BX 9193 .B7 B74 1893
Briggs, Charles A. 1841-
1913.
The defence of Professor
THE DEFENCE
^^K^X UF mill
> APR 19 19i
PROFESSOR BRIGGS
BEFORE THE
GENERAL ASSEMBLY
THE WHOLE CASE AGAINST PROFESSOR BRIGGS
embraces the follozving :
1. THE AUTHORITY OF HOLY SCRIPTURE. An Inaugural
Address, January 30, iSgi. Fourth edition. Cr. 8vo,
paper, net, ^^ <=^*
2. THE CASE AGAINST PROFESSOR BRIGGS— Part I. In-
cluding the Arguments of Professor Briggs and the
Official Papers before the Presbytery of New York in
1891, and the General Assembly in 1893. Cr. 8vo,
paper, net, 5° '^^*-
3. THE BIBLE, THE CHURCH, AND THE REASON. Lec-
tures ill exposition of the Inaugural in 1892. Second
edition. Cr. 8vo, %\m.
4. THE CASE AGAINST PROFESSOR BRIGGS -Part II. In-
cluding the Legal Arguments of Professor Briggs and the
Official Papers before the Presbytery of New York,
1892-1893. Cr. 8vo, paper, net, .... 50 cts.
5. THE DEFENCE OF PROFESSOR BRIGGS before the Pres-
bytery of New York, 1892. Cr. 8vo, paper, net, 50 ct$.
6. THE HIGHER CRITICISM OF THE HEXATEUCH. An
additional part of the Defence of Professor Briggt before
the Presbytery of New York. 189a. Cr. 8vo, . $175.
7. THE CASE AGAINST PROFESSOR BRIGGS-Part III.
The Defence of Professor Briggs and the Official Papers
before the General Assembly of 1893. Cr. 8vo, paper,
net 75 cts.
THE DEFENCE
OF
PROFESSOR BRIGGS
BEFORE THE
GENERAL ASSEMBLY
THE CASE AGAINST
PROFESSOR BRIGGS
PART III.
I. The Appeal of the so-called Prosecuting Committee to the
General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in the
United States of America, January i8, 1893.
II. The Argument of Professor Briggs before the General
Assembly against Entertaining the Appeal, May 24 and 25,
1893.
III. The Entertainment of the Appeal, May 26, 1893.
IV. The Argument of Professor Briggs before the General
Assembly against Sustaining the Appeal, May 29 and 30, 1893.
V. The Action of the General Assembly in Sustaining the
Appeal, May 31, 1893, and the Final Judgment of the
General Assembly, June i, 1893.
NEW YORK
CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS
1893
Copyright, 1893, by
CHARLES AUGUSTUS BRIGGS.
niEes or
■DWARD O. JENKINS' (ON,
NEW TORK.
TABLE OF CONTENTS.
PAGE
I. The Appeal of the so-called Prosecuting Com-
mittee TO THE General Assembly of the
Presbyterian Church in the United States
OF America, January i8. 1893 1
II. The Argument of Professor Briggs before the
General Assembly against Entertaining the
Appeal, May 24 and 25, 1893 35
III. The Entertainment of the Appeal, May 26,
1893 127
IV. The Argument of Professor Briggs before the
General Assembly against Sustaining the
Appeal, May 29 and 30, 1893 138
V. The Action of the General Assembly in Sus-
taining THE Appeal. May 31, 1893, and the
Final Judgment of the General Assembly,
June i, 1893 304
I.
THE APPEAL TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY.
New York, January i8th, 1 893.
To the Venerable the General Assembly of the Presbyterian
Church in tlte United States of America, Greeting :
The Presbyterian Church in the United States of
America, represented by the undersigned Prosecuting
Committee, in the case of the said Presbyterian Church
against the Rev. Charles A. Briggs, D.D., presents the
following Appeal from the final judgment in this case,
rendered by the Presbytery of New York on the ninth
day of January, 1893, with the grounds therefor, and the
specifications of the errors alleged. Believing that the
trial of the said Dr. Briggs is one of the most important
in the history of the Presbyterian Church, by reason of
the dangerous errors alleged to be contained in the Ad-
dress of the said Dr. Briggs at his inauguration as Pro-
fessor of Biblical Theology in Union Theological Semi-
nary, delivered on the 20th day of January, 1891, upon
which Inaugural Address charges and specifications were
tabled, and prosecution, in compliance with Sections 10
and 1 1 of the Book of Discipline, was initiated by the
Presbytery of New York in the name of the Presbyte-
rian Church in the United States of America ; and be-
lieving that the distinct and definite condemnation of
2 THE APPEAL
those alleged errors, by the Supreme Judicatory of the
said Presbyterian Church, is necessary in order to pre-
vent their spread and influence in the denomination ;
and, while having the highest respect for the Synod of
New York, believing that a special responsibility rests
upon the General Assembly, which is charged with the
duty of deciding in all controversies respecting doctrine ;
of reproving, warning or bearing testimony against error
in doctrine in any Church, Presbytery, or Synod, and in
cases that affect or concern the promotion of truth and
holiness through all the Churches under its care, as set
forth in Chapter XIL, Sections IV. and V., of the Form of
Government ; and in view of the desirableness of the
speediest settlement of this most important case, do
hereby appeal to and request your Venerable Body to
enter immediately upon the consideration and judicial
investigation of the appeal hereby presented, to issue
the case, and to finally determine the important ques-
tions involved, so as to secure the purity and the peace
of the Church at the earliest possible day.
In the further prosecution of the case on the part of
the said Presbyterian Church, the Appellant, represented
by the said Prosecuting Committee, respectfully sets
forth :
That on the thirteenth day of April, A.D. 1891, the
Presbytery of New York appointed a Committee to con-
sider the Inaugural Address of the Rev. Charles A.
Briggs, D.D., in its relation to the Confession of Faith, and
that on May eleventh, A.D. 1891, the said Committee pre-
sented to said Presbytery a report which was accepted,
and its recommendation, " that the Presbytery enter at
once upon the judicial investigation of the case," was
adopted by the said Presbytery, and thereupon it was
" Resolved, That a Committee be appointed to arrange
TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY 3
and prepare the necessary proceedings appropriate in
the case of Dr. Briggs"; and the Rev. G. W. F. Birch,
D.D., Rev. Joseph J. Lampe, D.D., Rev. Robert F.
Sample, D.D., and Ruling Elders John J. Stevenson and
John J. McCook, were appointed such Committee in
conformity with the provisions of Section 1 1 of the Book
of Discipline.
That after the initiation of the prosecution by the
said Judicatory, the Presbytery of New York, as above
recited, the said Prosecuting Committee entered upon
its duties.
That as said prosecution was initiated by a Judicatory,
and not by individual prosecutors, in compliance with
the provisions of Section lo of the Book of Discipline,
the Presbyterian Church in the United States of America
became the prosecutor, and an original party in the case,
and was represented by the said Prosecuting Committee,
which said Committee, under Section 1 1 of the Book of
Discipline, was charged with the duty of conducting the
prosecution in all its stages in whatever Judicatory,
until the final issue be reached.
That at the meeting of said Presbytery, held on the
fifth day of October, a.D. 1891, the said Prosecuting
Committee presented charges and specifications in the
case of the Presbyterian Church in the United States of
America against the Rev. Charles A. Briggs, D.D., which
were read in the presence of the Judicatory, and were
then served by the Moderator upon the said Rev. Charles
A. Briggs, D.D., together with a citation, citing him to
appear and plead to the said charges and specifications
at a meeting of the said Presbytery, to be held on No-
vember fourth, A.D. 1891.
That after said charges and specifications had been
presented to the said Presbytery and had been read, the
4 THE APPEAL
Presbytery entertained a motion made by the Rev.
George Alexander,. D.D., to arrest the judicial proceed-
ings and to discharge the Prosecuting Committee from
further consideration of the case, as follows :
*' Whereas, the Presbytery of New York, at its meeting
in May last, on account of utterances contained in an
inaugural address delivered January 20th, 1891, appointed
a Committee to formulate charges against the author of
that address, Rev. Charles A. Briggs, D.D., and whereas,
since that action was taken, the accused has supple-
mented those utterances by responding to certain cate-
gorical questions. * * *
" Therefore, Resolved, that Presbytery, without pro-
nouncing on the sufficiency of these later declarations to
cover all the points concerning which the accused has
been called in question, with hearty appreciation of the
faithful labors of the Committee, deems it expedient to
arrest the judicial proceedings at this point, and hereby
discharges the Committee from further consideration of
the case."
On the aforesaid motion to dismiss the case, as ex-
pressed specifically in the words " to arrest the judicial
proceedings" and "hereby discharges the Committee
from further consideration of the case," the Presbytery
by a yea and nay vote refused to adopt the above reso-
lution and to dismiss the case.
That on the said fifth day of October, A.D, 1891, the
said Presbytery adjourned to meet on the fourth day of
November, A.D. 1891, the day upon which the said cita-
tion was made returnable, and that at said meeting on
the fourth day of November, A.D. 1891, the said Presby-
tery was charged as a Judicatory in accordance with
Rule XL. of General Rules for Judicatories, and there-
upon the said Presbytery proceeded in the case of the
TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY 5
Presbyterian Church in the United States of America
against the Rev. Charles A. Briggs, D.D., and the said
Dr. Briggs then presented a paper purporting to be ob-
jections to the sufficiency of the said charges and speci-
fications in form and legal effect ; that said paper was
largely an answer to said charges or an argument upon
the merits of the case, and was denominated by the said
Dr. Briggs himself, a " Response to the Charges and
Specifications submitted to the Presbytery of New York,
by Prof. Charles Augustus Briggs, D.D.," and that the
said Presbytery thereupon permitted members of the
said Presbytery to discuss the merits of the main ques-
tion on behalf of the accused before and without per-
mitting the Prosecuting Committee to be heard on the
merits of the case.
That a question as to the status of the Prosecuting
Committee was raised, and the Moderator decided that
the Committee was properly a Committee of Prosecution
in view of the previous action of the Presbytery, and was
in the house as an original party under the provisions of
Section 10 of the Book of Discipline. That an appeal
was taken from the decision of the Moderator, the ques-
tion was divided, and the Moderator was sustained in the
point, that the Committee was in the house as a properly
appointed Committee of Prosecution, and also sustained
in the point that the Committee, as representing the
Presbyterian Church in the United States of America,
was an original party in the case.
That on said November fourth, A.D. 1891, the said
Presbytery, after fully hearing Dr. Briggs' " Response to
the Charges and Specifications," and without permitting
the Prosecuting Committee to be heard on the merits of
the case, upon the motion of the Rev. Henry Van Dyke,
D.D., made and entered on its records its decision and
g THE APPEAL
final judgment dismissing the said case in the following
words, to wit :
" Resolved, that the Presbytery of New York, having
listened to the paper of the Rev. Charles A. Briggs, D.D.,
in the case of the Presbyterian Church in the United
States of America against him as to the sufficiency of
the charges and specifications in form and legal effect ;
and without approving of the positions stated in his In-
augural Address, at the same time desiring earnestly the
peace and quiet of the Church, and in view of the decla-
rations made by Dr. Briggs touching his loyalty to the
Holy Scriptures and the Westminster Standards, and
of his disclaimers of interpretations put on some of his
words, deems it best to dismiss the case, and hereby does
so dismiss it."
From the aforesaid action of the said Presbytery of
New York on the said fourth day of November, A.D. 1 891,
in dismissing the case, the Prosecuting Committee took
an appeal in the name and on behalf of the said Presby-
terian Church to the General Assembly of the Presbyte-
rian Church in the United States of America, in accord-
ance with the provisions of Sections 94 to 102, inclusive,
of the Book of Discipline,
The said Appeal was made upon six different grounds,
supported by twenty-five specifications of error, and to-
gether with the written notice of Appeal required by-
Section 96 of the Book of Discipline, was given to the
Stated Clerk of the Presbytery of New York, and lodged
with the Stated Clerk of the General Assembly, within
the time required by Sections 96 and 97 of the Book of
Discipline.
The Appeal, the Record and other documents in the
case were referred to the Judicial Committee of the
General Assembly of 1892 at Portland, Oregon, and the
following action was had thereon :
TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY 7
"The Judicial Committee presented its report in the
case of the Presbyterian Church in the U. S. of A. vs.
Rev. Charles A. Briggs, D.D., which was accepted, as
follows :
The Judicial Committee respectfully reports that it
has carefully considered the documents submitted to it
in this case, and adopted the following resolutions :
1. That, in the opinion of this Committee, the Appeal
taken by the Presbyterian Church in the United States
of America, an original party represented by the " Com-
mittee of Prosecution," appointed under Section ii of
the Book of Discipline, has been taken from the final
judgment of the Presbytery in dismissing the case ; and
that the said Committee had the right to take this Ap-
peal representing the said original party.
2. That it finds that the notice of the Appeal has
been given, and that the Appeal, Specifications of Error,
and Record have been filed in accordance with Sections
96 and 97 of the Book of Discipline, and the Appeal is
in order.
3. That, in the judgment of the Committee, the Ap-
peal should be entertained, and a time set apart for the
hearing of the case.
In view of these considerations, the Committee re-
ports that the Appeal is in order, and that the General
Assembly should proceed, in accordance with the pro-
visions of Section 99 of the Book of Discipline, by
causing the judgment appealed from, the notice of Ap-
peal, the Appeal and the specifications of the errors
alleged, to be read ; then to hear the appellant by the
Committee of Prosecution ; then the defendant in per-
son, or by his counsel ; then the appellant by the Com-
mittee of Prosecution in reply, upon the question,
" Whether the Appeal shall be entertained ? " (Minutes
of General Assembly, 1892, page 90.)
8 THE APPEAL
The General Assembly was then constituted and
charged, in accordance with Rule XL. of the General
Rules for Judicatories, and during its sessions, on the
25th and 26th days of May, 1892, heard the Arguments
of the Appellant and the Appellee upon the question
whether the Appeal should or should not be entertained,
the Assembly adopted the report of the Judicial Com-
mittee and the Appeal was entertained. (Minutes of
General Assembly, 1892, pp. 118 and 119.)
Against this action of the Assembly, " in entertaining
the Appeal of the Prosecuting Committee, * * *
and so giving the Committee which preferred the
Charges against Dr. Briggs, standing before the Assem-
bly and right of Appeal as an original party," a protest
was presented by the Rev. S. J. McPherson, D.D., and
others, which protest was ordered to be entered on the
Minutes of the Assembly without answer. (Minutes of
General Assembly, 1B92, pp. 153,205.)
The Appeal, upon its merits, was then fully argued
by the Appellant and the Appellee before the General
Assembly, on May 28th, 1892 (Minutes of General As-
sembly, 1892, p. 140), and the provisions of Section 99
of the Book of Discipline having been fully complied
with, each of the twenty-five specifications of error was
sustained. The yeas and nays were ordered upon the
question, "Shall the Appeal be sustained ?" and 431
Commissioners voted to sustain the Appeal and 87 voted
not to sustain. (Minutes of General Assembly, 1892,
p. T41.)
On May 30th, 1892, the Committee appointed to draft
a form of Judgment to be entered in the said case sub-
mitted its report and recommended the form of decree
or order, which was adopted, (Minutes of the General
Assembly, 1892, p. 152) and is as follows:
TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY 9
*• The Presbyterian Church 1
IN THE
United States of America
vs.
Rev. Charles A. Briggs, D.D.
Appeal from the
judgment of the
Presbytery of
New York, dis-
missing the case.
" The General Assembly having, on the 28th day of
May, 1892, duly sustained all the specifications of error
alleged and set forth in the appeal and specifications in
this case,
" It is now, May 30, 1892, ordered, that the judgment
of the Presbytery of New York, entered November 4,
1 891, dismissing the case of the Presbyterian Church in
the United States of America against Rev. Charles A.
Briggs, D.D., be, and the same is hereby, reversed. And
the case is remanded to the Presbytery of New York
for a new trial, with directions to the said Presbytery to
proceed to pass upon and determine the sufficiency of
the charges and specifications in form and legal effect,
and to permit the Prosecuting Committee to amend
the specifications or charges, not changing the general
nature of the same, if, in the furtherance of justice, it
be necessary to amend, so that the case may be brought
to issue and tried on the merits thereof as speedily as
may be practicable.
" And it is further ordered, that the Stated Clerk of
the General Assembly return the record, and certify
the proceedings had thereon, with the necessary papers
relating thereto, to the Presbytery of New York."
This mandate of the General Assembly was received
by the Stated Clerk of the Presbytery of New York and
submitted to the Presbytery at its meeting held on the
13th day of June, 1892, when the Presbytery
" Resolved, That in the judgment of Presbytery, the
issue of the case is impracticable during the Summer,
10
THE APPEAL
but will receive the attention of Presbytery on its reas-
sembling in the Fall."
On the 9th day of November, 1892, the Presbytery of
New York met, was constituted and charged, in accord-
ance with Rule XL. of the General Rules for Judica-
tories. During the first day's session of the said Judi-
catory, in compliance with the said mandate of the
General Assembly, and the provisions of Section 22 of
the Book of Discipline, the said Judicatory permitted
the Prosecuting Committee to amend the Charges and
Specifications theretofore submitted in this case, and
the Prosecuting Committee thereupon submitted amend-
ed Charges and Specifications. In the furtherance of
justice, and with an earnest desire to fairly and fully
meet and conform to the suggestions and objections
raised by Dr. Briggs in his response to the original Charges
and Specifications, so far as such objections were valid
or well taken, the Prosecuting Committee, without de-
parting from or changing the general nature of the orig-
inal Charges, made such amendments as appeared to
them to be necessary to secure clearness and certainty
as to what was charged ; also to prevent the Charges
from covering more than one offence and to make the
Specifications, and the proofs cited in support thereof,
germane and pertinent to the Charges they were in-
tended to sustain. The sessions of said Judicatory
were continued with certain interruptions for a number
of days, during which certain proceedings were taken as
recorded in the minutes of said Judicatory, which min-
utes are hereby referred to as a part of the record of the
proceedings in this case, which culminated in the de-
cision and final J udgment from which this Appeal is taken.
On the 9th day of January, 1893, a committee con-
sisting of the Rev. George Alexander, D.D., the Rev.
TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY H
Henry Van Dyke, D.D., and Elder Robert Jaffray, ap-
pointed to bring in a minute to express the action of
the said Judicatory, made its report, which was adopted
by the Judicatory, and the said Presbytery, sitting in a
judicial capacity, made and entered its decision and final
judgment in this case, in the following words, to wit :
"The case of the Presbyterian Church in the United
States of America against the Reverend Charles A.
Briggs, D.D., having been dismissed by the Presbytery
of New York on November 4, 1891, was remanded by
the General Assembly of 1892 to the same Presbytery,
with instructions that ' it be brought to issue and tried
on the merits thereof as speedily as possible.' "
*'In obedience to this mandate the Presbytery of
New York has tried the case. It has listened to the
evidence and argument of the Committee of Prosecu-
tion, acting in fidelity to the duty committed to them.
It has heard the defense and evidence of the Rev.
Charles A. Briggs, presented in accordance with the
rights secured to every minister of the church.
" The Presbytery has kept in mind these established
principles of our polity, ' that no man can rightly be
convicted of heresy by inference or implication '; that
' in the interpretation of ambiguous expressions candor
requires that a court should favor the accused by putting
upon his words the more favorable rather than the less
favorable construction,' and * there are truths and forms
with respect to which men of good character may differ.'
" Giving due consideration to the defendant's explana-
tion of the language used in his Inaugural Address,
accepting his frank and full disclaimer of the interpreta-
tion which has been put upon some of its phrases and
illustrations, crediting his afifirmations of loyalty to the
Standards of the church and to the Holy Scriptures as
the only infallible rule of faith and practice, the Presby-
12
THE APPEAL
tery does not find that he has transgressed the limits of
liberty allowed under our Constitution to scholarship
and opinion.
" Therefore, without expressing approval of the criti-
cal or theological views embodied in the Inaugural Ad-
dress or the manner in which they have been expressed
and illustrated, the Presbytery pronounces the Rev.
Charles A. Briggs, D.D., fully acquitted of the offences
alleged against him, the several charges and specifica-
tions accepted for probation having been ' not sustained '
by the following vote :
f I Specification
[Charge |^;;^
f I Specification
^Charge j^;;;
{specification , .
Charge | ?.".'.'
( Specification..
( Specification . .
V-'^ Charge ]^;;;
yi ^ Specification. .
■ / Charge
SUSTAINED.
41
42
42
42
39
39
39
39
44
44
42
44
39
39
39
35
35
35
41
4i
W
17
17
17
17
16
16
16
16
17
17
17
17
15
15
15
H
14
14
16
16
58
59
59
59
55
55
55
55
61
61
59
61
54
54
54
49
49
49
57
57
NOT
SUSTAINED.
55
54
54
54
56
56
56
'56
52
52
54
52
55
55
55
57
57
57
55
55
W
5 ' 70
5 i 69
5 ' 69
5 . 69
72
72
72
72
5 I 67
5 ' 67
15
IS
69
67
17
72
17
72
17
72
16
73
16
7^
16
73
14
69
14
69
TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY I3
" Accordingly, the Presbytery, making full recognition
of the ability, sincerity and patience with which the
Committee of Prosecution have performed the onerous
duty assigned them, does now, to the extent of its con-
stitutional power, relieve said Committee from further
responsibility in connection with this case. In so do-
ing, the Presbytery is not undertaking to decide how far
that Committee is subject to the authority of the body
appointing it, but intends by this action to express an
earnest conviction that the grave issues involved in this
case will be more wisely and justly determined by calm
investigation and fraternal discussion than by judicial
arraignment and process.
" In view of the present disquietude in the Presbyte-
rian Church, and of the obligation resting upon all Chris-
tians to walk in charity and to have tender concern for
the consciences of their brethren, the Presbytery earn-
estly counsels its members to avoid on the one hand
hasty or over-confident statement of private opinion on
points concerning which profound and reverent students
of God's word are not yet agreed, and, on the other hand,
suspicions and charges of false teaching which are not
clearly capable of proof.
" Moreover, the Presbytery advises and exhorts all sub-
ject to its authority to regard the many and great things
in which we agree rather than the few and minor things
in which we differ; and, turning from the paths of con-
troversy, to devote their energies to the great and urgent
work of the Church, which is the proclamation of the
Gospel and the edifying of the Body of Christ."
From the aforesaid action, decision and final judg-
ment of the said Presbytery of New York, sitting in a
judicial capacity, taken on the ninth day of January,
1893, being the final judgment of the said Presbytery in
14 THE APPEAL
the case of the Presbyterian Church in the United States
of America against the Rev. Charles A. Briggs, D.D., in
behalf of the Presbyterian Church in the United States
of America, we, the undersigned, the Prosecuting Com-
mittee in the said case, do hereby appeal to your Vener-
able Body, the General Assembly of the Presbyterian
Church in the United States of America, in accordance
with the provisions of Sections 94 to 102, inclusive, of
the Book of Discipline,
Under the provisions of Section IV. of Chapter XI. of
the Form of Government of said Presbyterian Church,
the decision of a Synod on an Appeal which affects the
doctrine of the Church, is not final.
Section V. of Chapter Xll. of the said Form of Govern-
ment devolves upon the General Assembly " the power
of deciding in all controversies respecting doctrine and
discipline; of reproving, warning, or bearing testimony
against error in doctrine * * * in any church, presby-
tery, or synod."
Section IV. of the same Chapter provides that "The
General' Assembly shall receive and issue all Appeals
* * * that affect the doctrine or constitution of the
Church, which may be regularly brought before them
from the inferior judicatories."
Under these Sections of the Form of Government and
Section 102 of the Book of Discipline, the Appeal from
the former Judgment dismissing this case was taken by
the Prosecuting Committee, in behalf of the said Pres-
byterian Church, directly from the Presbytery of New
York to the General Assembly. The Supreme Court of
the Church, after full discussion, assumed jurisdiction of
the case, entertained the Appeal, and, after further full
argument, sustained the same.
The General Assembly, in reversing the former Judg-
TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY I5
merit of the Presbytery, directed that the case should be
tried upon its merits by the Presbytery of New York, and
from the result of that trial it is proper that the Appeal
should be made directly to the higher Judicatory, which
has already entertained jurisdiction of the case.
The status of the Prosecuting Committee, as represent-
ing the Presbyterian Church in the United States of
America, as an original party, under Sections 10 and 1 1
of the Book of Discipline, having been sustained by the
General Assembly of 1892, the Committee is charged
with conducting the prosecution in all its stages, in what-
ever Judicatory, until the final issue be reached.
The Prosecuting Committee cannot accept the decision
of the Presbytery of New York as final, and not take an
appeal therefrom, inasmuch as it would thereby assume
the responsibility of acting for the entire Church and
would surrender the Church's rights and the only oppor-
tunit}^ of securing a final determination, by the General
Assembly, of the questions at issue which involve most
important and fundamental doctrines.
As the Book of Discipline, Section 96, provides that
written Notice of Appeal, with the specifications of the
errors alleged, shall be given within ten days after the
Judgment has been rendered, the Prosecuting Commit-
tee must act promptly, and without being able to obtain
in advance the instruction or wishes of the only body
representing the entire Church, namely, the General
Assembly.
If the action of the Committee in taking this Appeal
does not commend itself to the court of last resort it
need not be entertained, and the Appeal can be dismissed
v/ithout prejudice to any interest.
Under ordinary conditions the Prosecuting Committee
would have taken this Appeal to the Synod of New
IQ THE APPEAL
York, but it does not appear to be best to do so in this
exceptional case for the following reasons :
1. To secure the peace and quiet of the Church it is
essential that a final determination of the fundamental
and important questions involved should be reached by
Ihe Court of last resort at the earliest practicable date.
2. As this case involves doctrine, it must be finally de-
termined by the General Assembly. The delay in reach-
ing an ultimate decision through an appeal by way of
the Synod could not be less than ^year, during which
the character of instruction given our candidates for the
gospel ministry might be unfavorably affected. By se-
curing the speedy decision of the Court of last resort in
this case, neither the rights nor the interests of any indi-
vidual would suffer.
3. If the Appeal should go to the Synod of New York
and be passed upon by that Judicatory, when the case
reaches the General Assembly by appeal from the de-
cision of the Synod, all of the Presbyteries constituting
that Synod would be excluded from representation in
the final determination of these important questions.
If the Appeal goes directly to the Assembly, the Com-
missioners from only one Presbytery in the entire Church
would be excluded from sitting, deliberating 'and voting
in the final decision. In the Synod of New York there
are thirty-two Presbyteries, nearly fifteen per cent, of the
whole number of Presbyteries in the Church. Inasmuch
as all these Presbyteries, excepting one, would be fully
represented and heard in the General Assembly, and the
General Assembly alone can give a final decision, we be-
lieve the time and the interests of the Synod of New-
York will be best conserved if the Assembly should en-
tertain the Appeal according to the Committee's request.
This important consideration of having these questions
TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY I'J
finally determined by the representatives of substantially
the entire Church, apart from the other reasons above
mentioned, would seem to require, in the interest of
fairness and justice to all concerned, that the Prosecut-
ing Committee should take an Appeal directly to the
General Assembly, and that the General Assembly should
entertain said Appeal.
The grounds of this Appeal are as follows :
First Ground of Appeal.
irregularity in the proceedings of said pres-
bytery of new york.
(Section 95, Book of Discipline.)
SPECIFICA riON FIRST.
In this, that in consideration of objections offered by
the accused the Presbytery of New York, sitting in a
judicial capacity, required the Prosecuting Committee
to amend the Amended Charges and Specifications sub-
mitted to said Presbytery on the 9th day of November,
1892, by striking out Charge IV., said Charge IV. being
in substance an essential part of the original Charges
and Specifications in the case sent down by the last Gen-
eral Assembly to the said Presbytery, with instructions
that the said case be brought to issue and tried on the
merits thereof.
SPECIFICA TION SECOND.
In this, that in consideration of objections offered by
the accused the said Presbytery required the said Prose-
cuting Committee to amend the Amended Charges and
Specifications by striking out Charge VII., said Charge
VII. being in substance an essential part of the original
Charges and Specifications in the case sent down by the
18
THE APPEAL
last General Assembly to the said Presbytery, with in-
structions that the said case be brought to issue and
tried on the merits thereof.
SPECIFIC A TION THIRD.
In this, that the said Presbytery, before proceeding
to trial, directed the transference of the proofs cited by
the Prosecuting Committee from the -Scriptures, the
Confession of Faith and the Catechisms, to sustain the
several Specifications, from the Specifications to the
Charges, by the following action, to wit : " Without
sustaining the general objection to the relevancy of the
proofs from the Scriptures, Catechisms and Confession,
the Presbytery directs the transference of these proofs
from the Specifications to the Charges."
SPECIFIC A TION FOURTH.
In this, that the Moderator of the Presbytery, the
Rev. John C. Bliss, D.D., without submitting the ques-
tion to the Judicatory, ruled that the Rev. Joseph J.
Lampe, D.D., speaking as a member of the Prosecuting
Committee, introduced new matter in his argument in
reply to the argument of the accused, and without speci-
fying the alleged new matter, the Presbytery, after the
close of the argument of the said Rev. Joseph J. Lampe,
D.D., on behalf of the Prosecuting Committee, took the
following action, to wit :
"■ Resolved, T^x^X the Presbytery now give the defend-
ant an opportunity to reply."
SPECIFICA TION FIFTH.
In this, that by the ruling of the Moderator, referred
to in Specification Fourth, the said Prosecuting Com-
mittee were refused the opportunity to close the case,
TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY 19
contrary to the practice and precedents in such cases in
the Judicatories of the Presbyterian Church in the Uni-
ted States of America.
SPECIFICATION SIXTH,
In this, that, notwithstanding the fact that the said
Dr^Bxiggs declined to be sworn as a witness when called
upon, the said Presbytery accepted statements or ex-
planations of the language used by the said accused, or
disclaimers on the part of the said accused, and gave to
said statements, explanations or disclaimers in the final
judgment of the said Presbytery, the force of such sworn
approbated and subscribed testimony, as is described or
referred to in Sections 6i and 62 of the Book of Dis-
cipline.
SPECIFICATION SEVENTH.
In this, that there was placed upon or in the Official
Stenographic Report of the proceedings of the said
Judicatory, of December 5th, 1892, as furnished to the
parties by the Stenographer, beginning at the last line on
page 448 (erased page No. 461) to a point below the
middle of page 468 (erased page No. 481), about twenty
pages, which said twenty pages contain words and
matter which were not spoken upon the floor of the Pres-
bytery, and, as is stated by the Stenographer, were intro-
duced into the Stenographic Report upon the request or
suggestion of Prof. Briggs, with the approval of the
Moderator, and after it had been announced to the Judi-
catory that both of the parties had fully presented their
evidence, and after the argument of the Prosecuting
Committee had been begun.
SPECIFIC A TION EIGHTH.
In this, that there was placed upon or in the Official
Stenographic Report of the proceedings of the said Judi-
20 THE APPEAL
catory, beginning at page 468 of said Official Steno-
graphic Report of the proceedings of the said Presbytery,
held on Monday, December 5th, 1892, fifteen or more
additional printed sheets, which said fifteen or more ad-
ditional printed sheets contain words and matter which
were not spoken upon the floor of the Presbytery, and
were introduced by the Stenographer into the Official
Stenographic Report of the proceedings, as said Steno-
graphic Report of December 6, 1892, shows, (page 578),
upon the request or suggestion of Prof. Briggs and by
direction of the Moderator, and after it had been an-
nounced to the Judicatory that both of the parties had
fully presented their evidence, and after the argument
of the Prosecuting Committee had been begun.
SPECIFIC A TION NINTH.
In this, that the request of the Prosecuting Committee
that such part of the Stenographic Report described and
referred to in Specifications Seventh and Eighth as
twenty pages and fifteen or more additional printed
sheets, respectively, should be stricken out and that the
accused should not be permitted to refer to or use any
portion of such matter, or the books or documents
therein referred to, as evidence upon the trial, was re-
fused by the said Judicatory, and in this, that the record
of said request was stricken from the Minutes of the said
Presbytery. (See Records of the New York Presbytery,
Vol. 14, pp. 395, 396.)
SPECIFICATION TENTH.
In this, that after the Prosecuting Committee had ob-
jected to the insertion into the Official Stenographer's
Report of certain words and matter, said matter being
upon about twenty pages of the Stenographer's notes,
TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY 21
and fifteen or more printed sheets being the pages and
printed sheets referred to in Specifications Seventh and
Eighth, which said words and matter were not spoken
on the floor of the Presbytery, and after the said Prose-
cuting Committee had requested that the said twenty
pages and the said fifteen or more printed sheets should
be stricken out, and that the accused should not be per-
mitted to refer to or to use any portion of such matter
or the books or documents therein referred to, as evi-
dence upon the trial, and in this, that the said Presby-
tery, while retaining as a part of the Stenographer's Re-
port, the said twenty pages and the said fifteen or more
printed sheets, voted to strike out of the Minutes the
said record of the request of the said Prosecuting Com-
mittee.
SPEC! PICA TION ELEVENTH.
In this, that when the vote was taken on the said
Charges and Specifications, the said Presbytery refused
to permit any of the members of the said Judicatoiy to
vote, to " Sustain in part," contrary to the precedents
and practice of the judicial procedure of the Presby-
terian Church in the United States of America.
SPECIFICATION TWELFTH.
In this, that the said Presbytery required that each
item in Charges I., II., III., V., and VI. should be voted
upon separately, thereby implying and. proceeding upon
the theory, which was not warranted by the facts, that
each of said Charges contained more than one offence.
(See Records of the New York Presbytery, Vol. 14, p.
368.)
22 the appeal
Second Ground of Appeal.
receiving improper testimony.
(Section 95, Book of Discipline.)
SPECIFICA TION FIRST.
In this, that notwithstanding the fact that the said
accused declined to be sworn as a witness when called
upon, the said Presbytery accepted statements or ex-
planations of the language used by the said accused or
disclaimers on the part of the said accused and gave to
said statements, explanations or disclaimers, in the final
judgment of the said Presbytery, the force of such sworn,
approbated and subscribed testimony as is described or
referred to in Sections 61 and 62 of the Book of Dis-
cipline.
SPECIFICA TION SECOND.
In this, that the Moderator, at the request of the said
accused, instructed the Stenographer, as appears by page
578 of the Stenographer's Report of the proceedings of
December 6th, 1892, to insert, beginning at the last line
on page 448 (erased page No. 461), to a point below the
middle of page 468 (erased page No. 481) of the Ofificial
Stenographer's Report of the proceedings of the Judi-
catory at its session on Monday, December 5th, about
twenty pages of stenographic notes, and also fifteen or
more additional printed sheets beginning at page 468
of the Official Stenographic Report, the statements and
matter contained in the said twenty pages of said Stenog-
rapher's notes, and in the said fifteen or more additional
printed sheets, being matter or statements which were
not spoken upon the floor of the Presbytery, and which
were permitted to remain as a part of the Stenographer's
TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY
23
Official Report and were received by the said Judicatory
as competent evidence.
SPECIFICATION THIRD.
In this, that the Presbytery admitted as lawful and
competent testimony any part of the quotations made
by the accused, in so far as they were writings or
extracts from the writings of the said accused, without
his having iirst taken the oath or afifirmation required
by Section 6i of the Book of Discipline.
Third Ground of Appeal.
declining to receive important testimony.
(Section 95, Book of Discipline.)
SPECIFICATION FIRST.
In this, that the said Presbytery instructed the said
Prosecuting Committee to strike out Amended Charge
IV., thereby declining to permit the said Committee to
prove said Charge IV. by competent evidence.
SPECIFICATION SECOND.
In this, that the said Presbytery instructed the said
Prosecuting Committee to strike out Amended Charge
VII., thereby declining to permit the said Committee
to prove said Charge VII. by competent evidence.
Fourth Ground of Appeal,
manifestation of prejudice in the conduct of
THE CASE.
(Section 95, Book of Discipline.)
SPECIFICATION FIRST.
In this, that several members, hereinafter named, of
the said Presbytery, sitting in a judicial capacity, who
24 THE APPEAL
afterwards voted not to sustain each and every one of
the Specifications and Charges, made statements upon
the f^oor of the Presbytery, respectively, as hereinafter
set forth, to wit:
Rev. George Alexander, D.D., said :
" What seems to me strange, Mr. Moderator, is that one of Dr.
Shedd's acknowledged logical faculty should be so blmd to the
distinction that ought to be made. 1 could adopt as my own
every word of that which he quoted from Dr. Briggs, and I am
not a Restorationist. The Lord has done great things for me
whereof I am glad, and I confidently believe that he is going to
do a great deal more for me hereafter. But that has nothing to
do with the question as to whether Dr. Briggs holds that there
is redemption in the world to come for those who die in sin.
The difficulty is, that this Charge imputes to Dr. Briggs views
which he distinctly says he does not hold." * * * " When
Dr. Briggs intimated a suspicion that the Prosecuting Com-
mittee might be holding back deliberately with testimony or
evidence in order to crush him with it after the opportunity for
response had gone by, I resented that suspicion, and if it had
been in order 1 should have risen in my place and asked him to
withdraw those words because it seemed to me an unworthy
suspicion. Now, that the suspicion seems to be justified by the
event, I am at a loss what to say. I am puzzled and distressed.
The members of this Prosecuting Committee are my personal
friends , I cannot believe that there is one of them that would
consciously do an injustice. 1 won't believe it, but 1 cannot
shrink from the fact that a wrong has been done in some way, •
and the more I think of it and the more I think of the defend-
ant, from whom I differ so widely, worn out and weak and suf-
fering from this terrific strain, required now to meet this fresh
assault — why, the more every drop of Anglo-Saxon blood in me
protests against it. We cannot remedy the wrong. All that
we can do is to give the defendant, if he desires it (1 hope he
will not desire it), an opportunity to meet this fresh evidence
and this fresh argument ; giving him reasonable time to prepare
his defense, and, if need be, giving the prosecution the last
word. I should not object to that at all. But, having spent so
TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY 25
much time, we cannot afford to seem, even, to do an injustice
to any one."
Rev. Antonio Arreghi said :
" An engagement made long before this Court, and made out
of fidelity to my work, renders it impossible for me to attend at
the sessions of this Court to-morrow and the day after. I
therefore ask the unanimous consent of the House to excuse- me
for those two days. It seems to me a great injustice because I
have an engagement, over which I have no control in the least,
and if I am not enrolled, it deprives me of the right to vote on
this trial. I may say right here that it is well known by the
Brethren on which side of the House each man stands on this
floor." [Cries of No! no!].
Rev. Henry M. Field, D.D., said:
" I wish at the beginning of this trial we might have one vote
that could be unanimous. We are all anxious to hurry on this
matter as much as possible. I believe our excellent friends of
the Prosecuting Committee would be very glad if this Presby-
tery would relieve them of the necessity of pressing these two
portions of their Charges. Let us be unanimous. I do not
think Col. McCook would be at all sorry to have these two
Charges stricken out. There are enough Charges left any way
to sink a ship. Let us go to trial on them and, if possible, unite
in this first disposal of these two Charges, which will be a most
happy and auspicious omen for all the rest."
Rev. Thomas S. Hastings, D.D., said :
" The change is radical, in my judgment, between this
amended Charge IV. and what was in the former Charges. It
gives the lie direct. That is the plain English of it and there is
no getting around that by any casuist. Dr. Briggs has told this
Presbytery that he does not hold such views, and in his demur-
rer he has reiterated it. Now, to bring before such a body as
this a Charge to try a man upon, assuming that it is doctrinal,
when it is really moral — being a question whether he lies or not
— is certainly a very serious and a very radical change. * ♦ *
* * I said that the charge does give him the lie direct and I
adhere to it. I did not say, however, that the Committee called
26 THE APPEAL
Dr. Briggs a liar. * * * And I take it that he himself is to be
accepted as an authority as to what he meant in that Inaugural
Address and in anything else that he has said or published, and
what has seemed to me extremely unfair and ungenerous on the
part of some is the persistent effort to read into his language
what he says distinctly was not in his mind and was not his
intention. A man must be his own interpreter, and, as I under-
stand it. Dr. Briggs is before this body saying that he intended
no such thing as is charged against him. When a man says that
about a charge, it seems to me that it is utterly out of character
and out of keeping for the Presbytery to insist upon that
Charge. Accept the man's disclaimer and denial and let the
Charge be withdrawn."
Rev. Henry Van Dyke, D.D., said :
" I can very readily specify some new matter that has been
introduced. It is quite evident that new matter has been intro-
duced [cries of 'No! no ! ' J. Those who do not yet see it
will see it when the Court comes to vote upon it. So it is
simply a matter of fairness and justice that we should allow the
defendant, if he wishes it, to reply. It would be an unheard of
thing in any civil Court that a prosecution should be allowed to
traverse new ground, and that the accused should not be
allowed to be heard or to ofTer evidence in rebuttal. It is a
thing to cause the blood of an Anglo-Saxon to boil within him,
every drop of it, too. Moreover, Mr. Moderator, it is not simply
that new matter has been introduced, but that statements which
have been made by the defendant again and again upon this
floor in respect to doctrines which he rejects, have beein again
attributed to him. And I maintain that it is simply a matter of
fairness and candor that we should make this offer to Dr.
Briggs, whether he will accept it or not, for the sake of the
honor of this House and in the way of decency."
SPECIFICATION SECOND.
In this, that while the said Presbytery in obedience to
the mandate of the last General Assembly has issued
and tried the case, it has not tried it fully on the merits
TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY 27
thereof, as is evinced by the striking out of Charges IV.
and VII. of the Amended Charges and Specifications.
SPECIFICA TION THIRD.
In this, that said Presbytery, in said final judgment,
by attempting to relieve the said Prosecuting Commit-
tee from further responsibility in connection with this
case appears to hinder and prevent the attainment of
the ends of discipline, apparently aiming to now ter-
minate the said case, and thus secure the same result
that the said Presbytery attempted to reach on Novem-
ber 4th, A.D. 1 89 1, by voting to dismiss the said case.
SPECIFICA TION FO UR TH.
In this, that the said Presbytery, in said final judg-
ment, expresses " an earnest conviction that the grave
issues involved in this case will be more wisely and
justly determined by calm investigation and fraternal
discussion than by judicial arraignment and process,"
notwithstanding the fact that the General Assembly
directed the case to be tried on the merits thereof and
thereby expressed a no less earnest conviction that the
grave issues involved should be determined by judicial
arraignment and process.
SPECIFICATION FIFTH.
In this, that sundry members of the said Presbytery,
to wit: Rev. Francis Brown, D.D., Rev. Henry M.
Field, D.D., Rev. Thomas S. Hastings, D.D., Rev. J.
Hall Mcllvaine, D.D..and Rev. Henry Van Dyke,D.D.,
sat and deliberated in the trial of this case and voted to
acquit the said accused, upon each and every specifica-
tion and charge, after manifestations of prejudice in the
conduct of the case, on the part of the said members
23 THE APPEAL
was pharged in the appeal to and sustained by the Gen-
eral Assembly of 1892,
SPECIFICATION SIXTH.
In this, that sundry Directors, Officers and Professors
of Union Theological Seminary, to wit: Rev. Francis
Brown, D.D., Rev. Edward L. Clark, D.D., Rev. Charles
R. Gillett, D.D., Rev. Thomas S. Hastings, D.D., Rev.
J. Hall Mcllvaine, D.D., Rev. Philip Schaff, D.D., Rev.
W. M. Smith, D.D., Rev. Marvin R. Vincent, D.D.,
and William A. Wheelock, Esq., sat and deliberated in
the said trial and voted to acquit the said accused upon
each and every specification and charge, said Directors.
Officers and Professors having previously approved and
published the said Inaugural Address, as appears in the
first edition which bears the imprint : " Printed for The
Union Theological Seminary, New York, 1891," "Copy-
right, 1891, by The Union Theological Seminary," and
as also appears in the second edition of said Inaugural
Address, which was also "Copyright, 1891, by The
Union Theological Seminary," which said Inaugural
Address contained the alleged erroneous doctrines for
the holding and publishing of which doctrines the accused
was then on trial.
Fifth Ground of Appeal.
mistake or injustice in the decision.
specification first.
In this, that the said Presbytery having declared the
said Amended Charges and Specifications sufficient in
form and legal effect and the said accused having re-
peatedly admitted the facts as set forth in the said sev-
eral Specifications, the said Presbytery was inconsistent
TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY 29
and erred in not accepting the said admissions of the
said accused and in not sustaining the said Charges as
its final judgment.
SPECIFIC A TION SECOND.
In this, that the said final judgment of the said Pres-
bytery was not warranted by the law and the evidence,
because the Court had decided that the Charges were
sufficient in form and legal effect ; that is, it had already
substantially determined that if the accused had taught
the doctrine with which he was charged, he was guilty
of an offence The several Charges alleged an offence
and the several allegations were proved by extracts
from the Inaugural Address cited in the several Specifi-
cations, and said extracts were admitted as authentical
by the accused, and were not retracted by him. The
proof was therefore complete. Said accused also intro-
duced his own writings as evidence, which writings, so
introduced, contained the extracts recited by the Prose-
cuting Committee in the several Specifications. If the
accused had brought evidence to show that he had made
no such utterances as were contained in the specifica-
tions, then and then only should he have been " fully
acquitted." The indictment had been found in order.
The evidence was unchallenged and the judgment should
have been " guilty as charged."
SPECIFICATION THIRD.
In this, that the said final judgment of the said Pres-
bytery, which disclaims to be an expression of the ap-
proval of the critical or theological views embodied in
the said Inaugural Address, is, in fact, an approval of
said critical or theological views and will have the
effect of encouraging the dissemination of said views
30 THE APPEAL
and will further increase the present disquietude in the
said Presbyterian Church and practically sets at naught
the declaration of the General Assembly of 1892, as
found on page 179 of its Minutes, in which said Gen-
eral Assembly " reminds all under its care that it is a
fundamental doctrine that the Old and New Testaments
are the inspired and infallible word of God," and that
"our Church holds that the inspired Word, as it came
from God, is without error. The assertion of the con-
trary cannot but shake the confidence of the people in
the sacred Books."
SPECIFICATION FOURTH.
In this, that the said final judgment is vague and un-
certain, inasmuch as said judgment gives due considera-
tion to the defendant's explanation of the language
used in his Inaugural Address and accepts his disclaimer
, of the interpretation which has been put upon some of
its phrases and illustrations, but does not specify which
explanations, phrases or illustrations, or whether such
explanations or disclaimers relate to the portions of the
said Inaugural Address upon which the Charges and
Specifications are based, and the said judgment is also
vague and uncertain in the statement that the said ac-
cused has not transgressed the limits of liberty allowed
under our Constitution to scholarship and opinion.
SPECIFICATION FIFTH.
In this, that the said final judgment is based wholly,
or in part, on the affirmation of loyalty made by the
said defendant to the Standards of the Church and to
the Holy Scriptures, as the only infallible rule of faith
and practice, when such affirmations consisted only of
unsworn statements, which statements were not com-
TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY 31
petent evidence and should have had no greater weight
or influence in shaping the final judgment than the
ordinary and technical plea of " not guilty."
SPECIFICATION SIXTH.
In this, that the said Presbytery received and was
moved by unsworn and improper testimony in making
its decision or final judgment, said improper testimony
being statements and arguments for the defence of said
accused, touching the merits of the case and being ex-
planations made by the accused of the language used in
his Inaugural Address and also statements referred to
in the said final judgment, as a frank and full disclaimer
of the interpretation which has been put upon some of
its phrases and illustrations and in giving to the argu-
ment of the said accused, as counsel in his own behalf,
the consideration due to sworn and approbated testi-
mony as provided for in Sections 6i and 62 of the Book
of Discipline.
SPECIFICATION SEVENTH.
In this, that said final judgment is vague and mislead-
ing and confounds unjustifiable controversy with useful
and constitutional discipline, ignoring the fact that
*' The ends of Discipline are the maintenance of the
truth, the vindication of the authority and honor of
Christ, the removal of offences, the promotion of the
purity and edification of the Church, and the spiritual
good of offenders." (Book of Discipline, Sec. 2.)
SPECIF ICA TION EIGHTH.
In this, that said final judgment is misleading and
unjust, because it evidently but erroneously aims to set
forth that there has been an effort to convict the accused
by inference or implication, and in quoting the words
32 THE APPEAL
" there are truths and forms with respect to which men
of good character may differ," seems to deny and make
light of the well-established principle of our polity,
that there are also truths and forms with respect to
which men of good character, who have assumed the
ordination vows of a Minister in the Presbyterian Church
in the United States of America, should not differ.
SPECIFICATION iVINTH.
In this, that upon December 28th, 1892, when the
Rev. George Alexander, D.D,, offered a resolution as
follows, to wit :
" The Court deems it proper to declare that a vote by
any member of this Court not to sustain the charges
preferred against Rev. Charles A. Briggs, D.D., does not
denote approval of his theological or critical views or of
the manner in which they have been advanced, but only
a judgment that the specific charges have not been
established," and after the said resolution had been dis-
cussed, it was laid on the table, and subsequently, after
the vote on the Charges and Specifications had been
taken the said resolution of Dr. Alexander was again
taken up and referred to the Committee appointed to
prepare the final judgment.
SPECIFICATION TENTH.
In this, that the said Presbytery, on January 9th,
A.D. 1893, sitting in private session, refused to strike
out of the resolution offered by Rev. Geo. Alexander,
D.D., and referred to in Specification Ninth, the words,
" does not denote approval of his theological or critical
views or of the manner in which they have been
advanced."
TO THE GENERAL ASISEMBLY 33
SPECIFIC A TION ELE VENTH.
In this, that the said final judgment of the said Pres-
bytery is contradictory in form and effect, because in
said final judgment the said Judicatory disclaimed agree-
ment with the critical or theological views held by the
accused, which were pronounced by said Judicatory
when they voted not to sustain the charges, as in agree-
ment with the Scriptures and the Standards. By reason
of their ordination vows and obligations, the views of
all the members of the said Judicatory must be assumed
to have been in agreement with the Scriptures and
Standards. Therefore, if the views of the accused were
in agreement with the Scriptures and the Standards, and
if the views of the majority of the members of the said
Judicatory were not in agreement with those of the
accused, then the views of the majority of the members
of the said Judicatory must, according to the final judg-
ment, have been in disagreement with the Scriptures and
the Standards.
It cannot be urged that there was room for the agree-
ment of both the views of the accused and the views of
the majority of the members of the said Judicatory with
the Scriptures and the Standards, because said Judica-
tory had already determined when the charges were pro-
nounced sufficient in form and legal effect, that the said
views, if held by the accused, constituted an offence.
The Judicatory was therefore shut up to one of two
legal and proper courses, either to declare that they
agreed with the views of the accused, or to declare that
the views of the accused disagreed with the Scriptures
and the Standards. In the former case they should
have refrained from disclaiming agreement with the
views of the accused ; in the latter case they should have
34 THE APPEAL TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY
voted to sustain the charges. There is, therefore, a
contradiction in the form and effect of the final judgment.
And in conclusion your Appellant prays your Vener-
able Body, the General Assembly of the Presbyterian
Church in the United States of America, to receive and
issue this appeal, and to take therein such action as in
your wisdom may seem best, in order to secure and pre-
serve the purity and peace of our Church.
The Presbyterian Church in the United States of
America represented by
George W. F. Birch, ]
Joseph J. Lampe, | Prosecuting
Robert F. Sample, }► Committee.
John J. Stevenson, Appellant.
John J. McCook,
II.
ARGUMENT AGAINST ENTERTAINING THE APPEAL.
Mr. Moderator, Ministers and Elders of the General
Assetnhly of the Presbyterian Chtirch in the United
States of A merica :
I appear before you at this time to resist the enter-
tainment of the Appeal entitled " Appeal to the General
Assembly from the decision and final judgment of the
Presbytery of New York, rendered January 9th, 1893."
THE STATEMENT OF THE QUESTION.
(i). The Book of Discipline (99) makes Dr. Briggs
the appellee in the case against him and he is required
by law to resist the entertainment of the Appeal against
the action of his Presbytery in acquitting him. He is not
allowed to employ professional counsel ; for the law is :
" No professional counsel shall be permitted to appear and
plead in cases of process in any of our ecclesiastical judicatories.
But if any accused person feel unable to represent and plead his
own cause to advantage, he may request any minister or elder,
belonging to the judicatory before which he appears, to prepare
and exhibit his cause as he may judge proper." (Book of
Discipline, 26.)
If the appellee had been allowed to employ profes-
sional counsel he would have done so ; or, if it had been
practicable to employ a member of the Judicatory at a
(35)
3g ENTERTAINING THE APPEAL
sufficient time in advance of the meeting of the Judica-
tory to enable him to master all the details of the case,
he would have employed him ; for it is doubtful whether
under present circumstances the accused can plead his
own cause to advantage. There is danger lest hostilit)'
to the appellee, or his opinions, may influence the court
in their determination of the purely legal questions in- '
volved in the entertainment of the Appeal. There is
danger lest the appearance of the appellee before you
may force your attention to his personality and his
opinions and so obstruct your consideration of the legal
arguments he has to present to you.
It will be difficult for you to distinguish between Dr.
Briggs as defendant and Dr. Briggs as counsel for the
defendant. This situation is an unfortunate one for the
appellee. But you should consider that it is not of his
choice ; it is a situation forced upon him by the Book
of Discipline. It is necessary for him to rise above all
personal considerations in the discussion of the enter-
tainment of the Appeal. It is necessary that the court
should do likewise. He appears before you not as Dr.
Briggs, but as the attorney for Dr. Briggs ; and he asks
you, as his attorney, to ever bear in mind that the ques-
tion now before you is not whether Dr. Briggs is right
or wrong in his opinions or in his conduct, but simply
and alone whether the Appeal can legally be entertained.
(2). The Book of Discipline carefully distingiiislies bc-
ttveen the entertainment of tJie Appeal and the sustaining of
the Appeal. (99). — The consideration of the merits of
the Appeal is not lawful until the question of the sus-
taining of the Appeal is in order. The lawful order now
is whether the Appeal shall be entertained. We should
banish from our minds, therefore, the merits of the Ap-
peal. Neither the appellants nor the appellee are al-
STATEMENT OF THE QUESTION ;>7
lowed to enter into the merits of the Appeal at this stage
of it. We would be called to order if we should venture
on this forbidden ground. Still less is it lawful for the
judges to enter into the merits of the Appeal prema-
turely in their consideration of the entertainment of the
Appeal. The Moderator cannot call you to order for
your thoughts, and feelings, and desires. But as a court
it is assumed that you have that self-restraint without
which you would be incompetent to sit as judges in the
case.
It is true that the grounds of the Appeal have been
read to you and so brought before your minds, and you
are therefore exposed to the temptation to consider
them. But the grounds of the Appeal were not read
before you in order that you might consider their merits
at this stage. They were read as a part of the Appeal
in order that the whole Appeal might be before you.
The Appeal was read that you might see its whole form
and structure, not that you might consider its matter. It
is impossible to present the form to the eye and ear with-
out the matter. And yet we may, and we must, distin-
guish in our argument between the form and the matter.
The question of entertainment has to do with the form
of the Appeal, the question of sustaining it has to do
with its matter. We now have to con.sider the form of
the Appeal in order to determine all preliminary ques-
tions relating to it. The questions to be determined
now are not whether there are valid and lawful grounds
of appeal which will justify you in sustaining it, if that
question should arise ; but you have to determine the
preliminary questions whether the Appeal is against a
final judgment of a Judicatory, whether the appellants
are an original party, whether the General Assembly can
lawfully take jurisdiction of the case, and other like pre-
38 ENTERTAINING THE APPEAL
liminary questions. Granting for the moment that the
appellants may be justified in every one of their grounds
of appeal, and that you feel sure that you would sustain
the Appeal for the reasons assigned ; yet if they do not
appeal from a final judgment, if they are not an original
party, if, for any valid reason, the General Assembly
cannot take jurisdiction of the case ; the Appeal cannot
lawfully be entertained even if its merits should be the
greatest conceivable. The court should therefore keep
firmly in mind that they have nothing to do with the
merits of the Appeal at this stage of it, but simply and
alone with the question ivhether it is lawful to entertain
the Appeal.
I.— HOW FAR IS THE APPEAL AGAINST THE FINAL JUDGMENT?
The Book of Discipline limits Appeals to final judg-
ments.
" An Appeal is the removal of a judicial case, by a
written representation, from an inferior to a superior ju-
dicatory; and may be taken, by either of the original
parties, from the final judgment of the lower judicatory."
(94.)
The Appeal we are now considering is alleged to be
in the title : '^ from the decision and final judgment of the
Presbytery of NewYork, rendered Jan. 9th, 1893."
(i). The ivord '■^ decision'" in the title of the Appeal is
either redundant and so adds nothing to the words ^^ final
judgment,'' or else it implies something additional to
^^ final judgment.'' In either case it has no place in the
Appeal — for if it be redundant it mars the simplicity and
precision of a legal document, and even if it was not de-
signed to mean more than final judgment there is danger
lest it may either consciously or unconsciously suggest
to some minds more than the law allows. If it implies
HOW FAR AGAINST THE FINAL JUDGMENT 39
something additional to the final judgment and this im-
plication is found in the matter of the Appeal, then the
Appeal is something more than an Appeal against a final
judgment and so far invalid. It needs but a cursory ex-
amination of the Appeal to see that a considerable por-
tion of it extends beyond the limits of a final judgment.
This is indeed clear from the professions of the Appeal
itself when it is said: "From the aforesaid action, de-
cision and final judgment of the Presbytery of N. Y. —
we the undersigned, the Prosecuting Committee, in the
said case do hereby appeal to your Venerable Body" (p.
15). So far as this is an appeal against any action or
decision of the Presbytery other than a final judgvient it
is not a lawful appeal. Therefore you cannot lazvfully
entertain it until all this irrelevant material relating to
actions and decisions of the Presbytery has been removed
from the Appeal.
(2). The alleged final judgment of the Presbytery of N'ew
York from which they appeal, ^^ pronounces the Rev. Charles
A. Briggs, D.D., fully acquitted of the offences alleged
against him!' This acquittal with such reasons as are
assigned therefore, constitutes the final judgment, if this
be a final judgment. For the Book of Discipline pre-
scribes that after the parties have been heard,
— " the judicatory shall then go into private session — the parties,
their counsel, and all other persons not members of the body,
being excluded ; when, after careful deliberation, the judicatory
shall proceed to vote on each specification and on each charge
separately, and judgment shall be entered accordingly." (33).
That only is a final judgment which conforms with
this rule. If the Presbytery of New York deemed it
wise to combine with their final judgment decisions of
any kind in the exercise of its functions of government,
or advice oi any kind in the exercise of its episcopal func-
40 ENTERTAINING THE APPEAL
tions, such a combination may not have been in good
form or in the best taste ; but such decisions and such
advice cannot be regarded as parts of the final judgment
and so subject to appeal. For the law prescribes that
the final judgment shall be entered according to the vote
and therefore can contain nothing that was not in the
vote, namely, the non-sustaining of the charges and spec-
ifications, that is to say, the acquittal and its reasons.
It is manifest that the greater part of the Appeal is
not against the non-sustaining of the charges and speci-
fications, but against action and decisions of the Presby-
tery. All this irrelevant material should be eliminated
from the Appeal as invalid and iinlazvfiil, before yon can
lawfully entertain it.
{a). What matters it that the Presbytery acquit Dr.
Briggs " without expressing approval of the critical or
theological views embodied in the Inaugural Address, or
the manner in which they have been expressed or illus-
trated "? This reservation of approval is not a part of
the final judgment even if it is embraced within the lim-
its of the same paragraph. The final judgment is simply
and alone the acquittal with its reasons. The Presby-
tery may have done right or wrong in this reservation
of approval. It is not lawful to discuss that question
here. But it is lawful for me to call your attention to
the fact that such reservation of approval is no part of
the final judgment prescribed in the Book of Discipline
and that therefore that reservation of approval cannot
lawfully be appealed from.
{b). The action of the Presbytery, whether right or
wrong in relieving " the committee from further respon-
sibility in connection with the case," though adopted in
the Report of the committee which contained the
alleged final judgment, is entirely apart from the non-
UO'.V FAR AGAINST THE FINAL JUDGMENT 41
sustaining of the charges and specifications, and is not
a final judgment, or part of a final judgment. It can-
not therefore be appealed from, but only complained
of. This decision of the Presbytery was made in the
exercise of its functions of government, not in the exer-
cise of its functions as a court.
(c). The Presbytery, in adopting the Report of the
committee,
— " earnestly counsels its members to avoid, on the one hand, hasty
or over confident statement of private opinion on points con-
cerning which profound and reverent students of God's Word
are not yet agreed, and, on the other, suspicions and charges of
false teaching which are not clearly capable of proof.
" Moreover the Presbytery advises and exhorts all subject to
its authority to regard the many and great things in which we
agree rather than the few and minor things in which we differ,
and turning from the paths of controversy to devote their ener-
gies to the great and urgent work of the Church which is the
proclamation of the Gospel and the edifying of the Body of
Christ."
This counsel, advice and exhortation may be right or
it may be wrong. It is not lawful for me to discuss that
question here. But it is lawful for me to say that such
counsel, advice and exhortation were given by the Pres-
bytery in the exercise of its episcopal functions. It
is entirely independent of the non-sustaining of the
charges ; it forms no part of a final judgment and
therefore cannot lawfully be appealed from. The only
remedy for error or wrong in this episcopal action was
complaint to the Synod of New York.
Possibly the Presbytery committed an error in all of
these decisions and counsels which were added to the
alleged final judgment and embraced in the one paper
reported by a committee and adopted by the Presby-
tery, January 9, 1893. It is not for me to go into the
42 EMTERTAINING THE APPEAL
merits of that question. But it is my right to call your
attention to the fact that even if all these decisions, and
all this counsel, and all these actions were unwise, un-
lawful and unjust, to the utmost extent conceivable,
they are no parts of the final judgment of the Presby-
tery in the case against Dr. Briggs ; they were not in-
volved in the vote not to sustain the charges ; but they
were simply decisions and actions of the Presbytery in
the exercise of its governmental functions, and counsels
of the Presbytery in the exercise of its episcopal func-
tions which may be complained of to the Synod of New
York but not appealed from as a final judgment. And
therefore you cannot entertain an Appeal from such
action, decisions and counsels. Vou are legally bound
to require the appellants io remove all this irrevelant ma-
terial from their Appeal before you can entertain it ; for
appeals are strictly limited to final judgmeiits and to them
alone.
