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W. F. P. NAPIER, Lkut.-Geneml 




Pbeliuinary Notice and Summary. 


Sir C. Napier appointed Indian Commander-in-Chief. Hostile feeling of 
Directors. Interview with the Duke of Wellington. With Lord John 
Russell. Refuses to go out, if not of the Supreme Council. Lieutenant 
Wood. Hostility. Sir Charles assumes command in India. Lord 
Dalhousie's first speech. 


Mutinous spirit among the Sepoys. Reduction of their pay. Soldiers not 
Automatons. Mutiny the greatest danger in the East. Mutiny at 
Rawul Pindee, Passive mutiny analyzed. Hostile population. European 
troops scattered. Dost Mohamed. Sikh soldiers. Vellore Mutiny. 
Instructions to Sir Colin Campbell. Unusual correspondence of Sepoys. 
Lord Dalhousie goes to sea. View of the Crisis. Instructions to Sir 
W. Gilbert. Mutinous spirit abates at Rawul Pindee. Clearness of 
Sir C. Napier's instructions. Insubordination at Delhi. Goorkas. 
Brahmins. Caste prejudices. Goorkas starving. Are promised line 


Journey of Inspection. Memoir on Defence of India begun. Mutinous 
spirit reappears. Delhi. Public Works. Camp Equipage. British 
power not dependant on canvass palaces. Eulogiuni of Mr. 
Thomason and Mr. Edwards. The 41st Native Infentry insub- 
ordinate. Sepoy furloughs withheld. The 41st submissive. Meemt. 



Military prisons. Evils of transxiortation. Mngnzines, ofiimls, anil 
niilitiiry prisons, lliinhvar, Ganges Canal. Laliore. Memoir com- 
pleted. Beasous for transmitting it to Lord Dalliousie, wlio takes 
ofTeuce. Not entitled to do so. Not on Eastern despot. 


Peshawur frontier disturbed. Letter on Lahore defences. Extravagant plan 
of Governing Board. Wall pulled down by Government. Eastern 
fortifications not despicable. Herbert Edwardes at Mooltan. English 
tliree years at Lahore witliout i)olicc. Scinde police organised in a 
month. Lord Ellenborougb's administration. Govindghur. Umritzer. 
Sealkote. Wuzzeerabad. Engineer Maxwell. Military Board. Parlia- 
n)eut involved. Lord Dalhousie's ignorance of soldiers. 


Afutiny at Wuzzeerabad. Sepoys sentenced to transportation. Sentence 
revised. Condenmed capitally. Sentence commuted. Reasons for 
treating each case as isolated. Lord Dalhousie's absurd reasoning and 
false conclusion. Sikh Punehayets. Murder of Sikh Rulers. First 
Punjaub war caused by Punehayets. Sepoys likely to adopt them. 
Brahmin's regard for oaths. Sepoys' connections with Sikh soldiers. 
Jhelum. Rawul Piudee. Attok. Peshawur. Lord Dalhousie's false 
reasoning. Site of Alexander's battle with Poms. Poet Moore. 


Rawul Pindee. Mutiny smouldering. Sepoys correspondence. Sir C. 
Napier refuses to open their letters. Boundary of India. Fourteen 
soldiers assassinated by AflFreedees. Affreedee Chief's statement. Leaders 
of the Assassuis demanded. Friendly tribes made enemies by civil 
misgovemment. Same man should have civil and military authority. 
Affreedee war unjust and impolitic. Probable result Sir C. Napier's 
government compared with Lord Dalhousie's. Measures which should 
have been adopted. Lord Dalhousie's wars. Attempts to suppress 
Sir C. Napier's dispatch. Notes and letter on the Government of Scinde. 


Reasons for going to Kohat. Review of Irregular regiments. Punjaub Board 
of Administration, its dangerous folly. Sunnnary of grounds for the 



Kolmt expedition. Baggage. Interview witli Afl'reedce Chiefs. Skirmish. 
Villages buniciL Sir C. Napier's indignation. Coke's Irregulars. Pass 
forced. Works not executed because Sir C. Napier was designer. Punjaub 
Board of acbuinistration. Mrs. George Lawrence. Death of young 
Sitwell. Feint to deceive Affreedees. Return through the Pass. 
Skirmish. Grand attitude and death of an Affreedee Chief. Jezails and 
Muskets. British bayonet charge. Futtch Mahomet. His exploits 
and honours. Lesson in skirmishing. Pass twice forced. Runject 
Sing lost 1000 men attempting some operation. General order. 
Extracts from Journal. False military notions. Lord DaUiousie's bad 
policy. Affreedees will be avenged. Lord Ellenborough and Lord 
Dalliousie. Difference of the Scinde and Punjaub frontier wars. 
Political agents. Letter from Lieut.-Col. Lawrence, and observations. 
Coke's and Daly's Irregulars. 


Kohat expedition offspring of a bad system. Governor-General heedless 
of ad\-ice. Letter to him. Regular troops tax-gatherers. War with 
tribes provoked. Two combats. Enemies uicrease. Men of Swat; 
doubtful if invaders or invaded. Bradshaw's operations. Governor- 
General should say where to stop. War does not brook delay. Calcutta 
remote for reference. Eusofzye country, danger of warring there. 
Phamuches. Akbar lost two Ai-mies in the mountains ; British one. 
Tribes not conquered. Sir Colin Campbell. Lord Dalhousic's war not 
termuiated. Sir C. Napier falsely accused of burning villages. Out- 
rages perpetrated in Colonel Bradshaw's expedition by politicals. 
That officer's vindication. Done by politicals. Burning villages cruel 
and foolish, approved by Lord Dalliousie. Dispatch and several letters 
on the Kohat expedition. Affreedees should be paid not warred uijon. 
Lord Dalliousie ignores Sir C. Najjier's services. Comments. Letter 
from Sir Colin Campbell. Sir C. Napier urges the danger and expense, 
of frontier warfare. Expedition to destroy the Affreedees' crops 
useless and exasperating. Plans for retention of Kohat Pass. f!(Ith 
regiment mutinies. Colonel Bradford. Captain McDonald, (idlh dis- 
banded. Goorka battalion substituted. Bradford. McDonald. Troup. 
European and Native officers. Lord Dalhousic's neglect of promise to 
Goorkas. Summary of facts. 


Commander-in-Chief's office not to be retained with honour. Suspension 
of pay-regulation at Wuzzecrabad. Censured by Supreme Council. 


Anulysiis of tluit censure. Corri'siwiuleiico. Pesliawiir Boi'iticks. Irre- 
giilai' 001^)8. Kuliiit furt. Seulkote. Meeiiu Meer. Kuropenus crowded 
lit Liibore. Kepriiniuul from Govcnior-Geuenil. Observations tbereou. 
Sir C. Nniner resigns. Oflieiul instructions witli observations. Lord 
Dolhousie's political ignorance. To proclaim sovereignty is not to 
conquci'. Instructions to General Campbell. Frontier not defined. 
Ollicial letter to Lord Dalbousic. Private ditto. False position of 
Comnuindcr-in-Cbief. Sir U. Napier vindicates bis conduct. Analyses. 
Lord Dalliousie's tirst minute. Brief Keview of Lord Dalbousie's 


Gimt and camel. Lieutenant Herbert Edwordes — Lis oamel — Lord Dalhuasie 
swallows it. Sir C. Napier — his gnat — Lord Dalhousio chokes upon it ; 
Scale for measuring Lord Dalhousie. Correspondence. 


TAET 11. 


Subject. Lord Dalhousie's jealousy. Personally to be desplsetl. Effect on 
public welfare. Kurrachee and Hyderabad barracks. Bombay barracks. 
Aden barracks. Waste of human life. 6cindo barracks. Lord Ellen- 
borough and Lord Dalhousie. Men die of red tape. Lahore barracks. 
Sir C. Napier's pliui of construction. Military Board plan. Sufferings 
of '2nd Bengal Europeans. Of Queen's 29th, 22nd, and GOth regiments. 
Sabathoo, Kassowlie, and Dugshai rendered healthy. Allahabad, Lahore, 
Sealkote. At Peshawur officers' barracks refused by the Directors. Bad 
results. Barracks there make no progress. Mortality. Military Board's 
interference. 50th regiment crushed by fall of barracks. MDitary Board 
and Directors responsible. Engineer system shall be changed. Feeling 
of British soldiers in India. Punkas. Parsimony of Directors. 
Hyderabad barracks. Sir C. Napier's efforts to preserve soldiers' health 
frustrated by Government. Kurrachee, its coming importance. 



To be placed under one Chief. Parties concerned in soldiers' supplies. 
Soldiers rarely complaui of their food. Courts of inquii-y. Commanding 
olficers. CJuarler-masters. Commissaries, their ways unknown. Con- 
tractors study Solomon's proverb. Jotee Persaud. System of military 
Board. Injurious to public service and private character. Delay of 
Audits. Commissary-General. Contractors driven to fraud by military 


Civil interference with inilitary matters. Commanders-in-Chief at Inuiie and 
in India. Iwiur wars uncxpcetcilly announced by massacres and lialllos. 
I'lceariouh position of Commanders in Chief in India. I'olilicals. Phar- 


iiuclies. McNaug}itcn. Sir F. Currie, Example of civil interference 
with military atliiirs. Never keep a dog and bark yourself. Sir C. 
Napier's dangerous position in India. Civil duties executed by soldiers 
injurious. Lord Dalhousie usiu^js military patronage. Offers respon- 
sibility. Lieut. Norman. Ensign Murray. Lord Dalliousie's shameful 
usage of Murray. Letter on civil duties. Sisyphus could not be zealous. 
Dispersion of Bengal Army. Cantonments. Civil magistrates. Natives 
hate English. Unfair duties imposed on Sepoys. Concentration of 
troops. Chupprasses and Birkendauses. Police battalions suppressed. 
Bombay and Bengal Armies compared. Sepoys good soldiers. Heavy 
duties. Treasure guards, Kaifir patrols. Libellous pamphlet signed 
a Bombay officer. Promotion by seniority. Lord Ilardinge's opinions. 
Geneml order. Officers should speak the language of their men. Cadets 
should do duty with Queen's regiments in England. Camps of instruc- 
tion. Augmentation of Company's Euorpean troops opposed. Goorkas. 
Soldiers overburthened with unnecessaries. 


Want of regimental senior officers. Guards. False system. Bad customs. 
Old officers respected. Young officers not so. Project for a new Staff. 
Europeans repel natives in Society. Eiu-opean officers. Sir Thomas 
Munro's opinion. European officers at Meeanee. Munro and others 
condemn the repulsion of natives. Furloughs. Munro's scale for 
Eiu-opean officers invalidated by modem changes. New military 
nomenclature censured. Fittest regiments. 45th stocking weavers. 
Flank companies. Insulting conduct to soldiers. Natives treated with 
immerited contumely. Eastern genius great. Native officers daring, 
able, ambitious and amiable. Native associations. People of India 
bullied by some civil servants. Such conduct condemned by Munro, 
Shore and others. Abolishing native officers likely to produce mutiny. 
Equality for natives. Danger best opposed by justice. Three measures 
of safety. Danger not avoided by concealment. Native Aides-de-Camps 
of Sir C. Napier's deprived of pay on his departure. Appointments 
without reference to military merit. 


Company's Artillery. Horse ArtUlery too numerous. Many officers too 
young for command. Connnander-in-Chief bound by red tape. Emula- 
tion of the three regiments in India. Different systems. Details. Folly 
of Military Board. Well horaed field batteries fast enough for warfare. 
Leather breeches. Directors' job. Indian Artillery (iliould form one 
body. Corrcbpoiideucc on removal of Bengal .iVitillery Head Quarters. 



Cavttlrj-. Value of diflereut horses. Sir W. Gilbert. Eutii-e horse unfit 
for war. Sad fate of a Sergeant. Opinions. Stud horses in Imlia 
worst. Carry Sir Private Patronage. Sir W. Gilbert's report Cape, 
Arab, Australian, and North-west country horses all superior to 
stud horses. Eurojiean trooper and Eastern horseman. Superiority 
of tiie latter not inherent. Light and Heavy Dragoons. English 
and Hungarian Hussai's. Valise. Militarj- dress shoidd be regula- 
ted by clmiate. Indian Cavalry should choose their own swords. 
Pistols. Carbines. Straight sword better than sabre. Marshal Saxe's 
opuiion. Steel and wooden scabbards. Eastern Cavalry. Captain 
Unett's fight. Native saddles. 


Infantry. Present and former dress of Sepoys. Musket too heavy. Rifles 
should be abolished. MLnie rifle not advantageous. Muskets reduced 
in weight. Drill diflicult hi Bengal. Goose step. Duke of York. 
Dundas. Sir John Moore's camp of instruction. His death and 


Scinde baggage corps. Disbanded from personal enmity. Fighting Camel 
Corps. Design and organisation. Good services. Bombay Government's 
attempt to abolisli it bafilecL 


Bombay Briberies. Lord Campbell's law. Lord Denman's opinion tliereon. 
Plain honest John Campbell on the hustings. On the Bench. Civil 
and military authorities at Bombay propose to aid a private company at 
the public expense; rejected by Lord Mehdlle. Messrs. Willougliby, 
Reid, Campbell, and Holland, involved in this baffled job. Questions on 
the subject. Persecution of Moonshee Ali Akbar. 


Origin and progress of prize monej-. Queen gi-ants prize money for Scinde. 
Directors attempt to defraud the troops. Not the first baseness. Offered 
Lord Wellesley .£.100,000 to connive at defrauding the Seringnpatam 
Army. Royal Government protects Scinde troops. Directors made 
tmsteea in place of Lord Ellenborough. Cheat the troops. Lord 
Campbell niles that the General of an Army is neither a soldier nor an 
officer of that Anny. Directors attempt to deprive Sir C. Napier of his 


fair sharo of booty. Appeal t« the Treasury. Directors quote false 
precedents. Foreed to produce true precedents, Mr. Pliilliniore's 
inenioriul. Decision against Directors. 


Sir II. Willock's letter to Mr. Turner. False claims of tlie Directors. 
Leadenhall documents and assertions not to be believed. Memoir 
exposing the Directors' misconduct. Sir C. Napier's commercial measures. 
Creek communication. Bombay Government, a sink of iniquity. Sup- 
presses Sir C. Napier's institutions and strives to destroy trade. Pro- 
pagates falsehoods with success for five years. Directors now forced to 
acknowledge the great value of Scinde. Mr. Frere's good government 
owing to the Bombay Council being purged of Reid, WUloughby, and 
Crawfurd — their vilcness. Public works required in Scinde. Sir Henry 
Willock's ignorance. Knows notliing of Russian and Chinese trafBo by 
Ladak. Oxus versus Indus. Russian goods cheaper at Peshawur than 
English goods. Czar wiser than Directors. Kiurrachee versus Calcutta. 
Soonomeeanee. Horse fair abolished by Directors. Sir C. Napier's 
vindication of his services and ajipeal to history. 



Letters from Lord EUenborough, Sergeant Casey, Rev. Edward Coleridge — Sir 
Robert Peel's opinion, and proceedings. Sir C. Napier's name glorious 
without a title. Memoir on the general defence of India. Lord 
Dalhousie's comments thereon, with replication. Extract of letter from 
Lieutenant Wood. Extract of letter from Lieutenant Herbert Edwardes. 
Brigadier Hearsey on civil interference. Extract from Parliamentary 
statistic papers on the profit from opium. 



As this work, though designed to expose promi- 
nent evils affecting the stability of our Eastern 
Empire, contains a vindication of my personal con- 
duct in resigning the chief military command — 
which cannot be consecutively made in the narra- 
tive — a previous brief view of that matter is here 
given, leaving the proofs for events as they arise. 

In 1849 a mutinous spirit pervaded some thirty 
Sepoy battalions, in march for, or actually in the 
Punjaub. Lord Dalhousie was then going to sea 
in search of health, and the Commander-in-Chief 
remained the man of highest power and respon- 
sibility in India; if danger arose, external or 
internal, he was to deal with it and answer for the 
public safety. Great danger did arise. The smoul- 
dering mutiny began to show itself openly at several 
places, notably with the Sepoys at AVuzzeerabad 
under Brigadier Ilearsey, and the Commander-in- 
Chief w^as to take care the public weal received 
no detriment. 

At this crisis, — Lord Dalhousie being on the 
B . 

Indian Ocean, a Government Order, — only locally 
applicable, — came accidentally into operation at 
AViizzcerabad ; it cancelled a former order of a 
like nature, touching the allowances to the Sepoys, 
and was disparaging to those soldiers. Brigadier 
Hearsey, thinking it would increase the discontent 
existing, wrote to his immediate superior. Sir 
AValter Gilbert, expressing fear of the result. 
Sir Walter, taking the same view, forwarded the 
letter to Colonel Grant, Adjutant-General, who 
laid the matter before me, urging the impropriety 
of the order originally, — and he was, eoc officio, 
intimately connected with and versed in the 
details of the Indian Army and all Government 
Orders affecting it. I concurred in his opinion 
and that of the other two distinguished officers of 
the Company's Service. The matter was critical ; 
the Governor-General was on the ocean ; the 
Supreme Council at Calcutta, fifteen hundred 
miles distant ; the Commander-in-Chief was on the 
spot, a member of the Supreme Council and espe- 
cially responsible for military order, — an isolated 
authority indeed, yet competent to deal with a great 
danger calling for immediate and decisive action. 

My first step was a reference to the instructions 
of the Duke of Wellington, where I found these 
words : — " On a station so distant, and of such 
" magnitude and j^olitical importance, you must 
" necessarilij act in a great measure from your own 
" discretion.'' Tliis was plain sense. Instruction 
which every commander of an army must have 
received since armies were first raised, and on 
Avhich every general must act whether so instructed 
or not. 

Now let my position be considered. 

Mutiny with the Sepoys is the most formidable 
danger menacing our Indian empire. Mutiny had 
appeared, the Governor-General had disappeared. 
The matter was urgent, the Supreme Council was 
fifteen hundred miles off, and no answer could 
be received from it under a month. The General 
of Brigade, the General of Division, and the 
Adjutant-General of the Company's Army were 
the three orthodox officers for the Commander-in- 
Chief to consult on details of their own service. 
They were distinguished men, experienced, and 
intimately acquainted with the Sepoys, amongst 
whom they had passed their lives ; their opinions, 
all in agreement, were before me, and concurred 
with my own. Wherefore, " acting on inj/ own 
" discretion,'' I suspended the Government Order. 
Mark ! it is of consequence : suspetided it as a 
dangerous measure, brought by accident partially 
into operation at a moment of great peril. But 
only until the Supreme Government should decide 
on the course to be pursued ; for the order of sus- 
pension was dated the 20tli of January 1850, and 
on the same day went my report stating facts and 
expressing confidence of Government support. 
What could 1 have done more ? How could I 
have done otherwise X 

To say this discretion was injudiciously exercised 
will not affect the question. That which T, and 
the three able officers spoken of, judged most 
fitting was done. We believed it to be within the 
competence of the Commander-in-Chief or the 
Adjutant-General would not have so advised, and 
had but the one object of preventing a spread 
of mutiny without the calamity of using force. 
Hence, the emergency being imminent, the discre- 

tion exercised was one of right in my position, 
and moreover actually enjoined by the Duke of 
Wclliniiton's instructions. To have shrunk from 
it would have been to show myself unworthy of 

For thus acting, in a mode imposed on me not 
only by the nature of the crisis and positive in- 
structions from home, but by Lord Dalhousie 
himself before he went to sea, — as shall be shown 
further on, — I was, by the same Lord Dalhousie, 
three months after the event, reprimcuulcd in the 
most offensive manner. I repeat, in the most 
offensive manner ; because a man, really designing 
to give support, would have written with his omii 
hand, or by his private secretary, not as he did, 
through the medium of officers under my 
command ! 

On receiving this insulting reprimand, which 
also forbade me to use my discretion on such matters 
" under any circumstances," in India, where 
the safety of the empire and the honour of the 
Army might call for instant decision, I decided 
to give up a command, which, from that moment, 
would have combined impotence with respon- 
sibility, and, so degraded, could only be held for 
the sake of lucre. Through the Duke of Wel- 
lington Her Majesty was graciously pleased to 
accede to my resignation and I returned to 

This is a succinct account of my sudden retire- 
ment, and those who only desire that explanation 
may shut the book ; but those who, taking an 
interest in the affairs of India and the public 
welfare, read on, will find proof that I acted with 
prudence and success; that Lord Dalhousie's 

conduct was unjustifiable ; that remote causes 
inflaenced him, and rendered my stay in India, 
while he was Governor-General, useless to the 
Army and dangerous to myself. With power to 
serve the public my office would have been 
retained ; but that no such power was mine, a 
narrative of events during the two years my 
command lasted will prove ; that is to say, two 
years' service, with great responsibility but no 
authority — furnishing a peg for the Governor- 
General to hang his own blunders upon. Sixteen 
thousand a year was my pay as a scape-goat, but 
reputation was dearer to me. 

Why I went to India a second time, not- 
withstanding much ill treatment before sustained 
in that country, and why I returned so sud- 
denly will be found in detail further on. But 
here it may be noted, that to resign before the 
expiration of the regular term was not peculiar 
to me. Lord Dalhousie's own father is said to 
have so done on the same ground ; and of thirteen 
Commanders-in-Chief within this century, five only 
have retained their posts the full term of five 
years. — one being Lord Hastings, who united the 
office with that of Governor-General. 


Appointed to the command of the Indian 
Armies against my own wish and my conviction of 
its inutility, I went expecting to find war. I found 
peace, and soon discovered that the absence of 
danger would excite and foster intrigues and secret 
hostility against one unfavourably regarded by the 
Court of Directors and the AYliig Government. 
Amongst those governing bodies might be some 
who placed confidence in me, but party feelings 
and private enmity were active before my depar- 
ture. No cause for this hostility, especially on the 
part of the Directors, was known to me, save my 
previous zealous obedience to Lord Ellenborough 
when he was Governor-General; for it would appear 
the Directors, and possibly the Whig Govern- 
ment, wished me, a Major-General, to disobey and 
thwart that nobleman. A person in office at the 
time, wrote to me with friendly warning, to forbear 
any public expression of admiration for Lord 
Ellenborough, as likely to be injurious to my 
own interests ! 

His Lordship was then to me unknown even by 
sight, but finding him just and wise, the warning 
received did not deter me from praising what 
appeared great and honourable in his conduct. 
Obedience was my duty, yet against a zealous 
performance of it I was warned as injurious to my 

7 [chap. I, 

oivti interests ! Always, however, a consideration 
for my own interest has led me to act honestly, and 
abide consequences. This obedience is the only 
traceable cause for the great hostility constantly 
evinced towards me — hostility which has not, how- 
ever, damaged me in public opinion ; on the con- 
trary, it damaged my enemies, and my honest 
conduct caused me to be sent out in despite of 
them as Commander-in-Chief, when those who 
basely vihfied Lord Ellenborough were, and are 
still, held in contempt both by the Queen's and 
Company's Armies in India. 

I have said the appointment was against my 
wish. When the Duke of Wellington first told 
me of it, I objected that my many enemies in 
India would mar its usefulness ; he laughed at 
that, pressed the matter home, and concluded thus : 
" //" t/ou don't ffo, I must.'' Still reluctant, from 
a firm conviction of the justice of my own view, 
I asked twenty-four hours for reflection. That 
was conceded, and finally a grateful sense of the 
public will prevailed. But scarcely was this 
arranged, when proof on proof arose that, with 
exception of Her Majesty, the Duke, the people 
of England, and the Armies of India, I was to expect 
from all other quarters that secret base hostility which 
is proverbially difficult for honourable men to repel. 

Amongst the indications leading to this conclu- 
sion was the following. Lord John Russell, at an 
interview, gave me to understand that doubts had 
arisen as to appointing me one of the Supreme 
Council, as all my predecessors had been. Ho 
intimated that the Directors were seeking for a 
precedent, and would probably find one for denying 
it to me. Lord John was explicitly and peremp- 

cHAr. I.] 8 

torily told on the instant, that I also would seek, 
and if I did not Jind would make a precedent, for 
to India I would not go unless as one of the 
Council. Six years I had served in the East with 
success as a military commander, and as a civil 
governor ; I had received the approbation of my 
Sovereign and the thanks of Parliament for victories 
which the public voice had applauded ; and I had 
been again called to command in the same country 
by that Sovereign and that public, and the expecta- 
tion of my submitting to such an insult from the 
Directors was preposterous. 

That a degraded command should have been 
offered or even discussed, showed that my measure 
of the Directors' temper was more exact than that 
taken by them of mine, when they thought I would 
ffo shorn of honour which others had received ; but 
another indication of hostility was soon furnished. 

Tlie strength of public feeling relative to the 
Indian command at this time must be remembered ; 
the victory of Goojerat was unknown, all persons 
connected with India were cast down in spirit, and 
a protracted warfare in the Punjaub was expected. 
That province is traversed by many rivers, five of 
which are large and dangerous for troops ; to pass 
them is difficult, especially in face of an enemy, and 
my business was to prepare in time for such opera- 
tions ; wherefore, having heard from Lord Ellen- 
borough that Lieutenant Wood of the Indian 
Navy, an officer well acquainted with those waters, 
was in London, I sought him out. He was a 
very intelligent man in the prime of life, knowing 
the rivers and speaking the languages of the 
tribes on their banks, and most anxious to go if 
he could be of service to the Company. My 

9 [chap. I. 

design was to enlist a body of English sailors at 
Calcutta, and so form a powerful bridge train, but 
I could get no definitive answer from the Directors. 
After I left London the Duke of Wellington, 
at my instance, also endeavoured to get Lieu- 
tenant Wood appointed, and was refused ! 

This was strong evidence of an inimical spirit 
working to the injury of the public at a critical 
moment, and where it was difficult to imagine the 
Court could have hesitated. Why were the services 
of Lieutenant Wood refused ! Was my application 
a job 1 That officer was to me unknown, save by 
Lord Ellenborough's recommendation and his own 
book ; he made no application to be employed ; he 
was sought out as a man who could do good service, 
and was ready to devote himself to the public. 
Here, then, at the outset, was not only a denial of 
just support, but opposition to evident public good, 
— opposition calculated to shake the confidence of 
any commander. Of what importance could it be 
to the Directors to prevent a Lieutenant of their 
Navy going to India, when his particular quahfica- 
tion made his presence there of vast importance in 
the opinion of the Indian Commander, and that 
of the Duke of Wellington \ My having asked for 
him ought alone to have been sufficient. It was so 
with the Duke, who applied for him and was 
earnest to assist me, yet could not succeed ! 

Pressed by the Government to hasten my depar- 
ture, I left England in the night of the 24th March, 
the anniversary of the victory at Hydrabad, reached 
Alexandria in fourteen days, embarked at Suez on 
the 11th of April, arrived at Calcutta the 6th 
May, and assumed the command of the vVrmies in 
India forty-three days after quitting London. 

CHAP. I.] 10 

At Simla, my first interview with Lord Dalhousie 
tended to confirm my suspicions that secret hostility 
was also at work in India. In ten minutes he told 
me in substance, nay, the words were, " that in 
" letters from England he had been warned against 
" my endeavouring to encroach upon his power, 
" and had answered, he would take damned good 
" care I should not." This was said in a half 
laughing manner, but the impression made by the 
letters was evident, although a little reflection might 
have convinced him that no Commander-in-Chief 
could desire to increase his own labour by usurping 
the powers of the Governor-General. Being 
resolved however, that nothing on my part should 
give strength to the erroneous ideas which had 
been so mischievously created in Lord Dalhousie's 
mind by others, I answered that he was quite 
right in his determination, but might believe 
there was no wish to infringe on his authority. 
It will appear in the sequel that this silly phantom 
of my ambition haunted him to the last ; yet our 
conversation was, on the whole satisfactory, and 
we went on well together at Simla. Since my 
resignation, it has been told me that certain persons 
about him tried, secretly, to excite his jealousy; 
this may or may not be, it was unkno'vvn to me at 
the time and I have never inquired who those 
gentlemen were. 


Less than a month after my arrival at Simla, a 
mutinous spirit arose among some of the Native 
regiments of the Bengal Army ; a matter which 
shall be here fully exposed, for on that question 
my command was resigned. 

Lord Dalhousie told me the Native regiments, 
while in the Punjaub, had received an additional 
pay from Government, because, after passing 
the frontier they were considered as on foreign 
service ; but when the Punjaub was annexed 
the Sepoys there had no more right to higher 
pay than the rest of the Army, and he had 
ordered their allowances to be reduced. This was 
just ; but it was reducing the pay of mercenaries, 
which is always a delicate affair and should be 
done with great caution through the Military 
Chiefs. It was not so done ; yet, in justice to Lord 
Dalhousie, it must be said that it was a matter of 
detail with which he was not acquainted, nor 
, aware of the danger it might create. It was the 
fault of those about him, he only acted in the 
ordinary undiscriminating official routine ; but the 
measure was executed in the same spirit, that is to 
say, without looking into cause and effect; for some 
men imagine they can deal with soldiers as so 
many automatons without the feeUngs or aspira- 
tions of other human beings. 

CHAP. II.] 12 

Official men often think that, to issue an order 
secures its execution. Lord Dalhousie, judging a 
reduction of the Sepoys' pay a proper measure, 
ordered it, and thought that sufficient to ensure 
quiet execution, lie was mistaken, and his error 
caused great danger to the State and ruin to many 
brave Sepoys ! He indeed, treated this mutiny 
amongst the native troops very lightly, after it had 
been supiyressed ; but he, and those who, like him 
have done so, know little of Indian interests. The 
ablest and most experienced civil and military 
servants of the East India Company consider 
mutiny as one of the greatest, if not the greatest 
danger threatening India, — a danger also that may 
come unexpectedly, and, if the first symptoms be 
not carefully treated, with a power to shake 
Leadenhall. Whether the mutiny in question was 
so treated will be seen in the following pages, in 
which its origin, progress and suppression, together 
with the conduct of Lord Dalhousie are exposed. 

Many military men, and others belonging to the 
Indian Civil Service, who remember what blood- 
shedding there was in former mutinies of far less 
formidable character, still survive, and will admit 
that this one was successfully dealt with ; for with- 
out sacrifice of life on the scaffold, or otherwise, 
Lord Dalhousie and India were extricated from a 
great peril, provoked by his inexperience in govern- 
ment and incapacity for dealing with armed men. 
That my duty was successfully done shall be 
maintained, yet without disputing the right of the 
Governor-General to reprimand the Commander- 
in-Chief: nevertheless, it is the ri(jht of the 
Commander-in-Chief to resign if the Governor- 
General, acting unjustly in addition to rebuke, 
deprives him of the power to execute the duties of 

13 [cHAr. II. 

his high office, especially when sent to India under 
circumstances so unusual. 

On the 19th of July, 1849, a letter received 
from Sir Colin Campbell, commanding the Station 
of Rawul Pindee, reported that : — " The 22nd 
" Native regiment of Infantry had refused to 
" receive the reduced j^di/ ordered hy the Governor- 
" General; and other Native regiments ivere equally 
" prepared to refuse their pay^ hut it had not been 
" offered because the Treasurer was short of money " 
Sir Colin had made an official report of this through 
the regular channel, but as the subject was of great 
importance, sent this private report direct that 
it miglit reach me in one, if not two, days sooner 
than it would through the head quarters of the 
division. This was a serious view to be taken 
by so able an officer, and very justly did he so 
regard the matter. 

The soldiers had displayed no violence towards 
their officers, they were outwardly respectful. To 
be sure they were. They knew what they were 
about. They knew passive resistance by many 
thousands of armed men would force the Govern- 
ment to compliance, without, as they thought, 
committing themselves, whereas open force would 
bring the European troops upon them. But let 
this passive respectful mutiny be traced to its 
natural result. Armed men refuse respectfully to 
receive the pay for which they had enlisted, insisting 
on a higher rate. The conduct of the Government 
is just, the demand of these men unjust. The 
Government refuses, and the passive respectful 
mutiny goes on. But the Sepoy has no capital ; 
he strikes for increase of wages ; and meanwhile 
has no means of living, save the old wages, which 
he peremptorily refuses to take. How long is this 

CHAP. II. J 14 

to last 1 A bazaar is in his camp, arms are in his 
hands, hunger presses. Let Government give way, 
and India goes ! But armed men will not starve, 
and the hitherto respectful Sepoy takes food by 
force, making his weapon his " bread earner." The 
European officer attempts to maintain discipline, 
and then the mutineers murder him ! Such is the 
analysis of passive or respectful mutinies, and 
assuredly that reported by Sir Colin Campbell was 
the first step towards open violent action, most 
dangerous in its nature. 

Mutiny among the Bengal Sepoys was not new 
to me; a few years before, the Bengal Sepoys had 
mutinied in Scinde ; but here we had to deal with 
men having a cause interesting every native soldier 
of whatever caste or condition, Jew or Gentoo, 
Christian or Heathen, for all understand the ad- 
vantage of higher pay ! In all mutinies, some men 
more daring than others are allowed to take the 
lead while the more wary prepare to profit when 
time suits ; a few men in a few corps, a few corps 
in an army begin ; if successful they are joined by 
their more calculating, and by their more timid 
comrades. So the mutiny at Rawul Pindee 
would have proceeded if not stifled early. But the 
danger on this occasion was not confined to the 
troops. The mutineers were in the midst of a 
warlike population ready to join them ; only five 
months had elapsed since the Sikhs had been de- 
feated; and there were other dangers. Our European 
regiments were scattered hundreds of miles asunder; 
single regiments in some places, in others only two 
together ; and if the Sikh population rose while the 
Sepoys were in mutiny the danger would have been 
of no ordinary kind. The Affghan people also 
were at hand, and at war with us ; we had driven 

15 [chap. II. 

Dost Mahomed across the Indus only a few months 
before, and he could have again taken the field. 
These things were to be considered, and supposing 
the worst to happen, what action was to be 
adopted ? INIy resolution was to remain quietly 
at Simla till the mutiny became more developed as 
to the number of regiments concerned, its influ- 
ence on the troops in the old provinces, and on 
the Sikhs also ; for their Army had, only a short 
time before mutinied in that very province, emptied 
the Khalsa treasury and overturned its Government. 
In the ranks of that Khalsa Army had been many 
Sepoys discharged from our forces, wdio were 
well known to, and even related to the mutinous men 
at Rawul Pindee; and who doubtless told their 
British friends how they had dictated to the Lahore 
Government the rate of pay, and what large do- 
nations they had extracted ; thus precept and ex- 
ample enhanced the danger. 

It was the time of raging heat, and I had 
scarcely recovered from the fatigue of a twelve 
hundred miles journey from Calcutta, which even 
young men do not like to encounter ; yet I would 
have gone to Rawul Pindee, if Lord Dalhousie had 
not concurred with me in thinking that such a 
move by the Commander-in-Chief might give 
unadvisable importance to the incipient mutiny: 
moreover, Sir Colin Campbell was an officer to be 
relied upon, and his letter was the first intimation 
of a bad spirit prevailing. My reply expressed 
strong hope that it was only a partial ebullition of 
ill-temper, which would with management pass 
away; nevertheless, preparation was made for the 
worst, in remembrance of Vellorc, where thirteen 
British officers and a hundred privates had been 

CHAP. II.] 16 

massacred, as many wounded, and all the mutineers 
slaughtered, because a Commanding Officer would 
not believe tliat Sepoys could mutiny ! That 
catastrophe was by some attributed to the intrigues 
of Tippoo Saib's family ; by others, to anger at a 
change of dress. Now the lately conquered nobles 
of the Punjaub were as capable as Tippoo's people 
of mischief; and the Rawul Pindee motive, higher 
pay, was of far more powerful influence than any 
dislike to costume. The one was local, ephemeral, 
limited ; the other of universal interest, affecting 
every Sepoy of India and believed to have been 
thus early entertained by no less than twenty-four 
battalions ! 

My official answer to Sir Colin Campbell, dated 
19th July, 1849, — after acknowledging his of 
the 13th, describing the insubordinate conduct of 
men in the 22nd Native regiment, — expressed 
sorrow that soldiers, good in other respects, should 
act so unbecomingly and injuriously for their own 
interests. He was, therefore, to toll them so, and 
if they persisted in their unfounded demand, each 
fool was to be discharged on the spot, and, stripped 
of his arms and clothing, turned out of the can- 
tonment as an unworthy Sepoy and a disgrace to 
his regiment. But on the honest soldiers of the 
seventh and flank companies — reported not to have 
joined the insubordinate men — the Commander- 
in-Chief's approbation was to be bestowed; and 
also upon any individual soldier, who had the good 
sense to take his regular pay instead of provoking 
dismissal as a vagabond and culprit. Hopes were 
expressed that before these orders arrived most of 
the men would have repented of their folly ; but if 
there was persistent misconduct, a report would go 

17 [e-iiAP. u. 

to the Governor-General, and an example be made 
of all the guilty. 

Accompanying this official communication, a 
private letter gave Sir Colin instructions how to 
act — yet with a wide discretion in case of a 
collision with the 53rd, the only Queen's regiment 
at the station. He was told the mutiny must not 
be designated by harsh names ; that it should be 
termed insubordination ; that a door sliould be 
opened for repenting culprits, and an opening left 
for leniency; but if aggravated misconduct followed 
vigorous proceedings would ensue. " Xo wrong 
" had been offered to the Sepoys, no promise 
*' broken ; their conduct was unreasonable, inex- 
" cusable and deserving of severe punishment ; yet 
" the Governor-General and Commander-in-Chief 
" had agreed to follow the course prescribed in 
" the official letter, giving the men a loop-hole for 
" repentance in hope the matter might melt away. 
" Fear of worse happening was indeed uppermost, 
" and nothing beyond opening a way for retreat 
" could be conceded ; but if a parcel of poor fellows 
" could be saved from punishment, it was a duty to 
" do it. If the Sepoys rejected kindness, trusted to 
" numbers and broke into open mutiny it was 
" certain not to be confined to llawul Tindee, and 
" must be put down by force. In that case no 
" special orders could be given from such a distance 
" and commanders of stations nuist act from the 
" dictates of their abilities and courage ; but Sir 
" Colin was, in the event of misliap, to retreat, not 
" on Lahore, but on Peshawur, where he would 
" find three European and some Bombay Native 
" regiments in support. Open mutiny was not 
" apprehended, but if it took place, Jhelum coukl 


CHAP. 11.] 18 

" not help and Wuzzocrabad was too far off; how- 
" ever, should the worst happen, it was thought 
" he, with the 53rd at his back, could settle every 
" difficulty." 

Soon another letter came from Rawul Pindee. 
Transmitted by Sir Colin it was written by Captain 
Mitchell, commanding the 13th Native Infantry. 
Dated July 14th, a day later than the first report, 
the contents did not allay apprehensions. A 
Hindustanee paper had been found on the parade 
ground, a hundred yards from the quarter-guard, 
addressed to the drill and pay Havildars ; it 
called on them by name, under penalty of cursing, 
to refuse any but the higher pay. Captain Mitchell 
had demanded from the Native officers information 
as to this paper and the feelings of the men, and 
unanimously they denied that insubordination 
existed ; the paper had been written by some 
stranger, and some of them mentioned the 22nd 
regiment as the probable source, because the 
Havildars' names were known there from frequent 
intercourse. The following exact translation was 
enclosed : — 

" To Bahawul Pandy, Lalla Doarbugee, &c. &c. 
The ten pay Havildars of companies, from the 
grenadier to the light, greeting: you are sworn 
that whoever of you, seeing this letter, and does 
not make a report to the drill Ilavildar of the 
regiment ; or, if any of the other Havildars of a 
company, one and all, do not make a report to the 
officers commanding companies, that the Sepoy 
of all the companies of this regiment, refuse to 
take one farthing less than twelve rupees per 
mensem, may every dreadful curse that can fall upon 
a Hindoo's head fall upon you ; and may the same 

19 [chap. II. 

curses fall upon us, if we agree to take anything 
less than the above sum, viz. twelve rupees per 

This paper — ominous, because the natives are 
most sensitive to curses and charms, implicitly be- 
lieving in their occult efficiency — strengthened the 
evidence of a deep concerted mutiny ; and the next 
day this view was further confirmed by a fresh 
communication from Sir C. Campbell. He said 
Captain Nesbit, commanding the 22nd regiment, 
had reported that his first information as to the 
steadiness of the light company was erroneous ; 
with the exception of the Native commissioned and 
non-commissioned officers, the bugler and a few 
privates named, they had refused to accept the 
reduced pay. To this Captain Nesbit added, 
that the previous consent of the company to receive 
that pay had been " a mere ruse," — they had never 
intended to accept it, and as a body stood in the 
same position as the rest of the regiment. Here 
then was further evidence of danger supported by 
cunning amongst the confederate mutineers. 

This new phase of insubordination occurred on 
the 16th of July ; but though the troops remained 
sullen on the 16th and 17th no gross act was 
reported. On the 18th however, the 13th Native 
regiment joined in the refusal to receive the 
reduced pay, and Sir Colin Campbell transmitted 
Captain Mitchell's, the commanding officer's, report 
on the subject. It stated that with the same ex- 
ception of commissioned and non-commissioned 
officers, and a few men, the 13th had followed the 
bad example of the 22nd regiment, and given this 
additional proof of a bad spirit, — the 22nd 
regiment had not heard the Government com- 

CHAT. II.] 20 

munication read before their insubordination, 
whereas to the 13th it had been read and exphiined 
before the reduced pay was offered. 

At the Rawul Pindee station were one Queen's 
regiment — the 53rd — and two Native regiments, 
botli in a state of mutiny ; there were also some 
Artillery, and a regiment of irregular Cavalry ; but 
these last, receiving a fixed sum to find themselves, 
their horses and arms, were not affected by the 
reduction, and were as safe as mercenary troops 
could be when a question of pay was agitated. 
This was however only the surface appearance. 
Sir Colin's first letter said the mutiny was not a 
sudden impulse ; it had been debated amongst the 
men of the 22nd and 13th for some time, and 
been the subject of a correspondence betweoi them 
and the troops stationed at Wuzzeerahad and other 
places. Now Wuzzeerabad, a large station, was 
fourteen marches from llawul Pindee, and if the 
mutineers had communication — it was afterwards 
proved they had — with the four Native regiments 
there, they must also have communicated with the 
intermediate stations of Jhelum, where were two 
regiments of Native Infantry, and no European 
troops. Strong, therefore, was the presumptive 
proof that eight regiments were mutinous, and a 
company, or even a single man accepting pay, 
was, as Captain Nesbit said, a ruse. 

With such evidence that the mutinous spirit per- 
vaded eight regiments — it might be many more — 
the Commander-in-Chiefs duty was to consider the 
danger in all its possible phases, because he who 
considers only wliat is likely to happen does 
little ; it is necessary to be prepared for every exi- 
gency, as far as the mind can unravel coming events. 

21 [chap. II. 

There are, with reference to danger, two kinds 
of men. The one makes no preparation, or makes 
it only for 2^^'ohahilities. The other prepares for 
possibilities. When a crisis comes, the former runs 
away, or meets it with confusion to perish dis- 
honourably, exclaiming who could have foreseen 
this] The latter being forewarned is forearmed, and 
calmly encounters the peril with honour — generally 
with success Here little prescience w^as needed. 
An immense responsibility had suddenly fallen on 
me when scarcely inducted in command ; and well 
I kncAV that whatever means were adopted, what- 
ever course was pursued, abuse unsparing would be 
poured on my head : but for that I was prepared, 
and confident also that threatening as the mutiny 
was it could be quelled by care or force. I did 
not however contemplate, that when all was safe 
the Governor-General, whose full support was not 
only my right but had been previously promised 
without reserve, would be the foremost of my 

To attain a clear conception of what ought to be 
done previous to action, my first view of the matter 
was written down, purged of those minor considera- 
tions, wliich so often encumber the mind in important 
affairs. Here it is given, as showing the basis of 
my proceedings throughout the anxious period 
which followed — most anxious, because war, hor- 
rible in all its forms, is worst when comrade has to 
meet comrade. 


" 1st. This mutiny is very serious. The 
" European troops are dispersed in cantonments, 
" hundreds of miles apart. 

CHAT. II.] 22 

" 2iid. In each cantonment tlie Queen's troops 
" are greatly outnumbered by the Native troops. 

" 3rd. The Punjaub, newly conquered, is hostile 
" to the English rule, and contains all the material 
" of an Army, defeated yet able to rally to the num- 
" ber of some sixty thousand men. Will Goolab 
" Sing remain faithful 1 

" 4th. The regular Native regiments in the 
" Punjaub amount to forty thousand men. Between 
" them and the Sikhs there is no antipathy ; 
" numbers of our Sepoys were found during 
" the war on the Sutledge in the ranks of the 
" Sikhs, not deserters from us, but men who 
*' belonged to the battalions which had been 
" disbanded for mutiny a few years ago by my 
" predecessor. 

" oth. The European troops are about twelve 
" thousand. 

" 6th. If the Native troops mutiny they -will be 
" joined by the Sikhs, and we must calculate upon 
" having one hundred thousand men opposed to 
"• twelve thousand European troops. This is a great 
" disparity as far as numbers go, but the moral 
" feeling will be wdth the twelve thousand ; so will 
" the individual physical strength ; so will the 
" money ; so will be all the means of war except 
" numbers. The mutineers will be ruled by 
" ' Punchayets,' that is to say, a sort of native 
" ' Politicals,' such as governed the old Khalsa 
" Army ; they did their w^ork well, they destroyed 
" both Army and Government in a very short space 
" of time. These advantages would quadruple 
" the' powers of the twelve thousand Europeans, 
" and reduce the chances to about tw^o to one 
" against us. 

23 [chap. II. 

" But thousands more may join in this mutiny, 
" and place the fate of British India in jeopardy far 
" beyond any that it has yet sustained. In the pre- 
" sent state of affairs, and at this period of the year 
" especially, any concession to the mutineers ^vould 
" be full of danger ; more dangerous than a col- 
" lision even, scattered as the European regiments 
" are. We must be very gentle, but fight sooner 
" than concede a single point. 

" I lia"\'e had a conversation with Lord Dalhousie 
" and Colonel Benson. This officer and myself 
" were opposed. He wanted to disband the 13th 
" and 22nd regiments of Native Infantry ; 1 
" objected, and Lord Dalhousie agreeing witli 
" me, decided not to disband them. Putting the 
" cruelty aside, I asked, what we were to do if 
" a vast number of regiments refused their payl 
" We could not disband thirty or forty battalions ! 
" What would Colonel Benson then do 1 Had we 
" dismissed those two regiments, the whole line, 
" trusting to their numbers and knowing we could 
" not disband an Army, would have followed the 
" example of the 13th and 22nd regiments. In 
" fine, no man living can tell where the danger 
" will end, and any blunder of this kind will be 
" ruinous. Accidents however will occur, I must 
" be prepared for the greatest possible danger, and 
" my resolution is to treat the cases as isolated 
" while they can be so treated ; for if we attem})t 
" to bully large bodies, they will do the same by 
" us and a fight must ensue." 

Such were my reflections at the time, and the 
system thus adumbrated was followed. 

Up to the 19th of July the mutiny a})pcared 
thoroughly organized in the two regiments at 

CHAP. IT.] 24 

Rawiil Pindee; and therefore, while convinced 
that to counter-work the mutineers was the only 
mode of stifling the insubordination Avithout 
direct force, I made preparation for that last dreadful 
resource, and sent with that view instructions to 
Sir Walter Gilbert, who commanded all the 
troops in the Punjaub. Dated July 19th, those 
instructions directed him to hold Sir Heni-y Dundas, 
now Lord Melville, with the 60th and 61st Queen's 
regiments and a Bombay field battery, ready to 
march to the aid of Sir Colin Campbell, should he 
demand help ; but he was to let Sir Colin know 
that two Bombay regiments, the Scinde Horse and 
a troop of Artillery, were at his disposal to march 
towards Kawul Pindee at once, in the hope they 
would sufiice and spare the Europeans a movement 
in the heat. 

On the same day, 21st of July, Sir Colin was 
apprised of all this. " He was to call for the aid 
" prepared, or not, as he judged fitting ; but, as 
" his troops had been three days in a state of 
" insubordination reaching mutiny, and hitherto 
" had only found the smooth edge of authority, 
" they must, if they did not yield, have the rough 
" edge also. Yet all must be done with caution, 
" as mistakes might have serious consequences. 
" Money questions interested all men. The British 
" ofiicers of the Company's Service had once almost 
" mutinied on a question of this very kind, and 
" after that, what might not be expected from 
" Sepoys ^ However, to repeat what had been 
" before said, precise orders could not be given at 
" such a distance; he must act for himself; support 
" was prepared, and placed at his disposal. 
" Nothing more could be done ; and he must 

25 [chap. II. 

" remember, that as dissension in our Army would 
" be likely to give the Sikhs the heart to rise, it 
" was necessary to look far-ahead and trust to 
" chance only when it could not be helped." 

Passive mutiny and open violence being thus 
alike provided against, further intelligence was 
awaited, and in a few days, Sir Colin Campbell, 
writing the 21st, reported that fear had prevailed 
over the mutinous spirit, and the men Avere return- 
ing to their duty. * This was satisfactory as to the 
Rawul Pindee station, so far as it went ; but con- 
firmation was still anxiously looked for, because of 
the " ruse" previously practised by the light com- 
pany : the present yielding might be only an ex- 
tension of that plan. A letter of the 23rd supplied 
this confirmation, the mutinous feeling seemed to be 
waning ; seemed I say, because even in this report 
Sir Colin Campbell, referring to his former sus- 
picions, said, " Thus has ended this disagreeable 
" affair, which looked serious in its character in 
" the first instance ; for there was reason to fear 
" that the same feeling pervaded other Native corps 
" stationed in the conquered territories, who iccre to 
" he affected hy the order directing the change from 
" the field to the cantonment rate of allowances.''' 

Aye ! there was reason to fear, more reason 
than either Sir Colin or myself weened of at that 
time ! His work was done, his responsibility 
was over, his station quieted ; but my work 
was not. I commanded a large Army, and my 
responsibility was for the safety of an empire. 
Other stations had been in correspondence Avitli 
Rawul Pindee, and to ascertain how far the 
pernicious spirit had spread was from the first an 
anxious task. Moreover, to follow my meditated 

CHAP. II.] 26 

course, — making the force of Government bear 
only on individuals prominently guilty, — it was 
necessary to try as ringleaders those who had 
been conspicuous, avoiding, as long as it was 
possible, a collision with masses. To gain time 
without such collision was also very important for 
several reasons ; amongst them my recent arrival. 
Calcutta had been reached the 6th of May, but 
twelve hundred miles were afterwards to be 
travelled at the slow rate of five miles an hour, 
and the Simla head quarters were not attained be- 
fore the 20th of June : hence the reins were 
hardly in hand when the horses began to kick ! 

It was an uneasy affair, but no men could have 
acted with more caution than did Sir Walter Gilbert 
and Sir Colin Campbell. From me also. Sir Colin 
Campbell, while conscious of the greatness of the 
danger, felt sure of good support, and acknowledged 
the judiciousness of his instructions, as will be 
seen by the following letter ; which likewise proves 
that from the first I was conscious of the danger, 
and treated it as a matter of vital importance to 
the safety of the State. Indeed it required to be 
so treated, seeing that all the persons cognizant 
of the matter, who were most capable of appre- 
ciating the danger of such events in India, were 
deeply alarmed. Lord Dalhousie has since, with 
equal disregard of sense and fairness, called the 
whole a '''Farce" It would have been a great catas- 
trophe if he only had dealt with it ; and was 
assuredly a deep lamentable tragedy for the un- 
happy though guilty 66th Native regiment, whose 
proceedings have still to be related. 

" Sir Colin Campbell to Sir Charles Napier^ 
" Raw id Pindee, July 26t/i, 1849. — Your order, 

27 [cHAr. II. 

sent through Sir Walter Gilbert, for Dimdas to 
reinforce me with certain troops in case I 
should require their aid, arrived here in the 
middle of the night by express, and your private 
letter of the 21st, adverting to that order, 
reached me late in the afternoon of yesterday. 
I cannot tell you how warmly I appreciate your 
kind consideration in sending me so speedily 
instructions for my guidance, so plain and dis- 
tinct that I could not err, and which provided 
for every contingency that could possibly arise. 
The combination amongst the men of the two 
corps, 13th and 22nd regiments, gave way to 
fear on the 18th, the day before your prescrip- 
tion for bringing them to their senses was dis- 
patched from Simla. 

" I have not presumed at any period to offer 
any suggestion as to the nature or amount of 
punishment they may be deserving of, for the 
sake of discipline, because I do not know these 
people well, and you do, and have had expe- 
rience in such affairs and in their settlement 
before this. I would beg to bring to your notice 
however, the fact which I learned two days ago, 
that these two corps have been quartered 
together almost constantly for the last five years. 
As soon as the season will admit of their march- 
ing, I think it would be advisable to separate 
the 13th and 22nd." 
The second scene is now to be described. It 
changes suddenly to the City of Delhi, some four 
hundred miles from Rawul Pindee, thus furnishing 
additional evidence that a combination for mutiny 
had been concerted among many regiments far 
distant from each other. The first proof was pre- 

CHAP. II.] 28 

sumptive, arising from the correspondence between 
the regiments quartered in the three stations of 
Rawul Pindee, Jhekim and Wuzzeerabad. 

The second proof is direct; but previous to enter- 
ing on it, a very curious circumstance must be told 
belonging to this date, and offering a sure measure 
for judging Lord ]3alhousie's after proceedings 
touching the 6Gth regiment alluded to above. 

We had three irregular corps of men called 
Goorkas, natives of the hills forming the kingdom 
of Nepaul. Bravest of Native troops, they at the 
battles on the Sutledge displayed such con- 
spicuous gallantry as to place them for courage 
on a level with our Europeans ; and certainly they 
have a high military spirit, are fierce in war, of 
unsurpassed activity, and possess great powers of 
enduring fatigue. Very low of stature, they have 
short limbs, but with enormous muscles and vast 
strength, and their chests are both broad and deep. 
These hardy soldiers profess an extraordinary 
attachment to our men, and are, like them, given 
to strong drink ; but are said to have a dislike to 
the Sepoys amounting to contempt. In the Nepaul 
war of 1814, with inferior numbers they defeated 
British troops more than once; and acquaintance 
with them under arms, in no way tended to diminish 
my opinion of their high character as soldiers. 

Now when the mutinous spirit arose with our Se- 
poys, the cliief leaders were undoubtedly Brahmins, 
and Brahmins, having a religious as well as a military 
character, enjoy an immense influence. All the 
higher Hindoo castes are imbued with gross super- 
stitions. One goes to the devil if he eats this; 
another if he eats that ; a third will not touch his 
dinner if the shadow of an infidel passes over it ; a 

29 [chap. II, 

fourth will not drink water unless it has been 
drawn by one of his own caste. Thus their religious 
principles interfere in many strange ways with 
their military duties. The brave men of the 35tli 
Native Infantry lost caste because they did their 
duty as soldiers at Jelalabad ; that is, they fought 
like soldiers, and ate what could be had to sustain 
their strength for battle. There never was a 
stronger proof than the annoyance which this noble 
regiment is said to have since received from other 
regiments, of the injury which high caste in a 
soldier does, and the Brahmin is the worst. Having 
two commanders to obey, caste, and captain, if they 
are at variance the last is disobeyed, or obeyed 
at the cost of conscience and of misery. 

Military rules sit light on the low caste man, he 
obeys his captain. He may be, yet probably is not, 
inferior in morals to a high caste man, and as a 
soldier he is superior. If caste chimes in with 
duty he is glad of it ; if not, he snaps his fingers 
at caste. 

When it was made known that Brahmins were 
at the head of the insubordinate men of the 13th 
and 22nd, and that in the first regiment alone there 
were no less than four hundred and thirty, the 
necessity of teaching that race they should no 
longer dictate to the Sepoys and the Government 
struck me, and my thoughts at once turned for 
means to the Goorkas, whose motto was, "eat, drink, 
and be merry." Their tenets are unknown to 
me ; it is said they do not like cow-beef, yet a cow 
would not be long alive Avith a hungry Goorka 
battalion ; they mess together, these Goorkas, and 
make few inquiries as to the sex of a beefsteak ! 
These, therefore, were men with which to meet 

CHAP. II.] 30 

Brahmins of Bengal, and their bristUng pre- 
judices of high caste. 

While reflecting on this, I was told by the com- 
mander of one of the Goorka regiments, that the re- 
sidence of the Governor-General and Commander-in- 
Chief at Simla made the necessaries of life so dear 
that the very small pay of the Goorka soldiers did 
not aiford them sufficient food — they were starving ! 
My course of action was then clear. It was to 
adopt the Goorka regiments into the line, abolish 
their limitation of service to the hills, and 
give them pay and allowance as Sepoys. Now, 
said I, the time is come to win the Goorka's heart 
by money and the red uniform which he longs to 
wear; and not alone the hearts of our Goorka 
soldiers, but those of all the Nepaulese soldiery, so 
that in a war with that dangerous power, the 
enemy's Army "will likely come over to us. How- 
ever, Goorkas will fight Goorkas readily. " No 
pay no Goorka," and the King of Nepaul cannot, 
as to money, compete with the Company. We 
may thus set the Brahmin at defiance, if he behaves 
ill. The Goorka will be faithful, and for low pay 
we can enlist a large body of soldiers whom our 
best officers consider equal in courage to European 
troops. Even as a matter of economy this will be 
good; but the great advantage of enlisting these 
hill men will be, that with 30,000 or 40,000 Goorkas 
added to 30,000 Europeans, the possession of 
India will not " depend on opinion," but on an 
Army, able with ease to overthrow any combination 
among Hindoos or Mahomedans, or both together ! 
Hence, when the commanding officer of the 
Goorka battalion near Simla told me his miserable 
soldiers must desert or starve, I asked Lord 

31 [chap. II. 

Dalhousie to take all the Goorka battalions into the 
line. He consented. But it was necessary first to 
ask if they would volunteer for general service, 
and a paper to that effect being drawn up, a clever 
young officer of the Artillery, Lieutenant Tombs, 
was selected to read it to the three regiments. 
Lord Dalhousie approved, Tombs executed his 
mission, and reported, that when the men understood 
the proposal, and heard the ])7'omise of high pay 
made hy the Governor-General to thetn through the 
Commander-in-Chief, they volunteered, not merely 
with alacrity but a joy, evinced, said Tombs, by 
" extraordinary screams of delight, unlike any 
" thing he ever before heard." Poor fellows, they 
were starving, and vehemently hailed the means of 
sustaining life ! This happened the 7th October, 
1849. Let it be borne in mind. 


On the 22nd of October I commenced a journey 
of inspection, which was, from unforeseen events, 
so extended as to comprise, virtually, nearly my 
whole career as Commander-in-Chief; wherefore, 
the incidents, reports and memoirs shall be for the 
most part given chronologically, laying bare all 
things, even to my contempt for the duplicity, 
miserable jealousy and weakness exhibited. This 
will enable the reader to travel, as it were 
mentally with me, and comprehend the views, 
opinions, sentiments and feelings which governed 
my actions. My first design however involved 
only visits to Delhi, Agra, Meerut, ITurdwar and 
Almora, having for object to frame a careful 
memoir on the general defence of India. 

With such a plan arranged as a guide for action, 
rapid movements of any portions of the vast Army 
at my disposal could have been made to a menaced 
frontier without confusion ; and with due care not 
to weaken by inconsiderate hurry important points. 
The composing of it cleared and fixed my own 
judgment, and furnished a good mode of explain- 
ing my military notions to the Governor-General, 
bespeaking support, or correction if not in unison 
witli the views of Government. My design also 

33 [CHAV. III. 

was to make this memoir a ground-work for great 
arrangements and establishments ; such as perma- 
nent magazines and barracks at central points, 
with reference to future wars on our Northern, 
Southern, Eastern, or Western frontiers, which are 
everywhere open. And, as Delhi, Meerut, Agra, 
Plurdwar and Almora, were important stations 
witliin convenient distances, and formed the base 
of my plan, a visit to them was of interest ; but 
soon the mutinous spirit reappeared too plainly to 
allow of delay, and called me to the Punjaub. 

On the 9th of November I entered Delhi, and 
sighed over its misfortunes, its magnificent palace, 
its degradation, ill-usage and dirt. Of the last, 
the worst is the puppet-king who dishonours it 
with his base court ; for if physical filth reigns 
amongst those gorgeous ruins in all disgusting 
forms, it is surpassed by the moral filtli. The 
palace of Delhi combines all that is horrible, dis- 
gusting and melancholy, with everything that was 
grand and beautiful ! I beheld Avith admiration 
that seat of empire, that throne of the Moguls, 
imperial until the insulting spoiler came in guise 
of Lord Wellesley's " ignominious tj/rants,'' when 
royal splendour passed away ! Nought now 
remains but ruin and the cherished feculence of 
Eastern debauchery and crime within the great 
and beautiful palace of Delhi ! 

This wretched king is upheld by the Leadenliall 
princes at an enormous expense. All in India 
now is sacrificed to mammon ; yet even to 
mammon the Court of Directors is in one sense 
untrue ; for by them as by all oligarchical go\ ern- 
ments the great state interests are sacrificed to the 
individual gain of ephemeral rulers, reckless of the 


CHAl'. I IT.] 34 

future to grasp the present profit. Sovereigns are 
identified with the countries they rule, but a 
mercantile oligarchy, like the Court of Directors, 
is not interested beyond the annual balance sheet 
during their respective tenures of power ; better 
it is for them to clutch hundreds within reach, 
than by a wise outlay draw forth the wondrous 
resources of the great Indian Empire and turn 
those hundreds into millions. Like the pedlar 
Jew the Director seeks small profit and quick 
returns, understanding well his personal interest 
but regardless of Indian greatness or happiness. 
This is patent to all who have traversed India, 
and looked at the remains of great roads, of great 
cities, of great palaces, of great mosques. By 
whom were they constructed 1 By the sovereigns 
of India. But where are the public works of the 
Court of Directors 1 For a hundred years they 
have milked the cow and given her no sustenance ! 
As their charter draws towards its close a show 
of doing work in shape of canals is being made, 
and the railroads will be good ; but railroads 
spring from the spirit of the age, no human 
power can stop their progress till the ^vhole earth 
becomes bound in ribs of iron. To Leadenhall no 
thanks are due for railways ; and if the principle 
on which they arc conducted is good, thanks be to 
Lieutenant-Colonel John Kennedy, who by his 
great abilities has set them right in the East. 
The Court of Directors never have and never will 
rule India well. Take an example. Raw cotton 
is now to England's manufactories what Sampson's 
hair was to his strength. America can play 
Delilah when she pleases ; yet our own possessions 
in India, capable of saving us from the danger of 

35 [chap. III. 

such an excision, have been neglected ! Look also 
at Scinde, Sugar, cotton, and indigo, could be 
produced there in great quantities and the finest 
quality, but no pains have been taken on that head. 

Is it not strange that England should leave in 
the hands of a small knot of merchants her own 
great destinies 1 Acting by the letter of Free 
Trade while its spirit is departed from, our riches 
are cast into the hands of slave drivers, and the 
resources of our own more rich and free possessions 
are left dormant for want of a market ! Would these 
things happen if India were a Royal Government '? 
Surely not. The present mismanagement of our 
Colonies seems indeed to tell against this argument, 
but our present Colonial mis-government notoriously 
springs from want of ability in one minister*, and 
will probably be reformed by Parliament ere this 
work goes to press. In the close Borough of 
Leadenhall Street, there is indeed no regenerating 
power; but the English people have discovered 
that it wants the full resources of India, and is 
resolved to have them. It will not much longer 
bear " Red Tapists,''' and will insist on able 

During my military tour, the usual size of the 
Commander-in-Chief's camp was reduced by me. 
The ordinary establishment, according to Colonel 
Burlton, late Commissary-General, was eighty or 
ninety Elephants, three or four hundred Camels, 
and nearly as many Bullocks, with all their attend- 
ants ; besides three hundred and thirty-two tent- 
pitchers, including fifty men solely employed to 

=:= Since Avritiiig the above, Lord Orcy has rcsij^nieil. To 
name him in the text was unnecessary, his incapacity luul liecome 
too notorious. 

CHAr. III.] 36 

carry glass doors for tlio pavilion. This was reduced 
by me to thirty Elephants, three hundred and 
thirty-four Camels, and two hundred and twenty- 
two tent-pitchers, realising a public saving of £.750 
a month while in Camp. 

Canvas palaces are not necessary for a General 
and his Staff making a military tour, even supposing 
there was truth in the favourite idea of some " old 
Indians^'' that pomp and show produce respect 
among the Indian people. But there is no truth in 
that. The astute native laughs at and hates the 
insolence which usually accompanies the ostenta- 
tious fallacy ! Indian birds arc not caught with 
chaff, though some old European birds in India 
are ! The respect of the former is paid to our 
military strength^ in secret they deride the ostenta- 
tion of temporary authority. The real Sovereign 
Princes and high Aristocracy of India, proud of 
their lineage or self-created real power, hold the 
ephemeral grandeur of the British in contempt and 
aversion ; but they respect our troops from fear — we 
beat them ! Wherefore, being a soldier and not a 
prince, I travelled as a soldier, and not as a prince. 
The Indians respect truth also, though they do not 
ahvays speak it ; and I was sensible that if their 
respect could not be obtained without a Lord 
Mayor's pageant it would not be so with one. I 
relied on a good horse under me, a good sword by 
my side, and plenty of good troops. These are 
what the Indians really venerate, because they 
know that India must be held as it was won. 

How can one hundred and fifty millions of 
people, who hate us mortally, be ruled if the sword 
be sheathed, and the Government given to civilians 
acting in the offensive manner described by 

37 [chap. III. 

Mr. Shore, one of themselves, who was at once able, 
courteous, and bold ? That there are many ex- 
ceptions, many able civilians, is true ; but the 
Indian judges his conquerors by the rule, not by the 
exceptions. However, let those who doubt read 
" Shore on Indian Affairs." AVliy are the ex- 
ceptions so loved % Because they are exceptions. 

Having saved money for the Company by giving 
up Elephants and Canvas Palaces, and been well 
abused for abolishing that mock grandeur, which is 
not only contemptible but mischievous, my journey 
to Delhi was marked by turning out the troops at 
all the Stations, that the people might see them 
move ; that the Generals and commanders of 
regiments might be judged of, and I learn where 
to put my hand for the work of war, — and truly 
there were plenty of excellent soldiers in all ranks. 

From Delhi my course was to Agra, stopping 
there at the house of Mr. Thomason, the able and 
justly popular administrator of the North-west 
provinces. And while expressing my respect for 
this gentleman, it may be allowable to notice also 
Mr. Edwards, the magistrate of Simla (not Major 
Herbert Edwards), who, as far as a not more than 
ordinary acquaintance gives means of judging, is a 
man with most able and extended views of policy ; 
and there is no one who more stanchly protects 
the natives against that injustice and insult, of 
which Mr. Shore so justly complains. These ex- 
pressions of respect for two distinguished civil 
servants of the Company, are drawn from me 
perforce, though foreign to my subject. 

On my return from Agra to Delhi, the Otli 
of November, it was reported that the 41st 
Native Infiintry had declared their resolution not 

CHAT. III.] 38 

to enter the Punjaub with reduced pay. The 
European garrison officers thought they would 
persist, and the report likewise said the men were 
in correspondence with twenty-four other regiments^ 
destined to form the new force in the Punjaub. 
The Army generally had not then received the usual 
furloughs for the year ; this to the Sepoy is a 
serious grievance, for on their furloughs depend 
many family arrangements, especially with men of 
high caste ; and the neglect was more distressing 
to all who were to pass the Sutledge, because of 
the increased distance from their families. 

As this omission was caused by the war, I 
wrote to Lord Dalhousie, begging for an immediate 
order, granting furloughs to twenty-five men per 
hundred ; there was time to do so before the day 
fixed for the 41st to march, and it would be 
likely to abate discontent, and deprive agitators of 
influence. Meanwhile the General Officer com- 
manding at Delhi was directed to inform the 
Native officers of the 41st, that the Governor- 
General would be moved to dismiss them if the 
regiment refused to march. Lord Dalhousie con- 
sented to all this ; and it is an irrefragable proof 
that he w^as then as much convinced of the danger 
as myself, and was, until he fell into bad hands, 
willing to give me all due support. The 41st 
regiment did march, being well pleased with the 
additional furloughs ; but a fact had transpired of 
no agreeable nature, namely, that twenty-four other 
re(jiments were of the same temper as the 4i\st 
had been, which, coupled with what had passed at 
Rawul Pindee, gave the mutinous spirit a more 
serious complexion than ever. 

Mcerut was tlie next station visited, where, 

39 [chap. III. 

among other objects for attention, was tliat of 
ascertaining whether an unoccupied barracks would 
make a prison for condemned European soldiers, 
instead of transporting them to New South Wales. 
The latter is a very injudicious punishment, 
because an opinion is prevalent in India that a 
transported soldier can do well for himself with a 
" ticket of leave ;" and there are soldiers so 
degraded as to commit heinous crimes, even felony, 
expressly to get transported. This they have 
avowed, and a greater injury to discipline can 
hardly be imagined than that punishment should 
be courted by crime ; that an honourable soldier 
should believe the blackguard, ^vhom he had 
perhaps himself brought to trial, should sail 
exulting in his sentence as the means of leading a 
healthy life with the hope of fortune. The 
reverse is probably the truth ; those felons, most 
likely, spend their lives in great misery, and it 
would be good to send them back to their regi- 
ments for a while after their term of transportation : 
their dearly-bought experience would then con- 
tradict the erroneous but prevalent idea of trans- 
portation being a pleasant life. 

The only caupe for the notion, which has been 
traced, is, that soldiers in New South Wales are 
often employed on the " Boundary Police" which 
they, no doubt, find advantageous. There may, 
however be other temptations for energetic villains; 
and as many years must pass ere the false idea is 
corrected, I proposed that Government should 
make the unoccupied Meerut barracks a prison for 
felons. It was well suited for that purpose, but 
during my stay in India the matter was entirely 
neglected by the Governor-General ; nor does it 

CHAP. III.] 40 

ap[)ear to have been noticed since. Tlic fault may 
be with Lord Dalhousie, or ^^itll the Sui)reme 
Council, or with the Military Board at Calcutta ; 
but a great fanlt it is, for no commanding officer 
of a European regiment in India will doubt the 
propriety of abolishing the transportation of 
soldiers to Australia. And now that golden 
mountains have been found, the desire to get there 
will augment. Not gold but ashes, disappoint- 
ment and misery, should await the felon ; yet the 
general opinion is different ; and there must be 
some foundation for the error, or the regiments 
coming from Australia to India would certainly 
undeceive their comrades if some 'slackness did not 
enable the felon to escape his punishment. 

The following notes, made at Meerut, were 
afterwards transmitted from Lahore to the Govei- 
no]-General : — 

" Lahore^ loth December, 1849. — Rapid travel- 
" ling, and a good many other matters of a more 
" pressing nature, prevented my telling you of my 
" examination of the position of Delhi and its 
" magazine. 

" As regards the magazine, the objections to it 
" are as follows : — 

" 1st. It is placed in a very populous part of 
" the city, and its explosion would be very horrible 
" in its effects as regards the destruction of life. 

" 2nd. It would destroy the magnificent palace 
" of Delhi. 

" 3rd. The loss of Government property would 
" also be very great, especially if my views of the 
" importance of Delhi, given in my report, be acted 
" upon ; namely, that it and Dinapore should be 
" two great magazines for tlie Bengal Presidency. 

41 [cHAr. III. 

" 4 til. It is without defence beyond what the 
guard of fifty men offer, and its gates are so 
weak tliat a mob could push them in. I there- 
fore think a powder magazine should be built 
in a safe pLicc. There is a strong castle three 
or four miles from the town, which would 
answer well, but I fear the repairs would be 
too expensive ; more so perhaps than what 
would be more efficacious, viz., to build a 
magazine in a suitable position near the city. 
" I send a sketch of the Arsenal, and some 
works which ought to be constructed for its 
security. They are not of my proposing, but I 
consider them well adapted to their object 
and recommend their being ordered. 
" Delhi was formerly considered very healthy, 
but since the canal has been brought into the 
town has become obnoxious to fevers. It would 
be worth while to have a medical report made 
on the effects of this, and of the advantages 
which would arise from turning its waters from 
this noble city. 

" I visited Agra and the military prisons there, 
and consider them very good in themsehes^ but 
utterly unfit for the confinement of Europeans, 
in consequence of the heat which an inclosed 
atmosphere acquires ; and from the inquiries 
made I come to the decided conclusion that no 
European constitution is capable of enduring a 
protracted imprisonment in the fortress of Agra. 
" I then proceeded to Meerut, and inspected 
the vacated barracks of the Sappers and Miners, 
which are perfecthj adapted for the imprisonment 
of soldiers, Euro[)ean and Native ; nothing can 
bo more complete; and I am not aware of any 

CHAP. III.] 42 

" expense that would be required beyond that of 
" puttmg up gratings in addition to the doors, — 
" prisons, places for solitary confinement, houses 
" for the governor and his deputies, guard- 
" houses, every thing necessary is there ready. 
" The advantage of making this a Military prison 
" for the Army is too evident to need any 
" explanation." 

At Hurdwar a magnificent canal was being cut, 
under the able superintendence of Lieut. -Col. 
Cautly ; but whether its advantages will counter- 
balance the effects of malaria, which it is supposed 
it may generate, is a matter for much consideration. 

From Hurdwar, my journey was to Kalka, and 
through the Jullunder to Lahore, which was 
reached the 30th November, after crossing the 
Sutledge at Philor, and the Beas at Beyroual; 
making seventeen marches in the Punjaub, where 
the scenery and people were so like those of 
Scinde it seemed to be my old quarters. 

At Lahore the memoir on the defence of India 
was completed, and having reason to believe the 
honest exposition there made of my opinions 
offended Lord Dalhousie, unintentionally on my 
part, it shall be here vindicated on the following- 
grounds : — 

1st. It was right to show the Governor-General, 
with frankness, all the dangers which might befal 

2nd. ]\Iy military experience and knowledge of 
the Western frontier provinces, rendered it proper 
in me, as Commander-in-Chief and a member of 
the Council, to communicate my opinions to Lord 
Dalhousie, wlio had no knowledge of military 
matters, nor much of the people. 

43 [chap. 111. 

3rd. My confidence in the Punjaub Board of 
Administration, as to its military capability, was 
entirely shaken by finding it desirous to accumu- 
late troops in a place called Adinanuggur, well 
known to be uninhabitable even for the natives at 
a certain season. My attention was drawn to this, 
by a remonstrance from General Wheeler, an able 
oflficer of the Company's Service, who knew the 
locality. He was right, the Board wrong ; not 
only as to the occupation of an unhealthy post but 
as to any military advantage arising from such 
occupation, even were the spot healthy. Lord 
Dalhousie supported me and the troops were 
withdrawn; many lives would otherwise have 
been unnecessarily lost. 

But when the Punjaub Board found it could not 
have troops at Adinanuggur, it tried to have some 
at a house called Battala, saying it was a large 
place fit for two hundred men. This I permitted 
against my judgment, and when the troops arrived 
there were no quarters, the house was filled with 
the political agent and his people ! The men were 
thus kept for some days in pouring rain, without 
any preparations to meet the exposure, and their 
oflfi-cer, to save their lives, returned to his station 
and reported the matter. His report went to 
Lord Dalhousie, yet the Board were not called over 
the coals, and it was indeed evident that henceforth 
the soldiers must be protected by myself Surely 
indignation was here just. Ought soldiers' lives to 
be so trifled with by the self-sufficiency and igno- 
rance of the Board of Administration 1 

4th. In military matters this Punjaub Adminis- 
tration was only worthy of censure, and its system 
of civil government appeared to me clearly tending 

CHAP. III.] 44 

to produce early dislike to our ride, and possibly 
insurrection. Hence, as war would bring the Com- 
mander-in-Chief's responsibility into activity, my 
reasons were freely given to the Governor-General 
for thinking that, under such a system of govern- 
ment as that of the Punjaub Board, we could not 
diminish the enormous force in the province. 
Lord Dalhousie had called for my opinion on that 
point, and to say a vast Army, seventy-two 
thousand men, was necessary, without frankly 
declaring why, would have been absurd. The why 
was, in my mind then and now, that the Punjaub 
was hadly governed ! There was no other reason for 
advising the retention of so great an Army. In 
Scinde, which is two-thirds the size of the Punjaub, 
I had offered to reduce the twelve thousand men 
under me to five thousand, or even three thousand, 
because the people were attached to our government; 
but there was nothing safe in the Punjaub, and the 
Army of Occupation could not safely be reduced. 

Had Lord Grey imitated my Scinde policy at the 
Cape, it is probable, to use his own foul words 
when speaking of my battles, that his Cape 
war of " unscrupulous aggrandizement, stained 
" in the eyes of the Almighty ivith the guilt of 
" unnecessary and wanton bloodshed,'" would not 
have arisen. He warned Parliament that if it 
thanked me for the victories in Scinde, " a portion 
of tliat guilt would fall on their heads." On whose 
head will the guilt of ^^unscrupulous aggrandizement"" 
in Africa fall ? Lord Grey is responsible for that 
war, in which we have lost all except military 
honour. If that has not suffered, thanks are only 
due to the soldiers led by Harry Smitli and Cathcart; 
but their skill and courage, and all the money spent, 

45 [chap. III. 

will not obliterate the evils which his pseudo states- 
manship has inflicted upon both races at the 

Lord Dalhoiisie, notwithstanding his displeasure, 
left the Army in all its strength. But this cannot 
last for ever, and my endeavour was to show his 
Lordship that another system of government and a 
good police would enable him to reduce that large 
Army, which the Company cannot always support, to 
hold one province in subjection. When the troops 
are withdrawn, it will be known who is right, who 
wrong. Let time decide ! Meanwhile, be it said 
that my memoir would not now meet the public eye, 
but for his Lordship's after-conduct. It was not 
written to give him offence, the Punjaub could 
not be insurgent while seventy-two thousand men 
were in occupation, the troops appeared to have 
been well posted by my predecessor, Lord Gough, 
and the only motive for the memoir was the public 
good. But what right had Lord Dalhousie to be 
offended 1 My opinions were not presumptuously 
forced upon his attention, he had desired such a 
memoir, which was drawn up as became an English 
gentleman and a responsible officer in high com- 
mand ; that is, without regard to ony thing but truth 
and sense. Was he to be told only what was 
agreeable and soothing to foolish pride ? Did he 
fancy himself Misnar, the Sultan of Eastern tale, 
whose archers shot down the only soldier of his 
Army that did _not fall prostrate at command ! 
But let the reader judge of Lord Dalhousie from 
the memoir itself, which will be found ter- 
minating the second part of this work. 


At Lahore the defence of the city occupied my 
attention. There were at the time disturbances 
on the frontier, near Peshawur ; and a force had 
marched under Colonel Bradshaw against the 
offending tribes, — not by my orders, but those 
of the Board of Administration, which always, 
sought, ignorantly, to meddle with military mat- 
ters. It had also proposed to re-fortify Lahore 
at enormous cost ; but that I opposed in the 
following letter to Lord Dalhousie : — 

" December 14:th, 1849. — Having just sent my 
" letter about the barracks, I will now send one 
" about the fortifications. I have, in company 
" with Sir Walter Gilbert, Brigadier Penny, and 
" Lieutenant-Colonel Tremenheere, thoroughly 
" examined the fortifications of Lahore, considered 
" its defences, and two months ago got Sir Colin 
" Campbell's opinion, as he had so long been 
" the Commandant in perilous times. The result 
" is, a decided opinion, that by throwing up the 
" wall wliich is marked blue in the accompanying 
" sketch, it will complete an excellent line of 
" defence, reaching from the Zuralli Gate to the 
" Mustee Gate, isolating the Citadel, which com- 

47 [chap. IV. 

" mands the town, and enabling that Citadel to 
" secure the submission of the inhabitants. 

" This line of defence will resist any attack 
" that can be made upon it. 

" The expense of building the wall will be 
" about ten thousand rupees^ in the opinion of 
" Colonel Tremenheere ; but his estimate vs, fifteen 
" thousand to be on the outside. At this trifling 
" cost the city will be put into a good state of 
" defence against any attack short of a regular 
" siege, to make it proof against which would not 
" cost less than half a million pounds sterling, 
" for every part of its fortifications would require 
" to be rebuilt. Sir Walter Gilbert, Brigadier 
" Penny, and Lieutenant-Colonel Tremenheere, all 
" concur Avith me in this opinion, and so does 
" Major Kennedy. 

" I observed several parts of the walls of the 
" town from which a considerable quantity of 
" material can be taken ; this will save some 
" portion of the expense, an object of the greatest 
" importance in all public works, but especially 
" in the present state of Indian finance, and when 
" barracks must be built for our Europeans. 

" I have a letter from Sir Colin Campbell, and 
" fear we shall have a fight. The force under 
" Colonel Bradshaw had crossed the Cabul river. 
" The fractious village was forty miles distant, 
" a parapet had been formed against us across 
" a pass, and great numbers were said to have 
*' assembled to defend it. I expect to hear of 
" some decisive blow having been struck to- 
" morrow." 

