642). 
» See p. 34. 



82 The Declaration of Paris 

VII 

Mr Phillimore^s Motion, Uh July 1854. 

The issue of the Declaration to the neutrals inevitably aroused 
the fears of those who believed that England's position as a 
maritime power rested in large measure on the right which had 
been abandoned. The Declaration, though it professed only to 
suspend the exercise of the right during the war, might after 
all prove to be the prelude to permanent abandonment. 

On the 4th July Mr J. G. Phillimore moved in the House 
of Commons, in studiously moderate language, 

that however, from the peculiar circumstances of this 
war, a relaxation of the principle that the goods of an 
enemy in the ship of a friend are lawful prize, may be 
justifiable, to renounce or surrender a right so clearly in- 
corporated in the Law of Nations, so firmly maintained by 
us in time of greater peril and distress, and so interwoven 
with our maritime renown, would be inconsistent with the 
security and honour of the country. 

The terms of the motion exactly fitted the situation. Even 
those who regretted what had been done, not knowing how it 
had been done, were willing to admit that the Government had 
found itself at the outbreak of hostilities in a difficult position. 
But the transition from the defence of the Riga despatch to 
the adoption, even temporarily, of Mr Milner Gibson's theories 
had been too abrupt not to make them fear for the future. 
He had made no secret of the desire of the Philosophical Radicals 
to see the practice of seizing enemy goods on neutral ships 
permanently abandoned. Lord Clarendon had lifted the veil 
just high enough to raise the suspicion that he might have 
become a convert. Some had dwelt on the danger of offending 
the neutrals, especially the United States ; they thought it 
likely that the neutrals of their generation might emulate the 
action of the Armed Neutralities. There was the possibility 
that the Government might be disposed to take the easy path 
of concession. Seeing how little the public then knew, the 
motion was well conceived. On the one hand, it was right that 
the nation should understand ; on the other, it would enable the 
Ministers to explain the difficulties of the situation, and, if they 
were so minded, take the nation into their confidence. 

The task of defending the action of the Government was 
assigned to Sir William Molesworth, First Commissioner of Works, 



Mr Phillimore's Motion, 4th July 1854 83 

the " accomplished leader of the Philosophical Radicals," who 
was supposed to have paid much attention to the subject, and 
he spoke through thirty-four columns of Hansard. He admitted 
that the common practice of belligerents had been to treat the 
goods of an enemy on the ship of a friend as lawful prize ; but 
the reason was that " in war, passion and hatred and seeming 
necessity, and the fancied interests of the moment, are apt to 
determine the actions of combatants ; and powerful belligerents, 
relying on their might, oftentimes set at defiance the best- 
established rules of war." Biit the merits of the maxim " free 
ships free goods " had been, he asserted, conceded by its recogni- 
tion in so many treaties, even by Great Britain, during the two 
previous centuries. Developing this thesis, he made an elaborate 
analysis of the different treaties, and drew from it the conclusion 
that the tendency of national opinion was in its favour. 

I do not propose to dissect this analysis ; a more careful 
and more accurate study of the treaties in which the maxim 
had been adopted, as well as of those in which it had not been 
adopted, had been published in 1801 by Robert Ward at the 
request of the then Foreign Secretary, Lord Grenville.^ His 
conclusions were radically different from those of Sir William 
Moles worth. There is only one comment necessary on this part 
of the speech : it is a pity it was not preceded by a study of 
Robert Ward's book. 

It is, however, of great importance to point out the funda- 
mental error into which Sir William Molesworth fell, and into 
which all advocates of " free ships free goods " fall. They 
assume that the principle is " adopted " because a provision 
agreeing to it for a very limited purpose is to be found in some 
treaties, is in fact included in the treaties concluded by Great 
Britain with France, Holland, Spain, and Portugal. The prin- 
ciple that the neutral flag covers enemy goods, that is, pro- 
tects them from seizure, can only be adopted by a country when 
it admits it as of universal application, and incorporates it un- 
conditionally into its general maritime law. " Adoption " of 
a principle means that its acceptance is not made subject to 
any condition ; the question whether other countries accept it 
too is immaterial. England adopted Free Trade ; Sir William 
Molesworth endeavoured to prove that she had also adopted 
" free ships free goods." Thus, even in this earliest attempt 
by the Philosophical Radicals to substantiate their case, their 
weakness in argument was apparent. Putting all ulterior 
motives on one side, France adopted the principle in this sense 

1 Reprinted in the series of English Classics on " The Rights of Belli- 
gerent and Neutral." 



84 The Declaration of Paris 

in the Reglement of July 1778/ on which so much turned during 
the American War of Independence. Further, from the nature 
of the maxim " adoption " must mean adopted as a belligerent. 
Adoption by any number of neutrals carries the case no further. 

A more limited form of adoption is where by treaty two 
countries agree that if they go to war with one another — " ce 
qu'^ Dieu ne plaise," as the treaties say — ^then their goods 
respectively shall be free on neutral ships. This is a concession 
by each party to the other, as a potential enemy ; but it 
satisfies one condition of adoption because, though not applic- 
able to all wars, it is applicable in the specified wars, through 
this potential enemy, to all neutrals. I doubt whether such 
an article is to be found in any of the treaties concluded 
before the Armed Neutralities. 

The agreement which is commonly found in the treaties is 
quite different, and amounts to no more than this : if either of 
the contracting parties should be at war with a third State, 
then the other, remaining neutral, may continue to trade with 
the enemy, may even carry his goods " free." To assert that 
this form of agreement, which is a privilege granted only to 
one prospective neutral, recognised the principle, or is even 
based on it as a principle, is a misuse of language. And the 
case can be put no higher. 

The main point of Sir William Molesworth's argument was 
that England had accepted the principle, because she had 
agreed to it in this reciprocal form in the treaties mentioned 
above. This point will be more fully dealt with in due course ; 
but it is necessary to say at once that the statement is a com- 
plete perversion of the facts of history. In the first place, it 
ignores the fact that in some treaties the agreement, either by 
omission or by express stipulation, was in precisely the opposite 
sense, was a recognition of the practice of seizing enemy goods 
on neutral ships. In the second place, it is misleading even 
in regard to those treaties in which the principle was included. 
When England did accept it, it was always as part of a bargain, 
and always when a political as well as a commercial alliance 
was in negotiation — except in the case of France. The idea 
that it was accepted generally and unconditionally in the com- 
mercial Treaty of Utrecht between England and France in 1713, 
on which so much emphasis is always laid, is entirely mythical. 
It had already been accepted in 1677 in the Treaty of St 
Germain-en-Laye, and then for a very specific purpose — in order 
to obtain a relaxation in favour of English vessels from the 

* Printed in the Documentary History of the Armed Neutralities. 

m 



Mr Phillimore*s Motion, 4th July 1854 85 

severity of the French law, which not only condemned enemy 
goods on board neutral vessels, but also the vessel as a penalty 
for carrying them. Further, in view of the maritime law then 
existing, the true version of what happened in 1677 is that both 
countries adopted this principle. The provisions of the Treaty 
of Utrecht were no more than a renewal of the agreement 
of 1677. 

Yet even this is not the limit of Sir William Molesworth's 
mistakes. He agreed that " free ships free goods " was almost 
invariably accompanied by the other principle, " enemy ships 
enemy goods." The Powers that accepted the former rule 
generally stipulated, he said, that neutrals should pay for the 
lenity of that rule by the confiscation of their property when 
found on board enemies' ships. But, he maintained, there was 
no logical connection between the two rules other than " the 
jingling of a verbal antithesis." His excursions into the region 
of international commercial policy led him completely astray. 
There is an intimate connection between the two rules ; the 
Jingling antithesis was only adopted as a convenient method of 
statement. The two rules are based on the principle that the 
flag is to determine the right of belligerent seizure, not the 
ownership of the property seized. And there is a deeper 
principle connecting the seizure of neutral goods on enemy 
ships with the seizure of enemy goods on neutral ships ; they 
are both methods of preventing neutrals giving assistance to 
the enemy. 

Sir William Molesworth was wrong in his principles ; he 
was still more wrong in his history. He ventured to assert 
that the Armed Neutrality of 1780 attained its object ! How 
wrong he was the volume in which the story of that League 
will be told at length will demonstrate. 

The important part of the speech was, however, the con- 
cluding statement : — " We have not renounced or surrendered 
any belligerent right appertaining to us by the Law of Nations. 
. . . Her Majesty did not renounce nor surrender any of her 
belligerent rights. For I need hardly assure the honourable and 
learned gentleman that to waive for the present a right, and 
to surrender it, are two quite distinct things." 

" To waive is not to surrender " summed up the defence of 
what had been done at the opening of the war. Did it really 
express the intention of the Government ? Lord Clarendon had 
confided to Lord Shaftesbury his desire to alter the law per- 
manently. Mr Milner Gibson had boldly advocated this per- 
manent change. Was Sir William Molesworth in the dark as 
to what his friends thought on the subject ? It is a question 



86 The Declaration of Paris 

of conscience which I shall not attempt to answer. But this 
may be said — if anyone will read through that lengthy speech, 
he will find it difficult to connect the concluding sentence with 
the very deliberate opinions which preceded it. 

Mr Robert Phillimore pointed out to empty benches that 
the Declaration of the Government was inconsistent with Sir 
William Molesworth's speech. Instead of talk about " waived 
rights," there ought to be, as that speech showed, an apology for 
wrongs formerly committed. That was a prophetic utterance, 
as we shall presently see ; but the House cared neither for this 
nor for Mr Phillimore's demonstrations of Sir William Moles- 
worth's historical inexactitudes. He pleaded special knowledge 
of the subject ; he showed that if Sir William was right, Lord 
Stowell must have been wrong ; but he was heard with im- 
patience, and the House was counted out at 9.45. 



i855 



The Debates in Parliament—Trading with the Enemy- 
Land Transport through Prussia. 

The Declaration to the neutrals had been accepted by all 
parties as inevitable : the public was mainly concerned with 
its consequences ; on the one side, as they affected the successful 
prosecution of the war ; on the other, as they affected trade. 
The debates in 1855 were confined to the economic side of the 
question. 

It seems to have been admitted that the blockade of the 
Black Sea was most unsatisfactory. Delay had been caused 
by further negotiation as to details with France. When orders 
were at last sent out, the English and French admirals proposed 
to establish the blockade by a squadron stationed at the entrance 
of the Bosphorus. But doubts were raised at home as to its 
legality ; and, after more delay, it was decided to be " illegal," 
and the admirals were ordered to blockade the Black Sea ports 
individually.^ From one cause and another the blockade was 
only notified on the 1st February 1855, was then postponed till 
the 14th, and not finally instituted till some days after. Mr 
Cardwell, speaking on the 20th for the Government, described 
the state of affairs as due to " inevitable remissness." The Sea 
of Azov was, so it was said, not blockaded.^ The blockade 
of the Baltic had, however, been carried out effectively ; but it 
had been nullified by the action of Prussia. 

King Frederick William's vacillation over his neutrality 
continued after the commencement of the war, till the Czar's 
influence prevailed on his brother-in-law to take up a definite 
attitude. Between them a very perfect system of transit of 
goods from Russia through Prussia to England was devised. 

^ Document No. 13. 

* The Sea of Azov was blockaded on the 3rd March; see "Blockade 
Notifications," Document No. 12. 

87 



88 The Declaration of Paris 

Russia developed her interior communications " to a degree of 
perfection that could scarcely have been anticipated " by means 
of very efficient roads to the Niemen and the Vistula, and to 
the Prussian frontiers generally. Prussia on her side offered a 
special inducement to the traders to adopt this route by abolish- 
ing her land import duties, and reaped great benefit herself by 
making a railway to Memel, just across the frontier. The result 
was that the roads were overflowing with Russian commerce, 
and vast stores of Russian produce, tallow, hemp, flax, and 
Unseed, flowed to the Prussian port, whence they were shipped 
on board neutral vessels to England. The blockade of the 
Baltic potts was thus completely neutralised. A curious state 
of affairs, which, if tolerated, would put in jeopardy most of 
the fundamental principles on which the effective waging of 
war depends : such vital principles as the prohibition of trading 
with the enemy ; the doctrine of " continuous voyage " ; it 
raised the merits of " free ships free goods " and the value of 
blockades ; and generally the relations of political economy 
with war. 

On the 20th February 1855, Mr R. P. Collier moved for a 
return of Russian exports from Archangel to England, and 
advocated further restrictions, suggesting the application of the 
" Rule of 1756." On the 6th March Lord Berners sought in- 
formation concerning a consignment of lead entered for ship- 
ment to St Petersburg via Hull and Memel, and commented 
on the increase of Russian goods imported into this country. 
" The Government," he said, " ought exphcitly to avow the 
policy they intend to adopt towards the nations with which 
we are at war, and likewise towards nations which regarded 
themselves as neutrals." On the 27th April the Earl of Albe- 
marle drew attention to the subject, and on the 15th May 
moved in the Lords that " in order to bring the war with Russia 
to a successful termination, it is necessary to restrict the trade 
with that country by more efficient measures than any which 
have hitherto been adopted." 

There was a singular want of frankness on the part of the 
Government in dealing with Mr Collier's suggestion that the 
" Rule of 1756 " should be relied on. It is conceivable that 
there might have been some objection to referring to the fact 
that the Cabinet themselves had endeavoured to introduce it 
into the Declaration to the Neutrals, but had withdrawn it in 
consequence of French opposition. But at least this might have 
been said, that the question had received due consideration by 
the Government, and that the operation of the Rule had been 
suspended by the Order in Council of the 15th April 1854. 



The Debates in Parliament, 1855 89 

All the questions raised in the three debates centre round 
the attitude of Prussia. Here there was no action taken by a 
neutral merchant which his Government undertook to defend ; 
it was action taken by a neutral Government itself in order 
to facilitate the trade of the enemy. It is called " unneutral 
service " when the trade thus officially fostered is with other 
neutrals ; a new name had to be devised, new principles to be 
established, when it was with the subjects of the belligerent. 
This state of affairs had been foreseen even in the early days of 
the war ; for, in the debate on the Riga despatch, 17th March 
1854, it was stated that preparations had then already been 
made for evading the blockade by land transport through 
Prussia. It seems that even contraband of war was allowed 
to pass through to the enemy. For reasons of uncertain policy, 
which will presently appear, no serious effort had been made 
to grapple with the situation. Moreover, the question was so 
full of practical difficulties that nothing but the sternest purpose, 
backed by clear policy, could deal with it effectively. 

We get back to the primitive facts underlying the whole 
question. When the subject of a neutral State sends contra- 
band by sea to the enemy, the belligerent remedy, seizure and 
confiscation, arises because the ship which carries it is at large 
upon the ocean. The. existence of the remedy depends on the 
possibility of enforcing it. But when it is sent by land across 
neutral territory, the belligerent is powerless to prevent it by 
active measures. He cannot enter the territory of the country 
which is in a state of neutrality with him to prevent its subjects 
trading with his enemy. 

If the neutral Government lends a hand, as by allowing the 
transit on State railways, it is officially assisting the enemy, 
and a clear breach of neutrality. But remedies are not always 
so clear as the breach. There are practically only three : pro- 
test, rupture of diplomatic relations, war. Protests are usually 
met by assurances ; and with assurances, even if there is no 
prospect of fulfilment, the belligerent often must re§t content. 
The British Government rested, rather hopelessly, content 
with Prussian assurances. Lord Granville, in answer to Lord 
Berners, said : " Very early in the war application was made to 
the Court of Prussia to prohibit the transmission of articles 
contraband of war through that country to Russia, and an 
assurance was given that the Pi-ussian Government would do 
their best to comply with the request — an assurance which," 
he was afraid, " had not been very perfectly complied with." 
However, the first assurance not having resulted in any amend- 
ment, a renewed assurance was given ; the Prussian Govern- 



90 The Declaration of Paris 

ment " had expressed an intention of rendering more effectual 
the means in her power of preventing such traffic." Restoration 
of the land import duties and shutting down the new railway 
were the only effectual means of preventing it, and neither of 
them was adopted. 

Lord Granville's answer referred only to the facilities for 
transit of contraband through Prussia ; he did not deal with 
their peculiar feature, that they enabled the British subjects 
to trade with the enemy. It would appear that the omission 
was deliberate. Lord Granville indulged in some very vague and 
not very relevant remarks about the " very considerable con- 
cessions in our old interpretation of the rights of belligerents " 
which had been made, and expressed a hope " that no attempt 
would be made to revert to our ancient practices." He then 
referred to the Berlin and Milan Decrees as examples of in- 
effectual attempts to keep enemy produce out of a belligerent 
country, and suggested, by way, it must be presumed, of showing 
how ineffectual our ancient practice was, that if this enemy pro- 
duce were sold to a neutral it " would have put it entirely out of 
the reach of our cruisers either in neutral or in our own vessels." 

Having demonstrated the ineffectiveness of everything to 
stop the trade. Lord Granville added that it was nevertheless 
contrary to the wish of the Government that the blockade of 
the Black Sea should be ineffectual ; but, as a matter of fact, 
that also came within the general ineffectiveness, for " it 
turned out to be impossible to establish such a blockade, and 
that was the reason why the imports from Russia to this country 
had been so great." Nevertheless, a recent article in the Revue 
des Deux Mondes,^ he intimated, showed that the injury to 
Russian trade had been great. 

If anything could be derived from such a very incoherent 
statement it was this : the Government, while making a show 
of stopping direct trade between British merchants and the 
enemy, intended to allow that trade when it was indirect. 

This policy tended to encourage British traders in violating, 
or at least to find excuses for them when they had violated, 
the ancient law of war, which forbids trading with the enemy. 
The Earl of Albemarle pressed the point very strongly. To 
trade with the enemy was a violation of the common law ; was 
an infringement of the statute of 25 Edward III., which made 
it treasonable " to give aid and comfort to the King's enemies 
in this realm or elsewhere " ; to sanction it was to conduct 
war upon peace principles. Two-thirds of the goods which were 

^ See Chapter IV. of " 1855," where this article is referred to. 



The Debates in Parliament, 1855 91 

carried by the transit trade through Prussia were intended for 
British ports, and nearly all the money with which that trade was 
carried on was British money. It would not have been worth 
while for Russia to have incurred all the expenses of creating 
the new roads merely to carry the remnant of the trade which 
was not British. The policy of the Government, therefore, 
furthered Russia's object, and enabled her to sustain her national 
credit. This was the direct consequence of the Order in Council 
of the 15th April. It was asserted that no British merchant 
had infringed the law until, three weeks after the declaration 
of war, the Order in Council had authorised it. The blockade 
of the Russian Baltic ports was illusory, because the goods were 
brought to Memel and carried thence under the neutral flag to 
England. " If Prussia had supplied the enemy with arms and 
munitions of war. Her Majesty's Government had supplied him 
with those sinews in the shape of £10,000,000, to be paid for 
exports from his country." The Government itself was aiding 
and comforting the King's enemies. 

If the evasion of the Baltic blockade profited Russia, it 
certainly benefited Prussia, and it was no wonder that she 
wished to preserve her neutrality ; no wonder that the war 
was exceedingly popular with her people. 

The virtue of the old law against trading with the enemy was 
thus put directly in issue, and the claims of political economy 
above the necessities of war. The Government had set them- 
selves deliberately, in the words of Sir William Scott in the 
Maria,^ " to introduce a state of things not yet seen in the world, 
that of a military war and a commercial peace." 

But the Government had not only set at defiance the ancient 
common law, they had undermined the doctrine of " continuous 
voyage," which the Courts had expressly devised to deal with 
indirect trade with the enemy, carried on in such a way as to 
avoid the risk of the direct trade. The facts of the Prussian 
transit trade differed in no way from the facts of the celebrated 
case of the Essex,^ except in being more flagrant. 

How did the matter stand on the renewal of the war with 
France in 1803 ? In regard to trade with the enemy's West 
Indian colonies, we had waived our right to seize enemy produce 
going direct to the United States. The Americans could not 
carry their West Indian cargoes direct to Europe ; they could, 
however, trade with the enemy from their own ports in goods 
which were their own property ; all that was necessary was to 

1 1 C. Rob., 380. 

" Referred to in Sir William Grant's judgment in the William, 
5 C. Rob., 385. 



92 The Declaration of Paris 

import the goods from the West Indies and then send them on to 
Europe. The trade-winds determined the courses of saihng ships, 
and lent an air of reality to these ingenious proceedings. James 
Stephen, in 1805, wrote in his pamphlet, War in Disguise : ^ 

Such is the position of the United States, and such 
the effect of the trade- winds, that European vessels, home- 
ward-bound from the West Indies, can touch at their ports 
with very little inconvenience or delay ; and the same is 
the case, though in a less degree, in regard to vessels coming 
from the remotest parts of South America or the East 
Indies. The passage from the Gulph of Mexico, especially, 
runs so close along the North American shore, that ships 
bound from the Havannah, from Vera Cruz, and other 
great Spanish ports bordering on the Gulph, to Europe, can 
touch at certain ports in the United States with scarcely 
any deviation. 

The Prize Courts, however, countered the practice of the 
" broken voyage," re-enforcing the doctrine of " continuous 
voyage " by the " common stock " principle. Only if enemy 
goods, imported into a neutral country, had passed into the 
" common stock " of that country, could they lose their enemy 
taint ; having thus become neutral property, then only could 
they be freely re-exported to a hostile State. 

Hence arose another and still more ingenious practice : the 
cargo was landed at a United States port and re-loaded im- 
mediately. Further, the landing of the cargo was given all 
the appearance of a bona-fide importation by the payment of 
import duties ; and the Customs system of rebate or drawback 
facilitated the re-export. In the case of the Essex the duties 
amounted to $5278 ; the drawback was $5080. 

On this ground the Prize Court held that the cargo had 
not gone into the common stock. The test originally accepted; 
that payment of duty implied bona-fide importation, was found 
to be insufficient to check the practice ; and when it was proved 
that they had only been nominally paid, the cargo was 
condemned. 

The analogy between the Essex and the Prussian land transit 
lies in this. The shippers availed themselves of the benefit of 
the law of the United States ; " The duties were paid or secured, 
according to law, in like manner as they are required to be 
secured on a like cargo meant for home consumption ; when 
re-shipped, the duties were drawn back with a deduction of 
8| per cent, on them, as is permitted to imported articles in 
all cases." 

* Reprinted and edited by the author of this study in 1917. 



The Political Economists' Theory of War 93 

Mahan criticises the first seizure on the ground of surprise, 
but is fully answered by Sir William Grant in the William.^ 
Otherwise he is of opinion that the decision was sound in 
principle. There was no suggestion that the United States 
Government were conniving at the action of the shippers. 
The law of which they had taken the benefit was the ordinary 
law of the country. But the action of the shippers brought 
about condemnation in the Prize Court. In the case of the 
land transit through Prussia, the Government of that country 
had deliberately altered the Customs law to facilitate it — the 
breach of neutrality was clear, and the British Government 
acquiesced ! 

II 

The Political Economists^ Theory of War. 

Behind the Government were the political economists with 
their notion that war must be waged in such a way as not to 
interfere with trade ; that a war for arms and a peace for 
commerce could coexist. The Ministers had woven the old 
principle and the new ideas into an inextricable tangle ; the 

^ "... It has, I tinderstand, been said that our departure from that 
supposed rule in the case of the Essex was a svtrprise upon the merchants 
of America, who had by our former decisions been led to believe that proof 
of landing and payment of duties in America would in every case be held 
absolutely decisive of the legality of the voyage. 

" By the original evidence the landing of the cargo at Marblehead 
was proved ; it was also in proof that the duties had been secured according 
to law — so the owners swore, so the custom-house certified. It was to 
be supposed that duties which were secured were one day to be paid, 
and it was doubtless meant to be so understood here ; for the fact was 
suppressed that at the moment when the certificate issued from the custom- 
house, and the oath was made by the owners, a debenture had been granted 
which in effect extinguished almost the whole of the duties that had been 
previously secured. Here was what is now said to have been by us held 
conclusive evidence of importation. But what did we determine ? That 
the importation was not sufficiently proved, and therefore we directed 
further proof of it to be made. Could any American, who at all attended 
to the proceedings of this Court, be really surprised by our again deciding 
a twelvemonth afterwards that such evidence was not conclusive ? Yet 
this effect, I mean of surprise, is ascribed to our decision in the Essex, in 
May 1805. 

" On the whole, I trust I have demonstrated that we did not in the 
case of the Essex, and that we do not in the case now before us, depart 
from any principle which we have ever adopted. The application to this 
case of the principles on which we really have proceeded has been already 
shown. The consequence is that the voyage was illegal, and that the 
sentence of condemnation must be affirmed." — (5 C. Rob., 385.) 



94 The Declaration of Paris 

political economists were ready with their theories to unravel 
it. Lord Granville's excursions into this unfamiliar region had 
produced no argument of greater stability than the fatalist 
remark : If our own people are not allowed to import enemy 
goods, the neutrals will ; then our own people will sell their 
goods to the neutrals, and so get them home : much better 
let them do it themselves. Mr Ricardo, son of the eminent 
economist, was equally fatalistic : "If the Russians wanted to 
sell their produce, and the Prussians had an interest in allowing 
it to pass. Englishmen would buy it whether that produce were 
Russian or not." Mr Cardwell was sunk in the depths of official 
despondency : " Depend upon it, means of evasion would be 
found to follow every enactment you might impose." We had 
travelled a long way from the stern lecturing of the Riga despatch, 
and the careful answer contained in the Emerson Tennent 
letter to the merchants' conundrums.^ Only Lord Clarendon 
struggled to keep up a bold front of being consistent with in- 
consistency. Lord Duncan had accompanied a deputation to 
the Foreign Secretary, who had assured them, with grave cir- 
cumlocution, that '- however anxious he might be to maintain 
the trade of the country, he thought it right to say that, in the 
position he occupied, he should feel it incumbent on him to take 
every means in his power to vex, to harass, and to annoy the 
great enemy with whom we were at war." 

Various methods had been suggested for counteracting the 
land-transit trade. Licences were banned, though without any 
clear perception of the reason which had led to their abuse in 
the Napoleonic Wars. Mr Cardwell exclaimed exultingly : " No 
privileges have been granted, no benefits conferred, by licences ; 
there have been no favoured traders, no unscrupulous traders, 
but all have been dealt with alike." Mr Cardwell had for- 
gotten that before the declaration of war the Government had 
announced that they were " very nearly in a position to deter- 
mine the principle on which we will allow licences." ^ " Certi- 
ficates of origin " were laughed out of court. Mr Mitchell had 
suggested, in favour of their adoption, that " it was notorious 
that hitherto no tallow had ever been shipped from Prussia, 
therefore our Consuls would be pretty well justified if an applica- 
tion were made for a certificate in the case of tallow, in suspect- 
ing its origin." But, said Mr Ricardo, seeing that flax and 
tallow were the produce of Prussia as well as of Russia, the 
suggestion was unpractical. " They could be supported by 
affidavits " : but everybody knew, experience in former wars 

^ Document No. 4 (4). • See p. 47. 



The Political Economists' Theory of War 95 

had indeed shown, that when an affidavit was wanted an 
affidavit was forthcoming — at a price. Moreover, manufactured 
articles, by the Customs law, are treated as the produce of the 
country of manufacture, and a very slight process was sufficient 
to give them that character. Russian flax combed in Prussia 
became Prussian flax : Russian tallow melted in Prussia became 
Prussian stearine ; or even, without melting, a ladleful of 
Prussian tallow cleverly introduced into a cask of Russian 
tallow, by a process with which Mr Ricardo was familiar, would 
immediately convert it into Prussian tallow. Therefore it was 
manifest that if the import of these commodities from Russia 
were prohibited, it would at once, in the ordinary course of 
commerce, create a large manufacturing trade in Prussia. 
Indeed, the Prussian merchants need not go to so much trouble 
and expense ; they had only to keep the Russian produce for 
Prussian consumption and send on their own in place of it. 
And then again, if we were clever enough to stop the exports from 
Prussia, it would be perfectly simple to get the Russian produce 
sent through Holland and other continental countries. All the 
tricks that the Courts had for so long struggled against were to 
come into their own again. The neutral merchant is generally 
supposed to be exceedingly ingenious in inventing devices for 
evading our methods of preventing trade with the enemy : ac- 
cording to the political economist, the British merchant, even 
when his country is at war, is as bad. The idea of imposing heavy 
import duties on Russian produce was also suggested and rejected. 
Heavy duties and rigorous blockade, which stops egress as well 
as ingress, could not coexist with any pretence of logical principle. 

That was Lord Derby's view ; but it was weighted with 
heavier argument. The principle advocated, he said, in the 
debate of the 15th May, is, " that you must not raise by financial 
restrictions the price of Russian produce in this country — that 
you must not check Russian trade — but that you must foster 
and encourage the commerce with that country in spite of the 
war. Then, away with your blockades at once ; do not let us 
go to the expense of blockading — or let us hear no more of the 
argument that you cannot prevent Russian trade, and that you 
ought not if you could." 

It is difficult to get at the real facts of this part of the case 
in view of the conflicting statements which were made. The 
Earl of Albemarle asserted that the Russian products could be, 
and were being, easily obtained from other sources. Tallow, 
about which so much trouble had been made, was really of no 
importance, as we only obtained a tenth of our supply from 
Russia, and this could be found elsewhere ; and to stop that 



96 The Declaration of Paris 

supply would be a real loss to Russia, because her trade was 
very limited. Then again, excellent substitutes for Russian 
flax had been found in India. The increased cost was declared 
to be a fatal objection. Lord Albemarle asserted,^ however, that 
the fact was that they had been discarded when the merchants 
discovered that Russian fibre was still easily obtainable. 

The ground thus cleared, the political economists boldly 
laid down their doctrine — that when we are at war with a 
country from which our manufacturers obtained their raw 
material, they must be allowed to continue getting it from the 
enemy in spite of blockades, and in spite of the benefit which 
the enemy obtained from that trade : in other words, that 
raw materials must be exempted from the law which prohibited 
trading with the enemy. 

This curious perversion of ideas is well illustrated by Mr 
Cardwell's answer to Mr Mitchell, in which he attempted to 
fuse the benefit and the damage which would result to the 
enemy by this doctrine. He denied that the blockade had 
been ineffectual ; on the contrary, he had reason to believe 
that the Russian manufacturers " have suffered materially by 
your being able to put upon Russia, by means of your blockade, 
that very pressure which my honourable friend is so anxious 
to induce you to put upon Great Britain, namely, to prevent 
the supply of raw material with which our manufacturers are 
supported." Then followed statistics to show that the blockade 
had not been ineffective. " I think," he added, " it is surprising 
that so great an effect should have been produced in so short 
a time ; for you will not forget that these are the results of 
a blockade as yet [20th February 1855] very imperfect, and 
that the advance of British capital by which in times of peace 
the trade of Russia is carried on had not yet been discontinued." 

These were the advances which, even in December 1853, Lord 
Clarendon had recommended the merchants to discontinue.^ 

Emphasis was laid on the specific application of the benefit 
of this economic conduct of the war to the import of flax seed, 
of which large supplies were received from Riga for sowing in 
Ireland, and on which the Irish linen industry was said exclusively 
to depend. The linen trade of this country was nearly equal 
to the whole external trade of Russia, and, the idea of using 
substitutes being rejected, the most serious inconvenience would 
have resulted if the war had been allowed to stop the import.^ . 

So the insoluble problem — how to damage the enemy 
without inconveniencing ourselves — was continuously debated. 

» On the 15th May. « See p. 41. 



The Political Economists' Theory of War 97 

Cautious men like Lord Grey took the view that it was a 
dangerous and mistaken policy to attempt to put any further 
restrictions upon the trade of the world for the purpose of 
injuring the enemy. Bolder spirits like Mr Ricardo declared 
that blockades were " obsolete and useless." But the net 
result of all the talking must have somewhat disturbed those 
who knew what the practice of war was, and what the desire 
of the neutrals. It was the discovery of a new virtue in the 
maxim " free ships free goods," which its authors avowedly 
never dreamed of, that it enabled the subjects of a belligerent 
to trade freely with the enemy ; and though by the Order in 
Council of 1854 ^ no British vessel was allowed " under any cir- 
cumstances whatever " to enter or communicate with any port 
of the enemy, yet their goods might be laden on neutral ships. 
As to those Englishmen who would buy raw material whether 
it were Russian or not, "if," said Mr Ricardo, " the maxim 
facilitated their purchases, so much the better for them " I 

To criticise such reckless methods of solving the problem is 
not to deny its difficulty, which has perplexed many countries 
at war. 2 The historic example in which the law of war was set 
aside in order to enable war to be carried on, is the deliberate 
importation of cloth from England in order to clothe the French 
armies, first in 1797 by the Directory, and again in 1807 by 
Bonaparte. 

The Council of Five Hundred in 1797 sent a complaint to 
the Directory " relative to English merchandize which has been 
run into France." ^ The Directory replied, admitting the im- 
portation through a Prussian merchant (on the security of the 
diamonds of the Republic) of thousands of ells of blue and red 
cloth, serge and white shalloons, and woollens, for clothing the 
soldiers. The message dwelt on the difficulty of obtaining these 
materials in France on credit for the most pressing needs of the 
troops. The opportunity which had arisen of procuring them 
from abroad, on terms of payment which the French merchants 

1 Document No. 9 (8). 

* But there is another and a better way — self-help, which we have 
followed during the present war. In the autumn of 1914 Great Britain 
found herself exceedingly hard pressed in regard to various essential 
munitions of war which, hitherto, she had procured from Germany 
and other foreign countries. To take one of many instances, glass for 
optical instruments of precision for the forces — the eyes of the fleet, the 
army, and the flying service. Instead of trading with the enemy, or 
trying to do so, we set to work through the various departments of the 
Ministry of Munitions to make new or develop old industries. The results 
have been amazing. The discovery of the means of procuring potash, 
for which formerly we were almost entirely dependent on Germany, from 
iron ores in the blast furnaces, is one of the industrial romances of the war. 

' Debrett's State Papers, vol. vi. p. 137. 

7 



98 The Declaration of Paris 

would not have accepted, had induced the Directory to sanction 
these transactions, truly advantageous for the Republic, and 
without which both the land and sea forces would have been 
exposed to the utmost want. The remission of the duty was 
necessary, because otherwise the price would have been much 
higher, as the contractors, who received bills in payment, would 
never have agreed to advance the money for the duty. 

In 1807 the armies of Bonaparte were in a similar condition 
of destitution ; leather as well as cloth had to be imported by 
devious routes from England. Bourrienne, the French agent 
at Hamburg, and afterwards the Emperor's faithful secretary, 
was commissioned to arrange the necessary business, the Berlin 
Decree notwithstanding, which, in spite of the opposition of 
the Customs officers, he successfully accomplished. 

L'empereur me demandait tant d'effets d'habillement pour ses 
troupes, que tout ce que contenait la ville de Hambourg, et ce qu'aura- 
ient pu fournir les villes de Bremen et de Lubeck n'aurait pu y sufl&re. 
Je fis, avec une maison de Hambourg, un traite par lequel je Tautorisais, 
malgre le decret de Berlin, a faire venir des draps et des cuirs d'Angle- 
terre. Je les obtenais d'une maniere sure et a moitie priz Nos soldats 
auraient eu cent fois le temps de mourir de froid s'il avait fallu observer 
ridiculement le systeme continental et cette kyrielle de decrets in- 
executables sur les marchandises anglaises. Le directeur des douanes 
a Hambourg prit de I'humeur ; je tins bon ; mes draps et mes cuirs 
arriverent ; capotes, habits, souliers, tout fut promptement con- 
fectionne ; et nos soldats se trouverent ainsi a I'abri des rigueurs de 
la saison. . . . 

Dans ce temps, Hambourg ni son territoire n'avaient de fabriques 
de drap, toute etofPe de laine etait, . . , interdite, et cependant j 'avals 
dd fournir et j 'avals fourni cinquante mille capotes a la grande-armee. 
Par suite d'un decret imperial tout recent, je devais faire confectionner, 
sans delai, seize mille habits, trente-sept mille vestes ; l'empereur me 
demandait deux cent mille pairs de souliers, outre les quarante mille 
paires que je lui avals deja envoyees, . . . et je fis le commerce avec 
I'Angleterre, au grand avantage des armees, qui furent bien habillees 
et bien chaussees.^ 

These transactions were, for the English merchants con- 
cerned, in breach of the common law ; for the neutral merchants, 
the taking of a risk which, in common parlance, is called a 
breach of neutrality. According to the theories of the Man- 
chester school they were legitimate, for they were in furtherance 
of the sacred cause of commerce ; according to the doctrinaire 
political economists, " so much the better " for all concerned. 

In the discussions in Parliament two very grave mistakes 
are specially to be noticed. 

The politicians drew a false conclusion from the confusion 

^ Bourrienne, Memoires sur Napoleon, vol. vii. p. 292. 



The Political Economists' Theory of War 99 

of trade which resulted during the Napoleonic Wars. Lord 
Granville pointed almost triumphantly to the fact that even 
those extreme measures, the Berlin and Milan Decrees, were 
powerless to prevent the Continent being flooded with English 
goods. When, from one cause and another, that trading came 
to an end and the merchants lost their mental balance. 
Brougham's perfervid oratory compelled people to believe that 
the fault lay with the Orders in Council. They argued that 
because a principle pushed to its extreme limit had produced 
such dire confusion, sound and unsound policy could no longer 
be distinguished. They themselves confused two distinct issues, 
the effect of war policy on the enemy, and its effect on the 
neutrals. They did not discern the difference between the 
" Licence System," ^ which was the butt of all their abuse, and 
the system of licences, which is an integral part of the common 
law. Mahan had not yet written his books to mal^ the matter 
clear. The political economists argued from the particular to 
the general. If one merchant could obtain permission to trade 
with the enemy it was a privilege, of all things most hateful 
to their minds. What one could obtain by express grant, all 
should have as a right. And yet there were lights to hghten 
their darkness. Lord Kenyon, C.J., in Potts v. Bell,^ had 
expressly approved Sir William Scott's dictum in the Hoop : ' 
" All trading with the public enemy, unless with the permission 
of the Sovereign, is interdicted." Wheaton has explained the 
meaning of this power of exemption : "A material object of 
the control which the Government exercises over such a trade 
is, that it may judge of the fitness of the persons, and under 
what restrictions of time and place such an exemption from the 
ordinary laws of war may be extended." * Kent too had written 
that the limitation of time is important ; " for what is proper 
at one time, may be very unfit and mischievous at another 
time." 6 

Instead of steadying themselves on these carefully con- 
sidered expositions of the law, the Government plunged to the 
other extreme, which cannot be more graphically stated than 
it is by the editor of Wheaton : " During the Crimean War 
England and France and Russia all permitted their respective 
subjects to trade with the enemy, provided the trade was carried 
on though the medium of a neutral flag " ! ® Is it surprising that 
a few years later, when the subject was once more discussed, 

1 See " 1855," Chapter III. » 8 T.R., 548. ' 1 C. Rob., 196. 

* Wheaton, International Law, 5th ed., p. 435. 

* Kent's Commentaries, Abdy's edition, p. 382. 
" Wheaton, op. cit., p. 438. 



100 The Declaration of Paris 

John Bright put his finger on the illogic of the poUcy : Why this 
hmitation to the neutral flag ? If you are right, you must go 
further still, and extend the privilege to the enemy flag.^ 

A sane, and, judged by the standard of discussion set up 
in Parliament, remarkable article appeared in the Edinburgh 
Review for July 1854, entitled " The Orders in Council on Trade 
during War," ^ in which a defence of the Government policy 
was undertaken. The facts of war and the principles of the 
law of war were frankly stated, and the issue involved in all 
war fairly faced — whether the loss inflicted on the intercourse 
of the enemy with this country is not commensurate to the loss 
inflicted on the interests which we might ourselves have engaged 
in his trade ? Whether we do most injury to the enemy or to 
ourselves ? Whether the advantages derived from the pressure 
we may put upon him are greater than the evils and incon- 
veniences by which they are purchased ? 

The means of exchange were denied us — commercial 
intercourse was stopped ; in striking the producers of these 
articles abroad, we afflicted the consumer at home ; the 
cost of war was enormously enhanced by the increased 
prices to be paid for every article of consumption which 
fell under these restrictions, and when these articles con- 
sisted of raw material, the want of them might paralyse 
the industry of the country. 

That is undoubtedly the consequence of war. The problem 
which is presented to every Government charged with the 
conduct of war must be how to minimise its effect on the people 
without minimising its effect on the enemy. 

The writer's first proposition, if somewhat too weak in its 
statement, is incontestable. 

Starting, then, from this absolute prohibition of 
trade with the enemy, when not authorised by a special 
act of the Crown, it devolves upon the constitutional 
advisers of the Crown to limit the application of this prin- 
ciple ; and it is their duty strictly to confine it within such 
limits as appear to be necessary for the public service and 
conducive to the national interests. . . . 

He contended that this duty had been performed by the 
issue of the Order in Council of the 15th April 1854,^ which gave 

» See " 1860 1862," Chapter IV. 

• I have been unable to trace the authorship of this article. In spite 
of what I believe to be its defects in argument, as a reasoned statement 
of the other side it is well worth reading. 

» Document No. 9 (8). 



The Political Economists' Theory of War 101 

to the intentions expressed in the Declaration to the neutrals 
" a more precise form and binding authority." The Declaration 
itself is described " as one of the most important and extensive 
concessions yet made to the liberal opinions and growing 
interests of this age," and " made by the two greatest maritime 
Powers of the world, at a moment when their union rendered 
them the absolute sovereigns of all seas — compelled to no 
surrender of their principles, but ready of their own free will to 
take those measures which they conceive to be most favourable 
to the cause of civilisation and humanity." They had adopted 
" the most liberal principles ever advanced by Catherine II. 
or the Baltic Confederacy." 

Merely to assume that these principles are " liberal " does 
not answer the questions the learned author had propounded ; 
it leaves unanswered the question whether they can be adopted 
consistently with the successful prosecution of the war. To 
preserve the supplies of raw material ordinarily obtained from 
the enemy may save the country from much inconvenience ; 
but the question still remains unanswered, whether the con- 
venience of getting them counter-balances the damage which 
would be caused to the enemy by stopping the trade. And to 
some persons " liberal " principles would not sanction the 
doctrine which the author approves, that the pressure we might 
have been able to inflict on all classes of society in the Russian 
Empire was one of the most powerful means we possessed of 
crippling the Russian Government by producing a reaction of 
interest and opinion against the head of it. 

The critics who profess these liberal opinions assume a care 
for the national interests which for some reason they deny to 
the Government. The writer of this article is no exception. 
He says : — 

The true principle to mitigate the rigour of this part 
of the Law of Nations is a more dispassionate consideration 
of the rights of others, aided by a more enlightened per- 
ception of our own national interests ; and we trust we may 
arrive at a time when it will be acknowledged and received 
as a maxim of State that the interest of the country is 
best secured, not by applying the rights of war in all their 
rigour to our own subjects and to neutrals, but, on the con- 
trary, by circumscribing those rights within the narrowest 
limits which are consistent with the effective prosecution of 
hostilities. 

A Government would be unworthy of its trust if it did not 
admit the truth of this opinion and universally act upon it. 
Acts of belligerency are in a constantly increasing order of 



102 The Declaration of Paris 

magnitude and severity. Rarely, if ever, is the full extent of 
belligerent power exerted at the outset ; nor are the rights of 
war applied in all their rigour either to our own subjects or to 
neutrals till the occasion demands. The problem, ever present, 
is how to exert pressure on the enemy with the least disturb- 
ance of the national interests. As to subjects, the law recog- 
nises that even the extreme rigour of its principle, which makes 
trading with the enemy illegal, may be relaxed by the Sovereign. 
That is a question of policy in the settlement of which the 
magnitude of the war and the vital nature of the issues involved 
must enter. But the law is so framed that, when the safety of 
the State requires it, the sacrifice of the most valuable interests 
may be demanded of the people. So as to neutrals, the full 
belligerent right of stopping all their trade with the enemy may 
well be held in suspense till the intensity of the struggle compels 
its exercise. The national interest may require that our own 
export and import trade with the neutrals should be preserved : 
a condition of its preservation may be the tolerance of some 
latitude in their trading with the enemy. These questions can 
only be dealt with by means of agreements with the neutrals, 
the adoption of some system of rationing them, which have 
largely figured in the present war. The conduct of war involves 
something more than merely putting in force acts of belligerency : 
it cannot be reduced to so simple a statement. But the political 
economist of that day sought to control it by reducing it, so 
far as the neutrals are concerned, to a common formula — that 
in all circumstances free ships must make free goods ; and, so 
far as subjects are concerned, to unrestricted trade with the 
enemy. He considered that the national interests are best 
served by the preservation of commerce at all risks ; he ignored 
the greatest national interest of all — ^to win the war. 



Ill 

Licences to Trade with the Enemy. 

The methods adopted by the Government in the Russian war 
seem to lay themselves open to criticism ; the omniscience of 
the political economist is apt to irritate ; yet the nature of the 
problem which had to be dealt with must not be ignored. The 
great virtue of the common law of England is that its principles 
are based on the working practical knowledge of the affairs of 
the world which those who framed and shaped it possessed ; 



Licences to Trade with the Enemy 103 

and this is as true of that part of it which relates to war as to 
that which relates to peace. But the old principle which forbids 
trading with the enemy was directly challenged, and a strong 
case of impracticability made against it. The origin of the prin- 
ciple is variously described : it is said to be the ancient law of 
England : it is said equally to be a maxim of the international 
law o£ war, and the fathers of that law have had something 
to say on the subject. 

It is, however, true that when nations entered into com- 
mercial treaties they endeavoured to mitigate the harshness of 
the rule for their mutual benefit ; the alien merchant was not 
always required to withdraw, nor was justice always denied him 
while he remained and was of good behaviour. A space of 
time, varying from three months to two years, was always 
allowed to him within which to wind up his affairs : in one 
famous treaty he was not required to withdraw at all.^ So too 
a large number of these commercial treaties broadly recognised 
free commerce with the enemy by the one party when the other 
was at war ; thus each deliberately opened the door to indirect 
trade with the enemy by its own subjects by way of the 
neutral merchants of the other party. 

But these were arrangements come to by agreement, and do 
not affect the principles of international law, which ought, if 
they are to be efficacious, to have practical wisdom behind 
them. The question involved in the adoption or rejection of 
such a principle as " free ships free goods " is essentially a 
practical one for all maritime nations, more so for an island 
nation than for any other. I have suggested that temperament 
enters largely into the discussion on merits : the fighting spirit 
cannot bring himself to believe that carrying goods for the 
enemy can be a legitimate occupation for neutrals ; the peace- 
fully inclined think otherwise, and in this year, 1855, the political 
economist sided with them. The question is one for the Ad- 
miralty : can the food supply of the country be maintained 
by the navy if this principle is adopted ? Lord Clarendon's 
belief in the iniquity of our ancient sea practice may have been 
profoundly sincere : what is lacking to our slender knowledge 
of his case was — Had he consulted the naval advisers of the 
Crown ? and what was their answer ? 2 In the absence of that 
answer, those who opposed him were justified in maintaining 
that our forefathers had wisdom on their side when they 

^ The Jay Treaty, 1794, between Great Britain and the United States, 
Ap. 26 (De Martens, Rectieil, iv. 338 ; 2nd ed., v. 642). 

* It may be noted that the naval authorities were consulted as to the 
answer to Sweden in regard to the sheltering ports in the Baltic (see p. 16). 



104 The Declaration of Paris 

asserted that our ancient practice was essential to the safety 
of the State. If, however, the Admiralty had agreed to the 
change, the " barbarian " argument could have been avoided. 

The political economists went to the other extreme ; they 
were not content to assert that free ships should make free 
goods ; and the commercialists, in their turn, were not content 
to declare that what they called " private property " should be 
immune from capture at sea. Both boldly decried the wisdom 
of the law of war : trading with the enemy should net be for- 
bidden ; it should, on the contrary, be allowed. And so " free 
ships free goods " appealed to them, because it fostered this 
trade, and, when pressed to its logical conclusion, must include 
the freedom of enemy ships and enemy goods. They rested 
their case on the necessity of maintaining the nation's supply 
of raw material from the cheapest market : and the cheapest 
market in that war, for certain kinds of raw material, was the 
enemy's. 

They ignored the fact that the old law of war recognised 
the possibility of this need arising, and had provided for it. 
By the constitution, just as the making of war resides in the 
Sovereign, so also does the right to mitigate its severity when 
the good of the State demands it. The Sovereign is em- 
powered to grant licences to trade with the enemy. But, 
for some, licences did not go far enough ; for others, they 
stood condemned by the excess to which they had been 
carried in former wars. 

Licences, as " high acts of sovereignty," stand midway 
between the extreme rigour of the law which prohibits all trade 
with the enemy, and the extreme philosophy that believes com- 
mercial peace can be maintained in the midst of war. They 
are an integral part of the history of the subject ; a small space 
must, therefore, be devoted to the subject, which Mahan has 
handled in the broadest spirit. 

A licence, he says, from its name, implies a prohibition 
which is intended to be removed in the particular case. The 
prohibition was against trading with the enemy ; the licence 
removed it. The licensing practice was adopted by both 
England and France during the Napoleonic Wars ; it was not 
so much a system, as an aggregation of individual permis- 
sions to carry on a traffic forbidden by the existing laws of the 
authority granting them. " It was generally admitted in Great 
Britain that the Board of Trade was actuated only by upright 
motives in its action, though the practice was vigorously attacked 
on many grounds — chiefly in order to impugn the Orders in 
Council, to which alone their origin was attributed ; but in 



Licences to Trade with the Enemy 105 

France the taint of Court corruption, or favouritism, in the issue 
of Hcences was clearly asserted." 

The " Licence System " was a peculiar and extensive adapta- 
tion of the principle adopted by the British Government in 
1808, immediately after the Orders in Council and the alliance 
of Russia with Napoleon. The numbers of licences granted rose 
from 2606 in 1807 to over 15,000 in 1809, and to over 18,000 
in 1810. 

" The true origin of the later licence trade is to be found 
in that supremacy and omnipresence of the British navy which 
made it impossible for vessels under an enemy's flag to keep 
the sea." Hostile owners transferred their vessels to a neutral 
ownership "by a fraudulent process which received the name 
of ' neutralisation.' A neutralised ship remained the property 
of the hostile merchant ; but, for a stipulated price, a neutral 
firm, who made this their regular business, gave their name as 
the owner's and obtained from the authorities of the neutral 
country all the requisite papers and attestations by which the 
British cruisers, on searching, might be deceived." It was " a 
regular systematic business, fraudulent from beginning to 
end," which had its origin in the war of the American 
Revolution in 1780, when Holland became a party to the 
war, having a large mercantile tonnage, with very inadequate 
means of protecting it. 

In the year 1806 it was asserted that there were up- 
wards of three thousand sail belonging to merchants of 
Holland, France, and Spain navigating under the Prussian 
flag ; and the practice doubtless was not confined to 
Prussia. '' It is notorious," wrote Lord Howick, the British 
Foreign Minister, that " the coasting trade of the enemy is 
carried on, not only by neutral ships, but by the shameful 
misconduct of neutral merchants, who lend their names 
for a small percentage, not only to cover the goods, but in 
numberless instances to mask the ships of the enemy." ^ 

The fact becoming known, British cruisers, when meet- 
ing a valuable ship with Prussian papers, were apt to take 
the chance of her being condemned, and sent her in ; but 
even in British ports and Admiralty courts the neutralising 
agent was prepared to cover his transaction. The captain 
and crew of the detained vessel were all carefully instructed 
and prepared to swear to the falsehoods, which were attested 
by equally false papers sworn to before Prussian judges. 
To this trade, it was alleged, France owed the power to obtain 
naval stores despite the British blockade of her arsenals. 

^ Cobbett's Parliamentary Debates, vol. x. p. 406. 



106 The Declaration of Paris 

The capture of vessels, the character of whose papers 
was suspected, served to swell the cry against Great Britain 
for violating neutral rights, induced greater severity in 
the British naval measures, and so directly contributed to 
the Berlin Decree and the Orders in Council.^ 

Further, in the development of his great onslaught on British 
commerce Bonaparte had developed his " Continental System," 
and the small States of Europe were coerced into concurrence 
with his policy of excluding British goods from the Continent. 
It was essential that Great Britain should take counter-measures. 
" She found ready to her hand the unprincipled system of 
neutralised vessels, and by means of them and of veritable 
neutrals she proposed to maintain her trade with the Continent." 
Every neutral vessel so employed was furnished with a pro- 
tecting licence which acted as a safe-conduct when she was 
boarded by a British cruiser. " The vessel," it ran, " shall be 
allowed to proceed, notwithstanding all the documents which 
accompany the ship and cargo may represent the same to be 
destined to any neutral or hostile port, or to whomsoever such 
property may belong." " These broad provisions," adds 
Mahan, " were necessary, for the flags flown, except that of the 
United States, were those of nations which had willingly or 
under duress entered the Continental System ; and the papers, 
having to undergo the scrutiny of hostile agents at the ports 
of arrival, had to be falsified, or, as it was euphoniously called, 
' simulated,' to deceive the Customs officer, if zealous, or to give 
him, if lukewarm, fair ground for admitting the goods." Such 
was the Licence System, and it reduced our commerce, as Lord 
Lansdowne said, " to one mass of simulation and dissimulation." ^ 
It provided Mr Brougham with a weapon of attack against the 
Orders in Council,when he appeared for the petitioning merchants 
at the Bar of the House of Commons ; but the alternatives, 
which he somewhat overlooked, were either that Bonaparte's 

^ The Influence of Sea Power on the French Revolution and Empire, 
Admiral Mahan, vol. ii. pp. 309, 310. 

2 " Our traders crept along the shores of the enemy in darkness and 
silence, waiting for an opportunity of carrying into effect the simulative 
means, by which they sought to carry on their business. Such a system 
led to private violation of morality and honour of the most alarming 
description. . . . Instead of benefiting ovir commerce, manufactures, and 
resources, the Orders in Cotmcil [which were responsible for the licences] 
diminished our commerce, disturbed OTir man^xfactu^es, and lessened otu* 
resources." — (Lord Lansdowne, quoted in Leone Levi's History oj British 
Commerce, p. 115.) 

The immoral influence of the system on the nation was attacked in 
Reflections on the Nature and Extent of the Licence Trade (Budd, 1811), 
which was the subject of an article in the Quarterly Review for July 
1811. 



Licences to Trade with the Enemy 107 

Continental System should prevail, or that it should fail ; and 
in the end it failed, 

But although the system which grew out of the normal grant 
of licences, when it is considered without reference to these 
alternatives, was open to criticism, the principle of licences 
remains an essential part of the machinery of war. The same 
principle lies at the root of the custom which allows vessels 
already at sea to pass to their destination in spite of a newly 
imposed blockade. It is the only method by which trade with 
the enemy, if it be necessary to continue it, can be legitimately 
maintained. Obviously, it must be for the Government, which 
is responsible for the conduct of the war, to decide whether it 
is necessary to maintain it, and to what extent. 

" A licence," says Wheaton,^ " is an act proceeding from the 
Sovereign Authority of the State, which alone is competent to 
decide on all the considerations of political and commercial 
expediency, by which such an exception from the ordinary 
consequences of war must be controlled." 

This brief review of the system would be incomplete without 
some extracts from Sir William Scott's judgment in the Goede 
Hoop in 1809.2 

Licences owe their origin to the general prohibition, 
which declares it unlawful for the subjects of this country 
to trade with the enemies of the King without his permission ; 
for a state of war is a state of interdiction of communication. 
That is a law which is not peculiar to this country, but one 
which obtained very generally among the States of Europe : 
in former wars this prohibition was attended with very 
little inconvenience, as the greater part of the countries in 
the neighbourhood remained neutral, and presented to the 
belligerents various channels of communication, through 
which they obtained from each other such commodities as 
they stood in need of. While the world, therefore, con- 
tinued in that state, of course licences would be granted 
only in very special cases, where it appeared that there was 
a necessity to have a direct communication with the enemy ; 
and being a matter of special indulgence, the application 
of them was strictissimi juris. 

But it has happened that, in consequence of the extra- 
ordinary and unprecedented course of public events, these 
licences have, in a certain degree, changed their character, 
and are no longer to be considered exactly in the same light. 

» International Law, 5th ed., p. 435. • Edw. 327. 



108 The Declaration of Paris 

It is notorious that the enemy has in this war directed his 
attacks more immediately against the commerce of this 
country than in former wars ; and a circumstance of still 
greater weight is, that he has possessed himself of all those 
places that in former wars remained in a state of neutrality. 
To what part of the Continent can we now look for a country 
which is not either under the actual dominion of France, 
or in that state of subjection to it which operates with all 
the effect of dominion ? It is a sta'te of things in which it 
has become impossible for England to carry on its foreign 
commerce, without placing it on a very different footing from 
what its convenience required in former wars. To say that 
you shall have no trade with the enemy would be, in effect, 
to say that you shall not trade at all, because that commerce 
which is essential to the prosperity of the country cannot 
be carried on in those small and obscure nooks and corners 
of Europe, if any such can be found, which are still inde- 
pendent. The question then comes to this, How is the foreign 
commerce of the country to be maintained ? It must be 
either by relaxing the ancient principle entirely, and per- 
mitting an unlimited intercourse with the ports of the 
enemy, and where the ports of other nations are put under 
blockade (as they are by the Orders in Council) for other 
reasons than those of a direct hostile character, they become 
liable to be considered and treated in like manner, so far 
as the purposes of blockade require ; or it must be by 
giving a greater extension to the grant of licences. As to 
the relaxation of the general principle, by which an open 
and general intercourse with the enemy would be allowed, 
the consent of both parties is requisite to make that effectual ; 
and even if the enemy permitted it, the legislature would 
probably not think it proper to proceed to that length, 
and for reasons, I presume, connected with the public 
safety. It has, therefore, tolerated a resort to the other 
mode of permitting a trade by licences, which, though 
they are so denominated, are likewise, in effect, expedients 
adopted by this country to support its trade, in defiance 
of all those obstacles which are interposed by the enemy. 
They are not mere matters of special and rare indulgence, 
but are granted with great liberality to all merchants of 
good character, and are expressed in very general terms, 
requiring, therefore, an enlarged and liberal interpretation. 

Looking to the intentions of the Government, not only 
to what they are, but to what I am led to suppose they must 
be ; looking to the extreme difficulty of carrying on the 
commerce of the country in the struggle which it has to 
maintain, not only against the power but against the craft 
of the enemy ; looking to the frequency and the sudden- 



Licences to Trade with the Enemy 109 

ness with which he lays on or takes off his embargoes, 
according to the exigency of the moment ; looking to the 
various obstructions that present themselves in obtaining 
vessels, in consequence of the small remainder that there is 
of neutral navigation in Europe ; looking, also, to this 
circumstance, that all this intercourse must be carried on 
by the subjects of the enemy, that it must be a confidential 
transaction to be conducted by an enemy shipper at great 
risk and hazard to himself ; looking to the total change 
which has taken place in the nature and character of these 
licences, if that denomination is to be considered : I say, 
looking to all these considerations, where there is clearly an 
absence of all fraud, and of all discoverable inducements to 
fraud, I must go to the utmost length of protection that 
fair judicial discretion will warrant, though there may, under 
such circumstances, have been a considerable failure in 
the literal execution of the terms of the licence. There may 
be great inconvenience in the whole system of licences, as 
indeed it is scarce possible in the present state of the world 
that there should not be great practical inconvenience in 
any mode of conducting its commerce. That is a question 
of policy, with which this Court has nothing to do. It has 
only to enforce the just execution of legitimate orders, 
issued by legitimate authority. 

It is objected to the master that he did not produce 
his licence to the captors, and that, on his arrival at Ply- 
mouth he delivered certain papers and documents to his 
agents there. But it is impossible not to take into con- 
sideration the difficulties under which such persons labour ; 
they are persons exposed to great harassments, both on the 
one side and on the other. They know that they are em- 
barked in transactions of great confidence and mystery 
requiring the utmost care and circumspection, and they 
are to pick their way in fear and silence, walking, as it 
were, at every step over burning ploughshares. 

While letting the world know something of the mysteries 
which were essential to carrying out the " simulation and dis- 
simulation " of the licence system, Sir William Scott did not 
hesitate to justify it as necessary to counteract the attacks of 
the enemy on the national commerce. The question has even 
now something more than an historical interest, and it may be 
necessary to refer to it again in the general review of the whole 
subject. But for the moment, and in connection with the story 
of the Declaration of Paris, the points which stand out from 
this year of talk, 1855, are these : that the question of neutral 
rights was relegated to a subordinate position ; that there was 



110 The Declaration of Paris 

no question of discussing the merits or demerits of " free ships 
free goods " as the principle of international law which could 
satisfy the demands of the neutrals ; that the attack was directed 
against the old prohibition of trading with the enemy. " Free 
ships free goods " was distorted from its accepted meaning to 
foster a general relaxation of those old safeguards under the 
protection of which war can alone be safely and successfully 
carried on. I venture to think the position as it is described 
in the latest edition of Wheaton — that subjects may trade with 
the enemy as long as the trade is carried on in neutral ships — 
to be an impossible one. 



IV 

The Facts as described by Contemporary Writers. 

It forms no part of the scheme of this book to lead my readers 
through the paths of the labyrinth of political economy. My 
intention is merely to state the facts, to indicate arguments 
used by the political economists of the day, and to point out 
very broadly how they were designed to upset the accepted 
principles of war, and in great measure succeeded. Certain 
other facts are material to the complete understanding of the 
question, as they throw light on two most important points : 
the effect of these new doctrines on the trade of Great Britain, 
and their effect on the trade and general situation of Russia. 

The consequences of the Prussian action will be gathered 
from the vivid picture of the activities in Memel and Konigs- 
berg, drawn by the Rev. Thomas Milner in his book, The Baltic : 
its Gates, Shores, and Cities, quoted in Mr J. L. Ricardo's 
pamphlet. The War Policy of Commerce, and referred to by 
Mr Collier in the debate of the 20th February 1855. In this 
pamphlet Mr Ricardo expanded the theories which he had 
advanced in the House of Commons. 

Two papers also appeared in the Revue des Deux Mondes 
dealing with the effect of the blockade on Russia. In the first 
M. Leon Faucher took a very adverse view of her internal con- 
dition. This was answered by M. L. Tegoborski, who contro- 
verted many of M. Faucher's facts. The former article was 
referred to by Lord Granville in support of his statement 
that the injury caused by the allied blockade to Russian trade, 
in spite of its ineffectiveness, had been great. 

The facts related by these writers have a very material 



The Facts as described by Contemporary Writers 111 

bearing on the questions to be presently discussed at the Peace 
Conference. 

From "The War Policy of Commerce," by J. L. Ricardo. 
[London, 1855.] 

To blockade the coast of a country having such a frontier as Russia 
is a mere absurdity. Of what avail is it to seal up Reval and Riga, 
and leave open Memel, Dantzig, and Konigsberg ? To guard one door 
and throw open others ? What possible object can be gained — not 
by preventing, but by diverting, the enemy's trade ? The roads leading 
to Tilsit, Memel, and Konigsberg are at this moment encumbered with 
interminable convoys, and the streets and squares of those towns are 
filled with Russian caravans, which, after a few days, return with mer- 
chandise for Russia. Hemp, flax, tallow, grain, and copper constitute 
principally what the Russians bring, and they take back coffee, sugar, 
cotton, various cloths, pewter, and, in particular, wine and olive oil. 
The trade in salt has also taken a very considerable development, and 
the importation of the article is estimated at not less than a million 
quintals, and the price of it is at present tripled in the market of Riga. 
In a single day, at the beginning of this month, at Tilsit, as many as 
300 Russian vehicles, which had passed the night on the other side of 
the river owing to the want of room, were counted. Part of these 
convoys are at present proceeding towards Konigsberg, but the greater 
part are towards Memel. The number of arrivals by water was not 
less considerable, but the frost, which had set in, had interrupted all 
expeditions by rivers. From Memel to Kowno, on the two priacipal 
water-courses, there are more than 300 diJfferent sorts of vessels, all 
with freight, and at least 130 rafts of building timber, loaded with corn, 
which have been caught in the ice. 

" Prussia," says the Rev. Thomas Milner,^ " neutral in the present 
war, is reaping a rich harvest from it at her eastern ports, Dantzig, 
Elbing, Konigsberg, and Memel ; especially at the latter, owing to the 
liberal concessions of the British and French Governments to neutral 
Powers. The eflEect of the blockade of the Russian ports has not been 
the stoppage of the foreign commerce of the country, but the trans- 
ference of it to the adjoining State as the medium ; except in the in- 
stance of the export of timber and the import of coals, which are far 
too heavy and cumbrous for overland transport. From St Petersburg 
and Riga to Memel and Konigsberg a caravan system has been organ- 
ised, and is carried on with considerable regularity. Goods for Russia, 
as cotton, sugar, wines, spices, and other colonial produce, are landed 
at the Prussian ports, and forwarded to their destination ; the same 
waggons returning with Russian produce, as hemp, flax, tallow, bristles, 
linseed and grain, for export to Great Britain, France, Holland, or 
Belgium. Thus the Prussian merchants gain by the commission on 
this traflBic ; and the Government profits by the increase of the 
Customs' duties. One of the Custom-houses on the frontier has taken 
as much as 1000 thalers a day for import duties ; and as many as 500 
cart-loads of hemp and flax have frequently arrived per day at Memel. 
Throughout the summer the town has presented an extraordinary 

^ The Baltic : its Gates, Shores, and Cities, by the Rev. Thomas Milner. 



112 The Declaration of Paris 

spectacle. Every warehouse, coach-house, stable, and outhouse has 
been literally crammed with merchandise ; the streets and open spaces 
have been piled with it ; while upwards of 100 ships have been kept 
Ijdng in the harbour, unable to discharge their cargoes, on accoimt of 
all the landing places being occupied. Landlords have realised rents, 
taverns and shopkeepers have obtained prices, comparable to those 
which resulted from the rush of emigration to Melboiu-ne." 

It is estimated that the extra cost paid on Russian produce belong- 
ing to the British merchant for its transport by the Russian peasantry 
to Memel is no less than £2,500,000. This is exclusive of the goods 
canied to Archangel for shipment, and the loss from damage and de- 
struction to them on the road, where insurance is impossible. 

And while this active trade is driven on the land frontier, the 
combined fleets of England and France . . . are watching on the sea- 
board to destroy the commerce of Russia. . . . 

The property of some few poor Finlanders has been destroyed, and 
some of our own, and the pretext is, that the damage to his commerce 
will put such pressure on the Emperor of Russia that he must consent 
to our own terms of peace. . . . 

By adopting the course with respect to neutrals which we now 
follow, the commerce of Russia, as has been shown, is diverted but 
not stopped. We dam it up on one side, but it flows freely out at 
the other. . . . 

It has been shown how futile was the attempt to blockade the 
trade of Russia on the shores of the Baltic while the land frontier was 
open and free. 

The British merchant complains, and complains with reason, that 
he has been deceived ; that he has been told that the Russian 
ports were strictly blockaded, and that, having laid in a stock of the 
articles he required at a high price, he now finds that the blockade did 
not exist at all, and that a large amount of these articles are suddenly 
thrown on the market, brought in foreign vessels, to the exclusion of 
British ships. The neutral shipowner has found his vessels employed 
at high rates, whereas imports of the like articles from neutral countries, 
on which British ships could have been engaged, have been proportionably 
discouraged. 

From "Les Finances de la Russie," in "Revue des Deux 
MoNDES," PAR Li^ON Faucher [August 1854]. 

Le commerce russe, prive des avances importantes que lui faisait 
chaque annee I'Angleterre, et qui ne montaient pas a moins de 5 million 
sterling, a perdu en outre ses meilleurs debouches au dehors, depuis 
que les flottes combinees bloquent hermetiquement les ports de la 
Baltique et ceux de la Mer Noire. Le change a baisse de plus de 20 
pour 100,1 I'exportation de I'or est prohibee, les faillites se succedent 
et s'accumulent sur toutes les places. Que la guerre se prolonge, et il 
ne restera bientot plus un comptoir ouvert a Petersbourg. Ainsi, 
apres avoir ruine le commerce et detruit le credit, Ton accepte les 
proprietaires f orders en les depouillant de leurs instrumens de travail, 
en leur enlevant les paysans censitaires ou serfs qui font leiu- principale 

^ La valeur du rouble argent est tombee de 4 francs a 3 francs 8 
centimes. 



The Facts as described by Contemporary Writers 113 

richesse ; mais si Ton appauvrit les proprietaires, si pour remplir les 
camps on depeuple les campagnes, je demande qui paiera desormais 
Timpot ? 

Non seulement les ressources extraordinaires que le gouvernement 
russe a fait jaillir, depuis dix-huit mois, des facultes contributives du 
pays en les excedent, vont lui manquer dans les annees qui suivront ; 
mais il verra et voit deja diminuer ses ressources ordinaires. . . . Le 
Moniteur suppose que la guerre actuelle et le bloc us des deux mers 
ameneront un deficit de 50 millions de roubles ou de 200 millions de 
francs, en calculant le rouble au pair, dans le produit de ces deux 
branches d'impot. 

Je ne saurais estimer le deficit k un chiffre aussi considerable. 
II est vrai que la presence des flottes combinees dans la Mer Noire et 
dans la Baltique paralyse le commerce exterieur de la Russie, qui pour 
les seuls exportations par cette double voie, excedait 300 millions de 
francs ; mais on admettra bien qu'une partie de mouvement commercial 
se reportera de la frontiere de mer sur la frontiere de terre, et que le 
tresor recuperera ainsi une partie des recettes qui semblaient entiere- 
ment perdus pour lui. Le gouvernement Russe I'a tellement senti 
qu'il vient, pour attirer le commerce dans cette direction, de moderer 
les droits de douane. Ainsi la necessite lui a suggere une mesiu^e tout 
a fait contraire k ses precedens, et qui est une bonne operation, si on 
1 'envisage au point de vue de I'economie politique. 

Reply by L. Tegoborski, in "Revue des Deux Mondes" 
[November 1854]. 

* Que le commerce exterieur de la Russie soit en souffrance par 
suite de la guerre et du blocus, c'est incontestable ; mais les interets 
des autres etats qui sont en communication maritime avec la Russie, k 
commencer par I'Angleterre elle-meme, en souffrent egalement, et 
I'auteur s'exagere beaucoup la part des sacrifices qui tombent a la 
charge de la Russie. Le commerce de plusieiu's ports russe a pris la 
voie de terre, et I'Angleterre elle-meme profite de cette voie detournee, 
par laquelle elle re9oit differens produits russes necessaires a son in- 
dustrie, tel que suif, chanvre, lin, etc., avec la difference toute fois 
qu'elle supporte le sm-plus des frais de transport de terre, siu-plus qui 
tourne en grande partie au profit de nos charretiers. Encore faut il 
observer que jusqu'a present, et contre toute attente, c'est plutot le 
commerce d'importation que le commerce d'exportation qui a souffert 
du blocus des ports russes. 

La valeur des exportations de la ville d'Odessa jusqu'^ la fin de 
juin a depasse d'environ 200,000 roubles celle des exportations, a la 
meme date, de I'annee 1853, qui a ete une des plus brillantes pour les 
operations commerciales de cette ville ; mais quand meme le commerce 
exterieur de la Russie serait entierement paralyse, ce qui n'est pas le 
cas jusqu'a present, celan'aurait pas, tant s'en faut, des consequences 
aussi desastreuses et aussi decisives pour son attitude, comme partie 
belligerante, que celles que I'auteur croit y trouver. ... La foire de 
Nijni-Novgorod, dont les operations commerciales s'elevent jusqu'^ la 
valeur de 60 millions de roubles [240 millions de francs], est le 
meilleur barometre du mouvement de notre commerce a I'interieur et 
en partie aussi de notre commerce exterieur. Or les resultats de cette 
foire, qui auraient ete pent etre serieusement affectes par les circon- 

8 



114 The Declaration of Paris 

stances actuelles, ont ete, cette aimee, si satisfaisans qu'ils ont surpasse 
toute attente. Les affaires se sont faites rondement, tout a ete paye 
au comptant, et les engagemens de Taimee passee ont ete exactement 
soldes. 

To this M. Leon Faucher replied in the same month : — 

" Suivant lui [Tegoborski] le commerce exteriem- de la Russie a 
pen souffert du blocus, mie bonne partie ayant pris la voie de terre, et 
en tout cas les charretiers russes y ont beaucoup gagne. Je ne voudrais 
pas troubler la satisfaction patriotique de M. de Tegoborski k I'endroit 
des charretiers, mais je lui ferait remarquer qu'il n'est nullement 
certain que les acheteurs etrangers aient fait les frais de cette depense." 



i856 



The Congress of Paris and the Treaty of Peace. 

The Congress of Paris met on the 25th February 1856, to settle 
a general Treaty of Peace. At the nineteenth sitting, the 30th 
March, the Plenipotentiaries affixed their signatures and the 
seal of their arms to the Treaty, and its supplementary con- 
ventions. Count Beust, in his M^moires, has described the Peace 
as " a masterly example of how to reverse the effects of a war, 
and obtain in the future the very opposite of what a treaty 
is intended to secure " ; and Baron Bourqueney, second Pleni- 
potentiary for France, remarked : " Quand vous lisez ce Traite, 
vous vous demandez quel est le vaincu, quel est le vainqueur ? " 
In the House of Lords Lord Derby declared that he accepted 
the peace, as he believed the country accepted it, " without 
enthusiasm, but without opposition." 

With the Treaty of Paris itself this study has no concern ; 
yet there is one link between the Treaty and the Declaration 
appended to it, which may account for what took place at the 
final sittings of the Congress. The French were eager for peace, 
says Mr Evelyn Ashley in his Life of Lord P aimer ston : " The 
Emperor himself was swayed by Count Walewski's many 
Russian affinities ; he was horrified by the daily accounts of 
the privations endured by his army in the Crimea, and he was 
absorbed in a domestic event which had given him an heir, 
whom he was anxious to christen amid the rejoicings for peace. 
He was, therefore, only thinking of how to ' faire le g^nereux ' 
towards the Czar, whom he would gladly have conciliated now 
that his position in Europe was secured." 

" Faire le genereux " pervades the protocols of the Congress. 
Everybody seemed full of concern for Russia. It was inevitable 
that the same spirit should prevail to the end, when the British 
Plenipotentiary offered with wide-open arms what the nations 

115 



116 The Declaration of Paris 

of Europe had for so long desired so ardently, but hardly dared 
hope ever to receive. 

Speaking of the Declaration of Paris in 1857, Lord John 
Russell said : " We all supposed that the Earl of Clarendon 
went to Paris with a view to make peace with Russia. There 
was no notice given to the people of this country, or to either 
House of Parliament, that any such question would be dis- 
cussed." " I believe," said Lord Derby, " if the country had 
known the terms you were about to conclude, and the Declara- 
tion you were about to sign, an indignant protest would have 
been made against the betrayal of the national interests." 

Criticism at the time, and since, has been concentrated on 
the fact that the decision to accept the Declaration was come 
to secretly, and it has been generally assumed that Lord 
Clarendon acted on his own motion without the Cabinet. Mr 
Evelyn Ashley, in his vindication, writes that it is desirable to 
record the fact of the policy " having been deliberately adopted 
by the English Cabinet, for what they considered good and 
sufficient reasons ... as many absurd tales have been from 
time to time current about it ; as though the English Pleni- 
potentiary had agreed to it without any authority from home 
or consultation with the rest of the Ministry." 

The criticism carries, on the face of it, its own condemna- 
tion. In this matter Lord Clarendon needs no personal vindica- 
tion, for the simple reason that Plenipotentiaries at Congresses 
do not act on their own initiative. What is deserving of 
criticism is the fact that there is no record extant of the " good 
and sufficient reasons " of which Mr Evelyn Ashley assumes 
the existence. No White or Blue Book has ever been issued 
containing the despatches which must have passed between 
the Cabinet and Her Majesty's Plenipotentiary at the Congress. 
The only reasons which have ever been given to the public are 
to be found in Lord Clarendon's speech when the Declaration 
was challenged in the House of Lords, soon after its signature. 
How far they were good, and justified the introduction of so 
great a change into the maritime practice of England without 
consulting Parliament ; how far they were a sufficient excuse 
for surrendering permanently what had so far only been waived, 
must be judged by examining the justification given by Lord 
Clarendon. Their sincerity could not fail to be challenged 
in view of Mr Cardwell's reiteration in 1855, in regard to the 
Declaration to the neutrals, of the principle which Sir WilUam 
Molesworth had asserted with much circumlocution in 1854, 
that " To waive is not to surrender." 



The Declaration of the Congress 117 

II 

The Declaration of the Congress. 

Having settled the terms of the Treaty of Peace, the Congress 
at the twentieth sitting, on the 2nd April, discussed the technical 
question whether the blockades should be raised before the ex- 
change of the ratifications. The precedents were in favour of 
extending the rigours of war even to its termination, continu- 
ing the blockade till treaties were formally completed ; but the 
prevailing spirit of liberality which had already exercised such 
a happy influence on international relations must discard 
precedent. France and Great Britain had already shown 
their solicitude for commerce : they must not hesitate to grant 
commerce this new benefit. Thus the President, Count Walew- 
ski ; and Lord Clarendon, acting on the suggestion, proposed an 
armistice at sea which would have the effect of raising existing 
blockades. The Russian plenipotentiaries, adopting these 
views with enthusiasm, declared that the proposition would 
certainly be accepted with extreme favour by their Government. 
But, while agreeing with the reason for the proposal, they felt 
bound nevertheless to reserve it for the approval of the Czar. 
The representatives of the other countries declared that the 
neutrals would receive the decision " avec un sentiment de 
vive reconnaissance." At the 21st sitting, on the 4th April, the 
Russian plenipotentiaries announced that the measures pro- 
hibiting the export of Russian produce from Russian ports 
would be cancelled, and the armistice was thereupon agreed 
to.^ The allies promised that their troops would be withdrawn 
within six months, and Russia on her side that her troops 
would be withdrawn from Kars as promptly as possible : 
Austria also would withdraw from the Principalities : all these 
promises to be put in force on the exchange of the ratifications 
of the treaties. 

At the 22nd meeting, on the 8th April, further details con- 
cerning the evacuation of territory were agreed to, and thus all 
questions relating to the Peace were satisfactorily settled. 

But Count Walewski thought it was desirable that, before 
separating, the plenipotentiaries should exchange their views 
on certain outstanding subjects, the settlement of which might 
prevent new complications arising. Although they were 
assembled specially to settle the Eastern question, they might 
reproach themselves if they did not take advantage of the 

^ See Document No. 17 



118 The Declaration of Paris 

circumstance which had brought the representatives of the 
principal European Powers, " pour elucider certaines questions, 
poser certains principes, exprimer des intentions, faire enfin 
certaines declarations," with the sole intention of assuring the 
peace of the world for the future — by dissipating, before they 
had become a menace, the clouds which were still looming on 
the political horizon. These questions were Greece — ^the troops 
of England and France being still in occupation of the Piraeus : 
the Pontifical States — Rome being occupied by the French 
and Austrian troops at the request of the Holy See. Then, 
" following up the same order of ideas, Count Walewski asks 
himself" whether the state of certain Governments of the 
Italian Peninsula, especially that of the Two Sicilies, did not 
merit the attention of the Congress. Finally, Belgium, whose 
best relations with the rest of Europe were being jeopardised 
by the proceedings of "La Marianne," a society whose opera- 
tions tended to disturb the repose and tranquillity of France. 

All these matters were then formally put before the Con- 
gress and discussed, and, with regard to some of them, con- 
clusions arrived at. But even yet the work of the Congress 
was not finished. Count Walewski proposed to the Congress 
" de terminer son oeuvre par une declaration qui constituerait 
un progr^s notable dans le droit international, et qui serait 
accueillie par le monde entier avec un sentiment de vive re- 
connaissance." Since the Congress of Westphalia, liberty of 
conscience had become an article of faith ; since the Congress 
of Vienna, the abolition of the slave trade and the freedom of 
navigation of the rivers had been accepted : " il serait vraiment 
digne du Congres de Paris de poser les bases d'un droit maritime 
uniforme en temps de guerre, en ce qui concerne les neutres. 
Les quatres principes suivants attendraient completement ce 
but :— 

"1. Abolition de la course : 

" 2. Le pavilion neutre couvre la marchandise ennemie, 
excepte la contrebande de guerre : 

" 3. La marchandise neutre, excepte la contrebande de guerre, 
n'est pas saisissable meme sous pavilion ennemi : 

" 4. Les blocus ne sont obligatoires qu'autant qu'ils sont 
effectifs." 

Whereupon the Earl of Clarendon reminded the Congress 
how, at the beginning of the war, England, as well as France, 
had sought by every means to mitigate its effect on the neutrals, 
and how each had renounced for their benefit principles which 
up to this war they had invariably maintained. Now England 
was prepared definitely to abandon her principle provided that 



The Declaration of the Congress 119 

privateering were abolished : "la course n'est autre chose 
qu'une piraterie organis^e et legale, et les corsaires sont un 
des plus grands fl^aux de la guerre, et notre etat de civilisation 
et I'humanite exigent qu'il soit mis fin a un syst^me qui n'est 
plus de notre temps." It was, however, to be well understood 
that if the proposition of Count Walewski were accepted by the 
Congress it would only bind those Powers which had accepted 
it, and could not be invoked by those which had refused to 
associate themselves with it. Count Buol, on behalf of 
Austria, declared that he appreciated the spirit and the 
bearing of the proposal, but having no instructions on the 
matter, he could say no more than that he would ask his 
Sovereign for orders. 

Baron Manteuffel declared that he was sufficiently acquainted 
with the intentions of the King, his august Master, not to 
hesitate to express his opinion without instructions. The 
maritime principles which had been proposed to the Congress 
had always been professed by Prussia, which had continually 
endeavoured to get them generally adopted. He considered 
himself authorised to join in a document having for its object 
their definite introduction into the public law of Europe. He 
was confident that the King of Prussia would not refuse his 
consent to what the Congress might approve. 

The Russian plenipotentiaries promised to obtain instruc- 
tions from their Government. 

The President, Count Walewski, then summed up the 
discussion on the various matters he had submitted to the 
Congress. He was pleased there had been discussion, though 
he could have wished that some more definite conclusions had 
been reached. With regard to the maritime law proposals, he 
hoped that at their next meeting all the plenipotentiaries would 
have received instructions to sign a document which " en 
couronnant I'ceuvre du Congr^s de Paris, r^aliserait un progr^s 
digne de notre epoque." 

At the 23rd meeting, on the 14th April, Count Buol declared 
that Austria congratulated herself on being able to join in a 
declaration the salutary influence of which she recognised. 
Count Orloff, on behalf of Russia, expressed himself in the same 
sense ; but his Court was not prepared to bind itself to maintain 
the principle of the abolition of privateering, and defend it 
against those Powers who would not accede to it. The re- 
presentatives of Prussia, Sardinia, and Turkey having also 
given their assent, the Congress adopted the Declaration as 
drafted. 

But the Earl of Clarendon thought that their meeting had 



120 The Declaration of Paris 

potentialities for good which were not yet exhausted, and had 
another proposition to make. Article VII. of the Treaty of 
Peace recommended the mediation of a friendly State in case 
of differences arising between the Porte and any of the signatory 
Powers. The calamities of war being still too present to every 
mind not to make it desirable to seek out every expedient 
calculated to prevent its return, he conceived that this happy 
innovation might receive a more general application, and thus 
become a barrier against conflicts which frequently only break 
forth because it is not always possible to enter into explanations 
and come to an understanding. Whereupon discussion followed, 
all admitting the wisdom of the proposal ; and after a little 
passage of arms between Count Buol and Count Cavour about 
the occupation of the Roman Legations by Austrian troops, 
" MM. les plenipotentiaires n'hesitent pas a exprimer, au nom 
de leurs Gouvernements, le voeu que les Etats entre lesquels 
s'eleverait un dissentiment serieux, avant d'en appeler aux 
armes, eussent recours, en tant que les circonstances I'ad- 
mettraient, aux bons offices d'une Puissance amie." They 
further hoped that the Governments not represented at the 
Congress would associate themselves with the idea which had 
inspired the wish just recorded. The Declaration was annexed 
to the protocol : — 



Annexe au Protocole No. 23. 
DSclaration. 

" Les Plenipotentiaires qui ont signe le Traite de Paris 
du 30 Mars, 1856, reunis en conference, — 

" Considerant : 

" Que le droit maritime, en temps de guerre, a ete pen- 
dant longtemps I'objet de contestations regrettables : 

" Que I'incertitude du droit et des devoirs en pareille 
matifere, donne lieu, entre les neutres et les belligerants, a 
des divergences d' opinion qui peuvent faire naitre des 
difficultes serieuses et meme des conflits : 

" Qu'il y a avantage, par consequent a etablir une 
doctrine uniforme sur un point aussi important : 

" Que les Plenipotentiaires assembles au Congres de 
Paris ne sauraient mieux r^pondre aux intentions dont 
leurs Gouvernements sont animes, qu'en cherchant a intro- 
duire dans les rapports internationaux des principes fixes 
k cet ^gard : 

" Dument autorises, les susdits Plenipotentiaires sont 
convenus de se concerter sur les moyens d'atteindre ce 



The Declaration of the Congress 121 

but : et etant tombes d'accord, ont arrete la Declaration 
solonnelle ci-apr^s : — 

"1. La course est et demeure abolie : 

"2. Le pavilion neutre couvre la marchandise ennemie, 
a r exception de la contrebande de guerre : 

"3. La marchandise neutre, k 1' exception de la contre- 
bande de guerre, n'est pas saisissable sous 
pavilion ennemi : 

"4. Les blocus, pour etre obligatoires, doivent ^tre 
effectifs, c'est k dire maintenus par une force 
suffisante pour interdire reellement I'acc^s du 
littoral de I'ennemi. 

"Les Gouvernements des Plenipotentiaires soussign6s 
s*engagent a porter cette Declaration a la connaissance des 
Etats qui n'ont pas ete appeles a participer au Congres de 
Paris, et a les inviter a y acceder. 

" Convaincus que les maximes qu'ils viennent de pro- 
clamer ne sauraient etre accueillies qu'avec gratitude par le 
monde entier, les Plenipotentiaires soussignes ne doutent pas 
que les efforts de leurs Gouvernements pour en g6neraliser 
I'adoption ne soient courronnes d'un plein succes. 

" La presente Declaration n'est et ne sera obligatoire 
qu'entre les Puissances qui y ont ou qui auront accede. 

" Fait a Paris, le 16 Avril, 1856." 

The signatures follow of the plenipotentiaries of Austria, 
France, Great Britain, Prussia, Russia, Sardinia, and Turkey. 

The final meeting took place on the 16th April. The Protocol 
of the previous meeting having been read and approved. Count 
Orloff announced that he had instructions to adhere, on behalf 
of Russia, to the wish expressed at that meeting, that " States 
between which any serious misunderstanding may arise should, 
before appealing to arms, have recourse, as far as circumstances 
may allow, to the good offices of a friendly Power." The 
Declaration was then signed. 