(3), The Presbytery of New York were certainly in-
cautious in their final proceedings in the case against
Dr. Briggs. On December 30, 1892, they voted upon
the Amended Charges and Specifications giving the de-
cision of the Presbytery not to sustain the Charges and
Specifications by majorities ranging from six to twenty-
four. According to the Book of Discipline they ought
then to have entered their judgment according to this
vote. Instead of taking this course, after the Moder-
ator had announced that Dr. Briggs had been acquitted
on all the charges, he appointed a committee from those
who voted not to sustain, to formulate the opinion of
the majority, and the judicatory took recess until Jan-
uary 9, 1893, when the Report of the committee was
made and adopted by a 7iiva voce vote. The Report of
this committee contained a formulation of the opinion
HOW FAR AGAINST THE FINAL JUDGMENT 43
of the majority, not only as to the final judgment of
the court, but also as to decisions in the exercise of the
governmental functions of the Presbytery and advice
in the exercise of its episcopal functions. The question
arises when was the final judgment pronounced and
which is the final judgment. Is the final judgment tlie
announcement of the moderator that Dr. Briggs had
been acquitted of all the charges — or was the final judg-
ment given when the Presbytery adopted the Report of
the committee t^n dzys ^iiterwdird} It is claimed that the
decision was rendered on December 10th when the vote
7vas taken and annomiced by the moderator as a vote of
acquittal. It is claimed by the defendant that he was
not and could not lawfully be exposed to a reversal of
that verdict by a change in the constituent members of
the court at a subsequent meeting ten days afterwards.
There was a considerable change in the membership of
the court. Many members of the court were absent.
There was a possibility of a sufificient change in voters
to make a decision not in accordance with the vote not
to sustain the charges and specifications on December
30th. There was time for various influences from out-
side the court to induce it to make a politic deliverance,
rather than a deliverance in accordance with justice and
right. The law does not contemplate such possibilities,
for it says the judgment vtnst be entered according to the
vote. It is claimed by the defendant that he was not
and could not lawfully be exposed to a peril of a re-
versal of the acquittal in a superior court by any mis-
takes whether material or formal which may have been
committed by a majority of the Presbytery at a subse-
quent meeting ten days after the vote which pronounced
him innocent and acquitted of all the charges and speci-
fications. He could not lawfully be exposed to the
44 ENTERTAINING THE APPEAL
peril of a reversal because of any unlawful procedure of
an intermediate party which sought the peace and quiet
of the Church whether at the cost of the defendant or
of the prosecutors, or of both of them. Yet this is
just the peril to which the defendant is now exposed by
such alleged mistakes in the action of the Presbytery
on January q, 1893, perils to which he would not have
been exposed if the Presbytery had entered its final
judgment according to the vote on December 30, 1892.
It is claimed that any appeal in order to be lawful
should be made against the final judgment of the Pres-
bytery so far as that judgment accords with the decision
acquitting Dr. Briggs, on December 30, 1892, which de-
cision was announced by the moderator as an acquittal
according to the vote. The Appeal now before you is
not against such a final judgment according to the vote
of December 30th, but against an alleged final judg-
ijient of January 9th, expressing the advice of the Pres-
bytery, and the opinion of the Presbytery on a variety
of matters which were not according to the vote of De-
cember 30th. It is not therefore a lawful Appeal and
you cannot entertain it until all this irrelevant material
is removed.
(4). If any one should contend that these are purely
technical objections which ought not to be made in an
ecclesiastical court as a bar to justice and right ; and if
any one should urge that the decision of December 30th,
that Dr. Briggs had been acquitted on all the charges, was
renewed in the adoption of the Report of the Comrnittee
on January 9th, in their words : " The Presbytery pro-
nounces the Rev. Charles A. Briggs, D.D., fully acquitted
of the offences alleged against him," and that therefore
the two actions are substantially identical ; let such an one
consider {a) that the appellants do not limit their Appeal
HOW FAR AGAINST THE FINAL JUDGMENT 45
to this clause of the action of the Presbytery of that date
acquitting Dr. Briggs of the offences alleged against him,
but they make their Appeal chiefly against other parts of
that action which were not contemplated in the vote of
acquittal Dec. 30th ; {b) that the defendant is entitled to
the final judgment in its legal form as based.on the de-
cision of December 30th, and should not be required to
defend another alleged final judgment which is open to
attack because it is much more than a final judgment ;
{c) that it is not right to put the defendant in jeopardy a
second time because of any alleged mistakes the court
may have made at a later date after the verdict was ren-
dered ; {d] that if the defendant should waive this tech-
nical objection how could he be assured that the court
of the General Assembly would secure him in his other
rights? His experience in the court of the Presbytery
and in the court of the last General Assembly has been
that his waiver of rights has only stimulated the prose-
cution in their demands for all that they could possibly
get from those judicatories. Why should the appellee
waive his rights when the appellants are seeking to de-
prive him of his ecclesiastical life ? For all of these
reasons the General Assembly cannot lawfully entertain
the Appeal. The Appeal is not so much against
the final judgment contained in the action of the
Presbytery of January 9th, according to the decision in
the vote of December 30th, as against the exercise of the
governmental and episcopal functions of the Presbytery,
contained in that action, and you cannot legally entertain
the Appeal tintil all this irrelevant material shall be re-
moved from it.
46 ENTERTAINING THE APPEAL
II.— IT IS UNI^WFUL FOR A PARTY CLAIMING TO BE A PUBLIC
PROSECUTOR TO APPEAL AGAINST A VERDICT OF ACQUITTAL.
The Appeal, if it be a lawful Appeal against a final
judgment, is an appeal against the verdict acquitting a
minister from the charge of heresy.
(i). Heresy is defined by Blacksto?ie as a denial of
''essential doctrines of Christianity, publicly and obsti-
nately avpzvedy So the Book of Discipline defines it as
errors which " strike at the vitals of religion a)id are in-
dustriously spread!' (41.) The defendant was libelled
with just this heresy in six charges, and was acquitted of
them all by the Presbytery. Ecclesiastical law has al-
ways regarded heresy as a deadly sin and a crime to be
visited with capital punishment. In civil law so long as
civil law enforced the judgments of ecclesiastical tri-
bunals, heresy was a crime against civil government also.
The final judgment of the ecclesiastical court, if it was a
condemnation of the alleged heretic, was ordinarily fol-
lowed by the writ " de hceretico coviburcndo " issued by
the crown, and the heretic was burned at the stake.
Many such alleged heretics were burned to death all
over Europe : John Huss at Constance, Savonarola at
Florence, Servetus at Geneva, Cramner, Ridley and Lati-
mer at Oxford. Even in the reign of Elizabeth two
Anabaptists were burned, and in the reign of James I.
two Arians. But in the middle of the 17th century, in
England, the civil law contented itself with the imprison-
ment of the heretics and the burning of the writings in
the market-place by the common hangman.
In the development of religious liberty in Great Britain
in the i8th century the punishment of heretics by the
civil authorities passed out of use. In the United States
of America, with the separation of Church and State,
APPEAL AGAINST A VERDICT OF ACQUITTAL 47
which is embedded in our constitution, the civil law takes
no cognizance of ecclesiastical offences and reserves to
itself the power over the person, liberty and life of men.
Therefore an ecclesiastical judgment cannot deprive a
man of his limbs, his liberty, or his life. But it goes as
far as it is possible to go and puts a man in jeopardy of
his ecclesiastical life. The lack of power in the Church
in this country at the present time to enforce its deci-
sions by any penalties of life, or liberty, or limb, and the
ease with which a man condemned as a heretic by one
denomination may find a home in another denomination,
has weakened the sense of the seriousness of the sin of
lieresy.
Heresy is defined in our Book of Discipline as " errors
which strike at the vitals of religion." These are some-
thing more than mere differences of opinion between
men who are good and true. These are far more serious
than such questions as may be decided by the Presbytery,
Synod, or General Assembly by majority votes. They
are errors which can only be determined by a judicial
process in accordance with the Constitution of the
Church. They are errors which involve a process of
criminal law — the charge of gross offences " striking at
the vitals of religion "; a plea of guilty^ or not guilty ;
an acquittal, or a sentence for an ecclesiastical crime ;
and a penalty which involves either the suspension, or'
the deprivation of ecclesiastical life. It is necessary
therefore for this court to consider whether it is laivful
to put a man in jeopardy of his ecclesiastical life a second
time for offences from zvhicli he has been acquitted after
full trial in the court of the Presbytery. \
(2). The Appeal is from a final judgment of acquittal
after trial by the court of the Presbytery, not against a
decision of a merely voluntary society. It is true that in
48 ENTERTAINING THE APPEAL
the eyes of the civil law the Church is nothing more
than a voluntary society, a social and religious club, with
the authority to determine its own membership and
from which it may be assumed that a person would vol-
untarily withdraw when he becomes uncongenial to his
associates. It seems probable that this view of the
Church is consciously or unconsciously in. the minds of
a large number of our ministers. It is represented in the
court of the General Assembly by a member of the
Judicial Committee who in a recent article in which he
has been preparing himself and others to consider this
case in a judicial frame of mind and in a Christian temper,
represents that a Presbyterian minister who differs from
a majority of the ministry of the denomination is honor-
ably bound to retire from the denomination. The
majority have the authority to determine whether he is
right or wrong in his opinions, whether he is guilty of
the deadly sin of heresy, whether he has been striking at
the vitals of the Christian religion. This is a plausible
but a very superficial statement. It is not true of the
laws of our native land. It is a principle of civil govern-
ment that majorities cannot always be trusted. A major-
ity in the House of Representatives is checked by the
voice of the Senate. A majority of both Houses of
Congress is checked by the veto of the President. The
combined action of both the executive and legislative
branches of the government is checked by the decisions
of the Supreme Court. So it has been the policy to
put checks on the majority in ecclesiastical courts. The
Presbyterian Church like other organized churches has a
system of checks and balances of power, and a Supreme
Court for the ultimate decision of constitutional ques-
tions. A heresy trial does not raise the question of the
opinion of majorities, but questions of law and of right.
APPEAL AGAINST A VERDICT OF ACQUITTAL 49
The Presbyterian minister vows in ordination subjection
to his brethren, but it is within strictly defined Hmits —
it is only so far as these brethren act " in the Lord,''
that is, as a court of Jesus Christ.
The Presbyterian Church claims in the Confession of
Faith that :
" The Lord Jesus, as king and head of his church, hath
therein appointed a government in the hand of church officers,
distinct from the civil magistrates.
" To these officers the keys of the kingdom of heaven are com-
mitted, by virtue whereof they have power respectively to retain
and remit sins, to shut that kingdom against the impenitent,
both by the word and censures ; and to open it unto penitent
sinners, by the ministry of the gospel, and by absolution from
censures, as occasion shall require." (Conf. XXX. i, 2.)
The fundamental principle of the Book of Discipline
is that " Discipline is the exercise of that authority,' and
the application of that system of laws which the Lord
Jesus Christ has appointed in his church." (i.)
Unless the majority act in accordance with these Pres-
byterian principles they cannot demand that any Presby-
terian minister should be subject to their decisions. The
vow of the subjection of the individual to his brethren is
strictly limited by the obligation of the Church itself,
and of every minister in the Church, to the Form of
Government, the Book of Discipline, the Westminster
Confession of Faith, and Holy Scripture. These docu-
ments make up the constitution of the Presbyterian
Church. Within these constitutional limits the majority
may exercise their right to decide the questions legally
brought before them. If they transcend these limits
their decisions do not bind the individual or the Church,
— they are altogether null and void. Every minister,
whether he differ in his opinions from the majority or
50
ENTERTAINING THE APPEAL
not, has the right to all these constitutional protections.
Any effort of a majority to exact of him more than
the constitution exacts, and to condemn him for opinions
which are extra-confessional, or to convict him for heresy
on account of anything that does not strike at the vitals
of rehgion, would be revolutionary. The Church' would
thereby divest itself of its judicial functions as a court of
Jesus Christ, it would put away its constitution and its
forms of jurisprudence. It would assume the functions
of a religious society, it would undertake to exercise the
rights of a club. It might be very good club law, but it
would not be ecclesiastical law.
Consider the consequences of this extremely low view
of the Church of Jesus Christ. It pushes off the ark of
the Church into the stream to drift with every current
of traditionalism. It makes any real reformation of the
Church impossible, for when has the Church been revived
or reformed by majority votes ? When God has raised
up prophetic men to be the leaders in any reform, major-
ities have always been against them.
This unchurchly view makes any correction of tra-
ditional error impossible. If the majority have been led
by the incompetence and blunders of mistaken leaders
into false positions ; if the Presbyterian Church has
drifted from the principles of the Reformation, and the
doctrinal and the ecclesiastical position of the West-
minster divines ; and a few individuals have learned this
by a careful study of the long neglected original author-
ities ; how will it ever be possible to bring the Church
back to its true position if the majority are to decide by
their own opinions merely, and are not to be themselves
corrected by the historical interpretation of their own con-
stitution ? It is not likely that the Presbyterian Church
will give itself bound hand and foot into the power of
APPEAL AGAINST A VERDICT OF ACQUITTAL 5^
an accidental majority of traditionalists. It will main-
tain its constitutional freedom and decide the questions
now before it as a court of Jesus Christ in accordance
with the laws of a constitutional church.
It is a fundamental principle in ecclesiastical law that
no one can separate himself from the Church without
being guilty of the sin of schism. It is assumed that the
Christian has been translated out of the realm of dark-
ness into the kingdom of the Son of God's love (Col.
i. 13). If he is by excommunication cut off from the
Church, he is, according to the apostle Paul, handed
over to Satan (i Cor, v. 5). If he voluntarily withdraws
from the Church, he re-enters the realm of darkness.
That is the theory of ecclesiastical law, whether it be
right or wrong. That is the theory upon which Church
discipline is based. A minister of the Presbyterian
Church, it is assumed, has a double call, a divine call
from Jesus Christ himself, and a human call in the or-
dination by the Church. Until recent times ministerial
character was regarded as indelible. It could not be re-
nounced by a minister. It could be taken from him
only by the Church which gave it to him, after a sen-
tence of deposition for an ecclesiastical crime. It is true
that a Aveakened sense of ministerial functions has
wrought a change in recent times. A minister may now
renounce the jurisdiction of the Presbyterian Church and
have his name erased from the roll, or he may be dis-
missed to another denomination at his own request, pro-
vided he is not on trial. If, however, charges are pend-
ing against him, he cannot take either of these courses
without an act of violence which would not exempt him
from trial. Therefore, for a minister against whom
charges are pending, or a minister who has a high sense
of the ministerial call, who knows that he is called of
52 ENTERTAINING THE APPEAL
Jesus Christ to the work of the ministry, who has con-
scientious duties to perform in the Presbyterian Church,
— one who has been called to represent a great principle
and who cannot retire from the Presbyterian ministry
without the disregard of known duty — there is no alter-
native for such a minister but to abide in the Presbyte-
rian ministry until he is excluded from its ministry by de-
position after trial. The ecclesiastical court is obliged
therefore, sitting as a court of Jesus Christ and acting in
his name, to consider the question of the entertainment
of this Appeal, not simply as involving the question
whether the minister shall be again put in jeopardy of
suspension or exclusion from the fellowship of a merely
voluntary society or religious club, but whether or not
it shall reopen the question already decided by the Pres-
bytery in order to consider whether to take from him in
whole or in part the external call given him in ordination
and whether it shall say, so far as its authority goes, he
can no longer be a minister of Jesus Christ.
It has been necessary to set before you at some length
the nature of the crime of heresy and what is involved
in its penalty, both in order to overcome misapprehen-
sions on this important subject, prevalent among the
ministry, but also in order to get a basis for the argument
now to be employed against the entertainment of the
Appeal. A much more fundamental principle is now at
stake than any principle involved in the questions of
law or of doctrine which have thus far been debated in the
case of Dr. Briggs. You will go very far in your action
upon the entertainment of this Appeal in the deter-
mination of the Question for yourselves and for the
Christian public, xvhether the Presbyterian Church regards
itself as a purely voluntary religious society, or as a Church
of Jesus Christ.
APPEAL AGAINST A VERDICT OF ACQUITTAL 53
(3). It is a well-known maxim of civil law that :
" Nemo debit bis vexari pro una et eadem Causa."
The Presbytery of New York were directed by the
General Assembly meeting in Portland May 30, 1892,
— " to proceed to pass upon and determine the sufficiency of tiie
charges and specifications in form and legal effect, and to per-
mit the prosecuting committee to amend the specifications and
charges, not changmg the general nature of the same, if, in the
furtherance of justice, it be necessary to amend, so that the case
may be brought to issue and tried on the merits thereof as
speedily as may be practicable."
The Presbytery complied with these directions, and
after a long and patient hearing of the case, in nineteen
sessions extending from November 9, 1892, until Jan-
uary 9, 1893, 128 ministers and elders gave their
verdict acquitting Dr. Briggs of all the charges against
him by majorities ranging from six to twenty-four.
According to the above maxim of civil law this acquittal
should be final. This maxim is a resultant of the expe-
rience of centuries in the practice of civil law. Will the
Presbyterian Church act in violation of this maxim by
entertaining the Appeal? The only purpose of the
Appeal is manifestly to reverse the verdict *of acquittal.
Will the General Assembly act in contravention of the
common law of Great Britain and America in order to
accomplish this purpose? Nothing but imperative
reasons could justify such a course.
(4). In the Constitution of the United States you
will find the provision in the fifth amendment :
" No person shall izvice be put in jeopardy of life or
limb for the same offence T
It is true that the Presbyterian Church does not in its
ecclesiastical courts put any one in jeopardy of life or
54 ENTERTAINING THE APPEAL
limb. It cannot. The civil law reserves such penalties
to itself. But the ecclesiastical court can do a minister
vastly greater injury than the mutilation of his limbs, or
the depriving him of his physical life. It may mutilate
his ministry by suspension, it may destroy it by deposi-
tion. The law of Christian discipleship requires A man
to sacrifice life and limb for Christ and His Church.
The ministers of Jesus Christ are called to deny
themselves, take up their cross and follow Him, They
are taught to expect suffering, persecution, martyrdom
for His sake. There may be in our ministry unworthy
men who regard the ministry as something which a man
may exercise or not at his convenience or pleasure. It
is to be feared that there are those who make the minis-
try a mere profession or means of livelihood. Such min-
isters could hardly be expected to take a serious view of
the solemn obligations of the ministerial office and of
the higher life that is wrapt up in it to the men called
of Jesus Christ, But the true and faithful minister
never hesitates to sacrifice his life itself for Christ's sake.
To injure a minister in his ministry is therefore far
more cruel to him than to cut off his limbs. To depose
him, and so cut ofT his ecclesiastical life, is a far greater
penalty than to deprive him of his physical life. Will
the Presbyterian Church commit an act of cruelty and
wrong worse than that prohibited in the constitution of
our country? If you entertain this Appeal and put the
defendant a second time in jeopardy of his ecclesiastical
life in order to satisfy the unrighteous demands of these
prosecutors, it needs no prophet to tell you that you
will yield still more to their greed and do worse wrong
than that which the constitution of our great Republic
forbids.
(5). Ecclesiastical law differs from civil law in some
APPEAL AGAINST A VERDICT OF ACQUITTAL 55
respects and allows appeals against verdicts of acquittal,
but tvithin certain narrow limits which it is necessary to
define. Before 1821 no distinction was made between
an appeal and complaint. Under the constitution from
1 82 1 to 1884 appeals were limited to judicial cases.
Under the new Book of Discipline they are still further
limited to final judgments in judicial cases (94). Prece-
dents should be considered in the light of these changes
in the law of appeals, for the most of the appeals men-
tioned in the Digests of Baird and of Moore would not
be lawful appeals under our new Book of Discipline,
because they are not from final judgments.
(6). Appeals were defined in the old Book of Disci-
pline until 1884 as "the removal of a cause already de-
cided, from an inferior to a superior judicatory, by a
party aggrieved." Under the new Book of Discipline,
as " the removal of a judicial case by written represen-
tation from an inferior to a superior judicatory, and may
be taken by either of the original parties, from the Final
Judgment of the lower judicatory." (94.)
Appeals are limited to original parties and indeed
aggrieved parties. It is true that the adjective
" aggrieved " is omitted from the present Book of Disci-
pline and " original " inserted in its place. But the rule
that there must be a grievance although not stated
should still be regarded as binding, for it is a funda-
mental principle in all law, civil and ecclesiastical, and
we cannot suppose that the Presbyterian Church would
undertake to supersede it. All the precedents in our
courts, civil and ecclesiastical, require appeals to be
made by aggrieved parties. This General Assembly
will hardly venture to entertain an Appeal from a party
unless they can convince you of a grievance. And that
grievance ought to be very great to justify you in
5(3 ENTERTAINING THE APPEAL
reopening the question of the guilt of a minister of the
sin and crime of heresy.
(7). There can be no doubt of the right of appeal of
the party who is convicted and who is aggrieved by
a sentence which imposes penalties upon him. Civil
and ecclesiastical law agree in this. But the question is
wJiethcr an unsuccessful prosecutor has the right of
appeal.
In civil law where parties litigate and where either
party may suffer grievance from the final judgment of
the court, either party may appeal. There are cases in
ecclesiastical law in which private parties may litigate on
account of private offences. In such cases either party
may appeal when aggrieved. The Book of Discipline
distinguishes between public and private offences. It
prescribes the preliminary steps which shall be taken in
both classes of offences. It requires that in private
offences "no prosecution shall be allowed in case of
alleged personal injury, where the injured party is the
prosecutor, unless those means of reconciliation have
been tried which are required by our Lord (Matthew
xviii. 15-17)." (8.) But "the course prescribed by the
preceding section shall not be required when the prose-
cution is initiated by a judicatory." (9.) The case
against Lhe defendant is not a case of litigation between
two private parties where a private offence has been com-
mitted. It was not begun in the method prescribed for
private offences. The case relates to a pubHc offence
and the prosecutor is a public prosecutor. Therefore,
there can be no question of a grievance of individuals.
TJie only grievance which can be argued is the grievance
of public prose cid or s, and the right of appeal for personal
grievance cannot be pleaded by them.
(8). In ecclesiastical law private prosecutors are allowed
APPEAL AGAINbT A VERDICT OF ACQUITTAL 57
in cases of ecclesiastical crime. This is in accordance
with the ancient practice in criminal law, which has been
done away with in modern times. In ancient law the
nearest kinsman was the prosecutor and the avenger of
blood. • Private wrongs or wrongs to the clan were more
emphasized than public wrongs or wrongs to the com-
munity, and therefore where the crime, according to
modern views, would embrace both public and private
wrong, the party suffering the wrong or his nearest of
kin personally conducted the process against the wrong
doer. The development of criminal law has tended
more and more to merge the private offence in the pub-
lic until the private wrong has been well-nigh submerged
in the ocean of public wrong. The seeking of redress
by individuals has been shown by experience to be pro-
ductive of bitterness and revenge ever increasing between
the parties and their friends in the process of the litiga-
tion. Accordingly, the law of England hedged it about
more and more limiting it to felony and mayhem and
exposing the prosecutor who failed in his charges to
heavy damages and imprisonment ; so that private pro-
cess became more and more infrequent until at last it was
abolished by law soon after the last case of it in 18 18.
In modern criminal law the prosecutor must always be
a public prosecutor and the prosecution be conducted in
the name of the commonwealth. Ecclesiastical law
lingers behind the civil law in its development. Private
prosecutors are allowed still to prosecute in ecclesiastical
courts, and having this right of prosecution they may
appeal in case of public offences if they have been
aggrieved by the decision, but not otherwise. It should
be observed that the private prosecutor is exposed to a
penalty in case of a failure to convict, just as he used to
be in the civil courts. The law is :
58 ENTERTAINING THE APPEAL
" Any person who appears as a prosecutor, without appoint-
ment by the judicatory, shall be warned before the charges are
presented, that, if he fail to show probable cause for the charges,
he must himself be censured, as a slanderer of the brethren, in
proportion to the malignancy or rashness which may appear in
the prosecution." (14.)
Therefore, if the private prosecutor fail in his prosecu-
tion he may suffer a grievance and so have the right of
appeal. Furthermore it is assumed that in all cases of
private prosecution there must be a private wrong wrapt
up in the public wrong. The prosecutor must shov/
some personal wrong or grievance before he is allowed
to prosecute in the civil courts. The ecclesiastical courts
are governed by the same principle. The party prose-
cuting must be an aggrieved party or he cannpt lawfully
prosecute. It may be conceded that private prosecutors
have not been held strictly to this principle in the courts
of the American Presbyterian Church. But great mis-
chief has resulted from the neglect of this rule. And
we should always bear in mind the maxim that a bad
precedent cannot make good law. Whatever looseness
there may have been in the interpretation of the law of
grievance in the ecclesiastical courts, yet the law itself
is on the statute-books that there must be a grievance mz
there can be no appeal. And this has been the practice
of the Ger^^ral Assembly as well. In 1874 an appeal
against the Synod of Illinois South was dismissed be-
cause the appellant was not an aggrieved party. (Min-
utes, p. 62.)
All the appeals of prosecutors known to Presbyterian
practice are of private prosecutors and these were required'
to show that they were aggrieved. But the case against
the defendant was not conducted by a private prosecu-
tor, and therefore no one is entitle^ to urge any such
APPEAL AGAINST A VERDICT OF ACQUITTAL 59
precedents. These prosecutors have no right to claim
on the one hand the grievance of a private prosecutor,
and on the other hand the immunity of a public prose-
cutor, and shield themselves behind the Presbyterian
Church in the United States of America against a counter
action for slander.
(9). W/ien the commonwealth is the prosecutor in a crim-
inal case, no appeal is laivful in behalf of the prosecution.
Even when justice miscarries an appeal is forbidden. As
an eminent authority says :
"If, through a misdirection of the judge on a question of law,
or a mistake of the jury, or their refusal to obey the instructions
of the court, or any other like cause, a verdict of acquittal is
improperly rendered, the verdict can never afterward, on the
application of the prosecutor, in any form of proceeding, be
set aside and a new trial granted."
And again :
" A statute which undertakes to give to the State the right of
appeal, to retry the party after acquittal on a valid indictment, is
void. And no writ of error, or other proceeding, allowed to the
State, can constitutionally open anew the question of guilt, after
the jeopardy has attached. Even though an acquittal has been
produced by an erroneous direction of the judge at the trial the
result is the same." (Bishop on Criminal Law, 993, 1026.)
The prosecution in the case against Dr. Briggs has
been conducted by a committee of Presbytery, claiming
to be a committee of prosecution, acting in the name of
the Presbyterian Church in the United States of
America. Such a public prosecutor has no right of
appeal by any statute law of the Presbyterian Church.
There is no precedent to justify such an appeal in the
practice of Presbyterian courts. The common law and
the practice of the civil courts forbid it. Therefore such
an appeal is without Warrant and illegal. The General
60
ENTERTAINING THE APPEAL
Assembly cannot entertain it without a violation of all
law and all precedent. You would enter into conflict with
the legal experience of mankind. You would do the
appellee a wrong that the civil courts would not hesitate
to redress.
(lo). This committee of the Presbytery of New -York is
not an aggrieved party. They have suffered no injury by
the acquittal of Dr. Briggs. They claim to be public
prosecutors, not individual prosecutors. Therefore they
have suffered no personal grievance. If there has been
any grievance it has been a public grievance which they
suffer only vicariously. If they feel any disappointment
in their failure to convict the accused, they should re-
member that they were not appointed to convict, but
only to prepare the case in behalf of the Presbytery
subject to the decision of the Presbytery. They have
fulfilled the task assigned them and they should acqui-
esce in the result. When they became public prose-
cutors they merged personal considerations. To appeal
against the Presbytery which appointed them lays them
open to the imputation of personal animosity in the
case such as might be natural even if wrong in a pri-
vate prosecutor, but which is both unnatural and un-
lawful in a pubhc prosecutor. The Book of Discipline
requires that :
" Great caution ought to be exercised in receiving accusations
from any person who is known to indulge a malignant spirit
toward the accused, or who is not of good character, or who is
himself under censure or process, or who is personally interested
in any respect in the conviction of the accused, or who is known
to be litigious, rash, or highly imprudent." (13.)
If such a law is necessary in the case of a private
prosecutor, how much more does it warn the public
prosecutor; and if the public prosecutor persist in an
APPEAL AGAINST A VERDICT OF ACQUITTAL Ql
appeal against a verdict of acquittal which has followed
a previous dismissal of the case, notwithstanding the
Presbytery which appointed them advise them to dis-
continue litigation, they raise the question whether they
may not have such " malignant spirit " and such " per-
sonal interest in the conviction of the accused " and be
so "litigious, rash, or highly imprudent," that they may
be no longer competent prosecutors : and whether the
General Assembly should not first inquire whether their
grievance consists in any other thing than a failure to
convict Dr. Briggs, and of that sense of wrong which
those so deeply feel who are causing grievance to others.
( II ). T/iis committee of Presbytery do not give any other
grounds of appeal than such as a public prosecutor might
give til a case of criminal law. The grounds of appeal
are " irregularity in the proceedings of the Presbytery,"
" receiving improper testimony," " declining to receive
important testimony," " manifestation of prejudice in
the conduct of the case," *' mistake or injustice in the
decision." Granting for the moment that the public
prosecutor could establish all these grounds of appeal
and all their specifications : it is not lawful to discuss at
this stage whether they are valid or not. But even if
they should be all valid, yet we must say, while these are
lawful grounds of appeal in cases of private offences
and of questions of law between litigants — they are not
valid grounds of appeal against an acquittal of heresy by
a public prosecutor. The civil court would not recog-
nize such mistakes in law, or alleged injustice of the de-
cision as grounds for appeal against a verdict of acquittal.
No more can the ecclesiastical court do so. If such alleged
mistakes in law do not invalidate an acquittal in a civil
court and justify an appeal, how can they have a differ-
ent result in an ecclesiastical court unless there is a
Q2 ENTERTAINING THE APPEAL
statute law plain and evident to justify such an appeal?
There is no such law. There is no such precedent.
(i2). // may be claimed by some that the Presbyterian
Church of the United States is aggrieved by this acquittal.
But who shall say this ? The public prosecutors ? The ap-
pellants seem to think that they are suffering grievance
vicariously for the Presbyterian Church. There are those
who encourage them in this opinion. But for whom do
they suffer grievance "^ Not for the Presbytery which
appointed them, for they appeal against the final judg-
ment of the Presbytery. They claim that they sufTer
grievance by that final judgment. Not for the Syjjjod of
New York, for the Synod of New York has not yet
recognized them as a party in the case. Not for the
General Assembly, for the General Assembly gave them
no appointment, gave them no authority to act as its
representatives. For whom, then, do they suffer vicari-
^ously? They say for the Presbyterian Church in the
United States of America — doubtless thinking that the
party in the Church which is pushing them on, is the
majority of the Church and is the Church. Possibly
they may be correct in their opinion that the majority
in the Presbyterian Church feel aggrieved .by the verdict
of acquittal against which they appeal. But when in
civil or ecclesiastical law has it ever been allowed for the
public prosecutor to claim that he must appeal because
in his opinion the majority of the people were aggrieved
by a verdict of acquittal? Such a thing is unknown to
law.
The case against Dr. Briggs has been tried and the.
verdict has been given in the lawful court of the Pres-
bytery. If a civil court had acquitted a man on trial for
murder it would be no ground of appeal, that the com-
monwealth was aggrieved by his acquittal. Possibly
APPEAL AGAINST A VERDICT OF ACQUITTAL g3
public opinion, often ill-informed, might regard the ac-
quittal as injurious to the commonwealth. The National
Spy might by its private detectives have so investigated
the matter as to leave no doubt in the minds of its
readers that the acquittal was a great mistake and an en-
couragement to crime. But an appeal would not be
valid on that account. Possibly public, opinion in the
Presbyterian Church, excited by interested parties and
warped by the misrepresentations of partisan religious
jiewspapers, may feel aggrieved by the acquittal of Dr.
Briggs ; but no law, common or statute, civil or eccle-
siastical, recognizes such floating and undefined public
opinion as a valid reason to put him in jeopardy a
second time. He cannot legally be tried by public opin-
ion, but only by the ecclesiastical court of the Presby-
tery. He cannot be convicted because public opinion
may think him guilty. His guilt must be proven in
court. The court is the tribunal to determine his guilt
or innocence. The Presbytery has given ita verdict tha^
Dr. Briggs is innocent. The public prosetutor cannot
plead public opinion as a sufficient reason to put him
in jeopardy again.
(13). It may be urged that the acquittal not only de-
termined that the defendant is innocent of the crime
of heresy, but also determines questions of great doctrinal
and constitutional importance zvhich should receive their
final determination only from the supreme court of the
Presbyterian Church in the United States of America.
But the final judgment of the Presbytery of New York
does not and cannot finally determine such questions
of doctrine or of the constitution. It simply and alone
determines that the defendant is innocent of the specific
charges made against him. The decision of the Pres-
byter)' of New York in the case of Dr. Briggs does not
g4 ENTERTAINING THE APPEAL
bind any other Presbytery ; still less the General Assem-
bly of the Presbyterian Church in the United States of
America as to any matters of doctrine or of law. An
acquittal does not determine whether his doctrines are
right or not ; but only that he is not personally guilty
of heresy. The doctrines of Dr. Briggs stand or fall by
themselves, without any endorsement of the, Presbytery,
and without any responsibility of the Presbytery, or
the Presbyterian Church for them. It is a common
mistake that the Presbyterian^hurch is responsible for
all doctrines of its ministers. The Presbyterian Church
is responsible for its constitution and its constitutional
rules, and for them alone. It cannot exact more of its
ministers. It cannot be responsible for anything that
they may say or do which is not in accord with these
rules. That is the law and usage of the Church and the
path of safety. Any other path leads to strife and
questions -of conscience with regard to every expression
of opinion and every detail of conduct.
Ji it were lawful to appeal every case of doctrine and
"fsew brought before the court of the Presbytery, it would
compel the General Assembly to finally determine all
these doctrinal and legal questions. If this Appeal
should be sustained it would become an unfortunate
precedent which would be followed by public prose-
cutors hereafter, who would in many cases, if not most
cases, magnify their office and bring differences of opin-
ion before the supreme court of the Church, and thus
establish a new and easy way for ambitious litigants to
secure authoritative decisions of the General Assembly
in many matters of faith and morals, of life and work,
which are now regarded as legitimate matters of private
opinion ; and thus imperil the constitution by an unend-
ing series of ^heresy trials and resulting changes in the
doctrine and law of the Presbyterian Church.
APPEAL AGAINST A VERDICT OF ACQUITTAL <35
Furthermore, it is not altogether certain that the de-
cisions of the General Assembly sitting as a court in a
judicial case finally determine questions of doctrine or
morals to which every minister is bound in conscience
to submit. It is possible that a majority of the General
Assembly might make an unconstitutional decision, and
that there might be a series of decisions of questions of
doctrine and morals in contravention of the doctrinal
and ecclesiastical standards. What course shall a synod,
or a presbytery, or a minister pursue in such a case ?
They may be justified in saying, we refuse to submit to
the decisions of this unrighteous majority. We shall
continue to maintain our constitutional rights. In the
next heresy trial we look for a righteous verdict. As
our Confession says :
" All synods or councils since the apostles' times, whether
general or particular, may err and may have erred ; therefore
they are not to be made the rule of faith or practice, but to be
used as a help in both." (XXXI. 3.)
Unless the high court of the General Assembly act in
strict accordance with the forms of law. and with the con-
stitution of the Church and with the sacred rights of
man as set forth in Holy Scripture and our national
constitution, it will be no rebellion if the minority in
the Church continue the struggle against unrighteous-
ness and wrong, hoping for better times. The General
Assembly cannot lawfully revise or amend the constitu-
tion by final judgments in heresy trials. The most that
you can do is to cut off the ecclesiastical life of the man
on trial, and raise the question of conscience with those
who sympathize with them, whether they shall protest
against the injustice and share his fate, or whether they
shall continue the battle for right within the Presby-
terian Church. , ^
QQ ENTERTAINING THE APPEAL
It was never designed that trials for heresy should be
the means of securing decisions of questions of doc-
trines and morals. T/ie coiirt is for discipline, not for
government ; for trials of law, not for definitions of
faith and morals. Trials for heresy are disciplinary pro-
cedures in order to determine the innocence or guilt of indi-
viduals, not to determine the truth or error of proposi-
tions. It is a misfortune if the General Assembly is
required, in order to right wrongs, to indirectly decide
questions of faith ; for the purpose of the litigation is to
right wrongs and not to determine doctrines. If there
is a difference of opinion in the denomination and parties
are divided in opinion on great doctrines of faith, the*
Form of Government prescribes the legal method for
determining the questions, i. e., by overtures from pres-
byteries to the General Assembly, the formulation of
statements of opinion by committees of the General
Assembly and then the submitting of these statements
of opinion to the presbyteries for their decision. If a
sufficient number of presbyteries adopt these state-
ments of opinion they justify the General Assembly in
defining the faith of the Church. Then those who can-
not subscribe to these definitions are excluded from the
Church without a heresy trial, by the very declaration
of these definitions.
The public prosecutors are pushing the Presbyterian
Church into a very inconsistent and dangerous position.
They are endeavoring to secure new definitions of
dogma by final judgments in a heresy trial, when they
ought to aim to secure them by overtures in accordance
with the provision of the Form of Government. The
Form of Government prescribes their path, not the Book
of Discipline.
(14). The Presbytery of Nezv York, the largest Pre shy-
APPEAL AGAINST A VERDICT OF ACQUITTAL (57
tery in the Presbyterian Church, after a long and patient
consideration of the merits of the case, gave a verdict of
acquittal. Would the General Assembly be willing to
give the same amount of time and the same degree of
patience to the consideration of the merits of the case,
if the Appeal should be entertained? The General As-
sembly is composed of more than five hundred members^
from all parts of the United States. Is it likely that so
numerous a body will be a more equitable court than
the Presbytery of New York ? Let any one consider
the situation of affairs in the Presbyterian Church since
the process was begun against Dr. Briggs and honestly
ask whether the General Assembly is likely to be in a
.more judicial frame of mind than the Presbytery of New
York. If the General Assembly should entertain this
Appeal it would be necessary to consider the merits of
the case with the utmost care, with evident impartiality,
with entire freedom from party prejudice and with un-
wearied patience for several weeks ; or you could not
win public confidence in your justice, or public respect
for your decision. If you override all the provisions of
-tiie constitution, and the maxims of civil law, the usages
•qf civil and ecclesiastical courts in order to entertain an
Appeal and then rush to a hasty decision ; you will
strike a deadly blow at the constitution and the disci-
pline of the Presbyterian Church.
(15). The Presbytery of New York rendered its verdict
of acquittal yiotwithstanding very great pressure upon its
members to vote for conviction. It is necessary briefly to
review the case. January 20th, 1891, Dr. Briggs deliv-
ered his Inaugural Address on the Authority of Holy
Scripture, in the chapel of the Union Theological Sem-
inary, New York. A garbled outline of that Address
was published in many of the religious and secular
gg ENTERTAINING THE APPEAL
newspapers and public opinion was excited against it
before the Address was published. April i8th, 1891, on
motion of Dr. Birch, by authority of the Presbytery of
New York, the Moderator, Dr. Shearer, appointed a
committee to consider the Inaugural Address and to re-
port at the meeting in May. This action was taken against
Dr. Briggs in his absence. He was confined to his
house by illness. He had no warning of the proposed
motion. This action was therefore in violation of the
law of the Church " that no discussion ought to be
allowed involving the character of an absent person in
his absence." Against this action of the Presbytery Dr.
Briggs protested at the meeting in May, that it was un-
lawful and without precedent. At the same meeting
the majority of the committee reported recommending
" that the Presbytery enter at once upon the judicial
investigation of the case." This report was adopted
and a committee was appointed by the Moderator, Dr.
Shearer, consisting of the majority of the former com-
mittee, to " arrange and prepare the necessary proceed-
ings appropriate in the case of Dr. Briggs." Against
this action Dr. Briggs gave notice of protest and com-
plaint to Synod, but subsequently withdrew this com-
plaint in order that there might be no delay in the
advance toward judicial proceedings. Thus far the Pres-
bytery of New York acted unfairly towards the defend-
ant. It gave him no opportunity to explain his Inau-
gural Address or of giving satisfaction to the Presby-
tery.
The directors of the Union Theological Seminary
undertook to satisfy themselves and to remove the
public prejudice, by securing from Dr. Briggs categorical
answers to eight questions embracing the chief points at
issue. This was published by the authority of the
APPEAL AGAINST A VERDICT OF ACQUITTAL (39
directors. But the General Assembly at Detroit in
May, 1 891, notwithstanding these categorical answers,
undertook to veto the transfer of Dr. Briggs to the
chair of Biblical Theology. Several of the prosecutors
took part in the act of veto and used their personal
influence in its behalf; and then returned to New York
and, with the other members of the committee " ap-
pointed to prepare the necessary proceedings," blos-
somed out into a prosecuting committee, by their own
inherent energy. Under the increased impetus of the
action of the General Assembly of Detroit, the Presby-
tery suffered them to table charges against Dr. Briggs,
October 5, 1891, and cited him to answer and plead to
them. It refused to dismiss the case. On November 4,
1891, he appeared and filed objections against "the suf-
ficiency of the charges and specifications in form and
legal effect." The Presbytery thereupon dismissed the
case against him by a vote of 94 to 39. Up to this dis-
missal in every vote the presbytery had been adverse to
the defendant. The dismissal was made after hearing
his Demurrer, notwithstanding the veto of the General
Assembly and the previous adverse votes of the Presby-
tery.
In April, 1892, the adverse influence in the Presbytery
against Dr. Briggs reasserted itself in the vote which
sent to the General Assembly at Portland four members
of the committee which had been prosecuting him and
eight other friends of the prosecution out of a total of
fourteen commissioners. The General Assembly at
Portland sustained the Appeal against the decision of
the Presbytery and ordered a ne\i^trial.
The Presbytery met on November 9, 1892, under the
influence of this unfavorable action of the General As-
sembly at Portland, overcame the preliminary objection
fjQ ENTERTAINING THE APPEAL
of Dr. Briggs, refused to hear his argument on the prelim-
inary objection and allowed the committee to table new
charges. The defendant on November 28, 1892, made
preliminary objections to the Amended Charges showing
that they were insufificient in form and legal effect,
insisting upon several of these objections, but waiving
his objections to six of the charges under certain condi-
tions accepted by the Presbytery, in order to go to trial
in accordance with the directions of the General Assem-
bly. If the defendant had appeared before the Presby-
tery under more favorable circumstances and had not
been confronted by the adverse decisions of the General
Assemblies at Detroit and at Portland, he would have
claimed as his right that these six charges should be
dismissed as insufificient in form and legal effect. As it
was, he personally waived his objections to them under
certain conditions, and threw the responsibility upon the
Presbytery whether they were ready to go to trial on
illegal and invalid charges.
Notwithstanding the concessions made by the defend-
ant the Presbytery overcame several of his preliminary
objections upon which he took his stand, forced him to
make several complaints to the Synod of New York and
then proceeded to trial. The defendant felt deeply the
disadvantage of the situation, and yet after the full hear-
ing accorded to both parties, during which the court in
every way favored the committee of prosecution and
even allowed them to act in defiance of the rulings of
the Presbytery so as to argue on two of the charges
which had been thrown out, and to review the whole
case and introduce new matter under the guise of rebut-
tal ; the court acquitted him on all the charges by
majorities ranging from six to twenty-four. Under
these circumstances of a dismissal in 1891 and an
APPEAL AGAINST A VERDICT OF ACQUITTAL 71
acquittal in 1892, by a court which showed so evidently,
to say the least, that they were not biased in favor of
Dr. Briggs, and which was under the external pressure
of the unfavorable action of two General Assemblies,
and which was compelled to acquit him by the evidence
in the case ; is it equitable to put the defendant in
jeopardy again for the offences charged against him ?
No civil court could do such a wrong. It would he a
new and an iniquitous precedent in an ecclesiastical
court. The civil courts might feel compelled in the in-
terests of equity to interpose.
The General Assembly cannot entertain this Appeal
tvithout doing violence to the sense of right which is exhib-
ited in the constitution of our coimtry, in the maxims of
common law, in the statutes of our commomvealth, and in
the practice of our civil courts ; without establishing an
entirely new and dangerotis precedent in ecclesiastical
law ; zvithout doing grave injtistice to the defendant and
to the Presbytery of New York ; and without under-
minitig public confidence in the equity of Presbyterian
discipline.
This is too heavy a cost to pay for the sake of secur-
ing a condemnation of one man, however objectionable
he may be. This is too great a strain to put upon our
constitution, in order to gain a decision on questions of
doctrine which may be more clearly and satisfactorily
defined by a procedure prescribed in the Form of Gov-
ernment. The common law lays down this fundamental
principle which applies to this case, if to any :
" It is for the public good that there be an end to litiga-
tion ^
fj2 . ENTERTAINING THE APPEAL
III. — PENDING THE COMPLAINT TO THE SYNOD OF NEW YORK
ON THE QUESTION WHETHER THE APPELLANTS ARE AN
ORIGINAL PARTY AND BEFORE THE DETERMINATION BY
THE SYNOD OF THAT QUESTION THIS ASSEMBLY CANNOT
ENTERTAIN THE PRESENT APPEAL.
The General Assembly meeting at Portland while con-
sidering the question of the entertainment of the Ap-
peal against the Presbytery of New York in dismissing
the case against Dr. Briggs, were informed by the appel-
lee on May 26th, 1892, that a complaint was pending be-
fore the Synod of New York against the decision of the
Presbytery of New York, Nov. 4th, 1891, in sustaining
by a vote of 64 to 57 the ruling of the Moderator as
follows :
'"I. That the committee which preferred charges against Dr.
Briggs (presented to Presbytery Oct. 5th, 1891), was a committee
of prosecution under section 11 of the Revised Book of Dis-
cipline ;
" ' 2. That the committee was in the house on the day on which
the citation was returnable (Nov. 4th, 1891, as aforesaid), as an
original party ;
" ' 3. That the committee as an original party, was virtually and
practically independent of the Presbytery.'
" This Complaint bears the signature of 1 14 ministers and elders
of the Presbytery of New York.
" According to the Book of Discipline (83), 'a complaint is a
written representation, made to the next superior judicatory.'
A complaint cannot be earned from the Presbytery to the Gen-
eral Assembly. Therefore the only redress the defendant had
against the decision of the Presbytery in these important matters
was by complaint to the Synod of New York. This Complaint
involves the very existence of this committee which has ap-
pealed ; whether they were appointed as a prosecuting commit-
tee, whether they are an original party, whether they have any
right to act independent of the Presbytery, and against the Pres-
bytery. If the Synod should decide any of these questions in
accordance with the views of the complainants, the appellants
ARE THE APPELLANTS AN ORIGINAL PARTY? 73
would have no present right of appeal, and could not therefore
appear before you as appellants at this time. The defendant
does not raise those objections here, because they go before the
Synod of New York for its decision, and he reserves the right
with others, his co-complainants, to argue these questions before
the Synod of New York."
The General Assembly at Portland after hearing this
statement of reservation, adopted the report of the ma-
jority of the judicial committee that the Appeal was in
order and that the Appeal should be entertained and a
time set for hearing the case. But they refrained from
adopting the report of the committee as a whole, or that
part of the report which recognized the appellants as a
committee of prosecution and an original party. The
part of the report not adopted is as follows :
— "that, in the opinion of this committee the Appeal taken by
the Presbyterian Church in the United States of America, an
original party, represented by the 'Committee of Prosecution,'
appointed under section 11 of the Book of Discipline, has been
taken from the final judgment of the Presbytery in dismissing
the case ; and that the said committee had the right to take this
Appeal representing the said original party."
The reasons for not adopting this part of the Report
of the Judicial Committee, were doubtless that, (i) the
appellants had not asked the Assembly to decide that
question, and (2) the appellee had distinctly reserved it
for the jurisdiction of the Synod of New York in the
Complaint pending before the Synod ; and (3) the As-
sembly desired to avoid any possible conflict of jurisdic-
tion between the General Assembly and the Synod of
New York.
The appellee was so extremely careful to reserve this
question of parties for the decision of the Synod of New
York that at the very beginning of his argument against
sustaining the Appeal he said :
74 ENTERTAINING THE APPEAL
" The appellee is now called upon to resist the Appeal made
to your venerable body by the alleged Prosecuting Committee of
the Presbytery of New York. You have decided to entertain the
appeal despite my protest and reservation of rights. It is now-
necessary for me, before going a step further, to say that I do
not consent to your decision. I do not waive my right, or the
right of my co-complainants, to prosecute our complaint before
the Synod of New York, in order that it may be determined there
whether the appellants were appomted as a Committee of Prose-
cution by the Presbytery of New York, whether they are an
original party, and whether they can act as appellants against the
decision of the Presbytery to dismiss the case. We reserve this
right. The appellee does not waive his right to seek any relief
that may seem to be proper against your decision to entertain
the appeal. He enters upon his response to the objections of
the appellants with all these reservations of right." •
It is argued by the prosecutors that the Assembly by
entertaining the Appeal implicitly recognized them as
parties. But this is not true. They recognized them as
prima facie a party whose right was not questioned before
them ; but they did not undertake to decide the ques-
tion whether they were real parties, which question was
reserved for the decision of the Synod of New York.
It is evident that the General Assembly reserved its
opinion on this question of the right of a public prose-
cutor to appeal as an original party, for it was brought
up before the Assembly by an overture from the Pres-
bytery of Cayuga :
— "asking that an interpretation of the Book of Discipline be
given which shall cover the points at issue :
"First. — The Constitution of the Presbyterian Church is not
less just or less enlightened than that of the United States.
Hence the principle laid down in the fifth amendment to the
Constitution of the United States, in the words, 'Nor shall any
person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy
of life or limb,' is applicable in all prosecutions initiated by any
judicatory of the Presbyterian Church.
ARE THE APPELLANTS AN ORIGINAL PARTY? 75
" Sccofid.~ln the Presbyterian Church a prosecution may be
initiated either by a private prosecutor or by a church judicatory.
In the latter case, if the judicatory disposes of the matter with-
out convicting the accused, he ought not for the same offense to
be again put in jeopardy of ecclesiastical penalties. Especially is
it absurd to hold that a judicatory has for the purpose of putting
an accused person a second tmie in jeopardy the right to appeal
from its own decision. And certainly a right which it never pos-
sessed it cannot delegate to any person or committee.
" Third.— \i the Revised Book of Discipline of the Presbyte-
rian Church does not forbid such violations of the rights of men
as are recognized in the Constitution of the United States, and
among all civilized nations, at least it does not require them, and
the judicatories of the Church may exclude them, and ought to
exclude them.
" Fourth.— 'Y)\&x& is no necessity in the Presbyterian Church
for giving the right of Appeal to a public prosecutor in defiance
of the enlightened judgment of mankind , for the rights of an
unsuccessful prosecutor are abundantly protected by other pro-
visions in our constitution. As the prosecution of offenses is
often a thankless task, undertaken for the public good, those
who undertake it should be amply protected. But it is equally
true that all persons should be protected from unreasonable
prosecutions, and that members of judicatories should be pro-
tected from being compelled needlessly to give their time to ec-
clesiastical trials."
This overture was referred to the same judicial com-
mittee which had reported that the Appeal in the Briggs
case was in order. Their report was made subsequent
to the decision of the Assembly in the Briggs case and
in the light of it. Nevertheless the Assembly adopted
as its reply the recommendation of the Committee, viz. :
" that as the subjects referred to are presented in thesz,
it is inexpedient for the Assembly to make any answer."
(Minutes, p. 23.)
It has also been argued that the Protest signed by Dr.
McPherson and some 53 others implies that the General
76 ENTERTAINING THE APPEAL
Assembly decided the question whether the appellants
were an original party. This is the language of the Pro-
test:
" We, the undersigned, ministers and elders, commissioners of
the 104th General Assembly, do hereby enter and record our pro-
test against the action of the General Assembly in entertaining
the appeal in the case of ' The Presbyterian Church in the United
States of America against the Rev, Charles A. Briggs, D.D.,' and
so givmg to the committee which preferred the charges against
Dr. Briggs, standing before the Assembly and right of appeal as
an ' original party,' beyond the control of the Presbytery and its
power to discharge them when dismissing the case."
But what answer did the Assembly give to the Pro-
test ? No answer. The Assembly was non-committal.
Notwithstanding the fact that the moderator was au-
thorized to appoint a committee to answer the Protest,
the Protest was " ordered to be entered on the Minutes
of the Assembly without answer," (Minutes, p, 25.)
It is clear therefore that the Assembly declined to de-
cide the question whether the committee was an original
party, (i) They declined to determine the question in
face of the reservation by the appellee of his own rights,
of the rights of his co-complainants, of the rights of his
Presbytery, and of the rights of his Synod; (2) they de-
clined to answer the question when it was raised before
them a second time by the Presbytery of Cayuga ; (3)
they declined to answer the question when it was forced
upon them .the third time by a protest of 54 commis-
sioners of the Assembly. They wisely and persistently
declined to answer the questioti because they saw clearly
that they would thereby be involved in an inevitable con--
flict of jurisdiction with the Syfiod of New York.
(2). This question of the original party is not a merely tech-
nical question, but one of the most important that has ever
been brought before a judicatory, one which has far-reach-
ARE THE APPELLANTS AN ORIGINAL PARTY? 77
ing consequences, affecting the rights of every judi-
catory, every ofifice-bearer, and every communicant in
the Presbyterian Church. It is necessary that you
should patiently consider the question in its historical
evolution in connection with this case.
April i8th, 1891, on motion of Dr. Birch, a committee
was appointed to consider " the Inaugural Address of
the Rev. Charles A. Briggs, D.D., in its relation to the
Confession of Faith." The majority of this committee
reported May nth, recommending " that the Presbytery
enter at once upon the judicial investigation of the case."
This report was adopted. Then, on motion of Dr. Shi-
land, a committee was appointed " to arrange and pre-
pare the necessary proceedings appropriate in the case
of Dr. Briggs." This is the authority on which the
prosecution act. This is the basis on which all their
claims rest to be a prosecuting committee, an original
party, independent of the Presbytery and representing
the Presbyterian Church in the United States of America.
Certainly one finds none of these things in the terms of
their appointment. There is not a word about their be-
ing a prosecuting committee. There is not the slightest
reference to the Presbyterian Church in the United States
of America. They were a committee of Presbytery, to
arrange and prepare something which they were to re-
port to the Presbytery. They were given discretion as
to what might be necessary and what might be appro-
priate to report. But the Presbytery did not endow the
committee with plenary power to determine of them-
selves without regard to the wishes of the Presbytery
what was appropriate and what was necessary.
It is claimed that the Presbytery had no alternative
than to appoint a prosecuting committee according to the
Book of Discipline which prescribes :
78 ENTERTAINING THE APPEAL
" When the prosecution is initiated by a judicatory, it shall
appoint one or more of its own members a Committee to con-
duct the prosecution in all its stages in whatever judicatory, until
the final issue be reached." (ii.)
If the Presbytery had determined to initiate prosecu-
tion by the judicatory, certainly it was required by law
to appoint such a prosecuting committee. But the
Presbytery may have disobeyed the law and so made
themselves liable to censure. It does not follow be-
cause there is such a law that the Presbytery must cer-
tainly have obeyed it. The terms of the appointment
of this committee show no recognition of such a law
either in the matter or form of their appointment.
But there is no stifficient evidence to show that the Pres-
bytery had reached the point ivhen they had decided to in-
itiate proceedings by the Judicatory, (a) The mover of
the resolution which appointed the committee signed
the complaint to the Synod of New York in which he
says with 113 other ministers and elders of the Presby-
tery of New York, that this committee was not appointed
as a prosecuting committee, {b) The Presbytery, May
1 1, were confronted by a protest and a complaint to Synod
made by Dr. Briggs against their preliminary action, and
it was not clear what might be the necessary and appro-
priate proceedings in view of that complaint and protest.
It might be best for the Presbytery to postpone further
proceedings until the Synod had decided upon this Com-
plaint against, its preliminary procedure, {c) The Gen-
eral Assembly had not yet met, and the Presbytery could
not know what proceedings the General Assembly would
direct, after giving its advice upon the numerous over-
tures coming before them with regard to the Inaugural
of Dr. Briggs. {d) The chairman of the committee, Dr.
Birch, said himself on the floor of the Presbytery, that it
ARE THE APPELLANTS AN ORIGINAL PARTY? ^9
might be necessary for him to act as an individual pros-
ecutor in the case. {/) The Rev. Dr. Sample, a member
of the committee, called upon Dr. Briggs and privately
requested him to appear before the committee and make
statements and explanations so as to obviate the neces-
sity of tabling charges. This was an act of kindness and
Christian courtesy on the part of Dr. Sample which he
, could not have undertaken if he supposed that he be-
longed to a prosecuting committee appointed after the
Presbytery had determined to initiate procedure. In
fact it was not clear to the Presbytery and they could
not know when this committee was appointed, what pro-
ceeding would be necessary or appropriate in the case of
Dr. Briggs.
Let the appellee tell you what proceedings seemed to
Dr. Briggs necessary and appropriate under the circum-
stances which emerged after the General Assembly at
Detroit undertook to veto his transfer to the Edward
Robinson Chair of Biblical Theology. This committee
should have considered (i) whether it was appropriate or
necessary that the judical investigation should be con-
ducted by a trial in the court of the Presbytery ; or
v/hether the investigation had not some preliminary
steps to take before a trial was necessary or even legal ;
whether it was not first necessary " by private conference
luith the accused, to avoid, if possible, the necessity of actual
process^' (9). This was in the mind of Dr. Sample and
other members of the Presbytery.
(2). Whether the accused ought not first to have had an
opportunity to give satisfaction to Jus bretJiren in open Pres-
bytery. This Dr. Briggs has always claimed as his right
and has repeatedly protested that it was taken from him.
(3). Whether it was not better to " wait until God in
his righteous providence should give further light, than
go ENTERTAINING THE APPEAL
by unavailing prosecution to weaken the force of dis-
cipline."
(4). If the committee had considered these prelimi-
nary questions it might then have recommended to the
Presbytery that the necessary and appropriate proceed-
ings were to proceed to a judicial investigation in the
form of a trial for heresy.
(5). The committee had also to determine whether
the doubt in their chairman's mind should be resolved,
and if a trial was to be undertaken whether it should be
initiated by the judicatory, or whether Dr. Birch him-
self should undertake it as an individual prosecutor. It
was for them to recommend if they thought wise, that
process should be initiated by the judicatory and that a
prosecuting committee should be appointed.
(6). It is doubtful whether this committee had the
right to prepare and table charges. The defendant has
never challenged their right to do this, because so much
was left to their discretion in the ambiguous terms of
their appointment. But it was certainly optional with
them whether they should table charges or not.
Thus this committee appointed to " arrange and pre-
pare the necessary proceedings appropriate to the case
of Dr. Briggs " had a sufficiently responsible task in
the terms of their appointment. It was within their
right to recommend, (i) that the Presbytery go to trial.
(2) That the Presbytery . initiate process. (3) That a
prosecuting .committee be appointed. (4) That the
charges which they had prepared be served upon the
accused.
Instead of limiting themselves to these their legiti-
mate functions, they took all these things for granted,
they set up the claim to be themselves the prosecuting
committee, an original party representing the Presby-
ARE THE APPELLANTS AN ORIGINAL PARTY? gl
terian Church in the United States of America, and they
insisted that the Presbytery had no option in the mat-
ter but to take the decisions of this committee on these
preliminary matters as final, and go on with the trial in
all its stages, in any way and before any court that this
committee in its extraordinary power and wisdom might
determine.
These extravagant claims of this committee of the
Presbytery first appeared on October 5, 1891, in connec-
tion with the printed report of the committee and their
spoken words upon the floor of the Presbytery by Dr.
Birch and Mr. McCook, but these claims were at once
denied by Dr. Thompson, who said :
" From the reading of the Book it seems that we have no
committee of prosecution yet. The committee was appointed
to arrange and prepare the papers ; it was not called a commit-
tee of prosecution. The committee of prosecution is to conduct
the matter through every stage. Nothing of the kind is ex-
pressed or implied in the record of the Minutes."
Dr. Van Dyke also urged that the committee was not
a party as against Dr. Briggs, but that the matter was
between the Presbytery and Dr. Briggs.
Dr. Shiland said :
*' If Dr. Briggs will answer the questions here, through the
Moderator, that he answered to the directors of the Seminary,
1 do not see any reason why we should go on with this trial."
Dr. Alexander said :
" I do wish that this should be before the Presbytery so that
we shall not be pressed into a judicial proceeding, into a
trial, without the opportunity of saying whether in view of all
the light now, we want to go into it, or whether we want to
pause right here."
Dr. Alexander moved that,
— " the Presbytery, without pronouncing on the sufficiency of
these latter declarations to cover all the points concerning which
82 ENTERTAINING THE APPEAL
the accused had been called in question, deems it expedient to ar-
rest the judicial proceedings and hereby discharges the commit-
tee from further consideration of the case."
Dr. John Hall moved an amendment that :
"The Presbytery receive the report of the committee and
recognize the diligence and conscientiousness of the committee ;
that in view of the disclaimers of distinct errors made by Dr.
Briggs, subsequent to the publication of the inaugural, the Pres-
bytery relieves the committee from its work, and at the same
time expresses its disapproval of the injudicious and misleading
language of the inaugural, of the spirit in which some parts of
it are presented, and of the suggestion of inference against the
authority of Holy Scripture, and enjoin on Dr. Briggs, their
brother and co-presbyter, that such methods be not pursued by
him in his place as professor."
