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Heroes  of  the  Nations 

A  Series  of  Biographical  Studies 
presenting  the  lives  and  work 
of  certain  representative  his- 
torical characters,  about  whom 
have  gathered  the  traditions 
of  the  nations  to  which  they 
belong,  and  who  have,  in  the 
majority  of  instances,  been 
accepted  as  types  of  the  sev- 
eral national  ideals. 


FOR  FULL  LIST  SEE  END  OF  THIS  VOLUME 


Iberoes  ot  tbe  "Wattons 

EDITED    BY 

f).  tiOl.  a,  S)avf8 


FACTA     DUCI8     VIVINT,     OPEROIAQUI 

OLORlA    RERUM OVIO.     IN    LIVI«M,    ISS. 

THC    HERO  S    DEEDS    AND    HARD-WON 
FAME   (HALL    LIVE. 


DEMOSTHENES 


DEMOSTHENES 


AND   THE   LAST   DAYS   OF   GREEK   FREEDOM 


384-322  B.C. 


(^■) 


a:  wf  pickard-cambridge 

Fellow  of  Balliol  College,  Oxford 


G.  P.  PUTNAM'S  SONS 

NEW  YORK  AND  LONDON 

XLbc    ftnicftcrbocfter    press 

1914 


JZQ5Q21 

So.  y<f 


COPYKIGHT.    I9I4 
BY 

G.  P.  PUTNAM'S  SONS 


X33 
PC 


"Cbe  Itntcfterlwclier  press,  flew  Korfc 


PREFATORY  NOTE 

IN  the  main  body  of  this  book,  references  have 
been  given  throughout  to  the  chief  original 
authorities  on  which  the  statements  in  the  text 
are  based.  It  seemed  less  necessary,  and  indeed 
scarcely  possible,  to  do  this  in  those  portions  of  the 
work  (especially  Chapters  II,  III,  and  beginning 
of  Chapter  IV)  which  are  of  the  nature  of  an 
introductory  summary:  and  readers  who  wish  for 
fuller  information  must  consult  the  larger  Greek 
histories  and  works  on  the  Athenian  constitution. 
The  work  has  been  based  on  a  study  of  the 
original  authorities  throughout,  but  I  have  con- 
sidered carefully  the  treatment  of  the  period  in  the 
leading  Greek  histories,  and  have  made  particular 
use  of  the  histories  of  Grote,  Holm  and  Beloch,  and 
of  Schafer's  Demosthenes  und  seine  Zeit,  which,  in 
spite  of  the  corrections  which  later  work  on  the 
subject  has  rendered  necessary,  can  never  be 
superseded.  I  wish  also  to  express  my  obHgation 
to  Hogarth's  Philip  and  Alexander  of  Macedon, 
Blass'  Attische  Beredsamkeit,  and  Butcher's  Demos- 
thenes (in  Macmillan's  Classical  Writers  series). 
Among  other  works  which  I  have  consulted  with 
profit  have  been  Francotte,  Les  Finances  des  Cites 

iii 


iv  Prefatory  Note 

Grecques;  W.  S.  Ferguson,  Hellenistic  Athens; 
Edward  Meyer,  Isokrates*  zweiter  Brief  an  Philipp; 
J.  Sundwall,  Epigraphische  Beitrdge  zur  sozial- 
poUtischen  Geschichte  Athens  im  Zeitalter  des  De- 
mosthenes; M.  P.  Foucart,  Les  Atheniens  dans  la 
Chersonese  de  Thrace  au  IV^  siecle;  W.  Reichen- 
bacher,  Die  Geschichte  der  athenischen  und  make- 
donischen  Politik;  A.  Cartault,  De  causa  Harpalica; 
A.  Motzki,  Eubulos  von  Prohalinthos;  U.  Kahr- 
stedt,  Forschungen  zur  Geschichte  des  ausgehenden 
filnften  und  des  vierten  Jahrhunderts;  E.  Schwartz, 
Demosthenes'  erste  Philippika  (in  the  Festschrift 
fur  Th.  Mommsen);  J.  Rohrmoser,  Ueber  den 
philokrateischen  Frieden;  P.  Wendland,  Beitrdge 
zur  athenischen  Politik  u.  Publicistik  des  vierten 
Jahrhunderts;  E.  Radiige,  Zur  Zeitbestimmung 
des  Euboischen  u.  Olynthischen  Krieges;  J.  Kro- 
mayer,  Antike  Schlachtf elder;  and  other  writings 
to  which  reference  is  made  in  the  notes. 

It  must  be  admitted  that,  time  after  time,  the 
evidence  which  has  come  down  to  us  is  not  sufficient 
to  give  certainty  to  the  conclusions  based  upon  it. 
For  the  greater  part  of  the  period  with  which  this 
book  deals,  a  historian  has  to  be  content  with 
Diodorus,  who  is  notoriously  untrustworthy  in 
certain  respects,  particularly  in  chronology;  with 
the  meagre  summary  of  Justin;  with  Plutarch,  to 
whom  the  moral  was  perhaps  as  important  as  the 
truth  of  his  story;  and  with  the  statements  of 
orators  about  themselves  and  about  one  another, 
made,  as  a  rule,  in  moments  of  strong  feeling,  and 


Prefatory  Note  v 

by  members  of  a  nation  by  which  strict  truth- 
fulness was  never  felt  to  be  one  of  the  most  obliga- 
tory virtues.  Here  and  there  we  receive  valuable 
help  from  inscriptions,  but  other  contemporary 
sources,  apart  from  the  orators,  are  almost 
wanting,  and  we  are  obliged  to  rely  upon  allusions 
in  writers  who  lived  centuries  after  the  events  with 
which  we  are  concerned.  There  are  many  points 
at  which  the  explanation  of  Demosthenes'  conduct 
and  policy  can  only  be  conjectured,  and  different 
writers  have  found  it  possible  on  the  same  evidence 
to  construct  diametrically  opposite  theories  of  his 
character  and  motives.  I  have  attempted  to 
estimate  these  as  impartially  as  possible,  and  it  is 
hoped  that  the  account  given  in  this  book  will  be 
found  to  be  in  accordance  with  the  evidence,  and 
that,  where  gaps  have  to  be  filled  by  conjecture, 
the  conjectiu-es  may  be  thought  reasonable  and 
consistent  with  the  more  certain  conclusions. 

As  regards  the  illustrations,  I  am  indebted  to 
Lord  Sackville  for  the  permission  given  by  him  to 
photograph  the  statue  of  Demosthenes  at  Knole; 
to  Dr.  G.  B.  Gnmdy  for  a  photograph  of  Ther- 
mopylae and  a  sketch  of  the  hills  about  Cytiniimi; 
to  Mr.  M.  S.  Thompson  for  a  photograph  of  the 
Lion  of  Chseroneia;  to  Mr.  A.  B.  Cook  for  a  photo- 
graph of  Calaureia ;  to  my  wife  for  a  drawing  of  the 
view  from  Thermopylae;  to  Messrs.  Fradelle  and 
Yoimg  for  permission  to  reproduce  their  photo- 
graph of  Lamia ;  to  the  Committee  of  the  Egyptian 
Exploration  Fund  for  leave  to  photograph  the 


vi  Prefatory  Note 

papyrus  which  appears  at  p.  317;  to  Dr.  G.  F. 

Hill  for  casts  of  the  coins  which  are  reproduced  in 
this  book;  to  Herr  J.  Kromayer  and  Messrs.  Weid- 
mann  for  leave  to  reproduce  maps  of  Chaeroneia 
and  the  neighbourhood;  and  for  other  help  to 
Prof.  Percy  Gardner  and  Mr.  A.  J.  Toynbee.  To 
all  of  these  my  best  thanks  are  offered. 

I  have  also  to  thank  the  Delegates  of  the  Oxford 
University  Press  for  permission  to  reprint  passages 
from  my  translation  of  the  Public  Speeches  of 
Demosthenes.  I  could  have  wished  to  quote  much 
more  freely  from  the  Speeches,  which  give  a  far 
more  truthful  impression  of  Demosthenes  than  can 
be  given  by  any  description ;  but  the  limitations  of 
space  imposed  by  the  plan  of  this  series  did  not 
allow  this ;  and  I  hope  that  the  translation  and  the 
present  volume  may  be  treated  as  companion 
works,  and  that  each  may  be  allowed  in  some 
small  degree  to  atone  for  the  many  deficiencies 
of  the  other. 

Postscript. — Since  the  above  was  written,  it  has  been  found 
possible  to  insert  some  more  illustrations.  For  these  I  have  to 
thank  my  wife,  Messrs.  Alinari,  and  the  English  Photographic 
Company  in  Athens. 


CONTENTS 

PAGE 

PREFATORY  NOTE   ......  iii 

CHRONOLOGICAL  TABLE  .....  xi 

CHAPTER  I 
THE  YOUTH  AND  TRAINING  OF  DEMOSTHENES        .  I 

CHAPTER  II 
GREECE  FROM  404  TO  359  .  .  .  .         4I 

CHAPTER  III 

THE  ATHENIAN  STATE  IN  THE  FOURTH  CENTURY 

B.  C 71 

CHAPTER  IV 
THE  BEGINNING  OF  DEMOSTHENES*  CAREER  .       IO9 

CHAPTER  V 

THE  RISE  OF  PHILIP 1 43 

CHAPTER  VI 

THE  OLYNTHLAN  WAR         .  .  .  .  •  I?! 

CHAPTER  VII 

THE  FIRST  EMBASSY  TO  PHILIP  .  .  .  228 

CHAPTER  VIII 

THE  SECOND  EMBASSY  AND  THE  PEACE  OF  PHILO- 

CRATES  ......       264 

vii 


viii  Contents 

PACE 

CHAPTER  IX 

THE  NOMINAL  PEACE  AND  THE  RENEWAL  OF  THE 

WAR 301 

CHAPTER  X 
CHiERONEIA 359 

CHAPTER  XI 
AFTER  CHiERONEIA 392 

CHAPTER  XII 
GREECE  IN  THE  ABSENCE  OF  ALEXANDER   .  .      42O 

CHAPTER  XIII 
THE  AFFAIR  OF  HARPALUS  AND  THE  LAMIAN  WAR         45O 

CHAPTER  XIV 
CONCLUSION 489 

INDEX 501 


ILLUSTRATIONS 

FACING  PAGB 

The  Acropolis  of  Athens    .  Frontispiece 

The  Statue  of  Demosthenes  in  the  Vatican  30 

Peiraeus,  Harbour  of  Zea,  from  Munychia  42 

The  Arcadian  Gate,  Messene    ...  54 

A  General  View  of  Sparta          ...  64 

The  Pnyx 76 

The  Statue  of  Demosthenes  at  Knole  Park  120 

(Front  view) 

The  Statue  of  Demosthenes  at  Knole  Park  122 

(Side  view) 

The  Temple  of  Hera  at  Olympia         .        .156 

Coins  of  Macedonian  and  Thracian  Kings  .  168 


The  Theatre  and  Temple   of   Apollo  at 
Delphi 


The  Statue  of  ^schines  at  Naples     . 

Thermopyl^,  the  Pass 

From  a  photograph  by  Dr.  G.  B.  Grundy 

The  View  from  Thermopylae 

From  a  drawing  by  H.  M.  Pickard-Cambridge 

The  Stadium  at  Delphi 
(Scene  of  the  Pythian  Games) 
is 


172 
246 
278 

282 

288 


X  Illustrations 

PAGE 

Papyrus  Fragment  of  Demosthenes'  Speech 

ON  THE  Embassy 316 

The  Athenian  Treasury  and  Museum  at 

Delphi 358 

The  Grand  Altar  at  Delphi        .         .         .     362 

The  Pass  of  Gravia  and  Site  of  Cytinium    368 

From  a  sketch  by  Dr.  G.  B.  Grundy 

Map  of  CHiERONEIA  AND  ENVIRONS  .  .       378 

(After  Kromayer) 

Diagram  of  the  Battle  of  CHiERONEiA         .    '384 

(After  Kromayer) 

The  Lion  of  Ch^roneia       ....     388 

From  a  photograph  by  Mr.  M.  S.  Thompson 
ACRO-CORINTHUS  AND  TeMPLE  AT  CORINTH        .       4OO 

Sparta 426 

From  a  drawing  by  H.  M.  Kckard-Cambridge 

The  Temple  of  Zeus  at  Olympia  .         .     458 

The  Acropolis  of  Lamia       ....     478 

From  a  photograph  by  Messrs.  Fradelle  &  Young 

Calaureia,  view    near    the    Precinct    of 

Poseidon       ......     484 

From  a  photograph  by  Mr.  A.  B.  Cook 

Statue  of  Demosthenes       ....     498 

As  restored  by  Hartwig 

Map  of  Greece  and   Surrounding   Coun- 
tries     at  end 


CHRONOLOGICAL  TABLE 

fThe  chronology  of  this  period  is  often  uncertain  and  there  are 
many  differences  of  opinion  among  historians  in  regard  to  it. 
The  order  of  events  in  the  years  355-348  is  especially  disputed. 
The  dates  here  given  must  therefore  be  regarded  only  as  those 
which  the  author  himself  regards  as  probable,  and  which  he  has 
followed  in  the  text.  The  table  only  includes  events  which  fall 
within  the  scope  of  the  book,  and  makes  no  claim  to  complete- 
ness). 

B.C. 

404  Athens  capitulates  to  Sparta;  the  Long  Walls  are  de- 

stroyed, and  the  Peiraeus  dismantled.  The  "Thirty 
Tyrants"  established. 

403-2  The  "Thirty  Tyrants"  overthrown  and  democracy 
restored. 

400  The  Spartans  begin  hostilities  against  Persia  in  Asia 

Minor. 

395  Artaxerxes  II .  sends  Timocrates  to  rouse  the  Greek  States 

against  Sparta.  Sparta  sends  help  to  the  Phocians 
against  the  Thebans  and  Locrians,  but  Lysander  is 
slain  at  Haliartus. 

394  Beginning  of  Corinthian  War,  in  which  the  Athenians 

and  allies  oppose  the  Spartans.  Spartan  forces 
recalled  from  Asia  Minor.  Conon  defeats  the  Spartan 
fleet  off  Cnidos,  and  Athens  refortifies  the  Peiraeus. 

393  The  Long  Walls  of  Athens  rebuilt.     Iphicrates  in  the 

Peloponnese. 

392  War  continues  in   the   Peloponnese,   between   Sparta 

and  Argos,  Corinth  etc.  (aided  by  Athens).  Iphi- 
crates destroys  a  Spartan  division.  Abortive  mission 
from  Sparta  to  Artaxerxes. 

391  War  in  Peloponnese  continues.    Sparta  also  sends  troops 

to  Asia  Minor  against  the  Persian  general. 


xii  Chronological  Table 

B.C. 

390  War    in    Asia    Minor,  etc.,  continues.    Thrasybulus 

brings  Thracian  princes  and  Byzantium  into  alliance 

with  Athens. 
389  Sparta  supports  ^Eginetans  against  Athens. 

388  Antalcidas  (of  Sparta)  interrupts  Athenian  corn-convoys 

from  the  Hellespont. 
387  Peace  of  Antalcidas. 

386  Plataeae,  Thespiae  and  Orchomenus  become  centres  of 

Spartan  influence  in  Boeotia. 
385  Sparta  destroys  the  walls  of  Mantineia,  and  recovers 

influence  in  the  Peloponnese. 
384  Birth  of  Demosthenes. 

383  Sparta   enforces   restoration  of  oligarchical  exiles  at 

Phleius,  and  aids  Acanthus  and  ApoUonia  against 

Olynthus.      Phoebidas    captures    the    Cadmeia    at 

Thebes. 
Cotys^becomes  Kling  of  the  Odrysian  Thradans. 
382  Birth  of  PhUip. 

380  Sparta  besieges  Phleius.     Isocrates'  Panegyricus. 

379  The  Spartans  take  Phleius,  and  compel  Olynthus  to 

join   the    Spartan   alliance.     Being   driven   out    of 

Thebes,  they  invade  Boeotia. 
378  Attack  of  Sphodrias  on  the  Peiraeus;  Athens  joins  the 

Boeotians  against  Sparta,  and  organises  the  Second 

Athenian  Confederacy.     Second  Spartan  invasion  of 

Boeotia. 
378-7      Symmories  instituted  for  collection  of  war-tax  at  Athens. 
377  Third  Spartan  invasion  of  Boeotia. 

376  Fourth  Spartan  invasion  of  Boeotia.     Chabrias  defeats 

the  Spartan  fleet  off  Naxos.     Death  of  Demosthenes ' 

father. 
375  Operations  of  Timotheus  on  the  Peloponnesian  coast 

and  about  Corcyra,  and  of  Chabrias  on  the  Thracian 

coast. 
Jason  of  Pherae  acquires  ascendancy  over  Thessaly. 

Thebes  recovers  power  over  Boeotia ;  Pelopidas  defeats 

the  Spartan  army  sent  to  help  the  Phocians. 
Olynthus  refounds  the  Chalcidic  league. 
374  Peace  made  between  Athens  and  Sparta,  but  immedi- 

ately broken  by  Timotheus.    Timotheus  operates 

on  the  Thracian  coast. 


Chronological  Table  xiii 

B.C. 

373  Spartans  devastate    Corcyra,  and  are    opposed  first 

by    Timotheus,  then  by  Iphicrates  and  Chabrias. 

Thebes  destroys  Plataeae.     Isocratee'  Platcncus. 
372  Iphicrates  continues  to  operate  against  Sparta  in  the 

West. 
371  Athens  makes  peace  with   Sparta,   and   Sparta  and 

Amyntas    acknowledge    her    claim    to   Amphipolis. 

Thebes  will  not  join  in  the  Peace.     Battle  of  Leuctra. 

Theban  supremacy  established. 
370  A  congress  at  Athens  confirms  the  Peace  of  Antalcidas. 

Mantineia   rebuilds   its   walls,    and   the   Arcadians 

found     Megalopolis.     Democratic     movements    in 

Argos,  Tegea,  etc. 
The  Thebans  massacre  the   people   of  Orchomenus. 

Jason  of  Pherae  murdered;  Alexander  acquires  his 

power. 
369  The   Thebans   invade   the   Peloponnese   to   help   the 

Arcadians  against  Sparta.    Athens  makes  alliance 

with  Sparta.     The  Thebans  make  the  Messenians 

independent  of  Sparta,  and  build  Messene. 
Death  of  Amyntas  III. 
368  The  Thebans  (under  Pelopidas)  unite  Thessaly  against 

Alexander   of    Pherae,   and   bring   Macedonia    into 

alliance,  taking  Philip  as  a  hostage  to  Thebes.     Per- 

diccas  III.  becomes  King  of  Macedonia. 
Hostilities   in    the   Peloponnese    continue.     Philiscus 

summons  a  congress  at  Delphi,  but  without  result. 
367  The  Thebans  again  in  the  Peloponnese.     Embassies 

from  the  Greek  States  to  Persia. 
366  The  Congress  of  Greek  States  at  Thebes  rejects  the 

Peace  proposed  by  Artaxerxes;  Timagoras  executed 

at  Athens. 
The  Thebans  are  unsuccessful  in  Thessaly.    Themison 

of  Eretria  gives   Oropus  to  Thebes. 
The  Arcadians  make  peace  with  Athens,  and  begin 

hostilities  with   Elis.     Corinth  and   Phleius   make 

peace  with  Thebes. 
Timotheus  helps  Ariobarzanes  in  revolt  against  Persia, 

and  conquers  Samos.     IsocraXes'  Archidamus. 
365-4       Hostilities  continue  between  Thebes  and  Alexander  of 

Pherae,  and  between  Arcadia  and  EUs. 


xiv  Chronological  Table 

B.C. 

365-4       Athens  sends  cleruchs  to  the  Chersonese.    Timotheus 

operates  there. 
364  Timotheus    conducts   hostilities    against    Cotys,    and 

attempts    to   take    Amphipolis,   but    fails.     Philip 

returns  from  Thebes  to  Macedonia. 
364-3      Demosthenes'  prosecutes  Aphobus,  and   is   trierarch. 

His  first  collision  with  Meidias. 
363  Thebes  sends  Epameinondas  with  a  fleet  to  the  Thracian 

region;  defeats  Alexander  of  Pherae  at  Cynoscepha- 

lae  (though  Pelopidas  is  slain);  and  destroys  Orcho- 

menus. 
Hostilities    between    Arcadians    and    Elis    continue; 

schism  among  the  Arcadians. 
362  Battle   of   Mantineia,    death   of   Epameinondas,   and 

virtual  end  of  Theban  supremacy.     A  Peace  made. 

Alexander    of     Pherae    commits    hostilities    against 

Athens. 
Timotheus  recalled  from  Thrace;  his  successors  are 

unsuccessful. 
Revolt  of  Egypt  and  a  large  part  of  Asia  Minor  against 

Persia.     Charidemus  in  Asia  Minor. 
Trial  of  Onetor. 
361  Unsuccessful  Athenian  expeditions  to  Thrace.     Milto- 

cythes  revolts  against  Cotys,  and  appeals  to  Athens. 

Callistratus  banished;  Aristophon  takes  the  lead  in 

Athens. 
Corey ra  deserts   the  Athenian   confederacy.     Athens 

makes  terms  with  Phleius,  Elis,  and  the  Achaeans. 
360  Timotheus  again  fails  to  take  Amphipolis.    Charidemus 

joins  Cotys.     Cotys  is  succeeded  by  Cersobleptes. 

Charidemus    forces   Cephisodotus   to   make   terms, 

which  the  Athenians  repudiate.     Demosthenes  co- 

trierarch  with  Philippides. 
359  Miltocythes  murdered  at  Cardia.      Partition  of  Odry- 

sian  kingdom  between  Cersobleptes,  Berisades,  and 

Amadocus;    the    Chersonese    nominally    ceded    to 

Athens,  but  not  actually  taken  over. 
Death  of  Artaxerxes  II.,  and  accession  of  Artaxerxes 

III. 
Alexander  of  Pherae  murdered;   Lycophron  and  Pei- 

tholaus  succeed  to  his  power. 


ii 


Chronological  Table  xv 

B.C. 

359  Death  of  Perdiccas  III.  Accession  of  Philip.     He  ac- 

knowledges the  title  of  Athens  to  Amphipolis,  but 
Athens  neglects  to  garrison  it. 
358  Chares  enforces  the  cession  of  the  Chersonese  to  Athens. 

Timotheus  liberates  Euboea  from  Theban  control. 
Demosthenes  co-trierarch  with  Philinus. 

Social  War.  Chios,  Cos,  Rhodes,  and  Byzantium  re- 
volt against  Athens;  defeat  and  death  of  Chabrias 
at  Chios. 

Philip,   after  a  campaign  against  the  Paeonians  and 
lUyrians,    attacks    Amphipolis,    which    appeals    to 
Athens.     Secret  arrangement  between  Athens  and 
Philip  with  regard  to  Amphipolis  and  Pydna. 
357  Social  War  continued.     Prosecution  of  Iphicrates  and 

Timotheus. 

Philip  takes  Amphipolis.  Olynthus,  rejected  by 
Athens,  makes  alliance  with  Philip.  Philip  takes 
Pydna. 

Law  of  Periander. 
357-6       Philip  takes  Poteidaea. 

356  Birth    of    Alexander    the    Great.     Philip    takes    Mt. 

Pangaeus,   and   founds   Philippi.     Athenian   alliance 
with  Lyppeius,  Grabus,  and  Cetriporis. 

Chares  helps  Artabazus  against  Persia;  the  Persian  King 
helps  the  allies  in  their  revolt,  and  Chares  is  recalled 
to  Athens. 

Androtion's  commission  to  recover  arrears  of  war-tax. 
Isocrates  On  the  Peace. 
355  Philip  conducts  campaigns  against  the  lUyrians  and 

Paeonians,  and  builds  a  fleet. 

End  of  Social  War.  Athens  recognises  the  independ- 
ence of  the  allies.  Mausolus  of  Caria  establishes 
oligarchies  in  Rhodes,  Chios,  and  Cos.  Athens 
makes  agreement  with  the  Messenians.  Athens 
sends  cleruchs  to  Samos. 

Sacred  War.  The  Phocians  under  Philomelus  seize 
Delphi,  and  the  Locrians  fail  to  defeat  them.  War 
is  declared  against  the  Phocians. 

Demosthenes'  Speech  against  Androtion. 

{End  of  year)  Philip  attacks  Methone.  Neapolis  applies 
to  Athens  for  help.     Isocrates'  Areopagiticus. 


xvi  Chronological  Table 

B.C. 

354  Philip  takes  Methone.     Hostilities  between  Cersoblep- 

tes  and  other  Thracian  princes. 

Philomelus  defeated  by  the  Thebans;  Onomarchus  suc- 
ceeds him,  and  makes  a  free  use  of  the  temple- 
treasures.  Chares  with  a  fleet  near  Neapolis;  he 
receives  money  from  Onomarchus,  and  defeats  Philip's 
admiral  Adaeus. 

Eubulus  becomes  Theoric   Commissioner.     Death  of 
Timotheus.     Demosthenes'   Speeches  against   Lep- 
tines,  and  On  the  Symmories. 
353  Athenian  colonists  established  by  Chares  in  Sestos. 

Cersobleptes  and  Charidemus  make  overtures  to 
Athens;  Aristocrates  proposes  a  decree  in  favour  of 
Charidemus.  Philip  takes  Abdera  and  Maroneia; 
he  is  opposed  by  Amadocus;  Pammenes  (sent  from 
Thebes  to  help  Artabazus  in  revolt  against  Persia) 
joins  Philip  at  Maroneia.  Cersobleptes  makes  terms 
with  Philip.     Philip  evades  Chares  at  Neapolis. 

Onomarchus  makes  alliance  with  Lycophron  and  Pei- 
tholaus  of  Pherae,  defeats  the  Locrians,  restores 
Orchomenus,  and  occupies  Thermopylae.  The 
princes  of  Larissa  invoke  Philip  against  Lycophron 
and  Peitholaus,  who  summon  Onomarchus.  Philip 
defeats  Phayllus,  but  is  defeated  by  Onomarchus. 

Sparta  proposes  restoration  of  territory  to  its  original 
owners.  Arcadian  and  Spartan  embassies  to  Athens. 
Demosthenes'  Speech  for  the  Megalopolitans. 
Athens  refuses  aid  to  the  Arcadians,  who  apply  to 
Thebes.  Hostilities  begin  between  Sparta  and  the 
Arcadians  (aided  by  Thebes). 
352  Onomarchus  takes  Coroneia,  but  is  defeated  and  slain 

by  Philip  in  Magnesia,  and  succeeded  by  Phayllus. 
Philip  deposes  the  princes  of  Pherae,  and  takes 
Pagasae;  but  retires  on  appearance  of  Athenian  force 
at  Th-^rmopylae.  Later,  Phayllus  is  killed  in  Locri 
and  succeeded  by  Phalaecus. 

Philip  returns  to  Thrace,  makes  alliance  with  Amadocus, 
Byzantium,  Perinthus,  and  Cardia,  and  defeats  Cer- 
sobleptes, taking  his  son  as  a  hostage.  He  besieges 
Heraeon  Teichos;  the  Athenians  resolve  to  send  an  ex- 
pedition, but  abandon  it  on  hearing  of  Philip's  illness. 


Chronological  Table  xvii 

B.C. 

352  Philip  returns  to  Macedonia.     Olynthus  makes  over- 

tures to  Athens. 
Hostilities  continue  between  Sparta  and  the  Arcadians. 

351-348  Sacred  War  continues  indecisively  between  the  Pho- 
cians  and  the  Thebans,  Thessalians  and  Locrians. 

351  Philip   conquers  the   Bislatae  and  threatens  Olynthus; 

he  afterwards  goes  to  lUyria  and  Epirus.  He 
intrigues  with  parties  in  Euboea  and  Olynthus;  his 
ships  commit  aggressions  against  Athens. 
Chares  is  sent  to  the  Hellespont,  inadequately  supplied. 
Artemisia  succeeds  Mausolus.  The  exiled  Rhodians 
apply  to  Athens  for  aid,  but  are  refused.  Demos- 
thenes' Speech  for  the  Rhodians  and  First  Philippic. 

350  Athens  quarrels  with  Corinth  and  Megara. 

Communications  between  Athens  and  Orontas  (in  revolt 
against  Persia) ;  Phocion  assists  Euagoras  of  Cyprus 
against  Persia. 
Peace  between  Sparta  and  the  Arcadians. 
Philip's  party  gain  ground   in  Olynthus.     Olynthus 

again  appeals  to  Athens. 
Demosthenes'  Speech  for  Phormio. 

349  Philip    requests    Olynthus    to    surrender     Arrhidaeus. 

Demosthenes'  First  and  Second  Olynthiacs.  Athens 
makes  alliance  with  Olynthus,  and  sends  Chares, 
but  recalls  him.  Philip  invades  Olynthian  territory, 
but  withdraws  in  order  to  reduce  Thessaly  to  order. 
Athens  transfers  Charidemus  from  the  Hellespont 
to  Olynthus,  but  he  achieves  only  slight  results. 
Demosthenes'  Third  Olynthiac  (in  autumn).  Apol- 
lodorus'  decree  respecting  the  Theoric  money  pro- 
posed. 
Trial  of  Stephanus. 

348  {February)  Phocion  is  sent  to  help  Plutarchus  of  Eretria 

against  Philip's  friends.  Battle  of  Tamynas.  Plu- 
tarchus is  thought  to  have  played  Athens  false. 
{March)  Demosthenes,  when  choregus  at  the 
Dionysia,  is  assaulted  by  Meidias.  Phocion  drives 
Plutarchus  from  Eretria  and  Callias  from  Chalcis, 
but  his  successor  is  a  failure.  The  Euboeans  obtain 
their  independence  of  Athens  {about  June).  Demo- 
sthenes' Speech  against  Bceotus. 


xviii  Chronological  Table 

B.C. 

348  Philip   takes    Mecyberna  and  Torone,   and    besieges 

Olynthus.  {July)  Philip  expresses  desire  for  peace 
with  Athens.  Philocrates  proposes  to  negotiate  with 
him.  {August)  Philip  captures  Olynthus,  and  de- 
stroys Chalcidic  towns.  Lycinus  prosecutes 
Philocrates,  who  is  defended  by  Demosthenes. 
{Autumn)  Athens  sends  embassies  to  rouse  the 
Greek  States  against  Philip.  ^Eschines  in 
Arcadia. 

347  Informal  communications  between  Philip  and  Athens. 

Dissensions  arise  among  the  Phocians. 
{July)     Demosthenes  becomes  a   Councillor   for   the 

year  347-346. 
{Late  Summer)  Thebes  invokes  Philip's  aid  against  the 
Phocians.  The  Phocians  appeal  to  Athens,  but  when 
Athens  sends  Proxenus  to  Thermopylae,  he  is  insult- 
ingly treated  by  Phatecus  Demosthenes  abandons 
prosecution  of  Meidias. 

346  Philip  sends  Parmenio  to  help  Pharsalus  against  Halus. 

{Early  Spring)  First  Embassy  from  Athens  to 
Philip.  {April)  Debates  upon  proposed  Peace. 
Philip  takes  Thracian  strongholds,  and  takes  Cerso- 
bleptes  prisoner.  {May,  June)  Second  Embassy; 
Peace  of  Philocrates  ratified.  {July)  Return  of 
Second  Embassy.  Third  Embassy  sets  out.  Philip 
occupies  Thermopylae;  the  Athenians  refuse  to  join 
him  in  settling  the  Sacred  War.  Phalaecus  surrenders 
Philip,  who  becomes  master  of  Phocis.  Isocrates' 
Philippus.  {Late  Summer)  The  Phocian  towns 
dismantle  \  Demosthenes  and  Timarchus  announce 
their  intention  of  prosecuting  ^Eschines.  {September) 
Philip  presides  at  Pythian  games.  Demosthenes' 
Speech  on  the  Peace.  {Winter — probably)  Mission 
of  Eucleides  to  Philip. 
Demosthenes'  Speeches  against  Pantaenetus  and  against 
Nausimachus  and  Xenopeithes. 

345  Timarchus  prosecuted  by  iEschines  and  condemned. 

Philip  organises  the  internal  government  of  Mace- 
donia. Communications  between  Athens  and 
Philip  with  regard  to  Thracian  towns.  Repair  of 
fortifications  of  Athens  and  the  Periaeus. 


Chronological  Table  xix 

B.C. 

345  Revision  of  the  list  of  Athenian  citizens.     Demosthenes' 

Speech  against  Eubulides. 
344  {First     half)     Philip    conducts    campaign    in    Illyria. 

He  also  organises  Thessaly,  and  is  elected  archon 
of  Thessaly  for  life.  {Second  half)  Demosthenes 
tries,  but  fails,  to  rouse  Peloponnesian  States  against 
Philip.  The  Argives  and  Messenians,  and  Philip 
himself,  send  envoys  to  Athens  to  protest.  Demo- 
sthenes' Second  Philippic.  The  Arcadians  and 
Argives  pay  compliments  to  Philip.  Hypereides 
substituted  for  ^schines  as  envoy  to  the  Amphicty- 
onic  Council  in  regard  to  Delos. 
343  Impeachment  of  Philocrates  by  Hypereides.     He  leaves 

Athens. 

{Spring)  Philip  sends  Python  to  Athens  to  offer  to 
amend  the  Peace,  etc.  A  Persian  Embassy  is  coldly 
received  at  Athens;  Thebes  and  Argos  send  help  to 
Persia  against  Cyprus. 

{Early  Summer)  Hegesippus  sent  as  envoy  to  Mace- 
donia. Disturbances  in  Elis,  owing  to  growth  of 
Philip's  party.  Attempted  coup  d'etat  in  Philip's 
interest  at  Megara  prevented  by  Phocion. 

{Summer)  Cleitarchus,  aided  by  Philip's  troops,  be- 
comes tyrant  of  Eretria.  Chalcis,  under  Callias, 
makes  overtures  to  Athens.  Trial  and  acquittal  of 
iEschines  on  the  charge  of  corruption  on  the  Em- 
bassy.    Execution  of  Antiphonas  a  spy. 

{Later)  Tour  of  Athenian  ambassadors  (including 
Demosthenes)  in  the  Peloponnese  and  Thessaly. 
Philip  compels  Arybbas  to  surrender  the  Alolossian 
kingdom  to  Alexander,  and  threatens  Ambracia; 
Athens  sends  troops  to  aid  Ambracia.  Philip  also 
garrisons  Nicasa  and  Echinus. 
J  342  Philip  in  Thrace.     He  conquers  the  Odrysian  kingdom, 

founds  military  colonies,  makes  alliance  with  the 
Getas,  and  passes  the  winter  of  342-341  in  Thrace. 
Athens  sends  cleruchs  to  Cardia,  and  orders  Dio- 
peithes  to  assist  them.  Philip  sends  a  garrison  to 
protect  Cardia;  Diopeithes  commits  acts  of  war 
against  Philip.  Philistides  becomes  tyrant  of  Oreus, 
assisted  by  Philip's  general,  Parmenio. 


XX  Chronological  Table 

B.C. 

341  {Spring)  Philip   protests  to  Athens  against  the   con- 

duct of  Diopeithes.  Demosthenes'  Speech  on  the 
Chersonese.  Philip  continues  his  conquests  in 
Thrace.  {Summer)  The  Third  Philippic.  Demo- 
sthenes makes  alliance  (for  Athens)  with  Byzan- 
tium and  Abydos,  and  with  Thracian  and  lUyrian 
princes:  Hypereides  renews  alliance  with  Rhodes 
and  Chios.  The  Persian  King  sends  money  to 
Diopeithes.  Athens  makes  alliance  with  Callias  of 
Chalcis,  and  expels  Philistides  from  Oreus  and 
Cleitarchus  from  Eretria.  Demosthenes  and  Callias 
organise  a  league  against  Philip.  Chares  stationed 
at  Thasos.  {Late — or  early  in  340)  Callias  and 
Athenian  ships  commit  acts  of  hostility  against 
Philip's  ships,  etc. 

340  {Early)    Demosthenes  crowned  at  the  Dionysia.     Exe- 

cution of  Anaxinus  as  a  spy.  Formation  of  league 
continues.  The  Byzantines  refuse  to  help  Philip 
against  the  Athenians  in  the  Chersonese.  {Summer) 
Philip  besieges  Perinthus  and  Byzantium.  After 
his  seizure  of  Athenian  merchant  ships,  Athens  form- 
ally declares  war.  Chares  in  command  at  Byzantium ; 
then  Phocion.  Demosthenes  reforms  the  trierarchy. 
{Autumn)  At  the  meeting  of  the  Amphictyonic 
Council,  ^schines  accuses  the  Amphisseans  of 
sacrilege. 

339  {Early)  The   Amphictyonic  Council   declares  war  on 

the  Amphisseans,  but  the  war  is  ineflFectively  con- 
ducted. Philip  raises  the  siege  of  Byzantium,  makes 
an  expedition  into  Scythia,  and  is  defeated  by 
the  Triballi  on  his  way  back  to  Macedonia.  {Early 
Summer)  Philip  appointed  commander  against  the 
Amphisseans.  {September)  Philip  occupies  Elateia. 
Demosthenes  makes  alliance  between  Athens  and 
Thebes.  {Autumn  and  Winter)  Demosthenes  car- 
ries financial  reforms;  the  Theoric  money  applied 
to  military  purposes.  Athens  and  Thebes  win  some 
successes  against  Philip. 

338  {First    half)    Demosthenes    again     crowned    at    the 

Dionysia.  Philip  takes  Amphissa  and  (perhaps) 
Naupactus;  Athens  and  Thebes  reject  his  proposals 


Chronological  Table  xxi 

B.C. 

338  for  peace.   {Summer)  Lycurgus  becomes  Theoric  Com- 

missioner. (/4  «gtt.sO  Battle  of  Chaeroneia.  Thebes  is 
garrisoned  by  Macedonian  troops  and  severely 
treated.  Orchomenus,  Thespiae  and  Plataeae  restored. 
Athens  prepares  for  defence;  Demosthenes  is  sent  to 
procure  com  and  money;  in  his  absence  the  "Peace  of 
Demades"  is  made.  {Later)  Repair  of  fortifications 
etc.,  under  Demosthenes'  supervision.  He  delivers  the 
Funeral  Oration.  Philip  settles  Phocis  and  Euboea, 
and  is  honourably  received  at  Megara,  Comith,  etc. ; 
being  rejected  by  Sparta,  he  overruns  Laconia.  At 
a  congress  at  Corinth,  he  establishes  a  synod  of  the 
Greeks,  and  makes  arrangements  for  invasion  of 
Asia.  Death  of  Isocrates,  and  of  Artaxerxes  III., 
who  is  succeeded  by  Arses. 

337  Demosthenes  becomes  Theoric  Commissioner.    The  two 

parties  in  Athens  assail  one  another  with  prosecutions. 
Philip  marries  Cleopatra,  and  Alexander  quarrels 
with  him. 

336  Ctesiphon   proposes   to   crown    Demosthenes   at    the 

Dionysia.  .^schines  announces  his  intention  to 
prosecute  him. 
Formal  reconciliation  between  Philip  and  Alexander. 
A  Macedonian  force  is  sent  to  Asia  under  Attalus. 
Philip  is  murdered  (in  July);  Alexander  is  acknow- 
ledged King  by  the  Macedonians,  Thessalians,  and 
Amphictyonic  Council.  He  marches  to  Thebes  and 
is  acknowledged  by  Athens.  At  a  congress  at  Corinth 
he  is  appointed  leader  of  the  Greeks  against  Persia; 
all  Greek  States  are  declared  autonomous. 
Secret  overtures  of  Athens  to  Persia  rejected.  Acces- 
sion of  Darius  Codomannus  as  King  of  Persia. 

335  Alexander  in  Thrace  and  Illyria.     Darius  sends  money 

to  Athens  to  be  used  against  the  Macedonians. 
Thebes  revolts,  encouraged  by  Athens  and  other 
States,  and  is  destroyed  by  Alexander.  Most  of  the 
peoples  friendly  to  Thebes  submit.  Alexander  de- 
mands surrender  of  anti-Macedonian  orators  but  is 
satisfied  with  banishment  of  Charidemus.  The 
Council  of  Areopagus  undertake  to  investigate  the  use 
of  Persian  gold  to  help  Thebes,  but  drop  the  enquiry. 


xxii  Chronological  Table 

B.C. 

334  Alexander  in  Asia  Minor.     Battle  at  the  Granicus. 

The  Persian  fleet  received  at  Samos  (tinder  Athenian 
control). 

332  Alexander  in  Syria  and  Egypt. 

333  Alexander  in  Asia  Minor.     Battle  of  Issus.     Agis  of 

Sparta,  assisted  by  Persian  money,  conquers  Crete. 

331  Alexander  in  the  East.     Battle  of  Arbela.     His  fleet 

recovers  control  of  the  .^gaean,  etc. 

330  Alexander  in  the  East.     Revolt  of  the  Odrysian  King 

Seuthes  crushed  by  Antipater.  Agis  leads  a  revolt 
in  the  Peloponnese,  defeats  Corrhagus,  and  besieges 
Megalopolis.  Demosthenes  at  first  encourages  the 
revolt,  but  the  Athenians  fail  to  support  it.  Agis  is 
defeated  and  slain  by  Antipater.  Prosecution  of 
Leocrates  by  Lycurgus,  and  of  Euxenippus  by 
Polyeuctus.  Trial  and  acquittal  of  Ctesiphon; 
Demosthenes'  Speech  on  the  Crown;  ^schines  leaves 
Athens. 

329-324  Alexander  in  the  East. 

328  (about).     Demosthenes  is  corn-commissioner.     He  is 

accused  of  embezzlement,  but  acquitted. 

327  Alexander  accorded  divine  honours  in   Bactria.     He 

goes  to  India. 

326  Lycurgus  ceases  to  be  Theoric  Commissioner.    Athenian 

expedition  to  Samos. 

324  Alexander    returns    from    India    to    Susa.     Flight    of 

Harpalus    to    Greece,    with    Alexander's    treasure; 
Athens  will  not  surrender  him,  but  takes  the  treasure, 
to  keep  it  for  Alexander;  Harpalus  escapes  from 
Athens.     Demosthenes  and  others  are  suspected  of 
receiving  part  of  the  treasure,  and  the  Council  of 
Areopagus  is  ordered  to  enquire,  but  delays. 
Alexander  demands  divine  honors  from  the  Greeks,  and 
orders  restoration  of  exiles  to  Greek  cities.     Demo- 
sthenes opposes.  He  is  sent  to  the  Olympian  festival, 
where   Nicanor   proclaims   Alexander's   commands; 
on  his  return,  he  moderates  his  attitude. 
Demosthenes  is  fined  50  talents  for  his  part  in  the 
Harpalus   affair,    and   goes   into    exile.      Death   of 
Lycurgus. 
Athenian  expedition  against  Tyrrhenian  pirates. 


Chronological  Table  xxiii 

B.C. 

323  {Early)  Alexander  receives  embassies  from  the  Greek 

States   at   Babylon.     {June)   Death   of   Alexander. 

Athens  forms  a  confederacy  for  the  liberation  of 

Greece,  and  recalls  Demosthenes.     Leosthenes  with 

L  the  allied  army  defeats  Antipater  and  shuts  him  up 

I  in  Lamia;  but  after  Leosthenes'  death,  Antipater 

\  escapes    and    joins    Craterus.      {Winter)    Funeral 

Oration  of  Hypereides. 

322  The  Athenian  fleet  is  thrice  defeated,  and  finally  (in 

August)  the  army  of  the  confederacy  is  defeated  at 

Crannon.     Athens  submits  to  Antipater,  and  receives 

a  Macedonian  garrison,  and  a  less  Democratic  con- 

;  stitution.      {October)     Death  of  Hypereides  and  of 

■  Demosthenes. 


DEMOSTHENES 


CHAPTER  I 

THE  YOUTH  AND  TRAINING  OF  DEMOSTHENES 

THE  subject  of  this  book  is  the  last  struggle  of 
the  Hellenes  for  liberty,  and  the  part  played 
in  that  struggle  by  Demosthenes.  We  shall  see 
him  confronting,  on  the  one  hand,  the  external 
enemies  of  his  country's  freedom — PhiHp,  Alexan- 
der, and  Antipater;  on  the  other,  the  orators  who, 
for  whatever  reason,  viewed  the  resistance  to  the 
Macedonian  power  with  disfavour,  and  above  all 
iEschines,  his  lifelong  opponent.  It  will  not  be 
maintained  that  the  conduct  of  Demosthenes  was 
at  all  points  admirable  or  blameless;  but  since  he 
represented  worthily,  throughout  a  most  critical 
period,  the  highest  traditions  and  instincts  of  his 
fellow-countrymen,  and  expressed  them  in  a  series 
of  orations  the  eloquence  of  which  was  not  only 
worthy  of  their  theme,  but  at  its  best  has  never 
been  surpassed,  he  is  entitled  to  a  distinguished 
place   among    those   heroes  of   the   nations,   the 


2  Demosthenes 

memory  of  whom  is  among  the  noblest  possessions 
of  mankind. 

Demosthenes  the  orator  was  the  son  of  Demos- 
thenes of  Paeania,  ^  a  town  lying  at  the  foot  of  the 
eastern  slope  of  Mount  Hymettus,  about  ten  miles 
from  Athens.  His  mother,  Cleobule,  was  the 
daughter  of  Gylon  of  Kerameis.  Gylon,  accord- 
ing to  the  story  told  by  ^schines, '  had  been  ban- 
ished from  Attica,  not  having  dared  to  face  a  trial 
on  the  charge  of  having  betrayed  Nymphaeum 
— a.  town  dependent  upon  Athens,  and  situated  on 
the  Tauric  Chersonese,  a  few  miles  south  of  Pan- 
ticapaeum,  ^  on  the  western  shore  of  the  Cimmerian 
Bosporus.  (All  around  lay  the  fertile  corn-lands 
whence  Athens  derived  a  considerable  part  of 
her  supply  of  grain.)  After  his  banishment  from 
Athens,  Gylon  continued  to  live  in  the  neighbour- 
hood of  the  Cimmerian  Bosporus,  and  received 
from  the  Spartocidae  (the  princes  who  ruled  the 
league  into  which  the  towns  on  both  sides  of  the 
strait  were  imited)  the  place  on  the  eastern  side 
called  Kepoi,  "the  Gardens."  There  he  married 
a  rich  wife  who  was  said  to  have  been  of  Scythian 
descent.     She  bore  him  two  daughters,  whom  he  , 

sent  to  Athens,  where  one  of  them  married  an         { 
Athenian  named  Demochares;  the  other  married 
the  elder  Demosthenes,  and  became  the  mother 
of  the  orator. 

The  facts  with  regard  to  the  alleged  treachery 

*  Now  Liopesi.  »/«  Ctes.,  §§  171,  172. 

s  The  modem  Kertch. 


Youth  and  Training  of  Demosthenes       3 

of  Gylon  cannot  be  certainly  ascertained ;  but  it  is 
at  least  probable  that  Gylon 's  crime  amounted  to 
no  more  than  the  transference  of  Nymphseum, 
towards  the  end  of  the  Peloponnesian  War,  when 
the  Athenians  were  no  longer  powerful  enough  to 
retain  their  outlying  possessions,  into  the  strong 
and  friendly  hands  of  the  Spartocidse,  whose  cor- 
dial relations  with  Athens  proved  to  be  of  great 
advantage  to  her  during  the  following  century. 
This  wise  step  may  easily  have  been  misrepresented 
at  Athens,  and  may  have  led  to  Gylon 's  condemna- 
tion. The  penalty  inflicted  was  probably  a  fine, 
with  banishment  until  the  fine  was  paid.  But 
Demosthenes  himself  tells  us^  that  although  his 
grandfather  at  one  time  owed  money  to  the  State, 
the  debt  was  wiped  off  before  his  death ;  and  Gylon 
may  even  have  lived  his  last  years  in  Attica. 

-^schines  also  taunts  Demosthenes  with  his 
descent  from  a  Scythian  mother.^  It  is  possible 
that  he  is  exaggerating,  and  that  Gylon's  wife  was 
the  daughter  of  a  Greek  settler  in  this  "Scythian" 
district.  But  if  she  was  in  reality  of  Scythian 
origin,  it  would  have  involved  no  serious  stigma 
in  the  eyes  of  the  Athenians.  In  fact,  if  Gylon's 
daughters  were  bom  before  the  archonship  of 
Eucleides  (b.c.  403-2)  they  would  have  been 
legally  in  the  same  position  as  the  daughters  of 
two  Athenian  parents^;  and  it  is  doubtful  whether 

'  In  Aphob.  IT,  §§  i,  2.  »  Cf.  Deinarchus  in  Dem.,  §  15. 

J  Dem.  in  Eubulidem,  §  30.  Plutarch,  Dem.,  iv.,  was  unable  to 
test  the  statement  as  to  Demosthenes'  Scythian  descent. 


4  Demosthenes 

the  status  of  the  children  of  an  Athenian  father 
by  a  foreign  mother  was  ever  actually  disputed, 
even  if  they  were  bom  after  the  year  of  Eucleides. 
As  the  date  of  the  loss  of  Nymphaeum  to  Athens 
cannot  be  exactly  determined,  Cleobule's  position 
must  remain  uncertain ;  but  it  is  probable  that  she 
was  not  more  than  about  twenty-two  years  old 
when  her  son  was  bom. 

Demosthenes  the  elder  was  the  owner  of  a  large 
number  of  slaves,  of  whom  (at  the  time  of  his 
death)  thirty-three  were  engaged  in  the  manufac- 
ture of  cutlery — whence  he  was  named  "the 
cutler" — and  twenty  in  making  couches,  and  he 
had  considerable  sums  of  money  invested  in  loans 
at  interest.  With  a  property  which,  as  reckoned 
up  by  his  son,  amounted  to  nearly  fourteen 
talents,  he  was  considered  a  wealthy  man.  He 
had  performed  his  obligatory  services  to  the 
State  not  merely  punctiliously  but  generously, 
and  was  regarded  by  his  contemporaries  with 
respect.' 

The  year  of  the  orator's  birth  was  probably 
384  B.C.  *  In  376,  before  he  had  reached  his  eighth 
birthday,  his  father  died,  leaving  him  with  his 
mother  and  his  five-year-old  sister.  The  dying 
man  entrusted  his  affairs  to  his  two  nephews — 
Aphobus,  his  brother's  son,  and  Demcphon,  son 
of  his  sister  and  Demon;  and  with  then  he  joined 

'Dem.  in  Aphob.  I,  passim;  ^sch.  in  Ctes.,  §  171;  Plut.,.De»»., 
iv.     See  also  Note  i  at  the  end  of  the  Chapter-. 
» Note  2. 


Youth  and  Training  of  Demosthenes      5 

a  lifelong  friend,  Therippides  of  Paeania.'  Apho- 
bus  was  to  marry  his  widow,  who  was  still  young, 
and  to  receive  with  her  a  dowry  of  eighty  minas; 
he  was  also  granted  the  use  of  the  house  and  fur- 
niture, until  Demosthenes  should  come  of  age. 
The  little  girl  was  to  be  betrothed  to  Demophon, 
and  he  was  to  receive  a  legacy  of  two  talents. 
Therippides  was  to  enjoy  the  interest  on  seventy 
minae  during  Demosthenes'  minority,  and  in  all 
other  respects  the  property  was  to  be  administered 
for  Demosthenes'  benefit.  But  the  trustees  mis- 
managed the  property  for  their  own  advantage, 
and  neglected  the  provisions  of  the  will.  Had 
these  instructions  been  followed,  Demosthenes 
might  reasonably  have  expected,  after  ten  years, 
to  receive  at  least  twenty  talents,  if  not  more: 
instead  of  which,  the  estate,  when  handed  over  to 
him,  was  not  worth  more  than  seventy  minas,  or 
about  one  twelfth  of  its  value  at  the  time  of  his 
father's  death.  ^ 

While  Demosthenes'  estate  was  being  treated  in 
this  disastrous  fashion,  how  was  he  himself  faring? 
A  boy  of  poor  physique,  thin  and  sickly,^  he  is  said 
to  have  been  forbidden  by  his  mother  to  take  part 
in  the  vigorous  exercises  which  were  an  element  in 
the  education  of  a  young  Athenian;  his  delicate 
appearance  exposed  him  to  the  ridicule  of  other 
boys ;  and  ^schines,  '•  when  they  were  both  almost 

'  The  account  of  Demosthenes'  guardians  and  their  conduct 
is  based  on  the  three  Speeches  against  Aphobus. 

» Note  3.  3  Plutarch,  Dem.,  iv.  "  In  Ctes.,  §  255. 


6  Demosthenes 

old  men,  upbraided  him  with  his  early  indifference 
to  his  physical  condition,  and  his  neglect  of  the 
chase.  So,  we  may  perhaps  infer,  he  grew  up 
solitary  and  unsociable ;  and  in  the  defects  of  his 
early  upbringing  may  possibly  be  found  the  origin 
of  a  certain  want  of  geniality  in  him,  of  which  his 
enemies  in  later  days  did  not  fail  to  make  the  most,  ^ 
and  which  perhaps  caused  him  to  take  an  unduly 
severe  and  unsympathetic  view  of  the  social 
pleasures  in  which  his  contemporaries  and  col- 
leagues participated.  As  for  his  intellectual  educa- 
tion, he  went,  he  tells  us,'  to  the  schools  which 
befitted  the  son  of  a  man  of  position,  though  in 
another  place  ^  he  accuses  Aphobus  of  depriving 
his  tutors  of  their  fees,  ^schines,  indeed,  several 
times,'*  taimts  him  with  being  uneducated,  but 
the  context  proves  that  he  is  thinking  of  a  want  of 
tact  and  of  taste,  rather  than  of  mental  equip- 
ment. So  far  as  he  was  really  deficient  in  these 
qualities,  the  fault  was  probably  the  consequence 
of  his  early  unsociability;  and  the  deficiency  in 
good  taste  was  shared  in  no  small  degree  by 
-^schines  himself. 

The  determination  of  Demosthenes  to  become 
a  great  political  orator  was  formed,  so  Plutarch 
tells  us,  s  in  his  boyhood,  and  was  prompted  by 

*  Cf.  Dem.,  de  F.L.,%  46,  Phil.  II,  §  30;  and  his  attitude  towards 
the  enjoyments  of  his  colleagues  in  the  Embassy. 

'  De  Cor.,  §  257.  3  /«  Aphob.  I,  §  46. 

*  In  Timarch.,  §  166;  de  F.  L.,  §  113,  153;  in  Ctes.,  §  130. 
»  Plut.,  Dem.,  V. 


Youth  and  Training  of  Demosthenes      7 

admiration  of  Callistratus,  whom  he  heard  speak 
either  in  the  Assembly, '  or  when  making  his  defence 
upon  a  charge  of  treason  in  connection  with  the 
loss  of  Oropus. '  "When  he  saw  Callistratus 
escorted  and  congratulated  by  numbers  of  per- 
sons," Plutarch  tells  us,  "he  admired  his  fame 
and  marvelled  even  more  at  his  eloquence,  as  he 
observed  in  him  the  strength  of  a  born  master 
and  tamer  of  men's  passions.  And  so  he  aban- 
doned all  other  studies  and  the  pastimes  of  his 
boyhood,  and  trained  himself  in  speaking  by  hard 
practice,  determined  to  be  some  day  an  orator 
himself."  Whatever  be  the  truth  of  this  story, 
Demosthenes  must  often  have  had  the  opportunity 
of  hearing  Callistratus,  before  the  latter  was  driven 
into  exile  in  361,  and  may  well  have  felt  inspired 
to  emulate  his  example. 

As  the  boy  grew  up,  he  naturally  became  aware 
of  the  mismanagement  of  his  affairs  by  his  guar- 
dians; he  determined  to  demand  restitution  or 
compensation ;  and  no  sooner  had  he  come  of  age, 
in  the  stmimer  of  366,  than  he  instituted  proceed- 
ings against  them  for  breach  of  trust,  suing  each 
separately  and  claiming  ten  talents  from  each. 
In  preparing  his  case,  he  sought  the  aid  of  Isasus, 
the  most  skilled  practitioner  of  the  time  in  cases 

*  Vit.  X  Oral.  844b. 

'This  is  Plutarch's  version;  but  as  the  trial  with  regard  to 
Oropus  cannot  have  taken  place  until  366,  the  speech  which 
roused  Demosthenes'  emulation  was  probably  delivered  on  some 
earlier  occasion. 


8  Demosthenes 

of  disputed  inheritance,  and  unrivalled  in  the 
thoroughness  and  ingenuity  with  which  he  applied 
every  argument  of  which  his  case  admitted.  ^ 

The  suit  against  Aphobus,  of  which  alone  we 
have  any  record,  came  on  first,  and  the  case  was 
submitted,  in  the  first  instance,  to  arbitration. 
Aphobus  persuaded  Demosthenes  to  entrust  the 
decision  to  three  acquaintances,  nominated,  ac- 
cording to  custom,  one  by  each  party,  and  one  by 
consent  of  both.  But  the  law  of  Athens  allowed 
either  party  to  withdraw  the  case  from  arbitration 
at  any  time  before  the  verdict  was  given,  and 
Aphobus,  on  ascertaining  that  the  verdict  would 
be  unfavourable  to  himself,  took  advantage  of  this 
possibility,  and  withdrew.  The  matter  then  came 
before  one  of  the  public  arbitrators,  who  were 
annually  chosen  by  lot  from  among  the  jxirors 
appointed  for  the  year.  Aphobus  tried  various 
shifts  in  vain,  and  the  arbitrator  pronoimced 
against  him,  but  instead  of  giving  a  final  decision 
himself,  referred  the  case  (as  he  was  entitled  to  do 
at  his  discretion)  to  a  law-court. 

But  four  or  five  days  before  the  trial,  which 
took  place  late  in  364  or  early  in  363,  Aphobus, 
with  the  help  of  his  friends,  made  a  clever  attempt 
to    evade   justice.     Under    the    Athenian    naval 

'  Various  stories  are  told  of  the  financial  relations  of  Demos- 
thenes to  Isaeus,  and  of  a  futile  application  for  instruction  which 
he  made  to  Isocrates;  but  the  stories  are  inconsistent  with  each 
other,  and  rest  on  bad  authority.  {Vit.  X  Oral.,  837d,  839e, 
844b;  Suidas,  s.  v.  'I<rotoj.) 


Youth  and  Training  of  Demosthenes      9 

system,  the  duty  of  equipping  and  commanding 
each  trireme  for  service,  when  need  arose,  was 
laid  upon  one  or  more  citizens  of  sufficient  means : 
but  any  citizen  who  felt  that  another  was  more 
capable  than  himself  of  bearing  the  burden  (which 
was  a  heavy  one)  might  challenge  him  either  to 
undertake  it  or  to  exchange  property  with  himself. 
Now  a  certain  Thrasylochus,  a  friend  of  Aphobus, 
had  been  called  upon  to  share  the  duties  of  trier- 
arch  with  a  colleague,  and  his  share  of  the  cost 
had  been  estimated  at  twenty  minae,  on  payment 
of  which  his  colleague  (or  a  third  party,  a  con- 
tractor) had  agreed  to  discharge  the  actual  duties. 
Thrasylochus  was  persuaded  without  difficulty 
to  challenge  Demosthenes  to  exchange  property 
or  to  undertake  the  co-trierarchy.  The  result  of 
the  exchange  would  have  been  that  all  claims 
connected  with  Demosthenes'  estate,  and  with 
them  the  right  to  prosecute  the  trustees,  would 
pass  from  Demosthenes  to  Thrasylochus  (who  of 
course  had  an  understanding  with  Aphobus),  and 
that  Demosthenes  would  be  left  without  any 
chance  of  obtaining  redress  from  his  guardians. 
At  first,  as  the  property  which  had  actually  been 
handed  over  to  him  was  quite  insufficient  to  bear 
the  burden,  Demosthenes  was  inclined  to  give  a 
provisional  consent  to  the  exchange,  intending  to 
appeal  afterwards  to  a  tribunal  which  should  decide 
finally  whether  the  burden  of  the  trierarchy  should 
fall  on  himself  or  on  Thrasylochus,  and  expecting 
to  win  his  appeal  by  demonstrating  the  fraudu- 


10  Demosthenes 

lency  of  his  opponents'  proceedings.  Upon  his 
consenting  to  the  exchange,  Thrasylochus  had  the 
right  to  inspect  and  value  Demosthenes'  property; 
and  in  the  course  of  the  inspection,  he  and  his 
brother  Meidias,  of  whom  more  will  be  heard 
hereafter,  did  wilful  damage  to  Demosthenes' 
house,  used  indecent  language  in  the  presence  of 
his  young  sister,  and  uttered  all  kinds  of  abuse 
against  himself  and  his  mother.  Worst  of  all, 
they  gave  the  former  trustees  of  the  estate  a  dis- 
charge from  all  claims.  Their  proceedings  appear 
to  have  caused  some  sensation  in  Athens,  and  as 
time  was  pressing,  and  the  suit  against  Aphobus 
was  due  for  hearing  in  a  few  days,  Demosthenes 
broke  off  the  negotiations  for  the  exchange,  and 
paid  Thrasylochus  the  twenty  minae,  though  he 
was  obliged  to  mortgage  his  house  and  his  other 
property  in  order  to  do  so.  He  subsequently 
prosecuted  Meidias  for  his  foul  language.  Meidias 
made  no  appearance,  and  was  condemned;  but 
Demosthenes  never  succeeded  in  recovering  the 
damages  awarded  him.  ^ 

In  the  action  against  Aphobus,  Demosthenes 
conducted  his  own  case.  His  opening  speech  was  a 
clear  and  businesslike  exposition  of  the  value  of 
the  original  estate,  of  the  manner  in  which  the 
guardians  had  dealt  with  it,  and  of  the  fiagrancy 
of  their  neglect  of  the  testator's  instructions.  In 
a  second  speech,  he  replied  briefly,  but  convincingly, 
to  a  plea  put  in  by  Aphobus  at  the  last  moment, 

» In  Meid.,  §§  76-81;  in  Aphob.  II,  §  17. 


Youth  and  Training  of  Demosthenes     ii 

when  there  was  no  time  left  for  the  production  of 
evidence  to  rebut  it,  and  concluded  with  a  pathetic 
appeal  to  the  jury  in  the  name  of  himself  and  of 
his  sister,  who  would  depend  upon  him  for  her 
marriage-portion. 

There  can  be  little  doubt  of  the  guilt  of  Aphobus. 
Had  he  been  innocent,  his  case  must  have  been 
susceptible  of  proof  in  a  simple  and  straightforward 
manner;  and  his  subsequent  proceedings  afford 
a  strong  presumption  against  his  honesty.  The 
jury  found  him  guilty.  Onetor,  his  brother-in-law 
and  a  pupil  of  Isocrates,  entreated  them  to  assess 
the  damages  at  one  talent  only,  and  promised 
himself  to  guarantee  payment  of  that  simi;  but 
the  jury  awarded  Demosthenes  ten  talents — the 
whole  amount  claimed. 

Instead,  however,  of  paying  the  sum,  Aphobus 
departed  to  Megara,  and  took  up  his  residence 
there  as  a  domiciled  alien.  Demosthenes  was  of 
course  entitled  to  seize  Aphobus'  property,  though 
the  State  gave  no  assistance  in  the  first  instance  in 
the  recovery  of  damages  awarded  by  a  court :  but 
before  his  departure,  Aphobus  had  taken  steps  to 
render  it  as  difficult  as  possible  for  Demosthenes  to 
obtain  effectual  satisfaction.  He  dismantled  his 
house,  tore  down  the  doors,  broke  up  the  wine-vat, 
and  removed  the  slaves.  He  made  a  present  to 
his  friend  ^sius  of  a  block  of  buildings  which  he 
owned,  and  to  Onetor  of  his  land,  in  order  that 
Demosthenes  might  be  forced  to  institute  pro- 
ceedings against  them  if  he  wished  to  seize  the 


12  Demosthenes 

property.  Besides  this,  he  made  an  attempt 
which,  if  successful,  would  have  secured  the  virtual 
reversal  of  the  verdict  against  him.  He  prose- 
cuted Phanus,  one  of  Demosthenes'  witnesses 
at  the  trial,  for  perjury,  and  was  assisted  in  the 
preparation  of  the  case  (and  also,  as  Demosthenes 
asserts,  in  the  procuring  of  false  witnesses)  by 
Onetor.  Demosthenes  defended  Phanus,  and  had 
no  difficulty  in  proving  his  case.  But  his  troubles 
were  not  yet  at  an  end ;  for  when  he  attempted  to 
take  possession  (as  he  was  entitled  to  do)  of  a 
piece  of  land  belonging  to  Aphobus,  he  was  driven 
out  of  it  by  Onetor,  who  professed  to  have  a  prior 
claim  to  the  land;  and  he  was  forced  to  prosecute 
Onetor  for  this  action.  The  trial  took  place  in 
362:  its  result  is  nowhere  recorded,  but  Demos- 
thenes' proofs  of  collusion  between  Aphobus  and 
Onetor  appear  to  be  imanswerable,  and  he  was 
doubtless  successful. 

The  five  extant  speeches  delivered  by  Demos- 
thenes in  the  course  of  his  attempt  to  recover  his 
property  are  strongly  reminiscent  of  Isaeus. 
Some  phrases,  and  even  (in  the  First  Speech  against 
Onetor)  a  whole  passage  on  the  value  of  evidence 
given  under  torture,  are  taken  verbatim  from  his 
teacher.  Yet  these  speeches  already  show  pro- 
mise of  greater  work  than  Isaeus  ever  produced. 
In  his  complete  mastery  of  his  subject,  in  the  clear 
exposition  of  facts,  in  the  skill  Mdth  which  the 
narrative  and  the  argument  are  dovetailed  one  into 
the  other,  and  in  the  ability  which  is  shown  not 


11 


Youth  and  Training  of  Demosthenes     13 

only  in  formal  proofs,  but  in  argument  from  prob- 
abilities and  indications  (particularly  in  the 
Speeches  against  Onetor),  Demosthenes  is  the 
follower  of  his  teacher.  But  in  the  eloquence  of 
the  more  pathetic  passages  he  surpasses  all  his 
predecessors ;  and  though  now  and  then  the  expres- 
sions of  strong  indignation  which  he  uses  have  the 
appearance  of  being  studied,  rather  than  quite 
spontaneous,  and  stand  out  rather  too  conspicu- 
ously in  the  somewhat  dull  and  uniform  texture  of 
the  main  part  of  the  speeches,  there  is  even  in 
these  some  evidence  of  power,  not  yet  entirely 
conscious  of  itself,  nor  entirely  under  control,  but 
obviously  capable  of  development.  It  is  said^ 
that  the  fierceness  which  Demosthenes  displayed 
in  his  attack  upon  his  guardians  earned  for  him 
the  nickname  of  Argas — the  name  of  a  venomous 
serpent;  and  it  is  not  improbable  that  these  early 
experiences  engendered  in  him  a  certain  bitterness 
— a  quality  which  was  always  liable  to  show  itself 
in  him  in  later  days,  when  he  was  strongly  moved. 

We  do  not  know  what  terms  Demosthenes  made 
with  Therippides  and  Demophon,  or  whether  he 
came  to  terms  with  them  at  all.  But  it  is  scarcely 
likely  that,  after  the  verdict  which  had  been  given 
against  Aphobus,  they  did  not  attempt  to  make 
some  arrangement  with  him.  We  hear,  however, 
of  lawsuits  against  Demophon's  father  and  brother, 
Demon  and  Demomeles.  The  elder  Demosthenes 
had  lent  money  at  interest  to  Demomeles,^  and 

'  iEsch.,  de  F.  L.,  §  99;  Plut.,  Dem.,  iv.       »  In  Aphob.  I,  §  n. 


14  Demosthenes 

Demosthenes  may  have  tried  to  recover  from  the 
father  what  was  due  from  one  or  both  of  his  sons. 
Against  Demomeles  he  brought  an  action  before 
the  Coimcil  of  Areopagus^  on  account  of  a  woimd 
in  the  head  which  Demomeles  had  inflicted  upon 
him — possibly  in  the  course  of  disputes  with 
regard  to  the  property — but  afterwards  abandoned 
the  case,  and  accepted  a  siim  of  money  in  com- 
pensation for  the  injury.^  ^schines  states  that 
Demosthenes  inflicted  the  injury  upon  himself, 
and  accused  Demomeles  of  causing  it,  in  order  to 
extract  money  from  him.  Such  a  statement  from 
such  a  source  carries  no  weight;  but  it  is  plain 
that  the  long  series  of  quarrels  with  his  relations 
cannot  have  contributed  to  the  young  orator's 
peace  of  mind  or  good  temper,  and  also  that  he 
was  himself  already  a  dangerous  person  to  quarrel 
with. 

In  spite  of  the  verdicts  of  the  courts,  it  is  un- 
certain how  much  Demosthenes  recovered  of  his 
estate.  Plutarch  says  that  he  failed  to  get  back 
even  the  smallest  fraction,  but  this  must  be  an 
exaggeration :  there  can  be  little  doubt,  for  instance, 
that  he  took  possession  of  Aphobus'  house,  ^  and 
it  is  imlikely,  as  we  have  seen,  that  he  recovered 
nothing  at  all  from  the  two  other  guardians.  For 
some  years  indeed  he  followed  the  profession  of  a 
writer  of  speeches,  but  we  cannot  be  sure  that  it 

'  This  Council  dealt  with  cases  of  actual  or  attempted  murder. 

'  De  F.  L.,  §  93. 

3  This  is  implied  in  the  Second  Speech  against  Onetor,  §  i. 


Youth  and  Training  of  Demosthenes     15 

was  poverty  that  obliged  him  to  do  so.  ^schines 
asserts^  that  Demosthenes  made  money  out  of 
rich  young  men,  and  particularly  out  of  the  half- 
witted Aristarchus,  whom  he  deluded  with  the 
pretence  that  he  could  make  him  a  great  orator. 
The  story  of  Demosthenes'  relations  with  Aristar- 
chus is  more  than  doubtful,  and  no  other  pupil 
of  Demosthenes  is  known  to  us  by  name.  But  it 
is  probable  that  down  to  the  year  345  or  there- 
abouts he  was  ready  to  teach  young  men  the  art 
of  speaking^  and  to  compose  speeches  for  others, 
though  he  did  not  appear  in  court  as  an  advocate 
for  others  in  person  after  he  entered  political  life.^ 
The  profession  of  speech-writer  was  not  one 
which  was  in  good  repute  in  Athens.  This  was 
partly  due  to  the  feeling  that  a  good  case  needed 
no  professional  ingenuity  to  support  it ;  and  so  not 
only  did  Lysias  and  other''  orators  deprecate  the 
deceitfulness  of  the  "clever  speaker"  and  treat 
his  skill  as  a  proof  of  his  dishonesty,  but  Isocrates, 
who  in  his  earlier  days  wrote  speeches  for  clients, 
afterwards  actually  denied  having  done  so,  and 
spoke  of  the  practice  with  contempt.  Besides 
this,  the  fact  that  the  professional  advocate  or 
speech- writer  was  paid  for  his  work^  suggested  a 
certain  unscrupulousness  to  the  Athenian  mind, 
which  disapproved  of  the  making  of  money  either 

» In   Timarch.,  §§  170-2;    de  F.  L.,  §  148;  in  Ctes.,  §  173.     See 
Note  4. 

'This  is  implied  by  ^sch.  in  Timarch.,  §§  117,  173,  175. 

sPseudo-Dem.  in  Zenoihemim,  §  31. 

*  See  below,  p.  19.  s  Note  5. 


1 6  Demosthenes 

by  rhetorical  practice  or  by  philosophical  teaching. 
Demosthenes*  opponents,  ^Eschines  and  Deinar- 
chus,  make  the  most  of  the  supposed  iniquity  of  the 
profession,  though  Demosthenes  returns  the  charge 
upon  iEschines'  own  head  with  some  force. ' 

But  Demosthenes'  real  motive  for  undertaking 
the  composition  of  speeches  for  others  may  have 
been  the  desire,  not  to  make  money,  but  to  acquire 
practice  in  the  art  for  himself,  with  a  view  to  his 
intended  career.  Plutarch*  tells  us  that  he  also 
profited  by  the  speeches  and  litigation  of  others, 
going  over  each  case  again,  when  he  returned  from 
the  court, — reflecting  upon  the  arguments  used, 
considering  how  the  matter  might  have  been  better 
treated,  and  remodelling  the  expressions  which  he 
remembered,  imtil  he  was  perfectly  satisfied  with 
them;  applying,  in  fact,  the  same  process  of  cas- 
tigation  and  revision  to  which  in  later  days  he 
appears  to  have  subjected  his  own  work. 

Nor  was  this  all.  It  was  doubtless  during  the 
ten  or  twelve  years  after  he  came  of  age  that 
Demosthenes  acquired  the  knowledge  of  Greek 
history  which  he  so  often  displays.  The  story  of 
his  having  copied  out  Thucydides  eight  times  ^  is 

^yEsch.  in  TtmorcA.,  i.,  §§  94  (with  schol.),  125,  175;  de  F.  L., 
§§  99. 165 ;  Isocr.,  deAntidosi,  §§  37-44 ;  de  Sophistis,  §§  19  S.. ;  Dein- 
arch.  in  Dem.,  §111;  Dem,,  de  F.  L.,  §  246. 

'Plut.,  Dem.,  viii. 

3  Lucian,  irpis  rbv  AvaldevTov,  §  4.  Equally  apocryphal  is  the 
tale  in  Zosimus*  Life  of  Demosthenes  that  when  the  library  at 
Athens  was  burnt,  and  the  MS.  of  Thucydides  destroyed,  Demos- 
thenes wrote  out  the  historian's  work  from  memory. 


Youth  and  Training  of  Demosthenes     17 

indeed  apocryphal.  But  that  he  was  thoroughly 
familiar  with  the  historian,  the  evidence  of  his 
earlier  style  leaves  no  doubt;  and  he  also  dis- 
plays the  same  habit  of  referring  events  and 
past  and  present  conditions  to  their  causes,  the 
same  serious  view  of  the  moral  aspect  of  political 
affairs,  and  the  same  manner  of  stating  and  apply- 
ing general  principles  of  action  and  policy,  as 
does  Thucydides,  both  in  the  speeches  included 
in  his  history,  and  in  his  own  reflections  upon 
events.  In  the  history  of  Thucydides  he  must 
have  studied  the  portraits  of  statesmen  of  widely 
different  types,  and  familiarised  himself  with  the 
better  and  the  worse  methods  which  statesmen 
could  employ.  For  him,  as  for  modem  readers, 
Thucydides  was  doubtless  a  school  of  political 
instruction  without  a  rival,  as  well  as  a  collection 
of  masterpieces  in  the  older  style  of  Athenian 
eloquence.  "^ 

The  style,  however,  of  Thucydides  could  not 
be  made  suitable,  without  great  modification,  to 
the  practical  affairs  of  the  middle  of  the  fourth 
century.  His  stiffness  and  compression  were  ill- 
fitted  for  carrying  away  the  jury  or  the  Assembly, 
and  the  perpetual  use  (which  was  characteristic 
of  him)  of  the  antithetical  figiu-es  of  speech,  valu- 
able as  these  always  remained  for  certain  purposes, 
would   have   seemed    artificial   and    monotonous 

'  The  speeches  in  Thucydides'  history  were  probably  less  widely 
removed  than  is  commonly  supposed  from  the  style  actually 
adopted  by  Pericles;  but  this  is  not  the  place  to  argue  the  point- 


1 8  Demosthenes 

to  the  audiences  which  Demosthenes  addressed. 
In  parts  of  the  first  extant  speech  of  Demosthenes 
to  the  Assembly — the  Speech  on  the  Naval  Boards, 
delivered  in  354 — these  Thucydidean  character- 
istics are  somewhat  conspicuous;  but  he  became 
more  discriminating  in  his  use  of  them  before  long. 
Since  the  history  of  Thucydides  had  been  written, 
two  new  styles  had  sprung  up.  The  one,  of  which 
Lysias  had  been  the  greatest  master,  was  partic- 
ularly serviceable  for  private  lawsuits.  It  consisted 
in  a  studied  simplicity,  an  apparent  innocence 
of  all  artifice,  which  must  have  been  (as  it  still  is) 
extremely  attractive,  especially  when  so  modified 
in  the  case  of  each  litigant  as  just  to  suit  his 
particular  character.  Almost  every  speech  of 
Lysias  appears  as  if  it  were  the  absolutely  natural 
and  unstudied  utterance  of  the  client  for  whom  it 
was  composed.  Only  in  prologue  and  epilogue, 
and  sometimes  in  moralising  upon  the  actions  or 
the  characters  described,  the  tone  is  somewhat 
heightened,  and  some  of  those  artifices  which 
distinctly  separated  oratory  from  conversation 
reappear,  though  even  so  they  are  not  thrust  for- 
ward. A  more  artificial  style  is  also  to  be  seen 
in  the  four  speeches  of  a  public  character  which 
Lysias  composed.  But  in  general  the  effect  of 
Lysias'  writing  is  that  of  conversation  in  which, 
without  any  sign  of  effort  on  the  speaker's  part, 
every  word  is  just  the  right  one,  and  is  ut- 
tered in  just  the  right  place.  The  arrangement 
of  the  speech  is  almost  invariably  simple — intro- 


A 


Youth  and  Training  of  Demosthenes     19 

duction,  narrative,  argument,  and  conclusion 
following  one  another  artlessly  and  straightfor- 
wardly. From  many  indications^  it  is  clear  that 
the  mistrust  of  the  "clever  speaker,"  to  which 
allusion  has  already  been  made,^  was  strong  in 
the  days  of  Lysias,  and  there  was  always  a  risk 
that  suspicion  would  be  aroused  if  a  private  per- 
son spoke  in  an  ingenious,  elaborate,  or  artificial 
manner.  In  the  same  spirit,  -^schines  and  others 
made  it  a  reproach  against  Demosthenes  himself 
that  he  elaborated  his  phrases  and  arguments  like 
a  sophist;  and  the  reason  which  Plato  gives ^  for 
the  fact  that  the  great  speakers  of  the  fifth  century 
had  not  published  their  speeches  was  that  they 
were  afraid  of  being  thought  sophists.  In  the 
speeches  composed  for  clients  by  Demosthenes 
himself,  it  is  noteworthy  in  what  apologetic  tones 
the  speaker  is  made  to  introduce  arguments  which 
show  an  acquaintance  with  law  or  with  precedents 
beyond  the  range  of  the  ordinary  man's  knowledge ; 
and  how  more  than  one  speaker  emphasises  his 
own  want  of  familiarity  with  the  courts  and  com- 
pares it  with  his  litigious  opponents'  long  practice  in 
conducting  lawsuits.  Even  in  speeches  dealing  with 
matters  of  public  interest,  Demosthenes  makes  his 
client  warn  the  jury  against  the  "clever  speaker." '» 

'  e.  g.,  Lysias,  xii.,  §  86,  xviii.,  §  i6,  xxvii.,  §  5,  xxx.,  §  24.  Lysias 
was  already  writing  speeches  before  399,  when  Socrates  was 
condemned  partly  for  making  the  worse  cause  appear  the  better. 

'See  above  p.  15.  ^  Phcsdrus,  2S'jd. 

*e.  g.  in  Androt.,  §§  4,  37;  in  Aristocr.,  §  5. 


20  Demosthenes 

Demosthenes'  speeches  have  not,  it  is  true,  the 
absolute  and  artless  simplicity  of  Lysias.  For 
although  in  certain  cases  of  a  trivial  kind  the  time 
allowed  was  so  short  that  only  a  concise  statement 
of  the  facts  and  recital  of  the  laws  was  possible, 
in  most  of  his  speeches  the  arrangement  is  care- 
fully planned  so  as  to  emphasise  the  important 
points;  and  the  narrative,  the  proofs,  and  the  reply 
to  the  actual  or  anticipated  argiunents  of  the 
opponent  are  interlaced  (after  the  example  of 
Isaeus)  in  a  manner  which  is  artistic  without  ceas- 
ing to  be  lucid,  and  which  offers  more  variety  to 
the  hearer  than  a  merely  consecutive  treatment  of 
the  several  elements  in  the  speech.  The  argu- 
ments, especially  those  which  are  drawn  from 
considerations  of  general  morality  or  of  public 
interest,  are  often  more  like  those  of  a  statesman 
than  of  a  plain  man,  and  the  contentions  of  the 
speakers  on  points  of  law  are  sometimes  subtle  and 
ingenious.  Dionysius  of  Halicamassus  (an  ad- 
mirable critic  of  the  last  century  B.C.,  and  a  very 
discerning  student  of  the  great  orators  in  particular) 
says  that,  as  compared  with  Lysias,  Demosthenes, 
like  Isagus,  aroused  suspicion  even  when  he  had  a 
good  case.^  But  modern  readers,  more  familiar 
with  the  ingenuity  of  lawyers,  and  more  conscious 
that  legal  questions  can  only  be  settled  by  the 
careful  sifting  of  legal  arguments,  are  less  likely 
to  feel  this;  and  in  fact  the  private  speeches,  at 
least,  of  Demosthenes  display,  to  a  degree  only 

'  Dion.  Hal.,  de  Isceo,  iv. 


Youth  and  Training  of  Demosthenes     21 

surpassed  in  the  work  of  Lysias  himself,  the  art  of 
adapting  the  language  and  tone  of  the  oration  to 
the  characters  of  the  several  speakers,  and  of 
giving  an  impression  of  innocence  and  honesty. 
They  show  also  on  occasion,  as  do  the  speeches  of 
Lysias,  a  sense  of  humour  which  rarely  appears  in 
the  political  orations. 

The  other  style  which  influenced  Demosthenes 
(coming  into  prominence  soon  after  that  of  Lysias) 
was  the  style  of  Isocrates,  itself  a  development  of 
that  of  Thrasymachus,  of  whom  as  an  orator  we 
know  little  except  that  it  was  he  who  first  intro- 
duced the  deliberate  use  of  rhythms  into  oratory. 
While  Isocrates  employs  the  antithetical  figures,  at 
times  to  excess,  he  does  not  merely  arrange  anti- 
thetical clauses  in  pairs,  but  builds  up  periods  of  a 
more  elaborate  kind  out  of  clauses  symmetrically 
arranged  and  characterised  by  dominant  and  often 
corresponding  rhythms.  Such  work  is  pleasing 
for  a  while,  but  its  rhythmical  character  and  its 
studied  symmetry  are  too  obtrusive;  its  obvious 
artificiality  soon  cloys;  its  regularity  becomes 
monotonous.  It  is  not  surprising  that  Isocrates' 
speeches  could  not  be  declaimed  in  the  Assembly 
or  the  Law-Courts,  and  that  his  influence  was 
achieved  through  the  circulation  of  his  writings 
in  many  copies. 

But  the  value  of  rhythmical  effects  and  of  a 
periodic  structure  in  oratory,  and  particularly 
in  oratory  addressed  to  an  aesthetically  sensitive 
people,  such  as  the  Athenians  were,  did  not  escape 


22  Demosthenes 

Demosthenes;  and  his  mastery  of  all  the  varieties 
of  oratorical  rhythm  must  have  been  largely 
acquired  in  his  eariy  years.  He  is  never  the  slave 
of  rhythm,  and  is  never  bound  to  a  single  type  of 
sentence-structure,  but  uses  every  type  as  he 
requires  it,  and  never  allows  any  to  pall.  For 
such  complete  mastery  long  practice  must  have 
been  needed.  Some  of  Isocrates'  greatest  writings 
were  issued  before  Demosthenes'  first  extant 
public  oration  was  deHvered, — the  Panegyricus 
in  380,  the  Platceicus  in  373,  the  Archidamus  in 
366,  the  Speech  on  the  Peace  probably  in  356,  and 
the  Areopagiticus  in  355.^  There  is  no  need  to 
take  literally  the  story  ^  that  Demosthenes  obtained 
surreptitiously  the  technical  treatises  of  Isocrates 
and  other  rhetorical  teachers  of  the  time  and 
learned  them  by  heart.  The  principles  of  Isoc- 
rates' art  must  have  been  well  known,  in  the  days 
of  Demosthenes'  youth,  to  all  who  were  interested 
in  rhetoric,  through  his  pupils,  and  through  his 
and  their  works;  and  it  was  doubtless  by  the  close 
study  of  these  works  that  he  was  enabled  to  adapt 
the  principles  to  the  purposes  of  practical  oratory. 
With  the  matter  of  Isocrates'  writings  Demos- 
thenes can  have  been  little  in  sympathy,  and  it  is 
only  in  his  earliest  work  that  we  seem  to  have  any 
unmistakable  echo  of  Isocrates'  sentiments.  It 
is  true  that  Isocrates,  like  Demosthenes,  traced 
much  of  the  evil  of  his  times,  first,  to  the  prevail- 

'  For  the  dates  see  Drerup,  Isocratis  opera  omnia,  I,  pp.  cliii.  flf. 
»Plut.,Z?ew.,v. 


Youth  and  Training  of  Demosthenes     23 

ing  love  of  pleasure  and  the  unwillingness  of  the 
citizens  of  Athens  to  undertake  personal  service 
for  the  good  of  the  community;  and  secondly,  to 
the  refusal  of  the  Athenian  people  even  to  listen 
to  those  wise  advisers  who  would  not  prophesy 
smooth  things.  He  was  also,  like  Demosthenes, 
deeply  impressed  by  the  perpetual  discord  of  the 
Greek  States  with  one  another,  and  by  the  cruelties 
and  the  mischief  perpetrated  by  the  mercenary 
armies  which  the  cities  employed  to  do  their  work ; 
he  expressed,  as  Demosthenes  did  (particularly  in 
middle  and  later  life),  the  strongest  Panhellenic 
feeling,  and  aspired  to  bring  about  a  union  of  all 
the  Hellenes,  with  Athens  as  their  centre.  The 
two  writers  had,  moreover,  many  ideas  in  common 
in  regard  to  the  history  and  traditions  of  Athens, 
and  appealed  to  the  same  outstanding  examples 
of  her  action  in  the  past.  But  nothing  could  be 
more  alien  from  Demosthenes  than  the  academic 
suggestions  by  which  Isocrates  sought  to  remedy 
the  mischiefs  of  the  age — the  vague  sentiment  (not 
altogether  unjustified  as  a  sentiment,  but  quite 
unpractical  as  a  policy)  in  favour  of  some  kind  of 
monarchy,  whether  it  was  to  be  exercised  by  Jason 
of  Pherae,  or  by  Dionysius  of  Syracuse,  or  by 
Philip;  the  fancy  that  Philip  could  be  converted 
into  a  regenerator  of  Hellas,  or  a  purely  unselfish 
leader  of  a  voluntary  Panhellenic  coalition;  the 
dream  of  a  return  of  the  city  to  the  form  of  govern- 
ment which  existed  in  the  days  when  the  Council 
of  Areopagus  was  supreme ;  the  idea  of  healing  the 


24  Demosthenes 

disunion  of  the  States  by  causing  them  to  under- 
take a  united  campaign  against  Persia  under  the 
leadership  of  Athens  and  Sparta,  or  of  Archidamus, 
or  of  Philip  himself.  When  Demosthenes  himself 
made  a  proposal  on  any  subject,  every  point  was 
worked  out  in  detail,  in  a  practical  and  business- 
like manner:  the  half -thought-out  generalities  of 
Isocrates  must  have  been  almost  repulsive  to  him ; 
and  as  for  Isocrates'  favourite  nostrum — a  luiited 
war  against  Persia — it  must  have  been  perfectly 
obvious  that,  so  far  from  it  being  possible  to  achieve 
union  by  organising  a  campaign  against  Persia, 
no  such  campaign  was  possible  imtil  some  kind  of 
unity  was  enforced:  and  when  in  fact,  after  Isoc- 
rates' death,  Philip  and  Alexander  imposed  a 
formal  imity,  and  Alexander  led  an  army  drawn 
from  many  of  the  Greek  States  into  Asia,  no  real 
or  effective  union — certainly  no  tmion  of  spirit — 
between  the  States  at  home  was  after  all  achieved. 
Isocrates'  attitude  both  towards  Philip  and  towards 
Persia  was  the  exact  opposite  of  that  which  Demos- 
thenes adopted  when  his  policy  was  fully  matured. 
Isocrates  wished  to  set  Philip  at  the  head  of  the 
Greeks  in  order  to  crush  Persia:  Demosthenes  (at 
least  in  341,  as  will  appear  later')  desired  the  al- 
liance of  Persia  in  order  to  prevent  Philip  from 
becoming  the  head  of  the  Greeks.  Moreover, 
Isocrates'  generally  anti-imperialistic  attitude  is 
just  the  reverse  of  the  attitude  of  Demosthenes 
towards  empire,  even  though  many  passages  in 

'  See  below,  pp.  316,  340-343.  409.  417- 


Youth  and  Training  of  Demosthenes     25 

Isocrates'  writings  may  express  in  more  fulsome 
and  artificial  language  the  sentiments  which 
Demosthenes  himself  held  with  regard  to  the 
degeneracy  of  the  People  and  their  behaviour 
towards  the  politicians  who  advised  them. 

Yet,  poles  apart  as  Isocrates  and  Demosthenes 
were,  the  younger  man  learned  much  from  the 
elder.  Above  all,  he  probably  learned  from  him 
the  possible  influence  of  speeches  published  as 
political  pamphlets.  There  can  be  little  doubt 
that  at  two  very  critical  times — those  of  the  Social 
War,  and  of  the  peace-negotiations  in  346 — public 
opinion  was  prepared  for  the  measures  to  which 
the  policy  of  Eubulus  led,  by  the  writings  of 
Isocrates;  and  there  can  be  even  less  doubt  that 
the  influence  of  Demosthenes'  own  speeches  was 
immensely  extended  by  their  publication.  The 
view,  which  some  recent  scholars  have  maintained,  ^ 
that  the  speeches  which  we  have  were  not  delivered 
at  all,  but  are  simply  political  pamphlets,  and  that 
Demosthenes'  real  speeches  in  the  Assembly  were 
far  rougher  in  form  and  more  violent  in  language, 
is  based  upon  very  inadequate  evidence;  and  it  is 
probable  that,  although  the  speeches  were  sub- 
jected to  some  revision  before  publication,  the 
divergence  between  the  spoken  and  the  published 
form  was  not  great.  But  it  is  beyond  question 
that  they  owed  much  of  their  influence  on  the 
course  of  events  to  their  appearance  as  pamphlets ; 
and  although  some  few  political  pamphlets^  seem 

'  E.  g.,  Hahn  and  Wendland.     See  Note  6.  '  Note  7. 


26  Demosthenes 

to  have  been  issued  towards  the  end  of  the  fifth 
century,  Demosthenes  was  the  first  great  practical 
statesman  to  make  use  of  methods,  the  effective- 
ness of  which  in  some  degree  anticipated  the  power 
of  the  press  in  modem  times;  and  it  was  from 
Isocrates  that  he  must  have  learned  to  use  them. 

Whether  or  not  Demosthenes  came  at  any  time 
under  the  influence  of  Plato,  who  died  in  347-6,  is 
doubtful.  Cicero,  Quintilian,  and  Tacitus  all 
allege  that  he  was  a  reader  and  even  a  pupil  of 
Plato;  but  the  tradition  on  which  they  relied 
seems  to  rest  on  very  weak  authority,^  and  al- 
though it  is  most  improbable  that  he  did  not  know 
the  philosopher's  writings,  he  can  have  felt  little 
sympathy  with  his  opinions.  Much  as  Demos- 
thenes lamented  the  weaknesses  of  the  Athenian 
people,  he  was  a  whole-hearted  believer  in  demo- 
cracy— the  constitution  which  Plato  placed  lowest 
but  one  in  his  enumeration  of  the  several  types  of 
State ;  and  the  fact  that  the  philosophic  ideal  was, 
from  the  point  of  view  of  the  practical  statesman, 
unpatriotic  and  selfish,  would  also  render  Demos- 
thenes unfriendly  to  such  speculations. 

During  the  years  between  365  and  355 — the 
years  of  preparation  for  his  public  career — 
Demosthenes  must  not  only  have  familiarised 
himself  with  the  work  of  his  predecessors  and  older 
contemporaries,  with  Greek  history  and  Athenian 
law,  but  must  also  have  written  many  of  those 

'  See  Sandys'  note  on  Cicero's  Orator,  iv.,  §16,  and  the  references 
there  given.     See  also  Note  8  below. 


Youth  and  Training  of  Demosthenes     27 

typical  passages  which  formed  part  of  an  orator's 
stock-in-trade.  For  nearly  every  speaker,  and 
certainly  every  rhetorical  teacher,  formed  a  col- 
lection of  prologues  and  epilogues,  and  of  passages 
dealing  with  each  of  the  more  frequently  recurring 
topics;  these  he  adapted,  as  might  be  convenient,  to 
the  purposes  of  the  particular  speech  upon  which 
he  was  engaged.  Rhetorical  teachers  appear  not 
only  to  have  imparted  such  collections  to  their 
pupils,  but  also  to  have  published  them,  and  hence 
we  find  not  only  verbal  or  almost  verbal  repeti- 
tions in  different  orations  of  the  same  speaker, 
but  also  passages  which  are  identical  in  the  speeches 
of  different  composers.^  Moreover,  the  rhetori- 
cian or  sophist  wrote  passages  both  for  and  against 
particular  views,  and  was  ready  to  be  of  service 
to  either  side ;  and  the  writer  of  speeches  for  clients 
doubtless  found  such  passages  useful.  ^  Nor  could 
the  politician,  who  had  already  formed  his  view 
and  chosen  his  side,  despise  the  advantage  of  hav- 
ing his  opinions  upon  certain  topics,  which  were 
sure  to  present  themselves,  reduced  to  the  best 
form  which  he  was  capable  of  giving  to  them :  and 
many  of  the  general  reflections  which  abound  in 
Demosthenes'  speeches  (and  particularly  those 
reflections  which  occur  in  more  than  one  context  ^) 

'  Compare  the  proceinium  of  Andocides,  de  Mysteriis,  with  those 
of  Lysias,  Or.  xix.,  and  Isocr.,  Or.  xv.;  and  Andocides  de  Paee, 
§§3-12,  with  ^schines,  de  F.  L.,  §§  172-6.  See  also  Spengel, 
Artium  Scriptores,  pp.  106,  107.  '  Note  9. 

J  Compare  (e.  g.)  Phil.  I,  §2,  and  III,  §5;  de  Chers.,  §34,  and 


28  Demosthenes 

may  owe  their  origin  to  his  early  studies.  In  his 
eariier  speeches,  when  one  or  another  of  these 
passages  is  inserted,  we  can  sometimes  detect  the 
joints ;  but  after  a  few  years,  though  many  of  the 
generaHsations  found  in  the  speeches  had  probably 
been  worked  up  beforehand,  they  are  so  perfectly 
fitted  into  their  place,  and  seem  to  arise  so  naturally 
out  of  their  context,  that  the  artificiality  is  almost 
imperceptible. 

An  orator  must  learn  not  only  to  compose  his 
speeches,  but  to  deliver  them.  It  was  here  that 
Demosthenes'  greatest  difficulties  lay.  He  began 
his  practice  weak-voiced,  lisping,  and  short  of 
breath;  the  letter  R  was  especially  troublesome 
to  him;  and  it  has  been  noticed  that,  in  the  statues 
of  him  which  are  known,  the  lower  lip  comes  much 
less  forward  than  the  upper — a  defect  which  is 
inimical  to  clear  enunciation.  We  are  told  that 
he  overcame  these  physical  disadvantages  by 
practising  with  pebbles  in  his  mouth,  repeating 
many  times  the  line, 

poxOei  yap  ixlya  xD^xa  xoTt  ^epbv  TQxe(poto,* 

trying  to  shout  down  the  breakers  on  the  shore  at 
Phalerum  (where,  in  Cicero's  day,  the  local  guides 
were  able  to  show  the  exact  spot  where  the  yotmg 
orator's  efforts  were  made^),  reciting  while  running 

Phil.  Ill,  §4;  in  Aristocr.,  §§207,  208,  and  Olynth.  iii.,  §§25,  26. 
See  also  Note  10. 

'  Odyssey,  v.,  402.  » Cic,  de  Fin.,  V,  ii.,  §5. 


I 


Youth  and  Training  of  Demosthenes    29 

up  hill,  learning  to  deliver  many  lines  in  one  breath, 
and  speaking  before  a  mirror  to  correct  his  gestures. 
More  than  once  he  failed,  when  he  rose  to  address 
the  People.  At  his  first  attempt  his  periods  fell 
into  confusion,  and  he  was  met  with  shouts  of 
laughter.  As  he  wandered  in  depression  up  and 
down  the  Peiraeus,  an  old  friend,  Eunomus  of 
Thria,  met  him,  and  rebuked  him  because,  when 
he  had  a  speech  to  deliver  that  was  worthy  of 
Pericles,  he  sacrificed  his  opportunity  from  want  of 
pluck  and  manliness — from  timidity  before  the 
crowd  and  lack  of  proper  physical  exercise.  On 
another  occasion,  when  he  had  failed,  the  actor 
Satyrus  came  to  his  aid.  Demosthenes  com- 
plained to  Satyrus  that,  although  he  had  sacrificed 
his  health  out  of  devotion  to  his  studies,  the  People 
would  not  listen  to  him,  but  preferred  the  speeches 
of  drunken  sailors  and  fools  to  his  own.  Satyrus 
bade  him  recite  from  memory  a  speech  of  Euripides 
or  Sophocles.  Demosthenes  did  so,  and  Satyrus 
then  taught  him  to  speak  it  in  a  manner,  and  with 
a  spirit,  that  befitted  the  character.  So  effective 
were  these  lessons  that  Demosthenes  came  to 
regard  action,  or  delivery,  as  incomparably  the 
most  important  of  all  the  elements  in  the  art  of 
oratory.  He  built,  we  are  told,  an  underground 
chamber  (which  was  shown  for  centuries  after- 
wards), where  he  daily  practised  his  voice  and 
delivery,  sometimes  for  two  or  three  months  at  a 
time,  shaving  one  side  of  his  head  in  order  that  he 
might  resist  the  temptation  to  go  out  into  the 


30  Demosthenes 

streets.  The  amount  of  truth  that  there  is  in 
these  tales  cannot  be  estimated;  but  we  need  not 
hesitate  to  beHeve  that  Demosthenes  showed  a 
heroic  perseverance  in  his  determination  to  over- 
come the  physical  defects  with  which  he  began  his 
career,  and  that  he  made  himself  perfect  in  that 
"actor's  art,"  which,  he  told  an  enquirer,  was 
first,  second,  and  third  among  the  requirements  of 
an  orator.^ 

Plutarch  tells  a  story  which  illustrates  the  im- 
portance attached  by  Demosthenes  to  the  tone 
of  the  voice.  A  man  came  to  him  and  asked  him 
to  plead  for  him,  explaining  that  he  had  been 
assaulted.  "Indeed,"  said  Demosthenes,  "you 
have  not  really  suffered  any  injury  at  all."  The 
man  thereupon  raised  his  voice  and  cried  out, 
"What?  Do  you  mean  to  say  that  I  have  suffered 
no  injury?"  "Ah!"  said  Demosthenes,  "now  I 
hear  the  voice  of  an  injured  man ! "  Plutarch  adds 
that  Demosthenes'  own  delivery  captivated  the 
majority  of  his  hearers,  though  the  more  refined 
of  them  thought  that  he  carried  his  action  to  a 
point  at  which  it  became  ignoble  and  effeminate. 
The  same  reproach  was  brought  (so  we  infer  from 
Aristotle^)  against  the  dominant  school  of  con- 
temporary tragic  actors. 

^  Cic,  Brutus,  §  142.  Most  of  these  stories  are  found  in 
Plutarch.  He  derived  some  of  them  from  Demetrius  of  Phalerum 
who  professed  to  have  heard  them  from  Demosthenes  himself. 
Some  say  that  the  actor  by  whom  he  was  assisted  was  Neoptol- 
emus  or  Andronicus,  and  that  Demosthenes  gave  him  10,000 
drachmae  for  his  help.     See  Note  11.  *  Poetics,  xxvi. 


1 


Youth  and  Training  of  Demosthenes     31 

Nervousness  was  less  easy  to  overcome  than 
defective  utterance:  and  on  one  or  two  important 
occasions  of  Demosthenes'  Hfe  this  weakness  seems 
to  have  recurred.^  Indeed  it  was  always  so  far 
present  that  he  seldom  ventured  to  speak  without 
preparation.  Whether  he  really  increased  his 
natural  lack  of  robustness  by  wearing  soft  raiment 
and  neglecting  bodily  exercises,  as  his  enemies 
affirmed,  we  do  not  know;  and  the  question  is  of 
no  importance.  He  had  at  least  the  courage  to 
pursue  his  way,  undeterred  by  every  obstacle,  to 
the  goal  which  he  had  set  before  himself — that 
of  becoming  a  statesman  and  an  orator  worthy 
of  Athens. 

APPENDIX  TO  CHAPTER  I 
{On  the  Private  Speeches) 

In  a  study  which  is  particularly  devoted  to  the  public  career  of 
Demosthenes  there  is  no  need  for  any  detailed  account  of  his 
Private  Speeches;  and  the  subject  is  rendered  difficult  by  the 
doubts  which  exist  as  to  the  genuineness  of  many  of  those  which 
have  descended  to  us  under  his  name,  and  the  uncertainty  of  the 
criteria  by  which  their  genuineness  is  tested.  But  they  are 
sufficiently  illustrative  of  his  versatility  as  an  orator  to  demand 
a  brief  notice. 

The  Private  Speeches  which  there  is  good  reason  to  consider 
genuine  mainly  fall  between  the  years  357  and  345.  (The  dates 
of  the  Speeches  against  Spudias  and  against  Callicles — both  of 
which  may  be  quite  early, — and  of  the  Speech  against  Conon, 
are  unknown.)  The  short  Speech  on  the  Trierarchic  Crown  was 
composed  on  behalf  of  ApoUodorus,  son  of  Pasion  the  banker,* 
who  seeks  to  make  good  his  claim  to  the  crown  offered  by  the 


*  Especially  on  the  First  Embassy  to  Philip  (see  below,  p.  243). 
Compare  Dem.,  de  F.  L.,  §  206,  de  Chers.,  §  68.  "Note  12. 


32  Demosthenes 

State  to  the  captain  whose  ship  was  first  manned  and  ready  for 
sea,  and  to  disprove  the  claim  of  his  opponents.  The  expedition 
for  which  the  fleet  was  ordered  out  was  probably  that  of  the  year 
360,  in  which  Demosthenes  himself  served,  and  the  trial  took 
place  two  years  later.  The  interest  of  the  Speech  lies  in  the  light 
which  it  throws  on  the  Athenian  naval  system — a  subject  with 
which  we  shall  be  concerned  in  a  later  chapter.  The  concluding 
portion  is  chiefly  devoted  to  a  denunciation  of  paid  advocates, 
which  falls  oddly  from  Demosthenes,  and  is  of  course  one  of  the 
tricks  of  the  trade.  The  trenchant  directness  of  the  Speech, 
and  its  outspoken  criticism  of  the  attitude  of  the  Athenians  to- 
wards defaulting  captains,  are  entirely  in  his  own  style;  and  we 
can  see  already  the  interest  in  naval  affairs  which  led  him  a  few 
years  later  to  propose,  and  many  years  later  to  carry  out,  a 
reform  of  the  Trierarchic  system. 

The  Speech  against  Spudias,  dealing  with  a  quarrel  arising 
out  of  a  family  arrangement,  which  had  been  broken  by  Spudias, 
need  not  detain  us.  In  its  tone  and  style  it  resembles  the  Speeches 
against  Aphobus  and  Onetor.  The  case  was  a  comparatively 
trivial  one,  and  is  briefly,  but  convincingly,  treated. 

The  Speech  against  Callicles  is  more  interesting.  It  is  admir- 
ably written  in  the  vein  of  a  good-natured  man  who  only  wants 
a  quiet  life,  but  is  wantonly  attacked  by  his  neighbour,  and  so 
has  to  appear  in  court.  The  speaker  and  Callicles  occupied 
adjacent  farms,  between  which  ran  a  road.  The  speaker's  father, 
finding  that  the  water  which  was  carried  down  from  the  hills 
was  making  a  channel  for  itself  in  his  land,  had  built  a  wall, 
which  diverted  the  flow.  Many  years  later,  a  torrent  due  to  a 
violent  storm  broke  down  an  old  wall  on  Callicles'  property  and 
did  some  mischief.  Callicles  then  brought  an  action  for  damages, 
and  the  reply,  composed  by  Demosthenes,  not  only  gives  an 
interesting  picture  of  Attic  country-life,  but  is  also  the  most 
graceful  and  humorous  of  his  speeches,  and  shows  that,  given  a 
good  case,  not  of  too  serious  a  nature,  he  could  adopt  a  less 
solemn  tone  than  was  usual  with  him. 

The  Speech  against  Conon  is  also  admirably  conceived.  A 
respectable  and  even  priggish  young  man  claims  damages  for  a 
somewhat  brutal  assault — the  culmination  of  a  good  deal  of 
"ragging"  on  the  part  of  a  number  of  men  who  had  formed 
themselves  into  a  club  of  a  lively  and  dissolute  character;  and  he 


Youth  and  Training  of  Demosthenes     2>2> 

expresses  himself  in  a  manner,  the  unconscious  humour  of  which 
must  have  given  a  good  deal  of  pleasure  to  the  composer  of  the 
Speech  and  to  the  jury.* 

The  Speeches  for  Phormio  (350  B.C.)  and  against  Stephanus 
(350  or  349),  delivered  in  the  course  of  litigation  mainly  concerned 
with  banking,  raise  a  problem  which  so  nearly  touches  the  char- 
acter of  Demosthenes  as  an  advocate  and  a  man,  that  they  must 
be  more  fully  treated  at  a  later  point  in  the  narrative. 

The  Speech  against  Boeotus  "On  his  name  "  was  written  in  348 
for  a  certain  Mantitheus,  who  brought  an  action  against  his 
half-brother  Boeotus  for  illegally  taking  the  same  name  as  him- 
self. It  is  composed  in  the  manner  of  a  blunt  and  direct  speaker, 
fond  of  putting  pointed  questions  one  after  another,  and  dis- 
playing some  humour  in  the  pictures  which  he  draws  of  the 
inconveniences  which  must  arise  from  the  failure  of  other  peo- 
ple to  distinguish  between  himself  and  the  much  less  respectable 
person  who  has  taken  his  name.  We  do  not  know,  however,  what 
was  to  be  said  on  the  other  side;  and,  for  whatever  reason,  the 
speaker  lost  his  suit. 

The  two  Private  Speeches  which  were  probably  composed  in 
or  about  the  year  346  are  (like  the  Speech  for  Phormio)  instances 
of  a  paragraphe  or  plea  in  bar  of  action,  based  principally 
on  the  fact  that  the  plaintiff  had  already  given  the  defendant  a 
release  from  all  claims.  In  the  Speech  against  Pantasnetus,  the 
claim  made  by  Nicobulus  against  Pantsenetus  was  the  result  of  a 
series  of  complicated  transactions  in  regard  to  the  ownership  of 
a  mine;  and  the  case  was  tried  under  the  special  law  regulating 
mines.  This  law  required  a  speedy  decision  and  imposed  certain 
stringent  conditions  on  the  litigants;  and  it  is  part  of  Nicobulus' 
plea  that  the  case  was  not  one  which  properly  fell  under  that 
law,  and  that  a  number  of  causes  of  action  which  should  have 
been  brought  before  different  courts  had  been  illegally  merged 
in  one  suit.  The  Speech  is  written  for  a  man  possessed  of  a  good 
deal  of  the  "humility  that  humbly  commends  itself  to  notice," 
and  conscious  of  the  prejudice  which  must  have  been  aroused  by 
Pantaenetus'  representation  of  him  as  a  money-lender  and  a 
person  whose  very  manner  was  suspicious;  and  it  combines  some 


'  The  date  of  the  Speech  is  uncertain;  but  it  may  have  been 
delivered  about  355  B.C. 


34  Demosthenes 

very  able  character-drawing  with  great  ingenuity  in  legai 
argument. 

The  other  paragraphs  was  pleaded  to  bar  an  action  brought 
by  Nausimachus  and  Xenopeithes,  who  claimed  a  large  sum  of 
money  from  the  sons  of  their  former  guardian  Aristaechmus. 
The  speaker  pleads  that  a  discharge  given  to  Aristaechmus  had 
covered  all  matters  connected  with  the  trust,  and  that  the  plain- 
tiffs' action  was  barred  by  the  Statute  of  Limitations.  The 
Speech  is  short,  lucid,  and  businesslike,  except  for  a  piece  of 
rhetorical  ingenuity  at  the  close,  where  the  speaker  replies  to  the 
plaintiffs'  claim  to  consideration  on  account  of  their  large  expendi- 
ture in  the  service  of  the  State,  by  arguing  that  such  a  plea  brings 
discredit  upon  the  city,  since  it  implies  that  the  city  makes 
excessive  demands  upon  her  citizens. 

The  last  of  the  Private  Speeches  which  can  with  any  prob- 
ability be  ascribed  to  Demosthenes  himself  was  directed  against 
Eubulides,  in  the  year  345.  The  speaker,  Euxitheus,  charges 
Eubulides  with  having  brought  about  his  exclusion  from  the  list 
of  citizens  (in  a  revision  which  took  place  in  345)  by  the  use  of 
unfair  means,  and  appeals  to  the  jury,  as  he  was  entitled  to  do, 
to  restore  his  name  to  the  list.  He  speaks  as  an  honest  and 
straightforward  man,  not  ashamed  of  his  poverty — his  mother 
sold  ribbons  and  had  served  as  a  nurse — and  is  confident  in  the 
strength  of  his  case,  which  is  clearly  and  vigorously  presented. 

These  speeches  sufficiently  illustrate  the  variety  of  the  aspects 
of  human  nature  with  which  an  Athenian  advocate  had  to  deal, 
and  the  skill  of  Demosthenes  in  dealing  with  them.  While 
adapting  himself  to  the  character  of  the  speaker,  he  yet  remains, 
in  most  cases,  recognisably  himself.  Even  if  his  more  forceful 
characteristics  are  repressed  in  the  main  part  of  the  speech — his 
irony,  his  moral  indignation,  his  merciless  incisiveness — they  are 
apt  to  break  out  in  sudden  flashes;  and  he  constantly  succeeds 
in  giving  the  impression  that  he  stands  on  a  higher  moral  level 
than  his  adversary,  and  can  afford  either  to  treat  him  with  scorn 
or  to  fall  upon  him  without  mercy.  But  when  once  he  had 
attained  a  position  of  responsibility  in  public  life,  we  can  under- 
stand that  he  would  naturally  abandon  this  lower  branch  of 
oratory,  just  as,  from  the  time  when  he  first  began  to  take  part 
in  political  debates,  he  ceased  to  appear  personally  in  court  in 
the  interest  of  his  clients, — doubtless  from  a  desire  not  to  prejudice 


Youth  and  Training  of  Demosthenes    35 

his  political  prospects  by  exposing  himself  to  the  ill-favour  with 
which  the  professional  advocate  was  regarded.  It  was  not  until 
after  345  that  he  was  in  a  position  really  to  control  the  policy 
of  Athens,  and  up  to  that  time,  while  he  was  in  opposition,  his 
political  occupations  were  probably  not  so  absorbing  as  to  leave 
him  no  time  to  write  speeches  for  clients.  But  after  this  date 
we  find  no  more  such  speeches  from  his  pen;  for  the  suggestion' 
that  after  the  accession  of  Alexander  the  Great  he  may  have 
found  himself  cut  off  from  political  activities  and  resumed  for  a 
time  the  profession  of  advocate  (composing  among  others  the 
Speeches  against  Phsenippus  and  against  Phormio)  rests  on  no 
solid  foundation. 

NOTES 

1.  It  is  not  easy  to  give  the  value  of  the  estate  according  to 
modern  standards.  At  the  present  price  of  silver,  the  weight  of 
silver  in  a  talent  (about  57  lbs.  avoirdupois)  would  be  worth 
little  more  than  £100  (see  Goodwin,  Demosthenes'  Meidtas, 
§  80,  note).  But  its  purchasing  power  would  be  much  greater. 
The  wages  of  an  unskilled  labourer  were  about  ij^  drachmae  a 
day  in  the  4th  century  B.C.  (see  Beloch,  Griech.  Gesch.,  ii.,  pp. 
358,359);  they  are  now  perhaps  3s.  a  day  (all  told)  in  England, 
and  at  this  rate  a  talent  would  buy  £600  worth  of  unskilled 
labour.  Again,  if  the  price  of  wheat  be  taken  as  a  standard, 
wheat  in  Athens  in  Demosthenes'  time  (tn  Phorm.  §  39)  cost  5 
drachmae  a  medimnus — about  27  dr.  a  quarter.  It  now  costs 
(March,  1913)  36s.  a  quarter  in  London;  and  at  this  rate  a  talent 
would  be  the  equivalent  of  about  £400. 

2.  The  date  of  Demosthenes'  birth  cannot  be  exactly  deter- 
mined, as  he  himself  gives  two  inconsistent  accounts  of  his  age. 
In  the  first  Speech  against  Onetor,  §  15,  he  says  that  Aphobus  was 
married  in  the  last  month  of  the  archonship  of  Polyzelus,  i.  e., 
about  June,  366  B.C.;  and  that  immediately  afterwards  he  himself 
came  of  age,  t.  e.,  reached  his  eighteenth  birthday.  If  so,  he  was 
born  soon  after  the  middle  of  384.  Again,  in  the  first  Speech 
against  Aphobus,  §§  4,  17,  19,  he  says  that  he  was  seven  years 
old  at  his  father's  death,  and  was  ten  years  under  guardianship 
before  coming  of  age  in  366.  This  also  fixes  his  birth  in  the  archon- 
year  384-3.     Hypereides  (in  Dem.,  Col.  22)  refers  to  him  in 

*  Butcher,  Demosthenes,  p.  140. 


36  Demosthenes 

324-3  as  over  sixty;  and  this  also  points  to  384.  But  in  the  Speech 
against  Meidias,  §  154,  he  speaks  of  himself  as  thirty -two  years  old. 
The  date  of  this  speech  is  disputed,  but  it  was  probably  composed 
(see  below,  p.  226)  late  in  the  summer  of  347;  and,  if  so  the  orator's 
birth  was  assigned  to  379.  Even  if  the  words  Sio  koL  TpidKovra 
are  a  corruption  of  Wrropa,  (5')  Kal  rpidKovra  (as  in  Thucyd.,  ii., 
2,  riffffapai  /xijvas  is  a  generally  accepted  emendation  of  5iJo 
/u^wj),  this  only  brings  us  back  to  381  B.C. — the  date  given  also 
by  Dion.  Hal.,  ad  AmmcBum,  I,  iv.  If  the  speech  was  delivered 
in  349,  as  many  scholars  suppose,  the  discrepancy  is  less,  but 
there  are  strong  reasons  against  this  dating.  The  date  of  De- 
mosthenes' birth  given  in  Vit.  X  Oral.,  p.  845d,  is  the  archonship 
of  Dexitheus,  B.C.  385-4. 

3.  The  real  value  of  Demosthenes'  estate  has  been  minutely 
discussed  by  Beloch,  Kahrstedt,  and  others,  but  the  discussion 
(which  turns  upon  the  interpretation  of  some  difficult  passages 
in  the  Speeches  against  Aphobus  and  against  Polycles)  is  too 
often  vitiated  by  an  obvious  desire  to  prove  Demosthenes  to 
have  been  lying.  Demosthenes  perhaps  exaggerates  slightly  the 
original  value  of  the  estate,  and  slightly  tmderrates  the  amount 
which  he  actually  received,  but  there  is  no  reason  to  suppose 
that  he  seriously  misstates  the  facts.  The  scope  of  this  book  does 
not  permit  a  more  detailed  examination  of  the  evidence. 

4.  ^schines  states  further  that  when  at  a  later  time  Aristar- 
chus  was  forced  to  go  into  exile  on  account  of  a  peculiarly  shocking 
murder  of  which  he  was  accused,  Demosthenes,  himself  an  insti- 
gator of  the  crime,  managed  to  retain  three  talents  which  he  ought 
t3  have  given  to  Aristarchus;  and  Deinarchus  (in  Dem.,  §§  30, 
47)  repeats  the  story  with  little  variation.  Demosthenes  himself 
{in  Meid.,  §§  104-7,  117-20)  stated  that  the  whole  story  was  a 
malicious  slander,  invented  and  spread  by  Meidias;  and  this  is 
as  likely  as  any  other  to  be  the  true  version  of  the  matter.  No 
ancient  orator  is  to  be  trusted  when  he  speaks  of  the  private  life 
of  his  opponents,  and  if  there  was  among  the  clients  or  pupils 
of  Demosthenes  a  rich  young  man  who  afterwards  became 
notorious,  it  would  be  quite  in  accordance  with  the  character  of 
Meidias  and  the  practice  of  Athenian  orators  to  add  the  details 
necessary  to  involve  Demosthenes  in  the  same  infamy.  The 
details  themselves  are  very  suspicious.  According  to  .<5)schines 
(de  F.  L.,  §  148)  the  murdered  man,  Nicodemus,  had  accused 


Youth  and  Training  of  Demosthenes     37 

Demosthenes  of  desertion.  The  occasion  referred  to  was  probably 
the  spring  of  348,  when  Demosthenes  returned  from  service  in 
Euboea  to  perform  his  duty  as  choregus  at  the  Dionysia.  But 
from  the  Speech  against  Meidias,  §  103,  it  appears  that  the  charge 
was  made,  not  by  Nicodemus,  but  by  Euctemon,  at  the  instiga- 
tion of  Meidias;  and  if  so,  the  reason  for  Demosthenes'  alleged 
animosity  against  Nicodemus  vanishes.  In  §  116  Demosthenes 
accuses  Meidias  of  charging  Aristarchus  falsely  with  the 
murder. 

5.  We  do  not  know  whether  the  profession  of  speech -writer 
was  really  lucrative.  The  only  indication  of  the  fees  charged 
is  found  in  a  fragment  of  the  defence  of  Antiphon  (edited  from  a 
papyrus  by  M.  Jules  Nicole  in  1907)  in  41 1  B.C.,  in  which  Antiphon 
says,  "My  accusers  assert  that  I  wrote  court-speeches  for  others, 
and  got  my  twenty  per  cent,  for  it."  But  as  Antiphon  was 
suspected  of  avarice,  we  cannot  be  sure  that  all  speech-writers 
demanded  twenty  per  cent,  of  the  sum  at  issue, — still  less  that  the 
rate  was  the  same  in  the  time  of  Demosthenes,  half  a  century 
later. 

6.  There  can  really  be  little  doubt  that  the  extant  speeches 
of  Demosthenes  were  delivered  substantially  in  their  present 
form:  and  the  arguments  to  the  contrary  are  singularly  weak. 
It  is  of  course  clear  that  they  underwent  a  certain  amount  of 
revision  and  alteration,  especially  through  the  insertion  of  passages 
here  and  there  to  meet  the  objections  of  opposing  speakers,  and 
possibly  through  the  modification  of  some  phrases  in  the  light 
of  the  debate.  Perhaps  also  the  formal  proposals  of  resolutions 
may  have  been  omitted  when  the  speeches  were  published;  such 
purely  formal  sentences  would  have  little  interest  for  readers. 
But  they  may  never  have  stood  in  the  text  of  the  speech  at  all. 
In  all  probability  motions  were  handed  in  to  the  clerk  or  the 
president,  and  read  aloud  by  him.  The  objection,  which  has 
been  raised  against  holding  the  extant  speeches  to  have  been 
spoken  orations,  viz.,  that  they  contain  no  definite  motions,  is  to 
be  answered,  partly  by  these  considerations,  partly  by  pointing 
out,  first,  that  some  of  the  speeches  obviously  did  accompany 
definite  motions,  and  that  they  do  make  quite  definite  proposals, 
though  not  in  formal  shape;  secondly,  that  some  of  the  speeches 
may  well  be  replies  to  motions;  thirdly,  that  there  is  no  reason 
why  either  Demosthenes  or  any  other  speaker  should  necessarily 


38  Demosthenes 

have  moved  a  motion  in  every  speech.     Other  objections  that 
have  been  raised  are: 

(i)  That  the  speeches  range  over  too  wide  a  ground  to  have 
been  made  upon  definite  motions  in  debate.  But  we  do  not 
know  what  Hmits  were  imposed  upon  irrelevancy  in  Athens, 
and  the  alleged  irrelevancy  has  been  greatly  exaggerated;  for 
the  objectors  (particularly  Hahn)  have  actually  treated  as 
irrelevant  the  arguments  which  Demosthenes  bases  on  broad 
grounds  of  policy  and  public  morality.  It  is  true  that  the 
extant  debating  speeches  of  Andocides  and  Hegesippus  do  not 
make  much  use  of  such  arguments;  but  this  is  part  of  the  differ- 
ence between  them  and  Demosthenes,  and  not  a  necessary 
feature  of  debating  speeches. 

(2)  That  the  speeches  are  not  such  as  Plutarch's  description 
of   Demosthenes'   manner   would   lead   us   to   expect.     This 
however  is  a  great  exaggeration  of  the  truth.     It  is  true  that 
Plutarch  and  ^schines  quote  some  phrases  from  Demosthenes 
more  violent  than  any  but  a  few  which  are  found  in  the  extant 
orations;  but  there  are  close  approximations  to  them,  and  the 
fact  that  they  must  have  occurred  in  speeches  which  Demos- 
thenes either  spoke  ex  tempore,  or  else  did  not  think  worth 
publication,  does  not  prove  that  the  speeches  which  he  did 
think  worth  publication  were  never  spoken. 
The  utmost  that  can  be  said  is  that  in  one  or  two  cases — and 
particularly  in  that  of  the  Third    Philippic — there  were  two 
versions  of  the  speech  current,  possibly  owing  to  a  reissue,  with 
alterations,   by   Demosthenes  himself.      But  it  has  now  been 
shown  to  be  highly  probable  that  versions  of  some  of  Demosthenes' 
speeches  were  made  up  by  Anaximenes  for  his  history,  partly  by 
copying  passages  in  genuine  published    speeches  of  the  orator, 
partly  by  invention  or  by  alteration  of  genuine  passages.      To 
this  or  similar  causes  we  almost  certainly  owe  the  Speech  on  the 
Constitution  (at  the  time  of  the  Olynthian  crisis)  and  the  Reply 
to  Philip's  Letter, — possibly  also  Philip's  Letter  itself  and  the 
Fourth  Philippic;  and  it  is  possible  (though  not  likely)  that  one 
of  the  versions  of  the  Third  Philippic  may  have  arisen  in  the  same 
way,  or  may  have  been  influenced  by  such  spurious  rhetorical 
work.     For  the  rest,  it  is  hard  to  understand  how  an  unprejudiced 
reader  can  regard  the  speeches  as  they  stand  as  unfit  for  a  debate. 
Even  a  feeble  imagination  should  be  able  to  form  some  concep- 


Youth  and  Training  of  Demosthenes    39 

tion  of  their  tremendous  power,  when  spoken  with  the  unique 
deUvery  of  Demosthenes.  But  imagination  is  not  always  one 
of  the  gifts  of  the  scholar. 

7.  Such  pamphlets  were  the  pseudo-Xenophontic  Consti- 
tution oj  Athens  (425-4  B.C.);  Andocides'  Speech  vphs  rods 
h-alpovs  (shortly  after  415);  Antiphon's  irepl  t^s  f/xraffraaiui 
(in  411);  and  the  irepl  woXtreias  ascribed  to  Herodes,  but  prob- 
ably the  work  of  a  member  of  Theramenes'  circle  in  404.  (See 
Drerup's  edition,  p.  no  ff.) 

8.  A  story  is  told  by  a  Scholiast  on  Galen,  de  Nat.  Fac.  II, 
§  172,  that  Demosthenes  was  expelled  by  Plato  from  his  class, 
because  he  would  only  attend  to  the  form  and  not  to  the  argu- 
ment of  the  remarks  made;  but  that  he  found  his  way  in  by  the 
garden-gate,  and  listened  for  a  long  time  without  being  detected. 
Hence  arose  the  Greek  proverb,  "to  get  in  by  the  garden-gate." 
(See  Probst,  in  Neue  Jahrbiicher  xxxi,  p.  307.) 

9.  We  find  in  Antiphon's  Speech  against  the  Stepmother 
strong  assertions  of  the  supreme  value  of  evidence  given  by 
slaves  under  torture;  and  in  the  same  orator's  Speech  on  the 
Murder  of  Herodes  an  equally  strong  condemnation  of  this 
kind  of  evidence,  as  likely  to  be  simply  the  evidence  which  will 
enable  the  slave  to  escape  from  the  torture  most  quickly. 

10.  Whether  the  repetitions  in  Demosthenes  are  as  numerous 
as  was  supposed  by  Lord  Brougham  (in  his  Dissertation  on  the 
Eloquence  of  the  Ancients)  may  be  doubted.  The  question  really 
turns  on  the  view  taken  of  the  origin  of  the  Fourth  Philippic 
(see  below,  pp.  342 ,  356) .  He  accounts  for  them  by  supposing  that 
the  orator  "desires  to  gratify,  to  please,  as  well  as  to  persuade; 
and  that  they  are  come  to  enjoy  a  critical  repast,  as  well  as  to 
expatiate  and  discourse  their  State-affairs.  In  this  case,  the 
repetition  would  heighten  the  zest  at  each  time;  as  they  who  love 
music  or  take  pleasure  in  dramatic  representations  are  never  so 
much  gratified  with  the  first  enjoyment  of  any  fine  melody  or 
splendid  piece  of  acting  as  with  its  subsequent  exhibition." 
That  Athenian  audiences  appreciated  an  oration  as  a  work  of  art 
is  undoubted;  but  it  is  too  much  to  suppose  that  they  were  so 
strongly  affected  by  the  particular  passages  which  in  fact  we  find 
repeated  (at  considerable  intervals  of  time)  as  to  welcome  them 
in  the  manner  imagined  by  Lord  Brougham. 

11.  Dr.  Johnson  was  never  tired  of  denouncing  the  use  of 


40  Demosthenes 

' '  action ' '  in  oratory.  ' '  Action  can  have  no  effect  upon  reasonable 
minds.  It  may  augment  noise,  but  it  never  can  enforce  argu- 
ment. If  you  speak  to  a  dog,  you  use  action;  you  hold  up  your 
hand  thus,  because  he  is  a  brute ;  and  in  proportion  as  men  are 
reinoved  from  brutes,  action  will  have  the  less  influence  upon 
them."  Mrs.  Thrale:  "What  then,  Sir,  becomes  of  Demosthenes' 
saying,  'Action,  action,  action'?"  Johnson:  "Demosthenes, 
madam,  spoke  to  an  assembly  of  brutes — to  a  barbarous  people." 
(Boswell.) 

12.  The  theory  of  Blass  that  Demosthenes  composed  the 
speech  on  his  own  behalf  (after  he  had  served  as  trierarch  in 
360),  and  that  Libanius  is  wrong  in  saying  that  ApoUodorus  was 
the  speaker,  seems  to  rest  on  insufficient  groimds;  but  there  is 
no  real  reason  to  doubt  that  Demosthenes  did  write  the  speech. 


CHAPTER  II 

GREECE   FROM    404    TO    359 

THE  condition  of  the  Greek  world  at  the  time 
when  Demosthenes  began  to  take  an  interest 
in  pubHc  affairs  cannot  be  satisfactorily  explained 
without  a  brief  review  of  the  course  of  Greek 
history  since  the  downfall  of  Athens  at  the  end 
of  the  Peloponnesian  War.  To  this  the  present 
chapter  will  be  devoted.  ^ 

So  far  as  Athens  herself  was  concerned,  the 
calamity,  despite  the  apparent  completeness  of 
her  overthrow  at  the  moment,  proved  to  be  less 
great  than  might  have  been  expected.  The 
tyranny  of  the  Thirty,  who  established  themselves 
in  power  shortly  after  the  capitulation  of  the  city 
to  Sparta,  was  soon  over;  and  it  had  at  least  one 
beneficial  result,  that  it  brought  oligarchy  into 
lasting  disrepute.  The  democratic  constitution 
was  restored;  and  although  rival  orators  might 
accuse  one  another  of  employing  oligarchical 
methods    or    of    sympathising    with    oligarchical 

'  The  summary  of  events  here  given  only  attempts  to  deal  with 
matters  which  must  be  mentioned  in  order  to  explain  the  history 
of  the  succeeding  period. 

41 


42  Demosthenes 

ideas,  and  theorists  might  hanker  after  a  constitu- 
tion more  efficient  in  its  practical  working  than 
the  Athenian  democracy,  there  was,  nevertheless, 
— at  least  for  eighty  years  or  so — ^no  serious  desire 
for  constitutional  change,  nor  any  risk  of  successful 
revolution.  The  laws  of  Athens,  which  had  fallen 
into  some  confusion,  were  revised  and  brought 
into  harmony  with  one  another;  the  city's  trade 
revived  rapidly;  her  external  splendour  and  her 
position  as  the  chief  centre  both  of  Hellenic  com- 
merce and  of  Hellenic  culture  brought  strangers 
to  her,  as  of  old,  from  all  countries;  and,  apart  from 
some  temporary  relapses,  her  history  for  the  next 
thirty  years  was  a  history  of  the  gradual  recovery 
of  strength  and  prosperity. 

The  history  of  Sparta  during  the  same  period 
presents  a  different  picture.  After  the  capitula- 
tion of  Athens  in  404  she  was  for  the  moment  the 
strongest  State  in  Greece.  But  the  governors  and 
"Committees  of  Ten,"  which  she  established 
wherever  she  could,  ruled  tyrannically,  and  she 
came  to  be  more  and  more  detested.  She  failed, 
moreover,  to  fulfil  the  expectations  of  the  principal 
States  which  had  assisted  her  to  conquer  Athens, — 
Corinth,  Argos,  and  Thebes.  Corinth  wished  for 
the  possession  of  Corcyra,  and  for  undisputed 
supremacy  in  the  seas  west  of  the  Isthmus,  in 
order  that  her  trade  in  those  seas  might  be  secure. 
Argos,  though  not  really  capable  of  being  more  than 
a  second-rate  power,  at  least  expected  some  im- 
provement  in  her  position  in  the   Peloponnese. 


S   d 

is 

a:   o 


S  >• 

CQ    m 


I 


II 


Greece  from  404  to  J59  43 

Thebes  desired  to  be  acknowledged  as  the  par- 
amount state  in  Boeotia.  Sparta  did  not  gratify- 
any  of  these  desires,  and  all  three  States,  as  well 
as  Athens  herself,  were  ready  to  turn  upon  her 
when  the  opportunity  offered  itself  in  395. 

In  that  year  the  Persian  King,  Artaxerxes  II., 
with  whom — nominally  in  the  interest  of  the  Greek 
cities  in  Asia  Minor — the  Spartans  had  been  at 
war  since  about  400,  sent  a  Rhodian  named  Tim- 
ocrates  to  the  principal  Greek  States,  with  large 
sums  of  money,  to  induce  the  leading  statesmen 
to  cause  their  several  cities  to  declare  war  upon 
Sparta.  (Whether  any  statesman  at  Athens  took 
the  bribe  is  uncertain:  in  any  case  Athens  needed 
little  persuasion.)  The  Thebans  incited  their 
friends  the  Locrians  of  Opus  to  hostilities  against 
the  Phocians;  the  latter  applied  for  aid  to  Sparta; 
and  the  Spartans  under  Lysander  invaded  Boeotia. 
But  Lysander  was  killed  in  an  attack  upon  Hali- 
artus,  and  when  an  Athenian  force  joined  the 
Thebans,  his  successor  returned  to  Sparta.  In 
the  next  year  (394)  we  find  a  mixed  army  composed 
of  troops  from  Athens,  Thebes,  Corinth,  Argos, 
and  Euboea,  opposed  to  the  army  of  Sparta,  in 
which  were  contingents  from  the  smaller  Pelopon- 
nesian  states.  At  first  Sparta  was  successful  on 
land :  but  the  re-fortification  of  the  Peiraeus,  the  port 
of  Athens,  was  begun  in  July;  on  August  loth, 
the  Athenian  admiral  Conon,  at  the  head  of  a 
Persian  fleet,  won  a  great  naval  victory  over  the 
Spartans  off  Cnidos ;  and  in  393  he  rebuilt  the  walls 


44  Demosthenes 

of  Athens  (which  had  been  destroyed  in  404),  a 
large  body  of  Theban  workmen  assisting  in  the 
task.     About  the  same  time  (probably  in  conse- 
quence of  the  revival  of  imperialistic  ambitions 
in  Athens)  the  moderate  leaders  who  had  guided 
Athens  for  some  years  gave  way  to  Agyrrhius  and 
other  politicians  of  a  more  extreme  type.     The 
increase  of   the  payment  for  each  attendance  in 
the  Assembly  to  three  obols  made  it  better  worth 
while  for  the  masses  once  more  to  throw  their 
weight  into  politics,  and  as  their  interests  were  on 
the  whole  best  served  by  war,  *  a  markedly  militant 
tendency  began  to  show  itself.     The  demagogues 
unhappily  resorted,  not  infrequently,  to  prosecu- 
tions of  their  opponents  and  of  the  wealthier 
citizens  in  order  to  obtain  money  and  to  find 
supplies  for  the  army.     The  war  continued  with 
varying  results  for  some  years:  on  the  whole  the 
trend  of  events  was  adverse  to  the  domination  of 
Sparta,  and  she  lost  to  a  great  extent  her  hold  over 
the  islands  and  more  distant  colonies.     Brilliant 
generalship   was   displayed    on    both    sides:   the 
Athenian   Iphicrates  in   particular   distinguished 
himself  by  his  use  of  the  newly  devised  force 
of  peltastae — composed  largely  (though  not  en- 
tirely) of  mercenaries,  and  more  lightly  armed, 
though  equipped  with  longer  weapons,  than  the 
heavy  hoplite  forces  which  had  been  customarily 
employed — as  well  as  by  new  tactical  methods, 
which  at  first  were  extremely  successful.     On  one 
'  See  below,  p.  74. 