Several hundred thousand pounds were thus 

CHAP. IV.] 48 

saved to the Company, whicli the Board of Ad- 
ministration would have incurred for the defence 
of the Punjaub ! This, with the attempt to 
garrison Adinanuggur and a proposal to build a 
fort in the plain of Kohat far from the town of 
that name, gave me the measure of its military 
talent. Boards indeed rarely have any talent, 
and that of the Punjaub offers no exception to 
the rule. In opposing these useless expenses 
Lord Dalhousie gave me support, but afterwards 
yielded to other advice ; the wall referred to was 
indeed built, yet has been since pulled down ! My 
Military Secretary, Major Kennedy, an engineer of 
the highest class, whose abilities were known to 
Lord Dalhousie ; the Chief Engineer Tremenheere; 
Sir Colin Campbell, Sir Walter Gilbert, and 
myself; all concurred in thinking the wall suffi- 
cient to ensure the defence of Lahore ! My 
authority for its being rased is only an Indian 
newspaper, the Lahore Chronicle, remarkable for 
falsehood, but this fact is credible. 

There are people in India who despise native 
fortifications. This is a great error. Most of the 
English in India laughed at the idea of INIooltan 
making any defence. Major Herbert Edwards 
said in a letter to the President of Lahore, " I 
" should he constrained in self-defence to keep up 
'' our prestige hy taking the city." It is a pity he 
did not ! He would have saved a great deal of 
bloodshed, no small expense, and sustained oar 
prestige. One naturally asks why he required any 
" constraint" to take an enemy's city if it could 
so easily be done ] That it was not to be done in 
so off-hand a style was however discovered by 

49 [cHAr. 


General Whish : when he joined ]\Iajor Edwards, 
their united forces failed with a fearful loss of 
men ; they were forced to decamp and await re- 
inforcements. Our contempt for Indian fortifi- 
cations has been terribly chastised more than once 
by sanguinary repulse and sanguinary success. 
Lahore with my wall was capable of resisting 
Affghanistan and all the Sikh powers banded 
together, and the city had a good commandant in 
Brigadier Tennant, an officer of the superb East 
Indian Artillery. 

When the measures to place Lahore in a state 
of defence were completed, the Governor-General 
permitted me to give over the gates of the town, 
not the citadel, to the civil power, and so spare the 
garrison of the citadel some of its very heavy duties ; 
for strange to say, though a year had elapsed since 
the conquest, and we had been the real rulers of 
it for above three years, the police were not then 
sufficiently formed to take charge of the town, even 
with regular troops in the citadel to su23port them ! 
So much for the vigour of Government, Lord 
Dalhousie's or the Board of Administration ; 
which was in fault is now uninteresting to me, 
at that time not so, for a commander's fame is in 
peril who in times of danger serves a weak Go- 

In Scinde the police were organised, armed, and 
in full performance of duties within one month after 
the battle of Hyderabad. Lord Eilenborough gave 
his orders with a wide discretion, and nothing was 
to be feared but want of capacity to properly 
execute his plans. He never shackled action. All 
local arrangements for the good of Scinde laid 
before him were sanctioned and enforced with a 


CHAP. IV.] 50 

vigour, indicating that his expectations must be 
fulfilled or my government would cease: but 
then zeal in the public service had from him the 
most grateful reward to an honest man — confidence 
and support. 

Before quitting Lahore, arrangements were 
made to construct good barracks for European 
troops, and a proper garrison was placed in the 
fortress of Govindghur, which, being a modern 
fortification, is one of the strongest in India, and 
the strongest in the Punjaub ; it is also of import- 
ance as commanding Umritzer, the chief seat of 
the Sikh religion. My advice was to place a strong 
Martello tower on the wall of Umritzer, within 
reach of the guns of Govindghur. There, on a 
mass of ruined ancient rampart, protected by the 
guns of Govindghur, it could with its cannon 
keep Umritzer in subjection both by physical and 
moral force ; for the Sikhs would not willingly 
draw a fire upon their Temple, to have its ruins 
fill up the sacred Pool of hnmortality : nor in 
truth would any Christian who has seen that holy 
and beautiful edifice ! 

When all in my power was done to secure 
healthy barracks and strong defences around 
Lahore, I went to Wuzzeerabad, stopping on the 
road to examine Sealkote, which I recommended 
to the Governor-General as an important military 
station, — 

1st. Because Lidian princes are ever ready to 
revolt against the oppression of the British Civil 
Government, when tliere is a chance of success ; 
and it was well known Goolab Sing, a modern 
Tiberius for horrible cruelty and villainy, was pre- 
pared to join Shore Sing after the battle of 

51 [chap. IV. 

Chillianwallah. Had Lord Goiigli been defeated 
at Goojerat, or that victory been a drawn battle ; 
had even Shere Sing's power over the other chiefs 
sufficed to substitute for battle his own plan, 
described to me by himself, — crossing the Chenaub 
and rapidly marching upon Lahore — in any 
one of these cases Goolab Sing would have at 
once turned upon the British : and he is a man of 
extraordinary ability. He has a rich treasury, 
quantities of cannon, small arms in abundance, and 
no prince in Lidia ever wants men if he abounds 
in money'? Sealkote being in sight of Jummoo,- 
the Maharajah's capital w^as therefore, in my 
military view, an important position for a large 
cantonment, if found healthy. 

2nd. While it holds the Maharajah's capital in 
check, it is on the road to Cashmere for aggressive 
operations on our part. 

3rd. It is nearer than Wuzzeerabad to the 
Manjha district, which it protects ; and Manjha is 
the most dangerous part of our new territory, being 
the rendezvous of nearly all the soldiers of the dis- 
banded Khalsa Army. 

4th. It covers the road from Jummo to Lahore 
and Umritzer. 

5th. It is supported by the garrisons of those 

6th. In case of a war, my arrangements would 
in a fortnight after it was declared, enable us, from 
Sealkote, to attack Goolab with 20,000 men, and 
take Junimoo before he was prepared for such a 
blow. We could then pursue our success by a 
rapid march upon Cashmere, while supports from 
Lahore, Wuzzeerabad and the Jullunder would 
follow close, and the advance be reinforced by a 

(iiAP. IV.] 52 

combined movement from Jhelum iipon Bimber, 
This would be on a plan of campaign by which 
intrepid troops could, when called on, subdue 
Cashmere in about two months after declaration 
of war, despite of its vast barriers of Himalayan 
mountains. The outline has been left with Colonel 
Drummond, Quartermaster-General, because, in 
case of a war with Goolab Sing, it may be of use. 
Sooner or later that war must come, and a very 
dangerous one it will be, if the passes are properly 
defended, as they assuredly will if it takes place 
during the life of Goolab. 

7th. The station at Wuzzeerabad is costly, and 
its healthiness doubtful, for being cultivated ground 
hired by Government, it is in the wet season inun- 
dated. Sealkote is not cultivated, and therefore 
much cheaper than the ground at Wuzzeerabad. 

8th. At Sealkote there are the strong walls of 
an old castle, which with little cost might be made 
defensible for a small garrison ; and in case of 
war the public stores could be there lodged, and 
the soldiers' families placed in safety. 

The site for a cantonment was a high piece of 
land with a gentle slope on all sides into the sur- 
rounding lower grounds, from whence the waters 
run into the River Chenaub some miles distant. 
On no part of this ground did dampness appear, 
and the neighbouring inhabitants affirmed that it 
was a healthy locality ; nor did the looks of the 
children in the environs contradict the assertion ; 
indeed the people said it wanted water, was too 
dry for agriculture, a fact important for health. 
But thinking there must be water for supply, as the 
wells were not deep, I made an experiment and 
excellent water was found at about twenty or 

53 [chap. IV. 

thirty feet. My plans here were sustained. The 
Governor-General, though not much of a judge as 
to the military or political advantages of Sealkote, 
was alive to the drains upon the public treasury 
caused by Wuzzeerabad. Lieutenant Maxwell, 
of the Bengal Engineers, was set to work by me on 
a well-considered plan for the construction of new 
barracks. His abilities and extraordinary activity 
had been made known to me in the Booghtee Hill 
campaign, where his exertions, day and night, had 
been of great service ; and here the rapid progress 
made in the construction of the cantonment of 
Sealkote again proved his character ; but to infuse 
his energy and sense into the Court of Directors, 
the Governor-General, or the Military Board, was 
impossible. They meddled, they reduced the height of 
the barrack rooms, and deprived the European sol- 
diers of fresh air ! 

That Military Board is a curse on the Indian 
Array. During the ten years of my connection with 
India it was a source of ever-flowing evil. Take 
whatever may be injurious to the Army in India, 
dissect it, and surely, directly or indirectly, the 
Military Board will be found the cause. The 
members, individually, are honourable men ; but they 
are members by virtue of their position, and are 
unable to reform their Board, for the only reform is 
abolition. Their dissensions, dilatory and conflicting 
divisions and unfitness are an insuperable impedi- 
ment to useful progress. Thoy are necessarily 
incompetent to conduct the important aflairs con- 
fided to them, and any business that does get 
through their department is probably effected by 
their subordinates. How should these last know 
what the height of a barrack should bel Why 

cHAr, IV,] 54 

should they care whether the British soldier has 
good food or bad food ; whether he lives liappily or 
dies miserably ; whether he goes into battle strong 
and nourished, or weak and emaciated with fever 1 

Without any direct proof, well I know the altera- 
tions made in my plan for tlie height of the barrack 
rooms — an alteration antagonistic to the principle 
on which they were designed — has arisen in some 
way with the Military Board. Why should the 
Governor-General wish to deprive the European 
soldier of fresh air by reducing the height of the 
barrack room ? Why should the Court of Directors 
wish to do that which either kills the soldier, or 
makes him an unprofitable charge for life upon the 
revenue ? " And why," says the English reader, 
should the Militari/ Board ivish to do sol Because 
the Military Board, in the fulness of its ignorance 
and idleness having once made barracks with low 
rooms continue to do so without making calcula- 
tions for regulating the necessary height ; because 
it never traced sickness among the troops to its 
causes ; never inquired how much air was required 
for the health and comfort of the troops ; in fine, 
made its mischievous rules without reason, and it 
is impossible to turn the wheels out of the deep 
deadly ruts in which they have run for years, jolting 
the public wagon to pieces — it resists all reform, 
and sets its face against improving either barracks 
or contracts for food. 

There may be men in the Military Board, from 
time to time of enlightened minds, feeling for the 
British soldier ; but it is a Board, and in a Board, 
as there is no responsible person, no man can do 
right. Wherever men are in masses the majority 
are deficient in knowledge and lionesty ; and as 

65 [chap. IV. 

most votes carry the question folly and iniquity 
triumph. The Governor-General on this occasion 
may have only heen weak in suffering the height 
of the barracks to be reduced, and the Court of 
Directors, of course, issued their orders in ignorance ; 
but "weakness and ignorance when they destroy men 
are not excusable. Parliamentary notice should be 
taken of the bad barracks in India, for it is a vital 
question to our soldiers, w^hose whole life is to be 
spent in them. My duty to those brave men makes 
me press this point on Members, because, when a 
Commander-in-Chief fails to obtain redress, there is 
no other chance of forcing the Court of Directors 
to spare the lives, the health and happiness of 
the British soldiers in India. Over and over again 
therefore let it be said, that had barracks, that is to 
saij, barracks with low ceilings, are the great cause of 
sickness among European soldiers in India. 



Here the mutinous spirit had also appeared. 

I was told that a young and excellent officer, when 
some Sepoys who were growling — as bad soldiers of 
all ranks, whether English or Sepoys, always do when 
the hardships of a campaign squeeze them a little — 
had said : " For shame ! You pretend to be soldiers! 
" Were I the General, I tvould dismiss you from the 
" Army.''' " If you did,'' answered a Brahmin 
soldier, ^^ you should get no more! we would stop 
" them ! and ivhat could you do then V This passed 
in the way that on a march such dialogues do pass 
between good officers and their men, that is half jest- 
ingly. Officers thus get acquainted with the real 
feelings of their troops, making allowance for the ill 
temper produced at times by severe bodily hardships. 

When Lord Dalhousie heard of this, he wrote, 
saying that had he been the officer, he would have 
made a prisoner of the Brahmin. Most likely he 
would, — so would any one without military ideas, 
or knowledge of mankind- — but this young officer 
knew his trade and comrades too well to do any 
thing so silly. The answer helped him to form a 
correct judgment of the feelings amongst those 
under him. To have arrested the Brahmin would 
have been an error, for no Court could have justly 
punished him : a man may be punished for 
persuading a soldier to desert, but not for advising 

57 [chap. v. 

2i peasant against becoming a soldier. Had Lord 
Dalhousie been in this officer's place, he would not 
only have been unable to punish the fancied crime, 
but would have closed the door of good information. 
The commander at Velore foolishly disbelieved the 
Sepoy who told him there was a conspiracy hatch- 
ing, and petulantly sent him away : he thus sealed 
his own death warrant with that of hundreds more ! 
Without the good intention of the Velore Sepoy, 
this Brahmin, in an unguarded moment, revealed the 
secret designs of his sect, and the officer acquainted 
his commander with the fact thus unguardedly 
made known. It is not by petulance that a know- 
ledge of soldiers' feelings is to be acquired. 

At Wuzzeerabad the men of the 32nd Native 
Infantry had displayed a mutinous spirit, refusing 
the lower pay ; and, as at Rawid Pindee agitators 
had been busy ; but the first appearance of insubor- 
dination had been firmly met by the officer com- 
manding. The station contained several troops of 
Horse Artillery and batteries of Foot Artillery, — 
mostly European, — one European and two Native 
regiments of Cavalry, two European and four Native 
regiments of Infantry; all under Brigadier Hearsey, 
who, as a Cavalry officer, was distinguished at the 
celebrated battle of Seetabuldee in 1817. He ex- 
plained to me how very serious the discontent of the 
Sepoys had been; and the following extract from my 
communication to Lord Dalhousie on the occasion, 
gives correctly the impressions of the moment. 

Camp, 29th Dec, 1850. Extract. — " I have 
" already informed your Lordship that the 32nd 
" N. L also refused their pay. * * ♦ * 

" With regard to this corps, all is, T tliink, riglit 
" now. Brigadier Hearsey was born and brought 

cnAr. v.] 58 

up among the natives, and speaks their language 
as well as themselves. He is also a man of 
great good sense, and made the Sepoys an 
admirable speech, which deeply affected them. 
He then tried the four first who refused their 
pay — not forty-nine, as private letters averred. 
They were sentenced imprisonment with hard 
labour, and he ordered them out and rivetted their 
chains on the full Brigade Parade, from which 
they were marched to the roads and instantly put 
to labour as felons. He then ordered the pay to be 
issued and not a man refused. The four men only 
refused their pay, but they are not the four 
agitators who went from company to company. 
I told you these men must be punished by a 
general Court Martial, and their crime involves 
capital punishment, which I hope the Court will 
award ; for never was there a more distinct 
conspiracy to dictate to Government what pay 
the troops were to receive ; and I am anxious to 
have an example made as soon as we can. 
" It appears that in the 32nd business some of 
the young Sepoys said, " We had better ivait till 
three or four regiments come up, and whatever 
they do, we will do also ! " However, I have 
broken two Subadars, and if the Court will 
sentence these four to death, or what they fear 
more, transportation, the whole affair I hope 
will be at an end, unless war breaks out, and 
then it will appear again as sure as fate. Soldiers 
never let go a money question ; look at the half 
batta question. The European officers of the 
Indian Army will never forget it ! Whether this 
pay affair subsides or not the Government have 
been perfectly just, and this gives Hearsey's 

59 [chap. v. 

" eloquent harangue such force and effect that I 
" hear Sepoys on parade hung down their lieads : 
" some of them shed tears." 

Sir Colin Campbell, to save time, had made an 
unofficial report of the Rawul Pindee affair, 
because it "was the first insubordination ; but from 
Wuzzeerabad came only Hearsey's official report : 
and his private views cannot be given, as those of 
Campbell have been. His opinion was, however, 
that of every officer in the Army. '* The mutinous 
spirit was voy formidable.'' It was only kept down 
by the presence of a powerful European force. 

" We had better tvait till three or four regi- 
" ments come up, and whatever they do we will 
" do also.'' This corroborated the Delhi reports 
of twenty-four regiments being involved. Four 
Sepoys also were tried by Court Martial for having 
" begun and excited a mutiny ; instigating the men 
" of their oxmi and other companies to tahe an oath 
" not to accept reduced pay. One having quitted his 
*' guard to excite his comrades." They were found 
guilty, and sentenced to imprisonment with hard 
labour for fourteen years. 

This sentence was revised with a strong com- 
mentary, which produced a sentence of death ; and 
a second Court having capitally convicted another 
Sepoy, my comment was thus continued. " These 
" five men have been justly sentenced to die, but I 
" commute their sentence into that of transportation 
" for life. In eternal exile they will expiate 
" their crimes. For ever separated from their 
" country and their relations, in a strange land 
" beyond tlie seas, they will linger out their mise- 
" rable lives ! It is a change, but not an amelio- 
" ration of their punisliment : they will remain 

CHAP, v.] 60 

" living examples of the terrible fate which awaits 
" traitors to tlicir colours !" 

In my observation on the first sentence, the 
Indian Army was generally and justly praised ; 
but that praise was, afterwards, by Lord Dalhousie 
most disingenuously quoted as a negation of any 
belief in the existence of a wide-spread spirit of 
mutiny ! But with such a spirit insidiously per- 
vading a large Army, it would have been idiotic, 
when punishing convicted mutineers, to tell all 
other soldiers they were merely unconvicted felons ! 
Unjust also, as well as unwise ; for though many 
regiments were knoAvn to be infected, the how 
many, or how far the infection pervaded the tainted 
regiments, was unknown. Abstaining from whole- 
sale public condemnation, indicates no disbelief of 
danger. The argument is absurd as disingenuous. 
Such unjust folly on my part, would have sufficed 
to originate a mutiny, and caused an existing one 
to spread ! 

The Army generally was fiiithful to its colours ; 
the bad spirit was confined to that portion inthePun- 
jaub, where it wanted and was resolved to have 
more pay : but that was sufficiently formidable ; for 
exclusive of irregulars, there were 50,000 men, and 
strong presumptive proof that some 30,000 were 
mutinous. Had they succeeded, all would have 
imited, and our Indian empire have disappeared ! 
Fortunately, my knowledge in governing soldiers 
was greater than Lord Dalhousie possessed. 

From the death of Runjeet Sing to the battle 
of Sobraon, the Sikh Army was governed by 
" Piinchai/ets,'' or " Punches " — committees of the 
soldiery. These bodies sold the Government to the 
Sikh chief who paid highest, letting him command 

61 [ciiAr. V. 

until murdered by some one who paid higher. 
Between 1841 and 1845, were thus killed, Shere 
Sing, Pertaub Sing, Sena Sing, Dyan Sing, Ilecca 
Sing, Sucket Sing, Juwahir Sing. To these add a 
goodly list of friends murdered with them, their 
wives being burnt alive of course and the Hcd 
Book of Lahore is complete for four years ! Tlie 
Treasury was at last exhausted, and the final 
Government sent the Army over the Sutlej to 
destroy, or be destroyed by the English — a feat 
accomplished at Sobraon. 

Such Mill for ever be the natural sequence of 
armed soldiers demanding higher pay ; yet Lord 
Dalhousie treated as unreal this danger in our 
Army ; not, however, until it had been suppressed 
by me. While it existed, he readily, eagerly, gave 
me full authority to act ; when it was over, he re- 
primanded me ; and thought I would be submissive ! 
His conduct shall have a more complete exposition 
further on. 

The Punchayets misled the Sikh soldiers, who 
were essentially patriotic, for Easterns accept the 
man actually on the throne as the rightful sovereign ; 
and it can hardly surprise those acquainted with 
mankind, that poor ignorant men should adhere to 
the chief who possessed the Treasury. The Sikh 
people had no constitution — their legitimate king 
was the enthroned man who gave high pay ; but 
the Sikh kingdom was thereby destroyed ! INfark ! 
the Punchayets were put down by our disbanding 
the Khalsa Army in 1846-7, in that very Punjaub 
where the British Sepoys were now — only two 
years later — beginning the same system ! To ^^ hat 
extent it was secretly carried is unknown ; but the 
four Sepoys condemned went from company to com- 

CHAT, v.] 62 

pauy administering unlawful oaths to insist on 
higher pay from a Government of a different reli- 
gion, and a different race ! 

Many regiments were of the same mind, and it 
may be assumed that each had, at least, four agitators 
similarly employed. Moreover, Hindoos do not take 
oaths lightly. The Hindoo sworn according to his 
religion, loses caste if he fails. A Brahmin break- 
ing his oath sworn on the water of the Ganges, 
becomes an outcast, accursed amongst men ! and of 
Brahmins each regiment contains a great number. 

Not only was the oath taken among our Sepoys 
thus binding, but many had comrades and relations 
among the regiments of the Sikh Army when 
governed by Punchayets ! Dismissed from the 
Bengal Army for mutiny, they had entered the 
Khalsa force when the Punchayet system was at its 
height, and were among those that forced the rulers 
to give higher pay ; and when the British Govern- 
ment disbanded the Khalsa troops, these Sepoys, 
discharged with the rest, in passing to their homes 
mixed with our Army. Now the most active muti- 
neers were in the 66th, a regiment which entered 
thePunjaub at the time the Khalsas were discharged, 
and early declared, — " They ivoiild have higher jtayy 
They had also been previously at Lucknow, from 
whence more Sepoys come than from any other part 
of India, and being thus most inocidated with the 
Sikh Punchayet doctrines, displayed the virus more 

This was a dangerous state of affairs. An enor- 
mous mercenary Army was to be dealt with, Pun- 
chayets had begun, and had they spread there would 
have been a war of races ! Only thirty regiments 
were supposed to b{^ infected. What of that 1 A 

63 [chap. v. 

surgeon may cut off a mortified limb — a General 
cannot cut off 30,000 men — liis operation is moral. 
Lord Dalhousie having escaped the danger, pre- 
tended there was none ! I who met and put it 
down knew it was great. 

Froui AVuzzeerabad my march was continued on 
Jhelum, Rawul Pindee and Attok to Peshawur, 
which was reached the first week in January. If 
mischief arose it was certain to be greatest at Pe- 
shawur and Attok, where Affghans and Sikhs could 
join the mutineers ; but the troops at Peshawur 
being beyond the Indus, our then frontier, were 
entitled to the high pay and no discontent existed. 
For that reason it was the fitting place for the 
Commander-in-Chief, and because he had a body of 
European troops there, able to recross the Indus, 
join the other Europeans at Rawul Pindee, and 
sweep down all the mutinous stations to Lahore or 
wherever Generals Gilbert and Wheeler might 
have formed their junction. Moreover as rapid 
communication with stations would have been im- 
possible, a subordinate General at Peshawur would 
wait for positive directions, and before they readied 
him might have a hundred thousand Affghans on 
his hands, while the Sikhs and mutineers held pos- 
session of Attok. The Commander-in-Chief would 
have the earliest intelligence and act at once. 

Lord Dalhousie has said, I had no belief that a 
mutinous spirit was in the Punjaub, because I left 
it to go to Peshawur. His military ideas are very 
circumscribed. Peshawur was the most dangerous 
point, and my showing myself at different stations, 
reviewing the troops and exhibiting confidence, 
powerfully tended to diminish the bad spirit ; the 
influence I thus acquired over the Native regiment 

CHAP, v.] 64: 

forming my body guard on that long march was 
very great. 

Here I would expatiate upon my interesting 
journey from Wuzzecrabad, crossing the Acesines, 
Hydaspes and Indus, but illness and a heavy cor- 
respondence compelled me to discontinue my journal, 
except at Jhelum, where some notes on the supposed 
site of the great battle between Alexander and 
Porus were written : all that hard work and debility 
permitted. Sickness could not wholly subdue 
curiosity to see that famous field ; but there was no 
trace of the few points which should yet exist, and 
it is difficult to believe those great soldiers, whose 
words and deeds have lived through more than two 
thousand years, there fought. Doubt destroys the 
interest of such investigations ; and the following 
extract only offers an opinion without study as to 
the antagonistic sites — Jhelum and Jullalpoor — for 
which Alexander's victory is claimed. 

" Jhelum, 11th January, 1850, — Two thousand 
" three hundred years, deficient histories, and a 
" river playing as many tricks as a kitten, offer no 
" satisfactory marks for tracing the site of a great 
" battle. However, Alexander certainly crossed the 
" Jhelum and fouglit Porus either at this place, or 
" Jullalpoor. The passes and form of the country 
" shew that in all times the communication from 
" Attok — at or near to which Alexander crossed the 
" Indus — ran in one line to Ixawul Pindee and there 
" divaricated : one track leading upon Jullalpoor, 
" the other on Jhelum. Hence by one of these 
" roads Alexander marched, and the question is — 
" did he move on Jullalpoor or Jhelum, when he 
" left Kawul Pindee % 

" The banks of the river at cither place cannot 

65 [chap. v. 

be now as they were then ; they vary with every 
flood ; but in favour of Jhchim are two pro- 
babiUties. Alexander would for health, march 
near the mountains ; and, knowing there were 
many great rivers to pass, would rather cross 
them near their sources, than where they inun- 
dated the surrounding plains when rain fell, 
producing fevers, with other obstacles. At 
Jhelum also are the remains of ancient towns, 
one on each bank of the river ; one is called 
Tukt i Sekundur or the throne of Alexander, 
to this day ; the other is on the side where the 
battle was fought ; and many Greek coins are 
found there." 

" Hussein Ahdal. — This is Lalla Rookh's garden. 
The trees were cut down in the late wars of 
Runjeet Sing ; but the hills, the clear stream of 
Avater which runs through the plain, and the 
form of the ground, confirm what is told of its 
former beauty. I have no time to say more ; 
my notice is only in compliment to the memory 
of the lady who loved it, to Fadladeen, and to 
Thomas Moore, for genius and patriotism were 
his, and gave to him 

" That freedom of miud which no vulgar dominion 
" Can tuni from the path a pure conscience approves, 

" Which with hope in the heart, and no chain on the pinion 
** Holds upwards its course to the light which it loves." 


From Jhclum my march had been by the Bukrala 
Pass to Pawul Pindee, where all was then quiet ; 
but the European officers were unanimous that the 
spirit of mutiny still existed ; and it was said here, 
as at Wuzzcerabad, that an unusual correspon- 
dence was going on between the Sepoys of different 
stations. Indeed so many letters had passed 
between Wuzzeerabad and stations in India as 
well as in the Punjaub, that some officers of rank 
urged my opening them to discover the state of the 
mutiny ; saying, that was assuredly the subject of 
them. This did not appear justifiable, save for the 
immediate prevention of bloodshed ; and as in- 
stant action was certainly not then contemplated 
by the mutineers, this odious step would only have 
taken from Government the merit of fairness which 
had hitherto marked its conduct. 

Peshawur was reached the 30th January, 1850 ; 
the garrison was very strong, because the position, 
four marches beyond the Indus, was delicate ; 
hence my first object was to examine the place and 
its vicinity. 

That the Sutlej ought to bound our Indian 
possessions until they are better governed, has 

67 [chap. VI. 

always been my opinion. The hostility of the 
Sikhs rendered that impossible ; but there is no 
impossibility of taking the Indus as a boundary. 
It seems however a law of nature that civilisation 
shall encroach upon barbarism. The American 
" Go-ahead " is not indeed our cry in India, — we 
have a modulated sound, and meekly we borrow 
in jest but decline repaying, and so creep on with 
humble expanding operations. 

Peshawur, a noble town, greatly improved by the 
Italian General Avitabili, is well supplied and 
cheaply, especially in articles coming from Russia. 
With prudent government we might hold it at 
peace with the surrounding tribes ; but with the 
actual government of the Punjaub, it was no surprise 
to hear that fourteen of our men had been 
assassinated in the AfFreedee territory. They were 
making a road, and when asleep in a tent the 
Affreedees severed the cords at night, and while 
the falling canvass held down the poor fellows, cut 
them to pieces. Only one man escaped to a tower 
with a garrison on the top of the Kohat Pass. 

The Affreedees' explanation of this matter was 
communicated by one of tlieir chiefs living in 
Peshawur. Our Government had given him 
money to support his influence among the Affreedee 
tribes ; influence arising, not from his power, but 
that, living in the town on good terms with the 
former Sikh Government, he had become a sort of 
ambassador. The Affreedees, hating the Sikhs, 
seldom entered Peshawur then, but hailed tlie 
British, and this man's house became constantly 
filled with men from the hills. The expense 
exceeded his allowances, and he thus told his 
story : — 

CHAP. YI.] 68 

" AVhen my countrymen came into town I had 
" to receive them or lose my influence. To cnter- 
■•' tain all would have been well ; but if I refused 
" to see them, or, receiving them did not offer 
" refreshment, it gave oflcnce. I was called a 
" traitor, taking the English money and betraying 
" my people : every unpopular act of the English 
" was laid to me, the Affreedees thinking I could 
" have prevented it, if willing. Daily my influence 
" gave way among my tribe and I relinquished my 
" allowance. 

" You ask me why the Aff'reedees have now 
" attacked you 1 This is the reason. Your 
" Government gives a certain sum yearly to be 
" distributed among the chiefs by the hands of 
" your political agent at Kohat. He is a good 
" young man, against whom I say nothing, but he 
" is inexperienced. There is living at Kohat a 
" clever man, a prince of the house of Sooja-ool- 
" Moolta, called the Shah-i-Zadah, a prince, who 
'• told the political agent he could distribute the 
" money among the chiefs better than the political 
" agent could. The latter took his advice and 
" gave the money to this prince, who brought the 
" head men of some small villages and told the 
" agent they were the Affreedee chiefs. They 
" were not. They were men of no influence what- 
" ever, and only received a per centage from the 
" prince who kept the remainder. The Aff'reedees 
" o-ot none of it ! 

'• The Aff'reedees thought it useless to complain 
" to the political agent against his favourite prince, 
" with whom he lived in habits of intimacy ; so they 
" said nothing, though very discontented, as they 
" lost money and were lowered in the eyes of their 

69 [chap. vr. 

" tribes. You began making a road througli the 
" Pass in the mountains between Peshawur and 
" Kohat, a Pass the Sikhs never conquered, and 
" their overthrow gave you no right to the 
*' AfFreedee territory. You English conquered the 
" Sikhs ; but you neither conquered tlie Affreedees, 
" nor had any right to appropriate this Pass which 
" is in our territory ! 

" Still the Affreedees submitted in silent dis- 
" content, until you put a tax on salt at the mines, 
*' amounting to more than seventeen times what was 
" ever before 2)aid, — even the Sikhs did not attempt 
" such an act of tyranny as this, — and as the 
" Affreedees chiefly live by the carrying and selling 
" of salt in Affghanistan, this tax destroyed their 
" traffic, and starvation stares them in the face. 
" * It is better,' say they, ' to die sword in hand 
" ' than by hunger,' — so they declared war a few 
" days ago by killing your detachment." 

He then said the Affreedees were willing to be 
our friends, if we treated them properly — not 
otherwise: that he spoke the truth, and would go 
on my expedition. So he did, and behaved very 
well, keeping always within my reach. He con- 
cluded with these remarkable words : " You, 
" General, ought not to go against the Affreedees. 
" You have a great name in all these countries, 
" you are greatly respected, and now you will be 
" blamed by all." 

]\Iy answer was, " As you think, so do I. We 
" have acted wrongly in this matter, and had your 
" tribes w-aited for my arrival, instead of murdering 
" fourteen soldiers, all you have said would have 
" been laid before the Governor-General, wlio 

cHAr. Yi.] 70 

" would have done you justice*. Originally in 
" the right, the AfFreedees are now in the wrong. 
" They have murdered fourteen innocent soldiers 
" who had neither insulted nor oppressed any one, 
" and obeying orders, suspecting no hostility, were 
" asleep ! I, their Commander, will do my best to 
" punish their murderers. You say there were 
" seven hundred engaged in this attack. Their 
" leaders must be given up. I will to-morrow in 
" arms demand them, and if they are not surren- 
" dered will attack you, being determined to go 
" through the Kohat Pass by fair means or by 
" force. Go, then to Akore, the first village, and 
" say these leaders must be given up to jus- 
" tice." 

He went, and thus all I said to him w^as, accord- 
ing to my wish, spread through the Affreedee tribes 
that niglit. It was not, however, expected that 
they would give up their chiefs ; for though every 
body of men has a Judas, a whole people are rarely 
so base. Yet what could I do ? 

The folly of the Punjaub Government provoked 
my indignation, but I was helpless, and my long- 
iixed opinion that mischief always arises from 
divided civil and military power in government was 
confirmed. When a subaltern in 1798, I had seen 
that great and good soldier, Sir Palph Abercrombie, 
resign command in Ireland because he could not 
agree with tlie Civil Government. In 1803 I saw 
General Fox resign the same command when Lord 

* I have since had reason to believe he would not. Let the 
men of Swat and the surrounding tribes speak to that 
point I 

71 [cHAr. YI. 

Hard wick was Lord-Lieutenant; yet two men, 
more mild of temper, could hardly have been found. 
In India, Lord W. Bentinck and Sir Edward 
Barnes quarrelled ; so did Lord Auckland and Sir 
H. Fane, though both wTre gentle well-meaning 
men. Lastly, Lord Dalhousie and Sir C. Napier, 
and which was right this book is to show ; because 
the public goodwill expressed towards me, when 
appointed Commander-in-Chief, should not be 
abated by false notions as to my resignation. 

The Affreedee chief's story must be true in the 
main. There was no other cause for outrage by a 
people who had received us so joyfully. Knowing 
nothing of the smooth gentle injustice of the 
Directors' Government, they had viewed our occu- 
pation of Peshawur as promising profit. What, 
then could make them lightly war on a power 
infinitely stronger than themselves, when their 
interest told them to be at peace ] Maltreatment. 
And Lord Dalhousie's after conduct exhibited 
more prominently the same incapacity for wise and 
just government. Had Sir Colin Campbell, who 
commanded at Peshawur when I left India, been 
invested with civil authority, he would have avoided 
offending the mountain tribes, who are as easily 
gained by justice as they are soured by injustice ; 
but he was only suffered to act under imliticals, and 
another war — on our side unjust and barbarous 
— arose in February, 1850. It still goes on, and 
may possibly compel us finally to abandon 
Peshawur; for there the French saying, " Le jeu 
ne vaut 2Kis la chandeUe " is strictly applicable. 
During its progress, we have cruelly burned 
beautiful villages, and devastated the land, found- 
ing our claim to do so on a nominally assumed 

CHAP. VI.] 72 

sovereignty of the Sikhs, who neither did nor coiild 
conquer tlie tribes in possession. 

Lord Dalliousic has saddled the Company with a 
costly contest by bad administration ; for he and 
his advisers cannot hiy it on the " jwedatory habits 
of the mountain tribes.'' Those predatory habits 
prevailed equally with the tribes on the Lower 
Indus, and in the Scinde mountains, yet I subdued 
them by conciliation ; and would, with power to 
act freely, have subdued those on the Upper Indus. 
My experience and success in dealing with such 
people was greater than that of any man in the 
Punjaub, and might have drawn more respect 
from Lord Dalhousie. lie was indeed entitled to 
employ those he judged fittest for his purpose, and 
he did so ; but an unjust, cruel warfare against the 
Affreedees, Momunds, Eusofzyes, and men of Swat 
has been the result, for which to God he is respon- 
sible, and should be made so to man. 

Lord Dalhousie's government on the Upper, and 
mine on the Lower Indus, may be briefly con- 
trasted. He insulted the tribes and augmented 
their taxes. I treated the tribes with resi)ect and 
reduced their taxes. He did not conquer the 
Upper Indus tribes, yet treated them as conquered 
when they received him with open arms ! I did 
conquer, and by hard battle, the Lower Indus 
tribes, but treated them gently. He turned friends 
into enemies and peace into war. I turned 
enemies to friends and war into peace. Here it 
may be asked — " How would you have acted to 
insure peace around Peshawur 1 " This is my 
answer : — 

1st. Assembled the chiefs to learn their wishes, 
and accede to them if reasonable, which is scarcely 

"VS [chap. vi. 

doubtful, because a weak power dealing with a 
strong one must be reasonable. 

2nd. The tribes should have appointed, each a 
negotiator for the special affairs of his tribe. 

3rd. The small sum given to the Affreedees 
should have been doubled, and paid monthly in 
advance, not held in arrear as it w^as, without 
excuse, save the insulting one of having a check 
on the chiefs. The Kohat defile is their territory ; 
we had no right to pass it without paying black 
mail, custom dues, or whatever it may be called, 
because that is their chief revenue. Paying in ad- 
vance would have removed discontent and produced 
confidence; feelings generally reciprocated, espe- 
cially when the generous course is first followed by 
the most powerful. Here it would have saved 
expense by saving a war, and established a cha- 
racter for generosity throughout central Asia, 
which the Anglo - Indian Government sadly 

4th. The monthly stipend should have been paid 
in my presence by the civil magistrate ; to prevent 
his cutchery subordinates taking a per centage, 
which the ignorant chiefs would be told, and be- 
lieve, was the civil magistrate's share : unhappily, 
there has been in India too much cause given for 
such belief. 

5th. In return the chiefs should have been our 
police within their own territory, giving up all 
murderers and thieves, or at least the property 
stolen. Failing in that, the value to be deducted 
from the tribute, which would affect the whole 
tribe, perhaps other tribes also ; for a Punclia}ct of 
selected chiefs from all the tribes should have 
decided which was to lose, and until they gave their 

CHAP. VI.] 74 

decision no money should be paid. This might 
have produced liostile feeUngs between the tribes, 
but would have secured peace for us. However, 
only our own subjects should be protected in this 
manner. Foreigners trading with us should win 
their way by paying the black mail, which for 
thousands of years has formed the revenue of the 
mountaineers, and is said to be levied with more 
justice and a lighter hand, than is usual Avith the 
British Government in India*. Our dignity would 
thus have been exalted, not lowered ; that dignity 
in support of which Lord Dalhousie talks so big, 
and does so little, as his Peshawur and Burmah 
wars attest. 

To have the frontier tribes as police was a suc- 
cessful experiment of mine on the Lower Indus, 
where Wullee Chandia a noble old warrior became 
a faithful " Warden of the 3Iarshes-\." Moreover, 
when the hill tribes were brought captives to 
Scinde, the lands they had previously devastated 
were given to them, on condition of good be- 
haviour, and they are now among the best agricul- 
turists in that country : many are also in the 
frontier police, and on more than one occasion have 
fought gallantly. 

6 th. Our treaty should have made the AfFreedees 
find labourers, paid by us, to make a road through 
their territory between Peshawur and Kohat : this 

* See " Shore on ludian Affiiirs." 

f And a friend also. That chief when eighty years of age, 
came three hundred miles to take leave when I was quitting 
Scinde. He asked no favour, but, thinking he owed life to me, 
displayed his gratitude when power was no longer mine. For 
an account of Wullee Chandia, see " Administration of Scinde," 
by Sir W. Napier. 

75 [chap. VI. 

they would have liked, if the land required was 
valued ; and besides paying their labourers liberally, 
they should have had monthly interest on the value 
of the ground for the road. Our justice and 
friendship would thus have been felt, and the 
expense would have been about the salary of one 
member of the Board of Administration ! How 
many times that sum has the war of three years 
with these ill-used people cost ? How many Hves 
have been lost, how little prospect of having a quiet 
frontier there as in Scinde ! But English ignorance 
of Indian character is incredible. Let those who 
doubt read Shore. Would that some able and 
honest Civil servant like himself would publish a 
compressed edition without repetitions. 

7th. The salt tax* should have been reduced not 
increased, as it was. The danger of exorbitantly 
taxing the AfFreedees' means of living was vainly 
urged by the Deputy-Commissioner at Peshawur, 
Lieut.-Colonel George Lawrencef. War ensued, 
and how the Lahore Government taxed salt is 
shown by the following official extract : " The old 
" rate of tax was five to six bidlock loads for one 
" rupee ; which may be estimated at from twelve 
" to eighteen maunds per rupee; a maund is about 
" eighty lbs. The present rate is one rupee per 
" maund ! This change has been ordered to pre- 
" vent the Kohat salt interfering with that from 
" Find Dadur Khan. Large quantities smuggled 
" across the Indus stopped the sale at the last- 
" named place." The folly of this proceeding 

* It should not be called Tax. Government, having a 
monopoly, raised the price from one to twelve and eighteen 
rupees — that is, — forhade the Affreedees to live. 

+ An officer of much merit, for whom I have a great regaid. 

cHAr. VI.] 76 

again measures Lord Dalhousie's capacity for 

8th. I would have paraded the troops at Pcsha- 
•\vur whenever the chiefs were paid, to place our 
generosity and power in juxtaposition. All men 
understand the language of facts. Justice — 
Rupees — Bayonets. Between Lord Dalhousie's 
system of governing and mine was this difference. 
By me the bayonet was shown, never used, and the 
rupee was jmt into the pocket of the native. By 
him the rupee was taken out of the native's pocket, 
while the bayonet and the firebrand were freely 
ap2)lied. The result was 2)eace in Scinde, war at 
Peshawur. The same cruelty and burning seems 
to go on in Burmah ; a reward has been offered 
for the head of a Burmah General, and a town of 
three thousand inhabitants deliberately burned ! 
" But you censurer used the bayonet at Kohat!" 
will be the cry of honest friends in India. Aye ! 
and the next chapter shall show why, despite of 
Lord Dalhousie's attempt to suppress that affair, 
by putting my dispatch in his pocket, as Lord 
Ripon did my dispatch of the Hill Campaign. 
Lord EUenborough's Parliamentary remonstrance 
against the injustice towards me and the brave 
troops employed alone caused their production. 

Mortal sickness fell on Sir C. Napier just as this 
work was roughly finished, and his state made 
reference impossible ; Avherefore, the following 
document, found amongst his papers, is inserted 
here as a note, showing how justly he called his 
own government wise. Every responsibility of 
publication necessarily attaches to me. The people 
of Scinde were not forced into hostility by injustice 

77 [chap. yi. 

as the frontier tribes of the Punjaub were, and then 
afflicted by Lord Dalhousie with fire and sword for 
resenting w^'ong. Was it from ignorance or faction 
that Sir C. Napier's great and successful example 
of good government over a million of people, was 
never alluded to, much less investigated by Parlia- 
mentary committees or Parliamentary orators, 
wdien expressly engaged to discover the best mode 
of ruling India? Truly our legislators are, or 
should be heaven born. Let this however be a 
land-mark! When Sir C. Napier, — at variance 
with the governing powers in India, — was retiring 
to private life, pursued by the revilings of suc- 
cessful knaves, who vainly imagined they had 
crushed him, the Sirdars of Scinde, those fierce 
Beloochees whose might in war, and feudal power 
he had overthrown in battle and by legislation, 
came forward in crowds, pouring forth their riches 
without stint to offer the apparently fallen man 
a testimonial of their attachment, — avowing that 
to him their conqueror, who had slaughtered in 
fight their best men by thousands, they owed free- 
dom and happiness and security. Every feeling 
of wrath had fled from their hearts to make way 
for love and veneration ; and they chose the 
moment when his power was gone, his fortunes 
low, to display their sentiments. AVhat man of 
history can boast of the like'? The sword of 
peace thus bestowed by the Sirdars, the tribute to 
his glory which he most prized, was laid beside his 
corpse when he died, and rested on his coffin when 
he was carried to the grave. 

W. Napier, Lieutenant-General. 

Cairo, February 14M, 1853. — I trust that if I 

CHAP. VI.] 78 

be called home my examination (by the Lords' 
Committee) will not be confined to those points 
which Lord Ellenborough's letter would seem to 
point at, and which could be got equally well, or 
better, by returns, imports, exports, and things of 
that kind. If I am to judge by what I saw of 
Sir George Clerk's examination, there are other 
questions opened regarding the taliimj as ivell as 
the governing of Scinde. 

There is the feeling with which the conquest 
was looked upon in Scinde, which, from my 
intimacy with all the leading men, no one is more 
capable of speaking to than myself. 

There are all the preparations of the INIeers for 
war, in the shape of orders for provisions, for 
Beloochees marching upon Hyderabad, long 
before you came to it, which my possession of 
their records enabled me to discover. 

There are fictions to refute as to the amount 
of plunder taken from them, which the exami- 
nation of the Tosha Kana [treasury] accounts 
enabled me to unravel. 

There is the new * * * of Lord Jocclyn, — that 
the ladies had not carpets to sit upon ; whereas 
they lent me more than I had use for for the 
Durbar when Lord Dalhousie came down. 

There is the fiction of their poverty met by 
the fact, that Outram himself changed his resolu- 
tion of handing them his share of the prize, when 
he found through his then friend, F. French, 
that they were in circumstances of wealth. 

There is the abolition of slavery to speak too, 
and its results, a measure not yet accomplished 
in India itself 

There is the settlement within four years, of 

79 [chap. yi. 

all claims to estates, which twenty-six years 
after conquest they are only very partially work- 
ing through at Bombay. 

There is the early assimilation of weights and 
measures to the Company's standard, a point 
which in a great portion of the rest of India they 
are almost as far from as ever, and the attempt 
at which was met by a riot, or almost a rebellion, 
within the last seven years at Surat. 

There is the introduction of the Company's 
copper money as well as silver, a measure which 
all their ingenuity in Bombay has never, beyond 
the island, been able to effect. 

There is the fact of the average duration of 
civil suits being but two-and-a-half days each, while 
in India the average duration is of twice as many 

There is a system of a per centage on civil suits 
in lieu of stamps, which the best writers in 
Bengal are in vain there advocating the introduc- 
tion of. 

There is the abolition of all private rights of 
seniorage incompatible with the administration 
of public justice, or injurious to the public 
revenue, a measure which in India they would 
gladly, if they could, effect. 

There is a system of police which the Govern- 
ment of the Punjaub and the Government of 
Bombay have been glad to try and imitate. 

There is the fact, that there never was a man 
confined for a political offence and never even a 
riot to put down, to contrast with the daily calls 
for troops to put down outbreaks in the other parts 
of India. 

There arc blood feuds between tribes put down 

CHAP. VI.] 80 

completely, Avliich, before we took Scinde, caused 
an average of between two and three hundred 
murders annually. 

There is public morality supported by putting 
down the infamous beasts, who, dressed as women, 
plied their trade in the Meer's time openly ; and 
there is the fact to be put on record, that the chief 
of them were recipients of stipends from the Ameers, 
as the Government records I became possessed of as 
Collector testified. 

There is child nuu'der and abortion put an end 
to, to which hundreds of infants were sacrificed 

There is the retail trade of opium, put on such a 
footing, as to render the debasing results of its 
use to the extent formerly in practice, now impos- 

There is the barbarous exhibition of men with 
stumps of hands chopped off for theft put an end 
to, and there is the law equally enforced as regards 

There is an asrricultural svstem introduced which 
renders the plunder of the cultivator by any Be- 
looch, to whose tender mercies he was handed over 
as a Jagheerdar, impossible. 

There is a protection given to commerce, and an 
access to the head of the State opened to commercial 
men when they have grievances to complain of, or 
suggestions of improvement to make, which was 
before unknown. 

There is a Belooch population, described in all 
previous works on Scinde as the most barbarous 
untameable ruffians in the world, exhibiting an 
example of order, docility and attention to the 
improvement of their estates in which the land- 

81 [cHAr. VI, 

owner in many civilized countries might find 
something to imitate. 

There is — but why go on with the enumeration '? 
There were more blessings conferred in Scinde, 
within the limited period it was under your 
domination, than have been effected in any cycle 
of ten times the term in other parts ; and in the 
rules for the sale of land, noiv, alas ! put an end 
to, the foundation was laid for the most extensive 
and the most lasting prosperity : and of every 
thing beneficial done since, the foundations were 
laid in the same period. 

This is what the Committee should see and 
know ; this is what should be put upon that 
permanent record. I do not know how far they 
have been touched upon by past witnesses, or how 
far it is your intention to show them by future 
evidence. I have not seen the Blue Book, and of 
your vieW'S I am necessarily ignorant — they have 
been told, to be sure, by Sir William Napier in 
his book; but I do think also that they should 
be told before the Committee, and that by one 
who knows the system in the other parts of India, 
and can speak the more strongly when speaking 
by comparison with it. 

I do not know. Sir Charles, whether, in speak- 
ing so much on these points I bore you, it is 
possible I may, — and if so, you must forgive me ; 
but no dog of decent breed could see a parcel 
of curs yelping at the heels of a nobler animal 
without longing to fix his teeth in the shape of a 
good honest English bull-dog bite in some of 
them ; that is precisely my feeling towards the 
Jocelyns, and Eastwicks, and Ogilvies, and all the 
rest of them, noble of birth or ignoble, who follow 


CHAr. Yi.] 82 

at their cry — * * * * * whom a plain tale, if there 
is any honesty left in England, must put down. 
I only pray Providence to spare you to us and to 
your country for some years, and if it be so, you 
will yet live like the illustrious man whose pall 
you lately bore to see your enemies and maligners 
discomfited, and become the loved and honoured 
of all. England is, in the long run, generally 
just to those wlio illustrate its history ; but painful 
and long, have, in nearly all cases, been the trial 
which envy and faction have made them first 
pass through. I remain &c. &c. 

Was it fitting that Sir C. Napier's beneficent 
government should have been ignored in Parlia- 
ment ? 

Was it fitting that the horrible rule of the 
Ameers, here depicted, should have been praised, 
its fall lamented, and efforts made to restore it 1 

Let the Press of England, the People of England 

answer ! 

W. N. 


The old AfFreedee chiefs tale disclosed the 
motive for murdering our soldiers, a crime pro- 
voked by injustice; still a crime to be punished, 
the victims not being the wrongdoers. It was 
necessary to re-open the Pass to Koliat, because 
one avowed object of my journey was to inspect 
that station, and the plain in which it stood could 
only be entered by the Pass. A personal exami- 
nation was also requisite for verifying an opinion 
on the defence of Kohat, given to the Governor- 
General. That town was a very important post — 
isolated if the defile was not opened — the 
Board of Administration had proposed to build a 
new fort at a distance from the place ; a project 
opposed by me as foolish. Was it for the Com- 
mander-in-Chief to sink his opinion and avoid visit- 
ing an important post within our own territory, be- 
cause a barbarian tribe denied a passage ? Such 
timidity would have gone throughout Central Asia 
as a defeat ! 

An old Indian officer told me he thought it 
" beneath the dignity of a Commander-in- Chief to 
" go on such an expedition ^ It would have been 
more so to let a tribe of AfFrcedees influence the 
movements of Head (Quarters ! In India wars 

cHAr. VII.] 84 

urisc, and Armies appear as by magic; and when a 
hundred and fifty millions of people abhor a hun- 
dred thousand conquerors, of whom two-thirds are 
non-military, how long will po^^•er be preserved 
without constant vigilance 1 The Commander-in- 
Chief should be, if possible, present wherever a 
shot is fired — at least such was my rule. 

That a General should never incur personal 
danger that can honourably be avoided is another 
question. Certainly he should never allow his 
plans to be deranged by exposing himself without 
precaution, as the unhappy Cabul political did, and 
so caused the massacre of a whole Army ! In 
Scinde, the political, Outram, urged me to put my- 
self into the hands of the Ameers, and had I been 
the Quixotic idiot to mind his silly mouthing, the 
massacre of my Army would have followed ; but 
Shakspeare has well ridiculed such folly in the 
Countess of Auvergne's attempt to catch Talbot. 
Outram, like Sir William McNaughten at Cabul, 
would have doltishly lost his own life at Hyderabad, 
liad not troops sent by me, saved him. Captain 
Conway commanded them, and his skilful and 
courageous defence of the Ilesidency — a defence in 
my dispatch erroneously attributed to Outram — 
merits every praise ; and in acknowledging my un- 
intentional error, I accord to that brave man what 
is his right, though momentarily usurped by 

There were other reasons for going to Koliat. 
The newly-raised Irregular corps for the Punjaub — 
some eighteen thousand men — were placed by Lord 
Dalhousie under the exclusive orders of the Board 
of Administration ; a civil body, responsible only to 
the Go^ ernor-General and not very cognisant how 

85 [chap. yii. 

to form soldiers. The young officers at the head of 
these Irreguhir corps, drilled them well, but tlieir men 
were so equipped as to be unfit for service. Whether 
the fault was with Lord Ualhousie, or the Board of 
Administration, is not worth inquiry ; but its mag- 
nitude would have been measured by disasters, had 
a second rising of the Sikhs taken place. 

Reviewing one of these corps under Major Coke, 
at Peshawur, I expected to find it moderately 
drilled, admirably appointed. A magnificent body 
of old soldiers were presented, — not old men, but 
men whose appearance bespoke them experienced 
warriors, and Coke was an officer fit to command. 
But when their arms and appointments were 
examined, the military providence of the Governor- 
General and Board of Administration shone 

One soldier had a musket without a lock ; 
another a lock without a musket. Here was a 
bayonet that could not be fixed ; there a bayonet 
that could not be unfixed. One man had a weapon 
with a lock, the cock of which would not go down ; 
then came one which would not stand up. A fine, 
handsome soldier, six feet high, brawny and 
bronzed, a model Grenadier, his broad deep chest 
swelling with military pride, and his black bril- 
liant eye s])arkling with a malicious twinkle, pre- 
tended to hold over his shoulder, between his 
finger and thumb, a flint — his only arm ! He was 
an epitome of political military arrangement — a 
powerful soldier rendered useless by ignorance ! 

Scarcely had this noble Infantry been reviewed, 
with one of Trrregular Cavalry under Captain Daly 
of the Bombay Fusileers, an excellent officer, wlicn 
orders came from the Board of Administration, not 

CHAP. VIT.] 86 

to me, but direct to them, to march to Kohat! 
Daly's Cavah-y were well equipped, because they found 
tliemselves in everything ; but Cavalry could not 
tight in a mountain pass, among rocky precipices ; 
and if these two regiments had marched, Coke's 
unarmed Infantry would have been cut to pieces, 
or have joined an enemy they could not have re- 
sisted or escaped from ! 

To interfere and go ^ith them in prevention of 
disaster was imperative; hence, taking the spare 
detonating muskets from the regular troops, to arm 
Coke's men, I reinforced my personal escort to 
answer any emergency of battle on my return. 
Including the two Irregular regiments, the expedi- 
tion was made with 2436 Infantry, 700 Cavalry, 
and 6 guns. This force, being supported by 
Peshawur, was sufficient to meet all the tribes, 
although good information gave them some forty or 
fifty thousand fighting men. But they could not 
at once assemble all, and might be beaten then on 
fair ground, because we had cannon and they had 

Expecting to enter their defile without opposi- 
tion, but to be intercepted with sharp fighting on 
the return, fourteen days' provisions were prepared, 
that the consumption of food might give transport 
for wounded men, and abundance of food leisure 
for slow carriage of the severely hurt. 

We marched the 9th February — but here the 
Chapter shall be terminated by a recapitulation of 
reasons for going in person : — 

1st. To see the plain and town of Kohat, and in 
obedience to the Ciovernor-General's orders, give 
an opinion on that frontier, and the new fort pro- 

87 [chap. VII. 

2nd. By escorting, to save the Irregular regi- 
ments ordered by the Punjaub Government to re- 
inforce the garrison of Kohat. 

3rd. To improve acquaintance with the Ben- 
gal troops under fire, which is more prized than 
parade familiarity, and gives chief and troops 
mutual confidence. 

4th. To show the world a Commander-in-Chief's 
progress was not to be arrested by a miserable 
mountain tribe. 

x\ll these objects were effected, and the two Irre- 
gular regiments saved from the destruction prepared 
for them by Governmental negligence. A General 
gets little credit for such services; those whose 
blundering would, but for him, produce useless 
bloodshed and disaster, try to conceal their errors 
by stifling publicity. Kohat was saved, the Bengal 
troops learned my mode of working in face of an 
enemy ; a way was forced through the mountains, 
and our arms were not insulted by having it pub- 
lished in Asia that a single tribe of Affreedees had 
frightened the British Commander-in-Chief from 
his avowed design ! 

It was effected in face of considerable danger. 
A Sirdar, Mahomet Azeem Khan, Avas in arms at 
Bunnoo, south of Kohat, and could have entered 
the Kohat plain with a large force, by one of the 
passes through the salt range, to aid the Affreedees. 
My informants gave him four thousand men, which 
were accepted as two thousand, allowing fifteen 
hundred for exaggeration and five hundred for men 
unwilling to fight ; but he could quickly have 
assembled a large force if he had joined the Affree- 
dees, and his operations were not to be lightly 
treated. All that an enemy can do should be con- 

CHAP. VI I.J 88 

sidercd, and then counter attacks baffling part of 
his plan, may render the rest more easy to deal 
with ; it was in this view three thousand troops 
were employed, and my attack so suddenly made ; 
for the massacre of our men was known only at 
mid-day the 6th February, and at daybreak on the 
9th we marched, which was as quick as the Com- 
missariat and carriage could be organised. 

Mr. McKenna, author of a " History of British India 
Ancient and Modern," says, " After they (the troops) had de- 
*' stroyed some villages, and killed many Affreedees, they returned 
" to their station, having lost tiro officers (only one) and several 
" men, without effecting their object.'' As Mr. McKenna is 
known to have a sincere desire to attain the truth, this correction 
of his error is given. 


From Pcshawur, the Kohat road runs fifteen 
miles over a plain to Mutini, a village near the 
entrance of the Pass of Kohat, and then through 
an uneven ridge projecting from the " Suffied 
Koh" or the White Mountain. Between this ridge 
and the Cabul river lies the plain of Peshawur on 
the North, and on the South, between it and the 
salt range, the plain of Kohat. We marched 
early — baggage in front under a strong advance 
guard, contrary to the usual order of movement 
against an enemy. This was because the confusion 
and danger caused by the baggage of an Indian 
column was known to me, and our first march 
being over the plain, with plenty of Cavalry, the 
enemy dared not come down from his hills to 

The baggage masters were inexperienced, 
their charge would have been long getting into 
march if the troops moved first, it would have 
reached the ground late, and then fatigue and 
impatience would have put the soldiers out of 
heart. My design was to insure a timely arrival, 
to instruct the young baggage masters, to let the 
troops sec the misery of much baggage, and convince 

CHAP. VIII.] 90 

the younger officers of the danger tliiis produced. 
A curious disorder was indeed presented ; however, 
it soon abated, and the baggage officers found 
they had sometliing to do besides sitting on their 
horses smoking cigars, and watching the picturesque 
appearance of Indian baggage in confusion, which, 
seen through the smoke of a pipe, seems '''■fait 
a peindre." The troops following with their 
steady pace cursed the baggage in front, and me 
for putting it there ; that was exactly what I 
wanted ; their favour was regained when they 
found their tents pitched. 

On the 15 th, being only a few miles from the 
village of Akore, at the entrance of the Pass, the 
baggage was placed in rear, strongly guarded ; 
Fisher's Irregular Horse was left to secure the 
entrance of the defile and communication with 
Peshawur and I rode to meet the chiefs at Akore. 
They were told our men had been murdered by 
the Affreedees, who we deemed friends and paid 
as allies ; wherefore the murderers must be given 
up. Their tribe had closed the Pass, but we were 
come to open it ; however, no attack should be 
made unless they fired ; but that would be con- 
sidered a declaration of war. An hour was given 
for a reply. 

The old Affreedee chief before-mentioned went 
into the village with the others for consultation, 
and within the hour returned with this answer: — 
" T//ej/ had nothwg to do with the murders and 
" coidd not give uj) the leaders." The column then 
moved on, a fire was opened upon the advanced 
guard, and a sharp skirmish began. Coke's Ir- 
regulars were sent to attack the other side of the 
village, and the enemy was soon beaten out of it, 

91 [chap VIII. 

but collectetl on the opposite heights. Lieutenant- 
Colonel Ijawrence, the Commissionor, here joined 
in the attack with a Civil force, about two thousand, 
acting separately, and not under my command, 
— a sort of volunteer corps formed of natives for 
the occasion. The Colonel led well, but his 
leading was far better than the following. 

In this skirmish the village was set on fire, and, 
thinking our troops had thus disgraced their 
colours, my anger was strongly expressed; but 
Colonel Lawrence told me the Board of Adminis- 
tration had directed him to burn the villages. 
This was as impolitic as it was dishonourable to 
the character of British soldiers; but no power 
was entrusted to me, and I had been sufficiently 
cautioned against interfering with the Punjaub 
Civil authorities. Entirely deprived of command 
over these troops, I was compelled to witness, and in 
some degree aid their abominable proceeding ; for, 
without the protection of my soldiers, those of the 
Board could not have executed their scandalous 
orders. The villages had been however entirely 
abandoned, save by fighting men, and the in- 
habitants had also carried away the contents of 
their dwellings, otherwise the orders to burn should 
not have been executed! 

This complete abandonment was not difficult, 
the villages are only occupied during the winter ; 
the people migrate in summer to the higher 
mountains. There were, however, other reasons 
for agreeing to the burning. On one hand little 
injury was done; on the other the blame of the 
long frontier war thus sure to be created, Avas as 
sure to be attributed to my preventing the arson. 
It would have been said, burning was the way to 

CHAP. VIII.] 92 

force submission, and all the bloodshed and expense 
which afterwards occurred would have been laid on 
my Quixotic notions. But it was these and like 
shameful proceedings which did cause discontent 
and war, and Sir Colin Campbell has since been 
compelled to submit to the contemplation of far 
worse and more disgraceful scenes. 

When the village of Akore was carried we 
entered the defile, having the baggage strongly 
guarded. An advance of six miles up the defile, 
the Affreedees, as expected, tormenting the rear, 
brought us to a second halting-ground, where we 
had another fight, and destroyed another village, 
many of our men being killed and wounded : indeed 
the whole march was a sharp skirmish. 

From the road on each side the rocks rose very 
steeply everywhere, in some places perpendicularly, 
and to get up them was climbing not walking. 
This under the occasional fire of the enemy, who 
from the summits also rolled great stones down, 
was very harassing to the flanking parties, and 
their physical exertions were great, exclusive of 
the danger ; but this service, to show my confidence 
was chiefly done by the Sepoys, and Mdth good 
courage. European troops might and should have 
been dispensed with altogether, were it not that 
the Afl'reedees alone could, with time, have mustered 
forty-five thousand men ; and Coke's Irregulars 
though superb soldiers were composed of Sikhs, 
Afl"ghans, and even Afl'reedees ! Adventurers 
from many tribes, and truth to tell, there was no 
surety in a severe trial against their changing 
sides ; yet my confidence gained more than we 
could have lost by their enmity, had they turned 
against us. They liad here more than their full 

93 [chap. yiii. 

share of fighting, and seemed to desire a monopoly 
of the whole. 

We passed the night of the 10th under fire, being 
only three or four hundred yards from the summits 
of the surroundhig heights, and several of our 
people were killed. Major Piatt of the 23rd 
regiment, standing at his tent-door, shot an Aff"ree- 
dee who from the top of a rock had killed one or 
two of our people. 

The 11th we marched seven miles, the rocks 
high on our flanks all the way ; but from their 
summits the enemy was dislodged by flanking 
parties, and at a village called Bosteekail we 
encamped on a little circular plain surrounded by 
rocky hills. Here the Civil force again burned one 
or two abandoned villages, and we being in a sort 
of bowl, sent our pickets up to its steep rocky brim, 
crowned with enemies, where the skirmishing con- 
tinued throughout the night. 

Meanwhile I rode to the top of the Pass. 
Hitherto, the way had been up a gradual and not 
very steep ascent, but now it rose like a staircase. 
A rudely constructed tower on the summit com- 
manded the defile, where I traced the site for a 
small square fort described in the replication to See 
Lord Dalhousie's comments on my general memoir, xn., 
A dozen or even six men, could thus defend them- 
selves in ordinary times against a sudden rising of 
the neighbouring tribes, and the fort, besides com- 
manding both sides of the narrow way, could Avith 
its guns sweep the ridge itself It would have been 
a useful work, and the materials for building were 
on the spot, but the plan was mine^ and it has 
never been built ! 

Next day, threading the defile, I descended by a 

Part II. 

CHAP. VIII.] 94 

precipitous road to Koliat, which is in an extensive 
plain — a beautiful little town surrounded by pic- 
turesque trees, with a stream of the purest sparkling 
water gushing froni a rock. A small fort under 
the wall was in a state of dilapidation, yet easy to 
restore, and certain repairs and additions were 
ordered ; but like the fort for the defile, have never 
been executed, and for the same reason. In India 
also procrastination is the rule. Kohat is however 
so completely isolated that if those works are not 
completed some disaster may occur. 

The Board of Administration had proposed to 
abandon this fort, and build a new one in the plain, 
to the Westward, where it could neither protect the 
town nor command anything ; nor is it clear why 
any military post should be at Kohat; but bad 
administration entails bad projects, expense and 
difficulties. Had we conciliated the Affreedees in 
the first instance, a subordinate revenue officer 
would have sufficed at Kohat, and eventually a 
small force at Peshawur. Now such an arrange- 
ment seems hopeless. 

At Kohat I visited the house where that 
charming and courageous woman, Mrs. George 
Lawrence, was kept prisoner by the Affghans, 
suffering much with an indomitable spirit, and 
commanding well-merited respect from the chival- 
rous warriors whose captive she was. They did 
their best to mitigate the austerity of her captivity; 
for she told me, that at one time, when much 
straitened for provisions themselves they would 
not allow her to want, and the sentry at her door 
appeared famished. Her own allowance was very 
small, yet she offered him a portion, which 
he devoured with avidity ; they were all starving, 

95 [chap. VIII. 

and had witli difRculty provided the little food 
given to her ! If Mrs. Lawrence and her gallant 
husband, George, would describe all that passed 
during their imprisonment, a very interesting 
volume would appear. 

Returning from Kohat that afternoon, afflicting 
intelligence of a great misfortune met me. Two 
of our pickets on the rocky heights had been 
attacked and very roughly handled. We had 
many killed and wounded, and among the latter 
Lieutenant Ilillier ; among the former the young, 
handsome, accomplished Sitwell. He was first 
struck down by a rock hurled from above, and then 
slain. It is sad to see so brave a youth fall in 
battle at the early age of nineteen ; more sad, when 
to a gallant spirit is added cultivated talents with 
great promise of social virtues. But his heroic fall 
has a mournful grandeur that must mitigate even 
parental affliction. 

The enemy were now thronging round us, it was 
expected they would attack during the night, and 
a circle of pickets was posted with two guns to 
flank the base of the rocks. 

The return march was to begin at daylight and 
a knowledge of barbarian habits made me expect 
more dangerous attacks than had been made while 
advancing ; we were weaker also by the two regi- 
ments left at Kohat. Wherefore to abate the 
coming assaults I had, when at Kohat, directed the 
spirited young officer commanding there, Lieu- 
tenant Pollock, to march with all his spare men, 
in a North- Westerly direction towards a Pass West 
of the Kohat defile. From thence a hill road led 
to Buzottee, and other strongholds of thv Affrce- 

CHAP. VIII.] 96 

decs, in which the families flying from the villages 
we had burned had taken refuge. 

Our enemies being all upon the heights above 
us, could see what passed on the Kohat plain ; and 
as Pollock was to be well advanced there at day- 
light, I felt assured the Affreedees, seeing him in 
march towards where their families were, would 
hasten to defend the defile he menaced ; and would 
also suppose we were going to wheel in combina- 
tion with him. IVIajor Coke had kept his men at 
the top of the defile to protect our rear-guard, and 
as the enemy, — not knowing he w^as to remain at 
Kohat, — took him for a part of our force, his 
position gave it a quiet march for a mile or two. 
But when he retired the Affreedees followed us ; 
not however in full force; Pollock's feint had 
drawn many towards the Western Pass. 

This was an important diversion. Our Govern- 
ment information, acquired at Peshawur, said the 
Oruckzie and Terah Affreedees had gathered forty- 
five thousand fighting men, exclusive of the 
warriors around us ; and as all are branches of one 
tribe, and combine in danger, he must proceed 
bridle in hand who ventures among their moun- 
tains. To enter them is easy, to retreat difficult, 
to remain stationary all but impossible ; for every 
convoy of provisions may have to fight its way 
through fearful straits, and the strongest Army 
be w^orn out, or paralyzed before an incautious 
commander is aware of his danger. The Emperor 
Akbar lost two large Armies in the Eusofzyes' 
country, opposite to that of the Affreedees' ; and 
the destruction of our forces in Affghanistan 
was another miserable catastrophe to warn impru- 

97 [chap. yiii. 

dent commanders and improvident Govern- 

To give Pollock's feint value wc resolved to 
retread the defile in one rapid march, thus forestal- 
ling the return of those Affrcedees who had gone 
to defend their Western villages. Enough how- 
ever had remained to keep us warm ; and the 
skirmishing in front flanks and rear was incessant 
for thirteen miles. 

Several incidents worth notice occurred. 

Some Affrcedees had gathered on a sugar-loaf 
rock, terminating a spur from the precipitous hills 
on our flank. Beinc: close to the road it barred 
progress, and the column halted. On the summit 
a warrior stood like Fuzcli's picture of Satan, 
with legs wdde apart and arms high in the air : 
waving a sword and shaking a shield he shouted 
and defied us ! A young Artillery officer, — ^Nlaister 
or Delane, — laid his gun with a shell and the 
flying death whizzing through the air burst at the 
moment it struck the brave Affreedce ! His head, 
his legs, his arms, flew like radii from a centre into 
the air, and a shout of exultation burst from the 
troops ! The amusements of a field of battle are 
grim. Condemn not that shout. Life was played 
for in the rough game, and they who won naturally 
rejoiced. It is however a painful remembrance. 

When he fell the others fled, Maister and Delane 
sending shell after shell amongst them with sur- 
prising accuracy. But wliilc this was going on, 
a dozen or two of enemies in the rear cre[)t unseen 
within tlirec hundred yards, and laying their jezails 
on rests sent a volley against some staff officers 
separately assembl(>(l witli spyglasses. None Avore 


CHAP. YIII.] 98 

touched ! Had the Affreedees been armed with 
muskets many must have i^one down. The riiie 
barrelled jezail, so absurdly eulogised, is a long 
cumbrous weapon, nearly harmless in war ; it can 
only be used from the summit of high rocks, 
whence the jezailchee deliberately fires down. 
The range is not equal to that of the musket ; it is 
even a more contemptible aim than a matchlock ; 
and this incident is one of many proofs that it 
would be well if the half-bred soldiers who speak 
of the " deadly aim and long range''' of matchlock 
and jezail thought more and wrote less. 

Our rear guard reached a narrow gorge, w^liere 
the overturning of a gun carriage had caused a halt, 
and the enemy pressed on skirmishing. Sir Colin 
Campbell was placing some Sepoys to cover the 
men about the gun, when the Aft'reedees closed 
gallantly, whereupon he rode forward calling for a 
charge ; but to reach mountaineers is easier said 
than done. Terrified by the Sepoys' rush, they 
fled without firing for a great distance. Campbell 
saved lives by this ebullition of military spirit, 
which he had previously more grandly displayed 
at Chillian wallah, when at a terrible moment he 
charged the Sikh guns with the 61st regiment and 
decided the crisis of that bloody field ! 

After this event the road opened on a small 
plain among rocks, where the enemy was ensconced, 
and from a projecting spur smote our column. 
One of the young Artillery officers threw some 
round sliot against them, and every bullet struck 
where the smoke of a jezail appeared ; but the 
brave barbarians did not move. Shells were then 
thrown and another gun opened ; all in vain ; and 

99 [ciiAr. Yiii. 

Captain Douglas of the Rifles moved to the attack, 
but the column having then resumed its march he 
was recalled. 

Among Colonel Lawrence's men was a chief, 
Futteh Mahomed, or Futteh Alii. He was six feet 
foiu' inches high, and always accompanied by his 
standard bearer, a tall spare man, not less daring, 
yet slight to look at near his gigantic master. This 
Futteh and his followers attacked a hill covered 
with enemies — he with his flag man conspicuously 
leading — the Aft*reedees held their ground, firing 
fast, but on the summit were charged sword in 
hand by Futteh who slew their chief with a single 
stroke " With one blow I split him doivn, no man 
wants a second from me" was his speech and 
it was no empty boast — all had fallen who came 
within the sweep of his sword. He was certainly 
one of the finest men ever seen, and in honour of 
his bravery I made him ride into Peshawur on an 
elephant, with his standard bearer behind the 
Houdah, waving the flag over his head. That man 
and his people will always be faithful to the British 
unless we maltreat him ; not an impossible event 
however, for the British oflicers at Peshawur said 
we had misused some Pathan chiefs who served us 
well in the Aff'ghan war. 

A good lesson in skirmishing was furnished 
during the advance. Coke's Sepoys, attacking a 
height, began firing though the enemy were covered 
by rocks. He ordered them to cease, but they said 
" the enemy will then fire, and many of us will be 
" shot down ; while we shoot they are afraid !" 
During this conversation the firing had ceased, and 
the others, as foreseen, opened hotly : Coke told his 

CHAP. Tin.] 100 

men to fight their own way. and the AfFreedees were 
soon driven from their j)osition. 

The cohnnn reached Mntini in the evening, 
liaving traversed, going and returning, thirty miles 
of Pass, with a loss of only twenty men killed, and 
about ninety wounded ; no baggage was missing, 
and all the objects of the expedition were attained, 
llunjeet Sing, at the head of a great Army had 
tried to force the same defile, and lost a thousand 
men, whereas we did not lose above twenty ! 

Faults had however been committed, severe 
comments were issued and a Native officer was put 
in arrest. The aim of this rebuke was to check 
with the Sepoys a habit of firing without orders ; 
it is common to all young troops when not well 
discij)lined, but inveterate with the fiery men of 
hot climates, and requires vigorous repression. 
Had I remained in India it should have been 
repressed, even by military execution, being a dis- 
obedience inviting defeat. 

TJie following are extracts from a journal, written 
on the evening of our arrival at Mutini. 

" 14th February, Peshawur, We have arrived 
" here after a march of eighteen miles, our loss is 
" not much when the desperate defiles through 
" which we passed, defended by a warlike race of 
" well-armed men, are considered — a disproof of the 
" ordinary nonsense about mountaineers, and ' how 
'' ' unwise it is to eocpcct success against them with 
" ' regular troops.' Only regular troops can suc- 
" ceed against them ! How few men understand 
" war. All this loss and expense has been caused 
" by the Government's inordinate taxation of salt ! 
" The Afireedees will be avenged. This country 

101 [chap. VIII. 

" is miserably governed and * * * has shown want 
'' of abilities as an Administrator. 

" 15th February, Peshawur. Rain is falUiig in 
" torrents ; had it caught us in the mountains, our 
" camels could not have moved ; but I had pre- 
'* pared for accidents by taking fourteen days pro- 
" visions. Altogether it has been a good lesson in 
" mountain warfare. The Sepoys did everything. 
" With exception of the Artillery, we made little or 
" no use of the Europeans, keeping them in reserve, 
" in case the enemy should become more nume- 
" rous than we expected, and throw up works. 

" 16th February. This day seven years I was 
" at Muttaree in Scinde, and made up my mind to 
" attack the Ameers, whatever force they might 
" have. I had then only two thousand men, but 
" having full power, was confident and successful. 
" Such is the difference of being under the orders 
" of a Lord Ellenborough and a Lord Dalhousie. 
" "We are in for plagues here. This Kohat affair 
" is pure blundering. Lord Dalhousie thinks, and 
" so do the members of the Board of Administra- 
" tion, that they are all great generals. They will 
" get us into some fatal scrape by their folly." 

They did do so. The first blood shed was at Sug- 
gow, the 11th of December, 1849. And a " little 
war " has continued up to this time, February 

Previous to our march. Sir Colin Campbell had 
given me a curious letter from the Deputy-Commis- 
missioner at Peshawur. It was his duty to indite 
it, being part of the system of employing 
political agents to advise or rather to dictate to 
general officers. Nominally, tJiey had not this 
power, but had a right to offer advice unasked ; 

CHAP. VIII.] 102 

and aiitlioriscd advice coming from below, with 
authority from above, must be attended to. A 
commander is thus unnecessarily loaded with respon- 
sibiHty, which may confuse and distract his atten- 
tion from the general arrangements with which his 
mind should be exclusively occupied. Those who 
place subalterns on a level with him, forget that he 
can ask their advice if he requires it ; but when 
spontaneously and authoritatively given, if not 
adopted, it throws upon him a very onerous and 
mischievous necessity of explaining his plans to 
subordinates over whom he has no control. And 
also, to superiors who have a control over him, and 
not chary of using their power ! In the midst of 
transactions, demanding the calmest thought, secresy, 
decision and firmness, he finds himself a member of 
a debating society, discussing his own measures ! It 
is thus campaigns are lost and Armies destroyed. It 
is thus the military characters of commanders are 
ruined. Richly they deserve disgrace, however, for 
their weakness. 

A General with an enemy on his hands has 
enough to occupy the most powerful mind without 
listening to the projects of his friends. If Govern- 
ment select an officer for command and give 
him a distinct and decided notice of what is 
expected, and what time and means can be afforded, 
he has a right to act from his own judgment in 
making use of them. If he does not give satisfac- 
tion, supersede liim ! But to control him by 
means of subordinates in direct correspondence with 
superior authorities, is to show want of confidence 
in his ability. When their blunders produce 
failures he becomes a mark for public anger, 
though free from fault; if that can be said of a 

103 [chap. VIII. 

man spiritless enough to be a tool when his 
soldiers are being lost, and his country's arms 

The letter or rather remonstrance runs thus : — 
" Peshawur, 2nd February, 1850. 1st. Having 
" heard yesterday that it is the intention of His 
" Excellency the Commander-in-Chief to withdraw 
" Her Majesty's 60th regiment from Peshawur, 
" and not having heard that any European regi- 
" ment is to be substituted for it, I deem it my 
" duty, with the utmost deference to the judgment 
" of the Commander-in-Chief, to submit for consi- 
" deration the following circumstances. 

" 2nd. The province and station of Peshawur 
" are most peculiarly circumstanced ; the inhabi- 
" tants of the surrounding villages are obedient 
" and respectful, but they are so mainly under the 
" operation of fear. 

" 3rd. The city has 60,000 inhabitants, of whom 
" about 20,000 if not more, are Cabulees, bound by 
" religion and consanguinity to our enemies in 
'• Affglianistan. 

" 4th. These and the people of the villages who 
" are equally so circumstanced are soldiers from 
" their birth, and can at any time muster from 60 
" to 80,000 firelocks, in the use of which they are 
" experienced. 

" 5th. The neighbouring hills are full of a like 
" description of people, but who are independent 
" of British rule and only restrained from making 
" inroads and disturbances by the terror of our 
" arms. 

" 6th. It is not alone the defence of Peshawur 
" itself tliat is to l)e considered, but also tliat wo 

CHAT. VIII.] 104 

" should be prepared at all times to detach troops 
" in "greater or less numbers to promptly suppress 
" any insurrectionary movement in the vicinity, 
" and with such parties there should be a consi- 
" derable proportion of Europeans. 

" 7th. During our recent operations in Eusofzyc 
" the Europeans, Avho were one to four, very essen- 
" tially contributed to our success. 

" 8th. With every confidence in the Native 
" troops, my experience in hill Avarflire of the 
" nature of that which we should be engag-ed in 
" here, induces me to believe that there should not 
" be less than three regiments of European In- 
*' fantry at Peshawur ; and although there is one 
" such corps at Rawul Pindee, still it is to be re- 
" membered that for five or six months of the year 
" no bridge of boats could be kept on the Indus 
" at or near Attok, during which time the Pro- 
" vince of Peshawur must necessarily depend 
" upon the troops within it. 

" 9th. If, therefore. His Excellency the Com- 
'• mander-in-Chief considers it necessary to w'itli- 
" draw the 60th Rifles, I w^ould respectfully suggest 
" that, that regiment be replaced by another corps 
*' of Europeans." 

This is a sample of the system. A regimental 
captain advises the Commander-m- Chief of India 
hoiv to distribute his troops, and teaches him how to 
direct his view of the state of a^'airs ! My com- 
ments, addressed to Sir Colin Campbell, were as 

" Peshawur, February 6th, 1850. 1st. It is the 
'' duty of all civil and military authorities to 
" communicate all information. Major-Generals, 

105 [chap. VIII. 

" Bri<i^adiers, and commanders of posts, may in case 
" of danger act at once and decisively upon such 
" information. 

" 2nd. The first five paragraphs of the Deputy- 
" Commissioner's letter are very well, giving a 
" summary of the state and feelings of the people, 
" but they are not required by me, because after 
" many years of war with these people I am as 
" cognizant of them and their country as I am ever 
" Hkcly to be. 

" 3rd. The paragraphs 6, 7, 8, and 9 contain 
" matters on which the civil officers are not called 
" upon to interfere ; they are purely military 
" things, and rest entirely with the Commander-in- 
" Chief." 

To this was appended the following memorandum 
from Sir Colin Campbell. 

" 1st. The Deputy-Commissioner, in his 6th 
" paragraph, supposes I have to learn the first 
" principles of the military art. Does he fancy 
" that 8000 men are placed here merely to defend 
" the town of Peshawur ? I imagined every one 
" knew this not to be the case as well as I do 
" myself. 