Dr. Hall's amendment was supported by Dr. Schauf-
fler and many others. Both of these motions were en-
tertained by the moderator ; both of them imply that
the claims of the committee were not recognized by
their movers, by their supporters, or by the Moderator.
Dr. Hall's amendment was put and lost. Dr. Alex-
ander's motion was lost by 64 to 62. But as Dr. Hall,
Dr. Schauffler and many others voted against Dr. Alex-
ander's resolution, it is evident that the majority of the
Presbytery, with the moderator at their head, did not
recognize the claim of the committee to be an original
party on October 9, 1891.
The Presbytery by a majority of two allowed the com-
mittee to table charges and they were served upon Dr.
Briggs. Before the meeting of the Presbytery in
November, the Synod of New York met and approved
the minutes of the Presbytery containing the report of
the committee and the recognition of them as the pros-
ecuting committee on the minutes. It is claimed by
the prosecution that the approval of the minutes debars
ARK THE APPELLANTS AN ORIGINAL PARTY? y3
further objection. But this is invalid for the reason
that the General Assembly has decided in 1879 ^^^^ •
•' The constituted right of appeal, ' either from a part of the
proceedings of a judicatory or from a definitive sentence,' and
the right of complaint ' respecting a decision by an inferior judi-
catory,' ' either before its rising or within ten days thereafter,"
cannot be in any way afifected by the approval of the Minutes of
the judicatory against the action of which the appeal or com-
plaint may be taken." (Minutes, p. 613; Digest, pp. 663, 664.)
Furthermore the difference of opinion in the Presby-
tery on this question had been sufficiently developed
and the opinion of the moderator and of the majority
had been sufficiently expressed and it only needed the
reassertion of the claims of the committee in a practical
form on Nov. 4th to make it a definite issue before the
Church. The issue was raised by a decision of the
moderator after listening to Dr. Briggs that " the plain-
tiff on the other side had a right to answer the objec-
tions." Dr. Van Dyke raised the point of order that
the committee were not an original party. The moder-
ator decided that :
— "this committee has been properly constituted as a committee
of prosecution and represents the Presbyterian Church in the
United States of America as the original party,** and "that its
power is to carry on this case to completion."
Dr. Van Dyke entered a protest. Dr. Brown appealed
from the decisions of the moderator and was seconded
by Dr. Shiland. The moderator refused Dr. Briggs the
floor to speak upon this question. The appeal was put
and the moderator was sustained by a vote of 64 to 57.
Thus this all-important constitutioiial question %vas
decided without hearing the parties, and without debate,
by a moderator who had changed his mind since the pre-
vious meeting of the Presbytery, and who came prepared
g^ ENTERTAINING THE APPEAL
to enforce his decision. All this is contrary to the law
of the Church which does not permit the moderator to
decide constitutional questions, but only questions of
order. A constitutional question upon which the legiti-
macy of the whole process against Dr. Briggs rests, was
decided by the arbitrary usurpation of authority by the
moderator of the Presbytery of New York. Further- ;
more the Book of Discipline requires that parties should
be heard on all questions of order or evidence arising in
the course of the trial before the moderator gives his
decision. But the moderator refused Dr. Briggs a hear-
ing on this essential question of order.
The only redress for these wrongs was by complaint
to the Synod of New York. This remedy was used by
the defendant and 113 other ministers and elders of the
Presbytery of New York. The Synod of New York
assumed jurisdiction of this Complaint, and until it has
been determined by the Synod, the General Assembly can-
not legally recognise the appellants as a prosecuting
committee.
(3). The decision of the moderator of the Presbytery
of New York not only gave the committee a status as a
prosecuting committee, but also enabled them to pro-
ceed in the case as an original party. If the case had
been initiated by the Presbytery then the Presbyterian
Church in the United States of America would be the
prosecutor and an original party ; according to the
Book of Discipline (10). But the case was not initiated
by the judicatory, but by a committee of the judicator}-,
appointed for a different purpose, which at first usurped
the functions of a prosecuting committee, and then was
recognized as an original party by a mistake of many
voters in the Presbytery who voted to sustain the mod-
erator's decision, but who subsequently signed the com-
ARE THE APPELLANTS AN ORIGINAL PARTY? §5
plaint to the Synod of New York against the action of
the Presbytery in sustaining that decision. The ques-
tion now arises, is a prosecuting committee an original
party representing the Presbyterian Church in the United
States of America ?
(a). The Book of DiscipHne nowhere makes the state-
ment that the prosecuting committee is an original
party. There is no statute law to that effect.
[b). There is no precedent in its favor. The common
law of the Presbyterian Church is against it. The Gen-
eral Assembly in 1877 decided that a prosecuting com-
mittee was not an original party. The minute is :
" In the case of the appeal of Thomas H. Skinner et al from
the Presbytery of Cmcmnati, the committee recommend that,
masmuch as the so-called appellants were not an origmal party,
they are not entitled to an appeal." (Minutes 1877, p. 575.)
These so-called appellants based their claim on an
opinion of the Old School Assembly in 1861 that a com-
mittee prosecuting for common fame was an original
party. (Moore's Digest, 563.) But this was merely an
opinion of that Assembly. It did not take effect. For
the Committee for Common Fame did not appear before
them as appellants. The General Assembly of 1877 did
not regard this inoperative decision of one section of
the Church only, as any bar to their decision. Thus the
claim that a prosecuting committee is an original party
is not sustained by statute law and is opposed by a
judicial decision of the General Assembly to the
contrary,
{c). But it is urged that the new Book of Discipline
intended that the prosecuting committee should be an
original party. The intention of a document may be
determined by the views of those who framed it, or of
8g ENTERTAINING THE APPEAL
those who adopted it as their own. It is reported that
the original members of the committee which framed
the new Book of Discipline are divided in their opinion
on this subject. Two of the most distinguished ecclesi-
astical lawyers now living who were members of the
committee on the revision of the Book of Discipline,
state that the committee inserted the provision that the
accusation should be brought in the name of the Presby-
terian Church in the United States of America " to
avoid the old and unsatisfactory provision which made
common fame the accuser. It was said that common
fame was a lying jade."
So far as we have been able to inquire there was no
discussion on this subject before the Church or the
General Assembly which adopted the new Book of
Discipline, so that if such a momentous change was
made in Presbyterian jurisprudence, it was made inno-
cently and unwittingly by the Presbyterian Church.
According to the testimony of Dr. Willis J. Beecher:
" Ten years ago, and more, when the revision of the Book of
Discipline was before the Church, the Presbytery of Cayuga
objected to the revised Book on the ground that it was capable
of being so interpreted as to give the right of appeal as against a
verdict of acquittal. In its overture to the Portland Assembly,
this Presbytery called attention to its action ten years ago, and
simply reiterated the position then taken. One or two other
Presbyteries and a few individuals took the same ground in
regard to the revised Book. Their protests made no impres-
sion at the time. Men who might have been expected to take
an interest in the matter took no interest in it. One reason
assigned was that there was really no ground for fear that such
an interpretation would be ever attempted. It was said that the
nature of an appeal was everywhere understood. It was said
that the danger apprehended by the protesters did not exist, inas-
much as it was absurd to think that the Presbyterian Church
would ever adopt judicial processes that all mankind regard as
ARE THE APPELLANTS AN ORIGINAL PARTY? 87
manifestly unjust. And so the matter went by default, without
widespread or careful discussion."
Therefore so far as we can obtain evidence as to the
intent of the framersof the new Book of DiscipHne and
of the Church which adopted it, we have no suf^cient
reason that such a change in Presbyterian law was con-
templated as the making a committee of prosecution an
original party representing the Presbyterian Church in
the United States of America.
{d). In criminal courts the public prosecutor repre-
sents the people as an original party. So it is claimed
that the prosecuting committee should represent the
Presbyterian Church in the United States of America
as an original party. There is much to be said in favor
of such an opinion. The civil law is in advance of
ecclesiastical law in this respect. The time will surely
come when ecclesiastical courts will not allow private
prosecutors for public offences, and when all trials
for heresy will be conducted by public prosecutors.
When this time shall come the public prosecutors may
be made an original party by the statute law of the
Presbyterian Church, and the law will guard the new
provision just as the commonwealth guards it from
every' possible abuse. But that time has not yet come.
There is as yet no such statute and no such usage, and
no such careful guarding. The Presbytery of New York
did not contemplate such a thing when the committee
was appointed to " arrange and prepare the necessary
proceedings appropriate in the case of Dr. Briggs."
This committee has thrust this momentous question
upon the Presbytery of New York, the Synod of New
York and the General Assembly, and involved it with
the merits of a great controversy and enveloped it in
the excitement of party feeling so that it is exceedingly
g§ ENTERTAINING THE APPEAL
difficult to consider this question of law upon its own
merits.
We should consider that a Presbytery and a criminal
court of law are not in exactly the same situation. It
is therefore not altogether clear that the one should be
taken as the model of the other. The Presbytery is a
body composed of all the ministers and representative
elders of all the Presbyterian congregations within a
given district. It represents the Presbyterian Church
in the United States of America within the given terri-
tory by its very constitution. Is it lawful for the Pres-
bytery to divest itself of its responsibility as represent-
ing the Presbyterian Church in the United States of
America? Can it avoid responsibility for its ministers,
its churches and its other business? According to the
constitution as it now is, the Presbytery is responsible
to the Synod of New York and to the General Assembly
for all its transactions, executive, legislative and judicial.
It cannot divest itself of any portion of its responsibil-
ity by throwing it upon a committee of its own appoint-
ment. It is responsible for all of its committees. There-
fore the Presbytery and the Presbytery alone must
represent within its bounds the Presbj'^terian Church in
the United States of America ; it must be the party in
every case initiated by it as a judicatory. The prose-
cuting committee represents the Presbytery in all that
it does. It conducts the case as the committee of the
Presbytery. It must conduct it in any way in which
the Presbytery directs it to conduct it. It must begin
when the Presbytery directs it to begin. It must finish
its labors when the Presbytery directs it to finish. If it
fail in its duty the Presbytery may censure it and dis-
band it. It may appoint another committee in its
place. It may enlarge its numbers or diminish them.
ARE THE APPELLANTS AN ORIGINAL PARTY? 89
The Presbytery cannot divest itself of its authority over
its committee of prosecution or shirk responsibility for
its actions. If the committee of prosecution, after its
appointment, indulge in a malignant spirit; if they show
by their conduct of the case that they are personally
interested in the conviction of the accused ; if it be-
comes evident to the Presbytery that they have become
" litigious, rash or highly imprudent " in the conduct of
the case ; and that they are by their actions bringing re-
proach upon the Presbytery and the good name of the
Presbyterian Church in the United States of America;
if they heap up grievances against themselves ; who is
to bear the blame in the higher courts for all these
grievances if not the Presbytery itself? If the Presby-
tery has not done its duty in keeping under its direction
and control a committee of its own appointment, the
Presbytery and not the committee will be censured in
the superior courts.
There is no statute law, there is no usage to sustain
the claim that a committee of prosecution is an original
party. Precedent is against it and it cannot be allowed
without divesting the Presbytery of its constitutional
authority and its constitutional obligations to the supe-
rior courts. The appellee and 113 other co-presbyters
had no other redress against this grievance than to com-
plain to the Synod. The Synod of Nezv York at its last
meeting assumed jurisdiction of this Cojnplaint and the
Assembly cannot recognize the appellants as original par-
ties until the Synod has decided that they are such.
(4). After the Presbytery had voted to dismiss the
case against Dr. Briggs on November 4, 1891, Mr.
Woodbury moved that " the committee of prosecution
be and the same is hereby discharged with the thanks
of the Presbytery." The moderator ruled this motion
90 ENTERTAINING THE APPEAL
out of order on the ground that the Presbytery had sus-
tained the moderator in his decision that the committee
were an original party representing the Presbyterian
Church in the United States of America. This then is,
the third point in the Complaint pending before the
Synod of New York that the committee was recognized
by the Presbytery of New York as "■virtually and prac-
tically independent of the Presbytery,'' so that the Pres-
bytery has no right to entertain a motion to discharge
them. This claim of the committee to be independent
of the Presbytery which appointed them is not involved
in the questions already discussed, whether they are a
committee of prosecution and an original party. As we
have seen, the General Assembly of 1877 decided that a
committee of prosecution was not an original party. So
they might be an original party and yet not independent
of the Presbytery which appointed them. The question
which now emerges is whether a prosecuting committee
may be independent of the Presbytery and so inde-
pendent as to continue in life after the Presbytery would
dismiss them and to persist in prosecution after the
Presbytery has given a verdict of acquittal and has ad-
vised it to discontinue prosecution.
{a). There is no statute law of the Book of Discipline
which makes the committee of prosecution independent
of Presbytery.
{J}). There is no precedent in Presbyterian courts in
which a prosecuting committee has been recognized as
independent of Presbytery.
{c). The constitution of the Presbyterian Church makes
all committees dependent upon the judicatories which
appointed them.
The statute law and the common law of the Presby-
terian churches testify against this extravagant claim of
the appellants in this case.
ARE THE APPELLANTS AN ORIGINAL PARTY? QJ
{d). The claims of these appellants are revolutionary
and disorganizing. Here is a committee which has been
acting for two years against the expressed wishes of the
Presbytery which appointed them. They claim to repre-
sent the Presbyterian Church in the United States of
America in appearing against their own Presbytery.
They won the appeal last year against the decision of the
Presbytery of New York to dismiss the case against Dr.
Briggs. They are now striving to win an appeal against
a decision of the Presbytery of New York acquitting
Dr. Briggs of charges of heresy. Their Presbytery ad-
vised them to discontinue prosecution, and yet, in defi-
ance of the will of their Presbytery, they continue the
prosecution. It may possibly be gratifying to a party in
the Presbyterian Church that there is a faithful remnant
in the Presbytery of New York who will contend for
sound doctrine against a majority of the Presbytery.
But let this party consider that, while such contention
may be lawful and praiseworthy within due bounds,
when conducted by individuals and exercised in the un-
questioned right of protest and complaint ; yet when a
committee appointed by a Presbytery for a specific pur-
pose persists in arraigning the Presbytery whose repre-
sentatives they were appointed to be, as guilty of error
and wrong in refusing to go as far as this committee
deems equitable, — they are exalting themselves as a com-
mittee of Presbytery above the Presbytery ; they arc as-
suming to be greater and wiser and more equitable than
the Presbytery; they are rebelling against the judica-
tory to whose jurisdiction they are subject by the consti-
tution of the Presbyterian Church. What would you
think if a committee of your Presbytery should treat
your Presbytery with such disrespect and airs of superi-
ority, and exalt themselves against you as represent-
92 ENTERTAINING THE APPEAL
ing the Presbyterian Church in the United States of
America?
(,?). If the higher courts of the Presbyterian Church
should ever be so unwise as to establish such an unfortu-
nate precedent that a committee of Presbytery may act
independently of its Presbytery, you will, ere long, see
some strange procedure in our ecclesiastical courts. P'or
if a committee of prosecution of a Presbytery may appeal
against the Presbytery, a committee of a session may
appeal against a session, and carry on the case against a
defendant in all its stages until it reaches the court of
last resort. If by any unwise procedure a session should
appoint an ambitious elder as " a committee to arrange
and prepare the necessary proceedings appropriate in
the case of Mrs. A. B. C," he would claim to be a prose-
cuting committee, to be an original party, to represent
the Presbyterian Church in the United States of America,
and he might carry on the case against an unfortunate
but innocent lady in spite of the advice of his pastor
and fellow elders, in spite of the advice of his Presby-
tery, through all the stages of litigation, and bring Pres-
byterian courts into contempt and shame before the
world. This is a terrible power that it is proposed to put
into the hands of committees of prosecution ; one which
may accomplish your purpose as an engine of destruc-
tion in the case of Dr. Briggs, but which, if once set in
motion, will do incalculable mischief in all parts of the
Church. It is safe to predict that those who vote in its
favor will be the first to suffer from it in their own per-
sons, families, and friends.
It is monstrous to suppose that a committee of prose-
cution may carry a case in all its stages to the court of
last resort, in defiance of the washes of the judicatory
which appointed them. If a committee of prosecution
ARE THE APPELLANTS AN ORIGINAL PARTY? 93
should prove to be incompetent, and show by their blun-
ders that they were involving the case in innumerable and
intricate questions of law, must the Presbytery allow
them to go on in their blunders at the expense of jus-
tice and right? If a committee of prosecution, in a case
of prosecution for immorality, should exhibit a lack of
moral sense and a questionable integrity, must the Pres-
bytery suffer them to go on and exhibit their wickedness
before all the courts of the Church? If a committee of
prosecution, in a case of heresy, should show their igno-
rance of sound doctrine, and as representatives of the
Presbyterian Church in the United States of America
should present such a parody of the doctrines of our
Church as to bring the blush of shame to the cheek of
the godly, must the Presbytery allow them to go on and
parade their ignorance in all the courts of the Church ?
If a prosecuting committee should manifest in the con-
duct of the case that they were personal enemies of the
accused, and are seeking to injure him in spite of truth
and right, shall they be allovv-ed to use all the privileges
of their position as a committee of Presbytery, in the
name of the Presbyterian Church in the United States
of America, to injure the accused in the higher courts
after the Presbytery is convinced that such prosecution
should cease? If a prosecuting committee should be in-
fluenced unduly to favor the accused, to obstruct the
cause of justice, pervert or keep back evidence, and in a
deceitful and hypocritical manner mislead the court to
unrighteousness, has the Presbytery no power to change,
reconstruct, or dismiss such a committee of prosecu-
tion? It is m.onstrous for any judicatory to put itself
in the power and at the mercy of such an arbitrary and
irresponsible party as such a committee of prosecution
would be.
94- ENTERTAINING THE APPEAL
The Complaint iioiv pending before the Synod of Nczv
York, which is noiv nnder the jurisdiction of the Synody
raises this question wJiether the committee appearing before
you in these appellants is independent of the Presbytery or
not. You cannot lawfully consider them as such until the
Synod has given its decision in the case.
(5). The question of the original party and the ques-
tions associated therewith were brought before the Synod
of New York at Albany by the Complaint signed by 1 14
ministers and elders of the Presbytery of New York.
The Synod found the complaint in order, took juris-
diction of the same, listened to arguments, debated the
matter, and resolved that :
"It is inexpedient to take action at the present time for the
following reasons :
"First. The case, through the action of the General Assembly
and the Presbytery of New York, is again before the Presbytery,
and the complainants may there have their remedy in their own
hands.
" Second. In case the remedy there be found insufficient they
will afterward have opportunity, by appeal or complaint, to bring
the matter again before the Synod."
There is in the hands of the Judicial Committee, as
they have reported to you, a Complaint to the General
Assembly against the action of the Synod in finding the
Complaint in order, giving you the best evidence that
the Complaint is alive before the Synod. This Complaint
you have referred to a Judicial Commission for trial.
The fact that all of these matters complained of are
now through the action of the Synod of New York
under the jurisdiction of the Synod and have not yet
been decided, is a sufificient reason why the General
Assembly cannot recognize the appellants as an original
party and so qualified to appeal.
ARE THE APPELLANTS AN ORIGINAL PARTY? 95
On Nov. 9, 1892, Dr. Briggs appeared before the
Presbytery of New York in accordance with the advice
of his Synod and made the following preliminary objec-
tion :
First. A Committee originally appointed " to arrange and pre-
pare the necessary proceedings appropriate in the case of Dr.
Briggs " appears before you claiming to be a Committee of Prose-
cution, and they are recognized as such by the Moderator's giv-
ing them the floor to act in that capacity. But their right so to
act is legally questioned by complaint to the Synod of New York,
and it has not yet been lawfully determined by the Synod.
Second. This Committee appeared before the last General As-
sembly as an original party, and acted as such by presenting an
appeal against the judgment of the Presbytery in dismissing the
case against me. They now appear before you as an original
party successful in their appeal. Their right to act as an original
party is questioned in the said complaint, and it has not yet been
lawfully determined by the Synod.
Third. This Committee claim to represent the Presbyterian
Church in the United States of America, and to be independent
of this Presbytery which appointed them. They acted inde-
pendently of the Presbytery by appealing to the General Assem-
bly against the judgment of the Presbytery in dismissing the case
against me. They now appear before you with a reversal of the
judgment of the Presbytery which they have obtained. Their
right to act independently of the Presbytery is questioned in the
said complaint, and it has not yet been lawfully determined by
the Synod.
Fourth. This Committee appear before you having acted, as
is claimed, in violation of the constitution of the Church, which
provides that when a complaint has been signed by more than
one-third of those present and voting m the Presbytery, it acts
as a stay to further proceedings. The above-mentioned com-
plaint, signed by a majority of the voters, has been filed with the
Synod of New York, and has been found in order by the Synod
of New York, and is now m possession of the Synod of New York.
Until the questions raised in said complaint have been determined,
this Committee cannot legally take any action in the matters
complained of. They cannot act as a Prosecuting Committee, or
96 ENTERTAINING THE APPEAL
as an original party, or as independent of the Presbytery ; and
you cannot allow them so to act without a violation of the law of
complaint embedded in the constitution of the Church.
Inasmuch as the Synod of New York suggested that the com-
plainants, being accordmg to the number of signers m the com-
plaint, a majority of the Presbytery, may have the remedy in
their own hands, the Presbytery are respectfully requested to
apply the said' remedy and, in accordance with the provision of
the Book of Discipline, to determine these preliminary objec-
tions which I hereby file. C. A. Briggs.
Dr. Briggs, in order to save the time of the Presbytery,
offered not to argue on the objection provided the prose-
cution did not argue. The moderator of the Presbytery
of New York permitted the prosecution to argue ; but
when Dr. Briggs claimed his right to argue in behalf of
his objection, he was ruled from the floor by the decision
of the moderator that his preliminary objection was out
of order on the ground that the General Assembly at
Portland had decided the matter in favor of the prose-
cution. The moderator was sustained by a majority of
the Presbytery on an appeal from his decision. Let the
court observe that the moderator undertook to decide a
question of fact, namely, what the General Assembly at
Portland had done, and he decided it erroneously as has
been clearly shown. But whether right or wrong the
moderator had no right to decide this question. It was
a debatable matter and was presented for debate in the
preliminary objection of Dr. Briggs which he had a
right to make. Against this action the defendant gave
notice of appeal and complaint to the Synod of New
York. Inasmuch as he could not appeal from an ac-
quittal he, was limited to his Complaint, which reads as
follows :
[This Complaint will be found in The Case against
Prof. Briggs, Part II., pp. 21-28.]
ARE THE APPELLANTS AN ORIGINAL PARTY? 97
The defendant has sought every lawful remedy against
the unfortunate action of the majority of the Presby-
tery of New York in sustaining these unlawful decisions
of the moderator in favor of these appellants as a com-
mittee of prosecution, an original party, and as inde-
pendent of the Presbytery. The defendant was in
hopes that the Synod of New York would determine
these questions before the Presbytery reopened the case
in accordance with the decisions of the last General
Assembly. But the Synod of New York, for reasons
best known to the Synod, decided to wait for further
action by the Presbytery. The Presbytery has taken
action , it is now for the Synod to give its decision.
The General Assembly cannot intrude into the functions
of the Synod in this particular, for the Synod has ,
present jurisdiction of the case, Vou cannot at present
recognize the appellants as a party, for their status as
such is challenged by the Synod of New York.
(6). The appellants forced their Appeal before the
General Assembly at Portland, notwithstanding their
knowledge of the Complaint signed by 114 ministers
and elders of the Presbytery of New York which was
lodged with the stated clerk of the Synod ere the case
was brought before the General Assembly for its deci-
sion. This Complaint was strictly in accord with the
Book of Discipline, which states :
"Whenever a Complaint, in cases non-judicial, is entered
against a decision of a judicatory signed by at least one-third
of the members recorded as present when the action was taken,
the execution of such decision shall be stayed, until the final
issue of the case by the superior judicatory." (85.)
As was said at Portland :
" It is evident that a vote of the Presbytery of New
York, sustaining a ruling of the moderator in an inter-
98 ENTERTAIxMNG THE APPEAL
pretation of our Book of Discipline, is a non-judicial deci-
sion." Therefore, this Complaint ought to have acted as
a stay until the Synod had decided the whole question of
the original party. The prosecution argued before the
last Assembly after the appellee had exhausted his right
of speech and when he had no right of reply, and again
before the Presbytery of New York on the occasion
when the Presbytery refused him the floor for argument,
that inasmuch as the majority of the names were
attached to the complaint after the ten days allowed by
law, that it could not act as a stay. This superficial
objection, to which the appellee was not allowed to
reply, doubtless influenced the last General Assembly
and also the Presbytery of New York. But its invalidity
is evident, for the law is not that two-thirds of the vote
shall be attached to the notice of complaint, but to the
complaint itself. The notice of complaint must be filed
within the ten days, and it is sufificient that it be signed
by the chief complainant on behalf of himself and
others. But the complaint itself need not be filed
before the second day of the next ensuing meeting of
the superior judicatory. The names were all attached
to the document placed in the hands of the stated clerk
of the Synod of New York in May, five months before
it was necessay that they should be attached. It is the
complaint signed by two-thirds which acts as a stay, and
not the notice of complaint. The requirements of the
law of stay were fully satisfied in this complaint, and it
ought to have stayed the General Assembly at Portland,
and the Presbytery of New York, from any further
action in the case until the complaint was determined
by the Synod of New York. The law of stay still
attaches to this same complaint which is now alive under
the jurisdiction of the Synod of New York. It stays
USURPIXG THE JURISDICTION OF THE SYNOD 99
this Assembly and all parties and courts until the Synod
has acted. Atid now that the Synod has fojmd this com-
plaint in order, and has assumed jurisdiction and post-
poned action luitil next October, yoii are stayed from
action, not only by the lazu of stay, but also by the fact that
the Synod of Nezv York has taken the appellee and his co-
complainants tinder its protection. It interposes the shield
of its jurisdiction and authority, and the General Assejn-
bly cannot take the case out of its hands.
IV. — THE APPEAL CANNOT BE ENTERTAINED WITHOUT USURP-
ING THE JURISDICTION WHICH AT PRESENT BELONGS TO
THE SYNOD OF NEW YORK.
(I). // is a rule in lazv that appeals shall be made gra-
datim, and not per saltern. It is the rule of canon law
and of civil law that there shall be no leaping of inter-
mediate courts, but that the process should take its reg-
ular course through the courts in their order and grade
of ascent. This rule is recognized in the Book of Disci-
pline which prescribes that : " Appeals are, generally, to
be taken to the judicatory immediately stiperior to that
appealed from." (f02.) The court immediately supe-
rior to the Presbytery of New York is the Synod of
New York. The appellants ought to have followed this
rule. Tf they have valid grounds of appeal from a final
judgment of the Presbytery of New York, if they are
an original party and it is lawful for them to appeal
against a verdict of acquittal, they ought to have made
their appeal to the Synod of New York.
It is true that this rule admits of exceptions. The
adverb ^^ generally " is the loop-hole through which they
propose to go. But this loop-hole is not large enough
to admit an appeal which is so great in its pretensions
and so immense in its train of consequences. The appel-
lOQ ENTERTAINING THE APPEAL
lants are obliged to present reasons why you should
entertain an appeal which according to this rule should
generally go to the Synod. They must give exceptional
reasons in order that this appeal may be an exceptional
case. Such exceptional reasons must be within the
limits of the law and usage of the courts of the Presby-
terian Church. They must not abridge the rights and
privileges of the appellee. They must be equitable in
themselves, and of such a character as to furnish a safe
precedent. It is not sufHcient that the exceptional
reasons shall be in the interest of the appellants. If
they are against the interest of the appellee you cannot
lawfully consider them. It is not sufificient that they
are in the immediate interests of the Presbyterian
Church. If they would violate precedent and law, if
they would establish a new and dangerous precedent,
you cannot safely sacrifice the permanent interests of
the Church for any transient and temporary advantage.
We shall first consider the reasons why this appeal
cannot legally take advantage of the adverb " generally,"
and then test the reasons presented by the appellants
for bringing their case before the General Assembly.
(2). There are no precedents to justify this Appeal.
There is only one case given in the Digest in which the
General Assembly recognized exceptional reasons for
leaping the Synod prior to 1870. This was the case of
Mr. Bourne in 18 16, in which the sentence of the Pres-
bytery of Lexington deposing him from the ministry
was reversed and a new trial ordered. But in this case
the Synod of Virginia stood upon its rights and censured
the Presbytery of Lexington for allowing an appeal froni
their decision directly to the Assembly. This precedent
is therefore a doubtful precedent. It did not gain the
consent of the Synod which was leaped. It is doubt-
USURPING THE JURISDICTION OF THE SYNOD 101
ful whether the General Assembly acted lawfully in
this case. The Synods, especially in those regions where
a higher type of Presbyterianism was maintained, did
not look with complacency upon this intrusion upon
their jurisdiction. There was no repetition of leaps of
Synods until 1870. The Southern Presbyterian Church
took pains in their Book of Discipline to make such a
leaping of the Synods an impossibility by the law :
" No appeal shall be carried from ajt i?iferior to any
other court tha^i the one immediately superior, without its
consents (259.)
The practice of the General Assembly has been either
to dismiss appeals which have leaped the Synods or
else refer them to the Synods for adjudication. A few
examples will suffice.
(i). Two appeals of Samuel Lowrey were dismissed
in 1822 " because the appellant had not prosecuted his
appeals before the inferior judicatories."
(2). Matthew H. Rice had leave to withdraw his
appeal in 1830, on the ground that "no reasons are
assigned by the appellant for making this appeal to the
General Assembly instead of the Synod."
(3). The church at Cooperstown " had leave to with-
draw their appeal in 1834, and prosecute it before the
Synod of Utica."
(4). John Turbitt, in 1859, had leave to withdraw his
appeal from the decision of the Presbytery of Peoria,
deposing him from the ministry, " because the case had
not been presented before the Synod."
(5). The papers in the case of the appeal of Francis
M. Denmick in 1872, were returned to the parties pre-
senting them, " that they may be adjudicated by the
Synod of Iowa, South."
The reluctance of General Assemblies to entertain
202 ENTERTAINING THE APPEAL
appeals directly from presbyteries may be seen in the
case of the Presbytery of Philadelphia in 1870 against
the Presbytery of Luzerne for an alleged invasion of
Presbyterial jurisdiction, A special reason was given in
this case, namely, " because of these presbyteries having
no common synodical relations." They belonged to
different synods. No synod could judge bet vyeen them.
It would seem, therefore, that this was an appropriate
case for the General Assembly, But the Assembly pre-
ferred another way. A new synod had been organized,
which embraced both presbyteries. Therefore the Gen-
eral Assembly proposed that " the new synod take up
the case and that the Presbytery of Luzerne cease all
, action until the synod decides."
So much was this the established usage of the Presby-
terian Church that in the Barnes case, when the whole
Church was excited to an extraordinary degree, and
when, if ever, a speedy settlement of the issue was desir-
able, Dr. Junkin courteously asked Mr. Barnes and the
Presbytery to agree harmoniously in carrying the case
directly to the Assembly. But when Mr. Barnes declined,
Dr. Junkin recognized the right of his opponent and
appealed to the Synod of Pennsylvania. Such courtesy
has been conspicuous by its absence in the case against
Dr. Briggs.
Since the reunion there have been two exceptional
cases in which the General Assembly allowed the appel-
lants to leap -the Synod. One of these was the case of
the Rev. W. W. McLane. This was an appeal of a
defendant against the final judgment of his Presbytery
condemning him as guilty of heresy. This case was not
tried because the appellant was granted leave to with-
draw his appeal. It is a precedent still more doubtful
than that of Mr. Bourne in 18 16. But even if these two
USURPING THE JURISDICTION OF THE SYNOD 103
cases of appeals of defendants should be regarded as
valid precedents, they do not justify the leaping of the
Synod and the entertainment of an appeal of a prosecut-
ing committee against a verdict of acquittal. These
two appeals of Bourne and McLane were exceptional
because a minister had been deposed. As was said a
a year ago :
" All law protects the innocent and gives the presumption to
the defendant. A minister who has been declared guilty by a
Presbytery might suffer serious injury if an appeal had to go in
Its regular course through the Synod to the General Assembly.
Such a man might prefer a speedy decision of his case by the
supreme court, and waive his right of appeal to the intermediate
court. But a prosecutor is in a different situation. He suffers
no injury by delay. He is deprived of no right by the trial of
the case before the intermediate court in the regular way. There
is no reason why he should insist upon a speedy determination of
the case."
The other exceptional case was the action of the Gen-
eral Assembly at Portland last year in which they per-
mitted these appellants to leap the Synod of New York
and entertained the appeal against the Presbytery of
New York in dismissing the case against Dr. Briggs.
This decision was influenced if not determined by the
opinion of the moderator of the last Assembly, who
seems not to have known of the usage of the supreme
courts of the Church, when in an answer to a question,
he said: "In my mind there is no constitutional pro-
vision by which, without a new trial, this appeal could
be sent to the Synod of New York." (Case, p. ii.) In
fact, as we have seen, the General Assembly has more
than once sent appeals to synods. But this leaping of
the Synod of New York last year has not yet received
the consent of the Synod of New York, for the Synod of
New York has taken jurisdiction of a Complaint which
104
ENTERTAINING THE APPEAL
if sustained renders the decision of the last Assembly
null and void, and makes the whole process since the
dismission of the case by the Presbytery unlawful.
But even if the action of the General Assembly at
Portland should be regarded as final, constitutional, and
a lawful precedent, it is no precedent for the present
appeal, for that was an appeal against a dismissal of a
case, and aimed at a new trial, — this is an appeal against
a final judgment in a case, and against a verdict of
acquittal and it aims at a reversal of the acquittal and
a final judgment of condemnation for heresy with a
sentence of suspension or deposition. There is no prec-
edent whatever for the leaping of the Synod by such an
appeal.
(3). It is against the policy of the Presbyterian Church
that there should be a leaping of the court of the Synod.
In 1882, a great advance was made in reconstructing
the Synods, so as to increase their efficiency, dignity,
and influence. They were enlarged and made State
Synods. Many of them, like the Synod of New York
and the Synod of Pennsylvania, became so large that
their commissioners are delegates from the Presby-
teries. The law was passed making the "decisions
of the Synod on appeals, complaints, and references,
which do not affect the doctrine or constitution of the
Church," to be "final" (Form of Government, XI. 4).
The Synods have thus become judicatories of vastly
more importance than they used to be. Will this Gen-
eral Assembly now take action which will decrease their
dignity, influence, and power? If the Synod of New
York, the largest of the Synods, may be overleaped to-
day for the sake of a speedy settlement of the case of
Dr. Briggs, what Synod in the Church can hope to escape
to-morrow when some other ambitious prosecutor may
USURPING THE JURISDICTION OF THE SYNOD 105
urge the speedy settlement of the case of some other
alleged heretic ? It is easy to see that if this change of
policy takes place, the Synods will lose far more than
they have gained in 1882.
If the General Assembly entertain this Appeal, they
will break down the barriers of our constitution, which
guarantees the rights of the Synods ; they will so enlarge
the loop-hole of exceptional cases that exceptions will
hereafter be the rule ; they will drive a coach and four
through the breaches in the palace of justice, and ex-
pose it to the depredations of every ambitious litigant.
For if it be lawful to leap the Synod in the interest of
defendants, as in the McLane case and the Bourne case,
and now in the interest of prosecutors in the Briggs
case, both in an appeal against a dismission and in an
appeal against a verdict of acquittal, there can be no
barrier to prevent the leaping of the Synod in any case
hereafter, and you may inscribe your decision with the
name Ichabod, for the glory of the Synod will have
departed from it.
(4). If yoii should entertain this Appeal, you ivould de-
prive the defendant of his right to appear before the court
of the Synod. The defendant has reason to believe that
the appellants fear to bring their case before the Synod
of New York. They have reason to dread lest their
appeal against the verdict of acquittal will not be enter-
tained by the Synod. The defendant has great confi-
dence in the Synod of New York that it will do him
justice, and that its decision will be just and right. It
is his constitutional right to go before the Synod. His
city of refuge against these prosecutors is the Synod of
New York. The General Assembly has no constitu-
tional right to obstruct him from seeking refuge with
the Synod. He casts himself into the arms of the Synod
IQQ ENTERTAINING THE APPEAL
of New York, in the confidence that the Synod will
shield him from any injustice and wrong that may be
done him. He claims the jurisdiction of the Synod,
and denies that the Assembly has any present jurisdic-
tion of the case. What right have you under the con-
stitution to deprive him of this right? What precedent
have you to justify you in refusing him this right?
What principle of equity can you plead for such a vio-
lation of individual rights? You would do a wrong un-
paralleled in the history of Presbyterianism, a wrong
which could be equalled only in the annals of the in-
quisition. The defendant will use every remedy that
the civil and ecclesiastical courts will give him, rather
than submit to such a wrong.
(5). If you sJiould entertain this Appeal, you violate the
constitutional rights of the Presbytery of New York.
The Presbytery has not given its consent to leap the
Synod of New York. The Presbytery has the right to
claim the vindication of the Synod of New York against
these prosecutors. These appellants appeal against the
final judgment of the Presbytery of New York. They
ask you to condemn the Presbytery and reverse their
final judgment. Commissioners from the Presbyteries
represented in this General Assembly, look the situation
in the face ! Apply to it the Golden Rule of our Saviour.
What would you think of it if a committee of your
Presbytery should force your Presbytery for trial before
the General Assembly without its consent ? What would
you think of it if your Presbytery should be deprived of
its rightful defence before the Synod ? If you listen to
the Appeal of these prosecutors, you will establish a
precedent that will vex you in your own Presbyteries
before many days. It is doubtful whether the Presby-
tery of New York, and the other Presbyteries which
USURPING THE JURISDICTION OF THE SYNOD 107
compose the Synod of New York, will submit to such an
act of violence and wrong.
(6). You cannot entertain this Appeal without depriving
the defendant and his co-presbyters of the right of com-
plaint, which is guaranteed to them in the constitution.
The only remedy the defendant and his co-presbyters
had against unjust and unlawful action of the Pres-
bytery of New York was by complaint to the Synod of
New York. If the verdict of the Presbytery had been
against him he might have appealed. But he cannot
appeal against a verdict of acquittal. Therefore he was
limited to complaints, and complaints can only be made
to " the next superior judicatory " (83), the Synod of
New York. He and his co-presbyters gave notice of
several complaints, which it is their intention to prose-
cute before the Synod of New York at its next meeting.
One of these has already been called to your attention.
These are the other complaints made against the inter-
locutory decisions of the Presbytery :
[These complaints are given in The Case against Prof
Briggs, Part II., pp. 69-77.]
These complaints are against interlocutory judgments
of the Presbytery, and have to do with the very founda-
tions of the case. If the Synod recognize the validity
of these complaints, the prosecutors have no case against
him, and any decision this Assembly might make, if they
should entertain the Appeal and then sustain it and re
verse it, would be null and void through the reversal by
the Synod of these interlocutory judgments of the Pres-
bytery of New York. The defendant and his co-presby-
ters have the constitutional right to make these com-
plaints. That was the only way in which they could
bring these unjust and unlawful proceedings of the Pres-
bytery before the superior courts. The Synod has a
108 . ENTERTAINING THE APPEAL
right to entertain them and determine them. The Syn-
od cannot refuse the complainants their right of a hear-
ing and of a decision. If the Assembly entertain this
Appeal without considering these complaints which can-
not legally be brought before you, you cannot have the
whole case of Dr. Briggs before you, you will have only
an ex parte and a partial statement of the case, you
would on the one hand deprive him of his legal right of
complaint, on the other hand you would run the risk of
making an ex parte judgment.
The court should be on their guard lest they do gross
injustice by such a procedure.
The defendant made a number of preliminary objec-
tions before the trial began. The Presbytery sustained
four of these objections. This gives the appellants seven
of their grounds of appeal. But the Presbytery over-
ruled five of these objections and the only redress the
defendant has is in his five complaints to the Synod of
New York. Will you review four of these objections in
the interest of the appellants when you cannot review
five of these objections in the interest of the appellee?
Will you entertain their Appeal against the procedure
of the Presbytery so far as it favors the defendant when
you cannot entertain his complaints against that pro-
cedure so far as it favors the prosecution ? Will you
entertain their Appeal against his evidence when you
cannot entertain his complaint against their evidence ?
Surely no court of law could do such flagrant injustice.
(7). You camiot entertain this Appeal without assum-
ing jurisdiction of a case ivJiich is now lawfully under the
Jurisdiction of the Synod. The Assembly have already
been informed that the Synod of New York has assumed
jurisdiction of a complaint signed by 114 ministers and
elders of the Presbytery of New York, which was pre-
USURPING THE JURISDICTION OF THE SYNOD l()9
sented at the meeting of the Synod in October last. It
would be an unconstitutional and revolutionary proced-
ure for you to assume jurisdiction of this case, which
could not be recognized as valid by the Synod of New
York and which could not prevent the Synod from pro-
ceeding with the case in the constitutional way. There-
fore even if you should make your final judgment and re-
verse the final judgment of the Presbytery of New York, it
could not yet be a final judgment, for the defendant, the
Presbytery of New York, and the Synod of New York
could not regard it as constitutional or valid.
(8). The law of the Church is that Appeals should be
consolidated with Complaints. The law is : " If a case
should be carried to an appellate judicatory by both ap-
peal and complaint, the same should be consolidated for
trial, if deemed proper by the appellate judicatory." (93.)
It is impossible to comply with this law unless the ap-
peal go where the complaints are, for complaints cannot
legally leap the Synod even if an appeal may. You may
send the appeal to the Synod of New York. But by no
process of law can this Assembly entertain the complaints.
Therefore the only way in which the Appeal and the Com-
plaint can be consolidated, is for the Assembly to advise
the prosecution to proceed to the Synod with their
Appeal.
(9). It is nnlaivful and it is inequitable to review a
final judgment before the interlocutory Judgments cojn-
plained as;ainst have been reviewed.
These Complaints now under the jurisdiction of the
Synod of New York, or to be brought before the Synod
at its next meeting, are complaints against interlocutory
judgments of the Presbytery of New York. The only
way in which these interlocutory judgments can be re-
viewed is in the court of the Synod. If these interlocu.
110 ENTERTAINING THE APPEAL
tory judgments of the Presbytery should be reversed,
the final judgment would be null and void. Therefore
the General Assembly must wait until the Synod has
determined these complaints against the interlocutory
judgments, before it can entertain an appeal against the
final judgment. That is the voice of law and oi prece-
dent and of the common sense of mankind.
For all of these reasons you cannot entertain this Ap-
peal without violating the rights of the Synod of New
York ; and without interfering with the rights of the
defendant and of the Presbytery of New York to a
hearing before the Synod of New York.
To encroach upon these reserved rights of the defend-
ant and the lower courts would be to do such an un-
paralleled wrong that they would be justified in resisting
it to the utmost extremities in the civil and ecclesias-
tical courts.
It seems almost incredible that the General Assembly
now in session in the capital of our country, the fountain
of law for our nation, in full view of all these monuments
of constitution, and of law, and of order, could even
consider the propriety of committing such a v/rong and
running such a risk, which at the utmost can only save
a year of time and bring by a hasty decision to a final
issue a case which may be brought to a final issue with-
out violence and without wrong by the next General
Assembly.
The system of law which governs the courts of the
Church has developed in harmony with the system oi
law which governs our native land. Its stately struc-
ture has been erected by the piety, the wisdom, the
industry and the experience of many generations. All the
REASONS FOR ENTERTAINING THE APPEAL m
great nations of antiquity have contributed to its mate-
rial. Moses and the prophets, Draco, Solon, and Ly-
curgus, the Ten Commands and the Twelve Tables, the
Pandects and the Institutes, the Canonists of the
Church, and the Jurists of the Modern State, have
united in the building of the palace of civil and ecclesi-
astical law. God forbid that the appellee should stain
any one of the precious stones of its structure. He
would gladly suffer injury and even wrong rather than
violate any of its sanctities. Under its stately roof
and in its ample enclosures there is peace and safety
and right. We have looked upon its foundations of
justice. We have studied its pillars of right. We have
examined its courses of equity. How dare we disturb
a single one of them ? Surely you will not tear down
one stone after another of this sacred pile in order to
gratify the vain ambition of these prosecutors and give
them a victory at such a cost to every one but them-
selves.
v. — WHAT REASONS DO THEY GIVE VOU FOR DOING SO MANY
AND SO GREAT WRONGS, FOR INCURRING SUCH GREAT
PERILS, AND FOR ESTABLISHING SUCH DANGEROUS PREC-
EDENTS ?
If a revolution be necessary in order to purge the
Presbyterian Church, and a return to chaos be their aim
in order to destroy what they call heresy, they should
present the best of reasons for such extreme measures.
We have listened to their reasons. They have been be-
fore you for many months in their printed Appeal. You
have had ample time to reflact upon them. Possibly
other reasons are kept in reserve to bring before you
after the appellee has exhausted his privilege of the
floor, which they think they may then impose upon you
112 ENTERTAINING THE APPEAL
without imperilling their validity. They have used but
half an hour in their opening. They gave little that is
worthy of attention. They act against the usage of all
courts in reserving their argument until it may be safe
from the criticism of the appellee. The appellants have
shown great skill in such tactics. But if you. should
allow them to go beyond their privilege of rebuttal and
bring in any additional reasons, you will doubtless find
that those which we shall test are a fair sample of the
whole.
(i). The appellants claim that
" If the Appeal should go to the Synod of New York and be
passed upon by that judicatory when the case reaches the Gen-
eral Assembly by appeal from the decision of the Synod, all of
the Presbyteries constituting that Synod would be excluded
from representation in the final determination of these import-
ant questions. If the Appeal goes directly to the Assembly, the
Commissioners from only one Presbytery in the entire Church
would be excluded from sitting, deliberating and voting in the
final decision. In the Synod of New York there are thirty-two
Presbyteries, nearly fifteen per cent, of the whole number of
Presbyteries in the Church. Inasmuch as all these Presbyteries,
excepting one, would be fully represented and heard in the Gen-
eral Assembly, and the General Assembly alone can giv^e a final
decision, we believe the time and the interests of the Synod of
New York will be best conserved if the Assembly should enter-
tain the Appeal according to the Committee's request."
It is greatly to be regretted that the majority of the
Judicial Committee should have used this argument in
their prejudgment of the case.
This is specious and plausible, but all the more sus-
picious on that account. At the last General Assembly •
the appellants represented that they would prove to be
the best friends of the appellee and that it was his inter-
est that he should be tried in the court of the Presby-
REASONS FOR ENTERTAINING THE APPEAL I13
tery. They had their way. The trial has taken place and
now they appeal against the verdict of acquittal. Such
friends have been sufficiently well known to the world
since the story of Job. These same prosecutors now rep-
resent that it is in the interests of the Synod that they
leap the Synod. But who made these appellants the
attorney to plead the interest of the Synod of New
York ? It will be time enough for them to represent
the interest of the Synod when they have received a
commission from the Synod. The Synod of New York
has rights and duties in the case. It is for the Synod
and for the Synod alone to say whether it will consent
to be leaped. The Synod did not give its consent last
October. It is doubtful whether it will give its consent
next October.
It is true that there is an apparent unfairness in ex-
cluding fifteen per cent, of the Church from the court of
last resort. But if the Synod should be excluded will it
injure the appellants or the appellee ? The appellee is
willing to trust his Synod and to run the risk. He is
the one who is most deeply concerned. He is the only
one who risks his ecclesiastical life. If he is willing to
take the risk, why should the appellants be so anxious
to avoid it ?
But it is not so clear that the representatives of Pres-
byteries within the bounds of the Synod of New York
would be excluded frorn a vote in a final decision of the
supreme court. The representatives of the Synod would
be excluded, all members of the Synod would be ex-
cluded. But it should be considered that the Synod of
New York is a body of delegates and that it would be
quite easy for the Presbyteries within the bounds of the
Synod of Nev/ York to send as their commissioners to
the Assembly, ministers and elders who were not mem-
11^ ENTERTAINING THE APPEAL
bers of the Synod of New York and who took no part
in the proceeding of the Synod, and so would not be
excluded from the final vote in the General Assembly.
There may be a difference of opinion about this matter.
But certainly no law or precedent would exclude them.
This reason for leaping the Synod therefore is without
force. There is no difficulty such as is alleged ; and if
there were, it would be far better to face the difficulty
and suffer from it, than do the vastly greater wrong of
intruding upon the reserved rights of the Synod of New
York.
(2). Another reason given by the appellants for the
entertainment of their Appeal is:
" B'^Meving that the trial of the said Dr. Briggs is one of the
most important in the history of the Presbyterian Church, by
reason of the dangerous errors alleged to be contained in the
Address of the said Dr. Briggs."
Dangerous errors are still alleged against the Inau-
gural Address of Dr. Briggs, notwithstanding his ac-
quittal by the Presbytery of New York. These appel-
lants are doubtless sincere in their allegation. But the
presumption is against them. These may be reasons to
justify them in their course before the bar of their own
consciences, but they are not reasons why you should
entertain their Appeal and leap the Synod of New York.
You may in your private opinion think that there are
dangerous errors in the Inaugural of Dr. Briggs. But
you cannot legally as judges in the case take that for
granted. The Presbytery of New York having ac-
quitted him of teaching dangerous errors, Dr. Briggs is
rectus in airia, and must remain so until the verdict is
reversed. You cannot reverse it as judges before you
have tried the merits of the Appeal. You cannot try
the merits of the Appeal when you are considering the
REASONS FOR ENTERTAINING THE APPEAL 115
legal grounds for and against the entertainment of the
Appeal. The appellants in this reason are asking you
to join with them in prejudging the whole case and
therefore their reason is invalid. It cannot legally be
considered at this stage.
It is alleged that these dangerous errors make the case
*• one of the most important in the history of the Presby-
terian Church." The appellee thinks that they ex-
aggerate the importance of the case. If the case has be-
come so important it is not because of the doctrinal
issues that are at stake ; but because of the violations of
law which have already taken place, and which it is pro-
posed still further to make in order to accomplish the
purpose of a party in the Church and win from the Gen-
eral Assembly new definitions of dogma. The doctrinal
issues are certainly important. It is not proper to con-
sider their merits here. But it is proper for the defend-
ant to call attention to the fact that he has always claimed
that the doctrinal differences are extra-confessional ques-
tions, and that the Presbytery of New York in its final
iudgment asserts that " it does not find that the defend-
ant has transgressed the limits of liberty allowed under
our constitution to scholarship and opinion."
But granting for argument's sake that the defendant
and his Presbytery may be wrong in this matter and
that the appellants are right, they would still have no
reason to leap the Synod of New York Was not the
case of Albert Barnes fully as important from the point
of view of 1835 .'' And yet Dr. Junkin, the private prose-
cutor, carried it to the Synod. Was not the case of Dr.
Lyman Beecher, Professor of Theology in the Lane
Theological Seminary, fully as important from the point
of view of 1835 ? And yet Dr. Wilson, the private prose-
cutor, did not venture to leap the Synod and appeal to
^^^lQ ENTERTAINING THE APPEAL
the General Assembly. If the cases of Albert Barnes
and Lyman Beecher had to go on gradatim in the midst
of the controversies of the Church in 1 835-1 837, why
should the case of Dr. Briggs ht per salteni in the contro-
versies of the last decade of the 19th centur}^?
(3). A third reason given by the appellants for leaping
the Synod is :
*' Believing that the distinct and definite condemnation of
those alleged errors by the Supreme Judicatory of the said Pres-
byterian Church, is necessary in order to prevent their spread
and influence in the denomination,"
This reason brings out the aim of the appellants in this
Appeal. They desire that there should be a distinct and
definite condemnation of the alleged errors of Dr. Briggs.
But how can the General Assembly condemn them un-
less they are proved to be errors? How can they be
condemned as errors in an unlawful manner ? Unless
they are condemned in the forms of law who will re-
spect such condemnation? If the process had been car-
ried on in the forms of law, according to the constitu-
tion, and if in a constitutional way Dr. Briggs had been
condemned, he would have submitted to the law in its
constitutional application to his case. But can you ask
him to submit to any illegal procedure, or t6 unconstitu-
tional action? The General Assembly may go on and
by a majority vote override all the safeguards of the
constitution and do unprecedented wrong to the de-
fendant, his Presbytery and his Synod, and condemn
his views as errors. But would those who are con-
demned by so unrighteous procedure respect it or obey
it ? If they refuse obedience, how can you compel tliem
to obey ? You have no other power than moral power. Ij
you become hwno^al in your actions you destroy your
moral power and it becomes worse than inoperative. The
REASONS FOR ENTERTAINING THE APPEAL H^
appellants say that : " The delay in reaching an ultimate
decision through an appeal by way of the Synod could
not be less than a year, during which the character of
instruction given our candidates for the gospel ministry
might be unfavorably affected."
But suppose that the appellants should win their case
and you should condemn the Inaugural as containing hurt-
ful errors, would that condemnation affect the character of
the instruction given to candidates for the ministry?
Who believes that it would ? The only effect of the ad-
verse action taken hitherto has been to call the defend-
ant to the defence of his Inaugural and win him the sup-
port of a host of friends all over the land in defence of
the rights of scholarship and opinion.
If this General Assembly should overcome all the right
of the defendant and do him the wrong of reversing his
acquittal by the Presbytery of New York, is there any
likelihood that the defendant would yield his opinions?
Do you suppose that Dr. Briggs would cease his teach-
ings on the mooted questions ? Would candidates for the
ministry cease to attend upon his instructions? You
know well enongh that none of these things could hap-
pen. Your decision would be a brutuni fiilmen. It could
have no other effect than to call a multitude to arms, in
a life-and-death struggle for truth and for right.
If on the other hand yoU should send this case where
it belongs, to the Synod of New York, and then in the
regular course of procedure within the limits of our con-
stitution and with the guarding of all rights, the supreme
court should eventually condemn Dr. Briggs and exclude
him from the ministry of the Presbyterian Church in the
United States of America, the defendant would acqui-
esce in the result and would seek authority to exercise
his ministry from some other Church of Jesus Christ.
1[8 ENTERTAINING THE APPEAL
What matters it if it take another year ? If the Assembly
direct these appellants to take their appeal to the Synod,
of New York, the appellee will not question their right
so to do, nor object to the appeal on the ground that it
was not first taken to the Synod. The General Assem-
bly has an evident right, as he has argued, to send the
case to the Synod and the Synod will be obliged to hear
the whole case ; and whatever the Synod may do, it will
certainly come before the next General Assembly, and a
final decision may be then reached. The Church of
Scotland took fifteen years to decide the case of Prof.
Simson. Far better that you should take one more
year in the thorough sifting of this case, than violate
law and order and equity, and confront a revolution
and a religious war.
The defendant agrees to the principle so far as he is
concerned : " Fiat jiistitia, mat ccelumy But he is not
willing that the ccelum of the Presbyterian Church
should fall in the interests of injustice and wrong. He
will do his utmost to prevent such a calamity.
(4). The fourth reason presented by the appellants for
leaping the Synod is:
" Believing that a special responsibility rests upon the Gen-
eral Assembly which is charged with the duty of deciding in
all controversies respecting doctrine ; of reproving, warning or
bearing testimony against error in doctrine in any Church, Pres-
bytery or Synod, and in cases that effect or concern the promo-
tion of truth and holiness through all the Churches under its
care."
The General Assembly has a special responsibility as
to these matters when they are brought before the Gen-
eral Assembly in a legal manner. But so have the Synod
and the Presbyteries each in their order special respon-
sibility for those matters within their respective bounds.
REASONS FOR ENTERTAINING THE APPEAL ng
Such responsibility rises gradatim and cannot be assumed
per saltern.
It is not for the General Assembly to usurp that
special responsibility which belongs to the Synod of
New York. The special responsibility of the General
Assembly begins when the Synod of New York has
given over the responsibility to the General Assembly in
the legal forms of Review, Reference, Complaint, or
Appeal, based on the decisions of the Synod. TJie
special responsibility of the General Assembly does not
begin until the Synod has exhausted its special responsi-
bility.
The fallacy of the whole prosecution is wrapped up
in the opinion that, the General Assembly has the right
of determining finally all questions of doctrine. The
Presbyterian Church is a constitutional Church in which
all its representative bodies have their duties specified
and restricted. The General Assembly is no more om-
nipotent in the Presbyterian Church than the Congress
of the United States is in the affairs of the Nation.
The General Assembly has the authority to act under
the constitution in the forms of the constitution and to
determine all constitutional questions, but no others.
It may determine all doctrinal questions so far as they
belong to the system of doctrine taught in the West-
minster Confession, but not a step further. The Gen-
eral Assembly has no authority to determine questions
of doctrine which are beyond the range of the defini-
tions of the Westminster Confession. If the General
Assembly should do this it would violate the constitu-
tion. The constitution prescribes a way in which the
Presbyterian Church may change its doctrinal system,
whether by addition or subtraction, or by transforma-
tion. This can be done by two-thirds of the Presby-
J 20 ENTERTAINING THE APPEAL
teries. It belongs to the reserved rights of the Pres-
byteries to make new definitions of Law and of Doc-
trine. It cannot be exercised by the General As-
sembly. If therefore the General Assembly should
undertake to decide extra-confessional questions of doc-
trine, such as are in dispute in the case of Dr. Briggs,
it would make an unconstitutional decision which would
be ipso facto null and void. No one would be under
any obligations whatever to obey it. What can be
gained by such decisions other than widespread dis-
satisfaction, which might result either in a public strug-
gle to obtain counter decisions in subsequent Assem-
blies, or in secret resistance waiting for better times, or
in schism and disruption? The Presbyterian Church is
engaged in a great revision movement which seems to
be turning in the direction of a new Creed. Is it not
far better for the Church to direct its energies for the
securing new definitions of its faith on these mooted
questions in the case of Dr. Briggs, in the constitutional
way, or else leave them to the battle of scholarship and
opinion ?
(5). The last reason given by the appellants for leap,
ing the Synod in order to the entertainment of the
Appeal is :
" In view of the desirableness of the speediest settlement of
this most important case, do hereby appeal to and request your
Venerable Body to enter immediately upon the consideration
and judicial investigation of the appeal hereby presented, to
issue the case, and to finally determine the important questions
involved, so as to secure the purity and the peace of the Church
at the earliest possible day."
They ask you to make haste and settle the dispute
at the earliest possible day. The defendant is more
anxious that the case should be speedily settled than
REASONS FOR ENTERTAINING THE APPEAL 121
the appellants can be. He has so many important en-
gagements to fulfil that the contest for his own rights
has already cost him more than they are worth to him.
If he could honorably retire from the contest he
would count it a privilege to do so. But greater inter-
ests than his own interests are at stake. He is called to
be the standard-bearer in a battle for truth and right.
He cannot return his sword to its scabbard until truth
and right have won. The appellants have forced him
before the courts of the Church. They have compelled
his attendance upon this venerable body. They are
urging you to make haste, to hurry on to a decision and
to rid them of their adversary. Such haste might be
appropriate in a court-martial, where the public good
required the court to run great risks of doing a lesser
individual wrong rather than run the risks of doing a
greater public injury. But such haste is indecent in
courts of law.
Justice does not hasten. It moves on majestically
and silently like the stars in their courses. It pulls
steadily and irresistibly like the force of gravitation.
Right does not speed, because it is sure of ultimate vin-
dication. Truth does not hurry, for it has no anxiety
about the future. It is falsehood which dreads the
future. It is wrong whose hands haste to mischief. It
is injustice whose feet are swift to shed blood. If these
prosecutors had a righteous cause they would not be in
such a hurry to bring it to its issue. If they were sure
of the truth, they would not by a hop, skip and a jump
avoid precedents and statutes and courts. They are
striving their utmost to avoid the regular course of pro-
cedure and secure a speedy settlement by this General
Assembly ; because they see that the eyes of the Pres-
byterian Church are opening to the unwisdom of the
^22 ENTERTAINING THE APPEAL
procedure into which it has been pushed by unwise and
ambitious leaders. There are signs that the panic about
the Bible and the Confession is passing away. They
dread the retribution that is in store for them when
the Presbyterian giant learns how greatly he has been
deceived.
" Though the mills of God grind slowly,
Yet they grind exceeding small ;
Though with patience He stands waiting,
With exactness grinds He all."
Mr. Moderator, Ministers and Elders of the Presbyterian
Church in the United States of America :
The appellee has presented for your consideration
invincible reasons why you cannot entertain this Appeal.
He has shown you (i) that it is not so much an Appeal
against a final judgment as against legislative decisions
and executive opinions and advice of the Presbytery
which are not appealable ; (2) that there can be no
appeal by a public prosecutor against a verdict of ac-
quittal ; (3) that these prosecutors are not accredited als
an original party; and (4) that you cannot take jurisdic-
tion of a final judgment when the Synod of New York
has taken jurisdiction of interlocutory judgments in the
case. These massive walls of law and equity frown
upon this Appeal. Upon these battlements the appellee
takes his stand. The constitution of our Church is his
banner. Here he will remain standing whatever may
betide. He can do no other. Here stands the Presby-
tery of New York, which has acquitted him. Here
stands the Synod of New York, which has taken juris-
diction of his complaints. Here will rally, sooner or
later, all who are loyal to Presbyterian law and disci-
FINAL STATEMENT 12B
pUne; all who have confidence in truth and scholarly
investigation ; all who would advance in the lines of the
historic faith and order of our Church ; all who seek the
peace and prosperity of the kingdom of God.
Mr. Moderator, I have but a few words in conclusion.
I beg leave to call the attention of the moderator and
the commissioners of this Assembly to page 6 of the
printed volume which has been circulated in this house.*
Near the end of the page you will observe that there
are three stars — not stars of glory, but stars, as I think,
of shame, because they indicate an omission which
ought not to have been made, because that which is
omitted would have brought before your minds a very
important item in the interest of the appellee. What
right have these appellants to quote a portion of the
action of a Presbytery and omit from that action, in an
ofificial document or semi-official document, such matters
as they please.? I therefore claim the right to supply
that omission, and to read from the minutes of the
Presbytery of New York the action which has been
omitted, which is as follows:
" Whereas, the Presbytery of New York, at its meeting
in May last, on account of utterances contained in the
inaugural address delivered January 20, 1891, appointed
a committee to formulate charges against the author of
the address, the Rev, Charles A. Briggs, D.D., and
whereas since that action was taken he has supple-
mented these utterances by answering to certain techni-
cal questions as follows:
" Question i. Do you consider the Bible, the Church,
and the Reason as co-ordinate sources of authority.''
