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NORTH KOREAN FORCES INVADE SOUTH KOREA: 

Security Council Action Requested — ^U.S. Air and 

Sea Forces Ordered Into Action • Statements by the 

President, Secretary Acheson, Ambassador Austin, and 

Ambassador Gross. Texts of Security Council Resolutions . 



ACHIEVING A COMMUNITY SENSE AMONG FREE 
NATIONS— A STEP TOWARD WORLD ORDER • 

Address by Secretary Acheson 

KEEPING PEACE IN THE CARIBBEAN AREA • 

By EduMrd A. Jamison 



14 



18 



For complete contents see back cover 



Vol. XXIII, No. 574 
July 3, 1950 




r^ 



U. i. SUPERINTENDENT OF DOCUMENTS 

JUL 251950 




'>-r„<^' 



x^owy*. bulletin 



Vol. XXIII, No. 574 • Publication 3902 
July 3, 1950 



For sale by the Superintendent of Documents 

U. S. QovernmSCt Printing Office 

Washington 25, D. C. 

Price: 

62 Issues, domestic $6, foreign $8.50 
Single copy, 20 cents 

The printing of this publication has 
been approved by the Director of the 
Bureau of the Budget (February 18, 1949). 

Note: Contents of this publication are not 
copyrighted and items contained herein may 
be reprinted. Citation of the Department 
Of State Bdlletin as the source will be 
appreciated. 



The Department of State BULLETIN, 
a weekly publication compiled and 
edited in the Division of Publications, 
Office of Public Affairs, provides the 
public and interested agencies of 
the Government with information on 
developments in the field of foreign 
relations and on the work of the De- 
partment of State and the Foreign 
Service. The BULLETIN includes 
press releases on foreign policy issued 
by the White House and the Depart- 
ment, and statements and addresses 
made by the President and by the 
Secretary of State and other officers 
of the Department, as well as special 
articles on various phases of inter- 
national affairs and the functions of 
the Department. Information is in- 
cluded concerning treaties and inter- 
national agreements to which the 
United States is or may become a 
party and treaties of general inter- 
national interest. 

Publications of the Department, as 
well as legislatii^e material in thefield 
of international relations, are listed 
currently. 



NORTH KOREAN FORCES INVADE SOUTH KOREA 






U.S. PRESENTS CEASE-FIRE 
RESOLUTION TO SECURITY COUNCIL 

Statement by Ernest A. Gross 

Deputy U.S. Representative on Security Council ^ 

At 4 o'clock in the morning, Sunday, June 25th, 
Korean time, armed forces from North Korea com- 
menced an unprovoked assault against the terri- 
tory of the Eepublic of Korea. This assault was 
launched by ground forces along the 38th Parallel, 
in the Ongjin, Kaesong, and Chunshon sectors, 
and by amphibious landings on the east coast in 
the vicinity of Jnagmung. In addition, North 
Korean aircraft have attacked and strafed the 
Kimpo airport in the outskirts of the capital city 
of Seoul. 

Under the circumstances I have described, this 
wholly illegal and unprovoked attack by the North 
Korean forces, in the view of my Government, con- 
stitutes a breach of the peace and an act of aggres- 
sion. 

This is clearly a threat to international peace and 
security. As such, it is of grave concern to my 
Govermnenh It is a threat which must inevitably 
be of grave concern to the governments of all 
peace- and freedom-loving nations. 

A full-scale attack is now going forward in 
Korea. It is an invasion upon a state which the 
United Nations itself, by action of its General As- 
sembly, has brought into being. It is armed 
aggi'ession against a government elected under 
United Nations supervision. 

Such an altack strikes at the fundamental pur- 
poses of the United Nations Charter. Such an 
attack openly defies the interest and authority of 
the United Nations. Such an attack, therefore, 
concerns the vital interest which all the members 



' Made before the Security Council on June 25 and re- 
leased to the press by the U.S. Mission to the U.N. on the 
same date. 



of the United Nations have in the organization. 

The history of the Korean problem in the United 
Nations is well known to you. At this critical 
hour I will not review it in detail. But let me 
recall only a few milestones in the development of 
the Korean situation. 

A joint Commission of the United States and 
the Soviet Union for 2 years sought unsuccessfully 
to agree on ways and means of bringing to Korea 
the independence which we assumed would auto- 
matically come when Japan was defeated. This 
2-year deadlock prevented 38 million people in 
Korea from getting the independence which it was 
agreed was their right. 

My Government, thereupon, sought to hold a 
four-power conference at which China and the 
United Kingdom would join the United States and 
the Soviet Union to seek agreement on the inde- 
pendence of Korea. The Soviet Union rejected 
that proposal. 

The United States then asked the General As- 
sembly to consider the problem. The Soviet Union 
opposed that suggestion. The General Assembly 
by resolution of November 14, 1947, created the 
United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea. 
By that resolution the General Assembly recom- 
mended the holding of elections not later than the 
31st of March 1948, to choose representatives with 
whom the Commission might consult regarding the 
prompt attainment of freedom and independence 
of the Korean people. These elected representa- 
tives would constitute a national assembly and 
establish a national government of Korea. 

The General Assembly further recommended 
that upon the establishment of a national govern- 
ment, that government should in consultation with 
the Commission constitute its own national secu- 
rity forces and to dissolve all military or semi- 
military formations not included therein. The 
General Assembly recommended that the national 



July 3, 1950 



government should take over the functions of 
government from the military command and from 
the civilian authorities of North and South Korea, 
and arrange with the occupying powers for the 
complete withdrawal from Korea of the armed 
forces as early as practicable and if possible within 
90 days. 

Elections were held in South Korea, and the 
Coromission did observe them. A Government in 
South Korea was set up as a result of the elections 
observed by the Commission. The Commission 
was unable to enter North Korea because of the 
attitude of the Soviet Union. 

The Temporary Commission in its report to the 
third session of the General Assembly stated that 
not all the objectives set forth for it had been fully 
accomplished and that, in particular, unification 
of Korea had not yet been achieved. 

Notwithstanding the frustrations and difficulties 
which the Temporary Commission had experienced 
in Korea, the General Assembly at its third session 
continued the Commission's existence and re- 
quested it to go on with its efforts to bring North 
and South Korea together. 

One aspect of the resolution adopted by the third 
session of the General Assembly should, I feel, be 
particularly emphasized. The General Assembly 
declared that a lawful government had been estab- 
lished in Korea as a result of the elections observed 
by the Commission and declared further that this 
was the only lawful government in Korea. Tliis 
is a most significant fact. 

The General Assembly declared further than the 
Government of Korea was based on elections which 
were a valid expression of the free will of the elec- 
torate of that part of Korea and which were ob- 
served by the United Nations Commission. 

In the light of this declaration, my Government 
on January 1, 1949, extended recognition to the 
Government of the Republic of Korea, and more 
than 30 states have since that time also accorded 
recognition to that Government. 

The United Nations Commission worked toward 
the United Nations objective of the withdrawal of 
occupation forces from Korea, the removal of the 
barriers between the regions of the North and 
South, and the unification of that country under a 
representative government freely determined by 
its people. 

In 1949, as in 1948, the Commission's efforts to 
obtain access to North Korea which included both 
direct intercourse with the northern authorities 



and endeavors to negotiate through the Govern- 
ment of the U.S.S.R. were fruitless. The Com- 
mission was unable to make progress either toward 
the unification of Korea or toward the reduction 
of barriers between the Republic of Korea and the 
northern authorities. The Commission reported 
to the General Assembly that the border of the 
38th Parallel was becoming a sea of increasingly 
frequent exchanges of fire and armed raids, and 
that this constituted a serious barrier to friendly 
intercourse among the people of Korea. 

The Commission observed the withdrawal of 
United States forces, which was completed on June 
19, 1949. Although it signified its readiness to 
verify the fact of the withdrawal of Soviet occu- 
pation forces from North Korea, the Commission 
received no response to its message to the U.S.S.R. 
and therefore could take no action. 

At the fourth session, the General Assembly 
again directed the Commission to seek to facilitate 
the removal of barriers to economic, social, and 
other friendly intercourse caused by the division 
of Korea. The General Assembly also authorized 
the Commission on October 21, 1949, in its discre- 
tion, to api^oint observers and utilize the services 
and good offices of persons whether or not repre- 
sentatives of the Commission. The United Nations 
Commission on Korea is presently in Seoul and 
we have now received its latest report. 

Mr. President, I have tabled a draft resolution ^ 
which notes the Security Council's grave concern 
at the invasion of the Republic of Korea by the 
armed forces of North Korea. This draft resolu- 
tion calls upon the authorities in the North to 
cease hostilities and to withdraw armed forces to 
the border along the 38th Parallel. 

The draft resolution requests that the United 
Nations Commission on Korea observe the with- 
drawal of the North Korean forces to the 38th 
Parallel and keep the Security Council informed 
on the implementation and execution of the resolu- 
tion. The draft resolution also calls upon all 
members of the United Nations to render every 
assistance to the United Nations in the carrying 
out of this resolution and to refrain from giving 
assistance to the North Korean authorities. 

The Security Council 

RECAr.MNo the finding of the General Assembly in its 
resolution of 21 October 1949 that the Government of the 



' Adoirted by the Security Council on June 25, 1950, by a 
vote of 9 to 0, with 1 abstention (Yugoslavia) ; U.S.S.R. 
was absent. 



Department of State Bulletin 



Republic of Korea is a lawfully established government 
"having effective control and jurisdiction over that part 
of Korea where the United Nations Temporary Commis- 
sion on Korea was able to observe and consult and in which 
the great majority of the people of Korea reside ; and Uiat 
this Government is based on elections which were a valid 
expression of the free will of the electorate of that part of 
Korea and which were observed by the Temporary Com- 
mission; and that this is the only such Government in 
Korea" ; 

MiNDBTJL of the concern expressed by the General As- 
sembly in its resolutions of 12 December 1948 and 21 Octo- 
ber 1949 of the consequences which might follow unless 
Member states refrained from acts derogatory to the re- 
sults sought to be achieved by the United Nations in bring- 
ing about the complete independence and unity of Korea ; 
and the concern expressed that the situation described by 
the United Nations Commission on Korea in its report 
menaces the safety and well-being of the Republic of Korea 
and of the people of Korea and might lead to open military 
conflict tliere; 

Noting with grave concern the armed attack upon the 
Republic of Korea by forces from North Korea, 

Determines tiiat this action constitutes a breach of the 
•pence, 

I. Calls upon the authoriites of North Korea (a) to 
cease hostilities forthwith; and (b) to withdraw their 
armed forces to the thirty-eighth parallel. 

II. Requests the United Nations Commission on Korea 
(a) to observe the withdrawal of the North Korean forces 
to the thirty-eighth parallel ; and (b) to keep the Security 
Council informed on the execution of this resolution. 

III. Calls upon all Members to render every assistance 
to the United Nations in the execution of this resolution 
and to refrain from giving assistance to the North Korean 
authorities. 



U. S. AIR AND SEA FORCES 
ORDERED INTO SUPPORTING ACTION 

Statement hy President Trwnan 

[Released to the press June 27] 

In Korea, the Government forces, which were 
armed to prevent border raids and to preserve in- 
ternal security, were attacked by invading forces 
from North Korea. The Security Council of the 
United Nations called upon the invading troops to 
cease hostilities and to withdraw to the 38th Par- 
allel. This they have not done but, on the con- 
trary, have pressed the attack. The Security 
Council called upon all members of the United 
Nations to render every assistance to the United 
Nations in the execution of this resolution. In 
these circumstances, I have ordered United States 
air and sea forces to give the Korean Government 
troops cover and support. 



The attack upon Korea makes it plain beyond 
all doubt that communism has passed beyond the 
use of subversion to conquer independent nations 
and will now use armed invasion and war. It has 
defied the orders of the Security Council of the 
United Nations issued to preserve international 
peace and security. In these circumstances, the 
occupation of Formosa by Communist forces 
would be a direct threat to the security of the 
Pacific area and to United States forces perform- 
ing their lawful and necessary functions in that 
area. 

Accordingly, I have ordered the Seventh Fleet 
to prevent any attack on Formosa. As a corollary 
of this action, I am calling upon the Chinese 
Government on Formosa to cease all air and sea 
operations against the mainland. The Seventh 
Fleet will see that this is done. The determination 
of the future status of Formosa must await the 
restoration of security in the Pacific, a peace set- 
tlement with Japan, or consideration by the 
United Nations. 

I have also directed that United States forces in 
the Philippines be strengthened and that military 
assistance to the Philippine Government be accel- 
erated. 

I have similarly directed acceleration in the 
furnishing of military assistance to the forces of 
France and the Associated States in Indochina and 
the dispatch of a military mission to provide close 
working relations with those forces. 

I know that all members of the United Nations 
will consider carefully the consequences of this 
latest aggression in Korea in defiance of the Char- 
ter of the United Nations. A return to the rule of 
force in international affairs would have far- 
reaching effects. The United States will continue 
to uphold the rule of law. 

I have instructed Ambassador Austin, as the 
representative of the United States to the Security 
Council, to report these steps to the Council. 



Soviet Help'Asked To Restore Korean Peace 

In reply to inquiries from the press the State 
Department on June 27 confirmed that the American 
Embassy at Moscow communicated, on that date, 
with the Soviet Foreign Office in regard to the inva- 
sion of the Republic of Korea by North Korean 
armed forces. The Embassy asked that the Soviet 
Government use its influence with the North Korean 
authorities for the withdrawal of the invading forces 
and the cessation of hostilities. 



July 3, 1950 



Remarks hy Secretary Acheson 

At his news conference on June 28 Secretary Acheson 
made the following extemporaneous remarks concerning 
the announcement hy President Truman of United States 
support for the Republic of Korea in accordance with the 
resolution of the Security Council of June 25. 

There are a few points which I should like to 
make before we go into the questions about the 
matter which I am sure is uppermost in all of your 
minds. That is the announcement by the Presi- 
dent yesterday of decisions which he had taken. I 
will not go into those decisions in detail but make 
some points about them. 

The first point I want to make is our feeling of 
deep gratitude here in the Department, and re- 
sponsibility also, for the almost unanimous world 
reaction which has come from the action taken by 
the United Nations and from the announcement 
made yesterday by the President of his actions in 
support of the United Nations. 