But the matter was not even yet finally disposed of. 

On the proposition of Count Walewski, and recognising that 
it would be to the common interest to maintain the indivisi- 
bility of the four principles of the Declaration, the Plenipoten- 
tiaries agreed that Powers which have signed it, or may 
adhere to it, cannot in justice enter into any arrangement 
relating to the rights of neutrals in time of war which is not 
based on the four principles of the Declaration. This resolu- 
tion, however, was not to have any retroactive effect nor to 
invaUdate existing conventions. 



122 The Declaration of Paris 

A vote of thanks was thereupon proposed by Count Orloff, 
and seconded by the Earl of Clarendon, to Count Walewski 
for his able conduct of the Congress, and was suitably replied 
to by M. le Premier Plenipotentiaire de la France. 

There is no other official record relating to the Declaration 
of Paris. The Treaty of Peace with its annexed conventions — 
(a) respecting the Straits of the Dardanelles and of the 
Bosphorus, (b) limiting the naval forces of Russia and Turkey 
in the Black Sea, (c) respecting the Aland Islands — were sub- 
sequently published in a White Paper, but the Declaration was 
not included. There is no official record of any instructions 
sent to the British Plenipotentiaries, nor of any references 
by them to the Cabinet. There does, however, exist in the 
Public Record Office a despatch from Lord Palmerston to 
Lord Clarendon, dated the 13th April, the day before the 23rd 
meeting of the Congress at which the Declaration was approved 
and signed, which was as follows : — 

Lord Palmerston to Lord Clarendon. 

Foreign Office, 

13th April 1856. 
My Lord, 

I have the honour to transmit to your Lordship a copy 
of the Draft of the Declaration respecting Maritime and 
Neutral Rights, which you forwarded to me on the 11th 
instant, and I have to state to Your Lordship that Her 
Majesty's Government concur in the substance of this pro- 
posed Declaration, provided that Amendments which are 
suggested in the Margin be made in it. Her Majesty's 
Government do not think it advisable to state in the Pre- 
amble, as strongly as it is stated in the proposed Draft, the 
assertion that the maintenance of those principles of Mari- 
time Law for which in times past Great Britain has invari- 
ably contended, must be a permanent cause of disturbance 
in the relations between Neutrals and Belligerents, and the 
word " calamities " seems needlessly strong as applicable to 
the differences which opposite opinions in regard to these 
questions have in time past produced. It may no doubt 
be politic for Great Britain to give up for the future doctrines 
of Maritime Law which she has in times past contended for, 
but Her Majesty's Government should not in doing so cast 
any censure upon the former course of the British Govern- 
ment, nor admit that the course which they are prepared 
to take upon a balance of advantages and disadvantages is 
forced upon them by necessity. 

Again, it would not be correct to say that a Declara- 



The Declaration of the Congress 123 

tion of principles such as is now proposed could alter the 
Law of Nations. That Law rests upon foundations wider 
and deeper than the occasional Declaration of a few States, 
and it could not be altered except by some agreement much 
more general and much more formal than the proposed 
Declaration ; and it would be dangerous for Great Britain to 
admit that such a Declaration issued by the representatives 
of a small number of States could alter the Law of Nations. 
An example thus set and a precedent thus established, by 
the consent and participation of Great Britain, might here- 
after upon other occasions be used for the purpose of estab- 
lishing Doctrines of International Law to which Great 
Britain might have the strongest possible objection and 
repugnance. 

It is desirable not only that the Declaration should 
be communicated to other States, but that the States to 
which it shall be communicated shall be invited to accede to 
it, and it is highly important to record that the principles 
thus proclaimed shall not be applicable to the relations of 
the Declaring Powers with States which shall not have 
acceded to the Declaration. 

This despatch gives us an insight into what the preamble 
to the Declaration as originally drafted contained, and we may 
appreciate the nature of the surrender which Lord Clarendon 
proposed to make. It must be conceded, however, that he was 
consistent. The adoption of the new principles, not as a politic 
concession, but in recognition of the neutral assertion of right, 
could not be based on any other ground than that the mainten- 
ance of the English principles of maritime law must be a " per- 
manent cause of disturbance in the relations between neutrals 
and belligerents " ; that their adoption in our former wars had 
produced " calamities " which must be laid to the charge of the 
Governments of the day, and that necessity now forced England 
to abandon them. 

It is clear, moreover, that Lord Palmerston did not con- 
template any permanent alteration of the Law of Nations. 

In connection with the dates of the meetings at which the 
Declaration was discussed at the Congress, some information was 
given in the House of Commons on the 3rd July 1898, in answer 
to a question put by Mr Gibson Bowles, which is difficult to 
follow. The Attorney-General stated that the draft was re- 
ceived in London on the 7th April 1856, was at once submitted 
to the Queen, and her approval signified to Lord Palmerston on 
the 8th. It was only on the 8th that Count Walewski made 



124 The Declaration of Paris 

his proposal to the Congress, and Lord Palmerston's despatch 
of the 13th appears to indicate that the draft it refers to 
was the first that had been received. The dates given in the 
answer of the Attorney-General must have been inadvertently 
inaccurate. 



Ill 

The Debate in the House of Lords. 

Neither the Treaty of Peace nor the Declaration stirred the 
House of Commons ; but in the House of Lords the Treaty was 
discussed on the 5th May, and on the 22nd Lord Colchester 
moved the following resolution in regard to the Declaration : — 

That the most eminent Jurists of all ages have accepted 
as a Principle of International Law that the Right of captur- 
ing an Enemy's goods on board of Neutral vessels is in- 
herent in all belligerent Powers ; that the Maintenance of 
this right is of essential Importance, and its Abandonment 
of serious Injury to a Power whose main reliance is on her 
Naval Superiority : 

That Great Britain consequently, although occasion- 
ally waiving the Exercise of the Right by Specific Treaties, 
has invariably refused to recognise the Abandonment of a 
Principle which successive Governments have concurred in 
considering identified with her national Greatness : 

That this House deeply regrets that a Principle so 
long and so strenuously maintained should in the recent 
conferences at Paris have been suddenly abandoned with- 
out the previous knowledge or sanction of Parliament by 
Plenipotentiaries assembled for the purpose of discussing 
the terms on which Peace with Russia might be concluded 
and the Affairs of the East satisfactorily adjusted. 

The interest of the debate centres in two speeches, Lord 
Clarendon's defence and Lord Derby's reply. The only light 
thrown at the time on the reasons which prompted the action 
of the Government is to be found in the former ; we should 
therefore be able to extract from it some idea of what were sup- 
posed to be the merits of the principles, especially " free ships 
free goods," embodied in the Declaration, and the reasons which 
had induced Lord Clarendon, as he confessed to Lord Shaftes- 
bury, to wish permanently to modify the principles of the Law 
of Nations. 



The Debate in the House of Lords 125 

The constitutional principle involved must first be briefly 
referred to. The Foreign Secretary defended the action of the 
Government in not submitting the Declaration to Parliament : 
first, because it is the right of the Crown to conclude treaties 
without the previous knowledge and consent of Parliament : 
secondly, because it is the prerogative of the Crown to sanction 
a Declaration of this kind, and it does not require the ratification 
of Parliament. Lord Derby concurred, and declared that no 
one had asserted or maintained the contrary. Some people 
undoubtedly did so at the time, and the point has been raised 
on many occasions since. The question involved is exceedingly 
complicated, and it will be more convenient to postpone the 
consideration of it till the time comes to review all the legal 
questions involved in the Declaration. It is sufficient for the 
moment to say that the first principle laid down by the Foreign 
Secretary is inaccurate because it is incomplete, and gives an 
insufficient view of the scope of the treaty-making prerogatives 
of the Crown ; and that the second does no more than beg the 
question raised by the criticism of the Government's action. 

Of the speech itself it is difficult to speak in terms of restraint. 
First, there are some passages which, in relation to the subject 
with which they deal, become mere sequences of words. Thus 
in answer to the assertion that the right to seize enemy goods 
on neutral vessels is necessary to our safety as a great maritime 
Power, Lord Clarendon said : — 

But if you affirm this doctrine, you must do so in an 
absolute and unconditional sense — you must give it no 
limitation either as to place or time — you must accept it 
everywhere and for ever ; and this I cannot but think would 
be a most unwise and injudicious proceeding where change 
is the visible law of society, and where everything is rapidly 
undergoing variation around us ; more particularly would 
it be unwise and injudicious to take such a course with 
respect to a matter which the noble Lord himself admits 
has been repeatedly altered to meet the exigencies of the 
times, and against which all the great maritime Powers of 
the world have constantly and consistently protested. 

The reply might have been given that Lord Clarendon was 
urging the House to affirm the doctrine that " free ships make 
free goods "in an absolute and unconditional sense, giving no 
limitation either as to place or time, accepting it everywhere 
and for ever. It might have been contended that this would be 
a most unwise and injudicious proceeding where everything is 
rapidly undergoing variation around us, especially in regard to 
naval armaments, more particularly with respect to a matter 



126 The Declaration of Paris 

against which the greatest maritime Power of the world had 
constantly and repeatedly protested. 

Again, referring to the anxiety of the neutrals to know 
whether we intended to maintain our former practice, he 
said : — 

Almost daily inquiries were addressed to me by the 
representatives of the neutral Powers, and though I cer- 
tainly cannot say that the maintenance of our former rule 
would have led to another " Armed Neutrality," it was 
quite plain that we should have stood alone in the world — 
we should have had every other maritime Power against 
us, and most properly so — because we should have been 
maintaining a law which was contrary to the public opinion 
of the world, which was hostile to commerce, and as un- 
favourable as possible to a mitigation of the evils of war. 
We should not only have stood alone in the world — but it 
was quite clear that we should have been at war not only 
with Russia, but with every other maritime Power in the 
world ; or, if not actually at war, in a position of most 
unpleasant character with other nations, and especially 
with the United States. 

Apart from the confusion of ideas which is reflected in 
the construction of the sentence, the question is inevitable : 
After the answer to the Scandinavian Powers in January, 
was there any such anxiety among the neutrals ? Whatever 
fate had in store for British merchants, the neutrals at least 
were safe. 

Secondly, there are curious inaccuracies, some verbal, as in 
the statement, " we have never been at war as anything but a 
principal " ; and some wanting in grip of the true meaning of 
the right of seizure at sea, as in the statement, *' If the neutral 
fulfils the obligation of neutrality, we have no claim to interfere 
with him. Were it otherwise, in the late war we should have 
been justified in sending an English fleet to Memel to demand 
all Russian property that might happen to be there ; or the 
French in marching an army into Belgium to seize all Russian 
property at Antwerp." 

Thirdly, there are many weak joints in the argument. That 
remarkable composition, the Consolato del Mare, which has so 
largely influenced all States in the settlement of their principles 
of maritime law, was passed over merely as " a treatise written 
in the Proven9al tongue in the thirteenth century " ; and Grotius 
himself was summarily dismissed as a jurist of no weight. His 
defence of the principle of seizing enemy goods on neutral ships 
must be set aside, because some jurists have defended the right 



The Debate in the House of Lords 127 

of belligerents to put women to death, to kill prisoners after 
surrender, and to torture captives before a besieged town in 
order to induce it to submit. When Lord Derby challenged 
this statement as futile, Lord Clarendon explained that what 
he meant to say was that Grotius " had recognised the right 
laid down in the Consolato del Mare without assigning his 
reasons for doing so " ! 

Fourthly, the central point of the speech was the analysis 
of the treaties in which England had agreed to " free ships free 
goods," which was evidently based on Sir William Moles worth's 
speech in 1854.^ The fact that we had never gone further than 
conceding the right to the other party to the treaty, when we 
were at war, accepting the reciprocal right in return, was ignored. 
We were said to have been parties to thirty-two international 
engagements in which the principle was adopted. The point 
that in no treaty had we ever given to all neutrals the right to 
carry our enemies' goods free, and so adopted the principle, 
was ignored. Yet one such treaty, but only such a treaty, 
would have been a precedent for what had been agreed to at 
Paris. The same criticism applies to the remark, also borrowed 
from Sir William Molesworth, that " in the course of the 
last two centuries a hundred and thirty international engage- 
ments have been made between the principal Powers of the 
world, in all of which, with eleven exceptions, the rule ' free 
ships free goods ' was contained." Not one was referred to in 
which the principle was adopted in its full significance ; nor any 
of the many in which the old practice had been adhered to. 

From this most superficial analysis of the subject Lord 
Clarendon's deduction was, " that in time of war, and in the 
heat and animosity of war, men lay aside this principle and 
resort to extreme and violent measures ; but that when at peace, 
and under the influence of reason and judgment, they never 
hesitate to declare that that should be the rule of all civilised 
nations." Yet it may be remarked that the Consolato del Mare 
was framed " under the influence of reason and judgment," and 
the nations never hesitated to adopt it as the wisest rules of 
war, until the professional neutrals found the maxim paid them 
better and pressed it on the belligerent nations. But, assuming 
the facts to be accurate, if any inference is to be drawn from 
them, it is that nations at war know what war means, and ignore 
the ideas which the student and the philosopher conceive in 
peace to be those on which war ought to be conducted. 

Everything in the past, however, which favoured the principle 
of seizure was brought within the ban as a relic of barbarous 
~ 1 See p. 83. 



128 The Declaration of Paris 

times ; every argument which favoured the principle of freedom 
of enemies' goods was adduced as worthy of the great object 
of modern civilisation, to mitigate the miseries of war. Then, 
as he had done in his speech in 1854, he glided from the fact of 
seizure to the persons who were authorised to seize — " the 
buccaniers " : " We even give licences to buccaniers to seize the 
property of peaceful merchants on the ocean." 

There was confusion of thought even on this most easy point 
of attack against existing practices. So long as privateering 
was kept distinct from the other matters dealt with by the 
Declaration the point was a good one. The time had arrived 
when privateering ought to be, and to remain, abolished ; the 
excesses of the privateers justified the action of abolishing it 
in the name of humanity. 

So far as the neutrals and their contentions were concerned, 
Lord Clarendon disposed of the history of England during the 
last hundred years in one short sentence : " They have reason 
and justice on their side." As the speech reads, the neutral 
protests which Lord Clarendon applauded were against the 
violation of the neutral flag by privateers. He intended to 
refer to their protests against the seizure of enemy property on 
their ships, which was the real point of attack. 

One conclusion only can be come to after this analysis of 
the speech : that Lord Clarendon was not a master of the 
details of his subject. The " good and sufficient reasons " 
which had induced the Cabinet to approve of the signature 
of the Declaration are but the thin and unsubstantial long- 
ings for something which stirred the minds of men who refused 
to face the realities of war, and in support of which, begging 
the question in issue, they invoked the name of humanity and 
the demands of civilisation. 

Further, there were two notable omissions in the speech. 
First, Lord Palmerston's instructions of the 13th April were 
not only not referred to, but were almost deliberately ignored, 
for nothing that Lord Clarendon said had any relation to the 
points emphasised in the Prime Minister's despatch. Secondly, 
a close and impartial review of the working of the new principle 
during the war should have been made ; it was the only way 
in which the merits of the new principle could be tested. It 
was useless in 1856 talking about the commercial humani- 
tarianism of a doctrine which allowed the neutrals to protect 
our enemies' goods from seizure, without seeing what the 
practical results of it had been during the years 1854 and 1855. 
The time had passed for vain imaginings ; realities stared the 
Government in the face. Unless debates pass into the air, and 



The Debate in the House of Lords 129 

Hansard is a sealed book, this fact must have been known — 
that the extremists had found a new merit in the prin- 
ciple : it allowed trading with the enemy in defiance of the 
ancient law. The real issue was shirked, and in the House 
of Commons no one took sufficient interest in the subject 
to raise debate. 

But there is something stranger still in Lord Clarendon's 
speech. Having made it plain that at the commencement of 
the war the only wise and rational course was for each of the 
allies to abandon its extreme doctrines, he said : " And now, 
my Lords, let me ask, having once waived these rights, was it 
possible, or was it prudent, for us to restore them ? " Yet when 
the Declaration to the neutrals in 1854 was challenged, a great 
parade was made of the fact that there had only been a waiver 
" for the present," and that this did not amount to a surrender ! 
It had been, as we have seen, the Government case from the 
very beginning of the discussions. Mr Milner Gibson, on the 
17th March 1854, had declared : " We make no surrender of 
principle ; we do not deprive ourselves of the power of exercis- 
ing these extreme rights whenever we think fit, by not allow- 
ing them to be exercised now." " To waive for the present a 
right," said Sir William Moles worth, on the 4th July 1854, 
" and to surrender it are two quite distinct things." " Not 
waiving any of those belligerent rights for which Great Britain 
had contended in former wars," said Mr Card well, on the 20th 
February 1855, " but suspending a part of them during the 
continuance of the present conflict on motives of policy." 
Lord Stanley of Alderley, on the 15th May 1855, referred to 
the Order in Council of the 15th April 1854 as a document 
" whereby we waived but did not abandon " the right of 
seizure. 

Lord Clarendon's plea for what was done in 1856 is taken 
up by Mr Evelyn Ashley, the apologist : " It was evident that 
the principle of seizure once abandoned could never be revived ; 
the concession to neutral rights once made could never be with- 
drawn." 

But if it is " evident " that the permanent was bound to 
follow the temporary abandonment, the alternatives were very 
plain : either the position which resulted from the concession 
ought to have been foreseen when it was made in 1854, but was 
not ; or it was foreseen, and the whole thing was deliberate. 
This question must be asked : Was there no one in the Queen's 
Councils in 1854, when the matter was being discussed, with 
sufficient foresight to put this question to the zealots for the 
new doctrine in the Cabinet, " Having once waived these 

9 



130 The Declaration of Paris 

rights, will it be possible, or will it be prudent, for us to 
return to them ? " 

Only one other sentence in Lord Clarendon's speech calls 
for brief comment : "I can tell your Lordships that it was not 
a very easy matter to accomplish." The protocols of the 
Conference scarcely seem to warrant this statement. 

Many Lords spoke during the debate ; among them the 
Earl of Carnarvon, " with a degree of power and ability " 
which drew from Lord Derby well-merited compliment. He 
hit the manifest blot in Lord Clarendon's speech, the confusion 
of the question of privateering with the concessions to the 
neutrals. " They stood upon an entirely different footing, 
although it might be easy to confound them, and to represent 
an opposition to extravagant concessions to neutrals as a 
defence of privateering." The Lord Privy Seal, the Earl of 
Hardwicke, thought — so vague were the Ministers themselves 
as to what they had really assented to — that even in the 
Declaration of Paris we had only waived our belligerent right 
of seizure, not abandoned it. But the interest centres in Lord 
Derby's own speech, which stands as a beacon above the flood 
of two years of talk. Against the tliin philosophy and the vague 
appeals to civilisation and humanity, against the inaccuracies 
of fact and inference, he set the stern necessities of war, and 
the facts of England's history. His text was that the adoption 
of the principles of the Declaration involved the abandonment 
of the naval superiority of the country, and that the terms of 
the agreement were not known before they were agreed to. 
The need for secrecy was imperative : "I should like to know 
what arguments were used by the noble Earl, and what condi- 
tions were made for the surrender of these rights ! " The pro- 
tocols were fresh from the printers : there were no reasons, no 
arguments in them. Reasons, which gravely weighed the con- 
sequences, have never been given from that time to this. So 
far as the abolition of privateering was concerned, Lord Derby 
accepted it cordially and willingly as a concession to humanity ; 
but it was not a boon to England, or the equivalent for the 
abandonment of her principle of seizure. If it were resorted to 
by all, none would gain more or suffer less than England. 

Dissecting Lord Clarendon's defence. Lord Derby pointed 
out that the claim that humanity demanded the freedom of 
enemy goods on neutral ships was answered by the well-known 
fact that the doctrine of right had not been heard of till Frederick 
the Great put it forward, in 1752, in defence of his refusal to pay 
the last instalment of the Silesian loan. 

As to this, there are two sentences in the Law Officers' 



The Debate in the House of Lords 131 

Report in reply to the Prussian Exposition des Motifs which 
are pregnant with meaning : — 

Before the year 1746, the Prussians do not appear to 
have openly engaged in covering the Enemy's Property. 

From 1746 the Prussians engaged in the gainful Practice 
of Covering the Enemy's Goods ; but were at a loss in what 
Shape, and upon what Pretence it might best be done. 

This suggestion was not made without full consideration : 
the " Pretence " was that free ships, as a matter of right, and 
not merely as a matter of mutual agreement, make free goods. 

Since then there had been many advocates of the novel 
doctrine ; but, continued Lord Derby, 

when the noble Earl put the question on the score of 
humanity, I am tempted to ask, whether the noble Earl is 
not laughing at the credulity of his hearers ? Was it the 
regard which Catherine of Russia felt for the principle of 
humanity, that induced her to raise the question ? Was it 
humanity which induced the other continental States to 
follow her example ? If it was humanity at all, it was 
humanity for themselves. Let us have no more of this 
talk about humanity. Let us look at the question as it 
really is, as a question of policy — a question which of our 
undoubted rights it is for our interest to maintain, and 
which we may safely abandon ? 

From this record of historical fact two alternative deduc- 
tions were drawn : by Lord Clarendon and his supporters, 
that if we persisted in maintaining our principle of seizure we 
should be alone, facing and irritating the neutrals ; by Lord 
Derby, that in times past " we have been alone, and yet main- 
tained and upheld the doctrine against a confederacy of 
opponents, as the segis of our power." That is the clear issue, 
and the Government case was only cumbered by confused 
notions of civilisation at last triumphant over the age of bar- 
barism. The opposition of the neutrals was dwelt on as a 
sufficient reason for abandoning our ancient principle : the 
reason for that opposition, which is the lesson of a hundred 
years of history, was glozed over : the consequences of the 
abandonment were ignored. Pitt and the statesmen of that 
day knew what those consequences would be, and they were 
not afraid to stand alone against all the world in arms. The 
principles which Pitt maintained were reasserted by Canning 
in 1827, when he refused to ratify a treaty concluded with 
Brazil on the ground that it contained an article abandoning 
the right of seizure. 



182 The Declaration of Paris 

The question of pohcy Lord Derby put to a very practical 
test. England was a naval and not a military Power ; omni- 
potent at sea, it is true, but, without alhes, impotent on land. 
Where should we have been in a war with Russia, having aban- 
doned the principle of seizing enemy goods on neutral ships, 
if we had not been assisted by the French military force ? The 
only power we could have brought against Russia was naval 
power, and if that had been unsupported by military assistance, 
what impression should we have made upon Russia up to this 
moment ? If we had not had the assistance of the greatest 
military Power on the earth, we would not have signed a peace 
for the next ten years, unless it had involved humiliating 
concessions. Or suppose — which God forbid ! — ^that a war 
should arise between England and France, what means should 
we have of opposing France, except closing her up hermetically, 
and stopping her commerce ? What should we do ? 

You cannot blockade the whole coast of France ; but 
you can practically prevent her from sending out one single 
bale of merchandise. Your new law permitting French 
goods to go with impunity on board neutral vessels comes 
into operation ; you have no blockade ; France gives up 
her whole commercial marine ; she makes her vessels into 
vessels of war ; she has seamen to man them ; and, before 
your very face, she carries on her whole commerce under the 
Prussian or American flag. You are powerless. Your 
power is gone. Your right arm is cut off. Your only 
means of defence are abandoned, and abandoned at the 
suggestion of France. Was there ever a Minister so led by 
the nose ? Was there ever a Minister who so deliberately 
walked into the trap set before his face, and so tamely and 
gratuitously surrendered the foundation of England's 
greatness ? 

In the case of war with the United States the position would 
have been even graver, for, though the United States was not 
a party to the Declaration, France would be entitled to the 
benefit of it, and could carry the goods of the enemy free. 

This argument put the case in the smallest possible compass : 
we had adopted the principle of " free ships free goods " 
because, with a military Power as an ally, we might do so with 
safety in this war. Without such an ally, the case for the new 
principle vanished. 

France and England are the two greatest Powers of 
Europe, and God forbid that they should be separated. 
United, they may secure or they may imperil the peace of 
the world ; but separated, they each have their peculiar 



The Debate in the House of Lords 133 

means of offence and defence. The means of France is 
her army ; and the main resort of England must always be 
to her navy, whether it be to defend her own coasts from 
aggression, to which, thank God, she has hitherto been a 
stranger, or to enforce her rights upon foreign nations. 
By the navy you must do it, and the more you circum- 
scribe the power of that navy, the more you weaken the 
strength and influence of the country. 

These are hard, substantial facts, and amply justify the 
rhetoric of Lord Derby's denunciation of " the humiliating 
Clarendon Capitulation of Paris " — that it was " cutting off 
the right arm, as it were, of the country." " I look upon it," 
he said, " as depriving her of those natural advantages which 
her great maritime power has given her in war, and of the 
exercise of that superiority and those belligerent rights, with- 
out which she is nothing. If she remains not mistress of the 
seas, she falls immediately and naturally into the position of a 
third-rate Power." ^ 

The right to seize enemy goods on neutral ships was accepted 
by all jurists of earlier days, was recognised by all jurists of 
modern times, and had been upheld by every statesman of 
importance in this country down to the latest, and it was re- 
served for the Party then in power to throw it away, " although 
Pitt and Grenville and Canning successively declared it to be 
the mainstay of the naval power of England." 

In one brief sentence Lord Derby summed up the long story 
of England's attitude on the question of the neutrals through 
the stormy periods of the Armed Neutralities. She had not 
been afraid to stand alone against a world in arms. 

That attitude inspired the glowing pen of Mallet du Pan 
to a longer tribute than Lord Derby's to the greatness of the 
manner in which she faced the hostile world. I have placed it 
on the first page of this series of books. It will bear quoting a 
second time. 

Des malheurs, des ressources, des dangers renaissants, une 
puissance ebranlee mais terrible encore au milieu de ses desastres, un 
courage opiniatre et I'apparence de toutes les vertus publiques an sein 
de la corruption politique ; tel est le tableau que continue d'offrir 
I'Angleterre. Tous les efforts possibles a un empire, Tor, les hommes, 
les vaisseaux, les intrigues, tout est employe pour succomber avec 
gloire ou pour triompher en se ruinant. L'histoire n'offre pas un 

^ To achieve this was the motive, expressed by De Vergemies' Con- 
siderations, for France aiding the United Colonies in the War of Indepen- 
dence ; see Documentary History oj the Armed Neutralities, Document 
No. 4, C 



134 The Declaration of Paris 

premier exemple d'une nation de dix millions d'individus attaquee 
dans les quatre parties du globe par une ligue redoubtable et resolue 
a faire face partout, sans que les defaites, les dissipations, le vide 
d'hommes, le poids des subsides et celui des emprimts, fassent chanceler 
la Constance de ses conseils. Get etonnant spectacle est-il I'effet d'lm 
entetement d'orgueil ou celui d'une magnanimite encouragee par le 
souvenir de succes et par I'estime de soi-meme ? . . . Surchargee de 
taxes, endettee de deux cents millions sterling, dechiree par 1 'esprit de 
parti, amoUie par I'opulence, corrompue par la soif de I'argent, obligee 
de transporter I'elite de ses forces a deux milles lieues d'elle, comment 
done I'Angleterre n'est-elle pas ecrasee par I'efFort de ses ennemis ? 
Comment, menacee ainsi que le fut Venise, par tous les prophetes poli- 
tiques, d'une ruine inevitable, n'a-t-elle perdu depuis quatre ans que 
des etablissements secondaires ? Je ne parle pas des colonies, elle ne 
lui appartenaient deja plus lorsque la France leur a prete son secours. 
C'est que les veritables nerfs de sa puissance ont encore tout leur 
ressort. Sa marine est entiere, son commerce preserve, I'illusion de 
son credit subsistante, mais surtout ses ennemis sans concert. Au 
lieu de se consumer en promenades sans objets ou en tentatives aven- 
turees, la flotte de la Manche a ete tout I'ete en mouvement pour veiller 
sur le retour des richesses du commerce. EUes attestent combien 
pen la guerre les a diminuees, et I'opulence de la nation au milieu des 
dissipations du tresor public. Dans I'espace de deux mois, nous avons 
vu cinq flottes marchandes verser dans les ports d'Angleterre les tribus 
de tout I'univers, et insulter, par leur rentree a quatre puissances 
dont les forces n'ont pu leur fermer la route de la Tamise. — {Annales 
Politiques, t. iii, pp. 71, 72.) 

Tw^o curious points remain to be noticed. 

In the circulars sent to the English and French diplomatic 
agents abroad instructing them to notify to the neutral Powers 
the Declaration of 1854, stress was specially laid on the necessity 
for their good behaviour. In his despatches to Count Walewski, 
M. Drouyn de Lhuys had pointed out that although the rights 
were suspended during the war, the allies would reserve to them- 
selves the right of withdrawing this suspension if occasion arose. 
In his Memoire, too, he gives the true meaning of the emphasis 
which was to be laid on the correlative neutral duty of preserving 
their subjects in strict neutrality. The benefits of the Declara- 
tion would remain " pourvu qu'aucune fraude n'appelat sur eux 
la s^verite des belligerants." 

By the absolute statement of the new principles in the 
Declaration of 1856, this reservation of power to revert to the 
old practices was abandoned. 

The acceptance of the Declaration of Paris was not mentioned 
in the Queen's speech proroguing Parliament, on the 29th July 
1856. 



The Powers which Adhered to the Declaration 185 

IV 

The Powers which Adhered to the Declaration. 

The Powers which had not been represented at the Congress 
were invited, as arranged, to adhere to the Declaration, and it 
was accepted by a large number almost immediately, in June, 
July, and August 1856.^ 

Most of the adherences were conveyed to the French diplo- 
matic representative in letters more or less ornate ; a few — 
the Argentine Confederation, Ecuador, and Switzerland — at 
once took the constitutional steps necessary to make the 
Declaration operative. In the first case, a special law was 
passed authorising the President to adhere ; in the two other 
cases, the legislature of the State itself adhered by a special 
decree. There seems to be no official information as to whether 
such steps were taken by the other States. ^ 

The Government of Sweden was unable to resist the tempta- 
tion to remark that the four principles " ay ant de tout temps 
6te reconnu et defendu par la Su^de, qui, dans mainte occasion, 
s'est efforcee a les faire triompher," it could have no hesitation 
in recognising their justice and utility. 

The Government of Brazil pointed out that the signatory 
Powers ought to complete their beneficent work by declaring 
that merchant vessels, without exception, should, under the 
protection of maritime law, be immune from the attacks of 
men-of-war. This declaration was made at the instance of 
the United States. 

It is to be noted that the invitation to adhere was given to 
all Powers which had not been represented at the Congress, no 
distinction being made between maritime and non-maritime 
nations. In the same way, although the invitation to attend 
the deliberations of the Naval Conference in London, in 1908, 
was limited to the great maritime Powers — Germany, Spain, 
France, Italy, Russia, Japan, Austria, the United States, and 



^ The terms in which the adherences of the different Powers were 
given will be fotind in Docximent No. 19. 

* It appears from the correspondence relating to the Franco -Prussian 
War in 1870, that a law had been passed in Prussia giving effect to the 
Declaration. M. Delbriick, the President of the Federal Office, " stated 
that there was no occasion to repeat the recognition by Prussia of the 
principles agreed to under Protocol 23 of the Treaty of Paris, for they 
have been embodied and published as a law in Prussia, giving^hem thereby 
the validity of an act of legislation." — {Extract from despatch of Lord A. 
Loftus to Earl Granville, Berlin, 23rd July 1870.) 



186 The Declaration of Paris 

afterwards Holland — all other Powers were to be invited to 
adhere. On this certain questions of principle of considerable 
importance arise. 

In paragraph 5 of the despatch of the 27th February 1908/ 
conveying the invitation to this Conference, a sentence occurred 
which is liable to misconstruction : " The rules by which 
appeals from national Prize Courts would be decided affect 
the rights of belligerents in a manner which is far more serious 
to the principal naval Powers than to others." Whether this 
was a formal recognition of the fact that the right of a belligerent 
State is higher in the scale of values than the right of the neutral 
merchant, or was intended to be no more than an indication 
that among naval Powers the rules, when formulated, would 
affect the greater naval Powers far more seriously than the 
smaller ones, need not be determined. The fact is that only 
naval Powers who might be described as potential belligerents 
took part in the discussions, and the potential neutrals, although, 
like Sweden and Denmark, some of them were maritime Powers, 
were not invited to the Conference, but were only to be asked 
to adhere. Looking at the question quite dispassionately, it 
is impossible to deny that it would have been better for such 
professional neutrals as the Scandinavian Powers to have 
joined in the discussion. 

It is true that the Powers who were represented considered 
all the questions from the twofold point of view, as belligerents 
and as neutrals in future wars ; but the impression left on the 
mind after reading this despatch is that the code of rules to 
be drawn up by the Conference would practically amount to 
a statement of the manner in which these nations, when belli- 
gerent, intended to deal with the neutrals during war. The 
motive underlying the calling of the Conference was to arrive 
at an agreement as to what are " the generally recognised 
principles of international law," or, in their absence, what 
are " the general principles of justice and equity " applicable in 
given circumstances ; but the right to adhere to an elaborate 
series of complicated rules, upon many of which, as it turned 
out, the Powers represented at the Conference could not come 
to an agreement, was not a satisfactory substitute for taking 
a share in forming them. The result, if the question had gone 
further, might have been that certain rules of naval policy and 
practice agreed to by certain Powers, to be acted on by them 
as belligerents, might not have been accepted by other Powers 
not parties to the Declaration, when neutral. 

^ " Correspondence and Documents respecting the International Naval 
Conference held in London," Misc. No. 4, 1909. 



The Powers which Adhered to the Declaration 137 

In the absence of an unanimous statement of represented 
Powers, concurred in by all non-represented Powers, that a 
certain rule was a rule of international law, or was " in accord- 
ance with the general principles of justice and equity," the 
result of the Conference could only have been a convention 
to which many Powers were parties, but to which some Powers 
were not. It is difficult to see how, in these circumstances, the 
property of the subjects of a neutral non-adhering Power could 
have been legitimately affected. 

It is constantly overlooked that all the rules of naval policy 
and belligerent practice are two-edged, affecting the neutral as 
well as the enemy ; and therefore non-maritime Powers are 
entitled to a voice in their settlement, because, though they have 
no ships which may be searched or seized at sea, their subjects 
may have property on board ships of other nationalities which 
are liable to confiscation. The adherence of Switzerland and 
of all the Balkan States was as necessary to the Declaration 
of London as that of the Scandinavian Powers, or of France 
or England. 

The fact is that there is no method by which the rules of 
" international law," as they are commonly understood, can 
be forced on non-adhering Powers. One State by standing out 
can wreck the aspiration of the mass. The criticism which, 
with great deference, I make of the proceedings of the London 
Conference is that, in spite of the reference to " the general 
principles of justice and equity " in the invitation, the application 
of these principles to secondary details was considered rather 
than the nature and quality of the principles themselves. 
There was no statement of, much less was there any attempt 
to enunciate, those " wide and deep foundations " of the Law 
of Nations of which Lord Palmerston wrote in his despatch to 
Lord Clarendon of 13th April 1856. Until these primary prin- 
ciples are determined, agreement as to secondary rules based 
on them is unlikely. It was difficult without concessions to 
get ten Powers to agree to such a simple rule as that " a vessel 
carrying contraband may be condemned if the contraband, as 
reckoned either by value, weight, volume, or freight, forms 
more than half the cargo " (Art. 40 of Declaration of London) ; 
there is little hope of forcing that rule on twenty others who 
have not taken part in the discussion. There is great hope 
that an agreement might be reached as to what are the funda- 
mental principles on which much more complicated rules ought 
to be based. 

This brief critical survey of the method adopted at the 
London Conference has an obvious bearing on the great ques- 



188 The Declaration of Paris 

tion of the moment — the settlement of principles, which all 
hope will be the ultimate settlement, to be presently under- 
taken at the coming Conference. I now revert to the question 
of the adherences to the Declaration of Paris. 

Owing to the rigorous condition attached to adherence, that 
all the four principles must be accepted as one and indivisible, 
three States, it is commonly said — but in reality four — stood 
out : Spain, Mexico, and Venezuela, ^ each of which declined to 
accept the abohtion of privateering ; and the United States. 
Spain ultimately adhered on the 18th January 1908, and Mexico 
on the 13th February 1909. The United States has still not 
adhered ; nor, it is believed, has Venezuela. 

But, even with these reservations. Count Walewski was not 
justified in reporting to the Emperor ^ that " tous les Cabinets 
ont adhere sans reserve," for the list of adherences which he 
gave, and which is, with some slight modifications, the same 
as that given in the State Papers and Hertslet's Commercial 
Treaties, does not include many of the South and Central 
American States. Nor are any of the countries included in 
which foreign jurisdiction is exercised, such as China and 
Persia. Japan adhered on the 30th October 1886,^ as soon as 
she had recovered her independence. 

Some of the American Republics adhered in an indirect 
manner later, by means of treaties with Italy, and some 
with France. These will be referred to presently. 

A graver omission was the failure to provide for certain 
processes constantly in operation in the world's government — 
absorption and disintegration of old States, and the formation 
and recognition of new States. When Sweden and Norway 
separated, both Powers declared that henceforth they would 
hold themselves severally responsible for all conventions and 
obligations concluded prior to 1905.^ 

All the German States adhered, but there does not appear 
to be any record of the formal adherence of the Empire.^ 

* Venezuela is not usually referred to as a non-adherent Power, but 
the statement in the text is made on the faith of the Table of Adherences 
in Sir Edward Hertslet's Map of Europe by Treaty, vol. ii. p. 1284. As 
Librarian of the Foreign Office he is not likely to have made a mistake 
in such a matter. 

' Document No. 19. 
' Docimaent No. 19. 

* State Papers, vol. xcviii. p. 834. 

" In the diplomatic correspondence of 1870, already referred to (p. 136), 
there is another letter, from Count Bismarck to Lord A. Loftus, stating 
that the laws laid down in the Declaration " are legally valid throughout 
the whole of the States of the North German Confederation" {State 
Papers, vol. Ix. p. 924). 



The Powers which Adhered to the Declaration 139 

So all the Italian States adhered, but there is no record in the 
State Papers of Italy's adherence.^ 

Among the new or newly recognised States there is no 
record of the adherence of any of the Balkan States subsequent 
to their independence. In regard to these, the question was 
neither difficult nor new. When in the extension of her Empire 
Great Britain undertakes the obligations of a new Protectorate, 
a common form has come to be adopted in the Order in Council 
applying to it certain standard Imperial statutes, which con- 
tain the necessary authority for this expeditious procedure — 
such are the Foreign Enlistment Act, 1870, the Fugitive 
Offenders Act, 1881, and many others. It is curious that in 
spite of the importance which has been attached to it as a docu- 
ment of international obligation, some such common form was 
not recommended for adherence to the Declaration of Paris in 
the constitutions of new States. 

The point has also been overlooked in the British Protectorate 
Orders in Council ; and thus Zanzibar and other British Protecto- 
rates have not adhered. And yet, constitutionally, they are 
independent States, whose foreign relations are under the guid- 
ance of their Protecting Power, Great Britain : and the mer- 
chants of Zanzibar are as entitled to a voice, even though it be 
vicarious, in questions affecting, say, their consignments of 
ivory, as the merchants of Switzerland whose consignments of 
clocks are affected. 

The adherences with which we have been dealing are usually 
assumed to have been to the Declaration as a whole — that is 
to say, to the four principles, together with the supplementary 
conditions, — that they are one and indivisible, and that no treatj?^ 
which was not based on them in their entirety should be entered 
into by any adherent Power. Some of the letters in which 
adherence was notified contained express reference to these 



^ This statement is borne out, up to 1861, by correspondence which 
passed between Washington and Turin in that year, relating to a proposed 
convention between the United States and Italy for the suppression of 
privateering and the immunity of private property at sea. The Italian 
Minister pointed out that his Government had not yet become a party of 
the Convention of 1856. He had no objection to negotiations proceeding 
based on the American proposals, but he intimated that the final decision 
of the Italian Government would be influenced by that of England and 
France. Later in the year, in September, the American Minister was 
instructed to ascertain whether Italy would enter into negotiations for 
the accession of the United States to the Declaration of Paris, and, if so, 
he was to enter into a convention in the form of the original proposal. 
In November the matter was dropped in consequence of the refusal of 
the British and French Governments to accept the adherence. — {State 
Papers, vol. li. p. 107 et seq.) 



140 The Declaration of Paris 

supplementary conditions. But Lord Clarendon's mediation 
principle lay outside the Declaration, and an express adherence 
to it Avas necessary. Some States accepted it and some did 
not. I have availed myself of the list of States which adhered 
given by Sir Edward Hertslet in his Map of Europe by Treaty,^ 
and have printed it among the Documents. ^ 



Indirect Adherences to the Declaration. 
(A) By Treaty with Italy. 

Reference has been made to certain treaties concluded with 
Italy and France, which, although they were not technically 
adherences to the Declaration by the other Contracting Parties, 
would appear, by the adoption of the four principles, to have 
achieved the same result. 

Taking those concluded with Italy first in order, in the 
treaties with Honduras (1868) and Guatemala (1868) the article 
dealing with the subject is stated to be " as a complement " to 
the Declaration : for this reason, that in addition to the four 
principles " which are accepted without reservation by the 
two Parties in their mutual relations," the immunity of private 
property is also accepted " in case of the misfortune of a war 
between them " ; but it is subject to the maintenance of the 
right of preventing, " by a suitable manifesto," all trade and 
communication between any part of the shores of their own 
territory and merchant ships navigating under a hostile flag, 
and of confiscating ships transgressing the interdiction. 

The treaty with Siam (1868) " recognised the principles " 
established by the Declaration, and followed the same lines as 
the previous treaties. 

In the case of the Sandwich Islands (1863), the four principles 
are adopted simply as " enunciated in the Declaration." In 
the case of Salvador (1860), the principles are adopted in the 
mutual relations of the two Parties without special reference 
to the Declaration. They are only to be applied to the Powers 
which recognise them equally ; this, of course, includes all the 
adherent Powers. 

In the treaty with Venezuela (1861) and with Costa Rica 
(1863) a different form is adopted. " The two High Contracting 
Parties adopt in their mutual relations the principle that the 
flag covers the merchandise " ; but it is limited in its appHca- 
tion to enemy goods (and persons) on board neutral ships. 

1 Vol. ii. p. 1284. 2 Dociiment No. 19, at end. 



The Powers which Adhered to the Declaration 141 

XIV. The two High Contracting Parties adopt in their mutual 
relations the principle that the flag covers the merchandize. If one of 
the two Parties should remain neutral, while the other is at war with a 
third Power, the merchandize carried by the neutral flag shall be reputed 
neutral, even though belonging to the enemy. Nevertheless all articles 
reputed contraband of war are excepted. 

It is likewise agreed between the Contracting Parties that the 
freedom of the flag secures the freedom of persons, and that individuals 
belonging to the hostile Power, found on board a neutral vessel, cannot 
be made prisoners, unless they be military in service of the enemy. 

The same principle is adopted in the treaty with Mexico 
(1870). 

The conclusion of these three treaties seems to be at vari- 
ance with the stipulation made by the declaring Powers, that 
no treaties should be signed by any adhering Power " qui ne 
repose a la fois sur les quatre principes." 

In the treaty between Italy and Uruguay (1866) the subject 
is not referred to ; but Art. XI. recognises broadly the right 
of one party to continue its commerce and navigation with the 
enemies of the other party, except to blockaded ports. 

(B) By Treaty with France. 

Two of the South American Republics concluded treaties with 
France on similar lines to those with Italy above referred to. 

In the case of Salvador (1858), the four principles are adopted 
simply, with an extension to persons, and, as in the case of the 
Sandwich Islands treaty with Italy, they are only to be applied 
to the Powers which recognise them equally, thus including all 
the adherent Powers. 

In the case of Peru, the principles are adopted with express 
reference to the Declaration, but it is followed by an article 
explaining their application in detail. 

In the case of the treaties with the Dominican Republic 
(1852), Honduras (1856), and New Granada (1856), the principle 
that the flag covers the merchandise is adopted to its full extent ; 
that is to say, neutral property on enemy ships is to be treated 
as enemy. 

The following is the article in the New Granada treaty : — 

XX. Les deux Parties Contractantes adoptent, dans leurs rela- 
tions mutuelles, le principe que " le pavilion couvre la marchandise." 
Consequemmentsi I'une des deux Parties reste neutre quandl'autre est en 
guerre avec une autre Puissance, les marchandises couvertes du pavilion 
neutre seront aussi reputees neutres, meme quand elles appartiendraient 
aux ennemis de I'autre Partie Contractante. II est egalement convenu 
que la liberte du pavilion assure aussi celle des personnes, et que les 



142 The Declaration of Paris 

individus appartenant a une Puissance ennemie, qui seraient trouves a 
bord d'un batiment neutre, ne pourront pas etre faits prisormiers, a 
raoins qu'ils ne soient railitaires et pour le moment engages au service 
de I'ennemi. En consequence du meme principe sur I'assimilation du 
pavilion et de la marchandise, la propriete neutre trouvee a bord d'un 
batiment ennemi sera consideree comme ennemie, a moins qu'elle n'ait 
ete embarquee sur ce navire avant la declaration de guerre, ou avant 
qu'on en ait connaissance dans le port d'ou le navire est parti. 

Les deux Parties Contractantes n'appliqueront ce principe, en ce 
qui conceme les autres Puissances, qu'a celles qui le reconnaitront 
egalement. 

It is difficult to account for this article in the last two 
of the three treaties mentioned above, as they were ratified 
after the Declaration of Paris was signed. They not only 
infringe the stipulation that no treaty should be signed by 
an adhering Power which was not based on all four principles, 
but they also contain the " enemy ships enemy goods " 
principle, which was in direct opposition to the 3rd principle 
of the Declaration. 

This article is to be found in many of the earlier treaties 
between France and the South American Republics : — e.g. 
Ecuador (1843), Guatemala (1848), Costa Rica (1848), Vene- 
zy£la (1843). 



The Refusal of the United States to Adhere. 

The United States declined to adhere, answering the invita- 
tion in a long memorandum from Mr Marcy, the Secretary of 
State. This should be known as " the Second Marcy Note," ^ 
in order not to confuse it with the First Note sent in 1854 ^ 
on receipt of the Declaration to the neutrals at the beginning 
of the war. 

It may be divided roughly into two parts : that in which it 
sets out very clearly and remorselessly all the weak points of 
the Declaration ; and that which is devoted to the advocacy of 
privateering, and the immunity of private property at sea. 

The Note sets out with a grievance, and it can hardly be 
denied that it was a very real grievance. The United States 
Government had, over two years previously, as indicated in 
the First Marcy Note, submitted the 2nd and 3rd principles 
— that the neutral flag covers enemy goods ; that neutral goods 

1 Document No. 21. * Document No. 8 J. 



The Refusal of the United States to Adhere 143 

are not seizable on enemy ships — ^to the maritime Powers in 
order to press their adoption as permanent principles of inter- 
national law. Four Governments had accepted them, but others 
had preferred to wait till the termination of the war. But the 
action of the plenipotentiaries at Paris had annihilated these 
negotiations by making the four principles indivisible, and pro- 
hibiting the adhering Powers from entering into any convention 
on the subject of neutral rights which was not based on them. 

Had the intentions of the Congress been more carefully 
drafted, it is probable that these two subordinate conditions, for- 
mulated in the 24th protocol,^ would have been included as part 
of the Declaration. But the point taken by the United States 
was not sound, for the 24th protocol was as effective, or as 
ineffective, as the 23rd ; ^ and, therefore, no nation was free to 
decide whether it would accede entirely or partially to the actual 
Declaration. But the result of the condition of indivisibility 
was that a nation was debarred from the right of accepting the 
two propositions proposed by the United States, establishing 
the freedom of the cargo irrespective of the fate of the ship, 
thereby assuring many advantages to neutral commerce which 
could only be obtained subject to too great a sacrifice — the 
abandonment of a right hitherto never contested, which might, 
so the United States contended, be regarded as essential to the 
freedom of the sea, privateering. 

It was further pointed out that the 4th principle — that 
blockade to be recognised must be effective — hardly came within 
the class of questions with which the Congress was concerned, 
for this had not recently been regarded as uncertain or as being 
the cause of " deplorable conflicts." The disputes, it was insisted, 
which had arisen as to blockade were always as to the facts, 
not as to the law. What is meant by a force really sufficient to 
prevent access to the enemy's coasts had been frequently and 
vehemently discussed, and the Declaration, by simply repeating 
an uncontested principle, had not removed any of the embarrass- 
ment of determining what is a sufficient force to make a blockade 
effective. This question was, therefore, left as open after the 
Declaration as it was before. Nations which had resorted to 
" paper blockades " had rarely, if ever, attempted to justify 
them on principle ; had generally admitted their illegality, 
and paid compensation to the injured parties. 

Special stress was then laid on the importance of the right 
of privateering, which was as justified by usage as the right 
to use men-of-war, or as any other principle in the maritime 
code. Few nations had ever hesitated to avail themselves of 

^ Document No. 17. 



144 The Declaration of Paris 

it ; and in two treaties only had the contracting parties agreed 
to abstain from their use — in 1675, between Sweden and the 
United Provinces, though, when they were at war a short time 
afterwards, the provision was ignored ; and in 1785, between 
the United States and France : but the clause was omitted when 
the treaty was renewed in 1799. During the last fifty years 
no step had been taken to abolish the right ; and it was, the 
United States considered, much to be regretted that the Con- 
gress, in assuming to put an end to differences of opinion between 
neutrals and belligerents, should have destroyed a principle 
as to which there was no difference of opinion. The Congress 
should have foreseen that, while in regard to three of the prin- 
ciples there would have been no serious objection from any side, 
in regard to the fourth there would have been a vigorous oppo- 
sition. The United States relied on Valin's justification of the 
right, published in 1681, and Pistoye and Duverdy's, published 
in Paris at the very time the Congress was sitting. Reasons 
should have been given for insisting on this principle and 
altering the law, though probably the Congress had adopted the 
common ones generally advanced, such as that the extension 
of Christianity had mitigated the severities of war ; that 
Governments wage war, and individuals have no right to take 
part in it unless authorised by their Government. 

The dominating principle in land warfare, the Note continued, 
is that non-combatants and their property must be respected ; 
pillage is against the usages of to-day. It was presumed that 
the keen desire to improve the cruel customs of war by exempting 
individual property at sea from enemy seizure, as it is exempt 
on land, was the principal reason why the Congress had declared 
privateering abolished. On this point the President's views 
are expressed in his message to Congress of the 4th December 
1854, when he dealt with the proposition which had been made 
to abolish privateering.^ He pointed out that the proposition 
was based on the principle that the private property of non- 
combatants ought to be exempt from the ravages of war. But 
the abolition of privateering would carry us very little way 
towards the establishment of this principle, which would also 
exempt private property from molestation from men-of-war. If 
the principal Powers of Europe would agree to the immunity of 
private property at sea, the United States would agree to the 
abolition of privateering. Mr Marcy was authorised to assent 
avec empressement to the principle which exempts private 
property on sea as on land. But the proposition to abandon 
privateering at sea could no more be accepted than one oblig- 

^ Document No. 15. 



The Refusal of the United States to Adhere 145 

ing a State to renounce volunteers on land. If private property 
might still be seized by warships, it was difficult to see why 
it might not be seized by privateers, which, after all, are only 
another branch of the public armed forces of the State. No 
sane principles of logic could justify the distinction ; no one 
was capable of drawing the line between them. The abuses of 
privateering had been exaggerated ; for no nation which author- 
ised privateers would omit to take necessary steps to prevent 
abuses. If the distinction were established, it would rest with 
each nation to declare which vessels are war-vessels ; the 
predominant maritime Powers would make this distinction to 
their own advantage, and weak nations should firmly resist 
the creation of such a power, and interpose barriers to en- 
croachments of this nature. The United States considered the 
maintenance of large armed maritime forces as dangerous to 
the national prosperity, and a danger to civil liberty ; their cost 
as a burden to the people, and a constant menace to peace. 
A considerable army always ready for war is a powerful tempta- 
tion ; the United States policy had always been against it, and it 
would not consent to a change in international law which would 
compel it to maintain in peace a powerful regular army or navy. 
If forced to maintain her rights by arms she would limit herself 
to relying on voluntary troops by land, and on the merchant 
marine for the protection of her commerce. In resisting the 
attempt to alter maritime law the United States laid its views 
before all those nations who did not look to become dominating 
maritime Powers, and whose interests were the same as those of 
the United States. The protection of commerce and the main- 
tenance of peaceful international relations cried aloud to them 
as to her to resist the change proposed in the Law of Nations. 
For them the abandonment of privateering would be accom- 
panied by disastrous consequences, without any corresponding 
advantages. It was not surprising, therefore, that powerful 
maritime nations desired to see it abolished ; for that nation 
which had a decided naval superiority would be the absolute 
master of the ocean. Such a Power at war with a nation 
inferior at sea would not have to trouble itself to look after 
its commerce, but only to hunt the enemy's ships, which could 
easily be held in check by half its naval forces ; the other half 
would sweep the ocean for its enemy's commerce. This would 
be worse if the superiority at sea were divided between three or 
four Powers. The fatal consequences of any great inequality 
in naval forces would be redressed by privateers. The ocean 
is the common property of all nations ; and instead of lending 
its aid to a measure which would probably give to a few, or 

10 



146 The Declaration of Paris 

perhaps one, a preponderance on the seas, every State should 
obstinately use all means in its power to defend its common 
heritage. A Power predominant on the ocean is even more 
dangerous than one predominant on land. The damage result- 
ing from the abandonment of the command of the sea to one 
or more strong naval Powers would arise chiefly from the 
liabiHty of private property at sea to seizure. The President, 
therefore, proposed to add to the proposition abolishing priva- 
teering the following, " and private property of the subjects 
of one belligerent Power shall not be seized by the vessels of 
the other, unless it be contraband." Thus amended, the pro- 
position, as well as the three others, would be accepted. He 
adhered to the other three independently of the first, if the 
amendment were not accepted. He thought there could be 
no serious opposition to his proposal. If the amendment were 
not adopted, the signatory Powers should agree as to what treat- 
ment they would accord to privateers coming to their ports. 
The United States would claim that consideration which they 
accorded, and which was accorded by international law before 
the Congress tried to alter it. 

Then followed a suggestion that the Plenipotentiaries should 
consider, as a kindred subject, the claims of the neutrals to a 
modification, if not to the abandonment, of the doctrine of 
contraband of war. Nations which preserve their peaceful 
relations ought not to be injured in their commercial relations 
by those who have chosen to go to war, so long as neutral 
citizens do not compromise their neutral character by direct 
intervention in military operations. The law as to sieges and 
blockades seemed sufficient to satisfy all the demands of 
belligerents. If this suggestion were adopted and really 
observed, the right of search, which had been the cause of so 
much inconvenience and damage to neutral commerce, would 
be limited to cases of reasonable suspicion of trading with 
besieged or blockaded places. Humanity and justice demanded 
that the calamities resulting from war should be strictly limited 
to the belligerents, and those who voluntarily participate in it ; 
and, on the other hand, that neutrals who abstain in good faith 
from this participation should be left free to carry on their 
ordinary commerce with either belligerent, without restrictions 
in respect to the articles dealt with. 

This document has a very definite relation to the discussion 
which shortly afterwards took place between the United States 
and the British Government when the question of the adherence 
of the United States to the Declaration of Paris was revived. 



The Refusal of the United States to Adhere 147 

But, beyond this, it has an importance in what may be called 
the intellectual development of the subject. No one can deny 
that there is considerable force in the reasoning which supported 
privateering ; it is put forward with confident and characteristic 
assurance ; and it is worthy of note that belief in the system 
did not immediately die out in England with the doctrinaire 
statement of the Declaration that " privateering is abolished." 
In 1875, in the Preface to his edition of Ward's Treatise on 
Maritime Laiv, Lord Stanley of Alderley, a distinguished peer 
who took part in the debate of 1856, and President of the Board 
of Trade, regretted the decision of the Congress of Paris on this 
matter. But the United States Government overlooked the 
real reason which had compelled the decision of the Congress, 
and which could no longer be ignored : that, however logically 
defensible in theory, privateers had become the scourge of the 
world's wars. And as for its simple faith in punitive measures, 
no country was more willing to adopt them, or to acknowledge 
their failure, than England. Chatham had tried them during 
the Seven Years' War, when " the action of our privateers was 
outrageous beyond endurance," when " there was a swarm of 
smaller privateers in the Narrow Seas who were not to be dis- 
tinguished from pirates." Nothing but the most strenuous 
exertions, penalties imposed by administrative action, penalties 
by Act of Parliament, cajolery by Government, pay in return 
for submission to naval discipline, restoration of prizes, enabled 
him to pacify the neutrals.^ 

Nor does this exhaust the importance of the document. 
It deals, but as subordinate to the main proposition, with the 
doctrines of immunity of private property at sea, and the 
assimilation of the principles of sea and land warfare ; and 
indicates the re-emergence from the Napoleonic past, in the 
language of the Napoleonic speeches, of these much more sweep- 
ing doctrines which, by their plausibleness, seemed specially 
suited to please the humanitarian mind. They thenceforward 
figured largely in all debates in Parliament. 

So much emphasis is laid in this Marcy Note on the principle 
of immunity of private property at sea that it is important to 
discover when the United States first adopted it. We have 
a fairly certain guide in the treaties which had been concluded 
at this period on its own initiative. 

There is no reference to it in the First Marcy Note. The 
United States was then concerned principally with the permanent 

^ See Sir Julian Corbett's England in the Seven Years" War, vol. ii. p. 6. 



148 The Declaration of Paris 

adoption of " free ships free goods," and expressed the hope 
that the provisional adoption of it by the Allies for the purposes 
of the war might lead to the much -desired result. To this end 
it had embarked on negotiations with the Powers, proposing 
that conventions should be entered into recognising the freedom 
both of enemy goods on neutral ships and of neutral goods 
on enemy ships. Four Governments had accepted, but others 
had preferred to wait till the termination of the war. Three 
of these consenting Powers must have been Russia, the Two 
Sicilies, and Peru, with which treaties were concluded on the 
22nd of July 1854, 13th of January 1855, and 22nd of July 
1856 respectively. 1 The fourth is uncertain, as no other treaty 
is mentioned in the Collections as having been concluded by 
the United States at this period. M. Drouyn de Lhuys refers 
in his Memoire to the fact of negotiations being in progress in 
1854, and threatened to revive them if an agreement were not 
reached with the British Government. ^ It was suggested by Lord 
John Russell, in a despatch in 1861,^ that the proposal made by 
the United States to France included the adoption of immunity 
of private property. The treaty was not, however, concluded. 

These three treaties are all on the same model. The two 
principles are laid down, and the parties agree to apply them — 
that is, when they are at war — to all Powers which adopt them 
" comme permamente et immuable." Further, they reserved 
to themselves the right to agree later (ulUrieurement), according 
as circumstances may require, on the application and extension 
which should be given to these principles. Nevertheless they 
declared that they would adopt them as rules whenever the 
question of appreciating the rights of neutrality arose. It 
was further agreed that all nations which should agree to 
observe these principles by a formal declaration, should enjoy 
the rights resulting from this accession in the same manner as 
the Contracting Parties to the treaties. Steps would be taken 
to bring about the accession of other Powers. 

The two principles are enunciated in these treaties in their 
simple form, and there is no suggestion of the larger principle 
of the general immunity of private property at sea. It would 
seem, therefore, that the doctrine was not advocated by the 
United States Government till the Second Marcy Note was 
presented to the Powers in 1856. 

On 14th July 1857 a motion was made by Mr Lindsay for 
copies of Mr Marcy's letter to the French Government upon 

» Document No. 16. . ' See p. 66. 

» Document No. 24 (1). 



The Refusal of the United States to Adhere 149 

the subject of privateering, and of any other correspondence 
between the British Government and other Powers on the 
same subject. There was an obvious objection to laying on 
the table of the House correspondence which had passed be- 
tween two foreign Powers, and on Lord Palmerston's suggestion 
the motion was withdrawn. In view of a certain speech which 
he had made at Liverpool the previous year, after the conclusion 
of peace — which was referred to in a debate which occurred 
some years afterwards, to be dealt with later — it is important 
to note his statement on this occasion, that the proposal to 
exempt private property at sea from capture required long 
and mature consideration. But it appeared that the new 
Government of the States had intimated that no answer to 
the Marcy Note was asked for, and therefore communications 
on the subject had been suspended. The reason for its with- 
drawal was not stated. 

Lord Palmerston added, with regard to the other question 
raised by the Note, that it was difficult to apply the same 
rules to sea as to land warfare, more especially as the practice 
in land warfare varied in different countries. 



i86o-i862 



The Report of the Horsfall Commission on 
Merchant Shipping, 1860. 

The direct discussion in Parliament of the Declaration of 
Paris ceased for some time after 1857 ; but the interest of the 
shipping world in the question naturally persisted, and a Select 
Committee of the House of Commons was appointed to report 
generally on questions affecting merchant shipping, among 
them belligerent rights at sea. Mr Horsfall was appointed 
chairman. The Report was issued in 1860, and the section 
in which this question is examined ^ shows the trend of the 
commercial mind at that period, more especially in regard to 
the refusal of the United States to adhere to the Declaration. 
The Committee considered that the refusal was not surprising, 

for the United States has obtained a recognition of the 
rights of neutrals for which she contended throughout a 
former period of hostilities ; and Great Britain has sur- 
rendered her rights without any equivalent from the United 
States. Our shipowners will thereby be placed at an im- 
mense disadvantage in the event of a war breaking out 
with any important European Power. In fact, should the 
Declaration of Paris remain in force, during a period of 
hostilities, the whole of our carrying trade would be inevit- 
ably transferred to American and other neutral bottoms. 

This opinion was supported by reference to the fact that 

at a recent period, upon a mere rumour of war in Europe, 
in which it was apprehended that Great Britain might be 
involved, American and other neutral ships received a 
decided preference in being selected to carry produce from 
distant parts of the world to ports in Europe, whereby 
even in a period of peace British shipowners were seriously 
prejudiced. 

^ Docviment No. 23. 
150 



Report of Horsfall Commission on Merchant Shipping 151 

The conclusion arrived at was that international law 
cannot remain in its present state ; for if England were involved 
in any great European war, the United States would almost 
certainly be neutral, " and then our great maritime rival would 
supplant us in the carrying trade." 

A somewhat curious state of things was supposed to have 
come about. " International law " had been remodelled by 
the adoption of the principles of the Declaration, but the 
United States had stood out ! This would, the Committee 
thought, in the event of war, " produce complications highly 
disastrous to British interests." 

An alternative remedy was proposed : either there must be 
complete immunity for all merchant ships and their cargoes 
during war, or 

we must revert to the maintenance of our ancient rights, 
whereby relying upon our maritime superiority, we may not 
merely hope to guard unmolested our merchant shipping 
in the prosecution of their business, but may capture 
enemies' goods in neutral ships, and thus prevent other 
nations from seizing the carrying trade of the kingdom 
during a state of hostilities. 

The question needed further consideration ; but as matters 
stood the Committee were in favour of the first alternative, 
because they believed that " in the progress of civilisation and 
in the cause of humanity, the time had arrived when all private 
property, not contraband of war, should be exempt from, capture 
at sea." 

There seems to be a hiatus in an argument which found 
that British interests, the progress of civilisation, and the cause 
of humanity all depended on the same principle which Bonaparte 
adopted in his effort to destroy British commerce. 

The Committee was largely composed of shipowners whose 
interests centred in the carrying trade ; but there seems to have 
been some misconception as to the meaning and effect of the 
Declaration, and as to the consequences of the United States 
standing out. Her position was a curious one. If she herself 
went to war she would not be expected to observe the principle 
" free ships free goods," though she had repeatedly expressed 
belief in it, and her willingness to act on it — as, indeed, she did 
during her war with Spain in 1898. But in the event of England 
going to war with another Power, the United States remaining 
neutral, the refusal to adhere would deprive her of the benefit 
of the principle. 

According to the then current interpretation of the Declara- 



152 The Declaration of Paris 

tion (insisted on by Lord Palmerston in 1862), it " related 
entirely to the relations between belligerent and neutral," and 
not to the relation of belligerents to each other. If this were 
true, the position of the United States in such a war, even 
assuming the enemy to be an adherent to the Declaration, 
would be far from satisfactory. Her ships carrying enemy pro- 
perty would be liable to be seized by England ; possibly also 
by the other belligerent. It is difficult, therefore, to follow the 
contention that she would obtain the carrying trade from other 
neutrals to the enemy. Taking, however, the true view of 
the Declaration, that it affects the relations of belligerent to 
belligerent as well as of neutral to belligerent, then the United 
States would obtain the privilege of free carriage of enemy 
goods, and the resultant carrying trade through the adherent 
enemy, although she herself had not adhered. But this destroys 
the intention of adherence, for the United States would get the 
benefit without it. It seems probable that the Committee 
took this view of the Declaration, though they did not express 
themselves very clearly. The value of their opinion, there- 
fore, depends on the very questionable assumption that when 
we are at war it is possible for us to obtain some share of the 
carrying trade of the world, either of neutral to neutral, or of 
neutral to the enemy. 

The shipowners deprecated the idea that they spoke only 
in their own interests, recognising that the interests of the whole 
community are involved in the prosperity and security of our 
merchant shipping. But the national interest in merchant 
shipping during war is a far larger question ; so momentous 
are the decisions which must be taken in regard to it, that we 
now see that the supreme direction and control of it in all its 
parts, whether for the purpose of transport of troops and muni- 
tions, or for maintaining the national supply of necessaries of 
life, or for preserving our friendly relations with the neutrals, 
must be in the State. We now realise that the Merchant Service 
is but a branch of the Royal Navy. From this point of view the 
shipowner and the interests of his shareholders stand in no more 
favourable position than the proprietor of any other means of 
transport, or than the owner of the goods transported. On this 
larger question the Report of the Committee throws no light. 
War had not at that time assumed sufficiently gigantic pro- 
portions to make men realise its paramount importance. 



Questions and Answers in Parliament, 1861 153 

II 

Questions and Answers in Parliament, 1861. 

On the 18th November 1861, Mr Horsfall asked the Govern- 
ment whether steps had been taken to carry out the recommenda- 
tions of the Committee.^ The answer was apparently in the 
negative, for Lord John Russell said that as the Treaty of Paris 
had been concluded the discussion with the United States, appar- 
ently on the Second Marcy Note, had not been continued. It had, 
in fact, been discontinued at the express request of the United 
States Government. But Lord John Russell took occasion to 
discuss the recommendations of the Committee, John Bright 
ineffectively raising the point that a discussion of such a nature 
was not in order in answering a question. Lord John said, 
when the matter was under discussion with the United 
States, that Lord Clarendon appeared to be unfavourable to 
the immunity of private property at sea. The United States 
seemed now to have gone a step further, contending that the 
blockade of commercial ports or the interruption of trade by 
blockade ought not to be permitted. In Lord John Russell's 
opinion this would compel the belligerent with the superior 
naval power to forego the advantages of her navy, and thus 
prolong the war, and lead to the employment of the enemy 
mercantile fleet for purposes of war. He recommended, there- 
fore, the greatest caution in taking any final step with regard 
to the question. 

Early in April 1861, the Civil War in America broke out. 
On the 15th, President Lincoln called out the militia in order 
to suppress the combination in the Southern States which 
had opposed the execution of the laws ; on the 17th, Jefferson 
Davis issued a proclamation inviting applications for letters 
of marque and reprisal ; and on the 19th, Lincoln proclaimed 
the blockade of the ports of the Southern States, " in pursuance 
of the laws of the United States and of the Law of Nations 
in such case provided." ^ On the 2nd and 6th May questions 
relating to the blockade were asked in the House of Commons. 
Lord John Russell said that this raised points in the Law of 
Nations so new that the opinion of the Law Officers had been 
asked for, and we were still in doubt as to what alterations 
were to be made in the Law of Nations in consequence of the 

^ Document No. 23. 

* Mountague Bernard, Neutrality of OrecU Britain during the American 
Civil War, p. 80. 



154 The Declaration of Paris 

Declaration of Paris. On the 7th May, Mr Horsfall having given 
notice of a motion as to the action to be taken on the Report 
of his Committee, Mr Walpole suggested its withdrawal on the 
ground that the discussion at that time would not be in the 
public interest. Lord Palmerston agreed that a postponement 
was advisable. The Law Officers had advised that the Southern 
States should be treated as belligerents. He added that further 
questions arose out of that question, with respect to which the 
Government was still in doubt — repeating Lord John Russell's 
words — " as to what are the alterations which are to be made 
in the Law of Nations in consequence of the Declaration of 
Paris." Those questions were of a difficult and intricate 
nature, were still under the consideration of the Government, 
and would be further considered before any declaration was 
made to other Powers. Mr Horsfall thereupon agreed to post- 
pone his motion. 

Ill 

The United States and the Declaration of Paris 
during the Civil War, 1861. 

During the American Civil War of 1861, the parts which the 
different nations had been accustomed to play were reversed. 
The decision of the European Powers to recognise the Confederate 
States of the South as a belligerent made their position funda- 
mentally different from that occupied by the non-belligerent 
States during the American Rebellion. So much turns on this 
that it will be well to made the point clear. Mr Hall ^ devotes 
an interesting chapter to the subject, and to an examination 
of the precedents, as also Sir William Harcourt in the first 
series of Letters of Historicus. The point which specially 
concerns us is that recognition of rebels as belligerents involves 
two important consequences : the acquisition by them of the 
rights and duties of a belligerent, and by the non-belligerents 
of the rights and duties of neutrals — and these consequences 
are made to depend on the decision of the non-belligerents. 
They may, and in fact do, ignore the wishes, it may be the 
rights, of the parent State, which may still call the seceding 
party " Rebels." The important fact is that with the recognition 
of them as belligerents their own status of " neutral " comes 
into existence. Otherwise there are no neutrals in a civil war. 

It is obvious that a serious question is thus raised between 

^ International Law, 7th ed., pt. i., chap. i. pp. 39-43. 



The Declaration during the American Civil War 155 

the parent State and the non-belligerent Powers. It led to 
great bitterness in the discussions between the Federal Govern- 
ment and the European Powers, represented by Great Britain 
and France. It might lead to war. The conclusion of treaties 
of alliance with rebels might be argued to be a legitimate form 
of recognition, might equally be a legitimate cause of war. It 
was, in fact, one of the reasons which led to the war between 
England and France at the time of the American Rebellion ; it 
was the assigned cause for the English declaration of war against 
Holland. That was not, however, " a case of recognition " 
of the American Colonists as belligerents — a question which 
does not seem to have been raised ; it was a recognition of their 
independence. The greater included the less. But whereas it 
seems to be agreed that the recognition of rebels as belligerents 
must be accepted by the parent State, which is bound to submit 
to the consequences, their recognition as an independent State 
need not be acquiesced in. Strictly speaking, it puts the re- 
cognising Powers in pari delicto, and would justify their being 
treated as enemies, to the ignoring of their pretension to be 
neutrals. This was the position assumed by Great Britain 
throughout the whole of the War of Independence ; the North 
America Act ^ declared that the ships and cargoes of those who 
traded with the rebel Colonies would be treated as belonging 
to enemies. 

In one of the despatches from Paris, to be presently re- 
ferred to, the French Government asserted that Great Britain 
" although treating at the commecement of the American War 
letters of marque as piracy, had, after a time, recognised the 
belligerent rights of the States in rebellion against her." ^ This 
assertion was not replied to, but its accuracy may well »be 
doubted. 

To revert to the Civil War. With the recognition of the 
Confederate States as belligerents the European Powers became 
neutrals, and looked, on behalf of their merchants, to reap the 
benefit of the aspirations which had been expressed at the 
Congress of Paris. The point which specially concerns us is 
the attitude of the North, that is to say, of the United States 
Government, towards the Declaration of Paris. 

The Cambridge Modern History states ^ that on the 20th April 
Mr Seward, the Secretary of State, instructed the American 
Minister in Europe to offer the adhesion of the United States 
to the Declaration, and that Great Britain and France agreed 
to accept it with the reservation that it should not affect the 

1 16 Geo, III., c. 6. « Document No. 24 (3), 

» Vol. xii. p. 16. 



156 The Declaration of Paris 

existing war. It is further stated that the United States issued 
no letters of marque, and the Confederate States very few. 

With deference, these facts need revision, for they do not 
tally with those recorded in the White Paper issued by the 
British Government. The statement that the United States 
took the i^^itiative in offering its adhesion to the Declaration 
is not borne out. The heading to the series of published de- 
spatches is " Correspondence relative to the Overtures addressed 
to the Contending Parties in the United States, with a view to 
their adhesion to the Principles of Maritime Law as laid down 
by the Congress of Paris in 1856 " ; ^ and this will be found to 
be the accurate description of the negotiations. In considering 
these despatches, allowance must be made for the time occupied 
by the transit of the mails. 

The first despatch, from Lord John Russell to Lord Cowley, 
British Ambassador at Paris, is dated the 6th May 1861 ; and it 
is evident from its terms that no proposal had at that time been 
received from the Federal Government. Its tenor was that no 
despatches had come from Lord Lyons, Minister at Washington, 
by the mail just arrived ; but that the accounts received from 
the Consuls were sufficient to show that a civil war had broken 
out. The British Government, looking at all the circumstances 
of the case, could not hesitate to admit that the Confederacy 
was entitled to be considered as a belligerent, and the attention 
of the French Government was to be called to the bearing which 
this unfortunate contest threatened to have on the rights and 
interests of the neutral nations. The circumstances referred to 
were President Lincoln's declaration of blockade of the Southern 
ports, and President Davis's declaration of his intention to issue 
letters of marque for cruisers to be employed against the com- 
merce of the North. The maritime Powers, more especially 
France and England, should therefore consider whether they 
would not invite the contending parties to act upon the 2nd 
and 3rd principles of the Declaration of Paris, to which the 
United States had not acceded. In practice, however, they 
had, in their Conventions with other Powers, adopted the 2nd 
principle, although admitting that without some such Convention 
the rule was not one of universal application. By these prin- 
ciples enemy cargoes were to be free on board neutral ships, 
and neutral cargoes free on enemy ships. 

It seems to Her Majesty's Government to be deserving 
of consideration whether a joint endeavour should not now 
be made to obtain from each of the belligerents a formal 

* A selection from this correspondence is set out as Document No. 24. 



The Declaration during the American Civil War 157 

recognition of both principles as laid down in the Declara- 
tion of Paris, so that such principles shall be admitted by 
both, as they have been admitted by the Powers who made 
or acceded to the Declaration of Paris, henceforth to form 
part of the general law of nations. 

The French Government replied that as these two principles 
had always been advocated by the United States, and that as 
France and the United States were agreed on these maritime 
questions, it would be difficult for either party in America to 
refuse assent to the principles now invoked. 

In a despatch of the 18th May to Lord Lyons, reference is 
made to a recent letter from Mr Seward intimating that fof eign 
advice was not likely to be accepted — would, in fact, be resented ; 
and also to the fact that negotiations in regard to the adherence 
to the Declaration of the United States had been broken off in 
1857, and had not been renewed. It was, however, presumed 
that, in view of its previous attitude towards the principle, the 
United States would agree to adopt " free ships free goods." 
With regard to the abolition of privateering, which was the cause 
of the United States withholding its adherence to the Declara- 
tion, it was necessary to consider what is required by the general 
law of nations. The commander and crew of a ship bearing a 
letter of marque must carry on hostilities according to the 
established laws of war. The British Government must, there- 
fore, hold any Government issuing such letters responsible for, 
and liable to make good, any losses sustained by British subjects 
in consequence of wrongful proceedings of vessels sailing with 
them. In this way thefTbject of the Declaration of Paris might, 
to a certain extent, be attained without the adoption of any 
new principle. These points were to be urged upon Mr Seward. 

The question was again referred to in another despatch of 
the same date. The British Government would gladly see the 
practice, which is calculated to lead to great irregularities, and 
to increase the calamities of war, renounced by both the con- 
tending parties in America, as it had been renounced by almost 
every other nation in the world ; but 

you will clearly understand that Her Majesty's Government 
cannot accept the renunciation of privateering on the part of 
the Government of the United States if coupled with the con- 
dition that they should enforce its renunciation on the Con- 
federate States, either by denying their right to issue letters 
of marque, or by interfering with the belligerent operations of 
vessels holding from them such letters of marque, so long 
as they carry on hostilities according to the recognised prin- 
ciples and under the admitted liabilities of the law of nations. 



158 The Declaration of Paris 

In a further despatch of the 21st May, Lord John Russell 
refers to a conversation he had had on the 18th with Mr 
Adams, United States Minister, who said he had powers to 
negotiate as to the adherence of his Government to the 
Declaration ; but that as instructions had been sent to the 
French and English Ministers in Washington, he would leave 
the matter in the hands of the Secretary of State. 

From this it appears that although instructions had been sent 
to Europe to offer adherence, the offer was not, in fact, made ; 
and that the initiative was taken by England and France, who, 
as the most powerful maritime States, took the lead, presumably 
with the concurrence of the other Powers. 

Cross-currents in diplomatic relations seem to have then set 
in, for on the 12th June Lord John Russell wrote to the Paris 
Embassy that he had been informed that the United States 
had proposed to France to accept the first principle of the 
Declaration, relating to the abolition of privateering, coupled 
with a provision protecting private property at sea from capture, 
but had stipulated that the Southern privateers should be con- 
sidered as pirates. England had objected to both suggestions, 
and France also. With regard to the first, its effect would be 
greatly to reduce the power in time of war of all States having 
a military as well as a commercial marine ; as to the second, 
its evident object was to lead the two Powers to take a decided 
part against the Southern Confederacy, and they had no in- 
tention of abandoning their neutral character. 

This despatch gives us the keynote to the whole corre- 
spondence, and shows clearly the reasons for its failure to 
achieve anything — the intense irritation of the United States at 
the recognition of the Confederacy — the " Rebs" — as belligerents. 
Thenceforward in every step taken, and in every despatch written 
from Washington, may be traced the unalterable determination 
to destroy if possible the consequence of that recognition. As 
belligerents the South would have the right, so vehemently 
contended for in the " Second Marcy Note," ^ to commission 
privateers. If they were not belligerents the privateers would 
be pirates, and, without any Declaration of Paris, the 
European Powers, under their own municipal laws, as well 
as under international law, would be bound to take their 
own measures for dealing with them. 

On the 4th June Lord Lyons wrote that he had proposed 
to the United States that they should adhere to the two prin- 
ciples. He added that probably Mr Adams would have already 
offered the larger adherence, subject to the question of piracy, 

^ Document No, 21. 



The Declaration during the American Civil War 159 

but suggested that it came too late. Had it been offered immedi- 
ately on the appearance of the Southern notice to issue letters 
of marque, action might have been taken to induce the South 
to abandon the idea ; but the privateers were now in full 
activity, and with considerable success. He doubted whether 
Congress would now ratify the abolition of privateering, and 
probably would not abide by the proposal made to France, 
when it found that it had nothing to gain by it. 

On the 21st June Lord John Russell informed Lord Lyons 
that the United States Minister at Paris had proposed to France 
the adoption of the Declaration, basing himself on Mr Marcy's 
answer to the request of the Powers in 1856. France agreed with 
us that the proposal should be rejected. Lord John asked Mr 
Adams whether he had similar instructions with regard to Great 
Britain. He had answered. No. And on the 17th Lord Lyons 
reported that Mr Seward declined to receive communications 
founded on the recognition of the South as belligerents ; and 
objected also to France and England acting in concert. He had 
pointed out that the United States had always admitted the 
2nd and 3rd principles of the Declaration, and accepted re- 
sponsibility for acts of privateers to whom it had issued letters 
of marque. Mr Seward considered that these principles were as 
applicable to operations against rebels as to regular war. 

On the 17th June Lord Lyons reported a further step by 
Mr Seward. He thought he had reason to complain that the 
Governments of Europe had taken no notice of his offer, made 
long ago, to adhere to the Declaration without reserve ; he 
preferred Mr Marcy's proposal, but if that were not acceptable 
he was ready to adhere as it stood, and Mr Adams was to be 
instnicted to say that he was willing that negotiations should 
be carried on either in London or Washington without delay. 
It is not very clear to what offer " made long ago " Mr Seward 
referred. On the 11th July, apparently in consequence of 
these instructions, Mr Adams referred Lord John Russell to his 
conversation of the 18th May, when he had intimated that he 
was instructed to offer the adhesion of the State to the 2nd, 3rd, 
and 4th principles, but to drop the 1st (abolition of privateer- 
ing). He was now instructed to offer and present a project of 
convention which included all four principles. Lord John 
pointed out that this would not amount to adherence, but he 
was content to waive the point if the convention was to be 
entered into with all States ; and to avoid delay, he would be 
satisfied if the one with France were ready. 

Meanwhile, during July and August, the Confederate States 
had been brought into line. They recognised the 2nd and 3rd 



160 The Declaration of Paris 

principles of the Declaration, and admitted responsibility for 
privateers. The question of blockade was of no practical im- 
portance in their case, as they had no fleet. 

The discussion with the North proceeded on the lines of 
adherence to Mr Marcy's propositions ; or, failing this, of ad- 
herence pure and simple. But Lord John Russell annexed 
to the Declaration an undertaking that it would have no bearing, 
direct or indirect, on the internal differences in the States. This 
obviously ran counter to the idea that by the adherence the 
Powers would be compelled to treat the Southern privateers as 
pirates. On the 23rd August Mr Adams sent a long despatch 
arguing the point ; but Lord John would not withdraw his 
stipulation, and instructions were sent to Mr Adams to break 
off negotiations. In December Lord Lyons wrote that the 
object of the accession would have been defeated by the stipula- 
tion, and that refusal to consider the Southern privateers as 
pirates after adherence would have been treated as a cause of 
quarrel. 

So ended the negotiations. There is, however, one point 
of interest which does not seem to have been discussed : 
whether, after the recognition of the Confederacy as belligerents, 
the acceptance of the adherence of the North would have been 
possible. Certainly the object which the North had in view 
would not have been achieved, for the Southern States could 
not have been both belligerents and pirates. This was probably 
the meaning of Lord John Russell's undertaking ; but it might 
have been more clearly expressed, and the point definitely and 
directly answered. Oi:i the other hand, the recognition of the 
Southern States as belligerents was not a recognition of their 
independence, and therefore there could have been no question 
of their adherence. Thus the negotiations proved infructuous. 
But they were well conceived from the point of view of a Govern- 
ment which had accepted the principles of the Paris Declaration, 
being directed merely to the adherence of both belligerents to 
two of those principles. The idea of the North that it could 
adhere to the Declaration after war had been declared was ill- 
conceived, and was no more than an endeavour to escape the 
consequences of the recognition of the South as belligerents. 
Further, the idea that the cumbrous method of independent 
conventions could be effectively substituted for simple ad- 
herence was still more so. But the important point with which 
we are chiefly concerned is that at the close of the war the posi- 
tion of the reunited United States was precisely the same as 
it was before. In spite of an earnest belief in, and constant 
adoption of, two of its principles, the result of the provision that 



The Debate of 1862 161 

adherence meant the definite acceptance of all four, was that 
the United States had not put itself into the position of an ad- 
herent, and therefore could not claim the benefits and privileges 
of the Declaration. 



IV 

The Debate of 1862. 

There was one last debate before the question ceased to en- 
gage the attention of Parliament ; an inevitable debate in view 
of the American Civil War, and the amount of contraband trade 
and blockade running which had sprung up. On the 11th March 
1862, Mr Horsfall had been given to understand that nothing was 
to be done to carry out the recommendations of the Committee ; 
he therefore brought on the motion which had gone into abey- 
ance the year before : " That the present state of international 
maritime law as affecting the rights of belligerents and neutrals 
is ill-defined and unsatisfactory and calls for the early attention 
of His Majesty's Government." The motion was seconded by 
Mr Cobden. It was ingeniously drafted, because it allowed men 
of all shades of opinion to support it — those who thought the 
Declaration of Paris had gone too far, and those who thought it 
did not go far enough. There was a full-dress debate which 
lasted two nights, with the result that the motion was, by leave, 
withdrawn. 

The extremists who followed Mr Horsfall advocated the 
immunity of private property at sea, as the Committee had done 
in their Report, " in the name of the commerce of the country, 
in the name of civilisation, humanity, and justice." But the 
motion, even if carried, would not have committed the House 
to the adoption of any concrete proposition ; and it was doomed 
to failure, for no Government which had recently and definitely 
adopted a certain code of principles, which had still more 
recently pressed them on the belligerents in a war, could be 
expected to admit that the present state of the law was " ill- 
defined " ; and the only " attention " which Her Majesty's 
Government could give to it would be the calling of another 
Conference — at the moment obviously out of the question. The 
only possible answer then to attacks on the Declaration by 
those who thought it went too far, was given by Lord John 
Russell, who himself shared that opinion — " We must abide 
by it." To have abandoned it at the first outbreak of war, 

11 



162 The Declaration of Paris 

within five years of its signature, would clearly have been a 
signal breach of faith.^ 

It is easy to criticise many years after the event ; but there 
appears to have been an obvious line of attack for those who 
believed that Pitt had not resisted in the teeth of Europe these 
" new-fangled doctrines " for nothing, who were convinced that 
the fortunes of the nation had been put in jeopardy by the 
Clarendon capitulation, and the prestige of its name tarnished. 
The case surely was not very difficult to deal with logically. 
Certain questions of maritime law had been, as it was thought, 
in the language of Count Walewski, elucidated, principles had 
been laid down, intentions had been expressed, enfin, certain 
declarations had been made, always and uniquely with the 
object of assuring, for the future, the repose of the world. 
That repose had been disturbed within a very short time ; war 
had suddenly broken out in a quarter least expected. No one 
could be said to be satisfied with the practical results of the 
new principles. Neither belligerent would accept the first ; 
the fourth had been deliberately set at naught, with the acqui- 
escence of the European Powers, by Lincoln's blockade with 
quite ineffective forces ; merchants were far from pleased with 
what they considered the high-handed measures taken by one of 
the belligerents, and the Foreign Office was besieged with com- 
plaints. The very thing which English Ministers of the time 
so feared, the risk of offending the neutral United States, had 
been deliberately run — the United States being at war, and 
England being the neutral. Even in March 1862, these things 
were already manifest ; it was not likely that the tension all 
round would diminish as the war developed. Was it not possible 
to wait for the end, and then, in all seriousness, without any 
expressed desire to impose one theory or another upon the world, 
to move the Government to call a Congress to inquire whether 
the principles, and the intentions, and the declarations, had stood 
the rough test of war and fulfilled the expectations which 

^ Mr C. W. P. Bentinck suggested the abandonment of the Declaration, 
describing it as a " solemn farce," impossible to be carried out. Lord 
John Russell, who had been a member of the Aberdeen Ministry in 1854, 
expressed the deliberate opinion that in point of principle the Declara- 
tion ought to be altered, and that the consequences were so serious as to 
show that it was very imprudent. While agreeing that we could hardly 
do otherwise than carry on the war on the same principle as France, he, 
like Lord Derby, would like to have heard some statement of the grounds 
for entering into the convention at the end of the war, when we were not 
under the necessity of making any concession. The state of the question 
was to some very alarming ; but he did not see that a breach of faith 
would at all mend our position, and he was afraid that we must be bound 
by it. 