II 


Greece  from  404  to  J5p  45 

occasion  he  surprised  and  destroyed  a  whole  di- 
vision of  the  Spartan  army  near  Corinth. 

In  392,  the  Spartans,  hard-pressed  for  money, 
made  an  abortive  appeal  to  Persia  for  the  dictation 
and  enforcement  of  a  Peace.  A  similar  appeal 
conveyed  to  Susa  by  their  admiral  Antalcidas  in 
387  was  more  successful ;  and  the  position  of  Athens 
at  the  end  of  the  year  was  seriously  threatened 
both  on  the  Hellespont  and  at  home:  her  finances 
were  exhausted ;  and  she  had  really  no  alternative 
but  to  submit  to  the  Peace,  which  was  finally 
concluded  in  the  winter  of  387-6.  Any  desire  on 
the  part  of  Corinth  and  Thebes  to  resist  was 
quelled  by  the  mobilisation  of  the  Spartan  army; 
and  when  the  Great  King's  letter  was  read  to  the 
assembled  representatives  of  the  Greek  States, 
the  terms  of  the  Peace  were  generally  accepted. 
They  seemed,  indeed,  to  provide  a  temporary 
solution,  if  not  altogether  an  honourable  one, 
both  of  the  disputes  between  the  Greek  States 
themselves,  and  of  the  position  of  the  Greek  cities 
in  Asia  Minor  in  relation  to  the  King.  These 
cities,  with  the  islands  of  Clazomenae  and  Cyprus, 
were  now  to  become  part  of  the  King's  Empire. 
All  other  Greek  cities  were  to  be  independent, 
except  that  the  islands  of  Lemnos,  Imbros,  and 
Scyros  were  still  to  belong  to  Athens.  The  King 
declared  his  intention  of  making  war  upon  any 
State  which  would  not  accept  the  peace;  and 
although  Thebes  made  an  effort  to  obtain  the 
recognition  of  her  supremacy  in  Boeotia,  she  was 


46  Demosthenes 

obliged  to  give  way,  and  to  allow  the  towns  of 
Orchomenus,  Platseae,  and  Thespiag  to  be  estab- 
lished as  independent  centres — centres,  that  is, 
at  first  of  Spartan,  and  before  long  of  Athenian, 
influence  within  Boeotia. 

The  ratification  of  the  Peace  of  Antalcidas  is  an 
event  of  the  highest  importance  for  the  history  of 
the  next  half-century.  On  the  one  hand,  the 
Peace  provided  as  it  were  a  charter  of  liberty  to 
all  the  smaller  States;  and  it  could  always  be 
appealed  to  by  a  larger  State  desirous  of  putting 
a  rival  in  the  wrong  by  accusing  it  of  menacing 
the  autonomy  of  weaker  cities.^  But,  on  the 
other  hand,  the  final  abandonment  of  the  Asiatic 
Greeks  to  the  Persian  Empire,  and  the  acknowledg- 
ment of  the  right  of  the  King  of  Persia  to  dictate 
terms  to  the  Greek  States,  are  very  significant  of' 
the  difference  between  the  spirit  of  the  fourth 
century  and  that  of  the  fifth,  when  any  concession 
to  Persia  was  thought  of  as  treason  to  the  cause  of 
liberty.  From  this  time  onwards,  the  possibility 
of  Persian  interference  in  the  internal  affairs  of 
Greece  was  always  in  the  background  of  men's 
thoughts,  whether  they  thought  of  such  inter- 
ference as  a  means  of  securing  their  own  ends,  or 
as  a  danger  to  be  guarded  against;  and  the  influ- 
ence of  Persia  by  means  of  the  "Persian  gold,"  of 
which  we  hear  so  much,  became  from  time  to  time 
a  real  and  a  very  unfortunate  element  in  Greek 
political  life,  creating  suspicion  everjrwhere,  and 

*Comp.  Xen.,  77e«.,  VI,  Hi,  §7,  etc. 


m 


Greece  from  404  to  j^q  47 

affecting  for  the  worse  both  the  course  of  debate 
in  the  councils  of  Athens  and  the  administration 
of  justice  in  her  courts. 

The  Peace  of  Antalcidas,  however,  did  not  in 
fact  allay  hostilities  in  Greece  itself.  It  did  indeed 
put  an  end  for  the  time  to  direct  hostilities  between 
the  Greek  States  and  the  Persian  Empire:  for 
although  the  rebellious  subjects  of  the  Empire — 
particularly  Euagoras  in  Cyprus,  and  Tachos  and 
Nectanebos  in  Egypt — were  greatly  assisted  by 
Athenian  generals  and  soldiers,  these  were  not 
acting  in  the  name  of  Athens,  and  the  Athenians 
were  more  than  once  obliged  to  recall  their  generals 
at  the  request  of  the  King.  But  in  Greece  itself 
the  Peace  was  not  perfectly  satisfactory  to  any  one. 
Athens,  though  the  retention  of  the  three  islands 
was  a  concession  to  her  dignity  and  an  advantage 
of  the  first  importance  to  her  trade,  was  ashamed 
of  the  affair,  got  rid  of  the  statesmen  who  had 
influenced  her  in  the  matter,  and  for  many  years 
followed  the  lead  of  Callistratus  in  their  stead. 
The  antagonism  between  Thebes  and  Sparta  was 
not  to  be  lightly  healed,  and  the  desire  of  the 
Spartans  to  recover  their  supremacy  over  the 
Peloponnese  could  not  remain  at  rest  for  long. 
They  did  not  indeed  formally  break  the  Peace. 
Their  interferences  with  other  States  were,  it 
seems,  justified  technically  by  the  receipt  of  an 
invitation  from  the  oligarchic  party  in  the  State 
interfered  with,  and  by  the  pretence  that  that 
party  represented  the   government  of  the  State; 


48  Demosthenes 

so  that  nominally  they  merely  placed  their  troops 
and  governors  at  the  service  of  the  local  govern- 
ment. But  the  effect  was  the  same  as  if  they  had 
openly  broken  the  Peace.  In  385  or  384  they 
compelled  the  people  of  Mantineia  (the  largest 
town  in  Arcadia,  and  generally  a  centre  of  resist- 
ance to  Sparta)  to  destroy  their  walls  and  to  live 
in  four  or  five  villages,  each  under  a  Spartan  gover- 
nor, instead  of  in  a  town  in  which  they  could  for- 
tify themselves,  and  could  also  listen  more  easily 
to  the  harangues  of  the  advocates  of  liberty.  In 
379  they  conquered  Phleius  after  a  siege  of  twenty 
months,  and  their  influence  throughout  Greece 
appears  for  a  time  to  have  recovered  rapidly.  In 
the  North  the  town  of  Olynthus,  the  head  of  the 
Chalcidic  League,  had  taken  advantage  of  the 
weakness  of  Macedonia  to  extend  its  power  over 
the  Chalcidic  peninsula  and  (in  spite  of  a  nominal 
alliance  with  the  Macedonian  King,  Amyntas  III.) 
even  over  part  of  Macedonia  itself.  Amyntas 
joined  two  of  the  threatened  Chalcidic  cities, 
Acanthus  and  ApoUonia,  in  an  appeal  to  Sparta. 
The  Spartans  responded  by  sending  an  expedition 
against  Olynthus,  which,  after  a  long  struggle,  was 
in  379  forced  to  become  a  member  of  the  Spartan 
alliance.  The  position  of  Amyntas  was,  of  course, 
greatly  strengthened ;  but  at  the  time  no  one  could 
foresee  that  the  power  of  the  Macedonian  mon- 
archy would  grow  so  great  as  to  make  it  very  regret- 
table that  Olynthus  and  the  Chalcidic  League  had 
not  been  suffered  to  remain  as  a  bulwark  against  it. 


Greece  from  404  to  jjQ  49 

In  383  or  382,  a  Spartan  force  under  Phoebidas, 
on  its  way  to  Olynthus,  contrived  to  seize  the 
Cadmeia,  the  acropolis  of  Thebes.  (The  Thebans 
were  at  the  time  led  by  democratic  statesmen, 
hostile  to  Sparta,  and  had  refused  to  join  in  the 
campaign  against  Olynthus;  while  Phoebidas  was 
aided  by  oligarchical  conspirators  within  the 
walls.)  The  Spartans  remained  in  possession 
until  379,  when  their  garrison  was  expelled  by  the 
democrats,  who  had  been  living  in  exile  in  Athens, 
and  who  now  formed  a  successful  plot  for  the 
recovery  of  their  native  city.  The  attitude  of 
Athens  was  peculiar.  Strongly  opposed  as  she 
had  been  to  the  policy  of  Sparta,  the  Spartan 
occupation  of  Thebes  had  been  an  advantage  to 
her,  since  she  had  been  enabled  thereby  to  recover 
from  Thebes  the  frontier  town  of  Oropus,  the 
possession  of  which  was  of  great  consequence ;  and 
the  Spartans  had  re-established  Plataese,  between 
which  town  and  herself  there  had  always  been 
friendship :  she  was  also  intimidated  by  the  proxim- 
ity of  the  Spartan  army,  and  in  consequence  was  not 
prepared  to  go  to  war;  she  even  sentenced  to  death 
the  generals  who  of  their  own  accord  had  helped 
the  Theban  exiles;  and  she  would  probably  have 
come  to  an  arrangement  with  Sparta  immediately, 
had  not  the  Spartan  admiral  Sphodrias  invaded 
Attica,  and  done  some  damage  before  he  retreated. 

The  action  of  Sphodrias  had  not  been  ordered 
by  the  Spartans,  but  they  refused  to  punish  him 
on  his  return.     Instead,  therefore,  of  making  peace 


50  Demosthenes 

with  Sparta,  the  Athenians  organised  a  new  league, 
with  the  avowed  object  of  mutual  protection 
against  the  Spartans  and  their  infringements  of 
the  Peace  of  Antalcidas ;  any  States  which  were  not 
subject  to  the  Persian  King  were  invited  to  join, 
and  the  terms  of  the  Peace  of  Antalcidas  gave  some 
assurance  to  the  smaller  cities  that  they  would 
not  be  oppressed,  and  made  them  the  more  ready 
to  become  members  of  the  league. 

The  chief  burden  of  the  organisation  of  this 
Athenian  confederacy  (sometimes  called  the  Second 
Delian  League  from  its  resemblance  to  the  great 
alliance  of  the  fifth  centiuy)  was  undertaken  by 
Callistratus  and  the  two  brilliant  admirals,  Cha- 
brias  and  Timotheus — the  latter  also  a  pupil  of 
Isocrates,  whose  "Panegyric  Oration"  in  380  had 
probably  done  something  to  prepare  the  way  for 
the  formation  of  the  confederacy.  The  arrange- 
ments were  completed  in  378  or  377.  The  synod 
of  the  allies  was  to  be  independent  of  the  Athenian 
Assembly,  and  the  consent  of  both  was  to  be 
required  to  all  active  measures,  and  particularly 
to  the  declaration  of  war  and  peace.  The  contri- 
butions of  the  allies  were  not  (as  were  those  of  the 
members  of  the  former  Delian  League)  to  be  re- 
garded or  designated  as  tribute  paid  to  Athens,* 
and  Athenians  were  not  to  hold  property  in  any  of 
the  allied  States.  Some  few  of  the  allies  appear 
to  have  contributed  ships,  but  all  probably  con- 
tributed money;  and  the  execution  of  the  plan  of 

*  See  Note  i  at  the  end  of  the  Chapter. 


Greece  from  404  to  j$g  51 

campaign  was  practically  left  to  the  Athenians. 
The  principal  cities  which  now,  or  soon  afterwards, 
became  members  of  the  confederacy  were  Rhodes 
and  Chios;  Mytilene  and  Methymna  in  Lesbos; 
Byzantium,  the  great  commercial  city  on  the  Bos- 
porus; Chalcis,  Eretria,  and  other  towns  in  Euboea; 
the  important  island  of  Corcyra  in  the  west,  and  the 
communities  of  Cephallenia,  Zacynthus,  and  Acar- 
nania,  with  many  others  of  less  note.  The  adhesion 
of  Thebes  was  also  obtained — perhaps  through  the 
personal  influence  of  the  Athenian  envoy  Thrasy- 
bulus — but  could  not  be  counted  upon  for  long. 

The  active  policy  pursued  by  Callistratus  and 
his  associates  necessitated  financial  reforms  in 
Athens  itself.  In  the  same  year  in  which  the 
League  was  formed,  in  the  archonship  of  Nausini- 
cus,  378-7  B.C.,  the  war-tax  (a  tax  upon  property, 
which  in  theory  was  only  levied  in  an  emergency) 
was  put  upon  a  new  basis.  The  property  liable  to 
taxation  was  valued,  and  divided  into  one  hundred 
parts,  and  those  who  were  liable  to  the  tax  were 
distributed  into  Boards  or  "Symmories."  Every 
citizen  except  those  whose  property  was  very 
small — the  limit  is  uncertain,  but  was  possibly 
twenty-five  minas — was  liable  to  the  tax.  By  an 
arrangement  which  was  made  shortly  after- 
wards, if  not  at  once,  the  three  hundred  richest 
men  in  Athens  had  to  advance  the  amount  due,* 

'  They  were  probably  distributed  equally  over  the  Symmories, 
three  in  each,  of  whom  one  was  the  leader  of  the  Symmory. 
See  Note  2. 


I 


52  Demosthenes 

and  were  left  to  recover  it  as  they  could  from  their 
poorer  brethren.  There  can  be  no  doubt  that, 
though  the  system  was  liable  to  abuse,  the  money 
was  forthcoming  under  such  an  arrangement  more 
promptly  than  it  wotild  have  been  if  there  had 
been  a  less  complete  organisation,  and  if  State- 
officials  had  been  obliged  to  apply  directly  to  a 
very  large  number  of  individual  citizens  for 
payment. 

The  power  of  the  new  confederacy  and  the 
efficiency  of  the  new  method  of  taxation  were  soon 
proved.  In  376  Chabrias  gained  a  great  victory 
over  the  Spartans  off  Naxos,  and  in  375  he  won 
over  a  number  of  towns  on  the  Thracian  coast  to 
the  alliance,  while  Timotheus  operated  success- 
fully against  Sparta  around  Corcyra  and  in  the 
seas  west  of  the  Isthmus  of  Corinth.  ^  In  the  same 
year,  the  Olynthian  league  was  refounded — so 
little  fear  of  Sparta  remained  in  that  region.  But 
the  cost  of  the  war  was  heavy.  Timotheus  in 
particular  was  greatly  embarrassed  by  want  of 
funds,  and  the  Thebans  gave  little  help.  In  con- 
sequence of  this,  a  Peace  was  made  with  Sparta 
in  374,  by  which  the  supremacy  of  Sparta  on  land 
was  acknowledged  by  Athens,  and  that  of  Athens 
at  sea  by  Sparta,  and  the  terms  of  the  Peace  of 
Antalcidas  were  re-affirmed.  But  this  Peace  was 
immediately  broken  by  acts  of  war  on  the  part  of 
Timotheus;  and  in  order  to  get  funds  for  the 
prosecution    of   the   campaign    in    the   West,    he 

'  It  was  in  these  operations  that  Aphobus  took  part  as  trierarch. 


Greece  from  404  to  35Q  53 

attempted  to  raise  fresh  allies  in  Thrace  and  the 
islands.  He  seems  also  to  have  obtained  the 
support,  for  a  short  time,  of  Jason  of  Pheras, 
the  most  powerful  ruler  in  Thessaly.  But  both 
Timotheus  and  Iphicrates,  his  successor  in  the 
command,  found  their  supplies  insufficient;  the 
Thebans  were  becoming  more  or  less  plainly- 
hostile  (for  the  success  of  the  Athenians  could  not 
but  be  regarded  as  a  danger  to  Thebes)  and  in  373 
they  had  destroyed  Plataeae.  Accordingly  peace 
was  again  made  in  371.  In  a  congress  at  Sparta, 
the  autonomy  of  all  the  Greek  cities  was  once  more 
publicly  asserted;  but  at  the  same  time  the  right 
of  Athens  both  to  Amphipolis'  and  to  the  towns 
in  the  Thracian  Chersonese  was  conceded.  The 
Persian  King  and  Amyntas,  King  of  Macedonia, 
were  both  represented  at  the  congress,  and  their 
admission  of  the  title  of  Athens  to  the  places  in 
question  was  of  some  significance.  But  the 
Thebans  felt  themselves  strong  enough  to  refuse 
to  join  in  the  Peace,  unless  they  were  recognised 
as  having  authority  over  all  the  Boeotians;  and 
since  Sparta  declined  to  acknowledge  this,  the 
Thebans  were  excluded  from  the  treaty,  and 
Cleombrotus,  with  a  Spartan  army  which  had 
gone  to  assist   the   Phocians  in   their  hostilities 

'  AmphipoHs  had  been  founded  by  the  Athenians  in  437.  The 
Spartans  had  captured  it  in  424,  and  in  spite  of  various  attempts, 
Athens  had  never  recovered  it.  It  was  now  an  important  city 
and  virtually  independent  both  of  the  great  Greek  cities  and  of 
Macedonia;  but  the  Athenians  claimed  to  have  a  right  to  it. 


54  Demosthenes 

against  Thebes,  was  instructed  to  attack  them. 
He  was  utterly  defeated  in  the  battle  of  Leuctra, 
and  the  supremacy  of  Thebes  among  the  Greek 
States  was  placed  beyond  doubt ;  though  a  second 
congress  of  envoys  from  Peloponnesian  and  other 
States,  which  assembled  at  Athens  before  the  end 
of  the  year,  once  more  confirmed  the  provisions 
of  the  Peace  of  Antalcidas. 

The  failure  of  the  Spartans  at  Leuctra  was  fol- 
lowed by  the  loss  of  much  of  their  influence  in  the 
Peloponnese.  In  one  town  after  another,  demo- 
cratic and  anti-Spartan  revolutions  took  place. 
The  Arcadian  peoples  asserted  their  independence 
without  delay.  The  walls  of  Mantineia  were 
rebuilt  in  370;  in  Tegea  the  supporters  of  Sparta 
were  overthrown;  and  the  new  town  of  Megalo- 
polis was  founded  to  be  the  centre  of  a  number  of 
Arcadian  tribes  and  the  meeting-place  of  their 
representative  assembly,  "The  Ten  Thousand." 
In  369,  the  Theban  forces  under  Epameinondas — 
and  among  them  troops  sent  by  the  Euboeans  and 
Acamanians,  who  must  have  deserted  the  Athen- 
ian alliance  for  the  Theban — appeared  in  the 
Peloponnese  to  support  the  Arcadians,  who,  having 
been  properly  refused  aid  by  Athens  (now  the 
ally  of  Sparta),  had  appealed  to  Thebes.  The 
Theban  army  invaded  the  territory  of  Sparta,  and 
established  Messene  as  the  capital  of  Messenia, 
at  last  independent  after  its  long  subjection  to 
Spartan  domination. 

There  is  little  to  be  gained  by  following  in  detail 


I 


Greece  from  404  to  J5p  55 

the  kaleidoscopic  movements  of  the  various  States 
in  the  Peloponnese  during  the  next  few  years. 
But  it  is  significant  that  two  attempts  were  made 
to  estabHsh  a  general  peace  by  means  of  Persian 
intervention.  In  368-7  a  congress  was  summoned 
to  meet  at  Delphi  by  Philiscus,  who  had  been  sent 
by  Ariobarzanes,  one  of  the  King's  Asiatic  satraps. 
It  proved  a  failure;  for  Thebes  and  Sparta  could 
not  agree  with  regard  to  the  independence  of 
Messenia,  and  the  attempt  of  Philiscus  to  enforce 
his  terms  by  collecting  an  army  came  to  nothing. 
In  the  following  year,  however,  representatives 
of  several  of  the  great  Greek  powers  waited  upon 
King  Artaxerxes  himself  at  his  court  in  Susa, — 
Pelopidas  from  Thebes,  Archidamus  from  El  is, 
Antiochus  from  Arcadia,  Leon  and  Timagoras 
from  Athens.  Pelopidas  took  the  lead.  The 
terms  he  proposed  stipulated  for  the  independence 
of  Messenia  and  of  Amphipolis,  and  the  with- 
drawal of  the  Athenian  war-ships  from  the  sea. 
To  this  Leon  refused  to  listen;  and  on  his  return 
home  he  prosecuted  his  more  compliant  colleague 
Timagoras,  who  was  executed  as  a  traitor.^  The 
representatives  of  the  Greek  States,  who  assembled 
at  Thebes,  also  refused  to  accept  the  proposals 
made  in  the  name  of  the  King ;  and  both  the  pres- 
tige of  Persia  and  the  position  of  Thebes  in  the 
Greek  world  were  distinctly  weakened. 

In  the  year  in  which  this  congress  met  (366)  the 

'  Comp.  Dem.,  de  F.  L.,  §§  31,  137,  191.     Demosthenes  states 
that  Timagoras  received  a  large  bribe  from  the  King. 


56  Demosthenes 

Arcadians  made  peace  with  Athens.  But  in  the 
course  of  the  struggle  with  Elis,  in  which  they  were 
engaged  from  365  onwards,  dissensions  arose 
among  themselves  as  to  the  use  to  be  made  of  the 
treasures  of  Olympia,  captured  from  the  Eleans; 
and  the  hostilities  which  resulted  from  these  dis- 
sensions, and  from  the  interferences  of  Thebes 
and  Sparta,  led  in  the  end  to  the  battle  of  Man- 
tineia  in  362;  in  which  there  fought  on  the  one 
side  the  Theban  army  under  Epameinondas 
(including  Boeotian,  Euboean,  and  Thessalian 
troops),  the  Arcadians  of  Tegea  and  of  Southern 
Arcadia  generally,  the  Messenians  and  the  Ar- 
gives;  and  on  the  other,  the  Spartans,  the  Arcadi- 
ans of  Mantineia  and  Northern  Arcadia,  the 
Eleans  and  Achaeans,  and  an  Athenian  contingent. 
The  Theban  side  was  victorious,  but  Epameinon- 
das was  killed,  and  his  loss  more  than  neutralised 
the  advantage  of  the  victory. 

The  policy  of  Athens  had  been,  since  the  battle 
of  Leuctra,  antagonistic  to  Thebes  and  friendly 
to  Sparta,  and  an  incident  of  the  year  366  had 
increased  the  hostile  feeling  of  the  Athenians 
towards  Thebes.  Themison,  tyrant  of  Eretria, 
had  seized  Oropus,  ^  and  had  put  it  into  the  hands 
of  Thebes,  nominally  until  a  proper  decision  should 
be  given  in  regard  to  the  claim  of  Athens  to  the 
town.  Besides  this,  the  Thebans  had  further 
alienated  the  Athenians,  by  the  destruction,  in  the 
course   of   the   last    few   years,    of   Orchomenus, 

'  See  above,  p.  49. 


Greece  from  404  to  3S9  57 

Thespiae,  and  Plataeae.^  But  the  Athenians  were 
tired  of  the  unprofitable  war,  and  not  long  after 
the  battle  of  Mantineia  a  general  Peace  was  made, 
Sparta  alone  standing  out.  Oropus  remained  in 
the  possession  of  Thebes,  ^ 

Before  the  battle  of  Mantineia,  the  Thebans 
had  been  very  active  in  North  Greece,  as  well  as 
in  the  Peloponnese.  In  the  year  370,  Alexander, 
the  son  of  Jason  of  Pherae,  succeeded  to  the  posi- 
tion of  overlordship  over  the  whole  of  Thessaly, 
which  his  father  had  held  for  about  five  years. 
But  Alexander  was  exposed  from  the  first  to  hostile 
invasions  from  Thebes,  led  by  Pelopidas  and 
Epameinondas.  The  invaders,  though  they  were 
not  uniformly  successful,  proved  themselves  to  be 
on  the  whole  the  stronger  power,  and  in  363 
Pelopidas  won  a  great  victory  at  Cynoscephalae, 
though  he  lost  his  own  life.  In  one  of  his  earlier 
expeditions  northwards  (in  368)  Pelopidas  had 
forced  the  Macedonians  into  alliance  with  Thebes, 
and  among  the  hostages  whom  he  brought  to 
Thebes  was  Philip,  the  future  conqueror  of  Greece, 
then  not  much  more  than  a  boy.  But  after  the 
death  of  Pelopidas  and  Epameinondas  the  Thebans 
do  not  appear  to  have  interfered  in  Thessaly,  or 
to  have  established  any  effective  control  over 
Alexander. 

During  the  greater  part  of  the  period  of  Cal- 
listratus'  ascendancy  in  Athens,  the  Athenians  had 

'  See  above,  p.  53. 

'  Diod.,  XV,  Ixxxix.;  Plut.,  Ages.,  xxxv. 


58  Demosthenes 

remained  on  good  terms  with  the  King  of  Persia; 
but  in  time  their  attitude  had  become  somewhat 
less  guarded.  The  condemnation  of  Timagoras 
and  the  refusal  of  the  King's  proposals  in  366 
marked  a  definite  change  of  policy.  In  the  same 
year,  or  soon  afterwards,  Ariobarzanes,  satrap  of 
the  Hellespont,  rose  in  revolt  against  the  King. 
At  first  Ariobarzanes  appeared  only  to  be  at  war 
with  rival  satraps,  and  the  Athenians  sent  Timo- 
theus  to  his  assistance.  As  soon  as  his  revolt 
against  the  King  himself  was  declared,  Timotheus 
was  precluded  by  the  terms  of  the  Peace  of  Antal- 
cidas  from  assisting  him  further.  But  Timotheus 
consoled  himself  by  besieging  and  taking  Samos, 
which  was  being  held,  in  violation  of  the  Peace, 
by  another  satrap,  Cyprothemis.  ^  Shortly  after- 
wards there  seems  to  have  been  a  general  revolt 
of  the  subordinate  princes  in  Asia  Minor  and 
Egypt  against  Artaxerxes  II.,  and  not  only 
Chabrias  of  Athens,  but  also  Agesilaus  of  Sparta 
went  to  the  aid  of  the  rebellious  Egyptians. 
Chabrias  only  returned  to  Athens  in  359.  By  that 
time  Artaxerxes  II.  had  died,  and  had  been 
succeeded  by  Artaxerxes  Ochus,  who  proceeded 
to  take  all  possible  measures  for  the  re-establish- 
ment of  his  authority  throughout  his  dominions. 

After  the  conquest  (nominally  the  liberation) 
of  Samos,  Timotheus  in  365  transferred  his  activ- 
ities to  the  Thracian  Chersonese,  where  the  main- 
tenance of  Athenian  influence  was  of  the  greatest 

^  Dem.,  pro.  Rhod.  lib.   §  9. 


Greece  from  404  to  3 $9  59 

importance,  since  the  greater  part  of  the  corn-supply 
of  Athens,  coming  as  it  did  from  the  shores  of  the 
Bosporus  and  the  Euxine,  had  to  pass  through  the 
Hellespont.  Athenian  settlers  were  sent  both  to 
Samos  and  to  the  Chersonese ;  and  Timotheus  then 
engaged  in  hostilities  with  Cotys,  who  had  suc- 
ceeded to  the  kingdom  of  the  Odrysian  Thracians 
in  383.  His  predecessor  Ebryzelmis  had  been  on 
good  terms  with  Athens,  ^  and  before  him  Medocus 
and  Seuthes,  who  had  divided  the  kingdom  between 
them,  had  been  brought  into  friendship  with 
Athens  by  the  diplomacy  of  Thrasybulus.  Cotys, 
on  the  other  hand,  showed  himself  more  anxious 
to  maintain  and  extend  his  own  power,  than  to 
assist  Athens  to  control  the  Chersonese;  and  he 
gave  Timotheus  and  other  Athenian  generals 
much  trouble.  Timotheus  also  attempted  (in 
succession  to  Iphicrates,  whose  efforts  had  failed) 
to  take  possession  of  Amphipolis,  the  right  of 
Athens  to  which  had  been  conceded  in  the  Peace 
of  371,  both  by  Amyntas  and  by  the  Persian  King. 
But  though  Poteidaea  and  Torone  (two  important 
towns  on  the  Chalcidic  peninsula)  and,  shortly 
afterwards,  Pydna  and  Methone  were  brought 
within  the  Athenian  alliance,  Timotheus  failed 
to  recover  Amphipolis.  He  also  made  no  headway 
against  Cotys;  nor  did  better  success  attend  any 
of  the  generals  who  were  sent  to  the  Hellespont 

'  See  Foucart,  Les  Atheniens  dans  la  Chersonese  de  Thrace, 
p.  6,  where  a  decree  of  the  Athenians  in  his  honour,  of  the  year 
386-5,  is  quoted. 


6o  Demosthenes 

in  362  and  361 ,  only  to  be  cashiered  and  prosecuted 
on  their  return.'  It  was  even  worse  that  Alexan- 
der of  Pheras  (now  acting  in  the  interests  of  Thebes) 
had  built  a  fleet,  occupied  the  island  of  Peparethus, 
defeated  the  Athenian  admiral  Leosthenes,  and 
made  a  profitable  raid  upon  the  Peiraeus  itself. 
Moreover  Epameinondas  had  (in  364-3)  made  a 
cruise  in  the  northern  waters  with  a  Theban  fleet, 
and  as  the  result  we  find  the  Byzantines,  with 
the  peoples  of  Cyzicus  and  Chalcedon,  interfering 
in  the  following  year  with  the  Athenian  corn- 
ships. 

The  policy  of  Callistratus,  who  had  up  till 
now  continued  to  direct  the  Athenian  Assembly, 
seemed  to  have  failed;  he  was  accused  in  361  of 
not  having  given  the  People  the  best  advice,  and 
went  into  exile;  his  ill-advised  attempt  to  return 
to  Athens  shortly  afterwards  led  to  his  execution. 
For  the  next  few  years  the  most  influential  states- 
man in  Athens  was  Aristophon,  a  man  of  advanced 
years,  who  had  been  powerful  early  in  the  centiiry, 
but  whose  known  friendly  inclinations  towards 
Thebes  had  kept  him  out  of  popularity  for  a  long 
period.  The  Peace  of  362,  which  has  already  been 
mentioned,  was  probably  due  to  his  influence,  and 
was  made  none  too  soon. 

At  first,  though  Athens  was  now  free  from  direct 

■  The  events  of  these  years,  and  especially  the  proceedings 
of  the  Athenian  admirals  and  navy,  are  strikingly  illustrated  in 
the  (pseudo- Demosthenic)  Speech  against  Polycles,  written  by 
an  unknown  orator  for  Apollodorus. 


Greece  from  404  to  35Q  61 

hostilities  on  the  part  of  Thebes,  there  was  little 
improvement  in  the  conduct  of  military  affairs 
in  the  North.  Timotheus  was  again  defeated  by 
the  AmphipoHtans  in  360-59.  In  the  same  year, 
Cephisodotus  was  sent  to  the  Hellespont;  but  he 
had  more  than  his  match  in  Charidemus,  a  captain 
of  mercenaries,  who  was  in  the  service  of  Cotys, 
and,  after  the  assassination  of  Cotys  in  the  next 
year,  was  practically  the  guardian  and  first  min- 
ister, as  well  as  the  general,  of  Cotys'  young  son, 
Cersobleptes. 

The  previous  relations  of  Charidemus  with 
Athens  had  been  chequered.  He  had  served  for 
three  years  under  Iphicrates;  and  the  latter,  when 
he  had  taken  hostages  from  Amphipolis,  had  en- 
trusted them  to  Charidemus,  intending  to  send 
them  to  Athens;  but  when  in  364  Timotheus 
succeeded  Iphicrates  in  the  command,  Charidemus 
gave  back  the  hostages  to  the  AmphipoHtans, 
thus  removing  the  strongest  inducement  to  them 
to  surrender  the  town,  and  himself  went  off  to 
Cotys.  Soon  afterwards  he  agreed  to  hire  his 
services  to  Olynthus,  which  at  this  moment  con- 
trolled Amphipolis;  but  some  Athenian  ships 
captured  him  on  his  way  thither;  he  joined  the 
Athenian  forces  instead,  and  was  rewarded  with 
the  citizenship  of  Athens  and  other  compliments. 
He  then  crossed  to  Asia  Minor,  and  joined  in  the 
disputes  of  the  satraps  Artabazus  and  Autophra- 
dates.  Professing  to  help  the  former,  he  actually 
took  from  him  (or  from  his  relatives  Memnon  and 


62  Demosthenes 

Mentor)  the  towns  of  Scepsis,  Cebren,  and  Ilitim; 
but  he  was  hard-pressed  by  Artabazus  and  cut  off 
from  supplies,  and  in  the  hope  of  obtaining  help 
from  Athens  he  wrote  to  the  newly  appointed 
Athenian  admiral,  Cephisodotus,  before  the  latter 
had  set  sail  from  Athens,  offering  to  put  the 
Chersonese  in  his  hands.  But  for  some  unknown 
reason,  Memnon  and  Mentor  relented  towards 
him,  and  persuaded  Artabazus  to  let  him  go 
unmolested.  He  joined  Cotys  at  Sestos  (in  360), 
and  instead  of  fulfilling  his  promise  to  Cephiso- 
dotus, laid  siege  to  the  Athenian  towns  of  Crithote 
and  Elasus  in  the  Chersonese,  openly  opposed 
Cephisodotus  for  several  months,  and  forced  him 
to  make  a  discreditable  treaty,  for  which  Cephi- 
sodotus was  cashiered  on  his  return  home  and 
fined  five  talents,  only  escaping  condemnation  to 
death  by  three  votes.  Demosthenes  served  in 
this  campaign  as  trierarch^;  Cephisodotus  sailed 
in  his  ship,  and  (according  to  a  statement  made  by 
^schines)^  Demosthenes  himself  spoke  against 
Cephisodotus — whether  as  prosecutor  or  as  witness 
does  not  appear — on  his  return  home. 

In  the  next  year  (359)  events  took  a  turn  more 
favourable  to  Athens.     Miltocythes,  a  Thracian 

^  He  was  probably  co-trierarch  for  the  year  with  Philippides 
of  Paeania  (C.  /.  A.,  ii.,  795  f.). 

'  In  Ctes.,  §  52.  Demosthenes  {in  Aristocr.,  §  168)  speaks  of 
the  severe  punishment  inflicted  on  Cephisodotus,  but  makes 
no  reference  to  any  action  of  his  own  in  the  matter.  (The  ex- 
pression which  he  uses  does  not,  as  some  suppose,  imply  that  he 
thought  the  sentence  unduly  harsh.) 


Greece  from  404  to  35Q  63 

prince  who  had  risen  against  Cotys  two  years 
before  and  had  received  promises  of  support  from 
Athens,  fell  into  the  hands  of  Charidemus.  He 
handed  him  over  to  the  people  of  Cardia,  who  were 
hostile  to  Athens,  and  they  put  Miltocythes  and 
his  son  to  death.  This  cruel  deed  was  followed  by 
a  general  outburst  of  indignation  in  that  part  of 
Thrace  against  Charidemus  and  Cersobleptes 
(the  successor  of  Cotys) ;  and  they  were  forced  to 
consent  to  a  partition  of  the  Thracian  kingdom 
between  Cersobleptes,  Berisadesv  and  Amadocus; 
the  two  latter  being  claimants  to  the  kingdom  who 
had  entered  into  friendship  with  Athens,  doubtless 
for  their  own  purposes,  but  none  the  less  honestly, 
since  they  stipulated  in  the  treaty  of  partition  for 
the  restoration  of  the  Chersonese  to  Athens. 
Satisfied  with  this,  the  Athenians  took  no  proper 
steps  to  fiilfil  their  own  obligations;  they  des- 
patched no  funds  to  Athenodorus,  the  commander 
of  Berisades'  army,  but  merely  sent  Chabrias  with 
one  ship ;  so  that  Cersobleptes.  was  able  to  disown 
the  treaty,  and  to  make  an  arrangement  favourable 
to  himself  with  Chabrias.  This  arrangement  the 
Athenians  repudiated,  but  it  was  not  until  358  or 
357  that  Chares,  who  had  taken  command  of  the 
Athenian  forces,  could  oblige  him  to  make  a  treaty 
more  in  accordance  with  the  original  settlement. 
Even  now,  Cardia,  which  commanded  the  entry 
to  the  Chersonese  from  the  Thracian  side,  was 
explicitly  excluded  from  the  list  of  places  handed 
over  to  Athens.     With  the  sequel  to  these  pro- 


64  Demosthenes 

ceedings  in  Thrace  we  shall  be  concerned  in  a 
later  chapter.  ^ 

We  have  now  reviewed  the  course  of  events  down 
to  the  year  359,  and  in  some  cases  for  a  year  or 
two  beyond.  It  remains  to  summarise  in  general 
terms  the  position  of  the  leading  States  in  Greece 
at  the  point  which  we  have  now  reached. 

Sparta,  though  still  one  of  the  three  strongest 
powers,  was  now  the  least  important  of  the  three. 
The  attainment  of  independence  by  the  Mes- 
senians  and  Arcadians,  with  their  newly-established 
centres  at  Messene  and  Megalopolis,  left  her  with 
reduced  territory  and  resources,  though  she  was 
ready  to  make  an  effort,  if  opportunity  arose,  to 
recover  lost  ground,  especially  against  the  Arca- 
dians. The  Arcadians  themselves  were  still  en- 
gaged in  hostilities  with  the  people  of  Elis,  and 
the  possession  of  the  district  occupied  by  the 
Triphylians  was  in  particular  a  matter  of  conten- 
tion between  the  two  peoples.  The  Arcadians 
— at  least  those  whose  meeting-place  was  Megal- 
opolis— relied  on  the  support  of  Thebes;  and  after 
the  battle  of  Mantineia,  a  Theban  force  under 
Pammenes  had  been  sent  to  help  them  to  maintain 
their  independence;  but  it  appears  probable  (in 
the  light  of  subsequent  events)  that  before  long  a 
party  gained  influence  which  was  desirous  of 
obtaining  support  from  Athens  rather  than  from 

^  The  chief  authority  for  the  narrative  of  affairs  in  Thrace  is 
the  speech  of  Demosthenes  against  Aristocrates.  See  below. 
Chap.  V  ad  fin. 


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Greece  from  404  to  j^g  65 

Thebes,  since  the  aid  of  Thebes  seemed  Hkely  to 
be  less  effective  now  that  Epameinondas  was  dead. 
Of  the  other  Peloponnesian  states,  Corinth  and 
Phleius  had  concluded  peace  with  Thebes  in  366; 
and  in  361  Athens  came  to  an  understanding  with 
Phleius,  Elis,  and  the  Achaeans;  but  neither  these, 
nor  Argos,  which  was  unfriendly  to  Sparta,  are  of 
any  importance  in  the  period  which  lies  before  us. 
Indeed  the  Spartans  themselves  play  but  a  small 
part  in  the  history  of  the  next  thirty  years,  though 
they  could  still  show  from  time  to  time  that  their 
bravery  and  their  national  dignity  had  not  entirely 
left  them.  The  relations  between  Sparta  and 
Athens  continued  to  be  generally  friendly. 

The  Thebans  were  fine  soldiers,  but  they  needed 
great  men  to  lead  them;  otherwise  they  had  not 
the  energy  or  the  perseverance  to  make  the  most 
of  their  opportimities ;  and  after  the  deaths  of 
Epameinondas  and  Pelopidas  they  were  far  less 
dangerous  than  they  had  previously  been.  They 
are  a  difficult  people  to  characterise.  The  Thebans 
proper  were  a  race  of  aristocrats — self-sufficient 
and  contemptuous  of  trade  and  commerce,  ruling 
or  intending  to  rule  over  the  inferior  towns  of 
Boeotia,  but  not  attempting  to  assimilate  them  or 
consult  their  interests;  and  they  were  generally 
destitute  of  the  humaner  feelings.  ^  If  they  shared 
with  the  Boeotians  generally  the  gift  for  art  and 
literature,  they  did  not  develop  it,  any  more  than 
they  used  their  political  and  military  opportimities. 

'  avaiffdr]Toi,  as  the  Athenians  calhxl  them. 
s 


66  Demosthenes 

except  when  stimulated  by  men  of  genius.  So  long 
as  they  could  maintain  their  hold  over  Boeotia,  and 
could  occupy  such  a  position  of  superiority  over 
their  neighbours,  the  Phocians  and  Thessalians, 
as  would  secure  themselves  against  interference, 
they  were  content  to  live  a  life  of  self-indulgence 
at  home;  though  it  was  of  importance  to  them,  if 
possible,  to  protect  themselves  against  Athens  by 
maintaining  a  firm  footing  in  Euboea,  keeping 
Oropus  in  their  own  hands,  and  suppressing  those 
towns  in  Boeotia  which  were  actually  or  tra- 
ditionally friendly  towards  Athens.  They  were 
entirely  devoid  of  all  concern  for  the  interests  of 
the  Greeks  as  a  whole.  In  the  Persian  wars  they 
had  gone  over  to  the  enemy;  their  alliance  with 
Philip  of  Macedon  was  dictated  by  equally  selfish 
motives;  and  had  they  not  been  persuaded  by  the 
extraordinary  efforts  and  eloquence  of  Demosthenes 
to  take  a  nobler  course,  they  might  perhaps  have 
remained  lords  of  Boeotia  under  the  Macedonian 
domination,  with  leisure  for  the  enjoyment  of  the 
pleasures  to  which  they  were  so  much  devoted. 

In  Thessaly  the  influence  of  Thebes  appears 
still  to  have  been  felt;  but  though  the  Thebans 
had  shown  their  power  even  against  so  powerful 
a  prince  as  Alexander  of  Pherae,  they  do  not  seem 
to  have  taken  steps  to  maintain  their  footiQg  in 
the  country,  and  after  the  assassination  of  Alex- 
ander in  359,  his  wife's  brothers,  Lycophron  and 
Peitholaus,  succeeded  to  the  overlordship  of 
Thessaly.     At  the  same  time  each  of  the  principal 


Greece  from  404  to  35Q  67 

towns  appears  to  have  had  its  own  subordinate 
government,  and  the  supremacy  of  the  tyrants  of 
Pherae  was  not  viewed  with  favour  by  rivals  in 
other  cities,  such  as  the  Aleuadae  of  Larissa.  The 
cavalry  of  Thessaly  were  a  very  valuable  addition 
to  the  forces  of  any  power  which  was  able  to  obtain 
their  assistance. 

Farther  towards  the  north  lay  the  Macedonian 
kingdom,  which  was  now  suffering,  owing  to  the 
death  of  Amyntas,  from  disputes  as  to  the  succes- 
sion, and  greatly  needed  a  firm  hand.  Round  the 
coasts  of  the  Thermaic  Gulf  were  the  colonies  now 
subject  to  Athens — Pydna  and  Methone  on  one 
side,  Poteidasa  on  the  other — of  which  more  will  be 
heard  in  the  future;  and  over  the  Chalcidic  penin- 
sula the  chief  authority  was  wielded  by  Olynthus, 
once  more  the  head  of  a  considerable  league.  Be- 
yond this  peninsula  stretched  the  coasts  of  Mace- 
donia and  Thrace,  as  far  as  the  Chersonese,  and 
beyond  the  Chersonese,  the  Thracian  kingdom  was 
bounded  by  the  Propontis  and  the  Euxine  Sea. 
Amphipolis,  virtually  independent,  occupied  a  po- 
sition of  great  commercial  and  military  importance 
near  the  mouth  of  the  Strymon,  and  not  far  to  the 
north-east  rose  Mount  Pangaeus,  with  its  gold- 
mines, worked  at  present  by  the  islanders  of  Tha- 
sos,  who  were  colonists  from  Athens.  On  the 
Thracian  coast  the  more  important  Greek  towns 
were  Abdera,  Nicaea,  and  Maroneia,  and,  between 
the  Chersonese  and  the  Bosporus,  Perinthus  and 
Byzantium,  the  latter  exercising  supremacy  over 


68  Demosthenes 

Selymbria  and  Chalcedon,  and  in  virtue  of  its  sit- 
uation commanding  all  the  traffic  in  com  and  other 
commodities  which  passed  backwards  and  forwards 
between  Greece  and  the  Euxine  coasts. 

We  may  now  turn  to  Athens.  No  longer  able 
to  stand  alone  against  a  combination  of  other 
powers,  and  no  longer  generally  acknowledged  as 
the  leader  of  the  Greek  States  (as  she  had  been  in 
the  great  days  after  the  Persian  wars  in  the  fifth 
century) ,  Athens  was  nevertheless  the  most  power- 
ful single  State  in  the  Greek  world.  No  city  headed 
so  extensive  and  important  an  alliance.  Corcyra  in- 
deed fell  away  in  361,  and  Byzantium,  with  the 
neighbouring  towns,  had  for  some  time  been  un- 
friendly ;  but  in  359  the  greater  number  of  the  mem- 
bers of  the  Second  Athenian  Confederacy  were  still 
loyal ;  and  in  the  course  of  the  next  two  years  most 
of  the  Euboean  States,  which  had  passed  from  the 
Athenian  to  the  Theban  alliance  about  twelve 
years  before,  were  set  free  from  the  Theban  domi- 
nation, at  their  own  request,  by  an  Athenian  fleet 
commanded  by  Timotheus,  and  became  adherents 
of  Athens.  (This  event  made  a  great  impression 
on  Demosthenes,  who  served  as  trierarch  in  the 
expedition.  Timotheus  had  roused  the  Athenians 
so  effectively  by  his  address  to  the  Assembly,  that 
the  expedition  had  started  within  three  days  af- 
ter it  had  been  resolved  upon.^     The  influence  of 

'  De  Chers.,  ad  fin.  The  expedition  is  placed  by  Diodorus,  XVI, 
vii.,  in  the  year  358-7.  Kahrstedt  (Forschungen,  pp.  70,  71)  de- 
cides for  the  late  summer  of  357,  i.e.  the  year  357-6. 


Greece  from  405  to  j^Q  69 

Athens  thus  extended  over  most  of  Euboea,  over 
the  important  islands  of  Lemnos,  Imbros,  Scyros, 
and  Samos  (as  well  as  others),  over  most  of  the 
coast-towns  on  the  Thermaic  Gulf,  and  over  the 
Thracian  Chersonese  and  a  number  of  towns  on 
the  south  coast  of  Thrace.  No  other  power  had 
so  numerous  a  fleet;  her  commercial  activity  and 
prosperity  were  unrivalled;  and  she  was  on  very 
friendly  terms  with  the  princes  who  ruled  the  corn- 
lands  about  the  Cimmerian  Bosporus,  ^  with  which 
her  trade  was  especially  large.  She  was  free  from 
serious  internal  division,  and  her  democratic  con- 
stitution stood  in  no  danger  of  disturbance. 

Yet  there  were  elements  of  weakness  in  her 
condition,  which  were  soon  to  become  actively  dan- 
gerous. The  raison  d'etre  of  the  Second  Confed- 
eracy— mutual  protection  against  Sparta — had 
long  ceased  to  exist;  and  her  policy  was  becom- 
ing less  and  less  one  in  which  the  allies  had  any 
interest.  Nevertheless  their  contributions  were 
still  exacted,  and  even  collected  by  Athenian 
admirals  at  the  head  of  their  fleet,  and  were  used 
for  any  campaign  in  which  they  were  at  the  moment 
engaged:  while  the  resumption  by  the  Athenians 
of  the  practice  of  sending  out  "cleruchs,"  or  colon- 
ists who  settled  and  held  land  in  allied  States,  was 
contrary  to  the  spirit,  if  not  (in  the  case  of  the 
particular  States  concerned)  to  the  letter,  of  the 
agreement  with  the  allies. 

Moreover  there  were  features  in  the  constitution 

'  See  above,  pp.  2,  59. 


70  Demosthenes 

and  in  the  financial  and  military  arrangements  of 
Athens  which  were  to  be  a  source  of  great  weakness 
in  the  next  years;  and  before  we  can  pass  to  the 
events  of  the  first  years  of  Demosthenes'  political 
life,  we  must  consider  at  some  length  the  political 
system  within  which,  like  other  Athenian  statesmen, 
he  had  to  work. 

NOTES  TO  CHAPTER  II 

1.  Francotte  {Les  Finances  des  Cites  Grecques)  points  out  that 
the  difference  between  4>6poi  ("tribute")  and  (nitn-a^is  ("con- 
tribution") was  not  merely  nominal.  The  (pdpos  had  been 
practically  determined  by  Athens;  the  ffvvrd^eis  were  arranged 
by  the  (rwidpiov  of  the  allies,  and  confirmed  by  the  Athenian 
Assembly.  The  <p6pos  was  used  by  the  Athenians  at  their  own 
discretion;  the  ffwrd^en  were  to  be  employed  only  for  the  objects 
of  the  Confederacy.  Comp.  F.  W.  Marshall,  The  Second  Athe- 
nian Confederacy  (Cambridge,  1905)  and  Phillipson,  International 
Law  and  Custom  of  Ancient  Greece  and  Rome,  vol.  ii.,  pp.  19-24. 

2.  The  details  of  the  system  introduced  in  378-7  are  keenly 
disputed,  and  to  discuss  them  here  would  take  too  much  space. 
The  method  of  vpoeur^pd  (payment  by  rich  men  in  advance) 
was  certainly  in  vogue  at  the  time  of  the  Speech  against  Polycles 
(§§  8,  9),  i.e.  in  360.  Whether  it  can  be  proved  to  be  earlier 
depends  on  the  interpretation  of  Dem.  in  Aphob.  I,  §§  7,  8,  9; 
ii.,  §4;  pro  Phano,  §59,  etc.  I  beHeve  that  the  payments  which 
Demosthenes'  guardians  are  there  stated  to  have  made  were 
made  by  way  of  vpoeur<(>opd,  and  if  so,  this  method  of  collection 
was  in  use  in  376,  and  must  have  been  the  original  one  under  the 
law. 


II 


CHAPTER  III 

THE  ATHENIAN  STATE  IN  THE  FOURTH  CENTURY  B.C. 

THE  supreme  power  in  Athens  rested  with  the 
Assembly,  of  which  every  adiilt  citizen  was 
a  member.  It  is  obvious  that  in  this  Assembly 
the  poor  must  have  outnumbered  the  rich.  We 
have  not  indeed  any  direct  information  as  to  the 
distribution  of  wealth  at  this  period ;  but  we  know 
that  in  the  year  358-7  the  number  of  citizens  who 
possessed  an  income  which  made  it  fair  to  lay  the 
burden  of  trierarchy  upon  them  was  estimated 
at  1200  only^;  and  that  in  322,  out  of  21,000  adult 
male  citizens,  only  9000  possessed  an  estate  even 
of  the  low  value  of  twenty  minse.  ^  It  follows  that 
if  the  poor  chose  to  make  use  of  their  numbers, 
they  could  always  outvote  the  richer  members  of 
the  Assembly;  and  the  political  interests  of  rich 
and  poor  respectively  were  so  far  distinct  as  to 
constitute  them  parties,  though  the  word  must  not 

'  Dem,,  de  Symtn.,  §   16,  etc. 

'  Demosthenes'  father,  who  was  counted  a  rich  man,  possessed 
an  estate  of  about  14  talents  ( =  840  minae)  at  his  death;  and  the 
wealthy  banker  Pasion,  30  talents.  Trierarchy  cost  (roughly 
speaking)  from  40  minae  to  a  talent. 

71 


72  Demosthenes 

be  taken  to  imply  the  rigid  organisation  or  the 
cleariy-cut  lines  of  demarcation  which  are  charac- 
teristic of  the  party-system  as  it  exists  to-day. 

The  richer  class  included  the  landowners  and 
the  traders.  Of  these  the  traders  were  by  far  the 
more  important.  Indeed  there  is  reason  to  think 
that,  concurrently  with  the  decline  of  agriculture 
in  Attica,  the  most  profitable  land  was  bought  up 
by  capitalists  resident  in  the  town,  and  worked 
by  means  of  slaves,  and  that  apart  from  such 
estates  the  holdings  were  small,  and  the  holders 
not  only  personally  insignificant,  but  also  unlikely 
to  be  regular  attendants  in  the  Assembly,  since 
they  would  not  be  able  to  leave  their  work  and 
come  to  town  for  that  purpose.  But  the  trading 
class  clearly  exercised  great  influence  in  the  As- 
sembly. In  the  first  place,  a  very  large  part  of 
the  wealth  of  the  country  was  in  their  hands,  and 
wealth  inevitably  carries  weight  even  in  the  most 
democratic  nations.  In  the  second  place,  with 
the  increase  of  luxury,  the  rise  in  the  standard  of 
living,  the  growing  variety  of  demand,  and  the 
consequent  speciahsation  of  trades  in  the  city  and 
the  larger  towns,  the  traders  and  the  financiers, 
and  those  whose  interests  were  connected  with 
theirs,  became  more  numerous  and  their  influence 
ramified  more  widely.  Above  all,  it  was  upon  the 
traders  that  Athens  depended  for  her  supply  of 
food;  for  the  amount  of  home-grown  com  was 
small;  and  this  alone  would  have  sufficed  to  give 
them  a  weight  in  the  Assembly  (under  normal 


Athenian  State  in  Fourth  Century  B.C.     'J2> 

conditions)  out  of  proportion  to  their  mere  num- 
bers. The  interests  of  the  richer  classes  were 
generally  better  served  by  peace  than  by  war.' 
The  passage  of  merchant-vessels  was  naturally 
most  secure  in  time  of  peace ;  and  the  fear  of  hostile 
invasion,  and  of  the  ravaging  of  the  landed  estates 
of  Attica  (as  they  had  been  ravaged  in  the  Pelo- 
ponnesian  War)  was  certainly  not  extinct.  Fur- 
ther, it  was  upon  the  rich  that  there  inevitably 
fell  the  chief  biu-den  of  the  extraordinary  taxation 
necessitated  by  war;  for  both  the  expenses  of  the 
trierarchy  and  the  greater  part  of  the  war-tax  had 
to  be  provided  by  the  wealthy  minority ;  and  these 
calls  upon  them,  which  were  an  addition  to  the 
very  large  share  which  they  contributed  of  the 
normal  expenses  of  government,  were  liable  to  be 
extremely  heavy.  No  doubt  the  interests  of 
trade  themselves  required  at  times  to  be  protected 
by  war;  and  all  alike  were  interested  in  maintain- 
ing at  any  cost  the  security  of  the  great  trade-route 
to  the  Bosporus  and  the  Euxine,  by  way  of  the 
^gean  Sea  and  the  Hellespont,  and  in  taking 
precautionary  measures  against  threatened  inva- 
sion. (We  shall  see  in  a  later  chapter  how  these 
considerations  affected  the  policy  of  Eubulus.)  But 
as  a  rule  the  well-to-do  classes  tended  to  favour  a 
pacific  policy,  and  preferred  to  render  trade  se- 
cure by  diplomacy  and  the  formation  of  alliances, 

'  See  Aristoph.,  Eccles.,  197  (392  B.C.): 

vavi  del  KaOfKKeivroh  trivrja-i  fi^v  SoKei, 
Tots  ir\ov<riois  5^  Kal  yeupyoii  oi  SoKeT, 


74  Demosthenes 

and  even  by  making  considerable  concessions, 
rather  than  by  war.  Whether  they  had  the  faults 
which  those  whose  interest  is  predominantly 
connected  with  money-making  are  always  apt  to 
show — whether  they  were  indifferent  to  national 
ideals  and  generous  sentiments,  or  were  liable  to  be 
short-sighted,  through  paying  too  great  a  regard 
to  the  nearer  as  opposed  to  the  more  distant  but 
greater  gain — we  have  not  much  direct  evidence 
to  show.  But  Demosthenes  at  times  uses  lan- 
guage which  suggests  that  he  was  conscious  of  such 
obstacles  in  the  way  of  his  own  policy,  even  though 
he  admits  the  patriotism  of  many  rich  men  and 
their  readiness  for  sacrifices.  "^ 

On  the  other  hand,  the  masses  were,  generally 
speaking,  in  favour  of  war  and  of  an  imperialistic 
policy.  If  not  the  safest  way  of  securing  an 
abundant  food-supply,  victorious  campaigns  were 
often  the  way  which  seemed  most  obvious;  and 
the  fact  that  war  was  paid  for  by  the  rich  made 
the  poor  less  conscious  of  its  disadvantages.  Fur- 
ther, it  was  only  through  war  that  the  poorer 
citizens  could  avail  themselves  of  one  of  the  chief 
means  of  earning  a  living  that  was  open  to  them 
and  not(  apart  from  some  very  exceptional  occa- 
sions) to  slaves — that  of  service  as  rowers  in  the 
fleet.  Besides  this,  the  tendency  of  the  crowd  to 
be  carried  away  by  the  kind  of  national  conceit 
or  swagger  which  is  ready  to  go  to  war  recklessly 
is  illustrated  by  a  number  of  references  to  the 

*  De  Cor.,  %  171. 


Athenian  State  in  Fourth  Century  B.C.     75 

orators  who  inflamed  the  Assembly  by  passionate 
appeals  to  the  traditions  of  the  past — to  the  great- 
est days  of  the  Athenian  Empire — and  by  the  fact 
that  Demosthenes  himself,  who  certainly  had  no 
shrinking  from  war,  even  when  a  tamer  prudence 
might  have  counselled  peace,  was  more  than  once 
obHged  to  deprecate  this  rash  folly.  * 

We  have  then  to  recognise  that  in  Athens  the 
tendencies  of  the  richer  and  poorer  classes  respec- 
tively were  almost  exactly  the  reverse  of  those 
which  are  shown  by  the  corresponding  classes  in 
most  modem  countries  to-day.  As  a  rule,  imperial- 
istic ideals,  and  an  inclination  towards  militarism, 
are  now  more  commonly  found  among  the  better 
educated  and  wealthier  members  of  the  commun- 
ity, and  are  supported  in  the  name  of  patriotism 
against  what  are  supposed  to  be  the  narrower,  more 
domestic,  and  even  more  selfish  aspirations  of  the 
less  wealthy.  In  Athens  it  was  the  popular  lead- 
ers who  cried  out  for  war;  and  it  was  those  who 
more  nearly  correspond  to  the  Conservatives  of 
modem  countries  that  strove  to  make  and  to 
maintain  peace. 

Unfortunately  neither  party,  as  a  whole,  seems 
to  have  been  animated  by  any  noble  ideal.  Rich 
and  poor  alike  would  have  said  that  the  security 
of  the  Empire,  or  at  least  the  maintenance  of  the 
naval  supremacy  of  Athens,  was  primarily  of 
importance  as  a  means  to  the  satisfaction  of  the 

'  E.g.,  de  Symm.,  §§  4  ff.,  41 ;  de  Pace,  §  13  flE.;  comp.  Isocrates, 
de  Pace,  §§  5,  36,  112,  etc. 


76  Demosthenes 

hunger  of  the  proletariat.  The  masses  might  add 
to  this  sentiment  an  enthusiasm,  often  somewhat 
shallow  and  only  artificially  stirred  up  by  popular 
orators,  for  the  traditions  of  Athens.  The  richer 
classes  wished  to  steer  such  a  middle  course  as 
would  neither  involve  loss  of  trade  and  the  inter- 
ruption of  the  food-supply  through  the  insecurity 
of  the  trade-routes,  nor  yet  necessitate  heavy 
expenditure  on  the  army  and  navy.  But  for  the 
masses  and  the  popular  orators,  the  golden  age  was 
in  the  past;  and  it  is  doubtful  whether  the  richer 
classes  had  any  clear  ideal  at  all,  except  that  of 
playing  for  safety.  Isocrates'  attempt  to  frame 
a  worthy  policy  for  Athens  met  with  httle  general 
acceptance.  Whether  or  not  the  policy  was  in  fact 
a  good  and  a  worthy  one,  it  was  not  a  time  when 
men's  practical  plans  were  generally  conceived  on 
a  large  or  generous  scale;  and  a  close  student  of 
this  period  can  hardly  fail  to  be  conscious  of  a  kind 
of  spiritual  deadness,  contrasting  strongly  with 
the  feeling  which  the  Athenians  had  displayed 
through  the  first  two  thirds  of  the  fifth  century — 
we  may  perhaps  say,  until  after  the  Plague — and 
defying  any  attempt  which  a  more  inspired  indi- 
vidual  might   make  to  kindle  it   into  warmth.' 

'  It  would  take  too  long  to  discuss  here  the  causes  of  this 
deadness.  But  apart  from  the  dispiriting  effects  of  the  Plague 
and  of  the  Peloponnesian  War,  the  principal  cause  was  the  rise 
and  the  all-pervading  influence  of  Rhetoric,  which  saps  the 
sincerity  both  of  those  who  practise  it,  and  of  those  to  whom  it  is 
addressed.  Plato's  criticisms  of  Rhetoric  appear  to  be  entirely 
justified  by  history,  and  the  fact  that  most  of  them  are  equally 


1 


II 


Athenian  State  in  Fourth  Century  B.C.     J  J 

Demosthenes  himself,  who  was  not  lacking  either 
in  ideals  or  in  inspiration,  could  not  restore  its 
old  life  to  the  Athenian  People,  though  at  one 
great  moment  he  fanned  the  flame  into  a  final 
blaze  of  splendour. 

The  masses  had,  as  has  been  said,  a  large  major- 
ity in  the  Assembly,  and  could  at  any  time  outvote 
those  who  represented  the  agricultural,  commercial, 
and  financial  interests.  But  we  have  unhappily 
no  means  of  discovering  with  any  certainty  what 
was  the  normal  composition  of  an  ordinary  meeting 
of  the  Assembly,  nor  (since  the  function  of  the 
Assembly  was,  as  Aristotle  phrases  it,  that  of 
judgment,  or  decision  upon  proposals  submitted 
to  them)  how  far  the  Assembly,  as  normally  con- 
stituted, was  capable  of  forming  judgments  based 
upon  rational  grounds.  There  can  be  little  doubt 
that  there  was  a  tendency  on  the  part  of  many  of 
the  best-educated  men  to  withdraw  entirely  from 
public  life  and  to  take  no  interest  in  State-affairs, 
preferring,  as  they  did,  the  self-satisfied  life  of  the 
cultured  individual  to  the  pursuit  of  the  common 
good — regarding  political  power  and  the  possession 
of  Empire  as  unimportant  in  comparison  with 
individual  virtue,  and  treating  the  comparative 
sordidness  of  politics  in  a  democracy  as  beneath 
the  notice  of  the  philosophic  mind.  Philosophy 
became  markedly  individualistic  in  the  fourth 
century,  and  alien  from  the  spirit  of  the  city-state. 

applicable  to  modern  journalism  renders  them  not  uninteresting 
at  the  present  day. 


78  Demosthenes 

What  the  fellow-citizens  of  Socrates  had  felt,  as 
to  the  incompatibility  of  his  principles  with  those 
of  a  city-state,  the  more  philosophic  Athenians 
now  began  to  feel  about  themselves.  The  with- 
drawal of  the  finer  intellects  from  all  attempt  to 
influence  the  actions  of  the  community,  however 
few  such  intellects  may  have  been,  must  necessarily 
have  been  a  loss. 

Moreover  there  cannot  be  much  doubt  that  the 
payment  for  attendance  in  the  Assembly,  which 
remained  at  about  the  same  figure  as  the  wage  of 
an  unskilled  labourer,^  was  likely  to  be  more 
attractive  to  the  proletariat  than  to  the  better 
educated  or  to  those  who  had  business  to  mind. 

There  is  indeed  something  to  be  said  on  the 
other  side.  In  the  first  place,  a  considerable 
proportion  of  the  members  of  the  Assembly  must 
have  acquired  some  training  in  public  business, 
and  in  the  art  of  coming  to  a  decision  upon  issues 
submitted  to  them,  in  the  sphere  of  local  govern- 
ment.* The  organisation  of  the  demes  was  very 
thorough,  and  the  political  activity  of  the  demes 
very  vigorous,  during  this  period;  and  a  system 
under  which  every  adult  citizen  was  a  member  of 
the  Assembly  of  his  deme,  and  might  well  hold 
office  in  it,  must  have  had  a  greater  educational 
value  than  (for  example)  the  English  system  of 
local  government,  which  works  by  means  of  re- 
presentative bodies,  and  in  consequence  only  edu- 
cates or  interests  a  comparatively  small  number 

'  Note  I  at  the  end  of  the  Chapter.  "  Note  2. 


Atheman  State  in  Fourth  Century  B.C.     79 

of  persons.  In  the  second  place,  it  is  remarkable 
that  of  the  leaders  in  politics,  the  generals,  the 
ambassadors,  and  the  financial  and  administrative 
officials,  a  very  large  proportion  were  men  of 
wealth.''  This  not  only  implies  the  absence  of 
strong  class-feeling,  but  it  also  shows  that  the 
masses  were  not  unready  to  entrust  their  affairs 
to  those  who  felt  themselves  called  upon  to  lead, 
and  able  to  do  so,  whoever  they  might  be."*  It  is 
true  that  they  also  showed  some  jealousy  of  their 
leaders,  and  even  more  of  those  officials  who,  when 
once  elected,  were  in  some  degree  independent  of 
the  People — generals,  for  instance,  and  ambassa- 
dors. We  shall  see  before  long  how  evil  the  effects 
of  this  jealousy  were.  But  at  least  there  was 
nothing  to  prevent  ability  from  attaining  the 
position  which  was  its  due,  however  perilous  the 
position  might  be;  and  on  the  whole  we  hear 
extraordinarily  little  of  the  noisy  and  ignorant 
type  of  demagogue. 

The  incompetence  of  the  Athenian  Assembly 
may  be  and  often  has  been  exaggerated.  At 
times  of  crisis  it  was  certainly  not  incapable  of 

'  This  is  established  with  a  very  high  degree  of  probability  by 
Sundwall  {Epigraphische  Beitrdge  zur  sozialpolitischen  Geschichte 
Athens). 

'See  esp.,  Dem.,  de  Fals.  Leg.,  §99.  The  statement  in  the 
text  is  not  really  inconsistent  with  Aristotle's  characterisation 
of  democracy  as  the  government  of  the  poor  for  the  benefit  of  the 
poor,  nor  with  Isocr.,  de  Antid.,  §159  ff.,  who  lays  stress  on  the 
suspicion  attaching  to  riches  (which  is  abundantly  illustrated  in 
the  life  and  speeches  of  Demosthenes). 


8o  Demosthenes 

responding  to  an  appeal  to  the  reason  and  good 
sense  of  its  members ;  and  under  normal  conditions 
political  ability  had  every  chance  of  coming  to 
the  front.  Nevertheless  the  Athenian  Assembly 
could  not  escape  from  the  dangers  which  appear  to 
beset  all  large  bodies  of  men  gathered  together. 
Unless  they  were  roused  or  awed  by  immediate 
and  urgent  danger,  there  was  always  the  probabil- 
ity that  they  would  respond  most  readily  to  an 
appeal  to  their  sentiment  or  their  desires.  Men 
who  are  assembled  in  a  crowd  do  not  thinks  unless 
they  are  forced  to  do  so  by  something  extraordi- 
nary; it  is  generally  the  shallowest  minds  which  are 
most  quickly  made  up,  and  which  infect  the  rest 
of  the  crowd  by  a  kind  of  contagion;  and  so  the 
art  of  rhetoric  is  different  from  that  of  reasoning. 
The  orator  has  often  to  use  arguments  which  no 
logic  can  defend,  and  to  employ  methods  of  per- 
suasion upon  a  crowd  which  he  would  be  ashamed 
to  use  if  he  were  dealing  with  a  personal  friend. 
It  must  be  added  that  in  the  period  which  we  are 
considering  the  issues  were  often  complex,  and 
that  it  would  not  have  been  possible  to  do  justice 
to  them  in  the  short  speeches  which  it  was  custom- 
ary to  deliver  in  the  Assembly;  and  further,  that 
any  attempt  to  state  a  complex  argument  was 
likely  to  expose  the  speaker  to  suspicion;  for  (as 
we  have  already  noticed  in  reference  to  the  speeches 
which  were  delivered  in  the  law-courts)  ability  in 
argument  and  in  exposition  was  not  very  distinct 
in  the  popular  mind  from  the  sophistry  of  the 


I 


Athenian  State  in  Fourth  Century  B.  C.     8i 

professional  rhetorician,  who  was  clever  enough  to 
argue  for  any  cause — and  if  necessary,  for  either 
side  of  any  case — and  to  make  the  worse  appear 
the  better.  Athenian  orators  often  warn  their 
audience  in  the  Assembly  as  in  the  law-courts 
against  being  deceived  by  the  cleverness  of  their 
opponents;  and  even  if  there  had  not  been  this 
suspicion  of  cleverness,  it  would  not  have  been 
easy  to  put  complex  proposals  (for  instance,  on 
finance)  before  a  crowd  and  give  the  true  reasons 
for  or  against  them. 

Again,  it  is  obvious  that  so  large  a  body  could 
only  form  its  judgment  upon  the  materials  pre- 
sented to  them  by  the  orators;  it  could  have  little 
or  no  independent  knowledge  of  facts;  and  when 
more  than  one  version  of  the  facts  was  presented, 
the  version  most  likely  to  be  accepted  was  that  of 
the  speaker  whose  oration  was  best  as  a  perform- 
ance ;  and  it  was  the  same  with  rival  arguments. 
The  Athenian  Assembly  was  probably  more 
susceptible  than  most  modem  audiences  to  the 
theatrical  effect  of  the  oration,  and  more  liable 
to  be  carried  away  by  oratorical  brilliance.  The 
.contests  of  the  orators  they  regarded  in  the  same 
light  as  the  contests  of  rival  actors.^  Indeed,  so 
great  was  their  interest  in  the  performance,  that 
it  was  often  the  only  interest;  and  the  practical 
moral  was  allowed  to  pass  without  effect,  when 
the  performance  was  over.  Demosthenes  often 
shows  himself  acutely  conscious  of  this  tendency. 

'  Comp.  Dem,  de  Pace,  §  7. 


82  Demosthenes 

"If,"  he  cries, ^  "you  sit  idle,  with  an  interest  that 
stops  short  at  applause  and  acclamation,  and  retires 
into  the  background  when  any  action  is  required, 
I  can  imagine  no  oratory,  which,  without  action 
on  your  part,  will  be  able  to  save  your  country." 
And  again, ^  "You  have  reached  such  a  pitch  of 
folly  or  distraction  or — I  know  not  what  to  call  it, 
for  often  has  the  fear  actually  entered  my  mind 
that  some  more  than  mortal  power  may  be  driving 
our  fortunes  to  ruin — that  to  enjoy  their  abuse, 
or  their  malice,  or  their  jests,  or  whatever  your 
motive  may  chance  to  be,  you  call  upon  men  to 
speak  who  are  hirelings,  and  some  of  whom  would 
not  deny  it;  and  you  laugh  to  hear  their  abuse  of 
others."  Both  Demosthenes  and  Isocrates  re- 
peatedly upbraid  the  Athenians  for  their  refusal 
even  to  listen  to  speakers  who  told  them  impleas- 
ant  truths  and  did  not  prophesy  smooth  things. 
"It  has  always  been  your  way,"  says  Isocrates, 
"to  drive  from  your  presence  all  who  did  not 
advocate  your  own  pleasures. "^  "Under  a  demo- 
cracy there  is  no  freedom  of  speech,"'* — so  he 
contradicted  in  a  sentence  one  of  the  Athenians' 
proudest  boasts.  The  excessive  love  of  pleasur- 
able excitement,  with  the  accompanying  paralysis 
of  the  will  and  the  inability  to  face  unpleasant 
facts,  were  the  worst  moral  diseases  from  which 
the  Athenian  People  was  at  this  time  suffering. 
There  were  also  defects  in  the  constitution  itself, 

'  De  Chers.,  §  77.  « Isocr.,  de  Pace,  §  3. 

»  PhU.  Ill,  §  54.  •♦  Ibid.,  §  14. 


i 


I 


Athenian  State  in  Fourth  Century  B.C.     83 

and  in  its  practical  working,  which  had  serious 
consequences;  and  to  these  we  must  next  turn. 

There  are  two  conditions  apart  from  which 
government  by  a  great  assembly  cannot  be  ima- 
gined to  have  any  chance  of  success.  One  is  the 
existence  of  a  responsible  ministry,  changeable, 
of  course,  from  time  to  time,  but  entrusted  with  a 
real  leadership  so  long  as  it  is  in  office.  The  other 
is  the  confinement  of  the  functions  of  the  Assembly 
to  the  decision  of  main  issues,  the  detailed  applica- 
tion of  its  resolutions  being  left  to  responsible 
and  experienced  officials  or  departments,  with 
reasonable  freedom  of  action.  These  two  condi- 
tions were  very  imperfectly  fulfilled  in  Athens. 
Almost  all  officers  of  State,  except  the  generals, 
were  elected  by  lot ;  so  that  there  was  no  guarantee 
of  their  fitness  for  office.  ^  There  was  no  ministry 
charged  with  the  duty  of  giving  advice  to  the 
People.  Everyone  of  the  thousands  of  members 
of  the  Assembly  stood  theoretically  on  precisely 
the  same  level  of  opportunity  and  responsibility. 
No  one  could  be  called  upon  to  make  a  proposal; 
and  though  in  strict  law  no  measure  could  be 
brought  forward  without  a  preliminary  resolution 
of  the  Council  of  Five  Himdred,  and  business  no 
doubt  began  with  the  propounding  of  such  a  reso- 
lution for  discussion,  it  seems  clear  that  the 
Assembly  had  unrestricted  power  of  amendment 
upon  the  proposition  of  any  member — the  dis- 
cussions on  the  Peace  of  Philocrates  illustrate  this' 

*  See  Isocr.,  de  Pace,  §  23.  'See  below,  pp.  249  ff. 


84  Demosthenes 

— and  no  obligation  was  apparently  felt  by  the 
Assembly  to  give  the  resolutions  of  the  Council 
any  more  respectful  attention  (as  embodying  the 
opinion  of  those  who  had  presumably  considered 
the  matter  with  care)  than  it  gave  to  the  wildest 
suggestion  made  by  a  popular  speaker  on  the  spur 
of  the  moment.  The  administrative  work  of  the 
Coimcil,  which  had  to  see  that  the  resolutions  of 
the  Assembly  were  carried  out,  to  collect  the  neces- 
sary information  and  materials  for  discussion,  and 
to  perform  many  of  the  duties  which  in  modem 
countries  fall  to  the  various  departments  of  the 
Civil  Service,  does  indeed  appear  to  have  been 
surprisingly  well  done,  considering  the  nature  of 
the  body.  For,  annually  elected  by  lot  as  it  was,^ 
there  was  no  guarantee  that  it  would  be  specially 
qualified  to  advise ;  and  since  it  transacted  most  of 
its  duties  by  means  of  committees  which  changed 
ten  times  a  year,  it  could  not  be  expected  to  main- 
tain any  continuous  or  definite  policy.  Fur- 
ther, although  on  the  whole  it  did  its  work  well,  it 
could  only  take  action  within  the  terms  of  the 
resolutions  of  the  Assembly ;  and  had  it  made  any 
attempt  to  frame  or  carry  through  a  policy,  the 
attempt  would  probably  have  been  regarded  as  an 
oligarchical  encroachment  upon  the  absolute 
rights  of  the  People,  which  the  Assembly  jealously 
maintained. 

The  want  of  a  ministry  left  the  Assembly  the 
victim  of  its  own  inconsistency,  and  of  the  varying 

'  Note  3. 


Athenian  State  in  Fourth  Century  B.C.     85 

moods  of  successive  meetings;  and  not  only  could 
no  continuity  of  policy  be  relied  upon  from  such  a 
body,  but  it  was  quite  possible  that  there  might  be 
no  policy  forthcoming  at  all,  simply  because  no 
one  was  under  any  obligation  to  make  a  motion''; 
or  that  the  measures  resolved  upon  might  be  left 
imperfect,  because,  though  a  resolution  to  take 
some  important  step  had  been  passed,  the  neces- 
sary subsidiary  resolutions  as  to  ways  and  m.eans 
had  been  omitted,  or  inadequate  provision  made^; 
and  in  fact  resolutions  as  to  ways  and  means, 
which  involved  personal  service  as  well  as  taxation, 
might  easily  be  so  unpopular  that  only  a  courageous 
man  would  move  them;  while  the  administrative 
officials  did  not  dare  to  act  without  the  sanction 
of  the  Assembly,  even  to  provide  means  to  carry 
out  the  Assembly's  own  decrees.  In  the  fifth 
century  a  certain  continuity  had  been  secured  by 
the  frequent  re-election  of  the  same  man  to  the 
office  of  general — nearly  all  other  officials  being 
appointed  by  lot;  but  in  the  fourth  century  the 
generals,  though  many  of  them  were  frequently 
re-elected,  came  to  be  more  and  more  professional 
soldiers,  and  less  and  less  politicians;  and  when 
not  engaged  in  war  on  behalf  of  Athens,  they  were 
as  likely  as  not  to  be  fighting  on  behalf  of  some 
other  power  until  Athens  had  need  of  their  services 
again,  or  enjoying  life  in  some  quarter  where  they 

'  Compare  the  silence  of  all  parties  and  persons  after  the 
news  of  Philip's  occupation  of  Elateia  arrived.  Dem.,  de  Cor., 
§§  169  £f.  •  See  below,  pp.  195,  215,  427. 


86  Demosthenes 

were  not  exposed  to  critical  eyes.  We  hear  very 
little,  during  this  period,  of  the  advice  of  generals 
to  the  Assembly,  though  Phocion  when  necessary 
played  the  part  of  a  statesman  as  well  as  of  a 
soldier.  The  only  chance  of  a  continuous  and 
consistent  policy  lay  in  the  possibility  of  some 
orator  or  statesman  winning  the  ear  of  the  Assem- 
bly through  a  sufficiently  long  period,  either  by 
force  of  character  or  by  playing  successfully  upon 
the  desires  of  the  majority;  and  it  is  because 
CalHstratus,  Aristophon,  Eubulus,  and  Demos- 
thenes were  able  each  to  secure  a  certain  degree 
of  influence  for  several  years,  that  the  acts  of  the 
Athenian  People  during  the  fourth  century  are 
not  merely  a  chaotic  and  incoherent  succession. 
Even  so,  the  moods  of  the  Assembly  made  the 
statesman's  task  an  unenviable  one;  we  find  no 
little  levity  and  inconstancy,  and  much  jealousy 
of  powerful  men;  and  the  means  to  which  states- 
men were  forced  to  resort,  in  order  to  maintain 
their  influence  long  enough  to  give  any  policy  a 
fair  trial,  were  often  of  a  regrettable  kind. 

The  defects  of  the  system  of  discussion  by  a 
popular  Assembly  were  necessarily  increased  by 
the  circumstances  of  a  time  when  the  relations 
between  the  several  States  of  Greece  were  hostile, 
or  at  least  needed  skilful  handling.  The  most 
democratic  of  modem  States  do  not  allow  the 
details  of  international  politics  or  projected 
military  and  naval  movements  to  be  settled  by 
public  discussion:  such  subjects  are  wholly  un- 


Athenian  State  in  Fourth  Century  B.C.     87 

fitted  for  such  treatment.  Any  delicacy  of  hand- 
ling, and  the  tact  which  often  saves  a  situation, 
are  under  such  circumstances  out  of  the  question ; 
and  though  the  value  of  such  tact  was  well  known 
in  Athens  (for  instance,  from  the  occasions  when 
Callistratus  went  as  envoy  to  Sparta,  and  Thrasy- 
bulus  to  Thebes)  the  knowledge  did  not  ordinarily 
lead  the  Athenians  to  entrust  their  foreign  affairs 
to  responsible  ministers  and  give  them  a  free  hand.  ^ 
This  would  have  been  impossibly  oligarchical,  and 
might  even  have  been  thought  to  point  towards 
tyranny.  So  the  Athenians  paid  for  the  logical 
carrying  out  of  their  democratic  principles  by  the 
incompetent  management  of  their  foreign  and 
military  affairs.  Philip  had  tact  enough;  but  tact 
is  a  virtue  of  individuals,  not  of  crowds. 

The  infrequency  of  the  meetings  of  the  Assembly, 
which  took  place  rather  less  often  than  once  a 
week,  was  also  a  great  disadvantage.  Internal 
affairs  may  perhaps  be  managed  by  such  meetings ; 
but  not  military  or  international  affairs,  in  which 
not  only  secrecy,  but  rapidity  and  the  power  of 
adapting  measures  to  swiftly  changing  situations 
are  often  everything.  Demosthenes  more  than 
once^  insists  on  the  advantage  which  Philip  pos- 

'  The  great  exception  is  the  mission  of  Demosthenes  to  Thebes 
i"  339  (see  below,  p.  373) .  Sundwall  {op.  cit.)  shows  that  the  ambas- 
sadors, like  the  generals,  were  usually  drawn  from  the  propertied 
classes — such  persons  alone  could  afford  the  incidental  expenses 
of  these  offices — and  this  may  have  increased  the  jealousy  of  the 
Assembly  towards  them. 

'  E.g.,  de  Fals.  Leg.,  §§  184  ff.;  comp.  §§  136,  2^7  f.,  etc. 


88  Demosthenes 

sessed  in  being  absolute  master  of  his  own  plans, 
under  no  necessity  to  make  them  public  until  the 
right  time  came,  and  able  to  modify  them  at  any 
time  without  consulting  any  one.  Extraordinary 
assemblies  might  be  and  sometimes  were  sum- 
moned, but  apparently  only  to  deal  with  specially 
important  and  sudden  crises.- 

Aristotle^  speaks  of  the  system  of  election  by 
lot  and  the  popular  control  of  the  law-courts  as 
the  two  chief  marks  of  the  sovereignty  of  the 
People.  The  former  merely  reduced  the  chances 
of  obtaining  the  services  of  qualified  persons;  but 
the  part  which  was  played  in  political  life  by  the 
law-courts  was  positively  mischievous.  A  states- 
man might  of  course  be  quite  rightly  brought 
before  the  law-courts;  and  some  specific  charge 
had  always  to  be  made.*  But  when,  whatever 
the  specific  charge,  the  issue  at  stake  was  in  reality 
whether  he  should  be  punished  as  a  criminal 
because  his  policy  was  impopular  or  had  led  to 
failure  in  one  respect  or  another,  it  is  plain  that 
criminal  procedure  was  being  applied  to  cases  for 
which  it  was  quite  unfitted.  If  a  statesman  had 
committed  a  crime,  it  was  right  to  punish  him  like 
any  other  man ;  but  because  the  policy  for  which, 

*  Ar.,  Pol.,  IV  (VI),  1300a,  1301a,  etc. 

'  The  commonest  form  of  proceeding  was  probably  that  of 
prosecution  at  the  end  of  the  tenure  of  some  office,  when  the 
Board  of  Auditors  who  received  the  retiring  oflScial's  report 
asked  if  any  one  had  any  charge  to  make,  and  if  so,  referred  the 
matter  to  a  jury. 


Athenian  State  in  Fourth  Century  B.C.     89 

on  his  proposal,  the  Assembly  had  made  itself 
responsible  had  resulted  otherwise  than  had  been 
expected,  the  statesman  did  not  on  that  accoiint 
deserve  a  heavy  fine  or  banishment  or  execution — 
least  of  all  when  the  mood  in  which  the  jury  was 
led  to  condemn  him  might  be  merely  a  transient 
one,  due  to  circumstances  which  would  be  sure 
to  change  and  cause  them  to  regret  their  action. 
The  list  of  statesmen  and  generals  who  were  tried 
and  condemned  during  the  fourth  century  includes 
nearly  all  of  those  who  displayed  any  ability,  and 
the  knowledge  that  the  consequences  of  failure 
would  not  be  (as  in  modern  States),  at  the  worst, 
dismissal  from  office  and  the  obligation  to  cross 
from  one  side  of  the  House  to  the  other,  but  death 
or  banishment  or  financial  ruin,  must  have  been 
paralysing  to  any  but  the  bravest,  and  must  often 
have  prevented  the  statesman  and  the  general 
from  taking  the  risks  which  any  honest  man  in 
such  positions  must  from  time  to  time  face. 

Nor  were  the  courts  representative  of  the  best 
side  of  public  opinion,  or  even  of  public  opinion 
as  a  whole.  The  enormous  size  of  the  juries  might 
at  first  lead  us  to  suppose  that  this  would  be  other- 
wise. But  sitting  on  juries  took  time,  and  was 
only  attractive  to  those  who  could  not  turn  their 
time  to  more  profitable  account.  For  the  jurors' 
daily  pay  was  still  only  three  obols — a  sum  which 
was  probably  less  than  half  the  wage  of  an  unskilled 
labourer ;  and  such  an  inducement  would  not  appeal 
to  any  but  the  aged  and  infirm,  the  poor  and  the 


90  Demosthenes 

idle.  The  character  of  the  juries  is  sufficiently 
indicated  by  the  arguments  which  even  leading 
men  thought  fit  to  address  to  them.  (They  were_ 
told,  on  more  than  one  occasion,  that  unless  they 
fined  the  accused  heavily  there  would  not  be 
sufficient  money  to  pay  their  fees.)  Indeed  the 
whole  tone  of  the  poUtical  oratory  addressed  to 
the  courts  is  (with  certain  notable  exceptions) 
lower  than  that  of  the  speeches  delivered  in  the 
Assembly.  It  is  evident  that  the  orators  had  to 
deal  with  those  who  enjoyed  vulgarities  and  sensa- 
tional pictures  in  black-and-white,  in  which  truth 
coimted  for  less  than  dramatic  effect.  Facts 
could  be  misrepresented  with  impunity,  and  appeals 
made  to  passion,  to  a  degree  unparalleled  in  the 
Assembly;  the  state  of  popular  feeling  at  the 
moment  counted  more  than  anything  else;  and 
the  jury  were  continually  encouraged  to  consider 
not  whether  the  accused  was  guilty  of  the  charge 
made  against  him,  but  whether  he  was  not  as 
black  in  character  as  a  man  could  be,  or  at  least 
black  enough  to  be  got  rid  of  for  good,  when  in 
fact  he  might  be  merely  of  a  respectable  colour 
which  at  the  moment  was  out  of  fashion.  Add 
to  this  that  the  juries  were  likely  to  have  little 
knowledge  of  law  beyond  what  the  advocates  on 
either  side  chose  to  supply  to  them,  that  they  had 
nevertheless  to  decide  questions  of  law  as  well  as 
of  fact,  and  that  the  verdict  was  subject  to  no 
revision — and  the  evils  of  the  system  are  sufficiently 
apparent. 


Athenian  State  in  Fourth  Century  B.C.     91 

Moreover,  apart  from  the  bad  influence  of  such 
a  system  upon  statesmen  in  full  career,  the  evil 
effects  of  the  actual  verdicts  are  only  too  evident. 
The  condemned  man  was  often  driven  into  exile 
either  by  the  fear  of  a  death  sentence,  or  by  the 
imposition  of  a  fine  which  he  could  not  possibly 
pay.  Such  political  exile  was  the  curse  of  Athen- 
ian public  life.  One  after  another,  the  ablest 
men  were  removed  from  the  service  of  the  State, 
which  might  have  the  utmost  need  of  them  before 
many  months  or  years  had  elapsed.  Without  a 
proper  ministry,  the  value  of  "His  Majesty's 
Opposition"  could  not,  of  course,  be  appreciated; 
and  in  Athens  the  effect  of  the  hot-headed  oratory 
of  the  prosecutor  and  the  inflammable  passions 
of  the  jury  was  often  to  make  permanent  what 
ought  to  have  been  at  most  a  temporary  retirement 
from  the  leadership  of  affairs. 

The  defects  of  the  Athenian  jury-system  were 
not  restricted  in  their  results  to  the  law-courts. 
For  it  was  from  the  jurors  for  each  year  that  the 
Nomothetce  were  chosen,  with  whom  there  rested 
the  power  to  repeal  or  to  retain  laws.  The  As- 
sembly merely  decided  whether  each  group  of  laws 
should  remain  unchanged,  or  whether  changes 
should  be  permitted  during  the  current  year.  The 
proposers  and  opponents  of  new  laws,  or  of  altera- 
tions in  the  old,  then  appeared  before  the  Nomo- 
thetffi;  the  proceedings  took  the  form  of  a  trial, 
after  which  the  Nomothetae  gave  a  final  decision. 
It  cannot  therefore  be  said  that  the  intelligence 


92  Demosthenes 

of  the  People  as  a  whole  was  adequately  repre- 
sented in  the  work  of  legislation  any  more  than 
in  the  administration  of  justice. 

We  pass  to  the  financial  arrangements  of  the 
Athenian  State.  The  general  principle  underly- 
ing them  was  that  the  ordinary  expenses  of  a  time 
of  peace  should  be  provided  for  from  the  produce 
of  such  public  property  as  the  mines  of  Laurium, 
and  the  rent  of  public  lands;  or  by  indirect  taxes, 
such  as  harbour-  and  market-dues,  percentages 
charged  on  sales  by  auction,  and  the  like;  except 
that  part  of  the  cost  of  the  great  public  festivals, 
and  the  duty  of  managing  them,  was  imposed  in 
the  form  of  "liturgies,"  or  compulsory  burdens, 
upon  wealthy  citizens,  who  had  to  serve  as  choregi 
at  the  Dionysiac  festivals,  or  as  stewards  of  the 
games,  or  in  sundry  other  capacities,  and  to  bear 
the  expenses  which  their  duties  entailed.  But 
indirect  taxes  could  not  be  increased  without 
becoming  too  serious  a  burden  upon  trade;  and 
therefore  any  extraordinary  expenses,  such  as 
those  of  a  time  of  war,  were  met  by  a  special  direct 
tax  upon  capital,  while  the  upkeep  of  the  fleet  was 
a  liturgy  laid  upon  the  rich  in  turn. 

We  have  already  seen  how  the  collection  of  the 
war-tax  was  organised  in  the  year  378-7,  by  the 
creation  of  the  Symmories ;  and  that  the  system  of 
collection  worked  well  on  the  whole  is  shown  by 
the  fact  that  on  the  occasion  when  Androtion, 
Timocrates,  and  others  were  appointed  to  get  in 
arrears  of  payment,  extending  over  a  good  many 


Athenian  State  in  Fourth  Century  B.  C.     93 

years,  the  total  arrears  amounted  to  fourteen 
talents  only,  out  of  three  hundred  that  had  been 
demanded  in  the  time. '  The  war-tax,  moreover, 
was  not  necessarily  burdensome,  though  it  might 
become  so;  in  the  case  of  Demosthenes  it  seems 
not  to  have  exceeded  one  per  cent,  per  annum  on 
the  assessed  value  of  his  property,  in  the  ten  years 
during  which  he  was  under  guardianship.  But  it 
was  in  theory  an  extraordinary  tax;  there  was  no 
permanent  revenue  applicable  to  military  pur- 
poses, and  no  regular  accumulation  of  a  surplus 
for  use  in  emergencies.  Eubulus  (for  reasons 
which  will  appear  later)  avoided  resorting  to  the 
war- tax  as  far  as  he  could ;  but  the  result  was  that 
the  generals  were  very  inadequately  supplied  with 
funds,  and  had  to  take  to  irregular  methods  of 
obtaining  them.  How  far  the  contributions  of  the 
allies  who  joined  in  the  second  Athenian  Confeder- 
acy were  at  the  disposal  of  Athens  there  is  no  direct 
evidence  to  show.  It  is  probable  that  the  consent 
of  the  Synod  of  the  allies,  as  well  as  that  of  the 
Athenian  Assembly,  was  strictly  required  before 
any  application  of  these  funds  could  be  made; 
though  in  the  year  341  Demosthenes  evidently 
contemplated  the  possibility  of  using  them  to 
maintain  the  Athenian  supremacy  in  the  Cher- 
sonese. ^  But  these  funds  were  very  much  dimin- 
ished by  the  Social  War.     Before  this  war  they 

'  Dem.,  in  Androt.,  §44.  The  exact  date  of  the  Commission 
and  the  precise  circumstances  of  its  appointment  are  much 
disputed,  but  the  figures  are  plain  enough.  '  De  Chers.,  §  21. 


I 


94  Demosthenes 

had  amounted  to  350  talents  yearly;  afterwards 
they  fell  at  once  to  ninety,  and  in  346  the  sum  was 
no  more  than  sixty  talents.  ^ 

The  trierarchic  system,  under  which  the  fleet 
was  equipped  and  manned,  had  also  serious  defects. 
In  former  times,  a  single  citizen  had  been  told  off 
to  equip  and  command  each  trireme.  But  towards 
the  end  of  the  Peloponnesian  War,  the  wealth  of 
the  richer  citizens  had  greatly  diminished,  and  it 
was  found  necessary  to  authorise  the  sharing  of 
the  responsibility  for  each  ship  by  two  citizens, 
each  of  whom  commanded  in  turn.  Any  one  who 
thought  himself  unjustly  called  upon  could  chal- 
lenge another,  whom  he  considered  to  be  better 
qualified  for  the  task,  either  to  undertake  the 
trierarchy  or  to  exchange  property  with  him. 
(How  this  right  was  abused  to  the  disadvantage 
of  Demosthenes  by  Aphobus  and  his  friends  we 
have  already  seen.) 

The  first  great  defect  in  this  system  lay  in  the 
delay  which  it  involved.^  Not  only  had  the 
Assembly  to  decide  upon  the  number  of  ships 
required,  and  the  proportions  of  citizens,  resident 
aliens,  and  mercenaries  to  be  called  upon  to  serve 
in  them — a  matter  upon  which  they  were  liable 
to  change  their  minds  more  than  once  before  doing 
anything, — but  time  had  to  be  given  in  which 

'iEsch.,  de  Fals.  Leg.,  §71;  comp.  Busolt,  Das  zweit.  Aih. 
Seebund,  pp.  723,  724. 

» Comp.  Dem.,  de  Fals.  Leg.,  §§  185-6;  Phil.  I.,  §  36. 


Athenian  State  in  Fourth  Century  B.   C.     95 

exchanges  of  property  could  be  made,  and  persons 
whose  means  were  not  immediately  forthcoming 
could  get  them  in  readiness  to  discharge  the  liturgy. 
There  was  also  great  difficulty  in  procuring  rowers 
and  crew.  Those  whose  names  were  on  the  lists 
drawn  up  by  public  officials  were  often  inefficient, 
and  a  public-spirited  trierarch  often  preferred  to 
hire  others.  In  either  case  the  arrangement 
between  the  captain  and  the  rowers  was  a  personal 
one,  and  the  rowers  were  liable  to  desert  if  they 
had  the  chance,  especially  if  they  were  not  punctu- 
ally paid  or  had  other  causes  for  dissatisfaction. 
Again,  the  dilatoriness  of  unwilling  trierarchs, 
though  after  a  certain  point  it  became  punish- 
able by  law,  was  a  further  source  of  delays.  It 
also  happened  not  infrequently  that  trierarchs  en- 
trusted their  duties  to  a  contractor,  who  equipped 
the  vessel  and  commanded  it  for  a  comparatively 
small  sum,  and  recouped  himself  by  committing 
acts  of  piracy  at  the  expense  of  friend  and  foe 
alike.  ^  The  financial  and  other  difficulties  were 
sometimes  so  great  that  the  State  was  obliged  to 
ask  patriotic  persons  to  volunteer  to  be  trierarchs, 
as  happened  in  the  year  358-7,  when  Demosthenes 
was  one  of  those  who  volunteered,  and  served  (as 
co-trierarch  with  Philinus)  in  the  expedition  to 
Euboea. ' 

'  These  points  are  amply  illustrated  by  the  Speech  on  the 
Trierarchic  Crown,  and  the  Speeches  (wrongly  ascribed  to 
Demosthenes)  against  Polycles,  and  against  Euergus  and  Mnesi- 
belus.  '  Dem.,  in  Meidiam,  §  i6i. 


96  Demosthenes 

In  the  same  year,  in  view  of  the  grave  financial 
situation  produced  by  the  Social  War,  a  law  pro- 
posed by  Periander  assimilated  the  trierarchic 
system  to  that  by  which  the  war-tax  was  collected. 
Twenty  Boards  or  Symmories  were  established  to 
provide  the  sums  necessary  for  the  equipment  of 
the  triremes;  there  were  sixty  persons  in  each 
Board,  and  the  total  number  of  persons  liable  for 
trierarchy  was  therefore  1200.  The  management 
within  each  Board  rested  with  the  richer  men 
(though  there  is  no  evidence  that  they  had  to 
advance  the  money,  as  in  the  case  of  the  war-tax) : 
but  they  used  their  power  to  escape  their  own  share 
of  payment — ^all  members  paid  the  same  share, 
whatever  their  property — ^and  so  to  overburden 
their  poorer  colleagues.  The  plan  (which  still 
continued  to  be  commonly  adopted)  by  which 
the  work  of  equipment  was  provided  for  by  con- 
tract, and  was  rather  a  matter  of  business  than  of 
personal  interest  or  patriotism,  was  doubtless  an 
unfortunate  one,  and  in  general  the  company-sys- 
tem must  have  diminished  the  efficiency  and  zeal  of 
the  service.  But  for  the  moment  it  provided  what 
was  most  of  all  needed — ^a  businesslike  method 
of  getting  the  funds  required  for  the  navy. 

The  worst  element,  perhaps,  in  the  Athenian 
financial  system  was  the  distribution  of  "Theoric 
money"  to  the  citizens  to  enable  them  to  enjoy  the 
pubUc  festivals.  The  exact  place  of  the  Theoric 
Fund  in  relation  to  the  general  revenues  of  the 
State  has  been  much   disputed.     But  it  would 


Athenian  State  in  Fourth  Century  B.C.     97 

appear  that  at  the  beginning  of  each  year,  the 
Assembly  passed  a  Budget,  allocating  to  special 
purposes  and  to  particular  funds  as  much  as  was 
required  by  each;  and  that  the  surplus  or  unal- 
located revenues  passed  in  time  of  war  into  the 
military  chest,  in  time  of  peace  into  the  Theoric 
Fund,  and  that  from  the  latter  they  were  distrib- 
uted to  the  citizens.  This  distribution  appears 
to  have  been  introduced  by  the  strongly  demo- 
cratic politician  Agyrrhius,  early  in  the  fourth 
century,  and  to  have  been  a  revival  in  principle, 
if  not  in  detail,  of  distributions  which  had  been 
made  in  the  previous  century ,  ^  and  we  shall  see 
that  about  the  time  at  which  Demosthenes  came 
forward,  a  special  law  was  passed  increasing  the 
sums  distributed,  including  (probably)  a  limited 
allocation  to  military  purposes  in  the  Budget,  and 
providing  that  the  whole  of  the  surplus  should 
always  pass  into  the  Theoric,  not  into  the  miHtary 
fund.*  No  doubt  the  distribution  had  a  certain 
religious  colour.  The  festivals  were  all  in  honour 
of  the  gods,  and  there  was  at  least  a  feeling  that 
their  hearty  celebration  was  likely  to  bring  good 
luck.  3     But    however    strongly    piety    might    be 

'  Comp.  Motzki  {Euhulus  von  Probalinthos  u.  seine  Finanz- 
politik,  pp.  49  ff.)  who  shows  that  the  distribution  of  Theoric 
money  was  probably  begun  by  Pericles,  and  was  distinct  from  the 
distributions  in  relief  of  poverty  instituted  by  Cleophon. 

»  See  below,  Ch.  IV.,  p.  127. 

»The  feeling  was  not  very  deep;  and  the  shallowness  of  the 
religious  sentiment  in  regard  to  the  festivals  is  shown  by  the 
treatment  of  the  subject  in  Anaximenes'  Art  of  Rhetoric,  ch.  ii. 


98  Demosthenes 

pleaded  in  favour  of  the  distribution,  it  can  hardly 
be  doubted  that  pleasure  rather  than  piety  was 
the  basis  of  its  popularity,  and  the  rigidity  of  the 
law  which  enjoined  it  was  a  great  disadvantage 
to  the  State.  We  have  here  one  indication  among 
many  of  the  reluctance  of  the  Athenian  democracy 
to  put  the  pleasure  of  the  moment  in  any  but  the 
first  place.  In  358  there  appears  for  the  first  time 
a  special  Board  of  Superintendents  of  the  Theoric 
Fund,  ten  in  number,  appointed  to  hold  office  for 
four  years,  after  which  they  were  not  re-eligible. 
It  may  be  assumed  that  a  capable  financier, 
elected  a  member  of  this  Board,  was  able  to 
control  its  policy,  and  that  even  when  his  own 
term  of  office  was  over,  he  might  maintain  his 
control  through  the  election  of  one  of  his  sympa- 
thisers. Thus  Eubulus  was  a  member  of  the 
Theoric  Commission  from  354  to  350,  and  his 
supporter  Aphobetus  (the  brother  of  ^schines) 
from  350  to  346.''  ^schines^  tells  us  that  the 
members  of  this  Board,  "owing  to  the  confidence 
which  the  people  placed  in  Eubulus,"  held  all  the 
important  financial  offices ^  of  State  between  them, 

*  Others  who  were  members  of  the  Commission  were  Diophan- 
tus  of  Sphettus,  358  to  354;  Cephisodotus,  346  to  342;  and 
Demosthenes,  338  to  334. 

'  In  Ctes.,  §25. 

3  Such  as  the  offices  of  the  Apodectae,  who  received  the  incom- 
ing funds;  and  of  the  Financial  Secretary  {&vri'ypa<l>e{i%)  whose 
business  was  to  report  the  state  of  public  funds  to  the  People. 
(Eschines  says  that  this  state  of  things  continued  "until  the  law 
of  Hegemon  was  passed,"  i.e.  until  after  336. 


Athenian  State  in  Fourth  Century  B.C.     99 

and  controlled  practically  the  whole  administra- 
tion. It  was  not  until  a  year  or  so  before  the 
battle  of  Chaeroneia  that  Demosthenes  succeeded 
in  applying  the  Theoric  money  to  military  pur- 
poses; and  the  continuance  of  the  Theoric  Board 
shows  that  the  distributions  were  afterwards  re- 
vived. Shortly  after  the  battle  there  appears  a 
separate  Treasurer  of  the  Military  Fund,  appointed 
for  four  years  at  a  time.  ^ 

It  should  be  added  that  special  needs  might  be 
met  by  the  assignment  of  special  commissions  to 
individuals  or  to  small  groups  of  persons.  Thus 
we  hear  of  Commissioners  of  Walls,  of  Dockyards, 
and  of  the  Fleet ;  of  Superintendents  of  the  Corn- 
Supply  (an  office  held  in  357-6  by  Callisthenes, 
and  in  338-7  by  Demosthenes);  and  of  other 
specially  commissioned  officials. 

We  have  lastly  to  consider  the  conduct  of  mili- 
tary matters.  The  two  points  which  are  of  most 
importance  are  the  comparative  independence 
of  the  generals,  and  the  employment  of  mercena- 
ries, who  formed  the  larger  proportion  of  almost 
every  force.  The  great  generals  of  this  period, 
though  there  is  no  reason  to  doubt  their  loyalty, 
were  not  so  closely  attached  to  the  city  as  those 
of  the  fifth  century  had  been :  or,  rather,  a  distinc- 
tion appears  to  have  grown  up  between  the  rela- 
tively independent  general  who  was  responsible  for 
the  conduct  of  war,  and  his  nominal  colleagues  who 

'Note  4. 


100  Demosthenes 

had  to  organise  the  preparations  for  war  at  home 
and  to  perform  various  duties  of  a  civil  rather 
than  of  a  miHtary  character. '^  The  militant 
general,  as  a  rule,  came  less  frequently  to  Athens. 
He  might  of  coiirse  be  recalled  and  put  on  his 
trial  like  any  other  officer  of  the  State,  and  the 
Athenians  got  rid  of  some  of  their  most  capable 
commanders  by  this  means.  But  for  the  most 
part  he  was  closely  attached  to  his  men;  and,  if 
not  employed  in  the  service  of  Athens,  he  had  no 
difficulty  in  finding  for  them  under  other  masters 
the  work  and  the  pay  which  they  expected.* 
The  day  of  professional  armies,  and  of  an  almost 
regimental  organisation  of  mercenaries,  each  body 
having  its  general  or  captain,  had  now  begun.  The 
soldier  came  less  and  less  into  touch  with  civil  life; 
and  we  hear  of  Iphicrates,  Chabrias,  Chares,  and 
others,  when  unemployed,  living  away  from 
Athens.  ^  There  is  no  doubt  that  generals  who 
were  both  indispensable  and  independent  were 
often  regarded  by  the  democracy  with  a  certain 
mistrust,  while  at  the  same  time,  on  account  of 
their  indispensableness,  they  were  flattered  and 
complimented  and  were  awarded  distinctions  in  a 
way  which  Demosthenes  regarded  as  unworthy  of 
a  vigorous  and  self-reliant  people.  "^ 

'  Comp.,  Dem.,  Phil,  I,  §26.  Philip  is  said  to  have  expressed 
his  surprise  that  the  Athenians  could  find  ten  generals  every 
year,  when  he  had  found  but  one  in  all  his  life,  viz.,  Parmenio 
(Plut.,  Apophth.  Phil.,  §2). 

» Comp.  Dem.,  Olynth.  II,  §  28. 

3  See  Theopompus,  fr.  103  (Oxford  Text).  *  Note  5. 


Athenian  State  in  Fourth  Century  B.  C.   lOi 

A  number  of  causes  had  contributed  to  the  change 
by  which  the  greater  part  of  the  Athenian  army 
came  to  be  commonly  composed  of  mercenaries. 
In  the  first  place,  the  Athenian  citizen  had  become 
much  less  ready  to  serve  in  person.  That  the  best 
educated  and  most  philosophic  minds  tended  to 
think  lightly  of  military  power  and  imperial  aims 
counted  for  something;  for  it  could  not  be  without 
effect  that  the  great  teachers  did  not  intimately 
connect  the  good  life  of  the  individual  with  such 
ideals.  But  it  counted  for  much  more,  that  the 
Athenians  were  coming  to  be  more  and  more 
absorbed  in  business,  and  found  that  their  busi- 
ness must  go  to  pieces  if  they  were  continuously 
absent  for  any  length  of  time  on  •  military  ser- 
vice; and  their  reluctance  naturally  increased,  as 
campaigning-seasons  became  longer,  and  military 
operations  ceased  to  be  confined  to  a  few  months 
of  the  summer. ' 

In  the  second  place,  the  art  of  fighting  had 
become  much  more  specialised,  and  the  trained 
skill  of  the  professional  soldier  had  become  almost 
necessary.  New  weapons,  new  and  better  organ- 
ised kinds  of  troops,  were  employed,  and  every 
arm  of  the  force  needed  practice  and  training.^ 
The  old  conventional  methods  of  warfare  had  given 
way  to  tactics  of  a  more  ingenious  kind;  and  had 
the  citizens  of  Athens  been  willing  to  serve  in 
larger  numbers,  they  could  not  have  supplied  all 
that  was  needed  in  an  army  of  the  fourth  century. 

•  See  Dem.,  Phil.  III.,  §§  48,  49.  « Ibid.,  §§  47,  49. 


102  Demosthenes 

In  the  third  place,  there  was  an  abundance  of 
men  ready  to  be  employed  as  mercenaries.  In 
former  days  the  surplus  population  had  been 
drafted  off  by  emigration  to  newly  founded  colo- 
nies. But  the  available  sites  for  colonisation  had 
all  been  taken,  and  at  the  same  time  population 
continued  to  grow,  while  the  supply  of  home-grown 
com  in  most  parts  of  Greece  diminished  rather 
than  increased.  The  pressure  was  particularly 
felt  among  the  agrictiltural  peoples,  with  whom 
the  food-supply  was  not  adequate  for  the  numbers 
and  was  not  so  easily  supplemented  by  imported 
corn,  since  the  imported  corn  was  mostly  used  up 
in  the  towns.  In  a  modem  State  there  would 
probably  have  been  an  inflow  into  the  towns  to 
find  work.  To  some  extent  this  may  have  hap- 
pened in  Greece,  and  the  numbers  of  the  idle 
proletariat  were  possibly  swollen  by  such  immi- 
grations. But  in  the  towns  workmen  were  little 
needed,  owing  to  the  regular  employment  of 
slave-labour;  and  even  if  work  could  be  found, 
the  existence  of  slavery  was  bound  to  keep  the 
wages  of  the  free  workmen  very  low  both  in  town 
and  country.^  It  was  more  profitable,  and  at 
the  same  time  more  exciting,  to  take  service  under 
a  captain  of  mercenaries,  and  to  fight  for  the  State 

'  This  view  has  been  contradicted  by  Mr.  A.  E.  Zimmem  in 
the  Sociological  Review,  vol.  ii,  Nos.  i  and  2  (1909).  In  spite  of 
his  extremely  interesting  discussion,  I  do  not  think  that  the  facts 
which  he  adduces  really  prove  his  case.  On  the  whole  matter, 
however,  a  more  complete  sifting  of  the  evidence  is  required. 


I 


Athenian  State  in  Fourth  Century  B.  C.    103 

which  would  bid  highest,  or  in  the  war  in  which 
there  was  Hkely  to  be  most  plunder.  Above  all, 
the  result  of  long  wars,  and  of  political  exile,  and 
of  the  revolutions  which  were  always  happening  in 
one  State  or  another  had  been  to  fill  the  country 
with  homeless  men,  who  were  ready  enough  to 
risk  their  lives  for  the  wage  offered,  and  for  the 
chance  of  adventure  and  booty.  But  though  the 
existence  of  men  eager  to  be  mercenary  soldiers 
and  the  readiness  of  States  to  employ  them  are 
easily  explained,  the  consequences  of  the  mercen- 
ary system  were  none  the  less  deplorable.  Though 
as  a  rule  the  Athenian  general  was  loyal  to  his 
employers,  he  was  partly  at  the  mercy  of  his  men, 
whose  allegiance  sat  more  loosely  upon  them; 
and  sometimes  (as  was  the  case  with  Charidemus) 
it  mattered  as  little  to  him  as  to  them  for  whom 
they  fought.  Even  though  we  do  not  find  at  this 
period  any  conspicuous  instances  of  treachery  or 
cowardice  on  the  part  of  mercenary  armies,  it  is 
clear  from  many  statements  of  Demosthenes  and 
others  that  such  armies  could  not  be  expected  to 
share  the  intense  patriotism  of  a  citizen-force 
whose  own  interests  were  at  stake.  Ruskin,^ 
in  a  remarkable  passage,  insists  that  the  soldier's 
business  is  not  killing,  but  being  killed.  The 
mercenary  soldier  probably  tended  to  take  the 
opposite  view.  In  addition  to  this,  the  mercenary 
must  be  always  fighting,  or  at  least  plundering. 
To  be  unemployed  meant  starvation.     The  mer- 

'  Unto  this  Last,  ch.  i. 


104  Demosthenes 

cenary  bands  which  roamed  over  Greece  were  a 
terror  to  all ;  and  if,  when  employed  by  Athens  or 
any  other  State,  they  were  not  punctually  paid, 
they  helped  themselves  at  the  expense  of  friends 
and  foes  alike.  The  allies  of  Athens,  Demosthenes  ^ 
says,  lived  in  deadly  fear  of  the  forces  that  Athens 
sent  out ;  and  Athenian  statesmen  could  not  always 
resist  the  temptation  to  avoid  the  imposition  of 
taxes,  by  letting  the  commanders  and  armies  find 
supplies  for  themselves,  even  by  plundering  the 
towns  and  ships  of  the  allies.  ^ 

We  have  now  surveyed  some  of  the  principal 
aspects  of  the  public  life  of  Athens  in  the  middle 
of  the  fourth  centiuy ;  and  the  conclusion  must  be 
that  the  Athenian  State  was  quite  unfitted  to  faoe 
the  impending  struggle  with  Philip  of  Macedon. 
The  better  as  well  as  the  worse  elements  in  aristo- 
cracy had  been  thrown  away.  It  is  conceivable 
that  a  democracy  in  which  the  share  taken  by  the 
People  in  government  was  confined  to  the  wise 
choice  of  responsible  leaders  and  the  determina- 
tion of  main  issues,  and  in  which  the  whole  of  the 
detailed  and  practical  administration  was  placed 
in  skilled  hands  (of  course  with  the  proper  safe- 
guards), might  have  been  successful;  not  only 
because  the  part  played  by  Athens  herself  could 
have  been  better  regulated,  but  also  because 
skilled  statesmen  and  diplomatists  might  have 
brought  about  such  a  combination  of  all  the  Powers 

'  Dem.,  in  Aristocr.,  §  139,  Phil.  I.,  §  45;  cf.  Isocr.,  Philippus, 
120  f.,  de  Pace,  44-8.  '  Dem.,  de  Chers.,  §§  22-26. 


i 


Athenian  State  in  Fourth  Century  B.  C.   105 

as  no  Assembly  could  ever  have  achieved.  But 
the  Athenian  democracy  could  never  have  trusted 
its  leaders  enough  to  give  them  a  sufficiently  free 
hand  in  the  conduct  of  military  and  international 
affairs;  and  its  failure  was  largely  due  to  its  deep- 
seated  jealousy  of  able  men.  Had  it  not  been  for 
this,  there  would  have  been  a  possibility  of  carry- 
ing out  reforms  in  many  departments  of  the  State, 
which  would  have  made  for  efficiency  and  success. 
What  reforms  were  needed,  Demosthenes,  among 
others,  shows  himself  well  aware ;  but  Demosthenes 
had  not  a  free  hand  until  it  was  too  late. 

It  must  be  acknowledged  that  the  jealousy  of 
the  Athenians  was  not  unfounded.  The  possession 
of  great  or  uncontrolled  power  seems,  among  the 
Greeks,  to  have  been  extraordinarily  fatal  to 
character.  The  lesson  taught  by  tyrannies  and 
oligarchies  was  that  power  and  selfishness  of  the 
most  brutal  kind  were  never  far  apart;  and  the 
few  instances  that  Greek  history  provided  of 
the  wise  and  public-spirited  lawgiver  were  not  suffi- 
cient to  diminish  the  effect  of  this  lesson.  But  in 
consequence  of  this,  the  Athenian  democracy  did 
not  realise  the  one  condition  without  which,  it 
would  seem,  any  democracy  must  go  down  in 
■presence  of  able  and  determined  foes — the  frank 
acknowledgment  of  an  aristocracy  of  those  who 
have  the  power  to  think,  to  foresee,  to  plan,  and 
to  command. 

Another  consideration  points  to  the  sam.e  con- 
clusion.    In  time  of  peace,  government  by  general 


io6  Demosthenes 

discussion  is  conceivably  a  possible  method.  But 
in  time  of  war,  when  men  throw  off  their  civilisa- 
tion and  revert  to  primitive  types  of  action,  the 
more  primitive  types  of  government  also  seem  to 
be  necessary  to  success ;  and  something  like  despot- 
ism— though  it  may  be  the  voluntarily  accepted 
despotism  of  the  best  or  ablest  men — can  alone  give 
a  State  the  coherence,  and  its  action  the  prompt- 
ness and  effectiveness,  without  which  failure  is 
almost  inevitable.  So  far  a  true  instinct  is  shown 
by  most  of  the  more  reflective  writers  of  the  fourth 
century,  in  the  strong  sentiment  which  they 
display  in  favour  of  some  kind  of  monarchy. 
Isocrates,  for  purposes  of  peace,  favours  a  kind 
of  popularly  elected  aristocracy  of  those  whom  he 
regards  as  the  wisest  men  in  Athens;  but  when  he 
thinks  of  war,  turns  to  the  idea  of  the  absolute 
rule  of  some  one  great  man — ^Jason  or  Dionysius  or 
Philip  himself.  But  in  the  fourth  century  these 
were  only  the  impracticable  fancies  of  spectators. 
Most  of  those  who  were  engaged  on  the  Athenian 
side  in  the  game  of  politics  and  war  had  no  such 
sentiments;  and  they  lost  the  game. 

NOTES  TO  CHAPTER  III 

I.  Agyrrhius  (see  above,  p.  44)  had  made  the  pay  for  attend- 
ance three  obols.  It  is  generally  believed  that  by  the  middle  of 
the  fourth  century  it  had  been  raised  to  one  drachma  (six  obols), 
in  order  that  the  remuneration  might  correspond  to  the  rise  in 
•wages  and  the  fall  in  the  value  of  money  which  had  taken  place. 
But  this  is  denied  by  Brandis  (Pauly-Wissowa,  Real-Encyclopddte, 
s,  V.  Ekklesia)  and  Sundwall  (Epigraphische  Beilrdge  zur  sozial- 


Athenian  State  in  Fourth  Century  B.  C.  107 

politischen  Geschichte  Athens,  p.  68).     Sundwall  seems  to  me  to 
underrate  the  preponderance  of  the  masses  in  the  Assembly. 

2.  On  this  subject  see  especially  Haussouiller,  La  vie  munici- 
pale  en  Attique.  Sundwall  {op.  ctt.,  p.  56)  thinks  that  it  was  only 
those  who  belonged  to  the  strata  of  society  above  the  poorest  that 
took  much  part  either  in  local  or  in  State  aflfairs.  Even  so,  local 
politics  would  educate  a  large  number  of  members  of  the  Assem- 
bly ;  and  the  Speech  against  Eubulides  shows  that  men  who  were 
quite  poor  might  play  an  important  part  in  the  life  of  their  deme. 

3.  Sundwall  shows  that  the  proportion  of  men  of  some 
property  was  in  all  probability  larger  in  the  Council  than  in  the 
Assembly.  No  doubt  the  number  of  such  persons  who  would  be 
interested  in  politics  and  would  feel  themselves  able  to  take  part 
in  the  administration  would  be  larger  in  proportion  than  that  of 
the  politically-minded  members  of  the  poorer  class;  and  so  the 
operation  of  the  lot  would  not  be  quite  so  haphazard  as  would 
seem  probable  at  first  sight.  But  even  so,  there  was  no  guarantee 
that  the  majority  would  be  fit  for  their  work;  and  though  such  a 
method  of  selection  might  seem  to  be  the  logical  consequence  of 
democracy,  it  is  hard  to  imagine  a  sillier.  (It  was  no  doubt 
deliberately  devised  for  the  express  purpose  of  preventing  men 
of  ability  from  obtaining  continuous  influence.) 

4.  There  is  not  sufficient  ground  for  dating  as  far  back  as  the 
middle  of  the  century  the  office  of  Superintendent  of  the  Ad- 
ministration (6  iwl  T5  dioiKT^ffei)  which  first  appears  in  322-1 — 
possibly  in  substitution  for  the  Theoric  Board,  of  which  we  hear 
no  more  after  that  time.  On  the  whole  subject  of  the  Theoric 
Board  and  other  financial  offices,  see  Sundwall,  op.  cit.,  pp.  41-43, 
and  Francotte,  Les  Finances  des  Cites  Crecques  (esp.  pp.  213  flF.)» 
in  whose  pages  nearly  all  the  evidence  will  be  found.  Ferguson 
(Hellenistic  Athens,  pp.  473-5)  attempts,  but  inconclusively,  to 
disprove  the  four  years'  tenure  of  the  Theoric  Commissioners. 
Motzki  {Euhulos  von  Probahnthos  und  seine  Finanzpohttk)  also 
discusses  the  various  questions  raised,  but  on  a  number  of  points 
I  am  unable  to  agree  with  him.  In  view  of  the  want  of  evidence 
and  the  complexity  of  the  subject,  the  account  given  in  the  text 
must  not  be  taken  as  more  than  probable  in  regard  to  details, 
though  there  is  no  doubt  of  the  main  point — the  drain  on  the 
State  funds  caused  by  the  Theorica,  which  should  have  been  either 
used  for  war  or  held  in  reserve. 


io8  Demosthenes 

The  system  of  providing  funds  for  the  State  by  raising  loans  at 
interest  was  very  rarely  resorted  to  in  ancient  Greece.  See  Zim- 
mem,  Athenian  Commonwealth,  p.  205. 

5.  A  passage  of  the  Xlllth  Oration  (irepl  ffvvra^im)  in  the 
Demosthenic  Collection — an  oration  which  is  certainly  not  the 
work  of  Demosthenes  as  it  stands,  but  contains  much  Demos- 
thenic material  and  doubtless  represents  the  orator's  sentiments 
— calls  attention  in  a  striking  way  to  the  change  of  tone  which 
had  taken  place  since  old  days  in  regard  to  the  generals:  "Your 
forefathers  did  not  erect  statues  of  Themistocles,  who  com- 
manded in  the  sea-fight  at  Salamis,  nor  of  Miltiades,  the  leader 
of  the  army  at  Marathon,  nor  of  many  others  whose  services  were 
beyond  all  comparison  with  those  of  the  generals  of  the  present 
day;  but  they  honoured  them  as  their  own  equals.  For  the  People 
would  not  then  forego  the  credit  of  any  of  its  achievements;  nor 
would  any  one  have  spoken  of  the  victories  at  Salamis  and  Mara- 
thon as  victories  of  Themistocles  and  Miltiades,  but  as  victories 
of  Athens.  But  to-day  we  hear  people  saying  that  Timotheus 
captured  Corcyra,  and  Iphicrates  cut  up  a  Spartan  troop,  and 
Chabrias  won  the  sea-fight  at  Naxos.  You  give  up  your  own 
claim  to  credit  for  these  successes,  when  you  pay  these  extrava- 
gant honours  to  each  of  your  generals."  The  passage  is  found 
in  a  slightly  expanded  form  in  the  Speech  against  Aristocrates, 
§§  196  flE. 


CHAPTER  IV 

THE  BEGINNING  OF  DEMOSTHENES*  CAREER 

IT  has  already  been  narrated  that  Aristophon 
succeeded,  about  the  year  361,  to  the  position 
of  influence  from  which  CalHstratus  had  been 
driven  in  consequence  of  the  failure  of  the  Athenian 
armies  in  the  neighbourhood  of  the  Chersonese, 
and  that  in  the  early  years  of  Aristophon's  leader- 
ship, the  Chersonese  had  been  secured  for  Athens, 
chiefly  as  the  result  of  operations  conducted  by 
Chares,  who  was  himself  a  favourite  of  the  People,  ^ 
and  aided  Aristophon  in  the  execution  of  his  policy 
both  then  and  afterwards.  But  the  apparent 
change  for  the  better  in  the  affairs  of  Athens  was 
very  soon  cut  short  by  the  outbreak  of  the  Social 
War  in  the  year  358-7.  The  causes  of  the  war  were 
twofold.  In  the  first  place,  the  Athenians  had 
violated  the  spirit,  if  not  the  letter,  of  their  agree- 
ment with  the  members  of  the  Second  Confederacy, 
both  by  sending  Athenian  settlers  to  the  allied 
cities,  and  by  other  high-handed  proceedings.  The 
aggressive  action  of  Chares  towards  Chios  and 
Rhodes  and  other  cities  was  perhaps  the  immediate 

'  See  Theopompus,  fr.  205  (Oxford  Text). 
109 


no  Demosthenes 

occasion  of  the  outbreak,  though  this  is  uncertain.  * 
In  the  second  place,  the  allegiance  of  some  of  the 
allies  had  been  weakened  by  the  activity  of  Thebes, 
and  particularly  by  the  naval  campaign  of  Epamei- 
nondas  in  364-3.  Aristophon  indeed  desired  to 
be  on  friendly  terms  with  Thebes,  and  his  chief 
opponent  Eubulus  shared  the  desire.  ^  But  nothing 
came  of  it.  In  358  the  most  powerful  of  the 
allies  declared  war  on  Athens. 

There  is  no  need  to  follow  the  disastrous  course 
of  the  war  in  detail.  It  was  marked  by  two 
features  characteristic  of  the  time; — ^first  the 
prosecution  of  Timotheus  and  Iphicrates,  who 
had  been  the  two  most  successful  commanders 
under  the  regime  of  Callistratus,  and  were  still 
probably  the  best  admirals  that  Athens  possessed, 
by  Aristophon  and  Chares,^  owing  to  their  ill- 
success  against  the  allies;  and  secondly,  the 
intervention  of  the  King  of  Persia  in  the  quarrel. 
In  the  course  of  the  war,  Chares,  while  acting  as 
Athenian  admiral,  went  of  his  own  accord  to  the 
assistance  of  the  revolted  satrap  Artabazus.  The 
Persian  King  retaliated  by  giving  his  countenance 
to  the  allies;  and  his  vassal,  Mausolus  of  Caria, 
gave  them  active  assistance.  The  Athenians 
recalled  Chares,  on  receiving  a  protest  from  the 
King;  and  in  order  to  avoid  a  war  with  the  King, 
who  had  to  a  great  extent  succeeded  in  reviving 
the  strength  and  improving  the  organisation  of  his 

»  See  Dem.,  pro  Rhod.,  §  3.  '  Dem.,  de  Cor.,  §  162. 

3  Chabrias,  the  third  great  general,  was  killed  in  the  war  in  358. 


Beginning  of  Demosthenes'  Career     iii 

kingdom,  they  were  forced  also  to  acknowledge 
the  independence  of  Chios,  Cos,  Rhodes,  and 
Byzantium.  Very  soon  afterwards  Selymbria, 
Perinthus,  Methymna,  and  Mytilene  withdrew 
from  the  Athenian  confederacy;  and  though  the 
confederacy  continued  to  exist,  and  the  Synod  of 
the  allies  still  met,  there  remained  but  the  shadow 
of  the  great  alliance  organised  by  Callistratus. 
As  the  disasters  of  the  Social  War  gradually  broke 
down  the  influence  of  Aristophon,  his  opponent 
Eubulus  came  more  and  more  into  prominence, 
fighting  his  way  largely  by  means  of  judicial 
prosecutions,^  and  gradually  gathering  around 
him  a  group  of  able  men — ^^schines,  for  instance, 
who  had  once  supported  Aristophon,^  and  his 
brother  Aphobetus — until,  about  the  year  355, 
he  had  attained  the  leading  position  in  the  State. 
It  was  probably  though  his  influence  that  peace 
was  made  with  the  allies  in  355.^ 

It  was  during  the  years  of  the  Social  War  that 
Demosthenes'  first  two  speeches  on  political  sub- 
jects were  composed.  The  war  had  involved  an 
intolerable  strain  upon  the  financial  resources  of 
the  city :  more  than  one  thousand  talents  had  been 
spent  in   three   years   upon   mercenaries   alone'': 

'  Dem.,  in  Meid.,  §§  207,  218,  and  schol.;  de  Fals.  Leg.,  §§  191, 
293.  ^  Dem.,  de  Fals.  Leg.,  §291. 

i  Schol.  ad  Dem.,  Olynth.  Ill,  §  28. 

<  Isocr.,  Areop.,  §9.  The  Speech  of  Isocrates  On  the  Peace 
illustrates  the  extreme  exhaustion  of  the  city.  The  law  of 
Periander  (see  p.  96)  was  one  of  the  measures  designed  to  obtain 
funds  promptly- 


1 12  Demosthenes 

and  the  nervousness  which  evidently  prevailed 
in  regard  to  the  finances  of  the  city  is  illustrated 
by  these  speeches,  both  of  which  had  their  origin 
in  proposals  of  a  financial  character. 

In  or  about  the  year  356,  Androtion,  a  pupil  of 
Isocrates,  but  (if  Demosthenes  gives  us  a  true 
portrait  of  him)  a  person  of  brutal  temperament 
and  immoral  life,  proposed  the  appointment  of  a 
commission  to  get  in  the  arrears  of  the  war-tax, 
which  amounted  to  fourteen  talents.^  Either, 
Androtion  declared,  the  sacred  vessels  used  in 
religious  processions  must  be  melted  down  and 
made  into  coin,  or  there  must  be  a  fresh  war- tax, 
or  the  arrears  must  be  called  in.  The  latter  course 
naturally  commended  itself  as  the  least  objec- 
tionable; a  commission  was  appointed,  and  was 
given  the  assistance  of  the  Apodectae  (the  receivers 
of  public  moneys)  and  of  the  Eleven  (the  chief 
police-officers);  and  among  the  commissioners 
were  Androtion  and  his  friend  Timocrates.  Andro- 
tion appears  to  have  behaved  with  great  incon- 
siderateness — even  with  some  cruelty — ^in  exacting 
the  money  due;  and  the  feeling  aroused  by  this 
encouraged  two  of  his  personal  enemies,  Euctemon 
and  Diodorus,  to  prosecute  him  shortly  afterwards, 
not  on  a  matter  arising  out  of  the  commission  itself, 
but  on  a  charge  of  proposing  an  illegal  decree." 

'  How  there  came  to  be  arrears  under  a  system  by  which  the 
rich  advanced  the  sums  levied  is  not  clear.  Perhaps  they  had 
failed  to  advance  the  whole  of  the  amounts  required  of  them. 
The  sums  still  owing  were  very  small ;  hardly  any  one  owed  more 
than  a  mina.  »  Note  i  at  the  end  of  the  Chapter. 


Beginning  of  Demosthenes'  Career      113 

The  decree  thus  attacked  was  one  awarding  crowns 
to  the  Council  which  went  out  of  office  in  the 
summer  of  355,  and  of  which  Androtion  himself 
had  been  a  member.  It  was  said  to  contravene 
two  laws — ^first,  that  which  required  a  preliminary 
resolution  of  the  Council  itself,  before  any  proposal 
could  be  made  to  the  Assembly;  and  secondly, 
that  which  forbade  the  award  of  crowns — the 
regular  form  of  compliment  to  an  outgoing  Council 
— to  any  Council  which  had  not  bmlt  a  certain 
number  of  triremes.  The  proposal  was  further 
stated  to  be  unlawful,  because  Androtion  had 
been  guilty  of  immoral  practices  which  disquali- 
fied him  from  taking  part  in  public  business;  and 
Androtion's  argimient,  that  the  enmity  against 
him  was  really  due  to  his  public-spirited  services 
in  recovering  the  arrears  of  the  war-tax,  was,  it 
was  urged,  quite  iinjustified;  as  was  also  his  claim 
to  gratitude  for  his  treatment  of  certain  sacred 
treasures,  which  he  had  melted  down  and  recast, 
thereby  enhancing  their  value:  his  official  conduct 
had  really  been  such  as  to  deserve  the  utmost 
reprobation.  Such  was  the  case  put  in  the  mouth 
of  Diodorus,  whose  speech  (which  followed  that 
of  Euctemon)  was  composed  for  him  by  Demos- 
thenes. But  Androtion  could  reply  that  a  Council 
could  not  be  expected  to  propose  a  vote  of  thanks 
to  itself;  and  that  the  Council  had  actually  col- 
lected the  funds  for  building  the  necessary  number 
of  triremes,  but  that  one  of  the  officials  had  ab- 
sconded with  them.     This  fact  certainly  freed  the 


114  Demosthenes 

Council  from  blame;  nor  could  the  enormity  of 
Androtion's  personal  conduct  be  held  to  justify 
the  infliction  of  a  stigma  upon  the  whole  Council. 
Androtion  therefore  was  properly  acquitted. 
Demosthenes,  though  he  makes  Diodorus  warn 
the  jury  to  beware  of  the  unscrupulous  ingenuity 
of  his  rhetorically  trained  adversary,  himself 
writes  to  his  brief,  and  that  brief  a  bad  one^;  so 
that  his  arguments  appear  suspiciously  subtle 
and  sophistical. 

We  do  not  know  why  Demosthenes  undertook 
the  case.  It  may  be  that  Androtion  was  a  sup- 
porter of  Aristophon,  and  that  Demosthenes  was 
trying  his  hand  first  on  the  side  of  the  Opposition. 
(Aristophon  had  certainly  himself  proposed  a 
similar  commission  to  enquire  into  cases  of  debt 
to  the  sacred  and  secular  funds  of  the  State'; 
and  it  is  therefore  probable  that  Androtion's 
decree  had  his  approval.)  Or  he  may  have  been 
particularly  interested  in  the  case  on  account  of 
the  alleged  failure  of  the  Council  to  build  the 
proper  number  of  ships.  That  his  interest  in  all 
that  affected  the  navy  was  already  active  had 
been  shown  by  the  Speech  on  the  Trierarchic 
Crown,  and  by  his  own  repeated  service  in  person 
as  trierarch;  and  it  was  to  be  still  more  plainly 
proved  in  the  following  year.  The  passage  in  the 
Speech  against  Androtion  ^  in  which  he  emphasises 

'  It  is  very  probable  that  he  had  some  technical  justification, 
in  point  of  law;  but  he  had  none  in  equity. 

»  Dem.,  in  Timocr.,  §  ii.  3§§  12-16. 


Beginning  of  Demosthenes'  Career     115 

and  illustrates  from  history  the  dependence  of  the 
prosperity  of  Athens  upon  the  efficiency  of  the 
navy  is  thoroughly  characteristic  of  him.  Be- 
sides this,  he  may  well  have  been  moved  to  indigna- 
tion, as  he  often  was  later,  by  what  seemed  to  him 
to  be  rascality  masquerading  in  the  guise  of  service 
to  the  State;  and  it  is  at  least  of  interest  that  he 
claimed  now,  as  later,  to  try  the  conduct  of  politi- 
cians even  in  small  things  by  the  standard  of  the 
highest  traditions  of  the  city.  Androtion  pro- 
fessed to  have  increased  the  value  of  certain  golden 
crowns,  which  had  been  awarded  as  marks  of 
honour  and  dedicated  in  the  temples,  by  recasting 
them  into  the  form  of  golden  cups, — mere  signs  of 
wealth. 