In all parts of the world where free opinion ex- 
ists, there has been an immediate response — a 
response to the realization that this was, if there 
ever was in the world, a test of whether the United 
Nations is going to survive. 

This attack was the most cynical, brutal, naked 
attack by armed forces upon an undefended coun- 
try that could occur. The world has understood 
that, and it has understood that the actions taken 
by the United States have been taken in support 
of the United Nations. 

The second point I want to make is that as soon 
as we knew that this attack had taken place, and 
had immediately conveyed that information to the 
President and gotten his instructions, it was the 
view of the President, and of the entire Govern- 
ment of the United States, that our first responsi- 
bility was to report this to the United Nations. 
This was done in the middle of the night on Sat- 
urday, June 24, and a meeting of the Security 
Council was called on Sunday, June 25. From 
then on, all action in Korea has been under the 
aegis of the United Nations. That is a very 
important point. 

The next point that I want to make is one that I 
am sure you understand. It is that the entire ac- 
tion of the Government of the United States, since 
a late hour on Saturday when this information 
came to us, has been taken under Presidential lead- 
ership and direction. Here, as in many other situ- 
ations in the years in which I have been Under 
Secretary and Secretary, the President has been 



faced with the most difficult decisions which had 
to be made quickly, and after taking full advice 
he has assumed the responsibility and he has made 
the decision. 

The fourth point I would like to make is that 
there has been complete unity among the Presi- 
dent's advisers, civil and military. The Depart- 
ments of State and Defense have worked practi- 
cally as one department ever since this matter 
arose, and in anticipation of possible difficulties 
of this sort, so that we were able on the shortest 
possible notice to present completed staff work to 
the President. He had the view of his advisers 
without having differences among his advisers. 

The fifth point I should like to stress is the unity 
which existed at the President's meeting yester- 
day, at which the Secretary of Defense and I, and 
our advisers, were present with the Congressional 
leaders. Here, again, the understanding of the 
problem, the understanding of the actions taken 
showed complete unity. 

The sixth point I should like to make is that 
with very few exceptions the press and radio of 
the United States has been unified in its comments 
upon what was done and the necessity for doing it. 
I assume, and I think I assume justly, that that 
attitude on the part of the press and the radio 
indicates that there is similar unity among the 
people of the United States. 

Finally, I should like to leave with you the 
thought that the complexities and difficulties of 
the international situation are great. This is a 
time for very steady and sober talk and action. 
It is not a time for general speculation, for trying 
to stir up difficulties which do not exist, for imag- 
ining possibilities which are remote. It is a time 
for the very greatest steadiness, and it is a time, 
as I have often said in the past, where, more than 
ever, you gentlemen share with the officials of the 
Government a very deep responsibility, which I 
feel sure you are quite aware of. 

U.S. ASKS SECURITY COUNCIL 
TO ASSIST IN REPELLING ATTACK 

Statement hy Ambassador Warren R. Austin 
U.S. Representative to the Security Council ^ 

The United Nations finds itself confronted to- 
day with the gravest crisis in its existence. 



' Made before the Security Council on June 27 and re- 
leased to the press by the U.S. Mission to the United 
Nations on the same date. 



Department of State Bulletin 



Forty-eight hours ago the Security Council, in 
an emergency session, determined tliat tlie armed 
invasion of the Republic of Korea, by armed forces 
from Northern Korea, constituted a breach of the 
peace. Accordingly, the Security Council called 
for a cessation of hostilities forthwith and the 
■withdrawal by the Northern Korean authorities 
of their armed forces to the 38th Parallel. The 
Security Council also requested the United Na- 
tions Commission on Korea to observe the with- 
drawal and to I'eport. Finally, the Security Coun- 
cil called upon all members to render every 
assistance to the United Nations in the execution 
of the resolution and to refrain from giving assist- 
ance to the North Korean authorities. 

The decision of the Security Council has been 
broadcast to the Korean authorities and is known 
to them. We now have before us the report of the 
United Nations Commission for Korea which con- 
firms our worst fears. It is clear that the authori- 
ties in North Korea have completely disregarded 
and flouted the decision of the Security Council. 
The armed invasion of the Republic of Korea con- 
tinues. The North Korean authorities have even 
called upon the established Government of the 
Republic to surrender. 

It is hard to imagine a more glaring example of 
disregard for the United Nations and for all the 
principles which it represents. The most impor- 
tant provisions of the Charter are those outlawing 
aggressive war. It is precisely these provisions 
which the North Korean authorities have violated. 

It is the plain duty of the Security Council to 
invoke stringent sanctions to restore international 
peace. 

The Republic of Korea has appealed to the 
United Nations for jsrotection. I am happy and 
proud to report that the United States is prepared 
as a loyal member of the United Nations to furnish 
assistance to the Republic of Korea. 

I have tabled a resolution * which I ask the 
Council to consider favorably as the next step to 
restore world peace. 

That resolution is as follows: 
The Security Council, 

Having Determined that the armed attack upon the 
Republic of Korea by forces from North Korea constitutes 
a breach of the peace, 

Having Called for an immediate cessation of hostilities, 
and 



Having Called upon the authorities of North Korea to 
withdraw forthwith their armed forces to the 38th Par- 
allel, and 

Having Noted from the report of the United Nations 
Commission for Korea that the authorities in North Korea 
have neither ceased hostilities nor withdrawn their armed 
forces to the 3Sth Parallel, and that urgent military 
measures are required to restore international peace and 
security, and 

Having Noted the appeal from the Republic of Korea to 
the United Nations for immediate and effective steps to 
secure peace and security, 

Recommends that the Members of the United Nations 
furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may 
be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore 
international peace and security in the area. 

This is the logical consequence of the resolution 
concerning the complaint of aggression upon the 
Republic of Korea adopted at the 473d meeting of 
the Security Council on June 25, 1950, and the 
subsequent events recited in the preamble of this 
resolution. That resolution of June 25 called upon 
all members to render every assistance to the 
United Nations in the execution of this resolution 



* Adopted by the Security Council on June 27 by a vote 
of 7 (U.S., U.K., France, China, Cuba, Ecuador, and 
Norway)—! (Yugoslavia), with 2 abstentions (Egypt and 
India) ; the U.S.S.R. was absent. 



Article 27 of the U. N. Charter 

1. Each member of the Security Council shall 
have one vote. 

2. Decisions of the Security Council on procedural 
matters shall be made by an aJfirmative vote of 
seven members. 

3. Decisions of the Security Council on all other 
matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of 
seven members including the concurring votes of the 
permanent members ; provided that, in decisions un- 
der Chapter VI, and under paragraph 3 of Article 
52, a party to a dispute shall abstain from voting. 

Article 28 of U. N. Charter 

1. The Security Council shall be so organized as 
to be able to function continuously. Each member 
of the Security Council shall for this purpose be 
represented at all times at the seat of the Organi- 
zation. 

2. The Security Council shall hold periodic meet- 
ings at which each of its members may, if it so 
desires, be represented by a member of the govern- 
ment or by some other specially designated 
representative. 

3. The Security Council may hold meetings at 
such places other than the seat of the Organization 
as in its judgment wUl best facilitate its work. 

Editor's Note: A Security Council practice has 
developed under which, if a permanent member of 
the Security Council abstains from voting on a non- 
procedural decision of the Council, such abstention 
is not considered to be a veto. 



July 3, 1950 



and to refrain from giving assistance to the North 
Korean authorities. This new resolution is the 
logical next step. Its significance is affected by the 
violation of the former resolution, the continua- 
tion of aggression, and the urgent military 
measures required. 

I wish now to read the statement which the 
President of the United States made today on this 



critical situation. 

[Here follows the President's statement as printed in 
this issue on page 5.] 

The keynote of the resolution and my statement 
and the significant characteristic of the action 
taken by the President is support of the United 
Nations purposes and principles — in a word 
"peace." 



SOVIET VIOLATIONS OF TREATIES AND AGREEMENTS 



The instability of peace the world over is due, 
in large measure, to deliberate Soviet policy and 
actions and to the wholesale Soviet violation of 
basic agreemerds. Because of the U.S.S.R.''s rec- 
ord in ignoring its international pledges, the faith 
of the world in Soviet signatures had been badly 
shattered. Whether it be the Yalta agreement or 
a treaty of friendship, the U.S.S.R. has chosen to 
ignore its sworn conwriitments whenever it has 
found such action advantageous for its own 
purposes. 

As it ruthlessly pursues its expansionist objec- 
tives in the postwar world, the Soviet Union is 
building up a reputation as an irresponsible inter- 
national marauder. Before the court of world 
opinion, it stands indicted for disregarding its 
international treaties and agreements, openly 
flouting protocols and promises, and encouraging 
violations of basic human rights by other treaty 
signatories. Because of its policy of refusal to 
work in concert with other nations, its preference 
for abrupt and unauthorized unilateral action, and 
its apparent determination to impose its will upon 
the world, the value of agreements with the Soviet 
Union has been nullified. From Yalta to the 
present, the broken pledges of the U.S.S.E. have 
marked international relations. A review of this 
record is worthwhile.^ 

Europe 

The uncertain peace of postwar Europe is pri- 
marily due to the fact that the Russians have de- 
liberately undermined the foundations upon which 



' This study brings up to date the material published in 
the BuiiETiN of June 6, 1948, p. 738. 



peace was to be built. The Soviet Union has vio- 
lated the Yalta agreement of February 1945, the 
Potsdam Declaration of July 1945, and the peace 
treaties so far concluded with the ex-German satel- 
lites. Soviet violation of Allied armistice agree- 
ments, refusal to act in concert with the other 
Allies on control commissions, and even the ignor- 
ing of the decisions of the Council of Foreign 
Ministers can be added to those. The fact that 
the framework of peace has never been completed, 
that Austria still pleads for a treaty, and that the 
settlement of the German question still plagues 
Europe is also due to Soviet intransigence and the 
unreliability of its word. 

THE YALTA AGREEMENT 

Wlien the Big Three met at Yalta in February 
1945, the three Governments, the United States, 
the United Kingdom, and the U.S.S.R., agreed 
to assist liberated people to form "interim gov- 
ernment authorities broadly representative of all 
democratic elements in the population and pledged 
to the earliest possible establishment through free 
elections of governments responsive to the will of 
the people." According to James F. Byrnes, for- 
mer Secretary of State, Stalin accepted the Yalta 
agreement without serious discussion and in an 
atmosphere of genial camaraderie. Yet, Soviet 
action has consistently undermined and made 
meaningless this fundamental declaration. 

The Potsdam Decisions and the Control Council 

The Potsdam Declaration of July 1945 aimed at 
the ultimate creation of a unified, democratic Ger- 
many. To achieve this aim, the powers repre- 
sented at the conference committed themselves to 



Deparfment of State Bulletin 



the destruction of German militarism, the wiping 
out of nazisiu, the punishment of war criminals, 
the decentralization of the political structure of 
Germany, and the dissolution of concentrations of 
economic power. A new democratic German gov- 
ermnent was to be developed under the supervision 
of an Allied Control Council (Ace), and the 
four Allied zone commanders were to enjoy abso- 
lute sovereignty in their respective zones unless 
their powers were pre-empted by Ace legislation. 
Besides dealing with Germany, the United States, 
the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union agreed 
at Potsdam, among other things, to consult with 
each other with a view to revising the procedures 
of Allied Control Commissions for Rumania, Bul- 
garia, and Hungary. 

The lack of success of the program formulated 
at Potsdam can be laid at the door of the Soviet 
Union. From the inception of the Potsdam pro- 
tocols, the U.S.S.R. has a record of wholesale vio- 
lation of the agreement, refusal to abide by 
decisions of the Control Councils, and a flagi'ant 
usurijation of power on the Control Councils in 
the satellite area. 

GERMANY 

Moreover, in dealing with Germany, the Soviet 
Union has readily disregarded promises made at 
meetings of the Council of Foreign Ministers 
(Cfm). By a Cfm decision reached at Moscow, 
March 19-April 24, IQIT, all German prisoners of 
war were to be repatriated by December 1, 1948. 
The U.S.S.R. not only did not return all German 
prisoners by tliat date, but she unilaterally an- 
nounced a new deadline of January 1, 1950. 

Under the Paris Cfm communique of June 20, 

1949, each occupying power in Germany agreed to 
insure the "normal functioning" of transport be- 
tween Berlin and the zones as well as between the 
Soviet and Western zones. Since January 13, 

1950, the Soviet authorities have intermittently 
interfered with traffic between Berlin and Western 
Germany. 

Violations of the Peace Treaties 

Upon ratification of the treaties of peace with 
Hungary, Bulgaria, and Rumania, on September 
15, 1947, the armistice period and the authority of 
the Allied Control Commissions came to an end. 
On this date, the treaties entered into force, and 
the three Governments regained a type of nominal 
sovereignty. In fact, however, the U.S.S.R. con- 



tinued to exercise tutelary powers over them. In 
consequence, the implementation of the treaties is 
characterized by subservient fulfillment with re- 
gard to obligations toward the U.S.S.R. but by 
evasion, delay, and violations with reference to the 
Western Allies. The Soviet Union condones and 
in many cases, abets these infringements and, as the 
tutelary power, must bear responsibility for them. 

HUMAN RIGHTS 

Under the peace treaties, the Hungarian, Bul- 
garian, and Rumanian Governments undertook to 
guarantee the enjoyment of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms, including freedom of ex- 
pression, of press and publication, of religious 
worship, of political opinion, and of public meet- 
ing. The U.S.S.R. directly aided and abetted 
these Governments in failing to fulfill these human 
rights clauses. Freedom of expression and of press 
and publication no longer exist in any of these 
countries. Freedom of worship is interfered with 
time and again, either through subtle methods or 
through drastic procedures such as the trials and 
imprisonments of church leaders. Freedom of 
political opinion is also violated by the forceful 
elimination of all political groups opposing the 
Communist-controlled governments of these coim- 
tries. 