" 2iid. With such parties there should he a con- 
" siderahle portion of Europeans. Tliis is a mis- 
" take. I admit of no such rule. In Scinde, I 
" twice sent the Irregular Horse on detached ser- 
" vice without Europeans. In 1845 I sent them 
" without Europeans to cover the gorges of the 
" Teyague and Sevistan hills. I also sent General 
" Simpson along the valley of the Teyague without 
" Europeans, and iny own column had but one 
" regiment of Europeans. I had in all a some- 
" what less force than the Peshawur force, and the 


" slightest check would have brought a hundred 
" thousand men upon me. 

" At INIeeanee I had less than five hundred 
" Europeans. At Hyderabad not so many, though 
" one battle was against 35,000 men, the other 
" against 26,000 men. I certainly do not admit the 
" Deputy-Commissioner's rule. The Europeans are 
" our best troops, but we are not to imagine that 
" because on important occasions we should useEuro- 
" peans, we must always use them and be unable 
" to fight without them. This is a preposterous 
" doctrine. The Bombay 25th Native Infantry at 
" Kotra carried all before them having no Euro- 
" peans but their officers. So far from thinking 
" Europeans should be with every detachment, the 
" reverse ought to be the rule. Detachments of 
" the Native Infantry ought to be habituated to act 
" ivith a reliance on their own valour and discipline^ 
" and it grieves me when I hear officers express a 
" want of confidence in their Sepoys. This goes 
" far to injure the self-reliance of the Native 
" troops. 

" 3rd. As regards the 7th para. I have no 
" doubt that a regiment of Europeans, armed with 
" firelocks Avhich cost five guineas a piece, as the 
" rifles do, contributed to the success of the opera- 
" tions in Eusofzye ; but had Colonel Bradshaw 
" had all his force composed of Native Infantry, 
" the result would have been equally successful, 
" and much more useful, by raising the confidence 
" of the Native troops. The rule laid down by the 
" Deputy-Commissioner is a deviation from sound 
" military principles, and the prevalence of it in 
" the Army is calculated to deteriorate, not to im- 
" prove the confidence of this noble Army in its 

107 [chap. VIII. 

" own powers. These sort of errors are very 
" dangerous. Commanders of Armies should never 
" permit them to pass unchecked. 

" 4th. I do not know what the Deputy-Com- 
" missioner's experience in hill warfare may be, but 
" I have had some myself; I have, as a subaltern, 
" seen it in Ireland, in Spain, in Greece, and 
" finally conducted one myself in Sevistan, as a 
" commander, with good results. I therefore know 
" something of it. I know its success depends not 
" on European troops, but upon the intelligence of 
" the commander, the drill and discipline of the 
" troops, be they what they may. The number 
" and description of these troops are points which 
" the Commander-in-Chief must decide upon to the 
" best of his judgment, and according to his general 
" arrangement. These mark his fitness or unfitness 
" for high command. 

" 5th. The necessity of another European regi- 
" ment being brought up or not, will depend upon 
" the opinion of the Brigadier, connected with 
" other circumstances. Nothing stated in the 
" Deputy-Commissioner's letter will alter my 
" arrangements. He says Peshawur has 60,000 
" inhabitants that gives 15,000 fit to bear arms. 
" These men have tlieir property and families at 
" stake, probably half of them are engaged in trade 
" and would be ruined by war. Danger from them 
" vanishes at a touch. But the villages in the 
" hills, the Deputy-Commissioner says, can turn 
" out from 60,000 to 80,000 matchlocks. I dare 
" say ! But who is to unite and command them? 
" Who is to pay them ? Who is to combine tlieir 
" operations ? No one. A year of diplomacy and 
" conspiracy among their chiefs would not unite 

CHAP. VIII.] 108 

'' these wild tribes for dan<^crous operations. I 
" know them perfectly and could set them at 
" variance with ease. 

" Suppose they did unite — what then] We saw 
" Bradshaw defeat ten thousand witli two thousand. 
" The eight or ten thousand I proposed to leave 
" here would by proportion be equal to fifty thou- 
" sand in a pitched battle. I won Scinde with less 
" than two thousand, of which only four hundred 
" were Europeans and all were raw troops and the 
" enemy were united under a regular despotic 
" Government. The force here is composed of 
" veterans. What has it to fear '? Nothing. At 
" the same time Sir Colin Campbell will of course 
" keep a " bright look out " and should circum- 
*' stances arise to make him judge a reinforcement of 
" Europeans necessary he shall have them ; but 
" I will not give way to the cuckoo cry in Ben- 
" gal for Europeans, whenever an enemy is ex- 
" pected. 

" I have the greatest confidence in the high 
" spirit of the European officers ; and in the 
*' courage of the Sepoys if ivell disciplined, and the 
" right spirit he put into them hy teaching them to re- 
" sp)ect themselves. But this mania among us of per- 
" suading them that they cannot fight except at the 
" side of Europeans, makes both officers and Sepoys 
" assume the fallacy as a trueism. This is wrong and 
" dangerous. T do not know whether I can restore 
" the proper confidence of the Bengal Army in its 
" powers or not, but I will not despair. We cannot 
" now work alone with our Native forces till we 
" gradually restore the temper of their courage 
" and confidence to what it was in the days gone 

109 [chap. VIII. 

" by, when Lake fought at the head of a handful 
" of Europeans." 

My earnest desire was to encourage the Native 
troops of all kinds, whether under my command 
or that of others, and therefore to Colonel Law- 
rence the following letter was sent after the expe- 

" Feb. 23, 1850. As Daly's and Coke's corps 
" arc not my children I am perhaps not called 
" upon to state my opinion of them. But as I 
" reviewed them both I have great pleasure in 
" saying they are two excellent regiments. I 
" really have seen none better. We all know 
" that it takes more time to form Cavalry than 
" Infantry ; and Daly has got his wild horsemen 
" into excellent order, — his regiment is perfectly 
" pliable and handy and has made Avonderful pro- 
" gress. Tell him to practise them to long and 
" rapid charges by small bodies at first, and thus 
" he will get the whole to charge under full 
" command. I forgot to mention this to him — 
" indeed I was quite delighted with the headlong 
" charge they made, and it is a better style of 
" charge than one held too much in hand as our 
" Cavalry's is, I think ! 

" As to Coke's — I have seen nothing superior 
" to it in drill. It is admirable, and both you 
" and I saw how this brave corps fought under 
" its excellent leader in our five days' campaign. 
" In short I am more pleased Avith these two 
" young commanders than I can well express. It is 
" not to be forgotten that had they gone to Kohat 
" with the execrable arms which Coke's regiment 
" had, they would have been in danger of being 

CHAP. VII I.] 110 

destroyed. It was fortunate I was on the spot, 

' and, foreseeing the danger, sent them good 

' arms. I shall take immediate steps to have 

' them armed as these brave soldiers so well 
' deserve." 


The Kohat expedition acquires interest as the 
offspring of a mistaken system established in the 
Punjaub. It was an early operation in a war, 
caused by that system ; a Avar which has lasted 
more than three years, against a people willing to 
be our friends ; a foolish, unjust, unnecessary war, 
which may go on for many years ; and should dis- 
turbances arise in the Punjaub, the Sikh insurgents 
will find their former enemies of the hills con- 
verted into allies ! 

Condemning the Government proceedings at the 
time ; I did not fail to give the Governor-General 
timely warning of the evil to be expected ; and 
the following letter written when first military 
operations were commencing, will exonerate me 
from the charge of finding fault after the event; 
but Lord Dalhousie had very little experience of 
India or of Government ; none at all of military 
matters, and my warning was fruitless. 

" Lahore^ 20th Dec. 1849. Allow me to draw 
" your attention to the following circumstances. 

" 1st. The employment of regular troops to 
" collect taxes has involved the Government in a 
" war among the hills. 

CHAP. IX.J 112 

" 2nd. Two combats have taken place, and much 
" blood has been shed. 

'* 3id. We appear to have had greater numbers 
" to encounter in the last battle than we had in 
" the first. 

" 4th. I do not know wliether we have passed 
" our own frontier or not : but the men of Swat 
" have fought against us, so the war is with ex- 
" tenial ioes as well as internal; and we have 
" either invaded others, or been ourselves invaded. 
" In these circumstances I want your Lordship to 
" lay down some plans for my guidance, and that 
" with the following views of affairs on your 
" mind. 

" If Colonel Bradshaw now goes forward his 
" force will daily become iveaker, his enemy will 
" become stronger^ he must therefore be reinforced ; 
" this will be a matter of no small expense, and as 
" his distance increases, his convoys would need 
" strong guards. If a hill war is to be carried on, 
" means must be found to finish it with success ; 
" it took me six months to prepare for the liill 
" w^ar in Sevistan. I made friends with hostile 
" tribes in rear of the hill robbers, and after causing 
" dissensions among them I then attacked them 
" in front. This I fear cannot now be done in 
" the Eusofzye country — all in their rear is hostile 
" to us, and friendly to them. 

" If Colonel Bradshaw now retreats he will be 
" pursued, and his retreat will proclaim a success- 
" ful resistance to our power by rebels and their 
" allies! 

" The question therefore arises, where are ive 
" to stop ? These are matters for your Lordship's 
" consideration and orders. War does not brook 

113 [fIfAV. IX. 

delays, and my waiting for instructions from Cal- 
cutta is out of the question. Not only must I 
be prepared with your distinct and positive in- 
structions, but I must prepare Sir Colin Camp- 
bell, and no time must be lost; for though I 
have nothing to apprehend, any post may tell us 
that there is nuich to fear, and for this I wish 
to be prepared to the fullest extent. I have no 
doubt that you have considered the subject of this 
war in all its accidents ; and are prepared to 
support Colonel Bradshaw, or recall him." 

The danger of warring in the Eusofzye country 
was impressed upon my mind by history and by 
experience. Alexander the Great lost an Army 
more to the Westward, — the great Akbar lost two 
Armies in the Eusofzye mountains, and we lost one 
at Cabul not very far from the same place. In the 
Booghtce Hill campaign I had myself, though 
successful, experienced the greatest difficulties, and 
the tribes bordering the Punjaub are said, probably 
with truth, never to have been conquered. They 
did not acknowledge fealty to the Sikhs, and the 
Eusofzyes and Affreedees denied our claim to 
sovereignty, — ready to accept our friendship they 
rejected our rule. A fort has since been built in 
the Eusofzyes' country, but to what purpose"? 
The garrison has been frequently beleaguered, 
and a force which marched against them only 
last year \mder a Brigadier, had this result : people 
were killed and wounded, and the force marched 
back ! 

With a less able man than Sir Colin Campbell 
there would probably have been the name of a 
fifth unhappy commander added to those of Pliar- 


CHAP. IX.] 114 

nuchcs, Zein Khan, Bir Bal, and McNaughtcn ! 
Yet he, one of the best officers in the service, 
has recently been compelled to resign his command ! 
An exposure of Lord Dalhousie's conduct in that 
matter, belongs to others ; but he may have cause 
to regret Sir Colin's absence. Above a hundred 
thousand well armed mountaineers are around 
Peshawur, without including the forces of the 
hostile King of Cabul. 

It has been said in England tliat the Affreedee 
villages were burned by me. That iniquity ema- 
nated entirely from the Punjaub Administration, and 
my reprobation at the time was unmeasured ; 
unavailing indeed against the civil authorities, yet 
openly and officially expressed where it could avail 
with the troops, as the following documents 

To Sir a Campbell, Jan. 2nd, 1850. " I am 
" much annoyed to find by Bradshaw's report that 
" villages have been destroyed. I cannot think he 
" did this, but being resolved to know whose doing 
" it was I send you an official memorandum through 
" the Adjutant-General. What! British troops 
" destroying villages and leaving poor women and 
" young children to perish in the depth of winter ? 
" I can hardly believe this, but will take good 
" care it never happens again under my command. 
" A copy of my memorandum has gone to Lord 
" Dalhousie to show him that this disobedience of 
" his directions is not passed over, and that I am 
" resolved to know who is in fault. Bradshaw is 
" an excellent officer, he has always been held 
" by me as one of the best we have in the service, 
" and if he has done this I shall be vexed ; yet 
" who else could give any orders on the subject 1 

115 [chap. IX. 

" However I care not who, if he was my own. 
" brotlier he should be shown up. I hope it has 
" been the work of the jjoliticals not the soldiers." 
" P.S. Let me know all about this matter 
" quickly." 

The memorandum was forwarded officially 
through the General of Division that all might 
know such savage proceedings, so derogatory 
to a soldier, so injurious, so destructive of dis- 
cipline should not be tolerated. Troops made 
to act as robbers soon become robbers and are 
easily defeated. 

Official memorandum. " It is with surprise and 
" regret I have seen in Lieutenant-Colonel Brad- 
" shaw's report of his march into the Eusofzye 
" country that villages have been destroyed by the 
" troops. 

" I desire to know why a proceeding at variance 
" with humanity, and contrary to the usages of 
" civilized warfare came to be adopted ? I disap- 
" prove of such cruelties, so unmilitary and so 
" injurious to the discipline and honour of the 
" Army. Should the troops be again called upon 
" to act you will be pleased to issue orders that 
" war is to be made on men, not upon defenceless 
" women and children, by destroying their habita- 
" tions, and leaving them to perish without shelter 
" from the inclemency of winter. I have heard 
" of no outrage committed by these wild moun- 
" taineers that could call for conduct so cruel, so 
" unmilitary, and so impolitic." 

Bradshaw, a brave and generous man thus vin- 
dicated his character : 

[cHAr. IX. 116 

" Jan. 13tli, 1850. I have the honour to ac- 
" knowledge the receipt of your letter of this 
" date, with accompaniments Xo. 36 and No. 4 
" from the Deputy-Assistant Adjutant-General 
" of the Punjaub Division, and the Adjutant- 
" General of the Army respectively, and in reply 
" thereto, to enclose, for the information of His 
" Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, a copy of 
" the instructions furnished for my guidance 
" during the detached command in the Eusofzye 
" country. 

" These instructions I carried out to the letter, 
" as far as lay in my power, and having done 
" so, the amount of injury to be inflicted on 
" the property of the foreigners and robbers, oc- 
" cupying the villages alluded to, rested with the 
" political authorities. 

" These villages ivere destroyed hy the orders 
" and under the jjersonal superintendence of the 
" Deputy-Commissioner. 

" Having completely routed and driven the 
" enemy from the valley, I remained there until 
" informed by him that everything he desired had 
" been effected, and that the presence of my 
" force was no longer required : on receiving 
" which intimation I immediately vacated the 
" valley. 

" With regard to the second paragraph of the 
" Adjutant-General's letter I beg to state that as 
" far as I can be aware of the Deputy-Commis- 
" sioner's intentions, the villages in question were 
" destroyed in consequence of their belonging to a 
" race of people who entertained a considerable 
" band of mounted robbers, to the terror of the 

117 [chap. IX. 

" peaceable villages in the Eusofzye district, 
" and that their vicinity to the hills, affording as 
" it did, an easy retreat to the inhabitants rendered 
" their destruction necessary, as the only marked 
" punishment that could be inflicted upon the 
" occupants. It was ascertained that the women, 
" children and all property had been carefully 
" removed, some weeks previous, to other villages 
" in the Swat and Bujair country ; and these tribes 
" with very considerable aid were thus enabled to 
" defend their position to the last with slight risk 
" of loss. 

" One day previous to my advance into the 
" valley the Deputy-Commissioners did to my 
" knowledge communicate with the head men of 
" these villages to the effect, that if they would 
" deliver up the mounted robbers, stolen property 
" &c. they would not be molested : of this proposal 
" no notice was taken excepting by their opening 
" a fire upon our pickets on the first opportunity 
" that presented itself." 

Colonel Bradshaw was a distinguished officer, 
able to sustain the highest opinion. All his com- 
rades regret him, none more than he who pays this 
tribute to his memory. 

The civil authorities were here, as in the defile 
of Kohat, the burners of villages ; but Bradshaw's 
operations being in December left the inhabitants 
Avithout shelter from the severity of winter, whereas 
in February, at Kohat, the cold was past and the 
roofing of the houses easily restored. The first 
caused much suftering, the last oidy indignation, 
neitlier produced good. I said Lord Dalhousie 
should be told of the disobedience of his directions. 
Those Avere " If resistance should be attempted it 

CHAP. IX.] 118 

" should be put down severely, but without tin- 
" necessary harshness, and under all circumstances 
" the head men of the villages will be brought 
" prisoners to Peshawur." From this it might 
be concluded the burning would be rebuked and 
prohibited ; but the orders given to Colonel 
Lawrence at Kohat, two months after, proved that 
Lord Dalhousie thought burning villages no 
" unnecessary harshness." He indirectly approved 
of such savage orders, by thanking the civil au- 
thorities ! He and his politicals like many other 
men mistook rigour with cruelty for vigour ! 

My dispatch to the Governor-General announcing 
the termination of the expedition ended thus. " In 
" this report to your Lordship I have confined 
" myself to fact. In a separate letter I shall take 
" the liberty of stating my opinion as to the 
" causes which have produced these unfortunate 
" events and on the state of affairs here." 

Separate letter. — " Hussein Abdal, February 
" 25M, 1850. I received your letter from Bombay 
" dated 31st January. It was quite impossible for 
" me to answer your minutes on my Military 
" Report sooner than I have done. It was full of 
" grave matter which needed all the consideration 
" I could give it, and also that I should see the 
" stations. However, it is now done and goes 
" Avith this letter. You will see also by ray dis- 
" patch that we had a most disagreeable episode to 
" my tour ! 

" As regards the Kohat affair, so far as I am 
" able to learn from minute inquiry and from all 
" parties, the case stands thus : an enormous in- 
" crease of price was put upon salt, by shutting the 
•' mines ; this vitally affected the Affreedee tribes, 

119 [cHAr. IX. 

" being a necessary of life ; and these peojjle being 
" very poor, it produced great discontent and I 

" believe it to be the real and chief motive of 

" their attack upon our detachment of Sappers. 

" They who live by ' black mail ' do not like roads 

" being made easy^ whose difficult^/ is the robber's 

" means of life and revenue ! "We not only tried 

" to make this road in our own territory ; but we 

" began it in their territory. This was not alto- 

" gether consistent with justice ; but still not 

" wry outrageously unjust ; because we paid these 

" people 6000 rupees a year for a safe passage 

" through their defiles ; and a passage is not alto- 

" gether safe where one runs the risk of breaking 

" one's neck over precipices. Still it was not just, 

" even if we paid the black mail of 6000 rupees. 

" ' But,' say the Affreedees, ' you did not !' This 

" brings me to the third cause of this attack. 

" They say that did not pay them ; he paid 

" a prince of the Sooja-ool-Moolta family, who lives 

" at Kohat, and is a favourite of . That 

" the Lieutenant gives this ' Shah-i-Zudah ' or 

" prince, the money (6000 rupees) that he pockets 

" most of it and distributes the remainder among 

" a few villages situated on the road through the 

" mountains, but the powerful Affreedee tribe get 

" none of the money. 

" They say our occupying the tower and the top 

" of the Pass with Edwards' men is an invasion of 

" their territory, and an insult; that they were 

" never conquered, never owned allegiance to the 

". Sikhs ; that we have no right to invade them. 

" That if we pay 6000 rupees a year to the irroper 

" people^ they will insure the freedom of the Pass 

CHAP. IX.] 120 

" to us and its safety. Now, my dear Lord, I tell 
" you what I have heard and for some part I can 
" vouch, for others I cannot ; but these are the 
" ostensible causes as put forth by the Affreedees. 
" I dare say the Board has another story. The 
" Deputy-Commissioner agrees with me about the 
" salt affair having been the chief cause ; and he 
" is distinctly of my opinion, that it is a mistake 
'' increasing the price of salt : at least so I under- 
" stand him. I tell you all I can gather that 
" both sides of the story may reach you. 

" As to my opinion, it is, that it will be much 
" better to secure the free passage of the defile 
" between Peshawur and Kohat by paying the 
" tribes than by force of arms. These defiles are 
" not to be easily guarded by us, and the expense 
" will be very great ; a thousand rupees a month 
" will enlist these tribes, and make the Pass safe. 
" I do not think that three times that amount will 
" secure them by force: nothing can prevent 
" matchlock-men firing at the traveller from the 
" cliff's, except making it the robber's interest not 
'* to do so. Every murder would require an expe- 
" dition to punish the offence, and no expedition 
" would be certain of success ! If any man tries 
" to make the march I did, with an inadequate 
" force, he will run some risk of being cut off". I 
" do not expect that you will agree with me in my 
" remarks, because our opinions about the Govern- 
" ment of the Punjaub are so different ; but I hope 
" you will give me credit for the frankness and 
" honesty of my opinion." 

The following acknowledgment of the service by 
the Go\ crnor-General in Council might lead to a 

-21 [cHAr. IX. 

supposition that it had been conducted by others, 
not by me. My appreciation of Lord Dalhousie's 
military judgment and that of his Council was 
indeed such as to render their tacit reproof of no 
moment ; yet my age and bad health considered, and 
that I had been on horseback fifteen hours each 
day, more or less under fire, my exertions might 
have been noticed : especially by a Governor- 
General, only tliirty-seven, who had left his 
Government to sail about for health with no small 
detriment to the public weal. 

" Honourable Sir, — We have had the honour to 
" receive your Excellency's dispatch, dated the 
" 16th February, enclosing reports of the opera- 
" tions against the Affreedees, in the neighbour- 
" hood of Kohat, — and in reply beg to express the 
" satisfaction of the Government, with the 
" manner in which this outrage by the rnoun- 
" tain tribes has been met by the troops in the 
" field. 

" 2. The Government has much pleasure in 
" concurring in the praises bestowed by your Ex- 
" cellency on the conduct of the several corps, 
" both officers and men, who composed the force 
" which has been employed, and who have so 
" highly distinguished themselves throughout the 
" operations in the hills. 

" 3. We request your Excellency to convey to 
" Brigadier Sir Colin Campbell, the commanding 
" officers, the officers, and men, the approbation of 
" the Government of India and their thanks for 
" the service which has been performed. 

" 4. The order of merit may very fitly be con- 
" ferred on the soldiers your Excellency has 
" named ; and the requisite steps for that purpose, 

CHAP. IX.] 122 

" shall be taken in the Military Department, 

" &c. &c. &c. (Signed), 

" Dalhousie, J. Littler, 
" F. CURRIE, J. Lowis. 

" Fort William, 15th March, 1850." 

The following extracts from Sir Colin Campbell 
soon confirmed the correctness of my anticipations 
of mischief from provoking the hill tribes. 

Peshawur, March 5^/^1850. Extract. "Intel- 
ligence has this day been received by Lawrence, 
from Captain Coke, up to the afternoon of the 2nd 
instant ; — Of the AfFreedees having collected in 
great numbers on the 28th ultimo, round the 
tower occupied by our people on the Kotal, or 
top of the Pass — of their having obliged the 
garrison to abandon the enclosure outside and 
retire to the inside of the tower; and of their 
having got possession of the tank which supplied 
the garrison with water. 

" Coke had marched on the 1st from Kohat and 
succeeded in relieving the garrison from a 
similar position of difficulty, and introducing 
supplies of food and ammunition, of which latter 
he had not over much to spare. This operation 
cost him 12 killed or missing, and 12 wounded, 
of his regiment. The tower was closely rein- 
vested the following day by the Affreedees, and 
the communication of the garrison with the 
tank again cut ofi". Without water the place 
was not tenable, and it had been shown how 
easily the enemy could deprive the garrison of 
all supply. Kohat had to be cared for, and 
much ammunition had been expended in the 
previous four days by those Irregular troops, who 
cannot be prevented from firing incessantly. 

123 [chap. IX. 

" To move from Koliat a second time with his 
whole force, and that not a large one, to attack 
a strong position for the purpose of throwing in 
the few supplies the tower could contain, and 
opening the communication of the garrison with 
the tank, from which they could again be cut off 
the moment he retired, and which he could not 
accomplish without considerable loss, and the 
expenditure of more ammunition than he could 
spare, made him think it better and more ad- 
visable to withdraw the force from the tower, it 
not being defencible in its present state, except 
at a great sacrifice of life, with the more than 
likelihood of failure after all. 
" The only chance, in the opinion of Lawrence, 
of these Affreedees being brought to proper 
terms, is to destroy their crops, now ripening, 
and to blow up and level every tower and house 
in the defile between Akore and the entrance 
of the Pass on the Kohat side. The crops will 
not be in a state sufficiently advanced to receive 
this injury, until the beginning of April ; and it 
is yet to be seen whether this severity will open 
the Pass permanently for us between this and 
Kohat. As this measure is likely to be adopted, 
and that their houses and towers could be 
eff'ectually destroyed at the same time, and the 
period so near at hand when it is to be done, if 
done at all, it did not appear to me advisable, or 
to Lawrence either, that anything should be 
attempted from this side against these people 
until then. 

" Supposing the houses and crops for this year 
to be destroyed, and these people still remain 
hostile and interrupt our communication Avith 

CHAP. IX. J 124 

Kohat, what is next to be done with them "? Tlie 
hot season will be by that time not far distant, 
when the sun burns very fiercely in these regions. 
In the mean time the women and children of the 
AfFrccdces have found shelter and protection 
with the families of the adjoining tribes, and it 
is the countenance and shelter thus afforded to 
their families by the adjoining tribes that has 
been one reason, in my opinion, for their holding 
out so doggedly against us. 

" They have derived from time immemorial 
their livelihood principally, if not entirely, from 
the sale of salt and fire-wood, both of which I 
imagine they obtained without any cost, beyond 
the labour of their collection. The tax recently 
ordered to be levied on the salt upon its removal 
from the mine, they regard as depriving them of 
a means of livelihood they have enjoyed before 
our arrival, without any such impost, or, at any 
rate, any such amount of impost being levied." 
On receipt of this communication, my anxiety to 
impress Lord Dalhousie with the danger and ex- 
pense of this frontier war induced me again to 
address him. 

Sickerala, 11th March, 1850. Extract. '• What 
" I feared has taken place ; the Aifreedees so far 
" from being cowed, as Lawrence expected they 
" would be, by the burning of their villages are 
" more exasperated, and have taken the Pass ; 
" which can only be held by a work. The regular 
" report will of course have reached you. Campbell 
" tells me Coke lost twelve killed, and as many 
" wounded on the 2nd. The intention of the 
" Deputy-Commissioner is to make a foray next 
" month and destroy the crops of the tribe. I am 

125 . [chap. IX. 

" quite opposed to this proceeding for the follow- 

" ing reasons. First. — It will cost many lives and 
" a good deal of money. Secondly. — It will 

" exasperate these tribes without any definite 
" object, for they are not dependant on these crops, 

" as they have plenty of room in the mountains, 

" where they can always reach our travellers. 

" Thirdly. — It is to wage war with an enemy you 

" cannot reach, and who, in the long run, will 

" have the best of it. We cannot sacrifice twenty 

" or thirty men every harvest, and every time we 

" want to pass a convoy through this defile, I 

" therefore have told Sir Colin Campbell that I 

" will not consent to sacrifice soldiers in such 

" work, unless I have positive orders from the 

" Supreme Government. 

" I see no plan but that which I before men- 

" tioned ; that is to take the Aff'reedee tribes into 

" iKty, and purchase the right of passing safely 

" through their territory. They killed some of 

" our men, and we slew a good many of theirs in 

" return ! In this state I think a man of good 

" sense might so deal with them as to make up a 

" peace with advantage to both parties ; but if we 

" destroy their crops, I do not think this will 

" be easily done. They will refuse peace on any 

" terms. If your Lordship resolves on keeping 

" the Pass by force, we must, at once, collect work- 

" men and build a fort on the top. The plan is 

" all ready, for I made Tremenhecre measure, and 

" I gave him the plan. The cost will be very 

" great; not of the fort itself, but of assembling 

" the workmen and gunrdlng them. But my own 

" opinion is, that we should be Avrong. I strongly 

" recommend that the fort of Kohat should be re- 

cHAr. IX.] 126 

paired immediately . It is fortunate that you did 
not begin to build the fort which the Board 
wanted, in the plains of Kohat : we must have 
either had the whole of the work destroyed and 
lost everything, or been obliged to encamp a 
large force for its protection. The beautiful 
little town of Kohat would have been without 
protection, and the inhabitants must have leagued 
with the hill tribes in self-defence. Its own old 
fort is exactly where it ought to be, and needs 
very little to make it a perfect protection to 
the town. 

" To tell you the truth I think there will be 
great difficulty with this same Pass of Kohat, and 
it would be better to give both civil and military 
power to Captain Coke who is a man of ability 
and experience. I know nothing of young 

but he must have extraordinary abilities if 

at his age he can manage these tribes, and if the 
AfFreedee account be true he cannot do so. The 
acts of the AfFreedees prove they believe what 

they say, whether true or not, viz., that is 

deceived by the Shah-i-Zudah. I tell you these 
things that you may form your own opinion more 

These suggestions passed as the idle wind. Lord 
Dalhousie preferred the opinions of young men of 
slight ability and little or no experience, to mine, 
and that of the war-bred Sir Colin ; the result has 
been suitable to the wisdom. But the story of the 
mutiny must now be resumed. 

On the 25th of February, returning from 
Peshawur, intelligence reached me that the 66tli 
Native Infantry had refused the reduced pay, and 
openly mutinied ! Thus the smouldering insubor- 

127 [chap. IX. 

dination among twenty-four battalions, which at 
Rawul Pindee and Wuzzcerabad had produced 
sparks, was here kindled into flame. The crisis ivas 
come! The 66th were in Govindghur, the strongest 
fortress in the Punjaub, close to Umritzer the holy 
city of the Sikhs. There were no Europeans save 
their officers in the place, which the mutineers had 
attempted to seize. It would have been a decisive 
blow ; for in Umritzer or immediately around it 
sojourned the majority of the Khalsa Army, so 
recently fought with at Chillian wallah and Goojerat 
— men who had put us to straits in five general 
actions ! They were supposed still to be fifty thou- 
sand strong, and known to be sullen, thirsting for 
vengeance, abiding events ! 

How was the fortress saved'? 

Lieutenant-Colonel Bradford an excellent officer 
of the Bengal Army, returning to the old provinces, 
with the 1st Native Cavalry, had accidentally en- 
camped outside, and was on the parade of the 66th 
when their shout of mutiny arose. Seeing the 
danger he hastily rejoined his men, and led them 
dismounted towards the gate; whereupon the guard, 
hearing the tramp of his approaching troops, run 
with great tumult to close the massive portals, 
saying the Cavalry should not enter. Their Euro- 
pean officer remonstrated, was disregarded, and 
improperly abandoned his post to make a report. 
At that moment Captain McDonald, a man of a 
different character arrived, and rushed sword in 
hand upon the mutineers ; they shrunk from the 
sweep of his weapon and he, grasping the almost 
closed gate drew it back just as Bradford came up 
with his men. Thus the place was saved ! 

Had the Sepoys closed the gate, their European 

cHAr. IX.] 128 

officers must have made a desperate effort to recover 
the command and been massacred ; or, seeing the 
futility of such an attempt, remained prisoners. In 
ten minutes the news would have spread all over 
the great city of Umritzer with unbounded exag- 
gerations ; from thence through the district called 
Manga, notoriously disaffected, and the first im- 
pulse of the disbanded Khalsa soldiers would have 
been to rise in arms ! 

The Sepoys at Wuzzeerabad said " We will wait 
till the other regiments come from the old provinces 
and do as they doT The 66th were come, and 
mutinied ! What security for the Government that 
this would not spread from station to station \ A 
drop of blood spilled at Govindghur and the Vellore 
tragedy would have been re-enacted ; and though 
xSir Walter Gilbert had as much courage and ac- 
tivity as Gillespie, he could not have recovered 
Govindghur as the latter did Vellore. For Gil- 
lespie had only the mutineers in that fortress to 
deal with ; Gilbert would have had fifty thousand 
Sikh soldiers outside on his hands, and a portion of 
his own troops secretly engaged to the 66th regi- 

When this news reached me I acted without 
hesitation. Lord Dalhousie's whereabouts was un- 
known, he was supposed to be at sea, but the 
following letter was immediately dispatched. 

" Feb. 27th 1850. The mutiny of the 66th will, 
" ere this, be known to you. I only received the 
" Courts Martial and Court of Inquiry the day 
" before yesterday, and gave my best consideration 
" as to the course to take, and having decided, lost 
" no time in acting. My mind was not long in 
" making up. The whole 66th regiment shouted 

129 [cHAT'. IX. 

" in disapprohation of its commanding officer, 
" when on the parade and under arms ! Wliat was 
" his crime "? He had ordered a soldier to be con- 
" fined for having forced a sentry and by violence 
" led his comrades to seize the arms of the regi- 
" ment* ! This shout was the act of every com- 
" panyl Well! what next? The guard, formed 
" of men of every company, endeavoured to shut 
" the gates and prevent the troops, Cavalry from 
" without who were coming to the aid of the 
" commanding officer, from entering. That is to 
" say, this guard tried to seize the fort ! This is 
'' the plain English of the matter. This wholesale 
" mutiny could not be concocted without the aid, 
" or at least, without the knowledge of the Native 
" officers; yet no whisper of it was made to the 
" European officers! 

" Had the Native officers even shown any 
" activity, any readiness to seize offenders, there 
" would, perhaps, be some cause to doubt their 
" connivance at this mutiny ; but their whole 
" conduct did not exceed a passive forbearance 
" from active mutiny ! Your Lordship well knows 
" my great objection to the disbanding of regi- 
" ments. I had that power placed in my hands 
" in Scinde, and I used it not. But liere hesitation 
" might endanger the safety of the Punjaub, even 
" of India, and I at once issued the general order, 
" copy of which is enclosed, and hope you will 
" approve of it. Each succeeding pay day might 

-■■• In the Bengal Army, the mens arms are lodged after 
parade under charge of sentries, and can only be taken back Ijy 
order of the European officers. In the Queen's Service it was 
formerly the same, but the " Bclh of Arms " are becoming 
obsolete. The ('>Oth regiment was therefore in open mutiny. 


CHAP. IX.] 130 

" produce a regiment in mutiny ; not an hour is 
" to be lost, and, with the Sergeant's answer 
" to Major Chamberlain fresh in my mind, I 
" resolved to show these Brahmins that they 
" cannot control our enlistment. It was neces- 
" sory to strike at once, and to strike with 
" vigour ! 

" What I have done will put the company to no 
" expense, — things remain the same, and our pro- 
" mise is performed to one out of the three Goorka 
" regiments ! I mean to repeat the operation if 
" another regiment mutinies, unless your Lordship 
" disapproves. The matter is a very dangerous 
" affair, and I really see no other method of sup- 
" porting the power of Government in this very 
" perilous crisis. 

" With regard to Sir Walter Gilbert, I think he 

" ought to have revised the sentence of fourteen 

" years' imprisonment on the daring mutineers who 

" seized the gate. Your Lordship knows that I 

" only did not hang five men of the 32nd because 

" I thought transportation for life was the most 

" fearful punishment of the two ! Sir Walter very 

" properly acted at once, but in this case I think 

" injudiciously. His leniency overturned the sys- 

" tem of severity which I had acted on, but the 

" thing was done, and he left me witliout power to 

" change it ! I am not satisfied with the ofiicers 

" of the 66tb. Your Lordship will observe, in 

" reading the proceedings of the Court of Inquiry, 

" that they have tried to diminish the crime of 

" their men. They call the shout of disapproba- 

" tion raised by the armed mutineers at their com- 

" mander '•a murmur.' Look at Lieut.-Col. Brad- 

" ford's and Lieut.-Col. Campbell's evidence! They 

131 [chap. IX. 

" call it by its right name, ' a shout of dimpproha- 
" tion,' I shall not let these murmuring officers off 
" without a reprimand. I like to sec officers asso- 
" ciate with their men in all proper feelings, but 
" not screening mutiny, and an attempt to seize 
" the fort of Govindghur in the midst of the Sikh 
" power ! Had these mutineers succeeded the 
" chances were that the Sikh soldiers might have 
" risen at once." 

The general order enclosed was written wdth the 
severity of censure called for by the crisis, but it is 
not necessary to repeat such censures, and the fol- 
lowing extracts will explain the measures alluded 
to in the dispatch. " The Native officers^ non- 
" commissioned officers and private Sepoys of the 
" Q>Qth regiment are to he marched to Umballah, 
" and there struck offi from the Service of the Hon- 
" ourahle East India Company ; and his Excellency 
" directs that the colours of the ijQ>th regiment are 
" to he delivered over to the loyal and brave men of 
" the Nusseree Goorka battalion ; and that the (^Qth 
" regiment shall in future be denominated the QQth, 
" or Goorka regiment. The 66/A have brought 
" down ruin and disgrace upon the regiment! 
" When a mutinous corps has endeavoured to 
" seize a fortress which a confiding Government 
" believed it had intrusted to faithful soldiers, 
" it is time that vengeance should fall upon the 
" whole." 

After exposing and rebuking a laxity of dis- 
cipline which had prevailed, eulogising Colonel 
Bradford and his regiment, and bestowing 
merited praise on Captain McDonald's energetic 
and intrepid conduct, the order thus proceeded. 
" I'he Com ma nder-in- Chief will take this opportu- 

CHAP. IX.] 132 

" nit}j of expressinfi his fervent hope, that the young 
" European officers of this Army, who are full of 
" ability, zeal and good feeling towards the natives 
" will see the necessity of associating as much as 
" possible ivith the Native officers, and make them 
" their comrades in every sense of the wordy 

Bradford's regiment was retiiriiiiig to the old pro- 
vinces — wherefore the pay difficulty did not affect 
his men's pockets, or furnish a motive for insubor- 
dination in their isolated position ; moreover, he 
was a firm and able commander. This it is neces- 
sary to note, because afterwards Lord Dalhousic 
said the 66tli mutinied " because they were taken by 
" surprise — that they had looked to getting higher 
" pay, and suddenly hearing it was not to be so, in a 
" moment of disappointmetit lost their disci2)line for 
" an instant.'' If so, why did he not restore them 
to their colours and honour \ He dared not ! 
But utterly unfounded are these his assertions. 
The 66th at Lucknow had, long before they 
entered the Punjaub heard the order for re- 
ducing the pay. INIajor Troup, their com- 
mander, had not himself read it according to 
regulation, but it had been read to the Sepoys 
by others, and canvassed throughout the regiment. 
Moreover, at Lucknow, and along the march 
the men liad declared their determination to 
have the higher pay when they reached the Pun- 

It will be recollected that the three Goorka 
regiments in the Company's service had been, when 
starving, promised through me by the Governor- 
General the same pay as Sepoys of the line, and that 
their screams of delight at the promise were astound- 
ing. That promise made 7th October, 1849, ill- 

loo [chat. IX. 

remembered by Lord Dalhousie, was not redeemed 
until the 22nd March, 1850, and then only with 
one regiment and perforce ! Such delays arc con- 
stant in India touching military matters which re- 
quire instant decision, and produce a discontented 
spirit which never exists under just arrangements. 
This might have been here very hurtful, was cer- 
tainly blameable, and personally disagreeable, as 
involving me in a seeming breach of faith : where- 
fore the opportunity to combine a redemption of 
promise with a great public benefit, was eagerly 
seized, so far as the Nusseree Goorka battalion was 

Let the whole chain of evidence regarding the 
mutiny now be summed up. 

First, — A natural desire of soldiers to keep a 
high pay which they had received for some 

Secondly, — The Government reducing that high 
pay to a nuich lower one. 

Thirdly, — Discontent manifested by mutiny in 
two regiments at Rawul Pindee, and reason to sup- 
pose it extended secretly to all other regiments 
going to the Punjaub. 

Fourthly, — This discontent appears again at 
Delhi some Jim hundred miles from Rawul Pindee, 
in a regiment ordered for the Punjaub. 

Fifthly, — It breaks out in the larger station of 
AVuzzeerabad nearer to HeadQuarters; but awed by 
a strong force of Europeans, the mutineers declare 
" they will wait till more Sepoy regiments come up, 
*' and then act in concert." 

Sixthly, — A regiment at Lucknow, ei(jht hundred 
miles from Rauml Pi)idce, displays the same s[)irit, 
and on tlie march to Go\indghur; and there, with 

CHAr. IX.] 13-1 

open mutiny attempts to seize the gates of the for- 
tress, containing a large treasure and magazines of 

Seventhly, — An extraordinary increase in the 
number of letters sent through the post-offices, 
is observed during the foregoing events. 

In face of these proofs Lord Dalhousic to justify 
his conduct when danger was past — indeed he 
could in no other mode reconcile it with sense or 
the appearance of justice — pretended there was no 
mvtiny ! that I had libelled the Army ! IMoreover, 
tliat I believed not in the mutiny because I praised 
the Army. — both cannot stand. — But many muti- 
neers were sentenced to death, transportation, long 
imprisonment, and hundreds consigned by disband- 
ing to infamy and destitution. Were they pardoned 
by him as innocent ! There is here only a choice 
between savage oppression and untruth. 

Were the sentenced all of the 66tli'? No! There 
were others who had insidiously attempted to 
organize a wide combination for passive mutiny ; 
that alone was proof of most dangerous insubordi- 
nation, and that judicious means were taken to 
quell it, for it was quelled ! 

Let it also be noticed, that when the 66th was 
disbanded, the mutiny ceased entirely. Why? The 
Brahmins saw that the Goorkas, another race, could 
be brought into the ranks of the Company's Army — 
a race dreaded as more warlike than their own. 
IVieir religious combination was by that one stroke 
rendered abortive. 


This work opened with a brief outline of the 
causes which led to my resigning a high position 
with sixteen thousand a year. Such advantages 
could only be relinquished because it was dis- 
honourable to keep them without corresponding 
services. Here are the proofs : 

On the 20th January, 1850, twelve days before 
the 66th mutinied, Avhen the crisis was evidently 
approaching, and it behoved me to act with the 
greatest caution, Brigadier Hearsey, writing offi- 
cially from Wuzzeerabad — after the Sepoys there 
had declared they would await the arrival of more 
regiments to enforce their demand for higher pay — 
terminated an analysis of another pay or allowance 
regulation, of a partial nature — which had just be- 
come applicable to his Sepoys — He ended with these 
words : "It appears to me to be altogether a new 
" regulation and ought to be carefully explained to 
" the Sepoys on parade if it is to be the rule for 
" the future, and to be enforced, and not tluis 
" introduced for the first time in a ' new addition of 
" ' Pay and Audit Regulation.' " 

Countersigned by Sir Walter Gilbert in approval, 
this letter reached mc when going to Peshawur, 

CHAP. X.] 136 

about a fortnight after quitting Wuzzeerabad, when 
the mutiny there liacl been but just quelled. The 
Adjutant-General Grant, laid the matter before me, 
expressing his entire agreement with Hearsey and 
Gilbert. He said, " the regulation in question had 
" been concocted hj/ siihordi/iafes in office^ merely to 
" save trouble, and he did not believe the Governor- 
" General or Commander-in-Chief of the time knew 
" it bore hard on the Sepoy. That from its nature 
" it only came into operation locally, and could be 
" known but to a few regiments: to enforce it at 
" Wuzzeerabad would be dangerous ! " 

This representation guided my conduct. The 
Bengal Army's regulations being different from the 
Bombay force with which I had served, minute details 
were necessarily referred to the Adjutant-General ; 
the regulation was said to be new, and it certainly 
deprived the Sepoys unjustly of old allowances at a 
moment when they were mutinous for higher pay : 
wherefore Colonel Grant wrote as follows. 

" January 20th, 1850. — With reference to the 
" letter of the Brigadier commanding at Wuz- 
" zeerabad No. 21 of the 11th instant, bearing your 
" countersignature, bringing to notice the difference 
" between the rates of compensation for dearness 
" of rations to the Native troops, contained in the 
" Pay and Audit Regulations for 1845, and those 
" specified in the Code for 1849, 1 have the honour, 
" by direction of the Commander-in-Chief, to 
" request that you will cause instructions to be 
" immediately issued to the several officers of the 
*' Commissariat Department concerned, to adjust 
" the compensation in accordance with the old 
" regulations as laid down in the Code for 1845, 


137 [cHAr. X. 


In the same hour that reference, as given below, 
was made, the words printed in italics only being 

" Rawul Phidee, 20th Jamiarj/, 1850. — I am 
" directed by the Commander-in-Chief to forward 
" for the purpose of being submitted to the Hon''^® 
" the President of the Council of India in Council, 
" copy of a letter addressed to me by Brigadier 
" J. B. Hearsey, C.B. commanding at Wuzzeera- 
" bad, No. 21 of the 11th instant, with annexments, 
" drawing attention to the difference between the 
" rates of compensation for dearness of rations to 
" the Native troops contained in the Pay and Audit 
" Regulations for 1845, and those specified in the 
" Code published in 1849. 

" By the old regulation the soldier received 
" compensation in money on each article of his 
" ration, calculated separately, when these pro- 
" visions exceeded the regulated prices. By the 
" new regulation the aggregate of the bazaar cost of 
" the whole ration is calculated, and from this the 
" Government rate, also aggregated, is deducted ; 
" so that at Wuzzcerabad, as shoAvn by the state- 
" ment of the Commissariat officer, dated 11th 
" instant, each Native soldier is said to lose one 
" anna six pice per mensem by the operation of 
" the new regulation. 

" This change in the regulation was not observed 
" by Sir C. Napier's predecessor, when the Code for 
" 1849 was sent to Army Head Quarters for any 
" comment tlie Commander-in-Chief might see fit 
" to make ; and Sir Charles Napier is i)ersua(led 
" that the alteration has been introduced witliout 

CHAP. X.] 138 

" the circumstances of the case being fully and 
" clearly explained to the Supreme Government. 

" The Commander-in-Chief considers the change 
" that has thus been made to the injury of the 
" soldier to be both impolitic and unjust, and he 
" feels assured that it only requires to be brought 
" to the notice of the Government, to ensure its 
" immediate rectification. 

" In the mean time, confident of the support of 
" Government, the Commander-in-Chief has directed 
" that compensation shall be issued to the Native 
" troops serving in the Punjaub, in accordance with 
" the rules laid down in the old regulation ; as in 
" the present state of transition from Scinde pay and 
" allowances, to the regular pay of the troops, a tran- 
" sition which has produced a most unprovoked state 
" of insuhordination in some regimetits, the Co7n~ 
" mander-in- Chief thinks that no cause of dissatis- 
" faction should he given to the troops." 

This letter reached Calcutta the 13th Feb- 
ruary; the answer came back the 26th. One 
month and seven days therefore ivere required for 
the Commander-in-Chief to communicate with the 
Supreme Council ! Yet Lord Dalhousie, as shall 
be shown, condemned me for exercising any dis- 
cretion at a moment so full of danger, and on a 
point so purely military ! He would have had me 
wait for an answer ; whicli, might have come as 
waste paper in the midst of terrible disasters 
caused by the delay ! Is this the way to govern "? 
Or is it only one of many signs of personal en- 
mity 1 Let it be recollected that I was of the 
Supreme Council, as well as Commander-in-Chief — 
not that my rights as such were adverted to at the 
time ; there was no reason ; none imagined the pro- 

139 [chap. X. 

ceedings could be thought an encroachment on the 
civil powers of Lord Dalhousic. lie was far away 
on the Pacific Ocean, and had left me full assurance 
of support ; but also the painful task of patching 
up his political blunders ! 

From that wonderful place the '■'■Council Chamber 
in Fort William,'' the answer came, and neither 
Colonel Grant nor myself could repress the thought 
that it was dictated by the very subordinates who 
had originally made the alteration to the injury of 
the Sepoy. 

" Council Chamber, Feb. 14yA, 1850. I am di- 
" rected to acknowledge the receipt of your letter 
" No. 13 of the 20th ultimo, submitting copy of 
" a dispatch from Brigadier Ilearsey commanding 
" at Wuzzeerabad, reporting the circumstance of 
" his having noticed a difference between the 
" regulation recorded in the Pay Code of 1845, and 
" that laid down in the Code of 1849, relative to 
" compensation to the native soldiery for the 
" dearness of their rations; intimating that the 
" Commander-in-Chief, being persuaded that the 
" alteration in question has been made without the 
" circumstances of the case being fully and clearly 
" explained to Government, and considering it to 
" be both impolitic and unjust, has ordered that 
" compensation shall be issued to the Native 
" troops serving in the Punjaub, in accordance 
" with the rule published in the Code of 1845. 

" 2. In reply I am desired by the Hon. Pre- 
" sident of the Council of India in Council, to 
" observe for the information of the Commander- 
" in-Chief, that Brigadier Ilearsey has wholly 
" misled His Excellency, in stating that the rule 
" in the Code of lb49 is ' altogether a new regu- 

CHAP. X.J 1 40 

" lation,' as the foUoAving brief history of the 
" regulation on the subject will show His Excel- 
" lency. 

" 3. Compensation appears to have been first 
" granted to the Native troops, serving at some of 
" .the Western stations, and limited to ottah when- 
" ever that article of food should be selling under 
" fifteen seers for the rupee. 

" 4. Compensation seems to have been subse- 
" quently passed, on special application, to the 
" Native troops at other stations of the Army, 
" Tv^here a scarcity of ottah prevailed, but the rule 
" was not extended to the Native soldiery through- 
" out this Presidency until the year 1844, when 
" Lord Ellenborough's Government in the general 
" order No. 79, dated 12th March of that year, 
" in defining the allowances admissible to the 
" troops serving in the Province of Scinde, ruled 
" that compensation should be granted, not for 
" dearness of ottah only, as formerly, but also for 
" the several minor articles (dholl, ghee, and salt) 
" composing the Native soldiers' rations. This 
" is the order entered in the Code of 1845, 
" page 108. 

" 5. In the following year, Lord Hardinge's 
" Government resolved to sanction a more liberal 
" scale of allowances, and other advantages, to 
" the troops in Scinde, and at the same time to 
" relieve the Native soldiery, generally from the 
" expenses to which, up to that period, they had 
" been subjected, in providing their own huts, and 
" for the wages of certain of the servants neces- 
" sarily employed with Native corps, and as the 
" rule of JNlarch 1844 had been found in jwactice 
" veiy troublesome and inconvenient, as well as in- 

141 [chap. X. 

juiious, inasmuch as, though at some stations 
one of the minor articles of rations may occasion- 
ally be more expensive, the other articles may, 
as frequently, be procurable at rates favourable 
to the soldier, advantage was taken of the oppor- 
tunitj/ thus afforded to introduce the existing rule, 
and accordingly, in para. 3, of the general 
order by the Governor-General in Council of 
the 15th August 1845, it was declared that com- 
pensation would be granted ' whenever the price 
' of provisions forming the Native soldiers' diet 
' shall exceed three rupees eight annas, the 
' aggregate of the rates for the several articles 
' as laid down in the general order of the 
' 26tli February 1824,' for troops on service. 
" 6. It is true that this rule was published in a 
general order fixing the allowances admissible 
to the troops in Scinde ; but seven days subse- 
quently, on the 22nd August 1845, in reviewing 
a letter of instructions on the subject proposed 
by the Military Board to be addressed to the 
Commissary-General, the Governor-General in 
Council caused it to be explained to that body 
that ' as regards money rations that item of 
' grant will cease in Scinde from tlie 1st Septem- 
' ber next, compensation only being allowable 
' there, as elsewhere, whenever the price of pro- 
' visions forming the soldiers' rations shall ex- 
' ceed three rupees eight annas, the aggregate of 
' the rates for the several articles, &c.' " 
" 7. And still farther to remove all doubt on 
the subject, on the 17th December 1847, a 
general order (No. 389 of 1847) was issued by 
the Cjovernor-General in Council republishing 
to the Army para. 3 of the order of the 15th 

CHAP. X.] 142 

" August 1845, already refeiTod to, declaring that 
" that para. ' was intended to be, and is to be 
" ' considered applicable to the Native troops 
" ' generally wherever they may be stationed.' 

" 8. The general order in question of 15th 
" August 1845 was, previous to its publication, 
" submitted to the late Commander-in-Chief, Lord 
" Gough, and its provisions were cordially ap- 
" proved by His Excellency as appears from his 
" minute on the subject, dated 10th June 1845, 
" on record in this department. 

" 9. The Commander-in-Chief, I am instructed 
" to state will thus perceive that the change in 
" the regulation of 12th March 1844 made on 
" the 15th August 1845, and explained in the 
" general order of 17th December 1847 was not 
" ordered hastily or unadvisedly by the Supreme 
" Government ; but on the contrary, after mucli 
" consideration on different occasions and full 
" deliberation, that it had been in operation 
" throughout the presidency long previous to the 
" publication of the Pay Code of 1849 without 
" as far as Government are aware, a single 
" objection being offered to it, and that it was 
" adopted as being perfectly just, equitable, and 
" politic by the late Governor-General (Lord 
" Hardinge) in Council and by the late Com- 
" mander-in-Chief, Lord Gough, and, I am to 
" add, is still so considered by the President in 
" Council. 

" 10th. Under such circumstances the President 
" in Council cannot but regret that his Excellency 
" should without previous communication with 
" Government, have ordered a general regulation 
" passed by the Governor-General of India in 

143 [chap. X. 

" Council, to be set aside at any of the stations of 
" the Army ; but his Honour in Council does not 
" consider it expedient to do more than thus 
" explain the real state of the case, until the 
" arrival of the Most Noble the Governor-General, 
" who is shortly expected at the presidency. 

" Signed R. Wyllie, Major &c. &c." 

This laboured sophistry shall not pass without 
exposure. Brigadier Hearsey is quoted as saying 
the rule of 1849 is altogether a new regulation. 
But his words were — This appears to me. 

What have the paragraphs 3, 4, 5 and 6 to 
do with the subject '? Absolutely nothing ! Except 
four lines in paragraph 5, here italicised, as marking 
why Lord Ellenborough's rule, favourable to the 
Sepoy was altered to one unfavourable. " It was 
" found in practice very troublesome and incon- 
" venient." 

With very good reason I called it unjust and 
impolitic. To deprive a soldier of pay once 
allowed is breaking a promise tacitly made when 
he enlists ; and to do so when three hundred thou- 
sand soldiers are interested is impolitic. It was 
deemed by me an alteration introduced by subor- 
dinates without being fully explained to the 
Supreme Government; because Lord llardinge 
would never, knowingly, do anything detrimental 
to the Sepoy. Just arrived, he had to deal with 
great events ; India and its Armies were to him 
new, and it was all but impossible to examine 
details as to the pounds of grain sold for a rupee, 
and whether a few soldiers in a few places, gained 
or lost some half-pence ! It was not true that 
I suspended the regulation because of its injustice 

CHAP. X.] 144 

and general impolicy, but that it ivas critically 
danf/erous at t/ie moment. 

The 5th paragraph falsely implies that Lord 
Ellenborough's regulation was injurious to the 
soldier. No ! " it was troublesome,'' nothing more ! 

Paragraph 10th. The Council regrets my acting 
on an emergency without previous communication 
with Government. All persons on the spot 
thought the matter too urgent for delay, and the 
suspension was only pending an appeal to Council 
— very different from setting it aside Avithout 

This display of Council wisdom arrived at the 
termination of the Kohat fighting. Ill, and vexed 
at the loss of brave comrades, victims to ignorant 
governing, I answered my colleagues with abrupt- 
ness ; yet, the feelings passing in my mind and the 
great provocation considered, with surprising 
moderation ! A terrible crisis for India was to be 
dealt with, and all my energies were engaged to 
avert spilling of blood, with a shock to the very 
foundation of the empire. Was that a time to 
soothe silly men by humility ? Thus it run. 
" I do not question the propriety of what Lords 
" EUenborough, Ilardinge and Gough thought 
" upon the subject of Sepoys' allowances; nor 
" what the President in Council thinks ; nor 
" do I know what with time to study the question 
" in all its details, I should think myself But 
" when every regiment in the Punjaub was in a 
" state not far short of mutiny about the reduction 
" of pay, it would be something like madness to 
" enter upon a fresh subject of reduction with the 
" troops. I am responsible for the obedience of 

145 [chap. X. 

" the Indian Army, both as Commander-in-Chief 
" and member of Council, and I protest against 
" any change or retrenchment being made at this 
" moment in the allowances of the Sepoy as at 
" first established. I repeat that I think the 
" enforcement of the rule in question would be 
" impolitic, unjust, and most dangerous in tlie 
" present critical moment. I am persuaded that 
" the Governor-General will be of my opinion 
" when he returns. 

" I enclose Colonel Grant's memorandum which 
" shows that Lord Gough did not, and could not 
" have formed an opinion on the case as regards 
" the Punjaub. His opinion applied to a different 
" state of affairs." 

Colonel Grants memorandum. " I beg to sub- 
" mit for your Excellency's consideration with re- 
" ference to paragraphs 3, 4, and 5, that the real 
" question is not how or under what circumstances 
" the rule to which you have objected was framed ; 
" but whether at the present time, when the allow- 
" ances in the Punjaub have been reduced to the 
" ordinary province rates, it is prudent or politic to 
" enforce a rule which deprives the Native soldier 
" of even the trifling addition to the ration com- 
" pensation to which he was entitled under the 
" older regulation, framed by Lord Ellenborough 
" and published in the Pay Code, of 1845. 

" Adverting to what is stated in paragraph 8, 
" with respect to Lord Gough's cordial approval of 
" the existing rule, I would observe, that his Lord- 
" ship could only have considered the ration com- 
" pensation question, as then placed before him, in 
" reference to its bearing on Scinde ; where the 
" soldier was in the receipt of the high rates of 


CIIAP. X.] 14() 

" allowances, then and still enjoyed by the troops 
" serving in that province. 

" I am persuaded liOrd Gongh had no know- 
" ledge of tlie correspondence between the Military 
" Board the Commissariat Department and the 
** Governor-General, to which allusion is made in 
"• paragraph 6 ; and if his Lordship was ever con- 
" suited, which 1 greatly doubt, regarding the 
" general application of the general order by the 
" Governor-General of the 17th December, 1847, 
" (paragraph 9), at all events he could not have 
" considered it in connection with our occupation 
"• of the Punjaub, and the altered circumstances in 
" which the Native troops serving in the new terri- 
" tory are now placed. Neither, I may be per- 
" mitted to add, could these points have been 
" contemplated by the late Governor-General in 
" Council, when for the sake of convenience and to 
" save trouble, as stated in paragraph 5, it was 
" decided to enact the rule to which your Excel- 
" lency has seen reason to object. P. Grant, &c." 

It is worth noticing here the sum of money 
which Government lost by my suspension of the new 
system, £.9 7^. 6r/. in every thousand Sepoys, and 
there were not more than tlirec or four thousand in 
the stations where the extra allowance was paid. 
Wherefore £.40 would have more than covered the 
whole possible loss ! Had an idea crossed my mind 
that Lord Dalhousic would ]-egard this as a des- 
perate attempt to usurp his supreme civil power, 
willingly would I have paid the Sepoys myself, to 
save bloodshed and vital mischief to the commu- 
nity. But the princi})lc ! that is the gravamen of 
the question. Yes ! the principle must be con- 

147 [chap. X. 

sidered. It is precisely that which let a Spanish 
King burn to death in the midst of his courtiers, 
because the official extinguisher of fires was not 
present ! 

I returned to Simla just six months after my 
departure from it ; six months spent in marching 
and under canvass, or fighting. Little did I expect 
the treatment awaiting me, but before touching on 
that, the following letter to Lord Dalhousie will 
show how little anticipation there was on my part 
of rebuke. 

" March 30^/«, 1850. — I delayed answering yours 
" of the 13th instant, which reached me a few days 
" ago, because I thought you would be over- 
" whelmed with business. I now do so. I read 
" what you said about Colonel Grant's memorial, 
" and he wishes it to be sent to the Court. He 
" says what is true, that although the ' extanf 
" Secretary of War's opinion is against him, the 
" ex-Secretary was the identical Secretary who 
" framed the warrant, he therefore decidedly 
" wishes it to be forwarded. 

" With regard to the Peshawur barracks, I am 
" sorry that the Court have a prejudice against bar- 
" racks for officers, because at Peshawur there is no 
" remedy. The narrow slip of ground which alone 
" is adapted to the barracks, will not admit of any 
" other plan than that which Tremenheere acted 
" upon. 

" In the next place it is much safer, for the 
" Khyburee men are most daring. However as the 
" plans are all gone up to the Military Board, you 
" will see how matters stand, and that all has been 
" done that is practicable. 

ciiAr. X.] 148 

" There is this difference between the Lahore 
'' plan and mine, that at Lahore officers receive 
" their rooms gratis, whereas by mine they are to 
" pay rent to Government. Tremenheere does not 
" see how we can alter the plan. 

" Captain Abbott did not say he had no soldiers, 
" bnt that he wanted no more ; I must have ex- 
" pressed myself ill. 

" With regard to the Punjaub Irregular corps, 
" they are very good, but only as to drill ; that is 
" to say as far as the officers commanding them are 
" concerned — but in all depending upon Govern- 
" ment they are lamentably deficient ; indeed unfit 
" for service and useless. I think 1 told you, had I 
" not accidentally been at Peshawur, the orders 
" from the Board for them to go to Kohat could 
" not have been obeyed ; or had it been attempted, 
" the corps would have suffered a most severe loss, 
" if not worse ; none of them had a musket that 
■•' they could have trusted to — -their appoint- 
" ments all equally bad, and their clothing no 
" better. 

" The fact is they arc all old soldiers, and fall 
" into the drill at once; how far they can be 
" confided in I do not pretend to say ; but 
" Coke's regiment fought the Affreedees gal- 
" lantly. 

" On going to Kohat I .found the old fort 
" admirably placed. The new fort which was 
" proposed would have been perfectly useless. 
" Kohat is a pretty spot, — plenty of the very finest 
" water. The old fort completely protects it ; and 
" I told Tremenheere to put it in a good state of 
" defence. I also have written to Sir Henry Law- 
" rence to say he should send some heavy Sikh 

149 [chap. X. 

" guns, which can be done by water to Kala Bagh, 
" and there landed. 

" I have also told Sir CoHn Campbell if there 
" are any Sikh guns at Attok to send them; all 
" the old fort requires is to have the walls loop- 
" holed, and a gun mounted on each tower — a little 
" repair — and no new work, is all that is required ; 
" so there will be no expense of any importance; 
" but even were it some expense, it is necessary, 
" now that Kohat is cut off from Peshawur. With 
" this fort repaired there is no danger to be appre- 
" hended by the garrison of Kohat. The rabble 
" now there, called ' Edward's men ' ought to be 
" formed and drilled. They are good for nothing 
" except the Artillery, which is well drilled 
" enough. 

" The new stations at Sealkote and Meean Meer 
" go on rapidly. I have twice visited Sealkote. 
" I hope we shall get all the troops well under 
" cover this summer, but I feel very nervous about 
" it. But Lieutenant Maxwell and Lieutenant 
" Glover are working liard and feel confident. The 
" Europeans are dreadfully crowded at Lahore, but 
" I applied for some buildings in the fort and 
" palace which will relieve them, for they could 
" not bear their present crowded state in the hot 
" weather. 

" The mutiny of the 66th of course rendered a 
" new arrangement necessary. It would not do to 
" trust the Sepoys at this moment with the entire 
" charge of so important a fortress, which has a 
" large treasury, commands Umritzer, and is in the . 
" Manjha. So I have placed one company of Euro- 
" peans there, two companies of Sepoys, and one 
" of Artillery. By a small addition to the officers' 

CHAP. X.] 150 

" quarters I can lodge the 100 Europeans well; 
" and there is so much brick ready on the spot 
" that tlie additional expense will be trifling. Tre- 
" menheere tells me there is a deadly tank in the 
" midst of the fort ; enough rubbish on its banks 
" to fill it up ; and it will yield a lac of burned 
" bricks ; so I ordered these to be at once used for 
" the barracks, and the tank to be filled up. This 
" will add to the health of the fort, to the circu- 
" lation of air, and reduce expense. 

" I am quite delighted at the order, just come, 
" about the Goorkas ! It puts an end to Brah- 
" min rule! I cannot express the pleasure it has 
" given me. 

" I have now given your Lordship as short an 
" account of my proceedings as I can till we meet. 
" I am on my way to Noorpore and Kangra, just to 
" see that frontier, and report upon it to your 
" Lordship. I expect a grilling ; but for that there 
" is no help. I have taken " Bentinck Castle " for 
" the season, where I hope soon to have the honour 
" of again meeting your Lordship, the only satisfac- 
" tion I have drawn from the mutiny, for had it 
" not been for that I should have been far on my 
" way to England. With kind regards to Lady 
" Dalhousie, &c." 

This design of going to England was founded 
partly on ill health, principally on the conviction, 
from experience, that in peace the actual though 
secret enmity of the Directors and Indian subordi- 
nates rendered it impossible for me to serve my 
country as Commander-in-Chief That unwelcome 
eminence had been accepted only because a negation 
of personal feeling was due to the country ; and 

151 [cHAr. X. 

because expecting Avar I felt strong- cnougli to 
override opposition when danger pressed. I found 
peace and a mean malignant jealousy against which, 
when backed by power lionourable service is of 
no avail. Lo ! the proof 

On the 25th of April, nearly one month after this 
letter, and nearly three months after the events, the 
following reprimand came from the Governor-Gen- 
eral — not sent in the shape of a private communi- 
cation, nor in his own hand writing, nor in that of 
his private secretary ; but through the agency of a 
captain, a Brevet-Major in the Army under my 
orders ! And tliis to a Commander-in-Chief and 
member of Council, to w^hom Lord Dalhousie had, 
up to that moment habitually written personally ! 

" To the Adjutant- General of the Army, — 
" Council Chamber, Fort William, 13th April, 
1850. Your dispatch No. 13 of the 20th 
January, and my reply thereto No. 331, dated 
l-4:th February last relative to the mode of calcu- 
lating compensation for Sepoys' rations, having 
been duly submitted to the Most Noble the 
Governor-General of India in Council, I am now 
directed to acquaint you, for the information of 
His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief that 
His Lordship in Council entirely concurs in the 
opinion expressed in para. 9, of my letter to your 
address of the 14th February above referred to, and 
views with regret and dissatisfaction the orders 
which the Commander-in-Chief intimates he has 
issued to the officers in the Punjaub. 
" 2. There was, I am to observe, no room for 
" doubt as to what were the intentions of the 
" Governor-General in Council, on tliis point, if th(> 

CHAP. X.] 152 

general order of 1847 had been referred to. If 
there had been doubt, the obvious and proper 
course for His Excellency was to have referred 
the matter for the consideration of the President 
in Council, and to have awaited his reply before 
he gave an order which he had no power to 
issue, and which did not in any respect call 
for haste. 

" 3. The Commander-in-Chief has issued this 
order with reference to troops in the Punjaub ; 
His Excellency knows the difficulty of reversing 
an order issued regarding pay ; and he must be 
aware that that difficulty becomes an impossi- 
bility after what has recently occurred in the 
Punjaub. The effect therefore of His Ex- 
cellency's act has been to re-establish in the 
Punjaub (for the Governor-General in Council 
will not sanction the extension of the change to 
districts to W'hich His Excellency's order has not 
applied) a different rate of allowances from that 
Avhich will prevail in other provinces, and thus, 
in great measure to thwart the endeavour which 
the Governor-General in Council has been 
making to assimilate the soldiers' allowances in 
every province of the presidency. 
" 4. His Excellency's orders having been given 
they are hereby confirmed, so far as regards the 
Punjaub ; and officers will be instructed to carry 
them into effect. 

" 5. But the Governor-General in Council, from 
a consideration of the papers before him, feels it 
necessary to intimate for the future guidance of 
His Excellency, that the Governor-General in 
Council wiU not again permit the Commander-in- 
Chief, under any circumstances, to issue orders 

lo3 [chap. X. 

" which shall change the pay and allowances of the 
" troops serving in India, and thus practically to 
" exercise an authority which has been reserved, 
" and most properly reserved for the Supreme 
" Government alone. R. Wyllie, Major, «&:c." 

The difficulty of reversing an order, and that here 
it was an " impossibility^" was an unfounded as- 
sumption ; there was no difficulty no reversing of 
any order, no impossibility ! A regulation of the 
General Government, unknown, de iiicto, to the 
Sepoys was suspended, not abrogated and only pend- 
ing the result of a reference to the Supreme Govern- 
ment. That reference was made without delay. 
Lord Dalhousie had only to say the regulation 
must be the rule and the thing was done ! Such 
a false assumption to sustain an unjust rebuke is 
utterly contemptible. 

Major Wyllie's first letter of the 14th February 
said the old rule was found injurious to the Sepoys 
— wherefore, putting the new rule in force must 
have been satisfactory to them, yet in the opinion of 
those on the spot it was dangerously unsatisfactory ! 

The Council should have been referred to for 
orders ! Why it was so ; but those orders could 
not come in time, and the danger admitted of no 

" The matter did not in any respect call for 
haste.'' What! No haste! When the 66th with 
open mutiny had nearly seized the fortress of 
Govindghur ! Mutinies are not to be bound 
with red tape. When this reprimand arrived, 
memory recalled Diogenes. " They deride thee, 
Diofjenes. Yes ! Hut I am not derided ! " Not 
more cheaply did that philosoiDhcr hold the de- 
rision than I the reprimand ; but a low underhand 

CHAP. X.] 154 

war against me was waged by pitiful intriguers 
about Lord Dalhousie, my contempt did not blind 
me to the fact that they secretly wielded his 
power ; and my holding office could only be 
disadvantageous to the public, dangerous to myself. 
Responsibility was left to me, nothing else; and 
any moment might make me a victim to men who 
had shown tliat neither truth nor sense were for 
them necessary to sustain an accusation. More- 
over my high office would thus become a sinecure, 
shameful to hold. 

Men of honest intentions are reluctant to accept 
the first aberration of a friend as a designed offence. 
With that sentiment, founded on Lord Dalhousie's 
former seeming cordiality, desirous also to avoid an 
open rupture, and fixed to make personal feeling 
bend to the public interest — thinking likewise he 
Avas misled by intriguers, I sent a private explanatory 
communication, having previously, as member of 
Council, warned him of mischief menacing the 
Punjaub. Both documents are given below, but 
neither availed. He was not to be moved to 
wisdom by one, or to justice by the other. 

" Katiffra, April 10th, 1850. Having told you 
" that I have made the necessary preparations with 
" Sir W. Gilbert, and Brigadier AVheeler, to put 
" down any disturbances in the Manjha, I think 
" it right to tell you what I hear, viz. — That the 
" assessment on land was based upon, and the same, 
" as that levied by the Sikhs. This was satisfactory. 
" But lately the Board has added two rupees per 
" beya for water, which has produced great dis- 
" content. Tlie sum raised by the Sikhs was cal- 
" culated on the water being given gratis ; but on 
" water bearing tax tlio sum is too heavy for the 

155 [chap. X. 

Hyots to pay, and there seems to be a general 
opinion that it will be resisted sooner or later. I 
will not go into details, because I am not master 
of them, and they are all within your reacli. If 
you are already cognizant of this matter, all is 
well ; if not, I have done my duty in giving you 
the information." 

" Si?nla, 26th April, 1850. I have just received 
from Lieutenant-Colonel Grant your two official 
letters, both dated 13th instant, and signed by 
INIajor Wyllie and Mr. Halliday respectively. 
The one letter is about the allowances to the 
Sepoys ; the other about my remarks on your 
minute. I will hereafter reply to both officially, 
and when your Lordship reads my explanation, 
especially about the Sepoys' allowances, you will 
be a better judge how far your reprimand to me 
on the latter subject is just. 

" If with a large Army on the verge of mutiny, 
I assumed a certain degree of responsibility to 
secure the public safety, I must take the con- 
sequences, as every man is prepared to do who 
thinks circumstances demand that he should 
incur such a risk : and I can only regret that 
you think I erred. This is a strong instance of 
the dangerous position in which a Commander- 
in-Chief in India may, at any time be placed ; 
viz. — liable to the most serious responsibility, 
yet possessing no power to meet it even in 
military matters ! The enforcement of the order 
consolidating the Sepoys' allowances at that 
moment would have been dangerous, and I was 
seconded in this opinion by two of the most 
capable judges in India, from their position, 
their abilities, and their long ex})crienco in the 

CHAP. X.] 156 

" Indian Army — I mean Lieutenant-Colonel Grant, 
" the Adjutant-General, and Brigadier Hearsey, 
" who commanded the station in which the 
" mutiny had most recently made its appearance. 
" I therefore feel satisfied I was justified hy cir- 
" cumstances in acting as I did ; and you will see 
" by the enclosed memorandum which I wrote in 
" reply to Major "VVyllie's letter to Colonel Grant, 
" dated 14th February, that I felt confident of 
" your Lordsliip's approbation and support ! At 
" the same time, I have no right whatever to 
" complain that your Lordship, as the higher 
" authority, should judge for yourself; and I do 
" not complain. At the same time, as Commandcr- 
" in-Chief in India, I cannot be expected to 
" expose myself willingly, in future, to such 
" another reprimand for exercising my professional 
" judgment in a critical moment, and when no 
" higher authority than my own was on the spot ; 
" and even had the whole Supreme Council been 
" there, I much doubt whether, in a question of 
" mutiny, any of them would be so well able to 
" judge as the Commander-in-Chief of the Army. 

" With respect to the letter about my reply to 
" your minutes ; I assure you that while implicitly 
" adhering to the opinions which I expressed 
" about the Punjaub, I never complained either 
" publicly or privately of want of support from 
" -you ! When I said that I received no infor- 
" mation, I referred entirely to the Punjaub 
" Government, not to the Supreme Government ; 
" and this referred to wformation, not to support. 
" I never complained of want of support from 
" any Government, nor any individual ! I was in 
" the Punjaub ; I was writing about the Punjaub ; 

157 [chap. X. 

" and when I spoke of ' Government,' I, of course, 
" referred exclusively to the Government of the 
" Punjaub. It gave me suggestions where I ought 
" to place troops, and these suggestions were 
" ridiculous, because there was no shelter for 
" troops where they proposed to place them, and if 
" there had been, I would not have complied with 
" their suggestions ; for it would have been con- 
" trary to common sense to scatter troops in the 
" most dangerous part of the Punjaub, and the 
" most unhealthy, when I covdd keep them together 
" in masses, and in a healthy country, close to the 
" supposed danger ! These suggestions I said, and 
" say still, do more harm than an enemy : they 
" threw upon me the great responsibility of 
" rejecting the advice of the Government of the 
" Punjaub ; and however correct and just my 
" arrangements might have been, chance might 
" have produced some mishap, and the public 
" would have naturally turned upon me, and said 
" ' The Punjaub Government warned you, and 
" ' you would not listen to it.' Therefore I said 
" that such improper interferences are, in my 
" opinion, much more embarrassing than an 
" enemy ; but I did not, either in this, or in any 
" remarks, refer to your Lordshij^. «&;c. &c. C. J. 
" Napier." 

Having thus fruitlessly bent a stiffened neck 
to public and social principle, I executed my design 
of resigning by the following letter to the Home 
Military Secretary, Lord Fitzroy Somerset. 

" Simla, May 22nd, 1850. My Lord. I have 
" the honour to enclose to your Lordship for sub- 
" mission to His Grace the Commander-in-Chief, 
" copies of a reprimand received from the 

CHAP. X.] 158 

" Governor-General in Council, and of my reply 
" thereto. 

" I came out to this country, as your Lordship 
" knows, much against my inclination, and only 
" because there was a war in which it was sup- 
" posed my local knowledge of the country might 
" be of use. I arrived just as Lord Gough had 
" victoriously ended the war ; and I have endea- 
" voured for above a year, to maintain the dis- 
" cipline of this excellent Army, so that I might not 
" deliver it to my successor in a worse state than I 
" received it from my predecessor. This was not 
" all together an easy task, for at the moment of 
" my assuming the command in India, a rcduc- 
" tion of Scinde pay became a just and necessary 
" measure, on the part of Government. Whether 
" the mode in which this measure was effected, 
" happened to be the best which could have been 
" taken by Government was a question with which 
" I had no concern : my business, as Commander- 
" in-Chief, was to quell the mutinous spirit 
" with which that reduction was encountered by 
" the troops; and, as far as we can at x^i'^sent 
" judge, it is generally believed I have succeeded. 
" The mutineers have been punished, and all is at 
" present quiet in the Punjaub. 

" For this successful exercise of my judgment, 
" at a critical juncture, I have, as your Lordship 
" sees, been publicly reprimanded, and forbidden 
" to exercise that judgment in future. I have 
" been treated as if I had assumed the powers of 
" Government, which I had not done ! I merely 
" acted with decision in a dangerous crisis: so 
" dangerous, that in a few days after, the mutinous 
" troops attempted to seize the strongest fortress 

159 [chap. X. 

" in thePunjaub. On that occasion also, although 
" the Governor-General publicly approved of 
" uhat I did, he, in a private letter regretted I had 
" not consulted the Supreme Council at Calcutta. 
" Such dangerous moments do not admit of slow 
" and undecided counsels. Yet I am reprimanded, 
" and therefore request, most humbly, that Ilis 
" Grace will obtain for me Her Gracious Majesty's 
" permission to resign the Chief Command in India ; 
" and the more so, as being now nearly TO years 
" of age — during the last ten years of which I 
" have gone through considerable fatigue of body 
" and mind, especially during the last year — my 
" health requires that relief from climate and 
" business which public service in India does not 
" admit. I therefore hope that His Grace 
" will allow of my being relieved in October 
" next, or as soon as may be convenient. 

" C. J. Napier." 
The main affair was thus closed. Not so the 
underhand warfare previously commenced, and 
now conducted with an acrimony showing how 
necessary for the public good my resignation 
was, and how becoming for my own character. 
Yet nothing was omitted by me, to establish a 
cordial official intercourse with Lord Dalhousie, 
and many slights from him were borne with 
patience. So little disposition was there to as- 
sume undue authority, while acting at a distance, 
that on my journey to Peshawur guiding instruc- 
tions were solicited by me, were obtained, and 
never deviated from, though by no means in accord 
with my views, 'i'hey have been reserved for this 
place, as more convenient for reference to facts in 

cHAr. X.] 160 

the observations necessary to prevent some parts 
passing for wisdom. 

Lord Dalliousie to Sir C. Napier. 

" December 24:th, 184:9. 1. I have had the honour 
" of receiving your Excellency's demi-official letter, 
" dated 20th instant, enclosing documents relating 
" to the operations recently undertaken against cer- 
" tain villages in the Husofzye district near Pesha- 
" ivur. In that letter your Excellency requests 
" distinct and positive instructions regarding the 
" course to he pursued, in the event of operations 
" bei7ig required in the hills ; as well for your own 
" guidance as to enable you to transmit the neces- 
" sary orders to Brigadier Campbell, commanding 
'■'■at Peshawur. 

" 2. I have had the honour of replying to your 
" communication demi-officially this day ; but on a 
" subject of so much importance I think it expe- 
" dient to convey the wishes of the Government to 
" your Excellency in an official form" 

Observation. — What I wanted w^as — that my 
powers and those of the Board of Administration 
should be in some degree defined, as that Board 
was inclined to interfere with military matters. 

" 3. A dispatch from the Deputy- Commissioner 
" of Peshawur dated the loth instant, leads me to 
" believe that the object for which the present oper- 
" ations ivere undertaken has been fully accomplished, 
" and that the force under Colonel Bradshaw was 
" about to return towards Peshawur." 

Observation. — By no means " fully accomplished" 
no, not even in 1853 after many subsequent en- 
gagements and abundance of bloodshed, and money 
lost by bad Government. 

161 [chap. X. 

" 4. I trust therefore that i^rovision for ulterior 
" measures in the present instance is not required. 
*' It is iwssihle that the severe punishment which 
" appears to have been inflicted on the refractory 
" villages^ and those ivho came to their aid, may deter 
" them from attempting hereafter resistance to our 
" authority^ or inroads upon our territories.'' 

Observation. — This severe punishment has 
produced four years' war ! No man can say when 
it will end. The tribes claim independence and 
fight for it. Lord Dalliousie evidently approved of 
burning villages. The civil force did so in the 
Kohat expedition. Colonel Bradshaw and Sir 
Colin Campbell were placed under the control of 
politicals who devastated a beautiful country ! This 
is rigour, and no portion of Lord Dalhousie's ad- 
ministration has exhibited vigour ! 

" 5. But with a population so long inclined to 
" turbulence as the border tribes, and so little accus- 
" tomed to show submission to any of the Govern- 
" ments under which they have successively passed, 
" I conceive that we must he prepared to expect from 
" time to time risings among the tribes over whom 
" our rule has been proclaimed, and jjlundering 
" itiroads by those ivhich lie close to our frontier.'' 

Observation. — Yes ! It was right to be pre- 
pared for risings. He proclaimed his rule ! so he 
has over the Pegue, and may proclaim it over 
China ! But these tribes never acknowledged his 
or any person's rule. They deny ever being con- 

" 6. Your Excellency is therefore requested to 
" instruct Brigadier Campbell that in the event of 
" any local outbreak or internal disturbance again 
" occurring, which of course, wouhl he forthwith 


on AT. X.] 102 

" 7nade known to the Bru/adier by the local officers^ 
" he will take 'unmediate steps fur its supj)ression 
" and punishment h\) measures of promptitude and 
" severity^ 

Observation. — My opinion Avas that these 
measures of severity were unjustifiable and im- 
])olitic ; the result proved them so ; yet worse and 
sadder measures followed. 