And  [says  Demosthenes]  he  did  not  even  observe 
that  never  to  this  day  has  this  People  been  eager  for 
the  acquisition  of  money;  but  for  honour  it  has  been 
eager,  as  for  nothing  else  in  the  world.  It  is  a  sign 
of  this,  that  when  Athens  had  money  in  greater  abun- 
dance than  any  other  Hellenic  people,  she  spent  it  all 
in  the  cause  of  honour ;  her  citizens  contributed  from 
their  private  resources;  and  she  never  shrank  from 
danger  when  glory  was  to  be  won.  Therefore  she  has 
those  eternal  and  abiding  possessions — ^the  memory  of 
her  actions,  and  the  beauty  of  the  offerings  dedicated 
in  honour  of  them — ^the  porticoes  which  you  see,  the 
Parthenon,  the  Colonnades,  the  Dockyards — no  mere 
pair  of  vases  these,  no  paltry  cups  of  gold,  three  or 
four  in  number,  weighing  a  mina  apiece,  to  be  melted 
down  again  whenever  you  choose  to  propose  it. 


1 16  Demosthenes 

For  the  rest,  the  Speech  is  vigorous  and  the  tone 
of  virtuous  indignation  well-sustained,  expressing 
itself  in  irony,  in  rhetorical  questions,  in  short 
pungent  sentences  and  strongly  worded  phrases. 

The  second  speech  which  Demosthenes  must 
have  composed  at  about  the  time  when  the  Social 
War  was  drawing  to  an  end  (or  perhaps  shortly 
after  peace  had  been  made)  was  that  against  the 
law  of  Leptines.  Leptines  had  proposed,  with 
the  approval  of  Aristophon,  to  abolish — retro- 
spectively as  well  as  for  the  future — those  grants 
of  immunity  from  certain  burdens*  imposed  by 
the  State,  which  had  frequently  been  made  as 
the  reward  of  distinguished  public  services.  The 
proposal  doubtless  arose  out  of  the  prevailing 
agitation  of  mind  in  regard  to  the  resources  of  the 
State ;  and  was  probably  suggested  by  recent  real 
or  supposed  abuses  of  the  practice  of  granting 
such  immunity.  Demosthenes  himself  a  few 
years  later'  protested  against  the  recklessness 
with  which  these  grants  were  made;  and  the 
opponents  of  the  law  desired  not  to  retain  the 
existing  practice,  but  to  amend  it  in  a  better 
manner  than  Leptines'  proposals  would  have.^ 

The  law  was  carried  in  the  Assembly,  probably 

'  The  chief  of  the  burdens  in  question  were  the  choregia — 
the  duty  of  providing  choruses  for  the  Dionysiac  and  some  other 
festivals;  and  the  gymnasiarchy,  or  stewardship  of  the  games 
celebrated  at  the  Panathenaea,  etc.  The  giving  of  tribal  banquets 
and  some  other  duties  were  also  included.  But  no  such  perman- 
ent immunity  was  given  from  the  trierarchy  or  the  war-tax. 

*  In  Artstocr.,  §201.  »  Note  2. 


Beginning  of  Demosthenes'  Career     117 

in  356;  but  the  mover  was  at  once  indicted  for 
the  illegality  of  his  proposal  by  one  Bathippus. 
Bathippus  however  died,  and  more  than  a  year 
elapsed  before  his  son  Apsephion  took  up  the  case. 
It  was  now  only  possible  to  attack  the  law,  not 
the  mover*;  and  in  accordance  with  custom,  the 
People,  who  by  passing  the  law  had  made  it  their 
own,  appointed  speakers  to  defend  it — Leptines 
himself,  Aristophon,  Leodamas,  and  Cephisodotus 
(all  distinguished  orators),  and  a  highly  respected 
citizen  named  Deinias.  Apsephion  was  repre- 
sented by  Phormio,  and  Demosthenes  supported 
his  case,  acting  nominally  in  the  interest  of  Ctesip- 
pus,  the  son  of  Chabrias,  who  had  been  slain  in 
battle  at  Chios  and  had  left  his  immunity  to  his 
son.^  The  main  grounds  of  the  charge  of  illegal- 
ity were  doubtless  set  forth  by  Phormio,  who 
addressed  the  court  first.  Demosthenes,  though 
he  pays  some  attention  to  the  legal  aspect  of  the 
case,  lays  special  stress  on  the  bad  moral  effect 
of  such  a  law — on  the  unwisdom  of  abolishing  one 
of  the  incentives  to  public-spirited  action,  and  so 
causing  the  city  to  appear  ungrateful  for  good 
service  done  to  it;  and,  above  all,  on  the  breach 

'  See  Note  i. 

» It  is  not  certain  whether  Ctesippus  was  actually  a  party  to 
the  prosecution;  or  whether  Demosthenes  was  merely  persuaded 
or  engaged  to  speak  by  Ctesippus  or  his  mother  (towards  whom, 
Plutarch  tells  us,  he  was  said  to  have  felt  an  attraction,  though 
he  did  not  go  so  far  as  to  marry  her).  I  can  see  no  sufficient 
reason  for  supposing  (as  Blass  does)  that  Demosthenes  did  not 
deliver  this  speech  himself. 


1 18  Demosthenes 

of  faith,  so  contrary  to  the  traditions  of  Athens, 
involved  in  taking  away  privileges  which  had  been 
granted,  merely  because  some  few  of  the  recipients 
had  proved  im worthy  of  them.  He  further  points 
out  that  neither  the  State  nor  any  of  its  citizens 
would  gain  much  by  the  law.  So  far  there  can 
be  little  doubt  that  Demosthenes  was  right; 
and  the  tone  which  he  adopts  is  dignified  and 
statesmanlike.  On  the  other  hand,  many  ;of  the 
arguments  which  he  uses  are  almost  transparently 
sophistical^  and  give  the  impression  not  only  that 
he  must  have  calculated  out  all  the  possible  argu- 
ments for  and  against  the  measure,  and  the  ways 
of  meeting  the  former  and  urging  the  latter,  but 
also  that  he  could  equally  well  have  argued  on  the 
other  side ;  and  this  cool  and  calculating  unfairness 
alienates  the  reader's  sympathy  (in  spite  of  the 
generally  pleasing  style  and  high  moral  tone  of 
the  Speech)  more  than  the  injustice  which  ap- 
pears in  later  speeches  as  the  result  of  passionate 
indignation  in  a  good  cause.  The  result  of 
the  trial  is  not  certainly  known.*  But  we  hear 
very  little  of  grants  of  immunity  after  this;  and 
it  is  at  least  probable  that  the  law  was  allowed 
to  stand. 

The  Speeches  against  Androtion  and  against 

'  In  partictilar  he  takes  cases  which  Leptines'  law  was  evidently 
not  intended  to  cover — if  it  seemed  to  cover  them,  it  was  at 
most  a  matter  of  bad  drafting — and  treats  them  as  typical. 

'  The  point  is  a  disputed  one,  and  no  piece  of  evidence  has 
been  produced  which  cannot  be  interpreted  consistently  with 
either  theory  of  the  issue. 


Beginning  of  Demosthenes'  Career     119 

Leptines  are  mainly  of  interest  because  they  show 
us  Demosthenes  at  a  time  when  he  was  little  mpre 
than  a  poHtical  lawyer,  and  not  yet  a  statesman 
fired  by  strong  conviction.  His  convictions 
gathered  strength  slowly ;  and  though  the  quaUties 
which  appear  in  his  later  work  are  already  seen 
in  certain  parts  of  these  speeches,  the  contrast 
between  them  and  the  Third  Philippic  or  the 
Speech  on  the  Crown  indicates  how  much  he  had 
yet  to  develop  both  as  a  statesman  and  as  an 
orator.  But  even  as  a  statesman  he  makes  a  very 
favourable  appearance  in  354,  in  the  Speech  on 
the  Symmories  or  Naval  Boards — the  first  of  his 
extant  speeches  before  the  Assembly. 

The  debate  in  which  the  Speech  was  delivered 
was  occasioned  by  reports  circulated  in  Athens 
of  the  vast  preparations  for  war  which  Artaxerxes 
was  making,  and  which  the  Athenians,  alarmed 
by  the  attitude  which  the  King  had  adopted 
towards  their  allies,  and  uneasy  owing  to  the  help 
which  Chares  had  given  to  Artabazus, '  viewed 
with  apprehension,  fancying  that  the  King  might 
be  intending  to  make  an  attack  upon  themselves. 
(His  preparations  were  really  directed  against  his 
own  rebellious  subjects  in  Egypt  and  Asia  Minor.) 
A  number  of  speakers  urged  the  Assembly  to 
forestall  the  supposed  intentions  of  Artaxerxes  by 
declaring  war  upon  the  Persian  Empire ;  and  they 
appealed  to  the  traditions  of  the  past,  the  glories 
of   Marathon   and   Salamis,   in   favour   of   their 

'  See  above,  p.  no. 


^> 


'} 


120  Demosthenes 

proposal.  ^  It  is  plain  that  the  proposal  itself  was 
little  short  of  madness.  Even  if  the  danger  to 
the  possessions  of  Athens  from  Philip  of "Macedorr"" 
had  not  been  growing  more  and  more  pressing 
(as  will  be  shown  in  the  next  chapter),  it  would 
have  been  a  hopeless  task  for  her  to  attack  Persia 
single-handed;  and  to  attempt  to  persuade  the 
other  Greek  States  to  join  her  would  have  been 
equally  hopeless,  even  if  the  King's  preparations 
had  been  aimed  at  her.  The  Greeks  were  alto- 
gether disunited,  and  Athens~HaJ  no  fimds  with 
which  to  enter  upon  such  a  campaign.  Demos- 
thenes therefore  opposed  the  project,  urging  the 
reasons  just  given,  and  making  them  palatable 
to  his  audience  by  dovetailing  into  them  the 
conventional  contrasts  between  Persian  and 
Athenian  honour,  by  referring  to  the  championship 
of  Athens  against  Persia — still  to  be  maintained, 
but  not  by  action  at  inopportune  moments, — and 
by  expressing  his  confidence  that  if  any  real 
danger  from  Persia  did  arise,  men  and  money 
would  be  forthcoming  readily  enough;  though  at 
the  same  time  he  argues  that  it  would  not  be  to 
the  interest  of  the  King  himself  to  attack  Greece. 
The  latter  argument  is  less  convincing;  but  the 
main  purport  of  the  Speech  is  sound  and  states- 
manlike. 

But   while  deprecating   the  rash   proposal   to 

'  The  idea  of  war  with  Persia  had  also  perhaps  been  rendered 
attractive  to  many  by  the  writings  of  Isocratcs,  and  particularly 
by  the  Panegyricus. 


THE  STATUE  OF  DEMOSTHENES  IN  KNOLE  PARK 

REPRODUCED  BY   PERMISSION  OF  LORD   SACKVILLE 
FRONT  VIEW 


Beginning  oj  Demosthenes'  Career     121 

declare  war,  Demosthenes  took  advantage  of  the 
interest  aroused  by  the  debate  to  propose  a  practi- 
cal reform,  with  a  view  to  increasing  the  efficiency^ 
of  the_nayy.  The  political  situation  obviously 
required  Athens  to  be  ready  for  action,  if  not 
against  Persia,  at  least  against  other  enemies; 
and  the  system  introduced  in  357  by  the  law  of 
Periander  had  not  proved  satisfactory  in  every 
respect.  It  has  already  been  mentioned'  that 
the  richer  members  of  the  Naval  Boards  instituted 
by  that  law  found  ways  of  evading  their  proper 
share  of  the  burden — they  would,  for  instance, 
arrange  that  certain  work  should  be  done  by  a 
contractor  for  a  talent,  and  would  then  exact  the 
whole  of  the  talent  from  their  poorer  colleagues.  ^ 
They  spent  little  or  nothing  themselves,  and  yet 
obtained  the  immunity  which  was  granted  to  a 
trierarch  from  all  other  burdens^  for  the  current 
year,  and  also  from  the  liability  to  the  trierarchy 
itself  until  after  the  lapse  of  another  year.''  It 
would  also  appear  that  the  duties  of  the  several 
Boards  and  of  their  members  were  distributed  in 
an  unbusinesslike  manner,  so  that  in  case  of  default 
it  was  not  certain  who  was  responsible;  and  be- 
sides this,  the  Twelve  Hundred,  who  were  liable 
to  the  burden  under  the  law,  were  twelve  hundred 
only  in  name,  owing  to  the  number  of  special 
exemptions  which  were  allowed.  Demosthenes 
proposed  to  increase  the  Twelve  Hundred  to  a 

'  p.  96.  »  Dem.,  in  Meid.,  §  155. 

»  Not,  however,  from  the  war-tax.       *  Dem.,  de  Cor.,  §§  102  flf. 


122  Demosthenes 

nominal  two  thousand,  in  order  that  when  all 
exemptions  had  been  allowed  for,  there  might 
actually  be  twelve  hundred  persons  available ;  and 
to  make  so  minute  a  subdivision  of  the  members 
of  the  Boards,  the  taxable  property,  and  the 
vessels  to  be  equipped,  and  so  detailed  an  assign- 
ment of  definite  duties  to  definite  groups  of  per- 
sons, in  regard  to  collection  and  equipment,  that 
evasion  should  be  impossible,  and  that  the  duties 
should  be  properly  carried  out.  The  thoroughness 
of  the  proposed  reform  is  very  characteristic  of 
Demosthenes.  As  in  his  earlier  speeches  he  had 
considered  every  possible  argument  that  could  be 
adduced  on  either  side,  so  in  proposing  a  practical 
measure,  he  leaves  no  detail  unprovided  for,  and 
tacitly  anticipates  every  objection,  while  at  the 
same  time  he  appeals  to  the  People  to  display  that 
unselfish  readiness  to  perform  any  duty  that  might 
be  laid  upon  them,  without  which  the  best-planned 
scheme  must  fail. 

The  proposed  reform  was  not  accepted;  but  it 
was  aTsignlficant  declaration  of  policy;  and  tEe 
main  object  of  the  Speech  was  achieved,  for  war 
was  not  declared  against  Persia.  That  this  result 
was  mainly  due  to  Demosthenes  is  almost  certain, 
for  scarcely  any  other  speaker,  he  tells  us,  ^  sup- 
ported him ;  and  if  it  seems  strange  that  he  should 
have  carried  such  weight,  when  he  had  only  been 
a  regular  speaker  in  the  Assembly  for  about  a  year, 
it  must  be  remembered  not  only  that  his  case  was 

'ProRhod.,  §6. 


Mm 


THE  STATUE  OF  DEMOSTHENES  IN  KNOLE  PARK 

SIDE  VIEW 


Beginning  of  Demosthenes'  Career     123 

really  unanswerable,  though  it  might  require  some 
courage  to  state  it  in  face  of  the  misplaced  patriotic 
appeals  of  the  other  side,  but  also  that  he  himself 
had  probably  attracted  attention  by  now,  both 
by  his  obvious  oratorical  gifts,  and  by  his  public- 
spirited  performance  of  the  duties  of  the  trierarchy 
and  the  other  liturgies  which  he  had  discharged. 

The  position  which  Demosthenes  intended  to 
take  up  towards  the  leading  statesmen  or  parties 
of  the  day  is  not  expressly  defined  in  the  Speech, 
because  it  was  not  the  custom  to  mention  living 
statesmen  by  name  in  the  Assembly.  But  it  is 
probable  that  Aristophon,  discredited  by  the 
failure  of  hi's  policy  in  the  Social  War,  had  retired 
in  the  interval  between  the  attack  upon  the  law 
of  Leptines  and  the  debate  on  the  Persian  ques- 
tion; or,  if  not,  that  the  proposal  of  war  with 
Persia  was  the  last  effort  of  his  supporters.  Eubu- 
lus,  whose  policy  was  mainly  one  of  peace  ah3~ 
retrenchment,  was  taking  his  place  as  leader,  and 
receiving  support  particularly  from  the  richer 
classes — the  leaders  of  commerce  and  the  principal 
tax-payers — to  whom  the  avoidance  of  war  (except 
so  far  as  it  was  necessary  for  purely  defensive 
purposes  or  for  the  protection  of  trade)  was  of 
great  importance.  In  the  Speech  against  Leptines 
Demosthenes  had  spoken  in  opposition  to  Aristo- 
phon; and  in  the  Speech  on  the  Naval  Boards  he 
was  on  the  side,  of  Eubulus,  in  so  far  as  he  depre- 
cated a  rash  military  venture  and  laid  stress  upon 
the  exhaustion  of  the  financial  resources  of  Athens. 


124  Demosthenes 

But  Demosthenes  was  certainly  not  an  advocate 
of  the  interests  of  the  well-to-do  classes,'  for  the 
reform  of  the  Naval  Boards  which  he  proposed 
was  designed  to  make  it  impossible  for  the  rich 
to  evade  their  duties;  and  he  wished  to  carry  on 
in  a  more  satisfactory  manner  the  preparations 
for  a  crisis  which  might  arise  at  any  moment. 
Before  long  his  antagonism  to  the  policy  of 
Eubulus  is  more  clearly  defined;  and  our  next 
task  will  be  to  attempt  to  realise  more  completely 
what  that  policy  was. 

The  aims  and  methods  of  Eubulus  are  still  a 
subject  of  controversy  among  historians  of  Greece. 
It  is  admitted,  on  all  hands,  that  he  was  an  upright 
and  incorruptible  statesman — no  small  distinc- 
tion for  a  politician  of  those  times — ^and  that  he 
was  a  master  of  finance.  It  is  disputed  whether 
his  policy  was  wise  and  patriotic  or  merely  narrowly 
prudent. 

We  have  seen  how  greatly  the  city  had  suffered 
in  consequence  of  the  Social  War.  There  were 
indeed  some  who  minimised  her  losses  and  her 
exhaustion^ — she  had  still  in  fact  a  considerable 
fleet,  though  little  money  for  its  upkeep;  there 
were  even  (as  we  have  seen)  those  who  were  not 
afraid  of  provoking  the  hostility  of  Persia;  and 
there  must  already  have  been  some  who  cried  for 

*  Even  in  attacking  the  law  of  Leptines,  he  was  not  supporting 
the  granting  of  immunities  to  rich  men  in  any  indiscriminate 
fashion.  ^  See  Isocr.,  Areopag.,  §§  i,  2. 


Beginning  of  Demosthenes'  Career     125 

vengeance  upon  Philip. '  Yet  there  can  be  no  real 
doubt  that  the  first  need  for  the  moment  was  a 
breathing  space,  in  which  the  city  could  replenish 
her  treasury,  repair  her  navy  and  her  defences, 
and  enable  her  trading-vessels  once  more  to  ply 
along  the  great  trade-routes  without  fear.  It  was 
under  such  circumstances  that  Eubulus  began  to 
take  control  of  affairs.  In  354  he  became  a 
member  of  the  Theoric  Board,  ^  and  owing  to  the 
confidence  reposed  in  him,  the  chief  elective  offices 
in  the  administration  came  to  be  held  by  members 
of  that  Board.  ^  Under  his  direction  the  number 
of  triremes  was  greatly  increased,  the  dockyards 
were  repaired  and  enlarged,  and  a  very  consider- 
able sum  of  money  collected,  without  recourse 
being  had  to  extraordinary  taxation.  It  appears 
that  the  success  of  Eubulus'  finance  was  partly 
due  to  the  provident  construction  of  the  annual 
Budget — for  the  fact  that  the  Theoric  Board 
was  appointed  for  four  years,  and  the  tenure  of 
the  chief  financial  offices  by  its  members,  must 
have  made  it  more  possible  than  before  to  construct 
plans  on  a  large  scale — and  partly  to  his  encourage- 
ment of  trade,  which,  among  other  advantages, 
increased  the  sums  received  by  means  of  indi- 
rect taxation.  Thus  Eubulus  not  only  instituted 
large  operations,  which  must  have  been  "good  for 

'  Comp.  Dem.,  Phil.  I,  §  43  (spoken  in  351-0). 
'  It  is  disputed  whether  he  held  any  other  specific  office,  and 
as  there  is  no  evidence  either  way,  the  question  is  insoluble. 
3  See  above,  p.  98. 


126  Demosthenes 

I  trade,"  in  connection  with  the  docks  and  fortifica- 
tions, but  he  greatly  improved  the  roads  and  the 
water-supply  of  the  city  itself — useful  measures, 
at  which  Demosthenes  scoffs  unjustly,  \  but  which 
conferred  benefits  upon  the  masses  as  well  as  upon 
the  trading  classes.  By  the  institution  of  a  new 
and  more  expeditious  procedure  for  the  settlement 
of  mercantile  disputes,  he  rendered  an  imdoubted 
service  to  Athenian  commerce.  *  At  the  same  time 
he  kept  a  strict  eye  upon  officials,  and  prosecuted 

y  them  remorselessly  if  any  sign  of  corruption  or 
irregularity  appeared.  ^  R^cognising_J;Jie_jactual 
weakness  of  the  city,  and  her  inability  at  the 
moment  to  pursue  an  imperialistic  policy  with 
any  success,  he  would  not  be  drawn  into  war, 
though  he  took  steps,  as  we  shall  see,  to  secure  the 
interests  of  Athens  in  the  Thracian  region,  and  so  to 
protect  the  corn-supply,  and,  while  refusing  to  en- 
ter upon  a  campaign  against  PhUip,  took  proper 
measures  of  defence  when  Philip  seemed  likely  to 
threaten  Attica.  The  apparently  incurable  dis- 
imion  of  the  Greek  States  was  an  obstacle  to  any 
attempt  to  form  a  lasting  coalition  against  the  ris- 
ing Macedonian  power,  and  he  recognised  the  fact. 
On  the  other  hand  there  can  be  no  doubt  that 
he  confirmed  and  gave  new  security  to  the  system 

'Olynth.  Ill,  §29. 

»Heges.,  de  Hal.,  §  12;  Pollux,  viii.,  63,  loi;  Harpocr.,  s.  v. 
infirtvoi  diKal:  comp.  Xenophon's  treatise  On  the  Reventies,  ch.  iii. 
(from  which  Eubulus  may  possibly  have  derived  the  idea). 

3  See  Dem.,  de  Pais.  Leg.,  §§  290-294. 


/ 


Beginning  of  Demosthenes'  Career     127 

by  which  theoric  money  was  distributed;  and  he 
may  even  have  extended  the  distributions.  In 
what  way  he  did  this  cannot  be  determined  with 
absolute  certainty ;  but  that  there  was  a  law  which 
in  some  way  forbade  the  application  of  the  theoric 
money  to  military  purposes,  and  that  in  349  it  was  y 
a  recent  law,  and  therefore  in  all  probability  was '" 
proposed  by  Eubulus  and  his  party,  is  proved  by 
the  demand  made  by  Demosthenes  in  that  year^ 
that  its  repeal  should  be  facilitated  by  those  who 
had  proposed  it.  The  statement  of  a  scholiast 
that  Eubulus  enacted  that  any  proposal  to  repeal 
this  law  should  be  punished  with  death  is  due  to 
a  misunderstanding  of  some  words  of  Demos- 
thenes. ^  It  is  most  likely  that  the  law  put  an  end 
to  the  assignment  of  unallocated  funds  (whether 
for  military  or  other  purposes)  by  means  of  decrees 
of  the  People,  and  that  it  did  so  simply  by  enacting 
that  all  funds  not  allocated  in  the  annual  Budget-' 
should  become  theoric  money ;  for  no  decree  might 
contravene  a  law,  on  pain  of  penalties  which 
might  be  very  heavy,  and  in  order  to  pass  any 
special  vote  of  money  out  of  the  surplus  it  would 
be  necessary  to  repeal  the  law  of  Eubulus.  That 
is  why,  when  in  349  Demosthenes  desired  to  con- 
vert the  theoric  money  to  military  purposes,  he 
demanded  the  appointment  of  Nomothetse;  for 
only  through  Nomothetae  could  laws  be  repealed 
or  passed.  '♦ 

'  Olynth.  Ill,  §  12.  » Ihid. 

J  See  above,  p.  125.  *  See  above,  p.  91,  and  Note  3. 


/ 


128  Demosthenes 

The  meaning  of  Eubulus'  policy  now  becomes 
clearer.  So  long  as  large  sums  could  be  voted  by 
decrees  of  the  People,  suddenly  inflamed  by  fiery 
oratory  and  encouraged  to  declare  war,  there  was 
no  security  for  his  plan  of  rehabilitating  the  fleet 
and  the  defences,  and  so  making  effective  provi- 
sion against  attack.  Little  harm  could  be  done 
by  the  prohibition  of  such  votes,  so  long  as  he  and 
his  friends  occupied  all  the  financial  offices,  and 
took  care  in  the  annual  Budget  to  provide  suffi- 
ciently for  these  measures  of  defence  and  for  the 
public  improvements  which  he  wished  to  carry 
out,  thus  including  all  the  military  expenditure 
which  they  contemplated  within  the  Budget, 
instead  of  leaving  it  to  fall  on  the  surplus.  By 
such  careful  budgeting  Eubulus  was  able  to  pro- 
vide for  all  the  needs  of  the  State  (assuming  that 
actual  war  could  be  avoided),  and  to  satisfy  the 
People  by  the  distribution  of  the  surplus  which 
remained  when  all  other  requirements  had  been 
covered.  For  obviously  he  was  forced  to  do  some- 
thing to  reconcile  the  masses  to  the  abandonment 
of  an  imperialistic  policy.  To  abandon  such  a 
policy  was  contrary  to  their  natural  sentiment; 
and  orators  who  flattered  their  pride  by  reference 
to  the  glories  of  the  past,  and  kept  their  ambition 
in  a  state  of  activity,  increased  the  force  of  this 
sentiment .  B  ut  the  distributions  of  theoric  money 
could  be  utilised  as  a  kind  of  premium  of  insurance ' 

'  The  metaphor  is  borrowed  from  Beloch,  Attische  Politik, 
p.  178. 


Beginning  of  Demosthenes'  Career     129 

against  interference  with  his  plans  of  retrench- 
ment and  repair  of  the  defences.  It  was  not 
without  reason  that  Demades  spoke  of  these 
distributions  as  the  "cement  of  the  democracy."  , 

The  poHcy  of  Eubulus  is  thus  quite  intelHgible ;   .j,^^\„^ 
its  aim  was  in  itself  a  good  one,  and  the  ability^^;^^   Qc^ 
which  he  displayed  in  carrying  it  out  was  remark-  .pc,-.,^?^- 
able.    Yet  its  weakness  is  also  clear.     In  the  first  -^-o 

place,  he  assumed  too  readily  that  it  would  be 
possible  to  avoid  war  for  a  considerable  time ;  and  y 
hejwas  so  reluctant  to  abandon  the  delusion  that, ' 
as  we  shall  see,  he  postponed  taking  action,  when  . 
war  was  forced  upon  him,  until  it  was  too  late.  ^ 
In  the  second  place,  no  argumentation  can  get 
over  the  fact  that  sums  which  might  have  gone 
to  constitute  a  strong  reserve  were  thrown  away  ^^ 
upon  amusements  which  had  acquired  a  dispro-  '^ 
portionate  importance  in  the  life  of  the  people. 
Lastly,  a  policy  which  might  be  justifiable  and 
advantageous  when  controlled  by  strong  and  able 
hands,  might  become  disastrous  under  a  weaker 
leader,  or  through  popular  pressure.     The  temp- 
tation for  the  People  to  demand,   and  for  the 
demagogue  to  grant,  increased  sums  for  such  dis- 
tributions, and  so  to  starve  the  administration, 
might  become  irresistible;  and  we  cannot  entirely 
refuse  to  listen  to  the  contemporary  writers  who  re- 

'  With  the  same  end  in  view,  Eubulus  increased  the  attractions 
of  some  of  the  festivals,  and  there  with  his  own  popularity;  comp. 
Dem.,01ynth.  Ill,  §  31,  where  the  grant  of  special  processions  at 
the  Boedromia  is  mentioned.  '  See  below,  Ch.  VI. 


\ 


130  Demosthenes 

garded  Eubulus  as  encouraging  the  People  in  idle- 
ness and  pleasure,  to  an  extent  which  rendered 
them  unready  for  courageous  and  patriotic  service 
when  it  was  most  needed.  "Eubulus,"  says  Theo- 
pompus,*  "was  a  demagogue  conspicuous  for  his 
A  care  and  industry ;  he  provided  a  great  amount  of 
money,  and  distributed  it  to  the  Athenians,  with 
the  result  that  under  his  leadership  the  city  became 

^  thoroughly  cowardly  and  idle";  and  Aristotle's 

strictures"  upon  the  practice  of  distributing  sur- 
plus funds  to  the  People  have  obvious  reference 
to  Eubulus.  "  The  multitude  receives  the  money 
to-day,  and  is  as  badly  off  as  ever  to-morrow; 
and  to  support  the  poor  in  this  way  is  like  pouring 
water  into  a  broken  pitcher." 

It  may  be  argued  in  reply  that  the  People  were 
already  so  far  enervated  and  demoralised  that  the 
action  of  Eubulus  was  the  effect  rather  than  the 
cause  of  their  moral  weakness ;  and  that  in  recognis- 
ing the  fact  as  it  was,  he  was  doing  the  best  thing 
that  the  circumstances  permitted.  Yet  (apart 
from  the  question  whether  the  People  were  by 
this  time  so  hopelessly  demoralised  as  this  implies) 
it  is  difficult  not  to  feel  that  his  policy  was  some- 
what cynical ;  it  was  certainly  destitute  of  any  such 
high  ideal  as  Demosthenes  constructed  for  him- 
self  on  a  foundation  of  Athenian  traditions,  hoping 
fiP^4\"''^^  he  did  that  he  would  be  able  to  persuade  his 

IL'      ^\      countrymen    not    merely    to    applaud    patriotic 

ry        sentiments  when  they  fell  from  the  lips  of  their 
»  Fr.  91  (Oxford  Text).  »  Ar.,  Pol,  VI  (VII),   p.  1320a. 


Beginning  of  Demosthenes'  Career     131 

orators,  but  also  to  face  the  hard  work  and  self- 
sacrifice  which  were  necessary  if  sentiment  was 
to  be  translated  into  action.  The  success,  how- 
ever short-lived,  of  Demosthenes  in  this  aim  shows 
that  the  idea  was  not  a  chimerical  one. 

But  at  the  moment  when  he  first  came  into 
power,  Eubulus  was  almost  certainly  right.  Re- 
trenchment and  repair  of  the  defences  and  the 
fleet  were  absolutely  necessary,  whether  they  were 
accompanied  by  distributions  of  money  or  not.  It 
was  very  desirable  to  avoid  war,  if  possible;  and 
the  proposals  which  Demosthenes  made  in  his 
next  two  public  speeches,  high-spirited  and  pa- 
triotic though  his  intentions  were,  were  almost 
certainly  mistaken.  It  will  be  convenient  to 
consider  these  at  once,  though  they  fall  rather 
later  in  time  than  some  of  the  events  which  must 
be  narrated  in  the  next  chapter. 

The  first  arose  out  of  affairs  in  the  Peloponnese. 
Here  for  the  last  ten  years,  Sparta  had  been  waiting 
quietly  for  an  opportunity  to  recover  her  power; 
and  in  353  such  an  opportunity  seemed  to  have 
occurred.  Since  355  the  Thebans,  who  had  pre- 
viously supported  the  enemies  of  Sparta  in  the 
Peloponnese,  had  been  engaged  ia  the  Sacred  War 
(of  which  more  is  to  be  said  hereafter)  against  the 
Phocians.  They  were  thus  less  able  to  help  their 
friends  in  South  Greece.  The  latter  therefore 
turned  towards  Athens  for  support  and  (probably 
in  the  last  year  of  Aristophon's  leadership)  were 


132  Demosthenes 

received  favourably.  The  Messenians  in  particu- 
lar received  a  solemn  promise  of  Athenian  aid, 
in  event  of  any  attempt  on  the  part  of  Sparta  to 
violate  their  independence.  ^  In  353  the  Spartans, 
with  no  little  ingenuity,  made  a  proposal  to  the 
other  Greek  States  that  there  should  be  a  restora- 
tion of  territory  to  its  original  owners.  The  pro- 
posal was  bound  to  meet  with  some  support  in 
Athens,  since  its  acceptance  would  secure  the  re- 
covery of  Oropus,  which  had  been  held  by  Thebes 
since  366,  and  the  restoration  of  the  towns  friendly 
to  Athens  in  Boeotia — Thespias,  Plataeas,  and 
Orchomenus.  Of  the  Peloponnesian  States,  Elis 
would  be  attracted  by  the  prospect  of  recovering 
Triphylia  from  the  Arcadians,  Phleius  by  that  of 
the  restoration  to  them  of  Tricaranum,  which  was 
now  occupied  by  the  Argives.  Sparta  herself  would 
then  obviously  claim  to  recover  her  dominion  over 
Arcadia  and  Messenia,  and  would  expect  the  sup- 
port of  the  other  States  who  had  benefited  by  the 
restoration  to  them  of  their  own  former  possessions. 
When  the  discussion  in  the  Assembly  took  place, 
and  embassies  both  from  Sparta  and  from  Mega- 
lopolis had  been  heard,  the  question  was  very 
warmly  debated .  In  favour  of  the  Spartan  proposal 
were  the  bitter  feeling  of  most  of  the  Athenians 
towards  Thebes,  the  desire  to  recover  Oropus,  and 
the  reluctance  to  break  with  the  Spartans,  who 
had  fought  side  by  side  with  the  Athenians  at 
Mantineia  and  elsewhere.   Demosthenes,  though  he 

'Paus.  IV,  xxviii.,  §§1,2. 


Beginning  of  Demosthenes'  Career     133 

professed  to  be  impartial  in  comparison  with  pre- 
vious speakers,  supported  the  Arcadian  appeal, 
on  the  ground  that  the  interest  of  Athens  required 
that  a  balance  of  power  should  be  maintained 
between  Sparta  and  Thebes,  and  that  the  Spartans 
would  gain  too  great  a  preponderance,  if  they 
were  permitted  once  more  to  be  overlords  of 
Messenia  and  Arcadia.  Besides  this,  Athens  was 
already  pledged  to  support  the  Messenians;  and 
to  accede  to  the  Arcadian  appeal  would  be  in  effect 
to  prevent  the  Spartans  from  committing  aggres- 
sions in  either  quarter.  At  the  same  time,  the 
alliance  with  the  Arcadians  must  be  frank  on  both 
sides,  and  the  Arcadians  on  their  part  must  for- 
mally renounce  their  alliance  with  Thebes.  It 
was  not  likely,  Demosthenes  argued,  that  Sparta 
would  actually  go  to  war;  and  even  without  yield- 
ing to  the  requests  of  Sparta  it  would  be  possible — 
and  that,  even  with  the  help  of  Sparta  herself — 
to  recover  Oropus  and  to  demand  from  Thebes  the 
restoration  of  the  suppressed  towns.  On  these  latter 
points,  Demosthenes'  argument  is  very  unconvinc- 
ing, resting  as  it  does  on  the  assumption  that  Sparta 
was  interested,  not  in  the  recovery  of  her  Empire,  but 
in  giving  effect  to  general  principles  of  justice — the 
very  thing  which  he  himself  denied,  in  denouncing 
the  unscrupulous  part  which  Sparta  was  playing. ' 

'  Both  in  this  Speech  and  in  the  next,  Demosthenes  shows  that 
he  has  not  yet  fully  grasped  the  importance  of  distinguishing  an 
abstractly  possible  argument  from  a  good  one.  Increased 
knowledge  of  affairs  remedied  this  defect. 


134  Demosthenes 

As  regards  the  main  question,  there  can  be 
little  doubt  that  to  make  alliance  with  the  Arca- 
dians would  really  have  involved  serious  risk  of 
war  with  Sparta,  and  probably  also  with  Thebes. 
Even  if  Sparta  had  recovered  her  dominion  in  the 
Peloponnese,  it  would  not  have  harmed  Athens, 
since  in  case  of  war  the  Peloponnesian  subject- 
States  would  have  been  certain  to  turn  against 
Sparta  once  more.  From  the  point  of  view  of 
Athenian  interests,  in  the  existing  circumstances, 
Eubulus'  policy  of  non-intervention  was  imdoubt- 
edly  the  safer.  On  the  other  hand,  it  is  impossible 
not  to  appreciate  the  higher  grounds  upon  which 
Demosthenes  rested  his  case — ^fidelity  to  the 
promise  given  to  the  Messenians,  and  the  tradi- 
>N^  tional  attitude  of  Athens  towards  the  victims  of 
others'  aggressions;  and  in  a  sense,  future  events 
afforded  a  certain  justification  of  his  policy.  For 
when  the  Athenians  had  rejected  the  Arcadian 
alliance,  a  temporary  relief  from  the  pressure  of 
the  Sacred  War  enabled  Thebes  to  send  help  to 
the  Arcadians,  who  became  more  closely  connected 
with  Thebes  than  ever,  and,  a  few  years  later, 
like  the  Thebans,  became  allies  of  Philip,  all  the 
efforts  which  the  Athenians  then  made  to  obtain 
their  support  proving  unsuccessful.  Hostilities 
were  carried  on  inconclusively  between  Sparta  and 
the  Arcadians  for  two  or  three  years,  until  in  350  a 
Peace  was  made,  by  which  the  Arcadians  retained 
their  independence.  The  conception  which  Demos-^ 
thenes  had  put  forward  of  the  duty  of  Athens 


1 


Beginning  of  Demosthenes'  Career     135 

towards  the  injured  appears  again  in  his  Speech 
in  defence  of  the  Liberty  of  the  Rhodians.  At 
the  end  of  the  Social  War  in  355,  Rhodes,  which 
had  been  one  of  the  leading  cities  in  the  revolt, 
fdl  into  the  hands  of  Mausolus,  King  of  Caria — a 
vassal  of  Persia,  who  had  assisted  the  allies  against 
Athens.  He  fostered  an  oligarchical  conspiracy 
in  the  city.  The  democratic  party  were  driven 
into  exile,  and  the  oligarchs,  who  acted  with 
cynical  brutality,^  maintained  their  position  by 
means  of  the  Carian  garrison.  Similar  events 
took  place  in  Cos ;  and  Athens  thought  it  necessary, 
as  a  precaution,  to  strengthen  the  band  of  Athe- 
nians resident  in  Samos.^  In  351  (or  possibly  a 
year  or  two  earlier)^  the  Rhodian  exiles  sent  a 
deputation  to  Athens,  asking  for  help  and  restora- 
tion— in  other  words  for  the  liberation  of  the  island 
at  once  from  the  oligarchy  in  possession  and 
from  the  power  of  Artemisia,  who  had  succeeded 
(probably  in  353)  to  the  throne  of  her  brother 
and  husband  Mausolus.  The  Athenians  were 
little  inclined  to  accede  to  the  request.  This 
same  democratic  party  had  led  the  revolt  against 
Athens  in  358,  and  popular  feeling  rejoiced  over 
their  misfortune.  Demosthenes,  however,  urged 
the  Athenians  to  forget  their  grudge,  to  take  up 
their  traditional  r61e  as  protectors  of  democracies 
everywhere,  and  to  remember  the  risk  to  which 
Athens  herself  would  be  exposed,  if  oligarchies 

'Theopomp.,  fr.  ii8  (Oxford  Text). 

» Dionysius,  de  Dein.,  ch.  xiii.  J  Note  4. 


r 


136  Demosthenes 

were  established  in  all  the  States  of  Greece,  and 
the  Athenian  democracy  were  left  alone.  The 
recent  disasters  suffered  by  Artaxerxes  in  Egypt, 
he  argued,  made  it  unlikely  that  either  he  or 
Artemisia  would  seriously  oppose  the  re-establish- 
ment of  Athenian  influence  in  the  island. 

There  can,  however,  be  little  doubt  that  Demos- 
thenes underrated  the  danger  of  war  with  Caria  or 
Persia,  if  Athens  interfered  in  Rhodes.  In  any 
case,  such  interference  was  directly  contrary  to  the 
policy  of  Eubulus,  with  whom  on  this  occasion 
the  People  as  a  whole  was  in  sympathy.  The 
generous,  though  probably  impolitic,  appeal  of 
Demosthenes  failed;  and  several  years  later  he 
speaks^  of  Cos  and  Rhodes  as  still  subject  to  Caria. 
Artemisia  herself  died  shortly  afterwards,  of  grief 
(so  it  is  said)  for  the  death  of  Mausolus. ' 

The  air  of  impartiality  which  Demosthenes 
studiously  affects  in  the  three  speeches  to  the 
Assembly  which  have  now  been  considered  makes 
them  appear  comparatively  tame  and  in  places 
academic  in  tone.  But  now  and  then,  as  we  have 
seen,  the  idealist  in  him  breaks  out,  and  he  demands 
that  Athens  shall  play  a  part  worthy  of  her  past. 
He  parts  company,  however,  with  the  vulgar 
jingoism  of  the  popular  orators  of  the  day,  in  his 
insistence  that  such  a  policy  involves  personaF 
work  for  each  individual  citizen,  and  that  patriotic 
sentiment  without  personal  self-sacrifice  is  useless. 

•  De  Pace,  §  25. 

'Theopomp.,  fr.  275  (Oxford  Text),  etc. 


Beginning  of  Demosthenes'  Career     137 

In  the  last  of  the  three  speeches^  he  emphasises 
strongly  both  the  breach  with  Athenian  tradition 
made  by  his  opponents,  and  the  difficulty  of 
rousing  his  audience  to  act  upon  the  principles 
which  they  professed.  It  is  true  that  in  dealing 
both  with  the  Arcadian  and  with  the  Rhodian 
appeal,  he  advocated  the  policy  which  was  pro- 
bably unwise  at  the  moment ;  it  would  have  been 
very  ill-advised  to  divert  into  other  channels  the 
forces  and  the  funds  which  were  certain  to  be 
needed  before  long  against  Philip.  Demosthenes 
had  still  much  to  learn  as  a  politician.  But  the 
significance  of  these  early  speeches  in  relation  to 
his  career  as  a  whole  lies  (in  spite  of  one  or  two 
touches  of  almost  cynical  opportunism, '  which  / 
may  have  been  designed  to  commend  him  to  the  ) 
Assembly  as  a  man  of  the  world)  in  the  growing 
sense  of  national  duty  which  they  reveal;  in  the 
plain  enunciation  of  certain  important  principles, 
such  as  the  doctrine  of  the  Balance  of  Power, 
and  the  assertion  of  the  necessary  hostility  of 
monarchies  and  oligarchies  to  a  democracy  like 
the  Athenian;  and  in  the  appeals  which  he  makes 
to  the  lessons  of  the  past.  In  these  points  these 
speeches  form  the  first  of  a  long  series  in  which  the 
same  ideas  can  be  traced. 

The  trial  of  Timocrates,  the  colleague  of  Andro- 
tion  in  the  Commission  for  recovery  of  arrears  of 

'  Pro  Rhod.,  §§  25-33;  comp.  Isocr.,  de  Pace,  §  30. 
*E.  g.,  pro  Megal.,  §  10;  pro  Rhod.,  §  28. 


138  Demosthenes 

taxation,  whose  proceedings  have  already  been 
described,  requires  a  brief  notice,  if  only  because 
it  illustrates  certain  remarkable  features  of  Athe- 
nian public  life.  As  in  the  trial  of  Androtion — of 
which  the  case  may  be  considered  a  sequel — the 
speech  of  the  prosecutor  Diodorus  was  written 
by  Demosthenes. 

In  355  the  Athenians  sent  an  embassy  to  Mau- 
solus,  King  of  Caria,  perhaps  to  protest  against 
his  action  in  assisting  the  rebellious  allies  of 
Athens  or  in  interfering  in  the  affairs  of  Rhodes. 
The  ambassadors  were  Androtion,  Melanopus, 
and  Glaucetes;  the  ship  on  which  they  sailed  was 
commanded  by  Archebius  and  Lysitheides.  On 
the  way  they  captured  an  Egyptian  merchant- 
vessel,  which  they  brought  to  Athens.  The 
Assembly  decided  that  as  Athens  was  on  friendly 
terms  with  the  King  of  Persia,  ^  and  Egypt  was  in 
revolt  against  him,  the  Egyptians  were  enemies  of 
Athens  (though  in  fact  they  had  but  recently  been 
assisted  by  Athenian  generals  and  soldiers),  and 
the  vessel  was  therefore  a  lawful  prize.  Accord- 
ingly the  prize-money  ought  to  have  gone  to  the 
State,  and  the  two  trierarchs  were  legally  respons- 
ible for  paying  it  over.  After  some  time  Euctemon 
denounced  them  to  the  Commission  recently 
appointed  on  the  motion  of  Aristophon  to  enquire 
into  debts  to  the  State,  for  their  failure  to  account 
for  the  sum,  which  amoimted  to  nine  and  a  half 

'  The  recall  of  Chares  in  the  previous  year  was  nominally 
based  on  the  same  assumption. 


Beginning  of  Demosthenes'  Career     139 

talents;  and  subsequently  proposed  a  decree  that 
payment  should  be  required  from  them,  but  that 
as  the  money  was  admittedly  in  the  hands  of 
Androtion,  Melanopus,  and  Glaucetes,  the  tri- 
erarchs  should  be  allowed  to  argue  before  a  court 
the  question,  whether  they  or  the  three  ambas- 
sadors were  liable.  Androtion  failed  to  convict 
Euctemon's  decree  of  illegality;  and  the  three  tried 
various  devices  for  evading  payment,  but  in  vain. 
At  last,  in  353,  they  found  themselves  in  the  posi- 
tion of  having  to  pay  the  debt  at  once,  or  to  be 
condemned  by  a  court  to  pay  a  sum  which  would 
amount  to  about  treble  the  original  debt;  in  the 
latter  alternative  they  would  be  imprisoned  till 
the  sum  was  paid.  They  therefore  got  Timocrates 
to  propose  a  law  that  any  debtor  to  the  State  who 
had  been  sentenced  to  imprisonment  (as  well  as 
to  repayment)  should  be  permitted  to  give  bail  by 
himself  or  his  friends  for  the  amount  of  the  debt, 
and  allowed  until  a  month  before  the  end  of  the 
current  year  to  discharge  it;  after  that  period 
his  bail  should  be  escheated,  and  himself  impris- 
oned. In  order  to  smuggle  the  law  through,  a 
certain  Epicrates  was  induced  to  propose  in  an 
Assembly  in  the  middle  of  July,  353,  a  decree  that 
the  Nomothetas  should  be  summoned  next  day,  on 
the  pretext  that  insufficient  funds  had  been  voted 
for  the  Panathenasa.  The  Nomothetae  met;  no- 
thing was  done  in  regard  to  the  Panathenaea ;  but 
Timocrates'  law  was  somehow  passed.  Diodorus 
and    Euctemon    prosecuted    Timocrates    for    the 


140  Demosthenes 

alleged  illegality  of  the  law;  and  the  trial  probably 
took  place  early  in  352.  There  can  be  no  doubt 
that  the  law  was  illegal,  and  was  merely  a  device 
to  enable  Androtion  and  his  colleagues  to  post- 
pone the  evil  day.  The  relevant  arguments  of 
Demosthenes  on  this  point  are  conclusive.  It  is 
therefore  all  the  more  pity  that  he  should  in  this 
Speech  (as  in  that  against  Leptines)  have  used 
other  arguments  directed  against  consequences 
which  no  one  would  have  dreamed  of  expecting 
from  the  law,  and  which  could  only  be  inferred 
from  it  (if  at  all)  because  it  had  been  hastily 
and  overwidely  drafted. '  He  strains  every  point 
against  Timocrates  and  Androtion  in  a  way  which 
is  at  least  disingenuous,  and  which  certainly  makes 
a  bad  impression.  ^  At  the  same  time,  the  know- 
ledge of  law  and  the  sureness  of  touch  which  he 
shows  are  remarkable,  and  here  and  there  a  strik- 
ing and  vivid  piece  of  writing  foreshadows  some 
of  the  best  of  his  later  work.  ^ 

We  do  not  know  what  the  result  of  the  trial  was. 
If  Timocrates  was  condemned  to  a  fine,  it  is  pro- 
bable that  it  was  not  so  heavy  as  to  force  him  to  go 
into  exile;  as  he  is  generally  supposed  to  be  the 
Timocrates  who  supported  Meidias  against  Demos- 

»Esp.  §§  79-101. 

» The  text  of  the  Speech  as  it  stands  appears  to  be  a  conflation 
of  two  speeches,  or  of  two  recensions  of  the  same  Speech ;  but  its 
exact  history  cannot  be  certainly  reconstructed.  Part  of  the 
Speech  consists  of  a  repetition  of  a  considerable  section  of  the 
Speech  against  Androtion,  with  very  slight  alterations. 

3  E.  g.,  §  208,  much  admired  by  Longinus. 


\\ 


Beginning  of  Demosthenes'  Career     141 

thenes  some  years  later.  Androtion  and  his 
colleagues  had  actually  paid  the  sum  due  from 
them  before  the  trial  of  Timocrates  began';  and 
though  this  would  not  purge  Timocrates'  guilt 
in  proposing  the  law,  it  might  mollify  the  jury 
when  the  penalty  had  to  be  fixed.  Androtion 
himself  was  still  active  in  Athens  in  346.  ^ 

NOTES  ON  CHAPTER  IV 

1.  No  proposal  might  be  made  in  the  Assembly  which  was 
inconsistent  with  the  existing  laws.  The  proposer  of  any  such 
motion  was  personally  liable  to  prosecution  (though  only  within 
the  year) ,  and  the  law  might  be  repealed  at  any  time  after  a  trial 
before  a  jury.  The  rule  was  a  safeguard  against  inconsistencies 
in  the  law,  and  against  the  risk  which  the  People  ran  of  being 
misled  by  an  able  orator  into  passing  measures  contrary  to  their 
own  will,  which  was  assumed  to  be  embodied  in  the  existing  law. 

2.  The  ultimate  object  of  the  law  of  Leptines  is  not  very 
clear.  It  can  hardly  have  been  an  important  measure  of  finance. 
It  is  true  that  the  preamble  stated  that  it  was  enacted  in  order 
that  the  richest  men  might  have  to  undertake  the  burdens;  and 
that  some  of  those  who  enjoyed  immunity  must  have  been  more 
or  less  wealthy  men.  But  they  were  comparatively  few  in  all; 
the  relief  given  to  the  rest  by  the  distribution  of  the  burden 
among  a  slightly  increased  number  would  be  slight;  and  the 
general  revenues  of  the  State  would  gain  nothing.  Nor  can  the 
law  be  accounted  for  by  a  dislike  on  the  part  of  the  democracy 
for  hereditary  privileges.  Most  of  the  grants  of  immunity  were 
indeed  made  to  a  man's  descendants  as  well  as  to  himself;  but 
there  is  no  evidence  to  show  that  the  Athenians  thought  of  the 
extension  of  a  compliment  to  the  descendants  of  a  distinguished 
servant  of  the  State  as  inconsistent  with  democracy.  It  is  much 
more  likely  that  there  were  notorious  cases  of  the  privilege  being 
enjoyed  by  the  undeserving;  or  that  it  had  been  much  granted 

'  §§  187  ff. 

»C.  7.  A.,  iv.,  109b  (Dittenb.  Syll.  Ed.,  ii.,  No.  129). 


142  Demosthenes 

of  late  to  persons  (such  as  powerful  generals)  of  whom  the  demo- 
cracy was  suspicious. 

3.  See  Francotte,  Les  Finances  des  CitSs  Grecques.  Francotte's 
account  of  the  law  and  policy  of  Eubulus  is  the  most  satisfactory 
that  I  have  seen.  He  notes  that  the  law  was  occasionally  evaded 
by  passing,  not  decrees,  but  special  laws,  dealing  with  small 
necessary  expenses,  grants  of  crowns,  etc.,  and  that  it  might  be 
evaded  in  small  matters  in  various  other  ways.  But  the  pro- 
posal of  a  large  vote  for  purposes  of  war  would  have  certainly 
been  followed  by  prosecution. 

4.  Dionysius  places  the  Speech  for  the  Rhodians  in  351. 
Butcher  and  others  would  date  it  a  year  or  two  earlier,  on  account 
of  the  comparatively  slight  mention  of  Philip,  which  they  suppose 
to  be  too  casual  for  the  year  of  the  First  Philippic.  But  the 
allusion  to  Philip  shows  that  in  the  speaker's  opinion,  though 
not  in  that  of  his  opponents,  Philip  is  a  very  formidable  foe. 
The  other  arguments  for  an  earlier  date  are  even  less  convincing. 


CHAPTER  V 

THE   RISE   OF   PHILIP 

BEFORE  some  of  the  events  narrated  in  the  last 
chapter  had  taken  place,  the  great  struggle 
between  Athens  and  the  royal  house  of  Macedonia 
had  begun. 

The  Macedonians  of  antiquity  were  a  mixed 
race,  and  the  degree  of  kinship  between  them  and 
the  Hellenic  peoples  is  a  matter  upon  which  no 
agreement  between  scholars  has  been  attained. 
The  Macedonians  proper  lived  on  the  low  lands 
watered  by  the  Axius  and  the  Haliacmon,  between 
the  mountains  and  the  sea,  with  Pella  for  their 
capital,  though  the  more  ancient  centre,  and  the 
burial  place  of  their  kings,  was  ^gas  or  Edessa.^ 
They  were  a  more  or  less  settled  agricultural 
people,  whose  lands  provided  for  them  the  neces- 
sities of  life,  and  who  engaged  comparatively 
little  in  foreign  trade.  They  were  the  subjects 
of  an  absolute  monarchy  of  an  almost  Homeric 
pattern,  holding  their  lands  at  the  pleasure  of  the 
King,  giving  him  military  service  at  his  command, 
and  in  every  way  bound  to  do  his  bidding,  except 

'  Now  Vodhena. 

143 


144  Demosthenes 

that  in  matters  of  life  and  death  the  assembly  of 
fighting  men  appears  to  have  had  a  right  to  give 
the  final  decision,  and  the  will  of  the  same  body- 
was  at  least  as  influential  as  the  right  of  birth  in 
determining  the  succession.  But  in  the  upper 
valleys,  and  among  the  moimtains,  there  dwelt  a 
number  of  tribes — Lyncestas,  Orestae,  Elimiotae, 
and  others — governed  by  princes  of  their  own, 
nominally  indeed  subordinate  to  the  King  of 
Macedonia,  but  restless  and  always  liable  to  rebel. 
These  were  probably  nearly  akin  to  the  lUyrians 
who  lived  to  the  westward  of  them  (between  them 
and  the  Adriatic),  and  to  the  Paeonians  on  the 
north  of  Macedonia.  There  is  also  some  evidence 
of  the  existence  of  Thracian  stocks  within  Mace- 
donia itself. 

That  the  royal  house  of  Macedonia  was  at  least 
partly  Hellenic  by  descent  had  been  admitted  in 
the  fifth  century  B.C.,  by  the  officials  of  Olympia,^ 
who  allowed  the  Macedonian  prince,  Alexander, 
to  compete  in  the  Olympian  games — a  privilege 
strictly  confined  to  Hellenes.  But  with  regard 
to  their  subjects  there  was  always  a  doubt.  On 
the  one  hand,  there  was  a  tradition  that  they,  or 
some  of  them,  had  migrated  from  Greek  lands  into 
Macedonia.  On  the  other,  they  were  often  spoken 
of  as  barbarians,  because  they  were  backward  in 
culture,  and  their  dialect  was  difficult  to  under- 
stand. (There  was  the  same  doubt  about  the 
peoples  of  Epirus  and  inner  ^tolia,  and  for  similar 

'  Herod.,  v.,  22. 


I 


The  Rise  of  Philip  145 

reasons.)  The  remains  of  the  Macedonian  dialect 
are  too  meagre,  and  the  extent  of  its  borrowings 
from  the  vocabulary  of  the  Greeks  proper  too 
uncertain,  to  justify  any  conclusion  as  to  the  na- 
tionality of  those  who  spoke  it ;  and  we  have  to  be 
contented  at  present  with  the  probability  that  they 
were  in  some  degree  akin  to  the  Hellenes  on  the  one 
side  and  the  lUyrians  on  the  other,  and  that  the  two 
stocks  (and  perhaps  others  with  them)  were  blended 
in  varying  proportions  in  different  localities.  ^ 

In  one  respect  the  Macedonians  afforded  a  strong 
contrast  to  all  but  the  least  advanced  Greek 
peoples,  namely,  in  the  fact  that  their  organisa- 
tion was  a  tribal  and  quasi-feudal  one,  and  did  not, 
as  with  the  Greeks,  centre  in  city-states.^  The 
Macedonians  proper,  as  distinct  from  the  hill- 
tribes,  appear  to  have  been  organised  primarily 
for  military  purposes.  The  greater  number  of 
the  able-bodied  land-holders  made  up  the  infantry 
or  ' '  foot-guards  "  -^ ;  and  a  smaller  body  of  wealthier 
and  more  honourable  men  composed  the  cavalry, 
or  "Companions"  of  the  King.''  At  the  time  of 
Philip's  accession  the  Companions  may  have  num- 
bered some  six  hundred.  Of  these  a  specially 
selected  group — probably  under  a  hundred — were 
"Companions  of  the  King's  person "s;  and  the 
highest  ambition  of  the  Macedonian  was  to  attain 
a  position  in  this  group.  But  in  this  organisation 
the  hill- tribes  had  no  part. 

'  Note  I  at  the  end  of  the  Chapter.  » The  unit  was  the  tOvo^, 
not  the  ir6Xtj.         3  ve^h-aipoi.         *  iraTpoi.         s  ol  dfjup'  airrbv  iraTpoi. 


146  Demosthenes 

On  the  sea-coast  the  freedom  of  action  of  the 
Macedonians  was  held  in  check  by  the  Greek 
colonies  planted  there.  In  the  time  of  the  Pelo- 
ponnesian  War  the  King,  Perdiccas  11. ,  had  failed, 
in  spite  of  his  political  ingenuity,  to  shake  off 
these  fetters.  His  successor,  Archelaus,  had  made 
efforts  to  modernise  his  kingdom,  building  roads 
and  chains  of  forts,  and  probably  attempting  to 
unite  the  unordered  elements  in  his  kingdom  by 
combining  all  in  one  national  army.  He  was  an 
admirer  of  Greek  culture,  and  encouraged  the 
literary  men  of  Greece  to  frequent  his  Court. 
Euripides  and  Agathon  ended  their  days  there; 
Timotheus  the  lyric  poet  and  Zeuxis  the  painter 
also  visited  Pella;  Socrates  was  invited  thither, 
but  declined  to  go.  But  the  efforts  of  Archelaus 
had  little  permanent  success,  and  in  the  confusion 
which  followed  his  death  in  399,  the  advance  which 
had  been  made  towards  a  higher  civilisation  was 
neutralised.  The  coastward  towns,  Olynthus, 
Acanthus,  and  Amphipolis,  increased  in  power, 
and  in  spite  of  a  temporary  set-back,  owing  to  the 
intervention  of  Sparta  in  379,*  the  Olynthian 
League  grew  powerful  and  continued  to  act  as  a 
barrier  in  the  way  of  Macedonian  ambition. 

Amyntas  III.,  whose  reign  lasted  (though  not 
without  interruptions)  from  393  to  369,  was  gener- 
ally on  terms  of  friendship  with  Athens,  and,  as  we 
have  seen,  ^  acknowledged  her  title  to  Amphipolis. 
He  married  the   Lyncestian   princess   Eurydice, 

'  See  above,  p.  48.  » p.  53. 


The  Rise  of  Philip  147 

who  bore  him  three  sons — Alexander,  Perdiccas, 
and  PhiHp,  who  was  bom  in  382.  Alexander, 
who  succeeded  Amyntas  in  369,  was  murdered 
after  a  reign  of  a  year;  and  the  yotmg  Perdiccas 
only  secured  the  throne  from  the  pretender 
Pausanias  by  the  intervention  of  Iphicrates,  who 
was  invoked  by  Eurydice.  At  the  beginning  of 
the  reign  of  Perdiccas  III.,  Ptolemy  of  Alorus, 
the  son-in-law  and  paramour  of  Eurydice,  acted 
as  regent;  and  when  (in  367)  the  Theban  general 
Pelopidas  advanced  from  Thessaly  to  Pella, 
Ptolemy  made  an  agreement  with  him,  and  was 
obliged  to  give  Philip,  then  fifteen  years  old,  with 
other  hostages  as  a  security  for  its  fulfilment. 
Philip  was  taken  to  Thebes,  and  lived  there  in  the 
house  of  Pammenes  until  364,  when  he  was  re- 
leased and  returned  to  Macedonia.  Perdiccas, 
like  Archelaus,  was  incUned  towards  Hterature 
and  philosophy,  and  Euphraeus,  a  pupil  of  Plato, 
was  for  a  time  his  principal  adviser. '  But  in  spite 
of  the  help  given  to  him  by  Iphicrates,  and  of  a 
short-lived  alliance  with  Athens  which  Timotheus 
persuaded  him  to  make,  he  gave  his  support  to  Am- 
phipolis  in  her  struggle  to  hold  out  against  Athens. 
In  359  he  was  killed  in  a  rising  of  the  hill-tribes, 
perhaps  instigated  by  Eurydice  herself,  in  revenge 
for  the  murder  of  Ptolemy  by  the  King's  orders.  ^ 

'  Comp.  Athen.,  xi.,  p.  5o8e.  o^ru)  fvxpui^  ffwira^e  rr/v  iraipiav 
ToO  /SacrtX^w  &ffT€  oiK  i^ijv  rov  ffvaffirlov  /irra(rx«i',  «'  /«)  rts  iirurTaiTo 
t6  yeufieTpeTv  fj  rb  (piKoao^tv.  For  Euphraeus.  see  Phil.,  Ill,  §  59, 
and  below,  p.  325. 

»  So  Justin,  VII,  V. 


148  Demosthenes 

The  Macedonians  first  proclaimed  his  infant  son 
King,  with  PhiHp  as  regent ;  but  very  soon,  in  view 
of  the  need  of  a  strong  hand,  they  transferred  the 
kingship  to  Philip  himself,  who  accepted  it,  we 
are  told,  under  compulsion. ' 

Philip  was  still  only  twenty-three  years  of  age; 
but  his  early  life  had  taught  him  lessons  by  which 
he  had  profited  to  the  full.  He  had  learned  that 
success  could  only  be  achieved  by  a  strong  hand, 
and  that  if  he  was  to  reign  over  Macedonia  in 
security  he  must  not  be  over-scrupulous  as  to 
means.  His  sojourn  in  Thebes  had  given  him 
an  opportunity  for  observing  the  successes  and 
methods  of  Epameinondas  and  Pelopidas — the 
/  one  a  unique  embodiment  of  commanding  military 
genius  and  high  culture,  the  other  the  most  reckless 
and  daring  soldier  of  his  age.  He  had  learned  to 
appreciate  the  almost  unbounded  opportunities 
which  lay  open  to  a  strong  man  in  the  Hellenic 
world,  as  it  then  was;  and  he  had  become  familiar 
with  the  recent  improvements  upon  the  traditional 
organisation  of  Greek  armies.  He  had  learned 
that  the  leader  of  a  strong  army,  who  could  attach 
his  men  to  himself  by  sentiment  as  well  as  by 
interest,  and  could  not  only  hold  his  force  together 
by  discipline,  but  could  develop  methods  of  fight- 
ing which  would  give  it  an  immediate  advantage 
over  those  who  followed  more  conventional  Hnes, 
was  practically  certain  of  success. 

Moreover  he  was  the  man  for  his  task.     Fear- 

'  Compulsus  a  populo  (Justin,  VII,  v.). 


Jl 


The  Rise  of  Philip  149 

less  and  resolute ;  not  to  be  turned  aside  by  a  defeat 
here  and  there,  or  by  any  misfortune  to  his  own 
person;  discerning  and  clever  in  dealing  with 
different  kinds  of  men  and  States;  never  eager  to 
secure  in  haste  what  might  be  better  secured  by 
patience,  or  to  use  force  where  fraud  would  serve, 
he  was  entirely  fitted  for  the  execution  of  an 
ambitious  and  far-reaching  policy  in  that  age. 
Besides  this,  he  was  personally  attractive,  not 
only  to  the  rough  Macedonian  soldiers,  with  whom 
he  mingled  freely  on  familiar  terms,  but  also  to 
the  cultxired  representatives  of  the  Greek  States, 
who  were  sent  to  treat  with  him.  He  had  learned 
at  Thebes,  among  other  lessons,  to  appreciate 
Hellenic  literature  and  refinement ;  he  encouraged 
dramatic  artists  to  visit  his  Court  at  Pella;  and, 
when  the  time  came,  he  engaged  Aristotle  himself 
as  the  tutor  of  his  young  son  Alexander.  He  was 
an  able  and  persuasive  speaker,  and  the  orators 
of  Athens  themselves  felt  the  power  of  his  adroit 
eloquence.'  Though  he  indulged  freely  in  the 
coarser  vices,  he  confined  his  indulgence  for  the 
most  part  to  seasons  when  it  could  not  interfere 
with  his  plans ;  and  it  in  no  way  affected  either  his 
own  hardiness — his  constitution  was  of  iron — or 
his  requirement  of  similar  hardiness  from  his 
soldiers.  He  used  money  no  less  skilfully  than 
other  means  of  persuasion  to  effect  his  purposes; 
his  generosity  was  lavish,  and  it  was  believed  by 
later  generations  that  his  victories  were  won  with 

'  iEsch.,  de  F.  L.,  §§  42,  43,  etc. 


15©  Demosthenes 

gold  as  often  as  arms.  That  he  employed  decep- 
tion to  achieve  his  ends  cannot  be  doubted,  though 
his  faithlessness  on  certain  occasions  was  certainly- 
exaggerated  by  Demosthenes.  The  rectitude  of 
ancient  and  modem  critics  may  deplore  some  of 
the  methods  which  Philip  used,  and  the  licenses 
which  he  permitted  himself  in  his  private  life.^ 
But  deceit  and  corruption  are  not  so  entirely 
unknown  in  modem  political  warfare  that  we  can 
afford,  on  account  of  his  use  of  them,  to  refuse  all 
admiration  to  a  strong  man,  who,  with  every 
instrument  thoroughly  at  his  command,  played 
his  great  game  with  skill,  precision,  and  courage, 
and  seldom  mistook  either  the  men  with  whom  he 
had  to  deal,  or  the  surest  method  of  dealing  with 
them. 

How  soon  Philip  conceived  the  policy  which  it 
was  his  life's  work  to  carry  out,  we  do  not  know. 
Doubtless  the  necessity  of  reorganising  the  army 
and  improving  its  methods  of  fighting  presented 
itself  first.  Before  long  he  may  have  determined 
upon  the  conquest  of  the  Hellenic  world;  and  in 
any  case  he  must  have  been  aware  from  the  first 
that  Macedonia  could  not  be  perfectly  independent, 
so  long  as  she  was  hemmed  in  by  Hellenic  colonies 
out  of  his  control,  and  by  warlike  and  restless 
tribes,  not  yet  subdued.  The  idea  of  the  conquest 
of  the  Nearer  East  probably  grew  in  his  mind 
later,  when  his  army  had  reached  its  full  efficiency, 
and    his    lordship  over  Greece  was  as    good  as 

'  Note  2. 


11 


The  Rise  of  Philip  15 1 

achieved.  It  may  even  have  been  suggested  by 
Isocrates. 

However  this  may  be,  the  organisation  of  the 
army  was  his  first  task.  By  the  formation  of 
regiments  on  a  territorial  basis,  bound  together 
by  a  local  patriotism  which  was  to  lead  to  a  more 
comprehensive  national  spirit;  by  offering  new 
prospects  of  promotion  from  one  rank  in  the  army 
to  another,  and  so  appealing  to  the  ambition  of 
the  individual  soldier;  by  attaching  the  higher 
ranks  above  all,  but  all  ranks  in  ascending  degrees, 
to  his  own  person;  he  created  a  united  national 
force,  which  he  drilled  into  efficiency  by  relentless 
practice  as  well  as  by  experience  in  actual  warfare. 
The  introduction  of  a  longer  spear  for  the  use  of 
the  infantry  gave  his  phalanx  a  great  advantage 
when  meeting  the  enemy:  his  cavalry,  brought  to 
the  highest  pitch  of  mobility,  were  frequently  so 
employed,  under  his  skilful  generalship,  as  to 
determine  the  issue  of  battle  by  their  action  at 
critical  moments,  and  were  given  an  importance 
which  cavalry  had  seldom  possessed  in  Greek 
warfare;  he  further  availed  himself  of  the  great 
improvements  in  siege-instruments  which  the 
engineers  of  the  day  devised;  and  his  cavalry  and 
infantry  were  supplemented  by  archers  and  light 
troops  of  other  descriptions,  so  as  to  be  prepared 
for  every  contingency. ' 

Above  all,  Philip's  army  was  kept  together  as 

'  On  Philip's  army,  see  Hogarth,  Philip  and  Alexander  oj 
Macedonia,  pp.  50-64,  etc. 


152  Demosthenes 

a  standing  force.  At  first  this  may_well- -have 
caused  some  discontent,  and  there  may  be  some 
truth  in  the  account  which  Demosthenes  gives  in 
the  Second  Olynthiac  of  the  state  of  feeling  Jn 
Macedonia. 

You  must  not  imagine  [he  says],  men  of  Athens, 
that  Philip  and  his  subjects  delight  in  the  same 
things.  Philip  has  a  passion  for  glory — that  is  his 
ambition;  and  he  has  deliberately  chosen  to  risk  the 
consequences  of  a  life  of  action  and  danger,  preferring 
the  glory  of  achieving  more  than  any  King  of  Mace- 
donia before  him  to  a  life  of  security.  But  his 
subjects  have  no  share  in  the  honour  and  glory.  Con- 
stantly battered  about  by  all  these  expeditions,  up 
and  down,  they  are  vexed  with  incessant  hardships; 
they  are  not  suffered  to  pursue  their  occupations  or 
attend  to  their  own  affairs;  and  for  the  little  that 
they  produce,  as  best  they  can,  they  can  find  no 
market,  because  the  trading  stations  are  closed  on 
account  of  the  war. 

r    In   the  same  Speech,  Demosthenes  speaks  of 
I  Philip's  jealousy  of  any  credit  ascribed  to  his  sub- 
ordinates;   and    Polyaenus^    relates    that    Philip 
y  professed  to  prefer  victories  won  by  diplomatic 
conversations  to  those  secured  by  arms,  because 
the  glory  of  the  latter  had  to  be  shared  with 
.  others,  while  that  of  the  former  was  all  his  own. 
But  we  know  that  Philip  in  fact  recognised  to  the 
full  the  qualities  of  Antipater  and  Parmenio,  his 
principal   generals;  there  is    no    other  evidence, 

»  Polyaen.  IV,  ii,  §  9. 


The  Rise  of  Philip  153 

apart  from  Demosthenes'  statements,  to  sug- 
gest any  disunion  of  spirit  between  Philip  and 
his  men;  and  it  would  seem  to  be  one  of  Philip's 
greatest  distinctions,  that  before  long  he  did 
make  his  subjects  feel  that  they  had  a  share 
in  the  honour  and  glory,  and  that  their  interest 
was  not  at  strife  with  their  loyalty  to  himself. 
In  any  case,  the  possible  inconveniences  of  a 
standing  army,  equipped  with  every  kind  of 
force,  were  more  than  counterbalanced  by  the 
immense  advantage  which  it  gave  him  over  his 
enemies.  "It  is  not,"  says  Demosthenes,  "as 
commander  of  a  column  of  heavy  infantry  that 
Philip  can  march  wherever  he  chooses,  but  because 
he  has  attached  to  himself  a  force  of  light  infantry,  \  ^0^ 
cavalry,  archers,  mercenaries,  and  a  miscellaneous 
camp.  .  .  .  Summer  and  winter  are  alike  to  him, 
and  there  is  no  close  season  during  which  he  sus- 
pends operations."'  And  again,  "with  a  standing ' 
force  always  about  him,  and  knowing  beforehand 
what  he  intends  to  do,  he  suddenly  falls  upon  whom- 
soever he  pleases ;  while  we  wait  until  we  learn  that 
something  is  happening, and  only  then,  in  a  turmoil, 
make  our  preparations."*  His  own  position  of 
absolute  command  was  an  even  greater  element 
in  his  success;  and  upon  this  also  Demosthenes 
lays  some  stress.^  In  short,  it  must  soon  have 
been  plain,  both  to  his  admirers  and  to  those  wh( 

'Phil.  Ill,  §49- 

^De  Chers.,  §  ii;  comp.  de  Cor.,  §235. 

3£.  g.,  Olynth.  I,  §  4;  de  Cor.,  §  235. 


,>«.?<.<< 


154  Demosthenes 

dreaded  him,  that  any  who  would  resist  him  had 
to  deal  with  a  man  of  extraordinary  genius,  who 
had  won  for  himself  a  position  of  extraordinary 
advantage. 

At  the  beginning  of  his  reign  it  was  necessary 
for  him  to  move  with  caution.  His  claim  to 
the  throne  was  disputed  by  more  than  one  pre- 
tender. But  he  had  the  support  of  the  Mace- 
donian army,  which  he  had  won  over  by  eloquent 
language,  and  he  rid  himself  of  his  rivals  without 
serious  difficulty.  One  of  them,  Argaeus,  had  been 
assisted  by  Athenian  troops.  It  was  not,  however, 
a  convenient  moment  for  Philip  to  enter  upon  a 
quarrel  with  Athens.  His  own  forces  were  not 
yet  in  order — the  Athenians  had  shown  signs  of 
reviving  strength  in  this  very  year,  in  the  recovery 
of  their  supremacy  over  the  Chersonese,  and  he 
himself  had  to  face  an  immediate  struggle  with 
the  hill-tribes  of  Paeonia  and  Illyria.  He  there- 
fore assumed  an  attitude  of  generositj^  and  sent 
back  to  Athens,  without  demanding  any  ransom, 
the  Athenian  citizens  whom  he  had  taken  among 
the  defeated  supporters  of  Argaeus.  At  the  same 
time  he  sent  an  embassy  to  Athens,^  asking  for 
peace;  and  since  the  Athenians  had  given  their 
aid  to  Argaeus  on  the  understanding  that  Argaeus 

'Dem.,  in  Aristocr.,  §  121;  Diod.  XVI,  iii.,  §  4;  Justin,  VII, 
vi.  [Diodorus  and  Justin  are  the  principal  continuous  authori- 
ties for  the  remainder  of  this  chapter;  but  many  Jstatements 
rest  on  passages  of  Demosthenes  (esp.  in  the  Olynthiacs  and 
Philippic  I)  and  other  orators,  and  on  allusions  in  various 
writers.     The  more  important  references  to  these  are  given.] 


1 


The  Rise  of  Philip  155 

would  restore  Amphipolis  to  them,  he  found  it 
convenient  to  recognise  the  Athenian  claim  to  the 
town,  in  order  to  obtain  for  the  moment  a  Peace 
which  he  had  no  intention  of  keeping.  It  was 
fortunate  for  him  that  the  Athenians  failed  to 
take  the  obvious  step  of  garrisoning  Amphipolis 
without  delay,  and  that  within  a  few  months  they 
became  involved  in  war  with  their  allies,  and  so 
had  little  opportunity  for  attending  to  their 
interests  elsewhere. 

Accordingly,  after  a  campaign  against  the 
Paeonians  and  Illyrians,  in  which  the  new  tactics 
were  employed  with  complete  success,  and  a  large 
district  was  added  to  his  kingdom,  Philip  returned 
to  the  coast  (late  in  358),  appeared  before  Am- 
phipolis, which  had  given  him  some  provocation,* 
and  demanded  its  surrender.  The  Amphipolitans 
at  once  despatched  Hierax  and  Stratocles  to 
Athens  to  ask  for  help.  To  counteract  their 
appeal,  Philip  wrote  a  letter  to  Athens,  explaining 
that  he  was  attacking  the  town  with  the  intention 
of  placing  it  in  the  hands  of  Athens.  In  reply  to 
this  the  Athenians  sent  Antiphon  and  Charidemus 
to  negotiate  with  him ;  and  it  was  arranged  that  if 
he  gave  up  Amphipolis  to  Athens,  he  should  re- 
ceive Pydna  from  Athens  in  its  stead.  This 
arrangement  was  very  discreditable  to  the  Athe- 
nian representatives.  Pydna,  though  it  had  been 
a  Macedonian  possession  until  Timotheus  won  it 
over  for  Athens  about  the  year  364,  was  an  ally 

'  Diod.  XVI,  viii.,  §  2. 


u 


156  Demosthenes 

of  Athens,  and  might  well  claim  to  be  consulted 
before  being  surrendered  to  Philip;  and  so  the 
nature  of  the  bargain  was  kept  secret,  lest  it  should 
become  known  at  Pydna;  the  Athenian  People 
were  only  informed  in  vague  terms  that  an  under- 
standing had  been  arrived  at.  Philip  had  now 
secured  the  support  of  a  party  in  Amphipolis ;  and 
it  was  by  their  treachery,  as  well  as  by  means  of 
his  engines,  that  he  took  the  town,  probably  in 
the  autumn  of  357.^  A  scholiast  says  that  after 
its  capture  he  at  once  put  the  traitors  to  death, 
on  the  ground  that  they  were  not  likely  to  be  more 
faithful  to  him  than  they  had  been  to  their  own 

^  ,v-j  fellow-citizens.     He  then  banished  all  who  were 

If' '  liiostile  to  him  in  the  town. 

^Jof  So   confidently   did   the   Athenians   expect   to 
^v|receive  Amphipolis,   that  when  the  Olynthians, 
^     alarmed  at  Philip's  success,  appealed  to  them  for 
aid  against  him,  they  would  not  listen.     In  con- 
sequence of  this,  the  Olynthians  tried  to  secure 

JFl  I  themselves  by  making  an  agreement  with  Philip 

^  I  himself;  and  it  was  quite  in  accordance  with  his 

'   ^  '  plans  to  accede  to  their  overtures,  and  to  make  a 

Peace  which  was  destined  to  last  until  it  should 

be  convenient  to  him  to  crush  them  in  their  turn. 

It  was  provided  in  the  agreement jthat_jthe_Qlyiir 

thians  should  not  make  terms  with  Athens  apart 

rom  himself.  ^ 

^  '  Dem.,  Olynth.  I,  §  5, 
»Dem.,  in  Aristocr.,  §108;  Olynth.  II,   §14;  Phil.  II,  §20, 


f 


"J   I 

-r'    a. 


i 


The  Rise  of  Philip  157 

How  the  Athenians  expected  to  be  able  to  give 
Pydna  to  Philip  was  never  disclosed;  for  Philip,  in- 
stead of  waiting  for  the  fulfilment  of  their  promise, 
himself  took  possession  of  Pydna  by  force  (assisted 
by  treachery  from  within)  and  refused  to  give  up 
Amphipolis.  He  next  joined  the  Olynthians  in  an 
attack  upon  Poteidaea.  This  was  one  of  the  most 
important  towns  of  the  Chalcidic  peninsula ;  it  had 
long  been  a  rival  of  Olynthus;  and  a  large  body  of 
Athenian  colonists  was  established  there.  Its  cap- 
ture was  rendered  easy  by  treachery  from  within; 
and  the  Olynthians  received  from  Philip  both  it 
and  also  Anthemus,  and  profited  greatly  by  the 
cultivation  of  the  territory  which  he  added  to  their 
own,  and  by  the  increase  in  their  trade. 

The  Athenians  had,  in  spite  of  the  Social  War, 
resolved  to  send  an  expedition  to  relieve  Poteidasa, 
but  it  did  not  start  in  time. '  Philip,  nevertheless, 
allowed  the  Athenians  whom  he  captured  in  the 
town  to  depart  without  ransom.  He  was  not  yet 
ready  to  take  measures  which  might  exasperate 
Athens ;  even  in  besieging  Poteidaea  he  was  nomin- 
ally acting  as  the  ally  of  the  Olynthians ;  and,  as  we 
have  seen,  he  gave  up  the  town  to  them.  It  was 
just  at  this  time  that  he  received  three  messen- 
gers with  good  tidings.  The  first  told  him  of  a 
victory  of  his  general  Parmenio  over  the  Illyrians ; 
the  second  of  the  success  of  his  force  in  the  Olym- 
pian games;  the  third  of  the  birth  of  his  son 
Alexander.  ^ 

'  Phil..  I,  §  35,  etc.  » Plut.  Alex.,  iii. 


1 58  Demosthenes 

At  about  the  same  time  Philip  was  enabled  to 
satisfy  the  want  of  money  which  was  pressing 
heavily  upon  him.  His  occupation  of  Amphipolis 
opened  the  way  to  the  gold-mines  of  Mount 
Pangaeus,  east  of  the  Strymon,  which  were  being 
worked  at  the  time  by  settlers  from  Thasos:  and 
he  took  advantage  of  an  appeal  made  to  him  by 
these  settlers,  when  hard  pressed  by  Thracian 
assailants,  to  occupy  their  town,  Crenides,  and 
to  enlarge  it  into  a  city  which  he  named,  after 
himself,  Philippi,  He  at  once  began  to  work  the 
mines,  and  from  this  time  onward  they  provided 
him  with  a  large  and  steady  income,  which  before 
long  amounted  to  as  much  as  one  thousand  talents 
a  year.  The  Athenians,  hampered  by  the  Social 
War,  were  unable  to  take  any  active  stepis  to  check 
his  advance.  They  made  an  alliance,  indeed,  in 
356,^  with  the  Pasonian  Lyppeius,  the  Illyrian 
Grabus,  and  the  Odrysian  prince  Cetriporis,  the 
eldest  son  of  Berisades,  to  whom  (in  the  division 
of  his  father's  share  of  the  Odrysian  kingdom 
which  took  place  on  his  father's  death)  there  fell 
the  western  portion,  including  the  district  in 
which  Amphipolis  and  Crenides  lay.  But  Cetri- 
poris could  not  retain  the  district  against  Philip, 
and  in  355  Philip  made  a  victorious  campaign 
against  the  Paeonians  and  lUyrians.  Moreover, 
his  conquest  of  the  district  east  of  the  Strymon 
enabled  him  to  take  advantage  of  its  luxuriant 
forests  to  provide  himself  with  timber,  with  which 

»  C.  I.  A.,  II.,  66. 


II 


The  Rise  of  Philip  159 

to  build  a  fleet — an  absolute  necessity  if  he  was 
to  maintain  his  hold  on  the  coast,  and  to  resist 
the  Athenians  on  their  own  element.  His  occu- 
pation of  the  coast-town  Datum,  which  Callistratus 
had  re-founded  (in  conjunction  with  settlers  from 
Thasos)  when  he  was  expelled  from  Athens,  gave 
him  a  convenient  naval  station.  He  was  now 
able  to  interfere  with  Athenian  trade,  and  also 
to  occupy  convenient  islands,  which  had  hitherto 
been  infested  by  pirates.  Before  the  end  of  355 
he  had  rid  himself  for  the  time  of  all  danger  from 
the  newly-made  allies  of  Athens,  and  was  in  a 
position  to  renew  direct  operations  against  Athe- 
nian interests  on  the  coast  of  the  Thermaic  gulf; 
and  he  could  now  dispense  with  the  pretence  of 
acting  as  the  ally  of  Olynthus. 

He  accordingly  laid  siege  to  Methone,  which 
was  the  last  important  Athenian  town  on  the  gulf,; 
and  was  used  by  the  Athenians  as  a  naval  base. / 
(It  had  been  brought  within  the  Athenian  alliance! 
by  Timotheus  about  ten  years  before.)  The  siege 
probably  began  in  the  last  months  of  355.*  The 
town  made  a  brave  resistance,  but  was  at  last 
forced  to  siirrender.  In  the  course  of  the  siege 
an  arrow  deprived  Philip  of  the  sight  of  his  right 
eye.  The  citizens  were  allowed  to  depart  free, 
but  with  only  one  garment  apiece,  and  their  ter- 
ritory   was    divided    among    Philip's    followers. 

Philip  was  now  master  of  the  whole  coastline  of 
the  Thermaic  gulf,  as  well  as  of  the  seaboard  from 

'  Note  3. 


1 60  Demosthenes 

the  east  side  of  the  Chalcidic  peninsula  to  a  point 
perhaps  fifty  miles  or  so  beyond  Amphipolis.  He 
had  ample  supplies  of  money  and  ships;  and  his 
army  had  so  far  proved  irresistible.  Athens,  on 
the  other  hand,  had  lost  all  the  stations  which 
she  had  possessed  on  the  coasts  of  Macedonia 
and  Chalcidice,  and  had  been  imable  to  give  any 
effective  help  to  her  allies  in  those  regions.  Even 
Methone  had  been  suffered  to  fall  imaided;  and 
the  policy  of  Eubulus  was  to  avoid  so  far  as  pos- 
',  sible  all  active  measures  of  hostility.  In  the 
J  period  which  we  have  now  to  consider,  we  shall 
see  Philip  pushing  his  conquests  far  along  the 
Thracian  coast,  and  also  securing  a  foothold  in 
Thessaly;  until  finally,  there  being  no  longer  any 
reason  for  allowing  the  Olynthian  confederacy  to 
interrupt  the  continuity  of  his  empire,  he  turns 
upon  Olynthus  itself.  The  chronology  of  the 
years  354-351  has  been  the  subject  of  prolonged 
controversy,  and  the  precise  order  of  some  of  the 
events  remains  uncertain;  but  there  is  no  doubt 
about  the  coiu-se  of  events  as  a  whole. 

It  was  probably  in  353  that  Philip  made  his 
next  move  along  the  Thracian  coast.  We  have 
seen  how  in  359  the  Thracian  kingdom  had  been 
divided  between  Cersobleptes,  Berisades,  and 
Amadocus,  and  how,  not  long  afterwards  the 
Chersonese,  with  the  exception  of  Cardia,  had 
been  definitely  handed  over  to  Athens  by  Cerso- 
bleptes, in  consequence  of  the  activity  of  Chares. 
Soon  after  this  Berisades  had  died,  and  his  share 


The  Rise  of  Philip  i6i 

of  the  kingdom  had  been  divided  between  his  sons, 
of  whom  Cetriporis,  as  has  been  narrated,  had 
made  alliance  with  Athens,  but  had  not  succeeded 
in  keeping  Philip  out  of  the  western  part  of  his 
dominions.  Amadocus  and  the  sons  of  Berisades 
seem  to  have  remained  on  friendly  terms  with 
Athens,  but  Cersobleptes  was  naturally  anxious 
to  get  rid  of  them,  and  to  reign  once  more  over 
the  whole  Odrysian  kingdom.  Hostilities  had, 
it  seems,  already  begun,  the  sons  of  Berisades 
entrusting  their  cause  to  the  generals  Simon, 
Bianor,  and  Athenodorus. 

At  the  same  time  Cersobleptes  desired  to  effect 
his  end  without  opposition  from  the  Athenians, 
who  just  about  this  time  (in  353),  to  confirm  their 
occupation  of  the  Chersonese,  had  sent  a  body  of 
colonists  to  Sestos.^  It  is  possible  that  at  this 
time  Cersobleptes  thought  of  an  aUiance  with 
Athens  as  his  best  resource  against  the  probable 
advance  of  Philip.  Accordingly  (probably  in  353) 
he  sent  Aristomachus  as  his  representative  to 
Athens,  to  emphasise  the  friendly  sentiments  of 
himself  and  his  general  Charidemus  towards  the 
city.  Aristomachus  further  asserted  that  Chari- 
demus and  no  one  else  would  be  able  to  recover 
Amphipolis  from  Philip,  and  urged  the  Athenians 
to  elect  him  general.     The  suggestion  was  taken 

'  Chares  established  them  in  the  town  by  force,  killing  and 
enslaving  the  inhabitants  who  resisted.  Diod.,  XVI,  xxxiv. 
For  the  chronology,  see  Foucart,  Les  Atheniens  dans  la  Chersonese, 
p.  28  flf.,  where  a  satisfactory  solution  of  the  difficulties  is  given. 


1 62  Demosthenes 

up  by  one  Aristocrates,  who  further  proposed  that 
the  person  of  Charidemus  should  be  declared 
inviolable,  and  that  any  one  who  killed  him  should 
be  liable  to  summary  arrest  in  any  territory  be- 
longing to  Athens  or  her  allies.  The  proposal 
was  cleverly  contrived  in  the  interests  of  Cerso- 
bleptes;  for  had  it  been  passed,  its  effect  would 
have  been  that  Simon,  Bianor,  and  Athenodorus 
would  be  afraid  to  act  against  Cersobleptes' 
forces,  commanded  by  Charidemus,  for  fear  of  in- 
curring the  ill-will  of  Athens.  The  decree,  how- 
ever, was  at  once  indicted  as  illegal  by  Euthycles, 
who  engaged  Demosthenes  to  compose  his  speech 
for  him.  But  the  trial  did  not  take  place  until 
the  summer  of  352;  and  before  that  time  Philip 
had  once  more  made  his  appearance  on  the 
Thracian  coast,  and  had  seized  the  towns  of 
Abdera  and  Maroneia. 
^  Upon  this,  Cersobleptes,  instead  of  looking  any 
more  (if  he  had  done  so  previously)  to  Athens  to 
help  him  against  Philip,  appears  to  have  thought 
it  better  to  come  to  terms  with  Philip  himself,  and 
so  to  resume  his  former  attitude  of  hostility  to- 
wards Athens.  Accordingly  he  sent  ApoUonides 
of  Cardia,  a  town  which  had  remained  hostile  to 
Athens,  to  negotiate  for  him  with  Philip  at  Maro- 
neia, and  gave  Philip  seciuities  for  his  fidelity. 
At  the  same  time  he  probably  hoped  that  Philip 
woiild  espouse  his  cause  against  Amadocus;  but 
in  this  he  was  disappointed;  for  Philip,  finding 
that  Amadocus  intended  to  offer  resistance,  ap- 


The  Rise  of  Philip  163 

pears  to  have  thought  it  better  not  to  lose  time 
in  conquering  an  enemy  who  could  be  conquered 
at  any  time,  but  to  return  to  Greece,  where  a  great 
opportunity  for  extending  his  influence  was  now 
opened  to  him,  in  the  form  of  an  invitation  to 
interfere  in  the  Sacred  War.  (Demosthenes  says^ 
that,  had  it  not  been  for  the  resistance  of 
Amadocus,  there  would  have  been  nothing  to 
save  the  Athenians  from  having  to  fight  with- 
out delay  against  the  Cardians  and  Cersobleptes. 
But  it  is  difficult  to  think  that  Philip  regarded 
the  resistance  of  Amadocus  as  important,  except 
in  so  far  as  time  would  have  been  required  to 
crush  it.) 

In  the  negotiations  between  Philip  and  Cerso- 
bleptes at  Maroneia  the  Theban  general  Pammenes 
also  appears  to  have  taken  some  part;  for  Cerso- 
bleptes (so  Demosthenes  tells  us)  gave  pledges 
"to  Philip  and  Pammenes."  Pammenes  had  been 
sent  by  the  Thebans  to  support  Artabazus  in  his 
revolt  against  the  Persian  King,  at  some  time 
after  the  Athenians  had  compelled  Chares  to 
withdraw  his  assistance  from  him.^  On  his  way 
either  to  or  from  Asia  Minor,  Pammenes  met 
Philip  at  Maroneia.  They  were  old  friends,  for 
Philip  had  lived  in  Pammenes'  house  while  a 
hostage  in  Thebes;  and  perhaps  Pammenes  with 
his  army  gave  Philip  his  support  during  the  nego- 

'  In  Aristocr.,  §  183.     (This  Speech  is,  as  before,  our  principal 
authority  for  Thracian  aflfairs.) 
'See  above,  p.  no. 


164  Demosthenes 

tiations,  at  least  so  far  as  to  increase  the  formidable 
appearance  of  Philip's  host.' 

Philip  now  began  to  return  homewards*;  but 
on  his  way  back  he  had  to  pass  Neapolis,  where 
Chares  was  waiting  with  twenty  ships.  (Neapolis 
was  a  member  of  the  Athenian  confederacy,  situ- 
ated on  the  coast  not  far  from  Datum,  in  the  district 
already  conquered  by  Philip;  but  the  town  seems 
so  far  to  have  remained  independent  of  him.  In 
355  it  had  appealed  to  Athens  for  help,  ^  and  Chares 
may  have  been  sent  in  answer  to  this  appeal.) 
Philip  contrived  to  get  past  by  a  clever  ruse.  He 
sent  four  of  his  swiftest  vessels  in  advance ;  Chares 
went  in  pursuit  of  them  into  the  open  sea,  and 
while  he  was  thus  employed,  Philip  got  past  Nea- 
polis in  safety  with  the  rest  of  his  force.  The 
four  ships  also  escaped.  (It  was  possibly  about 
this  time  that  Chares  defeated  the  mercenaries  of 
Philip  under  the  command  of  Adaeus,  a  general 
who  was  sumamed  "the  Cock."  Theopompus^ 
tells  us  that  in  celebration  of  this  victory  Chares 
feasted  the  Athenians  with  funds  given  him  out 
of  the  temple  treasures  of  Delphi  by  Onomarchus, 
the  Phocian  general  in  the  Sacred  War,  of  whom 
more  is  to  be  said  hereafter.  The  event  must 
therefore  be  placed  between  Onomarchus'  seizure 
of  the  treasures  in  354  and  his  death  in  352.) 

The  trial  of  Aristocrates  took  place  in  352,  and 
the  speech  which  Demosthenes  composed  against 

'  Note  4.  »  Note  5.  »  C.  I.  A.,  ii.,  66. 

*  Fr.  241  (Oxford  text). 


The  Rise  of  Philip  165 

him  is  by  far  the  most  remarkable  which  we  have 
yet  considered.  Apart  from  the  exhaustive  treat- 
ment of  the  Athenian  law  of  homicide,  which 
displays  the  thoroughness  generally  characteristic 
of  Demosthenes'  legal  arguments,  and  proves 
conclusively  the  illegality  of  Aristocrates'  decree, 
the  manner  in  which  he  handles  the  question  of 
Athenian  policy  in  regard  to  Thracian  affairs  as 
most  masterly.  Demosthenes  argues  strongly 
that  the  right  policy  for  Athens  is  to  prevent  the 
absorption  of  power  over  the  whole  of  Thrace  by 
one  man — in  other  words,  to  keep  Cersobleptes  in 
check  by  strengthening  the  rival  princes  and  con- 
firming them  in  their  reliance  upon  Athens'; 
while  the  effect  of  such  a  decree  as  Aristocrates 
had  proposed  would  be  to  make  these  princes 
believe  that  Athens  was  veering  round  to  the  side 
of  Cersobleptes,  if  she  could  accord  such  unparal- 
leled honours  to  his  chief  minister  and  general. 
He  shows  also  by  a  spirited  narrative  of  Chari- 
demus'  career  that  the  man  himself  was  quite  un- 
worthy of  such  an  honour,  and  that  his  allegiance 
could  not  be  counted  upon,  whatever  Athens 
might  do  for  him.  Towards  the  end  of  the  Speech, 
he  makes  an  onslaught  upon  the  statesmen  who 
were  influential  at  the  time,  the  party  of  Eubulus, 
denouncing  them  for  enriching  themselves  while 

'  It  is  the  same  doctrine  of  the  Balance  of  Power  as  he  had 
appHed  to  Peloponnesian  affairs  and  to  the  case  of  Sparta  and 
Thebes  in  the  previous  year,  in  the  Speech  for  the  Megalopolitans. 
(See  above,  pp.  132-33.) 


1 66  Demosthenes 

(Impoverishing  the  State,  and  for  degrading  the 
democracy  by  accustoming  it  to  obey  their  own 
dictates  in  a  servile  and  unworthy  manner.  ^  The 
Speech  has  a  trenchant  vigour  and  a  breadth  of 
outlook  which  are  far  in  advance  of  the  qualities 
displayed  in  Demosthenes'  earlier  work;  and  its 
nobility  of  tone  and  the  absence  from  it  of  all 
personal  rancour  have  been  generally  recognised. 
It  has,  however,  been  doubted  whether  the  policy 
recommended  by  Demosthenes  was  the  best  under 
the  circumstances.  There  seem  to  have  been  two 
alternatives  open  to  the  Athenian  people  at  this 
time.  The  one,  upheld  by  Eubulus  and  his  party, 
was  to  preserve  peace  for  the  present  at  all  costs,or 
at  least  to  take  no  more  active  steps  against  Philip 
than  were  absolutely  necessitated  either  by  immi- 
nent danger  or  by  the  imperialistic  tendency  of  the 
multitude,  who  were  likely  to  insist  upon  some 
kind  of  retaliation  against  Philip's  aggressions. 
(It  was  probably  in  view  of  some  such  pressure 
that  Chares  had  been  sent  to  NeapoHs.)  The 
possibility  of  avoiding  war,  and  at  the  same  time 
of  holding  Philip  in  check,  might  seem  to  be  offered 
by  an  alliance  with  Cersobleptes.  If  that  prince 
were  permitted  to  unite  all  Thrace  under  his  own 
sway,  he  would  be  a  powerful  buffer  between 
Philip  and  the  Chersonese,  the  retention  of  which 

'  Considerable  portions  of  §§  207-210  are  repeated  in  Olynth. 
Ill,  §§  25-31.  Probably  Eubulus'  supporters  were  influenced 
by  the  desire  to  save  their  wealth  in  supporting  a  peace-policy. 
But  if  some  grew  rich,  we  have  no  proof  that  they  did  so  by 
illegitimate  means. 


The  Rise  of  Philip  167 

was  essential  to  Athens,  since  without  it  her  corn- 
supply  was  menaced;  and  there  was  the  chance 
that  Cersobleptes  would  do  the  main  part  of  the 
fighting,  with  the  able  general  Charidemus  to 
lead  his  forces,  while  Athens  could  continue  to 
recruit  her  strength,  sending  only  a  small  squad- 
ron to  his  support.  From  this  point  of  view, 
the  policy  advocated  by  Demosthenes — that  of  re- 
jecting the  overtures  of  Cersobleptes — must  have 
seemed  a  mistaken  one. 

But  the  alternative  policy  which  evidently 
was  in  Demosthenes'  mind  had  at  least  as  much 
to  recommend  it, — the  policy  of  keeping  Cerso- 
bleptes weak  by  maintaining  rival  princes  by  his 
side  in  Thrace,  and  of  preventing  Philip  from  ex- 
tending his  influence  in  that  direction,  by  taking 
such  active  measures  against  him  as  would  keep 
him  fully  occupied  nearer  home.  The  difficulty 
of  Eubulus'  policy  lay  in  the  fact,  which  Demos-^^ 
thenes  emphasises  strongly,^  that  past  experience 
had  shown  that  Cersobleptes  and  Charidemus  were 
not  to  be  relied  upon,  and  that  no  alliance  with 
them  would  be  certain  to  fulfil  its  object.  More- 
over, Athens  already  had  engagements  with  the 
other  princes.  The  weakness  of  Demosthenes* 
policy  was  that  (in  all  probability)  Athens  was 
not  yet  in  a  condition  to  prosecute  war  against 
Philip  with  sufficient  vigour  to  ensure  success. 
In  fact,  Athens  was  in  a  position  of  danger,  which- 
ever plan  she  followed ;  and  the  difference  between 

' §§ 123-137. 


1 68  Demosthenes 

Demosthenes   and   his   opponents   was   a  phase 

of  the  more   fundamental   difference   in  regard 

■  to    the    policy   to    be    pursued   towards   Philip, 

/  the   one    side   appealing   to   national   traditions 

'',  and  ideals,   the    other  to   motives  of   prudence 

and  to  the   unwillingness   of  the  People  to  go 

out    and  fight   in   person,    however   excited  the 

crowd  might  be  at  each  new  aggression  of  their 

enemy. 

Neither  policy  was  free  from  danger;  neither 
could  be  certain  of  success;  and  whether  we  sym- 
pathise more  with  Demosthenes  or  with  Eubulus, 
each  of  whom  viewed  the  situation  from  one  point 
of  view,  and  neither  of  whom,  perhaps,  saw  it 
whole,  is  a  question  of  temperament  rather  than 
a  matter  to  be  settled  by  argument.  The  same 
problem  recurs  repeatedly  in  the  history  of  the 
next  few  years.  ^ 

We  do  not  know  whether  Aristocrates  was  con- 
demned for  the  illegality  of  his  proposal.  The 
decree  itself,  having  been  brought  before  the  Coun- 
cil only,  and  not  before  the  Assembly,  would  have 
ceased  to  have  any  force  (even  apart  from  the 
suspensory  effect  of  Euthycles'  indictment)  at 
the  end  of  the  archonship  in  which  it  was  passed, 
— in  other  words,  even  before  the  trial  took  place. 
But  in  351  we  find  Charidemus  among  the  gen- 
erals of  Athens,  and  (either  late  in  353,  or  in 
352)  alliance  was  made  between  Athens  and 
Cersobleptes. 
'  Note  6. 


COIN  OF  CETRIPORIS 


COIN  OF  PHILIP  (silver) 


COIN  OF  PHILIP  (GOLD) 


COIN  OF  ALEXANDER  (SILVER) 


COIN  OF  ALEXANDER  (GOLD) 


COIN  OFLYSIMACHUS  (SILVER) 


COINS  OF  MACEDONIAN  AND  THRACIAN  KINGS 


The  Rise  of  Philip  169 

NOTES  ON  CHAPTER  V 

1.  The  best  recent  discussion  of  the  subject  is  that  by  G. 
Kazarow,  "Observations  sur  la  nationality  des  anciens  Mac6- 
doniens"  {Bull.  con.  Hell.,  xxiii.,  p.  243  ff.);  iii  which  the  writer 
combats  successfully  the  arguments  used  by  Hoffmann  {Die  Make- 
donen  und  ihre  Sprache)  and  Beloch  to  prove  the  close  relationship 
of  the  Macedonians  to  the  Greeks,  and  agrees  with  those  who  con- 
nect them  more  closely  with  the  Illyrians.  See  also  Cavaignac, 
Histoire  de  V Antiquite,  vol.  ii.,  bk.  iii.,  ch.  iv.,  for  an  account 
of  Macedonia.  A  more  thorough  examination  of  Macedonian 
personal  and  local  names  may  some  day  throw  light  upon  the 
ethnological  problem;  and  it  is  possible  that  the  course  of  political 
events  may  render  Macedonia  more  accessible  to  the  exploring 
scholar. 

2.  Theopompus  insists  (in  many  of  the  extant  fragments) 
upon  the  drunkenness  and  immoralities  of  Philip  and  his  com- 
panions. We  cannot  say  how  far  he  is  telling  the  truth ;  but  we 
may  suspect  that  he  was  not  free  from  the  desire  to  draw  sensa- 
tional pictures  with  a  view  to  edification.  Polyaenus,  IV.,  ii., 
gives  a  number  of  anecdotes  in  illustration  of  Philip's  resource- 
fulness and  unconventionality  in  military  matters. 

3.  An  inscription  (C  I.  A.,  ii.,  70),  dated  about  Dec.  26, 
355  B.C.,  commends  Lachares  of  ApoUonia  for  bringing  something 
into  Methone;  and  it  is  not  easy  to  explain  the  special  merit  of 
such  an  action  unless  the  town  was  already  beleaguered.  Dio- 
dorus  narrates  the  siege  and  fall  of  Methone  twice  (XVI.,  xxxi 
and  xxxiv.),  under  the  years  354-3  and  353-2  respectively.  See 
also  Kahrstedt,  Forschungen,  p.  42. 

4.  The  circumstances  of  the  mission  of  Pammenes  are  very 
obscure.  The  Thebans  had  previously  been  on  good  terms  with 
the  Persian  King,  and  they  were  on  good  terms  with  him  again 
in  351,  when  he  sent  them  a  present  of  money.  Demosthenes 
perhaps  had  some  inkling  of  the  temporary  alteration  of  their 
policy  in  354  (Speech  on  the  Naval  Boards,  §§  33,  34).  Pammenes 
seems  soon  to  have  been  suspected  by  Artabazus  of  negotiating 
with  the  King's  supporters  (Polysnus,  VII.,  xxxiii.,  §  2). 

5.  The  chronology  of  Philip's  Thracian  campaign  is  very 
uncertain.  Demosthenes,  in  Aristocr.,  §  183,  records  Philip's 
presence  at  Maroneia,  and  the  mission  to  him  of  ApoUonides, 


170  Demosthenes 

bringing  securities  from  Cersobleptes  to  Philip  and  Pammenes; 
and  as  far  as  Demosthenes  is  concerned  the  date  may  be  any  time 
between  355  and  352,  when  the  trial  of  Aristocrates  took  place. 
(Demosthenes  also  records  Amadocus'  opposition  to  Philip.) 
Diodorus  apparently  places  Pammenes'  expedition  in  353-2, 
but  does  not  mention  his  meeting  with  Philip.  Diodorus'  dates, 
however,  are  very  unreliable,  and  the  attempts  to  extract  cer- 
tainty from  his  history  by  tracing  out  the  different  authorities 
whose  works  he  is  supposed  to  have  clumsily  combined  are  very 
inconclusive.  It  is  nowhere  stated  whether  Philip's  meeting 
with  Pammenes  took  place  on  the  latter 's  outward  or  homeward 
journey.  If  on  the  former,  Philip  must  have  made  an  expedition 
to  Thrace  in  354  or  (more  probably)  353,  and  the  events  here 
discussed  must  have  occurred  then,  as  is  assumed  in  this  chapter; 
if  on  the  latter,  one  expedition  to  Thrace,  in  352,  after  the  check 
at  Thermopylae  (see,  below  p.  178)  will  suffice;  and  the  events  in 
question  will  then  be  part  of  the  same  campaign  as  the  siege  of 
Hergeon  Teichos  in  November,  352.  But  the  fact  that  Polyaenus, 
IV.,  ii.,  §  22,  speaks  of  Philip  returning  {ivavTJei)  after  taking 
Abdera  and  Maroneia  suggests  that  the  latter  alternative  is  the 
less  likely  of  the  two.  The  schol.  on  ^Esch.,  F.  L.,  §  81,  states 
that  Philip  helped  the  Byzantines  and  Perinthians  and  Amadocus 
against  Cersobleptes  in  a  dispute  for  the  possession  of  territory, 
and  made  him  surrender  the  disputed  ground  to  them,  and  give 
his  son  as  a  hostage  to  himself.  As  Demosthenes  does  not  men- 
tion these  events,  they  probably  fell  late  in  352  (after  the  trial 
of  Aristocrates).  Indeed  the  -n-ia-Teis  mentioned  in  §  183  as 
given  by  Philip  to  Cersobleptes  at  Maroneia  could  hardly  have 
included  his  son  without  Demosthenes  noticing  the  fact:  and 
these  events  therefore  were  probably  part  of  the  campaign  which 
included  the  siege  of  Herason  Teichos  (see  below).  On  the  former 
expedition  in  353  Amadocus  had  resisted  Philip;  in  352  he  fought 
on  the  same  side.  Possibly  the  Amadocus  who  appears  in  352 
was  in  fact  the  son  of  the  opponent  of  Philip  in  353 :  cf.  Harpocr., 
S.V.  AfidSoKOi  .  .  .  5i5o  y€y6pa<nv  otroi,  irirrip  Kol  vl6s,  Ss  Kal  HXlirirtfi 
ffVfjLfjMX'^ffi^v  ^Xdep  els  rbv  irpbs  Kepao^Xiirrriv  irbXefjav. 

6.  Kahrstedt  (Forschungen)  has  attempted  to  prove  that 
Demosthenes  was  animated  throughout  the  years  355-351  by  a 
desire  to  forward  the  interests  of  Persia;  but  the  arguments  used 
to  prove  this  are  very  far-fetched  and  inconclusive. 


CHAPTER  VI 

THE  OLYNTHIAN  WAR 

WE  have  seen  that  after  taking  Abdera  and 
Maroneia  and  granting  terms  to  Cer- 
sobleptes,  Philip  returned  homewards.  He  did 
so  in  response  to  an  invitation  which  he  had 
received  from  the  princes  of  the  ruling  dynasty  of 
Larissa  to  assist  them  against  the  princes  of  Pherae 
and  their  allies  the  Phocians,  and  so  to  take  part 
in  the  Sacred  War.  In  order  to  imderstand  the 
situation  it  is  necessary  to  go  back  a  few  years. 

The  battle  of  Leuctra  in  371  had  given  Thebes 
the  supremacy  over  her  neighbours  the  Phocians; 
but  the  latter  were  not  content  to  be  subjects  of 
Thebes,  and  in  362  they  had  refused  to  join  in  the 
last  campaign  of  Epameinondas  in  the  Peloponnese ; 
for  they  were  still,  as  they  had  been  before  the 
battle  of  Leuctra,  on  friendly  terms  with  Sparta. 
Before  long  the  Thebans  found  a  pretext  for 
attempting  to  punish  them,  which  would  give  to 
the  attempt  the  colour  of  religious  sanction. 

The  temple  and  oracle  at  Delphi  were  under  the 
control  of  the  Amphictyonic  Council,  representing 
a  very  ancient  confederacy  of  twelve  Greek  tribes, 

171 


1/2  Demosthenes 

which  no  doubt  were  originally  more  or  less  equal 
in  power,  but  in  the  course  of  history  had  come  to 
differ  widely  in  importance.  The  twelve  tribes 
included  not  only  the  Thessalians,  Boeotians, 
Dorians,  and  lonians,  and  such  tribes  of  secondary 
importance  as  the  Achaeans,  Phocians,  and  Locrians, 
but  also  the  comparatively  insignificant  Malians, 
Perrhagbi,  Magnetes,  Dolopes,  and  (Enianes  (or 
(Etaeans).  Each  of  these  tribes  had  two  votes  in 
the  Council.  Athens  appears  to  have  exercised 
one  of  the  Ionian  votes,  Thebes  one  of  the  Boeotian, 
Sparta  one  of  the  Dorian.  The  geographical 
position  of  the  smaller  tribes  was  such  as  to  make  it 
likely  that  the  Thebans  and  Thessalians  (at  any 
rate  if  united)  could  command  a  majority  of  votes 
in  the  Coimcil;  and  since  the  battle  of  Leuctra 
the  Thebans  had  begim  to  use  the  Council  to 
further  their  political  ends.  Thus  they  caused  it 
to  impose  a  heavy  fine  upon  Sparta  for  the  seizure 
of  the  Cadmeia  in  383,  perhaps  treating  this  act 
as  a  violation  of  the  oath  which  bound  the  mem- 
bers of  the  League  together;  and  in  356  the  Council 
was  led  to  mulct  the  Phocians  in  a  very  large  sum 
for  some  offende,  the  nature  of  which  is  variously 
reported,'  but  which  was  probably  the  encroach- 
ment upon  land  dedicated  to  Apollo,  the  god  of 
Delphi.  They  further  proposed  to  dedicate  the 
Phocians'  own  territory  to  the  god.    At  the  same 

•Diod.,  XVI,  xxiii.;  Justin,  VIII,  i.;  Paus.,  X,  ii.,  i;  and 
Athen.,  XIII,  p.  560  (quoting  Duris).  The  principal  authority 
for  the  history  of  the  Sacred  War  is  Diodorus*  XVIth  book. 


I 


The  Olynthian  War  173 

time  they  increased  the  penalty  previously  imposed 
upon  the  Spartans;  for  of  course  it  had  not  been 
paid.  Whether  Sparta  and  Athens,  which  were 
both  traditionally  friendly  to  the  Phocians,  were 
represented  at  the  meeting  of  the  Council  is 
unknown;  if  they  were,  they  must  have  been 
outvoted. 

The  Phocians,  led  by  Philomelus,  refused  to  pay 
the  fine;  and  after  obtaining  some  financial  aid 
from  Archidamus,  King  of  Sparta,  proceeded  in 
355  to  seize  the  temple  of  Delphi,  and  erase  the 
record  of  the  sentence  against  them.  (The  temple 
was  in  the  hands  of  the  Delphians,  who  were 
originally  a  branch  of  the  Phocian  race.  There 
was  a  standing  dispute  between  the  Delphians  and 
the  Phocians  as  to  the  control  of  the  temple,  and 
Philomelus'  action  was  not  without  some  show  of 
justification.)  The  Phocians  also  defeated  the 
forces  of  the  Locrians,  their  neighbours,  who 
attacked  them  at  the  instigation  of  Thebes;  and 
Philomelus  secured  (though  not  without  threats  of 
violence)  the  approval  of  the  Pythia,  the  priestess 
of  the  oracle,  for  his  designs.  The  Thebans  and 
Thessalians  (most  of  whom  were  traditionally 
hostile  to  their  restless  Phocian  neighbours)  now 
induced  the  Amphictyonic  Council  to  declare  a 
"Sacred  War"  against  the  Phocians,  and  sum- 
moned the  Greek  peoples  to  join  in  punishing 
them  for  their  sacrilege.  The  response  seems  to 
have  been  fairly  general  on  the  part  of  the  tribes 
situated  to  the  north  of  Boeotia;  Byzantium  also. 


174  Demosthenes 

which  had  for  several  years  been  friendly  to  Thebes, 
sent  supplies  of  money.  ^  The  Spartans  sent  one 
thousand  men  to  the  assistance  of  the  Phocians'; 
and  to  procure  mercenaries,  Philomelus  made  use 
of  part  of  the  treasures  of  the  Delphian  temple, 
probably  intending  at  the  time  to  repay  them. 

What  was  the  attitude  adopted  by  Athens  ?  It  is 
impossible  to  give  a  certain  answer.  Aristophon  and 
Eubulus  were  alike  disposed  towards  friendship 
with  Thebes  as  a  general  policy,^  though  on  the 
other  hand,  there  was  a  long  history  of  friendship 
between  Athens  and  the  Phocians,  and  the  People 
as  a  whole  detested  the  Thebans.  (Demosthenes 
himself  was  generally  friendly  to  Thebes.) ''  It  is 
possible  that  at  first  the  political  leaders  in  Athens 
took  the  Theban  side,  and  the  record  of  a  treaty 
between  Athens  and  the  Locrians,  ^  which  seems  to 
fall  in  the  early  years  of  the  war,  lends  some  colour 
to  this  view.  In  any  case,  though  they  appear  to 
have  returned  a  friendly  answer  to  the  Phocian 
appeal,  they  at  first  gave  the  Phocians  no  active 
help;  and  the  popular  mind  seems  to  have  been 
divided    between    a    strong    disapproval    of    the 

'  Dittenb.,  Syll.  (ed.  2),  1.,  120. 

»  Cf.  ^sch.,  de  F.  L.,  §  133  flf. 

»  Dem.,de  Cor.,  §162. 

*  Cf.  .(Esch.,  de  F.  L.,  §  106.  Kal  yip  irpbs  toTs  iWois  KaKoit 
^oiwTtdfet.  Demosthenes'  Speech  for  the  Megalopolitans  was 
much  more  favourable  to  Thebes  than  to  Sparta,  though  he  used 
the  conventional  phrases  of  dislike  for  the  Thebans  to  disarm 
suspicion. 

sC.  I.  A.  ii.,  90.  See  Schwartz,  Demosthenes'  Erste  Philip- 
pika  (Festschr.  fur  Th.  Mommsen),  p.  17. 


II 


The  Olynthian  War  175 

sacrilegious  acts  of  the  Phocians,  and  a  sentimental 
anxiety  lest  they  should  be  exterminated.^ 

The  war  was  waged  with  great  ferocity  from  the 
first.  Philomelus  gained  some  striking  successes, 
but  in  354  was  defeated  by  the  Thebans  near  Neon 
and  killed  himself.  He  was  succeeded  by  Ono- 
marchus,  who  made  an  unscrupulous  use  of  the 
temple-treasures,  not  only  to  pay  mercenaries,  but 
also  to  give  presents  to  powerful  persons  in  many 
cities,  no  doubt  in  order  to  obtain  through  them 
the  support  of  their  countrymen.  *  Among  others 
who  joined  him  was  Lycophron,  prince  or  "tyrant " 
of  Pherae,  who  was  desirous  of  restoring  the 
domination  of  his  house  over  the  Thessalians;  for 
since  the  death  of  Alexander,  a  few  years  before, 
the  house  of  Pherag  had  lost  its  supremacy,  and  the 
Aleuadae  of  Larissa  had  come  to  the  front.  In  354 
and  the  greater  part  of  353  Onomarchus  appears  to 
have  been  in  the  main  successful.  He  defeated  the 
Locrians,  and  also  restored  Orchomenus  and  liber- 
ated it  from  the  power  of  Thebes.  He  also  obtained 
command  of  the  all-important  pass  of  Thermopylae ; 
and  though  he  sustained  a  check  from  the  Thebans 
at  Chaeroneia,  this  does  not  seem  to  have  greatly 
injured  his  cause.  Before  the  end  of  353,  the 
princes  of  Larissa,  Eudicus  and  Simus,  invoked 
the  aid  of  Philip  against  the  rival  house  of  Pherae; 
Philip,  as  we  have  seen,  obeyed  the  call;  and 
Lycophron  thereupon  sent  in  haste  for  Onomarchus 
and  his  army. 

»Dem.,  de  Cor.,  §  i8.       »Theopomp.,  fr.  240, 241  (Oxford  Text). 


176  Demosthenes 

Onomarchus  first  sent  his  brother  Phayllus,  who 
was  soon  driven  off  by  Philip.  He  then  went  to 
the  rescue  himself,  and  defeated  Philip  severely  in 
two  battles.  Philip  was  little  daunted;  encour- 
aging his  downcast  troops,  he  withdrew  from 
Thessaly  for  a  time,  but  only,  as  he  said,  "like  a 
ram,  in  order  to  butt  the  harder  next  time."  For 
the  moment  Lycophron  was  master  of  Thessaly, 
and  Onomarchus  pursued  his  successes  farther 
south,  and  captured  Coroneia.  But  early  in  352 
Philip  reappeared,  and,  crowning  his  men  with 
laurel  to  proclaim  their  championship  of  the  cause 
of  Apollo  and  so  to  give  them  confidence,  he 
obtained  a  complete  victory  over  Onomarchus  and 
Lycophron  near  the  coast  of  Magnesia.  Ono- 
marchus lost  his  life,  and  Philip  put  to  death  a 
very  large  number  of  prisoners  as  guilty  of  sacri- 
lege; some,  however,  of  the  fugitives  were  picked 
up  by  Chares,  who  happened  to  be  sailing  by  the 
Magnesian  coast  at  the  time.  Philip  now  be- 
sieged and  took  Pherae,  deposed  Lycophron  and 
put  an  end  to  the  despotic  regime,  and  became 
master  of  practically  the  whole  of  Thessaly. 

Whatever  had  been  the  attitude  of  Athens 
earlier  in  the  war,  it  was  now  evident  that  she 
could  no  longer  ignore  the  growing  power  of  Philip. 
It  has  been  suggested  that  Chares  may  have  been 
sent  to  Magnesia  in  order  to  co-operate  with 
Onomarchus;  though  the  only  evidence  is  that  of 
Diodorus,  who  treats  his  presence  there  as  acci- 
dental.   But  when,  after  taking  Pherae,  Philip  pro- 


The  Olynthian  War  177 

ceeded  to  attack  Pagasas,  the  most  important  sea- 
port of  Thessaly, '  the  Athenians  resolved  to  send  an 
expedition  to  the  aid  of  the  town.  Unfortunately, 
like  the  expedition  to  Methone,  it  arrived  too  late, 
when  Philip  had  already  become  master  of  the  port. 
Philip  now  arranged  the  affairs  of  Thessaly,  acting 
on  the  whole  in  a  lenient  and  conciliatory  fashion, 
but  taking  for  himself  the  harbour-dues  and  re- 
taining Magnesia  in  his  own  occupation.  Then, 
before  July,  352,  he  moved  towards  Thermopylae. 
On  this  occasion  the  Athenians  were  in  time. 
There  can  be  no  doubt  that  Eubulus,  no  less  than 
the  war-party,  now  realised  the  necessity  of 
measures  of  defence.  The  only  alternative  would 
have  been  to  make  peace  with  Philip  and  come  to  a 
definite  arrangement  as  to  territory,  both  in  Greece 
and  in  Thrace;  but  this  would  certainly  have 
meant  the  renunciation  of  Amphipolis  by  Athens; 
and  to  this  the  majority  of  the  Assembly  would 
not  yet  have  consented.  Nothing  remained  then 
but  to  oppose  Philip,  and  the  measures  taken  were 
proposed  by  a  supporter  of  Eubulus,  Diophantus 
of  Sphettus.  The  citizens  were  thoroughly  roused 
and  volunteered  for  service;  and  five  thousand 
infantry  and  four  hundred  cavalry  were  sent  by 
sea  to  Thermopylae  under  Nausicles  at  a  cost  of 
two  hundred  talents  (including  the  private  expen- 
diture of  the  soldiers) .  At  Thermopylae,  Phayllus, 
the  successor  of  Onomarchus  in  the  command, 
already  waited  on  land  with  a  powerful  army,  in 

'  It  lay  close  to  the  site  of  the  modern  Volo. 


lyS  Demosthenes 

which  the  Phocians,  whom  he  had  rallied  once 
more,  were  supported  by  large  contingents  of 
Spartans  and  Achaeans,  and  by  the  mercenaries 
who  had  previously  fought  for  Lycophron.  On 
hearing  of  the  arrival  of  the  Athenian  squadron, 
Philip  abandoned  the  attempt  to  cross  the  Pass; 
and  Demosthenes  more  than  once''  refers  to  this 
occasion  as  one  of  the  few  on  which,  in  recent 
years,  the  Athenians  had  acted  worthily  of  their 
traditions,  and  so  had  entirely  succeeded  in  their 
object.  Apart  from  the  danger  of  an  advance, 
Philip's  willingness  to  retire  is  not  hard  to  explain. 
He  had  already  gained  immensely  in  prestige 
in  this  campaign,  not  only  by  the  mere  fact  of 
his  victory,  but  by  the  role  he  had  been  able  to 
assume,  of  champion  of  the  god  of  Delphi,  whose 
sanctuary  had  been  violated  by  Onomarchus  and 
the  Phocians  in  a  way  which  shocked  the  religious 
sentiments  of  the  Greeks  generally,  whatever  might 
be  the  political  interests  of  each  State.  To  create 
a  favourable  feeling  towards  himself  in  this  way 
was  no  slight  gain;  and  he  may  well  have  been 
content  for  the  moment  to  enjoy  the  advantage 
of  this,  without  endangering  it  by  attempting  to 
push  his  conquests  further.  It  is  also  probable 
that  with  Thessaly  in  his  power  (though  not  yet 
perfectly  subdued)  to  the  north  of  the  Pass,  and 
with  the  Thebans,  his  allies,  farther  south,  and 
presumably  able  to  hold  the  defeated  Phocians  in 
check,  he  saw  that  less  was  to  be  gained  by  trying 

'  E.  g.,  Phil.  I,  §  13;  de  F.  L.,  §§  84, 86;  de  Cor.,  §  32. 


The  Olynthian  War  179 

to  cross  the  Pass  in  face  of  strong  opposition,  than 
by  pursuing  and  consolidating  his  conquests  to  the 
east  of  Macedonia. 

So  we  find  him  before  the  end  of  352  once  more 
in  Thrace.  It  has  already  been  narrated  that 
about  a  year  before  this,  he  had  taken  securities 
from  Cersobleptes  and  had  been  opposed  by 
Amadocus,  but  had  refrained  from  retaliating. 
On  the  present  occasion,  he  appears  to  have  aided 
Amadocus  against  Cersobleptes.  "The  peoples  of 
Byzantium  and  Perinthus, "  so  a  scholiast  states,^ 
"and  Amadocus  the  Thracian,  made  war  upon 
Cersobleptes,  king  of  a  portion  of  Thrace,  on 
account  of  some  disputed  territory.  Philip  as- 
sisted them  and  defeated  Cersobleptes,  and  forced 
him  to  yield  the  territory  to  those  who  claimed  it. 
He  further  took  Cersobleptes'  son  as  a  hostage, 
and  carried  him  off  to  Macedonia."  (^schines 
saw  Cersobleptes'  son  at  Pella,  where  he  was  still 
kept  in  captivity,  when  he  went  there  as  ambassa- 
dor six  years  afterwards.)  Philip  seems  in  fact  to 
have  been  following  the  very  policy  which  Demos- 
thenes had  recommended  to  Athens  in  the  Speech 
against  Aristocrates — that  of  dividing  the  power 
over  Thrace  among  a  number  of  persons  or  States ; 
and  his  alliance  with  Byzantium  appears  natural 
enough  when  we  remember  that  the  Byzantines, 
like  himself,  had  supported  the  Theban  side  in 
the  Sacred  War.  He  further  made  alliance  with 
Cardia,  and  so  secured  for  himself  a  stronghold 

'On^sch.,  de  F.  L.,  §  8i. 


1 80  Demosthenes 

overlooking  the  Chersonese — a  very  serious  menace 
to  the  power  of  Athens.  In  November  of  the  same 
year  he  laid  siege  to  Heraeon  Teichos.  The  exact 
position  of  this  fortress  is  not  known,  but  it  was 
probably  so  near  either  to  the  Chersonese  or  to  the 
coast  along  which  the  Athenian  corn-ships  passed 
that  the  Athenians  could  not  contemplate  Philip's 
action  with  equanimity;  and  they  were  once  more 
roused  to  a  fit  of  energy.  Demosthenes*  own  words 
best  describe  the  sequel^: 

Amidst  all  the  discussion  and  the  commotion  which 
took  place  in  the  Assembly,  you  passed  a  resolution 
that  forty  warships  should  be  launched,  that  men 
under  forty-five  years  of  age  should  embark  in  person, 
and  that  we  should  pay  a  war-tax  of  sixty  talents. 
That  was  in  the  month  of  November.  That  year 
came  to  an  end.  ^  There  followed  July,  August,  Sep- 
tember.'' In  September,  after  the  Mysteries,  and 
with  reluctance,  you  despatched  Charidemus  with  ten 
ships,  carr3dng  no  soldiers,  and  five  talents  of  silver. 
For  so  soon  as  news  had  come  that  Philip  was  sick 
or  dead — both  reports  were  brought — you  dismissed 
the  armament,  men  of  Athens,  thinking  that  there 
was  no  longer  any  occasion  for  the  expedition.  But 
it  was  the  very  occasion;  for  had  we  then  gone  to 
the  scene  of  action  with  the  same  enthusiasm  which 
marked  our  resolution  to  do  so,  Philip  would  not 
have  been  preserved  to  trouble  us  to-day. 

'  Olynth.  Ill,  §  4. 

'  The  Athenian  year  ran,  roughly  speaking,  from  July  to  July. 

3  I.e.,  of  351  B.C. 


The  Olynthian  War  i8i 

The  account  which  Demosthenes  gives  can  easily 
be  filled  out.  We  can  imagine  that  the  militant 
instincts  of  the  democracy  were  so  keenly  aroused 
by  the  alarm  raised  by  the  war  party,  that  Eubu- 
lus  thought  it  necessary  to  yield  so  far  as  to  send 
an  expedition  to  Heraeon  Teichos.  Then  came  the 
news  of  Philip's  illness,  which  enabled  Eubulus 
once  more  to  advocate  inaction,  the  wealthier 
citizens  to  seek  to  avoid  the  expenditure,  and  the 
rest  to  relapse  into  their  customary  unwillingness 
to  do  their  own  fighting.  ^  (It  is  noteworthy  that 
we  now  find  Charidemus  in  the  service  of  Athens. 
Probably  Philip's  activity  in  Thrace  had  convinced 
him  that  the  cause  of  Cersobleptes  was  destined 
to  be  lost,  and  the  Athenians  were  doubtless  better 
pleased  to  have  him  as  a  supporter  than  as  an 
opponent.) 

We  have  seen  that  about  this  time  the  proposal 
of  Demosthenes  to  help  the  exiled  Rhodian  demo- 
crats was  made  and  defeated, — no  doubt  by  the 
influence  of  Eubulus,  who  in  this  matter  acted 
wisely,  since  it  would  have  been  very  imprudent 
to  risk  offending  Persia,  when  there  were  other 
enemies  to  be  reckoned  with.  Artaxerxes  was 
just  now  engaged  in  the  attempt  to  reduce  his 
rebellious  subjects  in  Egypt  to  obedience,  and  was 
doubtless  anxious  to  be  free  from  troubles  else- 
where.    The  refusal  of  Athens  to  take  part  in  the 

'  In  the  Speech  for  the  Rhodians  (delivered,  probably,  early 
ill  351)1  Demosthenes  had  upbraided  the  Athenians  in  passing 
for  thinking  of  Philip  as  a  foe  not  worth  reckoning  with. 


1 82  Demosthenes 

Rhodian  quarrel  was  therefore  convenient  to  him ; 
and  at  the  same  time  he  apparently  tried  to  secure 
the  inactivity  of  the  Thebans  by  sending  them  a 
large  present  of  money  in  answer  to  the  appeal 
which  they  made  to  him,  when  they  were  hard 
pressed  for  funds  with  which  to  carry  on  the  Sacred 
War.  For  the  war  was  dragging  on  inconclusively. 
Phayllus  had  achieved  some  successes,  but  had 
died  before  the  end  of  352,  and  had  been  succeeded 
by  Phalaecus ;  but  the  war  continued  to  be  waged  in 
Boeotia  and  Phocis  for  some  years,  without  any 
decisive  action  taking  place;  though  at  times  the 
Phocian  territory  suffered  severely  from  the  in- 
cursions of  the  enemy. 

When  Philip  recovered  from  the  illness  which 
forced  him  to  raise  the  siege  of  Heraeon  Teichos,  he 
appears  to  have  turned  his  thoughts  at  once  to 
Olynthus.  He  had  suffered  that  city  to  remain  at 
the  head  of  the  Chalcidic  League,  and  to  retain 
Poteidasa,  Anthemus,  and  other  territories;  but  it 
must  have  become  more  and  more  plain  to  all  that 
he  was  not  likely  to  refrain  from  requiring  the 
submission  of  the  league,  and  so  consolidating  his 
dominions,  so  soon  as  it  should  be  convenient  to 
him.  Already  in  352  Olynthus  had  taken  ad- 
vantage of  Philip's  absence  in  Thrace  to  make 
overtures  to  Athens,  and  had  thus  broken  her 
compact  with  him,  under  which  peace  was  only  to 
be  made  by  her  with  Athens  in  conjunction  with 
himself;  and  shortly  afterwards  Philip's  step- 
brother   Arrhidaeus,    who   had   opposed   Philip's 


The  Olynthian  War  183 

accession  to  the  throne,  took  refuge  in  Olynthus 
and  was  welcomed  there.  ^  Early  in  351 — this  at 
least  is  the  probable  date — Philip  made  his  appear- 
ance within  the  territory  of  Olynthus.^  It  may 
be  that  he  was  only  led  to  cross  the  borders  of  the 
Chalcidic  League  in  the  course  of  making  good  his 
conquest  of  the  neighbouring  territory  of  the 
Bisaltse,  on  his  way  back  from  Herason  Teichos^; 
he  certainly  took  no  hostile  steps  against  the 
cities  of  the  League,  and  even  protested  his  friend- 
ship towards  them.  But  it  was  probably  now 
that,  in  response  to  an  embassy  from  the  Chalcidic 
cities,  he  quoted  to  them'  a  fable  about  War  and 
Violence,  which  he  represented  as  supernatural 
powers  whom  they  seemed  Hkely  to  bring  down 
upon  themselves.'' 

During  the  years  351  and  350  Philip  left  the 
Olynthians  unmolested.  It  is  possible  that  he 
suffered  from  a  recurrence  of  his  illness,  ^  and  that 
during  part  of  the  time  he  was  occupied  in  the 
fortification  of  strongholds  in  Illyria,  and  in  hos- 
tilities against  Arybbas,  King  of  the  Molossi.^ 
But  there  can  be  no  doubt  that  he  was  all  this  time 
fostering  in  Olynthus  a  party  favourable  to  himself, 
and  secretly  intriguing  in  Euboea,  with  a  view  to 
creating  such  occupation  there  for  the  Athenian 

*  Dem.,  in  Aristocr.,  §§  107-9,  ^^^  schol.  in  Olynth.  I,  §  5. 

'Phil.  I,  §17;  Olynth.  I,  §  13. 

3  See  Schafer,  ii.,  p.  122. 

^Theopomp.,  fr.  124  (Oxford  Text);  comp.  Babrius,  Fab.  70. 

5  Dem.,  Prooem.,  xxi.,  §  2. 

«  Dem.,  Phil.  I,  §  48;  Olynth.  I,  §  13. 


1 84  Demosthenes 

forces  as  would  render  them  unable  to  come  to  the 
aid  of  Olynthus,  when  he  chose  to  fall  upon  it. 

It  is  most  probable  that  it  was  early  in  351  that 
his  ships  began  to  make  those  raids  upon  Athenian 
territory  which  are  mentioned  both  by  Demos- 
thenes and  by  ^schines.  They  not  only  descended 
upon  Lemnos  and  Imbros,  and  carried  off  Athenian 
citizens  as  prisoners  of  war;  but  they  also  seized 
a  fleet  of  Athenian  corn-ships  off  Gerasstus  (the 
southernmost  point  of  Euboea),  and  actually  landed 
troops  at  Marathon,  and  carried  off  the  Athenian 
state-galley,  which  was  conveying  a  deputation  to 
a  religious  festival  at  Delos. '  The  alarm  which 
these  acts  occasioned  is  described  by  ^Eschines, 
who  says  that  the  special  meetings  of  the  Assembly 
which  were  called  in  the  midst  of  the  alarm  and 
turmoil  caused  by  the  news  outnumbered  the 
regular  meetings.  Yet  no  active  steps  were  taken, 
except  that  of  sending  Charidemus — probably  to 
the  Hellespont — as  described  in  the  passage 
already  quoted  from  the  Third  Olynthiac,  with 
ten  ships  and  five  talents,  and  leaving  him  to  find 
mercenaries  for  himself;  and  it  must  have  been  at 
one  of  the  meetings  of  the  Assembly  in  this  year 
(probably  in  the  autumn,  after  the  despatch  of 
Charidemus)'  that  Demosthenes  delivered  his 
First  Philippic  Oration. 

'  Dem.  Phil.  I,  §  34;  in  Near.,  §  3;  Procem.,  xxi.,  §  2;  iEsch., 
de  F.  L.,  §  72. 