On April 2, 1949, the United States and Great 
Britain charged the three Governments with hav- 
ing violated the human-rights obligations of the 
peace treaties. All three Governments issued de- 
nials and indicated their unwillingness to adopt 
the requested remedial measures. The United 
States and the United Kingdom thereupon in- 
formed them that in the British and American 
view a dispute had arisen concerning the interpre- 
tation and execution of the peace treaties. Under 
the treaties,^ any dispute concerning the execution 
of the treaties, which is not settled by diplomatic 
negotiations, should be referred to the heads of the 
United States, United Kingdom, and U.S.S.R. 
missions in the three countries. On May 31, 1949, 
the United States called upon the United Kingdom 
and U.S.S.R. to hold a meeting of the three heads 
of mission in each country to settle the disputes 
which had arisen over noncompliance with the 
human-rights clauses. The Soviet Union, in a note 
of June 11, 1949, refused to participate in the 
meetings, contending that no such disputes had 

' Art. 40, Hungarian treaty ; art. 36, Bulgarian treaty ; 
and arts. 37 and 38, Rumanian treaty. 



July 3, 1950 



arisen and that there was, therefore, no reason for 
such a meeting. A second United States note, de- 
livered June 30, 1949, expressed regret for the 
Soviet Union's disregard of the provisions of the 
treaties and again asserted that disputes did exist 
between the United States and the three satellite 
Governments. In a memorandum dated July 19, 
1949, the Soviet Union reaffirmed its previous con- 
tention and, since that time, has consistently re- 
fused to participate in a meeting on the matter. 

By its stand, the Soviet Union violates the dis- 
putes clause of the peace treaties and the offending 
countries are encouraged to continue systematically 
and willfully to violate their treaties. 

Besides the flagrant violations of the human- 
rights clauses, there have been other treaty viola- 
tions. In each instance, the attitude of the Soviet 
Government is to condone the violation. 

HUNGARY 

Under article 10 of her treaty, Hungary under- 
took to honor her prewar bilateral treaties with 
the Allied and Associated Powers, provided that 
the other contracting party notified the Hungarian 
Government, within a period of 6 months of the 
coming into force of the peace treaty, that she 
desired to keep in force or revive the bilateral 
treaty in question. Among the prewar treaties 
coming under the provisions of this article was 
the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Naviga- 
tion of 1925 between the United States and Hun- 
gary. Although the United States Government 
duly notified Hungary, within the prescribed 
6-month period, that she desired to keep this bilat- 
eral treaty in force, the Hungarian Government 
has evaded and refused to fulfill its obligations 
under article 10 in at least two notable instances : 
first, in the seizure of United States property ; and 
second, in the arrest and trial of two American 
citizens, Robert Vogeler and Israel Jacobson, who 
were held incommunicado without access to United 
States consular officers. 

Under article 23 of the peace treaty, Hungary 
undertook to pay the sum of 100 million dollars 
as reparations to Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. 
On February 27, 1949 (after the Moscow-inspired 
Cominform declaration of June 28, 1948, against 
Yugoslavia), the Yugoslav Minister to Hungary 
delivered a note to the United States Legation at 
Budapest stating that the Hungarian Govern- 
ment had failed to abide by article 23 of the treaty 
and that, as a result of the ill will of the Hungar- 



ian Government, the enforcement of article 23 
could not be carried out by direct negotiations 
between the two Governments. The Hungarian 
Govei-nment has, to this day, refused to comply 
with article 23 of the treaty, and the Soviet Gov- 
ernment has refused to participate in a meeting 
of the three heads of mission at Budapest, pro- 
vided for in article 40 of the treaty for the settle- 
ment of disputes which cannot be solved by direct 
negotiation. 

Under article 28 of the treaty, Hungary under- 
took to restore all legal rights and interests of the 
United Nations and their nationals, as they existed 
on September 1, 1939, as well as to compensate 
such persons for property loss and war damage. 
The Hungarian Government has given no indica- 
tion that she intends to compensate American cit- 
izens. On November 8, 1949, the United States 
Legation at Budapest transmitted to the Hungar- 
ian Minister for Foreign Affairs four new claims 
and additional evidence with regard to 116 previ- 
ous claims. Although Hungary has acknowledged 
receipt of the note, she has taken no action to fulfill 
these claims. 

BULGARIA 

The U.S.S.R. has openly aided and abetted the 
Bulgarian Government in failing to fulfill com- 
pletely or in totally ignoring treaty provisions lim- 
iting the armed forces.^ The Soviet Union ac- 
complished this fact by supplying Bulgaria with 
arms, ammunition, and equipment in excess of 
those needed for the armed foi'ce stipulated by the 
peace treaty. In addition, the U.S.S.R., by nega- 
tive and extremely dilatory acts, is tolerating Bul- 
garian failure to reduce these forces to the limits 
prescribed in article 10. The U.S.S.R., by nega- 
tive and obstructionist tactics, aided and abetted 
the Bulgarian Government in the formation, main- 
tenance, and training of paramilitary organiza- 
tions, i. e., the militia and the use of this organ- 
ization by the Bulgarians to violate both the spirit 
and letter of article 2, the human-rights clause of 
the treaty. The U.S.S.R., encourages the Bul- 
garian Government to deny the Governments of 
the United States and United Kingdom their 
rights, under the terms of the treaty, to informa- 
tion pertaining to the Bulgarian armed forces or 
the right to gather such information by investiga- 
tion. The Soviet Government declined the United 
States-United Kingdom invitation to name a So- 

' Arts. 9, 10, 11, and 12. 



10 



DepartmenI of State Bulletin 



viet rein-esentative to participate in a proposed 
survey of the Greco-Bulgarian border.* It, there- 
by, encouraged the Bulgarian Government's reply 
that, under the terms of the peace treaty, the mat- 
ter should be referred to the United States, United 
Kingdom, and U.S.S.R. diplomatic missions. ( The 
Soviet Government had already refused to partici- 
pate in any such conventions under article 3G of the 
peace treaty to settle disputes concerning the in- 
terpretation or execution of the Bulgarian peace 
treaty.) 

RUMANIA 

As in Bulgaria, the Soviet Government has con- 
sistently refused to cooperate with American and 
British chiefs of mission to consider the princi- 
ples involved in the implementation of the mili- 
tary clauses of the peace treaty with Rumania. 
Both the Soviet and British chiefs of mission 
agreed to a meeting on this matter, scheduling it 
for May 18, 1948. However, the Soviet Ambas- 
sador cancelled the scheduled meeting, saying that 
he was "indisposed,"' and, on May 26, 1948, he 
addressed a note to the American Minister stating 
that there was no necessity for the proposed meet- 
ing and no reason for putting the proposal into 
effect. Thus, the Rumanian Government has felt 
free to violate the military provisions of the peace 
treaty. 

Violations of Agreement With Iran 

Soviet-Iranian relations are based formally on 
the treaty of friendship of February 26, 1921, 
which was reaffirmed in 1928. Article IV of this 
treaty states : 

In consideration of the fact that each nation has the 
right to determine freely its political destiny, each of the 
two contracting parties formally expresses its desire to 
abstain from any intervention in the internal affairs of 
the other. 

In 1942, the U.S.S.R., United Kingdom, and Iran 
signed a treaty of alliance in which the two large 
powers agreed to respect the territorial integrity, 
sovereignty, and independence of Iran. In the 
1943 Tehran declaration, the U.S.S.R., United 
Kingdom, and the United States expressed their 
desire for the maintenance of the independence, 
sovereignty, and territorial integrity of Iran. As 
a signer of the United Nations Charter, the 
U.S.S.R. subscribed to article II (par. 4), which 
states : 



* Note No. 056 of Feb. 16. 1948. 



All members shall refrain in their international rela- 
tions from the threat of use of force against the territorial 
integrity or political independence of any State, or in any 
manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United 
Nations. 

The U.S.S.R., in her relations with Iran, has vio- 
lated all of these solemn commitments. 

The Soviet Government, in a note to the United 
States on November 29, 1945, admitted that Soviet 
forces in Iran had prevented Iranian troops from 
taking action after the outbreak against the Iran- 
ian Government in northern Iran. This Soviet 
action at least indirectly aided the Azerbaijan sep- 
aratists and, thus, constituted interference in the 
internal affairs of Iran, in violation of its 1921 
pledge of friendship. Furthermore, violations of 
the tripartite treaty occurred both during and 
after World War II. By supporting the Azer- 
baijan separatists while occupying Iran and by its 
refusal to evacuate its troops except under United 
Nations pressures, the U.S.S.R. violated the 
Tehi-an declaration. The Iranian appeal to the 
Security Council in January 1946 and its notifica- 
tion to the Council on December 5, 1946, that the 
U.S.S.R. had warned Iran to refrain from moving 
troops into Azerbaijan were both based upon 
charges of Soviet interference in the internal af- 
fairs of Iran in violation of the United Nations 
Charter. Moreover, the Soviet radio has repeat- 
edly attacked the Iranian Government on false 
grounds, has incited the Iranian people to violent 
action against the government, and has given sup- 
port to the illegal Tudeh Party. 

Violation of Agreements Involving the Far East 

KOREA 

The Soviet Government openly violated the 
joint United States-U.S.S.R. Moscow agreement 
for the reestablishment of Korean independence 
and the economic recovery of the country. The 
two powers were to consult in the preparation of 
proposals for the formation of a provisional Ko- 
rean government. The U.S.S.R. representative on 
the Joint Control Commission consistently refused 
to allow such consultation except under unilateral 
interpretations of the phrase "democratic parties 
and social organizations" which, in each case, 
would have excluded all but pro-Soviet political 
groups. Moreover, the Soviet delegation refused 
to consult with Korean groups whose representa- 
tives had at any time expressed opposition to the 



July 3, 7950 



11 



provision for placing Korea under trusteeship, as 
envisaged in the Moscovf agreement. 

The Joint Commission agreed to reestablish the 
movement of persons, motor, rail transport, and 
coastwise shipping between the zones of north and 
south Korea. The Soviet Command in north 
Korea refused to discuss or implement this agree- 
ment and resisted efforts toward reestablishing 
the natural economic unity of the country. Con- 
cessions to economic coordination were made only 
on a barter basis. No regularized movement of 
persons or transport was established beyond that 
allowed the United States to supply her outposts 
that were accessible only by roads through Soviet- 
occupied territory. 



JAPAN 



In the terms of the Potsdam Declaration, defin- 
ing the conditions for the Japanese surrender. 



Japanese military forces, after being completely 
disarmed, were to be permitted to return to their 
homes, "with opportunity to lead peaceful, pro- 
ductive lives." On December 8, 1949, the U.S.S.R. 
signed the Geneva Prisoners of War Convention, 
setting forth the rights and obligations of coun- 
tries holding prisoners of war. 

TASS, the official Soviet news agency, on May 
20, 1949, declared that there were 95,000 Japanese 
prisoners of war in Soviet-held territory still 
awaiting repatriation. According to Japanese 
figures, an additional 376,929 Japanese were then 
still under Soviet control. The discrepancy is ex- 
plicable either by continued detention of Japanese 
prisoners or an abnormally high death rate. The 
U.S.S.R. refuses to give any information on the 
matter and has walked out of Control Council 
meetings in which the problem was broached. 



The Korean Experiment in Representative Government 

Statement hy John Foster Dulles 
Consultant to the Secretary ^ 



The American people salute the Korean nation. 
We honor the valiant struggle you are making for 
liberty — human liberty and national liberty. 

The American people enlisted in that struggle 
175 years ago. We were, then, few, poor, divided, 
and menaced. There were only about 3 million of 
us. We were living precariously off the soil and 
the seas. We had been divided by loyalties to 13 
rival sovereign states. We were closely pressed 
by the great military powers of that time — Spain 
to the south, England and France to the north, and 
Russia, which had moved into our continent, in 
the west. Nevertheless, our founders saw that 
Providence had given our people a unique oppor- 
tunity' to show that a free society could develop a 
spiritual, intellectual, and material richness which 
could not be matched by a society of dictatorship 
and that, if we took advantage of that opportunity, 
our example would stimulate men elsewhere to cast 
off the shackles of despotism. From its beginning, 
our effort was consciously related to the general 
welfare of mankind. 

We went through many dark days and long 
nights. But our exj^eriment succeeded. Our con- 

' Made before the National Assembly of the Republic of 
Korea at Seoul, Korea, on June 19 and released to the press 
on the same date. 



duct and example, despite many faults, did help 
to show the infinite possibilities of free men, and it 
encouraged men everywhere to pry loose the grip 
of despotism and to take command of their own 
destiny. The nineteenth century was, in most of 
the world, an era of human liberation. 

But the battle between liberty and despotism is 
never-ending. It has no limits either in space or 
in time. It is part of the constant struggle between 
good and evil, a struggle that seems to have been 
ordained for the testing of man. 

DesiJotism, thrown onto the defensive in the 
nineteenth century, has resumed the offensive in 
the twentieth century. Already, the United States 
has twice intervened with armed might in defense 
of freedom when it was hard-pressed bj' unpro- 
voked military aggression. We were not bound by 
any treaty to do this. We did so because the 
American people are faithful to the cause of 
human freedom and loyal to those everywhere 
who honorably support it. 

Today, the Korean people are in the front line 
of freedom, under conditions that are both dan- 
gerous and exciting. You emerged from over 40 
years spent under Japanese militarism. But you 
have not emei'ged into conditions of placid ease. 
Instead, you encounter a new menace, that of So- 



12 



Depaiiment of Sfafe Bulletin 



viet communism. It denies the spiritual worth and 
dignity of the individual human being. It insists 
that ail men should be regimented into a pattern 
of conduct made for them in Moscow. It seeks 
to impose that degrading concept upon all men 
everywhere. 

Taking advantage of Japanese surrender terms, 
Soviet communism has seized in its cruel embrace 
the Korean people to the north of the 38th Paral- 
lel ; and, from that nearby base, it seeks, by terror- 
ism, fraudulent propaganda, infiltration, and in- 
citement to civil unrest, to enfeeble and discredit 
your new Republic, hoping, no doubt, that the 
people might, m despair, accept the iron discipline 
of the Soviet Communist Party. 

That is a hard test for those who are only newly 
training in the practice of representative govern- 
ment. 

Some observers felt that your task was a hope- 
less one. You have proved them to be wrong. 
Your faith and your works have confounded the 
skeptics. You have already held two general elec- 
tions in an atmosphere free of terrorism, and a 
very high percentage of all eligible voters have 
participated. Out of your electoral processes, has 
come a stable and representative government. 
You have developed a strong, disciplined, and 
loyal defense establishment. Through hard work, 
you are steadily improving your country's eco- 
nomic condition. 