Answer. No.
* See p. 4 of this book.
;124 ENTERTAINING THE APPEAL
" Or, do you believe the Scriptures of the Old and New
Testaments to be the only infallible rule of faith and
practice ? A. Yes.
" Q. 2. When you use the word 'reason,* do you in-
clude the conscience and the religious feeling? A. Yes.
" Q- 3- Would you accept the following as a satisfactory
definition of Inspiration : ' Inspiration is such a divine
direction as to secure an infallible record of God's reve-
lation in respect to both fact and doctrine ' ? A. Yes.
" Q. 4. Do you believe the Bible to be inerrant in all
matters concerning faith and practice, and in everything
in which it is a revelation from God, or a vehicle of
divirte truth, and that there are no errors that disturb its
infallibility in these matters, or in its records of the his-
toric events and institutions with which they are insep-
arably connected ? A. Yes.
"Q. 5. Do you believe that the miracles recorded in
Scripture are due to an extraordinary exercise of divine
energy? A. Yes.
" Q. 6. Do you hold what is commonly known as the
doctrine of a future probation ? Do you believe in pur-
gatory? A. No.
" Q. 7. Do you believe that the issues of this life are
final, and that a man who dies impenitent will have no
further opportunity of salvation? A. Yes.
** Q. 8. Is your theory of progressive sanctification such
that it will permit you to say that you believe that when
a man dies in the faith, he enters the middle state regen-
erated, justified, and sinless? A. Yes.
"(Signed) C. A. Briggs.
" I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy from
the Minutes of the Board of Directors of Union Theo-
logical Seminary of the City of New York.
" (Signed) E. M. KiNGSLEY, Recorder."
FINAL STATEMENT 125
Air. Moderator and brethren, the appellant in the
opening argument, as I have already intimated, entered
into the merits of the appeal. I shall not attempt to go
into that merit myself, except so far as to make an
explicit denial of his statement, when he charges me
with teaching doctrines which are fundamental errors. 1
deny that I have ever taught any doctrines that are fun-
damental errors, and my Presbytery has acquitted me,
brethren, of teaching any fundamental errors.
I afifirm before this body that I believe the Holy Scrip-
tures to be the word of God, the only infallible rule of
faith and practice, according to the vow that I assumed
at my ordination, and which I have renewed every three
years, according to the rule of the Union Theological
Seminary. I affirm that I hold to the whole doctrine
taught in the first chapter of the Westminster Confes-
sion relating to Holy Scripture, without any qualifica-
tion or reservation whatever. I beg leave to affirm that
I hold to the entire system of doctrine set forth in the
Westminster Confession, and anything that I may have
said that at all conflicts with this statement is due to
the misinterpretations vvhich have been put upon the
language which I have uttered. I will not say that those
misinterpretations are always intentional. I shall not
exonerate myself from some possible blame in lack of
clearness in the enunciation of them. But I beg leava
to affirm the truth, that I have made no statement that
at all conflicts with the affirmations that I have made
before you.
And now, brethren, in all honesty between us as
brethren, ought not this case to cease? Send it to the
Synod of New York, and I call in all honesty and friend-
liness upon the appellants to unite with me in that pro-
cedure ; and I promise them in your presence that if
226 ENTERTAINING THE APPEAL
they will go with me to the Synod of New York, where
the whole case can be considered by that Synod, that
in the most friendly and courteous manner I, will aid in
a full solution of all the matters in dispute. And if the
case is brought before the next General Assembly and
you make a final judgment in the case, then, I will
submit to your verdict. That is all I have to say. If
I have said anything that at all injures the feelings of
any member of this court, I very much regret it. If I
have said anything in my Inaugural that has disturbed
the peace of the Church, or caused any doubt or uncer-
tainty or affliction to even the feeblest of God's children,
I regret it more than any one else can do. I have been
a teacher of the Bible in the Union Theological Semi-
nary for twenty years. There are only four professors
now teaching in your theological seminaries who have
been in service longer than I have. There are only
two of them who have taught more ministers now in the
service than I have. I challenge the production of a
single one of these ministers who have been under my
instruction during the past twenty years, who can say
that anything that I have taught him has undermined
or diminished his faith in the divine authority of Holy
.Scripture, or his love for the Word of God.
III.
THE ENTERTAINMENT OF THE APPEAL.
Dr. Geo. D. Baker, chairman of the Judicial Commit-
tee, on May 23d presented the Majority Report of the
Judicial Committee :
" In the case of the Presbyterian Church in the United States
of America against the Rev. Charles A. Briggs, D.D., being an
appeal to the General Assembly from the decision and final judg-
ment of the Presbytery of New York rendered January 9, 1893,
the Judicial Committee begs leave respectfully to report that
they have examined the papers pertaining to this case, and find :
" I. That the appellant in the case is the Presbyterian Church
in the United States of America represented by its prosecuting
committee appointed by the Presbytery of New York, and as such
appellant has the right of appeal to this Assembly as an original
party; and said prosecuting committee is entitled to conduct
the prosecution in all its stages in whatever judicatory until the
final issue be reached.
" 2. That due notice of appeal in this case has been given, and
the appeal and specifications of error alleged and the record in
the case have been filed m due time in accordance with the pro-
visions of Book of Discipline, sections 96 and 97 ; and that said
appeal is accordingly in order.
"3. We, therefore, respectfully recommend to the General As-
sembly that the appeal be entertained and the case be issued.
" Pending the adoption of this recommendation, your commit-
tee submit the following resolutions :
" (A) Resolved^ That the General Assembly finds that due no-
(127)
228 ENTERTAINMENT OF THE APPEAL
tice of the appeal in this case has been given, and that the ap-
peal and specifications of the errors alleged have been filed
in due time and that the appeal is in order in accordance with
the provisions of the Book of Discipline.
" (B) Resolved, That after the judgment, the notice of appeal,
the appeal and the specifications of error alleged have been read
and the parties have been heard, namely, the prosecuting com-
mittee and the appellee, as to whether said appeaL shall be en-
tertained, three hours being allowed for such hearing, namely,
one and one-half hours to either party, and after hearing from
the members of the Assembly, three hours being allowed for
such hearing, the Assembly shall then vote upon the following
resolution :
"Resolved, That the appeal from the decision and final judg-
ment of the Presbytery of New York in the case of Prof. Charles
A. Briggs, D.D., is hereby entertained, and it is ordered that the
case proceed to trial in accordance with the provisions of the
Book of Discipline.
"All of which is respectfully submitted,
"George D. Baker, John T. Duffield, John Hays, James T. Left-
wich, James L. Maxwell, E. J. Sanders, John Peacock, J. B. Ken-
dall, Edward F. Green, Thomas McDougall, Cyrus Pershing,
William Fulton, George W. Cummings, H. M. Craydon, and
James L. Orr."
Dr. Baker then said :
" I am requested also, to give to the Assembly a sup-
plemental statement with reference to the principal
reasons which have influenced the committee in reach-
ing the decision which they have now declared :
"The Judicial Committee feels constrained to put on
record and submit to the General Assembly, as supple-
mental to its report, the following principal reasons
which have influenced and determined them in reaching
the conclusions declared in said report :
" I. The Book of Discipline provides in express and
^J^ unambiguous terms for an appeal directly from the Pres-
ENTERTAINMENT OF THE APPEAL 129
bytery to the General Assembly. Chapter 9, Sec. 4,
paragraph 102, reads as follows :
'"Appeals are generally to be taken to the Judicatory
immediately superior to that appealed from.'
" And Chapter 12, Sec. 4, reads as follows :
" ' The General Assembly shall receive and issue all
appeals concerning the doctrine or Constitution of the
Church which may be regularly brought before them
from the inferior Judicatories.'
" Such an appeal directly to the General Assembly is,
therefore, plainly permissible when the gravity of the
issue and the circumstances of the case render it advisa-
ble. Accordingly, the General Assembly of 1892, in
strict compliance with the provisions of the Book of
Discipline, not only decided the status of appellants as
a' committee to conduct the prosecution in all its stages,
in whatever judicatory, until the final issue be reached,
but they also decided that the gravity of this case and
the circumstances connected with it were such as to jus-
tify an appeal from the Presbytery to the General As-
sembly.
" If this case, afTecting vitaPlly the essential doctrine of
the Church, and having to do with its principles and its
purity throughout its borders, be not a proper case to
be appealed directly to the General Assembly, and if it
is not in its character the very case for which the direc-
tory provides in the matter of direct appeal, it may be
well asked. What case could possibly be such ? It is
evident to us that it was to provide for precisely such
an emergency as is now upon the Church in this case
that provision was made in the Book of Discipline when
it granted the right of direct appeal to the General As-
sembly.
" 2. In the final decision of the grave issues involved
;1^30 ENTERTAINMENT OF THE APPEAL
in this case — and it is only the General Assembly which
can give this final decision— it is eminently desirable
that the Assembly making such decision should, as far
as practicable, be representative of the entire Church.
" Should these views be decided by an Assembly on
appeal from the Synod of New York, the Commission-
ers from that Synod representing more than one-fifth of
the entire membership of the Church would be debarred
by Sec. 98 of the Book of Discipline from sitting, delib-
erating, or voting in the case. Moreover, such a case of
the exclusion of the Synod of New York might work to
the disadvantage of the interests of the defendant him-
self. As far as the defendant himself in this case is con-
cerned, it is manifestly more just that the Assembly which
finally passes upon his case should be one not com-
pelled to exclude his own synod, the Synod of New
York.
" 3. For more than two years the peace of the Church
has been sadly disturbed by the issues pending in this
case. It seems highly desirable, nay, it seems to us im-
perative, to settle these issues without unnecessary delay.
To keep the Church in continued agitation, anxiety,
and uncertainty for another year, when it is within our
constitutional prerogative to determine the matter at
the present time, is, in our judgment, to unjustifiably
evade the solemn duty in the Providence of God de-
volved upon us, and would make us responsible for the
prolongation of a condition of affairs in our beloved
Church which imperils its purity and its peace, and hin-
ders it in the fulfillment of its legitimate mission and the
prosecution of its legitimate work.
" This report is signed by the same members of the
Judicial Committee who signed the report already read.
The Moderator: Do I understand from the Chair-
ENTERTAINMENT OF THE APPEAL 131
man that there is a minority report authorized to be
submitted ?
Dr. Baker : There is.
The Moderator: The Chairman of that minority
will read his report.
The moderator then recognized Dr. Niccolls, of
St. Louis.
Rev. Dr. NiCCOLLS: Mr. Moderator, I well know
that the fact that we present a minority report puts us
already under the suspicion of the Assembly as standing
in an attitude of opposition to the claims of the appellant
in this case. We do not wish to be so considered. We
are not here in the least degree to question the right of
this appeal to come before the Assembly. We are not
here to .question in the least degree the orderliness of
this report. But it is with reference to an opinion ex-
pressed in regard to the entertainment of this appeal,
which I trust will be clearly presented in the minority
report, that we present our views at this time. I will
first read the exception we have taken, and then as
briefly as possible state our reasons :
Minority Report of the Judicial Committee.
" The undersigned members of the Judicial Committee feel
constrained to submit to the General Assembly the following
minority report :
" We recommend that the majority report be amended by strik-
ing out all that follows, beginning with the recommendation that
the appeal be entertained and issued, and substituting the follow-
ing : ' We find the appeal in order, and recommend that the
parties be heard in accordance with the provisions of the Book
of Discipline, section 99.' We ask this for the following reasons:
" I. The majority report, by recommending that the appeal be
entertained and issued, prejudges the case by advising the Assem-
bly to do what the Book of Discipline says shall be determined
only after the parties have been heard. The language of the
][32 ENTERTAINMENT OF THE APPEAL
Book is as follows : ' The judicatory may then determine, after
hearing the parties whether the appeal shall be entertained.' The
impropriety of recommending that the appeal to entertain an
issue in this case is the more apparent when it is remembered
that one of the points involved in it is whether the appeal shall
be entertained by the Assembly or referred to the Synod of New
York.
" 2. The majority report in form pledges the committee in ad-
vance to entertain the appeal, the parties not yet being heard ;
and yet this same committee is entitled 'to sit, judge, and vote
in this case as the members of the judicatory.'
" 3. The majority report is contrary both to the letter and
spirit of the Book of Discipline, as stated in rule 99, Section IV,
Chapter IX, which is as follows: 'Where due notice of an ap-
peal is given and the appeal and the specifications of the errors
alleged have been filed in due time, the appeal shall be consider-
ed in order. The judgment, the notice of appeal, the appeal,
and the specifications of the errors alleged shall be rea'd, and the
judicatory may then determine after hearing the parties whether
the appeal shall be entertained.'
" It will be seen that the functions of the Judicial Committee
in this case are limited to finding the appeal in order and recom-
mending the method of procedure, and that it is not its right to
recommend to the Assembly that the appeal shall be entertained
and issued.
" For these reasons we recommend that it shall be amended
so as to conform with the law of the Church.
"This is signed by John Meigs, Charles T, Thompson, John Y.
Foster, Henry H. Stebbins, and by the Chairman of the Minority.
" Now may I say a word, Mr. Moderator, with refer-
ence to the reasons that have influenced us ?
The Moderator : Certainly, sir.
Dr. NiCCOLLS : " You will observe that we are not
differing in principle from the majority report. We are
perfectly ready that this case shall be put on its passage
before this Assembly. But I call your attention especi-
ally to the different meanings in which the word ' enter-
tained ' is used. Ordinarily by the word ' entertained '
EiNrEKrAlNMENT OF THE APPEAL I33
we mean that the subject shall be taken up for its con-
sideration. In that view of it at first the committee
were unanimous. We were all agreed that this report
should be brought before the Assembly and that the
Assembly should pass upon it, and then, after hearing
all the parties, decide what should be done. But when
we were thus agreed it was stated and decided by the
Chairman that this report meant that those who com-
mitted themselves to it had agreed to tell the Assembly
that in their judgment a decision should be such as they
have recommended. You will see that this was presented
in the argument, and very ably presented in the argument,
of the Chairman of the Committee, who has taken the
arguments presented by the appellant in the report for
the most part and incorporated them into the report of
the majority ; and in view of the arguments used by the
appellants, which you have not yet heard, you vv^ould be
directed to entertain this appeal and give the very ver-
dict, by the form of the resolution, which you are to
vote upon. This we claim is deciding for the Assembly
beforehand. We wish this report to come before you in
the simple form of law, unprejudiced by our decision in
one way or another. We simply find the report in order,
and tell you to look as the Book requires, into all the
facts of the case. But the other report proposes that
you shall say what should be done with the report.
What we ask is simple fairness in the case.
" You will remember that certain overtures were re-
ferred from this Assembly to our committee ; quite a
large number of those overtures were referred, asking
that a certain disposition be made of this appeal. Those
overtures were not considered, and this resolution, recom-
mended to you by the majority report, was made irre-
spective of those matters which you referred to us for
134 ENTERTAINMENT OF THE APPEAL
information ; and without regarding those facts the ma-
jority has told you to determine that this case should be
entertained, and issued, and put on trial before you, be-
fore you have the facts in the case and before the Judicial
Committee have heard the appellants in the case.
" You will also observe that the majority report is con-
tradictory. Its first recommendation is this:
" ' We recommend to the General Assembly that the
appeal be entertained and the Assembly proceed to issue
the case.'
" If you adopt that first recommendation, you have de-
cided the whole case before you have it. Then here is
another resolution interjected which seems to contradict
that :
"' We recommend that the appeal shall be and hereby
is entertained and the case proceed to trial pursuant to
the provisions of the Book of Discipline.'
" If the first recommendation of the majority report
were simply that the report was found in order, and that
the Assembly proceed to hear all the parties, and if it
were then stated that we recommend the adoption of
the resolution to follow it after due notice, there would
be no objection on the part of the minority. But by the
terms of the resolution, it is desired to commit the com-
mittee to a decision in advance.
" I will say frankly that some few members of the
committee desired to have a reference to this, but they
did not deem it proper to prejudge the case by asking
the Assembly to consider that matter, they did not pre-
sume to ask the whole committee to bring in such a
recommendation. They wanted the case presented on
its merits, as a matter of law, to the Assembly in order
that there might be no complaint of unfairness.
" Here are the names of sixteen of the most honor-
ENTERTAINMENT OF THE APPEAL I35
able gentlemen in the Assembly written to their decision
beforehand, to the effect that they believe that this ap-
peal should be entertained and issued in this General
Assembly. What would you think of a judge who
should give a written opinion to a party on appeal that
his appeal should be sustained ? What would you think
if that judge should say : ' I give you a written opinion
that your appeal shall be sustained ; I will now proceed
to take my place on the bench and listen to the parties,
and give my decision subsequently ' ?
" Here are the judges who are to sit in this, the high-
est court of the Church, who are entitled to sit and vote
in this Church on this very question, Shall the appeal be
entertained ? It is found valid as to law and order ; they
have decided beforehand that it shall be ; they have put
their names to it to say that it shall be ; and then follow
the recommendation to sit as judges in the very court
that is to listen to the appellant and to decide the very
facts in the case.
" It is for these reasons that the minority respectfully
ask that the majority report be amended to conform to
what is evidently the teaching of the law in this case ;
that the case be heard simply on its merits, without be-
ing hampered by a previous judgment on the part of the
Judicial Committee."
It is evident that the majority of the Judicial Com-
mittee recommended the entertainment of the Appeal be
fore the appellee was heard, and that they also proposed
to so limit him as to time, as to prevent an adequate
presentation of his case. After private remonstrance
with them and discussion, the Judicial Committee on
May 24th unanimously recommended to amend their
report as follows :
l$Q ENTERTAINMENT OF THE APPEAL
"The Judicial Committee unanimously recommend :
" I. That the appellants be allowed, if they so desire, one hour
in which to present their case at the beginning.
" 2, The appellee having mformed the Chairman of the Judi-
cial Committee that he would probably need five hours to pre-
sent his defense of the action of the Presbytery and his reply to
the appellants, that five hours shall be allowed him, should he
wish to occupy so much time.
" 3. That the appellants be allowed two hours to reply to the
appellee, the time to be extended, should they request it, not to
exceed, however, the limit of time allowed to the appellee."
On motion the Judicial Committee was allowed to
amend its report as indicated.
May 26th.
After the debate a resolution was offered in accord-
ance with the majority report :
"Resolved, That the appeal from the decision and final judg-
ment of the Presbytery of New York in the case of Rev. Charles
A. Briggs, D.D., is hereby entertained ; and it is ordered that the
case proceed to trial in accordance with the provisions of the
Book of Discipline."
An amendment was offered :
" Resolved^ That the four hours assigned for discussion by the
Assembly having terminated, it is the judgment of this Assem-
bly on the question of the entertainment of the Appeal, in the
case of Dr. Briggs, that the whole case be and is hereby referred
to the Synod of New York for its adjudication at its next regular
meeting."
A motion was immediately made to lay the amendment
on the table. This was carried by a viva voce vote. A divi-
sion was called for and the moderator declared that the
majority was in favor of laying it on the table, but re-
fused to count the votes. The ayes and noes were
ENTERTAINMENT OF THE APPEAL
137
called for on the original motion,
vote of 405 to 145.
It was carried by a
Synod.
Atlantic
Baltimore
Yea.
. . 12
. .. 10
Nay.
California
.. I"?
3
2
I
I
6
Catawba
China
Colorado
Illinois
India
Indiana
.. 8
. . 2
• . 7
..19
. . 2
. . II
Indian Territory. .
jowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Michigan
Minnesota
.. 8
•• 23
. . 14
.. 6
. . II
10
I
4
9
10
Missouri
... 18
Synod. Yea.
Nebraska 9
New Jersey 20
New Mexico 4
*New York 31
North Dakota 5
Ohio 36
Oregon 6
Pennsylvania J7
South Dakota 10
Tennessee 5
Texas 5
Utah 7
Washington 7
Wisconsin 9
Nay.
2
14
2
I
10
2
5
— Totals 405 145
The report of the majority of the committee was
then adopted as a whole.
* Presbytery of New York not voting.
IV.
ARGUMENT OF PROF. BRIGGS AGAINST SUSTAINING
THE APPEAL.
Mr. Moderator, Ministers and Elders of the Presbyterian
Church in the United States of America :
I wish to make a few preliminary statements for the
information of the house, and the gentlemen of the
press, and the stenographer.
First, I waive the reading of the records, although I
feel very deeply that the records contain my defence in
its fullness, including the printed document called The
Defence, also the volume entitled The Higher Criticism
of the Hexateuch, which is a part of the defence, and the
volume on The Bible, the Church, and the Rcasoji, which
was submitted to the Presbytery of New York as a part
of the evidence, and also all of the evidence which I sub-
mitted to the Pfesbytery of New York in the trial. But
the reading of all that defence and all that evidence
would consume a great many hours, and I have taken it
for granted that this defence and the evidence, having
been sent by mail to every commissioner of this Assem-
bly, as honorable men they have read it, and it would
only be necessary for me in argument to call attention to
what I regarded as the essential parts thereof.
Second, I have endeavored to save the time of the
(138)
ARGUMENT AGAINST SUSTAINING THE APPEAL 139
house as far as possible in my argument. Therefore I
have gone over it and I have cut it up and readjusted so
many parts of it that I can answer the question of the
stated clerk that not even the copy which is in my
hands can altogether be relied upon as giving to the sten-
ographer the argument which I am now to make, be-
cause it is necessary, under the peculiar circumstances
in which I am now placed, to make some portions of my
argurnent purely extempore.
Let me say, in the third place, that there are so many
of these specifications of error which concern especially the
presbytery of New York, that I feel it is a serious burden
that it should be laid upon me to defend the presbytery.
I wish that the commissioners of the presbytery had
more time to defend the presbytery with reference to
these matters. But I feel that whatever opinion you
may have as to the larger portion of the specifications,
under the grounds of appeal, that if you sustain nearly
all of them, you still would have no reason whatever to
make any change in the verdict, and that alone is what
the appellee has to do with. At the same time let me
say one word to this body as a precaution. In view of
my experience in the last General Assembly, I will state
very frankly to you what my fear is. If I could have
three or four of the elders and lawyers who thus far
have voted against me in this body rise up in the debate
and inform you what portions of these specifications
were illegal, I think I could be content to leave the
most of them for the judgment of the house. I do not
see how I can spend the time to go into all of them in a
sufficient manner. The peril of the situation is this,
brethren. I ask you to guard yourselves against it, as
judges of this court, that, when it comes to a vote and
you are weary with the long discussion of the parties
140 ARGUMENT AGAINST SUSTAINING THE APPEAL
and the debate, you shall not rush on without thought
and sustain one specification after another without
giving it the due consideration that it requires, lest
you may make the mistake of establishing a very unfor-
tunate precedent, which may not hurt the defendant,
whose sole interest is in the merits of the case, but
which may do grave injustice to appellees who may have
the misfortune at some subsequent time to argue their
cases before future General Assemblies. With these
preliminary statements I shall enter upon my argument.
Mr. Moderator, Ministers and Elders of the Presbyterian
Church in the United States of A inerica :
You have overcome the objections to the entertain-
ment of the appeal presented to you by the appellee ;
you have summoned him to resist the sustaining of the
appeal. He cannot enter upon this task without a dis-
tinct reservation of rights. He does not consent to
your entertainment of the appeal. He still claims, not-
withstanding your action, that the appeal is not so much
against the final judgment as against action supplement-
ary thereto ; that no appeal is lawful by a public prose-
cutor against a verdict of acquittal ; that the appellants
are not an original party ; and that the synod of New
York has the rightful jurisdiction of this case.
The appeal is urged on the basis of thirty-four specifi-
cations grouped under five grounds. These grounds
charge the Presbytery of New York with doing every
wrong that could be done according to the Book of Dis-
cipline,— " irregularity in the proceedings," " receiving
improper testimony," " manifestation of prejudice in the
conduct of the case," " mistake or injustice in the deci-
sion." The presbytery of New York must be a very in-
considerate and wicked body if it could make so many
ARGUMENT AGAINST SUSTAINING THE APPEAL 141
blunders and do such grave injustice to these five inno-
cent presbyters whom it appointed to " arrange and pre-
pare the necessary proceedings appropriate in the case
of Dr. Briggs."
It would weary you to go over these thirty-four speci-
fications in the order in which the appellants present
them. It would be profitless to test the same objec-
tions three, four, and five times under the different
heads. We shall consider each objection once only in
its appropriate place and inquire whether it gives any of
the alleged grounds for sustaining the appeal.
The specifications have been examined in order to de-
termine whether there was any principle of arrangement,
chronological, logical, rhetorical, or sensational, but, so
far as can be seen, their only arrangement is a promis-
cuous one. To follow it would be to get us into the
same intricacy and confusion of mind in which the ap-
pellants themselves seem to be involved.
The appellee therefore proposes to arrange all their
specifications of objection in chronological order in ac-
cordance with the several stages of procedure in the
court of the presbytery. This will enable us to test
every matter complained of in the midst of the circum-
stances which gave it birth.
1.— THE ACTION OF THE PRESBYTERY UPON THE PRELIMINARY
OBJECTIONS OF THE DEFENDANT.
The appellants present seven specifications of objection
under three grounds against four different actions of the
presbytery upon the preliminary objections of the de-
fendant. The appellee, when we were considering the
Entertainment of the Appeal, called your attention to the
fact that the presbytery had overcome five of his pre-
liminary objections, and that he and others, his co-com-
142 ARGUMENT AGAINST SUSTAINING THE APPEAL
plainants, made five complaints to the synod of New-
York against these actions of presbytery. You have de-
cided to do the great injustice of entertaining the objec-
tions of the appellants to four actions of the presbytery
without entertaining the objections of the appellee to
five actions of the presbytery.
The actions of the presbytery which are presented by
the appellants as grounds of appeal are, (i) striking out
Charge IV. from the Charges prepared by the commit-
tee; (2) striking out Charge VII. ; (3) transferring the
proofs from Scripture and Confession from the specifi-
cations to the Charges; and (4) requiring a vote on each
item of the Charges.
I . Striking out Charges IV. and VI T.
It will save time to discuss the two rejected Charges
together.
The General Assembly should now carefully consider
the preliminary objections to the Amended Charges made
by the defendant. Among* other things he said : [See
The Case against Prof. Briggs, Part II., pp. 57, 58, from
which the citation was made of all matter within the
sentences given below :
" I object to the amended charges that they do not comply
with the law respecting amendment, and that they violate the ex-
press directions of the last General Assembly But, so far
as I am concerned, I shall waive this objection as regards six of
these new charges, and make my stand against two of them."]
The defendant would have resisted all of the Charges
as insufificient in form and legal effect on this ground,
that their general nature had been changed, if it had not'
been for the evident desire on the part of the last Gen-
eral Assembly and also of the Presbytery of New York
that the merits of the case should be reached as soon as
STRIKING OUT CHARGES IV. AND VII. jlS
possible. Therefore the defendant waived everything
he could rightfully waive. He took his stand on the
illegality of two of the Charges, not merely because the
general nature of them had been changed, but because
they were really new Charges, and Charges which im-
peached his veracity.
I shall simply repeat to the General Assembly what
has been said to the Presbytery :
[See The Case agaitist Prof. Briggs, Part II., pp. 61-65,
from which citation was made of all the matter within
the following sentences :
" Two charges remain to be considered, namely, 4 and 7. I
object to them on two grounds, (i) These are new charges,
which so change the general nature of the original charges that
they cannot legally be allowed ; and (2) that it is not in the
mterests of justice that such charges as these should be approved
by the Presbytery of New York I ask the Presbytery,
in view of these disclaimers, if it is just, if it is honorable, if it is in
accordance with Christian courtesy and gentlemanly propriety,
for the prosecution to make such charges against me .'' " ]
Judge, ye ministers and elders of this supreme court
of the Presbyterian Church, whether the Presbytery did
right or not in refusing to try these Charges.
Dr. Alexander offered the following resolution :
" Resolved^ That the Presbytery, in consideration of objections
offered by the accused, require the committee to amend the
charges and specifications by striking out charges 4 and 7."
Mr. McCook of the prosecuting committee then said :
" I therefore suggest, as the time for adjournment has arrived,
that the Committee be given to-night to examine and read what
Dr. Briggs has said with reference to charges 4 and 7, and, if we
can, in a most careful and conscientious desire to save the time
of this body and to conserve the truth, remove those charges,
why, we will be very glad to do so." (Stenographical Report,
p. 154.)
144 ARGUMENT AGAINST SUSTAINING THE APPEAL
Dr. Alexander said at the beginning of the next
session :
*' It will be remembered that last evenmg the counsel of the
committee asked for delay, m the hope that upon a review of
their charges they might find that they could consistently drop
the two referred to in my resolution. I am prepared to give way
to the committee in order to hear whether they have concluded
to do that, or not, and for that purpose only." (Stenographical
Report, p. 167.)
Mr. McCook, instead of giving the decision of the
committee on the matter referred to them, went into an
elaborate argument against removing Charges IV.
and VII.
During the remarks of Mr. McCook, Dr. Alexander
interposed :
" I do not like to interrupt Col. McCook, but it seems to me
that he is doing something very much more than that for which
I yielded the floor to him. What I yieldea to him for was to
ascertain what the conclusion of the committee had been in thif>
case ; and now he seems to be making an elaborate argument
against the objection ofifered by Dr. Briggs." (p. 176.)
Dr. Briggs also interposed with an objection :
" Mr. Moderator, I wish to record an objection now in order
that I may put it in my appeal. I wish to record my objection
now that the Prosecuting Committee yesterday were heard m
response to my preliminary objection, and you are now giving
them a second opportunity to respond without my consent."
(p. 182.)
At last Dr. Alexander interposed again and insisted :
" I msist, Mr. Moderator, that this is trespassing entirely
beyond what courtesy would require me to do in yielding the-
floor to Col. McCook. He has not only answered the question,
which I yielded the floor to him to allow him to answer, but he
has made an elaborate defence against the objections made, and
now he is proceeding apparently to discuss the question as to
STRIKING OUT CHARGES IV. AND VII. I45
the orderliness of our proceeding. I cannot yield the floor
further."
" Mr. McCooK : I simply wished, in conclusion, to make a sug-
gestion in the way of orderly procedure which might save time.
" Dr. Alexander : You see, Mr. Moderator, that the purpose
of this is not, as we had supposed, to give opportunity for the
withdrawal of forces at certain points, but to strengthen those
forces and to forge new weapons. I yielded the floor in the
hope that the Committee might see their way clear to what
seems to me a just thmg, and what certainly would be a graceful
thing. They have not seen fit to do so. I cannot but feel that
the Committee have had full consideration given them. They
have brought before us what is substantially a new case. It is
manifestly a much stronger case than the one which they pre-
sented originally. They now have six broad accusations, upon
which the accused consents to go to trial. They have had the
opportunity of presenting two arguments in answer to the objec-
tions which have been made, and it seems to me that nothing
more can be asked on their side. On the other hand, what is the
position of the accused ? He has been put a second time in
jeopardy. Some of us, in our desire to reach the merits of this
case and obey the mandate of the higher court, have stifled our
convictions with reference to the constitutional order of pro-
cedure, and now the Committee insists upon pressing these
charges, apparently with the desire to stop every possible
avenue of escape. And why do they refuse to drop these
charges } In order that they may require the accused to plead
to charges which he has distinctly and solemnly and repeatedly
repudiated. It seems to me that the object of the Committee,
like the object of this body, should be not to convict the accused
if it is possible to convict him. but to clear him if it is pos-
sible to clear him consistently with truth and law and
righteousness.
" I wish simply to add, Mr. Moderator, that it seems to me
that it should be the desire of the Committee and the desire of
this house to drop such charges as these when the brother
accused comes forward and says, as he has said to us : ' Brethren,
you have misconceived me ; I do not hold these views, and I
never did hold these views.' Now, if there is any apparent in-
consistency betwen phrases in the Inaugural Address and that
146 ARGUMENT AGAINST SUSTAINING THE APPEAL
statement of his, why, let him give his explanation as a peer
among his peers, and do not frame them into an indictment
against him to which he is called upon to plead before this
tribunal where he is on trial for his ecclesiastical life." (Steno-
graphical Report, pp. 186-188.)
The motion of Dr. Alexander was divided, and on sep-
arate votes Charges IV. and VII. were thrown out.
This decision of the Presbytery ought to have settled
the matter in the court of the Presbytery. But in fact,
Mr. McCook in his argument in behalf of the Piosecu-
tion argued in behalf of the Charges which were thrown
out, as the defendant showed in his Defence: [pp. xii-xvi.]
So also Dr. Lampe argued on these same Charges under
the guise of a rebuttal. The defendant took exception
to this argument as follows :
" (4). Finally, let me call your attention to the fact that this
afternoon Dr. Lampe has reiterated the argument on the seventh
Charge that you threw out, and has reiterated it in a most offen-
sive form. Do you allow a committee claiming to be appointed
by this Presbytery, and to represent you, to override a ruling
which you have distinctly made ? I call for the justice of the
court I appeal to the sense of honor of the judges. In this ar-
gument on the seventh Charge (which was ruled out) he attrib-
utes to me the words of my beloved teacher, Dr. Dorner. when
I have expressly disclaimed in my argument, as you will remem-
ber, holding that particular phase of his doctrine. It is true that
m my book entitled 'Whither,' on pages 260 and 261, I quoted
an extract from Dr. Dorner with reference to those who had
passed into the middle state, in which he said a few words about
the condition of the impenitent there, and expresses the hope
that some of them may be saved ; but as the greater part of the
extract (and that is the reason why I cited it) refers to the pro-
gressive sanctification of believers who have gone into the middle,
state, I did not indorse every word that Dr. Dorner said, in
' Whither ' ; nor did I think it necessary for me to disclaim that
portion of his doctrine when I said, ' Lest any one should stum-
ble at these excellent thoughts, owing to the name of Dorner, 1
STRIKING OUT CflARGES IV. AND VII. 14'j'
shall conclude with the wise words of John Wesley.' The pre-
vious context in which this passage was contained shows suffi-
ciently well that I had been teaching the doctrine of progressive
sanctification after death of believers, and had not thought of
any change for unbelievers so far as their redemption is con-
cerned. And in the argument which I made before you I took
the precaution, lest any one should misunderstand me, when I
quoted this extract from Dorner again, to disclaim that specific
teaching of Dorner which Dr. Lampe ha^ again, and in spite of
my disclaimer, attributed to me this afternoon." {The Defence,
pp. 192-193-)
In order to overcome the force of these unlawful argu-
ments and any possible injury he might suffer from them
in the minds of the court, the defendant in the course of
his argument briefly said :
"When I indorse the doctrine of Dorner as regards the pro-
gressive sanctification of believers after death, that does not im-
ply that I hold with him that those who die impenitent here and
go to the world of the lost may yet be redeemed from their lost
condition in the Middle State. Many holy and wise men hold
that doctrine, and God forbid that I or any other should chal-
lenge their right to their opinion. O that I could agree with
them ! I would gladly make many sacrifices if 1 could honestly
indulge in such a comfortable hope. But I do»not, 1 cannot. I
exercise my right in disclaiming this opinion, and I also exercise
my right of Christian charity in refusing to condemn them as
enemies of Christ on account of it." {The Defence, pp. 176-177.)
Dr. Lampe has argued this afternoon that I teach that
those who enter the future life impenitent will have an
opportunity of beginning a Christian life there. I have
never taught any such thing. I have distinctly repudi-
ated the Roman Catholic doctrine of purgatory. I have
distinctly and over and over again repudiated the doc-
trine of second probation.
I have repudiated the doctrine that there is any regen-
eration after death for those who die impenitent. I have
148 ARGUMENT AGAINST SUSTAINING THE APPEAL
distinctly disclaimed that there is any regeneration after
death for those who die unregenerate, or that there is
any beginning of their Christian life after death. My
doctrine of redemption after death concerns alone, in all
the statements that I have made respecting it, those who
die as believers, those who enter the future life as born
again under the influence of the Holy Spirit in this
world.
It is claimed by the appellants that because they in
their original charges used the words " state and charac-
ter of believers after death," they had a right in their
new charge to refer to the change of character of un-
believers after death. I cannot see any propriety in that.
They made no statement in their original Charge upon
my views as to eschatology, that I taught that unbeliev-
ers changed their condition after death. My complaint
is that they have introduced that new Charge into the
seventh of these Amended Charges.
You have heard that I proclaim the dreadful heresy
of race redemption ; whereas, if you will look in my In-
augural Address you will see that my reference to race
redemption is 'connected with the doctrine of the incar-
nation of our Lord. The question is, what is race re-
demption ? My brethren take too narrow a view of re-
demption. They are thinking of redemption as nothing
more than deliverance from hell fire or as the beginning
of a Christian life, whereas I have been using " redemp-
tion " in my Inaugural and in my writings in its more ex-
tended sense, as embracing, according to the doctrine of
our Confession of Faith, the entire process, from the be-
ginning in regeneration until the last stage, when the
glorified church rejoices in the presence of the bride-
groom. If you take into consideration the meaning
which I attach to redemption — and I beg leave to aflfirm
STRIKING OUT CHARCxES IV. AND VII. I49
that that is the Scriptural use of the term — you will see
that my views on this subject have been consistent and
that I have never taught what they charge me with
teaching under this seventh Charge. Would that I could
teach such a comfortable doctrine ; and if the time ever
comes that I can, I will gladly lay down my ministry in
the Piesbyterian Church and go forth to teach the
hope of salvation of some of those who apparently have
died without regeneration in this world. But I do not
hold that belief now ; I cannot.
With reference to the fourth charge, predictive proph-
ec5^ let me say that I have been teaching Messianic
prophecy for twenty years to a thousand Christian min-
isters who are now at work in all parts of the world. I
published a work on " Messianic Prophecy " after many
years of teaching and careful revision of my lectures.
This book has been translated into the Japanese lan-
guage and is now in use in several theological colleges
in Japan. They see no error in it, and it has received
the commendation of no less a man than William E.
Gladstone, and the hearty approval of no less evangeli-
cal a man than the late Dr. Franz Delitzsch, of Leipsic. I
shall read from the context.
A Member : When was that book written?
Dr. Briggs : Several years ago. I forget the date
now.
Dr. Brown : In 1886, was it not?
Dr. Briggs : Yes, 1886, I think. Now I read from
the context :
" We are met on the threshold of Hebrew prediction with the
bold statements of Kuenen, that Hebrew prediction has been
proved false by history in so many particulars that the system
cannot be regarded as true and divine. Its predictions have not
been fulfilled in the time allotted them, and the fulfilment is no
150 ARGUMENT AGAINST SUSTAINING THE APPEAL
longer possible. The reverse of the predicted has often hap-.
pened,
" Hebrew prediction has been disproved by events, and it must
take its place with all other prophecy as a compound of truth
and error, of blasted hopes and disappointed expectations. These
charges wil! not bear serious examination. They really concern
only the scholastic theory of prophecy and misinterpretations of
predictions.
" The scholastic theory of prophecy, which was essentially
Montanistic, failed to distinguish between the form and the sub-
stance of prophecy. It sought above all verbal accuracy and cir-
cumstantial and detailed fulfilment. It sought by strained inter-
pretations to identify prophecy and history.
" The efforts to show the literal fulfilment of the predictions
of Daniel in the history of Israel from the exile to the advent,
in its dreadful inconsistencies of interpretation, have so dis-
graced the science of Biblical Interpretation that it is a marvel
that the book has survived such cruel manipulation. The vain,
efforts to find Christian history depicted in the Apocalypse of
John has so damaged the book that we are not surprised that
€ven Christian scholars should have abstained from its study as
unprofitable.
" Predictive prophecy has been made a burden to apologetics
by the abuse that has been made of it by self-constituted de-
fenders of the faith and presumptuous champions of orthodoxy.
It is necessary that evangelical critics should rescue predictive
prophecy from the hands of those who have made such sad mis-
takes.
" Kuenen has taken advantage of the errors of the scholastic
theory and interpretation of predictive prophecy, and has dealt
Hebrew prediction the severest blows it has ever received. We
shall parry these blows of Kuenen by showing that they have
destroyed the .scholastic theory, but they have not in the slight-
est degree injured Hebrew prediction as such.
" Predictive prophecy has its necessary forms and limitations,
which we should carefully study in order to understand it. .We
shall first distinguish the form from the substance of the predic-
tion, and then present the necessary limits of Hebrew prediction ;
for we would unfold the truth which Tholuck has so well ex-
pressed when he says : ' It is not prediction of the accidental.
STRIKING OUT CHARGES IV. AND VII. 15^
but of that which is of religious necessity, which is the essential
thing in Hebrew prophecy.'
" Kuenen has the right of it over against the scholastic apol-
ogists when he says : When they assert that the prophecies
have been fulfilled exactly and literally, and thence deduce far-
reaching consequences, we cannot rest satisfied with the general
agreement between the prediction and the historical fact, but
must note also along with that the deviation in details as often
as such a deviation is actually apparent.'
" But Kuenen and the Scholastics are here alike in error, for
the prophecies are predictive only as to the essential and the
ideal elements. The purely formal elements belong to the point
of view and coloring of the individual prophets. We are not to
find exact and literal fulfilments in detail or in general, but the
fulfilment is limited, as the prediction is limited, to the essential
ideal contents of the prophecy. We start therefore from the
point of view of the prediction, and thence rise through several
forms of prediction.
" The future judgment and redemption, the two poles of pre-
dictive policy, are necessarily based on present experience of
discipline and upon the history of redempti'^n and judicial acts
of Jahveh in the past. Looking forth into the future, prophetic
prediction clothes and represents that which is to come in the
scenery and language familiar to it in the present and in the
past. The most suitable events, persons, and things of the past
and the present are employed. Hence the type or the symbol
lies at the basis of all genuine prediction." (pp. 43-45.)
This is the passage from Kuenen in its connections
and I think the house will see that I am opposing
Kuenen and endeavoring to state the evangelical posi-
tion on which the whole system of the Messianic proph-
ecy of the Old Testament can be defended, and then I
go to the Old Testament predictions and point them
forward to fulfilment by Jesus Christ in history.
Now let me read you my summing up of Messianic
prophecy :
" We have in the Messianic prophecy of the Old Testament
an organic system constantly advancing on the original lines.
152 ARGUMENT AGAINST SUSTAINING THE APPEAL
and expanding into new and more comprehensive phases with
the progress of the centuries. Vast and complex that organism
is, — so complex that the wisest sages of Israel could not compre-
hend it, — as vast as the difference between a divine advent and
a human advent, as contrasted as a suffering and reigning Mes-
siah, as an advent of grace and revival, and as an advent of
judgment and perdition ; and yet there is a unity in all this
variety and complexity that no one could discern until Jesus
Christ was born, God manifest in the flesh ; until He passed
through the experience of a suffering Messiah, and advanced to
His throne as the reigning Messiah ; until the advent of the
Holy Spirit at Pentecost warned of the advent of the great and
terrible judgment.
" In Jesus of Nazareth the key of the Messianic prophecy
of the Old Testament has been found. All its phases find
their realization in His unique personality, in His unique
work, and in His unique kingdom. The Messiah of prophecy
appears in the Messiah of history. The redemption predicted
as the completion of the redemption experienced in greater and
richer fulness in the successive stages of the old covenant is at
last completed in the Messiah of the cross and of the throne ; in
the Lamb that was slain for the redemption of men, but who
liveth as the fountain of life, and the owner of the keys of
Hades.
" Hebrew prophecy vindicates its reality, its accuracy, its com-
prehensive ideality as a conception of the divine mind, as a
deliverance of the divine energy, as a system constructed by
holy men who spoke as they were moved by the Holy Spirit.
" The Messiah of prophecy and the Messiah of history, the
redemption of Hebrew prediction and the redemption of Chris-
tian possession, are not diverse, but entirely harmonious in the
Lamb, who was foreordained before the foundation of the world,
but was manifest in these last times of its history.
" For it was the same divine Being who devised the redemp-
tion of the world, who revealed it in prophetic prediction, who
pl-epared for it in the development of history, who accomplished
it in time and eternity. Hebrew prophecy springs from divinity
as its source and ever-flowing inspiration, and it points to divin-
ity as its fruition and complete realization.
" None but God could give such prophecy ; none but God can
STRIKING OUT CHARGES IV. AND VII. 153
fulfil such prophecy. The ideal of prophecy and the real of hi.story
correspond in I-^im, who is above the limits of time and space
and circumstance, who is the creator, ruler, and saviour of the
world, and who alone has the wisdom, the grace, and the power
to conceive the idea of redemption, and then accomplish it in
reality through the incarnation, crucifixion, resurrection, ascen-
sion, and second advent of His only begotten and well-beloved
Son, very God of very God, the Light and Life and Saviour of
the world." {Messianic Prophecy, pp. 497-499.)
That is the conclusion of my whole argument on the
Messianic predictions. Need I argue whether I hold
the views imputed to me or not ?
We have gone over the procedure of the Presbytery
of New York in their dealings with two Charges, which
the prosecution strove so long and with such persistence
to have accepted by the presbytery and served upon the
accused, and which they insisted upon arguing in spite
of the presbytery. Who has the right to determine
whether charges are sufficient ? The presbytery, or a
committee of the presbytery?
A MEMBER : We have listened to what Dr. Briggs has
said on that subject, and I should like to ask him a
question. That book was written in 1886, and I should
like to ask if that is the opinion of Dr. Briggs at this
time ? Does he subscribe to the same opinions now ?
Dr. Briggs : Certainly I do. That book I use as a
text-book in the Union Theological Seminary, where it
has been used continuously since it was written. Every
senior class goes over it. I hold the same views pre-
cisely. I have not changed a particle.
Dr. Briggs, resuming: And if a Presbytery decide to
serve six charges and not to serve two charges is it not
within their proper functions so to decide? There is no
right of appeal against it, for it is not a final judgment.
There is no right of complaint, because the supreme
court has decided that a complaint cannot be taken
154: ARGUMENT AGAINST SUSTAINING THE APPEAL
against a court for exercising its discretion. (Digest, p.
(>7']^ Therefore the action of the Presbytery in refusing
to accept these Charges and serve them was final. But
suppose that the Presbytery made a mistake in not serv-
ing these Charges, what action can the Assembly law-
fully take in the case ? These Charges have not been
served, they have not been tried, they form no part of the
final judgment. How can this matter be appealed? It
cannot be shown that the striking out of these Charges
influenced the final judgment on the other Charges sub-
mitted for probation. Would you send them to the
Presbytery of New York for trial ? This is the most
you could do. You cannot try these two Charges which
have not been tried in the court of the Presbytery, any
more than you could try any other charges. These
Charges are not under your jurisdiction. There is no
way in which they can reach your jurisdiction without a
trial of them in the court of the Presbytery.
It is difficult to see what purpose the appellants have
in mind in insisting upon these Charges after the Presby-
tery refused to entertain them. They bring these objec-
tions under five Specifications and three Grounds. It is
claimed by the appellants that the striking out of these
charges was irregular because they were in substance an
essential part of the original Charges and Specifications.
This we have shown not to be the case. They were en-
tirely new charges and in no sense amendments of the
original Charges and Specifications. It was not irregular
for the Presbytery to exercise the discretion, which the
General Assembly had directed them to use, when they
instructed the Presbytery " to permit the committee to
amend the Charges and Specifications, not changing the
general nature of the same." The General Assembly
did not direct the Presbytery to declare any charges suf-
ficient which this committee might submit ; but to pass
STRIKING OUT CHARGES IV. AND VII. 155
Upon such charges and determine their sufficiency, de-
termine those which were sufficient and those which
were not sufficient. The Presbytery did exactly what
the General Assembly directed it to do. It determined
the sufficiency of six of the Charges and the insufficiency
of two of them. Therefore its action cannot be regarded
as irregular.
It is claimed by the prosecution that the Presbytery
declined to receive important testimony when they re-
fused to permit the committee to prove these two re-
jected Charges by competent evidence. But how could
the Presbytery permit the committee to present evidence
for Charges which were stricken out as new Charges and
as insufficient? The Presbytery could not do so without
the violation of law. The committee did not ask per-
mission to present evidence for these insufficient charges,
but they did it without permission and in a manner in-
jurious to the accused, and to which the accused ob-
jected and took exceptions.
But what has this presentation of evidence in behalf
of Charges which were thrown out, to do with the final
judgment of the Presbytery on Charges which were
tried? The Appeal is against a final judgment of the
Presbytery of New York acquitting Dr. Briggs of six
Charges which were tried. The final judgment has nothing
to do with the Charges which were thrown out and not
tried. Therefore even if the Presbytery did wrong in
throwing out these Charges and the evidence proffered
therefor, it is not claimed that the Presbytery declined
to hear competent evidence in proof of the Charges sub-
mitted for probation, and upon which the final judgment
was pronounced, and therefore the whole of the third
Ground of appeal must be stricken out as altogether ir-
relevant to the final judgment upon the six Charges from
which the appeal was taken.
15G ARGUMENT AGAINST SUSTAINING THE APPEAL
It is also claimed by the appellants that the Presby-
tery manifested prejudice in the conduct of the case (IV.
2) when it gave its opinion that the two Charges were
new Charges and should be thrown out. This is the as-
sertion of the committee. But it is without proof.
Which was the more likely to be prejudiced, the com-
mittee in behalf of the Charges which it had prepared ;
or the Presbytery sitting as a court of Jesus Christ and
in conscience bound to determine whether the Charges
were new Charges or not ? The General Assembly should
not discredit the Presbytery of New York by imputing
prejudice to the Presbytery unless the General Assem-
bly is convinced of such prejudice by insuperable argu-
ments. None such have been presented. It is the pre-
sumption that the court was without prejudice.
2. T7'ansfer of Proofs.
The appellants object to irregularity in the proceed-
ings of the Presbytery of New York in " the transference
of the proofs cited by the Prosecuting Committee from
the Scriptures, the Confession of Faith and the Cate-
chisms, from the Specifications to the Charges." (I. 3.)
Listen to the Preliminar){ Objection of the accused :
" I object to the relevancy of all the proofs from Scripture,
Confession, and Catechisms. Let me clearly set before you what
kind of proof is necessary in order to convict me of heresy under
Presbyterian law. It is necessary for this court, if you would
make a just verdict in the feair of God, to put the charges and
specifications in definite forms of major and minor premises.
The major premise or charge must represent that certain teach-
ings are irreconcilably opposed to some essential doctrine of the
Westminster Standards and Holy Scripture. The minor premise
or specification must set forth some statement in my Inaugural
Address, interpreted in a sense to which I consent, which is in
conflict with said doctrine.
TRANSFER OF PROOFS I57
" Proof from Holy Scripture and the Westminster Confession
must be presented under the charges in order to prove that the
doctrines asserted in the charges as essential doctrines are really
essential doctrines. Under the specifications the prosecution
are shut up to proof from my Inaugural that I teach therein the
erroneous doctrines specified. An examination of the charges
and specifications shows that they do no such thing. The proofs
from Scripture and from Confession are all under the specifica-
tions when they should be under the charges. I therefore chal-
lenge the relevancy of all the proofs offered by the prosecution
from the Confession and from Holy Scripture. The attention of
the Presbytery is called to this fault. It may be corrected by a
simple transfer of these proofs from the specifications to the
charges if the Presbytery so desire." (The Case, Part II., p. 54.)
The Presbytery had no alternative than to take the
action which they took. But the prosecution paid less
attention to this action of the Presbytery than they did
to the action of the Presbytery in striking out two of
the Charges. As the defendant showed in his defence,
the prosecution pursued their own way and the Presby-
tery did not interfere with them. And now after they
have exercised themselves in this license and rebellion,
they make the action of the Presbytery a ground of ap-
peal. If it was a lawful ground of appeal — it did them
no harm, they have no grievance. They had their own
way. The only grievance in the matter was suffered by
the defendant, who, after the Presbytery had sustained
his objection, saw the Presbytery neglect to enforce its
decision against the prosecution. This conduct of the
prosecution reminds us of that greedy boy, who after his
father had told him not to eat his cake, thought he
might eat it and have it too.
3. Itemizing the Charges.
The prosecution represent that there was " irregular-
ity in the proceedings of the Presbytery," in that the
158 ARGUMENT AGAINST SUSTAINING THE APPEAL
Presbytery required that each item in Charges I,, II. y
III., V. and VI. should be voted upon separately. (I. 12.)
This was the preliminary objection of the defendant :
[See The Case against Prof. Briggs, Part II., pp. 59-
61, from which citation was made of all matter between
the sentences given below :
"Charges I. and II. agree in alleging conflict with the essen-
tial doctrine of the Holy Scripture and of the Standards that
Holy Scripture is most necessary and the rule of faith and prac-
tice." .... "The only thing that I insist upon, in the interest of
justice, is, that every offence alleged against me shall be acted
upon by a separate vote. Only in this way can you comply with
the law, that a vote on each charge shall be separately taken.
Only by this procedure can you reach a just verdict."]
If the Presbytery had not removed this preliminary
objection, it would have acted unfairly toward the ac-
cused. It is evident that the Charges were made to con-
vict the accused if it were at all possible to convict.
The only hope the prosecution had in the court of the
Presbytery — the only hope they can entertain before
fair-minded judges, is to gain conviction by a cumula-
tive vote. They are now trying to secure from you an
endorsement of their iniquity.
But consider for a moment what would be involved in
sustaining this specification of objection to the action of
the Presbytery of New York. The defendant waived
his objection to six of the Charges on the express condi-
tion that the Presbytery would take the action it did
take. This was distinctly understood by the Presby-
tery. Mr. McCook represented in his rejoinder that the
defendant had waived his objection to all the charges
but two and had expressed his willingness to go to trial
upon them. (p. 173.) But the defendant corrected this
statement as follows :
TRANSFER OF PROOFS 15<>
" It is not true altogether that I have waived objec-
tion to every charge but two. I have waived it under
certain conditions. If the Presbytery fulfil these con-
ditions I waive ; if they do not, I do not waive." (p. 191.)
Further on in the debate Dr. Briggs said :
" In the preparation of my demurrer I considered carefully the
Charges as a pure matter of ecclesiastical law, and I made up my
mind that I would waive every point I could in order to save the
time of the house and get to the merits of the case. You see
that I waive what I regard as substantial objections to five of the
charges. The objections that I make to these charges are : That
they violate the action of the General Assembly in their reversal of
your dismissal, and also the provision of the Book of Discipline
which requires that when amendments are made in charges the
general nature thereof shall not be changed. Now, I take ex-
ceptions— I have filed preliminary objections to all of these five
charges, as transcending the general nature thereof. I am will-
ing to v/aive that objection provided you recognize my other ob-
jection, and, in either of the ways that have been indicated, avoid
it. My other objection is, that the charges are insufficient in
form and legal effect. They are insufficient in form and legal
effect because they state more than one offense in the charge.
Section 16 of the Book says : 'A charge shall not allege more
than one offense.' I claim that these charges, each and all of
the five, allege more than one offense. I have argued it in my
demurrer which is in your possession. Now, it has been argued
by the prosecution that it does not make two charges to say that-
an offense is contrary to the Book of Discipline — that an offense
is contrary to the Standards of the Church, and also of the Holy
Scriptures. I never have contended that it was. It is the doc-
trine. It is the doctrine against which contradiction is charged
which makes the item. There are two doctrines stated here —
contradiction with two doctrines. That is what makes it two
offenses. An offense does not merely consist, as was well argued
by Dr. Brown the other day, an offense does not merely consist
in what is imputed to me. You may impute anything you please
to me. That is no offense, unless you can show something in
the Westminster Standards and in the Holy Scriptures with
160
ARGUMENT AGAINST SUSTAINING THE APPEAL
which that is in contradiction. An offense is contradiction with
something in the Standards, and that something has to be speci-
fied. Now, theie are two specifications here of contradiction,
and these two specifications of contradiction make two offenses ;
and I hold that it would be an injustice to me that by a cumula-
tion of votes you might convict me, whereas, if each one were
voted upon separately, I would be acquitted. There is the injus-
tice that is involved in trying two offenses under the same
charge, and that is the reason of the law of the Book of Disci-
pline that a charge shall set forth only one offense and the al-
leged offense.
" Now, Mr. Moderator, of course there may be room for a differ-
ence of opinion here, but I wish to be entirely frank with this
body. I have waived ; I have gone as far as I can conscien-
tiously go in waiving objections to the transcending of the gen-
eral nature thereof in order to get to trial, and, if you will con-
sent in any way you please, either by allowing the committee to
make two new charges out of these, or by taking a separate vote
upon them, to prevent any injustice in your verdict and to bring
about a definite decision, I am agreed. That is all that I ask. I
ask a decision which we can consent to, which is clear, definite,
and just. That is all. 1 waive it with that understanding, and I
consent to Dr. Alexander's resolution because it accomplishes
that. If there is any other way, I will consent to that. But let
it be understood that I cannot waive my objections as to trans-
cending the general nature thereof unless you consent to this
proposition. If you refuse it, I am obliged to contest the general
nature of each one of these charges, and if you> overcome me,
carry it by appeal to the higher courts. Now, do not force me
to this, brethren. Do not force me to this when I am yielding
all that I can in the interest of coming speedily to the result, and I
am willing to do anything that is just and reasonable in the matter.
" Dr. Booth : May I ask Dr. Briggs a question before he takes
his seat.' I have followed him with great interest and attention.
I would ask him if I am right in apprehending that his affirma-
tion in regard to there being two doctrines is, first, one doctrine
that the Holy Scripture is most necessary ?
" Dr. Briggs : Yes.
' Dr. Booth : And the second doctrine, that it is the rule of
faith and practice ?
TRANSFER OF PROOFS IgJ
" Dr. Briggs : Yes.
" Dr. Booth : I hope the brethren will notice that, because that
exolains — I seem to feel myself that his request is reasonable.
The only objection is that it would involve the preamble or the
statement of the charge over again, and I understand that he
would be content with the question being taken separately.
" Dr. Briggs : That is all I ask.
" Dr. Booth : I do not see how, under the circumstances, there
could be any objection to that. However, I am not the Prose-
cuting Committee."
The Presbytery then took the following action by a
great majority :
" Resoh't-ci, That in view of the conditional waiver made by the
defendant, the Presbytery, without passing upon his objections to
charges i, 2, 3, 5 and 6, rule that in taking the vote each of the
items in these charges, as indicated by numerals in the objec-
tions filed, shall be voted upon separately."
Dr. Lampe argued this afternoon that the offence is a
doctrine taught by Dr. Briggs. Clearly that is a mis-
take. The offence is that Dr. Briggs teaches something
that is in contravention of an essential and necessary ar-
ticle of Holy Scripture or of the standards of the Church.
And if it is asserted that his teaching conflicts with two
different doctrines of the standards, then two offences
are alleged, and these two offences must be alleged in
two different charges. That is my point.
It will be evident to the General Assembly that if in
any way the condition on which the waiver was made is
removed, that the waiver is removed also. And as the
Presbytery of New York did not pass upon the prelimi-
nary objections to five of the Amended Charges as in-
sufficient in form and legal effect, but went to trial simply
on the basis of the waiver, the whole question of in-
sufificiency of these five charges is raised before this As-
sembly by the prosecution challenging the agreement.
162 ARGUMENT AGAINST SUSTAINING THE APPEAL
Therefore the Assembly itself must either consent to the
action of the Presbytery on the matter, or itself pass up-
on the sufficiency of the five charges, before they can be
regarded as triable. This General Assembly will hardly
do the grave injustice of giving the prosecution all the
advantage of the waiver when they deny to the appellee
the advantage of the action of his Presbytery on which
the waiver was conditioned. The prosecution demand
the waiver and also a censure of the Presbytery of New
York for agreeing to the waiver with the condition at-
tached. If you sustain this specification, you declare the
agreement made between the Presbytery of New York
and the defendant an invalid agreement. If it be an in-
valid agreement, the General Assembly cannot take ad-
vantage of it. But the whole trial on the Charges and
the final verdict from which an appeal was taken, rest
upon this agreement. If you declare it invalid, you
make the whole trial invalid and your only honorable
course will be to send the case to the Presbytery of
New York for a new trial, with the instruction to pass
upon and determine the sufficiency of the Charges in
form and in legal effect.
We have considered all the objections of the appel-
lants to the action of the Presbytery of New York upon
the Preliminary Objections of the defendant. We have
seen that the action of the Presbytery was lawful and
just. We have seen that a reversal of the action of the
Presbytery in these regards would be to endorse the
discourteous and dishonorable practices of the prosecu-
tors ; and that the effect of such reversal could have no
other lawful issue than a new trial in the Presbytery
of New York.
UNSWORN EVIDENCE lg3
II. THE EVIDENCE.
The appellants make ten specifications of objection to
the Evidence submitted by the defendant under three
Grounds of Appeal. But they are really only two objec-
tions repeated five times under different heads.
The appellee has two Complaints to come before the
Synod of New York against the evidence offered by the
prosecution. You have decided to entertain their objec-
tions to his evidence when you cannot entertain his ob-
jections to their evidence.
I. Unsworn Evidence.
This is the history of the Evidence submitted by the
accused from his own writings. The defendant present-
ing his evidence said :
" Inasmuch as my preliminary objection to the presentation by
the prosecution of evidence by the wholesale, and my request for
the reading of their evidence, have been overruled by the Pres-
bytery, 1 submit to your decisions with the reservation of all
rights of appeal and complamt, and claim the same privilege for
the defendant which you have granted to the prosecution.
" I submit the following documentary evidence ' in so far as it
bears upon this case,' reading such portions as I desire to bring
before you at this time, and reserving the right to read such
other portions as I may desire to use in the several stages of the
defence." [See The Case, Part II., pp. 80-108.]
T am not going over all the details of these arguments.
The whole extent of it would take fully an hour. I am
going to skip all the references to it in the stenographer's
report and simply sum up upon it. I think that will
make it sufificiently clear.
In the conclusion of the argument before the Presby-
tery, Dr. Brown said :
' I now move that the documentary evidence offered by the
defendant be regarded by the Presbytery as competent evidence.