'  This  is  more  likely  than  the  view  that  the  sending  of  Charide- 
mus was  due  to  the  speech.  The  sending  of  Charidemus  is 
probably  referred  to  in  §43. 


11 


The  Olynthian  War  185 

It  was  the  first  occasion  on  which  Demosthe- 
nes had  opened  the  debate,  and  it  required  some 
courage  on  the  part  of  a  man  only  thirty  years  of 
age  to  rise  without  waiting  for  older  men  (in  ac- 
cordance with  the  custom  of  the  Assembly)  to 
give  their  opinions  first.  "But,"  he  said,  "since 
we  find  ourselves  once  more  considering  a  question 
upon  which  they  have  often  spoken,  I  think  I  may 
reasonably  be  pardoned  for  rising  first  of  all.  For 
if  their  advice  to  you  in  the  past  had  been  what  it 
ought  to  have  been,  you  would  have  had  no  occa- 
sion for  the  present  debate."  He  then  proceeded 
at  once  to  the  attack.  The  unfortunate  position 
of  affairs  was  entirely  due  to  the  refusal  of  the 
Athenians  to  take  a  personal  part  in  the  defence 
of  their  country.  It  was  the  reliance  upon  mer- 
cenaries, the  failure  to  support  them  and  their 
generals  with  funds,  and  the  intermittent  charac- 
ter of  their  military  operations,  that  placed  the 
interests  of  Athens  at  the  mercy  of  Philip.  In  a 
few  strokes  he  depicted  the  Athenian  people  of  his 
day — their  excitability,  their  love  of  sensational 
gossip,  their  inability  to  sustain  any  impulse  which 
they  might  feel  for  the  moment,  and  to  follow  it 
out  into  effective  action. 

What?  [he  asked] — do  you  want  to  go  round  ask- 
ing one  another:  "  Is  there  any  news?"  Could  there 
be  any  stranger  news  than  that  a  man  of  Macedonia 
is  defeating  Athenians  in  war,  and  ordering  the  affairs 
of  the  Hellenes?  "Is  Philip  dead?"  "No,  but  he  is 
sick."     And    what  difference  does  it  make  to  you? 


1 86  Demosthenes 

For  if  anything  should  happen  to  him,  you  will  soon 
raise  up  for  yourselves  a  second  Philip,  if  it  is  thus 
that  you  attend  to  your  interests.  Indeed,  Philip 
himself  has  not  risen  to  this  excessive  height  through 
his  own  strength,  so  much  as  through  our  neglect.  I 
go  even  further.  If  anything  happened  to  Philip — 
if  the  operation  of  Fortune,  who  always  cares  for  us 
better  than  we  care  for  ourselves,  were  to  effect  this 
too  for  us — you  could  descend  upon  the  general  con- 
fusion and  order  everything  as  you  wished;  but  in 
your  present  condition,  even  if  circumstances  offered 
you  Amphipolis,  you  could  not  take  it;  for  your  forces 
and  your  minds  alike  are  far  away. 

Besides  this,  the  whole  military  system  of  Athens 
was  at  fault.  The  delay  in  organising  a  force  even 
when  it  had  been  resolved  upon  was  fatal  in  dealing 
with  an  adversary  like  Philip,  and  offered  a  strong 
contrast  to  the  promptitude  with  which  all  ar- 
rangements in  connection  with  the  popular  festi- 
vals were  carried  out.  Nor  could  anything  be 
done  by  isolated  expeditions\to  the  places  attacked. 

The  method  of  your  warfare  is  just  that  of  bar- 
barians in  a  boxing-match.  Hit  one  of  them,  and  he 
hugs  the  place;  hit  him  on  the  other  side,  and  there 
go  his  hands ;  but  as  for  guarding  or  looking  his  op- 
ponent in  the  face,  he  neither  can  nor  will  do  it.  It 
is  the  same  with  you.  If  you  hear  that  Philip  is  in 
the  Chersonese,  you  resolve  to  make  an  expedition 
there;  if  he  is  at  Thermopylae,  you  send  one  there; 
and  wherever  else  he  may  be,  you  run  up  and  down 
in  his  steps.     It  is  he  that  leads  your  forces. 


The  Olynthian  War  187 

It  was  therefore  absolutely  necessary,  Demos- 
thenes insisted,  that  there  should  be  a  standing 
force,  kept  permanently  at  the  seat  of  war.  More- 
over, this  force  should  consist  in  a  large  measure  of 
citizens,  whose  presence  would  at  least  act  as  a 
check  upon  the  independence  of  the  generals,  and 
make  them  less  likely  to  desert  the  war  to  which 
Athens  had  sent  them  and  go  off  upon  some  more 
profitable  expedition.  Further,  Demosthenes  re- 
minded his  hearers,  these  generals,  receiving  no 
support  from  home,  plundered  the  very  allies  of 
Athens,  and  obtained  acquittal  when  brought  to 
trial,  by  pleading  the  difficulties  of  their  position. 
This  could  only  be  remedied  by  providing  both 
funds  and  citizen-soldiers  liberally. 

At  the  same  time,  Demosthenes  was  careful  to 
distinguish  his  attitude  from  that  of  the  noisy 
orators,  who  clamoured  for  war  and  proposed 
measures  of  a  magnitude  which  was  absurd  un- 
der existing  circumstances — with  the  result  that 
nothing  was  done  at  all.  He  had  thought  out 
carefully  what,  in  his  opinion,  the  situation  re- 
quired, and  had  worked  out  the  details  after  his 
manner.  The  force  ultimately  to  be  created  was 
one  of  fifty  ships,  carrying  citizen-troops,  with 
transports  for  half  the  cavalry^  of  the  city ;  and  this 
was  to  be  kept  ready  for  immediate  action  in  case 
of  any  emergency.  But  since  this  armament 
could  not  be  organised  at  once,  he  proposed  that  a 
smaller  force  should  be  prepared  for  immediate 
service,   consisting  of  two   thousand  soldiers,   of 


1 8  8  Demosthenes 

whom  five  hundred  were  to  be  citizens,  and  two 
hundred  cavalry,  including  fifty  citizens.  The 
citizens  should  serve  in  relays,  and  ten  warships 
would  be  required.  This  force  was  not  to  fight 
any  pitched  battle,  but  to  harry  Philip's  coasts,  to 
keep  him  in  check,  and,  above  all,  to  prevent  him 
from  plundering  the  allies  and  territory  of  Athens. 
It  was  to  receive  bare  rations — the  amoimt  was 
exactly  calculated — ^and  for  the  rest  was  to  support 
itself.  (Demosthenes  accompanied  the  proposal 
with  a  detailed  exposition  of  the  sources  from  which 
he  expected  to  be  able  to  draw  the  necessary  fimds, 
but  the  schedule  was  unfortunately  not  published 
with  the  Speech,  and  has  not  come  down  to  us.) 
The  general  in  command,  he  said,  would  determine 
the  particular  operations  to  be  undertaken,  as 
circumstances  required;  the  force  would  winter  in 
the  islands  subject  to  Athens,  and  whenever  the 
opportunity  occurred,  would  lie  close  to  the  Mace- 
donian coast,  and  block  the  mouths  of  the  ports. 

In  order  to  rouse  his  countrymen  to  the  pitch  of 
enthusiasm  which  would  induce  them  to  take  the 
steps  which  he  urged  upon  them,  Demosthenes 
appealed  to  every  motive  that  could  influence 
them — pride  in  the  past,  shame  at  the  present, 
trust  in  the  help  given  by  Heaven  to  those  who 
help  themselves,  alarm  for  the  future  if  the  danger 
were  not  averted  by  vigorous  action.  Beside  the 
eloquence  of  this  Speech  the  earlier  orations — with 
the  exception  of  parts  of  the  Speech  against 
Aristocrates — seem  cold. 


The  Olynthian  War  189 

The  proposals  of  Demosthenes  have  often  been 
criticised.  Of  their  practicabiHty  in  detail  we 
have  no  means  of  judging.  But  it  is  perfectly 
clear  that  if  Philip  was  to  be  opposed  at  all — and 
it  is  really  upon  that  fundamental  question  that  his 
critics  differ  from  Demosthenes — it  could  only 
be  by  neutralising  the  advantages  which  Philip 
possessed,  through  a  change  in  Athenian  methods 
of  warfare,  of  the  kind  which  Demosthenes  pro- 
posed. Whether  the  Athenians  would  face  the 
necessity  of  personal  service  and  of  a  standing 
army  was  (just  as  he  represented  it)  a  question  of 
character  and  resolution;  and  he  believed  in  them 
enough  to  think  them  capable  of  the  necessary 
sacrifices.  That  he  was  mistaken  is  perhaps  small 
blame  to  him.  The  suggestion  (which,  of  all  that 
he  makes  in  the  Speech,  sounds  most  strange  to 
modem  readers) ,  that  the  presence  of  citizen-soldiers 
in  the  army  was  required  in  order  to  be  a  check 
upon  the  generals'  independence,  was  probably 
sensible  enough  in  the  circumstances  of  the  time. 
If,  as  it  was,  a  general  was  to  a  great  extent  in  the 
hands  of  his  mercenaries,  and  had  to  lead  them 
where  they  wanted  to  go,  their  influence  would  at 
least  be  partially  counteracted  by  the  presence  of  a 
large  body  of  citizens,  whose  claim  to  the  general's 
services  on  their  country's  behalf  could  make  itself 
felt  on  the  spot. 

But  so  far  as  we  know,  Demosthenes'  Speech 
bore  no  fruit.  At  least  we  know  of  no  operations 
against  Philip  which  can  be  assigned  to  the  year 


190  Demosthenes 

350.  Instead  of  this  we  hear  of  trivial  quarrels  of 
the  Athenians  with  their  nearer  neighbours,  the 
Megareans  and  Corinthians.  The  Megareans  ap- 
pear to  have  trespassed  upon  land  sacred  to  the 
two  goddesses  of  Eleusis,  Demeter  and  Persephone, 
whom  the  Athenians  held  in  the  deepest  veneration ; 
and  an  Athenian  force,  led  by  the  general  Ephial- 
tes,  invaded  Megara,  and  forced  the  Megareans  to 
recognise  a  delimitation  of  the  sacred  territory 
by  the  officials  of  the  Eleusinian  mysteries.^  An 
armed  force  was  also  sent  into  the  territory  of 
Corinth  to  attend  the  Isthmian  Games,  because 
the  Corinthians,  for  some  reason  unknown  to  us, 
had  omitted  to  send  the  Athenians  the  customary 
official  invitation  to  the  Games.  To  these  quarrels 
Demosthenes  not  unjustifiably  refers^  with  con- 
tempt, since  in  pursuing  them  the  People  was 
neglecting  its  more  vital  interests. 

It  is  probably  to  the  same  year  that  we  must 
refer  the  friendly  communications  ^  between  Athens 
and  Orontas,  satrap  of  Mysia,  who  was  in  revolt 
against  the  King  of  Persia,  and  had  helped  the 
Athenian  generals  with  supplies  of  com.  These 
communications  showed  a  different  attitude  on 
the  part  of  the  Athenians  towards  Persia  from  that 
which  had  led  them  in  356  to  recall  Chares  when  he 
was  helping  Artabazus.  Moreover,  the  rebellious 
subjects  of  the  King  in  Egypt  were  being  assisted 
by  the  Athenian  Diophantus,  and  owed  much  of 

'  See  Didym.,  Schol.  in  Dent.,  Col.  13,  for  details. 

•Olynth.  Ill,  §  20.  3  C.  7.  A.,  ii.,  108. 


The  Olynthian  War  191 

their  success  to  his  generalship.  (On  the  other 
hand,  Phocion,  of  whom  much  more  will  be  said 
in  the  sequel,  is  found  in  350  helping  the  King's 
forces  at  the  siege  of  Salamis,  where  Euagoras  had 
revolted.  Perhaps  by  this  time  Orontas  had  been 
subdued,  and  the  King  may  have  threatened  the 
supporters  of  the  rebel  satrap,  and  caused  them  to 
veer  round  once  more.)  There  is  much  that  is 
obscure  in  the  relations  of  Athens  to  the  King  at 
this  time,  but  the  hostile  attitude  which  she 
appears  to  have  adopted  for  a  time  may  possibly 
be  explained  by  recent  communications  between 
Philip  and  Artaxerxes.  It  is  at  least  probable 
that  Philip  had  thought  it  well,  before  turning  his 
attention  to  conquests  nearer  home,  to  come  to  a 
temporary  understanding  with  Artaxerxes  which 
would  secure  him  against  Persian  interference 
with  his  own  recently  acquired  power  in  Thrace 
and  on  the  Hellespont. ' 

In  the  meantime  Philip  was  encouraging  the 
party  favourable  to  himself  in  Olynthus,  the 
leaders  of  which  were  Euthycrates  and  Lasthenes, 
assuring  them  that  he  meant  their  city  no  harm, 
and  inducing  them  to  persuade  their  fellow-citizens 
to  dismiss  his  opponents  from  their  confidence. 

•  Demosthenes  (Phil.  I,  §  48)  alludes  to  a  rumour  that  Philip 
had  sent  ambassadors  to  the  King;  and  Arrian,  II,  xiv.,  quotes  a 
letter  of  Darius  to  Alexander  the  Great,  reminding  the  latter  of  his 
father's  friendship  and  alliance  with  Artaxerxes  Ochus.  There 
is  no  indication  in  Arrian  of  the  date  of  the  alliance,  and  some 
would  place  it  about  343;  but  I  think  the  year  351-0  is  more 
likely  to  be  the  right  date. 


192  Demosthenes 

Thus  persuaded,  the  Olynthians  exiled  Apolloni- 
des,  the  leader  of  the  anti-Macedonian  party,  and 
before  long  took  what  proved  to  be  the  fatal  step 
of  appointing  Lasthenes  to  command  their  cavalry. 

And  so  [says  Demosthenes^],  when  some  of  them 
began  to  take  bribes,  and  the  People  as  a  whole  were 
foolish  enough,  or  rather,  unfortunate  enough,  to  re- 
pose greater  confidence  in  these  men  than  in  those 
who  spoke  for  their  own  good ;  when  Lasthenes  roofed 
his  house  with  the  timber  which  came  from  Mace- 
donia, and  Euthycrates  was  keeping  a  large  herd  of 
cattle  for  which  he  had  paid  no  one  anything,  when  a 
third  returned  with  sheep,  and  a  fourth  with  horses; 
while  the  People,  to  whose  detriment  all  this  was  be- 
ing done,  so  far  from  showing  any  anger  or  any  dis- 
position to  chastise  men  who  acted  thus,  actually 
gazed  on  them  with  envy,  and  paid  them  honour,  and 
regarded  them  as  heroes — when,  I  say,  such  practices 
were  thus  gaining  ground,  and  corruption  had  been 
victorious,  then,  though  they  possessed  one  thousand 
cavalry,  and  numbered  more  than  ten  thousand  men, 
though  all  the  surrounding  peoples  were  their  allies, 
though  you  went  to  their  assistance  with  ten  thousand 
mercenaries  and  fifty  ships,  and  with  four  thousand 
citizen-soldiers  as  well,  none  of  these  things  could 
save  them.  Before  a  year  of  the  war  had  expired 
they  had  lost  all  the  cities  in  Chalcidice,  while  Philip 
could  no  longer  keep  pace  with  the  invitations  of  the 
traitors,  and  did  not  know  which  place  to  occupy  first. 

The  history  of  the  years  349  and  348  affords  a 

^De  F.  L.,  §265  ;  cj.  Phil.,  Ill,  §§  56, 63,  64,  66,  and  ie  Chers., 
§59. 


The  Olynthian  War  193 

striking  proof  of  the  demoralisation  of  the  poHtical 
leaders  in  these  cities,  and  of  the  ruthlessness  with 
which  Philip  removed  out  of  the  way,  by  foul 
means  no  less  than  by  fair,  any  obstacle  that 
barred  his  progress.  He  virtually  declared  war 
on  Olynthus,  despite  his  renewed  professions  of 
good- will,  early  in  349,  when  he  demanded  the 
surrender  of  his  step-brother.  This  demand  the 
Olynthians  refused.  Probably  they  recognised 
that  they  would  now  in  any  case  have  to  fight  to 
the  death ;  and  they  renewed  their  appeal  to  Athens, 
asking  once  more  for  the  alliance  which  had  been 
talked  of  three  years  earlier,  and  for  practical 
assistance  against  Philip.^  In  the  meantime  they 
declined  to  make  any  agreement  with  him,  though 
he  appears  to  have  made  proposals  to  them. 

The  First  Olynthiac  Oration  of  Demosthenes 
formed  part  of  the  debate  upon  the  Olynthian 
request.  It  has  indeed  been  disputed  whether  it 
was  actually  the  first  of  the  three  Olynthiacs  to  be 
delivered,  but  expressions  used  in  it  leave  no  doubt 
that  the  alliance,  or  at  least  the  nature  of  the  help 
to  be  given  to  the  Olynthians,  had  not  yet  been 
determined  upon,  and  that  at  the  time  of  its 
delivery  Olynthus  itself  had  not  been  attacked, 
and  none  of  the  Chalcidic  cities  had  been  actually 
taken;  nor  can  Philip's  expedition  to  Thessaly 
(which  occurred  later  in  349)  have  taken  place. 
The  traditional  order  of  the  Speeches  is  in  fact 
the   most   probable,   and    the    character    of    the 

'  Philochorus  ap.  Dion.  Hal.  ad  Ammaeum,  I.,  ix. 


194  Demosthenes 

several  Speeches,  in  this  order,  admits  of  easy 
explanation. 

Demosthenes  began  by  congratulating  his 
hearers  on  the  happy  fortune  which  had  offered  so 
desirable  an  alliance  to  Athens,  and  by  laying  stress 
upon  the  certainty  (as  he  regarded  it)  that  Philip, 
unless  checked  at  a  distance,  would  make  his  way 
to  Attica  itself;  and  that  if  he  did  this,  the  country, 
and  above  all  the  farmers,  would  be  ruined.  He 
entreated  his  countrymen  to  fling  aside  their  short- 
sighted indifference,  and  to  exchange  their  love  of 
ease  for  a  strenuous  activity  on  behalf  of  the  Olyn- 
thians  and  of  their  own  interests.  He  reminded 
them  of  Philip's  restless  energy,  and  his  skill  in 
using  his  opportunities,  and  contrasted  it  with 
the  dilatoriness  of  the  Athenians,  who  were  al- 
ways too  late  to  effect  their  object.  He  further 
urged  that  the  present  moment  was  a  peculiarly 
opportune  one ;  for  not  only  had  Philip  been  dis- 
appointed at  not  carrying  all  before  him  without 
having  to  strike  a  blow,  but  the  Thessalians  were 
growing  restive  and  were  Hkely  to  revolt  against 
his  supremacy. 

The  Speech  was  not  confined  to  generalities. 
Demosthenes  had,  as  usual,  a  definite  plan  of 
action  in  view,  and  did  not  shrink  from  the  re- 
sponsibility and  the  risk  of  proposing  it.  One 
force  must  go  to  Chalcidice  to  save  the  towns  of 
the  League;  another  to  the  Macedonian  coast,  to 
inflict  damage  upon  Philip's  own  country.  As 
regards  funds,  he  hinted,  not  obscurely,  that  the 


The  Olynthian  War  195 

only  right  course  was  to  divert  the  festival-money 
to  military  uses;  but  as  it  was  obvious  that  the 
People  were  not  prepared  for  this,  he  suggested 
a  general  war-tax  as  the  best  means  of  raising 
money. 

The  ■  proposals  of  Demosthenes  were  strongly 
opposed,  and  among  others,  Demades'  (a  brilliant 
extempore  orator  who  afterwards  played  a  con- 
siderable part  in  the  history  of  Athens)  spoke 
against  them.  But  the  alliance  with  Olynthus 
was  made;  Chares  was  sent  with  two  thousand 
mercenaries  and  the  thirty  ships  which  were  al- 
ready under  his  command;  and  in  addition,  eight 
ships  were  to  be  sent  when  they  could  be  got 
ready.  *  The  mission  of  Chares,  however,  proved 
fruitless — for  what  reasons  we  do  not  know.  His 
enemies  in  Athens  (the  party  adverse  to  war) 
renewed  their  campaign  of  accusations  against 
him,  ^  and  apparently  he  was  inadequately  supplied 
with  funds;  for  it  seems  most  likely  that  at  the 
time  when  the  Second  Olynthiac  was  delivered,  no 
war- tax  had  yet  been  levied;  and  it  is  not  improb- 
able that  the  People,  in  deciding  upon  an  expedi- 
tion, had  abstained  from  voting  money  to  maintain 
it.  Besides  this,  the  same  orators  appear  to  have 
represented  Philip  in  the  most  formidable  light, 
as  a  power  with  whom  it  was  useless  to  contend. 

Under  some    such  circumstances   the   Second 

'  Suid.,  s.  V.     A-ntJuiSris.  ^  Philochorus  ap.  Dion.  Hal.,  /.  c. 

3  The  accusations  may  very  likely  have  been  true  enough. 
See  Dem.,  Olynth.  II,  §§  27-29. 


196  Demosthenes 

Olynthiac  was  delivered,  not  long  after  the  First. 
Demosthenes  insists  briefly  upon  the  shamefulness 
of  his  countrymen's  inaction,  and  then  devotes  a 
large  section  of  the  Speech  to  the  argument  that 
Philip's  power,  being  based  upon  selfishness  and 
treachery,  could  not  last,  and  that  there  were 
already  signs  of  its  approaching  collapse.  The 
argument  does  more  credit  perhaps  to  the  orator's 
faith  in  moral  principles  than  to  his  insight  into 
the  situation  of  the  moment.  Possibly  it  was 
adopted  merely  as  a  convenient  method  of  per- 
suading the  multitude  that  Philip  was  not  so 
formidable  as  he  was  said  to  be.  Yet  there  is  a 
ring  of  sincerity  about  it,  which  perhaps  justifies 
us  in  thinking  that  Demosthenes'  experience  had 
not  yet  been  long  enough  to  show  him  that  the 
triumph  of  righteousness  in  mundane  affairs  is 
often  long  postponed,  and  cannot  be  reckoned 
upon  at  any  given  moment. 

When  power  [he  says]  is  cemented  by  good-will, 
and  the  interest  of  all  who  join  in  a  war  is  the  same, 
then  men  are  willing  to  share  the  labour,  to  endure 
the  misfortimes,  and  to  stand  fast.  But  when  a  man 
has  become  strong,  as  Philip  has  done,  by  a  grasping 
and  wicked  policy,  the  first  excuse,  the  least  stumble, 
throws  him  from  his  seat  and  dissolves  the  alliance. 
It  is  impossible,  men  of  Athens,  utterly  impossible,  to 
acquire  power  that  will  last,  by  unrighteousness,  by 
perjury,  and  by  falsehood.  Such  power  holds  out 
for  a  moment  or  for  a  brief  hour;  it  blossoms  brightly, 
perhaps,  with  fair  hopes;  but  time  detects  the  fraud. 


The  Olynthian  War  197 

and  the  flower  falls  withered  about  its  stem.  In  a 
house  or  a  ship  or  any  other  structure  it  is  the  foun- 
dations that  must  be  strongest;  and  no  less,  I  believe, 
must  the  principles  which  are  the  foundation  of  men's 
actions  be  those  of  truth  and  righteousness.  Such 
qualities  are  not  to  be  seen  in  the  acts  of  Philip 
to-day. 

In  the  later  speeches  against  Philip  we  find  little 
remaining  of  this  fine  faith. 

But  the  orator's  application  of  these  principles 
was  not  a  happy  one.  For  the  picture  which 
follows  of  the  disaffection  of  Philip's  followers,  and 
of  the  incompetence  of  the  warriors  who  surrounded 
him  (if  not  of  their  dissoluteness) ,  must  be  greatly 
overdrawn,  even  though  it  purports  to  be  based 
on  first-hand  evidence.  There  can  also  be  little 
doubt  that  the  representation  which  he  gave  of 
Philip's  condition  was  ill-judged,  for  it  is  never 
wise  to  set  too  low  a  value  on  an  enemy,  and 
Demosthenes  may  even  have  contributed  to  the 
failure  of  his  own  object,  by  encouraging  the 
People  (contrary  to  his  custom)  to  think  too  lightly 
of  their  danger.  They  were  not  at  all  unlikely  to 
seize  on  this  part  of  his  Speech  and  neglect  the 
rest. 

Demosthenes  next  turns  upon  the  Athenians 
themselves  the  blame  for  the  misconduct  of  their 
generals,  whom  they  would  not  supply  with  the 
means  to  carry  on  the  war,  and  who  therefore 
resorted  to  actions  which  roused  the  virtuous 
indignation  of  the  citizens  who  sat  at  home  at 


198  Demosthenes 

ease.  He  demands  once  more  (as  the  only  solu- 
tion of  the  difficulty)  that  the  citizens  shall  go  on 
active  service  in  person,  and  shall  contribute 
funds  in  proportion  to  their  wealth;  and  further 
that  they  shall  reform  their  behaviour  in  the 
Assembly  and  listen  impartially  to  the  various 
counsels  given  to  them,  in  order  that  they  may 
choose  the  best.  "You  used,  men  of  Athens,  to 
pay  taxes  by  Boards;  to-da:y  you  conduct  your 
politics  by  Boards.  On  either  side  there  is  an 
orator  as  leader,  and  a  general  imder  him," — the 
reference  is  probably  to  Chares  and  Charidemus, 
who  were  respectively  patronised  by  rival  groups, 
— "and  for  the  Three  Hundred,^  there  are  those 
who  come  to  shout.  This  system  you  must  give 
up;  you  must  even  now  become  your  own  masters; 
you  must  give  to  all  their  share  in  discussion,  in 
speech  and  action. "  The  Second  Olynthiac  goes 
beyond  the  First  in  the  hint  which  it  contains  of 
a  reform  of  the  taxation-system,  by  which  all, 
without  exception,  should  be  obliged  to  contribute 
in  proportion  to  their  income;  in  the  proposal 
(repeated  from  the  First  Philippic)  that  the  citizens 
should  serve  in  the  army  in  relays,  until  all  had 
served;  and  in  the  suggestion  that  an  embassy 
should  be  sent  to  make  common  cause  with  the 
discontented  Thessalians.  But  none  of  these  sug- 
gestions was  carried  out;  there  was  little  or  no 
improvement  in  the  attitude  either  of  the  dominant 
party  or  of  the  People  towards  the  war ;  and  about 

»  See  above,  p.  51. 


The  Olynthian  War  199 

this  time  Chares  was  recalled  to  take  his  trial  upon 
the  charges  preferred  by  his  enemies,  and  was  not, 
it  would  seem,  immediately  replaced. 

Philip  now  began  a  series  of  attacks  upon  the 
towns  of  the  Chalcidic  League.  Among  the  first 
to  suffer  was  Stageira,  the  birthplace  of  Aristotle, 
which  was  razed  to  the  ground.^  (Its  restoration 
was  permitted  many  years  later  upon  the  in- 
tercession of  the  philosopher.)  His  operations, 
however,  seem  to  have  been  interrupted  by  the 
necessity  of  reducing  the  Thessalians  to  order. 
They  had  grown  restive,  as  we  have  already  seen. 
Peitholaus,  one  of  the  dynasty  expelled  from  Pherae 
had  returned^;  the  fortification  of  Magnesia  by 
Philip's  generals  had  been  interfered  with;  and 
the  Pheraeans  had  resolved  to  demand  from  PhiHp 
the  restoration  of  Pagasae,  and  to  refuse  him  the 
enjoyment  for  the  future  of  their  harboiu*  and 
market  dues.  In  consequence  of  this,  PhiHp  once 
more  expelled  Peitholaus,  and  took  steps  to  quell 
any  tendency  to  insubordination,  whether  by 
force  or  by  those  friendly  assurances  which  he 
knew  so  well  how  to  give  and  to  break. 

In  the  coiirse  of  the  summer,  probably  as  soon 
as  Philip's  operations  in  Chalcidice  began,  the 
Olynthians  again  appealed  to  Athens  for  help. 
In  response  to  the  appeal  Charidemus  was  trans- 
ferred from  the  Hellespont  to  Chalcidice,  with 
eighteen  ships  and  a  mercenary  force  consisting 
of  four  thousand  light  infantry  and  150  cavalry. 

'  Diod.,  XVI,  Hi.  'Ibid. 


200  Demosthenes 

At  first  his  conduct  of  the  war  appeared  to  promise 
success.  He  overran  Pallene  (one  of  the  three 
promontories  of  the  Chalcidic  peninsula,  already 
invaded  by  Philip),  and  devastated  Bottiaea,  a 
district  of  Macedonia  south  of  the  river  Lyd- 
ias.  But  the  promise  came  to  nothing,  through 
Charidemus'  own  fault;  for  instead  of  prosecut- 
ing the  campaign  further  he  gave  himself  up  to  the 
grossest  debauchery,  and  even  demanded  from  the 
Olynthian  Council  the  means  to  satisfy  his  lusts.  * 
Nevertheless  the  temporary  success  of  Charide- 
mus may  have  caused  some  elation  in  Athens, 
and  in  the  debate  in  which  Demosthenes*  Third 
Olynthiac  oration  was  delivered  most  of  the 
speakers  appear  to  have  talked  light-heartedly  of 
wreaking  vengeance  upon  Philip.  It  is  prob- 
able that  the  special  subject  of  the  debate  was  the 
financial  provision  to  be  made  for  the  operations  in 
aid  of  Olynthus;  the  date  which  seems  most  likely 
is  the  auttimn  of  349.  Though  the  orator  repeats 
briefly  some  of  the  points  of  the  earlier  Speeches 
(emphasising  the  discredit  attaching  to  Athens, 
and  the  danger  of  allowing  the  war  to  be  carried 
into  Attica),  his  main  object  is  now  to  urge  the 
necessity  of  setting  free  the  money  which  at  present 
passed  into  the  festival-fund,  and  of  using  it  for 
the  purposes  of  the  war.  The  probable  nature  of 
the  difficulty  has  already  been  explained.^  De- 
mosthenes' words  leave  no  doubt  that  Eubulus  and 

'  Philochorus  c/>.  Dion.  Hal.,  /.  c;  Theopomp.,  fr.  139  (Oxford 
Text).  '  See  above,  p.  127. 


The  Olynthian  War  201 

his  party  had  succeeded,  by  means  of  a  compara- 
tively recent  law,  in  giving  fresh  security  to  the 
distributions  of  festival-money.  No  motion  to 
use  that  money  for  the  war  would  be  legal,  until 
the  law  in  question  had  been  repealed;  and  the 
repeal  of  the  law  could  only  be  effected  by  the 
Nomothetae,  the  Legislative  Commission  appointed 
out  of  the  jurors  for  the  year,  to  which  the  rriaking 
and  immaking  of  laws  was  entrusted. 

The  danger  of  attempting  to  secure  the  desired 
end  by  any  more  direct  means  was  illustrated  by 
the  fate  of  Apollodorus,  who  about  this  time 
proposed  a  resolution  in  the  Council  (and  sub- 
sequently brought  it  before  the  Assembly)  that 
the  Assembly  should  decide  whether  the  surplus 
funds  at  the  disposal  of  the  administration  should 
go  to  the  festival -fund  or  to  the  military  chest. 
According  to  the  account  given  in  the  Speech 
against  Nesera'  (the  work  of  an  unknown  con- 
temporary of  Demosthenes),  no  one  in  the  As- 
sembly voted  against  the  proposal;  and  though 
this  is  probably  an  exaggeration,  the  Assembly 
doubtless  approved  warmly  of  the  proposal.  But 
Apollodorus  was  indicted  by  Stephanus  for  the 
illegality  of  his  decree,  and  was  fined  a  talent.  We 
do  not  know  what  the  precise  relations  between 
Demosthenes  and  Apollodorus  at  this  time  were.* 
It  is  clear,  however,  that  their  policy  in  regard  to 
the  festival -money  was  identical,^  but  that  Demos- 

'  §5.  »  See  Appendix  to  this  chapter. 

*  On  this  policy  in  general,  see  above,  pp.  96-98. 


202  Demosthenes 

thenes  was  more  careful  than  ApoUodorus  to  go 
to  work  in  a  legal  manner. 

In  the  Third  Olynthiac  he  demands  the  appoint- 
ment of  a  Legislative  Commission,  and  further 
requests  that  the  first  step  shall  be  taken  by  those 
who  were  responsible  for  the  mischievous  law. 
He  also  demands  the  repeal  of  certain  laws  with 
regard  to  military  service,  which  gave  encoiu^age- 
ment  to  malingerers,  and  took  the  heart  out  of 
patriotic  citizens.  He  goes  on  to  insist  with 
greater  emphasis  than  ever  upon  the  need  of 
personal  service,  and  of  such  a  reorganisation  of 
the  financial  system  as  would  require  every  citizen 
to  render  his  duty  to  the  State,  according  to  his  age 
and  capacity,  before  becoming  entitled  to  any 
share  in  the  public  funds.  We  do  not  know  if  this 
proposal  was  embodied  in  any  formal  motion ;  if  it 
was,  it  was  not  carried;  and  certainly  no  Legisla- 
tive Commission  was  appointed.  But  the  words 
in  which  Demosthenes  outlines  the  kind  of  re- 
organisation which  he  has  in  view  are  siifficiently 
remarkable. 

"What?"  some  one  will  ask,  "  do  you  suggest  that 
we  should  work  for  our  money?"  I  do,  men  of  Ath- 
ens ;  and  I  propose  a  system,  for  immediate  enforce- 
ment, which  will  embrace  all  alike ;  so  that  each,  while 
receiving  his  share  of  the  public  funds,  may  supply 
whatever  service  the  State  requires  of  him.  If  we  can 
remain  at  peace,  then  a  man  will  do  better  to  stay  at 
home,  free  from  the  necessity  of  doing  anything  dis- 
creditable through  poverty.     But  if  a  situation  like 


The  Olynthian  War  203 

the  present  occurs,  then,  supported  by  these  same 
sums,  he  will  serve  loyally  in  person ,  in  defence  of  his 
country.  If  he  is  beyond  the  age  for  military  service, 
then  let  him  take,  in  his  place  among  the  rest,  that 
which  he  now  receives  irregularly  and  without  doing 
any  service,  and  let  him  act  as  an  overseer  and  man- 
ager of  business  that  must  be  done.  In  short,  with- 
out adding  or  subtracting  more  than  a  small  sum, 
and  only  removing  the  want  of  system,  my  plan  re- 
duces the  State  to  order,  making  your  receipt  of  pay- 
ment, your  service  in  the  army  or  the  courts,  and  your 
performance  of  any  duty  which  the  age  of  each  of 
you  allows,  and  the  occasion  requires,  all  part  of  one 
and  the  same  system.  But  it  has  been  no  part  of  my 
proposal  that  we  should  assign  the  due  of  those  who 
act  to  those  who  do  nothing ;  that  we  should  be  idle 
ourselves  and  enjoy  our  leisure  helplessly,  listening  to 
tales  of  victories  won  by  somebody's  mercenaries^; 
for  that  is  what  happens  now.  Not  that  I  blame 
one  who  is  doing  some  part  of  your  duty  for  you ;  but 
I  require  you  to  do  for  yourselves  the  things  for 
which  you  honour  others,  and  not  to  abandon  the 
position  which  your  fathers  won  through  many  a 
glorious  peril,  and  bequeathed  to  you. 

It  may  be  that  such  a  proposal  had  no  chance 
of  success;  and  modem  critics  have  spoken  con- 
temptuously of  Demosthenes'  unpractical  and 
fanciful  schemes  of  reform.  Yet  we  cannot  but 
feel  that  the  history  of  Athens  would  have  been 
the  poorer,  if  no  one  had  set  forth  a  policy  worthy 
of  the  great  traditions  of  the  city.     It  is  true  that 

'  An  obvious  reference  to  Charidemus. 


204  Demosthenes 

idealism  is  easier  for  the  Opposition  than  for  those 
who  are  responsible  for  the  detailed  working  out  of 
practical  measures.  Yet  it  is  plain  that  it  re- 
quired no  small  courage  in  Demosthenes  to  speak 
in  this  tone.  Those  who  associate  him  with  vulgar 
demagogues  need  to  remember  that  on  this  occa- 
sion Demosthenes  was  opposing  not  merely  the 
dominant  party,  but  the  whole  force  of  popular 
desire;  for,  so  far  as  the  festival-money  was 
concerned,  Eubulus  and  the  People  were  entirely 
at  one.  Consequently,  he  tried  to  make  the 
People  realise  the  wrong  done  to  them  by  the 
politicians  who  spoke  to  please  them,  and  effected 
their  own  ends  by  flattering  the  desires  of  the 
multitude;  and  he  repeats  with  little  alteration 
some  of  the  passages  which  he  had  already  used  in 
composing  the  Speech  against  Aristocrates.  The 
contrast  between  the  spirit  of  the  great  statesmen 
of  Athens  in  old  days  and  that  of  his  own  oppon- 
ents is  drawn  in  a  passage^  which  is  too  long  for 
quotation,  but  is  one  of  the  most  impressive  in  all 
his  speeches. 

In  348  Philip  made  his  appearance  again  in 
Chalcidice  with  a  large  army,  and  continued  the 
work  of  conquest.  One  after  another  the  towns 
fell  into  his  hands ;  corruption  and  treachery  did  his 
work  even  more  effectively  than  force.'  Mecy- 
bema,  the  port  of  Olynthus  itself,  distant  less  than 
three  miles  from  the  city,  and  Torone,  the  chief 

'§§24-31.  •  Diod.,  XVI,  liii. 


The  Olynthian  War  205 

town  of  the  Sithonian  peninsula,  were  betrayed, 
and  he  took  them  without  having  to  strike  a  blow. 
At  last  he  threw  off  all  pretence.  Hitherto  he  had 
continued  to  profess  friendly  intentions  towards 
Olynthus;  but  when  he  was  within  five  miles  of 
the  city,  he  suddenly  told  the  Olynthians  that 
there  were  only  two  alternatives — either  they  must 
cease  to  live  in  Olynthus,  or  he  to  live  in  Mace- 
donia/ Once  more  the  Olynthians  appealed  to 
Athens,  begging  for  a  force,  not  of  mercenaries, 
but  of  citizens.  The  Athenians  were  at  last  roused ; 
but  they  were  in  great  difficulties ;  for,  owing  to 
the  intrigues  of  Philip  in  Euboea,  they  found  them.- 
selves  involved  in  hostilities  with  their  former 
allies  in  that  island.  It  was,  however,  determined 
that  Chares  should  go  to  the  relief  of  Olynthus 
with  a  citizen  force  of  two  thousand  heavy  infantry 
and  three  himdred  cavalry,^  But  Chares  had  not 
yet  passed  the  public  examination  of  his  conduct 
in  his  former  expedition  to  Olynthus,  in  reference 
to  which  a  trial  upon  charges  brought  b}^  Cephi- 
sodotus  hung  over  his  head ;  and  he  demanded  that 
the  matter  should  be  settled  before  he  went. 
Cephisodotus  complained  that  Chares  was  making 
the  demand  with  his  hand  on  the  throat  of  the 
People;  but  it  may  be  taken  as  certain  that  no 
accusation  was  allowed  to  stand  in  the  way  of  his 
departure,  and  he  sailed.^  Unhappily  he  was 
hindered  by  the  stormy  wind  which  blows  for  some 

'  Dem.,  Phil.  Ill,  §  1 1.  '  Philochorus  ap.  Dion.  Hal.,  /.  c. 

3  Ar.,  Rhet.,  Ill,  x.,  1411a. 


2o6  Demosthenes 

weeks  in  the  summer  from  the  north  over  the 
^gean;  and  before  he  could  arrive  at  Olynthus, 
the  city  had  fallen  by  treachery.  ^  It  had  held  out 
bravely  against  repeated  assaults  by  Philip's  army, 
and  had  inflicted  heavy  losses  upon  it.  But  in  the 
end  Lasthenes,  who  had  been  given  the  command 
of  the  Olynthian  cavalry,  betrayed  them  on  the 
field,  in  conjunction  with  Euthycrates;  and  with 
their  betrayal  all  was  lost.' 
\  About  the  month  of  August,  348,  Philip  entered 
Olynthus.  By  his  orders  the  inhabitants  (among 
whom  a  number  of  Athenian  citizens  were  cap- 
tured) were  sold  as  slaves  ^ ;  and  with  cruel  cynicism 
the  traitor  Euthycrates  was  appointed  to  deter- 
mine the  price  to  be  paid  for  each.  ^  Philip's  step- 
brothers Arrhidaeus  and  Menelaus  were  taken  and 
put  to  death.  ^  The  conqueror  made  large  presents 
of  captives  and  spoil  to  his  friends  and  supporters; 
and  not  long  afterwards  ^schines  described  how 
he  had  met  the  Arcadian  Atrestidas  travelling 
home  from  Macedonia  with  a  large  body  of  women 
and  children  given  to  him  by  Philip.*^  The  Olyn- 
thian territory  was  given  principally  to  Macedon- 
ian chieftains,  and  large  parts  of  Chalcidice  were 

'  Suid.,  V.  s.  Kdpavoi. 

'  Dem.,  Phil.  Ill,  §§  56,  66;  de  F.  L.,  §  267;  Diod.,  /.  c,  etc. 

3iEsch.,  de  F.  L.,  §  15;  Dem.,  Phil.  II.,  §  21;  Diod.,  /.  c,  etc. 

<Hypereides,  fr.  76  (Oxfd.  Text).  The  truth  of  the  story  that 
Aristotle  the  philosopher  pointed  out  to  Philip  the  wealthiest  of 
the  citizens  happily  rests  on  very  doubtful  authority.  (See 
Grote,  Pt.  II,  ch.  Ixxxviii). 

s  Justin,  VIII,  iii.  *Dem.,  de  F.  L..  §§  305,  306, 


The  Olynthi 


probably  worked  by  their  for^i^^Mai. 
slaves,  for  the  benefit  of  Philip  atid  h$s  H&t^  ..crv 
Among  the  friends  of  Philip  who  pr6fi?83.  by  life 
distribution  of  the  lands  taken  from  fee  allies  erf 
Athens  were  (according  to  Demosthenes)^  both 
^schines  and  Philocrates,  of  whom  much  more 
will  be  heard  shortly.  By  the  time  that  Philip's 
work  was  finished,  thirty-two  Chalcidic  towns  had 
been  annihilated,  and  that  (Demosthenes  tells  us^) 
with  such  savagery  that  a  few  years  afterwards  no 
one  could  have  told  that  their  sites  had  ever  been 
inhabited.  Most  of  them  were  never  restored; 
and  Appian,'*  writing  in  the  second  century  after 
Christ,  says  that  no  trace  remained  of  them  except 
the  foundations  of  the  temples.  Even  if,  as  some 
modem  writers  ^  assert,  Demosthenes  somewhat 
exaggerated  the  calamity  for  rhetorical  effect, 
there  can  still  be  no  real  doubt  of  the  sweeping 
nature  of  the  destruction  inflicted  by  the  conqueror 
upon  this  unhappy  region.^  Those  who  could 
derived  some  satisfaction  from  the  fact  that  when 
the  traitors  had  done  their  work,  they  were  cast 
aside  by  Philip,  who  knew  them  too  well  to  trust 
them.  7 

The  Athenians  gave  a  home  and  the  privileges  of 
citizenship  to  those  fugitives  from  Olynthus  who 

'  ^Esch.,  de  F.  L.,  §  156,  and  Dittenb.,  SylL  Inscr.  (ed.  2),  No. 
178.  =>  Dem.,  de  F.  L.,  §§  145,  146.  sphil.   Ill,  §  26. 

*  Bell.  Civ.,  IV,  102.  s  E.g.  Beloch,  Gr.  Gesch.,  ii.,  p.  505  n. 

'  Pliny  (Nat.  Hist.,  ii,,  27)  spoke  of  the  blood-red  meteor,  which 
fell  to  earth  in  349,  as  a  message  of  the  sanguinary  cruelties  which 
accompanied  the  fall  of  Olynthus.  ^  Dem.,  de  Chers.,  §40. 


mosthenes 


"'their  escape,  and  tried  to  quiet 
"ISI  gBonsciences  by  passing  resolutions  of 
sljrong  gpndemnation  against  the  traitors.*  But 
th^^rospeirt  of  the  final  loss  of  all  hope  of  recover- 
ing -Amphipolis  (for  this  was  a  necessary  conse- 
quence of  Philip's  victory)  cannot  have  been  easy 
to  face.  Philip,  on  the  other  hand,  celebrated  his 
victory  by  holding  a  festival  in  honour  of  the 
Olympian  Zeus,  with  dramatic  performances  to 
which  he  summoned  all  the  most  celebrated  actors 
of  Greece,  feasting  his  friends  and  making  presents 
to  them  with  lavish  generosity.' 

We  must  now  recur  to  the  unexpected  crisis  in 
Euboea,  which  was  at  least  a  partial  cause  of  the 
failure  of  the  Athenians  to  render  effective  aid  to 
Olynthus.^  We  saw  that  the  influence  of  Athens 
in  Euboea  had  been  restored  by  the  brilliant 
campaign  of  Timotheus  about  the  year  357,  when 
the  Athenians  liberated  the  people  of  Euboea 
at  their  own  request  from  the  domination  of 
Thebes;  and  in  352  Demosthenes^  mentioned 
Menestratus  of  Eretria  as  a  ruler  friendly  to  Athens. 
But  very  soon  after  this  Philip  had  begun  to  feel 
his  way  in  the  island.  In  the  First  Philippic 
Demosthenes  quoted  a  letter  which  Philip  had 
sent  to  the  Euboeans,  though  its  purport  has  not 

'  Dem.,  de  F.  L.,  §267;  Suid.,  *.  v.  Kdpavoi;  Harpocr.,  s.  v. 
IfforeK-fis  etc. 

'  Demosthenes  {de  F.  L.,  §  192  flE.)  tells  a  touching  story  of  the 
favour  asked,  in  response  to  Philip's  invitation,  by  the  comic 
actor  Satyrus.  J  Above,  p.  183.  *  In  Aristocr.,  ^124. 


The  Olynthian  War  209 

come  down  to  us.  It  appears  probable,  however, 
that  he  went  to  work  by  encouraging  the  estab- 
lishment of  tyrants  in  the  important  cities  of  the 
island,  and  by  supporting  them  with  money  and 
men.  In  Eretria,  in  348,  the  ruler,  who  was 
favourable  to  Athens,  was  Plutarchus;  and  a  ris- 
ing against  him  was  led  by  Cleitarchus,  ^  who  was 
probably  now  (as  he  was  later)  in  close  touch  with 
Philip.  Plutarchus  accordingly  sent  to  Athens  to 
ask  for  aid.  Demosthenes  strongly  opposed  the 
granting  of  this  request,  desiring  doubtless  that  the 
undivided  forces  of  the  city  should  be  employed 
to  save  Olynthus  from  Philip.  His  action  in  so 
doing  has  been  much  criticised,  on  the  ground  that 
Euboea  was  far  nearer  to  Athens  than  Olynthus, 
and  that  a  hostile  power  there  could  be  a  very 
dangerous  foe.  But  it  is  quite  possible  that  he  was 
right.  The  only  chance  of  defeating  Philip  was  to 
strain  every  nerve,  and  to  let  no  other  call  stand 
in  the  way.  Experience  had  shown  that  a  short 
and  sharp  campaign^  might  sufBce  to  reduce 
Euboea;  and  this  might,  without  inordinate  risk, 
be  postponed  until  the  Olynthian  crisis  was  over. 

However  this  may  be,  Plutarchus  had  a  power- 
ful helper  in  Athens  in  the  wealthy  Meidias,  the 
friend  of  Eubulus  and  the  enemy  of  Demosthenes, 
whom  he  actually  accused  of  fomenting  trouble  in 
Euboea  in  order  to  injure  Plutarchus,  the  friend  of 
Athens.^     Owing  to  the  influence  of  Eubulus  and 

'  Schol.  on  Dem.,  de  Pace.,  p.  i6i. 

'  Like  that  of  Timotheus;  see  p.  68.       »  Dem.,  in  Meid.,  §i  lo. 

14 


210  Demosthenes 

Meidias,  it  was  resolved  to  send  assistance  to 
Plutarchus ;  Phocion,  a  brave  soldier  and  a  member 
of  Eubulus'  party,  but  trusted  by  all  alike  for  his 
blunt  and  outspoken  honesty,  crossed  with  a  force 
of  infantry  and  cavalry  about  the  month  of  Febru- 
ary, 348,  ^  and  Meidias  went  with  him  as  a  cavalry 
officer. 

The  detailed  history  of  the  expedition  is  not  very 
certain.  But  it  appears  that  some  of  the  cavalry 
were  transferred  to  Olynthus,^  and  that  Phocion 
unwisely  sent  home  the  rest  of  them,  thinking 
that  they  were  not  wanted.  ^  With  the  remainder 
of  the  force  Phocion  took  up  a  disadvantageous 
position  near  Tamynas,  while  Plutarchus  encamped 
in  the  neighbourhood.  Here  Phocion  was  be- 
leaguered by  Callias  and  Taurosthenes,  two 
brothers  who  held  sway  over  Chalcis,  and  of  whom 
the  former  had  obtained  aid  from  Philip  (probably 
in  the  form  of  troops  serving  under  Philip's  generals 
in  Thessaly) ,  and  the  latter  had  hired  mercenaries 
who  had  previously  been  engaged  in  Phocis.'* 
Phocion  was  hardly  pressed,  and  though  he  affected 
to  think  little  of  the  desertions  of  the  more  frivo- 
lous of  his  soldiers,  he  sent  to  Athens  for  reinforce- 
ments.    The  Council  at  once  ordered  back  the 

'  Dem.,  in  Bceot.  de  nom.,  §  16.  Demosthenes  described 
Phocion  as ' '  the  pruner  of  his  periods  "  (^  tuv  ifiuv  \6yav  kotIs). 

'  Dem.,  in  Meid.,  §  197. 

J  Meidias  on  his  return  home  denounced  the  way  in  which  the 
expedition  had  been  conducted;  ibid.,  §  132. 

^iEsch.,  in  Ctes.,  §§  86,  87;  Plut.,  Phocion,  xii.,  xiii.;  Dem.,  in 
Meid.,  §  161  sqq.     See  also  Note  i  at  the  end  of  the  Chapter. 


The  Olynthian  War  211 

cavalry  who  had  been  sent  home,  and  called  for 
rich  men  to  volunteer  to  be  trierarchs,  so  heavy  was 
the  expenditure  demanded  at  this  time.  Among 
the  volunteers  was  Meidias  himself/  Before  the 
reinforcements  could  leave  Athens,  an  engagement 
had  been  forced  upon  Phocion  at  Tamynas  by  the 
action  of  Plutarchus,  who  marched  out  of  camp 
to  meet  an  attack  of  the  enemy  without  waiting 
for  Phocion.  The  Athenian  cavalry,  also  too 
impatient  to  wait  for  Phocion,  followed  Plutarchus 
in  some  disorder.  After  very  little  fighting  Plu- 
tarchus fled ;  and  it  was  only  by  hard  fighting  that 
Phocion,  having  appeared  on  the  field  of  battle, 
was  able  to  win  the  day.  Among  those  who  were 
specially  distinguished  in  the  fight  was  ^schines, 
who  was  sent  to  take  home  the  news  of  the  vic- 
tory.^ The  conduct  of  Plutarchus  was  set  down 
to  treachery,  and  Phocion  proceeded  to  expel  him 
from  Eretria,  and  to  occupy  the  commanding 
fortress  of  Zaretra,  while  Callias  took  refuge  with 
Philip. 

On  hearing  of  Phocion 's  victory,  the  Athenians 
had  countermanded  the  reinforcements  which  they 
had  voted;  and  Phocion  was  obliged  to  send  a 
second  message  to  ask  that  they  should  be  de- 
spatched. Before  they  could  leave  Athens,  the 
Dionysiac  festival  took  place  (in  March,  348)  3, 

*  Demosthenes  ungenerously  suggests  that  he  volunteered  to 
be  trierarch  only  to  avoid  fighting  with  the  cavalry,  of  which  he 
was  an  oflficer.  ^  Plut.,  Phoc,  xiii.;  ^sch.,  de  F.  L.,  §  169. 

*  Note  2.  The  Speech  of  Demosthenes  against  Meidias  is  the 
chief  authority  for  this  affair  and  the  events  connected  with  it. 


212  Demosthenes 

and  Demosthenes  acted  as  choregus  on  behalf  of 
the  Pandionid  tribe,  having  volunteered  to  under- 
take the  expenditure  and  returned  from  the 
army  in  Euboea,  where  he  had  been  serving,  in 
order  to  fulfil  the  duties  of  his  office.  In  the 
midst  of  the  festival,  to  which  a  certain  religious 
sanctity  was  attached,  Meidias  entered  the  theatre 
in  a  violent  manner,  and  struck  him  a  number  of 
blows  on  the  head  with  his  fist.  This  outrageous 
act  was  only  the  last  of  a  series  of  attempts  to 
interfere  with  Demosthenes  in  the  discharge  of  his 
duties.  For  Meidias  had  already  tried  to  prevent 
the  members  of  the  chorus  which  Demosthenes 
furnished  from  obtaining  the  usual  exemption 
from  military  service;  he  had  broken  into  the 
house  of  the  goldsmith  whom  Demosthenes  em- 
ployed, and  had  damaged  the  gold  crowns  and 
gold-embroidered  robes  which  were  being  made  for 
the  chorus;  he  had  corrupted  the  chorus-trainer 
and  even  the  archon  who  presided  at  the  Dionysia; 
he  had  tried  to  induce  the  judges  at  the  festival  to 
promise  to  vote  against  Demosthenes'  chorus ;  and 
he  had  blocked  up  the  entrances  by  which  the 
chorus  was  to  march  into  the  theatre.  It  is  not 
surprising  that  though  Demosthenes  had  secured 
the  services  of  the  best  flute-player  in  Athens, 
Telephanes  by  name,  and  Telephanes  had  done 
his  best  to  replace  the  chorus-trainer,  the  prize 
went  to  another. 

On  the  day  following  the  Dionysia,  the  Assembly 
met  in  the  theatre,  to  consider  (as  was  customary) 


The  Olynthian  War  213 

any  matters  that  arose  out  of  the  festival.  Demos- 
thenes laid  a  formal  complaint  against  Meidias, 
and  the  Assembly  passed  a  vote  condemning  the 
latter's  act,  and  so  strengthened  Demosthenes' 
hands  with  a  view  to  his  intended  prosecution  of 
Meidias  before  a  law-court.  We  shall  see  later 
on  what  the  issue  of  this  affair  was.  The  prosecu- 
tion of  Demosthenes  by  Euctemon,  the  friend  of 
Meidias,  for  desertion  in  returning  from  Eubcea 
was  not  persisted  in.  It  was  indeed  too  absurd 
to  have  a  chance  of  success. 

After  the  Dionysia  the  troops  which  Phocion  had 
asked  for  were  sent,  and  the  cavalry  encamped 
(as  before)  at  Argura.  (Meidias  however  stayed 
with  his  ship.)  In  the  course  of  the  summer 
Phocion  was  succeeded  in  the  command  by 
Molossus.  The  recall  of  Phocion  is  possibly  ex- 
plained by  the  fact  v/hich  Plutarch  mentions 
immediately  before  it,  that  Phocion,  after  occupy- 
ing Zaretra,  had  set  free  all  the  prisoners  who  were 
of  Hellenic  nationality,  fearing  the  orators  at 
Athens,  lest  they  should  force  the  People  in  anger 
to  take  some  cruel  action  against  the  prisoners — 
an  action  at  once  creditable  to  Phocion's  good  feel- 
ing, and  significant  of  his  well-known  contempt  for 
the  People  and  their  leaders.  However  this  may 
be,  his  successor  mismanaged  the  war,  and  was 
himself  taken  prisoner.  Before  the  summer  was 
over,  peace  was  made  upon  terms  disadvantageous 
to  Athens.  The  Euboean  towns  obtained  their 
independence,  and  the  Athenians  cherished  some 


214  Demosthenes 

ill-feeling  against  them  for  several  years.  Carystus 
alone  remained  a  member  of  the  Athenian  alliance. 
A  particular  cause  of  annoyance  lay  in  the  fact 
that  Plutarchus,  when  pressed  for  payment  by 
some  of  his  mercenaries,  had  given  them  some 
Athenian  soldiers  as  security,  *  and  these  the  Athen- 
ians had  actually  been  obliged  to  ransom  at  heavy 
cost. 

The  Euboean  war  may  temporarily  have  cast 
a  shadow  over  the  popularity  of  Eubulus.  His 
cousin  Hegesileos.  who  had  been  second  in  com- 
mand to  Phocion  and  was  accused  of  abetting 
the  proceedings  of  Plutarchus,  was  tried  and  con- 
demned, and  Eubulus  did  not  venture  to  appear 
in  his  defence.* 

The  events  of  the  year  348  were  thus  disastrous 
for  Athens.  Not  only  was  Philip's  power  now 
consolidated  down  to  the  southern  borders  of 
Thessaly,  but  Athens  herself  was  practically  iso- 
lated. The  Euboeans,  her  most  powerful  allies, 
were  lost  to  her;  her  settlers  in  Lemnos,  Imbros, 
and  other  islands  were  exposed  to  the  attacks  of 
Philip's  captains;  and  if  Philip  made  his  way  to 
the  Hellespont,  it  was  doubtful  whether  she  could 
oppose  him  with  any  chance  of  success.  ^ 

To  assign  the  responsibility  for  the  course  which 
events  had  been  allowed  to  take  is  no  easy  task. 
There  can  be  little  doubt  that  Demosthenes  was 
right  in  seeing  signs  of  grave  moral  decay  in  the 

^  Schol.  on  Dem,,  de  Pace.  '  Dem,,  de  F.  L.,  §  290. 

•  Note  3. 


The  Olynthian  War  215 

Athenian  People  as  a  whole.  Their  love  of  pleasure 
and  their  indifference  (except  in  sentiment)  to  the 
national  honour,  so  long  as  the  festival-money 
was  not  interfered  with,  did  not  exist  only  in  his 
imagination;  and  when  all  allowance  is  made  for 
the  excuse — it  was  hardly  more — afforded  by  the 
religious  character  of  the  festivals,  we  cannot  but 
feel  that  the  People  had  primarily  themselves  to 
thank  for  their  disasters.  It  was  the  same  moral 
causes,  reinforced  by  the  unwillingness  of  many  to 
leave  their  business,  that  accounted  in  a  great 
measure  for  the  refusal  of  personal  service  in  the 
army.  The  professional  soldier  might  be  a  more 
efficient  fighter,  but  professional  soldiers  were  ruin- 
ously expensive ;  and  the  better  morale  of  the  citi- 
zen-soldier fighting  for  his  own  country  probably 
went  some  way  towards  compensating  for  his  tech- 
nical deficiences ;  the  hard-won  success  of  Phocion's 
citizen-hoplites  at  Tamynce  showed  that  such  a 
force  was  not  to  be  despised.  Now  and  then,  in  a 
moment  of  excitement,  the  citizens  would  rise  and 
take  the  field;  but  their  enthusiasm  was  short- 
lived, and  they  would  not  face  a  fully-considered 
system  of  regular  service  in  relays,  such  as  Demos- 
thenes advocated. 

It  is  not  worth  while  to  attempt  to  apportion 
the  blame  more  precisely  between  the  People  and 
their  leaders.  Eubulus'  policy  came  to  shipwreck 
over  foreign  and  military  affairs,  largely  because 
funds  were  not  forthcoming  for  active  warfare, 
however   well    he    had    provided    for   defensive 


2 16  Demosthenes 

measures ;  and  funds  were  not  forthcoming  because 
he  either  would  not  or  dared  not  curtail  the  festival- 
fund,  nor  would  he  draw,  as  he  might  have  done  by 
means  of  a  war-tax,  upon  the  wealth  of  the  richer 
classes  who  were  his  principal  supporters.  A  few 
volunteer  trierarchs  were  a  poor  substitute  for 
the  contributions  which  the  considerable  private 
wealth  of  the  citizens  of  Athens  might  have  pro- 
vided. But  the  measures  of  a  political  leader 
necessarily  depend  to  a  great  extent  upon  what  he 
can  expect  his  followers  to  consent  to;  and  the 
defects  of  the  policy  of  Eubulus  largely  arose 
out  of  those  of  both  the  richer  and  the  poorer 
classes ;  for  the  one  would  not  make  great  sacrifices, 
and  the  other  would  not  give  up  the  distributions ; 
and  it  was  doubtless  his  misfortune  that  he  was 
given  no  time  to  carry  out  his  policy  of  retrench- 
ment and  the  gradual  building  up  of  a  navy,  but 
was  confronted  by  a  combination  of  circumstances 
which  proved  too  strong  for  him  and  for  Athens. 
The  conjunction  of  the  Euboean  difficulty  with  the 
Olynthian  crisis  was  cunningly  contrived  by  Philip, 
and  rendered  the  efforts  of  the  Athenians  ineffect- 
ual just  at  the  moment  when  they  were  preparing  to 
throw  some  real  energy  into  the  assistance  which' 
they  gave  to  the  beleaguered  town.  The  strain 
upon  them  was  great  ^;  and  though  it  might 
probably  have  been  met  by  means  which  they  did 

'  In  the  early  part  of  348  there  was  not  enough  money  to  pay 
the  juries,  so  that  the  courts  had  to  be  suspended  (Dem.,  in 
Boeot.  de  notn.,  §  16). 


The  Olynthian  War  217 

not  see  fit  to  adopt,  neither  politicians  nor  people 
proved  equal  to  dealing  with  the  situation.  It  is 
to  the  credit  of  Demosthenes  that  throughout 
these  years  he  represented  fearlessly  the  higher 
side  of  the  national  spirit  as  he  understood  it,  and 
attempted  to  revive  in  his  countrymen  what,  in 
spite  of  themselves,  he  believed  to  be  their  true 
character. 

Before  closing  this  account  of  the  first  period 
of  the  war  with  Philip,  it  will  be  convenient  to 
narrate  the  sequel  to  an  incident  which  has  already 
been  described,  the  assault  of  Meidias  upon 
Demosthenes  at  the  Dionysia  of  348.  Demos- 
thenes, as  we  have  seen,  encouraged  by  the  vote 
which  the  Assembly  passed  in  condemnation  of 
Meidias'  misconduct,  gave  notice  that  he  would 
prosecute  him  before  a  jury.  Even  after  this, 
Meidias  proceeded  to  commit  further  acts  of 
annoyance  against  Demosthenes,  and  opposed 
(though  unsuccessfully)  his  selection  as  a  Coun- 
cillor for  the  year  347-6,  by  bringing  false  accusa- 
tions against  him  at  the  scrutiny  to  which,  like  all 
other  candidates  for  office,  Demosthenes  had  to 
submit.  At  the  meeting  of  the  Assembly  at  which 
Meidias'  conduct  at  the  Dionysia  had  been  con- 
sidered, Eubulus,  in  spite  of  Meidias'  entreaties, 
had  refused  to  rise  and  speak  in  his  defence.  But 
it  became  known  later  that  he  intended  to  support 
Meidias  at  the  trial ;  and  it  also  became  apparent 
that   no   public   speaker   would   give   his   aid  to 


2 18  Demosthenes 

Demosthenes.  That  the  influence  of  Eubulus 
with  an  Athenian  jury  was  very  great  is  proved 
by  the  pains  which  Demosthenes  took  to  counter- 
act it  both  in  the  Speech  against  Meidias  and  in  his 
prosecution  of  ^schines.^  Meidias  himself  was 
also  a  person  of  no  small  influence,  and  held  a 
number  of  offices  which  carried  with  them  some 
importance  and  dignity,  however  reprehensible  he 
might  have  been  in  his  performance  of  the  duties 
attached  to  them.  Demosthenes  therefore  may 
have  felt  that  his  chances  of  winning  his  case,  in 
the  existing  condition  of  public  feeling,  were  small, 
for  the  popular  indignation  at  the  insult  to  a 
choregus  had  doubtless  soon  worn  off ;  and  Meidias' 
friends  appear  to  have  intimated  that  Meidias 
was  ready  to  pay  adequate  compensation,  if  the 
prosecution  were  dropped.  Accordingly,  before  the 
case  was  actually  brought  into  court,  Demosthenes, 
after  repeatedly  rejecting  all  overtures,  at  last 
came  to  terms  with  Meidias  (probably  late  in  the 
year  347),  and  accepted  half  a  talent  from  him  in 
settlement  of  his  grievance."  It  is  possible  that 
he  was  partly  influenced  by  political  considerations ; 
for  we  shall  see  shortly  that  in  the  year  347-6 
Demosthenes  acted  in  harmony  with  Eubulus  and 
his  party  in  forwarding  the  negotiations  for  the 
Peace  with  Philip,  which  had  now  become  neces- 
sary; and  he  may  have  been  glad,  by  abandoning 

»Dem.,  de  F.L.,  §§29oflf. 

'  Half  a  talent  was  by  no  means  a  contemptible  sum,  though 
^schines  and  others  scoff  at  Demosthenes  for  accepting  it. 


The  Olynthian  War  219 

his  suit  against  Meidias,  to  avoid  creating  diffi- 
culties, and  also,  it  might  be,  imperilling  his  own 
position  in  Athens. 

The  speech  which  Demosthenes  composed  for 
the  prosecution  of  Meidias  survives,  though  there 
are  indications  that  it  did  not  receive  a  final  re- 
vision, and  it  was  probably  not  published  by  De- 
mosthenes himself.  It  is  a  vigorous  attack  upon 
the  whole  life  and  career  of  Meidias  (including 
unhappily  some  of  those  fictions  about  the  parent- 
age of  the  accused  which  seem  to  have  appealed 
to  Athenian  juries) .  The  orator  repeatedly  insists 
that  the  insult  was  less  to  himself  than  to  the 
People  (who  had  already  expressed  their  indigna- 
tion), and  recalls,  one  after  another,  the  acts  of 
violence  and  outrage  of  which  he  alleges  Meidias 
to  have  been  guilty.  He  deals  with  parallel  cases 
in  the  past — both  those  from  which  Meidias  might 
hope  to  draw  some  arguments  in  his  defence,  and 
those  which  formed  precedents  for  his  condemna- 
tion. He  disparages  the  vaunted  public  services 
of  Meidias,  and  compares  them  with  his  own. 
After  employing  every  argument  which  can 
blacken  the  guilt  of  Meidias  himself,  he  attacks 
Eubulus  and  the  other  supporters  of  the  accused, 
and  calls  upon  the  jury  to  vindicate  the  laws, 
and  to  make  Meidias  an  example  to  all  other 
offenders. 

The  Speech  follows  the  obvious  lines,  but  is 
powerfully  written  in  a  tone  of  warm  indignation, 
varied  here  and  there  by  pathos,  when  he  recoimts 


220  Demosthenes 

the  calamities  of  Meidias'  former  victims,^  and 
even  by  a  touch  of  something  Hke  humour,  as 
when  he  imitates  Meidias'  own  manner  of  address- 
ing the  People,  ^  or  when  he  sums  up  his  considera- 
tion of  the  services  of  Meidias  to  the  State.  ^ 

Where  then  is  his  brilliant  record?  What  do  his 
services  to  the  State  and  his  magnificent  outlay 
amount  to?  I  cannot  see,  unless  we  are  to  think  of  the 
house  that  he  has  built  at  Eleusis — so  tall  that  it 
darkens  the  whole  neighbourhood ;  or  the  pair  of  whit-e 
horses  from  Sicyon  which  takes  his  wife  to  the  Mys- 
teries or  wherever  she  pleases;  or  the  three  or  four 
footmen  who  accompany  him  as  he  sweeps  through 
the  market-place,  talking  about  his  bowls  and  drink- 
ing-horns and  wine-cups  in  a  loud  voice,  so  that  the 
passers-by  may  hear. 

The  attitude  which  Demosthenes  takes  up — that 
of  a  champion  of  the  rights  of  the  democracy 
against  the  vulgar  and  insolent  rich — ^is  perhaps 
a  little  overdone ;  but  the  portrait  of  Meidias  is  vig- 
orously drawn,  and  takes  its  place  worthily  beside 
those  of  other  villains  depicted  in  Greek  and  Ro- 
man oratory. 

APPENDIX  TO  CHAPTER  VI 

{On  the  Affair  oj  Phormio  and  ApoUodorus) 

The  action  of  Demosthenes  in  connection  with  the  dispute 
between  Phormio  and  ApoUodorus  is  so  much  disputed,  and  the 
questions  raised  are  of  such  importance,  owing  to  their  bear- 
ing upon  the  estimate  to  be  formed  of  his  character,  that  they 
demand  special  consideration. 

^£.«-§§95ff.  '§303.  »  §158. 


The  Olynthian  War  221 

Phormio  was  first  the  slave  and  then  the  confidential  freedman 
of  Pasion,  the  great  Athenian  banker.  Pasion  died  in  370,  leaving 
two  sons,  ApoUodorus  and  Pasicles.  In  his  will  he  provided  that 
Phormio  should  marry  his  widow  (receiving  with  her  a  consider- 
able dowry)  and  should  be  one  of  the  guardians  of  his  younger 
son  Pasicles;  and  that  until  Pasicles  came  of  age,  Phormio  should 
rent  the  business,  which  included  a  shield-factory  as  well  as  the 
bank,  paying  a  fixed  rent  to  the  estate,  and  making  what  profit 
he  could  for  himself.  It  was  intended  that  the  property  should 
remain  undivided  until  Pasicles  came  of  age,  and  should  then  be 
apportioned  equally  between  him  and  his  elder  brother,  ApoUo- 
dorus. But  the  conduct  of  ApoUodorus  made  this  impossible. 
He  appears  to  have  been  a  man  of  some  public  spirit,  and  to  have 
served  more  than  once  as  trierarch  with  distinction.  (We  have 
already  seen  how  he  claimed  the  "Trierarchic  Crown"  oflFered  in 
360. 0  But  his  ambition  to  serve  the  State  was  more  than  com- 
pensated by  his  careless  and  extravagant  habits,  and  he  was  at 
the  same  time  extremely  litigious.  No  less  than  eight  of  the 
speeches  included,  rightly  or  wrongly,  among  those  of  Demos- 
thenes were  written  by  or  for  ApoUodorus,  and  we  know  that 
he  appeared  in  many  other  lawsuits,  and  was  ready  to  prosecute 
any  one,  relation  or  stranger,  upon  any  provocation. 

The  result  of  ApoUodorus'  conduct  was  to  imperil  the  security 
of  the  joint  estate  by  the  liabilities  which  he  was  always  incurring : 
and  in  consequence  of  this,  the  guardians  of  Pasicles  resolved  to 
make  a  division  of  the  property,  without  waiting  for  Pasicles  to 
come  of  age,  in  order  to  save  their  ward's  share.  It  was,  however, 
arranged  that  Phormio  was  to  retain  the  lease  of  the  business, 
paying  half  the  rent  to  ApoUodorus,  and  keeping  half  for  the 
benefit  of  Pasicles.  In  362  Pasicles  came  of  age,  and  Phormio's 
lease  determined;  he  set  up  business  as  a  banker  on  his  own 
account,  and  was  granted  the  citizenship  of  Athens,  in  recogni- 
tion of  his  high  qualities,  as  his  master  Pasion  had  been  granted 
it  before  him.  In  the  course  of  the  negotiations  which  followed 
the  termination  of  the  lease,  and  again  after  certain  legal  pro- 
ceedings which  took  place  on  the  death  of  ApoUodorus'  mother  in 
360,  ApoUodorus  gave  Phormio  a  formal  release  from  all  claims. 
In  spite  of  this,  about  the  year  350,  he  entered  a  claim  against 

'  See  pp.  31-32. 


222  Demosthenes 

Phormio  for  twenty  talents.  Phormio  thereupon  resorted  to  the 
procedure  by  paragraphs,^  pleading  that  (whatever  the  merits 
of  the  case)  the  action  brought  was  illegal,  because  ApoUodorus 
had  already  given  a  discharge  from  all  claims,  and  because  the 
Statute  of  Limitations  forbade  such  claims  to  be  made  after  the 
expiration  of  five  years  from  the  winding-up  of  the  trust. 

A  litigant  who  pleaded  a  paragraphs  had  the  right  to  be 
heard  first,  and  Phormio,  who,  owing  to  his  foreign  descent  and  his 
unfamiliarity  with  the  courts,  did  not  speak  in  person,  was  re- 
presented by  his  friends,  one  of  whom  delivered  the  speech  com- 
posed for  him  by  Demosthenes.  This  speech  not  only  made 
good  the  technical  plea,  but  also  dealt  in  a  manner  which  seems 
almost  mercilessly  conclusive,  with  the  original  case.  It  further 
attempted  to  meet  the  jealous  attitude  adopted  by  ApoUodorus 
towards  Phormio — once  his  father's  slave,  but  now  his  stepfather 
— and  emphasised  the  services  rendered  by  Phormio  not  only  to 
ApoUodorus  and  his  family,  by  the  preservation  of  their  property 
for  them,  but  also  to  the  State.  Above  all  the  speaker  insists  on 
the  value  of  honesty  in  business,  in  contrast  to  the  spendthrift 
life  and  dishonest  litigiousness  of  persons  like  ApoUodorus.  The 
moral  force  of  the  speech  proved  irresistible.  ApoUodorus  did 
not  receive  one  fifth  of  the  votes  of  the  jury,  and  therefore 
incurred  a  very  heavy  fine,  in  addition  to  the  loss  of  his  case. 

But  ApoUodorus  would  not  accept  his  defeat  without  a  struggle. 
As  Aphobus  had  prosecuted  one  of  Demosthenes'  witnesses,  so 
ApoUodorus  prosecuted  one  of  the  witnesses  who  had  supported 
Phormio.  As  in  the  former  case,  so  in  the  latter,  the  witness 
was  one  whose  evidence  was  unimportant;  Phormio's  justification 
of  the  paragraphs  would  have  been  conclusive  without  it.  Never- 
theless any  conviction  for  false-witness  would  almost  certainly 
have  led  to  a  new  trial  of  the  original  case,  and  a  new  trial  in- 
stituted under  such  circumstances  would  not  have  been  likely  to 
terminate  in  favour  of  Phormio. 

Now  among  the  speeches  of  Demosthenes  there  have  descended 
to  us  two  written  for  ApoUodorus  in  prosecution  of  this  very 
witness,  Stephanus;  and  it  has  naturally  been  felt  that  if,  after 
his  impassioned  oration  for  Phormio,  Demosthenes  changed  sides, 
and  assisted  ApoUodorus  in  the  attempt  to  overthrow  a  verdict 


*  See  above,  p.  33- 


The  Olynthian  War  223 


which  he  himself  had  done  most  to  secure  and  to  justify,  he  did  not 
act  like  an  honourable  man.  Nor  would  this  be  his  most  serious 
deflection  from  a  high  standard  of  honour  in  the  matter.  For  the 
manner  in  which  the  First  Speech  against  Stephanus  treats  the 
case  is  even  more  discreditable,  if  it  is  the  work  of  Demosthenes. 
He  argues  that  the  very  documents  on  which  he  had  relied  to 
prove  Phormio's  plea  in  the  previous  trial  are  either  non-existent 
or  are  forgeries  by  Phormio  himself;  and  whereas  he  had  in  the 
former  speech  paid  an  eloquent  tribute  to  Phormio's  high  charac- 
ter and  distinguished  services,  he  now  attacks  him  in  a  scurrilous 
and  ungentlemanly  manner,  coupling  the  attack  with  the  gross- 
est insinuations  with  regard  to  Apollodorus'  own  mother  and 
brother.  Apollodorus  himself  might  conceivably  have  spoken 
thus;  but  if  Demosthenes  carried  the  art  of  writing  in  the  character 
of  his  client  so  far  as  this,  we  can  only  say  that  it  proves  his 
ability  more  conclusively  than  his  honour.  The  case  against 
Stephanus  was  in  fact  a  very  lad  one;  to  most  of  the  conten- 
tions of  the  speaker  the  reply  is  either  actually  contained  in  the 
Speech  for  Phormio,  or  is  such  as  suggests  itself  immediately ;  and 
the  skill  of  the  advocate  is  not  sufficient  to  conceal  their  weakness. 
Unfortunately  no  final  decision  as  to  the  authorship  of  the 
Speeches  against  Stephanus  is  possible.  The  Second  Speech, 
indeed,  which  is  weak  both  in  argument  and  in  style,  no  one  now 
believes  to  be  the  work  of  Demosthenes;  possibly  it  is  a  sub- 
sequently written  version  of  a  reply  made  by  Apollodorus  on  the 
spur  of  the  moment.  But  in  regard  to  the  First  Speech  the 
arguments  for  and  against  Demosthenes'  authorship  are  almost 
equally  divided.  As  regards  the  internal  evidence  there  is,  on 
the  one  hand,  little  in  the  style  or  the  argument  which  would  have 
suggested  that  it  was  not  his  work,  had  it  not  been  for  the  incon- 
sistency of  the  attitude  adopted  in  this  speech  with  that  assumed 
in  the  Speech  for  Phormio ;  and  one  striking  passage  is  almost 
identical  with  a  passage  in  the  Speech  for  Pantasnetus,  which  is 
usually  admitted  to  be  Demosthenes'  work.  On  the  other  hand, 
there  are  a  few  phrases  and  passages  which  do  not  read  as  if  they 
were  his,  and  which  at  least  leave  room  for  the  possibility  that 
the  Speech  was  composed  by  another.  A  certain  monotony  of 
expression — particularly  in  the  use  of  connecting  particles  and 
pronouns — has  been  thought  to  be  unlike  Demosthenes,  and  the 
parallelism  with  the  "Pantasnetus"  does  not  prove  identity  of 


224  Demosthenes 

authorship,  since  identical  passages  sometimes  occur  in  different 
orators. ' 

But  the  question  is  further  complicated  by  external  evidence. 
It  is  clear  that  Demosthenes  was  thought  to  have  done  something 
dishonourable  in  connection  with  ApoUodorus  and  Phormio;  but 
what  he  was  originally  accused  of  was  not  the  composition  of 
speeches  for  both  sides.  "  What  idea , ' '  asks  .^schines, ' '  are  we  to 
have  of  a  born  traitor?  Is  he  not  a  man  who  treats  those  who 
have  to  do  with  him  and  trust  him,  as  you  have  treated  them? — 
a  man  who  writes  speeches  for  money,  to  be  used  in  court,  and 
shows  them  to  the  other  side?  You  wrote  a  speech  for  Phormio 
the  banker,  and  got  your  fee;  and  you  showed  it  to  ApoUodorus, 
who  had  prosecuted  Phormio  on  a  capital  charge."'  This  can 
only  mean  that  Demosthenes  showed  ApoUodorus  his  Speech  for 
Phormio  in  the  original  trial.  (The  charge  is  called  a  capital  one 
by  a  slight  exaggeration,  not  unparalleled  in  Greek  oratory, 
because  the  sum  involved  was  so  great  that  Phormio,  if  con- 
demned, would  be  obliged  to  go  into  exile.)  It  is  possible  that  the 
explanation  which  certain  scholars  J  propose  is  the  true  one — 
that  Demosthenes  tried  to  reconcile  ApoUodorus  to  Phormio,  and 
showed  him  the  Speech  to  prove  to  him  the  hopelessness  of  his 
case,  but  in  vain.  It  would  be  easy  for  ^schines  to  misrepresent 
this  as  an  act  of  treachery  to  Phormio,  while  it  is  very  diflBcult  to 
suppose  that  if  Demosthenes  had  actually  treated  Phormio  as 
the  writer  of  the  First  Speech  against  Stephanus  treats  him, 
./Eschines  and  Deinarchus,  who  raked  up  every  possible  scandal 
against  him,  would  not  have  made  full  use  of  the  fact. 

But  if  this  is  so,  how  are  we  to  explain  the  fact  that  Plutarch  * 
and  other  late  writers  definitely  state  that  Demosthenes  wrote  for 
both  ApoUodorus  and  Phormio?  Plutarch  says  that  it  was  like 
selling  swords  to  both  sides  from  the  same  factory.  (This  does 
not  in  itself  seem  to  be  a  very  grave  offence;  but  the  point  per- 
haps lies  in  the  reference  to  the  occupation  of  Demosthenes' 
father.)  Probably  the  statement  is  due  simply  to  the  fact  that 
speeches  for  both  were  found  in  the  Corpus  of  Demosthenic 
speeches,   compiled   in  the  first   instance    at    Alexandria.     A 


»  See  above,  p.  27.  *  .^sch.,  de  F.  L.,  §§  165, 173. 

»  Note4.  4  Pint.,  Dem.,  xv. 


The  Olynthian  War  225 

later  writer,  Zosimus  (c.  500  a.d.),  still  further  exaggerates  the 
supposed  iniquity  of  Demosthenes;  and  it  may  be  that  the  whole 
story  is  based  on  a  misunderstanding,  which,  when  once  started, 
went  on  enlarging  itself. 

Those  who  believe  that  Demosthenes  did  write  the  First  Speech 
against  Stephanus  usually  ascribe  his  conduct  to  political  motives. 
We  have  seen'  that  just  about  this  time,  Apollodorus  proposed  a 
decree  in  the  Assembly  that  the  People  should  decide  whether 
the  surplus  revenues  should  be  used  for  military  purposes,  instead 
of  passing  automatically  into  the  festival-fund.  This  was  pre- 
cisely in  accordance  with  the  policy  which  Demosthenes  earnestly 
advocated  in  the  very  year  of  the  trial  of  Stephanus,  with  a  view 
to  war  against  Philip  of  Macedon.  But  it  is  very  doubtful 
whether  such  considerations  could  really  have  weighed  with 
Demosthenes.  Apollodorus'  proposal  was  probably  made  in  the 
same  headstrong  spirit  as  his  many  prosecutions;  it  was  illegal;  he 
was  heavily  fined  for  it;  and  it  is  probable  that  it  did  more  harm 
than  good  to  the  cause  which  Demosthenes  desired  to  forward. 
It  is,  moreover,  difficult  to  suppose  that  any  advocate  who  had 
triumphantly  succeeded  in  a  good  case  would  take  up  a  bad  one 
against  his  former  client  in  reference  to  the  very  same  matter, 
whatever  the  political  situation. 

There  is,  therefore,  at  least  good  reason  to  hope  that  Demos- 
thenes was  not  guilty  of  the  atrocious  conduct  ascribed  to  him. 
If  he  was,  there  is  little  that  can  be  said  in  extenuation  of  it.  The 
plea  that  the  relations  of  a  speech-writer  and  his  client  were  not  so 
close  as  those  of  a  modern  lawyer  with  those  whom  he  represents 
cannot  help  him  much ;  and  it  does  not  even  touch  the  real  point 
of  the  gravamen — the  utter  heartlcssness  and  want  of  good  feeling 
shown  by  an  attack  upon  Phormio's  character  as  scurrilous  as  his 
previous  eulogy  had  been  noble.  The  eulogy,  no  less  than  the 
attack,  viewed  in  this  light,  would  be  no  more  than  a  piece  of 
cold-blooded  trickery.  All  that  can  be  said  is  that  if  Demos- 
thenes did  act  thus,  there  is  nothing  in  all  the  rest  of  his  career — 
for  his  fierce  attacks  upon  his  own  enemies  are  a  very  different 
matter — which  is  even  remotely  parallel  to  this  action;  and 
though  this  is  no  exculpation,  it  at  least  enables  us  to  deny  that 
such  conduct  was  characteristic  of  him. 


'  Above,  p.  201. 
IE 


226  Demosthenes 

NOTES 

1,  Some  historians  assume  that  these  mercenaries  were  sent 
by  the  Phocian  leader  Phalaecus.  But  this  is  nowhere  stated  in 
our  authorities,  and  the  Phocians  were  in  alHance  with  Athens. 
It  is  at  least  equally  likely  that  Taurosthenes  induced  some  of  the 
mercenaries  hitherto  employed  by  Phalascus  to  come  over  to 
Euboea  by  oflFering  higher  pay.  If,  however,  Phalaecus  deliber- 
ately sent  them  to  oppose  the  Athenians,  it  must  have  been 
because  the  dissensions  in  the  Phocian  ranks  had  already  reached 
a  point  at  which,  because  the  party^opposed  to  Phalascus  was 
friendly  to  Athens,  he  himself  chose  to  take  the  opposite  line. 
This  happened  towards  the  end  of  347  (see  below,  p.  238) ;  but  we 
have  no  evidence  that  early  in  348  it  was  already  so. 

2.  The  date  of  the  Euboean  expedition  has  been  much  dis- 
puted, and  some  historians  place  it  in  350  or  349  rather  than  in 
348.  The  following  are  the  principal  considerations  which  appear 
to  determine  348  as  the  true  date: 

(i)  Demosthenes  was  choregus  in  the  year  of  the  expedi- 
tion and  the  Speech  against  Meidias  was  written  for  delivery 
in  the  archonship  of  the  second  archon  after  the  one  in 
whose  year  the  choregia  fell  (jplrov  eras  tovtI,  §  13).  Further 
(§  III)  Demosthenes  was  a  member  of  the  Council  in  the 
year  of  the  Speech.  Now  supposing  that  his  choregia  fell 
in  March,  348  (in  the  archonship  of  Callimachus,  who  held 
oflSce  from  July,  349,  to  July,  348),  the  Speech  must  have 
been  composed  for  the  archonship  of  Themistocles,  i.e.,  for 
a  date  after  July,  347 ;  and  in  the  archonship  of  Themistocles, 
347-46,  we  know  that  Demosthenes  was  in  fact  a  Councillor. 
Those  who  date  the  expedition  and  the  Speech  earlier  suppose 
that  he  was  also  'a  Councillor  in  350-49  or  349-8.  This 
would  have  been  legally  possible;  but  as  the  Councillors  were 
chosen  by  lot,  it  is  hardly  likely;  and  there  is  absolutely  no 
independent  evidence  of  his  having  been  a  Coimcillor  in 
either  of  those  years. 

(2)  The  Olynthiac  Orations,  probably  delivered  in  the  sum- 
mer and  autumn  of  349,  know  nothing  of  the  Euboean  trouble. 

(3)  The  Speech  against  Neaera,  §  3,  and  the  Speech  against 
Meidias,  §  197,  make  it  certain  that  the  citizen-expedition  to 
help  Olynthus  fell  in  the  same  year  as  the  Euboean  expedition. 


I 


The  Olynthian  War  227 

(4)  According  to  ^schines,  de  F.  L.,  §  12,  ths  Eubcean  en- 
voys came  before  the  Assembly  to  discuss  terms  of  peace  shortly 
before  the  capture  of  Phrynon  by  privateers,  which  took 
place  during  the  Olympian  truce.     The  truce  fell  in  July,  348. 

3.  Grote  is  very  probably  right  in  assigning  to  the  weeks 
immediately  following  the  fall  of  Olynthus  the  disappearance  of 
Chares  from  view.  Antiochus  was  sent  to  look  for  him,  and  to 
teU  him  that  the  people  of  Athens  failed  to  understand  why,  when 
Philip  was  on  his  way  to  the  Chersonese,  the  Athenians  did  not 
even  know  where  to  find  their  general  or  the  force  which  they  had 
sent  out;  and  ^schines  {de  F.  L.,  §  71)  speaks  of  1500  talents 
spent  in  the  course  of  the  war  upon  runaway  generals,  of  whom 
he  names  Deiares,  Deipyrus,  and  Polyphontes — men  otherwise 
unknown  to  us.  Grote  connects  the  mission  of  Antiochus  with  a 
panic  on  the  part  of  th6  settlers  in  the  Chersonese,  and  it  is  very 
likely  that  rumours  of  Philip's  alleged  intention  to  proceed  thither 
may  have  been  circulated  at  this  time.  Schafer  (ii.,  p.  178) 
even  thinks  that  Philip's  generals  were  actually  sent  thither. 

4.  Schafer  in  particular  takes  this  view.  The  whole  question 
is  well  summed  up  in  Paley  and  Sandys'  Select  Private  Orations  of 
Demosthenes,  ii.,  pp.  xxxix  fif.  It  should  be  added  that  it  is  very 
improbable  that  the  Speech  was  composed  either  by  Apollodorus 
himself,  or  by  the  writer  who  composed  most  of  the  extant 
speeches  delivered  by  him. 


CHAPTER  VII 

THE  FIRST  EMBASSY  TO  PHILIP 

EVEN  before  the  actual  fall  of  Olynthus  it  must 
have  become  plain  to  most  clear-sighted 
politicians  that  Athens  was  not  in  a  position  to 
carry  on  the  war  against  Philip  with  success.  She 
had  let  slip  the  opportiinity  which  she  might  have 
taken  in  349,  of  throwing  herself  with  vigour 
into  the  defence  of  Olynthus,  and  in  348,  when 
the  Athenians  realised  somewhat  more  clearly  the 
gravity  of  the  situation,  it  was  too  late;  for  the 
,  movements  in  Euboea  led  them  to  divide  their 
\  forces,  and  neither  their  energy,  nor  the  fimds  which 
they  chose  to  consider  available,  were  sufficient 
for  the  double  task.  The  successful  continuance 
of  the  struggle  with  Philip  being  thus  impossible, 
the  only  course  which  sensible  men  could  take  was 
to  come  to  terms  with  him. 

Philip  also  was  anxious  for  a  suspension  of 
hostilities.  Athens  was  not  indeed,  from  his  point 
of  view,  so  serious  a  foe  as  the  Athenians  liked  to 
believe,  and  he  could  well  afford  to  have  patience 
before  he  proceeded  to  bring  his  rivalry  with  her 
to  an  issue.  At  the  same  time  she  was  strong 
enough  at  sea  to  make  the  carrying  out  of  his  more 

228 


The  First  Embassy  to  Philip         22^ 

immediate  objects  much  more  difficult  than  it 
would  otherwise  have  been.  Her  action  at 
Thermopylae  in  352,  and  the  determination  which 
she  had  shown,  even  under  the  leadership  of 
Eubulus,  to  maintain  her  position  on  the  shore  of 
the  Hellespont,  were  sufficient  evidence  of  this; 
and  it  would  be  easier  for  him  both  to  advance  his 
power  in  Greece  itself  and  to  confirm  and  extend  his 
sway  in  Thrace,  if  he  could  come  to  some  such 
arrangement  with  Athens  as  would  get  rid  of,  or  at 
least  delay  and  hamper,  her  interference  with  his 
movements.  Further,  he  was  suffering  from  the 
closing  of  his  ports  by  Athenian  ships,  and  the 
raids  which  Athenian  commanders  made  upon  his 
coasts.^  Some  have  even  thought  that  he  had 
already  in  view  the  project  of  uniting  all  Hellas 
imder  his  sway,  in  order  to  proceed  to  the  conquest 
of  the  East;  and  that  for  this  purpose  he  desired 
the  co-operation  of  the  Athenian  fleet,  which  was  as 
superior  to  his  own,  as  his  land  forces  were  to  those 
of  Athens.  However  this  may  be  (and  there  is  no 
evidence  upon  the  point),  in  the  summer  of  348, 
when  the  envoys  from  the  Euboean  towns  went  to 
Athens  to  discuss  the  terms  of  the  Peace  to  be  made 
between  Athens  and  the  Euboeans,  Philip  author- 
ised them  to  say  that  he  too  desired  to  come  to  an 
understanding.  * 

»  Dem.,  de  F.  L.,  §315. 

"  ^sch.,  de  F.  L.,  §  12.  The  last  Athenian  expedition  to 
Olynthus  had  doubtless  already  departed,  but  owing  to  bad 
weather  had  not  reached  its  destination. 


230  Demosthenes 

Shortly  afterwards  an  Athenian  named  Phrynon 
was  captured  by  PhiHp's  ships  in  the  course  of  a 
raid,  during  the  time  (so  he  asserted)  of  the  Olym- 
pian Truce,  ^  when,  according  to  Greek  custom, 
hostilities  should  have  been  suspended.  He  was 
ransomed,  and  on  his  return  to  Athens  requested 
the  Athenians  to  appoint  an  envoy  to  go  on  his  be- 
half to  Philip,  and  to  ask  for  the  restoration  of  the 
sum  paid  for  his  freedom.  Ctesiphon  was  sent,  and 
returned  with  a  message  from  Philip  stating  that 
he  had  entered  upon  the  war  with  Athens  against 
his  will,  and  would  still  be  glad  if  it  could  be  termi- 
nated. He  added  other  friendly  expressions;  the 
message  was  welcomed  by  the  People  with  enthusi- 
asm, and  a  vote  of  thanks  to  Ctesiphon  was  passed. 

Immediately  afterwards,  Philocrates  carried  a 
decree  that  permission  should  be  given  to  Philip 
to  send  envoys  to  Athens  to  discuss  terms  of  peace. 
Thereupon  Lycinus  (representing,  according  to 
^schines,  certain  interested  persons,  who  had 
stood  in  the  way  of  a  similar  proposal  of  Philocrates 
before  the  return  of  Ctesiphon)  impeached  Phi- 
locrates for  the  alleged  illegality  of  the  decree,^ 
and   demanded   the   infliction   of  a   fine  of  one 

'  I.e.,  about  the  month  of  July.  The  object  of  the  Truce  was 
to  allow  all  who  desired  to  do  so  to  travel  to  Olympia  for  the 
games  without  fear. 

'  Philocrates'  decree  may  have  run  counter  to  a  resolution  to 
receive  no  envoys  from  Philip,  forming  part  of  the  terms  of 
alliance  with  the  Olynthians  (Schafer,  vol.  ii.,  pp.  23,  166);  but 
there  seems  to  be  no  definite  evidence  as  to  the  nature  of  the 
illegality  alleged. 


The  First  Embassy  to  Philip        231 

hundred  talents.  Philocrates,  who  was  ill  at  the 
time  of  the  trial,  was  defended  by  Demosthenes, 
"in  a  speech  which  lasted  all  day,"  and  was 
acquitted.  Lycinus  failed  to  obtain  a  fifth  part  of 
the  votes  of  the  jury,  and  so  became  himself  liable 
to  a  heavy  penalty.  ^ 

The  action  of  Demosthenes  in  defending  Phi- 
locrates may  be  explained  in  one  of  two  ways, 
according  as  the  trial  of  Philocrates  is  supposed  to 
have  taken  place  before  or  after  the  fall  of  Olyn- 
thus.  If  Demosthenes  defended  the  proposer  of 
negotiations  for  peace  even  before  Olynthus  had 
fallen,  we  can  only  suppose  that  he  had  already 
seen  the  hopelessness  of  continuing  the  struggle 
for  the  present,  and  had  had  the  courage  to  act 
upon  his  changed  conviction.  On  the  other  hand, 
it  is  improbable  that  he  would  really  have  con- 
sented to  abandon  Olynthus  in  the  hour  of  her 
greatest  need;  and  it  is  much  more  likely  that  the 
trial  of  Philocrates  did  not  take  place  until  some 
time  after  Olynthus  had  been  taken.  ^  For 
Phrynon  can  hardly  have  returned  to  Athens  before 
the  end  of  July,  348 ;  some  time  must  have  elapsed 
between  his  return  and  that  of  Ctesiphon;  and 
also  between  the  proposal  of  Philocrates  and  his 
trial.  It  is  probable  therefore  that  the  trial  did 
not  take  place  imtil  some  weeks  at  least — possibly 
monthvS — after  the  fall  of  Olynthus,  and  by  this 
time,  as  we  shall  see,  Demosthenes  was  certainly 

'  iEsch.,  de  F.  L.,  §  14;  in  Ctes.,  §  62. 
»  Note  I  at  the  end  of  the  Chapter. 


232  Demosthenes 

convinced  of  the  necessity  of  peace,  and  could  de- 
fend Philocrates  without  inconsistency. 

The  capture  of  Olynthus  and  PhiHp's  treatment 
of  the  inhabitants  and  (together  with  them)  of  the 
Athenians  whom  he  found  in  the  city,  caused  a 
momentary  revulsion  of  feeling  in  Athens  against 
the  proposed  arrangement  with  Philip ;  and  even 
Eubulus  himself  and  his  supporters  were  carried 
away  by  it.  Eubulus  addressed  the  Assembly  in 
very  strong  terms  in  regard  to  Philip,  praying 
(Demosthenes  tells  us^)  that  perdition  might  seize 
him,  and  proposed  to  send  embassies  throughout 
the  Greek  world  and  "almost  to  the  Red  Sea,"' 
with  the  object  of  uniting  all  the  Hellenes  in 
opposition  to  Philip,  and  of  summoning  a  congress 
for  the  purpose.  These  proposals  were  supported 
in  speeches  of  a  highly  patriotic  tone,  and  among 
those  who  spoke  in  their  favour  was  ^schines — a 
man  of  somewhat  humble  birth,  who  had  been 
first  a  schoolmaster,  then  an  actor,  and  then  a 
clerk  in  government  offices,  until  he  came  into 
prominence  as  a  supporter  of  Eubulus.  He  was  a 
man  of  great  talent,  and  a  ready  extempore 
speaker;  and  the  magnificent  voice  with  which 
nature  had  endowed  him  gave  him  a  great  ad- 
vantage when  addressing  a  people  so  impression- 
able as  the  Athenians.  On  the  present  occasion, 
Demosthenes  tells  us,  -^schines  quoted  the  decrees 
of  Miltiades  and  Themistocles — the  heroes  of  the 

^DeF.L.,  §291.  'Ibid.,  §304. 


i 


The  First  Embassy  to  Philip        233 

Persian  wars — and  the  oath  of  allegiance  taken 
by  the  young  Athenian  soldier  on  assuming  his 
armour."  He  doubtless  pictured  Athens  as  once 
more  taking  the  leadership  of  a  Panhellenic 
confederacy,  as  she  had  done  in  the  Persian  wars. 
The  embassies  were  sent.^  ^schines  himself 
went  to  Arcadia,  where  Philip  had  been  intriguing 
with  some  of  the  leading  politicians,  and  had 
evidently  found  favour;  for  the  Athenian  party 
among  the  Arcadians  had  already  sent  repre- 
sentatives to  Athens  through  Ischander.^  On  his 
return,  Demosthenes  says,  *  ^schines 

reported  to  the  Assembly  the  long  and  noble 
speeches,  which,  he  said,  he  had  delivered  on  your 
behalf  before  the  Ten  Thousand  at  Megalopolis, 
in  reply  to  Philip's  spokesman,  Hieronymus;  and  he 
described  at  length  the  criminal  wrong  that  was  done 
not  only  to  their  own  several  countries,  but  to  all 
Hellas,  by  men  who  took  bribes  and  received  money 
from  Philip.  Many  a  time  in  the  course  of  his  speech 
he  called  Philip  '  barbarian  '  and  '  devil '  and  he  re- 
ported the  delight  of  the  Arcadians  at  the  thought 
that  Athens  was  now  waking  up  and  attending  to 
affairs,  s 

He  also  gave  an  indignant  account  of  the  fate 
of  the  captured  Olynthians,  illustrating  it  by  that 

'  De  F.  L.,  §  303. 

'  As  to  the  date  of  the  embassies,  there  can  be  little  doubt  that 
they  took  place  in  the  late  autumn  and  winter  of  348-7,  though 
there  is  no  direct  evidence.  Diod.,  XVI,  liv.,  has  obviously  no 
chronological  value.  » Ibid.,  §  303.  *  Ibid.,  §  11. 

^Ibid.,   §305. 


234  Demosthenes 

of  the  women  and  children  carried  off  to  Arcadia 
by  Atrestidas, '  and  narrating  how  he  had  been 
moved  to  tears  by  the  sight,  and  by  the  thought 
of  the  unhappy  condition  of  the  Greek  world,  in 
which  such  cruelties  could  go  unpimished.  ^ 
r  The  embassies,  however,  entirely  failed  to  secure 
their  object.  None  of  the  southern  Greek  States 
seem  to  have  imagined  at  present  that  Philip's 
growing  power  involved  any  danger  to  themselves ; 
and  none  of  them  had  reason  to  be  so  much 
interested  in  the  welfare  of  Athens  as  to  join  in  a 
league  for  her  benefit.  It  has  indeed  been  sug- 
gested that  Eubulus  did  not  expect  any  result  from 
these  missions  to  the  Greek  States ;  that  they  were 
only  sent  in  order  to  convince  the  People,  who  were 
momentarily  in  a  militant  mood,  of  the  hopeless- 
ness of  continuing  the  war,  by  demonstrating  the 
isolation  of  Athens;  and  that  the  speeches  of  him- 
self and  ^schines  (both  at  Athens ;  and  at  Megalo- 
polis) were  nothing  but  a  piece  of  elaborate  acting. 
Fortunately  it  is  not  necessary  to  ascribe  such 
motives  in  order  to  explain  their  action.  It  is 
far  more  probable  that  the  state  of  public  feeling 
immediately  after  the  fall  of  Olynthus  was  such 
that  Eubulus  resolved  to  make  a  desperate  effort 
to  bring  about  the  Panhellenic  coalition,  which 
alone  could  offer  to  Athens  the  least  chance  of 
defeating  Philip  at  that  time.  When  this  attempt 
failed,  all  parties  alike  must  have  seen  the  in- 
evitableness  of  a  Peace ;  and  Demosthenes  himself 

*  See  above,  p.  206.  *  Dem.,  /.  c,  §  306. 


The  First  Embassy  to  Philip         235 

acted  in  concert  with  Philocrates  in  forwarding  the 
negotiations,  though,  in  the  light  of  his  subsequent 
conduct,  we  can  have  Httle  doubt  that  he  regarded 
the  Peace  only  as  an  armistice,  during  which  Athens 
might  recover  her  strength  and  prepare  herself  to 
return  to  the  struggle  with  renewed  vigour. 

Among  the  Athenians  who  had  been  taken 
prisoners  in  Olynthus  were  latrocles  and  Eucratus. 
(The  latter  is  otherwise  unknown;  the  former 
appears  again  as  an  ambassador  to  Philip.)  The 
relatives  of  these  men  supplicated  the  Assembly 
in  solemn  form,  laying  an  olive-branch  upon  the 
altar  and  beseeching  the  People  to  take  steps  to 
obtain  the  liberation  of  the  captives ;  and  they  were 
supported  by  Philocrates  and  Demosthenes.  In 
answer  to  their  appeal,  with  which  many  others 
whose  friends  had  been  captured  must  have 
sympathised,  the  actor  Aristodemus,  who  was  on 
familiar  terms  with  Philip  in  consequence  of  his 
professional  visits  to  the  Macedonian  court,  was 
sent  to  negotiate  for  their  release.  ^  Another  actor, 
Neoptolemus,  appears  to  have  accompanied  him,  or 
at  least  to  have  travelled  to  Macedonia  about  the 
same  time.^     latrocles  was  set  at  liberty  without 

^JEsch..,  deF.L.,\%  15  ff. 

»Dem.,  de  F.  L.,  §§  12,  315.  It  is  possible  that  Neoptole- 
mus had  been  for  some  time  bringing  messages  of  good-will  from 
Philip,  even  before  Demosthenes  had  been  convinced  of  the 
necessity  of  peace.  For  Demosthenes  (de  Pace,  §§  6,  7)  de- 
scribes how  he  had  warned  the  People  against  Neoptolemus 
(though  in  vain),  and  this  can  hardly  have  happened  after  the 
fall  of  Olynthus. 


236  Demosthenes 

ransom,  and,  on  arriving  at  Athens,  spoke  of 
Philip's  good-will  towards  the  city.  Aristodemus 
did  not  return  for  some  time,  owing  (as  ^schines 
tells  us)  to  some  matter  of  business,  though  others 
have  supposed  (less  probably)  that  he  was  detained 
by  Philip  as  a  kind  of  hostage,  when  he  heard  of  the 
embassies  sent  from  Athens  to  the  other  Greek 
States.  The  Athenians  became  impatient  at  his 
absence,  and  at  last — probably  late  in  the  summer 
of  347 — the  Council  passed  a  resolution  ordering 
him  to  return.  He  obeyed,  and  in  his  report  to  the 
Assembly  again  declared  Philip's  good-will  to 
Athens,  and  added  that  Philip  would  gladly  form 
an  alliance  with  her.  Demosthenes,  who  was  a 
member  of  the  Council  for  the  year  347-6,  and 
apparently  an  influential  member,^  proposed  that 
the  Coimcil  should  not  only  pass  the  vote  of  thanks 
which  was  customarily  given  by  the  Council  to  a 
returning  ambassador,  but  should  also  award  him 
a  crown.  ^ 

It  was  about  this  time  that  a  fresh  crisis  occurred 
in  the  Sacred  War,  in  consequence  of  which 
a  serious  complication  was  introduced  into  the 
relations  between  Athens  and  Philip.     The  war 

*  This  is  shown  by  the  fact  that  on  the  entry  of  the  Council 
into  office,  he  was  chosen  to  perform  the  solemn  inaugural  sac- 
rifices on  its  behalf,  and  was  appointed  to  other  posts  of  dignity — 
among  them  those  of  leader  of  the  mission  sent  to  represent  the 
city  at  the  Nemean  Games,  and  of  priest  to  the  Awful  Goddesses, 
whose  shrine  lay  in  a  cave  beneath  the  Areopagus  {in  Meid.,  § 
114).    See  Note  2.  «iEsch.,  de  F.  L.,  §  17. 


The  First  Embassy  to  Philip        22,7 

had  been  dragging  on  indecisively.  The  Phocians 
retained  possession  of  the  important  Boeotian 
towns  of  Orchomenus,  Coroneia,  and  Corsiae,  as  well 
as  of  the  places  which  gave  them  command  of  the 
Pass  of  Thermopylae — Alponus,  Thronium,  and 
Nicaea.  But  the  Delphian  treasury  was  exhausted 
by  the  expenses  of  the  war;  and  it  was  found  that 
some  of  the  Phocian  leaders  had  been  enriching 
themselves  out  of  the  temple  treasures.  Phalae- 
cus  was  deprived  of  his  command,  and  replaced 
by  Democrates,  Callias,  and  Sophanes;  but  since 
his  deposition  only  divided  the  forces,  and  the 
mercenaries  still  remained  faithful  to  him,  he  was 
restored  to  the  generalship,  though  the  strife  of 
the  factions  was  not  healed.  At  this  point  the 
Thebans  and  Thessalians,  still  unable  to  conquer 
their  enemy,  applied  for  help  to  Philip,  in  the  name 
of  the  Amphictyonic  Council.  Philip  appears 
either  to  have  postponed  giving  an  answer,  or  at 
most  to  have  sent  a  few  soldiers,  wishing  to  reduce 
the  Thebans  to  a  lower  depth  of  humiliation  before 
coming  to  terms  with  them — so  at  least  Diodorus 
says.^  The  Phocians  appealed  to  Athens,  and  the 
Athenians  promised  to  help  them.  ^  (The  promise 
must  have  been  made  before  Philip  had  definitely 
given  his  adhesion  to  the  Thebans ;  it  would  hardly 
have  been  possible  to  give  it  afterwards  without 

'  Diod.,  XVI,  Iviii. 

» Their  readiness  is  doubtless  explained  by  the  attractive  bait 
which  the  Phocians  dangled  before  them — the  control  of  Ther- 
mopylcE. 


238  Demosthenes 

breaking  off  the  negotiations  for  peace  with 
Philip.)  The  Phocian  envoys  offered  to  place  the 
strongholds  commanding  Thermopylas  in  the  hands 
of  the  Athenians,  if  they  would  send  a  force  to 
take  them  over;  and  Proxenus,  the  Athenian 
admiral,  was  ordered  to  proceed  to  Thermopylae  at 
once.  At  the  same  time  it  was  resolved  to  equip 
a  fleet  of  fifty  ships,  and  to  call  upon  all  citizens 
under  thirty  years  of  age,  who  were  liable  to 
service,  to  join  the  expedition. 

But  when  Proxenus  appeared  at  Thermopylae, 
Phalascus  dismissed  him  in  an  insulting  manner; 
and  Archidamus,  who  came  from  Sparta  in  re- 
sponse to  an  appeal  from  the  Phocian  authorities, 
was  similarly  treated.  For  so  strong  was  the 
dissension  in  the  Phocian  ranks  that  Phalascus 
refused  to  acknowledge  the  acts  of  the  rival  faction 
(by  which,  it  seems,  the  messages  to  Athens  and 
Sparta  had  been  sent);  and  he  also  insiilted  the 
heralds  who  came  from  Athens,  in  accordance  with 
custom,  to  announce  the  religious  truce  at  the 
season  of  the  Eleusinian  mysteries  (September, 
347),  and  imprisoned  the  envoys  who  had  carried 
the  appeal  for  help  to  Athens.  Proxenus  appears 
to  have  returned  to  his  former  station  at  Oreus,  and 
the  fifty  ships  which  had  been  voted  were  of  course 
not  sent,  though  they  lay  ready  in  harbour  in  case 
of  need.  ^    For  the  Phocian  people  as  a  whole,  the 

*  Dem.,  de  F,  L.,  §  322.     On  the  chronological  difficulty  see 
Notes. 


The  First  Embassy  to  Philip        239 

conduct  of  Phalaecus  proved  fatal,  as  will  appear 
hereafter. 

Philip  seems  not  to  have  committed  himself  for 
some  time  to  any  definite  step;  for  as  late  as  the 
spring  of  the  next  year,  all  the  parties  interested 
appear  to  have  been  quite  uncertain  of  his  inten- 
tions.* He  did,  however,  send  his  general  Par- 
menio  into  Thessaly,  to  intervene  in  a  dispute 
between  the  towns  of  Pharsalus  and  Halus  in  the 
interest  of  the  former;  and  the  treatment  of  Halus, 
as  well  as  that  of  the  Phocians,  became  a  disputed 
question  in  connection  with  the  peace-negotiations, 
to  which  we  may  now  return. 

Not  long  after  the  beginning  of  346,  Philocrates 
proposed  a  decree  ia  the  Assembly,  that  ten 
ambassadors  should  be  sent  to  Philip  to  discuss  the 
question  of  peace,  as  well  as  other  matters  that 
were  of  interest  to  both  parties,  and  to  request 
him  to  send  plenipotentiaries  to  Athens,  with 
whom  peace  might  be  finally  concluded.  De- 
mosthenes was  nominated  one  of  the  ten  by 
Philocrates,  ^schines  by  Nausicles^;  and  as  the 
assistance  of  Aristodemus  upon  the  embassy  was 
desirable,  owing  to  his  previous  friendly  relations 
with  Philip,  Demosthenes  moved  a  resolution 
in  the  Coimcil  that  messengers  should  be  sent  to 
the  towns  in  which  Aristodemus  had  professional 

»  See  below,  pp.  268,  274. 

» See  above,  p.  177.  Nausicles  was  probably  a  member  of 
Eubulus'  party. 


240  Demosthenes 

engagements,  asking  that  he  might  be  excused 
from  fulfilHng  them/  The  other  members  of  the 
embassy  were  latrocles,  Ctesiphon,  and  Phrynon 
(all  of  whom  had,  like  Aristodemus,  experienced 
Philip's  favour),  Philocrates  himself,  Nausicles, 
Dercylus,  and  Cimon.  With  them  went  Agla- 
ocreon  of  Tenedos,  as  the  representative  of  the 
allies  of  Athens. 

Up  to  this  point  there  is  no  serious  doubt  as  to 
the  facts  (for  although  within  a  year  or  two,  when 
the  Peace  had  come  to  be  regarded  with  disgust 
at  Athens,  both  Demosthenes  and  -^schines  were 
eager  to  disclaim  all  connection  with  the  inception 
of  the  negotiations,  ^  there  can  be  no  question  that 
both  were  in  fact  prominently  concerned  in  it). 
But  from  this  point  onwards  the  two  orators — 
and  they  are  virtually  our  only  authorities — give 
quite  different  accounts  of  the  facts  at  every  stage ; 
and  neither  of  them  scrupled  to  distort  the  truth 
when  it  suited  their  purpose,  each  being  anxious 
to  appear  to  have  had  nothing  to  do  with  Phil- 
ocrates or  with  the  steps  which  led  to  results  so 
unwelcome  to  the  Athenians  as  those  which  fol- 
lowed the  Peace  proved  to  be.  Much  therefore 
remains  uncertain. 

The  discrepancy  between  the  two  accounts  of 
the  embassies  begins  even  before  the  departure  of 
the  ambassadors  from  Athens.  According  to 
Demosthenes'  story  ^ — told  in  343,  when  he  wished 

'  ^sch.,  de  F.  L.,  §§  18, 19.  •  Note  4. 

»Dem.,  de  F.  L.,  §  13. 


The  First  Embassy  to  Philip        2^1 

to  convict  ^schines  of  corruption,  by  proving 
that,  having  once  been  opposed  to  Philocrates,  he 
had  inexplicably  altered  his  mind — ^schines 
came  to  him  and  suggested  that  they  should  act 
in  concert  during  their  mission,  and  should  par- 
ticularly keep  an  eye  upon  "that  abominable 
and  shameless  man,  Philocrates."  To  this  story 
-^schines  replied,  with  justice,  that  such  a  proposal 
would  have  been  absurd  and  even  impossible, 
when  he  knew  that  Demosthenes  had  been  support- 
ing Philocrates  from  the  outset  and  had  been 
nominated  a  member  of  the  embassy  by  him.^ 
-^schines  adds  that  Demosthenes  (who  especially 
associated  with  Aglaocreon  and  latrocles)  made 
himself  intolerable  to  his  colleagues  on  the  journey ; 
and  that  when  the  ambassadors  were  discussing 
what  they  should  say  to  Philip,  and  Cimon  ex- 
pressed his  apprehension  lest  Philip  should  get  the 
better  of  them  in  argument,  Demosthenes  boasted 
that  he  had  an  inexhaustible  stream  of  arguments ; 
and  that  what  he  had  to  say  about  the  Athenian 
claim  to  Amphipolis  and  the  origin  of  the  war  was 
so  convincing  that  he  would  be  able  to  "sew  up 
Philip's  mouth  with  an  unsoaked  rush," — to  per- 
suade Philip  to  restore  Amphipolis,  and  to  induce 
the  Athenians  to  permit  the  return  of  Leosthenes, 
who  had  been  banished  from  Athens  for  his  mis- 
conduct of  the  war.^ 

Whether  this  tale  was  true  or  not,  the  ambassa- 
dors lost  no  time  on  the  journey.     They  did  not 

'  ^sch.,  de  F.  L.,  §  20.  '  Ibid.,  §21. 

16 


242  Demosthenes 

even  wait  at  Oreus  for  the  herald  who  had  been 
sent  in  advance  to  procure  a  safe-conduct,  and 
who  should  have  returned  to  meet  them  there; 
instead  of  doing  so,  they  sailed  at  once  and  came 
to  Halus,  which  was  being  besieged  by  Parmenio, 
Philip's  general;  passing  thence  through  the 
Macedonian  camp,  they  came  to  Pagasae,  and  did 
not  meet  the  herald  till  they  reached  Larissa.  On 
their  arrival  at  Pella,  they  were  granted  an  inter- 
view by  Philip,  and  addressed  him  in  order  of  age, 
the  last  place  being  assigned  to  Demosthenes,  as 
the  youngest  member  of  the  mission.' 

^schines  (from  whom  we  get  our  only  report  of 
the  interview)  describes  his  own  speech  at  length, 
and  tells  how  he  recounted  the  services  rendered 
by  Athens  in  the  past  to  Philip's  house  and  to 
Philip  himself,  the  earlier  history  of  the  struggle  for 
Amphipolis,  the  legendary  grounds  for  the  Athen- 
ian claim  to  that  town,  and  the  acknowledgment  of 
that  claim  by  Philip's  father  Amyntas.  If,  he 
concluded,  Philip  based  his  own  claim  upon  his 
capture  of  the  town  in  war,  it  could  be  justified 
only  if  the  war  was  a  war  against  Athens — ^which 
Philip  had  never  admitted;  for  if  it  was  not,  he 
had  taken  from  the  Amphipolitans  a  town  which 
belonged  not  to  them,  but  to  Athens.  We  can 
imagine  that  Philip  must  have  smiled  inwardly  at 
this  academic  harangue,  which  ^schines  retails 
without  any  consciousness  of  the  futility  of  ad- 
dressing legendary  and  historical  arguments  to  one 

»^sch.,/.  c,  §§22,25. 


The  First  Embassy  to  Philip        243 

so  little  likely  to  be  swayed  by  such  considerations.  ^ 
We  do  not  know  what  the  other  envoys  said;  but 
at  last  it  came  to  the  turn  of  Demosthenes,  and  his 
colleagues,  ^schines  tells  us,  expected  a  grand 
fulfilment  of  his  boasted  intentions.  But  instead 
of  rewarding  their  expectations,  he  broke  down 
hopelessly  from  nervousness,  forgot  his  notes,  and 
lost  the  thread  of  his  argument ;  and  in  spite  of  the 
kindly  encouragement  of  Philip,  who  bade  him 
not  take  his  misfortune  to  heart  as  though  he  had 
broken  down  on  the  stage,  he  was  utterly  unable 
to  proceed,  and  the  interview  was  suspended.* 

When  the  ambassadors  had  retired,  Demosthe- 
nes attacked  ^schines  angrily — we  have  still  only 
-^schines'  word  for  the  story — and  declared  that 
he  had  ruined  the  city  and  her  allies ;  and,  when 
he  was  asked  for  an  explanation,  demanded  if 
iEschines  had  forgotten  the  exhaustion  of  the 
People  and  their  intense  desire  for  peace.  "Or  is 
it,"  he  asked,  "those  fifty  ships  which  have  been 
voted,  ^  but  will  never  be  manned,  that  have  made 
you  so  confident?  For  you  have  irritated  Philip 
to  such  an  extent  by  what  you  have  said,  that  the 
result  of  the  embassy  is  likely  to  be,  not  peace, 
but  an  interminable  war."''  The  meaning  of  this 
scene,  if  it  ever  took  place,  must  be  that  Demos- 

'  Such  arguments  however  were  conventional  in  Greek  diplo- 
macy, and  Isocrates  uses  them,  even  to  Philip,  almost  ad  nauseam. 

» ^sch.,  /.  c.  §§  34,  35.     See  Note  5. 

3  The  reference  is  to  the  ships  which  were  to  have  been  sent  to 
Thermopylae  to  join  Proxenus.     (See  p.  238.) 

4.Esch.,/.c.,§§36,37. 


244  Demosthenes 

thenes  was  himself  intensely  anxious  for  peace,  in 
view  of  the  helpless  condition  of  Athens  at  the  mo- 
ment, and  thought  that,  by  opening  the  question  of 
Amphipolis,  -^schines  had  spoiled  all  chance  of  it. 
(It  may  even  have  been  this  fear  v/hich  led  him  to 
break  down  before  Philip.)  ^schines  had  no 
time  to  answer  this  attack  before  the  herald  re- 
called them  to  Philip's  presence  to  hear  his  deci- 
sion. Philip  proceeded  to  reply  to  each  of  the 
ambassadors  in  order,  referring  with  special  em- 
phasis to  the  arguments  of  ^schines — iEschines 
himself  tells  the  story — but  making  no  allusion  to 
anything  that  had  been  said  by  Demosthenes. 
His  friendly  tone  disproved  the  truth  of  Demos- 
thenes' apprehensions,  and  Demosthenes  was  so 
mortified  at  being  proved  in  the  wrong  that  he 
lost  control  of  himself,  and  even  behaved  badly 
at  the  complimentary  feast  to  which  Philip  had 
invited  the  ambassadors.  ^  As  to  the  substance  of 
Philip's  answer,  we  learn*  that  Philip  undertook 
not  to  attack  the  Chersonese  before  the  Athenians 
had  come  to  a  decision  in  regard  to  the  Peace;  and 
the  ambassadors  took  with  them  a  letter  from  him, 
promising  in  general  terms  to  confer  great  benefits  on 
Athens  if  he  were  granted  alliance  as  well  as  peace.  ^ 
Demosthenes,  according  to  .^schines'  story, 
appears  soon  to  have  regretted  his  unfortimate 
conduct;  and  lest  it  should  become  known  at 
Athens,  he  did  his  best  on  the  way  home  to  in- 
gratiate himself  with  his  colleagues,  promising  to 

'  iEsch.,  /.  c,  §§  38,  39.     '  Ibid.,  §  82.     J  Dem.,  de  F.  L.,  §  40. 


The  First  Embassy  to  Philip        245 

assist  them  individually  in  their  private  needs  and 
their  public  career,  and  lavishing  fulsome  praises 
upon  the  address  of  .^schines  to  Philip ;  and  while 
they  were  all  dining  together  at  Larissa,  he  even 
laughed  at  himself  for  his  breakdown,  and  spoke 
with  admiration  of  Philip's  ability,  ^schines  ex- 
pressed his  agreement,  and  Ctesiphon  went  so  far 
as  to  say  that  he  had  never  seen  so  charming  a  man 
as  Philip.  "Ah!"  cried  Demosthenes, "neither  of 
you  would  dare  to  speak  of  Philip  in  such  terms 
to  the  People!"  They  declared  that  they  would 
do  so;  and  Demosthenes  in  turn  declared  that  he 
would  hold  them  to  their  promise,  while  at  the  sam.e 
time  he  entreated  ^schines  to  tell  the  People  that 
"Demosthenes  also  had  spoken  in  defence  of  the 
claim  of  Athens  to  Amphipolis." '  (It  is  clear  that 
the  People  had  not  yet  realised  that  the  recovery 
of  Amphipolis,  however  nearly  it  might  touch  their 
pride,  was  not  practically  possible;  and  though 
the  ambassadors  must  have  known  it  well  enough, 
none  of  them  was  anxious  to  admit  it  publicly.) 

The  ambassadors  must  have  re-entered  Athens 
about  the  end  of  March,  346.  They  first  an- 
nounced the  result  of  their  mission  to  the  Council ; 
and  the  Council,  on  the  motion  of  Demosthenes, 
who  spoke  in  laudatory  terms  of  his  colleagues,  and 
of  -^schines  in  particular,  decided  to  propose  to  the 
People  that  a  crown  of  olive  should  be  awarded  to 
each  of  them,  and  that  they  should  be  invited  (in 

»^sch., /.  c,  §§40-43. 


246  Demosthenes 

accordance  with  custom)  to  a  complimentary  ban- 
quet in  the  Prytaneum — the  Guildhall  of  Athens.  * 
They  next  came  before  the  Assembly,  and  spoke 
as  had  been  arranged,  ^schines  and  Ctesiphon 
used  the  language  which  Demosthenes  had  de- 
clared they  would  not  dare  to  use,  in  praise  of 
Philip's  charm,  his  good  memory,  and  his  talents 
as  a  speaker;  and  ^schines  described  Philip  as  a 
thorough  Hellene,  and  anything  but  a  barbarian,  as 
some  called  him.^  ^schines  also  tells  us  that  he 
remembered  Demosthenes'  request,  and  told  the 
Assembly  that  he  had  left  it  to  Demosthenes  to 
say  anything  that  might  have  been  passed  over 
in  regard  to  Amphipolis.  But  when  last  of  all 
Demosthenes  rose,  he  turned  upon  his  colleagues 
(says^schines),  and  rubbing  his  head  and  making 
his  usual  fantastic  gestures,  rallied  them  upon  their 
garrulity  and  their  compliments  to  Philip.  "I 
will  show  you,"  he  said,  "how  to  report  the  re- 
sult of  an  embassy.  Read  the  resolution  under 
which  we  were  sent."  The  clerk  read  it.  "Well," 
he  said,  "these  were  our  instructions,  and  we  have 
fulfilled  them.  Here  is  Philip's  answer,  and  it  is 
for  you  to  discuss  it."  This  businesslike  brevity 
met  with  some  applause,  though  some  (-^schines 
says)  exclaimed  at  its  maliciousness.  Demosthe- 
nes proceeded: 

^schines  thought  Philip  an  able  speaker;  I  did 
not.  Any  one  else  in  the  same  position  could  have 
done  nearly  as  well.     Ctesiphon  thought  he  had  a 

'  iEsch,,  /.  c,  §§  45,  46.  «  Dem.,  de  F.  L.,  §  308. 


li 


THE  STATUE  OF  AESCHINES  IN  THE  NAPLES  MUSEUM 


The  First  Embassy  to  Philip        247 

glorious  face;  to  me  Aristodemus  the  actor  is  just  as 
handsome.  He  was,  they  say,  a  good  companion 
to  drink  wine  with.  Our  colleague  Philocrates  was 
better.  It  is  stated  that  an  opportunity  was  left  me 
of  speaking  about  Amphipolis;  but  .^schines  would 
rather  have  given  me  a  share  in  his  life-blood  than 
in  his  argument.'  All  this,  in  fact,  is  beside  the 
point,  and  I  propose  simply  that  a  safe-conduct 
be  given  to  the  herald  who  has  come  from  Philip, 
and  to  the  envoys  who  are  about  to  proceed  hither ; 
that,  when  they  have  arrived,  meetings  of  the  As- 
sembly be  summoned  for  two  days,  to  discuss  the 
question  of  alliance  as  well  as  that  of  peace;  and 
that,  if  you  think  we  deserve  it,  a  vote  of  thanks  be 
passed  to  us  for  our  services,  and  that  we  be  invited 
to  a  banquet  in  the  Prytaneum  to-morrow. 

Demosthenes'  mockery  of  his  colleagues,  if  the 
scene  really  took  place,  was  very  unworthy  of  him ; 
but  he  can  hardly  be  blamed  for  proposing  to  carry 
out  the  ordinary  formalities  of  Greek  diplomacy,  or 
for  asking  for  the  conventional  expressions  of  ap- 
proval from  the  Assembly;  and  his  further  motion, 
to  give  Philip's  envoys  seats  of  honour  at  the  forth- 
coming Dionysiac  festival  was  (like  the  banquet 
which  he  gave  them)  a  natural  civility,  which  his 
enemies  afterwards  misconstrued  as  evidence  of 
disloyalty  to  his  country.  ^ 

The  two  meetings  of  the  Assembly  were  fixed, 
on  Demosthenes'  motion,  for  the  i8th  and  19th 

»  See  Dem.,  de  F.  L.,  §  254. 

"iEsch.,  de  F.  L.,  §§46-55;  in  Ctes.,  §  63.     For  Demosthenes' 
reply,  see  de  Cor.,  §  28,  and  de  F.  L.,  §§  234-236. 


248  Demosthenes 

of  Elaphebolion — April  15th  and  i6th;  and  it  was 
necessary,  before  any  treaty  could  be  made,  that 
the  situation  should  be  discussed  by  the  Synod 
representative  of  the  allies  of  Athens,  which  was 
then  meeting  in  the  city.  ^  The  Synod,  according 
to  vEschines,  resolved  to  agree  to  peace  upon  such 
terms  as  the  Assembly  should  decide;  they  said 
nothing  of  an  alliance  with  Philip;  but  added  a 
proposal  that  it  should  be  lawful  for  any  Greek 
State  to  become  a  party  to  the  Peace  within  three 
months.  The  effect  of  the  acceptance  of  this 
proposal  would  clearly  have  been  to  give  the 
Phocians  a  chance  of  securing  themselves  against 
Philip  and  the  Thebans,  by  joining  in  the  Peace. 
They  also  suggested  that  the  decision  of  the 
Assembly  should  be  postponed  until  the  envoys 
sent  in  the  winter  by  Athens  to  the  Greek  States 
had  returned;  probably  because  they  wished  to 
discover  whether  the  other  States  would  be  likely 
to  favour  such  a  general  Peace ;  and  at  a  later  time 
^schines  accused  Demosthenes  of  having  hiuried 
on  the  meetings  of  the  Assembly,  without  waiting 
for  the  return  of  those  envoys,  and  so  having 
ruined  the  chance  of  a  universal  Peace.  It  is 
very  probable  that  Demosthenes  did  not  desire 
to  risk  the  chance  of  any  change  of  feeling  in 
Athens,  and  that,  seeing  peace  to  be  necessary,  he 
thought  it  best  to  conclude  it  as  soon  as  possible. ' 

'  See  Marshall,  The  Second  Alhentan  Confederacy,  p.  334. 
^  The  evidence,  which  is  very  perplexing,  is  discussed  in  Note  7. 
The  view  given  in  the  text  seems  to  be  the  most  probable. 


The  First  Embassy  to  Philip        249 

It  appears  to  have  been  resolved  on  the  motion  of 
Demosthenes  that  the  discussion  in  the  Assembly 
should  take  place  on  the  i8th  of  Elaphebolion,  and 
the  voting  on  the  proposals  made  (but  no  speeches) 
on  the  19th.  ^  At  the  first  meeting,  Philocrates 
proposed  that  alliance  as  well  as  peace  should  be 
made  with  Philip,  but  that  the  Phocians  and  Halus 
should  be  excluded  from  it.  (The  envoys  sent 
by  Philip — Antipater,  Parmenio,  and,  probably, 
Eurylochus — may  already  have  made  it  plain  to 
Philocrates  that  Philip  would  not  admit  the 
Phocians,  and  no  doubt  the  terms  proposed 
were  virtually  dictated  by  Philip.)  This  proposal 
^schines  denounced  in  very  vigorous  language, 
declaring  that  he  could  not  support  it  so  long  as  a 
single  Athenian  remained  alive.  ^  Instead  of  it,  he 
upheld  the  proposal  of  the  Synod  of  the  allies, 
which  would  have  given  the  Phocians  and  the 
people  of  Halus  an  opportunity  of  participating  in 
the  Peace,  since  it  allowed  three  months  during 
which  any  State  might  declare  its  adhesion  to  the 
treaty.  3  Demosthenes  also  supported  the  allies' 
proposal,  and  the  Assembly  broke  up  under  the 
impression  that  peace  would  certainly  be  made, 
but  that  for  the  alliance  it  would  be  better  to 
wait  for  three  months  or  so,  in  case  a  general 
arrangement  should  then  seem  desirable. ''     On  the 

^  Msch.,deF.L.,  §65. 

»Dem.,(ieF.  L.,  §14;  M^ch..,dc  F.L.,  §63. 

J  Msch.,  in  Ctes.,  §  71. 

^  Ibtd.     See  Note  8. 


250  Demosthenes 

next  day,  despite  the  motion  which  Demosthenes 
had  carried  in  regard  to  the  procedure,  there  was 
clearly  considerable  discussion  as  well  as  voting.* 
But  the  two  accounts  of  the  proceedings  are 
entirely  different.  Qemosthenes  claims  to  have 
spoken  in  favour  of  the  resolution  of  the  allies,  and 
implies  that  he  was  opposed  to  the  making  of  an 
alliance  with  PhiHp;  he  declares  that  the  People 
would  not  even  listen  to  Philocrates,  who  had 
proposed  alliance  as  well  as  peace;  but  that 
^schines  rose  and  supported  Philocrates,  de- 
nouncing those  who  reminded  the  Athenians  of  the 
deeds  of  their  forefathers  in  ancient  days,  and 
expressing  his  intention  of  proposing  a  law  that 
the  Athenians  should  assist  no  Hellenic  people 
by  whom  they  had  not  previously  been  assisted — 
meaning  that  in  the  present  case  they  should  not 
support  the  Phocians.  ^  ^schines,  on  the  contrary, 
declares  that  he  did  not  speak  on  the  second  day  at 
all  3;  and  that  the  sentiments  imputed  to  him  by 
Demosthenes  were  a  distortion  of  those  which  he 
uttered  on  the  first  day,  in  reply  to  inflammatory 
speeches  by  certain  orators,  who  tried  to  prevent 
the  making  of  peace  at  all,  and  pointed  to  the 
Propylaea  and  the  Acropolis,  and  appealed  to  the 
memory  of  Salamis  and  the  tombs  and  trophies 
of  the  Athenians  of  old.     In  answer  to  such  fire- 

*  ^sch.,  de  F.  L.,  §§  65-67,  denies  that  there  was  any  dis- 
cussion; but  in  thein  Ctes.,  §§  71  ff.,  he  himself  gives  an  account 
of  the  discussion  on  the  second  day  of  the  debate. 

'Dem.,deF.L.,  §§15,16,311.  3^sch.,de  F.  L.,  §§66. 


The  First  Embassy  to  Philip        251 

brands,  ^schines  declared,  he  had  urged  that  while 
it  was  well  to  bear  these  great  traditions  in  mind,  it 
would  also  be  well  if  the  People  were  to  imitate 
the  wisdom  of  their  forefathers,  without  falling 
into  their  errors  and  their  unseasonable  passion 
for  strife;  he  had  held  up  to  them  as  a  warning 
the  disasters  brought  about  by  the  rash  policy  of 
Cleophon  in  the  latter  part  of  the  Peloponnesian 
War,  and  as  an  example  the  battles  of  Plataeae, 
Salamis,  and  Marathon.^  But  as  to  the  second 
day,  he  states  that  Demosthenes  himself  supported 
Philocrates,  and  showed  to  a  certain  Amyntor 
(who  was  ready  to  give  evidence  of  the  fact)  a 
resolution  to  the  same  effect  as  that  of  Philocrates 
— ^proposing  alliance  as  well  as  peace  with  Philip — 
which  he  had  himself  drafted  and  was  ready,  if 
necessary,  to  hand  in  to  the  chairman.^  In  the 
Speech  against  Ctesiphon^  he  goes  farther,  and 
declares  that  Demosthenes  rose  without  leaving 
time  for  any  one  to  anticipate  him,  and  said  that 
the  proposals  of  the  previous  day  were  idle,  unless 
Philip's  ambassadors  agreed  to  them;  that  it  was 
wrong,  however  much  they  disliked  the  mover  and 
the  name  of  an  alliance,  to  "snap  off  the  alliance 
from  the  peace ' ' ;  and  that  instead  of  waiting  for 
the  tardy  adhesion  of  the  other  States  before 
making  the  alliance,  they  should  settle  the  ques- 
tion of  peace  or  war  for  themselves.'*     Demos- 

'  ^sch.,  de  F.  L.  §§  74-77.  '  Ibid.,  §§  67,  68. 

iln  Ctes.,  §§71,  72. 