There is solid ground for encouragement. No 
doubt, there are difficult days ahead and many 
problems yet unsolved, some internal, some exter- 
nal. But what has already happened shows that 
it lies within your power to achieve the goal of a 
Korea that is strong and free. Nothing can pre- 
vent that if you persist in your resolute will to be 
free, and if each of you individually exercises the 
self-controls that are required for the general 
good. A free society is always a society of di- 
versity. That is the secret of its richness. But 
also it is a society in which men must voluntarily 
curb their individualism to the extent needed to 
enable the nation as a whole to avoid frustration 
and to achieve creation. 

As you establish here in South Korea a whole- 
some society of steadily expanding well-being, you 
will set up peaceful influences which will disinte- 
grate the hold of Soviet communism on your fel- 
lows to the north and irresistibly draw them into 
unity with you. Never, for a minute, do we con- 
cede that Soviet Communists will hold perma- 
nently their unwilling captives. No iron curtain 
can indefinitely block off the attracting force of 
what you do if you persist in the way you have 
been going. 

You are conducting what may go down in his- 
tory as the Great Korean Experiment, an experi- 
ment which, in its way, can exert a moral influ- 
ence in the twentieth century as prof oimd as that 



which, in the nineteenth century, was exerted by 
what was then called the Great American Experi- 
ment. That is why the eyes of the free world are 
fixed upon you. You carry the hopes and aspira- 
tions of multitudes. 

The American people give you their support, 
both moral and material, consistent with your own 
self-respect and your primary dependence on your 
own efforts. 

W& look on you as, spiritually, a part of the 
United Nations which has acted with near una- 
nimity to advance your political freedom, which 
seeks your unity with the north and which, even 
though you are technically deprived of formal 
membership, nevertheless requires all nations to 
refrain from any threat or use of force against 
your territorial integrity or political independence. 

The American people welcome you as an equal 
partner in the great company of those who com- 
prise the free world, a world which commands 
vast moral and material power and resolution that 
is unswerving. Those conditions assure that any 
depotism which wages aggressive war dooms itself 
to unutterable disaster. 

The free world has no written charter, but it is 
no less real for that. Membership depends on the 
conduct of a nation itself; there is no veto. Its 
compulsions to common action ai'e powerful, be- 
cause they flow from a profound sense of common 
destiny. 

You are not alone. You will never be alone so 
long as you continue to play worthily your part 
in the great design of human freedom. 



Tax Treaty Negotiations 
To Open With Israel 

[Released to the press June 16] 

United States and Israeli tax officials are ex- 
pected to meet at Washington on July 10, 1950, 
for technical discussions of possibilities for im- 
proving tax relations between the two countries 
and to consider whether a basis exists for conven- 
tions for the avoidance of double taxation with 
respect to taxes on income and to taxes on the 
estates of deceased persons. 

If a basis for conventions is found, drafts of 
the proposed terms will be prepared by the partici- 
pants and submitted to their respective govern- 
ments for consideration with a view to signing. 

In preparation for the discussions, interested 
persons are invited to submit information and sug- 
gestions to Mr. Eldon P. King, Special Deputy 
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Bureau of In- 
ternal Revenue, Washington 25, D. C. 



July 3, 1950 



13 



ACHIEVING A COMMUNITY SENSE AMONG FREE NATIONS- 
A STEP TOWARD WORLD ORDER 

Address hy Secretary Acheson ^ 



For years to come, no Secretary of State will 
speak at Harvard without tliinking of General 
Marshall's address here 3 years ago. That speech 
was an act of far-reaching importance. It may be 
useful for his successor to put that act in a setting 
in history and to show where it has led and where 
it is now leading us. 

Not 2 years had then passed from the end of the 
war, but our hopes for the postwar world were 
already dimmed. 

In the anguish of war, the world had resolved 
to build a new order in which peace, freedom, and 
justice would be secure. These aspirations were 
expressed in the Charter of the United Nations. 
If ever a document spoke the feeling in the hearts 
of all mankind, that document was the Charter. 

It pledged that the nations would live together 
as good neighbors; that they would unite their 
strength to maintain the peace; that armed force 
would not again be used, save in the common in- 
terest ; that they would work together to advance 
the well-being of all men everywhere. 

That document was signed 5 years ago next 
Monday. 

It was essential to the success of this organiza- 
tion, as Mr. Cordell Hull had said on April 9, 1944, 
that the major powers recognize and harmonize 
their basic interests. 

The foreign policy of the United States was 
firmly founded on the belief that this could be 
done. We hoped that the union of our efforts with 
those of our Allies in time of war could be con- 



' Delivered before the Harvard Alumni Association, 
Cambridge, Mass., on June 22 and released to the press 
on the same date. 



14 



tinned. To this end, we were determined to ac- 
commodate our basic interests with those of other 
powers. 

That determination found expression in our 
actions. 

Differences there were, but that was to be ex- 
pected. We were prepared to look upon them as 
the natural residue of years of mutual mistrust. 
We were prepared to honor our wartime commit- 
ments and the security requirements of other na- 
tions. The overwhelming sentiment of our people 
favored settlement of our points of friction, as 
we regarded them, the immediate demobilization 
of our armed forces and the inauguration of the 
new era of peace. 

But, as the ominous portents grew, doubt also 
grew as to whether one of our late allies was, in 
fact, intent on cooperation. 

Review of Soviet Actions Since 1945 

The year of the San Francisco conference was 
also the year in which the Soviet Union renewed 
intimidating pressures upon its neighbors, Iran 
and Turkey. It was the year in which the Soviet 
Union, in violation of agreements on which the ink 
was scarcely dry, imposed governments of its own 
choosing on Bulgaria and Rumania and supported 
the imposition of a minority regime in Poland. 

In the following year, 1946, the sequence of 
Soviet actions filled out an unmistakable pattern. 
This was the year in which the head of the Soviet 
state made it clear in a speech to his people that the 
wartime alliance with the non-Communist world 
was at an end. This speech was followed by a 
propaganda campaign of unrestrained hostility 

Dspattmen\ of State Bulletin 



against our country, which has continued to this 
day. 

This was the year also in which Soviet leaders 
began a program of assistance to Communist-dom- 
inated guerrillas in Greece and increased their 
l^ressure on Turkey for control of the Straits. 
This was the year when Soviet action in Germany 
foreshadowed its intention to break up the four- 
]iower control arrangement and to Sovietize the 
Eastern zone, which it controlled. This was the 
year in which the Soviet Union walked out of the 
Security Council when called upon to honor its 
agreement to withdraw its troops from Iran. 

In this year, also, the Soviet control of Hungary 
was consummated. In this year, the international 
Communist movement began its efforts to block 
the political and economic recovery of France and 
Italy by strikes and other disruptive activities of 
its parties in these countries. 

The pattern was plain. Wherever the force of 
Soviet arms prevailed, the Soviet Union would 
take over virtual control. Where Soviet armed 
forces could not reach, the international Commu- 
nist movement was used to gain control by subver- 
sion. 

American Response to Soviet Actions 

Three events which took place in 1947 helped to 
crystallize the American response to Soviet con- 
duct. 

The first of these was President Truman's mes- 
sage to Congress of March 12, requesting fimds for 
the Greek- Turkish Aid Program. In his message, 
the President declared it to be the policy of the 
United States — 

... to support free peoples who are resisting attempted 
subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures. 

. . . We must assist free peoples to work out their own 
destinies in their own way. 

The second event of 1947 was the speech of Gen- 
eral Marshall from this platform on June 5th. 

Its purpose was the revival of the working econ- 
omy of the world so that free institutions could 
exist. 

Less than 1 month later, the Soviet Foreign Min- 
ister, Mr. Molotov, walked out of the conference 
at Paris at which the European Recovery Program 
was launched. 

That the Soviet Union would not only refuse 
to participate in the European Recovery Program 
but would also sabotage the effort was made ex- 



plicit 2 months later at the founding of the Com- 
munist Information Bureau. 

There, the Soviet delegate announced that the 
Soviet Union would bend every effort in order 
that the European Recovery Program be doomed 
to failure. 

The Soviet effort to defeat the program did not 
succeed. But its decision to obstruct rather than 
participate did much to sharpen the cleavages of 
a divided world. 

The third event in 1947 which helped to mark 
and to crystallize a development in American 
thinking was the London meeting of the Council of 
Foreign Ministers, and General Marshall's report 
to the American people upon his return, on De- 
cember the 19th. 

In analyzing the reason for the frustration we 
had encountered in our efforts to reach an agree- 
ment with the Soviet Union on Germany, General 
Marshall concluded — and this was a significant 
step in the development of our thinking — that until 
the political vacuum created by the war had been 
filled by the restoration of a healthy European 
community, we would not be able to achieve any 
genuine agreements with the Soviet Union. 

Agreements between sovereign states, General 
Marshall reminded us, are usually the reflection 
and not the cause of genuine settlements. 

This was the issue, he said : we would not have 
a settlement until the coming months had dem- 
onstrated whether or not the civilization of West- 
ern Europe would prove vigorous enough to rise 
above the destructive effects of the war and restore 
a healthy society. 

As the issue became understood in these terms 
by the American people and the other people of 
the Western world, they responded with a succes- 
sion of measures looking toward the strengthening 
of the free world. 

The pace of this response was quickened by the 
Communist seizure of Czechoslovakia, 2 months 
later. 

The formation of the Western Union and the 
signing of a defense treaty at Brussels in the early 
months of 1948 gave expression to the European 
resolve to unite both political and military strength 
in the common defense. 

This country, in statements by the President and 
a resolution of the Senate, announced its support 
of these efforts and its desire to help them. 

In his inaugural address of January 20, 1949, 
the President announced the intention of the 



July 3, 7950 



15 



United States to enter into a treaty for the defense 
of North Atlantic Area and to supply military 
assistance to free nations. 

Success of U.S. Efforts 
To Strengthen Free World 

In the 17 months which have since passed, we 
have witnessed the rapid emergence of the North 
Atlantic community as a political reality. 

An unj^recedented rate of economic recovery 
has now brought the productivity of Western 
Europe, for the most part, above prewar levels. 
Long-range economic problems are being met with 
vigor and initiative. The nations of the North 
Atlantic community are building a common de- 
fense system for the primary purpose of prevent- 
ing any further acts of aggression against this 
area. 

These measures of coalescence and of strength 
evidence the determination of the free world that 
the Soviet Union shall not, by coercion or subver- 
sion, destroy the independence of free states. 

Wherever free men and their governments have 
been determined to preserve their freedom and 
their independence and where assistance from the 
United States could help them to do so, we have 
given our help. Our aid is a supplement and not 
a substitute. We have seen, in China, that even 
help on a great scale cannot replace the will of the 
people and their goveinment to preserve their 
independence. 

Elsewhere in the world, the assistance and en- 
couragement we have given to men who were 
stoutly helping themselves have been of decisive 
importance. In accordance with our American 
traditions and the responsibilities which our times 
have thrust upon us, we have exercised a position 
of leadership in strengthening the free world. 

In the period we have been discussing, there 
have been a number of Secretaries of State in this 
country. There has been, however, but one Presi- 
dent. The successive decisions — and they were 
hard decisions — by which this policy has been 
developed and applied were made by the President. 

The consistency of purpose reflected in these 
decisions, which I have enumerated, is evident to 
all in retrospect. They are successive signposts, 
with a constancy of destination. 

Our goal has not changed. We continue to strive 
for the fulfillment of the aspirations to which we 
dedicated ourselves in the war. We seek to realize 
the principles of the Charter of the United Na- 



tions — a just and lasting peace, modei'ation and 
mutual respect among nations, the advancement of 
the well-being of mankind. 

Our efforts to move toward this goal by agree- 
ment among nations have been confronted witli a 
great obstacle. That obstacle is the inordinate 
ambition of the Soviet leaders, which is based on 
their delusions about the non-Communist world. 

We are taking measures which will enable us to 
surmount this obstacle and move on toward our 
objective. This is the meaning of our efforts to 
strengthen the free world. 

Strengthening Measures To Prevent War 

I have said before — and it cannot be said too 
often — that war is not inevitable. It is the deter- 
mined purpose of this country, and of the like- 
minded nations working with us, to prevent war. 
We are building our strength in order that we may 
eliminate the conditions which could give rise to 
war, and we are on the threshold of a new period 
in the successful forward-movement of this effort. 
We face this new period with confidence, but we 
must be very clear in our minds about our purposes 
in the times that lie ahead. 

We do not arm for purposes of conquest. Our 
strength is a shield, whose purpose is twofold. 

First, our strength is essential to a progressive 
and successful resolution of the difficulties which 
today beset the international community. 

The obverse of General Marshall's conclusion 
after the London meeting of the Council of For- 
eign Ministers is that when the political vacuum 
has been filled by the restoration of a healthy 
European conmiunity, greater progi'ess will be 
possible in settling differences in the world. 
Strength is not a substitute for discussion and 
accommodation. 

As the leaders of the Soviet Union come to 
appreciate that their analysis of the world situa- 
tion and their policies flowing from that analysis 
have been incori'ect, the possibility for reasonable 
settlements of matters affecting the stability and 
progress of the international community will 
increase. 

Until the Soviet leaders do genuinely accept a 
"live and let live" philosophy, then, no approach 
from the free world, however imaginative, and no 
Trojan dove from the Communist movement, will 
help to resolve our mutual problems. 

This does not mean that discussion should not 
take place or that every effort should not be made 



16 



Dapartment of Slate Bulletin 



to settle any questions which are possible of 
settlement. 

It is our policy to be, as General Marshall put 
it, the first to attend at international conference 
tables and the last to retire. 

We shall continue, through diplomatic channels 
and through the United Nations, to keep open 
every possibility for the adjustment of differences, 
and we look forward confidently to the day when 
the gradual process of accommodation will begin 
to make itself felt. 

To this end, we shall continue to give unfaltering 
support to the United Nations. In addition to the 
constructive work it is now doing, the United 
Nations is a symbol of our hopes for harmony 
among nations. 

The second purpose of our strength is to enable 
us to carry ahead a creative relationship with the 
other nations of the free world. Our traditions 
and our self-interest direct us toward the great 
constructive tasks before us among the peoples of 
the free world. 