164 ARGUMENT AGAINST SUSTAINING THE APPEAL
" Mr. McCoOK : Before the question is taken, I wish to call at-
tention to the fact that the Prosecuting Committee would re-
quire to have an exception noted if that vote is taken in that
way to include the testimony which has not been verified.
" The Moderator : The exception relates to a portion of the
evidence taken from his own writings.
The question, then, is upon the motion made by Dr. Brown,
that the documentary evidence offered by the defendant be re-
garded as competent evidence. All in favor of that motion will
say aye ; opposed, no. Carried." (Stenographical Report, pp.
469-480.)
It is claimed by the appellants that there was Irregu-
larity in the proceedings of the Presbytery of New York
in accepting this unsworn evidence.
This is an invalid objection, because Dr. Briggs, acting
as the counsel for the defendant, read extracts from
printed documents which were sufficiently verified by
the submission of the documents themselves to the Pres-
bytery, which documents were not challenged by the
prosecution. The defendant was not a witness. He
gave no oral testimony and therefore was not required
to be sworn as a witness. There is no evidence to show
that the Presbytery accepted the statements and ex-
planations of the language used by the accused in any
other way than that in which such statements and ex-
planations were presented in printed books and minutes
of the Presbytery. The evidence presented by the pros-
ecution was purely documentary — the evidence presented
by the defence was purely documentary. There was no
place for being sworn as a witness on either side of this
case. To have sworn the defendant would have been an
irregularity without precedent. It is doubtful whether
there was more than a handful of the Presbytery who
did not sustain the Moderator in his decision. No one
UNSWORN EVIDENCE 1^5
ventured to test the sense of the court by an appeal from
his decision. This General Assembly could not sustain
this objection without establishing a new and injurious
precedent, namely, that when a defendant who by the
law of the Presbyterian Church acts as his own counsel,
undertakes as a counsel to submit in evidence printed
documents, he must take the oath that these documents
express his real opinions before they can be admitted in
evidence. The prosecution wish to push the defendant
to the bar as a criminal, and to deprive him of the priv-
ilege of counsel and of the rights of counsel.
Exactly the same specification appears as sustaining
the second ground of Appeal, namely, receiving im-
proper testimony. This is invalid for the reason that
documentary evidence is proper testimony and that it
is not a legal procedure to require the counsel of a de-
fendant to be sworn as to the truthfulness of the matter
contained in such printed documents of the defendant
as he may present as evidence in the case.
This specification appears in another form under the
same ground of appeal as specification third.
The Presbytery could not lawfully do otherwise than
it did. It could not refuse to admit documentary evi-
dence as lawful and competent. It had no right to re-
quire that the counsel who offered these documents
should be put under oath simply because the evidence
was taken from the writings of the accused.
These same specifications again do service as speci-
fications 5 and 6 to sustain the fifth ground of Appeal,
alleging that there was mistake or injustice in the de-
cision of the Presbytery. These are invalid because the
Presbytery was bound to consider the documentary evi-
dence offered by the defence, no less than the docu-
mentary evidence offered by the prosecution. The evi-
IQQ ARGUMENT AGAINST SUSTAINING THE APPEAL
dence by the prosecution is simply and alone docu-
mentary evidence. If it be necessary that documentary
evidence should be sworn to be valid, then the prosecu-
tion have no valid evidence. They ask you to receive
their unsworn documentary evidence as valid and to
reject the unsworn documentary evidence of the de-
fendant as invalid. Their documentary evidence con-
sists chiefly of the writings of the defendant. Are un-
sworn extracts from the writings of the defendant to be
accepted as valid evidence against him, and unsworn ex-
tracts from his writings to be rejected as invalid evi-
dence for him ?
Let the General Assembly take that position and you
have no valid evidence in the case as regards the opin-
ions of the defendant. He has not sworn to the extracts
from his writings given by the prosecution in their speci-
fications. He has admitted them, it is true, but not
under oath. Are his admissions of extracts from his
writings when not under oath to be regarded as valid ;
and his assertions of extracts from his writings when
not under oath to be regarded as invalid? Are his state-
ments to be accepted as valid when they seem to favor
the prosecution ; but to be rejected as invalid when
they seem to favor the defence? Such justice is one-
eyed and that one eye looks unflinchingly to one side.
Let the General Assembly take that position and the
appellee challenges your entire evidence. You must
throw the case out of court as destitute of evidence, or
send it back to the Presbytery with instructions requir-
ing that the evidence on both sides be sworn evidence.
Consider the situation that would arise if the defend-
ant should yield to the opinion of the prosecution and
give his consent to take the oath as regards the extracts
he presented in evidence from his writings ; then he
UNSWORN EVIDENCE lg7
would authenticate his own evidence, but the evidence
of the prosecution would remain unauthenticated. For
you cannot by any process of law compel the defendant
to take the oath to verify extracts from his writings
made by the prosecution. You cannot compel him to
incriminate himself or to assist the prosecution in the
evidence they proffer for the purpose of convicting him.
One word more before leaving this subject. The ex-
tracts from the writings of Dr. Briggs and from the
minutes of the Presbytery presented in the evidence by
the defense are not challenged by the prosecution as to
their reality or their truthfulness. Search their argu-
ments before the Presbytery and you will find that they
do not dispute them as forged or falsified or untruthful.
Indeed they themselves do not hesitate to use many of
the same extracts in argument. Mr. McCook simply
claimed that the oath should be administered in order
to make them valid in law. He raised a question of
legal validity, not a question of historical validity, or of
moral validity. Had the Presbytery of New York any
reason to doubt the truthfulness of these extracts? Has
this General Assembly any reason to doubt them?
Granted for argument's sake that Dr. Briggs made a
technical mistake in refusing to be sworn, and that the
Presbytery of New York made a mistake in law in de-
clining to pat him under oath ; such mistakes do not
disturb the equities of the case. For the Presbytery
could not equitably refuse to consider the evidence prof-
fered in these extracts and they ought to have made
their final judgment on the basis of the " affirmations of
loyalty made by the defendant to the Standards of the
Church, and to the Holy Scriptures as the only infallible
rule of faith and practice." They ought to have made
their final judgment in view of the explanations made
IQS ARGUMENT AGAINST SUSTAINING THE APPEAL
by the accused of the language used in his Inaugural
Address, and of his " frank and full disclaimer of the
interpretation which has been put upon some of its
phrases and illustrations." They would have done the
defendant a grave wrong if they had refused to consider
all these important parts of his evidence, simply because
they were unsworn. Could you overturn the verdict of
acquittal because of such a technicality as this?
Let us look at it in the concrete. If you should
throw out the copy of the Inaugural submitted by Dr.
Briggs, you still have before you the copy submitted by
the prosecution.
The prosecution in their evidence cite from the Inau-
gural the sentence :
" There are historically three great fountains of divine author-
ity— the Bible, the Church and the Reason." (p. 27.)
The defendant cited in his evidence the following ex-
tract from the same edition of the Inaugural put in evi-
dence by the prosecution :
" When it was said, * There are historically three great foun-
tains of divine authority — the Bible, the Church and the Reason *
— I did not say, and I did not give any one the right to infer
from anything whatever in the Inaugural Address or in any
of my writings, that I co-ordinated the Bible, the Church and
the Reason."' (pp. 85-86.)
The prosecution cite from the Inaugural the extract :
" There is no authority in the Scriptures, or in the creeds of
Christendom, for the doctrine of immediate sa.nctification at
death." (p. 54.)
And again from the appendixes :
" There is no authority in the Scriptures, or in the creeds of
Christendom, for the doctrine of immediate sanctification at
death. The only sanctification known to experience, to Christian
orthodoxy, and to the Bible, is progressive sanctification. Pro-
EVIDENCE NOT READ IQQ
gressive sanctification after death, is the doctrine of the Bible and
the Church ; and it is of vast importance in our times that we
should understand it and live in accordance with it."
The defendant quotes from the same appendix :
" The views that I have expressed with regard to sanctification
after death should be carefully distinguished from the Roman
Catholic doctrine of Purgatory on the one side and the Armin-
ian doctrine of Probation on the other side. Both of these I
rejecjt. I build on the Biblical doctrine of the Mi'ddle State and
the invariable statement of the New Testament that the second
advent of Jesus Christ is the goal of Sanctification. Rom. viii.
29-30; I Gor. i. 8; Eph. iv. 13-26; Phil. i. 6 ; i Thess. iii. 13.
v. 23 ; 2 Peter iii. 13-14; John iii. 2-3. There is not a passage
in the Bible that teaches either directly or indirectly immediate
sanctification at death." (p. 86.)
Ought the Presbytery to have accepted the unsworn
extracts from the Inaugural male by the prosecutors as
vahd, and to have rejected the unsworn extracts from the
same Inaugural made by the defence as invahd? Who
could think for a moment of such a thing?
2. THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED BUT NOT READ.
Five specifications of error are given by the appellants
under two grounds of appeal. But there is really only
a single act of the Presbytery which is objected to,
namely, the acceptance by the Presbytery of evidence
which was presented but not read. I shall omit the
long argument in the Presbytery on this head, and con-
tent myself simply by asking Dr. Brown to read the
answer to the protest of Elder Ketchum and others
made by the Presbytery of New York.
Dr. Brown read as follows :
" The Presbytery desires to record the following answer, in
accordance with Section 106 of the Book of Discipline, to the
protest signed by A. P. Ketchum, W, G. T. Shedd, George L.
170 ARGUMENT AGAINST SUSTAINING THE APPEAL
Shearer and others, against action of this Judicatory relating to
the record of evidence in the case of the Rev. Charles A. Briggs,
D.D. :
" I. The Presbytery calls attention to the fact that, although
the protest is declared to be made against ' injurious and erro-
neous acts and proceedings,' it cites but one act against which
protest is lawful. Section 104 of the Book of Discipline gives
to members of a minority the right to protest. A minority ex-
ists only when some question has been decided by a majority
vote. The only such action related in the protest is the vote of
the Presbytery to strike out the record of a request made by
the Prosecution. Against this action only, among the pro-
ceedings set forth in the protest, is the protest lawful. But it
is noteworthy that, of the four reasons assigned by the protest-
ants, not one relates to the question whether the Presbytery
erred in striking out the record of this request. The reasons,
therefore, do not sustain the protest, and it might be enough to
record this fact as a sufficient legal answer to the protest. But
inasmuch as the protest calls in question certain other proceed-
ings, on alleged grounds of justice and order, the Presbytery
deems it wise and proper, notwithstanding this technical defect,
to cover in its answer all the matters embraced in the protest.
" II. The Presbytery finds the relation of facts in the protest
to be incomplete, inaccurate and misleading in several particu-
lars, and desires to supplement and correct it, as follows :
" (a) The matter now appearing on pp. 448-468 of the sten-
ographer's official notes, and on the printed sheets inserted at
p. 468 of the said notes, and referred to in the protest, was all
brought to the notice of the Presbjrtery, was placed in the hands
of each member of the Presbytery and of the Prosecution in
printed form, was offered by the defendant as evidence, and was
sufficiently described and identified by him.
" (i) The defendant was prepared and ready to read the evi-
dence if the Presbytery had so desired, and omitted the reading
of it solely to save the time of the Presbytery, already severely
taxed.
" (f) In this the defendant evidently acted in good faith, and
with the simple desire to meet the convenience of the Presby-
tery, and the Presbytery so understood and acquiesced without
a word of dissent.
EVIDENCE NOT READ 171
" (d) After the defendant had offered all his evidence, in-
cluding the evidence which has been made the occasion of pro-
test, the Presbytery voted 'that the documentary evidence which
has been offered by the defendant be considered competent '
(Minutes of Presbytery, Dec. 5, 1892, p. 384).
" (e) The contents of the pages indicated, in the stenogra-
pher's report, are therefore not ' new matter which purports to be
evidence,' as the protest terms them, nor were they introduced
after the time for the lawful introduction of evidence was past,
but they are a part of the evidence introduced by the defendant
lawfully and at the proper time.
" (/) Assuming it to be true that the matter on pp. 448-468 of
the stenographer's report was there recorded by the authority of
the Moderator, it is evident that the authority of the Modera-
tor, in this, gave effect to the will of the Presbytery indicated by
its acquiescence and consent aforesaid.
" (^^) In addition to his general powers as representative of
the Presbytery, the Moderator had the special power vested in
him as Chairman and representative of the Committee appointed
November 28, 1892, 'to supervise the official stenographer's re-
ports of the proceedings ' (Minutes of November 28, 1892, p. 347).
" (^) There is no evidence, in the stenographer's notes or else-
where, that the contents of pp. 448-468 of said notes, or any
part of them, were ' inserted ' in any other sense than would
properly apply to all the stenographer's materials, including his
shorthand notes and such written or printed documents as are
placed in his hands, which are put into the typewritten form ' in
the interval between two sessions of the Judicatory.'
" (/) The fifteen sheets of printed matter referred to in the
protest were introduced by the direction of the Moderator in
open Presbytery, and with the full accord of Presbytery ; the
Moderator making his decision distinctly, stating it repeatedly,
and calling attention to the fact that his decision was subject
to an appeal to the house, if any one should appeal ; and neither
the prosecution, nor any one of the protestants, nor any other
member of the Judicatory, made a motion or showed a desire to
lake such an appeal (Minutes of December 6, 1892, pp. 389, 390;
Stenographer's Report, pp. 577, 578).
" (J) The Presbytery had previously decided that evidence need
not be read to the Pre.sbytery in order to be competent evi-
172 ARGUMENT AGAINST SUSTAINING THE APPEAL
dence (Minutes November 30, 1892, pp. 362, 370; Stenographer's
Report, pp. 297, 314, 364), and the action concerning the evidence
now under consideration accorded with that decision.
" (A) The Presbytery calls attention to the statement of the
protest that 'a motion having been duly made and seconded,
that the Judicatory should comply with the request of the Pros-
ecuting Committee and strike out all such matter from, the sten-
ographic report, said motion was declared by the Moderator to
be out of order, and was not put to the house,' as an erroneous
statement, in that, as appears from the stenographer's notes, no
such motion was made. The only motion offered in behalf of the
prosecution in this matter was the motion to have their request
entered on the Minutes; an amendment was offered to the effect
that their request be excluded from the Minutes, and the motion
passed in this amended form (Stenographer's Report, pp. 582-
591, 662-681, 684-696, especially pages 664, 661, and 672).
'III. The reasons assigned for this protest are, as already in-
dicated, totally irrelevant, since they have no connection with
the only part of the proceedings referred to against which pro-
test is lawful, viz., the decision of Presbytery to exclude from
the record a request made by the prosecution. But they embody
criticisms of action taken by the Moderator and the Presbyter}',
which the Presbytery is unwilling to pass by without notice.
'* {a) The first ' reason ' is in the judgment of the Presbytery
an invalid criticism, because, while the stenographer's report of
proceedings should be an exact record, that report may and
properly should include whatever is received and taken as read
or spoken, and so given the effect of read or spoken words. The
evidence under consideration was, to save valuable time, offered
without reading, and taken as read.
" (^) The second ' reason ' is in the judgment of the Presby-
tery an invalid criticism, because no ' new matter ' was intro-
duced into the stenographer's notes, because the matter referred
to had been brought before the Presbytery, and was properly in-
troduced, and because said matter is actually evidence in the
case admitted by the Presbytery as competent. The Presbytery
is therefore unable to see how there can be therein anything
' misleading, erroneous and irregular,' or anything ' that may
greatly hamper, embarrass, and possibly vitiate the entire judi-
cial proceedings.'
EVIDENCE NOT READ 173
" {c) The third ' reason ' is in the judgment of the Presbytery
an invalid criticism, because ' the accuracy and integrity of the
official stenographic report of the proceedings ' were in fact
secured by the incorporation of the said matter in the said report,
and would not have been secured otherwise.
"(</) The fourth 'reason' is in the judgment of the Presby-
tery an invalid criticism, because the Presbytery is unable to see
how 'the entire record of this important judicial case may be
rendered invalid and ineffectual ' by the action criticised, unless
the incorporation in the record of all the evidence which the
Judicatory has admitted as competent, instead of the admission
of a part and the exclusion of a part, should have the effect of
making the record ' invalid and ineffectual,' which seems absurd.
"IV. Although a protest, with relevant reasons, against the
action of the Presbytery in excluding the record of the request
of the prosecution from the Minutes of Presbytery, would be
technically in order, it seems surprising that any one should sup-
pose the record of the request to be adm.issible.
" {a) No action on the request was taken, or even proposed,
and the Minutes do not include a record of action not taken.
" {b) The request was to the effect that the said twenty pages
of the stenographer's notes and the said fifteen additional printed
sheets should be stricken from the official stenographic record,
'and that the accused should not be permitted to refer or to use
the contents of said twenty pages of stenographer's notes, or of
the said fifteen additional printed sheets, or any of the extracts,
documents or books in either of them contained, recited or
referred to, as evidence upon the trial, or in any manner what-
ever before this Judicatory '--notwithstanding the facts that the
Presbytery had by vote declared this with the other evidence
offered by the defendant to be competent evidence, and that it
was actually a part of the lawful evidence presented by the de-
fendant, and that the Moderator had explicitly so. recognized it,
and secured its embodiment in the official stenographic record,
as aforesaid, and that no appeal had been taken from the decision
of the Moderator that it should be embodied therein, and that
for these reasons the prosecution had no right to make the
request, and that the Moderator had ruled that the request was
not in order ; and matters declared not in order have no place
in the official record of proceedings.
174 ARGUMENT AGAINST SUSTAINING THE APPEAL
" (t) The attempt to secure the record of the said request
under the guise of the record of an exception, — which exception
the prosecution were entitled, if they thought best, to take to
any part of the proceedings that they disapproved, — was improper
and out of order.
"V. Inasmuch as (a) the failure to include in the official sten-
ographer's report a part of the evidence which had been offered
by the defendant, taken as read by the acquiescence and consent
of the Judicatory, and by vote accepted as competent, would
have been an irregular act, and one of singular injustice to the
defendant ; and
" (d) The inclusion of the said evidence in the said report in-
volved no wrong, hardship or injustice to the prosecution, and
the prosecution had therefore no just ground for desiring that it
be not there included, or for seeking to deprive the defendant of
his right to use it for the purposes of his defence before the
Judicatory, and
" {c) The action and the decisions of the Moderator in reference
to this matter and the acquiescence of the Presbytery therein
appear to have been equitable and right, and
" (</) The exclusion of the request of the prosecution from the
Minutes, by vote of the Presbytery, was in accordance with prec-
edent and the requirements of the case.
"Therefore, in view of all the foregoing considerations, the
Presbytery is unable to see any justification for the protest, or
any proper ground for the criticisms contained therein." (Sten-
ographical Report, pp. 1102 seg.)
This answer of the Presbytery to the Protest is a
sufficient answer to the specifications of the Prosecution.
It is now necessary for me to call the attention of the
General Assembly to an interesting incident showing
that the Prosecution were hoisted by their own petard,
and that their argument through Dr. Lampe would have
been in a very sad condition if it had not been for the
considerateness of the Presbytery and of the defendant.
This is the episode :
" Dr. Briggs . And now, Mr. Moderator, I wish to make a
request of the Presbytery, namely, that they shall direct Dr.
EVIDENCE NOT READ 175
Lampe to specify what portions of the printed argument put in
our hands have not been read on this floor. I make this request
— not to exclude any part of his argument from consideration ;
if they wish to have it incorporated in the stenographic report,
1 for one shall make no objection — but it is necessary for me
to know what I am to except to ; and there are matters contained
in this printed argument which were not read before us and
which I want to except to and which I cannot except to unless
they are recognized as before the court. Therefore, I request
that Dr. Lampe shall specify what portions of his printed argu-
ment have not been presented to the court.
"The Moderator: I think that it is a proper request to
make.
" Dr. Robinson : Dr. Lampe has not got through yet, has he ?
"The Moderator : No, sir; but he can do that.
" Dr. Lampe : As to that I will state this. I felt yesterday
afternoon under intense pressure. I wanted to get through, and
I saw that you wanted me to get through, and I came near mak-
ing myself sick, and sometimes when I got to a paragraph and
saw what it was, I simply gave a paragraph in a sentence. Now
I cannot tell every paragraph that I treated in that way. I simply
did it out of an intense desire to relieve the house and to relieve
myself.
" Now, I will go over the paper and see if I can find those
things, but that was my simple aim. I wanted to accommodate
the house and get through, and in every instance where I did
that I think I gave the true sense of the paragraph. However,
if you wish me to go over the Minutes and mark out what I pos-
sibly may have left out, I will do so.
"The Moderator : I will ask if the stenographer took down
your address as you gave it, or whether he followed your printed
manuscript, because there is a variation between the stenog-
rapher's notes and the printed argument of Dr. Briggs ; he hav-
ing spoken more than is contained in his printed argument, and
in this case there is less spoken than will appear in print.
[The stenographer stated that he followed the printed argu-
ment of Dr. Lampe, leaving out such portions as Dr. Lampe in-
dicated by pencil memoranda were not read. ]
" Dr. Briggs : May I state that while I was delivering my argu-
ment I furnished the stenographer a copy of it to follow me, and
176 ARGUMENT AGAINST SUSTAINING THE APPEAL
I delivered some matter orally that I could not have time to
have printed. Therefore, the written argument does not em-
brace everything thai I said. But it is all in the stenographer's
report, and so soon as I can get a moment's leisure I mean to
strike off a page to add to the printed report. But what I am
calling attention to now is something different. It is something
delivered to you in print which was not spoken orally. I desire
to make no difficulty for the prosecution about it. I wish to
have it in some legal form so that I may except to it.
"The Moderator: Would not this relieve the difficulty : If
Dr. Lampe be allowed to incorporate the printed form in the
stenographer's notes, just as matter submitted by you has been
incorporated ?
"Dr. Briggs: Yes, if the house will take the same action in
his case as it took in my case. I think the house should take
the action, however.
"The Moderator: The question, then, is for the house to de-
cide, namely, that Dr. Lampe have power to incorporate in the
stenographer's minutes the argument in printed form as pre-
sented, including the portions omitted in reading. Carried."
(Stenographer's Report, pp. 1302 st;^.)
If the evidence of the defendant is to be excluded, the
argument of Dr. Lampe must in common fairness be ex-
cUided also. Then the greater part of the case of the
prosecution vi^ould be destroyed. The prosecution un-
consciously fell into the pit their own hands did dig.
" The monitory touch o' the tether — felt
By few, not marked by many, named by none
At the moment, only recognized aright
r the fulness of ihe days, for God's, lest sin
Exceed the service, leap the line."
Consider the equities of the case. Dr. Briggs pre-
sented as a part of his evidence extracts from twenty-
three representative scholars. Origen, Jerome, and Au-
gustine among the Fathers ; Luther and Calvin among
the Reformers; Baxter and Rutherford as representa-
EVIDENCE NOT READ 177
tive Puritans and Presbyterians of the seventeenth cen-
tury ; Van Oosterzee of the Reformed Church of Hol-
land ; Sanday, Plummer, Huntington, and Gore of the
Episcopal Church ; Bruce, Iverach, Charteris, Dods,
and Vincent of the Presbyterian Church ; Beet of the
Wesleyans; Fisher, Cave, Thayer, and Fairchild of the
Congregational Churches ; Apple of the German Re-
formed Church — all testifying that there are errors in
Holy Scripture. If these extracts are valid evidence,
they are invincible evidence in favor of the defendant
and against the prosecution. Hence the anxiety of the
prosecution to rule them out and of the defendant that
they should be considered. Why should the prosecu-
tion be so anxious to deprive the accused of his evidence ?
If he made a mistake in not reading these extracts and
the Presbytery made a formal and technical mistake in
their action in recording this evidence in the Stenograph-
ical Report, is it equitable that the defendant should be
deprived of his evidence on that account? His motive
for not reading was a good motive, to save the time of
the body. No injury was done to any party. The evi-
dence was in the hands of the prosecution and of every
member of the court, in printed form.
The defendant presented to the Presbytery the names
and the writings of 124 scholars now living and of 23
scholars who, though among the departed, have yet
taught during the 25 years since 1866 when the defend-
ant began his studies of Biblical Criticism in the Univer-
sity of Berlin ; all of whom hold to the views of the au-
thorship of the Pentateuch and of Isaiah held by the de-
fendant, and charged against him as heresy. These are
invincible arguments in favor of the defendant and
against the prosecution.
The attempt made by Dr. Lampe this afternoon to
378 AUGUMENT AGAINST SUSTAINING THE APPEAL
traduce these 124 honored scholars by calHng them ra-
tionalists and unbelievers was exceedingly unfair and
improper. It does not represent the truth of the case.
Come of them are rationalists ; some of them are as
evangelical and orthodox as he is. Why should the de-
fendant be deprived of such important evidence, even if
he and his presbytery committed technical mistakes in
connection with its presentation ?
It is evident that if the prosecution have their way, if
you recognize their specifications of error as valid, you
will rule out all the evidence proffered by the defendant
and will have to decide the case on the basis of the evi-
dence offered by the prosecution, and that evidence
alone. If you desire to condemn the defendant at any
cost to truth and right, this might be the easiest way in
which you can do it. But even if you could justify such
a procedure on technical and purely legal grounds, how
could you escape the imputation of injustice from an
outraged community who would point to all the evi-
dence of the defendant which you excused yourselves
from considering because of merely technical mistakes
committed by the Presbytery of New York?
You cannot refuse his unsworn extracts and accept
theirs. You cannot rule out so much of his evidence as
was not read and admit their wholesale evidence which
was not read. But even if you could take such an un-
just position, the case against Dr. Briggs would rest
simply and alone upon the extracts from the Inaugural
given as the specification of the Charges. The defend-
ant disclaims the interpretations put upon these extracts
by the prosecution. He denies that they present any'
evidence of the truthfulness of the Charges. *You cannot
convict himbyan interpretation of these extracts which the
defendant repudiates as illegitimate, illogical, and untrue.
THE LOGIC OF THE CASE I79
III. THE ARGUMENT.
Seven Specifications under three Grounds of Appeal
have to do with the argument of the defendant and the
action of the Presbytery with reference to the argument
of the prosecution. There are three alleged errors. We
shall review them in their historical order.
I. The Logic of the Case.
It is alleged that there was mistake or injustice in the
decision of the Presbytery of New York, in the logic of
the case, as set forth under Ground 5, specifications 1st
and 2d. The appellants represent that the case was
such a simple one, so clear and definite and indubitable
in its logic that there was no room for a difference of
opinion in the Presbytery as to the verdict, and that if
there had been no prejudice the judgment would have
been : " guilty as charged."
As the prosecution state the logic of the case it was
very simple. The Presbytery decided that " if the ac-
cused had taught the doctrine with which he was charged,
he was guilty of an offence." The accused admitted the
facts as set forth in the specifications ; therefore the
Presbytery should have judged him guilty. That is their
argument.
Logic is of essential importance in this case and in all
cases. Logic is necessary to all right thinking, to all
sound doctrine, to all equitable law and to all good prac-
tice. But logic, like all true and good things, has many
counterfeits and shams. A little experience in this world
teaches us all that, none are so illogical as those who
boast of their logic. If you would find an illogical man
you will find him in one who constructs a syllogism and
points you to the conclusion that you must make or be
ISO ARGUMENT AGAINST SUSTAINING THE APPEAL
regarded as illogical and prejudiced. True logic needs
no defence, no advocate. It is as clear and bright and con-
vincing as the beams of sunlight. The logic of the ap-
pellants is at fault just exactly where the faults always
appear with these logicians, namely, in their premises.
Like other pretended logicians they are so infatuated
with the certainty of their conclusions that they have
neglected to verify their premises.
(i). It is said in their minor premise that the defendant
admitted the facts as set forth in the several specifications.
This premise is a false premise. The defendant did not
admit the facts. What are facts according to law? The
Book of Discipline prescribes :
" The Charge shall set forth the alleged offence ; and
the specifications shall set forth the facts relied upon to
sustain the Charge." (15.)
The law requires that the specifications shall set forth
the facts. It is argued by the prosecution that inas-
much as the defendant admits the extracts contained in
the specifications ; therefore he admits the facts. This
is their logic, but it is leap logic. These prosecutors are
skilful jumpers. True, the law requires that the specifi-
cations shall set forth the facts ; but do they set forth
the facts? Here is another assumed premise. If it be
true that the defendant admits the extracts, are the ex-
tracts facts, or does he admit that they prove the facts ?
Here again these marvellous logicians take for granted
their premises. None of them is true.
It is easy to show that the specifications do not con-
tain the facts relied upon to sustain the Charge and the
appellee did not admit the facts. The appellee admits
that the proper course under ordinary circumstances
would have been for him to show that the specifications
did not contain the facts, when he made his Preliminary
THE LOGIC OF THE CASE 1S|
Objections. The reason he did not take this course was
that he yielded to the desire to get at the merits of the
case as soon as possible and therefore made no more
legal objections than were necessary to guard his inter-
ests at the start and because he saw that without imperil-
ling his rights he might make this additional objection in
his defence. There is no statute law and there is no
common law in the Presbyterian Church which compels
a defendant to make all his legal objections to Charges
and Specifications prior to trial. The course which the
defendant pursued was not in his own interest, but in the
interest of the Presbytery of New York. But in the
course of his argument in Defence, the defendant called
attention to the specifications as not containing the facts
required in the law of specification. The Presbytery
permitted him so to do. The Prosecution took no ex-
ception to this procedure. Therefore it must be regard-
ed as valid. All this is plain from the following extract
from the Defence :
" (2) The doctrines attributed to me are as follows :
" (A) ' The Reason is a fountain of divine authority, which
may and does savingly enlighten men, even such men as reject
the Scriptures as the authoritative proclamation of the will of
God and reject also the way of salvation through the mediation
and sacrifice of the Son of God as revealed therein.'
" {B) ' The Church is a fountain of divine authority which,
apart from the Holy Scripture, may and does savingly enlighten
men.'
" {a) The prosecution are obliged to prove these doctrines in
their specifications, by extracts from the Inaugural. There are
two specifications under each charge. These specifications con-
sist of four groups of extracts from the Inaugural. These ex-
tracts are properly proofs of some fact that the prosecution
should state. But what do they propose to prove ? They do
not tell us in their specifications. If the extracts are statements
of fact such as the law of specification requires, where are the
152 ARGUMENT AGAINST SUSTAINING THE APPEAL
proofs of the fact ? If they are proofs, where are the statements
of fact ?
" {l>) But suppose we take them as both facts and proofs of
fact, inasmuch as they are extracts from the Inaugural. We are
then obliged to consider the question of their relevancy to the
charge. I am obliged to admit these extracts, and you are
obliged to vote that the specifications are true so far as the ex-
tracts are concerned. But what is it that they prove ? How are
you to bring them under the charge .'' Consider the effect of
these extracts upon the several members of the court. I take it
that my statement that ' Martineau could not find divine authority
in the Church or the Bible, but did find God enthroned in his
own soul,' is objectionable to many of you. You may think me
guilty of error or of indiscretion in making such a statement.
You might desire to condemn me on that account. Would you
then be justified in voting to sustain the charge for that reason }
On consideration you will see that there are several links in a
chain of argument before you can attach this statement about
Martineau to the doctrine attributed to me. You ought to test
all the links of this chain before you can honorably condemn
me as guilty of the charge. This testing ought to be made
under the specification. The only way to accomplish this under
present circumstances is to insert in these specifications the doc-
trine attributed to me in the charge." (The D'fence, pp. 29-30.)
" Only by thus inserting the statement of fact can you vote in-
telligently upon this specification. This is the form in which I
shall bring the question before you.
" (c) We have simply to determine whether the doctrines
attributed to me are sustained by the extracts given from the
Inaugural. I admit the statements that 'the Reason is a foun-
tain of divine authority," and 'the Church is a fountain of
divine authority.' But I deny all the rest of the doctrines attrib-
uted to me in the form and in the language in which the prose-
cution state them in these two charges. They do not prove and
they cannot prove from the Inaugural that I teach that men who
reject the Scriptures and the salvation through Jesus Christ are
savingly enlightened by the Reason or by the Church. There
are no express statements to that effect in the Inaugural. There
are no statements which by logical deduction involve such conclu-
THE LOGIC OF THE CASE 183
sions. You cannot hold me responsible for any inferences made
from my statements by the prosecution or by yourselves, whether
such inferences appear valid to you or not. There are several
invalid assumptions which the prosecution are forced to make
before they can convince you even by indirection of the validity
of such inferences.
" (3) I shall waste no time in an attempt to expound the doc-
trines which have been invented by the prosecution and wrongly
attributed to me, but I shall proceed to the main question in
ban ." ( The Defence, pp. 30-31. )
It thus appears that the defendant challenged the
specifications. He called attention to the specifications as
merely giving extracts from the Inaugural and not stat-
ing what the facts were which these extracts were cited
to prove. The appellee calls your attention to an ex-
tract from the standard authority in Presbyterian law,
the same extract given in my demurrer in 1891 :
" A Libel is a Law Syllogism, consisting of the Proposition or
Relevancy, which is founded upon the Laws of God, or some
Ecclesiastical Constitution agreeable thereto, as, whosoever is
absent from publick Divine Service on the Lord's Day, ought to
be censured. The Second Part consists of the subsumption or
probation, which condescends on matter of Fact, viz., But such
a person did, upon such or such a Lord's Day, absent unneces-
sarily from the publick Worship of God. The Third Part con-
sists of the Conclusion or Sentence, which contains a Desire,
that the Profaner of the Lord's Day, according to the Laws and
Customs mentioned in the first part, may be Censured."
This is from Walter Stewart's Collections, — the
same authority referred to the other day by your Stated
Clerk as Pardovan.
The specifications ought to have contained the minor
premises of the Charges — for only in that way could the
specifications be relevant to the Charges. The defend-
ant admitted the extracts. But inasmuch as there was
no mention of fact, which these extracts were presented
184 ARGUMENT AGAINST SUSTAINING THE APPEAL
to prove, he did not admit the facts by admitting the
extracts. The court will observe that the defendant
took no advantage of the prosecution in this respect.
He showed them how the specifications might be con-
structed and proceeded to his defence against them just
as if they had been thus reconstructed and were already
in the right form before the Presbytery. If now we put
the minor premise of the Charge in these specifications,
let us see exactly what the defendant admitted and
what he did not admit. The defendant admitted that
he taught :
(i). Errors may have existed in the original text of
the Holy Scriptures.
(2). Moses is not the author of the Pentateuch.
(3). Isaiah is not the author of half the book that
bears his name.
{4). Sanctification is not completed at death.
These four things the defendant admits as his teach-
ing.
But the defendant expressly denies that he taught :
" (A) ' The Reason is a fountain of divine authority, which may
and does savingly enlighten men, even such men as reject the
Scriptures as the authoritative proclamation of the will of God
and reject also the way of salvation through the rnediation and
sacrifice of the Son of God as revealed therein.'
" (B) ' The Church is a fountain of divine authority which,
apart from the Holy Scripture, may and does savingly enlighten
men.' "
Therefore the statement that the defendant admitted
the facts when he admitted the extracts in the specifica-
tions is untrue. He admitted what ought to have been
given as the minor premises of four of the Charges, and
he denied what ought to have been given as the minor
premises of two of the Charges. But none of these
minor premises were in the specifications.
THE LOGIC OF THE CASE 185
(2). Let tis 7101V coftsider the major premises of the
Charges :
They should state what the heresy is, namely, contra-
vention of certain essential and necessary articles of the
Westminster Confession and of Holy Scripture, which
strike at the vitals of religion. Do the major premises
state such heresies ? It is not sufficient for the prose-
cution to say so. They must prove their majors as well
as their minors.
Dr. Lampe argued this afternoon that anything con-
trary to Holy Scripture is an ofTense, even though it be
not contained in the Westminster Standards, and that
anything contrary to the standards is an offense
even if it be not stated in the Holy Scripture.
What an absurd position ! There is not a man in this
Assembly that might not be prosecuted for heresy by
some ambitious prosecutor on such an extensive ground
as this ; exposed to prosecution because some ambitious
prosecuting committee do not agree with him as to the
interpretation of some passage of Holy Scripture or the
standards of the Church.
I have stated that it is necessary to prove, in prose-
cutions, that the doctrine is contrary to an essential and
necessary article of the Westminster Confession and
Holy Scripture, — of them both. Neither one is lawful
alone. That is the only safe position which any one can
occupy or which the Church can occupy.
A Presbytery does not endorse the major premise of
a charge when it resolves that the proceedings be found
in order and that the charges and specifications be con-
sidered sufficient. This is the error of the prosecution.
The sufficiency is simply according to the book, section
22, to put the accused on his defence, and that is all.
Indeed, the chief argument throughout the defence was
186 ARGUMENT AGAINST SUSTAINING THE APPEAL
to show that these major premises were not valid. The
Presbytery Hstened to his arguments. They were not
excepted to by the prosecution. Therefore this pro-
cedure is now unassailable.
Consider the position in which the prosecution had
placed themselves by their invalid charges and specifica-
tions. They put all the proofs from Scripture and
Confession under the specifications when they ought to
have put them under the charges. The Presbytery
directed them to make the transfer, not in the interest of
the defendant, but in the interest of orderly procedure.
The prosecution appeal to you to reverse this transfer.
It is not in the interest of the appellee that you should
refuse them ; for if the proofs from Scripture and Con-
fession belong under the specifications, then the facts
which these citations should prove belong under the
specifications likewise. Then the major premises of the
Charges belong to the facts relied upon to sustain the
Charge. If that be so, then these facts were certainly
not admitted by the defendent. Grant them their claim
as to the proofs and they forge the weapon for the de-
struction of their other claims as to the admission of
the defendant and you would be obliged to recognize
that the defendant admitted none of the specifications.
If, however, the proofs from Scripture and Confession
belong under the Charge, then it is necessary that these
proofs should be used to sustain the major premises of
the Charge, or else these premises are destitute of proof.
It was an essential part of the argument to so use them.
There can be no valid premises and therefore no valid
conclusion without them. In either case the logic of
the prosecution is leap logic.
Let us now bring before us what was the exact situa-
tion with regard to these major premises of the Charges.
TUE LOGIC OF THE CASE 187
The prosecution allege conflict with seven essential doc-
trines of the Westminster Standards and of Holy Scrip-
ture.
A. The defendant admitted these as essential doc-
trines :
(i). Holy Scripture is most necessary.
(2). Holy Scripture is the rule of faith and practice.
(3). Holy Scripture is the word of God written.
(4). Holy Scripture is immediately inspired.
He also claimed that he himself held to these doc-
trines and in no way contravened them by his teaching.
B. The defendant admitted that these are doctrines
of the Confession :
(i). Holy Scripture evidences itself to be the word of
God by the consent of all the parts.
(2). The infallible rule of interpretation of Scripture
is the Scripture itself.
He also claimed to adhere to these doctrines although
he denied that they were essential doctrines.
C. The defendant denied that it was an essential doc-
trine or that it was any doctrine of the Westminster
Confession or Holy Scripture : " That the souls of be-
lievers are at their death at once made perfect in holi-
ness." He admitted the phrase "at their death made
perfect in holiness," but he denied the phrase ''at once,''
which the prosecution arbitrarily inserted in the West-
minster definition in order to point their interpretation
of it.
It will thus be plain to the General Assembly that the
defendant claimed that he himself holds to all of these
doctrines of the Westminster Confession except the
doctrine contained in the words " at once " which the
prosecution added to the confessional statement. He
also admitted that four of them were essential doctrines.
188 ARGUMENT AGAINST SUSTAINING THE APPEAL
(3). It is claimed by the prosecution that the Presby-
tery, when it resolved that the Charges were sufficient,
determined the relevmicy of the major and minor pre-
mises. It determined the relevancy so far as " to put
the accused on his defence," but it did not determine
the relevancy so far as to close the question to argu-
ment. Possibly this question of relevancy might better
have been raised in the Preliminary Objections, I think
so myself. I thought so before the argument was made.
If the defendant had taken this course, the trial would
probably never have taken place, or if it had taken place
it would have been prolonged because of the necessity
of going over the whole ground of the case twice, first
under the question of relevancy, second under the de-
fence. The defendant was not shut up to such pro-
cedure. He deliberately preferred the course which he
pursued, not in his own interest, but to meet the desire
of the Church to get at the merits of the case as soon
as possible. He was within his rights in that procedure.
He did not discuss the relevancy of the premises under
his Preliminary Objections. But he did discuss it in
his Defence. His arguments under this head were not
questioned by the Presbytery— they were not questioned
by the prosecutors. No exception was taken to them.
They must be regarded as valid and receive the atten-
tion and consideration that is their due from the Gen-
eral Assembly.
These were the arguments of the defendant under
this head of relevancy :
" The charges have three parts : (i) the doctrines stated as the
essential doctrine of the Holy Scriptures and the Standards of the
Presbyterian Church in the United States of America ; (2) the
doctrines attributed to me ; and (3) the charge that the doctrines
attributed to me ' are contrary to the said essential doctrines.'
" Let us test these three parts in their order.
THE LOGIC OF THE CASE 189
" (i). The essential doctrine of our standards is said to be
' that the Holy Scripture is most necessary, and the rule of faith
and practice.'
" It is plain that two doctrines are here stated. The two doc-
trines are (i) ' that the Holy Scripture is most necessary,' and
(2) ' the rule of faith and practice.' These two doctrines might
have been embraced under a more general statement of doctrine
if the prosecution had chosen to do so. But in fact they state
them as two different doctrines. You have decided to try them
together, but to vote on each charge separately.
" I admit that the doctrine, ' that Holy Scripture is the rule of
faith and practice,' is an essential doctrme of our Standards and
of Holy Scripture. There is no evidence required to prove that
proposition in the Charge. I admit that the doctrine that ' Holy
Scripture is most necessary' is a doctrine of the Westminster
Confession. I am not prepared to admit that the statement of
that doctrine in the Westminster Confession is essential in the
form of its expression. But whether it be essential or not, is
immaterial. I do not care to argue that question, for the reason
that I firmly believe that ' Holy Scripture is most necessary ' in
that exposition of the phrase which the context and the lan-
guage demand. I subscribe to both of these doctrines entirely,
sincerely, and without any reservation whatever. But it is evi-
dent that there is a difference of interpretation of these two
doctrines between the prosecution and the defendant. They
have the right to prove that their interpretation is the necessary
interpretation, and that my interpretation is the incorrect inter-
pretation. They have given you no such proof." {The Defence,
pp. 22-23.)
Then after testing all the passages of Scripture cited
by the prosecution, it was said :
" We have examined the nine passages from Holy Scripture
cited by the prosecution. Some of them establish the doctrine
that Holy Scripture is most necessary, which doctrine we do not
deny. But none of them are in conflict with the declarations
made in the Inaugural." {The Defence, p. 28.)
The prosecution seem to hold the opinion that
Holy Scripture is the supreme judge in religion. That
190 ARGUMENT AGAINST SUSTAINING THE APPEAL
is not the confessional statement. The confessional
statement is :
" It is not Holy Scripture which is the supreme Judge, it is the
Holy spirit, and the Holy Spirit alone. Holy Scripture is that in
which the Holy Spirit speaks, and He speaks bearing witness by
and with the word in the heart of the believer. The Holy Spirit
speaks to the reason of the godly man through Holy Scripture and
gives him the ultimate decision in all matters of faith and practice.
" I never taught any other doctrme. If any one thinks that
this doctrine conflicts with the doctrine that the Reason is a
great fountain of divine authority, he thinks wrongly and is apart
from the true lines of logical reasoning. The Confession does
not here say that the Holy Spirit does not speak in the Reason
apart from Holy Scripture, and so speaking, speak with divine
authority. It says that the Holy Spirit is the supreme Judge.
He is the supreme Judge wherever and whenever and in what-
ever form He speaks. The Confession is only concerned to teach
that it is when speaking in the Holy Scripture that He is the
supreme Judge, and that when so speaking the Church must
yield allegiance whatever may have been the decrees of coun-
cils or opinions of ancient writers ; and that private spirits must
obey, whatever the doctrines of men may have been ; in other
words that Church and Reason must yield to the supreme Judge,
the Holy Spirit, when speaking in Holy Scripture. I have not
said that the Holy Spirit speaks the final word in the Reason to
which the Church and the Bible must yield. I have not exalted
the Reason above the Bible. I am no Rationalist. It is the
teaching of the Confession to which I subscribe, that the Holy
Spirit when He speaks the infallible word in Holy Scripture al-
ways speaks through the Scripture to the Reason, and by His in-
ward work in the heart, in the Reason, gives certainty, assurance,
and infallible conviction of the truth and grace of God. There
is no conflict between Reason and Scripture in such a case.
There can be none. The Holy Spirit unites them in an infallible
bond of certainty.
" The prosecution also cite in evidence several answers to ques-
tions in the Catechisms which teach that Holy Scripture is ' the
only rule of faith and obedience,' 'the only rule to direct us how
we may glorify and enjoy Him.' ....
THE LOGIC OF THE CASE 191
" The aim of the Inaugural Address was not to vindicate the
Bible as a rule of faith ; certainly not to say anything which could
directly or indirectly militate against that essential doctrine. If
that had been my aim I would have made it my theme. My aim
was to set forth the divine authority of Holy Scripture, and there-
fore the title given to the Address was 'The Authority of Holy
Scripture.' That was its theme, that was the objective point of
its argument and its rhetoric. It aimed to remove every stum-
bling-block set up by the traditional dogma in the way of the
authority of Holy Scripture. It endeavored to set forth the au-
thority of Holy Scripture by adducing such evidence from Scrip-
ture itself as every reasonable man might understand and esti-
mate at its intrinsic value.
" It is not charged that I deny the authority of Holy Scripture.
The complaint is that I do not make the authority of the Bible
sufficiently great to be the rule of faith and practice. But this
complaint is without justification, for it is not necessary to main-
tain that the Bible is the only authority in matters of religion,
or the only great fountain of divine authority, or the only chan-
nel of divine guidance, in order to maintain consistently that
Holy Scripture is the rule of faith and practice. May not the
light of nature have divine authority ? Listen to the Confession :
"'Although the light of nature and the works of creation
and providence do so far manifest the greatness and power of
God, as to leave men inexcusable.' (I. i.)
" If the light of nature so manifest the greatness and power of
God — does it not bear divine authority ?
" Listen to Holy Scripture :
" ' For when the Gentiles which have not the law, do by nature
the thmgs contained in the law, these, having not the law, are a
law unto themselves, which show the work of the law written in
their hearts, their conscience, also bearing witness and their
thoughts the meanwhile accusing or else excusing one another.'
(Rom. I. 19, 20.)
" There is a divine law in the heart and conscience of men.
Paul here teaches that this law is divine, but it is not infallible.
" Is It a necessary consequence that ' the rule ' should be ' the
only great fountain of divine authority'.' I claim that the
Reason is a great fountain of divine authority and yet not a rule
of faith and practice. I shall explain this further on. But I am
192 ARGUMENT AGAINST SUSTAINING THE APPEAL
not obliged to explain it. It is the duty of the prosecution to
prove that there is irreconcilable conflict here. They do not pro-
pose this in their charge. They have not proffered any evidence
of it. They have simply assumed it, and they have asked you to
take this leap (rver a chasm of difference in order to give an illogic-
al verdict." ( The Defence^ pp. 42-44.)
The Church.
" I DECLARED in the Inaugural that ' Thf Church is a great
fountain of divine authority.' I make the same declaration in
your presence at this time. I shall show you that this declara-
tion is not contrary to Holy Scripture and the Westminster
Standards, but on the other hand that it is so important a doc-
trine of the Holy Scripture and the Standards that to deny it
would be heresy.
" I have already tested under the first charge the nine passages
of Scripture cited by the prosecution under both the first and the
second charges, and I have shown that there is no relevancy in
them to either charge.
" I have also considered the several passages of the Westmin-
ster Standard which are also the same under both charges, and
have shown that they do not teach that Holy Scripture is the
sole fountain of divine authority ; and that they leave room for
. the Reason as a fountain of divine authority. It seems unneces-
sary for me to review them again and show that they also leave
room for the Church as a fountain of divine authority. I shall
use my time therefore in the positive argument from Confession
and Holy Scripture in support of my thesis. The prosecution
claim that the doctrine that the Church is a fountain of divine
authority is contrary to the doctrines that the Holy Scripture is
most necessary, and the rule of faith and practice. It is difficult
to understand how any intelligent man can leap the gulf between
these two propositions ; or how any Churchman, Roman Catho-
lic, Greek Catholic, Anglican, Lutheran, Presbyterian, or Con-
gregationalist can deny that divine authority speaks and acts
through the Church. If an ancient Puritan or a Westminster
divine could descend from Paradise into this Presbytery to-day,
he would be filled with astonishment that a Presbytery of a
Church that calls itself Presbyterian could have so far abandoned
the faith of the Puritan fathers, as to permit the prosecution to
THE LOGIC OF THE CASE 193
charge a minister with heresy for maintaining that there is
divine authority in the Church. I am well a\fare, as was stated
m the book ' Whither? ' that modern Presbyterians have depart-
ed far away from the Westminster doctrine of the Church and
the sacraments; but who could have imagined that a man would
be charged with heresy for holding to the Westminster doctrine
and mamtaining it against the errors of modern dogmaticians?
It is significant that the Westminster Confession gives seven
chapters (XXV.-XXXI.) upon the doctrine of the Church and the
sacraments, doctrines as essential and necessary to the system of
doctrine taught in the Westminster Confession as the dqctrine
of Holy Scripture contained in the first chapter. The prosecu-
tion do not cite against me a single sentence from these seven
chapters when they charge me with error in teaching that the
Church is a fountain of divine authority. If this be an error, it
touches the doctrine of the Church as well as the doctrine of
Holy Scripture, and one would expect to find something in these
seven chapters that would give the Westminster decision of this
most important question. To these chapters I sincerely sub-
scribe, and I challenge the sincerity of the subscription to these
chapters of any man who denies that the Church is a fountain
of divine authority." (7'hi! Defence, pp. 67-69.)
Co-ordinating the Fountains.
" I said in the Ifiaugural that ' Men are influenced by their tem-
peraments and environments which of the three ways of access
to God they may pursue.' This was made the ground of a dis-
tinct specification under the original ist Charge. The sentence
, is cited among the extracts in the specification, and may therefore
be regarded as one of my declarations which is offered as contrary
to essential doctrine. It will explain my meaning over against
misrepresentations of it which were made in Specification IV. of
the original first charge and in the argument of the prosecution.
" I did not say that men were determined by their environ-
ments, but influenced by their environments. No man ever came
to God without the prevenient call of God's Spirit. No one ever
found God in the Reason until God Himself entered into the
Reason to make Himself known there. No one ever found God
in the Bible until the Holy Spirit pointed the way. No one ever
194 ARGUMENT AGAINST SUSTAINING THE APPEAL
found God in the Church, until Christ's touch opened his eyes.
Men are indeed inluenced by their temperaments and environ-
ments. That is a matter of common experience. All are not
Churchmen ; all are not Evangelicals ; all are not Rationalists.
But all may be Christians, using each one the avenue of religion
most familiar to him and most suited to him. But in any case it
is the divine Spirit who determines when, and where, and how
the effectual call shall be made ; and when, and where, and how
the transforming grace shall be imparted and the infallible assur-
ance of faith bestowed.
" It is said that I am co-ordinating the Bib'e, the Church, and
the Reason. The prosecution did not put this in their charge.
But they have put it into the minds of some of this court in their
argument and it may influence your decision.
" I call attention to the fact that I have denied more than once
that I co-ordinated the three fountains of divine authority. I
denied it in the Appendix to the second edition of my Inaugural
as follows : ' I did not say, and I did not give any one the right
to infer from anything whatever in the Inaugural Address, or in
any of my writings, that I co-ordinated the Bible, the Church,
and the Reason ' (p. 85).
" I denied it again in my lectures on 'The Bible, the Church,
and the Reason,' where I said: 'The Churchmen have exalted
the Church above the Bible and the Reason. The Rationalists
have exalted the Reason above the Bible and the Church. The
Evangelical party have exalted the Bible above the Church and
the Reason ; but no party, so far as we know, has made Bible.
Church, and Reason co-ordinate, that is, on the same level, in
the same order, of equal, independent authority ' (p. 63).
" And again : ' The only persons, so far as I know, who have
ever thought of co-ordinating the Bible, the Church, and the
Reason as fountains of divine authority, are some recent contro-
versialists who impute to others their own misconceptions, or
who, after the manner of scholastic logicians, invent imaginary
opponents in order to show their dialectic skill in destroying
them ' (p. 210).
" You cannot constrain me to accept the inferences of others.
You must in law accept my explanations. When I say, 'The
Bible, the Church, and the Reason are historically three great
fountains of divine authority,' can you rightly infer that I co-
THE LOGIC OF THE CASE I95
ordinate the three? How about the apostle John in the ist
epistle, V. 8, 9, when he says :
"'For there are three who bear witness, the Spirit, and the
water, and the blood : and the three agree in one. If we receive
the witness of men, the witness of God is greater : for tbe wit-
ness of God is this, that he hath borne witness concerning his
Son.'
" Are the Spirit, the water, and the blood co-ordinate witnesses ?
Listen to Bishop Westcott.
•' Westcott argues that the water and the blood refer not only
to the baptism of Christ and the atoning blood of Christ on the
cross, but to the two sacraments : 'Just as the Spirit is found to
be personal in His work with men, so also the water and the
blood speak personally through those in whom their efficacy is
realized. The participle expresses the actual delivery of the wit-
ness, and this as a present, continuous action. The witness here
is considered manifestly as the living witness of the Church, and
not as the historic witness of the gospels. Through believers
these three, "the Spirit, and the water, and the blood," perform
a work not for believers only, but for the world (John xvii. 20 f).'
" ' The threefold witness of which St. John has spoken, simply as
being threefold, satisfies the conditions of human testimony.
Much more then, he argues, does a threefold divine witness meet
ail claims, and such a witness it is implied we have in the wit-
ness of the Spirit, the water, and the blood. This witness, there-
fore, is " greater " than the v/itness of men in regard to its au-
thority.'
" Here we have three witnesses giving divine testimony to our
Saviour, without any reference to Holy Scripture : two of them
the sacraments, and therefore necessarily the Church, one of
them the divine Spirit. This passage not only shows that there
can be three witnesses speaking with divine authority, and yet
not co-ordinate ; but it also shows that the two sacraments of the
Church bear in them and with them divine authority. This Pres-
bytery will hardly undertake to declare Bishop Westcott a here-
tic, especially when Luther and so many of the Fathers are at his
back. {^The Defence, pp. 81-83.)
196 ARGUMENT AGAINST SUSTAINING THE APPEAL
What IS Plenary Inspiration f
" I agree to the doctrines (i) that ' Holy Scripture is the Word
of God written '; (2) ' immediately inspired '; and (3) ' the rule
of faith and practice.'
" Do these statements necessarily involve the doctrine that
there are no errors in Holy Scripture ? (a) The doctrine that
' the Holy Scriptures are the rule of faith and practice ' clearly
does not involve that 'the Holy Scriptures are the rule in mat-
ters other than faith and practice.' If I find fallibility in Holy
Scripture in matters of faith and practice, I am inconsistent with
the Confession. But, in the Inaugural, I expressly disclaimed
such fallibility. This disclaimer is recognized in the citations,
from my Inaugural given by the prosecution :
" ' The Bible has maintained its authority with the best schol-
ars of our time, who with open minds have been willing to recog-
nize any error that might be pointed out by historical criticism ;
for these errors are all in the circumstantials and not in the es-
sentials ; they are in the human setting, not in the precious jewel
itself ; they are found in that section of the Bible that theolo-
gians commonly account for from the providential superintend-
ence of the mind of the Author as distinguished from divine rev-
elation itself. It may be that this providential superintendence
gives infallible guidance in every particular ; and it may be that
it differs but little, if at all, from the providential superintend-
ence of the fathers and schoolmen and theologians of the Chris-
tian Church. It is not important for our purpose that we should
decide this question. If we should abandon ' — [I did not say I
did abandon. I am speaking as an apologist. ' If we abandon] the
whole field of providential superintendence so far as inspiration
and divme authority are concerned, and limit divine inspiration
and authority to the essential contents of the Bible, to its re-
ligion, faith, and morals, we would still have ample room to seek
divine authority where alone it is essential, or even important, in
the teaching that guides our devotions, our thinking, and our
conduct ' (p. 22).
"The only errors T have found or ever recognized in Holy
Scripture have been beyond the range of faith and practice, and
therefore they do not impair the infallibility of Holy Scripture
as a rule of faith and practice.
THE LOGIC OF THE CASE jg^r
" Bat it is claimed that if 1 recognize errors in matters beyond
tiie range of faith and practice, I excite suspicion as to the infal-
libility of Holy Scripture within the range of faith and practice.
You are entitled to that opinion for yourselves, but you have no
right to force your opinion upon me. The Confession does not
say ' rule of all things,' but ' the rule of faith and practice.' You
must judge by the Confession, not by your fears, or your impres-
sions, or by the conclusions you have made. But is it true that
fallibility in the Bible in matters beyond the scope of the divine
revelation impairs the infallibility in matters within the scope of
divine revelation ? We claim that it does not. The sacred writ-
ings were not composed in heaven by the Holy Spirit, they were
not sent down from heaven by angel hands, they were not com-
mitted to the care of perfect men, they were not kept by a suc-
cession of perfect priests from that moment until the present
time. If these had been the facts in the case, we might have had
a Bible infallible in every particular. But none of these things
are true. God gave His Holy Word to men in an entirely differ-
ent way. He used the human reason and all the faculties of im-
perfect human nature. He used the voice and hands of imper-
fect men. He allowed the sacred writings to be edited and re-
edited, arranged and rearranged and rearranged again by imper-
fect scribes. It is improbable that such imperfect instrumentali-
ties should attain perfect results. It was improbable that fallible
men should produce a series of writings infallible in every re-
spect. It was sufficient that divine inspiration and the guidance
of the Holy Spirit should make their writings an infallible rule
of faith and practice, and that the divine energy should push
the human and the fallible into the external forms, into the un-
essential and unnecessary matters, into the human setting of the
divine ideals. As the. river of life flowing forth from the throne
of God, according to Ezekiel's Vision, entering into the Dead Sea
quickens its waters and fills them with new life, so that 'every-
thing shall live whithersoever the river cometh ' . . . ' But the
miry places thereof and the marshes thereof shall not be healed *
(Ez. xlvii. 9-11) ; so may it be with that divine influence which
we call inspiration when it flows into a man. It quickens and
enriches his whole nature, his experience, his utterance, his ex-
pressions, with truth and life divine, and yet leaves some human
infirmities unhealed in order that the revelation may be essen-
198 ARGUMENT AGAINST SUSTAINING THE APPEAL
tially divine and infallible, and yet bear traces of the human and
fallible into the midst of which it came.
" You will sometimes hear the proverb cited : ' Falsus in uno,
falsus in omnibus.' But this ancient proverb has no manner of
application to the matter in hand. It does not refer to errors of
ignorance or inadvertence, but to errors of deceit and falsehood.
If it could be shown that the writings of the Old Testament, any
of them, were written with the intent of deceiving and mislead-
ing men, then we could not trust them as infallible in matters of
faith and practice. But the errors that have been found in the
Bible are not errors of deceit but of inadvertence, not of falsehood
but of lack of knowledge. A witness in a court of justice is not
rejected because he betrays ignorance and slips into errors of
detail, which may have resulted from carelessness and inatten-
tion. His evidence is all the stronger for these marks of sim-
plicity and the faults of common people. A witness who makes
no mistake is open to suspicion, lest his testimony may have
been prepared for the occasion by his advocate or himself. His-
torical documents are not cast aside as worthless because they
contain errors. No historic document can be found that is alto-
gether infallible. Even the Pope of Rome does not claim in-
fallibility in all things, in his utterances at the table and on the
street, in his conversation with his friends about literature, art,
science, or philosophy, war, or finance, but only when sitting in
the chair of St. Peter he speaks, ex cathedra, as the vicar of
Christ, in his official position as the supreme head of the Church
in matters of faith and morals. I refer you to the testimony
presented to the court and read from ' Biblical Study,'
pp. 240-243, and 'The Bible, the Church, afid the Reason,'
pp. 1 1 5-1 17, as setting forth the views which I" have held for
many years on this subject, and I ask you. to consider whether
they are in conflict with the Biblical or Confessional doctrine of
the rule of faith.
" It is evident that I and others can hold that Holy Scripture
is ' the only infallible rule of faith and practice,' and yet hold
that there are errors in Holy Scripture in matters that do not in
any way impair its infallibility in matters of faith and practice.
" (b) The charge of the prosecution is, that errors in Holy
Scripture conflict with the essential doctrine that ' Holy Script-
ure is the Word of God written.' The prosecution may think
THE LOGIC OF THE CASE J 99
that there is conflict here, but they are mistaken. The reason
why they see conflict is because they interpret ' Word of God
written ' differently from what I do. They put into this doc-
trine in their original Specification, ' true and full inspiration,'
meaning so far as we can determine — (i) Plenary inspiration ;
(2) Verbal inspiration ; (3) Inerrancy. Let me remark at the
outset that although I admit the phrase 'true and full inspira-
tion,' it is not a phrase of the Confession or of Holy Scripture.
The only phrase of the Confession used by them in this state-
ment is ' the Word of God written.' I hold to the ' true inspiration
of the Word of God written,' but I also hold that there are errors
in Holy Scripture, and that there is no inconsistency between
these statements. The inconsistency is in the mind of the prose-
cutors because they already include in the term full inspiration,
verbal inspiration and inerrancy ; whereas I use plenary, or full,
in the grammatical and historical sense as referring to the con-
tents of the words. When we say that a lamp is full of oil, we
do not mean that the lamp is oil, but that it contains oil in the
receptacle which it incloses. When I say the Scriptures are full
of divine inspiration, I mean that the Scriptures as writings are
filled full with an inspired rule of faith and practice, which rule fills
and pervades Scripture in all its parts. I have the authority of
John Wallis, a clerk of the Westminster Assembly, for this
view, when he says :
" 'The Scriptures in themselves are a Lanthorn rather than a
Light ; they shine, indeed, but it is alteno luniine ; it is not their
own, but a borrowed light. It is God which is the true light
that shines to u? in the Scriptures ; and they have no other light
in them, but as they represent to us somewhat of God, and as
they exhibit and hold forth God to us, who is the true light that
" enlighteneth every man that comes into the world." It is a
light, then, as it represents God urtto us, who is the original
light. It transmits some rays ; some beams of the divine nature ;
but they are refracted, or else we should not be able to behold
them. They lose much of their original lustre *by passing
through this medium, and appear not so glorious to us as they
are in themselves. They represent God's simplicity obliquated
and refracted, by reason of many inadequate conceptions ; God
condescending to the weakness of our capacity to speak to us in
our own dialect.' (John Wallis, ' Sermon,' Lond., 1791, pp.