" 7. The force under the immediate orders of the 
" Brigadier is amply sufficient for any such contin- 
" gcncy. 

'• 8. If the outbreak should be of a nature of a 
" general insurrection among the lull tribes under 
" our rule, your Excellency in that event ivill be 
" so good as to issue orders at once, during my 
'• absence, for such preparations to be made, and 
" such operations to be undertaken as your great 
'• experience may suggest, or as you may judge neces- 
" sary and right. 

" 9. If the hostility should be external; if 
" incursions should be made upon our territory by 
" border tribes ; or if they should give their aid, as 
" in the present case, to i-ebellion among our own 
" jjeople, the invasion will, as a matter of course, be 
" repelled immediately, without delaying for refer- 
" ence. But I have distinctly to request that no 
" aggressive movement, either as the consequence 
" of such incursion, or under any other circum- 
" stances, may be made upo)i the territories beyond 
" our frontier, tvithout a reference to the Government 
" for the purpose of ascertaining its views and 
" opinions in the case.'' 

Observation — In obedience to these orders our 
troops were forbade to fire unless fired upon when 
the Pass of Koliat was entered. His Lordsliip 

163 [chap. X. 

seems very apprehensive that 1 who wished to take 
measures for preventing war. and disa})proved 
of severities, should be so eager for war as to 
require a check by previous reference to a Govern- 
ment which by its severities was provoking war ! 
Our frontier indeed ! How was that marked 1 
He thinks his Jiat gave a frontier Hne, without 
reference to other nations' views. Mark also that 
to repel an incursion of border tribes was a 
matter of course without reference, but to repel 
a mutiny menacing the whole empire without 
reference was a crime. 

" 10. It is very jmssible that an expedition 
" against the border tribes beyond the frontier may 
" at some time become unavoidable for the repression 
'' of violence and injury ; but I cannot contemplate 
" any circumstances in which the necessity for 
" aggressive measures should be so urgent as to 
" over-rule the expediency of submitting to the 
" Government such a reference as I have men- 
" tioned and receiving its instructions thereon." 

Observation. — Here is evident fear of and 
eagerness to bar encroachment on his authority ; 
and as I had given no cause it may be assumed 
that the warning he had so energetically denounced 
as unnecessary at our first interview was working 
in his mind. 

" 11. 27ie Board of Administration will be 
" directed to transmit to your Excellency any in- 
" formation connected tvith the state of the neigh- 
" bouring countries during my absence^ which 
'* it may be desirable for you to know" 

Observation. — This Board of vVdministration 
was composed of a captain of Artillery and two 
civilians ; good, doubtless, in their callings, but 

f'HAP. X.] 164 

they were to send me, not every, but aiiy informa- 
tion, which tliey judged it desirable for the 
Commandcr-in-Cliief, one of the Supreme Council 
also to know ! Lord Dalhousie designates me as a 
man of " great experience^'' ought he then to 
make me in military matters with a disturbed 
frontier dependent on a captain of Artillery and 
two civilians. He might at least, without rash- 
ness, have directed his Board to furnish every 
information ! 

" 12. Should anythinxj occur requiring your 
" EocceUency to issue such orders as are contem- 
" 2)lated in the foregoing paragraphs, I request that 
" your Excellency ivould direct the Adjutant- 
" General to communicate them to the Board for 
" their information ^ 

My resignation as said, closed the principal 
affair; but it was not transmitted without vindi- 
cating my own dignity by repelling Lord 
Dalhousie's luijust and offensive reprimand. Ad- 
dressing him directly I exposed his silly assertion 
as to the non-necessity of haste, and maintained 
my right to support instead of reprimand. Rebut- 
ting also the false accusation of having usurped 
Government powers, proof was given that the 
suspended regulation w^as, de facto, new to the 
Sepoys, and injurious to them. Arranged in 1847 
it had not appeared until 1849 in the Code, and 
its application had been of rare occurrence. 
Known to Government, but unknown generally 
to the Sepoys it had first come into operation in 
the Purijaub at Cliristmas 1849, when a sudden 
rise in price of provisions, rendered it applicable at 
Wuzzeerabad ; and as the mutinous spirit was then 

165 [chap. X. 

very perilous a sudden reduction of allowances 
must have augmented the mischief. To suspend 
was right; a measure imposed by the state of 
the soldiers' minds. There ivas a iiecessity for 
haste ! 

The regulation was impolitic, was unjust, 
would have produced bloodshed. Unjust because 
compensation for increased cost of living once 
given, should not be retaken ; and suddenly to 
do so without explanation, was to " tamper at 
" a critical moment tvith the Sepoys' money in 
" violation of the public faith,'' — a dangerous 

My conduct was therefore becoming and in like 
circumstances would be repeated. My judgment 
being good or bad was not the question — as his 
Lordship seemed to think — but whether the Com- 
mander-in-Chief at a distance from the seat of 
Government, the highest authority being at sea — 
should avert imminent peril to the State by dealing 
promptly with mutiny in an Army of four hundred 
thousand men ! 

The Governor-General in Council had decided 
that on such an occasion the Commander-in-Chief 
should not exercise any discretion ; should not act 
promptly; that he should lose five weeks in 
references, and let the smouldering fire of mutiny 
burst into conflagration — in fine, that the State 
ought not to he saved irregularly ! He had repri- 
manded me for so saving it, and forbade my ever 
exercising my discretion " under any circumstances" 
in financial matters. But it was not a financial — 
it was a vital matter! With such shackles and 
such treatment to expect from him instead of 
support in future difficulties, there was, I said, no 

CHAP. X.] 166 

safety for mc, and a command so paralyzed could 
be no lonp^er retained. 

This rejoinder drew a long recriminatory minute 
from Lord Ualliousie, and a series of those docu- 
ments were exchanged. Although tedious, they 
should have found place here, were it not that my 
application to the Board of Control for I^ord Dal- 
housie's last, has been refused! No doubt from 
jirudent considerations. Failing of all none have 
been given, but the following analysis of his Lord- 
slii])'s first attempt to justify his conduct will in- 
dicate the nature of the whole. 

Misstatmg the question, he with a disingenuous 
subtlety sought to give the character of a private 
dispute to what ought to have been the calm inves- 
tigation of a State question. The Commander-in- 
Chief liad he said, cancelled a Government regula- 
tion and introduced another ; whereas, as repeatedly 
shown, suspension only pending a reference to 
supreme authority had taken place. 

Laboriously he proved that the regulation, called 
a new, unjust, and impolitic measure, had been 
known and acted upon previously in the Punjaub ; 
but that affected not the matter ; for the Brigadier 
commanding the station, the General commanding 
the province, the Adjutant-General of the Com- 
pany's Army, concurred in saying it was new to the 
Sepoys ; and this discrepancy as to the fact proves 
that the regulation — partial and local in its nature 
— was but obscurely known, and consequently, 
though characterised by Lord Dalhousie as vital, 
was really of little importance as regarded the 
authority of Government. In this view Lord 
Dalhousie laboured sliowing as to tli(,^ regulation 
not being new, in no manner affected the propriety 

167 [chap. X. 

of my act, which rested entirely on the davger of 
enforcing it at the moment. 

Not more available was an emphatically enforced 
defence of the justice and policy of the regulation. 
It might be abstractedly just and politic, yet involve 
a practical injustice and great impolicy by a 
partial untimely api)lication. It certainly reduced 
the Sepoys' allowances when they were mutinous 
for higher allowances, and was therefore justly cha- 
racterised as a " Tampering irith the Sepoys' money 
at a dangerous moment." But that was not, as the 
minute insinuated, an offensive remark, because 
even the appearance of injustice was dangerous at 
the time ; the real injustice was however inad- 
vertently admitted in the minute, when it asserted 
that the old rescinded regulation gave the Sepoys 
more than was designed ; for that more had been 
enjoyed by them for seventeen months, and many 
had enlisted on the faith of its being continued. 

The gravamen of the matter was the amount of 
danger. I said it was great and imminent. Lord 
Dalhousie in this minute, peril being past, desig- 
nated it as unworthy of notice, adducing in support 
his own opinions, and my general orders and journey 
to Peshawur which he said proved that I also 
slighted the danger ! Let the value of these 
counter assertions be measured by facts. Lord 
Dalhousie was at sea, I was on the spot ; and up 
to his embarking, as shall be shown further on by 
his own letters, we were in perfect accord on the 
extent of the danger and necessity of vigorous 
measures. Mutinies did actually occur in succes- 
sion at llawul Pindee, at Delhi, at Wuzzeerabad, 
at Govindgluir ; and in that succession the overt 
acts auLMnented in violence — tlie last beinij^ an 

cHAr. X.] 168 

attempt to seize the most important fortress of the 
Piiiijaub ! If then my k^o^vlcdg•e acquired on the 
spot was greater than Lord Dalhousie could acquire 
at sea, my proceedings also proved that the danger 
was not slighted by me seeing that of two courses 
open, the one of greatest personal responsibility 
was chosen. 

Lord Dalhousie said he founded his judgment on 
" minor evidence,'' " secret information,'' and ^'' piihlic 
records." These last w^ere simply the documents 
showing the suspended regulation was not new. 
The minor evidence he did not indicate. The secret 
information must have been from civilians ; or one 
of the military officers who agreed as to the peril 
at the time, must secretly have represented the 
matter in a different light — a supposition not to be 
entertained without proof Wherefore Lord Dal- 
housie's judgment, formed on such evidence could 
be of no value. As to my orders, it w ould have 
been insanity to proclaim, that the mutineers 
were many and feared ; that their machinations 
were known, and a resort to force only re- 
mained for them. IMy treating the affair as a 
partial discontent was in truth the inverse measure 
of the danger. 

But nothing is more discreditable to Lord Dal- 
housie than a sneering attempt to place me on the 
dilemma of acknowledging the mutiny to be slight, 
or my journey to Peshawur a flying from danger. 
Peshawur was the real point of danger, and his 
sneer, redolent of ignorance and bad feeling, coming 
from a man who had gone to sea at the moment of 
greatest peril, should have been suppressed. No 
immediate outbreak was apprehended. What was 
feared was the secret spread of a scheme to obtain 

169 [chap, X. 

liiglier pay for an Army of three hundred tliousand 
men, by compeUing Government to yield, or dis- 
band the whole, on neither of which horns could it 
sit and live ! The disbanded Sikh soldiers and the 
Affghans might also have joined, and nought re- 
main for defence but the power and might of the 
European soldiery — most numerous at Peshawur, 
which was therefore the real point both of safety 
and danger. 

The minute adduced the final submission of the 
66th regiment and subsequent quietude of the 
Sepoys generally, as proofs that no real mutiny was 
in contemplation ; that is, adduced the success of 
my measures to suppress mutiny as evidence that 
no mutiny existed ! The logic is equal to the gene- 
rosity ! If a mutinous spirit had been general, 
said Lord Dalhousie, the action of the 66th 
w^ould have been a '''■spark to light the whole into a 
flame /" But if that spark had not been acci- 
dentally stamped out, and the immediate substitu- 
tion of the Goorka battalion for the 66tli had not 
rendered the Brahmin project of non-enlistment 
abortive, would not flame have been kindled and 
increased to a conflagration % 

Partial mutinies, said the minute, were frequent ; 
as if that were of no consequence, instead of being 
fearful indications of mischief and secret dange- 
rous discontent. Wherefore in lieu of thanking 
me for preventing these partial mutinies being- 
fashioned into one irresistible combination. Lord 
Dalliousie dared to call me the calumniator of the 
Bengal Armi/ ! 

Passing from mutiny the minute again accused me 
of usurping the essential powers of Government, of 
changing the Government regulations; of increas- 

CHAP. X.] 170 

ing the pay and allowances of the troops, of avow- 
ing a wisli to grant the demand of mutineers and 
the more readily tliat they were numerous ! Then 
dilating on the danger of such proceedings and 
views, it rose to enthusiastic self-laudation for hold- 
ing opinions of a contrary tendency. This is con- 
temptibly absurd. Nothing was usurped, nothing 
granted, nothing claimed but the right to assume 
responsibility at a moment of great peril, when 
reference to superior authority was impossible. 

AVith the same uncandid spirit, my complaint 
that no support was to be expected if a future 
exigency demanded the like promptness, was de- 
signated as claiming that my " pleasure and discre- 
tion should be the rule of Government," thus 
attempting to assimilate the momentary assump- 
tion of responsible authority on extraordinary 
occasions, with a permanent exercise of independent 
power. The minute asserted that full support was 
given to mo. So far as promises went, that is true ; 
but no performance followed. The promise was a 
snare! Was there serious mutiny and danger? 
Then Lord Dalhousie's support was a reprimand 
i'or having saved him and the State from a vital 
disaster ! Was the mutiny overrated 1 then his 
support was the waiting for a plausible pretext to 
insult merely for over-zeal, a man of nearly twice 
his age, with ten times his experience and 
service. Finally, it might be supposed from the 
minute that some extraordinary irreparable in- 
vasion of supreme authority had produced terri- 
ble and permanent evil ; whereas there had 
been only the withholding for a month a saving 
to Government of a few })ounds sterling ! The 
reader may now take as a true and tempe- 

171 [chap. X. 

rate statement, of the whole matter in dispute 
a brief review of Lord Dalhousie's conduct placed 
at the end of this first part. It was drawn 
up at the time by a friend, my mind being then 
too much occupied with public business to regard 
private controversy. 


Lord Dalhousie. His Gnat and Camel. 

One of his Lordship's minutes conchided with 
tliis lofty peroration : " I have equal confidence that 
" their judgment" (the Queen's and Company's Go- 
vernment) " will be, that I have only done my duty 
" towards the Government I administer and to- 
" wards those who entrusted it to me, in refusing 
" to allow to the Commander-in-Chief of their 
" Army, a jpower which no Commander-in-Chief has 
" ever enjoyed — which no j^redecessor of his has ever 
" dreamed of claiming, and which no Government in 
" Christendom could ever concede.'' 

The Indian Government is not in Christendom ! 
Let us proceed with the Gnat and Camel. The 
gnat so choking, as shown in the above passage, 
was engendered when the Commander-in-Chief to 
prevent the spread of mutiny, absolutely, it would 
seem from his Lordsliip's expression, ^;rt7'«/yr^f/ the 
Civil Government by locally suspending one of its 
regulations and that not a very wise or just one. 
This was assuming a power " no Commander-in- 
" Chief ever before dreamed of claiming, and no Go- 
" vernment could ever concede."" Compose your 

173i [chap. XI. 

agitation, my Lord, and remember the camel you 
swallowed icith the facility of a boa constrictor ! 

In September 1848, a little more than one year 
before my gnat was born, Lieutenant Herbert 
Edwards, of the East India Company's Army, as- 
sembled a force in the service of the Maharaja, 
Duleep Sing — at that time an independent Sove- 
reign. In this force several regular regiments of 
the jNIaharaja's Army were suspected of having an 
inclination to join Moolraj at Mooltan. To fix 
tlieir wavering loyalty, Edwards, a Lieutenant of 
the Bengal force, without leave from the Sikh Go- 
vernment, or from Lord Dalhousie, or from the 
Supreme Council of India, or the Directors, pro- 
mised those foreign regiments, if they remained 
faithful to their own Sovereign, that the Governor- 
General would take them out of the Maharaja's 
Anny, into the East India Company's regular ser- 
vice. This promise was approved of by Lord Dal- 
housie, and the regiments are now in the Company's 

Here was a camel glibly swallowed by Lord 

The Gnat. The Camel. 

General Sir Charles Lieutenant Herbert 

Napier, member of the Edwards, of the Bengal 

Supreme Council and Fusileers,promised whole 

Commander - in - Chief, regiments of a foreign 

suspended a regulation of Sovereign to take them 

detail, involving a sum into the Company's Ar- 

of £.6 Ss. sterling until my! This, although an 

the Government's wishes act beyond the legitimate 

could be as.ccrtained. poivers of the Gorernor- 

This temporary measure General himself was ap- 




to stave off imminent 
danger to the State was 
counselled by three of 
the oldest and most dis- 
tinguished officers of the 
Indian Army. For this 
momentary assumption 
of a slender responsibility 
he was, w ithout regard to 
his age, his services, his 
high rank, or the small- 
ness of the sum, inde- 
cently, petulantly, and 
unwarrantably repri- 
manded by Lord Dal- 
housie ! Yet he had 
only exercised a discre- 
tion enjoined by the 
Duke of AVellington's 
written orders. 

proved of and sanctioned 
by Lord Dalhousie. But 
then Lieutenant Ed- 
wards was also ajioUtlcal. 
Lieutenant Edwards may 
have acted wisely, and 
Lord Dalhousie also ; yet 
adding whole regiments 
to the regular force of 
theEast IndiaCompany's 
Army, without the sanc- 
tion of Government, was 
a strong measure for a 
Lieutenant of Infantry! 

In my case the danger was greater, more press- 
ing ; my rank far higher, and the amount of respon- 
sibility trivial, even to ridicule ! AVhy then w^as I 
reprimanded'? Because Lord Dalhousie was per- 
sonally jealous, and had not sufficient firmness to 
bear the truth ! 

Intent to find fault he petulantly and with bad 
faith seized what he fancied a good opportunity, 
and made a mistake for his own character. He 
had only three weeks before, with express reference 
to the mutiny, promised me " unreserved support,'' 
not conditionally nor in ignorance, but with deep 
alarm at the danger, though going himself to seek 
personal relaxation at sea. The proof of this fol- 

175 [chap. XI. 

lows, it is irrefrngable, as being under his own 
hand, and damnatory as complete. 

It has been shown that he gave warrant for com- 
mencing, at my own discretion, a war of devasta- 
tion against the frontier tribes, slaying them and 
burning tlieir liabitations ; he will be found equally 
ready to warrant my spilling blood to any extent 
in suppression of mutiny; but to suspend the ab- 
straction of six pounds sterling from the Sepoys' pay 
for that object was an inexcusable offence ! Let 
these things be taken as the measure of his humanity 
and wisdom; his reprimand as the measure of his 
courtesy, and his letters now given as the gauge of 
his faith and conscience when — the danger being 
over — he dared to affirm that there was no mutiny, 
and that I had libelled the Bengal Army by pretend- 
ing there was ! 

Cam})^ Loodiana^ 
Sunday November 11th 1849. 

1. P.M. 

INIy Dear Sir Charles, 

I received your letter of 9th ( relative to 
symptoms of insubordination in the 41st Native 
Infantry at Delhi ;) two hours ago. 

This letter will go to you by an express which 
will be dispatched immediately, carrying to the 
general officer at Umballah a general order, granting 
the furlough you have suggested, for publication by 
him. A branch express is ordered from Umballah 
to Meerut and another to Delhi, which it ought to 
reach before the morning of the 13tli. 

The general order will be also sent to day to 
General Officers commanding in the Punjaub and 
to Brigadier Wheeler in JuUunder. 

CHAP. XI.] 176 

The general order opens by alluding to the circum- 
stances whicli prevented furlougli this year (on the 
suggestion of Lord Gough I think but I will not 
delay this letter to make sure) then adverts to the 
cessation of such necessity — gives leave to 25 men 
per company now as for 1849 and promises furlough 
for 1850, as usual on the return of those now 
allowed to depart. 

The general order of which I enclose a copy fully 
carries into effect what you intend, I think. It is 
quite fair in itself — is no concession — and ought 
to be acceptable. 

With respect to any dissatisfaction either in these 
corps or in any other on the score of the amount of 
allowances, there is no alternative of measures for 
us. The difficulty is one begotten of the past. 
Every one was prepared for the probability of its 
showing itself. It must be met ; and the ground 
on Avhich we can take our stand is so perfectly just 
and reasonable and necessary, that we may thus 
meet the difficulty with full confidence as to the 

I hope this may be only a passing grumble ; but 
I think you are very wise in 'preparing for its being 
something worse ; and I am very sure of your 
doing everything that is right in the circumstances 
that may arise, whatever they may he. The regiment 
with me, the 9th Native Infantry, were informed 
some time ago, and have not said a word ; but 
then they are well commanded. 

I shall move onwards towards Lahore, where I 
shall probably be on 27th unless the row thickens ; 
in which case I will regulate my plans as may be 
best for the service. 

The necessity for getting the Court's consent to 

177 [chap. XI. 

the inrroasc for Goorkas was vexing. Tlie letter 
went by last mail. I wrote privately and urgently 
also, and I have no doubt of success. I have 
prayed the chairman to take it in hand, and to give 
the increase. Even though they should insist on 
the reduction suggested by Lord Gough in June 
1848 as the condition. I hope they will not insist 
on that condition but will give every thing we ask. 

P.S. — I add a postscript to observe that the services 
of the Goorkas anywhere are exigible from them 
on emergency by their present terms of enlistment. 
If any necessity should at this moment arise for 
taking advantage of what we believe to be their 
thorough trustworthiness, we can do so — and the 
Court could not then refuse the boon asked, or fail 
to confirm it, if I were to grant it to them by 
antici])ation. I would do so noiv but that such an 
act would ensure their economical reduction of one 
company which you deprecate. I hope as I have 
said — to get the increase and yet keep the com- 
pany. ' D. 

Note. — We had promised these Goorkas line pay 
if they would enter the line — they accepted the 
offer with joy — with what honesty or wisdom could 
we then order them down to the plains to quell a 
mutiny without performing our promise ? It 
would have shaken their fidelity ! But by the step 
I afterwards took, when the 66th nuitinied, we 
showed our confidence in them and fulfilled our 

CHAP. XI.] 178 

Bamneewalla Canip^ 

24th December, 1849. 
My dear Lord, 

We have more trouble about the Scinde 
pay ! It has taken place at Wuzzeerabad, and 
four or five men have been detected whom I have 
ordered to be tried forthwith — I think they will 
be shot. There are complete proofs of their having 
gone from company to company in the 32nd Native 
Infantry. When I heard of their refusing the seven 
rujDees, I ordered the regiment to be drawn out, 
the men singly offered their pay, and every one 
who refused to be instantly tried on the spot and 
the sentence executed. I have not yet received 
the report, but a private letter says that forty-nine 
were tried, sentenced, and instantly put in chains, 
and sent off to the roads. Brigadier Hearsey then 
made a speech to the regiment, which had great 
effect: the letter, I hear, says, '•'it threw the 
regiment into tears.'' Tlie four agitators are under 
trial, or will be as soon as possible, and I hope 
they will be sentenced death or transportation, 
which, I believe, has more terrors for them than 
death. This is a most daring attempt of these 
four villains to dictate to the Government what 
pay the troops are to have, and I trust the Court 
will do its duty. This seems on the first blink to 
be a small matter — to my eyes it is a vital one ! 
To punish these four scoundrels, to the utmost 
extent of the law military, is necessary. I am so glad 
you did not disband the former two, it was a weak, 
silly, and most unjust proposal of * * * * which 
would have placed us altogether in the wrong, and 
we could not have followed it up ! The Native 
officers and non-commissioned officers have I 

179 [chap. xr. 

hear behaved well ; giving prompt information 
to their European officers : but my official reports 
have not come in yet, This matter will I hope 
end here — if not I will carry on the same process 
with every recusant corps. I have no report from 
Campbell! Sir H. Lawrence told Colonel Grant 
that it was all settled, and that his brother was 
punishing the garrison and putting the people to 
expense thereby ! I think this is a queer way to 
govern ! Punishing by wholesale makes hatred, 
not obedience. 

The Maharaja left Lahore with only 20 Sowars 
under a Native officer ! Not a single European 
with him I hear. I have not the slightest idea 
who is to blame for this, but I have ordered a rigid 
scrutiny amongst the military, and if I can find out 
who is to blame I will report him to you. I 
executed your orders exactly, till the Board's 
official representation of immediate danger abso- 
lutely forced me to increase the escort, at their 
desire as T reported to you ; security was necessary ; 
the rescue of the child would have produced 
war at once. But sending him with a Native 
officer, for I believe tw^o marches, and an escort of 
only twenty natives Avas too bad. I fear my 
friend * * * * will not come out clear ! How- 
ever I will not condemn him, for I really have no 
opinion upon the matter ; only I will find out that 
none of my red coats are culpable, or if they were 
they shall take the consequences ; it is too serious 
a matter to pass over, being a gross and dangerous 
neglect. I wanted to send the guns only as far as 
Ferozeporc, but the Board begged that they might 
go on, as it seems they consider our old " jtrotected 

CHAP. XI.] 180 

States (fs dangerous as the Piinjauh itself,''' so I 
consented. Believe me to be always, &c. «&;c. C. J. 


Camp, Mooltan, 

30th December, 1849. 

My dear Sir Charles, 

I have just received your letter of 
24th instant. The conduct of 32nd regiment 
distresses me much in every way. It is unreason- 
able on every ground and unpardonable. 

The original creation of the allowances extra 
was a short-sighted and impolitic as well as un- 
necessary act, but the Government cannot allow 
the act and its evils to extend into futurity. 
I am very sure that the course you co7itemj)late is the 
truly merciful one. No punishment can be too 
severe for the men who deliberately instigate to 
mutiny, and althoucjh I am as little bloody-minded 
as most men, I should be quite prepared to advise, if 
called upon, that these men should be put to death. 
It is true that it is said transportation across the 
seas has more terrors than death. I very much 
doubt it, and I conceive that the promptitude of 
the punishment, in retribution of the act, and in 
the presence of those who partially shared in it, 
would have a greater effect in rei^rcssing similar 
offences than the more distant punishment of ban- 
ishment. I am very glad you are where you are ; 
and I feel quite at ease when the conduct of 
measures consequent on such offences is in your 

The Board has reported no such measures in 
Eusofzye as Colonel Grant has mentioned. They 

181 [chap. XI. 

have advised retaining a post and I believe they 
are right — but they liave expressly said that re- 
taining it is worth more than the revenue of the 
district, thougli not worth more than the peace of 
the district. Any quartering of the troops on the 
people would not be permitted for a day, and 
eitlier Grant has misapprehended or Lawrence has 

What you tell me about the Maharaja amazes 
me. If inquiry shall show it to be true it certainly 
is not your fault, or mine, for the 18th Royal Irish 
were left there, and a wing of the body-guard had 
arrived. The country about Umballah is more 
Sikh than any part of the Punjaub except the 
Manjha, and the great chiefs Puttecald Jhund 
&c. are independent though friendly — the latter 
quality evinced in the manner men are most un- 
willing to show it in, viz. parting with their money. 
They volunteered to lend, and did lend me 30 
lacs on the spot last war. But the people hate us 
of course like Sikhs. 

This place is a melancholy mass of desolation. 
Believe me, yours sincerely &c. Dalhousie. 

Camp, Goojerat, 
5tli January, 1850. 
My dear Lord, 

On arriving at Wuzzeerabad, I learned 
from Brigadier Hearsey that the Sepoys, and espe- 
cially the young ones, said " W/ten other regiments 
come up we will do as they do — this reduction is 
tyranny, hut what can we do alone ?" He further 
said that an unusual degree of correspondence is 
going on between regiments, which he considered 
very bad, and wished that the Government could 

CHAP. XI.] 182 

prevent it, or appoint a person to read all the 
Sepoy's letters. I told him that to do this is quite 
impossible ; that neither could Government abridge 
correspondence nor open private letters, except on 
some occasion which would bear out such an act. 
He also told me that, during the Avar, some men 
were grumbling, and Neville Chamberlain rebuked 
them, saying " You are pretty fellows to pretend to 
" be soldiers when a few hours' hardship makes 
" you grumble ; had I the power I would dismiss 
" you." On which another soldier, and I think a 
Havildar replied " Yoti had better not do that, for you 
" should not get a man from the country to replace 
" us if you did" 

I tell you what Hearsey told me, and it marks a 
bad spirit. He seems to think there may be more 
trouble given yet as regiments enter the Punjaub. 
Hearsey does not want sense, and is perfectly 
master of the language of the men, knowing them 
well Grant tells me. I know so little of him that 
I cannot speak of him from personal acquaint- 
ance However he appears to have 

conducted this refusing pay affair with great judg- 

Now, all that he has told me, when compared 
with the report among the 41st, that I heard at 
Delhi — of twenty-four regiments having resolved 
not to march into the Punjaub unless with Scinde 
allowances — looks bad. It is just one of those events 
that one can make no conjecture upon, but we must 
ivait ; if nothing happens all is right, but if it turns 
out to be preconcerted mutiny, force must be met 
by force ; the least concession would cost us India. 
And justice has placed us on high ground, thank 
God ! for I declare if we were not perfectly right and 

183 [chap. XI. 

just, I could not reconcile it to my conscience to do 
what must be done in my opinion to save India 
from tlie state the Sikhs were in before we quar- 
relled with them. I am not in the least doubtful 
about putting a stop to this atrocious attempt of the 
villains who are trying to mislead their comrades, 
but fear it will cost bloodshed if they succeed ; for 
I will immediately act against all with the utmost 
rigour. Neither your Lordship nor myself would 
shed a drop of blood if it can be avoided ; but 
a thousand lives must be taken rather than 
let 400,000 men dictate to their Government 
unjustly nor justly either, for that matter; but w^oe 
to the Government which places itself in so dread- 
ful a position. 

I cannot express what pleasure our just and 
honourable position gives me. If the men under 
trial are condemned as mutineers, I will execute 
them at once, which I have power to do — and noAV I 
am sure that this most disagreeable affair will open 
the eyes of the Directors and satisfy them that I am 
right in wishing for Goorka battalions; and I would, 
if I could, have 25,000 of them, added to our own 
Europeans which would form an Army of 50,000 
men that, well handled, would neutralise any 
combination among the Sepoys ! I do most 
seriously recommend this subject to your considera- 
tion, and wliether it ought not to be seriously 
pressed upon tlie consideration of the Court ] I 
believe your Lordship's opinion concurs with mine 
as to the Goorka battalions, and I wish, if so, that 
you would order their high pay to be issued from 
the 1st of January, — it will at once secure the 
fidelity of these brave troops, and it will bring 
others rapidly, if we should determine to increase 

CHAP. XI.] 184 

their strength. These are the small points which 
in times of danger govern gn^at events. You see 
that I write to you franldy all I think. Believe me, 
&c. C. J. Napier. 

Kotree, January 18th, 1850. 

My dear Sir Charles, 

I received your two letters of 5th inst. 
just as I was leaving Sukkur, and have been with- 
out the means of sending a reply until I reached 
this place. 

T quite agree with you in being prepared for dis- 
content among the Native troops on coming into 
the Punjaub under diminished allowances. I looked 
with just anxiety to the result of a measure which 
was indispensable from the first ; and I am well 
satisfied to have got so far through it without vio- 
lence as we have. The Sepoy has been over-petted 
and over-paid of late; and has been led on by the 
Government itself into the entertainment of ex- 
pectations and the manifestation of a feeling which 
he never held in former times. 

The General and yourself have no doubt of the 
perfect justice and perfect necessity of the present 
orders; and they must be enforced. 

I would fain hope that flying rumours are ex- 
aggerated and that ijoitr 2)rompt and decided action 
at Delhi and Wuzzeerahad will check all future 

I saw the 41st regiment at Mooltan. It has 
behaved perfectly well ever since it left Delhi ; and 
the men, INIajor Ilalford told me, have seemed 
ashamed of themselves ever since. 

If my hope is disappointed, the course of action 

185 [chap. XI. 

you indicate is the only right one — indeed it is the 
only jwssihle one. A yielding or a compromise in 
this case would be worse than a defeat by an enemy 
in the field, and would inake our own Army more 
really formidable to us than the Khalsa have 

On this point then, our sentiments are in perfect 
unison : and whenever anything may occur which 
requires or would be benefited by the support of 
the Government ; that support will be unreservedly 

All testimony has led me to form the opinion you 
hold of the efficiency and fidelity of the Goorka 
corps. If immediate increase of their pay were 
necessary to enable you to command the services of 
those corps in the event of disaffection among the 
Native Infantry, I would at once issue an order for 
the increase; but the terms of their own contract 
of enlistment entitle you to call upon them to move 
anywhere on emergency; and as you can thus avail 
yourselves of them fully and at once if they should 
be needed, I think it better to wait for the reply 
from the Court which in another month will reach 
me. I will make use in the meantime of recent 
events for the purpose of strengthening arguments, 
which I feel satisfied the Court have already felt to 
be sufficient. 

I have heard the anecdote of Neville Chamber- 
lain and the Ilavildar related by others. The only 
thing which casts doubt on it is that Mr. C. should 
have passed over the threatening speech of the man 
without report to his commanding officer. If any 
man in this Army said so he should not have re- 
mained a day in it. His instant dismissal, would 
liave been a light punishment for so treasonable a 

CHAP. XI.] 186 

speech, and it would have speedily served to prove 
the emptiness of his threat that none would be 
found to take their places. 

Believe me, &c., Dalhousie. 

It will be difficult for Lord Dalhousie to reconcile 
his reprimand with the expressions of satisfaction 
and promises of support given in these letters ; or 
with the honorable observances of society. It may 
be more easy to reconcile them in taste and truth 
with his early assurance that he " tvould take 
" damned good care I did not encroach on his autho- 
'' ritj/:' 

Brief review of Lord Dalhousie' s conduct referred 
to at 2)age 171. 

" In two instances the Governor-General of India 
' has expressed dissatisfaction with the Commander- 
' in-Chief, for having taken upon himself the re- 
' sponsibility of acting in matters beyond the com- 
' pass of his acknowledged powers. 

" The first was that in which the Commander-in- 
•' Chief, to meet the mutiny of the 66th regiment 
' (exhibited in their attempt to seize the fortress 
•' of Govindghur) disbanded that regiment of his 
' own authority ; filling up their place in the line 
■' by making the Nusseree Goorka battalion, the 
•' 66th or Goorka regiment. 

" The Governor-General was absent from India 
" at the time of these transactions ; and on his re- 
" turn, approved of disbanding the old 66th ; but 
" j^riimtely disapproved of the enlistment of the 
" Nusseree battalion without sanction of theGovern- 
'' ment at Calcutta. He however, confirmed the 

187 [chap. XI. 

whole of the Commandor-in-Chicfs steps, without 
expressing publicly any dissatisfaction. 
" He had a right to express his dissatisfaction, 
and in doing so privately, exercised that right in 
a delicate way. 

" The Commander-in-Chief had no right to feel 
personally annoyed at this. On the contrary, he 
feels personally obliged, for the manner in which 
dissatisfaction was expressed ; but he is bound, 
for his own future security, to examine minutely, 
the public grounds wdiich compelled him to over- 
step his authority ; and likewise the ground upon 
which the Governor-General hesitates to express 
his approval privately. 

" The acts of the Commander-in-Chief were two. 
1st. The disbandment of the 66th regiment. 2nd. 
The enlistment of the Nusserce battalion. Both 
w^ere beyond his authority and the character of 
both as regarded responsibility was precisely the 
same. Neither was justifiable, unless the public 
safety absolutely required it. The only grounds 
were that it would have required 37 days to have 
waited for the sanction of the Supreme Govern- 
ment ; and the first reply might have required a 
rejoinder occupying 37 days more, and thence a 
six months' correspondence, with possibly a final 
reference to the Court of Directors. It appeared 
as reasonable to regulate the movements of a 
battle, as to quell a mutiny, by such a dilatory 
process. The Commander-in-Chief had reason to 
suppose from his intercourse with the Governor- 
General, as long as intercourse was possible, about 
this long smouldering mutiny, that the Cjovernor- 
General was as fully persuaded as himself of the 
necessity of treating every indication of it with 

CHAP XI.] 188 

" quick decision and vigour ; and they had hitherto 
" concurred in tlieir views of the subject. 

" There was good reason to suppose that every 
" regiment in the Punjaub was imbued with pre- 
" cisely the same spirit exhibited by the 66th 
" regiment, and were determined to force from 
" Government a larger rate of pay than that fixed 
" for them, and for which they had voluntarily 
" enlisted. Hence the delay of 37 days in 
" applying whatever might be finally considered 
"• as the fitting remedy, might have arrayed the 
" whole of the Native Army in the Punjaub, 
" upwards of fortij thousand mefi, against their Go- 
" vernment ! This too, in a country containing 
" 60,000 disbanded Sikh soldiers, with but ten 
" European regiments to resist them. 

" These considerations induced the Commander- 
" in-Chief with great reluctance^ to assume the 
" responsibility. 

" Assuredly, if ever there was a case that im- 
" peratively called for prompt action, and the 
" setting aside of dilatory etiquette, this "was one. 
" Had the Commander-in-Chief's moral courage 
" failed him in the emergency ; and had the evils 
" which he thus arrested, been permitted to extend 
" until the Army had been in open mutiny, it 
" would have been a miserable excuse to offer to his 
" Sovereign and countrymen for the loss of their 
" richest empire, that a point of etiquette induced 
" him to delay when he could have prevented the 
" catastrophe ! 

" Of the two acts, however, the Governor- 
" General approved of one, while he privately dis- 
" approved of the other without superior sanction. 
" The first was the disbanding the 66th regiment, a 

189 [chap. XI. 

" remedy frequently tried on former occasions of 
" mutiny, but found ineffectual. The Commander- 
" inX'liief liad no confidence in the mere measure of 
" disbanding ; he was exceedingly averse to that 
" system, and only employed it as a necessary pre- 
" liminary to liis second act, in which he had con- 
" fidence, namely enlisting the Goorkas. This 
" step however, he was told by the Governor- 
" General he should not have taken. 

" The Commander-in-Chief had distinct proof, 
" which the Govindghur inquiry sustains, that the 
" basis of the mutiny was a general feeling 
" amongst the Sepoys, that they could control the 
" Army enlistments — that if regiments were dis- 
" banded, the same individuals or some other 
" members of their families would find their way 
" into the new regiments. This was the root of 
" the mutiny, and the first exhibition of it at 
" Govindghur was a party from each company, 
" respectfully asking for their discharge ; this was 
" the principle which the Commander-in-Chief at 
" once saw must be met He therefore disbandc^d 
" the 6Gth, not as a punishment, but in order to 
" introduce a diff"erent race of people; thereby 
" proving that the ordinary Sepoy classes could 
" not control the enlistmcnit. Without this tlie 
" disbandment would only have caused an ex- 
" tension of the mutiny ; but with it the mutiny 
" was effectually crushed ! A month's delay at 
" that moment, might have lost India, after a 
" destructive collision between tlie European re- 
" giments, and a mutinous Native Army, sup- 
" ported by every nudcontent in Ilindostan. Yet 
" the Governor-General is not satisfied with this 
" hai)])y result ; and instead of cordial grateful 

CHAP. XI.] 190 

" acknowledgments for liaving saved India at a 
" dangerous crisis, without cost either of life 
" or money, the Commander-in-Chief is told 
" that he has, in accomplishing this enormous 
" benefit, committed a breach of official etiquette ! ! ! 
" Assuredly no Commander-in-Chief who has the 
" intellect and vigour requisite to secure the in- 
" terest of his Sovereign and his country, can be 
" safe under such a controlling influence. 

" The second case in which the Governor-General 
" has expressed dissatisfaction at the Commander- 
" in-Chief for assuming responsibility, referred 
" to the suspension of a revised regulation of 
" Government, affecting the Sepoys' remuneration 
" for rations. 

" An official and excessively harsh disapproval 
" was issued by the Governor-General in Council ; 
" and further an injunction has been laid upon the 
" Commander-in-Chief not, in future, upon any 
" account, to assume such a responsibility. The 
" answer again is Sahis iwpuli suprema lex. The 
" whole of the dangerous symptoms of mutiny 
" which had been showing themselves for nearly 
" a year, originated in an alteration of pay for the 
" Punjaub Army. 

" In January, after several regiments had shown 
" their feelings publicly, and before the exhibition 
" of the 66th in Govindghur, an alteration intro- 
" duced in the new audit regulations was brought 
" under the Commander-in-Chiefs observation, 
" It would in addition to the previous reduction 
" of pay, have affected the allowances of the 
" Sepoys ; and was described to him as a new rule, 
" a statement which he had no cause for doubting, 
" and no means of verifying without a dangerous 

191 [chap. xr. 

delay. It was earnestly brought before him by 
the Brigadier-General commanding at Wuzzeer- 
abad, where the most decided steps had just 
been taken by the discontented soldiers ; and the 
Brigadier's views were sustained by the general 
officer commanding the division, and by the 
Adjutant-General of the Army, The Com- 
mander-in-Chief did not consider this a fitting 
time to broach any new subject of discontent, as 
connected with the soldiers' allowances ; where- 
fore he directed the suspension, hut in that dis- 
trict only^ of the new rule, lest it should increase 
the mutinous spirit already sufficiently strong. If 
he had delayed, in order to communicate with the 
supreme Government at Calcutta, the regulation 
must have been acted upon each recurring pay 
day, before any authority for its suspension could 
arrive, and the evil would have been done. 
" Notwithstanding all the Commander-in-Chiefs 
precautions the scene at Govindghur subsequently 
took place, which, however, by assuming heavy 
responsibility he rendered innocuous. And 
now when all the danger appears to have passed, 
in consequence of the very measures which the 
Commander-in-Chief adopted, and of the very re- 
sponsibilities, lohich in these cases he assumed, his 
acts are disapproved ; and he is desired not in 


Would- the Govenor-General in Council have 
approved of his conduct if he had wasted the 
valuable time of action in Meriting, leaving to a 
mutinous Army the opportunity of driving 
the English Government clear out of India ] 
" With respect to the imperative instruction 
conveyed to the Commander-in-Chief not again 

(•HAP. XI.] 192 

" to assume a responsibility with which he is not 
" vested, nothing can be more absurd in princi})lc 
" or dangerous in practice, if the present, or any 
" future Commander-in-Chief be weak enough to 
" attend to it. The security of nations and 
" Governments has frequently depended upon sub- 
" ordinate officers, not only acting without sanction 
" of their superiors but in direct opposition to 
" their rules and orders ; and perhaps in India, of 
" all places in the world, may the exercise of this re- 
" sponsibility be most required for the public good. 
" An active mutiny w^as to be dealt with by the 
" Commander-in-Chief thirty-seven days removed 
" from the power of consulting by letter with the 
" Supreme Government — that Commander-in-Chief 
" being second in council only to the Governor- 
" General, and having been specially selected by 
" the unanimous voices of his Sovereign and his 
" countrymen to save India in a crisis of the 
" greatest peril. The magnitude of the question 
" was such, that had the mutiny succeeded in the 
" Punjaub, it would probably have extended to 
" the whole Native Armies of Bengal, Bombay, 
" and Madras, as the subject was one of common 
" interest to every Sepoy in India, viz. the power 
" of regulating their own pay. They would thus 
" have over-ridden the British Government, and 
" produced the same anarchy which a similar course 
" pursued successfully by the Sikh P.unchayets 
" had accomplished in the Punjaub. The sup- 
" pression of this mutiny was a purely military 
*' question, in wliich the Commander-in-Chief could 
" not have received any assistance whatever from 
" consultation with the civil Government, even had 
" it been on tlie spot with him, and consultation 

193 [chap. XI. 

" been possible. But consultation was impossible. 
" The Commander-in-Chief therefore, did what he 
" thought riglit on his own responsibility, and 
" thoroughly arrested the mutiny without bloodshed, 
" or cost. His remedy produced no inconvenience 
" whatever ; but it has introduced a principle so 
" intelligible to every Sepoy in the Army, that it is 
" not being over sanguine to expect that it will 
" henceforth prevent the repetition of those muti- 
" nous attempts, which have periodically occurred 
" in the Bengal Army for many years past. 

" What has been the reward of the Commander- 
" in-Chief for thus exercising a responsibility 
" absolutely unavoidable, and producing such happy 
" results ? Harshly censured, as if he had not 
" only failed but been an incorrigible and habitual 
" delinquent. 

" A Lieutenant on guard at the gate of Govind- 
" ghur, adhered strictly/ to his orders, in refusing 
" admittance to troops until he should receive his 
" commanding officer's authority, who was within 
" A FEW HUNDRED YARDS OF HIM ; by this ctiquctte 
" he would have lost the fortress but for the vigour 
" of Captain Macdonald. He was severely censured 
" by the Commander-in-Chief and by a Court of 
" Inquiry ; and narrowly escaped a Court Martial ; 
" yet his error was the not breaking through his 
" orders in the hour of need ! 

" The Governor-General's censure proved that he 
" does not understand the duties of military subor- 
" dination, and that it may be as imperative upon an 
" officer to transgress an order, as it is under ordi- 
" nary circumstances to conform strictly. 

" It now becomes requisite to examine the gene- 
" ral position held by the Commander-in-Chief in 


CHAP. XI.] 194: 

" India, as affecting himself, the Army, and the 
" safety of India. 

" It is fortunate, although merely accidental, 
" that, whilst conferring a great public benefit, the 
" Commander-in-Chief did not spill blood, or ex- 
" pend treasure, or cause inconvenience. Had it 
" been otherwise, it is clear that however correct 
" or wise his conduct may have been, he could not 
" with the weight of CTOVcrnment censure for liaving 
" assumed responsibility, have cleared himself from 
" the stain thus unjustly cast upon him. 

" No man therefore, who has a character that he 
" prizes beyond the emoluments of office, can ven- 
" ture to hold the appointment of Commander-in- 
" Chief, exposed as it is, under the present system, 
" as above illustrated; and whoever does hold it, in 
" conforming to the present system, must be pre- 
" pared to risk the loss of character, to sacrifice 
" the Army and risk the security of India as a 
" British possession. 

" When the present Commander-in-Chief arrived 
" in India, he found the Army in a state of gross 
" undiscipline, and grievously inexpert in military 
" movements; and that from causes of which many 
" were beyond his control. He found the seeds 
" of mutiny sown in a large proportion of the 
" Native Army, on a principle that would necessa- 
" rily extend with rapidity to the whole of the 
" Native troops. He found tliis, and sought with 
" infinite labour to use the powers vested in him 
" to mend matters: the source of the evils how'cver, 
" was beyond his reach. He could issue judicious 
" orders, enunciate sound principles, and hold up 
" to reprobation negligence or misconduct; he 
" could punish dishonorable or unsoldierlike con- 

195 [chap. XI. 

" duct; and 14 hours hard labour, daily, enabled 
" him to ascertain minutely the merits of every 
" case, and execute that painful duty with strict 
" justness. But he could not introduce that ear- 
" nest military spirit which is the only sound basis 
" for discipline and military efficiency. He found 
" that the officers of the Indian Army looked at 
" their regiments merely as stepping stones to 
" lucrative civil employments ; and that the obtain- 
" ing of such employments w^as not in any way 
" dependant upon fulfilment of regimental duties. 
" No fewer than 443 officers in the Bengal Army 
" had thus been withdrawn from their regiments 
" and placed in lucrative employments by the civil 
" authorities, without any distinct recommendation 
" through the military authorities, or being based 
" on professional character. Thus the mainspring of 
" the Army was relaxed. The officers saw that the 
" posts of emoluments were not granted for military 
" duties, and military duty became a painful task. 

" The Commander-in-Chief is placed in a false 
" and painful position. Able to punish, unable to 
" reward, he cannot possibly bring the Army to 
" that efficiency which his Sovereign and his coun- 
" try have a right to expect ; and he must bear the 
" blame of its defects, although those are actually 
" forced on by Government practices beyond his 
" control. 

" As regards general military arrangements in 
" India, — incompatible with the character of the 
" Commander-in-Chief the Army he commands, 
" and with the safety of the country — the mode 
" in which military expeditions are decided 
" upon, undertaken and executed, may be men- 
" tioned. One of several that have occurred since 

CHAP. XI.] 19G 

" the arrival of tlie present Commander-in-Chief in 
" India, is an illustration. Tlie Rajah of Sikhem 
" committed some offensive act The head of the 
" Government immediately fulminated an indignant 
" threat of punishment, and a military expedition 
" was ordered without consultation with the Com- 
" mander-in-Chief. After the troops had marched, 
" it came to the Commander-in-Chief's knowledge 
" that, on the recommendation of a civil func- 
" tionary in the Sikhem country, the force had been 
" fixed at 700 men ; that the plan of campaign 
" proposed by this gentleman was, that they should 
" advance 80 miles into the enemy's country, 
" leaving, at several posts, detachments from a 
" main body, only 700 strong at starting! It was 
" admitted that the country was most difficult and 
" precipitous, with jungle so dense there was rarely 
" the power of seeing 30 yards in advance. That 
" there were no roads, no power to employ animals 
" in the transport of stores and baggage, all of 
" which must necessarily be conveyed on men's 
" backs. That the march must be conducted in 
" Indian file through these dangerous passes. 
" There was also a monastic establishment on the 
" line of march, whose feeling towards us was not 
" ascertained, but would naturally be hostile to the 
" invading professors of an adverse faith ; and who 
" would, of course, have enormous inliuence in 
" stirring up the people of the country to resistance, 
" in defiles where the natives with their matchlocks 
" would be as efficient as disciplined troops. 

" Tlie Commander-in-Chief hearing that troops 
" had actually gone fortli from the Army under 
" his command without his knowledge, felt most 
" uneasy, lest disaster should befall them; and wrote 

197 [chap. xr. 

" to the Brigadier commanding, connselling the 
" greatest possible cantion. That officer was aUve 
" to the danger of his position, and made such a 
" report to the Government, that, after a con- 
" siderable advance, tlie latter wisely suspended 
" further progress; and the loud threat fulminated 
" by Lord Dalhousie remained a dead letter ! It is 
" said, that by negotiation the Rajah, ignorant of 
" the strength of his position, has since conceded to 
" our Government what they required in the way of 
" reparation ; but this has nothing to do with the 
" principle in which the Commander-in-Chief is 
" interested. It was a mere piece of good fortune, 
" arising out of the Commander-in-Chief's vigilance 
" — which the civil government might possibly 
" denominate officiousness — that the miserably in- 
" adequate expedition thus detached from his 
" Army by the civil Government had not been 
" destroyed in the defiles of Sikhem. The world, 
" in ignorance of the principle of military arrange- 
" ments in India, would naturally have considered 
" the Commander-in-Chief responsible for the dis- 
" aster. Hence while such a system is in force no 
" officer who prizes his character, the lives and 
" credit of his soldiers and fame of his country 
" beyond the high emoluments of his post, can re- 
" main Commander-in-Chief in India. 


" The present Commander-in-Chief has received a 
" severe reprimand from the Government, in return 
" for having quelled the most dangerous and extcn- 
" sivc mutiny, that has ever shown itself in the 
" Indian Army- 

" He has been enjoined, not, under any circum- 

CHAF. \I.] 198 

stances in future, to take upon liimself a simi- 
lar responsibility to that wliicli enabled him 
to quell the late mutiny, when it was impossible 
for him to consult the Government under a 
month's loss of time. That responsibility being 
merely the suspending a Government charge 
against the Sepoys of £.6 9s. for a month ! ! 
" The mode in which officers are at present 
abstracted from the Army, and placed in lucra- 
tive employment, without reference to military 
exertions, renders it impossible for the Com- 
mander-in-Chief to maintain the requisite degree 
of military spirit, discipline, and efficiency, in 
the Army. 

" The mode in which military expeditions are got 
up by the Civil Government without reference 
to the Commander-in-Chief exposes him, the 
Army, and the country, to loss of character. 
" Any one of the above four causes would justify 
the Commander-in-Chief in resigning. The four 
united render it imperative upon him to resign 
his dangerous post. 

Simla 2Srd April 1850. 


PAET 11. 


Having shown the causes of my resignation, 
and of the war which has tormented the North- 
west frontier for four years, a detailed exposition 
of the state of the Company's Armies shall follow ; 
my chief object being to exhibit defects in the 
Indian military system, and point out the remedies. 
Lord Dalhousie's civil Government cannot how- 
ever be separated from military matters, and fre- 
quently additional proofs must be given that my 
holding office under him would have been a public 
wrong. He was jealous and hostile, feelings as- 
siduously nourished and augmented by persons 
about him, with the usual cunning of vulgar- 
minded men devoid of abilities. Personally this 
might have been despised, but the injury to the 
public welfare demands exposure. 

The barracks for Europeans shall be first 
noticed ; and this dreadful branch of Indian misrule 
shall be treated with the frankness becoming a 
man bound by a sacred duty towards liis fellow 

The barrack system sacrifices soldiers' lives and 

CHAr. I.] 200 

happiness to a fiillacious dishonest economy ! I 
charge the Court of Directors, the MiUtary 
Board of Calcutta, the Government of Bombay, 
with shameful negligence of the soldiers' safety ! 
And with good warrant, because they disregarded 
my representations when a high position and great 
experience gave title to attention. The completed 
Artillery barracks at Kurrachee, and the finished 
wing of Infantry barracks at Hyderabad, furnished 
proof that my notions were sound. Lord Ellen- 
borough sanctioned my building the last-named 
healthy barracks — Lord Dalhousie forbade their 
completion ! One forwarded improvement — the 
other stopped it ! Lord Dalhousie at first sup- 
ported me, but soon his conduct displayed official 
feebleness — he would not oppose the Court of 
Directors, or abate the folly of the Military 

The Colaba and King's barracks at Bombay have 
destroyed whole regiments; commanding officers 
dreaded them as pest houses ; but it is said the 
Government has now been compelled by public 
indignation to put doAvn or alter those of Colaba. 
It is full time. I walked through the men's sleep- 
ing rooms there upon planks laid in water 
coverinq the floors ! An oflficer who knew them well 
thus speaks : " The Colaba barracks it would 
" appear are destined to be the slaughter-houses 
" of more thousands of British soldiers than would 
" suffice for the loinning of fifty battles ! The 
" moment we landed, each shipload was at once 
" attacked by cholera, and we buried 97 men ! 
ci # # * * # came to see us. I represented to 
" him that disease must ever attack the troops 
" stationed there, particularly in the monsoon 

201 [chap. I. 

" season, wliile the barracks are so low and close 
" to that Mangrove swamp, that if no more con- 
" venient site could be found on which to build 
" new ones, the present ones should be raised upon 
" strong arches 14 feet from the ground, and the 
" rooms above made high, ventilated &c." He pro- 
mised to give all attention, but it ended in draining 
and raising the roofs, and ventilating, which has 
indeed improved the barracks ; but the " evil is still 
" there ! The men sleep and live on the ground 
" floor.'' — The floor walked over on planks ! 

In 18-18 I was Commandant of Bombay, sickness 
was at Colaba as usual, and the excellent officer 
quoted above, recommended the construction of 
new barracks on firm ground, with a sale of the 
edifice in the swamp, for a bonding warehouse ; 
the purchase money would have repaid many times 
the cost of the new construction ! A committee 
composed of myself, the Quarter-Master-Gencral, 
and the Executive Engineer, chose a very suitable 
site, and estimates were ordered, but without 
result, and death's maw continues to be overfilled 
at Colaba ! 

At Aden the barracks are mats — nothing more ! 
Better than low rooms of masonry, because they 
let out foul air ; but they do not protect Europeans 
against the dreadful heat of a tropical sun ! Is 
not this a disgraceful treatment of the Queen's 
troops where the Indian Government is wasting 
thousands upon fortifications 1 

At the Colaba and King's barracks the soldiers 
die like rotten sheep under the nose of the Council, 
and where the Governor is also Commander-in-Chief; 
for at Calcutta, Madras, and Bombay, the Governors 
possess that title ; tlie real military heads having no 

CHAP. I.] 202 

authority within those towns — an absurd rule of 
ancient times. 

It was in 1842 the officer quoted above remon- 
strated; in 1852 soldiers are still immolated in 
those pestilential barracks ! Ten years therefore 
our men have to my knowledge, been perishing 
without an excuse for the Bombay Government's 
cruelty; and from the first construction of those 
infamous pest houses they have so perished ; victims 
to Councils, Military Boards, Committees and like 
irresponsible tyrannies. Would to God that Par- 
liament had returns of the regiments quartered in 
those barracks from 1800, and of the British soldiers 
killed by them. 

In the Bengal presidency the barracks are, with 
few exceptions, extremely bad ; but more pernicious 
still is the number of men crammed into them. 
Losses by battle sink to nothing compared with 
those inflicted by improperly constructed barracks, 
and the jamming of soldiers — no other word is 
sufficiently expressive. Long experience, and con- 
sultations with men of science medical and engi- 
neer officers, have taught me that every barrack 
room should in hot climates, allow, at least, one 
thousand cubic feet of atmospheric air for each person 
sleeping in a room. That is the minimum ; with 
less, insufferable heat and a putrid atmosphere 
prevails, death is the result ! The soldiers rise at 
night feverish, or in profuse perspiration, to sleep 
out on the ground amidst damp exhalations. In- 
dian night air in the Autumn months is dangerous 
to all who sleep exposed ; but to do so when heated 
by an overcrowded room is death ! Some may 
escape, or merely loose health ; but to escape is the 
exception, the rule is death ! 

203 [chap. I. 

Aware of this clanger veterans endure, lying 
restless and miserable till the dawn comes, and with 
it the blazing sun of India — a wretched sleepless 
night to prepare for a burning day ! Languid and 
unhappy they go to their duties, seeking by drams 
to sustain body and mind against overwhelming 
lassitude and low spirits and this artificial excite- 
ment carries them through the day. But again the 
night of misery returns, the dram does its daily 
deadly work, and liver and brain become inflamed, 
fever supervenes, and the mind sinks under 
bodily suffering and hopelessness of change. 

All bad influences being thus brought into full 
activity it follows that men soon die, or become 
drunken feeble creatures and always on the sick 
list, to be discharged with a pension between thirty 
and forty years of age, after costing the public 
enormous sums without equivalent service. This 
inhuman drain upon public life and health, and 
upon the public treasury, constantly goes on, and 
the soldiers able to remain in the ranks are but half 
the "strong fellows they would be if properly lodged. 

When Governor of Scinde I laboured for good 
barracks, not in vain, for Lord Ellenborough ruled. 
One fine barrack was built, a second half built 
before my departure ; but then the Bombay 
Government and Lord Dalhousie arrested further 
progress, and the collected materials lie scattered 

When Commander-in-Chief this matter of bar- 
racks was pressed with some effect upon Lord 
Dalhousie ; but where Lord Ellenborough would 
have instantly ordered the necessary work, Lord Dal- 

* See " Admiiiislratioii (if Scinde " by Sir W. Napior. 

CHAP. I.] 204 

housic consulted the Court of Directors — so men 
died and die still of red tape ! However at Lahore, a 
healthy spot called Mecan Meer, was selected, where 
Runjcet Sing had formerly built his barracks. 
Good water was found twenty feet below the 
surface, the air was pure, and the building for- 
warded with vigour by myself and an active Engi- 
neer — lieutenant Glover. The young officers of 
the Indian Army are full of energy, desirous to 
learn and eager to work. 

The scope and dimensions of these barracks were 
on a plan I vainly hoped to make general. The 
barrack rooms were only wide enough for two rows 
of bedsteads, a long table and two rows of forms, 
leaving a passage between the forms and bedsteads. 
The height of the rooms 35 feet to the ceiling, or, 
if the roof was open, to the wall 2)late ; the vent 
above not to be included in the height. The ceil- 
ings were to be ventilated, letting the foul air out 
at the roof; side ventilation produces draughts and 
does not let out bad air so freely as upper vents. 

The object in having rooms narrow and high was 
to prevent the common practice of jamming. For 
in India the Military Board calculates how many 
men a barrack room can hold, 7iot hy its cubic con- 
tent of air, hut hy the superjicies of the floor ! Troops 
were, — until forbade by me — thus made to occupy 
barrack rooms of 12, 10, or even 8 feet high. Upon 
this diabolical calculation, soldiers were swept off 
by thousands ; The Black Hole at Calcutta, seems 
to have been the Board's model ! That a number of 
human beings should thus be deprived of pure air, 
many with incipient disease in their constitutions, is 
terrible ; the result has been fever, scurvy, dysen- 
tery, death ! 

205 [chap l 

Narrow high rooms not only give pure air, but 
debar crowding ; it cannot be done without such 
fflarinof indifference to the soldiers' lives as would 
elicit determined remonstrances from commanding 
officers. A medical report in my possession forcibly 
shows the effect, in one instance of the low bar- 
rack rooms establislied by the INIilitary Board — 
Murdering Board should be its name ; for directly 
and indirectly it causes more loss of life, more 
extravagance than can be described, and its evil 
influence spreads far beyond barracks ! Do the 
Directors know the mischief perpetrated by that 
body ? I only became fully aware of its destruc- 
tive operations when Commander-in-Chief. It 
kills more soldiers than the climate, more than 
hard drinking ; and one half of the last springs 
from the discomfort, the despair caused by its bad 

The medical report mentioned touches only the 
2nd Europeans at Sabathoo ; but the crowding of 
men is everywhere, and that deadly exposition will 
equally apply to Her Majesty's 29th regiment, 
which was nearly destroyed at the neighbouring 
barrack of Kassowlie. Both buildings were in the 
pure air of the hills, yet from their crowded state 
both regiments were so ruined in 1846-7-8 that 
neither were fit for service in 1850! Their num- 
ber, their colours, their uniform remained — the 
men were gone I Crowding did the mischief. 
Behold the proof! 

At those i)laces the climate is of the fin est in India; 
cool, salubrious and elevated from five to seven 
thousand feet above the sea ! The barracks built by 
the Military Board there too contain one battalion 
each were occupied by the two regiments, and they 

CHAP. I.] 206 

died like rotten sheep. This havoc teas attributed 
to cVnnate ; wherefore the barracks were abandoned 
as unhealthj/, and new constructions — be(/un in the 
vicinity at Dugshai — were stoirped by order of the 
Military Board for the safne reason. 

That Sabathoo and Kassowlie shonld be pesti- 
lential, Avhile Simla ajjparently so like in climate 
was resorted to as a Garden of Eden, was in- 
credible ; wherefore I visited the condemned 
barracks to seek the real cause of the terrible 
sickness. Easily it was found ! Only 400 cubic 
feet of air had been allowed for each man ! "What 
quantity of air Suraj-ud-Dowlat allowed in the 
Calcutta Black Hole has not been stated, but at 
Kassowlie and Sabathoo a measuring tape proved 
that the military Suraj-ud-Dowlat was the Board. 
Lord Dalhousie's permission w'as then obtained 
for repairing these barracks and finishing those 
at Dugshai. 

At this time all the European soldiers in India 
dreaded Sabathoo and Kassowlie, but the spell 
of terror was broken in this manner. While the 
new constructions were in progress I reached 
Peshawur, where the 60th regiment was suffering 
dreadfully from the bad site of the barracks. That 
was the fortune of war ; they were the best to be 
had, but the sad state of this fine regiment made 
me resolve to send it to Kassowlie and Sabathoo, 
notwithstanding the universal dread of those 
places. ^len were astonished, but to Doctor Boys 
their surgeon, whose medical abilities merited the 
highest confidence, the real cause of disease at 
those stations was pointed out : and as his opinion 
coincided with mine the regiment marched — not 
however, to be crowded into one barrack after the 

207 [chap. I. 

Military Board's fashion, but to occupy both bar- 
racks, — a "wing in each ! Moreover the roofs had 
been raised, and the trees, which around Kassowlie 
were so close that the branches hung over the 
building had been cleared away, in despite of strong 
opposition, for the support of Lord Dalhousie, 
was then lost; but with the aid of remonstrance 
from the commanding officer of the regiment — the 
much-lamented Colonel Bradshaw, and of the 
medical men, who tliroughout India oppose the 
crowding system, the opposition was overcome. 

The 60th regiment entered the barracks of 
Kassowlie and Sabathoo, with gloomy forebodings, 
so did the 22nd enter those of Dugshai ; but when 
I left India both were in health, not exceeded by 
any regiment in England ! The returns of the 
22nd, 19tli November, 1850, gave, on a strength 
of 1054, only 29 in hospital, several from accidents 
and eleven from a complaint as common in London 
and Paris as in India. Not one in fifty were sick 
from climate ! It was not bad air that had destroyed 
the soldiers — it was the Military Board's economy 
of wood and stone, its extravagance of life ! 

Nearly every barrack in India is bad as to alti- 
tude; Allahabad is of the few exceptions ; but being 
in a fort, the air, enclosed by walls, is intolerably 
hot for Europeans. Allahabad is also at the 
confluence of the Ganges and Jumna, and when 
towns on the banks of great rivers decay stagnant 
waters are formed and spread malaria. Allahabad, 
said to be the ancient Palibrotha, may again 
become celebrated ; its site is grand and central. 

Following up my plan of the barracks at Lahore 
and Meean Mcer, a construction was also begun at 
Sealkote, and another at Peshawur; and the 

CHAP. I.] 208 

greatest exertions were made to get the troops 
well covered before the hot weather. In India 
officers are not lodged in barracks, they receive 
money to build what is called a " bungalow,'' but 
at this time foreseeing that our frontier policy 
would inevitably produce a war with the tribes 
around Peshawur, 1 proposed to have the officers 
quartered in the barracks for safety. The Court 
of Directors refused, the usual bungalows were 
built, and their occupants are now compelled to 
hire Native (guards against the hill men ! How can 
subalterns afford this ? 

When I quitted Peshawur, all persons concerned 
were zealous to complete the barracks before the 
hot weather set in, their bungalows, mess houses, 
billiard rooms, stables, and even a theatre were 
rising fast, and I, acting with sanction from the 
Governor-General, having given specific orders 
stupidly fancied the private soldiers' barracks 
would arise more rapidly. This was in February, 
and well pleased I was to think the autumn 
ravages of fever would be averted. My satisfaction 
was short lived. In August a letter from General 
Campbell reported that the barracks which ought to 
have been then finished had made no progress ! 

The public buildings necessary to save the lives 
of the Queen's troops had made no progress, while 
everything required by the officers had been 
rapidly completed ! The engineers had made 
every effort to construct the baiTacks before the 
sun poured down its destructive floods of heat ; 
the Commander-in-Chief, with discretionary powers, 
had done all depending on him ; every subordinate 
was zealous, yet no progress was made and death 
assailed the soldiers ! The mortality was fearful. 

209 [chap. I. 

Why was this ? The labour market at Peshawur 
was free, and the officers fjave the waqes labour could 
command in the market, ivhile the executive engineer 
was limited by the Military Board to frved rates, 
below what the working people could command, not 
only from British officers, but from the natives of 
the country ! 

Was this prohibition of progress, this fiat of 
death for the poor soldiers, the angry comment on 
my habitual efforts to expose the murderous 
absurdities of that Board 1 My thoughts are free, 
the facts were so — the lives of many brave men 
were sacrificed, men who had decided the battle of 
Chillianwallah, and by Lord Gough personally 
thanked on the battle field. Those noble soldiers 
so ready to die when the Service demands their 
death ! Never do they flinch from any trial called 
for by honour ; but the Military Board, the Court 
of Directors, the East India Company of Merchants, 
with vile parsimony, selfish idleness, and ingra- 
titude consigned them to destruction ! 

Here let a mournful indignant record be made 
of what happened to the 50th regiment. 

More than decimated in the battles of Moodkee 
Ferozshur, Aliwal, and Sobraon, its remains entered 
thebarracks at Loodiana under the fostering economy 
of the Military Board ; a gale of wind arose, the 
edifice fell bodily, and those glorious soldiers, their 
wives and children, were in one horrid instant 
destroyed ! It is said three liundred men women 
and children were crushed ; such dreadful events 
do not admit of exactness ; but the Military Board 
and Court of Directors are responsible to God and 
man — the first for the calamity, tlie second for not 

CHAP. I.] 210 

liaving abolished the first, and augmented its corps 
of Engineers, instead of employing Infantry officers 
ignorant of the business to execute what belongs to 
engineers and builders. But the vile system should 
be reformed altogether to enable the legitimate 
officers to do their work with safety to the troops 
and themselves. They cannot do this with com- 
plicated accounts, and a ruinous balance against 
them for years under a delayed audit. If an 
engineer dies how is that balance to be settled? 
How can a man labour with a will when not only 
his family but his honour may be ruined by a Board 
which does not know, or does not do its work ? 
None can serve as they ouglit under protracted 
financial responsibility, especially in such an enerva- 
ting climate. 

An engineer should plan his works with all 
possible perfection, — should frame his estimates 
with reference to perfect execution and keep within 
them. He should look to the quality of his 
materials, and rigidly enforce contracts. He should 
not be a mere clerk with intricate accounts for 
years unaudited ! He should be intent on plans, 
estimates, superintendence, — and lie requires time 
for study. 

Generally speaking the Directors treat their 
Army well, but they must not suppose British 
soldiers are unreasoning beings ; that they do not 
ask why bungalows are quickly built by officers, 
and soldiers' barracks make no progress ? They 
do not see their comrades die without feeling a 
just indignation. The Leadenliall people may be 
assured these things, aye ! and much more is talked 
of in every barrack room ; for in the British ranks 

211 [chap. I. 

are officers and privates of far greater capacity than 
any in the Court of Directors — ftxr better informed 
as regards India and its Government. 

Seeing the soldiers' misery I regulated their 
numbers in barracks, so as to allow each a thousand 
cubic feet of air ; but it said the Court of Directors 
have ordered the height of the unfinished barracks 
commenced by me to be reduced ! If so, thousands 
of soldiers are doomed men. Expecting such 
iniquity, the completion of one barrack at Meean 
IMeer to the full height of thirty-five feet was 
secured — perhaps this also will be cut down ! My 
hope is however that public feeling for the soldiers 
may be excited, and the Directors comjielled to 
raise barrack rooms even higher than thirty-five 
feet, for in despair of getting more that was taken 
as a minimum. 

Punkas have been lately set up in the European 
barracks. They are large fans slung from the 
ceiling and swayed by a rope to cool the air. The 
soldiers' health has improved where they have been 
used, but the Directors have awarded such scanty 
payment for punkamen, that where there are not 
canteen funds to aid, they are not used! So 
incurable in Leadenhall Street, is that disease, — 
the dothuj on dividends! Punkas will not avail, 
however, without rooms thirty or forty feet high, 
with top ventilation. High rooms, expensive once, 
are permanently economical, and a remedy for a 
dreadful evil — punkas are a mere expedient. 

The ftite of the barracks at Hyderabad on the 
Indus exemplifies the mode by which my efforts to 
lodge soldiers healthily were nullified. They were 
designed to hold a regiment, and the Luncnted 
Major Peat of the Engineers took all pains witli 

ciiAr. 1.] 212 

the plan. One wing was completed by Lieut. 
Burke an able Bombay Engineer, before my depar- 
ture in 18-i7 ; but then the building of those 
beautiful barracks, and everything else beneficial 
for Scinde left unfinished by me, was stopped 
under the Bombay Government. However, one 
wing was finished, and in 1850, half a regiment 
placed there was healthy, while the other wing 
quartered at a more salubrious station of Kurrachee, 
was unhealthy. Why? At Hyderabad the men 
were not crowded, at Kurrachee they were. 

When Commander-in-Chief, I urged the comple- 
tion of the Hyderabad barracks as a depot for 
regiments coming from England, instead of sending 
them to Calcutta, where they quit the ships to be 
crowded in the bad barracks of that great city. The 
hospital soon fills there, numbers die from the 
union of bad lodging, fiery drink, and fiery climate, 
and the survivors are hurried away as quickly as 
2)0ssihle. But that possible depends on various 
circumstances, and the young soldier, after a long 
voyage, and knowing nothing of Indian marching, 
suffers severely. The march alone shakes his 
constitution without the previous mismanagement. 
In 1850, the Queen's 87th regiment Avas absolutely 
decimated by that mismanagement. 

AVere all regiments destined for the North-west 
provinces to land in Scinde, they would find at 
Hyderabad a spacious airy barrack, be in a certain 
degree acclimatised, and finally go up the Indus in 
steamers to their destination. The maj) will show 
the folly of sending them to Calcutta instead of 
Kurrachee — it is almost as bad as attacking 
Burmah by Rangoon instead of Aracan ; that 
supreme absurdity by which, in contempt of 

213 [ciiAr. I. 

Wellington's judgment, of Sir A. Campbell, and 
cf every man knowing aught of war, the Lords 
Amherst and Dalhousio have displayed their 
military genius ! Would that the latter was only 
" Lieutenant- Colonel to the Earl ofMar." 

All regiments from England destined for the 
Northern Bengal provinces should land about the 
end of November at Kurracliee. That place, so 
decried by factious folly, will become one of the 
largest and most important cities of India, and 
every power of Government should be applied to 
hasten its progress. It will be the emporium of 
traffic by the Indus, and now offers the shortest 
and best line for the transmission of troops to the 
Punjaub, to the Northern and the North-western 
provinces of Bengal. 



Much should be said on this subject, if the 
Indian newspapers had not announced that the 
Commissariat has been taken from the Military 
Board and placed under a Commissary-General. 
A few remarks are however necessary. 

The soldier is supplied with bread and meat 
by contractors, and whether the articles be good 
or bad he must pay for them ; the hospitals also 
are thus furnished with necessary comforts ; two 
thirds of the poor invalids' pay being deducted 
for the cost. The interest of the soldier and the 
contractor are opposed. If the latter gives bad 
articles, the soldier complains, and shame and 
dishonour it would be for his officers not to listen 
and do him justice. The rule is that the com- 
manding officer orders a Court of Inquiry; on 
whose report, if facts warrant, the Commissary 
is called on to change the provisions. But human 
nature has still its influences, and how they 
may act in this case is worth examination. 

ly/e Soldier. — Can he have any motive to refuse 
good food ? His complaint must be made at 
breakfast or dinner time to his officer ; and in 
India complaints of this nature take long to re- 

215 [chap. II. 

medy ; the men must therefore wait several hours 
for their nourishment, perhaps lose it altogetlier 
that day — a strong check. In fifty-eight }"ears' 
service I have never known of soldiers making an 
unreasonable complaint of their food ! 

The Court of Inquire/. — What influence can elicit 
an unjust opinion from the members. Regimental 
officers have no visible bias for or against the 
soldier, or the authorities would not make them 

The Commanding Officer. — Nearly always he con- 
firms the finding of the court. Married officers in 
command have indeed sometimes been accused of 
improper intimacy with contractors and commis- 
saries ; yet my long experience has never furnished 
an instance of a commanding officer not supporting 
his men as to their food. 

Quarter-Masters. — It is said they often support 
the contractor. This does not accord with my 
knowledge ; yet they sometimes do declare the 
meat to be loholesome when the soldier complains. 
Meat may be wholesome, and hardy soldiers with 
the digestion of ostriches may be laughed at for 
complaining ; they do not complain when no better 
can be had, but they pay for the best qualiti/, and 
have a right to it. Wherefore Quarter-Masters 
and contractors should abstain from opinions as to 
wholesomeness and stick to the contract. 

Commissary. — lie generally supports the con- 
tractor. Under the Military Board he would 
probably be dismissed if he did not ; but his 
support is accounted for by the troops in another 
manner. Men who enter tlic department very 
poor in a short time live more splendidly than 
general officers. To receive presents from contrac- 

CHAP. II.] 216 

tors is forbidden to the Commissary — not forbidden 
to his wife ; and public cattle and public servants 
can be employed on private affairs ! Again, a 
house may be accidentally built or bought by a 
contractor, and a Commissary may get it at a 
nominal rent. How do some Commissaries live so 
well, get so rich 1 Why do they lean to contractors 
in disputes about the soldiers' supplies 1 Why is it 
that the public eye twinkles so merrily and so 
maliciously when Commissaries are spoken of? 
Answer those who can — the way of a Commissary 
with a contractor may be added to the three things 
which Solomon knew not. Contractors however 
read the Proverbs, and find " a gift in secret 
pacifieth wrath." 

Jotee Persaud, to whom the Indian Government 
owed so much money and gratitude for nourishing 
its Army in the field, when the Commissariat failed, 
has made India ring with complaints of that 
Government's injustice. A legal verdict has com- 
pelled it to pay him, but an impression prevails that 
in a new war no great contractor will undertake to 
provision the troops on his terms. Persaud's con- 
tract was honourably fulfilled even to peril of 
his life ; it was remunerative — he w^ould be a 
fool else, Avhich all India knows he is not — and 
doubtless many under frauds happened, for in such 
an innnense operation he could not prevent them. 
He sent his agents abroad, and it was for Govern- 
ment servants to see that all Avas right. Who were the 
Government agents bound to prevent the frauds for 
which the Government sought to make Jotee Per- 
saud answerable 1 English officers in the Civil and 
Commissariat 8cr\ ices ! 

Before us are two classes of men. 

217 [chap. II. 

First— Agents of the contractor, natives, having 
sub-contracts, all interested in giving inferior 
supplies, and in many instances destitute of the 
honour which, for aught shoAvn to the contrary, 
Jotee Persaud, an Indian gentleman, possesses. 

Second — Commissariat officers appointed to de- 
tect frauds, honourable men, doubtless. But a 
great difficulty arises. The Government proclaimed 
the existence of frauds which the Commissariat 
officers were paid to prevent, and with few excep- 
tions those gentlemen declared that Jotee Persaud 
had honestly performed his contract. This was 
honourable, because it drew on themselves an im- 
putation of connivance, or of being duped. 

Has any inquiry been instituted as to their 
conduct ] No ! and the public opinion in India is, 
that if Jotee Persaud had been hard pushed he 
would have told strange tales of bribery. The 
Commissariat department is thus placed in a dis- 
creditable light, injurious even to private character. 
More than one officer has been heard to say he 
would not accept an appointment in the Com- 
missariat, because honesty would be no protection 
from suspicion. This, in a great measure is owing 
to the Commissariat being under the Military 
Board, whose long arrears of accounts make 
vigorous administration impossible. Jotee's un- 
settled claims extended so far back as 1838, 
perhaps farther ; and a Commissariat officer, a 
man of honour, who served under me in 1845, said 
that in 1850 his accounts for that period were not 
settled ! 

The remedy is to abolish the ISfilitary Board, and 
appoint one Chief Connnissary who can act with 
vigour, and whose character is involved with that 


CHAP. 11.] 218 

of his department. Being responsible to the Com- 
inander-in-Chicf, and through him to the Governor- 
General, he should have great power to dismiss ; 
and not to exercise that power with energy where 
corruption existed should be fatal to his reputation. 
He would choose for contractors men of substance, 
giving a fair profit, but making forfeiture for non- 
performance proportioned to the dreadful results 
which such failures produce, namely, distress, ill- 
health, death to the soldiers. The Military Board 
may think ten, or ten thousand pounds a pro- 
per fine for the destruction of troops, but it is 
not so ; the penalty should be as terrible to the 
contractor as the results are to the soldier; the great 
events depending on their strength should not 
be put in jeopardy by tenderness to a swindling 

What is the course of the Military Board 1 It 
accepts from native contractors tenders for sup- 
plying the Europeans at a price so low that it 
is not possible to execute the contract honestly, and 
every species of fraud and bribery is resorted to by 
the dexterous rascal who contracts. 



Discipline in the Bengal Army is so involved 
Avith the civil system that the errors of the last in a 
great measure produce those of the first, and in 
some degree excuse them. The interference of the 
civil power is extensive, constant and pernicious ; 
but a few illustrations must suffice, and nothing 
here said touching the Commanders-in-Chief of the 
British Army should be taken as applicable to the 
late Duke of Wellington. Enveloped in his own 
splendour his word was, or ought to have been law 
as to war. Ordinary men only are my mark, when 
drawing comparisons between them and the Indian 

In England the Commander-in-Chief stands in 
presence of the Sovereign, which nearly extinguishes 
his responsibility. He is in contact with the Go- 
vernment, his duties are by long custom defined, 
and the regulations of the Army arc clearly and 
well laid down. If war comes it is the result of 
political arrangements, with which he has no con- 
cern ; ho has in fine, no greater responsibility than 
may attach to him as commander of an expedition, 
if he quits England at tlie licad of one. He pro- 

CHAP. III.] 220 

vides for the number and equipment of troops 
wanted for service ; but even then shares responsi- 
bility with the Ministers or throws it entirely on 
them. His shght accountabiUty is absorbed by the 
powerful Government mth whom he is in daily 
consultation during peace ; and when war comes 
the War Minister is the real commander. If the 
military man dislikes this, he can resign ; and 
though to surrender a post so honourable and lucra- 
tive, requires firmness, that is all. The ex-chief 
puts on his hat, walks out of the Horse Guards to 
his club, reads his successor's name in the Gazette^ 
and goes home to dinner. 

The poor Indian General cannot do so with a like 
facility and coolness. He does it though. Of four- 
teen Commanders-in-Chief in India since the year 
1792, ten have resigned before their term, and of 
those who did not, two were Governors-General, 
the others but two held their commands to the 
last — suffering all things. 

An Indian Commander-in-Chief is some 12,000 
miles from his home, and has gone that distance on 
a fool's errand if he resign before his full period of 
service. He is not young, has probably suffered in 
health by going out, and having with great cost 
established himself and his family at such a dis- 
tance, cannot resign his position and large salary 
lightly; he suffers himself and so do others, for his 
personal staff are turned adrift: moreover, if in the 
North-west provinces, he has at an advanced age a 
weary journey before re-embarking for home. These 
inconveniences make him retain his post while he 
can do so with honour; whereas in London the 
Commander-in-Chief has not even to ])ack up a 
carpet bag when he resigns ! Such is the differ- 

221 [chap. tii. 

ence of position as to private affairs, and with public 
matters it is greater. 