The Debate of 1862 163 

enthusiasts had formed of them ? Such a notion made at the 
proper time could not have been refused. As it was, the debate 
was nothing more than a confused babel of sound, signifying 
and achieving nothing. It is impossible to give a consecutive 
analysis of it, for speaker followed speaker, not answering him, 
but only throwing fresh words into the hotch-potch of talk. 
Principles were asserted without argument ; arguments advanced 
supporting no recognised principle ; and the result, except for 
one memorable speech, nothing. That speech was John 
Bright's. Many men spoke with varying degree of ability, and 
all the old arguments were repeated, some defending the Decla- 
ration, some attacking it. Sir Roundell Palmer, the Solicitor- 
General, stood judicially between the two parties, and expressed 
the opinion that even with the Declaration " round our necks " 
he placed as much faith as before " in the patriotism, the 
resources, and the elasticity of the country." 

Sir George Cornewall Lewis started an unnecessary and ex- 
tremely debateable point, which startled and annoyed men of 
both sides : that the Declaration being a treaty, would cease 
to be binding in the event of our going to war with one of the 
signatories. This point will be considered in the Second Part 
of this volume. 

John Bright's speech was conspicuous for its statesmanship. 
It was a fair-minded expression of his extreme view. There 
were no strained appeals, only an occasional reference, to 
" humanity " and " civilisation." As a " friend of peace," glory- 
ing indeed at the jibe which had been thrown at him a thousand 
times, his constant demand was that, in the name of humanity, 
all wars should cease. But the impression that his speech leaves 
upon the mind is that, given the existence of war, he recognised 
that " humanity " had no special claim to be thrown into the 
balance against its being successfully waged. He frankly 
admitted that the principles he was advocating were in the 
teeth of all the ancient theories of war. But he did not denounce 
those theories as " relics of barbarism," nor the new theories 
as " more suited to the times in which we live." He wished his 
creed to be judged on its merits ; and his creed was, not " com- 
merce at any price " and everything sacrificed to its interests, 
but that the beneficent influence of commercial intercourse 
would soften the asperities of men's political intercourse ; and, 
in spite of the Crimea, in spite of the American Civil War, he 
believed that war would become more difficult notwithstanding 
the enormous armaments, and continuous war more remote. 
" Our commerce," he declared, "is so extensive, and its force 
so mighty — I will say so omnipotent — that it is utterly im- 



164 The Declaration of Paris 

possible that the ancient theories and the ancient policy of war 
can any longer be maintained." He looked forward to the time 
when " the commercial interests of mankind will assert the 
superiority to which they have a right over those tendencies to 
war which in time past, and even now sometimes, act too strongly 
on the minds of statesmen and rulers. ... I think we are look- 
ing from the darkness into the dawn." 

In natural sequence to this line of thought he believed that 
to rob war of one of its most potent weapons — the right to de- 
stroy private property at sea — would tend necessarily to reduce 
its field of operations, and so its length. In his eyes indeed 
the " victories of peace had begun " by the acceptance of the 
Declaration of Paris. In his summary of it he stated its 
principles with brutal frankness ; and he put the consequences 
of it, almost exultingly, before the House in a way in which 
its advocates never had the courage to do. The Declaration 
" declared that there should henceforth be no war made upon 
the trade of a belligerent with the exception of an actual 
blockade . . . that belligerents might trade in peace, not only 
with each other, but with all neutrals, if their trade was only 
carried on in the ships of neutrals." There was no question of 
" neutral rights " here, but only of belligerent concession to 
belligerent ; and the position he thought might be put still 
more plainly thus : " if an enemy will keep his own ships at 
home we undertake, and all other nations undertake, to do no 
harm to his trade at sea." But, he continued, the Declaration, 
thus interpreted, was but a stepping-stone. You must be 
logical ; and the logical consequence of what had been done 
was that more remained to be done, as Mr Thomas Baring had 
insisted : " You have freed the cargoes ; you have freed the 
manufactures of a country in their transit across the sea . . . 
why not include the ships ? If the trade of belligerents be 
permitted — and the object of the Declaration of Paris was to 
permit it, upon condition that it should be carried in neutral 
ships — why should it not go in the ships and come in the ships 
of belligerents ? " 

To him, then, it was clear that the Government had paved 
the way for the acceptance of that great principle, the immunity 
of private property from capture at sea. But further, the 
adoption of this principle was just ; for, if he had rightly inter- 
preted the effect of the Declaration, it would follow from this 
privilege given to neutral ships that the great bulk of our own 
ships during war would be kept in harbour. That was what 
the Liverpool Chamber of Commerce thought ; and if they 
were right, the result would come to this, that we had agreed 



The Debate of 1862 165 

to make war less burdensome to ourselves, and less burdensome 
to any enemy ; but we had done it in such a manner as to inflict 
special hardship, and to cause something like ruin and very 
grievous injury to a very large and important class of the 
population of the country — ^the shipowners. You have freed the 
cargoes, it follows that you must free the ships. 

Having made his point, he turned and rent Lord Palmerston; 
for the Prime Minister, in the first flush of the peace, in 1856, 
had gone down to Liverpool and made a most indiscreet speech. 
He had, in fact, propounded what to the " rights of war " party 
was most damnable doctrine, but to the pacifists had been a 
word of good cheer : " We had with France made changes 
and relaxations in the doctrine of war which, without in any 
degree impairing the power of the belligerents against their 
opponents, maintained the course of hostilities, yet tended to 
mitigate the pressure which hostilities inevitably produce upon 
the commercial transactions of countries that are at war. I 
cannot help hoping that these relaxations of former doctrines 
which were established at the beginning of the war, practised 
during its continuance, and ratified by formal engagements, 
may perhaps be still further extended ; and in the course of 
time the principles of war which are applied to hostilities by 
land may be extended without exception to hostilities by 
sea, and that private property shall no longer be exposed to 
aggression on either side." 

This was the full extent of the pacifists' hopeful creed, and 
was certainly not accepted by all the Government, notably 
Sir George Cornewall Lewis, who declared that there was no 
difference between the existing mode of conducting warfare on 
land and at sea. But some sceptical newspaper, probably the 
Times, had declared this to be a " crotchet," and that Lord 
Palmerston's real opinion was that the adoption of it would 
be tantamount to committing " political suicide." Bright pro- 
duced the quotation with telling effect. The Prime Minister 
had appealed in glowing language to the shipowners and mer- 
chants of Liverpool to say that, while the Government were 
engaged in the great transactions of war, they had not neglected 
the great interests of the commerce of England. He would 
not say he had been " starring the provinces," and had not been 
very particular as to the mode by which he excited the en- 
thusiasm of his audience. He was ready to believe that at the 
moment he was in earnest as to the possibility of carrying the 
principle of the Declaration further. Oblique sarcasm, which 
involved some particle of untruth, was foreign to John Bright ; 
but he did not refrain, when he found it necessary to show up 



166 The Declaration of Paris 

things in their true Hght, from using the very simplest words 
of scorn in the vocabulary. If the newspaper was right in its 
estimate of his true opinion, unless he had been talking 
** twaddle," the Prime Minister must explain how it was he 
differed so greatly from his colleague the Secretary of War, and 
from himself. 

Palmerston could not but answer the challenge ; for he must 
have known that " all kinds of twaddle " was the only way in 
which to describe his speech at Liverpool. He admitted having 
used the words ascribed to him ; he must have known that 
Bright was right in saying, " I have a distinct recollection that 
these observations were accepted with great satisfaction in the 
seats of industry in the north of England, and I believe that 
these observations went far with many men to convince them 
of the justice of the course which our representative had taken 
at Paris and of the wisdom of proceeding still further." But 
" further reflection and deeper thinking " had made him alter 
his opinion with regard to one of the two doctrines he had 
referred to. He hoped that the Honourable Member would be 
kind enough to give weight to his second thoughts, " and also 
come round to those second thoughts, which are proverbially 
the best." He then proceeded to give the House the benefit 
of his second thoughts. 

Bright's thoughts concerning this extraordinary statement 
have not been revealed. Probably they took some such shape 
as this : that the test of statesmanship when action is essential 
is the value of its first thoughts, because action taken cannot be 
undone. 

The passage quoted from the Liverpool speech related to 
two matters : first, the exemption of private property at sea 
from capture ; secondly, the assimilation of the principles of 
war at sea to the practice of war on land. It was in regard 
to the first that " further reflection and deeper thinking " had 
compelled Lord Palmerston to alter his opinion. This was his 
new and, therefore, deliberate opinion : "If you give up that 
power which you possess, and which all maritime States possess 
and have exercised, of taking the ships, the property, and the 
crews of the nation with whom you may happen to be at war, 
crippling the right arm of our strength, you would be inflicting 
a blow upon our naval power, and you would be guilty of an 
act of political suicide." 

Lord Palmerston showed considerable moral courage in 
accepting the very words which the newspaper had attributed 
to him, " pohtical suicide." There can be no doubt that that 
was his real opinion : it tallied with what he had written to 



The Debate of 1862 167 

Lord Clarendon when he sanctioned the surrender at Paris in 
1856 ; it was what he had said in effect in the House in 1857, 
that the suggestion of the United States as to the immunity 
of private property at sea " required long and matured con- 
sideration," and what he had hinted at in 1861. How he came 
to say what he did at Liverpool must ever remain a mystery ; 
but this is clear, that attributing to him all good faith, as Bright 
was willing to do, he had already changed his mind the follow- 
ing year, and it is to be regretted that the public were kept in 
ignorance for so long a time.^ 

Yet he was not quite fair to himself. In 1857 he had also 
said that it was difficult to apply the same rules of warfare to 
the sea as prevailed on land ; but now he was willing to admit 
the possibility, had suggested at Liverpool that they could be 
applied ; indeed he thought that, so far as it was in the power 
of the Government by arrangement with other Powers, they had 
accomplished it by the abolition of privateering. Therefore to 
that doctrine he still adhered ; but he rambled in his argument. 
He denied that the essential difference between sea and land 
warfare was that in the latter private property was respected, 
but that in the former it was seized. The only difference was 
really in favour of sea warfare, because at sea it was taken 
with more order and regularity, and was not declared to be 
prize until it had been adjudicated by a competent tribunal 
as a legal and proper capture. It was, however, a fact that at 
sea private property was taken by a different set of people, 
the privateers ; and now that they had been abolished, the 
desired assimilation had been effected ; the balance remained 
in favour of the sea. But this part of the speech was confused 
and anecdotal, and there are other signs in it that Bright's 
reference to his old backsliding at Liverpool had upset his 
equanimity ; he was betrayed into other blunders. 

He denied that the principle of immunity of private pro- 
perty at sea follows as a logical consequence from the accept- 
ance of " free ships free goods," because " the Declaration of 
Paris related entirely to the relations between belligerents 
and neutrals " ; and the immunity of private property doctrine 
" relates to the relation of belligerents to each other." 

The point will be more fully considered in the Second Part 
of this volume, but it must be indicated at once. It is obvious 
that if a number of Powers agree by a single Declaration (as 
distinct from a series of separate agreements) to accept and 

^ Mr Sheldon Amos, in Political and Legal Remedies for War, gives the 
occasion of Lord Pabnerston's recantation as the 3rd February 1860. I 
have been unable to trace any allusion to the subject on this date. 



168 The Declaration of Paris 

abide by the principle " free ships free goods," it must apply- 
as between themselves when any of them are belligerents — 
and then as between belligerent and belligerent : and the re- 
mainder are neutral — and then as between belligerent and 
neutral. 

The question whether the immunity of private property is 
a logical consequence from the maxim depends on the accuracy 
of John Bright's argument. I find it difficult to detect the 
flaw. 

Again, Lord Palmerston was wrong in saying that the 
identity of sea and land warfare was achieved by abolishing 
privateers, as his own illustrations of the excesses committed 
during land warfare showed ; and still more wrong in describing 
the privateers as not being a regularly organised force acting 
under the authority of a responsible Government. The com- 
plaints against the system were not that they acted without 
authority, but that they abused their authority, acting in 
excess of it. 

Finally, he was wrong in his assumption that " free ships 
free goods " was justified by the theory that a merchant ship 
at sea is part of the national territory, and that, therefore, the 
boarding of a neutral ship at sea was equivalent to an invasion 
of neutral territory. The " floating island " theory has long 
been exploded.^ He declared that we had maintained that 
theory in the affair of the Trent, even at risk of war ; but Earl 
Russell's despatch to Lord Lyons, of the 23rd January 1862,2 
did not give currency to a very inaccurate theory, but rested 
the British case entirely on the respect due to the national 
flag, another and perfectly distinct doctrine. Whether that 
doctrine is a sufficient justification for " free ships free goods " 
is another matter. It is the point round which the whole con- 
troversy between England and the neutral nations turns. 

Lord Palmerston's argument, therefore, was in reality a 
justification of the protest against the second principle of the 
Declaration of Paris. There can be little doubt that, but for 
his unfortunate speech at Liverpool, his real views, had he 
re-read his own despatch to Lord Clarendon of the 13th April 
1856, would have been more coherently stated. 

Then Disraeli rose and administered the coup de grace. He 
was too imbued with the history of England at its greatest to 
speak on such a subject without weighty reflection. But it was 
already past midnight ; and he must have felt that no amount 
of argument would achieve the recall of the Declaration of Paris. 

* See judgment of Lindley, L.J., in the Franconia case, L.R., 2 Ex. D., 
at p. 93. 2 State Papers, vol. Iv. p. 650. 



The Debate of 1862 169 

He therefore compressed his opinion into one short sentence : 
" We have given up the cardinal principle of our maritime 
code." The reason for the change in the views of the Govern- 
ment at the time of the Crimea from those acted on during the 
wars with France was patent : they feared that the assertion 
of our old principle might involve us in embarrassment with the 
United States. Had the night been younger we might have had 
from the past-master of sarcasm a comparison of the spirit of 
that day with that of old times when Chatham and, after 
Chatham, Chatham's son had faced the anger of the neutrals, 
and braved the threats of Armed Neutralities. 

As for Lord Palmerston and his Liverpool speech, it was 
clear, Disraeli remarked, that when peace was proclaimed he 
had gone down to the country to receive the congratulations 
of his friends and stimulate the spirit of the Party, which was 
none too pleased with the Treaty of Paris. Disraeli protested 
against the maritime law of England being made the sport of 
Party, and against introducing the plea of " second thoughts " 
into so great a subject. The Prime Minister had now proclaimed 
to be " political suicide " the adoption of the very doctrine 
which he had supported in that speech. His influence would 
be shattered ; and when, if ever, he again warned the country 
of the danger of any step contemplated by any Government, 
his words would fall on doubting ears, as those from the 
mouth of the man who had so often called " wolf " to the 
village when there was no wolf, that when the warning was 
needed it was ignored. 

Lord Palmerston's Liverpool speech was once more referred 
to on 6th February 1908 in a debate on Mr F. E. Smith's amend- 
ment to the Address, that " we humbly express our regret that 
Your Majesty's plenipotentiaries at The Hague Conference were 
not authorised to forward the reduction of international 
armaments by assenting to the principle of the immunity of 
enemy merchant vessels, other than carriers of contraband, 
in time of war." 

It is unnecessary to refer to the arguments which were used, 
as the war has raised the subject from the region of opinion 
into that of hard practical fact. The debate is interesting, 
however, as showing the vitality of the immunity of private 
property at sea doctrine. Sir Edward Grey drew attention to 
Lord Palmerston's recantation in 1862, and expressed the 
opinion that humanity had nothing to do with seizing enemy 
property on neutral ships. 



PART II 



COMMENTART 



THE MEANING AND EFFECT OF THE 
DECLARATION OF PARIS, 

To the story of the Declaration of Paris, as it has been told from 
forgotten despatches and the columns of Hansard, must now be 
added a study of its meaning and effect. Its provisions have 
by the greater number of writers been taken at their face value, 
but they are so very crudely stated, the discussions in the 
Congress of Paris were so loose and unscientific, that their 
value is very small. 

There is this much to be said for Catherine of Russia : having 
got a certain number of neutrals, and two of the belligerents, to 
accept her principles, she set her lawyers to work on a maritime 
code.^ The best principles in the world need accurate statement. 
One would have imagined that the ideas which the plenipo- 
tentiaries intended should govern the relations of belligerents 
and neutrals in future wars would have been handed over to the 
official draftsmen to reduce into a concrete and workman- 
like form. Even as principles intended as a guide to future 
legislation they leave much to be desired in the statement. 
As operative rules without such legislation, there is no good word 
to be found for them. Nor, taking them as a whole, can they 
lay any claim to be a code, for the point in greatest dispute 
is left untouched. There is no definition of the meaning of 
contraband of war. 

On the very threshold of our study as to what are the meaning 
and effect of the Declaration we are confronted with a question 
which no one seems to have been at pains to ask, then or since : 
Do the four formulas represent political principles, which the 
adherent Governments engaged to observe when they went to 
war ? or were they intended to be legal maxims for the guidance 
of the Prize Courts ? 

In this Second Part I propose to examine some of the ques- 
tions which arise in connection with the interpretation of the 
Declaration. 

1 A translation of this code is printed in vol i. of this series, The Docu- 
mentary History of the Armed Neutralities. 



173 



174 The Declaration of Paris 



The Nature of a Declaration : The Treaty-making 
Prerogative. 

First, then, what is a Declaration ? Treaties we know ; Con- 
ventions we think we know ; but Declarations ! Is it a term 
of deeper or shallower meaning ? Or is it one of that class of 
verbal changes which always mean the same thing ? 

Mr Oppenheim has thrown some light on the question. He 
says that the term " declaration " is used in three senses ; ^ but 
with one of them only we need concern ourselves — when it is 
used as " the title of a body of stipulations of a law-making 
treaty according to which the Parties engage themselves to 
pursue in future a certain line of conduct." ^ He considers that 
there is no essential difference between declarations and treaties, 
and that their binding force upon the contracting parties is the 
same by whatever name they are called. 

Continental jurists have busied themselves with the question, 
and have been at great pains to prove that the Declaration of 
Paris is a binding document. Some would seem to have endowed 
it with a very special force ; these Mr Oppenheim very effectively 
disposes of : ^ — 

The attempt to distinguish fundamentally between a 
Declaration and a Convention by maintaining that whereas 
a " Convention creates rules of particular International Law 
between the contracting States only, a Declaration contains 
the recognition, on the part of the best qualified and most 
interested Powers, of rules of universal International Law " 
does not stand the test of scientific criticism. 

This imaginary principle expresses no more than fear that 
England, having fallen into the pit which they digged for her, 
may possibly have some chance of getting out of it. But I 
would go much further than Mr Oppenheim ; the suggestion is 
merely fantastic, and quite unworthy that the test of scientific 
criticism should be applied to it. 

But while I agree that a declaration is not a higher sort of 
international document than a treaty, I cannot agree that there 
is no essential difference between them. We must assume from 
the fact of its use that the term does indicate a special form 

* International Law, vol. i. pp. 537, 552. ^ j^,^ p. 551. 



The Nature of a Declaration 175 

of agreement between States. This difference is indicated in 
Mr Oppenheim's definition that it is " a body of stipulations " 
(or, of course, " one stipulation ") " according to which the 
parties engage themselves to pursue in future a certain line of 
conduct." But this is incomplete as it stands, and I think 
the distinction is more accurately stated thus : A treaty or a 
convention is an agreement as to present or future conduct 
requiring no further action on the part of the High Contracting 
Parties to complete its effectiveness. A declaration is used 
when it is necessary to indicate that the agreement arrived at 
requires some further action to be taken to make it operative, 
either immediately or when occasion arises. Yet even this is not 
sufficiently explicit to convey a meaning clear of all ambiguity ; 
for some treaties require further action to make them operative, 
the most familiar instance being those dealing with extradition, 
which need an Order in Council to apply the Extradition Act, 
and so give them full effectiveness. 

An examination of the question seems to point to this con- 
clusion : that a declaration is used when the agreement is as 
to the acceptance of a principle which requires further action 
on the part of the High Contracting Parties to put it in force. 
The Declaration agreed to at the Congress of Vienna as to the 
abolition of the slave trade required further action on the part of 
the signatory Powers to put it in force in their own dominions, 
and may be taken as the classical example. The question is 
whether this precedent should not have been followed in the 
case of the Declaration of Paris. 

The Declaration of Paris was not submitted to Parliament. 
Ministers were loud in their protest that it was unnecessary, 
being entirely within the prerogative. This has led some 
foreign critics off the track of their knowledge of our institutions, 
supposing this virtue of exemption from parliamentary control 
to be peculiar to a " declaration." But this point is clear : 
that as a constitutional document a declaration does not differ 
from a treaty, and — a declaration by Parliament as such being 
as unimaginable as a treaty entered into by Parliament — falls 
within and is subject to all the rules which govern the treaty- 
making prerogative. 

Now, fn the common statement of the first rule we come 
across a very grievous misuse of words. It is said that the 
treaty-making prerogative is " absolute." What is meant is 
that it is " unfettered," subject only to the condition imposed 
in a constitutional monarchy, that the King acts on the advice 
of his responsible Ministers. There are no fetters, either as 
to range or extent of this prerogative ; but so far from being 



176 The Declaration of Paris 

" absolute " it is subject to one unshakeable rule, which, if 
infringed, will render the Bang's sign-manual of no effect ; the 
Courts, even of lowest degree, must disregard it. The rule is 
that no treaty can alter the law, for the law is above all treaties ; 
and the Courts above the King and his Ministers. Alteration 
of the law can only be accomplished by Parliament ; that is, by 
the King with the advice and consent of the Lords and Commons 
in Parliament assembled. 

Exception must be taken to Mr Oppenheim's term " law- 
making treaty " ; for while it is perfectly true that treaties are 
part of the law of the land, and, as was laid do\vn in R. v. Wilson,^ 
will be enforced by the Courts, this term is too wide in its scope ; 
and when applied to declarations assumes the very question 
which Lord Clarendon assumed, but which requires the closest 
study, whether the Declaration of Paris did effect what it pro- 
fessed to effect, a change in the maritime law enforced by English 
Prize Courts. 

This point, though elementary, is of such importance to the 
subject in hand that I summarise what I have said in my book 
on Extradition, as it contains the clue to the real position of 
the Declaration of Paris. 

It is fundamental that the making of treaties is part of the 
prerogative of the King. But there are two other principles 
equally fundamental : that the King cannot, in the exercise of 
any part of the prerogative, interfere with the rights of the 
subject ; nor can he interfere with or alter matters which have 
been dealt with by ParUament. 

The King requires no sanction to enable him to enter into 
a bilateral extradition treaty with a foreign Sovereign. But 
seeing that the surrender of a criminal, fugitive in England 
from a foreign State, involves his arrest, a deprivation of the 
fugitive's right to liberty in England, against whose laws he has 
committed no offence, the authority of Parliament is necessary 
in order to enable the King to carry out his treaty obligation. 
But in the case of a fugitive surrendered to England from a 
foreign country, the Extradition Act is silent ; the treaty 
prerogative here requires no reinforcement by parliamentary 
authority. The Act does not profess to decide in what cases 
the King may agree to receive fugitives surrendered under the 
treaty who have committed offences in England. They are 
brought here in virtue of the treaty, they are tried here in 
virtue of the law. 

This very plain principle must be applied to the Declaration. 



1 L.R. 3, Q.B.D. 42. 



The Nature of a Declaration 177 

The complaint that Parliament was not consulted contained 
something more than a protest that it was an affront not to 
consult it on so important a matter. The constitutional question 
involved in the treaty-making prerogative was in issue. 

This prerogative has suffered grievously at the hands of 
Ministers. In 1890 the question was deliberately threshed out 
in Parhament in the debate on the Act authorising the cession 
of Heligoland to Germany, and all the light and learning then 
available was brought to bear on its solution : with no better 
conclusion than that in regard to cessions of territory the 
precedents showed it to be in a nebulous condition. And yet, 
seeing that a cession must affect the people's rights in the 
territory ceded, it was as simple an example of the funda- 
mental principle as could well be imagined. Mr Gladstone did 
not carry matters any further by declaring that he would " wash 
his hands " of the whole matter, and by taking no further part 
in the debate. He approved the policy of the Conservative 
Government, which he might vigorously have attacked, but 
challenged their action in bringing the matter before the House. 
Though he enjoyed the reputation of being a past-master of 
constitutional lore, he enunciated the false doctrine that the 
treaty-making prerogative is absolutely and in all cases beyond 
the cognisance of Parliament. 

Lord Clarendon, when his action was challenged in the House 
of Lords very soon after the Congress of Paris, took the same 
line ; and Lord Campbell, Lord Chief Justice of England, wrote 
a letter, which was read to the Lords, declaring that the Govern- 
ment action was right. There was at the time a vigorous out- 
cry against the Government in certain quarters ; and even now 
the criticism is still heard among those who disbelieve in the 
merits of the Declaration, that it is inoperative because it 
was not submitted to Parliament. For the moment I am not 
prepared to say that the Government were not within their 
rights. No opinion can be given without a more minute ex- 
amination of the questions involved in the inquiry whether 
the constitutional forms required by the law to accomplish 
the terms of the Declaration were complied with ; or, putting 
it another way, whether the Declaration is in itself an effective 
document ? 

The point involved may be illustrated, and more completely 
understood, by briefly considering the annexe to the protocols 
of the Congress of Vienna dealing with the abolition of the 
slave trade, which was also in the form of a Declaration. 

The plenipotentiaries, duly authorised thereto, declared in 
the face of Europe the universal abolition of the trade to be 

12 



178 The Declaration of Paris 

" une mesure particulierement digne de leur attention, conforme 
a I'esprit du siecle, et aux principes gen^reux de leurs Augustes 
Souverains," and proclaimed " le voeu de mettre un terme a 
un fleau qui a si longtemps desole I'Afrique, degrade I'Europe, 
et afflige I'humanite." They declared that they were " animes 
du desir sincere de concourir a 1 'execution la plus prompte et 
la plus efficace de cette mesure, par tous les moyens a leur dis- 
position, et d'agir dans I'emploi de ces moyens avec toute la 
persistance qu'ils doivent a une aussi grande et belle Cause." ^ 
But they recognised that no more could be done than that each 
signatory Power would engage to take, so soon as it might be 
convenient, all steps necessary to abolish the trade within 
its dominions — the further steps necessary to make that 
Declaration effective. 

So far as England is concerned, even though the King should, 
in virtue of his prerogative, conclude treaties, or make declara- 
tions, with intent to abolish the slave or any other trade, yet 
they would remain abstractions unless and until Parliament 
passed the necessary legislation to give effect to them, for the 
simple reason that rights of individuals in the trade would be 
affected. 

The abolition of the slave trade was a far more complicated 
business than the alteration of the maritime law, the rights in- 
volved more clearly apparent, the owners of them more vocable. 
But that does not excuse Ministers for the reticence they ex- 
hibited in not explaining the grounds of their opinion. The 
ipse dixit of the Lord Chief Justice was insufficient in so grave 
a matter. The customary reference to the Law Officers' opinions 
was omitted, though presumably they had been consulted. The 
question was a diflficult one, and hinges on the negative spirit 
which pervades the Declaration of Paris, expressive of the great 
negative, at last achieved, that England would no longer act in 
war as she had been used to do ; and while the necessity for 
Parliamentary action is obvious where the King's engagement 
is positive — to act ; it may well be not quite so obvious where 
the engagement is negative — not to act. Yet the same rule 
holds, that the law cannot be altered by the King. If the law 
in any circumstances requires action, then no engagement of 
the Kjng can effectively agree to inaction. So in the case of a 
principle which the Courts enforce, no engagement of the King 
can compel them to refrain from enforcing it. 

^ De Martens, Nouveau Becueil, ii. p. 432. 



Principles of the Declaration Examined 179 



II 

The Constitutional Aspect of the Principles of the 
Declaration Examined. 

We must now examine the four principles of the Declaration 
in order to see whether, in accordance with the rule just dis- 
cussed, they ought to have been submitted to Parliament. 

As to principle 1 — that " privateering is and remains 
abolished." The grant of letters of marque to privateers de- 
pends solely on the King's prerogative of granting commissions. 
The principle means, therefore, that the plenipotentiaries duly 
authorised undertook on behalf of the Queen and her successors 
never again to issue these commissions. This matter then 
rests entirely on the prerogative ; the law was not involved, 
the rights of the individual were not affected, and therefore 
parliamentary concurrence was unnecessary. 

As to principle 4 — ^that " blockades, in order to be legally 
binding, must be effective." 

The form in which the principle is stated suggests that it 
was intended as a direction to the Prize Court not to recognise 
blockades unless they are " effective." The principle implies 
that ineffective blockades had been resorted to in the past, 
and that the practice was now to cease. But the declaration of 
blockade is an act of war ; it is a " high act of sovereignty." ^ 
The principle, therefore, also implies a submission of this act 
to a judicial test of effectiveness. 

But in point of fact it did little more than state a rule 
which everybody admitted — ^that what are known as " paper 
blockades " will not be recognised. The actual words used 
and what underlay them will be considered in the next chapter. 
But whatever may have been the intention of the Congress, 
no change in the law having been effected in fact, the consti- 
tutional principle does not arise. 

As to principle 3 — that " neutral goods, with the exception 
of contraband of war, are not liable to capture under enemy's 
flag." 

This principle affected France more than England. " Enemy 
ships enemy goods " did not form part of English general 
maritime law, though she had agreed to it in some treaties. 
The Courts, whether of Common Law or of Prize, would recognise 
these treaties, which were expressly preserved by one of the 
subsidiary conditions attached to the Declaration. The principle 

1 Sir W. Scott in the HenricJc and Maria, 1 C. Rob , 146. 



180 The Declaration of Paris 

amounted to an undertaking that Parhament would never, 
without the consent of all the adherent Powers, alter this law — 
an undertaking contrary to the law and custom of Parliament. 

In view of the further subsidiary condition that no treaties 
should be entered into in future which were not based on the 
four principles, there was a further undertaking that the Queen 
and her successors would comply with this condition. This 
undertaking would not require Parliamentary sanction. 

As to principle 2 — that " the neutral flag covers enemy's 
goods with the exception of contraband of war." 

Lord Derby's criticism of this principle (in the debate of 
1856) was that it was " dogmatic and dictatorial." Another 
verbal criticism is that by the use of the word " covers " it 
asserted what was not a fact with regard to English maritime 
law. But " covers " meant " shall in future cover " so far as 
England was concerned. Indeed, Lord Clarendon probably 
meant it to imply " ought in the past to have covered " ! 

This is the only one of the four principles as to which a doubt 
on the constitutional question arises ; and there are three inde- 
pendent lines of argument by which the Government might have 
justified the refusal to submit the second principle to the 
approval of Parliament. 

First : it is in the power of the Executive to modify or 
abandon the exercise of a belligerent right, whether the right 
be seizing enemy goods on neutral ships, or blockading enemy 
ports. 

Therefore this principle may be construed as an under- 
taking by the plenipotentiaries on behalf of the Queen and 
her successors to do at the commencement of every war what 
had been done in 1854 — issue an Order in Council^ abandon- 
ing the right. From this point of view, the acceptance of the 
principle would be within the prerogative. 

Or secondly : the King is a party to all proceedings in prize. 
Prize accrues to the King in his office of Admiralty. No one has 
a right to prize ; it is awarded by the Court to the captors as 
Royal bounty, 2 in accordance with the terms of a Proclamation 

1 Document No. 9 (8). 

2 " The King in his office of Admiralty is . . . the fountain of all prize . . . 
the King holds the office of Lord High Admiral in a capacity distingmshable 
from his regal character." — (Sir William Scott in the Mercurius, 1 C. 
Rob., 80.) 

This was subsequently amplified in the Elsabe (4 C. Rob., 408) : — 
" It is admitted on the part of the captors that their claim rests wholly 
on the Order of Council, the Proclamation, and the Prize Act. It is not 
(as it cannot be) denied that, independent of those instruments, the whole 
subject-matter is in the hands of the Crown, as well in point of interest 
as in point of authority. Prize is altogether a creature of the Crown. No 



Principles of the Declaration Examined 181 

issued at the commencement of each war. The adoption of 
" free ships free goods " as a permanent principle may be con- 
strued, therefore, to mean a perpetual modification voluntarily 
made by the Crown of its rights of prize. It is a waiver of a 
claim to prize in respect of a certain category of goods which 
the Crown would otherwise have been entitled to make good. 

Prize, whether taken by ships in regular commission or 
under letters of marque, thus lying in grant from the King, 
the adoption of a principle which limits the amount of prize 
money, or the cases in which prizes may be taken and so prize 
money acquired, cannot prejudice any right in the grantees, 
but merely limits the grant. Therefore, from this point of view 
also the acceptance of the principle was within the prerogative, 
and no parliamentary sanction was necessary. 

Or thirdly : assuming the constitutional principle to be, 
stated broadly, that the prerogative cannot alter the law of 
England, the argument would take this form — " Maritime law " 
depends on the Law of Nations ; the Prize Courts enforce this 
law, with which Parliament has nothing to do. The " maritime 
law of England " is an inaccurate expression. If this is a sound 
view — and there is authority for it, more especially in the 
Zamora judgment ^ — ^then the Government would have been 
justified in saying that the adoption of the 2nd principle lay 
beyond the control of Parliament. 

Thus, with regard to three of the principles the Government 
were on the right side of constitutional law, and certainly had 
two sound arguments to support them in regard to the other. 
Yet the fact remained that an alteration was effected in the 
law of prize administered by the English Courts, of Common 
Law as well as of Prize. The question how far such an alteration 
is withdrawn from the general rule that Parliament alone can 
alter the law must be postponed for the present. It must be 

man has, or can have, any interest but what he takes as the mere gift of 
the Crown. Beyond the extent of that gift he has nothing. This is the 
principle of law on the subject, and founded on the wisest reasons. The 
right of making war and peace is excliisively in the Crown. The acquisi- 
tions of war belong to the Crown ; and the disposal of these acquisitions 
may be of the utmost importance for the purpose both of war and peace. . . . 

" The Proclamation gives the whole property, but not till after adjudica- 
tion ; until that time, no beneficial interest attaches. So the Prize Act 
in hke terms gives the whole interest or property in opposition to that 
proportional and partial interest given by former Acts, but not till ad- 
judication. In adverting to these instnxments, it is impossible not to 
remark the very guarded terms in which the benefit is conferred. The 
Proclamation gives to privateers ' after final adjudication, and not before ' ; 
not merely after adjudication, but superadding a negative pregnant, ' and 
not before.' " 

^ Lloyd's Prize Cases, iv. p. 62. 



182 The Declaration of Paris 

confessed, however, that the alternative, that such a change 
should be left entirely to the discretion of the Ministers of the 
day, is curious and dangerous. It certainly stretches the 
doctrine that Parliament has no control over war except the 
furnishing or withholding supplies to its extreme limit. 

But putting technicalities on one side, there is the best of 
all reasons why such an alteration should be submitted to 
Parliament : it is a question in which the people of England 
are deeply concerned. And there was a precedent. The 
treaty with France of 1786 was brought before both Houses 
by motion ; Pitt himself moved in the Commons.^ In the 
Lords, Lord Lansdowne approved the procedure because " it 
has been an ancient custom of advising the Crown in matters 
of commerce." ^ 

As a matter of fact, that treaty contained an article recognis- 
ing " free ships free goods " as between the two countries. He 
expressed his concern at its introduction, and his hope that 
this principle would never again be introduced into any treaty 
without Parliament being consulted.^ 

It may be true that, in regard to maritime law, no such 
ancient custom of advising the Crown exists ; but assuredly the 
concern of the people in it is as great as in their commercial 
relations with foreign countries. " Need not " is not always 
a sufficient justification for " will not." Unfortunately in 1856 
it fitted in too well with the desire for secrecy. 

The most curious point remains. It is more than doubtful 
whether aU the talk about constitutional doctrine represented 
the actual opinion of the Government. The Declaration of 
Paris, at least in regard to the principle " free ships free goods," 
stood constitutionally on precisely the same plane as the 
Declaration to the neutrals in 1854, in which that principle had 
been first adopted. Great pains then were taken to decide what 
was the proper course to pursue in regard to so novel a docu- 
ment. Lord John Russell said that, when the policy had been 
decided on, there would probably be an Order in Council or 
a Declaration, and that the Government were not quite sure 
whether a Bill might not also be necessary. This was decided 
in the negative ; but the Declaration was followed by an Order 
in Council — 15th April 1854 — " in furtherance " of the Declara- 
tion. What was true of one was true of the other, when the 
need arose. The constitutional question had therefore been 
decided, but in a manner very different from that stated by 
Lord Clarendon. The view of the Law Officers apparently was 

^ Hansard's Parliamentary History, vol. xxvi. pp. 346, 381. 
2 Ih., p. 554. 3 jft.^ p. 577. 



The Form in which the Principles are Stated 183 

that such a Declaration need not be submitted to Parliament ; 
but that it was not in itself an operative document, and, in order 
to fulfil the Queen's obligations under it, an Order in Council 
would be necessary to put it in force whenever England went 
to war. The course adopted in 1854 was also followed in March 
1860, when an Order in Council was issued " relative to the 
observance of the Rules of maritime war under the Declaration 
of Paris," in the event of war by France and Great Britain 
against China. ^ 

The solution of the constitutional question naturally varies 
in each country according to the provisions of its constitution. 
The Declaration was promulgated in France, ^ and also, as we 
have seen, in the Argentine Republic, Switzerland, and Prussia. 



Ill 

The Form in which the Principles are Stated. 

If the constitutional question was dealt with clumsily, the 
drafting of the principles was still worse. With regard to the 
1st principle, the declaration that " privateering is and remains 
abolished," though untrue as long as there were any dissenting 
Powers, may pass as a convenient formula to indicate the 
undertaking of the adherent Powers that they would never 
issue commissions to privateers. Yet even then, it is by no 
means clear that there is not a reservation in favour of resorting 
to them in the event of a war with a non-adherent Power. 

The 2nd — that " the neutral flag covers enemy's goods with 
the exception of contraband of war " — is incomplete even as a 
statement of principle. Just as it was necessary to declare 
that " free ships " could not make contraband of war " free," 
so it was necessary to declare that they did not make any 
goods " free " when they were on board a ship condemned for 
running a blockade. 

Further, in the case of an embargo, " free ships " have no 
privileges at aU in respect of any goods on board, and neutral 
owners of cargo may suffer great loss from the delay occasioned 
by enforced detention in port. The order for an " embargo 
or stop " to prevent vessels clearing out of our ports for enemy 
ports specially refers to and includes " all persons and effects " 
on board such vessels. These omissions bear witness to the 

1 Document No. 25. ^ Document No. 18. 



184 The Declaration of Paris 

unnecessary haste with which the principles were sketched out. 
It is the more surprising in the case of embargo, because special 
emphasis is always laid by the neutral on the delay occasioned 
by visit at sea, even if it is not followed by search. The delay 
caused by an embargo must be ten times as great. 

Similar criticism is applicable to the 3rd principle — that 
" neutral goods, with the exception of contraband of war, are 
not liable to capture under enemy's flag." An enemy's ship 
caught running blockade is condemned because she is enemy 
property. ' Neutral goods on board are condemned because 
they are on board a ship running blockade. It was not intended 
to give to the enemy flag the privilege of " covering " neutral 
goods in such circumstances ; the principle is, therefore, in- 
accurately stated. 

The main defect of the statement of both the 2nd and 3rd 
principles, however, is that the question, What is contraband of 
war ? is left in the air. 

The settlement of a list of contraband goods was of course 
impossible at the closing meetings of a long Conference. The 
idea of a list — or rather three lists — of " absolute contraband," 
" conditional contraband," and " free " or non-contraband goods, 
prevailed till the present war. It was presumably intended to 
preserve this classification in 1856 ; and as the plenipotentiaries 
were not the persons best suited to frame such lists, their ulti- 
mate settlement should have been left to experts to be thereafter 
designated, as was done at Upsal in 1654. 

From the point of view of other nations it was a dangerous 
omission ; for it left open, and therefore England free to insist 
on, the opposite principle that a belligerent has a right to pro- 
claim his own list of contraband, and to add to it as necessity 
arises, a necessity of which he is, and must be, the sole judge. 

It could not have been assumed that there was any agree- 
ment on the subject unless the Armed Neutralities had been for- 
gotten. The countries of the League contended that a list of 
contraband contained in a treaty between two Powers could be 
extended arbitrarily to a third Power not a party to it, could 
even be made applicable, at the will of one of the signatory 
Powers, to a Power with which there was no treaty dealing 
with the subject. 

This is not the place to consider the subject of contraband 
at any length ; but the question of " contraband by treaty " 
is sufficiently clear to warrant this brief statement, which is 
based on historical fact. The commercial relations between two 
countries may be such that when they are settling questions 
likely to arise in the event of one of them being at war, the 



The Form in which the Principles are Stated 185 

other remaining neutral, some questions may be dealt with 
specially in such a way as to reduce friction in the circumstances 
and preserve friendly relations. Contraband is such a question. 
It must always be the desire of a country likely to remain 
neutral in war to protect the trade in its staple industry. If 
the country with which a commercial treaty is in process of 
negotiation considers that, with due regard to its own safety, 
it can exempt the produce of that industry from the goods 
which it will seize on their way from that country to the enemy, 
it may well do so, taking care to obtain a quid pro quo. But 
this affords no reason why such goods going from another 
neutral country to the enemy should also be exempted. This 
is the simple inference to be drawn from the explanatory con- 
vention of 4th July 1780 between Great Britain and Denmark.^ 
Both the 2nd and 3rd principles are, therefore, ineffective. 

Even the cardinal principle of contraband, that goods 
are only liable to be seized as such when they have an enemy 
destination, was omitted. It is common knowledge that this is 
fundamental to the idea of contraband, but a very considerable 
difficulty has always existed in determining what is " enemy 
destination." It is true that it became acute in respect of 
broken voyages during the Civil War in 1865 over the Nassau 
and the Matamoros cases, ^ when what was looked upon, and 
is even now called, the American extension of the doctrine 
was adopted. But the controversy dates back to the cases of 
the Essex and the William,^ in 1805, and the lawyers were 
perfectly familiar with it. 

What, then, was the effect of the new declaration that " free 
ships make free goods " on the doctrine of " continuous voyage" ? 
Apparently no one was at pains to inquire. It certainly is very 
difficult to answer the question. There seem to have been 
only two alternatives : either that the doctrine of " continuous 
voyage " should also be left in the air, the understanding being 
that the new maxim would be interpreted subject to that 
doctrine by the countries then for the first time adopting it ; 
or, seeing that the maxim could not annihilate the doctrine 
altogether, that any extension of the maxim beyond the cases 
of the most palpable use of a neutral country for transport 
of contraband to the enemy was assumed to be impossible. 
I do not pretend to unravel the problem ; my object is only 
to show at what a loose end the Declaration of Paris, hailed 

1 De Martens, Recueil, ii. 102 ; (2nd ed.) iii. 177. 

2 See Moixntague Bernard's History of the Neutrality of Cheat Britain 
in the American Civil War, pp. 299 et seq. 

35 c. Rob., 385. 



186 The Declaration of Paris 

with such profound joy by the neutrals as putting an end to 
what they had to endure from England, left some of the most 
important details of the principles it enunciated. 

The absence of accurate draftsmanship is specially noticeable 
in the statement of the 4th principle, that " blockades, in 
order to be legally binding, must be effective, that is to say, 
maintained by a force sufficient really to prevent access to 
the coast of the enemy." It states nothing more than what 
was in normal circumstances considered to be the law, without 
explaining the meaning of the term " effective," nor what was 
the proper method of preventing access to the enemy's coast, 
which had always given rise to disputes. This serious criticism 
was forcibly put forward by the United States Government 
in the Second Marcy Note.^ 

The fourth principle . . . can hardly be regarded as 
one falling within that class with which it was the object 
of the Congress to interfere ; for this rule has not, for a 
long time, been regarded as uncertain, or the cause of any 
" deplorable disputes." If there have been any disputes 
in regard to blockades, the uncertainty was about the 
facts but not the law. Those nations which have resorted 
to what are properly denominated " paper blockades " 
have rarely, if ever, undertaken afterwards to justify their 
conduct upon principle, but have generally admitted the 
illegality of the practice, and indemnified the injured parties. 
What is to be judged " a force sufficient really to prevent 
access to the coast of the enemy," has often been a severely- 
contested question ; and certainly the Declaration, which 
merely reiterates a general undisputed maxim of maritime 
law, does nothing towards relieving the subject of blockade 
from that embarrassment. What force is requisite to con- 
stitute an effective blockade remains as unsettled and as 
questionable as it was before the Congress at Paris adopted 
the Declaration. 

The real question in dispute was whether the English prin- 
ciple of blockade fulfilled the condition of effectiveness. That 
principle was stated by Pitt in his speech of the 25th March 
1801 : " Ports ought to be considered in a state of blockade 
when it is unsafe for vessels to enter them, though the ports 
are not actually blocked up." ^ This was the principle accepted 
in the treaty with Russia in 1801 ^ : " Que, pour determiner 
ce qui caracterise un port bloque, on n'accorde cette denomi- 

^ Document No. 21. 

2 Hansard's Parliamentary History, vol. xxxv. col. 1127. 

3 De Martens, Sup., ii. 476 ; (2nd ed.) R. 2, vii. 260. 



The Form in which the Principles are Stated 187 

nation qu'a celui oil il y a, par la disposition de la puissance qui 
I'attaque avec des vaisseaux arretes ou suffisamment proches, 
un danger evident d'entrer." 

Assuming the question of " paper blockades " to have been 
actually under discussion, the 4th principle may certainly 
be said to have settled it. But although the absence of all 
record leaves us in the dark as to what was discussed, there is 
little doubt that the principle was directed against the English 
doctrine that blockades could be established bycruisersquadrons, 
and that Lord Clarendon intended to throw over Pitt's principle 
and the definition of the Russian treaty. 

Sir William Harcourt in the Letter of Historicus, which 
deals with the Law and Practice of Blockade, pointed out 
the difference between this definition and the doctrine which 
the Armed Neutrality sought to establish. The blockading 
vessels were to be " arretes et suffisamment proches " ; in the 
Russian treaty they were to be " arretes ou suffisamment 
proches." 

The principle as drafted did not settle our difference of 
opinion with the continental jurists. The Courts could, there- 
fore, still follow the precedents of the French wars in judging 
the effectiveness of our blockades. 

The same remark applies to blockades of other nations, 
which in insurance cases may come before the ordinary Courts. 
So long as no new interpretation was given to the legal mean- 
ing of an " effective " blockade, the Common Law Courts would 
still follow the precedents of the Prize Court. 

An even more serious defect in the statement of the principle 
was the application to blockade of the expression " legally 
binding." The misuse of criminal law terms is characteristic 
of every branch of the law applicable to belligerent and neutral 
merchant. If the declaration of an " effective blockade " were 
in itself effective ; if it did in reality, and not in pretence, create 
an " offence " for the commission of which there were a real 
penalty of seizure, then the term would have some meaning. 
But as " the law " stands, it is just as if robbery were punish- 
able only if the offender be caught in the act. The adventurous 
skipper may snap his fingers at the biggest squadron of cruisers 
if he can get through ; and in a gale of wind the rules of 
" effectiveness " invite him to make the attempt, by allowing 
the cruisers to draw off, while the blockade still remains techni- 
cally " effective." What we call " the law of blockade " is a 
mere tangle of words. It is not even, as it ought to be, based 
on the principle " catch as catch can," for it is fettered with 
this provision, that even though you catch you may only keep 



188 The Declaration of Paris 

if, in the opinion of a committee of experts, you could catch 
other ships should they give you the chance of trying. 

If the words " legally binding " mean anything it must be 
this — that a declaration of blockade is a prohibition to neutral 
ships to pass that way to the relief of the enemy, disobedience 
being visited with the penalty of condemnation as for a real 
" offence." But were that so, then, if the ship were found in 
harbour when the port falls into the hands of the belligerents, 
she would still be liable to condemnation — but she is not. 
Success purges the " offence," and once in port at anchor, the 
risk of seizure is over. Or again, breach of blockade may be 
by getting out as well as by getting in. According to the 
English view of the law, the risk of seizure continues till the end 
of the outward voyage. If it were an " offence," and not a mere 
risk of getting caught, then the vessel would be liable to be 
captured on her next voyage. But it is clear that when the 
voyage is over " limitation " has set in. 

That these and many other peculiarities in the " law " are 
capable of satisfactory explanation is another matter ; but the 
discussion of it must be postponed for the present. The point 
emphasised now is that, granting it was advisable to proclaim 
the principle, and accepting Lord Clarendon's view that it was 
politically necessary to abandon Pitt's views of blockade, some 
attempt should have been made soon afterwards to turn the 
principle into agreed and coherent rules. But this important 
work was not attempted till the Congress of London sat in 1908 ; 
and no greater condemnation could have been pronounced on 
the inchoateness of the principle laid down by the Declaration 
of Paris than the statement in Sir Edward Grey's invitation 
to the Powers, that " the discussions which took place at The 
Hague during the recent Conference showed that on various 
questions connected with maritime war divergent views and 
practices prevailed among the nations of the world." ^ This 
was specially applicable to blockade, for the principles acted 
on by England and other countries in regard to it were widely 
divergent. 

^ Correspondence respecting the International Naval Conference in 
London, 1908-9 ; Misc. No. 61 (1909). 



The Effect of War on Treaties 189 



IV 

The Effect of War on Treaties, and especially on this 

Declaration. 

As a general proposition it is undisputed that treaties come 
to an end when war breaks out between the nations which have 
made them. The question was raised very inadvisedly in con- 
nection with the Declaration of Paris, in the debate of 1862, by 
Sir George Cornewall Lewis, Secretary of State for War, who 
seems to have asserted that it would not remain in force if war 
broke out between any two of the signatory Powers. " By 
international law," he said, 

you may make a valid engagement with respect to the 
principle that the neutral flag covers enemy's goods ; but 
when you go to war with a nation, war puts an end to 
all treaties and engagements in the nature of a treaty. If 
we had a treaty with the United States recognising the 
principle that belligerents were to recognise one another's 
mercantile marine, the very act of war would have put an 
end to that treaty. 

As to the Declaration of Paris, I deny that it must be 
binding in the event of war. It is binding in respect of 
neutrals in time of war. No doubt we are bound in respect 
of France or Russia if we are at war with the United States ; 
but it is an absurdity to suppose that if we were at war 
with France or Russia, it would have any binding effect 
upon us, except in regard to our honour. All I say is, it 
is not binding by international law. 

This very obscure statement naturally aroused great indigna- 
tion. Sir Stafford Northcote objected to a Minister of the Crown 
using such language. He cited Kent as an authority for the 
principle that treaties which are made in anticipation of war 
remain binding during hostilities. 

As a general rule, the obligations of treaties are dissi- 
pated by hostilities ; but if a treaty contains any stipula- 
tions which contemplate a future state of war and make 
provision for such an exigency, those stipulations preserve 
their force and obligation when the rupture takes place. 
The obligation of keeping faith is so far from ceasing in 
time of war that its efficacy becomes increased, from the 
increased necessity for it.^ 

^ International Law, Abdy's ed., p. 393. 



190 The Declaration of Paris 

He also mentioned familiar cases in which this principle 
must be true ; as where the time for belligerent subjects to quit 
the country, or questions as to exchange of prisoners of war, 
have been agreed to. Clearly war could not put an end to such 
provisions. 

John Bright also cited authorities to uphold the morality 
of nations and the faith of treaties. From Wheaton — 

There might be treaties of such a nature as to their 
object and import as that war would necessarily put an 
end to them ; but where treaties contemplate a permanent 
arrangement of territory, or other national rights, or in 
their terms were meant to provide for the event of an in- 
tervening war, it would be against every principle of just 
interpretation to hold them extinguished by war.^ 

And from Sir Robert Phillimore — 

The general maxim that war abrogates treaties be- 
tween belligerents must manifestly be subject to limitation 
in one case — namely, in the case of treaties which expressly 
provide for the contingency of the breaking out of war 
between the contracting parties.^ 

It may be unscientific, but it certainly has a moral weight 
of some practical value, when we say that to violate a treaty is 
a breach of the Law of Nations, in spite of the absence of some 
higher compelling force, something in the shape of a sanction. 
The international " law " as to the observance of treaties can 
be put on no more secure ground than that nations are expected 
to carry out their engagements in the same way as individuals are 
by law compelled to carry out theirs. The breach of a treaty 
engagement may lead to a rupture with the other contracting 
party, and rupture to war, if that other can put sufficient forces 
in the field, or ships upon the sea ; other States will not interfere 
unless they too are parties to the engagement. It is no concern 
of theirs ; but they will obviously be chary of entering into 
agreements with a State which has once made default in observ- 
ing its treaties.^ 

^ International Law (Dana's edition), pp. 352, 363 n. 

^ International Law, iii. p. 662. 

3 The meaning of this paragraph may be illustrated by the case of 
Belgium. Germany's invasion in breach of her guarantee of Belgium's 
neutraUty has generally been spoken of as a "breach of international law," 
as if the observance of a treaty were the subject of a rule like any other 
governing the intercourse of nations. But when we say that the violation 
of a treaty obligation is a breach of the Law of Nations, we mean to imply 
that that law in dealing with nations is based on the same principle as 
the law which deals with individuals, and that one of those principles is 
that it is wrong to break an obligation. 



The Effect of War on Treaties 191 

War does, as a fact, destroy all relations between the belli- 
gerents ; obviously, therefore, any agreements on which their 
relations rest must cease to exist on the outbreak of hostilities, 
do require renovation on their cessation.^ But seeing that the 
obligation to observe treaties can be put no higher than that it 
rests on the national honour (which, however, the majority of 
States deem the highest ground), it is clear that the case of 
those treaties which profess to regulate the conduct of the con- 
tracting States in the event of their falling out — " ce qu'a Dieu 
ne plaise " — is summed up accurately by Kent, if we attribute 
to the word " obligation " its exact international meaning, 
when he says : " The obligation of keeping faith is so far from 
ceasing in time of war, that its efficacy becomes increased, from 
the increased necessity for it." 

If one State agrees with another State that in the event of 
war between them certain things shall not happen (as that 
their traders shall not be disturbed in their business for a 
certain period), it is a mere chaos of thought to say that when 
war does break out those things may happen, and, in that 
instance, the traders be disturbed. 

It is the necessity for an honourable fulfilment of obligations 
as to conduct in war, increased tenfold by the fact of obligations 
undertaken mutually by many States, which is the only sanction 
for Hague Conventions. 

Anything more injudicious can hardly be imagined than for 
Sir George Cornewall Lewis, in the course of a highly contentious 
debate as to whether the Government had been wise to adopt 
a maxim limiting belligerent action, to suggest vaguely that 
in the event of war the maxim would cease to bind us. Even 
if it were true it was quite unnecessary, and inevitably led some 
speakers into a side-track, confusing an already sufficiently 
confused issue.^ 

^ For an illustration, see " Declarations d'adh^sion des Etats allemands 
a la remise en vigueur des Trait^s ant^rieurs a la Guerre," January-February 
1872 {State Papers, vol. Ixii. p. 834). 

* The idea that war abrogates all treaties, including those made in 
direct contemplation of war, has at times been really considered as 
dangerous. It is specially referred to, and steps taken to counteract it, 
in the treaty of 1871 between Italy and the United States {State Papers, 
vol. Ixi. p. 88). 

By Art. XXI. provision is made, inter alia, that in case of war between 
the High Contracting Parties (which may God avert), six months is to be 
allowed for subjects to retiim to their own country : " And it is declared 
that neither the pretence that war dissolves treaties, nor any other what- 
ever, shall be considered as annulling or suspending this article ; but, on 
the contrary, that the state of war is precisely that for which it is provided, 
and during which its provisions are to be sacredly observed as the most 
acknowledged obligations in the law of nations." 



192 The Declaration of Paris 

Sir George was reputed to be the " precisest of reasoners 
and the most logical of men " ; but in answer to Mr Thomas 
Baring's criticism, he found no other explanation of his cryptic 
saying than the following : — 

This is so important a point that I should be sorry 
if any misunderstanding arose. What I meant to say, 
and what I believe I did say, was this : that I conceived 
the Declaration of Paris to be binding as between this 
country and neutrals during the existence of war, and to 
be equally binding with a treaty, though it was only a 
Declaration ; but that if we were at war with any of the 
parties to that Declaration, then, like other treaties, it 
would cease to have a binding effect as regards the 
belligerent. 

If words, carefully collated with the best authorities, could by any 
possible means avoid a pernicioTis doctrine without getting involved in it 
themselves, this article shoiild have achieved it. But if all treaties, even 
those which contemplate a state of war and make provision for it, are 
annihilated by war, then this treaty would equally suffer that fate. 

The curious point about this treaty is that this provision is not intro- 
duced into the other articles which contemplate a state of war arising 
between the two countries, and it might be contended, on the principle 
indtisio uniiis exclusio altering, that the other provisions had been left 
to their fate when war should arise. 

Thus by Art. XII. the High Contracting Parties agree " that, in the 
unfortunate event of war between them, the private property of their 
respective citizens and subjects, with the exception of contraband of 
war, shall be exempt from capture or seizure, on the high seas or else- 
where, by the armed vessels or by the military forces of either party," 
but no reference is made to " the pretence that war dissolves treaties " ; 
nor is it mentioned in Art. XIII., which defines what " ought to constitute 
a legal blockade." 

If, however. Sir George Cornewall Lewis did not mean to assert the 
doctrine broadly, that war does dissolve all treaties, but meant some- 
thing quite different which he tried to explain, then it really was hardly 
worth while to try to avoid an imaginary doctrine by such an artificial 
set of words. 

In connection with this treaty it is interesting, in reference to what 
I have said in the text as to the doubtful meaning of " adoption " of this 
maxim, to turn to Art. XVI., in which the contracting countries accepted 
it. There is this proviso : — 

" Provided that the stipulations declaring that the flag shall cover the 
property shall be understood as applying to those Powers only who recognise 
this principle ; but if either party shall be at war with a third, and the 
other neutral, the flag of the neutral shall cover the property of enemies 
whose Governments acknowledge this principle, and not of others." 

What this means I do not know. Does it apply only to Governments 
which recognise the principle generally as part of their system of mari- 
time law, or does it include those who have included it in their treaties 
with some countries but not with others ? And to which form of " recog- 
nition " does it relate ? To the reciprocal engagement when the parties 
are at war with one another ; or to the more usual form, when one of the 
parties is at war and the other is neutral ? 



The Effect of War on Treaties 198 

This does not clear up what he had said in his speech : "If 
we had a treaty with the United States recognising the principle 
that being belligerents we were to recognise one another's 
mercantile marine, the very act of war would put an end to 
that treaty." 

He was referring to the principle, much advocated during 
the debate, of immunity of private property at sea, and what 
he said was that, if, accepting this principle, we entered into a 
treaty with the United States, in the event of war private 
property at sea would cease to be immune. I am under the im- 
pression that he was endeavouring to understand and explain 
Lord Palmerston's statement that " free ships make free 
goods " deals entirely with the relations between belligerents 
and neutrals, and that the relations of belligerents with one 
another are only affected by the " immunity of private pro- 
perty " principle. But having asserted that were this provision 
in a treaty it would not bind the parties if they were at war, 
Sir George Cornewall Lewis went boldly on and applied this 
very heretical doctrine to the Declaration of Paris : " If we 
were at war with any of the parties to the Declaration, then, 
like other treaties, it would cease to have a binding effect as 
regards that belligerent." Men so wide apart in their habits of 
thought as Sir Stafford Northcote and John Bright united in 
condemning such language in the mouth of a Minister of the 
Crown. Did he mean that in such an event both belligerents 
might commission privateers, might declare blockades which 
were not " effective," might seize neutral goods on enemy ships, 
and enemy goods on neutral ships ? Did he mean that the 
Declaration of Paris, in spite of all the applause which had been 
lavished upon it, in spite of all the gratitude with which it had 
been acclaimed by the neutrals, would be nulle et non avenue ? 
Clearly he did not mean this, because he " conceived that the 
Declaration would be binding as between this country and 
neutrals during the existence of a war " ; and three of its 
principles affect neutrals. But the abolition of privateering 
would, according to this view, not operate as regards the belli- 
gerent ; therefore his ships might be seized by our privateers. 

In endeavouring to unravel the complicated idea that any 
principle of the Declaration should, in the event of our being 
at war, be binding on us in regard to the neutrals, and not 
binding as regards the other belligerent, I propose to confine 
my inquiry to the " free ships free goods " principle. What is 
true of that must also be true of the others. 

One preliminary point must first be made clear. " Free 
ships free goods " when introduced into treaties may assume one 

13 



194 The Declaration of Paris 

of two distinct forms : in the first and common form the right 
of free carriage for the enemy of one party would be granted 
to the other party remaining neutral ; in the second form the 
right of free carriage by all neutrals was acquired by each 
party in the event of war.^ The essential difference between 
the two forms is that in the first the right of free carriage was 
given to one potential neutral ; whereas in the second the right 
would be given to one potential enemy. Complicated questions 
of construction arise in regard to the question whether the con- 
verse right enures to the enemy under the first' form, and to all 
neutrals under the second ; but they need not detain us for the 
present. Nor need we consider what the resultant rights to 
enemy and neutrals would be if several independent treaties, 
containing either of the forms, were entered into by each pair 
of a group of three or more States. This problem arises under 
the combined operation of the treaties of Utrecht between 
England and France, France and Holland, and the treaty of 
Westminster between England and Holland. It would have 
been raised in a still more acute form in the case of the inde- 
pendent conventions proposed in 1862 to be entered into by 
the United States with each of the adherent Powers to the 
Declaration of Paris. ^ These subsidiary questions do not arise 
under the Declaration, which was a multilateral agreement, 
governing the relations between every adherent State with 
every other adherent State. It is not debateable that it governed 
those relations, first, between each belligerent, secondly, be- 
tween each belligerent and each neutral. 

This may be tested in the concrete. States A, B, C, D 
agree that, as between themselves, the neutral flag shall cover 
enemy goods. This must mean that if A is at war with B, 
the flags of C and D shall cover A's goods as against B and B's 
goods as against A. So if B is at war with D, that the flags 
of A and C shall cover B's goods against D and D's goods 
as against B. Neither Lord Palmerston's dictum nor Sir George 
Lewis's explanation will stand the test of this most elementary 
analysis. But all the Powers did not adhere, and the question 
of the application as between adherent and non-adherent States 
is one of great complexity which requires special consideration. 

^ I am doubtful whether any example of this form is to be found. It 
would be worded thus : "In the event of the contracting Parties being 
at war, then their goods shall be respectively free voider neutral flags." 
This, however, would be the consequence of an adoption of " free ships 
free goods " generally. See pp. 83, 84. 

» See p. 159. 



The Effective Operation of the Declaration 195 



V 

The Effective Operation of the Declaration that " Free 
Ships make Free Goods. '^ 

We now come to the vital question involved in the Declaration 
of Paris — limiting the inquiry, as before, to the 2nd principle, 
What was its effective value as an international agreement ? 
The States of the world came to be divided into adherents and 
non-adherents — sheep and sea-wolves. They did not all and all- 
at-once assume the sheep's clothing. There was on the part of 
the majority extreme haste to adhere ; but some made excuses. 
An examination of the consequences of the Declaration while 
some States abstained is therefore necessary. It will enable 
us to test its practical value, to see whether the Congress really 
did achieve anything worthy of the congratulations which 
the plenipotentiaries poured out so lavishly upon their work : 
whether it was practical statesmanship. 

The adherent Powers were of two categories : those whose 
general law allowed them to seize enemy goods on neutral ships, 
and those who, either by express provision of their law or by 
conventions with other States, recognised, or asserted that they 
recognised, the freedom of enemy goods on neutral ships. 
The fact that the first category included at the time only one 
State, England, makes the inquiry, as it affects the statesmanship 
of the English plenipotentiaries, all the more interesting and 
important. For simplicity's sake we may assume that the 
non-adherent Powers resembled the second category of the 
adherents in their recognition of the maxim. 

Now the Declaration contained a provision that "it is not 
binding except as between those Powers who have adhered to 
it," or, more plainly, as Lord Palmerston put it in his despatch 
of the 13th April 1856, " it shall not be applicable to the rela- 
tions of the Declaring Powers with States which shall not have 
acceded to the Declaration." The meaning of this provision 
must be — it was clearly Lord Palmerston's meaning — that those 
of the adherent Powers who did not recognise the maxim in 
their general law (in other words, England) would continue 
legitimately to enforce their old practice of seizing enemy pro- 
perty on neutral ships in their relations with any non-adherent 
Power. During war the relations of any adherent to any non- 
adherent may be those of belligerency or those of neutrality. 
Therefore the meaning of this provision in its application to 
England is, that whether a non-adherent Power be the enemy 



196 The Declaration of Paris 

at war with England, or be neuter when England is at war 
with another Power, the ancient maritime law of England re- 
mained in force in regard to it, with the express approval of 
the other adherent Powers. 

This being so, it is obviously necessary to do now what 
ought to have been done ages ago : test the application of this 
principle to the various cases which might occur. 

I assume England to be at war, because concrete cases are 
easier to handle : we ought thus to be able to reach the precise 
consequences of England's adherence to the Declaration. 

Case A. — War between England and an Adherent 

Power. 

i. Where the Neutral is also an Adherent Power. — The maxim 
here has full play, for both enemy and neutral come within the 
express scope of the Declaration. « 

ii. Where the Neutral is a Non-adherent Power. — Under the 
express terms of the Declaration, it is not binding as between 
England and such a neutral. Therefore that Power ought not 
to be entitled to the benefit of the maxim. But the adherent 
enemy is entitled to that benefit. If this neutral were allowed 
to carry this enemy's goods " free," the express right which 
England retained would be nullified, and the result would be to 
make nonsense of the condition of the Declaration. 

The meaning of the limitation of its operation must therefore 
be, that an adherent belligerent is not entitled to the benefit 
of free carriage of his goods by a non-adherent neutral. 

Case B. — War between England and a Non-adherent 

Power. 

i. Where the Neutral is also a Non-adherent Power. — The 
maxim here disappears, for both enemy and neutral are outside 
the Declaration. 

ii. Where the Neutral is an Adherent Power. — Under the 
express terms of the Declaration, it is not binding as between 
England and such a belligerent. Therefore the goods of that 
Power ought to be liable to seizure. But the adherent neutral 
is entitled to the benefit of the maxim. If this enemy were 
allowed to have his goods carried " free " by this neutral, again 
the express right which England retained would be nullified, 
and again the result would be to make nonsense of the condition 
of the Declaration. 

The meaning of the limitation of its operation must there- 
fore also be that an adherent neutral is not entitled to carry 



Conditions attached to Adherence to Declaration 197 

" free " the goods of a non-adherent belHgerent. But if this 
be so, then the Declaration has destroyed the historic contentions 
of the neutrals as to the meaning of the maxim. 

But in this case the confusion is more extended : for this 
enemy is neither bound, nor expected, to observe the maxim in 
regard either to this neutral or to England. Therefore, unless 
this country's general law, as distinct from treaties, prevents 
him, he will not be concerned with the fact that both England 
and the neutral are adherent Powers, but he will seize, under 
the old maritime law, English goods on these neutral ships. 

Case C. — ^War between two Non- adherent Powers ; 
England, as well as other Adherents, being 
Neutral. 

In this case adherent neutrals will take no benefit from their 
Declaration, for they have expressly excused both belligerents 
from observance of the maxim. If, therefore, they hope to 
carry goods for either belligerent, the other will probably seize 
them, and will certainly pay no regard to assertions of a " right " 
which he is expressly entitled to disregard. The neutrals' only 
course would be to form another Armed Neutrality, which, 
unless the belligerent's Government were affected with the same 
nervousness as many politicians confessed to in 1854, would 
probably suffer the same disregard as its predecessors, and the 
Declaration would result in nothing. 

Judged thus by its practical results, the Declaration cannot 
be said to be satisfactory. Yet they could easily have been fore- 
seen had someone taken the trouble to think out the not very 
complicated consequences resulting from twice ten or two dozen 
States entering into a reciprocal engagement to adopt this two- 
edged maxim. They are not to be avoided by declaring that 
it has only one edge. 



VI 

The Conditions attached to adherence to the Declaration : 
Indivisibility of the four Principles. 

The Declaration was agreed to on the 16th April 1856. The 
statement of its principles was followed by an engagement on 
the part of the plenipotentiaries to bring it to the knowledge 
of the States which had not taken part in the Congress, and to 
invite them to accede to it, doubting not that the gratitude of 



;|^8 The Declaration of Paris 

the whole world for the maxims they had proclaimed would 
lead to their general adoption. The efforts of the Governments 
would thus be crowned with full success. 

It was then resolved as a necessary corollary that 

La prec^dente Declaration n'est et ne sera obligatoire 
qu'entre les Puissances qu'y ont ou qui y auront accede. 

At the last sitting of the Congress, on the 16th April, a 
further resolution was taken, that the four principles were to 
be one and indivisible. Adherence was to be " all in all or not 
at all." This condition would result naturally from adherence 
to the Declaration. Partial adherence to such a document 
would be impossible without an express provision recognising 
it. But in order to assure this impossibility the principle of 
** indivisibility " was specially emphasised. The signatory 
Powers pledged themselves, and required adherents to pledge 
themselves, not to enter into any engagement on the subject of 
neutral rights which was not based on all four principles. 

Sur la proposition de M. le Comte Walewski et reconnais- 
sant qu'il est de I'interet commun de maintenir I'indivisi- 
bilit6 des quatre principes mentionn^s a la Declaration 
signee en ce jour MM. les Plenipotenti aires conviennent que 
les Puissances qui I'auront signee ou qui y auront accede, 
ne pourront entrer, a I'avenir, sur I'application du droit des 
neutres en temps de guerre, en aucun arrangement qui ne 
repose a la fois sur les quatre principes de la dite Declaration. 

The Plenipotentiaries thus deliberately interposed the con- 
dition of the indivisibility of the four principles, not merely 
before their aspiration to include them in the Law of Nations 
could be fulfilled, but before any one of them could be asserted 
to be a principle of that law. The United States Government, 
in its refusal to adhere, pointed out that the principle of 
" indivisibility " did not form part of the Declaration, which 
was perfectly true ; but the claim based on it, that therefore 
the United States could adhere to some of the principles and 
not to all, could not be admitted in the absence of express 
permission. 

The principle of " indivisibility " carries with it some curious, 
though latent, consequences. It disposes for good of the asser- 
tion that " free ships free goods," for example, is, or ever was, 
of itself and by itself, a " principle " of the Law of Nations. 
Specially, this could never be asserted by a non-adherent against 
an adherent Power. It is also conclusive evidence of the opinion 
of a large number of Powers against the validity of such a 



Conditions attached to Adherence to Declaration 199 

contention made by one non-adherent Power against another 
non-adherent Power. It reduced the maxim from the lofty 
position in which it had been placed by Frederick the Great, 
by Catherine, by Paul, by Bonaparte, of a primitive right 
included in the code which Nature had devised for the govern- 
ment of nations, to a principle depending on express consent. 
Not only that, it was not a principle which could be consented 
to by itself, but only in connection with three other principles. 
The pretension that it was, or is, or ever could be again asserted 
to be a neutral " right," was once and for all destroyed. 

So much of international thought and writing has centred 
round the Declaration, much of it of the loosest kind, some of 
it learned, some of it painfully ignorant, that it is worth while 
considering briefly the wisdom of this condition. For, assum- 
ing all the virtues with which each of the four principles has 
been endowed by enthusiasts, the connection between them, 
the suggestion that their interdependence was asserted for 
the " common interest," is not so obvious as not to require 
some explanation. Indeed it ignored the link of indivisibility, 
recognised by the common practice of nations in the early 
treaties, which connected " free ships free goods " with " enemy 
ships enemy goods." The Armed Neutralities had been so far 
logical. While they insisted on the freedom of enemy property 
under the neutral flag, they left untouched the French and 
Spanish practice of seizing neutral goods under the enemy 
flag. It is perfectly true that from the standpoint of the pre- 
tended inviolability of neutral commerce this practice was as 
bad as seizing enemy goods under the neutral flag. But the 
linking together of the two maxims under the principle of the 
flag was based on logic, and they are the only two principles 
which could be called scientifically " indivisible." 

The opinion is certainly justified that zeal for the gradual 
development of international law, for the " progress " which 
M. Drouyn de Lhuys had in his mind, might well have been 
contented with the acceptance of one or two of the principles 
as a commencement of execution of the plan. Seeing that 
privateering was " un des plus grand fleaux de la guerre," 
something worthy of the gratitude of the whole world would 
have been achieved if its abolition had been accomplished. 
If Lord Clarendon was bent on sacrificing something, seeing 
that England was quite as bad an offender as any other country 
in this matter, if not the worst of all, he might have devoted 
his energies to that. But by tying it on to the acceptance of 
other doctrines, he ran the risk of jeopardising the complete 
carrying out of the scheme, as in fact he did. 



200 The Declaration of Paris 

So as to " free ships free goods," which was the favourite 
maxim of the United States. All that had passed in 1854 in 
regard to its adoption, and the rejection of " enemy ships enemy 
goods," showed that unanimity here was probable, and " pro- 
gress " feasible. In the First Marcy Note,^ acknowledging the 
Declaration to the neutrals in 1854, the United States Govern- 
ment had expressed the hope that " free ships free goods " 
might become a settled principle, so as " to prevent it from 
being called again in question from any quarter or under any 
circumstances." The United States had proposed to the Powers 
in 1854 that simple conventions should be entered into recog- 
nising the maxim, as well as the freedom of neutral property 
on enemy ships. Russia, Peru, and the Two Sicilies accepted 
the invitation.^ In order to achieve the universal acceptance 
of these two principles, there was a stipulation in the Russian 
Treaty— 

que toutes les nations qui consentiront ou pourront con- 
sentir a acceder aux regies du premier article de cette 
convention, par une declaration formeUe stipulant qu'elles 
les observeront, jouiront des droits resultant de cette 
accession de la meme mani^re qu'auront lieu la jouissance 
et I'observation par les deux puissances signataires de la 
presente convention. 

France was on the point of signing. 

The United States, in refusing to adhere to the Declaration 
of Paris, did not hesitate to show irritation that its own project 
should be superseded by one which made the acceptance of the 
two principles only possible if they were linked on to two 
others, one of which was unacceptable, and the other of ques- 
tionable value. A reply to the Second Marcy Note would 
have been interesting, not only because it would have answered 
the objections raised to the abolition of privateering, but also 
have explained why the principle of " indivisibility " had been 
insisted on. The opportunity of explaining the reason for the 
condition passed away, and it has never since been attempted. 
The Swedish letter of adherence to the Declaration hardly 
furnishes a satisfactory explanation. If Lord Clarendon had 
suggested as a bargain that we should accept " free ships 
free goods," provided that the United States would abandon 
privateering, it would have been intelligible, resembling the 
mutual surrender of principle by England and France in 1854. 
But the strange part of his defence is that Lord Clarendon 
asserted that we had got the benefit of the abandonment of 

* Document No. 8 J. » Document No. 16. 



Conditions attached to Adherence to Declaration 201 

privateering as a quid pro quo for our acceptance of the maxim, 
the real fact being that we had abandoned both privateering, 
and our principle of seizing enemy goods on neutral ships, in 
return for nothing at all.^ 

So as to blockade. No international issue was ever so 
clear-cut. England was again, in the eyes of " all Europe," 
^vie great offender. The French wars had shown the extent 
to which blockading could be carried. The English prin- 
ciple was well known : Pitt had declared it ; the treaty 
with Russia in 1801 had accepted it. The Continental Powers, 
ever since the days of the Armed Neutralities, had insisted 
that more precision was required, and that ports should be 
closely blocked by stationary ships. The Council Board was 
set, full powers to discuss this question, then or at a later 
date, could have been obtained : here was a brilliant occasion 
" pour ^lucider " cette question, " poser certains principes, 
exprimer des intentions, faire enfin certaines declarations " 
with regard to this thorny question. But Lord Clarendon 
would neither struggle to maintain the English principle of 
blockade, nor yet give it up unless he also gave up our principle 
of seizure. Yet this was essentially a matter capable of being 
argued on war principles, as distinct from doctrinaire ideas. 
The admirals of the Allied fleets had shown what sailors thought 
of the matter, for they agreed to blockade the Black Sea ports 
by stationing their squadrons at the entrance of the Bosphorus, 
to the dismay of the statesmen and lawyers at home. The 
occasion for sailors and lawyers to discuss and settle their long- 
standing dispute was at hand ; but it was allowed to pass. 

* From a memorandum in a biindle of " Miscellaneous Papers " in the 
Public Record Office, discovered since the statement in the text was in 
type, it wo\ild appear that Lord Clarendon had had this idea in his mind for 
some time. Portugal had received the invitation from the United States 
to join in the treaty which had been proposed in 1854, and sought Lord 
Clarendon's advice through our Ambassador, Sir Richard Pakenham. Lord 
Clarendon wrote : "It must be for the Government in question to determine 
whether it shotdd bind itself by a treaty engagement to recognise the 
principle that free ships make free goods, but I strongly advise that the 
adoption of such an engagement with the United States should be made 
conditional on the abandonment of the practice of issuing letters of marque. 
Any maritime Power at war with the United States would find an enormous 
advantage in the prohibition of a system so attractive to the adventurous 
spirit and buccaneering habits of American citizens, and to which they 
would resort with great success and in formidable niunbers." 



202 The Declaration of Paris 

VII 

The Courts and the Declaration, 

There are certain documents of which the Courts take 
" judicial notice," that is to say, they interpret and apply their, 
without formal proof of their existence. Their contents form 
part of the knowledge which reposes in the " judicial bosom." 
Thus the statutes of the realm may be cited in argument with- 
out proof that they have been passed. But treaties are not in 
this category. They are, it is true, part of the law of the land ; 
but when they are relied on they must be " proved " : brought 
formally to the notice of the Court. The method of proof 
has been simplified by Lord Brougham's Evidence Act (No. 2) 
of 1851 ; but they have not been raised to the dignity of 
" judicial notice." For some unexplained reason, treaties and 
other international documents are not communicated to the world 
at large — which includes the Bench of Judges. Their publica- 
tion in the Gazette is not required ; and Lord Brougham's Act 
does not go so far as to authorise the admission in evidence of 
King's printer's copies. 

Our methods in such matters are slipshod. Even in the 
case of statutes, we have no formal " promulgation " such as 
obtains on the Continent. In France it is a fundamental 
principle that a law does not come into force until it is pro- 
mulgated, that is, published in the official Gazette. But in 
England a statute is in force from the moment of the King's 
assent ; it does not depend even on the issue of the King's 
printer's copy. The maxim that ignorance does not excuse 
breaches of the law applies from that moment to all its 
provisions, how many or various they may be, or intricate 
their meaning. In the case of a criminal statute, breach of its 
provisions five minutes after it is passed is an offence punishable 
by the extreme penalty provided the Judge thinks fit to impose 
it. This is an old-established rule of our constitution which 
might, if enforced to the letter, be productive of infinite hard- 
ship ; but, as Sir George Jessel used to say, " Such is our law." 

It is possible that the rule as to " judicial notice " may have 
sprung from the old struggle between Parliament and the King, 
for the shadow of a constitutional principle is discernible in the 
distinction which is made between statutes and treaties. The 
Judges take " notice " of an Act of Parliament, but not of an 
Act of the King. " King-made law," which includes treaties, 
proclamations, Orders in Council, and even treaties which by 



The Courts and the Declaration 203 

statute require an Order in Council to bring them into effective 
operation, must be proved ; though sometimes, as in the case 
of extradition treaties, they are ordered to be published in the 
Gazette.^ 

This brief outline of a highly technical subject has an 
important bearing on the question in hand — the recognition 
of the Declaration of Paris by the Courts. It is conceivable 
that a document of which the Court cannot take " judicial 
notice " may, by frequent reference, become so well known 
to the individual Judges that they would be justified in waiving 
formal proof. But this is " judicial familiarity," and not to be 
confused with " judicial knowledge." It is no disrespect to the 
Common Law Judges to say that they have not even judicial 
familiarity with the language in which the principles of the 
Declaration of Paris are expressed. 

How then would it be proved, in order to establish the 
proposition, in an insurance case springing out of the war, that 
by English maritime law " free ships make free goods " ? The 
only official document in which the Declaration is contained 
is the White Paper " presented to Parliament," in which the 
protocols of the Congress of Paris are printed in French, with an 
English translation. It has never officially been put into any 
other form, nor published independently. The spirit which kept 
it secret has prevailed to the end. The constitution does not 
make publication a condition to the efficacy of a treaty ; but 
neither does the law authorise the Courts to accept the print of 
a protocol as judicial proof of an international agreement. 

In the case of executive orders and rules made in virtue of 
statutes, it is customary to provide that they shall be laid 
on the tables of the Houses ; and, unless the circumstances are 
exceptional and require immediate executive action, they 
become operative as part of the parent statute, as amended by 
motion, within a prescribed period, usually forty days. But 
this custom has not been extended to treaties or other acts 
done in virtue of the prerogative. The result is, therefore, that 
there has been no publication of the Declaration of Paris which 
is receivable in evidence. 

These somewhat vague principles apply to the Prize Court, 
which is set up by the King to administer the Law of Nations. 

^ Before the publication of the Statutory Rules and Orders chaos reigned 
in regard to obtaining authorised copies of Orders in Council, treaties, 
and other similar documents. Pubhcation in the Gazette, though not 
reqviired by law, was assimaed to be all-sufficient notice to all whom they 
might concern, the idea being that it was the duty of all good citizens to 
be subscribers to that periodical. 



204 The Declaration of Paris 

It has been said that the Court itself sits under the authority 
of the Law of Nations, is, so to speak, a " Law of Nations 
Court." In England, the Court of Admiralty is invested with 
jurisdiction in prize, administering a law which lies outside the 
great body of the law of England, but, when occasion arises, 
also administering the municipal law of the country. 

The Prize Court has gradually assumed to itself the functions 
of a Court of Law, and the Judge exercises his functions in 
accordance with the notions fundamental to the administration 
of justice in England. The principle of " judicial knowledge " 
probably therefore applies. The provisions of the Declaration 
of Paris have become, from frequent reference, familiar to the 
Judge ; but it is doubtful whether there is so radical a difference 
between a Prize Court as now constituted and a Court of Law 
as to warrant any further departure from the strict rules of 
legal procedure.! 

A reference to the French procedure adopted in the case of 
the Declaration of Paris will throw light on the peculiarity of 
our own practice. It was promulgated by Imperial decree.^ 

This decree fulfilled the legal forms required by the French 
constitution for making the Delaration operative ; its principles 
thenceforward became the law of all the Courts, and it is the 
notice, required by French law, to all the world that France 
is an adherent Power. This fact might well be in question in 
a Common Law Court ; it would be proved in the same way 
as any other question of foreign law. 

The manner in which a State has adhered to the Declara- 
tion is therefore important, and is a question which the Courts 
might have to consider. 

* It is popularly supposed that the Prize Courts in all countries are 
judicial tribiinals. There is not much information available on the subject, 
but it is certain that in some countries they are administrative CoTirts. 

The Decree of Napoleon "portant institution d'un Conseil de Prises" 
(Document No. 6 B), issued before the Russian War, shows that the con- 
stitution of the French Prize Courts differs essentially from our own. It 
is a Conseil, not a Cour de Prises. It is not suggested that such a Conseil 
does not give its decisions in accordance with international law ; the fact 
that conclusions are given shows that the Procureur-Oeneral, or some other 
member of the Parquet, is appointed to the Conseil, and these would 
naturally be in accordance with international law. During the Russian 
War M. de Pourtalis, an eminent French lawyer, was the legal member of 
the Conseil. 

An example of the form of the decision, in the name of the King, will 
be found in the State Papers, vol. viii. p. 423. It was given in December 
1819, and terminated the long correspondence between the United States 
and France respecting the burning of two American vessels in 1811 by 
French frigates after the alleged revocation of the Berlin and Milan 
Decrees. 

* Document No. 18. 



The Courts and the Declaration 205 

In the case of Switzerland and a few other countries the 
adherence was by arretS, a copy of which was included in the 
" act of adherence." The meaning of the correspondence 
between England and Germany in 1870, referred to in the 
chapter on " The Adherence of the Powers " is now clear. 
At the outbreak of war Lord Granville had asked for a formal 
notification from the belligerents that they would observe the 
principles of the Declaration. The Prussian answer was that 
a law had already been passed, and nothing further was there- 
fore required.! 

But what would happen in the case of a country which had 
only adhered by official letter, such as those which have been 
collected in the State Papers ? There are certain occasions on 
which the Courts are authorised to apply to a Secretary of 
State for official information, as in the case of the existence of 
" foreign jurisdiction." ^ The authority of a statute making 
this information evidence is, I believe, requisite ; it is doubtful 
whether there is any recognised principle. 

Another old rule of procedure arising out of war must be 
noticed. An alien enemy has no loctts standi in the Courts, 
even in prize proceedings in w^^ich he may have a considerable 
interest. Neutral captains were allowed to claim the immunity 
of enemy cargoes as well as of their own ships. " In the last 
war the master was general claimant for himself and everybody 
concerned " {Jungfre Maria).^ This appears at first sight to be 
an evasion of the old practice rule ; but it was probably no 
more than an application of a legal principle. The cargo was 
the property of an enemy subject in custody of the ship, and the 
ship's owner, or his legal representative, the master, waCs allowed 
to put the treaty before the Court, not on the enemy owner's 
behalf, but in his own right as legal custodian. The owner 
derived the benefit of it. 

The Lords went even further in the Yong Vrow Adriana,* 
in 1760. The Vice-Admiralty Court of Gibraltar had restored 
the ship as belonging to neutrals, but had condemned part of 
the cargo as enemy property. The owners of the cargo appealed, 
and the appeal was prosecuted in the name of the master, 
the original claim having been in his name. The Lords declared 
" that the captain is not now at liberty to appeal, under 
privilege of the ship, but that the owners may use him on the 
appeal as a claimant of this property." 

1 See p. 135. 

* Foreign Jurisdiction Act, 1890, s. 4. 

» Hay and Marriott's Rep., p. 283. * Burrell, 178. 



206 The Declaration of Paris 

The question has now been put on a new and entirely satis- 
factory footing by the decision of the late President, Sir Samuel 
Evans, in the Schooner Mowe.^ He recognised the injustice of 
not allowing an enemy subject to avail himself of a provision 
in a treaty containing " stipulations which contemplate a 
future state of war and make provision for such an emergency," 
and destroyed the old rule that an alien enemy is not persona 
standi in judicio where such a provision would enure to his 
benefit. He held that " whenever an alien enemy conceives 
that he is entitled to any protection, privilege, or relief 
under any of the Hague Conventions of 1907, he shall be 
entitled to appear as a claimant, and to argue his claim 
before the Court." 