127, 128.) " {The Defence, pp. 88-93.)
200 ARGUMENT AGAINST SUSTAINING THE APPEAL
The Will of God Conunitted to Writing.
" (a) The Confession represents that .... God ' committed
wholly unto writing ' ' that knowledge of God and of his will which
is necessary unto salvation.' This statement I sincerely adopt.
But note what was committed ' wholly unto writing ': ' the
knowledge of God and of his will which is necessary unto salva-
tion ' — nothing more ; not the knowledge of geography, not the
knowledge of chronology, not the knowledge of correct cita-
tions, not exactness in names of persons and things, unless you
can prove that these are necessary to salvation. This statement
of the Confession amounts to nothing more than ' rule of faith
and practice '; it is hardly as much, because there are some
matters of faith and practice which may not be necessary to sal-
vation. This statement does not touch upon knowledge not
necessary to salvation. If there are errors in such matters as
are not necessary to salvation, what has that to do with this pas-
sage ? When it is said that God committed that wholly unto
writing, does it teach that God Himself committed to writing.
or does it imply the use of holy penmen ? Manifestly the latter.
If then God used holy penmen to commit this knowledge to
writing, you cannot conclude that these penmen did not commit
to writing, together with this knowledge of God necessary to
salvation, other knowledge which was not necessary to salva-
tion ; and if so, you cannot conclude that there were no errors
in that matter which these men wrote, unless you can also prove
that God commissioned them to commit this also to writing.
You cannot prove any such thing from this passage of the Con-
fession which limits itself to ' knowledge necessary to salvation.'
Further, ' commit to writing ' does not imply any more than that
this knowledge of God necessary to salvation is wholly in these
writings. It does not imply that the words which contain this
knowledge are inspired, or that they may not be connected with
human and fallible material." {The Defence, pp. 92-93.)
' The Word of God Written.'
" (d) The phrase ' the Word of God written,' in the first clause
of Section 2d of Chapter I., seems to have great importance in
the minds of the prosecution. I fail to see what use they can
make of it in proof of the inerrancy of Holy Scripture. This
THE LOGIC OF THE CASE 201
section gives a list of the canonical books of Holy Scripture and
prefaces the list with the statement, ' Under the name of Holy
Scripture, or the Word of God written, are now contained all the
books of the Old and New Testaments, which are these,' etc.
"This is a cfomprehensive statement which simply amounts to
this : that Genesis, Exodus, and so forth, are books of Holy
Scripture, that is, ' the Word of God written.' ' Word of God
written ' is only an explanation of the term ' Holy Scripture.' It
may be that the prosecution have in mind some hidden sense of
this passage which they have not yet brought out to the light of
■day, but, with the best study that I can give it, it amounts to
nothmg more than that Genesis is the written Word of God,
Exodus is the written Word of God, that is, is Holy Scripture,
etc., etc. 1 certainly hold to this. Genesis, Exodus, and the
entire list of writings given in this section are the Word of God,
constituent parts of Holy Scripture. I do not know why the
prosecution cite this phrase unless they think that it is contrary
to my statement when I say : ' The Bible, as a book, is paper,
print, and binding — nothing more. It is entitled to reverent
handling for the sake of its holy contents because it contains the
divine word of redemption for man, and not for any other reason
whatever " (p. 30). This extract was used in the original Speci-
fication. It is left out of the present Charge. But was the
Bible, as written by the sacred penmen, a book with paper, print,
and binding? We think not. All these are quite modern.
What printer was ever inspired, what paper-maker ever com-
municated divine authority to the paper, what binder ever im-
parted salvation through his tools to the binding ? I gave the
true reason for reverent handling of the Bible. My language
indeed is only a paraphrase of the first section of the Confession.
The Confession says : ' It pleased God to commit the knowledge
of God and of his will which is necessary unto salvation wholly
unto writing.' I said : ' for the sake of its holy contents because
it contains the word of redemption for man.' I do not see how
my language could be any nearer to the Confessional language
unless I cited the Confession word for word." {JThe Defence, pp.
93-94.)
202 ARGUMENT AGAINST SUSTAINING THE APPEAL
Holy Scripture is the Word of God.
" {c) The prosecution cite Section 4th in order to prove that
the Confession teaches that Holy Scripture is ' the Word of
God.' There can be no doubt of this. The prosecution seem
to interpret it as if it meant that Holy Scripture is so the Word
of God that every sentence and word in it is divine and infalli-
ble. But the Confession certainly does not say this, and it evi-
dently does not mean this.
" I have shown that we cannot take the statement of one of
the three doctrinal standards as of essential importance unless
it correspond with the statements of the other documents, and
that we must so interpret the varying phrases of the three stand-
ards «ts to get a doctrine which will be consistent with the phras-
ing of them all. The Larger Catechism teaches that ' the Holy
Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments are the Word of
God, the only rule of faith and obedience.' But the Shorter
Catechism, the last of the three documents to be composed, and
which presupposes the other two, teaches that ' the Word of
God which is contained in the Scriptures of the Old and New
Testaments is the only rule to direct us how we may glorify and
enjoy him.' It is evident, therefore, that the Westminster doc-
trine of Holy Scripture must be so constructed as to enable us
to say, ' the Bible contains the Word of God,' as well as to say,
' is the Word.' There are two extremes of statement which are
both inconsistent with the Westminster statement. If, on the
one hand, you take the statement of the Shorter Catechism
and say, Holy Scripture contains the Word of God in its chief
doctrines, but there are some doctrines of faith and rules of life
which are not the Word of God ; then you cannot subscribe to
the statement, ' is the Word of God.' So, on the other hand,
if you take the statement of the Larger Catechism in such a
sense as to say, Holy Scripture is the Word of God in all its
parts, thoughts and words, sentences and linguistic expression,
then you cannot subscribe to the statement, ' contains the Word
of God.' The true Westminster doctrine is the same that we '
have already seen, that the Bible contains the Word of God in
that it contains the rule of faith and practice, and it is the Word
of God because this rule of faith and practice so fills and per-
vades and controls Holy Scripture as to make it to all intents
THE LOGIC OF THE CASE 203
and purposes the Word of God. As a Westminster divine well
says :
" ' For the Scripture stands not in cortice vcrborutn, but in 7/?^-
dulla sensus, it's the same wine in this vessel which was drawn
out of that.'
" I can sincerely subscribe to both statements, ' is the Word
of God," and 'contams the Word of God,' but I challenge the
subscription to the words ' contains the Word of God ' on the
part of those who insist that ' is the Word of God ' means verbal
inspiration and inerrancy in every particular. I challenge the
subscription to the clause ' contains the Word of God ' by the
prosecution, when they say, in the language of Dr. Birch ;
" ' God is the arranger of its clauses, the chooser of its terras,
and the speller of its words so that the text in its betters, words,
or clauses is just as divine as the thought ' (Stenographer's Re-
port, p. 558).
" The blind zeal with which some have recently insisted upon
' is the Word of God ' reminds us of Luther's uncharitable con-
duct at the conference at Marburg. To use the words of Dr.
Schaff :
" ' Luther first rose, and declared emphatically that he would
not change his opinion on the real presence in the least, but
stand fast on it to the end of life. He called upon the Swiss to
prove the absence of Christ, but protested at the outset against
arguments derived from reason and geometry. To give pictorial
emphasis to his declaration, he wrote with a piece of chalk on
the table in large characters the words of institution, with which
he was determined to stand or fall ; Hoc est corpus meum ' (' His-
tory of the Christian Church,' VI., p. 640).
" We well know the evil consequences of a divided and dis-
tracted Protestantism which resulted from this intolerant and
opinionated conduct of the great reformer. Shall we allow men
who are pigmies alongside of Luther to plunge oiir Presbyterian
Church into distraction and division by the entering edge of the
copula * IS ' ? In the usage of language, this little word ' is ' is
capable of a variety of interpretations. 'This is my body ' in
the words of Jesus is of infinitely more consequence than 'Holy
Scripture is the Word of God ' in our Confession of Faith. Give
heed to the warning of history." {The Defence, pp. 95-96.)
204 ARGUMENT AGAINST SUSTAINING THE APPEAL 1
Immediately Inspired.
" {d) The prosecution cite Section 8th in order to prove the
infallibility of the original text of Scripture. The Confession
teaches that —
" ' The Old Testament in Hebrew and the New Testament in
Greek, bemg immediately inspired by God, and by his singular
care and providence kept pure in all ages, are therefore authen-
tical . so as' m all controversies of religion, the church is finally
to appeal u^to them ' (I. 8),
" There are three affirmations here : (i) that the original text
was immediately inspired by God , (2) that they have been kept
pure in all ages and are therefore authentical ; (3) they are the
final appeal in all controversies of religion. The third state-
ment gives the scope of the others. The Scriptures are the final
appeal in religious controversies ; matters of faith and practice,
not for questions of science. Those who have resorted to the
Bible to prove that the sun moved round the earth, that the
earth could not be circumnavigated, that the universe was created
in SIX days of twenty-four hours, and the like, have surely gone
beyond the range of the Westminster Confession, which specifies
controversies of religion. Those zealous defenders of the in-
fallibility of the Scriptures in other like matters of detail out-
side of the range of religious controversies, apart from matters
of faith and practice, will ere long be convicted of similar error.
" (i) The prosecution emphasizes the phrase 'being imme-
diately inspired by God," which indeed they include in the
Charge itself in the clause 'immediately inspired.* The Con-
fession states that ' the Old Testament in Hebrew and the New
Testament in Greek, being immediately inspired by God.'
" It is evident that the prosecution rest their case upon the
adverb ' immediately.' What does it mean in this passage ?
' Immediately ' does not refer to the time when the Holy Scrip-
tures were composed, and therefore it has nothing whatever to
do with the original autographs. The Confession does not say,
' having been immediately inspired by God,' referring to their'
origin in the past, but 'being immediately inspired by God,'
alluding to their present condition. The doctrine is that the
Hebrew and Greek copies, as we now have them in our hands,
are immediately inspired by God; they have within them the
THE LOGIC OF THE CASE 205
divine grace of inspiration, and it is there immediately from
God as compared with the translations from the Greek and
Hebrew origmals, where the inspiration is mediately from God,
namely, through the medium of these origmals. That this is the
meanmg of the Confession is clear from the controversial litera-
ture of the times when the Confession was composed It
IS evident, therefore, that the adverb ' immediately ' gives the
prosecution no support for their doctrine that the original auto-
graphs were without error. It has nothing whatever to do with
such autographs." {The Defence, pp. 97-99.)
The Autlienitcity of Holy Scriplure.
" It is evident to any one who takes the pains to compare the
Charge with Specification 6th of the first Charge in the original
Charges and Specifications, that the prosecution have changed
their base. The prosecution originally proposed to prove that
Dr. Briggs' assertion, 'that Moses is not the author of the Penta-
teuch,' was a fact which sustained the Charge that he taught
'doctrines which conflict irreconcilably with and are contrary to
the cardinal doctrine taught in the Holy Scriptures and contained
in the Standards of the Presbyterian Church, that the Scriptures
of the Old and New Testaments are the only infallible rule of
faith and practice.' This charge they have abandoned and pro-
pose to prove that the ' teaching that Moses is not the author
of the Pentateuch' is 'contrary to direct statements of Holy
Scripture and to the essential doctrines of the Standards of the
Presbyterian Church.' (i) 'That the Holy Scripture evidences
itself to be 'the word of God .... by the consent of all the
parts,' and (2) that 'the infallible rule of interpretation of Scrip-
ture is the Scripture itself.' Here are two charges which you
have decided to try together, but to vote upon separately.
" Let me call attention to two principles established at an
earlier stage in my argument.
"(i) It is not sufficient to point to direct statements of Holy
Scripture, unless the Church has already defined that those state-
ments are direct, or it is agreed by the parties that they are di-
rect. I shall show you later on that there are no such direct
statements of Holy Scripture. But even if I should fail in such
proof, it is plain that the Church has not defined these so-called
direct statements of Holy Scripture in the Westminster Stand-
206 ARGUMENT AGAINST SUSTAINING THE APPEAL
ards, and therefore it is not lawful to use them as evidence of
an essential and necessary article of the Confession of Faith.
" (2) It is not sufficient for the prosecution to claim that a doc-
trine IS an essential doctrine of the Westminster Standards. They
may claim anything and everything. It is necessary for them to
prove their claim. The court have doubtless noticed that the
prosecution have made no attempt in their argument to present
such proof. They have made no use of these . passages of our
Confession whatever. On this account I ask that you rule Charges
IV. and V. out of court as entirely destitute of proof. But 1
shall find it convenient to use these passages of the Confession
myself and turn them against the prosecutors. I admit that two
doctrines of our Standards are ' that the Holy Scripture evidences
itself to be the word of God by the consent of all the parts,' and
'the infallible rule of interpretation of Scripture is the Scripture
Itself.' ....
" But I fail to see in what respect the doctrine that Moses did
not write the Pentateuch contravenes the doctrine of the ' con-
sent of all the parts ' of Holy Scripture, or the doctrine that ' the
infallible rule of interpretation of Scripture is the Scripture it-
self.' I am sure that I hold these three doctrines. It may be
that the prosecution can convince you that I am inconsistent in
holding these doctrines. But they have not thus far ventured to
make such an argument, and if they had done so they could not
do away with the fact that I do hold these doctrines. You will
then have to apply the law of the supreme court in the Craig-
head case that —
" 'No man can rightly be convicted of heresy by inference or
implication ; that is, we must not charge an accused person with
holding those consequences which may legitimately flow from
his assertions. Many men are grossly inconsistent with them-
selves ; and while it is right, in argument, to overthrow false
opinions, by tracing them in their connections and consequences,
it is not right to charge any man with an opinion which he dis-
avows.' (Craighead Case, Minutes of the General Assembly, 1824,
p. 122.)
" You cannot convict me in the face of this decision of the
General Assembly.
" But let us rise above these legal aspects of the case to the
merits of the question. The Confession teaches that ' the infalli-
THE LOGIC OF THE CASE. 207
ble rule of interpretation of Scripture is the Scripture itself.'
Accordingly we must resort to Holy Scripture for the infallible
interpretation of the question whether Moses wrote the Penta-
teuch or not. To that we agree, and to that rule we shall resort
so soon as preliminary questions can be settled.
"Granting that there is 'consent of all the parts' of Holy
Scripture, it is our duty to determine what that consent is. This
we shall use every effort to determine. But it is evident to the
court at the outset that there is an irreconcilable difference of
opinion between the parties who propose to resort to the same
tribunal and to seek the same guidance. They try to prove to
you that Holy Scripture tells us that Moses wrote the Penta-
teuch. I, on the other hand, will present to you indubitable evi-
dence that ' the consent of all the parts ' of Holy Scripture, and
the interpretation of Scripture which is given by Scripture itself,
force the conclusion that Moses did not write the Pentateuch.
The argument is therefore reduced to the Scriptural argument.
But we are confronted at the outset by the principle already es-
tablished, that the Church has not officially determined the in-
terpretation of these passages of Holy Scripture, and that you
cannot by a majority vote in the Presbytery decide which is the
correct interpretation. The constitution of the Church forces
you to decide by the interpretation of Scripture given in the
Confession and to limit your decisions within the strict lines of
its decisions. To depart from them and judge me by the inter-
pretation of these passages of Scripture by a majority vote of the
Presbytery^ will violate the constitution of the Church and all
the precedents of ecclesiastical process." ( The Defence, pp. 115-
120.)
"Let me sum up my arguments on the Charges IV. and V.
"(i) There is no lawful bridge by which these specifications,
'that Moses is not the author of the Pentateuch and that Isaiah
IS not the author of half of the book that bears his name,' can
be brought under the Charges. Therefore there is no rele-
vancy in the specifications— they cannot be accounted as valid.
" (2) The Westminster Confession of Faith nowhere states
that Moses wrote the Pentateuch or that Isaiah wrote the whole
of the book that bears his name. Therefore there can be no
lawful case against me in the Presbyterian Church.
" (3) The testimony of Holy Scripture in the passages ad-
208 AKGUMENT AGAINST SUSTAINING THE APPEAL
duced does not show that Moses wrote the Pentateuch and that
Isaiah wrote the book that bears his name. Therefore my state-
ments are not in conflict with Holy Scripture and there is no
valid case against me on the ground of Holy Scripture.
" (4) Holy Scripture makes it evident that Moses did not write
the Pentateuch and that Isaiah did not write half of the book
ihat bears his name. Therefore mv statements are true and the
prosecution are in conflict with Holy Scripture." {The Defence,
pp. 1 50-1 5 1.)
Progressive Sanctification after Death.
"This Charge states (i) that it is an essential doctrine of
Holy Scripture and of the Standards ' that the souls of believers
are at their death at once made perfect in holiness.' But no
proof is offered for this essential doctrine under the Charge.
We shall consider whether there is any proof for it whatever in
Holy Scripture and the Standards. (2) The Charge states that
Dr.'Briggs teaches ' that Sanctification is not complete at death.'
This I may accept as a fairly good statement of my doctrine.
(3) The Charge states that my doctrine is contrary to the essen-
tial doctrine of Holy Scripture and of the Standards. This state-
ment we shall have to consider. But let me warn the court again
that they must confine themselves to the question at issue. They
have no right to condemn me on account of any other doctrines
taught in the citations from my Inaugural, except the doctrine
attributed to me in the Charge, namely, 'that Sanctification is
not complete at death.' My doctrine is clearly stated in the fol-
lowing words of the Inaugural cited by the prosecution as part
of their specification :
" ' There is no authority in the Scriptures, or in the creeds of
Christendom, for the doctrine of immediate sanctification at
death. The only sanctification known to experience, to Christian
orthodoxy, and to the Bible, is progressive sanctification. Pro-
gressive sanctification after death is the doctrine of the Bible
and the Church.'
" It IS claimed by the adversaries that this statement is against
the Westminster Standards, which teach ' that the souls of be-
lievers are at their death at once made perfect in holiness.' They
cite from the Confession, chapter xxxii. (i), from the Larger
Catechism, Ques. 86, and from the Shorter Catechism, Ques. 37.
THE LOGIC OF THE CASE 209
But Dr. Birch in his argument made no use whatever of these
passages from our Standards ; and Mr. McCook used only one of
them. Question 37 of the Shorter Catechism, in order to state
that it teaches a doctrine directly contrary to my doctrine. But
that was a mere assertion without proof, and no proposal was
made to show that that doctrine is an essential doctrine of the
Standards. Therefore I ask that you decide in accordance with
'A
law and usage in courts of justice and throw out the Charge
which is so destitute of proof. But inasmuch as I desire that
you should know what is the precise relation of my doctrine to
the Westminster Standards, I shall consider these passages. (i)<
It is true that it is taught in the Shorter Catechism that ' the
souls of believers are at their death made perfect in holiness '
(37) ; but it is not said that at their death believers are immedi-
ately, in a moment of time, ' at once' by divine transformation,
made perfect in holiness. I can say at their death made ' perfect
in holiness ' because I believe that the souls of believers at death
enter the Middle State, in which state they are made perfect in
holiness by progressive sanctification. ' At their death ' does not
necessarily imply ' in the very moment of the transition from
life to death,' or in the exact second of time after the spirit has
departed from the body ; but ' at their death ' is in antithesis
with ' in this life,' and means nothing more than ' in the state of
death.' ' Made perfect in holiness ' does not necessarily imply
' that the sanctification of the soul is instantaneously, in the
moment of time after it leaves the body, perfected and com-
pleted '; but it is consistent with the belief that the soul is made
perfect in holiness in the state of death. The Larger Catechism
teaches as follows :
" 'The communion in glory with Christ, which the members
of the invisible church enjoy immediately after death, is in that
their souls are then made perfect in holiness, and received into
the highest heavens, where they behold the face, of God in light
and glory ; waiting for the full redemption of their bodies ' (86).
" It is not said that their souls are made immediately perfect
in holiness after death any more than it is said immediately re-
ceived into the highest heavens. This question speaks of the
communion in glory with Christ which the members of the in-
visible church enjoy immediately after death. Is that com-
munion limited to the moment of time at death? Does it not
210 ARGUMENT AGAINST SUSTAINING THE APPEAL
rather continue during the whole time in that state, beginning
immediately after death ? Immediately after death in this pas-
sage means the whole state which begins immediately after
death, during which the communion is enjoyed, as we might in-
fer also from the clause ' waiting for the full redemption of their
bodies.' What therefore is affirmed as happening immediately
after death is affirmed as happening during that state- of com-
munion and waiting which begins immediately after death ; and
not in the moment of time that begins that state. The four
affirmations are not of successive chronological events, but of
parallel events : (i) 'made perfect in holiness,' (2) 'received into
the highest heavens,' (3) ' behold the face of God in light and
glory,' (4) 'waiting for the full redemption of their bodies '; all
alike refer to the communion in glory with Christ, which con-
tinues through this entire state from death to the resurrection.
There is nothing in the text or the context of this passage, or in
the proof texts of the Confession cited to sustain it, to indicate
that 'made perfect in holiness' applies only to the moment
of time when the Middle State begins, or that it confines the
communion with Christ in the long period of the state which
follows the moment immediately after death, to the single thing
' waiting for the full redemption of their bodies.'
" This interpretation of the phrase ' immediately after death '
is made probable when we put Question 86 in its context in the
midst of the group of Questions 82-90. Que.stion 82 asks :
" ' What is the communion in glory, which the members of the
invisible church have with Christ ? ' The answer is : ' The com-
munion in glory, which the members of the invisible church
have with Christ, is in this life, immediately after death, and at
last perfected at the resurrection and day of judgment.'
" Here then, you observe, are three states in which this com-
munion with Christ is enjoyed : (i) this life; (2) immediately
after death ; (3) at the resurrection and day of judgment. The
communion with Christ is evidently not limited to the point of
time immediately after death, but to the state beginning imme-
diately after death and extending up to the day of judgment ;
for ' in this life ' clearly refers not to any single moment in this
life, but to the whole Christian state in this life from the moment
in which Christian life begins in regeneration until the soul de-
parts from the body at death. So ' at the resurrection and day
THE LOGIC OF THE CASE 211
of judgment' is not limited to a moment of time when the
resurrection and the judgment may take place ; but refers to the
final state of communion with Christ beginning with resurrec'
tion and judgment but extending through all eternity. Accord-
ingly, ' immediately after death,' which intervenes between this
life and 'at the resurrection and day of judgment,' is not limited
to the moment of the soul's departure into the Middle State,
but comprehends the communion with Christ which is the ex-
perience of believers from the moment of death till the day of
resurrection. The scope of the question makes this certain.
Observe the question is : ' What is the communion in glory,
which the members of the invisible church have with Christ?"
It is extremely improbable that the Westminster divines would
limit that communion in the future state to two points of time
— first, the moment of death, and second, the moment of resur-
rection, and leave entirely out of view the millenniums of the
Middle State and the eternities of the Ultimate State.
" In accordance with this general statement of Question 82,
which we have thus analyzed, there follow separate questions as
to each one of these states :
' (83). ' What is the communion in glory with Christ, which
the members of the invisible church enjoy in this life ? '
"(86). 'What is the communion in glory with Christ, which
the members of the invisible church enjoy immediately after
death ? '
" (90). ' What shall be done to the righteous at the day of judg-
ment .'' '
"The 'immediately after death ' of the specific question has
the same meaning as the ' immediately after death ' of the gen-
eral question ; and the meaning of the ' immediately after death '
of the answer must be the same, all therefore referring to the
state immediately after death, and not to the point of time at
death. Therefore there is no proof that the clause ' then made
perfect in holiness ' is to be limited to the very moment of
death.
" Furthermore, there are several expressions in these questions
and answers which do not agree with the doctrine of immediate
and perfect sanctification in the moment of death. The state-
ment ' at last perfected at the resurrection and day of judgment '
indicates that the glory of the Middle State is intermediate
212 ARGUMENT AGAINST SUSTAINING THE APPEAL
glory and not perfected glory. The statement ' waiting for the
full redemption of their bodies ' shows that the redemption was
not yet full nor yet perfected at death, that it could not be full,
could not be perfected till the day of judgment. And Question
90 tells us that the righteous will be openly acknowledged and
acquitted at 'the day of judgment,' not before ; that they 'shall
be received into heaven, where they shall be fully and forever
freed from all sin and misery; filled with inconceivable joys;
made perfectly holy and happy both in body and soul, in the
company of innumerable saints and angels, but especially in the
immediate vision and fruition of God the Father, of our Lord
Jesus Christ, and of the Holy Spirit, to all eternity. And this is
the perfect and full communion, which the members of the invis-
ible church shall enjoy with Christ in glory, at the resurrection
and day of judgment.'
" Such expressions as these with reference to the day of judg-
ment indicate that * the perfect and full communion with Christ
in glory ' is not enjoyed until that time ; that then, first, believ-
ers will ' be openly acknowledged and acquitted '; that not till
then shall they ' be fully and forever freed from all sin '; that not
till then shall they ' be made perfectly holy.'
" It is evident, therefore, from these statements of our Stand-
ards, that perfect holiness, perfect redemption, perfect com-
munion with Christ in glory, cannot be enjoyed until the decisions
of the day of judgment. How can anyone be perfectly sanctified
who has not attained ' perfect and full communion with Christ
in glory,' who has not yet been 'openly acknowledged and ac-
quitted,' and who still has to look forward to the resurrection
when for the first he will be ' fully and forever freed from
all sin ' and made ' perfectly holy and happy both in body and
soul ' ? Those who teach immediate sanctification at death are
in irresistible conflict with these statements of the Confession ;
whereas those who teach progressive sanctification after death
and regard the state immediately after death as a state during
which men are made perfect in holiness, which progress in per-
fection reaches its end at the day of judgment, reconcile all
these statements of the Larger Catechism into a higher unity,
where there is complete and perfect harmony.
" I am well aware that these statements are obscure and ca-
pable of such interpretation as to involve them in many inconsist-
THE LOGIC OF THE CASE 213
encies. I do not claim that the Westminster divines were
altogether clear themselves as to these difficult questions of
eschatology. 1 am also aware that many citations can be made
from their writings which teach immediate sanctification at
death. I have doubtless seen the most, if not all such extracts
as can be adduced. But whatever the opinions of any or all of
them were on this subject, when they constructed the careful
statements of our Standards, they were obliged to keep close to
the doctrines of Holy Scripture, and thus it is that their
statements, though indefinite and obscure, in no wise come in
conflict with the doctrine of progressive sanctification after
death, and in no wise teach the error of immediate sanctification
at death. The Westminster divines shared the common fault of
the Protestantism of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries in
that having thrown aside the Roman Catholic doctrine of Purga-
tory, and having neglected to revive the ancient Catholic doc-
trine of the Middle State, they left the Middle State between
death and the resurrection in their definitions, but did not care-
fully distinguish it from the Ultimate State. Accordingly in
their creeds, neglecting to make important distinctions and yet
adhering closely to Scripture, they did not fall into statements
of error ; but in their writings failing to observe the distinction
made in Holy Scripture between the Abaddon of the Middle
State and the Gehenna of the Ultimate State, and between the
heaven of the Middle State and the heaven of the Final State,
they said many things of the one that belong properly to the
other. When, therefore, in accord with many modern Protestant
theologians, I advance into this unexplored territory of the Mid-
dle State and go beyond the Westminster Confession in my
statements and definitions, follow in the lines drawn by the
ancient Church and gather together all the teachings of Holy
Scripture, and so more carefully distinguish between the Middle
State and the Ultimate State, 1 do not violate the statements of
the Confession ; I go into regions of liberty and extra-confes-
sional dogma, and in those regions pursue the scientific, histori-
cal, and Biblical methods of investigation and statement.
" (2). If any one insists upon rejecting the proof that has been
given with regard to the proper interpretation of the phrase
' made perfect in holiness," his attention is invited to the West-
minster doctrine of sanctification, and he is asked, if there be
214 ARGUMENT AGAINST SUSTAINING THE APPEAL
an inconsistency between the two chapters, which is the more
important chapter of the Confession, the one giving the general
doctrine of progressive sanctification or the one givmg the
specific doctrme of immediate sanctification at death under the
head of the doctrme of the Middle State ? The chapter on
sanctification knows no other sanctification than progressive
sanctification. Listen to this doctrine :
"'I. They who are effectually called and regenerated, hav-
ing a new heart and a new spirit created in them, are further
sanctified, really and personally, through the virtue of Christ's
death and resurrection, by his word and Spirit dwelling in them .
the dominion of the whole body of sin is destroyed, and the sev-
eral lusts thereof are more and more weakened and mortified ;
and they more and more quickened and strengthened, in all sav-
ing graces, to the practice of true holiness^ without which no
man shall see the Lord.
•' ' IL This sanctification is throughout in the whole man, yet
imperfect in this life : there abideth still some remnants of corrup-
tion in every part, whence ariseth a continual and irreconcilable
war, the flesh lusting against the Spirit, and the Spirit against the
flesh.
" ' in. In which war, although the remaining corruption for a
time may much prevail, yet, through the continual supply of
strength from the sanctifying Spirit of Christ, the regenerate part
doth overcome : and so the saints grow in grace, perfecting
holiness in the fear of God.' (Chap XIII.)
" This chapter is one of the choicest productions of the West-
minster divines. It sets forth truly and accurately the doctrine
of Holy Scripture. If the Presbyterian Church had bound this
13th chapter on their heart instead of the 3d chapter, and
had made the Scriptural doctrine ot sanctification their article
of the standing and falling Church, rather than the scholastic
dogma of reprobation, what a glorious history they might have
had in the last two centuries ! There would have been no need
of the agonies of the present revision movement. It seems
sometimes as if those who insist upon immediate sanctification
at death were using the term sanctification in a different sense
from the Westminster Standards. Sanctification is sometimes
used in the Scriptures and also in theological literature and
debate, for that cleansing from sin which takes place in the laver
THE LOGIC OF THE CASE. 215
of regeneration; and again for that induction into a higher
Christian life which is effected by the power of the Holy
Spirit upon the souls of men at certain crises of their history.
I do not question that men are sanctified in the sense that they
are washed in the laver of regeneration clean from every cor-
ruption, taint, and defilement of sin. I do not doubt that the
fountain which flows from the Redeemer's side cleanseth from
all sin in the hour of death as in any hour of life, when the
sinner opens his heart in faith and repentance to the saving
love of Jesus. So again I do not question the higher life that
men may attain in this world, when throwing aside every
weight of besetting sin, tearing away all the bands of evil habits
and associations, dissolving every other tie which might restrain
them from God and duty, they consecrate themselves to the
service of the Redeemer and with fresh courage strain every
nerve of holy resolution, striving for the love of Christ in the
passion of self-sacrificing devotion to the Master's service.
The divine Spirit lifts up such consecrated ones to a higher
plane of religious experience and fills their souls with joy and
holy endeavor. I firmly believe that such transformations, long
prepared by the Spirit's secret workings upon the soul, may
take place immediately in a moment of time, in a happy hour
which seems like a second birth, a second resurrection. It is
the shooting of the plant of grace above the ground after the
long season of sowing and germination in the secret recesses of
the heart. It is the springing forth of the blossom in the spring-
time after a long winter's secret preparation. That there will
be such a transformation at death, the spring-time of a new
life, I do not doubt I firmly believe that then there will be a
transformation greater than any that is possible in this life. You
may call this sanctification if you will, you may say that this is
'being made perfect in holiness,' if that is your meaning, but
if you do you have a very meagre and inadequate conception of
the sanctification taught in the Holy Scripture and in the West-
minster Confession. Christian sanctification is vastly higher,
grander, and more glorious than this. According to the West-
minster Confession, it is not merely cleansing from sin and ris-
ing to a higher grade of Christian life and experience, ' it is
being more and more strengthened in all saving graces, to the
practice of true holiness.' How can there be the practice of
216 ARGUMENT AGAINST SUSTAINING THE APPEAL
true holiness except in time of duration ? How can there be the
practice of true holiness without holy conduct ? How can there
be holy conduct without Christian activity? How can there be
Christian activity without doing and working and serving Christ
and the brethren ? The practice of true holiness, therefore,
must, from the very necessities of the case, follow the transfor-
mation that takes place at death — it cannot be a part' of it. It
IS conceivable that believers at their death rhay be immediately
so strengthened in all saving graces as to be perfectly endowed
for the practice of true holiness, but it is inconceivable that the
practice itself could be immediately imparted. The practice of
true holiness cannot be given by God ; it must be the exercise
and work of man, under the influence of the divine Spirit, and
must follow any influence of sanctification at death. But
inasmuch as the practice is an essential part of the sanctifi-
cation and there can be no completeness of sanctification, no
perfection in holiness without the practice of true holiness,
the completion of sanctification at the moment of death is
impossible.
" The Westminster Confession also teaches that ' this sanctifi-
cation is throughout in the whole man.' The text cited in
proof of the position is .
" ' And the very God of peace sanctify you wholly , and I pray
God your whole spirit and soul and body be preserved blameless
unto the coming of our Lord Jesus Christ ' (1. Thess. v. 23). It
is manifest that according to this text and this statement of the
Confession, sanctification embraces the body as well as the soul.
Sanctification cannot be completed without the body. It is
clearly taught in the Confession, XXXII., that believers are
waiting in the Middle State 'until the day of judgment for the
full redemption of their bodies." So the Larger Catechism
states that then at the day of judgment ' they shall be fully and
forever freed from all sin and misery, filled with inconceivable
joys, made perfectly holy and happy both in body and soul.'
Wherefore according to the Westminster Standards, the full
redemption of their bodies, the sanctification of their bodies,
' made perfectly holy in body and soul,' does not take place
until the day of judgment. Therefore sanctification is not
throughout in the whole man until the day of judgment. Man
cannot, therefore, be immediately and completely sanctified at
THE LOGIC OF THE CASE 217
death. That measure of sanctification which he receives at
death is intermediate between the sanctification in this life and
the complete sanctification at the day of judgment. It is
furthermore evident that the apostle, in the text cited, is pray-
ing, not that God would sanctify the Thessalonians wholly at
death,, or present them blameless at the hour of death, but
- unto the commg of our Lord Jesus," that is, the second advent ;
and what is that but the day of the resurrection of the body and
the final judgment ?
" If therefore, by any confusion of mind, the Westminster
divines have taught in Chapter XXXII., and the correspond-
ing questions and answers of the Larger and Shorter Catechisms,
the doctrine of immediate sanctification at death, they have
thereby through inadvertence taught a doctrine which is
irreconcilable with and contrary to and in conflict with their
doctrine of sanctification and their doctrine of the resurrection
of the body, and their doctrine of the day of judgment. Can any
doubt, in such a case, which passage must give way ? Shall we
give up three doctrines of greatest importance for the sake of
one doctrine of lesser importance .''
" (3). I freely grant that the most natural interpretation of the
phrases of the Westminster Standards, 'at their death made
perfect in holiness,' or 'immediately after death,' is in favor of
the doctrine of immediate sanctification at death, though I
think that the contexts of the Larger Catechism and the Con-
fession disprove that interpretation. But granting that my in-
terpretation is wrong, the question arises whether the doctrine
of immediate sanctification at death is an essential doctrine of
the Westminster Confession. Can you regard the doctrine as
essential to the Westminster system of doctrine.? It is a doc-
trine in the difficult field of eschatology, where there must be
liberty for investigation, statement, and debate, until the Church
has matured its Christian experience and defined more closely
its faith.
" Is the Presbytery ready to take the position that the dogma
of immediate sanctification at death is an essential doctrine of
the Presbyterian Church, so that no man can become a Presby-
terian minister who does not hold it ? If so, you stretch and
strain the line of cardinal and essential doctrines to an extent
that will be destructive of the peace and prosperity of the
218 ARGUMENT AGAINST SUSTAINING THE APPEAL
Church. I doubt whether the superior courts will sustain you
in such a position, and if they should do this wrong to the
Church of God, the Christian world will regard them as break-
ing the bonds of catholicity." {The Defence, pp. 151-161.)
"The epistle to the Hebrews gives us a glimpse of the
Church in the Middle State in these words :
" ' But ye are come unto mount Zion, and unto the city of the
living God, the heavenly Jerusalem, and to innumerable hosts of
angels in general assembly and to the church of the first-born
who are enrolled in heaven ; and to God of all the Judge, and
to the spirits of just men made perfect; and to Jesus the medi-
ator of a new covenant, and to the blood of spnnkling that
speaketh better than that of Abel.' (Heb. xii. 22-24.)
•• This passage is cited by the Westminster divines in proof of
their phrase ' made perfect in holiness.' And it is their only
proof text. Let me call your attention again to the principle
laid down in my preliminary objection, that even if the West-
minster divines meant to teach the doctrine of immediate sanc-
tiflcation at death, yet if the passage of Holy Scripture on which
they rely for proof teach a different doctrine, we are obliged by
our subscription vows and by the doctrine of the Westminster
Standards to follow Holy Scripture rather than the Confession,
and you must judge by Scripture rather than by the Confession.
This is said as a guide to those who may not be convinced by
the argument I have given you as to the doctrine taught in our
Confession. I shall now endeavor to show you that this passage
of Holy Scripture does not teach the doctrine of immediate
sanctification at death, {a) Observe that we have in this passage
a scene of great magnificence and glory, an assembly in the
heavenly Jerusalem on the heavenly heights of Zion, of the God
of all, Jesus the Mediator of the new covenant, the general
assembly of innumerable hosts of angels, and the church of the
first-born, the spirits of just men made perfect. This festal
assembly in the new Jerusalem is in antithesis to Sinai blazing
and quaking with terrors. What is there in text or in context
to suggest that this is a scene which immediately follows the
death of every individual, or that immediately after death every
believer is ushered into this festal assembly ? What is there in
text or context to imply that these first-born from among men,
THE LOGIC OF THE CASE 219
these just men, these spirits perfected, embrace all believers
that have departed this life ? What is there in text or in context
to imply that these perfected spirits attain their perfection at
the precise moment of their death ? The prosecution will have
to prove these three questionable propositions ere they can use
this passage as an evidence that all believers are immediately
sanctified in the moment of their departure from this life. They
cannot give you any such proof, {b) Listen to the opinions of
distinguished commentators on this passage. Calvin is one of
the commentators who interpret ' spirits of just men made per-
fect,' of the fulfilment or completion of their earthly life. If
John Calvin, the father of Calvinists, the prince of interpreters
among the Reformers, be correct in his interpretation, this pas-
sage has nothing whatever to do with the question whether
sanctification is immediate or progressive after death. Calvin,
however, gives his opinion on sanctification after death in his
comment upon another passage, where he says :
" ' As, however, the spirit is accustomed to speak in this man-
ner in reference to the last coming of Christ, it were better to
extend the advancement of the grace of Christ to the resurrec-
tion of the flesh. For although those who, have been freed from
the mortal body do no longer contend with the lusts of the flesh,
and are, as the expression is, beyond the reach of a single dart,
yet there will be no absurdity in speaking of them as in the way
of advancement, inasmuch as they have not yet reached the
point at which they aspire, they do not yet enjoy the felicity and
glory which they have hoped for, and, in fine, the day has not
yet shone which is to discover the treasures which lie hid in
hope. And in truth, when hope is treated of, our eyes must
always be directed forward to a blessed resurrection as the grand
object in view.' (Calvin on Phil., I., 6.)
" (<:) De Wette represents many commentators who think that
these perfected spirits are the martyrs of the old dispensation,
the theme of Heb. xi., of whom it is said :
" ' And these all, having had witness borne to them through
their faith, received not the promise, God having provided some
better thing concerning us, that apart from us they should not
be made perfect' (verses 39, 40).
"There can be no doubt that our passage is based upon that
passage, not only because of the term ' perfected,' but also be-
220 ARGUMENT AGAIXST SUSTAINING THE APPEAL
cause of the ' better thing ' which appears in both passages.
The ' better thing ' of xi. 40, is referred to as that in which
Hebrew and Greek martyrs share alike and at the same time;
but what it is, is not distinctly stated. In our passage, however,
it is the new covenant of Jesus, the Mediator, and His blood of
sprinkling. Therefore we must extend the reference of the
perfected spirits to the New Testament martyrs as well as to the
Old Testament martyrs. The blood of sprinkling gives us the
clew to the meaning of perfected here. As Weiss says, the en-
tire usage of the Epistle refers this perfection to that attained
through Christ and His sacrifice. We are not to think of moral
perfection. Let us recall this usage for a few moments. There
are four passages which teach that perfection was not through
the Levitical priesthood or the sacrifices prescribed in the law
(vii. II, 19; ix. 9; X. i). It is then said in antithesis but 'by
one offering he [Christ] hath perfected forever them that are
sanctified ' (x. 14). The ' sanctified ' here are, as the present
participle shows, to use the words of Bishop Westcott, ' all who
from time to time realize progressively in fact that which has
been potentially obtained for them.' The perfected spirits here
are therefore those who have been perfected by the mediatorial
intercession and cleansing of the blood of Christ, and not those
who have attained moral perfection, or who have completed once
for all their sanctification. It is possible that the prosecution
understand by ' perfect in holiness ' just this cleansing by the blood
of Christ and this equipment in the righteousness of Christ. If
this be their meaning I shall not dispute their doctrine, so far as
it goes. But the doctrine of sanctification which is in Holy
Scripture and in the Westminster Confession is vastly higher
than this. It is not merely cleansing from sin ; it is the infusion
of habits of holiness. It is not merely clothing in the righteous-
ness of Christ ; it is the habitual practice of holy conduct and
the attainment of an indelible holy character.
" This festal assembly of angels and perfected spirits reminds
us of several similar gatherings in the Apocalypse with which
»this passage seems to be in parallelism: vi. 9-1 1; xiv. 1-5;
XX. 4-6.
" In all these passages the martyrs of the martyr age of the
Church are conceived as the first fruits, or the first-born, or par-
takers of the first resurrection. They have been faithful and
THE LOGIC OF THE CASE 221
true in their testimony even unto death, they have kept them-
selves undefiled and without blemish from contact with idolatry,
they are virgins as the bride of the Messiah and have not com-
mitted fornication with heathen gods, they are clad in the white
robes of the priests of God, they live and reign with Christ in
the heavenly Zion throughout the complete period of His medi-
atorial reign, they share the Redeemer's blessedness and glory.
But for all this it is not said that they cease to progress in
sanctification, or that they have attained moral perfection, or
that they have gained that Christlikeness and Godlikeness which
is the final goal of redemption and which alone can come ac-
cording to the apostle John, when the Messiah is manifested in
glory at His second advent when the saints are manifested with
Him. Then for the first time the rays of the sun of righteous-
ness will shine through every saint and not a mote will be found
in those sunbeams
" The invariable statement of the New Testament is that the
second advent of Jesus Christ is the goal of sanctification. In
addition to the passages already considered, I would refer to
Rom, viii. 29, 30; I. Cor. i. 8; Eph. iv. 13-16; Phil. i. 6; I.
Thess. iii. 13; v. 23; H. Peter iii. 13, 14. There is not a pas-
sage in the Bible that teaches either directly or indirectly im-
mediate sanctification at death, or that the completion once and
for all of the holy advancement of mankind is accomplished in
a moment of time by a magical transformation in the dying
hour. The Christian Church has always taught the doctrine of
the Middle State between death and the resurrection; and of
progress in the holy life after death, in that state. There have
been those who taught the sleep of pious souls. Dr. Birch
seems to hold that opinion, for he said in his argument : 'All
dead Christians are asleep. When we are asleep we show the
rest which consists in the inaction of mind and body' (Stenog-
rapher's Report, p. 631). Others have held that departed spirits
pass a dreamlike existence, with powers of memory of the life in
this world, and of anticipation of the resurrection of the body
and the judgment-seat of God ; but without real activity or
change of condition throughout the entire period. But these
opinions have always been rejected by the orthodox." {The De~
fence, pp. 170-174.)
222 ARGUMENT AGAINST SUSTAINING THE APPEAL
" I have gone over all the Charges made against the doctrines
set forth in my Inaugural Address. I have shown that the doc-
trines taught by me are not contrary to the Westminster Con-
fession, but that they are in accord therewith ; that they are not
irreconcilable with the Scriptures, but are the product of a
comprehensive study of the Scriptures." {^The Defence,"^. 181.)
The Presbytery of New York yielded to the argu-
ments of the defendant. The prosecution did not con-
vince the Presbytery that their premises were valid, or
that their conclusions from these premises were valid.
It will thus appear to the court of the Assembly that
the appellants did not make out their case in the
court of the Presbytery. They failed to set forth the
facts in their specifications. They failed to prove their
minor premises in Charges I. and II. They failed to
prove their major premises in Charges IV., V., VI.
They failed to prove relevancy in Charges I., II., III.^
IV., and V. Therefore the inevitable logic of the case
was an acquittal.
One practical word, ministers and elders, before we
pass from this subject. I have shown you the position
into which these prosecutors are endeavoring to force me
and to force you. Granted that I made a mistake in
that I did not insist, in my preliminary objections, that
they ought to have inserted the facts in their specifica-
tions ; granted that I made a mistake in my preliminary
objections that I did not argue the question of relevancy
there; granted that the Presbytery made a mistake in
that they did not settle all these preliminary questions
before they went to trial ; I have given you the reason
why this was not done ; I have shown you that, not-
withstanding all that has been said by the prosecution,
all these questions were actually argued by them as well
as by the defendant before the court of the Presbytery.
THE LOGIC OF THE CASE 223
Now I ask you even if all these mistakes have been
made, is it fair, is it righteous, is it honorable, for them
to try to force the court of this General Assembly, in
despite of the facts that I have set before you, to put
the case in this form, that the appellee has admitted the
facts, the Presbytery has admitted that the charges are
relevant, and therefore it had no alternative, and you
have no alternative than to vote for the conviction?
2. The New Matter introduced by Dr. Lampe.
The next topic that I would have to consider in its
order, would be the new matter introduced by Dr. Lampe.
If I should go into that matter fully and expose all
the injustice of that procedure, and use the argument
that I have, it would take fully an hour. I think under
the circumstances of the case it is not necessary for me
to read those specifications before you or to go into any
argument upon this part of the case. I trust that whole
question to the good sense of the house.
[The appellee was under the impression that the Gen-
<eral Assembly would be consistent with itself and would
not sustain this specification of the appeal. But in the
rush of the final vote there was no discrimination. It
seems necessary therefore to give to the public the argu
ment which he had prepared for the General Assembly.
The report of the Judicial Committee which was adopt-
-ed, and upon which the appellee relied, was as follows :
" Rev. Dr. Baker : Mr. Moderator, it gives me great satisfaction
to be able to say that this report which the committee are about
to present is entirely agreeable to the parties concerned in this
case ; and, being so, I hope and am convinced that it will be cor-
dially approved by this court, and that we may enter without de-
bate upon the order prescribed.
" The judicial committee respectfully recommends the follow-
224 ARGUMENT AGAINST SUSTAINING THE APPEAL
ing order in the determination of the appeal which has been en-
tertained by the General Assembly.
" First. Inasmuch as the reading of the record in the case has
been by consent of the parties omitted, except such particulars
thereof as they may deem necessary in presenting their respect-
ive arguments, the parties shall at once be heard, the appellants
opening and closing the case, four and one-half hours being al-
lotted to the appellants and seven hours to the appellee.
" Second. The members of the judicatory appealed from, namely,
the Presbytery of New York, shall then be heard, two hours be-
ing allowed for this purpose, and ten minutes being granted to
each speaker, it being understood, however, that any member
shall have the privilege of yielding his time to another member.
" Third. Members of the General Assembly shall then be heard
for two hours, speeches being limited to ten minutes, according
to the standing rule.
" Fourth. Thereafter the vote shall be taken upon each specifi-
cation of error alleged, the form of the question being : Shall the
specification of error be sustained ?
"Dr. Baker : Let me say — I say it for the sake of the court,
not for the sake of the parties who, of course, perfectly under-
stand it — that it may be perfectly understood at the outset, I de-
sire to say to the court that the appellants will introduce in their
opening all the matter which they propose in arguing the case.
No new matter whatsoever will be introduced in the closing argu-
ment. It is proper that the court should understand this. As I
say the parties understand it themselves perfectly."
Against this decision the appellants objected as fol-
lows :
" Col. McCooK : Moderator, Fathers, and Brethren : Upon the
suggestion of the judicial committee, and with the assent of the
parties, it has been arranged that the appellant shall present in
their opening argument their entire case, with citation of author-
ities, and so much ot the record as they rely upon.
" The appellant gladly acts upon this suggestion of the judicial
committee, as it is likely, in this case, to save the time of the
Assembly. This procedure is, however, contrary to that which
has, so far as I can learn, always been followed in ecclesiastical
THE LOGIC OF THE CASE 225
courts, where the appellant has been permitted to dispose of his
time and present his case, opening and closing his argument in
the manner which commended itself to his best judgment within
the limit of time fixed by the court, and especially has this been
done under our Book of Discipline, wherein section 99 provides
in sub-section 2 that ' the parties shall be heard, the appel-
lant opening and closing.'
" In assenting to this suggestion of the judicial committee, the
appellant, to prevent the establishment of a precedent which
might work to the disadvantage of parties in other cases of ap-
peal, calls attention to the matter, and now publicly, so that the
facts may appear upon the stenographic record of the judicial
proceedings, showing its exceptional character, and so that a
stipulation, as to order of proceedings, in a single case, shall not
be quoted or establish a precedent contrary to the direct, affirm-
ative, constitutional right of appellants, under section 99 of the
Book of Discipline, to open and close the argument and as they
may think best."
This shows that the General Assembly ruled that the
case should be presented in the Assembly in the same
way in which the defendant urged that it ought to have
been presented in this Presbytery.]
This is the history of this affair.
Before the defendant began his defence he said to the
Moderator that he would like to ask of the Prosecuting
Committee whether they have closed their argument.
To this Mr. McCook replied : " We have except in
answer to yours." Then Dr. Briggs said :
" I have a reason for asking that question, Mr. Moderator and
Brethren. We notice that there are several members of the
Committee who have not yet spoken — especially Dr. Lampe,
who is the Biblical scholar of the Committee. He has not yet
spoken on the question of the charges. If he has anj^thing further
to say I think it should be said now, in order that I may have an
opportunity to reply to it. I do not want them to go over this
matter a second time, and after I have made my defence. I wish
to make my defence against all the Prosecuting Committee have
226 ARGUMENT AGAINST SUSTAINING THE APPEAL
to say ; and, if Dr. Lampe has anything prepared, as I suspect he
has, it is his duty to present it to the Presbytery now. He has
no right to present anything after I have spoken that he has pre-
pared beforehand in support of the charges. He has only the
right to present afterwards a response to my defence ; and I now
give notice that Dr. Lampe and the Prosecuting Committee will
be held strictly to that. He has no right to traverse the whole
case again and introduce new matter against me. If he has any-
thing of that kind to present he should submit it now. I have a
reason for this, Mr. Moderator and Brethren, because I suspect
that the policy of this Committee is now exactly the same as that
which they pursued in Portland, at the General Assembly, last
May. Oh, they had very, very little to say ; they would not
occupy much time ; they would take any time that the General
Assembly saw fit to give them. They did not take very much
time at the beginning, to be sure, but after I had finished, then
they came in with new material, which I had no opportunity
whatever to respond to. Now, I call upon the Committee if they
have anything more to say, to say it now, or forever after hold
their peace.
" Mr. McCooK : I hoped that I would not have to say another
word on this floor, and I should not have done so were it not for
the fact that Prof. Briggs has raised a question, which of course
there is no objection to his raising, and there is no possible ob-
jection to answering it at this time, although it might better
have been raised in the ordinary course of procedure.
" The Prosecuting Committee do not know at this time of any-
thing else that we wish to present in the opening of this argu-
ment. Under the provision of the Book of Discipline the Pros-
ecuting Committee are charged with the responsibility, which is
a great disadvantage, of opening the case ; then the accused is
to be heard, and the Prosecuting Committee are entitled to close
the case. And, if any attempt is made by the Prosecuting Com-
mittee to do anything which the Book does not permit and
which is not right, I feel that the judicatory would be safe in
expecting an objection to be raised to it by Prof. Briggs, and it
would be fairly passed upon at the time when such a question is
raised. We do not know at this time of anything additional
that we wish to present in advance in opening the matter, or we
THE LOGIC OF THE CASE 227
would have presented it. What will be developed by Prof.
Briggs' argument — as we are also in the unfortunate position of
not being mind readers — we cannot anticipate; but whatever it
becomes our duty to answer to, growing out of his argument, I
feel assured that the house may depend upon our making the
best possible answer in our power.
"The Moderator: I think the matter is understood.
" Dr. Field: Then do we understand that the reply of the
Prosecuting Committee will be strictly confined to the line of
defence .''
" Mr. McCooK : It will be confined strictly to the discussion
before the house. That is all the restriction that will be made
upon us.
"The Moderator: The Prosecuting Committee, I believe,
have a right to be heard after the defence.
" Dr Brown : The statement has just been made by the
spokesman of the Prosecuting Committee that the Book of
Discipline provides that the prosecution shall begin, and shall
be followed by the defendant, and then that the prosecution
have a right to close the case. I wish to ask the Committee to
point out the section of the Book which contains that provision.
I am not aware that there is any such provision.
" The Moderator : That is an order which is usually fol-
lowed.
" Dr. Brown : I ask that the section in the Book which pro-
vides that procedure be pointed out.
"A Member: They cannot do it. There is no such section
in the Book.
"The Moderator: I think there is nothing in the Book
which bears upon that, but this is the order that is generally
pursued.
" Dr. Brown : Will you, Mr. Moderator, then call attention to
the fact that there is no provision in the Book which points out
the procedure stated by the gentleman who represents the Pros-
ecuting Committee?
" The Moderator : That will be understood, I suppose. The
question now is upon taking recess.
" Dr. Briggs : Just one word, Mr. Moderator, I wanted to
call the attention of the house to the situation in order to guard
my rights in the premises. I simply desire to state now that if
228 ARGUMENT AGAINST SUSTAINING THE APPEAL
any injustice is done in the opening up of a new line of argu-
ment, that at the proper time I will throw myself upon the jus-
tice of this body, relying upon their sense of what is right and
just to give me a fair opportunity to reply.
"The Moderator: I think the house will do that without
doubt." (Stenographicai Report, pp. 754-759.)
After completing his argument Dr. Briggs said :
" Before the prosecution proceeds I wish to have some rules
adopted by the house. It is very evident from the Book of Dis-
cipline that they have no right to present any further argument.
I may say that I would not myself make this objection were it
not necessary as a party. The only provision of the Book of
Discipline on this subject is, ' And then the parties themselves
shall be heard.' The prosecution have no right of rebuttal, ac-
cording to the Book. I make that point, Mr. Moderator, and I
shall ask a ruling upon it — that the prosecution have no right of
rebuttal, according to the Book. I am perfectly willing to make
no objection to their speaking in rebuttal for a reasonable time,
provided they ask that privilege of the house, and the house
grants.it. I am not objecting to the prosecution having a right
of rebuttal, if the house gives it to them ; but I do object to
their assuming that they have a right according to the Book.
The prosecution, as you will remember, have insisted on the
letter of the law from the beginning. When I have in the course
of the argument called your attention to precedents of our
courts, they have said, ' Oh, we have a new Book of Discipline ;
we must stick closely to the new Book.' Now they are in ex-
actly the fix that they have put me in all the way through. They
have asked the pound of flesh, and up to this time you have
given it to them. The question now is, whether they shall have
the blood also. Now, Mr. Moderator, I ask your ruling as to
whether they have that right. If the moderator decides they
have the right, I shall appeal to the house. Then if the house
decides in my favor I shall not object to a motion that they have
a certain time given them. But I shall ask, to save time, that there
shall be a ruling to this effect : That the prosecution be required
to limit themselves strictly to rebuttal; that they shall not be
allowed to traverse the whole case and bring in a new argument
against me, and force me to prepare a reply at this late time
THE LOGIC OF THE CASE 229
when my strength is well-nigh exhausted and when the patience
of this house is well-nigh exhausted. I called upon them, you
remember, at the conclusion of their argument, to know if they
had anything more to say, and, if so, to say it; so that I might
know all there was against me, and might be able to reply to it.
And I very much believe, from their procedure in the higher
court last May, and from certain other things that they have
claimed upon this floor, that they will claim the right to do ex-
actly what they please. That is the right they have claimed all
the time, and it is a right which I, as a party, cannot concede at
this time. There is one other point, Mr. Moderator, and that is
that they shall be distinctly prohibited from using in this rebut-
tal any material that they have prepared prior to the delivery of
my argument. I apprehend that a ver>- large portion of the
argument of Dr. Lampe has been prepared for months and
months before I appeared in ray defence. I claim the justice of
this house. I ask no indulgence and no mercy from any one.
I ask the justice of this house,.that they shall be prohibited
from bringing in here at this stage of the argument anything
not prepared in answer to my argument here, thus forcing you
to go into Christmas week and hold sessions of this court, when
we are all exhausted, and when some members of the court must
retire and lose their vote in order to save their health or their
lives. I claim that it is not just for them to bring in at this
stage a long argument which was prepared months and months
ago. If, with these restrictions and this understanding, they
can be allowed to speak for a limited time, I shall not object ;
but unless these restrictions are made, I object. I ask you, Mr.
Moderator, to please rule on my first point.
" Mr. McCooK : Dr. Briggs is quite right in saying that the
Book of Discipline provides no procedure upon this particular
point. It is the universal custom, so far as I can learn, in every
court — ecclesiastical, civil, or criminal— that the person bringing
the charge, or the prosecution— such as the prosecuting commit-
tee in this case— should open their case ; the defence shall then
be heard, and the prosecution have the right of reply. That
procedure, I believe, is universal. It is not in terms expressed
in our Book of Discipline. So far as the presentation of this
case is concerned on the part of the prosecution, we have
opened it, and we have presented our evidence. We have
230 ARGUMENT AGAINST SUSTAINING THE APPEAL
no desire to suggest any new evidence. But we do claim, as a
matter of justice and of fairness and of right, that now, when the
defendant has been heard in his defence — and, of course, we
could not anticipate what he would say to this court, and courts
generally do not expect the prosecution to anticipate, but give
them the right to hear the argument and to present their argu-
ment in reply — that we have a right to present our reply. As I
have said several times, I assume that this court will confine our
closing argument to the presentation of our view in answer to
what the defendant has presented, and only to such of his evi-
dence as may have been touched on for the first time. In other
words, we wish the right — we think it is our right, and we feel very
sure this Presbytery will grant us the right — to answer fully and
properly, and nothing else, the arguments which have been pre-
sented here by the accused. That we claim, and we think it is
in the interest of fairness and of the time of this body and of
the parties, and of all concerned, that for the saving of an hour
or two, or a few hours, the prosecuting committee should not at
this time be deprived of their right to make their answer. This
is the only time we will ever have, I hope, the opportunity of
presenting an answer to Dr. Briggs' argument. If we do not
make that answer here and now, we will never have the oppor-
tunity. In fairness and justice and right, we claim that we
should be heard, and we do not believe that it is to the interest
of the prosecution or in the interest of the time of the court or
of the defendant that at this time the discussion should be cut
oflf unduly. We have not interrupted him. I think the house
will bear me out in that statement. I have been very careful
never to interject a word when Dr. Briggs was speaking unless
it was absolutely necessary. We have heard him fully, and now
common justice and the rights of the Church which we claim to
represent, demand that we should be heard with the same con-
sideration, with the same unlimited time, if necessary — although
we are considering the time and will keep ourselves within all
proper limits, but we think we have that right. We do not ask
it as a favor. It is a question of right in the trial of such a
cause. Of course we submit everything to the ruling of the
house, subject to proper exception; but we do think it is our
right, and we think it is in the interest of all the parties that
we should be heard, and heard fully.
THE LOGIC OF THE CASE 231
" Dr. Field : Mr. Moderator, you have already decided the
question, and Mr. McCook agrees entirely with you that the
prosecution have no right whatever under the Book, and Dr.
Briggs is ready to grant it as ia privilege. Now, why all this
discussion ?
"The Moderator: The Moderator is impelled to decide that
the question of order is not well taken, and for these reasons :
"First : That the usage in such cases is against the point
which is raised.
"Second: That usage is based upon the law of the church
governing complaints and appeals, which distinctly gives us this
order of the opening and the closing being on the part of those
who present their case — the greater including the less.
" Third : That the parties cannot have been said to have
been heard until the prosecution has had a full opportunity to
present'its whole case. It has only presented a part of that case
so far. It has taken a very small portion of time compared
with that accorded to the defendant. You have heard the de-
fendant patiently and fully, as you should have done ; and now,
in the view of the Moderator, it is only fair, it is only in accord-
ance with our usage and with the principle of our Book, that
the prosecution should be heard fully, but not presenting new
matter.
" Dr. Briggs : Mr. Moderator, I shall have to appeal from
your decision— not, as I said before, that I wish to prevent the
prosecution
"The Moderator (interposing) : Dr. Briggs, you have already
been heard.
" Dr. Briggs : I wish to state the grounds of my appeal.
"The Moderator : If you wish to appeal, your appeal will be
put to the House without debate.
" Dr. Briggs : I have a right to state the grounds, haven't I }
" The Moderator : There can be no debate. Do you appeal
from the decision }
" Dr. Briggs : I do appeal from the decision.