In India jjcace is 7iever certain for a single day. 
Take the four last wars. That of Cabul was so 
sudden as to be proclaimed only by a massacre. 
In Scinde war was proclaimed by a battle ; and if 
Outram, the political agent, had been allowed to 
direct affairs there, as the political agent, jNIcNaugh- 
ten, was at Cabul, the same disasters would have 
befallen our Army. The Bundlecund war also was 
proclaimed by a battle; the first Punjaub war came 
down like an avalanche, and the second was equally 

When war thus breaks out the Commander-in- 
Chief becomes the responsible man before the 
world. He lies down at night in peace ; he wakes 
at daylight to fight a general action ! On the 13th 
December, 1845, peace reigned in India; on the 
18th a fearful battle took place at Moodkee, where 
sixteen British officers, with three hundred and 
fifty privates were laid dead! An Indian Com- 
mander-in-Chief may in a moment find himself, 
witliout preparation, responsible for the safety of 
the Indian empire. His position is in no way like 
that of the liome Commander-in-Chief, on whom 
events so sudden and so terrible cannot burst. 
Therefore tlie former ought to have power com- 
mensurate witli his vast responsibility. 

Many are the examples of danger from divided 
power in war from the pernicious interference of 
civil autliorities; and also of mihtary men invested 
with civil power — politicals. Alexander the Great 
sent a force against Spitamenes under the orders of 
Pharnuches, a Lycian pohtical, who had doubtless 
passed a " splendid e.rainination in the Persian Ian- 

CHAP. III.] 222 

giiage^'' but was, of course, cut to pieces by 
S])itamcnos, the Akbar Khan of those days. Come 
to modern times. The rival powers of McNaughten 
and Elphinstone had horrible results ; but let those 
unhappy gentlemen rest in peace ; be it only stated 
that there was a divided command and great 

AVhen the second Punjaub war broke out the 
Governor-General was at Calcutta, the Commander- 
in-Chief was at Simla 1200 miles distant; the 
British resident at the court of Duleep Sing was in 
Lahore, 300 miles from the Commander-in-Chief 
INIoolraj of Mooltan revolted in April 1848, and in 
July the Lahore resident. Sir Frederick Currie sent 
a force against him. This he did in the exercise 
of civil power, contemptuous of the Commander-in- 
Chiefs antagonistic opinion ! Who was Sir Fre- 
derick Currie? A civilian assuredly knowing 
nothing of war. AVho was the Commander-in- 
Chief? An officer whose military exploits had won 
for him a peerage. 

Failure followed of course, and it was not until 
a seige of five months by troops of unsurpassed 
gallantry that the political folly was redeemed by 
the capture of the place ; moreover an accidental 
extraordinarily healthy season alone saved that 
force from being sacrificed by this unmilitary move- 
ment, made in defiance of the Commander-in-Chief. 
For my part, knowing how mischievous the inter- 
ference of the civil power must be, and having 
Cabul and Mooltan before my eyes, with remem- 
brance of my own narrow escape in Scinde from 
the fatuitous political Outram. I resolved to main- 
tain firmly the integrity of military command 
while I could — when I could not to resign. Woe to 

223 [chap. III. 

the country whose ruler employs subordinates to 
advise, to suggest, to dictate, about military matters. 
In India political subalterns are allowed to dictate 
to a General in the field, though no able minister 
would do so, knowing it must make a good General 
bad, and a bad one worse. 

The Prince of Sikhim seized English travellers 
in his territories, and the Council at Calcutta, under 
Lord Dalhousie's direction, issued orders for war 
witliout letting me, the Commander-in-Chief, know 
of it until after the troops had reached the Sikliim 
frontier. There a civilian gave the plan of cam- 
paign, but the General showed so clearly the 
danger of attempting to obey, that the expedition 
was relinquished by the Council, — yet the General 
himself was very roughly treated for having pre- 
vented an inevitable disaster ! He sent me his vin- 
dication. Had he entered the jungle mountains on 
the civil agent's plan, his force would never have 

Several other small wars were also as lightly 
undertaken. There was a war in Bunnoo and I knew 
notliing of it ; another in Eusofzye and I was not 
consulted ; a third at Lucknow which cost us an 
officer and 500 killed or wounded. How weak is 
such a system of Government ! Small failures of 
this nature do vast injury in the East. The natives 
draw conclusions unfavourable to our rule, and the 
honour of our arms ; and each affair adds to the 
enemy's military knowledge. 

Oppressed with ill-health and great labours I 
had no wish to be consultiny phi/sician with quacks 
about war. To be of use was impossible. Advice 
from me would not have been listened to, or only 
so much of it taken as to insure failure and afford 

riTAP. HI.] 224 

an excuse to sliift blame from the Govcriior- 
General's shoulders. Always ready to accept, I 
never sought responsibility, especially under men 
of contemptible abilities. These desultory wars 
were not necessary, and voluntarily to have meddled 
with them would have been folly. The public 
cannot benefit by such interference with military 
authority, and the Governor-General would do well 
to take counsel from my old nurse, who used to say 
" mind hoy never keep a dog and bark yourself.'' 
Until this barking ceases the Indian Commander- 
in-Chief must be loaded with responsibility, denuded 
of power, and constantly trembling for his own 
fame and the public service. 

The injurious effect on discipline caused by the 
employment of soldiers in civil duties shall now be 
shown ; but first some notice of the patronage 
usurped by Lord Dalhousie will be fitting ; because 
it is unjust that a commander should have no 
power to reward distinguished deeds, and the Army 
look for benefits to other than the man who has to 
enforce discipline. 

Lord Dalhousie increased the Irregular force in 
the Punjaub by many new corps, but placed them 
under the orders of the Board of Administration, 
not under mine. Other Governors-General had 
before raised Irregulars, making the first appoint- 
ments, but always turning them over to the Com- 
mander-in-Chief with the subsequent patronage. 
Long after these regiments were raised Lord Dal- 
housie offered the command to me, yet retained the 
permanent patronage contrary to custom. This 
would have placed the Irregulars under my autho- 
rity on different conditions, viz. command and 
patronage of the old Irregular force, as given by 

225 [chap. in. 

Lords Ellcnboroiigh and liardinge to Lord Goiigh, 
and to which I succeeded — command of the new 
Irregular force without the patronage. I refused 
additional authority, without power to promote 
officers whose claims were strong, and surely the 
spirit here exhibited by Lord Dalhousie was not 
laudable. Nor was it confined in action to the 
patronage he denied, as a very cruel proceeding now 
to be related will prove. Perhaps the Court 
of Directors will yet repair this wrong to the ser- 
vice, and to one of its bravest young officers. 

In the Pass of Kohat a Sepoy picket, descending 
a precipitous mountain under fire and the rolling 
of large stones, had some men killed and wounded. 
Four of the latter, dreadfully hurt, crept under 
rocks for shelter ; they were not missed until the 
picket reached the bottom, but were then dis- 
covered by our glasses, high up and helpless. For- 
tunately the enemy did not see them, and some 
Sepoys volunteered a rescue. Headed by Lieut. 
H. W. Norman of the 31st Native Infantry, and 
Ensign C. Murray 70th Native Infantry, these 
brave men — would that their names were known 
to me for record — ascended the rocks in defiance of 
the enemy, and brought the wounded men down. 

Such generous daring called for prompt recog- 
nition, and two vacant appointments in my gift 
were given; that of Brigade-Major to Norman, and 
the Adjutancy of an Irregular regiment of Cavalry 
to Murray. The latter immediately put himself to 
the great expense of the Cavalry uniform, and 
joined ; but scarcely had I left India when this 
courageous younif man, only knoivn to me by his noble 
exploit, was deprived of the appointment he had so 
gallantly won ! The pretext of the Governor- 


CHAr. HI.] 226 

General and the Court of Directors is, that Ensign 
Murray must rejoin his first regiment, because he 
■was in excess of the number of officers permitted 
to be absent. This regulation was never rigidly 
enforced until I became Commander-in-Chief I It 
had been systematically broken for years, and it 
Mould have been only becoming to favour an officer, 
who had by his courage contributed to save the lives 
of four soldiers at the imminent risk of his own ! 

How rarely is it the lot of a brave young soldier 
to distinguish liimself in the view of a Commander- 
in-Chief. Murray braved danger and obtained 
glory; but for reward he has been mulcted in heavy 
useless expenses — perhaps involved in debt ! There 
were other officers of his regiment employed on 
civil duties ; could not one of those have rejoined 
rather than this brave young man who had be- 
haved so gloriously % How fair and honourable 
was his claim for exception ; how fraught with 
advantage as an incentive to deeds of generous 
courage ! Military daring displayed in the noblest 
cause is surely worthy of reward, yet here it met 
with punishment, with mortification, ruinous ex- 
pense and sickening disappointment. 

The following passages of a letter from the 
commander of an Irregular Cavalry corps depicts 
another great evil. 

" \Oth June^ 1850. — I will submit my general 
' objections against the employment of Irregular 
' Cavalry on civil duties. One of my troops, 
' placed at the disposal of the superintendent of 
' the province is employed to escort treasure and 
' diik-travcllers. It furnishes orderlies who attend 
' the superintendent in his rides, and when he 
' goes into the district, ten Sowars accompany 

227 [cH^p. III. 

" liim. Small parties of two or three troopers, even 
" only one, are scattered about under uncovenanters' 
" assistants, and Native revenue collectors, suni- 
" moning and bringing in refractory landholders 
" and villagers. Here then is one troop nominally 
" at two, really at twenty-two stations ! " But the 
" duty most to complain of is attendance on the 
" magistrate. Besides carrying letters and orders, 
" they escort him in his rides morning and even- 
" ing ; and when on a tour, relays are placed every 
" eight or ten miles to carry the post which some- 
" times is 201bs weight. This added to the usual 
" military trappings weighs the rider to one side, 
" the horses suffer in their backs and legs, and as the 
" men buy their horses they have reason to complain. 

" Your Excellency knows the conduct of my 
" regiment, the Native officers and men are of 
" high fimilics. Many of them have served faith- 
" fully upwards of forty years, and bear marks of 
" distinction, medals, wounds and orders of merit, 
" and their professional pride is injured if not 
" entirely lost by performing duties that, in many 
" instances, must obviously lower them in" their 
" own respect and in the estimation of their 
" countrymen. I cite no particular instances ; but 
" I have known of many troopers at the disposal of 
" civilians being taken a gallop of eight or ten 
" miles on guard, besides being subjected to de- 
" grading and humiliating tasks — even to carrying 
" bread and butter and vegetables. I have known 
" the horses sent out to different stages for a 
" gentleman's own riding ; and I have known a 
" trooper sent back, after a long ride, to fetch 
" a pair of shoes for a magistrate ! 

" I have served many years with this regiment, 
" have great reason to be proud of commanding it ; 

CHAP. III.] 228 

" and may be permitted to say, with feelings natural 
" to a soldier, tliat I have taken great pains with 
" men and horses in discipline and appointments, 
" my wish ever being that in good conduct and 
" appearance they should do credit to the service 
" — I cannot hope they can any longer he so. 

" The breaking up of a regiment into small 
" detachments renders it unserviceable as a military 
" body ; the moral feeling will be destroyed, the 
" discipline will be destroyed. Distant from the 
" supervision of their European officers, free from 
" restraint, scattered in large towns and villages, 
" young soldiers will imbibe every pernicious 
" habit ; they will gamble, get in debt, and acquire 
" disgusting vices, which it will be impossible to 
" eradicate. The horses and equipments will be 
" ruined ; all the labour and discipline of years 
" will have been wasted, and a fine regiment 
" turned into a crippled disorganised rabble." 

In this way corps are ruined, their commanders 
lose all interest in them, and disgust takes place 
of zeal. How could Sisyphus feel zealous] These 
Irregular Cavalry corps consist of natives with 
high military feeling, who dislike being attached 
to civilians, from some of whom they receive 
affronts. The Native soldier is often insulted also 
by military officers, but is more susceptible to it 
from civilians. This conduct is confined indeed to 
vulgar-minded men of both services ; but that there 
are such, the real soldiers and real statesman of 
the Company's service acknowledge with regret. 

Extent of Canton?nents. — This evil also springs 
from interference of the civil power with the dis- 
cipline of the Army. In Bengal the Army is 
widely and unnecessarily scattered. From Mulmein 
to Calcutta, as the crow flies, is some 900 or 1000 

229 [chap. III. 

miles ; from Assam to Calcutta about 700 miles ; 
from Calcutta to Pcshawur 1400 miles : in breadth 
the average may be 400 miles. Thus one million 
of square miles are occupied by military stations. 

Great heat stimulates to luxury, high pay fur- 
nishes means for indulgence, the sites of canton- 
ments belong to Government, there is no want of 
space, and an allowance in money instead of 
barracks enables officers to build houses with large 
enclosures, called compounds. An Indian canton- 
ment resembles a town of villas ; some are seven 
miles in length. And beyond the military bounds 
dwell civilians, having guards — another civil inter- 
ference with the military — for our Indian Govern- 
ment is so beloved, that after ruling above a 
century, magistrates cannot live out of the reach of 
bayonets ! This is the practical comment upon the 
assertion that " India has become a great empire not 
'* so much h\f the sword as hy the wisdom of its 
" Council. '' India is sinking under such wisdom. 
A Welleslcy, a Hastings, an Ellenborough, by their 
genius check the downward progress, a Dalhousie 
gives it impetus. His Burmah war, and discredit- 
able contest beyond the Indus, will make it difficult 
for his successor to restore India to real safety. 

In that excellent work, " Shore on Indian Af- 
fairs" the causes of the hatred entertained by 
the Indian population is clearly shown; a hatred 
which in Bengal renders it necessary for civil ser- 
vants to have guards so numerous, and at distances 
so great from head quarters, they cannot be relieved 
daily and become detachments. Discipline is thus 
destroyed. They mount by the week, by the 
month; they have been left even three months, 
because there were not men to relieve them! Sol- 

ciiAr. I IF.] 230 

dicrs hate to be constantly on guard, constantly 
dressed and accoutred in any climate, in a tropical 
one it is unendurable, and therefore evaded. 

Tlie commander of these miscalled guards having 
placed a sentry, goes to bed; so do the rest, and 
when tlie sentry thinks it time to be relieved, he 
calls up the next man. Here is the origin of the 
general Indian custom of guards going to bed and 
self-relief of sentries. It is destructive to the 
power and safety of an Army, yet so established 
that the Commander-in-Chief cannot abolish it. 

At regimental head quarters, although scant of 
men for the necessary military, and unnecessary civil 
duties, guards are assigned for commanding officers' 
quarters, for mess houses, for commissaries, for 
stores, for treasure. Europeans cannot take all 
their own guards, because Government do not build 
barracks which will enable their duties to be done 
under cover from the sun; wherefore Sepoys are 
furnished. Sepoy guards arc substituted for locks 
and keys, and no mercy is shown as regards these 
duties: with the Sepoy it is " Mungo here ! Mungo 
there ! Mungo everywhere /" These innumerable 
guards require more men than are to be had for 
reliefs, and therefore become detachments for fur- 
nishing sentries. 

I first sought to reduce the size of cantonments 
and number of guards, designing, if that could be 
accomplislied, to concentrate the troops more and 
so abolish the evil. Unless this be done and all 
civilians, except the Governor-General, be denied 
military guards, the evil cannot be thoroughly 
remedied. None are more aware of it than the 
Bengal officers ; yet they cannot correct it, while 
every commissary, almost every civil servant may 

231 [chap. hi. 

have a native guard for asking, and do ask for 
them, while their legitimate force, the Chupprassees 
and Birkendauses, is equal in iiumhers to the ichole 
Army. Those men are paid by the public to do 
the duties thus thrown upon the soldiers ! These 
Chupprassees and Birkendauses are employed by 
the civil servants of the Company as domestics ! 
At least all the Indian world says so, and if not 
so employed what do those men do ? Why are 
soldiers required ? 

Lord EUenborough endeavoured to correct this 
by forming those idle functionaries into "^^o/zce 
battalions.'' He left India before the measure 
was completed. Yet even the few battalions 
formed did, when the Sikh war began, free regi- 
ments which would not otherwise have appeared 
on the Sutlej. Soon however this admirable mea- 
sure was stifled, as predicted by a very able civil 
servant, who opposed it and being questioned, 
replied — " The measure was a good one, but the 
" prejudice was so strong I knew it would sooner 
" or later be reversed, and the re-action be mis- 
" chievous." The evil therefore remains, and the 
Sepoys are wearied and disgusted. 

The officers of the Queen's and Bombay Armies 
naturally cry out, when they see sentries self 
relieved and guards going to bed ; but when the 
remote causes of this loose discipline were revealed, 
I saw that a partial effort to remedy would make 
matters worse. 

The Bombay Army is superior to the Bengal in 
discipline — not in military spirit. This springs 
from the comparative smallness of the Bombay 
presidency. In Bombay are thirty-two regiments 
of the line ; in Bengal eighty-four regiments ; and 

CHAP. III.] 232 

much more difficult it is to keep tlie greater number 
in high discipHnc. The Bengal regiments are 
spread over an extent of country, far greater in 
proportion to numbers than those of Bombay. 
The Bengal Commander-in-Chief cannot see his 
Army. To visit twelve stations out of some sixty 
or seventy took six months. 

The Bombay Commander-in-Chief can see his 
whole force with ease in six weeks. This alone 
makes an Army good, if there be any discipline at 
all. Sir Colin lialkett. Lord Keane, Sir Thomas 
McMahon, Sir AVilloughby Cotton, succeeding each 
other at Bombay, had all this excellent Army under 
their eyes, except from 1842 to the end of 1847, 
when a large portion was under me in Scinde, 
where its discipline and drill was not allowed to 
deteriorate, and it added to its former renown. The 
proportion of Queen's to Native regiments influences 
the latter less in the Bengal state of dispersion, than 
in the Bombay state of concentration : the Queen's 
regiments mixed with the twenty-nine Sepoy regi- 
ments in Bombay furnish examples of the highest 
discij)line and drill ; but in Bengal they are less 
mixed with the Native corps. 

Here be it remarked, that the personal conduct 
of the Sepoys in quarters is exemplary. The Euro- 
pean officers of the Company's service are as ready 
to punish misconduct as those of the Queen's 
service ; and there is now in both services compara- 
tively little of the disgraceful trickery of concealing 
crime ; yet the number of Courts Martial held on 
the two races of men are all in favour of the 
Hindoo. There were under me tAventy-nine 
Queen's regiments, and two Company's European 
regiments. Of Natives some hundred and fifty 

233 [chap. hi. 

regiments, regular and irregular. Fifty European 
officers were tried by my orders and only twenty- 
eight Native officers ! Of the first, three only were 
acquitted, and East India Courts Martial cannot be 
accused of harshness in their sentences ; their fault 
lies the other way; for when discipline grows slack, 
conscience acts on many members of Courts Martial : 
feeling they cannot throw the first stone, a weakness 
fatal to discipline ensues. 

The European non-commissioned officers are in 
England remarkably well-conducted men; eight 
were tried by me in India, two were acquitted ! 
Of Native non-commissioned officers only twelve, 
and one was acquitted. 

Of Native private soldiers only twenty-three 
were tried, and seven acquitted. No Army ever 
possessed better behaved soldiers than the Sepoys. 

Treasure ought to be guarded by the Birken- 
dauses and Chupjyrassees, but regular troops are 
employed by regiments, wings, detachments; and 
their marches are usually in the hottest season of 
the year and to great distances. Sometimes they 
are two or three months under European officers ; 
often young, inexperienced and unable from the 
heat to exert themselves. The duty is therefore 
done according to their bodily strength, the general 
relaxation of discipline in the Army, and particular 
state of it in each regiment — and always such 
fatigue is incurred in guarding treasure in the hot 
season, as to oppress Native as well as Europeans, 
officers and Sepoys. 

Frequent heavy duties deteriorate discipline, 
when the excitement of war is absent ; and even 
then when there is not fighting — it wears out body 
and mind. These treasure-guards resemble the Cape 

CHAP. III.] 234 

j)atrols against Kaffirs as to fatigue ; but the patrols 
are made in the finest climate of the world, whereas 
the Indian treasure-guards march in floods of heat, 
and exposed to deadly fevers. The patrol soldiers 
are cheered by a glory which their devotion courage 
and endurance merits, and of which even Lord 
Grey's malice cannot deprive them. The poor 
treasure-guard Sepoy has no glory, no moral sup- 
port under suflering: he falls under fatigue, the 
sun and fever, unheeded and unheard of — a victim 
to duties not military, and which an Army of Birken- 
dauses and Chupprassces are paid for doing, but do 
not do ! 

Between the 1st January and the 31st October 
of the following year, twenty-five thousand seven 
hundred and sixteen Infantry^ and three thousand 
three hundred and siocty-four Cavalry, total 29,080 
soldiers ivere furnished for treasure escorts alone, 
exclusive of all other civil duties ! Moreover, on 
nine occasions detachments, in two instances of 
wliole regiments, are not included, because from 
accidents their numbers are not in my possession. 
Even this falls short of the truth. During part of 
that time the general relief of corps was going 
on, and treasure was frequently sent with relieving 
regiments not included above. Twenty to thirty 
thousand men are therefore annually employed on 
this one branch of civil duty, for long periods and to 
great distances. Sucli are the severe trials of the 
Bengal Army. Injurious to its discipline, heart-break- 
ing to its best officers who are devoted to the service. 

This exposition of the Bengal system leads to 
the notice of a general order issued on the 
18th October 1850. It amazed some Queen's 
officers, who knew my abstract opinions did not 

235 [chap. III. 

coincide witli its tenor. It was bitterly censured 
by one of the Indian newspapers, and in an anony- 
mous pamphlet signed a " JBombai/ Officer " who 
thus speaks of it. " NotJuuf) hut the most de- 
" plorahle ignorance and foUi/ on one hand, or the 
" deepest hatred and malice on the other could have 
" give)( rise to such a measure.'' 

After a career of ten years in India, owing every- 
thing that a successful General can owe to his 
troops, to bear towards those troops " the deepest 
hatred and malice," seems strange ; but this folly, 
hatred, malice, and virulent enmity was exhibited 
by the clever and experienced Bengal Lieutenant- 
Colonel Tucker, Adjutant-General. He composed 
the order, which was highly approved of by Major- 
General Sir Hugh Wheeler, one of the first officers 
in the Indian Army ; and by Colonel Grant, who 
had previously been Adjutant-General. They can 
hardly have been " deplorably ignorant " of their 
own service, " and embucd with deep hatred, 
malice, and virulent enmity." 

The document was issued to support the Bengal 
system of promotion by seniority, yet is described 
in the pamphlet as one fitted to destroy '' everij skill, 
high ^;r//?tv/></<?, and soldier-like ^jr<W(?." Let this 
be examined ; for it was an order of great import- 
ance, sanctioned by me for good reasons. 

The East India Company's rule is that promo- 
tion shall go by seniority with European officers ; 
and with Native officers and Sepoys, when not un- 
fitted ; but that unfitness must be honourably stated 
by their regimental commanding officers, and 
decided on by the Cominandcr-in-Cliief I ex- 
amined with all imaginable care the claims recom- 
mended or passed over by commanding officers ; 

CHAP. HI.] 236 

for though the Bombay system, resembling that of 
the Koyal Army, seems to me best, I liad no right 
to alter the Court of Director's rule and break 
Government faith with tlie Sepoys. This faith, 
respected by all my predecessors in command, was 
by the oldest and most distinguished officers of the 
Bengal Army judged not only binding but vital, 
and the Commander-in-Chief, who has not the right 
to order the change of a button in the uniform, 
could not alter an organic regulation. 

Supposing a right, would the exercise of it have 
been wise ; Lord Hardinge conversed with me on 
this subject at Lahore. He had been much occu- 
pied with the Indian articles of war, had made 
many inquiries as to this system of promotion, and 
the substance of his discourse was this : The ad- 
herence to setiiority promotion with the Native 
Army^ the old officers looking to their pensions, is 
the strongest hold ive have upon the fidelity of the 
Army ; every man looks to his promotion and 
pension with confidence, and this confidence ensures 
his faithful services. Lord Hardinge in addition 
to his own experience, had information from the 
ablest and most distinguished Bengal military men 
and civilians ; and many of the last are intimately 
acquainted with military details, and with the feel- 
ings of the Sepoys. 

His opinion, no light one, coincided with the 
opinions of all my predecessors in command ; such 
high authorities, such grave opinions, could not be 
disregarded and the safety of India risked, because 
two or three inexperienced commanders of regi- 
ments wished to promote men without reference to 
service ; passing over better soldiers than those 
favoured, and perhaps better than themselves ! 

237 [ciiAP. III. 

What would those gentlemen say if the Court 
of Directors were to break the rule of seniority, as 
regards Europeans ? What shrieks about injustice, 
tyranny, would ring from station to station ! But 
according to the " Boinhay Officer " it is right to 
place the brave old Sepoy at the caprice of pre- 
judiced, or ignorant commanding officers, and to 
protect those glorious veterans is to destroy " talent, 
skill, energy, high principle, and soldier-like pride !" 

This order was required to check a recent prac- 
tice by regimental commanders of passing over 
men of long service, with one, two, three, even 
four medals on their breasts, and scars on their 
bodies. Many were thus treated, especially by the 
worst commanders. No less than 215 good soldiers 
were passed over in one regiment to make a 
favourite, — honourable or dishonourable — Drill 
Corporal ; and a Corporal had been made Drill 
Sergeant over the heads of seventeen senior 
Corporals. Sepoys love justice, and Colonel 
Tucker's order supported the public faith. Had it 
not been issued the Bengal veterans, ill-used and 
disgusted, would have nourished secret disaffec- 
tion. It allowed however a margin for passing 
over one or two men, if the grounds for so doing 
would bear thorough sifting by general officers. 

In the Bombay Army, to disregard seniority is 
the custom. This brings on Native officers and 
non-commissioned officers, younger, more active, 
and more ambitious than those of Bengal ; and they 
learn as much of regimental details from the 
Queen's regiments as their European officers do ; 
it is abstractedly a good custom ; and there is no 
injustice, because the Bombay Sepoy, of an intelli- 
gent race, enlists knowing what to expect ! But 

CHAP. III.] 238 

the Bengal Sepoy also enlists with a knowledge of 
rules and customs, and those promote him, accord- 
ing to his regimental number. Honourably and 
bravely he devotes his life to duty, under promise 
of a pension and decorations after long years of 
service. To break faith with him would be 
infamous ! but that is no obstacle with the " Bom- 
hay Officer,'' who yet assails the character of 
Bengal Europeans in the following terms. " A 
" want of high moral tone, and the e^ristence of a 
" certain la.vitij of principle among the European 
" officers in common with European society is 
" general in the Bengal presidency ^ He "^Tites to 
excite ill-will between the two armies, and has shown 
that if he really belongs to it, the Bombay force pos- 
sesses in him an unsurpassed specimen of baseness. 
If the Directors think a change advisable, 
notice should be given that the system holds good 
with soldiers enlisted up to that date ; but subse- 
quent enlistment would give no claim to promotion 
by seniority. Probably they do not tliink any 
alteration advisable ; for many experienced officers 
agree with Lord Hardinge and the Bengal Gene- 
rals, as to the danger of alteration, which indeed 
cannot be effected as matters now stand. Nor has 
any evil of magnitude grown out of it. Under my 
command at various times for ten years, in action 
and out of action, the Bengal Sepoys never failed in 
zeal, courage, or activity. At Meeanee and at 
Dubba their 9th Cavalry advanced bravely under a 
heavy fire ; in the Booghtee hills the Bengal In- 
fantry behaved wqW under severe trials ; in the 
Kohat Pass, Native officers and non-commissioned 
officers bravely led their men up against the 
Affreedees. Where have they behaved ill when 

239 [chap. III. 

properly drilled and led? It is said that in 
mutinies age has abated the officers' energy. Per- 
haps so, but an awkward question may be asked. 
Might not younger men have been energetic in a 
wrong direction ? As to the abused order, Sir 
Hugh Wheeler, writing to the Adjutant-General 
says " Upon my honour I consider the order of the 
" 18th just issued, will do more to restore the 
" tone and right feeling of the Native Army than 
" any act that has been done for the last thirty 
" years." Colonel Grant also writes " I have read 
" the admirable order of the 18th instant. It is 
" one of the best and most judicious ever issued to 
" this Army, and tlie Commander-in-Chief and his 
" Adjutant-General deserve the thanks of all well- 
" wishers to our service for it." 

Officers should speak the language of their men. 
Lately this has been strictly enforced. The idle, the 
stupid, those who have learned to converse, but have 
not energy, or perhaps time, to pass a regular ex- 
amination, are discontented ; and on a few it fell 
heavily. But a subaltern's duties in the best 
Native regiments gives full time for study, and he 
hears constantly the language of his soldiers. 
With these advantages a young" man may acquire 
that language in a year, however naturally un- 
gifted with the faculty. — An officer of my own 
regiment mastered two within six months after 
landing in India ! 

It has been asked " Why should men pass exa- 
" minations when they can attain the language 
" without passing]" There is no security that 
they will do so. More than one Sepoy has been 
brought to trial for " insolence ;" his vehomcnce, in 
vainly trying to make his officer understand, having 

GHAr. rii.J 240 

been RO misconstrued. Such ignorance enables the 
soldiers to be really insolent without discovery. 
The ''Bombai/ Officer " says " those ivho study Hin- 
dostanee books cannot studi/ Hindostanee men ;" 
and that " those who study the language necessarily 
" know less of it than he who don't study it ! This 
" 7nay appear paradoxical." Indeed! 

Tlie Directors should obtain leave to send their 
cadets to regiments in England for two years, to 
acquire the drill and discipline of the Queen's 
troops, which is perhaps more perfect than any, save 
the French and Piedmontese excepted — they sur- 
pass us in some things, we surpass them in others. 
Having studied this subject under good masters, 
Abercrombie, Moore, Craufurd, Hope, Wellington, 
those great warriors taught me that an exact drill 
and rigid discipline make Armies capable of great 
exploits ; and the larger the Army the more sternly 
must they be enforced. In the enormous Army of 
India orders do not reach the distant stations in 
a shape to enforce obedience : under a loose system, 
-they are only obeyed immediately about head quar- 
ters, sometimes not even there. A most important 
order, concocted by Lord Dalhousie and myself, 
Tv^as totally neglected, or rather disobeyed hy fifteen 
commanders of regiments — floating with the stream 
of a loose discipline they were not conscious of 
wrong doing. 

Had I remained in India camps for improving 
drill and discipline should have been formed, and 
a vast body of instructors formed in England, 
namely, the British regiments at home, with which 
the young Indian officers should have first done 
duty. This would also have tended to assimilate 
the Queen's and Company's services, and remove 

2^1 [cHAr. III. 

ridiculous jealousies entertained by the \ ulgar- 
ininded in both Armies. The Directors might 
thus also ascertain through the Horse Guards the 
qualification of military aspirants. 

The question of augmenting the Company's 
European regiments may here be noticed. They 
have neither the strict discipline, nor the superior 
drill of Her Majesty's forces ; but the Bengal and 
Bombay corps are nevertheless in good order, and 
have an unsurpassed military spirit. Historic pride 
clings to masses as much as to individuals, con- 
ducing to honourable conduct when rightly felt ; if 
otherwise it cankers. ^Mtli soldiers this springs 
from regimental traditions. The 1st Bombay 
Europeans, drawn originally from the Royal Army, 
are proud of being the source from whence spring 
the 1st Bengals; and both are proud that for a 
hundred years India has resounded with their 
exploits. The two second regiments are equally 
proud, and all are hardy warriors, who never shrink 
in battle. The Madras troops are not known to me 
from personal observation, but they bear the same 
character as the others. A good officer can bring 
such regiments into high order quickly ; hence all 
may be considered on a par with the Queen's 
troops, and the question of their augmentation 
becomes, in a great measure, one of finance. 

To augment the Company's Europeans and dimi- 
nish the Queen's regiments in India would be some 
relief to the Company's revenue, but a great 
burthen to the British Treasury; wherefore the 
Company's Europeans should not be augmented, to 
increase the Directors' patronage without good 
results : India is as safe with six Queen's regiments 


ciiAr. III.] 212 

and six of the Company's, as she would be with 
twelve Company's and a proportionate reduction of 
Royal regiments. Keeping the latter there has 
also the advantage of inuring them to war; the 
troops in India and at the Cape are at this time 
England's best ; not equal to those at whose head 
AVellington stood on the summit of the Pyrenees, 
less experienced and hardy indeed, but of the same 
stuff, the same courage and strength. They have 
fought much, can do for themselves in the field, 
and are de\'oid of the rashness of recruits who rush 
into fire without knowing what to do when there. 
They are fighting men whom England may at any 
time recall for a home crisis. The Directors can 
supply their place with Goorkas — the door for that 
recruiting was opened by me, and it will be wise 
not to close it again, but take time as the soldiers 
say " hy the firelock.'" 

Scinde was almost my first command in India, 
and going there with European notions of war I 
thought to separate a soldier from his Avife and 
make him cleave to his knapsack was a maxim of 
wdsdom. The first was done to hand by climate. 
Nearly all the ladies had gone or were going away, 
and my own wife and children had been left at 
Poonah, against their will indeed, for they were 
amongst the few women desirous to brave the 
climate of Scinde, when an order to serve there was 
by men considered a death warrant. 

In the field the Queen's 22nd regiment carried 
their packs — in the desert and in the battle it was 
on their shoulders — but experience taught me that 
the load is too great for young, and for slight men 
under an Eastern sun. In the Jl^est Indies it can 

243 [(MAP. III. 

be carried without evil results: tins is a mystery, 
but the Westeru suu does not act so injuriously as 
the Eastern. 

A knapsack is made of painted cloth which pre- 
vents air reaching the soldier's back, while straps 
compress his chest and shoulders, tightening his 
cloth coat and wasting him by excessive perspira- 
tion. The pack is not now carried in India, but 
the quantity of necessaries within it should be 
curtailed. They are unnecessaries. The following- 
scale was made at my request, by Sir Colin Camp- 
bell, after consultation with old non-commissioned 
officers, of whose intelligence he was sure; but 
even in that scale the articles marked by asterisks 
are not needed ; one coatee or shell jacket is 
enough: one coat served me, and a private need 
not have twice as many coats as a Commander-in- 

Four white jackets ! " The climate is hot." 
Let the soldier pull off his coat. Parade ! Let 
the soldier appear on parade in fighting trim; a 
battle is his greatest day's work, and he should be 
always prepared for action. 

White trousers — six. To frighten himself and 
his neighbours when wounded with a display of 
blood. Three pair of blue cotton are enough. 

White shirts, six. — What does a man living 
by labour, want with six white shirts 1 Three good 
check shirts are sufficient for cleanliness. 

SocIkS, four pair. — Two are enough. Marshal 
Saxe says soldiers do not want stockings. I agree 
with him they chafe the feet and keep them damp. 
The Austrian soldiers wear none. 

Stock and clasjt. — Even before the men who 
invented hanging, the guillotine, the garotte and 

CHAT. III.] 241: 

embroidered collars to the dress coats of general 
officers, lie who invented stocks and clasps for 
British soldiers should be ranked for venomous 
imagination in tormenting his fellow-creatures. 
The first three are comparatively humane, and 
include a provision for life ; the embroidered collar 
is but a temporary pillory, like the legs of Sinbad's 
old man ; but the soldier's hard leather stock and 
clasp is daily a bar to all enjoyment, productive of 
apoplexy in the Indian sun, and a great impedi- 
ment in marching. It prevents the free use of the 
musket in battle ; and when taking to the bayonet, 
if the stock be not thrown away, the man is half 
strangled before closing in mortal strife. Let a 
soft cape button round the man's throat over his 
shirt collar. If he needs warmth, some men do, he 
can let his beard grow and be under his shirt collar. 
To order the wearing of flannel shirts, is also an act 
of tyranny, interfering unnecessarily with a man 

Hair combs ! — Cut the hair short, and soap and 
water is enough. 

Sponge ! — To keep his clothes wet ! The great 
attention of commanding officers and captains 
should be given to soap and water, not to nail 
brushes, sponges, hair brushes, shall we have 
lavender-water bottles] Parades with bare feet, 
bathing, soap, scrubbing, — these are what make 
soldiers really clean. 




Lint uf Necessaries for a Soldier serving in India, showintj the Weitjht 
of the whole as at jiresent 1850. 

No. Articles. 

No. Articles. 

1 Dress Cap. 

1 Hair Comh. 

1 Forage Cap. 

] Hair Brush. 

1 Coatee. 

1 Razor, Brush and Soap. 

1 Cloth Shell Jacket. 

1 Cloth Brush. 

4 White Jackets. 

2 Shoe Brushes. 

1 Pair Cloth Trousers. 

1 Knife, Fork, and Spoon. 

6 Pair White Trousers. 

1 Turnscrew Worm, Brush & I'icker. 

2 Pair Blue Cotton Trousers. 

1 Holdall or case for small articles. 

6 W^hite Shirts. 

1 Knapsack and Straps. 

2 Check Shirts. 

1 Haversack. 

3 Flauuel Shirts. 

1 Button Stick and Brush. 

2 Flannel Bands. 

1 Sponge. 

4 Pair Socks. 

1 Set of Straps for carrying Great Coat. 

1 Stock and Clasp. 

1 Gun Stopper. 

2 Pair Braces. 

1 Mess Tin and Cover. 

3 Pair Boots. 

1 Piegimental Box. 

2 Towels. 

Weight of the whole 05 

lbs. including the Soldier's box. 

Dress Cap. 
Forage Cap. * 
Coatee. * 
Cloth Shell Jacket. 
White Jackets. * 
Pair of Cloth Trousers. 
Pair White Trousers. * 
Pah" Blue Cotton Trousers. 
White Shirts. * 
Check Shirts. 
Flannel Shirts. * 
Flannel Bands. 
Pair Socks. 
Stock and Clasp. * 
Pair Braces. 
Pair Boots. 









Reduced List of Necessaries proposed for the European Soldier serving 

in India. 

Hair Comh. * 

Hair Brush. * 

Razor Brush and Soap. * 

Cloth Brush. 

Shoe Brushes. 

Knife, Fork, and Spoon. 
1 Turnscrew Worm, Brush & Picker. 
1 Holdall or case for small articles. 


Button Stick and Brush. * 

Sponge. * 

Set of Straps or carrying Great Coat. 

Gun Stopper. 

Mess Tin and Cover. 

Regimental Bag. 

Haversack and Canteen. 

Towels. I 

Weight of liie wliolc about ^.i^ilbs. iuiliuliii^ iIk 


CHAP. 111.] 246 

From the first list the regimental box has 
recently been erased. Each box weighed 441bs., 
encumbering every Queen's regiment on march 
with 44,00()lbs. weight of wood, or more than 19 
tons. The twenty-nine Queen's regiments in India 
could not therefore move without carriage for 551 
tons weight of solid wood ! The soldiers paid 
heavily for those boxes ! A camel's average load is 
3001bs., and a string of those animals occupies 
great length of ground. How this mere weight of 
WOOD must embarras an Army ! 

In 1842 when the order for these boxes was 
issued by Sir Jasper Nicolls, I told my immediate 
superior, Sir Thomas McMahon, that it was em- 
barrassing in respect of carriage ; and if a Queen's 
soldier refused to pay for the box, the regulations, 
which wisely forbids charging the soldiers for any- 
thing not sanctioned by the Sovereign, would bear 
him out before a Court Martial. Sir Thomas agreed 
and forwarded my statement, for which I received a 
reprimand from Sir Jasper Nicolls. The boxes are 
now abolished — satisfaction sufficient to me for 
that unjust rebuke. Sir Jasper had no legal 
authority to make soldiers buy the boxes, and it 
was impossible to carry them about ! 


Want of Senior Officers with Regiments. 

Subalterns arc constantly in command of regi- 
ments without being, as in the Irregular corps, 
selected for command ; they are generally inexpe- 
rienced and the regiment goes to pieces. Sepoys 
observe all that passes, and their respect for the 
British officer is weakened ; his courage and power 
are feared, he is a dangerous animal to offend and 
they obey, but respect him only in good regiments. 
Can a battalion under a young subaltern be fit for 
service. He may be zealous, clever ; but where is 
his knowledge ■? He thinks all is right. He meets 
with a Queen's regiment, and doubts ; but his 
awakened intelligence is immediately stifi.ed by some 
" Old Indian " who tells him the Indian Armies being 
of different races must have different systems ; that 
superior wisdom has established self-relieving-going- 
to-bed-guards as most suitable for Bengal Sepoys. 
This folly is accepted, and tlie system is perpetuated 
by weak and idle men, and even by able officers, 
prejudiced from habit and giving authority from 
reputation for its continuance. The force of 
custom here actually overpowers a Commander-in- 
Chief. Government alone can reform. 

CHAr. IV.] 248 

Field officers and Captains should be kept witli 
their regiments. Discipline greatly depends upon the 
Captains, Dull Generals, Colonels and INIajors there 
are ; yet white hairs meet with respect, and veteran 
commanders know at least the routine of service. 
Young men have indeed commanded well, but the 
average of good regimental commanders is in 
favour of the aged ; they may be inert, but their 
grey beards inspire respect when young men would 
be overborne, especially if there be a sarcastic fel- 
low amongst their companions ; if too zealous to be 
thus cowed, they are apt to become Martinets — of 
all military pests the worst. 

Experienced Captains are the pillars of discipline, 
but scarce in Native regiments, the best being 
taken for staff, or civil employments, which generally 
turns a good Captain in to a bad " political." There 
is a remedy. Form a staff corps of officers, having 
no more pay than in tlie line, and no extra advan- 
tage than allowance for horses, according to rank. 
Government would save ; but to save is not the 
object ; it is to |?rgye«^ regimental officers being 
tempted hy high imi) to appli/ for staff situations. 
With low salaries the staff could only be sought 
for by men conscious of ability and ambitious of 
distinction. Such real soldiers, seldom encumbered 
by families, would compose a staff more effective 
than at present : yet the Company has excellent 
staff officers. Exchanging into marching regi- 
ments s]iould be allowed. Ilie civil service and 
general staff would thus be well furnished, and the 
line suffer no damage. 

European officers arc now more numerous than 
formerly, and associate apart. This creates in the 
Native officer secret dislike, and the European loses 

249 [ciiAr. IV. 

the best opportunities of becoming fumiliar \vitli 
Native character, customs, and hinguage. The 
Sepoy officer is degraded and his miUtary pride, 
which Easterns are as susceptible of as Europeans, 
is deeply woinided. ISfany able officers have said 
" Look at the superioritij of the Irregular Cavahy 
" and Infantry/, to the Hegnlars ; yet they have hut 
" three European officers to a regiment.'' But the few 
officers of Irregulars are selected for energy, talent, 
and activity. Young they are, yet the late wars have 
given them experience. To select for a large 
Army is impossible. Officers must be taken as God 
made them, as the Directors send them — they must 
be taken as wives are taken. Some men sell 
their wives, and it is said the Directors sell 
cadetships, but they cannot sell cadets ; they can 
select officers for the Irregulars — they cannot do 
so for tlie Regulars. 

Each company should have a Captain. Sir 
Thomas Munro reckons one European officer per 
company enough, and he was one of the greatest 
men the Anglo-Indian Service ever possessed, civil 
or military. With hesitation I differ from him ; 
but had he seen the present state of the European 
and Native officers he Avould probably have 
admitted more Europeans. A grand lesson was 
given by the Company's Eiu'opean officers at 
Meeanee, ^^'hen leading their men to shock the 
enormous mass of Bcloochees before them. Each 
regiment on reaching the summit of the river 
bank, which had before hidden their enemies, 
staggered l)ack, as that vast Belooch multitude, in 
terrible array met tlie sight. Intrepidly then the 
Britisli officers stood, and tlie 8ei)oys rallied, but 

CHAP. IV.] 250 

it seemed as if, wanting that example, they would 
have broken ! 

It is said, '* if the Europeans were fewer, they 
must mix with and improve the Native officers." 
They do not do so now, and it is a great error. All 
old officers of name in the Company's service, 
including Sir Thomas Munro, have complained 
that the younger race of Europeans keep aloof from 
Native officers ; showing thereby want of foresight, 
and casting away, as of no value, the strong attach- 
ment those natives are so susceptible of forming 
for them. How different this from the spirit which 
actuated the old men of Indian renown, whom 
smaller men should take as guides ! The desire 
to converse with the Sepoys would alone have 
induced me to study their language ; neither age 
nor want of will stopped me, but my public 
duties gave no time. 

That young men, having the great examples 
alluded to, should avoid the society of their Indian 
comrades is incomprehensible, coupled with the 
enthusiasm they evince for the honour and glory 
of the Sepoys ; yet so it is — old officers to a man 
say the Native officer is neglected. Some main- 
tain that there are too many Europeans ; to that is 
opposed the example of Meeanee. The actual state 
is certainly the worst possible ; so many Europeans 
as to form an exclusive society, yet too few for 
duty, unless the natives are raised to social equality 
and self-respect ! 

Munro would have a Commandant, an Adjutant, 
and ten company officers. At present there are six 
Captains, two Lieutenants, and five Ensigns ; but 
the actual number doing duty do not exceed one 

251 [chap. IV. 

per company. For besides staff and ci^il drafts, 
the quick passage to England tempt applications 
for sick leave; and medical men grant it more 
readily than ^vhen the journey was long. For- 
merly on a two years' furlough, six or ten months 
were spent in an uncertain dangerous voyage. 
Now one month by the Red Sea suffices, including 
a tour through Italy and down the Ilhinc. Tlie 
old voyage was a desperate effort to save life ; the 
modern one a pleasant excursion sought by men of 
taste, who with beer have swelled their livers 
enough to relieve a doctor's conscience : it is safer 
practice to let a bilious man go to Europe than to 
risk manslaughter by keeping him in India. Sir 
Thomas Munro's establishment of one European 
officer i>er company, would leave very few indeed 
for duty. The right of furloughs, sickness, staff 
appointments, and civil employments would not 
leave three officers, on an average, in each regi- 

Every band of armed men requires a chief, and 
there should be a Captain for each company to pay 
them, discipline them, protect and lead them to 
battle. The modern habit, in Queen's regiments, of 
numbering companies instead of, as formerly, call- 
ing each by its Captain's name is to me offensive. 
The numbering may be convenient for AVar Office 
returns, for the useless endless books and reports 
introduced into the orderly room, which have 
nearly turned the commander of a regiment into a 
clerk ; but the Captain's name gave military pride, 
and moral elevation. He was proud of a company 
bearing his name, and sought to distinguish 
remarkable men. The soldier thought to act ill 
was a personal insult to his Captain, who would not 

cnAi>. IV.] 252 

quit his company unless for the Grenadiers or 
light Infantry : it seemed abandoning his family. 
This fine military attachment is passing away. 
Who cares for No. I, No. 2, No. 3 1 The modern, 
mercantile, expression is that a young gentleman is 
" in charge of No. 1." He does not " command " 
it — he is in charge of it, as if it was a pound of 
tallow candles! And he expects his Ca2)taincy 
not his Company. 

Native regiments should have ten Captains, 
unless the Directors choose to reduce the number 
to eight, abolishing the flank companies. That I 
do not recommend. They are valuable in war to 
" brigade " and place under select officers. This, 
in my opinion, is better than regiments of Ilifles, 
Light Infantry, Fusileers and Grenadiers. They 
have advantages possibly, but put me in mind 
of a story. Several regiments were in line, all had 
titles except the 45th, or Nottingham regiment. 
One commanding officer addressed his regiment 
as Fusileers ! Another King's Own ! A third 
Buff's ! A fourth. Queen's lloyals ! At last 
the old warrior who commanded the 45th, pro- 
voked at these titles his own regiment having none, 
shouted in a voice of thunder " Stocking Weavers ! 
Shoulder arms /" To this day the regiment bears 
the name ; and good weavers they are, having 
woven on their colours a glorious ^vreath recording 
thirteen great battles ! 

The having flank companies is opposed by some 
able men, who think selecting flank companies 
deteriorates the spirit of the battalion-men. And 
that ten companies are too many for one man to 
command in action. Conversing with the cele- 
brated Marshal Ney on our organization, he told me 

253 [chap. IV. 

" he did not like ten companies; eiglit was the 
■'- proper number, as being more square, more in 
" hand for movements." 

My predilection for flank companies remains. If 
the Grenadiers and Light Infantry of a brigade or 
division be united, they can be given to some man 
of superior abilities without offence. Major-Gene- 
ral Sir Fiddle Faddle having a brigade, cannot 
complain tliat a corps of Grenadiers and Light 
Infantry is placed under Major Genius, The old 
General has a sharp Brigade-Major ; the young 
Major a temporary command. The Major harrasses 
convoys ; the IMajor-Gcneral leads in battle, waving 
liis hat, his thick bald head shining through the 
smoke, and looking as if a cannon shot would glance 
off it as from a Martello tower. 

The Light Infantry should be composed of men 
beloiv 5 feet 6 inches; the Grenadier of men ahorc 
5 feet 10 inches — thus equalizing the battalion 
companies, which would then have the finest men, 
while choice emulative corps could be formed ; and 
worked hard, as their casualties could be filled up 
instantly from their regiments. In the American 
war the flank battalions were called the best 
troops ; that is they were most frequently engaged 
under the cleverest commanders ; these influences 
might be effectually combined by the use of flank 
companies, which should never bo placed in line. 
The general opinion is against them, but much may 
be said for them, especially in India, Mhere a 
seniority service collects so many men of Methuselah 
vitality in the liighcr grades ! These men will not 
budge, and cannot be trusted with operations in 

Some officers who would not let soldiers chew 

CHAP. IV.] 254 

food in their own way, have been gradually intro- 
ducing bad customs. A private soldier is forbid 
to address his officer except in full dress and accom- 
panied by a non-commissioned officer, likewise full 
dressed ! Tliis is injiu'ious and even dangerous ; it 
digs as it were, a ditch between the company officer 
and his men ! AVhen I was a Captain any man 
could speak to me if so minded, at any time about 
his affairs. If he complained he was told to bring 
the opponent up, and both stories were heard. 
When commander of a regiment, my rule was, that 
complaint must first be made to the Captain ; and 
if satisfliction was not obtained the aggrieved man 
came with his officer, dressed or undressed. 

This new rule places men at the mercy of non- 
commissioned officers who will oftentimes oppress. 
A soldier frequently wants advice, or to obtain 
indulgence, which enables the officer to discover his 
character and encourage or correct him. The new 
ceremony cuts them off from this beneficial fami- 
liarity, and confidence is checked — nay ! changed 
for disgust. Except in moments of great anger, 
when the private goes with a red-hot complaint, he 
will not speak to his officer at all ! How are com- 
pany officers to study men's characters when none 
dare address them but in full dress, and in presence 
of a non-commissioned officer ? 

This system abates the real respect and affection 
which is habitual to our troops, for the spirit of 
aristocracy is strong with them, and they are 
entirely disposed to honour their officers. Martinets 
W'ho leave nothing to human nature, disgust soldiers 
with the service. Formerly moral discipline was 
left much to the Captain ; for while to some men 
license may be granted, others must be held at 

255 [chap. IV. 

arm's length, and the Captain's intimacy made him 
the best judge : it might be proper to say to a dirty 
or saucily-disposed man, " Never come to me unless 
you arc in full dress ;" but to have the whole 
regiment so trussed up in rules, is to treat the 
soldiers as inclined to offend and insult which none 
known to me in a long life, ever were. No Army 
in the world is more replete with a cordial feeling 
between all ranks than the Army of England ! 

Now returning to the social condition of the 
Native officers, it is to be observed that a certain 
class of Europeans in India treat them with a light- 
ness and contumely which, exclusive of its vulgarity, 
is undeserved. They forget what marvellously able 
men have been among these Eastern races : Akbar, 
Baber, Aurcngzibe, Sevagee, Hyder Ali, Runjeet 
Sing, Goolab Sing, and many more ; such as the 
extraordinary Nanuc, who, if what is written of 
him be true, must have been one of the most perfect 
of human beings. The Eastern intellect is great, 
and supported by amiable feelings ; and the Native 
officers have a full share of Eastern daring, genius, 
and ambition ; but to nourish these qualities they 
must be placed on a par with European officers. 

The veteran Soubadar (Captain) and Jemadar 
(Subaltern) must not be commanded by a fair-faced 
beardless Ensign, just arrived from England with a 
gold laced cap hanging over Iiis ear, but entirely 
ignorant of military matters. This yoinigstcr will 
lead an assault like a devil incarnate, and under fire 
will stand like a rock, or go on like a rocket, exactly 
as he is ordered ; he has the makings of a first-rate 
soldier, so have the Native Indian gentlemen at his 
age ; but to give him command over tlu^ dark 
veterans of thirty, forty, or fifty years' service is the 

CHAP. IV.] 256 

imposition of conquerors ; one wliicli the Native 
gentlemen feel deeply and silently resent. 

Ambition and love of military glory is strong in the 
hearts of the Sepoys till long service renders them 
desirous of rest ; and Mhen it comes they reflect on 
the bitter disappointments of their youthful ambition. 
Between them and military honours there has 
always been a bar. The superb Colonel Skinner 
alone acquired a Companionship of the Bath, and 
to obtain that for him required the honourable and 
strenuous exertions of Lords Lake and Combermere. 
We give Sepoys peculiar decorations indeed ; but 
they burn to share ours ! And why not ? They 
have shared the danger ! 

Some European officers think it would be good to 
abolish the Native officers altogether. They do not 
cast their thoughts back ; they see those Native 
officers almost passive, and judge them as thei/ are, 
not as they ought to he, as they once were, and as we 
may he sure they ivill he again ere many years pass ! 
The spirit of the age is to improve. Old viilanies 
are passing away ; Ireland is not now crushed by 
bad law s ; the abolition of slavery in the A\'est 
Indies has given that hell-born abomination a 
w^ound in America, which the genius of tlie glorious 
woman Mrs. Stowe is likely to render incurable. 
The rising spirit of justice in England towards the 
misgoverned people of the East will soon teach the 
latter how to display strength ; the " Purdah" or 
curtain, behind which the old ladies of Leadenhall 
Street with Zenana-like modesty, conceal their 
intrigues, is being roughly torn away. Association 
in India means comhination, and when one hundred 
and fifty millions combine, the game is over. 

Our best men have said the natives should be 

257 fcHAP. IV. 

associated with us in the civil service, and they are 
dropping in one by one ; ere long the influx ^vill be 
great, and in the general advance the Army will not 
lose its place. The Sepoys have not however been 
ill used by their European officers. The simple and 
just military Code which governs our own troops, 
also rules the Indian Army ; and saving our Euro- 
pean pretensions to superiority there is little to 
complain of. But civilians, all powerful, and fre- 
quently insolent, trammelled by no fixed rules, 
ignorant of English as they are of Indian law, with 
a slender, or no knowledge of the language, have 
so bullied the people of the East, that it is evident 
they are resolved to bear it no longer. These cen- 
sures of the civil service are supported by Munro, 
by Shore, and Norton. 

Although the Sepoy has not many evils to com- 
plain of, he has that great one already noticed — his 
oncers do not take rank with ours. Those who 
would abolish the Native officers should consider 
that it will blast the hopes of 200,000 armed men ; 
for every soldier in the Indian Armies looks forward 
to be an officer. The abolition of the Native 
officers would go through the whole Army like an 
electric shock; every man in it would think he had 
lost the pension of a Soubadar : hope would fly 
and mutiny take its place. Equality between 
Native and European gentlemen is being ceded in 
the civil service ; so it must be for the military. 
There is danger, but it is better to encounter that 
with justice than with a coward conscience. It is 
true that witli Indian gentlemen as officers, ranking 
with Europeans, the seniors among the Havildars 
and the Sepoys could not easily get commissions ; 


CHAP. IV.] 258 

but danger menaces every way. It may however 
be met by three important measures. 

EnHst 30,000 Goorkas — that will give force. 

Proclaim that no man enlisted after a given 
period shall be promoted for seniority, but may be 
for merit — that will be justice. 

Let every Ilavildar, after a certain age and 
service, have a liberal pension, higher than that 
now given — that also will be just. 

With these precautionary measures Native gen- 
tlemen may be employed, taking rank with Euro- 
peans. There would still be danger, but nothing 
to what will be if Indian officers demand equality of 
rank, which is by no means impossible with the 
active young non-commissioned officers, so greatly 
vaunted in the Bombay Army. 

There are people to say, " This should not he put 
into their heads'' It is in their heads already! It 
is talked over in every guard room and bazaar in 
India, and has been for years! The objection is of 
a piece with that against the great Duke's letter. 
" It taught our neighhours how weak England's 
" defences were" Danger is not removed by 
concealment, but by preparation and that noble 
justice which makes power scorn exclusive privi- 
leges, and gives to weakness all its rights. 

liOrd Ellenborough made two Native officers his 
Aides-de-Camp, and I, although ignorant of this, also 
appointed two, Meerza Khan, and Ali Beg, of the 
Scinde Horse, who, as a non-commissioned officer 
commanded my escort in the battle of Meeanee. 
Very painful it was to hear those brave men lost 
their pay when I left India, remaining only extra 
Aides-dc-Camp to my successor — he was probably 

259 [chap. IV. 

embaiTassed by pre-engagements : however the 
honour remains. Many Native officers merit the 
Companionship of the Bath. Those who doubt their 
high qualities as men, or daring as soldiers, are 
woefully in error. 

The Indian staff appointments require reform. 
In 1849, there were 686 regimental officers of 
the Bengal Army detached, having civil or mili- 
tary appointments, of which 443 were made by 
the Governor-General, or some civil authority, 
without any recommendation from their military 
chiefs ; the remaining 243 were staff appointments 
emanating from the Commander-in-Chief, who 
however could only recommend, not appoint. 
Thus more than a third of the Bengal officers 
held lucrative detached employments, nearly two- 
thirds of which were selected by the civil Govern- 
ment without reference to the military authorities ! 
The effect is destructive to military feeling and 

It was natural for those officers to seek lucrative 
appointments, and as most of them were obtained 
from the civil authorities without regard to the 
discharge of military duties, it was natural that 
great indifference to the latter should prevail. 
High station and emolument were to be obtained 
by influential supplication ; the military course 
demanded earnest and constant attention to details, 
tiresome and uninteresting, unless a high soldier- 
spirit be cultivated. The result was great efforts 
to procure unmerited appointments, and the 
smallest possible attention to those duties which 
raise a man in the estimation of his military 
superiors. Kogimcntal duty became a tread-mill, 
from which every one was to fly when ho could. 

CHAP. IV.] 260 

To counteract the demoralising tendency of this 
civil patronage, which included numerous military 
as well as civil appointments, it was made known 
to the Army that all appointments in my power 
should be distributed with strict reference to 
military claims and qualifications. Periodical 
regimental returns were called for, setting forth by 
comparative numbers each officer's regimental 
services, campaigns, actions, wounds and ])yo- 
ficiency in the native language. Of these 
numbers four WTre for having passed the inter- 
preter's examination, and two for the Hindostanee 
examination. Commanding officer's classification 
as to efficiency and zeal in regimental duties was 
also required. 1st class to be worth four, 2nd 
class, two, 3rd class 0. 

To compare accurately the merits of different 
persons is difficult, but to enforce regimental duties 
and details absolutely necessary, and this was a safe 
approximation ; because all the points, except one, 
touched matters of fact which could not be misre- 
presented. The arbitrary one, giving weight to the 
commanding officer's opinion of his officers was 
limited, the reports were to be public, and to bear 
the scrutiny of Brigadiers and Generals of Division 
before reaching the Commander-in-Chief. 


Of the Co7npanys Artillery. 

Second to none in the world. Incessant practice 
in war for fifteen years has produced perfection. 
But there are not enough officers, the Horse 
Artillery is too numerous, and kept complete at 
the expense of the Foot Batteries ; there is not 
above one officer to each company of Foot Artillery, 
and many are too young to command. 

To convince Lord Dalhousie of the injury to the 
service caused by the overproportion of Horse 
Artillery — it is the number not the arm that is 
objectionable — I asked for reports ; but he had not 
vigour to make the presidencies of Bombay and 
Madras give them ; red tape baffled my effi^rt to 
diminish the expense, and increase the efficiency of 
the Company's Artillery. The saving would have 
placed the whole on a good footing. 

An Infantry General can only speak of Artillery 
as affecting his operations of the weight and calibre 
of guns, the quantity of ammunition with the 
troops and in reserved parks ; the beasts of burden 
and of draught, and their forage. The calculations 
and details imposed on a Commander by his 
Artillery are many, but it re[)ays the trouble 

CHAP, v.] 262 

if judiciously applied ; if not horses and mules and 
men eat up his supplies ; heavy carriages, tons of 
useless brass, wood and iron, paralyze his move- 

It was a great object to ascertain the qualiiications 
of the Indian Artillery officers. They were gene- 
rally full of regimental pride, with all requisite 
science ; quick and true marksmen, and abounding 
in resources to overcome obstructions ; there was 
also a great emulation between the services of the 
three presidencies. Of the Madras corps my know-- 
ledge is only hearsay — all in its praise however, 
and principally from that excellent officer Captain 
Oakes, who fell at Kangoon. The officers of all 
three regiments pressed me to assimilate them in 
details, especially in the mode of driving and 
construction of carriages ; but there was not suffi- 
cient power to do it effectually, and unless so done, 
'twere better let alone. Nor was there time. It 
would indeed have been a very troublesome affiiir ; 
for the officers were so enamoured of their own 
systems, that assimilation meant with each, admis- 
sion of superiority, and as all were good there was 
no danger in leaving well alone. 

The chief difference between the Bengal and 
Bombay Artillery is in their mode of driving, 
Avhicli they denominate single and double driving. 

Single driving is one rider to a pair of horses. 
Its chief advantages are : 1st. The guiding is 
directed by one will, at least said so by the Bombay 
officers. This may be true on an English road, 
with well trained horses ; it may be doubted with 
the wild driving of a campaign, half-trained horses 
and no roads. 2nd. The off-wheel horse has less 
severity of work, having no rider to carry ; but the 

263 [chap. v. 

draught will not be equal. These and other 
objections do not, however, seem to be well ascer- 
tained ; for the horse w hich suffers from carrying 
the man can be relieved by changing him to the 
off side ; and though this also is disputed by the 
opponents of single driving it is certain, the man 
who rides one horse and drives the other, must be 
well trained and experienced for a country full of 
bogs, nullahs and broken ground. 

Double driving, used in Bengal, is having a 
second rider on the off-draught horse. The advan- 
tages are: 1st. The wheel horses have an equality 
of labour. 2nd. The second rider helps to work 
the gun. 3rd. There is more simultaneous move- 
ment, each rider imparting his will easily to the 
horse he bestrides ; and emergencies dictate a 
simultaneous impulse to both riders ; the sight, 
the voice, and the hearing act together. 4th. If 
an obstacle impedes a gun and each horse is led by 
a man on foot, they may be unable to get the 
gun over ; but let those men mount the four horses 
and the increased weight and simultaneous effort 
instantly succeeds. An instance of this occurred 
under my command in the Booghtee hills. 5th. If 
one man is struck by a shot another remains to 
conduct the horses. 6th. A driver, bringing a gun 
into heavy fire, obtains moral support by having a 
comrade, and they drive daringly. 

On these advantages and disadvantages, the 
ablest and most experienced Artillery officers 

Poles and shafts offer a more practical question 
yet arc disputed with so much tenacity, that it 
would be hazardous to give an opinion. 

CHAP, v.] 264 

The wood of the gun carriages is also a subject 
of dispute. The degrees of durability and tenacity 
is important, and the Court of Directors ought to 
have it decided by experiments at Woolwich, where 
there would be no prejudice, and where the sagacity 
of tlie Bengal IMilitary Board, as evinced by the 
following Madras report, would be duly estimated. 
" The Bengal Government by the advice of the 
" Military Board, ordered one kind of carriage for 
" all the Artillery of India, a carriage unsuited in 
" its dimensions to the wood procurable for the 
" Madras Artillery ; and in its weight and con- 
" struction to the horses supplied to the Madras 
" regiment. Saul ivood, which they use in Bengal, 
" cannot be found in Madras ; but the order of 
*' the Bengal Government compels exactly the same 
" dimensions with teak, a very inferior wood, 
" though of immense strength and toughness. 
" The consequence has been a great and useless 
" expenditure ; the wheels on the Bengal pattern 
" are quite unserviceable when built with our wood. 
" The carriages ordered for general use by the Ben- 
" gal Government were brought into the Madras 
" service and fairly tested ; after deliberate consider- 
" ation and ample trial, they were returned into 
" store, as our horses were unequal to the draught. 
" This the Bengal Military Board stated to the 
" Government was not a ' serious objection.' " 

The horse is not able to draw the gun^ hut that is 
not a serious objection ! Oh ! the Board ! 

The Madras Artillery prefer brass. The Bombay 
iron the Bengal wooden naves. The iron nave 
is condemned, as liable to break, and not to be 
repaired or easily replaced ; it is not so with brass 

265 [chap. v. 

naves, but the wooden ones are more easily replaced 
than either. There are other disputes as to the 
construction of carriages which could also be better 
decided at Woolwich than in India. Not that the 
Indian Artillery officers are less scientific ; but at 
Woolwich conclusions were arrived at after a long 
war, by men who had served throughout that war, 
and some of very distinguished abilities still remain. 

Let me now observe, that well-horsed field 
batteries are sufficient for all the exigencies of a 
campaign. No one wants to see guns making 
charges, and field batteries can always accompany 
Cavalry before a charge, and be brought up after 
one ere the horsemen can accomplish all their 

To descend from charges to leather breeches may 
seem a step from the sublime to the ridiculous ; but 
the Court of Directors have taken from the Horse 
Artillery their leathers, and substituted cloth pan- 
taloons, to the great displeasure of the drivers, 
with extravagance for the Company. Great pains I 
took to ascertain the cause of this, knowing leather 
breeches to be for riding, cooler in Summer warmer 
in Winter, and more economical than any other 
material. The result was a conviction that some 
cloth merchant, or tailor, who was a Director or 
cousin to a Director, or was, as Lady Emmeline 
Stuart Wortley would say, slantingdicularly con- 
nected with Leadenhall Street ; or who had some 
influence in the Military Board of Calcutta, was 
at the bottom of the cloth pantaloons. Whether 
the drivers will ever get into their leathers again is 
for prophecy ; but for hard work and long marches 
in India, " there is nothing like leather." 

CHAP, v.] 266 

Three or four troops of Ilorse Artillery would not 
be amiss, but there arc thirteen troops in the 
Bengal Army ; six in the Madras Army, four in 
that of Bombay. The Artillery regiments of the 
three presidencies should form one corps, with head 
quarters in a central position, to which the projected 
railways from Calcutta, Madras, and Bombay could 
give communication with those presidencies. All 
disputes would thus be swept away. 

This cliapter on Artillery shall be closed with an 
official correspondence and report — mere formalities 
being suppressed — relative to removing the present 
head quarters of the Indian Artillery to some 
station in the North-west provinces — a subject of 
considerable interest. 

The annexation of the Punjaub induced me to 
advise the head quarters of the Bengal Artillery 
being removed to Meerut ; and the following 
extracts are from the answer. 

" His Excellency proposes to move the head 
" quarters of the Artillery from Dum Dum to 
" Meerut. The Governor-General regrets that he 
" is precluded from assenting to this proposal by 
" recent orders from the Court of Directors. 

" The late Governor-General Lord Hardinge 
" submitted a similar proposal to the home 
" authorities, shortly before the Marquis of Dal- 
" housie's arrival in India. The Court of Directors 
" declined to assent until further cause should be 
" shown. The Governor-General is therefore 
" unable at the present moment to accede to His 
" Excellency's wish : but, adverting to the changes 
" which have subsequently taken place by the 
" addition of the Punjaub, His Lordship will 

267 [chap. v. 

" be happy to receive a full communication of His 
" Excellency's views on this head, and to transmit 
" to the Court a fresh application from the Govern- 
" mcnt of India thereupon." 

This dispatch enclosed extracts from a commu- 
nication by the Directors on the subject, to which I 
returned the following answer — 

" October 18, 1849. — There is no difficulty in 
" removing the head quarters of the Artillery 
" from Dum Dum to Meerut or Delhi ; but I 
" proceed to what the Court calls very justly, the 
" two '' ^yractical questions.' 

" To the first I answer Yes. The Commandant 
" should be with the mass of his regiment, and 
" that ought to be at Delhi or Meerut. 

" To the second, that all the recruits and cadets 
" ought to be sent to Meerut, or anywhere except 
" Dum Dum. 

" I see no loss to the Artillery in having an 
" officer of that corps belonging to this, in my 
" opinion injurious body, removed; his removal 
'* would be a small reduction of a great evil ; 
" [The Military Board] the Court probably will 
" not concur in that opinion, and my answer is 
" that taking into consideration the value of the 
" Military Board, the Commandant of Artillery's 
" services at said Board, the expense of a hired 
" member, should the Commandant be withdrawn, 
" and any views which the Commandant may 
" take of his duties, still the advantages admitted 
" are sufficient to overrule all these objections. 

" I know nothing about Madras, but at Bombay 
" there can be no better place for the head 
" quarters of Artillery than the capital ! There 

CHAP, v.] 268 

" the Arsenal and Artillery head quarters are 
" handy to Scinde, handy to Goojerat, handy to 
*' Cambay, handy to the coast, north and south, 
" and central to the interior : therefore ' no 
" complaint has been made by Bombay, Nor 
" ' till the present time from your presidency' 
" No! AVhen Lord Lake was beaten at Bhurt- 
" poor, and Gillespie slain in the Dera Doon, 
" there was no need to bring up the head 
" quarters of the Artilleiy ; it was near enough ; 
" it could then be in no better place! But 
" Peshawur is as far from Bhurtpoor, as Bhurtpoor 
" is from Calcutta ! Our Armies are on the Indus, 
" not on the Jumna . The frontier was then six 
" hundred miles from the Artillery head quarters, 
" and in no small danger of being nearer ! Now 
" your frontier is twelve hundred miles from the 
" Artillery head quarters, and in no danger of 
" retrograding. 

" This distance is too far; it is attended with 
" danger and inconvenience much too obvious to 
" every soldier, to be balanced by the service of 
" Brigadier * * * * in the Military Board ; 
" or by any view that can be taken by a Com- 
" mandant of Artillery of the importance of his 
" position; indeed that importance would be 
" much increased at Meerut, Delhi, or any central 
" position. 

" As to the expense of a paid Artillery officer to 
" take his place at the Military Board at Calcutta, 
" it is a dream ! Any accountant could prove that 
" to the Court. 

" I agree with the Court that it is a good 
" rule not to break up old systems; still a giant 

269 [chap. v. 

" cannot be kept in his childish clothes, and from 
" the Burrampootra river to the Indus is too wide 
" a space for leaving the Artillery head quarters 
" at Dum Dum ; this is not my single opinion, it is 
"• universal. 

" The Court admits that Meerut is more advan- 
" tageous than Dum Dum, both as to air, and 
" morals, and strength ; I go wholly with this 
" opinion. India is not unhealthy. Climate is 
" made to bear the sins oi gin and crowded barracks. 
" Both flourish at Dum Dum. 

" As to expense. Move the head quarters first, 
" without all the establishment, move the latter 
" gradually ; there may be much moved without 
" any expense at all. The reduction of some 
" troops of Horse Artillery would cover the 
" whole. I could do it, and save the revenue. 
" If the Military Board are intrusted with the 
" operation it will cost some lacs. The Military 
" Board is the greatest enemy to economy in 
" India, as regards military expenses." 

In this state matters remained till June 1850, 
when the following communication came from 
the Government Secretary through the Adjutant- 

" Simla, ISth June, 1850. In transmitting to 
" you for submission to the Commander-in-Chief, 
" the accompanying extract of a letter from the 
" Honourable the Court of Directors respecting the 
" removal of Artillery head quarters to Meerut 
" or Delhi, I am directed to request that you will 
" move His Excellency, in order to enable the 
" most noble the Governor-General to reply to 
" the requirements of the Honourable Court, to 
" be so good as to communicate to his Lordship 

CHAP, v.] 270 

" full details of the arrangements which Sir 
" Charles Napier wislies to recommend in con- 
" nection with the proposed removal of the 
" Artillery head quarters from Dum Dum." 

This request produced the following memo- 


" I would remove the King and the gunpowder 
" out of Delhi. The first to Futtypoor-Sikree, and 
" the last to an old castle near Delhi, the name of 
" which I forget ; but it must be either Shumsheer 
" or Toglakabad. 

" To put this castle in complete repair, would 
" be costly ; but a comparatively small sum would 
" make it a magazine and a guard house. It 
" would also hold large stores, so as to lighten the 
" demand for room at the Artillery head quarters, 
" by placing in the castle cumbrous articles rarely 
" required, but which must be in reach of head 
" quarters, such as carriages, &c. 

" The present danger to Delhi from the gun- 
" powder would be removed : its palace turned 
" to use and preserved; two points of vast 
" importance to humanity and public pride; for, 
" assuredly, if any city has just cause for pride in 
" its public buildings Delhi has a right to exult 
" in the grandeur of that marvellous palace ! As 
" matters now stand, some accident will cause the 
" powder to blow^ up ; and then the King, the 
" palace, and the population, all go into the air 
" together ! To prevent such a catastrophe must 
" be considered to be a matter of deep importance 
" and worth a considerable expense, even were no 
" other advantage to be gained. 

" The palace and present Arsenal would hold 

271 [chap. v. 

" the Artillery head quarters. It would also hold 
" the Military Board, which would be better placed 
" there than at Calcutta. 

" It is said Delhi is unhealthy. If this be a fact 
" there is no more to say; but a rigid police to 
" keep the town clean, sound sanitary rules about 
" irrigation from the canal, which runs much too 
" rapidly to produce malaria if the banks are kept 
" clean, would perhaps make Delhi as healthy 
" as any part of India. 

" In most parts of India the effects of man's im- 
" prudence is attributed to climate ! If a man 
" gets drunk, the sun has given him a headache, and 
" so on. Every garden at Delhi, if not kept clean, 
" becomes a morass ; weeds flourish ; filth runs 
" riot, and Delhi is unhealthy. The result is, that 
" the grandest city in India has the name of being 
" insalubrious, though it does not appear to have 
" any natural cause to produce sickness, no natural 
" swamps which would require vast labour, science, 
" and sums of money to overcome. Nothing evil, 
" in short, that does not appear to be of man's 
" own creation ! Yet Delhi is said to have an 
" unhealthy climate; I cannot persuade myself 
" Delhi is so unfortunate, and that care and clean- 
" liness would not make it as healthy as Meerut, 
" or any place in India. The soil is said to be 
" sterile, and a sterile soil is not naturally unhealthy 
" in a hot climate : a fertile soil usually is 
" unhealthy. The general objection is, that 
" unhealthiness reigns at the foot of hills ; but it 
" is also evident what is the cause of this. The 
" water comes down and lodges at their base, there 
" forming swamps. This is a matter so easily 
" remedied that it needs no more notice in an 

CHAP, v.] 272 

" age when drainage is becoming well under- 
" stood. 

" I prefer Delhi to Meerut because 

" 1st. Its fame is not a matter of indifference. 

" 2nd. It is fortified. 

" 3rd. It is safe. 

" 4th. It has a ' prestige' about it : its renown 
" gathers people and adds to its naturally impor- 
" tant position. A great establishment being 
" there formed would add to the splendour of 
" Delhi, improve the population make the city 
" more safe and more cleanly; in short give 
" strength and vigour to this grand capital of India, 
" which must always maintain a vast influence in 
" the East. 

" If Delhi be unhealthy what made it such a 
" grand city '? Emperors do not build palaces in 
" unhealthy places ! Men do not congregate 
" in unhealthy spots ! Great cities do not rise in 
" unhealthy positions ! In their fall they become 
" unhealthy, for as they perish they grow filthy : 
" neglected ruins, dirt, and squalid want, produce 
" ill-health. 

" There is another strong reason in favour of 
" placing the head quarters of the Artillery at 
" Delhi. It will be the terminus of the railway 
" from Calcutta ; and this will make it much more 
" convenient than Meerut for a great Arsenal. 

" The Delhi King within the palace is a mere 
" effigy ; yet he forms a moral rallying point, 
'* round which gather the dreams of discontented 
" princes, feeding upon prophecies ! Such prophe- 
" cies and traditions as those about Delhi, often- 
" times work out their own fulfilment. In the 
" present case they are only rendered dangerous 

273 [cHAr. V. 

" by the existence of the phantom King, whom we 
" there maintain at vast expense. 

" I prefer Delhi to Meerut as the head quarters 
" of Artillery for another advantage, which it 
" would possess, viz. there is no large river between 
" it and the Sutlej ; whereas all hea\7 guns and 
" stores collected at Meerut have the Jumna and 
" the Hindoun rivers to cross ere they can reach 
" Umballah: this is a great inconvenience, for 
" I believe that neither of these rivers can be 
" bridged. 

" Such appear to me to be the advantages of 
" Delhi over Meerut ; but still, if Delhi is really 
" unhealthy, I have no more to say. That point 
" is however doubtful ; the fact might be ascer- 
" tained from its former history, and from the 
" reports of medical officers. Its advantages over 
" Meerut are great ; and to purify and render the 
" renowned City of Delhi salubrious would be 
" a work worthy of the Government of India. 

" The Governor-General asks what arrangc- 
" ments are proposed for the transfer of the liead 
" quarters, from Dum Dum to whatever place the 
" Government please to decide upon for the future 
" head quarters of the Artillery "? 

" Those arrangements consist of two parts. The 
" first in the preparation of the locality, and the 
" buildings, repairs, &c. The second in the march 
" when the first has been done. 

" The first must be arranged by the Military 
"■ Board, the Engineer's Department, and the Com- 
" mandant of iVrtillery. The second, like the 
" march of any other corps. Both are so simple 
" as liardly to require notice, but tlie following istlie 
" usual mode of proceeding. 


CHAP, v.] 274 

" The Commandant should make his general 
" arrangements at Dum Diim preparatory to the 
" move of his establishments, and leaving the 
" minor arrangements to be executed by his second 
" in command and other subordinates proceed in 
" person to Delhi, or Meerut, accompanied by the 
" Chief Engineer officer and another member of 
" the Military Board. These three would form a 
" committee, which ought to have full power to 
" make the necessary preparatory arrangements at 
" Delhi. The first officer being a member of the 
" Military Board, should decide what is required 
" for his corps. The second, also a member of the 
" Military Board, should execute the same ; and 
" the third, also a member of the Military 
" Board, should attend to the expenditure and 
" accounts. 

" They should first get ready the barracks then 
" prepare for whatever part of the establishment 
" the Commander of Artillery thinks it right to 
" have moved first ; and let the preparation of that 
" portion be rapidly completed ; then that part 
" should be ordered to leave Dum Dum, and so 
" on in succession, getting each portion of barracks 
" completed in itself at Delhi or Meerut, before 
" its occupants are ordered to leave Dum Dum. 

" The next in command at Dum Dum must in 
" the meantime be preparing for the embarkation 
" of his various departments, to proceed by water 
"•' to Avhatever point is fixed upon for landing ; at 
" which point a third officer will be posted to 
" arrange their debarkation, and march to their 
" final destination. 

" The Commissariat will arrange the carriage by 
" land and water. 

275 [chap. v. 

" Such is the outline of tlie general arrange- 
" ments, and the minor details will, of course, be 
" executed by those employed under the orders of 
" their inmiediate superiors. 

" Finally, there is little doubt, if the air permits 
" the removal, that the establishment of the head 
" quarters of the Artillery at Delhi will be less 
" expensive and more complete than at Meerut ; 
" and it must be recollected that a broad view of 
" the subject should be taken ; that is to say, not 
" a few healthy or unhealthy years, but the general 
" qualities of the ground, and what depends on 
" nature, and what on accident. I have heard 
" that for many years Kurnaul was reckoned one 
" of the healthiest spots in India. Why is it not 
*' so now ? Ignorant of the details and locality, 
*' I cannot answer the question ; but it shows that 
" a broad view of these subjects is necessary, or 
" otherwise an epidemic, or the fatal results of bad 
*' barracks, bad arrangements, and other accidental 
" sources of ill-health will be assumed to be uncon- 
" querable evils, fixed, and without remedy ! 

" With regard to the observations of the Court 
" of Directors contained in paragraph 14, viz. 
" ' That the Court would entertain very serious 
" ' objections to remo\ing the whole of the Euro- 
" ' pean Inflmtry from Fort William to Dum Dum,' 
" I entirely concur in the opinion of the Ilonour- 
" able Court. It would be an error to leave 
" the safety of that important fortress in doubt. If 
" it be necessary to expend money to improve its 
" salubrity it should be done ; but the defence of 
" the capital must not be neglected for a moment. 
" For the same reason a strong Artillery force 
" ought alwavs to be maintained at Dum Dum. I 

CHAP, v.] 276 

" consider the force of Artillery now there is too 
"• weak ; but could not reinforce it, until the ques- 
" tion is settled whether the head quarters are to 
" move or not. 