This principle applies to the Declaration of Paris ; an 
enemy subject therefore may now argue his claim to the 
privilege of " free ships free goods." Any. doubt as to the 
binding force of treaties of this kind during war, such as was 
raised in the House of Commons by Sir George Cornewall Lewis, 
has been set at rest, and the mists of an archaic prejudice have 
been dispelled by a common-sense rule, which was at the same 
time enlightened jurisprudence. 



VIII 

The Declaration and the Law of Nations. 

It is generally assumed that the adherence of all nations to 
such a document as the Declaration would modify international 
law, and a short cut has been taken to the conclusion that such 
a modification has, in fact, been effected. Two assumptions 
are made to this end : first, that the United States is the only 
non-adherent Power ; secondly, that the state of American 
maritime law is such that the condition of adherence has been 
satisfied. So many and such serious consequences follow, that 
it is necessary to examine these assumptions carefully. 

M. Drouyn de Lhuys wrote exultingly in his M6moire : — 

A cette declaration ont accede toutes les puissances, ex- 
cepte I'Espagne, le Mexique, et les Etats-Unis de I'Ameriqiie 
du Nord. Les deux premieres ne firent des reserves que 
sur le droit d'armer des corsaires, mais elles donn6rent leur 

^ Lloyd's Prize Cases, ii. p. 70. 



The Declaration and the Law of Nations 207 

adhesion aux autres articles. Quant aux Etats-Unis, ils 
auraient accepte la declaration tout enti^re si Ton eut 
ajout6 une clause relative a I'inviolabilite de la propriety 
privee sur mer. 

Sauf ces restrictions, les arrangements conclus en 1854 
entre I'Angleterre et la France sont tombes dans le domaine 
public et places desormais sous I'autorite du droit des gens. 

Count Walewski, reporting the adherences of the Powers 
to the Emperor in 1856,^ put the consequence on aMower level. 
He wrote that the principles of the Declaration " ainsi se trouve 
consacre dans le droit international de la presque totahte des 
Etats de I'Europe et de I'Amerique." 

The late Sir Samuel Evans, in his judgment in the Marie 
Glaser ^ (September 1914), said that the position at the outbreak 
of the war was as follows : — 

The Declaration has been adopted by practically all the 
civilised States of the world except the United States of 
America. 

The United States refused to become a party to it, chiefly 
on the broad ground that they desired a complete exemp- 
tion from capture at sea of all private property other than 
contraband. Nevertheless the United States announced at 
the beginning of the Civil War that they would give effect 
to its principles during those hostilities ; and again, in 
1898, during their war with Spain, the President issued 
a proclamation on April 26th, 1898,^ declaring that the 
policy of the United States Government in the conduct of 
the war would be to adhere to the rules of the Declaration 
of Paris therein set forth, one of them being thus expressed : 
" Neutral goods not contraband of war are not liable to 
confiscation under the enemy's flag." 

Spain also in the same year, while maintaining that she 
was not bound by the Declaration, gave orders * for the 
observation of the rules that (i) a neutral flag covers 
the enemy goods, except contraband of war; and (ii) 
neutral goods, except contraband of war, are not liable 
to confiscation under the enemy's flag. 

Spain and Mexico, which had for half a century refrained 
from acceding to it, have recently formally acceded, the 
former State on January 18th, 1908, and the latter on 
February 13th, 1909. 

Our own country, one of the original parties to it, has 
steadfastly adhered to it. 

The Court accordingly ought to, and will, regard the 

1 Document No. 19. ' Lloyd's Prize Cases, i. p. 66. 

» Dociiment No. 26 A. * Document No. 26 B. 



208 The Declaration of Paris 

Declaration of Paris, not only in the light of rules binding in 
the conduct of war, but as a recognised and acknowledged 
part of the Law of Nations, which alone is the law which 
this Court has to administer. 

I venture on criticism of recent decisions solely where it is 
necessary to the elucidation of the discussion. The supreme 
knowledge of maritime law comes only as a slow growth from 
continued study and experience. When the war broke out no 
one had studied it with that profoundness which its administra- 
tion requires. There is hardly a principle of the books which 
has not needed overhauling. We had all been brought up 
under the influence of doctrines introduced in the middle of the 
nineteenth century for the purpose of modifying the stringency 
of maritime law as it had been understood by England ; of 
introducing doctrines, pressed to their utmost limit in the 
Declaration of London, which, when we were face to face with 
the realities of a continental war, were found to sap the foun- 
dations of effective belligerency. Above all, the Declaration of 
Paris had passed into a kind of gospel ; but it was forgotten 
that its principles had never been seriously examined. It was 
taken as accomplished fact. The learned President's state- 
ment, therefore, expresses an opinion which generally prevailed 
during the first few months of war. 

The war has been a great disturber of pre-judgments, and I 
venture to discuss his statement ; for there is a wide difference 
both in fact and intention between Sir Samuel Evans' opinion 
and both M. Drouyn de Lhuys' and Count Walewski's views. 
They do not rest on a common basis of principle. 

Further, it is not quite clear what was the meaning of the 
statement made on the eve of the American Civil War, that the 
Law Officers had been instructed to advise " a-s to what are the 
alterations which are to be made in the Law of Nations in 
consequence of the Declaration of Paris." ^ 

Now as to the two traditional assumptions underlying the 
Marie Gldser judgment.^ Neither of them is warranted. First, 
as we have seen, there were, and are still, many non-adherent 
States. Secondly, in the absence of adherence, will conformity 
of law suffice ? 

The Declaration expressly excluded adherence subject to 
reservations. The reservation made by Spain, Mexico, and 
Venezuela was as to the abolition of privateering ; that principle 
was not removed from the Declaration ; the position of these 
countries in 1868 was, therefore, the same as if they had re- 

» See p. 153. « Lloyd's Prize Cases, i. p. 56. 



The Declaration and the Law of Nations 209 

fused to accept all the four indivisible principles. They were 
non-adherent Powers. 

Again, an offer to adhere subject to a condition cannot 
become effective until the condition has been accepted by the 
other Powers. The United States offered complete adherence 
if the principle of the immunity of private property at sea were 
added. That principle was not added. Therefore in 1868 
the United States was a non-adherent Power, and is so now. 
Further, the proposal actually made by the Government at 
Washington to Great Britain and France during the Civil War 
was that it should be by way of separate conventions.^ Lord 
John Russell was willing to accept this for the purpose of 
simplifying matters during the Civil War. Serious complica- 
tions would have resulted if his offer had been accepted ; but 
he attached a condition which was rejected, and the negotia- 
tions came to an infructuous end. 

Lastly, the acceptance of the principles, even of all four, 
merely by legislation of a country, cannot be the adherence 
required by the terms of the Declaration. For laws may be 
altered, and the pledge which adherence implies would still be 
wanting. A Power which " accepted " the principles in this way 
would not be in the same position as the adherent Powers. 

With regard to M. Drouyn de Lhuys' statement, we must 
inquire what it was that had fallen " dans le domaine public." * 
" Domaine public " is a French term for which " public law " 
is the only, though not the precise, equivalent. He did not 
say that the principles of the Declaration have passed into the 
droit des gens, but " sont places desormais sous I'autorit^ du 
droit des gens." He could not have intended to assert that 
principles which these States had refused to accept had become 
principles of the droit des gens in spite of them ; this would 
have involved a contradiction in terms. The meaning probably 
is no more than that the observance of the principles by the 
adherent Powers had passed within the realm of international 
law. This does not carry us very far, for the observance of 
treaties is required by the Law of Nations. 

Count Walewski's intimate relations with M. Drouyn de 
Lhuys make it probable that he was accurately expressing his 
view, that the principles had passed into the international law 
of the several States which had accepted them by adhering to 
the Declaration. By " international law " he must have meant 
" maritime law " ; and his opinion, therefore, was that the 

1 See p. 159. 

' The reference to the " arrangement of 1854 " in the statement must 
have been intended to refer to the principles adopted in 1856. 

U 



210 The Declaration of Paris 

maritime law enforced by each State is such as its legislature 
enacts it ; that uniformity in the maritime laws of all States 
is desirable ; and that when this is achieved, we reach the 
true droit des gens or international law. 

With regard to Sir Samuel Evans' opinion, I venture to 
think that the condition of interdependence attached to the 
acceptance of the principles makes it impossible for the accept- 
ance, even by all the non-adherent Powers, of one, or two, or 
even three of them, to have converted them into principles of 
international law. 

But assuming the acceptance of the two principles — ^freedom 
of enemy property on neutral ships, and freedom of neutral 
property on enemy ships — by all nations to have satisfied the 
condition of their recognition as principles of international law 
— ^the non-adherent Powers by legislation ; the adherent Powers 
by the fact of adherence — the Declaration of Paris would be 
reduced to the subordinate position of evidence in respect of the 
attitude of some of the Powers. This would altogether destroy 
the effect which has been ascribed to it by tradition. And yet 
if we give to the Declaration any larger warrant of authority, in 
face of the fact that some Powers have not adhered, we should 
be giving to a conventional agreement a wider scope than its 
terms imply ; for rights and obligations enacted by a convention 
rest on nothing but consent. 

The fallacy that States which are not parties to conventions 
can be compelled to observe them runs all through the history 
of the subject ; the climax in fallacy being reached in the Due 
de Bassano's report to Bonaparte in 1812, that the Treaty of 
Utrecht — that is to say, two of the commercial treaties signed at 
Utrecht in 1713 — had established " a common law " of nations : 
" Les droits maritimes des neutres ont et^ regies solennelle- 
ment par le traite d'Utrecht, devenu la loi commune des 
nations." ^ 

I do not here discuss the wider proposition, that if all States 
adhere to a convention its provisions are thereafter transmuted 
into principles of the Law of Nations. It is sufficient to refer 
once more to Lord Palmerston's despatch of the 13th April 1856, 
to show that he never contemplated or assented to any radical 
alteration of the Law of Nations : — 

It would not be correct to say that a declaration of 
principles such as is now contemplated could alter the 
Law of Nations. That law rests upon foundations wider 

* Rapport A VEmpereur NapoUon : Reponse par Phileleuthertcs : 
Londres, 1812. 



The Declaration and the Law of Nations 211 

and deeper than the occasional declaration of a few States, 
and it could not be altered except by some agreement 
much more general and much more formal than the pro- 
posed Declaration ; and it would be dangerous for Great 
Britain to admit that such a Declaration issued by the 
representatives of a small number of States could alter the 
Law of Nations. An example thus set and a precedent 
thus established, by the consent and participation of 
Great Britain, might hereafter upon other occasions be 
used for the purpose of establishing doctrines of inter- 
national law to which Great Britain might have the 
strongest possible objection and repugnance. 

It is desirable not only that the Declaration should 
be communicated to other States, but that the States to 
which it shall be communicated be invited to accede to 
it, and it is highly important to record that the principles 
thus proclaimed shall not be applicable to the relations 
of the declaring Powers with States which shall not have 
acceded to the Declaration. 

The general tenor of this despatch has already been con- 
sidered. It was highly critical of the draft sent over from Paris 
for approval of the Cabinet, and important alterations in the 
proposed preamble were indicated as essential to England's 
concurrence. These two paragraphs seem to be conceived in 
the same critical spirit. Lord Clarendon had intimated 
that, " If the whole Congress were to adopt the proposition 
of Count Walewski, it should be well understood that it would 
only be binding in regard to the Powers who may accede to it, 
and that it could not be appealed to by Governments who may 
refuse their accession." 

Lord Palmerston thought that, having accepted the policy, 
it should be made as far-reaching in its operation as possible, 
and therefore proposed that States not represented at the Con- 
gress should be invited to join. But he must not be taken to 
have agreed that, even if all were to accept the invitation, the 
" much more general and much more formal " agreement would 
have been reached by which alone an alteration in the Law of 
Nations would have been effected ; that the Declaration, even 
with all the States in the world as adherents, would become 
one of those wide and deep foundations on which the Law of 
Nations rests. 

The despatch is suggestive of the large question which the 
Declaration had opened up ; it does not profess to solve it. 

It may be agreed that a multilateral convention to which 
all nations have adhered is more efficacious to bind than a series 
of independent conventions entered into between them all, two 



/ 



212 The Declaration of Paris 

and two ; but the assumption that its principles thereby pass 
into the Law of Nations, even if it rested on a sounder basis 
than it does, is not a practical proposition. 

But, these questions apart, we are faced with two difficulties. 
First, if adherence to a convention by all States does make its 
principles part of international law, it would shut out all pro- 
gress in the rules of maritime law ; for no alteration, however 
beneficial and obviously necessary, could be introduced except 
by way of another general convention ; and, in the premises, 
the refusal of one State to adhere would prevent its adoption. 
Secondly, and more important, either a State can never withdraw 
its assent to such a convention, or, if it may and does, the rule 
must thereupon drop out of the code. The suggestion lends 
itself to endless discussion, which would not be very profitable. 
But one remark may be made. Debates on war principles in 
peace-time, in spite of Lord Clarendon's view ^ that only then 
can reason dictate the right way to wage war, can never be very 
satisfactory. The possibilities of war seem then so remote, so 
unreal, that the conditions inevitably are more favourable to 
the latent ulterior motive which plausible diplomatic phrases 
skilfully employed hide from the wit of even clever pleni- 
potentiaries. But this is conceivable : that theoretical principles 
might be adopted which, put into war practice, might mean 
irretrievable disaster to some consenting Power. Does the 
doctrine that contracts are eternal and indefeasible, except by 
consent of all parties, hold then ? 

In conclusion, I pass from the region of theory and con- 
jecture to the very practical solution of all difficulties which is 
suggested by Sir Samuel Evans' later decision in the Schooner 
MoweJ^ 

The result of that decision has been already dealt with. Its 
indirect consequences are, I think, wider than at first sight 
appear. An enemy subject may now claim the benefit of one of 
the principles of the Declaration, and argue his case before the 
Court, if his Government is an adherent Power, in the same way 
as the subject of an adherent neutral Power. A multilateral 
treaty differs in no respect from a simple treaty — the subjects 
of the Parties come within the application of the new rule of 
practice in both cases. But the subjects of a non-adherent 
Power could not claim the benefit of the rule. 

This decision seems to me, with great respect, to do away 
with the necessity of an inquiry whether the Declaration has 

1 See p. 127. 2 Lloyd's Prize Cases, ii. p. 70, see p. 206. 



The Declaration and the Law of Nations 213 

become part of the Law of Nations ; for whether nineteen 
nations, or all nations, have adhered, in order to entitle the sub- 
ject of an adherent Power to raise a direct issue under it, it is 
to the Declaration he must appeal. The position of such a 
claimant is not strengthened by the assertion that the Declara- 
tion has become part of the Law of Nations, and the position 
of subjects of a non-adherent Power is not altered. 



CONCLUSION 

Many strange things conspired to the evolution of the Declara- 
tion of Paris, and it will be well, in conclusion, to gather 
together the threads of the story. 

Having accepted the condition which the Scandinavian Powers 
attached to their neutrality, that their free ships should make 
enemy goods free, Lord Clarendon almost immediately informed 
British merchants that the old law of war against trading with 
the enemy would be enforced, and that their consignments 
from the enemy would not be free on neutral ships. 

Being engaged with France as ally in a naval war, Lord 
Clarendon recognised that the action of the fleets must rest 
on identity of principle, and both Governments endeavoured 
to bring this about. 

While the negotiations were being dragged out to the last 
minute before war was declared, and the patience of France 
was sorely tried. Lord Clarendon submitted the draft Declara- 
tion as a British project to the United States Minister in London, 
and was seeking his approval. Finality was promised at a 
time when nothing was further off than a final decision ; and 
even then it was finality in the English Cabinet, not in the 
Allied councils. 

France was not informed of the part which the United States 
Government was asked to play in the discussion, still less did 
she know that the differences of opinion in the Cabinet had 
disappeared under the pressure of the Minister's opinion. 

Throughout these parallel discussions the " Rule of 1756 " 
dances like a firefly. It is here, it is gone, it reappears ; on 
the morning of the last day it is insisted on, to the im- 
minent wrecking of the joint declaration ; by the evening it is 
withdrawn, but not abandoned. 

Faced with serious criticism in Parliament by those who 
feared that the policy adopted for this war might become a 
perpetual principle to be adopted in all wars, the Government 
spokesmen allayed those fears by what was tantamount to a 
pledge for the future — " To waive is not to surrender." 

214 



Conclusion 215 

Behind this was the fixed intention of Lord Clarendon, 
confided to Lord Shaftesbury, to alter the ancient law, to 
abandon the ancient practice, permanently : and the con- 
fession to M. Drouyn de Lhuys that he dared not do it openly, 
in the face of the people. 

Between the Government and the people there was built up 
a screen of false conclusions drawn from half-true statements ; 
of theories as to how war ought to be waged ; of political 
economists' predictions of what would happen if only those 
theories were adopted — by whom these doctrines were asserted : 
that trading with the enemy must be permitted ; that the 
maxim " free ships free goods " sanctions it ; that ships and 
cargoes upon the sea are not part of the national commerce, 
but private property, which should be immune from capture ; 
that the Bonaparte theories were sound, and that we owed an 
apology to the world at large for having resisted and defeated 
them. 

To the demonstration of these doctrines a year of theoretical 
talk was devoted, and the most glaring act of unneutral service 
that could well be devised, short of actual military assistance 
to the enemy, the scheme of Prussian land-transit to Memel, 
was but feebly protested against. 

And afterwards the Declaration of Paris was hung " round 
our necks " : and no better justification forthcoming than 
this : " And now, my Lords, let me ask, having once waived 
these rights, was it possible, or was it prudent, for us to return 
to them ? " 

So the full circle was complete : to waive was to surrender, 
as had always been intended. Thus Lord Clarendon achieved 
his purpose, and England, through his agency, did what the 
neutrals had in vain demanded for a hundred years, under more 
strenuous Ministers, that she should do. 

Yet so little importance did Lordf Clarendon attach to the 
Declaration, that when, a few months later. Parliament was 
prorogued, no mention was made of it in the Queen's speech. 

But of the many strange things, none more strange than Lord 
Palmerston's varying moods. It is difficult to believe that the 
author of the despatch to Lord Clarendon on the eve of his 
signing the Declaration can have made the speeches he did : 
either in the autumn of 1856 to the electors of Liverpool, or in 
the House of Commons in 1862 embodying his " second thoughts." 
These speeches show one thing clearly, that the question is 
too intricate to be dealt with in the political manner. Theory 
cannot replace practical experience. The question to be solved 
is whether, if neutrals are allowed to carry enemy goods free. 



216 The Declaration of Paris 

and " private property " is immune upon the sea, England can 
successfully wage war ? Only the experts in naval and military 
matters can answer that question. But the civilian may 
assist by his researches into historical records. And history 
reveals three distinct policies hostile to England. 

First, that of the enemy, who shapes his policy according to 
his needs for carrying on the war. Without " free ships free 
goods " France could not have got the assistance which the 
neutral gave her for building and repairing ships, and would not 
have been able to carry on the war in aid of the Americans. 

When the alliance with the Colonists was completed and, 
after long secret preparation, war had been declared, M. de 
Sartine, French Secretary of State for the Marine, being informed 
that England was seizing cargoes of ships timber and naval 
stores on Dutch ships, wrote fort emu to M. de Vergennes : 
" Si les Anglais prennent les neutres, nos appro visionnements 
pour Tannic prochaine seront interceptes ; vous jugez du mal 
que cela nous fera." ^ 

Dr Fauchille's book on the Armed Neutrality of 1780 
contains frequent allusions to this need of France if she was 
to carry on the war. In one pregnant passage he says : " C'^tait 
pour la France I'unique moyen d'assurer I'approvisionnement 
de ses ports et I'entretien de sa marine, conditions indispensables 
au soutien d'une guerre navale contre I'Angleterre. La France 
ne trouvait pas en elle-meme les materiaux essentiels pour la 
navigation . . . seule, elle n'aurait pu importer toutes les choses 
necessaires. ... II fallait done recourir a I'^tranger." ^ 

Secondly, that of the neutral merchant, whose trade in his 
staple commodities, ships timber and naval stores, would be 
carried on without risk of seizure if only " free ships free goods " 
could be insisted on. 

Mr Wroughton, British Minister at Stockholm, wrote in 
February 1780 : "I am constantly assured that we give too 
great an extent to the appellation of naval stores, which, being 
the natural and sole production of this country, such an im- 
pediment to their exportation cannot fail of being a great 
detriment to its trade and revenues." ^ 

And Mr Morton Eden, British Minister at Copenhagen, 
reported about the same time a conversation with Count Berns- 
torif, with reference to the victualling trade, especially in salted 
provisions : " It was a point they [the Danes] never could give 
up, nor would ; it was nearly the only production of the country, 

* De Sartine to de Vergennes, 22nd August 1778 (Fauchille, La Ligue 
dea Neutres, p. 4). 

» Fauchille, ibid, p. 16. » F.O., 73, Sweden. 



Conclusion 217 

and the loss of this branch of commerce must be highly detri- 
mental. Some of the Royal Family engaged in the trade." ^ 

Thirdly, that of the neutral shipowner, the profits of whose 
carrying trade would be magnified past reckoning if " free ships 
free goods " were admitted as a universal rule. 

Mallet du Pan records the answer to the Prince of Orange 
of a Dutch shipper who carried munitions to the Spaniard : " S'il 
y avait un commerce lucratif avec I'enfer, je me hasardais d'y 
bruler mes voiles." 2 

There is little difference in principle between this confession 
and the statement in the speech from the Dutch throne in 
September 1855 : " Bien que la guerre n'ait pas ete sans exercer 
une influence assez sensible sur le commerce et la navigation, 
ces deux branches d'industrie nationale se trouvent neanmoins 
dans une situation satisfaisante." ' 

The principle is to secure the profit from the commerce which 
is incident to war. 

So it was always three to one : the interests of the three 
coinciding to reduce England's power of seizing enemy property 
to its lowest limits : supporting their claim by assertions that 
it found its warrant in the Law of Nations. 

When it is said that in the past England was not afraid to 
stand alone, the meaning is, that she was undeterred by this 
combination, and fought at sea according to the principle which 
she believed to be the foundation of the law of war : to prevent 
neutral assistance from reaching the enemy. In spite of the 
bluster of Armed Neutralities she held her own. 

The fear of offending the United States, working on the latent 
inclination to adopt humanitarian theories of war, produced the 
change in English maritime law which was finally embodied in 
the Declaration of Paris. Mr Marcy prevailed where Catherine 
had failed. 

But neither fear of offending the neutrals, nor reckless dis- 
regard of them, is the principle on which wars can be fought 
and won. Each by its own way will lead to disaster : fear of 
offence paralyses the striking force of the country ; reckless 
disregard destroys the commercial action and reaction on which 
our own relations with the neutrals depend. The path of safety 
lies between ; and it is the way which, as I believe, the Law of 
Nations sanctions. 

The old question. What is the Law of Nations ?, is once more 
to be discussed ; on the answer will depend the solution of all 



^ F.O., 22, Denmark. ^ Annales pdlitiqtiea, t. i. p. 226. 

^ State Papers, vol. xlvi. p. 1040. 



218 The Declaration of Paris 

the disputes between belligerent and neutral merchant. It is 
to be found in Lord Palmerston's despatch to Lord Clarendon. 

He modified certain statements in the preamble proposed 
to the Declaration which prejudiced the verdict of history on 
Britain's action in past wars, and he definitely established the 
meaning of the term which had been so greatly misused — ^the 
" Law of Nations." I know of no statement which so concisely 
renders all Lord Stowell's teaching — that that Law does not rest 
on principles which Congresses have endeavoured to formulate, 
but on wide and deep foundations, the search for which has 
for so long been abandoned. The despatch has lain hidden 
for many years. It will, I think, serve as an all-sufficient 
and inspiring guide in the momentous discussions which are 
now imminent. 



PART III 



T>OCUMENTS 



CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE OF CHIEF HISTORICAL EVENTS 
CONNECTED WITH THE RUSSIAN WAR, 1854-1856. 



Manifesto of the Porte setting forth reasons for the declara- 
tion of war against Russia. {N.R.O.,^ xv. p. 547.) 

Manifesto of the Emperor of Russia against the declaration 
of war by the Porte. {N.R.O., xv. p. 551.) 

Conference at Vienna between Austria, Great Britain, France, 
and Prussia to smooth away the differences between 
Rvissia and the Porte. {N.R.G., xv. p. 533.) 

Protocol : — Consideration of the Tvirkish answer. {N.B.G., 
XV. p. 535.) 

Protocol : — Consideration of the Russian propositions. 
{N.R.O., XV. p. 538.) 

Russian manifesto suspending diplomatic relations with 
Great Britain and France. {State Papers, xlvi. p. 363.) 

Protocol : — Consideration of preliminaries of proposed Treaty 
between Riissia and the Porte. (N.R.G., xv. p. 540.) 

Treaty of Alliance between Great Britain, France, and the 
Porte. {N.R.G., xv. p. 565.) 

Russia crosses the Danube and invades Turkey. 

Declaration of causes of war by Great Britain. {N.R.G., 
XV. p. 552.) 

Protocol :■ — Russia having left vtnanswered the invitation of 
the Conference to evacuate the PrincipaHties, it was de- 
cided that " L'6tat de guerre d6ja declar^e entre la Russia 
et la Sublime Porte existe 6galement de fait entre la 
Russie d'une part, et la France et la Grande Bretagne 
de I'autre." {N.R.G., xv. p. 543.) 

Convention between Great Britain and France to determine 
the object of their alliance and the means to be employed 
in common. {N.R.G., xv. p. 568.) 

Treaty of offensive and defensive alliance between Austria 
and Prussia. {N.R.G., xv. p. 572. German text. State 
Papers, xliv. p. 84.) 

Additional article, 26th November, with accession of Germanic 
Confederation, 9th December 1854. 

Treaty, Austria and Prussia, 20th April 1854 : — 
i. Mutual guarantee of each other's territory, 
ii. Mutual assistance in case of aggression, 
iii. Military assistance to be ready in case of need. • 
iv. Invitation to all Governments of the Germanic Con- 
federation to accede. 
v. Neither party to conclude a separate alliance detri- 
mental to this alliance, 
vi. Ratifications to be exchanged without delay. 

Additional article. Austria and Prussia regard the occupation 
of the Lower Danube by Russia as dangerous, but under- 
stand that her troops will be withdrawn in consequence of 
concessions now granted to Christian subjects by the Porte. 

Single article. Austria to request Russia to stop her in- 
vasion of Turkish territory, and guarantee evacuation of 
Danubian Principalities. Pmissia to support this. In the 
event of Russia's refusal, art. ii. of the Treaty to be put 
in force. 
llth-23rd April lS54i Russian manifesto relating to the war. {State Papers, xlvi. 
p. 382.) 



ith October 1853 
1st November 1853 
5th December 1853 

13th January 1854 

2nd Febrvxxry 1864 

9th Febriiary 1854 

5th March 1854 

12th March 1854 

21st March 1854 
2Sth March 1854 

9th April 1854 



10th April 1864 
20th April 1854 



De Martens, Nouveau Recueil Gineral 



222 



The Declaration of Paris 



23rd May 1864 
14^ June 1854 
24<^ Jtdy 1854 
Sih August 1854 



September 1854 
2Qth September 1854 
nth October 1854 . 
25<^ October 1854 . 
bih November 1854 . 
2ndDecem66r 1854 . 

2%th December 1854 . 



January 1855 
26thJamiary 1855 

17«A^e6rMart/1856 

4<A ikfarcJi 1855 
16f^ March 1855 

15ffc ikforcA 1855 



Sth September 1S55 , 
21si^ot;ew6er 1855 



27<;i J/ovemfter 1855. 
25th February -Qth 
April 1856 



30«^ March 1856 



28<^ viprtZ 1856 



Protocol ;-.-Comm\inication of Convention concluded on the 
20th April between France and England on one side and 
Austria and Prussia on the other. {N.R.G., xv. p. 544.) 

MiUtary Convention between Austria and the Porte, Austria 
agreeing to take all necessary steps to secure the evalua- 
tion of the PrincipaUties. {N.R.O., xv. p. 594.) 

Decree of the Diet of the Germaxi Confederation adhering to 
Treaty of Alhance between Austria and Prussia of 20th 
April 1854. (N.B.G., xv. p. 679.) 

Notes exchanged at Vienna between Atistria, France, and 
Great Britain, fixing the basis for the establishment of a 
Peace between Russia and the Porte. {N.B.O., xv. p. 644. ) 

The aUied armies land in the Crimea. 

Battle of the Alma. 

The Siege of Sebastopol begins. 

Battle of Balaclava. 

Battle of Inkerman. 

Treaty of Alhance between Great Britain, France, and 
Austria. {N.R.G., xv. p. 600.) 

Memorandtunby Great Britain, France, and Aiistria to Russia. 

In order to prevent the revival of recent compUcations, 
Great Britain, France, and Austria declare that— 
i. No former Treaties between Turkeyand Russia concern- 
ing Moldavia, Walachia, and Serbia are to be revived, 
ii. Free navigation of the Danube. A syndicate to have 

power to clear away the obstacles at the estuaries. 
iii. Revision of Treaty of 13th July 1841, to re-establish 

the existence of the Ottoman Empire, 
iv. Russia to renoimce ofi&cial protection of the Sultan's 
Christian subjects, and not to revive the Treaty of 
Koutchouk Kainardj i,the misinterpretation of which 
was the cause of the war. {N.B.O., xv. p. 632.) 

Lord Aberdeen resigns. 

Lord Palmerston becomes Prime Minister. 

Supplementary Convention between Great Britain and 
France accepting the accession of Sardinia to the Conven- 
tion of 10th AprU 1854. {N.B.O., xv. p. 606.) 

Circular of Cotmt Nessehode to Russian Ministers in neutral 
countries in regard to Sardinia's joining in the war 
{N.B.G., XV. p. 555.) 

Manifesto by Sardinia justifying her declaration of war 
against Russia. {N.B.G., xv. p. 657.) 

Protocols of second Conference at Vienna between Great 
Britain, France, Austria, Tiirkey, and Russia. {N.B.G., 
XV. p. 633.) 

Convention between Sardinia and the Porte, Sardinia ad- 
hering to the Alhance of Great Britain and France with 
the Porte of 12th March 1854. (N.B.G., xv. p. 623.) 

Fall and evacuation of Sebastopol. 

Treaty between Great Britam, France, and Sweden guaran- 
teeing territorial integrity of Sweden against Russia. 
{N.B.G., XV. p. 628.) 

Capitxolation of Kars. 

Congress of Paris between Great Britain, France, Sardinia, 
Tvu-key, Austria, Prussia, and Russia to determine condi- 
tions of Peace. {State Papers, xlvi. p. 63. N.B.G., xv. 
p. 700.) 

Signature of Treaty of Peace at Paris. {State Papera, xlvi. 
p. 8. N.B.G., XV. p. 770.) 

Signature of Declaration of Paris. 

Queen's Proclfunation of Peace. {State Papers, xlvi. p. 62.) 



Declarations of Neutrality, January 1854. 

A.— SWEDEN TO THE BELLIGERENTS. 

BARON REHAUSEN TO THE EARL OF CLARENDON. 

Londres, le 2 Janvier^ 1854. 

Les complications politiques du moment, k la suite de la 
declaration de guerre de la Porte Ottomane, et I'eventualitd 
possible d'une guerre maritime, ont impost au Gouvernement 
de Sa Majeste le Roi de Su^de et de Norv^ge I'obligation de 
vouer une attention serieuse aux effets qui pourraient en resulter. 
Son desir sincere est de conserver intactes les relations de bonne 
amitie et de parfaite intelligence qui r^gnent si heureusement 
entre les Royaumes Unis et tous les Gouvernements de I'Europe. 
N'ayant rien de plus a cceur que de maintenir et de cimenter 
ces relations, Sa Majesty le Roi de Su^de et de Norvege regarde 
comme un devoir de ne point laissez ignorer aux Puissances 
amies et alliees la marche politique que, pour y parvenir, elle 
se propose de suivre dans I'eventualite ci-dessus mentionn^e. 

Guidee autant par la franche amitie qui regne entre les 
Souverains et les peuples des Royaumes Unis et du Danemarc, 
que par cette communaut6 d'interets et de principes politiques 
qui se soutient et se renforce reciproquement, Sa Majest^ le 
Roi de Suede et de Norvege s'est vue appelee, en premier lieu, 
k se concerter avec son auguste ami, voisin et allie, Sa Majesty 
le Roi de Danemarc, sur les mesures a adopter eventuellement, 
afin d'etablir une action commune, propre a faciliter par son 
identite I'application du syst^me convenu. Ces ouvertures 
ayant trouv^ I'accueil favorable, auquel on etait en droit de 
s'attendre, c'est en conformite des resolutions arretees par les 
2 Souverains, que le Soussigne, Envoys Extraordinaire et 
Ministre Plenipotentiaire de Sa Majeste le Roi de Suede et de 
Norvege pr^s Sa Majeste la Reine de la Grande Bretagne et 

223 



224 The Declaration of Paris 

d'Irlande, a re9u I'ordre de son auguste Souverain de porter k 
la connaissance du Minist^re de Sa Majeste Britannique les 
regies generales que Sa Majesty le Roi de 5u^de et de Norvege 
a cru devoir etablir, afin de fixer la position de ses Etats pour 
le cas deplorable que des hostilites entre les Puissances amies 
et alliees du Roi vinssent a eclater. 

Le systemeque Sa Majeste le Roi de Suede et Norvege 
entend suivre et appliquer invariablement est celui d'une stricte 
neutralite, fondee sur la loyaute, I'impartialit^ et un egal respect 
pour les droits de toutes les Puissances. Cette neutralite, selon 
les vues uniformes des 2 Cours, imposerait au Gouvernement 
de Sa Majesty le Roi de Suede et de Norvege les obligations et 
lui assurerait les avantages suivants : 

1. De s'abstenir, pendant la lutte qui pourrait s'engager, de 
toute participation, directe ou indirecte, en faveur d'une des 
Parties Contendantes au detriment de I'autre ; 

2. D'admettre dans les ports de Suede et de Norvege les 
batiments de guerre et de commerce des parties belligerantes ; 
le Gouvernement se reservant toutefois la faculte d'interdire aux 
premiers I'entr^e des ports de guerre suivants, savoir : celui de 
Stockholm, en de9a de la forteresse de Waxholm ; de Christiania, 
en de9a du fort de Kaholm ; le bassin interieur de la station 
militaire Norvegienne a Horten ; les ports de Carlsten et de 
Carlskrona, en dega des fortifications ; et le port de Slito, dans 
rile de Gottland, en de9a des batteries elevees a Encholm. 

Les reglements sanitaires et de police que les circonstances 
auraient rendu ou pourraient rendre necessaires, devront 
naturellement etre observ^g et respectes. Les corsaires ne 
seront pas admis dans les ports, ni toleres sur les rades des 
Etats de Sa Majeste le Roi de Suede et de Norvege ; 

3. D'accorder aux batiments des Puissances belligerantes la 
faculte de se pourvoir dans les ports des Royaumes Unis de 
toutes les denrees et marchandises, dont ils pourraient avoir 
besoin, a I'exception des articles reputes contrebande de guerre ; 

4. D'exclure des ports de Suede et de Norvege I'entr^e — les 
cas de detresse constat6e except^s — la condamnation et la vente 
de toute prise ; et enfin, 

5. De jouir, dans les relations commerciales des Royaumes 
Unis avec les pays en guerre, de toute surete et de toutes les 
facilites pour les navires Suedois et Norvegiens, ainsi que pour 
leurs cargaisons, avec I'obligation toutefois pour ces navires 
de se conformer aux regies generalement etablies et reconnues 
pour les cas speciaux de blocus declares et effectifs. 

Tels sont les principes g^neraux de la neutrality adoptee par 
Sa Majeste le Roi de Su^de et de Norvege pour le cas qu'une 



Declarations of Neutrality 225 

guerre en Europe viendrait k eclater. Le Roi se flatte qu'ils 
seront reconnus conformes aux droits des gens, et que leur loyale 
et fidele observation mettra Sa Majeste en 6ta.t de cultiver avec 
les Puissances amies et alliees ces relations que, pour le bien de ses 
peuples, il lui tient a coeur de preserver et toute interruption. 

En priant Lord Clarendon de vouloir bien porter la pr^sente 
communication a la connaissance du Gouvernement de Sa 
Majesty Britannique, le Soussigne, &c. 

The Earl of Clarendon. Rehausen. 



THE EARL OF CLARENDON TO THE HON. W. GREY. 

Foreign Office, January 20, 1854. 
Sir, 

I have to inform you that the note which has been delivered 
to me by Baron Rehausen, containing the declaration of neu- 
trality on the part of Sweden and Norway in the event of 
war, has received the best attention of Her Majesty's Govern- 
ment ; and I am glad to express the satisfaction with which 
they have learned the neutral policy which it is the intention 
of the Swedish and Norwegian Government to pursue, and 
the measures adopted for giving effect to that policy. 

Her Majesty's Government do not doubt that if war should 
unfortunately occur, the engagements now taken by the Swedish 
and Norwegian Government will be strictly and honourably 
fulfilled, and Her Majesty's Government will lend their best 
endeavours in support of the neutral position that Sweden and 
Norway propose to maintain. — I am, &c. 

The Hon. W. Grey. Clarendon. 

B.— DENMARK TO THE BELLIGERENTS. 

COUNT REVENTLOW CRIMINIL TO THE EARL OF 
CLARENDON. 

Legation de Danemarc, le 2 Janvier, 1854. 

Les complications politiques du moment, a la suite de la 
declaration de guerre de la Porte Ottomane, et I'eventualite 
possible d'une guerre maritime, ont impose au Gouvernement de 
Sa Majeste le Roi de Danemarc I'obligation de vouer une atten- 
tion serieuse aux effets qui pourraient en resulter. Son desir 
sincere est de conserver intactes les relations de bonne amitie 
et de parfaite intelligence qui r^gnent si heureusement entre 

15 



226 The Declaration of Paris 

le Danemarc et tous les Gouvernements de I'Europe, N'ayant 
rien de plus a coeur que de maintenir et de cimenter ces relations, 
Sa Majesty le Roi de Danemarc regarde comme un devoir de 
ne pas laisser ignorer aux Puissances alli^es et amies la marche 
politique que, pour y parvenir, elle se propose de suivre dans 
I'eventualit^ ci-dessus mentionn^e. 

Guidee autant par la franche amiti6 qui r^gne entre les 
Souverains et les peuples du Danemarc et des Royaumes Unis 
de Su^de et de Norv^ge, que par cette communaute d'interets 
et de principes politiques qui se soutient et se renforce recipro- 
quement, Sa Majesty le Roi de Danemarc s'est vue appelee, en 
premier lieu, a se concerter avec son auguste ami, voisin et allie, 
Sa Majesty le Roi de Suede et de Norv^ge, sur les mesures a 
adopter eventuellement, afin d'etablir une action commune, 
propre a faciliter, par son identite, I'application du systeme con- 
venu. Ces ouvertures ayant trouve I'accueil favorable, auquel on 
etait en droit de s'attendre, c'est en conformite des resolutions 
arret^es par les 2 Souverains, que le Soussign^, Charge d'Affaires 
de Sa Majeste le Roi de Danemarc pres Sa Majeste la Reine 
de la Grande Bretagne et de I'lrlande, a refu I'ordre de son 
auguste Souverain de porter a la connaissance du Ministere de 
Sa Majeste Britannique les regies generales que Sa Majeste le 
Roi de Danemarc a cru devoir etablir, afin de fixer la position 
de ses Etats, pour le cas deplorable que des hostilites entre des 
Puissances amies et alliees du Roi vinssent a ^clater. 

Le systeme que Sa Majeste le Roi de Danemarc entend suivre 
et appliquer invariablement, est celui d'une stricte neutralite, 
fondee sur la loyaute, I'impartialite et un egal respect pour les 
droits de toutes les Puissances. Cette neutralite, selon les vues 
uniformes des 2 Cours, imposerait au Gouvernement de Sa 
Majeste le Roi de Danemarc les obligations et lui assurerait les 
avantages suivants : 

1. De s'abstenir, pendant la lutte qui pourrait s'engager, 
de toute participation, directe ou indirecte, en faveur d'une des 
parties contendantes au detriment de I'autre ; 

2. D'admettre dans les ports de la Monarchic les batiments de 
guerre et de commerce des parties belligerantes, le Gouvernement 
se reservant toutefois la faculte d'interdire aux premiers, ainsi 
qu'aux navires de transport appartenant aux flottes respectives 
des Puissances belligerantes, I'entree du port de Christianso. 

Les reglements sanitaires et de police que les circonstances 
auraient rendu ou pourraient rendre n^cessaires, devront 
naturellement etre observes et respectes. Les corsaires ne 
seront pas admis dans les ports, ni toleres sur les rades des 
Etats de Sa Majeste Danoise ; 



Declarations of Neutrality 227 

3. D'accorder aux batiments des Puissances bellig^rantes la 
faculty de se pourvoir, dans les ports de la Monarchic, de toutes 
les denrees et marchandises dont ils pourraient avoir besoin, k 
I'exception des articles reputes contrebande de guerre ; 

4. D'exclure des ports de la Monarchic I'entr^e — les cas de 
detresse constates except6s — ^la condamnation et la vente de 
toute prise ; et enfin, 

5. De jouir, dans les relations commerciales des Etats de Sa 
Majeste Danoise avec les pays en guerre, de toute surety et de 
toutes facilites pour les navires Danois, ainsi que pour leurs 
cargaisons, avec obligation toutefois pour ces navires de se 
conformer aux regies generalement etablies et reconnues pour 
les cas speciaux de blocus declares et effectifs. 

Tels sont les principes generaux de la neutralite adoptee par 
Sa Majeste le Roi de Danemarc pour le cas qu'une guerre en 
Europe vint a ^clater. Le Roi se flatte qu'ils seront reconnus 
conformes au droit des gens, et que leur loyale et fiddle observa- 
tion mettra Sa Majeste en etat de cultiver avec les Puissances 
amies et alliees ces relations que, pour le bien de ses peuples, 
il lui tient tant a coeur de preserver de toute interruption. 

En priant son Excellence le Comte de Clarendon de vouloir 
bien porter la presente communication a la connaissance du 
Gouvernement de Sa Majeste Britannique, le Soussign^, &c. 

Le Comte de Clarendon. A. Reventlow Criminil. 



THE EARL OF CLARENDON TO MR BUCHANAN. 

Foreign Office, January 20, 1854. 
Sir, 

I have to inform you that the note which has been delivered 
to me by Count Reventlow Criminil, containing the declaration 
of neutrality on the part of Denmark in the event of war, has 
received the best attention of Her Majesty's Government ; and 
I am glad to express the satisfaction with which they have 
learned the neutral policy which it is the intention of the Danish 
Government to pursue, and the measures adopted for giving 
effect to that policy. 

Her Majesty's Government do not doubt that if war should 
unfortunately occur, the engagements now taken by the Danish 
Government will be strictly and honourably fulfilled, and Her 
Majesty's Government will lend their best endeavours in 
support of the neutral position that Denmark proposes to 
maintain. — I am, &c. 

A. Buchanan, Esq. Clarendon. 



228 The Declaration of Paris 



C— DENMARK TO THE UNITED STATES. 

THE DANISH CHARGE D'AFFAIRES AT WASHINGTON TO 
THE UNITED STATES SECRETARY OF STATE. 

Washington^ January 20, 1854. 

The present poHtical comphcations consequent upon the 
declaration of war by the Ottoman Porte, and the possible 
contingency of a maritime war, have imposed upon the Govern- 
ment of His Majesty the King of Denmark the obligation of 
giving an earnest attention to the effects which may be the 
result. Its sincere desire is to preserve intact the relations of 
friendship and good understanding which so happily reign 
between Denmark and all the Governments of Europe. Having 
nothing more at heart than to maintain and cement those 
relations, His Majesty the King of Denmark regards it as a 
duty not to leave the allied and friendly Powers in ignorance 
of the line of policy which, for the attainment of said object, 
he proposes to follow in case of the above-mentioned event. 

Guided as much by the frank friendship which reigns between 
the Sovereigns and people of Denmark and of the United King- 
doms of Sweden and Norway, as by that community of interests 
and political principles which reciprocally sustains and reinforces 
each other. His Majesty the King of Denmark has found him- 
self called, in the first place, to concert himself with his august 
friend, neighbour, and ally, the King of Sweden and Norway, 
on the measures eventually to be adopted in order to establish 
a common action proper to facilitate, by its identity, the appli- 
cation of the system agreed upon. These overtures having met 
with that favourable reception one had a right to expect, it is 
in conformity with the resolutions taken by the two Sovereigns 
that the Undersigned, Charge d' Affaires of His Majesty the King 
of Denmark, near the Government of the United States of 
America, has received the order of his august Sovereign to 
bring to the knowledge of the Government of the United States 
the general rules which His Majesty the King of Denmark 
has deemed it proper to establish in order to fix the position 
of his States in the deplorable event of hostilities breaking out 
between the friendly and allied Powers of the King. 

[The remainder of the Note was substantially the same as 
the Danish Declaration to the Belligerents, No. 1, B.] 



Declarations of Neutrality 229 

D.— SWEDISH DECLARATION TO THE UNITED 

STATES. 

THE SWEDISH CHARGfi D'AFFAIRES AT WASHINGTON TO 
THE UNITED STATES SECRETARY OF STATE 

Washington, January 28, 1854. 

The present political complications consequent upon the 
declaration of war by the Ottoman Porte, and the possible 
contingency of a maritime war, have imposed on the Govern- 
ment of His Majesty the King of Sweden and Norway the 
obligation of giving an earnest attention to the effects which 
may be their result. Its sincere desire is to preserve intact 
the relations of friendship and good understanding which so 
happily reign between Sweden and Norway and all the Govern- 
ments of Europe. Having nothing more at heart than to 
maintain and cement those relations, His Majesty the King of 
Sweden and Norway regards it as a duty not to leave the allied 
and friendly Powers in ignorance of the line of policy which, 
for the attainment of the said object, he proposes to follow in 
case of the above-mentioned event. 

Guided as much by the frank friendship which reigns be- 
tween the Sovereigns and people of Sweden and Norway and 
of the Kingdom of Denmark, as by that community of interests 
and political principles which reciprocally sustain and reinforce 
each other, His Majesty the King of Sweden and Norway has 
found himself called, in the first place, to concert himself with 
his august friend, neighbour, and ally, the King of Denmark, 
on the measures eventually to be adopted in order to establish 
a common action proper to facilitate, by its identity, the 
application of the system agreed upon. These overtures having 
met with that favourable reception one had a right to expect, 
it is in conformity with the resolutions taken by the two 
Sovereigns, that the Undersigned, Charge d' Affaires of His 
Majesty the King of Sweden and Norway, near the Government 
of the United States of America, has received the order of his 
august Sovereign to bring to the knowledge of the Government 
of the United States the general rules which His Majesty the 
King of Sweden and Norway has deemed it proper to establish 
in order to fix the position of his States in the deplorable event 
of hostilities breaking out between the friendly and allied Powers 
of the King. 

[The remainder of the Note was substantially the same as 
the Swedish Declaration to the Belligerents, No. 1, A.] 



280 The Declaration of Paris 

E.— REPLY OF THE UNITED STATES TO 
DENMARK AND SWEDEN. 

THE UNITED STATES SECRETARY OF STATE TO THE 
DANISH CHARGlfi D'AFFAIRES AT WASHINGTON. 

Washington, February 14, 1854. 

The Undersigned, Secretary of State of the United States, 
has the honour to acknowledge the receipt of the Note which 
the Charge d' Affaires of His Majesty the King of Denmark 
addressed to this Department on the 28th ulto., bringing to the 
knowledge of this Government the general rules which it has 
been deemed proper by His Majesty the King of Denmark, in 
concert with His Majesty the King of Sweden and Norway, to 
establish, in order to fix and define the position of Denmark 
in the event of hostilities breaking out among the Powers of 
Europe, in consequence of the existing relations between Russia 
and the Ottoman Porte. 

The Undersigned has the honour to inform Mr Torben Bille 
that, at his request, the views of his Government have been 
submitted to the President, and that they are regarded by him 
with all the interest which the occasion demands. Mr Bille 
may rest assured that the Government and people of this 
country feel deep solicitude in the events now transpiring in 
Europe, not only on account of the general anxiety they occasion 
to those Powers more nearly exposed to the menaced evils, 
but also as having a most important ulterior bearing upon the 
United States. 

The Undersigned, etc. 

T. Bille, Esq. W. L. Marcy. 

[The reply to the Swedish Charg6 d' Affaires was in identical 
terms.] 



The Riga Despatch, 16th February 1854. 

The Earl of Clarendon has had under his consideration your 
despatch requesting to be informed what respect would be paid 
by British cruisers, in the event of war, to bona-fide British 
property, the produce of Russia, if shipped on board neutral 
vessels. T am to acquaint you in reply that property of the 



Riga Despatch 231 

description in question, the produce of Russia, and exported 
therefrom, by and on account of a British merchant domiciled 
and trading there, although purchased before the war, and ex- 
ported to England, would not be respected by Her Majesty's 
cruisers unless in pursuance of a licence, or of some special 
instructions from Her Majesty to the officers of the navy. By 
the law and practice of nations a belligerent has a right to con- 
sider as enemies all persons who reside in a hostile country, or 
who maintain commercial establishments therein, whether such 
persons be by birth neutrals, allies, enemies, or fellow-subjects ; 
the property of such persons exported from such country is, 
therefore, res hostium, and, as such, lawful prize of war. Such 
property will be condemned as prize, although its owner may be 
a native-born subject of the captor's country, and although it 
may be in transitu to that country and its being laden on board 
a neutral ship will not protect the property. You will, there- 
fore, inform those whom it may concern that in the event of 
war the property in question will not be protected by the con- 
sular certificate, or by any other document, but will be liable to 
capture and condemnation as prize. 

To the British Consul at Riga, 
February 16, 1854. 



Instructions of the British and French Governments for 
the Mutual Protection of Subjects and Commerce, 
February 1854. 

e. (l) circular to british diplomatic and 

CONSULAR AGENTS. 

^^ Foreign Office, February 23, 1854. 

The communication which has recently been made to you 
of the correspondence on Eastern affairs which has been laid 
before both Houses of Parliament, will have shown you that 
there is every probability of an early commencement of hos- 
tilities between Great Britain and France on one side, and 
Russia on the other. That correspondence will also have 
shown you that the British and French Governments, through- 
out the difficult and complicated negotiations which have pre- 



232 The Declaration of Paris 

ceded the existing state of affairs, have earnestly and cordially 
acted together, with a view to avert the calamity of war, and 
that they are equally prepared to act with the same earnestness 
and cordiality for the preservation of the Ottoman Empire, 
if the Emperor of Russia should still be unwilling to negotiate 
for peace on fair and reasonable terms. 

The time has now arrived when it is incumbent on the two 
Governments to prepare for all the contingencies of war ; and 
among those contingencies it has been impossible for them to 
overlook the danger to which their subjects and their com- 
merce on the high seas may be exposed by the machinations 
of their enemy, who, though unable from his own resources 
materially to injure either, may seek to derive means of offence 
from countries whose Governments take no part in the contest 
which he has provoked. 

But it is a necessary consequence of the strict union and 
alliance which exists between Great Britain and France, that, 
in the event of war, their conjoint action should be felt by 
Russia in all parts of the world ; that not only in the Baltic, 
and in the waters and territory of Turkey, their counsels, their 
armies, and their fleets, should be united either for offensive 
or defensive purposes against Russia, but that the same spirit 
of union should prevail in all quarters of the world, and that 
whether for offence or defence the civil and military and naval 
resources of the British and French Empires should be directed 
to the common objects of protecting the subjects and commerce 
of England and France from Russian aggression, and of de- 
priving the Russian Government of the means of inflicting 
injury on either. 

For these reasons Her Majesty's Government have agreed 
with that of His Majesty the Emperor of the French to instruct 
their civil and naval authorities in foreign parts to consider 
their respective subjects as having an equal claim to protection 
against Russian hostility ; and for this purpose, either singly 
or in conjunction with each other, to act indifferently for the 
support and defence of British and French interests. It may 
be that, in a given locality, one only of the Powers is represented 
by a civil functionary, or by a naval force ; but, in such a 
case, the influence and the power of that one must be exerted 
as zealously and efficiently for the protection of the subjects 
and interests of the other as if those subjects and interests 
were its own. 

I have accordingly to instruct you, Sir, to act in conformity 
with this principle. You will consider it your duty to protect, 
as far as possible, against the consequence of the hostilities 



British and French Government Instructions 233 

in which England and France may shortly be engaged with 
Russia, the subjects and interests of France equally with those 
of England ; and you will make known without reserve to the 
French civil and naval authorities with whom you may have 
means of communication, any dangers to which the interests 
of either country may be exposed, or any opportunities with 
which you may become acquainted of inflicting injury on the 
common enemy. 

Instructions to the same effect will be sent by the Govern- 
ment of France to its civil and naval authorities in foreign 
parts, and Her Majesty's Government concur with that of 
France in anticipating the most favourable results from this 
decided manifestation of the intimate . union which prevails 
between them, and which it is their earnest desire should 
influence their agents in all parts of the world at a moment 
when they are about to engage in a contest with the Empire 
of Russia for an object of such paramount interest to Europe 
as the maintenance of the Turkish Empire. — I am, &c. 

(Signed) Clarendon. 



E. (2) INSTRUCTIONS TO BRITISH NAVAL OFFICERS. 

By the Commissioners for executing the office of Lord High 
Admiral of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Ireland. 

The Earl of Clarendon, Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of 
State for Foreign Affairs, having informed us that Her Majesty's 
Government and that of France have agreed that their civil 
authorities and naval forces in all parts of the world should 
co-operate, or if necessary act singly, for the protection of the 
interests of the subjects and commerce of the two nations, 
whenever the same may stand in need of assistance, against the 
hostile machinations of Russia ; and Lord Clarendon having 
further signified the Queen's commands that an instruction to 
that effect should be issued for the direction of Her Majesty's 
naval forces in all parts of the world ; we transmit to you here- 
with a copy of Lord Clarendon's letter, together with a copy of 
a circular addressed by his Lordship to Her Majesty's Diplo- 
matic and Consular Agents abroad ; and we hereby require and 
direct you to conform yourself in all respects to the views and 
instructions of Her Majesty's Government as expressed in Lord 
Clarendon's letter, and in the circular in question. 

We further acquaint you that a similar instruction has been 



284 The Declaration of Paris 

addressed by the French Government to the naval forces of 
France. 

We further require and direct you to take the earliest oppor- 
tunity, after receipt of this order, of communicating in the most 
friendly manner with the officer in command of the French 
naval forces on your station, with the view of giving the fullest 
and speediest effect to the intentions of Her Majesty's Govern- 
ment and that of France. 

Given under our hands the 24th February 1854. 

(Signed) J. R. G. Graham. 
Hyde Parker. 



F. (l) CIRCULAR TO FRENCH DIPLOMATIC AND 
CONSULAR AGENTS. 

,-. Paris. Fevrier 1854. 

Monsieur, 

Forces d'admettre la possibility d'hostilit6s entre eux et la 
Russie, le Gouvernement de Sa Majesty Imp6riale et celui de 
Sa Majesty Britannique ont pense que I'alliance qu'ils ont con- 
tractee en vue d'un danger commun devait couvrir tous ceux 
de leurs int^rets que les consequences de la guerre pourraient 
atteindre ou menacer. Quelle que soit I'etendue des ressources 
dont ils disposent, notamment sur mer, ils ont k tenir compte 
de I'impr^vu. II peut, si la guerre delate, se produire, dans des 
parages oil les forces navales de chacun d'eux ne seraient point 
constamment pr^sentes, des conjonctures ou leurs nationaux et 
leur pavilion de commerce n'auraient pas, au moment n^cessaire, 
tout I'appui indispensable a leur securite. 

Les deux Gouvernements n'avaient qu'a s'inspirer de la 
pens^e qui preside k leurs rapports actuels pour trouver un 
moyen de pourvoir k ces ^ventualit^s, et ils I'ont vu dans 
I'adoption concert^e d'un systeme de protection reciproque 
embrassant ces int6rets diss6mines sous toutes les latitudes. 
Les Agents diplomatiques et commerciaux, ainsi que les com- 
mandants des forces navales, de chacun des deux pays, sur tous 
les points du globe, devront done accorder leur appui aux sujets 
et au commerce de I'autre, dans toutes les hypotheses ou ils 
seraient menaces par I'ennemi commun. 

En consequence. Monsieur, vous consid^rerez, en pareil cas, 
les batiments et les sujets Anglais, dans votre ressort, comme 
ayant le meme droit que les batiments et les sujets Frangais k 
toute I'assistance que comportent vos attributions, et vous 
donnerez avis de cette prescription aux officiers de Marine de 



British and French Government Instructions 235 

Sa Majesty Imp^riale qui seraient en position de concourir aux 
mesures que les circonstances resultant de I'etat de guerre vous 
paraitraient commander. Les Agents et les officiers de mer de 
Sa Majeste Britannique recevront des instructions identiques, 
et ainsi les sujets et le commerce des deux nations seront autoris^s 
k compter sur la protection reciproque des Consuls et de la 
Marine des deux Puissances. 

Vous comprendrez, Monsieur, que je ne cherche point k 
determiner k I'avance tous les cas qui pourront r^clamer votre 
intervention. C'est a votre sagacity de vous diriger dans I'appli- 
cation du principe destine k vous servir de r^gle de conduite. 

Les deux Gouvernements ont tenu beaucoup moins a preciser 
les circonstances et les formes dans lesquelles cette protection 
devra s'exercer qu'a bien marquer le caract^re qu'elle doit 
prendre. Mais, en donnant au monde ce nouveau temoignage 
de I'unite de leurs vues et de la sincerite de leur alliance, ils sont 
persuades que, pour assurer a cette mesure commune toute 
I'efficacite desirable, leurs Agents n'ont besoin que de se bien 
p^netrer de I'esprit de solidarite qui en a inspire aux deux 
Cabinets la pensee. — Recevez, &c. 

(Signe) Drouyn de Lhuys. 



F. (2) INSTRUCTIONS TO FRENCH NAVAL OFFICERS. 

Paris, Fivrier 1854. 
Messieurs, 

Ma depeche du 18 Fevrier a appele sp6cialement votre atten- 
tion sur les graves complications qu'a fait naitre en Europe la 
question d'Orient. Les n^gociations entamees pour denouer 
pacifiquement le differend qui s'est eleve entre la Russie et la 
Turquie sont demeurees sans resultat, et tout porte a croire que 
de nouveaux efforts demeureront impuissants. 

L'Angleterre et la France ont resolu de prot^ger I'Empire 
Ottoman, et de s'opposer, meme par la force, aux projets 
envahissans de la Russie. Ces deux grandes nations sont 
intimement unies dans leur politique et se sont mutuellement 
donn6 les gages les plus certains de leur alliance. Leurs escadres 
croisent de concert dans la Mer Noire ; elles se pretent recipro- 
quement le plus loyal concours ; les deux Gouvernements, apr^s 
avoir adopte une politique commune, se sont mis egalement 
d'accord sur tous les moyens d'action. 

Cette alliance de la France et d'Angleterre ne doit pas se 
r6v61er seulement dans les mers d'Europe. Le Gouvernement 
de Sa Majesty Imperiale et celui de la Reine de la Grande 



236 The Declaration of Paris 

Bretagne desirent que la meme union, le meme accord, r^gnent 
sous toutes les latitudes. 

Les forces navales de TAngleterre et de la France doivent 
done se preter un mutuel concours dans toutes les regions meme 
les plus lointaines. 

Immediatement apres la reception de ces instructions, vous 
aurez soin de vous mettre eYi relation avec les commandants des 
stations ou des batiments de la Grande Bretagne. Vous devrez 
combiner, de concert avec eux, toutes les mesures qui auraient 
pour objet de proteger les interets, la puissance ou I'honneur du 
drapeau des deux nations amies. Vous vous preterez dans ce 
but une mutuelle assistance, soit que vous deviez attaquer 
I'ennemi, quand les hostilites auront commence ou quand la 
declaration de guerre aura ete faite, soit que vous vous trouviez, 
dhs ce moment, dans I'obligation de vous defendre. 

Vous devrez accorder votre protection aux batiments du 
commerce de la Grande Bretagne au meme titre que les batiments 
de guerre de I'Angleterre preteront aide et protection aux navires 
marchands de notre nation. 

En un mot, les deux Gouvernements de France et d'Angle- 
terre d^sirant que leurs forces navales armees agissent comme si 
elles appartenaient k une seule et meme nation, je compte que, 
pour ce qui vous concerne, vous ne perdrez jamais de vue cette 
r^gle de conduite, et que vous saurez la pratiquer de mani^re 
k cimenter davantage encore, s'il se peut, I'intime union des 
deux pays. 

Tant que les hostilites entre la France et I'Angleterre d'une 
part, et la Russie de I'autre, n*auront pas commence ou que la 
declaration de guerre n'aura pas 6te faite, vous vous dispenserez 
de prendre I'initiative des mesures agressives, et vous vous 
tiendrez sur la defensive. J'aurai soin, aussitot que le moment 
sera venu, de vous transmettre toutes les instructions necessaires 
pour I'attaque. — Recevez, &c. 

(Sign^) Duces. 



Board of Trade Correspondence 237 



Correspondence between Messrs Martin, Levin <& Adler 
and the Board of Trade, February-March 1854. 



To The President of the Board of Trade. 

13 Trinity Square, Tower Hill, 
February 24, 1854. 
Right Honourable Sir, 

We shall feel greatly obliged by your informing us whether, 
in the event of a war between this country and Russia, Russian 
goods imported from neutral ports would be considered contra- 
band, or would they be fairly admissible into England ? 

Being much interested in this question, we solicit the favour 
of a reply, — And remain, with due respect, &c. 

(Signed) pro Martin, Levin & Adler, 
J. H. Hamblen. 



To The Right Honourable the President of the Board 
OF Trade. 

13 Trinity Square, Tower Hill, 
March 9, 1854. 
Sir, 

On the 24th ultimo, we took the liberty of addressing you 
a letter, of which the following is a copy : — " We shall feel 
greatly obliged by your informing us whether, in the event of a 
war with Russia, Russian goods imported from neutral ports 
would be considered contraband, or would they be fairly ad- 
missible into England ? Being much interested in this question, 
we solicit the favour of your reply, and remain with due 
respect," &c. 

To this letter we have received no answer of any kind, 
which makes us fear that ours did not reach its destination. 
May we respectfully, but urgently, solicit a reply to the present 
as early as possible ? The question is one of vital interest to 
us. We have now considerable quantities of Russian goods 
on the way from that country to England, partly by land 
via Germany ; this must be our apology for troubling you, 



238 The Declaration of Paris 

and as we cannot tell at what precise time they may arrive 
here, we do not know until favoured with your answer in what 
position we stand. — ^We remain, ifec. 

(Signed) Martin, Levin & Abler. 



8 

Office of Committee of Privy Council for Trade, 
Whitehall, March 10, 1854. 
Gentlemen, 

With reference to your letter of yesterday's date, in which 
you request a reply to the question contained in your letter 
of the 24th ultimo, as to the treatment of Russian produce in 
this country, in the event of a war with Russia, I am directed 
by the Lords of the Committee of Privy Council for Trade to 
inform you, that they are in communication with Her Majesty's 
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs on the subject, and that 
a reply will be sent to your letter of the 24th ultimo so soon 
as the decision of Her Majesty's Government as to the course 
to be adopted in this matter shall enable them to do so. — 
I am, &c. 

(Signed) J. Emerson Tennent. 

Messrs Martin, Levin & Adler. 



4 

Office of Committee of Privy Council for Trade, 
Whitehall, March 14, 1854. 
Gentlemen, 

In reply to your letter of the 24th February, requesting to 
be informed whether, in the event of war between this country 
and Russia, Russian goods imported from neutral ports would 
be considered contraband, or would be admissible into England ; 

I am directed by the Lords of the Committee of the Privy 
Council for Trade to inform you, that in the event of war, every 
indirect attempt to carry on trade with the enemy's country 
will be illegal ; but, on the other hand, bond-fide trade not 
subject to the objection above stated, will not become illegal, 
merely because the articles which form the subject-matter of 
that trade were originally produced in an enemy's country. — 
I am, &c. 

(Signed) J. Emerson Tennent. 

Messrs Martin, Levin & Adler. 



Board of Trade Correspondence 239 



18 Trinity Square, Tower Hill, 
March 15, 1854. 
Sir, 

We beg to acknowledge receipt of your favour of yesterday, 
in answer to our inquiry relative to Russian produce imported 
from neutral ports, in the event of war. You therein state, 
that " every indirect attempt to carry on trade with the enemy's 
country will be illegal ; but, on the other hand, bond-fide trade 
not subject to the objection above stated, will not become 
illegal, merely because the articles which form the subject- 
matter of that trade were originally produced in an enemy's 
country." 

We are very desirous to be informed where the line of dis- 
tinction is to be drawn between " an indirect attempt to carry 
on trade," and a " bond-fide trade," as we cannot at present 
see how, in case of war, any Russian goods could be imported 
into this country, without such importation coming under 
the head of an indirect attempt to carry on trade with the 
enemy's country ; unless the interpretation put upon your 
letter by several of the merchants with whom we have conferred 
upon it, be the true one, viz., that a British subject buying 
(by his agents) Russian produce in Russia, and importing the 
same, via Germany (a neutral country), will be acting illegally, 
and his goods would be seized on their arrival here ; but that 
a neutral subject buying Russian goods and consigning them 
to this country from a neutral port, will be considered to be 
carrying on a bond-fide trade, and his merchandise will be 
admitted for consumption into England. This view of the case 
would give such a decided advantage to the neutral over the 
British subject, that we cannot believe such to be the intention 
of the Government. We therefore feel it necessary to put the 
present question, trusting we may be favoured with an explicit 
reply : 

In the event of war being declared between this country 
and Russia, will it be allowable to import Russian produce (the 
property of British or neutral subjects) into this country from 
neutral ports ? — We remain, &c. 

(Signed) pro Martin, Levin & Adler, 
J. H. Hamblen. 

To the Secretary, Marine Department, 
Board of Trade. 



240 The Declaration of Paris 



6 

Office of Committee of Privy Council for Trade, 
Whitehall^ March 16, 1854. 
Gentlemen, 

In reply to the inquiry contained in your letter of the 15th 
instant, whether, in the event of war being declared between 
this country and Russia, it will be allowable to import Russian 
produce, the property of British or neutral subjects, from 
neutral ports, I am directed by the Lords of the Committee of 
Privy Council for Trade to refer you to the general principle 
laid down in my letter of the 14th, and to repeat, that in the 
case of articles originally produced in Russia, but since pur- 
chased from neutrals at a neutral port, and in the ordinary course 
of trade with such port by British merchants, the fact of their 
having been originally produced in Russia will be immaterial. — 
I am, &c. 

(Signed) J. E. Tennent. 

Messrs Martin, Levin & Adler. 



5 

Declarations to the Neutrals, March 1854. 

A.— GREAT BRITAIN. 

Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain 
and Ireland, having been compelled to take up Arms in support 
of an Ally, is desirous of rendering the War as little onerous as 
possible to the Powers with whom she remains at Peace. 

To preserve the Commerce of Neutrals from all unnecessary 
Obstruction, Her Majesty is willing, for the present, to waive 
a Part of the belligerent Rights appertaining to Her by the Law 
of Nations. 

It is impossible for Her Majesty to forego the Exercise of Her 
Right of seizing Articles contraband of War, and of preventing 
Neutrals from bearing the Enemy's Despatches, and She must 
maintain the Right of a Belligerent to prevent Neutrals from 
breaking any effective Blockade which may be established with 
an adequate Force against the Enemy's Forts, Harbours, or 
Coasts. 

But Her Majesty will waive the Right of seizing Enemy's 



Declarations to the Neutrals 241 

Property laden on board a neutral Vessel, unless it be contraband 
of War. 

It is not Her Majesty's Intention to claim the Confiscation 
of neutral Property, not being contraband of War, found on 
board Enemy's Ships ; and Her Majesty further declares, that 
being anxious to lessen as much as possible the Evils of War, 
and to restrict its Operations to the regularly organised Forces 
of the Country, it is not Her present Intention to issue Letters 
of Marque for the commissioning of Privateers. 

Westminster, March 28, 1854. 



B.— FRANCE. 

Paris, le 29 mars 1854. 
Sire, 

A une epoque ou les relations maritimes et les interets com- 
merciaux occupent une si large place dans I'existence des peuples, 
11 est du devoir d'une nation qui se trouve contrainte a faire la 
guerre de prendre les mesures necessaires pour en adoucir autant 
que possible les effets, en laissant au commerce des peuples 
neutres toutes les facilites compatibles avec cet etat d'hostilite 
auquel ils cherchent a demeurer etrangers. 

Mais il ne suffit pas que les bellig6rants aient la pensee intime 
de respecter tou jours les droits des neutres ; ils doivent de plus 
s'efforcer de calmer, par avance, ces inquietudes que le commerce 
est tou jours si prompt a concevoir, et ne laissant planer aucun 
doute sur les principes qu'ils entendent appliquer. 

Un reglement sur les devoirs des neutres pourrait paraitre 
une sorte d'atteinte a la souverainete des peuples qui veulent 
garder la neutralite ; une declaration spontanee des principes 
auxquels un belligerant promet de conformer sa conduite semble, 
au contraire, le temoignage le plus formel qu'il puisse donner de 
son respect pour les droits des autres nations. 

C'est dans cette pensee qu'apr^s m'etre concerte avec le 
Gouvernement de Sa Majeste Britannique, j'ai I'honneur de sou- 
mettre a la haute approbation de Votre Majest6 la declaration 
suivante. 

Je suis avec respect. Sire, de Votre Majesty, le tres-humble 
et tres-ob6issant serviteur et fiddle sujet. 

Sign^ : Drouyn de Lhuys. 
Approuve : 

Signe : Napoleon. 



16 



242 The Declaration of Paris 

D]£CLARATION RELATIVE AUX NEUTRES, AUX LETTRES DE 
MARQUE, ETC. 

Sa Majeste I'empereur des Fran9ais, ayant ete forcee de 
prendre les armes pour soutenir un allie, desire rendre la guerre 
aussi peu onereuse que possible aux puissances avee lesquelles 
elle demeure en paix. 

Afin de garantir le commerce des neutres de toute entrave 
inutile, Sa Majeste consent, pour le present, a renoncer a une 
partie des droits qui lui appartiennent comme puissance belli- 
g^rante, en vertu du droit des gens. 

II est impossible a Sa Majesty de renoncer a I'exercice de son 
droit de saisir les articles de contrebande de guerre et d'empecher 
les neutres de transporter les depeches de I'ennemi. Elle doit 
aussi maintenir intact son droit, comme puissance bellig^rante, 
d'empecher les neutres de violer tout blocus effectif qui serait 
mis, a I'aide d'une force suffisante, devant les ports, les rades ou 
cotes de I'ennemi. 

Mais les vaisseaux de Sa Majesty ne saisiront pas la propriety 
de I'ennemi chargee a bord d'un batiment neutre, a moins que 
cette propriete ne soit contrebande de guerre. 

Sa Majeste ne compte pas revendiquer le droit de confisquer 
la propriete des neutres, autre que la contrebande de guerre, 
trouvee a bord des batiments ennemis. 

Sa Majeste declare en outre que, mue par le desir de diminuer 
autant que possible les maux de la guerre et d*en restreindre les 
operations aux forces reguli^rement organisees de I'^fitat, elle n'a 
pas, pour le moment, I'intention de delivrer des lettres de marque 
pour autoriser les armements en course. 



Creation of Prize Courts 243 

6 

Creation of Prize Courts* 

A.— ENGLAND. 

(l) ORDER IN COUNCIL. 

At the Court at Buckingham Palace, 
the 29th Day of March 1854. 

PRESENT, 

The Queen's Most Excellent Majesty in Council. 

Her Majesty having determined to afford active assistance 
to Her Ally, His Highness the Sultan of the Ottoman Empire, 
for the protection of His Dominions against the encroachments 
and unprovoked aggression of His Imperial Majesty, the Emperor 
of all the Russias, Her Majesty therefore is pleased, by and with 
the advice of Her Privy Council, to order, and it is hereby 
ordered, that General Reprisals be granted against the Ships, 
Vessels, and Goods of the Emperor of all the Russias, and of 
His Subjects, or others inhabiting within any of His Countries, 
Territories, or Dominions, so that Her Majesty's Fleets and Ships 
shall and may lawfully seize all Ships, Vessels, and Goods 
belonging to the Emperor of all the Russias, or his Subjects, 
or others, inhabiting within any of His Countries, Territories, or 
Dominions, and bring the same to Judgment in such Courts of 
Admiralty within Her Majesty's Dominions, Possessions or 
Colonies, as shall be duly commissionated to take cognizance 
thereof. And to that end Her Majesty's Advocate General, 
with the Advocate of Her Majesty in Her Office of Admiralty, 
are forthwith to prepare the Draught of a Commission, and 
present the same to Her Majesty at this Board, authorizing the 
Commissioners for executing the Office of Lord High Admiral to 
will and require the High Court of Admiralty of England, and 
the Lieutenant and Judge of the said Court, his Surrogate or 
Surrogates, as also the several Courts of Admiralty within Her 
Majesty's Dominions which shall be duly commissionated to 
take cognizance of and judicially proceed upon all and all manner 
of Captures, Seizures, Prizes and Reprisals, of all Ships, Vessels, 
and Goods that are or shall be taken, and to hear and determine 



244 The Declaration of Paris 

the same, and according to the course of Admiralty, and the Law 
of Nations, to adjudge and condemn all such Ships, Vessels, 
and Goods, as shall belong to the Emperor of all the Russias, 
or his Subjects, or to any others inhabiting within any of his 
Countries, Territories or Dominions ; And they are likewise 
to prepare and lay before Her Majesty at this Board, a Draught 
of such Instructions, as may be proper to be sent to the said 
several Courts of Admiralty, in Her Majesty's Dominions, 
Possessions and Colonies, for their guidance herein. 

From the Court at Buckingham Palace this Twenty-ninth 
day of March One thousand eight hundred and fifty-four. 

Cranworth, C. William Molesworth. 

Granville, P. Lansdowne. 

Argyll, C. P. S. J. Russell. 

Breadalbane. Abercorn. 

Clarendon. Mulgrave. 

Newcastle. Ernest Bruce. 

Sidney Herbert. Drumlanrig. 

Stephen Lushington. I. R. Graham. 

W. E. Gladstone. Aberdeen. 

(2) ORDER IN COUNCIL APPROVING DRAFT COMMISSION. 

Whereas there was this day read at the Board the annexed 
Draught of a Commission authorizing and enjoining the Com- 
missioners for executing the Office of Lord High Admiral of Great 
Britain or any two or more of them to will and require the High 
Court of Admiralty of England and the Lieutenant and Judge 
of the said Court his Surrogate or Surrogates as also the several 
Courts of Admiralty within Her Majesty's Dominions Possessions 
or Colonies which shall be duly commissioned and thereby author- 
izing and requiring them to take cognizance of and judicially 
to proceed upon all and all manner of Captures Seizures 
Prizes and Reprisals, of all Ships and Goods that are or shall 
be taken and to hear and determine the same and according 
to the course of Admiralty and the laws of nations to adjudge 
and condemn all such ships and vessels and goods as shall belong 
to the Emperor of Russia or to his subjects or to any others 
inhabiting within any of his countries, territories or dominions 
unless licensed by Her Majesty or exempted by the operation 
and effect of an Order of Her Majesty made and dated this 29th 
day of March ^ for exempting from capture or detention Russian 
Vessels under Special circumstances or any future order in this be- 
half Her Majesty taking the same into Consideration was pleased 

1 Document No. 9 (4). 



Creation of Prize Courts 245 

with the advice of Her Privy Council to approve thereof and to 
Order as it is hereby Ordered that the Rt. Hon-ble Visct Palmer- 
ston One of Her Majesty's Principal Secretaries of State do cause 
the said Commission to be prepared for Her Majesty's Royal 
Signature with a proper warrant for the immediate passing the 
same under the Great Seal of the United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Ireland. 

Commission. 

Victoria by the Grace of God of the United Kingdom of 
Great Britain and Ireland Queen Defender of the Faith and so 
forth to Our right trusty and wellbeloved Councillor Sir James 
Robert George Graham Baronet Our trusty and wellbeloved 
Hyde Parker Esquire Companion of Our Most Hon-ble Order 
of the Bath Vice Admiral of the Blue Squadron of Our Fleet ; 
Maurice Frederick Fitzhardinge Berkeley Esq're Companion of 
Our Most Hon'ble Order of the Bath Rear Admiral of the White 
Squadron of Our Fleet Richard Saunders Dundas Esquire 
Companion of Our Most Hon'ble Order of the Bath Rear Admiral 
of the Blue Squadron of Our Fleet ; Alexander Milne Esq're 
Captain in Our Navy and William Francis Cowper Esq're Our 
Commissioners for executing the Office of Lord High Admiral 
of Our United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and the 
Dominions thereunto belonging and to Our Commissioners for 
executing that Office for the time being Greeting. Whereas 
We have determined to afford active assistance to Our Ally 
His Highness the Sultan of the Ottoman Empire for the protec- 
tion of his Dominions against the encroachments and unprovoked 
aggression of His Imperial Majesty the Emperor of all the 
Russias : And whereas by and with the Advice of Our Privy 
Council we have ordered that General Reprisals be granted 
against the Ships Vessels and Goods of the Emperor of all the 
Russias and of his Subjects and others inhabiting within any 
of his Countries Territories or Dominions so that Our Fleets and 
Ships shall and may lawfully seize all Ships Vessels and Goods 
belonging to the Emperor of all the Russias or his Subjects or 
others inhabiting within any of his Countries Territories or 
Dominions and bring the same to Judgment in such Courts of 
Admiralty within Our Dominions Possessions or Colonies as 
shall be duly commissionated to take cognizance thereof These 
are therefore to authorize and We do hereby authorize and 
enjoin you Our said Commissioners now and for the time being 
or any two or more of you to will and require the High Court 
of Admiralty of England and the Lieutenant and Judge of the 
said Court and his Surrogate and Surrogates and also the several 



246 The Declaration of Paris 

Courts of Admiralty within Our Dominions Possessions or 
Colonies which shall be duly commissionated and they are 
hereby authorized and required to take cognizance of and 
Judicially to proceed upon all and all manner of Captures 
Seizures Prizes and Reprisals of all Ships Vessels and Goods 
already seized and taken and which hereafter shall be seized 
and taken and to hear and determine the same and according 
to the Course of Admiralty and Law of Nations to adjudge and 
condemn all such Ships Vessels and Goods as shall belong to 
the Emperor of All the Russias or to his Subjects or to any 
others inhabiting within any of his Countries Territories or 
Dominions. In witness whereof we have caused Our Great 
Seal of Our United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland to 
be put and affixed to these Presents. Given at Our Court at 
St James's the 3rd day of April in the year of Our Lord 1854, 
and in the 17th year of Our Reign. 

(3) WARRANT OF THE LORDS COMMISSIONERS OF THE 
ADMIRALTY REQUIRING THE HIGH COURT OF AD- 
MIRALTY TO PROCEED IN PRIZE CAUSES, &c. 

By the Commissioners for executing the Office of Lord High 
Admiral of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Ireland, &c. 

Her Majesty having been pleased by the Commission under 
the Great Seal of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Ireland bearing date the Third day of April One thousand eight 
hundred and fifty-four to authorize us to the effect following 
as by the Commission itself herewith sent you to remain of 
Record in the Registry of the High Court of Admiralty of England 
doth more at large appear. These are in Her Majesty's Name 
and Our's to will and require the High Court of Admiralty of 
England, and you the Lieutenant and Judge of the said Court, 
and your Surrogate and Surrogates, and you are hereby author- 
ized and required to take cognizance of, and to judicially proceed 
upon all and all manner of Captures, Seizures, Prizes and Re- 
prisals of all Ships Vessels and Goods that are or shall be 
taken, and to hear and determine the same, and according to 
the course of Admiralty, and the Law of Nations to adjudge 
and condemn all such Ships Vessels and Goods, as shall belong 
to the Emperor of all the Russias, or his Subjects, or to any 
others inhabiting within any of his Countries, Territories or 
Dominions, which shall be brought before you for Trial and 
Condemnation. 

And for so doing this shall be your Warrant. 



Creation of Prize Courts 247 

Given under our hands and the Seal of the Office of Admiralty 
this Fourth day of April One thousand eight hundred 
and fifty-four. 

Hyde Parker. / 
r. s. dundas. 

To The Right Honourable Stephen Lushington, D.C.L., 
Judge of the High Court of Admiralty of England. 

By command of their Lordships. 

W. A. B. Hamilton. 



B.— FRANCE. 

D]fiCRET PORTANT INSTITUTION D'UN CONSEIL 
DES PRISES. 
Napoleon, etc. etc. 

Vu la declaration faite par nos ordres au Senat et au Corps 
l^gislatif, le 27 mars dernier, relativement a I'etat de guerre 
existant avec la Russie ; 

Vu notre declaration du 29 mars dernier, relative aux neutres, 
aux lettres de marque, etc. etc. ; 

Vu la convention conclue le 10 mai dernier entre nous et Sa 
Majeste la reine du royaume uni de la Grande-Bretagne et 
d'Irlande, relativement au jugement et au partage des prises ; 

Notre conseil d'^fitat entendu, 

Avons decr^t^ et decretons ce qui suit : 

Art. 1*'. Un conseil des prises est institue a Paris. 

Art. 2. Ce conseil statue sur la validite de toutes les prises 
maritimes faites dans le cours de la presente guerre, et dont le 
jugement doit appartenir a I'autorite fran9aise. II statue 
egalement sur les contestations relatives a la qualite des navires 
neutres ou ennemis, naufrages ou echoues, et sur les prises 
maritimes amenees dans les ports de nos colonies. 

Art. 3. Ce conseil est compose : 1° d'un conseiller d'lStat, 
president ; — 2° de six membres, dont deux pris parmi les maitres 
de requetes de notre conseil d']6tat ; — 3° d'un commissaire du 
gouvernement qui donne ses conclusions sur chaque affaire. 

Les membres du conseil des prises sont nommes par d^cret 
imperial, sur la presentation de nos ministres des affaires 6tran- 
g^res, de la marine et des colonies. 

Leurs fonctions sont gratuites. 

Un secr6taire-greffer est attache au conseil. 



248 The Declaration of Paris 

Art. 4. Les stances du conseil des prises ne sont pas pub- 
liques. Ses decisions ne pourront etre rendues que par cinq 
membres au moins. Le commissaire du gouvernement est, 
en cas d'absence ou d'empechement, remplace par I'un des 
membres du conseil. 

Art. 5. Les decisions du conseil des prises ne sont ex^cu- 
toires que huit jours apres la communication officielle qui 
en est faite a nos ministres des affaires etrang^res, de la 
marine et des colonies. 

Art. 6. Les decisions rendues par le conseil des prises peuvent 
nous etre deferees en notre conseil d'fitat, soit par le commissaire 
du gouvernement, soit par les parties interessees. Le recours 
doit etre exerce par le commissaire du gouvernement dans les 
trois mois de la decision, et par les parties interessees dans le 
trois mois de la notification de cette decision. Ce recours n'a pas 
d'effet suspensif, si ce n*est pour la repartition definitive du 
produit des prises. Toutefois, le conseil des prises pent ordonner 
que I'ex^cution de sa decision n'aura lieu qu'a la charge de 
fournir caution. Dans tous les cas, il pent etre ordonne en notre 
conseil d'lStat qu'il sera sursis a I'execution de la decision contre 
laquelle un pourvoi est dirige, ou qu'il sera fourni une caution 
avant cette execution. 

Art. 7. Les avocats a notre conseil d'^fitat ont seuls le droit 
de signer les memoires et requetes qui sont presentes au conseil 
des prises. 

Art. 8. Les Equipages des batiments de Sa Majesty la 
reine du royaume uni de la Grande-Bretagne et d'Irlande sont 
representes devant le conseil des prises par le consul de leur 
nation ou par tout autre agent que designe le gouvernement 
britannique. 

Art. 9. Les agents consulaires Strangers peuvent presenter 
au conseil des prises toutes les observations qu'ils jugent con- 
venables dans I'interet de leurs nationaux, mais seulement par 
I'intermediaire du commissaire du gouvernement. 

Art. 10. Les frais de secretariat et autres depenses accessoires 
occasionnees par le service du conseil des prises forment un 
chapitre special au budget du minist^re de la marine et des 
colonies. 

Art. 11. Les dispositions de I'arret^ des consuls du 6 germinal 
an VIII. et des autres r^glements non contraires a notre present 
d^cret sont maintenues. 

Sont n^anmoins abrog^s les articles 9, 10 et 11 de I'arret^ 
du 6 germinal an VIII. 

Art. 12. Nos ministres secretaires d'^fitat au departement 
des affaires etrang^res et au departement de la marine et des 



Despatches announcing Declaration to Neutrals 249 

colonies sont charges, chacun en ce qui le concerne, de I'ex^eu- 
tion du present decret. 

Fait au palais de Saint-Cloud, le 18 juillet 1854. 

Napoleon. 
Par I'Empereur, 

Le ministre secretaire d'Etai au departement 
des affaires etrangtres. 
1 Sign6 : Drouyn de Lhuys. 

Le ministre secretaire d^J^tat au departement 
de la marine et des colonies. 
Signe : Th. Duces. 



Circular Despatches announcing the Declaration to 
the Neutral Powers, March, April, 1854. 

A.— BRITISH CIRCULAR DESPATCH CONTAINING DRAFT OF 
NOTE TO BE ADDRESSED BY AGENTS ABROAD TO 
FOREIGN COURTS, ACCOMPANYING H.M.'S DECLARATION 
OF MARCH 28, 1854. 

Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Ireland and His Majesty the Emperor of the French, 
being compelled to take up arms for the purpose of repelling 
the aggression of H.M. the Emperor of Russia upon the Ottoman 
Empire, and being desirous to lessen as much as possible the 
disastrous consequences to commerce resulting from a state of 
Warfare, their Majesties have resolved for the present not to 
authorise the issue of letters of marque. 

In making this resolution known, they think it right to 
announce at the same time the principles upon which they will 
be guided during the course of this war with regard to the 
navigation and commerce of neutrals. 

H.M. the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain 
and Ireland has accordingly published the accompanying 
Declaration, which is identical with that published by H.M. 
the Emperor of the French. 