" The Moderator : I will put the question in this way, so
there can be no misunderstanding about it. Those in favor of
sustaining the decision of the Moderator, will say aye — those
opposed to the decision of the Moderator Sustained. '
232 ARGUMENT AGAINST SUSTAINING THE APPEAL
Dr. Lampe then proceeded to make the chief argu-
ment for the prosecution, covering the whole ground of
the case and under the guise of a rebuttal introducing a
large amount of new matter. To this new matter the
defendant made several exceptions as follows :
[See The Case against Prof. Briggs, Part II.,
pp. 143-153, where these exceptions are given.]
The Moderator also called attention to the fact that
Dr. Lampe was exceeding the limits.
" It is very difficult for the Moderator to bear in mind all the
evidence that has been submitted, but I am a little in doubt
whether these authorities were me^ntioned in your evidence, Dr.
Lampe.
" Dr. Lampe : I am speaking to this point, that the Church
was
" The Moderator : I think you are giving ground for an
exception.
"Mr. McCoOK : Dr. Lampe must of course answer the argu-
ments presented by Dr. Briggs on the question under discussion.
He cited a great many authorities upon those subjects, and in illus-
tration of the position of the Church Dr. Lampe follows that
line. If he trenches in the slightest degree on what is right, an
exception should be made, as has been made by Dr. Briggs, and
it would be quite proper ; but Dr. Lampe must have liberty of
illustration in answer to the argument that was taken on the
other side. • '
"Dr. Van Dyke: Mr. Moderator: I think your exception is
certainly wise and just ; for not only are there new evidences,
but they have not the slightest thing in the world to do with in-
errancy. Dr. Lampe is discussing the question of inspiration and
religious infallibility, which has never been called in question.
"• Dr. Briggs : I am not going to interrupt Dr. Lampe in the
slightest degree, nor would I have .said a word if the Moderator
had not spoken, preferring to reserve the right of exception until
the close of his argument, as I did to-day ; but you will remem-
ber that I was compelled by the ruling of the house at the begin-
ning, against my own judgment, to put m your hands all the
evidence that I was going to use and I did it. Every citation
THE LOGIC OF THE CASE 233
that I made I put into the hands of the other side, that they
might verify it and use it, and they have had all the advantage
of that. Now you observe that Dr. Lampe is bringing in a large
amount of evidence, of which I had no notification then, and
which I have had no opportunity to consider, and which you see
it is probable I will not be able to consider at all.
"The Moderator: An exception will be entered if you
desire it.
" Dr. Briggs : Yes, sir ; I desire an exception." (Sienograph-
ical Report, p. 121 5.)
After the conclusion of the argument of Dr. Lampe,
Dr. Van Dyke said :
" I de&ire to ofTer a motion, Mr. Moderator, and without re-
mark, as follows :
" Resolved, That in view of the fact that the Moderator has
ruled that the Prosecuting Committee in closing their argument
should not introduce new evidence or traverse new ground and
that they have done so, an opportunity should be granted to the
defendant to reply, if he desires, and to close the case." ....
Dr. Alexander said :
" Mr. Moderator r When Dr. Briggs intimated a suspicion that
the Prosecuting Committee might be holding back deliberately
with testimony or evidence in order to crush him with it after
the opportunity for response had gone by, I resented that suspi-
cion, and if it had been in order I should have risen in my place
and asked him to withdraw those words, because it seemed to
me an unworthy suspicion. Now that the suspicion seems to be
iustified by the event, I am at a loss what to say. I am puzzled and
distressed. The members of this Prosecuting Committee are my
personal friends ; I cannot believe that there is one of them that
would consciously do an injustice — I won't believe it. But I
cannot shrink from the fact that a wrong has been done in some
way; and the more I think of it, and the more I think of the de-
fendant, from whom I differ so widely, worn out and weak and
suffering from this terrific strain, required now to meet this fresh
assault — why, the more every drop of Anglo-Saxon blood in me
protests against it. We cannot remedy the wrong. All that we
234 ARGUMENT AGAINST SUSTAINING THE APPEAL
can do is to give the defendant, if he desires it (I hope he will
not desire it), an opportunity to meet this fresh evidence and
this fresh argument ; giving him reasonable time to prepare his
defence, and. if need be, givmg the prosecution the last word ; I
should not object to that at all. But having spent so much
time, we cannot afford to seem even to do an injustice to any
one.
The Moderator : " The Moderator understands that, per-
haps without any intention to bring in new evidence, quotations
were made in the way of illustration from certain authors,
although strictly speaking their names should have been sub-
mitted before; and Dr. Briggs has met that point already by
takmg two exceptions, and of course he reserves his rights in
view of the carrying up of the case to a higher court, and it
might all be conserved there. But if Dr. Briggs chooses to make
answer to any of these points that he considers to be new evi-
dence, or that are actually new evidence, he has a right to do so.
(Stenographical Report, pp 1343- 1344.)
" Dr. Van Dyke : It is quite evident that new matter has been
introduced. (Cries of No ! No !) Those who do not yet see it
will see it when the court comes to vote upon it. So it is simply
a matter of fairness and justice that we should allow the defend-
ant, if he wishes it, to reply. It would be an unheard-of thing in
any civil court that a prosecution should be allowed to traverse
new ground and that the accused should not be allowed to be
heard or to offer evidence in rebuttal. It is a thing to cause the
blood of an Anglo-Saxon to boil within him, every drop of it,
too. Moreover, Mr. Moderator, it is not simply that new mat-
ter has been introduced, but that statements which have been
made by the defendant again and again upon this floor in respect
to doctrines which he rejects, have been again attributed to him.
And I maintain that .... It is simply a matter of fairness
and candor that we should make this offer to Dr. Briggs, whether
he will accept it or not, for the sake of the honor of this house,
and in the way of decency." (pp. 1351-2.)
After considerable debate, Dr. Briggs, by the consent
of the prosecution and by the unanimous vote of the
house, was heard. He said :
THE LOGIC OF THE CASE 235
" The Biblical scholar (and may I also say, the historian ?) of
the prosecution has spoken. He has done precisely what the
defendant, prior to the delivery of the argument for the defence,
intimated to the Presbytery that he would do. He has disre-
garded the evidence as set forth in the Amended Charges and
submitted to the Presbytery, and has introduced a large amount
of new evidence. He has ignored the case as presented by the
real chairman of the prosecution, as well as by the ostensible
chairman, in their opening arguments. He has not considered
the argument for the defence as worthy of rebuttal. He has
introduced such a large amount of new matter as to make an
entirely new case. The ostensible chairman of the prosecution
promised that the prosecution would introduce no new matter.
But this promise, like many others from that same source, was
a disguise of its fulfilment. Dr. Lampe has done precisely what
was promised and agreed he should not do. He has trampled
under foot the rights of the defendant, the precedents which
govern ail trials, and the rulings of this court. The injustice
and the wrong have been done. The court has permitted them.
The argument goes up on the Stenographical Report to the
higher courts to the injury of the defence. What shall the de-
fendant do under the circumstances ? Shall he claim the right
to make a new argument against this new case ? He might justly
do so. And yet the time already given to this trial has been so
extended, the strength and patience of the court have been so
strained, the health of some of the dearest friends of the defend-
ant has become so imperilled, and his own vigor is so much
impaired, that he does not hesitate to say that he would rather
be convicted than undertake a new argument at this stage. It
has come to this pass, that members of the court are saying. If
such things can be done in the name of the Presbyterian Church
in the United States of America, it costs more to be a Presby-
terian than it is worth.
" It is necessary, however, that I should say a few words."
He then went on to show in a few examples the
great injustice that had been done. (See T/ie Defence,
pp. 184-185, 189-192.) The action of the Presbytery-
was as follows (Stenographic Report, pp. 1377-1378) :
236 ARGUMENT AGAINST SUSTAINING THE APPEAL
" Dr. George Alexander : If it be in order I move that the
Committee of Prosecution have the opportunity to close the
case, if they desire to do so.
" The Moderator : I think the case should close here. The
Moderator decides that the case is now closed.
" Dr. C. L. Thompson : May we now take up from the table
the resolutions that were offered by Dr. Wylie as to the order of
procedure ?
" Mr. McCoOK : I do not wish to say a word further than
simply to record a formal exception to the ruling of the Moder-
ator as to the matter being closed without the committee being
further heard.
" Dr. Sutton ; Take an appeal to the house.
" The Moderator : What is Mr. McCook's idea in regard
to it?
"Mr. McCooK : I cannot remove your decision. It was sug-
gested that we be heard, and you decided that we should not be
heard. I simply wish to enter an exception to that decision and
ask that it be noted upon the records.
"The Moderator: I will recall that decision for a moment
in order to ask a question, — on what ground the committee
should desire now to be heard further.
" Mr. McCooK : As I stated before, simply as a matter of
order. We do not wish to say one word in reply to what Dr.
Briggs has said ; but, as I said — not just now, but when we had
the floor before recess — as a matter of order I thought it was
our right to reply; but as the Moderator. has decided that we
should not have that right, I simply wish to take an exception.
J" The Moderator: The Moderator is very clearly of the
view already embodied in his ruling, that the prosecuting com-
mittee had the right to open and to close — to be fully heard ;
and that they should close, provided no new matter should be
introduced. New matter having been introduced in the view
of the Moderator, Dr. Briggs has now made reply. The Moder-
ator's view is, and his decision is, that the case is now closed.
" Dr. Booth : You allow the exception, of course ?
"The Moderator: Certainly."
Judge, ye Ministers and Elders of the Court, whether
the prosecution suffered a grievance in this matter or
THE LOGIC OF THE CASE 237
whether they did not do the defendant an irreparable
wrong and give the Presbytery of New York sufficient
reason for censuring them for a breach of faith and a vio-
lation of the rulings of the court.
(3). Prejudice.
It is alleged that there was " manifestation of preju-
dice in the conduct of the case by Dr. Geo. Alexander,
Rev. Antonio Arrighi, Dr. Henry M. Field, Dr. Thomas
S. Hastings, and Dr. Henry J, Van Dyke." (IV. 2). Also,
" T-hat Rev. Francis Brown, D.D., Rev. Henry M. Field,
D.D., Rev. Thomas S. Hastings, D.D., Rev. J. Hall Mcllvaine,
D.D., and Rev. Henry Van Dyke, D.D., sat and deliberated in
the trial of this case and voted to acquit the said accused, upon
each and every specification and charge, after manifestations of
prejudice in the conduct of the case, on the part of the said
members was charged in the appeal to and sustained by the
General Assembly of 1892." (IV. 5.)
Also
" In this, that sundry Directors, Officers and Professors of
Union Theological Seminary, to wit : Rev. Francis Brown, D.D.,
Rev. Edward L. Clark, D.D., Rev. Charles R. Gillett, D.D., Rev.
Thomas S. Hastings, D.D., Rev. J. Hall Mcllvaine, D.D., Rev.
Philip Schaff, D.D., Rev. W. M. Smith, D.D., Rev. Marvin R.
Vincent, D.D., and William A. Wheelock, Esq., sat and deliber-
ated in the said trial and voted to acquit the said accused upon
each and ever)' specification and charge, said Directors, Officers
and Professors having previously approved and published the
said Inaugural Address, as appears in the first edition which
bears the imprint : ' Printed for The Union Theological Semi-
nary, New York, 1891,' 'Copyright, 1891, by The Union Theo-
logical Seminary,' and as also appears in the second edition of
said Inaugural .Address, which was also 'Copyright. 1891, byThe
Union Theological Seminary,' which said Inaugural Address
contained the alleged erroneous doctrines for the holding and
publishing of which doctrines the accused was then on trial."
(IV. 6.)
238 ARGUMENT AGAINST SUSTAINING THE APPEAL
Dr. George Alexander is in your presence. He is
able to speak for himself. He needs no defence from
me.
The Rev. Antonio Arrighi, the faithful missionary to
the Italian population of New York, is not present in the
Assembly, but he has spoken for himself in a recent
letter to the Evangelist, as follows :
" As an appeal is to be made to the General Assembly in the
case of Dr. Briggs, and one of the arguments stated in that ap-
peal is that some of the members of the court that tried and
acquitted Dr. Briggs were moved so to do because prejudiced,
and my name is used in that argument, I wish to say : That I do
not know from what motives others were led to vote for acquittal,
but as far as I am myself concerned, I assert that I voted as I
did because, after having heard the arguments on both sides, I
was fully persuaded that the Prosecuting Committee had not
proven nor sustained any of the charges or specifications, and I
voted as I did because I had made my vote a subject of earnest
prayer, and I believe that I was guided by the Spirit to vote as I
did. I may state here that my vote was not in the least influ-
enced by any other cause, but only by an intelligent sense of jus-
tice. During or before the trial of Dr. Briggs not a word was
said to me by any of the friends of Dr. Briggs to influence me
to be favorable to him. Not such, however, was the case with
the supporters of the prosecution ; one of the strongest friends
of the Committee of Prosecution will recall to mind that he
called me to his office and tried to have me look upon the case
in the same light as he did. And another equally strong friend
of the prosecution called at my church and begged hard to in-
duce me to stay away from the court so that I might lose the
right to vote. His reason for this request was that he himself
was obliged to be away. I do not know what right the Commit-
tee of Prosecution had thus to use my name as a prejudiced
person ; however, I will say, that no man, no committee, how-
ever able it may be, has any right to pass judgment upon the
motive for action of any man ; and in this they show how weak
their case must be. Besides the reasons already stated, I was
moved to vote as I did because, above all, I love the Church to
THE LOGIC OF THE CASE 239
which r belong, and earnestly desire her peace and prosperity.
It seems to me that the devil has been laughing at us long
enough, and the world has been saying, ' See how those breth-
ren quarrel with each other.' I therefore hope that the Gen-
eral Assembly will put a stop to all such sneers by stopping any
further proceeding in this unfortunate affair. Thus it will com-
pel the world to say, ' See how these brethren love each other,
and how peacefully they work for the upbuilding the cause of
Christ.'
" Yours truly, AntONIO Arrighi,
" Pastor of the Italian Evangelical Church.
" 155 Worth Street, New York."
The following distinguished divines are accused by
these prosecutors of prejudice :
Dr. Henry M. Field, the editor of the Evangelist ; Dr.
Thomas S. Hastings, the President of Union Theolog-
ical Seminary ; Dr. Henry J. Van Dyke, pastor of the
Brick Church. If such men as these can be charged
with prejudice on the flimsy grounds of the words cited
out of their historical occasions, where will you be able
to find unprejudiced judges?
It is alleged that the General Assembly at Portland
sustained a specification of prejudice against Drs. Brown,
Field, Hastings, Mcllvaine, and Van Dyke. It is unfor-
tunately true that the Assembly at Portland did all that
the prosecution asked them to do and put this imputa-
tion upon these five distinguished names. But granted
that these five were prejudiced in 1891, does it follow
that they were prejudiced in 1892 ? How can you prove
that they did not accept the rebuke of the Assembly
with meekness and sit in the trial in a judicial frame of
mind ? There is no law of the Church which excludes
them from their seat as judges in the case.
It is alleged that Professors and Directors of the Union
Theological Seminary, nine in number, having approved
240 ARGUMENT AGAINST SUSTAINING THE APPEAL
and published the Inaugural Address, ought not to have
sat as judges in the case. But this is a misstatement of
the fact. It is not true that the publication of the
Inaugural on the authority of the Directors implies ap-
proval of the doctrines taught in the Inaugural on the
part of any of the nine professors and directors. I
would not presume to say that these professors and
directors approved of any of the views stated in the
Inaugural. They approved it as suitable for publica-
tion— and that is all. It does not imply that they could
not sit as judges in the case and decide according to the
evidence. There is no law by which the friends and
associates of the accused should be excluded from the
court of the Presbytery in his trial.
If the court of the Presbytery had been of the nature of
a jury in a criminal court, the challenges would not have
been all on the one side. The defendant might justly
have challenged those members of the court who went
to Detroit and voted to veto his transfer to the Edward
Robinson Chair of Biblical Theology. He might justly
have challenged those who took sides with the prosecu-
tion against their Presbytery before the last General As-
sembly. He might justly have challenged those who
on the floor of the Presbytery and elsewhere had shown
personal animosity to the accused and extreme preju-
dice against his opinions. I shall not mention names.
Were the professors of Union Seminary prejudiced and
the professors of Princeton Seminary unprejudiced ? Was
the editor of the Evangelist prejudiced and the editor of
the Observer unprejudiced ? Were those who refused to
recognize the rights of the General Assembly to veto the
transfer prejudiced and those who strove with all their
might to carry the veto unprejudiced ? There can be but
one answer to these questions by unprejudiced parties.
THE LOGIC OF THE CASE 241
The law of the Church does not permit any such
challenge of the members of the court. It is assumed
that every Presbyter is to decide in the fear of God, in
the presence of Christ, and under the guidance of the
Holy Spirit, and that the judges will judge righteous
judgment. The reality sadly departs from the ideal.
But it is not equitable to consider any pretended depart-
ures on the one side, without also considering alleged
departures on the other. As was shown in the argu-
ment against Entertaining the Appeal, the defendant has
been compelled to argue in every case before courts
which were unfriendly to him, and which have again and
again acted against his interests and done him grave in-
justice and wrong. Doubtless the civil courts are in
advance of the ecclesiastical courts in the protection of
parties against prejudice and bias. The time will surely
come when no man will be put in jeopardy of his
ecclesiastical life in a court which is unfriendly to him
and where the influence of parties may determine the
verdict in defiance of justice and right. The time will
surely come when the defendant may by a challenge
rule all unfriendly persons and hostile partisans from the
court which tries him. The time will surely come when
a man cannot be deprived of his ecclesiastical life by a
mere majority of such members as now constitute the
courts of the Church. But as things now are, the court
of the Presbytery of New York will compare quite
favorably with any other courts which have thus far had
jurisdiction of the case. And this General Assembly
will have to take great pains to purge itself of any sus-
picion of bias, prejudice, or partisanship ere it can safely
undertake to impute such things to the members of the
lower court, and especially to such honorable names as
those mentioned in the specifications of this Appeal.
242 ARGUMENT AGAINST SUSTAINING THE APPEAL
But granting for the sake of argument, that there has
been prejudice on the part of the thirteen names speci-
fied by the Committee, there would still have been ac-
quittal on three of the Charges and there would have
been conviction only by a majority of one on the sixth
Charge, a majority of two on the first Charge, and of
seven on the third Charge. But the General Assembly
could not sustain an objection of prejudice against the
prosecution without giving the defendant also an oppor-
tunity to show prejudice against him. If the three
voters were ruled out who voted against Dr. Briggs in
Detroit, he would still have been acquitted on all but
the third Charge. And it would be quite easy for him
to show that many more than thirteen members of the
court had so committed themselves against him by the
public expression of their opinions, that they had an
invincible prejudice in the case. If you allow the prej-
udice of the members of the court to be considered, it
would be quite easy to show that Dr. Briggs would have
been acquitted by much greater majorities than any that
he received. And if the question of prejudice is to be
considered in connection with the court of the Presbytery,
it must also be considered in the court of the Assembly,
and it will first be necessary to purge this court by chal-
lenges of the parties before you can give a righteous ver-
dict. If you will not allow a challenge in this court you
cannot consistently allow it in the Presbytery.
No valid grounds for sustaining the Appeal have been
presented under this head. The only thing it is
lawful for you to do, if you have a right to take juris-
diction of the case, is to review the evidence and the
arguments of parties and then determine whether the
verdict was in accordance with the evidence or not.
THE FIJ^AL ACTION OF THE PRESBYTERY 243
IV. — The Final Action of the Presbytery.
There are ten specifications of error under three
grounds of appeal relating to the final action of the
Presbytery. It has been shown in the argument against
Entertaining the Appeal that this final action was not
only a verdict of acquittal with its reasons — which alone
can be regarded as a final judgment ; but also action of
the Presbytery in the exercise of its episcopal and legis-
lative functions against which an appeal is unlawful.
We shall find that these ten specifications of error chiefly
relate to such things and that they are irrelevant to the
final judgment and therefore present no valid grounds
of appeal.
[The most of these were referred by the appellee to
the members of the Presbytery of New York for re-
view. But inasmuch as the General Assembly sustained
all these specifications, I shall print the argument against
the specifications which I was prevailed upon by the
Judicial Committee to omit in order to save the time of
the Assembly.]
(i). Attempting to relieve the Committee of further re-
sponsibility in connection with the case.
Manifestation of prejudice in the conduct of the case
is charged :
" In this, that said Presbytery in said final judgment, by at-
tempting to reheve the said Prosecuting Committee from fur-
ther responsibility m connection with this case appears to hinder
and prevent the attainment of the ends of discipline, apparently
aiming to now terminate the said case, and thus secure the same
result that the said Presbytery attempted to reach on November
4th, A.D. iSgt, by voting to dismiss the said case." iW . 3.)
But this action of the Presbytery was not taken dur-
244 ARGUMENT AGAINST SUSTAINING THE APPEAL
ing the trial, but after the trial had been completed and
the vote had been taken and the verdict of acquittal
declared. Therefore it was not a manifestation of prej-
udice in the conduct of the case. Whether the Presby-
tery had a right to relieve the committee of its respon-
sible task or not depends upon the decision of the
question of the original party by the Synod of New
York. If the Synod should decide that the committee
is not independent of Presbytery, then the Presbyter>-
ought to have dismissed them. If the Synod should
decide that they are independent of the Presbytery, then
the Presbytery could not have relieved them of their
responsibility in the case. Whichever way the Synod
may decide does not afTect the rightfulness of the ver-
dict in the final judgment ; but only the rightfulness of
an appeal to the superior courts. Even if the Presby-
tery committed an error here, that is no ground for rep-
resenting prejudice in the trial of the case, and there-
fore it gives no ground for a reversal of the verdict.
This specification of error is therefore irrelevant to the
Appeal.
(2). Fraternal Discussion.
It is alleged that there was manifestation of prejudice
in the conduct of the case :
" In this, that the said Presbytery, in said final judgment, ex-
presses ' an earnest conviction that the grave issues involved in
this case will be more wisely and justly determined by calm in-
vestigation and fraternal discussion than by judicial arraignment
and process.' notwithstanding the fact that the General Assem-
bly directed the case to be tried on the merits thereof and
thereby expressed a no less earnest conviction that the grave
issues involved should be determined by judicial arraignment
and process." (IV. 4.)
This conviction of the Presbytery is an expression of
THE FINAL ACTION OF THE PRESBYTERY 245
the opinion of the Presbytery. It may be a right
opinion or it may be a wrong opinion. This opinion
was not expressed during the trial, but subsequent to
the trial. There is no evidence that this opinion influ-
enced the verdict. It is more reasonable to suppose
that the verdict influenced the opinion. It is not for
the appellee to defend that opinion. He is not re-
sponsible for it. Even if it be a wrong opinion, its error
gives no ground for overturning the verdict. The com-
missioners of the Presbytery of New York should defend
this opinion. It is sufficient for the appellee to defend
the final judgment, the verdict of acquittal. This speci-
fication should not be sustained, because it is irrelevant
to the final judgment.
(3). Approval of the views of the Inaugural.
It is alleged that there was " mistake or injustice in
the decision ":
" In this, that the said final judgment of the said Presbytery,
which disclaims to be an expression of the approval of the
critical or theological views embodied in the said Inaugural
Address, is, in fact, an approval of said critical or theological
views and will have the effect of encouraging the dissemination
of said views and will further increase the present disquietude in
the said Presbyterian Church," etc., etc. (V. 3, 9, 10, 11.)
It is certainly not in the interest of the appellee to
defend the Presbytery of New York against these allega-
tions of error. These statements in the final action of
the Presbytery do an injury to the defendant if to any-
body. For he has a right to object to any questioning
of the rightfulness of his views by the body which
acquitted him. The appellee agrees with the appellants
that the Presbytery did what they ought not to have
done when they made this deliverance. Is the appellee
246 ARGUMENT AGAINST SUSTAINING THE APPEAL
to suffer for it? He suffers from it in the indirect
disapproval of his views which may be inferred from it.
Is it equitable that this error of the Presbytery should
cost him the risk of a reversal of the acquittal ? Look
at the unfair situation in which the appellee is placed.
He admits that in this the Presbytery of New York
committed an error. If it is relevant to the verdict, then
you should sustain it, and if you sustain it you must
sustain the Appeal in part. If you sustain it in part
you may censure the Presbytery, but you have no
ground for disturbing their verdict — for the error was
committed against the defendant, not against the prose-
cution. This error is not relevant to the final judgment.
It was committed by the Presbytery in the exercise of
its episcopal functions, not in the exercise of its judicial
functions. Let the commissioners of the Presbytery
defend this action, the appellee cannot.
But this much the court should consider, that the
prosecution endeavored to force the issue upon the
Presbytery, that they must either approve the views of
the Inaugural, or condemn them by a verdict of guilty
of heresy.
Mr. McCook said in his argument :
" The question meets each one of us, are these doctrines of
Professor Briggs contradictory to the Holy Scriptures and to
the Standards of our Church ? In approving of his teaching, and
you do approve of it, if you vote for an acquittal, you who have
this view will go back to your respective congregations with the
acknowledgment that your view of the Word of God is not the
view of the prophets and apostles, and of Jesus Christ himself.
You are virtually to say to them and to the world that the Bible
is not any longer regarded by you as the only infallible rule of
faith and practice, but that the Reason and the Church are also
fountains of divine authority ; that the words of the Bible do
not convey the inspired truth ; that it is a matter of tempera-
THE FINAL ACTION OF THE PRESBYTERY 247
ment and environment which way of access to God men may
pursue ; that the whole race of man is redeemed, will be justi-
fied, sanctified, glorified, whether they be elected or not, whether
they be heathen or Christian. You will tell them that a man who
teaches all these doctrines should still remain in that ministry
that has been honored by such men as Edwards, and Smith, and
the Hodges, and Adams. And you will collect money for mis-
sions, although you agree that most men will be saved in the
Middle State, even if they die in their sins. You will agree with
me that the issue is of vital importance." (pp. 47-48.)
To this the defendant replied in his Preliminary Re-
marks :
" What members of this court can be misled by the statement
that ' you do approve of the defendant's teaching ' if you vote
for an acquittal ' ? That is not the question before you. The
question is, whether the Charges are true or false, whether the
defendant has taught the doctrines alleged in the Charges, and
whether, if he has, these doctrines conflict with the essential doc-
trines of the Standards named in the Charges. You may disap-
prove of his teaching altogether, and yet you can do no other
than pronounce him innocent so far as any case that the prose-
cution has made against him."
To avoid this false issue, Dr, Geo. Alexander offered
a resolution on December 28, 1892, that
" The Court deems it proper to declare that a vote by any
member of this Court not to sustain the Charges preferred
against Rev. Charles A. Briggs, D.D., does not denote approval
of his theological or critical views, or of the manner in which
they have been advanced, but only a judgment that the specific
charges have not been established."
This resolution was discussed and then laid on the
table until after the vote on the Charges and Specifica-
tions had been taken. Then it was taken from the table
and referred to the committee appointed to prepare the
final action of the Presbytery.
If the resolution had been adopted prior to the taking
248 ARGUMENT AGAINST SUSTAINING THE APPEAL
of the vote, then it might have been urged that the reso-
lution influenced the vote. But in fact the resolution
was not adopted before the taking of the vote, or after
taking the vote, but was referred to a committee, who
substituted for it in their report the following clause :
" Without approving of the positions stated in his In-
augural Address."
Therefore it cannot be maintained that the resolution
influenced the verdict. It must be shown that the ver-
dict would have been reversed by the Presbytery if this
resolution had not been offered, or else you cannot regard
this resolution as a sufificient reason to justify you in
reversing the verdict. This has not been shown. It
cannot be shown.
The Presbytery did wrong, in the estimation of the
defendant, in that this resolution and its substitute in
the final action of the Presbytery is so framed that it
seems to imply a disapproval of the views of the Inau-
gural. The Presbytery should have so framed its
opinion as not to leave it open to this interpretation.
The Presbytery was not called upon in the trial to say
whether they approved the views of the defendant or
disapproved them. The Presbytery was called upon to try
them by the constitution and to determine whether these
views were contra-confessional, or whether they "struck
at the vitals of religion," whether they were heretical.
The Presbytery determined that these views were not
contra-confessional. It did more ; it expressly gave
its opinion that they were extra-confessional ; " the Pres-
bytery does not find that he transgressed the limits of
liberty allowed under our constitution to scholarship and
opinion." Having determined that the views were thus
within the limits of liberty — that is, were extra-confes-
sional and extra-judicial — it had no authority as a court
THE FINAL ACTION OF THE PRESBYTERY 249
to give any judgment whatever upon them, whether of
approval or disapproval.
It is probable that the Presbytery meant by the clause
to which exception is taken, nothing more than a simple
reservation of opinion as to the views stated in the In-
augural Address. If that was its meaning, the Presby-
tery certainly had the right to express such a reservation.
It was within its episcopal jurisdiction so to do. No
wrong has been done the prosecution by this reservation
of opinion. They failed in convincing the Presbytery
that the defendant was guilty. They failed in forcing
the Presbytery to disapprove the views of the defendant.
Let me say a single word here, Mr. Moderator and
brethren. You are in a very delicate position, as it
seems to me, before the Christian world. You will have
to take great care lest in condemning the accused you
approve the theological views of these theologians who
are prosecuting him. For I will undertake to bring out
an enormous catalogue of heresies in the arguments
which they have presented to these courts. Unless you
guard yourselves, in your final decision, against any
approval of these arguments, you will put yourselves in
a very unfortunate position, to justify your action be-
fore the Christian world.
(4). Effort to Convict the Accused by Inference.
It is alleged by the prosecution that there was mis-
take or injustice in the decision of the Presbytery,
" In this, that said final judgment is misleading and
unjust, because it evidently but erroneously aims to set
forth that there has been an effort to convict the accused
by inference or implication." (V. 8.)
But this allegation does not accord with the facts of
the case. The Presbyter^' in its final action states that :
250 ARGUMENT AGx^INST SUSTAINING THE APPEAL
" The Presbytery has kept in mind these established
principles of our polity ' that no man can rightly be
convicted by inference or implication.' "
This is a statement of a principle of law which gov-
erned their own action. It makes no imputation upon
the action or the motives of the prosecution. The Pres-
bytery makes no allegation against them as to inferences
or implications. But the defendant does make such alle-
gations, and these are sustained by their whole conduct
of the case. The prosecution depend absolutely and
alone upon false inferences and invalid implications in
their arguments. So far did they go in such offensive
and unrighteous procedure that in the opinion of the
defendant and of many onlookers they ought to have
received the censure of the Presbytery. They have
earned the censure of the General Assembly and of all
honorable men by their persistent efforts to force their
inferences and implications upon the defendant and upon
the Presbytery.
The attention of the General Assembly is called to
two gross examples of such imputations which were ex-
posed to the Presbytery by the defendant :
" I shall not take the time of the judicatory by calling attention
to the insinuations and statements of larger errors which per-
vade the argument of Mr. McCook, but your attention is called
to the closing section of that argument, in which an attempt is
made to explain all the errors imputed to the defendant by the
root error of Naturalism — which it is said ' in the hands of a more
logical writer than Professor Briggs would be pushed to far more
radical conclusions .... and will soon leave you about as
much exclusiveness as Christians, in having the oracles of God,
as Mahometans or Brahmins have.' " (p. 46.)
" If the prosecution are serious in this statement of the case,
they are convicted out of their own mouth of gross neglect of
duty. If they have here struck at the root of all the errors of
THE FINAL ACTION OF THE PRESBYTERY 251
Dr. Briggs, they certainly ought to have put it in a Charge. If
they made a mistake in the formulation of the original Charges,
why did they not confess their mistake, abandon the old case,
and bring in new Charges under a new case ? That would have
been honest, that would have been manly, that would have been
welcomed by the defendant and all honorable men. But to
bring such a serious accusation into an argument to prove other
Charges, which have been recognized as sufficient for probation,
is to wrong the defendant and to presume upon the patience and
indulgence of the court. This new charge is utterly and abso-
lutely false. It was forged in the brain of its author. It was in-
vented in a diseased mind. You have no right as a court to
consider it. The laws of evidence in all courts, civil and eccle-
siastical, require you to blot out from the argument any and
every reference to other imputed errors than those alleged in
the Charges. These and these aKme the prosecution were en-
titled to prove." ( T/ie Defence, pp. x-xi.)
The other example was in the argument of Dr.
Lampe.
" {b) When Dr. Lampe argues that I teach the errancy of
Jesus, he argues on a much more serious matter than any con-
tained in the Charges, and in such a way which shows that he
knows but little of the true doctrine of the personality of our
adorable Saviour. I am not surprised that a man who can speak
of the hours of prayer and religious meditation, as lonely hours,
should know so little of Jesus Christ. When we are apart from
the world and present with Jesus we have companionsljiip which
IS richer and more glorious than that of all the world beside.
My argument was simply this, that Jesus never said that Moses
wrote the Pentateuch or that Isaiah wrote all of the book which
bears his name ; and that He was not obliged to correct all the
errors of His contemporaries. This argument the prosecution
did not attempt to rebut, they did not refer to it ; but, in place
of rebuttal, charge me with a more serious error than anything
contained in the Charge. How can this court look upon such
conduct with any degree of toleration }
" (c) Almost the entire argument of Dr. Lampe is directed
against the views of rationalistic critics, with the implication
252 ARGUMENT AGAINST SUSTAINING THE APPEAL
that I am responsible for their opinions. The prosecution had
in their hands my printed argument on the authorship of the
Pentateuch and the book of Isaiah. They have not paid the
slightest attention to anything in my argument. As I stated at
the close of my argument on the Pentateuch, I defend the his-
toricity of the Pentateuch no less than the prosecution ; and I
defend it on better grounds and with far greater hopes of success
when I recognize parallel narratives of the same event in the
history contained in the Pentateuch. The court should recog-
nize all this irrelevant argument and rule it out of court, and
confine themselves to the specific matters contained in Charges
IV, and v., and determine whether a man who denies the
Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch and asserts that Isaiah did
not write half the book which bears his name, has taken a con-
tra-confessional position and is thereby ruled out from the Presby-
terian Church.
" (3) I have taken exception to much the greater portion of
the argument of Dr. Lampe, as in no sense a rebuttal, but a new
case against me. It is impracticable for me to go over all the
argument at this time. Let me take one glaring specimen. He
puts in my mouth (p. 16) the statement: 'Newman could not
find certainty and God in the Bible striving never so hard, but
found a place among the faithful through the institutions of the
Church. Martineau could not find God in the Bible but did
find Him enthroned in his own soul.' This is a misrepresenta-
tion. The passages from the Inaugural referred to (pp. 25, 27)
say no such thing. They say, ' Martineau could not find divine
authority in the Church, or the Bible ; but did find God en-
throned in his own soul ' (p. 27). ' Newman, who could not
reach certainty, striving never so hard, through the Bible or the
Reason, but who did find divine authority in the institutions of
the Church ' (p. 25).
" I did not say that Newman and Martineau did not find God
in the Bible. That statement the prosecution, and they alone,
are responsible for. To find God is one thing, to find divine
authority in that in which we find God, is another and a different
thing. The difficulty with the prosecution is that they seem in-
capable of making distinctions and seeing differences in the
fields of theology which are so unfamiliar to them." ( The De-
fence, pp. 1 90- 1 9 1.)
THE FINAL ACTION OF THE PRESBYTERY c>53
The Presbytery simply ignored this conduct of the
prosecution. It stated that it was influenced by the
principle which is quoted from the decision of the Gen-
eral Assembly " that no man can rightly be convicted of
heresy by inference or implication." If that statement
is unjust to the committee, it is simply because it calls
their attention to a principle which convicts them at the
bar of their own consciences as guilty of unrighteous-
ness and wrong. It is true that the Presbytery states
that " there are truths and forms with respect to which
men of good character may differ," but where is there
anything misleading or unjust in that statement ? It is
an invalid inference that " this seems to deny and make
light of the well-established principle of our polity, that
there are also truths and forms with respect to which
men of good character should not differ." There is no
inconsistency in these statements to any clear mind.
The Presbytery decided that the views challenged in the
Inaugural belonged to the former class. Possibly the
Presbytery erred in their classification of the views of
the defendant — but it did not err in the distinction it
made between the two classes of truths and forms.
Therefore this specification of error is invalid. The
Presbytery were not misleading and unjust in these
statements. The Presbytery made the distinctions
which the law of the Church required them to make in
connection with a final judgment of Charges for heresy.
(5). TJie Final Judgvient Vague.
It is represented by the appellants that there was
" mistake or injustice in the decision :
" In this, that the said final judgment is vague and
uncertain."
Vagueness is alleged in several particuldrs.
254r ARGUMENT AGAINST SUSTAINING THE APPEAL
{a) It is true that the Presbytery stated that it gave
"due consideration to the defendant's explanation of the
language used in his Inaugural Address, accepting his
frank and full disclaimer of the interpretation which has
been put upon some of its phrases and illustrations."
It is alleged that these explanations, phrases, and illus-
trations should have been specified. There is no ground
in law for such a specification. It was not necessary nor
was it proper for the Presbytery to specify all those ex-
planations, phrases, and illustrations. To do so would
be to review a considerable portion of the argument for
the defence. Such a review is unprecedented in final
judgments, (b) It is alleged that it should have been
specified " whether such explanations or disclaimers re-
late to the portions of the said Inaugural Address upon
which the Charges and Specifications are based." But
such a specification was uncalled for. It is to be assumed
that the court would do its duty and limit its consider-
ation to the Charges and Specifications. The prosecu-
tion present no evidence that the court did otherwise.
{c) It is alleged that the statement of the Presbytery
that the defendant " has not transgressed the limits of
liberty allowed under our constitution to scholarship and
opinion " is vague and uncertain. This objection is in-
valid and uncandid, for the Presbytery was called upon
to determine six Charges and their Specifications. It
gave as its judgment that the opinions of the defendant
were not heretical and acquitted him of the charges
alleged against him. It determined that the opinions of
the defendant so far as they were challenged in these
Charges and their Specifications were within the limits of
liberty. There is nothing vague or uncertain in that. If
there be any vagueness or uncertainty, it is in the
Charges and Specifications prepared by the prosecution.
THE FINAL ACTION OF THE PRESBYTERY 255
They cannot ask that the Presbytery should make any
other lines of discrimination than the lines drawn by the
Charges. If their Charges and Specifications were vague,
they cannot impute vagueness to the Presbytery, when
on finding the Charges unproven, it says that the views
charged as heretical have not transgressed the limits of
liberty.
{d) It is alleged that " the Presbytery confounds unjus-
tifiable controversy with useful and constitutional disci-
pline " But there is no ground for this allegation.
There are evidently two classes of opinions, one class
heretical which demands useful and constitutional disci-
pline, another class within the limits of liberty allowed
under our constitution to scholarship and opinion. It
was the duty of the Presbytery to determine in view of
the Charges, to which of these classes the challenged
opinions of Dr Briggs belonged. The Presbytery may
have made a wrong classification of the views of Dr.
Briggs — but there is no vagueness in the distinction of
the two classes and there is no other vagueness in the
classification than such as is found in the Charges them-
selves for which the prosecution is responsible.
(6). Sustain in Part.
It is alleged that there was irregularity in the proceed-
ings of the Presbytery of New York :
" In this, that when the vote was taken on the said Charges
andSpecifications, the said Presbytery refused to permit any of
the members of the said Judicatory to vote, to ' Sustain in part,"
contrary to the precedents and practice of the judicial procedure
of the Presbyterian Church in the United States of America."
(I. II.)
The Presbytery on motion of Dr. Thompson adopted
a rule for taking the vote. This rule was adapted to the
256 ARGUMENT AGAINST SUSTAINING THE APPEAL
structure of the Charges and Specifications. The Charges
were so constructed that they contained several differ-
ent Charges. The Presbytery, in accordance with the
PreHminary Objection of the defendant, directed that
these Charges should be itemized in order to save the
time required to reconstruct them, in accordance with
the suggestion of the defendant. The Charges had no
proper Specifications. The Specifications were merely
extracts from the Inaugural, nothing more. The vote
to sustain in part has to do with the relation of the spec-
ifications to the Charges. If a Charge has several spec-
ifications, one or more of them may be sustained, and
so the Charge may be sustained in part.
The present Appeal is so constructed that votes to
sustain in part are possible under each and every ground
of appeal. But the Charges were so constructed that a
vote to sustain in part was impracticable. It would only
have taken time and tended to confusion in the vote.
No exception was taken by the prosecution to the de-
cision of the Presbytery to take the vote in the way de
cided upon. It was seen after careful deliberation that
no injustice would be done, and that the method decided
upon by the Presbytery would be most equitable.
Ihis will be clear to any one who examines the
Charges and Specifications and studies the vote. There
was no place for votes to sustain in part. Four of
the Charges had each one specification only. There
can be no vote to sustain in part where there is but
one specification. The other two Charges had two
specifications each. Here it was theoretically possible
for a vote to sustain in part if the specifications had
been so constructed as to raise different issues ; but they
were not so constructed and therefore such a vote was
not practicable. This becomes evident in the debate.
THE FINAL ACTION OF THE PRESBYTERY 257
It is clear that the Presbytery took this view of it, for
the vote is identical under the two specifications of
Charge II. Under Charge L there was a single voter
out of 128 who changed his vote on the second specifica-
tion. If now any one should say that there was the pos-
sibility of a different result under Charges I. and II. and
that therefore the usual method should have been fol-
lowed and a vote to sustain in part permitted, let him
consider that if this be so, the irregularity did no injus-
tice in this case ; for according to the vote on the speci-
fications there could have been only a single vote to sus-
tain in part, and that one on Charge I. only ; and if any
injury was done, it was not done to the prosecution, but
to the defendant, because the minister who voted to
sustain the second specification of Charge I. and not to
sustain the first specification, voted to sustain the Charge ;
so that the only difference in the result would have been
that one voter would have voted on the first Charge to
sustain in part, instead of to sustain. Certainly the
prosecution have no ground for appeal in this matter.
We have gone pati-ently through all these specifica-
tions of objection and grounds of appeal against the ver-
dict of the Presbytery acquitting Dr. Briggs of the six
Charges of heresy alleged against him. It seems as if
we have been passing through a fog bank. The 34 spec-
ifications seemed banked up in formidable array — but
we went straight forward — we pushed against them, they
yielded to the least touch, they shrank back from the
merest breath, they are airy nothings, they have left
nothing but an unpleasant and disagreeable sensation
which we trust will soon pass away now that we have
left them behind.
These appellants have no case. They may be dis-
258 ARGUMENT AGAINST SUSTAINING THE APPEAL
appointed at their failure to convict the accused. But
you cannot legally sustain their Appeal. All its grounds
are invalid. The most of them are trivial. Many of
them are childish. But if they were all of them valid,
what could you say other than this : — the Presbytery
ought tc have served upon the defendant the two
Charges which were thrown out and to have allowed the
prosecution to present their evidence to sustain them ;
the Presbytery ought not to have itemized the Charges,
or to have changed them in any way ; the Presbytery
ought to have required the defendant to take oath as to
the genuineness of his own writings, and to have read
all his evidence before the court ; the Presbytery ought
not to have said any of those things in their final judg-
ment against which the prosecution object ; they ought
to have limited themselves to the verdict with its rea-
sons ; they ought to have allowed that unique voter to
vote to sustain in part instead of to sustain. In all these
respects the Presbytery did wrong and are deserving of
censure for these errors, and we do hereby reverse all
these actions. Granted that all these actions were erro-
neous, the verdict will still remain unassailable. The
only ground given on which you can change the verdict,
is by ruling out the thirteen voters who are alleged by
the prosecution to have been influenced by prejudice in
favor of the accused. You then have seriously to con-
sider (i) whether it is lawful to condemn these eminent
ministers and laymen as guilty of prejudice, without a
trial ; (2) whether you can entertain charges of prejudice
against those who voted in favor of the accused, when
you refuse to entertain charges of prejudice against
tifose who voted against him ; (3) whether you can rule
out prejudiced parties from the lower court, unless you
have already ruled them out from the superior court.
THE REASON 259
Thus the only ground for a reversal sinks by its own
weight in the marsh of its own iniquity, and disappears
in the mud of its own false pretensions.
V. — The Doctrines of the Appellee.
Now, Mr. Moderator, I propose, after having devoted
so much time to disproving the case as presented by the
appellants, to state to you as frankly as I can, what are
those things which I veritably believe and teach. In
order to do this I shall use for the most part my
Defence and the writings put in evidence in the case.
Tlie Reason.
The first charge against me, stripped of all that I deny
as relevant, is that I make the Reason a great fountain
of Divine authority. Let me make a statement here,
having reference to the argument of Dr. Lampe. It
seems to me that Dr. Lampe and most of my critics
make the serious mistake of confounding the original
source of all authority with the fountain of authority.
It seems to me that the prosecution make the Bible the
infallible source of authority, instead of recognizing
that God is speaking through the Bible, as I do ; and
therefore they do not understand my position when I
say that the Reason and the Church are fountains of
divine authority.
I do not mean that there is any original divine au-
thority in the human Reason, or that there is any origi-
nal divine authority in the Christian Church, but simply
that they are channels, fountains, media, through which
God's Holy Spirit speaks to men.
Now, I wish, in the consideration of the Reason as a
fountain of divine authority, to call upon my friend, Dr.
Brown, in order to save my strength, to read some
260 ARGUMENT AGAINST SUSTAINING THE APPEAL
passages, as a part of my argument, from my Defence
before the Presbytery on that point.
Dr. Brown read as follows :
" We shall now show that the Confession distinctly recognizes
the Reason as a great fountain of divine authority. The prose-
cution shut their eyes to seven chapters of the Confession (lo,
13, 14, 16, 18, 20, 26) when they represent that my doctrine of the
Reason is erroneous. In their original Charges they state that
I 'strike at the vitals of religion ' in teaching that the Reason is
a great fountain of divine authority. I do, indeed, 'strike at the
vitals of religion,' but in a sense quite different from that in their
minds, for this doctrine so strikes at the vitals of religion that
there can be no vital religion without it. It does indeed enter
into the very life of the religion of Jesus Christ. It strikes at
the barriers of dead orthodoxy and barren ecclesiasticism, and
strikes through them to the fountain head of Christian life.
" {a) There can be no such thing as EfTectual Calling unless
the Reason is a great fountain of divine authority." {The De-
fence, p. 47.)
" In effectual calling the Holy Spirit acts upon the soul of
man. The call is by the divine word and the divine Spirit ;
always by the divine Spirit, but not always by the divine word ;
but whether the divine word is used or not, in any case it is
the divine Spirit who enlightens the mind to understand the
things of God ; gives a new heart of flesh for the old heart of
stone; renews the will, determining it by almighty power to
that which is good. All these operations of the divine Spirit
change the mind, the heart, the will, the constituent parts of the
inner man. Does any one suppose that the divine Spirit en-
lightens the mind without using the Reason ? Can the heart be
transformed from a hard stone to sensitive flesh without usmg
the Religious Feeling? Can the will be determined to that
which is good without using the Conscience.'' If mind, heart,
and will are changed in effectual calling, then Reason, Religious
Feeling, and Conscience are quickened with the pulsations of the
divine Spirit and animated with new life. When the mind is
savingly enlightened by the Spirit of God, how can this be other-
wise than by the Spirit of God speaking with divine authority
THE REASON 261
through the forms of the Reason, so that the mind understands
the things of God on the authority of God ? When the will is re-
newed and determined by the divine Spirit to that which is good,
how otherwise can it be determined than by a divine authority
in the conscience overcoming every doubt as to the good, and
every disinclination to the good ?
" In effectual calling, the calling is effectual simply because the
Holy Spirit enters the human Reason with divine energy to
work through the Reason effectually in all the avenues of human
nature. By effectual calling the redeemed enter into a new
world in which divine authority flows through the fountain of
the Reason to govern and enrich all their lives.
" (i>) There can be no such thing as Sanctification unless the
Reason is a great fountain of divine authority." (p. 48.)
"Sanctification is accomplished by Christ's word and Spirit
dwelling in them — not by Christ's word alone, but also by the
indwelling Spirit ; by the word and Spirit usually in Christian
lands; but by the Spirit always in every land and in every re-
deemed person. By the word dwelling in us we understand not
only Holy Scripture engraved on the memory, but appropriated
by the soul and transformed into principles of holy living and
doing. How then shall we understand the indwelling Spirit ?
Where does the Holy Spirit dwell if not at the central point
of our human nature, and where else can that be for any intelli-
gent person than in the Reason, where the conscience is taught
to speak the categorical imperative which is now truly a word
divine, where the religious feeling is stimulated to holy im-
pulses which are as the breath of God to men ; where the Rea-
son is informed with holy thoughts which are truth from
heaven; and where the divine presence fills the soul with the
assurance of a divine authority which is no bondage, but peace
and joy? There can be no sanctification unless the Holy Spirit
dwell in the Reason, and so by divine authority govern the
life and conduct." (p. 49.)
" (c) There can be no such thing as Saving Faith unless the
Reason is a great fountain of divine authority." (p. 50.)
" If faith is wrought in our hearts by the divine Spirit, can
262 AKGUMENT AGAINST SUSTAINING THE APPEAL
it be wrought in any other way than through the Reason ? Can
there be any faith in which the conscience, the religious feeling,
and the Reason do not share ?" (p. 51.)
" Can there be any ' receiving and resting upon Christ ' if
the Reason exclude Christ, if the conscience disapprove of
Christ, if the religious feeling shrink from Christ? It is because
the Holy Spirit lights up the chambers of the soul, it is because
Jesus Christ shines in our hearts with light divine that we see
Him and know our Saviour, as we see and know the sun when
he rises at the break of day. It is through the effusion of divine
energy, the infusion of divine life, the suffusion of divine light,
that sinful man is born of God, to live in the Spirit and know
his Saviour." (p. 51.)
" {d) There can be no such thing as Good Works well pleas-
ing to God, unless the Reason is a great fountain of divine au-
thority." (p. 52.)
" In order to do good works it is, therefore, necessary that
the Holy Spirit should ' work in the believer to will and to do
of his good pleasure.' If the Holy Spirit work in a man, how
else shall He work than in the forms of the Reason.'' The Holy
Spirit not only works in the man, but He dwells in him while
working, in his innermost soul. And where can the Holy Spirit
dwell within us save in the forms of the Reason }
" {^) There can be no such thing as Assurance of Grace,
unless the Reason is a great fountain of divine authority.
(P- 52.)
" If the Westminster doctrine of the Assurance of Grace were
really a part of the living faith of the Presbyterian Church, no
one could accuse me of heresy for teaching that the Reason
is a great fountain of divine authority, for let any one consider
what is involved in this doctrine. It is the assurance of a be-
liever, the making him certain that he is a child of God. This
comes by inward evidence within the soul of man, not merely
by outward evidence from Bible or Church. It is the Holy
Spirit witnessing with our spirits — Spirit with spirit — not simply
THE REASON 263
the Holy Spirit witnessing through Holy Scripture and Holy
Sacrament. It is the direct and immediate contact of the Holy
Spirit with the spirit of the believer— a contact which gives cer-
tainty. What can give certainty except divine evidence? What
can assure our souls but divine authority ? The Confession dis-
tinctly teaches that the Holy Spirit is present to the spirit of
man with divine authority, and that presence is within the man,
in his inmost being, his higher spiritual nature. Where is that
presence, if not in the forms of the Reason ?
"(/) There can be no true Liberty of Conscience unless the
Reason is a great fountain of divine authority, (p. 53.)
" God is the Lord of the conscience. The conscience has no
other Lord. The conscience is especially the place where God
is Lord and through which He exercises His divine authority.
Liberty of conscience is essential to true religious life and
activity. No • implicit faith ' is required. No blind obedience
is lawful. The Christian conscience refuses to close its eyes. It
ever looks upward for authority divine to enjoy the vision of
God. Conscience refuses bondage; it is the free-born daughter
of God. True religion appeals to the conscience, the faithful
monitor ot God within the breast. Let the conscience rule the
man and God will rule him. Bind him to blind obedience, any
external authority whatever, whether church or state, whether
system of dogma or letter of Scripture, and you obstruct the
dominion of God in the man. The conscience must remain free
in order to healthful religious life. The Lord of the conscience
must speak with divine authority through the conscience in
order that the life may be a holy life. If the Lord of glory in-
habit the conscience, make it His throne within the man, all its
monitions will be divine. This is the ideal of liberty of con-
science which every Christian should seek. You shatter this
ideal for yourselves, if you say it is heresy to teach that the
Reason— explaining Reason as the conscience — is a great foun-
tain of divine authority.
" ig) There can be no real communion with Christ, unless the
Reason is a great fountain of divine authority." (p. 54-)
" The bond between the saints is a bond of faith tied by the
Holy Spirit. The Church and the Bible often mediate between
264 ARGUMENT AGAINST SUSTAINING THE APPEAL
the appropriating faith and the bestowing Holy Spirit ; but they
do not take the place of either the Holy Spirit or of faith. Faith
lays hold of Christ, the direct object of the soul's activities.
Faith so unites to Christ as to give fellowship in the graces of
Christ and in the life of Christ from His incarnation to His reign
and second advent. This faith so unites with Christ that there
is direct and immediate communion with Him. Christ with ir-
resistible attraction draws faith to Him and faith rests on His
breast. "Where can faith and Christ meet save in the Reason.!*
Faith does not ascend to heaven. Christ descends from heaven.
Christ presents Himself to faith as its appropriate object, as its
source and mspiration, as the ground of its existence and its cer-
tainty. Christ imparts certainty to faith in this communion ;
where alone it can be imparted, in the forms of the Reason." (p.
55.)
"We appeal to the statements of Holy Scripture respecting
those outside the visible kingdom of God, and therefore excluded
from contact with Holy Scripture and Church. What shall we
say to the preaching of Paul ? ' And he made of one every na-
tion of men for to dwell on all the face of the earth, having de-
termined their appointed seasons, and the bounds of their habi-
tation : that they should seek God, if haply they might feel after
him and find him, though he is not far from each one of us ;
for in him we live, and move, and have our being; as certain even
of your own poets have said, For we are also his offspring."
(Acts xvii. 26-28.)
" Do none of these offspring of God among the heathen feel
after Him? Do those who feel fail to find Him .^ Do none of
those, the root of whose being is in God, look to the root and
become conscious of that fountain of life springing up within
them? Or are these words of Paul a fancy, incapable of realiza-
tion, a dream which finds no counterpart in the real heathen
man ?
'• What of the preaching of Peter? ' Of a truth I perceive that
God is no respecter of persons; but in every nation he that fear-
eth him, and worketh righteousness, is acceptable to him.' (Acts
X. 34-35-)
"Are there no God-fearing men among the nations who hold
to the ethnic religions ? Are there none who give alms and work
THE REASON 2^5
righteousness? Was Peter mistaken ? Does God really respect
persons and reject a man because he was not born a Hebrew or
because he was not educated in Christian lands ? Was Cornelius
the only illustration of this profound utterance? And was he
accepted simply because he might have been a proselyte ?
"What of the preaching of Jesus? 'The men of Nineveh
shall stand up in the judgment with this generation, and shall
condemn it: for they repented at the prv^'aching of Jonah; and
behold, a greater than Jonah is here. The queen of the south
shall rise up in the judgment with this generation, and shall con-
demn it : for she came from the ends of the earth to hear the
wisdom of Solomon ; and behold, a greater than Solomon is here.'
(Matt. xii. 41-42.)
** If the proud Assyrians, the inhabitants of Nineveh, were not
excluded from repentance and redemption because they had no
Bible and were hostile to the kingdom of Israel, why should any
other metropolis of the ethnic religions be excluded if they re-
pent in accordance with the teaching they have ? Is the Orient-
al queen the only potentate who has found God by wisdom out-
side the kingdom ? True, the one heard the preaching of Jonah
and the other the wisdom of Solomon. But there is no evidence
that either of them accepted Holy Scripture or united with Holy
Church." (p. 58.)
" Let me call your attention to my motive for introducing the
divine authority in the forms of the Reason into my Inaugural
Address. If you will read the Inaugural with any degree of at-
tention, you will see that my purpose was not to extol Rational-
ism or to magnify Martineau or to teach the salvation of the
heathen ; but as I distinctly said : ' We have examined the Church
and the Reason as seats of divine authority in an introduction
to our theme, the authority of the Scriptures, because they open
our eyes to see mistakes that are common to the three depart-
ments.' " (p. 28.)
" My subsequent use of the divine authority in the forms of
the Reason was in order to show that the three seats of author-
ity speak in harmony ; and in order to point to their vast im-
portance for a higher Christian life. I said, and I reaffirm wiiat
I said : ' the Reason also has its rights, its place and importance
in the economy of Redemption. I rejoice at the age of
266 ARGUMENT AGAINST SUSTAINING THE APPEAL
Rationalism, with all its wonderful achievements in philosophy.
I look upon it as preparing men to use their reasons in the
last great age of the world. Criticism will go on with its
destruction of errors, and its verification of truth and fact.
The human mind will learn to know its powers, and to use
them. The forms of the reason, the conscience, the religious
feeling, the aesthetic taste — all the highest energies of our
nature will exert themselves as never before. God will appear
in their forms and give an inward assurance and certainty
greater than that given in former ages. These increased powers
of the human soul will enable men to search those higher mys-
teries of Biblical theology that no theologian has yet mastered,
and those mysteries that are wrapped up in the institutions of
the Church to all who really know them. It is impossible that
the Bible and the Church should ever exert their full power unti'
the human reason, trained and strained to the uttermost, rises to
the heights of its energies and reaches forth after God and His
Christ with absolute devotion and self-renouncing love. Then
we may expect on the heights of theological speculation, and
from the peaks of Christian experience, that those profound doc-
trines that now divide Christendom by their antinomies will ap-
pear as the two sides of the same law, or the foci of a divine el-
lipse, which is itself but one of the curves in that conic section of
God's dominion in which, in loving wisdom. He has appointed
the lines of our destiny," (Inaugural Address, pp. 65, 66.)
" Consider for a moment, (a) What can you do in private
prayer unless divine authority comes to you in the forms of the
Reason ? How can you fix your mind on God, how can you send
forth a petition unto His ears, how can you expect an answer un-
less the soul reaches forth with all its powers in order to lay
hold upon God.'' And where will you find Him.' In the air?
Can you ascend to Him.-" We speak of it in local relations, but
we do not really ascend to heaven — God descends to us. He
condescends to answer us by entering into us and taking pos-
session of us by His almighty presence and power.
" How can you know that your prayers have been heard ?
How can you know that they have been answered, unless the
divine Spirit gives you that knowledge through a fountain of di-
vine authority bursting forth within you .'' I appeal to your Chris-
tian experience in private prayer. Are you not accustomed to
THE REASON 267
turn away from the world and fix your attention on God in earn-
est pleas for help or glad thanksgiving ? Have you not been as-
sured as by a touch divine flashing the light you need to see the
pathway of privilege and duty, determining; you to pursue the
right course and calming your feelings into a heavenly peace?
No possible influence, of friendly counsel, or hostile threats, can
stay or deflect the course of the man whom God has taught in
prayer.
" I cannot understand how any one who is accustomed to private
prayer, and especially to ejaculatory prayer, and who endeavors
to follow the guidance of God's Spirit in his daily life — I cannot
understand how any such man could possibly consent to a denial
of a fountain of divine authority within his own soul.
" {b) Think also of your hours of religious meditation and pri-
vate communion with God. Some of you, I doubt not, have en-
joyed such hours when the world has vanished, Holy Church is
forgotten, the Bible lies unnoticed, and nothing interposes be-
tween you and God. What heights of religious ecstasy, what
raptures of heavenly bliss do those enjoy whose religious feelings
thrill with the touch of the divine Spirit, whose conscience is
alive with holy concepts, and whose religious imagination sees
|esus Christ in His wondrous grace and matchless beauty. Such
heavenly places in Christ Jesus are open to us because Christ
Jesus comes to us in accordance with His promise and enters the
forms of the Reason, and fills all the avenues of the soul with
fountain-streams of sweetest authority.
" {c) How can Christian doctrine be rightly unfolded unless
by a Christian speculation, guided by the divine Spirit, working
within the Reason ? There is speculative theology which is mere
rationalizing — there is scholastic theology that is mere scholas-
ticism. All such theology is a mere process of logical evolu-
tion, subject to the errors into which weak man is ever fall-
ing. But a true Christian theologian who would know the
truth of God must be willing to do the will of God. Faith
cannot go far ahead of practice. Theology cannot outstrip
life. Nothing is genuine in Christian theologfv which is not
born of God's Spirit. How else shall the Christian theologian
get the truth of God unless he be guided by the Holy Spirit into
the truth ? The Holy Spirit dwells in the Church and in the in-
dividual Christian for this purpose, giving divine authority and
2(58 ARGUMENT AGAINST SUSTAINING THE APPEAL
certainty of truth in the forms of the Reason. Thus the theolo-
gian grows in the divine doctrine. Thus the Church advances
in Its most holy faith.
" I have shown you by indubitable evidence from Confession
and from Scripture and from Christian experience that ' there are
historically three great fountains of divine authority, the Bible,
the Church, and the Reason.' It is an historical fact which can-
not be gainsaid without closing the eyes to evidence which per-
vades history.
" Early in our century a great revival movement took its rise
in Oxford, and spread all over the Church of England, and the
churches which are her daughters. It was the Anglo-Catholic
revival, whose essential principle was the recognition of the
divine authority in the Church. In the middle of our century
another revival movement spread over the English-speaking
world, having as its great principle the divine authority in the
Bible. In the closing years of our century another great revival
took its rise in the East of London and spread all over Christen-
dom in the form of the Salvation Army. This Army is the anti-
thesis of the Anglo-Catholic movement because it is altogether
unchurchly. It seeks immediate communion with God, divine
authority within the soul by the baptism of Blood and Fire which
come from the real presence of Christ and the all-pervading
power of the indwelling Spirit.
" I call these three great revival movements of our century to
witness that divine authority comes to men through the three
great fountains, the Bible, the Church, and the Reason. Every
revival movement of the past witnesses a similar confession.