Democracy is a dynamic idea in the world. 
Many millions of people look to this country for 
leadership in applying both the moral and the 
practical idea of democracy to the problems which 
we and they face. It is our responsibility to dem- 
onstrate the unlimited creative possibilities of the 
democratic process for "better standards of life 
in larger freedom," in the language of the United 
Nations Charter. 

Community Sense Among Free Nations 

It is a fact of considerable importance, although 
hardly recognized, that much of what the free 
world has been doing to build its strength has 
been in itself a great creative effort. The means 
by which free men have sought to strengthen their 
defenses have led, perhaps to some degree uncon- 
sciously, to a community sense among free nations. 
Both the North Atlantic community and the com- 
munity of the American states are institutions 
founded on pi'inciples which must eventually pre- 
vail in a wider world. 

Unlike the alliances of a former day, these 
associations among states produce a community of 
peoples where no dominance exists, a community 
which is based on generous and willing coopera- 
tion and on the primacy of individual liberty. 
These are communities in which rules of mutual 
aid and self-help are cardinal and in which the 
duty and responsibility of aiding other free peo- 

Ju/y 3, 1950 

892500—50 3 



pies to achieve their own development in their own 
way are fully recognized. 

Thus, the weaving of a community sense among 
the nations who have joined their strength in these 
common efforts is a substantial step toward the 
realization of a world order based on consent and 
dedicated to peace and progress. It has accom- 
plished, in a great area of the world, a fuller reali- 
zation of the principles of the Charter of the 
United Nations since it has advanced international 
cooperation to maintain the peace, to advance 
human rights, to raise standards of living, and to 
promote respect for the principle of equal rights 
and self-determination of i^eoples. 

The great effort in which we are engaged to 
build a North Atlantic community is not merely 
a means. It is in itself a creative act of historic 
significance. 

It is often true in history that men acting under 
immediate compulsion are only partly aware of 
the great consequences of what they have set in 
motion. Measures taken to suit a narrow purpose, 
if conceived in harmony with man's moral nature, 
may leave a great creative legacy. 

The barons at Runnymcde were seeking relief 
from the oppressive and arbitraiy actions of a 
despotic king, but the principles they enunciated, 
embodied in the Magna Carta, laid the basis for 
the restraints upon the state which are funda- 
mental to individual liberty. 

The complaints of the American colonists about 
taxation, which might conceivably have been 
settled through diplomatic negotiation, instead, 
gave rise to that enduring statement of the in- 
alienable rights of man, the Declaration of 
Independence. 

It is in the nature of democracy to recognize 
that the means we choose shape the ends we 
achieve. In a democracy, there are no final ends, 
in the sense of a Utopia. 

The followers of Karl Marx endure the dictator- 
ship of a police state in the delusion that they are 
ascending to a classless society. But a democratic 
society camiot employ means which belie and 
indeed destroy the possibility of achieving its 
goals. Democratic society, by its conduct from 
day to day, from week to week, and from year to 
year, is creating its own future. 

If we would continue to move toward our goal 
of a world order in which peace, freedom, and 
justice may be secure, the means we choose to 
{Continued on page 38) 

17 



KEEPING PEACE IN THE CARIBBEAN AREA 



ty Edward A. Jamison 



On April 8, 1950, in the Council Chamber of the 
Organization of American States (Oas), in the 
Pan American Union building at Washington, the 
representatives of 21 nations of the Western Hem- 
isphere took part in an event of profound impor- 
tance to peace and security among their own 
governments and of significance to the peace of 
the world. Meeting as representatives of govern- 
ments of sovereign equality, these members of the 
Council of the Oas, who were acting provisionally 
as Organ of Consultation under the Rio treaty, 
brought to a successful conclusion (without a dis- 
senting vote in 6 hours of continuous voting and 
debate) the second and third successful applica- 
tions of that inter- American pact to controversies 
between American states. 

Here was a convincing demonstration of inter- 
American solidarity in action. For over 3 months, 
the consultative body of the Oas dealt with charges, 
by one or another government of the Caribbean 
area, that other American governments or their 
officials had tolerated or even openly supported 
activities directed from abroad against their own 
existence. During that period, an Investigating 
Committee of five members of the Organ of Con- 
sultation carried out an intensive and thorough 
examination within all the countries directly con- 
cerned of the factual bases of these charges and 
produced an objective and frank report. 

The report, Which has been made public, was 
the basis upon which the Organ of Consultation 
on April 8 took firm and constructive action. It 
approved resolutions which (1) made clear the 
culpability of certain of the accused governments; 
(2) called upon these governments to take st«ps 



to remove the causes of the difficulties and to restore 
their relations to a normal, friendly basis; (3) in- 
dicated that repetition of the disturbing events 
might well require more extreme action under the 
Eio treaty ; and (4) laid the groundwork for other 
general action to eliminate the causes of underly- 
ing difficulties.^ 

Controlling International Strife Among Countries 

The problems that revolutionary irregularities 
create are not new in the general area of the Car- 
ibbean, elsewhere in the Americas, or, for that 
matter, in the world. For generations, and fre- 
quently even in recent years, armed groups and 
individual adventurers have sought by various 
means to overthrow by force one or another of the 
established governments of the area. Nor is such 
action necessarily a strange phenomenon among 
countries that had originally achieved indepen- 
dence by revolutions, at times with the active 
assistance of other governments and peoples. 
However, the growth of concepts of international 
order and the development of procedures for 
making them efi'ective have produced an increas- 
ing recognition of the fundamental fact that gov- 
eriunents have a responsibility, if only as an 
aspect of maintaining their own independence, of 
preventing irregular activities which they can 
control and which have the purpose of starting or 
promoting civil strife in neighboring countries. 



' For full texts of the resolutions approved on Apr. 8, 
1950, see Bulletin of May 15, 1950, p. 771. Copies of the 
resolutions, which have been issued in English, Spanish, 
French, and Portuguese, may also be obtained from the 
Pan American Union, Washington, D.C. 



18 



Department of Sfafe Bulletin 



This purpose was the meaning of the action that 
the American Republics took in 1928 at Habana 
when manj' of them signed a treaty proscribing 
sucli activities. Such, also, has been one of the pur- 
poses, since that time, of numerous other inter- 
American actions. 

In 1947, the American states drew up the Inter- 
American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, "the 
Rio Treaty," which provides inter-American ma- 
chinery for dealing not only with armed attack 
or serious thieats from outside the hemisphere and 
with open conflicts between American states but 
also with any other fact or situation that ''might 
endanger the peace of America" and "that affects 
the inviolability or the integrity of the territory or 
the sovereignty or the political independence of 
any American State." The quoted language is 
from article 6 of that treaty. 

Applying the Rio Treaty 

The Rio treaty became effective in December 
1948 when the necessary ratifications by 14 gov- 
ernments were completed. Shortly thereafter, 
Costa Rica invoked the treaty, and its procedures 
were applied to a dispute between that country 
and Nicaragua, a dispute which was settled to the 
satisfaction of both parties by their concluding, 
on February 21, 1949, and subsequently ratifying, 
a treaty of friendship. This settlement marked 
the successful culmination of the first application 
of the Rio treaty.^ 

On January 3, 1950, an American state again 
invoked that treaty. The Government of Haiti, 
through its representative on the Council of the 
Oas, Ambassador Joseph L. Dejean, on that date, 
requested the Chairman of the Council, Ambas- 
sador Luis Quintanilla of Mexico, to p)lace before 
that body charges by Haiti that the Government 
of the Dominican Republic had committed acts of 
intervention which affected the territorial inviola- 
bility, the sovereignty, and the political independ- 
ence of Haiti. The charges also included the 
accusation that officials of the Dominican Govern- 
ment had aided in the preparation of a conspiracy 
in which an armed band was to overthrow the 
established Government of Haiti. This armed 
band, according to the charge, was proceeding 
from the Dominican Republic under the leadership 
of a former Haitian army officer. Colonel Roland, 

* For an account of the situation by W. Tapley Bennett, 
Jr., see Bxjlletin of June 5, 1949, p. 707. 



who had been in exile in that country for some time 
and whose activities had been the basis of earlier 
action by Haiti under inter-American procedures 
for settling disputes. Although Haitian officials 
had thwarted the conspiracy, Haiti held that the 
situation Mas sufficiently serious to warrant action 
under article G of the Rio treaty. 

Chairman Quintanilla lost no time in calling a 
meeting to consider the Haitian invocation of the 
treaty. Wlien the representatives gathered on 
January 6, the Haitian Ambassador, who had only 
recently been welcomed as the new representative 
of his Govermnent on the Council, expounded fur- 
ther the bases of the Haitian complaint. 

Ambassador Joaquin Salazar of the Dominican 
Republic replied by reading a formal note in 
which, in the name of his Government, he not only 
denied categorically the Haitian charges but also 
called upon the Council to apply the terms of the 
Rio treaty to the situation which the Dominican 
Republic claimed had developed as a result of 
failure of several other govenunents of the Carib- 
bean over a period of years to carry out their 
international obligations. This situation, he in- 
dicated, had endangered and continued to endan- 
ger the sovereignty of his government. 

Debate on the Haitian Charges 

The debate which ensued demonstrated that 
most of the Council members clearly felt that valid 
grounds existed for putting the treaty procedures 
into effect. Whether this action should be taken 
with respect to the specific charges presented by 
Haiti alone, or whether the more general situation 
presented by the Dominican Government (in 
which other countries figured) should be dealt, 
with as well was not, at first, clear. Actually, the 
Council produced no definitive decision on the 
issue at the January 6 meeting, but the importance 
of the charges that Ambassador Salazar brought 
out was recognized by reference to them in the 
preamble of the resolution finally approved. 

The resolution set for the precise decisions, how- 
ever, on applying the treaty and declared the 
need for a full investigation of the facts. The 
Council followed the procedure for which an im- 
portant precedent had been set in the Costa Rica- 
Nicaragua case of the previous year. In the first 
place, the Council convoked the Organ of Consul- 
tation and called a meeting of Ministers of Foreign 
Affairs, with time and place of the meeting not 
specified. 



July 3, 1950 



19 



In conformity witli article 12 of the treaty, the 
Council itself may act provisionally as Organ of 
Consultation until the meeting of Foreign Minis- 
ters takes place. The significant precedent of the 
Costa Rica-Xicaragua case showed, however, that 
acting provisionally as consultative organ without 
the actual holding of the Foreign Ministers meet- 
ing, the Council may reach a satisfactory resolu- 
tion of the problem. 

Appointment of Investigating Committee 

The second important decision embodied in 
the resolution of January 6 was that the Council 
should appoint an Investigating Committee to de- 
termine the facts upon which subsequent decisions 
of the consultative organ would be based. The 
view that an impartial baring of the facts of the 
situation would in itself have a salutary effect upon 
the uneasiness which had so long characterized 
relations among governments in the area had con- 
siderable basis. Whatever delay might be entailed 
was felt to be expendable, in this instance, because, 
on the whole, the charges did not point to a threat 
or international dereliction of such imminence that 
a thorough search for the truth could be dispensed 
with. Many of the charges dealt with activities 
which, however important in producing a state 
of tension, were incidents of the past. 

Shortly after the meeting of January 6, Chair- 
man Quintanilla announced the appointment of 
the representatives on the Council to the Investi- 
gating Committee. These were Ambassadors 
Jose Mora of Uruguay, Eduards Zuleta Angel of 
Colombia, Guillermo Gutierrez of Bolivia, and 
Paul C. Daniels of the United States, and Minister 
Alfonso Moscoso of Ecuador. At an organiza- 
tional meeting, held the following day. Ambassa- 
dor Mora was chosen chairman of the group. 

The resolution approved by the Council on 
January 6 stipulated that the Bases de Actuacion — 
or terms of reference — of the Investigating Com- 
mittee would be described in detail in a subsequent 
meeting of the Council, acting provisionally as 
Organ of Consultation. Accordingly, a second 
meeting was held on January 11, in which it took 
significant actions and set important precedents. 

Decision To Discuss Dominican Case Separately 

Perhaps, the most significant decision of this 
meeting was that the Organ of Consultation should 
take up the Haitian and Dominican petitions sep- 
arately — dealing with the note presented by Haiti 



as "Case A" and with that presented by the Do- 
minican Republic as "Case B." In a sense, the 
necessities of the voting procedures of the Rio 
treaty, which provides that "the parties directly 
interested" shall be excluded from voting when 
the Organ of Consultation is dealing with a situa- 
tion or dispute between American states, dictated 
this decision. The Haitian petition was based on 
charges directed against the Dominican Govern- 
ment, while the note of the latter Government re- 
ferred to a more general situation, covering a 
considerably longer period, in which several other 
goveriunents w ere charged with international dere- 
liction. On the basis of agreement on the distinc- 
tion between the two cases, the Council considered 
Haiti and the Dominican Republic to be the 
directly interested parties in "Case A"; and it also 
approved the document setting forth the functions, 
powers, and attributes of the Investigating Com- 
mittee for dealing with that case. 

The Council generally assumed that the Investi- 
gating Committee would examine the facts of both 
cases. A difficult problem, however, arose when 
the Council attempted to determine, for voting 
purposes, which governments were "directly in- 
terested" in "Case B." Although the Dominican 
note had mentioned several governments, Ambas- 
sador Salazar indicated early in the meeting that 
his Government regarded only Haiti, Cuba, and 
Guatemala as parties to an existing dispute or sit- 
uation. Since the immediate issue concerned the 
voting privilege and since Guatemala, because of 
not having ratified the Rio treaty, held no voting 
right, the problem was reduced to determining 
whether Cuba and Haiti were, in fact, directly 
interested parties to "Case B." Considerable de- 
bate followed on this issue with general insistence 
that a government may become "directly inter- 
ested" either through accusing others or by being 
itself accused of an international wrongdoing. 
This determination the Council decided did not 
in itself imply culpability on the part of the ac- 
cused. Finally, the necessary two-thirds majority 
concluded that the Dominican Republic, Haiti, and 
Cuba were the Governments, among those which 
had ratified the treaty, which were "directly in- 
terested" in "Case B." 