In thus restricting within the narrowest limits the exercise 
of their rights as belligerents, the Allied Governments confidently 
trust that the Governments of countries which may remain 
neutral during this war will sincerely • exert every effort to 
enforce upon their subjects/citizens the necessity of observing 



250 The Declaration of Paris 

the strictest neutrality. Her Britannic Majesty's Government 
entertains the confident hope that the . . . Government will 
receive with satisfaction the announcement of the resolutions 
thus taken in common by the two Allied Governments, and 
that it will, in the spirit of just reciprocity, give orders that 
no privateer under Russian colours shall be equipped or vic- 
tualled or admitted with its prizes in the ports of . . . and 
also that the subjects/citizens of . . . shall rigorously abstain 
from taking part in armaments of this nature or in any other 
measure opposed to the duties of a strict neutrality. 



B.— FRENCH CIRCULAR DESPATCH TO DIPLOMATIC AGENTS 
IN NEUTRAL COUNTRIES. 

Paris, March 30, 1854. 
Monsieur, 

Le Moniteur de ce jour public la declaration du gouverne- 
ment fran9ais au sujet des neutres, ainsi que le rapport que 
j'ai pr^sente a I'Empereur en la soumettant a sa haute appro- 
bation. Vous trouverez ci-joint copie de ces deux documents. 

Le gouvernement de Sa Majeste britannique a promulgu^, 
de con cote, la meme declaration. 

Au moment ou les deux Etats prennent les armes pour la 
defense commune d'un allie, ils ne pouvaient donner une preuve 
plus eclatante de la parfaite conformite de leurs sentiments et 
de I'esprit de solidarite qui les unit, qu'en adoptant les memes 
resolutions dans une matiere sur laquelle, jusqu'ici, leurs principes 
avaient ^te si differents. 

Penetre de cette solicitude que la France a tou jours t6moign6e 
pour les neutres, le gouvernement de I'Empereur s'etait d^s 
longtemps preoccupe des questions graves que la neutrality 
soul^ve, pour en preparer la solution dans le sens le plus favor- 
able aux interets des peuples avec lesquels il demeure en paix. 
Je m'empresse de reconnaitre qu'il a trouve le gouvernement 
de Sa Majesty britannique anim6 des memes desirs, et deja 
penetre de la pens^e de laisser les neutres en possession de 
tous les avantages que les necessites indispensables de la 
guerre ne feraient point un devoir absolu de restreindre. 

C'est cette communaute de vues qui a dicte la declaration 
adoptee par les deux gouvernements ; et, je n'hesite pas a 
le dire, jamais un document de cette nature n'a 6te con9U dans 
des termes aussi favorables. 

L'intention de ne point d61ivrer de lettres de marque y est 
ofiiciellement annoncee ; 

La n6cessite du blocus eifectif est admise ; 



Despatches announcing Declaration to Neutrals 251 

Le pavilion neutre couvrira la marchandise, et pourtant 
la marchandise neutre restera libre sous pavilion ennemi : 

Tels sont les avantages qui vont etre assures au commerce 
pendant la guerre ; et meme, lorsqu'elle sera terminee, cette 
declaration commune demeurera comme un precedent con- 
siderable acquis a I'histoire de la neutralite. 

Mais si I'union intime de la France et de I'Angleterre a permis 
de consacrer un syst^me aussi avantageux pour les nations 
neutres, il doit en r^sulter pour celles-ci une obligation plus 
stricte de respecter d'une mani^re complete les droits des belli- 
g^rants. Nous avons done raison d'esperer que les gouverne- 
ments neutres non-seulement ne feront aucun acte qui puisse 
presenter un caractere hostile, mais qu'ils s'empresseront de 
prendre toutes les mesures necessaires pour que leurs sujets 
s'abstiennent de toute entreprise contraire aux devoirs d'une 
rigoureuse neutralite. 

Je vous adresserai incessamment un pro jet de note dont 
la redaction aura ete concertee avec le gouvernement de Sa 
Majeste britannique, pour notifier la declaration presente au 
gouvernement aupres duquel vous etes accredite. 

C— FURTHER FRENCH CIRCULAR DESPATCH TO DIPLOMATIC 
AGENTS IN NEUTRAL COUNTRIES. 

Paris, April 5, 1854. 
Monsieur, 

J'ai I'honneur de vous transmettre le projet d'une note que 
vous voudrez bien adresser immediatement au Gouvernement 
aupres duquel vous etes accredite, pour lui faire connaitre les 
principes que la France et la Grande-Bretagne appliqueront 
aux neutres dans le cours de la guerre actuelle, ainsi que la 
resolution qu'ont prise les deux gouvernements de ne point 
delivrer, quant a present, de lettres de marque. 

Le representant de Sa Majeste britannique recevra I'ordre 
d'adresser au gouvernement de . . . une communication analogue. 

Vous voudrez bien me transmettre la reponse du gouverne- 
ment de . . . d^s qu'elle vous sera parvenue, et faire les de- 
marches necessaires pour qu'elle soit conforme a la juste attente 
des deux gouvernements. 

Projet de note. 

Le soussigne a re5u I'ordre de son gouvernement d'adresser 
a S. Exc. M. . . .la communication suivante : 

S.M. I'Empereur des Fran9ais et S.M. la Reine du Royaume- 
Uni de la Grande-Bretagne vont se trouver dans la necessity 



252 The Declaration of Paris 

de recourir k la force des armes pour repousser les agressions 
dont I'empire ottoman est I'objet de la part du gouvernement 
de S.M. I'Empereur de Russie. Voulant, autant que possible, 
diminuer pour le commerce les consequences funestes de I'etat 
de guerre, Leurs Majestes ont resolu de ne point autoriser la 
course, quant a present, par la delivrance de lettres de marque, 
et de faire connaitre, en meme temps que cette resolution, les 
principes qu'elles entendent appliquer a la navigation et au 
commerce des neutres dans le cours de cette guerre. C'est 
dans ce but que S.M. I'Empereur des Frangais a fait publier 
la declaration ci-jointe, identique a celle que S.M. la Reine 
du Royaume-Uni de la Grande-Bretagne et d'lrlande a fait 
publier de son c6t6. 

En restreignant I'exercise de leurs droits de bellig^rants 
dans des limites aussi etroites, les gouvernements allies se croient 
fondes a compter sur les efforts sinc^res des gouvernements 
qui demeureront neutres dans cette guerre, pour faire observer 
par leurs sujets (ou nationaux) les obligations de la neutrality 
la plus absolue. En consequence, le gouvernement de S.M. 
I'Empereur des Fran9ais a la confiance que le gouvernement de 
. . . accueillera avec satisfaction I'annonce des resolutions 
prises en commun entre les deux gouvernements allies, et voudra 
bien, par une juste reciprocity, donner des ordres pour qu'aucun 
corsaire sous pavilion russe ne puisse etre arm6 ni ravitaill6, 
ni admis avec ses prises dans les ports de . . . et pour que les 
sujets . . . (ou citoyens) . . . s'abstiennent rigoureusement de 
prendre part a des armements de ce genre ou a toute autre 
mesure contraire aux devoirs d'une stricte neutralite. 



8 

United States Despatches relating to the Declaration 
to the Neutrals.^ 

A.— THE UNITED STATES MINISTER IN LONDON TO THE 
UNITED STATES SECRETARY OF STATE. 

.p, . London^ February 24, 1854. 

I then inquired of his Lordship [Lord Clarendon] whether 
the British Government had yet determined upon the course 
they would pursue, during the impending war, in regard to 
neutrals ; whether they would adhere to their old rule of captur- 

* State Papers, vol. xlvi. pp. 821 et seq. 



U.S. Despatches as to Declaration to Neutrals 253 

ing the goods of an enemy on board the vessel of a friend, or 
adopt the rule of " free ships free goods " ; observing that it was 
of great importance to my countrymen, engaged in commerce, 
that they should know the decision on this point as speedily as 
possible. 

He said that the question was then under the consideration 
of the Cabinet, and had not yet been decided, but I should be 
the very first person to whom he would communicate the result. 
Intimating a desire to converse with me, informally and un- 
officially, upon the subject, I informed him that I had no in- 
structions whatever from my own Government in relation to 
it, but, as an individual, I was willing frankly to express my 
opinions. From what passed between us, I should consider it 
a breach of confidence in me to report his private opinions, on 
a question still pending before the Cabinet Council, and on which 
its members are probably divided. 

I can, however, have no objection to repeat to you the sub- 
stance of my own observations. 

I said that the Supreme Court of the United States had 
adopted, in common with their own Courts, the principle that 
a belligerent had a right, under the law of nations, to capture 
the goods of an enemy on board the vessel of a friend, and that 
he was bound to restore the goods of a friend captured on board 
the vessel of an enemy. That, from a very early period of our 
history, we had sought, in favour of neutral commerce, to change 
this rule by Treaties with different nations, and, instead thereof 
to adopt the principle that the flag should protect the property 
under it, with the exception of contraband of war. That the 
right of search was, at best, an odious right, and ought to be 
restricted as much as possible. There was always danger, from 
its exercise, of involving the neutral in serious difficulty with 
the belligerent. The captain of a British man-of-war or privateer 
would meet an American vessel upon the ocean and board her 
for the purpose of ascertaining whether she was the carrier of 
enemies' property. Such individuals, especially, as their own 
interest was deeply involved in the question, were not always 
the most competent persons to conduct an investigation of this 
character. They were too prone to feel might and forget right. 
On the other hand, the American captain of a vessel searched 
would necessarily be indignant at what he might believe to be 
the unjust and arbitrary conduct of the searching officer. 
Hence bad blood would be the result, and constant and dangerous 
reclamations would arise between the two nations. 

I need not inform his Lordship that our past history had 
fully justified such apprehensions. On the other hand, if the 



254 The Declaration of Paris 

rule that " free ships shall make free goiods " were established, 
the right of the boarding officer would be confined to the 
ascertainment of the simple facts, whether the flag was bond- 
fide American, and whether articles contraband of war were on 
board. He would have no investigation to make into the owner- 
ship of the cargo. If, superadded to this rule, the correspond- 
ing rule was adopted, that " enemy's ships shall make enemy's 
goods," the belligerent would gain nearly as much by the latter 
as he had lost by the former, and this would be no hardship 
to the neutral owner of such goods, because he would place 
them on board an enemy's vessel with his eyes open, and fully 
sensible of the risk of capture. 

I observed that the Government of the United States had 
not, to my recollection, made any treaties recently on the prin- 
ciple of " free ships free goods," and the only reason, I pre- 
sume, was, that until the strong maritime nations, such as 
Great Britain, France, and Russia, should consent to enter into 
such treaties, it would be of little avail to conclude them with 
the minor Powers. 

This, I believe, is a fair summary of all I said, at different 
times, in the course of a somewhat protracted conversation, and 
I hope it may meet your approbation. 

I shall not be astonished if the British Government should 
yield their long-cherished principle, and adopt the rule, that the 
flag shall protect the cargo. I know positively that Sweden 
and Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands and Prussia, are urging 
this upon them ; but what I did not know until the day before 
yesterday was, that the Government of France was pursuing 
the same course. 

In this connection, I think it to be my duty to say that the 
correspondence of Mr Schroeder, our Charge d' Affaires at Stock- 
holm, a gentleman with whom I am not personally acquainted, 
has furnished me the earliest and most accurate information 
of the proceedings of the northern Powers on questions which 
may affect the neutral interests of the United States. 

Lord Clarendon referred to our neutrality law (of April 20th, 
1818) ^ in terms of high commendation, and pronounced it 

^ The Act of Congress of the 20th April 1818 provided in sec. 2 : 
" That if any person shall, within the territory or jurisdiction of the 
United States, enlist or enter himself, or hire or retain another person 
to enlist or enter himself, or to go beyond the limits or jurisdiction of 
the United States with intent to be enlisted or entered in the service 
of any foreign Prince, State, colony, district, or people as a soldier, or as 
a marine or seaman, on board of any vessel of war, letter of marque, or 
privateer, every person so offending shall be deemed guilty of a high 
misdemeanour, and shall be fined not exceeding 1000 dollars, and be 
imprisoned not exceeding thi'ee years," etc. 



U.S. Despatches as to Declaration to Neutrals 255 

superior to their own, especially in regard to privateers. They 
are evidently apprehensive that Russian privateers may be fitted 
out in the ports of the United States, to cruize against their 
commerce, though, in words, his Lordship expressed no such 
apprehension. Would it not be advisable, after the war shall 
have fairly commenced, for the President to issue his proclama- 
tion upon the proper official authorities to be vigilant in executing 
this law ? This could not fail to prove satisfactory to all the 
belligerents. 

The Hon. W. L. Marcy. James Buchanan. 



B.— THE UNITED STATES MINISTER IN LONDON TO THE 
UNITED STATES SECRETARY OF STATE. 

London, March 17, 1854. 
(Extract) 

Lord Clarendon sent for me yesterday, and, in compliance 
with his promise, read me the declaration which had been pre- 
pared for Her Majesty, specifying the course she had determined 
to pursue towards neutral commerce during the present war. 
It announces distinctly, not only that the neutral flag shall 
protect the cargo, except in cases of contraband, but that the 
goods of neutrals captured on board an enemy's vessel shall be 
restored to their owners. It fully adopts the principle that 
" free ships shall make free goods," and also secures from con- 
fiscation the property of a friend found on board the vessel of 
an enemy. 

The declaration on the subject of blockades, so far as I could 
understand it, from the reading, is entirely unexceptionable 
and in conformity with the doctrines which have always been 
maintained by the Government of the United States. 

Her Majesty also declared that she will issue no commissions 
to privateers, or letters of marque during the war. 

His Lordship then asked me how I was pleased with it ; 
and I stated my approbation of it in strong terms. 

I said that, in one particular, it was more liberal towards 
neutral commerce than I had ventured to hope, and this was in 
restoring the goods of a friend, though captured on the vessel 
of an enemy. 

He remarked that they had encountered great difficulties 
in overcoming their practice for so long a period of years, and 
their unvarying judicial decisions ; but that modern civilisation 
required a relaxation in the former severe rules, and that war 
should be conducted with as little injury to neutrals as was 



256 The Declaration of Paris 

compatible with the interest and safety of belligerents. He 
also observed that he had repeated the conversation which he 
had with me on these subjects to the Cabinet Council, and this 
had much influence in inducing them to adopt their present 
liberal policy towards neutrals. 

He then expressed the hope that their course would prove 
satisfactory to the Government of the United States ; and I 
assured him that I had no doubt it would prove highly gratifying 
to them. 

I asked him if I were at liberty, in anticipation of the publica- 
tion of Her Majesty's declaration, to communicate its substance 
to yourself; and he replied, certainly, I was. It had not yet 
undergone the last revision of the Cabinet ; but the principles 
stated in it had received their final approbation, and would not 
be changed. 

If our shipping interest in the United States should feel as 
anxious upon this subject as American owners of vessels in this 
country, you may deem it advisable to publish a notice of the 
practice which will be observed by Great Britain and France 
towards neutrals during the continuance of the present war ; 
and to this I can perceive no objection. 

The Hon. W. L. Marcy. James Buchanan. 



C— THE UNITED STATES MINISTER IN PARIS TO THE 
UNITED STATES SECRETARY OF STATE. 

Paris, March 22, 1854. 
(Extract) 

The allies, too, find themselves under the necessity of pro- 
viding for future contigencies of a most delicate nature, by 
instructions to their naval commanders, acting in concert, in 
respect to neutral rights pending the war. In the past history 
of the two countries, the principles of France on this subject 
have been, as you are aware, entirely at variance with those 
held by England. It is both delicate and difficult to produce 
harmony in their combined action. The deep interest of the 
European States, not engaged in this war, in the adoption by 
the allies, with their absolute naval supremacy over Russia, of 
measures which will give to the commerce of neutrals the most 
perfect security, added to the earnest desire of the allies to 
secure their co-operation, if to be had, and, if not, to avoid their 
active opposition, has given to the subject the deepest interest, 
and contributed to prepare the way for a fair and equitable 
adjustment. I have looked to this subject with deep anxiety. 



U.S. Despatches as to Declaration to Neutrals 257 

and have endeavoured to guard against any possible violation 
of our rights as a neutral, by the measures of the belligerents, 
in the prosecution of the war. I have embraced every oppor- 
tunity, since I have been in Paris, of impressing, by informal 
conversation, on the Minister, and with the representatives of 
foreign Powers here, that if those liberal principles which the 
United States have always maintained were not recognized, my 
Government could not be satisfied ; that with her vast com- 
mercial marine, her enormous surplus products, her export and 
import trade, and her large investments in the fisheries in the 
Pacific and Atlantic Oceans, it was impossible that my country 
could submit to any practical exercise of the rights of war which 
would subject her citizens, their business, and their vessels to 
vexatious searches, captures, or detentions ; that except in 
cases of contraband, her flag must protect the cargo which it 
covered, and the high seas must be what the God of nature 
intended it — a free highway for all nations. The point on which 
most apprehension is felt is the engagement of citizens and 
vessels of the United States in privateering under the Russian 
flag. I have urged, that, with every disposition to prevent such 
unlawful proceedings by our people, the Government would find 
much difficulty in enforcing its laws, unless sustained by public 
opinion in the United States, and aided by the people, as well 
as by officers of the Government ; that with the vast extent of 
seacoast of the United States, the Government could not have 
information of the preparation of vessels for such enterprizes, 
in all cases, in time to suppress them, unless the people felt an 
anxious desire that the laws should be executed ; that if the 
allies adopted just and liberal measures in regard to neutral 
rights, it would give profitable returns to a safe business, and 
the entire mercantile community of the United States would, 
from a sense of justice and of national duty, as well as of their 
own interest, be found ready to aid the Government in executing 
the laws ; that, tempting as might be the offers to engage under 
the Russian flag to cruize against the commerce of the allies, 
the danger of the service, the difficulty of realizing their prizes 
by adjudication, and, above all, the actual profit of lawful trade, 
under equitable and fair rules in respect to neutral rights, and 
the public satisfaction at seeing just principles established among 
nations, would probably prevent citizens, however bold and 
adventurous, from taking part in the assaults on the commerce 
of the allies. 

The combination of circumstances is most auspicious to the 
establishment of our cherished principles of neutral rights — ^the 
rights of the weaker Powers against the aggressive pretensions 

17 



258 The Declaration of Paris 

of the strong ; and the considerations of poUcy are too grave, 
in their favour, to beUeve that so sagacious a statesman as Mr 
Drouyn de Lhuys will fail to see them in all their force, nor is 
there any doubt that he will be sustained by the Emperor. 

It is fortunate, too, that the present state of things will 
give to the British Cabinet a disposition to regard with favour 
the relaxation and liberalization of their ancient views on this 
subject. 

The Hon. W. L. Marcy. J. Y. Mason. 



D.— THE UNITED STATES MINISTER IN LONDON TO THE 
UNITED STATES SECRETARY OF STATE. 

,y . .. London, March 24, 1854. 

In my last despatch, of the 17th instant, I omitted, for want 
of time, to refer to the conversation between Lord Clarendon 
and myself, on the general subject of privateering. He did not 
propose the conclusion of a Treaty between Great Britain and 
the United States for its suppression ; but he expressed a strong 
opinion against it, as inconsistent with modern civilization, and 
liable to great abuses. He spoke in highly complimentary terms 
of the Treaties of the United States with different nations, 
stipulating that if one of the parties be neutral and the other 
belligerent, the subjects of the neutral accepting commissions 
as privateers to cruize against the other from the opposing 
belligerent, shall be punished as pirates. 

These ideas were, doubtless, suggested to his mind by the 
apprehension felt here that Americans will, during the existing 
war, accept commissions from the Emperor of Russia, and that 
our sailors will be employed to cruize against British commerce. 

In short, although his Lordship did not propose a Treaty 
between the 2 Governments for the total suppression of privateer- 
ing, it was evident that this was his drift. 

In answer, I admitted that the practice of privateering was 
subject to great abuses ; but it did not seem to me possible, 
under existing circumstances, for the United States to agree to 
its suppression, unless the naval Powers would go one step 
further, and consent that war against private property should 
be abolished altogether upon the ocean as it had already been 
upon the land. There was nothing really different in principle 
or morality between the act of a regular cruizer and that of a 
privateer in robbing a merchant vessel upon the ocean, and 
confiscating the property of private individuals on board for the 
benefit of the captor. 



U.S. Despatches as to Declaration to Neutrals 259 

But how would the suppression of privateering, without 
going further, operate upon the United States ? Suppose, for 
example, we should again unfortunately be engaged in a war 
with Great Britain, which I earnestly hoped might never be the 
ease ; to what a situation must we be reduced if we should 
consent to abolish privateering. 

The navy of Great Britain was vastly superior to that of 
the United States in the number of vessels-of-war. They could 
send cruizers into every sea to capture our merchant vessels, 
whilst the number of our cruizers was comparatively so small as 
to render anything like equality in this respect impossible. The 
only means which we would possess to counterbalance in some 
degree their far greater numerical strength, would be to convert 
our merchant vessels, cast out of employment by the war, into 
privateers, and endeavour, by their assistance, to inflict as much 
injury on British as they would be able to inflict on American 
commerce. 

The genuine dictate of Christianity and civilization would 
be to abolish war against private property upon the ocean 
altogether, and only employ the navies of the world in public 
warfare against the enemy, as their armies were now employed ; 
and to this principle thus extended, it was highly probable the 
Government of the United States would not object. 

Here the conversation on this particular subject ended in a 
good-natured manner ; and I am anxious to learn whether 
what I have said in relation to it meets your approbation. 

The Hon. W. L. Marcy. James Buchanan. 



E.— THE UNITED STATES MINISTER IN PARIS TO THE 
UNITED STATES SECRETARY OF STATE. 

Paris, March 30, 1854. 
(Extract) 

In the Moniteur of this morning appeared a report of the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, and the declaration of the Emperor 
of France, on the subject of neutrals, letters of marque, etc., 
pending the war. I enclose slips of the Moniteur containing 
these several important documents. I think that you will 
observe in them satisfactory recognition of liberal principles in 
regard to the rights of neutrals. 

The Hon. W. L. Marcy. J. Y. Mason. 



260 The Declaration of Paris 



F.— THE UNITED STATES MINISTER IN LONDON TO THE 
UNITED STATES SECRETARY OF STATE. 

London, March 31, 1854. 
(Extract) 

You will perceive that Her Majesty's declaration concerning 
the commerce of neutrals is substantially the same as that 
which I informed you it would be in my despatch of the 17th 
instant. It has given great satisfaction to the diplomatic repre- 
sentatives of neutral nations in London, and to no one more 
than myself. 

Indeed it is far more liberal than I had any reason to expect 
it would have been, judging from the judicial decisions and past 
history of the country. 

The Hon. W. L. Marcy. James Buchanan. 



G.— THE UNITED STATES CHARGilfi D'AFFAIRES AT STOCK- 
HOLM TO THE UNITED STATES SECRETARY OF STATE. 

Stockholm, April 10, 1854. 
Sir, 

A Swedish Ordinance was published yesterday, defining the 
rights and obligations of such of the people as are engaged in 
commerce and navigation. The document is interesting as 
forming part of the history of the Northern neutrality. For 
this and other reasons I have translated it entire.^ The marginal 
notes which I shall add, will enable you to refer to any clause 
that may chiefly interest you. 

You will best know what reliance may be safely placed upon 
the equitable promises which have been held out to neutrals by 
the belligerent Powers ; seemingly triumphs of the enlightened 
age over historic reminiscences of war. It would ill become 
me to offer an opinion of the realities to be looked for ; but the 
forebodings of the more intelligent men of the country weigh 
upon this community ; and, although unconfessed by Govern- 
ment, they are the real controlling influences in the Council 
of State. — I have, etc., 

The Hon. W. L. Marcy. F. Schroeder. 

* Thip Ordinance is printed in French among the Neutral Legislation 
issued during the war (Document No. 14 M). 



U.S. Despatches as to Declaration to Neutrals 261 



H.— THE UNITED STATES SECRETARY OF STATE TO 
THE UNITED STATES MINISTER IN LONDON. 

Washington, April 13, 1854. 
(Extract) 

The course indicated to you by Lord Clarendon as that which 
Great Britain had determined to pursue in the event of a 
European war in regard to neutral commerce is entirely satis- 
factory to this Government as to the 2 main points. 

The proposition submitted to you — the same, I presume, 
which Mr Crampton has confidentially submitted to me — are, 
1st. That free ships make free goods, except articles contraband 
of war ; and 2nd. That neutral property, not contraband, found 
on board enemies' ships is not liable to confiscation. The 
United States have long favoured the doctrine that the neutral 
flag should protect the cargo, and endeavoured to have it 
regarded and acted on as a part of the law of nations. There is 
now, I believe, a fair prospect of getting this sound and salutary 
principle incorporated into the international code. 

There can be, I presume, no doubt that France cheerfully 
concurs with Great Britain in adopting this principle as a rule of 
conduct in the pending war. I have just received a despatch 
from Mr Mason, in which he details conferences he had with the 
French Ministers on the subject of neutral rights ; it does not 
appear from the accounts he has given of them that the French 
Government had intimated to him the course it intended to 
pursue in regard to neutral ships and neutral property on board 
enemy's ships. I have no doubt, however, that France has more 
readily acquiesced in the indicated policy than Great Britain. 

Both Great Britain and France, as well as Russia, feel much 
concerned as to the course which our citizens will take in regard 
to privateering. The two former Powers would at this time 
most readily enter into conventions, stipulating that the subjects 
or citizens of the party, being a neutral, who shall accept com- 
missions or letters of marque, and engage in the privateer ser- 
vice, the other party being the belligerent, may be treated as 
pirates. A stipulation to this effect is contained in several of 
our treaties, but I do not think the President would permit it 
to be inserted in any new one. His objection to it does not arise 
from a desire to have our citizens embark in foreign belligerent 
service, but, on the contrary, he would much regret to see them 
take such a course. Our laws go as far as those of any nation — 
I think further — in laying restraints upon them in regard to 
going into foreign privateer service. This Government is not 



262 The Declaration of Paris 

prepared to listen to any proposition for a total suppression 
of privateering. It would not enter into any convention 
whereby it would preclude itself from resorting to the merchant 
marine of the country, in case it should become a belligerent 
party. 

The declaration which Her Britannic Majesty's Government 
proposes to issue is distinct in interdicting to neutrals the coast- 
ing and colonial trade with the belligerent, if not enjoyed by 
them previous to the war. In regard to this trade, you are 
aware that Great Britain asserted principles, in the wars result- 
ing from the French Revolution, before she issued her obnoxious 
Orders in Council, which this country held to be in violation of 
the law of nations. Should she still adhere to those principles 
in the coming conflict in Europe, and have occasion to apply 
them to our commerce, they will be seriously controverted by 
the United States, and may disturb our friendly relations with 
her and her allied belligerents. The liberal spirit she has indi- 
cated in respect of the cargoes under a neutral flag, and neutral 
property which may be found on board of enemies' ships, gives 
an implied assurance that she will not attempt again to assert 
belligerent rights which are not well sustained by the well- 
settled principles of international law. 

In some respects, I think the law of blockade is unreasonably 
rigorous towards neutrals, and they can fairly claim a relaxation 
of it. By the decisions of the English Courts of Admiralty — 
and ours have generally followed in their footsteps — a neutral 
vessel which happens to be in a blockaded port is not permitted 
to depart with a cargo, unless that cargo was on board at the 
time when the blockade commenced, or was first made known. 
Having visited the port in the common freedom of trade, a 
neutral vessel ought to be permitted to depart with a cargo, 
without regard to the time when it was received on board. 

The right of search has heretofore been so freely used, and 
so freely abused, to the injury of our commerce, that it is re- 
garded as an odious doctrine in this country, and, if exercised 
against us harshly in the approaching war, will excite deep and 
widespread indignation. Caution on the part of belligerents 
in exercising it towards us in cases where sanctioned by usage, 
would be a wise procedure. As the law has been declared by 
the decisions of Courts of Admiralty and elementary writers, 
it allows belligerents to search neutral vessels for articles contra- 
band of war, and for enemies' goods. If the doctrine is so 
modified as to exempt from seizure and confiscation enemies' 
property under a neutral flag, still the right to seize articles 
contraband of war, on board of neutral vessels, implies the right 



U.S. Despatches as to Declaration to Neutrals 263 

to ascertain the character of the cargo. If used for such a 
purpose and in a proper manner, it is not probable that serious 
collisions would occur between neutrals and belligerents. 

A persistent resistance by a neutral vessel to submit to a 
search renders it confiscable, according to the settled determina- 
tion of the English Admiralty. It would be much to be regretted 
if any of our vessels should be condemned for this cause, unless 
under circumstances which compromitted their neutraUty. 

J. Buchanan, Esq. W. L. Marcy. 



I.— THE FRENCH MINISTER AT WASHINGTON TO THE 
UNITED STATES SECRETARY OF STATE. 

Washington, April 28, 1854. 
(Translation) 

The Undersigned Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Pleni- 
potentiary of France, has received orders from his Government 
to address the following communication to the Honourable 
Secretary of State. 

His Majesty the Emperor of the French, and Her Majesty 
the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain, are about 
to find themselves under the necessity of resorting to force of 
arms in order to repel the aggressions of which the Ottoman 
Empire is the object, on the part of His Majesty the Emperor 
of Russia. Being desirous to lessen as much as possible, in 
behalf of commerce, the fatal consequences of a state of war, 
their Majesties have determined not to authorise privateering, 
for the present, by issuing letters of marque, and to make known, 
at the same time, that this determination is communicated, 
the principles which they intend to apply to the navigation and 
the commerce of neutrals during this war. 

It was with this view that His Majesty the Emperor of the 
French caused the accompanying declaration to be published ; 
the same being identical with that which Her Majesty the Queen 
of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland has caused 
to be published on her side. 

In confining the exercise of their rights of belligerents within 
such narrow bounds, the Allied Governments consider them- 
selves justified in relying upon the sincere efforts of those 
Governments which shall remain neutral in this war, to cause 
their respective citizens and subjects to observe the obligations 
of strictest neutrality. Consequently, the Government of His 
Majesty the Emperor of the French, trusts that the Government 
of the United States will receive with satisfaction the announce- 



264 The Declaration of Paris 

ment of the determination taken in common between the two 
AlHed Governments, and that it will, by way of just reciprocity, 
give orders so that no privateer under the Russian flag shall be 
allowed to be fitted out or victualled, nor admitted with its 
prizes, in the ports of the United States, and in order that United 
States citizens may rigorously abstain from taking part in equip- 
ments of this kind, or in any other measure contrary to the duties 
of a strict neutrality. — The Undersigned, etc.. 

The Hon. W. L. Marcy. Sartiges. 

[A letter was written in similar terms by Mr Crampton, 
British Minister to the United States, forwarding the Queen's 
Declaration to the Secretary of State.] 

J.— FIRST MARCY NOTE, APRIL 28, 1854. 

United States of America, 
Department of State. 

The undersigned. Secretary of State of the United States, has 
had the honor to receive the note of Mr Crampton, Her Britannic 
Majesty's envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary, of 
the 21st instant, accompanied by the declaration of Her Majesty 
the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, 
in regard to the rule which will for the present be observed 
towards those Powers with which she is at peace, in the existing 
war with Russia. 

The undersigned has submitted those communications to the 
President, and received his direction to express to Her Majesty's 
government his satisfaction that the principle that free ships 
make free goods, which the United States have so long and so 
strenuously contended for as a neutral right, and in which 
some of the leading Powers of Europe have concurred, is to 
have a qualified sanction by the practical observance of it in 
the present war by both Great Britain and France — ^two of the 
most powerful nations of Europe. 

Notwithstanding the sincere gratification which Her Majesty's 
declaration has given to the President, it would have been en- 
hanced if the rule alluded to had been announced as one 
which would be observed not only in the present, but in every 
future war in which Great Britain shall be a party. The un- 
conditional sanction of this rule by the British and French 
governments, together with the practical observance of it in 
the present war, would cause it to be henceforth recognised 
throughout the civilised world as a general principle of inter- 
national law. This government, from its very commencement, 



U.S. Despatches as to Declaration to Neutrals 265 

has labored for its recognition as a neutral right. It has 
incorporated it in many of its treaties with foreign powers. 
France, Russia, Prussia, and other nations, have, in various 
way,s, fully concurred with the United States in regarding it 
as a sound and salutary principle, in all respects proper to be 
incorporated into the law of nations. 

The same consideration which has induced Her Britannic 
Majesty, in concurrence with the Emperor of the French, to 
present it as a concession in the present war, the desire " to 
preserve the commerce of neutrals from all unnecessary obstruc- 
tion," will, it is presumed, have equal weight with the belli- 
gerents in any future war, and satisfy them that the claims of 
the principal maritime Powers, while neutral, to have it recog- 
nised as a rule of international law, are well founded, and should 
be no longer contested. 

To settle the principle that free ships make free goods, except 
articles contraband of war, and to prevent it from being called 
again in question from any quarter or under any circumstances, 
the United States are desirous to unite with other Powers in a 
declaration that it shall be observed by each, hereafter, as a 
rule of international law. 

The exemption of the property of neutrals, not contraband, 
from seizure and confiscation when laden on board an enemy's 
vessel, is a right now generally recognised by the law of nations. 
The President is pleased to perceive, from the declaration of 
Her Britannic Majesty, that the course to be pursued by her 
cruisers will not bring it into question in the present war. 

The undersigned is directed by the President to State to Her 
Majesty's minister to this government that the United States, 
while claiming the full enjoyment of their rights as a neutral 
power, will observe the strictest neutrality towards each and all 
the belligerents. The laws of this country impose severe 
restrictions not only upon its own citizens, but upon all persons 
who may be resident within any of the territories of the United 
States, against equipping privateers, receiving commissions, 
or enlisting men therein, for the purpose of taking a part in 
any foreign war. It is not apprehended that there will be any 
attempt to violate the laws ; but should the just expectation 
of the President be disappointed, he will not fail in his duty 
to use all the power with which he is invested to enforce obedi- 
ence to them. Considerations of interest and the obligations 
of duty alike give assurance that the citizens of the United 
States will in no way compromit the neutrality of their country 
by participating in the contest in which the principal powers 
of Europe are now unhappily engaged. 



266 The Declaration of Paris 

The undersigned avails himself of this opportunity to renew 
to Mr Cramp ton the assurance of his distinguished consideration. 

ixr u- 4. A loo ^osA W. L. Marcy. 

Washmgton, April 28, 1854. 

John F. Crampton, Esq., etc., etc. 



K.— MR MARCY'S NOTE TO FRANCE.^ 
(Extrait du Moniteur du 23 Mai 1854.) 

Paris, 23 Mai 1854. 

Le gouvernement des Etats-Unis de I'Amerique du Nord 
a repondu, le 28 Avril, a la communication qui lui avait 6te 
faite par le ministre de France de la declaration des deux grandes 
puissances maritimes de I'Europe relativement aux pavilions 
neutres durant la guerre actuelle. Dans cette reponse, M. L. 
Marcy exprime, au nom du president de I'Union, le voeu que 
les maximes adoptees de concert par la France et I'Angleterre 
deviennent pour I'avenir la regie de conduite de toutes les 
nations civilis6es. Le secretaire d'Etat declare, en outre, que 
son gouvernement a la ferme volonte d'observer strictement et 
de faire observer de meme les devoirs de la neutralite. II 
rappelle que la legislation du pays interdit severement a tout 
citoyen am^ricain, ainsi qu'a toute personne etablie sur le ter- 
ritoire de rUnion, les ^quipements de corsaires, les commissions, 
les enrolements d'hommes en vue de prendre part a la guerre 
^trangere. M. Marcy ajoute qu'il n'est pas a craindre que 
quelque tentative ait lieu pour enfreindre ces lois, mais que, 
dans le cas ou I'attente du gouvernement de I'Union a ce sujet 
serait trompee, le President croirait devoir user du pouvoir 
dont il est investi pour les faire respecter. 

L.— THE UNITED STATES SECRETARY OF STATE TO THE 
UNITED STATES MINISTER AT ST PETERSBURGH. 

« Washington, May 9, 1854. 

You have probably seen the joint declaration of Great 
Britain and France, referred to in the enclosed copy of a Note 
to Mr Crampton, Her Britannic Majesty's Minister to this 
Government. This declaration was communicated to me by 
Ministers of France and England, accompanied by a Note, to 
which I replied. The Note to the French Minister is substan- 
tially the same as that sent to Mr Crampton. 

^ The text of the original Note was not available. The extract from 
the Moniteur is reprinted from Ortolan's Diplomaiie de la Mer. 



U.S. Despatches as to Declaration to Neutrals 267 

It is the settled purpose of this Government to pursue such 
a course, during the present war in Europe, as will give no cause 
to either belligerent party to complain, and it sincerely hopes 
neither will give this country any ground for dissatisfaction. 

The danger of a misunderstanding is much less with Russia 
than with Great Britain and France. I believe, however, these 
latter Powers are desirous to pursue a fair and liberal course 
towards neutrals, and particularly towards the United States. 

You will observe that there is a suggestion in the enclosed 
for a Convention among the principal maritime nations to unite 
in a declaration that free ships should make free goods, except 
articles contraband of war. This doctrine had heretofore the 
sanction of Russia, and no reluctance is apprehended on her part 
to becoming a party to such an arrangement. Great Britain 
is the only considerable Power which has heretofore made a 
sturdy opposition to it. Having yielded for the present in the 
existing war, she thereby recognises the justice and fairness of 
the principle and would hardly be consistent if she should with- 
hold her consent to an agreement to have it hereafter regarded as 
a rule of international law. I have thrown out the suggestion 
to Great Britain and France to adopt this as a rule to be observed 
in all future wars. The President may instruct me to make the 
direct proposition to these and other Powers. Should Russia, 
Great Britain, and France concur with the United States in 
declaring this to be the doctrine of the law of nations, I do not 
doubt that the other nations of the world would at once give 
their consent and conform their practice to it. If a fair oppor- 
tunity should occur, the President requests you to ascertain the 
views of His Majesty the Emperor of Russia on the subject. 

The decisions of Admiralty Courts in this and other countries 
have frequently affirmed the doctrine that a belligerent may 
seize and confiscate enemy's property found on board of a neutral 
vessel ; the general consent of nations, therefore, is necessary 
to change it. This seems to be a most favourable time for such 
a salutary change. From the earliest period of this Government, 
it has made strenuous efforts to have the rule that free ships 
make free goods, except contraband articles, adopted as a prin- 
ciple of international law ; but Great Britain insisted on a dif- 
ferent rule. These efforts, consequently, proved unavailing ; 
and now it cannot be recognised, and a strict observance of it 
secured, without a conventional regulation among the maritime 
Powers. This Government is desirous to have all nations agree 
in a declaration that this rule shall hereafter be observed by 
them respectively, when they shall happen to be involved in 
any war, and that, as neutrals, they will insist upon it as a 



268 The Declaration of Paris 

neutral right. In this the United States are confident that they 
will have the cordial consent and co-operation of Russia. — 
I am, etc., 

T. H. Seymour, Esq. W. L. Marcy. 



Proclamations and Orders in Council, March-April 1854. 

(l) FEBRUARY 18.— PROCLAMATION PROHIBITING EXPORT 
OF ARMS, STORES, ETC. 

By the Queen — A Proclamation. 
Victoria R. 

Whereas by the Customs Consolidation Act, 1853, Section 
150, certain Goods may, by Proclamation or Order of Her 
Majesty in Council, be prohibited either to be exported or 
carried Coastwise : And whereas We, by and with the Advice 
of Our Privy Council, deem it expedient and necessary to 
prohibit the Goods herein-after mentioned either to be exported 
or carried Coastwise : We, by and with the Advice aforesaid, 
do hereby Order and Direct, that from and after the Date 
hereof, all Arms, Ammunition and Gunpowder, Military and 
Naval Stores, and the following Articles, being Articles which 
We have judged capable of being converted into, or made 
useful in increasing the Quantity of. Military or Naval Stores, 
that is to say. Marine Engines, Screw Propellers, Paddle Wheels, 
Cylinders, Cranks, Shafts, Boilers, Tubes for Boilers, Boiler 
Plates, Fire Bars, and every Article, or any other component 
Part of an Engine or Boiler, or any Article whatsoever, which 
is, can or may become applicable for the Manufacture of Marine 
Machinery, shall be and the same are hereby prohibited either 
to be exported from the United Kingdom or carried Coastwise. 

Given at Our Court at Buckingham Palace, this Eighteenth 
Day of February, in the Year of Our Lord One thousand 
eight hiindred and fifty-four, and in the Seventeenth 
Year of Our Reign. 

God save the Queen. 



Proclamations and Orders in Council 269 

(2) MARCH 9.— PROCLAMATION AGAINST FITTING OUT OR 
EQUIPPING VESSELS FOR WARLIKE PURPOSES. 

By the Queen — A Proclamation. 
Victoria R. 

Whereas by an Act of Parliament passed in the Fifty-ninth 
Year of the Reign of His late Majesty King George the Third, 
entitled " An Act to prevent the enlisting or Engagement of 
His Majesty's Subjects to serve in Foreign Service, and the 
fitting out or equipping in His Majesty's Dominions Vessels for 
Warlike Purposes, without His Majesty's Licence," it is amongst 
other things enacted [recital of s. 7 of Foreign EnUstment Act, 
1819, 59 G. III. c. 69]. And whereas it has been represented to 
Us that Ships and Vessels are being built in several Places within 
the United Kingdom, and are being equipped, furnished, and 
fitted out especially with Steam Machinery, with Intent that 
they shall be employed as aforesaid, without Our Royal Leave 
or Licence for that Purpose first had or obtained or signified 
as aforesaid ; We have therefore thought fit, by and with the 
Advice of Our Privy Council, to issue this Our Royal Proclama- 
tion, warning all Our Subjects against taking part in such 
Proceedings, which We are determined to prevent and repress, 
and which cannot fail to bring upon the Parties engaged in 
them the Punishments which attend the Violation of the Laws. 

Given at Our Court at Buckingham Palace, this Ninth Day 
of March in the Year of our Lord One thousand eight 
hundred and fifty-four, and in the Seventeenth Year 
of Our Reign. 

God SAVE the Queen. 

On the 28th March Her Majesty issued a Declaration of the 
causes of war ; and on the same date her Declaration with 
reference to neutrals and letters of marque [No. 5, A]. 

On the 29th March, by an Order in Council, general reprisals 
were granted against Russia. 

(3) MARCH 29.— EMBARGO ON RUSSIAN VESSELS. 

At the Court at Buckingham Palace, 
the 29th Day of March 1854. 

present, 
The Queen's Most Excellent Majesty in Council. 

It is this Day ordered by Her Majesty, by and with the Advice 
of Her Privy Council, that no Ships or Vessels belonging to any 



270 The Declaration of Paris 

of Her Majesty's Subjects be permitted to enter and clear out 
for any of the Ports of Russia, until further Order ; and Her 
Majesty is further pleased to order, that a general Embargo or 
Stop be made of all Russian Ships and Vessels whatsoever, now 
within or which shall hereafter come into any of the Ports, 
Harbours, or Roads within any of Her Majesty's Dominions, 
together with all Persons and Effects on board the said Ships 
or Vessels : Provided always, that nothing herein contained 
shall extend to any Ships or Vessels specified or comprised in 
a certain Order of Her Majesty in Council, dated this Twenty- 
ninth Day of March, for exempting from Capture or Detention 
Russian Vessels under special Circumstances ; and Her Majesty 
is pleased further to order, and it is hereby ordered, that the 
utmost Care be taken for the Preservation of all and every Part 
of the Cargoes on board any of the said Ships or Vessels, so that 
no Damage or Embezzlement whatever be sustained. 

And the Right Honourable the Lords Commissioners of 
Her Majesty's Treasury, the Lords Commissioners of the Ad- 
miralty, and the Lord Warden of the Cinque Ports are to give 
the necessary Directions herein as to them may respectively 
appertain. 

C. C. Greville. 



(4) MARCH 29.— EXEMPTING CERTAIN RUSSIAN VESSELS 
FROM CAPTURE. 

At the Court at Buckingham Palace, 
the 29th Day of March 1854. 

PRESENT, 

The Queen's Most Excellent Majesty in Council. 

Her Majesty, being compelled to declare War against His 
Imperial Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias, and being 
desirous to lessen as much as possible the Evils thereof, is pleased, 
by and with the Advice of Her Privy Council, to order, and it 
is hereby ordered, that Russian Merchant Vessels, in any Ports 
or Places within Her Majesty's Dominions, shall be allowed 
until the Tenth Day of May next. Six Weeks from the Date 
hereof, for loading their Cargoes and departing from such Ports 
or Places ; and that such Russian Merchant Vessels, if met at 
Sea by any of Her Majesty's Ships, shall be permitted to con- 
tinue their Voyage, if on Examination of their Papers it shall 
appear that their Cargoes were taken on board before the Ex- 
piration of the above Term : Provided, that nothing herein 



Proclamations and Orders in Council 271 

contained shall extend or be taken to extend to Russian Vessels 
having on board any Officer in the Military or Naval Service of 
the Enemy, or any Article prohibited or contraband of War, or 
any Despatch of or to the Russian Government. 

And it is hereby further ordered by Her Majesty, by and with 
the Advice of Her Privy Council as aforesaid, that any Russian 
Merchant Vessel which, prior to the Date of this Order, shall 
have sailed from any Foreign Port bound for any Port or Place 
in Her Majesty's Dominions, shall be permitted to enter such 
Port or Place and to discharge her Cargo, and afterwards forth- 
with to depart without Molestation, and that any such Vessel, 
if met at Sea by any of Her Majesty's Ships, shall be permitted 
to continue her Voyage to any Port not blockaded. 

And the Right Honourable the Lords Commissioners of Her 
Majesty's Treasury, the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, 
and the Lord Warden of the Cinque Ports, are to give the neces- 
sary Directions herein as to them may respectively appertain. 

C. C. Geeville. 



(5) APRIL 7.— EXTENDING ORDER No. 4 TO 
INDIA AND THE COLONIES. 

At the Court at Buckingham Palace, 
the 7th Day of April 1854. 

PRESENT, 

The Queen's Most Excellent Majesty in Council. 

Her Majesty being compelled to declare War against His 
Imperial Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias, and being 
desirous to lessen as much as possible the Evils thereof, is 
pleased, by and with the Advice of Her Privy Council, to order, 
and it is hereby ordered, that Russian Merchant Vessels which, 
at the Time of the Publication of this Order, shall be in any Ports 
or Places in Her Majesty's Indian Territories under the Govern- 
ment of the East India Company, or within any of Her Majesty's 
Foreign or Colonial Possessions, shall be allowed Thirty Days 
from the Time of the Publication of this Order in such Indian 
Territories, or Foreign or Colonial Possession, for loading their 
Cargoes and departing from such Ports or Places ; and that such 
Russian Merchant Vessels, if met at Sea by any of Her Majesty's 
Ships, shall be permitted to continue their Voyage if, on Examina- 
tion of their Papers, it shall appear that their Cargoes were 
taken on board before the Expiration of the above Term ; pro- 
vided that nothing herein contained shall extend, or be taken 



272 The Declaration of Paris 

to extend, to Russian Vessels having on board any Officer in 
the Military or Naval Service of the Enemy, or any Article pro- 
hibited or contraband of War, or any Despatch of or to the 
Russian Government. 

And it is hereby further ordered by Her Majesty, by and 
with the Advice of Her Privy Council as aforesaid, that any 
Russian Merchant Vessel which, prior to the Twenty-ninth Day 
of March now last past, shall have sailed from any Foreign 
Port, bound for any Port or Place in any of Her Majesty's 
Indian Territories, or Foreign or Colonial Possessions, shall be 
permitted to enter such Port or Place, and to discharge her 
Cargo, and afterwards forthwith to depart without Molestation ; 
and that any such Vessel, if met at Sea by any of Her Majesty's 
Ships, shall be permitted to continue her Voyage to any Port 
not blockaded. 

-■^i And the Right Honourable the Lords Commissioners of Her 
Majesty's Treasury, the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, 
and Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for War and the 
Colonies, the Right Honourable the Commissioners for the 
Affairs of India, and all Governors, Officers, and Authorities 
whom it may concern, in Her Majesty's East Indian, Foreign, 
and Colonial Possessions, are to give the necessary Directions 
herein as to them may respectively appertain. 

C. C. Greville. 



(6) APRIL 7.— EMBARGO ON RUSSIAN VESSELS IN 
CHANNEL ISLANDS AND ISLE OF MAN. 

At the Court at Buckingham Palace, 
the 7th Day of April 1854. 

present. 
The Queen's Most Excellent Majesty in Council. 

It is this Day ordered by Her Majesty, by and with the Advice 
of Her Privy Council, that no Ships or Vessels belonging to any 
of Her Majesty's Subjects be permitted to enter and clear out 
for any of the Ports of Russia until further Order ; and Her 
Majesty is further pleased to order, that a general Embargo or 
Stop be made of all Russian Ships and Vessels whatsoever now 
within or which shall hereafter come into any of the Ports, 
Harbours, or Roads, within Her Majesty's Islands of Jersey, 
Guernsey, Alderney, and Sark, and the Isle of Man, together 
with all Persons and Effects on board the said Ships or Vessels : 
Provided always, that nothing herein contained shall extend 



Proclamations and Orders in Council 273 

to any Ships or Vessels specified or comprised in a certain 
Order of Her Majesty in Council, dated the Twenty-ninth Day 
of March last, for exempting from Capture or Detention Russian 
Vessels under special Circumstances ; and Her Majesty is pleased 
further to order, and it is hereby ordered, that the utmost Care 
be taken for the Preservation of all and every Part of the 
Cargoes on board any of the said Ships or Vessels, so that no 
Damage or Embezzlement whatever be sustained. 

And the Lieutenant-Governors of Her Majesty's Islands of 
Jersey, Guernsey, Alderney, and Sark, and of the Isle of Man» 
for the Time being, are to give the necessary Directions herein 
as to them may respectively appertain, and to return an Account 
of their Proceedings to this Board. 

C. C. Greville. 



(7) APRIL 11.— PERMITTING EXPORT OF CERTAIN 
PROHIBITED ARTICLES. 

At the Council Chamber, Whitehall, 
the 11th Day of April 1854. 

By the Lords of Her Majesty's Most Honourable 
Privy Council. 

The Lords of the Council having taken into consideration cer- 
tain Applications for Leave to export Arms, Ammunition, Military 
and Naval Stores, &c., being Articles of which the Exportation 
is prohibited by Her Majesty's Proclamation of February 18th, 
1854 : their Lordships are pleased to order, and it is hereby 
ordered, that Permission should be granted by the Lords Com- 
missioners of Her Majesty's Treasury to export the Articles so 
prohibited, to be carried Coastwise to Ports in the United King- 
dom, and likewise to all Places in North and South America, 
except the Russian Possessions in North America ; to the Coast 
of Africa, West of the Straits of Gibraltar, and round the South 
and East Coast of Africa ; to the whole Coast of Asia not within 
the Mediterranean Sea or the Persian Gulf, and not being Part 
of the Russian Territories ; to the whole of Australia, and to 
all British Colonies within the Limits aforesaid, upon taking a 
Bond from the Persons exporting such prohibited Articles that 
they shall be landed and entered at the Port of Destination ; 
and that all further Permission to export such Articles to other 
Parts of the World be only granted upon Application to the 
Lords of the Council at this Board. 

C. C. Greville. 
18 



274 The Declaration of Paris 



(8) APRIL 16.— IN FURTHERANCE OF THE DECLARATION 
TO THE NEUTRALS. [No. 6 A.] 

At the Court at Windsor, 
the 15th Day of April 1854. 

PRESENT, 

The Queen's Most Excellent Majesty in Council. 

Whereas Her Majesty was graciously pleased, on the Twenty- 
eighth Day of March last, to issue Her Royal Declaration in the 
following Terms : 

Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Ireland, having been compelled to take up 
Arms in support of an Ally, is desirous of rendering the 
War as little onerous as possible to the Powers with whom 
she remains at Peace. 

To preserve the Commerce of Neutrals from all un- 
necessary Obstruction, Her Majesty is willing, for the 
Present, to waive a Part of the Belligerent Rights apper- 
taining to Her by the Law of Nations. 

It is impossible for Her Majesty to forego the Exercise 
of Her Right of seizing Articles Contraband of War, and of 
preventing Neutrals from bearing the Enemy's Despatches, 
and She must maintain the Right of a Belligerent to prevent 
Neutrals from breaking any effective Blockade which may 
be established with an adequate Force against the Enemy's 
Forts, Harbours, or Coasts. 

But Her Majesty will waive the Right of seizing Enemy's 
property laden on board a neutral Vessel unless it be Con- 
traband of War. 

It is not Her Majesty's Intention to claim the Confisca- 
tion of neutral Property, not being Contraband of War, 
found on board Enemy's Ships ; and Her Majesty further 
declares, that being anxious to lessen as much as possible 
the Evils of War, and to restrict its Operations to the 
regularly organised Forces of the Country, it is not Her 
present Intention to issue Letters of Marque for the com- 
missioning of Privateers. 

Now it is this Day ordered, by and with the Advice of Her 
Privy Council, that all Vessels under a neutral or friendly Flag, 
being neutral or friendly Property, shall be permitted to import 
into any Port or Place in Her Majesty's Dominions all Goods 
and Merchandise whatsoever, to whomsoever the same may 
belong ; and to export from any Port or Place in Her Majesty's 
Dominions to any Port not blockaded any Cargo or Goods, 



Proclamations and Orders in Council 275 

not being Contraband of War, or not requiring a special Per- 
mission, to whomsoever the same may belong. 

And Her Majesty is further pleased, by and with the Advice 
of Her Privy Council, to order, and it is hereby further ordered, 
that, save and except only as aforesaid, all the Subjects of Her 
Majesty and the Subjects or Citizens of any neutral or friendly 
State shall and may, during and notwithstanding the present 
Hostilities with Russia, freely trade with all Ports and Places 
wheresoever situate which shall not be in a State of Blockade, 
save and except that no British Vessel shall under any Circum- 
stances whatsoever, either under or by virtue of this Order or 
otherwise, be permitted or empowered to enter or communicate 
with any Port or Place which shall belong to or be in the 
Possession or Occupation of Her Majesty's Enemies. 

And the Right Honourable the Lords Commissioners of Her 
Majesty's Treasury, the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, 
the Lord Warden of the Cinque Ports, and Her Majesty's 
Principal Secretary of State for War and the Colonies, are to 
give the necessary Directions herein as to them may respectively 
appertain. 

C. C. Greville. 



(9) APRIL 15.— EXTENDING ORDER NO. 4 TO THE 16TH MAY. 

At the Court at Windsor, 
the 15th Day of April 1854. 

PRESENT, 

The Queen's Most Excellent Majesty in Council. 

Whereas by an Order of Her Majesty in Council of the Twenty- 
ninth of March last, it was amongst other things ordered, " that 
any Russian Merchant Vessel which prior to the Date of this 
Order shall have sailed from any Foreign Port, bound for any 
Port or Place in Her Majesty's Dominions, shall be permitted 
to enter such Port or Place and to discharge her Cargo, and after- 
wards forthwith to depart without Molestation, and that any 
such Vessel, if met at Sea by any of Her Majesty's Ships, shall 
be permitted to continue her Voyage to any Port not blockaded " : 
And whereas Her Majesty, by and with the Advice of Her 
said Council, is now pleased to alter and extend such Part of the 
said Order : It is hereby ordered, by and with such Advice as 
aforesaid, as follows ; that is to say, — That any Russian Mer- 
chant Vessel which, prior to the Fifteenth Day of May One 



276 The Declaration of Paris 

thousand eight hundred and fifty-four, shall have sailed from 
any Port of Russia, situated either in or upon the Shores or 
Coasts of the Baltic Sea or of the White Sea, bound for any 
Port or Place in Her Majesty's Dominions, shall be permitted 
to enter such last-mentioned Port or Place, and to discharge 
her Cargo, and afterwards forthwith to depart without Molesta- 
tion ; and that any such Vessel, if met at Sea by any of Her 
Majesty's Ships, shall be permitted to continue her Voyage to 
any Port not blockaded. 

And Her Majesty is pleased, by and with the Advice afore- 
said, further to order, and it is hereby further ordered, that in 
all other respects Her Majesty's aforesaid Order in Council, of 
the Twenty-ninth Day of March last, shall be and remain in full 
Force, Effect, and Operation. 

And the Right Honourable the Lords Conamissioners of Her 
Majesty's Treasury, the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, 
and the Lord Warden of the Cinque Ports, are to give the neces- 
sary Directions herein as to them may respectively appertain. 

C. C. Greville. 



(10) APRIL 16.— PROHIBITING EXPORT OF ARMS 
FROM MALTA AND GIBRALTAR. 

At the Court at Windsor, 
the 15th Day of April 1854. 

PRESENT, 

The Queen's Most Excellent Majesty in Council. 

Whereas it has appeared expedient and necessary to Her 
Majesty, by and with the Advice of Her Privy Council, by reason 
of the Hostilities now subsisting between Herself and His Imperial 
Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias, to prohibit the Goods 
herein-after mentioned to be exported from the Island of Malta 
and its Dependencies, except as herein-after provided : 

Her Majesty is pleased, by and with the Advice of Her Privy 
Council aforesaid, to order, and it is hereby ordered, that from 
and after the Publication of this Order in the said Island, all 
Arms, Ammunition, and Gunpowder, Military and Naval Stores, 
and the following Articles, being Articles deemed capable of being 
converted into or made useful in increasing the Quantity of 
Military or Naval Stores ; that is to say. Marine Engines, Screw 
Propellers, Paddle Wheels, Cylinders, Cranks, Shafts, Boilers, 
Tubes for Boilers, Boiler Plates, Fire-bars, and every Article, 



Proclamations and Orders in Council 277 

or any other component Part of an Engine or Boiler, or any 
Article whatsoever which is, can, or may become applicable for 
the Manufacture of Marine Machinery, shall be and the same are 
hereby prohibited to be exported from the said Island of Malta 
and its Dependencies, except with the Licence of the Governor 
or other Officer administering the Government thereof for that 
Purpose first had and obtained. 

And the Most Noble the Duke of Newcastle, One of Her 
Majesty's Principal Secretaries of State, is to give the necessary 
Directions herein accordingly. 

C. C. Greville. 

An Order similar to the above was also issued prohibiting 
the Exportation of Arms, &c., from the " Town and Garrison 
of Gibraltar." 



(II) LIMITING PROCLAMATION OF 18TH FEBRUARY 
[NO. (1)] TO CERTAIN ARTICLES. 

At the Council Chamber, Whitehall, 
the 24th Day of April 1854. 

By the Lords of Her Majesty's Most Honourable 
Privy Council. 

The Lords of the Council, having taken into consideration 
certain Applications for Leave to export various Articles of 
which the Exportation is prohibited by Her Majesty's Pro- 
clamation of the 18th February 1854, are pleased to order, 
and it is hereby ordered, that the Officers of Her Majesty's 
Customs do not hereafter prevent the Export of any Articles, 
except only — 

Gunpowder, Saltpetre, and Brimstone ; 

Arms and Ammunition ; 

Marine Engines and Boilers, and the component Parts 
thereof. 

And that such last-named Articles be prohibited from Export 
only when destined to any Place in Europe North of Dunkirk 
or to any Place in the Mediterranean Sea East of Malta ; and 
that the Officers of Her Majesty's Customs do permit the Export 
of the said enumerated Articles to any other Part of the World, 
upon taking, from the Persons exporting the same, a Bond that 
they shall be landed and entered at the Port of Destination. 

Whereof the Lords Commissioners of Her Majesty's Treasury, 



278 The Declaration of Paris 

and Officers of Her Majesty's Customs, and all other Persons 
whom it may concern, are to take Notice, and govern them- 
selves accordingly. 

C. C. Greville. 

(12) November 30, 1854. — Prohibiting the export of lead, nitrate 

of soda, blue lias, Portland cement, and any article used 
in the manufacture of marine cement. 

(13) January 2, 1855. — Rescinding the Order of Nov. 30 pro- 

hibiting the export of blue lias, Portland cement, and 
any article used in marine cement. 

(14) August 7, 1855. — Prohibiting the export of sulphate of 

potash, muriate of potash. 

(15) August 7, 1855. — Prohibiting the export of rivet iron, 

angle iron, round bars, rivets, strips of iron, sheet plate 
iron, low moor plates. 

(16) August 28, 1855. — Granting leave to export certain articles, 

hitherto prohibited, to places east of Malta, with the 
exception of gunpowder, saltpetre, brimstone, nitrate 
of soda, sulphate of potash, muriate of potash, arms 
and ammunition of every kind, including lead. 

(17) August 30, 1855. — Amending in certain details Order No. 15 

relative to the export of iron. 

(18) August 30, 1855. — [Probably in lieu of No. 15 as amended.] 

Prohibiting the export of rivet iron, angle iron, rivets, 
strips of iron, low moor and bowling plates, sheet plate 
iron exceeding J inch, round bars of from f- to |-inch 
diameter. 

(19) September 20, 1855. — Rescinding Order No. 16, with the 

exception of gunpowder, saltpetre, brimstone, sulphate 
of potash, muriate of potash, arms and ammunition. 

(20) September 20, 1855. — Prohibiting the export of chlorate of 

potash. 

(21) November 1, 1855. — Prohibiting the export, to all foreign 

countries except British possessions, of saltpetre, nitrate 
of soda, sulphate of potash, muriate of potash, chlorate 
of potash. 

(22) December 27, 1855. — Prohibiting the export to Her 

Majesty's colonies and plantations in North America, 
including the West Indian Islands and all foreign 
countries, of saltpetre, nitrate of soda, sulphate of 
potash, muriate of potash. 



Proclamations and Orders in Council 279 

(23) December 28, 1855. — Rescinding the prohibition to export 

chlorate of potash. 

(24) April 9, 1856.— Revoking Order No. 3. 

(25) April 9, 1856. — Revoking Order No. 6. 

(26) April 9, 1856. — Taking off all prohibitions on the exporta- 

tion of arms, ammunition, etc. 

(27 and 28) April 9, 1856.— Revoking Order No. 10 (Malta and 
Gibraltar). 



(29) FEBRUARY 8, 1855.— PROCLAMATION DECLARING AS 
TRAITORS ALL BRITISH SUBJECTS WHO SHALL ASSIST 
HER MAJESTY'S ENEMIES. 

By the Queen — ^A Proclamation. 

Victoria R. 

Whereas information has been received that certain acts 
of a highly treasonable nature have been, or are about to be, 
done or attempted by certain British subjects adhering to the 
Queen's enemies, either within Her Majesty's dominions, or 
in parts beyond the seas ; such as building, or aiding and assist- 
ing in building, or equipping, ships of war, providing stores, or 
tackling, arms, and ammunition, for such ships, or manufactur- 
ing or fitting, or aiding, or assisting in manufacturing or fitting, 
steam machinery, either for such ships or for other warlike 
purposes ; or by entering into contracts, engagements, or agree- 
ments for some of the aforesaid purposes, or otherwise adhering 
to, aiding, assisting, or abetting, the Queen's enemies in parts 
beyond the seas, in levying or carrying on war against Her 
Majesty : now. Her Majesty, by this Her Royal Proclamation, 
doth warn all such persons engaging in any such treasonable 
designs or attempts as aforesaid, or otherwise adhering to, 
assisting, aiding, or abetting the Queen's enemies, that they will 
be liable to be apprehended and dealt with as traitors, and 
will be proceeded against with the utmost rigour of the law. 

Given at our Court at Windsor, this eighth day of February, 
in the year of our Lord One thousand eight hundred 
and fifty-five, and in the eighteenth year of our reign. 

God save the Queen. 



(30) April 28, 1856. — Proclamation of peace. 



280 The Declaration of Paris 

10 

Instructimis to the Fleets. 
A.— ENGLISH. 

INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE COMMANDERS OF H.M.'S SHIPS AND 
VESSELS OF WAR AS TO THE DISPOSAL OF CAPTURED 

VESSELS. 

I. The Commanders of Her Majesty's Ships and Vessels of 
War shall send all Ships, Vessels, and Goods which they shall 
seize and take, into such Port within Her Majesty's Dominions 
as shall be most convenient for them, in order to have the same 
legally adjudged in the High Court of Admiralty of England, 
or in some other Admiralty Court lawfully authorised to take 
cognizance of matters of Prize. 

II. After such Ships, Vessels, and Goods (save as to Ships 
of War) shall have been taken into any such Port, the Captor 
or one of his Chief Officers or some other person present at the 
capture, shall bring or send as soon as possibly may be, three 
or four of the principal persons belonging to the captured 
Ship or Vessel (two of whom shall always if possible be either 
the Master, Supercargo, Mate or Boatswain) before the Judge 
of the High Court of Admiralty of England, his Surrogate or 
the Judge of some other Admiralty Court within the British 
Dominions lawfully authorised, or others commissioned for 
that purpose as aforesaid, all such Books, Papers, Passes, Sea 
Briefs, Charter Parties, Bills of Lading, Cockets, Letters, and 
other Documents and Writings whatsoever as shall be delivered 
up, or found on board any such Ship or Vessel ; and the Captor 
or one of his Chief Officers or some other person who was present 
at the capture, and saw the said Papers and Writings delivered 
up, or otherwise found on board at the time of the Capture, 
shall make Oath that the said Papers and Writings are brought 
and delivered in as they were received and taken without any 
Fraud, Addition, Subduction, Alteration or Embezzlement what- 
ever, or otherwise shall account for the same upon Oath to the 
satisfaction of the Court. 

III. All Ships, Vessels, Goods, Wares, Merchandises and 
other Effects (save as to Ships of War) so captured as aforesaid 
shall immediately upon being brought into Port, be delivered over 
into the custody of the Marshall or other duly qualified Officer 
of the High Court of Admiralty of England, or other Court of 



Instructions to the Fleets 281 

Admiralty commissioned as aforesaid, or in the absence of any 
such Officer into the custody of the Collector, Comptroller, or 
other principal Officer of the Customs or Navigation Laws, and 
such Ships, Vessels, Goods, Wares, Merchandise and Effects 
shall be kept and preserved, and no part thereof shall be sold, 
spoiled, wasted or diminished, and the bulk thereof shall not be 
broken (save only in case of urgent necessity or by Decree of 
the Court,) until final judgement shall have been given in the 
said Court of Admiralty touching and concerning the same. 

IV. If any Ships or Vessels belonging to Her Majesty or Her 
Subjects or to any of Her Allies or their Subjects shall be found 
in distress by being in Flight, set upon, or Captured by the 
Enemy, or by reason of any other Accident, the Commanders 
of Her Majesty's Ships and Vessels of War shall use their best 
endeavours and give aid and succour, and to the utmost of 
their power labour to recapture and free the same from the 
Enemy or such other distress. 

V. The Commanders of Her Majesty's Ships and Vessels of 
War shall not ransom or agree to ransom or quit or set at liberty 
any Ship or Vessel, Goods or Wares, Merchandises, or other 
Effects belonging to the Enemy, which shall have been seized 
and taken by them, save only in case of urgent necessity. 

VI. The Commanders of Her Majesty's Ships and Vessels of 
War shall carry all persons taken on board of any captured 
Men of War or other Ships or Vessels to Ports at which there 
are or shall be established Depots for the reception of Prisoners 
of War, and shall there deliver them over to such persons as 
shall be duly authorised to receive and take charge of them ; 
and no such Commander or other Officer shall presume, upon 
any pretence whatever, to land, release, or deliver over any 
such persons at any other place to any other person or in any 
other manner than as aforesaid. 

VII. The Commanders of Her Majesty's Ships and Vessels of 
War shall not until further orders capture, detain or molest any 
Ship or Vessel belonging to any subject or citizen of any State 
in amity with Her Majesty solely by reason of Enemy's Goods 
being laden on board her, nor shall they, until further orders, 
capture, detain or molest any Goods, Wares, Merchandises, and 
Effects laden on board the same solely by reason of their belong- 
ing to the Enemy. 

VIII. The Commanders of Her Majesty's Ships and Vessels 
of War shall seize, detain, and Capture all Ships and Vessels 
laden wholly or in part with Arms, Ammunition, Naval or 
Military Stores, Officers, Troops, Seamen, and Despatches, or 
any other Contraband of War, which is destined for the use 



282 The Declaration of Paris 

of the Enemy, and shall send such Ships or Vessels, and con- 
traband (except as hereinafter mentioned) into some Port 
within Her Majesty's Dominions for adjudication before the 
High Court of Admiralty of England, or some other Court of 
Admiralty duly authorised to take cognizance thereof; pro- 
vided, that if any such Ships, Vessels, or Contraband be owned 
by the Subjects of France, the same shall be taken into some 
Port of France for adjudication. 

IX. The Commanders of Her Majesty's Ships and Vessels 
of War shall seize all Ships and Vessels and the Goods, Mer- 
chandise, and Effects laden therein to whomseover belonging, 
that shall be found attempting to Violate any Blockade of the 
Ports, Harbours, or Coasts of the Enemy, and shall send them 
(except as hereinafter excepted) into some Port within Her 
Majesty's Dominions for adjudication before the High Court of 
Admiralty duly commissioned to take cognizance thereof ; pro- 
vided, that if such Ships or Vessels be owned by Subjects of 
France the same shall be taken into some Port of France for 
adjudication. 

X. In case Her Majesty shall declare any Ports, Harbours, 
or coasts to be in a state of Blockade, the Commanders of Her 
Majesty's Ships and Vessels of War are hereby enjoined to stop 
all Neutral Vessels, which they shall meet at Sea, destined to 
the said Ports, Harbours, or coasts, and if they shall appear to 
be ignorant of the existence of the said Blockade, and have 
no Contraband of War on board, they shall turn them away, 
apprising them that the said Ports, Harbours, or Coasts are in 
a state of Blockade, and shall write a Notice to that effect upon 
one or more of the Principal Ship's Papers ; and if any neutral 
Ship or Vessel, which shall appear to have been so warned, or to 
have been otherwise informed of the existence of the Blockade, 
or to have sailed from her last Port after it may reasonably 
be supposed that notification of the Blockade had been made 
public there, shall yet be found attempting or intending to 
violate such Blockade, such Vessel shall be seized, and sent 
into some Port within Her Majesty's Dominions, for legal adjudi- 
cation before the High Court of Admiralty of England, or some 
other Court duly authorised to take cognizance thereof; pro- 
vided, that if such Ship or Vessel be owned by Subjects of France, 
the same shall be taken into some Port of France for adjudica- 
tion. And if any neutral Ship or Vessel be found coming out 
of any blockaded Port which she shall previously have entered 
in violation of such Blockade, or if she shall have any Goods 
or Merchandise on board laden after knowledge of the Blockade, 
such Ships or Vessel, and the Goods, Wares, Merchandises, and 



Instructions to the Fleets 283 

other Effects on board the same shall in like manner be seized 
and sent in for adjudication ; provided that, if such Ship or 
Vessel be owned by the Subjects of France, she shall be taken 
into some Port of France for adjudication. But any neutral 
Ship or Vessel coming out of any such blockaded Port, in 
ballast, or having only Goods or Merchandise on board laden 
before the knowledge of the Blockade, shall be suffered to pass 
except there be other grounds for detaining her, and a Notice 
and Warning shall be written upon one or more of the 
Principal Ship's Papers prohibiting such Vessel from again 
attempting to enter such Port during the existence of the 
blockade. 

B.— FRENCH. 

INSTRUCTIONS ADRESSfiES PAR SON EXCELLENCE LE MIN- 
ISTRE SECRETAIRE D'fiTAT AU DfiPARTEMENT DE LA 
MARINE ET DES COLONIES A MM. LES OFFICIERS GfiNfiR- 
AUX, SUPfiRIEURS ET AUTRES, COMMANDANT LES ES- 
CADRES ET LES BATIMENTS DE SA MAJESTfi IMPfiRIALE. 

Paris, le 31 Mars 1854. 
Messieurs, 

Par une circulaire en date du 28 de ce mois, je vous ai fait 
connaitre que la Russie s'etait constituee vis-a-vis de la France 
et de I'Angleterre dans un etat de guerre dont la responsabilit^ 
lui appartient tout entiere [No. 3 (F. 2)]. 

Vous trouverez ci-jointe la declaration faite k ce sujet au 
S6nat et au Corps legislatif par ordre de I'Empereur. 

Je vous notifie aujourd'hui les intentions de Sa Majeste 
relativement aux devoirs nouveaux qui en decoulent pour vous, 
ind6pendamment du concours que vous aurez a preter aux 
operations militaires proprement dites, suivant les instructions 
speciales que je vous adresserai ou qui vous parviendront a ce 
sujet par la voie hierarchique. 

Voici done la ligne de conduite que vous aurez a tenir par 
suite de cette declaration : 

1. Des ce moment vous etes requis de courir sus a tous les 
batiments de guerre de Sa Majest6 I'empereur de Russie ou k 
tous corsaires armes sous son pavilion, et a vous en emparer par 
la force des armes ; vous aurez egalement a courir sus et a 
capturer tous les batiments de commerce russes, ainsi que leurs 
cargaisons, que vous rencontrerez en mer ou dans les ports et 
rades de I'ennemi, sous les exceptions suivantes : 

Un delai de six semaines, qui court du 27 de ce mois au 9 mai 
prochain inclusivement, ay ant €t€ accord^ aux batiments de 



284 The Declaration of Paris 

commerce russes pour sortir des ports fran9ais, soit qu'ils s'y 
trouvent en ce moment ou qu'ils y entrent ulterieurement, vous 
n'arreterez aucun de ces batiments pendant ledit delai, et vous 
laisserez egalement continuer leur navigation a ceux de ces 
batiments qui etabliraient par leurs papiers de bord qu'etant 
partis dans les limites du delai accorde, ils se rendent directe- 
ment a leur port de destination et qu'ils n'ont pu encore y 
parvenir. Les memes exceptions s'appliqueront aux navires 
russes sortis des ports de I'Angleterre ou qui seraient destines 
pour ces ports. 

2. Vous n'apporterez aucun obstacle a la peche coti^re, meme 
sur les cotes de I'ennemi ; mais vous veillerez a ce que cette 
faveur, dictee par un interet d'humanit6, n'entraine aucun abus 
prejudiciable aux operations militaires et maritimes. Si vous 
etes employes dans les eaux de la mer Blanche, vous laisserez 
aussi subsister sans interruption, et sauf repression en cas d'abus, 
r^change de poisson frais, de vivres, d'ustensiles et d'agres de 
peche qui se fait habituellement entre les paysans des c6tes 
russes de la province d' Archangel et les pecheurs des c6tes 
du Finnmarken norvegien. 

3. Vous n'arreterez pas non plus les batiments russes pourvus 
d'un sauf-conduit ou licence, soit du gouvernement imperial, 
soit du gouvernement britannique, ou, enfin, du gouvernement 
ottoman. Vous trouverez ci- joint un modele de la forme 
adoptee pour les licences ou sauf-conduits fran9ais. Je vouis 
communiquerai ulterieurement un modele des actes analogues 
des gouvernements anglais et ottoman. 

Vous vous assurerez que les actes qui voUs seront pr^sent^s 
sont sinceres et que les conditions en ont ete rigoureusement 
observees ; en cas de soup5ons sur leur sincerite ou d'inexe- 
cution de leurs conditions, vous etes autoris6s a saisir le batiment 
qui en serait porteur. 

4. Vous vous abstiendrez d'exercer aucun acte d'hostilit6 
dans les ports ou dans les eaux territoriales des puissances 
neutres, et vous considererez les eaux territoriales comme 
s'^tendant k une port^e de canon au dela de la laisse de basse 
mer ; vous vous abstiendrez egalement de toute capture ou 
poursuite hostile dans les ports et eaux territoriales des puis- 
sances alliees, a moins que vous n'en soyez requis ou que vous 
n'y soyez autoris6s par I'officier de la puissance territoriale 
charge du commandement le plus voisin. 

5. L'6tat de guerre interrompant les relations de commerce 
entre les sujets des puissances belligerantes, vous aurez a arreter 
non seulement les batiments marchands nationaux, mais encore 
les batiments marchands des puissances alliees, qui, sans une 



Instructions to the Fleets 285 

permission ou licence sp6ciale, tenteraient d'enfreindre cette 
interdiction, ou qui, plus coupables encore, chercheraient a 
violer un blocus ou s'engageraient dans un transport de troupes, 
de depeches officielles ou de contrebande de guerre pour le 
compte ou a destination de I'ennemi. 

6. Les neutres 6tant autorises par le droit des gens a continuer 
librement leur commerce avec les puissances belligerantes, vous 
n'arreterez les batiments neutres que dans les cas suivants : 

1° S'ils tentaient de violer un blocus ; 

2° S'ils transportaient, pour le compte ou a destination de 
I'ennemi, des objets de contrebande de guerre, des depeches 
officielles ou des troupes de terre ou de mer. Dans ces divers 
cas, le batiment et la cargaison sont confiscables, sauf lorsque 
la contrebande de guerre ne forme pas les trois quarts du 
chargement, auquel cas les objets de contrebande sont seuls 
sujets a confiscation. 

7. Tout blocus, pour etre respecte, devra etre effectif, c'est- 
a-dire maintenu par des forces suffisantes pour qu'il y ait 
danger imminent de pen^trer dans les ports investis. La 
violation du blocus resulte aussi bien de la tentative de penetrer 
dans le lieu bloque que de la tentative d'en sortir apr^s la declara- 
tion du blocus, a moins, dans ce dernier cas, que ce ne soit sur 
lest ou avec un chargement pris avant le blocus ou dans le delai 
fixe par le commandant du blocus, delai qui devra tou jours etre 
suffisant pour proteger la navigation et le commerce de bonne foi. 

Un blocus n'est d'ailleurs cense connu d'un batiment qui se 
dirige vers un port bloque qu'apr^s que la notification speciale 
en a ete inscrite sur ses registres ou papiers de bord par I'un des 
batiments de guerre formant le blocus ; . et c'est une formality 
que vous ne devrez point negliger de faire remplir toutes les 
fois que vous serez engages dans une operation de ce genre. 

8. La contrebande de guerre se compose des objets suivants, 
lorsqu'ils sont destines a I'ennemi, savoir : 

Bouches et armes a feu, armes blanches, projectiles, poudre, 
salpetre, soufre, objets d'equipement, de campement et de 
harnachement militaires, et tous instruments quelconques 
fabriques a I'usage de la guerre. 

9. Sauf la verification relative au commerce illicite dont je 
vous ai indique le caractere, vous n'avez point a examiner la 
propriete du chargement des navires neutres : le pavilion couvre 
la marchandise, et des lors la propriety ennemie chargee a bord 
n'est point confiscable ; toutefois, je crois devoir vous informer 
que, par une faveur speciale que Sa Majeste a entenduxonceder 
aux neutres dans le cours de cette guerre, d'accord avec Sa 
Majeste la reine, son auguste alliee, les propri^t^s des sujets 



286 The Declaration of Paris 

allies ou neutres trouvees k bord des navires ennemis seront 
exemptes de confiscation. 

10. Pour I'application de ces principes, la nationality des 
maisons de commerce doit se determiner d'apres le lieu ou 
elles sont etablies ; mais la nationalite des batiments ne derive 
pas seulement de celle de leurs proprietaires, mais encore de 
leur droit legitime au pavilion qui les couvre. 

11. En cas de detresse d'un batiment national ou alli^ ou 
en cas de capture par I'ennemi, vous devrez lui porter toute 
aide et assistance ou vous efforcer d'en operer la recousse : 
I'intention de Sa Majeste est que ce sauvetage ou cette recousse 
ne donne lieu a aucun droit sur le batiment secouru ou recous. 
Dans le cas ou vous reprendriez sur I'ennemi un batiment neutre, 
vous etes autorises a considerer ce batiment comme ennemi 
s'il est reste plus de vingt-quatre heures en la possession de 
I'ennemi, a moins de circonstances exceptionnelles dont Sa 
Majeste se reserve I'appreciation. Si le batiment n'est pas 
reste pendant vingt-quatre heures au pouvoir de I'ennemi, vous 
le relacherez purement et simplement. 

12. Si vous rencontrez un corsaire sous pavilion russe, vous 
le saisirez et le traiterez comme tout autre batiment marchand 
ennemi ; mais Sa Majeste ayant, d'accord avec ses augustes 
allies, renonce quant a present a la delivrance de lettres de 
marque, est en droit d'attendre que I'armement et la conduite 
des corsaires ennemis soient renfermes strictement dans les 
limites les plus restreintes du droit des gens, et vous aurez k 
verifier avec rigueur s'ils ne rentrent pas dans I'un des cas prevus 
par la loi du 10 avril 1825 sur la piraterie, dont vous trouverez 
ci- joint un extrait, afin que vous puissiez, le cas echeant, en faire 
I'application. 

13. Pour remplir les devoirs resultant des indications qui 
precedent, vous aurez a exercer le droit de visite. Bien que 
ce droit soit illimite en temps de guerre quant aux parages, je 
vous recommande cependant expressement de ne I'exercer que 
dans les parages et dans les circonstances ou vous auriez des 
motifs fondes de supposer qu'il pent amener la saisie du bati- 
ment visits. 

Quant a la former vous vous tiendrez, autant que possible, 
hors de la portee de canon. Vous enverrez a bord un canot 
dont I'officier montera sur le navire a visiter, accompagne de 
deux ou trois hommes seulement, et se bornera a verifier, d'apres 
les papiers de bord, la nationalite ainsi que la nature du bati- 
ment et du chargement, et k reconnaitre si le batiment est 
engag^ dans un commerce illicite. 

L'examen des papiers de bord est d'autaut plus important 



Instructions to the Fleets 287 

que, d'apres noire legislation, ces papiers peuvent seuls servir 
au jugement ult^rieur sur la validity ou I'invalidit^ de la prise. 

14. Vous ne visiterez point les batiments qui se trouveront 
sous le convoi d'un navire de guerre alli6 ou neutre, et vous 
vous bornerez k r6clamer du commandant du convoi une liste des 
batiments places sous sa protection avec la declaration ^crite 
qu'ils n'appartiennent pas a I'ennemi et ne sont engages dans 
aucun commerce illicite. Si cependant vous aviez lieu de 
soup9onner que la religion du commandant du convoi a ^te 
surprise, vous communiqueriez vos soup9ons a cet officier, qui 
proc^derait seul a la visite des batiments suspectes. 

15. Si la visite ne determine pas la saisie du batiment, 
I'officier qui en aura ^te charg^ devra seulement la constater 
sur les papiers du bord ; si au contraire elle determine la saisie, 
I'officier visiteur devra : 

1° S'emparer de tous les papiers de bord ; 

2° Dresser un invejitaire ; 

8° Mettre a bord un equipage pour la conduite de la prise. 

16. En cas de prise d'un corsaire ou d'un pirate, vous pro- 
c^derez de la meme mani^re ; mais dans le cas de capture d'un 
batiment de guerre, vous vous bornerez a la constater sur votre 
journal, et vous pourvoirez a la conduite de la mani^re la plus 
conforme a la securite des equipages auxquels vous la confierez. 

Les lettres officielles et particuli^res trouvees a bord des 
batiments captures devront m'etre adressees sans delai. 

17. Toute prise doit etre jug^e, et il ne vous est pas permis 
de consentir a un traite de ran9on, et dans ce cas meme I'acte 
de ranyon, r^dig^ conform6ment aux modeles joint aux pr^sentes 
instructions, devra etre soumis a la juridiction qui est ou sera 
chargee en France du jugement des prises. 

18. II a ete convenu entre le Gouvernement de Sa Majeste 
Imperiale et celui de Sa Majeste Britannique : 

1° Que le produit net des prises faites en commun sera 
divise en autant de parts qu'il y aura d'hommes embarqu6s 
sur les batiments engages dans Taction, sans tenir compte des 
grades, et que la repartition des sommes revenant aux batiments 
respectifs sera faite par les soins de chaque gouvernement et 
d'apres la loi du pays ; 

2° Que, quant aux batiments en vue au moment de la capture, 
et dont la presence pourrait encourager le capteur et intimider 
I'ennemi, il leur serait accord^ une part dans la prise. 

Le mode du jugement des prises n'ayant pas encore 6t6 
T6g\6 d6finitivement entre Sa Majeste I'Empereur et son auguste 
alliee, je ne suis point en mesure de vous fixer aujourd'hui d'une 
mani^re positive sur la marche qui devra etre suivie. 



288 The Declaration of Paris 

Cependant les dispositions ci-apres me paraissent devoir etre 
adoptees : 

1° Par exception, le juge competent sera le juge du capture 
lorsqu'il s'agira de batiments fran9ais qui se seraient mis dans le 
cas d'etre arretes par des croiseurs anglais, pour violation ou 
tentative de violation de blocus ou pour transport de contre- 
bande de guerre, et vice versa lorsqu'il s'agira de batiments 
anglais qui auraient ete arretes par des croiseurs frangais ; 

2° Pour les batiments captures autres que ceux des marines 
fran9aise ou anglaise, la regie que le juge competent de la prise 
est le juge du capteur reprendra son empire ; 

3° Si la capture a lieu par suite d'une action commune et 
sous un commandement superieur, le pavilion du commandant 
sup6rieur determinera la nationality du juge ; 

4° Si la capture est faite par un croiseur de I'une des deux 
nations alliees en presence et avec I'appui materiel ou moral 
d'un croiseur de I'autre, le juge de la prise sera celui du capteur. 

19. Lorsque le jugement devra appartenir a la juridiction 
franyaise, vous conduirez la prise dans le port de France le plus 
rapproche, le plus accessible et le plus sur, ou dans le port de 
la possession fran9aise la plus voisine ; mais si des circonstances 
de force majeure ne vous permettaient pas de conduire la prise 
en France ou dans une possession fran9aise, vous pourrez la 
conduire dans un port anglais ou ottoman oti se trouverait un 
consul de Sa Majeste Imperiale, avec lequel vous vous concerterez 
sur la destination ulterieure de la prise. 

Lorsque, au contraire, vous serez dans le cas de remettre a 
la juridiction anglaise une prise faite ou amenee par vous, vous 
la conduirez dans le port anglais le plus proche, et vous vous 
entendrez, soit avec le consul de Sa Majeste Imperiale, soit avec 
I'autorite locale, pour vous en dessaisir d'une maniere reguliere. 

Ces diverses dispositions devront naturellement etre observees 
par les officiers conducteurs de prises. 

20. Vous ne devrez distraire du bord aucun des individus 
qui montent le batiment capture, s'il s'agit d'un corsaire ou 
d'un batiment marchand ; mais les femmes, les enfants et 
toutes les personnes ^trang^res au metier des armes ou k la 
marine ne devront, en aucun cas, etre traites comme prisonniers 
de guerre, et seront libres de debarquer dans le premier port 
oil le batiment abordera. S'il s'agit d'un batiment de guerre, 
et sauf la meme exception, vous pourrez, si vous le jugez utile, 
transborder une partie de I'equipage, et vous conduirez les 
prisonniers soit dans un port militaire de France, soit dans 
tout autre port qui pourra etre ulterieurement design^ comme 
lieu de depot pour les prisonniers de guerre. 