" Here observe, that a barrack ought to be 
" built at Calcutta for the lodgment of every 
" regiment on first landing from Europe. Such a 
" barrack is much required, and would be also 
" useful if any circumstances were to arise which 
" made it necessary to increase the garrison of 
" Calcutta. As matters now stand, when a regi- 
" ment lands it is crowded, becomes sickly, and 
" loses numbers, which is accounted for by some 
" people saying, that a new regiment is not accli- 
'* mated. This appears to me to be a fallacy. The 
" sickness arises from bad lodgment and drinking, 
" to which even good and generally sober soldiers 
" often have recourse, when ill accommodated 
" and uncomfortable. Want of comfort on first 
" arriving in the capital causes a great loss of 
" soldiers, which always take place on new regi- 
" ments coming to Calcutta. 

" The Honourable Board says, If I will suggest 
" a more efficient system for the Military Board 
" His Lordship will gladly give my statement and 
" suggestions his ' best consideration.' To do this 
" would require more time than is at my disposal ; 
" but it would be one of mere time, and no other 
" difficulty; for the Honourable Court may be 
" assured that the defects of the Board are very 
" glaring ; and for a sample look to a memorandum 
" in answer to a question from the Governor- 
" General relative to this subject. 

" The Board is too far removed from its work 
" not to impede the public service. It should be 

277 [cHAr. V. 

" placed either at Agra or Delhi, if not abolished. 
" I must be excused for differing from the Court 
*' of Directors as to its 17th paragraph. Whatever 
*' may be the principle of the Military Board's 
" powers of sights that Board's powers, in fact^ 
" are immense and most injurious to the service; 
" and it would be to fail in duty to the Company 
" if I did not say so. The Military Board should 
" be abolished, and a Chief Engineer, with two 
" deputies, both Engineer officers, appointed, and 
" made responsible for the whole of the Board's 
" duties: to him all the subordinate Engineers 
" should report, and he should receive all his 
" orders from the Commander-in-Chief, who, in like 
" manner, would receive his from the Governor- 
" General in Council. 

" The Chief Engineer would forward all accounts 
" to the Auditor-General. He would report pro- 
" gress in all military works to the Commander- 
" in-Chief, the latter forwarding the same to the 
" Governor-General in Council, to whom also His 
" Excellency would be responsible for their pro- 
" gress. Each district Engineer should have a 
" treasurer attached, by whom all accounts should 
" be settled. The district Engineer should sign 
" every voucher, and be responsible for seeing, in 
" company with the treasurer, every payment 
" made honestly to his workmen, without the 
" deductions which subordinates are apt to make 
" when they can ; but he should not have to make 
" up accounts, or have anything to say to them 
" beyond seeing the actual payments made, and 
" signing the vouchers for such payments. 

" The sanction of the Governor-General in 
" Council should accompany every order for ex- 

CH.vr. v.] 278 

peiiditure. It sliould be sent to the Chief 
Engineer by the Commander-in-Chief, as the 
sole anthority for any expenditure ; and the 
Chief Engineer, the Auditor-General, and Ac- 
countant-General should be held responsible, 
that the accounts were made up and closed 
monthly, the district Engineer having an acquit- 

" By this arrangement every military expendi- 
ture would originate with the Governor-General 
in Council. 

" The Commander-in-Chief could propose any- 
thing, but originate nothing. He would see that 
the works ordered were executed well and with 
proper rapidity. 

" The Chief Engineer would receive and check 
all plans and estimates, forwarding the same to 
the Commander-in-Cliief, who would forward 
them to the Governor-General in Council for 
final sanction. 

" Thus the Governor-General would order the 
plans and estimates, and then approve or alter 
them and finally give his sanction. 
" Knowledge and responsibility would be applied 
to the vast expenditure on public works, and 
thereby reduce it. 

" With the system of the Military Board neither 
knowledge nor responsibility is applied to such 
w^orks. The Board orders this, and forbids that, 
at its pleasure, and the results prove its incom- 
petency. One natural result is an enormous 
unnecessary expenditure ; and as to the respon- 
sibility of this Board it would be absurd to talk 
of it: it is imaginary. 
'• Such are the best views which, without enter- 

279 [cHAr. V. 

ing into details, I can take of this subject 
generally ; and, having resigned the command 
of the Army, I can have no other motive to 
influence me than that which has all along 
guided me — the interest of the East India Com- 
pany, and early preparation for that storm which 
may some day burst upon its possessions ; a 
storm Avliich can only be met by a rigid M'ell- 
regulated economy to which, it is my opinion, 
the Military Board is diametrically opposed. — 

" C. J. Napier, &c." 
" P.S. — There is another piece of bad arrange- 
ment which ought to have been noticed. The 
common practice of changing Engineers, who 
have begun the execution of a work. This 
should never be done. Every man at all ac- 
quainted with public works knows perfectly well 
that the Engineer who begins a work grows 
interested in it, and labours to do it well ; 
whereas when exchanged for another, both work 
with disgust. Their pride is mortified, and they 
neither do nor can work with the same ardour. 
The Court of Directors would do well to prohibit 
this, and their works would be carried on with 
much advantage. This changing is also a 
source of great expense, and bad work, of which 
every one conversant with such work is aware." 


On the Cavalry. 

While I knew of Indian Cavalry only by read- 
ing, the entire horse appeared to be necessarily the 
most perfect for war ; his fire, energy, endurance, 
power of all kinds, must make him for battle little 
inferior to the biped upon his back, and in truth he 
is a noble animal ! But experience showed him 
to be a wild untameable warrior, too excitable 
for the fortitude and discipline acquired in modern 
tactics ; the hard-working, much-enduring gelding 
is the horse for Eastern warfare. 

Not less than eighteen reports on Eastern horses 
were obtained by me from Cavalry and Artillery 
officers ; and from two Infantry officers, known to 
the Indian public for unrivalled judgment — Sir 
Walter Gilbert* and General George Hunter. 
The last was many years at the head of the Com- 
pany's stud ; the first, apart from his military 
renown, celebrated for equestrian knowledge and 
equestrian exploits. 

All these reports concurred with one another; 

•'•= My lamented iViciul Sir W. Gilbert lias died since the above 
was written. 

281 [chap. VI. 

and with my own opinions, namely, that mares and 
geldings arc the proper animals to employ in the 
Indian Cavalry and Artillery services. Several 
of the reports were sent by Sir George Berkley, 
Commander-in-Chief at Madras, who from various 
experiments came also to the conclusion that 
geldings were best for military purposes. 

In the field the shrill neighing of the perfect 
horse is incessant, and at night Cavalry can never 
be concealed from an enemy. The commander of 
a Horse brigade wrote thus to Sir Walter Gilbert, 
" The very noisy disposition of the entire horse 
" renders him almost useless upon out-post duty at 
" night, and serves more to point out your own 
" position than to be a look out upon the enemy. 
" This I found everywhere, but more particularly 
" at Ferozshur on the night of the 21st December, 
" where, after taking up my position in rear of 
" your own division, the horses of my brigade 
" became so noisy and troublesome that they 
" plainly pointed out our position to the enemy, 
" who immediately opened upon us, and I was 
" obliged, with the Commander-in-Chief's per- 
" mission, to change my ground during the night." 

At certain seasons the entire horse is constantly 
restless ; after the hardest day's work his anxiety 
will frequently prevent his feeding and throw him 
out of condition ; he is then troublesome to 
manage, and so dangerous to ride that accidents 
are constantly happening, — so constantly as to 
destroy the rider's confidence ! The troopers 
cannot dismount to link their horses and act as 
Infantry ; each horse must have his man, and the 
commaud(U', quoted above, continues thus " Tlie 
'' difficulty is great of securing the entire horse 

cHAr. VI.] 282 

" -svlicn in the field, and the consequent privation 
" of rest to the rider during short halts or night 
" bivouacs in presence of an enemy. This I found 
" particularly at Ferozshur during the night of 
" the 2 1st December, where the brigade, when 
'•' dismounted, w^ere for the most part obliged to 
" stand to their horses' heads, and were conse- 
" quently totally deprived of rest. The difficulty 
" of unbitting the entire horses to feed under 
" similar circumstances must be added. Witness 
" Ferozshur, where for this and other causes the 
" horses of my brigade were without food or 
" water for forty-eight hours." 

Oh a terrible night that happened ! A night, 
Avhen the Governor-General and Commander-in- 
Chief, with adamantine firmness, resolved to abide 
the coming morn and save India, or die sword in 
hand. And this was the Cavalry preparation for 
the mortal struggle ! 

In actual battle the danger augments. Men are 
shot down, horses get loose, hands cannot be spared 
to catch them, and they interrupt the movements. 
The excellent report of the above Brigadier again 
says " This I experienced, particularly at Moodkee, 
" where after passing through the first body of the 
" enemy, we came in contact with and were in the 
" midst of the Sikh Army, and when our safety and 
" success so much depended upon our compact- 
" ness, we were impeded in reforming for further 
" action by the number of fighting loose horses 
" from my own and other brigades that we could 
" not get rid of." 

At ChillianAvallah a Sergeant of the Artillery or 
Light Dragoons, a man of large stature, one of the 
finest men in India, got mixed with the enemy in 

283 [chap. VI. 

a charge ; his horse, one of those vicious brutes so 
common in our ranks, attacked an enemy's horse 
— the beasts bit, struck, and kicked, fighting so 
furiously, tliat the noble soldier, though a powerful 
swordsman, was unable to use his weapon ; he 
could neither manage his frantic horse nor defend 
himself, and both his arms were lopped off! In 
hospital he said to his officer, " Oh Sir, if it had not 
" been for my horse I could have cut down a 
" dozen of those fellows." 

Tliat was a peculiar case, but the loss of life from 
unmanageable horses happens in e^ery battle. 
Nor is this the greatest evil, because a few deaths 
more or less, may not affect the result of a combat ; 
but riders going into action conscious that their 
horses may become unmanageab.e, lose that confi- 
dence which troopers should have; they will charge, 
but not v.'ith headlong fury and the single thought 
to lodge their swords in the bodies of their enemies; 
fear of their own steeds tightens the rein, slackens 
the spur, and checks the fierceness of the shock ! 

Witli geldings heel ropes are not needed, and 
good judges think them injurious, especially when 
cold winds and hot suns induce the horse to turn 
for shelter. 

A man mounted on a perfect horse cannot lead 
another horse, the animals would fight directly. 
Not so Avith the gelding, who will also work until 
he drops ; whereas the entire horse when fatigued 
often becomes obstinate and vicious. This is 
particularly characteristic of the stud horses, which 
are the worst. They have, however, one all-saving 
virtue. They fail under their riders, they refuse to 
drag the cannon in battle ; but they never sink 
under the load o( patronafje^ placed on their backs 

CHAP. VI.] 284 

by the Court of Directors — superintendents, 1st 
class assistants, 2nd class assistants, sub-assis- 
tant, assistant-surgeons, veterinary surgeons, re- 
mount depot, with its assistant-superintendents, 
its officers in " medical charge," its veterinary 
surgeons, its riding masters, and its assistant 
riding masters ! All are carried ! A stud horse 
bearing Sir Private Patronage, withLeaden 
hall lance in rest, and " Coute qui Coute" 
for motto, makes unrivalled charges, rolling over 
all other horses, Arab, Australian, Cape horse, 
Persian ! 

But even the stud horse with his ponderous 
knight may come to the earth ; and to help the 
good work here is Sir Walter Gilbert's reasoned 
summary of several officers' opinions, together with 
his own ; to which I have joined others, furnishing 
irresistible evidence against the stud system. 

" Lahore, Sept. I2th, 1850. — I have now the 
" honour to forward for submission to the Com- 
" mander-in-Chief a letter dated 25th July last, 
" No. 1033, from the Brigadier commanding at 
" Peshawur, giving cover to an amended return in 
" duplicate, of all the horses admitted to the 
" service by the Standing Committee at that 
" station ; and to a report also in a duplicate, on 
" the description of horses purchased since the 
" formation of the Committee as called for, and 
" returning the documents received in your dis- 
" patch No. 8, of the 15th May last. 

" I beg to avail myself of this occasion to offer a 
" few observations for the consideration of His 
" Excellency and Government, on the present 
" system of supplying the mounted branch of the 
" service with remounts, and the expense incurred 

285 [chap. yi. 

" for this purpose; and also on the comparative 
" merits of the animals supplied. 

" The average number of horses annually re- 
" quired for the mounted service is estimated at 
" 1200; namely 13 troops of Horse Artillery 200; 
"12 Horse Field Batteries 100 ; 3 regiments of 
" Dragoons 150; and 10 regiments of Light 
" Cavalry 750. These 1200 horses are supplied 
" from the Government stud chiefly, though some 
" are from New South "Wales, very few from the 
" Cape, and from the countries to the West and 
" North-west of India; they are admitted to the 
" service through the instrumentality of Com- 
" mittees, and eventually allotted to the several 
" corps in the order above noted as regards priority 
" of selection. 

" The cost of stud horses on an average of five 
" years is reckoned at rupees 758 : 12 : 3| each 
" in the ' stud accounts' from which it is inferred 
" that they have cost the State this amount when 
" they leave the stud for the remount depot, 
" where they are retained till five years old, and 
" are partially broken in and trained. If to this 
" be added the expense of their transit from the 
" stud to the remount depot, their keep there, 
" and transit thence to regiments, it will be found 
" that each stud horse costs the State little if any- 
" thing less than one thousand rupees. 

" Of the colonial horses, those from New South 
" Wales cost from £.15 to £.20, and those from 
" the Cape of Good Hope from £.18 to £.25., the 
" freight from either colony, the distance being 
" about equal, together with other incidental 
" expenses, would be £.20 or £.25 per liorse, so 
" that the average cost in Calcutta would be. New 

CHAP. VI.] 28G 

" South Wales £.43, and Cape horses £A1. The 
" 100 horses purchased at the Cape by Major 
" Bower of the ^Madras Army average £Ab 5-s-. Id. 
" each, 

" The enclosed reports of the Peshawur Com- 
" mittee exhibit 71 Nortliern horses purchased at 
" an average of 370 rupees for Horse Artillery and 
" Light Cavalry, and 260 rupees for those for 
" Light Field Batteries. The average price of the 
" Candahar horses, purchased by General Hunter 
" at Sukkur, for Major Dawes' Light Tield Battery 
" was 300 rupees; and the average of 99 horses 
" purchased by Major Edwardes at Mooltan for 
" General Courtland's Artillery was 216 rupees. 

" The average price of the Arab probably does 
" not exceed 500 rupees at Bombay, taking one 
" branch with another. 

" I have heard it very generally remarked by 
" judges of horses, and my own opinion entirely 
" coincides with theirs, that the stud horses have 
" very greatly deteriorated within the last twenty 
" years; and that they are in every respect inferior, 
" for all military purposes, to the colonial and 
" Arab, and as regard light field batteries, to the 
" Northern horses. 

" Even the best stud horses — those the first 
" selected for the Horse Artillery — are too often 
" bad tempered and of insufficient substance for 
" Horse Artillery ; and wiien they meet with any 
" obstacle which they cannot immediately sur- 
" mount they become sulky and will not renew 
*' the effort, and manual labour must be had 
" recourse to, not merely to aid, but often in sub- 
" stitution of the horses. Tliis was repeatedly 
" noticed not only by me but by Brigadier H. M. 

287 [chap. vr. 

" AVheclcr, C.B. and other officers during the hite 
" military operations in the Punjaub ; it was also 
" noticed daring the operations in Affghanistan ; 
" and hence, when it becomes necessary to 
" manoeuvre troops in the presence of an enemy, 
" no commander can place the confidence he ought 
" to have in his Artillery. Had the teams of 
" Lieutenant-Colonel Lane's troop been Cape, New 
" South Wales, or Arab horses, it seems to me very 
*' probable that his troop wonld not ha\e lost the 
" gun left on the bank of the Chenaub, at Ilam- 
" nuggur. 

" Whilst the first pick of the stud horses are 
" to a considerable extent deemed inadequate to 
" Horse Artillery purposes, how can it be expected 
" that those left — after the Dragoons and Light 
" Cavalry have had their choice also — should be 
" equal to light field battery draught, A\hen it is 
" recollected that the six-pound Horse Artillery gun, 
" with carriage and ammunition, weighs 32| 
" cwt., and the nine-pound light field battery gun, 
" with carriage and ammunition, weighs 42 cwt. 
" The injudiciousness of so greatly underhorsing 
" the heavier gun (by ten cwt.) was nearly exem- 
" plificd in Major Boileau's battery, which, but for 
" the exertions of Colonel Gowan, of the Artillery, 
" in collecting all the spare horses he could find to 
" aid it, might have been left on the heavy sandy 
" plain at Buduwal, and must always be a source 
" of anxiety in the field. 

" Tlie capabilities of the large powerful and 
" docile Cape horse for Artillery and Cavalry pur- 
" poses, cannot be doubted ; but were it so, the 
** question would be set at rest by the result of 
" the trial of the one hundred horses [)urchased for 

CHAr. Yi.] 288 

" the Madras Army, purchased last year by Major 
" Bower. 

" In 1837 the late Lieutenant-Colonel Ilavelock 
" purchased sixty-five Cape horses at £.25 each, for 
" the 4tli Light Dragoons. They were considered 
" the best horses in that regiment, and worth twice 
" the sum given for them, as they stood the march 
" to Cabul better than horses of any other descrip- 
" tion. Thirty-one of them were subsequently 
" made over to the 14th Light Dragoons in 1841, 
" and from being remarkably fine horses were 
" much prized in that regiment also; two still 
" remain, the casualties of the others occurred as 
" per margin. Of the sixty-five horses, ten were 
" selected as officers' chargers, a contrast to the 
" result of my inquiry in 1848, when only one 
" officer in the Sirhind had a stud bred charger; 
*•' the officers invariably preferring Arabs or colo- 
" nials. Major Bower's able report to the Com- 
" missary-General of the Madras Army, dated 29 th 
" November, 1849, from the Cape, furnishes very 
" valuable information, in detail, regarding the 
" horses of that colony. 

" Horses from New South Wales have been 
" under trial in the Bengal Army for three or four 
" years past, and the result of extended inquiry 
" leads me to believe that they are much approved 
" of, especially as draft cattle for the Artillery. A 
" reference to the quarterly report of officers com- 
" manding mounted corps, in reply to the Adjutant- 
" General's circular letter No. 314, of the 8th 
" February, 1847, would establish this point. 

" That there is a great diiference between the 
" horses bred in tlie neighbouring districts, and 
" occasionally even between those bred by different 

289 [ciiAr. VI. 

owners in the same district, is well known to 
those who have given attention to the subject ; 
and of the New South Wales horses, those from 
Van Diemen's Land, South Eastern and \yestern 
Australia (the latter possessing the very great 
advantage of being the nearest to and having the 
easiest communication with India of any of the 
Australian districts) may be considered the best, 
as regards both breeding and docility ; and those 
from Sidney the least suited to military purposes, 
from the mares and colts in that district beinfj 
allowed to run wild in the bush, which renders 
the colts difficult to break in and uncertain in 

" The qualifications of the Arab as a Dragoon or 
Light Cavalry horse are so universally known, 
and his superiority to the stud bred horses is so 
generally admitted, that it does not appear neces- 
sary to enlarge on the subject. The teams of 
Lieutenant-Colonel Blood's troop of Bombay 
Horse Artillery, employed with the Army of the 
Punjaub in the late campaign, were all Arabs. 
This troop marched early in the cold season from 
Scinde to Mooltan. At the close of the siege it 
proceeded with Major-General Whish's force, to 
join the Commander-in-Chief, and was engaged 
in the battle of Goojerat. It accompanied the 
force which followed up the Sikhs and Affghans 
to Peshawur ; and, at the end of the campaign, 
its horses were in admirable condition, as were 
also the horses of the 14th Light Dragoons, 140 
of which were Arabs and 169 Persians. 
" In the pursuit of the flying enemy at the close 
of the action at Goojerat, this troop kept up with 
the 8rd Light Dragoons till the pursuit tonniiia- 


CHAP. VI.] 290 

" ted beyond the village of Sainthul ; and towards 
" the end of the pursuit, I witnessed it gallop 
" over two miles of ploughed ground ; while, from 
*' the horses being knocked up, several troops of 
" Bengal Horse Artillery had been left at a deep 
'• nullah after passing Jellalabad. In the march 
" from Goojerat to Pcshawur the Arab teams took 
" their guns and wagons up the difficult passes 
" (Buckrala, &c.) with ease, and without hesitation; 
" while the teams of stud horses were obliged to 
■' be taken out, and their places supplied by manual 
" labour with drag ropes, to surmount the same 
" obstacles. These circumstances show the supe- 
" riority of Arabs over stud horses, as draught 
" cattle. 

" The Northern horses, (from Persia, Turkistan, 
" Herat, Candahar, and Caubul) from their mus- 
" cular strength and fulness of body are superior to 
" stud horses and equal to Arabs as draught cattle, 
" while they resemble the Arab in good temper 
" and docility, as shown in Lieutenant-Colonel 
" Fordyce's comparative report enclosed, and in 
" which I concur. The large horses above 14.2 
" are well adapted for either Horse Artillery or 
" Cavalry, and the capabilities of those from 14 to 
" 14.2 for field battery draught have been proved 
" by the teams attached to Major Dawes' battery 
" (No. 17) in the last campaign. After the battle 
" of Chillianwallah, including a previous march of 
" about eight miles, the horses of this battery 
" brought their guns and wagons out of action 
" not only laden with the wounded, but having 
" also several of the enemy's captured guns attached 
" to their own. These were Candahar horses, pur- 
" chased at Sukkur by Major-Gcneral Hunter 

291 [chap. vt. 

" at an average of three-hundred rupees per 
" head. 

" In the last march into Ramnuggur I remarked 
" on the beauty of a pair of pole horses in No. 3 
" light field battery, to a young Artillery officer 
" who replied that they were ' Candahar horses, 
"' ' and had not been one day spared since leaving 
" ' Delhi ;' or in other words, that since then they 
" had been in draught daily and not been led one 
" day in three as stud horses require to be. The 
" horses of this battery (with the exception of 
" thirty-two furnished from the Kurnaul depot 
" when on the march to join the Army of the Pun- 
" jaub) were purchased by Major-General Hunter 
" in Scinde, and turned out remarkably w^ell. No. 
" 6, or Captain Abbott's battery was horsed at 
" Candahar with the small stout horses of the 
" country called yaboos. It served with the Army 
" throughout the Affghan campaign, and accom- 
" panied Sir R. Sale's force to Jellalabad, where it 
" was constantly employed on the heavy sands in 
" that neighbourhood, and was always the admi- 
" ration of every one for its efficiency. 

" In the power of enduring privation, the stud 
" horse is far inferior to either the Arab, the 
" Northern, or Colonial horse. Where grass and 
" forage are difficult to procure, or inferior in 
" quality, the stud horse immediately loses condi- 
" tion, and it requires great care, rest, and an 
" abundant supply of forage to bring him round, 
" even when under ten or twelve years of age ; 
" but if above ten or twelve years old, he is 
" hardly ever again brought into good condition. 
" With the Arab or Northern it is different ; they 
" will thrive on the worst forage, and when grass 

CHAP. VI.] 292 

is not procurable, will readily consume leaves of 
trees, thatch of houses and such like food, which 
a stud horse, if almost starving, would refuse ; 
and with a little care and attention when forage 
becomes plentiful they will quickly recover their 
condition, even when fifteen or eighteen years 
of age. In the last campaign I noticed Colonial 
horses also kept their condition under such 
privation, while the stud horses became thinner 

" The stud horse is not only greatly inferior to 
the Arab in temper and docility, but also in con- 
stitutional freedom from disease; and I have 
strong reasons for believing that Bursottee exists 
to a most injurious extent, and has become pro- 
portionally constitutional amongst stud horses. 
This disease, peculiar to India, is incurable ; the 
sores spread in rainy or damp weather, until the 
animal is unable to work ; and in the meantime 
every horse in the same stable, whose skin may 
receive a scratch, is liable to become diseased, 
from the flies carrying the matter from one sore 
to another. Out of 260 stud horses sent to Nos. 
11 and 15 light field batteries in October 1848 a 
very large number had Bursottee. Four have 
been cast from No. 11 battery on this account 
and sixteen for bad constitutions. The total 
casualties in less than two years have been thirty 
horses in this battery only. 

" I have no account of tliose in No. 15 battery ; 
but I perfectly recollect inspecting the whole 
batch of 260 wlien they arrived at Umballah, under 
charge of Lieutenant Stokes of the Artillery, and 
a worse lot I never saw. The number of horses 
with Bursottee was so great that had it not been 

293 [chap. VI. 

that the Army was then assembling for the Sut- 
Icj campaign, and tlie attention of the Com- 
mander-in-Cliief and Government was fully occu- 
pied, I should have brought the state of these 
260 horses to notice in an official report. 
" For the satisfaction of Government I would 
strongly recommend that Veterinary-Surgeon 
Hurford, H.M.'s 9th Lancers, or Veterinary- 
Surgeon Harris of the 6th, (both officers of high 
professional attainments and very many years 
experience in India, and the former of whom 
submitted a report on the present state of stud 
horses, forwarded to your address in my letter 
No. 805 of the 1st August 1849,) may be deputed 
to inspect the remount depot, and the several 
establishments of the stud, for the purpose of 
reporting upon the horses as to their state 
of health, the causes of sickness or disease 
that may exist, or have prevailed at the 
several depots within the last few years, 
and as to their general soundness, and con- 
stitutional tendency to, or freedom from dis- 
ease ; and particularly as to the extent to 
which Bursottee exists amongst the stud 

" I would also suggest that whenever horses are 
to be passed into the service cither from the 
remount depot, the stud, or elsewhere, a vete- 
rinary surgeon, entirely unconnected with the 
stud, should always attend the C'ommittee, or 
officer receiving the horses ; and should, at the 
foot of the roll, certify that he had examined the 
horses noted in it, and that they were free from 
disease, sound, and iit for the branches of tlie 
service to which tliey had been allotted. 

CHAP. VI. J 294 

" When liorscs are sent to regiments from the 
" depot, or the stud, they should be accompanied 
" by a Native farrier and sullotree, either from the 
" depot or regiment furnishing the troopers sent 
" with them. 

" From the foregoing observations it would 
" appear, that the horses procurable from the 
" Cape, Arabia, and the country beyond our West 
" and North- West frontier, and Australia, are not 
" only superior as regards temper, docility, consti- 
" tutional freedom from disease, power of enduring 
" privations, and muscular power for draught to 
" the stud horses, but can be purchased for half the 
" cost; so that, if the stud horses cost 1000 rupees 
" each, 1200 required annually would amount to 
" 1,200,000 while the same number of horses pro- 
" cured elsewhere would, taken one with another, 
" not cost more than 450 rupees each, or 540,000 
" rupees annually, by which 660,000 rupees would 
" be saved to the State. Even if the stud horses 
" cost but 760 rupees each on joining a regiment 
" (and not as supposed from the stud accounts, on 
" merely leaving the stud for the remount depot,) 
" or 912,000 rupees per annum, still there would 
" be a saving of 372,000 rupees annually, and 
" withal far better horses introduced into the 
"■ service. 

" I feel persuaded that the chief requirement to 
" ensure the well working of the arrangements for 
" supplying the remounts from the colonies is a 
" judicious selection of resident agents. The 
" appointment of INlajor Bower of the Madras Army 
" to the Cape was most fortunate in this respect, 
" and were an officer of equal judgment deputed 
" from Bengal to Van Diemen's Land, and each of 

295 [chap. VI. 

" the oificers assisted by a veterinary surgeon from 
" his own service, I should have no doubt of an 
" excellent supply of remounts being furnished at 
" an average rate even lower than I have 
" mentioned. 

" That the number of colonial, Arab, and Nor- 
" thern horses required for the Indian Armies 
" annually, can be obtained, does not appear to 
" me to admit of a doubt, as the supply would 
" increase with the demand. 

" The circumstance of the sources from whence 
" the remounts would be drawn, being external 
" and not internal, I do not conceive to be of such 
" moment as in any way to impede the having 
" recourse to those sources, instead of continuing 
" to depend on so expensive an establishment as 
" the stud for inferior cattle. 

" In respect to the colonial horses, the sources of 
" supply although external, are nevertheless, parts 
" of the same empire, which would materially 
" benefit by the demand, both as regards the 
" landed and shipping interests. 

" The trade of the Cape and Australia, and also 
" with the Persian Gulph, I presume to be of 
" sufficient importance to require naval protection, 
" especially in time of war, so that there would 
" be little risk of the communication being cut 
" off'. 

'-' Should Government prefer the system of con- 
" tracts, I have no doubt a call for tenders from 
" the Cape or Australia would be speedily answered 
" by parties in those colonies, fully competent to 
" supply the State with the number of horses 
" required annually, and at a price much below the 
" cost of our stud horses, for all passed into the 
" service by a committee ; the horses rejected by 

CHAP. VI.] 296 

" the committee continuing the property of the 
" contractors, and at their disposal. 

" The people of the countries from whence the 
" Northern horses are brought, are poor, and 
" excepting horses and fruit, have little to offer to 
" India in exchange for broad cloths, cotton goods, 
" indigo, hardware, &c., which they purchase out of 
" the produce of their own exports. To increase the 
" demand for their horses is, therefore, in reality 
" to increase the amount of exportations to the 
" countries beyond our West and North-West 
" frontier ; for it is well known that the amount 
" realized on imports from beyond that frontier is 
" not taken back in money but in merchandise. 
" In promoting the extension of our commerce with 
" the countries beyond the British frontier, we 
" adopt one of the measures best calculated to 
" ensure the peace of that frontier ; hence it would 
" appear to be politic not only to lot them share 
" in supplying the Government demand for 
" horses, (especially as the state would never be 
" dependent on those countries only) but also to 
" lower the duty on their horses to a very low 
" figure, if not to remit it entirely, with the view 
" of opening a more extended market. 

" In conclusion I woidd strongly urge attention 
" to the present mode of supplying remounts ; for 
" the stud horses not only have deteriorated within 
" the last seventy years, but, in my opinion, will 
" continue so to do, from causes explained in a 
" letter from Veterinary-Surgeon Hurford, H.M.'s 
" 9th Lancers, forwarded to your address in my 
" letter of the 1st of August, 1849, No. 806." 
" W. R. Gilbert, &c. «&c." 

We assume as the type of the Cavalry horse, the 
charger on aHounslow Heath parade. Well fed, 

297 [cHAr. VI. 

well groomed, well trained, he goes through a 
held day without injury, although carrying more 
than twenty stone weight; he and his rider pre- 
senting together, a kind of Alderman centaur. 
But if in the field, half starved, they have at the 
end of a forced march to charge an enemy ! The 
biped, full of fire and courage, transformed by war 
work to a wiry muscular dragoon, is able and 
willing ; but the overloaded quadruped cannot 
gallop — he staggers ! This is the picture which 
should regulate the dress of horsemen ; bearing also 
in mind the wasting sun, which in India enervates 
man and beast. 

Our poor horses, thus loaded, are expected to 
bound to hand and spur, while the riders wield their 
swords worthily. They cannot, and both man and 
animal appear inferior to their Indian opponents. 
The active vigour of the dark Eastern horseman is 
known to me ; his impetuous speed, the sudden volts 
of his animal, seconding the cunning of the swords- 
man as if the steed watched the edge of the weapon, 
is a sight to admire; but it is too much admired by men 
who look not to causes. The Eastern warrior's eye 
is quick, but not quicker than the European's ; his 
heart is big, yet not bigger than the Euro])ean's ; 
his arm is strong, but not so strong as the Euro- 
pean's ; the slicing of his razor-like scimitar is 
terrible, but an English trooper's downright blow 
splits the skull. Why then does the latter fail? 
The light-weighted horse of the dark swordsman 
carries him round his foe with elastic bounds, and 
the strong European, unable to deal the cleaving 
blow, falls under tlio activity of an inferior 
adversary ! 

TiOok at our officers, mounted or on fool. Look 

CHAP. VI.] 298 

at the Infantry British soldier with his bayonet ! 
AMiat chance lias an Eastern against them in single 
combat? Neville Chamberlain, Robert Fitzgerald, 
Montague McMurdo, Charles Marston, John 
Nixon, Francis McFarlane, and many more have, 
hand to hand, slain the first-rate swordsmen of 
the East. Oh ! no ! there is no falling off in 
British swordsmen since Kichard Cceur de Lion, 
with seventeen knights and three hundred archers, 
at Jaffa defied the whole Saracen Army, and 
maintained his ground. Why then is the English- 
man inferior to the Eastern horseman in India I 

1st. The black man's horse is his own property; 
and private interest beats the Commissary in 
feeding ; the Eastern's animal lives better than the 
Englishman's. 2nd. The hardships of war are by 
our dressers of Cavalry thought too little for the 
noble animal's strength ; they add a bag with the 
Frenchified name of " Valise " containing an epi- 
tome of a Jew's old clothes shop. Notably so if the 
regiment be Hussars, a name given to Hungarian 
light horsemen, remarkable for activity, and carry- 
ing no other baggage than a small axe and a tea 
kettle to every dozen men. Our Hussars old 
clothes bag contains jackets, breeches of all dimen- 
sions, drawers, snuff-boxes, stockings, pink boots, 
yellow boots, eau-de-Cologne,Windsor soap, brandy, 
satin waistcoats, cigars, kid gloves, tooth brushes, 
hair brushes, dancing spurs ; and thus a lic/ht 
Cavalry horse carries twenty-one stone. 

Hussars our men are not. A real Hussar, 
including his twelfth part of a kettle, does not 
weigh twelve stone — before he begins plundering. 
'I'he heavy Cavalry horse, strange to say, carries 
less than the light Cavalry — only twenty stone ! 

299 [chap. VI. 

A British regiment of Cavalry on parade is a 
beautiful sight ; give it six months hard work in 
the field and while the horses fail the men lose 
confidence ; the vanity of dress supersedes efficiency. 
Take eight or ten stone off the weight carried, and 
our Cavalry will be the most efficient in the world. 

It is not pleasant to speak of military dress, 
because the nonsense published on the subject, 
must have sickened the public. Some general 
principles may however be laid down. 

Climate must influence dress, and it may be 
assumed the people of a country wear that best 
adapted to their climate. 

Armies must be composed of men uniformly 
dressed, and uniforms should be regulated by 
climate ; warm for cold climates, light for hot 

On these general principles the light loose dress 
of the Native Cavalry is, for horse and man, better 
suited for the Indian Regular Cavalry than the 
English tight fitting cloth jacket, into which our 
own ]3ragoons, and the poor Sepoy Troopers are 
alike stuffed — the latter being men who pass half 
of every day with only a small cloth tied round 
their waist! No more of Cavalry dress. 

Cavalry Arms. — This is a subject on which as 
much nonsense has been printed as upon clothing, 
yet general principles also apply. 

Courage, a quick eye and strong arm, make a 
man dangerous in fight. Engraved on a small 
Spanish blade is this legend " If your courage is 
" good neither my size nor temper will fail you^ 
Every man wishes however for the best weapon to 
give effect to his courage, and he should choose his 

cHAr. VI.] 300 

own blade, because confidence in his choice makes 
it the best for him. 

To arm Cavahy Sepoys with heavy English 
swords of one weight, one shape, one length is a 
mistake. The Indian swordsman's skill is produced 
by constant practice with a sabre, which gives 
him a matchless sleight of hand ; every Indian 
horseman should therefore be suffered to purchase 
his own sabre. It will be what he feels himself 
best capable of wielding, and impart a moral 
courage, which the English regulation-sword — 
hated and despised — deprives him of in an equal 
degree. In the first case he believes his weapon 
will make up for his deficiency of strength ; in the 
second, he must suffer for the deficiencies of his 

As to the intrinsic qualities of European and 
Indian swords respectively, there are finely tem- 
pered blades and very badly tempered blades in 
both ; pistols should be replaced by carbines in all 
regiments, and as a straight sword gives a more 
desperate drawing-cut than a sabre, while a stab 
with it is more dangerous than a cut, and a weak 
man may use it with nearly as much effect as a 
strong one, it would be well if Indian soldiers 
looked to the superior qualities of that shaped 
blade. Marshal Saxe — himself a celebrated 
swordsman — thought the advantage of thrusting so 
great that he proposed arming Cavalry with strong 
rapiers, of a three-cornered shape, like a bayonet, 
to prevent cutting. The Cavalry steel scabbard 
is noisy, which is had ; heavy which is worse ; 
and it destroys the weapon's sharp edge, which is 
worst. The native wooden scabbard is best. 

301 [cHAr. VI. 

The Native Hcgiilar Cavalry are made to use 
English saddles and ride with long stirrups. To 
change these saddles was beyond my power ; but 
my intent was to abolish the egregious folly of long 

These observations on Cavalry may be concluded 
by remarking that the East Indian people are not 
only masterly horsemen, but masterly in Cavalry 
movements. On one occasion a body of that justly 
renowned regiment, the 3rd Light Dragoons under 
Captain Unett, charged superior numbers of Sikh 
horsemen, who purposely gave way in the centre, 
while the flanks wheeled inward, closed, and 
assailed his rear, leaving his front unopposed ; for 
their apparently broken centre soon followed the 
wings, and all fell on the men of the 3rd before 
they could come round. Unett a distinguished 
officer, w^as desperately wounded, and many men 
were killed in this fight ; nevertheless he brought 
the rest off with honour. Our Native enemies daily 
improve in war and are not to be despised ! 



Dress. — The Sepoys are encumbered with 
breeches ; their former dress leaving bare the 
legs was better; yet now tliat we make war in 
the Northern regions of India warm clothing must 
be provided for them, they cannot bear cold, and 
on the whole perhaps their clothing is reasonable — 
the stiff stock round their necks always excepted, 
it is bad enough in England, scarcely to be borne 
in India. 

Fire Arms. — The European musket is too heavy 
for the Sepoy. Ten years of constant attention 
to this point makes me counsel the Directoi*s 
to have a lighter weapon. A British soldier goes 
through the musket exercise with a steady body, 
only his arms move, and their muscular strength is 
sufficient. Observe the Sepoy. He sways his 
body from side to side to assist his weak 
arm ; he does not remain steady like the European 
soldier : his musket is too heavy ! This over- 
weight is still more apparent on long and forced 

303 [chap. VII. 

The bore of the musket should not be dimin- 
ished, but its wciglit reduced in the lock brass- 
work and wood ; it should be a more finished 
weapon both in the Queen's and Company's 
service ; and one important improvement, hitherto 
unnoticed, might be made by every regimental 
armourer. At the muzzle, the edge of the barrel 
is sharp, being filed across at right angles to the 
bore, and in quick loading the soldier striking the 
edge with his ramrod gives it ragged inward pro- 
jections, which catch the bullet as it leaves the 
bore and cause divergence, generally making the 
ball rise. The ragged edge is usually on the lower 
side of the barrel, but the whole inner rim should 
be rounded off which will also facilitate the entrance 
of the cartridge. 

Rifles should be abolished — I speak of the 
weapon not the gallant men in whose ranks I once 
was, and whose exploits have never been sur- 
passed — but the weapon is not good for war ; 
and as to Minie rifles, they will in my opinion 
destroy that intrepid spirit which makes the British 
soldier always dash at his enemy. In close countries 
they are of no advantage, because men then get 
near an enemy before they see him ; and in open 
countries he must be rushed upon or battles will 
not be decisive. Exposed to Minie rifles Generals 
cannot reconnoitre, except from long uncertain 
distances, and battles will become great skirmishes, 
lasting many days and producing no great results, 
save the wasting of ammunition, and making the 
soldier think how he can hide himself from fire, 
instead of how to drive a bayonet into his enemy's 

CHAP, vir.] 304 

The Millie rifle will not do so much execution 
as is expected. Its long range requires high ele- 
vation, giving a lofty parabolic curve ; it therefore 
will only strike where it falls ; all under the curve 
are safe. To attack a position defended by Minie 
riflemen, our English mode of lines will be safest; 
its use will however probably render the attack 
in lines general. The close razant fire of the 
musket at thirty paces, aiming at the knees, is ter- 
rible. I have seen musketry at five paces distant, 
every shot told, the slaughter was unprecedented, 
the battle decisive. 

It is said, " the musket' changed into a Minie 
" rifle does not lose it character as a musket, it 
" may be used with the common spherical bullet 
" if needs be." This is condemnation. Small 
arms requiring two kinds of ammunition are bad. 
Being able to use a musket ball with the Minie 
rifle does not indeed compel its use; but then 
where is the advantage ] We can load with any- 
thing, from brad nails to gold rings. Alii Pasha 
of Joannina fired doubloons upon the Turks be- 
sieging him, when grapeshot failed — the avaricious 
old villain knew his hour was come ! 

To send a ball straight you must abate windage ; 
the long range is founded on the absence of ivind- 
age^ that is the principle of the Minie rifle. Grant 
it accurate projection and length of range, there 
are other principles still to be considered in 

Powder, especially when bad, fouls the barrel, 
and every discharge gives a new layer that foul- 
ness until tlie ball will not enter the bore. Here 
the Minie rifleman, if his enemy be rushing on, is 

305 [chat. VII. 

ill a fix, like his ball, which by main force he has 
jammed two or three inches down the barrel ; and 
he loses all confidence in the weapon. 

If the same windage be given as to a musket- 
ball, the character of the piece is changed, and it 
has all the defects of the musket which are 
admitted ; but then, " out of the thistle danger 
we pluck the flowTr safety " — the short range 
and very uncertain flight of shot from the 
musket begets the necessity of closing with an 
enemy, which the British soldier's confidence in 
superior bodily strength, due to climate, pushes 
him to do ; he takes his stand in line of battle, 
thinking the ne jjIus ultra of glory is a close volley 
and a charge of bayonets with his terrific shout of 
battle. Stop that and he is a common man. 
Frederick the Great encouraged his troops to charge 
first and fire after the bayonet had done its work ; 
modern generals are seeking by the Minie rifle to 
do away with the employment of the bayonet. 

The principle of the musket is to have plenty 
of windage, because however bad the powder the 
ball goes down freely ; the firing is quick, and if 
low also the ball will do mischief somewhere. 
Exact aim is not required ; the smoke, the noise, 
the excitement, prevent it ; the man aimed at is 
missed but his neighbour is hit, and every step for- 
ward the British soldier reckons an approach to 
winning the battle wdth his bayonet. It is said the 
Minie Kiflemen can constantly retire, striking down 
at 800 yards an advancing enemy where muskets 
will be of no avail. An Army always retiring will 
soon get into confusion and fly ! 

An enemy flying from the bayonet flics broken, 


cHAr. VII.] 306 

routed ! > vu enemy flinching from distant fire 
retires in order, uill rally and with distant fighting 
close the day. Next mornmg he is again firing 
with his Minies at 1200 yards distance — that is, if 
he can load, for they must be flrst spung-ed to let 
the ball go down. It must however be admitted 
that if the INlinic gives the same windage as the 
old musket until ignition expands the cup, it is a 
complete weapon. lict it however be proved with 
masses of men and Infantry officers ; not by Wool- 
wich experiments with gunsmiths, poachers, and 
pigeon-shooters, whose deadly aim would, as the 
soldiers say, " knock out a midge's eye at a hundred 
" yards." But then the execution of the IVIinie 
will be sure at 800 yards, and within that distance 
no Cavalry can draw up, no guns unlimbcr, no 
general reconnoitre ; battles will be fought by guess 
with small arms only. Who will gain by that ] 
Certainly the most numerous infantry, and the 
English must always be fewer on the continent. 
The Minie rifle perfected, will ring the knell of 
British superiory. The charging sliouts of Eng- 
land's athletic soldiers will no longer be heard, or, if 
heard, no longer heeded in the battle — and when 
were French soldiers ever beaten by fire only 1 

The Directors should lessen the weight of their 
musket to meet the Sepoy's weakness ; preserving 
the bore*. A musket beautifully finished, and 
carrying very truly, whose barrel is 3 feet 2 inches, 
and whose weight is only 5 pound 10 ounces is 
now on my table ; and beside it is a Spanish 
musket 3 feet 10 inches in the barrel, weighing 

* See my " Letter on the Defence of England by Volunteers 
and Militia." Publisher, Moxon, Dover Street. 

307 [chap. yit. 

only 9 pound 4 ounces. All muskets should be 
reduced to six or seven pounds weight. 

Drill. — Having little personal knowledge of 
Madras drill, the Bengal and Bombay systems only 
shall be noticed. The Bombay Army is compact, 
and its present chief, Lord Frederick Fitzclarence, 
qualified by an intimate knowledge of military 
details to render its drill equal to the Queen's 
Army. The greatest defects are the Seapoys' inve- 
terate habit of talking in the ranks, and firing 
without orders, — defects implying fault in com- 
manding officers. 

In Bengal drill is a matter of great difficulty 
from the dispersion of the troops, which paralyzes 
the officer's zeal and abilities. Long I sought men- 
tally for a remedy and finally borrowed from that 
great man, Sir John Moore, who first reformed the 
drill and discipline of the British Army at Shorn- 
Cliffe. He was supported by the Uuke of York, 
to whose honour be the fact recorded. Sir David 
Dundas had previously compiled, chiefly from the 
works of Saldern and Guibert, the book of man- 
oeuvres which bears his name, but the system may 
be traced to the Potsdam lessons of Frederick the 
Great. Before its appearance the British Army 
had no fixed system ; every officer commanding a 
brigade, a regiment, or an Army, had his own pecu- 
liar mode, and all was confusion. Dundas, had 
not however capacity to rise above compilation, and 
the Duke of York laid a fortunate hand on Moore 
to form model troops. 

Moore was allowed to select regiments, the 
design being to train men and officers, and gra- 
dually furnish from the latter, commanders for 
other corps. ])undas's manoeuvres were there im- 

CHAP. YII.] e3()8 

proved, and alterations Avere adopted which have 
since become general without their origin being 
known. There a fine interior regimental economy was 
arranged, and a peculiarly zealous spirit infused 
into officers ; there the ridiculous clubs of hair, so 
incommodious to the soldiers, were cut off", and the 
long gaiters and pipe-clay breeches replaced by 
trousers and half-boots ; there the polishing of gun- 
barrels was abolished, brown barrels introduced, 
and the bayonet fastened by a spring instead of the 
defective zig-zag ; there the ranks were reduced 
from three to two, and the only really sure and 
always practicable square, by wheeling up of sec- 
tions at quarter distance, was invented ; there a 
knapsack was composed on so good a pattern 
that every deviation from it has since proved a 
failure; there the balance-step, ridiculed by the 
" fool ivho rushes m," but the source of all easy 
and compact movements was devised, and with it 
the measuring pace-stick, the pendulum, and timing- 
tap of the drum, the gliding march and free car- 
riage — for Moore always sought to assimilate the 
soldier's post and carriage as much as possible with 
nature, removing useless restraints. 

At Corunna the British Army lost that great 
master, who had so improved its power, but not 
until he had shown that his genius for leading was 
as great as for forming troops. His lessons sur- 
vive. The Duke of AVcllington composed the cele- 
brated Light Division of the Shorn-Clifte regiments, 
placing it under the first disciplinarian of his Army 
— Robert Crawfurd, and it became what all the 
world knows : IMoore's system though perhaps now 
deteriorated, is still that of the British Army. 

With full knowledge of a practice originating 

309 [chap. V]]. 

with Frederick, improved by Moore, and adopted 
by Wellington, the mode of reforming the Bengal 
Army was not a difficulty ; but Lord Dalhousie 
and the Directors were to be dealt with instead of 
a Duke of York ; and my plan, though only involv- 
ing the marching of a few regiments was sure to 
be objected to by them. It was simply to establish 
a camp of instruction for ten or twenty thousand 
men at some great station, chosen as the head 
quarters of the Indian Army, where drill 
during the winter months would have been con- 
stant, and discipline throughout the year. Adju- 
tants and commanders of other regiments should 
have been permitted to attend two winter months 
without losing their allowances; and any officer 
at his own expense. The regiments should have 
been changed every second year, and the Bengal 
Army would thus have been in time supplied with 
well-instructed regimental commanders. 


Baggage Corps, a)id Fighting Camel Corps. 

The first of tliese realized in the INIooltan Cam- 
paign all my expectations of its utility ; further 
experience has confirmed that proof, and if Major 
Maughan the Commander would write a memoir 
of its services on the march from Kurrachee to 
Peshawur in 1848 and 1849, it would be very 
useful. The corps has been since disbanded by the 
Directors, for no known reason, if it be not that 
it was authorised by Lord Ellcnborough ! 

On my arrival in Scinde, Sir Richard England's 
baggage came pouring into that country, out of the 
Bolan Pass — a huge disorderly mob — my conviction 
Avas instantaneous, that without a baggage corps 
no Indian Army could manoeuvre with rapidity and 
just power. It has been sometimes called the 
camel baggage corps, but camels have only to do 
with it as being the beasts of burthen in Scinde ; 
it might be composed of elephants, horses, mules, 
or asses. Baggage corps means organization — 
method instead of confusion, that does not suit 
peculating Commissaries, or dishonest Contractors ; 
it would impede the enemy's capture of vouchers and 

311 [CIIAP. VIII. 

prevent jmhlic animals being used for private 
jyurposcs. The officer commanding the baggage 
corps and his subalterns, all holding commissions, 
would protect alike the baggage and the public 
accounts. In the Commissariat, honest men would 
then be distinguished from those who would be 
averse to a baggage corps as inconvenient. 

Formerly a great speculator, the Jotee Persaud 
of his time, contracted for conveying baggage, 
to receive so much daily while moving, so much 
when halting ; he had officers and sub-officers grad- 
uating downwards, and all duties and responsi- 
bilities were defined. That was a baggage corps 
founded on interest, excellent, yet inferior to 
mine, because it required large bodies of troops 
to guard it; discipline could not be so well 
maintained, and the countries through which it 
passed were not protected from plunder. In those 
days people say, there was no Commissariat ; if 
there was, it put the public to unnecessary expense, 
as it did in the Chillianwallah and Goojerat 
Campaigns, where Jotee Persaud, and not the 
Commissariat saved the Army from starvation. 

Lord Gough complained that liis unwieldy 
baggage shackled his movements, which would 
not have happened with a baggage corps. In 
Burmah General Godwin's Army has been crip- 
pled by want of carriage ; but if INIajor Maughan's 
corps, instead of being disbanded, had been sent 
to that country as a partizan body, it would have 
collected baggage animals if any were to be 
found ; and being well drilled and armed would 
have required no aid. The baggage corps has 
been disbanded by men knowing notliing of war 
— but times will come to make men justly appre- 

HAP. VIII. 1 312 


ciate and restore the corps in despite of the false 

notion that it is expensive. 

Camel Fighting Coiys. 

The organization of this body was the result 
of experience. When the Scinde war began, 
" a raid " in the Desert to capture Eamaum Ghur 
was undertaken. It was an operation of danger 
and difficulty ; for only a few troops could be 
employed, and it was necessary to carry water. 
The Queen's 22nd were mounted on baggage 
camels using the uneasy baggage saddle. How- 
ever we did our work, and the plan of forming 
a camel corps of men mounted on swift camels 
with proper saddles entered my mind. The men's 
bedding was to form a soft seat, their provisions 
to hang from the bow, and thus a body of Infantry 
able to march a hundred miles at a stretch Avould 
be formed. This was afterwards executed, and 
a corps for partizan warfare organized under 
Captain Fitzgerald whose unusual bodily strength, 
intrepidity and ability, made him a suitable 
leader. In the hill campaign it was of great use*, 
and would have been of much greater in extended 
military operations under a general who knew how 
to use it. 

When I became Commander-in-Chief the mis- 
chievous Bombay Government ordered it to be 
disbanded, but Lord Dalhousie w^as persuaded 
to absorb it in the Bengal Army; it has since 
done good service in the Derajat under Captain 
Bruce, who succeeded Fitzgerald and thoroughly 
understands its nature. 

* See " Civil Adininistmtion of Scinde," by Sir W. Napier. 


Bombay Briberies. 

The third edition of a pamphlet thus headed, 
and signed Indus has recently appeared. Being 
well acquainted with the characters there justly 
held up to public scorn, Indus has told me nothing 
new, I could add to his information ; but I will 
not give the Lord Chief Justice occasion to show 
that he can make his law insufficient to jwotect an 
honourable man against libels, yet sufficient for the 
jtrotection of such characters. Lord Campbell from 
the bench, sneeringly advised me, when vainly seek- 
ing justice at his hands, to write my own com- 
mentaries in imitation of Caesar ! The first chapter 
shall be headed witli the following remarks made 
by Lord Denman upon Lord Campbell's decision 
in that case, 

" Lord Campbells laiv is not the law of England. 
" It gives a licence for any slander. No jmblic 
" servant has any jn-otection from libel under such 
" law. It is not the law of England. And if Sir 
" C. Napier is not satisfied with the article in 
" ' The Times ' commenting on the trial, I have no 

CHAP. IX.] 314 

" hesitation in advising him to go to another Court 
" where Lord CamphelVs law will not jirevaiiy 

That Lord Denman's authority is great, from his 
superior probity as a man and a judge, and from 
his cautious temper, Lord Campbell cannot gain- 
say ; for on the 7th of July 1853, when enforcing 
a point of law in the House of Lords, he said 
" I have the good fortune to agree on this subject 
" ivith Lord Denman, who was not in the habit of 
"• giving his opinions rashly*.'' 

But previous to writing my commentaries pains 
must be taken to ascertain a few passages of Lord 
Campbell's private life and connections, when he 
was, to use his own description of himself, on the 
hustings — " Plain, honest John Camjjbell /" An 
expression which caused universal laughter at the 
time; but the merriment turned to gloom when 
" Plain honest John CampbelV became by Whig 
favour. Lord Chief Justice of the King's Bench ! 
I say his private life shall be inquired into, because 
a man who offers uncalled for and impertinent 
advice, gives the advised a right to ascertain 
the worth of his self-constituted Privy Coun- 
sellor ! 

Lidus has dealt only with direct unscrupulous 
bribery, but there are various ways in which money 
may be officially obtained. The following papers 
came to my hand in a private — not a secret mode 
— and broadly they show what manner of men the 
Scinde Quarter-Master-General Major McMurdo, 
and myself, had to deal with at Bombay, in defence 
of the public interest. The transaction took place 
a few weeks after my departure. 

■i= Sec " Times," 8th July 1853. 

315 [chap. IX. 

"Bombay 15tli November 18^7. I have been 
" desired to Avrite to Colonel Dundas, as you will 
" of course see that the Government are desirous 
" of using the private steamers for troops in prc- 
" ference to country vessels, even if the charge should 
" be higher. They are now only commencing and 
" will have more steamers out soon, when I hope 
" we shall be able to dispense altogether with 
" the clumsy beastly country boats. I hope you 
" will lend your aid as far as possible and in case 
" you have not concluded a contract for boats for 
" the 18th regiment, see if you can send them 
" down by two companies at a time on the private 
" steamers, and the same with the 7th Native In- 
" fantry. I do not expect the aid of another of the 
" large steamers for some time to come, if at all, 
" and the letter I have sent to Colonel D. "will 
" warrant your acting as I propose. 

" Signed J. Holland." 

The expression " I have been desired " gives 
this letter a demi-official character ; and, as the 
writer is the Bombay J)ej:^w(7/-Quarter-Master- 
General, it must be taken as coming from the 
head of that office. " The Government are 
" desirous'' is another plain indication of the 
original source of the transaction. Now at 
that time Willoughby and Reid whom Indus 
has made such prominent characters, w^re Mem- 
bers of Council, and chiefly directed the Go- 
vernment of Bombay ; and here we find that 
Government, through the Quarter-jNIaster-General's 
department, striving to force Colonel Dundas, now 
Lord Melville, the Commander at Kurrachee, and 
INIajor Mc^Iurdo his Quartcr-Mastcr-General, to 
ship the troops in i^rivate steamers and break off 

CHAT. IX. J 316 

their transmission by native boats between Kur- 
raclice and Bombay. 

The stern official answer follows : 

" Kurrachee, 2Wi Nov. 1847. I am directed by 
" the officer commanding in Scinde and Cutcli 
" to acknowledge the receipt of your letter 
" No. 1849 of the 13th instant relative to the 
" transport of troops on board the vessels of the 
" Steam Navigation Company, and to state that 
" however expedient and desirable it may be that 
" these vessels should be used in the transport of 
" parties of troops occasionally to and from Scinde, 
" andespecially of Europeans; Colonel Dundas con- 
" siders that in dispatching any considerable body of 
" Native troops from Scinde, the employment of 
" country craft is more expedient in point of time and 
" expense, for the following reasons, viz. — 1st. As 
" regards time : a Native regiment can embark 
" in boats at Kurrachee and reach Bombay in 
" from four to five days, when the whole regi- 
" ment may land effective ; whereas, by adopting 
" the transport by the Steam Navigation Company's 
" steamers, not more than two companies could 
" embark together, which would occupy a period 
" of five weeks in the transport of one regiment to 
" Bombay. 

" 2nd. As regards expense : the 18th Native 
" Infantry now under orders to Bombay may be 
" taken as an instance: the tonnage by boat 
" required for this corps will amount, probably, to 
" 3545 candies, which at 10 annas a candy will 
" cost 2215 rupees; whereas in sending the 
" regiment as proposed, the cost would be 
" as foUows : 

317 [chap. IX. 

7 European officers at 107 rupees each = 749 
892 Native officers and non-commissioned 

rank and file at 8 rupees each .= 71 3G 

75 Public followers at 8 rupees each . = (JOO 

165 Wives at 8 rupees each ....=: 1320 

155 Cliildren at 4 rupees each . . . = G20 

3 Horses at 25 rupees each . . . = 75 

The Native Infantry would cost rupees =10,500 

" Under these circumstances I am desired to say 
" the contract for the supply of boats for the con- 
" veyance of the 18th and 7tli regiments will not 
" be relinquished. M. McMurdo, &c." 

This attempt to have troops transmitted by 
a private company, with great loss of money, greater 
loss of time, and other public injuries, wdthout a 
single counteracting advantage, is a proof either of 
gross ignorance or reckless disregard of the public 
good. But Messieurs Reid, Willoughby, Campbell, 
and Holland, have spent their lives in their 
respective departments, and such a degree of 
ignorance is incredible even in them. Yet a 
motive there must be. Why were those gentlemen 
so zealous for a private company's emoluments, 
to the great injury and loss of the i)ublic X The 
answer involves another question. Were Mes- 
sieurs Reid, Willoughby, Campbell, and Holland, 
all larfje holders of shares in that private com- 
pany ? 

While awaiting an answer to the last question 
it will not be impertinent to show how Wil- 
loughby and Ueid have dealt w-ith my Moonshee 
Ali Akbar, whose treatment has been before 
alluded to in the comparison between Lord Dal- 

(11 AT. IX.] '318 

liousic's Government of the Punjaub and my 
Government of Scintle. 

Ali Akbar was attached as moonshee, or native 
writer and interpreter to the political establishment 
of Scinde, when in 1842 it was made over to me by 
Lord Eilenborongli ; and he was strongly recom- 
mended by my predecessor in the political agency. 
At my side during all the subsequent war his cha- 
racter developed itself very favourably. To a 
powerful frame and the staunchest courage he 
joined a frank and loyal disposition ; was patient in 
difficulties, physically and mentally very enduring, 
and zealous in the discharge of his duties. He 
won my regard in the field, and retained it in after 
years during the civil administration of the country. 
The Supreme Government rewarded his services 
with the order of merit. This was his ruin. The 
Bombay Council marked him for a A'ictim through 
whom to strike at me ; there is no other way of 
accounting for tlie remarkable character of the pro- 
ceeding instituted against him by Messieurs AVil- 
loughby and Ileid of the Bombay Council: they 
hoped to find means of concocting evidence against 
7}ie-hy persecuting /tim, and at all events pain me 
by his ruin. Thus they proceeded. 

Mr. Pringle my successor in the Government of 
Scinde was ordered to make an inquiry into the 
alleged fact, that Ali Akbar had in the years 
1842-43 remitted large sums of money to his banker 
and agent at Bombay — Aga Mahomed Ivaliim. 
Extraordinary exertions were then made to obtain 
accusations; the country was scoured for evidence; 
and the Lieutenants of Police at the principal 
towns in Scinde were required to 2J0st public notices 
inviting accusers io ap)pear against the moonshee ! 

319 [chap. IX. 

The result of all this was embodied in a report from 
Mr. Pringle, -whicli, for the sake of brevity has been 
condensed as follows : 

" Ali Akbar, accounting for his property, states 
" that 35,170 rupees was derived from inherit- 
" ance. 30,000 was the property of Mahomed 
" Hoossein, with whom he had agreed in 1843 
" to proceed to Arabia. Tlie remainder consisted 
" of earnings in the AfFghan campaign, and two- 
" thirds of the profits of a joint trade carried on for 
" five years and a half with one Hajee Alice, from 
" funds derived from inheritance, 29,000 rupees: 
'' but Ali Akbar had no active part in the concern. 

" The evidence jjwcurahle is consistent with Ali 
" Akbar s statement. The parties to some of the 
" bills decline giving evidence indeed ; which may 
" however be attributed to fear of a breach of mer- 
" cantile confidence, though the conduct of the 
" parties at Hyderabad in thu^ declining is unsatis- 
" factory." 

Here I must remark that nothing will induce a 
native merchant in Scinde to show his books. On 
two occasions Captain Rathborne. my collector at 
Hyderabad, wanted to see the books of some mer- 
chants, but they positively refused. Bred up under 
the Ameer's rule they are accustomed to tliink 
when Government becomes acquainted wdtli their 
accounts spoliation must follow. AVhen the Ameers 
got hold of a banker's books the next day brought 
a demand of " the loan of the balance credit /" Cvy- 
tainly they would not show their books. Tlic 
mere fact of their doing so would have injured 
their credit all over Asia. 

" Mr. Pringle is of opinion that Ali Akbar is 
" entitled to credit in the absence of proof to the 

cHAr. ix.J 320 

" contrary, beyond the snspicion arising from the 
" magnitude of the sum. The only accusers 
" against Ali Akbar have been common defamers, 
" who were never able to make their charges in a 
" specific form." 

" Mr. Pringle is of opinion that nothing should 
" be done to Ali Akbar derogatory to his respecta- 
" bility or injurious to his fortune. His position 
" in Scinde has invested him with a certain 
" influence, and he recommends that his services 
" be transferred, or that he be pensioned." 

AVhat was the conduct of the Bombay Govern- 
ment on receipt of this honest report % Was Ali 
Akbar honorably restored, or was he pensioned 1 
Neither ! BafHcd by the scrupulous integrity of 
the British inquiring officers, and enraged at the 
simple candour with which Mr. Pringle expressed 
his opinion, Mr. Willoughby cast the report aside, 
and adopted a course best described in an extract 
from Lord Falkland's minute. 

" For some time prior to the above (Mr. Pringle's 
" report) reaching Government, several lawsuits 
" against Aga Mahomed (the man to whom Ali 
" Akbar remitted the money) had been pending in 
" 11. M. Supreme Court, and amongst them one to 
" which the moonshee Ali Akbar was a party, as a 
" claimant on Aga Mahomed's estate. It therefore 
" occurred to Government that in the course of the 
" proceedings, the moonshee must have been 
" examined upon oath with regard to his transac- 
" tions with Aga Mahomed, and also have put in 
" an account current of those transactions, and have 
" proved in what mode his remittances from Scinde 
" had been effected." 

I will presently show that it was not for an}- 

321 [chap. IX. 

statements of Ali Akbar on this trial that the 
Government sought for copies of the proceedings, 
but for the perjured evidence of the bankrupt swin- 
dler on whose estate Ali Akbar had a claim. 

The papers alluded to were delivered up to the 
Government by the Chief Justice, not however 
without a remonstrance against so " iiovel a course,'' 
and the declaration that " it must be presumed the 
" documents asked for would be used for only ^yroper 
" purposes." Of that the public shall now judge. 

The evidence of the documents thus obtained 
goes to prove that Aga Mahomed had been the 
moonshee's guardian and trustee when a boy, and 
his banker in later years ; but that he was become 
bankrupt; that in September 1845 Ali Akbar 
having heard damaging accounts of his banker's 
ch'cumstances wrote to demand his moneyof him,and 
Ai>-a Mahomed unable to meet the call resorted to 
the usual Eastern practices of evasion and treachery, 
with a view to get rid of his principal creditor. 
AVhile pretending to make over certain houses and 
lands in satisfaction of the debt, he secretly told the 
Government that Ali Akbar had remitted sus- 
piciously large sums to him about the time that 
" Scinde was plundered." His object was to ruin 
the poor moonshee, and how he succeeded shall 
shortly be shown. 

Subsequently Aga Mahomed was declared a 
bankrupt, and his estates were sequestered by the 
Sheriff of Bombay, including the })roperty that had 
been previously made over to Ali Akbar, in the 
manner before described ; and it was for the 
recovery of this property from the Sheriff that Ali 
Akbar became involved in the law-suit. 
• It would bave been fruitless to liave searched 

CHAP. IX.] 322 

throngli sucli an inextricable mass of perjnry as an 
Indian money law-suit presents, for any real solu- 
tion of the question of Ali Akbar's integrity in 
Scinde ; and that was iwt Mr. AVilloughby's object. 
He only longed for Aga Mahomed's evidence, no 
matter how palpable the perjury, for he knew it 
would be in opposition to Ali Akbar's statement, 
and the ruin of the latter was accomplished upon 
the following '■'■ grouriils for suspicion" a term Lord 
Falkland used to justify the act. Aga Maliomed's 
evidence run thus : 

" When Ali Akbar went to Scindo he had no 
" property of any amount. When he sent large 
" sums down, then I suspected, and wrote that letter 
" to the Government.'" Noav " that letter" to Go- 
vernment was addressed to myself in October 1845, 
at the time the writer, Aga Mahomed, being in 
difficulties, wished to evade Ali Akbar's call to pay 
up ; it was only at that convenient time for him- 
self that he began to suspect Ali Akbar, though 
the remittances he mentioned were made in 
1842-43 ! 

In that letter Aga INIahomed explained his 
position with respect to Ali Akbar. " I was his 
" father's agent, who was in the service of Govern- 
" ment for upwards of twenty-three years ; he 
" always deposited his savings with me, and he 
" was a man of wealth. The moonshee (Ali 
" Akbar) from time to time drew from me almost 
" all his money, which was to the amount of 
" nearly 35,589 rupees. I beg to enclose your 
" Excellency the list and copies of vouchers from 
" different persons in whose favour he drew the 
" cash." 

Aga Mahomed then added his account current 

323 [chap. IX. 

with Ali Akbar, in which, among other items are 
the following : 

" Account rendered to his de- 
ceased father - - 35,589 rupees. 
" Cash received after his death 1,151 „ 
" Furniture sold by auction - 1,203 „ 

&c. &c. &c. 
Can black and white differ more than this man's 
two statements made within eighteen months'? 
The Moonshee went to Scinde without property, 
yet he drew large sums from funds left in the 
hands of this very fellow ! Wheii the moonshee 
drew large sums he susjjected and wrote that letter; 
yet two or three years had elapsed between the 
drawing and that letter! Even in this perjured 
evidence he was inconsistent before the Court, for 
on his examination he admitted that Ali Akbar 
" traded out ! " With what ? He must have had 
the means — he could not trade without capital and 
profits, and Aga Mahomed was his banker. All 
this was nothing to a Government resolved upon 
the ruin of the unfortunate man. Mark the 

" We the Council have no positive proof of the 
" fact being as Aga Mahomed states in the above 
" evidence, he surmised it to be the case ; but, 
" altogether, I consider that such strong corro- 
" borative grounds for susjncion exist against Ali 
" Akbar that I cannot bring myself to believe in 
" his innocence." And so he was ignominiously 
dismissed the service ! This was not all : he had 
been for above a year previously suspended from 
his office, without pay or means of subsistence. 
Why ! even condemned felons are fed ! Now 

CHAP. IX.] 324 

ruined by the law, crushed and insulted by an 
unjust Government, he goes forth a beggar ! 

Had this very cruel conduct been continued by 
the Bombay Government against a servant so dis- 
tinguished, it would probably have added his death 
to the pecuniary ruin which it has inflicted upon 
him as the reward of signal service during a long 
course of years. This once athletic man's health 
was broken down by the persecution ; and a letter 
received from Kurrachee in 1849 contained these 
words " The news of your appoititment has saved 
" the moonshee's life" And it is a very strong 
indication of the nature of the proceedings of the 
Bombay Government, that the instant the news of 
my nomination as Commander-in-Chief reached 
Bombay, the moonshee was in haste condemned on 
Lord Falkland's " suspicions ! " 

Thus because Willoughby and Reid raised his 
Lordship's " siispicio7is'' an old and faithful servant 
of the public, distinguished for zeal and activity in 
peace and gallantry in the field, is to be ruined for 
ever — this makes the blood boil. Lord Falkland 
does not know the moonshee — I know him per- 
fectly. He is an honest man, and the whole of this 
shameful business has been a dishonourable con- 
trivance to which Lord Falkland has lent himself, 
in ignorance it is to be hoped. 

The Bombay Government put forth public 
notices through the Police at the three principal 
towns in Scinde, viz. : Kurrachee, Hyderabad, and 
Shikarpore to encourage natives to accuse the 
moonshee ! Every body at all acquainted with 
India must be aware of the turpitude of this act. 
It was to invite false-swearing, and every sort of 

325 [ciiAr. IX. 

foulness ; a more grossly flagitious act never was 
committed by a British Government. Messrs. 
Reid and Willougliby expected to produce a host 
of accusers against the moonshee, and thus obtain 
colour for concocting some charge against me. 
And with this vile motive prosecuted these vile 
proceedings against him for a year and a half, and 
finished by depriving him of his appointments, 
because Lord Falkland " considers" that he has 
" grounds for suspicmi ! " A suspicion of what 1 
Of having taken presents ! ! ! It were better not to 
examine too minutely into such questions in 
Bombay, if suspicion is to be taken as proof. 
Suspicion ! Why Willoughby and Reid are not 
only pointed at, but absolutely and distinctly de- 
clared by natives of Baroda to be the recipients of 
bribes from the Gwicowar, and that declaration, 
with the sums specified, are to be found in the 
Parhamentary Book on Baroda afi"airs ! 


Scinde Prize Money, 

Everything relative to prize money has always 
been and ever will be interesting to nations and to 
fighting men. The prize money of crowned heads 
and Republics consists of territories, contributions, 
cities, arsenals, revenues. Formerly if soldiers 
spared life it was for ransom, and Generals had 
great difficulty to prevent cruel plundering and 
devastation, which indeed they rarely wished to do, 
for the hopes of plunder brought daring men to 
their standards. Sovereign and people then gained 
by victory, and the soldier would not be denied his 
profit. But standing Armies made him a paid 
servant of the Crown, to which appertained all 
spoil of war, and Sovereigns now resign this right 
of booty to reward bravery; wherefore whatever 
may be said on the immorality of m ar the soldier 
is not touched thereby ; he only obeys the orders 
of his legal rulers, and they reward him for profit- 
able victory. 

This reward, called prize money, is honestly 
gained, notwithstanding the doctrines of those who 
interpret to " Render unto Cicsar the things which 
" are Ctesar's" — as meaning " Render unto robbers 

327 [chap. 


" the things which are ijoiirs.'' Soldiers hold by 
the original reading, and render unto Coesar obedi- 
ence according to the laics of their country. It 
was this doctrine — reinforced by the natural rights 
of self-defence against intended massacre — that 
authorised me to war in Scinde. Victory followed, 
and the Queen voluntarily gave the booty to the 
Army ; it was not applied for, or even looked for 
by me. The Court of Directors, influenced by 
avarice and anger, attempted to defraud both the 
Queen's and their oivn troops of this booty, and 
appropriate it to themselves, but the Royal Govern- 
ment stepped in to bar that discreditable proceeding. 
It was not their first attempt to perpetrate such a 
wrong. In the third volume of the " Lives of the 
" Lindsays''' will be found a letter from Lord 
Wcllesley, denouncing the Directors for offering 
him £.100,000 to connive at defrauding the troops 
who stormed Seringapatam. 

In my case, with intrigue they got themselves 
appointed trustees for the distribution of the booty 
in place of Lord Ellenborough, who was first 
designed for that charge. This, said a lady, was 
making " the cruel uncle trustee for the babes in the 
" wood.'' Was she wrong ? No ! They cheated 
us of a considerable sum ; and that should have 
been proved in a court of law, if Chief Justice 
Campbell had not, to the astonishment of the bar, 
and amidst its ill concealed derision, refused a rule, 
— tliat is refused a trial, though driven, in vindi- 
cation of that refusal, to assert lliat the General of 
an Army which hud gained two great victories, was 
neither an officer nor a soldier of that Army ! Such 
was his legal acumen — or something else ! 

cHAr. X.] 328 

The Directors having failed, tlianks to her Majesty, 
in intercepting the bulk of the soldiers prize money, 
endeavoured to deprive me singly of the full share, 
which the regulated division of booty assigned to 
my rank ; giving what they called " a decision" 
adverse to my claim. They had only the dishonour 
for their pains, The Royal warrant admitted of 
appeal to the Lords of the Treasury, and one was 
made by counsel, Mr. John George Phillimore. 
The Lords also got the written opinions of the 
Duke of Wellington, the Earl of Ellenborough, and 
Viscount Hardinge — all emphatically given in my 
favour. The Directors then supported their " deci- 
" sion'' by what they called '■'■ iwecedents,'' that is 
they withheld all the really governing precedents 
and adduced inapplicable and inconsistent cases ; 
but Mr. Phillimore discovered the existence of the 
last, and the Lords of the Treasury compelled the 
Directors, despite of their reluctance, to produce 
them. The following memorial was then addressed 
to the Treasury and produced a final decision in 
my favour. 


As the Directors of the East India Company 
have disputed the claim of Lieutenant-Gencral Sir 
Charles Napier to one-eighth of the prize money 
taken in Scinde by the Army under his command, 
the reasons by which that claim is supported should 
be stated on his behalf; and to reduce this state- 
ment witliin the narrowest limits, the propositions 
concerning which there is no question between Sir 
Charles Napier and the Board of Directors, shall be 
first laid down. 

329 [chap. X. 

On the one hand it is admitted that there are 
cases in which the commanding officer is entitled 
only to one-sixteenth ; and it is admitted that there 
are cases in which the commanding officer is entitled 
to one-eighth. 

On the other, the rank of the commanding officer, 
the circumstance of there being, or not being, any 
superiors in military rank to whom he must give an 
account of his operations, and by whom he is liable 
to be controlled ; the fact of his being the first of 
several general officers, each of whom is entitled 
to a share of the prize money, — these are the tests 
constantly appealed to by the East India Directors 
by which the validity of such a claim must be 

If the person claiming the eighth of the prize 
money does not hold the rank of General ; if he 
have superiors in military rank by w'hom he is 
liable to be controlled, and to whom he is responsi- 
ble for his operations ; or if, though first in rank, 
he be one of several general officers, all of whom 
are entitled to a share of the prize money, it may 
be admitted for the purposes of this inquiry (not- 
withstanding some more liberal precedents in the 
records of the East India Company) that the claim 
of the Commander-in-Chief to one-eighth cannot be 

Again, if there be no military officer to whom he 
is responsible, or who has any power to control, or 
in any way to interfere with his operations ; if the 
force which he commands cannot, with any regard 
to the usual sense and common acceptation of 
language, be considered as a detachment from a 
greater Army, but is to all intents and ])urpos('s an 
Army of itself, pursuing an independent object, and 
governed by an independent head, — if above all the 

CHAP. X.] 330 

comiiiaiidcr be the sole general officer claiming a 
share of the prize money — that is, if he be the sole 
representative of that class to ^vhich according to 
all rnle and precedent one-eighth is due — then it is 
evident from the principles deliberately laid down 
and often insisted upon by the East India Directors, 
that the claim made by one so situated to an eighth 
of the prize money is valid, and, without overturn- 
ing all analogy and running counter to the whole 
current of precedent, cannot be rejected. 

Now Sir Charles Napier, during his command in 
Scinde, combined every circumstance enumerated 
in the latter category. 

1st. He was appointed by Lord Ellenborough 
directly and immediately as Governor-General of 
India to a separate, distinct, and independent 

2nd. The Commander-in-Chief of the forces in 
India had no share whatever in this appointment, 
nor was he privy to it, nor was any portion of the 
authority of Sir Charles Napier as Commander in 
Scinde delegated from him, or from any other 
military officer at any of the presidencies in India. 

3rd. Sir Charles Napier communicated as to his 
military operations directly with the Governor- 
General of India, and with him alone. He made 
no report whatever concerning his military opera- 
tions to any military officer. His command was 
as independent in Scinde as that of Lord Welling- 
ton's in Spain, and his reports of the routine of 
military duties was exactly analogous to those made 
by Lord Wellington to the Duke of York, during 
the time of his command in the Peninsula. 

4th. The command of Sir Charles Napier had a 
distinct and specific object, with the execution of 
which he alone was entrusted, and the knowledge 

331 [chap. X. 

of which was communicated to no one besides 

5th. He was the sole general officer in command, 
the representative of a class to which one eighth 
was unquestionably due, and this circumstance, as 
will be shown by extracts from the Archieves of 
the East India Company is precisely that which is 
appealed to by the Directors as furnishing a clear 
and decisive test as to the validity of the claim. 

To prove that Sir Charles Napier was not the 
commander of a detachment, but the leader of an 
Army, irresponsible to any one besides the Gover- 
nor-General, it will be sufficient to refer to the 
minute of Lord Ellenborough, by which, and not 
by any resolution of the Bombay Government he 
was appointed to his command, August 26th, 1842. 

The whole transaction is exactly conformable 
to this letter. Letter after letter is written by 
Lord Ellenborough and Sir Charles Napier to each 
other, without the least allusion from which the 
possibility of any intervening authority could be 
surmised : and with countless passages which are 
irreconcileable with the existence of any such 
authority. Among many otlier letters, one written 
by Lord Ellenborough to Sir Charles Napier from 
the camp at Nalaghar November 25th 1842, con- 
tains the following expressions. " It is desirable 
" that in the event of your moving you should 
" have all the troops near the Scinde frontier 
" at your disposal. I therefore enclose letters 
" directing the officers commanding at Deesa and 
" in Cutch to obey any orders they may receive 
"• from you. I shall acquaint the Bombay Govern- 
" ment that this authority lias been givenyou." 

By this dispatch of the Governor-Generars, all 

CHAP. X.] 332 

aiitliority over the officers at Cutch was actually 
taken from Sir Thomas McMahon and transferred 
to Sir Charles Napier; yet it would seem the 
Court of Directors argue that the authority of Sir 
Cliarles Napier was delegated from Sir Thomas 
McMalion in the face of a document showing so 
unanswerably that Sir Charles Napier's authority 
was given by the Governor-General, and that the 
powers of Sir Thomas McMahon were diminished 
and controlled by the Governor-General in order 
(for the sake of attaining more effectually the object 
he had in view) to make the powers vested in Sir 
Charles Napier more independent and extensive — 
such an interpretation of so plain a state of facts is 
unnatural and even extravagant. Whatever inde- 
pendent authority it was in the power of the 
Governor-General of India to give to a General in 
command, was given, by Lord Ellenborough, to Sir 
Charles Napier ; and in opposition to testimony so 
direct and decisive, that the appointment of Sir 
Charles Napier was made originally and exclusively 
by the Governor-General, it is strange to find the 
Court of Directors doubting — as if it had the re- 
motest possible bearing on the present inquiry 
whether Sir Charles Napier's command was a 
subordinate or a principal one — a resolution of the 
Secret Department of the Bombay Government 
which, as far as Sir Charles Napier's command was 
concerned, might just as well not have existed at 
all, which is nothing more than a notification of 
Sir Charles Napier's appointment, — a mere regis- 
tration of the command of the Governor-General in 
which the Government of Bombay, approving or 
disapproving, was bound at once to acquiesce with- 
out hesitation or interference. 

333 [chap. X. 

The Bombay Government did not select and 
had no power to select Sir Charles Napier for the 
functions assigned to him by Lord EUenborough. 
It had no power to agree to, or to dissent from 
that selection. Its resolution was entirely col- 
lateral to the instructions received by Sir Charles 
Napier from the Governor-General. It had no 
effect whatever on his office, which was created 
solely by Lord EUenborough, nor did Sir Charles 
Napier derive from it the slightest portion of 
autliority. It is however more surprising that the 
Court of Directors, though they have omitted to 
notice the minute by which Sir Charles Napier was 
appointed to the command as well as the subse- 
quent correspondence between Lord EUenborough 
and himself, should actually quote a merely formal 
and technical document from the Bombay Com- 
mander concerning Courts IVIartial ! 

In the first place, as we are advised, the date of 
that document is subsequent to the period when 
the prize money was captured. Again, if any 
inference can be dra'vvn from a paper so irrelevant 
to the object of the present inquiry, it can only be 
one strongly in favour of Sir Charles Napier — 
because the warrant of the Bombay Commander-in- 
Chief relates only to the Bombay troops, whereas 
not troops from Bombay only, but from all the 
presidencies were under the command of Sir 
Charles Napier. Lastly — the delegation was, as 
the most superficial knowledge of military pro- 
ceedings shows a mere act of routine, implying no 
subordination on one side and no authority on the 
other; and therefore in no sense touching the 
question whether the command of Sir Charles 
Napier in Scinde was a princi[)al or a subordinate 

CHAP. X.] 334 

one. These two papers however so entirely mis- 
conceived, and which a moment's examination suf- 
fices to put in a proper light, are the only docu- 
ments cited by the Court of Directors as tend- 
ing to invalidate the claims of Sir Charles Napier. 