*  Almost  the  very  opinion  which  Dem.,  de  F.  L.,  §  307,  at- 
tributes to  ^schines! 


252  Demosthenes 

thenes  then  (so  ^schines  says)  called  Antipater 
and  asked  him  directly  whether  he  would  accept 
the  Peace  without  the  alliance,  and  received  a 
negative  answer.  This  of  course  meant  that 
any  one  who  desired  the  Peace  must  give  way  on 
the  question  of  the  alliance. 

Thus  ^schines  and  Demosthenes  each  accused 
the  other  of  supporting  the  resolution  of  Philoc- 
rates  as  against  the  proposal  of  the  allies,  and  of 
thus  becoming  responsible  for  the  exclusion  and 
subsequent  overthrow  of  the  Phocians.  (It  must 
be  borne  in  mind  that  the  accusations  were  made  at 
a  time  when  they  had  become  declared  enemies, 
when  the  overthrow  of  the  Phocians  had  caused 
the  Athenians  to  regard  the  Peace  with  detestation, 
and  when  each  of  the  orators  desired  to  prove  to  the 
jury  that  he  had  supported  the  side  which  had  since 
become  the  popular  one.)  Can  we  form  any  rea- 
sonable opinion  as  to  their  real  attitude  at  the 
time?  What  seems  clear  is  that  on  the  i8th  of 
Elaphebolion  it  appeared  likely  that  a  Peace  would 
be  made  which  would  leave  the  door  open  to  the 
Phocians  and  the  people  of  Halus,  and  to  other 
Greek  States,  if  they  decided  within  three  months 
to  join  in  an  alliance;  and  this  proposition  both 
^schines  and  Demosthenes  supported.  It  is  also 
tolerably  clear  that  between  the  debates  of  the 
1 8th  and  the  19th  something  happened  which 
convinced  certain  of  the  politicians  that  such  a 
Peace  was  impossible — Philocrates  had  probably 
known  this  before — ^and  this  can  only  have  been 


i 


The  First  Embassy  to  Philip        253 

the  discovery  that  Philip  was  absolutely  resolved 
not  to  agree  to  such  terms.  This  must  have  been 
intimated  to  them  by  Philip's  envoys.  That  being 
so,  what  course  was  open  to  one  who,  like  Demos- 
thenes, believed  peace  to  be  necessary  for  the  time? 
What  but  to  attempt  to  convince  the  People  that 
they  must  give  up  the  proposal  of  the  allies,  and 
accept  peace  on  Philip's  own  terms,  viz.,  the  mak- 
ing of  a  Peace  and  an  alliance  at  once,  without 
waiting  three  months?  The  most  obvious  way  of 
doing  this  was  that  which,  according  to  -^schines' 
account,  Demosthenes  adopted,  viz.,  putting  the 
question  publicly  to  Antipater  in  the  Assembly; 
and  it  is  highly  probable  that,  as  Amyntor  told 
.^schines,  Demosthenes  had  a  consequential  mo- 
tion drafted  and  ready.  But  even  when  they 
heard  Antipater's  reply,  the  Assembly  were  not 
ready  to  give  up  the  plan  which  they  had  approved 
of  on  the  previous  day;  and  it  is  probable  that 
before  they  consented  they  were  led  in  some  way  or 
other  to  believe  that  they  were  not  really  sacrificing 
the  Phocians  to  Philip  and  the  Thebans  by  mak- 
ing the  alliance  at  once.  How  was  this  managed? 
The  Phocians  and  Halus  were  passed  over  in 
silence;  Philocrates'  motion  was  introduced,  but 
they  were  not  mentioned  by  name;  and  the 
explanation  was  given,  so  Demosthenes  says,^ 
by  ^schines  and  his  friends  that  Philip  could  not 
receive  the  Phocians  openly  as  allies,  owing  to  his 

'  Dem.,  de  F.  L.,    §  321;  comp.  Phil.  II,    §§  12,  28,  and  see 
Note  9. 


254  Demosthenes 

own  existing  relations  with  the  Thessalians  and 
Thebans;  but  that  when  the  Peace  was  made  he 
would  act  in  such  a  way  as  to  satisfy  the  Athenians. 
If  this  was  so,  ^schines  also  had  changed  his  mind 
in  the  night,  and  that  is  perhaps  the  most  probable 
account  of  the  matter ;  though  -^schines  may  have 
sincerely  believed  that  Philip  would  act  in  the 
manner  described.  Nor  do  we  find  any  statement 
that  Demosthenes  on  this  occasion  expressed  any 
other  belief. 

But  even  with  these  assurances  before  them,  the 
People  were  not  induced  to  agree  to  the  proposal  of 
Philocrates,  until  Eubulus  told  them  bluntly  that 
tmless  they  accepted  it  (of  course  in  its  new  form, 
without  any  express  mention  of  the  Phocians  or 
Halus)  they  must  prepare  for  immediate  war,  pay 
a  war-tax,  and  devote  the  festival-fund  to  military 
purposes.^  This  of  course  was  the  plain  truth. 
Philip  held  all  the  cards;  and  unless  peace  were 
made  on  his  terms,  there  must  be  a  war,  and  the 
People  must  make  those  very  sacrifices  which  they 
had  so  steadily  refused  to  make.  The  threat  was 
sufficient.  It  was  resolved  that  the  Athenian 
People  and  their  allies  should  make  peace  and 
alliance  with  Philip  and  his  allies,  and  none  were 
specially  mentioned  or  excluded.  Further,  it  was 
agreed  that  each  of  the  two  parties  to  the  Peace 
should  retain  what  it  possessed  at  the  time  when 
the  Peace  was  made  * ;  and  the  treaty  also  contained 
various  provisions  in  reference  to  freedom  of  trad- 

»  Dem.,  de  F.  L.,  §  291.  '  Hegesippus,  de  Hal.,  §§  18,  26. 


The  First  Embassy  to  Philip        255 

ing  and  the  suppression  of  piracy.^  The  same 
ten  ambassadors  were  appointed  to  receive  the 
oaths  of  PhiHp  and  his  allies  in  confirmation  of  the 
treaty. 

But  who  were  the  "allies"  on  either  side?  The 
advocates  of  peace,  in  order  to  get  their  proposal 
carried  at  all,  had  left  this  point  indefinite ;  and  it 
was  this  that  was  a  principal  cause  of  the  troubles 
and  misunderstandings  of  the  next  few  years.  The 
politicians  themselves  can  hardly  have  misimder- 
stood  the  situation.  The  allies  and  possessions  of 
Philip  included  all  whom  he  had  conquered,  and  his 
possession  of  Amphipolis  and  Poteidasa  could  not 
be  questioned.  The  allies  of  Athens  were  those 
who  were  actually  members  of  her  confederacy, 
and  were  represented  in  the  Synod  of  the  con- 
federacy. Philip  evidently  did  not  intend,  and 
could  not  be  expected,  to  recognise  her  right  to 
make  peace  in  the  name  of  any  others.  It  was  no 
small  thing  that  the  possession  of  the  Chersonese, 
with  the  exception  of  Cardia,  was  now  guaranteed 
to  her.  * 

But  obviously  a  less  precise  interpretation  of 
the  term  "allies"  was  also  current  in  popular  lan- 
guage, and  there  was  no  science  of  international 
law  to  lay  down  definitions.  Consequently  not 
only  orators  at  Athens,  but  even  diplomatists  sent 
to  Philip's  court,  could  make  a  show  of  arguing 

'  "Philip's  Letter, "  §  2;  comp.  Hegesippus,  /.  c,  §§  12-15. 
*'Dem.,deF.L.,  §78. 


256  Demosthenes 

that  the  allies  of  Athens  included  any  people  or 
persons  with  whom  she  had  a  treaty  of  friendship, 
or  to  whom  she  had  promised  support — the  Pho- 
cians,  Halus,  and  even  Cersobleptes.  *  (This 
prince,  though  he  had  been  forced  to  give  hos- 
tages to  Philip,  was  no  doubt  still  formally  on 
terms  of  friendship  with  Athens'').  It  was  even 
argued  at  a  later  date  that  Amphipolis  still 
belonged  to  Athens  by  right.  ^ 

Difficulties  arose  from  this  cause  almost  im- 
mediately. For,  a  few  days  after  the  decision  had 
been  made,  the  Athenians  and  the  allies  repre- 
sented in  the  Synod,  in  pursuance  of  a  motion 
proposed  by  Philocrates,  took  the  oath  to  maintain 
the  Peace,  in  the  presence  of  Philip's  envoys.  No 
representative  either  of  the  Phocians  or  of  Cer- 
sobleptes  took  the  oath'*;  but  a  representative  of 
Cersobleptes  claimed  to  do  so ;  and  at  a  later  time, 
Demosthenes  and  ^schines  each  tried  to  blame 
the  other  for  his  exclusion.  Probably  both  were 
agreed  at  the  time  that  Cersobleptes'  envoy  could 
not  legitimately  be  included,  and  it  fell  to  Demos- 
thenes, as  president  of  the  Assembly  held  on  the 
25th  of  Elaphebolion,  to  give  a  formal  ruling  to 
that  effect.  ^ 

When  the  tangled  evidence  is  carefully  studied, 
there  can  be  little  doubt  that  up  to  the  point  at 

*Dem.,de  Cor.,  §27. 

»-^sch.,  de  F.  L.,  §  9:  in  Ctes.,  §  61,  describes  him  as  the 
"friend  and  ally  of  the  city." 

3  See  below,  p.  312.  t^sch,,  in  Ctes.,  §§  73-75.  s  See  Note  10. 


The  First  Embassy  to  Philip        257 

which  the  Athenians  swore  to  the  treaty,  Demcs- 
thenes  had  not  changed  his  mind  as  to  the  necessity 
of  making  peace,  and  although  on  the  first  day  of 
the  debate  he  had  made  an  effort  to  confine  the 
treaty  to  a  Peace,  without  an  immediate  alHance, 
and  so  to  save  the  Phocians  and  Halus,  he  had 
immediately  seen  the  necessity  of  giving  way  upon 
these  points,  and  had  acted  accordingly.  If  this 
is  so,  it  is  impossible  to  relieve  him  of  the  respon- 
sibility (which  he  shared  with  his  colleagues)  for 
the  consequences  of  the  Peace,  however  vehemently 
he  may  have  wished  to  repudiate  it  afterwards. 
Not  that  the  responsibiUty  really  involves  any 
blame,  for  he  was  fully  justified  in  carrying  into 
effect  his  conviction  of  the  necessity  of  peace  at 
the  time;  he  was  acting  as  the  interests  of  his 
country  demanded ;  and  there  is  no  sign,  up  to  this 
point,  of  any  serious  division  of  opinion  among  the 
leading  politicians  in  Athens.  It  is  only  in  their 
respective  records  or  falsifications  of  the  facts,  and 
in  their  comments  upon  them  in  the  light  of  their 
subsequent  dissensions,  that  differences  appear. 
If  Demosthenes  is  to  be  blamed,  it  is  not  so  much 
for  helping  to  make  the  Peace,  as  for  trying  after- 
wards to  disown  his  action. 

For  from  this  point  onwards  the  friction,  which 
seems  to  have  arisen  from  comparatively  trivial 
and  personal  causes,  between  Demosthenes  and 
the  other  ambassadors,  became  rapidly  trans- 
formed into  definite  opposition,  accompanied  by 
ill-will  which  neither  he  nor  they  took  any  pains 
17 


258  Demosthenes 

to  conceal.  To  him,  the  Peace  was  no  more  than 
an  armistice,  rendered  absolutely  necessary  by  cir- 
cumstances, but  only  tolerable  because  it  might 
be  turned  to  good  account,  if  the  opportunity 
were  taken  of  preparing  for  a  resimiption  of 
the  struggle.  They,  on  the  other  hand,  desired  a 
lasting  Peace,  such  as  was  inconsistent  with  De- 
mosthenes* ideal  of  national  honour.  No  sooner, 
therefore,  was  the  Peace  made,  than  he  began  to 
think  about  the  means  of  preventing  Philip  from 
gaining  fresh  power  or  extending  his  influence 
farther  southward.  From  this  point  of  view, 
every  action  of  his  colleagues  which  seemed  to 
fiu-ther  Philip's  plans,  or  to  offer  any  prospect  of 
permanence  to  the  Peace,  presented  itself  to  his 
mind  as  treason;  and  this  attitude  of  mind  de- 
veloped so  rapidly,  that  (if  what  he  declared  three 
years  later  was  true)  he  was  very  unwilling  to  serve 
upon  the  Second  Embassy,  and  would  not  have 
done  so,  but  for  the  fact  that,  on  his  previous  visit 
to  Macedonia,  he  had  promised  to  take  ransom- 
money  to  some  of  the  Athenian  prisoners  there. 

NOTES  TO  CHAPTER  VII 

1.  JEsch.,  de  F.  L.,  §  15,  says  simply  inrh  Si  Toi>s  airoiis  xp^wus 
'O\vv0os  idXu.  In  the  Speech  against  Ctesiphon,  §  62,  he  places 
the  acquittal  of  Philocrates  before  the  beginning  of  Themistocles' 
archonship  (July,  347),  but  does  not  give  any  nearer  indication  of 
date. 

2.  At  a  time  when  both  ^schines  and  Demosthenes  were 
anxious  to  disown  all  connection  with  the  Peace,  ^schines  (in 
Ctes.,  §  62)  accused  Demosthenes  of  having  obtained  his  place  in 
the  Council  by  corrupt  means  for  the  express  purpose  of  support- 


I 


The  First  Embassy  to  Philip        259 

ing  Philocrates.  But  there  is  no  doubt  that  this  story  was  an 
invention  on  the  part  of  ^schines.  He  made  a  similar  assertion 
about  Timarchus  {in  Tim.,  §  io6);  and,  as  Schafer  remarks,  he 
had  not  thought  of  this  calumny  against  Demosthenes  at  the 
time  of  the  Speeches  on  the  Embassy. 

3.  ^sch.,  de  F.  L.,  §  134,  says  that  the  letter  of  Proxenus, 
giving  an  account  of  the  treatment  he  had  received,  and  the  report 
of  the  heralds  of  the  Mysteries  were  read  at  the  same  meeting  of 
the  Assembly  as  that  at  which  the  Peace  was  discussed.  This 
has  caused  much  difficulty;  for  the  resolution  of  Philocrates, 
constituting  the  First  Embassy,  can  hardly  have  been  proposed 
for  some  months  after  the  rebuff  by  the  Phocians.  Consequently 
Schafer  and  others  have  thought  that  the  Mysteries  referred  to 
were  the  "Lesser  Mysteries,"  held  in  March  and  therefore 
(according  to  Schafer)  announced  in  February.  But  was  there 
any  solemn  announcement  of  these  to  all  the  Greek  states,  as 
there  was  of  the  Eleusinian  Truce  in  September?  Grote  is 
probably  right  in  saying  that  there  must  have  been  many  dis- 
cussions of  the  peace-negotiations  before  Philocrates'  resolution 
was  proposed,  and  that  the  news  from  Thermopylae  was  brought 
during  one  of  these. 

4.  ^schines  disclaims  connection  with  the  early  negotiations 
in  the  de  F.  L.,  §  20,  and  the  passage  in  the  Speech  against 
Timarchus,  §  174  (delivered  in  345),  does  not  prove  that  he 
claimed  any  credit  for  the  Peace  then  (as  is  sometimes  supposed), 
but  only  that  he  expected  Demosthenes  to  charge  him  with  re- 
sponsibility for  it,  along  with  Philocrates — in  other  words,  that 
by  the  time  of  the  trial  of  Timarchus,  Demosthenes  wished  to 
disavow  his  own  share  in  the  matter.  In  the  de  Cor.,  §§  20-24, 
Demosthenes  disclaims  all  share  in  it  very  insistently,  but  none 
the  less  falsely. 

5.  Schafer,  ii.,  p.  204,  thinks  that  .^Eschines  is  exaggerating 
Demosthenes'  breakdown,  and  that  Demosthenes,  as  the  last 
speaker,  naturally  had  not  much  to  say,  but  summed  up  briefly. 
This  is  only  conjecture,  though  we  have  no  means  of  testing  the 
truth  of  ^schines'  story.  Plutarch's  statement  (Dem.,  xvi.)  that 
Philip  paid  special  attention  to  Demosthenes'  arguments  may 
refer  to  the  Second  Embassy,  or  may  quite  possibly  be  unhistori- 
cal. 

6.  iEschines  {in  Ctes.,  §  67)  says  that  Demosthenes  at  first 


26o  Demosthenes 

proposed  that  the  Assembly  should  meet  on  the  8th  of  Elaphe- 
bolion,  April  5th,  without  waiting  for  the  arrival  of  Philip's 
envoys.  It  is  of  course  conceivable  that  he  proposed  a  prelimin- 
ary discussion  on  that  day,  though  it  is  inconceivable  that  any  one 
should  have  suggested  the  giving  of  a  final  decision  without 
hearing  what  Philip  had  to  say.  ^schines  treats  the  proposal  as 
sacrilegious,  since  the  8th  of  Elaphebolion  was  a  feast  of  Asclepius 
and  the  day  appointed  for  the  Proagon,  a  ceremony  preliminary 
to  the  Dionysiac  festival.  For  whatever  reason,  the  i8th  and 
19th,  when  the  festival  would  be  over,  were  actually  chosen. 

7.  The  testimony  as  regards  the  allies'  proposal  and  the  en- 
voys mentioned  in  it  is  found  in  ^schines,  de  F.  L.,  §§  57-62, 
in  Ctes.,  §§64-70,  Dem.,  de  F.  L.,  §16,  in  Ctes.,  §§22,  23. 
The  chief  points  are  as  follows: 

(i)  Demosthenes  (de  F.  L.,  §  16)  is  indignant  with  ^schi- 
nes  for  making  certain  remarks  on  the  19th  of  Elaphebolion, 
in  the  presence  of  the  envoys  who  had  come  from  the  Greek 
States  in  response  to  the  embassies  sent  from  Athens,  on  the 
advice  of  ^schines,  in  the  vain  hope  of  getting  up  a  united  war 
against  Philip.  This  must  refer  to  the  embassies  sent  out  late 
in  347  (above,  pp.  232-33). 

(2)  To  this  ^schines  replies  {de  F.  L.,  §§  57  ff.,  and  in 
Ctes.,  §§  67,  70)  that  there  were  no  envoys  present  from  any 
Greek  States,  and  that  the  Athenian  ambassadors  sent  to  the 
States  had  not  returned;  but  he  seems  to  suggest  that  it  was 
still  worth  while  to  wait  for  their  return,  and  states  that  the 
Synod  of  the  allies  wished  to  delay  the  decision  of  the  Assembly 
until  their  arrival;  and  he  attacks  Demosthenes  for  having 
forced  on  the  meetings  of  the  Assembly,  without  waiting  for 
the  envoys,  and  for  having  thus  spoiled  the  chance  of  making  a 
universal  Peace  and  so  saving  the  Phocians. 

(3)  To  this  Demosthenes  answers  (de  Cor.,  §§  22,  23)  that 
there  were  no  Athenian  envoys  out  on  a  mission  to  the  Greek 
States  at  the  time,  for  the  Greeks  had  all  long  ago  been  tried 
and  found  wanting. 

There  are  thus  two  points  (often  confused  with  one  another 
by  modem  writers)  upon  which  the  orators  contradict  one 
another: 

(r)     Demosthenes  states  that  there  were  envoys  from  the 

Greek  States  present  in  Athens  on  the  19th  of  Elaphebolion,  who 


The  First  Embassy  to  Philip         261 

had  come  in  response  to  the  Athenian  embassies  sent  in  the 
previous  winter,  ^schines  denies  this;  and  Demosthenes  him- 
self {de  Cor.,  §  23)  implies  that  the  Greek  States  had  generally 
failed  to  respond  to  those  embassies.  If  therefore  any  States 
at  all  had  sent  envoys  to  Athens,  it  is  probable  that  very  few 
had  done  so  (see  below). 

(2)  i^schines  states  that  certain  envoys  sent  from  Athens  to 
the  Greek  States  had  not  yet  returned,  but  were  still  out  on  their 
mission  on  the  19th  of  Elaphebolion.  (As  a  matter  of  fact 
some  of  those  sent  in  the  winter  had  certainly  returned — he 
himself,  for  instance.)  Demosthenes  replies  that  there  were 
no  Athenian  envoys  then  out  on  a  mission  to  the  Greek  States. 
It  is  strongly  in  favour  of  .^schines'  statement,  that  in  the 
de  F.  L.,  §  60,  he  quoted  the  actual  decree  of  the  Synod  of  the 
allies,  expressly  asking  that  the  Assembly  should  meet  "when 
the  envoys  had  returned  to  Athens  and  reported  the  result  of 
their'mission.  "  It  is  difficult  to  avoid  concluding  that  there 
must  have  been  some  Athenian  envoys  out  on  a  mission  at  the 
time,  and  they  must  have  been  either  some  of  the  envoys  sent 
in  the  winter  of  347-6  to  get  up  a  united  war  against  Philip 
(in  which  case  .(^schines  is  misrepresenting  the  facts — in  the 
de  F.  L.,  §  57,  though  not  in  the  in  Ctes.,  §  64 — in  describing 
the  object  of  their  mission  as  a  united  war  or  a  united  peace) ; 
or  else  envoys  sent  after  the  mission  of  the  ten  ambassadors  to 
Philip,  to  invite  the  Greek  States  to  join  in  a  general  Peace. 
Kahrstedt  {Forschungen,  p.  67)  adopts  the  latter  alternative; 
but  there  is  no  real  evidence  of  the  sending  of  such  envoys,  and 
it  is  highly  improbable  that  so  soon  after  the  sending  of  envoys 
to  propose  a  united  war,  the  Athenians  would  have  sent  others 
to  propose  a  united  peace.  The  first  alternative  therefore  is 
the  more  probable — that  some  of  the  envoys  sent  in  the  winter 
had  not  yet  returned,  and  that  the  allies  thought  it  desirable  to 
wait  and  ascertain  from  them  what  was  the  feeling  of  the  other 
Greek  peoples  before  finally  concluding  peace.  (Although  the 
embassies  had  on  the  whole  proved  a  failure,  some  of  the  Greek 
peoples  may  actually  have  sent  envoys  to  Athens  in  response,  as 
Dem.,  de  F.  L.,  §  16,  implies,  and  if  so  .^schines  was  telling 
a  falsehood  in  denying  it;  though  it  seems  almost  more  likely, 
in  view  of  his  confident  challenge  to  Demosthenes,  that  he  was 
speaking  the  truth,  and  that  Demosthenes  was  telling  a  false- 


262  Demosthenes 

hood  in  order  to  exaggerate  the  shockingness  of  ^schines' 
language  by  stating  it  to  have  been  used  in  the  very  presence  of 
the  envoys.  Demosthenes  is  also  probably  wrong — de  Cor., 
§  23 — in  saying  that  no  Athenian  envoys  were  still  out  on  a 
mission.)  Demosthenes  probably  did  not  wish,  for  the  reason 
given  in  the  text,  to  delay  the  conclusion  of  peace  by  waiting 
for  the  return  of  the  envoys. 

8.  Demosthenes'  account  of  the  proceedings  of  the  i8th  of 
Elaphebolion  is  probably  less  accurate  than  that  of  .(Eschines. 
He  says  {de  F.  L.,  §  144)  that  the  Assembly  on  that  day  ratified 
the  proposal  of  the  allies,  and  was  on  the  point  of  summoning 
Philip's  envoys  to  inform  them  of  the  decision,  when  .^schines 
forced  an  adjournment  of  the  question  until  the  next  day.  But 
by  his  own  motion,  no  voting  could  take  place  on  the  first  day; 
the  only  possible  "  ratification  "  on  that  day  can  have  been  in  the 
form  of  applause ;  and  the  adjournment  of  the  decision  to  the  next 
day  was  the  result  of  his  motion,  not  of  any  action  of  .^schines. 
(The  procedure  laid  down  in  his  motion  was  not  followed  on  the 
second  day ;  but  there  was  clearly  some  good  reason  for  setting  it 
aside,  and  this  must  have  commanded  the  assent  of  the  Assembly. 
No  such  reason  can  have  been  suggested  on  the  first  day,  upon 
which  there  seems  to  have  been  no  excitement  or  difficulty.) 

9.  Demosthenes  implies  that  the  statements  of  ^schines  and 
his  friends  as  to  Philip's  promises  and  intentions  were  made  on 
this  occasion  as  well  as  later,  in  July,  not  only  in  his  speech  in  343 
at  the  trial  of  ^Eschines  (§321),  but  also  in  344  in  addressing  the 
Assembly  itself,  which  it  would  be  less  easy,  perhaps,  to  mislead  as 
to  what  had  taken  place  in  its  presence,  viz.,  Phil.  II,  §§  12,  28, 
— where  references  are  made  to  the  promises  on  the  strength  of 
which  Philip  obtained  the  Peace.  This  could  only  apply  to  April, 
and  not  to  July,  when  the  Peace  had  already  been  made.  Whether 
the  statements  were  really  made  by  .(Eschines  himself,  and  not 
rather  by  Philocrates,  may  be  doubted;  but  if  they  were  made  by 
iEschines,  it  can  hardly  be  doubted  that  he  believed  them;  for, 
as  we  shall  see,  he  was  really  anxious  to  save  the  Phocians,  and 
Demosthenes'  account  of  .^schines'  attitude  towards  them  is 
the  grossest  perversion  of  the  truth.  It  was  Demosthenes  himself 
who  was  prepared,  if  necessary,  to  sacrifice  the  Phocians,  in  order 
to  obtain  peace  for  the  time. 


The  First  Embassy  to  Philip        263 

10.  According  to  ^schines,  de  F.  L.,  §§  82-86,  the  Assembly 
met  on  the  25th  of  Elaphebolion,  and  Demosthenes  was  in  the 
chair.  At  this  meeting  Critobulus  of  Lampsacus  appeared,  and 
demanded  in  the  name  of  Cersobleptes  (who  had  not  been  men- 
tioned in  the  debates  of  the  i8th  and  19th)  to  be  allowed  to  swear 
to  the  Peace  among  the  allies  of  Athens.  Aleximachus  proposed 
that  he  should  be  permitted  to  do  so;  but  Demosthenes  refused  to 
put  the  motion — the  passing  of  which  he  said,  would  mean  the 
breaking  oflf  of  the  Peace — until  he  was  practically  forced  to  do  so. 
(iEschines  does  not  say  that  the  motion  was  carried.)  On  the 
other  hand  .^schines  (in  Ctes.,  §  73-5)  says  that  Philocrates  pro- 
posed, and  Demosthenes  put  to  the  vote,  a  resolution  that  the 
oath  should  be  taken  that  day  by  the  allies  represented  in  the 
Synod  then  sitting;  and  that  as  there  was  no  representative  of 
Cersobleptes  present  in  the  Synod,  Cersobleptes  came  to  be 
excluded.  It  is  obvious  that  these  two  accounts  are  not  consis- 
tent with  each  other.  Both  speeches,  however,  agree  that  Cer- 
sobleptes was  in  fact  excluded;  for  in  the  de  F.  L.,  §  86,  ^schines 
states  that  Demosthenes  had  charged  him  with  driving  Cer- 
sobleptes' representative  away,  when  the  oaths  were  taken, 
immediately  after  the  Assembly  had  been  broken  up.  Plainly 
the  exclusion  of  Cersobleptes  was  a  thing  which  the  Athenians 
came  afterwards  to  view  with  disfavour,  and  both  orators  try  to 
disclaim  responsibility  for  it.  (Grote,  Pt.  II.,  ch.  89,  and  Hogarth, 
Philip  of  Macedon,  p.  91,  both  assert  that  Cersobleptes'  repre- 
sentative was  allowed  to  take  the  oath.  This  seems  to  be  contrary 
to  the  evidence.  The  "Letter  of  Philip"  appears  to  preserve 
a  tradition  of  his  exclusion,  though  it  is  there  ascribed  to  the 
generals  of  Athens,  doubtless  because  the  oaths  were  taken  in  the 
generals'  office.) 


CHAPTER  VIII 

THE    SECOND    EMBASSY    AND    THE    PEACE    OF 
PHILOCRATES 

THE  ten  ambassadors,  upon  their  appointment 
to  serve  on  the  Second  Embassy  to  PhiHp, 
were  instructed  to  administer  the  oath  of  fideUty 
to  the  treaty  just  negotiated,  both  to  Philip,  and 
also  to  the  magistrates  of  the  peoples  allied  with 
him,  in  their  several  cities.^  They  were  further 
ordered  to  negotiate  for  the  ransom  of  the  Athen- 
ian prisoners  who  were  in  the  hands  of  Philip  and 
his  subjects,  and  to  do  all  that  they  could  to  serve 
the  interests  of  Athens  in  regard  to  the  general 
situation.^  Demosthenes  states  also  that  it  was 
forbidden  that  any  of  them  should  have  a  private 
interview  with  Philip;  but  it  is  very  doubtful 
whether  an  instruction  implying  so  strong  a  mis- 
trust of  them  and  so  overtly  insulting  both  to  them 
and  Philip  was  really  ever  given  them;  though  it 
was  obvious,  and  it  may  have  been  stated,  that 
only  their  collective  action  would  be  binding  upon 
Athens. 

As  soon  as  Philip's  envoys  had  left  the  city, 

'  Dem.,  de  F.  L.,  §  278.  » ^sch.,  de  F.  L.,  §§  103, 104. 

264 


I 


The  Second  Embassy  265 

Demosthenes  urged  his  colleagues  to  sail  as  quickly 
as  possible  to  the  Hellespont,  where  Philip  was 
now  operating,  in  order  to  prevent  him  from  mak- 
ing conquests  in  that  region  before  taking  the 
oath,  and  then  excusing  himself  on  the  groimd  that 
he  had  not  yet  sworn  to  a  Peace.  He  knew,  he 
said,  that  the  Athenians  would  not  go  to  war 
afresh  on  account  of  places  so  conquered,  when 
they  had  once  agreed  to  peace  on  general 
grounds.  His  colleagues,  however,  displayed  no 
haste ;  and  since  no  regular  meeting  of  the  Assembly 
was  due  for  some  time,  he  procured  a  decree  of 
the  Council  (which  had  been  given  authority  on 
the  matter),  ordering  the  ambassadors  to  depart 
at  once,  and  to  join  Proxenus,  who  was  still  lying 
off  the  north  coast  of  Euboea  with  his  ship; 
Proxenus  was  then  to  convey  them  without  delay 
to  Philip,  wherever  he  might  be.  The  ambas- 
sadors left  Athens  and  met  Proxenus  at  Oreus; 
but  instead  of  sailing,  delayed  there  in  order  to 
enable  ^schines  to  obtain  an  appointment  as 
representative  or  consul  of  Oreus  at  Athens.  ^  At 
last  they  went,  not  to  the  Hellespontine  region  by 
sea,  but  by  land  to  Pella,  and  arrived  there 
twenty-three  days  after  leaving  Athens.  All  the 
time  Demosthenes  protested  against  their  dilatori- 
ness  with  increasing  emphasis. ' 

'  He  IS  mentioned  as  holding  this  office  in  343-2  by  Dem.,  de 
Cor.,  §82. 

'  Dem.,  de  F.  L.,  §  156.  (Most  of  our  information  about  the 
Second  Embassy  comes  from  §§  150-178  of  this  Speech.) 


266  Demosthenes 

After  their  arrival  at  Pella,  they  had  still  to 
wait  twenty-seven  days  before  Philip  himself 
appeared.  The  interval  was  spent  by  Demosthe- 
nes in  making  arrangements  for  the  ransom  of  all 
the  Athenian  prisoners  he  could  find ;  and  for  this 
purpose  he  had  taken  with  him  a  talent  of  his  own 
money.*  In  the  meantime  Philip  had  captured 
a  number  of  strongholds  in  Thrace, — Doriscus, 
Serrhium,  the  Sacred  Mountain,  Myrtenum,  and 
Ergiske,  ^ — and  had  taken  Cersobleptes  prisoner. 
Cersobleptes'  kingdom  thus  passed  into  Philip's 
power,  though  he  did  not  remain  in  captivity — 
his  son  being  already  a  hostage — but  was  allowed 
to  remain  nominally  in  possession  of  his  dominions, 
though  no  doubt  under  conditions. 

When,  at  a  later  date,  the  Athenian  Eucleides 
was  instructed  to  ask  Philip  for  an  explanation  of 
his  action  in  Thrace,  Philip  answered  that  he  was 
within  his  rights,  since  he  had  conquered  these 
places  before  he  met  the  ambassadors  or  took  the 
oath.^  Demosthenes  lays  great  stress  on  these 
conquests,  as  evidence  of  the  faithlessness  of 
Philip,  and  of  the  injury  done  to  Athens  through 
the  dilatoriness  of  his  colleagues.  But  in  reality 
Philip's  defence  was  a  good  one;  and  the  fact  that 
in  341  Demosthenes^  thought  it  worth  while  to 

'  The  attempt  of  ^schines,  de  F.  L.,  §§  99,  100,  to  cast  dis- 
credit upon  Demosthenes'  charitable  work  is  unconvincing. 

'  Some  of  these  places  were  probably  unimportant,  and  ^Es- 
chines  scoffs  at  Demosthenes  for  his  lamentation  over  places 
which  no  one  had  ever  heard  of  before. 

3  Schol.  on  Dem.,  de  F.  L.,  §  162.  4  Phil.  Ill,  §  15. 


The  Second  Embassy  267 

invent  the  certainly  false  statement  that  Philip 
had  already  taken  the  oath  when  he  captured 
these  places,  shows  that  he  was  conscious  of  the 
soundness  of  Philip's  case  when  the  facts  were 
truly  stated.  Indeed,  according  to  ^schines* 
account^  of  the  matter,  Philip  had  captured  Cer- 
solDleptes  and  the  Sacred  Mountain  on  the  day 
before  the  Athenians  themselves  took  the  oath, 
and  therefore  before  the  ambassadors  left  Athens ; 
and  as  evidence  of  this,  he  produced  a  letter  from 
Chares.  We  cannot  then  tell  whether  the  delay 
of  the  ambassadors  really  injured  the  interests  of 
Athens  at  all.  But,  however  this  may  have  been, 
PhUip  was  within  his  rights  in  acting  as  he  had 
done:  for  these  strongholds  did  not  belong  to 
Athens  at  all,  but  to  Cersobleptes ;  and  though 
Chares  was  defending  them,  it  was  for  Cersobleptes, 
who  was  at  war  with  Philip,  that  he  was  doing  so; 
and  Philip  kept  his  word  faithfully  in  not  attack- 
ing the  Chersonese.  Further,  it  may  be  doubted 
whether  Philip  would  really  have  brought  to  an 
end  his  conquests  in  Thrace  (as  Demosthenes 
said  he  would  have),  even  if  the  ambassadors  had 
proceeded  directly  thither  and  received  his  oath. 
He  would  have  been  under  no  obligation  to  do  so ; 
but  the  Athenians  w^ere  so  accustomed  to  regard 
that  region  as  within  their  own  sphere  of  influence, 
that  Demosthenes  found  no  difficulty  (in  343)  in 
speaking  of  the  loss  of  it  as  a  loss  to  Athens,  and 
as  due  to  the  disobedience  of  the  ambassadors  to 

'  ^sch.,  de  F.  L.,  §  89-92. 


[ 

268  Demosthenes 

their  instructions.  No  doubt  the  conquest  of 
Cersobleptes'  kingdom  brought  Philip  nearer  to 
the  Chersonese,  and  this  is  what  Demosthenes 
had  sought  to  prevent;  but  he  had  no  right  to 
complain  that  Philip  was  playing  Athens  false. 
Nor  is  there  any  proof  that  the  delay  of  the  ambas- 
sadors was  due  to  their  corruption  by  Philip  or 
his  agents,  though,  if  Demosthenes  was  telling 
the  truth,  they  did  contravene  their  instructions. 

When  Philip  returned  to  Pella,  he  found  there 
representatives  of  many  Greek  States,  each  hoping 
to  persuade  him  to  fall  in  with  their  wishes.  He 
made  himself  agreeable  to  all,  and  seems  to  have 
led  all  alike  to  imagine  that  they  were  certain  of 
success.  Besides  the  Athenian  ambassadors,  there 
were  envoys  from  Thebes,  bent  upon  urging  Philip 
to  cross  the  Pass  of  Thermopylae  and  terminate 
the  Sacred  War  in  their  interest;  there  were 
Spartans,  who  hoped  for  the  commission  of  the 
Delphian  temple  to  the  care  of  their  kinsmen,  the 
Dorians  of  Mount  Parnassus,  and  also  doubtless 
wished  to  deprecate  Philip's  intrigues  with  their 
enemies  in  the  Peloponnese;  there  were  Phocians, 
who  had  every  reason  to  attempt  to  agree  with 
the  adversary  quickly;  and  there  were  Euboeans, 
who  in  all  probability  were  not  well  disposed 
towards  Athens,  and  desired  to  retain  Philip's 
support. 

Philip  appears  to  have  courted  the  good-will 
of  the  Athenian  representatives  by  lavish  gener- 
osity.    Demosthenes  states  that  offers  of  large 


The  Second  Embassy  269 

sums  of  money  were  first  made  privately  to  each 
of  them ;  that  when  one  of  them  refused — he  coyly 
abstains  from  mentioning  his  own  name — Philip 
sent  a  large  sum  to  them  all  in  common ;  and  that 
when  he  himself  prevented  the  acceptance  of  it 
in  this  form,  his  colleagues  divided  the  sum  among 
themselves,  in  addition  to  what  they  had  already 
received.  For  his  own  part,  he  tells  us,  he  asked 
Philip  to  use  the  mone3%  which  he  was  offering  the 
ambassadors,  to  redeem  the  captive  Athenians 
from  those  of  his  subjects  who  had  come  into 
possession  of  them,  and  that  Philip,  not  liking  to 
reply  that  Demosthenes'  colleagues  had  taken  the 
money,  consented  to  do  this,  but  postponed  the 
fulfilment  of  his  undertaking,  promising  to  send 
the  prisoners  back  in  time  for  the  Panathenasa.  ^ 
How  much  truth  there  is  in  this  story,  apart  from 
Philip's  promise  to  send  home  the  prisoners,  we 
cannot  tell,  ^schines  declared  that  the  other 
ambassadors,  having  learned  wisdom  from  the 
trick  played  on  them  by  Demosthenes  on  their 
previous  journey,^  kept  aloof  from  him,^  and  this 
may  have  helped  to  make  him  unduly  suspicious 
of  them.  But  that  Philip  tried  to  secure  friends 
for  himself  in  Athens  by  lavishing  presents  upon 
the  ambassadors  is  more  than  probable,  when  we 
know  the  use  which  he  made  of  Macedonian  gold 
elsewhere ;  the  pretext  of  hospitality  to  his  guests 
was  a  convenient  one,  and  may  have  served  to 

'  Dem.,  de  F.  L.,  §§  166-171.  »Seeabove,  p.  245. 

3  ^sch.,  de  F.  L.,  §  97. 


270  Demosthenes 

quiet  their  consciences.  That  scrupulous  absten- 
tion from  all  appearance  of  evil,  which  is  demanded 
of  public  servants  at  the  present  day,  was  not 
expected,  or  at  least  was  rarely  found,  in  ancient 
Greece. 

The  Theban  envoys,  Demosthenes  tells  us, 
proved  absolutely  incorruptible;  though  it  may  be 
doubted  whether  he  is  right  in  concluding  that 
the  success  of  the  Thebans  was  due  to  the  impres- 
sion made  upon  Philip  by  the  conduct  of  their 
ambassadors.  Philip's  perception  of  his  interest 
was  hardly  likely  to  be  affected  by  such  edifying 
examples.  ^ 

It  is  evident  that  there  was  considerable  dis- 
sension between  Demosthenes  and  his  colleagues 
as  to  the  way  in  which  they  were  to  carry  out  their 
instructions.^  They  first  read  their  instructions 
aloud;  and  for  some  time  the  discussion  turned 
on  points  of  minor  importance.  At  last,  ^schines 
says,  fearing  that  matters  of  greater  weight  would 
be  overlooked  entirely,  he  reminded  his  colleagues 
that  while,  of  course,  they  were  bound  to  receive 
the  oaths  of  Philip  and  his  allies,  and  to  negotiate 
for  the  ransom  of  the  prisoners,  the  real  difficulty 
lay  in  the  execution  of  the  injunction  to  do  their 
best  for  the  interest  of  Athens  in  general.  He 
himself  interpreted  this  instruction  as  having 
reference  to  the  advance  of  Philip  to  Thermopylae, 

'  Dem.,  de  F.  L.,  §§  139-142. 

» We  are  here  dependent  on  iEschines  {de  F.  L.,  §§  108-I17) 
for  our  information. 


The  Second  Embassy  271 

which  every  one  assumed  to  be  about  to  take  place, 
as  it  was  evidently  Philip's  intention  to  bring  the 
Sacred  War  to  an  end ;  and  he  understood  the  wish 
of  the  Athenian  People  to  be  that  they  should  try 
to  persuade  Philip  to  humble  the  Thebans,  and 
to  set  up  the  walls  of  those  cities  of  Boeotia  which 
the  Thebans  had  destroyed.  This  had  not  been 
expressed  in  the  decree  of  the  Assembly,  only 
because,  if  they  failed  in  their  object,  it  would  be 
better  that  the  intention  of  the  People  should  not 
be  generally  known.  It  would  be  wrong,  he  de- 
clared, for  the  ambassadors  of  Athens  to  shrink 
from  coming  to  the  point,  for  fear  of  incurring 
the  hostility  of  the  Thebans.  But  Demosthenes 
(^schines  declared)  loudly  protested  against  this 
proposal,  asserting  that  it  was  not  the  business 
of  the  ambassadors  to  set  up  strife  between  Athens 
and  Thebes.  "Let  Philip  go  to  Thermopylae," 
said  he;  "no  one  will  prosecute  me  for  any  move- 
ments of  Philip  with  his  army;  but  only  for  any 
words  or  actions  that  are  not  covered  by  our 
instructions."  The  result  of  the  discussion  was 
that  it  was  arranged  that  each  of  the  ambassadors 
should  say  to  Philip  what  he  thought  it  desirable  to 
say. 

When  the  time  for  their  interview  with  Philip 
came,  Demosthenes,  though  the  youngest  of  the 
ambassadors,  insisted  on  speaking  first,  in  order 
that  everything  might  not  be  said  by  others,  before 
his  turn  came.  He  began  his  address  to  Philip 
by  hinting  that  the  ambassadors  were  not  all 


272  Demosthenes 

there  with  the  same  object,  and  proceeded  to 
recount  and  emphasise  his  own  services  in  for- 
warding the  peace-negotiations,  and  the  attentions 
which  he  had  paid  to  Philip's  envoys  (upon  which 
he  laid  such  stress  that  his  colleagues  were  thor- 
oughly ashamed);  he  concluded  with  some  very 
tasteless  remarks  about  Philip  himself,  alluding 
sarcastically  to  the  complimentary  language  that 
his  colleagues  had  used.  "I  have  not  called  you 
beautiful,  for  woman  is  the  most  beautiful  thing 
on  earth ;  nor  a  good  drinker,  for  that,  I  conclude, 
is  the  way  to  praise  a  sponge;  nor  have  I  praised 
your  memory;  for  such  adulation  is  a  task  for 
a  hireling  sophist";  and  he  concluded  amid  the 
laughter  of  the  assembled  envoys  of  all  the  Greek 
States.  Then  ^Eschines  rose,  he  tells  us ;  and  after 
remarking  that  the  ambassadors  had  not  been  sent 
by  the  Athenians  to  defend  their  own  actions, 
but  had  been  chosen  on  account  of  their  personal 
character,  he  spoke  briefly  of  the  ratification  of 
the  treaty,  which  they  had  come  to  obtain,  and 
the  other  points  definitely  contained  in  their 
instructions;  and  then  passed  on  to  Philip's 
intended  march  to  Thermopylas.  He  begged 
Philip,  if  possible,  to  settle  the  questions  in  which 
the  Amphictyonic  powers  were  interested  not  by 
force  of  arms,  but  by  a  vote  of  the  Council,  after 
a  regular  trial  of  the  case ;  but  if  that  were  impos- 
sible (as  he  supposed  it  was,  since  Philip's  army 
was  assembled  and  ready  to  start),  he  begged  to 
put   before   Philip  certain  considerations  arising 


The  Second  Embassy  273 

out  of  the  constitution  of  the  Amphictyonic 
League,  and  the  oath  which  bound  its  members 
together.  This  oath  the  Thebans  had  transgressed 
in  destroying  the  Boeotian  cities;  and  although  it 
was  right  to  punish  the  sacrilege  committed  against 
the  temple  at  Delphi,  it  was  those  who  had  com- 
mitted it  that  should  be  punished,  and  not  their 
countries.  Finally,  he  called  upon  Philip  not  to 
ratify  by  force  the  wrong-doing  of  the  Thebans; 
and  warned  him,  if  he  supported  Thebes,  to  expect 
no  gratitude  from  her. 

It  is  not  very  difficult  to  gather  from  this  account 
what  policy  ^schines  and  Demosthenes  respec- 
tively had  in  view,  ^schines  seems  to  have  made 
an  honest  attempt  to  save  the  Phocians,  and  to 
turn  Philip's  forces  against  Thebes  by  a  recital 
of  the  misdeeds  of  the  Thebans  and  a  discussion 
of  constitutional  questions,  though  these  could 
hardly  be  expected  to  influence  Philip.  This  was 
certainly  the  policy  which  the  majority  of  the 
People  of  Athens  would  have  approved,  as  the 
debates  upon  the  Peace  had  shown ;  and  ^schines 
was  probably  right  in  his  interpretation  of  the 
rather  vague  instructions  given  to  the  ambassadors. 

Demosthenes  looked  somewhat  farther  ahead. 
He  saw  that  if  Philip  were  to  possess  himself  of 
the  Pass  of  Thermopylae,  and  so  to  obtain  the 
power  to  march  farther  southward,  when  he  chose, 
the  best  chance  of  averting  the  submission  of 
Athens  to  him  would  be  in  a  combination  between 
Athens  and  Thebes ;  and  he  did  not  want  to  cut  of! 


274  Demosthenes 

"all  hope  of  this  by  taking  a  line  hostile  to  Thebes 
at  Philip's  Court.  Accordingly  he  desired  to  con- 
fine the  action  of  the  ambassadors  to  the  receiving 
of  the  oaths  and  the  ransoming  of  the  captives. 
His  colleagues  were  probably  aware  of  his  object; 
but  the  prevailing  dislike  of  the  Thebans  was  so 
great  that  they  could  have  no  sympathy  with  him. 
"To  crown  all  his  faults,"  ^schines  declared,* 
"  he  is  a  pro-Theban. ' '  But  assuming — as  Demos- 
thenes assumed  and  his  colleagues  did  not — that 
the  Peace  was  to  be  only  an  armistice,  and  that 
the  war  against  Philip  was  to  be  renewed  so  soon 
as  Athens  was  in  a  condition  to  renew  it,  Demos- 
thenes' caution  was  probably  wise. 

PhiHp's  own  aim  was  doubtless  by  this  time 
tolerably  well-defined.  He  intended,  sooner  or 
later,  to  conquer  both  Thebes  and  Athens,  or  to 
make  satisfactory  terms  with  them,  but  he  was  in 
no  hurry,  and  for  the  time  it  was  quite  convenient 
to  him  to  support  Thebes,  and  so  keep  Athens 
powerless.  He  must  have  seen,  as  clearly  as  De- 
mosthenes saw,  that  the  one  thing  which  might 
thwart  him  would  be  an  alliance  between  Athens 
and  Thebes.  Besides  this,  his  prestige  would  suf- 
fer if  he  at  once  threw  over  the  Thebans,  with 
whom  he  was  supposed  to  be  on  friendly  terms. 
He  therefore  went  his  way  as  he  had  planned,  but 
played  with  the  envoys  of  the  various  States  until 
the  time  came  for  him  to  make  the  decisive  move ; 
and  there  is  no  reason  to  doubt  that  he  led  some 

» ^sch.,  de  F.  L.,  §  io6. 


The  Second  Embassy  275 

at  least  of  the  Athenians  (of  course  without  making 
any  official  intimation)  to  believe  that  he  really 
intended  to  march  against  Thebes,  just  as  he  led 
the  Spartans  to  believe  that  he  would  fulfil  their 
particular  wishes.  (So  certain  of  this  did  the 
Spartans  feel,  that  they  ventured  to  use  threaten- 
ing language  to  the  Thebans  present.')  He  may 
even  have  led  the  Phocians  themselves  to  hope 
for  his  favour.  ^ 

Philip  declared  his  acceptance  of  the  Peace  at 
Pella^;  and  the  ambassadors  remained  there  until 
he  was  ready  to  proceed  southwards.  They  then 
accompanied  him  and  his  army  as  far  as  Pherse; 
and  there  the  oaths  were  taken,  Demosthenes 
says,''  in  an  insulting  manner,  in  an  inn;  and  the 
ambassadors,  instead  of  visiting  Philip's  allies  in 
their  several  cities  and  administering  the  oath  to 
their  respective  magistrates,  were  content  to  re- 
ceive it  at  Pherae  from  the  persons  introduced  by 
Philip  as  the  representatives  of  his  allies.  Demos- 
thenes perhaps  exaggerates  the  importance  to 
Philip  of  preventing  the  Athenian  ambassadors 
from  making  a  tour  of  the  States  allied  to  himself; 
but  Philip  may  well  have  thought  that  they  might 
cause  mischief.  That  they  disobeyed  their  in- 
structions in  not  making  such  a  tour  seems  certain; 
but  they  probably  attached  little  importance  to 
the  manner  of  the  ratification,   so  long  as  the 

'  iEsch.,  de  F.  L.,  §  136.  '  Dem.,  Phil.  Ill,  §  11. 

3  Dem.,  de  Cor.,  §  32.     See  Note  i  at  the  end  of  the  Chapter. 
*  Dem.,  de  F.  L.,  §  158. 


276  Demosthenes 

ratification  itself  was  secured.  The  Phocians, 
the  people  of  Halus,  and  Cersobleptes  had  already 
been  tacitly  excluded  from  participation  in  the 
Peace,  and  it  is  probable  that  Philip  expressly 
declared,  before  taking  the  oath,  that  they  were 
not  covered  by  the  treaty  to  which  he  swore.  ^ 
The  representatives  of  Cardia  took  the  oath  among 
the  allies  of  Philip;  and  though  Demosthenes 
afterwards^  blamed  his  colleagues  for  permitting 
this,  he  was  not  justified  in  doing  so;  for  Cardia 
had  been  specially  excepted  from  the  towns 
in  the  Chersonese  given  up  to  Athens  by  Cer 
sobleptes,  and  had  made  alliance  with  Philip 
in  352. 

The  ambassadors  had  now  finished  their  work» 
and  had  only  to  make  their  report.  Demosthenes 
(who  had  already  tried  to  go  home  in  advance  of 
his  colleagues,  in  order  to  denounce  their  alleged 
misconduct,  and  had  chartered  a  vessel  for  the 
purpose,  but  had  been  prevented)  drew  up  a  draft- 
report,  which  his  colleagues  naturally  rejected. 
They  sent  instead  a  letter  drawn  up  by  themselves, 
announcing  the  accomplishment  of  their  mission.  ^ 
They  then  proceeded  homewards,  bearing  with 
them  a  letter  from  Philip,  which  Demosthenes 
afterwards  asserted  (no  doubt  falsely)  to  have 
been  composed  by  ^schines  at  a  private  interview 
with  Philip  on  the  river  Lydias  in  Macedonia, 

»  Dem.,  de  F.  L.,  §44. 

'  Ibid.,  §  174:  comp.  de  Pace,  §  25;  de  Chers.,  §  66. 

3  Dem.,  de  F.  L.,  §  174. 


The  Second  Embassy  277 

before  they  started  for  Pherae. '  At  the  same  time 
PhiHp  marched  towards  Thermopylae,  and  arrived 
there  before  the  ambassadors  reached  Athens. 
They  re-entered  the  city  on  the  13th  of  Sciropho- 
rion,  or  about  July  6th. 

The  ambassadors  had  now  to  meet  the  Council, 
the  Assembly,  and  the  Board  of  Auditors  or 
Logistae,  whose  approval  was  required  in  the  case 
of  every  public  official  on  the  termination  of  his 
office.  In  the  Council,  Demosthenes  immediately 
denoimced  his  colleagues  as  guilty  of  misconduct 
upon  the  embassy,  and  recounted  the  history  of 
the  negotiations  from  the  beginning.  Doubtless 
the  charges  which  he  made  against  them  in  the 
first  instance  were  based  on  their  delay  at  the 
outset,  their  failure  to  go  direct  to  Philip  in  Thrace, 
and  the  manner  in  which  they  had  allowed  Philip's 
allies  to  take  the  oath.  (He  can  hardly  at  this 
stage  have  charged  them,  as  he  did  afterwards, 
with  injuring  the  prospects  of  the  Phocians.) 
The  Council  were  convinced  by  his  statement, 
and  withheld  from  the  ambassadors  the  compli- 
ments which  were  almost  invariably  paid  to  such 
persons — the  vote  of  thanks,  and  the  invitation 
to  a  banquet  in  the  Prytaneum.  ^ 

Demosthenes  further  states  ^  that  he  entreated 

'  Dem.,  de  F.  L.,  §  36;  ^sch.,  de  F.  L.,  §  124.  The  gross  in- 
sinuations which  Demosthenes  (de  F.  L.,  §  175)  makes  against 
^schines,  who  left  Pherae  twenty-four  hours  later  than  his  col- 
leagues, are  doubtless  malicious  inventions. 

'  Dem.,  de  F.  L.,  §§  18,  31,  32.  i  Ibtd.,  §  18. 


278  Demosthenes 

the  Council  that  Proxenus,  who  was  still  lying 
with  his  squadron  off  the  north  coast  of  Euboea, 
should  be  instructed  to  go  to  Thermopylae,  and 
prevent  Philip  from  crossing  the  Pass.  This 
statement  it  is  very  difficult  to  believe;  it  may  well 
have  been  manufactured  after  the  overthrow  of 
the  Phocians,  when  he  was  very  anxious  that  the 
People  should  imagine  that  he  had  tried  his 
hardest  to  prevent  that  calamity,  and  that  his 
colleagues  had  deliberately  helped  Philip  to  ac- 
complish it.  It  is  most  improbable  that  he  wished 
to  break  the  Peace  at  once,  when  the  object  for 
which  he  had  desired  it  was  unachieved;  and  the 
interference  of  Proxenus  would  have  rendered 
the  prospect  of  the  alliance  with  Thebes,  for  which 
he  ultimately  hoped,  more  remote.  Nor  do  we 
hear  anything  about  the  bringing  of  such  a  proposal 
before  the  People. 

The  Assembly  met  on  the  i6th  of  Scirophorion 
(July  loth).  According  to  Demosthenes'  account 
of  the  proceedings,  ^schines  rose  without  waiting 
for  the  resolution  drafted  by  the  Coimcil  to  be 
read,  ^  and  announced  that  he  had  persuaded 
Philip  to  grant  all  the  desires  of  the  Athenians, 
and  that  there  was  no  occasion  for  the  alarm  which 

'  This  resolution  should  have  contained  the  proposal  about 
Proxenus,  had  any  such  been  made.  It  is  very  doubtful  whether 
.^schines  would  have  been  allowed  to  anticipate  the  promulga- 
tion of  a  resolution  of  the  Council;  and  probably  Demosthenes 
was  trying  to  account  for  the  fact  that  no  one  had  ever  heard  of 
his  proposal  about  Proxenus,  by  saying  that  -^schines  prevented 
them  from  doing  so  by  rising  first. 


II 


I 


The  Second  Embassy  279 

his  arrival  at  Thermopylae  had  occasioned;  for  if 
the  Athenians  would  only  wait  for  two  or  three 
days,  they  would  hear  that  Thebes  was  being 
besieged,  that  Thespiae  and  Plataeae  were  being 
restored,  and  that  the  money  due  to  the  temple 
of  Delphi  was  being  exacted,  not  from  the  Phocians, 
but  from  the  Thebans,  who  had  themselves  planned 
the  seizure  of  the  temple;  for  he  had  persuaded 
Philip,  he  said,  that  to  plan  such  a  deed  was  as 
impious  as  to  commit  it;  and  on  this  account  the 
Thebans  had  set  a  price  on  his  own  head.  He  also 
gave  the  Assembly  to  understand  that  Philip 
would  restore  Athens  to  her  old  position  in  Euboea 
— that  was  at  least  what  the  Euboeans  themselves 
expected — and  he  added  that  there  was  yet  an- 
other matter  which  he  had  arranged  with  Philip, 
but  he  did  not  wish  to  mention  it  yet,  since  even 
now  some  of  his  colleagues  were  jealous  of  him. 
This,  Demosthenes  says,  was  intended  as  a  hint 
at  the  restoration  of  Oropus  to  Athens.  Philip's 
letter  was  also  read  to  the  Assembly.  In  it 
Philip  explained  the  fact  that  the  ambassadors 
had  not  visited  his  allies  severally  by  saying  that 
he  had  himself  retained  them  to  help  him  effect 
a  reconciliation  between  the  two  hostile  Thes- 
salian  towns,  Pharsalus  and  Halus.  (Whether 
they  really  attempted  to  forward  such  a  reconcili- 
ation we  do  not  know.  In  any  case  Halus  cap- 
itulated to  Philip  not  long  afterwards,  and  the 
inhabitants  were  banished  or  enslaved.  ^  He 
I  Dem.,  de  F.  L.,  §§  36-39- 


28o  Demosthenes 

also  offered  to  do  anything  to  gratify  the  Athenians 
that  was  consistent  with  his  honour;  but  no  specific 
promises  were  mentioned.  This  last  fact  made 
Demosthenes  suspect  that  the  promises  made  by 
-^schines  were  not  genuine,  and  were  made  through 
the  mouth  of  ^^schines  in  order  that  no  one  might 
be  able  afterwards  to  accuse  Philip  himself  of 
breaking  his  word.  He  therefore  rose  and  denied 
all  knowledge  of  any  such  intention  on  Philip's 
part,  and  tried  to  give  his  reasons  for  disbelieving 
in  them ;  but  being  refused  a  hearing,  owing  to  the 
insulting  interruptions  of  ^schines  and  Philoc- 
rates,  and  the  unwillingness  of  the  People  to  dis- 
believe such  good  news,  he  contented  himself 
with  solemnly  asserting  his  own  disbelief  in  the 
promises,  and  disclaiming  all  credit,  if  they  should 
be  realised ;  while  Philocrates  remarked  insolently, 
"No  wonder  that  Demosthenes  and  I  cannot 
agree!  for  he  drinks  water  and  I  drink  wine";  at 
which  the  audience  laughed. 

Such  is  Demosthenes'  account  of  the  debate,^ 
and  ^schines'  attempt  ^  to  disprove  its  substantial 
truth  is  on  the  whole  unconvincing.  He  denies 
that  he  made  any  promises :  he  admits  that  he  had 
told  Philip  that  in  his  own  opinion  Thebes  ought 
to  be  a  part  of  Boeotia,  and  not  Boeotia  a  depend- 

'  Dem.,  de  F.  L.,  §§  19-26,  34-41,  44-46,  68,  102,  220;  de 
Cor.,  35.  Substantially  the  same  account  is  found  in  the  Speech 
on  the  Peace,  §§  9,  10,  delivered  very  soon  after  the  events  and 
therefore  more  reliable;  comp.  also  Phil.  II,  §§  29,  30. 

»^sch.,  de  F.  L.,  §§  1 19-123. 


The  Peace  of  Philocrates  281 

ency  of  Thebes;  and  this,  he  says,  was  the  only 
basis  for  Demosthenes'  description  of  his  speech. 
He  also  gives  a  slightly  different  version  of  the 
alleged  conversation  between  himself  and  the 
Euboean  representatives.  But  when  he  admits 
so  much,  we  can  hardly  fail  to  discern  that  he  and 
his  supporters  did  lead  the  Assembly  to  believe 
that  Philip  meant  no  ill  to  the  Phocians.  The 
result  of  the  debate  was  the  passing  of  a  decree 
proposed  by  Philocrates,  thanking  Philip  for  his 
promised  acts  of  justice,  extending  the  Peace  and 
alliance  with  Philip  to  posterity,  and  declaring 
that  if  the  Phocians  refused  to  surrender  the  temple 
of  Delphi  to  the  Amphictyons,  Athens  would  take 
steps  against  those  responsible  for  the  refusal.^ 
It  is  inconceivable  that  the  Assembly  should  have 
passed  this  resolution,  and  recommended  the  Pho- 
cians to  lay  down  their  arms,  had  they  thought 
that  the  Phocians  would  be  treated  as  they  after- 
wards were  treated.  Some  one  must  either  have 
caused  them  or  allowed  them  to  think  that  Philip 
would  act  generously  towards  them,  and  would  not 
give  way  to  the  wishes  of  the  Thebans.  ^schines 
stated  ^  at  his  trial  in  343  that  every  one  expected 
this,  since  no  one  believed  that  Philip  would  wish 
to  render  Thebes  more  powerful,  and  so  more 
dangerous  to  himself;  and  that  the  ambassadors 
received  the  same  impression  from  what  they  had 
seen  and  heard  in  Philip's  camp.     It  may  be  taken 

•  Dem.,  de  F.  L.,  §§  47,  48;  comp.  §§  55,  310. 
»^sch.,  de  F  L.,  §  136. 


282  Demosthenes 

as  certain,  therefore,  that  -^schines'  own  speech 
on  the  1 6th  of  Scirophorion  confidently  expressed 
that  view,  though  it  was  probably  expressed  with 
perfect  sincerity;  and  it  is  a  confirmation  of  this, 
that  in  345,  at  the  trial  of  Timarchus,  ^lEschines 
still  spoke  in  sanguine  terms  of  Philip's  promises 
to  Athens,  and  of  his  hope  of  their  fulfilment.  * 

Very  shortly  after  the  return  of  the  ambassadors 
from  the  Second  Embassy,  Philip  sent  two  letters, 
inviting  the  Athenians,  now  his  allies,  to  send  a 
force  to  join  his  own  army  at  Thermopylae,  and  to 
help  in  the  decision  of  the  questions  in  which  the 
Amphictyons  were  interested.  Now  this  was 
just  what,  if  ^schines'  account  of  Philip's  inten- 
tions was  correct,  Philip  might  have  been  expected 
to  do;  and  it  is  very  probable  that  he  desired  to 
have  an  Athenian  force  at  his  side,  to  counteract 
the  influence  of  the  Thebans  in  case  the  latter 
should  pursue  an  extreme  policy,  or  attempt  to 
aggrandise  themselves  to  an  inconvenient  extent, 
Moreover,  if  the  Phocians  were  to  be  helped  at  all, 
it  might  well  seem  that  the  Athenians  had  now  an 
opportunity  of  using  their  influence  to  help  them. 
The  invitation,  however,  was  declined,  on  the 
advice  of  Demosthenes  and  on  the  motion  of 
Hegesippus.  Different  reasons  are  given  for  the 
refusal.  On  the  one  hand,  the  fear  was  suggested 
by  the  anti-Macedonian  party  that  Philip  would 

» iEsch.,  in  Tim.,  §  169.     See  Note  2. 


4i 


, 


The  Peace  of  Philocrates  283 

keep  the  Athenian  soldiers  as  hostages^;  and  on 
the  other,  the  People  may  have  been  influenced, 
as  Demosthenes  asserts,^  by  the  idea  that  the 
invitation  showed  that  Philip  meant  no  harm  to 
the  Phocians,  and  that  therefore  no  action  was 
necessary — a  conclusion  which  they  were  always 
ready  to  adopt,  and  which  was  almost,  if  not  quite, 
as  much  to  Philip's  advantage  as  their  acceptance 
of  his  invitation  would  have  been.  Whether 
Demosthenes  really  feared  treachery  on  Philip's 
part,  or  whether  he  was  convinced  that  the  Phocian 
cause  was  hopeless,  and  desired  to  avoid  a  fruitless 
collision  with  Thebes,  there  is  no  direct  evidence 
to  show,  ^schines^  attributes  Demosthenes'  ac- 
tion expressly  to  his  leaning  towards  Thebes,  and 
he  is  very  likely  right. 

The  Assembly  had  appointed  ten  ambassadors 
to  convey  to  Philip  the  resolution  of  the  i6th  of 
Scirophorion.  Demosthenes  had  been  nominated 
as  one  of  the  ten,  but  in  spite  of  much  pressure, 
had  refused  to  serve,  and  had  entered  a  sworn 
excuse.''  ^schines  had  also  been  elected,  but 
either  declined  the  office,  or  else  failed  to  start  at 
the  same  time  as  his  colleagues,  on  account  of 
illness.  ^  But  when  the  ambassadors  had  travelled 
no  further  than  Chalcis  in  Euboea,  they  were  met 
with  the  news  that  Phalsecus  and  the  Phocian 
mercenary  army  had  surrendered  to  Philip  on  the 

^  Msch.,  de  F.  L.,  §137.  ="  Dem.,deF.  L.,§§5i,52. 

iMsch.,deF.L.,  §141.  ^Dem.,  de  F.  L.,  §  122. 

»  Note  3. 


284  Demosthenes 

23d  of  Scirophorion  (July  17th).  There  can  be 
little  doubt  that  treachery  had  been  at  work  here ; 
possibly  Phalagcus,  whose  dissensions  with  the 
rival  party  among  the  Phocians  have  already  been 
mentioned,  ^  had  had  an  understanding  with  Philip 
for  some  time ;  and  certainly  the  terms  of  surrender 
permitted  him  and  his  eight  thousand  mercenaries 
to  go  to  the  Peloponnese  unmolested,  and  thus 
left  the  Phocian  people  entirely  at  the  mercy  of 
Philip  and  his  Theban  and  Thessalian  allies ;  for  the 
Spartan  force,  which  had  marched  under  Archi- 
damus  to  help  them,  had  returned  home  when  they 
saw  the  position  of  affairs. 

/  Demosthenes  represents  the  surrender  of  the 
phocians  as  the  consequence  of  the  resolution  of 
Philocrates  which  the  Assembly  had  passed  on  the 
1 6th  of  Scirophorion,  and  therefore  lays  upon 
Philocrates  and  ^schines  the  whole  responsibility 
for  the  fate  of  the  Phocians.  His  argument, 
however,  plausible  as  it  is,  must  be  pronounced 
quite  imconvincing.  Nothing  could  have  saved 
the  Phocians.  Financial  exhaustion,  internal  divi- 
sion, and  treachery  were  the  cause  of  their  over- 
throw; and  it  is  extremely  doubtful  whether  their 
surrender  was  in  any  way  hastened  by  the  news 
of  the  debate  in  Athens,  or  by  the  impression  con- 
veyed by  the  speeches  of  ^schines  and  his  col- 
leagues, that  Philip  intended  to  deal  generously 
with  the  Phocians.  ^  ^schines  was  quite  justified 
in  replying  that  it  was  not  his  speeches,  but  the 

'  See  above,  p.  226.  » Note 4. 


The  Peace  of  Philocrates  285 

presence  of  Philip's  army,  that  brought  about  the 
capitulation ;  but  that  if  any  action  on  the  part  of 
Athens  had  aggravated  the  disaster,  it  was  the 
refusal  of  the  Athenians,  on  Demosthenes'  advice, 
to  join  Philip  and  use  their  influence  to  save  the 
Phocians. 

On  hearing  of  the  capitulation  of  Phalaecus,  the 
Athenian  ambassadors  at  once  returned  home. 
The  first  to  reach  Athens  was  Dercylus,  who  gave 
the  news  to  the  Assembly  during  a  meeting  which 
was  held  at  the  Peiraeus  in  reference  to  the  dock- 
yards, on  the  27th  of  Scirophorion  (July  21st). 
The  intelligence  w^as  received  with  the  utmost 
horror  and  alarm  by  the  People,  who  had  evidently 
been  relieved  of  all  apprehension  for  their  Phocian 
allies,  but  were  now  panic-stricken  lest  Philip 
should  intend  to  march  into  Attica  itself.  On  the 
motion  of  Callisthenes,  the  Assembly  resolved  to 
bring  in  the  women  and  children  and  movable 
property  from  the  country,  to  strengthen  the 
frontier  garrisons,  to  fortify  the  Peiraeus,  and  to 
hold  the  rural  festival  of  Heracles  within  the  city 
walls.  They  also  instructed  the  ambassadors  to 
depart  once  more  for  Philip's  camp,  and  to  do  what 
they  could  to  ameliorate  the  situation,  ^schines 
now  went  with  his  colleagues,  and  found  Philip 
engaged,  along  with  the  Thebans,  in  celebrating 
the  success  of  his  plans  with  high  festivities,  in 
which  (according  to  Demosthenes')  they  heartily 
joined.     It  was  not,  in  fact,  a  time  to  make  a  de- 

'Dem.,  de  F.  L.,  §§  128-130. 


286  •     Demosthenes 

monstration  of  hostility  to  Philip  by  refusing  his 
hospitality,  and  ^schines  probably  acted  with 
tact,  though  by  doing  so  he  gave  an  opportunity 
to  his  enemies  to  misrepresent  his  motives.  ^ 

Philip  naturally  made  his  mastery  of  the  Phocian 
territory  complete,  garrisoning  those  towns  which 
surrendered  to  him,  and  storming  and  destroying 
those  which  did  not.  At  the  same  time,  he  sent 
a  letter  to  Athens,  announcing  what  he  had  done, 
and  expressing  his  astonishment  at  the  hostile 
attitude  which  the  People  had  adopted,  seeing 
that  the  Phocians  were  not  included  in  the  Peace. ' 
He  next  summoned  the  Amphictyonic  Coimcil, 
as  ^schines  had  previously  urged  him  to  do.^ 
The  representatives  of  the  Boeotians  and  the 
Thessalian  tribes  were  doubtless  in  a  majority, 
the  Thessalians  having  of  course  recovered  their 
Amphictyonic  rights,  of  which  the  Phocians  had 
deprived  them.  The  (Etasans  proposed  that  all 
the  adult  males  of  the  Phocians  should  be  executed 
as  guilty  of  sacrilege.  Such  savagery  as  this  was 
not  approved  by  the  Council ;  but  it  was  decided 
that  the  Phocian  towns  should  be  destroyed  and 
the  inhabitants  settled  in  hamlets  of  not  more  than 

'  Demosthenes'  argument  {de  F.  L.,  §§  126,  127)  that  it  was 
remarkable  that  ^schines  should  go  to  the  Theban  camp,  if  the 
Thebans  had  set  a  price  on  his  head,  is  also  misleading;  for,  as 
an  ambassador,  he  would  be  safe  in  any  case. 

2 The  "Letter  of  Philip"  cited  in  Dem.,  de  Cor.,  §  39,  is  prob- 
ably not  genuine;  and  Grote  appears  to  be  right  in  thinking  that 
the  real  letter  must  have  been  more  conciliatory  in  tone. 

3  See  above,  p.  272. 


The  Peace  of  Philocrates  287 

fifty  houses  each — the  hamlets  to  be  at  least  two 
hundred  yards  apart;  that  the  Phocians  should 
be  permitted  to  own  the  land,  but  should  repay  to 
the  temple,  by  annual  instalments  of  sixty  talents, 
the  value  of  the  stolen  treasure,  and  should  not 
be  allowed  to  possess  horses  or  arms  until  the 
repayment  had  been  completed;  and  that  those 
who  had  fled  should  be  liable  to  arrest  anywhere, 
as  being  under  a  curse  for  their  sacrilege.^  The 
destruction  of  the  towns  was  carried  out  by  the 
Thebans,  and  the  country  was  garrisoned  with 
Macedonian  troops.  ^ 

^schines  claims  to  have  saved  the  Phocians 
from  a  worse  fate  by  his  efforts  at  the  meeting,  ^ 
and  in  fact,  when  the  customs  of  Greek  warfare 
are  considered,  it  is  doubtful  whether  they  were 
harshly  dealt  with.  The  wholesale  enslavement 
and  the  executions  which  generally  followed  a 
capitiilation  were  conspicuously  absent;  and  the 
life  in  villages,  and  those  very  near  to  one  another,  '• 
was  no  serious  hardship  to  an  agricultural  people. 
No  doubt  the  condition  to  which  they  were  reduced 
was  painful  enough.  The  Thebans  probably  went 
beyond  the  letter  of  the  sentence,  or  at  least  spared 
no  cruelty  in  carrying  it  out  5;  and  most  of  those  of 
the  inhabitants  who  had  the  courage  or  the  means 
withdrew  into  exile,  in  preference  to  submitting 

^  Diod.,  XVI,  ix.  '  Dem.,  de  F.  L.,  §  8i. 

J^sch.,  de  F.  L.,  §§  142,  143. 

*  Not,  of  course,  near  enough  for  the  formation  of  large  strong- 
holds by  uniting  the  villages.  5  Justin,  VIII,  v. 


288  Demosth  enes 

to  the  new  conditions.'  The  pathetic  picture 
which  Demosthenes  afterwards  drew  of  the  state 
of  Phocis  may  not  be  greatly  exaggerated. 

Men  of  Athens  [he  says*],  the  horror  and  the  im- 
mensity of  this  calamity  have  never  been  surpassed 
in  our  day  in  the  Hellenic  world,  nor  even,  I  believe, 
in  the  time  before  us.  .  .  .  The  nature  of  the  ruin 
which  the  unhappy  Phocians  have  suffered  may  be 
seen,  not  only  from  these  decrees,  but  also  from  the 
actual  results  of  the  action  taken;  and  an  awful  and 
piteous  sight  it  is,  men  of  Athens.  For  when  recently 
we  were  on  our  way  to  Delphi,  we  could  not  help 
seeing  it  all — houses  razed  to  the  ground,  cities 
stripped  of  their  walls,  the  land  destitute  of  men  in 
their  prime — only  a  few  poor  women  and  children  left, 
and  some  old  men  in  misery.  Indeed  no  words  can 
describe  the  distress  now  prevailing  there. 

But  it  is  doubtful  whether,  according  to  Greek 
ideas,  the  guilt  of  sacrilege  was  not  lightly 
atoned  for.  For  Orchomenus  and  Coroneia,  the 
Boeotian  cities  which  had  helped  the  Phocians, 
there  was  no  mercy.  These  the  Thebans  destroyed 
utterly,  and  sold  the  inhabitants  as  slaves;  and 
the  supremacy  of  Thebes  over  Bceotia  was  once 
more  complete. 

The  Amphictyonic  Council  transferred  to  Philip 
the  two  votes  which  the  Phocians  had  possessed 
at  their  meetings ;  and  in  order  to  punish  the  States 
which  had  given  or  promised  assistance   to  the 

'  Dem.,  de  F.  L.,  §  80.  ^  lUd.,  §§  64, 65. 


The  Peace  of  Philocrates  289 

Phocians,  the  Council  took  from  Athens  the  right 
to  precedence  in  consulting  the  oracle,  which  they 
had  hitherto  enjoyed,  and  gave  this  also  to  Philip. 
The  Spartans  were  forbidden  to  enter  the  temple 
at  all.  Finally,  it  was  resolved  that  Philip  should 
preside  over  the  Pythian  games  at  Delphi  in  Sep- 
tember, 346. 

The  news  of  these  decrees  of  the  Council  was 
received  at  Athens  with  great  indignation,  and 
was  followed  by  a  strong  revulsion  of  feeling 
against  the  Peace  and  its  advocates.  Both  Sparta 
and  Athens  refused  to  send  their  usual  official 
deputations  to  attend  the  Pythian  games,  though 
-^schines  appears  to  have  been  present  as  Philip's 
guest.  *  This  omission  the  Amphictyonic  Council- 
lors were  not  disposed  to  pass  over,  and  they  sent 
an  embassy  to  Athens,  bearing  a  letter  from  Philip, 
and  demanding  that  the  Athenians  should  recognise 
him  as  an  Amphictyonic  Power  in  place  of  the 
Phocians.  ^Eschines  supported  the  request,  plead- 
ing that  Philip's  action  had  been  dictated  by  the 
Thebans  and  Thessalians,  in  whose  hands  he  had 
been.*  But  so  strong  was  the  feeling  against  him 
and  against  Philip,  that  the  Assembly  would  not 
hear  him;  and  so,  says  Demosthenes,  "he  stepped 
down  from  the  platform,  and  showing  off  before 
the  envoys  who  had  come  from  Philip,  told  them 
that  there  were  plenty  of  men  who  made  a  clamour, 
but  few  who  took  the  field  when  it  was  required 
of  them." 

•Dem.,<ieF,L.,  §128.      »  Dem.,de  Pace,  §22;  Phil.  II,  §  14. 


290  Demosthenes 

It  would,  however,  have  been  the  height  of  folly 
to  have  brought  down  upon  Athens  at  this  moment 
the  united  strength  of  Philip  and  the  Thebans  and 
Thessalians ;  and  Demosthenes  himself  intervened 
to  prevent  this,  and  for  this  ptupose  delivered  the 
Speech  on  the  Peace,  which  has  come  down  to  us. 
Athens  therefore  gave  the  required  recognition, 
and  the  Peace  remained  for  the  time  undisturbed. 

The  result  of  the  events  of  the  two  years  between 
the  autumn  of  348  and  that  of  346  was  that  Philip 
had  gained  all  that  he  had  set  out  to  gain,  with  no 
loss  to  himself,  by  the  skilful  handling  of  men  and 
circumstances.  He  had  secured  a  foothold  to 
the  south  of  Thermopylce;  his  soldiers  or  allies 
held  the  Pass  and  the  neighbouring  town  of  Nicaea. 
(Nicaea  itself  was  committed  to  the  Thessalians, 
and  they  were  also  given  control  of  Magnesia.) 
Phocis  was  held  by  Macedonian  garrisons;  and  if 
he  desired  to  march  farther  south  there  was  nothing 
to  hinder  him.  His  recognition  as  an  Amphicty- 
onic  Power  had  given  him  a  definite  position  as 
the  head  of  a  Hellenic  State,  and  the  part  which  he 
had  played  as  the  champion  of  the  god  was  one 
which  brought  with  it  a  certain  prestige. 

Just  after  the  Peace  had  been  concluded  at 
Athens  in  April,  and  before  the  surrender  of  the 
Phocians  in  July,  the  aged  Isocrates  addressed  a 
letter  to  Philip,  urging  him  to  put  himself  at  the 
head  of  the  forces  of  the  Greek  States  and  lead 
a  great  expedition  to  the  conquest  of  the  East. 


The  Peace  of  Philocrates  291 

This  union  in  a  great  enterprise,  the  old  man 
argued,  would  heal  the  discords  of  the  States  with 
one  another,  and  would  enable  them  to  rid  them- 
selves of  the  mercenary  armies  which  were  the 
curse  of  the  time;  for  when  the  conquest  of  Asia 
was  accomplished,  the  mercenaries  could  be  settled 
in  cities  to  be  planted  in  these  new  dominions. 
In  spite  of  the  garrulity,  the  almost  pathetic  self- 
consciousness,  and  the  want  of  all  sense  of  pro- 
portion which  the  letter  displays,  there  was 
something  prophetic  in  the  aged  writer's  advice. 
Philip  may  indeed  have  already  conceived  the 
great  design  which  Alexander  was  destined  to 
carry  out;  but  it  is  at  least  possible  that  it  was 
first  suggested  by  Isocrates ;  though  his  fancy  that 
the  Greek  States  would  take  part  in  it  voluntarily, 
before  they  were  decisively  conquered,  and  that 
their  discords  would  vanish  in  the  enthusiasm  of 
a  worthy  common  aim,  was  sadly  out  of  date, 
and  was  never  destined  to  be  realised.  Even  if 
Philip  was  not  inspired  by  Isocrates,  the  writings 
of  Isocrates  were  widely  read,  and  may  have 
prepared  men's  minds  for  the  announcement  of 
the  great  design  when  the  time  came.  Philip, 
however,  was  not  yet  ready.  He  at  least  had  no 
misunderstanding  as  to  the  temper  of  the  Greek 
States;  and  the  hill-tribes  on  the  northern  and 
western  frontiers  of  Macedonia  claimed  his 
attention.  In  the  meantime  he  could  feel  toler- 
ably secure  against  the  fear  of  any  hostile  move- 
ment south  of  Thermopylas. 


292  Demosthenes 

The  pOvSition  of  Athens  was  a  far  less  enviable 
one  than  that  of  Philip.  It  was  long  before  the 
People  recovered  from  their  remorse  at  the  fate 
of  their  allies,  the  Phocians,  for  whose  preserva- 
tion they  had  done  nothing;  and  Demosthenes 
took  full  advantage  of  this  feeling  to  renew  by 
degrees  a  more  active  hostility  to  Philip,  whom  he 
regarded  with  implacable  determination  as  the 
enemy  of  his  country's  freedom. 

The  question  of  the  responsibility  of  the  several 
Athenian  statesmen  for  the  events  of  the  years 
348  to  346  is  a  very  vexed  one.  But  if  the  view 
which  we  have  so  far  taken  is  correct,  Demosthenes 
deserves  no  serious  blame,  however  unattractive 
his  behaviour  on  certain  occasions  may  have 
been.  He  had  plainly  worked  for  the  Peace  from 
the  time  of  the  fall  of  Olynthus,  imtil  the  Athenians 
swore  to  the  treaty.  But  regarding  the  Peace 
simply  as  a  breathing-space,  to  be  spent  in  prepara- 
tion for  war,  he  had  been  anxious  that  the  alliance 
\  with  Philip  should  not  be  given  too  intimate  or 
too  permanent  a  character;  and  he  had  therefore 
strongly  opposed  Philocrates'  motion  to  extend 
it  to  posterity,  and  he  had  attempted  to  secure 
the  repulse  of  any  friendly  overtures  which  Philip 
made.  Above  all,  he  had  looked  forward  to  the 
I  future,  and  saw  that  the  day  would  come  when  the 
I  Thebans  might  be  ready  and  even  glad  to  make 
\ alliance  with  Athens;  and  that  whenever  hostili- 
ties with  Philip  were  renewed,  the  prime  need  of 


The  Peace  of  Philocrates  293 

Athens,  herself  a  sea-power,  would  be  that  of  a 
land  army  to  co-operate  with  her.  For  this  he 
could  not  look  to  Sparta,  though  Athens  was  on 
friendly  terms  with  the  Spartans.  For  not  only 
was  the  day  of  the  greatness  of  Sparta  over,  but  the 
freedom  of  action  of  the  Spartans  would  always  be 
held  in  check  by  the  other  Peloponnesian  peoples. 
He  could  look  only  to  Thebes.  And  so,  although 
it  was  impossible,  in  the  existing  state  of  feeling 
in  Athens,  to  advocate  this  policy  openly,  he  had 
opposed  every  step  which  might  deepen  the  enmity 
between  the  Athenians  and  the  Thebans;  and  had 
taken  little  or  no  part  (so  far  as  we  can  gather)  in 
advocating  the  sending  of  assistance  to  the  Pho- 
cians,  although  when  their  ruin  was  accomplished, 
he  made  it  his  main  argument  in  his  attacks  upon 
his  opponents — sl  proceeding  which  it  is  impossible 
to  view  without  a  certain  disgust,  and  which  can 
only  be  justified  in  a  very  slight  degree  by  the 
patriotic  ideal,  the  realisation  of  which  he  hoped 
to  advance  by  such  unhappy  means. 

But  what  is  to  be  said  of  the  part  played  by 
Philocrates  and  ^Eschines?  Were  they,  as  Demos- 
thenes urged,  the  corrupt  hirelings  of  Philip,work- 
ing  deliberately  against  what  they  knew  to  be  the 
interest  of  their  country?  It  is  very  difficult  to 
prove  this.  With  regard  to  the  making  of  the 
Peace  in  the  first  instance,  there  need  be  no  ques- 
tion that  they  acted  in  perfect  good  faith;  and 
-^schines'  change  of  mind  between  the  two  debates 
on  the  1 8th  and  19th  of  Elaphebolion — the  time 


294  Demosthenes 

from  which  many  writers  are  inclined  to  date 
his  corruption  by  Philip's  envoys — was  probably 
made  with  perfect  honesty,  when  he  found  that 
Philip  was  prepared  to  allow  the  Athenians  less 
latitude  than  they  had  hoped.  The  delay  of  the 
ambassadors  in  carrying  out  some  of  their  instruc- 
tions and  their  failure  to  fulfil  others  to  the  letter 
must  be  admitted  to  have  been  grave  faults  in  men 
placed  in  such  a  position  of  reponsibility.  Yet  it 
is  extremely  doubtful  whether  these  faiilts  had  in 
fact  any  very  serious  consequences.  It  is  very 
uncertain  whether  the  ambassadors  could  have 
succeeded  in  preventing  Philip  from  making  good 
his  conquests  in  Thrace;  and  even  more  uncertain 
whether  any  injury — beyond,  at  most,  a  trifling 
loss  of  prestige — was  inflicted  on  Athens  by  the 
manner  in  which  Philip's  allies  took  their  oath. 

The  most  serious  question  was  whether  it  was 
their  doing  that  Philip  was  able  to  pass  through 
Thermopylae  unopposed,  and  whether  the  doom 
of  the  Phocians  had  been  brought  upon  them  owing 
to  the  predictions  which  ^schines  made  to  the 
Assembly  in  Athens:  and  the  more  carefully  the 
facts  are  considered,  the  more  certain  it  appears 
that  it  was  not  their  doing.  Nothing  could,  under 
the  circumstances,  have  prevented  the  surrender 
of  the  Phocians ;  it  is  more  than  doubtful  whether 
it  was  hastened  by  a  single  day  owing  to  the 
decision  of  the  Athenian  Assembly;  and  if  an 
Athenian  contributed  at  all  to  the  mitigation  of 
their  calamity,  it  was  -^schines. 


The  Peace  of  Philocrates  295 

The  strength  of  Demosthenes'  charges  against 
^schines  lay  in  the  fact  that  ^schines'  predic- 
tions had  proved  false.  Was  that  ^schines' 
fault?  Should  he  have  realised  beforehand  that 
no  reliance  was  to  be  placed  upon  the  rumours 
which  Philip  had  caused  to  be  disseminated  about 
the  camp,  or  even  upon  the  promises  made  by 
Philip  himself?  It  was  in  his  failure  to  realise 
this  that  his  true  weakness  probably  came  out; 
and  it  is  because,  in  spite  of  all  that  he  should  have 
learned  from  the  conduct  of  Philip  towards  Athens 
in  the  matter  of  Amphipolis  and  Pydna,  he  was 
not  on  his  guard,  but  was  carried  off  his  feet  by 
the  attitude  of  apparent  friendliness  and  generosity 
which  Philip  adopted  towards  Athens,  and  also 
(it  must  probably  be  added)  by  the  unconscious 
influence  of  Philip's  lavish  generosity  towards 
himself  and  his  colleagues,  that  he  forfeits  the 
claim  to  the  highest  character  as  a  statesman. 
That  he  was  definitely  bribed  to  perform  particular 
services  and  to  deceive  the  People,  in  the  manner 
alleged  by  Demosthenes,  there  is  nothing  to  show. 
That  he,  and  Philocrates  to  an  even  greater  extent, 
benefited  by  Philip's  munificence,  and  were  influ- 
enced in  their  judgment  of  him  accordingly,  seems 
certain ;  and  owing  to  this,  they  led  the  Athenians 
to  believe  much  that  was  never  destined  to  be 
realised.  And  although  these  promises  and  pre- 
dictions were  in  all  probability  not  the  cause  of 
the  Phocian  disaster,  Demosthenes  was  right  when 
he  declared  that  all  receipt  of  presents  by  an  am- 


296  Demosthenes 

bassador  was  criminal,  and  that  when  once  there 
was  money  in  one  scale  of  the  balance,  it  would 
always  outweigh  the  reason  in  the  other. 

There  is  one  other  possible  explanation  of  -^s- 
chines'  conduct,  though  it  seems  a  less  probable 
one.  It  may  be  that  he  did  not  in  fact  place  great 
reliance  on  the  predictions  which  he  made;  but 
that  he  believed  nevertheless  that  it  was  of  vital 
importance  to  Athens  that  a  lasting  alliance  with 
Philip  should  be  made,  and  therefore  thought 
himself  justified  in  using  these  predictions  and 
the  promises  contained  in  Philip's  letter  to  gain 
that  end,  taking  the  risk  of  their  being  falsified. 
But  this  also,  though  it  might  be  defended  by  a 
casuist,  would  not  be  a  wise  or  proper  course  for 
a  statesman. 

Demosthenes  certainly  supposed  that  the  con- 
duct of  yEschines  was  corrupt  and  traitorous 
throughout.  His  subsequent  friendly  relations 
with  Philip,  maintained  in  spite  of  the  failure  of 
his  predictions,  were,  Demosthenes  thought,  a 
proof  of  this.^  We  know  little  of  these  friendly 
relations,  apart  from  the  fact  that  ^schines  went 
to  Philip's  camp  after  the  surrender  of  Phalaecus, 
and  remained  with  him  until  after  the  Amphicty- 
onic  meeting  and  perhaps  imtil  after  the  Pythian 
games.  But  there  is  no  reason  to  doubt  that  at 
this  time  he  was  exerting  his  influence,  as  a  friend 
of  Philip,  on  behalf  of  the  unhappy  Phocians;  and 
the  statements,  which  Demosthenes  often  makes, 

I  Dem.,  de  F.  L.,  §§  102  ff. 


The  Peace  of  Philocrates  297 

that  ^schines  shared  Philip's  joy  at  the  success 
of  his  deception,  instead  of  sharing  the  disappoint- 
ment of  the  Athenians,  rest  on  no  evidence  but 
Demosthenes'  word,  which  in  such  a  case  is  un- 
fortunately worth  nothing.  Even  if  ^Eschines' 
friendship  with  Philip  was  as  great  as  Demosthenes 
alleged,  it  would  still  have  to  be  remembered  that 
Philip  was  the  accepted  ally  of  Athens,  that 
iEschines  and  his  party  believed  the  alliance  to 
be  the  best  thing  for  Athens  as  well  as  for  Philip, 
that  it  was  to  be  a  permanent  alliance,  and  that 
Philip's  action  in  regard  to  the  Phocians  was  no 
wrong  to  Athens  under  the  terms  of  the  treaty; 
and  so  it  could  hardly  be  a  crime  to  be  Philip's 
friend. 

Our  conclusion,  therefore,  is  that  ^schines  de- 
ceived the  People,  only  because  he  was  himself 
deluded;  that  for  his  own  delusion  he  was  doubt- 
less to  blame;  but  that  the  consequences  of  the 
delusion  and  the  deception  were  not  in  fact  so 
serious  as  Demosthenes  represented.  Indeed  the 
Athenians  were  perhaps  prevented  by  them  from 
going  to  war  with  Philip,  when  they  were  not  well 
prepared  to  do  so,  in  a  fit  of  alarm  at  his  arrival 
at  Thermopylae:  and  their  worst  result  was  the 
cruel  disappointment  of  the  People  at  their  non- 
fulfilment — a  disappointment  the  consequences  of 
which  were  to  no  one  more  serious  than  to  Phi- 
locrates and  ^schines  themselves. 

For  the  rest,  we  have  before  us  here,  as  in  the 
rest  of  this  history,  two  irreconcilably  different 


298  Demosthenes 

ideals  of  national  policy.  Demosthenes  is  filled 
with  the  passion  for  national  freedom.  ^Eschines 
and  his  party  aim  at  a  soHd  and  lasting  peace. 
Both  ideals  are  defensible;  and  it  was  not  yet 
certain  that  the  former,  any  more  than  the  latter, 
was  impracticable.  According  as  the  one  or  the 
other  appeals  to  us  most  strongly,  we  shall  side 
with  Demosthenes  or  ^schines ;  for,  as  has  already 
been  stated,  it  is  upon  the  temperament  of  the 
critic  rather  than  upon  argument  that  the  decision 
will  depend.  In  the  following  chapters  we  shall 
trace  the  gradual  rise  of  Demosthenes  to  a  position 
in  which  he  became  as  powerful  as  if  he  had  been 
formally  elected  Prime  Minister.  His  ascendancy 
was  not  attained  all  at  once,  and  he  had  to  suifer 
more  than  one  rebuff;  but  in  the  end  he  succeeded 
in  causing  the  People  to  realise  that  his  ideal  for 
Athens  was  also  their  own,  and  to  face  a  decisive 
struggle  in  the  cause  of  freedom. 

NOTES  TO  CHAPTER  VIII 

I.  It  is  disputed  whether  Philip  actually  took  the  oath  at 
Pella  or  at  Pherae.  Demosthenes,  de  Cor.,  §32,  only  says  that 
w/«)X67i;<re  ttiv  dpi)vi)v  (which  might  signify  an  informal  declara- 
tion of  acceptance) — and  his  expression  in  the  de  F.  L.,  §  44, 
Toiii  6pKovs  f/JxWev  dfivipat,  if  taken  literally,  implies  that 
Philip,  like  the  allies,  took  the  oath  at  Pherae.  But  Demos- 
thenes, de  Cor.,  §  32,  certainly  means  it  to  be  understood  that 
Philip  had  sworn  to  the  Peace  in  Macedonia;  otherwise  he  could 
have  no  ground  for  saying  that  the  ambassadors  ought  to  have 
left  Philip,  instead  of  accompanying  his  march  southward.  (He 
adds  that  they  were  bribed  to  remain  with  Philip.)  Demosthe- 
nes may  however  be  misrepresenting  the  facts;  and  the  am- 


The  Peace  of  Philocrates  299 

bassadors  may  really  have  remained  at  Philip's  side  because  they 
could  not  get  him  to  take  the  oath  till  he  reached  Pherae. 

2.  The  passage  (^sch.,  de  F.  L.,  §  121)  which  some  have 
interpreted  as  an  assertion  by  ^schines  that  Demosthenes  him- 
self expressed  his  commendation  of  ^schines'  address  to  Philip 
on  the  Phocian  question,  is  seen,  when  properly  interpreted,  to 
record  only  a  sarcastic  reply  to  ^schines  (Schafer,  ii.,  269  n.; 
Goodwin's  edition  of  the  de  Corona,  p.  262).  Rohrmoser  (Ueber 
den  philokrateischen  Frieden,  p.  809)  tries  to  save  ^schines' 
credit  by  supposing  that  the  promises  of  Philip  were  only  made  on 
condition  that  the  Athenians  joined  Philip's  forces  and  helped 
him  to  settle  the  Phocian  difficulty;  but  there  is  really  no 
evidence  of  this. 

3.  Demosthenes'  suggestion  that  i5)schines  stayed  behind  in 
order  to  counteract  any  possible  change  of  feeling  on  the  part 
of  the  People  during  his  colleagues'  absence  is  probably  quite 
groundless.  Demosthenes  further  states  that  .(Eschines  entered 
a  sworn  excuse,  and  sent  his  brother,  with  a  physician  to  testify 
to  his  illness.  To  this  ^Eschines  replies  (probably  without  truth) 
that  the  laws  did  not  allow  any  one  to  decline  an  office  to  which  he 
had  been  elected;  and  that  he  had  only  sent  his  brother  to  apolo- 
gise for  his  failure  to  set  out  with  his  colleagues. 

4.  Demosthenes'  argument  in  the  de  F.  L.,  §  123,  that  Philip 
could  not  have  remained  at  Thermopylje  or  in  Phocis,  if  the 
Athenians  had  not  abstained  from  helping  the  Phocians  and  so 
left  them  powerless  to  resist,  is  at  first  sight  plausible.  "It  was 
absolutely  impossible  for  Philip  to  stay  where  he  was,  unless  you 
were  misled.  There  was  no  com  in  the  country,  for,  owing  to  the 
war,  the  land  had  not  been  sown,  and  to  import  com  was  im- 
possible so  long  as  your  ships  were  in  command  of  the  sea;  while 
the  Phocian  towns  were  many  in  number,  and  difficult  to  take 
except  by  a  prolonged  siege.  Even  assuming  that  he  were  taking 
a  town  a  day,  there  are  two  and  twenty  of  them."  But  the 
argument  depends  on  the  assumption  that  Phalsecus  would  not 
have  surrendered  anyhow — an  assumption  not  likely,  when  we 
consider  that  he  had  no  money,  that  the  Phocians  were  divided, 
and  that  he  probably  had  an  understanding  with  Philip.  (Philip 
would  otherwise  hardly  have  given  him  such  easy  terms.)  Nor  is 
it  likely  that  Philip's  commissariat  was  so  imperfectly  organised 
as  Demosthenes  implies;  and  we  do  not  know  what  powers  of 


300  Demosthenes 

resistance  the  Phocians  could  have  offered  without  Phatecus  and 
his  troops.  Further,  the  calculation  of  dates  by  which  Demos- 
thenes {de  F.  L.,  §§  52-61)  tries  to  prove  that  the  debate  in 
Athens  was  the  cause  of  Phalaecus'  surrender,  is  highly  ingenious; 
but  it  is  no  proof. 


CHAPTER  IX 

THE  NOMINAL  PEACE  AND  THE  RENEWAL  OF 
THE  WAR 

IN  spite  of  the  adverse  judgment  passed  by  the 
Council,  ^schines  had  succeeded  in  persuading 
the  Assembly  to  accept  the  motion  of  Philocrates, 
and  to  refuse  to  listen  to  Demosthenes'  version  of 
the  proceedings  of  the  embassy.  There  remained 
a  third  ordeal  which  he  must  face,  before  he  could 
feel  himself  to  be  out  of  danger.  The  returning 
ambassadors  had  to  undergo  a  scrutiny  by  the 
Board  of  Auditors  or  Logistas;  and  any  citizen 
could  give  notice  that  he  intended  to  prosecute  an 
official  under  an  audit  for  misconduct  in  his  office. 
Then  the  case  must  be  tried  by  a  jury,  over  which 
the  Logistae  presided.  If  Demosthenes '  statement  * 
is  true,  ^schines  made  an  attempt  to  evade  this 
scrutiny;  and  Demosthenes  alleged  that  he  did 
so  through  consciousness  of  guilt,  though  his 
motive,  when  we  consider  the  state  of  popular 
feeling  immediately  after  the  surrender  of  the 
Phocians,  may  well  have  been  nothing  worse  than 
consciousness  of  danger.     The  attempt,  however, 

'Dem.,dcF.L.,§§2iiff, 

301 


302  Demosthenes 

failed,  and  when  ^schines  appeared  before  the 
Board,  Demosthenes  gave  notice  of  his  intention 
to  prosecute  him. 

Demosthenes  was  supported  by  Timarchus,  who 
had  been,  Hke  himself,  a  councillor  in  the  year 
347-6,  and  had  taken  a  somewhat  active  part  in 
promoting  the  repair  of  the  fortifications.  ^  Tim- 
archus had  also  proposed  to  the  Council  a  measure 
forbidding  any  Athenian,  on  pain  of  death,  to 
supply  arms  or  fittings  for  ships  of  war  to  Philip.' 
But  unfortunately  Timarchus  had  in  his  youth 
been  notorious  for  his  gross  immorality,  and  this 
gave  ^schines  an  opportunity  for  delaying  the 
attack  upon  himself  and  weakening  its  force.  He 
prosecuted  Timarchus  himself  for  the  sins  of  his 
past  life,  and  demanded  that  he  should  be  dis- 
franchised as  the  law  commanded.  Despite  the 
fact  that  Timarchus  had  filled  many  important 
offices,  and  that  the  offences  alleged  against  him 
had  been  committed  many  years  before,  the  record 
against  him  was  too  clear  to  be  ignored;  Demos- 
thenes did  not  even  venture  to  speak  in  his  defence; 
and  he  was  condemned  and  lost  his  citizenship. 
Some  discredit  was  doubtless  reflected  upon 
Demosthenes  owing  to  his  association  with  Tim- 
archus, and  he  waited  for  this  to  pass  off  be- 
fore proceeding  further  with  the  prosecution  of 
.^schines.  ^ 

'  ^sch,,t»  Tim.,  §  80.  »  Dem.,  de  F.  L.,  §  28. 

3  In  the  course  of  that  prosecution,  he  replied,  with  very  strong 
feeling,  to  part  of  ^schines'  speech  against  Timarchus. 


Nominal  Peace  and  Renewal  of  War     303 

The  trial  of  Timarchus  probably  took  place 
eariy  in  345.  During  that  year,  while  the  Athen- 
ians were  actively  restoring  their  fortifications 
and  dockyards  and  rehabiHtating  the  fleet,  ^  Philip 
was  busily  engaged  upon  the  internal  organisation 
of  Macedonia.  As  a  security  against  the  less 
settled  tribes  upon  his  frontiers,  he  planted  colonies 
among  them,  which  he  supplied  partly  by  the 
transplantation  of  some  of  his  Macedonian  subjects 
— not  without  some  hardships  to  them,^ — and 
partly,  in  all  probabiUty,  by  the  transference  to 
those  districts  of  the  inhabitants  of  the  Greek 
towns  which  he  had  conquered  in  Thrace  and 
Chalcidice.  ^  This  policy  had  probably  the  double 
effect  of  introducing  a  civilising  influence  where 
it  was  much  needed,  and  of  breaking  down,  by 
the  transference  of  inhabitants  from  place  to  place, 
the  local  subdivision  of  his  kingdom,  and  so  prepar- 
ing his  subjects  for  a  more  truly  national  unity." 
At  the  same  time  he  probably  re-organised  the 
financial  arrangements  of  his  kingdom,  increased 
his  store  of  arms,  and  enlarged  his  fleet ;  and  a  few 
years  of  comparative  peace  greatly  increased  his 
material  prosperity. ' 

Peace,  however,  in  the  full  sense,  was  not  long 

» By  the  year  343,  they  possessed  300  ships  of  war,  fully 
equipped  (Dem.,  de  F.  L.,  §  89).  "  Justin,  VIII,  5. 

J  See  Reich enbacher,  Die  Gesch.  der  Athenischen  und  Make- 
donischen  Politik,  pp.  8-10. 

*  A  few  years  later  he  carried  the  same  policy  further  by 
planting  colonies  among  the  "barbarians "  of  Thrace.  See  below, 
p.  330.  s  Dem.  de  F.  L.,  §  89. 


304  Demosthenes 

possible  for  him.  Early  in  344  we  find  him  once 
more  engaged  in  a  campaign  against  the  Illyrian 
tribes  on  his  frontiers ' ;  and  it  was  probably  in  this 
campaign  that  he  was  wounded  in  the  leg,  while 
in  pursuit  of  the  Illyrian  King  Pleuratus. ' 

When  this  expedition  was  over,  he  carried  out — 
probably  in  the  late  summer  of  344 — a  re-organisa- 
tion of  Thessaly,  setting  a  tetrarch  (no  doubt  a 
partisan  of  his  own)  over  each  of  the  four  divisions 
of  the  country,-^  and  placing  a  Macedonian  garri- 
son in  Thessaly.  It  was  arranged  that  the  public 
revenues  of  Thessaly  should  henceforth  be  paid 
to  himself,  and  perhaps  also  that  Thessalian  troops 
should  form  a  regular  part  of  his  army.^  In  the 
same  year  the  Thessalians  elected  him  archon  or 
overlord  of  Thessaly  for  his  life.  ^  Philip  accom- 
plished these  changes,  it  would  seem,  with  great 
tact;  the  supersession  of  the  local  princes  or 
"tyrants"  was  a  popular  step;  and  he  appears 
everywhere  to  have  turned  the  strife  of  factions 
to  his  own  advantage.  Isocrates,  in  a  letter  to 
Philip,^  written  probably  just  after  the  work  in 

'  Diod.,  XVT,  Ixix. 

'  Didym.,  schol.  in  Dent.,  Col.  12.  Meyer  {Isokrales^  zweiter 
Brief,  pp.  760,  761)  is  probably  right  in  inferring  from  the  name  of 
Pleuratus  that  it  was  against  a  northern  branch  of  the  Illyrians 
that  his  campaign  was  directed,  and  that  Philip  may  have  pene- 
trated almost  to  the  Adriatic.  ^  Note  i  at  the  end  of  the 
Chapter.                          *  Dem.,  Phil.  II,  §  22;  rfe  Chers.,  §  14. 

s  See  E.  Meyer,  I.e.,  p.  762,  and  his  edition  of  Theopompus' 
Hellenika,  p.  229,  etc. 

«  Isocr. ,  Ep.  ii.  ,§21.  For  the  date  of  this  letter,  see  E.  Meyer, 
/.c,  pp.  762,  763. 


Nominal  Peace  and  Reneival  of  War      305 

Thessaly  was  accomplished,  congratulated  him 
upon  it,  adding  that  it  was  far  harder  to  capture 
the  good-will  of  a  people  than  to  take  their  walls. 
In  the  same  letter  he  begged  Philip,  in  view  of 
his  high  vocation,  not  to  expose  himself  rashly 
to  personal  dangers,  and  urged  him  to  court  the 
good-will  of  Athens,  and  not  to  believe  all  the  evil 
that  he  heard  spoken  of  her.  "You  will  never," 
he  declared,  "find  a  State  that  can  do  better 
service  either  to  the  Hellenes  or  to  your  own 
interests." 

Philip  had  in  fact  some  reason  to  feel  vexation 
with  Athens.  Public  opinion  in  the  city  had  set 
strongly  against  him  since  the  overthrow  of  the 
Phocians,  and  Demosthenes  had  done  his  best  to 
encourage  this  unfriendly  feeling.  The  Athenians 
had  sent  Eucleides— probably  late  in  346 — to 
remonstrate  with  Philip  in  regard  to  the  Thracian 
towns  which  he  had  taken  before  returning  to 
Pella  to  ratify  the  Peace,  and  to  ask  for  their 
restoration  to  Cersobleptes,  and  for  the  extension 
to  that  prince  of  the  advantages  of  the  Peace.  ^ 
This  request  he  naturally  refused.  But  he  was 
by  no  means  anxious  to  re-open  hostilities  with 
Athens,  and  his  whole  policy  from  this  time  on- 
wards goes  to  prove  that  he  really  desired,  at  this 
period,  not,  as  Demosthenes  incessantly  asserted, 
the  conquest  of  Athens,  but  a  good  understanding 
with  her,  and  an  alliance  on  friendly  terms ;  though 

•  "D^m.^de  F.L.,  §  i8l. 


3o6  Demosthenes 

the  fact  that  Philip  was  bound  to  be  the  predomin- 
ant partner  in  any  such  alliance  must  in  any  case 
have  set  Demosthenes  against  it.  And  so,  while 
rejecting  a  demand  which  was  not  reasonable* 
Philip  offered  to  cut  a  channel  across  the  Cher- 
sonese at  his  own  charges' — an  operation  which 
would  have  provided  the  Athenian  settlers  in  the 
Chersonese  with  a  good  line  of  defence  against  the 
incursions  of  the  Thracians,  and  would  probably 
have  conferred  a  great  benefit  upon  Athenian 
merchant-ships.  The  offer  does  not  appear  to 
have  been  accepted;  and  in  the  autumn  of  344 — 
probably  about  the  time  when  Isocrates  was  com- 
posing his  letter — envoys  were  sent,  of  whom 
Demosthenes  was  the  chief,  to  the  Peloponnese, 
to  counteract  the  influence  of  Philip  there. 

The  Peloponnesian  peoples  were  no  nearer  con- 
tentment than  they  had  been  for  many  years. 
We  have  seen  how  the  Arcadians — those  at  least 
whose  centre  was  at  Megalopolis — had  been 
compelled  by  the  rejection  of  their  appeal  to  Ath- 
ens in  353  to  rely  upon  Thebes,  and  the  growing 
friendliness  between  Athens  and  Sparta  had  also 
induced  other  Peloponnesian  peoples  who  were 
hostile  to  Sparta  or  afraid  of  her  to  enter  into 
relations  with  Philip.  The  embassies  from  Athens 
after  the  fall  of  Olynthus  had  failed  to  arouse  any 
feeling  against    Philip  in   southern    Greece;  the 

^  Dem.,  Phil.  II,  §  30;  cp.  Heges.,  de  Hal,  §§  39,  40.  The 
exact  date  of  Philip's  offer  is  uncertain;  but  Schafer  (ii.,  p.  347) 
must  be  approximately  right  in  placing  it  at  this  point. 


Nominal  Peace  and  Renewal  of  War      307 

Arcadians,  Messenians,  and  Argives  were  all  uhder 
the  domination  of  parties  which  had  an  tinder- 
standing  with  him,  and  he  had  helped  them  by 
sending  them  supplies  of  money  and  mercenary 
soldiers,  and  by  requiring  the  Spartans  to  leave 
Messenia  undisturbed.'  Demosthenes  and  the 
other  envoys  now  attempted  to  persuade  them 
that  Philip's  friendship  was  untrustworthy,  and 
was  only  offered  in  order  that  he  might  the  more 
easily  rob  them  of  their  freedom.  Demosthenes 
reminded  them  of  the  final  issue  of  Philip's  alliance 
with  Olynthus,  and  of  the  steps  by  which  he  had 
acquired  his  complete  dominion  over  Thessaly.* 
But  in  spite  of  the  applause  which  his  eloquence 
called  forth,  Demosthenes  had  to  confess  that  he 
had  failed  to  make  any  impression^;  the  Arcadians 
soon  afterwards  passed  various  complimentary 
decrees  in  honour  of  Philip,  resolving  to  erect  his 
statue  in  bronze,  and  to  welcome  him  within  their 
walls,  if  he  came  to  the  Peloponnese;  the  Argives 
did  likewise*;  and  before  long  envoys  came  to 
Athens  from  Argos  and  Messene  (doubtless  with 
Philip's  approval)  to  make  a  formal  complaint 
against  the  interference  of  the  Athenians  with 
'  their  efforts  to  maintain  their  independence  of 
Sparta. 

About  the  same  time  Philip  himself  sent  to 

'  Dem.,  PhU.  II,  §  15. 

'Ibid.,  §§  20-25.  He  misrepresented,  however,  the  attitude 
of  the  Thessalians  to  Philip;  they  were  probably  quite  contented 
under hissway.         ^  Ibid.,  §27.        ■<  Dem.,  de  i^.  L.,  §§  261,  262. 


\ 

3^5  Demosthenes 


Ati.fjis  a  formal  remonstrance  against  the  asser- 
tions of  the  Athenian  orators  that  he  had  broken 
the  Peace  and  had  been  false  to  his  promises.  He 
had,  he  declared,  made  no  promises;  and  he  de- 
manded that  the  charges  should  be  proved  or 
withdrawn. '  It  is  with  this  situation  that  Demos- 
thenes dealt  in  the  Second  Philippic,  a  speech  of 
which  the  first  object  was  to  convince  the  Athen- 
ians that  Philip's  plans  were  all  being  organised 
for  the  one  purpose  of  subduing  Athens;  and  that 
it  was  with  this  intent  that  he  was  courting  the 
support  of  the  Thebans  and  Peloponnesians,  who 
were  not,  like  Athens,  prevented  by  any  considera- 
tions of  righteousness  from  forwarding  his  cause. 
In  the  latter  part  of  the  Speech  he  denounced  the 
corruption  of  the  orators  who  had  brought  forward 
the  promises  and  predictions  by  which  the  People 
had  been  induced  to  consent  to  the  Peace;  he 
referred  more  than  once  to  Philip's  "breaches  of 
the  Peace,"  and  upbraided  his  audience  for  their 
failure  to  take  any  steps  to  prevent  the  fulfilment 
of  Philip's  designs.  The  text  of  the  answer  which 
he  proposed  to  give  to  Philip's  envoys  has  not 
come  down  to  us;  nor  do  we  know  whether  the 
Assembly  adopted  it. 

The  Speech  is  an  eloquent  one ;  and  it  is  there- 
fore the  greater  pity  that — in  so  far  as  it  as- 
sumed that  Philip  had  broken  faith  with  Athens — 
it  should  have  been  based  upon  a  false  hypothesis ; 
indeed  Philip's  own  promises,  as  contrasted  with 

'  Liban.,  Hypoih.  ad  Dem.  Phil.  II. 


Nominal  Peace  and  Renewal  of  War      309 

the  predictions  of  ^Eschines,  seem  to  have  been 
of  the  vaguest  possible  character.  But__tliat. 
PhiHp  was  scheming  for  the  ultimate  overthrow  of 
Athens,  and  deceiving  her  with  offers  of  friendship 
until  the  convenient  moment  came,  was  a  per- 
fectly possible  inference  from  the  facts  before  the 
orator,  viewed  in  the  light  of  Philip's  past  dealings 
with  other  peoples;  and  a  partial  explanation, 
though  not  a  justification,  of  the  stress  laid  in  the 
Speech  upon  Philip's  "promises"  may  be  found  in 
the  fact  that  the  orator  was  preparing  to  carry 
out  his  threatened  prosecution  of  ^schines,  and 
doubtless  desired  to  take  every  opportunity  of 
impressing  upon  the  People  beforehand  the  main 
points  of  his  case,  chief  among  which  was  the 
alleged  falsity  of  the  promises  conveyed  and  the 
predictions  uttered  by  ^schines.  There  is  every 
reason  to  think  that  the  unpopularity  of  ^schines 
and  his  friends  was  increasing;  and  two  events, 
which  probably  occurred  soon  after  the  delivery 
of  the  Second  Philippic,  are  very  significant  of  this. 

Late  in  344  or  early  in  343  the  inhabitants  of 
Delos  laid  before  the  Amphictyonic  Council  a 
request  that  the  Athenians  should  be  deprived  of 
the  control  of  the  famous  temple  of  Apollo  in  that 
island.  (Whether  the  Amphictyonic  Council  had 
any  traditional  jurisdiction  over  Delos  we  do  not 
know;  but  to  have  denied  the  right  of  the  Coun- 
cil to  decide  the  question  might  have  involved 
the  risk  of  an  Amphictyonic  war  against  Athens.) 


3 1  o  Demosthenes 

^schines  was  appointed  by  the  People  to  present 
the  Athenian  case — a  good  appointment  in  itself, 
for  ^schines  was  more  likely  than  any  member  of 
the  opposite  party  to  carry  weight  with  a  body  of 
whom  the  majority  were  allies  of  Philip.  But  the 
Council  of  Areopagus,  who,  for  some  reason  un- 
known to  us,  had  been  given  power  to  revise  the 
choice  of  the  Assembly,  cancelled  the  appointment 
of  -^schines;  and  Hypereides,  an  energetic  sup- 
porter of  Demosthenes,  was  sent  in  his  stead.* 
The  Amphictyonic  Council,  after  hearing  Euthy- 
crates,  the  betrayer  of  Olynthus,  on  the  one  side, 
and  Hypereides  on  the  other,  decided  in  favour  of 
Athens, — possibly  at  a  hint  from  Philip,  who 
clearly  desired  to  avoid  causes  of  offence  for  the 
present. 

An  even  heavier  blow  to  Philip's  friends  was 
the  condemnation  of  Philocrates,  in  the  first  half 
of  343,  upon  an  indictment  preferred  by  Hypereides 
for  corruption  and  for  not  having  given  the  best 
advice  to  the  People.  ^  Whether  Philocrates  had 
really  been  guilty  of  corruption  we  do  not  know. 
Demosthenes  subsequently  spoke  as  if  the  fact 
were  notorious,  and  had  been  admitted  by  Phi- 
locrates himself,  who,  he  said,  used  even  to  make 
a  parade  of  his  guilt,  "selling  wheat, ^  building 

*  Dem.,rfe  F.  L.,  §209;  Hyper,  in  Demadem,  fr.  76  (Oxford 
Text),  etc. 

» Hyper.,  pro  Euxenippo,  §§  29,  30  (Oxford  Text). 

»7.e.,  wheat  received  from  Philip,  or  bought  with  Philip's 
money.     Dem.,  de  F.L.,  §114. 


Nominal  Peace  and  Renewal  of  War     311 

houses,  saying  that  he  was  going  to  Philip  whether 
you  elected  him  or  not,  changing  Macedonian 
gold  openly  at  the  bank."  Like  -^schines,  we 
are  told,  he  had  received  gifts  of  land  from  Philip ; 
like  Atrestidas,  he  had  brought  home  women 
captured  in  Olynthus.  ^  Whether  all  this  was  true 
or  not,  he  discerned  that  he  had  no  chance  of 
acquittal,  and  left  Athens.  He  was  condemned 
to  death  in  his  absence.  In  the  course  of  the 
trial,  Demosthenes,  who  expressed  his  surprise 
that  Philocrates  alone  was  accused  of  bringing 
about  results  of  such  magnitude,  challenged  any 
of  Philocrates'  colleagues,  who  had  had  no  share 
in  his  misconduct  and  disapproved  of  his  actions, 
to  come  forward  and  say  so, — offering  to  accept 
the  word  of  any  one  who  made  such  a  disclaimer. 
No  one  responded;  and  Demosthenes  made  much 
of  this  in  the  subsequent  trial  of  ^schines,  who 
would  not  "accept  acquittal  even  when  it  was 
offered  him,"  even  though  he  had  none  of  the 
excuses  which  some  of  his  colleagues  might  have 
pleaded.^  About  the  same  time  Proxenus  was 
tried  and  condemned — we  do  not  know  on  what 
charge — through  Demosthenes'  influence.^ 

The  reply  of  the  Assembly,  whatever  it  was,  to 
Philip's  protest  did  not  prevent  him  from  sending 
Python  of  Byzantium  (a  pupil  of  Isocrates  and  an 

'  Dem.,  de  F.  L.,  §§  145,  309. 

'  Ibid.,  §§  116-118;  comp.  ^Esch.,  in  Ctes.,  §§  79-81. 
3 Dem.,  de  F.  L.,  §  280;  Deinarch.  in  Dem.,  §  63.     See  Schafer, 
H.,  p.  369. 


312  Demosthenes 

able  speaker)  to  Athens  early  in  343,  accompanied 
by  envoys  from  his  allies,  to  convey  an  offer  to 
consider  the  amendment  of  anything  that  might 
be  amiss  in  the  terms  of  the  Peace,  and  to  express 
his  regret  that,  when  he  was  desirous  of  making 
the  Athenians  his  friends,  more  than  all  the  other 
Greeks,  they  were  induced  by  self-interested  ora- 
tors to  repel  his  overtures.^  -^schines  supported 
the  representations  of  Python,  while  Demosthe- 
nes (as  he  tells  us)  * 

would  not  give  way  before  the  torrent  of  insolent 
rhetoric  which  Python  poured  out  upon  the  Assembly, 
but  rose  and  contradicted  him,  and  would  not  betray 
the  city's  rights,  but  proved  the  iniquity  of  Philip's 
actions  so  manifestly  that  even  his  own  allies  rose  up 
and  admitted  it. 

It  was,  however,  decided  to  send  Hegesippus  as 
ambassador  to  Philip,  to  propose  certain  altera- 
tions in  the  terms  of  the  Peace.  Of  these  the 
most  important  was  that  the  clause  which  or- 
dained that  "each  party  should  retain  what  they 
possessed''  at  the  time  of  making  the  Peace,  should 
now  be  made  to  ordain  that  "each  party  should 
retain  what  was  their  own,''  an  alteration  which 
was  intended,  beyond  all  doubt,  to  reopen  the 
question  of  the  right  to  Amphipolis  and  Poteidasa. 
It  was  also  resolved  to  propose  the  inclusion  of  all 

'  The  mission  of  Python  may  have  been  in  part  the  outcome  of 
Isocrates'  letter  to  Philip  (see  above,  p.  290). 
*  De  Cor.,  §  136. 


I 


Nominal  Peace  and  Renewal  of  War     313 

the  Greek  Peoples  in  the  treaty,  as  well  as  the  allies 
of  the  two  contracting  parties;  to  guarantee  their 
autonomy  and  promise  them  aid  against  any  ag- 
gressors; and  to  ask  Philip  once  more  to  surrender 
the  places  taken  from  Cersobleptes  in  April,  346. 
It  appears  that  the  Athenians  also  laid  claim  to 
Cardia. 

It  is  probable  that  the  question  of  Halonnesus, 
which  continued  to  be  a  matter  of  controversy  in 
the  next  year,  was  already  included  among  the 
subjects  of  negotiation  between  Philip  and  Athens.  * 
Halonnesus  was  a  small  island  near  Sciathus.  It 
was  the  stronghold  of  a  pirate  named  Sostratus, 
who  had  probably  been  doing  damage  to  Philip's 
ships.  Philip  had  driven  him  out  and  taken  pos- 
session of  the  island,  and  the  Athenians,  who 
claimed  the  ownership  of  the  island,  now  requested 
Philip  to  restore  it  to  them. 

Hegesippus  was  a  person  devoid  of  tact  and 
violent  in  speech,  and  gave  great  offence  to  Philip, 
who  even  went  so  far  as  to  banish  the  poet 
Xenocleides,  Hegesippus'  host  during  his  visit  to 
IVIacedonia.  ^  With  regard  to  the  proposals  of  the 
Athenians,  Philip  rejected  at  once  the  suggested 
alteration  of  the  clause  v^4th  regard  to  the  posses- 
sions of  the  two  parties,  declaring  that  he  had  not 

'The  chief  authority  on  this  matter  is  the  Speech  of  Hegesippus 
de  Halonneso,  which  has  descended  to  us  among  the  speeches  of 
Demosthenes.  Hegesippus'  authorship  is  denied  by  Beloch, 
Gr.  Gesch.,  ii.,  539,  but  defended,  more  or  less  convincingly,  by 
E.  Meyer,  Isokrates'  zweiter  Brief,  p.  776. 

»Dem.,de  F.L.,  §331. 


314  Demosthenes 

offered,  or  authorised  his  envoys  to  offer,  any  such 
change.  He  was  ready  to  include  the  other  Greek 
peoples  in  the  Peace ;  and  to  submit  to  arbitration 
both  the  question  of  the  Thracian  towns  and  the 
Athenian  claim  to  Cardia — as  he  well  might,  his 
case  being  apparently  a  very  strong  one.  He  was 
also  ready  to  go  to  arbitration  in  regard  to  Halon- 
nesus,  or  to  give  the  island  to  Athens  as  a  free  gift. 
On  the  advice  of  Demosthenes  and  Hegesippus, 
arbitration  was  refused,  upon  the  ground  that  no 
impartial  arbitrator  could  be  foimd;  and  Philip 
was  informed  that  the  Athenians  did  not  wish  him 
to  give  them  the  island,  but  to  give  it  hack — a  mere 
matter  of  syllables,  at  which  ^schines  and  the 
comic  poets  of  the  time  scoffed,  ^  but  one  involving 
the  whole  question  in  dispute  as  to  the  ownership 
of  the  island.  Philip  naturally  refused  to  do  as 
he  was  bidden. 

The  Speech  of  Hegesippus  which  has  come  down 
to  us  was  made  in  one  of  the  debates  about 
Halonnesus  early  in  342.  It  is  thoroughly  un- 
reasonable in  tone  and  argument,  and  in  expression 
is  sarcastic  and  violent;  though  the  contention 
that  it  was  beneath  the  dignity  of  the  Athenians, 
to  whom  belonged  the  empire  of  the  sea,  to  accept 
islands  from  Philip,  or  to  go  to  arbitration  with 
him,  was  calculated  to  win  applause.  On  nearly 
every  point  raised  in  the  Speech  Philip  could  give 
a  fair  reply;  and  though  it  is  uncertain  whether 
modem  international  law  would  have  admitted 

'  iEsch.,  in  Oes.,  §  83;  Antiphanes,  fr.  169  (Kock). 


Nominal  Peace  and  Renewal  of  War      315 

Philip's  right  to  the  island  (assuming  that  it  had 
belonged  to  Athens  before  it  was  occupied  by  the 
pirate  captain),  it  may  also  be  doubted  whether, 
seeing  that  the  pirate  had  been  siiffered  by  Athens 
to  remain  undisturbed  and  to  molest  the  traffic 
at  his  pleasure,  the  power  who  expelled  him  might 
not  equitably  claim  to  have  taken  the  island  from 
him  and  not  from  Athens.^     At  least  Philip's  of-     Z' 
fer  to  "give"  it  to  Athens  was  a  fair  compromisef ^  ^ !'  ' 
and  the  statement  of  Demosthenes,  that  no  impar-    "^ 
tial  arbitrator  could  be  found,  was  little  more  than/^''^,;,*^'^'' 
an  intimation  that  he  was  working  for  a  renewal,  ^"^^ 
of  hostilities.     Still  Philip's  patience  was  not  ex- 
hausted; and  though  he  retained  Halonnesus,  he 
as  yet  took  no  step  which  could  give  the  Athen- 
ians an  excuse  for  war. 

At  the  same  time  as  the  mission  of  Python  to 
Athens,  early  in  343,  there  arrived  also  an  embassy 
from  the  King  of  Persia,  asking  for  a  renewal  of 
ancient  friendship  between  the  Great  King  and  the 
people  of  Athens.  ^  The  circiimstances  which  led 
the  King  to  send  messages  at  this  time  to  several 
of  the  Greek  States  are  not  precisely  known,  but 
it  may  be  taken  as  certain  that  he  was  appre- 
hensive of  Philip's  intentions  with  regard  to  Asia 
Minor.  His  viceroys  in  that  region  had  displayed 
great  independence  while  he  was  engaged  in  the 
reconquest   of  Egypt;   and  he  may  have  been 

'  See  Phillipson,  International  Law  of  Greece  and  Rome,  vol. 
ii.,pp.  132-151. 

"  Didym.,  schol.  in  Dem.,  Col.  8.     See  Note  2. 


3i6  Demosthenes 

desirous  to  obtain  an  alliance  with  some  of  the 
Greek  States  which  would  act  as  a  counterpoise 
to  the  influence  which  Philip  was  likely  to  exert 
in  favour  of  the  viceroys  in  Asia  Minor,  as  his 
intimacy  with  one  of  them,  Hermeias  of  Atameus, 
had  shown.  But  the  Athenians  were  in  no  mood 
at  present  to  abandon  their  traditional  enmity 
towards  the  King.  It  is  highly  probable,  in  view 
lof  his  later  policy,^  that  Demosthenes  may  have 
'  urged  them  to  do  so,  in  the  hope  of  obtaining  a 
powerful  ally  against  Philip.  But  if  so,  he  failed. 
The  Athenians  replied  that  their  friendship  would 
remain,  so  long  as  the  King  abstained  from  attack- 
ing the  Greek  cities  in  Asia  Minor.  This  was  of 
course  tantamount  to  a  refusal  of  the  King's  pro- 
position. The  Thebans  and  Argives,  on  the  other 
hand,  sent  him  substantial  aid  against  Egypt, 
and  it  was  largely  this  that  enabled  him  to  re- 
conquer the  rebellious  province. 

It  was,  in  all  probability,  shortly  after  midsum- 
mer, 343,  that  the  accusations  of  Demosthenes 
against  -^schines  came  before  a  court  of  law, 
consisting  of  1501  jurors,  under  the  presidency  of 
the  Logistae.  The  speeches  of  Demosthenes  and 
^schines  have  both  come  down  to  us,  not  indeed 
in  the  exact  form  in  which  they  were  delivered, 
but  in  that  in  which  they  were  afterwards  pub- 
lished, some  alterations  of  the  original  text  having 
been  made,  and  some  arguments  inserted  in  each, 

'  Note  3. 


7j:frfi  y4:>J -rhV' 


PAPYRUS  FRAGMENT  OF  DEMOSTHENES'  SPEECH  ON  THE  EMBASSY 


Nominal  Peace  and  Renewal  of  War     317 

in  order  to  meet  the  adversary's  points,  or  to 
correct  the  unfavourable  impression  which  certain 
passages  had  made  upon  the  jury. 

The  Speech  of  Demosthenes  opened  with  a  brief 
statement  of  the  duties  of  an  ambassador,  and  an 
outline  of  his  proof,  to  be  given  fully  afterwards, 
that  -^schines  had  failed  to  fulfil  those  duties  in 
any  particular.  The  first  half  of  the  Speech  con- 
sists mainly  of  a  narrative  of  the  events  upon 
which  the  case  turned;  and  we  have  already  seen 
reason  to  conclude  that  the  version  which  Demos- 
thenes gave  of  the  facts  was  in  many  ways  a  dis- 
torted one.  The  ruin  of  the  Phocians  and  the 
capture  of  the  Thracian  towns  by  Philip  were 
represented  as  entirely  due  to  the  corruption  of 
iEschines  and  his  colleagues.  The  second  part 
of  the  Speech  lays  especial  stress  on  the  mischief 
wrought  in  Greece  by  traitors,  and  upon  the  de- 
ceptive and  ingenious  character  of  Philip's  policy, 
which  ^schines — so  Demosthenes  argued — had 
furthered.  It  also  contains  passages  of  self- 
defence  against  the  charge  of  participation  in  the 
peace-negotiations,  and  of  vehement  personal 
attack  upon  ^schines,  his  relations  and  support- 
ers. The  reply  of  ^schines  was  largely  composed 
of  narrative.  It  was  a  businesslike  and  detailed 
answer  to  the  charges  made  against  him,  and 
although  it  does  not  show  the  same  oratorical 
force  and  emotional  power  as  the  speech  of  Demos- 
thenes, it  remains  one  of  the  most  striking  orations 
of  antiquity,     -^schines  was  supported  by  Eubu- 


3 1 8  Demosthenes 

lus,  whom  we  now  see  for  the  last  time  taking  a 
conspicuous  part  in  political  controversy,  and  by 
Phocion,  whose  blunt  honesty  and  courage  always 
carried  great  weight.  He  was  acquitted  by 
thirty  votes. '' 

To  what  causes  is  the  acqtiittal  of  ^schines  to 
be  attributed?  The  support  given  to  him  by 
Eubulus  and  Phocion  doubtless  counted  for  some- 
thing; for  in  spite  of  the  growing  popularity  of 
Demosthenes  and  the  feeling  of  irritation  against 
the  authors  of  the  Peace,  the  People  strongly 
sympathised  with  Eubulus  in  his  desire  to  avoid 
war  and  to  defend  the  theoric  fund  against  possible 
encroachments;  and  there  was  in  all  probability 
some  fear  (since  Demosthenes  is  at  pains  to  dispel 
it),*  that  the  condemnation  of  ^schines  wotdd 
lead  to  a  renewal  of  war  with  Phihp.  Again,  the 
part  played  by  Demosthenes  himself  in  the  earlier 
negotiations  for  peace  could  not  really  be  disguised 
or  explained  away ;  and  ^schines  pressed  strongly 
the  point  that  Demosthenes  was  accusing  him  on 
the  ground  of  transactions  for  which  he  himself 
shared  the  responsibility.  That  Demosthenes 
was  conscious  of  this  weakness  in  his  position  is 
shown  by  the  great  care  which  he  took  to  define 
the  issue.  3     ^schines,  he  declared,  was  not  being 

'This  was  known  to  Plutarch  {Dent.,  xv)  from  Idomeneus  of 
Lampsacus,  a  friend  of  Epicurus,  and  therefore  almost  a  con- 
temporary witness:  comp.  Vit.  X  Oral.,  840b,  c;  and  see  Note  4. 

^Ibid.,  §§  134  ff.,  341,  342. 

3  Dem.,  de  F.  L.,  §§  91-97,  and  202  ff. 


Nominal  Peace  and  Renewal  of  War     319 

tried  because  the  city  made  peace,  but  because 
she  made  peace  on  dishonourable  terms  and  with 
disastrous  results. 

But,  after  all,  the  true  reason  for  ^schines' 
acquittal  was  probably  that  Demosthenes  could 
not  prove  him  to  be  guilty.  We  have  already 
seen  that  upon  the  most  important  points,  -^s- 
chines  had  a  good  reply  to  the  allegations  brought 
against  him;  and  more  than  once  he  turned  the 
tables  upon  Demosthenes  very  effectively,  and 
not  only  contrived  to  place  his  assailant's  own 
conduct  during  the  two  embassies  in  a  very 
unfavourable  light,  but  also  showed  that  Demos- 
thenes had  done  less  than  he  himself  had  done  to 
help  the  Phocians,  whose  calamities,  alleged  to 
have  been  due  to  ^schines  and  Philocrates,  were 
the  starting-point  of  Demosthenes'  most  impres- 
sive argument.  The  fact  that  -^schines  was  ac- 
tually supported  by  the  testimony  of  some  of 
the  Phocian  exiles  must  have  told  heavily  in  his 
favour.  It  is  also  probable  that  Demosthenes 
overshot  the  mark,  even  for  the  taste  of  an  Athen- 
ian jury,  in  the  grossness  of  the  stories  and  sug- 
gestions which  he  produced  in  regard  to  -^schines 
and  his  friends.  One  story  the  jury  actually 
refused  to  allow  him  to  complete^ — the  story  of 
the  ill-treatment  of  an  Olynthian  woman  by  ^s- 
chines,  which  ^schines  declared  to  have  been 
invented  by  Demosthenes.* 

»  Dem.,  de  F.  L.,  §196  ff.;  cf.  JEsch.,  de  F.  L.,  §§  4,  154-158. 
•-/Eschines   brought   forward    Aristophanes   of    Olynthus   to 


320  Demosthenes 

The  Speech  of  Demosthenes  contained  indeed 
passages  of  magnificent  oratory,  such  as  might 
well  prove  irresistible;  the  general  principles  to 
which  he  appealed  were  sound  and  nobly  enun- 
ciated, however  unjustified  his  application  of  them 
in  this  particular  case;  his  unique  power  of  con- 
vincing narration  was  never  more  impressively 
exercised,  however  untrue  some  parts  of  the  nar- 
rative may  have  been;  the  wide  prevalence  of 
treachery  and  corruption  in  the  Greek  States  was 
beyond  question;  and  these  causes,  coupled  with 
the  strong  dislike  which  prevailed  for  the  Peace  of 
Philocrates  and  its  real  or  supposed  consequences, 
perhaps  account  for  the  smallness  of  the  majority 
by  which  -^schines  was  acquitted.  It  must  also 
be  remembered  that  though  ^schines  could  not 
be  shown  to  be  guilty  of  corruption,  and  though 
no  modem  jury  could  possibly  have  condemned 
him,  he  had  almost  certainly  profited  to  a  con- 
siderable extent  by  Philip's  friendship;  and  that 
though  he  was  probably  as  sincerely  convinced  of 
the  advantages  to  be  gained  by  Athens  through 
alliance  with  Philip,  as  Demosthenes  was  convinced 
of  the  opposite,  his  increased  prosperity  might 
well  make  others  suspicious.  But  we  cannot 
doubt  that  he  was  rightly  acquitted,  and  that 
Demosthenes,  though  passionately  sure  that  the 
only  sound  or  worthy  policy  for  Athens  was  one 

testify  that  Demosthenes  had  offered  him  money  to  vouch  for 
the  story,  and  to  declare  that  the  woman  was  his  wife.  (There 
were  probably  lies  on  both  sides.) 