Convention as to Joint Captures 



289 



21. Je n'ai pas besoin de vous recommander, en terminant, 
de concerter votre action avec les batiments de Sa Majesty 
Britannique ou de la Porte Ottomane toutes les fois que vous 
en trouverez I'occasion. Je suis persuade que vous ne perdrez 
jamais de vue raccord complet qui existe entre les trois gouverne- 
ments, et que vous ne negligerez rien de ce qui pourrait le 
fortifier et resserrer les liens qui les unissent. 

Independamment des documents auxquels se referent les 
presentes instructions, vous trouverez ci-apres divers actes dont 
les dispositions devront etre observees, sauf, bien entendu, en 
ce qu'elles auraient de contraire aux regies qui precedent. 

Recevez, messieurs, I'assurance de ma consideration tr^s- 
distinguee. 

Le ministre secretaire (VJ^tat de la marine et des colonies, 
Theodore Ducos. 



11 



Convention between Great Britain and France relative to 
Joint Captures, with Instructions to the Fleets, 
May 10, 1854. 



Her Majesty the Queen of 
the United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Ireland, and His 
Majesty the Emperor of the 
French, being desirous to deter- 
mine the jurisdiction to which 
the adjudication of joint cap- 
tures which may be made dur- 
ing the course of the present 
war by the naval forces of the 
two nations shall belong, or of 
captures which may be made 
of merchant-vessels belonging 
to subjects of either of the two 
countries by the cruizers of the 
other, and being desirous to 
regulate at the same time the 
mode of distribution of the 
proceeds of joint captures, 



Sa Majeste la Reine du Roy- 
aume Uni de la Grande Bre- 
tagne et d'lrlande, et Sa 
Majeste I'Empereur des Fran- 
9ais, voulant determiner la 
juridiction a laquelle devra 
appartenir le jugement des 
prises qui, dans le cours de la 
guerre actuelle, pourront etre 
operees en commun par les 
forces navales des deux nations, 
ou des prises qui pourront etre 
faits sur des navires marchands 
appartenant aux sujets de I'un 
des deux pays par les croiseurs 
de I'autre, et voulant regler en 
meme temps le mode de repar- 
tition des produits des prises 
effectuees en commun, out 

19 



290 



The Declaration of Paris 



have named as their Plenipo- 
tentiaries for that purpose : 

1. When a joint capture shall 
be made by the naval forces of 
the two countries, the adjudica- 
tion thereof shall belong to the 
jurisdiction of the country 
whose flag shall have been 
borne by the oJBficer having 
the superior command in the 
action. 

2. When a capture shall be 
made by a cruizer of either of 
the two allied nations in the 
presence and in the sight of 
a cruizer of the other, such 
cruizer having thus contributed 
to the intimidation of the 
enemy and encouragement of 
the captor, the adjudication 
thereof shall belong to the juris- 
diction of the actual captor. 

3. In case of the capture of a 
merchant-vessel of one of the 
two countries, the adjudication 
of such capture shall always 
belong to the jurisdiction of the 
country of the captured vessel : 
the cargo shall be dealt with, as 
to the jurisdiction, in the same 
manner as the vessel. 

4. In case of condemnation 
under the circumstances de- 
scribed in the preceding 
Articles : 

(1) If the capture shall have 
been made by vessels of the 
two nations whilst acting in 
conjunction, the net proceeds 
of the prize, after deducting the 
necessary expenses, shall be 
divided into as many shares 
as there were men on board 
the capturing vessels, without 
reference to rank, and the 



nomm6 pour leurs Plenipoten- 
tiaires a cet effet : 

1. Lorsqu'une prise sera 
faite en commun par les forces 
navales des deux pays, le juge- 
ment en appartiendra a la juri- 
diction du pays dont le pavilion 
aura et6 porte par I'officier qui 
aura eu le commandement 
sup^rieur dans Taction. 

2. Lorsqu'une prise sera 
faite par un croiseur de Tune 
des deux nations alliees en 
presence et en vue d'un croiseur 
de I'autre, qui aura ainsi con- 
tribue a intimider I'ennemi et 
a encourager le capteur, le 
jugement en appartiendra a la 
juridiction du capteur efifectif. 



3. En cas de capture d'un 
batiment de la marine mar- 
chande de I'un des deux pays, 
le jugement en appartiendra 
tou jours a la juridiction du 
pays du batiment capture ; la 
cargaison suivra, quant a la 
juridiction, le sort du bati- 
ment. 

4. En cas de condamnation 
dans les circonstances prevues 
par les Articles precedents : 

(1) Si la capture a ^t^ faite 
par des batiments des deux 
nations agissant en commun, le 
produit net de la prise, deduc- 
tion faite des d^penses neces- 
saires, sera divise en autant de 
parts qu'il y aura d'hommes 
embarques sur les batiments 
capteurs, sans tenir compte des 
grades, et les parts revenant 



Convention as to Joint Captures 



291 



shares belonging to the men 
on board the vessels of the 
Ally shall be paid and delivered 
to such person as may be duly 
authorized on behalf of the 
allied Government to receive 
the same ; and the distribution 
of the amount belonging to 
each vessel shall be made by 
each Government according to 
the laws and regulations of the 
country. 

(2) If the capture shall have 
been made by cruizers of either 
of the two allied nations in 
the presence and in sight of a 
cruizer of the other, the divi- 
sion, the payment, and the 
distribution of the net proceeds 
of the prize, after deducting 
the necessary expenses, shall 
likewise be made in the manner 
above mentioned. 

(3) If a capture, made by 
a cruizer of one of the two 
countries, shall have been ad- 
judicated by the Courts of the 
other, the net proceeds of the 
prize, after deducting the neces- 
sary expenses, shall be made 
over in the same manner to the 
Government of the captor, to 
be distributed according to its 
laws and regulations. 

5. The commanders of the 
vessels of war of Their Majesties 
shall, with regard to the send- 
ing in and delivering up of 
prizes, conform to the Instruc- 
tions annexed to the present 
Convention, and which the two 
Governments reserve to them- 
selves to modify by common 
consent, if it should become 
necessary. 



aux hommes embarqu^s sur 
les batiments de la nation 
alli6e seront payees et delivrees 
a la personne qui sera dument 
autorisee par le Gouvernement 
allie a les recevoir ; et la 
repartition des sommes reve- 
nant aux batiments respectifs 
sera faite par les soins de 
chaque Gouvernement suivant 
les lois et r^glements du pays. 

(2) Si la prise a ^t^ faite par 
les croiseurs de I'une des deuk 
nations alli^es en presence et 
en vue d'un croiseur de I'autre, 
le partage, le paiement, et la 
repartition du produit net de 
la prise, deduction faite des 
depenses necessaires, auront 
lieu egalement de la mani^re 
indiquee ci-dessus. 

(3) Si la prise, faite par un 
croiseur de I'un des deux pays, 
a ete jugee par les Tribunaux 
de I'autre, le produit net de la 
prise, deduction faite des de- 
penses necessaires, seraremis de 
la meme mani^re au Gouverne- 
ment du capteur, pour etre 
distribu6 conform^ment a ses 
lois et r^glements. 

5. Les commandants des 
batiments de guerre de Leurs 
Majest^s se conformeront, pour 
la conduite et la remise des 
prises, aux Instructions jointes 
a la presente Convention, et 
que les deux Gouvernements se 
reservent de modifier, s'il y a 
lieu, d'un commun accord. 



292 



The Declaration of Paris 



6. When, in execution of the 
present Convention, the valua- 
tion of a captured vessel of war 
shall be in question, the calcu- 
lation shall be according to the 
real value of the same ; and 
the allied Government shall be 
entitled to delegate one or more 
competent officers to concur in 
the valuation. In case of dis- 
agreement, it shall be decided 
by lot which officer shall have 
the casting voice. 

7. The crews of the captured 
vessels shall be dealt with ac- 
cording to the laws and regula- 
tions of the country to which 
the present Convention attri- 
butes the adjudication of the 
prize. 

8. The present Convention 
shall be ratified, and the rati- 
fications shall be exchanged at 
London within ten days from 
this date, or sooner if possible. 



6. Lorsque, pour I'execution 
de la presente Convention, il y 
aura lieu de proceder a I'estima- 
tion d'un batiment de guerre 
captur6, cette estimation por- 
tera sur sa valeur effective ; 
et le Gouvernement allie aura 
la faculte de d^leguer un ou 
plusieurs officiers competents 
pour concourir a I'estimation. 
En cas de desaccord, le sort 
decidera quel officier devra 
avoir la voix preponderante. 

7. Les equipages des bati- 
ments captures seront trait^s 
suivant les lois et r^glements 
du pays auquel la presente 
Convention attribue le juge- 
ment de la capture. 

8. La presente Convention 
sera ratifi^e, et les ratifications 
en seront echangees a Londres 
dans le delai de dix jours, ou 
plus tot si faire se pent. 



ANNEX TO THE CONVENTION. ANNEXE A LA CONVENTION. 



INSTRUCTIONS to the Com- 
manders of Ships of War 
belonging to Her Majesty the 
Queen of the United King- 
dom of Great Britain and 
Ireland and to His Majesty 
the Emperor of the French. 

You will find inclosed a copy 
of a Convention which was 
signed on the 10th instant 
between Her Majesty the 
Queen of the United Kingdom 
of Great Britain and Ireland 
and His Majesty the Emperor 
of the French, regulating the 
jurisdiction to which shall be- 



INSTRUCTIONS pour les 
Commandants des Bdtiments 
de Guerre de Sa Majeste la 
Reine du Royaume Uni de la 
Grande Bretagne et d'lrlande 
et de Sa Majeste VEmpereur 
des Frangais. 

Vous trouverez ci- joint copie 
d'une Convention single le 10 
de ce mois entre Sa Majeste la 
Reine du Royaume Uni de la 
Grande Bretagne et d'Irlande 
et Sa Majeste I'Empereur des 
Frangais, pour regler la juri- 
diction a laquelle devra appar- 
tenir le jugement des prises 



Convention as to Joint Captures 



298 



long the adjudication of the 
joint captures made by the 
aUied naval forces, or of the 
captures of merchant-vessels 
belonging to the subjects of 
either of the two countries 
which shall be made by the 
cruisers of the other, as likewise 
the mode of distribution of the 
proceeds of such joint captures. 

In order to ensure the execu- 
tion of this Convention, you 
will conform yourself to the 
following Instructions : 

1. Whenever, in consequence 
of a joint action, you are re- 
quired to draw up the report or 
proces-verbal of a capture, you 
will take care to specify exactly 
the names of the ships of war 
present during the action, as 
well as the names of their com- 
manding officers, and, as far as 
possible, the number of men 
embarked on board those ships 
at the commencement of the 
action, without distinction of 
rank. 

You will deliver a copy of 
that report or procds-verbal to 
the officer of the allied Power 
who shall have had the superior 
command during the action,' 
and you will conform yourself 
to the instructions of that 
officer as far as relates to the 
measures to be taken for the 
conduct and the adjudication 
of the joint captures so made 
under his command. 

If the action has been com- 
manded by an officer of your 
nation, you will conform your- 
self to the regulations of your 
own country, and you will con- 



operees en commun par les 
forces navales alliees, ou faites 
sur des navires marchands ap- 
partenant aux sujects de I'un 
des deux 6tats par les croiseurs 
de I'autre, ainsi que le mode 
de repartition du produit des 
prises effectuees en commun. 



Pour assurer I'ex^cution de 
cette Convention, vous aurez a 
vous conformer aux Instruc- 
tions suivantes : 

1. Lorsque, par suite d'une 
action commune, vous serez 
dans le cas de rediger le rapport 
ou le proces-verbal d'une cap- 
ture, vous aurez soin d'indiquer 
avec exactitude les noms des 
batiments de guerre presents 
a Taction, ainsi que de leurs 
commandants, et, autant que 
possible, le nombre d'hommes 
embarques a bord de ces bati- 
ments au commencement de 
Taction, sans distinction de 
grades. 

Vous remettrez une copie de 
ce rapport ou proces-verbal a 
Tofficier de la Puissance affile 
qui aura eu le commandement 
superieur dans Taction, et vous 
vous conformerez aux instruc- 
tions de cet officier en ce qui 
concerne les mesures a prendre 
pour la conduite et le jugement 
des prises ainsi faites en com- 
mun sous son commandement. 

Si Taction a 6t6 command^e 
par un officier de votre nation, 
vous vous conformerez aux 
r^glements de votre propre 
pays, et vous vous bornerez k 



294 



The Declaration of Paris 



fine yourself to handing over 
to the highest officer in rank 
of the allied Power who was 
present during the action a 
certified copy of the report or 
of the proces-verbal which you 
shall have drawn up. 

2. When you shall have 
effected a capture in presence 
of, and in sight of, an allied 
ship of war, you will mention 
exactly, in the report which 
you will draw up when the 
capture is a ship of war, and in 
the report or proces-verbal of 
the capture when the prize is 
a merchant- vessel, the number 
of men on board your ship at 
the commencement of the 
action, without distinction of 
rank, as well as the name of 
the allied ship of war which 
happened to be in sight, and, 
if possible, the number of men 
embarked on board that ship, 
likewise without distinction of 
rank. You will deliver a certi- 
fied copy of your report or 
proces-verbal to the commander 
of that ship. 

8. Whenever, in the case of 
a violation of a blockade, of 
the transport of contraband 
articles, of land or sea troops 
of the enemy, or of official 
despatches from or for the 
enemy, you find yourself under 
the necessity of stopping and 
seizing a merchant-vessel of 
the allied nation, you will take 
care to : 

(1) Draw up a report (or 
procts-verbal), stating the place, 
the date, and the motive of the 
arrest, the name of the vessel. 



remettre k I'officier le plus 
61eve en grade de la Puissance 
alli^e, present k Paction, une 
copie certifiee du rapport ou du 
proces-verbal que vous aurez 
redig6. 

2. Lorsque vous aurez 
eifectu6 une capture en pre- 
sence et en vue d'un batiment 
de guerre allie, vous mention- 
nerez exactement dans le rap- 
port que vous r6digerez, s'il 
s'agit d'un batiment de guerre, 
et dans le proces-verbal de 
capture, s'il s'agit d'un bati- 
ment de conunerce, le nombre 
d'hommes que vous aviez k 
bord au cominiencement de 
Taction, sans distinction de 
grades, ainsi que le nom du 
batiment de guerre allie qui se 
trouvait en vue, et, s'il est 
possible, le nombre d'hommes 
embarques a bord, egalement 
sans distinction de grades. 
Vous remettrez une copie certi- 
fiee de votre rapport ou proces- 
verbal au commandant de ce 
batiment. 

3. Lorsqu'en cas de viola- 
tion de blocus, de transport 
d'objets de contrabande, de 
troupes de terre ou de mer 
ennemies, ou de d6peches offi- 
cielles de ou pour I'ennemi, 
vous serez dans le cas d'arreter 
et saisir un batiment de la 
marine marchande du pays 
allie, vous devrez : 

( 1 ) Rediger un proces-verbal , 
enonyant le lieu, la date, et le 
motif de I'arrestation, le nom 
du batiment, celui du capitaine, 



Convention as to Joint Captures 



295 



that of the captain, the number 
of the crew ; and containing 
besides an exact description of 
the state of the vessel, and of 
her cargo. 

(2) Collect and place in a 
sealed packet, after having 
made an inventory of them, 
all the ship's papers, such as 
registers, passports, charter- 
parties, bills of lading, invoices, 
and other documents calcu- 
lated to prove the nature and 
the ownership of the vessel and 
of her cargo. 

(3) Place seals upon the 
hatches. 

(4) Place on board an officer, 
with such number of men as 
you may deem advisable, to 
take charge of the vessel, and 
to ensure its safe conduct. 

(5) Send the vessel to the 
nearest port belonging to the 
Power whose flag it carried. 

(6) Deliver up the vessel to 
the authorities of the port to 
which you shall have taken her, 
together with a duplicate of 
the report (or proces-verbal), 
and of the inventory above- 
mentioned, and with the sealed 
packet containing the ship's 
papers. 

4. The officer who conducts 
the captured vessel will procure 
a receipt proving his having 
delivered up the vessel, as well 
as his having delivered the 
sealed packet, and the dupli- 
cate of the report (or proces- 
verbal) and of the inventory 
above-mentioned. 

5. In case of distress, if the 
captured vessel is not in a fit 



le nombre des hommes de 
I'^quipage ; et contenant en 
outre la description exacte de 
r^tat du navire, et de sa 
cargaison. 

(2) Reunir en un paquet 
cachete, apr^s en avoir fait 
I'inventaire, tous les papiers 
de bord, tels que actes de 
nationalit6 ou de propriety, 
passeports, charte-parties, con- 
naissements, factures, et autres 
documents propres a constater 
la nature et la propriete du 
batiment et de la cargaison. 

(3) Mettre les scelles sur les 
6coutilles. 

(4) Placer k bord un officier, 
avec tel nombre d'hommes que 
vous jugerez convenable, pour 
prendre le batiment en charge, 
et en assurer la conduite. 

(5) Envoyer le batiment au 
port le plus voisin de la Puis- 
sance dont il portait le pavilion. 

(6) Faire remettre le bati- 
ment aux autorites du port ou 
vous I'aurez fait conduire, avec 
une expedition du proces-verbal 
et de I'inventaire ci-dessus men- 
tionnes, et avec le paquet 
cachet6 contenant les papiers 
de bord. 

4. L'officier conducteur d'un 
batiment captur6 se fera de- 
livrer un re9u constatant la 
remise qu'il en aura faite, ainsi 
que la delivrance qu'il aura 
faite du paquet cachete et de 
I'exp^dition du proces-verbal 
et de I'inventaire ci-dessus 
mentionn^s. 

5. En cas de d^tresse, si le 
batiment capture est hors 



296 



The Declaration of Paris 



state to continue its voyage, 
the officer charged to conduct 
to a port of the allied Power 
a prize made on the merchant 
service of that Power, may 
enter a port of his own country 
or a neutral port ; and he will 
deliver his prize to the local 
authority, if he enters a port 
of his own country, and to the 
Consul of the allied nation if 
he enters a neutral port, with- 
out prejudice to the ulterior 
measures to be taken for the 
adjudication of the prize. He 
will take care, in that case, that 
the report or proces-verbal, and 
the inventory which he shall 
have drawn up, as well as the 
sealed packet containing the 
ship's papers, be sent exactly 
to the proper Court of adjudi- 
cation. 

6. You are not to consider 
as prisoners of war, and you 
will give free permission to 
land, to all women, children, 
and persons not belonging to 
the military or maritime pro- 
fession who shall be found on 
board the captured vessels. 

With this exception, and 
those which your own security 
may suggest, you will not per- 
mit any person to be removed 
from on board the vessel ; and 
in all cases you will retain the 
master, supercargo, and others 
whose evidence may be essen- 
tial to the adjudication of the 
prize. 

You will treat as prisoners 
of war all persons whatever 
who may be found on board 
the enemy's vessels, with the 



d'etat de continuer sa route, 
I'officier charge de conduire 
dans un port de la Puissance 
alliee une prise faite sur la 
marine marchande de cette 
Puissance, pourra entrer dans 
un port de son propre pays ou 
dans un port neutre ; et 11 
remettra sa prise a I'autorite 
locale, s'il entre dans un port 
de son pays, et au Consul de la 
nation alliee s'il entre dans un 
port neutre, sans prejudice des 
mesures ulterieures a prendre 
pour le jugement de la prise. 
II veillera, dans ce cas, a ce que 
le rapport ou proces-verbal et 
I'inventaire qu'il aura r^diges, 
ainsi que le paquet cachet^ 
contenant les papiers de bord, 
soient envoyes exactement a 
la juridiction chargee du juge- 
ment. 

6. Vous ne consid6rerez 
point comme prisonniers, et 
vous laisserez librement de- 
barquer, les femmes, les enfants, 
et les personnes Strangers au 
metier des armes ouala marine, 
qui se trouveront a bord des 
batiments arretes. 

Sauf cette exception et celles 
que vous suggerera le soin de 
votre surety, vous ne distrairez 
aucun individu du bord ; dans 
tous les cas, vous conserverez 
a bord le capitaine, le subre- 
cargue, et ceux dont le t^moi- 
gnage serait essentiel pour le 
jugement de la prise. 

Vous traiterez comme prison- 
niers de guerre, sauf I'excep- 
tion ci-dessus indiqu^e au § 1, 
tous les individus quelconques 



Convention as to Joint Captures 



297 



exceptions above mentioned 
in§l. 

You will place no other re- 
striction on the liberty of allied 
or neutral subjects found on 
board allied or neutral vessels, 
than such as may be necessary 
for the security of the vessel. 

With respect to your own 
countrymen, you will treat 
them according to the general 
instructions you have received, 
and you will, in no case, deliver 
them up to a foreign juris- 
diction. 

The persons who may have 
been exceptionally removed 
from the captured vessels shall 
afterwards be sent back to their 
own country, if they belong 
to the allied nation ; if they 
are neutrals or enemies, they 
shall be treated as if they had 
been found on board vessels 
captured by you separately. 



trouv^s k bord des batiments 
ennemis. 

Vous n'imposerez k la liberty 
des sujets allies ou neutres, 
trouves sur les batiments allies 
ou neutres, d'autre restriction 
que celle qui pourra etre n^ces- 
saire pour la s^curit^ du bati- 
ment. 

Quant a vos nationaux, vous 
les traiterez conformement aux 
instructions g6n6rales dont vous 
etes muni, et vous n'aurez, en 
aucun cas, k les remettre a une 
juridiction ^trang^re. 

Les hommes distraits excep- 
tionnellement du bord des bati- 
ments captures, devront etre 
ulterieurement renvoy^s dans 
leur pays, s'ils appartiennent k 
la nation alliee ; et s'ils sont 
neutres ou ennemis, ils seront 
traites comme s'ils se fussent 
trouves sur des batiments cap- 
tures par vous isolement. 



FRENCH DECREE PROMULGATING THE CONVENTION. 

Napoleon, par la grace de Dieu et la volont6 nationale, 
Empereur des Fran^ais. 

A tous presents et a venir, salut. 

Sur le rapport de notre ministre secretaire d']Stat au d^- 
partement des affaires etrang^res, 

AvoNS decret£ et decretons ce qui suit : 

article premier. 

Une convention, suivie d'une annexe, ayant ^t^ conclue le 
10 mai de la presente annee 1854, entre la France et le Royaume- 
Uni de la Grande-Bretagne et d'Irlande, pour regler le mode de 
jugement et de partage des prises faites dans le cours de la 
presente guerre ; et les actes de ratification ayant 6t6 respective- 
ment echanges le 20 du meme mois, ladite convention, dont 
la teneur suit, recevra sa pleine et enti^re execution. 
[Here follows the Convention.] 



298 The Declaration of Paris 

12 

British Notifications of Blockades.^ 

1854 

(1) 12th may 1854. 

Letter from Senior Officer H.M.S. Amphion, Memel Roads, 
informing the British Vice Consul that Riga, Libau and Windau 
are strictly blockaded as from 15th May, sent as enclosure with 
Senior Officer's Report dated 14th June 1854 to Vice Admiral 
Sir Charles Napier. 

Summary of Report. — In respect of neutral vessels captured 
in attempting to violate the Baltic blockade, and sent to England 
for adjudication, three points must be established before they 
can be condemned as lawful prize : — 

1. Effective blockade. This has been continually main- 
tained. 

2. Intention to violate blockade. This has been ascertained 
by the course of the captured vessel in each case. 

3. Knowledge of blockade. 

Regarding the first point, I have the honour to inform you, 
that since May 9th, when I was first entrusted with the blockade 
of this coast (at which time I found H.M.S. Conflict and Cruizer 
on the Station, which vessels had been blockading since April 
20th) 2 ships have been ordered to cruize off the entrance of 
the Gulf of Riga, a passage limited by the shoals to a breadth 
of 3 miles, this entrance has never been left without one vessel. 
. . . Under these orders 154 vessels have been warned off since 
April 20th, though nearly all had passed through the Sound, and 
only 4 had been detained for attempting to enter blockaded ports. 
Residents in such ports had been officially notified of the exist- 
ing blockade through the British Vice Consul at Memel. 

(2) 13th JUNE 1854 

Notifying despatch from Vice Admiral Dundas commanding 
H.M.'s naval forces in the Black Sea, dated 1st June, announcing 
blockade of the Danube by combined British and French naval 
forces. 

^ State Papers, vols, xliv., xlv. 



British Notifications of Blockades 299 

(3) 16a?H JinSTE 1864. 

Notif jdng despatch from Vice Admiral Sir Charles Napier 
commanding H.M.'s naval forces in the Baltic, dated 28th May, 
announcing that Libau and Windau on the coast of Courland and 
other ports etc. from Lat. 55° 53' N. to as far north as Cape 
Dager Ort, including Riga, Pernau and all other ports etc. in 
the Gulf of Riga " were then in a state of blockade by a com- 
petent force " : 

that all ports etc. eastward from Cape Dager Ort as far as 
Helsingfors and Sveaborg on the coast of Finland : continuing 
westward, ports including the Aland archipelago : from thence 
northward, Tornea and all intermediate Russian ports etc. in 
the Gulf of Bothnia " are and were then in a state of strict 
blockade by a competent force." 



(4) 12th JULY 1854. 

Notifying despatch from Sir Charles Napier commanding 
H.M.'s naval forces in the Baltic announcing that on and from 
26th June " a strict and effective blockade was actually estab- 
lished by combined British and French naval forces of ports in 
the Gulf of Finland : that a complete blockade of Cronstadt and 
St Petersburg had been effected by the combined fleets from 
the same date : thence, passing westward, the line of blockade 
included the whole coast of Esthonia and adjacent islands to 
Ekholm Light." 

(5) llTH AUGUST 1854. 

Notifying further particulars of blockades of Russian Baltic 
ports. " On being joined by the French squadron in the Gulf 
of Finland on the 13th June the duties of blockading in that 
Gulf and elsewhere were henceforward conjointly carried into 
effect." 

(6) 28th SEPTEMBER 1854. 

Notifying strict blockade of all ports in the White Sea 
including specially Archangel and Onega by a competent force 
of the allied fleets. 

(7) 3bd NOVEMBER 1854. 

Notifying despatch from Sir Charles Napier announcing the 
raising of the blockade of ports in the Gulf of Bothnia. 



300 The Declaration of Paris 

1855 

(8) 3bd march 1865. 

Notifying despatch from Rear Admiral Sir Edmund Lyons 
commanding H.M.'s naval forces in the Black Sea, dated 11th 
February, announcing that the ports in the Black Sea and in 
the Sea of Azov were strictly blockaded by a competent force 
of the allied fleets, and that certain ports in the Crimea would 
remain open and free from blockade. 

(9) 10th march 1855. 

Notifying despatch from Sir Edmund Lyons announcing 
raising of blockade of the Danube. 

(10) 27th APRIL 1855. 

Notifying despatch from officer commanding H.M.'s squadron, 
dated 19th April, announcing that Libau on the coast of Cour- 
land was placed on that date in a state of strict blockade by a 
competent British force in the name of the allies ; and that on 
the same day all Russian ports in the Baltic, including the 
entrance to the Gulf of Riga, were also placed in a state of strict 
blockade by a competent force. 

(11) 16th may 1855. 

Notifying despatch from Rear Admiral Dundas commanding 
H.M.'s ships in the Baltic, of a strict blockade by an effective 
force of ports in the Gulf of Finland in the name of the allies. 

(12) 21ST JUNE 1855. 

Notifying despatch " with reference to the blockade of the 
Gulf of Finland already established on 28th April last," announ- 
cing ports in the Gulf of Finland, especially Cronstadt, were 
strictly blockaded by a competent force on the 27th May in 
the name of the allies. 

(13) 29th JUNE 1855. 

Notifying despatch from French and British admirals 
commanding the allied naval forces announcing that all ports 
on the coast of Finland were on the 15th June placed in a state 
of strict blockade by a competent force of the allied fleets. 



Correspondence Relating to the Blockades 301 

(14) 17th JULY 1855. 

Notifying despatch from Senior Officer of White Sea Squadron 
announcing a strict blockade in the name of the allies by a 
competent force of ports on the White Sea, especially Archangel 
and Onega. 

(15) 27th JULY 1855. 

Notifying despatch from Rear- Admiral Dundas announcing 
joint notification of strict blockade of Baltic ports and all 
Russian ports in the Gulf of Bothnia, by a competent force 
of the allied fleets. 

(16) 29th NOVEMBER 1855. 

Notifjdng despatch from Senior Officer White Sea Squadron 
raising blockade of the White Sea on 9th October. 



1856 

BRITISH NOTIFICATION OF THE RAISING OF THE BRITISH 
AND FRENCH BLOCKADES OF RUSSIAN PORTS, PENDING 
THE RATIFICATIONS OF THE TREATY OF PEACE. 

Foreign Office, April 8, 1856. 

Notice is hereby given, that pending the ratification of the 
Treaty of Peace, an armistice by sea, as well as by land, has been 
agreed upon between Great Britain and her Allies, on the one 
part, and Russia on the other ; and that consequently, orders 
have been given for immediately raising the blockade of Russian 
ports. 



13 

Correspondence Relating to the Blockades. 

A. — M. Drouyn de Lhuys to Count Walewski. 

Paris, le 19 Avril, 1854. 

M. LE COMTE, 

Le blocus devant naturellement etre notifie en meme temps 
pour les Gouvernements Franyais et Anglais je vous prie 
d'engager Lord Clarendon a me faire parvenir le plus prompte- 
ment possible par I'intermediare de Lord Cowley les avis 



302 The Declaration of Paris 

relatifs aux blocus effectues par les forces navales Britanniques, 
afin que la notification en puisse etre inseree le meme jour 
dans le Moniteur et dans la Gazette de Londres. De mon cot^, 
j'aurai soin de transmettre a Lord Clarendon par votre inter- 
mediare I'avis des blocus effectues par les forces navales 
Fran9aises. 

Quelle que soit la marine qui ^tablisse le blocus, je pense 
qu'il doit tou jours etre sense avoir ete effectue par les forces 
navales combinees au nom des deux Gouvernements allies ; il 
me parait essentiel que les termes de la notification soient 
explicites a cet egard et pour prevenir les difficultes auxquelles 
pourraient donner lieu les blocus des golfes et des c6tes je crois 
aussi convenable d'ins6rer dans toutes les notifications outre 
les noms des principaux ports ces termes : " et autres ports, 

rades, havres, ou criques du Golfe de ou de la cote de 

depuis le cap ou la pointe jusqu'au cap ou la point e ." 

II ne peut echapper a Lord Clarendon qu'il y a toujours avantage 
a ^viter une discussion de principes lorsque les doutes peuvent 
etre prdvenus par le simple choix des termes. J'ai soumis 
cette observation a Lord Cowley qui I'a trouvee d'autant plus 
fondee que d'apres la jurisprudence Anglaise il ne lui paraissait 
pas certain qu'en cas de blocus du Golfe de Finland par exemple 
sans autre designation, la navigation entre deux ports du golfe 
put etre considere comme violant le blocus. 

II est dans nos usages de transmettre les notifications de 
blocus au corps diplomatique accredite a Paris et je pense 
que cet usage existe aussi en Angleterre veuillez bien M. le Comte 
vous en assurer aupres de Lord Clarendon, et, s'il en est ainsi 
lui proposer d'adopter pour ces sortes de notifications le projet 
de circulaire ci- joint ou tout autre qu'il jugerait convenable 
d'y substituer pour que ces sortes de communications aient lieu 
de la part des deux Gouvernements dans les termes identiques. 

Le Ministre d' Angleterre a Copenhague a notifie officielle- 
ment au Gouvernement Danois I'intention ou se trouve TAmiral 
Napier de bloquer le Golfe de Finlande. Je pense que cette 
notification ne saurait remplacer celle qui doit suivre I'insertion 
de I'avis du blocus dans les journaux officiels, et je me crois fond6 
a la considerer comme ayant ete faite sans instructions. D'apres 
une r^gle qui a prevalu dans le droit des gens moderne et que 
pour notre part nous avons observee scrupuleusement dans les 
mesures de represailles que nous avons eu a employer contre 
le Mexique et Bu6nos-Ayres, il doit^tre laisse aux batiments 
neutres, en cas d'etablissement de blocus un delai suffisant 
pour quitter le port sur lest ou avec leur chargements : cette 
regie a ete rappelee aux commandants de nos batiments de guerre 



Correspondence Relating to the Blockades 303 

par les instructions gen^rales dont ils ont 6t6 munis. Je vous 
prie M. le Comte d'engager Lord Clarendon a faire donner aux 
commandants Anglais des ordres dans le meme sens si les in- 
structions generates qui ont du leur etre adressees ne sont pas 
deja explicates sur ce point. 

Je vous rappellerai a cette occasion M. le Comte le desir que 
je vous ai exprime par ma depeche du de ce mois, 

d'avoir communication des instructions generales des croiseurs 
Anglais et de connaitre I'opinion du Cabinet Anglais sur les 
instructions adresses a nos croiseurs. Je re9ois encore journelle- 
ment de la part des Puissances neutres des demandes d'explica- 
tions sur les principes adoptes par nous en mati^re de droit 
maritime et je ne puis y repondre convenablement qu'apres 
etre fixe sur les principes admis par le Gouvernement Anglais. 
Je vous prie M. le Comte de renouveler vos demarches aupr^s 
de Lord Clarendon pour etre mis en mesure de me transmettre 
promptement que j 'attend a cet egard. 



B. — Memorandum by M. Drouyn de Lhuys — Views of 
THE French Government on the Blockade of the 
Black Sea. 

le 29 Juin, 1854. 

MM. les Vice Amiraux Hamelin et Dundas pensent que le 
blocus des ports Russes de la Mer Noire ne peut-etre rendu 
effectif que par I'adoption des deux mesures suivants. 

La premiere que serait prise par le Gouvernement Ottoman 
aurait pour objet de defendre I'exp^dition (clear out) de tous les 
navires neutres de Constantinople pour les possessions Russes 
de la Mer Noire, et d'empecher tous navires neutres destines 
pour les possessions Russes de quitter le Bosphore au moyen de 
deux batiments de guerre Turcs et d'un ou plusiers batiments 
allies stationes a I'entree de la Mer Noire avec ordre d'inscrire 
sur les papiers de bord de ces navires la defense de se rendre 
dans les ports Russes. La seconde mesure consisterait a etablir 
deux croisieres de batiments-a-vapeur de deux escadres alliees, 
I'une devant le golfe occidental entre le Danube et le Cap 
Chersonese et la seconde devant le golfe oriental entre le Cap 
Chersonese et la Baie de Gelendjik. Les 19 vaisseaux de ligne 
des escadres combinees feraient, en outre, de frequentes appari- 
tions dans les golfes de mani^re a rendre le blocus aussi effectif 
que possible. Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres qui avait ete 
consults sur la premiere partie de cette proposition par M. le 
Ministre de la Marine en consequence d'une depeche de M. le 



304 The Declaration of Paris 

Vice Amiral Hamelin a repondu le 26 Juin qu'elle ne lui 
paraissait pas admissible d'apres les principes proclames par 
les 2 Gouvernements allies au commencement de la guerre, 
attendu qu'elle avait evidemment pour objet de remplacer un 
blocus effectif par une interdiction de commerce que la Porte 
elle-meme ne pourrait prononcer sans violer ses engagements 
conventionnels avec les Puissance maritimes. Rapprochee de la 
2™® partie de la proposition, qui tend a I'etablissement d'un 
blocus effectif, la premiere partie n' off re plus le caractere absolu 
qui semblait devoir la faire repousser sans reserve : elle a 
seulement pour I'objet d'ajouter a I'efficacite de blocus, et dans 
cette mesure elle pent etre adoptee en partie. 

En effet, si Ton regarde comme utile de bloquer tous les ports 
Russes de la Mer Noire, meme ceux qui sont sans importance 
pour le commerce d'exportation et qui ne sont frequentes que 
par des caboteurs, et si Ton admet que les croisieres projetees 
peuvent constituer suivant les termes de nos declarations une 
force suffisante pour qu'il y ait danger de penetrer dans les ports 
declares en ^tat de blocus, il est inutile de reclamer de la Porte 
aucune mesure d'interdiction commerciale ; mais il pent etre 
avantageux, surtout au point de vue de la jurisprudence Anglaise, 
de poster des croiseurs Turcs ou allies a 1' entree de la Mer Noire 
afin de notifier a tous les navires entrant I'existence du blocus 
effectif des ports Russes, au moyen d'une inscription sur les 
papiers de bord. Les batiments qui auront re9u ce 1' avertisse- 
ment ne sauraient s'ils sont rencontres aux environs des ports 
bloques en reclamer un second et pourront evidemment etre 
saisis comme ayant cherche a violer un blocus. II va sans 
dire que MM. les Amiraux devront faire la notification du blocus 
dans les termes convenus entre les deux Gouvernements, c'est 
a dire en designant nominativement les ports ainsi que les points 
nautiques extremes des rades, havres, ou criques compris dans 
le blocus. 

[For Lord Clarendon's reply to M. Drouyn de Lhuys' letter 
of 19th April, see Addendum on p. 440.] 



Neutral Legislation as to Navigation during War 305 

14 

Neutral Legislation as to Navigation during the War, 

A.— BRAZIL. 

DECREE OF H.M. THE EMPEROR OF BRAZIL 
CONCERNING PRIVATEERS. 

Rio de Janeiro, 17 May, 1854. 
I have the honour to inform Your Excellency that His Imperial 
Majesty, attentive to the commercial interests of his subjects, 
and desirous to observe a strict neutrality during the war 
which unhappily exists between Great Britain and France on 
the one side and Russia on the other, as far as possible to 
conform to the principles of international law and the Imperial 
legislation, has decided to adopt the following resolutions : — 

1. That no privateer flying the flag of any belligerent 
Power may be armed, provisioned, or admitted with its prizes 
into the ports of our empire. 

2. That no Brazilian subject shall take part in the arming 
of privateers nor take any action opposed to the duties of a 
strict neutrality. 

I officially inform Your Excellency of the said resolutions 
and I have to request Your Excellency to send suitable instruc- 
tions in order that they may be understood and executed by 
the authorities of the Empire and those that are subordinate 
to you. 

Permit me to take the opportunity of repeating to Your 
Excellency the assurances of my perfect esteem and distinguished 
consideration. 

Antonio Paulino Limpo de Abreu. 

To H.E. o Sr. Jose Maria da Silva Paranihos. 

B.— BREMEN. 

ORDINANCE OF THE SENATE OF BREMEN, DECLARING 
THE NEUTRALITY OF BREMEN IN THE WAR BETWEEN 
CERTAIN EUROPEAN POWERS; AND PROHIBITING THE 
EXPORTATION OF ARTICLES CONTRABAND OF WAR.— 
BREMEN, APRIL 12, 1854. 

As a state of war now exists between several of the Great 
European Powers, and the commencement of hostilities by sea 
and land has been declared, the Senate, in order, under existing 

20 



306 The Declaration of Paris 

circumstances, to secure Bremen property from loss and damage 
as much as possible, and to maintain the neutral position of 
Bremen against all infringement, sees itself called upon to 
require the attention of all, but particularly of those engaged 
in commerce, and also of shipowners, so that they, in their 
commercial transactions to and from places belonging to a 
belligerent State, be it in a state of blockade or not, in order 
to avoid their own loss, do abstain from all and every violation 
of those obligations imposed on them in time of war by the 
general law of nations and by Bremen State Treaties. 

Notwithstanding that the Senate feels assured that the 
reference to their duties towards friendly Powers and their own 
State will be sufficient to deter the citizens of Bremen in future, 
as it has done hitherto, from every undertaking opposed to 
the principles of public law, yet it hereby at the same time, 
without prejudice to any other measures that may become 
necessary for the maintenance of the neutrality of the State 
of Bremen, enjoins the following regulations for general 
observation : — 

1. The exportation is prohibited of all articles deemed 
contraband of war by the law of nations, or by the existing 
Bremen State Treaties ; and particularly of munitions of war, 
gunpowder, musket and cannon balls, percussion caps, sulphur, 
and saltpetre, ordnance and arms of every description, and 
generally of all articles immediately serving for purposes of 
war, to the territory of any of the belligerent Powers by land 
or water, and whether under Bremen or foreign flag. 

The transgression of this prohibition will be followed, in 
addition to the confiscation of the articles in question, by fine 
or imprisonment according to circumstances. 

2. On all shipments of goods to the belligerent States the 
articles are to be correctly specified ; the term " merchandize " 
or any general designation is inadmissible. 

3. No Bremen vessel shall be allowed to carry double sets 
of ship's papers, or to sail under a foreign flag. 

4. The legal obligation previously imposed on the sworn 
shipbrokers that they shall give notice of the shipment of 
articles considered as contraband of war, as also in regard to 
the genuineness of the ship's documents and ship's papers, 
remain unaltered in validity, and the observance thereof is 
hereby again expressly enjoined on them. 



Neutral Legislation as to Navigation during War 307 

ORDINANCE OF THE SENATE OF BREMEN, PROHIBITING THE 
ADMISSION, FITTING-OUT, AND PROVISIONING OF PRIVA- 
TEERS IN THE PORTS OF BREMEN, DURING WAR 
BETWEEN CERTAIN EUROPEAN POWERS.— BREMEN, 
APRIL 28, 1854. 

The Governments of Great Britain and France having 
officially announced to the Senate that they have agreed to 
make no use, until further notice, of the right possessed by 
them as belligerent Powers to grant letters of marque during 
the continuance of the war carried on by them, therefore, the 
Senate, considering the obligations imposed on neutral States 
by a just reciprocity, finds itself called upon hereby to ordain, 
for general observance, as follows : — 

1. All citizens of the State of Bremen are forbidden, under 
peril of heavy punishment, in anywise to engage in privateer- 
ing, either by fitting out privateers themselves, or by affording 
them indirect aid. 

2. The proper authorities are directed not to allow, under 
any circumstances, the fitting out and provisioning of privateers, 
be they under whatever flag or letters of marque they may, 
in any port belonging to the State of Bremen, and not to permit 
any such privateers, and any prizes which they may have with 
them, to enter a Bremen port, unless in cases of clearly-proved 
distress at sea. 

Resolved in the Assembly of the Senate, Bremen, the 28th 
of April, and published on the 29th of April, 1854. 

C— DENMARK. 

NOTICE OF THE DANISH GOVERNMENT RELATIVE TO THE 
RENEWED APPLICATION OF THE ORDINANCE OF MAY 4, 
1803, AS TO HOW TRADERS AND SEAMEN ARE TO CON- 
DUCT THEMSELVES IN CASE OF A WAR BETWEEN 
FOREIGN MARITIME POWERS, ETC. 

Copenhagen, April 20, 1854. 
On the 11th inst. His Majesty the King graciously appointed 
the Undersigned Ministers to remind His Majesty's subjects of 
the laws contained in the Ordinance of the 4th of May 1803 
relating to the conduct to be observed by traders and navigators 
in case of a war between foreign naval Powers ; and likewise 
to announce that, on account of the impending war, the said 
Ordinance will come again into operation in all and every part 
of His Majesty's realm from the day on which this notice is 
there made known. 



308 The Declaration of Paris 

As it has also been deemed necessary to particularize more 
especially several regulations in that Ordinance, His Majesty 
has been pleased to give his subjects some interim instructions 
to enable them conscientiously to perform their duties ; to 
observe as well the general conditions of the Treaty, which 
in the event of the threatened war come into force, as also the 
Declaration of Neutrality communicated by order of His Majesty 
to several foreign Powers, especially the belligerents in the 
annexed translated circular, in the same manner as it will be 
by His Majesty and his Government. 

The Undersigned Ministry have, therefore, to announce and 
enforce the following by Royal Authority : 

Section 1. In regard to Article I. of the Ordinance of 4th 
May 1803, it is hereby determined that the Royal Latin sea- 
passes ordered therein must be procured for all voyages, ex- 
cepting the inland navigation in the Baltic, Cattegat, and the 
German Ocean, or between Danish or neutral ports in the Baltic 
and Cattegat. 

Although the Royal Latin sea-pass is only valid for one 
voyage, to wit, from the time of the departure of the vessel 
for her home port after receipt thereof, until her return 
(Ordinance, 4th May 1803, Article XII.), it may, nevertheless, 
be presumed that it will be renewed by indorsement, according 
to circumstances. 

Under the designations of Colleges (Boards) made use of in 
the Ordinance of 4th May 1803, Article IX., the respective 
Ministries are now to be understood ; so that when Article 
XIV. names the General Land Economy and Commercial 
Board, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs is meant ; in like 
manner, the Finance Ministry is to be understood by the West 
Indian Guinea Revenue and General Board of Customs alluded 
to in the same paragraph. 

For the present the Royal Latin sea-pass is furnished by 
the Minister of Foreign Affairs gratis. 

Section 2. In addition to the articles specified in the 
Ordinance of 4th May 1803, all manufactured articles which 
may be directly converted into articles of warfare, are now 
deemed contraband of war. 

Should any change or addition, with respect to contraband 
of war, be necessary in consequence of any special stipulations 
between His Majesty the King and foreign Powers, the Ministry 
for Foreign Affairs reserves to itself the right of giving further 
particulars after having received His Majesty's instructions. 

Section 3. In consequence of the conditions of the existing 
Treaties (Treaty with Great Britain, of 11th July 1670, Art. III., 



Neutral Legislation as to Navigation during War 309 

4 
and explanatory Article of July, — 1780, and agreeable to the 

MX 

contents of the Royal Declaration of Neutrality (Article I.)), it 

is illegal for His Majesty's subjects to take any kind of service 

whatever, either by land or in any of the Government ships 

belonging to the eventual belligerent Powers ; and especially 

to pilot the vessels of war or transports of those Powers beyond 

the pilots' districts of the Danish Kingdom. 

The above is made known for the instruction and guidance 

of all whom it may or doth concern. 

Bluhme. 



ORDINANCE OF THE KING OF DENMARK, RELATING TO THE 
CONDUCT OF TRADERS AND MARINERS WHEN WAR 
BREAKS OUT BETWEEN FOREIGN MARITIME POWERS. 

Copenhagen, May 4, 1803. 

We, Christian the Seventh, by the Grace of God, King of Den- 
mark and Norway, the Vandals and Goths, Duke of Schleswig- 
Holstein, Stormarn, Ditmarsh, and Oldenburg. 

Make known, that although by sundry orders, before pub- 
lished, we have established the laws and regulations to be 
observed by our trading and maritime subjects, when war takes 
place between foreign naval Powers, we, nevertheless, deem it 
necessary, under existing circumstances, to compile under one 
Ordinance, and to particularise the details of the above-named 
orders, which are to serve as a guide to all whom they may 
concern, in order that, on the one hand, the basis thereof may 
be generally understood, by which it is at all times our intention 
to maintain the rights of our trading and maritime subjects ; 
on the other hand, that no one may be able to exculpate himself 
on the ground of ignorance of the duties devolving on him as a 
Danish subject, in the aforesaid case. It is, therefore, our most 
gracious will that the following Regulations only and alone shall 
in future be observed and strictly followed by all and every one 
desirous of participating in the privileges to which the neutrality 
of our flag entitles them in times of war, in their legal tradings 
and navigation ; for this purpose we have hereby rescinded and 
annulled all former regulations made for the guidance of our 
subjects in this respect ; therefore we direct and command as 
follows : — 

Art. I. Those of our trading and maritime subjects who are 
desirous of despatching any ship belonging to them across the 
seas to any of the foreign places to which, according to the 
circumstances, the effects of the War may extend, are bound, 



310 The Declaration of Paris 

under due observance of all the instructions and rules, herein- 
after appointed, to furnish themselves with a royal Latin sea- 
pass, also the necessary papers and documents for a lawful 
despatch of the vessel. For this purpose, on the outbreak of 
hostilities between foreign Powers, it will be further determined 
and made public for what places it will be deemed necessary 
for ships to be furnished with our Latin sea-passes. 

II. The pass cannot be obtained before the owner of the 
vessel for which it is required has procured the necessary ship's 
certificate, as evidence of his legal right to the ship. 

III. No one may obtain a ship's certificate who is not our 
subject, either born in our kingdom and possessions, or before 
the commencement of hostilities between any of the Naval 
Powers of Europe, has been in possession of all the rights of 
citizenship, either in our own or other neutral States. In all 
cases the owner of the vessel for which the certificate is required 
shall be resident in some part of our kingdom or possession. 

IV. Anyone who, according to the preceding article, is 
entitled to obtain a ship's certificate, shall, in order to procure 
the same, present himself before the magistrate or other autho- 
rity of the place to which the ship belongs, or where the greater 
part of the owners are resident, and there either the whole, or 
at least the chief owner, shall make oath, or by a written and 
signed affidavit, swear that the ship belongs to him or them 
(all being our subjects), and that the vessel for which the ship's 
certificate is required has on board no contraband of war 
destined to any of the belligerent Powers or their subjects. 

V. No one may, on the breaking out of war, be allowed to 
command any ship furnished with our royal sea-pass, who shall 
have been born in the country of any of the Powers which are 
at war, without he has obtained his rights of citizenship in our 
kingdom and possession prior to the breaking out of hostilities. 

VI. Every captain commanding a vessel furnished with our 
royal sea-pass, must have obtained his citizenship in some part 
of our kingdom or dominions. He is bound at all times to have 
his bugerbrief (certificate of citizenship) with him on board. As 
a surety that he will undertake nothing contrary to the tenor 
of these, our regulations, he is bound, before his departure from 
the port where he receives the pass, to make oath that, with 
his consent, nothing shall be done whereby the pass and docu- 
ments rendered to him might be misused. This affidavit shall 
be delivered by the owner with his application for the pass ; 
but should this, owing to the absence of the captain, not be 
practicable, it must be announced by the owner, and our Consul 
or Commercial Agent at the district where the captain then is 



Neutral Legislation as to Navigation during War 811 

shall be responsible that the captain makes such affidavit on 
receipt of the pass : 

VII. No supercargo, factor, clerk, or other ship's officer, 
being a subject of the belligerent Powers, shall be on board of 
such ships as shall be furnished with a royal Latin sea-pass. 

VIII. Of the crew, including the mate, the half shall at all 
times consist of seamen of our realm. Should it happen that 
the crew at a foreign port should become incomplete, by deser- 
tion, death, or sickness, in such a manner that the captain is 
rendered incapable of fulfilling the commands contained in this 
Article, it shall be lawful for him to ship as many foreigners, 
but preferably the subjects of neutral Powers, as may be neces- 
sary for the continuation of the voyage ; but in no case shall 
the number of the subjects of the belligerent Powers on board 
the ship be more than the third of the entire crew. Every 
change in the crew, and the reasons thereof, shall be noted by 
the master on his crew-list, and in every case be attested in 
writing by our respective Consuls and Commissioners of Com- 
merce, or their representatives, at the port into which the ship 
enters ; such endorsement serving the master as justification in 
all cases that may arise. 

IX. In addition to the ship's documents, which are always 
to be kept on board, the following also belong, exclusive of the 
ship's certificate alluded to in Article II., viz., the ship's " biel 
or bygnings brev " (builder's certificate) ; and in case he who had 
the vessel built has since had her transferred to another owner, 
then also " kiobebrevet or skiodet " (the purchase certificate or 
transfer). These documents are to be sent in to the colleges or 
authorities by the owner on applying for the pass, together with 
the certificate to prove the ship's lawful right to the possession 
of the pass : 

The royal Latin sea-pass, with the requisite translations. 

The maale-brev (measure-brief). 

EquipageruUen or folkelisten (crew-list), duly attested by the 
proper authorities. 

Charter-parties and bills of lading of the cargo ; and, lastly, 

Told and clarerings seddelen (Customs' clearance) from the 
port where the cargo is shipped. 

X. The maale-brev (measure-brief) shall be issued by the 
authorities empowered to measure vessels in our kingdom. 
Should any of our subjects purchase a vessel in a foreign port, 
our Consul or Commercial Agent at that place shall be author- 
ized to effect the ship's measurement, and furnish the master 
with an interim measure-brief, which shall be deemed valid until 
the ship arrives at any port of our kingdom, where she shall be 



812 The Declaration of Paris 

properly measured and branded, and a formal measure-brief pre- 
pared, which shall afterwards always remain on board the ship. 

XI. All and every one is prohibited, owners as well as 
captains, to procure or have on board duplicate ship's papers, 
or to carry a foreign flag, so long as they shall sail with the 
papers and documents graciously furnished to them by us. 

XII. Our royal Latin sea-pass is valid only for one voyage ; 
to wit, from the time the ship, after the reception thereof, leaves 
the home port, to the time of her arrival back again, provided 
she shall not have come into the possession of any other person 
by lawful sale, in which case the new owner shall obtain the 
necessary passes and papers in his own name. 

XIII. As according to the generally acknowledged principles, 
the subjects of neutral Powers are not permitted to have goods 
on board which may be deemed contraband of war, when des- 
tined to the belligerent Powers or to their subjects, or which 
may already belong to them, we hereby distinctly determine 
what is to be understood as contraband of war, to prevent our 
flag being misused for covering the carriage of such prohibited 
goods, and in order that no one may be enabled to exculpate 
himself on the plea of ignorance. The following articles, there- 
fore, shall be looked upon and deemed by our subjects to be 
contraband of war ; to wit, cannon, mortars, all sorts of weapons, 
pistols, bombs, grenades, ball, guns, flints, matches, gunpowder, 
saltpetre, brimstone, cuirasses, pikes, swords, belts, cartridge 
boxes, saddles, and bridles, excepting such a quantity of these 
articles as may be necessary for the defence of such vessel and 
crew. Moreover, the positive obligations respecting the convey- 
ance of prohibited goods and property in ships or vessels belonging 
to our subjects, entered into by special stipulations with foreign 
Powers, are to remain in full force in all their parts, for which 
purpose owners shall be furnished with particular instructions 
to regulate their actions on this head on receipt of the pass. 

XIV. Should any ship or vessel destined to a neutral port 
take on board such goods which, if intended for any port be- 
longing to the belligerent Powers, would be regarded as con- 
traband of war, every such shipper and master shall then, in 
addition to the oath they have respectively to make as owner 
and captain, before the proper magistrate or other authorities 
be compelled to make a special declaration, apart from the usual 
required Customs' clearance, setting forth the description, 
quantity and value of such goods, in conformity with the 
invoices and bills of lading, which declaration, signed by the 
shipper and master, shall be certified by the proper collector 
or inspector of Customs at the places where the clearance is 



Neutral Legislation as to Navigation during War 813 

effected. Such attested declaration shall, after clearance of the 
ship, be forwarded without delay by our Custom-House officers 
to our West Indian Guinea Revenue and General Board of 
Customs, to serve for the control of the goods therein mentioned 
on due arrival at the proper port of destination, unless it can 
be shown by authenticated proof that they were prevented by 
cases of distress or violent detention. The control thereof shall 
be conducted in the following manner : the shipper of such 
goods shall procure a certificate from our Consul or Commercial 
Agent at the place to which the ship is destined, or, if no Consul 
or Commercial Agent, or their representative, reside there, then 
of the proper functionaries or other persons appointed by public 
authorities at the place, duly qualified to issue such certificate, 
which certificate aforesaid shall legally certify the arrival of 
such ship and discharge of such goods, in conformity with the 
given declaration. This certificate must be procured, and for- 
warded to our General Land Economy and Commercial College, 
as soon as the vessel arrives at her port of destination, or has 
returned to an inland harbour. Should such certificate not be 
forthcoming within a proper time necessary for the completion 
of the voyage, our General Land Economy and Commercial 
College shall demand of the shipper a declaration, such as he 
may conscientiously affirm on oath, that he has received no 
intelligence of the ship and goods in question. Should no proof, 
however, be obtainable of the arrival of the ship and the dis- 
charge of the goods in question at a neutral port, or the preven- 
tion thereof be shown to have been occasioned by accident or 
forcible detention, the shipper shall pay to the Sea Pass Ex- 
chequer of our General Land Economy and Commercial College 
a fine of 20 Rbthlr. for every commerce last of the ship's burthen, 
and in such cases of transgression the owners and captain shall 
be liable to prosecution according to law. 

XV. No captain shall sail to any port blockaded by sea by 
any of the belligerent Powers, and he shall guide himself in 
this respect carefully, according to the warnings made known 
to him by the proper authorities respecting the blockade of any 
ports. In case that on sailing into any port, of the blockade 
of which he was before ignorant, he meet any ship, under a 
man-of-war's flag, belonging to the belligerent Powers, and it 
then be announced to him by the commander thereof that the 
port is really under blockade, he shall without delay put back, 
and in nowise seek to creep in by surreptitious means, so long 
as such port shall be in state of blockade. 

XVI. None or our subjects shall serve on board privateers, 
much less fit out, or have any interest in fitting out of such 



314 The Declaration of Paris 

vessels ; neither shall any owner or master allow his ship to be 
used for the transport of troops, weapons, or ammunition of 
war, of what kind or nature soever. In case a master should 
not be able to prevent his ship, by means of irresistible force, 
being made use of for the aforesaid purpose, it shall be his duty, 
fervently, and by a formal deed, to protest against such violent 
treatment, which it was not in his power to prevent. 

XVII. Should a merchant vessel, not sailing under an armed 
protection, be boarded at sea by any ship belonging to the 
belligerent Powers entitled to examine her ship's papers, the 
captain shall make no resistance against such search, when 
undertaken by the commanding officer of the aforesaid armed 
ship ; but he shall, on the contrary, be bound to produce faith- 
fully and without reserve all papers and documents relating to 
ship and cargo. It is, moreover, most stringently prohibited for 
the captain, his officers, or any of his crew to throw overboard 
or any manner destroy or conceal any document or paper on 
board belonging to the ship or cargo, be it either before or during 
the search. When merchant vessels are allowed the armed 
protection of our man-of-war flag, every master is compelled 
to show his ship's papers to the superior officer of the convoy, 
before he can be received under such convoy, and in all cases 
implicitly to follow his orders. 

XVIII. Should any master or owner dare to transgress or 
otherwise to oppose this our Ordinance, he shall have forfeited 
his citizenship, and his further right to fit out vessels, and also 
be subjected to be prosecuted by law, and punished, according 
to the circumstances, as perjurers, or as wilful transgressors of 
our royal mandate. On the other hand we will, with parental 
care, maintain and protect the interest of our beloved subjects' 
lawful commerce and navigation, when they conduct themselves 
obediently in accordance to the above rules and instructions ; 
for which purpose we have instructed and commanded our 
Ministers, Consuls, and other proper authorities abroad, to pre- 
vent to the utmost of their power, any annoyance or molestation 
to our subjects, and in case of such occurring, to protect the 
sufferer, and endeavour to obtain justice for him and compensa- 
tion for damages. We shall likewise, at all times, graciously 
support every well-grounded claim that any of our subjects may 
at any time humbly lay before us. 

Given under our hand and seal, at our royal residence, 
in the city of Copenhagen, the 4th May 1803. 

Schimmelmann Schestedt. (L.S.) Christian R. 

C. Winther. 



Neutral Legislation as to Navigation during War 315 

D.— HAITI. 

DECLARATION OF THE EMPEROR OF HAITI, RELATIVE TO 
THE NEUTRALITY OF HAITI IN THE WAR BETWEEN 
THE ALLIED POWERS AND RUSSIA; THE NON-ADMIS- 
SION OF PRIVATEERS INTO HAITIAN PORTS; THE NON- 
VIOLATION OF BLOCKADES ; AND THE TRADE OF 
NEUTRALS.— NOVEMBER 18, 1864. 

Sa Majeste I'Empereur, voulant conserver la neutralite dans 
la guerre qui se poursuit en Europe entre les Puissances alliees 
et la Russie, a daigne arreter ce qui suit : 

Les navires armes en course ne seront point admis dans les 
ports et rades de I'Empire et en pourront par consequent s'y 
procurer ni munitions ni instruments quelconques dont ils 
pourraient avoir besoin. 

Ne seront pas admis pareillement dans ces ports, les arma- 
teurs avec leurs prises k moins d'un cas de peril evident. 

II ne sera pas permis de leur acheter des objets qu'ils pour- 
raient avoir a vendre quels qu'ils soient. 

Defense est faite aux sujets de I'Empire de prendre du service 
k bord des batiments des armateurs etrangers, et aux batiments 
sous pavilion haitien de transporter pour aucune des Puissances 
belligerantes, des objets de contrebande de guerre. 

Les dits batiments pourront toutefois faire le transport du 
commerce dans les ports et rades des Puissances belligerantes, 
et prendre chargements, dans leur qualite de neutres, de mar- 
chandises appartenant aux sujets des dites Puissances, excepte 
la contrebande de guerre. Les batiments sous pavilion haitien 
s'abstiendront d'entrer dans les ports qui seront bloques reelle- 
ment et effectivement ; c'est-a-dire, lorsque ce blocus est 
maintenu par des forces suffisantes et lorsqu'il y a declaration 
formelle du commandant des forces navales. 

Le Gouvernement de I'Empire se conforme aux principes 
proclames par les Puissances belligerantes relativement au 
commerce des neutres, a savoir : le pavilion couvre la marchan- 
dise ; la propriete des neutres, meme sur les navires ennemis, 
est inviolable (excepte, dans le Cas de contrebande de guerre 
et de blocus effectif ) ; et enfin on declare que des lettres de 
marque ne seront pas delivrees. 

Le present avis est public pour que le commerce haitien s'y 
conforme. 



316 The Declaration of Paris 



E.— HAMBURGH. 

PROCLAMATION OF THE SENATE OF HAMBURGH, PRO- 
HIBITING THE EXPORTATION OF ARTICLES CONTRA- 
BAND OF WAR, AND THE VIOLATION OF BLOCKADES, 
DURING HOSTILITIES BETWEEN CERTAIN EUROPEAN 
POWERS.— HAMBURGH, APRIL 10, 1854. 

During the present state of war between several of the Great 
European Powers the Senate feels itself called upon to issue the 
following regulations : — 

The exportation of all contraband of war, considered as such 
according to the law of nations or Hamburgh State Conven- 
tions, viz. : — 

Ammunition, guns, gunpowder, saltpetre, sulphur, balls, 
caps, all kinds of arms, and, generally speaking, all objects 
which may be used in warfare, is hereby prohibited to the States 
of the belligerent Powers, whether under Hamburgh or under 
foreign colours, or by land. 

Whosoever, as owner or master of a vessel or shipper of such 
articles, acts in contravention of this ordinance is not only 
liable to the confiscation of such articles, but will likewise be 
heavily fined and punished by imprisonment. 

In order to exercise a proper control over goods to be shipped 
to belligerent States, those goods are to be distinctly named, 
and the expression " merchandize," or any other general deno- 
mination, is inadmissible. 

No captain or master of a ship under Hamburgh colours is 
permitted to break a blockade, or, after having been informed 
thereof, to pass through it clandestinely, nor is he permitted 
to have double ship's papers, or to carry a foreign flag, as long 
as he is furnished with a Hamburgh ship's pass. 

Those who may wish to ascertain further particulars respect- 
ing the orders and instructions of the belligerent Powers, relating 
to the navigation and commercial intercourse of neutrals, are 
to apply to the Board of Trade. 

PROCLAMATION OF THE SENATE OF HAMBURGH, WARNING 
HAMBURGH CITIZENS AGAINST PRIVATEERING; AND PRO- 
HIBITING THE ADMISSION OF PRIVATEERS INTO PORTS 
OF HAMBURGH, DURING WAR.— HAMBURGH, APRIL 26, 
1854. 

The Senate, in again most urgently drawing attention to 
the fact that the duty of every individual citizen of the State 
of Hamburgh requires him to avoid all that might impair the 



Neutral Legislation as to Navigation during War 817 

neutral position of the Hamburgh State and its flag, hereby 
warns all citizens of Hamburgh, under threat of heavy punish- 
ment, from being in any manner concerned, during the present 
war, in privateering, or in taking any interest therein, either by 
fitting out privateers themselves or by indirectly aiding them. 

At the same time the Senate makes publicly known that no 
privateer, let it be under whatever flag, or provided with what- 
ever letters of marque it may, shall, either with or without prizes, 
be admitted into the ports and roads of Hamburgh, except in 
cases of clearly-proved distress at sea, and that the proper orders 
have been given to turn away immediately such privateers and 
their prizes under any circumstances. 



PROCLAMATION OF THE SENATE OF HAMBURGH RESPECTING 
THE EXPORTATION TO NEUTRAL PORTS OF ARTICLES 
CONTRABAND OF WAR.— HAMBURGH, MAY 22, 1854. 

It appearing advisable, in order to obviate abuses and in- 
conveniences on the exportation to neutral ports of articles 
which, by the Ordinance of the lOfh April,^ are to be considered 
as contraband of war, to adopt proper measures in order to 
prevent such articles being conveyed to other ports than those 
they are declared for by the shippers, the Senate, with respect 
to the export of articles contraband of war to neutral ports, 
the prohibition of such articles to the countries of the belli- 
gerent Powers remaining in force, has come to the following 
resolution : — 

Every shipper for neutral ports of articles which, according 
to the notification of the 10th April, are to be considered as 
contraband of war, is to engage, on declaring the name of the 
consignee and their place of destination on his oath, to be bound, 
under forfeiture of the value of the articles so shipped, to produce 
to the Custom-House authorities here a certificate from the 
Hamburgh Consul, or, if there is none, from the competent 
authority at the place of destination, declaring that the articles 
have been actually landed and delivered to the declared consignee. 
The time within which such certificate is to be produced shall be 
fixed according to the distance of the port of destination. 

The shippers are liable under this bond until the production 
of the certificate, and in case they fail to produce it within the 
time appointed for delivering it in, they shall pay the full value 
of the articles so exported, unless they can substantiate on oath, 
on being required so to do, that, owing to accidents on the voyage, 

1 See p. 316. 



318 The Declaration of Paris 

or the seizure of the vessel at sea, they have received no account 
respecting the ship and cargo. 

The above-named declarations on oath and the bonds are 
to be handed in to the Custom-House authorities here by the 
ship-broker previous to his clearing out the vessel, and the ship- 
brokers must note the same on the manifest of the vessel, on 
pain of being deprived of their privileges ; they, as ship-brokers, 
must further be responsible that, to the best of their knowledge 
and belief, no articles contraband of war are exported in any 
vessel to neutral ports without delivering in the prescribed 
declaration. 

If required, the Custom-House authorities will grant a certi- 
ficate of the delivery to them of such declarations on oath and 
forms of obligation for a fee of two marks currency. 

F.— HANOVER. 

LAW OF HANOVER, RELATIVE TO THE NEUTRALITY OF 
HANOVER IN THE WAR BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN, 
FRANCE, AND TURKEY ON THE ONE PART, AND RUSSIA 
ON THE OTHER PART; PROHIBITING PRIVATEERING; 
OR THE EXPORT OF ARTICLES CONTRABAND OF WAR. 
HANOVER, MAY 6, 1854. 

George V., by the grace of God King of Hanover, Royal 
Prince of Great Britain and Ireland, Duke of Cumberland, Duke 
of Brunswick and LUneburg, etc. 

On account of the war which has broken out between England, 
France, and Turkey on the one side, and Russia on the other side, 
and of the resolutions adopted by the two first-mentioned States 
for the purpose of preventing, as much as possible, injury to the 
commerce and shipping of the neutral Powers, We, with the 
constitutional assent of the General Assembly of the States, 
issue the following orders, which are to have the force of law 
until further directions : — 

Art. I. Our subjects are prohibited from accepting or using 
letters of marque under any form or flag whatever, as well as 
from every kind of participation in the fitting-out, manning, 
or management of privateers, and especially from serving on 
board them. 

Anyone who acts contrary to this prohibition must not 
only expect no protection from our Government if he be treated 
by other States as a pirate, but he shall moreover be tried by 
the tribunals of this country, according to Article CXXX., No. 2, 
of the Criminal Code, and the other provisions thereof applicable 
to the case. 



Neutral Legislation as to Navigation during War 319 

II. No privateer shall be allowed to enter Hanoverian 
harbours except in case of distress at sea, and then the vessel 
must be watched, and forced to leave again as soon as possible. 

In such cases, moreover, no supply of provisions, except 
victuals, if necessary, for immediate use, no making up of 
stores, of arms, or ammunition, must take place from this country 
on pain of punishment, according to Article I. 

III. The transport to and from the belligerent States of 
their troops, arms, or ammunition, as well as other articles 
serving for hostile purposes, and regarded by the general law 
of nations as contraband of war, is prohibited in Hanoverian 
ships. 

Anyone who transgresses this prohibition must expect no 
protection from our Government in case of seizure and confisca- 
tion by the belligerent States, besides which he wiU be liable to 
have his Hanoverian sea-pass taken away, and to be refused a 
new one during the continuance of the war, to be fined to the 
amount of 500 dollars, or to be imprisoned for six months. 

IV. The transport of despatches and couriers for the belli- 
gerent States shall be visited by the same punishment. 

V. The exportation of the materials mentioned in Article 
III. from our Kingdom to any one of the belligerent States is 
forbidden, no matter under what flag it may be intended to 
take place. 

Our authorities shall prevent such exportation, with military 
aid if necessary ; but should any take place notwithstanding, 
the ship and such part of the cargo as consists of the said articles 
shall be confiscated, and the delinquent shall moreover be 
punished, according to the provisions of Article III. 

VI. Using a foreign flag before the actual change of the 
nationality of a ship, or carrying double ship's papers for the 
purpose of evading the above orders, will, in the cases men- 
tioned in Articles III. to V., be punished moreover as fraud, 
according to § 217 of the Penal Police Law of 25th May 1847. 

VII. The sentences of fine and imprisonment incurred under 
this law wiU be passed by the criminal departments of the 
Superior Tribunals. 

VIII. The present law may be wholly or partially repealed 
by further ordinances. 

IX. Our Ministries, each in its own department, are charged 
with the execution of this law, and our Ministry of Finance 
and Commerce especially is authorized to issue, by way of 
proclamation, more particular instructions regarding articles 
that are to come under the designation of contraband of war. 



820 The Declaration of Paris 

G.— HAWAIIAN ISLANDS. 

PROCLAMATION OF THE KING OF THE HAWAIIAN ISLANDS, 
OF NEUTRALITY IN THE WAR BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN, 
FRANCE, TURKEY AND RUSSIA.— HONOLULU, MAY 16, 1854. 

Be it known to all whom it may concern that We, Kame- 
hameha III., King of the Hawaiian Islands, hereby proclaim 
our entire neutrality in the war now pending between the great 
maritime Powers of Europe ; that our neutrality is to be 
respected by all belligerents to the full extent of our jurisdiction, 
which by our fundamental laws is to the distance of one marine 
league surrounding each of our islands of Hawaii, Maui, Ka- 
hoolawe, Lanai, Molokai, Oahu, Kauai, and Niihau, commenc- 
ing at low-water mark on each of the respective coasts of the 
said islands, and includes all the channels passing between and 
dividing the said islands from island to island ; that all captures 
and seizures made within our said jurisdiction are unlawful ; 
and that the protection and hospitality of our ports, harbours, 
and roads shall be equally extended to all the belligerents, so 
long as they respect our neutrality. 

And be it further known, to all whom it may concern, 
that we hereby strictly prohibit all our subjects, and all who 
reside within our jurisdiction, from engaging either directly or 
indirectly in privateering against the shipping or commerce 
of any of the belligerents, under the penalty of being treated 
and punished as pirates. 

Done at our Palace of Honolulu, this 16th day of May 1854. 

Keoni Ana. Kamehameha. 



H.— LtTBECK. 

ORDINANCE OF THE SENATE OF Lt^BECK, PROHIBITING 
THE EXPORT OF ARTICLES CONTRABAND OF WAR, 
DURING HOSTILITIES BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN, FRANCE, 
AND TURKEY AGAINST RUSSIA.— Lt BECK, APRIL 10, 1854. 

In consequence of the state of war existing between Turkey, 
France, and Great Britain on the one part, and Russia on the 
other part, the Senate, in order to protect the trade and naviga- 
tion of Lijbeck, hereby ordains and brings to the general know- 
ledge of the public that : 

1. The exportation of articles contraband of war for the 
belligerent Powers or their subjects is prohibited. 

2. Articles contraband of war are arms, ordnance, firearms, 
and munitions of war of every description, but particularly 



Neutral Legislation as to Navigation during War 321 

gunpowder, musket and cannon balls, rockets, percussion 
caps, and all other articles serving for war purposes, as also 
saltpetre, sulphur, and lead. 

8. The transgression of the present ordinance will be followed 
by the confiscation of the articles contraband of war, and all 
those who are guilty thereof, or accomplices therein, shall be 
severely punished. 

PROCLAMATION OF THE SENATE OF LUBECK, ANNOUNCING 
THE NEUTRALITY OF LUBECK IN THE WAR BETWEEN 
CERTAIN EUROPEAN POWERS; AND PROHIBITING THE 
VIOLATION OF BLOCKADES, OR THE OUTFIT OF PRIVA- 
TEERS FROM, OR THEIR ADMISSION INTO, PORTS OF 
LUBECK.— LUBECK, APRIL 24, 1854. 

With reference to the official announcement made to us of 
a blockade of the whole of the Russian Baltic ports to be 
effected by the British fleet, and in order, in the present war, 
to maintain the neutral position of Lubeck unimpaired, and 
also to avert loss and injury from the citizens of this State, the 
Senate has resolved to make the following regulations for 
general observance : 

1. No master of a Lubeck vessel shall break a blockade, 
or, after having been informed thereof, endeavour clandestinely 
to evade it. He must not carry two sets of ship's papers, nor 
sail under a foreign flag. 

2. Privateers shall neither be fitted out nor provisioned in 
the Free State of Lubeck. The citizens of Lubeck must wholly 
refrain from participation in such undertakings, which are in- 
consistent with the principles of a strict neutrality. 

3. Privateers, with or without prizes, shall not be admitted 
into the harbours of Lubeck, except in cases of proved distress 
at sea. In such a case, however, the privateer and any prizes 
she may have shall be placed under surveillance, and shall 
leave the harbour again as soon as may be. 



L— MECKLENBURGH-SCHWERIN. 

ORDINANCE OF THE GRAND DUKE OF MECKLENBURGH- 
SCHWERIN, PROHIBITING THE OUTFIT OF PRIVATEERS 
FROM PORTS OF MECKLENBURGH-SCHWERIN, OR THEIR 
ENTRANCE INTO THE SAME, DURING WAR BETWEEN 
CERTAIN EUROPEAN POWERS.— SCHWERIN, APRIL 26, 1854. 

We, Frederick Francis, by the grace of God, Grand Duke 
of Mecklenburgh-Schwerin, in pursuance of our Ordinance of 

21 



322 The Declaration of Paris 

the 15th instant, for the purpose of preserving our neutral 
position in the present war, ordain as follows : 

1. Privateers, with or without prizes, are not to be admitted 
into the harbours of our dominions. 

If, therefore, an armed privateer should appear before any 
of our ports, either for the purpose of bringing its prizes into 
safety, or to seek shelter, or to be supplied with provisions, or 
to be repaired, or under any other pretext whatever, its entry 
and remaining in the port is altogether prohibited : it is to be 
sent away and a notification to be made here immediately. 

2. As privateers are neither permitted to be fitted out nor 
provisioned in our dominions, our subjects are also entirely to 
abstain, under heavy penalties, from every participation in 
undertakings so incompatible with the principles of a strict 
neutrality. 

J.— NAPLES. 

ORDONNANCE DE S. M. LE ROI DE NAPLES CONCERNANT 
LES CORSAIRES ET LE COMMERCE NAPOLITAIN PEN- 
DANT LA GUERRE, 12 APRIL 1854. 

His Majesty the King of Naples wishing on the one hand to 
preserve to its fullest extent the neutrality adopted in the 
present war, and on the other hand to conform to the political 
principles manifested by the belligerent Powers concerning 
neutral commerce, has resolved the following : — 

That no ships armed as privateers shall be admitted to the 
ports of this kingdom, nor provided with arms, military stores, 
or anything serving thereunto. 

That no privateer may bring prizes into the ports of this 
Kingdom except in cases of imminent peril, nor may they 
remove anything whatsoever out of the said prizes. 

That the subjects of this Kingdom shall not be allowed to 
take service on board a privateer of any foreign nation. 

That no vessels of this Kingdom shall convey any articles 
whatsoever recognised as contraband of war to any belligerent 
Power. 

That the ships of this Kingdom may freely carry on their 
commerce in the ports and in the harbours of belligerent Powers, 
and in the capacity of neutrals they may also carry merchandise 
belonging to the subjects of the said Powers except contraband 
of war. 

Finally, that ships of this Kingdom are prohibited from 
entering into any blockaded port provided that the blockade 



Neutral Legislation as to Navigation during War 823 

is effective and maintained by a sufficient force, and when it 
has been formally notified by the Commanding Officer. 

The rules which the belligerent Powers will follow (seguiranno) 
concerning neutral commerce are as follows : — 

That the flag covers the merchandise except contraband of 
war ; that the property of neutrals on enemy ships shall be 
immune from capture except in the case of contraband of war ; 
that a blockade in order to be effective must be maintained by 
a sufficient force and duly announced ; and that, lastly, letters 
of marque will not be issued. 



K.— PORTUGAL. 

DECREE OF THE KING-REGENT OF PORTUGAL, DECLARING 
THE NEUTRALITY OF PORTUGAL IN THE WAR BETWEEN 
TURKEY, ETC., AND RUSSIA, AND PROHIBITING THE 
OUTFIT OF PRIVATEERS FROM PORTUGUESE DOMINIONS. 
—LISBON, MAY 5, 1854. 

Home Department, May 5, 1854. 
Sire, 

War being declared between Powers with whom we are in 
ancient alliance, which alliance it behoves us to keep intact, 
and the Crown of Portugal being bound to take all measures 
in order on its part to preserve the strictest neutrality during 
the present contest, so that one of the belligerent parties shall 
not be treated with more or less favour than the other, and 
keeping in view what has always, under similar circumstances, 
been practised by the Sovereigns and Governments of these 
realms, your Majesty's Ministers have agreed upon submitting 
to your Majesty the following Decree, from the adoption of 
which will follow, on the part of the Portuguese Government, 
the observance of the rules of the law of nations, which Neutral 
Powers are bound to keep and uphold. 

DUQUE DE SaLDANHA. 

Taking into consideration the Report of the Ministers and 
Secretaries of State of all the several departments, I am pleased 
to decree, in the name of the King, as follows : — 

Art. I. The relations of peace, of good friendship, and 
cordial understanding which subsist between Portugal and 
all the Governments of Europe ought, on our part, to be 
preserved intact, and to continue to be religiously observed, 
by preserving the most strict and absolute neutrality with 
regard to the Powers which are at present in a state of war. 



324 The Declaration of Paris 

II. In the ports of this kingdom, and in its possessions 
in any part of the world, it is prohibited to Portuguese subjects, 
and to foreigners residing in Portugal, to construct or arm 
vessels to be employed as privateers during the present war ; 
and letters of marque will be denied to either of the above- 
mentioned parties. 

III. The entrance of privateers, and of prizes made by them, 
or by any vessels of war of the belligerent Powers, into the 
ports mentioned in the preceding Article, is also prohibited. 

§ An exception shall be made to this rule in cases of dis- 
tress in which, according to the law of nations, it is indispensable 
to show hospitality, the sale or unloading of prizes thus arriving 
at the ports of these realms being, however, in no way permitted, 
neither may such vessels entering there remain any longer time 
than is necessary for receiving the succour of humanity which, 
in accordance with the said law of nations and with the pro- 
visions of the Decrees of the 30th of August 1780, and the 3rd 
of June 1803, are due to them. 

The Ministers and Secretaries of State of the several depart- 
ments shall thus understand, and cause the same to be carried 
out. 



King- Regent. 



L.— SPAIN. 



DECREE OF THE QUEEN OF SPAIN, PROHIBITING THE OUTFIT 
OF PRIVATEERS IN THE SPANISH DOMINIONS DURING 
WAR BETWEEN TURKEY, ETC., AND RUSSIA.— MADRID, 
APRIL 12, 1854. 

Ministry of Marine, Madrid, 

April 12, 1854. 
Madam, 

The war which has unfortunately broken out in the East, 
might do harm to our navigation and commerce, the prosperity 
of which so warmly interests your Majesty. 

Fortunately Great Britain and France, well worthy of the 
advanced post which they occupy amongst civilized nations, 
have strenuously endeavoured to diminish the evils which the 
present struggle must cause to the world, by renouncing for 
the present the issuing of letters of marque, and by making 
conjointly other declarations which are highly favourable to 
neutral Powers. 

It behoves the commercial interests of Spain to take ad- 
vantage of a course of policy so highly humane, and to satisfy 
at the same time your Majesty's feelings towards the nations 
which are the friends and allies of Spain. 



Neutral Legislation as to Navigation during War 825 

Therefore, the undersigned Minister, in conformity with the 
opinion of the Council of Ministers, has the honour to propose 
to your Majesty the subjoined project of Decree. 

Madam, at the Royal feet of your Majesty, 

El Marques de Molins. 

DOCKET DE SA MAJESTfi LA REINE D'ESPAGNE CONCERNANT 
LES CORSAIRES ET LE COMMERCE ESPAGNOL PENDANT 
LA GUERRE. 

In consideration of the proposals I have received from my 
Minister of Marine, the following articles are decreed with the 
approval and consent of the Council of Ministers : — 

1. The equipment, the maintenance, and admission of 
privateers flying the Russian flag is prohibited in all Spanish 
ports. 

2. It is equally prohibited to owners, masters, and captains 
of Spanish mercantile ships to accept letters of marque from 
any Power, or to assist any vessels having the character of 
privateers, except in virtue of the claims of humanity in the 
case of fire and shipwerck. 

3. The Spanish flag covers the transportation of all articles 
of commerce except warlike stores, papers, or despatches, but 
not commerce with ports blockaded by the belligerents. By 
means of this present decree Her Majesty's Government will 
not be responsible for any damage which may be incurred by 
persons trading in violation of this article. 



M.— SWEDEN. 

ORDONNANCE DE S. M. LE ROI DE SUfiDE CONCERNANT 
LA NAVIGATION DE SES SUJETS PENDANT LA GUERRE, 
8 APRIL 1854. 

Nous, Oscar, par la grace de Dieu, roi de Su^de et de Norv^ge, 
des Goths et des Vandales, savoir faisons : Qu'ayant reconnu 
la necessity, en vue des collisions qui menacent d'6clater entre 
des puissances maritimes etrangeres, que ceux de nos fiddles 
sujets qui exercent le commerce et la navigation observent 
rigoureusement les obligations et precautions requises pour 
assurer au pavilion suedois tous les droits et privileges qui lui 
reviennent en qualite de pavilion neutre, et pour ^viter ^gale- 
ment tout ce qui pourrait en quelque maniere le rendre suspect 
aux puissances belligerantes et I'exposer a des insultes ; nous 
avons jug6 k propos, en rapportant ce qui a ^te statu^ pr^- 



326 The Declaration of Paris 

cedemment k cet 6gard, d'ordonner que les regies suivantes 
devront dorenavant etre generalement observees. 

V^. Pour etre admis a jouir des droits et privileges revenant 
au pavilion suedois en sa qualite de neutre, tout batiment 
suedois devra etre muni des documents qui, d'apres les ordon- 
nances existantes,i sont requis pour constater sa nationalite, et 
ces documents devront tou jours se trouver a bord du batiment, 
pendant ses voyages. 

2. II est severement defendu aux capitaines d'avoir des 
papiers de bord et des connaissements doubles ou faux, ainsi que 
de hisser pavilion etranger en quelque occasion ou sous quelque 
pretexte que ce soit. 

3. S'il arrivait que, pendant le s6jour d'un batiment suedois 
k I'etranger, I'^quipage, soit par desertion, mort, maladie ou 
autres causes, se trouvat diminue au point de n'etre plus 
sufflsant pour la manoeuvre du navire, et qu'ainsi des matelots 
Strangers dussent etre engages, ils devront etre choisis de pre- 
ference parmi les sujets des puissances neutres ; mais dans 
aucun cas le nombre des sujets des puissances bellig^rantes qui 
se trouveront a bord du navire ne pourra exceder un tiers du 
total de I'equipage. Tout changement de cette nature dans le 
personnel du navire, avec les causes qui y ont donne lieu, devra 
etre marque par le capitaine sur le role de I'equipage, et la fide- 
lite de cette annotation devra etre certifiee par le consul ou 
vice-consul suedois competent, ou bien, en cas qu'il ne s'en 
trouvat point sur les lieux, par la municipalite, le notaire public 
ou quelque autre personne de la meme autorite, suivant les 
usages des pays respectifs. 

4. Les batiment s suedois, en quality de neutres, pourront 
naviguer librement vers les ports et sur les cotes des nations en 
guerre ; toutefois les capitaines devront s'abstenir de toute 
tentative d'entrer dans un port bloqu6 d^s qu'ils auront 6te 
formellement prevenus de I'etat de ce port par I'officier qui 
commande le blocus. 

Par un port bloque, on entend celui qui est tellement ferm^, 
par un ou plusieurs vaisseaux de guerre ennemis stationn^s et 
suffisamment proches, qu'on ne puisse y entrer sans danger 
evident. 

5. Toutes marchandises, m^me propriete des sujets des 
puissances belligerantes, pourront etre librement menees k bord 
des batiments suedois, en leur qualite de neutres, k la reserve 
des articles de contrebande de guerre. Par contrebande de 
guerre il faut entendre les articles suivants : canons, mortiers, 

* Ordonnances royales du !«' mars 1841 et 16 aout 1861. 



Neutral Legislation as to Navigation during War 327 

armes de toute esp^ce, bombes, grenades, boulets, pierres a feu, 
m^ches, poudre, salpetre, soufre, cuirasses, piques, ceinturons, 
gibernes, selles et brides, ainsi que toutes fabrications pouvant 
servir directement k I'usage de la guerre, — en exceptant toutefois 
la quantity de ces objets qui peut etre n6cessaire pour la defense 
du navire et de I'^quipage. 

Pour le cas qu'^ regard de la definition des objets de contre- 
bande de guerre, des changements ou additions devraient etre 
introduits par suite de conventions avec les puissances etrang^res, 
il en sera ult^rieurement statu6.^ 

6. II est interdit a tout capitaine su^dois de se laisser employer 
avec le batiment qu'il conduit k transporter pour aucune des 
puissances bellig^rantes des d^peches, des troupes ou des muni- 
tions de guerre, sans y etre contraint par une force r^elle ; 
auquel cas il devra protester formellement contre un tel emploi 
de la force. 

7. Les batiments des puissances belligerantes pourront im- 
porter dans les ports suedois et en exporter toutes denrees et 
marchandises, pourvu que, d'apr^s le tarif general des douanes, 
elles soient permises k I'importation ou a I'exportation, et k la 
reserve des articles reputes contrebande de guerre. 

8. II est defendu k tout sujet suedois d'armer ou d'^quiper 
des navires pour etre employes en course contre quelqu'une des 
puissances belligerantes, leurs sujets et propriet^s ; ou de 
prendre part k I'equipement de navires ayant une pareille 
destination. II lui est egalement defendu de prendre service 
k bord de corsaires etrangers. 