The Council, thus, ajiproved the Investigating 
Committee's Bases de Actuacion as applicable to 
both cases. This document described in detail the 
powers and functions of the Committee, which had 
been charged, in general terms, in the resolution of 



20 



Department of State Bulletin 



January 6 Mitli conducting an "on the spot investi- 
gation of the facts and their antecedents." Its 
terms authorized the committee ". . . to hear wit- 
nesses, to receive depositions and to avail itself 
of any other sources of" information" which it 
miglit consider pertinent to its task. Furthermore, 
the terms instructed it to prepare a report or re- 
ports containing a recital of the facts, pertinent 
documentary material, and its conclusions as a 
result of the investigation. Meetings of the Com- 
mittee and the transmittal of its report to the 
Organ of Consultation were to be in private session, 
but the Council decided that the consultative body 
would decide on the documents to be made public 
as well as other action that might be considered 
advisable. 

The Investigating Committee planned to visit 
the countries which figured in the charges of cur- 
rent importance; but since it could accomplish 
considerable preparatory work at Washington, 
the Committee immediately initiated a series of 
meetings in which it heard the representatives of 
governments, including the Foreign Minister of 
Haiti, high Foreign Office officials of the Domini- 
can Republic, and others. In this manner, the 
Conunittee prepared the way for a thorough and 
intensive examination in the countries concerned 
of the basis for charges which were both specific 
and complex. 

Investigating Committee's Examination 

This examination, which began in Haiti, lasted 
for more than 3 weeks, during which time the 
Committee also visited the Dominican Republic, 
Cuba, Guatemala, and, briefly, Mexico. The ac- 
tivities of the Committee, in this period, included 
interviews both of a formal and informal nature 
with the Presidents and high officials of each of 
the directly interested governments, hearings of 
the testimony of numerous witnesses who had 
either participated in or were acquainted with 
details of revolutionary irregularities, visits by 
members of the Committee to areas in which 
activities were either alleged to have been carried 
on or which had significance for some other reason, 
to say nothing of constant reviewing and ordering 
of data which were acquired. The Committee left 
no doubt that it was determined to make its inves- 
tigation as thorough as it was impartial. The 
work of the Committee, particularly in this phase, 
together with the assistance given by all the gov- 



ernments involved, offers an encouraging example 
of the effective implementation of procedures for 
peaceful settlement undertaken by a regional col- 
lective security body. 

When the Committee returned to Washington, it 
undertook immediately the task of winding up the 
investigation and analyzing the extensive data 
compiled regarding the facts of the cases. Fur- 
thermore, the Committee was obligated to point 
out what it believed to be the basic factors con- 
tributing to Caribbean irregularities and offer its 
conclusions regarding steps which could eliminate 
these factors and thereby avoid repetition of the 
difficulties. It gave considerable attention to pre- 
paring general considerations and drafting 5 reso- 
lutions, covering all essential aspects of the 
problem, which the Organ of Consultation may 
propose for action. 

The Council of the Organization, acting pro- 
visionally as Organ of Consultation, received the 
Committee's 73-page report at a special meeting in 
the Council Chamber on March 13, 1950.^ The 
Council had decided, in its previous meeting, that 
the session in which it received the report would 
begin as a closed meeting. No objection was ex- 
pressed though a suggestion was made that the 
doors be opened immediately to the press and 
public. 

The report itself was withheld from publication 
for 6 days in order that the representatives of dis- 
tant governments might have time to forward it 
to their Foreign Offices. The manner in which 
the contents of the document appear to have been 
kept in confidence until the date of publication, 
which was March 20, 1950, is a striking example 
of the cooperative spirit which all the members of 
the Council showed throughout the entire period. 

Wlien the consultative body released the con- 
tents of the document, the governments and the 
public quickly appreciated the work the Commit- 
tee had accomplished. This report was no white- 
wash, nor was it, in any sense, a surrender to dip- 
lomatic camouflage. Rather, it was a straight- 
forward, clear-cut analysis of the factual basis of 
charges made by two governments, with conclu- 
sions which fixed responsibility and proposed steps 



' The full test of the report of the Investigating Com- 
mittee has been Issued in English, Spanish, and French by 
the Pan American Union, Washington, D.C., as Docu- 
ment C-I-67. Copies may be obtained by writing to the 
Pan American Union. 



July 3, 1950 



21 



for a solution of the immediate and underlying 
difficulties. On March 22, Secretary Acheson ex- 
pressed the full support of the United States for 
the Committee's conclusions and recommendations 
and i^raised the Committee for the thorougluiiess 
and objectirlty of its work.* 

Because oi its sigiiiGcance in the development of 
the inter-American peace-keeping machinery, as 
well as its importance in setting forth the basic 
facts and considerations in the cases dealt with 
the report itself merits careful attention as a his- 
toric document. The following presents a sum- 
mary of certain of its highlights. 

Summary of Highlights in the Report 

The Committee examined, first, "Case A," re- 
sulting from the Haitian petition of January 3. 
It found that several of the charges by Haiti 
against the Dominican Republic had considerable 
basis in fact. Of these charges several concerned 
the activities of two Haitian exiles who were said 
to have engaged in attacks upon the Haitian Gov- 
ernment by radio from Ciudad Trujillo. The 
Committee held that failure of the Dominican 
Government to prevent incitement of this kind was 
in violation of the Joint Declaration that each gov- 
ernment had signed on June 9, 1949, in which each 
had indicated that it would not tolerate activities 
in its territory that had as their object the disturb- 
ance of the internal peace of the neighboring 
country. Recognizing the particular importance 
of this Joint Declaration, as well as the subsequent 
reaffirmation of it by the Dominican Government, 
the Committee concluded that the Dominican Gov- 
ermnent should have prevented certain of the 
activities which were found to have taken place. 

Of more immediate concern, however, was the 
Haitian charge that the abortive plot of Novem- 
ber-December 1949 (which Haitian police had 
uncovered and suppressed) had involved, among 
other things, contact between conspirators at 
Port-au-Prince and the Haitian exile at Ciudad 
Trujillo, ex-Colonel Astrel Roland, and that Do- 
minican citizens and certain Government officials 
had supported the preparations for the conspir- 
acy. In this charge the Committee found much 
truth. Not only did it establish the fact that a 
conspiracy existed between persons in Haiti and 
Roland for the purpose of overthrowing the Presi- 
dent of Haiti, but it also found that certain Do- 



* Bulletin of Apr. 3, 1950, p. 523. 



minican officials aided this action, which a 
Dominican diplomatic officer at Port-au-Prince 
had transmitted $2,000 to the conspirators, and 
that a Dominican citizen and former high official 
". . . played a principal part in said cooperation." 

In dealing with the petition of the Dominican 
Republic, "Case B," the Committee indicated that 
the complexity and scope of the complaints made 
difficult an analysis of each in detail. After it 
had dealt with certain examples of events, in- 
dicative of the "state of unrest" of previous years, 
which illustrated that no one government had felt 
exclusively the problem of revolutionary activity, 
it did analyze three of the situations which formed 
a main basis of Dominican charges and the relation 
of those to the "present situation." It found that 
two of these, the Cayo Confites expedition of 1947 
(which Cuba eventually thwarted) and the attack 
at Luperon in June 1949 (in which one plane 
actually made a water landing in Dominican ter- 
ritorial waters) had gained considerable headway 
as a result of toleration and, in some cases, open 
support by officials of two Governments, Cuba in 
the former case and Guatemala in the latter. 

A third Dominican accusation was that fresh 
preparations for warlike action against the Domin- 
ican Government were undertaken, with aid from 
the Cuban Red Cross, late in 1949 in Cuba. The 
accusation also charged that the Cuban Red Cross 
had engaged in constructing an airfield in Cuba 
which was to be used as a starting point for an 
attack on the Dominican Republic. In this case, 
the Committee found that, although certain un- 
usual circumstances surrounded the control of and 
activities carried on in the name of the Cuban or- 
ganization, the proposed airfield clearly could not 
be used to facilitate a military invasion of the Do- 
minican Republic. 

Although the Committee found that the irregu- 
larities in connection with the above specific Do- 
minican complaints were matters of the past, it 
stated that certain of the circumstances which 
had contributed to them continued to exist and that 
these were giving rise to new factors "indicative of 
an abnormal situation in the Caribbean zone." 
Specifically, it found (1) that various groups of 
exiles ". . . not only persist in their struggle, but 
also seek surreptitious support from govern- 
ments"; (2) that some governmental authorities 
were indicating a willingness to keep these exile 
groups; (3) that certain agents of revolutionary 
movements were occupying and using official posi- 



22 



Departmenf of State Bulletin 



tions for their revolutionary purposes; (4) that 
collections of war materials used in earlier revolu- 
tionary attempts and a ''professionally subversive 
element in certain sections" which were insuffi- 
ciently controlled still existed. 

All of these facts led to the conclusion that ele- 
ments remained which were likely to create war- 
like situations. 

After it had dealt with the immediate factual 
situation in each case, the Investigating Commit- 
tee set forth a series of basic factors which, it be- 
lieved, had contributed to Caribbean irregularities 
and presented conclusions on steps which the coun- 
tries concerned might take to eliminate such fac- 
tors and avoid repetition of the irregularities. 

Among those factors upon which the Committee 
recommended sj^ecific action to the Organ of Con- 
sultation were : 

1. The limitations of the 1928 Convention on 
Duties and Eights of States in the Event of Civil 
Strife.^ This treaty, the inter-American instru- 
ment which is specific and detailed regarding the 
duties of states in situations such as those which 
had troubled the Caribbean area, required review 
in order to determine whether it should be made 
more adequate and up to date in fixing the obliga- 
tions of states in preventing ". . . the prepara- 
tion and carrying out of activities which have the 
purpose of fomenting civil strife in other coun- 
tries." Although some members made suggestions 
for strengthening it, the Investigating Commit- 
tee's primary recommendation was that competent 
inter-American organs should study this matter 
thoroughly to determine what effective measures 
they could work out on the matter. 

2. The problem of political asylees, refugees, 
and exiles. In this connection, the Committee 
noted explicitly the problems created by the exist- 
ence of an increased number of political exiles 
in the Caribbean area, some with sincere and 
idealistic purj^oses and others whose motives were 
adventurous or mercenary. This problem is, in- 
deed, implicit in almost every phase of the Com- 
mittee's report. Here, again, the Committee 
proposed that competent organs of the Oas make 
a careful study to determine whether further in- 
ter-American action might be practical or 
desirable. 

3. The lack of adequate measures to give effec- 
tiveness to the principle of representative democ- 

July 3, T950 



racy, particularly as reflected in the free electoral 
process. The relevance of this fundamental prob- 
lem, although not set forth in explicit terms, was 
implicit in many phases of the situation which the 
Committee had examined. The difficulty of find- 
ing means within a framework in which the non- 
intervention commitment is precise and specific, 
for promoting adequate respect for representative 
democracy is quite clear, but the proposal that the 
matter be subjected to careful study underlined 
the need for seeking such means. 

One aspect of the relation of the principle of 
representative democracy to inter-American com- 
mitments was, however, thought worthy of clari- 
fication : the Committee proposed that the Organ 
of Consultation declare in precise terms that, what- 
ever might be the need for giving representative 
democracy more effectiveness, it could find no 
justification for asserting that the promotion of 
that principle authorizes a government or gov- 
ernments to violate international commitments 
regarding nonintervention. 

4. The need for some means to assure fulfillment 
of the recommendations which the Organ of Con- 
sultation might make with regard to the problems 
presented to it. The establishment of a committee 
with adequate powers to observe compliance with 
whatever steps the Organ of Consultation might 
agree upon was, therefore, proposed. 

On the basis of the facts presented, the conclu- 
sions reached on the Haitian and Dominican com- 
plaints, and these general considerations, the In- 
vestigating Committee prepared drafts of resolu- 
tions, based upon the consultative organ's drafts, 
which, in effect, summarized the Committee's con- 
clusions regarding the factual situation in each 
case and the steps which might be taken to correct 
them as well as to deal with the general situation. 
These, together with certain additional proposals 
on more general questions, were the matters on 
which the Organ of Consultation based its action 
of April 8, referred to above. 

At the meeting on March 13, the consultative 
organ agreed that it would give approximately 3 
weeks for governments to examine the Investigat- 
ing Committee's report and formulate their views 
on its recommendations. 

The consultative organ began its consideration 
on April 3. In this meeting and in others on the 
two following days, it heard the points of view of 
various governments, including those most directly 
involved, and, during this time, members presented 

23 



various amendments to the Investigating Commit- 
tee's draft resolutions. The first of these meet- 
ings took on added significance since Foreign Min- 
isters Ernesto Dihigo of Cuba, Ismael Gonzalez 
Arevalo of Guatemala, and Vilfort Beauvoir of 
Haiti were present. 

The consultative organ's action culminated these 
preparatory meetings and also concluded con- 
sideration on the two cases. 

With regard to that case in which Haiti was the 
petitioner, the resolution of April 8 indicates that 
irregularities for which the Dominican Govern- 
ment had responsibility were contrary to inter- 
American principles and that, although the danger 
to peace which they represented had been dis- 
pelled, their repetition would call for further 
action under the Rio treaty. The resolution notes, 
however, that the repeal of war powers which 
President Trujillo had obtained in December 
1949 — a grant of special power to declare war 
which had figured in the Haitian petition and on 
which Cuba also had requested action by the Organ 
of Consultation — together with Dominican legis- 
lation to prevent subversive activities in its terri- 
tory, demonstrated the intention of that Govern- 
ment to maintain peace and prevent events of the 
kind which had been the basis of the Haitian 
complaint. 

Nevertheless, the resolution formally requests 
the Dominican Government to "take immediate 
and effective measures to prevent government offi- 
cials from tolerating, instigating, encouraging, 
aiding or fomenting subversive and seditious 
movements against other governments" and to 
comply strictly with the Joint Declaration of June 
9, observance of which was held to be equally the 
responsibility of Haiti. Furthermore, the con- 
sultative organ pointed out to both governments 
certain means for strengthening their relations. 
It requested both to make every effort, within 
limits of constitutional authority, to avoid sys- 
tematic and hostile propaganda against each other 
or other American governments. 

The resolution dealing with the case emanating 
from the Dominican complaint contains a clear 
indication that revolutionary irregularities had 
been directed against the Dominican Republic in 
Cuba in 1947 and in Guatemala in 1949. Further- 
more, the resolution establishes the fact that offi- 
cials of those governments had not only expressed 
their sympathy with these movements but also had, 
in some cases, lent them aid. Certain of the facts 



determined were held to be contrary to basic inter- 
American norms, and the resolution indicates that 
the irregularities, if repeated, will call for further 
action under the Rio treaty. In this case, the reso- 
lution notes that declarations "formulated by the 
Chief Executives of Cuba and Guatemala, to which 
reference is made in the Report of the Committee, 
constitute a guaranty against future recurrence 
of acts of this kind." 