It would be waste of time to dwell longer on 
topics which serve only to cloud the real nature of 
the case. The error which led to their insertion in 
the minute of the Directors does not require refuta- 
tion. It could result only from a confusion of 
terms, and must vanish the moment that confusion 
is dispelled. The argument then as to the nature 
of Sir Charles Napier's command may be concisely 
stated thus ; was it in the power of the Governor- 
General in India to confer an absolute independent 
command"? And if it was, how could it be con- 
ferred more effectually and unequivocally 1 Are 
the letters written by the parties, viz. by the 
Governor-General and Sir Charles Napier, evidence 
of the relation in which they stood to each other 1 
If so, the passages quoted above, and many more 
which might be cited demonstrate, as plainly as it 
is in the power of words and of conduct explain- 
ing, and in exact conformity with those words to 
demonstrate, that the command of Sir Charles 
Napier was not subordinate but a principal and in- 
dependent command. 

Is the testimony of the Governor-General as to 
his own intention in making the appointment con- 
clusive ? If so, it is sufficient to refer to the 
minute above quoted, and to a letter written by 
Lord Ellenborough since his return to England, 
and annexed to this memorial. To whom did Sir 
Charles Napier address the communication of the 
victory of Meanee 1 To Lord Ellenborough. In- 

335 [chap. X. 

stpad of all tliose facts, had the circumstances been 
directly the reverse, had Sir Charles Napier not been 
appointed by a despatch of the Governor-General, 
had he corresponded with and received instructions 
from a superior military officer ; had there been no 
correspondence between the Governor-General and 
himself; had no troops been under his command 
but those of the Bombay presidency ; and if instead 
of having the officers in Cutch within the Bombay 
presidency, by the express command of the 
Governor-General, actually taken from the com- 
mand of Sir Thomas Mc'Mahon the Commander- 
in-Chief at Bombay, and placed under his own, 
Sir Charles Napier had been subject to Sir Thomas 
Mc^NIahon and responsible to him for his proceed- 
ings — if such had been the state of facts, the 
assertion of the Court of Directors that Sir Charles 
Napier was not Commander-in-Chief of the forces 
in Scinde (for they mean that or nothing) might 
have been supported by something like a plausible 
argument. But as the premises are in diameter 
contradictory to those which would give any colour 
to such reasoning, they must lead to an opposite 
conclusion, and it is therefore submitted with the 
utmost confidence that so much of the case of Sir 
Charles Napier as turns upon the nature of his 
command, and as to the authority from which that 
command issued is established beyond all shadow 
of doubt or controversy. 

This question being then disposed of — and taking 
it for granted that the command exercised in Scinde, 
by Sir Charles Napier was independent and exclu- 
sive as well as that he was the sole general officer 
employed on that occasion, it remains to see how 
his case stands under the circumstances as a matter 

CHAP. X.] 336 

of usage, and what the rules arc which the East 
Indian Directors lay down as applicable to the 
prize money due to claimants so situated. 

In the instance of the Chinsurah prize money, 
July 1781, when the capture of the Dutch settle- 
ment was effected which, to use the very words of 
the East India Directors, " was neither the effect of 
" meritorious service nor of capitulation, the place 
" being defenceless and ceded on requisition — an 
" act of formal accommodation not of military 
" occupation," — one-eighth of the prize money was 
set apart for the commanding officer ; and after the 
claim of General Hibbert, which seems to have 
been altogether without foundation, was withdrawn, 
one-eighth of the prize money thus acquired, was, 
with the express sanction of the Court of Directors 
and after inquiry, awarded to Captain Chatfield 
the commanding officer on that occasion — that is 
— a subaltern who had not performed any " 7neri- 
torious service " received without dispute the share 
to which, after the battles of Meanee and Hyder- 
abad, Sir Charles Napier's title is disputed. 

The case of Serampore (1812) is in a contrast no 
less remarkable with the present conduct of the 
Directors. Serampore was a small Danish settle- 
ment within sight of Calcutta. It neither did nor 
could make any resistance against a small detach- 
ment of four or five companies of Infantry under 
the command of Colonel Carey. There was no 
more danger incurred — no more skill exhibited 
than on parade — not a shot was fired — yet upon 
that occasion one-eighth of the whole (360 shares) 
prize money was allotted to Colonel Carey. 

A case follows, of still more importance, on 
which the attention of the Directors was especially 

'^37 [chap. X. 

fixed, ill examining whicli they slate the principles 
by Avhich the distribution of prize-money in India 
should be regulated, to which they systematically 
appeal afterwards as the rule of their proceedings. 
This case is precise in favour of Sir Charles Napier ! 
It is that of Seringapatam. Had Sir Charles 
Napier's Advocate been called upon to select ex- 
pressions which would set his Client's demand 
beyond the reach of cavil, it would not be easy for 
him to find any more appropriate than those em- 
ployed on that occasion by the Directors of the 
East India Company. On the taking of Seringa- 
patam one-eighth of the prize-money was awarded 
to General Harris. This share General Harris 
received and kept. It is while censuring this dis- 
tribution, that the Directors make use of expressions 
which, if hostile to the claim they then endeavoured 
to impeach, are strongly in favour of that against 
which they are now contending. 

Letter to Fort St. George 24:th August 1804. 
" Upon the share of one-eighth as claimed by 
" General Harris, however strongly impressed that 
" officer may have been with the justice of his 
" own demand, upon the fullest investigation we 
" are decidedly of opinion tliat, according to tlie 
" undoubted usages of the British service, the Com- 
" mander-in-Chief not being sole General was not 
" entitled to an eighth ; had there been only one 
" Genei-al serving under his orders, he would have 
" been entitled to two-thirds of an eighth ; but 
" there being more than one general officer the 
" share of the Commander-in-Chief ought to have 
" been one-sixteenth and no more. Sucli we 
'- conceive to liave been the indis})utable limits of 
" General Harris's share according to the rules 


cHAr. X.J 338 

" and usages of the British service, nor can we 
" find any case of distribution even in India which 
" could warrant the General's claim as Commandcr- 
" in-Chief to one-eighth, he not being at the time 
" sole General. Were it possible to adduce a 
" precedent of remote date in support of such a 
" principle of distribution we cannot admit that it 
" Avould prevail in opposition to the scale of dis- 
" tribution established in 1793 by His Majesty's 
" proclamation, and the Act of Parliament for the 
" regulation of Naval Prize, — the principles of 
" which Act have ever since governed the distri- 
" bution of prize in both services. 

" We arc ready to allow that in by far the 
" greater number of cases of prize which have 
" occurred in India, the officer in command of the 
" forces shared one-eighth part. These precedents 
" can in no degree justify the late distribution, yet 
" we deem it due to General Harris to notice the 
" fact, as we can well conceive that in the view 
" the General took of his own claims he mie^ht 
" have been misled by not sufficiently adverting to 
" the distinction between the share of a Com- 
" mander-in-Chief being sole General, and that of 
" a Commander-in-Chief, as in the present case, 
" having several general officers to share that 
" eighth with him." 

Is not the validity of Sir Charles Napier's claim 
a direct corollary from the principles here laid 
down ? If the claim of General Harris to one- 
eighth would, in the opinion of the Court of 
Directors, have been valid had no general officer 
been entitled to share in the prize money of 
Seringapatam, Sir Charles Napier's claim must 
be valid now, as there were no general officers 

339 [chap. X 

entitled to share in the Scinde prize money. If 
General Harris was wrong bccanse he did not 
" advert to the distinction between a sole General 
" and one who has several general officers to 
" share with him." Sir Charles Napier, inasmuch 
as the distinction which was adverse to General 
Harris makes altogether in his favour, is in the 
right. That this and no other was the real point 
kept in view by the East India Directors is 
especially manifest from their subsequent despatch 
in the case of the Mahratta prize money. 

Sir Arthur Wellesley who commanded a detached 
body of troops on that occasion received one-eighth 
of the prize money. The Court of Directors find 
fault with that distribution, and for this reason 
because the rule insisted upon in the case of 
Seringapatam was not complied with, — in other 
words because there were other general officers to 
share with Sir Arthur Wellesley. They do not 
say, as the fact was, that Sir Arthur Wellesley's 
command was not independent, that he was not 
Commander-in-Chief, that he was only a Major- 
Gencral but that {Letter to Bengal July \2th, 
1804) " with regard to the orders relative to corps 
" entitled to share in the principles laid down on 
" the letter from the Commander-in-Chief to the 
" President of the Prize Committee, we have no 
" observation to offer ; but as to the distribution of 
" shares resolved on by that Committee it appears 
" to be inconsistent with the regulations prescribed 
" by His Majesty's orders, and to the sentiments 
" contained in our letter to Foi't St. George on the 
'' subject of tlie Seringapatam prize money of the 
" 24th August, 1804 founded thereon, copy of 
" which has been transmitted to you. In all 

CHAP. X.] 340 

" future distinctions of prize money in India these 
" must therefore be acted upon as far as circum- 
" stances will admit." This amounts to an express 
confirmation of Sir Charles Napier's claim. 

In the distribution of the Ilattrass prize money, 
1817, the same principle was acted upon under the 
express sanction of the East India Directors. The 
principle is thus stated, " to the (jeneral officers 
" one-eighthy Not only were the general officers 
allowed one-eighth on that occasion, but Lieutenant- 
Colonel Prother who commanded a separate detach- 
ment was allowed one-sixteenth, a claim which 
according to the principles now contended for by 
the East India Directors w'ould be wholly untenable. 
The precedent of Ilattrass is referred to in the 
Concan case as the best guide, 31st May, 1820, 
and in the opinion of Sir Charles Colville Lieutenant- 
Colonel Prother was entitled to one-eighth. 

The case of the Concan prize money is also 
emphatically in Sir Charles Napier's favour. In 
that case it must be observed that there was no 
general officer at all in command, Lieutenant- 
Colonel Prother, Colonel Kennedy, Captain Imlach, 
and Captain Morrison commanded separate detach- 
ments. liieutenant-Coloncl Prother (who received 
one-sixteenth in the liattrass case — this is men- 
tioned to prevent confusionj claimed one-eighth. 
One-sixteenth was paid at first to the claimants. 
With regard to the other sixteenth the question 
w^as submitted to the Court of Directors and in their 
letter to Bombay, dated 8tli October, 1828, they 
authorise the proper authorities by whom the 
question was submitted to them to pay " the 
" reserved sixteenth to the estate of Lieutenant- 
" Colonel Prother and to the other officers com- 

341 [chap. X. 

" mandin (J detachments who were similarly situated." 
No precedent can be imagined stronger or more 
conclusive. The officers claiming the eighth had 
not even the rank of General. The Directors in 
the very documents by which they ratify their 
demand, call tliem " commanders of detachments" 
and yet they grant to them what they refuse to Sir 
Charles Napier. In order to remove all doubt, and 
to show that each commander of a detachment 
received for himself one-eighth of the whole, the 
very words in which the question was submitted to 
the Court of Directors are annexed. " Question 
" submitted as to the appropriation of one-sixteenth 
" of the booty taken by the force under the late 
" Lieutenant-Colonel Prother in 1817-18. That 
" officer having only been paid one-sixteenth under 
" a doubt whether he should receive one-eighth of 
" the whole, the widow of that officer now submits 
" her claim to receive the reserved sum. There 
" were three other detachments to which a similar 
" arrangement applies, commanded respectively 
" by Lieutenant-Colonel Kennedy, Lieutenant- 
" Colonel Imlach, and Captain Morrison." 

In the next case the distribution of the Kittoor 
prize money, 1824. The system of distribution 
adopted was that of the Concan prize money 1821 
(extract Bombay General Order 1821,) and the 
attention of your Lordships is particularly solicited 
to this fact which, if it stood alone, would be con- 
clusive in Sir Charles Napier's favour, viz. tliat 
according to that scale one-eiglith of the whole Avas 
specifically allotted to the Lieutenant-Colonel com- 

In tlie Khelat case »Sir Thomas Wiltsliire (not 
being a general officer) commanded a small force 

CHAP. X.] 342 

on its return from Candahar to the Indus. lie only 
commanded a small detached corps under specific 
orders from superior authority. He was no more a 
Commander-in-Chief than Lord Hill was at Arroys 
INIolinos ; yet as the capture of Khelat was the result 
of this expedition grave doubts existed whether the 
claim preferred by Sir Thomas Wiltshire to one- 
eighth of the spoil was not valid. 

In the distribution of the Bhurtpore prize money, 
one-eighth was allotted to the Commander-in-Chief 
with the deliberate sanction of the Government. It 
should be remarked that on this occasion there 
were several general officers entitled to share 
in the distribution. Finally by an arrangement 
sanctioned by the Court of Directors in their 
dispatch dated 10th April, 1833, one-eighth of the 
whole is allotted to the General Commanding-in- 
Chief, even where there are other general officers 
entitled to share the prize money. 

To recapitulate the argument in favour of Sir 
Charles Napier he is entitled to one-eighth as the 
General Commanding-in-Chief of the Forces in 
Scinde and Beloochistan. He was not like Sir T. 
Wiltshire at Khelat, or General Marshall at 
Hattrass, or Lieutenant-Colonel Prother at Concan, 
the commander of a detached force, but of an Army 
over which he had the sole command, and for the 
operations of which he was alone responsible. No 
Commander-in-Chief of any presidency was ever 
made acquainted with the orders given to Sir Charles 
Napier by the Governor-General, not even the 
Commander-in-Chief in India, Sir Jasper Nicholls, 
when present in the Governor-General's camp. 
The original order dated Bewar, appointing Sir 
Charles Napier to the command in Scinde, would 

343 [cHAr. X. 

have been valid without any subsidiary order from 
the Government of Bombay. This order dated 
Bewar, which the Directors do not quote ! was the 
only source of Sir Charles Napier's authority, — and 
that resolution of the Bombay Government, which 
they do quote, is nothing- to the purpose, and can 
only serve to perplex and to mislead. 

Sir Charles Napier is entitled to an eighth, as 
being the sole general officer entitled to share in 
the prize money. Let it be conceded for the sake 
of argument that Lord Ellenborough's dispatch, 
and all the tests appealed to as proving the com- 
mand of Sir Charles Napier to be distinct and 
independent go for nothing. What is the con- 
sequence \ That the other general officers would 
be entitled to share in the eighth allotted to the 
class, and that Sir Charles Napier would be entitled 
to two-thirds of an eighth. But there being no 
other general officers the question really does not 
arise. Had there been other general officers, the 
question would have arisen whether Sir Charles 
Napier, like the commander at Bhurtpore, and 
according to the undisputed usage of the Indian 
Army, was entitled to one eighth, — and that ques- 
tion it is submitted must have been decided in Sir 
Charles Napier's favour for the reasons stated 

Now, that the class of general officers is entitled 
to one-eighth is unquestionable ; the usage in the 
distribution of prize money in India has generally 
been fluctuating and capricious, but on this point 
it has been uniform. In all the cases examined, 
none in principle is more steadily kept in view or 
more assumed throughout as an axiom not to be 
disputed, than that stated in the Seringapatam 

CHAP. X.] 344: 

dispatch, viz. that the Generals as a class are 
entitled to one-eighth of tlic ])rize money. It has 
indeed sometimes happened that when many 
Generals are employed and the booty is small, such 
a share would be less than that of a Colonel, and 
in such cases an option has been allowed such 
Generals of accepting a certain number of shares — 
1500 for instance, — in lieu of their proportion of 
the eighth. But the rule has never been disputed. 
The circumstance that Sir Charles Napier was the 
sole general officer commanding a force which 
cannot be called (and has not been called by those 
who resist his claim) a detachment, distinguishes 
Sir Charles Napier's case from all those where 
one sixteenth has been allotted to the commanding 
officer. AVithout reiterating the argument it is 
only necessary to refer to the expressions of the 
Court of Directors in the cases of General Harris, 
and of Sir Arthur Wellesley, to show that for the 
opponents of Sir Charles Napier this difficulty is 
insurmountable. If Sir Charles Napier's claim is 
refused a new precedent will be created of which 
throughout all the records of prize transactions in 
India there is not the least example or intima- 

For these reasons it is hoped that your Lord- 
ship's will ratify the claim of Sir Charles Napier to 
one-eighth of the Scinde prize money — a claim in 
exact conformity with established usage, and 
ratified by every principle to which a claimant can 
appeal. For all those reasons of policy and jus- 
tice apply to the present case which have caused 
heretofore that proportion of spoil to which Sir 
Charles Napier now asserts his right to be awarded 
to those who like him were subject to no superior. 

345 [chap. X. 

He, like them, was assisted by no equal on him, as 
on them, the management of a dangerous war 
exchisively devolved. He like them could have 
called upon none to divide the responsibility of 
failure. And he like them as it is trusted your 
Lordships by your decision will establish, in all 
reason entitled to the invariable and hitherto un- 
questioned consequences of success. 

John George Phillimore. 


Having set forth the most prominent evils of 
the raihtary service in India, and the pernicious 
interference of the Civil Government, my design 
was to make this a miscellaneous chapter, but 
severe illness debars execution. My task must ter- 
minate with a short memoir, written some time 
back, to expose the effrontery of the Directors in 
claiming merit for doing what they strenuously 
thwarted and opposed. 

At a commercial assembly in Manchester a letter 
from Sir Henry AVillock, Vice-Chairman of the 
Court of Directors, was read by Mr. Turner ; the 
purport was to proclaim the strong desire of the 
Court to forward British trade wdth Central Asia 
by the Indus, the advantages of Kurrachee, and 
the establishment of fairs in Scinde. The public 
shall now judge what faith can be put in any 
documents, or assertions emanating from Leaden- 
hall Street ; and how entirely baseless are the 
pretensions of the oligarchy there collected to the 
praise of good Government. 


The fairs announced by Sir H. Willcock have 
been established by Mr. Frere, who now governs 

347 [chap. XI. 

Scinde admirably so far as his proceedings are 
known to me ; but a change has come over the 
Indian Government. Sir Henry '\\'illock's letter, 
dated 26th June 1852, says " The Court of 
" Directors have sedidonshj turned their attention 
" to the improvement of British commerce with 
" Central Asia, and have been desirous that 
" the attention of the commercial ivorld should he 
" turned to the advantafjeoiis jiosition of Kurrachee'' 
This he treats as a new and dazzling policy ; but 
though pretended to be so by him and his colleagues, 
it is assuredly an old policy to others, Lord Ellen- 
borough and everyone in Scinde were familiar 
with it ten years ago ! At that time his Lordship 
ordered me to construct a large serai, or depot for 
merchants' goods at Sukkur, and the site w^as 
actually marked out. The pressing events of war 
stopped the immediate building, and when conquest 
enabled us to proceed, Lord Ellenborough had 
been recalled and no money could be got from the 
succeeding Government. 

My efforts were then directed to render Kur- 
rachee the real mouth of the Indus, a matter soon 
brought to a successful issue. For Lieutenant 
Balfour, a clever officer of the Indian Navy, having 
heard from the fishermen, that a navigable tide creek- 
way along the coast communicated with the Indus, 
was directed to explore it with his steamer. The 
thing was so, and that sure communication being 
established has been used ever since. Kurrachec 
thus became the mouth of the Indus, because 
this creek-way is not affected by the annual inun- 
dation of the great river, and is free from the 
influence of raging seas. 

Four of the war steamers under my orders 

CHAP XI.] 348 

were immediately placed at the disposal of tlie 
Kurracliee merchants, and despite of the difhciilty 
of opening a new line of trade ; despite also of 
the unsuitableness of war vessels for the carriage 
of goods ; the merchants found this water com- 
munication to the Indus and so up to Sukkur, 
so much cheaper and more rapid than their old 
land line, that they abandoned Kafilas and poured 
their trade on Kurracliee by water so fast the 
steamers were unequal to the work. 

On my departure Scinde was placed under the 
Bombay Government, at that time the very sink 
of iniquity, and it instantly took the steamers from 
the merchants and abolished all my arrangements 
for establishing and nourishing trade with Central 
Asia and the Punjaub by the Indus ! This line, 
pointed out by nature, was the best, the quickest, 
the safest, the cheapest ; but as I had previously 
warred down the robber tribes of the Cutchee 
Hills, who infested all the country between the 
Bolan Pass and the Indus, the land trade by 
Kafilas had also become secure — cheaper likewise 
than before, because those tribes previous to my 
war on them always levied black mail, besides 
occasional wholesale robbery of the Kafilas 
going from the Bolan to Sukkur, Shikarpore and 

I do not altogether fasten on the Court of 
Directors this atrocious attempt to crush the 
incipient commerce by Kurracliee up the Indus 
to Mittenkote, from thence to strike off by the 
Punjaub East, West and North. It was the then 
Government of Bombay which did that ill turn 
to the commercial public — and from personal hos- 
tility to me. Falsely it represented to the world 

349 [chap. XI. 

tlio state of Scinde, and suppressed all information 
of tlie vast capabilities of that great and interesting 
country ; but now Manchester pressure has 
extorted from the Directors a common-sense view, 
and acknowledgment of the immense opening for 
commercial enterprize by Kurrachcc, to which I 
vainly strove to draw Government attention when 
Scinde was under my rule. 

Foreseeing clearly that Kurrachee must in time 
become a great emporium, I early connncnccd the 
construction of a quay of very considerable dimen- 
sions, necessary for the commerce of the port, and it 
was very much advanced at my departure ; but that 
also the Bombay Government stopped when I was 
gone, and it remained untouched from 1847 until 
1852 when IMr. Frere with a proper spirit com- 
pleted it. He was however supported by Lord 
Falkland, the actual governor of Bombay, whose 
council had then been purged of Reid, Willoughby, 
and Crawfurd, persons who have unceasingly 
endeavoured with laboured secret falsehoods, private 
and official, to defame me, and crush Mr. Pringle 
my first successor : had they remained Mr. Frere, 
being an honourable man, would also have been 

With these remembrances it is a subject for 
rejoicing, that the Court of Directors have been con- 
strained to admit the value of Scinde as an acqui- 
sition, and to acknowledge its vast productive 
powers for cotton, indigo, sugar and grain — in fine 
for all that a fine climate, fine soil and period- 
ical inundation can nourish ; immense riches 
are there, and a fine race of men to work them 

CHAT. XI.] 350 

What commercial men should urge on the 
Directors shall be here enumerated. 

1st. The employment of an engineer to cut the 
bar at the entrance of Kurrachee Harbour. It is not 
alluvial, it is decayed stone, easily pulverised, 
and the water will aid the Avork, washing away the 
loosened rock. 

2nd. The application of science to deepen and 
clear the harbour, 

3rd. To lay pipes from the Mullaree River to 
Kurrachee. The surveys levels and estimates were 
all taken by me, are complete for application, and 
the cost only £.12,000, according to the estimate of 
the military engineer Lieutenant Colonel Scott. 
From a reservoir thus formed at Kurrachee the 
pipes should be continued along the quay or bund 
to Kemaree Point, for supplying the shipping with 

4th. Construct another quay at the mouth of the 
tide creek of Ghisree. 

5th. A railway from Kurrachee to Ghisree — 
three miles. 

6th. Trace a new town to extend from Kemaree 
point towards Clifton. 

7th. To fortify Kurrachee in the mode submitted 
by me, and approved of by the Supreme Govern- 
ment in India. My plans and estimates are in the 
hands of the Directors ; they are not extensive, and 
the day may come when they will be wanted ; but 
they should be executed at once in a country always 
liable to wars. 

8th. Make a road from Sukkur to Shikarpore for 
which I gave plans and an estimate. 

9th. Send steamers to the Indus suited to its 

351 [chap. XI. 

stream. Captain Powell of the Indian Navy is con- 
versant with the navigation of that river, and can 
give the proper build. 

There are other things to be done, but those 
mentioned will put commerce in full action on the 
Indus and the rivers of the Punjaub. They 
would all have been done by me but for the inter- 
ference of superior power; for the Court of Directors 
had not then " sedulously turned their atten- 
" tion to the improvement of British commerce 
" with Central Asia." On the contrary, that 
Court sedulously opposed all improvements when 
pressed by me. I urged, but the Directors dis- 
regarded and suppressed " the advantages of the 
" position of Kurrachee, as convenient for the 
" introduction of British manufactures to the vast 
" extent of countries immediately AVest and North- 
" AVest of that province." And now Sir Henry 
Willock, their vice-chairman, is not ashamed to 
claim the merit of such conception for the men 
who stifled its realization when mine ! But his 
letter shows that the Court is not yet aware of 
the full extent and value of the opening through 
Scinde for British manufactures. He forgets the 
North-East ! Forgets that four great navigable 
rivers flow through the North-East countries — all 
rich and beckoning to Manchester ! Forgets also, or 
likely never knew, that in the North also there runs 
from East to West, the great lino of traffic between 
China and llussia, by which liussian goods are 
sold in the upper part of India cheaper than 
English goods ! 

That line passes through IjcU or Ladak in 
Thibet, which by the map is oidy two hundred 
and fifty miles north of Simla ; the Chcnaub river, 

CHAP. XI.] 352 

a tributary of the Indus, flows Avithin a hundred 
miles of Ladak, and it may be assumed that Cash- 
mere will, ere long, become a British province, 
because justice and policy unite to dictate the 
wrestling of that miserable country from the 
horrible tyranny of the infernal monster Goolab 
Sing. AVhen that is done the Chinese trade, 
now passing through Ladak will descend on 
India, followingthe courses of the five rivers; for the 
devil's in the dice if England, with water carriage 
the whole way from Liverpool to within one 
hundred miles of Ladak, cannot win the Chinese 
trade from Russia ! 

Ladak is assuredly, the Eastern field of battle 
for a commercial contest with Russia. To use 
military terms, England's line of operations, having 
India for a base, is short easy and safe ; that of 
Russia long, difficult and insecure. Our line will 
pass altogether through our own territories, while 
that of Russia runs through barbarous nations 
altogether beyond her control. English goods 
will indeed reach Ladak, charged with a portion of 
the national debt ; but Russian goods will go there 
charged with the black mail levied by w ild robber 
tribes at every step — impositions which would 
destroy the trade altogether if the caravans did 
not themselves pillage. Of this I have been 
assured by men who have a full knowledge of the 
subject, having travelled with the Kafilas and 
caravans. But whether we win this Chinese trade 
by forethought and enterprise, or lose it by 
supineness and mis-government of India, — the case 
of Mr. Aratoon, who was unceremoniously and un- 
fairly stopped short in a great commercial enter- 
prise along the Punjaub rivers by Lord Dalhousie, 

353 [chap. xr. 

is a sample of the latter — it is clear that the trade 
from the North-East, will in time be immense, if 
India continues a British possession: much greater 
than that from the countries mentioned by Sir 
Henry Willock. Why he omitted to notice this 
trade is strange, probably he knew nothing of it, 
and his letter was merely to assuage Manchester 
hostility on the Indian bill. 

He must now be told that the North-Western 
nations of Asia have a shorter line for mercantile 
operations with Europe by the Oxus, which will 
therefore beat the Indus, and leave us only the 
North Eastern trade of which he takes no notice ! 
From the North-western countries, Persia and 
Russia, with their great inland waters, will carry 
off the trade. When I was at Peshawur llussian 
goods of aU kinds, sugar, tea, &c. were to be had 
cheaper than English goods, though that place is 
only two marches west of the Indus ; but the 
llussian Emperor takes more pains than the Court 
of Directors to assist commerce, and his line is 
shorter. Sir Henry ^-N'illock, while making great 
display of his commercial acumen, has overlooked 
altogether the most important source for trade 
viz. the territory North-East of Scinde although 
under the rule of himself and his coUcaguos ! 

That territory must be the most important com- 
mercial quarter, because trade will not go round 
about when it can go straight forward. The 
Calcutta interest may writhe and twist at the 
growing importance of Bombay and Ivurrachee, 
but the whole commerce of the countries North- 
East of Scinde will finally descend on Kurrachee ; 
and the march of Alexander the Great from the 
Beas to the ocean, with the voyage of Nearclius, 

A A 

CHAP. XI.] 354 

marks the coming line of European trade Avith 
India: the time is not distant when it will be 
adopted. The commercial glory of Calcutta is 
departing: the Indus, the Jhelum, the Chenaub, 
the Ravee, the Sutledge, the Nerbudda — and rail- 
roads, will unite to give the ascendancy to Bombay 
and Kurrachee. 

Foreseeing while stiU Governor of Scinde what 
was to come, I urged the purchase of Soonomeeanee, 
the only port besides Kurrachee on the Scindian 
Sea frontier. The Jam of Bella was willing to sell 
it for a very small sura, and the bargain would have 
been struck had I remained; since then it has 
dropped, but it ought to be completed and quickly ; 
for though the security of Scinde under my rule 
had such attraction that the trade of Soonomeeanee 
was drawn off to Kurrachee, the former is the 
better harbour, and there will be trade enough for 

Those who desire to have the immense opening 
for our manufactures presented by Scinde, must 
urge on the Court of Directors the works mentioned ; 
and press on the Queen's Government the reform 
of the India charter, recommended by Lord Ellen- 
borough, who alone really understands the subject 
in all its bearings — political, military, and com- 
mercial. If England chooses to lose his services 
and have an enormous empire dead for commerce, 
— alive only for the profit of Lord Welleslcy's 
twenty-four ignominious tyrants — be it so. But if 
Parliament does its duty, free from private influence, 
it will accept the good counsels of a man so 
thoroughly versed in all that concerns India. 

It is now only necessary to add, for the entire 
breaking down of Sir Henry Willock's communi- 

855 [chap. XI. 

cation, that under my orders and sanction General 
Hunter of the Company's Service did estabUsh a 
horse fair at Kukkur, which was to have been 
enlarged for general commerce, but the Indian 
Government immediately abolished it; though 
through that fair he had purchased some hund- 
reds of horses for the Bengal Army which were 
found to surpass all others: and he could have 
supplied the armies of three presidencies with animals 
of a superior description, at half the price now paid 
for an inferior supply ! 

This exposition of the Director's " sedulous 
" attcntioti" is recommended to commercial men — 
my work is terminated. Discursive it has been, 
because the object was to lay bare many intricate 
evils, each of which demanded especial notice ; but 
the reforms proposed are founded, not on theories but 
experience — upon successful practice in war and 
Government. Of personal griefs so much only 
have been told as comported with a clear display 
of facts due to the people of England, who called 
me to command tlie Armies of India at a danger- 
ous crisis. For no light matter was a command 
so bestowed, relinquished. Had the matter 
between Lord Dalhousie and myself been of a 
private nature, it would have been left to struggle 
as it could to liglit from under my contempt ; but 
it is essentially of public interest, and not peculiarly 
affecting me. I am the ninth or tenth Commander- 
in-Chief who, in a short period, has been driven to 
resign by the inter-meddling of overbearing and 
not over- wise Governors-General ; and the well- 
being of our Indian Empire demands, that so great 
an office should not be rendered despicable, by an 
interference commonly conducive to mischief, 

ciiAr. XI.} 356 

always degrading to the general, weak enough to 

Nevertheless a wronged man I have been — more 
wronged than this work tells of, for ever the public 
good has guided mc in suffering as in action ; but 
when falsehood is in vigorous activity, with encou- 
ragement and support from power ; when even 
from the judgment seat insolence and oppression 
are dealt forth ; the dignity of human nature gives 
a right, without imputation of vanity, to avow good 
services. To me also as an inspired truth has come 
that passionate burst of eloquence with which 
Charles Fox repelled foul enmity. " There is a 
" sjnrit of resistance imi^lantcd h\) the Deity 
" in the breast of man 2^roportioned to the size of the 
" wrongs he is destined to endure.'' That spirit 
prompts me to vindicate a claim to better usage. 
I have won victories, subdued a great kingdom by 
arms and legislation, governing so as to enable a 
million of human beings to enjoy life and lift 
their heads in freedom. I have opened a vast field 
for commercial enterprise by the Indus, augmented 
the revenue of tlie Indian Government by millions ; 
and in a moment of imminent peril saved the Anglo- 
Indian Empire from mutiny more formidable than 
ever before menaced its stability. The return has 
been, twice to drive me from higli and honourable 
positions, and all but proclaim me a public enemy. 
In Parliament vilified by men without truth or 
honour; out of it libelled, and from the Bench 
Avith vulgar insult refused protection against 
slander, I leave my actions to history. 



History is not asleep, she will vindicate the 
wronged man's fame. The solemn multitude 
attendant around his grave was her first record, 
and already she speaks in the following letter, 
through her servants — the highest and the lowest — 
the Governor-General who commanded and the poor 
soldier who served. It was thus he linked together 
the ends of society. 

Letter from The Earl of Ellenhoroiigh. 

Sei)t. Wth, 1853. " It certainly was very satis- 
" factory to see in the spontaneous and general 
" movements of the troops, the constituted autho- 
" rities and the people, an unequivocal proof that 
" justice was done to the great military and civil 
" services of your brother, and to that thorougli 
" honesty of purpose and self-devotion whicli dis- 
" tinguished his character. Yet still hardly any 
" one knows the full extent of the service he ren- 
" dered in conquering Scinde. 

" Few are capable of appreciating the military 
" advantages of our occupation of that province, 
" and many have been deceived by the disingenuous 
" misrepresentations of its financial results. In 
'• point of fact it is the only acquisition since that 


" of the Dewaniiy in 1765, which has been largely 
" beneficial to the revenue. 

" It gave us the monopoly of the supply of 
" opium to China, and its financial advantages may 
" be almost measured by the enormous increase in 
" the revenue from opium since 1843. The 
" increase of the revenue from opium passes 
" (which is carried to the account not of Scinde 
" but of the Bombay presidency) is a direct and 
" admitted consequence of the closing of the routes 
" by W'hich Malwa opium was taken to Diu and 
" Demaun, and I think this alone amounted — in the 
" last year of which the amount was furnished, to 
" the committee — to £.588,723, but the price of 
" the Bengal opium has also been raised by so 
" taxing that which competed with it. 

" In an account furnished by the Court of 
" Directors, they disingenuously inserted 32 lacs of 
" military expenditure under the head of ' civil 
" ' charges of Scinde,' but after defraying these 
" military charges the net surplus derived from the 
" conquest (taking credit from the improved receipts 
" from opium) is above £.500,000 a year. 

" The annexation of the Punjaub does not 
" present a financial result by any means so 
" favoiu-able. In fact, if the military expenditure 
" incurred within the Punjaub w^ere charged to its 
" account, there would of course be a large deficit; 
" this however would be as unjust towards the 
" Punjaub as a similar line of conduct is towards 
" Scinde ; if the civil expenditure alone be charged 
" to the Punjaub, there is a net surplus of revenue, 
" but it is very inferior indeed to that derived from 
" Scinde. 

" In imposing a treaty upon the Ameers your 


" brother only executed his instructions — in de- 
"• posing the Ameers after their treachery at 
" Meeanee, he still only executed his instructions. 
" The whole merit of the military operations and 
" of the subsequent civil administration is his own. 
" If demerit there be in any measure with regard 
" to Scinde, I alone am responsible. I am not 
" very uneasy under the weight of that responsi- 
" bility, but such as it is, it is fit that I should 
" bear it. 

'■ I can hardly yet realize my position, deprived 
" as I now am of the inestimable advantage 
" of recurring on all military questions to your 
" brother for his opinion, which he so kindly 
" on all occasions gave to me — No man ever had 
" a more faithful or a more able adviser, and I 
" cannot but feel that without him I can never 
" speak with authority, although I may with con- 
" viction upon any matter relating to war. 

" If your brother had any weakness it was that 
" of entertaining too great a partiality for me. I 
" was sensible of this and laboured to correct and 
" control my judgment of all I said and did, so as 
" to bring it nearer to the truth than entire reliance 
" upon his too indulgent opinion would have 
" allowed it to be. 

" The greatest advantage I have had through 
" life has been that of always living with the fore- 
" most men of the time — I am now compelled to 
" endeavour still to retain some portion of that 
'• advantage by considering what their opinion 
" would have been on the new questions wliich 
" may arise — and to no one will my mind more 
" frequently recur than to your brother, my last, 
" my best and my most devoted friend. 

" Ellenborougu." 


" BalUnafvuih, Belfast 15th September 1853. 
" Sir, — With feelings of deep regret I learnt from 
" the pubHc papers the decease of our dear General 
" on the tjJDth ultimo. I humbly beg leave Sir, 
" }ou will be kindly pleased to accept my humble 
" condolence on the sad bereavement it has pleased 
" Almighty God to inflict on his illustrious family 
" particularly, and on the British nation generally. 
" I cannot Sir withhold my humble sentiments of 
'• devoted affection for the renowned chief who led 
" me to battle and to victory on the hard fought 
" fields of Meeanee and Hyderabad ; and not only 
" so, but who subsequently, on being discharged 
" from the 22nd regiment on a pension of one- 
" shilling per diem (labouring under general para- 
" lysis and debility) made application to the 
" Chelsea Board in my favour and procured me an 
" increase of sixpence per diem. Sir, I mention 
" these circumstances; the former you are well 
" acquainted with, the latter impresses on me a 
" sense of gratitude which time can never efface. 
" I assure you Sir, it afforded me no small degree 
" of satisfaction to learn that you were present 
" when the spirit of the mighty dead took its de- 
" ])arture from this vale of tears, to (I fervently 
" hope and trust) the regions of eternal bliss. I 
" humbly trust, Sir, you will be kindly pleased to 
" excuse my troubling you with a correspondence, 
" all I can offer as a palliation is, my devoted 
" affection for and heartfelt gratitude to the 
" memory of our dear dear General Sir Charles. 
" I remain Sir &c. John A. Casey, 

" Late colour-sergeant 22nd Foot. 

" To Major McMurdo. 

Let the following testimony to excellence of 
another kind be added. 


E.vtract of a letter from the Reverend Edward 

" Eton College, September \Sth 1853. — Some 
" time in 1843 or 1844 Sir Robert Peel said to 
" mc, 'You are acquainted I think with the Napier 
" family r Yes! in some degree with three mem- 
" bcrs of it. ' To wliich of them do you award the 
"palm in literature'?' Expressing surprise I 
" answered that I had never regarded Sir C. Napier 
" as a writer, but as the most heroic and generous 
" of soldiers. — 'Well,' he said, ' I can assure you 
" that I am much inclined to rank him above his 
" brother. Not I only, but all those of the Go- 
" vernment who have read his letters and dispatches 
" from Scinde are immensely struck by their mas- 
" terly clearness of mind and vigour of expression; 
" and feel with me, that he is as great with his pen 
" as he has long proved himself with his sword. 
" I have no hesitation in placing them in com- 
" parison with the Gurwood dispatches, or, with 
" the best tilings of the kind which have ever been 
" written.' Edward Coleridge." 

Sir Ivobert Peel's judgment was just ; it Avill be so 
found, if the dispatches and letters spoken of ever 
see the light. Yet Sir Robert, speaking thus of 
his literary talent, and equally forcibly of his 
administrative and legislative powers, as may be 
seen in the "History of the Administration of 
" Scinde," Sir Robert, who in Parliament and in 
private society expressed unbounded admiration of 
Sir Cliarles Napier's exploits ; he who, even before 
the command of the Indian Armies was bestowed, 
at an honorary banquet told him in presence of a 
great company, English and foreign, tluit his services 
had not been adeipuitely honoured, was Minister 


when the Tower guns were silent on his victories, 
when the thanks of Parliament were kept back for 
a year, and those honours, privately admitted to be 
nobly won, were altogether withheld ! 

The Directors' Parliamentary interest was strong, 
and other Ministers gladly followed in debarring 
the rewards, without the grace of admitting the 
claim. But the object of their neglect, like Wolfe 
and Moore, knew how to make his name glorious 
without a title — Charles James Napier engraved on 
his tombstone shall say to inquirers — read history ! 
Living, his spirit yearned only for the grateful 
praise of his countrymen — and living and dead he 
received it — in that happier than Scipio ! 

It is however strange that Sir Robert Peel, who 
is said to have evinced when dying a like sense of 
native dignity, should not have repelled such 
icfnoble influence in defence of a <^reat man. 

Justificatory and Supporting Documents. 

No. 1. 

Memoir on the Defence of India, and the Military 

Occupation of the Punjaub*. 

The Punjaub question involves in some measure 
that of whether the Indian army shall be increased 
or not. That must be determined by the political 
state of India with regard to surrounding countries, 
and by the internal duties which the troops are 
and may be called upon to perform. This is the 
broad statement of the case, embracing not merely 
the Punjaub but all India. It is a wide question, 
calling for immediate and vigorous decision, or great 
inconvenience may befall the Indian government. 

•i'- Some necessary verltal rorrcrtions have been made in this 
memoir, but in no manner affecting either the tone or matter. 


Let me begin with an outline of the poHtical 
state of India, taking only a general view, for to 
enter into details would require volumes. 

State of India. 

The political state as regards foreign powers is 
this: — In the South is the large kingdom of the 
Nizam, whose capital is Hydrabad of the Deccan, 
where a sovereign with twelve millions of subjects 
has his government in confusion ; but writing for 
one whose position gives him full knowledge of 
this matter, it is only necessary to call attention to 
the dangerous aspect of this state, sufficiently 
powerful to wage a very mischievous war against 
us. To the South and Westward this power links 
on as it were to the Southern Mahratta States, 
which, in 1845, singly made war upon us for 
many months, though we had ten thousand men in 
the field, and among them five or six European 
regiments ; and they will again do so when oppor- 
tunity offers — other tribes there also hate us. 

North Eastward of the Nizam's country lies a 
wild tract, held by lawless barbarians bearing 
various names — Goomspor, Coles, &c. Some of 
these are, even now, in a state of hostility with the 
Madras presidency. All south of the Nerbudda 
river is therefore unsettled, unsafe, and ready to 
rise against the British rule ; and, in addition, those 
two great presidencies do not cover their own 
expenses, though if properly ruled they would 
yield a large revenue to the Company. No state of 
things more unsettled or more dangerous than this 
can be conceived, and these two mismanaged 
presidencies amount to somewhere about one half 
of our eastern possessions, including Scinde, which 


is unwisely attached to the Bombay government. 
However, as these two presidencies have eacli an 
army of its own over which I liave no other control 
than the command when in the field, no more 
need be said about tliem, and the subject has been 
touched merely to show that in case of distress 
Bengal cannot expect much support from that 
quarter. The whole country lying to the South of 
Nerbudda river is unsafe, and that to the North 
very little better, if at all ! 

Now take a view of our Eastern frontier. There 
we have the Barrampootra river, which descends 
from the Hymalaya mountains to join the Ganges 
near its mouth. The Barrampootra curves towards 
the west, and our territories, which lie on its left 
bank, are shaped thereby like a crescent moon, one 
of the horns of which is formed by Assam, and the 
other by Arracan. I have no local knowledge of 
these parts, but this strip of territory lies along 
the powerful and unfriendly kingdom of Ava, and 
a war with that strong kingdom would expose our 
whole Eastern frontier to attack ; the distant posts 
in Assam would also be in peril. The close frontier 
of Burma enables that power to press suddenly and 
dangerously upon the capital of our Indian Empire, 
and such events are no castles in the air, but 
threatening real perils : the Eastern frontier, 
therefore is not safe. 

Come now to the North. The kingdom of 
Nepaul, hostile and ready to strike, runs along and 
forms our Northern frontier for five hundred miles, 
and is most dangerously placed upon our line of 
communication between Calcutta and tlie North 
West provinces. It can bring about three hundred 
pieces of cannon and one hundred thousand fighting 


men into the field. Should danger arise in the North 
West provinces, and they are all hostile to us ; or, 
should we have war with Ava, or with any Indian 
power, Nepaul is upon our rear ! Does any man, 
knowing India, doubt that, if a reverse had befallen 
us on the Sutledge Nepaul was ready to attack our 
rear ? Does any man doubt, that all the good 
people in and around Patna would not have joined 
them % The war would have run South like wild 
fire and all those tribes would be in arms. These 
are serious matters, claiming timely consideration ; 
for were danger to gather it would find our troops 
widely scattered from the Indus to the Barram- 
pootra, a distance, which it would take troops six 
months* to march over ! and for five months in 
each year the European portion of our army cannot 
march at all ! Such things render war ruinous, 
and victory doubtful. 

The North West must now be considered, that is to 
say, the country between the Jumna and Sutledge, 
the Punjaub and Scinde, and tlie line of the lower 
Indus. Their state demands much attention. But 
while discussing these North AVestcrn Provinces, 
we must not forget that the South, East, and 
North are teeming with dangers ; each has fought 
us singly and handled us rudely ; what coidd they 
not do if combined \ That they have not yet 
combined is almost miraculous, and gives no 
security for the future. 

The Punjaub has been t\vice occupied, but it is 
not conquered. We now hold it M'ith fifty-four 

* As there is uow u teiidoncy to construct railways in India, it 
is satisfactory to observe that the structure of the country is 
calculated to combine the various important requiix'mcnts of 
tralhc, political objects and niililary defence, if the right course 
be pursued. 


thousand fighting men*, and it is very dangerous 
ground. Scindc has liitlicrto been safe under the 
system established by Lord Ellenborough ; but 
that has been changed, and should risings take 
place in Scinde simultaneously with the Punjaub, 
the Bolan Pass will be open to invasion from 
AfFghanistan in concert with an inroad through 
the Khyber. Multitudes would pour through the 
Bolan, and be joined by all the tribes to the East 
of that Pass, rising in thousands among the 
surrounding hills, and rushing down upon Scinde, 
which could not then march a man to the aid of 
the Punjaub as it did in 1846 and 1849. 

Under the Bombay Government Scinde is not 
likely to be safe as it has been hitherto. The 
government being changed, results wdll probably 
change also, and a civil form of government is 
uncongenial to barbarous Eastern nations. There 
is no probability of the Punjaub becoming safe. 
Both it and Scinde are now governed by a system 
unsuited to the people. It is the same system 
which has for a hundred years prevailed in India 
w^ithout making it tranquil or prosperous. India 
has only prospered by conquest, and these conquests 
are most assuredly not due to the system of its 
government, but to the courage of the troops. 
The present system in the Punjaub will produce 
among the people neither peace nor attachment to 
our rule : no barbarous people will endure a civil 

Under Lord Ellenborough Scinde was conquered, 
and he established a cheap military government 
which lasted five years, and has continued so under 

• Since this was written, eighteen thousand irregulars have 
been added, making seventy-two thousand fighting men. 


nearly the same system up to the present moment 
in perfect tranquilhty. 

Under the government of Lord Ilardinge the 
Punjaub practically fell into our hands. His sys- 
tem, diametrically opposed to that of Lord Ellen- 
borough's, made civil government, not military, 
the rule, and it produced another war. How- 
ever the Punjaub was again subjected by our 
courageous armies, and there was a choice between 
Lord EUenborough's and Lord Hardinge's sytems 
— that is between military and civil — and Lord 
Hardinge's civil government was adopted "with one 
difference — he subsidized., liOrd Dalhousie annexed. 
The two first-named Governors-General acted from 
their own opinions, the third was controlled. My 
decided opinion is that Lord EUenborough's system 
was right, and events bear that view out; but 
the object is only to show that facts lead me to 
believe the present system of government will 
break down. 

Possibly, there may not be another war in the 
Punjaub, but the country will be unsettled, 
dangerous, and a vast weight on the finances of 
India, which they cannot bear; for we must 
maintain a large army in the Punjaub, and com- 
pared with Lord EUenborough's, an exorbitantly 
paid civil establishment, where a small military 
force and an economical civil establishment ought 
to suffice. After governing Scinde four years, I 
offered to hold it with three thousand men and tlie 
police. All beyond that number were maintained, 
not by me but the General Government in 
expectation of a war in the Punjaub ; and were 
the Punjaub governed in a similar manner thirty 
thousand would be now sufficient for its occupa- 


tion, and in two years half that number would 
suffice. It is impossible to form opinions on the 
force required to control any country without a 
full consideration of the mode in which it is 
governed, that is tlie foundation of everything! 
Taking, therefore, all these matters into considera- 
tion, giving each its just weight, and having some 
experience of the people and country, my opinion 
is, that after victories, which ought to have decided 
everything, the North West is not more safe than 
the South, the East, and the North. 

Having now noticed all our frontiers, it must be 
acknowledged that there is a belt of powerful ea:- 
ternal enemies around India, and plenty of internal 
foes besides. That is to say, every native prince or 
chief within or without our frontier — there is not 
a single exception — our colour, our religion, our 
deeds, our words, our thoughts, our manners, are 
all odious to them ! There is nothing unreason- 
able, nothing unnatural in this, but Ave should look 
at it as dangerous, and examine the strength of 
each enemy separately ; and as the Punjaub, so 
recently annexed, may at this moment be considered 
the most dangerous, let us begin by investigating 
the state of that province. 

The defence of India is confided to four dis- 
tinct armies, viz., Queen's, Bengal, Madras, and 
Bombay, consisting collectively of about three 
hundred thousand fighting men, and four hundred 
pieces of artillery ready for war, without including 
guns of position, or mounted on forts and lying in 
our arsenals. This is a vast army, and in good 
discipline, complete in its equipments, full of 
courage, with a liigh military spirit running through 
all ranks. It is also necessary to say that this force 


could bo (lonblcd without any injurious pressure on 
the population ; every part of India would furnish 
recruits in abundance for our popular service, and 
as troops they are proverbially fiiithful. There are 
things which admit of correction, and may be put 
right when the Commander-in-Chief's office is placed 
on a proper footing, not till then. But that matter 
shall be treated of in another letter : here it must ■ 
suffice to give a decided opinion that this magni- 
ficent army is sufficient to guard India at present, 
and the annexation of the Punjaub does not, or at 
least need not, impose the raising of one additional 

This country presents an equilateral triangle, 
of which each side is about four hundred miles. 
The north side, or base, is bounded by the southern 
ranges of the Ilymalaya mountain ; the western 
side by the Indus ; the southern side by the Sut- 
ledge and Beas Hi vers. These great rivers join at 
Mittun Kote, which forms the apex of the triangle. 
The northern part is mountainous ; the centre and 
southern portions are flat, and traversed by many 
rivers, large and small, but all united at INIittun 
Kote. This description, sufficient for the present 
purposa, gives about eighty thousand square miles 
of territory to defend ; territory filled with ri\'ers, 
deserts, mountains, marshes, jungles, and all the 
adjuncts for a Vendeean warfare, should the Sikhs 
rebel : and that their courage has been no way 
abated by the last struggle is confidently asserted. 

The number of Sikhs lately in arms, and now in 
the Punjaub, is estimated at one hundred thousand 
fighting men, and they are not likely to " turn 
their swords into ]>loughsliares." But they laid 


down their arms ! Yes ; u portion did ; that sig- 
nifies nothinjj^ ; hravo men soon find arms, and there 
are arms to be liad. But their eannons were 
all taken ! So it was confidently said, but they 
neither were then^ nor are they now taken ! The 
credulity which believes that they were, will 
believe anything. However, my calculations arc 
founded on their not only having arms, but that 
they are casting guns daily in the jungles. A 
Sikh foiindnj is not like our founderies. A dozen 
men make holes in the earth, melt the metal, cast 
the gun in sand, and our people know it not! 
How can they 1 Can they watch eighty thousand 
square miles \ It is not done, and it cannot be 
done. The Sikhs may want money, but the Irish, 
in 1798, made a fierce war without money; the 
Vendeeans had no money ; the Greeks had no 
money ; and, doubtless, the Sikhs can do without 
money : moreover, Goolab Sing may join them 
and he has money. The Sikhs have means and 
some day they may unexpectedly use them ; and we 
must take possibilities into our consideration, 
leeiving nothing to chance wdiicli can be provided 
against by foresight. 

This is not all we have to look to in the Punjaub. 
Goolab Sing will probably be faitliful to, us, he 
knows our power ; yet he has also seen our weak- 
ness in the two wars of the Punjaub ; and no man 
in his senses will deny that India was in great 
danger from both, or that the country was scarcely 
saved by the victories of Sobraon and Goojerat. A 
third war may be more ably and more violently con- 
tested : for a third we must therefore be prepared. 

Two cases may arise. Goolab may be irritated, 
or he may die ; in either case we shall have war 


with the Punjaub ; for it is supposed certain that 
his son and nephew will draw the sword. Their 
abilities are unknown, but Goolab Sing has great 
capacity, four hundred pieces of artillery and an 
army ; all the Sikhs will rally round him and give 
the power of doubling that army with extraor- 
dinary rapidity ; and, as to treasures, he has been 
accumulating money all his life most avariciously, 
and fame says by means most unscrupulous. There 
is therefore no sound reason to doubt his ability to 
maintain a numerous army for two years. His 
country is perhaps the strongest in the world for 
defence ; he can ensconce himself in snow for half 
the year ; he has forts of various strength, quanti- 
ties of small arms, and in the depths of his jungles 
and snows can conceal his preparations. To quell 
such an enemy will not be easy, especially if his 
intriguing genius persuades the Nepaulese to war at 
the same time. This combination is the greatest 
external danger we have to apprehend ; and if it 
comes the Indian army will need all the courage 
of the troops, and all the skill of their leaders. 

This view of the subject must guide us as to the 
disposition of the troops, so as to war with fair 
prospects of success against those two dangerous 
powers. And for that, and indeed every purpose, 
Delhi is the proper place for our great arsenal and 
place of arms. It lies in a central position to sup- 
ply troops and reinforcements, and is at hand either 
for Nepaul or the Punjaub. The head quarters 
of the Artillery should be at iJelhi or Meerut. 

Mussoorie, Landour, Bareilly, and Almorah, 
should be made strong, I have much to learn 
about these places, and mean to acquire informa- 
tion ; at present, it is only necessary to say they 


appear important points as to an attack from 
Nepaul ; for if such be threatened from the western 
frontier- of that long kingdom, the troops at these 
stations could be instantly supported from Delhi, 
Meerut, Umballah, and Simla ; and if the Nepaulese 
moved out from their capital against Dinapore, 
from these stations, we could at once penetrate 
in their rear, and oblige them to retrace their steps 
in defence of their own country. 

Dinapore should be at all times strongly occu- 
pied by a powerful garrison and have a fortified 
magazine, so as to be ready to meet an inroad from 
Katmandoo or to attack that capital, from which it 
is about twenty marches ; that is, nine to Segowlie 
which sliould always have a strong body of cavalry, 
and eleven more to Katmandoo. Segowlie should 
have a cavalry force, because it is generally sup- 
posed the Nepaulese dread that arm, and the country 
around furnishes plenty of forage. But it ought 
to be so strongly occupied by troops, whether of 
cavalry or infantry, and even protected by works, 
as to maintain itself till succour arrived from Dina- 
pore. Dinapore itself is one of the most im- 
portant places in India for a grand magazine. For 
on the north it holds Nepaul in check, and will 
support a force acting against Katmandoo ; and on 
the west it is well placed to forward stores by water 
to Allahabad and Delhi. In tlie event of reverses, 
it will supply the Bengal army Avhen defending 
the line of the Soane River, in combination with 
the armies of Madras and Bombay which would 
co-operate along the Nerbudda River. Each Army 
would thus cover its own presidency and yet be in 
communication with the other ; and the whole in 
case of need be able to unite in one mass. This 


outline must suffice at present for tliose important 
districts, in whicli. however, the nnnibor of stations 
may be diminished, so as to concentrate tlie troops 
on strong points in case of coming wars. 

The great principle as regards the forces of 
India is this : have a large, well-organized police, 
to do all those duties for the civil branches of the 
Government which require armed men ; such as 
occasional guards for civil servants, escorts of 
treasure, putting down robbers, arresting men for 
the civil powers ; in short, a constabulary force, 
leaving the military to their own duties: this was 
Lord Ellenborough's design, and he partly executed 
it. On tliis plan the troops would be concentrated 
in large bodies to bear upon any enemy, whether 
foreign or domestic. I will return to the subject 

With regard to the Punjaub, it is my business 
to consider the feelings and habits of the various 
tribes we may have to deal with. In the Jullunder 
the people of the plains, south, are quiet and agri- 
cultural ; while those to the north, among the hills, 
are warlike dissatisfied Sikh soldiers ; food and 
money are very scarce but swords are plentiful ; 
and they are ready for any outbreak — war is their 
vocation ! Many reports received agree in this, 
and these turbulent tribes are close on Goolab 
Sing's frontier ! 

As to that able upstart, — whose progress has 
been from Catamite to Cabinet Minister, and, 
finally to a throne, — all is, and must be, conjec- 
ture. Pie has his choice of peace or war, which 
he will decide upon no man can tell ; but he has 
made his peace with the Siklis, and though he 
does not now enrol these discont(nited soldiers lie 
is able to do so when it pleases him. His great 


power and doubtful designs have a strong moral 
influence over the JuUunder, and from that district 
his dominion trends in a north-western direction 
towards Attok on tlie Indus, where he links on to 
tlie Ilazara country and to the Peshawur district, 
which is ever troubled by the Aftghans. These, 
and the tribes of the Khyber Pass, with their habits, 
are well known ; and if commotions happen in the 
Punjaub tlie Peshawur country will probably at 
once become the seat of warfare. 

South of Peshawur is the Kohat country, with 
all the wild tribes of Bunnoo and of the Salt 
range. The men of Bunnoo are unruly and 
warlike ; and we may consider the JuUunder 
Doab and the Peshawur districts as the two most 
dangerous points within our newly acquired frontier. 
First of the JuUunder Doab, by far the most 
important of the two, for the loss of Peshawur 
would be trifling ; it is a mere out-post guarding 
the Khyber Pass, — an advance guard waiting for 
the day, and come it w'ill, wdien with all our 
" moderation'' we shall conquer Affghanistan and 
occupy Candahar. But to lose the JuUunder 
would cut our line of communication, and jjlace 
an enemy between the Punjaub and our Indian 
provinces. In this general view must be noticed a 
tract of very high importance, viz., that contained 
between the Upper Indus and the Upper Ganges, 
embracing a portion of the JuUunder. Of this 
tract Simla is the proper liead-quarters and centre, 
and a strong body of troops esconced there amongst 
mountains eflcctually cuts ofl" the communication 
between Nepaul and the territories of Goolab 
Sing. Should a war arise with him, the troops in 
this district would form the right flank of an army 
marching against Jummoo ; and in a war with 


Ncpaul would reinforce tlie left flank of a force 
marching from Delhi upon the Upper Gogra river. 

There is also another thing not to be overlooked. 
Goolab Sing is reported to have said, at the time 
Lord Hardinge was at Lahore, that, " had he 
" conducted the war, it would have been carried 
" on very differently ; that he would not have 
" been shut up in Sobraon like a rat in a trap, 
" and would have turned eighty thousand Cavalry 
" upon the country between Ferozepore and 
" Delhi." Had this happened, our Army, scat- 
tered as it then was, would have stood a fair 
chance of being cut to pieces. There was nothing 
to meet foes in the rear ! If an enemy again got 
those hills, as they once had, we might not have a 
second Ochterlony to put them out ! The disasters 
of Kulunga might be repeated. This important 
mountainous district — the key equally to the 
Punjaub and to Nepaul — should not be left 
exposed as it has hitherto been. 

The advantage of the healthy air for European 
troops in those hills adds to the value of their 
good military position ; and for that reason my 
intent is to gather the greatest portion of the 
European troops between the Jumna and the Beas, 
hoping the Government will cause permanent 
barracks to be built for them in a becoming- 
manner ; for to had barracks may be attributed 
the enormous loss of men which the 29th regiment 
has sustained, and every other regiment that has 
suffered in the Bengal presidency. There is 
scarcely any illness which assails the troops that 
may not be traced to want of room in barracks. 
Lately the 1st Europeans were afflicted with 
cholera in the barracks at Cawnpore ; they were 
moved into tents and the cholera ceased ! 'I'hc 


2nd Europeans arc assailed by scurvy, and it is 
justly attributed by medical men on the spot, 
to the crowded state of their barracks. But of 
this more hereafter. 

It is now to be decided what number of troops 
sliould be cantoned on each bank of tlie Sutledge. 
I shall consider them under the heads of regi- 
ments of Cavalry, battalions of Infantry, and 
pieces of cannon, without entering into greater 
detail ; and when speaking of so many battalions 
or regiments, I will draw a line under the number, 
])lacing a figure in a fractional form, to designate 
Europeans: thus, 10 battalions, will signifiy 8 

battalions of Xative Infantry, 2 battalions of 

On the left bank of the Sutledge, above its 
junction witlrthe Beas, there are six stations: — 

I would not quarter Europeans 

The present barracks infamous. 
Ditto, a slaughter-house ! 

Barracks for a European regiment sliould be 
constructed at five of these stations, from which, in 
a fortnight they can reach either the Ravec or 
the Ganges, and the men would be very healtliy 
if the positions are well cliosen, and the barracks 
good: the last being imperative. 

The Goorka regiments should be kept in the 
hills. There are 5 battalions on the left bank of 
the Sutledge above its junction with the Beas, 
and as there is but the one station, that of Feroze- 
pore, below the junction of those rivers, the 














5 battalions there cantoned being included, 

would make in all, 10 along the bank of the Sut- 

ledge, with two regiments of cavalry, and twelve 
pieces of cannon. 

On the right bank of the Sutledge, between it 
and the ilavec, there are 13 battalions, 5 regi- 
ments of cavalry, and 18 pieces of cannon. Thus, 
23 battalions of infantry, 7 regiments of cavalry, 

and 30 pieces of cannon are disposed for what 
may be denominated the mountainous district. 
Wherefore, averaging each regiment of cavalry 
at 420, and each battalion at 800, we have about 
26,000 fighting men. 

This number is absolutely necessary when the 
character of the people between the Upper Beas 
and the Upper Ravee is taken into consideration, 
in connection with Goolab's confining frontier, 
embracing the East and North from Shipree to 
Jummoo — but for this district more European 
troops, and fewer Native regiments are required, 
and barracks will be wanted ; where, cannot be 
decided till we know the places which are most 


The garrison of Lahore is for me a question of 
difficulty, and I must trust to others. The pre- 
sent garrison consists of 7 battalions, 3 regiments 

2 i 

of cavalry, 24 pieces of cannon. 

Sir "W. Gilbert, Sir Colin Campbell, the 
Adjutant-General Grant, tlie Quartennaster- 
General Colonel M*" Sherry, and myself, are of one 


opinion, that the garrison of Lahore cannot be 
safely reduced below its present force, but one 
regiment of Europeans shall be removed until the 
barracks are more ample. It is now destructive to 
have them there. 


The garrison of this station consists at present 
of 2 troops horse artillery, 2 field batteries, manned 
by 2 companies foot artillery, 24 guns, 2 companies 
pioneers, 3 regiments of cavalry, 6 regiments of 

1 2 

infantry. Wuzzeerabad, or Sealkote, which is 
said to be a far preferable position for a station, 
dominates two Doabs ; holds Jummoo in check ; 
commands the passage of the Chenaub, and sup- 
ports the garrisons of Lahore and Jhelum. Martello 
towers should be constructed at the ford, if the 
river does not change its bed there. We do not 
use fortifications enough — they double our forces, 
and in a large country like India are of great 
advantage, if properly 2)laced. Perhaps a Martello 
tower is the best work for guarding this ford of 
the Chenaub, but it must be secured ; and in 
existing circumstances no reduction should be 
made of the force at Wuzzeerabad, beyond my 
present act of withdrawing a battery, and possibly 
a regiment of infantry to reinforce other points. 

This station guards the fords of the Jelum, 
which are generally practicable from November to 
March inclusive. Being close to a large town, it 
should not consist of less than a brigade, which is 
exactly the same force as the Supreme Govern- 
ment deems it requisite to have at Sau(/or, in the 


centre of the three presidencies ! How, then, can 
we reduce troops guarding the passage of a great 
river, and watching the passes through which a 
powerful and not well-disposed neighbouring- 
sovereign can pour down forces into the plains 
below 1 It is impossible. 

Rmvid Pindee. 
At this station there are 3 battalions of infantry 


and 1 regiment of cavalry, with 1 troop of horse 
artillery and a company of pioneers. Its greatest 
advantage is the reputed salubrity, being high 
land with rivers flowing from it on the West into 
the Indus, on the East into the Jhelum. That it 
commands the road from Mozufferabad to Attok is 
true ; but this is equally done by uniting it to 
Attok and so massing our troops. If the ruler of 
Cashmere formed a design to attack Attok he 
could do so before the commanding officer at 
Hawul Pindee was aware of it ; whereas, if both 
stations were united at Attok they would be safe ; 
or at least able to resist until reinforced ; and an 
enemy could not march on Jhelum, leaving the 
troops at Attok in his rear. 


This place commands the passage of the Indus. 
The force now there is sufficient at jirescmt ; but 
not so for a permanent cantonment, which shoidd 
be prepared for a much greater force and that 
force strongly entrenched. At present, there are 
three companies of infantry, one company of 
artillery, one (■()m])any of s;ip])ers and miners ; but 
the Rawul i'indce cantonment should be removed 


there, unless consideration of health forbids, which 
shall be ascertained on reaching the spot. The 
bridge at Attok should be defended with a double 
bridge head, to secure a retreat from Peshawur, or 
to support that place ; but the works required can- 
not be determined without seeing the place. 

Attok is two long marches from Peshawur. 
That an iron bridge should be thrown over the 
Indus there no one can doubt. It commands all 
that Hawul Pindee docs and supports Peshawur 
into the bargain. It should be a large station, and 
might perhaps enable us to withdraw the regular 
troops now at Peshawur. 


The force here is 4 batteries, 1 company of 
pioneers, 3 regiments of cavalry, 7 battalions of 


infantry, or somewhere about 9000 men ; and 
assuredly not less can be kept in this isolated 
position, within three marches of Jellalabad. It is 
said Sir H. Lawrence thinks all this territory can 
be defended by irregulars ; my wish is to give it 
up and remove the station to Attok. 

Having now taken a review of the whole dis- 
position of the force, which amounts to about 
54,772* men of all arms, it does not at present 
appear that any reduction can be made. My opinion 
that Lord Ellenborough's policy of giving a military 
government to Scinde was right, remains unchanged 
— it succeeded. A different policy in the Punjaub 
has once failed, and it is to be feared that another 
failure may occur in the course of a couple or three 
years, if not sooner ; wherefore, at present, any 

* Since increasud tu 72,000. 


roduction of the force occupying the Punjaub 
would be prcnuiture. 

Irregular Cavalrj/. 

There are 10 regiments now forming under the 
Board of Administration in the Punjaub ; of these 
5 are cavah-y and 5 infantry. My recommendation 
is, tliat they be employed as a military police in 
parts remote from the great stations and across the 
Indus ; and as Sir Henry Lawrence thinks they 
can defend the Peshawur district, I shall be glad to 
give that up to him ; first declaring explicitly that 
from my knowledge of all irregular corps, except 
those extremely well commanded — and even those 
are not always very safe — they will plunder the 
people more or less. 1'he few European officers with 
them arc unable to control their men when detached. 
If these irregulars take the trans-Indus districts, the 
whole Peshawur force may be withdrawn to Attok, 
where it will form a reserve to protect the ir- 
regulars in case of need ; but on these matters my 
opinion shall be reserved until Peshawur has been 

That the force in the Punjaub is enormous must 
be admitted, but it may have to contend with 
150,000 or 200,000 men. Those whose position 
and abilities enable them to judge, reckon that 
100,000 were opposed to Lord Gough, and to 
estimate Goolab Sing's army at 50,000 men is a 
very low figure ; he has plenty of money, and 
whoever has money in India has armies. — They are 
synonymous ! 


With me the following postulates liave always 
been axioms. Tlie revenue of a country can never 


be collected without force. In a civilized country, 
this force is the law of the land ; in a barbarous 
country, the law of arms. Any force which 
compels people to pay taxes must be odious ; in a 
newly conquered country, the soldiers ought to be 
feared not hated, and to bring them into daily 
contact witli the people as tax-gatherers gradually 
wears away fear, engenders hatred, and destroys 
discipline. When Governor of Scinde, this reasoning 
led me to establish a force apart from the military, 
to support the collectors of revenue and to repress 
vagabonds, spreading like so many eyes over the 
land and relieving soldiers from work not military 
and injurious to tlieir discipline and spirit. 'I'here 
was fear however, that this vigorous police force 
might oppress the poor people ; and to prevent that 
it was not placed under the magistrate, but under 
officers of its own. The examples of Bombay and 
Bengal showed me that all troops or paid persons 
put under a magistrate are spoiled, lose discipline, 
and become very dangerous to the people unless a 
counteracting power prevented the abuse. So my 
magistrates and their attendants formed one body, 
the officers of police and their men another ; eacli 
had its point of honour, but without power over 
the other, and in all quarrels the governor alone 
was arbitrator. 

The police had tlieir rules. Being created to 
support the magistrates and the laws, they were at 
the call but not under the command of the former ; 
their pride was to maintain peace, catch thieves, 
fight bands of robbers, and support the magistrates, 
wider the orders of their own officers ! And if a 
European or Native magistrate, a European or a 
Native officer of police oppressed the poor, the 


others took part against him. If they joined, a 
petition from the people was sure to reach the 
Governor, who hekl a conrt of appeal, the punish- 
ments of which were severe. Twice such grand 
courts were assembled, which kept all straight ; for 
in both instances the people were victorious against 
the English officers ; it being a point with me not 
to bolster up any authority assailed, leaving it to 
stand on right, and that alone ! The poor thus 
knew where to find redress, the police and magis- 
trates of all ranks knew it also, and were diligent 
and active in their respective duties. Each de- 
partment had a British officer of zeal and activity 
at its head, each kept the duties of his own corps 
separated from the other, and the whole worked 
well for the poor. Oppression was resisted in all 
directions, and the soldiers having no concern in 
disputes were viewed with aw^e and dread, yet 
with amity by the people. Crime, trial, accpiittal, 
or punishment, followed in rapid succession, with a 
vigor that never does, and never can exist under 
a civil government, — though the course most 
pleasing to a barbarous people. 

For the Scinde police, the country was divided 
into three collectorates — Ilyderahad, Kurrachee^ and 
Shikarpore, tlie governor bt'ing chief of all. Two 
thousand four hundred policemen were organized 
in three divisions, answering to the collectorates, and 
at the head of each was a British officer. Over 
these three lieutenants of police was a captain of 
police, always at my head-(piarters, wlio received 
from his lieutenants daily reports ; and his own 
diary, and tliose of every lieutenant of i)olice, 
collector and deputy collector were ])eriodically 
read by me : — thus all that ]iassed in .Scinde was 


made known to mc, oxclusive of secret information, 
on which liowever no action was ever founded, 
except in preparation for evil or with a view to 
open inquiry. In no instance was punishment 
awarded without trial, and no trial but under open 
accusation. No man was ever treated in Scinde 
during my military administration as All Akbar, 
See my moonshee, has been since treated by the Civil 

Chap. IX. Government of Bombay. 

These three divisions of police were subdivided : 
First, — Cavalry^ armed and mounted like the 
irregular horse, their pay being about twenty-five 
rupees a month. Second, — Rural Police, men on 
foot, armed and drilled like troops of the line ; tliey 
acted as regular troops in the Ilill Campaign. 
Third, — CItj/ Police, drilled and armed, yet ex- 
clusively employed in the large towns, Hyderabad, 
Kurrachee, Shikarpore, Sukkiir, and Larkana. 

No man of the police could be dismissed without 
trial, unless by my authority as Governor, wliich 
was self-restricted by published rules. The Captain 
of Police had a Native Adjutant on two hundred 
rupees a month, and under these officers were 
Havildars and Naiks, as in other irregular corps. 
Nothing occurred in Scinde that was not reported 
daily by the Captain of Police if it were of an ex- 
traordinary nature, and his diary gave all the 
ordinary intelligence at the end of the week. These 
various diaries coming in from all parts of 
Scinde confirmed or refuted each other, and thus 
the police was kept to its duty with a tight rein, 
though with much labour to me. 

At first, the Rural Police and Cavalry had some 
stiff fights with bands of robbers, and six policemen 
were slain in one encounter ; but in nearly all they 


were victorious and finally cleared the country of 
robbers. No man travelled with a guard in Scinde 
under my rule ; whereas, before the conquest, no 
man travelled without a guard ! This was all done 
by the police ; nor was any soldier ever called out 
by my orders to arrest a man, to execute a man, 
to furnish a treasure escort, or to quell a riot. 
What has occurred since my departure is to me 
unknown. Now, if such a police had been esta- 
blished in the Punjaub a smaller body of troops 
might suffice. If placed at the head of the Punjaub 
Government at first, I should not now demand 
more than 30,000 soldiers, and even greatly reduce 
that number after three or four years ; but to do 
this would demand a very different system from 
that which prevails, and, truth to speak, appears to 
me very dangerous and defective in principle. 

I repudiate the idea of casting reflections on 
the abilities or zeal of officers employed in the 
Punjaub ; but if danger arises the civil and 
military authorities will not agree and all the 
operations will be weak. Neither have these 
observations been made from any desire to govern 
the Punjaub. Any government w'ould be by me 
refused, unless under very extraordinary circum- 
stances, and then undertaken with sore regret and 
displeasure, only from a sense of duty. My asser- 
tion that the system of government in the Punjaub 
is a very dangerous one, is, therefore, merely the 
expression of an opinion springing from Scinde ex- 
perience ; but on that opinion my calculation that 
the force in the Punjaub cannot at present be re- 
duced is founded. The government of the Punjaub 
appears feeble and expensive when it ouglit to be 
strong and economical. A large revenue and a quiet 

c e 


people will make me out a false prophet, but my 
opinion is shared by others. Nearly all persons 
who give vent to their thoughts look for another 
rising of the Sikhs ; and few doubt that, at Goolab 
Sing's death, his son, having now the desire will 
then have the means of making war upon us. 
However, be this judgment sound or unsound, it 
rules my view, and my duty is to state it honestly ; 
it has so been done, inoffensively it is hoped. 

The forces left for the defence of the remaining 
provinces of India are now to be considered, that is 
to say of the Bengal Presidency, for the Madras 
and Bombay Presidencies have each their o^vn 

Bengal Army. 

This consists of 158,659 fighting men, from 
which number deduct 54,772 in the Punjaub, and 
103,887 men are left for the defence of Bengal, 
exclusive of the Punjaub. Taking an approxima- 
tion, the remainder of the Presidency of Bengal is 
about four times the area of the Punjaub, which 
gives about 25,000 men in the other parts of 
Bengal for the same area, occupied by 54,772 in 
the Punjaub. Common sense declares we ought 
not to require half as many men to occupy a country 
that has been many years under our rule, as are 
required to occupy a warlike country which has 
only been subdued five months. After governing 
Scinde four years the proper garrison for that 
province was by me set at 3000 men, and Scinde is 
not much less than the Punjaub. Now, extent is 
one of the chief difficulties in the military occupa- 
tion of a country, and more particularly one like 
India. Moreover Scinde is an isolated country, 
entirely surrounded by foreign states. 


Scinde is brought forward too often it may be 
said; but no better guide offers for judging the 
number of troops required for other provinces 
than a reference to what was done there. All 
India is a conquered land. The Punjaub and 
Scinde are merely provinces added to the rest, but 
are inhabited by a more warlike race than the 
Bengalese. If then measures and number which 
sufficed for Scinde are applied to the more gentle 
race of Bengal, that number should be ample, and 
would give 3000 men to each space equal to the 
Punjaub; or 12,000 for the whole of Bengal. 
Wherefore, it is here maintained, that eight times 
that number, or 100,000 men, are sufficient to 
occupy Bengal, and no increase to the military 
force of India is required ; but, emphatically, to 
render that force efficient, a good military j^oli^e 
is necessary. A very high authority. Lord 
Ellenborough, assures me that Chupprassees and 
Birkendauses, &c. are now employed in numbers 
equal to the Indian Army ! Here is the whole 
passage of a memorandum given to me by that 
authority : — " The Birkendauses, Chupprassees, and 
" civil servants of the Government, are almost as 
" numerous as the Army. They are utterly 
" inefficient for the suppression of any more than 
" a street row; they arc not to be trusted in 
" the escort of treasure ; they cannot take the 
" ordinary duty of guarding public and private 
" property in a cantonment, when a regiment 
" moves out. Their inefficiency is a main cause 
" of the dispersion of the Army, and its occupa- 
" tion in duties not properly of a military 
" character. I was introducing military police in 


" lieu of them, and had abeady a battalion at 
" each of the great stations above Allahabad : the 
" whole civil duty of Bundlecund and Saugor was 
" performed by other similar battalions, and the 
"■ presence of these police battalions in the upper 
" provinces enabled Lord Hardingc, in 1845-6, to 
"• move to the Sutledge four more regiments than 
" he would otherwise have had disposable." 

Suppose then the number of Chupprassees, 
Birkendauses, &c. equals the number of the Bengal 
Army, we have idlers equal to 158,659 fighting 
men, who will be made on my plan to do their 
duty to the public ! Allow 58,000 of this number 
to continue in their present capacities, there will 
be 100,000 at the disposal of Government as 
military police, to do those duties which arc now 
thrown upon the Army, to its great detriment and 

It has been shown, that the occupation of the 
Punjaub, reduced the Bengal Army, south of the 
Sutledge, to 103,000 fighting men ; and they are 
n,ot concentrated in masses, either to meet invasion 
or quell rebellion : they are scattered over an 
enormous space in small bodies, and for the sole 
purpose of protecting civil servants, who ought 
to be protected by a just and good government, by 
gaining the affection of the people, and by those 
158,000 servants called Chupprassees, and what not, 
who now afford no protection at all to the civil 
magistrates. Yet they were originally entertained 
for such service, but do it not, as the employment of 
troops proves. But suppose we get the disposal of 
100,000 of these men. Let them form eight 
divisions, each division consisting of 12,500 men, 


and the whole Army is at once set free from civil 
duties and given up to its own, viz. the defence 
of our vast and dangerous frontiers. 

There are, as shown, 103,887 soldiers disposable 
for the provinces, exclusive of the Punjaub Army ; 
of these should be stationed, — 

5000 at Dacca, to protect the Eastern frontier. 

5000 at Barrackpore, to protect the capital. 

3000 at Bhagulpore, sending 1000 cavalry to 
Titilcca. This force of 3000 has to watch the 
Nepaul frontier, to support the Dinapore force, and 
to support the capital. It also holds a connecting 
post between Dinapore and Calcutta. 

14,000 at Dinapore, sending 2000 cavalry to 
Segowlee to protect our frontier against Nepaul, 
and to send troops eastward, in case of a war with 

4000 at Allahabad, as a reserve to support either 
Dinapore or Cawnpore, as occasion might require. 

2000 at Cawnpore and Lucknow. 

4000 at Agra, to support either Delhi or 

12,000 at Delhi, as the magazine there must be 
powerfully defended and that great Mahomedan 
city powerfully controlled. The force there sta- 
tioned should also be able to escort convoys, and 
resist any sudden danger, should such arise, from 
the Ajmeer side, or in any other direction. Delhi 
should be the grand magazine for supplies to all 
the troops stationed between the Upper Ganges 
and the Upper Sutledge, and those troops should 
be on the circumference of a semi-circle passing 
through Agra, Almorah, Simla, and Fcrozepore. 
To all these Delhi is central ; and from it supplies 
must be sent to the magazines in the Punjaub and 


the Jullunder, until the more convenient route, 
from Kurrachec by the Indus be arranged, to 
Ferozeporc, Lahore, and Wuzzecrabad. 

10,000 at Meerut, to support Delhi, and to form 
a reserve in case of a war either with Nepaul, or with 
Goolab Sing. Meerut should also be the head- 
quarters of the artillery, if Delhi be not accepted. 

10,000 at Umballah, to support either Deera or 
Simla, in case of war with Nepaul, or the 

5000 at Almorah, to guard the North West 
frontier of Nepaul. 

4000 at Bareilly, to support Almorah. 



. 5,000 1 


. 5,000 


. 3,000 

Dinapore, . 

. 14,000 


. 4,000 


. 2,000 

All these could be 


. 4,000 

^ reinforced, in case of 


. 12,000 

need, by large bodies of 

Meerut, . 

. 10,000 



. 10,000 

Almorah, . 

. 5,000 

Bareilly, . 

. 4,000 



Seventy-eight thousand men thus disposed, would 
enable Government to reduce 25,000 of the 103,000 
now scattered, as if with a pepper-box, all over 
Bengal ; for what purpose % It is difficult to say, 
unless to do those duties which no government 
ought to require ; duties which under a good 


government the civil service ought to perform with 
the 158,000 paid idlers now at its command*. 

The reasons for forming each station have been 
given, and the numbers so calculated as to make 
each station, assisted by the police, equal to its 
necessities until aid arrives. For example. Should 
a war concerted between Nepaul and the Maharaja 
suddenly break out, 20,000 men could within ten 
days assemble at Dera from Meerut and Umballah, 
to support Almorah or Simla ; the troops at those 
places being, meanwhile, sufficient for a good 
defence. Delhi wdth its strong garrison could 
forward convoys of supplies to Hurdw^ar in eleven 
days ; and if cu'cumstances placed Almorah in most 
danger, Meerut and Bareilly could send 15,000 
men to its aid. 