9. II ne sera permis k aucun corsaire etranger d'entrer dans 
un port suedois et de sejourner sur nos rades. Des prises ne 
pourront non plus etre introduites dans les ports suedois, 
autrement que dans les cas de detresse constatee. II est Egale- 
ment interdit k nos sujets d'acheter des corsaires Etrangers des 
effets captures de quelque espece que ce soit. 

10. Lorsqu'un capitaine faisant voile sans escorte est ren- 
contrE en pleine mer par quelque vaisseau de guerre de I'une 
des puissances belligerantes ayant droit de controler ses papiers 
de bord, il ne doit ne se refuser ni chercher k se soustraire k 
cette visite ; mais il est tenu de produire ses papiers loyalement 
et sans detour, ainsi qu'a surveiller que ni depuis que son navire 
a et6 hel6, ni pendant la visite, aucun des documents concemant 
le navire ou son chargement ne soit soustrait ou jete a la mer. 

11. Lorsque les batiments marchands font voile sous escorte 

^ Par line ordonnance post6rieure du roi de SuMe (13 septembre 1851), 
le plomb en saumons ou sous toute autre forme doit aussi etre trait6 
comme contrebande de guerre. 



828 The Declaration of Paris 

de vaisseaux de guerre, les capitaines devront se regler sur ce 
qui est prescrit par I'ordonnance royale du 10 juin 1812. 

12. Le capitaine qui observe scrupuleusement tout ce qui 
lui est prescrit ci-dessus doit jouir, d'apres les traites et le droit 
des gens, d'une navigation libre et sans gene ; et si, nonobstant, 
il est moleste, il a droit de s'attendre a I'appui le plus energique 
de la part de nos ministres et consuls a I'etranger, dans toutes 
les justes reclamations qu'il pourra faire pour obtenir reparation 
et d^dommagement ; au lieu que le capitaine qui omet et 
neglige d'observer ce qui vient de lui etre prescrit pour sa route 
ne devra s'en prendre qu'a luimeme des desagrements qui 
pourront resulter d'une pareille negligence, sans avoir a esperer 
notre appui et protection. 

13. Dans le cas qu'un navire suedois fut saisi, le capitaine 
doit remettre au consul ou vice-consul suedois, s'il s'en trouve 
dans le port ou son batiment est amen6, mais a son defaut, au 
consul ou vice-consul suedois le plus voisin, un rapport fidele 
et dument certifie des circonstances de cette prise avec tous 
ses details. 

Mandons et ordonnons a tous ceux a qui il appartiendra de 
se conformer exactement a ce que dessus. En foi de quoi nous 
avons signe la pr^sente de notre main, et y avons fait apposer 
notre sceau royal. 



The following memorandum relating to the above Ordinance 
was added to the letter of the United States Charge d'Affaires 
at Stockholm to the Secretary of State, dated 10th April 1854 
[Document No. 8 G] : — 

" I have examined the above-cited Ordinance, in hopes to find 
in it the claim that neutral merchant-vessels under convoy are 
exempt from actual visit of belligerents, and that an assurance 
by the commander of the convoying man-of-war in relation to 
the vessels under his protection must suffice. These things do 
not appear in the Ordinance referred to, nor in that at present 
translated ; but I have been officially informed that the Swedish 
Government claim these principles as international rights, and 
as expressed in Article XII. of our Treaty with Sweden of 1783, 
revived in, the existing Treaty, Article XVII. 

" The Swedish Ordinance of 1812, cited above, contains sailing 
directions for convoys, and national regulations for the com- 
manders thereof. F. Schroeder." 



President Pierce's Message to Congress 829 



15 

Extracts from President Piercers Message to Congress, 
4th December 1854. 

Long experience has shown that, in general, when the prin- 
cipal Powers of Europe are engaged in war, the rights of neutral 
nations are endangered. This consideration led in the progress 
of our War of Independence to the formation of the celebrated 
confederacy of the Armed Neutrality, a primary object of which 
was to assert the doctrine that Free Ships make Free Goods, 
except in the case of articles contraband of War, a doctrine 
which from the very commencement of our national being has 
been a cherished idea of the Statesmen of this country. At 
one period or another every maritime Power has by some 
solemn Treaty stipulation recognised that principle, and it 
might have been hoped that it would come to be universally 
received and respected as a rule of international law. But the 
refusal of one Power prevented this in the next great war which 
ensued, that of the French Revolution, and it failed to be 
respected among the belligerent States of Europe. Notwith- 
standing this, the principle is generally admitted to be a sound 
and salutary one ; so much so that at the commencement of 
the existing war in Europe, Great Britain and France announced 
their purpose to observe it for the present, not however as a 
recognised international right, but as a mere concession for the 
time being. The cooperation, however, of these two powerful 
maritime nations in the interest of neutral rights appeared to 
me to afford an occasion justifying and inviting on the part 
of the United States a renewed effort to make the doctrine 
in question a principle of International Law by means of special 
conventions between the several Powers of Europe and America. 
Accordingly a proposition embracing not only the rule that 
free ships make free goods, except contraband articles, but also 
the less contested one that neutral property other than contra- 
band though on board enemy's ships shall be exempt from 
confiscation, has been submitted by this Government to those 
of Europe and America. 

Russia acted promptly in this matter : a convention was 
concluded between that country and the United States providing 
for the observance of the principles announced not only as 
between themselves but also as between them and all other 
nations which shall enter into the like stipulation. None of 



330 The Declaration of Paris 

the other Powers have as yet taken final action on the subject. 
I am not aware, however, that any objection to the proposed 
stipulations has been made, but on the contrary they are 
acknowledged to be essential to the security of neutral com- 
merce, and the only apparent obstacle to their general adoption 
is in the possibility that it may be encumbered by inadmissible 
conditions. 

The King of the Two Sicilies has expressed to our Minister 
at Naples his readiness to concur in our proposition relative to 
neutral rights, and to enter into a convention on that subject. 

The King of Prussia entirely approves of a project to the 
same effect subniitted to him, but proposes an additional article 
providing for the renunciation of privateering. Such an article 
for most obvious reasons is much desired by nations having 
naval establishments large in proportion to their foreign com- 
merce. If it were adopted as an international rule, the commerce 
of a nation having comparatively a small naval force would be 
very much at the mercy of its enemy in case of war with a 
Power of decided naval authority. The bare statement of the 
condition in which the United States would be placed after 
having surrendered the right to resort to privateers in the event 
of war with a belligerent of naval supremacy will show that 
this Government could never listen to such a proposition. The 
navy of the first maritime power in Europe is at least 10 times 
as large as that of the United States, without resort on our 
part to our mercantile marine : the means of an enemy to inflict 
injury upon our commerce would be tenfold greater than ours 
to retaliate. We could not extricate our country from this 
unequal condition with such an enemy unless we at once departed 
from our present peaceful policy and became a great naval 
power. Nor would this country be better situated in a war 
with one of the secondary naval Powers. Though the naval 
disparity would be less, the greater extent and more exposed 
condition of our widespread commerce would give any of them 
a like advantage over us. 

The proposition to enter into engagements to forego resort 
to privateers in case this country should be forced into war 
with a great naval Power is not entitled to more favourable 
consideration than would be a proposition to agree not to 
accept the services of volunteers on land. When the honour 
or the rights of our country require it to assume a hostile attitude 
it confidently relies on the patriotism of its citizens, not ordinarily 
devoted to the military profession, to augment the army and 
navy so as to make them fully adequate to the emergency which 
calls them into action. The proposal to surrender the right 



United States Conventions as to Neutrals 331 

to employ privateers is professedly founded upon the principle 
that private property of unoffending non-combatants, though 
enemies, should be exempt from the ravages of war ; but the 
proposed surrender goes but little way in carrying out that 
principle, which equally requires that such private property 
should not be seized or molested by national ships of war. 
Should the leading Powers of Europe concur in proposing as 
a rule of international Law to exempt private property upon the 
ocean from seizure by public armed cruisers as well as by 
privateers, the United States will readily meet them upon that 
broad ground. — [From The Times, 18th December 1854.] 



16 



Conventions between the United States and 
other Countries as to Neutrals. 

A. — RussiA.i 22 July 1854. 

Les Etats-Unis d'Am^rique et sa Majesty I'Empereur de toutes 
les Russies animes d'un egal desir de maintenir et de preserver 
de toute atteinte les rapports de bonne intelligence qui ont 
de tout temps si heureusement subsiste entre eux-memes, comme 
entre les habitants de leurs Etats respectifs, ont r^solu d'un 
commun accord de consacrer, par une convention formelle, 
les principes du droit des neutres sur mer qu'ils reconnaissent 
pour conditions indispensables de toute liberte de navigation 
et de commerce maritime. . . . 

1. Les deux hautes parties contractantes reconnaissent 
comme permanent et immuable le principe qui suit, savoir : 

(1) Que le pavilion couvre la marchandise (that free ships 
make free goods), c'est a dire, que les effets ou marchandises 
qui sont la propri6te des sujets ou citoyens d'une Puissance 
ou Etat en guerre, sont exempts de capture ou confiscation 
sur les vaisseaux neutres, k I'exception des objets contrebande 
de guerre. 

(2) Que la propri^te neutre, k bord d'un navire ennemi, 
n'est pas sujette k confiscation, k moins qu'elle ne soit contre- 
bande de guerre. 

Elles s'engagent k appliquer ces principes au commerce et 

> De Martens, N.R.O., xvi. pt. i. p. 671. 



832 The Declaration of Paris 

a la navigation de toutes Puissances et Etats qui voudront les 
adopter de leur cote comme permanents et immuables. 

2. Les deux hautes parties contractantes se r^servent de 
s'entendre ulterieurement selon que les circonstances pourront 
I'exiger sur I'application et I'extension a donner, s'il y k lieu, 
aux principes convenus a I'article 1. Mais elles declarent d^s 
k present qu'elles prendront les stipulations que renferme le 
dit article 1, pour r^gle, toutes les fois qu'il s'agira d'aprecier 
les droits de neutralite. 

3. II est convenu entre les hautes parties contractantes 
que toutes les nations qui voudraient consentir a acc6der aux 
regies contenues dans I'article 1 de cette convention par une 
declaration formelle stipulant qu'elles s'engagent a les observer, 
jouiront des droits resultant de cette accession comme les deux 
Puissances signataires de cette convention jouiront de ces 
droits et les observeront. Elles se communiqueront reciproque- 
ment le resultat des demarches qui seront faites a ce sujet. 

4. La presente convention sera approuvee et ratifiee par le 
President des Etats-Unis d'Amerique, par et avec I'avis et le 
consentement du Senat des dits Etats, et par sa Majesty 
I'Empereur de toutes les Russies, et les ratifications en seront 
^changees a Washington dans I'espace de dix mois, a compter 
de ce jour, ou plus tot, si faire se peut. 

B. — Two Sicilies.^ 13 January 1855. 

The United States of America and his Majesty the King of 
the kingdom of the Two Sicilies, equally animated with a 
desire to maintain and preserve from all harm the relations of 
good understanding which have at all times so happily sub- 
sisted between themselves, as also between the inhabitants 
of their respective States, have mutually agreed to perpetuate, 
by means of a formal convention, the principles of the right 
of neutrals at sea, which they recognize as indispensable condi- 
tions of all freedom of navigation and maritime trade. . . . 

1. The two High Contracting Parties recognize as perman- 
ent and immutable the following principles, to wit : 1st. That 
free ships make free goods ; that is to say, that the effects or 
goods belonging to subjects or citizens of a Power or State 
at war are free from capture and confiscation when found on 
board of neutral vessels, with the exception of articles of contra- 
band of war. 2nd. That the property of neutrals on board 
an enemy's vessel is not subject to confiscation unless the same 

1 De Martens, N.R.G., xvi. pt. i. p. 569. 



United States Conventions as to Neutrals 333 

be contraband of war. They engage to apply these principles 
to the commerce and navigation of all such Powers and States 
as shall consent to adopt them on their part as permanent and 
immutable. 

2. The two High Contracting Parties reserve themselves 
to come to an ulterior understanding as circumstances may re- 
quire with regard to the application and extension to be given, 
if there be any cause for it, to the principles laid down in the first 
article. But they declare from this time that they will take the 
stipulations contained in the said 1st article as a rule, whenever 
it shall become a question to judge of the rights of neutrality. 

3. It is agreed by the High Contracting Parties that all 
nations which shall or may consent to accede to the rules of 
the first article of this convention, by a formal declaration 
stipulating to observe them, shall enjoy the rights resulting from 
such accession as they shall be enjoyed and observed by the 
two Powers signing this convention. They shall mutually 
communicate to each other the results of the steps which may 
be taken on the subject. 

4. The present convention shall be approved and ratified 
by the President of the United States of America, by and with 
the advice and consent of the Senate of the said States, and by 
his Majesty the King of the kingdom of the Two Sicilies ; and 
the ratifications of the same shall be exchanged at Washington 
within the period of twelve months, counting from this day, 
or sooner if possible. 

C— Peru.i 22 July 1856. 

The United States of America and the Republic of Peru, in 
order to render still more intimate their relations of friendship 
and good understanding, and desiring, for the benefit of their 
respective commerce and that of other nations, to establish 
an uniform system of maritime legislation in time of war, in 
accordance with the present state of civilization, have resolved 
to declare, by means of a formal convention, the principles 
which the two republics acknowledge as the basis of the rights 
of neutrals at sea, and which they recognize and profess as 
permanent and immutable, considering them as the true and 
indispensable conditions of all freedom of navigation and 
maritime commerce and trade. . . . 

1. The two High Contracting Parties recognize as permanent 
and immutable the following principles < — 

1st. That free ships makes free goods — that is to say, that 

1 De Martens, N.R.G., xvii. pt. i. p. 191. 



334 The Declaration of Paris 

the effects or merchandize belonging to a power or nation at 
war, or to its citizens or subjects, are free from capture and 
confiscation when found on board of neutral vessels, with the 
exception of articles contraband of war. 

2nd. That the property of neutrals on board of an enemy's 
vessel is not subject to detention or confiscation, unless the 
same be contraband of war ; it being also understood that, 
as far as regards the two contracting parties, warlike articles, 
destined for the use of either of them, shall not be considered 
as contraband of war. 

The two High Contracting Parties engage to apply these prin- 
ciples to the commerce and navigation of all Powers and States 
as shall consent to adopt them as permanent and immutable. 

2. It is hereby agreed between the two High Contracting 
Parties, that the provisions contained in article 22 of the treaty 
concluded between them at Lima, on the 26th day of July, 
1851, are hereby annulled and revoked, in so far as they militate 
against, or are contrary to, the stipulations contained in this 
convention ; but nothing in the present convention shall, in 
any manner, affect, or invalidate the stipulations contained 
in the other articles of the said treaty of the 26th day of July, 
1851, which shall remain in their full force and effect. 

3. The two High Contracting Parties reserve to themselves 
to come to an ulterior understanding, as circumstances may 
require, with regard to the application and extension to be 
given, if there be any cause for it, to the principles laid down 
in the first article. But they declare, from this time, that they 
will take the stipulations contained in the said article as a rule, 
whenever it shall become a question to judge of the rights of 
neutrality. 

4. It is agreed between the two High Contracting Parties 
that all nations which shall consent to accede to the rules of 
the first article of this convention by a formal declaration, 
stipulating to observe them, shall enjoy the rights resulting 
from such accession as they shall be enjoyed and observed 
by the two parties signing this convention ; they shall com- 
municate to each other the result of the steps which may be 
taken on the subject. 

5. The present convention shall be approved and ratified 
by the President of the United States of America, by and with 
the advice and consent of the Senate of said States, and by 
the President of the republic of Peru, with the authorization 
of the legislative body of Peru, and the ratifications shall be 
exchanged at Washington within 18 months from the date 
of the signature hereof, or sooner, if possible. 



Protocols of the Congress of Paris 335 

17 

Protocols of the Congress of Paris, 1856. 

PROTOCOLE NO. 20.— STANCE DU 2 AVRIL 1856. 

•Ainsi qu'il I'avait decide, le Congr^s s'occupe de la question 
de savoir si les blocus peuvent etre lev^s avant I'^change des 
ratifications du Traits de Paix. 

M. le Comte Walewski expose que les pr^c^dents dtablissent 
que, generalement, les blocus n'ont et6 leves qu'au moment de 
I'echange des ratifications, en vertu du principe que la guerre 
n'est terminee qu'au moment ou les stipulations qui doivent 
y mettre fin, ont re9U la consecration des Souverains ; que I'esprit 
de liberality qui exerce, de nos jours, une si heureuse influence 
sur le droit international et sur les relations que les diverses 
Puissances entretiennent entre elles, permet n^anmoins de 
deroger a cette regie ; que la France et la Grande Bretagne, 
qui ont mis les blocus existants, se sont entendues pour donner, 
dans cette circonstance, une marque de leur sollicitude pour le 
commerce en general, et qu'il ne reste plus, des lors, qu'a se 
concerter sur les moyens propres a assurer a I'Europe ce nouveau 
bienfait. 

D'accord avec M. le premier Plenipotentiaire de la France, 
M. le Comte de Clarendon propose de conclure une armistice 
sur mer. Cette mesure, dans son opinion, aurait pour effet la 
levee immediate des blocus existants. 

M. le Comte Walewski ajoute que cette combinaison per- 
mettrait de considerer les prises, faites posterieurement a la 
signature de la Paix, comme non avenues, et de restituer les 
navires et les chargements captures ; que le commerce se trou- 
verait ainsi autorise a reprendre, sans plus de retard, toutes ses 
transactions, si la Russie, de son cote, levait, d^s a present, les 
mesures exceptionnelles qu'elle a prises, durant la guerre, pour 
interdire, dans ses ports, les operations commercials qui se 
faisaient pendant la paix. 

Adoptant avec empressement les voeux exposes par MM. 
les Plenipotentiaires de la France et de la Grande Bretagne, 
MM. les Plenipotentiaires de la Russie repondent que la pro- 
position soumise au Congres sera vraisemblablement accept^e 
avec une extreme faveur par leur Gouvernement ; qu'ils s'em- 
pressent, par consequent, d'y adherer par les memes motifs qui 
I'ont suggeree aux Plenipotentiaires qui en ont pris I'initiative ; 



336 The Declaration of Paris 

mais qu'ils se trouvent dans I'obligation de reserver I'approba- 
tion de leur Cour. 

MM. les Plenipotentiaires des autres Puissances d^clarent que 
cette m esure sera accueillie avec un sentiment de vive reconnais- 
sance par les Etats neutres. 

II est, en consequence, decide que si, dans la prochaine 
stance, ainsi qu'ils le presument, MM. les Plenipotentiaires de 
la Russie sont autorises a faire savoir que leur Gouvernement a 
leve les prohibitions imposees, pendant la guerre, au commerce 
d'importation et d'exportation dans les ports et sur les frontieres 
de I'Empire Russe il sera conclu entre la France, la Grande 
Bretagne, la Sardaigne, et la Turquie, d'une part, et la Russie, 
de I'autre part, une armistice sur mer qui comptera a dater de 
la signature de la Paix, et qui aura pour effet de lever tous les 
blocus. Par consequent, les prises faites posterieurement a la 
date du 30 Mars passe, seront restitutes. 

Les actes Consulaires et formalites requises des navigateurs 

et des commeryants seront remplis provisoirement par les Agents 

des Puissances qui ont consenti, pendant la guerre, a prendre 

soin officieusement des int6rets des sujets des Etats bellig^rants. 

(Suivent les signatures.) 



PROTOCOLE No. 21.— STANCE DU 4 AVRIL 1856. 

Le Protocole de la prec^dente seance est lu et approuve. 

MM. les Plenipotentiaires de la Russie annoncent qu'ils sont 
autorises a declarer que les mesures prohibitives prises pendant 
la guerre pour fermer les ports Russes au commerce d'exportation, 
vont etre levies. 

Par suite de cette declaration, et conformement a la resolution 
qu'il a prise dans sa prec6dente reunion, le Congres arrete qu'il 
est conclu un armistice maritime entre la France, la Grande 
Bretagne, la Sardaigne, et la Turquie, d'une part, et la Russie, 
de I'autre parte, et que les prises faites posterieurement a la 
signature de la Paix seront restitutes. 

II est convenu, en consequence, que des ordres seront donnas 
pour la lev^e immediate des blocus existants, et que les mesures 
prises en Russie, pendant la guerre, contre I'exportation des 
produits Russes, et notamment celles des cer^ales, seront ^gale- 
ment rapportees sans retard. 



Protocols of the Congress of Paris 837 

PROTOCOLE No. 22.— STANCE DU 8 AVRIL 1856. 

Le Protocole de la pr^cedente seance est lu et approuv^. 

M. le Comte de Clarendon rappelle que, dans la derni^re 
reunion, et attendu que tous les Plenipotentiaires n'^taient pas 
encore en mesure d'acceder a d'autres propositions, le Congr^s 
s'est borne a convenir de la levee des blocus. II annonce que 
les Plenipotentiaires de la Grande Bretagne sont aujourd'hui 
autorises a faire savoir que les decisions restrictives imposees, k 
r occasion de la guerre, au commerce et a la navigation, sont k 
la veille d'etre rapportees. 

MM. les Plenipotentiaires de la Russie ayant renouvel^ la 
declaration analogue qu'ils ont faite dans la seance du 4 Avril, 
et tous les autres Plenipotentiaires ayant ^mis un avis favorable, 
le Congres arrete que toutes les mesures, sans distinction, prises 
a I'origine ou en vue de la guerre, et ayant pour objet de suspendre 
le commerce et la navigation avec I'Etat ennemi, sont abrogees, 
et qu'en tout ce qui concerne soit les transactions commerciales, 
sans en excepter la contrebande de guerre, soit les expeditions 
de marchandises et le traitement des batiments de commerce, 
les choses sont retablies partout a dater de ce jour, sur le pied 
ou elles se trouvaient avant la guerre. 

M. le premier Plenipotentiaire de la France dit ensuite qu'il 
doit appeler I'attention du Congres sur un sujet qui, bien que 
concernant plus particuli^rement la France, n'en est pas moins 
d'un grand interet pour toutes les Puissances Europeennes ; 
il croit superflu de dire qu'on imprime chaque jour en Belgique 
les publications les plus injurieuses, les plus hostiles, contre la 
France et son Gouvernement ; qu'on y preche ouvertement la 
revolte et I'assassinat ; il rappelle que, recemment encore, des 
journaux Beiges ont ose preconiser la societe dire " La Marianne," 
dont on salt les tendances et 1' objet ; que toutes ces publications 
sont autant de machines de guerre dirigees contre le repos et la 
tranquillite de la France par les ennemis de I'ordre social, qui, 
forts de I'impunite qu'ils trouvent a I'abri de la legislation Beige, 
conservent I'espoir de parvenir enfin a realiser leurs coupables 
desseins. 



M. le Comte Walewski propose au Congres de terminer son 
oeuvre par une declaration qui constituerait un progres notable 
dans le droit international, et qui serait accueillie par le monde 
entier avec un sentiment de vive reconnaissance. 

Le Congres de Westphalie, ajout-t-il, a consacr6 la liberte 

22 



338 The Declaration of Paris 

de conscience, le Congr^s de Vienne I'abolition de la traite des 
noirs et la liberty de la navigation des fleuves. 

II serait vraiment digne du Congr^s de Paris de poser les 
bases d'un droit maritime uniforme en temps de guerre, en ce 
qui concerne les neutres. Les quatre principes suivants atten- 
draient compl6tement ce but : — 

1. Abolition de la course ; 

2. Le pavilion neutre couvre la marchandise ennemie, 
excepte la contrebande de guerre ; 

3. La marchandise neutre, excepte la contrebande de guerre, 
n'est pas saisissable meme sous pavilion ennemi ; 

4. Les blocus ne sont obligatoires qu'autant qu'ils sont 
effectifs. 

Ce serait certes la un beau r^sultat auquel aucun de nous ne 
saurait etre indifferent. 

Quant aux observations presenters par M. le Comte Walewski 
sur les exc^s de la presse Beige, et les dangers qui en resultent 
pour les pays limitrophes, les Plenipotentiaires de I'Angleterre 
en reconnaissent I'importance ; mais, representants d'un pays 
oti une presse libre et independante est, pour ainsi dire, une 
des institutions fondamentales, ils ne sauraient s'associer k 
des mesures de coercition contre la presse d'un autre Etat. 
M. le premier Plenipotentiaire de la Grande Bretagne, en d^- 
plorant la violence a laquelle se livrent certains organes de la 
presse Beige, n'hesite pas a declarer que les auteurs des execrables 
doctrines auxquelles faisait allusion M. le Comte Walewski, 
que les hommes qui prechent I'assassinat comme moyen d'at- 
teindre un but politique, sont indignes de la protection qui 
garantit a la presse sa liberty et son ind^pendance. 

En terminant, M. le Comte de Clarendon rappelle qu'ainsi 
que la France, I'Angleterre, au commencement de la guerre, a 
cherche, par tous les moyens, a en att^nuer les effets, et que, 
dans ce but, elle a renonc^, au profit des neutres, durant la lutte 
qui vient de cesser, a des principes qu'elle avait jusque la in- 
variablement maintenus. II ajoute que I'Angleterre est disposee 
k y renoncer d^finitivement, pourvu que la course soit ^galement 
abolie pour tou jours ; que la course n'est autre chose qu'une 
piraterie organisee et legale, et que les corsaires sont un des 
plus grands fieaux de la guerre, et que notre etat de civilisation 
et I'humanitr exigent qu'il soit mis fin k un syst^me qui n'est 
plus de notre temps. Si le Congr^s tout entier se ralliait k la 
proposition de M. le Comte Walewski, il serait bien entendu 
qu'elle n'engagerait qu'a I'^gard des Puissances qui y auraient 



Protocols of the Congress of Paris 339 

acc6d6, et qu'elle ne pourrait etre invoqu^e par les Gouverne- 
ments qui auraient refus6 de s'y associer. 

M. le Comte Orloff fait observer que les pouvoirs dont il a 
6te muni, ayant pour objet unique le retablissement de la paix, 
il ne se croit pas autorise a prendre part a una discussion que 
ses instructions n'ont pas pu pr^voir. 

M. le Comte de Buol se f^licite de voir les Gouvernements de 
France et d'Angleterre disposes k mettre fin aussi promptement 
que possible k I'occupation de la Gr^ce. L'Autriche, assure-t-il, 
forme les voeux les plus sinc^res pour la prospdrit^ de ce Royaume, 
et elle desire egalement, comme la France, que tous les pays de 
I'Europe jouissent, sous la protection du droit public, de leur 
ind^pendance politique et d'une complete prosp^rit^. II ne 
doute pas qu'une des condition essentielles d'un etat de choses 
aussi desirable ne reside dans la sagesse d'une legislation combin6e 
de mani^re a prevenir ou a reprimer les exc^s de la presse, que 
M. le Comte Walewski a blames avec tant de raison en parlant 
d'un Etat voisin, et dont la repression doit etre consid^ree 
comme un besoin Europeen. II esp^re que dans tous les Etats 
continentaux ou la presse offre les m^mes dangers, les Gouverne- 
ments sauront trouver, dans leur legislation, les moyens de 
la contenir dans de justes limites, et qu'ils parviendront 
ainsi k mettre la paix a I'abri de nouvelles complications 
internationales. 

En ce qui conceme les principes de droit maritime dont 
M. le premier Plenipotentiaire de la France a propose I'adoption, 
M. le Comte de Buol declare qu'il en apprccie I'esprit et la portee, 
mais que n'etant pas autorise par ses instructions a donner un 
avis sur une mati^re aussi importante, il doit se borner, pour le 
moment, a annoncer au Congr^s qu'il est pret a solliciter les 
ordres de son Souverain. 

Mais ici, dit-il, sa tache doit finir. II lui serait impossible, 
en effet, de s'entretenir de la situation interieure d'Etats ind^- 
pendants qui ne se trouvent pas representes au Congr^s. Les 
Pl^nipotentiaires n'ont re9u d'autre mission que celle de s'occuper 
des affaires du Levant, et n'ont pas ete convoqu^s pour faire 
connaitre a des Souverains ind^pendants des voeux relatifs k 
I'organisation interieure de leurs pays : les pleins-pouvoirs 
deposes aux Actes du Congr^s en font foi. . . . 

M. le Baron de Manteuffel declare connaitre assez les inten- 
tions du Roi son auguste Maitre, pour ne pas h^siter a exprimer 
son opinion, quoiqu'il n'ait pas d'instructions k ce sujet, sur les 
questions dont le Congr^s a ete saisi. 

Les principes maritimes, dit M. le premier Plenipotentiaire 



840 The Declaration of Paris 

de la Pnisse, que le Congr^s est invite a s'approprier, ont tou jours 
ete professes par la Prusse, qui s'est constamment appliquee 
a les faire prevaloir ; et il se considere comme autorise a prendre 
part a la signature de tout Acte ay ant pour objet de les fairs 
admettre d6finitivement dans le droit public Europ^en. II 
exprime la conviction que son Souverain ne refuserait pas son 
approbation a I'accord qui s'etablirait dans ce sens entre les 
Plenipotentiaires. 

MM. les Plenipotentiaires de la Russie ajoutent qu'ils pren- 
dront les ordres de la Cour sur la proposition soumise au Congr^s 
relativement au droit maritime. 

M. le Comte Walewski se f^licite d'avoir engag6 les Pleni- 
potentiaires a echanger leurs idees sur les questions qui ont ete 
discutees. II avait pense qu'on aurait pu, utilement peut- 
etre, se prononcer d'une mani^re plus complete sur quelques- 
uns des sujets qui ont fixe I'attention du Congr^s. " Mais, tel 
quel," dit-il, " I'echange d'idees qui a eu lieu n'est pas sans 
utilite." 

M. le premier Plenipotentiaire de la France etablit qu'il en 
ressort, en effet : 

1. Que personne n'a contests la n6cessit6 de se pr^occuper 
murement d'ameliorer la situation dp la Grece, et que les trois 
Cours Protectrices ont reconnu I'importance de s'entendre entre 
elles a cet dgard. 

2. Que les Plenipotentiaires de I'Autriche se sont associes 
au vceu exprim6 par les Plenipotentiaires de la France de voir 
les Etats Pontificaux ^vacues par les troupes Fran9aises et 
Autrichiennes aussitot que faire se pourra sans inconvenient 
pour la tranquillite du pays et pour la consolidation de I'autorite 
du Saint Siege. 

3. Que la plupart des Plenipotentiaires n'ont pas conteste 
I'efficacite qu'auraient des mesures de clemence prises d'une 
mani^re opportune par les Gouvernements de la Peninsule 
Italienne, et surtout par celui des Deux Siciles. 

4. Que tous les Plenipotentiaires, et meme ceux qui ont cm 
devoir reserver le principe de la liberte de la presse, n'ont pas 
hesite k fletrir hautement les exc^s auxquels les journaux Beiges 
se livrent impunement, en reconnaissant la necessite de remedier 
aux inconvenients reels qui resultent de la licence effrenee dont 
il est fait un si grand abus en Belgique. 

Qu'enfin I'accueil fait, par tous les Plenipotentiaires, k Vid6e 
de clore leurs travaux par une declaration de principes en matiere 
de droit maritime, doit faire esperer qu'a la prochaine seance, 
ils auront re^u de leurs Gouvernements respectifs I'autorisation 



Protocols of the Congress of Paris 841 

d'adh^rer k un Acte qui, en couronnant I'oeuvre du Congr^s de 
Paris, r^aliserait un progr^s digne de notre epoque. 

(Suivent les signatures.) 



PROTOCOLE No. 23.— SlfiANCE DU 14 AVRIL 1856. 

Le Protocole de la seance prec6dente et son Annexe sont 
lus et approuves. 

M. le Comte Walewski rappelle qu'il reste au Congr^s a se 
prononcer sur le projet de Declaration dont il a indique les bases 
dans la derni^re reunion, et demande aux Pl^nipotentiaires 
qui s'^taient reserv6 de prendre les ordres de leurs Cours 
respectives, a cet egard, s'ils sont autorises a y donner leur 
assentiment. 

M. le Comte de Buol declare que I'Autriche se felicite de 
pouvoir concourir a un Acte dont elle reconnait la salutaire 
influence, et qu'il a ete muni des pouvoirs necessaires pour y 
adherer. 

M. le Comte Orloff s'exprime dans le meme sens ; il ajoute, 
toutefois, qu'en adoptant la proposition faite par M. le premier 
Pldnipotentiaire de la France, sa Cour ne saurait s'engager a 
maintenir le principe de I'abolition de la course et a le defendre, 
contre des Puissances qui ne croiraient pas devoir y acceder. 

MM. les Pl^nipotentiaires de la Prusse, de la Sardaigne, et 
de la Turquie, ayant ^galement donne leur assentiment, le 
Congr^s adopt e le projet de redaction annexe au present Proto- 
cole, et en renvoie la signature a la prochaine reunion. 

M. le Comte de Clarendon, ayant demand^ la permission de 
presenter au Congr^s une proposition qui lui semble devoir 
etre favorablement accueillie, dit que les calamit^s de la guerre 
sont encore trop presentes a tous les esprits pour qu'il n'y ait 
pas lieu de rechercher tous les moyens qui seraient de nature 
a en pr^venir le retour ; qu'il a et6 insere a I'Article VII du 
Trait6 de Paix une stipulation qui recommande de recourir a 
Taction m^diatrice d'un Etat ami avant d'en appeler a la force, 
en cas de dissentiment entre la Porte et I'une ou plusieurs des 
autres Puissances signataires. 

M. le premier Plenipotentiaire de la Grande Bretagne pense 
que cette heureuse innovation pourrait recevoir une application 
plus g^nerale et devenir ainsi une barriere oppos^e a des conflits 
qui, sou vent, n'eclatent que parcequ'il n'est pas tou jours possible 
de s'expliquer et de s'entendre. 

II propose done de se concerter sur une resolution propre k 
assurer, dans I'avenir, au maintien de la paix cette chance de 



342 The Declaration of Paris 

duree, sans, toutefois, porter atteinte a Tinddpendance des 
Gouvernements. 

M. le Comte Walewski se declare autorise k appuyer I'id^e 
6inise par M. le premier Plenipotentiaire de la Grande Bretagne ; 
il assure que les Plenipotentiaires de la France sont tout disposes 
k s'associer a I'insertion au Protocole d'un voeu qui, en repondant 
pleinement aux tendances de notre epoque, n'entraverait, 
d'aucune fa9on, la liberte d'action des Gouvernements. 

M. le Comte de Buol n'hesiterait pas a se joindre a I'avis des 
Plenipotentiaires de la Grande Bretagne et de la France, si la 
resolution du Congr^s doit avoir la forme indiquee par M. le 
Comte Walewski ; mais il ne saurait prendre, au nom de sa 
Cour, un engagement absolu et de nature a limiter I'independance 
du Cabinet Autrichien. 

M. le Comte de Clarendon repond que chaque Puissance est 
et sera seule juge des exigences de son honneur et de ses int^rets ; 
qu'il n'entend nuUement circonscrire I'autorite des Gouverne- 
ments, mais seulement leur fournir I'occasion de ne pas recourir 
aux armes, toutes les fois que les dissentiments pourront etre 
aplanis par d'autres voies. 

M. le Baron de Manteuffel assure que le Roi, son auguste 
Maitre, partage completement les idees exposees par M. le Comte 
de Clarendon ; qu'il se croit done autorise a y adherer et a leur 
donner tout le d^veloppement qu'elles comportent. 

M. le Comte Orloff, tout en reconnaissant la sagesse de la 
proposition faite au Congr^s, croit devoir en referer a sa Cour 
avant d'exprimer I'opinion des Plenipotentiaires de la Russie. 

M. le Comte de Cavour desire savoir, avant de donner son 
opinion, si dans I'intention de I'auteur de la proposition, le voeu 
qui serait exprime par le Congres s'etendrait aux interventions 
militaires dirig^es contre des Gouvernements de fait, et cite, 
comme exemple, I'intervention de I'Autriche dans le Royaume 
de Naples en 1821. 

Lord Clarendon repond que le voeu du Congres devrait 
admettre I'application la plus generale ; il fait remarquer que, 
si les bons offices d'une autre Puissance avaient determine le 
Gouvernement Grec a respecter les lois de la neutralite, la France 
et I'Angleterre se seraient tres probablement abstenues de faire 
occuper le Pir6e par leurs troupes. II rappelle les efforts faits 
par le Cabinet de la Grande Bretagne, en 1823, pour pr^venir 
rintervention arm^e qui cut lieu, a cette Epoque, en Espagne. 

M. le Comte Walewski ajoute qu'il ne s'agit ni de stipuler 
un droit, ni de prendre un engagement ; que le voeu exprim^ 
par le Congres ne saurait, en aucun cas, opposer des limites k 
la liberty d'appr^ciation qu'aucune Puissance ne pent aligner 



Protocols of the Congress of Paris 343 

dans les questions qui touchent k sa dignite ; qu'il n'y a done 
aucun inconvenient a g^n^raliser I'id^e dont s'est inspire M. le 
Comte de Clarendon, et a lui donner la portee la plus etendue. 

M. le Comte de Buol dit que M. le Comte de Cavour, en 
parlant, dans une autre seance, de I'occupation des Legations 
par des troupes Autrichiennes, a oublie que d'autres troupes 
^trang^res ont 6t6 appelees sur le sol des Etats Romains. 
Aujourd'hui, en parlant de I'occupation par I'Autriche du 
Royaume de Naples en 1821, il oublie que cette occupation a 
6t6 le r^sultat d'une entente entre les Cinq Grandes Puissances 
reunies au Congr^s de Laybach. Dans les deux cas, il attribue 
k I'Autriche la m6rite d'une initiative et d'une spontaneity que 
les Pl^nipotentiaires Autrichiens sont loin de revendiquer 
pour elle. 

L'intervention, rappel6e par le Pl^nipotentiaire de la Sar- 
daigne, a eu lieu, ajoute-t-il, a la suite des pourparlers du Congr^s 
de Laybach ; elle rentre done dans I'ordre d'idees 6nonce par 
Lord Clarendon. Des cas semblables pourraient encore se 
reproduire, et M. le Comte de Buol n'admet pas qu'une inter- 
vention effectuee par suite d'un accord etabli entre les Cinq 
Grandes Puissances, puisse devenir I'objet des reclamations 
d'un Etat de second ordre. 

M. le Comte de Buol applaudit a la proposition, telle que 
Lord Clarendon I'a presentee, dans un but d'humanite ; mais il 
ne pourrait y adherer, si on voulait lui donner une trop grande 
Etendue, ou en d^duire des consequences favorables auxGouverne- 
ments de fait, et a des doctrines qu'il ne saurait admettre. 

II desire, au reste, que le Congr^s, au moment meme de ter- 
miner ses travaux, ne se voie pas oblige de traiter des questions 
irritantes et de nature a troubler la parfaite harmonic qui n'a 
cess6 de r^gner parmi les P16nipotentiaires. 

M. le Comte de Cavour declare qu'il est pleinement satisfait 
des explications qu'il a provoquees, et qu'il donne son adhesion 
k la proposition soumise au Congres. 

Apr^s quoi MM. les Plenipotentiaires n'hesitent pas k ex- 
primer, au nom de leurs Gouvernements, le vceu que les Etats 
entre lesquels s'^leverait un dissentiment serieux, avant d'en 
appeler aux armes, eussent recours, en tant que les circon- 
stances I'admettraient, aux bons offices d'une Puissance amie. 

MM. les Plenipotentiaires esp^rent que les Gouvernements 
non repr6sentes au Congres s'associeront a la pensee qui a inspire 
le vceu consign^ au present Protocole. 

(Suivent les signatures.) 



344 The Declaration of Paris 

ANNEXE AU PROTOCOLE No. 23. 
Declaration. 

Les Pl^nipotentiaires qui ont signe le Traite de Paris du trente 
Mars, mil huit cent cinquante-six, reunis en Conference, — 

Consid^rant : 

Que le droit maritime, en temps de guerre, a 6te pendant 
longtemps I'objet de contestations regrettables ; 

Que I'incertitude du droit et des devoirs en pareille mati^re, 
donne lieu, entre les neutres et les belligerants, a des divergences 
d'opinion qui peuvent faire naitre des difficultes serieuses et 
meme des conflits ; 

Qu'il y a avantage, par consequent, a etablir une doctrine 
uniforme sur un point aussi important ; 

Que les Plenipotentiaires assembles au Congr^s de Paris ne 
sauraient mieux repondre aux intentions dont leurs Gouverne- 
ments sont animes, qu'en cherchant a introduire dans les 
rapports internationaux des principes fixes a cet ^gard ; 

Dument autorises, les susdits Plenipotentiaires sont convenus 
de se concerter sur les moyens d'atteindre ce but ; et etant 
tombes d'accord ont arrete la Declaration solennelle ci-apr6s : — 

1. La course est et demeure abolie ; 

2. Le pavilion neutre couvre la marchandise ennemie, a 
I'exception de la contrebande de guerre ; 

3. La marchandise neutre, a I'exception de la contrebande 
de guerre, n'est pas saisissable sous pavilion ennemi ; 

4. Les blocus, pour etre obligatoires, doivent etre effectifs, 
e'est-a-dire, maintenus par une force suffisante pour interdire 
r6ellement Facets du littoral de I'ennemi. 

Les Gouvernements des Plenipotentiaires soussign^s s'enga- 
gent a porter cette Declaration a la connaissance des Etats qui 
n'ont pas ete appeles a participer au Congr^s de Paris, et k les 
inviter a y acceder. 

Convaincus que les maximes qu'ils viennent de proclamer 
ne sauraient etre accueillies qu'avec gratitude par le monde 
entier, les Plenipotentiaires soussignes ne doutent pas que les 
efforts de leurs Gouvernements pour en generaliser I'adoption 
ne soient couronnes d'un plein succ^s. 

La presente Declaration n'est et ne sera obligatoire qu'entre 
les Puissances qui y ont ou qui y auront accede. 

Fait k Paris, le seize Avril, mil huit cent cinquante-six. 

(Suivent les signatures.) 



Protocols of the Congress of Paris 345 

PROTOCOLE No. 24.— STANCE DU 16 AVRIL 1856. 

Le Protocole de la pr^cedente seance est lu et approuv^. 

M. le Comte Orloff annonce qu'il est en mesure, en vertu des 
instructions de sa Cour, d'adh^rer d^finitivement au voeu con- 
sigii6 a I'avant dernier paragraphe du Protocole No. 23. 

II est donn6 lecture du projet de Declaration annexe au 
Protocole de la derni^re reunion, apr^s quoi, et ainsi qu'ils 
I'avaient decide, MM. les P16nipotentiaires proc6dent k la signa- 
ture de cet Acte. 

Sur la proposition de M. le Comte Walewski, et reconnaissant 
qu'il est de I'int^ret commun de maintenir l'indivisibilit6 des 
quatre principes mentionnes a la Declaration sign^e en ce jour, 
MM. les Plenipotentiaires conviennent que les Puissances qui 
I'auront sign6e ou qui y auront acced6, ne pourront entrer, a 
I'avenir, sur I'application du droit des neutres en temps de 
guerre, en aucun arrangement qui ne repose a la fois sur les 
quatre principes objet de la dite Declaration. 

Sur une observation faite par MM. les Plenipotentiaires de 
la Russie, le Congr^s reconnait que la presente resolution, ne 
pouvant avoir d'effet retroactif, ne saurait invalider les Con- 
ventions anterieures. 

M. le Comte Orloff propose a MM. les Plenipotentiaires 
d'offrir, avant de se separer, a M. le Comte Walewski tous les 
remerciements du Congr^s pour la mani^re dont il a conduit ses 
travaux : " M. le Comte Walewski formait," dit-il, " a I'ouver- 
ture de notre premiere reunion, le voeu de voir nos deliberations 
aboutir a une heureuse issue ; ce voeu se trouve realise, et assure- 
ment I'esprit de conciliation avec lequel notre President a dirige 
nos discussions, a exerce une influence que nous ne saurions trop 
reconnaitre, et je suis convaincu de repondre aux sentiments 
de tous les Plenipotentiaires en priant M. le Comte Walewski 
d'agreer I'expression de la gratitude du Congres." 

M. le Comte de Clarendon appuie cette proposition, qui est 
accueillie avec un empressement unanime par tous les Pleni- 
potentiaires, lesquels decident d'en faire une mention speciale 
au Protocole. 

M. le Comte Walewski repond qu'il est extremement sensible 
au temoignage bienveillant dont il vient d'etre I'objet ; et de 
son cote, il s'empresse d'exprimer k MM. les Plenipotentiaires 
sa reconnaissance pour I'indulgence dont il n'a cesse de recueillir 
les preuves pendant la duree des Conferences. II se feiicite avec 
eux d'avoir si heureusement et si compietement atteint le but 
propose a leurs efforts. 

Le present Protocole est lu et approuve. 
(Suivent les signatures.) 



346 The Declaration of Paris 

18 

French Promulgation of the Declaration of Paris, 1856. 

DOCKET IMPERIAL PORTANT PROMULGATION DE LA D^CLA- 
RATION DU 16 AVRIL 1856, QUI RfiGLE DIVERS POINTS 
DE DROIT MARITIME. 

Napoleon, 

Par la grace de Dieu et la volenti nationale, Empereur des 
Franyais, 

A tous presents et a venir, salut : 

Ayant vu et examine la declaration conclue, le seize avril mil 
huit cent cinquante-six, par les plenipotentiaires qui ont sign^ 
le traite de paix de Paris du trente mars de la meme annee, 

Declaration dont la teneur suit : 

Declaration. 

Les plenipotentiaires qui ont sign6 le traite de Paris du trente 
mars mil huit cent cinquante-six, reunis en conference, 

Consid6rant : 

Que le droit maritime, en temps de guerre, a 6t6 pendant 
longtemps I'objet de contestations regrettables ; 

Que I'incertitude du droit et des devoirs en pareille mati^re 
donne lieu, entre les neutres et les belligerants, a des divergences 
d'opinion qui peuvent faire naitre des difficultes sdrieuses et 
meme des conflits ; 

Qu'il y a avantage, par consequent, k ^tablir une doctrine 
uniforme sur un point aussi important ; 

Que les plenipotentiaires assembles au congr^s de Paris ne 
sauraient mieux r6pondre aux intentions dont leurs gouverne- 
ments sont animds, qu'en cherchant a introduire dans les rapports 
internationaux des principes fixes a cet egard ; 

Dument autorises, les susdits plenipotentiaires sont convenus 
de se concerter sur les moyens d'atteindre ce but, et, ^tant 
tomb6s d'accord, ont arrets la declaration solennelle ci-aprds : 

1°. La course est et demeure abolie ; 

2°. Le pavilion neutre couvre la marchandise ennemie, k 
I'exception de la contrebande de guerre ; 

8°. La marchandise neutre, k I'exception de la contrebande 
de guerre, n'est pas saisissable sous pavilion ennemi ; 

4°. Les blocus, pour etre obligatoires, doivent etre effectifs, 



Adherences to the Declaration of Paris 347 

c'est-a-dire, maintenus par une force suffisante pour interdire 
r^ellement Facets du littoral de reimemi. 

Les gouvernements des plenipotentiaires soussignes s'engagent 
a porter cette declaration a la connaissance des ifitats qui n'ont 
pas ete appel^s a participer au congr^s de Paris, et k les inviter 
k y acc6der. 

Convaincus que les maximes qu'ils viennent de proclamer ne 
sauraient etre accueillies qu'avec gratitude par le monde entier, 
les plenipotentiaires soussignes ne doutent pas que les efforts 
de leurs gouvernements pour en generaliser I'adoption ne soient 
couronnes d'un plein succ^s. 

La presente declaration n'est et ne sera obligatoire qu'entre 
les puissances qui y ont ou qui y auront acced6. 

Fait a Paris, le seize avril mil huit cent cinquante-six. 
(Suivent les signatures.) 

Sur le rapport de notre ministre et secretaire d'!l^tat au 
d6partement des affaires 6trang^res, 

Nous avons decrete et decretons ce qui suit : 

Art. V^. La susdite declaration est approuvee et recevra sa 
pleine et entiere execution. 

Art. 2. Notre ministre et secretaire d'fitat au departement 
des affaires ^trang^res est charge de I'ex^cution du present 
decret. 

Fait a Paris, le vingt-huit avril mil huit cent cinquante-six. 

Napglj^on. 



19 

Adherences to the Declaration of Paris, 

RAPPORT A L'EMPEREUR DES FRANgAIS SUR LA PUBLICA- 
TION DES NOTES OFFICIELLES PORTANT ACCESSION A 
LA DilfiCLARATION DU CONGRfiS DE PARIS, DU 16 AVRIL 
1856, RELATIVE AU DROIT MARITIME EN TEMPS DE 
GUERRE. PARIS, LE 12 JUIN 1856. 

Departement des Affaires Etrangtres. 
Sire, 

Votre Majesty daignera se rappeler que les Puissances signa- 
taires de la Declaration du 16 Avril 1856, s'etaient engagees k 
faire des demarches pour en generaliser I'adoption. Je me suis 



348 The Declaration of Paris 

empress^ en consequence de communiquer cette Declaration 
a tous les Gouvernements qui n'etaient pas representes au 
Congres de Paris en les invitant a y acceder et je viens rendre 
compte a I'Empereur de I'accueil favorable que cette com- 
munication a re9U de la plupart de ceux auxquels elle a et6 
transmise. 

Adoptee et consacr^e par les Plenipotentiaires de I'Autriche, 
de la France, de la Grande Bretagne, de la Prusse, de la Russie, 
de la Sardaigne, et de la Turquie, la Declaration du 16 Avril 
a obtenu I'entiere adhesion des Etats done les noms suivent 
savoir : 

Bade, La Baviere, la Belgique, Breme, le Bresil, le Duch^ 
de Brunswick, le Chili, la Confederation Argentine, la Confedera- 
tion Germanique, le Danemark, les Deux-Siciles, la Republique 
de I'Equateur, les Etats-Romains, Francfort, la Grece, Guate- 
mala, Haiti, Hambourg, le Hanovre, les deux Hesses, Lubeck, 
Mecklembourg-Sehwerin, Mecklembourg-Strelitz, Nassau, Olden- 
bourg, Parme, les Pays-Bas, le Perou, le Portugal, la Saxe, 
Saxe-Altenbourg, Saxe-Cobourg-Gotha, Saxe-Meiningen, Saxe- 
Weimar, la Suede et la Norvege, la Toscane, le Wurtemberg.^ 

Les Etats reconnaissent done avec la France et les autres 
Puissances signataires du Traite de Paris, 

1°. Que la course est et demeure abolie, 

2°. Que le pavilion neutre couvre la marchandise ennemie 
a Texception de la contrebande de guerre. 

3°. Que la marchandise neutre, a I'exception de la contre- 
bande de guerre, n'est pas saisissable sous pavilion ennemi ; 

4°. Enfin, que les blocus, pour etre obligatoires, doivent etre 
effectifs, c'est-a-dire, maintenus par une force sufiisante pour 
interdire reellement I'acces du littoral de I'ennemi. 

Le Gouvernement de V Uruguay a donne egalement son 
entier assentiment a ces quatres principes sauf ratification du 
pouvoir legislatif. 

L'Espagne, sans acceder k la Declaration du 16 Avril, k cause 
du 1° point, qui concerne I'abolition de la course a repondu 
qu'elle s'appropriait les trois autres. Le Mexique a fait la 
meme reponse. Les Etats-Unis seraient prets de leur cote a 
accorder leur adhesion, s'il etait ajout6 a I'enonce de I'abolition 
de la course que la propriete priv^e des sujets ou citoyens des 
nations belligerents serait exempte de saisie sur mer de la part 
des marines militaires respectives. Sauf ces exceptions, tous 
les cabinets ont adher6 sans reserve aux quatre principes qui 

^ The adherences now printed have been, as far as possible, brought up 
to date. 



Adherences to the Declaration of Paris 349 

constituent la Declaration du Congres de Paris, et ainsi se 
trouve consacre dans le droit international de la presque totality 
des Etats de I'Europe et de I'Amerique un progr^s auquel le 
Gouvernement de Votre Majeste continuant Tune des plus 
honorables traditions de la politique Fran9aise peut se feliciter 
d'avoir puissamment contribue. Afin de constater ces adhesions 
je propose a I'Empereur d'autoriser I'insertion au Bulletin des 
lois des notes officielles dans lesquelles elles se trouvent con- 
signees et si votre Majesty agree cette proposition, je ferai 
publier de la meme mani^re les accessions qui pourront me 
parvenir ulterieurement. — ^Je suis, &c. 

A. Walewski. 



ARGENTINE CONFEDERATION. 

DECLARATION DU PRESIDENT DE LA 
CONFfiDfiRATION ARGENTINE. 

Parana, le 1 Octobre, 1856. 
(Traduction) 

Nous Justo-Jose de Urquiza, President Constitutionnel de la 
Confederation Argentine ; 

Considerant que leurs Excellences MM. les Ministres Plenipo- 
tentiaires de Sa Majeste I'Empereur des Fran9ais et de Sa Majeste 
Britannique, au nom de leurs Gouvernements respectifs, ont 
invite separement le Gouvernement National de la Confederation 
Argentine a adherer aux principes sur le droit maritime arretes 
dans le Congres de Paris, le 16 Avril de la pr^sente annee, dont 
la teneur suit : 

•1°. La course est et demeure abolie ; 

2°. Le pavilion neutre couvre la marchandise ennemie, a 
I'exception de la contrebande de guerre ; 

3°. La marchandise neutre, a I'exception de la contrebande 
de guerre, n'est pas saisissable sous pavilion ennemi ; 

4°. Les blocus, pour etre obligatoires, doivent etre effectifs, 
c'est-a-dire, maintenus par une force suffisante pour interdire 
r^ellement I'acces du littoral de I'ennemi ; 

La presente Declaration n'est et ne sera obligatoire qu'entre 
les Puissances qui y ont ou qui y auront a.cc6d6. 

En consequence, et faisant usage de I'autorisation du Congres 
Souverain par la loi en date du 15 Septembre dernier, 

Declarons : 

Que le Gouvernement National Argentin adhere aux principes 
ci-dessus exprimes, se considerant comme oblige a regler, d'apr^s 
eux, ses rapports avec les Gouvernements qui les ont ou qui les 



350 The Declaration of Paris 

auront accept6s. Le Ministre des relations exterieures communi- 
quera et fera circuler la presente Declaration, qui sera inscrite 
au registre national. 

Donn6 dans la maison du Gouvemement dans la ville de 
Parana, capitale provisoire de la Confederation Argentine, le 
ler Octobre de Tan 1856. 

JUSTO-JOSE DE UrQUIZA. 



BADEN. 

LE MINISTRE DE BADE A PARIS AU MINSTRE DES AFFAIRES 
ifiTRANGfiRES DE L'EMPEREUR. 

Paris, le 30 Juillet, 1856. 
M. LE Ministre, 

Le Cabinet de Paris, ainsi que ceux de Vienne, de Londres, 
de Berlin et de Saint-Petersbourg, ont bien voulu communiquer 
dans le temps au Gouvernement Badois la Declaration que les 
Plenipotentiaires reunis au Congres de Paris ont signee et 
annexee au Protocole du 16 Avril dernier, No. 24, dans le but 
d'6tablir une legislation uniforme du droit maritime des neutres 
en temps de guerre. 

Afin d'atteindre pleinement I'objet qu'il s'dtait propose, le 
Congres a juge convenable que sa Declaration fut port^e k la 
connaissance des Gouvernements qui n'avaient pas pris part 
a ses travaux et pour les engager a y adherer, invitation qui a 
ete egalement adressee au Gouvernement de Son Altesse Royale 
le Prince-Regent, mon auguste Souverain. 

En consequence, le Soussigne, Envoye Extraordinaire et 
Ministre Pienipotentiaire de Bade, conformement aux ordres 
qu'il a re9us, a I'honneur de faire a son Excellence M. le Ministre 
des Affaires Etrang^res de Sa Majeste I'Empereur des Fran9ais 
la communication suivante : 

Le Gouvernement Badois ne saurait meconnaitre les grands 
bienfaits resultant de I'Acte en question pour le bien-etre et 
la securite du commerce universel. L'on devra au principe 
consacre par ladite declaration, en ce qui touche I'abolition de 
I'armement en course, d'avoir rassure des interets dont le de- 
veloppement prend chaque jour de plus grandes proportions, 
et d'avoir pose une legislation sur le droit des neutres propre k 
rendre desormais impossibles les complications et les conflits 
regrettables, amenes tant de fois dans le passe par I'incertitude 
des interpretations en pareille mati^re. Bien que les Etats 
maritimes soient plus specialement interesses dans la question, 
ce ne sont pas eux seuls qui recueilleront les heureux effets 



Adherences to the Declaration of Paris 351 

des quatre points convenus au Congr^s de Paris ; les fruits en 
riviendront a tous les pays que I'industrie et le commerce, ces 
liens puissants des nations, rattachent ^troitement entre eux. 

Le Gouvernement Badois n'h^site done pas k se rendre k 
I'appel qui lui a ^te fait ; c'est avec une vive satisfaction qu'il 
donne sa pleine adhesion a des principes si eonformes a I'esprit 
et £1 la civilisation de notre si^le. 

En informant Son Excellence M. le Ministre des Affaires 
Etrang^res que le Gouvernement de Son Altesse Royale le 
Prince-R6gent de Bade adhere sans restriction a la Declaration 
signee a Paris, le 16 Avril dernier, le Soussigne a I'honneur de 
prier son Excellence de vouloir bien lui accuser reception de 
la pr^sente. — ^H saisit, &c. 

Baron de Schweizer. 



BAVARIA. 

LE MINISTRE DES AFFAIRES ifiTRANGfiRES DE BAVlfiRE AU 
CHARGE D'AFFAIRES DE BAVlfiRE A PARIS. 

Municht le 4 Juillet, 1856. 

M. LE COMTE, 

M. le Comte de Massignac, Charge d' Affaires de France pr^s 
cette Cour, m'a communique, en vertu des ordres de son 
Gouvernement et en invitant le Gouvernement Bavarois a y 
adherer, une Declaration signee le 16 Avril dernier, par MM. 
les Plenipotentiaires des Puissances representees au Congr^s 
de Paris et dans laquelle sont pos^s, en mati^re de droit 
maritime, les principes suivants : 

1°. La course est et demeure abolie ; 

2°. Le pavilion neutre couvre la marchandise ennemie, k 
I'exception de la contrebande de guerre ; 

3°. La marchandise neutre, a I'exception de la contrebande 
de guerre, n'est pas saisissable sous pavilion ennemi ; 

4°. Les blocus, pour etre obligatoires, doivent etre effectifs, 
c'est-a-dire, maintenus par une force suffisante pour interdire 
r^ellement I'acces du littoral de I'ennemi. 

Le Gouvernement du Roi, M. le Comte, constate avec une 
vive satisfaction, due a I'initiative du Gouvernement de Sa 
Majesty I'Empereur des Fran9ais, le grand progr^s qui vient de 
s'accomplir dans cette branche importante du droit international. 
La nouvelle doctrine, en efifet, est fondle sur les principes de 
I'equite la plus ^vidente ; elle est, en outre, en tous points 
conforme k I'esprit pacifique et civilisateur dont se glorifie k 
juste titre I'epoque actuelle, et elle mettra heureusement fin k 



352 The Declaration of Paris 

des divergences d'opinion qui souvent ont ete la source de 
difficultes serieuses et de conflits. 

Ce document ayant ete place sous les yeux du Roi, notre 
auguste Souverain, qui en a reconnu la haute importance en 
payant en meme temps un juste tribut de reconnaissance aux 
Hautes Puissances representees au Congres de Paris, je viens 
d'etre autorise a porter a votre connaissance, M. le Comte, 
que le Gouvernement Bavarois adhere pleinement et avec em- 
pressement aux principes de droit maritime proclames dans 
la seance du 16 Avril, qu'il les accepte et entend les appliquer 
dans leur ensemble, et qu'il s'engage a n'entrer a I'avenir dans 
aucun engagement sur I'application du droit maritime en temps de 
guerre sans stipuler I'observation des quatre points susenonces. 

Vous voudrez bien, M. le Comte, donner lecture et laisser 
copie de la presente depeche a M. le Comte Walewski. — 
Recevez, &c. 

Von der Pfordten. 



BELGIUM. 

LE MINISTRE DES AFFAIRES STRANGERES DE BELGIQUE 
AU MINISTRE PLfiNIPOTENTIAIRE DE FRANCE A 
BRUXELLES. 

Bruxelles, le 6 Juin, 1856. 

M. LE MiNISTRE, 

Votre Excellence a ete chargee d'inviter le Gouvernement du 
Roi a acceder a la Declaration souscrite, le 16 Avril dernier, par 
les Puissances qui ont participe au Congres de Paris, declaration 
qui a pour objet de consacrer les principes de droit maritime, 
savoir : 

1°. La course est et demeure abolie ; 

2°. Le pavilion neutre couvre la marchandise ennemie, k 
I'exception de la contrebande de guerre ; 

3°. La marchandise neutre, a I'exception de la contrebande 
de guerre, n'est pas saisissable sous pavilion ermemi ; 

4°. Les blocus, pour etre obligatoires, doivent etre effectifs, 
c'est-a-dire, maintenus par une force suffisante pour interdire 
r^ellement I'acc^s du littoral de Tennemi. 

Apr^s avoir pris les ordres du Roi, mon auguste Souverain, 
j'ai I'honneur de donner acte a votre Excellence de la pleine et 
enti^re adhesion de la Belgique a la Declaration susmentionnee 
et aux principes qu'elle renferme. J'ajouterai, M. le Ministre, 
que Sa Majeste en a hautement appr^ci^ le caract^re eleve : 
elle se f^licite de I'influence salutaire que cette nouvelle base 



Adherences to the Declaration of Paris 353 

du droit public maritime doit exercer dans I'avenir, et m'a 
charg^ d'etre ici I'interprdte de ses sentiments de satisfaction. 

ViCOMTE ViLAIN XIIII. 



BRAZIL. 

LE MINISTRE DES AFFAIRES fiTRANGfiRES DU BRfiSIL 
AU MINISTRE DE FRANCE. 

Rio Janeiro^ le 18 Mars, 1858. 
(Traduction) 

Le Soussigne du Conseil de Sa Majeste I'Empereur, Ministre 
Secretaire d'Etat des Affaires Etrangdres, a porte a la connais- 
sance du Gouvernement Imperial I'invitation qui lui a ete faite 
par M. le Chevalier de Saint-Georges, Envoy6 Extraordinaire 
et Ministre Plenipotentiaire, au nom de Sa Majest6 I'Empereur 
des Fran9ais, relativement aux principes generaux de droit 
international proclam^s par le Congr^s de Paris. 

Le Gouvernement de Sa Majeste I'Empereur ne pouvait que 
faire le plus bienveillant accueil a la Declaration par laquelle 
les Pl^nipotentiaires du Traite Europeen du 30 Mars, 1856, 
ont termine leur glorieuse mission. Le droit conventionnel de 
I'Empire, comme ne I'ignore pas M. de Saint-Georges, a toujours 
ete inspire par les memes sentiments lib^raux et pacifiques 
qui consacrent la doctrine la plus generalement suivie jusqu'a 
ce jour. 

Ces dispositions amicales du Gouvernement Imperial n'ont 
6te que confirmees par I'examen r^fl^chi de I'important objet 
auquel se ref^re I'invitation du Gouvernement de Sa Majesty 
I'Empereur des Fran9ais, et le soussigne a la satisfaction, d'apr^s 
les ordres de I'Empereur, son auguste Souverain, de faire savoir 
a M. de Saint-Georges que le Gouvernement Imperial adhere 
enti^rement aux principes de droit maritime etablis par les 
Conferences de Paris, a savoir : 

1°, La course est et demeure abolie ; 

2°. Le pavilion neutre couvre la marchandise ennemie, a 
I'exception de la contrebande de guerre ; 

3°. La marchandise neutre, k I'exception de la contrebande 
de guerre, n'est pas saisissable sous pavilion ennemi ; 

4°. Les blocus, pour etre obligatoires, doivent etre efifectifs, 
c'est-a-dire maintenus par une force suffisante pour interdire 
reellement I'acces du littoral de I'ennemi. 

Le Gouvernement Imperial, en s'associant dans cette forme, 
quant a I'adoption de maximes si mod6r6es et si justes, aux 
Gouvernements qui en ont pris I'initiative, esp^re que la politique 

23 



354 The Declaration of Paris 

sage et g^nereuse qui les a inspir^es en r^glera egalement la 
vraie pratique, evitant, autant qu'il sera possible, les desaceords 
et les conflits qui, de tout temps, ont apporte des restrictions 
aux principes 6nonc^s aux paragraphes 2 et 3 a I'egard du 
droit de visite et de la qualification de marchandise hostile, 
et aussi quant au principe enonce au paragraphe 4, en ce qui 
determinera sa condition essentielle et les cas de violation 
effective de la part des neutres. 

L'humanite et la justice doivent certainement au Congres 
de Paris une grande amelioration apportee a la loi commune des 
nations ; mais, au nom des memes principes, on peut encore 
demander aux Puissances signataires du Traite du 30 Mars, 
1856, comme complement de son oeuvre de justice et de civil- 
isation, la consequence salutaire que renferment les maximes 
qu'elles ont proclam^es. Cette consequence est que, toute 
propri^te particuliere inoffensive, sans exception, des navires 
marchands, doitetre placee sous la protection du droit maritime 
a I'abri des attaques des croiseurs de guerre. 

Le Gouvernement Imperial adhere en cela a I'invitation des 
Etats-Unis d'Amerique et, dans I'espoir que la modification 
propos^e par cette Puissance au premier des principes proclam^s 
par le Congres de Paris se r^alisera, se declare d^s a present 
dispose k I'admettre comme la complete expression de la 
nouvelle juridiction Internationale. 

Le Soussign^, en adressant a M. de Saint-Georges cette 
agr^able communication, saisit cette occasion pour lui renou- 
veler les expressions de sa parfaite estime et de sa considera- 
tion distingu6e. 

J. M. DA SiLVA PaRANHAS. 



BREMEN. 

LE SYNDIC CHARGfi DES AFFAIRES fiTRANGfiRES DE LA 
VILLE DE BR^ME AU MINISTRE RESIDENT DES VILLES 
LIBRES A PARIS. 

Brtme, le 11 Juin, 1856. 

M. LE MiNISTRE, 

M. I'Envoy^ de France s'est acquitt6 aupr^s de moi de la 
communication dont il avait 6te charge par le Gouvernement 
de Sa Majesty Imp6riale, au sujet de la Declaration du Congres 
de Paris concernant les principes de droit maritime en temps 
de guerre. Cette communication a €t€ accueillie par le S6nat 
avec la satisfaction que devait lui faire eprouver I'adoption de 
principes si favorables aux int6rets des neutres et si conformes 
aux progr^s de notre temps." Le S^nat ne saurait done, Monsieur. 



Adherences to the Declaration of Paris 355 

que s'empresser d'adh^rer a la Declaration sign^e par les membres 
du Congres de Paris, le 16 Avril dernier, convaincu que I'adh^sion 
a donner a I'acte dont il s'agit ne devra produire tout I'effet 
desirable qu'autant qu'elle embrassera dans son ensemble les 
quatre principes poses par les Puissances signataires. C'est dans 
cette mesure qu'il n'hesite pas a la formuler, en considerant 
comme ^tant lies d'une maniere indivisible les quatre points 
resolus par la Declaration precitee. 

Je vous invite, en consequence. Monsieur, k porter cette 
adhesion pleine et sans reserve a la connaissance de M. le Comte 
Walewski, a qui vous voudrez bien laisser copie de la presente 
depeche. Je ne doute pas qu'elle ne reponde compl^tement 
aux voeux du Gouvernement de I'Empereur et au but de la 
communication que M. Edouard Cintrat avait ete charge de 
nous faire. 

Vous profiterez en meme temps de cette occasion, Monsieur, 
pour reiterer a M. le Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres I'expression 
de la sincere reconnaissance du Senat pour tons les genereux 
principes de droit public qui, sur I'initiative de I'Empereur, 
inspire de la politique traditionnelle de la France, ont ete 
consacres par le Congres, dans le noble but d'empecher, dore- 
navant, autant que cela est possible, les guerres, ou d'en dimi- 
nuer les tristes consequences. — Recevez, &c. 

Smidt. 

BRUNSWICK. 

LE MINISTRE D'fiTAT DU DUG DE BRUNSWICK AU 
CHARGE D'AFFAIRES DE FRANCE. 

Brunswick, le 7 Dicembre, 1857. 

M. de Charge d' Affaires, le Soussigne Ministre d'Etat Ducal 
a eu I'honneur de recevoir la copie d'une depeche de M. le Comte 
Walewski, avec la copie y jointe de la Declaration des Plenipo- 
tentiaires au Congres de Paris, relatives aux nouveaux principes 
du droit maritime arretes dans la seance du 16 Avril, 1856, 
lesquelles pieces vous avez bien voulu lui transmettre par votre 
note du 4 courant, et il se hate, M. le Charge d'Affaires, de vous 
en presenter I'expression de toutes ses obligations. Le Gouverne- 
ment de Son Altesse le Due sait parfaitement apprecier le progr^s 
sur le domaine du droit des gens, se manifestant dans les principes 
de cette declaration, ainsi que les bienfaits pour le commerce 
et les rapports internationaux, qui ne tarderont pas a en 
decouler, et il ne saurait que s'en feliciter. 

Comme la Di^te F^derale a, dans sa seance du 10 Juillet 
dernier, unanimement declare son adhesion aux principes en 



856 The Declaration of Paris 

question, et que les repr^sentants de la France, de la Grande- 
Bretagne et de la Russie a Francfort ont 6t6 inform^s de cette 
conclusion, il sera permis au Soussign^ Ministre d'Etat de s'y 
referer. — Le Soussign6, &c. 

Geyso. 

CHILI. 

LE MINISTRE DES RELATIONS EXTfiRIEURES DU CHILI 
AU CHARGE D'AFFAIRES DE FRANCE. 

(Traduction) Santiago, le 13 Aout, 1856. 

Monsieur, 

J'ai eu I'honneur de recevoir votre note en date du 24 du mois 
dernier, par laquelle vous invitez mon Gouvernement, au nom 
de celui de Sa Majeste I'Empereur, k s'associer a la Declaration 
sign^e par les Plenipotentiaires du Congr^s de Paris, le 16 Avril 
dernier, et ayant pour objet de fixer des bases uniformes de 
droit maritime a regard des neutres. J'ai re9U en meme temps 
une copie de la note que M. le Ministre des Affaires Etrang^res 
de France vous a adress6e a ce sujet, et de la Declaration sus- 
mentionnee du 16 Avril. 

Les quatre principes sanctionn^s et promulgues dans cette 
declaration ont deja ete en partie I'objet de stipulations formelles 
dans les Traites que la R^publique a conclus avec des Puissances 
de I'Europe et de rAm^rique. 

Les regies proclam^es sur cette mati^re par le Congres de Paris 
sont done en tout conformes a la politique de mon Gouverne- 
ment, et aucune difficulte ne s'oppose a la signature d'engage- 
ments propres a les sanctionner et a les y generaliser. 

Si votre Gouvernement est anime du meme desir, le mien 
sera heureux de concourir, pour sa part, a la generalisation de 
principes aussi conformes aux int^rets generaux du commerce 
du monde et qui sont en harmonic si parfaite avec la civilisation 
de notre epoque. — Je saisis, &c. 

A. Vargas. 

DENMARK. 

LE MINISTRE DES AFFAIRES fiTRANGfiRES DE DANEMARC 
AU MINISTRE DE FRANCE. 

Copenhague, le 25 Juin, 1856. 
Le Soussigne, Ministre des Affaires Etrang^res de Sa Majesty 
le Roi de Danemark, a eu I'honneur de recevoir la note que 
M. Dotezac, Envoy6 Extraordinaire et Ministre P16nipotentiaire 
de Sa Majeste I'Empereur des Fran9ais, a bien voulu lui adresser, 
en date du 2 du courant, en lui remettant, par ordre de son 



Adherences to the Declaration of Paris 357 

Gouvernement, la Declaration que le Congres de Paris a, sur 
la proposition du premier Pl^nipotentiaire de Sa Majest6 
I'Empereur Napoleon, adoptee dans la seance du 16 Avril 
dernier, touchant certains principes du droit maritime en temps 
de guerre, dont les Puissances signataires du Traite de Paix du 
30 Mars de la presente annee sont convenues de faire entre 
elles la r^gle invariable de leur conduite. 

A cette note 6tait egalement jointe une depeche de Son 
Excellence M. le Comte Walewski, Ministre des Affaires Etran- 
geres de Sa Majeste I'Empereur des Fran9ais, en date du 15 
Mai, par laquelle M. Dotezac a ete charge d'inviter le Gouverne- 
ment de Sa Majeste le Roi de Danemark a acceder a la Decla- 
ration susmentionnee. 

Le Soussigne s'est fait un devoir de remettre cette Decla- 
ration au Roi, son auguste Souverain, en portant I'attention 
de Sa Majeste sur les considerations qui en ont motive la signa- 
ture et qui justifient pour I'avenir, sans restriction et dans leur 
ensemble, les principes qui en font I'objet. 

La Declaration porte : 

1°. Que la course est et demeure abolie ; 

2°. Que le pavilion neutre couvre la marchandise ennemie, 
a I'exception de la contrebande de guerre ; 

3°. Que la marchandise neutre, a I'exception de la contre- 
bande de guerre, n'est pas saisissable sous pavilion ennemi ; 

4°. Que les blocus, pour etre obligatoires, doivent etre 
effectifs, c'est-a-dire maintenus par une force suffisante pour 
interdire reellement I'acces du littoral ennemi. 

Enfin il est stipule dans la Declaration qu'elle n'est et ne 
sera obligatoire qu'entre les Puissances qui y ont ou qui y 
auront accede. 

La justice des principes enonces est si evidente et les principes 
memes sont si conformes a I'esprit de la legislation Danoise en 
mati^re de droit maritime, que I'invitation qui vient d'etre ainsi 
adressee au Gouvernement du Roi a ete doublement agreable 
a Sa Majeste. 

En consequence, le Soussigne se trouve autorise a declarer, 
par la presente, que le Gouvernement de Sa Majeste le Roi de 
Danemark accede a la Declaration signee, le 16 Avril de I'annee 
courante, par les Plenipotentiaires reunis au Congres de Paris, 
et qu'il adopte, sans restriction et dans leur ensemble, les 
principes consacres par cet acte, en en reconnaissant I'indivisi- 
bilite pour I'avenir. 

En priant M. Dotezac de vouloir bien porter la presente 
note a la connaissance du Gouvernement Imperial, le Sous- 
signe, &c. De Scheele. 



858 The Declaration of Paris 

ECUADOR. 

DfiCRET DU SfiNAT ET DE LA CHAMBRE DES REPRfiSENTANTS 
DE L'EQUATEUR RfiUNIS EN CONGRfiS. 

Quito, le 6 Decemhre, 1856. 
(Traduction) 

Le Senat et la Chambre des representants de I'Equateur, 
reunis en Congres, 

Considerant que la Declaration adoptee au Congres de 
Paris, en date du 16 Avril de la presente annee 1856, par les 
Plenipotentiaires de plusieurs Etats de I'Europe, est conforme 
aux principes que la Republique a professes jusqu'a ce jour et 
stipules avec plusieurs nations de I'Amerique, 

Decretent : 

Art. 1. La Republique de I'Equateur adhere a la Declaration 
signee a Paris, le 16 Avril de la presente annee, par les Plenipo- 
tentiaires de I'Europe, declaration qui comprend les resolutions 
suivantes : 

1°. La course est abolie ; 

2°. Le pavilion neutre couvre la marchandise ennemie, a 
I'exception de la contrebande de guerre ; 

3°. La marchandise neutre, a I'exception de la contrebande 
de guerre, n'est pas saisissable sous pavilion ennemi ; 

4°. Le blocus, pour etre obligatoire, doit etre effectif, c'est- 
a-dire doit etre maintenu par une force suffisante pour interdire 
I'acces du littoral de I'ennemi. 

2. A regard des Etats qui ont adhere ou qui adhereront, 
la Republique de I'Equateur s'engage, en consequence, a 
observer tous et chacun des points exprimes dans I'Article 
precedent. 

Soit communique au Pouvoir Executif pour etre public et 
mis en vigueur. 

Donne a Quito, capitale de la Republique, le 29 Novembre, 
1856, I'an XII de la Liberte. 

Le President du Senat, 
Manuel Bustamente. 

Le President de la Chambre des Representants, 
Paul Guevara. 

Le Secretaire du Senat, 

MODESTE ESPINOSA. 

Le Secretaire de la Chambre des Representants, 
Paul Bustamente. 



Adherences to the Declaration of Paris 359 

Palais du Gouvernement, a Quito, le 6 D^cembre, 1856, an 
XII de la Liberte. 

Pour etre mis k execution. 

Marcos Spriel. 
Antonio Mata. 



FRANKFORT. 

LE PREMIER BOURGMESTRE DE FRANCFORT AU 
MINISTRE DE FRANCE. 

Francfort-sur-le-Mein, le 17 Juin, 1856. 

Le soussigne, Premier Bourgmestre de la Ville Libre de Franc- 
fort, s'est empresse de porter a la connaissance du haut Senat 
la communication officielle que M. le Comte de Monttessuy, 
Ministre Plenipotentiaire de Sa Majeste I'Empereur des Frangais, 
a bien voulu lui faire au sujet de la Declaration a I'egard du 
droit maritime arretee a Paris, le 16 Avril, 1856, au nom de 
leurs Gouvernements respectifs, par les Plenipotentiaires qui 
ont signe le Traite de Paris du 30 Mars, 1856. 

Le Senat, appreciant dans toute leur etendue la haute 
port^e des dispositions de la Declaration en question, disposi- 
tion qui reglent le droit maritime en temps de guerre d'une 
maniere analogue aux interets du commerce et de la civilisa- 
tion, et propres a prevenir et a resoudre les difficultes et les 
conflits dus a I'incertitude de la loi internationale en pareille 
matiere, a charge le soussigne de repondre a la communication 
qui lui a ete faite par la declaration officielle : 

Que le Senat de cette Ville Libre accede sans restriction au 
contenu de la Declaration sur le droit maritime du 16 Avril, 
1856, ainsi qu'a I'engagement de n'entrer, a I'avenir, dans aucun 
arrangement sur I'application du droit maritime en temps de 
guerre sans stipuler la stricte observation des 4 points resolus 
par la Declaration. 

Le Senat ne doute pas que tous les Etats qui n'ont pas ete 
appeles a participer au Congres de Paris repondront avec 
gratitude a I'invitation d'acceder a un Acte qui, a juste titre, 
est considere comme un des progr^s qui font la gloire de notre 
temps et comme le veritable couronnement de I'oeuvre de 
pacification conclue a Paris. 

Le soussigne a I'honneur de prier M. le Comte de Monttessuy 
de vouloir bien porter la declaration du Senat a la connaissance 
du Gouvernement de Sa Majeste I'Empereur, et saisit, &c. 

Dr Neuburg. 



360 The Declaration of Paris 



GERMANIC CONFEDERATION. 

LE PRESIDENT DE LA DifiTE GERMANIQUE AU 
MINISTRE DE FRANCE. 

Francfort, le 10 Juillet, 1856 
(Traduction) 

Le Soussign^ a I'honneur de pr^venir son Excellence M. le 
Comte de Monttessuy, Envoye Extraordinaire et Ministre Pl^ni- 
potentiaire de Sa Majeste I'Empereur des Fran9ais, que la 
Haute-Diete a pris connaissance avec le plus vif interet de 
la communication que son Excellence a bien voulu lui faire 
relativement a la Declaration signee a Paris, le 16 Avril dernier, 
concernant I'interpretation et I'application du droit maritime 
en temps de guerre. 

Conformement a I'invitation qui y est exprimee ainsi qu'aux 
propositions faites conjointement par les Gouvernements de 
Sa Majeste I'Empereur d'Autriche et de Sa Majeste le Roi de 
Prusse, et aux communications faites de la part des legations 
de Sa Majeste Britannique et de Sa Majesty I'Empereur de 
Russie, la Haute-Diete a pris, dans sa seance d'aujourd'hui, la 
decision dont le Soussigne a I'honneur de transmettre ci-jointe 
une copie. — II saisit, &c. 

Rechberg. 

RESOLUTION DE LA DifiTE GERMANIQUE, DU 
10 JUILLET, 1866. 
(Traduction) 

La Diete Germanique a decide : 

En appreciant et en reconnaissant pleinement le contenu et 
les fins de la Declaration concernant I'interpretation et I'appli- 
cation du droit maritime en temps de guerre, que les P16ni- 
potentiaires reunis au Congres de paix de Paris ont signee 
comme annexe du Protocol XXIV des Conferences, et par 
laquelle a et6 arrete ce qui suit : 

1°. La course est et demeure abolie ; 

2°. Le pavilion neutre couvre la marchandise ennemie, a 
r exception de la contrebande de guerre ; 

3°. La marchandise neutre, k I'exception de la contrebande 
de guerre, n'est pas saisissable sous pavilion ennemi ; 

4°, Les blocus, pour etre obligatoires, doivent etre effectifs, 
c'est-a-dire maintenus par une force suffisante pour interdire 
reellement I'acc^s du littoral de I'ennemi. 

De se rendre a I'invitation qui lui a ^t^ faite de la part de 
I'Autriche et de la Prusse, ainsi que des Cours de France, de la 



Adherences to the Declaration of Paris 361 

Grande-Bretagne et de Russie, d'adh^rer a cette Declaration 
et par consequent d'y acc^der au nom de la Confederation 
Germanique. 

GREECE. 

LE MINISTRE DES AFFAIRES fiTRANGfiRES DE 
GR^CE AU MINISTRE DE FRANCE. 

AtheneSf le ^^ Juin, 1856. 

Le Soussigne, Ministre de la Maison Royale et des Relations 
Ext^rieures de Sa Majeste Helienique, a I'honneur d'accuser 
reception a M. I'Envoye Extraordinaire et Ministre Plenipo- 
tentiaire de Sa Majeste I'Empereur des Fran9ais, de la note, en 
date du 6 Juin, par laquelle il a bien voulu lui communiquer 
la Declaration sur les droits des neutres en temps de guerre 
maritime, sign^e a Paris le tV Avril, 1856, et dont la teneur 
suit : 

Declaration. 

Les Pl^nipotentiaires qui ont sign6 le Traits de Paris du 
30 Mars, 1856, r^unis en Conference, 

Considerant : 

Que le droit maritime, en temps de guerre, a ete, pendant 
longtemps, I'objet de contestations regrettables ; 

Que I'incertitude du droit et des devoirs, en pareille matiere, 
donne lieu, entre les neutres et les belligerants, k des divergences 
d'opinion qui peuvent faire naitre des difficultes s^rieuses et 
meme des confiits ; 

Qu'il y a avantage, par consequent, a 6tablir une doctrine 
uniforme sur un point aussi important ; 

Que les Plenipotentiaires assembles au Congr^s de Paris ne 
sauraient mieux repondre aux intentions dont leurs Gouverne- 
ments sont animes, qu'en cherchant a introduire dans les 
rapports internationaux des principes fixes a cet egard ; 

Dument autorises, les Plenipotentiaires sont convenus de se 
concerter sur les moyens d'atteindre ce but, et, etant tombes 
d'accord, ont arrete la Declaration solennelle ci-apr6s : 

1°. La course est et demeure abolie ; 

2°. Le pavilion neutre couvre la marchandise enneraie, k 
I'exception de la contrebande de guerre ; 

S°. La marchandise neutre, a I'exception de la contrebande 
de guerre n'est pas saisissable sous pavilion ennemi ; 

4°. Les blocus, pour etre obligatoires, doivent etre effectifs, 
c'est-^-dire maintenus par une force suffisante pour interdire 
reellement I'acc^s du littoral de I'ennemi. 



362 The Declaration of Paris 

Les Gouvernements des Plenipotentiaires soussignes s'en- 
gagent a porter cette Declaration a la connaissance des Etats 
qui n'ont pas ete appeles a participer au Congres de Paris, et 
a les inviter a y acceder. 

Convaincus que les maximes qu'ils viennent de proclamer 
ne sauraient etre accueillies qu'avec gratitude par le monde 
entier, les Plenipotentiaires soussignes ne doutent pas que les 
efforts de leurs Gouvernements, pour en generaliser I'adoption, 
ne soient couronnes d'un plein succes. 

La presente Declaration n'est et ne sera obligatoire qu'entre 
les Puissances qui y ont ou qui y auront accede. 

Fait a Paris, le 16 Avril, 1856. 

BUOL SCHAUENSTEIN. HUBNER. 

A. Walewski. Bourqueney. 

Clarendon. Cowley. 

Manteuffel. Hatzfeldt. 

Orloff. Brunow. 

C. Cavour. De Villamarina. 

Aali. Mehemmed Djemil. 

Le Gouvernement de Sa Majeste se felicite sincerement 
d'avoir a donner son accession a un acte qui est une veritable 
conquete de la justice et de la science du droit sur des maximes 
differemment con9ues et plus differemment encore appliqu6es 
Jusqu'a present par les diverses nations. Les grandes Puissances 
signataires du Traits de Paix de Paris peuvent se glorifier a 
juste titre d'avoir ajoute a leur grande oeuvre de pacification 
un bienfait aussi important que celui dont elles viennent de 
doter le monde entier. 

Le Soussigne, apres avoir pris les ordres du Roi, son auguste 
Souverain, s'empresse done de declarer a M. I'Envoye Extraordi- 
naire et Ministre Plenipotentiaire de France, que le Gouverne- 
ment Grec adhere a toutes et k chacune des quatre clauses 
contenues dans la susdite Declaration, et promet de s'y con- 
former exactement, le cas echeant. 

Toutefois, comme la Declaration n'est et ne sera obligatoire 
qu'entre les Puissances qui y ont ou qui y auront accede, le 
Soussigne prie M. Mercier de faire prendre a son Gouverne- 
ment les dispositions convenables pour informer le Gouverne- 
ment Grec quelles sont les Puissances qui ont deja exprime ou 
exprimeront, dans la suite, leur adhesion a la Declaration. 

A. R. Rangabe. 



Adherences to the Declaration of Paris 363 



GUATEMALA. 

LE MINISTRE DES RELATIONS EXT^RIEURES DE GUATE- 
MALA AU CHARGfi D'AFFAIRES DE FRANCE. 

(Traduction) Guatemala, le 30 AouU 1856. 

M. LE ViCOMTE, 

J'ai eu I'honneur de recevoir, avec la note que vous avez 
bien voulu m'adresser le 18 de ce mois, une copie de la depeche 
de son Excellence M. le Comte Walewski, par laquelle ce Ministre 
vous charge d'engager le Gouvernement de Guatemala a adherer 
aux principes de droit maritime adoptes par les Plenipoten- 
tiaires reunis dernierement a Paris, et qui sont constates par 
la Declaration signee, le 16 Avril dernier, dont vous avez bien 
voulu m'envoyer egalement une copie. 