The resolution formally requests the Govern- 
ments of Cuba and Guatemala, however, to take 
adequate measures to prevent the existence in 
their territories of armed groups conspiring 
against other countries and to control war materi- 
als of such groups as well as any illegal traffic in 
arms. Favorable action on the resolution brought 
the withdrawal of several more drastic proposals 
for change. As a result of an amendment to this 
resolution, the responsibility of the Dominican 
Government for action contrary to inter- American 
harmony was declared, and that Government was 
also called upon to take adequate measures to in- 
sure absolute respect for the principle of non- 
intervention. Subsequent portions of the resolu- 
tion (1) make a request, similar to that described 
above, regarding hostile propaganda of all four 
directly interested governments; (2) call upon 
Cuba and the Dominican Republic to settle speed- 
ily an outstanding controversy; and (3) reaffirm 
the 14 conclusions approved by the Inter-Amer- 
ican Peace Committee on September 14, 1949, that 
contained a general restatement of existing prin- 
ciples pertinent to the international difficulties 
among Caribbean countries. 

As a means of insuring effective fulfillment of 
steps that the Organ of Consultation agreed upon, 
the Investigating Committee recommended the 
establishmenc of a committee with authority to re- 
quest and receive pertinent information and to 
promote, if necessary, a new meeting of the con- 
sultative organ itself. This proposal, involving 
significant precedent for future action, caused a 
degree of uneasiness on the part of certain repre- 
sentatives who feared that it might impinge, in 
some way, on the principle of nonintervention. 
Mexico proposed certain amendments that tem- 
pered such apprehensions, and the consultative 
organ approved the creation of a continuing com- 
mittee, provisional in character. 

This committee, to which Chairman Quintanilla 
appointed the five members who had served on the 
Investigating Committee, is to inform itself of the 



24 



Deparfmenf of State Bulletin 



manner in which the two resohitions are carried out 
and to report to all the American governments 
within 3 months after April 8, and again when its 
work has been completed. The committee, which 
has been installed, has taken the name "Special 
Committee for the Caribbean" and is under the 
chairmanship of Ambassador Mora of Uruguay. 
The consultative organ gave unanimous approval 
in the April 8 meeting to the Investigating 
Committee's declaration that the principles of rep- 
resentative democracy, of suffrage, and of partici- 
pation in government do not authorize any gov- 
ernment or group of governments to violate 
inter-American commitments on nonintervention ; 
the representative of Guatemala, although unable 
to vote on the resolution, stated his Government's 
full approval of the concept it expressed. 

A fifth resolution, approved unanimously, stipu- 
lates that the Council of the Oas, through its 
competent organs, shall initiate studies of the diffi- 
cult and complex questions that the Investigating 
Committee propounded. 

Such studies include the following subjects : (1) 
the possibilities of stimulating and developing 
the effective exercise of representative democracy, 
with special emphasis on suffrage and the principle 
of free elections; (2) means for strengthening and 
improving the 1928 Habana Convention, prescrib- 
ing measures governments should use to prevent 
the preparation of activities designed to foment 
civil strife in other countries ; and (3) the "regimen 
of political asylees, exiles, and refugees." 

That practical achievement rather than aca- 
demic assessment is anticipated as a result of 
these studies is attested by the careful stipulation 
of procedures for handling them. These require 
that, in the case of the 1928 Habana Convention, 
a document be produced to be submitted directly 
to the governments and that, on the other items, 
topics be prepared for action at an Inter- American 
Conference, the supreme organ of the Organization 
of American States. 

The consultative organ approved other resolu- 
tions that urge the governments directly concerned 
to normalize their mutual relations as soon as 
possible and express the hope that governments 
which have not ratified basic inter-American in- 
struments will give this matter prompt attention. 
Finally, the Organ of Consultation, after stating 
that the members of the Investigating Committee 
"have deserved well of the nations of America" 



and merited a vote of "confidence and gratitude," 
formally terminated the action of the Council of 
the Organization under the Rio treaty on the cases. 

Conclusion 

The success of international action may appear 
to be measured in terms of resolutions and docu- 
ments, detailed and often excessively wordy. 
Nevertheless, the documents resulting from the 
actions of the inter-American Organ of Consul- 
tation summarized above reveal, in themselves, 
achievements in the orderly development of free- 
dom and international security in the Western 
Hemisphere. Furthermore, many of the steps 
which the various bodies took in producing that 
finished work on specific cases constitute invalu- 
able precedents which will either make the need 
for future action less likely or strengthen the 
means for meeting threats which, in the future, 
may unfortunately occur. 

The documents alone, however, can never tell 
the whole story. Any impression that the 3 
months in which the inter-American peace ma- 
chinery was at work on these problems were com- 
pletely devoid of rivalry, the struggle for political 
advantage, or even hostility would be misleading. 
Issues were involved which touch most directly 
upon the sensitive spots in relations among the 
American states. Basically, though, the spirit of 
the "convivencia interamericana" — a term which 
no English ti'anslation can adequately express — 
characterized the proceedings from their begin- 
ning to the successful outcome of the meeting of 
April 8. This spirit was expressed in the unend- 
ing efforts of all the members of the Investigating 
Committee in their impartial search for facts, 
in the cooperative assistance that the governments 
directly involved gave to the Investigating Com- 
mittee, and in the manner in which the losers as 
well as those who had been successful accepted the 
hotly debated issues, once they were solved. 

The ultimate test of success for this venture in 
inter-American peace-keeping will, of course, 
depend upon the long-range results in reliev- 
ing tensions and eliminating the basic causes of 
the irregularities from which it stemmed. Early 
indications of more than transitory success in this 
regard are encouraging. In any circumstances, 
the inter-American community has, once again, 
demonstrated its capacity to use effectively the ma- 
chinery for peace and security which it has 
devised. 



July 3, J 950 



25 



Upholding Principles and Rights 

of Others in the Process of International Negotiation 



hy Philip C. Jessup 
Ambassador at Large '■ 



Negotiation is as old as human society. The 
goal toward which we strive is the place where the 
processes of negotiation eventually prevail and the 
drums of war are silenced by the triumphant 
symphony of peace. That is the goal of the for- 
eign policy of the United States. International 
negotiation is a process and means, not an end 
in itself. To be successful, it must take place in 
a situation where nations, for whatever reason, are 
willing to reconcile their interests with each other. 
The basic difficulty which we should keep in mind 
in discussing the role of negotiation is the diffi- 
culty of creating a situation wherein nations are 
willing to reconcile and adjust their interests. 

The process of international negotiation re- 
quires concessions but not concessions at the ex- 
pense of principles or of the rights of others. Ap- 
peasement is again a distortion of negotiation and 
creates instead of allaying tension. 

There is unfortunately abroad in the world 
today a philosophy which sees no evil in tension. 
That philosophy, put into practice on a national 
scale, is the natural and inevitable result of a dis- 
regard of what the Charter of the United Nations 
calls "faith in fundamental human rights, in the 
dignity and worth of the human person." The 
system of the Soviet police state, like that of the 
similar Nazi regime, sees no value in the individ- 
ual. From this point they move with some logic 
and no humanity to the denial of the concept of 
the equality of states which is one of the principles 
on which the United Nations is based. The ])olice- 
state system cannot confine its theory of brutal 
suppression within its own frontiers. This is in- 
deed the absolute power which corrupts absolutely. 
In international relations, it results in the practice 
which we witness constantly of denying the right 
of smaller states to assert or even to formulate 



' Excerpts from an address delivered at Hamilton Col- 
lege, Clinton, N.Y., on June 11 and released to the press 
on the same date. 



their own policies. Some smaller states have un- 
happily been forcibly sucked into the Soviet orbit 
and are compelled as satellites to revolve around 
the Soviet Union. That is why a Bulgarian can 
be tried for treason, not to Bulgaria but to the 
Soviet Union. That is why Yugoslavia is itself 
considered traitorous — again to the Soviet Union. 

Difficulty in Peaceful Adjustments With U.S.S.R. 

The process of negotiations between a govern- 
ment which, like ours, believes in freedom and a 
government like that of the Soviet Union which 
does not is obviously difficult. We have differ- 
ent sets of values and different objectives. It is 
difficult, but it is not impossible. There have 
been situations in which we have negotiated with 
the Soviet Union, and we are prepared to do so 
again. Particularly we are always ready to carry 
on that form of multipartite negotiation which is 
the essence of the United Nations system. The 
difficulty wliich for the time being blocks that 
channel of negotiation is the refusal of the Soviet 
Union to particijjate in the various organs, com- 
missions, and committees of the United Nations 
because they are unwilling to have the majority 
decide how the question of Chinese representation 
should be settled. 

Control of Atomic Weapons 

I should like to discuss by way of example one 
question which is of prime importance and on 
which the Soviet Union now refuses to negotiate 
in the United Nations though called upon by the 
General Assembly to do so. The question is that 
of the international control of atomic weapons. 

Immediately after the revelation to the world 
of the discovery of the atomic bomb, in August 
1945, the United States voluntarily took steps to 
insure that the development of atomic energy 
would be f)laced under international control and 



26 



Deparfmeni of Sfate Bulletin 



\ 



that atomic energy would be used only for peace- 
ful purposes. 

The first step was a meeting between the Presi- 
dent and the Prime Ministers of tlie United King- 
dom and Canada in November 1945. The three 
agreed upon a declaration calling for international 
action under the United Nations. 

A month later, in December 1945, the Secretary 
of State met in Moscow with the Foreign Minis- 
ters of the United Kingdom and Soviet Union 
and agreed to sponsor a resolution in the United 
Nations setting up an international Atomic 
Energy Commission. This resolution was unani- 
mousl}' approved by the General Assembly at its 
first session in 1946, and a Commission was es- 
tablished within the United Nations. 

This Commission and its Committees held over 
200 meetings extending over a period of almost 2 
years. After thorough study, a majority of the 
members of the Commission evolved the basic out- 
lines of an effective international control system 
for atomic energy. Only the Soviet Union and 
its satellites disagreed with the majority findings. 
They proposed a completely different plan which 
the majority found not to be a plan for effective 
control. In 1948, the Commission finally reported 
the deadlock which had developed to the Security 
Council. 

The deadlock in the Commission was paralleled 
in the Council. The Council was barred from 
approving the Conmiission's majority plan by the 
Soviet veto. 

The reports of the Commission were then con- 
sidered by the General Assembly, and 40 member 
governments voted to approve the Commission's 
proposals. Only the Soviet bloc voted against 
them. The Assembly called on the Commission 
to resume its work. It also called on the per- 
manent members of the Commission — the perma- 
nent members of the Security Council plus Can- 
ada—to consult together to determine if a basis 
for agreement existed. The Soviet representative 
opposed this proposal. He stated that there was 
no basis for consultation, and that such discus- 
sions were unnecessary. 

After the Assembly session, the Commission 
did start meeting again. But it found itself still 
confronted by the impasse created by the Soviet 
Union's unwillingness to negotiate on the basis of 
a plan wliicli would provide adequate safeguards. 
After long deliberation the Commission concluded 
that no useful purpose was being served by con- 
tinuing discussion until such time as the permanent 
members found a basis for agreement. 
_ Last fall, at New York, after several consulta- 
tions among the permanent members had resulted 
m no progress, the General Assembly considered 
further the work of the Atomic Energy Com- 
mission. The Assembly reaffirmed its support 
for the United Nations plan. The Assembly again 
called for consultations among the permanent 
members and requested them to explore all avenues 

July 3, 1950 



which might lead to agreement. These consulta- 
tions were begun. They were suspended in Jan- 
uary of this year as a result of the Soviet walk-out. 

The ]3lan evolved by the majority of the members 
of the United Nations involves the concept of an 
international agency which would manage all 
atomic activities on behalf of the signatory nations. 
This plan was based on proposals submitted by 
the United States in 1946. We are justly proud 
of these proposals. We offered, in effect, to turn 
over our atomic resources and capacity to an inter- 
national authority so that these resources could 
benefit all mankind, and so that the world would 
not live under the threat of an atomic war. Our 
original proposals were modified and elaborated 
in negotiations although their essential objectives 
were retained. The plan finally worked out was 
not an "American plan" but oiie formulated and 
approved by the overwhelming majority of the 
United Nations. It is a United Nations plan. 

Tlie international agency to be established under 
this scheme would : 

a. Own all uranium and thorium, the basic 
source materials, from the moment they are mined 
until they are finally consumed as nuclear fuel. 

b. Own, manage, and operate all facilities using 
or producing dan<rcrous quantities of nuclear 
fuel — such as Oak Ridge and Hanford. 

c. License all nondangerous facilities and activ- 
ities operated nationally. 

d. Carry on research. 

e. Exercise thorough-going rights of inspection 
and survey in order to locate new ore sources and 
to detect or prevent clandestine activities. Mili- 
tary reservations would not be exempted from 
inspection. 

The agency would be a servant of the signatories. 
The principles governing the agency's policies in 
the production and stockpiling of production fa- 
cilities would be spelled out in the agency's charter. 
The treaty would also provide for the prohibition 
of the manufacture, possession, and use of atomic 
weapons. And it would make that prohibition 
effective by the control system it established. The 
treaty would provide for the disposal of existing 
stocks, would prescribe the stages whereby controls 
would go into effect, define violations, and provide 
effective enforcement measures. 

The Soviets reject the concept of a strong inter- 
national authority. Atomic operations would 
continue mainly on a national basis. Their pro- 
posals provide that : 

a. Atomic weapons would be "prohibited" by a 
paper convention. 

b. An International Control Commission would 
be established but its powers would be limited to 
making recommendations to governments and to 
the Security Council, where the veto would apply. 
Any one of the permanent members of the Coun- 
cil could thus prevent action. 

c. Nations would continue to own materials and 



27 



own, operate, and manage all dangerous atomic 
energy facilities. 

d. Atomic plants would be subject to some kind 
of "periodic" inspection. But the Soviet Union 
has not been clear as to how this inspection would 
work. The Control Commission would have "ac- 
cess" to facilities and "acquaintance" with pro- 
duction operations, but inspections would be "pe- 
riodic" and "normally inspectors will visit only 
declared plants." 