Nominal  Peace  and  Renewal  of  War     321 

of  strenuous  antagonism  to  Philip,  was  not  justi-\ 
fied  in  the  construction  which  he  placed  on  the  \ 
part  taken  by  ^schines  in  opposition  to  that  policy. 
Indeed,  an  impartial  historian  can  hardly  avoid    I 
going  further  than  this:  for  Demosthenes'  distor-   / 
tion  of  the  truth  at  many  points  in  his  argument  / 
(intended,  as  it  was,  to  conceal  his  own  part  in 
making  the  Peace),  and  above  all  the  shameless 
use  which  he  made  of  the  calamities  of  the  Phocians 
— calamities  which  he  had  done  nothing  to  prevent, 
whereas  his  opponent  had  at  least  attempted  to  , 
mitigate   them;   but   which   he   nevertheless   set  \ 
forth  in  tones  of  the  deepest  pathos  and  indigna- 
tion— must  remain  a  blot  upon  his  character  as 
a  man  and  an  orator,  which  the  worthiness  of  his 
political  aims  and  the  nobility  of  much  of  his 
subsequent  career  cannot  wholly  wipe  out. 

The  effect  of  the  verdict  upon  the  current  of 
political  life  at  the  time  is  hard  to  estimate. 
Probably  in  view  of  the  narrowness  of  the  majority, 
it  was  that  of  a  drawn  battle,  damaging  to  both 
parties;  but  it  is  impossible,  upon  the  evidence 
before  us,  to  judge  whether  the  party  of  y^schines 
benefited  more  by  his  acquittal  than  Demosthenes 
gained  by  having  so  nearly  secured  a  victory.  It 
is  certain  that  from  this  time  onwards  Demos- 
thenes' influence  grew  steadily:  it  was  he  and  his 
supporters  who  practically  guided  the  action  of 
the  city  for  the  next  five  years;  and  this  can  only 
mean  that,  whatever  reasons  the  jury  had  for 
acquitting  iEschines  of  corruption,  the  sympathies 


322  Demosthenes 

of  the  People  were  with  the  main  principles  of 
Demosthenes'  policy. 

An  incident  which  probably  occurred  soon  after 
the  trial  ^  of  ^schines  illustrates  the  exacerbation 
of  feeling  between  the  two  orators.  A  certain 
Antiphon,  who  had  been  struck  off  the  roll  of 
citizens  in  a  revision  of  the  list  which  had  taken 
place  in  346,  was  found  by  Demosthenes  concealed 
in  the  Peiraeus,  whither  Demosthenes  said  he  had 
come  under  a  promise  to  Philip  that  he  would  bum 
the  dockyards.  (We  do  not  know  what  evidence 
Demosthenes  had  of  this;  but,  in  view  of  Philip's 
evident  desire  to  avoid  a  quarrel  with  Athens  at 
this  time,  the  story  seems  most  unlikely.)  Dem- 
osthenes arrested  him  and  brought  him  before 
the  Assembly;  ^Eschines  protested  that  the  con- 
duct of  Demosthenes  in  arresting  the  man  without 
authority  was  unconstitutional,  and  induced  the 
Assembly  to  let  him  go.  Demosthenes,  however, 
informed  the  Council  of  Areopagus;  and  through 
their  action,  Antiphon  was  re-arrested,  tried, 
tortured,  and  executed.  "And  so,"  adds  Demos- 
thenes, "ought  you  to  have  treated  ^schines." 
Plutarch,  who  alludes  to  the  story,  speaks  of 
Demosthenes'  action  as  "very  aristocratic";  and 
it  can  hardly  be  defended. 

In  the  latter  half  of  the  year  343,  Philip,  while 

*  The  date  is  not  stated;  but  the  incident  is  not  mentioned  in 
either  of  the  speeches  at  the  trial  of  -^schines.  The  only  account 
of  it  is  in  Dem.,  de  Cor.,  §§  132-134. 


Nominal  Peace  and  Renewal  of  War      323 

studiously  avoiding  any  breach  of  the  Peace  with 
Athens,  was  extending  his  influence  in  many 
directions;  and  the  Athenians  took  some  steps  to 
neutraHse,  if  possible,  the  effect  of  his  movements. 
In  Epirus  Philip  took  up  the  cause  of  Alexander, 
brother  of  his  wife  Olympias,  against  Arybbas 
(Alexander's  uncle  and  former  guardian),  whom  he 
compelled  to  surrender  the  Molossian  kingdom  to 
Alexander.  He  also  increased  the  extent  of  that 
kingdom  by  bringing  within  it  the  district  of 
Cassopia  (in  the  south-west  comer  of  Epirus), 
with  its  three  towns,  Pandosia,  Boucheta,  and 
Elateia^;  and  he  proposed  further  to  add  to  it 
Ambracia,  and  the  island  of  Leucas,  both  colonies 
of  Corinth.  The  Athenians  thereupon  sent  em- 
bassies, in  which  Demosthenes,  Hegesippus,  and 
Polyeuctus*  took  part,  to  the  Peloponnesian 
States,  with  the  object  of  arousing  feeling  against 
Philip.  It  was  perhaps  in  consequence  of  this 
that  the  Corinthians,  whose  colonies  were  menaced, 
applied  to  Athens  for  aid.  The  appeal  was  favour- 
ably received.  The  Athenians  sent  troops  to 
Acamania  to  defend  Ambracia,  and  resolved,  if 
an  opportunity  offered,  to  take  up  the  cause  of 
Arybbas,  who,  on  seeking  refuge  in  Athens,  had 
been  welcomed  with  honour  and  granted  the 
citizenship.^     The   alliance   of  Athens   was  also 

'  Or  Elatreia. 

»  And  perhaps  also  Cleitomachus  and  Lycurgus.  - 
Jjustin,  VIII,  vi.;    Diod.,  XVI,  Ixxii.;    Dem.,  in  Olympiad., 
§  §  24-6;  Phil.  Ill,  §  §34,  72;  C.  I.  A.,  ii.,  115.     On  the  date  see 
Beloch,  Gr.  Gesch.,  ii.,  p.  543  n. 


324  Demosthenes 

sought  by  the  Achaeans,  whose  colony  at  Naupactus 
on  the  -(Etolian  coast  had  been  promised  by  Philip 
to  the  ^tolians,  in  order  to  gain  the  good-will  of 
the  latter.  But,  being  still  desirous  of  avoid- 
ing hostilities  with  Athens,  Philip  did  not  at  pre- 
sent proceed  further  against  either  Ambracia  or 
Naupactus,  but  returned  to  Macedonia  through 
Thessaly.  Here  also  the  emissaries  of  Athens 
had  been  busy,  attempting  to  undermine  the 
loyalty  of  Philip's  Thessalian  and  Magnesian 
subjects';  and  it  was  perhaps  for  this  reason  that 
he  now  left  Macedonian  garrisons  in  Nicaea  (which 
in  346  had  been  entrusted  to  Thessalian  soldiers), 
and  in  Echinus,  a  Theban  colony,  but  situated 
on  the  borders  of  the  Thessalian  territory  on  the 
north  coast  of  the  Maliac  Gulf.  ^ 

At  about  the  same  time  PhiHp's  troops  were 
engaged  in  Euboea,  and  his  agents  in  the  Pelopon- 
nese.  His  adherents  in  Eretria  had  brought 
about  the  overthrow  of  the  democracy  in  that 
town,  and  the  establishment  of  an  oligarchy,  at 
the  head  of  which  stood  Cleitarchus.  The  demo- 
crats took  refuge  in  Porthmus,  the  port  of  Eretria, 
and  were  there  besieged  by  Philip's  soldiers. 
Shortly  afterwards  (perhaps  early  in  342)  we  find 
the  Macedonian  general  Parmenio  supporting 
Philistides,  who  headed  a  similar  revolution  in 
Oreus,  and  was  similarly  established  as  "tyrant." 
These  events,  though  in  no  way  a  breach  of  the 

»  Schol.  on  ^sch.,  in  Ctes.,  §  83. 

'  Dem.,  Phil.  Ill,  §  34  and  "Reply  to  Philip's  Letter,"  §  4. 


Nominal  Peace  and  Renewal  of  War     325 

Peace,  were  undoubtedly  grave  disasters  for 
Athens.  Oreus  would  be  a  valuable  base  of 
operations  for  Philip  against  Sciathus,  Peparethus, 
and  the  other  islands  of  that  group.  Eretria 
became,  by  the  change,  a  "fortress  overlooking 
Attica."  Moreover,  the  revolutions  had  been 
carried  out  with  some  cruelty,  and  Demosthenes 
describes  in  eloquent  and  pathetic  language  the 
fate  of  Euphraeus,  the  democratic  leader  in  Oreus, 
who  had  dared  to  expose  and  denounce  the  in- 
trigues of  Philistides  and  his  friends."  The  gov- 
ernment of  the  "tyrants"  thus  established  was, 
according  to  Demosthenes,  cruel  and  despotic. 

A  noble  recompense  did  the  people  in  Oreus  receive, 
for  entrusting  themselves  to  Philip's  friends,  and 
thrusting  Euphrasus  aside!  and  a  noble  recompense 
the  democracy  of  Eretria,  for  driving  away  your 
envoys  and  surrendering  to  Cleitarchus!  They  are 
slaves,  scourged  and  butchered  !^ 

Philip  appears  to  have  attempted  to  effect  a 
similar  revolution  in  Geraestus.^  The  people  of 
Chalcis,  however,  under  the  leadership  of  Callias 
and  Taurosthenes,  made  overtures  to  Athens. 
Callias  had  formerly  been  on  good  terms  with 
Philip  and  had  spent  some  time  in  his  company, 
but  had  in  some  way  offended  him;  he  had 
also  been  friendly  with  the  Thebans,  but  now  (in 
order  to  protect  himself  against  Philip's  friends, 

'  Dem.,  Phil.  Ill,  §  §  59  flF.;  comp.  de  Chers.,  §  §  18,  36. 

»  Dem.,  Phil.  Ill,  §  §  65,  66.  3  Dem.,  de  F.  L.,  §  326. 


326  Demosthenes 

Cleitarchus  and  Philistides)  came  over  to  the 
Athenian  side.^  It  was  probably  about  this  time 
that  Demosthenes  and  CaUias  began  those  com- 
mimications  which  ended  in  the  aUiance  of  341 ; 
and  that  (on  Demosthenes'  advice)  a  corps  of 
soldiers  imder  Chares  was  stationed  in  Thasos, 
to  protect  the  islands.^ 

In  the  Peloponnesian  States  also  Philip's 
friends  were  active.  In  343  (before  the  trial  of 
-^schines)  two  of  Philip's  adherents  in  Megara, 
Perillus  and  Ptoeodorus,  attempted  a  coup  d'etat 
with  the  aid  of  a  mercenary  force  sent  by  Philip: 
but  Phocion  marched  rapidly  to  the  aid  of  the 
Athenian  party  with  a  force  of  Athenian  soldiers, 
fortified  Nisasa,  the  harbour  of  Megara,  and  con- 
nected it  by  long  walls  with  the  town^;  while 
Demosthenes  negotiated  an  alliance  between 
Athens  and  Megara.''  In  Elis  Philip's  party  got 
the  upper  hand,  and  terrible  massacres  occurred. 
Among  those  slain  were  the  remnant  of  Phalaecus' 
mercenary  force,  which  (after  taking  part  in  some 
fighting  in  Crete)  had  been  hired  by  exiles  from 
Elis  to  assist  them  against  the  Macedonian  party 
and  its  allies,  the  Arcadians.  ^  These  movements 
in  the  Peloponnese  could  not  fail  to  make  a  great 
impression  upon  the  Athenian  People,  as  they  did 

'  See  ^sch.,  in  Ctes.,  §  86  flf.  »  VU.  X  Oral.,  845  e. 

i'Dem.,deF.L.,  §  §  204,  295  ff.,  326;  de  Cor.,  §71;  Phil.  Ill, 
§  27;  Plut.,  Phoc,  XV.  (Plutarch  gives  no  date  for  Phocion's 
expedition,  but  this  must  almost  certainly  be  the  occasion). 

4Dem.,  do  Cor.,   §§  234,  237;  Phil.  Ill,  §74. 

s  Diod.,  XVI,  Ixiii.;  Dem.,  de  F.  L.,  §  260,  etc.' 


Nominal  Peace  and  Renewal  oj  War      327 

upon  Demosthenes;  it  appears  that  in  the  year 
343-2  the  alliance  between  Athens  and  the  Mes- 
senians  was  renewed ' ;  and  these  events  doubtless 
prepared  the  way  by  their  effect  upon  Athenian 
public  opinion  for  the  alliance  against  Philip  in 
341,  in  which  many  Peloponnesian  peoples  joined.* 

Early  in  342  Philip  went  once  more  to  Thrace, 
leaving  the  young  Alexander  to  govern  in  Mace- 
donia in  his  absence.  His  object  was,  in  all  prob- 
ability, not  merely  to  complete  his  conquest  of 
Thrace  itself,  where  Cersobleptes  was  once  more 
active,  but  also  to  obtain  control  over  the  route 
by  which  the  Athenian  corn-supply  passed,  and 
therewith  the  power  to  force  Athens  to  come  to 
terms,  if  force  proved  necessary.  If,  as  is  likely, 
the  design  of  the  conquest  of  Asia  Minor  was 
already  present  to  his  mind,  it  would  be  essential 
to  make  sure  of  his  ground  on  the  nearer  side  of 
the  Hellespont,  before  embarking  upon  an  eastern 
campaign. 

It  was  as  important  for  Athens,  if  she  desired 
to  retain  her  independence,  to  keep  the  great 
corn-route  open,  as  it  was  to  Philip  to  obtain  the 
power  to  close  it.  Athens  had,  in  fact,  only  two 
alternatives.  She  might  make  an  agreement  with 
Philip,  to  be  sincerely  kept  by  her  as  well  as  by  him, 
and  arrange  a  precise  delimitation  of  territories 
and  spheres  of  influence.     If  she  chose  that  alter- 

'  C.  I.  A.,  iv.,  2,  114  b;  comp.  Vit.  X  Oral.,  851a, 
"  Note  5. 


328  Demosthenes 

native,  the  two  powers  could  live  in  peace  side  by 
side  (Athens  retaining  the  Chersonese)  and  could 
fight  side  by  side  in  the  great  campaign  in  the 
East  which  Isocrates  had  advocated.  Or,  if  she 
would  not  do  this,  she  might  go  to  war  with  him, 
at  the  head  of  as  many  of  the  Greek  States  as 
would  follow  her  lead.  There  were  difficulties  in 
connection  with  both  alternatives.  A  power  .in_. 
alliance  with  Philip  could  never  hope  to  be  the  pre- 
dominant partner,  and  Athenian  pride  was  not 
ready  to  take  the  second  place.  Besides  this, 
there  was  a  natural  and  genuine  disbelief  in  the 
likelihood  of  the  honest  observance  of  any  treaty 
by  Philip ;  for  though  his  attitude  towards  Athens 
throughout  the  last  few  years  had  not  only  been 
formally  correct,  but  even  forbearing,  his  past 
history  had  not  been  such  as  to  inspire  confidence, 
and  even  now  he  was  spreading  his  net  all  round 
Attica,  so  that  it  seemed  likely  that  before  long 
she  would  be  entirely  isolated.  Nor  was  there 
any  sure  guarantee,  whatever  agreement  might 
be  made  with  Philip,  that  the  hostile  neighbours 
of  Athens  would  remain  at  peace  with  her.  On 
the  other  hand,  the  disunion  of  the  Greek  States 
made  it  uncertain  whether  Athens  would  find  any 
following  against  Philip  that  would  be  of  much 
real  advantage  to  her;  and  although  Philip  was 
not  likely  to  be  able  to  cut  her  off  from  the  sea, 
there  was  no  land-force  which  could  be  relied  upon 
to  hold  him  in  check  and  prevent  the  ravaging  of 
Attica.     Moreover,  the  disinclination  of  the  People 


Nominal  Peace  and  Renewal  of  War     329 

for  the  sacrifices  entailed  by  war  was  as  great  as 
ever,  however  much  their  pride  might  rebel  at  the 
idea  of  Philip's  ascendancy. 

But  Demosthenes'  choice  had  long  been  made: 
and  the  People,  though  not  yet  brought  to  the 
point  at  which  they  would  take  strong  measures 
at  any  sacrifice,  were  disposed  to  follow  his  lead; 
and  though  he  could  not  yet  propose  the  one 
measure  in  which  hope  lay,  an  alliance  with 
Thebes  (since  neither  they  nor  the  Thebans  were 
yet  ready  for  this),  he  took  steps  during  the  next 
few  years  to  drive  PhiUp  to  such  hostile  action  as 
would  convince  the  People  that  they  must  fight, 
if  they  were  to  remain  true  to  that  passion  for 
autonomy  and  leadership  which  was  one  of  the 
dominant  elements  in  their  national  character. 
There  can  be  little  doubt  that  Demosthenes 
interpreted  the  collective  feeling  of  the  mass  of  his 
fellow-countrymen  rightly;  and  his  efforts  were 
now  all  directed  to  forcing  them  to  translate  their 
feeling,  which  was  apt  to  show  itself  only  in 
spasmodic  outbursts,  into  steady  action,  under- 
taken after  thorough  preparation.  ,_y 

Philip's  campaign  in  Thrace  was  completely 
successful,  though  few  details  are  known  to  us. 
He  conquered  the  whole  territory  of  the  princes 
Cersobleptes  and  Teres.  The  latter,  who  died 
in  the  course  of  the  war,  had  been  given  the  citizen- 
ship of  Athens  (though  he  had  joined  Philip  in  his 
earlier  campaign) ;  and  the  Athenians  had  vainly 
sent  protests  to  Philip,  requesting  him  to  allow 


330  Demosthenes 

these  princes  to  retain  their  kingdom,  as  allies  of 
Athens.  Philip  made  the  perfectly  correct  reply- 
that  these  princes  had  not  participated  in  the 
Peace  of  346,  and  that  he  was  under  no  obligation 
to  recognise  them  as  allies.  ^  The  dominions  thus 
definitely  added  to  his  kingdom  Philip  proceeded 
to  secure  by  the  foundation  of  military  colonies, 
of  which  the  chief  were  Calybe  (or  Cabyle)  and 
Philippopolis  (on  the  upper  waters  of  the  He- 
brus),  the  former  being  nicknamed  Poneropolis 
— "  Rogueborough  " — on  account  of  the  alleged 
character  of  the  settlers  planted  there.  ^  He 
strengthened  his  position  on  the  northern  frontier 
of  Thrace  by  his  friendly  reception  of  Cothelas, 
King  of  the  Getae,  who  lived  between  the  Hebrus 
and  the  Danube ;  and  (since  his  principles  did  not 
force  monogamy  upon  him)  he  married  Cothelas* 
daughter.  ^  He  also  made  alliance  with  the  Greek 
colony  of  Apollonia  on  the  Black  Sea,  and  prob- 
ably with  Odessus  (Varna)  and  other  smaller  Greek 
settlements  on  the  same  coast.  "*  -^nos  at  the 
mouth  of  the  Hebrus,  the  last  ally  of  Athens  in 
Thrace,  deserted  her  for  Philip  in  341.  ^  In  the 
course  of  his  campaign  Philip  captured  a  number 

»  Ep.  Phil.,  §§8,9.     See  Note  6. 

*Dem.,  de  Chers.,  §44;  Steph.  Byz.,  s.  v.  ^iXlirirov  7r6Xts; 
Theopomp.,  fr.  107  (Oxford  Text),  etc. 

3  Satyr,  fr.  5;  ap.  Athen.,  xii.,  p.  557  d;  Steph.  Byz.,  s.v.  TSrai. 
The  permission  of  polygamy  sharply  distinguishes  the  Mace- 
donians from  the  Greeks. 

*  Justin,  IX,  ii.;  Arr.,  VII,  ix.,  3,  etc.  (for  full  refs,  see  Schafer, 
vol.  ii.,  pp.  446-450).  s  Dem.,  in  Theocr.,  §  37. 


I 


Nominal  Peace  and  Renewal  of  War     33 1 

of  strongholds,  of  which  Drongilus  and  Masteira 
are  particularly  named,  though  their  positions  are 
not  certainly  known';  and  he  passed  the  winter 
of  342-1  in  Thrace,  enduring  great  hardships  with 
his  army. 

The  Athenian  commander  in  the  Chersonese 
in  342  was  Diopeithes  of  Sunium.  Either  in  that 
year,  or  shortly  before,  the  Athenians  had  sent  a 
fresh  body  of  settlers  to  the  Chersonese,  and  these 
were  generally  well  received  by  the  towns  in  the 
peninsula.  But  Cardia,  which  claimed  to  be  the 
ally,  not  of  Athens,  but  of  Philip,  naturally  refused 
to  admit  them.  Diopeithes  was  instructed  to 
look  after  the  interests  of  the  settlers,  and  raised 
a  body  of  mercenaries,  for  whom  he  provided  pay 
by  acts  of  piracy  against  the  trading  ships  of 
smaller  islands  and  maritime  towns,  or  by  exact- 
ing contributions  from  them,  under  the  name  of 
"benevolences,"  in  return  for  which  their  ships 
were  safely  escorted  by  his  squadron.  (In  acting 
thus,  Demosthenes  says,  Diopeithes  was  following 
the  regular  practice  of  Athenian  commanders.*) 
When  he  began  to  threaten  the  Cardians,  the 
latter  appealed  to  Philip  for  support,  and  a  Mace- 
donian garrison  was  sent  to  protect  the  town. 
Diopeithes  now  went  further,  and  committed  a 
direct  act  of  hostility  against  Philip's  dominions. 
For,  while  Philip  was  fighting  in  the  interior  of  \ 
Thrace,   Diopeithes   made  a  raid  into  Thracian 

'  Dem.,  de  Chers.,  §  44,  etc.  »  De  Chers.,  §§  24  flE. 


332  Demosthenes 

territory  and  plundered  the  country  about  Crobyle 
and  Tiristasis,  which  lay  near  the  entrance  to  the 
Chersonese  from  the  side  of  the  Propontis;  and 
when  Philip  sent  an  envoy  named  Amphilochus 
to  negotiate  for  the  return  of  prisoners,  Diopeithes 
seized  him,  and  would  not  let  him  go  imtil  he  had 
paid  a  ransom  of  nine  talents.  ^ 

Philip  had  already  offered  to  submit  to  arbitra- 
tion in  regard  to  Cardia,  and  he  now  (early  in  341) 
despatched  a  strong  protest  to  Athens,  declaring 
that  he  would  take  active  measures  to  protect  the 
Cardians.^  The  matter  was  discussed  at  a  meet- 
ing of  the  Assembly,  and  we  learn  from  Demos- 
thenes' speech  on  that  occasion  all  that  we  know 
of  the  debate.  The  peace-party  attacked  Dio- 
peithes on  account  of  his  irregular  and  piratical 
actions,  which,  they  declared,  were  bound  to  end 
in  war  with  Philip;  and  they  evidently  succeeded 
in  rousing  considerable  feeling  against  the  com- 
mander. They  laid  great  stress  on  the  blessings 
of  peace,  and  accused  the  anti- Macedonian  poli- 
ticians of  designs  upon  the  public  funds — ^in  other 
words,  upon  the  festival-money.  Demosthenes 
admitted  (for  the  sake  of  argument)  the  unjusti- 
fiability  of  Diopeithes'  actions,  though  he  spoke 
of  them  under  the  name  of  "assistance  to  the 
Thracians";  but  he  insisted  that  when  Philip  was 
advancing  his  dominion  in  a  manner  most  perilous 
to  Athenian  interests,  it  was  not  the  time  to  recall 
or  to  attack  the  commander  who  was  at  least  do- 

'  Ep.  Phil.,  §  3.  'De  Chers.,  §  16. 


Nominal  Peace  and  Renewal  of  War     333 

ing  something  to  maintain  the  Athenian  cause 
— still  less  to  send  another  commander  and  fleet 
to  bring  him  back,  or  keep  guard  over  him,  as  his 
opponents  had  proposed.  To  interfere  with  him 
now  would  be  to  do  the  very  thing  that  Philip 
would  wish.  He  further  iu*ged  the  seriousness  of 
the  danger  lest  Philip  should  advance  to  Byzan- 
tium while  the  Etesian  winds  were  blowing;  for 
then  Athens  could  do  nothing  to  hinder  him, 
imless  she  had  a  strong  force  in  the  Chersonese. 
As  to  the  risk  of  war  with  Philip,  he  replied  that 
it  was  only  the  misleading  influence  of  Philip's 
party  that  prevented  the  Athenians  from  seeing 
that  Philip,  whatever  professions  he  might  make, 
was  already  at  war  with  them.  In  an  impressive 
passage'  he  imagines  the  other  Hellenes  interro- 
gating the  Athenians  as  to  their  policy: 

"Is  it  true,  men  of  Athens,  that  you  send  envoys 
on  every  possible  occasion,  to  tell  us  of  Philip's  designs 
against  ourselves  and  all  the  Hellenes,  and  of  the  duty 
of  keeping  guard  against  the  man,  and  to  warn  us  in 
every  way?"  We  should  have  to  confess  that  it  was 
true.  "Then,"  they  would  proceed,  "is  it  true,  you 
most  contemptible  of  all  men,  that  though  the  man 
has  been  away  for  ten  months,  and  has  been  cut  off 
from  every  possibility  of  returning  home,  by  illness 
and  by  winter  and  by  wars,  you  have  neither  liberated 
Euboea  nor  recovered  any  of  your  own  possessions? 
Is  it  true  that  you  have  remained  at  home,  unoccupied 
and  healthy — if  such  a  word  can  be  used  of  men  who 

*  §§  35-7- 


334  Demosthenes 

behave  thus — and  have  seen  him  set  up  two  tyrants 
in  Euboea,  one  to  serve  as  a  fortress  directly  menacing 
Attica,  the  other  to  watch  Sciathus ;  and  that  you  have 
not  even  rid  yourselves  of  these  dangers — granted  that 
you  did  not  want  to  do  anything  more — but  have  let 
them  be?  Obviously  you  have  retired  in  his  favour, 
and  have  made  it  evident  that  if  he  dies  ten  times  over, 
you  will  not  make  any  move  the  more.  Why  trouble 
us  then  with  your  embassies  and  your  accusations?" 
If  they  speak  thus  to  us,  what  will  be  our  answer?  I 
do  not  see  what  we  can  say. 

He  then  defines  what  he  regards  as  the  proper  at- 
titude for  Athens  to  adopt  ^ : 

First,  men  of  Athens,  you  must  thoroughly  make  up 
your  minds  to  the  fact  that  Philip  is  at  war  with 
Athens,  and  has  broken  the  Peace — you  must  cease 
to  lay  the  blame  at  one  another's  doors — and  that  he 
is  evilly-disposed  and  hostile  to  the  whole  city,  down 
to  the  very  ground  on  which  it  is  built.  ...  But 
his  hostilities  and  intrigues  are  aimed  at  nothing  so 
much  as  at  our  constitution.  .  .  .  For  he  knows  very 
well  that  even  if  he  becomes  master  of  all  the  world, 
he  can  retain  nothing  securely,  so  long  as  you  are  a 
democracy;  and  that  if  he  chances  to  stumble  any- 
where, as  may  often  happen  to  a  man,  all  the  elements 
which  are  now  forced  into  union  with  him  will  come 
and  take  refuge  with  you.  .  .  .  And  so  he  would 
not  have  Freedom,  from  her  home  in  Athens,  watch- 
ing for  every  opportunity  he  may  offer.  .  .  .  Sec- 
ondly, you  must  realise  clearly  that  all  the  plans 
which  he  is  now  so  busily  contriving  are  in  the  nature 


Nominal  Peace  and  Renewal  of  War     335 

of  preparations  against  this  country;  and  wherever 
any  one  resists  him,  there  he  resists  him  on  our  behalf. 
For  surely  no  one  is  so  simple  as  to  imagine  that  when 
Philip  is  so  covetous  of  the  wretched  hamlets  of 
Thrace,  and  when  to  get  these  places  he  is  endur- 
ing heavy  labours,  and  the  extremity  of  danger,  the 
harbours  and  the  dockyards  and  the  ships  of  the 
Athenians,  the  produce  of  their  silver-mines,  and  their 
huge  revenue  have  no  attraction  for  him;  or  that  he 
will  leave  you  in  possession  of  these,  while  he  winters 
in  the  very  pit  of  destruction  for  the  sake  of  the  millet 
and  the  spelt  in  the  silos  of  Thrace.  No  indeed!  It 
is  to  get  these  into  his  power  that  he  pursues  both  his 
operations  in  Thrace  and  all  his  other  designs. 

The  only  remedy,  Demosthenes  insisted,  lay  in  the 
organisation  and  efficient  maintenance  of  a  stand- 
ing force,  to  defend  the  liberties  of  the  Hellenes. 
He  then  turned  to  attack  his  opponents,  and  their 
anxiety  to  prosecute  the  orators  and  generals  of 
the  war  party,  and  upbraided  the  People  vehe- 
mently for  their  readiness  to  listen  to  them: 

Yours  is  the  one  city  in  the  world  where  men  are 
permitted  to  speak  on  behalf  of  the  enemy  without 
fear;  a  man  may  take  bribes,  and  still  address  you 
with  impunity,  even  when  you  have  been  robbed  of 
your  own.  .  .  .  Aye,  and  you  know  that  of  such 
speakers,  some  who  were  poor  are  rapidly  growing 
rich;  and  some  who  were  without  name  or  fame  are 
becoming  famous  and  distinguished,  while  you,  on 
the  other  hand,  are  becoming  inglorious  instead  of 
famous,  bankrupt  instead  of  wealthy.     For  a  city's 


33^  Demosthenes 

wealth  consists,  I  imagine,  in  allies,  confidence,  loy- 
alty— and  of  all  these  you  are  bankrupt.' 

After  defending  himself  against  the  charge,  which 
his  opponents  had  brought  against  him,  of  lack- 
ing the  courage  of  his  opinions,  and  of  abstaining 
from  formally  moving  the  measures  which  he  re- 
commended, he  concluded  with  a  proposal  that 
Diopeithes'  force  should  be  maintained,  and  envoys 
sent  in  all  directions  to  organise  the  movement 
against  Philip. 

Above  all  [he  added],  we  must  punish  those  who 
take  bribes  in  connection  with  public  affairs,  and  must 
everywhere  display  our  abhorrence  of  them;  in  order 
that  reasonable  men,  who  offer  their  honest  services, 
may  find  their  policy  justified  in  their  own  eyes  and 
in  those  of  others.  If  you  treat  the  situation  thus, 
and  cease  to  ignore  it  altogether,  there  is  a  chance — a 
chance,  I  say,  even  now — that  it  may  improve.  If, 
however,  you  sit  idle,  with  an  interest  that  stops 
short  at  applause  and  acclamation,  and  retires  into 
the  background  when  any  action  is  required,  I  can 
imagine  no  oratory,  which,  without  action  on  your 
part,  will  be  able  to  save  your  country. 

r  The  Speech  glows  with  an  enthusiasm  which  is 
V  obviously  genuine,  and  was  in  every  way  calculated 
to  commend  to  the  People  the  policy  which  the 
speaker  believed  to  be  the  only  one  consistent  with 
the  interest  and  honour  of  Athens.  In  fact,  mat- 
ters had  now  gone  so  far  that  war  was  practi- 
§  64  ff . 


i 


Nominal  Peace  and  Renewal  of  War      337 

cally  inevitable,  and  whether  or  not  Demosthenes 
was  to  be  blamed  for  having  done  his  best  to 
produce  such  a  state  of  things,  there  could  be  no 
doubt  of  his  duty  when  once  it  was  brought  about. 
Accordingly  in  this  Speech  and  in  the  Third  Philip- 
pic the  tone  of  authority  is  more  strongly  marked 
than  in  most  of  his  earlier  orations;  though  he  is 
still  conscious  of  the  strength  of  the  opposition,  \ 
and  of  the  danger  to  himself  which  his  policy  / 
involved. 

We  do  not  know  whether  the  Speech  on  the 
Chersonese  had  any  immediate  result,  beyond  its 
effect  on  public  opinion,  though  it  is  certain  that 
Diopeithes  was  not  recalled.  It  is  also  certain 
that  within  two  or  three  months  of  the  date  of  the 
Speech,  the  feeling  of  the  Athenians  had  become 
much  more  positively  militant,  and  the  outbreak 
of  war  in  Thrace  much  more  imminent.  It  was 
in  a  debate  upon  a  renewed  application  for  sup- 
plies from  the  army  in  the  Chersonese  that  the 
Third  Philippic  was  delivered.  In  this  Demosthe- 
nes' policy  is  even  more  fully  declared.  It  was  not 
now,  he  insisted,  in  any  selfish  interest  of  her  own,  _-' 
but  as  the  champion  of  the  Hellenes  against  the  en- 
emy of  their  freedom,  that  the  Athenians  must  take 
the  field-  He  again  declared  that  Philip  was  not 
only  at  war  with  Athens,  but  was  obtaining  all  y 
the  advantages  of  an  unopposed  conqueror  at  her 
expense:  and  Philip  could  not  be  expected  to  make  _ 
a  formal  declaration  of  war,  when  it  was  much  -<7 
more  to  his  purpose  to  cause  the  Athenians  to  take-    ^- 


338  Demosthenes 

no  steps  against  him,  on  the  ground  of  the  exist- 
ence of  the  Peace.  He  next  traced  rapidly  and 
forcibly  the  growth  of  Philip's  power  until  his  in- 
fluence had  extended  itself  not  only  over  Thessaly, 
but  over  Euboea,  Megara,  Elis,  and  western  Greece. 

But  [he  continued'],  though  all  of  us,  the  Hellenes, 
see  and  hear  these  things,  we  send  no  representatives 
to  one  another  to  rlkriiRS  tlip  mattfr;  wp.  pTinw  Tin 
indignation ;  weare  in  so  evil  a  mood,  so  deep  have  the 
lines  been^  cut  that  sever  city  from  citVr  that  up  to 
this  day  we  are  unable  to  act  as  either  our  interest  or 
our_duty^require.  We  cannot _unite;  we  can  form 
no  combination  for  mutual  support  or  friendship,  but 
we  look  on  while  the  man  grows  greater,  because 
every  oije^as_made  up  hismind  (as  it  seems  to  me)  to 
profit  by  the  time  during  which  his  neighbour  is  being 
ruined,  and  no  one  cares  or  acts  for  the  safety  of  the 
Hellenes.  For  we  all  know  that  Philip  is  like  the 
recurrence  or  the  attack  of  a  fever  or  other  illness,  in 
his  descent  upon  those  who  fancy  themselves  for  the 
present  well  out  of  his  reach.  .  .  .  What  [he  asks']  is 
the  cause  of  these  things?  FoivasJtj^a§_jiQJiJBdthDut 
reason  and  just  cause,  that  the  Hellenes  in  old  davs 
were ,  so  pronipt  for^freedom,  so  it  is  not  without 
reason  or  causeJJiat  they  are  now  so  prompt  to  be 
slaves.  There  was  a  spirit,  men  of  Athens,  a  spirit 
in  the  minds  of  the  PeopleJn^jthose-daySy-which  is 
absent  ta-day — the  spirit  which  vanquished  the  wealth 
of  Persia,  which  led  Hellas  in  the  path  of  freedoni,  and 
never  gave  way  in  face  of  battle- by  sea  or  land;  a 
spirit  whose  extinction  to-day  has  brought  universal 

» §§  28,  29.  » §  36  ff. 


Nominal  Peace  and  Renewal  of  War     339 

ruin  and  turned  Hellas  upside  down.  What  was  this 
s^!nt?  It  was  nothing  subtle  or  clever.  It  meant 
that  men  who  took  monej_from  tho£eL_Hdio^imed  at 
dnirirrrujn.  nr-flt  thfi  tuin  of  Hellas  were  execrated  by 
all;  that  it  was  then  a  very  grave  thing  to  be  con- 
victed of  bribery;  that  the  punishment  of  the  guilty 
man  was  the  heaviest  that  could  be  inflicted,  that  for 
him  there  could  be  no  plea  for  mercy,  nor  hope  of 
pardon.  No  orator,  no  general,  would  then  sell  the 
critical  opportunity  whenever  it  arose — the  oppor- 
tunity so  often  offered  to  men  by  fortune,  even  when 
they  are  careless  and  their  foes  are  on  their  guard. 
They  did  not  barter  away  the  harmony  between 
people  and  people,  nor  their  own  mistrust  of  the  ty- 
rant and  the  foreigner,  nor  any  of  these  high  senti- 
ments. Wb^TP.  P^^  ^^^c^^  gpnf.itnpn^'^  nnw?  Tliey_have 
been  sn1d_jrij-,hf>.  marVp.t  and  are  gone;  and  thogg_have 
been  imported_in  their  stead  through  which  the 
natioiLJiea_ruiaed_and_plaguerSlricken — the  envy  of 
the  man  who  has  received  his  hire;  the  amusement 
which  accompanies  his  avowal ;  the  pardon  granted  to 
those  whose  guilt  is  proved;  the  hatred  of  one  who 
censures  the  crime;  and  all  the  appurtenances  of  cor- 
ruption. For  as  to  ships,  numerical  strength,  un- 
stinting abundance  of  funds  and  all  other  material 
of  war,  and  all  the  things  by  which  the  strength  of 
cities  is  estimated,  every  people  can  command  those 
in  greater  plenty  and  on  a  larger  scale  by  far  than 
in  old  days.  But  all  those  resources  are  rendered 
unserviceable,  ineffectual,  unprofitable,  by  those  who 
traffic  in  them. 

At  the  same  time,  Demosthenes  was  under  no 
delusion  as  to  Philip's  power.     Athens,  in  spite 


340  Demosthenes 

of  her  recovery  from  the  impoverished  condition 
in  which  she  found  herself  some  years  before,  was 
not  yet  strong  enough  to  risk  a  pitched  battle 
on  land  against  Philip's  modernised  army.  Her 
policy  was  rather  to  hold  him  in  check  by  per- 
petual operations,  forming  part  of  a  lengthy  carn- 
paign,  and  so  to  conduct  operations  at  a  distance 
that  he  might  be  unable  to  draw  nearer  to  Attica. 
In  the  latter  part  of  the  Speech,  he  returned  to 
the  attack  upon  his  opponents,  and  upon  the 
People  for  their  apathy  in  regard  to  his  opponents' 
disloyalty^;  and  cited  instance  after  instance  to 
show  the  disasters  brought  about  by  Philip's 
friends — in  Olynthus,  in  Oreus,  in  Eretria.  Fi- 
nally he  moved  that  preparations  for  war  should 
at  once  be  begun,  and  that  envoys  should  be  sent 
to  the  Peloponnesian  States,  to  Chios  and  Rhodes, 
and  to  the  King  of  Persia  himself  (whose  interests 
in  regard  to  Philip  were  the  same  as  those  of 
Athens),  to  organise  the  world  against  Philip. 
No  one  would  do  this,  he  declared,  if  Athens  did 
not.  "The  task  is  yours.  It  is  the  prerogative 
that  your  fathers  won,  and  through  many  a  great 
peril  bequeathed  to  you." 

V    A  mere  summary  of  this  great  Speech,  and  a  few 

quotations,  can  give  but  a  poor  impression  of  its 

power.     It  is  a  stronger  proof  of  it,  that  the  policy 

\advocated  in  it   was    instantly   adopted.     Rein- 

Tforcements  and  money  were  sent  to  Diopeithes; 

within  a  month  or  two  at  most  Chares  also  was 

I    '  See  Ch.  III.,  p.  82. 


Nominal  Peace  and  Renewal  of  War     341 

in  the  Chersonese,  ^  and  Athenian  garrisons  were 
placed  in  Proconnesus  and  Tenedos.^  The  exer- 
tions made  by  Athens  were  such  as,  a  short  time 
before,  no  one  would  have  believed  her  capable 
of  making.  Her  envoys  went  in  all  directions. 
Demosthenes  himself  travelled  to  Byzantium:  by 
his  efforts  the  old  alliance  between  Byzantium 
and  Athens  was  renewed;  grudges  on  both  sides 
were  forgotten;  and  the  key  of  the  Black  Sea  was 
thus  once  more  in  friendly  hands.  (At  a  later 
date  Demosthenes  recalled^  with  some  pride  that, 
in  consequence  of  this,  Athens  was  kept  supplied 
during  the  war  which  followed  with  the  necessaries 
of  life  in  greater  plenty  than  during  the  years  of 
peace  in  Alexander's  reign.)  From  Byzantium  he 
passed  to  Abydos,  and  succeeded  in  transform- 
ing its  long-standing  ill-feeling  against  Athens  into 
friendship.''  He  also  renewed  friendly  relations 
with  the  Thracian  princes,  though  whether  with 
those  who  had  already  been  conquered  by  Philip, 
or  with  others,  who  may  have  retained  a  nominal 
independence,  we  do  not  know.  ^  It  may  have 
been  on  the  same  tour  that  he  went  to  Illyria, 
since  he  couples  the  Illyrians  with  the  Thracian 
princes  in  the  enumeration  of  those  with  whom  he 
had  negotiated.  Hypereides  travelled  to  Rhodes, 
and  probably  to  Chios  also,  and  secured  their 
alliance.^     Messengers  were  also  perhaps  sent  to 

'  C.  I.  A.,  ii.,  116.  *  Dem.,  de  Cor.,  §302. 

^  Ibid.,  §  89.  ^Ibid.,  §302. 

s  lUd.,   §  244.  «  Vit.  X  Oral.,  850a. 


342  Demosthenes 

the  King  of  Persia;  and  he  certainly  sent  money 
to  Diopeithes.^ 

It  is,  however,  possible  that  the  embassy  to  Per- 
sia was  not  sent  at  once.  We  hear,^  it  is  true, 
of  a  certain  Ephialtes  who  was  sent  to  the  King 
when  Philip  was  besieging  Byzantium,  and  who 
secretly  brought  back  large  sums  of  money  from 
the  King  to  induce  the  popular  leaders  in  Athens 
to  commence  war.  Demosthenes,  it  is  said,  re- 
ceived three  thousand  darics,  and  Hypereides 
also  shared  in  the  distribution.  It  is  impossible 
to  test  the  truth  of  this  story,  or  to  decide  whether 
Ephialtes  was  sent  as  the  result  of  Demosthenes* 
advice.  But  it  is  at  least  probable  that  the  People 
did  not  immediately  overcome  their  repugnance 
to  a  step  so  contrary  to  their  traditions  and  in- 
clinations as  the  appeal  for  help  to  the  King; 
and  if  the  Fourth  Philippic  is  (as  some  suppose)  a 
pamphlet  issued  by  Demosthenes  himself  some- 
what later  than  the  delivery  of  the  Third  Philippic, 
it  shows  that  the  suggestion  of  an  embassy  to  the 
King  needed  to  be  reinforced  by  further  argument 
than  he  had  given  to  the  point  in  that  Speech. 
There  is,  however,  no  evidence  to  show  that  (as 
some  modem  critics  surmise)  the  action  of  the 
Athenians  in  seeking  alligj^ce  w;ith  the  King  alien- 

*  Ar.,  Rhet.,  II,  viii.,  p.  1386a  13.  The  reply  of  the  King  to  the 
Athenians  quoted  by  ^sch.,  in  Ctes.,  §  235,  cannot,  as  is  generally 
stated,  refer  to  this  occasion,  but  must  belong  to  the  year  335, 
since  it  was  given  "shortly  before  Alexander  crossed  into  Asia." 

^  Vit.  X  Oral,  ?>\^i.,  848c.      The  authority  is  not  very  reliable. 


Nominal  Peace  and  Renewal  of  War      343 

ated  from_JJieirL__:^ie___syTripa.t.bies  of  the  other 
Greeks.  Thebes  and  Sparta  at  any  rate  could 
not  throw  stones  at  them,  and  many  of  the  other 
States  shortly  afterwards  joined  in  league  with 
Athens.  And  though  there  is  no  doubt  a  formal 
inconsistency  hRt-^p.p.ri  Dp.mn<;t>ipnpc;'  gtmng  ex- 
pressions in  reference  to  the  great  traditions  of 
Athens  as  the  champion  of  the  Greeks  against 
Persia,  and  his  advocacy  of  a  Persian  alliance 
against  Philip,  the  latter  policy  was  dictated  by 
higher  reasons  than  considerations  of  mere  con- 
sistency. Indeed,  to  use  the  help  of  Persia  to 
secure  the  freedom  of  Greece  was  scarcely  even 
inconsistent  with  the  principle  underlying  the 
traditional  attitude  of  Athens,  and  was  certainly 
no  treason.  The  assertion  that  Demosthenes 
himself  received  money  from  the  King  occurs  first 
in  a  very  late  and  not  always  reliable  authority, 
and  may  be  false ;  but  even  if  it  is  true,  it  is  a  gross 
exaggeration  to  state,  as  some  modem  historians 
do, '  that  from  this  time  onwards  Demosthenes  was 
the  chief  agent  of  Persia  in  Greece.  His  later  re- 
lations with  Persia  will  be  considered  in  their  place. 
It  was  not  only  by  embassies  that  Demosthenes 
prepared  for  the  struggle.  On  his  proposal  a 
definite  alliance  was  made  in  the  summer  of  341 
with  Chalcis  in  Eubcea;  and  the  envoys  sent 
to  deprecate  this  by  Cleitarchus  and  Philistides 
failed  to  obtain  a  favourable  hearing  at  Athens.* 

'  Ed.  Meyer,  Isokrates'  zweiter  Brief,  p.  778. 
»  Dem.,  de  Cor.,  §  82. 


344  Demosthenes 

Before  July  was  over  the  Athenian  general  Ce- 
phisophon  had  expelled  Philistides  from  Oreus, 
and  in  the  following  month  Cephisophon  was  suc- 
ceeded by  Phocion,  who  besieged  Eretria,  drove 
out  Cleitarchus,  and  (as  had  been  done  in  Oreus) 
restored  the  democracy.^  In  conjunction  with 
Callias  of  Chalcis  Demosthenes  now  proceeded 
to  organise  a  league  against  Philip,  and  the  Athen- 
ians about  the  same  time  conferred  the  citizenship 
of  Athens  upon  Callias  and  his  brother  Tauro- 
sthenes.  Callias  and  Demosthenes  went  to  the 
Peloponnese  and  obtained  promises  of  large  sums 
of  money  and  considerable  contingents  of  soldiers 
from  Corinth  and  Megara,  and  from  the  Achasans. 
(The  Spartans,  and,  as  was  natural,  the  Pelopon- 
nesian  States  in  which  Philip  had  influence,  stood 
aloof.)  Demosthenes  also  travelled  to  Acamania, 
and  received  the  adhesion,  not  only  of  the  Acar- 
nanians,  but  of  Ambracia,  Leucas,  and  Corcyra 
as  well.  Callias  appeared  before  the  Assembly 
in  person,  probably  in  January  or  February,  340, 
and  reported  the  results  of  his  tour;  and  (according 
to  ^schines'  account)  spoke  of  further  advantages 
gained,  which  must  at  present  be  kept  secret. 
Demosthenes  confirmed  this  hint,  and  reported 
the  promises  which  he  had  himself  received.  He 
further  stated  that  arrangements  had  been  made 
for  a  congress  at  Athens,  to  be  held  in  a  very 
short  time,  on  the  14th  of  Anthesterion  (March 
7th) ,  340.     The  congress  was  probably  held,  since 

'  Didym.,  scliol.  in  Dem.,  Col.  i.;  Diod.,  XVI,  Ixxiv. 


Nominal  Peace  and  Renewal  of  War      345 

Plutarch^  records  the  reply  made  by  Hegesippus 
to  the  new  aUies,  who  desired  their  rates  of  con- 
tribution to  be  settled,  that  "war  cannot  be  put 
upon  rations";  and  although  ^schines^  describes 
the  announcements  made  by  Demosthenes  as  a 
conspicuous  illustration  of  Demosthenes'  skill  in 
making  his  falsehoods  detailed  and  circumstantial, 
there  is  no  reason  to  doubt  that  the  promises  were 
really  given;  for  most  of  the  States  named  did  in 
fact  give  help  to  Athens  in  the  campaigns  of  339 
and  338.  Demosthenes  claimed  ^  that  from  these 
sources  there  came,  besides  citizen-troops,  fifteen 
thousand  mercenaries  and  two  thousand  cavalry. 
In  dealing  with_the  Euboeans,  as  afterwards 
in  making  alliance  with  Thebes,  Demosthenes 
sought  to  render  the  friendship  stable  by  offering 
generous  terms  to  the  new  allies.  Instead  of  re- 
quiring the  Euboean  States  to  contribute  to  the 
Athenian  League,  he  persuaded  the  Assembly  to 
permit — by  a  decree,  ^schines  says,  "longer  than 
the  Iliad'' — the  formation  of  a  separate  Euboean 
confederacy,  and  to  authorise  the  peoples  of  Oreus 
and  Eretria  to  contribute  their  funds  to  Callias 
instead  of  to  the  treasury  of  the  Athenian  allies. 
There  can  be  little  doubt  that  this  was  a  wise  as 
well  as  a  generous  step.  It  was  well  worth  some 
sacrifice  to  establish  a  united  Euboea,  and  to 
convert  the  island,  which  Philip  might  have  made 
his    base  of   operations  against  Athens,   into  a 

'  Plut.,  Dem.,  xvii.  *  In  C/es.,  §  99. 

3  De  Cor.,  §  237. 


34^  Demosthenes 

barrier  against  him.'  ^schines,  however,  eleven 
years  later,  ^  attacked  Demosthenes  fiercely,  for 
thus  depriving  the  Athenians  of  the  contributions 
from  Euboea,  and  rendering  Euboea  independent 
of  Athens,  except  for  the  futile  provision  that  the 
citizens  of  Chalcis  should  come  to  the  aid  of  Athens 
if  she  were  attacked.  He  further  alleged  that 
Demosthenes  had  been  bribed  to  do  this  by  the 
gift  of  a  talent  apiece  from  Chalcis,  Eretria,  and 
Oreus;  and  described  how  the  people  of  Oreus 
vainly  tried  to  persuade  Demosthenes  to  let  them 
off  this  payment,  promising  to  erect  a  statue  to 
him;  and  how  in  the  end  they  were  obliged  to 
mortgage  their  public  revenues  to  him,  until  the 
talent  was  repaid  with  interest.  In  the  story  as 
told  by  ^schines  there  are  some  very  improbable 
statements,  ^  and  the  whole  tale  may  be  fictitious, 
even  though  Hypereides  and  Deinarchus  also  al- 
lege that  Demosthenes  made  money  out  of  the 
negotiations  with  Callias;  for  when  the  morality 
of  Greek  statesmen  generally  was  such  as  it  ap- 
pears to  have  been  at  this  period,  it  was  a  matter 
of  course  that  any  statesman  who  gave  advan- 
tageous terms  to  another  State  would  be  accused 
of  having  done  so  for  a  bribe. ' 

However  this  may  be,  Callias  proved  himself 

'  De  Cor.,  §  301 ;  cf.  §  237  fl.  '  In  Ctes.,  §§  103-105. 

J  Such  as  that  Cleitarchus,  the  expelled  tyrant  of  Eretria,  as 
well  as  the  son  of  a  former  tyrant  of  Oreus,  took  part  in  the 
transaction. 

1  On  the  date  of  the  Euboean  alliance,  see  Reichenbacher, 
Dte  Gesch.  der  athenischen  u.  makedonischen  Politik,  pp.  30-34. 


Nominal  Peace  and  Renewal  of  War      347 

an  active  partner;  for,  with  ships  lent  to  him  by- 
Athens,  he  attacked  the  towns  on  the  Gulf  of 
Pagasae  and  took  them  all;  and  seizing  any  mer- 
chant-vessels that  were  sailing  to  Macedonia,  sold 
those  on  board  as  slaves.  The  Athenians  passed 
a  vote  of  thanks  to  him  for  these  achievements, 
which,  in  the  spirit  if  not  in  the  letter,  involved 
a  distinct  breach  of  the  Peace  of  Philocrates.  ^ 
About  the  same  time  (probably  late  in  341  or  early 
in  340)  acts  of  direct  hostility  were  committed. 
The  islanders  of  Peparethus  (who  belonged  to 
the  Athenian  alliance)  seized  Halonnesus  and 
expelled  Philip's  soldiers,  who  had  occupied  it 
since  the  expulsion  of  the  pirates;  and  when  in 
return  Philip's  ships  made  a  raid  upon  Peparethus, 
the  Athenian  admirals  were  ordered  to  make 
reprisals.^  Besides  this,  a  Macedonian  herald 
named  Nicias,  carrying  despatches,  was  seized  on 
Macedonian  territory  by  the  Athenians,  and  kept 
in  prison  for  ten  months ;  and  the  despatches  were 
publicly  read  in  the  Assembly.^  The  Athenian 
forces  stationed  in  Thasos  offered  a  refuge  to 
pirate  ships,  despite  the  clause  in  the  treaty  with 
Philip  by  which  both  parties  bound  themselves  to 
suppress  piracy.''  At  Athens  itself,  Demosthenes 
caused  the  arrest  of  Anaxinus  of  Oreus,  whom  he 
alleged  to  be  a  spy  in  Philip's  interest,  though 

^  Ep.  Phil.,  §5.  It  may  be  that  technically  the  acts  of  Callias, 
even  when  he  had  borrowed  ships  from  Athens,  could  not  con- 
stitute a  breach  of  the  Peace  by  Athens. 

'Ibid.,   §§12-15.  i  Ibid.,  ^2.  *  Ibid. 


348  Demosthenes 

iEschines  declares  that  he  had  come  to  Athens  to 
make  purchases  for  Philip's  wife,  Olympias;  and, 
on  Demosthenes'  motion,  Anaxinus  was  tortured 
and  executed,  despite  the  fact  that  he  had  once 
been  Demosthenes'  host  at  Oreus^ — an  unpleas- 
ant incident,  but  very  significant  of  the  strength 
of  the  prevalent  feeling  against  Philip,  At  the 
Dionysia  in  March,  340,  on  the  proposal  of  Aris- 
tonicus,  Demosthenes  was  crowned  with  a  wreath 
of  gold  before  the  assembled  People,  for  his  services 
to  the  city.  ^ 

In  the  meanwhile  Philip  had  not  been  idle  in 
Thrace.  Before  the  end  of  341  the  whole  country 
was  in  his  power;  and  it  became  plain  that  (as 
Demosthenes  had  foreseen)  the  turn  of  his  former 
allies,  Byzantium  and  Perinthus,  must  shortly 
come.  The  Byzantines,  as  has  already  been 
narrated,  had  now  made  alliance  with  Athens, 
and  when  Philip  called  upon  them  to  join  in  resist- 
ing the  Athenians  in  the  Chersonese,  they  replied 
that  such  action  could  not  be  required  of  them 
under  the  terms  of  their  treaty  with  him.  ^  About 
the  end  of  July,  340, "  his  ships  sailed  up  the  Hel- 

'  Perhaps  during  the  delay  at  Oreus  on  the  Second  Embassy. 
Demosthenes  taunts  ^schines  with  receiving  Anaxinus,  as  well  as 
the  envoys  of  Cleitarchus  and  Philistides  on  a  former  occasion; 
but  ^schines  as  Consul  of  Oreus  at  Athens  would  be  bound  to  do 
this;  see  Dem.,ci«^  Cor.,  §§  82,  i37;^sch.,t»C/e5.,  §224. 

'  Dem.,  de  Cor.,  §  83.  3  Ibid.,   §  8.7 

<  Philochorus,  fr.  135;  for  the  date  see  Kromayer,  Antike 
Schlachff elder,  i.,  p.  178. 


Nominal  Peace  and  Renewal  of  War     349 

lespont;  but  the  Athenian  commander  in  the 
Chersonese  showed  such  hostiHty,  that  PhiHp, 
to  protect  his  ships,  marched  his  army  alongside 
of  them  through  the  Chersonese,  while  the  Athen- 
ian commanders  invoked  the  assistance  of  the 
Byzantines.  (The  opposition  of  the  Athenians 
to  the  passage  of  Philip's  ships  had  been  enjoined 
upon  them  by  a  decree  proposed  in  the  Assembly 
by  Poly  crates,  and  was  thus  an  act  of  open 
war.  0 

Philip  now  laid  siege  to  Perinthus  with  the  aid 
of  all  the  devices  that  he  and  his  engineer  Poly- 
eidus  could  contrive.  The  inhabitants  made  a 
magnificent  resistance,  but  would  probably  have 
been  forced  to  surrender,  had  not  the  Persian  King 
ordered  his  satraps  to  render  them  all  possible 
assistance.  In  consequence  of  this  order,  a  large 
body  of  mercenaries  crossed  from  Asia  Minor, 
imder  the  command  of  the  Athenian  Apollodorus 
and  Aristomedes  of  Pherae.*  The  Byzantines  also 
helped  the  Perinthians  both  with  men  and  supplies ; 
and  the  resistance  was  so  successful  that  Philip 
suddenly  departed,  leaving  only  part  of  his  forces 
before  the  walls,  and  laid  siege  to  Byzantium  itself. 

It  was  about  this  time  (in  the  autumn  of  340) 
that  there  occurred  the  event  which  led  to  the 
actual  declaration  of  war  between  Athens  and 
Philip.    The  Athenian  merchant  fleet  had  collected 

^Ep.  Phil.,  §  16. 

»Diod.,  XVI,  Ixxv.;  Paus.,  I,  xxix.,  §7;  "Reply  to  Philip's 
Letter,"  §  5. 


350  Demosthenes 

at  Hieron  ^  (an  island  belonging  to  Chalcedon  and 
situated  near  the  Asiatic  coast,  at  the  entry  of  the 
Bosporus),  in  order  that  Chares  might  thence 
escort  them  safely  homewards  with  his  war-ships. 
But  during  the  temporary  absence  of  Chares  at  a 
conference  with  the  commanders  of  the  Persian 
force,  Philip  succeeded  in  getting  possession  of  the 
merchant-ships,  to  the  number  of  230,  and  not 
only  took  from  them  seven  hundred  talents  in 
money  and  the  cargoes  of  com  and  hides  which  he 
found  there,  but  also  used  the  timber  of  the  vessels 
themselves  for  his  siege- works.  ^  The  Athenians 
appear  to  have  sent  a  protest  to  Philip,  and  in  reply 
he  despatched  a  letter  (of  which  the  substance  is 
probably  contained  in  the '  'Letter  of  Philip"  includ- 
ed among  the  orations  of  Demosthenes)  enumerat- 
ing the  acts  of  hostility  which  the  Athenians  had 
committed  against  him  since  346,  denoimcing  the 
orators  of  the  war-party,  and  declaring  his  inten- 
tion of  retaliating.^  In  reply,  on  the  advice  of 
Demosthenes  (though  possibly  the  formal  motion 
was  not  moved  by  him) '',  it  was  resolved  to  remove 
the  column  on  which  the   treaty  of  peace  and 

'  Its  name  was  due  to  its  containing  a  temple  of  Zeus  Ourios 
See  Arrian,  Peripl.,  §§  12,  25;  Boeckh.  on  C.  I.  G.,  ii.,  3797; 
WeilonDem.  in  Lept.,  §  36. 

'  Didymus,  schol.  in  Dem.,  Col.,  x.,  xi.  (quoting  Philochorus). 
The  sum  of  seven  hundred  talents  seems  enormous;  and  it  may  at 
least  be  questioned  whether  the  numeral  is  not  corrupt.  See 
Note  7. 

3  See  Foucart,  Les  Atheniens  dans  la  Chersonhe,  p.  38. 

4  Dem.,  de  Cor.,  §  76;  comp.  Didymus,  I.e.,  and  ^sch.,tn  Ctes., 
§55. 


Nominal  Peace  and  Renewal  of  War     35 1 

alliance  with  Philip  was  engraved,  to  man  a  fresh 
fleet,  and  to  carry  on  the  war  by  all  possible  means.  ^ 
In  order  to  facilitate  the  execution  of  this  deter- 
mination, Demosthenes  propounded  a  reform  of 
the  trierarchic  system,  somewhat  different  in 
detail  from  that  which  he  had  put  forward  in  354, 
but  with  the  same  object — that  of  preventing  the 
rich  from  evading  their  responsibilities.  Whereas 
imder  the  existing  system  rich  men  had  contributed 
only  a  fraction  of  the  cost  of  a  single  trireme,  con- 
tributions were  now  to  be  graduated  in  strict  pro- 
portion to  property;  and  so  "a  man  came  to  be 
charged  with  two  warships,  who  had  previously 
been  one  of  sixteen  subscribers  to  a  single  one."'' 
It  is  for  this  strict  apportionment  of  liability  to 
property  that  Demosthenes  afterwards  claimed 
special  credit.  The  wealthier  citizens  vainly  at- 
tempted, he  tells  us,  to  divert  him  from  his  pur- 
pose by  the  offer  of  huge  bribes,  and  to  hinder 
the  passage  of  the  law  by  prosecuting  him  for  its 
alleged  illegality;  the  prosecutor  did  not  obtain  a 
fifth  part  of  the  votes  of  the  jury,  and  so  himself 
incurred  a  fine,  -^schines  of  course  opposed  the 
law  vigorously,  but  it  was  carried,  and  so  success- 
ful was  its  operation  that  throughout  the  war  with 
Philip  not  a  complaint  was  raised  against  it ;  there 
were  no  cases  of  default;  the  work  of  equipment 
was  properly  done;  and  no  ship  was  left  at  home 
as  unsea worthy,  or  abandoned  at  sea.^     Demos- 

^  Philochorus,  ap.  Dion.  Hal.,  ad  Amm.,  i.,  x. 

="  Dem.,  de  Cor.,  §  104.  3  Ibid.,  §§  102-109. 


352  Demosthenes 

thenes  himself  was  appointed  overseer  of  the  fleet,  ^ 
and  thus  himself  supervised  the  execution  of  his 
law.  At  some  time  or  other  after  the  passage  of 
the  law,  modifications  appear  to  have  been  intro- 
duced into  it,  probably  in  consequence  of  a  renewed 
attack  by  ^schines;  but  there  can  be  little  doubt 
that,  for  the  time,  Demosthenes  had  his  own 
way.^ 

Philip  had  doubtless  expected  to  surprise  Byzan- 
tium while  its  defenders  were  assisting  the  Perin- 
thians.  In  this  he  failed;  but  he  laid  siege  to  the 
city  with  vigour,  and  did  not  relax  his  efforts 
throughout  the  winter.  The  Athenians  ordered 
Chares,  with  forty  ships,  to  attempt  to  relieve 
the  beleaguered  city;  but  the  inhabitants  mis- 
trusted him  (perhaps  with  good  reason)  and  would 
not  admit  him  to  the  city.  ^  At  first  the  Athenians 
were  inclined  to  resent  this;  but  Phocion  declared 
that  the  fault  lay  more  with  the  general  than  with 
the  Byzantines;  and  he  was  thereupon  himself 
sent  out  (with  Cephisophon)  in  place  of  Chares, 
late  in  340  or  early  in  339.''  Demosthenes  and 
Hypereides  were  among  those  who  voltmtarily 
furnished  ships  for  the  war.  ^  Phocion  was  warmly 
welcomed  by  the  besieged,  and  conducted  the 
defence  of  the  city  in  conjunction  with  Leon,  a 
Byzantine  who  had  been  his  friend  when  both 
were  pupils  of  Plato  in  the  Academy.     His  ships 

'  This  was  probably  an  extraordinary  office,  created  for  the 
occasion.  » Note  8.         J  Note  9.  <  C.  /.  A.,  ii.,  809. 

s  C.  I.  A.,  ii.,  808,  809;  Vii.  X  Oral.,  848f,  851a. 


Nominal  Peace  and  Renewal  of  War      353 

also  protected  the  Athenian  com-convoy.^  The 
peoples  of  Perinthus  and  Byzantium  passed  reso- 
lutions of  gratitude  to  Athens  in  glowing  terms, 
and  sent  crowns  to  her,  as  did  also  the  colonists 
in  the  Chersonese;  and  Demosthenes  afterwards 
claimed  to  be  the  only  statesman  for  whose  deserts 
the  city  had  received  a  crown.  ^  The  Byzantines 
were  also  assisted  by  ships  from  Chios,  Rhodes, 
and  Cos — once  their  allies  against  Athens,  and 
now  (perhaps  owing  to  anxiety  for  the  safety  of 
their  own  commerce)  allies  of  Athens  itself  once 
more;  a  Persian  force  crossed  once  more  from  Asia 
to  help  them  3;  and  in  spite  of  persistent  attacks, 
Philip  could  not  take  the  town.  At  last,  after  a 
well-planned  attempt  on  a  moonlight  night,  which 
might  have  succeeded  had  not  the  defenders  been 
roused  by  the  barking  of  dogs,  he  resolved  to  depart 
(early  in  the  spring  of  339). "*  By  concocting  a 
carefully  devised  letter  to  Antipater,  and  contriv- 
ing that  it  should  fall  into  the  hands  of  the  Athen- 
ian commanders,  he  caused  the  latter  to  leave  the 
passage  of  the  Bosporus  open,  and  so  got  his  ships 
away  from  the  Black  Sea,  where  they  appear  to 
have  been  confined.  ^  On  his  way  he  perhaps 
plundered  the  Athenian  colonies  in  the  Chersonese, 
and  apparently  his  fleet  passed  through  the  Hel- 
lespont without  difficulty,  probably  because,  as 

'  Dem.,  de  Cor.,  §  89.  »  7Ji<f.,  §  90  ff. 

J  Arrian,  Anab.,  II,  xiv.,  §  5. 

<  For  the  date,  see  Kromayer,  Antike  Schlachff elder,  pp.  181, 
184.  5  Front.,  I,  iv.,  §  13. 

33 


354  Demosthenes 

before,  he  kept  the  colonists  employed  on  shore; 
but  Phocion  afterwards  overtook  some  of  his  ships, 
and  recovered  some  of  the  Thracian  coast  towns 
which  Philip  had  taken,  making  descents  upon 
various  points  until  he  was  wounded  and  forced 
to  return  home.^ 

Philip  now  took  his  army  off  upon  a  distant 
expedition  against  the  warlike  Scythian  King 
Ateas,  who  had  insulted  him  in  the  previous  year.  * 
From  this  raid,  which  took  him  as  far  as  the 
Danube,  he  carried  off  a  vast  number  of  captives, 
as  well  as  horses,  flocks,  and  herds  ^ ;  and  his  success 
no  doubt  refreshed  the  spirits  of  his  men.  But  on 
his  way  homewards,  he  passed  through  the  country 
of  the  Triballi,  a  fierce  tribe  living  on  Motmt 
Hasmus,  and  in  a  sudden  attack  by  the  tribesmen 
he  not  only  lost  the  booty  taken  from  the  Scythians 
but  was  himself  severely  wounded  in  the  thigh.'* 
He  succeeded,  however,  in  fighting  his  way  through 
into  Macedonia,  where  he  must  have  arrived  in 
the  spring  of  339. 

Up  to  this  point  the  result  of  the  struggle  had 
been  favourable  to  Athens,  and  Philip's  failure  to 
take  Byzantium,  and  his  subsequent  misfortunes, 
must  have  given  great  encouragement  to  the 
Athenians.     But    some    months    before    Philip's 

*  Justin,  IX,  [i.;  Syncellus  III,  692;  Plut.,  Phoc,  xiv.  See 
Note  10. 

»  For  anecdotes  about  this  King,  see  Schafer,  ii.,  p.  519. 

3  Justin,  IX,  ii.;  Strabo,  p.  307;  ^sch.,  in  Ctes.,  §  128. 

4  Justin,  IX,  iii.;  Didym.,  schol.  in  Dent.,  Col.  13. 


I 


Nominal  Peace  and  Renewal  of  War     355 

return  to  Macedonia  there  had  been  sown  the 
seeds  of  new  troubles  for  Athens,  and  new  oppor- 
tunities for  PhiHp.  The  nature  of  these,  and  the 
issue  of  the  struggle,  will  be  the  subject  of  the  next 
chapter. 

NOTES   TO   CHAPTER   IX 

1.  On  the  difficulty  in  the  evidence  as  to  the  Thessalian 
tetrarchies  (Dem.,  Phil.  II,  §  22,  de  Chers.,  §  26,  and  Harpocr., 
s.  V.  SexaSapxia)  see  the  note  in  my  translation  of  Demosthenes' 
Public  Orations,  vol.  ii.,  pp.  166, 167.  It  is  disputed  whether  the 
tetrarchies  were  actually  created  in  344,  or  whether  Philip  at  first 
established  a  decadarchy  or  Council  of  Ten,  and  replaced  it  by 
tetrarchies  in  343.  But  I  am  now  inclined  to  think  that  the 
decadarchy  is  a  myth,  and  that  there  was  only  one  constitutional 
change. 

2.  It  is  not  certain  whether  Artaxerxes  had  or  had  not  yet 
effected  the  reconquest  of  Egypt  at  the  time  of  this  mission  to 
Athens  in  343.  See  Meyer,  Isokr.  zweiter  Brief,  p.  777 ;  Kahrstedt, 
Forschungen,  pp.  15  flf.,and  Klio,  vol.  x.,  p.  508;  Lehmann-Haupt 
in  Klio,  vol.  x.,  pp.  391  fif.,  and  in  Gercke  and  Norden's  Einleit- 
ung  in  die  Alteriumswissenschaft,  in.,  pp.  61,  119;  and  Cavaignac, 
Hist,  de  VAntiquite,  p.  401.  Kahrstedt  gives  strong  reasons  for 
thinking  that  Egypt  was  not  subdued  until  the  following  winter — 
that  of  343-2.  The  King  may  have  wanted  the  Greek  States  to 
give  him  help  against  Egypt,  or  at  least  to  facilitate  his  obtaining 
Greek  soldiers  as  mercenaries.  But  he  probably  had  Philip  also 
in  his  mind.  Some  think  that  he  first  tried  to  negotiate  with 
Philip  himself  and  obtained  a  nominal  and  short-lived  alliance; 
but  the  passage  of  Arrian,  II,  xiv.,  on  which  this  conjecture  is 
based,  probably  refers  to  an  earlier  period.  See  above.  Chap. 
VI.,  p.  191. 

3.  Comp.  Phil.  Ill,  §  71,  where  Demosthenes  recommends  an 
embassy  to  the  King  (in  341 ).  The  proposal  is  still  more  strongly 
argued  in  Phil.  IV,  §§  31-34,  where  the  writer  urges  that  the 
fact  that  the  King  had  seized  Philip's  confidant  Hermeias  proved 
his  interest  in  the  war  with  Philip,  and  protests  against  the  appli- 
cation of  the  names  "barbarian"  and  "public  enemy"  to  the 


35^  Demosthenes 

Great  King.  Whether  the  Fourth  Philippic  was  issued  by  Dem- 
osthenes as  a  pamphlet  in  the  early  summer  of  341  (as  Korte, 
Rhein.  Mus.,  Ix.,  p.  3,  believes),  or  was  compiled  from  Demosthenic 
material  by  Anaximenes  for  insertion  in  his  history  (as  Nitsche 
and  Wendland  think),  it  was  certainly  the  work  of  some  one 
intimately  acquainted  with  the  events  and  position  of  afifairsinthe 
early  part  of  341  (just  after  Phil.  III.),  and  can  safely  be  used  as 
an  authority. 

4.  Plutarch  himself  doubts  whether  the  trial  really  took 
place,  and  whether  the  speeches  were  ever  delivered,  on  the  in- 
adequate ground  that  neither  orator  distinctly  refers  to  the  trial 
in  his  speech  at  the  trial  of  Ctesiphon  in  330.  Why  should  they? 
It  was  not  an  occasion  of  which  either  could  be  proud;  it  was  a 
defeat  for  one,  and  a  very  narrow  escape  for  the  other,  and 
yEschines,  the  victor  in  the  contest,  had  least  reason  of  all  to 
mention  it,  since  he  desired  his  connection  with  the  Peace  to  be 
forgotten.  The  expression  used  by  Dion.  Hal.  (ad  Amm.,  i., 
10)  when  he  says  that  Demosthenes  "  composed "  this  speech, 
while  in  other  cases  he  used  words  distinctly  implying  deliv- 
ery, may  be  purely  accidental.  That  there  were  some  dif- 
ferences between  the  spoken  and  the  published  speech  of 
Demosthenes  is  certain,  and  some  of  the  replies  to  "anticipated 
objections"  of  the  adversary  were  probably  not  written  until 
after  the  trial. 

5.  Beloch  believes  that  an  alliance  against  Philip  was  made  in 
343-2;  but  the  arguments  urged  against  this  view  by  Reichen- 
bacher,  Die  Geschichte  der  athenischen  u.  makedonischen  Politik, 
pp.  30,  31,  are  very  strong. 

6.  The  Letter  of  Philip,  included  among  the  works  of  Demos- 
thenes, is  probably  extracted  from  the  History  of  Anaximenes 
{see'WenAla.ndtAnaxiinenesvonLampsakos,^.  13);  but  there  is  no 
reason  to  doubt  that  itaccurately  represents  Philip's  point  of  view, 
though  it  cannot  be  assumed  that  all  the  arguments  contained  in 
it  were  embodied  in  one  letter;  and  it  seems  safe  to  use  it  as  an 
authority.  The  so-called  "Reply  to  Philip's  Letter"  is  mainly  a 
compilation  of  passages  from  works  of  Demosthenes,  probably 
derived  from  the  same  source;  but  there  is  no  reason  to  regard  it 
as  unreliable  as  to  facts. 

7.  There  is  great  difiBculty  as  to  the  ships  taken  by  Philip. 
The  account  given  in  the  text  is  taken  from  the  Scholia  of  Didymus; 


Nominal  Peace  and  Renewal  of  War     357 

comp.  Dem.,  de  Cor.,  §§  73  and  139.  A  quite  diflFerent  account 
is  given  in  the  two  decrees  and  the  letter  of  Philip  quoted  in  Dem., 
de  Cor.,  §§  T2>~n-  According  to  these,  twenty  Athenian  ships, 
sent  under  Leodamas  to  the  Hellespont  as  an  escort  for  corn-ships 
sailing  from  the  Hellespont  to  Lemnos,  were  seized  by  Philip's 
admiral  Amyntas,  and  detained,  in  the  belief  that  they  were 
really  going  to  help  Selymbria,  which  was  being  besieged  by 
Philip;  but  upon  the  representations  of  envoys  sent  from  Athens, 
they  were  restored.  The  same  story  is  cited  (evidently  from  the 
documents  in  the  de  Cor.,  I.e.)  by  the  scholiast  on  the  "Reply  to 
Philip's  Letter. "  But  (i )  there  is  nowhere  else  any  reference  to  a 
siege  of  Selymbria  by  Philip  (Nitsche,  Demosthenes  und  Anaxi- 
menes,  pp.  82  ff.,  is  not  at  all  convincing);  and  (2)  the  documents 
quoted  in  the  text  of  the  de  Cor.  are  certainly  spurious  (see 
Goodwin's  edition,  App.  VIII.).  They  do  not  even  go  to  prove  the 
point  which  Demosthenes  wishes  to  prove;  for  the  capture  of 
ships  immediately  afterwards  restored  can  hardly  have  been  the 
cause  of  war;  and  there  are  sundry  mistakes  in  them.  We  are 
therefore  probably  justified  in  rejecting  the  whole  story,  as  Grote 
does.  But  if  Selymbria  really  was  attacked  by  Philip,  it  was 
doubtless  on  his  way  from  Perinthus  to  Byzantium;  and  if  the 
seizure  of  Leodamas'  ships  really  took  place,  it  may  have  been 
neglected  by  the  Greek  historians  through  a  confusion  of  it  with 
the  later  seizure  of  the  230  ships  at  Hieron. 

8.  We  do  not  know  to  what  .(Eschines  refers  {in  Ctes.,  §  222), 
when  he  says  that  he  "convicted  Demosthenes  of  stealing  from 
the  State  the  trierarchs  of  sixty-five  swift  ships";  but  the  refer- 
ence is  doubtless  to  his  criticism  of  some  detail  of  the  scheme.  It 
is  probable  that  the  criticisms  of  others  led  Demosthenes  after- 
wards to  modify  the  details;  and  Deinarchus  states,  as  a  mat- 
ter of  course,  that  he  did  so  for  money  (Dein.,  in  Dem.,  §  42). 
Demosthenes  (de  Cor.,  §  312)  speaks  of  a  damaging  attack  upon 
his  law  by  ^schines,  acting  as  the  hireling  of  the  wealthy  mem- 
bers of  the  Naval  Boards.  We  do  not  know  when  this  took  place ; 
but  it  was  probably  some  time  after  the  law  had  come  into  work- 
ing; since  we  gather  from  ^schines,  I.e.,  that  the  attack  was  based 
on  the  effects  of  the  law. 

9.  Plutarch  (Phoc.,  xiv.)  says  that  Chares  was  obliged  to 
wander  about,  getting  money  from  allied  cities  and  despised  by 
the  enemy.     It  is,  however,  possible  that  the  real  reason  for  his 


358  Demosthenes 

withdrawal  was  the  death  of  his  wife,  and  there  is  some  evidence 
that  he  contrived  to  operate  effectively  against  Philip  at  sea. 
See  Schafer,  ii.,  pp.  508,  509,  and  references  there  given. 

ID.  Some  writers  believe  (on  the  evidence  of  a  statement  in 
Diod.,  XVI,  Ixxvii.,  which  in  any  case  is  far  too  sweeping)  that 
Philip  now  made  peace  with  the  Byzantines  and  their  Greek 
allies,  with  the  exception  of  Athens;  but  the  evidence  is  not  suffi- 
cient to  show  whether  any  arrangement  was  really  made.  See 
Grote,  pt.  ii.,  ch.  90. 


I 


CHAPTER  X 

CELERONEIA 

WE  must  now  go  back  a  few  months,  to  the 
meeting  of  the  Amphictyonic  Council 
which  took  place  in  October  or  November,  340.^ 
At  this  meeting,  the  representatives  of  the  Locrians 
of  Amphissa,  who  in  the  Sacred  War  against  the 
Phocians  had  been  on  the  same  side  as  the  Thebans 
and  Philip,  proposed  that  a  fine  of  fifty  talents 
should  be  inflicted  upon  Athens,  because  the 
Athenians  had  hung  in  a  new  chapel  or  "treasury" 
in  the  precincts  of  Apollo  at  Delphi  certain  shields 
which  they  had  taken  in  the  Persian  wars,  without 
waiting  for  the  dedication  of  the  chapel,  and  in 
regilding  the  shields  had  inscribed  upon  them  the 
words,  "The  spoil  of  the  Athenians,  taken  from 
the  Persians  and  the  Thebans,  when  they  fought 
against  the  Greeks."  (The  words  had  doubtless 
been  inscribed  upon  them  originally,  but  they 
may  have  become  obscure  through  age.) 

The  Athenian  "  Hieromnemon ' '  or  representative 
on  the  Council  was  Diognetus;  while  the  official 
delegates,  or  Pylagori,  sent  by  Athens  were  ^sch- 

'  Note  I  at  the  end  of  the  Chapter. 
359 


36o  Demosthenes 

ines,  Meidias,  and  Thrasycles.  ^  When  the  Locrian 
representative  had  spoken,  Diognetus  sent  for  ^s- 
chines,  and  asked  him  to  reply  on  behalf  of  Athens. 
But  when  he  had  entered  the  Council-meeting  and 
was  beginning  to  speak,  one  of  the  Locrians  present 
— an  ill-mannered  fellow,  ^schines  declared,  and 
perhaps  prompted  by  some  evil  power — roseand  told 
the  meeting  that  they  ought  not  to  have  allowed  the 
name  of  the  Athenians  to  be  mentioned  during  that 
holy  season,  but  should  have  excluded  them  from 
the  temple  as  accursed,  on  account  of  their  al- 
liance with  the  sacrilegious  Phocians.  ^schines 
tells  us  that  at  this  he  became  more  angry  than 
he  had  ever  been  in  his  life,  and  retaliated  upon 
the  Amphisseans  by  denouncing  their  impiety  in 
cultivating  the  plain  of  Cirrha,  which  had  been 
devoted  to  Apollo  for  ever  in  the  time  of  Solon, 
and  in  making  money  out  of  the  sacred  harbour. 
Pointing  to  the  plain,  which  lay  spread  out  below 
them,  and  recalling  its  history,  he  declared  that  he 
himself  and  the  People  of  Athens  were  ready  to 
defend  the  consecrated  land  "with  hand  and  foot 
and  voice,"  and  by  every  possible  means. 

And  so  [he  continued],  do  you  take  counsel  for 
yourselves.  The  sacrifices  stand  ready  to  be  offered, 
and  you  are  about  to  ask  the  gods  for  their  blessing 
upon  yourselves  and  your  country.  With  what  words, 
with  what  conscience,  with  what  faces,  with  what 

'  Note  2.  We  have  only  Demosthenes'  word  for  the  statement 
that  ^schines  was  elected  by  the  Assembly  when  hardly  any  one 
was  present. 


Cheer  oneia  361 

confidence,  can  you  dare  to  make  your  supplications, 
if  you  have  left  this  accursed  people  unpunished?  In 
plain  and  unambiguous  words  the  curse  stands  in- 
scribed against  those  who  have  committed  such  mis- 
deeds, and  those  who  have  condoned  them;  and  in  it 
is  the  prayer  that  those  who  have  not  come  to  the 
help  of  Apollo  and  the  other  gods  of  Delphi  may  not 
sacrifice  aright,  and  that  the  gods  may  not  receive 
their  offerings. 

Such  was  the  impression  made  by  the  fiery 
eloquence  of  ^schines  upon  men  who  (as  Demos- 
thenes says')  were  imused  to  oratory,  that  their 
anger  was  now  turned  against  the  Amphisseans; 
and  the  Council  bade  their  herald  summon  the 
whole  adult  population  of  Delphi  to  meet  the 
Council  and  the  delegates  at  day-break  with  pick- 
axes and  spades,  on  pain  of  falling  under  a  curse. 
The  crowd  thus  collected  descended  next  morning 
to  Cirrha,  destroyed  the  harbour,  and  set  fire  to 
some  of  the  houses.  But  the  people  of  Amphissa, 
hearing  what  had  been  done,  came  down  in  force 
from  their  own  town,  attacked  the  Delphians,  and 
did  some  violence  to  the  sacred  persons  of  the 
Amphictyonic  Councillors,  who  with  difficulty 
made  their  way  back  to  Delphi.  Next  morning 
the  president  of  the  Council,  Cottyphus  of  Phar- 
salus,  convoked  an  assembly  of  all  the  worshippers 
of  the  god  who  were  present  in  Delphi.     The  con- 

'  No  doubt  truly;  for  they  were  mostly  representative  of  the 
northern  Greek  tribes,  who  were  not  nearly  so  civilised  as  the 
Athenians. 


362  Demosthenes 

duct  of  the  Amphisseans  was  censured  in  strong 
terms ;  and  it  was  resolved  that  the  Council  should 
hold  an  extraordinary  meeting  at  Thermopylae, 
before  their  next  regular  meeting,  and  shoiild  pre- 
pare a  decree  inflicting  proper  punishment  upon 
the  Amphisseans  for  their  impiety  in  encroaching 
on  the  sacred  ground,  and  doing  violence  to  the 
Amphictyons. 

When  ^schines  made  his  report  at  Athens,  the 
Assembly  at  first  strongly  commended  his  action, 
though  Demosthenes  declared  that  it  must  lead  to 
an  Amphictyonic  war  against  Athens — a.  prophecy 
which  many  supposed  to  have  been  prompted 
merely  by  personal  ill-will  against  ^schines.^  When 
however  the  decision  came  to  be  taken  whether  the 
Athenian  representatives  should  attend  the  special 
meeting  which  had  been  ordered,  Demosthenes, 
having  first  persuaded  the  Council,  carried  a  reso- 
lution in  the  Assembly  forbidding  them  to  do  so. 
(iEschines  alleged  that  this  was  only  done  by  a 
snatch-vote  taken  in  his  own  absence.)  The  ex- 
traordinary meeting  took  place  early  in  339,^ 
when  Philip  was  far  ojff  in  Scj'-thia.  No  repre- 
sentatives of  Athens  or  Thebes  were  present. 
War  was  declared  by  the  Amphictyonic  Council 
against  the  Amphisseans,  and  Cottyphus  was  ap- 
pointed to  command  the  Amphictyonic  troops. 

*  The  prophecy  was  fulfilled,  not  indeed  immediately  or 
literally  (for  ^schines  had  in  fact  averted  this),  but  in  all  prac- 
tical effect,  a  few  months  afterwards. 

'  Probably  in  January  or  early  in  February.     See  Note  3. 


ChcBToneia  363 

At  this  point  there  is  a  discrepancy  between 
our  two  authorities,  -^schines  states  that,  as  the 
result  of  the  first  campaign,  the  Locrians  were  or- 
dered to  pay  a  fine  by  a  specified  date,  to  banish 
those  who  were  responsible  for  their  impious  acts, 
and  to  recall  those  who  had  opposed  them.  Dem- 
osthenes, on  the  other  hand,  says  that  Cottyphus 
could  only  obtain  troops  from  the  Amphictyonic 
powers,  and  these  (in  the  absence  of  support  from 
Athens,  Thebes,  Sparta,  and  Philip)  were  ineffec- 
tive ;  some  did  not  even  answer  his  summons,  and 
the  campaign  was  a  failure.  Whether  on  this  ac- 
count, or  on  account  of  the  failure  of  the  Locrians 
to  pay  the  fine  and  carry  out  the  other  require- 
ments of  the  Amphictyons,  the  question  of  the 
conduct  of  the  war  was  reconsidered  at  the  regular 
meeting  of  the  Council  in  May  or  June,  at  which 
Cottyphus  declared  that  unless  the  Amphictyonic 
peoples  would  take  the  field,  and  contribute  suffi- 
cient funds,  and  fine  those  who  would  not  serve, 
the  only  chance  of  success  was  to  appoint  Philip 
their  general.  The  Councillors  (mostly  represen- 
tatives of  tribes  which  were  in  alliance  with  Philip) 
took  the  easier  coiu-se,  and  elected  Philip.  His 
wound  had  healed ;  he  accepted  the  invitation,  and 
marched  southward. 

Such  was  the  course  of  the  events  which  led  to 
a  struggle  more  momentous,  perhaps,  than  any 
since  the  Persian  wars.  What  was  the  meaning 
of   them?     Demosthenes   asserts   that   ^schines 


364  Demosthenes 

had  been  bribed  by  Philip  to  attack  the  Amphis- 
seans,  and  so  create  a  situation  in  which  Philip 
could  again  intervene.  He  denies  that  the  Amph- 
isseans  had  made  any  complaint  against  Athens, 
since  they  could  not  have  done  so  without  giv- 
ing the  Athenians  formal  notice,  and  such  notice 
had  never  been  given.  But  an  argument  based 
upon  such  a  technicality  is  inconclusive.  The 
speech  of  the  Locrian  representative  may  not  have 
been  in  order,  and  may  yet  have  provoked  a  reply ; 
or  it  may  rather  have  been  a  notice  of  motion  than 
a  formal  motion,  ^schines  cannot  at  least  be 
denied  the  excuse  of  having  acted  under  provoca- 
tion. But  was  his  action  in  itself  justifiable? 
This  too  it  is  difficvdt  to  deny;  it  seems  extremely 
likely  that  he  really  prevented  the  declaration  of 
an  Amphictyonic  war  against  Athens;  there  is 
not  the  least  evidence  that  his  action  was  prompted 
by  Philip;  and  he  probably  acted  in  good  faith, 
when  confronted  by  a  critical  situation. 

What  then  was  the  explanation  of  Demosthenes 
action?  ^schines  asserts  that  Demosthenes  was 
in  the  pay  of  the  Locrians  of  Amphissa,  and  had 
not  only  been  bribed  by  them,  when  he  was 
Pylagorus  in  343,  to  say  nothing  of  their  impious 
acts  to  the  Amphictyonic  Council,  but  was  actually 
receiving  twenty  minae  a  year  from  them,  on  the 
understanding  that  he  would  forward  their  inter- 
ests at  Athens  in  every  way.  But  it  is  possible 
to  place  a  more  honourable  construction  upon  his 
action.     The  attack  upon  Athens  in  the  Amphic- 


Chceroneia  365 

tyonic  Council  had  been  made  by  the  Amphisseans 
as  friends  of  the  Thebans,  whose  feelings  had  been 
hurt  (probably  through  pure  thoughtlessness)  by 
the  restoration  of  an  inscription  which  might  more 
happily  have  been  suffered  to  remain  obsolete, 
and  the  revival  thereby  of  the  record  of  an  old 
stain  upon  their  history, — their  abandonment  of 
the  Hellenic  cause  at  the  time  of  the  Persian 
invasion  of  480.  Demosthenes  saw  that,  if  Athens 
was  to.  hold  out  against  Philip,  she  must  not  quarrel 
with  Thebes,  and  therefore  must  not  join  in  action 
against  the  Amphisseans.  He  must  alsD"'fiaye 
Imown  that  the  Thebans  were  growing  discon- 
tented with  their  condition  as  allies  of  Philip,  as 
they  came  to  realise  that  they  could  only  occupy 
a  position  of  secondary  importance.  Indeed  they 
had  committed  at  least  one  definitely  unfriendly 
act  against  Philip:  for  while  he  was  in  Scythia, 
they  had  expelled  the  Macedonian  garrison  which 
he  had  placed  in  Nicaea,  and  had  occupied  the 
place  themselves';  his  garrisoning  of  their  colony 
at  Echinus  had  probably  offended  them;  and  it 
could  hardly  please  them  that  those  Peloponnesian 
peoples  who  had  once  relied  upon  them  now  looked 
to  him  as  their  protector.  The  feelings  of  the 
Thebans  would  naturally  have  been  made  known 
to  Demosthenes  by  visitors  from  that  city,  since 
he  was  Proxenus  or  Consul  of  Thebes  in  Athens. 
Further,  though  it  was  true  that  ^^schines  had 
diverted  the  immediate  attention  of  the  Amphic- 
'  Philochorus,  ap.  Didym.,  schol.  in  Dent.,  Col.,  xi. 


/ 
/ 


366  Demosthenes 

tyons  from  Athens  to  the  Amphisseans,  it  was 
also  true,  as  Demosthenes  declared,  that  to  rouse 
the  Amphictyons,  and  particularly  to  rouse  them 
against  the  Amphisseans,  who  had  been  Philip's 
allies,  was  an  action  not  unlikely  to  give  Philip  an 
opening  for  intervention,  and  to  render  it  probable 
that  Athens  would  suffer  as  much  as  Amphissa. 
Demosthenes  was  convinced  that  Philip  was  bound 
to  take  some  action  against  Athens  before  long; 
for  although  after  Phocion's  retirement  the 
Athenian  admirals  seem  to  have  carried  on  hostili- 
\  ties  against  Philip  with  poor  success,  the  trade  of 
'  the  Macedonian  ports  suffered  greatly  from  the 
raids  made  by  Athenian  ships,  ^  and  he  was  certain 
to  desire  to  retrieve  his  reputation  after  his  failure 
/  before  Perinthus  and  Byzantium.  And  so  it  was 
even  more  necessary  than  before  to  preserve  the 
good-will  of  the  Thebans,  whose  feelings  and  in- 
terests were  now  being  brought  by  the  force  of 
circumstances  into  harmony  with  those  of  the 
Athenians. 

From  this  point  of  view,  Demosthenes'  refusal 
to  coimtenance  the  attack  of  the  Amphictyons 
\ .  upon  the  Amphisseans,  the  friends  of  Thebes,  was 
.^  wise  and  far-sighted,  and  the  event  fully  justified 
it.  But  pubHc  opinion  at  Athens  was  still  too 
ill-disposed  towards  Thebes  to  allow  Demosthenes 
to  give  to  the  Assembly,  as  the  real  reason  for  his 
policy,   his   desire  to  make  friendship  with  the 

'  Dem,,  de  Cor.,  §§  145,  146. 


Chceroneia  367 

Thebans:    and   hence    he    doubtless    used    other 
arguments.  ^ 

Some  writers  indeed  have  reproached  Demos- 
thenes for  not  allowing  Athens  to  join  in  the  war 
against  Amphissa,  in  the  belief  that  the  appeal  to 
Philip  would  have  been  rendered  unnecessary  if  / 
the  Athenians  had  taken  part  in  the  war  with 
vigour.     But  the  struggle  with  Philip  was  bound' 7 
to  come  soon ;  and  it  was  not  a  time  to  alienate  f 
the  most  powerful  ally  whom  Demosthenes  hoped 
to  gain,  on  the  chance  of  postponing  the  struggle  V) 
for  a  little.     Others  have  said  that,  by  following  V'' 
Demosthenes'  poHcy,  Athens  lost  her  chance  of   K 
joining  in  a  great  national  enterprise,  first  in  vin-      /- 
dication  of  the  national  god  of  Delphi,  and  then    / 
in  a  campaign  with  Philip  against  Persia,  crushing  ,' 
Thebes  if  necessary  on  the  way.     But — leaving  ; 
aside  the   question  whether  Philip's  aims  were  1 
national  and  Hellenic,   or  whether  he  was  not  ; 
primarily  interested  in  the  enlargement  of  the  \ 
Macedonian  Empire — was  a    "national"    enter-    \ 
prise,  in  which  Athens  would  probably  have  to 
take  the  second  place,  reconcilable  with  the  Athen- 
ian ideal,  as  Demosthenes  interpreted  it,  and  as 
it  was  probably  viewed  by  his  fellow-countrymen? 
Was  it  to  be  expected  that  any  alliance  between 
an  absolute  monarch  and  the  democracy  of  Athens 
would  be  secure?    And  how  were  the  People  to  be 

*  iEschines  probably  shared  the  popular  animosity  against 
Thebes,  much  as  he  afterwards  lamented  her  overthrow  by 
Alexander. 


368  Demosthenes 

led  to  make  an  alliance  which  could  only  appear 
to  them  a  surrender  of  the  brilliant  prospect  of 
success  opened  up  by  the  history  of  the  last  year? 
It  seems  then  that  Demosthenes -took  Uie-one 
path^which  was  consistent  both  with  prudence 
and  with  the  national  honpur,  as  the^thenians_ 
generally  conceived  it. 

To  the  question  whether  the  original  complaint 
of  the  Amphisseans  against  Athens  had  been 
prompted  by  Philip,  in  the  hope  of  stirring  up  an 
Amphictyonic  war  against  Athens,  no  answer  can 
be  given.  (If  it  was  so,  ^Eschines  accidentally 
traversed  Philip's  purpose.)  It  is  not  inconceiv- 
able that  it  was  so,  for  Philip  must  have  known, 
^  as  well  as  Demosthenes,  that  a  final  struggle  with 
Athens  had  to  come,  end  that  owing  to  the  defeat 
of  the  Macedonian  party  in  Athens  by  Demosthe- 
nes, the  issue  could  not  be  decided  by  treachery 
or  by  diplomacy,  but  only  by  arms,  and  an  Amphic^ 
tyonic  war  would  be  a  highly  convenient  method 
of  action.  There  is  however  no  evidence  which  can 
be  brought  to  bear  on  the  question.  That  Cotty- 
phus  was  acting  deliberately  in  Philip's  interest  is 
stated  by  Demosthenes  and  others,  ^  and  is  the  more 
likely,  perhaps,  because  his  native  town,  Pharsalus, 
had  greatly  benefited  by  Philip's  favours. 

Philip,  with  an  army  composed  of  Macedonian 
and  Thessalian  troops,  marched  southward,  without 
delay,  taking,  probably,  the  direct  road  from 
Lamia  to  Cytinium  in  Doris,  and  avoiding  Ther- 

'  E.  g.,  Schol.  on  de  Cor.,  §  151. 


THE  STATUE  OF  DEMOSTHENES  IN  THE  VATICAN 

PHOTO   BY  ALINARI 


r^ 


/    ;-- 


o-     ^  ' 


u.      ° 


Chceroneia  369 

mopylae.  He  first  occupied  Cytinium,  which 
commanded  the  road  over  the  mountains  (by  the 
Pass  of  Gravia)  to  Amphissa,  the  nominal  goal 
of  his  march;  but  instead  of  proceeding  directly 
to  Amphissa,  he  diverged  into  the  high-road  which 
led  into  the  Phocian  plain,  and  thence  to  Thebes 
and  Athens,  and  (early  in  September,  339)  seized 
Elateia,  which  commanded  the  road  at  a  point 
only  a  few  miles  north  of  the  Boeotian  frontier. 
It  is  highly  probable  that  he  also  secured  the  less 
important  routes  over  the  mountains  from  Therm- 
opylae into  the  plain,  which  they  enter  near  the 
modem  villages  of  Demitsa  and  Turkochori. 
With  regard  to  the  force  in  Nicsea  at  this  moment 
there  is  some  doubt;  probably  it  was  still  in  the 
hands  of  the  Thebans,  who  had  seized  it  in  the 
previous  year,  but  soon  after  his  occupation  of 
Elateia  Philip  requested  them  to  hand  it  over  to 
the  Locrians  in  whose  district  it  stood  ^;  and  it  is 
possible  that  he  had  previously  been  making 
friends  with  this  branch  of  the  Locrian  stock,  on 
finding  that  the  Thebans  were  becoming  disaffected 
towards  him.^  However  that  may  be,  by  forti- 
fying Elateia  he  placed  himself  in  a  very  strong 
position :  the  main  roads  in  his  rear  were  absolutely 
secure,  and  the  position  also  had  other  advantages. 

'  Didym.,  schol.,  Col.  xi. 

'  So  Glotz  argues  {Bull.  Corr.  Hell.,  1909,  pp.  526  ff.).  But  the 
evidence  which  Glotz  offers  in  support  of  his  conjecture  that 
Philip  had  also  been  entering  into  friendship  with  the  Phocians 
and  that  he  occupied  Elateia  as  the  friend  of  the  Phocians,  in 
whose  territory  it  lay,  is  far  from  conclusive. 

24 


370  Demosthenes 

It  may  be  taken  as  certain  that  the  occupation  of 
Elateia  was  primarily  intended  by  himself  as  a 
menace  to  Thebes,  and  a  warning  to  her  to  renew 
her  rapidly  vanishing  friendship  towards  himself; 
and  it  was  convenient  to  convey  this  without  ac- 
tually entering  Boeotian  territory,  for  that  would 
have  thrown  Thebes  into  the  arms  of  Athens.  It 
seems  equally  certain  that  Philip  intended  now 
to  make  an  end,  once  for  all,  of  the  opposition  to 
himself  in  Greece.  But,  as  usual,  he  wished  to 
have  some  plausible  ground  for  his  action.  The 
pretext  for  his  presence  in  Greece  was  the  commis- 
sion given  him  by  the  Amphictyons  to  destroy 
Amphissa;  but  had  he  executed  this  commission 
at  once,  the  pretext  would  have  disappeared;  his 
ostensible  purpose  would  have  been  fulfilled,  and 
he  would  have  had  no  specious  excuse  for  remain- 
ing in  Greece.  Besides  this,  the  Phocian  plain 
doubtless  offered  his  army  a  better  supply  of  food 
than  the  mountains  between  Cytinium  and  Am- 
phissa could  have  afforded.  For  all  these  reasons, 
he  occupied  Elateia. 

The  Athenians  were  at  first  paralysed  by  the 
news,'  for  not  having  realised  (as  Demosthenes 
had)  the  growing  estrangement  between  Philip 
and  the  Thebans,  they  assumed  that  he  had  come 
to  join  forces  with  the  Thebans,  and  to  march 
with  them  upon  Attica.  A  very  famous  passage 
of  the  Speech  on  the  Crown  ^  describes  the  effect 
of  the  news. 

^DeCor.,  §§  legfiE. 


ChcBroneia  37 1 

It  was  evening,  and  one  had  come  to  the  Prytanes ' 
with  the  news  that  Elateia  had  been  taken.  Upon 
this  they  rose  up  from  supper  without  delay;  some  of 
them  drove  the  occupants  out  of  the  booths  in  the 
market-place  and  set  fire  to  the  wickerwork,^  others 
sent  for  the  generals  and  summoned  the  trumpeter, 
and  the  city  was  full  of  commotion.  On  the  morrow, 
at  break  of  day,  the  Prytanes  summoned  the  Council 
to  the  Council  Chamber,  while  you  made  your  way  to 
the  Assembly,  and  before  the  Council  had  transacted 
its  business  and  passed  its  draft-resolution,  the  whole 
People  was  seated  on  the  hillside.  ^  And  now,  when 
the  Council  had  arrived,  and  the  Prytanes  had  re- 
ported the  intelligence  which  they  had  received,  and 
had  brought  forward  the  messenger,  and  he  had  made 
his  statement,  the  herald  proceeded  to  ask,  "Who 
wishes  to  speak?"  But  no  one  came  forward;  and 
though  the  herald  repeated  the  question  many  times, 
still  no  one  rose,  though  all  the  generals  were  present, 
and  all  the  orators,  and  the  voice  of  their  country  was 
calling  for  some  one  to  speak  for  her  deliverance. 
For  the  voice  of  the  herald,  uttered  in  accordance 
with  the  laws,  is  rightly  to  be  regarded  as  the  common 
voice  of  our  country.  And  yet,  if  it  was  for  those  to 
come  forward  who  wished  for  the  deliverance  of  the 
city,  all  of  you  and  all  the  other  Athenians  would  have 
risen,  and  proceeded  to  the  platform ;  for  I  am  certain 
that  you  all  wished  for  her  deliverance.  If  it  was  for 
the  wealthiest,  the  Three  Hundred  would  have  risen, 
and  if  it  was  for  those  who  had  both  these  qualifica- 

'  The  acting  committee  of  the  Council. 

'  Probably  a  bonfire  was  a  method  of  summons  to  an  extra- 
ordinary meeting  of  the  Assembly.  J  I.e.,  on  the  Pnyx. 


3/2  Demosthenes 

tions — loyalty  to  the  city  and  wealth — then  those 
would  have  risen  who  subsequently  made  those  large 
donations ;  for  it  was  loyalty  and  wealth  that  led  them 
so  to  do.  But  that  crisis  and  that  day  called,  it  seems, 
not  merely  for  a  man  of  loyalty  and  wealth,  but  for 
one  who  had  also  followed  the  course  of  events  closely 
from  the  first,  and  had  come  to  a  true  conclusion  as  to 
the  motive  and  the  aim  with  which  Philip  was  acting 
as  he  was.  The  man  who  was  needed  was  found  that 
day  in  me. 

Demosthenes  then  describes  how  he  dispelled  the 
belief  that  Philip  had  a  satisfactory  understanding 
with  the  Thebans,  and  that  it  was  therefore  too 
late  to  prevent  him  from  marching,  with  them, 
into  Attica.  Had  this  been  so,  they  would  have 
heard  of  his  being,  not  at  Elateia,  but  on  the  bor- 
ders of  Attica.  It  was  because  the  attitude  of  the 
Thebans  was  still  uncertain  that  he  had  occupied 
Elateia,  in  the  hope  of  encouraging  his  friends  in 
Thebes,  and  intimidating  his  opponents,  and  so 
compelling  them  to  join  him,  whether  they  would  or 
no.  This,  Demosthenes  declared,  there  was  still 
time  to  prevent,  if  the  Athenians  would  forget  their 
grudges  against  the  Thebans,  and  offer  them  an  al- 
liance on  generous  terms.  At  the  same  time  they 
must  show  that  they  were  in  earnest,  by  immedi- 
ately arming  all  the  citizen-troops  and  cavalry,  and 
ordering  them  to  march  to  Eleusis  (the  first  halting 
place  on  the  most  convenient  road  to  Boeotia) ; 
and  they  must  give  the  envoys  to  be  sent  to 
Thebes,  with  the  generals,  full  power  to  decide  the 


Cheer  oneia  373 

steps  to  be  taken  next.  His  eloquence  carried  the 
Assembly  with  it :  the  levy  of  troops  was  ordered, 
and  he  himself,  with  others,  was  immediately 
despatched  to  Thebes.  "This,"  he  says,  "was 
the  first  step  towards  our  new  relations  with 
Thebes:  the  danger  had  seemed  likely  to  descend 
upon  the  city  like  a  torrent  in  winter"';  but  "this 
decree  caused  the  peril  that  encompassed  the  city 
to  pass  away  like  a  cloud."  ^ 

On  his  arrival  at  Thebes,  Demosthenes  found 
envoys  from  Philip  and  the  Thessalians  already 
there.  ^  Philip  was  represented  by  Amyntas  and 
Clearchus,  his  allies  by  Thrasydsus  and  Daochus.  ■♦ 
Though  the  Thebans  had  been  the  friends  and 
allies  of  the  Amphisseans,  against  whom  he  was 
ostensibly  marching,  Philip  was  prepared  to  treat 
them  as  neutrals,  if  they  would  either  join  him 
in  marching  into  Attica,  or  would  even  allow  him 
and  his  army  an  unopposed  passage  through 
Boeotia.  The  Theban  Assembly  first  heard  the 
envoys  of  Philip  and  his  allies,  who  recalled  all 
the  deeds  which  the  Athenians  had  ever  done 
against  Thebes,  and  held  out  the  prospect  of  the 
enrichment  of  the  Thebans  with  Attic  plunder, 
or,  if  they  refused  Philip's  overtures,  of  the  pltm- 
der  of  Boeotia  itself  by  his  forces.  ^     Demosthenes 

'  Ke  Cor.,  §  153.  'Ibid.,  ^188.  ilbid.,  ^211. 

^Diodorus  states  that  Python  was  one  of  Philip's  envoys,  but 
the  quotation  which  he  gives  from  de  Cor.,  §  136,  refers  to  another 
occasion.  sDem.,  de  Cor.,  §§  213,  214. 


374  Demosthenes 

does  not  record  his  own  reply  in  full:  but  there  can 
be  little  doubt  that  he  urged  that  if  the  Thebans 
joined  Philip,  the  only  result  would  be  that  Philip 
would  be  enabled  to  subdue  Athens  and  Thebes 
separately,  whereas  the  two  cities,  if  united,  might 
hope  to  defeat  his  arms  entirely;  he  doubtless 
appealed  with  his  matchless  eloquence  to  the  sense 
of  Hellenic  patriotism,  and  the  terms  which  he 
offered  were  extraordinarily  generous,  in  view  of 
the  previous  relations  between  the  two  States. 
Thebes  was  to  be  recognised  as  mistress  of  Boeotia, 
and  the  Athenians  undertook  to  assist  her  against 
any  city  that  refused  obedience  to  her;  the  com- 
mand of  the  forces  at  sea  was  to  be  shared;  the 
Thebans  were  to  command  on  land,  and  the 
Athenians  were  to  pay  two  thirds  of  the  cost  of 
the  campaign. 

At  a  later  day  ^schines  bitterly  attacked 
Demosthenes  for  offering  terms  so  favourable  to 
Thebes,  and  (as  he  declared)  so  humiliating  to 
Athens.  Nor  can  it  be  denied  that  to  abandon 
the  cause  of  Thespiae  and  Platsae,  the  independence 
of  which  she  had  always  championed,  was  to 
abandon  a  very  noble  element  in  the  traditional 
policy  of  Athens;  and  it  must  also  have  touched 
her  pride  to  give  up  Oropus.  But  as  regards  the 
division  of  the  expenditure,  it  must  be  remembered 
that,  in  consequence  of  her  situation,  Thebes 
would  have  to  defray  the  greater  part  of  the  cost  of 
maintaining  the  troops  quartered  in  her  territory ; 
and,  in  the  position  in  which  the  Athenians  were 


Cheer  oneia  375 

placed,  it  would  have  been  madness  to  quarrel 
over  the  precise  apportionment  of  responsibility 
and  privilege  between  the  two  parties  in  the  alli- 
ance. There  is  no  doubt  that  Demosthenes  acted 
boldly,  for  a  member  of  a  democracy,  in  offering 
such  terms  on  his  own  authority;  but  the  stake 
was  worth  the  cost  to  Athens  and  the  risk  to 
himself.  There  is  no  more  characteristic  passage 
in  his  speeches  than  his  defence  against  ^schines' 
strictures  upon  this  agreement  with  Thebes.  ^ 

If  you  refer,  ^schines  [he  says],  to  what  was  fair 
as  between  ourselves  and  the  Thebans  or  the  Byzan- 
tines or  the  Euboeans — if  at  this  time  you  talk  to  us 
of  equal  shares — you  must  be  ignorant,  in  the  first 
place,  of  the  fact  that  in  former  days  also,  out  of  those 
ships  of  war,  three  hundred  in  all,  which  fought  for  the 
Hellenes,  Athens  provided  two  hundred,  and  did  not 
think  herself  unfairly  used,  or  let  herself  be  seen 
arraigning  those  who  had  counselled  her  action,  or 
taking  offence  at  the  arrangement.  It  would  have 
been  shameful.  No !  men  saw  her  rendering  thanks  to 
Heaven,  because  when  a  common  peril  beset  the 
Hellenes,  she  had  provided  double  as  much  as  all  the 
rest  to  secure  the  deliverance  of  all.  Moreover,  it  is 
but  a  hollow  benefit  that  you  are  conferring  upon  your 
countrymen  by  your  dishonest  charges  against  me. 
Why  do  you  tell  them  now,  what  course  they  ought 
to  have  taken?  Why  did  you  not  propose  such  a 
course  at  the  time  (for  you  were  in  Athens  and  were 
present)  if  it  was  possible  in  the  midst  of  those  critical 

^DeCor.,  §§238ff. 


376  Demosthenes 

times,  when  we  had  to  accept,  not  what  we  chose,  but 
what  circumstances  allowed? 

What,  he  asks,  would  his  opponents  have  said, 
if  he  had  haggled  over  the  terms,  and  the  Thebans 
had  joined  Philip? 

The  Thebans  and  Athenians,  in  pursuance  of 
Demosthenes'  proposals,  now  sent  urgent  em- 
bassies to  the  other  Greek  States  in  the  hope  of 
winning  their  support,  while  Philip  himself,  fully 
realising  the  gravity  of  the  crisis,  wrote  to  his  own 
allies  in  the  Peloponnese  (who  had  for  the  most 
part  been  hitherto  on  friendly  terms  with  Thebes), 
representing  himself  simply  as  the  champion  of  the 
Amphictyons  against  Amphissa,  and  (if  Demos- 
thenes' account  is  to  be  trusted)  dissimulating  his 
further  intentions.^  The  Arcadians,  in  spite  of 
their  alliance  with  Philip,  determined  to  remain 
neutral.  The  Messenians  and  the  people  of  Elis 
followed  their  example.  The  Spartans,  though 
hostile  to  Philip,  adhered  to  the  policy  which  they 
had  followed  for  some  years,  of  eschewing  all 
entanglement  in  foreign  affairs.  Those  who  sup- 
ported the  Athenian  and  Theban  cause  were  the 
Euboeans,  Achaeans,  Megareans,  and  Acarnanians, 
and  the  inhabitants  of  Corcyra  and  Leucas. 

Those  politicians  in  Athens  who  were  opposed  to 
war  attempted  to  find  support  in  the  evil  omens 
which  were  reported  shortly  after  Demosthenes* 
decree  had  been  carried  and  acted  upon.     The 

^  Ibid.,  §§  156,  218,222. 


Chceroneia  S77 

Delphic  oracle  prophesied  calamity,  and  old  orac- 
ular sayings  were  quoted  to  the  same  effect. ' 
At  Thebes,  statues  were  said  to  have  dripped  with 
blood.'  Worse  still,  on  September  21st,  when  the 
candidates  for  initiation  in  to  the  Eleusinian  mys- 
teries went  down  to  the  sea  to  purify  themselves, 
some  of  them  were  killed  by  a  shark.  ^  But  when 
it  was  proposed  to  consult  the  oracle  once  more, 
Demosthenes  declared  that  the  priestess  of  Delphi 
had  "philippized,"  as  she  had  "medized,"  or  taken 
the  Persian  side,  in  the  Persian  wars,  and  he 
reminded  both  Athenians  and  Thebans  how  the 
greatest  statesmen  of  each  city,  Pericles  and 
Epameinondas,  had  scorned  such  pretexts  for 
cowardice  as  were  now  put  forward. ''  Nor  would 
he  permit  the  march  of  the  troops  from  Athens  to 
be  delayed  by  unfavourable  omens  at  the  sacrifices 
offered  on  their  behalf;  and  for  the  time,  both  in 
Athens  and  in  Thebes,  his  word  was  law. 

The  measures  which  Demosthenes  proposed 
could  not  be  carried  through  without;  funds.  To 
provide  these,  Demosthenes  urged  once  more, 
and  this  time  with  success,  that  the  surplus  re- 
venues which  had  been  spent  on  festivals  should  be 
applied  to  military  purposes.  ^  He  also  carried  a 
resolution  suspending  for  the  time  the  work  of 
repairing  the  docks  and  the  arsenal,  and  so  set 

'  Plut.,  Dem.,  xix.,  xxi.  *  Schol.,  Apoll.,  Arg.,  iv.,  1284. 

J  ^sch.,  in  Ctes.,  §  130,  and  schol. 

■•  ^sch.;  I.e.;  Plut.,  Dem.,  xx. 

s  Philochorus,  ap.  Dion.  Hal.,  ad  Amm.,  I,  xi.     See  Note  4. 


378  Demosthenes 

free  a  considerable  sum.  It  is  in  this  same  year 
that  we  hear  first  of  the  "treasurer  of  the  military 
fund,"  and  it  is  highly  probable  that  the  office  was 
now  constituted  for  the  first  time.  The  office  was 
held  by  Callias,  the  nephew  of  Lycurgus ;  and  Ly- 
curgus  himself,  an  able  and  courageous  financier, 
and  an  ardent  supporter  of  Demosthenes,  became 
a  member  of  the  Theoric  Commission  in  338,  and 
for  the  next  twelve  years,  either  in  virtue  of  his 
own  official  position,  or  through  his  friends  in  office, 
controlled  the  financial  administration  of  Athens.  ^ 
At  the  earliest  possible  moment^  the  Athenian 
forces  joined  those  of  Thebes,  and  received,  on 
their  arrival  at  that  city,  a  warm  and  friendly 
welcome.  ^  Freely  received  into  the  houses  of  the 
Thebans,  they  in  no  way  abused  their  privileges, 
and  the  official  friendship  between  the  two  States 
was  doubtless  confirmed  by  the  personal  good 
feelings  thus  generated.  The  allied  forces  now 
fortified  the  passes'*  through  which  Philip's  route 
into  Boeotia  would  necessarily  lie.  The  most  im- 
portant of  these  was  the  Pass  of  Parapotamii, 
through  which  the  Cephissus  flowed  from  the 
Phocian  into  the  Boeotian  plain;  the  minor  passes 
which  crossed  the  same  range  (such  as  that  leading 

^  See  Note  5. 

'  If  any  reliance  is  to  be  placed  on  ^sch.,  in  Ctes.,  §140,  the 
troops  did  not  even  wait  for  the  formal  ratification  of  the  alliance 
by  vote  of  the  Assembly.  3  Dem.,  de  Cor.,    §§215,  216. 

4 1  follow  closely  the  account  of  the  campaign  given  by  Kro- 
mayer,  Antike  Schlachtfelder  in  Criechenland,  vol.  i.,  which  has 
superseded  all  previous  work  on  the  subject. 


-i 


Chceroneia  379 

to  Daulis,  and  another  at  the  eastern  end  of  Mt. 
Hedyleium)  were  doubtless  also  occupied.^  At 
the  same  time,  at  the  request  of  the  inhabitants 
of  Amphissa,  a  force  of  ten  thousand  mercenaries 
imder  Chares  was  sent  to  guard  the  approach  to 
that  town  from  Cytinium  (which  Philip's  troops 
had  occupied)  by  the  Pass  of  Gravia ;  and  the  chief 
command  at  this  station  seems  to  have  been  held 
by  the  Theban  Proxenus.  ^ 

In  the  eariiest  engagements,  which  Demosthenes 
describes  as  "the  winter  battle,"  and  "the  battle 
by  the  river,"  the  allies  were  successful.  (It 
seems  likely  that  these  engagements  resulted  from 
attempts  on  the  part  of  Philip  to  force  a  way 
through  the  Pass  of  Parapotamii.)  The  allies  also 
fortified  Ambrysus,  and  perhaps  other  Phocian 
towns,  which  had  been  destroyed  by  Philip  dur- 
ing the  Sacred  War. ^  Their  spirits  rose;  mutual 
congratulations  passed  between  Athens  and 
Thebes;  sacrifices  and  processions  were  held  at 
Athens  in  gratitude  to  the  gods,  and  the  city, 
Demosthenes  tells  us,''  was  "full  of  pride  and  joy 
and  thanksgiving."  Demosthenes  himself,  upon 
the  motion  of  Demomeles,  supported  by  Hyper- 
eides,  was  awarded  a  golden  crown,  which  was 
publicly  conferred  on  him  at  the  Dionysiac  festival 
in  March,  338,  and  though  Demomeles  was  pro- 
secuted for  the  alleged  illegality  of  the  decree  by 

'  See  map. 

'  ^sch.,  in  Ctes.,  §  146;  Deinarch.,  in  Dem.,  §  74. 

3  Paus.,  IV,  xxxi.,  §3.     See  Note  6.  *  De  Cor.,  §216. 


380  Demosthenes 

Diondas,  he  was  acquitted,  and  the  prosecutor 
failed  to  obtain  even  one  fifth  of  the  votes  of  the 
jury — the  proportion  necessary  to  save  him  from 
a  heavy  fine.  PhiHp  appears  to  have  thought 
it  best  to  wait  for  reinforcements,^  before  taking 
further  active  measures. 

It  has  often  been  argued  that,  in  spite  of  these 
early  successes  won  by  the  allies,  the  purely  defen- 
sive tactics  adopted  by  them,  and  the  division  of 
their  forces,  in  consequence  of  the  despatch  of 
one  quarter  of  the  army  to  guard  Amphissa — 
nearly  twenty  miles  away  from  the  main  body  at 
Parapotamii — were  serious  strategical  errors.  The 
A  latter  step  was  strongly  opposed  by  ^schines  at 
X  \  the  time,  when  it  was  proposed  in  the  Assembly 
by  Demosthenes,  and  he  made  it  a  point  in  his 
attack  upon  Demosthenes  at  a  later  date.^  As 
regards  the  defensive  attitude  of  the  allies,  they 
should  have  seen,  it  is  urged,  that  they  would  be 
no  better  off,  even  if  they  remained  in  occupation 
of  the  passes  for  an  indefinite  time:  Philip  would 
still  be  undefeated  and  a  menace  to  Boeotia  and 
Attica,  and  their  troops  would  be  growing  im- 
patient at  the  prolonged  hardships  of  camp-life. 
In  reply  it  has  been  pointed  out^  that  the  line  of 
defence  chosen — the  series  of  passes  from  Mount 
Parnassus  to  Lake  Copais — was  a  very  good  one, 
completely  protecting  Boeotia  and  therefore  Attica 

'  Diod.,  XVI,  Ixxxv.  » In  Ctes.,  §§  146, 147. 

3  By  Kromayer,  op.  cit. 


Cheer  oneia  381 

also;  that  it  would  have  been  difficult  or  impossible 
for  Philip  to  circumvent  the  defenders  at  either 
end  of  the  line ;  and  that  by  the  occupation  of  these 
passes,  as  well  as  of  the  southern  end  of  the  Pass 
of  Gravia,  Philip  was  cut  off  (as  he  could  have  been 
cut  off  by  no  other  method)  from  access  to  the 
Gulf  of  Corinth  and  his  Peloponnesian  allies ;  while 
the  Pass  of  Gravia  was  itself  easy  to  defend  from 
the  south,  as  modem  no  less  than  ancient  experience 
has  shown,  owing  to  the  nature  of  the  country. 
Besides  this  it  was  highly  probable  that  Philip 
would  not  be  able  to  remain  for  an  indefinite  time 
at  Elateia,  but  would  be  forced  to  return  by  the 
unsettled  state  both  of  his  own  frontiers  and  of 
his  recently  acquired  dominions  in  Thrace.  If,  on 
the  other  hand,  Philip  attacked  and  succeeded  in 
forcing  the  passes,  the  allies  could  still  fall  back 
on  the  plain  of  Chasroneia,  and  choose  their  ground 
for  battle. 

The  fact  that  in  the  end  Philip  defeated  the 
allies  was  due  less  to  defects  in  their  general  plan 
of  campaign  than  to  his  astuteness  and  knowledge 
of  human  nature.  He  was  well  aware  that  a  mixed 
force  of  citizens  from  two  large  and  several  small 
States,  combined  with  bodies  of  mercenary  soldiers, 
was  not  likely  to  be  completely  under  the  control 
of  a  single  authority,  exercising  equal  caution 
and  foresight  at  all  points.  Taking  advantage, 
no  doubt,  of  a  favourable  moment,  and  having 
(we  may  surmise)  prepared  the  way  by  spreading 
rumours  of  his  feigned  intentions,  he  arranged  that 


382  Demosthenes 

a  letter  addressed  to  his  general,  Antipater,  should 
fall  into  the  hands  of  Proxenus  and  Chares,  the 
commanders  of  the  allied  forces  stationed  near 
Amphissa,  stating  that  he  was  compelled  suddenly 
to  return,  in  order  to  quell  a  revolt  in  Thrace.* 
To  give  colour  to  this  statement,  he  withdrew  his 
troops  from  Cytinium.  Thereupon  the  mercenary 
force  guarding  Amphissa  naturally  became  slack, 
and  neglected  to  keep  guard.  Suddenly,  by  a 
forced  march,  Philip,  with  a  large  body  of  troops, 
swept  through  the  Pass  of  Gravia  by  night,  an- 
nihilated the  defending  force,  descended  upon 
Amphissa,  and  took  it.  The  town  was  afterwards 
destroyed  by  order  of  the  Amphictyonic  Coimcil. ' 
He  then,  by  a  vigorous  move,  pushed  on  to  Nau- 
pactus — at  least  two  days'  march — and  took  it, 
giving  it,  as  he  had  promised,^  to  his  allies  the 
^toUans,  and  returning  to  Amphissa  before  his 
enemies  could  take  any  steps  against  him.''  He 
had  thus  opened  for  himself  a  way  to  the  Corinth- 
ian gulf,s  and  further,  by  occupying  Amphissa 
and  the  surrounding  territory,  he  had  gained  com- 
mand of  the  passes  leading  through  the  outlying 
ranges  of  Mt.  Parnassus  and  Mt.  Korphis  into 
the  plain  of  the  Cephissus  to  the  south  of  Chaero- 
neia.  His  troops  could  now,  if  he  desired,  come 
round  by  these  passes  and  harass  the  allied  army 

*  Polyaenus,  IV,  ii.,  8.  '  Strabo,  ix.,  p.  427. 

J  Dem.,  Phil.  Ill,  §  34.  *  See, however,  Note 7. 

s  This  is  true,  whether  Naupactus  was  taken  on  this  occasion 
or  not. 


Cheer  oneia  383 

at  Parapotamii  from  the  rear.  Of  this  possibihty 
he  at  once  took  advantage,  sending  flying  corps 
which  plundered  the  western  plains  of  Boeotia. 
He  himself  returned  to  Elateia. 

It  was  perhaps  just  after  this  that  Philip  once 
more  attempted  to  achieve  his  ends  by  diplomacy, 
instead  of  by  fiu*ther  fighting.  He  sent  envoys 
both  to  Athens  and  Thebes.  At  Athens,  though 
Phocion  warned  his  countrymen  to  reflect  upon 
the  consequences  of  defeat,  and  to  make  terms 
with  Philip,  Demosthenes  (so  ^schines  asserts) 
threatened  to  drag  any  one  to  prison  by  the  hair 
who  mentioned  peace;  and  when  the  Boeotarchs 
at  Thebes  showed  an  inclination  to  listen  to  Philip, 
he  denounced  them  in  the  Athenian  Assembly  as 
traitors,  and  proposed  to  send  a  herald  to  Thebes 
to  ask  for  a  free  passage  for  the  Athenian  forces 
marching  against  Philip,  with  the  result  that  the 
Thebans  were  shamed  into  abandoning  all  thought 
of  peace.  He  urged  upon  the  Athenians  the  im- 
portance of  fighting  at  as  great  a  distance  as 
possible  from  the  city,  and  his  influence  both  in 
Athens  and  Thebes  was  sufficient  to  ensure  the 
continuance  of  the  struggle.* 

The  generals  at  Parapotamii,  finding  their 
communications  with  Thebes  and  Athens  threat- 
ened by  Philip's  light  troops,  now  withdrew  from 
the  passes  into  the  plain  of  Chaeroneia,  where  they 
could  check  the  plundering  forays,  and  choose 
an  advantageous  position  for  the  decisive  battle. 

» See  Note  8. 


384  Demosthenes 

Upon  this  Philip  recalled  his  light  troops  and  re- 
united them  with  his  main  army,  and  so  with  all 
his  forces  marched  through  the  Pass  of  Parapo- 
tamii  into  the  plain,  and  confronted  the  allies. 

The  decisive  battle  took  place  on  the  7th  of 
Metageitnion  (probably  the  2nd  of  August,  in  our 
reckoning^),  338.  The  allies'  line  stretched  across 
the  plain  of  Chseroneia,  the  left  wing  resting  against 
the  rocky  hill  of  Petrachos,  on  which  the  town  was 
built,  the  right  touching  the  Cephissus,  where 
it  nms  close  beneath  the  steep  western  end  of 
the  moimtain  spur  called  Acontium.  The  total 
length  of  their  front  was  perhaps  a  little  over  a 
mile.  The  allied  army  contained  between  thirty 
thousand  and  forty  thousand  men,  of  whom 
Thebes  supplied  twelve  thousand  infantry  (in- 
cluding the  "Sacred  Band,"  with  whom  it  was  a 
point  of  honour  to  stand  by  one  another  to  the 
death)  and  eight  hundred  cavalry,  Athens  about 
ten  thousand  infantry  and  six  hundred  cavalry, 
and  the  smaller  states  perhaps  nine  thousand 
infantry;  the  mercenaries  employed  numbered 
about  five  thousand,  and  the  cavalry  were  made 
up  by  various  contingents  to  two  thousand  in  all.' 
Behind  the  left  wing  lay  the  entrance  of  passes 
leading  to  Lebadeia  and  Coroneia,  by  which,  in 
case  of  need,  it  would  be  possible  to  retire  without 

'  See  Kromayer,  op.  ciL,  p.  185.  The  alternative  date  is 
September  ist. 

2  This  is  Kromayer's  computation,  based  upon  calculations  as 
probable  as  our  information  allows. 


Chceroneia  385 

being  harassed  by  cavalry  in  pursuit.  This  wing 
was  constituted  by  the  Athenian  army,  com- 
manded by  Stratocles,  Ly sides,  and  Chares; 
Demosthenes  himself  served  among  the  infantry, 
the  words  "  Good  Luck  "  ^  inscribed  upon  his  shield. 
In  the  centre  were  the  mercenaries  and  the  con- 
tingents of  the  small  States.  The  right  wing  was 
the  post  of  greatest  danger  and  responsibility. 
If  the  enemy  could  force  their  way  through  the 
defenders'  line  here,  there  was  no  means  of  out- 
flanking them,''  the  plain  would  be  open  to  the 
victors,  and  they  would  be  able  to  cut  off  the 
retreat  to  Coroneia.  In  this  position  the  Thebans 
were  stationed  under  Theagenes.  The  Mace- 
donian army  numbered  about  thirty  thousand  in- 
fantry and  two  thousand  cavalry — a  rather  smaller 
force  than  that  of  their  opponents,  but  for  the 
most  part  drilled  to  act  in  unison,  and  all  imder 
the  command  of  one  master-mind. 

At  the  Theban  end  of  the  line  the  battle  was  at 
first  hotly  contested;  but  the  young  Alexander, 
whom  Philip  had  placed  in  command  of  the  Mace- 
donian left,  through  his  personal  bravery  and  the 
encouragement  given  by  it  to  his  men,  at  last 
succeeded  in  forcing  a  way  through  the  Theban 
ranks.  Philip,  on  the  contrary,  on  the  Mace- 
donian right,  withdrew  step  by  step  before   the 

'*A7o^5  TixV. 

'  They  might  possibly,  though  not  easily,  have  been  outflanked, 
after  forcing  their  way  through,  from  the  side  of  Chasroneia  on  the 
other  wing. 

«»       '  ■._ -,- 


386  Demosthenes 

impetuous  onset  of  the  Athenians,  who  felt  con- 
fident of  victory.  Stratocles  even  bade  his  men 
pursue  the  enemy  to  Macedonia  itself.*  "The 
Athenians  do  not  know  how  to  win  a  victory," 
Philip  is  said  to  have  remarked,  as  he  observed 
the  violence  of  their  attack,  and  proceeded  to 
draw  them  yet  farther  from  the  favourable  posi- 
tion, on  somewhat  higher  groimd  than  his  own, 
which  they  had  at  first  occupied.  At  length, 
when  he  had  retired  about  half  a  mile,  and  the 
Athenians,  already  tired,'  had  behind  them,  not 
the  entrance  to  the  passes,  but  only  the  steep 
rocky  hill  of  Petrachos,  which  made  retreat  im- 
possible for  them,  Philip  suddenly  halted  and 
bade  his  men  return  the  Athenian  attack.-'  His 
plan  was  entirely  successful;  the  Athenian  line 
was  broken;  and  Alexander,  having  forced  his 
way  through  on  the  other  wing,  now  threatened 
the  allies  in  the  rear.  The  position  was  hopeless. 
Some  who  were  nearer  the  centre  were  able  to 
escape  and  make  for  the  passes,  but  those  on  the 
extreme  left  wing,  caught  between  the  enemy  and 
the  rocks,  could  only  surrender  or  perish.'*  A 
thousand  Athenian  citizens  were  killed  and  two 

^  Polyaenus,  IV,  ii.,  2.     =»  Polyaen.,  IV,  ii.,  7;  Frontin.,  II,  i.,  9. 

3  Some  ancient  writers  {e.  g.,  Diod.,  XVI,  Ixxxv.)  ascribes 
Philip's  sudden  change  of  tactics  to  jealousy  of  Alexander,  but  it 
can  scarcely  be  doubted  that  military  considerations  were  really 
the  determining  motive. 

<  None  of  our  authorities  say  anything  about  the  action  of 
cavalry  in  the  battle;  but  probably  Philip  completed  his  work  by 
bringing  his  cavalry  round  upon  the  Athenian  wing. 


ChcBYoneia  387 

thousand  taken  prisoners.  All  who  coiild  fled 
in  headlong  rout,  and  among  them  Demosthenes. 
On  the  other  wing,  the  Sacred  Band  had  been  cut 
to  pieces  where  they  stood,  and  the  general  loss 
in  the  Theban  ranks  was  very  heavy.  No  serious 
pursuit  was  attempted;  probably  Philip's  men 
were  too  much  exhausted;  and  the  fugitives  col- 
lected at  Lebadeia. 

Demosthenes  was  perfectly  justified  in  hinting* 
that  bad  generalship  was  the  cause  of  the  defeat. 
There  was  no  one  commander,  directing  the  opera- 
tions of  the  allies  as  a  whole.  Phocion,  the 
greatest  Athenian  general  then  living,  had  perhaps 
been  away  with  the  fleet  in  the  ^gean  when  the 
commanders  were  being  elected,^  or  else  was  not 
appointed  owing  to  his  known  disapproval  of  the 
campaign;  and  the  Greek  commanders  were 
entirely  outgeneralled  by  Philip,  who  had  already 
proved  in  previous  contests  the  effectiveness  of  a 
feigned  retreat,  and  of  tiring  out  the  enemy  before 
attacking  them.  Lysicles,  who,  like  Chares,  was 
among  the  fugitives,  was  condemned  to  death  by 
a  jiuy  at  Athens;  Lycurgus,  who  prosecuted, 
demanded  of  him  how,  after  a  defeat  which 
entailed  the  death  and  capture  of  so  many  of  his 
fellow-citizens  and  the  enslavement  of  all  Greece, 
he  could  dare  to  walk  the  streets  of  Athens  in 
open  day,  being,  as  he  was,  a  living  reminder  to 
hiscoimtry  of  her  shame  and  reproach.  ^ 

»  Be  Cor.,  §§  194,  245.  »  Plut.,  Phoc,  xvi. 

»  Diod.,  XVI,  Ixxxviii. 


388  Demosthenes 

Of  Stratocles  we  hear  no  more.  Chares  perhaps 
did  not  return  to  Athens.   ^ 

Thus  the  C^use  of  HglTgriiir  liberty,  for  whirh 
Demosthenes  jiaj^gl^rivpn   for  gn  many  ypflrs,  wfl<; 

finally  lost.  A  few  brief  struggles  had  yet  to  be 
made,  but  the  battle  of  Chasroneia  was  in  effect 
a  thoroughly  decisive  blow.     "  WitlL-ihe— bodies 

of   those  who_fgn    hprp    •vyq„<;    bnripH    f^tp    ftPpdnrn 

ol  the  Hellenes." '  Close  to  the  battle-field,  where 
the  Theban  dead  were  buried,  a  marble  lion  was 
erected  in  memory  of  those  who  had  died  for 
freedom.  This  monument  has  in  recent  times 
been  restored  from  the  ruin  into  which  it  had  fallen, 
and  re-erected  on  or  near  the  spot  on  which  it 
originally  stood. 