En reponse a cette note, j'ai I'honneur de vous informer, 
Monsieur, que le President de la Republique est d'avis que les 
principes etablis dans cette Declaration sont non-seulement 
d'une justice rigoureuse, mais qu'ils peuvent etre en meme 
temps une garantie pour les nations faibles ; en consequence, 
son Excellence, avec I'assentiment unanime de son Cabinet 
d'Etat, donne avec satisfaction son adhesion formelle aux 
principes importants contenus dans la Declaration faite, le 16 
Avril dernier, par le Congr^s de Paris. — Je saisis, &c. 

P. DE Aycinena. 

HAITI. 

LE MINISTRE DES RELATIONS EXTfiRIEURES D'HAITI 
AU CHARGfi D'AFFAIRES DE FRANCE. 

Cayes, le 17 Septembre, 1856. 

Le Soussigne, Ministre des Relations Exterieures de Sa Majesty 
I'Empereur d'Haiti, a eu I'honneur de recevoir la note de M. le 
Vice-Consul, charge de la Legation et du Consulat general de 
France a Port-au-Prince, par laquelle il a officiellement signifie 
au Gouvernement Haitien la Declaration du 16 Avril dernier 
des Plenipotentiaires Europeens du Congr^s de Paris, et demand^ 
au Gouvernement de Sa Majeste Imperiale son adhesion aux 
principes du droit maritime international proclames dans le 
Congres precite. 

Le Ministre des Relations Exterieures d'Haiti est charge 
d'annoncer au Vice-Consul de France la pleine et enti^re ad- 
hesion du Gouvernement Imperial et ajoute que cette adhesion. 



364 The Declaration of Paris 

ainsi que la Declaration qui y a donne lieu, seront rendues 
publiques par le journal officiel du Gouvernement. 

Le IMinistre des Relations Exterieures d'Haiti prie M. le 
Vice-Consul d'agreer, &c. 

L. DUFRENE. 

HAMBURG. 

LE SYNDIC CHARGE DES AFFAIRES :fiTRANG£RES DE HAM- 
BOURG AU MINISTRE RESIDENT DES VILLES LIBRES A 
PARIS. 

Hambourg, le 27 Juin, 1856. 
Monsieur le Ministre, 

M. I'Envoye de Sa Majeste I'Empereur des Fran§ais m'a 
communique le 3 de ce mois, en m'en laissant copie, une depeche 
que le Ministre des Affaires ^Etrangeres, M. le Comte Walewski, 
lui avait adressee, en date du 19 Mai, au sujet des principes de 
droit maritime en temps de guerre adoptes par les Puissances 
signataires du Traite de Paris, et par I'adoption desquels les 
signataires, et surtout la France, par la genereuse proposition 
de laquelle cette resolution a eti prise, se sont acquis des titres 
durables a la profonde reconnaissance de toutes les nations 
maritimes. Une communication analogue m'a ete faite le 
meme jour par les Ministres d'Autriche, de la Grande -Bretagne, 
de Prusse et de Russie. 

Sur le rapport que je lui en avais fait, le Senat vous autorise, 
conformement au desir que M. le Comte Walewski en avait 
exprim^ dans sa depeche du 19 Mai, k declarer a Son Excellence, 
au nom du S^nat, que le S^nat adhere pleinement et sans 
restriction quelconque aux 4 points contenus dans la Declara- 
tion sur le droit maritime en temps de guerre, que M. Cintrat a 
bien voulu nous transmettre, et que le Senat s'engage en meme 
temps a n'entrer a I'avenir, sur I'application du droit maritime 
en temps de guerre, dans aucun arrangement sans stipuler la 
stricte observation des 4 points resolus par cette Declaration. 

Vous profiterez en meme temps de cette occasion. Monsieur, 
pour r^iterer a M. le Ministre des Affaires fitrangeres Fexpres- 
sion de la sincere reconnaissance du Senat pour tous les genereux 
principes de droit public qui, sur I'initiative de I'Empereur, 
inspire de la politique traditionnelle de la France, ont ete 
consacres par le Congres, dans le noble but d'empecher dore- 
navant, autant que cela est possible, les guerres, ou d'en diminuer 
les tristes cons^uences. 

Vous voudrez bien donner lecture et laisser copie de cette 
d^p^che a M. le Ministre des Affaires ^^trang^res. — Agreez, &c. 

Merck. 



Adherences to the Declaration of Paris 365 
HANOVER. 

LE MINISTRE DES AFFAIRES fiTRANGfiRES DE HANOVRE 
AU MINISTRE DE FRANCE. 

Hanovre, le 31 Mai, 1856. 

Le Soussign^, Ministre d'Etat et des Affaires Etrang^res, a 
re9u la note du 28 de ce mois, que M. le Comte de Reculot, 
Envoy6 Extraordinaire et Ministre P16nipotentiaire de Sa 
Majesty I'Empereur des Fran9ais, au nom de son Gouverne- 
ment, a bien voulu lui adresser pour inviter le Gouvernement 
Hanovrien a adherer a la Declaration des Pl^nipotentiaires au 
Congr^s de Paris relative aux nouveaux principes du droit 
maritime arret^s dans la seance du 16 Avril dernier. 

Appreciant dans toute leur valeur la genereuse initiative 
prise a cette occasion et les motifs eleves qui I'ont dict^e, le 
Gouvernement Hanovrien reconnait avec une vive satisfaction, 
dans les principes appeles desormais a servir de r^gle au droit 
maritime international, I'eclatant temoignage d'un grand progr^s 
accompli, constatant, k la veritable gloire de ceux qui I'ont 
realise, le sentiment profond du droit et de I'^quite, et qui 
restera dans I'histoire comme I'un des plus beaux monuments 
de la civilisation moderne. 

Organe de la plus vive reconnaissance de Gouvernement 
Hanovrien envers les Hautes Puissances representees au Congr^s 
de Paris, le soussigne Ministre d'Etat et des Affaires Etrang^res, 
autoris6 a cet effet par le Roi, son auguste Maitre, a I'honneur 
de porter a la connaissance de M. le Comte de Reculot, que le 
Gouvernement Hanovrien adhere avec empressement a la De- 
claration des Plenipotentiaires au Congr^s de Paris relative aux 
nouveaux principes du droit maritime arretes dans la seance 
du 16 Avril dernier, qu'il en accepte I'application pleine et 
enti^re, et qu'il s'engage nommement a n'entrer, a I'avenir, en 
aucun arrangement sur I'application du droit maritime en 
temps de guerre sans stipuler la stricte observation des quatre 
points r^solus par ladite Declaration. — Le Soussigne, &c. 

Platen Hallermund. 

HESSE-CASSEL. 

LE MINISTRE D'fiTAT DE HESSE-CASSEL AU CHARGfi 
D'AFFAIRES DE FRANCE. 

T,, Cassel, le 4 Juin, 1856. 

Monsieur, 

Ayant re^u par I'interm^diaire de M. de Montherot, Envoy6 

Extraordinaire et Ministre P16nipotentiaire de Sa Majesty 

I'Empereur des Fran9ais pr^s la Cour Electorale de Hesse, les 



366 The Declaration of Paris 

copies d'une depeche de M. le Ministre des Affaires Etrang^res 
de Sa Majeste I'Empereur, ainsi que d'une Declaration en date 
du 16 Avril dernier, toutes deux ay ant trait aux nouveaux 
principes du droit maritime en temps de guerre adopt^s par les 
Plenipotentiaires au Congr^s de Paris, j'ai I'honneur de vous 
pr6venir. Monsieur, que je me suis fait un devoir d'en porter 
le contenu a la connaissance de I'Electeur, mon auguste Maitre, 
et que Son Altesse Royale a accueilli cette communication avec 
un int^ret particulier, daignant en meme temps exprimer son 
adhesion aux principes enonc6s. — Veuillez, &c. 

De Meyer. 

HESSE-DARMSTADT. 

LE MINISTRE DES AFFAIRES fiTRANGfiRES DE HESSE- 
DARMSTADT AU MINISTRE PLfiNIPOTENTIAIRE DE SON 
ALTESSE ROYALE LE GRAND-DUC A PARIS. 

,, T, Darmstadt, le 15 Juin, 1856. 

M. LE Baron, 

J'ai I'honneur de vous transmettre sous ce pli copie de deux 
pieces importantes que M. le Vicomte Rcederer a bien voulu me 
communiquer, il y a quelque temps, savoir, d'une depeche de 
M. le Comte Walewski, en date du 15 du mois passe, et d'une 
Declaration des P16nipotentiaires qui ont signe le Traite de 
Paris du 30 Mars dernier, destin^e a fixer les principes du droit 
maritime en temps de guerre. 

Le Gouvernement Grand-Ducal, tr^s-sensible a I'invitation 
que le Cabinet des Tuileries lui a fait adresser, par I'organe de 
la Legation Imp6riale a Darmstadt, d'acceder a la Declaration 
du Congr^s de Paris sur cette importante mati^re, ne saurait 
qu'applaudir a une doctrine si favorable a la security et au 
d^veloppement des rapports internationaux. 

Son Altesse Royale le Grand-Due m'a, en consequence, 
donne I'ordre de vous charger, Monsieur le Baron, de faire con- 
naitre au Gouvernement Imperial combien celui du Grand- 
Duche de Hesse se rejouit des heureux r^sultats des d-marches 
que, par ordre de Sa Majesty I'Empereur, M. le Comte Walewski 
a faites au Congr^s de Paris dans un but d'utilite si reelle et si 
universelle. 

Vous ajouterez que le Gouvernement Grand-Ducal adhere 
avec empressement, sans reserve ni restriction quelconque, a 
cette Declaration comme etablissant des principes indivisibles. 

Vous voudrez bien, d'ailleurs, donner lecture et laisser copie 
de la pr6sente d6peche a son Excellence M. le Comte Walewski. 
— Agr^ez, &c. 

Baron de Dalwigk. 



Adherences to the Declaration of Paris 367 

HOLLAND. 

LE MINISTRE DES AFFAIRES fiTRANGfiRES DES 
PAYS-BAS AU MINISTRE DE FRANCE. 

La Haye, le 7 Juin, 1856. 

Le Soussign^, Ministre d'Etat et des Affaires Etrang^res, a 
eu I'honneur de recevoir de M. le Baron d'Andr^, Envoye Extra- 
ordinaire et Ministre Plenipotentiaire de Sa Majeste I'Empereur 
des Fran9ais, en date du 2 de ce mois, communication de la 
Declaration faite en Conference a Paris, le 16 Avril, 1856, au 
nom de leurs Gouvernements respectifs, par les Plenipotentiaires 
qui ont signe le Traits du 30 Mars de la meme annee, et relative 
au droit maritime en temps de guerre. 

Pareille communication a ^te faite au Soussignd par les 
autres legations des Puissances signataires du Traite du 30 
Mars, accreditees a la Haye. 

A cette communication 6tait jointe I'invitation d'acceder k 
la Declaration precit^e. 

Le Gouvernement de Sa Majeste le Roi des Pays-Bas a 
re9U cette communication avec une satisfaction proportionnee k 
ToeuvTe de haute civilisation qui, par I'adoption unanime des 
maximes contenues dans la Declaration, a ete accomplie dans 
la Conference de Paris. 

A ces maximes, du reste, les Pays-Bas ont tou jours rendu 
hommage. 

C'est, en consequence, avec empressement que le Soussign^, 
d'apr^s les ordres du Roi son auguste Maitre, et en son nom, 
declare acceder a ladite Declaration du 16 Avril, en exprimant 
I'espoir que I'adoption des principes qui y sont etablis sera 
generale et que leur maintien ne souffrira jamais d' interruption. 

Le Soussigne a fait parvenir une note identique a MM. les 
autres Representants des Puissances signataires. 

II prie M. le Baron d'Andre de vouloir bien lui accuser la 
reception de la pr^sente et d'agrder, &c. 

Van Hall. 

JAPAN. 

. FRENCH NOTIFICATION OF THE ACCESSION OF JAPAN TO THE 
DECLARATION OF PARIS OF APRIL 16, 1856, RESPECTING 
MARITIME LAW. PARIS, DECEMBER 24, 1886. 

Sa Majeste I'Empereur du Japon ayant accede k la Declara- 
tion signee le 16 Avril, 1856, au Congr^s de Paris, pour regler 
divers points de droit maritime, par I'Acte d' Accession deiivre 



368 The Declaration of Paris 

par son Excellence M. Inouye Kaoru, Ministre des Affaires 
;6trang6res muni de pleins pouvoirs en bonne et due forme ; acte 
d'acceptation dont la teneur suit ici mot pour mot :— 

" Le Soussign6, Ministre des Affaires ifitrang^res de Sa 
Majesty I'Empereur du Japon, a I'honneur de faire savoir k 
M. Sienkiewicz, Ministre de France k Tokid, que le Gouverne- 
ment du Mikado, appreciant la haute justice des principes 
proclames dans le Declaration dressee le 16 Avril 1856, par le 
Congr^s de Paris, et dont le texte est ci- joint, donne son adhesion 
entifere definitive aux quatre clauses contenues dans cette De- 
claration, et s'engage k s'y conformer exactement. 

" Le Soussigne attacherait du prix a ce que son Gouverne- 
ment fut informe-des adhesions qui se sont deja produites et de 
celles qui pourront avoir lieu dans la suite. — II saisit, &c. 

" (L.S.) Inouye Kaoru, 
" Ministre des Affaires J^trangdres. 

" Minist^re des Affaires ^fitrang^res, T6ki6, le 30 jour du 10 mois 
de la 19 ann^e de Meiji (30 Octobre, 1886)." 

Nous, Ministre des Affaires fitrangeres de la Republique 
Fran9aise, dument autorise a cet effet, acceptons formellement 
la dite accession tant au nom du Gouvernement de la Republique 
qu'au nom des Hautes Puissances Signataires de la Declara- 
tion du 16 Avril, 1856 ; et nous nous engageons a accomplir 
les obligations contenues dans la dite Declaration qui pourront 
concerner Sa Majeste I'Empereur du Japon. 

En foi de quoi nous avons signe le present Acte d'Accepta- 
tion d' Accession et y avons appos6 notre cachet. 

Fait a Paris, le 24 Decembre, 1886. 

(L.S.) Flourens. 

LUBECK. 

LE SYNDIC CHARGfi DES AFFAIRES fiTRANGfiRES DE LA 
VILLE DE LUBECK AU MINISTRE RESIDENT DES VILLES 
LIBRES A PARIS. 

Luheck, le 20 Juin, 1856. 
M. LE Ministre, 

Monsieur TEnvoy^ Extraordinaire et Ministre Pl^nipoten- 
tiaire de Sa Majesty I'Empereur des Fran9ais accredits aupr^s 
de la ville libre et anseatique de Lubeck, par une note du ler 
courant a fait communication de la Declaration des Ministres 
signataires de la paix de Paris, du 30 Mars dernier, au sujet 
des principes de droit maritime en temps de guerre. Cette 
communication et I'invitation y ajout^e d'adh^rer a ladite 
Declaration ont iti accueillies par le S6nat avec toute la satis- 



Adherences to the Declaration of Paris 369 

faction due a I'adoption de principes si favorables aux int^rSts 
des neutres et si conformes aux vues ^clair^es du si^cle. Le 
S6nat, Monsieur, apr^s avoir fait pr^c6der des communications 
int6rieures, s'empresse d'adh^rer, au nom de Lubeck, k cette 
meme Declaration, telle qu'elle est sign^e par les membres du 
Congr^s de Paris, le 16 Avril dernier, acte qui produira tout 
I'effet d^sir^ par I'ensemble des quatre points y contenus et 
ins6parablement li^s. 

En consequence. Monsieur, je viens d'etre charge par le 
Senat de vous inviter a porter cette adhesion pleine et enti^re k 
la connaissance de son Excellence Monsieur le Comte Walewski, 
en lui laissant copie de la pr^sente depeche. 

CuRTius, Syndic. 



MECKLENBURG-SCHWERIN. 

LE MINISTRE DES AFFAIRES fiTRANGfiRES DE MECKLEM- 
BOURG-SCHWfiRIN AU MINISTRE DE FRANCE. 

Schwirin, le 22 Juillet, 1856. 

Le Soussign6, Ministre des Affaires Etrang^res de Son Altesse 
Royale le Grand-Due de Mecklembourg-Schwerin, a re9u la note 
dont son Excellence M. de Cintrat, Envoy^ Extraordinaire et 
Ministre Pienipotentiaire de Sa Majesty I'Empereur des Fran9ais 
a Hambourg, I'a honor^, en date du ler Juin dernier, et qui a 
pour objet d'inviter le Gouvernement Grand-Ducal k acc^der 
a la Declaration signee, le 16 Avril dernier, par les Puissances 
qui ont particip^ au Congr^s de Paris, sur les principes du 
droit maritime en temps de guerre. 

Apres avoir pris les ordres du Grand-Due, son auguste 
Souverain, le Soussigne est charge d'etre I'interpr^te de la vive 
satisfaction dont Son Altesse Royale a ete penetree en voyant 
etablie, par la consecration de ces principes, une nouvelle base 
du droit public maritime, propre a attenuer les calamites de 
la guerre et a mettre un terme a I'etat d'incertitude auquel a 
donne lieu jusqu'a present I'application de la loi Internationale 
en pareille matiere. 

Plus Son Altesse Royale sait apprecier le caract^re eieve 
d'un tel acte, plus elle s'est empressee de prononcer sa pleine 
et enti^re adhesion a la Declaration susmentionnee et aux prin- 
cipes qu'elle renferme. 

Ayant I'honneur de transmettre ci-jointe k M. de Cintrat la 
copie de la patente qui, en consequence, vient d'etre publiee par 
I'organe officiel du Gouvernement Grand-Ducal, le Soussigne, &c. 

Comte de Bulow. 
24 



870 The Declaration of Paris 

PUBLICATION RELATIVE A L' ADHESION DU GRAND-DUCHfi 
DE MECKLEMBOURG-SCHWfiRIN A LA DlfiCLARATION SUR 
LES DROITS DES NEUTRES, EN TEMPS DE GUERRE, 
SIGN:fiE A PARIS, LE 16 AVRIL, 1856. 

Schwirin, le 22 Juillet, 1856. 
(Traduction) 

Nous, Fr6deric-Fran9ois, par la grace de Dieu, Grand-Due 
de Mecklembourg, &c., savoir faisons que les Plenipotentiaires 
des Puissances representees au Congres de Paris ayant signe, 
le 16 Avril dernier, la Declaration sur les droits des neutres en 
temps de guerre, dont le texte original et la traduction sont 
imprimis ci-apr^s dans le supplement A, et lesdits Plenipoten- 
tiaires etant, en outre, convenus que les Puissances qui ont signe 
cette Declaration, ou qui pourraient y acceder encore, seraient 
tenues de ne passer desormais aucune transaction sur le droit 
des neutres en temps de guerre qui ne reposat sur les quatre 
principes dans leur ensemble pos^s dans ladite Declaration, 
avons, sur I'invitation faite a notre Gouvernement, appreciant 
pleinement les motifs qui ont dirigd les signataires de la De- 
claration du 16 Avril dernier, et etant parfaitement d'accord 
avec le contenu d'icelle, compietement accede, avec notre Grand- 
Duche, non-seulement a cette Declaration, mais aussi a la con- 
dition relative k I'indivisibilite des quatre principes poses, et 
avons ordonne de publier notre accession par le present acte. 

Donne en notre Ministere d'Etat, Schwerin, le 22 Juillet, 
1856. Frederic FRANgois. 

Comte Bulow de Schroeter de Brock. 



MECKLENBURG-STRELITZ. 

LE MINISTRE D'ETAT DE MECKLEMBOURG-STR^LITZ 
AU MINISTRE DE FRANCE. 

Neu-Strilitz, le 25 Aout, 1856. 

Le Soussigne, Ministre d'Etat de Son Altesse Royale le Grand- 
Due de Mecklembourg-Streiitz, a I'honneur de faire part a Son 
Excellence M. I'Envoye Extraordinaire et Ministre Pienipoten- 
tiaire de Sa Majeste I'Empereur des Fran9ais, en reponse a sa 
note du 1 Juin, 1856, que la Confederation Germanique, en 
appreciant hautement et a I'unanimite le contenu et le but de 
la Declaration arretee par les Plenipotentiaires assembles au 
Congres de Paris sur I'interpretation et I'application du droit 
maritime en temps de guerre et signee, le 16 Avril de cette 



Adherences to the Declaration of Paris 371 

ann^e, comme annexe du Protocole de la vingt-quatri^me con- 
ference, ayant accede a cette declaration, Son Altesse Royale 
le Grand-Due a prononce son adhesion a cette meme Declara- 
tion par un arrets du 14 de ce mois. 

Le Soussigne prie Son Excellence M. Cintrat de vouloir bien 
en informer son Gouvernement, et profite, &c. 

Bernstorff. 



MEXICO. 

ACCESSION OF MEXICO TO THE DECLARATION RESPECTING 
MARITIME LAW SIGNED AT PARIS, APRIL 16, 1850- 
FEBRUARY 13, 1909. 

The French Charge d'affaires to Sir Edward Grey. 

Ambassade de France, 
Londres, le 9 Avril, 1909. 
M. LE Secretaire d'Etat, 

Le Ministre du Mexique a Paris vient d'informer le Gouverne- 
ment de la Republique de I'accession de son Gouvernement a 
la Declaration de Paris du 16 avril, 1856, sur le droit maritime. 

Je suis charge par M. le Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres 
de porter cette information a la connaissance de votre Excellence 
en lui remettant copie de I'acte par lequel le Gouvernement 
fran9ais a accepte, tant en son nom qu'au nom des Puissances 
signataires de la Declaration de 1856, I'adh^sion du Gouverne- 
ment mexicain. — Veuillez, &c., E. Daeschner. 

(Inclosure.) 

Acte d'Acceptation d'Accession. 

Le Gouvernement des ;6tats-Unis mexicains ayant &ccid6 
a la Declaration signee le 16 avril, 1856, au Congres de Paris, 
pour regler divers points de droit maritime, par I'Acte d'Accession 
delivre par M. S. B. de Mier, Envoye extraordinaire et Ministre 
plenipotentiaire du Mexique a Paris, Acte d'Accession dont la 
teneur suit : — 

Le Soussigne, Envoye extraordinaire et Ministre Pleni- 
potentiaire des fitats-Unis du Mexique pr^s le President de la 
Republique franQaise, a I'honneur de faire savoir k M. S. Pichon, 
Senateur, Ministre des Affaires ^fitrang^res de la Republique 
fran9aise, que le Gouvernement des fitats-Unis mexicains, 
appr^ciant la haute justice des principes proclames dans la 
Declaration dressee le 16 avril, 1856, par le Congres de Paris, 
donne son adhesion entiere et definitive aux quatre clauses 



372 The Declaration of Paris 

contenues dans cette Declaration et s*engage a s*y conformer 
enti^rement. 

Paris, le 13 fevrier, 1909. 

(L.S.) S. B. DE MiER. 

Nous, Ministre des Affaires fitrang^res de la Republique 
fran§aise, dument autorise a cet effet, acceptons formellement 
ladite accession, tant au nom du Gouvernement de la Republique 
qu'au nom des Hautes Puissances signataires de la Declaration 
du 16 avril, 1856. 

En foi de quoi nous avons signe le present Acte d' Accepta- 
tion d'Accession et y avons fait apposer notre cachet. 

Fait k Paris, le 13 fevrier, 1909. 

(L.S.) S. PiCHON. 

Sir Edward Grey to the French Charge d'affaires. 

Foreign Office, April 21st, 1909. 
Sir, 

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your note 
of the 9th instant, in which you inform me of the accession of 
the United States of Mexico to the Declaration respecting 
maritime law, signed at Paris on the 16th April, 1856, and inclose 
a copy of the Act by which the Government of the French 
Republic has accepted such accession. 

In thanking you for this communication, of which I have 
taken due note, I have, &c. 

E. Grey. 

NASSAU. 

LE MINISTRE D'fiTAT DE NASSAU AU CHARGlS 
D'AFFAIRES DE FRANCE. 

Wiesbaden, le 18 Juin, 1856. 

Le Soussigne, Ministre d'Etat de Son Altesse le Due de 
Nassau, a eu I'honneur de mettre sous les yeux de son auguste 
Souverain la copie de la depeche de M. le Comte Walewski 
que M. le Vicomte Roederer, Charge d'Affaires de France, a 
bien voulu lui remettre. 

Son Altesse le Due, convaincu de la justesse ainsi que de 
la salutaire influence des quatre principes du droit maritime 
international consign6s dans la Declaration que les P16nipoten- 
tiaires des Puissances representees au Congres de Paris ont 
formellement ^mise, le 16 Avril dernier, n'hesite point a y 
adherer sans restriction. 



Adherences to the Declaration of Paris 373 

En priant M. le Vicomte Roederer de vouloir bien porter 
cette haute resolution a la connaissance de son Gouvernement, 
le Soussigne, &c. 

Prince de Wittgenstein. 



NORWAY. See SWEDEN AND NORWAY. 

OLDENBURG. 

LE MINISTRE DES AFFAIRES fiTRANGfiRES D'OLDENBOURG 
AU MINISTRE DE FRANCE. 

Oldenbourg, le 9 Juin, 1856. 

Le Soussigne a eu I'honneur de recevoir la note, en date du 
1 du courant, par laquelle Son Excellence M. Cintrat, Envoye 
Extraordinaire et Ministre Plenipotentiaire de Sa Majeste 
I'Empereur des Frangais, a bien voulu lui communiquer la 
Declaration signee a Paris, le 16 Avril dernier, par les Membres 
du Congres, dans le but de fixer les bases d'un droit maritime 
uniforme en temps de guerre. Le Gouvernement Grand-Ducal 
a partage la vive satisfaction avec laquelle I'etablissement 
d'une legislation uniforme en fait de droits de guerre navale a 
ete generalement accueilli ; il se felicite d'etre invite par les 
Hautes Puissances contractantes a acceder a un arrangement 
qui repond tant a I'esprit de notre epoque et qui promet tant 
d'avantages pour les interets du commerce et de la navigation. 

En consequence, le Soussigne est autorise a declarer que le 
Gouvernment de Son Altesse Royale le Grand-Due d'Olden- 
bourg adhere aux principes poses dans les quatre Articles du 
Protocole mentionne du 16 Avril dernier, et qu'il reconnait 
I'indivisibilite de ces principes. 

En priant Son Excellence M. Cintrat de vouloir bien lui 
accuser reception de I'adhesion de son Gouvernement, le Sous- 
signe, &c. De Rossing. 

PAPAL STATES. 

SON EMINENCE LE CARDINAL SECRETAIRE D'fiTAT 
A L'AMBASSADEUR DE FRANCE. 

Du Vatican, le 2 Juin, 1856. 
(Traduction) 

Le Soussigne, Cardinal Secretaire d'Etat, s'est empresse de 
placer sous les yeux du Saint P^re, non-seulement le texte de la 
deliberation du Congres de Paris relative aux principes de droit 
maritime applicables en temps de guerre, mais aussi la depeche 



874 The Declaration of Paris 

de M. le Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres de Sa Majeste I'Em- 
pereur, voire auguste Maitre, laquelle en etait le commentaire. 
Votre Excellence avait eu la bont^ de me transmettre copie 
de ces documents par la note qu'elle m'a fait I'honneur de 
m'adresser le 27 du mois dernier. A cette occasion, votre Excel- 
lence annon9ait qu'elle avait ete chargee par le Gouvernement 
Imperial d'inviter celui du Saint Siege a donner son adhesion 
a cette resolution du Congr^s, attendu les avantages qui resultent 
pour les neutres de dispositions positives conformes a I'esprit 
de la civilisation moderne. 

Sa Saintete, apr^s avoir porte son attention sur les considera- 
tions diverses qui ont engage les Plenipotentiaires signataires 
du Traite de Paix a discuter et resoudre un point d'une aussi 
grande importance, ne pouvait manquer d'apprecier les principes 
qui les ont guides. II lui a semble qu'ils repondaient parfaite- 
ment a la necessite de proteger les interets commerciaux et les 
nombreuses transactions qui en sont la consequence, et qui, 
dans les circonstances actuelles, ont pris un si grand developpe- 
ment chez toutes les nations. En reconnaissant que Ton a eu 
en vue d'eviter que, durant une lutte entre Puissances belH- 
gerantes, la propriete des sujets d'un Gouvernement neutre cut 
a souffrir de la divergence des opinions, Sa Saintete a vu avec 
satisfaction que les Articles de la resolution combinee par les 
Plenipotentiaires donnaient pleine garantie contre une pareille 
eventualite. En consequence de ces observations, Sa Saintete, 
s'^tant determinee a accueillir I'invitation qui lui ^tait faite, 
a charge le Soussigne de faire connaitre, en son nom, que, de 
la part du Saint Si6ge, enti^re adhesion etait donnee a I'acte 
susmentionne concernant le droit maritime international. 

Le Soussigne, en accomplissant avec plaisir une mission si 
honorable, prie votre Excellence de vouloir bien en rendre 
compte a son Gouvernement et d'agreer, &c. 

Antonelli. 

PARMA. 

LE MINISTRE DES AFFAIRES £TRANG£RES DE 
PARME AU MINISTRE DE FRANCE. 

Parme, le 20 Aoitt, 1856. 
Le Soussigne, Ministre d'Etat pour le Departement des 
Affaires Etrangeres de Son Altesse Royale Madame la Duchesse- 
Regente de Parme, a eu I'honneur de recevoir la depeche de 
Son Excellence M. le Prince de Latour-d'Auvergne, Ministre 
Plenipotentiaire de Sa Majeste I'Empereur des Fran9ais pres les 
Cours de Parme et de Toscane, en date du 30 Juin dernier, par 



Adherences to the Declaration of Paris 375 

laquelle le Gouvernement de Parme a re9u du Gouvernement 
Fran9ais communication de la Declaration sign^e par les Pl^ni- 
potentiaires r^unis au Congr^s de Paris, le 16 Avril, 1856, ayant 
pour objet de faire reconnaitre des principes determines de 
droit maritime en temps de guerre, et pour I'inviter a adherer 
a ladite Declaration. 

Le Gouvernement de Son Altesse Royale est trop dispose a 
applaudir et a s'associer a tout ce qui peut faciliter aux peuples 
le progres dans les voies de la civilisation pour ne pas accueillir 
une telle invitation. 

C'est pourquoi le Soussigne se felicite de pouvoir declarer, 
d'apres les ordres re9us de Madame la Duchesse-Regente des 
Etats de Parme, au nom du Due Robert I, que Son Altesse 
donne son enti^re adhesion aux quatre principes enonces dans 
la Declaration du 16 Avril, 1856, des Plenipotentiaires au 
Congres de Paris, ainsi conyus : 

1°. La course est et demeure aboUe ; 

2°. Le pavilion neutre couvre la marchandise ennemie, a 
I'exception de la contrebande de guerre ; 

3°. La marchandise neutre, a I'exception de la contrebande 
de guerre, n'est pas saisissable sous le pavilion ennemi ; 

4°. Les blocus, pour etre obligatoires, doivent etre effectifs, 
c'est-^-dire maintenus par une force suffisante pour interdire 
reellement I'acces du littoral de I'ennemi. — ^Le Soussigne, &c. 

Pallavicini. 

PERU. 

LE MINISTRE RESIDENT DU PfiROU A PARIS AU MUSTISTRE 
DES AFFAIRES fiTRANGfiRES DE L'EMPEREUR. 

^ Paris, le 23 Novembre, 1857. 

M. LE COMTE, 

Son Excellence D. D. Manuel Ortiz de Zeballos, Ministre des 
Relations Exterieures du Perou, m'annonce, par le dernier 
courrier, que la Convention nationale et le Gouvernement 
Supreme ont adopte avec plaisir les principes reconnus comme 
base du droit maritime par le Congres de la Paix, dans sa De- 
claration faite a Paris, le 16 Avril, 1856. 

Ces principes sont : 

1°. La course est et demeure abolie ; 

2°. Le pavilion neutre couvre la marchandise ennemie, a 
I'exception de la contrebande de guerre ; 

3°. La marchandise neutre, a I'exception de la contrebande 
de guerre, n'est pas saisissable sous pavilion ennemie ; 

4°. Les blocus, pour etre obhgatoires, doivent etre effectifs, 



376 The Declaration of Paris 

c'est-a-dire maintenus par une force suffisante pour interdire 
reellement I'acc^s du littoral de I'ennemi. 

J'ai I'honneur, en portant ces faits a la connaissance de 
votre Excellence, selon I'ordre que j'en ai re9u de mon Gouverne- 
ment, de la prier de vouloir bien me permettre de saisir cette 
occasion, &c. 

Luiz Mesones. 

PORTUGAL. 

LE MINISTRE DES AFFAIRES ^TRANGfiRES DE 
PORTUGAL AU MINISTRE DE FRANCE. 

(Traduction) Palais, le 28 Juillet, 1856. 

Excellence, 

Par ordre de son Gouvernement, votre Excellence a ete 
chargee, de concert avec les autres Representants des Puissances 
signataires du Traite de Paix du 30 Mars de cette annee, d'inviter 
le Gouvernement de Sa Majesty a adherer a la Declaration du 
16 Avril dernier, signee par les Plenipotentiaires qui ont pris 
part au Congres de Paris et contenant les quatre principes 
suivants de droit maritime, a savoir : 

1°. La course est €t demeure abolie ; 

2°. Le pavilion neutre couvre la marchandise ennemie, a 
I'exception de la contrebande de guerre ; 

3°. La marchandise neutre, a I'exception de la contrebande 
de guerre, n'est pas saisissable sous pavilion ennemi ; 

4°. Les blocus, pour etre obligatoires, doivent etre effectifs, 
c'est-a-dire maintenus par une force suffisante pour interdire 
reellement I'acces du littoral de I'ennemi. 

Sa Majeste, a qui j'ai rendu compte, conme c'etait mon 
devoir, de la susdite invitation, appreciant pleinement les 
grands avantages qui doivent resulter, pour les interets generaux 
du commerce et de la navigation, de I'adoption des quatre 
principes etablis, m'a ordonne de demander imm^diatement 
aux Cortes I'autorisation necessaire, qu'elles ont accord^e par 
la loi du 25 courant. J'ai alors re9u de Sa Majesty I'ordre de 
repondre a votre Excellence que son Gouvernement adhere 
avec plaisir, pleinement et enti^rement, a la susdite Declaration, 
d'autant plus que les principes enonces dans les Articles II., III. 
et IV. sont les memes que ceux que le Portugal a deja admis, 
en 1782, dans un Trait6 avec la Russie, et recemment dans le 
Traite de Commerce et de Navigation qu'il a conclu avec la 
Confederation Argentine. 

D'autre part, Sa Majeste a daign^ m'autoriser a declarer a 



Adherences to the Declaration of Paris 377 

votre Excellence, que le Gouvernement Portugais adhere egale- 
ment au principe enonce dans I'Article VIII. du Traite de Paris, 
et auquel se rapporte le Protocole XXIII. du 14 Avril dernier, 
portant que : " Les Etats entre lesquels s'el^verait un dis- 
sentiment s^rieux, avant d'en appeler aux armes, auraient 
recours, en tant que les circonstances I'admettraient, aux bons 
offices d'une tierce Puissance," sans toutefois que cette adhesion 
de la part du Gouvernement du Roi affecte en rien son inde- 
pendance et sa liberte d'action. 

Je prie votre Excellence de vouloir bien porter la presente 
declaration a la haute connaissance de Sa Majeste I'Empereur 
des Fran9ais, et je profite, &c. 

Marquis de Loule. 



LE MINISTRE DES AFFAIRES fiTRANGfiRES DE 
PORTUGAL AU MINISTRE DE FRANCE. 

(Traduction) Palais, le 28 Juillet, 1856. 

Excellence, 

Pour satisfaire aux desirs que votre Excellence m'a exprimes 
par ordre de son Gouvernement, en ce qui concerne la restriction 
contenue dans le Protocole XXIV. du 16 Avril, 1856, j'ai 
I'honneur de I'informer que les termes dans lesquels le Gouverne- 
ment de Sa Majeste a cru devoir donner son adhesion a la 
Declaration du 16 de ce mois, ne pouvant etre que ceux qu'ont 
autoris^s les Cortes et qui sont identiques aux termes adoptes 
par les Gouvernements de Belgique et de Su^de, le Gouverne- 
ment Portugais se trouve, par consequent, en ce qui concerne 
ladite restriction, dans le meme cas que ces deux nations et 
que les autres qui auraient adhere ou qui viendraient a le faire 
dans des termes semblables a ceux de la Declaration dont il 
est question. — Je profite, &c. 

Marquis de Loule. 



SAXE-ALTENBURG. 

LE MINISTRE DES AFFAIRES fiTRANGfiRES DE SAXE- 
ALTENBOURG AU MINISTRE DE FRANCE. 

Altenbourg, le 9 Juin, 1856. 
Le Soussigne a eu I'honneur de recevoir la note de Son Ex- 
cellence M. le Vicomte des M61oizes, Ministre de France, du 5 
Mai dernier, avec les copies des depeches de son Excellence 
M. le Comte Walewski, Ministre des Affaires Etrang^res de 



378 The Declaration of Paris 

France, et n'a pas manqu^ de prendre les ordres de Son Altesse 
Royale le Due, son auguste Souverain, qui I'a charge de faire 
a son Excellence la presente communication : 

Le Gouvernement du Due reconnait parfaitement la justesse 
du voeu des Puissances representees au Congres de Paris, qui 
a ete exprime dans le Protocole No. XXIII., de la seance du 14 
Avril dernier, savoir ; " que les Etats entre lesquels s'eleverait 
un dissentiment serieux, avant d'en appeler aux armes, eussent 
recours, en tant que les circonstances I'admettraient, aux bons 
offices d'une Puissance amie." Le Gouvernement du Due 
hesite d'autant moins a s'associer a ce principe, que celui-ci 
ne porte aucun prejudice ni a la souverainet^ des Etats in- 
dividuels, ni aux relations et aux devoirs particuliers reposant 
sur la solidarite des Etats AUemands. 

Les principes concernant le commerce maritime en temps 
de guerre, sur lesquels le Congres de paix est tombe d'accord, 
et qui se trouvent poses et resolus dans la Declaration du 16 
Avril, 1856, n'ont pu que faire eprouver au Gouvernement du 
Due la plus grande satisfaction, de sorte qu'il ne tarde point 
a repondre a I'invitation qu'il a re9ue et a acceder a ladite 
Declaration dans toute sa teneur. 

Le Soussigne prie Son Excellence de vouloir bien porter les 
declarations ci-dessus a la connaissance de son Gouvernement, 
et profite de cette occasion, &c. Larisch. 



SAXE-COBURG-GOTHA. 

LE MINISTRE DES AFFAIRES fiXRANGfiRES DE SAXE- 
COBOURG-GOTHA AU MINISTRE DE FRANCE. 

Gotha, le 22 Juin, 1856. 

M. LE ViCOMTE, 

En vous accusant la reception de vos lettres du 20 Mai 
avec les annexes relatives aux principes adoptes par les Pl^ni- 
potentiaires signataires du Traits de Paris du 30 Mars, sur les 
droits des pays neutres, en temps de guerre, et le recours a 
prendre aux bons offices d'une Puissance amie, avant d'en 
appeler aux armes, j'ai I'honneur de remercier votre Excellence 
de cette communication. En meme temps je me felicite de 
pouvoir vous assurer que le Gouvernement du Duch^ de Co- 
bourg-Gotha, en tous points d'accord avec les sentiments du 
Congres, y accede pleinement, sauf les engagements qu'il a pris 
envers la Confederation Germanique. — Veuillez, &c. 

Seebach. 



Adherences to the Declaration of Paris 379 

SAXE- WEIMAR. 

LE MINISTRE DES AFFAIRES fiTRANGfiRES DE SAXE- 
WEIMAR AU MINISTRE DE FRANCE. 

T.^ ^, Weimar, le 22 Juin, 1856. 

M. LE ViCOMTE, 

Apr^s mon retour de la campagne, on m*a fait part de deux 
offices du 20 Mai, par lesquels votre Excellence, au nom du 
Gouvernement Imperial, a bien voulu inviter la Cour Grand- 
Ducale a acceder a la pensde de haute mediation internationale 
introduite dans TArticle VIII. du Traite du 30 Mars et aux 
principes proclames par la Declaration du 16 Avril concernant 
le commerce maritime en temps de guerre. 

Je me suis hate de transmettre ces communications interes- 
santes a Monseigneur le Grand-Due, mon auguste Maitre, et 
Son Altesse Royale, convaincue des effets bienfaisants de 
pareils principes adoptes au concert des Etats Europeens, m'a 
charge d'exprimer ses remerciments de la communication susdite 
et de declarer a votre Excellence qu'elle accedait aux principes 
en question d'autant plus sans aucune hesitation, que Son 
Altesse Royale a appris qu'on ne pent pas douter que la meme 
accession aura lieu de la part de la Confederation Germanique. 

En priant votre Excellence de bien vouloir faire part de 
cette declaration au Gouvernement Imperial, je profite de 
cette occasion, &c. Watzdorf. 

SAXONY. 

LE MINISTRE DES AFFAIRES fiTRANGfiRES DE SAXE 
AU MINISTRE DE FRANCE. 

_ Dresde, le 16 Juin, 1856. 

M. LE Baron, 

C'est avec un vif interet que le Gouvernement de Saxe a 
re^u la communication que vous avez ete charge de lui faire de 
la Declaration arretee, le 16 Avril dernier, entre les Puissances 
reunies au Congr^s de Paris, pour poser les bases d'un nouveau 
droit maritime en temps de guerre, et qui est con§ue en ces 
termes : — 

1°. La course est et demeure abolie ; 

2°. La pavilion neutre couvre la marchandise ennemie, a 
r exception de la contrebande de guerre ; 

3°. La marchandise neutre, a I'exception de la contrebande 
de guerre, n'est pas saisissable sous pavilion ennemi ; 

4°. Les blocus, pour etre obligatoires, doivent etre effectifs, 
c'est-a-dire maintenus par une force suffisante pour interdire 
reellement I'acces du littoral de I'ennemi. 



380 The Declaration of Paris 

Le Gouvernement de Sa Majeste I'Empereur des Frangais, 
en nous donnant connaissance de cet accord, ayant bien voulu 
y joindre I'invitation d'y acceder, je m'empresse, d'apres les 
ordres de Sa Majeste le Roi, mon auguste Souverain, de con- 
stater ici : 

L'adhesion pleine et entiere du Royaume de Saxe a la De- 
claration mentionnee ci-dessus et aux principes qu'elle renferme, 
comme etablissant entre les neutres et les belligerants un droit 
international qui ne saurait avoir que de bien salutaires effets ; 

Ainsi que I'intention de n'entrer, a I'avenir, sur I'application 
du droit des neutres en temps de guerre, en aucun engagement 
qui ne repose a la fois sur les quatre principes objets de ladite 
Declaration. 

En vous priant, M. le Baron, de bien vouloir porter cet 
acte d'adhesion a la connaissance de votre Gouvernement, je 
saisis, &c. Beust. 

SPAIN. 

EXCHANGE OF NOTES BETWEEN THE BRITISH AND FRENCH 
GOVERNMENTS RESPECTING THE ACCESSION OF SPAIN 
ON JANUARY 18, 1908, TO THE DECLARATION RESPECT- 
ING MARITIME LAW SIGNED AT PARIS, APRIL 16, 1856. 

The French Ambassador to Sir Edward Grey. 

Ambassade de France, 
Londres, le 15 fevrier, 1908. 
M. LE Secretaire d'IStat, 

L'Ambassadeur d'Espagne a Paris vient de notifier a M. le 
Ministre des Affaires ifitrangeres que son Gouvernement adherait 
a la Declaration du 16 avril, 1856, sur le droit maritime. 

Je suis charge de transmettre a votre Excellence une copie 
de I'Acte par lequel le Gouvernement de la republique a 
accepte I'accession de I'Espagne, tant en son nom qu'en celui 
des Puissances signataires de la Declaration precitee. — Veuillez 
agreer, &c. Paul Cambon. 

(Inclosure.) 

AcTE d'Acceptation d'Accession. 

Sa Majeste le Roi d'Espagne ayant accede a la Declaration 
sign6e le 16 avril, 1856, au Congres de Paris, pour regler divers 
points de droit maritime, par I'Acte d'Accession d^livre par 
son Ambassadeur extraordinaire et Plenipotentiaire a Paris, 
son Excellence M. de Leon y Castillo, Marquis del Munis, Acte 
d'Accession dont la teneur suit : — 



Adherences to the Declaration of Paris 881 

Le soussign6 Ambassadeur extraordinaire et P16nipoten- 
tiaire de Sa Majesty le Roi d'Espagne pr6s le President de la 
R^publique franyaise, a I'honneur de faire savoir a M. S. Pichon, 
s6nateur, Ministre des Affaires !fitrang^res de la Republique 
fran9aise, que le Gouvernement espagnol, appr^ciant la haute 
justice des principes proclames dans la Declaration, dressee 
le 16 avril, 1856, par le Congr^s de Paris, donne son adhesion 
entidre et definitive aux quatre clauses contenues dans cette 
Declaration, et s'engage a s'y conformer exactement. 
Paris, le 18 Janvier, 1908. 

(L.S.) F. DE Le6n y Castillo. 

Nous, Ministre des Affaires ^fitrangeres de la Republique 
fran9aise, dument autorise a cet effet, acceptons formellement 
ladite accession, tant au nom du Gouvernement de la republique 
qu'au nom des Hautes Puissance signataires de la Declaration 
du 16 avril, 1856. 

En foi de quoi nous avons signe le present Acte d' Accepta- 
tion d' Accession et y avons fait apposer notre cachet. 

Fait a Paris, le 18 Janvier, 1908. (L.S.) S. Pichon. 

Sir Edward Grey to the French Ambassador. 

,^ ^ Foreign Office, February 18, 1908. 

Your Excellency, & .w » ;? > 

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your note 
of the 15th instant, in which you inform me of the accession 
of Spain to the Declaration respecting maritime law, signed 
at Paris on the 16th April, 1856, and inclose a copy of the Act 
by which the Government of the French Republic has accepted 
such accession. 

In thanking your Excellency for this communication, of 
which I have taken due note, I have, &c. E. Grey. 



SWEDEN AND NORWAY. 

LE MINISTRE DES AFFAIRES fiTRANGfiRES DE SUfiDE 
ET DE NORVfiGE AU MINISTRE DE FRANCE. 

,, Stockholm, le 13 Juin, 1856. 

Monsieur, ' 

Par votre office du 27 du mois passe, vous m'avez fait 
I'honneur de me communiquer, d'ordre de votre Cour, la De- 
claration que MM. les Pienipotentiaires au Congr^s de Paris 
ont adoptee, le 16 Avril dernier, ayant pour but d'etablir une 
doctrine uniforme sur le droit maritime en temps de guerre, 



382 The Declaration of Paris 

Declaration qui a et^ portee k la connaissance des Etats non 
repr^sent^s au Congr^s, avec I'invitation d'y acc^der. 

Cette Declaration porte, 

1°. Que la course est et demeure abolie ; 

2°. Que le pavilion neutre couvre la marchandise ennemie, 
k I'exception de la contrebande de guerre ; 

3°. Que la marchandise neutre, a I'exception de la contre- 
bande de guerre, n'est pas saisissable sous pavilion ennemi ; 

Et 4°. Que les blocus, pour etre obligatoires, doivent etre 
effectifs, c'est-a-dire, maintenus par une force suffisante pour 
faire interdire reellement I'acces du littoral de I'ennemi. 

Les principes enonces dans les Articles II. et III. de la sus- 
dite Declaration, par I'adoption desquels I'application du droit 
maritime se trouverait fixee pour I'avenir, ayant de tout temps 
ete reconnus et defendus par la Su^de, qui, dans mainte occa- 
sion, s'est efforcee a les faire triompher, le Gouvernement de Sa 
Majeste le Roi de Suede et de Norwege ne saurait hesiter a en 
reconnaitre la justice et I'utilite. II s'estime done heureux d'y 
adherer et de declarer en meme temps qu'appreciant les raisons 
p6remptoires qui ont motive I'adoption des premier et quatrieme 
points de la Declaration susmentionnee, il les accepte egale- 
ment et sans restriction quelconque, en reconnaissant I'indi- 
visibilite des principes qui s'y trouvent consignes. 

En exprimant toute la satisfaction qu'eprouve le Roi mon 
auguste Souverain de voir ainsi reglee, par un acte solennel 
qui exercera une si grande influence sur I'avenir du commerce 
Europeen, une question mena9ante pour ses interets les plus 
chers, je vous prie. Monsieur, de vouloir bien porter a la con- 
naissance de votre auguste Cour la pr^sente declaration et 
d'agreer, &c. Stierneld. 



On the 16th November 1905, after the separation of Norway 
from Sweden, the following official statement was made with 
regard to the treaty obligations of the two Powers under 
existing Treaties : — 

... Si ces Conventions et Arrangements pouvaient 
etre jusqu'ici consid^res comme entrainant pour la Norv^ge 
et pour la Su^de une responsabilite commune vis a vis des 
obligations qui en r^sultent pour chacun d'entre eux, le 
Gouvernement Norvegien se tient done des a present 
responsable seulement des obligations des dits Conventions 
et Arrangements communs qui concernent la Norvege. 
II en est de meme r^lativement aux Conventions Interna- 
tionales auxquellcs la Norvege et la Suede ont adhere 
en commun. 



Adherences to the Declaration of Paris 883 

SWISS CONFEDERATION. 

LE CONSEIL FfiDfiRAL SUISSE AU MINISTRE DE FRANCE. 

Berne, le 28 Juillet, 1858. 

Son Excellence M. le Ministre de France a bien voulu com- 
muniquer, au nom du Gouvernement de Sa Majeste I'Empereur, 
k M. le President de la Confederation, une Declaration en quatre 
articles emanant des Hautes Puissances representees au Congr^s 
de la Paix a Paris, sur les principes du droit maritime a observer 
dorenavant en temps de guerre, le 16 Avril dernier, en invitant 
en meme temps la Confederation Suisse a adherer a cette 
declaration. 

Le Conseil Federal a voue une serieuse attention a cette 
ouverture et, aimant a reconnaitre dans les bases de cette 
Declaration un progr^s important dans les voies de Thumanite 
et de la civilisation, ainsi que les grands avantages qui en re- 
sulteront pour le commerce et la navigation en temps de guerre, 
il n'a pu hesiter a y donner suite. A cet effet, il a soumis cette 
affaire avec recommandation a I'Assembiee Federale Suisse, et 
I'adhesion de la Confederation Suisse a la susdite Declaration 
a ete prononcee par decret du yi du mois courant. 

En ayant I'honneur d'adresser ci-incluse a Son Excellence une 
expedition vidimee de ceNdecret, rendu par la Haute Assembiee 
Federale, le Conseil Federal prie M. le Comte de Salignac- 
Feneion de bien vouloir le faire parvenir au Haut Gouvernement 
Fran9ais, et saisit, &c. — Au nom du Conseil Federal Suisse, 

Le President de la Confederation, Staempfli. 
Le Chancelier de la Confederation, Schiess. 

ARRETS FfiDfiRAL CONCERNANT L'ADH]eSION DE LA SUISSE 
AU DROIT MARITIME EN TEMPS DE GUERRE. 

Berne, le IQ Juillet, 1856. 

L'Assembiee Federale de la Confederation Suisse, conside- 
rant les grands avantages resultant de la Declaration collective 
arretee dans le Congres de Paris, sur le droit maritime pour 
la navigation et le commerce en temps de guerre ; 

Vu la proposition du Conseil Federal, 

Arrete : 

La Confederation Suisse adhere a la Declaration des Puis- 
sances representees au Congres de Paris, sur le droit maritime 
en temps de guerre, du 16 Avril, 1856. 



884 The Declaration of Paris 

Ainsi arrets par le Conseil des Etats Suisses. 
Berne, le 11 Juillet, 1856. 

Au nom du Conseil des Etats Suisses. 
Le Secretaire, J. Kern Germann. Le President, F. Dubs. 

Ainsi arrets par le Conseil National Suisse. 

Au nom du Conseil National Suisse. 

Berne, le 28 Juillet, 1856. 
Le Secretaire, Schiess. Le President, Jules Martin. 

L'exp^dition conforme k I'original. 

Le Chancelier de la Confederation, Schiess. 



TUSCANY. 

LE MINISTRE DES APFAIRES jfiTRANGfiRES DE TOSCANE 
AU MINISTRE DE FRANCE. 

Florence, le 5 Juin, 1856. 
MoN Prince, 

La communication que Votre Excellence m'a fait I'honneur 
de m'adresser, le 30 du mois passe, a I'^gard des nouveaux 
principes de droit maritime proclames par le Congr^s de Paris, 
a tout de suite occup^ la plus s^rieuse attention de la part du 
Gouvernement Grand-Ducal. 

Ces principes constituent un progres de civilisation trop 
notable et sont dictes par un esprit trop genereux d'humanite 
et de tolerance, pour que leur Declaration ne soit pas accueillie 
par le monde entier avec la plus vive reconnaissance. 

La Toscane, appelee par le Gouvernement de Sa Majesty 
I'Empereur des Frangais, aussi bien que par ceux de Sa Majesty 
la Reine de la Grande-Bretagne et de Sa Majest6 Imperiale et 
Royale Apostolique, a s'associer a cette Declaration et a donner 
son adhesion aux principes qui en forment le sujet, a de tout 
temps profess6 des sentiments si conformes a ceux qui ont 
anim6 les magnanimes resolutions du Congres de Paris, elle a 
toujours, et d'une mani^re tellement constante, regie sa con- 
duite sur ces nobles maximes, que sa reponse ne saurait etre 
douteuse. 

Consequemment, mon Prince, ayant invoque les ordres de 
mon auguste Souverain, j'ai I'honneur de vous signifier que le 
Gouvernement Grand-Ducal adhere purement, simplement et 
indivisiblement, aux quatre points de droit maritime r^solus 
par le Congres de Paris dans sa seance du 8 Avril de cette ann^e ; 
qu'il les regardera, a I'avenir, comme faisant partie de son droit 
international, et s'engage a n'entrer avec qui que ce soit en 



Adherences to the Declaration of Paris 385 

aucun arrangement sur I'application du droit maritime en 
temps de guerre, sans stipuler leur fiddle observation. 

Je suis bien aise d'avoir k constater une pareille conformity 
de vues entre le Gouvernement de Son Altesse Imp^riale et 
Royale le Grand-Due mon Maitre et celui de Sa Majesty 
I'Empereur des Fran9ais, et je saisis cette occasion pour avoir 
I'honneur de r^iterer k Votre Excellence les temoignages de 
ma haute consideration. Baldasseroni. 



THE TWO SICILIES. 

LE MINISTRE DES AFFAIRES fiTRANGfiRES DES DEUX 
SICILES AU MINISTRE DE FRANCE. 

Naples, le 31 Mai, 1856. 
(Traduction) 

Le Soussigne, charge du Portefeuille du Ministere des Affaires 
Etrang^res, a regu la note que son Excellence M. le Baron 
Brenier, Envoye Extraordinaire et Ministre Plenipotentiaire de 
Sa Majeste I'Empereur des Fran^ais lui a fait I'honneur de lui 
adresser, en date du 25 du mois passe, pour inviter le Gouverne- 
ment de Sa Majeste Sicilienne a adherer aux principes contenus 
dans la Declaration adoptee par les Plenipotentiaires reunis au 
Congres de Paris, relativement au commerce et a la navigation 
des neutres en temps de guerre. 

Le Soussign6 se fait un plaisir de faire connaitre a son Ex- 
cellence que le Gouvernement du Roi accueille bien volontiers 
I'invitation du Gouvernement Imperial de se conformer aux 
susdites maximes adoptees par la France et par les autres Puis- 
sances qui ont pris part aux Conferences de Paris, maximes 
propres a maintenir la r^ciprocite de leurs bonnes relations 
Internationales, d'autant plus que ce sont celles qui, depuis 
un temps eloigne, sont professees par le Gouvernement royal 
lui-meme. 

Le Soussigne ne doit pas cependant negliger, dans cette 
circonstance, de manifester combien a ete agreable la convic- 
tion exprimee par son Excellence dans la susdite note, que le 
Gouvernement Royal ne ferait pas de difficulte d'adopter des 
principes inspires par la plus sage politique et par la vraie 
civilisation, et a I'occasion desquels le Gouvernement du Roi 
se plait a declarer qu'une semblable proposition est, par sa 
nature, de celles qui ont tou jours trouve en France le plus fort 
appui, et dont le resultat est a I'honneur du Gouvernement 
Imperial. — Le Soussigne, &c. Carafa. 

25 



386 The Declaration of Paris 

URUGUAY. 

[See Count Walewski's Report to the Emperor, p. 348.] 

WURTEMBERG. 

LE MINISTRE DES AFFAIRES fiTRANGfiRES DE WURTEMBERG 
AU MINISTRE DE WURTEMBERG A PARIS. 

Stuttgard, le 25 Juin, 1856. 
M. LE Baron, 

J'ai I'honneur de vous informer qu'une communication m'a 
ete faite par les Ministres d'Autriche, de Prusse, de Russie, de 
France et d'Angleterre, accredites pres cette cour, ayant pour 
objet de me faire savoir que les Plenipotentiaires assembles au 
Congres de Paris ont pris une decision relative a plusieurs ques- 
tions du droit maritime, jusqu'^ present douteuses, decision qui 
a ete immediatement adopt6e, comme regie invariable, par les 
Puissances representees au Congres. En meme temps, lesdits 
Ministres m'ont remis une copie de I'acte r^dige sous forme de 
Declaration solennelle, dans lequel les Plenipotentiaires ont 
enonce les considerations qui ont servi de base a cet arrangement, 
ainsi que les principes qui ont ^te etablis en consequence, en 
exprimant le d^sir de voir le Gouvernement du Roi donner 
son adhesion aux principes du droit des gens consacr^s par 
cette Declaration. 

En vous transmettant une copie de la declaration dont il 
s'agit, j'ai I'honneur de vous informer que le Gouvernement du 
Roi approuve completement les considerations sur lesquelles 
repose I'arrangement en question, attendu qu'il lui parait non- 
seulement desirable, mais meme indispensable, d'apr^s I'^tat 
actuel des relations internationales, de r^soudre, autant que 
possible, tous les doutes qui ont subsiste jusqu'a present a 
I'egard d'une partie aussi essentielle du droit des gens, et de 
prevenir d^sormais des conflits qui peuvent resulter de I'in- 
certitude sur des principes legaux. Le Gouvernement du Roi 
reconnait egalement que les principes etablis dans la Declara- 
tion dont il s'agit r^pondent au but qui vient d'etre indiqu6 ; 
et il ne pent qu'applaudir au progr^s notable que ces principes 
consacrent dans la voie d'un d^veloppement du droit des gens 
g^n^ral, conforme aux id^es et aux besoins de notre epoque. 

Je vous prie, en consequence, M. le Baron, de vouloir bien, 
en donnant lecture de la presente depeche au Ministre des 
Affaires Etrang^res de Sa Majeste I'Empereur des Fran9ais, 



Adherences to the Declaration of Paris 387 

M. le Comte Walewski, et, en lui en laissant une copie, notifier 
en meme temps k son Excellence que le Gouvernement de Sa 
Majeste le Roi, notre auguste Maitre, accede completement et 
sans restriction aux quatre principes relatifs au futur droit 
maritime en temps de guerre, qui sent ^tablis dans la Declara- 
tion susmentionnee. 

Vous voudrez bien en meme temps exprimer a M. le Comte 
Walewski que le Gouvernement du Roi a vu, par la depeche 
adressee par son Excellence a M. le Marquis de Ferri^re, et dont 
celui-ci m'a laisse une copie, que la conclusion de cet arrangement, 
qui est d'un si haut int^ret pour les relations commerciales 
internationales, lesquelles ont acquis de nos jours une si grande 
importance, doit etre attribuee principalement aux efforts du 
Cabinet Fran9ais, qui s'est acquis ainsi un nouveau titre aux 
sentiments de reconnaissance du Gouvernement du Roi. 

En attendant I'avis de la prompte execution du mandat qui 
vous est confie, je saisis cette occasion, &c. 

HUGEL. 



Adherences to the Mediation Proposal ^ included in the Declaration 
[contained in 2Srd Protocol of April 14.] 

Anhalt Dessau Coethen. Modena. 

Argentine Confederation. Nassau. 

Baden. New Grenada. 

Brazil. . Oldenburg^ 

Bremen." Parma. 

Chili. Portugal. 

Denmark. Saxe-Altenburg. 

Frankfort. Saxe-Coburg-Gotha. 

Germanic Confederation. Saxe-Meiningen. 

Greece. Saxe-Weimar. 

Hamburgh. Saxony. 

Hanover. Two Sicilies. 

Hesse-Cassel. Sweden and Norway. 

Hesse-Darmstadt. Tuscany. 

Lubeck. Wurtemberg. 
Mecklenburg- Schwerin. 

^ Hertslet, Map of Europe by Treaty, vol. ii. p. 1284. 



388 The declaration of Paris 

20 

Indirect Adherences to the Declaration of Paris. 

A.— GUATEMALA. 

[By Treaty with Italy, I868.1] 

Art. XII. As a complement of the principles of maritime 
law established by the declaration of the Congress of Paris 
on the 16th April 1856, which are accepted without reservation 
by the two parties in their mutual relations, the two Powers 
agree that, in case of the misfortune of a war between them, 
private property of any kind belonging to citizens of one shall 
be respected by the other, the same as property of neutrals, 
and this both at sea and on land, on the high seas as well as 
in the territorial seas, and in any other place whatever, and 
under whatsoever flag the vessels and the goods are navigating, 
without any other restrictions than the case of breaking blockade 
and the case of contraband of war. 

Nevertheless, the right is maintained of preventing during 
the war all trade and communication between all or any parts 
of the shores of their own territory and merchant ships navi- 
gating under a hostile flag, as well as of applying confiscation 
and other penalties to the transgressors of the interdiction, pro- 
vided that the prohibition and the penalty be determined by a 
suitable manifesto previously published. 

B.— HONDURAS. 

[By Treaty with Italy, I868.2] 

XII. As a complement to the principles of maritime law 
established by the Declaration of the Congress of Paris on 
the 16th of April 1856, which are accepted without reservation 
by the two parties in their mutual relations, the two Powers 
agree that, in ease of the misfortune of a war between them, 
private property of any kind belonging to citizens of one shall 
be respected by the other, the same as property of neutrals, 

^ State Papers, vol. Ix. p. 769. * Ibid., vol. Ixi. p. 1049. 



Indirect Adherences to the Declaration of Paris 389 

and this both at sea and on land, on the high seas as well as the 
territorial seas, and in any other place whatever, and under 
whatsoever flag the vessels and the goods are navigating, without 
any other restrictions than the case of breaking blockade and 
the case of contraband of war. 

Nevertheless, the right is maintained of preventing during 
the war all trade and communication between all or any parts 
of the shores of their own territory and merchant ships navi- 
gating under a hostile flag, as well as of applying confiscation 
and other penalties to the transgressors of the interdiction, 
provided that the prohibition and the penalty be determined 
by a suitable manifesto previously published. 

XIII. The blockade to be obligatory must be effective and 
declared. 

The blockade shall not be considered effective unless it be 
maintained by forces sufficient for the real prevention of any 
access to the coasts or the ports blockaded. 



C— MEXICO. 

[By Treaty with Italy, 1870.i] 

XX. The contracting States, if either of them should be 
at war with another country, will recognise and observe the 
principle that the neutral flag covers the enemy's merchandize, 
that is, that the effects or goods belong to citizens of a country 
at war are exempt from capture and from confiscation when 
found on board neutral vessels, with the exception, however, 
of contraband of war, and that the property of neutrals found 
on board a vessel belonging to the enemy shall not be liable to 
capture and confiscation, unless it be contraband of war. 

XXII. If one of the contracting States should be at war 
with a third Power the citizens of the other may continue their 
navigation and trade with the belligerents, saving contraband 
of war, and excepting those places which may be blockaded 
or besieged by sea or by land. 

D.— PERU. 

[By Treaty with France, I86I.2] 

XIX. Les deux Hautes Parties Contractantes adoptent 
dans leurs relations mutuelles les 4 principes de droit maritime 

1 State Papers, vol. Ix. p. 1016. 2 jjj^^ ^qI^ ^j, p. 122. 



890 The Declaration of Paris 

proclames dans la declaration de 16 Avril, 1856, par les Pleni- 
potentiaires de rAutriche, de la France, de la Grande-Bretagne, 
de la Prusse, de la Russie, de la Sardaigne, et de la Turquie, 
reunis au Congres de Paris, et reconnus 6galement par le 
Gouvernement du Perou, aux terms de la resolution legislative 
du 3 Octobre, 1857,^ savoir : 

1°. La course est et demeure abolie ; 

2°. Le pavilion neutre couvre la propriete ennemie, a I'excep- 

tion de la contrebande de guerre ; 
3"^. La propriete neutre, a I'exception de la contrebande 

de guerre, n'est pas sujete a confiscation sous pavilion 

ennemi ; 
4°. Les blocus, pour etre obligatoires, doivent etre effectifs, 

c'est-a-dire maintenus par une force suffisante, capable 

d'interdire reellement tout acces a la cote de rennemi. 

XX. Comme consequence des principes qui precedent les 
deux Hautes Parties Contractantes convicnnent les points 
suivant : 

1. Les na vires de celui des deux Etats qui demeurera neutre 

pourront naviguer librement d'un port ou d'un territoire 
neutre a un autre neutre, d'un port ou d'un territoire 
neutre a un autre ennemi, et d'un port ou territoire 
ennemi a un autre egalement ennemi, a I'exception, bien 
entendu, des endroits ou des ports en etat de blocus, 
et, dans tous les cas, la marchandise charg^e a bord 
de ces navires, quel qu'en soit le proprietaire, sera libre, 
a I'exception, de la contrebande de guerre. Sera egale- 
ment libre tout individu embarque a bord du batiment 
neutre, lors meme qu'il serait sujet ou citoyen de I'Etat 
ennemi, pourvu qu'il ne soit pas actuellement au service 
de I'ennemi ou en destination pour y entrer. 

2. Les proprietes et les sujets ou citoyens de celle des deux 

Parties Contractantes qui demeurera neutre, tandis que 
I'autre sera engagee dans une guerre seront a I'abri de 
toute confiscation et arrestation, meme a bord d'un 
navire ennemi, a moins qu'il ne s'agisse de contrebande 
de guerre ou de contrebande de guerre ou de personnes 
actuellement au service de I'ennemi ou a destination 
pour y entrer. 



^ See Adherence of Peru, p. 375. 



Indirect Adherences to the Declaration of Paris 391 

E.— SALVADOR. 

[By Treaty with France, 1858.i] 

XIX. Les deux Hautes Parties Contractantes adoptent dans 
leurs relations mutuelles les principes suivants : 

1°, La course est et demeure abolie ; 

2°. Le pavilion neutre couvre la marchandise ennemie, a 

I'exception de la contrebande de guerre ; 
3°. La marchandise neutre, a I'exception de la contrebande 

de guerre, n'est pas saisissable sous pavilion ennemi ; 
4°. Les blocus, pour etre obligatoires, doivent etre effectifs, 

c'est-a-dire maintenus par une force suffisante pour 

interdire r^ellement I'acc^s du territoire de I'ennemi. 

II est d'ailleurs convenu que la liberty du pavilion assure 
aussi celle des personnes, et que les individus appartenant k 
une Puissance ennemie qui seraient trouves a bord d'un bati- 
ment neutre ne pourront pas etre faits prisonniers k moins 
qu'ils ne soient militaires et pour le moment engages au 
service de I'ennemi. 

Les deux Hautes Parties Contractantes n'appliqueront ces 
principes, en ce qui concerne les autres Puissances, qu'a celles 
qui les reconnaitront ^galement. 

[By Treaty with Italy, 1860.2] 

XIX. Les deux Hautes Parties Contractantes adoptent dans 
leurs relations mutuelles les principes suivants : 

1°. La course est et demeure abolie, 

2°. Le pavilion neutre couvre la marchandise ennemie a I'ex- 
ception de la contrebande de guerre. 

3°. La marchandise neutre a I'exception de la contrebande 
de guerre n'est pas saisissable sous pavilion ennemi. 

4°. Les blocus, pour etre obligatoires, doivent etre effectifs, 
c'est-a-dire maintenus par une force suffisante pour 
interdire r6ellement I'acc^s du littoral de I'ennemi. 

II reste en outre convenu que la liberte du pavilion garantit 
aussi celles des personnes et que les individus appartenant a 
une Puissance ennemie qui seraient rencontres a bord d'un 
batiment neutre, ne pourront etre faits prisonnier, a moins 
que ce ne soient des militaires et qu'ils ne soient en ce moment 

1 State Papers, vol. 1. p. 389. ^ 75^4^,^ vol. Ixi. p. 1037. 



392 The Declaration of Paris 

au service de I'ennemi. Les deux Hautes Parties Contractantes 
n'appliqueront ces principes qu'aux Puissances qui les re- 
connaissent egalement. 

F.— SANDWICH ISLANDS. 

[By Treaty with Italy, 1863.i] 

ADDITIONAL ARTICLE TO THE TREATY OF COMMERCE AND 
NAVIGATION, JULY 22, 1863. 

The two High Contracting Parties, moreover, agree that 
they will conform to the principles sanctioned by the Congress 
of Paris, and enunciated in the Declaration of April 16, 1856, 
relative to privateering, the rights of neutrals, and blockade, 
in the following terms, that is : — 

"1. Privateering is and remains abolished. 

"2. The neutral flag covers the merchandise of the enemy, 
with the exception of contraband of war. 

" 3. Neutral merchandise, excepting contraband of war, can- 
not be sequestrated under hostile flag. 

" 4. Blockades, to be obligatory, must be effective ; that is, 
maintained by a sufficient force really to prevent access 
to the shores of the enemy." 

G.— SIAM. 

[By Treaty with Italy, I868.2] 

XVI. The High Contracting Parties, recognizing the prin- 
ciples of maritime law established by the Paris Congress of 
1856, agree that if a war should take place between them, 
private property, of whatever kind, belonging to citizens of 
the one, shall be respected by the other, in the same manner 
as the property of neutrals. This shall be observed on land, 
at sea, on the high seas, in the territorial waters, and every- 
where else, and whatever may be the flag under which the 
vessels navigate or the goods are carried, without any limita- 
tions, except the case of breaking blockade and the case of 
contraband of war. 

The right is maintained, however, of preventing, during 
the war, all commerce and communications between all or any 
points of the coast of their own territory, and merchant ships 
under hostile flags, and also to visit transgressors of the pro- 

1 State Papers, vol. Ix. p. 404. * ma., vol. Ix. p. 777. 



Second Marcy Note, 1856 393 

hibition with confiscation and other penalties, provided the 
prohibition and the penalties be made known by a suitable 
manifesto published previously. 

XVII. If Siam should be at war with another nation, this 
circumstance shall not cause any impediment to the free trade 
of Italy with Siam or with the hostile nation. 

Italian ships may always, save in the case of effective 
blockade, proceed from the ports of one to the ports of the 
other belligerent nation, transact the usual business there, and 
import or export all kinds of goods not prohibited. 



21 

Second Marcy Note, 1856. 

Mr Marcy to Count Sartiges. 

Department of State, Washington 
July 28, 1856. 

The Undersigned, Secretary of State of the United States, has 
laid before the President " The Declaration concerning Maritime 
Law," adopted by the Plenipotentiaries of Great Britain, Austria, 
France, Prussia, Russia, Sardinia, and Turkey, at Paris, on 
the 16th of April 1856, which the Count de Sartiges, Envoy 
Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of France, has 
presented on behalf of the Emperor of the French to the 
Government of the United States, for the purpose of obtaining 
its adhesion to the principles therein contained. 

Nearly two years since the President submitted, not only 
to the Powers represented in the late Congress at Paris, but to 
all other maritime nations, the second and third propositions 
contained in that Declaration, and asked their assent to them 
as permanent principles of international law. The propositions 
thus submitted by the President were : — 

"1. That free ships make free goods — that is to say, that 
the effects or goods belonging to subjects or citizens of a Power 
or State at war are free from capture and confiscation when 
found on board of neutral vessels, with the exception of articles 
contraband of war. 

" 2. That the property of neutrals on board an enemy's 



394 The Declaration of Paris 

vessel is not subject to confiscation unless the same be 
contraband of war." 

It will be perceived that these propositions are substantially 
the same as the second and third in the Declaration of the 
Congress at Paris. 

Four of the Governments with which negotiations were 
opened on the subject by the United States have signified their 
acceptance of the foregoing propositions.^ Others were inclined 
to defer acting on them until the return of peace should furnish 
a more auspicious time for considering such international 
questions. The proceeding of the Congress of the Plenipo- 
tentiaries at Paris will, as a necessary consequence, defeat the 
pending negotiations with the United States, if the two following 
propositions, contained in Protocol No. 24, are acceded to : — 
1st, that the four principles shall be indivisible ; and 2nd, that 
the Powers which have signed or may accede to the Declaration 
shall not enter into any arrangement in regard to the application 
of the right of neutrals in time of war which does not at the 
same time rest on the four principles v/hich are the object 
of said Declaration. As the indivisibility of the four principles, 
and the limitation upon the sovereign attribute of negotiating 
with other Powers, are not a part of the Declaration, any nation 
is at liberty to reject either, or both, and to act upon the 
Declaration without restriction, acceding to it in whole or 
in part. In deliberating on this important subject, it behoves 
all Powers to consider, and, if they think proper, to act 
upon this distinction. All the Powers which may accede 
to that Declaration, and the subsequent restrictions contained 
in the 24th Protocol, will assume an obligation which takes from 
them the liberty of assenting to the propositions submitted to 
them by the United States, unless they at the same time 
surrender a principle of maritime law which has never been 
contested — the right to employ privateers in time of war. 

The second and third principles set forth in the Declaration, 
being those submitted to other maritime Powers for adoption 
by this Government, it is most anxious to see incorporated, by 
general consent, into the code of maritime law, and thus placed 
beyond future controversy or question. Such a result, securing 
so many advantages to the commerce of neutral nations, might 
have been reasonably expected, but for the proceedings of the 
Congress at Paris, which require them to be purchased by a too 
costly sacrifice — the surrender of a right which may well be con- 
sidered as essential to the freedom of the seas. 

^ For the treaties with three of these Governments, see Group 16, 
p. 331 ; see also p. 148. It is uncertain which is the fovirth Government. 



Second Marcy Note, 1856 395 

The fourth principle contained in the Declaration, namely, 
" Blockades, in order to be binding, must be effective ; that 
is to say, maintained by a force sufficient really to prevent 
access to the coast of the enemy," can hardly be regarded as 
one falling within that class with which it was the object of the 
Congress to interfere ; for this rule has not, for a long time, 
been regarded as uncertain, or the cause of any " deplorable 
disputes." If there have been any disputes in regard to 
blockades, the uncertainty was about the facts, but not the 
law. Those nations which have resorted to what are properly 
denominated " paper blockades " have rarely, if ever, under- 
taken afterwards to justify their conduct upon principle, but 
have generally admitted the illegality of the practice, and 
indemnified the injured parties. What is to be judged " a force 
sufficient really to prevent access to the coast of the enemy," 
has often been a severely contested question ; and certainly the 
Declaration, which merely reiterates a general undisputed maxim 
of maritime law, does nothing towards relieving the subject 
of blockade from that embarrassment. What force is requisite 
to constitute an effective blockade remains as unsettled and as 
questionable as it was before the Congress at Paris adopted 
the Declaration. 

In regard to the right to employ privateers, which is declared 
to be abolished by the first principle put forth in the Declara- 
tion, there was, if possible, less uncertainty. The right to 
resort to privateers is as clear as the right to use public armed 
ships, and as incontestable as any other right appertaining to 
belligerents. The policy of that law has been occasionally 
questioned, not, however, by the best authorities ; but the 
law itself has been universally admitted, and most nations 
have not hesitated to avail themselves of it ; it is as well sus- 
tained by practice and public opinion as any other to be found 
in the Maritime Code. 

There is scarcely any rule of international law which particular 
nations in their Treaties have not occasionally suspended or 
modified in regard to its application to themselves. Two 
Treaties only can be found in which the Contracting Parties 
have agreed to abstain from the employment of privateers 
in case of war between them. The first was a Treaty between 
the King of Sweden and the States-General of the United 
Provinces, in 1675. Shortly after it was concluded the parties 
were involved in war, and the stipulation concerning privateers 
was entirely disregarded by both. The second was the Treaty 
of 1785, between the United States and the King of Prussia. 
When this Treaty was renewed in 1799, the clause stipulating 



396 The Declaration of Paris 

not to resort to privateering was omitted. For the last half 
century there has been no arrangement, by Treaty or otherwise, 
to abolish the right, until the recent proceedings of the 
Plenipotentiaries at Paris. 

By taking the subject of privateering into consideration, 
that Congress has gone beyond its professed object, which was, 
as it declared, to remove the uncertainty on points of maritime 
law, and thereby prevent " diiferences of opinion between 
neutrals and belligerents, and consequently serious difficulties 
and even conflicts." So far as the principle in regard to 
privateering is concerned, the proceedings of the Congress are 
in the nature of an act of legislation, and seek to change a 
well-settled principle of international law. 

The interest of commerce is deeply concerned in the estab- 
lishment of the two principles which the United States had 
submitted to all maritime Powers ; and it is much to be 
regretted that the Powers represented in the Congress at Paris, 
fully approving them, should have endangered their adoption 
by uniting them to another inadmissible principle, and making 
the failure of all the necessary consequence of the rejection 
of any one. To three of the four principles contained in the 
Declaration there would not probably be a serious objection 
from any quarter, but to the other a vigorous resistance must 
have been anticipated. 

The policy of the law which allows a resort to privateers 
has been questioned for reasons which do not command the 
assent of this Government. Without entering into a full dis- 
cussion on this point, the Undersigned will confront the ordinary 
and chief objection to that policy, by an authority which will 
be regarded with profound respect, particularly in France. 
In a commentary on the French Ordonnance of 1681, Valin 
says : — 

" However lawful and time-honoured this mode of warfare 
may be, it is, nevertheless, disapproved of by some pretended 
philosophers. According to their notions, such is not the way 
in which the State and the Sovereign are to be served : whilst 
the profits which individuals may derive from the pursuit are 
illicit, or at least disgraceful. But this is the language of bad 
citizens, who, under the stately mask of a spurious wisdom, 
and of a crafty, sensitive conscience, seek to mislead the judg- 
ment by a concealment of the secret motive which gives birth 
to their indifference for the welfare and advantage of the State. 
Such as are worthy of blame as are those entitled to praise 
who generously expose their property and their lives to the 
dangers of privateering." 



Second Marcy Note, 1856 397 

In a work of much repute published in France almost 
simultaneously with the proceedings of the Congress at Paris, 
it is declared that — " The issuing of letters of marque, therefore, 
is a constantly customary belligerent act. Privateers are bond- 
fide war-vessels, manned by volunteers, to whom, by way of 
reward, the Sovereign resigns such prizes as they make, in the 
same manner as he sometimes assigns to the land forces a 
portion of the war contributions levied on the conquered 
enemy " (Pistoye et Duverdy, Des Prises Maritimes). 

It is not denied that annoyances to neutral commerce, and 
even abuses, have occasionally resulted from the practice of 
privateering ; such was the case formerly more than in recent 
times : but when it is a question of changing a law, the inci- 
dental evils are to be considered in connexion with its benefits 
and advantages. If these benefits and advantages can be 
obtained in any other way, without injury to other rights, 
these occasional abuses may then justify the change, however 
ancient or firmly established may be the law. 

** The reasons which induced the Congress of Paris to declare 
privateering abolished are not stated, but they are presumed 
to be only such as are usually urged against the exercise of 
that belligerent right. 

The prevalence of Christianity and the progress of civilization 
have greatly mitigated the severity of the ancient mode of 
prosecuting hostilities. War is now an affair of Governments. 
"It is the public authority which makes and carries on war ; 
individuals are not permitted to take part in it, unless authorized 
to do so by their Government." It is a generally received rule 
of modern warfare, so far at least as operations upon land 
are concerned, that the persons and effects of non-combatants 
are to be respected. The wanton pillage or uncompensated 
appropriation of individual property by an army, even in 
possession of an enemy's country, is against the usage of modern 
times. Such a mode of proceeding at this day would be con- 
demned by the enlightened judgment of the world, unless 
warranted by special circumstances. Every consideration which 
upholds this sentiment in regard to the conduct of a war on 
land favours the application of the same rule to the persons and 
property of citizens of the belligerents found upon the ocean. 

It is fair to presume that the strong desire to ameliorate 
the severe usages of war by exempting private property upon 
the ocean from hostile seizure, to the extent it is usually 
exempted on land, was the chief inducement, which led to 
" the declaration " by the Congress at Paris, that " privateering 
is and remains abolished." 



398 The Declaration of Paris 

The Undersigned is directed by the President to say, that 
to this principle of exempting private property upon the ocean, 
as well as upon the land, applied without restriction, he yields 
a most ready and willing assent. The Undersigned cannot 
better express the President's views upon the subject than by 
quoting the language of his annual Message to Congress, of 
December 4, 1854 : — 

" The proposition to enter into engagements to forego a 
resort to privateers, in case this country should be forced into a 
war with a great naval Power, is not entitled to more favourable 
consideration than would be a proposition to agree not to accept 
the services of volunteers for operations on land. When the 
honour or rights of our country require it to assume a hostile 
attitude, it confidently relies upon the patriotism of its citizens, 
not ordinarily devoted to the military profession, to augment 
the army and navy, so as to make them fully adequate to the 
emergency which calls them into action. The proposal to 
surrender the right to employ privateers is professedly founded 
upon the principle that private property of unoffending non- 
combatants, though enemies, should be exempt from the ravages 
of war ; but the proposed surrender goes but little way in 
carrying out that principle, which equally requires that such 
private property should not be seized or molested by national 
ships of war. Should the leading Powers of Europe concur 
in proposing, as a rule of international law, to exempt private 
property, upon the ocean, from seizure by public armed cruizers 
as well as by privateers, the United States will readily meet 
them upon that broad ground." 

The reasons in favour of the doctrine that private property 
should be exempted from seizure in the operations of war are 
considered in this enlightened age so controlling as to have 
secured its partial adoption by all civilized nations ; but it 
would be difficult to find any substantial reasons for the dis- 
tinction now recognized in its application to such property on 
land, and not to that which is found upon the ocean. 

If it be the object of the Declaration adopted at Paris to 
abolish this distinction, and to give the same security from the 
ravages of war to the property of belligerent subjects on the 
ocean as is now accorded to such property on the land, the 
Congress at Paris has fallen short of the proposed result, by 
not placing individual effects of belligerents beyond the reach 
of public armed ships as well as privateers. If such property 
is to remain exposed to seizure by ships belonging to the navy 
of the adverse party, it is extremely difficult to perceive why it 
should not, in like manner, be exposed to seizure by privateers, 



Second Marcy Note, 1856 899 

which are, in fact, but another branch of the pubHc force of the 
nation commissioning them. 

If the principle of capturing private property on the ocean 
and condemning it as prize of war be given up, that property 
would, and of right ought to be, as secure from molestation 
by public armed vessels as by privateers ; but if that principle 
be adhered to, it would be worse than useless to attempt to 
confine the exercise of the right of capture to any particular 
description of the public force of the belligerents. There is no 
sound principle by which such a distinction can be sustained ; 
no capacity which could trace a definite line of separation pro- 
posed to be made ; and no proper tribunal to which a disputed 
question on that subject could be referred for adjustment. 
The pretence that the distinction may be supported upon the 
ground that ships not belonging permanently to a regular navy 
are more likely to disregard the rights of neutrals than those 
which do belong to such a navy is not well sustained by modern 
experience. If it be urged that a participation in the prizes 
is calculated to stimulate cupidity, that, as a peculiar objection, 
is removed by the fact that the same passion is addressed by 
the distribution of prize-money among the officers and crews 
of ships of a regular navy. Every nation which authorizes 
privateers is as responsible for their conduct as it is for that 
of its navy, and will, as a matter of prudence, take proper 
precaution and security against abuses. 

But if such a distinction were to be attempted, it would 
be very difficult, if not impracticable, to define the particular 
class of the public maritime force which should be regarded 
as privateers. " Deplorable disputes," more in number and 
more difficult of adjustment, would arise from an attempt to 
discriminate between privateers and public armed ships. 

If such a discrimination were attempted, every nation would 
have an undoubted right to declare what vessels should consti- 
tute its navy, and what should be requisite to give them the 
character of public armed ships. These are matters which could 
not be safely or prudently left to the determination or super- 
vision of any foreign Power, yet the decision of such contro- 
versies would naturally fall into the hands of predominant 
naval Powers, which would have the ability to enforce their 
judgments. It cannot be offensive to urge weaker Powers to 
avoid as far as possible such an arbitrament, and to maintain 
with firmness every existing barrier against encroachments 
from such a quarter. 

No nation which has a due sense of self-respect will allow 
any other, belligerent or neutral, to determine the character 



400 The Declaration of Paris 

of the force which it may deem proper to use in prosecuting 
hostilities ; nor will it act wisely if it voluntarily surrenders 
the right to resort to any means, sanctioned by international 
law, which, under any circumstances, may be advantageously 
used for defence or aggression. 

The United States consider powerful navies and large stand- 
ing armies, as permanent establishments, to be detrimental to 
national prosperity and dangerous to civil liberty. The expense 
of keeping them up is burdensome to the people ; they are, 
in the opinion of this Government, in some degree a menace 
to peace among nations. A large force, ever ready to be 
devoted to the purposes of war, is a temptation to rush into 
it. The policy of the United States has ever been, and never 
more than now, adverse to such establishments ; and they can 
never be brought to acquiesce in any change in international 
law which may render it necessary for them to maintain a 
powerful navy or large regular army in time of peace. If forced' 
to vindicate their rights by arms, they are content, in the 
present aspect of international relations, to rely, in military 
operations on land, mainly upon volunteer troops, and for the 
protection of their commerce in no inconsiderable degree 
upon their mercantile marine. If this country were deprived of 
these resources, it would be obliged to change its policy, and 
assume a military attitude before the world. In resisting an 
attempt to change the existing maritime law that may produce 
such a result, it looks beyond its own interest, and embraces 
in its view the interest of all such nations as are not likely to 
be dominant naval Powers. Their situation in this respect is 
similar to that of the United States, and to them the protection 
of commerce, and the maintenance of international relations 
of peace, appeal as strongly as to this country, to withstand 
the proposed change in the settled Law of Nations. To such 
nations, the surrender of the right to resort to privateers would 
be attended with consequences most adverse to their com- 
mercial prosperity, without any compensatin