Wherever there has been vital religion, wherever there have been
holy men and women seeking after the living God, God has
given them the assurance of His presence and authority, some-
times through the Church, sometimes through the Bible, and
sometimes through the Reason. We cannot deny this without
shutting our eyes to history, or refusing to recognize in these re-
vival movements anything but illusions and delusions of pious
enthusiasts. I decline to recognize one form af -genuine and re-
fuse the others as delusions. I recognize them all, eaqh in its
place combining to accomplish the full work of grace in the
world.
" Convict me of heresy under Charge I., and you challenge the
AS TO MARTINEAU 269
Christian centuries. All the ages will be against you, and, in a
multitude of voices like the roar of many waters, will denounce
you as knowing neither the truth nor the power of God." {The
DrfcHce, pp. 60-64.)
Mr. Moderator and brethren, the view which
has been set before you as I trust with sufficient ful-
ness in these extracts is a view without which, as it
seems to me, there can be no spiritual reHgion, and no
higher life, I do not see how you can possibly ground
the salvation of any of the heathen, or the salvation of
any one, outside of certain religious communions, un-
less you base it upon some such doctrine as this. I do
not see how we can enter into personal communion
with Jesus Christ and the living God unless we recog-
nize that God's Holy Spirit is present with us, and that
we can come and do come into immediate fellowship
with God, in which the world, the Bible, the Church,
and everything pass away, and our union and contact
with God are immediate and complete.
I think you will see, on reflection, that the view I have
taken is in the interest of a higher life, and if the breth-
ren will only rise to it, their religious experience will be
richer and fuller, more Biblical, more confessional, more
like that of the Puritan heroes of the seventeenth cen-
tury, and more like that of the great reformers of the
sixteenth century.
I am not teaching any heresy in this doctrine. I am
t^ching the truth of God which has come down
through the ages of the Christian Church.
^ * ' As to Martineau.
" I said that ' Martineau did not find divine authority
in the Church or the Bible, but he did find God en-
throned in his own soul.' Holy Scripture is sufficient
270 ARGUMENT AGAINST SUSTAINING THE APPEAL
to give saving knowledge even when men do not find it.
It is sufficient for all men — for the entire world. But
all men do not, in fact, gain this saving knowledge from
the Bible. I did not say whether Martineau gained
saving knowledge from the Bible or not. That was not
the question before me in the Inaugural. I was consid-
ering the question of religious certainty, the fountains
of divine authority. I did not say that Martineau re-
jected the way of salvation revealed in the Bible, but I
said Martineau could not find certainty of divine
authority in the Church or the Bible. He says he did
not and could not. We have no right to doubt him or
dispute him in this statement of his experience. The
only question which was raised by me was, whether he
did find God ' enthroned in his own soul.' That is a
question of fact. I did not raise the question whether
a man who rejects the way of salvation revealed in the
Scripture may find God enthroned in his own soul. I
did not consider that question in the Inaugural. I_der
cline to consider it now. I insist that this court shall
confine itself to the questions raised in my Inaugural
and not rove over the field of theology generally, under
the guidance of this erratic committee. I have shown
that Scripture, history, Confession, and experience
prove that there are those who find God enthroned
within their own souls. The question is whether Mar-
tineau was such a person. I have said that he was such
a person. It is possible I may be mistaken in this
question of fact. But such a mistake is no heresy unless
I am a heretic under the general charge that 'the Rea-
son is a great fountain of divine authority.' If I am in
error about Martineau, the example used by me was a
bad one. You may think so if you please. A bad ex-
ample may discredit a proposition, but it does not dis-
THE CHURCH 271
prove it. If my opinion of Martineau errs at all, it is
on the side of Christian love, which covers over a
multitude of sins. The prosecution run great risks
of trenching on Christian love, if they venture to assert
that Martineau is mistaken when he claims to have
found God enthroned in his own soul." {The Defence,
p. 66.)
" The Church.
I have claimed, under the second charge, that the
Church is a great fountain of divine authority. " The
Westminster Confession clearly shows that the visible
Church is the kingdom of the Lord Jesus Christ ; that
He hath given the ministry, oracles, and ordinances of
God unto it ; and ' doth by His own presence and Spirit
make them effectual.' If the Presbytery is not a court
of the Kingdom of Christ erected by divine authority ;
if you have not been given the ordinances by Jesus
Christ to administer in His name ; if Jesus Christ and
his Spirit are not present in the midst of you — then you
are no part of the Church of Jesus Christ at all. I do
not think that any considerable number of you hold
such heretical views. But whatever this court may con-
clude, I declare that the statement of the Confession is
a true statement. There is divine authority in the
Church ; it is Christ's kingdom. He reigns over it. He
inhabits it by His Spirit, He makes its institutions effica-
cious. He grants access to Himself through His Church.
Our Presbyterian fathers rejoiced in such access. Their
descendants enjoy this unspeakable privilege. Are
we to be robbed of our birthright? Are you ready
to banish from the official doctrine of the Presby-
terian Church the witnessing Spirit, the indwelling
Christ, the living God, in order to incase the Holy
272 ARGUMENT AGAINST SUSTAINING THE APPEAL
Trinity in the covers of a book? Shall we destroy the
Church in order to exalt the Bible ?" (pp. 70-71.'^
" The sacraments which we are constantly enjoying in
our churches, being instituted by Christ, must have divine
authority. Whenever we use them, the authority of
God is impressed upon us by the words of institution
and the prayer of consecration. They are not mere
ceremonies established by divine authority. They are
means of grace, they give something of immense value
to us. They signify, seal, and exhibit the benefits of
Christ's mediation. There is divine authority in this
signifying, sealing, and exhibiting. There is no less
authority in what the sacraments set forth than in what
Holy Scripture sets forth. They * strengthen and in-
crease faith and all other graces.' How can they do
this unless divine authority imparts that strength and
increase.'*" (p. 71.)
" If the efficacy of a sacrament depends upon the
working of the Holy Spirit, then the Holy Spirit must
be in touch with the believer in the sacrament, and if
He is in touch with the believer, pod is in touch with
him, and there is divine authority imparted in the pres-
ence and power of the Pxoly Spirit." (p. 71".)
Let me call your attention to a word spoken by Dr.
Lampe yesterday afternoon. He says, if I understood
him aright — and I endeavored to take down his exact
language — " We know nothing of Christ except through
the Bible story." He acknowledges it. We know noth-
ing of Christ except through the Bible story. Are you
ready to consent to that, commissioners of the General
Assembly? Have we no knowledge of Jesus Christ in
the sacrament of the Lord's Supper ? Are we not
brought into personal relations with Jesus Christ, into
THE CHURCH 273
a personal knowledge of Him at the Lord's table ? I
carmot subscribe to Dr. Lampe's doctrine. It is rank
heresy. If there ever was a heresy prorrtulgated in the
history of the Church, that statement is the rankest
heresy.
" If our Lord is really present to us in the Lord's
Supper, is not divine authority present with us in Him ?
and if divine authority is present in Him are not all of tjie
spiritual benefits thus received of divine authority, and
do they not come with certainty to our souls? The
Holy Supper is often more potent than Holy Scripture
in the impartation of divine authority and certainty. It
is thus rightly named a sealing ordinance. You cannot
deny that there is divine authority in the Church with-
out denying the presence of Christ in the Holy Eucha-
rist, without robbing the sacraments of their historic
value to the Christian world. I appeal to your religious
experience in the communion hour. Have we not en-
joyed fellowship with our divine Master at the Lord's
table? Have not our religious emotions been quick-
ened by a power divine? Have we not felt in our in-
most being the divine touch ? Have we not seen the
Lord with eyes of faith and holy love ? Listen to the
testimony of prophet and sage; of evangelist and apostle,
of martyr and saint, of theologian and reformer, of holy
men and women in all ages, an innumerable company,
whose voices flow down the ages, from all churches, from
all lands, and in every language and tongue, through
every variety of liturgy and ceremony and rite :
'* O Christ, Saviour divine ! we testify to Thy gracious
presence, Thy sweet authority. Thy heavenly gifts of
comfort and of joy, in the sacrament of Thy love." (p.
72.)
" The Church has no divine authority in itself — apart
27^ ARGUMENT AGAINST SUSTAINING THE APPEAL
from God. Its divine authority is in that its chief in-
stitutions were divinely appointed, and that these di-
vinely appointed institutions are the ordinary channels
of the divine grace. The Church is a fountain of divine
authority. The divine authority flows forth from God
Himself, as the sole original fountain-head and ultimate
source, through the fountain of the Church, and dis-
tributes its healing and life-giving streams through all
its ministries." (p. 74.)
The Case of Spurgeon.
Now, a few words as to the case of Spurgeon :
" The prosecution use the passage from the Inaugural
referring to Spurgeon, under both charges. They harp
upon it in their argument to excite prejudice against
me. What I said about Spurgeon may not be pleasing
to the prosecution. It may be very distasteful to many
members of the presbytery." So I would say here. It
may be distasteful to many, perhaps to most, of the
members of the court. " But is it not strictly true? Is
it not a fact that Spurgeon is an example of the modern
evangelical ? Did he not assail the Church and the Reason
in the interest of the authority of Holy Scripture ?
These are well-known weaknesses of the great preacher.
But he had so many excellent Christian qualities that
the world pardons his weakness in the matters referred
to and honors him as the noblest evangelical of them
all. It may seem strange to some of you that * the
average opinion of the Christian world would not assign
him a higher place in the kingdom of God than Mar-
tineau or Newman.' But a little reflection ought to
convince you that it is so. Spurgeon is the hero of the
Evangelical party in the Church. He was generally es-
teemed to be the greatest preacher of the gospel in our
THE CASE OF SPURGEON 275
generation. His sermons have been of incalculable
benefit to multitudes. I yield to none in admiration of
Spurgeon as a master of sacred eloquence."
It was my privilege to enjoy many times listening to
his eloquence, and to know a great deal of the work he
was doing.
" But any one who understands the state of religious
opinion in England knows that Spurgeon only repre-
sented a party among the Non-conformists, and that a
considerable proportion of them would not assign him a
higher place than Martineau or Newman. He lived to
find himself in a hopeless minority in his own denomi-
nation and to separate from the mass of the Non-conform-
ists, whom he accused of being on the ' down grade.'
He was not a master of Christian theology, and, there-
fore, so soon as he went out of his sphere to teach men
wiser than himself he made a sad failure among those
who were nearest to him in denominational affini-
ties. In the average opinion of the Church of England
Spurgeon would certainly assume the lowest place of the
three. Among Roman Catholics, the world over, New-
man would have the pre-eminence. Among German
Protestants, Martineau would hold the highest rank. In
North America, without doubt, Spurgeon is in greatest
estimation. I did not assign Spurgeon a lower place
than Newman or Martineau. I did not say that in the
opinion of the Christian world he would take the lowest
place of the three. I did not give the average opinion of
the United States, or of Non-conforming England, or of
Presbyterian Scotland, or of Ulster, or of the Evangel-
ical party ; but I said correctly, ' The average opinion of
the Christian world would not assign him a higher place
in the kingdom of God than Martineau or Newman.' "
(pp. 79-80.)
276 ARGUMENT AGAINST SUSTAINING THE APPEAL
I think that no man who really looks the situation in
the face can possibly deny that proposition.
** But suppose I made a mistake in statistics, and my
opinion is wide of the facts, is such a mistake heresy?
Am I responsible for the facts ? Am I to blame if
Spurgeon in public estimation shares the throne with
Martineau and Newman ? Is it any merit of mine if he
be exalted above them ? Can I change the facts by
my statements about them ? . . . . Where do they find
in the Westminster Confession that the modern Evan-
gelical is the most favored of the children of God ? "
(p. 80.)
" As Christian ministers I ask you, ought we not to es-
timate these three representative Christians of our time
with Christian love ? And is it not Christian love to say,
we refuse to determine which of them has the highest
place in the kingdom of God ? We recognize each as a
prophet to our generation. We see in each a man who
has enjoyed the light of the divine countenance, and
who has reflected in his life and character the graces of
a child of God.
" I asked the question in the Inaugural and I ask it
again of this court, whether in view of all the facts
adduced, * may we not conclude, on the whole, that
these three representative Christians of our time, have,
each in his own way, found God and rested on divirte
authority?' Let each juror answer this question for
himself. You must answer it inyour own verdict. You
must either say with me, ' Yes, we may conclude that
Spurgeon, Newman, and Martineau have rested on
divine authority '; or you must say with the prosecution,
' No ! Spurgeon found God in the Bible, but Newman
did not find God in the Church, and Martineau did not
find God in the Reason. They were mistaken in their
THE CASE OF SPURGEON 277
religious experience. They were without God and with-
out divine authority for their faith and life.' You cannot
evade the issue, if you bring this issue into the charges.
Your verdict will be interpreted by the Christian world as
yes or no to the question. I rejoice in this issue. Again I
say, Yes ; and I would deliberately choose the company
for time and for eternity of Martineau and Newman
rather than of such loveless persons as would cast them
out of the congregation of the faithful." {The Defence,
pp. 80-81.)
But let me say, Mr. Moderator and brethren, in my
opinion you have no right to bring any of these concrete
cases into the Charges. They are not in the Charges.
Anything that I have said as regards Martineau, or any-
thing that I have said as regards Newman, is not made
an element of charge against me. The references to
them in the extracts which I have read are only brought
in for the purpose of proving the proposition stated in
the Charge, and therefore you have no right to bring
these concrete cases into the Charge. If you do, you must
meet the issue before the Christian world.
Now, let me call your attention to another serious er-
ror made by Dr. Lampe in his argument. He said, if I
mistake not, that the Bible was the only and final au-
thority to Christ and His apostles. So I took it down.
Think of that statement, brethren. Did Christ and His
apostles give us nothing more than they found in the
Bible, the Old Testament, in their hands ? Did Jesus
Christ depend for His authority upon the Old Testament
Scriptures? Did He not come forth as the incarnate
Word, fresh from the bosom of the Father with a new
revelation, infinitely more precious than all that is con-
tained in the Old Testament? Did the apostles limit
themselves for their authority to the Old Testament
278 ARGUMENT AGAINST SUSTAINING THE APPEAL
Scriptures ? Did they not claim that the Spirit of God
was within them, that they spake as the ambassadors of
Jesus Christ, and that they spake with the same author-
ity with which the Old Testament prophets spoke — a
word coming forth fresh from the enthroned and glori-
fied Jesus with an infallible, divine authority to all who
received it ? You can make but one answer to this
question. The statement of Dr. Lampe is dreadfully
wrong.
Another statement that Dr. Lampe made is no less
false. He said that faith is based solely on the authority
of Holy Scripture. Do you believe that, brethren? Is
your faith based solely on the authority of Holy Scrip-
ture ? My faith is not. My faith is based upon Jesus
Christ, my Saviour, and upon Him alone. The Holy
Scripture has brought. me to Him to rejoice in knowledge
of Him as a person, to live in communion with Him,
and to derive my authority directly from Him and from
His Holy Spirit.
Now, brethren, I have gone over the first and second
Charges. I hope that you understand my position ex-
actly. If you wish to condemn me for heresy for this
I cannot help it. Here I stand before God. These are
my views, and I shall proclaim them as the truth of God
as long as I live.
Mr. Moderator, I have just received a question in re-
gard to the matter that I have passed over, which, in ac-
cordance with my promise, I shall first answer.
" Would you kindly give me your interpretation of
the word ' fountain,' as you use it, and oblige."
I thought I had done this, but it seems exceedingly
difificult to make my meaning plain. I use " fountain "
not in the sense of the original source, because, as I
have said, God alone is the original source. But I use
ERRORS IN HOLY SCRIPTURE 279
" fountain " in a figurative sense, as that out of which
the waters flow, synonymous with " channel " and " me-
dium.' God is the only original source. The Bible, the
Church, and the Reason are channels, media, means of
grace, by which God communicates His divine authority
to men. I hope I have made myself plain.
Errors in Holy Scripture.
I now wish to bring forth and state positively what
my views are with reference to errors in Holy Scripture.
In the argument on the logic of the case, I endeavored
to show that my views were not inconsistent with the
Westminster Confession and with Holy Scripture. I
now wish to bring forward what is my position. I rec-
ognize that I have asserted that there may have been
errors in the original autographs of Holy Scripture. I
have not said that there must be. There may be — there
may have been errors in the original autographs. Now
I quote from my argument before the Presbytery :
" I shall adhere to the policy which I have thus far
followed with regard to errors in Holy Scripture. I
have refused to accept the dogma that the original au-
tographs were inerrant. I have maintained that there are
errors in the texts which we have and in the best texts
we can get by the science of textual criticism, and that
it is improbable that the original texts, if we could dis-
cover them, would be much different from those we
have in that regard. But I have refused to affirm that
there were errors in the original autographs; because it
is unscientific and it is unscholarly and it is against the
truth-loving spirit of Christianity to make affirmations
of dogma where we have no certain evidence. I have
always refrained as far as possible from pointing to
errois in the present text of Scripture. But every Bib-
2S0 ARGUMENT AGAINST SUSTAINING THE APPEAL
lical scholar admits them. There are a few professors in
the Biblical department in American theological semi-
naries who hold to this modern dogma of inerrancy, and
in the interests of this dogma try to explain away the
errors of Holy Scripture, but even these Procrusteans
are obliged to admit that they must resort, for some of •
the most stubborn of them, to conjectures that these
were bastards to the original text." {The Defence,
p. 105.)
Now just let me say a word about the danger of this
position. True scholarship follows the best texts we can
get by the processes of textual criticism, after an ex-
amination of all the manuscripts, of all the versions, of
all the citations in ancient authorities. We build on that.
That is the best text we can get. Now do you not see that
there is peril in conjecturing as to the texts further back,
because, if you are going to conjecture in the interests
of orthodoxy, how are you going to prevent a man from
conjecturing in the interest of heterodoxy? If you are
going to insist on the a priori argument that because of
the truthfulness of God and the essential nature of divine
revelation, these original autographs must have been in-
errant, how are you going to resist those men who specu-
late, on what seems to them to be valid grounds, that
there are errors of a different kind in Holy Scripture''
How are you going to meet the rationalists? How are
you going to meet the man who questions, on what he
deems to be valid grounds, those texts of Holy Scripture
(there are only a few of them) which teach directly the
doctrine of the Holy Trinity? My dear brethren, you
are imperilling the faith by this position vastly more than
any scholar can, by accepting the view which I have
stated, that there may have been errors in the original
documents. But whether there were errors in the orisfinal
ERRORS IN HOLY SCRIPTURE 281
autographs or not, what matters it, so long as we may
maintain our position, that there are no errors that at all
interfere with matters of faith and doctrine? And now
let me read you a word from my lectures on The Bible,
the Churchy and the Reason :
" The dogma of the inerrancy of the original auto-
graphs of Scripture is one that has no practical advan-
tage, but it may be very pernicious in effect. It is recog-
nized that all modern versions of the Bible contain er-
rors. King James' version and the Revised Version
alike have them. You cannot escape them in the use
of the Scriptures in church, in Sunday-school, in prayer-
meeting, and in the home. The people are exposed to
their influence, they cannot avoid them. Our opponents
say that these errors were not in the original autographs.
What comfort does this ofTer to the people of the
Church who never can see the original autographs and
could not read them if they saw them ? What possible
advantage is there in making statements as to docu-
ments to which no man has any access at the present
time, or has had access for centuries? Such a pure
speculation which is beyond any possibility of verifica-
tion cannot be promulgated as a dogma of the Church ;
for no dogma has any binding force that cannot be
proved by clear, definite, and decisive evidence and be
verified by criticism. The people who use the English
Bible have no use for such a dogma. They desire to
use their Bibles with profit and to know the grounds of
their faith. If the dogmatician should say to these Eng-
lish readers of the Bible, who have found errors that
they cannot explain, ' A proved error in Scripture con-
tradicts not only our doctrine, but the Scripture claims,
and therefore its inspiration in making those claims,*
some would doubtless respond : Then I must give up
282 ARGUMENT AGAINST SUSTAINING THE APPEAL
my Bible, for I cannot deny the errors. If the dogma-
tician replies, Oh, but these errors were not in the orig-
inal autographs ; the inquirer asks, But how do you
know that? Have you ever seen these original auto-
graphs ? Has any divine for a thousand years or more
seen them? The dogmatician can only answer, No, and
reaffirm his theory that Holy Scripture must have been
inerrant, for God could not give a revelation that would
not be inerrant. And thus they reproach the real Bible
in which errors are found, in order to exalt an imaginary
Bible which neither they nor any one else has ever dis-
covered. We are not surprised that such arguments
excite grave doubts in many minds in our times, whether
the Bible is inspired at all.
" Biblical scholars pursue a very different course. They
say, Yes, there are errors. There is no doubt about
that. These errors are also in the original texts. There
is no fault of translation. They are in the best manu-
scripts we have. It is altogether probable that they were
also in the original autographs. But we have not the
original autographs and we refuse to dogmatize about
errors in them. But what do these errors amount to,
after all? They are only in minor matters, in things
which lie entirely beyond the range of faith and prac-
tice. They have nothing to do with your religion, your
faith in God and His Christ, your salvation, your life
and conduct. They are but as motes in the sunbeam.
They are the imperfections of the human medium
through which the divine revelation has come. Men at
the best are and must be earthen vessels, in their
preaching and writing unto you. Take the word of
God that is in these writings, its message of grace and
salvation, its lessons of life, its holy guidance, its pre-
cious comfort. These will attest themselves as the word
ERRORS IN HOLY SCRIPTURE 283
of God to you and yours as they have to others in all
ages.
''The Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments
were immediately inspired by God, but that inspiration
did not make them inerrant in matters of science. They
have been kept pure in all ages, so far as their purpose
of grace, their message of salvation, their rule of faith
and practice is concerned ; but they are not inerrant
now, and it is not probable that they ever were inerrant
in matters of chronology. They are sufficient to give
that knowledge of God and of His will which is neces-
sary unto salvation ; but they are not sufficient to give
the knowledge of astronomy and botany. They are the
only infallible rule of faith and practice ; but they are
not the only infallible rule of agriculture and naviga-
tion, of commerce and trade, of war and finance. The
Scriptures are pure, holy, errorless, so far as their own
purpose of grace is concerned, as the only infallible rule
of the holy religion, the holy doctrine, and the holy life.
They are altogether perfect in those divine things that
come from heaven to constitute the divine kingdom on
earth, which, with patient, quiet, peaceful, but irresist-
ible might, goes forth from the holy centre through all
the radii of the circle of human affairs and persists until
it transforms the earth and man.
"The Bible is the infallible rule of faith and practice.
It is such, and no one can make it otherwise. It claims
to be such, and it vindicates its own claim. The reader
of the Bible will find this out for himself. The author-
ity of God will grasp his heart and conscience with irre-
sistible power. The preaching of the Word accompanied
by the divine Spirit will ever continue its blessed work of
convicting and converting men, of sanctifying them and
redeeming them. The Bible will ever be the counsellor
28i ARGUMENT AGAINST SUSTAINING THE APPEAL
and guide of our race,- until the second advent of our
Lord. From the Bible new truth will break forth for
every generation, to lift men higher and urge them on-
ward in the paths of sanctification. The Bible is the
master, the infallible rule, and it will ever continue to
break in pieces every other rule of faith and life that
men may put in its way. It will ever continue to give
new theology, new religious forces, and new, fresher, and
grander guidance in holy life and conduct to all the suc-
cessive generations of mankind.
" There are errors in the Bible as there are spots upon
the sun. The sun-spots do not disturb the light and.
heat and chemical action of the great luminary or check
his reign over our solar system. They suggest that
there are greater mysteries of glorious light and reign
beyond our vision. So the errors in Holy Scripture do
not in the slightest degree impair the divine authority
that shines through them or the reign of grace that is
carried on in this world by means of them. They inti-
mate, however, that the authority of God and His gra-
cious discipline transcend the highest possibilities of
human speech or human writing ; and that the religion
of Jesus Christ is not only the religion of the Bible, but
the religion of personal union and communion with the
living God," {The Bible, the Church, and the Reason,
pp. 111-115.)
Higher Criticism.
First I shall give you the summary of my views as to
the Hexateuch from my volume entitled The Higher
Criticism of the Hexateuch, submitted as part of my argu-
ment before the Presbytery of New York :
"(i). We have not one narrative, but a fourfold nar-
rative of the origin of the old covenant religion, as we
HIGHER CRITICISM 285
have a fourfold gospel giving the narrative of the origin
of the new covenant religion. There is, indeed, a re-
markable correspondence in these four types or points
of view. The Ephraimitic writer may be compared
with Mark, the Judaic writer with Matthew, the priestly
writer with Luke, and the Deuteronomist with John.
The difference between the Pentateuch and the Gospels
is that the four narratives of the Pentateuch have been
compacted by a series of inspired Redactors ; whereas
the Gospels have to be harmonized by uninspired teach-
ers in the Church. This unity in variety strengthens
the credibility of the Pentateuch. As the four Gospels
contain the gospel of Christ, so the narratives of the
Pentateuch contain the law of Moses. As our Saviour
is set forth by the Evangelist as the mediator of the
new covenant, Moses is set forth by the narratives of
the Pentateuch as the mediator of the old covenant.
" (2). The Pentateuch does not give us one Mosaic
code, but several codes of Mosaic legislation, a deca-
logue of worship, a judicial code of several decalogues, a
people's code, a code of holiness, and a priest-code,
contained in the narratives, somewhat as the Gospels
present us the discourses of Jesus in the varied types
peculiar to Mark, Matthew, Luke, and John. As we
harmonize the Gospels for a complete and symmetrical
statement of the doctrine of Jesus, so we harmonize the
codes of the Pentateuch for a complete and symmetrical
exposition of the law of Moses. The law was given
through Moses, grace and truth came through Jesus
Christ.
" (3). The Mosaic legislation was delivered through
Moses, the great prophetic law-giver of Israel, and then
unfolded in historical usage and interpretation in a
series of codifications by inspired prophets and priests ;
286 ARGUMENT AGAINST SUSTAINING THE APPEAL
but it was in several stages of advancement in the his-
torical life and experience of Israel from the conquest to
the exile. It was a divine ideal, a supernatural revealed
instruction, to guide the people of Israel throughout
their history, and lead them to the prophet greater than
Moses, who was to fulfil and complete his legislation.
The law was the true light of Israel until the first Ad-
vent, even as the Gospel is the light and guide of the
Church until the Second Advent. Israel appropriated
more and more the instruction of the law, as the Church
has appropriated more and more the doctrine of the
Gospel. The history of God's people under both cove-
nants has been essentially the same — a grand march for-
ward under the supernatural light of a divine revelation.
" (4). Law and Prophecy are not two distinct and sepa-
rate modes of revelation, but the same. The law of
Moses was as truly prophetic as legal. Moses was even
more a prophet than a law-giver. The prophets of God
that followed him all give divine law as well as divine
prophecy. As the apostles in the new covenant were
not merely expositors of the Gospel, but came forth
from the risen and glorified Christ with new revelations,
enlarging and completing the Gospel ; so the prophets
were not mere expositors of the law, but carhe forth im-
mediately from the presence of Yahweh as really as
Moses did, with new revelations enlarging and complete
ing the old. The distinction between law and prophecy
in the Bible is a fluctuating one, so that the whole divine
revelation may be called law, and also prophecy, accord-
ing to the usage of the Bible itself.
" (5). There is in the law, as in the Gospel, a divine
transforming power which shaped the history of Israel,
as the Gospel has shaped the history of the Church in
successive stages of appropriation. Not without some
HIGHER CRITICISM 287
reason have many recent Christian scholars after Nean-
der divided the history of the Christian Church after the
names of the chief apostles as indicating the various
types of Christianity. With even more reason might we
divide the history of Israel into stages of progress in ac-
cordance with the several law codes. The Christian
Church may look forward to a time when the unity and
variety of the gospel of Christ shall be fully manifested
in her historic life. The people of Israel also reached a
stage when in her historic life the several codes har-
monized, and the whole bent of the nation was in the
study of the law and a conscientious fulfilment of it, and
then in the fulness of time Christ Jesus the Messiah
came.
" The deeper study of the unity and variety of the
Pentateuchal narratives and laws, as we defend them
historically against Reuss, Kuenen, and Wellhausen, and
advance in the apprehension of their sublime harmony,
will fructify and enrich the theology of our day, just as
the deeper study of the unity and variety of the gospels
by the school of Neander, in the defence of them against
Strauss, Renan, and Baur, has been an unspeakable bless-
ing in the past generation. This having been accom-
plished, we may look forward to a time when our eyes
shall be opened as never before to the magnificent
unity of the whole Bible in the midst of its wondrous
variety. Then the word of God, as one supernatural
divine revelation, will rise into such a position of spirit-
ual power and transcendent influence, as shall greatly
advance the kingdom of our Lord and Saviour Jesus
Christ, and hasten the realization of that most blessed
hope of both the Old and New Testaments, the coming
of the Messiah in glory." (pp. 160-162.)
You hear a great deal in these times about the perils
2S8 ARGUMENT AGAINST SUSTAINING THE APPEAL
of the Higher Criticism. The Higher Criticism as applied
to Holy Scripture is the same discipline, essentially, that
is applied to the study of the classic literature of Greece
and Rome, and also to the ecclesiastical literature of the
Church. It has to do only with the literary forms of
Holy Scripture ; it does not at all interfere with the sub-
stance of Holy Scripture. The only thing that the
Higher Criticism can do is to answer questions as to au-
thorship and date, as to the original structure of books,
whether they came at once from an original author; how
far they have been edited and re-edited. But the only
thing we have to do as Christians, with our Holy Scrip-
ture, is to know whether the Bible, as it now is, is the
holy and inspired word of God. Now I ask you, what
have all these questions, which have simply to do with
the production of the Bible — what have they to do with
the question whether the Bible, as it now is, is the holy
and inspired word of God or not ? Those of us who are
engaged in the study of the Higher Criticism claim that
we are making the Old Testament more real, and more
powerful, giving it a higher and grander position before
the Christian scholars of our day. The Bible is being
studied as never before, and the results of this move-
ment of the Higher Criticism will be grand and glorious
in the future of the Christian Church.
There will now be read a citation from the volume,
The Bible, the Church, and the Reason, in which I en-
deavor to sum up some of the advantages of the Higher
Criticism :
" Criticism is destructive of traditional dogma, but it
is constructive of Biblical doctrine. Criticism from its
nature cannot destroy anything but error. It searches
for truth. It gives vastly more than it takes away.
" Criticism is nothing more than a scientific, exact,
HIGHER CRITICISM 289
exhaustive study of the Bible itself. It makes the Bible
more real, more historic, more pregnant with holy mean-
ing than ever before, simply because it studies the Bible
more extensively and more profoundly. Criticism has
made the Bible a new book, because exhaustive study
has found numberless new things in it, unknown to
students who neglected to study it. In the times of the
supremacy of the traditional dogma it was studied only
on the surface and for dogmatic or practical purposes.
It was merely a treasury out of which there might be a
capricious selection of texts to prove statements of dog-
ma which were already constructed by deductive reason-
ing. It was a thesaurus of texts for pulpit discourse
from which one might start an evangelical sermon. But
now the Bible is studied ardently from cover to cover,
by large numbers of enthusiastic students the world
over, who are bringing forth treasures new and old to
enrich the Church of God. Think not the critics are
destroying the Bible which they study with so much
enthusiasm and love. They have enthroned the Bible
in a higher position than it has ever held before in the
estimation of the world. They have restored the Bible
to its place as the queen of the literature of the world,
as the holy book for the man of science, the student of
literature and art, the historian and philosopher. Criti-
cism has created several new theological disciplines, such
as the Contemporary History of Israel and of Christ and
His apostles, Biblical Literature, and Biblical Theology,
and these are furnishing the divine material for a nobler
theology and a nobler Christian life.
" 2. The traditional view of the Biblical books attached
all the law to Moses, all the psalms to David, all the
wisdom to Solomon. The prophets and histories were
the only books which were left as guides to the develop-
290 ARGUMENT AGAINST SUSTAINING THE APPEAL
ment of the religion of Israel. There was a gap of cen-
turies between the Old and the New Testaments. My
friends, all this has changed. The gap between the
books has been filled up by modern criticism. God did
not leave Israel without guidance when she needed it
most, under the Persian and Greek yoke, when exposed
to the distracting influence of other religions and civil-
izations. God's Spirit abode with His people after the
theophanic presence had departed, and holy men of God
spake under His influence in sacred song and wisdom, in
historic composition and prophecy through all that long
period of waiting for the Messiah. There is an un-
broken continuity in divine revelation until divine revela-
tion reached its summit in Jesus Christ and His apostles.
If Criticism had done nothing else than fill up this sup-
posed chasm in divine revelation, it would have con-
ferred a boon of greater value to the world than all the
theories and traditions it has destroyed.
" 3. Another great result of Criticism is the destruc-
tion of the pessimistic theory that the history of Israel
was a history of backslidings. Modern Criticism finds a
legislation given by Moses, but unfolding in a series of
codes until Ezra, the second Moses, laid its capstone.
Criticism finds Israel from David onward until the Mac-
cabean age, singing and praying, in ever increasing
wealth of devotion, sacred psalms, responding from the
heart of the people to the teachings of God's law.
Criticism finds a succession of sages from Solomon to
the latest times preparing the way by their sentences of
wisdom for the jewelled sentences of the Messiah in
His training of the twelve. Israel did not go on declin-
ing through the centuries. Israel went on steadily ad-
vancing through the centuries in religion, in doctrine
and in morals, in wisdom, in law, in psalmody, and in
HIGHER CRITICISM 291
prophecy, undergoing that divine training which pre-
pared her to welcome the Messiah and furnish Him with
the apostles and prophets of the new dispensation.
What has Criticism destroyed that can compare with
this immense gain ?
" 4. Criticism has shown a wonderful variety as well as
unity in the Scriptures. Criticism has called attention
to the marvellous beauty of Biblical literature. It has
shown that there are works of the imagination in the
Old Testament in prose and poetry, preparing the way
for those visions of truth contained in the parables of
our Lord. It has disclosed wondrous specimens of
gnomic, lyric, and dramatic poetry. It has discovered
forms of the poet's art which approximate to the classic
epic poetry. It has disclosed four distinct varieties of
historic composition, and detected in their sources an-
cient poems and legends which the older Biblical scholars
never dreamed of. It has more than doubled the num-
ber of Hebrew prophets. It has increased the inspired
penmen to a much larger and richer company. The old
choirmasters of the inspired congregation remain.
Moses and David, Solomon and Isaiah, and everyone of
the ancient worthies retain their historic places. But
we now see that they were not merely soloists appearing
at great intervals in the progress of divine revelation,
alone, without masters, without disciples and without
associates, but that they were leaders of choirs of law-
givers, historians, prophets, poets, and sages who make
the entire history of Israel a grand oratorio of redemp-
tion." (pp. 146-149.)
I have been requested by a member of the House to
state definitely my views in regard to my assertion that
Moses did not write the Pentateuch in its relation to the
words of Jesus with reference to Moses and the Penta-
292 ARGUMENT AGAINST SUSTAINING THE APPEAL
teuch. I shall endeavor to do so by quoting from The
Bible, the Church, and the Reason :
" But some will say, ' Was it not the common opinion
in the days of our Lord that Moses wrote the Penta-
teuch, and that Isaiah wrote the book that bears his
name ? ' We answer, that so far as we know, it was the
common opinion that Isaiah wrote the book that bears
his name. But it was also the common opinion that
David wrote the Psalter. As to the Pentateuch, opinion
was divided whether it was lost when the temple was
destroyed by the king of Babylon, and restored or recast
by Ezra or not. If you insist upon interpreting the
New Testament by the opinion of the Jews of the time
as regards Isaiah and the Pentateuch, you must follow it
also as regards the Psalter. But why should we interpret
Jesus and His apostles by the opinions of the Jews of
His time? Why should we suppose that He shared
with them in all the errors He did not oppose and re-
fute? Jesus either knew that Moses wrote the Pen-
tateuch or He did not know. {a). If we said that Jesus
did not know whether Moses wrote the Pentateuch or
not, we would not go beyond His own saying that He
knew not the time of His own advent. Those who
understand the doctrine of the humiliation of Christ and
the incarnation of Christ find no more difficulty in sup-
posing that Jesus did not know the author of the Pen-
tateuch than that He did not know the day of His own
advent.
" (^). If on the other hand any one should say Jesus
must have known all these things, and He ought not to
have used language that might deceive men ; we re-
spond, that His language does not deceive men. We
have shov/n from literary usage in all ages and in the
HIGHER CRITICISM 293
Bible itself that it is equally true and good language for
the critics as for the anti-critics. The question is, shall
we interpret the words of Jesus by the opinions of His
contemporaries? This we deny. Jesus was not obliged
to correct all the errors of His contemporaries. He did
not correct their false views of science. He was the
great physician, but He did not teach medicine. He
was greater than Solomon, and yet he declined to de-
cide questions of civil law and politics. He never re-
buked slavery. Is He responsible for slavery on that
account ? The Southern slaveholders used to say so ;
but even they are now convinced of their error. The
signs of the times indicate that in a few years the anti-
critics will disappear as completely as slaveholders.
"*The attempt to bar the way of the Higher Criticism
of the Old Testament by interposing the authority of
the New Testament is an unworthy effort to make our
Lord and His apostles responsible for those conceits and
follies of ancient tradition which modern American tra-
ditional dogma with great unwisdom has accepted and
endorsed." (pp. 127-128.)
Dr. Lampe argued against me, as if I held the opinion
that Jesus did not know, or that He accommodated His
instruction to the ignorance of His hearers. He ignored
my opinion as stated in the same volume as follows :
" It is the custom in literature to name anonymous
writings after the name of the chief character in it, or
the theme of it, and then in that case it is quite com-
mon to personify the book and represent it as saying or
teaching this or that. When Jesus uses Moses as another
name for the Law or Pentateuch, and when He repre-
sents that Isaiah prophesied, it is by no means certain
that Jesus meant to say that Moses wrote the Penta-
teuch, or Isaiah wrote the prophecy referred to, e. g.
294 ARGUMENT AGAINST SUSTAINING THE APPEAL
The book of Esther is named Esther not because any-
one ever supposed that she wrote it, but because she is the
heroine, the theme of the book ; and when I say, as I
often have said, Esther never uses the name of God, or
teaches any doctrine of faith, you will understand me as
using Esther for the book of Esther.
" No one ever supposed that Ruth wrote the book of
Ruth, or would suppose that I regarded her as its author
if I should say, as I have often said, Ruth teaches a
doctrine different from Deuteronony and Ezra in rep-
resenting that even a Moabitish woman may enter
the kingdom of God. The usage of the New Testament
is also sufficiently clear at these points. Thus the epis-
tle to the Hebrews, iv. 7, uses David as a name of the
Psalter. It was the common opinion until the i8th
century that David wrote all the Psalms; but no Biblical
scholar at present, so far as I know, thinks that the
epistle to the Hebrews forces him to hold that David is
the author of the entire Psalter. Why, then, should
any one insist that when the name Moses is given to
the Pentateuch, and Isaiah to the book of Isaiah, that it
implies that Moses and Isaiah wrote all those writings
attributed to them by tradition ? " (pp. 127-128.)
Progressive Sanctificatioii after Death.
I shall call your attention, first, to a passage from the
Evidence submitted to the Presbytery of New York :
" But justification by faith belongs to the earlier stages
of redemption. All those who are justified are also
sanctified. No one can be ultimately and altogether re-
deemed without sanctification.
" It is necessary that believers should have the in-
dwelling of the Holy Spirit, and that they should be
* more and more quickened and strengthened in all sav-
PROGRESSIVE SANCTIFICATION AFTER DEATH 295
ing graces to the practice of true holiness, without which
no man shall see the Lord,' and * so the saints grow in
grace, perfecting holiness in the fear of God.* The doc-
trine of immediate sanctification is a heresy which has
always been rejected by orthodox Protestants.
"The Westminster Confession definitely states : ' This
sanctification is throughout, yet imperfect in this life.'
If imperfect in this life for all believers, there is no other
state in which it can be perfected save in the Inter-
mediate State. The Intermediate State is therefore for
all believers without exception a state for their sanctifi-
cation. They are there trained in the school of Christ,
and are prepared for the Christian perfection which they
must attain ere the judgment day.
" There are some theologians who persuade them-
selves that they can believe in the immediate justifica-
tion and the immediate sanctification of infants, of in-
capables, and of heathen adults, in the change of death,
in that supreme moment of transition from this life to
the Middle State. Such a theory may be stated in
words, but it is inconceivable in fact. What a transfor-
mation would take place in the intellectual and moral
powers of infants, incapables, and the dark-minded
heathen ! Such a metamorphosis is not taught in the
Scriptures or the Creeds. It would violate the intel-
lectual and moral constitution of man.
"Those who believe it may claim that all things are
possible to God. But it might be said that it is just
as possible for God to use the water of Baptism, ex
opcre operato, to work regeneration, as Sacramentarians
believe ; and it is just as possible that the elements of
the Lord's Supper may be changed into the real body
and blood of our Lord, as the Roman Catholics believe.
296 ARGUMENT AGAINST SUSTAINING THE APPEAL
These divine transformations are just as possible to God
and just as credible to the mind of man as the immediate
transformation of a little babe into a perfectly holy man
in the image of Jesus Christ ; or of the instantaneous ac-
complishment of the entire ordo s/xhitis for an idiot in
the very moment of death. All such magical doctrines
are subversive of the entire structure of Protestantism.
They belong to an age of magic, and have no place in
an age of Reason and Faith.
" It was a keen thrust of Mohler that Protestantism
without a purgatory must either let men enter heaven
stained with sin, or else think of an immediate magical
transformation at death, by which sin mechanically and
violently falls off from us with the body. Hase justly
replied that Protestantism would not accept this dilemma,
and that Protestant Theology taught that the divine
grace was operative, and men capable of moral develop-
ment after death. This view is the established opinion
in German Theology. Dorner, Martensen, Kahnis, and
other divines teach that there must be a growth in sanc-
tification in the Middle State. All Protestants must ac-
cept this doctrine or they are sure to be caught in the
inconsistency of magical, mechanical, and unethical opin-
ions. This opinion is commonly held by Protestants in
Great Britain. Why should Protestants in America lag
behind their brethren in Europe ? We have been caught
in the snares of recent errors. Let us break through
the snares and re-establish ourselves in the ancient
Christian doctrine of the Middle State.
" The doctrine of immediate justification and sanctifi-
cation at death involves the conceit that the child who
dies in infancy a few moments after birth is immediately
justified and sanctified, receives saving faith and all the
PROGRESSIVE SANCTIFICATION AFTER DEATH 297
Christian graces in an instant ; while his brother, who
Hves in this world, is not justified until he reaches the
age in which he can exercise personal faith, and then he
has all the struggles of life to undergo until he reaches
the limits of human life without the comforts of sancti-
fication, which he cannot receive until death. If this
were so, then blessed are those who die in infancy, and
thus outstrip their fellows in the Christian race. Vastly
better to be born to die, than to be born to live in this
uncertain world. What parent would not prefer to lay all
his children in an early grave, assured of their salvation,
rather than expose them to the dreadful risks of life and
the possibility of eternal damnation?" {Magazine of
Christian Literature, Dec, 1889. Article, Redemption
after Death, pp. 11 2- 114.)
Let me here answer a question which has been sent up
to me : " Do you mean by ' Middle State ' a condition of
being between earth and heaven, or a condition of heav-
enly life between the death of the believer and the final
judgment?"
I mean the latter.
I shall add the following from my Defence before the
Presbytery :
" The doctrine of progressive sanctification after death
raises many important and difficult questions with regard
to the Middle State, which I am no more bound to
answer than are others. I have stated my views so far
as I see my w^ay and no farther. I see. that believers
enter the Middle State imperfect, but they are cleansed
by the blood of Christ from all sin, and are therefore sin-
less. They are justified by the grace of God, and are
therefore guiltless ; they are by the immediate influence
of the divine Spirit raised to a higher and nobler life
and more blessed experience of redemption. But so
298 ARGUMENT AGAINST SUSTAINING THE APPEAL
soon as the redeemed soul begins its active practice,
conduct, and service in the Middle State, the question
presses itself upon us what that conduct, practice, and
service will be. Will it be immediately after and for-
ever perfectly holy, or will there still remain some de-
gree of imperfection in their practice of true holiness ?
To those whose ideas of holiness are low, and measured
only by innocence, holy intention, and resolution, or
who think of human models of a holy life, it may not
seem unnatural that believers should at once become
alike perfect in holiness and that their practice of true
holiness should be invariably free from imperfections of
any kind. But to that man who considers how weak
and imperfect the greatest saints and martyrs have been
when they left this world ; how far from perfection the
best of our friends have been when they left us ; and
then compare them with the sublime ideals of perfect
likeness to the pure and holy Jesus, entire likeness to
God the Father in perfect conduct, it will seem incredi-
ble that the man who leaves this world so imperfect
should in a moment of time leap to this perfection of
practice. We need some very clear and express teach-
ing in Holy Scripture to justify such a belief. And we
have it not.
" It is to be feared that those who are thinking of im-
mediate sanctification at death are not thinking of the
sanctification set forth in Scripture ; but of a merely
negative sanctification, such as consists in the absence of
positive sin. Sanctification embraces this as one of its
elements certainly, but Christian sanctification is vastly
more than this — it is the positive attainment of perfect
practice. It is not only the non-commission of sin ; it
is not only the doing of holy deeds under favorable cir-
cumstances ; it is not merely the accumulation of holy
PROGRESSIVE SANCTIFICATION AFTER DEATH 299
strength, purpose, resolution, and character such as
make it easy to resist sin ; but it is vastly more than
that — it is the attainment of the masterful experience
and practice of Jesus Christ, so that the saint rises supe-
rior to every temptation or any possibility of tempta-
tion ; and attains such a height of Christlikeness and
Godlikeness that it will be absolutely impossible for him
to commit sin, so to say, as impossible as for Christ to
be stained with guilt or for God to commit iniquity, and
in which the entire character, conduct, and practice are
as perfectly holy as the character and conduct of God,
pure as Christ is pure, perfect as God is perfect. Does
any one suppose that such purity, such perfection, can
be gained in the moment of death ? Such a sanctifica-
tion is the goal of that progressive sanctification that
begins with regeneration in this life and is carried on
until the resurrection. and the judgment day.
" The doctrine that has been unfolded removes diffi-
culties from many other doctrines, {a) It enables us
first to understand the doctrine of the universal salvation
of infants and incapables. It seems most probable that
the God of all grace begins their redemption in this
world by an act of regeneration, takes it up when they
die at that point, and carries it on in the Middle State
through all the subsequent steps of sanctification.
" How can we think of such a mechanical act, such a
magical change, as the transformation of a new-born
heathen babe into the perfect likeness of Jesus Christ in
the very moment of death ? No passage of Holy Scrip-
ture teaches such a doctrine, {b) This doctrine of pro-
gressive sanctification after death also relieves the doc-
trine of the salvation of some of the heathen and of the
heathen world. We can now see that those who have
300 ARGUMENT AGAINST SUSTAINING THE APPEAL
been enlightened by the Logos and born again of the
Holy Spirit, among any of the religions of the world,
having the root of the matter in them, the vital tie of
union with the Deity, enter the Middle State, where
they enjoy all the training they need for their progres-
sive sanctification. Israel was able to do his mediatorial
work for the nations only imperfectly in this world. It
seems probable that Israel has ever carried on that
mediatorial work as the religious teacher of mankind,
when the patriarchs and prophets, the sages and the
singers received the pious heathen into the school of
holiness that lay beyond the grave. And so it is with
the ministry of the Church. The Church has only in
part carried on its ministry in this world. Its greatest
ministry has ever been in the Middle State, in training
the departed babes and pious heathen in the holiness
and blessedness of the heavenly state. As our Lord
descended into Hades to preach the gospel there, so the
ancient Church conceived the apostles and teachers as
carrying on His work. There is an apostolic succession
of ministry which is not confined to this earth, but em-
braces in its redemptive scope the realm of the living
and the dead, as Christ is the king and judge of the liv-
ing and the dead, and His Church is composed of the
living and the dead.
" I believe that this doctrine of progressive sanctifica-
tion after death is of great practical importance.
" {a) It fills up the Middle State for us with an at-
tractive, industrious, holy life, a progress in grace, in
knowledge, in holiness, and in all perfections. We realize
that our departed friends are not asleep, but awake in
the most active of lives. We see our babes growing in
the divine life. We see our beloved in the companion-
ship of prophets and apostles, of saints and martyrs, and
PROGRESSIVE SANCTIFICATION AFTER DEATH ^Ql
of the Holy Jesus. We know that they have not for-
gotten us, that they are praying for us, and are waiting
to welcome us into the world of the redeemed. Death
loses its terrors — and becomes only a gateway into a
better country, into a brighter and purer life.
" {d) It incites to holy endeavor. The doctrine of im-
mediate sanctification at death cuts the nerves of Chris-
tian endeavor and dries the sap of holy activity. What
is the use, says the sluggish soul, in my striving so hard
for holiness, when I shall receive it all in an instant
whatever my life has been ? All I need is pardon, to get
into the kingdom at the eleventh hour. If I can only
crawl through just at the moment the gate of death
creaks on its hinges, I shall be as holy and as blessed as
the greatest martyr and the most self-sacrificing of mis-
sionaries.
" No such doctrine was known to the martyr age of
the Church. Those who hold such views are not the
stuff martyrs are made of. There would have been no
martyrs, there would have been no Church, it Christian-
ity had built on such a foundation. Those who, with
Paul and John, keep their eyes fixed upon the perfec-
tion of God, the likeness of Christ, and make it their one
aim, their one hope, to attain that perfection and like-
ness at the resurrection and the advent — those will purify
themselves in this world that they may enter the next
world with as great an advancement as possible. For if
there are grades of service and advancement here, there
will be still greater differences of grade there ; and the
honors of heaven will be apportioned in accordance with
the self-sacrificing ministry of earth. The holy deeds
done in the body are the sacred necleus of the holy
practice of the Middle State.
" The doctrine of progressive sanctification is in ac-
302 ARGUMENT AGAINST SUSTAINING THE APPEAL
cordance with the laws that God has established in the
ethical constitution of man. The conscience speaks the
categorical imperative in the first dawn of the moral
consciousness, and it pronounces its decision in the light
of the training that men receive in their successive stages
of advancement in morals.
" The Church and the Bible give their potent aid to
the conscience in the ethical elevation of humanity. It
is always, everywhere, and in every variety of form and
education, a training. Shall all this ethical training
cease at death, all the varied stages of progress in the
different periods of life, of culture, of racial and national
advancement, be reduced to a common level and made
of none effect, by a mighty transformation that will deal
with the race, father and child, mother and babe, master
and scholar, self-sacrificing missionary and pagan con-
vert, the devoted evangelist and the thief and murderer
turning in his last hour to Christ from the shadow of
the gallows — alias one undistinguishable mass? Such
a doctrine strikes a deadly blow at the moral nature of
man, the. ethical constitution of society, the .historic
training of our race, and the moral government of God.
"The doctrine of progressive sanctificatior\ after death
harmonizes Christian faith with Christian ethics, and
both of these with the ethics of humanity and the ethics
of God. It enables us to comprehend the whole life of
man, the whole history of our race from its first creation
until the day of doom, and all the acts of God in crea-
tion and providence, under one grand conception, the
divine sanctification of man." (pp. 1 77-181.)
Mr. Moderator and brethren, I have endeavored to set
forth before you, as clearly and as thoroughly as I could,
what are my views on the subjects in dispute. I hold
PROGRESSIVE SANCTIFICATION AFTER DEATH 303
these views sincerely and with all my heart. I maintain
that they are the views that are set forth in Holy
Scripture. The larger portion of them are set forth
also in the Westminster Confession of Faith, and, as I
know from a study of the Westminster divines for many
years, would be regarded by them as very important
matters of the Puritan faith of the seventeenth century.
There are other matters in dispute which have arisen in
the public mind since the times of the Westminster as-
sembly, and have received no definition in our stand-
ards. Now you must judge upon these matters as
judges in the presence of Jesus Christ, and before the
living God, and under guidance of the Holy Spirit.
I challenge you, before God, that you judge righteous
judgment. I challenge you, before God, that you judge
me according to the record of the declarations that I
have made. I challenge you, before Jesus Christ, that
you do no wrong to the Church of the living God.
V.
THE SUSTAINING OF THE APPEAL, AND THE JUDGMENT
OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY.
All of the 34 specifications under the five grounds
of Appeal were carried by a viva voce vote except IV.
I and 5, which charged prejudice against certain mem-
bers of the Presbytery of New York, which were lost.
IV. 6, which charged prejudice against directors, ofifi-
cers, and professors of the Union Theological Seminary,
was carried by a majority of two votes — 236 to 234.
There was a count of votes on several other specifica-
tions as follows :
I. I, 282 to 190; I. 2, 282 to 177.
I. 4, 238 to 195 ; I. 6, 250 to 185.
II. r, 262 to 185.
It is evident that the Assembly voted with little dis-
crimination and in the determination to sustain the
Appeal at every cost to truth and right, and without
regard to the unfortunate precedents which might be
established by their votes. Some of the leaders endeav-
ored to discriminate, but they could not restrain their
followers in the final rush of the vote.
The vote was then taken on the Sustaining of the
Appeal, when 298 voted to sustain, 85 to sustain in part,
and 116 not to sustain.
(304)
THE JUDGMENT 3O5
A committee of fifteen was appointed to bring in an
explanatory minute, as follows :
Ministers: Thomas A. Hoyt, D.D., H. W. Congdon,
James H. Brooks, D.D., Calvin W. Stewart, D.D., W.
W. Harsha, D.D., Jame? J. Lucas, George D. Baker,
D.D., E. P. Whallon, D.D., and Thomas D. Ewing,
D.D.
Elders : John Randolph, Thomas McDougall, David
Jacks, E. T. Green, James A. Curry, and E. D. War-
field.
This committee reported June 1st.
The Judgment upon Dr. Briggs.
Rev. Dr. Hoyt: Mr. Moderator, the committee ap-
pointed to formulate the judgment of the Assembly is
now ready to report. Before that report is presented,
however, I wish to ask Dr. Baker (a member of a sub-
committee sent by this committee to interview Dr.
Briggs), to relate the result of that interview, which was
undertaken by the committee in a kind spirit of con-
ciliation.
Dr. Baker : Mr. Moderator, when your committee
convened this morning under your direction, it was im-
pressed with a sense of responsibility which seldom falls
to the lot of men to bear. We felt that the very first
thing to do in all Christian courtesy and love was to send
a committee to Dr. Briggs and give him an opportunity
to say whatever he might be pleased to say in view of
the distressing circumstances. There was a prayer in
our hearts that Dr. Briggs might be led of God to say
something which would relieve the painful situation. I
regret to say, Mr. Moderator, that our hope in this
regard was disappointed. Our interview was frank,
306 THE JUDGMENT
kind, and cordial to the last degree ; but Dr. Briggs
insisted strenuously, positively, irrevocably, upon every-
thing that he had said in the defence which he made
when brought to the bar of this court. At my request
he gave into my hands this statement in his own hand-
writing, and bearing his own signature, which I will
read :
" In accordance with your request, I hereby state that
your committee called upon me to ask me if I had any-
thing to say to them respecting the disposition of the
case. I thereupon said that I adhered to all the posi-
tions taken before the General Assembly, and had
nothing further to say ; save that the appellee reserves
all rights, and that the General Assembly should take
the exclusive responsibility for any further action."
When I interrogated him particularly with reference
to the declaration he made to this court that he should
continue under all circumstances to teach, so long as he
lived, the doctrines to answer for which he was brought
to the bar of this court, he replied that he had only to
reiterate that declaration ; that whatsoever might be the
disposition of this case, whatsoever action we might
take this afternoon with reference to it, he should still
teach, as he has done heretofore, these doctrines, which
he sincerely believes. It was in view of this declaration,
Mr. Moderator, that your committee took the action
which is now to be reported by the chairman.
Dr. HOYT : With your permission, Mr. Moderator, I
will now read the judgment which it is recommended
by your committee be taken by this Assembly in that
case :
THE JUDGMENT 307
General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in the
United States of America, in session at Washington, D.
C, June I, 1893.
Presbyterian Church in the
United States of America,
Appellant,
vs.
Rev, Chas. A. Briggs, D.D.,
Appellee.
On Appeal from the
final judgment of
the Presbytery of
New York.
This appeal being regularly issued and coming on to
be heard on the judgment, the notice of appeal, the
appeal, and the specifications of errors alleged, and the
record in the case from the beginning, and the reading
of said record having been omitted by consent, and the
parties hereto having been heard before the judicatory
in argument, and the opportunity having been given to
the members of the judicatory appealed from to be
heard, and they having been heard, and opportunity
having been given to the members of this judicatory to
be heard, and they having been heard, as provided by the
Book of Discipline, and the General Assembly as a judi-
catory sitting in said cause on appeal having sustained
the following specifications of error, to wit :
All of said specifications of errors set forth in said five
grounds of appeal, save and except the first and fifth
under the fourth ground of appeal, on consideration
whereof this judicatory finds said appeal should be and
is hereby sustained, and that said Presbytery of New
York, the judicatory appealed from, erred in striking
out said amended charges four and seven, and erred in
not sustaining on the law and the evidence said amended
charges one, two, three, five, six and eight ; on consider-
308 THE JUDGMENT
ation whereof this judicatory finds that said final judg-
ment of the Presbytery of New York is erroneous and
should be and is hereby reversed ; and this General As-
sembly sitting as a judicatory in said cause coming now
to enter judgment on said amended charges, one, two,
three, five, six and eight, finds the appellee, the said
Chas. A. Briggs, has uttered, taught and propagated
views, doctrines and teachings as set forth in said
charges contrary to the essential doctrine of Holy
Scripture and the Standards of said Presbyterian Church
in the United States of America, and in violation of the
ordination vow of said appellee, which said erroneous
teachings, views and doctrines strike at the vitals of
religion and have been industriously spread ; wherefore,
this General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in
the United States of America, sitting as a judicatory in
this cause on appeal does hereby suspend Chas. A.
Briggs, the said appellee, from the ofifice of a minister
in the Presbyterian Church in the United States of
America, until such time as he shall give satisfactory
evidence of repentance to the General Assembly of the
Presbyterian Church in the United States of America,
for the violation by him of the said ordination vow as
herein and heretofore found.
And it is ordered that the Stated Clerk of this Gen-,
eral Assembly transmit a certified copy of this judg-
ment to the Presbytery of New York to be made a part
of the record in this case.
It was also ordered that a copy be furnished to the
appellee, the Rev. Chas. A. Briggs, D.D.
Doctrinal Statements.
Rev. Dr. HOVT: Mr. Moderator, in addition to this
report of judgment, there were also formulated by us
THE STATEMENT 309
in obedience to your commands, doctrinal statements
bearing upon the issues which have been pending here,
and with your permission I will ask that Rev. Dr. Harsha,
the chairman of the sub-committee, read that paper.
Rev. Dr. Harsha : The report, Mr. Moderator, of
this sub-committee, is a very brief one. We did not
deem it advisable to go into large details on the doc-
trinal points raised in this appeal.
"Your committee, to whom was intrusted the duty of
formulating a deliverance of this Assembly on the doc-
trinal points involved in the appeal of the committee of
prosecution from the decision of the presbytery of New
York in the case of Charles A. Briggs, D.D., reports as
follows :
" First. We find that the doctrine of the errancy of
Scripture as it came from them to whom and through
whom God originally communicated his revelation, is in
conflict with the statements of the Holy Scripture itself,
which asserts that all Scripture or every Scripture is
given by the inspiration of God (H. Timothy iii. 16);
that the prophecy came not of old by the will of man,
but that holy men of God spake as they were moved by
the Holy Ghost (H. Peter i. 21); and also with the state-
ments of the standards of the Church which assert that
the Holy Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments are
the Word of God (Larger Catechism, question 3), of
infallible truth and divine authority (Confession, chapter
I., section 5).
" Second. We find in this case involved the question of
the sufficiency of the human reason and of the Church,
as authorized guides in the matter of salvation. Your
committee recommends that this General Assembly de-
clare that the Reason and the Church are not to be re-
garded as fountains of divine authority ; that they are
310 THE PROTEST
unrelia.ble and variable, and whilst they may be and no
doubt are channels or media through which the Holy
Spirit may reach and influence for good the human soul,
they are not to be relied upon as sufficient in themselves
and aside from Holy Scripture, to lead the soul to a
saving knowledge of God. To teach otherwise is most
dangerous, and contrary to the Word of God and our
Standards, and our ministers and churches are solemnly
warned against them.
" TJiird. We find involved in this case a speculation in
regard to the process of the soul's sanctification after
death which in the judgment of this Assembly is a
dangerous hypothesis, in direct conflict with the plain
teachings of the Divine Word and the utterances of the
standards of our church. Those standards distinctly
declare that the souls of believers are at their death
made perfect in righteousness and do immediately pass
into glory, whilst their bodies, being still united to
Christ, do rest in their graves till the resurrection.
(Shorter Catechism, question 37 ; H. Corinthians v. 3 ;
Philippians i. 23, and John xvii. 24.)"
The Protest.
The following is the Protest presented by Dr. Sprague,
of Auburn, in regard to the sentence against Dr. Briggs :
"■ We, the undersigned, ministers and elders in the
Presbyterian Church in the United States of America,
declaring our hearty belief in, and love for, the Holy
Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments and our
entire loyalty to the principles of the Presbyterian
Church, desire respectfully to record our solemn protest
against the verdict of suspension, and the proceedings
leading to the verdict, in the case against the Rev.
Charles A. Briggs, D.D., in the General Assembly of 1893.
THE PROTEST 311
^^ First. As involving, in our judgment, acts of doubt-
ful constitutionality.
" Second. As seeming to abridge the liberty of opinion
hitherto enjoyed under our standards by office-bearers
in the Church.
" Third. As tending, we believe, to the discouragement
of the thorough study of the Bible and reverent ad-
vance in apprehension of divine truth ; and
''Fourth. As inflicting what we cannot but feel is an
injustice on a Christian scholar of acknowledged high
character and learning, as well as on the Presbytery of
New York, which has fully acquitted him of the charges
alleged against him."
This Protest was signed by sixty-three ministers and
elders, commissioners of the General Assembly, who
voted in the minority.
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