Eight  years  afterwards  in  the  Speech  on  the 
Crown,  ^  Demosthenes  was  called  upon  to  defend 
the  policy  which  had  led  to  so  disastrous  a  failure, 
-^schines  had  left  no  argument  untried  which 
could  fasten  the  defeat  of  Chaeroneia  upon  his 
rival.  The  defence  which  Demosthenes  made  was, 
in  effect,  that  since  the  policy  was  the  only  right 
and  worthy  one  for  Athens  and  since  all  that 
an  orator  or  a  statesman  could  do  to  make  it 
successful  had  been  done,  he  was  not  to  blame  if, 
through  bad  generalship  or  the  inscrutable  will  of 
Heaven,  the  struggle  had  ended  in  defeat. 

In  everything  the  issue  falls  out  as  Heaven  wills, 
but  the  principle  which  he  follows  reveals  the  mind 

'  Lycurgus,  in  Leocr.,  §  50. 

'  De  Cor.,  §§  192, 193 ;  comp.  §§  194, 195,  and  245, 246. 


\ 


ChcBroneia  389 

of  the  statesman.  Do  not  therefore  count  it  a  crime 
on  my  part  that  Philip  proved  victorious  in  the 
battle.  The  issue  of  that  event  lay  with  God,  not 
with  me.  But  show  me  that  I  did  not  adopt  every 
expedient  that  was  possible,  so  far  as  human  reason 
could  calculate;  that  I  did  not  carry  out  my  plan 
honestly  and  diligently,  with  exertions  greater  than 
my  strength  could  bear;  or  that  the  policy  which  I 
initiated  was  not  honourable,  and  worthy  and  indeed 
necessary;  and  than  denounce  me,  but  not  before. 

He  claimed  above  all  to  have  interpreted  aright 
the  deepest  instincts  of  his  fellow-countrymen,* 
and  only  those  who  believe  that  no  attempt  is 
justifiable  which  fails  can  refuse  to  accept  his  plea. 
For  years  he  had  striven  to  foster  the  love  of  lib- 
erty in  the  Athenian  people,  until  at  last  they  were 
ready  to  sacrifice  everything  else  for  the  one  thing  y 
which  they  counted  best,  as  their  fathers  had  done  ■ 
before  them.  To  have  succeeded  in  this  aim,  to 
have  produced  so  great  a  moral  reaction  in  a  peo- 
ple who  were  tending  more  and  more  to  yield  to 
the  pleasure  of  the  moment,  and  to  sacrifice  nat- 
ional to  private  considerations,  was  in  itself,  per- 
haps, a  greater  service  to  his  country  than  any 
success  which  a  general  might  have  won.  That 
he  had  not  misinterpreted  the  feelings  of  his  coim- 
trymen  was  shown  by  their  steady  support  of  him 
in  the  ensuing  years,  in  face  of  all  the  attacks 
of  time-serving  enemies.  Defeated  undoubtedly 
the  Athenians   were,  but  they  had  become  them- 

^  Ibid.,  §§  199,  206.     See  pp.  329,  490. 


390  Demosthenes 

selves  once  more,  if  only  for  a  moment,  they  had 
fought  for  the  noblest  cause  known  to  the  Hel- 
lenic world,  and  the  consciousness  of  this  must 
at  least  have  been  some  consolation  to  the  nobler 
spirits  among  them  in  the  years  which  followed 
the  battle  of  Chaeroneia. 

NOTES  ON  CHAPTER  X 

1.  The  story  is  told  by  ^sch.  in  Ctes.,  §§  1 13-131,  and  Dem., 
de  Cor.,  §§  143-152,  and  from  the  two  accounts  the  facts  can  be 
reconstructed  with  fair  probability.  It  has  been  disputed 
whether  the  quarrel  broke  out  at  the  autumn  meeting  of  340, 
or  the  spring  meeting  of  339 ;  but  Kromayer,  Antike  Schlachtf elder, 
i.,  pp.  181,  182,  has  shown  conclusively  that  it  was  at  the  autumn 
meeting,  in  October  or  November. 

2.  The  Pylagori  were  not  members  of  the  Council,  and  had  no 
vote  in  it,  but  were  official  representatives  of  their  several  States, 
sent  to  transact  business  with  the  Council.  They  were  perhaps, 
as  a  rule,  persons  of  greater  distinction  than  the  Hieromnemon. 
It  was  as  Pylagorus  that  Demosthenes  had  attended  the  Council 
in  343.     (See  Sundwall,  Epigraphische  Beitrdge,  pp.  50,  51.) 

3.  Kromayer  {I.e.)  shows  that  Philip  must  have  been  elected 
general  at  the  spring  meeting,  not  the  autumn  meeting  of  339, 
since  the  latter  only  took  place  in  October  or  possibly  early  in 
November.  The  spring  meeting  was  in  May  or  June,  and  this 
would  be  long  enough  after  Philip's  return  to  Macedonia  to 
justify  ^schines' statement  {I.e.,  §129)  that  it  was  iroXXy  XP^''V 
Ha-repov,  if  he  returned  late  in  February  or  in  March. 

4.  Schafer  concludes  from  the  order  of  Philochorus'  state- 
ments that  Demosthenes  carried  these  measures  before  the  cap- 
ture of  Elateia,  but  the  inference  does  not  seem  to  be  necessary. 
The  measures  were  passed  in  the  archonship  of  Lysimachides, 
i.e.,  after  July  9th,  339;  and  it  does  not  appear  that  between  that 
date  and  the  capture  of  Elateia  in  September  any  event  occurred 
of  so  threatening  a  character  as  to  induce  the  Athenian  People  to 
divert  the  theoric  money  from  the  festivals — ^a  step  to  which  they 
had  always  been  obstinately  opposed. 

'    5-     0*1  the  official  position  of  Lycurgus,  see  Francotte,  Les 


Cheer  oneia  391 

finances  des  citSs  grecques,  pp.  231,  232.  He  was  for  four  years 
a  theoric  commissioner,  and  probably  held  various  special  com- 
missions during  and  after  that  time.  The  office  which  most 
historians  suppose  him  to  have  held — that  of  "chief  of  the  ad- 
ministration" {oeirl  ry  dioiK-fitrei) — does  not  appear  to  have  been 
constituted  until  a  later  date.  Francotte  thinks  that  the  office 
of  military  treasurer  may  have  existed  as  early  as  347,  but  his 
argument  is  not  conclusive. 

6.  Glotz,  Bidl.  Corr.  Hell.,  1909,  pp.  526-546,  argues  that  the 
rebuilding  of  the  Phocian  towns  (except  for  the  fortification  of 
Ambrysus  by  the  allies  for  purely  military  purposes)  was  really 
the  work  of  Philip,  whom  he  supposes  to  have  become  friendly 
with  the  Phocians  since  his  rupture  with  Thebes.  This  involves  a 
very  violent  treatment  of  Pausanias'  statements,  and  does  not 
seem  to  be  proved.  It  is  true  that  the  Phocians  are  not  men- 
tioned among  Philip's  opponents  at  Chasroneia.  But  were  the 
Phocians  in  a  condition  to  engage  in  active  hostilities  at  all  at  this 
period? 

7.  The  taking  of  Naupactus  by  Philip  is  recorded  in  Theo- 
pompus,  fr.  42  (Oxford  text),  and  is  placed  here  by  Beloch  (who 
follows  Schafer)  because  no  other  date  can  be  found  for  it,  though 
it  is  fair  to  notice  that  Schafer  has  to  emend  Suidas'  statement 
that  the  fact  is  recorded  by  9€(Mr6jUiros  iv  /3'  (Book  II),  to  iv  v/S' 
(Book  LII),  because  Book  LII  of  Theopompus  seems  to  have 
dealt  with  this  period.  Possibly  the  taking  of  Naupactus  ought 
really  to  be  placed  after  Chasroneia.  (The  event  may  only  have 
been  mentioned  in  passing  in  Theopomp.,  II.).  Beloch's  argument 
that  after  Chasroneia  no  one  resisted  Philip  is  not  conclusive. 
We  have  no  evidence  to  show  that  the  people  of  Naupactus  may 
not  have  done  so,  and  Theopompus  seems  to  imply  that  they  did. 

8.  The  authorities  for  Philip's  communications  with  Athens 
and  Thebes  are  Plutarch,  Dem.,  xviii.,  Phoc,  xvi.,and  ^sch.,  in 
Ctes.,  §§  149-151.  But  ^schines'  story  is  not  very  clear  as  to  the 
date  of  these  proceedings,  and  Plutarch  gives  no  precise  indica- 
tion. It  is  possible  that  these  proceedings  really  belong  to  an 
earlier  stage,  before  the  arrangement  with  Thebes  was  decisively 
concluded. 


CHAPTER  XI 

AFTER   CILERONEIA 

THE  night  after  the  battle  of  Chaeroneia  was 
spent  by  Philip  in  drunken  revelry.  He 
mocked  triumphantly  at  the  failure  of  Demos- 
thenes' plans,  as  he  shouted  out  the  opening  words 
of  the  orator's  decrees,^  beating  time  with  his 
foot  to  their  half -metrical  rhythm.  In  his  intox- 
ication he  jeered  at  his  prisoners,  imtil  he  was 
suddenly  sobered  by  the  remark  of  one  of  them, 
the  Athenian  orator  Demades — "O  King,  Fortune 
has  bidden  you  play  the  part  of  Agamemnon. 
Are  you  not  ashamed  to  behave  like  Thersites?" 
At  this  he  tore  off  his  garlands,  put  an  end  to  the 
revel,  and  ordered  Demades  to  be  set  free.*  But 
when  the  fugitives,  who^ad  assembled  at  Leba- 
deia,  asked_  leave  jbo  bury  their  Hpfld,  he  refuser! 

their  ^PQ12g?t,  altViQIlgJl  l^y  s'~>  doirg  hp  was  vinlat.- 

ing  one  of  the  mostsacred  tradition^  nf  Orppk 
warfare;  and  they  were  forced  to  return  to  their 
homes^  cleaving  their^solemn  obligation^o  their 
comradesjunfulfilled. 

The  news  of  the  disaster  reached  Athens  first 

'  Ar]fw<T94v7ii  AijiMffOivovs  Ilaiavieis  rdS*  etirey. 
»  Diod.  XVI,  Ixxxvii.;  Plut,,  Dent.,  xx. 
392 


After  ChcBroneia  393 

through  a  rumour  from  G)noe^;  but  soon  the 
defeated  soldiers  began  to  arrive,  and  its  full  mag- 
nitude became  known.  Amidst  all  the  anxiety 
and  lamentation  of  the  friends  of  the  soldiers,* 
the  leading  statesmen  in  Athens  did  not  lose  their 
heads  for  a  moment.  On  the  resolution  of  Hyper- 
eides  the  Assembly  passed,  without  delay,  a  reso- 
lution ordering  preparations  to  be  made  for  the 
defence  of  the  city.  That  such  a  project  was  not 
hopeless,  even  though  the  country-districts  of 
Attica  might  be  devastated  by  Philip,  was  shown 
by  the  King's  failure  to  reduce  Byzantium,  in 
consequence  of  his  inability  to  cut  off  her  access 
to  the  sea ;  for  in  the  case  of  Athens  his  difficulties 
would  have  been  far  greater.  The  Council  of 
Five  Hundred  marched  under  arms  to  the  Peiraeus 
to  take  measures  for  its  defence.  ^  It  was  resolved 
to  bring  the  women  and  children  from  the  country 
districts  into  the  city,  to  arm  all  citizens  who  were 
between  fifty  and  sixty  years  of  age  as  a  garrison 
for  the  walls, '» to  restore  their  civic  rights  to  those 
who  had  lost  them  owing  to  judicial  sentences,  to 
give  citizenship  to  any  resident  aliens,  and  freedom 
to  any  slaves,  who  would  serve  in  the  forces,  ^  and 
to  appoint  Charidemus,  Philip's  implacable  enemy, 
commander-in-chief.^    Demosthenes,    on   his   re- 

'  Hyper.,  in  Aristog.,  fr.  31  (Oxford  text). 

'  Vividly  described  by  Lycurgus,  in  Leocr.,  §§  39  flf. 

J  Lycurgus,  I.e.,    §  37.  ■*  Ibid.,  §  16. 

5  Hyper.,  in  Aristog.,  fr.  29;  Vit.  X  Oral.,  851a,  etc. 

*Plut.,  Phoc,  xvi. 


394  Demosthenes 

turn,  provided  by  a  series  of  decrees  for  the  details 
of  the  defence — the  disposition  of  the  garrisons,  the 
entrenchments,  the  funds  for  the  fortifications^; 
and  the  confidence  of  the  People  in  him  remained 
unimpaired.  Arms  were  taken  from  the  temples 
in  which  they  had  been  dedicated,  and  slabs  from 
the  tombstones,  to  meet  the  urgent  need.  Demos- 
thenes was  also  appointed  corn-commissioner, 
and  sailed  away  to  procure  com  and  money  for 
the  city's  use,  while  the  financial  control  at  home 
remained  in  the  hands  of  Lycurgus. 

The  departure  of  Demosthenes  at  this  juncture 
has  been  criticised  with  undue  harshness.  It  is 
said  that  he  quitted  Athens  when  he  should  have 
been  there  to  face  the  consequences  of  his  policy; 
and  that  he  left  Hypereides  and  Lycurgus  to  do 
the  hard  work,  and  to  incur  the  subsequent  hu- 
miliation of  submission  to  Philip.  It  is  at  least  an 
equally  plausible  hypothesis  that  he  was  especially 
selected  for  the  work  of  collecting  com  and  money, 
because  all  his  eloquence  would  be  needed  to 
persuade  the  allies  and  others  to  supply  these 
necessities  at  such  a  moment;  and  it  is  highly 
probable  that  when  he  left  Athens,  he  did  so  in 
the  confidence  that  the  work  of  defence  was  in 
good  hands,  and  that  the  policy  of  continued  resist- 
ance to  Philip  was  securely  accepted  by  the  People. 

'  Dem.,  de  Cor.,  §  248.  ^schines,  in  Ctes.,  §  159,  and  Plut., 
Dent.,  xxi.,  state  that  from  motives  of  caution,  Demosthenes 
got  his  friends  (especially  Nausicles)  to  propose  these  decrees 
formally. 


After  Chceroneia  395 

But  this  policy  was  not  destined  to  be  carried 
out,  and  the  line  of  action  adopted  by  Philip  was 
probably  the  reason  for  this.  We  cannot  indeed 
be  stire  of  the  precise  order  of  events  during  the 
days  which  followed  the  battle  of  Chaeroneia; 
but  it  is  certain  that  Philip  at  once  took  stem 
vengeance  upon  Thebes,  and  at  the  same  time 
displayed  an  astonishing  leniency,  and  even 
friendliness,  towards  Athens.  He  placed  a  Mace- 
donian garrison  in  Thebes,  and  entrusted  the  gov- 
ernment to  three  hundred  of  his  own  supporters, 
who  punished  the  patriotic  party  mercilessly  with 
exile,  execution,  and  confiscation.  "^  He  further 
decreed  the  dissolution  of  the  Boeotian  league,  and 
the  restoration  of  Orchomenus,  Plataeae,  and 
Thespiae,  which  had  been  traditionally  hostile  to 
Thebes.*  The  Theban  prisoners  captured  at 
Chaeroneia  were  sold  into  slavery,  and  the  Thebans 
had  even  to  pay  for  the  privilege  of  burying  their 
dead.  The  obedience  of  northern  Greece  was 
still  more  firmly  secured  by  the  planting  of  Mace- 
donian garrisons  in  Chalcis  and  Ambracia,  and 
(now  if  not  earlier  3)  by  the  transference  of  Naupac- 
tus  from  the  Achaeans  to  the  ^tolians. 

Yet^towards  Athens  Philip  tnoV  nn  hostile 
action.  Various  reasons  for  this  have  been  sug- 
gested— the    rliffirnlf^r    nf    x^c\^^c'Mng    the    ^^Y',    his 

genuine  admiration  of  Athens  _as„jthe  centre  of 
Hellenic  culture ;  and  (possibly  the  most  important 

*  Justin,  IX,  iv.,  etc.  »  Pausan.  IV,  xxvii.,  §  5,  IX,  i.,  §  3. 

»  See  above,  pp.  382,  391. 


396  Demosthenes 

consideration  of  all)  his  desire  to  obtain  without 
trouble  her  co-operation  in  his  projected  Eastern 
campaign.  In  any  case  Athens  was  not,  like 
Thebes,  a  tg^^^j^^nlly  '^^  ^^'^  ^w^j  ^  and  he  might 
weU  feel  free  to  be  generous.  Either  Philip's 
attitude,  or  a  sense  (which  may  have  revived  in 
the  absence  of  Demosthenes)  of  the  inevitable 
hardships  which  further  resistance  would  entail, 
brought  about  a  change  of  feeling  in  Athens. 
The  appointment  of  Charidemus,  who  (as  Plutarch 
states)  had  been  clamorously  nominated  by  the 
wilder  spirits  in  Athens,  was  cancelled  by  the 
Council  of  Areopagus,  and  Phocion  was  elected 
in  his  place;  and  when  Philip  sent  Demades  to 
Athens,  to  express  his  willingness  to  enter  into 
negotiations,  it  was  resolved  to  send  Phocion  and 
iEschines,  with  Demades  himself,  as  ambassadors 
to  Philip.  By  the  terms  of  the  Peace  of  Demades, 
Athens  was  permitted  to  retain  possession  not 
only  of  Athens,  but  of  Delos,  Lemnos,  Imbros, 
Scyros,  and  Samos.  ^  Oropus  was  restored  to  her, 
and  the  King  promised  not  to  send  any  warship 
into  the  Peiraeus,  or  any  land-force  into  Attica. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  Athenian  alliance  was 
dissolved,  and  its  members  (with  the  exception  of 
the  island  peoples  already  mentioned)  were  de- 
clared independent;  the  Chersonese  passed  into 

*  The  alliance  had  been  formally  dissolved  by  the  declaration 
of  war  in  340;  see  p.  350. 

'  Diod.,  XVIII,  Ivi.;  Aristotle,  Ath.  Pol.,  61,  62;  C.  I.  A.,  ii., 
824. 


After  ChcBroneia  397 

Philip's  power ';  a.nri  A  then?  herself  hp.ca.rne_the 
ally  ofPhilip.  The  bones  of  the  Athenians  slain*^ 
at  Chaeroneia,  who  had  been  burned  on  the  battle-, 
field  by  the  motors,  were  conY£Y£d  back  to  Athf.ns 
by  Alexander  himself,  accompanied  by  Antipater 
and  Alcimachus,  two  of  Philip's  ablest  gen_ei:als ; 
and  the  two  thousand  prisoners  were  j;estm;ed 
without  ransom.  The  reaction  of  feeling  in 
Athens  prodiiced  by  this  unlooked-for  generosity 
was_gj:eat.  On  the  proposal  of  Demades,  the 
citizenship  of  Athens  was_  voted  to  Philip  and 
Alexander,  it  was  resolved  to  erect  a  statue  of 
Philip  in  the  market-place,  and  other  honours 
were  offered  to  the  two  generals." 

For  the  moment  the  Macedonian  party  in 
Athens  seemed  to  have  triumphed;  Philip's  aim 
was  not,  after  all,  what  Demosthenes  had  said  it 
was — the  destruction  of  Athens:  and  ^schines 
at  least  boasted  openly  of  his  friendship  with 
Philip.  But  on  the  return  of  Demosthenes,  it 
was  soon  seen  that  the  popular  confidence  in  him 
unshaken.  The  renewal  of  the  fortifications  was 
actively  continued,  as  inscriptions  of  the  time 
make  plain, »  Instead  of  hurried  preparations 
for  defence,  systematic  building  and  modemisa- 

'  It  is  not  mentioned  in  the  list  of  Athenian  possessions  in 
Aristotle,  Ath.  Pol. 

*  Justin,  IX,  iv.,  v.;  Polyb.,  V,  x.;  Plut.,  Detn.,  xxii.;  Hyper.,  in 
Demad.,  fr.,  77;  Paus.  I,  ix.,  §  4;  Demades,  fr.,  etc. 

^See  Frickenhaus,  Athens  Mauern,  pp.  14-29;  and  Wilamo- 
witz-Moellendorf,  Arist.  u.  Athen,  i.,  pp.  194,  353,  etc. 


398  Demosthenes 

tion  of  the  fortifications  were  carried  on;  Demos- 
thenes was  appointed  (by  the  Pandionid  tribe) 
to  be  one  of  the  Ten  Commissioners'  entrusted 
with  the  superintendence  of  the  work;  and  during 
his  tenure  of  office,  he  contributed  as  much  as  a 
talent  and  a  half  from  his  own  property  for  the 
service  of  the  State.  ^  It  appears  also  that  a 
system  of  drill  and  military  discipline^  much  more 
regular  than  had  hitherto  been  enforced  in  time 
of  peace,  was  now  instituted  for  those  who  were 
liable  to  service,. 

It  was  a  far  higher  mark  of  public  respect,  that 
Demosthenes  was  chosen  to  deliver  the  Funeral 
Oration  in  honour  of  those  who  fell  at  Chaeroneia, 
despite  the  bitter  opposition  of  vEschines  and  other 
orators  of  the  Macedonian  party.  "And  the 
reason,"  he  told  ^schines,  in  the  Speech  on  the 
Crown,  3 

you  know  well,  but  I  will  tell  it  you  nevertheless. 
The  People  knew  for  themselves  both  the  loyalty  and 
zeal  which  inspired  my  conduct  of  affairs,  and  the 
iniquity  of  yourself  and  your  friends.  .  .  .  And 
further,  they  thought  that  one  who  was  to  pronounce 
an  oration  over  the  dead,  and  to  adorn  their  valour, 
should  not  have  come  beneath  the  same  roof,  nor 
shared  the  same  libation,  as  those  who  were  arrayed 

'  T«x<MroM)t'.  Whether  he  was  appointed  in  338  or  337  is 
uncertain. 

"  ^sch.,  in  Ctes.,  §§  17,  31;  Dem.,  de  Cor.,  §  113. 

*  §§  286-288.  The  extant  Funeral  Speech  which  purports 
to  be  the  one  delivered  by  Demosthenes  on  this  occasion  is  a 
patent  forgery. 


After  Cheer oneia  399 

against  them;  that  he  should  not  there  join  hands 
with  those  who  with  their  own  hands  had  slain  them, 
in  the  revel  and  the  triumph-song  over  the  calamities 
of  the  Hellenes,  and  then  come  home  and  receive 
honour — that  he  should  not  play  the  mourner  over 
their  fate  with  his  voice,  but  should  grieve  for  them 
in  his  heart.  What  they  required  they  saw  in  them- 
selves and  in  me,  but  not  in  you;  and  this  was  why 
they  appointed  me,  and  not  any  of  you.  Nor,  when 
the  People  acted  thus,  did  the  fathers  and  brothers 
of  the  slain,  who  were  then  publicly  appointed  to 
conduct  the  funeral,  act  otherwise.  For  since  (in 
accordance  with  the  ordinary  custom)  they  had  to 
hold  the  funeral  feast  in  the  house  of  the  nearest  of 
kin,  as  it  were,  to  the  slain,  they  held  it  at  my  house, 
and  with  reason;  for  though  by  birth  each  was  more 
nearly  akin  to  his  dead  than  I,  yet  none  stood  nearer 
to  them  all  in  common.  For  he  who  had  their  life 
and  their  success  most  at  heart,  had  also,  when  they 
had  suffered  what  I  would  they  had  not,  the  greatest 
share  of  sorrow  for  them  all. 

The  enemies  of  Demosthenes  continued  to  show 
their  hostility  by  attacking  him  on  every  conceiv- 
able ground. 

All  those  who  were  interested  in  injuring  me  [he 
says^]  combined,  and  assailed  me  with  indictments, 
prosecutions  after  audit,  impeachments,  and  all  such 
proceedings — not  in  their  own  names  at  first,  but 
through  the  agency  of  men  behind  whom,  they 
thought,  they  would  best  be  screened  against  recogni- 
tion.    For  you  doubtless  know  and  remember  that 

^  De  Cor.,  §249. 


400  Demosthenes 

during  the  early  part  of  that  period  I  was  brought  to 
trial  every  day,  and  neither  the  desperation  of  Sosicles, 
nor  the  dishonesty  of  Philocrates,  ^  nor  the  frenzy  of 
Diondas  and  Melantus,  nor  any  other  expedient,  was 
left  untried  against  me.  And  in  all  these  trials, 
thanks  to  the  gods  above  all,  but  secondarily  to  you 
and  the  rest  of  the  Athenians,  I  was  acquitted; 

and  he  justly  prided  himself  upon  the  public 
testimony  thus  given  to  his  integrity  and  patri- 
otism. Hypereides  was  assailed  in  the  same 
way.^*  He  was  impeached  by  Aristogeiton  for 
the  illegality  of  the  decree  which  he  had  moved 
immediately  after  the  battle,  and  by  which  slaves 
were  set  free,  aliens  enfranchised,  and  those  con- 
demned by  the  law-courts  restored  to  their  priv- 
ileges. The  decree  was  in  fact  plainly  illegal; 
but  Aristogeiton's  opposition  had  already  had  the 
effect  of  making  it  a  dead  letter,  ^  and  the  People 
accepted  Hypereides*  defence.  "It  was  the  arms 
of  the  Macedonians,"  he  said,  "that  darkened  my 
eyes.  It  was  not  I  that  proposed  the  decree;  it 
was  the  battle  at  Chaeroneia."  It  was  plain  that 
the  honours  paid  to  Philip  and  Alexander  had  been 
but  the  expression  of  an  immense  feeling  of  relief 
at  the  moment,  in  consequence  of  Philip's  gener- 
osity, and  that  the  real  sentiment  of  the  People 
remained  true  to  Demosthenes. 

After  settling  Phocis  and  Euboea,  Philip  went 
to  Megara,  and  thence  to  Corinth  and  the  Pelo- 

'  Not  the  proposer  of  the  Peace  of  346.         »  Vit.  X  Orai.,  849  a. 
3  See  above,  p.  168. 


? 

o 

Ill 

z 

\- 

UJ 

I 

J. 

H 

o 

After  Cheer oneia  401 

ponnese.  The  Megareans  and  Corinthians  re- 
ceived him  with  honour;  and  a  Macedonian  force 
was  left  at  Corinth  to  command  the  Isthmus. 
Most  of  the  Peloponnesian  peoples  submitted  to 
him  readily,  and  some  displayed  an  ignominious 
flattery.  The  Spartans,  on  the  contrary,  bluntly 
refused  to  acknowledge  him,  in  spite  of  their 
military  weakness  at  the  time;  and  in  consequence 
of  this  he  overran  Laconia,  and  gave  considerable 
portions  of  it  to  the  Argives  and  others  of  his 
allies,  though  he  refrained  from  attacking  Sparta 
itself.  He  next  held  a  congress  of  representatives 
of  the  Greek  States  at  Corinth,  and  announced 
his  intentions  with  regard  to  the  invasion  of  the 
Persian  Empire.  He  was  formally  appointed 
commander  of  the  Greeks  against  Persia;  the  con- 
tingents to  be  furnished  by  the  several  States  for 
the  campaign  were  settled;  and  a  common  synod 
of  the  Greeks  was  now  established,  with  Corinth 
as  its  meeting  place.  ^  The  Athenians  were  called 
upon  to  furnish  a  fleet 'and  a  troop  of  cavalry;  and 
Demades  proposed  in  the  Assembly  the  fulfilment 
of  this  demand;  but  it  needed  the  influence  of 
Phocion  to  persuade  the  Athenians  to  agree  to  it, 
in  spite  of  their  obvious  inability  to  refuse, — so 
strong  was  the  sense  of  shame  at  the  position  in 
which  they  found  themselves.  * 

'  Note  I  at  the  end  of  the  Chapter. 

*  Diod.,  XVI,  Ixxxix.;  Justin,  IX,  v.;  Polyb.,  XVI,  xxxiii.; 
Plut.,  Phoc,  xvi.;  Oxyrh.,  Pap.,  I,  p.  25,  col.  iii.,  1. 3  fif.;  WiUielm, 
Attische  Urkunden,  p.  43. 

2d 


402  Demosthenes 

It  was  probably  at  about  this  time  that  the 
aged  Isocrates  wrote  his  Third  Letter  to  Philip, 
expressing  his  satisfaction  that  he  had  lived  to  see 
the  dream  of  his  youth  on  the  point  of  realisation — 
the  union  of  the  Hellenes  in  a  great  expedition 
against  Persia, — a  satisfaction  which  was  his  sole 
consolation  amid  the  trials  of  old  age.  Before 
the  end  of  the  year  338  he  died.  ^ 

The  attacks  of  the  Macedonian  party  upon 
Demosthenes  and  Hypereides  in  the  law-cotirts 
were  met  by  counter-attacks,  in  which  Lycurgus 
was  especially  prominent.  The  first  of  his  more 
notable  victims  was  Autolycus,  a  member  of  the 
Coimcil  of  Areopagus;  upon  whom  the  death 
penalty  was  pronounced  for  his  withdrawal  from 
Athens  with  his  family  and  his  money,  when  the 
news  of  Chceroneia  had  arrived,  and  the  city  had 
need  of  all  her  men  and  their  resources.  *  Another 
was  Lysicles,  who  had  been  general  at  Chaeroneia, 
and  was  also  condemned  to  death.  ^  So  relentless 
and  successful  was  Lycurgus  in  his  political  pro- 
secutions, that  one  of  his  opponents  said  that  he 
dipped  his  pen,  not  in  ink,  but  in  death,  when 
he  composed  his  speeches.''  His  high  personal 
character,  and  his  known  patriotism  and  incorrupt- 
ibility, as  well  as  his  proved  ability  in  practical 
administration,  gave  him  great  power;  and  the 

»  Note  2.  a  Lycurg.,  in  Leocr.,  §  53,  etc. 

i  Diod.,  XVI,  Ixxxviii.     See  above,  p.  387. 
*Vii.  X  Oral.,  8416. 


Ajter  Chceroneia  403 

moral  earnestness  and  pathos  of  his  oratory  were 
sufficient  to  conceal  his  harshness  towards  his 
opponents  and  the  exaggeration  of  his  language. 
Hypereides  also  took  part  in  the  campaign  of 
litigation.  Demades  had  actually  proposed  to 
confer  the  citizenship  of  Athens,  and  the  office  of 
proxenus,  or  consul  for  Athens,  upon  Euthycrates, 
whose  treachery  had  brought  about  the  fall  of 
Olynthus;  and  Hypereides  indicted  the  proposal 
as  illegal.^  The  result  of  the  trial  is  not  known; 
but  it  is  difficult  to  suppose  that  Demades  received 
the  approval  of  the  jury. 

Early  in  the  summer  of  337  Demosthenes  was 
chosen  commissioner  of  the  festival-fund  for  the 
four  years  beginning  in  July  of  that  year.  We  do 
not  know  to  what  extent  the  distributions  of 
festival-money  were  carried  out  during  his  term 
of  office.  It  was  a  time  of  peace,  and  probably 
the  surplus  no  longer  went  (as  it  had  done  during 
the  war  by  his  own  enactment)  into  the  war-chest, 
but  was  at  least  in  part  distributed  as  "theoric 
money."  That  Demosthenes  should  have  agreed 
to  this  is  not  inconsistent  with  his  insistence  in 
earlier  years  upon  the  application  of  the  surplus 
to  defray  the  cost  of  war.  He  had  never  in  fact 
condemned  the  distribution  as  bad  in  itself,  but 
only  as  bad  when  it  was  treated  as  more  important 
than  the  vital  needs  of  the  State;  and  he  had 
admitted  that  if  those  needs  could  be  met  without 
suspending  the  distributions,  they  ought  to  be  so 

» Apsines,  I,  p.  388. 


404  Demosthenes 

met.^  That  condition  was  now  realised.  The 
large  expenditure  of  Lycurgus  on  public  buildings 
shows  that  the  financial  condition  of  the  city  must 
have  been  tolerably  prosperous;  and  we  can  be 
sure  that  popular  opinion  must  have  demanded 
the  resumption  of  the  distributions. 

The  popularity  of  Demosthenes  and  the  general 
sense  of  his  generosity  and  administrative  ability 
were  expressed  by  a  decree  proposed  by  Ctesiphon 
early  in  336,  that  Demosthenes  should  be  crowned 
with  a  golden  crown  in  the  theatre  at  the  ensmng 
Dionysia,  on  the  ground  that  he  continuously  spoke 
and  acted  for  the  best  interests  of  the  city.  The  de- 
cree ordered  that  the  herald  should  proclaim  before 
the  assembled  miiltitude  (which  would  include 
strangers  from  all  parts  of  Greece)  that  Demos- 
thenes was  crowned  for  his  merit  and  his  courage.  * 
The  decree  was  passed  by  the  Council ;  but  when  it 
came  before  the  Assembly,  ^schines  gave  sworn  no- 
tice that  he  intended  to  indict  Ctesiphon  for  the 
illegality  of  his  proposal.  This  declaration  ipso 
facto  suspended  the  operation  of  the  decree,  and 
.^schines  instituted  judicial  proceedings;  but  be- 
fore he  could  bring  the  case  to  an  issue,  events  took 
a  turn  which  made  it  very  unlikely  that  the  Mace- 
donian party  would  win  any  success  with  the  Peo- 
ple or  a  popular  jury  for  some  time  to  come. 

When  Philip  had  made  his  arrangements  at 

'  Olynth.  Ill,  §  19. 

» -<Esch.,  in  Ctes.,  §§  49,  236,  246;  Dem.,  de  Cor.,  §  244,  etc. 


After  Chceroneia  405 

Corinth  for  his  projected  invasion  of  Asia,  he 
retiimed  to  Macedonia;  and  shortly  afterwards  a 
quarrel  which  had  long  been  imminent  came  to  a 
head.  PhiHp  had  grown  tired  of  his  wife  Olympias, 
the  mother  of  Alexander,  and  in  337  he  married 
Cleopatra,  the  niece  of  Attains,  one  of  his  generals. 
At  the  wedding-feast  an  angry  scene  took  place 
between  himself  and  Alexander;  Alexander  de- 
parted into  Lynce^tis,  and  his  friends  were  ban- 
ished. But  early  in  336  a  formal  reconciliation 
took  place;  Olympias  and  Alexander  returned  to 
court;  and  it  was  arranged  that  Alexander's 
sister  (also  named  Cleopatra)  should  marry 
Olympias'  brother_  (her  own  uncle),  Alexander  of 
Epirus ;  while  Attalus  was  sent  to  Asia  in  command 
(with  Parmenio)  of  a  large  division  oFtEe^army.  ^ 
We  may  pass  over  certain  other  compHcations  of 
the  situation.  PhiHp  determined  to  celebrate 
the  wedding  of  his  daughter  Cleopatra  at  ^gae 
with  great  splendour;  all"  the'Greek  States  and 
neighbouring  princes  sent  embassies  bearing  pre- 
sents i_  and  among  them  the  Athenians  sent^  a 
golden  crown,  and  announced  a  decr^^  '"^^j'^'h  tVipy 
had  passed,  imdertaking  to  deliverujLanyione^who 
had  conspired  agamst  Philip's  life  and  esra.ped 
to  Athens.^     But  iathe  midst  of  the  feast,  Philip 

»  Plut.,  Alex.,  ix.,  X.;  Justin,  IX,  v.;  Diod.,  XVI,  xci.,  etc. 

'  Whether,  as  Beloch  (A.  P.,  p.  239)  supposes,  this  decree  was 
passed  in  response  to  a  demand  by  Philip  for  some  fresh  proof  of 
the  loyalty  of  Athens,  in  view  of  the  strong  anti-Macedonian 
feeling  recently  manifested  there,  there  is  no  evidence  to  show. 


4o6  Demosthenes 

was  stabbed  in  the  theatre,  where  the  festal  per- 
formance was  about  to  begin,  by  an  injtired  fa- 
vourite named  Pausanias,  and  died  immediately. 
(July,  336.)'  That  Olympias  was  in  the  back- 
ground of  the  plot  is  more  than  probable;  the 
satisfaction  which  she  did  not  hesitate  to  show 
lent  colour  to  the  suspicion;  and  the  fact  that 
Cleopatra,  her  rival,  had  just  borne  a  son  to  Philip, 
who  might  some  day  contest  th'e  succession  against 
Alexander,  may  have  impelled  her  to  desire  Philip's 
instant  death.* 

Demosthenes  received  private  intelligence  of 
Philip's  death,  before  the  news  was  generally 
known  in  Athens;  and  it  would  be  pleasant  if  we 
could  draw  a  veil  over  his  behaviour.  He  came 
before  the  Council  with  a  joyful  face,  declaring 
that  he  had  had  a  dream,  in  which  Zeus  and 
Athena  had  appeared  to  him,  promising  some 
great  blessing  to  Athens.  This  was  in  itself 
nothing  more  than  a  piece  of  rather  childish  acting; 
but  it  was  far  more  reprehensible  that  when  the 
news  was  made  public,  he  appeared  in  a  festal 
garment,  and  with  a  garland  on  his  head,  though 
it  was  but  seven  days  since  the  death  of  his  own 
daughter;  and  that  the  People  (doubtless  fol- 
lowing his  lead)  offered  sacrifice  in  gratitude  for 
good  news  and  voted  a  crown  to  Pausanias. 
Phocion,  to  his  credit,  protested  against  this  un- 
generous exultation  over  the  dead,  and  reminded 

»Diod.,  XVI,  xci.-xciv.         » Justin,  IX,  vii.;  Diod.,  XVII,  ii. 


After  ChcBroneia  407 

his  countrymen  that  the  army  which  had  defeated 
them  at  Chaeroneia  was  only  diminished  by  one 
man.^  The  plea  that  Demosthenes'  conduct  was 
intended  as  a  political  demonstration — an  invita- 
tion to  other  States  to  throw  off  the  Macedonian 
yokgzr-is  no  excuse  for  the  want  of  restraint  and 
generosity  displayed  both_  by  himself  and  tEe 
People. 

It  soon  became  plain  how  illusory  was  the  idea 
that  the  death  of  Philip  afforded  an  opportunity 
for  the  recovery  of  independence.  Any  such  hope 
was  excluded  by  the  promptitude  with  which 
Alexander,  recognised  as  King  by  Antipater  and 
the  army,  took  steps  to  secure  his  position.  His 
half-brother  Arrhidasus  he  treated  indeed  with 
consideration,  and  gave  him  a  military  command, 
first  in  Thrace  and  then  as  captain  of  the  Thes- 
salian  cavalry.  But  all  actual  or  possible  conspir- 
ators or  claimants  to  the  succession  were  at  once 
put  to  death;  Cleopatra  and  her  infant  son  fell 
victims  to  the  ferocity  of  Olympias,  though  Alex- 
ander was  not  privy  to  her  design;  Attalus, 
Cleopatra's  uncle,  was  assassinated  in  Asia  Minor 
by  Alexander's  own  orders — his  hostility  to 
Alexander  was  proved  by  the  fact  that  the  Athen- 
ians had  opened  communication  with  him; — and 
though  Demosthenes  chose  to  mock  at  the  young 
King  and  to  call  him  Margites,  after  a  foolish 
character  in  an  old  poem,^  he   showed   himself 

'  Plut.,  Dem.,  xxii.,  Phoc,  xvi.;  ^sch.,  in  Ctes.,  §§  77,  78; 
Diod.,  XVII,  iii.  '  Probably  of  the  sixth  century  B.C. 


4o8  Demosthenes 

entirely  capable  of  managing  his  difficult  inherit- 
ance. Within  three  months  of  Philip's  death  he 
marched  southwards  into  Greece  at  the  head  of  a 
large  army.  He  first  claimed  the  allegiance  of 
the  Thessalians,  who  resolved  to  join  him  in 
marching  against  Athens.'  At  Thermopylae  he 
was  acknowledged  by  the  Amphictyonic  Council, 
and  proclaimed  commander  in- chief  of  the  Greeks ; 
and  he  expressed  himself  in  friendly  language  to 
the  Ambraciots  and  Acamanians,  who  had  seemed 
likely  to  give  him  trouble.  He  then  proceeded 
on  his  way  and  encamped  outside  Thebes. 

The  Athenians  now  repented  of  their  rashness, 
and,  on  the  proposal  of  Demades,  sent  a  deputa- 
tion to  apologise  for  their  tardy  recognition  of 
him.  At  the  same  time  they  once  more  brought 
in  their  families  and  property  from  the  cotintry 
into  the  city.^  Demosthenes  himself  was  elected 
to  serve  on  this  embassy,  but  returned  home  after 
accompanying  his  colleagues  only  as  far  as  Mt. 
Cithasron.3  Alexander  at  first  addressed  the 
envoys  severely,  but  afterwards  returned  a  gracious 
reply;  and  the  People  of  Athens,  relieved  of  their 
terror,  voted  him  even  higher  honours  than  they 
had  conferred  upon  Philip.  '♦  After  this  Alexander 
convened  a  congress  of  representatives  of  the 
Greek  States  at  Corinth  (the  Spartans  still  holding 

»  Diod.,  XVII,  iv.;  ^sch.,  in  Ctes.,  §  i6i. 
'  Diod.,  XVII,  iv.;  Justin,  XI,  iii.;  Demades,  fr.,  etc. 
3  Diod.,  I.e.;  .^sch.,  in  Ctes.,  §  i6i ;  Dein.,  in  Dem.,  §  82;  Plut., 
Dem.,  xxiii.  *  Diod.,  I.e.;  Arrian,  I,  i.,  §  3. 


After  Chceroneia  409 

aloof);  his  leadership  of  the  Greek  forces  was 
formally  recognised,  and  a  convention  was  drawn 
up,  by  which  it  was  agreed  that  the  several  States 
were  to  be  autonomous,  and  all  forms  of  interfer- 
ence by  one  State  with  another  were  forbidden; 
the  congress  was  to  meet  periodically;  and  it  is 
most  probable  that  a  Macedonian  force  remained 
at  Corinth.'' 

In  the  spring  and  summer  of  335  Alexander  was 
occupied  with  campaigns  in  Thrace  and  Illyria, 
undertaken  with  a  view  to  ensuring  the  obedience 
of  the  restless  inhabitants  of  those  countries  dur- 
ing his  expedition  into  Asia.  These  campaigns 
were  completely  successftil.  But  his  absence  at  so 
great  a  distance  allowed  the  sentiment  of  independ- 
ence to  revive  once  more  in  Athens  and  Thebes; 
false  reports  of  his  death  encouraged  the  patriotic 
movement,  and  may  have  been  used  as  arguments 
for  action  by  Demosthenes  and  Lycurgus.  ^ 

Demosthenes  appears  at  this  time  to  have  hoped 
to  secure  his  country's  freedom  by  making  common 
cause  with  Persia.  The  details  of  these  negotia- 
tions are  not  clearly  known  to  us.    Rather  earlier 

'  The  authority  is  the  speech  "On  the  Treaty  with  Alexander, " 
certainly  not  written  by  Demosthenes,  but  perhaps  a  genuine 
speech  of  one  of  the  anti-Macedonian  party,  and  later  in  date  than 
332,  since  in  §  7  it  mentions  events  in  Lesbos  in  that  year 
(Arrian,  III,  ii.,   §  6). 

'  So  the  fragment  of  Demades  states;  but  the  authority  is  bad, 
as  the  fragment  is  probably  a  late  forgery  (see  Blass,  Ait.  Ber., 
Ill,  ii.,p.  272). 


410  Demosthenes 

— just  after  Alexander's  accession, — Demosthenes* 
overtures  (which  were  perhaps  made  without  the 
knowledge  of  the  People)  appear  to  have  been 
rudely  repulsed,  and  the  King  bluntly  refused  to 
send  money  to  Athens.^  But  soon  afterwards 
Darius,  who  had  probably  succeeded  to  the  throne 
about  the  end  of  336,  seems  to  have  realised  the 
formidable  character  of  Alexander's  intentions, 
and  to  have  sent  a  sum  of  three  hundred  talents, 
to  be  used  against  the  Macedonian  power.  ^  This 
sum  the  People  refused,  as  was  correct;  but  it  is 
stated  to  have  remained  in  the  hands  of  Demos- 
thenes, to  be  employed  for  the  object  specified. 
That  his  enemies  should  afterwards  accuse  him 
of  misappropriating  it  was  a  matter  of  course.  ^ 

It  was  with  the  connivance  and  aid  of  Demos- 
thenes that  the  Thebans  now  received  back  some 
of  their  exiled  fellow-citizens  (who  had  been 
sojourning  in  Athens),  and  then  killed  two  of  Alex- 
ander's officers,  restored  the  democratic  constitu- 
tion, and  besieged  the  Macedonian  garrison  in  the 
Cadmeia.  On  Demosthenes'  proposal  the  Athen- 
ians resolved  to  send  help  to  Thebes;  an  army 
and  fleet  were  made  ready,  and  an  embassy  was 
sent  to  Persia  to  propose  a  formal  alliance. ''  Dem- 
osthenes    also    sent     large    supplies     of     arms, 

'-(Esch.,  in  Ctes.,^  238. 

'  According  to  Plutarch,  proofs  of  this  were  found  by  Alexander 
at  Sardis  in  some  letters  written  by  Demosthenes,  and  in  records 
by  Persian  generals  of  the  amount  sent. 

3  Msch.,  in  Ctes.,  §240;  Dein.,  in  Dent.,  §§  10,  18;  Plut., 
Dem.,  XX.  ■♦Arrian,  II,xv. 


After  Cheer oneia  411 

bought  with  Persian  gold,  to  Thebes.  But  the 
forces  of  Athens  made  no  move.  The  People  had 
already  experienced  the  consequences  of  hasty 
action,  and  were  apparently  waiting  to  learn  the 
truth  about  Alexander  himself,  and  to  discover 
what  direction  events  were  likely  to  take.  Some  of 
the  Peloponnesian  peoples  also  signified  their 
sympathy  with  the  revolt  of  Thebes;  and  some 
were  persuaded  by  Demosthenes  ^  to  reject  Anti- 
pater's  demand  for  their  help  against  the  Thebans; 
but  only  the  Arcadians  sent  any  troops,  and  these 
marched  no  farther  than  the  Isthmus.  Had  en- 
ergetic action  been  taken  by  their  friends,  it  is 
not  impossible  that  the  Thebans  might  have  been 
successful,  and  ^schines  afterwards^  accused  Dem- 
osthenes himself  of  bringing  about  the  over- 
throw of  Thebes  by  his  miserliness;  he  would  not 
even,  ^schines  says,  advance  the  five  talents  for 
which  the  Macedonian  mercenaries  in  the  Cad- 
meia  offered  to  betray  the  fortress.  Deinarchus 
also  accused  him  of  refusing  ten  talents  to  Astylus, 
the  leader  of  the  Arcadian  forces,  and  stated  that 
others  paid  Astylus  the  money  on  condition  that 
he  should  return  home  instead  of  going  to  the 
assistance  of  Thebes.  ^  These  assertions  are  hardly 
credible.  It  is  much  more  likely  that  it  was  the 
influence  of  Phocion,  whose  caution  had  more  than 
once  justified  itself,  that  kept  the  Athenians  from 
carrying  their  sympathy  into  action. 

'  Dein.',  in  Dent.,  §  19;  Vit.  X  Oral.,  p.  850. 

'  In  Ctes.,  §  240.  3  Dein.,  in  Dem.,  §  20. 


412  Demosthenes 

But  though  it  is  conceivable  that  the  Athenians 
might  have  enabled  Thebes  to  free  herself,  it  is 
not  likely.  With  astonishing  suddenness,  Alex- 
ander himself  appeared  with  his  army  outside  the 
walls  of  Thebes.  At  first  he  attempted  to  win 
the  Thebans  by  conciliatory  overtures;  but  they 
had  stiffered  much  from  the  garrison  in  the  Cad- 
meia,  and  were  determined  to  resist  to  the  last.* 
Within  a  few  days  the  town  was  taken  by  storm,  the 
forces  of  Thespias,  Platseae,  Orchomenus,  and  the 
Phocians  taking  part  in  the  assault,  and  giving  vent 
to  the  hatred  of  many  generations.  Six  thousand 
Thebans  were  slain  in  the  massacre  which  followed, 
and  over  thirty  thousand  were  taken  prisoners. 
Alexander  entrusted  the  decision  of  the  fate  of  the 
conquered  to  the  Greek  peoples  who  had  taken 
part  in  the  siege.  In  accordance  with  that  deci- 
sion Thebes  was  razed  to  the  ground,  the  temples 
and  the  house  of  Pindar  alone  being  spared ;  nearly 
all  the  captives  were  condemned  to  be  sold  as 
slaves,  and  the  remaining  survivors  of  the  Thebans 
were  declared  outlaws,  to  whom  no  Hellenic  city 
must  give  shelter.  The  territory  of  Thebes  was 
divided  between  Orchomenus  and  Plataeag,  and 
a  Macedonian  garrison  once  more  occupied  the 
Cadmeia.  ^ 

The  destruction  of  Thebes  caused  a  paroxysm 
of  horror  and  fear  in    the  other  Greek  States. 

'  Arrian,  I,  vii.;  Diod.,  XVII,  ix. 

»  Arrian,  I,  ix. ;  Diod.,  XVII,  xiv.,  etc. 


After  Cheer oneia  413 

Some  of  them  sought  to  secure  themselves  by- 
giving  evidence  of  submission  to  the  destroyer. 
The  Arcadians  put  to  death  those  who  were  re- 
sponsible for  the  despatch  of  troops  to  the  Isthmus ; 
the  people  of  Elis  recalled  from  exile  the  banished 
partisans  of  the  Macedonian  domination;  the 
^tolians  asked  pardon  of  Alexander  for  the  sym- 
pathy they  had  shown  with  the  conquered;  at 
Messene  and  at  Pellene  in  Achaia  tyrants  were  set 
up  who  favoured  the  Macedonians.  ^  The  Athenians 
were  not  slow  to  recognise  their  own  special  peril, 
owing  to  the  part  they  had  played  in  encouraging 
the  revolt  of  Thebes.  The  news  of  the  massacre 
reached  them  in  the  midst  of  the  Eleusinian  Mys- 
teries. The  feast  was  broken  off,  and  the  city- 
was  once  more  prepared  for  defence  against  the 
expected  attack;  large  sums  of  money  were  con- 
tributed both  by  citizens  and  resident  aliens'; 
and  the  fugitives  from  Thebes  were  warmly  wel- 
comed, in  spite  of  the  prohibition  pronoimced 
by  the  King  and  his  allies.  ^  But  once  more  the 
spirit  of  resistance  was  overcome  by  that  of  cau- 
tion and  alarm.  On  the  motion  of  Demades,  ten 
ambassadors  were  sent  to  Alexander  with  a  message 
of  congratulation,  not  only  upon  his  safe  return 
from  Illyria,  but  also  (if  the  accounts  which  have 
come  down  to  us  are  correct)  upon  his  punishment 

^  Diod.,  XVII,  viii.;  Arrian,  I,  x. ;  Speech  on  Treaty  with  Alex., 
§§  4ff.,  10,  11;  Paus.,  VII,  xxvii.,  §  i. 
'  Dem.,  de  Cor.,  §  3i2;f»  Phorm.,  §  38. 
3Plut.,^/ex.,xiii. 


414  Demosthenes 

of  the  rebellious  Thebans.  It  is  not  surprising 
that,  on  receiving  this  shameful  despatch,  the  King 
threw  it  away  and  refused  to  speak  to  the  envoys.  ^ 
Subsequently,  however,  he  offered  to  pardon 
Athens,  if  she  would  send  away  the  Theban  refu- 
gees who  had  taken  shelter  with  her,  and  would  de- 
liver up  to  him  the  leaders  of  the  anti-Macedonian 
party,  among  whom  were  named  Demosthenes, 
Lycurgus,  Polyeuctus,  Charidemus,  Ephialtes,  and 
others.'' 

In  the  debate  which  ensued  in  the  Assembly, 
Phocion,  after  being  repeatedly  called  upon  for  his 
opinion,  recommended  that  the  demands  of  the 
King  should  be  obeyed,  declaring  that  the  leaders 
whose  surrender  was  in  question  had  brought 
enough  trouble  upon  Athens  already,  and  that 
he  himself  would  gladly  sacrifice  his  dearest  friend 
for  the  public  good,  after  the  example  of  the  heroes 
of  legend.  It  is  said  that  the  People  shouted  this 
proposal  down.  Demosthenes  himself  warned 
them  that  it  was  not  well  for  the  sheep  to  surrender 
the  sheep-dog  to  the  wolves ;  and  that  if  they  sold 
the  orators  to  Alexander,  they  woiild  be  selling 
themselves  into  slavery,  like  merchants,  who  only 
display  a  few  grains  of  com  as  a  sample,  but 
thereby  sell  their  whole  cargo.  Hypereides  and 
Lycurgus  also  opposed  Phocion's  proposal.^    The 

'  Arrian,  I,  x. ;  Plut.,  Phoc,  xvii.     See  Note  3. 
'  Arrian,  l.c,  Plut.,  I.e.,  and  Dem.,  xxiii.;  Diod.,  XVII,  xv.  The 
names  are  not  the  same  in  all  the  accounts. 
3  Vit.  X  Oral.,  838d;  Plut.,  Phoc,  ix. 


After  Cheer oneia  415 

resolution  which  was  finally  adopted  was  moved 
by  Demades.  (Diodorus  states — we  do  not  know 
on  what  authority — that  he  had  been  bribed  by 
Demosthenes  with  a  gift  of  five  talents).  It  was 
determined  to  send  an  embassy  to  Alexander  to 
ask  pardon  for  the  orators  and  generals  whose 
surrender  he  had  demanded,  on  condition  that 
judicial  proceedings  should  be  taken  against  any 
who  were  guilty  of  misconduct;  and  to  beg  that 
the  Theban  exiles  should  be  permitted  to  remain 
in  Athens. 

The  embassy  was  headed  by  Phocion  and 
Demades.  The  eloquence  of  the  latter,  and  the 
outspoken  advice  which  the  former  gave  to  the 
King,  proved  successful.  In  fact  the  sack  of  Thebes 
and  the  extirpation  of  one  of  the  greatest  cities 
of  Greece  was  an  act  which  was  condemned  by  the 
moral  sense  of  the  Greeks  generally;  Alexander's 
own  conscience  was  not  free  from  misgivings  about 
it;  and  he  may  have  been  glad  to  retrieve  his 
character  by  showing  clemency  towards  Athens. 
Accordingly  he  gave  ear  to  Phocion 's  advice  that 
he  should  turn  his  army  against  barbarians,  not 
against  Greeks;  and  reduced  his  demands  to  the 
requirement  that  Charidemus,  one  of  the  most 
irreconcilable  opponents  of  Macedonia,  should  be 
expelled  from  Athens.  With  this  the  Athenians 
complied.  Charidemus  went  to  Persia  and  took 
service  under  Darius ;  and  his  example  was  shortly 
afterwards  followed  by  Ephialtes  and  other  Athen- 
ian generals.     Alexander  returned  to  Macedonia 


4i6  Demosthenes 

with  the  knowledge  that  he  had  nothing  to  fear 
for  the  present  from  the  Greeks. 

A  resolution  of  the  Assembly  entrusted  the 
Council  of  Areopagus  with  the  promised  enquiry 
into  the  use  made  of  gold  from  Persia  for  the  as- 
sistance of  Thebes,  but  the  Coimcil  allowed  the 
matter  to  drop^;  and  although  the  enemies  of 
Demosthenes  repeatedly  accused  him  of  enriching 
himself  with  the  money  sent  by  the  Great  King, 
there  is  no  evidence  which  deserves  the  name  to 
show  that  he  really  did  so ;  and  the  reception  given 
to  his  defence  in  the  Speech  on  the  Crown,  in  which 
he  claims  to  have  been  incorruptible  from  first  to 
last,  is  scarcely  consistent  with  the  insinuations 
made  by  his  enemies  to  the  effect  that  his  accept- 
ance of  large  presents  from  Persia  was  matter  of 
common  knowledge.  ^ 

When  we  review  the  course  of  events  from  the 
battle  of  Chseroneia  to  the  departure  of  Alexander 
to  Asia,  it  is  not  easy  to  find  sufficient  reason  for 
the  severity  with  which  the  part  played  by  Demos- 
thenes has  been  criticised.  It  is  plain  that  his 
own  policy  was  one  of  resistance  to  the  uttermost. 
That  alone  he  considered  to  be  worthy  of  the  tradi- 
tions of  Athens.  Whatever  concessions  to  circum- 
stances his  fellow-countrymen,  less  courageous 
than  himself,  might  make,  he  lost  no  opportunity 

'  Dein.,  in  Dent.,  §  lo. 

'  ^sch.,  in  C<«5.,§§  173, 209, 259;  Dein.,  in  Dem.,  %  70;  Hjrper., 
in  Dem.,  Col.  25;  Plut.,  Dem.,  xiv.,  etc 


After  Cheer oneia  417 

which  seemed  to  offer  a  chance  of  throwing  off  the 
yoke,  and  worked  steadily,  with  Lycurgus,  for 
the  improvement  of  the  defences,  the  increase  of  the 
efficiency  of  the  army,  and  the  strengthening  of  the 
financial  resources  of  the  city.  It  is  also  plain  that 
he  had  the  confidence  of  the  People;  and,  conscious 
of  this,  he  did  not  shrink  from  taking  measures, 
which  his  country's  interest  seemed  to  demand, 
upon  his  own  responsibility,  whatever  risk  to 
himself  they  involved.  Chief  of  these  measures 
were  the  communications  which  he  kept  up  during 
this  period  with  Persia,  with  whom  it  was  natural 
to  make  common  cause  against  a  common  foe. 
It  is  true  that  his  correspondence  with  Persia  was, 
from  a  narrowly  democratic  point  of  view,  a 
violation  of  the  spirit  of  the  constitution.  "The 
Coimcil  and  the  Assembly,"  -^schines  protested, 
"are  passed  over:  despatches  and  embassies  come 
to  private  houses,  and  those  not  from  insignificant 
persons,  but  from  the  greatest  Powers  in  Asia  and 
Europe."  Besides  this,  the  responsibility  for  the 
expenditure  of  the  money  remitted  from  Persia 
to  be  used  against  Alexander  was  one  which, 
when  refused  by  the  People,  placed  him  in  a  very 
invidious  position.  Yet  here  again  he  took  the 
risk  of  the  charges  of  malversation  which  any  one 
could  bring,  and  which,  though  no  one  could  prove 
them,  could  not,  in  all  probability,  be  disproved 
without  disclosing  facts  as  to  the  use  of  this  secret 
service  money  which  had  better  be  kept  secret; 
and  he  was  not  afraid  of  being  denoimced  as  an 


4i8  Demosthenes 

autocrat.  There  is  no  valid  ground  for  believ- 
ing that  Demosthenes  acted,  during  this  period, 
otherwise  than  with  a  single  eye  to  what  he  believed 
to  be  the  interest  and  honour  of  his  country. 

But  was  his  action  wise,  as  well  as  patriotic? 
Was  his  statesmanship  equal  to  his  good  intentions? 
Here  there  is  more  room  for  doubt.  We  cannot 
tell  whether  he  did  or  did  not  rely  too  strongly 
upon  the  support  of  his  countrymen, — whether 
he  ought  to  have  known  that  they  would  not  really 
go  to  the  help  of  Thebes.  It  was  at  least  a  generous 
error,  if  he  attributed  to  them  still  the  spirit  which 
they  had  shown  before  the  battle  of  Chaeroneia. 
Nor  can  we  now  tell  how  far  his  belief  that  the 
moment  was  a  favourable  one  for  the  revolt  of 
Thebes  was  reasonable.  Alexander,  so  far  as 
any  one  knew,  was  in  lUyria,  and  some  said  he 
was  dead.  His  sudden  appearance  before  Thebes 
was  at  least  as  great  a  surprise  to  every  one  else  as 
to  Demosthenes  himself;  and  it  does  not  seem 
right  to  blame  him  for  falling  into  an  error  which  no 
one  else  avoided.  It  is  easy  to  find  fault  with  him 
in  the  light  of  our  later  knowledge  of  Alexander's 
character,  and  his  skill  in  making  sudden  move- 
ments with  a  rapidity  paralysing  to  his  enemies. 
But  in  335  Alexander  was  not  so  well  known,  in 
spite  of  his  prompt  action  in  the  previous  year, 
as  he  became  a  few  years  later.  On  the  whole, 
therefore,  it  does  not  seem  just  to  denoimce  the 
course  piu-sued  by  Demosthenes  during  these 
years  either  as  dishonest  or  as  unstatesmanlike; 


After  Cheer oneia  419 

and  more  credit  is  due  to  him  than  has  always  been 
given  for  the  courage  and  consistency  which  he 
displayed. 

NOTES  TO  CHAPTER  XI 

1.  Wilhelm,  Attische  Urkunden  (Sitzungsber.  Akad.  Wien., 
191 1),  shows  that  the  confederation  formed  at  Corinth  included 
far  more  States  than  has  been  generally  supposed,  and  that  it  was 
much  more  minutely  organised,  especially  as  regards  the  repre- 
sentation (on  a  proportional  basis)  of  the  several  peoples  in  the 
common  synod.  (He  interprets  in  this  sense  C.  I.  A.,  ii.,  i6o, 
184,  and  some  other  inscriptions.)  It  is  disputed  whether  Philip 
intended  only  to  free  the  Greek  towns  in  Asia  from  Persian  rule, 
or  to  conquer  the  whole  or  the  greater  part  of  Asia  Minor,  or  to 
enter  upon  a  series  of  campaigns  comparable  to  those  actually 
carried  out  by  Alexander.     There  is  no  evidence  on  the  point. 

2.  The  picturesque  story  of  Isocrates  being  so  overcome  with 
grief  at  the  defeat  of  Chseroneia  that  he  refused  food,  and  so  died 
a  few  days  after  the  battle,  must  be  taken  to  be  disproved;  and 
apart  from  this  story  there  are  no  good  grounds  for  disputing 
the  genuineness  of  the  Third  Letter  to  Philip.  (See  Beloch, 
Griech.  Gesch.,  ii.,  p.  574  n.)  The  Letter  is  in  keeping  with 
Isocrates'  known  sentiments,  and  the  style  is  also  his. 

3.  Grote  and  others  doubt  the  story  of  this  embassy  to 
Alexander;  and  it  is  not  clear  that  Plutarch's  statement  can 
refer  to  any  embassy  before  Alexander's  demands  were  made. 
His  language  is  very  obscure  {e.g.,  it  is  not  at  all  plain  to  what 
the  words  t6  fi^v  irpGn-ov  ^^(jiur/M  refer).  That  he  was  much 
confused  about  this  period  is  shown  I'y  the  fact  that  in  his  Life  of 
Demosthenes,  chapter  xxiii.,  he  runs  together  events  of  which 
some  took  place  before  and  some  after  the  taking  of  Thebes. 
Arrian  also  may  have  transferred  to  an  earlier  stage  in  the 
proceedings  a  message  really  sent  to  Alexander  after  he  had 
demanded  the  surrender  of  the  orators.  But  it  is  only  too 
probable  that,  whether  before  or  after,  some  such  message  was 
sent. 


CHAPTER  XII 

GREECE  IN  THE  ABSENCE  OF  ALEXANDER 

WE  know  little  of  the  history  of  Athens  during 
the  first  years  of  Alexander's  absence  in  the 
East.  But  it  can  be  gathered  that  it  was  Demades 
who  took  the  lead  in  public  affairs,  sometimes 
holding  financial,  sometimes  military  offices,  and 
receiving  frequent  presents  from  Antipater,  whom 
Alexander  had  left  in  charge  of  Macedonia  and 
Greece.  The  statue  of  Demades  in  bronze  was 
even  erected  in  the  market-place  in  his  Hfetime, 
contrary  to  Athenian  custom ;  and  he  was  accorded 
the  honour  of  perpetual  maintenance  in  the  Pry- 
taneum  at  the  expense  of  the  state.  He  was 
supported  by  Phocion,  who  was  continually  re- 
elected general,  and  (unlike  Demades)  decHned  all 
presents  from  Antipater;  and  also  by  ^schines, 
though  the  activity  of  the  latter  appears  to  have 
been  intermittent,  and  he  lived  for  the  most  part 
the  life  of  a  prosperous  landowner.  Among  his 
possessions  were  included  estates  which  had  once 
formed  part  of  the  territory  of  Thebes.'     Demo- 

'Dem.,  de  Cor.,  §§ 41  fiF.  307  flf;^sch.,tn  Cte5.,§§2i6  S.;  Dein., 
in Dem.,  §§  loi ;  Plut., Phoc,  xxx.,  etc. 

420 


Greece  in  the  Absence  of  Alexander   421 

sthenes  seems  to  have  given  up  for  the  time  all 
attempt  to  influence  the  course  of  affairs.  "When 
there  happened,"  he  says  to  -^schines,^  "what  I 
would  had  never  happened,  when  it  was  not  states- 
men that  were  called  to  the  front,  but  those  who 
would  do  the  bidding  of  a  master,  those  who  were 
anxious  to  earn  wages  by  injuring  their  country, 
and  to  flatter  a  stranger — then,  along  with  every 
member  of  your  party,  you  were  found  at  your 
post,  the  grand  and  resplendent  owner  of  a  stud — 
while  I  was  weak,  I  confess,  yet  more  loyal  to 
my  fellow-countrymen  than  you. "  ^schines  and 
Deinarchus  of  course  attribute  his  quiescence  to 
cowardice."*  If  it  is  cowardice  to  recognise  the 
temporary  hopelessness  of  a  cause,  then  Demos- 
thenes is  open  to  the  charge;  but  that  is  not  the 
ordinary  meaning  of  cowardice;  and  when  there 
seemed  to  be  hope  once  more,  Demosthenes  acted 
energetically  enough. 

A  modem  historian  ^  has  suggested  that  the  rea- 
son for  Demosthenes'  retirement  is  to  be  found 
in  a  rapprochement  between  himself  and  Dema- 
des,  as  the  result  of  which  Demades  in  335  pro- 
posed the  motion  which  prevented  the  surrender 
of  Demosthenes  and  others,  while  Demosthenes 
undertook  not  to  attempt  to  disturb  the  Peace,  or 
to  interfere  with  Demades'  acts.  But  there  is  no 
sufficient  evidence  of  any  such  agreement,  and  the 
subsequent  association  of  the  two  orators  in  the 

'  De  Cor.,^  320.  '  ^sch.,  in  Ctes.,  §§  163  ff. ;  Dein.,  l.c. 

sBeloch,  Att.  Polilik.,  p.  243. 


422  Demosthenes 

affair  of  Harpalus^  does  not  prove  it.  It  is  more 
likely  that  Demades'  motion  was  a  compromise 
dictated  by  the  strong  popular  feeling  against 
conceding  Alexander's  demands  on  the  one  hand, 
and  the  danger  of  refusing  compliance  on  the  other; 
and  that  Demosthenes'  abstinence  from  public 
affairs  was  no  more  than  a  wise  concession  to 
circumstances.  Indeed,  even  after  the  supposed 
compact  with  Demades,  Demosthenes  joined 
Hypereides  in  opposing  the  proposal  to  furnish  a 
contingent  to  Alexander  (as  the  Athenians  were 
bound  to  do) — a  fact  which  of  itself  almost  proves 
that  the  compact  never  existed.^  On  the  motion 
of  Phocion,  twenty  ships  and  a  smaU  corps  of 
cavalry  were  sent  to  join  Alexander's  army  3;  but 
a  number  of  Athenian  volunteers  took  service  in 
the  cause  of  Persia.  Whether  there  is  any  truth 
in  the  assertions  of  Demosthenes'  enemies  that  he 
sought  a  reconciliation  with  Alexander  through  the 
mediation  of  a  youth  named  Aristion,  and  with 
Olympias  through  Callias  of  Chalcis,  is  very  doubt- 
ful.'* The  statements  made  by  ^schines  and 
Hypereides  when  prosecuting  him  some  years 
later  are  certainly  not  reliable  testimony;  espec- 
ially as  -^schines  at  least  was  particularly  anxious 
to  prove  that  Demosthenes  had  really  taken  the 
Macedonian  side — a.  paradox  which  only  false- 
hoods could  support. 

»  See  below,  p.  461.  »  Vit.  X  Oral.,  847  c,  848  e. 

3  Plut.,  Phoc,  xxi.;  Diod.,  XVII,  xxii. 

*  Msch.,  in  Ctes.,  §  162 ;  Hyper.,  in  Dem.,  col.  20. 


Greece  in  the  Absence  of  Alexander   423 

But  though  defeated,  the  anti- Macedonian 
party  was  not  wholly  inactive.  In  334  Diotimus, 
one  of  the  generals  whose  surrender  Alexander  had 
demanded,  died;  and  Lycurgus  proposed  a  decree 
in  his  honour. '  In  the  same  year  when  the  Persian 
fleet  appeared  in  the  -^gean,  it  was  permitted  by 
the  Athenians  to  re  victual  at  Samos.^  But 
Alexander  could  afford  to  overlook  these  pin- 
pricks, and  it  is  clear  that  he  desired  to  remain  on 
good  terms  with  Athens.  He  even  went  out  of  his 
way  to  pay  her  compliments.  After  his  victory 
at  the  Granicus  in  334,  despite  the  fact  that  he  had 
captured  a  number  of  Athenians  among  the  enemy, 
he  sent  a  present  to  Athens  and  three  hundred 
suits  of  Persian  armour  to  be  dedicated  in  the 
Parthenon;  with  the  inscription,  "Dedicated  by 
Alexander,  son  of  Philip,  and  by  the  Greeks, 
except  the  Lacedaemonians,  out  of  the  spoils  taken 
from  the  Barbarians  of  Asia. "  ^ 

Until  the  battle  of  Issus  in  333,  Demosthenes, 
who  continued  to  receive  special  intelligence  from 
the  seat  of  war,  cherished  hopes  that  Alexander 
would  be  defeated  in  Cilicia,  and  regarded  with 
unconcealed  satisfaction  the  apprehensions  of 
.^schines  and  other  friends  of  the  Xing'*;  but  after 
that  victory,  no  room  was  left  for  such  hopes. 

In  the  spring  of  331  the  Athenians  sent  an  em- 
bassy to  Alexander,  bearing  him  a  golden  crown  in 
honour  of  his  victories ;  and  he  then  set  free  those 

■  Vit.  X   Oral.,  844  a.  » Arrian,  I,  xix.,  §  8. 

*  Arrian.  I,  xvi.,  §  7.  ■♦iEsch.  in  Ctes.,  §  164. 


424  Demosthenes 

of  their  fellow-citizens  whom  he  had  taken  prison- 
ers at  the  Granicus,  and  had  before  refused  to 
release^;  and  in  ordering  the  affairs  of  Greece, 
whether  by  his  own  commands  or  through  his 
regent  Antipater,  he  appears  to  have  been  careful 
to  avoid,  so  far  as  Athens  was  concerned,  any 
breach  of  the  agreement  between  himself  and  the 
Greek  States. 

Thus  the  course  of  events  in  Greece  was  com- 
paratively uneventful  until  after  Alexander's 
crowning  victory  at  Arbela  in  331,  and  the  death 
of  Darius  in  the  following  year.  Sparta  alone 
acted  in  a  manner  which  threatened  trouble. 
The  Spartan  King  Agis  entered  into  commiinica- 
tion  with  Persia,  and  in  333,  supported  by  funds 
received  from  Persian  admirals,  made  himself 
master  of  Crete.  Consequently  in  331,  Alexander 
ordered  a  large  fleet  under  Amphoterus  to  take 
action  against  Sparta,  and  sent  money  to  Antipater 
to  be  used  in  reducing  the  Spartans  to  obedience. ' 
At  last,  in  330,  Sparta  declared  war  against  Alex- 
ander. The  moment  seemed  favoiirable.  Anti- 
pater was  engaged  in  Thrace,  where  a  revolt  had 
broken  out  under  the  leadership  of  the  Odrysian 
King  Seuthes;  and  Memnon,  one  of  Alexander's 
own  commanders,  seems  for  a  time  to  have  joined 
in  it.  ^    Further,  there  was  considerable  discontent 

^Arrian,  I,  xxix.;  Ill,  vi.;  C.  I.  A.,  ii.,  741  f. 
»Arrian,  III,  vi.;  Diod.,  XVII,  xlviii. 

3  In  this  year  the  Athenians  passed  a  decree  in  honour  of 
Rhebulas,  son  of  Seuthes  (C.  I.  A.,  ii.,  175  b).     This  may  mean 


Greece  in  the  Absence  of  Alexander   425 

in  Greece  at  the  violation  of  the  promises  made  by 
Alexander  at  Corinth  in  336,  through  the  arbitrary 
conduct  of  Macedonian  commanders.  Tyrants 
had  been  set  up,  favourable  to  the  Macedonian 
domination,  in  Messene,  Lesbos,  and  Pellene, 
though  it  had  been  promised  that  there  should  be 
no  interference  with  the  constitutions  of  the  States. 
Macedonian  captains  had  seized  Athenian  and 
other  trading  vessels  and  detained  them  atTenedos, 
and  the  Athenians  had  actually  equipped  a  fleet 
of  one  hundred  ships  under  Menestheus,  son  of 
Iphicrates,  to  recover  them;  but  (in  accordance 
with  Alexander's  policy  of  conciliation  towards 
Athens)  they  were  released  before  active  measures 
were  taken.  A  Macedonian  trireme  had  entered 
the  Peirsus,  nominally  to  demand  permission  for 
the  building  of  small  vessels  there  for  the  Mace- 
donian fleet,  but  more  probably  in  the  hope  of 
recruiting  the  fleet  with  Athenian  sailors,  though 
the  request  had  been  withdrawn  when  the  Atheni- 
ans objected.  ^ 

Agis  at  first  gained  some  slight  successes.  He 
defeated  a  Macedonian  corps  under  Corrhagus ;  the 
people  of  Elis,  all  the  Arcadians  except  those  of 
Megalopolis,  and  all  the  Achaeans  except  those  of 
Pellene  joined  him;  and  he  laid  siege  to  Megalo- 

that  Rhebulas  came  to  Athens  to  renew  the  old  friendship 
between  the  city  and  the  Thracian  princes,  and  that  the  Athenians 
wished  to  show  sympathy  with  the  revolt  of  Seuthes.  See  Schafer, 
iii.,  p.  200. 

'  Speech  on  Treaty  with  Alexander. 


426  Demosthenes 

polis.  ^  He  also  appealed  to  Athens  for  support,  and 
the  extant  speech  (wrongly  ascribed  to  Demosthe- 
nes) "On  the  Treaty  with  Alexander"  may  have 
been  delivered  in  one  of  the  consequent  debates  in 
the  Assembly,  by  a  supporter  of  the  Spartan  King's 
request.  It  is  not  easy  to  ascertain  with  any 
certainty  what  part  Demosthenes  took  in  the 
discussion.  According  to  Plutarch,^  he  began  by 
asking  the  Athenians  to  assist  Agis,  but  afterwards 
shrank  back,  finding  that  the  People  were  not 
willing  to  join  in  the  rising.  It  may  be  suspected 
that  this  is  substantially  the  truth.  That  he  did 
at  first  encourage  the  Spartans  to  hope  for  Athen- 
ian aid  seems  to  be  indicated  by  ^schines'  state- 
ment ^  that  Demosthenes  had  clahned  (though 
falsely)  a  share  in  instigating  the  Peloponnesian 
revolt,  as  well  as  a  revolt  in  Thessaly,  of  which  we 
know  nothing  more;  though  in  the  same  speech — 
so  vEschines  states — he  complained  in  a  series  of 
strained  metaphors  of  the  helpless  condition  into 
which  his  old  opponents  had  brought  the  State, 
and  so  excused  himself  from  carrying  his  support 
of  the  movement  further.  In  another  place,  ■• 
Plutarch  states  that  the  Athenians  resolved  to  give 
the  Peloponnesians  the  support  of  their  fleet — 
perhaps  they  were  influenced  by  Demosthenes* 
attitude  at  the  outset — but  that  Demades  cleverly 
parried  this  resolution,  by  pointing  out  that  the 

'.^ch.  in  Ctes.,  §  165,    166;  Dein.,  in  Dein.,%  34;   Diod., 
XVII,  c.  »  Plut.,  Dem.,  xxiv. 

3  In  Ctes.,  §  167.  4  Plut.,  PrcEC.  Ger.  Rep.,  818  e,  f. 


I 


Greece  in  the  Absence  of  Alexander   427 

only  funds  available  for  the  expenditure  which  this 
policy  would  entail  were  those  which  he,  asTheoric 
Commissioner,  had  saved  for  distribution  at  an 
approaching  festival;  and  that  the  Athenians, 
rather  than  forego  this  distribution  or  contribute 
from  their  private  property,  were  content  to  do 
nothing.  In  that  case,  Demosthenes  might  well 
complain  that  the  sinews  of  the  State  had  been 
cut  by  his  opponents ;  and  his  withdrawal  from  his 
first  attitude  was  dictated  by  simple  prudence. 
It  was  of  no  use  to  encourage  Sparta  to  expect  sup- 
port which  the  People  would  not  give ;  and  it  is  to 
Demosthenes*  credit  that  he  was  not  afraid  to 
face  the  humiliation  which  such  a  withdrawal 
from  his  original  position  brought  with  it.  Cer- 
tainly nothing  can  be  more  despicable  than  the  in- 
sincerity of  ^schines  and  Deinarchus '  in  blaming 
him  afterwards  for  doing  nothing  to  help  the 
Spartans  against  Macedonia,  while  at  the  same 
time  they  tried  (as  will  be  seen  shortly)  to  fasten 
upon  him  some  of  the  responsibility  for  the  rising, 
and  declared  that  his  behaviour  had  brought  dis- 
credit upon  the  city.  ^ 

The  siege  of  Megalopolis  was  raised  upon  the 
arrival  of  Antipater  with  an  army  considerably 
outnumbering  that  of  the  Spartans  and  their  al- 
lies. Agis  gave  battle,  but  was  completely  de- 
feated, and  himself  slain.  ^     Antipater  demanded 

^^sch.,  I.e.]  Dein.,  in  Dem.,  §  35.         »^sch.,  in  Ctes.,  §  254. 
sCurtius,  VI,  i;  Diod.,  XVII,  Ixii.,  Ixiii,;  Paus.,  I,  xiii.,  §  6; 
Justin,  XII,  i.;  Plut.,  Agis,  iii.,  etc. 


428  Demosthenes 

fifty  noble  Spartans  as  hostages,  and  entrusted  the 
sentence  on  the  rebelHous  States  to  the  congress  of 
the  Greeks  at  Corinth.  But  the  Spartans  ap- 
pealed to  Alexander,  to  whom  the  hostages  were 
sent ;  and  he  pardoned  all  but  the  chief  movers  in 
the  revolt,  only  commanding  the  payment  of  120 
talents  to  Megalopolis  as  compensation  for  the 
inconvenience  caused  to  them  by  the  siege.  ^  A 
proposal  was  made  by  the  enemies  of  Demosthenes 
to  hand  him  over  for  judgment  to  the  Amphicty- 
onic  Coimcil,  which  was  to  meet  in  the  autumn  of 
330,  as  though  he  had  been  in  some  way  respon- 
sible for  the  disturbances ;  but  the  People  refused 
to  sanction  this,  ^  and  showed  thereby  that  though 
they  might  be  unwilling  to  take  any  action  which 
involved  danger  or  sacrifice,  their  sympathy  with 
the  attitude  of  Demosthenes  towards  the  Mace- 
donian conqueror  had  not  substantially  altered. 

Moreover,  a  notable  trial  of  this  same  year 
(330)  showed  that  the  patriotic  party  was  still 
active.  Lycurgus  prosecuted  a  certain  Leocrates 
for  desertion  after  the  battle  of  Chaeroneia.  When 
the  first  report  of  the  battle  came,  Leocrates  had 
departed  with  all  his  belongings  to  Rhodes,  to 
escape  the  ruin  which  seemed  to  be  coming  upon 
Athens,  and  had  even  reported  at  Rhodes  that 
Athens  was  actually  taken.  He  had  subsequently 
settled  at  Megara  as  a  resident  alien,  and  engaged 

'Curtius,  I.e.;  Diod.XVII,  Ixxiii. 

•iEsch., twCtes.,  §§  161, 254;  Dem.,<i«  Cor.,  §322. 


Greece  in  the  Absence  of  Alexander  429 

in  trade  on  a  considerable  scale.  In  the  year  33 1  -o 
he  ventured  to  return  to  Athens;  and  Lycurgus, 
true  to  the  stem  principles  which  had  led  him  to 
prosecute  Autolycus,  charged  him  with  treason 
and  demanded  the  death-penalty.  The  Speech 
of  Lycurgus  may  still  be  read.  He  justly  prides 
himself  on  his  avoidance  of  all  attempt  to  bring 
odium  upon  the  accused  by  the  introduction  of 
matter  irrelevant  to  the  charge,  and  of  references 
to  the  life  of  the  prisoner,  apart  from  the  time  of  his 
offence.  He  spends  all  his  energy  in  proving  the 
enormity  of  the  offence  itself,  judged  by  the 
standard  of  Athenian  tradition;  and  a  consider- 
able part  of  the  Speech  consists  of  narratives  of 
episodes  in  Athenian  history,  with  long  quotations 
from  the  poets.  Though  the  language  is  exagger- 
ated,^the  tone  of  the  Speech  is  earnest  and  patriotic ; 
but  nothing  can  quite  justify  the  attempt  to  put 
Leocrates  to  death  for  an  offence  committed  eight 
years  before,  by  way  of  making  a  demonstration 
against  the  Macedonian  supremacy.  The  votes 
of  the  jury  were  equally  divided  and  Leocrates 
was  acquitted.  The  trial  illustrates  the  sharp 
division  of  political  opinion  in  Athens,  and  the 
large  amount  of  support  upon  which  statesmen  of 
the  patriotic  party  could  still  reckon,  at  least  when 
no  sacrifice  was  entailed  by  their  policy. 

It  was  probably  at  about  the  same  time*  that  a 
certain  Euxenippus  was  impeached  by  Polyeuctus 

'  It  was  at  any  rate  between  330  and  324  (Blass,  AU,  Ber.,  Ill, 
ii.,  p.  64). 


430  Demosthenes 

for  giving  bad  advice  to  the  People  and  receiving 
bribes  from  those  who  were  acting  against  the 
interests  of  Athens.  From  the  remains  of  Hyperei- 
des'  speech  for  the  defence,  it  is  evident  that  of 
the  arguments  used  by  the  prosecutor,  one  of  the 
most  formidable  was  derived  from  the  prisoner's 
alleged  flattery  of  the  Macedonians,  and  of 
Olympias  in  particular.  That  such  an  argument 
should  have  been  used  is  some  indication  of  the 
state  of  popular  feeling. 

It  may  have  been  the  failure  of  the  Spartan 
revolt,  with  which  Demosthenes  was  known  to 
have  sympathised,  that  led  -^schines  to  renew  the 
attack  upon  him,  in  the  form  of  a  prosecution  of 
Ctesiphon,  which  he  had  allowed  to  drop  six  years 
before,  when  the  news  of  Philip's  death  had  re- 
vived the  antipathy  of  the  Athenians  to  Mace- 
donian rule.  It  will  be  remembered  that  Ctesiphon 
had  proposed  in  the  Council,  and  the  Council  had 
resolved,  that  a  golden  crown  should  be  bestowed 
upon  Demosthenes  in  the  theatre  at  the  Dionysia, 
with  a  proclamation  to  the  effect  that  he  consis- 
tently spoke  and  acted  for  the  true  good  of  the 
People  of  Athens,  and  a  commemoration  of  his  pub- 
lic services ;  and  that  ^schines  had  indicted  this 
as  illegal.  The  indictment  had  had  the  effect  of 
suspending  the  operation  of  the  decree,  which 
became  void  at  the  end  of  the  year  in  which  it  had 
been  moved.  Some  difficulty  has  been  caused 
by  the  fact  that  in  the  Speech  against  Ctesiphon 


Greece  in  the  Absence  of  Alexander  431 

iEschines  clearly  assumed  that  unless  Ctesiphon 
was  condemned,  Demosthenes  would  be  crowned 
at  the  next  Dionysia;  and  certain  historians  have 
been  led  by  this  to  suppose  that  Ctesiphon' s 
decree  had  again  been  brought  forward  at  the 
time  of  the  Spartan  rising,  and  that  this  led 
^schines  to  repeat  his  indictment.  But  there  is 
no  evidence  of  this;  and  it  seems  more  natural  to 
suppose  that  every  one  assumed,  as  a  matter  of 
course,  that  if  the  jury  acquitted  Ctesiphon  his 
motion  would  be  formally  reintroduced  and  carried 
into  effect.  Others  have  suggested  that  Demos- 
thenes' own  party,  in  the  confident  expectation 
of  an  acquittal,  forced  ^schines  to  proceed  with  his 
indictment,  by  threatening  to  prosecute  him  and 
demand  the  infliction  of  a  fine  upon  him  for  having 
failed  to  carry  out  his  sworn  intention  earlier.  But 
of  this  also  there  is  no  evidence;  and  it  is  incon- 
ceivable that  if  such  threats  had  been  used,  neither 
orator  should  have  made  the  barest  allusion  to  them. 
It  is  much  more  likely  that  ^schines  thought 
that  an  opportunity  offered  itself,  in  the  temporary 
humiliation  of  Demosthenes  owing  to  his  failure 
in  regard  to  the  Spartan  rising,  of  inflicting  a 
crushing  defeat  on  his  rival;  and  that  the  revived 
prosecution  of  Ctesiphon  is  to  be  connected  with 
the  prosecutions  of  anti- Macedonian  leaders  in 
other  States,  perhaps  with  the  approval  of  Alexan- 
der or  Antipater.  Demosthenes  himself  saw  such 
a  connection.^     "At  the  same  time  as  the  irre- 

_^De  Cor.,  §  197. 


432  Demosthenes 

concilable  enemies  of  Athens,  Aristratus  in  Naxos 
and  Aristoleos  in  Thasos,  are  bringing  the  friends 
of  Athens  to  trial,  ^schines  in  Athens  itself  is 
accusing  Demosthenes."  But  -^schines  had  un- 
der-estimated the  strength  of  Demosthenes'  po- 
sition. The  sympathies  of  the  People,  of  whom 
the  jury  that  would  try  the  case  would  be  repre- 
sentative, were  still  with  Demosthenes  and  an- 
tagonistic to  the  Macedonian  rule.  Even  before 
the  trial  began  ^schines  must  have  been  conscious 
of  this;  for  he  actually  attempted  to  enlist  the 
good-will  of  the  jury  by  alleging,  as  among  the 
offences  of  Demosthenes,  that  he  had  let  slip  a 
number  of  occasions  upon  which  he  might  have 
opposed  the  Macedonians,  and  by  continually  in- 
sinuating that  Demosthenes'  opposition  to  Mace- 
donia had  been  a  sham.  The  result  of  the  trial 
was  to  afford  Demosthenes  his  last  and  most  signal 
triumph. 

iEschines  assailed  the  proposal  of  Ctesiphon  on 
three  grounds.  He  alleged  first,  that  it  was  il- 
legal to  crown  a  statesman  who  had  not  passed 
the  public  scrutiny  to  which  all  public  officials 
were  liable  on  laying  down  office,  and  that  Demo- 
sthenes, who  at  the  time  of  the  decree  had  been  a 
Commissioner  of  fortifications  and  of  the  festival- 
fund,  had  not  passed  this  scrutiny;  secondly,  that 
it  was  illegal  to  proclaim  the  crown  in  the  theatre 
in  the  manner  proposed;  and  thirdly,  that  the 
reasons  which  were  given  by  Ctesiphon  for  the 
award  of  the  crown,  and  which  it  was  proposed  to 


Greece  in  the  Absence  of  Alexander   433 

proclaim,  were  false.  It  was  a  case  in  which  the 
jury  had  not  only  to  give  the  verdict,  but  also,  if 
they  condemned  the  accused,  to  fix  the  penalty. 
Never  within  the  memory  of  man  had  any  trial 
aroused  such  interest  throughout  the  Greek  world, 
and  the  court  was  thronged  not  only  with  Atheni- 
ans, but  with  strangers  from  all  parts  of  Greece.' 
The  prosecutor  addressed  the  court  first.  After 
an  introduction,  in  which  he  emphasised  the  im- 
portance of  punishing  illegal  proposals,  in  order 
to  safeguard  the  constitution  at  a  time  when  all 
constitutional  principles  were  falling  into  neglect,* 
he  proceeded  at  once  to  explain  the  technical 
grounds  upon  which  he  relied.  He  first  cited  the 
law  which  forbade  the  crowning  of  an  official  still 
liable  to  scrutiny,  and  defended  it  on  the  ground 
that  a  proposal  to  confer  a  crown,  even  if  the 
reservation  were  made  (which  Ctesiphon  had 
omitted  to  make)  that  the  ceremony  should  not 
take  place  until  after  the  scrutiny  had  been  held, 
was  bound  to  prejudice  the  issue  of  the  scrutiny  in 
favottr  of  the  recipient  of  the  crown.  ^  He  further 
replied  to  the  argument  which  he  expected  Demo- 
sthenes to  use,  to  the  effect  that  the  office  which  he 
held  was  not  a  public  office  in  the  technical  sense, 
and  that  the  public  money  of  which  he  had  charge 
was  his  own  gift,  for  which  he  could  not  reasonably 
be  called  to  account.''  It  may  be  suspected  that 
some  of  these  passages   (like  some  which  occur 

'  ^sch.,  in  Ctes.,  §  56.  » §  §  1-8. 

2  §§  9-12.  ■♦  §§  13-31. 

28 


434  Demosthenes 

later  in  the  Speech)  were  inserted  in  it  for  publica- 
tion after  Demosthenes  had  spoken;  but  there  can 
be  no  doubt  that  up  to  this  point  ^schines'  case 
was  a  good  one  in  point  of  law. 

With  regard  to  the  second  technical  question, 
there  is  not  much  more  doubt.  There  appears  to 
have  been  a  law  which  forbade  the  proclamation 
of  a  crown  in  the  theatre,  and  ordered  that  a 
crown,  if  awarded  by  the  Council,  should  be 
proclaimed  in  the  Coimcil-chamber,  if  by  the 
People,  in  the  Assembly.  But  there  was  appar- 
ently another  law,  regulating  proceedings  at  the 
Dionysia,  and  forbidding  proclamations  in  general 
at  the  festival,  but  permitting  those  crowns  to  be 
publicly  conferred  in  the  theatre  which  had  been 
granted  to  Athenian  citizens  by  other  States,  if 
the  People  gave  permission.  This  law  ^schines 
expected  Demosthenes  to  wrest  to  his  purpose,  by 
arguing  that  coronation  in  the  theatre  was  lawful 
if  the  People  consented  to  it,  and  omitting  to 
mention  the  restriction  of  this  permission  to  the 
case  of  crowns  conferred  by  other  States.  Accord- 
ingly he  warned  the  jury  against  such  sophistry, 
and  protested  against  the  notion  that,  with  all  the 
safeguards  provided  by  the  constitution  against 
contradictory  laws,  such  a  contradiction  as  the 
anticipated  argument  implied  would  have  been 
permitted  to  remain.  * 

It  is  highly  probable  that  here  also  ^schines 
was  on  firm  groimd.     But  both  he  and  Demos- 

*  §§32-48. 


Greece  in  the  Absence  of  Alexander   435 

thenes  were  well  aware  that  the  case  would  not 
be  decided  upon  purely  technical  grounds,  and 
though  he  dealt  with  these  grounds  fully,  and  (so 
far  as  we  can  judge)  straightforwardly,  the  greater 
part  of  his  Speech  was  devoted  to  the  attempt  to 
prove  that  the  reasons  which  Ctesiphon  had  given 
for  conferring  the  crown  on  Demosthenes  were 
false,  and  that  Demosthenes  had  not  deserved 
well  of  the  State.  ^ 

After  a  brief  reference  to  some  of  the  early  in- 
cidents of  his  rival's  career,  he  divided  his  life 
into  four  periods — the  first,  the  time  of  the  Peace 
of  Philocrates;  the  second,  from  the  Peace  of 
Philocrates  to  the  renewal  of  the  war  with  Philip; 
the  third,  the  time  of  the  alliance  with  Thebes; 
and  the  last  from  the  battle  of  Ch^eroneia  to  the 
time  of  the  trial.  He  attempted  to  show  that  in  all 
four  periods  the  policy  of  Demosthenes  was  corrupt 
and  detrimental  to  Athens.  We  have  considered 
these  charges  in  reference  to  the  events  of  the 
several  periods  in  their  place,  and  need  not  do  so 
again.  The  most  significant  points  in  ^Eschines' 
attack  are  his  insinuation  that  Demosthenes,  in 
spite  of  his  patriotic  professions,  had  more  than 
once  acted  in  subservience  to  the  Macedonian 
interest,  and  his  attempt  to  prove,  not  only  that 
Demosthenes  had  worked  in  harmony  with  Phil- 
ocrates (in  which  there  was  some  truth),  but  also 
that  the  alliance  which  he  had  negotiated  with 
Callias  and  the  Euboeans  was  dictated  by  sordid 

'§§49-176. 


436  Demosthenes 

self-interest;  that  he  had  claimed  undue  credit  for 
the  alliance  with  Thebes,  and  had  granted  the 
Thebans  terms  which  were  highly  disadvantage- 
ous to  Athens ;  that  his  policy  at  that  time  had  led 
directly  to  the  battle  of  Chaeroneia  and  the  de- 
struction of  Thebes ;  and  that  since  these  disasters 
he  had  pursued  a  cowardly,  but  not  less  mis- 
chievous, course.  In  a  striking  passage,^  ^schi- 
nes  imagines  the  scene  at  Dionysia,  if,  when  the 
orphans  of  those  who  had  fallen  in  the  service  of 
their  country  were  presented  with  a  suit  of  armour 
by  the  State,  Demosthenes,  whose  policy  had  made 
them  orphans,  was  crowned  with  gold.  At  an- 
other point  ^  he  enumerates  the  qualities  of  a 
true  "friend  of  the  People,"  and  finds  that  neither 
in  his  parentage  nor  in  his  character  has  Demos- 
thenes any  of  these  marks  of  the  democratic 
spirit. 

In  the  latter  part  of  the  Speech,  ^schines  first 
argued  that  whereas  in  old  times  rewards  had  been 
but  rarely  bestowed  by  the  People,  and  had  there- 
fore been  highly  esteemed,  the  indiscriminate 
bestowal  of  honours  was  tending  to  diminish  their 
value.  ^  He  then  returned  to  the  topic  of  the 
importance  of  trials  for  illegal  proposals,  and  de- 
clared that  in  cases  where  the  proof  was  neces- 
sarily so  straightforward,  and  required  only  the 
comparison  of  the  incriminated  proposal  with  the 
letter  of  the  law,  the  accused  ought  not  to  be 
allowed  to  employ  an  advocate  to  mislead  the 

'§§152-158.  "§§168-176.  3  §§177-191. 


Greece  in  the  Absence  of  Alexander   437 

jury — that  Demosthenes,  in  short,  ought  not  to  be 
permitted  to  speak  on  behalf  of  Ctesiphon,  or  at 
least  ought  to  be  strictly  confined  to  the  legal 
questions  at  issue,  and  to  the  order  of  topics  laid 
down  by  the  prosecutor.^  There  follows  in  the 
Speech  as  we  have  it,  a  series  of  brief  arguments 
in  reply  to  those  which  Demosthenes  was  expected 
to  use — ^most  of  them,  in  all  probability,  inserted 
after  the  trial,  as  a  reply  to  arguments  which 
Demosthenes  actually  had  used — together  with 
passages  designed  to  arouse  the  animosity  of  the 
jury  against  Demosthenes  himself  or  against 
Gtesiphon.^  In  conclusion,  .^schines  insisted 
upon  the  moral  effect  which  the  verdict  of  the  jury 
must  inevitably  have,  and  besought  them  to  put 
an  end  to  the  acquisition  of  excessive  power  by 
individuals  and  to  the  corruption  of  statesmen  by 
Persian  gold.^  A  passage  of  real  power  ends  with 
a  sadly  frigid  and  artificial  appeal : 

And  now,  O  Earth  and  Sun  and  Virtue  and  In- 
telligence and  Culture,  whereby  we  distinguish  the 
honourable  from  the  shameful,  I  have  given  you  my 
aid  and  have  spoken.  If  I  have  accused  him  well,  and 
as  the  charge  deserves,  I  have  spoken  as  I  desired;  if 
inadequately,  as  well  as  I  could.  Do  you  consider  the 
arguments  which  I  have  used,  and  those  which  I  have 
passed  over,  and  give  the  vote  which  justice  and  the 
interest  of  the  city  require. 

Had  the  reply  of  Demosthenes  been  lost,  it  may 
be  that  ^schines'  Speech  would  have  been  given 
'§§191-214.  »§§  215-242.  '§§243-259. 


438  Demosthenes 

a  higher  place  in  the  estimation  of  later  ages  than 
has  usually  been  assigned  to  it.  There  are  indeed 
in  it  passages  of  overwrought  rhetoric  and  digres- 
sions of  disproportionate  length ;  yet  his  case  is,  on 
the  whole,  strongly  presented,  and  its  personalities 
do  not  transgress  the  limits  which  Athenian  taste 
allowed.  But  Demosthenes'  defence  of  Ctesiphon 
throws  his  rival's  oration  utterly  in  the  shade.  It 
is  not  only  that,  except  upon  the  technical  points, 
which  no  one  present  can  have  regarded  as  of 
serious  importance,  his  case  is  overwhelmingly 
good;  his  Speech  as  a  whole  stands  on  a  moral 
level  which  is  incomparably  higher.  Certain  re- 
servations must  doubtless  be  made,  and  those 
not  unimportant.  The  replies  to  the  several 
portions  of  -^schines'  accusation  are  interspersed 
with  passages  of  personal  attack,  which  are  almost 
savage  in  their  vehemence,  and  are  irrelevant  to 
the  main  issue.  Probably  no  such  language  was 
ever  used  by  a  politician  about  his  opponents 
on  any  other  occasion  even  in  Athens,  and  the 
brilliant  dramatic  power  which  some  of  these  pass- 
ages show  does  not  excuse  their  untruthfulness.^ 
There  are,  moreover, — chiefly  in  those  parts  of  the 
Speech  which  deal  with  the  Peace  of  Philocrates, — 
misrepresentations  of  the  truth,  due  to  the  orator's 
desire  to  disclaim  all  share  in  a  transaction  which 
was  now  discredited  in  popular  estimation.  On 
the  points  of  law  which  ^schines'  adduced,  the 

'  Comp,  esp.,  §§  159,  198,  209,  257-264  (the  famous  account 
of  iEschines's  earlier  days — probably  almost  entirely  false),  308. 


Greece  in  the  Absence  of  Alexander   439 

reasoning  of  Demosthenes  can  only  be  called 
sophistical  and  evasive.  At  best  it  could  only  be 
urged  that  the  law  had  been  broken  before  on 
many  occasions,  sometimes  in  Demosthenes'  own 
favour.  But  when  all  that  can  be  said  in  criticism 
of  the  Speech  is  fully  allowed  for,  the  greatest 
difference  between  it  and  that  of  ^schines  remains, 
^schines  scarcely  ever  rises  above  the  level  of  the 
party  politician,  the  legal  prosecutor,  the  personal 
enemy.  His  Speech  reveals  no  breadth  of  outlook, 
no  worthy  ideal  of  national  policy.  Its  whole 
effect  is  negative.  It  attacks  one  act  of  Demos- 
thenes after  another,  cleverly  indeed,  but  from  the 
standpoint  of  no  general  principles,  no  far-sighted 
aims;  and  sometimes — more  particularly  in  those 
passages  in  which  it  seeks  to  disparage  the  terms  of 
the  alliance  with  Thebes,  or  those  in  which  Demos- 
thenes is  accused  of  favouring  the  Macedonian 
interest^ — a  meanness  and  an  insincerity  are  re- 
vealed which  are  utterly  unworthy  of  a  statesman. 

Demosthenes,  on  the  other  hand,  speaks  in  the 
tone  of  a  statesman  who  has  attempted  whole- 
heartedly to  carry  out  his  own  highest  ideals,  and 
those  of  his  countrymen,  and  who  can  appeal  with 
confidence  to  the  best  side  of  their  national 
character,  convinced  that  he  has  not  interpreted  it 
wrongly.     He  claims  to  be  judged,  not  by  the 

'  Demosthenes  did  not  reply  to  the  charges  so  far  as  they 
referred  to  the  most  recent  times — doubtless  because  of  the 
danger  he  would  have  incurred  had  he  tried  to  prove  expressly 
his  hostility  to  Alexander. 


440  Demosthenes 

familiar  jargon  about  the  "friend  of  the  People," 
but  by  the  highest  standards  of  statesmanship. 

Every  investigation  that  can  be  made  as  regards 
those  duties  for  which  an  orator  should  be  held  re- 
sponsible, I  bid  you  make.  I  crave  no  mercy.  And 
what  are  those  duties?  To  discern  events  in  their 
beginnings,  to  foresee  what  is  coming,  and  to  forewarn 
others.  These  things  I  have  done.  Again,  it  is  his 
duty  to  reduce  to  the  smallest  possible  compass, 
wherever  he  finds  them,  the  slowness,  the  hesitation, 
the  ignorance,  the  contentiousness,  which  are  the 
errors  inseparably  connected  with  the  constitution  of 
all  city-states;  while,  on  the  other  hand,  he  must 
stimulate  men  to  unity,  friendship,  and  eagerness  to 
perform  their  duty.  All  these  things  I  have  done, 
and  no  one  can  discover  any  dereliction  of  duty  on 
my  part  at  any  time.  ^  .  .  . 

Do  you  ask  me  [he  demands]  for  what  merits  I 
count  myself  worthy  to  receive  honour?  I  tell  you 
that  at  a  time  when  every  politician  in  Hellas  had 
been  corrupted — beginning  with  yourself, — no  oppor- 
tunity that  offered,  no  generous  language,  no  grand 
promises,  no  hopes,  no  fears,  nor  any  other  motive, 
tempted  or  induced  me  to  betray  one  jot  of  what  I 
believed  to  be  the  rights  and  interests  of  the  city ;  nor 
of  all  the  counsel  that  I  have  given  to  my  fellow- 
countrymen,  up  to  this  day,  has  any  ever  been  given 
(as  it  has  by  you)  with  the  scales  oTthe  mind  inclining 
to  the  side  of  gain,  but  all  out  of  an  upright,  honest, 
uncorrupted  soul.  I  have  taken  the  lead  in  greater 
affairs  than  any  man  of  my  own  time,  and  my  ad- 

'  §  246. 


Greece  in  the  Absence  of  Alexander   441 

ministration  has  been  sound  and  honest  throughout 
aU.'  .  .  . 

All  these  measures,  men  of  Athens,  will  be  found  by 
any  one  who  will  examine  them  without  jealousy, 
to  have  been  correctly  planned,  and  executed  with 
entire  honesty;  the  opportunity  for  each  step  was 
not,  you  will  find,  neglected  or  left  unrecognised  or 
thrown  away  by  me;  and  nothing  was  left  undone, 
which  it  was  within  the  power  and  the  reasoning 
capacity  of  a  single  man  to  effect.  But  if  the  might 
of  some  Divine  Power,  or  the  inferiority  of  our 
generals,  or  the  wickedness  of  those  who  were  betray- 
ing your  cities,  or  all  these  things  together,  con- 
tinuously injured  our  whole  cause,  until  they  effected 
its  overthrow,  how  is  Demosthenes  at  fault  ?^  .  .  . 

Not  when  my  surrender  was  demanded,  not  when  I 
was  called  to  account  before  the  Amphictyons,  not  in 
face  either  of  threats  or  of  promises,  not  when  these 
accursed  men  were  hounded  on  against  me  like  wild 
beasts,  have  I  ever  been  false  to  my  loyalty  towards 
you.  For  from  the  very  first  I  chose  the  straight  and 
honest  path  in  public  life ;  I  chose  to  foster  the  honour, 
the  supremacy,  the  good  name  of  my  country,  to  seek 
to  enhance  them,  and  to  stand  or  fall  with  them.^ 

At  every  stage  in  the  argument,  Demosthenes 
puts  the  question,  "What  was  the  part  which 
Athens  was  bound  to  pla}',  if  she  was  to  be  true  to 
herself  and  her  traditions?"  and  claims  to  have 
urged  her  to  play  that  part. 

Should  she,  ^schines,  have  sacrificed  her  pride  and 
her  own  dignity?    Should  she  have  joined  the  ranks 
^§§297.298.  ="§303.  3  §322. 


442  Demosthenes 

of  the  Thessalians  and  Dolopes,  and  helped  Philip 
thereby  to  acquire  the  empire  of  Hellas,  cancelling 
thereby  the  noble  and  righteous  deeds  of  our  fore- 
fathers? Or,  if  she  should  not  have  done  this  (for  it 
would  have  been  in  very  truth  an  atrocious  thing), 
should  she  have  looked  on,  while  all  that  she  saw  would 
happen,  if  no  one  prevented  it — all  that  she  realised, 
it  seems,  at  a  distance — was  actually  taking  place?' 
.  .  .  What  language  should  have  been  used,  what 
measures  proposed,  by  the  adviser  of  the  People  at 
Athens  (for  that  it  was  at  Athens  makes  the  utmost 
difference),  when  I  knew  that  from  the  very  first,  up 
to  the  day  when  I  myself  ascended  the  platform,  my 
country  had  always  contended  for  pre-eminence, 
honour  and  glory,  and  in  the  cause  of  honour,  and  for 
the  interests  of  all,  had  sacrificed  more  money  and 
lives  than  any  other  Hellenic  people  had  spent  for 
their  private  ends:  when  I  saw  that  Philip  himself, 
with  whom  our  conflict  lay,  for  the  sake  of  empire  and 
absolute  power,  had  had  his  eye  knocked  out,  his 
hand  and  his  leg  maimed,  and  was  ready  to  resign  any 
part  of  his  body  that  Fortune  chose  to  take  from  him, 
provided  that  with  what  remained  he  might  live  in 
honour  and  glory?  And  surely  no  one  would  dare  to 
say  that  it  was  fitting  that  in  one  bred  at  Pella,  a 
place  then  inglorious  and  insignificant,  there  should 
have  grown  up  so  lofty  a  spirit  that  he  aspired  after 
the  empire  of  Hellas,  and  conceived  such  a  project 
in  his  mind;  but  that  in  you,  who  are  Athenians,  and 
who  day  by  day  in  all  that  you  hear  and  see  behold 
the  memorials  of  the  gallantry  of  your  fathers,  such 
baseness  should  be  found  that  you  would  3deld  up 

*§63. 


Greece  in  the  Absence  of  Alexmider   443 

your  liberty  to  Philip  by  your  own  deliberate  offer  and 
deed. ' 

So  he  argues  above  all  in  justification  of  the 
policy  which  led  to  the  battle  of  Chaeroneia: 

Even  if  what  was  to  come  was  plain  to  all  before- 
hand; even  if  all  foreknew  it;  even  if  you,  ^schines, 
had  been  crying  with  a  loud  voice  in  warning  and 
protestation — you  who  uttered  not  so  much  as  a 
sound — even  then,  I  say,  it  was  not  right  for  the  city 
to  abandon  her  course,  if  she  had  any  regard  for  her 
fame,  or  for  our  forefathers,  or  for  the  ages  to  come. 
As  it  is,  she  is  thought,  no  doubt,  to  have  failed  to 
secure  her  object — as  happens  to  all  alike,  whenever 
God  wills  it:  but  then,  by  abandoning  in  favour  of 
Philip  her  claim  to  take  the  lead  of  others,  she  must 
have  incurred  the  blame  of  having  betrayed  them  all. 
.  .  .  But  this  was  not,  it  appears,  the  tradition  of  the 
Athenians:  it  was  not  tolerable;  it  was  not  in  their 
nature.  From  the  beginning  of  time  no  one  had  ever 
yet  succeeded  in  persuading  the  city  to  throw  in  her 
lot  with  those  who  were  strong,  but  unrighteous  in 
their  dealings,  and  to  enjoy  the  security  of  servitude. 
Throughout  all  time  she  has  maintained  her  perilous 
struggle  for  pre-eminence,  honour,  and  glory.*  .  .  . 

It  cannot,  it  cannot  be  that  you  were  wrong,  men 
of  Athens,  when  you  took  upon  you  the  struggle  for 
freedom  and  deliverance.  No!  by  those  who  at 
Marathon  bore  the  brunt  of  the  peril — our  fore- 
athers!  No!  by  those  who  at  Plataeae  drew  up  their 
battle-line ;  by  those  who  at  Salamis,  by  those  who  off 

»  §§  66-68.  '  §§ 199-203. 


444  Demosthenes 

Artemisium  fought  the  fight  at  sea;  by  the  many  who 
lie  in  the  sepulchres  where  the  People  laid  them — • 
brave  men,  all  alike  deemed  worthy  by  their  country, 
iEschines,  of  the  same  honour  and  the  same  obsequies 
• — not  the  successful  or  the  victorious  alone !  ^ 

It  is  such  sentiments  that  give  its  unique  eleva- 
tion to  the  Speech  on  the  Crown.  We  have 
considered  in  the  preceding  chapter  the  justifica- 
tion of  Demosthenes'  policy  at  different  stages 
in  his  career,  and  there  is  no  need  to  repeat  what 
has  been  said,  nor  to  give  a  formal  analysis  of  a 
Speech  which  every  student  of  Demosthenes  must 
read  many  times.  The  Speech  began  with  an 
appeal  to  the  gods;  and  the  solemnity  of  its  con- 
clusion also  is  in  keeping  with  the  momentous 
character  of  the  issue : 

Never,  O  all  ye  gods,  may  any  of  you  consent  to 
their  desire!  If  it  can  be,  may  you  implant  even  in 
these  men  a  better  mind  and  heart.  But  if  they  are 
verily  beyond  all  cure,  then  bring  them  and  them 
alone  to  utter  and  early  destruction,  by  land  and  sea. 
And  to  us  who  remain,  grant  the  speediest  release 
from  the  fears  that  hang  over  us,  and  safety  that 
nought  can  shake.  ^ 

When  the  votes  of  the  jury  were  counted,  it  was 
found  that  ^schines  had  not  received  one  fifth 
of  the  total  number.  He  thereby  became  liable 
to  the  penalties  ordained  by  the  law  of  Athens  for 
malicious  prosecution — Si  fine  of  looo  drachmae, 

'§208.  *§324- 


Greece  in  the  Absence  of  Alexander   445 

and  certain  civil  disabilities.  ^  He  coiild  doubtless 
have  paid  the  fine  and  faced  the  loss  of  rights ;  but 
he  could  not  face  the  spectacle  of  Demosthenes' 
triumph,  and  therefore  withdrew  from  Athens. 
He  first  went  to  Ephesus,  where  he  hoped  to  obtain 
a  favourable  reception  from  Alexander,^  but  the 
hope  was  frustrated  by  the  news  of  Alexander's 
death  in  323.  Then,  if  not  before,  he  went  to 
Rhodes,  where  he  passed  most  of  the  remainder  of 
his  life.  He  is  said  to  have  taught  rhetoric  there, 
reciting  to  his  pupils  the  very  speech  with  which 
Demosthenes  had  overthrown  him;  and  to  have 
met  their  admiration  with  the  remark,  "Ah!  but 
you  should  have  heard  the  beast  himself!"^ 

The  division  of  opinion  in  Athens,  or  rather,  the 
conflict  in  the  public  mind  between  interested 
caution  and  patriotic  sentiment,  is  illustrated  by 
the  few  facts,  apart  from  the  doings  of  Alexander, 
that  have  come  down  to  us  from  the  period  im- 
mediately following  the  acquittal  of  Ctesiphon. 
On  the  one  hand,  the  party  of  non-resistance 
remained  powerful.  Phocion  continued  to  be  re- 
elected general.''  Demades  retained  his  power  in 
the  Assembly.  ^     On  the  other  hand,  Lycurgus  was 

'  Plut.,  Dem.,  xxiv.;  comp.,  Dem.,  de  Cor.,  §§  82,  266. 

»  Vit.  X  Oral.,  846  c. 

J  Hid.,  840  d.;  Schol.  on  ^sch.,  de  F.  L.,  {.,  etc. 

*  Ai:  he  was  general  forty-five  times,  he  must  have  been  re- 
appointed almost  every  year. 

s  Decrees  of  the  years  329  to  323  in  his  name  are  known  to  us 
from  C.  I.  A.,  ii.,  178,  193,  809,  811;  cf.  Dein.,  in  Dem.,  §  loi. 


446  Demosthenes 

in  control  of  public  finance  down  to  326,  and  De- 
mosthenes himself  exercised  important  influence, 
since  he  was  described  by  Hypereides  as  "director 
of  State-affairs  in  general."^  Deinarchus  also 
complains  of  his  power,  and  both  Demosthenes  and 
Demades  figure  as  leading  statesmen  in  the  melan- 
choly episode  which  comes  before  us,  when  next 
we  are  able  to  study  the  internal  history  of  Athens 
in  detail.  It  is  probably  to  be  inferred,  not  that 
any  formal  agreement  had  been  made  between  the 
rival  parties,  but  that  statesmen  of  opposite  views 
were  able  to  exercise  influence  side  by  side,  and  to 
divide  the  administrative  offices  between  them, 
because  caution  demanded  that  those  who  were 
of  the  Macedonian  party  should  not  be  discarded, 
while  the  stronger  popular  sentiment  was  on  the 
side  of  Demosthenes  and  Lycurgus.  Probably 
there  was  little  open  friction;  and  it  seems  most 
likely  that  the  political  life  of  Athens  was  confined 
for  some  years  to  purely  local  questions,  and  that 
its  most  notable  expression  was  the  carrying  out  of 
the  extensive  building  operations  which  had  been 
planned  by  Lycurgus.'  For  the  rest,  the  citizens 
went  about  their  business,  and  enjoyed  the  dis- 
tributions of  festival-money,  and  the  otherpleasures 
of  a  time  of  peace. 

In  one  respect  only  did  serious  trouble  arise. 

^  i-iruTTdTfjs  rG)v  SXup  vpayftArav.  Hyper.,  in  Dent,,  col.  xii.; 
comp.  Dein.,  in  Dem.,  §§  5,  7. 

'  See  von  Wilamowitz-Moellendorf,  AristoUsles  und  A  then,  pp. 
352,  353;  Ferguson,  Hellenistic  Athens,  pp.  8, 9,  etc. 


Greece  in  the  Absence  of  Alexander  447 

The  price  of  com  rose  about  this  time  to  a  for- 
midable height.  The  rise  had  begun  even  before 
the  trial  of  Ctesiphon^;  and  it  became  so  serious 
that  a  special  fund  was  formed  for  the  purchase  of 
com;  Demosthenes  was  made  com-commissioner, 
and  contributed  a  talent  from  his  own  capital  to 
the  fund.'  The  position  was  made  worse  by  the 
action  of  Cleomenes,  Alexander's  representative 
in  Egypt,  who  made  a  "comer"  in  grain,  and  sold 
it  at  very  high  prices  in  Athens,  transferring  his 
cargoes  elsewhere  whenever  the  price  fell.^  It  is 
possible  that  a  number  of  decrees  proposed  by 
Demosthenes,  conferring  honour  upon  various 
persons,  are  to  be  connected  with  their  services 
in  connection  with  the  corn-supply.  By  these 
decrees,  '*  a  certain  Diphilus  was  given  the  privilege 
of  maintenance  in  the  Prytaneum,  and  the  honour 
of  a  statue  in  the  market-place;  a  resident  alien, 
named  Chaerephilus,  and  his  sons,  were  given  the 
citizenship  of  Athens,  and  so  were  the  bankers 
Epigenes  and  Conon ;  and  statues  of  the  princes  of 
the  Bosporus,  whose  friendship  with  Athens  was 
of  long  standing,  were  also  erected.^  Demo- 
sthenes was  accused  of  embezzlement  during  his 
tenxire  of  office,  but  was  acquitted.  *    We  hear  also 

'  Dem.,  de  Cor.,  §  89.  »  Vit.  X  Orc^,845  c. 

»  [Dem.],  in  Dionysod.,  §  7,  etc.;  see  Boeckh,  Staatsh.,  i.,  p.  119, 
etc.  <  Dein.,mZ?ew.,§43. 

»  We  do  not,  however,  know  the  date  of  their  erection,  and  it 
may  have  taken  place  earlier. 

*  Vit.  X  Oral.,  845  e.  Schafer  rightly  observes  that  this 
notice  cannot  refer  to  the  year  338;  ^schines  would  not  have 


448  Demosthenes 

of  an  expedition  under  Miltiades  in  May,  324,  to 
Western  waters,  to  protect  the  Athenian  trade 
in  the  West  against  Tyrrhenian  pirates.  The 
decree  ordering  the  expedition  was  proposed  by 
Cephisophon  and  supported  by  Hypereides,'  and 
instructions  were  given  for  the  founding  of  a 
colony  on  the  Adriatic;  but  we  know  nothing  of 
the  fortunes  of  the  expedition. 

In  326  Lycurgus  ceased  to  hold  office.  Whether 
he  retired  of  his  own  accord,  or  whether  he  was 
rejected  in  favour  of  other  candidates  we  do  not 
know.  The  former  alternative  is  possible;  he 
was  not  living  after  324,  and  his  health  may  already 
have  been  failing.  The  other  alternative  is  sug- 
gested by  the  fact  that  he  was  succeeded  by  a 
personal  enemy,  Menes^chmus,  whom  he  had 
successfully  prosecuted  for  impiety  in  a  matter 
which  had  to  do  with  the  sanctuary  of  Delos.^ 
It  has  also  been  suggested  that  the  election  of 
Menesaechmus  marks  the  beginning  of  a  division 
m  the  ranks  of  the  patriotic  party,  since  we  after- 
wards find  Menesaschmus  associated  with  Hyper- 
eides  in  attacking  Demosthenes;  but  there  is  no 
evidence  to  prove  or  disprove  this  supposition. 
Shortly  before  his  death,  Lycurgus  caused  him- 
self to  be  taken  to  the  Metroon  and  the  Council 
chamber,  to  render  an  account  of  his  long  steward- 
failed  to  notice  any  charge  against  Demosthenes  of  dishonesty  in 
thatyear.  '  C. /. ^.,ii.,8o9  a. 

'  Vit.  X  Oral.,  843  d.  A  speech  for  the  defence  was  included 
in  antiquity  among  the  speeches  of  Deinarchus. 


Greece  in  the  Absence  of  Alexander  449 

ship.  Menesaechmus,  who  alone  ventured  to 
bring  any  charge  against  him,  entirely  failed  to 
justify  his  allegations,  and  the  stem  but  capable 
and  honest  old  statesman  was  carried  home  to 
die.^ 

^  Vit.  X  Orat.,  842  e. 
39 


CHAPTER    XIII 

THE  AFFAIR  OF  HARPALUS  AND  THE  LAMIAN  WAR 

FOR  about  two  years  (327  to  325)  Alexander 
was  engaged  in  his  great  expedition  to  India, 
and  it  was  not  until  324  that  he  returned  to  Susa. 
In  his  absence  his  deputies  had  governed  as  though 
they  had  expected  him  never  to  come  back;  and 
among  the  most  shameless  of  these  unfaithful 
viceroys  was  Harpalus,  who,  after  a  chequered 
career,  had  been  left  in  command  at  Babylon. 
There  he  indulged  in  a  long  orgy  of  luxury  and 
immorality.  He  sent  to  Athens  for  the  famous 
courtesan  Pythionice,  and  treated  her  as  his  queen; 
and  after  her  death  he  buried  her  sumptuously, 
and  erected  statues  of  her  both  in  Babylon  and  in 
Athens,  where  Charicles,  the  son-in-law  of  Phocion, 
acted  as  his  agent  in  the  matter.  The  "Tomb  of 
Pythionice"  was  still  to  be  seen  in  Plutarch's  day 
on  the  road  from  Athens  to  Eleusis.  Another 
courtesan  from  Athens,  named  Glycera,  was  soon 
installed  in  the  vacant  place,  and  the  extravagances 
of  Harpalus  continued  as  before.  Suddenly  it  was 
announced  that  Alexander  was  on  his  way  back 
from  India.     Harpalus  fled  from  Babylon  without 

450 


Affair  of  Harpalus  and  the  Lamian  War  451 

delay  (in  the  winter  of  325-4) ,  taking  with  him  a 
force  of  six  thousand  mercenaries,  and  the  sum  of 
five  thousand  talents  out  of  Alexander's  treasure, 
which  had  been  in  his  charge.  ^ 

He  first  sailed  to  the  coast  of  Attica  with  thirty 
ships,  and  anchored  off  Sunium,  expecting  that 
the  People  of  Athens  would  receive  him  and  join 
forces  with  him  in  a  revolt  against  the  Macedonian 
power.  ^  There  was  some  ground  for  his  expecta- 
tions, since  he  had  influential  friends  in  Athens,  and 
in  return  for  presents  of  com  which  he  had  sent, 
the  Athenians  had  already  granted  him  the  citi- 
zenship. But  Demosthenes,  who  doubtless  saw 
that  there  would  be  great  danger  in  such  an  alHance, 
and  that  the  assistance  of  Harpalus  was  not  likely 
to  be  the  means  by  which  Athens  could  secure 
freedom,  persuaded  the  People  to  reject  Harpalus' 
offer  (tempting  as  it  must  have  been  at  first  sight) 
to  place  his  ships  and  men  at  the  disposal  of  the 
Athenians.  ^  Demosthenes'  policy  on  this  occasion 
is  very  like  that  which  he  had  pursued  in  regard 
to  the  Peace  of  346 — a  policy  of  refusing  to  break 
the  Peace  when  the  chances  of  success  were  too 
small  for  a  prudent  statesman  to  act  upon.  The 
general  Philocles,  who  had  charge  of  Munychia 
and  the  Peiraeus,  was  ordered  to  prevent  Harpalus 
from  landing,  and  undertook  upon  oath  to  do  so.  "* 

Thus  baffled,  Harpalus  departed  with  his  ships 

'  Diod.,  XVII,  cviii.;  Theopomp.,  fr.  244,  245  (Oxford  text); 
Plut., PAoc,  xxii.  '  Curt.,  x.,  ii.  '  Plut.,  Dem., xxv. 

*  Vit.  X  Oral.,  846  a;  Diod.,  I.e.;  Deinarch.,  in  FhUocl,,  §  i. 


452    '  Demosthenes 

to  Taenarum,  and  landed  his  men  there.  He  then 
returned  with  a  single  ship  to  the  Peiraeus,  bringing 
with  him  a  very  large  sum  of  money.  Philocles, 
probably  induced  by  a  bribe,  failed  to  prevent  his 
entrance,  and  he  now  supplicated  the  People  for 
aid,  at  the  same  time  distributing  bribes  where 
he  thought  they  would  be  effective,''  The  less 
cautious  members  of  the  patriotic  party,  and 
among  them  Hypereides,  wished  to  take  this 
opportunity  of  declaring  war,  being  evidently 
convinced  (perhaps  by  the  statements  of  Harpalus 
himself)  that  many  of  the  oriental  satraps  were 
ready  to  rise  against  Alexander,  and  would  already 
have  done  so,  had  Athens  not  repelled  Harpalus.' 
But  this  policy  was  opposed  by  Demosthenes,  who, 
as  before,  thought  the  occasion  unfavourable  for 
the  renewal  of  the  war,  and  by  Phocion,  who  spoke 
so  plainly  in  regard  to  Harpalus'  methods  as  to 
force  him  to  cut  short  his  distributions  of  money.  ^ 
At  the  same  time  the  surrender  of  Harpalus  was 
demanded  by  Antipater  and  Olympias,  and  also 
by  Philoxenus,  Alexander's  commander  in  south- 
em  Asia  Minor.  Philoxenus  came  personally  to 
Athens  for  the  purpose,  and  his  advent  caused 
the  Athenians  great  alarm,  of  which  Demosthen- 
es took  advantage.  "If,"  he  asked  the  People, 
"  you  cannot  look  a  candle  in  the  face,  how  will  you 
face  the  sim  when  he  appears?  "     (There  is  in  fact 

'Plut.,PAoc.,xxi. 

» Pollux,  X,  §  159;  Hyper.,  jwZJew.,  col.  xix. 

3  Plut.,  Dew.,  XXV. ;  PAoc,  xxi. 


Affair  of  Harpalus  and  the  Lamian  War  453 

reason  to  think  that  Alexander  was  just  now 
contemplating  a  great  expedition  against  Athens, 
in  consequence  of  a  rumour  that  had  reached  him 
that  Harpalus  had  been  well-received  there.  0 
Finally  it  was  resolved,  on  Demosthenes'  proposal, 
not  to  surrender  Harpalus  (for  probably  public 
opinion  would  not  have  permitted  this),  but  to 
keep  him  in  confinement,  and  to  take  charge  of  the 
money  which  he  had  brought,  until  Alexander 
should  send  a  fully  accredited  representative  to 
take  both  over.^  Demosthenes  also  had  the 
question'  put  directly  to  Harpalus  by  Mnesitheus, 
how  much  money  he  had  brought  with  him,^ 
Harpalus  named  seven  hundred  talents  as  the 
sum;  but  the  amount  actually  deposited  next  day 
in  the  Acropolis  was  found  to  be  no  more  than  350 
talents.  Demosthenes,  who  was  one  of  those 
charged  with  the  duty  of  conveying  the  money  to 
the  Parthenon,  failed  to  inform  the  People  of  the 
exact  sum  deposited.''  The  probable  reason  for 
this  omission  will  presently  appear;  but  it  soon 
became  known  that  a  very  large  sum  was  missing. 
Demosthenes  next  appears  to  have  carried  two 
proposals — first,    that    those    who    had    received 

'  Curt.,  X,  ii.  The  rumour  is  alluded  to  in  the  fragments  of  a 
satyric  play  named  Agen,  performed  before  Alexander,  probably 
at  Susa,  early  in  March,  324;  Athen.,  XIII,  p.  596. 

»  Vit  X  Oral.,  846  b;  Dein.,  in  Dem.,  §  89;  Hyper.,  in  Dem.,  col. 
viii.,  ix. 

3  Hyper.,  I.e.,  adds  the  interesting  note  that  Demosthenes  was 
sitting  "  in  his  usual  place,  under  the  cutting  "  or  Katatome. 

<  Vit.  X  Oral.,  846  c. 


V 


454  Demosthenes 

money  from  Harpalus  should  be  allowed  to  escape 
all  penalty  if  they  restored  it';  and  secondly  that 
the  Council  of  Areopagus  should  enquire  into  the 
whole  affair,  and  should  report  to  the  People  the 
names  of  those  who  had  taken  presents  from 
Harpalus,  with  a  view  to  their  prosecution.  *  Just 
at  this  moment,  Harpalus  succeeded  in  escaping 
from  prison — with  whose  aid  or  connivance  there 
is  no  evidence  to  show^ — and  returned  first  to 
Taenarum,  and  thence  sailed  to  Crete,  where  he 
was  murdered  by  one  of  his  own  captains,  Thibron 
of  Sparta. "  The  Coimcil  of  Areopagus  took  their 
time  before  setting  seriously  to  work  at  the  inves- 
tigation entrusted  to  them,  and  in  the  meantime 
the  situation  became  further  complicated. 

Before  Alexander  had  set  out  on  his  march  to 
India  in  327,  he  had  been  greeted  as  a  god  through 
the  flattery  of  the  sophist  Anaxarchus — or  it  may 
have  been  Cleon — and  divine  honours  had  been 
paid  him;  though  Callisthenes,  the  nephew  of 
Aristotle  and  himself  a  distinguished  historian,  had 
strongly  protested,  and  in  consequence  had  shortly 
afterwards  been  put  to  death  on  a  charge  of 
complicity  in  a  conspiracy  of  the  royal  pages.  ^ 
Early  in  324  Alexander  demanded  that  the  Greek 

^  Hyper,  in  Dent. ,  col,  xxxiv. 

»  Plut.,  Z)em.,  xxvi. ;  Dein.,  t»  Dem.,  §  4. 

» It  was  notoriously  easy  to  escape  from  prison  at  Athens; 
comp.  Plato's  Crito,  in  which  Socrates'  friends  oflFer  to  arrange 
his  escape.  4  Diod.,  XVII,  cix. 

s  Arrian,  IV,  x., §§  7-9, xv.;  Curt.,  VIII,  v.,  viii.;  V\nt.,  Alex., Iv. 


Affair  of  Harpalus  and  the  Lamian  War  455 

States  also  should  recognise  his  divinity.^  Prob- 
ably the  smaller  States  complied  without  making 
any  difficulties;  at  Megalopolis,  for  instance,  a 
shrine  was  dedicated  to  Alexander,  and  was  seen 
several  centuries  afterwards  by  Pausanias.  ^  Even 
the  Spartans  gave  a  contemptuous  assent,  agree- 
ing to  **let  Alexander  be  a  god  if  he  liked.  "^  At 
Athens  the  spirit  of  resistance  was  stronger. 
Lycurgus,  who  was  priest  of  Erechtheus,  asked  the 
indignant  question,  "What  sort  of  a  god  is  he,  at 
whose  temple  a  man  must  purify  himself  on  coming 
out  instead  of  on  going  in?"''  The  demand  was 
opposed  by  Demosthenes,  who  declared  that  the 
city  should  worship  only  the  traditional  gods.^  It 
was  also  opposed  by  Pytheas,  an  orator  who  was 
at  present  on  the  anti- Macedonian  side^;  and  in 
spite  of  Demades'  warning  to  the  Assembly,^ 
"to  take  care  lest  in  guarding  heaven  they  should 
lose  earth,"  the  People  refused  to  submit  to  the 
demand. 

But  with  it  came  another  and  a'  more  serious 
command  from  Alexander,  which  Demosthenes 
was  at  first  prepared  to  resist  even  at  the  risk  of 
war.*    This  was  an  injunction  issued  to  all  the 

*  Note  I  at  the  end  of  the  Chapter.      »  Paus,,  VIII,  xxxii.,  §  i, 
iJEX.,  Var.  H:,  II,  xix.;  Pint.,  Lac.  Apophth.,  2ige. 

*  Vit.  X  Oral.,  842  d.  The  question  may  have  been  asked  in 
327;  if  not,  it  is  the  last  recorded  utterance  of  Lycurgus. 

s  Polyb.,  XII,  12  a.  «  Plut.,  Prac.  Cer.  Rep.,  804  b. 

7Val.,  Max.,  VII,  xiii. 

'Hyper.,  in  Dem.,  col  xxxi.;  Dein.,  in  Dem.,  §§  69,  94; 
Diod.,  XVIII,  viii.     See  Ed.  Meyer,  Kleine  Schriften,  pp.  311  flf. 


456  Demosthenes 

Greek  States  that  they  should  receive  back  those 
who  had  been  banished  from  their  several  cities, 
with  the  exception  of  those  who  were  under  a 
religious  ban.  The  command  was  given  by  the 
King  partly  (so  Diodorus  explains)  "for  the  sake 
of  his  reputation."  It  was  not  creditable  to  his 
rule  that  many  thousands  of  his  subjects  should 
be  homeless  exiles;  still  less,  that  his  dominions 
should  be  overrun  by  lawless  mercenaries  or 
brigands,  such  as  many  of  the  exiles  became.  But 
the  explanation  was  partly  that  "he  desired  to  have 
a  large  number  of  persons  in  each  State  attached 
to  himself,  as  a  security  against  the  revolutions 
and  risings  of  the  Greeks."  On  the  other  hand, 
the  order  was  a  direct  breach  of  the  convention  of 
Corinth,  by  which  the  King  had  undertaken  not  to 
interfere  with  the  internal  affairs  of  the  Greek 
cities;  though  it  might  be  argued  that  Alexander 
the  god  could  claim  authority  to  supersede  the 
terms  of  any  mere  human  convention;  and  from 
this  point  of  view,  the  combination  of  the  two 
demands  was  an  ingenious  stroke  of  policy. 
Even  apart  from  the  divine  claims,  the  injunction 
was  an  announcement  that  Alexander  intended  to 
stand  above  the  internal  party-divisions  of  the 
several  States.  But  the  fulfilment  of  the  injimc- 
tion  was  boimd  to  lead  to  serious  internal  disturb- 
ances in  each  city — the  more  so  because  exile  was 
generally  due  to  political  causes.  The  Athenians 
had  special  reasons  for  apprehension,  since  they 
had  driven  out  a  number  of  the  inhabitants  of 


Affair  of  Harpalus  and  the  Lamian  War  457 

Samos^  to  make  room  for  Athenian  settlers,  and 
the  King's  order  would  compel  them  to  restore 
these.  In  any  case  the  order  was  bound  to  evoke 
the  strongest  resentment  in  Athens.  It  was  vir- 
tually a  demand  that  she  should  renounce  her 
internal  autonomy;  and  it  was  in  accordance  with 
Demosthenes*  strongest  political  sentiments  that 
he  should  think  it  right  to  resist  it  to  the  death. 
There  is  thus  no  reason  to  have  recourse,  for  an 
explanation,  to  the  motive  suggested  by  his  ene- 
mies, '  that  he  desired  to  get  up  a  war  in  order  to 
divert  the  attention  of  the  People  from  the  enquiry 
entrusted  to  the  Council  of  Areopagus,  from  which 
he  had  reason  to  apprehend  danger. 