To lay down a conjectural campaign is un- 
necessary, but this disposition of the troops would 
meet danger from Nepaul or the Punjaub or botli 
together, or from Ava. A large force could be 
rapidly assembled at Dinapoor to support Calcutta 
in a war wdth Ava, or to cover it from Katmandoo. 
Another large force could be thrown from Umballah 
and Meerut into the mountainous district, so as to 
cut all communication between the Punjaub and 
Nepaul, and form a powerful reserve for reinforcing 
our army, whether to invade Nepaul by Almorah, or 
the Maharaja by Noorpoor. These masses would 
also have the aid of the police battalions, to the 
number of 12,000 in each district, for keeping the 
country tranquil or forming reserves, for in war 
they would be of no less use than in peace. They 

* Many of these men are said to be used as domestics by the 
civil servants. This is the general opinion, often asserted, and 
never denied. 


would form a nucleus for the villagers to rally round 
in cases where clouds of irregular cavalry might 
try to devastate a district, for such troops could 
be defeated by police ; the Scinde police defeated 
them, and did good service in the hills against the 
Boogties ; they also guarded convoys and acted as 
out pickets. Moreover, the police battalions in 
question could guard the towns when the troops 
moved to battle ; for as 2000 did those duties in 
Scinde 100,000 could do them in Bengal! A 
third of that number could do so, working, as they 
would according to my arrangement, under the 
protection of great military masses. 

The most important point next to the location 
of our troops is now to be considered, viz. The 
immense enhancement of military discipline and 
the perfection at M'hich large masses of troops 
arrive by being collected in numbers. Men and 
officers, more especially commanders, thus acquire 
the habit of acting in great bodies, of manoeuvring, 
of drawing their supplies, of knowing and emulating 
each other, occupying ground, judging distances, 
and rates of march ; the necessity of moving well 
closed up when heavy columns are in march, of 
good lines being preserved, &c., all matters w^ell 
known in theory, but in execution only to be 
effected by practice. All the moral feelings of an 
army, and its physical powers, are increased by 
being assembled in large masses. It was said Lord 
Hardinge objected to assembling the India troops 
for fear they should conspire. This reason I cannot 
accede to, and ha"\e never met an Indian officer 
who did accede to it; and few men have had 
more opportunities of judging the armies of all 
three presidencies than myself 


Lord Hardinge only saw the Bengal army as 
Governor-Cjiencral, and for a short time. I have 
constantly commanded and studied Bengal and 
Bombay Sepoys for nearly eight years, and could 
find nothing to fear from them, except when ill 
used ; and even then they are less dangerous than 
British troops w^ould be in similar circumstances. 
There is, it seems to me, no danger in their being 
massed, but very great danger in their being 
spread over a country as they are now. By 
concentrating the Indian army, its spirit, its 
devotion, its powers, will all be increased. By 
dispersion our safety hangs on the want of 
combination between two or more of our surround- 
ing enemies ; and such a combination is so far from 
being improbable that its not yet having taken 
place is almost miraculous. 

One more remark is necessary previous to closing 
this subject of defence against external and in- 
ternal foes. It relates to railways. They can be 
of no use in war, except in one case, which how- 
ever is precisely that of India — namely, when an 
immense distance separates detached bodies of 
troops. From Peshawur to Calcutta is such a vast 
distance, that no enemy could entirely interrupt 
the rail communication. Let us take from Loo- 
diana to Calcutta, about twelve hundred miles. 
In a war with Nepaul, a small portion of rail might 
be destroyed by an active enemy, and no doubt 
would be so ; but still, when guarded by an active 
police in its whole length, the railway would, not- 
withstanding the interruption, enable large bodies 
to assemble rapidly on many portions. If in one 
thousand miles for example, one mile be interru[)ted, 
and to interru[)t one mile, e\en by ten feet being 


destroyed here and ten there, would be dan- 
gerous and difficult when vigilantly guarded, 
and in such a crisis, the guards would in 
number and watchfulness be trebled. But even 
this one mile, or one hundred, would leave nine 
hundred miles for rapid travelling — a distance 
which in India will require two months if not 
three to march a regiment over ; but by railroad, 
thirty-six hours ! 

There is therefore an immense saving of time, 
even with a portion of rail destroyed — time even 
for repairs, and still with gain of days, weeks, 
months ! Very different this from railways travers- 
ing the seat of war in a hostile country which 
cannot be guarded, and bear only accidentally on 
military movements with advantage. In India, 
there is one fixed line of communication, along 
which one line of railway would run without inter- 
ruption, everywhere guarded by moving armies and 
thousands of police. The cost of moving troops 
would also be greatly diminished by a railway. 

The advantages of my plan may be thus summed 

1st. The army so placed as to be able to con- 
centrate rapidly on points of military importance. 

2nd. Its moral and physical powers greatly 

3rd. Its numbers reduced, and while less nume- 
rous and consequently less expensive its power 
increased ; for, after a few years, three perhaps, the 
Punjaub ought not to require 20,000 men. 
Wherefore, 34,000 might be spared in addition to 
the 25,000 already indicated for reduction South 
of the Sutledge, 59,000 in all. 

4th. A great diminution of expense in many 


other obvious ways, exclusive of the disbanding 

5th. The embodying of an active pohce out of 
those numerous and mischievous petty tyrants, the 
Chupprassees, and Birkendauses, whom all men 
seem to concur in considering as not merely useless, 
but a curse to the country, and to the character of 
our civil government so far as the poor people are 
concerned. These Chupprassees and Birkendauses, 
instead of being under magistrates, many of whom 
are young and too inexperienced to keep order 
and who have besides other avocations, would on 
my plan be under officers whose sole occupation 
would be police duty ; and both men and officers, 
having their work defined and themselves respon- 
sible, would take a pride in doing well. 

This arrangement may or may not suit the high 
authorities, but they are, on a larger scale, what 
answered well in Scinde, and may tliercfore be 
taken as of proved efficacy if properly conducted ; 
for all rules and regulations are idle things if not 
well and vigorously enforced. 

Fortifications of Lahore and Mooltaii. 

These can only be treated generally, yet present 
two questions : 

1st. Is there any occasion to fortify those cities 
at all"? 

2nd. Are the new works proposed good or not % 

Let those who want expensively fortified places 
answer the following questions : — 

As military works are thrown up against some 
enemy, who is the enemy that can besiege either 
Lahore or Mooltan X The answer to this will be 
difficult! There is no enemy, nor can there be 


one for a hundred years, capable of besieging either 
of those cities ! We may be beaten in the field 
by a coalition of nations, but then neither Lahore 
nor Mooltan would be held. Our rallying point 
would be Delhi, not Lahore. If we are not beaten, 
who is to besiege Lahore or Mooltan X No 
one ! We do not want fortified towns in the 
Punjaub : we do want barracks — good barracks, 
not the vile murderous places into which soldiers 
are thrust, and there daily perish. 

As it is most unwise to throw up fortifications at 
enormous expense while the hospitals and grave- 
yards are filled from bad barracks, I oppose the 
plan for fortifying either Lahore or Mooltan. 
Some small repairs may be necessary, but there the 
fortifying Lahore and Mooltan should stop ; more 
would be unnecessaiy and expensive. Every shil- 
ling which the government can possibly afford, and 
even more, are required for barrack constructions ; 
not such expensive mischievous edifices as the 
Military Board have built at Loodiana, by which 
the 50th Regiment was destroyed in one terrible 
night; but really good barracks, on arches, with 
rooms thirty feet high and twenty feet wide. 

The second question as to the goodness of the 
works proposed, cannot be answered until both 
places have been seen. 


There arc some hundreds of Forts in the Pun- 
jaub, large and small. Are they to be repaired or 
destroyed % Neither, unless some of them are 
good for police stations — such should be repaired. 
The same question arose about Scinde. The 
Court of Directors sent a letter to Lord llardinge 


asking my advice, which was then, as now, to let 
them alone. Tliere can be but two kinds of war 
in the Punjaub. A war made by regular in\^ading 
armies or an insurrectionary war. In the first 
case the forts can do us no harm ; nothing better 
than the enemy should disseminate his army to 
hold these petty forts. The principle of regular 
war is to concentrate. The nature of an insurrec- 
tionary war is the reverse ; the people suddenly 
congregate and falling on some weak part destroy it 
and disperse ; and the troops, sent hurriedly to 
support the part attacked find the mischief done, 
with nothing to show how or by whom ! Now 
what leader in such a war would shut himself up 
in one of these forts ? His game is freedom, is 
enterprise. He who would occupy forts would be 
a fool ! They are of no importance, and may be 
safely left to themselves. If ever available in war, 
it would be as a temporary refuge for a detachment 
of our police until relief came. Finally, to destroy 
them will cost a large sum, which would be more 
usefully expended in saving the lives of Europeans, 
by giving them better food and good dwellings. 


I have, while writing the above, visited the 
barracks at various stations, and find most of them 
disgraceful^ and the cause of disease and death to 
thousands of European soldiers. Those of Kassowlie 
are slaughter-houses, and there are others not 
much better. However, endeavours have lately 
been made to improve these buildings. It is an 
imperative duty that proper barracks should be 
built, and an especial report shall be made to the 
Governor-General as soon as the requisite docu- 


ments can be collected to prove the evils which 
arise from building bad barracks. Those at Dug- 
shai are the only good ones I have seen ; they are 
really excellent, and it is to be hoped the Governor- 
General will give orders for their being imme- 
diately completed. 

This report has been drawn up with an imper- 
fect knowledge on many points, because my stay 
has been short in this part of India, and many and 
various matters have had to be dealt with on 
assuming the command of this great Army : it may 

be hereafter amended. 


Head Quarters, General, Commander-in-Chief. 

27th Nov., 1849. 

On this memoir Lord Dalhousie made the fol- 
lowing comments placed in juxtaposition with my 

No. 2. 

Lord Dalhousie s comments. 

" The Commander-m-Chief, 
" in the several portions of his 
" Report, reviews the natural 
" fcatui'es of the Punjaub with 
" its adjacent districts, and 
" dwells on the character 
" and condition of the Sikh 
" population. His Excellency 
" sets forth the view he has 
" taken of the power and dis- 
" position of the neighbouring 
" states, and adverts to the 
" form of administration, and 
" to the mode in which the 
" province is governed." 

Replication hy Sir C. Napier. 
Yes, I do in my Report 
" advert to the form of ad- 
" ministration, and to the mode 
" in which the province is 
" governed ;" for on the mode 
in which a newly-conquered 
country is governed everything 
depends — it is the Alpha and 
Omega — it embraces everything, 
as it is good or bad so does 
it create or prevent rebellion. 
Therefore, did I advert to the 
Government in the Punjaub as 
the foundation on which all 
military disposition of the 
troops must mainly depend. 
Where a good Government 


rules, the people are content, 
and few or no troops are re- 
quired. Where a bad one 
rules the reverse is the case. 
It is impossible for me to shut 
my eyes to these truisms, and, 
neglecting them, pretend to 
make military arrrangements 
of any soundness and sense. 


All this I am bound to ad- 
mit to be my opinion, and my 
residence of three weeks at 
Lahore and tour through 
the Punjaub have confirmed 
my opinion. I consider that 
a powerful police ought long 
since to have been formed ; 
none has yet been formed. 
The Civil Government at the 
capital could not even relieve 
the gate-guards of the town ! 
They had no arms ! Were not 
formed ! There is no head of 
police to form them. A strong 
and vigorous Government in 
the Punjaub would, long since, 
have had a powerful police all 
over the country, controlling 
troubled spirits, protecting the 
well-disposed, and collecting 
information as to the state of 
the people hi each district; 
also collecting informati^on re- 
lative to the unquiet spirits, 
and thus doing all that fore- 
sight can do to p-evcnt insurrection. If, in des}»ito of such a 
necessary precaution an insun'cction brealcs out, and the police 
give information of the coming evil, the troops can deal witli it ; 
but the troops cannot prevent insurrection if th(? country is 
resolved upon it in consequence of being discontented with its 


" His Excellency gives it as 
" his opinion, that the system 
" of Government in the Punjaub 
" is ' veiy dangerous and de- 
" ' fective in principle, feeble, 
" ' and expensive,' and, as the 
" consequence of that opinion, 
" and having regard to the 
" character of the population, 
" to the position and power of 
" the Maharaja of -Jummoo, 
" and to the amount of force 
" by which he thinks we are 
" liable to be opposed, Ilis Ex- 
" cellency has formed the con- 
" elusion, that he cannot at 
" present recommend any re- 
" duction of the force now 
" occupying the Punjaub, and 
" amounting to not less than 
" 54,000 men." 


Goveniraent The absence of an efficient police makes me 
consider that the 54,000 men, which I found in the Punjaub, 
are still requisite. It would be madness in me hastily to reduce 
the number of troops which my predecessor thought necessary 
after six years' experience in this cunuuaud, and in which opinion 
all officers of liigh rank with whom I have conversed on the 
subject concur. 

" While I think it right to 
' state, that I by no means 
concur in the opinions His 
Excellency has expressed 
respecting Civil Government 
in India generally, or admit 
the justice of the terms in 
which he has conveyed his 
judgment on the system of 
Government established in 
the Punjaub, I yet do not 
feel myself called upon in 
this place to vindicate the 
measures which have been 
taken, and which have re- 
ceived the approbation of 
the Government 1 serve." 


" Neither do I concur with 
" His Excellency in the estimate 
" he has formed of the actual 
" power for attack possessed by 


I did not expect to alter 
the opinion of the Governor- 
General, nor was my opinion 
given with that object. I 
merely stated my own opinions, 
which, as Commander-in-Chief, 
and one of the Supreme 
Council, I am bound to do 
honestly. The Governor-Ge- 
neral has a right to honest 
opinions from me in both ca- 
pacities ; an honest opinion 
may be a wrong opinion, even 
dangerously so ; but whatever 
it be, the person who gives it 
is answerable for its honesty, 
which alone is in his own power. 
The Governor- General is as- 
suredly not called upon to vin- 
dicate to me the measures 
which have been taken ; and 
I can assure him that my Re- 
port was not intended as an 
attack upon those measures, 
but merely the expression of 
my own opinion, which was 
called for by him. 


I am very glad that the Go- 
vernor-General does not think 
my estimate of the power of 
the Maharaja correct. He has 


'■ Maharaja Gookb Sing, or 
" coincide with him in the 
" anticipation of events which 
" he regards as probable." 

" Nevertheless, I entirely 
" agree with His Excellencj- 
"as to the expediency which 
" he urges of maintaining the 
" army on a footing of full 
" preparation against all pos- 
" sible risks, in a country whose 
•' warhke population has been 
" but recently subdued, and 
■"'where internal insurrection 
•' as well as frontier disturb- 
" ance, must be regarded as 
.*' probable contingencies." 


' " The force of 54,000 men, 
" which His Excellency has 
" named as essential for the 
" occupation of the Punjaub, 
" including the Jullmider Doab 
" and the banks of the Sutlej, 
■" is indeed enormous." 

more information than I have 
on the subject, and is probably 


The Governor-General and 
myself agree perfectly in this 
grand principle of preparation, 
whatever difference there may 
be in other points ; and this 
is the essential one to cope 
with fortune. 

" But when the Commander- 
in Chief of the army, after 
a very mature deliberation, 
submits it to me as his pro- 
fessional opinion, that a 
smaller amount of force can- 
not at present be employed, 


The Governor-General seems 
to think the force in the Pun- 
jaub enormous. I think so 
too ; but His Lordship will no 
doubt recollect that many think 
the army should be increased, 
and that I not only said it was 
enough, but in my Report 
have pointed out the means of 
great reduction, grounded upon 
the very high authority of Lord 


I believe that there is 
scarcely a man in India that 
thinks the army in the Pun- 
jaub is too large, except mj-- 
self and I think it could bo 
reduced ; but I cannot recom- 
mend its reduction under the 


" founding his opinion on the 
" circumstances of our position 
" in the Puiijaub, and more 
" especially on the formidable 
" character of the people who 
" have passed under our rule ; 
" and on the means possessed 
" by neighbouring princes for 
" our injury, I consider it to 
" be my duty at once to confirm 
" the arrangements, which, 
" under this head, His Excel- 
" lency has suggested." 


♦' In pages 29 to 37 of the 

" Report, His Excellency ex- 
" plains in detail the distribu- 
" tiou which he desires to make 
'' of the troops that are to be 
" stationed within the new 
" territory for its occupation 
*' and defence. 

I. " His Excellency recom- 
*' mends that the army in the 
" Punjaub shall be stationed 
" at the following places, viz. : 
" Lahore, "VVuzzeerabad, or 
*' Sealkote, Jhelum, Attok, and 
" Peshawur, — Mooltan is not 
" mentioned ; but I presume 
" that it is intended to re- 
" tain there permanently the 
" amount of force which has 
" lately been sent there in re- 
" lief." 

present form of Government, 
and other existing circum- 


I explain in my report the 
actual distribution of the force 
This I have no power to change. 
I think the distribution a good 
one, but were it the worst pos- 
sible I have no power to 
change it now, for we have no 
cover anywhere else to put the 
troops under. When I see 
the various stations — when I 
hear the reports of experi- 
enced men as to the health of 
these stations, then I shall be 
able to say whether or not I 
desire any change. Circum- 
stances must decide these mat 
ters. "What is right to-day 
may be wrong to-morrow. As 
to Mooltan being a fortified 
place, I intend, if possible, to 
visit it and make a special 
report from actual observation ; 
for I considered the position to 
be one demanding a more de- 
cided opinion than I possess 
the means of giving. But I think that Mittun Kote is a 
preferable position for a cantonment. I would not re-build the 
walls of Mooltan if they are down. 


II. " His Excellency re- 
" coHiraeuds that the five re- 
" gimeiits of irregular cavalry, 
" and five of the irregular iufau- 
" try, which have been raised 
" in the Punjaub, shall be 
" ' employed as a military 
" ' police in parts remote from 
" ' the great military stations, 
" ' and across the Indus.' " 
He adds, " As Sir H. Law- 
" rence thinks they can 
" defend the Peshawur dis- 
" tricts, I am very glad to give 
" that up to them. 

" The two preceding para- 
" graphs sum up, briefly, the 
*' recommendations of the Com- 
" mander-in-Chief under this 
" head. 

" The distribution of the 
" regular troops in the new 
" province, is a question so 
" purely military, that I should 
** desire to rely upon His 
" Excellency's judgment, and 
" to accept his recommenda- 
" tions as conclusive in this 
" matter." 

I only recommended that 
the Board should have the 
defence of the trans-Indus 
territory : 

1st. Because it was volun- 

•2nd. Because, in those terri- 
tories, I considered there was 
very little danger of inva- 
sion, except at Peshawur, 
which was provided for by 
placing a large body of regular 
troops at Attok. 

3rd. Because I thought so 
large an irregular force ought 
to do something, and I have 
hitherto seen this force do 
little or nothing, though nearly 
a year has passed since the 
conquest, and it yet seems to 
be without order or arrange- 
ment. To speak the truth, I 
see very little prospect of its 
being organised. The organi- 
sation of such a body is no 
easy operation. It requires a 
skilful military head. I see 
no such head at work. The 
distribution of these irregulars 
is as purely a military question 
as that of the regulars ; and I 
will hereafter touch upon it. 


" But I consider it necessary 
to direct His Excellency's 
especial attention to that 
portion of the Punjaub 
which is designated the 
Manjha, and which lies be 


His Lordship directs my es- 
pecial attention to that portion 
of the Punjaub dosignat<xl the 
Manjha, lying between the 
rivers Beeus and Ilavoe. This 
I shall attend to ; but I must 


tweeu the Ravee and the 
Beeas or Sutlej. The whole 
of that district is occupied 
almost exclusively by Sikhs, 
and within its bounds the 

' Sikh population as a body, 
is for the most part col- 
lected. If formidable insur- 
rection is to be apprehended, 
it is most probably within the 

' Maujha, to the North of the 

■ city of Umritzer, that it will 

■ take place. The character 
' of that population generally 

• is far too warlike, especially 
' after the addition which it 
' has lately received of large 

• bodies of discharged or fugi- 
' tive soldiers, to be securely 

• lelt to the control even of 
' the military police, which I 

'• have intimated my intention 
' of forming. It is hardly 
' necessary for me to add that 
'it is of the utmost import- 
'• ance that any attempt at 
' actual insuiTection should be 
' dealt with speedily as well as 
' vigorously ; and that the 
' means should be at hand of 
' bringing promptly to bear 
' upon the insurgents a force 
' so constituted as to ensure 
' immediate and entire suc- 
' cess. 

" I apprehend that this will 
' not be the case, if the regular 
' troops within the Barce 
' Doab are stationed exclu- 
' sively at Lahore ; especially 
' since it is now intended to 
' hold the fortress of Govind- 

be allowed to call his attention 
to a few facts, as being very 
important, because his minute 
tlu'ows upon me a very great 
proportion of responsibihty, 
which his sense of justice "w-ill 
tell him I can only accept, if 
the confidence placed in me, 
and the power entrusted to me 
are commensurate to this re- 
sponsibility. His Lordship's 
observation, calling my atten- 
tion to the state of the Manjha, 
does three things : — 

1st. It implies that I kno\«-, 
and have all along known, the 
dangerous state of the Manjlia. 

2nd. That I could make 
arrangements to prevent a 
rising there, and that I haVe 
not done so. 

3rd. That if one should 
hereafter occur, I am respon- 

Now, in j ustice to myself, I 
must protest against the as- 
sumption of any such respon- 
sibility (if I am correct in 
assuming that it is implied by 
His Lordship's expression), 1 
will therefore state why I pro- 
test against this responsibility, 
by answering these three points 

1st. I have had no informa- 
tion given to me relative to 
the state of the Manjlia till I 
received a letter from the 
Board of Administration, dated 
20th December, 1849, which 
improperly writes to me, to 
pro})ose an arrangement of the 


" gbur by a wing, instead of troops, because the Manjha is 
•• ail entire regiment, as hither- unsafe. 

" to." Now tlie Boai'd's " swjgcs- 

tions " are of no use to me as 
to the placing of troops ; none 
in the world ! But the Board, 
in this letter, for the first 
time, give me information of 
danger; and information of 
danger is what I want — not 
suggestions how to meet it. 
The next information which 
I get, and it is more full and more detailed than that which I re- 
ceived from the Board, is this ]\Iinute ! Had his Lordship, 
while at Lahore, either by letter or by word of mouth, given me 
the information I have now received, I would have explained all 
that 1 had done without having the information I ought to have 
had from the Board, and taken His Lordship's orders on what 
he wished if he thought my arrangements deficient, which I do 
not thiidv they are, as far as circumstances permit. Had I been 
summoned to his presence with Sir H. Lawrence, T could have 
replied to all I now do, for His Lordship's observations I had 
before heard from Sir H. LawTcnce, though not the detailed in- 
formation of danger now said to exist. I have already said, that 
I had no information confided to me as to the dangerous state of 
the Manjha till the date of the Board's letter, and His Lordship's 
Minute ; and that unless full information is given to me (as far 
as Government possess it) of the real state of the country, it is 
impossible for me to make other than general preparations for 
war, namely, the location of the troops so as to support each 
other. The improvement of the toiie of honourable feeling in 
the army, the maintenance of rigid discipline and the drill. 

Answer to the second ohservntion. — To the second observation, 
implying, as I read the JNIinutc, that I could make arrangements 
to prevent a rising in the Manjha, I reply thus : It is possible 
that, if I filled the ^Manjha with troops it might prevent a 
rising ; it is not prohahle, because if men are resolved to I'ise 
they can always find a place of rendezvous, where no force can 
prevent their assembling. " Where there is a will, there is a 
way." However, it is, I admit, possible. But will the l^oard, 
wlii(;h has made the suggestion be pleased to say wlici"(^ the 
soldiers are to he lodyed ? The placing troops at Adeeuanuggur 


is to murder them. By removing the troops from that place last 
autumn 1 saved many lives which would have been lost 
had His Lordship taken the opinion of the Board, instead 
of a much more competent opinion, that of Brigadier Wheeler. 
Well, failing in the inconsiderate attempt to lodge soldiers in the 
uoxious district of Adeenanuggur, the Board called for them at 
Buttala, and said there was ample accommodation for two com- 
panies. These companies were sent. They found no accom- 
modation at all ! and, after much suffering, and, for aught I 
know to the contraiy, loss of life by being exposed to the 
weather in tents during the rainy season, these two companies 
were obliged to return to Umritsur. 

It is easy for the Board to say " put 2000 men in the Manjha," 
but the Board's words are not soldiers' barracks, and therefore, it 
is not so easy " to put 2000 men in the Manjha," without a 
much gi'eater loss of life than putting down a rising by force of 
arms would cost. Believing as I do most sincerely, tliat his 
Lordship and the Board are as anxious to pi'otect the soldiers from 
pestilence as I am, I am sure that both will admit that I cannot 
pour troops into the Manjha without baiTacks are amply pro- 
vided — and none are provided ! But why should troops be 
poured into the IManjha? Merely because the Board say there 
is danger of a rising ! I have assertions. I have no proofs. 
No detailed information from spies to enable me to form my own 
judgment how to act on an emergency, when, if it occurs, all 
must depend upon that very knowledge which is withheld from me 
even at this moment ! I ought to have daily information from 
the Board, of all that passes in the Manjha and in every part of 
the Punjaub ; or I should have means given to me to acquire 
information for mj'self, which I could do, I beUeve, more 
eff(3ctually than the Board can ! However, I cannot put troops 
into the Manjha without cover. 

But I have done all that I could do. I have placed troops all 
round the Manjha. Troops at Noorpore, at Kangra, at Hajeepore, 
Mookerian, Bodeepind, Hoosheai-pore, Kurtarpore, JuUunder, 
Loodiana, Ferozepore, Lahore, Govindghur, and soon at Sealkote. 
Thus the Manjha is the centre of a girdle of troops, which can 
in a few hours, and the most distant in two marches, be poured 
in rapidly from the Jullunder and Lahore, under two of our 
ablest general officers. Sir W. Gilbert and Brigadier Wheeler. 
I therefore afiij-m that I hare made all the preparations in my 
power, for ''speedily and vigorously" suppressing an insurrection; 


and I place full confidence in the experience and abilities of the 
two general officers above named. On all these grounds I main- 
tain that I am not responsible for any insurrection, but am 
responsible for putting any such rising down, for which I have 
made the proper preparations. I also maintain that the proper 
means of preventing such insurrections, viz. a well ordered 
police, has not been established, which is one of my reasons for 
thinking the Board of Administration is a feeble government. 

I maintain that a well organised police and a well conducted 
system of espionage are the two most powerful means of ^jreren^/n^ 
an insurrection ; and should the police prove too feeble, then the 
works of the troops is to quell such a rising, the government 
keeping the commander of such troops constantly and fully 
informed, leaving it to him to take liis owti measures. A 
government that keeps me informed assists me in my duty. A 
government that " suggests" only, impedes me, and is more 
dangerous than an enemy. It destroys all system, and produces 
patch work without plan or definite object. The Manjha is on 
my plan suiTounded by troops, and the heavy force in the 
Jullundur has a bridge and many fords through which that force 
can pass into the Manjha. The Government can also provide 
boats when the river swells. I was asked what force was I'cquired 
in Govindgur? I said, and say still, the wing of a regiment; but 
I was not told till now, that large bodies of soldiers had entered 
the Baree Doab. This information, however, does not alter my 
opinion that a wing is sufficient for Govindgur ; but I shall be 
glad if quarters are constructed for a whole regiment, not at all 
as regards the defence of the Baree Doab, but because there is a 
want of barrack-room everywhere, and the more barracks that are 
constructed the greater will be the saving to Government. 

I say that for the defence of the Doab no more men are 
wanted at Govindghur than are wanted for the defence of the 
fortress. Gentlemen who wear red coats, but who are not soldiers, 
are always for a small force to march here and another there, so 
as always to bring British troops into battle with inferior num- 
bers, when proper management may give an equal or superior 
number. The courage of our troops may sometimes prevent 
disaster, but a commander has no right to make such arrange- 
ments as require such dangerous proofs of their bravery. If a 
regiment is quartered at Govindghur it could send a wing promptly, 
uo doubt, against neighbouring insurgents, and that wing mirjlit 
beat them and suffer great loss in dou)g so ; but it might also 


get cut to pieces, or it might be cut oflF, or the whole regiment 
might be blocked up in the fort. All these small detached 
bodies, scattered here and there, as with a pepper-box, are 
common devices, but are dangerous, and proofs of extreme 
ignorance in military matters. 

My object, as I endeavoured to explain in my Report — I fear 
unsuccessfully — is to have the power of attacking any enemy 
that presents himself with an overpowering force, and also a 
healthy force of strong men. I cainiot undertake to prevent 
insurrection as matters are in the Punjaub ; and I would on no 
account be held responsible for what 1 cannot do. If that is 
to be done it must be done l)y a well-organised police, well 
supported by a regular force. Should it arise I am ready to put 
rebellion down ; I have not the least doubt of doing so ; but it 
must be by concentrating the forces not by dispersing them ; 
at least I cannot do so in any other way. If it is thought I am 
wrong, I am ready to obey any orders that I receive, but I will 
not act on opinions which I think erroneous unless I am 
relieved from responsibility ; then indeed I am ready to send 
troops any where that the Board of Administration may advise. 

The troops defending the Baree Doab are not merely those 
forming the large force at Lahore. Troops can march from 
Noorpore, Hadjeepore, IMookerian, Kangra, Boodeepind, Hos- 
hearpore, Kurtarpoor, Jullunder, Loodiana, Ferozepore, Sealkote. 
The most distant post being within a circle of about sixty miles 
radius ; that is to say, two forced marches. I have marched the 
distance in twenty-four hours ; and we have within these limits 
forty-seven regiments with a due proportion of artillery. 

L. L. 

" I am not aware whether The camel corps is to be 

" His Excellency has in view applicable wherever there may 

" any particular station for the be sudden danger. It is, and 

" camel corps, which, at his has been, ever since it came 

" request, I transferred to the into the Punjaub, within a 

" Bengal establishment. My march (for the camel corps) of 

" consent to the transfer was the Manjha. If the civil ser- 

" grounded on those considera- vice do their duty, as I dare 

" tions of its peculiar consti- say they do, there can be no 

" tutions and capacities, which armed insurrection beyond 

" would appear likely to render their own strength to put 

" it of the greatest value in down without their being able 


this quarter, where disturb- 
ances are more likely to 
occur than anywhere else in 
the plains, and where force 
and rapidity of action would 
be of the greatest moment. 
I shall beg His Excellency's 
consideration of this subject, 
and shall be happy to be 
favoured with his views 


•' It certainly would have 
been satisfactory to me, if 
His Excellency's scheme for 
the distribution of so large a 
force had lirovided for the 
occupation hij the regular 
trooj^s of the frontier dis- 
tricts along the right bank 
of the river Indus. These 
districts, His Excellency pro- 
poses to leave to the irre- 
gular regiments, which have 
been recently raised. 
" With reference to tlic 
relinquishment of the Pesh- 
awur valley, also, to an 
irregular force, I conceive, 
that I am right in stating 
that Sir H. Lawrence never 
contemplated undertaking 
such a duty with the com- 
pai'atively small amount of 
force, which has been sanc- 

to give timely information to 
the Government ; and the 
camel corps, like other troops, 
would mtu"ch towards the point 
of danger. I have no other 
views about it than to quarter 
it where there is good forage 
for the camels, and where its 
great powers may be useful. 
It is ready for service when 
called upon, and as reported to 
Government. I have now 
ordered it to the Derajat, 
where it will fnid good forage ; 
and I think will be more useful 
than anywhere else. 

The principle of concentra- 
ting large bodies of troops in 
masses is that of strength. 
It is the appUcation of the 
fable of the bundle of sticks 
applied to military operations. 
Were I to provide for the oc- 
cupation, by the " regular 
" troops, of the frontier dis- 
'' tricts along the right bank of 
" the Indus," more than I have 
done, I fear I should weaken 
the regular force, injure disci- 
pline, which grows lax in 
detachments, and thus do harm 
instead of good. Both His 
Lordship and Sir II. Lawrence 
think, that, to relinquish to the 
irregular troops the districts 
beyond the Indus, would be 
unadvisable, — so do I. 1 did 
not pi'opose to do so. I pro- 
[uised to keep a large force at 


" tioned as permanent by the Attok, on the right bank ; but 
" Goverument." I have no other name to mark 

the spot so well as Attok, as a 
support to the irregulars. 

Tlai3 force would support 
every thing do^^■n the river, 
and Mooltan could support, by 
a meeting force, every thing up the river. I also told Sir H. 
Lawrence that I proposed to place the camel corps somewhere 
about Muukera, and he was to give me all the information he 
could collect ; but, some years ago I knew pretty nearly all he 
can find out. With Peshawur on the North, Mooltan on the 
South, and the camel coi-ps in the centre, at Dera Ismael Khan, 
we have also the grand support of 54,000 men dominating over 
the whole country, and by their influence supporting every tiling 
every where ! 

Let me now ask, what enemy would the troops in the Derajat 
have to encounter ? We are not in danger of invasion, unless 
from Affghanistan ; and the Affgans would come through the 
Bolan and Khyber Passes. Met at the Bolan by the force in the 
north of Scinde, also met by those in Mooltan, or, if matters are 
properly managed, by a force at Mittenkote which I believe to be 
a superior position to Mooltan. At the Khyber the Affghans 
would be met by the troops at Peshawur. The troops have been 
all exceedingly well posted by my predecessor to support these 
regular troops at Mooltan, and in the Peshawur districts : but it 
may be said, we have wild tribes in Derajat to oppose. I cannot 
believe that these tribes will rebel if the civil officers govern well. 
I have dealt with the wildest of them and found no difficulty ; 
but say, there may be partial disturbance from Bunnoo, and 
inroads from the HiUs. Well, we have an army of irregulars, 
and these would put down insurrection, and repel invasion by 
wild tribes, even although they were without support from any 
other troops. But they are not without support. They will be 
well supported, as I have shown ; and when I learn more, I can 
reinforce the camel corps at Dera Ismael Khan if necessary. 
This corps is in beautiful order, equal to any regular corps in the 
Indian army, and all tried soldiers. I must have a report on 
Dera Ismael Khan, as to its feelings, its means of defence, its 
health, &c., all which I shall take means to procure. 


" But, however, this may 
have been, I have now to 
state, on the part of the 
Government, that I cannot 
consent to confide the de- 
fence of a post, whose security 
is of the highest pohtical im- 
portance, to any in-egular 
force. Whatever it may be 
practicable to do, when an 
iron bridge shall have been 
completed across the Indus, 
1 hold strongly now the 

■ opinion which the Com- 

■ mander-in-Chief has ex- 
pressed in page 35, and I 

' would request that the 
' regular force, stationed across 
' the Indus, beyond Attok, 
' may, at present, be one capa- 
• ble of maintaining itself in 
' that ' isolated position,' as 
' His Excellency appears to 
' have originally intended." 

With reference to this para- 
graph, I do not clearly under- 
stand what is meant by " I 
" cannot consent to confiding 
•' the defence of a post, &c. to 
" any irregular force." I never 
proposed in my Report to leave 
the district solely to the defence 
of the irregular force ! On the 
contrary, there are ten regi- 
ments, and twelve pieces of 
cannon, stationed in the Pesha- 
wur district to support the 
irregular force ; and I have 
expressly said that I would not 
withdraw a man, but station 
them on the river and establish 
a tete du pont. 



The ten regiments at A or C, — reserving to myself to fix 
the station when I saw the ground, — and 4000 at B, form 
an army ready to march to the support of any part held by 
irregulars that might be attacked ; but who is to attack them ? 
People like the Eusofzyes, 10,000 of whom were defeated by 
2000 of our own men, the latter losing but five men killed ! I 
cannot help thinking that my using the word " Attok," to mark 
the point fur a bridge and large cantonment, has made His 
Lordship imagine, that I propose drawing the Peshawur Station, 
altogether to the left bank of the Indus, which never came into 
my head, not even if an iron bridge existed. 


O. 0. 

" While, as I have before If His Lordship will place 
" observed, I should have been the Avliole of the irregular 
" glad if His Excelleiu^y had force under my command, I 
" contemplated the occupation will do my best immediately to 
" of the lower trans-Indus form them and support them 
" districts by the regular effectually by their own high 
" troojis, I am prepared to state of discipline. The Scinde 
" assent to their defence being Horse and Camel Corps are 
" undertaken, if necessary, by irregulars, and I know of no 
" the irregular and local regiments of cavalry or in- 
" corps." fautry superior to them. There 

is no reason why all the new 
corps should not be equally efli- 
cient ; I think I could quickly 
make them so if His Lordship 
places them under my orders, 
and gives me the means ; but 
in their present state they appear to me an inefficient, dangerous, 
and co)isequontly a costly force. 

I am prepared should His Lordship wish me to take this 
force in hand to organise it, so that the ten new regiments shall 
give full and efficient support to the Magistracy of the Punjaub, 
and be equal to deal with any local disturbance. I should model 
them upon the same system that I did the Scinde Police, with 
such modification as their having been already formed into 
regiments requires. It would be better otherwise, but it is not 
good to make changes when it can be avoided. I should keep 
them distinct from the military, and call them Police Regi- 
ments. I should require to have an officer to command 
them, with the rank and pay of a brigadier, who ought to have 
a brigade-major and a clerk. This I think would be quite 
enough. The officer I should recommend for this would be 
Lieut.-Colonel Hodgson, as he is said to be a strict and able 
officer, somewhat severe, which is so much the better for such a 
command. His regiment is said to be in excellent order. His 
Lordship knows more of hiiu than I do, but I judge from his 
general character among military men, and I have neither met, 
nor can I hear of one with sufficient rank more fitting. 

P. P. 

" But this frontier is of The frontier referred to by 

" very great extent. His Ex- His Lordship in this paragraph 


" ceilency correctly describes 
" the population of liuunoo, 
" and the neighbouring dis- 
" tricts, as ' warlike and un- 
" ' ruly,' and, in the time of the 
" Sikhs, a little army was re- 
" requisite to keep them in 
'• submission. The passes in 
" the hills must be secured, 
" and the forts -which it has 
" been found necessary even 
" of late years to build, in 
" order to overawe these tur- 
" bulent tribes, must be gar- 
" risoncd. For all this, the 
" irregular coi-ps, weakened as 
" they must be by providing 
" for the control of Huzara 
" and other points, will ufiord 
" a very inconsiderable force." 


by us I do not know. 
I know the moral 

is about 400 miles in length. 
In the time of the Sikhs, the 
tribes were warlike and un- 
ruly; and having been, as I 
have kno-mi them to have been 
for many years, horribly tyran- 
ised over by the Sikhs, even 
past the endurance of human 
nature, a " little army " m'^^ 
necessary to hold them in 
check, as his Lordship justly 
observes. Writhing as they 
were under such cruelty six 
years ago, they sent to ask me 
to reUeve them from their suf- 
ferings, and I would go alone 
among them to-morrow and 
rule them without a British 
soldier. With this conviction 
and experience I cannot think 
that there is any great difficulty 
in oiu- holding the Derajat. 
The passes need not be secured, 
but they must be made pass- 
able by good roads. 

Why forts should have been 
I did not know that they had 

feelings of the people, and tho 
general topography of the Derajat, but I do not know the to- 
pography of this country in detail. The lu'st knowledge tells me 
that good government will do more than forts to keep those 
tribes in order, however turbulent they may now be. However, 
it is veiy possible that one or two forts may be required : one, 
for instance for a magazine in some central point, as Dera 
Ismael Khan. I hear that the Governor- General has made a 
tour there. If this be tme, it is worth a hundred forts towards 
quieting the people. As I know nothing of the disposition of 
the irregular f(jrcc alluded to by his Lordsliip, I cannot say where 
it is weak, or where strong; but I know tbat if well organised 
and well placed this force is numerous enough to keep the 
whole Punjaub in obedience, the Derajat included. If it 
cannot do this, the force is either badly placed, or badly 
comniauded, or tliero ni\ist be a general rosolution to rcbcd 


against our nile, which cannot be prevented and must end in 
another war ; which of tho three is the case I am not able 
to say. 

I have seen Major Abbott, who is in civil charge of the 
Huzara country, and he is decidedly against any additional 
troops, whether regular or irregular being sent into his district*. 

Q. Q. 

" It is true that a military A military police of 9000 

" police, amounting to 3000 cavalry and infantry, his Lord- 
" horsemen, and 6000 foot, has shij) says has been sanctioned. 
" been sanctioned. The num- I do not know if this be in 
" her appears in the aggregate addition to what I hear is the 
" considerable ; but when ap- amount of in-egulars (18,000), 
" plied to the vast area in- or that this 9000 men make a 
"eluded within the new terri- portion of the 18,000: it is 
" tory, the extent of aid which not material. His Lordship 
" it can give in deaUng with thinks the number " in the 
" rebellion or invasion beyond " aggregate considerable ; but 
" the Indus, would not be " when applied to the vast area 
" great." " included within the new 

" territory — the extent of aid 

" which it can give in dealing 

" with rebellion or invasion 

" beyond the Indus, would not be great." In answer to this I 

have to observe : 

1st. That the extent of our new territory is thinly populated, 
and the Mahomedans form half of that, and are probably friendly 
to the British rule in the Punjaub. 

2nd. That there are vast tracts, nearly deserts in this new 
territory, which require no troops at all ! For example, all the 
interior of the tracts between the rivers generally, whose banks 
only are populous. 

3rd. That the policemen, or irregulars, would have to deal 
neither with rebellion nor invasion, both of which would be met 
by an army of above 54,000 men. The whole duties of these 
18,000 military police would be simply to support the local civil 
authorities against any turbulent individuals or small bands of 
robbers that might infest a district. The Irish constabulary 
force does this. The Scinde police did this in my time, and the 

* Major Abbott held this whole district in perfect subjection 
during the war, and without any troops. He won the confidence 
of the people and they stood by him .' 


villagers generally obeyed the call, if assistance was required by 
the police. The samo ought to take place in the Derajat, — the 
whole right bank of the Indus is inhabited by people whose 
habits and manners, and language are similar from Kurrachee 
up to Attok. I know their general chai*acter perfectly. I held 
about four hundred miles of this district in perfect subjection for 


" I repeat that it is of the 
" highest political importance 
" that we should secure our- 
" selves against any circum- 
" stances which could cause 
" even a temporary relinquish- 
" ment of the ground we have 
" occupied. However tempo- 
" rary the withdrawal might 
" be, its mere occurrence 
" would spread over the coun- 
" try, as we have before seen, 
" and would be deeply injurious 
" to our position and to the 
" public tranquillity." 


I perfectly agree with his 
Lordship that it is dangerous 
to abandon territor}' even for a 
time. I think when at 
Meeanee I attacked an army 
of 35,000 men with 2000, I 
gave a pretty decided proof of 
my conviction of the danger of 
retiring before these very 
people ! To prevent such an 
occurrence as the abandon- 
ment of territory is the great 
object of my Report, and of 
all that I have said on the sub- 
ject ! There is but one system 
in my opinion by which this 
can be prevented : good and 
conciliatory government ; a well 
organized police ; troops kept 
in masses, well disciplined, 
and well placed for meeting invasion or supporting the 

His Lordship states the danger of temporary withdrawal. I 
quite agree with him, and for that very reason have opposed the 
withdrawal of a single man from the Punjaub generally, or from 
any part of it ; and so afraid am I of such a misfortune taldng 
place, that I am now opposing the very mistaken plan which the 
Board of Administration seem desirous of seeing adopted, viz. 
spreading detachments all about the country ; which is far more 
calculated to ensure the abandonment of territory, or some such 
disaster, than to keep the couutiy quiet. This system, as I have 
before said, indicates small knowledge of military matters. T 
opposed this system, which several magistrates wanted when I 


commanded the northern drstrict in England in perilous times, 
luid thus saved Manchester and Nottingham from heing attacked, 
and enahled the garrison of Sheffield to resist an attack at the 
same time that the 45th detachment fought the rehcl Frost in 

In 1842, I found it established by the politicals in Scinde, 
and by overturning it I held the country safe. I must 
always oppose a system of scattering troops as destructive to 
the discipline and safety of the army, and admirably calculated 
on the occurrence of any outbreak to cause the abandonment, 
with disgrace, of large tracts of territory. The reason is very 
simple — the enemy breaks out prepared in masses, and finds us 
spread out and prepared for defeat in detail ! But in any 
case we must abandon territory to concentrate. This alone, 
without referring to the destruction of discipline caused by such 
a dissemination of the tx'oops, is of itself an immense evil, and 
full of danger. 


" If then the trans-Indus 
districts are to be held by 
the irregular corps, it is, in 
my judgment indispensable 
that they should lie aided by 
the presence of artillery 
across the river, and pro- 
vided with sufficient support 
upon this side." 


Of course no one can doubt 
it for a moment. 

" As the distribution stands 
at present, no support, how- 
ever urgently required, could 
be given, without a very 
considerable delay. It has 
not been proposed to place 
any troops in the Scinde 
Sanger Doab, from its extre- 
mity to the Salt range. None 
in the Chuch Doab ; none 
in the lower Rechna Doab ; 


I have already shown that 
full support can be given to 
the troops in the Derajat, if 
those troops are well dis- 
ciplined and properly placed. 
This is one of those places 
for which I wanted the 
camel coi-ps, and only kept it 
at Goojerat till I could see it, 
to ascertain the state of dis- 
cipline it is in, which I have 


" and I presume that not done, and find it excellent. It 
'■ mucli could safely be spared has now marched for Dera 
" from the force at Mooltan." Ismael Khan, — its remaining 

there cannot be finally settled 
till I know more as to the 
health of the place, and what 
forage these is. It must be re- 
collected that I have no information given me. I knew nothing, 
absolutely nothing of these irregular corps ; and I cannot arrange 
for the support of troops of whose state and locality I am utterly 
ignorant. The thing is impossible. I can either take the whole 
under my orders, or I can defend the Derajat with regular troops 
by establishing new stations — a work of time, and care, and cost ; 
or I can give up all interference with the right bank and merely 
place reserves where the Board wish : so doing I cannot be re- 
sponsible for what may happen, whether good or evil, but I will 
do whatever the Governor- General orders to the best of my ability. 
I cannot, and am sure he does not expect me to take responsi- 
bility except for my own measures. If the Governor-General 
gives over the whole defence of the Derajat to me, I will imme- 
diately recall all ill-formed regiments and relieve them by good 
troops. As to the Doab mentioned by his Lordship as defence- 
less, I have to observe, — 

1st. That " the Scinde Saugor Doab, from its extremity to the 
Salt Range," is, generally speaking, a desert. It requires no 
regular force, nor would it be possible there to station one with- 
out an enormous expense, which outlay would in no shape be 
remunerated by any advantage of which I am aware. 

2nd. " None in the Chuch Doab." — No, — none, and for pretty 
nearly the same reasons. No invader can enter there; it has 
much desert, and is dominated by Lahore, Wuzeerabad and 
Jhelum. What large body of insurgents could collect there ? 
None. The Board and his Lordship's minute both say, that 
all the dangerous Sikhs are in the Maiijha, far from, and uncon- 
nected with the Doab between the Jhelum and Chcnaub. 1 
repeat that no danger can arise there, and no regular troops can 
be there placed, without great expense. 

3rd. " None in the Lower Rechna Doab." — No, — none. It 
also is nearly a desert ; and no regular troops could bo there 
placed without gi'eat expense, and there is no object to bo 
gained — Mooltan and Lahore completely command this waste, for 
such it has been fx'om the time of Alexander to this day. 

The inhabitants of all tlicse Doabs live along the banks of the 
£ £ 


rivers whicli hound them ; and along the banks alone are people and 
cultiviitioii foinul. — These long strips of population must be kept 
in order by a police, and this is easily done ; but surely stations 
of regular troops would be utterly misplaced in such positions. 
The character of these Doabs is to be high between the rivers, 
deficient in water, and therefore without much cultivation. 


It is not for me to dictate to 
the Governor-General, if he 
tliinks that the 18,-562 irregular 
troops and some twenty or 
thirty pieces of cannon are not 
sufficient to hold these misera- 
ble tribes in subjection. I can 
only say, that those whom he 
has entrusted with the direction 
of this Army must mismanage 
their troops ; for 1 would stake 
my life upon doing it with half 
this force, with proper civil 
government. Wliile writing 
this a retuni has been sent to 
me, from which I now see the 
numbers and stations of these 
troops. But I have as yet had 
no time to study them, or form 
any idea of the propriety of 
the latter; neither do I know 
the state of their discipline, 
drill, arms, appointments, 
clothing and composition. 

" Guided by past experience, 
and by a knowledge of the 
nature of these districts, I do 
not consider that they can be 
safely held, as suggested, by 
the irregular corps, unless 
these are accompanied by 
a field battery in Bunnoo 
and the Northern portions, 
and by another field batteiy 
at Dera Ghazee Ivlian and 
the Southern portions ; — the 
whole being supported by a 
station resembling that at 
Jhelum, at some point upon 
the Eastern side of the river 

" The position of canton- 
ments, the maintenance and 
repair of forts to be occupied 
by troops, and the fortifica- 
tions of Lahore, &c. are de- 
tails on which his Excel- 
lency proposes to report 
officially, after he shall have 
visited them severally. They 
need not, therefore, be ad- 
verted to at present. 
" I am verj' desirous of 
coming to a definite conclu- 
sion on this subject before I go to sea. The necessity for 
my going has already been the source of much vexation to me, 
and the feeling is greatly aggravated, by my finding myself 
unable to remain at Lahore, in order to settle these details in 


" more close communication than is now practicable. I tmst, 
" however, that the several points, which, as yet remain un- 
" decided, may be speedily adjusted. They are as follows :" — 

" 1st. Having acquiesced in 
" the recommendations of the 
" Commander-in-Chief, respect- 
" ing the amount of force to 
" bo stationed in the Punjaub, 
" and the general distribution 
" thereof, I beg to be favoured 
" with his E.N;cellency's con- 
" sideration of the views I have 
" expressed, as to the suffi.- 
" ciency of the force, as now 
" placed, for acting speedily on 
'• any formidable rising among 
" the Sikhs in the Upper 
" Manjha, — an event which I 
" do not regard as probable ; 
" but which is very possible." 

His Lordsliip desires me to 
say, what consideration I have 
given to the defence of the 
Upper Manjha. My answer is 
as follows : — 

1st. There is a largo body 
of troops at Lahore. 

2nd. There aro other large 
bodies of troops in the Jul- 

3rd. There is the wing of a 
regiment at Noorpore, and 
another at Kangra. These, 
and all beyond, north of the 
Beas, are placed under Sir 
Walter Gilbert, who has a per- 
fect knowledge of the country 
and the people ; whose head- 
quarters are at Lahore, and he 
can, in two marches, reach any 
point of the Upper Manjha. 
4th. Being at Lahore, he is 
at the seat of Government ; and, if kept properly informed of 
every thing that passes, of all the Board of Administration 
hear, and of all ihey report to the Governor-General — as he 
certainly ought to be or he cannot make his arrange- 
ments — then he can before an outbreak occurs move in force 
with his troops to the point in danger, of which he must be the 
best judge. If he is to consult with the Board of Administra- 
tion, I have no doubt that all kinds of accidents will happen, 
as is generally the case when a council directs the movements of 

5tli. I have given both Generals Gilbert aifd Wheeler distinct 
instructions to seek for and attend to all information which tlie 
civil authorities can give to them ; and to be prompt in putting 
down insurrection, keeping a sharp look out as ta what passes in 
the Manjlin. 


Oth. There is one liridge and eight or ten fords over the 
Beas ; and Brigadier Wheeler can pass his force at one or 
many points, over the Beas, into the Manjha during the winter. 

7th. I have ordered the American pontoons also to be sent 
to him, which wall arrive before the swelling waters destroy the 
bridge and fords. There are also boats in abundance. 

8th. To station forces in the Upper Manjha after the waters 
rise would be to destroy the troops by disease ; before that time, 
there is no need ! However, this must be as the Governor- 
General pleases, and if he decides on the plan of the Board of 
Administration new stations must be built in an unhealthy 
district. I will, on my return from Peshawur — when I mean to 
go through all that country — make my report to his Lordship. 
I have always said that, if healthy, I consider Noorpore a 
proper position to station a strong force, as being a frontier 
post on the Maharajah's territories. It is with regard to 
his Highness's power that I propose this, not to insurrection, 
which I never cease to repeat, is only to be prevented by good 


I can, at present, see no 
better position than Dera 
Ismael Khan for a central 
force in the Derajat. To this 
place I have, as before stated, 
ordered the camel corps ; and 
ordered Major Michell to make 
his report to me upon it. 

There should be a report 

made by some experienced 

medical officer upon this place, 

but I have no power to send 

them. Tlie Commander-in- 

Cliief in India has not the 

authority necessary to fulfil the 

duties of his position in this, 

and many other matters, as I have personally stated to his 

Lordship more than once ; but 1 do not mean l)y this, that I 

am denied any support — quite the contrary. I complain of the 

system, which I think objectionable ; and, had not his Lordship 

given me the support which he has, I would not have remained 

" 2nd. If his Excellency 
" should still prefer, that the 
" trans- Indus districts of the 
" Derajat and Bunnoo should 
" be held by the irregular 
" corps, under the conditions 
" which I have stated, as those 
" on which I could consent to 
" the measure, I should wish 
" to know where the support- 
" ing force would be placed." 


a month iu India. But I have to thank him, not the system, 
for tliat support ! If his Lordship re piires that new stations 
should be formed in the Doabs and in the Derajat, he has only 
to order them ; but it is clear that it was impossible for me to 
form these since my arrival, as tliere are no means witliin my 
reach, even had I thought they were necessary, which, as before 
said, I do not. 

The military occupation of a country, if it be done at once, 
requires the full and uncontrolled power of the commander, with 
full means at his disposal, and it requires also very great 
experience and ability to do it. If it be done by consultation, as 
in the present case, after a year has passed, the troops holding 
the ground on which the accidents of the war had placed them, 
then the alFair is one of time and examination, and the Governor- 
General has two sources of information, the Board of Adminis- 
tration and the Commander-in-Chief of the Army. I have, 
personally much respect for the Members of the Board, and in 
their civil capacity, for aught I know to the contrary, their 
abilities may be great and their exertions successful : but I 
consider their militaiy views to be erroneous and dangerous ; for, 
though I have no doubt but that the bravery of the troops will 
carry them victoriously through all encounters, it is my business 
to place them so that their known valour may not be put to such 
unfair, and at times disastrous trials. We have seen some 
20,000 men at the lowest calculation destroyed at Cabul, — a 
small force cut off to a man in the Boogtee Hills — another force 
utterly defeated iu the same hills with other disasters equally 
shameful, all arising from civilians or ignorant officers in civil 
employment pretending to direct militaiy operations, which, 
wearing a red coat and holding a commission does not make 
every man capable of doing ; on the contrary, very few men are 
capable of this. I do not know one man among the military 
employed in political situations under Government who has an 
idea of conducting military oj)erations. Tiierc are many clever 
men, and I believe they are all brave soldiers, but they arc not, 
in my opinion, either generals or statesmen. 

Witnessing the disgraceful and melancholy facts above alhnled 
to, and which have happened in the last ten years, it is impossible 
for me to conceal from his Lordship a single opinion which 1 
liold, or I should render myself responsible for any misfortune 
that should hereafter happen to our arms. The Board of 
Administration have, apparently, called out to his JiOrdship for 


troops here, and troops there ; but I ask where are the barracks 
for them ? I have already said, that the Board ouce stated to 
his Lordship that there were baiTacks for two companies at 
Battala. On the faith of that statement, two companies were 
sent to Battahi, and tlierc was not accommodation for a man ! 
These companies after much suffering returned to Umritzur ! I 
reported tlais to the Governor-General, but I never heard more 
upon the subject ! Of course, I cannot now attach faith to any 
statement made as to cover for troops by the Board, as I cannot 
risk the health and the lives of soldiers upon reports so ill-judged 
and groundless as that relative to Battala. 

The supporting force for the Derajat is the chain of stations, 
Peshawur, Attok, Rawul Pindco, Jhelum, Wuzzeerabad, Lahore, 
and Mooltan ; and the proper discipline and location of the large 
body of irregular troops quartered in the Derajat, which is 
sufficient, if properly handled, to keep a country double the size 
of the Derajat in subjection. 


" 3rd. In that event the 
question must be determined, 
under whose orders the ir- 
regular corps are to be. 
" In the minute, authorising 
their organization, I stated 
that, on their completion, 
they should be considered as 
under authority of the Com- 
" Expressions in His Excel- 
lency's report induce me to 
suppose that, in the event of 
their being employed as ho 
has suggested, he contem- 
plates their becoming what 
are called civil corps, and 
being placed under the orders 
of the Board of Adminis- 

" It is necessary that this 
■ point should be clearly as- 
' ccrtained, and I therefore 


This rests with his Lordship. 
His " mimUe authorising their 
" organization places them, on 
" completion, under the Com- 
" mander-in-Chief," and I am 
perfectly ready to take them. 

The expressions in my Report 
refer to circumstances which 
can only be determined by the 

They are these : — 

1st. If there is to be a jwlice 
under the civil power, and I 
hold that such a force is neces- 
sary, for without it the Punjaub 
will sooner or later be in dis- 
order ; then I think the whole 
irregular force ought to be 
under the exclusive orders of 
the Commander-in-Chief, be- 
cause / know — I do not think, 
or imagine, or conjecture — but 
I know that if the civil power 


" request to be favoured with in India may interfere with the 
" his Excellency's opinion, military tho public service will 
" whether tho corps in question suffer by their jarring. This 
" should bo placed, as con- ought not to be, neither ought 
" templated in the original any evil to exist ; but so it is, 
" minute, under the orders of and no human power can pre- 
" the Commander-in-Chief, or vent it. 

*' under those of tho Board of 2nd. If there be wof a police, 
" Administration. let the uregular force be ap- 

(Siytied) " J. Dalhousie." plied to the duties which police 

battalions ought to perform ; 
and let a brigadier bo appointed 
to command the whole as head 
of tlie police ; and let him be 
under the control of the Com- 
mander-in-Chief, or of the 
Board of Administration, as his Lordship thinks best. My own 
opinion is that tlie Commander-in-Chief is best, because he will 
maintain a system of regularity and discipline that the Board 
will not be able to do ; and I always considered that the value 
of the police in Scinde depended more on the tone and spirit 
instilled into the corps than on any thing else, and that no 
body of magistrates can effect — it is impossible. I speak with 
perfect disinterestedness, for the formation of this body of 
irregulars will give me much trouble ; but which trouble I am 
ready to take as an imperious public duty ; for as matters now 
stand I do not think that this large body of irregular troops 
is of much use. On the contrary, I think they are dangerous. 
If made over to me, as in tho first minute of the Governor- 
General was contemplated, I should at once organize and place 
them in proper positions for securing the tranquillity of the 

I hear there has been a battle in Bunnoo, but I have as 
yet had no report of it : all these matters I will endeavour to 

Knowing the character of the whole of tliat tract of country 
called the Derajat, I can assure his Lordship that he may 
always expect inroads from tho mountains. Having full power 
I prevented this in Scinde ; but I do not think, with less 
power than T possessed in Scinde, it can be prevented by any 
one, in the mountains which bear iq)on tho i )(iiiiat ; nollihi;/ can 
prevent it, short of systematic attacks on the lull tiibis, *.iirh as 


1 made uii the Boogtee Hills, and a system of government suited 
to the Punjaub. If the Governor-General orders me, according 
to his first intentions, to take the new corps under my orders, 
I will— 

1st. Appoint a proper oilicer selected for the service as 
brigadier to the whole force, and give him an active brigade 
major and a clerk. This will ensure the exact execution of 
my orders. 

2nd. I will complete and organize these regiments, reporting 
to his Lordship any officers who are either incompetent or 
without zeal, and whose regiments are, therefore, not in the 
state of discipline which they ought to be. 

3rd. I will apply to the Board of Administration to say, 
where it apprehends danger, I conclude the Manjha and 
Bunnoo to be the two where there is apprehension. However, 
where they apprehend danger there shall they find support, as 
far as a government so unsuited to the people ai'e supported. 

4th. I will study the question as to the security of the 
Uerajat, a question with which I am tolerably fiimiliar, because, 
as I have before said, it is a continuation of that strip of ter- 
ritory which runs along the whole western com'so of the Indus 
from Attok to Kurrachee. I refer to the right bank; there 
neither is nor can be danger on the left ; if the people are well 
treated they will not rise ; they have no support from moun- 
taineers and no mountains whei'ein to seek refuge however dis- 
contented they may be. Having now seen a good deal of this 
province I feel satisfied that it is much more easy to govern than 
Scinde, because on the left bank of the Indus there are no 
mountains for refuge, except in the Huzara district. The in- 
fluence of the troops dominates over the whole. Goolab Sing is 
detested, and can influence none but the disbanded Sikh troops ! 
From him, and him alone, may danger be expected on the 
eastern side of the Indus at the present moment — no one else 
has means. I think him powerful and dangerous in the extreme : 
he will oblige us to keep a large force in the Punjaub, and this 
force will drain the Indian treasury ; it would be wise, on the 
first occasion, to undo the injustice which we committed on the 
unhappy people of Cashmere when we placed them under this 
man's rule ; we ought to pay him back the purchase money, and 
take Cashmere from him. The bargain would be a great gain to 
the Company, and a blessing to the people of that unhappy 



When the post of Commander-in-Chief was accepted by me, 
expecting war in the Punjaub, I applied through the Duke of 
Wellington to the India Board, for the services of Lieutenant 
Wood of the Indian NaAy, to form a pontoon train, and his 
Grace took great pains to obtain for me the services of that 
skilful officer, but the Court of Directors refused ! I was, how- 
ever, allowed to send out some newly- invented inflated com- 
position rafts, which the Duke saw, and approved of for experi- 
ment. They are now come, and answer so far that I have been 
on them with a gun, and they seem capable of bearing a great 
weight. Whether they will eventually be found to answer, or 
not, I am not prepared to say. 

In the meantime, and after having seen most part of the 
Punjaub, and crossed all its river's, my conviction is more strong 
than ever, that both for peace and war, for militaiy movements, 
and for the demands of the Civil Government of the Punjaub a 
large and effective pontoon train should be formed under the 
command of an expert naval officer, with not less than seven 
divisions of seamen under his command, each division consisting 
of as many men and boats, &c. as may hereafter be decided : 

J St Division, stationed at Attok. 

2nd ,, „ at Jhelum. 

3rd ,, „ at Wuzzeerabad, or Sealkote. 

4 th ,, ,, at Lahore. 

5th „ ,, at Hurreekee. 

Gth „ ,, at Kallabag. 

7th „ „ on the River Beas. 

The station should always be as high up the current as found 
convenient, as boats could be the more easily floated down. The 
boats, the armament, and all belonging to such an establishment, 
should be arranged in the most perfect manner ; and till such 
a pontoon train be formed the full resources of the Punjaub 
will not, in ray opinion, be drawn fortli ; nor will an army be 
able to act with the freedom wliich such an establishment would 
give to its operations. 

To bridge the rivers in the Punjaub may be practicable by 
means of arched viaducts for one hundred, or one hmuhrd and 
twenty miles, running down U\nn high-water mark to the low- 
water mark, and then inniu'cting these viaducts witli a bridge ; 
but it is not in thcbC days that such great works can be performed. 


and until they be pei-fornietl, an estaWishracnt for pontoons, 
that call place and remove floating bridges rapidly when the 
water is low and attend to the femes when the floods come 
down, is, in my opinion essential to the good government of the 

Attok, Peshawuk, and Kohat. 

I have examined carefully all this country, and have made up 
my mind that Peshawur is the only proper place for the military 
station in tliis district*. 

1st. Because the town is a very large one. The civil power 
must therefore reside there. 

2nd. The magistrate and the town must be protected from the 
mountaineers of the Khyber and Affreedee hills ; all living by 

3rd. If the station was anywhere but in Peshawur a second 
station must be formed to protect it. Thus would the troops be 
divided and the expense be doubled. 

4th. It not only guards the entrance to or rather exit from 
the Khyber Pass, but also that to Kohat. If placed elsewhere 
it would be inconvenient. 

5th. The recent quarrel with the AfFreedee tribes has rendered 
all communication with Kohat dangerous ; and it is likely to 
continue so, unless proper means are taken. 

6th. I therefore decide on Peshawur as the proper position for 
the station across the Indus in this district. 

7th. I also decide that the west side of the town is the proper 
place for the cantonment. It appears that all the troops there 
quartered were veiy healthy all the past year. Whereas those 
quai-tered in the fort and the Wuzzeora Bhaug were very un- 
healthy. Everything concurs to make the West side of the 
town the proper place for troops, as far as our medical men's 
experience goes. 

8th. The Citadel of Peshawur ought to bo immediately re- 
paired. To do this will not be expensive, and I have desired 
Lieutenant-Colonel Tremenheere to make a report and estimate 
of the work. 

'■• If it be wise to hold any territory beyond the Indus, which 
is a doubtful question. 



I visited Kohat. It stands in a plain, has an old citadel 
which completely protects the town, and ought to he immediately 
repaired, without much expense. A few guns should he mounted, 
the fort well cleaned out, and a small magazine built. The idea 
of building a work farther advanced in the plains is too puerile 
to need remark. I have desired Lieutenant-Colonel Tremen- 
heere to make a report on, and an estimate of the cvpense of 
repairing the Citadel of Kohat. 

The Pass. 

The Pass must now he fortified. I see no reason why we 
should have had any quarrel with the AfFrcedee tribe. But the 
mischief is done ; blood has been foolishly shed and no choice 
is left. We must command the Pass and the defdo leading 
thereto for many miles, or the communication with Kohat is 

I have therefore, after much consideration, ordered Lieutenant- 
Colonel Tremenheero to prepare the plan of a Serai with two 
towers, thus : — 

Each tower is to hold twelve 
men, &c., and be prepared 
for its own separate defence, 
so that the Serai may bo 
abandoned, and the towers 
prevent any one entering, as 
they would be shot from tho 
towers. Each tower would have a piece of cannon, so that 
twenty-four men could defend the Pass. While, if danger pressed, 
the wing of a regiment of infantry could be quartered in the 
Serai. I much fear that twelve more towers at least will bo 
required to secure tho communication along tho defile. How- 
ever they will not be expensive, but they will demand a police 
to occupy them. If my opinion is of any weight, I should say, 
pay tho Affreedee chiefs double what they ask to defend the Pass. 
They ask GOOO rupees a year; I would give them 1J2,0(J0. It 
is only by generosity that such tribes can be kept in order, in 
such circumstances. These people will give trouble unless this 
couree be taken, and tho salt tax placed on its ancient fcioting. 
These are civil matters, hut unless well regulated Kohat is cut 



off. Nothing can pass that defile witliout being fired upon by 
the mouutaineei's. 


Tliis town is defended by a mere wall with towers and is com- 
manded on all sides ; but it is important as being placed on the 
most suitable position for passing the Indus, and for the con- 
struction of a bridge, for which this is generally allowed to be 
the most eligible place. 

I proposed that six Martcllo towers should be placed on the 
heights which command this fortress and town, which I have 
marked in the plan A, B, C, D, E, F. 

A commands the fortress at li50 yards distance, and all the 
other adjacent heights on the left bank of the Indus. 

B commands the fortress at 020 yards distance, and a small 
tower there would, I think, be useful. 

C commands the fortress at 540 yards, and a low hill under 
it, fi'om which the enemy breached the western side of the for- 
tress when defended by Lieutenant Herbert*. This is an im- 
portant place I think for a large tower, to hold four or six guns. 
It commands the road from Kawul Pindee, and the gorge G, 
between the heights H, K. 

D. On this height I would also place a small tower with one 
gun, because, unless occupied, a besieging force would in the 
night pass a force under cover of the heights D, H, and place a 
battery to play upon the bridge, M. 

On the right bank of the river I would place a strong tower at 
E, which commands, in reverse, the whole fortress of Attok, at 
1580 yards. This height also commands all the others, in reach 
of fort, on the right bank of the Indus. 

E. This height commands the town and fortress, and also the 
fort of Karibad, on which the besiegers established a battciy 
against Lieutenant Herbert. This tower I would make strong. 

I would repair the fort of Kairabad, and fortify the Serai on 
the left bank. 

I also consider that a large tcte-de-pont ought to be thrown 
up on the right bank. This need not be expensive. A mere 
high wall of stone, with loop-holes, would be sufficient. The 

* An intrepid young ullicer distinguished by liib defence of 


stone abounds on tlie spot, ciud of that strong sliito wliicli iv 
quires no cutting or blasting. 

The whole expense of these works I have requested Lieut.- 
Colonel Tremenheere to estimate, and I will forward it, when 
received to the Governor-General : I apprehend that a lac 
of rupees would cover all. 

I think that barracks should be built here for three regiments 
of Native Infantry. One in the fortress, and two on the right 
bank of the river. They should be divided between the fortress, 
the Serai, the tete-du-pont, and the towers. 

By the foregoing means the passage of the Indus at Attok 
will be made safe, whether war should come from Goolab Sing in 
the east, or the Affghans on the west, or both together The vast 
importance of this passage requires no comment, it is obvious ; 
and its importance becomes tenfold, if the Government means 
to keep the district of Peshawur. 

I should have made a sojourn of some days at Attok but the 
expedition to Kohat has delayed me, and the hot weather 
approaches fast, so as to leave mc but little time for examining 
the Manjha and Jullundcr Doab. 

In concluding these remarks I have to observe, that there may 
be some discrepancies in them, and some diiTering in degree from 
those given in my original Eeport. If so, these arise from my 
having seen the localities of which I speak ; whereas, in my Re- 
port, and in the commencement of these remarks, I had not, 
and was obliged to speak from what I heard from others. 

I will not detain this paper to examine and compare it with 
the Picport, as it would add to the delay which has, neccssarihj, 
taken place, for a subject so serious cannot be written off without 
due consideration and examination. Ckyiv,'iQ>th February, 1850. 

It may be liere observed in support of the vicAvs 
taken in this memoir and maintained in the repli- 
cation, that some of the dangers pointed out have 
been since incurred on the eastern frontier. A 
war witli Burmah has taken phice. On the 
western frontier the mountain tribes have been 
provoked to hostilities, not only in front of 
Peshawur but along the Derajat ; isolated expe- 
ditions have been, and continue, to be sent against 


them, with the barbarous instruction to slay and 
burn but without any solid success; and it is 
probable that this petty but tedious, harrassing 
and cruel warfare, which has now lasted more 
than three years will finally demand a great and 
regular invasion of their fastnesses, perhaps an 
unavailing one, or the abandonment of the right 
bank of the upper Indus. Here however are two 
wars going on at opposite frontiers of India — 
one of them a great war — and in neither has the 
Commander-in-Chief appeared as leader or adviser. 
Are then the great military interests, of which the 
Commander-in-Chief is the legitimate guardian, 
still made the sport of ignorant civilians and 
beardless politicals 1 It would seem so by the 
results, especially in Burmah, where the Dal- 
housie generalship has certainly not triumphed 
over the enemy, whatever it may have done over 

No. 3. 
Extract of a letter from Lieutenant Wood. " I 
" feel it a duty I owe to tell you a plain story, and 
" that in a few words. After you left I waited 
" on the authorities of the Horse Guards. Lord 
" Fitzroy Somerset gave me a letter to Mr. Water- 
" field of the Board of Control, and that gentleman 
*' sent me with a note to the India House. There 
" I was told that the Directors had no power 
" to originate a single appointment in India, 
" but that every new appointment there must 
" emanate in the first place from the Governor- 
" General. On returning to the War Office 
" Lord Fitzroy Somerset said ' Tell Mr. Water- 
" ' field that we think the President of the Board 


" ' should give Mr. Wood a letter to the Governor- 
" ' General with a copy of the Duke's letter, for 
" ' (he added) we think Sir Charles Napier entitled 
" ' to every assistance which can be given him.' 
" The reply was, ' Sir John Ilobhouse will give 
" ' Lieutenant AVood such a letter, but thinks 
" ' Lieutenant Wood had better not take it.' I 
" -svill not trouble you with further details Sir 
" Charles, a host of difficulties are conjured up to 
" deter me from going ; the meaning of all which 
" amounts to this. ' Lieutenant Wood may go if 
" ' he likes at his own risk and expense, but we 
" ' will do nothing to aid him. Had it rested 
" ' with the Horse Guards I should have followed 
" ' you out next mail ; but the Board of Control 
" ' chose to view it as a mere personal matter of 
" ' my own. Not so Lord Fitzroy Somerset' " 

No. 4. 

Extract of a letter from Lieutenant Herbert 
Edwards to the President at Lahore. 

" Sep. 2nd 1848. Under these circumstances, 
" I have thought it my bounden duty to take on 
" myself the very great responsibility of assuring 
" all the regular troops of Maharajah Duleep 
" Sing, now under my command, that if the 
" conduct of the Sikh nation should oblige 
" the British Government to declare the treaty 
" null and void, and to annex the Punjaub to 
" Ilindostan, every soldier who to the last shall 
" have faithfully performed his duty to the 
" Maharajah shall 2>^ss as a matter of course into 
" the service of our Government, and enjoy the 
" sam^ privileges as he now does. I beg to assure 


you that I have not been induced to take this 
step from observing the smallest sign of disaf- 
fection in the troops alluded to." 

No. 5. 

The following documents exhibit the interference 
of the civil with the military service on the most 
delicate points ; and the presumptuous conduct of 
military men invested with civil power, independent 
of their commanders. The dates and subjects 
show that the reduction of the Sepoys' pay which 
caused the mutiny, was here entrusted to a captain 
who was to act without the cognizance of the 
General commanding. (Mere formalities are sup- 

Station orders hy Brigadier Hearsey^ Wuzzeerahad, 
Friday 6th July 1849. 

Captain Campbell, Paymaster of the Punjaub, 
will for the future make known to the Brigadier 
commanding all orders or circulars he may receive 
from the Auditor-General, regarding any change 
that may be contemplated in the pay and allow- 
ances of the force now stationed at Wuzzeerabad ; 
and if no reference to higher authority on these 
points is necessary the Brigadier will make 
known such charge in station orders to officers 
commanding corps and attachments; until such 
are published in station orders any circulars com- 
manding officers may receive from the Pay Office 
are not to be attended to, but are to be forwarded 
for the consideration of the Brigadier. 

Those lately sent by the Paymaster, as directed 
by the Auditor-General to commanding officers, 
regarding Scinde allowances, &c. have been referred 


through Su' W. R. Gilbert to his Excellency the 
Commander-in-Chief. When a reply is received it 
will be pnblished to the force. 

Brigadier Hearsey to the Deputy-Assistant 
Adjutant' General. 

Cantonment^ Wuzzeerahad, \2th July^ 1849. — T 
have the honour to acknowledge your letter, &c., 
enclosing one from Captain Campbell, and calling 
on me for an explanation of the circumstances 
therein adverted to, for the information of Sir W. 
Gilbert, commanding the Punjaub division. I 
enclose copies of letters and orders prepared some 
days ago to forward, but a severe iUness (cholera) 
prevented my so doing. 

May I be permitted humbly to state, that either 
I must consider myself responsible for the content- 
ment and good behaviour in all respects of those 
under my command, as far as insuring it is in my 
power, or I must be relieved of that onus. 

If an authority is permitted to be in the vicinity 
of my cantonment, having power to issue orders to 
officers commanding regiments on so delicate a 
point as the pay and allowances of the men, of 
which I am not even to he apjmsed — nay ! suck 
orders are expected hy this authority to he circulated 
in my station orderly hook without my consent heing 
asked or granted — I have only to consider myself a 
nullity instead of commanding officer. 

It was on tliis point I first made known my 
sentiments to Captain Campbell, and then sent him 
my letter 26th June. I received no reply, but the 
Military Auditor-Generals last circular was sent to 
officers commanding regiments to act upon, witliout 
any public report being made tt> me by Captain 
Campbell of liis having done so. 

F V 


Finding this had occurred I issued the station 
order 6th July he complains of, deeming myself 
fully justified in doing so. A copy of it was sent 
to Captain Campbell. He has thought proper to 
deem my issuing orders an interference with him 
in his Divisional capacity of Paymaster, and 
as setting aside instructions he has received 
from Lieutenant-Colonel Goldie, Military Auditor- 

If Lieutenant-Colonel Goldie, or Captain Camp- 
bell are responsible persons for the contentment and 
good behaviour of the troops I bow obedience, and 
own I am wrong; but if the men refuse their pay and 
allowances in consequence of deductions being 
made without orders sent from the Governor- 
General and the Commander-in-Chief, and such 
orders, under the instructions from the Major- 
General commanding the division being fully 
explained on parade to them, I must either acquiesce 
in such mutinous conduct, until reference on the 
subject is made to head quarters, or I must make 
them take it under terror of military punishment. 

The onus or responsibility would then fall on 
me, and the cause of such disobedience (the Auditor- 
General's circular) would not even be adverted to. 

May I be pardoned if I honestly avow I do not 
understand this Government within a Government. 
I am ready and willing at all times to obey 
authority, but I do not deem Colonel Goldie such 
authority until the Governor-General or Com- 
mander-in-Chief directs all orders from that officer, 
regarding pay and allowances of the men, addressed 
to commanding officers of regiments without my 
knowledge are to be immediately obeyed. 

I now deem it my duty after two months' expe- 


rience to bring publicly to the notice of the Com- 
mander-in-Chief that Captain Campbell's residence 
is six and a-half miles from the cantonment, thus 
causing double guards over treasure — here and at 
his quarters ; double responsibility for treasure ; 
which I have been informed by the Adjutant- 
General — should any loss occur — would fall on me; 
besides the continual small escorts passing to and 
fro from his house with pay for troops, as also with 
treasure tumbrils. 

All this responsibility is on my shoulders for his 
personal convenience, and I beg to be relieved from 
it, by Captain Campbell being ordered within the 
limits of cantonment, or being permitted to go to 
any other station in the Trans Eavee territory he 
may fix upon. — J. R. Hearsey, Brigadier, &c. 

No. 6. 

In " the Statistical Papers relating to India," 
presented to Parliament 1853 will be found, page 
85, the following passage. 

" Tlie attention of Government has been extended 
" to the improvement of the newly-acquired province 
" of Scinde, and amongst the public ivorks con- 
" structed in this territory may be mentioned Kur- 
" rachee Mole and road at an expense of 
" £.30,961." 

The effrontery of this is almost incredible. Sir 
C. Napier designed, commenced, and nearly 
finished the mole and road ; but when he left 
Scinde, " Government,''' with scoffs through their 
organs at the ruin of his projects, stopped the 
work ! 

Again, at page 87. 

" On the Indus also the Government have esta- 


" blished steam-vessels for the conveyance of both 
" poods and passengers from Kurrachee to Mooltan, 
''■ and picrpose extending the line to Kalahagh on the 
" Indus ^ and to Jhelum on the river of that 
" name.''' 

Sir C. Napier established steam-vessels for the 
purpose above-named, they were in full activity 
with an enormously increasing trade when he left 
Scinde ; but then, " Governinenf immediately took 
away the steamers and stopped the trade ! ! 
Can effrontery go further ? Yes ! 
The Directors and their partizans, have diligently 
inculcated, publicly and privately, the notion that 
Scinde is a heavy burthen on their revenue. The 
habitual expressions are " The costly annexation of 
" Scinde,'' — " The Directors owe nothing to Sir C. 
" Napier for fastening a7i unprofitable province on 
" them." Yet with these words on their lips their 
hands have presented to Parliament without tremb- 
ling the following report relative to only one branch 
of the many profits derived from the decried 
conquest, viz. opium. The smuggling of that drug 
through Scinde had reduced the value of their 
passes for private traffic to 125 rupees per chest 
in 1835. Mark the rise after the conquest of 
Scinde, as admitted in the following extract from 
the same statistic papers, page 74. 

" The subjugation of Scinde afforded opportunity 
" for the levy of a higher rate. Down to the period 
" of that event a large portion of the opium of 
" Malwa had been conveyed through Scinde to 
" Kurrachee and thence onwards to the Portuguese 
" ports of Diu and Demaun. The route was now 
" closed and it was reasonably expected that an 
" advance might be made in the charge of passes, 


" without risk of loss to the revenue from a dimin- 

" ished demand for them. The rate was accord- 

*' inffJjj increased in October 1843, /)*o?/i 125 rupees 

" to 200 rupees per chest ; upon the principle that it 

" was desirable to fix the imce at the highest amount 

" which could he levied without forcing the trade 

" into other channels., a further increase was made in 

" 1845, when it was determined that the charge 

" should he 300 rupees jjer chest. Under the like 

" views it was in 1847 raised to 400 rupees pter 

" chest." 

It is also admitted in the same papers that the 
net receipts from Bombay 

In 1840 were 11,701 

In 1849 887,506 

Increase £.875,805 

Sir C. Napier's conquest and Government of 
Scinde had therefore augmented the Company's 
opium profit, in one year, on the one Une of Bom- 
bay, nearly a million sterling — the previous years 
having also been successively and enormously 
increased. But the price of Bengal opium was 
likewise proportionally raised from the same cause, 
and therefore the gross profit has been many mil- 

With this money in hand, the Directors sought 
to deprive the conqueror of liis prize money, did 
deprive him of a portion, and vilifying his actions 
call his conquest barren ! 





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