The  popular  feeling  was  on  Demosthenes*  side, 
and  he  was  appointed  chief  of  the  official  re- 
presentatives sent  by  Athens  to  the  Olympian 
festival  in  July  or  August,  324,  to  which  Nicanor 
of  Stageira  had  been  sent  by  Alexander  to  pro- 
claim the  King's  pleasure  to  the  assembled  Greeks.  ^ 

In  anticipation  of  Nicanor*s  proclamation,  more 
than  twenty  thousand  of  the  exiles  affected  by  it 
had  gathered  at  the  festival,  and  they  received  it 
with  great  demonstrations  of  joy,  which  were  not 
shared  by  the  Athenians  or  the  ^tolians;  for,  just 
as  the  former  had  occupied  Samos,  so  the  latter  had 

»  Perhaps  as  recently  as  326.  C.  I.  A.,  ii.,  808  a,  records  the 
despatch  of  a  fleet  to  Samos  in  that  year. 

*  E.  g.  Hyper.,  /.  c. 

3Diod.,  XVIII,  viii.;  Justin,  XIII,  v.;  Curt.,  X,  ii.;  Hyper., 
in  Dent,  col.  xviii. 


458  Demosthenes 

occupied  CEniadae,  and  expelled  the  inhabitants  of 
the  town ;  and  they  now  found  themselves  required 
to  restore  it  to  them.^  Nicanor  was  instructed 
not  only  to  proclaim  the  restoration  of  exiles 
(except  those  from  Thebes,  whose  return  to  their 
native  land  was  explicitly  forbidden^),  but  also,  it 
would  seem,  to  forbid  the  federal  meetings  of  the 
Achaeans,  Arcadians,  and  Boeotians;  and  Antipater 
was  ordered  to  enforce  the  King's  decree  by  arms 
upon  those  cities  which  proved  disobedient.  Dem- 
osthenes does  not  appear  to  have  expressed  the 
feelings  of  himself  or  his  fellow-citizens  in  any 
conspicuous  manner  during  the  festival;  but  it  is 
mere  malice  on  the  part  of  Deinarchus^  to  treat 
him  as  a  traitor  to  his  country,  on  the  ground  that 
he  was  seen  speaking  to  Nicanor.  The  representa- 
tives of  the  most  hostile  powers  may  have  the  best 
of  reasons  for  meeting  one  another,  and  it  may 
even  be  that  Demosthenes  postponed  the  outbreak 
of  a  crisis  by  diplomatic  conversations. 

But  whatever  Demosthenes'  conduct  at  Olym- 
pia, '»  his  visit  seems  to  have  caused  him  to  regard 
the  situation  as  more  dangerous  than  he  had  at 
first  believed.  He  remained  firm  indeed  as  regards 
the  restoration  of  exiles;  but  he  withdrew  the  im- 
peachment which  he  had  preferred  against  the  or- 
ator Callimedon  for  associating  with  the  Athenian 
exiles,  who  were  now  assembled  at  Megara  and  were 

'  Diod., /.  c. ;  V\nt.,Alex.,  xlix. 

'  Plut.,  Lac.  Apophth.,  p.  221  a. 

3  Dein.,  in  Dem.,  §,103.  < Note 2. 


Affair  of  Harpalus  and  the  Lamian  War  459 

demanding  readmission  to  Athens^;  and  he  also 
withdrew  his  opposition  to  the  recognition  of  Alex- 
ander's divinity.  "Let  him  be  son  of  Zeus,"  he 
said,  "or,  if  he  prefers  it,  son  of  Poseidon,  for  all  I 
care. "  He  doubtless  believed  that  if  the  Athenians 
gave  way  upon  this  point,  which  was  of  compara- 
tively little  pohtical  importance,  Alexander  might 
be  content  to  ignore  their  neglect  of  the  more  seri- 
ous injunction.  ^  In  consequence  of  this,  Demades 
now  proposed  that  Alexander  should  be  added  as  a 
thirteenth  to  the  twelve  Olympian  gods,  under  the 
title  of  Dionysus,  whose  mythical  home  at  Nysa 
Alexander  fancied  himself  to  have  discovered;  and 
that  a  temple  should  be  erected  to  him^;  and  this 
decree  appears  to  have  been  accepted,  since  Hy- 
pereides,  a  year  or  so  later,  '^  alluded  scornfully  to 
this  payment  of  divine  honours  to  men. 

A  number  of  embassies  proceeded  about  this 
time  to  Babylon,  where  Alexander  received  their 
congratulations  and  homage  (accompanied  by  gold- 
en crowns)  early  in  323;  he  also  considered  the 
political  and  other  questions  which  they  submitted 
to  him,  and  among  them,  their  requests  in  regard 
to  the  return  of  the  exiles.  ^     It  is  probable  that 

'  Dein.,  in  Dem.,  §§  58,  94.  Another  Athenian,  named  Poly- 
euctus,  was  also  prosecuted,  though  not  by  Demosthenes;  but 
was  able  to  prove  that  he  had  gone  to  Megara  to  visit  his  mother. 

'  Dein.,  in  Dem.,  §  94;  Hyper.,  in  Dem.  col.  xxxi. 

sVal.,  Max.,  VII,  ii.,  E.  10;  .<EUan.,  Var.  Hist.,  V,  xii.;  Athen., 
VI,p.25ib;Diog.,  L.,  VI,  Ixiii.  ^  Hyper.,  Epitaph.,  col.  viii. 

s  Arrian,  VII,  xix.,  xxiii.,  seems  to  distinguish  two  series  of 
embassies;  Diod.,  XVII,  cxiii.,  groups  all  together. 


460  Demosthenes 

the  Athenians  sent  envoys  among  the  rest ;  for  we 
are  told  that  Alexander  at  this  time  restored  to  the 
Greeks  the  statues  and  other  works  of  art  which 
the  Persians  had  carried  off  at  the  time  of  Xerxes* 
invasion  of  Greece,  and  among  others  restored  to 
the  Athenians  the  statues  of  Harmodius  and  Aris- 
togeiton,  who  had  liberated  Athens  from  tyranny 
in  510.  But  he  probably  refused  to  give  way  as 
regards  the  restoration  of  exiles,  since  various  in- 
scriptions of  the  time  allude  to  the  return  of  the 
banished  to  their  several  cities — to  Samos  among 
others.''  Whether  he  insisted  upon  the  reception 
into  Athens  of  those  who  had  been  expelled  we  do 
not  know. 

Before  the  embassies  were  received  at  Babylon, 
the  Harpalus  affair  came  to  an  issue.  It  is  plain 
that  public  excitement  over  the  matter  had  been 
growing;  the  apprehension  of  danger  from  Alexan- 
der had  also  increased;  and  there  was  much 
impatience  at  the  long  delay  of  the  Council  of 
Areopagus  in  coming  to  a  conclusion.  They  had 
indeed  instituted  a  search  in  the  houses  of  sus- 
pected persons,  but  without  result.  Demosthenes 
was  openly  charged  by  his  enemies  with  receiving 
money  from  Harpalus ;  and  in  self-defence  proposed 
a  decree  ordering  an  enquiry  by  the  Coimcil  of 
Areopagus  into  the  charge  against  himself,  de- 
claring himself  ready  to  submit  to  the  penalty  of 
death  if  he  were  foimd  to  have  taken  the  money. 

'  C.  I.  G.,  ii.,  2166,  2671,  2672,  etc.,  and  Ditt.  Syll.,  (Ed.  2) 
162. 


Affair  of  Harpalus  and  the  Lamian  War  461 

Philocles  did  the  same.^  That  Demosthenes 
himself  gave  evidence  before  the  Coiincil  appears 
from  the  circumstance  that  Deinarchus  accused 
him  of  committing  perjury  before  that  body.  At 
some  point  in  the  course  of  the  proceedings,  two 
persons,  a  father  and  son,  were  condemned  to 
death  and  executed,  on  the  proposal  of  Demos- 
thenes ;  it  is  conjectured  that  they  may  have  been 
the  watchmen  who  had  been  set  to  guard  the 
treasure.*  Such  was  the  nervousness  of  all  par- 
ties, that  those  who  had  actually  taken  money 
from  Harpalus  were  the  first  to  accuse  others  of 
having  done  so,  in  the  hope  of  saving  themselves.  ^ 
Even  Hypereides,  who  was  above  suspicion,  was 
mentioned  by  the  comic  poet  Timocles  (prob- 
ably at  the  Dionysia  in  March,  324)  as  having  re- 
ceived money,  along  with  Demosthenes,  Moerocles, 
Demon,  and  Callisthenes.  At  last,  six  months 
after  the  enquiry  had  been  ordered,''  the  Council 
reported  that  Demosthenes  had  received  twenty 
talents  of  the  lost  money,  Demades  six  thousand 
gold  staters  (also  equivalent  to  about  twenty 
talents),  and  that  various  sums  had  been  accepted 
by  Philocles,  Cephisophon,  Hagnonides,  Aristoni- 
cus,  Aristogeiton,  and  Charicles. 

In  consequence  of  this  report,   the  Assembly 

»  Dein.,  in  Dent.,  §§  8,  47,  82,  83,  86,  etc.;  in  Philocl.,  §§  i,  2. 
Demosthenes  perhaps  trusted  that  this  Council  would  be  fav- 
ourably inclined  to  him,  as  on  some  former  occasions. 

'  Dein.,  in  Dent.,  §§  8,  62,  83. 

s  Plut.,  Dent.,  xxv. ;  Phoc,  xxi.  *  Dein.,  in  Dent.,  §  45. 


462  Demosthenes 

appointed  ten  orators  to  prosecute  the  accused  on 
behalf  of  the  State.  Among  the  ten  were  Hyperei- 
des,  Pytheas,  Menesaechmus,  Procles,  Stratocles, 
and  Himeraeus. '  Of  these  Menesaechmus  was  the 
former  assailant  of  Lycurgus;  Pytheas,  though 
he  had  opposed  the  recognition  of  Alexander's 
divinity,  was  shortly  afterwards  in  the  pay  of 
Antipater^;  Stratocles  had  been  described  by 
Demosthenes  3  as  the  most  plausible  scoundrel  in 
the  world.  What  was  Hypereides  doing  in  con- 
junction with  such  men,  and  in  antagonism  to 
Demosthenes?  Probably  the  two  had  been  drift- 
ing apart  for  some  time.  The  patient  moderation 
of  Demosthenes,  who  was  waiting  for  a  really 
favourable  moment  before  renewing  the  struggle 
for  freedom,  and  the  fact  that  he  had  been  content 
to  divide  the  administrative  offices  with  Demades 
and  his  friends,  may  gradually  have  alienated 
Hypereides ;  the  original  refusal  of  Demosthenes  to 
accept  the  overtures  of  Harpalus  may  have  seemed 
to  Hypereides  to  be  a  sacrifice  of  a  unique  oppor- 
tunity, 4  and  the  charge  of  bribery  and  embezzle- 
ment may  have  seemed  to  be  a  convenient  way  of 
getting  rid  of  so  cautious  a  leader.  It  was  per- 
haps for  similar  reasons  that  Hypereides  attacked 
Hagnonides  and  Aristonicus,  who  had  also  been 
opponents  of  the  Macedonian  power. 

The    charge   against    Demosthenes    was    tried 

»  Dein.,  in  Dem.,  §  i;  Vit.  X  Oral.,  846  c. 

»  Comp.  Dem.,  Ep.,  iii.,  §  29. 

» In  Pantcenet.,  §  48  (circ.  346-5  B.C.).  *  Note3. 


Affair  of  Harpalus  and  the  Lamian  War  463 

first.  The  speech  of  Stratocles,  in  which  the 
proofs  of  the  charge  are  said^  to  have  been  given, 
has  not  come  down  to  us;  and  we  are  therefore 
ignorant  what  the  nature  of  these  proofs  was. 
The  Council  of  Areopagus  had  only  reported  its 
conclusions,  not  the  grounds  of  them.^*  The 
speech  of  Deinarchus,  composed  for  one  of  the 
prosecutors — ^probably  Himeraeus,  ^ — ^followed  that 
of  Stratocles.  The  speaker  does  not  offer  a  vestige 
of  proof  of  any  kind,  being  apparently  content 
with  the  findings  of  the  Council.  On  the  other 
hand,  he  tries  by  every  means  to  rouse  prejudice 
against  Demosthenes,  by  recalling  the  destruction 
of  Thebes  and  other  disasters  and  attributing 
them  to  him,  and  by  accusing  him  of  taking  bribes 
on  a  number  of  former  occasions.  But  the 
meanest  arguments,  in  a  speech  brimming  over 
with  malice,  are  those  which  accuse  Demosthenes 
of  having  all  along  been  working  in  the  service  of 
Macedonia,  from  the  time  of  the  Peace  of  Philoc- 
rates  onwards,  and  of  having  thrown  away  every 
opportunity  of  opposing  Philip  and  Alexander. 
(The  arguments  of  course  show  that  the  prosecu- 
tors were  aware  that  the  feeling  of  the  jury  would 
be  strongly  anti-Macedonian.)  The  speaker 
further  urged  the  jury  to  remember  that  the  eyes 

*  Dein.,  in  Dem.,  §  i.  *  Dem.,  Ep.,  ii.,  §  i. 

sBlass,  Alt.  Ber.,  Ill,  ii.,  p.  310.  Haupt  thinks  that  the 
speaker  was  Menesaechmus.  Whoever  he  was,  he  had  himself 
been  denounced  for  corruption  by  Pistias,  an  Areopagite,  but 
had  succeeded  in  clearing  himself. 


464  Demosthenes 

of  the  world  were  upon  them,  and  that  it  was 
important  to  punish  corruption  in  the  case  of 
eminent  men  above  all.  What,  he  proceeded  to 
ask,  would  happen  if  Alexander  demanded  to  be 
paid  the  money  brought  by  Harpalus?  Would 
Demosthenes  expect  the  Athenians  to  go  to  war, 
in  order  that  he  and  others  might  retain  what  they 
had  stolen?  The  Speech  is  marked  throughout  by 
vehement  and  impetuous  but  overwrought  rhetoric ; 
by  way  of  additional  insult,  passages  not  only  of 
iEschines'  but  of  Demosthenes'  own  earlier  orations 
are  used  with  very  little  alteration  against  Demos- 
thenes himself;  and,  whatever  were  the  merits 
of  the  case,  there  is  no  public  oration  by  a  Greek 
orator  which  stands  on  quite  so  low  a  level  as  this. 
At  a  later  stage  in  the  trial  Hypereides  spoke, 
and  some  not  inconsiderable  fragments  of  his 
speech  are  known  to  us.  Hypereides  like  Dein- 
archus  regards  the  finding  of  the  Areopagus  as 
sufficient  evidence  in  itself,  particularly  as  Demos- 
thenes himself  had  proposed  that  its  verdict,  if 
given  against  him,  should  be  conclusive.  He  asks 
whether  it  is  likely  that  it  was  for  nothing  that 
Demosthenes  had  taken  no  proceedings  against  the 
custodians  who  had  let  Harpalus  go,  when  it  was  he 
himself  who  had  moved  that  he  should  be  kept  in 
custody?  or  that  Harpalus  would  have  bribed  lesser 
men,  and  passed  over  Demosthenes,  the  mana- 
ger of  the  whole  affair?  He  also  brings  up  against 
Demosthenes  the  scandal  about  the  Persian  gold, 
and  the  failure  to  help  Thebes  against  Alexander. 


Affair  of  Harpalus  and  the  Lamian  War  465 

What  is  more  interesting  is  that  Hypereides 
gives  us  the  only  information  we  have  as  to  the 
line  of  defence  which  Demosthenes  was  expected 
to  adopt,  and  which  had  no  doubt  become  known 
before  the  trial.  Demosthenes  had  demanded  a 
detailed  account  of  the  sums  which  he  was  alleged 
to  have  received,  showing  from  whom  he  had 
received  them,  and  where — a.  demand  upon  which 
Hypereides  throws  scorn,  saying  that  it  is  treating 
the  Council's  report  as  though  it  were  a  banker's 
accoimt ;  but  which  seems  in  itself  not  unreasonable. 
He  had  also  declared  that  the  report  of  the  Council 
of  Areopagus  was  false,  and  that  the  Areopagites 
desired  to  get  rid  of  him,  by  way  of  doing  a  favour 
to  Alexander.  The  latter  assertion  is  very  likely 
to  have  been  so  far  true,  that  the  danger  which  the 
Athenians  apprehended  from  Alexander's  indig- 
nation may  have  been  strongly  urged  upon  them, 
and  may  have  forced  them  to  make  a  report, 
when  they  had  probably  hoped  to  let  the  matter 
drop,  as  they  had  done  in  the  case  of  the  "Persian 
gold."  But  what  is  of  most  importance  is  the 
statement  of  Hypereides  that  Demosthenes  had 
made  all  his  subsequent  denials  of  the  receipt  of 
the  money  ineffectual,  by  having  at  first  admitted 
that  he  had  taken  the  money  and  by  having  tried 
to  justify  himself  for  doing  so,  on  the  pretext  that 
he  had  borrowed  the  money  for  the  festival-fund.* 

'  The  Interpretation  of  vpoSeSaveifffUvoi  (Hyper.,  in  Dent., 
col.  X.)  given  by  Holm  and  others,  who  take  it  to  mean  that 
Demosthenes  had  advanced  twenty  talents  of  his  own  to  the 

30 


466  Demosthenes 

(His  friend  Cnosion  also  hinted  that  if  pressure 
were  exerted,  the  result  would  be  the  revelation 
of  a  state-secret,  and  would  be  detrimental  to  the 
public  interest.^)  This  defence  Hypereides  de- 
scribed as  bringing  discredit  upon  the  People,  by- 
letting  it  be  thought  that  they  would  apply  Harp- 
alus'  money  to  their  own  public  purposes.  The 
verdict  of  the  court  was  against  Demosthenes. 
It  was  open  to  them  either  to  condemn  him  to 
death,  or  to  fine  him  ten  times  the  amount  alleged 
to  have  been  received  by  him.^  Instead  of  doing 
either,  they  inflicted  a  fine  of  fifty  talents,  com- 
mitting him  to  prison  imtil  it  should  be  paid. 

The  question  of  the  guilt  or  innocence  of  Demos- 
thenes has  been,  and  still  is,  keenly  disputed.  It  is 
impossible  to  discuss  all  the  considerations  which 
have  been  urged  on  either  side ;  many  of  them  are 
plainly  invalid;  but  it  may  be  well  to  state  briefly 
the  conclusions  to  which  the  very  slender  evidence 
seems  to  point.  It  can  scarcely  be  denied  in  the 
face  of  Demosthenes'  own  admission  (unless  Hyp- 
ereides is  telling  a  downright  falsehood)  that 
Demosthenes  received  the  money.  It  appears 
probable  that  he  did  not  take  it  as  a  bribe  from 
Harpalus.  If  he  had  done  so,  he  could  hardly 
have  proposed  to  take  Harpalus  into  custody  and 

festival-fund,  and  had  repaid  himself  out  of  Harpalus'  money, 
cannot  be  extracted  from  the  Greek,  though  it  may  represent 
Demosthenes'  plea. 

^  Ibid.,  col.  xiii.  » Ibid.,  col.  xxiv.;  Dein.,  in  Dent.,  §  60. 


Affair  of  Harpalus  and  the  Lamian  War  /^iS'j 

put  his  money  into  safe  keeping  to  be  restored  to 
Alexander.  Plutarch  indeed^  tells  a  story  to  the 
effect  that  though  Demosthenes  had  refused 
Harpalus'  offers  at  first,  yet,  when  Harpalus  was 
in  custody  and  the  money  being  counted,  he  was 
moved  with  admiration  of  a  golden  cup,  finely 
worked,  which  was  among  the  treasure;  and  that 
the  same  night  Harpalus  secretly  sent  him  this 
cup,  together  with  twenty  talents.  Next  day, 
when  he  was  called  upon  to  speak  in  the  Assembly, 
and  expected  to  maintain  his  former  attitude 
towards  Harpalus,  he  pretended  to  be  suffering 
from  loss  of  voice,  and  appeared  with  his  throat 
elaborately  muffled  up;  but  the  story  leaked  out; 
he  and  his  friends  thought  it  well  to  get  Harpalus 
away  from  Athens,  to  prevent  any  possible  dis- 
closures; and  the  Areopagus  then  instituted  the 
domiciliary  search  which  has  been  mentioned. 
But  if  this  tale  were  true,  it  is  almost  inconceivable 
that  it  should  not  have  been  alluded  to  in  the 
speeches  for  the  prosecution.  Deinarchus  would 
never  have  failed  to  take  full  advantage  of  so 
picturesque  a  story.  Nor  does  Hypereides  men- 
tion it  when  he  alludes  to  the  escape  of  Harp- 
alus. Moreover,  we  are  told  that  Harpalus' 
steward  was  captured  by  Philoxenus  at  Rhodes, 
and  told  him  the  names  of  the  statesmen  to  whom 
Harpalus  had  given  money,  and  that  Demo- 
sthenes* name  was  not  among  the  number.^ 
Demosthenes  then  did  not  receive  the  money 

»  Plut.,Z?eOT.,xxv.  »  Paus.,  II,  xxxiii.,  §4. 


468  Demosthenes 

from  Harpalus,  but  must  have  appropriated  it 
after  the  treasure  had  been  transferred  to  those 
appointed  by  the  Assembly  to  take  charge  of  it, 
of  whom  he  was  one.  Further  it  is  quite  possible 
that  his  statement  that  he  had  taken  it  "for  the 
theoric  fund"  was  true,  though  he  cannot  have 
formally  transferred  it  to  the  fund;  for  then  it 
could  have  been  proved  by  the  accounts  of  the 
fimd.  He  was  evidently  apprehensive  of  war  with 
Alexander.  In  case  of  war,  the  theoric  fund  would 
almost  certainly  be  called  upon  to  provide  money 
for  military  purposes;  and  it  is  far  from  improb- 
able that  Demosthenes  hoped  to  lay  the  founda- 
tions of  a  reserve  out  of  the  money  taken  from 
Harpalus ;  just  as  he  had  taken  Persian  gold  to  help 
Thebes.  If  this  was  so,  he  was  at  least  not  guilty 
of  an  act  of  theft  for  his  own  personal  aggrandise- 
ment, however  indefensible  his  action  may  have 
been.  Indefensible,  of  course,  it  was.  The  money 
was  the  property  of  Alexander;  the  People  had 
resolved  that  it  should  be  kept  in  the  Acropolis 
until  Alexander  sent  for  it,  and  had  entrusted  to 
Demosthenes,  among  others,  the  execution  of  this 
decree:  the  money  was  clearly  not  available  for 
the  public  purposes  of  Athens.  But  it  cannot  be 
doubted  that  if  war  with  Alexander  had  broken 
out,  the  People  would  have  sanctioned  the  use  of 
Harpalus'  treasure  for  the  defence  of  Athens; 
Deinarchus  assumed  that  this  was  so'^;  and  it  is 
not  to  be  supposed  that  the  Athenians  felt  so 
'Dein.,  in  Dem.,  §§  64  ff. 


Affair  of  Harpalus  and  the  Lamian  War  469 

strongly  about  Demosthenes*  action  in  taking 
the  money  prematurely  for  the  use  of  Athens  as 
modem  judges  of  the  case  would  feel.  The  com- 
paratively light  penalty  inflicted  indicates  this. 
Demosthenes  then  was  guilty  of  an  action  based 
on  the  saijie  principle,  and  directed  towards  the 
same  end,  as  his  acceptance  of  Persian  gold,  but 
less  justifiable,  because  it  involved  a  breach  of 
faith.  When,  however,  that  is  admitted,  his  fault 
still  remains  far  less  ignoble  than  his  critics,  ancient 
and  modem,  would  have  us  believe.  There  is  at 
least  no  sufficient  reason  for  supposing  that  he  was 
influenced  by  corrupt  motives,  or  that  he  aimed 
at  his  own  personal  gain;  and  we  are  justified  in 
preferring  an  interpretation  of  his  action,  which, 
while  it  does  not  acquit  him  of  a  certain  unscrupu- 
lousness  as  to  means,  is  consonant  with  the  patri- 
otic aims  which  he  pursued  throughout  his  career. 
The  penalty  inflicted  was,  as  we  have  said,  light 
in  comparison  with  that  which  the  laws  allowed. 
But  in  itself  a  fine  of  fifty  talents  was  a  heavy  one. 
No  doubt  the  court  took  into  account  not  merely 
the  appropriation  of  the  money  by  Demosthenes, 
but  also  his  failure  to  report  the  exact  sum  depos- 
ited in  the  Acropolis^;  though  there  may  be  some 
ground  for  his  complaint^  that  he  was  treated  more 
harshly  than  the  rest  because  his  case  was  the 
first  to  be  tried,  and  that  others  who  made  pre- 
cisely the  same  defence  as  he,  got  off  impimished.^ 

'  Vit.  X  Oral.,  846  c.  '  Dem.,  Ep.,  ii.,  §  15. 

3lt  must,  however,  be  remembered  that  he  occupied  a  position 


470  Demosthenes 

However  that  may  be,  he  was  unable  to  pay  so 
large  a  sum,  and  was  cast  into  prison.  But  before 
many  days  he  felt  the  hardships  of  the  prison  to 
be  greater  than  his  age  and  health  could  endure, 
and  contrived  to  make  his  escape.  Plutarch  tells 
the  story  nhat  when  Demosthenes  was  a  little  way 
from  the  city,  he  saw  some  of  those  with  whom  he 
had  had  differences  following  him,  and  tried  to  hide ; 
but  they  called  to  him  that  they  had  followed  him  to 
bring  him  money  for  his  journey,  and  urged  him 
to  bear  his  misfortune  cheerfully;  whereupon  he 
burst  into  lamentation  at  his  exile  from  a  city 
where  even  his  enemies  were  kinder  than  any 
friends  he  would  find  elsewhere.  As  he  left  the 
city,  so  Plutarch  also  tells  us,  he  had  cried  aloud 
to  Athena  Polias,  "O  Lady  of  the  City,  why  dost 
thou  delight  in  three  of  the  most  cruel  beasts — 
the  owl,  the  snake,  and  the  People?"  and  when 
yoimg  men  came  to  talk  to  him  during  his  exile, 
he  dissuaded  them  from  entering  upon  a  political 
career,  declaring  that  if  he  had  a  fresh  start  and 
two  roads  lay  open  to  him,  the  one  to  the  platform 
and  the  Assembly,  the  other  straight  to  death, 
then,  knowing,  as  he  did,  all  that  a  political  career 
involved — fears,  jealousies,  slanders,  struggles, — 
he  would  take  the  road  that  led  straight  to  death. 
He  passed  his  time  for  some  months  partly  in 
-^gina,  partly  at  Troezen;  but  he  found  Troezen 

of  special  influence  and  responsibility,  and  that  less  important 
persons  might  well  be  more  leniently  treated. 
'  Plut.,  Dem.  xxvi. 


Affair  of  Harpalus  and  the  Lamian  War  471 

an  unsafe  refuge,  and  moved  to  the  island  of 
Calaureia,  from  which  (as  from  yEgina)  he  could 
see  Athens  and  the  Attic  coast.  ^  Hence  he  wrote 
the  Second  Letter  ascribed  to  him,  in  which  he 
pleaded  earnestly  with  the  People  for  restoration 
to  Athens.  He  recalled  his  long  career  of  public 
service,  and  claimed  the  same  leniency  as  was 
shown  to  his  fellow-defendants;  he  protested  his 
abiding  loyalty  to  his  country;  and  asked  to  be 
delivered,  for  the  sake  of  the  reputation  of  the 
People,  as  well  as  of  his  own,  from  the  hardships 
and  shame  of  exile. 

As  for  the  other  accused  persons,  Demades  either 
did  not  venture  or  did  not  condescend  to  face  the 
jury;  he  was  condemned  and  fined,  but  did  not 
leave  Athens.  Probably  he  was  able  to  pay  the  fine 
inflicted,  and  thus  remained  free  to  take  part  in  po- 
litical life.  Philocles,  who  was  held  responsible  for 
the  original  admission  of  Harpalus  to  Athens,  as 
well  as  for  his  acceptance  of  Harpalus'  money,  was 
driven  into  exile.  Aristogeiton  and  the  remainder 
of  the  defendants  appear  to  have  got  off  free.  ^ 

Such  was  the  history  of  this  unhappy  affair. 
The  result  of  it  was  that  the  party  opposed  to 
Demosthenes  had  temporarily  a  free  hand.  Not 
only  Alexander,  but  also  his  deceased  companion 
Hephasstion,    received    official    worship.^     Mene- 

»  Dem.,  Ep.,  ii.,  §§  17-20.     See  Note  4. 

» Dein.,  tnDem.,  §  iOi\;inAristog.,%  i5;Dem.,£p.,ii.,  §§  15,  16. 
3  Hyper.,  Epitaph.,  Col.  viii.;  Arrian,  VII,  xiv.,  §  7,  xxiii.,  §  6; 
Plut.,  Alex.,  Ixxii. 


472  Demosthenes 

saechmus  prosecuted  the  sons  of  Lycurgus,  claiming 
that  they  should  make  good  that  alleged  deficit  in 
the  public  accounts  for  which  he  had  vainly  tried 
to  prove  their  father  responsible;  and  they  were 
actually  condemned  and  imprisoned.  But  shortly 
afterwards  their  cause  was  taken  up  by  Democles, 
a  pupil  of  Theophrastus,  and  by  Hypereides,  and 
was  strongly  supported  by  Demosthenes  in  a  let- 
ter addressed  to  the  People — the  third  of  those 
ascribed  to  him — in  which  he  declared  that  the 
People  of  Athens  were  being  ill-spoken  of  abroad 
owing  to  their  treatment  of  the  sons  of  one  of  their 
most  loyal  and  public-spirited  servants;  and  that 
when  Pytheas  was  suffered  to  riot  in  wealth  and 
immoraHty,  and  those  who  had  taken  the  patriotic 
side  were  driven  into  exile,  it  was  plain  that 
patriotism  was  unprofitable.  He  quoted  instances 
of  generous  treatment  accorded  to  far  less  deserv- 
ing persons,  and  at  the  close  of  the  letter  pleaded 
once  more  for  himself,  as  well  as  for  the  sons  of 
Lycurgus.  Whether  owing  to  this  letter  or  to  the 
activity  of  the  advocates  of  the  condemned  in 
Athens,  the  People  were  moved  to  remorse  for  their 
ingratitude  towards  one  of  their  greatest  bene- 
factors, and  the  sons  of  Lycurgus  were  released.  ^ 

The  enemies  of  Demosthenes  did  not  long  enjoy 
their  ascendancy;  for  early  in  June,  323,  Alexander 
died  at  Babylon  after  a  short  illness.  When  first 
the  rumour  of  his  death  reached  Athens,  Demades 
refused  to  credit  it.     "  If  Alexander  were  dead, "  he 

'  Vit.  X  Oral.,  842  d,  and  Hyper.,  fragm.  118  (Oxford  text). 


Affair  of  Harpalus  and  the  Lamian  War  473 

declared,  "the  whole  world  would  be  reeking  of 
his  corpse"^;  and  Phocion  tried  to  quiet  the  public 
excitement  by  saying,  in  the  manner  characteristic 
of  him,  "If  Alexander  is  dead  to-day,  he  will  be 
dead  to-morrow  and  the  next  day  also ;  so  that  we 
have  plenty  of  time  to  make  our  plans."  In  fact 
the  situation  was  not  at  all  clear,  for  there  was  no 
obvious  successor  to  Alexander;  but  as  the  result  of 
the  deHberations  of  his  generals  at  Babylon,  it  was 
decided  that  his  half-brother  Arrhid^us,  a  man  of 
feeble  mind,  should  be  temporarily  acknowledged 
King,  saving  the  rights  of  the  yet  unborn  infant  of 
Alexander  and  Roxana,  should  it  prove  to  be  a 
boy;  that  Perdiccas  should  be  regent;  that  Lysim- 
achus  should  have  the  command  in  Thrace  and 
the  Hellespont ;  and  that  in  Macedonia  the  supreme 
power  shotild  be  divided  between  Antipater,  as 
commander-in-chief,  and  Craterus,  who  shortly 
afterwards  advanced  as  far  as  Cilicia,  but  did  not 
at  present  proceed  to  Macedonia.  Egypt  was 
assigned  to  Ptolemy,  and  various  provinces  in  Asia 
Minor  to  Eumenes,  Antigonus,  Leonnatus,  and 
others.  ^ 

Their  short  experience  of  Macedonian  govern- 
ment led  many  Greek  peoples  at  this  crisis  to 
attempt  to  throw  off  the  yoke.  Risings  took 
place  in  Rhodes,  Chios,  and  Ephesus.  ^     In  Greece 

'  Plut.,  Phoc,  xxii.,  etc. 

^Arrian,  Suppl.,  §§  3,  7;  Diod.,  XVIII,  ii.-iv.,  vi.;  Dexippus, 
fr.  I. 

3  Diod.,  XVIII,  viii.;  Suid.,  s.  v.,  Ephorus;  Strabo,  XIV,  p. 
645,  etc.;  Polyasn.,  VI,  49. 


474  Demosthenes 

proper,  the  first  active  steps  were  taken  by  Leos- 
thenes,  an  Athenian,  who  had  succeeded  in  keeping 
together  at  Tasnanim  some  eight  thousand  of  the 
Greek  soldiers  who  had  returned  from  Asia;  and 
this  force  was  increased  by  the  discontented  sol- 
diers who  flocked  thither  from  all  parts,  as  to  a 
cave  of  AduUam.  ^  On  hearing  the  news  of  Alex- 
ander's death,  he  went  to  Athens  and  opened 
negotiations  with  the  Cotmcil,  which  gave  him 
fifty  talents  and  a  supply  of  arms,  and  sent  envoys 
in  his  interest  to  the  -^tolians,  and  obtained  a 
ready  promise  of  support.  These  actions  of  the 
Council  were  not  at  first  made  known  to  the  People, 
and  it  was  not  until  the  fact  of  Alexander's  death 
was  placed  beyond  all  doubt  that  a  proposal  to 
fight  for  freedom  was  brought  before  the  Assembly, 
and  recommended  to  it  by  Hypereides  as  well  as  by 
messages  from  Demosthenes."  The  richer  mem- 
bers of  the  Assembly  advised  the  maintenance  of 
the  Peace,  but  were  overborne  by  a  large  majority, 
the  eloquence  of  Hypereides  proving  more  effective 
than  the  cautious  advice  of  Phocion,  though  some 
of  Phocion's  observations  were  only  too  well 
founded. 3  "Leosthenes'  talk,"  he  said,  "is  like 
a  cypress-tree — tall  but  unfruitful."  "When," 
asked  Hypereides,  "will  you  ever  advise  the 
Athenians  to  fight?"  "When  I  see  the  yoimg," 
said  Phocion,  "ready  to  do  their  duty,  and  the 

'  Diod.,  XVII,  cxi.;  XVIII,  ix.;  Paus.,  I,  xxv,  §  5;  VIII,  lii.,  §  5. 
» Hyper.,  Epitaph.,  col.  ii.;   Vit.  X  Oral.,  849  f. 
3  Diod.,  XVIII,  ix.;  Dexippus,  fr.  2. 


Affair  of  Harpalus  and  the  Lamian  War  475 

rich  to  pay  taxes,  and  the  poKticians  to  abstain 
from  stealing  public  money."  The  army  of 
Leosthenes  inspired  no  confidence  in  Phocion. 
"It  is  good  enough,"  said  he,  "for  the  short  race. 
I  am  afraid  of  the  long — of  the  campaign;  for  the 
city  has  no  other  funds  or  ships  or  soldiers. "  But 
the  Assembly  was  in  no  mood  for  caution.  It  was 
resolved  to  equip  240  ships,  and  to  put  all  Atheni- 
ans under  forty  years  of  age  into  the  field — those 
belonging  to  three  of  the  tribes  to  guard  Attica, 
those  belonging  to  the  remaining  seven  to  serve  be- 
yond the  borders.  They  further  sent  embassies  to 
other  Greek  States,in  the  hope  of  inducing  them  to 
join  in  a  general  rising  and  to  claim  their  freedom.  * 
So  unpopular  had  the  Macedonians  become,  that 
although  it  seemed  to  many  persons  in  the  other 
States  that  Athens  was  taking  a  prematiu-e  and  a 
dangerous  step,  the  envoys  found  support  almost 
everywhere.  Besides  the  ^tolians,  many  north- 
em  Greek  tribes  gave  their  adhesion — among  them 
some  of  those  Thessalian  and  neighbouring  tribes 
which  had  been  reckoned  the  most  faithful  allies 
of  Macedonia.  Boeotia  and  Euboea  were  in  the 
occupation  of  Macedonian  troops  or  were  subject 
to  strong  Macedonian  influence;  yet  even  in  Eu- 
boea the  people  of  Carystus  joined  in  the  league. 
In  the  Peloponnese,  Sparta  was  powerless,  or  at 
least  unable  to  help;  but  the  peoples  of  Argos, 
Sicyon,  Epidaurus,  Troezen,  Elis,  and  Messenia 
all  promised  their  aid.  ^    As  for  funds,  the  treasure 

»  Diod.,  XVIII,  X.  » Ibid.,  xi.;  Paus.,  I,  xxv.,  §  4. 


476  Demosthenes 

of  Harpalus  was  freely  used.^  Demades  was 
prosecuted  for  making  illegal  proposals  and  for 
impiety,  and  particularly  for  his  proposal  to  re- 
cognise the  divinity  of  Alexander.  He  was  heavily 
fined — ten  talents  according  to  one  authority,  one 
hundred  according  to  another — and  lost  his  civic 
rights.^  Pytheas  also  was  prosecuted  and  was 
imprisoned;  but  he  escaped,  and  he  and  Callime- 
don  betook  themselves  to  Antipater,  and  were 
despatched  by  him  to  the  Peloponnese  to  coimter- 
act  the  effect  of  the  embassies  sent  thither  by  the 
Athenians.^  In  Arcadia  Pytheas  encountered 
Demosthenes,  who,  though  in  exile,  used  all  his 
powers  to  aid  Hypereides,  Polyeuctus,  and  the 
other  spokesmen  of  Athens.  Pytheas  (according 
to  Plutarch's  story)  remarked  that,  just  as  asses' 
milk  made  mischief  in  a  house,  so  an  Athen- 
ian embassy  was  bound  to  cause  disorders  in 
a  state.  "No,"  replied  Demosthenes;  "asses* 
milk  is  a  good  medicine,  and  so  is  a  visit  from 
the  Athenians." 

So  great  were  the  services  rendered  by  Demo- 
sthenes, that  the  Athenian  People  determined  to 
recall  him.  The  formal  decree  for  this  purpose 
was  proposed  by  his  nephew  Demon ;  and  since  it 
would  have  been  unconstitutional  to  remit  the 
fine  of  fifty  talents  which  the  orator  had  been 

» Diod.,  XVIII,  ix. 

»  Diod,,  XVIII,  xviii,;  Plut.,  Phoc,  xxvi.;  Athen.,  VI,  p.  251  b; 
^lian.,  Var.  H.,  V,  xii. 

3  Siiid.,  s.  v.,  Pytheas;  Plut.,  Dem.,  xxvii. 


Affair  of  Harpalus  and  the  Lamian  War  477 

condemned  to  pay,  he  was  ordered  to  prepare  and 
decorate  the  altar  of  Zeus  the  Saviour  for  a  forth- 
coming festival,  and  to  enable  him  to  meet  this 
very  slight  expenditure,  the  sum  of  fifty  talents  was 
voted  to  him.^  We  may  suspect  that  the  money 
came  out  of  the  treasure  of  Harpalus.  A  trireme 
was  sent  to  convey  him  from  ^gina,  and  at  the 
Peiraeus  he  was  met  by  a  great  concourse  of  his 
fellow-citizens,  headed  by  the  nine  archons  and 
the  priests;  and  we  are  told  that  he  raised  his 
hands  towards  heaven  and  thanked  the  gods  that 
he  had  been  granted  an  even  more  honourable 
return  than  Alcibiades,  since  his  restoration  was 
not  forced  upon  his  fellow-citizens,  but  was  their 
voluntary  act. 

Before  this  happy  event  took  place,  the  war  had 
probably  begun.  Leosthenes  commenced  opera- 
tions by  sending  a  force  of  eight  thousand  men  by 
sea  from  Taenarum  to  ^tolia;  here  he  was  joined 
by  an  army  of  seven  thousand  ^tolians ;  and  with 
the  combined  forces  he  marched  to  Thermopylae 
and  occupied  the  Pass  without  encountering 
opposition.  The  Athenians  had  by  this  time 
despatched  a  force  of  five  thousand  citizen-infan- 
try, five  hundred  cavalry,  and  two  thousand  mer- 
cenaries to  join  him;  but  they  were  unable  to  effect 
a  passage  through  Boeotia,  owing  to  the  strong 
resistance  offered  by  the  allies  of  the  Macedonians, 
until  Leosthenes  marched  southward  with  part  of 

»  Plut.,  Dem.,  xxvii.;   Vit.  X  Oral.,  846  d;  Justin,  XIII,  v. 


478  Demosthenes 

his  forces,  defeated  the  enemy,  and  so  enabled  the 
Athenian  troops  to  reach  Thermopylae.  ^  He  then 
moved  northward  to  confront  Antipater,  who  came 
to  meet  him  with  thirteen  thousand  infantry  and 
six  hundred  cavalry,  not  waiting  for  the  reinforce- 
ments which  he  had  urgently  requested  Craterus 
and  Leonnatus  to  send.  The  first  engagement  took 
place  near  Heracleia.  In  the  middle  of  the  battle, 
Antipater's  Thessalian  cavalry  rode  over  and  joined 
Leosthenes,  and  Antipater  was  obliged  to  throw 
himself  into  the  fortress  of  Lamia,  to  wait  for  the 
expected  reinforcements  from  Asia.  He  was 
blockaded  by  Leosthenes,  who  had  no  siege-train 
with  him,  and  failed  to  storm  the  fortress,  but 
hoped  to  starve  the  defenders  out.  Antipater 
was  one  time  so  hard  pressed  that  he  asked  Leos- 
thenes for  terms;  but  Leosthenes  would  accept 
nothing  less  than  unconditional  surrender,  and  this 
was  naturally  refused.  ^ 

Leosthenes'  forces  had  grown  considerably 
through  accessions  of  troops  from  the  peoples  of 
north  Greece,  but  he  could  not  draw  Antipater  into 
the  field.  A  peculiarly  severe  winter  proved  even 
more  trying  to  his  soldiers  than  the  petty  fighting 
to  which  they  were  continuously  exposed;  the 
.^tolians  made  excuses  and  returned  home;  and 
finally  Leosthenes  himself  was  struck  on  the  head 
by  a  stone,  and  died  two  days  afterwards.  ^ 

*  Diod.,  XVIII,  ix.,  xi.;  Hyper.,  Epitaph.,  col.  v. 
'  Diod.,  XVIII,  xii.,  xviii,;  Polyaen.,  IV,  iv.,  §  2. 
i  Died.,  XVIII,  xiii. 


Affair  of  Harpalus  and  the  Lamian  War  479 

The  Funeral  Oration  in  honour  of  Leosthenes 
and  others  who  had  fallen  in  the  campaign  was  en- 
trusted to  Hypereides.^  The  greater  part  of  his 
speech  has  come  down  to  us,  and  is  a  striking 
specimen  of  the  type,  which  was  peculiar  to 
Athens.  The  matter,  and  even  the  style,  of  the 
speech  were  largely  determined  by  convention — 
the  introduction,  in  which  the  orator  apologises 
for  his  own  inadequacy;  the  praise  of  Athens,  her 
indigenous  People  and  the  noble  upbringing  of  her 
sons;  the  praise  of  the  fallen,  and  the  recital  of 
their  services  to  their  country ;  the  prophecy  of  an 
immortality  of  fame  for  them;  the  anticipation  of 
their  meeting  in  another  world  with  the  glorious 
men  of  old;  the  mingled  congratulation  and  con- 
solation addressed  to  the  bereaved;  and  (as  re- 
gards style)  the  series  of  those  artificial  antitheses 
of  which  Gorgias  had  set  the  example.  Yet  all 
these  conventional  elements  are  treated  by  Hyper- 
eides  with  a  peculiar  grace  and  no  small  imagina- 
tive power;  and  the  speech  is  a  worthy  monument 
of  the  last  struggle  of  the  Hellenes  for  freedom. 

Leosthenes  was  succeeded  in  the  command  by 
Antiphilus,  who,  though  he  was  an  able  general, 
had  not  the  commanding  personality  which  was 
particularly  needed,  if  the  depression  caused  by 
Leosthenes'  death  was  to  be  siu"mounted.  ^    Not 

'  It  is  very  doubtful  whether  Diodorus  is  right  in  saying  that 
Demosthenes  had  not  yet  returned  to  Athens.  The  reason  for 
the  selection  of  Hypereides  was  doubtless  that  he  (after  Leosthe- 
nes) was  the  chief  promoter  of  the  war.     (So  Schafer,  iii.,  p.  374.) 

» Paus.,  I,  XXV.,  §  5;  Justin,  XIII,  v. 


480  Demosthenes 

long  afterwards  Leonnatus,  in  response  to  Anti- 
pater's  urgent  call,  crossed  to  Europe  and  marched 
into  Thessaly  with  more  than  twenty  thousand 
infantry  and  fifteen  hundred  cavalry.  Antiphilus 
abandoned  the  siege  of  Lamia  and  moved  north- 
wards at  the  head  of  twenty-two  thousand  infantry 
and  thirty -five  hundred  cavalry.  In  a  severe  cav- 
alry engagement,  Leonnatus  was  defeated  and 
slain;  and  the  Macedonian  infantry,  not  daring 
to  face  the  Thessalian  horse,  withdrew  into  the 
hills.  But  on  the  following  day  Antipater  joined 
forces  with  the  relieving  army,  and  marched  north- 
wards, unmolested  by  Antiphilus;  and  on  the 
banks  of  the  Peneius  he  was  joined  by  Craterus 
and  a  large  army. 

At  sea  the  Macedonian  fleet  proved  victorious, 
and  though  the  Athenians  equipped  all  the  ships 
they  could,  the  total  number  which  put  to  sea 
under  Euetion  was  only  170;  and  they  were  twice 
severely  defeated — ^the  first  time,  probably,  near 
Abydos  (Euetion  having  proceeded  thither  to 
guard  the  Hellespont) ;  the  second  time  by  Cleitus 
with  240  ships,  near  Amorgos.*  But  a  force  of 
Macedonians  and  mercenaries  which  landed  on  the 
coast  of  Attica  near  Rhamnus  and  laid  it  waste 
was  repulsed  with  considerable  loss  by  Phocion  at 
the  head  of  a  citizen-levy.*    At  the  same  time 

» The  evidence  of  unpublished  inscriptions  is  cited  for  these 
battles  by  Ferguson,  Hellenistic  Athens,  p.  17;  Diodorus  assigns 
both  victories  to  Cleitus.  The  Athenians  had  a  larger  number  of 
ships,  but  could  not  man  them.  See  also  Beloch,  Gr.  Gesch.,  iii., 
p.  76  n.  »  Diod.,  XVIII,  xv.,  xvi.;  Plut.,  Phoc,  xxv. 


Affair  of  Harpalus  and  the  Lamian  War  481 

Phocion  resisted  successfully  the  proposal  that  an 
Athenian  force  should  invade  Boeotia.^  Antiphi- 
lus  remained  in  Thessaly;  but  his  forces  had 
been  for  some  time  falling  away,  many  contingents 
leaving  either  because  they  thought  that  Leosthen- 
es'  successes  had  settled  the  war,  or  because  the 
soldiers  had  affairs  to  attend  to  at  home ;  and  signs 
of  discontent  showed  themselves  in  the  camp. 
When  Antipater  and  Craterus  marched  south- 
wards with  an  army  of  nearly  fifty  thousand  men  in 
aU,  Antiphilus  had  less  than  thirty  thousand  to 
oppose  to  them.  The  two  armies  met  at  Crannon, 
on  the  7th  of  Metageitnion  (early  in  August,  322), 
the  anniversary  of  the  battle  of  Chaeroneia.  The 
battle  was  in  itself  indecisive,  though  the  Greek 
loss  was  heavier  than  the  Macedonian;  but  the 
council  of  war  called  next  day  by  Antiphilus  and 
Menon  (who  commanded  the  cavalry)  rejected  the 
proposal  to  request  the  Greek  States  to  despatch 
reinforcements,  and  decided  to  send  a  message  to 
Antipater,  asking  him  to  discuss  terms  of  peace. 
But  Antipater  refused  to  recognise  the  anti- 
Macedonian  league  as  a  whole,  and  replied  that 
each  State  must  treat  with  him  separately;  while 
at  the  same  time  he  proceeded  to  take  the  Thes- 
salian  towns  one  after  another  by  storm,  and 
Pharsalus  among  them.  The  result  was  that  the 
States  of  northern  Greece  soon  came  to  terms  with 
him,  being  further  encouraged  to  do  so  by  his 
envoys,  who  promised  favourable  terms  to  those 

'  Plut.,  Phoc,  xxiv.;  Polycsn.,  Ill,  xii. 
31 


482  Demosthenes 

who  submitted;  and  before  long,  out  of  all  the 
members  of  the  league  which  had  been  formed,  the 
-^tolians  and  Athenians  alone  were  left.  ^ 

The  Athenians  now  found  it  necessary  them- 
selves to  ask  Antipater  for  conditions  of  peace. 
At  what  precise  moment  they  first  sent  to  him  is 
uncertain.  It  may  have  been  after  the  taking  of 
Pharsalus^ ;  but  it  was  probably  not  tmtil  Antipater 
and  Craterus  had  crossed  the  Pass  of  Thermopylae 
and  encamped  in  Boeotia.  Then  the  Athenians, 
in  alarm,  once  more  called  upon  Demades  to  get 
them  out  of  their  difficulty,  restoring  to  him  his 
civic  rights,  and  cancelling  the  fine  which  had  led 
to  his  loss  of  them.  He  went  to  Antipater' s  camp 
with  Phocion  and  Demetrius  of  Phalerum;  but 
Antipater  would  agree  to  no  terms  except  ab- 
solute surrender — the  only  terms  which,  in  an 
evil  hour,  Leosthenes  had  been  willing  to  accept 
from  him  at  Lamia.  That  Antipater  did  not 
march  into  Attica,  as  Craterus  desired  to  do, 
before  dictating  terms,  was  only  due  to  his  respect 
for  Phocion.  ^ 

The  Athenians  had  no  choice  but  to  submit. 
They  had  not  even,  as  in  former  days,  any  su- 
premacy at  sea,  and  would  have  had  no  power  to 
withstand  a  blockade;  and  although  Demochares, 
the  nephew  of  Demosthenes,  entered  the  Assembly 
with  his  sword  and  called  his  fellow-countrymen  to 

«  Diod.,  XVIII,  xvii. 

»  Vit.  X  Oral.,  846  e,  does  not  really  prove  this. 

9  Died.,  XVIII,  xviii.;  Plut.,  Phoc,  xxvi. 


Affair  of  Harpalus  and  the  Lamian  War  483 

arms,^  it  was  resolved  to  send  Phocion  and  the 
other  ambassadors  back  to  Thebes,  to  announce 
to  Antipater  the  unconditional  surrender  of  the 
city.  The  philosopher  Xenocrates,  the  head  of 
the  Academy,  was  sent  with  them,  in  the  hope  that 
being  a  friend  of  Antipater  he  might  use  his 
influence  to  advantage;  but  Antipater  refused  to 
hear  him.*  Antipater  then  announced  that  the 
Athenians  would  be  allowed  to  retain  possession 
of  Attica,  but  not  of  Oropus,  which  was  given  to 
the  Boeotians.  Lemnos  and  Imbros  appear  also 
to  have  remained  in  the  hands  of  Athens.  ^  The 
question  of  the  possession  of  Samos  was  referred 
to  the  regent  Perdiccas,  who  subsequently  re- 
stored the  island  to  its  former  inhabitants,  and 
ordered  the  Athenian  settlers  to  withdraw.  The 
Athenians  were  reqiiired  to  deliver  up  to  Antipater 
the  orators  who  had  promoted  the  war;  and  to 
revise  the  constitution  in  such  a  way  as  to  restrict 
the  franchise  to  citizens  who  had  a  property  of 
at  least  twenty  minas.  On  these  conditions  they 
would  be  permitted  to  be  the  friends  and  allies  of 
Macedonia.  A  Macedonian  garrison  was  to  be 
placed  in  Munychia,  and  a  heavy  war-indemnity 
was  required.  "♦  Xenocrates  is  said,  on  hearing  the 
terms,  to  have  declared  them  to  be  reasonable 
terms  for  slaves,  but  harsh  for  free  men;  and 

»  VU.  X  Orat.,  847  c,  d.  »  Plut.,  Phoc,  xxvii. 

3Diod.,  XIX,  Ixviii.;  XX,  xlvi.;  C.I.A.,  ii.,268,  592,  737,  etc. 
<Diod.,  XVIII,  x\'iii.,  Ivi.;  Plut.,  Phoc,  xxvii.;  Diog.  Laert., 
X,i. 


484  Demosthenes 

Phocion  did  his  best  to  induce  Antipater  to  give 
up  his  determination  to  garrison  Munychia,  but 
in  vain.  "I  will  do  you  any  favour,  Phocion," 
Antipater  replied,  "which  does  not  mean  destruc- 
tion for  you  and  for  us";  and  Callimedon,  one  of 
Phocion's  colleagues,  and  a  man  of  strongly  anti- 
democratic sentiments,  is  said  himself  to  have 
opposed  Phocion's  request.  The  surest  way  to 
quell  any  desire  to  resist  the  conqueror  was  to 
disfranchise  the  greater  number  of  those  poorer 
citizens  whose  inclinations  were  generally  towards 
war.  On  the  day  of  the  procession  which  escorted 
the  statue  of  lacchus  from  Athens  to  Eleusis,  at 
the  opening  of  the  Eleusinian  Mysteries  (the  20th 
of  Boedromion,  in  the  middle  of  September,  322) , 
— ordinarily  a  day  of  joy  and  religious  emotion, 
— a  Macedonian  force  under  Menyllus  occupied 
Munychia,  and  the  visible  proof  of  the  humiliation 
of  Athens  was  complete.  By  the  constitutional 
change  imposed  upon  the  city  12,000  citizens  lost 
the  franchise,  and  9000  only  retained  it.  A  very 
large  proportion  of  those  who  were  disfranchised 
were  deported  at  Antipater' s  bidding  to  new  homes 
in  Thrace  and  elsewhere. 

The  chief  power  in  Athens  was  once  more  in  the 
hands  of  Demades  and  Phocion,  with  whom  were 
associated  Pytheas,  Callimedon,  and  others  of  the 
Macedonian  party.  On  the  proposal  of  Demades, 
sentence  of  death  for  high  treason  was  passed 
against  Demosthenes,  Hypereides,  Himeraeus,  and. 

'Diod.,  XVIII,  xviii.;  Plut.,  Phoc,  xxviii. 


CALAUREIA,  VIEW  NEAR  THE  PRECINCT  OF  POSEIDON 

PHOTO  BY   MR.   A.    B.    COOK 


Affair  of  Harpalus  and  the  Lamian  War  485 

other  patriotic  orators.^  The  condemned  had 
probably  aheady  fled  from  Athens;  but  the 
emissaries  of  Antipater  were  in  pursuit,  and  did 
their  work  only  too  well,  taking  no  account  even 
of  the  privilege  of  sanctuary.^  Archias  of  Thurii, 
sumamed  "the  exile-hunter,"''  seized  Hypereides, 
Himerasus,  and  Aristonicus  in  the  temple  of  ^acus 
in  ^gina,  and  sent  them  to  Antipater  at  Cleonae, 
where  they  were  executed  on  the  9th  of  Pyan- 
epsion  (early  in  October). ^  Demosthenes  took 
refuge  in  the  sanctuary  of  Poseidon  in  the  island 
of  Calaureia.  There  Archias  landed  with  some 
Thracian  soldiers,  and  first  tried  to  induce  him  to 
leave  the  sanctuary  by  promising  that  he  should 
suffer  no  injury.  According  to  Plutarch's  story, 
Demosthenes  had  had  a  dream  on  the  previous 
night,  in  which  he  thought  that  he  was  acting  a 
tragedy,  as  the  rival  of  Archias  (who  had  been  an 
actor  by  profession),  and  that  though  he  won  the 
favour  of  the  audience,  he  failed  in  the  end  for 
lack  of  proper  equipment.  No  offer  that  Archias 
could  now  make  induced  him  to  surrender. 
"Your  acting,  Archias, "  he  said,  "never  convinced 
me  yet,  nor  will  your  promises  now."  Archias 
then  changed  his  tone,  and  began  to  use  threats. 
"Ah!"  said  Demosthenes,  "now  I  hear  the  voice 
from  the  Macedonian  tripod;  you  were  acting 
until  now.  Wait  a  little, "  he  added,  "until  I  have 
written  a  message  to  my  friends  at  home."     He 

'  Suid.,  5.  V.  ^AvriiraTpos.  '  Polyb.  ix.,  xxix.       i<l>vyaSo6TJpai. 

*  Plut.,  Dem.,  xxviii.,  etc.;  comp.  Vit.  X  Oral.,  849  b,  c. 


486  Demosthenes 

then  retired  within  the  temple  and  took  a  tablet, 
and  biting  the  end  of  his  pen,  as  he  used  to  do 
when  he  was  composing,  he  kept  it  between  his 
lips  for  a  short  time,  and  then  covered  up  his  head. 
The  soldiers  thought  that  this  was  a  sign  of 
cowardice,  and  Archias  again  offered  to  effect 
a  reconciliation  for  him  with  Antipater.  But 
when  Demosthenes  felt  the  poison,  which  he  had 
concealed  in  the  quill,  beginning  to  work,  he  cried, 
"Now,  Antipater,  the  time  has  come  when  you 
can  play  the  part  of  Creon,  and  cast  my  body  away 
unburied.  Dear  Poseidon,  I  leave  thy  sacred 
precincts  before  I  die;  for  Antipater  and  the 
Macedonians  have  not  even  left  thy  sanctuary 
unpolluted."  So  saying,  he  tottered  forward. 
As  he  passed  the  altar  he  fell,  and  died  with  a 
single  groan.  The  day  was  the  i6th  of  Pyan- 
epsion,  the  day  on  which  the  women  celebrating 
the  Thesmophoria  held  their  soleron  fast.  ^ 

NOTES  TO  CHAPTER  XIII 

I.  Mr.  D.  G.  Hogarth  in  the  English  Historical  Review  for 
1887,  p.  317,  and  (with  some  slight  modifications)  in  his  Philip 
and  Alexander  of  Macedon,  p.  198,  attempts  to  prove  that  the 
demand  for  divine  honours  for  Alexander  was  made  not  by  himself, 

'  Plut.,  Dent.,  xxix.,  xxx.  Plutarch  mentions  some  variations  of 
the  story  which  became  current;  e.  g.  that  he  imbibed  the  poison 
from  an  amulet,  or  took  it  from  a  bag  which  he  carried  around  his 
neck.  He  adds  that  the  heading,  but  no  more,  of  a  letter  to 
Antipater  was  found  upon  his  person  when  he  fell,  according  to 
one  version.  Demochares  stated  some  years  afterwards  that  his 
uncle  had  not  died  of  poison,  but  had  been  mercifully  taken  out  of 
this  life  by  the  gods  at  this  critical  moment. 


Affair  of  Harpalus  and  the  Lamian  War  487 

but  by  his  supporters  in  the  several  cities  of  Greece,  and  was  "a 
spontaneous  outburst  of  adulation  from  various  cities,  led  by  the 
philo-Macedonian  party  in  each,  intended  to  greet  the  conquerer 
on  the  earliest  occasion  whereon  an  embassy  could  approach  his 
presence. "  He  points  out  that  the  only  authority  which  ex- 
pressly mentions  a  letter  from  Alexander  as  the  occasion  of  the 
votes  and  debates  in  the  several  cities  is  ^lian.,  Var.  Hist.,  II, 
xix.,  who  records  how  AXXot  fjiiv  dXka  i\j/ri<pl(rai>To,  AaKedaifjubvioi  d' 
ixeiva  'EirefSij  'AK^^avdpos  ^o^Xerai  6e6s  eivai,  eorw  Oeds,  Arrian, 
VII,  xxiii.,  describes  the  embassies  which  subsequently  went 
to  Alexander  as  garbed  &ffirep  Oeupol  B^dev  els  rifiijv  6eov  a^iyfjJvoi, 
but  does  not  say  that  it  was  in  obedience  to  a  command 
from  Alexander  that  they  did  so.  It  is  true  that  .^Elian 
is  not  always  trustworthy;  but  it  is  surely  not  justifiable  to 
discredit  his  story  on  the  ground  that  the  Spartan  reply  is  too 
characteristically  "Laconic"  to  be  true — at  least  to  be  true  of 
Sparta  in  324.  Nor  is  the  fact  that  his  head  was  not  struck  on 
any  coin  (for  this  was  a  mark  of  divinity)  in  his  lifetime  in  itself 
conclusive,  especially  as  he  died  so  soon  after  the  date  of  the 
alleged  claim  to  divine  honours. 

Mr.  Hogarth  also  tries  to  show  that  the  irpoffKivrjixii  or 
adoration  of  Alexander  in  Bactria  in  327  was  due  to  a  politic 
determination  on  his  part  to  assimilate  the  habit  of  the  two 
peoples — the  Persian  and  the  Macedonian — in  their  King's 
presence,  and  did  not  imply  a  claim  to  divinity.  But  those  who 
were  present  certainly  interpreted  it  in  the  latter  way,  if  there  is 
any  truth  in  Arrian's  account;  and  Mr.  Hogarth's  attempt  to 
discredit  Arrian's  authority  at  this  point  is  not  very  convincing. 

At  best,  it  must  be  left  an  open  question  whether  Alexander 
himself  claimed  divinity  or  not.  So  far  as  the  position  in  Athens 
is  concerned,  it  makes  little  difference  whether  the  demand  was 
initiated  by  Alexander  or  by  Demades;  though  it  does  affect 
our  estimate  of  Alexander's  character,  which  Mr.  Hogarth  is 
concerned  to  defend.  (See  also  Ed.  Meyer,  Kleine  Schriften, 
pp.  285  ff.;  esp.  pp.  330,  332.) 

2.  In  Vint.,  Dent.,  ix.,  and  Vit.  X  Oral.,  845  b,  c,  we  find  the 
story  of  a  brilliant  address  delivered  by  Demosthenes  at  Olympia, 
in  reply  to  a  sophist  named  Lamachus,  who  had  uttered  a  panegy- 
ric on  Philip  and  Alexander,  combined  with  denunciations  of  the 
Thebans  and  Chalcideans ;  whose  services  to  Greece  Demosthenes 


488  Demosthenes 

extolled,  while  attacking  those  who  flattered  the  Macedonians. 
No  date  is  given,  and  Schafer  assigns  the  incident  to  the  present 
occasion;  but  it  seems  at  least  as  likely  that  it  took  place  in  332, 
though  we  have  no  independent  evidence  of  Demosthenes' 
presence  at  Olympia  in  that  year. 

3.  Haupt  {Die  Vorgeschichte  des  harpalischen  Processes, 
Rhein.  Mus.,  xxxiv.,  pp.  377-387)  thinks  that  the  split  in  the  anti- 
Macedonian  party  may  have  been  of  still  longer  standing.  He 
notes  that  Hypereides  gets  his  material  for  the  denunciation  of 
Demosthenes  from  as  far  back  as  the  date  of  the  destruction  of 
Thebes;  and  that  he  and  Deinarchus  use  virtually  the  same 
language  about  Thebes  and  about  the  alleged  overtures  of  Demos- 
thenes to  Alexander  and  Olympias;  and  he  argues  that  this  means 
that  Hypereides  cannot  have  been  in  agreement  with  Demosthe- 
nes at  that  time.  But  all  that  it  necessarily  implies  is  that  he  was 
getting  up  the  best  case  he  could  against  Demosthenes,  and  using 
any  material  that  would  serve  his  turn.  He  may,  however,  have 
been  alienated  by  Demosthenes'  withdrawal  of  active  support 
from  the  Peloponnesian  revolt  in  330,  or  by  his  acquiescence  in 
the  recognition  of  Alexander's  divinity.  It  is  also  possible  (see 
above,  p.  448)  that  the  substitution  of  Menesaechmus  for  Lycurgus 
in  326  was  due  to  differences  in  the  party;  but  the  evidence  does 
not  permit  certainty. 

4.  The  genuineness  of  the  Second  and  Third  Letters  ascribed  to 
Demosthenes  is  disputed  by  Schafer,  Westermann  and  others. 
Absolute  proof  is  impossible;  but  Blass  {Att.  Ber.,  Ill,  i.,  pp.440 
ff.,  and  III,  ii.,  pp.  406-7)  makes  out  a  very  strong  case  for  their 
genuineness,  and  I  have  felt  at  liberty  to  use  them  as  historical 
documents.  If  they  are  not  by  Demosthenes,  they  probably 
date  from  very  shortly  after  his  time;  and  nothing  of  first-rate 
importance  depends  upon  them.  The  genuineness  of  the  First 
Letter  is  far  more  doubtful  (it  is  an  exhortation  to  internal  unity 
after  the  death  of  Alexander).  The  Fourth  and  Fifth  are 
probably  spurious. 


CHAPTER  XIV 


CONCLUSION 


THE  question  how  far  Demosthenes  was  justi- 
fied in  the  pohcy  which  he  pursued  has  been 
discussed  in  the  preceding  chapters  in  relation  to 
each  of  the  principal  crises  of  the  struggle  in  which 
he  played  so  large  a  part.  His  vindication  of 
himself  in  the  Speech  on  the  Crown  is  more  con- 
vincing than  any  discussion  at  the  present  day 
can  possibly  be,  and  very  little  more  need  be  said. 

The  claim  of  Demosthenes  to  be  ranked  among 
the  heroic  men  of  the  past  rests  above  all  on  the 
constancy  and  sincerity  with  which  he  defended 
the  noblest  cause  known  to  the  Greeks — that  of 
Hellenic  liberty;  and  only  those  who  have  failed 
to  recognise  that  most  of  what  was  best  in  the 
Greek,  and,  above  all,  in  the  Athenian  character 
sprang  from  and  was  bound  up  with  political 
liberty,  can  seriously  censure  his  choice.  If  any 
cause  was,  to  a  Greek,  worth  fighting  for  to  the 
death,  that  for  Which  Demosthenes  fought  and 
died  was  pre-eminently  so.  Polybius  indeed,^ 
writing   two   centuries   later,    declared   that   the 

'  Polybius,  XVII,  xiv. 

489 


X 


490  Demosthenes 

"crop  of  traitors"  in  the  Greek  cities,  whom 
Demosthenes  so  vehemently  denounced,  deserved 
no  such  name,  and  that  they  were  pursuing  the 
true  interest  of  their  several  countries  in  submitting 
to  Philip  and  Alexander,  and  finding  in  subjection 
to  a  common  master  that  freedom  from  strife  with 
one  another  which  they  had  failed  to  find  so  long 
as  they  were  autonomous.  Yet  such  a  solution 
of  their  political  problems  can  hardly  be  called  an 
honourable  one;  nor  did  these  States  ever  bring 
forth  fruits  comparable  to  those  achievements  by 
which  the  Athenians,  when  they  were  most  fully 
inspired  by  the  spirit  of  freedom,  won  the  admira- 
tion of  humanity. 

Moreover,  it  is  plain  that  the  test  by  which 
Polybius  tried  the  policy  of  the  statesmen  of  the 
fourth  century  was  simply  that  of  success.  Dem- 
osthenes' policy,  he  said,  led  to  the  disaster  of 
Chaeroneia,  whereas  the  Arcadians  and  Messen- 
ians  enjoyed  the  blessings  of  peace.  If  success  is 
the  true  and  only  test  of  statesmanship,  Polybius 
was  doubtless  right.  But  if  political  libertyjtiad 
proved  itself  so  precious  that  without  it  the_ 
whole  of  life  would  have  seemed  to  be  lived  on  a 
lower  plane,  success  was  an  altogether  unworthy 
criterion  by  which  to  judge  the  actions  of  those 
who  were  dominated  by  such  a  sentiment.  Demo- 
sthenes was  convinced  that  such  was  the  persuasion 
of  the  Athenians,  if  not  of  all  other  Greek  peoples, 
and  that  by  struggling  to  the  end  for  the  freedom 
of  Athens,  and  causing  the  Athenians  to  struggle 


Conclusion  491 

for  the  freedom  of  the  Hellenes,  he  was  fulfilling 
their  noblest  instincts. 

If,  however,  success  is  seriously  taken  to  be  the 
proper  criterion  of  merit,  it  must  not  be  forgotten 
that  the  policy  of  Demosthenes  very  nearly  did 
succeed.  Philip  was  actually  discomfited  before 
Byzantium;  and  the  defeat  of  Chaeroneia  was  due 
to  nothing  which  it  was  in  Demosthenes'  power  to 
provide  against,  nor  even  to  the  inferiority  of  the 
forces  which  he  had  brought  together,  but  sim- 
ply to  bad  generalship.  Whether,  supposing  that 
Philip  had  been  defeated  at  Chasroneia,the  struggle 
would  have  been  at  an  end,  no  one  can  say;  and 
it  is  idle  to  speculate  upon  such  questions ;  but  at 
least  the  defenders  of  Hellenic  liberty  came  near 
enough  to  success  to  justify  their  attempt,  even 
from  the  narrow  standpoint  assumed  by  Polybius 
and  by  some  modem  critics.  Nor  is  it  without 
significance  that  Aristotle  (who  had  no  special 
liking  for  Demosthenes),  when  he  desires  to  illus- 
trate a  common  form  of  fallacy, '  finds  a  conspicu- 
ous illustration  in  the  statement  that  the  policy 
of  Demosthenes  was  responsible  for  all  the  evils 
that  befell  his  country. 

The  principal  causes  of  the  failure  of  Demos- 
thenes' plans  have  long  been  plain  to  us — the 
unsteadiness  of  the  Athenian  people;  the  lack  of 
generals  comparable  in  ability  to  the  statesmen  of 
the  time;  the  disunion  of  the  Greek  States.  For 
the  second  of  these  causes,  no  blame  attaches  to 

^  The  argument  post  hoc,  ergo  propter  hoc:  Ar.,  Rhet.,  II,  xxiv. 


492  Demosthenes 

Demosthenes,  and  it  is  not  certain  that  he  could 
have  been  aware  of  the  inferiority  of  the  Athenian 
commanders  until  they  were  put  to  the  test.  The 
disunion  of  the  States  he  strove  hard  to  overcome, 
and  to  a  very  remarkable  extent  he  succeeded. 
The  alliance  of  Thebes  and  Athens  was  a  thing  of 
which  the  most  sanguine  prophet  could  never  have 
dreamed  a  few  years  before. 
\l.  But  ought  Demosthenes  to  have  recognised  that 
f  his  fellow-countrymen  were  no  longer  equal  to  the 
strain  to  which  he  desired  to  subject  them?  Is 
he  to  be  blamed  for  taking  too  generous  a  view  of 
their  character?  Certainly  he  was  not  unaware  of 
their  defects.  No  one  ever  pointed  out  more 
candidly  than  he,  how  far  they  fell  short  of  the 
traditional  ideal  of  Athenian  citizenship,  or  re- 
alised more  clearly  their  unwillingness  to  sacri- 
fice pleasure  and  ease,  and  to  undertake  great 
personal  risks  for  the  sake  of  the  national  honour. 
The  fickle  and  spasmodic  nature  of  their  patriotism, 
their  liability  to  be  carried  about  by  alternate 
gusts  of  courage  and  alarm,  were  constantly  before 
him.  Yet  even  so,  incapable  of  sustained  effort 
A  and  prolonged  sacrifices  as  the  Athenians  were,  it 
(.  |\was  a  nobler  thing  to  attempt  to  revive  in  them  the 
TJ^  spirit  which  they  had  lost,  than  to  acquiesce  in 
their  degeneracy  and  levity,  and  to  "  despair  of  the 
Republic. "  Nor  must  it  be  forgotten  that  in  this 
attempt  also  Demosthenes  came  nearly  enough 
within  reach  of  success  to  justify  his  policy  in  the 
judgment  of  any  large-minded  critic. 


Conclusion  493 

Demosthenes'  ideal  and  his  determination  to 
maintain  it,  as  the  ideal  not  of  himself  alone  but 
of  his  nation,  stand  in  no  need  of  vindication ;  and 
he  well  deserves  our  admiration  for  the  courage 
with  which,  in  pursuit  of  this  ideal,  he  contended 
against  those  desires  and  prejudices  of  his  fellow- 
countrymen  which  were  inconsistent  with  it. 
In  three  important  points  at  least,  his  policy  ran 
directly  counter  to  popular  sentiment — in  his 
demand  that  the  festival-money  should  be  given 
up  for  purposes  of  war;  in  his  far-sighted  desire 
to  bring  about  an  alliance  with  Thebes ;  and  in  his 
attempt  to  obtain  the  co-operation  of  the  Persian 
King  against  Philip.  Yet  all  these  aims  he  pur- 
sued without  faltering  in  face  of  attack  and 
misrepresentation;  and  there  can  be  little  doubt 
that  he  was  wise,  as  well  as  courageous,  in  so 
doing. 

The  question  whether  liberty  and  pre-eminence 
are  political  ideals  which  possess  a  universal  value 
and  need  no  justification  is  too  large  to  discuss  here. 
There  are  many  who  believe  (as  Plato  and  Arist- 
otle probably  believed)  that  these  are  secondary 
in  importance  to  the  good  life  of  the  individual 
in  a  peaceful  society,  and  to  whom  militarism  and 
imperialism  are  consequently  abominable.  There 
is  something  to  be  said  for  this  view.  But  it  must 
not  be  forgotten  that  in  the  Athens  of  Demosthe- 
nes' day  it  was  a  view  which  had  not  made  its 
way  into  the  region  of  practical  politics,  but  was 
peculiar  to  philosophic  circles.     There  is  no  evi- 


494  Demosthenes 

dence  that  it  was  desire  for  the  good  life,  or  for 
the  refined  enjoyment  of  art,  literature,  and  philo- 
sophy, that  made  the  majority  of  the  Athenians 
unwilling  to  fight;  or  that  any  higher  motives 
than  business,  pleasure,  and  love  of  ease  were  the 
cause  of  their  reluctance.  Nor  is  it  an  absurd 
contention  that  the  life  of  the  individual  is  itself 
.greatly  ennobled  by  membership  of  an  imperial 
nation.^  It  may  at  least  be  doubted  whether 
more  than  a  handful  of  Athenians  thought  other- 
wise; and  if  so,  it  is  a  mistake  to  judge  Demos- 
thenes by  a  standard  which  is  out  of  relation  to  the 
political  life  of  his  times. 

The  faults  which  sullied  the  character  of  Demos- 
thenes as  a  public  man  are  not  only  conspicuous, 
but  are  such  as  tend  in  many  ways  to  alienate  the 
sympathies  of  the  modem  world  from  him.  The 
worst,  perhaps,  was  an  indifference  to  truth,  which, 
while  it  was  not  incompatible  with  the  larger 
sincerity  manifested  in  his  constancy  to  the  su- 
preme objects  of  his  life,  led  him  to  deal  very 
tmfairly  with  his  opponents,  to  falsify  history,  and 
to  repudiate  his  own  share  in  transactions  which 
were  perfectly  proper,  but  which  had  come  in 
time  to  be  viewed  with  disfavour  by  the  majority 
of  the  Athenians.     Doubtless  some  of  the  blame 

^  It  cannot  of  course  be  contended  that  the  noblest  ele- 
ment in  British  imperialism — the  government  of  dependent 
races  for  the  good  of  the  governed,  and  the  bringing  of  light 
to  those  who  sit  in  darkness — was  present  in  the  imperialism  of 
Athens,  but  this  does  not  invalidate  the  contention  stated  in 
the  text. 


Conclusion  495 

for  this  should  be  assigned  to  the  People  itself; 
and  Demosthenes'  attempts  to  deceive  the  People 
in  regard  to  the  past  are  in  some  degree  excusable 
when  we  consider  that  if  he  had  spoken  or  ad- 
mitted the  whole  truth,  his  policy  in  regard  to  the 
present  and  future  would  certainly  have  been  im- 
perilled. It  may  be  that  absolute  truthfulness 
is  not  possible  for  the  leader  of  a  democracy.  But  * 
it  is  difficult  not  to  feel  that  the  misrepresentations 
of  which  Demosthenes  was  guilty  sometimes  went 
beyond  anything  that  such  considerations  can 
justify;  that  one  who  could  lament  over  the  i 
calamities  of  the  Phocians,  which  he  had  done 
nothing  to  prevent,  and  could  ascribe  them  to  the 
man  who  (if  any  one  had  done  so)  had  helped  to  miti- 
gate them  deserves  the  severest  reprobation;  and 
that  his  scandalous  inventions  in  regard  to  his  rival's 
history  and  morals  are  utterly  atrocious.  There 
was  also  a  certain  intransigeance — amounting  at 
times  almost  to  ferocity — in  his  absolute  refusal 
to  consider  even  the  most  reasonable  offers  which 
Philip  might  make,  and  in  the  steps  which  he 
took  to  exacerbate  the  relations  between  Athens 
and  the  King  of  Macedon.  No  doubt  he  was 
whole-heartedly  convinced  that  even  if  a  compact, 
as  favourable  to  Athens  as  possible,  were  made 
with  Philip,  it  would  mean  at  best  that  Athens 
would  be  sure  only  of  the  second  place  in  the 
Hellenic  world;  and  that  whatever  compact  were 
made,  it  would  only  be  observed  by  Philip  until 
such  time  as  he  desired  to  break  it.     Yet  Demos- 


496  Demosthenes 

thenes,  however  sincere  and  patriotic  he  may  have 
been,  is  sometimes  repellent  in  the  hatred  which 
he  displays,  and  at  times  this  hatred  led  him  to 
make  false  charges  and  to  commit  acts  of  cruelty 
which  admit  of  no  justification. 

In  his  money-dealings  he  did  not  always  observe 
the  standard  of  correctness  which  a  modem 
statesman  is  expected,  as  a  matter  of  course,  to 
observe.  There  is  not,  however,  an  iota  of 
evidence  that  will  stand  criticism  to  show  that 
he  profited  personally  by  any  of  the  transactions 
that  were  alleged  against  him;  and  the  worst  of 
these  transactions,  the  appropriation  of  Harpalus* 
treasure,  was  probably  dictated,  just  as  his  receipt 
of  the  gold  from  Persia  had  been,  by  public  spirit 
so  intense  as  to  render  him  unscrupulous  about 
means.  Judged  by  the  standard  of  his  times,  he  is 
almost  beyond  reproach.  It  is  not  unworthy  of 
notice  that  within  a  few  months  of  condemn- 
ing Demosthenes  for  taking  some  of  Harpalus' 
money,  the  People  themselves  took  all  that  was 
left  of  it  to  pay  the  cost  of  the  Lamian  War.  No 
one  now  asserts  that  the  policy  of  Demosthenes 
was  in  the  smallest  degree  influenced  by  considera- 
tions of  gain  or  of  gratitude  for  presents  received. 
It  is  doubtful  whether  this  could  be  said  of  some 
of  the  orators  who  opposed  him. 

To  the  enumeration  of  his  faults  as  a  statesman, 
it  must  be  added  that  he  seems  to  have  been  a 
man  of  an  unsociable  and  unfriendly  temperament, 
and  a  bitter  and  relentless  enemy;  in  all  that  we 


Conclusion  497 

learn  about  him  from  the  ancients  or  from  his  own 
writings,  there  is  no  hint  of  any  intimate  friend- 
ship or  domestic  affection.  So  wholly  was  he 
identified  with  political  aims,  that  he  almost 
seems  to  have  had  no  private  life.  He  was, 
moreover,  deficient  in  humour  and  in  gentlemanly 
feeUng;  and  both  these  faults  reveal  an  unattrac- 
tive narrowness  of  imagination. 

But  against  these  faults,  public  and  private,  is 
to  be  set  a  devotion  to  a  great  ideal,  absorbing 
the  whole  man;  a  capacity  for  work  unrivalled  in 
the  history  of  great  statesmen;  a  thoroughness  in 
all  that  he  did,  which  cared  for  every  detail,  and 
left  nothing  to  chance;  a  gift  of  language,  pene- 
trated and  transformed  into  eloquence  of  the 
very  highest  order  by  the  passion  for  a  great  cause ; 
and  a  courage  which  rose  superior  to  all  physi- 
cal weakness,  and  was  not  daimted  by  failure  or 
danger.  The  greatness  of  his  character  in  these 
respects  more  than  redeems  its  unloveliness.  ^ 

Many  years  after  Demosthenes'  death,  in  the 
year  280  B.C.,  when  there  was  a  temporary  revival 
of  the  spirit  of  independence  in  Athens,  his 
nephew  Demochares  carried  a  decree  that  his 
statue  in  bronze  shotdd  be  erected  in  the  market- 
place, and  that  the  eldest  son  of  his  house  should 
always  receive  maintenance  at  the  public  cost  in 

» I  have  attempted  a  brief  appreciation  of  the  character  of 
Demosthenes  as  an  orator  in  the  introduction  to  my  translation 
of  the  Public  Speeches,  and  need  not  repeat  what  is  there  said. 
See  also  Index,  s.  v.  Demosthenes. 


498  Demosthenes 

the  Prytaneum.  The  statue  which  was  erected 
was  the  work  of  Polyeuctus,  and  its  character  is 
familiar  to  us  through  the  two  great  copies  of  it  in 
marble  which  have  come  down  to  us.  Of  these 
one  is  in  Lord  Sackville's  collection  at  Knole,  the 
other  in  the  Vatican.  In  both  these  the  hands 
which  hold  a  roll  are  substitutes  for  those  which 
originally  belonged  to  the  statue.  In  the  original 
the  hands  were  clasped  tightly,  and  a  story  is  told 
of  a  soldier  who  deposited  all  his  money  in  the 
hollow  formed  by  these  clasped  hands;  the  leaves 
of  a  plane-tree  which  stood  near  fell  into  the 
hollow  and  concealed  the  gold  for  a  long  time;  and 
when  the  soldier  came  back  and  found  his  money, 
the  wits  of  the  time  vied  in  making  epigrams  on 
the  orator's  incorruptibility. '^  In  the  year  1901 
a  pair  of  clasped  hands  in  marble  was  foimd  in 
the  gardens  of  the  Palazzo  Barberini  in  Rome. 
These  proved  to  be  the  hands  of  a  copy  of  the  ori- 
ginal work  of  Polyeuctus ;  and  a  cast  of  the  Vatican 
statue  which  was  made,  with  these  hands  in  place 
of  the  well-known  ones,  proves  the  superiority 
of  the  original  design.  =*  The  earnestness  and 
strong  emotion  which  the  clasped  hands  betoken 
are  in  keeping  with  the  character  of  Demosthenes 
as  a  politician  and  an  orator.  It  is  possible  that  the 
hands  which  hold  a  roll  were  substituted  at  some 

*  Plut.,  Bern.,  xxx.,  xxxi,;  qj.  Vit.  X  Oral.,  847  a,  850  f. 

*  See  illustration.  The  discovery  and  restoration  were  the 
work  of  P.  Hartwig  (see  Jahrbuch  des  K.  Deuischen  Archaolog- 
ischen  Instituts,  vol.  xviii.,  pp.  28,  29). 


THE  STATUE  OF  DEMOSTHENES  RESTORED  BY  HARTWIG 

FROM   THE  JAHRBUCH   DES  DEUTSCHEN  ARCHAOLOGISCHEN   INSTlTUTS,    VOL 
XVIII,    PART  I,    PAQE  28,    PUBLISHED  BY  GEORGE  REIMER,  BERLIN,    1903 


Conclusion  499 

period  when  (the  original  hands  having  been  lost) 
Demosthenes  was  regarded  from  the  standpoint 
of  his  literary  eminence,  rather  than  of  his  political 
importance  and  moral  force. 


INDEX 


Abdera,  67,  162 
Abydos,  341,  480 
Acanthus,  48,  146 
Acamania,    Acamanians,    51, 

54,  323,  344.  376,  408 
Achaea,  Achagans,  56,  65,  172, 

178,  327,  344,  376,  395,  413, 
428,458 

Adaeus,  164 

JEgas,  143,  405 

^gina,  470,  477,  485 

^nos,  330 

iEschines,  his  origin,  etc.,  232; 
his  accounts  of  Demosthenes' 
origin  and  youth,  6,  14-16; 
supports  Aristophon,  then 
Eubulus,  III;  cultivated 
Olynthian  lands,  207,  311; 
in  Euboea,  211;  ambassador 
to  Arcadia,  etc.,  232-234;  on 
First  Embassy  to  Philip,  239 
flf;  in  discussions  after  First 
Embassy,  245  ff,  259-263; 
on  Second  Embassy,  264  S.; 
in  discussions  after  Second 
Embassy,  277  S.;  responsi- 
bility as  regards  the  Pho- 
cians,  284,  285,  287,  292  flf., 
317-321;  support  of  Philip 
after  Peace  of  Philocrates, 
289;  question  of  his  corrup- 
tion, 293  ff.;  friendship  with 
Philip,  296,  297,  397; 
prosecution  for  corruption  by 
Demosthenes,  trial,  speech, 
and  acquittal,  301,  302, 
316-322;  his  prosecution  of 
Timarchus,  302 ;  increasing 
unpopularity,  309  ff.;  super- 


seded as  envoy  in  regard  to 
Delos,  310;  supports  Python, 
312;  defends  Antiphon,  322; 
attacks  Demosthenes  in  re- 
gard to  Euboean  alliance,345, 
346;  opposes  Demosthenes' 
reforms,  351,  352,  357;  ac- 
tion at  the  Amphictyonic 
Council,  360-368;  attacks 
Demosthenes  in  regard  to 
Theban  alliance,  374,  375; 
ambassador  to  Philip  with 
Demades,  396;  opposes 
choice  of  Demosthenes  for 
Funeral  Oration,  398;  sup- 
ports Demades,  420,  421; 
prosecution  of  Ctesiphon, 
404,  430-445;  leaves  Athens, 

445 

.(Esius,  II 

.^tolia,  iEtolians,  144,  324, 
382,  395,  458,  474,  477,  478 

Agathon,  146 

Agesilaus,  58 

Agis,  424,  426,  427 

Aglaocreon,  240,  241 

Agyrrhius,  44,  97,  106 

Alcimachus,  397 

Alexander  (Macedonian 
Prince),  144 

Alexander  II.,  of  Macedon,  147 

Alexander  III.,  the  Great,  149, 
157,  327,  385,  386,  397, 
405-409,  412-415,  418,  419, 
422-424,  431,  450,  453-460, 
471-473,  486-487;  Speech 
on  Treaty  with,  409,  426 

Alexander  the  Molossian,  323, 
405 


501 


502 


Index 


Alexander  of  Pherae,  57,  60, 
66 

Aleximachus,  263 

Allies  of  Athens,  meaning  of 
the  Term,  255.  (See  also 
Confederacy,  Social  War.) 
Synod  of  the,  93,  248  flf. 

Alponus,  237 

Aleuadae,  67,  175 

Amadocus,  63,  160-163,  170, 
179 

Ambassadors,  position  of 
Athenian,  79 

Ambracia,    Ambraclots,    323, 

324.  344,  395.  408 

Ambrysus,  379,  391 

Amorgos,  480 

Amphictyonic  Council,  League, 
etc.,  171-173.  237.  272,  273, 
286-289,  309,  310,  359-364, 
390,  408,  428 

Amphilochus,  332 

Amphipolis,  53,  59,  61,  67,  146, 
147,  155-158,  161,  208, 
241-247,  255,  256,  295,  312 

Amphissa,  Amphisseans,  359- 
368,  373,  376,  379,  382 

Amphissean  War,  359  ff. 

Amphoterus,  424 

Amyntas,  Macedonian  ad- 
miral, 357,  373 

Amyntas  III.,  King  of  Mace- 
don,  53,  59,  67,  146,  147,  242 

Amyntor,  251,  253 

Anaxarchus,  454 

Anaximenes,  38,  97,  356 

Anaxinus,  347 

Andronicus,  30 

Androtion,  92,  112-115,   137- 

»  MI 

Antalcidas.     See  Peace 

Anthemus,  157,  182 

Antigonus,  473 

Antiochus,  55,  227 

Antipater,  152,  249,  252,  253, 
353,  397,  407,  411,  420,  424, 
427,  431,  452,  473,  476,  478- 
486 

Antiphilus,  479-481 

Antiphon,  orator,  37,  39 

Antiphon,  ambassador,  155 


Antiphon,    supposed    traitor, 

322 
Aphobetus,  98,  in 
Aphobus,  4,  5,  7-12 
Apodectae,  98, 1 12 
ApoUodorus,  General,  349 
ApoUodorus,    politician,    etc., 

31,  40,  60,  201,  220-225 
Apollonia,  in  Chalcidice,  48 
ApoUonia,  on  the  Euxine,  330 
ApoUonides    of    Cardia,    162, 

169 
ApoUonides  of  Olynthus,  192 
Apsephion,  117 
Arbela,  424 

Arbitration,  at  Athens,  8 
Arcadia,  Arcadians,  54,  56,  64, 

132-134,  233,  234,  306,  307, 

326,    376,    411,    413,    425- 

428,  458,  476 
Archelaus,  146 
Archias,  485 
Archidamus,  24,  55,  173,  238, 

285 
Areopagus,    Council    of,     14, 

310,  322,  396,  416,  454,  460, 

461,465 
Argaeus,  154 
Argives,    Argos,    42,    43,    65, 

132,  307,  316,  401,  475 
Argura,  213 
Ariobarzanes,  55,  58 
Aristsechmus,  34 
Aristarchus,  15,  36,  37 
Aristion,  422 
Aristocrates     (and     Speech 

against),  162-168 
Aristodemus,    235,    236,    239, 

240, 247 
Aristogeiton  (politician),  461, 

471 
Aristogeiton,  Statue  of,  460 
Aristoleos,  432 
Aristomachus,  161 
Aristomedes,  349 
Aristonicus,  348,  461,  462,  465 
Aristophon,   60,   86,    109-111, 

H4,  116,  117,  123,  131,  174 
Aristotle,  130,  149,  199,  204, 

491 
Aristratus,  432 


Index 


503 


Arrhidseus    (i)  206,   (2)  407, 

473 
Artabazus,  61,  62,   no,   119, 

163 
Artaxerxes  II.,  43,  55,  58 
Artaxerxes  III.,  58,  no,  119, 

135,  181,  182,  191,  315,  316, 

340-343. 349. 355 

Artemisia,  135,  136 

Arybbas,  183,  323 

Asiatic  Greeks,  45-47,  316, 
419 

Assembly.     See  Athens 

Astylus,  411 

Ateas,  354 

Athenodorus,  63,  161,  162 

Athens,  condition  after  404 
B.C.,  41,  42;  in  359  B.C.,  68; 
in  353  B.C.,  160;  in  348 
B.C.,  214;  constitution,  char- 
acter of  Assembly  and  Peo- 
ple,   etc.,    23,    71    ff.,    128, 

130,  180,  185,  186,  198,  213, 
214,  254,  328,  337-339, 
389,  390,  491-495;  consti- 
tution of  322  B.C.,  484;  mili- 
tary and  naval  system,  86, 
87,  99  ff.;  185  ff.,  198,  202, 
203,  214,  340,  351,  352,357. 
377.  378,  480.  {See  also 
Trierarchy.)  Law-courts, 
88  ff.,  433,  436,  437;  ar- 
rangements for  legislation, 
91,  141.  {See  also  Nomo- 
thetae).  Financial  system, 
92  ff.,   107,    III,   112,   124- 

131,  142,  200-202,  216,  427. 
(See  also  Taxation.)  See 
also  Demosthenes,  Confed- 
eracy,   Persia,  Corn-Supply 

Atrestidas,  206,  234,  311 
Attains,  405,  407 
Auditors.     See  Logistse 
Autolycus,  402 
Autophradates,  61 

Babylon,  450,  459,  460,  472, 

473 
Bathippus,  117 
Berisades,  63,  158,  160 
Bianor,  161,  162 


Boeotarchs,  383 

Boeotia,  Boeotians,  43,  53,  56, 
65,  172,  271,  273,  288,  374, 
395.  458,  475. 477, 483.  (See 
also  Thebes) 

Boeotus,  33 

Bosporus,  59, 447 

Bosporus,  Cimmerian,  2,  69 

Bottiaea,  200 

Boucheta,  323 

Brougham,  Lord,  39 

Byzantium,  Byzantines,  51, 
60,67,68,  III,  170,  173,  179, 
333.  341,  348-353.  358 


Cabyle,  330 
Cadmeia.     See  Thebes 
Calaureia,  471 ,  485 
Callias,  Althenian,  378 
Callias,  of  Chalcis,  210,  211, 

325,  326,  344-347.  422 
Callias,  of  Phocis,  237 
Callicles,  31,  32 
Callimedon,  458,  478,  484 
CaUisthenes  (i),  99;  (2),  454, 

461 
Callistratus,    47,    50,    51,    57, 

60,  86,  159 
Calybe,  330 
Cardia,  63,  160,  162,  179,  276, 

313.  314.  331.332 
Carystus,  214,  475 
Cassopia,  323 
Cephallenia,  51 
Cephisodotus,  general,  61,  62; 

orator,  117,  205 
Cephisophon,    344,    352,    448, 

461 
Cersobleptes,  61,  63,  160-170, 

179-181,  256,  263,  266,  267, 

276,  305.  313,  327.  329 
Cetriporis,  158,  161 
Chabrias,  50,  52,  58,  63,  100, 

no 
Chaerephilus,  447 
Chaeroneia,  175,  383-392 
Chalcedon,  60,  68 
Chalcidic  League,  48,  52,  146, 

182,     183,     199,    207.     {See 

also  Olynthus.) 


504 


Index 


Chalcis,  51,  210,  283,  325,  326, 

343. 346. 395 

Chares,  100,  109,  no,  119, 
161,  164,  176,  195,  198,  199, 
205,  227,  340,  350,  352,  357, 

358,  379.  385.  387 

Charicles,  450, 461 

Charidemus,  61-63,  103,  155, 
161,  162,  167,  168,  180,  181, 
184,  198,  199,  200,  393,  396, 

414,415 
Chersonese,   Speech  on,  331- 

337 
Chersonese,  Thracian,  53,  58, 
59.  62,  63,  69,  109,  154, 
160  fit.,  179,  180,  227,  244, 
267,  268,  276,  306,  331- 
333.    337.    340,    341.    348, 

349. 353. 396 
Chersonese,  Tauric,  2 

Chios,  51,  109-111,  340,  341, 

353. 473 
Cimon,  240,  241 
Cirrha,  360,  361 
Clazomenae,  45 
Clearchus,  373 
Cleitarchus,  324-326, 343,  344, 

346 
Cleitus,  480 
Cleobuie,  2,4 
Cleombrotus,  53 
Cleomenes,  447 
Cleon,  454 
Cleonag,  485 
Cleopatra,  405-407 
Cleophon,  97, 251 
Cleruchs,  69 
Cnidos,  43 
Cnosion,  466 
Confederacy,  Second  Athenian, 

50  flf.,  68-70,  93,  396 
Conon,  admiral,  43 
Conon,  banker,  447 
Conon,    Speech    against,    32, 

33 

Constitution.     See  Athens 
Constitution,  Speech   on  the, 

38, 108 
Corcyra,  42,  51,  68,  344,  376 
Corinth,  Corinthians,  42,  43, 

65.  190,  323,  344.  400 


Corinth,  Congress  at,  400,  401, 
408,  409,  419,  428 

Corn-Supply,  at  Athens,  2,  5, 
9,  60,  69,  72-75,  99.  102, 
180,  327,  341,  357,  394,  447, 

451 
Coroneia,  176,  288,  384,  385 
Cos,  III,  135,  136,353 
Cothelas,  330 
Cottyphus,  361-363 
Cotys,  59,  61,  62 
Council    of    Areopagus.     See 

Areopagus 
Council  of  Five  Hundred,  83, 

84,  107,  113,  236,  245,  265, 

277.  362,  371,  393,  404,  430 

Crannon,  481 

Craterus,  473,  480-482 

Crenides,  158 

Crete,  424 

Critobulus,  263 

Crithote,  62 

Crobyle,  332 

Ctesiphon,    ambassador,    230, 

231,  240,  245,  246;  politician, 

404, 430-445 
Ctesippus,  117 
Cynoscephalae,  57 
Cyprothemis,  58 
Cyprus,  45, 47 
Cytmium,  368,  369,  379 
Cyzicus,  60 

Daochus,  373 

Darius,  191,  410,  424 

Datum,  159,  164 

Deiares,  227 

Deinarchus,    346,    421,    427, 

446,  448,  458,  461,  463,  464, 

468,  488 
Deipyrus,  227 
Delian   League,  Second.     See 

Confederacy 
Delos,  184,  309,  310,  396,  448 
Delphi,  55,  1 71-175,  268,  269, 

359-361,377 
Demades,  195,  392,  396,  397, 

401,    403,    408,    413,    415, 

420-422,  426,  427,  446,  455, 

459,  472,  476,  484 
Demagogues,  44 


Index 


505 


Demes,    political    life    of,    78, 

107 
Demetrius,  30,  482 
Demochares,  2,  13,  482,  487 
Damocles,  472 
Democracy.     See  Athens 
Democrates,  237 
Demomeles,  13,  14,  379 
Demon,  4,  13,  461,  478 
Demophon,  4 
Demosthenes,  the  elder,  2,  4, 

71 

Demosthenes,  the  orator,  his 
claim  to  fame,  i ;  birth  and 
origin,  2,  4,  35,  36;  youth 
and  early  ambitions,  5-7; 
litigation  with  guardians, 
etc.,  7-14,  36;  works  as 
writer  of  speeches  for  others, 
I5i  16,  37;  knowledge  of 
history  and  law,  16,  17,  26; 
his  private  speeches,  31-35, 
222-225;  his  speeches  really 
delivered,  37,  38;  his  tri- 
erarchies,  62,  68,  95,  352; 
speaks  against  Cephisodotus, 
62;  opinion  of  the  Assembly, 
82;  speech  against  Andro- 
tion,  1 1 2-1 16,  119;  early 
interest  in  naval  matters, 
32,  114,  115;  speeches 
against  Leptines,  116-119; 
on  the  Symmories,  1 19-124; 
for  the  Alegalopolitans,  131- 
134;  for  the  Rhodians,  135- 
137,  142,  181;  against 
Timocrates,  137-141; 
against  Aristocrates,  164- 
170,  179;  First  Philippic, 
184-189;  Olynthiacs,  193- 
204;  opposes  Euboean 
Expedition,  209;  assaulted 
by  Meidias;  settles  the 
quarrel ;  speech  against 
Meidias,  209,  212,  213,  217- 
220;  member  of  Council, 
226,  236,  258;  his  part  in 
the  Peace  of  Philocrates, 
and  attitude  towards  it 
when  made,  230  ff.,  257- 
259,  292,  293,  318-321,  435; 


on  First  Embassy  to  Philip, 
239  ff.,  259;  in  discussions 
after  First  Embassy,  245  ff., 
259-263;  on  Second  Embas- 
sy, 264  ff. ;  in  discussions 
after  Second  Embassy,  277 
ff. ;  Speech  on  the  Peace, 
290;  prosecution  of  ^schines, 
Speech  on  the  Embassy, 
302,  309,  316-322,  356; 
ambassador  to  Peloponnese, 
306,  323;  Second  Philippic, 
308;  opposes  Python,  312; 
has  Antiphon  executed,  322 ; 
co-operates  with  CalHas,  326, 
436 ;  negotiates  alliance  with 
Megara,  326;  Speech  on 
Chersonese,  331-337;  Third 
Philippic,  337-340;  organizes 
alliance  against  Philip, 
341-345;  Fourth  Philippic, 
342;  crowned  in  340  B.C., 
348;  in  338  B.C.,  379;  sup- 
ports declaration  of  war, 
350;  trierarchic  reform, 
351,  357;  policy  as  to 
Amphissean  War,  362-368; 
makes  alliance  with  Thebes, 
370-376,  436;  organizes 
allies  before  Chaeroneia, 
376;  financial  reform,  377, 
378;  at  Chasroneia,  387; 
defence  of  his  policy  up  to 
Chaeroneia,  388-390,  489- 
490;  measures  for  defence 
and  food  supply  of  Athens, 
394,  397,  398;  Funeral 
Oration,  398,  399;  attacked 
in  law-courts,  399,  400; 
theoric  commissioner,  403 ; 
Ctesiphon's  proposal  to 
crown  him,  404;  behaviour 
on  Philip's  death,  406,  407; 
resistance  to  Alexander, 
409-419,  464;  temporary 
retirement,  421,  422;  policy 
in  regard  to  the  Spartan 
rising,  426,  427;  defence  of 
Ctesiphon,  Speech  on  the 
Crown,  430-445 ;  influence 
after     trial     of     Ctesiphon, 


5o6 


Index 


Demosthenes — Continued 
446,  447;  the  Harpalus 
affair,  451-454.  457,  460- 
470,  496;  attitude  as  regards 
deification  of  Alexander, 
455,  459;  a-nd  as  regards 
restoration  of  exiles,  456- 
458;  condemnation  and 
exile,  466-472,  476;  his 
letters,  472,  488;  his  recall, 
476,  477;  death,  485,  486; 
character,  489-499 

Ideals  of  national  duty,  135 
-137, 168, 217, 258,  298,  329, 

337,  389,  416,  441-444,  489 
ff. ;  attitude  towards  Thebes, 
174,  274,  278,  283,  292, 
293,  329.  365-368,  370  ff.; 
attitude  towards  Persia, 
120,  136,  170,  181,  182,  316, 
340-343,  355,  409,  410,  416, 
417;  as  orator,  i,  12,  13,  16, 
18,  20-29,  37-39,  118,  119, 
122,  133,  136,  137,  140,  166, 
188,  196,  219,  220,  223,  308, 
320,    321,    336,    340,    345, 

438-444,  497 
Dercylus,  240,  285 
Diodorus  (politician),  112, 113, 

114,  138,  139 
Diodorus  (historian),  170 
Diognetus,  359,  360 
Diondas,  380, 400 
Dionysia,   21 1-2 13,  217,   247, 

260,  348,  430,  434,  436 
Dionysius    of    Halicarnassus, 

20 
Dionysius  of  Syracuse,  23,  106 
Diopeithes,  331-337,  34°.  342 
Diophantus,  177, 190 
Diotimus,  423 
Diphilus,  447 
Dolopes,  172 
Dorians,  172,268 
Doriscus,  266 
Drongilus,  331 

Ebryzelmis,  59 
Echinus,  324, 365 
Egypt,  47,  136,  138,  190,  315, 
316,355 


Elaeus,  62 

Elateia,  369-372;  comp.  323 
Elatreia,  323 

Eleusis,  Eleusinian  Mysteries, 
190,  238,  259,  372,  377,  413, 

484 
Elis,  Eleans,  56,  64,  65,  326, 

376,  413,  428,  475 
Embassy,   the   First,   230  ff.; 

the    Second,    264    ff.;    the 

Third,  283  ff.,  299 
Epameinondas,  54,  56,  57,  60, 

148,377 

Ephesus,  445, 473 

Ephialtes,  342,  414,  415 

Epicrates,  139 

Epidaurus,  475 

Epigenes,  447 

Epirus,  144, 323 

Ergiske,  266 

Eretria,  51,  208,  209,  211,  324, 
325, 344-346 

Etesian  Winds,  205,  333 

Euagoras,  47, 191 

Euboea,  Eubceans,  43,  51,  54, 
56,  66,  68,  183,  205,  208- 
214,  226,  227,  229,  268,  279, 
324-326,  333,  343-346,  376, 
400, 475 

EubuHdes,  34, 107 

Eubulus,  73,  86,  92,  97,  98, 
III,  124-131,  134,  142,  165- 
168,  174,  177,  181,  200, 201, 
204,  209,  210,  214-219,  229, 
232,  234,  254,  317,  318 

Eucleides,    ambassador,    266, 

305 
Eucleides,  archonship  of,  2 
Eucratus,  235 
Euctemon,  37,  112,  113,  138, 

139,213 
Eudicus,  175 
Euetion,  480 
Eumenes,  473 
Eunomus,  29 
Euphraeus,  147, 325 
Eurydice,  146,  147 
Eurylochus,  249 
Euthycles,  162 
Euthycrates,    191,    192,    206, 

310,  403 


Index 


507 


Euxenippus,  429 
Euxitheus,  34 
Exchanges  of  property,  9 

Festival- Fund,  Money,  etc. 
See  Theoric  Fund 

Generals,  position  of,  in 
Athens,  79,  83,  85,  86,  99, 
100,  108,  187,  189,  198 

Geraestus,  184,  235 

Getae,  330 

Glaucetes,  138,  139 

Glycera,  450 

Gorgias,  479 

Grabus,  158 

Granicus,  423,  424 

Gravia,  Pass  of,  369,  379,  381, 
382 

Greek  States,  disunion  of  23, 
120,  126,  234,  338 

Guardians.     See  Aphobus 

Gylon,  2, 3 

Hagnonides,  461, 462 
Haliartus,  43 
Halonnesus,  313-315. 347 
Halus,  239,  242,  249,  252-254, 

256,  257,  276,  279 
Harmodius,  460 
Harpalus,  450-454 
Hegesileos,  214 
Hegesippus,  282,  312-315,  323, 

345 
Hellespont.     See    Chersonese, 

Thrace 
Hephaestion,  471 
Heracleia,  478 

Heraeon  Teichos,  170,  180,  181 
Hermeias,3i6,  355 
Hierax,  155 

Hieromnemones,  359, 390 
Hieron,  350 
Hieron    Oros.       See    Sacred 

Mountain 
Himeraeus,  462,  463,  484,  485 
Hypereides,  310,  341,  342,  346, 

352,  379.  393.  394.  400,  403, 

414,  422,  430,  448,  452,  461- 

467,  472,  474,  476,  479,  484, 

485,  488 


latrocles,  235,  240,  241 
Illyria,     lUyrians,     144,     155, 
157,  158,  183,  304,  341,  409 
Imbros,  45,  69,  184,  214,  396, 

483 
Immunity  (from  taxation,  etc.) , 

116,  121,  141, 142 
lonians,  172 
Iphicrates,    44,    53,    59,    61, 

100,  no,  147 
Isaeus,  7,  8,  12,  20 
Ischander,  233 
Isocrates,    8,    11,    15,    21-25, 

50,   77,   82,    102,    120,   243, 

290, 291, 304, 328, 402, 419 
Issus,  423 
Isthmian  Games,  190 

Jason,  23,  53,  102 

Johnson,  Dr.,  39 

Juries.    See  Athens,  law-courts 

Kepoi,  2 

Lachares,  169 

Lamachus,  487 

Lamia,  Lamian  War,  478-480 

Larissa,  67, 171 

Lasthenes,  191,  192,  206 

Laurium,  92 

Law-courts.     See  Athens 

Lebadeia,  384,  387,  392 

Lemnos,  45,  69,  184,  214,  357, 

396, 483 
Leocrates,  428, 429 
Leodamas,  117, 357 
Leon, 55, 352 
Leonnatus,  473, 480 
Leosthenes,  60,  241,  474-479 
Lep tines.     Law    of    Leptines, 

116-118,  141, 142 
Lesbos,  51,  409,  425 
Leucas,  323,  344,  376 
Leuctra,  54, 171 
Liturgies,    92,    116.     See   also 

Immunity,  Taxation. 
Locrians,  of  Opus,  43 
Locrians,     Ozolian ,     172-174; 

and  see  Amphissa 
Logistae,  267,  301,  316 


508 


Index 


Lycinus,  230 
Lycophron,  66,  175,  176 
Lycurgus,  387,  394,  402,  404, 

409,  414,  423,  428,  429,  445, 

446,  448, 449, 454 
Lycurgus,  sons  of,  472 
Lyppeius,  158 
Lysander,  43 
Lysias,  18,  19,  21 
Ly sides,  385,  387,  402 
Lysimachus,  473 
Lysitheides,  138 


Macedonia,  Macedonians,  57, 
67,  143  ff.,  169;  and  see 
Philip 

Magnesia,  176,  177,  199,  324 

Magnetes,  172 

Malians,  172 

Mantineia,  48,  54,  56 

Mantitheus,  33 

Marathon,  184, 443 

Maroneia,  67,  162,  163 

Masteira,  33 1 

Mausohis,  no,  135,  138 

Mecyberna,  204 

Medocus,  59 

Megalopolis,  Megalopolitans, 
54,  64,    132,  306,  425-428, 

455 
Megalopolitans,     Speech     for, 

131-134 
Megara,    11,    190,    326,    344, 

376,400,401,458 
Meidias,  10,  36,  140,  209-213, 

217-220 
Meidias,  Speech  against,  219, 

220 
Melantus,  400 
Melanopus,  138, 139 
Memnon,  61,  62,  424 
Menelaus,  206 
Menesaechmus,  448,  449,  462, 

463, 472, 488 
Menestheus,  425 
Menestratus,  208 
Menon,  481 
Mentor,  62 
Menyllus,  483 
Mercenary    armies,     1 01-104, 


III,  203;  and  see  Athens, 
Generals 
Messene,     Messenia,     Messe- 
nians,  54,  55,  64,  131-134, 

307.  327,  376,  413,  425,  475 
Methone,  59,  67,  159,  169 
Methymna,  51,111 
Military  System.     See  Athens 
Military  Fund,  Treasurer  of, 

99 

Miltiades,  448 
Miltocythes,  62, 63 
Mnesitheus,  453 
Molossians,  183,  323,  405 
Molossus,  213 

Money,  value  of  Athenian,  35 
Munychia,  451,  483,  484 
Myrtenum,  266 
Mytilene,  51,  iii 

Naupactus,  324,  382,  391,  395 
Nausicles,  177,  239,  240 
Naiisimachus,  34 
Nausinicus,  51 

Naval  Boards.    See  Symmories 
Naval    System.     See   Athens, 

Symmories,  Trierarchy 
Naxos,  52 

Neaera,  Speech  against,  201 
Neapolis,  164 
Nectanebos,  47 
Neon,  175 

Neoptolemus,  30,  235 
Nicasa,     near     Thermopylae, 

237,  324.  365.  369 
Nicasa,  in  Thrace,  67 
Nicanor,  457, 458 
Nicias,  347 
Nicobulus,  33 
Nicodemus,  36, 37 
Nissea,  326 
Nomothetae,  91,  127,  139,  201, 

202 
Nymphaeum,  2,  3,  4 

Odrysian  Kingdom.  See  Beri- 
sades,  Cotys,  Cersobleptes, 
Seuthes 

CEniadae,  458 

CEnianes,  173 

CEtaeans,  172,  286 


Index 


509 


Olympian  festival,  games,  etc., 

144,457,487 
Olympian  truce,  227,  230 
Olympias,  348,  405-407,  422, 

452 
Olynthiac    Orations,    193-204 
Olynthus,  48,  52,  61,  146,  156, 

182  flf.,  191  ff.,  228,  231,  232, 

340 
Onetor,  and  Speeches  against, 

11-13 
Onomarchus,  164, 175-178 
Oratory  in  Athens,  80  ff.,  90. 

See     also     Demosthenes, 

Isocrates,   Lysias,  Rhetoric, 

Statesmen 
Orchomenus,  46,  56,  132,  175, 

288,395,412 
Oreus,  238,  242,  265,  325,  326, 

340, 344-346, 348 
Orontas,  190 
Oropus,  49,  56,  66,  132,  133, 

279.  374,  396,  483 


Paeonians,  144, 158 

Pagasse,  177,  199,  347 

Pallene,  200 

Pammenes,  64,  147,  163,  169, 

170 
Pamphlets,  political.  In  Greece, 

25, 26, 39 
Panathenrea,  139 
Pangasus,  Mt.,  67,  158 
Panhellenic  sentiment,  23,  337 
Pantaenetus,  33, 223 
Paragraphe,  33,  222 
Parapotamii,    378,    379,    383, 

384 
Parmemo,  152,  157,  249,  324, 

405 

Parnassus,  268, 382 

Pasicles,  221 

Pasion,  31,  221 

Pausanias,  147, 406 

Peace,    of   AntaJcidas,   45-47, 

T,  54,58 

Peace,  of  374  B.C.,  52;  of  371 
B.C.,  53;  of  366  B.C.,  56;  of 
362  B.C.,  57,  60;  of  350  B.C., 
134;  of  Philocrates,  83,  227 


ff..  347;  of  Demades,  396; 
of  322  B.C.,  483 
Peiraeus,  29,  43,  285,  322,  393, 

425,  451,  452,  477 
Peitholaus,  66, 199 
Pella,  143,  146,  147,  149,  265, 

266,  268,  275,  298 
Pellene,  413,425 
Pelopidas,  55,  57,  148 
Peltastae,  44 

Peparethus,  60,  325,  347 
Perdiccas  II.,  146 
Perdiccas  III.,  147 
Perdiccas,  regent,  473,  483 
Periander,  law  of,  96,  11 1,  121 
Pericles,  97,  377 
Perillus,  326 
Perinthus,  67,    ill,    170,  179, 

348, 349 
Perrhaebi,  172 
Persia,     Athenian    policy    in 

regard  to,  44,   55,   57,   58, 

119,  120,  123,  135,  190,  191, 
316,  340-343,  409,  410. 
See  also  Artaxerxes,  Darius. 
Interference  in  Greek  poli- 
tics, 45-47,  55,  1 10,  315, 424; 
Isocrates'  policy  in  regard 
to,  24 

Persian    gold,    46,    342,    343, 
-  410,  411,  416,  417,  464,  465, 

468 
Phalascus,  182,   226,   237-239, 

283,  284,  299,  300,  326 
Phalerum,  28 
Phanus,  12 

Pharsalus,  239,  279,  368,  481 
Phayllus,  176,  177,  182 
Pherae,  67,  175,  176,  199,275, 

298 
Philip,  birth,   147;  early  life, 

57,     148;     accession,     148; 

character,  148-150, 154, 169; 

organisation  of  his  kingdom 

and    army,    150-154,    303; 

early  relations  with  Athens, 

120,  142,  154,  155;  capture 
of  Amphipolis,  155,  156; 
treaty  with  Olynthus,  156; 
takes  Pydna,  157;  Potei- 
daea,    157;    Methone,    159; 


510 


Index 


Philip — Continued 

Pagasae,  177;  founds 
Philippi,  158;  campaigns 
against  Paeonians,  Illyrians, 
etc.,  155,  158,  183,  304; 
campaigns  in  Thrace,  160- 
164,  169,  170,  179-181,  266, 
327  flf.,  357;  his  part  in  the 
Sacred  War,  171-178,  237 
flf.,  283  flf.;  preparations  for 
attack  upon  Olynthus,  182- 
184,  191,  193;  relations  with 
Persia,  191,  315,  316,  355, 
401 ;  campaign  in  Thessaly, 
199;  capture  of  Olynthus, 
204-208;  negotiations  with 
Athens  and  Peace  of  Phi- 
locrates,  228  ff.,  268  flf.; 
occupation  of  Phocis,  283 
flf.;  his  letter  to  Athens,  38, 
263,  286,  350,  356;  his 
position  in  346  B.C.,  290; 
organises  Macedonia,  303 ; 
organises  Thessaly,  304 ; 
relations  with  Athens  after 

346    B.C.,    305-315.    O'l^    ^«« 

below;  supports  Alexander 
against  Arybbas,  323;  inter- 
feres in  Euboea  and  Pelo- 
ponnese,  324-326;  besieges 
Perinthus  and  Byzantium, 
349.  350;  in  Scythia,  354; 
wounded  by  Triballi,  354; 
marches  to  Elateia,  368, 
369;  takes  Amphissa  and 
Naupactus,  382 ;  wins  battle 
of  Chaeroneia,  383-387 ; 
conduct  after  the  battle, 
392;  treatment  of  Thebes 
and  Athens,  395-397;  calls 
Congress  at  Corinth,  401 ; 
marries  Cleopatra,  405 ; 
assassinated,  406 

Philip's  Letter,  reply  to,  38, 
356 

Philippi,  158 

Philippics.     See  Demosthenes 

Philippides,  62 

Philippopolis,  330 

Philiscus,  55 

PhiUstides,  324-326,  343,  344 


Philocles,  451,  452,  461,  471 
Philocrates,  ambassador,  etc., 
207,  230-235,  239  flf.,  249  flf., 
280,  281,  284,  293  flf.,  310, 

311 

Philocrates,   prosecutor   of 

Demosthenes,  400 
Philomelus,  173-175 
Philosophy    and    politics,    26, 

77,  78,  loi,  106 
Philoxenus,  453, 467 
Phleius,  48,  65,  132 
Phocians,  Phocis,  43,  53,  66, 

171-178,     182,     226,     237, 

238,    248   flf.,   273,    276   flf., 

294.  295.  299.  300,  317-321, 

359.  360,  379,  391,  400,  412 
Phocion,    86,     191,    210-213, 

318,  326,  344,  352-354.  383. 

387.  396,  401,  406,  4",  414, 

415,    420,    422,    445,    452, 

472-474, 480-484 
Phoebidas,  49 
Phormio,  (i)  33,  220-224;  (2), 

117 
Phrynon,  227,  230,  231,  240 
Plataeae,  46,  49,  53,    57,    132, 

374,  395.  512 
Plataeae,  Battle  of,    251,    443 
Plato,  19,  26,  39 
Pleuratus,  304 
Plutarchus,  209-211,  214 
Polycles,  Speech  against,  60 
Polycrates,  349 
Polyeidus,  349 
Polyeuctus   (statesman),   323, 

414,476 
Polyeuctus  (sculptor),  498 
Polyphontes,  227 
Poneropolis,  330 
Porthmus,  324 
Poteidaea,   59,   67,    157,    182, 

255,312 
Procles,  462 
Proconnesus,  341 
Proxenus    (Athenian),    238, 

243,259,265,278,311 
Proxenus  (Theban),  379 
Ptoeodorus,  326 
Ptolemy,  147 
Pydna,  59,  67,   I55-I57.  295 


Index 


511 


Pylagon,  359, 390 
Pytheas,  455,  462,  476,  484 
Pythionice,  450 
Python,  311, 312 

Rhamnus,  480 
Rhebulas,  424 
Rhetoric,   15,   16,   18,   19,  77, 

80,81, 114 
Rhodes,  51,  109-111,  135-137, 

181,  340,  341,  353,  445,  473 
Rhodians,  Speech  for,  135-137, 

142 
Rhythm,  In  oratory,  21,  22 
Rich  and  poor,  in  Athens,  72 

flf.,  220,  483,  484 
Roxana,  473 

Sacred  Mountain,  266,  267 
Sacred   War,    131,    164,    171- 

178,  236  ff.,  271,  282  ff. 
Salamis,  battle  of,  251 
Salamis,  in  Cyprus,  191 
Samos,  58,  69,  135,  396,  423, 

457, 460, 483 
Satyrus,  29 
Sciathus,  325,  334 
Scyros,  45,  69,  396 
Scythia,  354 
Selymbria,  68,  iii,  357 
Serrhium,  266 
Sestos,  161 

Seuthes,  (i)  59,  (2),  424 
Simon,  161,  162 
Simus,  175 
Slave-labour,  102 
Social  War,  93,  109-112,  124, 

157, 158 

Socrates,  78,  146 

Sophanes,  237 

Sosicles,  400 

Sostratus,  313 

Sparta,  Spartans,  42,  45,  47- 
49.  54.  56,  64,  131-134.  172, 
173,  178,  268,  275,  285,  289, 
293.  306,  307,  363,  401, 
424-428,  475 

Spartocidae,  2 

Speech-writers,  professional, 
15.16,37 

Sphodrias,  49 


Spudias,  31,32 

Stageira,  199 

Statesmen,  corruption  of,  82, 

192,    193,    295,    310,    335- 

340, 346, 440 
Stephanus,     and     Speeches 

against,  201, 222-225 
Stratocles,    (i)    155,    (2)   385, 

386,  (3)  462,  463 
Sunium,  451 
Symmories,   51,  92,  96,   119- 

124,351.357 

Tachos,  47 

Tasnarum,  452,  454,  474 

Tamynae,  210,  211,  214 

Taurosthenes,  210,  325,  344 

Taxation,  Athenian,  51,  52, 
70.  73.  85,  92  ff.,  112,  121- 
124,  180,  198,  351 

Tegea,  54,  56 

Telephanes,  212 

Tenedos,  341,425 

Ten  Thousand,  the,  54 

Teres,  329 

Thasos,  158,  159,  326,  338,  347 

Theagenes,  385 

Thebans,  Thebes,  42-44,  49, 
51-57,  60,  65,  66,  131-134, 
169,  171-178,  181,  237, 
268,  270, 271,  273-275,  279, 
281-293,  316,  329,  359, 
362-388,395,409-414 

Themison,  56 

Theopompus,  169 

Theoric  Board,  Fund,  etc., 
96-99,  107,  125  flf.,  195,  200- 
202,  225,  318,  377,  378,  390, 
391,403,427,465 

Therippides,  5 

Thermopylae,  175,  177-179, 
237,  238,  268,  270-273, 
277-279,  282,  290,  299, 
362,  408,  477,  478,  482 

Thesmophoria,  486 

Thespiag,  46,  57,  132,  374, 
395.  412 

Thessalians,  Thessaly,  56,  57, 
66,  67,  172-178,  198,  199, 
237,  284-290,  304,  324,  355, 
368,  408,  478,  480,  481 


512 


Index 


Thibron,  454 

Thirty  Tyrants,  the,  41 

Thrace,  Thracians,  59-63,  67, 
158,  160  ff.,  179-181,  266- 
268,  317,  327-337,  341, 
348-354,  408,  424,  473 

Thrasybulus,  51, 59 

Thrasylochus,  9, 10 

Thrasymachus,  21 

Thucydides,i6, 17 

Timagoras,  55 

Timarchus,  259, 302 

Timocles,  461  ' 

Timocrates  (Athenian),  92, 
112,137-141 

Timocrates  (Persian),  43 

Timotheus  (General),  50,  52, 
53,  58,  59,  61,  68,  no,  147, 
155,208 

Timotheus  (poet),  146 


Tiristasis,  332 

Torone,  59,  204 

Triballi,  354 

Tricaranum,  132 

Trierarchic  Crown,  Speech  on, 

31,32,114 
Trierarchy,  9,  32,  71,  73,  92, 
94-96,    116,    121-124,    351, 

357 
Triphylia,  64, 132 
Troezen,  470, 475 
Tyrrhenians,  448 

Xenocleides,  313 
Xenocrates,  483 
Xenopeithes,  34 

Zacynthus,  51 
Zaretra,  211 
Zeuxis,  146 


^  Selection  from  the 
Catalogue  of 

G.  P.  PUTNAM'S  SONS 


Complete  Catalogue  sent 
on  application 


Heroes  of  the  Nations 


A  Series  of  biographical  studies  of  the  Kves  an(3 
^ork  of  a  number  of  representative  historical  char-, 
acters  about  whom  have  gathered  the  great  traditions 
of  the  Nations  to  which  they  belonged,  and  who  have 
been  accepted,  in  many  instances,  as  types  of  the 
several  National  ideals.  With  the  life  of  each  typical 
character  will  be  presented  a  picture  of  the  NationaJ 
conditions  surrounding  him  during  his  career. 

The  narratives  are  the  work  of  writers  who  are 
recognized  authorities  on  their  several  subjects,  and, 
while  thoroughly  trustworthy  as  history,  will  present 
picturesque  and  dramatic  "stories"  of  the  Men  and 
of  the  events  connected  with  them. 

To  the  Life  of  each  "Hero"  will  be  given  one  duo- 
decimo volume,  handsomely  printed  in  large  type, 
provided  with  maps  and  adequately  illustrated  ac- 
cording to  the  special  requirements  of  the  several 
subjects. 

"^or  f«U  list  of  volumes  see  nexi  pags. 


HEROES  OF  THE  NATIONS 


NELSON.    By  W.  Clark  RnmO. 

GUSTAVUS  ADOLPHUS.     By  C 
R.  L.  Fletcher. 

PERICLES.     By  Evelyn  Abbott. 

THEODORIC   THE   GOTH.     By 
Thomas  Hodgkin. 

SIR  PHILIP  SIDNEY.    By  H.  R. 

Fox-Boume. 

JULIUS  CiESAR.    By  W.  Ward* 
Fowler. 

WYCLIF.    By  Lewis  Sergeant. 

NAPOLEON.      By    W.     O'Connor 
Morris. 

HENRY  OF  NAVARRE.    By  P. 

F.  WiUert. 

CICERO.       By     J.     L.     Strachan- 
DaTidson. 

ABRAHAM  LINCOLN.    By  Noah 
Brooks. 

PRINCE    HENRY    fOF   PORTU- 
GAL) THE  NAVIGATOR. 
By  C.  R.  Beazley. 

JULIAN    THE    PHILOSOPHER. 
By  Alice  Gardner. 

LOUIS  XIV.     By  Arthur  HassaU. 

CHARLES    XII.      By    R.    Nbbet 
Bain. 

LORENZO  DE'  MEDICI.     By  Ed- 
ward Armstrong. 

JEANNE    D'ARC    By    Mrs.    OU- 

phant. 

CHRISTOPHER  COLUMBUS.   By 
Washington  Irving. 

ROBERT   THE   BRUCE.     By  Sir 
Herbert  Maxwell. 

HANNIBAL.       By     W.     O'Connor 
Morris. 

ULYSSES  S.  GRANT.     By  WiUiam 
Conant  Church. 

ROBERT     E.     LEE.      By    Henry 
Alexander  White. 

THE  CID  CAMPEADOR.     By  H. 

Butler  Clarke. 

SALADIN.       By      Stanley       Lane- 
Poole. 

BISMARCK.      By     J.     W.     Head- 
lam. 


ALEXANDER  THE  GREAT.    By 

Benjamin  I.  Wheeler. 

CHARLEMAGNE.     By  H.  W.  C 
Davis. 


OLIVER        CROMWELL. 
Charles  Firth. 


By 


RICHELIEU.      By  Jamas  B.  Fm» 
kins. 

DANIEL  O'CONNELU     By  Rob- 
ert  Dunlop. 

SAINT     LOUIS     (LouU    IX.    of 
France).     By  Frederick  Perry, 

LORD    CHATHAM,     By    Walfofd 
David  Green. 

OWEN    GLYNDWR.      By    Arthnc 
G.  Bradley. 

HENRY   V.     By  Charles  L.  King** 
ford. 

EDWARD    I.     By   Edwaid    Jenks* 

AUGUSTUS    CiESAR.    By  J.   B. 

Firth. 


FREDERICK  THE  GREAT. 
W.  F.  Reddaway. 


By 


WELLINGTON.     By  W.  O'Connor 

Morris. 

CONSTANTINE  THE  GREAT.  By 
J.  B.  Firth. 

MOHAMMED.     D.  S.  Maigoliouth. 

GEORGE  WASHINGTON.     By  J. 
A.  Harrison. 

CHARLES  THE  BOLD.     By  Ruth 
Putnam. 

WILLIAM    THE     CONQUEROR. 

By  F.  B.  Stanton. 

FERNANDO  CORTES.    By  F.  A. 

MacNutt. 

WILLIAM  THE  SILENT.     By  R. 

Putnam. 

BLUCHER.     By  E.  F.  Henderson. 

ROGER    THE     GREAT.     By    E, 

Curtis. 

CANUTE    THE  GREAT.     By   L. 
M.  Larson. 

CAVOUR.     By  Pietro  Orsi. 

DEMOSTHENES.  By  A.  W.  Pickard- 
Cambridge. 


The  Story  of  the  Nations 


In  the  story  form  the  current  of  each  National  life 
is  distinctly  indicated,  and  its  picturesque  and  note- 
worthy periods  and  episodes  are  presented  for  the 
reader  in  their  philosophical  relation  to  each  other 
as  well  as  to  universal  history. 

It  is  the  plan  of  the  writers  of  the  different  volumes 
to  enter  into  the  real  life  of  the  peoples,  and  to  bring 
them  before  the  reader  as  they  actually  lived,  labored, 
and  struggled — as  they  studied  and  wrote,  and  as 
they  amused  themselves.  In  carrying  out  this  plan, 
the  myths,  with  which  the  history  of  all  lands  begins, 
will  not  be  overlooked,  though  these  will  be  carefully 
distinguished  from  the  actual  history,  so  far  as  the 
labors  of  the  accepted  historical  authorities  have 
resulted  in  definite  conclusions. 

The  subjects  of  the  different  volumes  have  been 
planned  to  cover  connecting  and,  as  far  as  possible, 
consecutive  epochs  or  periods,  so  that  the  set  when 
completed  will  present  in  a  comprehensive  narrative 
the  chief  events  in  the  great  Story  of  the  Nations; 
but  it  is,  of  course,  not  always  practicable  to  issue 
the  several  volumes  in  their  chronological  order. 

For  list  of  volumes  see  next  page. 


THE  STORY  OF  THE  NATIONS 


GREECE.    Prof.  Jas.  A.  Htnkoo. 
ROME.    Arthur  GilnuuL 

THE  JEWS.  Prof.  James  K-  Hew- 
mer. 

CHALDEA.    Z.  A.  Ragozin. 

GERMANY.    S.  Baring-GouM. 

NORWAY.     Hjalmar  H.  Boyesen. 

SPAIN.  Rer.  B.  E.  and  Susan 
Hale. 

HUNGARY.    Prof.  A.  V&mh6rf. 

CARTHAGE.  Prof.  Alfred  J. 
Church. 

THE  SARACENS.  Arthur  Gil- 
man. 

THE  MOORS  IN  SPAIN.  Stanley 
Lane-Poole. 

THE     NORMANS.    Sarah     Ome 

Jewett. 
PERSIA.    S.  G.  W.  Benjamin. 
ANCIENT    EGYPT.    Prof.    Geo. 

Rawlinson. 
ALEXANDER'S  EMPIRE.    Prof. 

J.  P.  Mahaffy. 
ASSYRIA.    Z.  A.  Ragozin. 
THE  GOTHS.     Henry  Bradley. 
IRELAND.     Hon.  Emily  Lawless. 
TURKEY.     Stanley  Lane-Poole. 
MEDIA  BABYLON,  AND   PER- 
SIA.    Z.  A.  Ragozin. 
MEDIEVAL  FRANCE.  Prof.Gus- 

tave  Masson. 
HOLLAND.       Prof.     J.    Thorold 

Rogers. 
MEXICO.    Susan  Hale. 
PHCENICIA.    George  Rawlinson. 
THE     HANSA     TOWNS.     Helen 

Zimmem. 
EARLY  BRITAIN     Prof.  Alfred 

J.  Church. 
THE      BARBARY      CORSAIRS. 

Stanley  Lane-Poole. 
RUSSIA.     W.  R.  Morfill. 
THE  JEWS  UNDER  ROME.    W. 

D.  Morrison. 
SCOTLAND.    John  Mackintosh. 
SWITZERLAND.    R.   Stead  and 

Mrs.  A.  Hug. 
PORTUGAL.     H.  Morse-Stephens. 
THE  BYZANTINE  EMPIRE.     C. 

W.  C.  Oman. 
SICILY.     E.  A.  Freeman. 
THE       TUSCAN       REPUBLICS 

Bella  Duffy. 
POLAND.    W.  R.  Morfill. 
PARTHIA.     Geo.  Rawlinson. 
JAPAN.     David  Murray.  ^, . 


THE   CHRISTIAN    RECOVER% 
OF  SPAIN.     H.  E.  Watts. 

AUSTRALASIA.    Greville  Tn«ar. 
then. 

SOUTHERN   AFRICA.    Geo.  M. 

Theal. 

VENICE.    Alethea  Wi&L 

THE  CRUSADES.    T.  8.  Andief 

and  C.  L.  Kingsford. 
VEDIC  INDIA.     Z.  A.  Ragoda. 
BOHEMIA.    C.  E.  Maurice. 
CANADA.     J.  G.  Bourinot. 
THE  BALKAN  STATES.  "VraUaaa 

Miller. 
BRITISH  RULE  IN  INDIA.    R. 

W.  Frazer. 
MODERN    FRANCE.    AndrS    L6 

Bon. 
THE  BRITISH  EMPIRE.    AHred 

T.  Story.     Two  vols. 
THE  FRANKS.     Lewis  Sergeant. 
THE  WEST  INDIES.    Amos  K. 

Fiske. 
THE    PEOPLE    OP    ENGLANH 

Justin  McCarthy,  M.P.      Twi 

vols. 
AUSTRIA.     Sidney  Whitman. 
CHINA.    Robt.  K.  Douglass. 
MODERN  SPAIN.    Major  Martin 

A.  S.  Hume. 
MODERN  ITALY.     Pietro  Orn. 
THE     THIRTEEN     COLONIES. 

Helen  A.  Smith.     Two  vols. 
WALES  AND  CORNWALL.  Owna 

M.   Edwards. 
MEDIEVAL  ROME.    Wm.  Miller 
THE  PAPAL  MONARCHY.    Wm 

Barry. 
MEDI.ffiVAL      INDIA.      Stanley 

Lane-Poole. 
BUDDHIST  INDIA.    T.W.  Rhy» 

Davids. 
THE    SOUTH    AMERICAN    RE. 

PUBLICS.     Thomas  C  Daw. 

son.    Two  vols. 
PARLIAMENTARY    ENGLAND. 

Edward  Jenks. 
MEDI.<EVAL  ENGLAND.      Mary 

Bate  son. 
THE  UNITED  STATES.  Edward 

Earle  Sparks.     Two  vols. 
ENGLAND.    THE   COMING,  OP 

PARLIAMENT.  L.OeeilJaae, 

GREECE    TO  A.   D.    14-      E.  & 

Shuckburgh. 
ROMAN     EMPIRE.      H.    Stuart 
Jones. 


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