The basic issue between the United Nations 
plan and the Soviet plan is that of effective versus 
ineffective control, of real control versus a pre- 
tense of control. The United Nations plan recog- 
nizes that the nature of atomic energy production 
dictates the need for close control at all stages of 
development. From the time it leaves the mine 
until it reaches the end product, the production of 
atomic energy is a Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde: It 
can be turned to beneficial or destructive uses. It 
can transform itself from Dr. Jekyll to Mr. Hyde 
at any moment and at any stage. 

No halfway measures — such as "Monday and 
Thursday" inspections or "periodic" inspections — 
would offer assurance against the diversion of 
nuclear fuel from peacetime to military use. Our 
federal or any state government would never be 
satisfied with a system for inspecting banks or 
meat-packing plants which was based on the no- 
tion that the institution to be inspected should be 
warned in advance when the inspectors would 
arrive. Can we as a nation accept such a notion 
where our very national existence may be 
involved ? 

The Soviet control convention is so devoid of 
effective safeguards tliat all that remains in effect 
is a convention on prohibition — a paper conven- 
tion on prohibition. Such a convention is no bet- 
ter than the good faith of its signatories. This 
we must realize, as a result of bitter experience, 
is not good enough. It is indeed worse than no 
plan at all. It might deceive some with its il- 
lusory security, but it would not in fact provide 
the substance of security. It might bring atomic 
disarmament in the West. But the West would 
have no assurances as to the atomic disarmament 
actually carried out in the Soviet world, behind 
the Iron Curtain. 

MEASURES FOR SECURITY 

The difference between the United Nations and 
the Soviet plans reflects a fundamental cleavage 
between the aims of the majority and the minority. 
Representatives of Canada, China, France, the 
United Kingdom, and the United States reported 
as follows to the General Assembly in 1949 : 

All the Sponsoring Powers other than the U.S.S.R. 
put world security first and are prepared to accept in- 
novations in traditional concepts of international co- 
operation, national sovereisnty and economic organiza- 
tion where these are necessary for security. The 
Government of the U.S.S.R. puts its sovereignty first and 



is unwilling to accept measures which may impinge upon 
or interfere with its rigid exercise of unimpeded state 
sovereignty. 

The willingness to accept some restrictions on 
sovereignty is one of the great and hopeful at- 
titudes in the world today. The Schuman pro- 
posal with respect to the European coal and steel 
inditstries is the most recent example of this pro- 
gressive spirit. 

The behavior of the Soviets in the atomic energy 
negotiations shows these features : 

1. Distrust of the proposals of other nations. 

2. An effort to get concessions from other 
nations without yielding anything themselves. 

3. Bitter denunciation of the opposition, and 
vicious propaganda attempts to sow discord and 
arouse suspicion. 

4. Finally, steady freezing of Soviet opposition, 
as though their own propaganda had a certain 
self-propagating quality. 

This last feature is most disturbing. Yet the 
Soviet system seems to have this effect. Public 
statements from the Kremlin set the tone and 
give the cue to many organizations and publica- 
tions throughout the world which, in some form 
or other, repeat the Kremlin's ideas. These are 
then reported back as the sentiment of the peoples 
of the world. These reinforcing echoes of their 
own voices apparently solidify the original views 
of the Kremlin. It is as though, in the words of 
Mr. X, in his now famous article in Foreign 
Affairs : 

It is an undeniable privilege of every man to prove 
himself right in the thesis that the world is his enemy; 
for if he reiterates it frequently enough and makes it the 
bacliground of his conduct he is bound eventually to be 
right. 

It seems that there could be no clearer statement 
of what is happening in the Atomic Energy Com- 
mission of the United Nations. At the start of 
the negotiations, either from motives having to do 
with their internal situation, or from suspicion 
of the motives of others, the Soviet representatives 
took the position that the majority plan was a 
hostile gesture. Failing to make an objective 
study of the elements essential to any real con- 
trol, and with no informed body of public opinion 
which could cause them to reconsider their original 
position, the Kremlin has seemed to become in- 
creasingly committed to a course which is as 
dangerous to the Soviet Union as it is to the rest 
of the world. 

The appropriate forum for atomic energy nego- 
tiations as approved by the last General Assembly 
is the forum of the six permanent members of the 
United Nations Atomic Energy Commission. The 
United States stands ready at all times to take part 
in the consultations in that forum whenever the 
Soviet Union chooses to return to it. 

We believe the United Nations plan is an effec- 
tive plan. It has our support. But, as the Presi- 
dent said last February, 



28 



Department of State Bulletin 



... It has our support not because of its form or its 
words Init because we believe it would achieve effective 
control. The stakes are too large to let us, or any nation, 
stand on pride of authorship. We ask only for a plan 
that provides an effective, workable system — anything 
less would be a sham agreement. Anything less would 
increase, not decrease, the dangers of the use of atomic 
energy for destructive purposes. We shall continue to 
examine every avenue, every possibility of reaching real 
agreement for effective control. 

But we will not rely merely on a paper conven- 
tion "prohibiting" the use of the atomic bomb. 
We must not only prohibit the use of the bomb, 
we must also establish a system which will make 
that prohibition effective. That is the crucial dif- 
ference between the United Nations and Soviet 
plans. It is the difference between eliminating or 
continuing to live under the threat of atomic war. 



Strength as Basis for Negotiating With Soviets 

These negotiations illustrate the difficulty of 
peaceful adjustments with the Soviet Union. It 
would be dishonest to deny that the attitude and 
action of the Soviet Union creates a threat to the 
peace of the world. Their actions do belie their 
peaceful protestations. They are devoting a 
huge proportion of their resources to military pur- 
poses. There is nothing in their history to indi- 
cate that this great military machine of theirs is 
dedicated to the cause of peace and freedom. 
There is abundant evidence to the contrary. 
There is nothing in their political literature or 
philosophy to indicate that they respect weakness 
even though it were weakness inspired by benevo- 
lence and good will. Neither we nor other nations 
who share our view of life and dedication to free- 
dom are willing to place ourselves at the mercy of 
the Soviet Union. The fate of the Baltic states, 
of a Czechoslovakia, of a Hungary, or a Poland 
is not one which we crave for ourselves or our 
children. 

In the face of such an aggressive imperialist 
system as that of the Soviet Union, there is a pre- 
requisite to negotiation. That prerequisite is 
strength. It must be a strength sufficient to be 
apparent to the rulers in the Kremlin. It must 
be sufficient and sufficiently long maintained to 
convince those rulers that their policies, their will 
cannot be imposed. It must be an economic 
strenght which continues to demonstrate the fal- 
lacy of their Marxian concept that capitali.sm con- 
tains the seeds of its own decay. It must be a 
military strength which negates the possibility of 
a repetition of the tragic histories of armed sub- 
jection. It must be a spiritual strength which not 
only stands firm but which marches confidently 
forward to greater and greater well-being for the 
common man and woman in every part of the 
■world. On the basis of such strengtli in the free 
world, the Kremlin may decide that it too has an 
interest in avoiding conflict and reducing tensions. 
Then negotiations may lead to their rightful goal. 



Army Attache, Declared Persona 
Non Grata, Withdrawn From Rumania 

[Released to the press June 21] 

The Rumanian Oovemment has declared persona non 
grata Capt. Herschel Butsinpiller, United States Assistant 
Army Attach^ of the American Legation, Bucharest, Ru- 
mania. In conformity with customary diplomatic prac- 
tice, the United States Government is tvithdraimng Cap- 
tain Butsinpiller hut has denounced the basis of the 
Rumanian Government's demand. 

The United States Charge d' Affaires at Bucharest, Murat 
Williams, on June 20 delivered informally to the Rumanian 
Foreign Office the reply of the United States Government 
as follows: 

The Government of the United States has taken 
note of the manner in which the Rumanian Gov 
ernment has misrepresented an action on the part 
of certain members of the American Legation re- 
lating to the disposal of some obsolete small arms 
ammunition. The United States Government has 
also noted the Rumanian Government's demand in 
this connection for the recall of Captain Herschel 
Hutsinpiller, Assistant United States Army At- 
tache at Bucharest. 

It is illustrative of the conduct of diplomatic 
relations by the Rumanian Government that, 
through its organs of propaganda, it should have 
launched a new virulent attack against the Ameri- 
can Legation and the United States Government 
on the basis of an artificially exaggerated and 
distorted incident, without so much as first seeking 
an explanation through the American diplomatic 
representatives in Rumania. 

It is also characteristic that, after stating on 
June 9 that the Rumanian Government "would 
leave it up to the United States Government to 
decide what to do about Captain Hutsinpiller" and 
without awaiting the transmission of a reply from 
the Government of the United States, the Ruma- 
nian Ministry of Foreign Affairs on June 14 should 
have peremptorily demanded the recall of Captain 
Hutsinpiller. 

The quantity of the ammunition in question was 
negligible. It was disposed of in an open manner 
which belies assertions that this action had a clan- 
destine or secretive character. The false construc- 
tion placed by the Rumanian Government-con- 
trolled press on the intentions of the United States 
Government and its representatives in connection 
with this insignificant incident is patent on its face. 

The United States Government is withdrawing 
Captain Hutsinpiller. At the same time, it repu- 
diates the alleged justification for the Ministry's 
demand. The use which the Rumanian authorities 
have made of this episode and the abuse, on this as 
on former occasions, of the right to declare a 
foreign official unacceptable can only lead to the 
conclusion that the Rumanian Government's action 
is not really based upon the incident or upon the 
conduct of Captain Hutsinpiller but is part of a 
deliberate and centrally directed policy, being car- 



July 3, 1950 



29 



ried out throughout Eastern Europe, to mterrupt 
the normal conduct of diplomatic relations between 
the United States and the states of that area. 



On June 6, 1950, the official organ of the Ruma- 
nian Workers Party (Communist) launched a new 
propaganda attack upon the American Legation 
at Bucharest by publishing a letter signed by a 
janitor of its service attache's office. The letter 
stated that the writer had been an eye witness to 
the destruction by two enlisted men attached to 
that office of "four cases and a small sack contain- 
ing ammunition for pistol and automatic weapons." 
This ammunition was said to have been thrown 
into Lake Snagov, a small lake in the environs of 
Bucharest, from the jetty of a "villa" occupied by 
Captain Hutsinpiller. 

The Rumanian press as a whole took up the 
Government-inspired cry. It related the incident 
to trials of the past few years which are purported 
to demonstrate espionage and subversive activities 
of the American and British diplomatic missions. 
The most recent of these trials produced alleged 
evidence that the British Legation was hiding 
arms to be supplied to groups of Rumanian dissi- 
dents. The ammunition-dumping incident was 
given a similar interpretation. 

The underlying facts of the situation appear 
to be that the reported incident involved the dispo- 
sal of a small quantity of outdated ammunition 
left over from the supplies of the United States 
military representation of the Allied Control Com- 
mission for Rumania. During the Armistice 
period, that mission represented the United States 
as one of the three occupying powers. It was with- 
drawn in December 1947 in conformity with pro- 
visions of the Treaty of Peace with Rumania. 

In addition to Captain Hutsinpiller, who has 
been on duty in Rumania since March 191:7, the 
Americans mentioned in the Rumanian account 
are Sgt. John K. Reynolds and Corp. Byron L. 
Bird. The two enlisted men left Rumania June 
10 according to previous schedule, in line with the 
current, reduction of our Legation's staff. Captain 
Hutsinpiller is leaving June 2.5. 



Rumania Protests Against Travel 
Restrictions on Personnel in U.S. 

Statement by Secretary Acheson 

[Released to the press June 23] 

Over the past 3 years, the Rumanian Govern- 
ment has subjected our diplomatic representation 
at Bucharest to progressively severe restrictions, 
impediments, and discourtesies. These not only 

30 



drastically curtail the performance by our mission 
of its normal diplomatic and consular functions, 
but they also violate the existing consular agree- 
ment with Rumania and effectively deprive our 
chief of mission of rights and privileges to which 
he is entitled by his special responsibilities under 
the Treaty of Peace with Rumania. 

For a year now, there have been in effect in 
Rumania travel restrictions which, as adminis- 
tered by the Rumanian authorities virtually con- 
fine our representatives to Bucharest and its imme- 
diate environs. Theoretically, these restrictions 
are imposed on all diplomatic personnel. Theo- 
retically also, our people may travel to a few des- 
ignated" places by special permission. This is of 
little value since the Rumanians as a rule delay un- 
duly or fail to issue travel permits. 

At the time the travel restrictions were imposed, 
we were given informal assurance that we had only 
to ask and we would be permitted to travel to 
Constanza in connection with incoming shipments 
for the Legation. This, like many other such as- 
surances, has proved hollow. 

The Rumanian Government has deprived our 
personnel of premises for which they had rental 
contracts at destinations where they might be per- 
mitted to go. AVlien no other accommodations are 
available, it is of little use for them to travel 
there. 

Altogether the restrictions and harassments to 
which our mission in Rumania has been subjected 
by the Rumanian Government are more compre- 
hensively severe than those of any other country. 
We do not accept the thesis that we must conduct 
our relations toward one state and its representa- 
tives, regardless of its behavior toward us and our 
representatives, in the same way as we would 
toward other states. 

The institution on May 25 of the travel-pro- 
cedure applicable to personnel of the Rumanian 
Legation here involves reciprocity of diplomatic 
comity, a principle which the Rumanians have em- 
jjhasized to an extreme degree.^ As the Rumanian 
Government was informed, our administration of 
the travel procedure will be carried out with a view 
to the current treatment of our representatives in 
Rumania. 

It is interesting to note that the Rumanian pro- 
test recognizes that the imposition of travel re- 
strictions by a receiving country upon the official 
personnel of a sending country constitutes a lim- 
itation on the normal activity of a diplomatic mis- 
sion. When the Rumanian Government is disposed 
to remove the restrictions which it has placed on 
the travel of our representatives in Rumania, we 
will be ready to alter appropriately the restrictions 
which are presently applicable to ijersonnel of the 
Rumanian Legation here. 



' Bulletin of June 5, 1950, p. 921. 

Department of State Bulletin 



The Need for an International Trade Organization 



Views of Howard W. McGrath 
Attorney General 



The following letter dated April I4, 1950, was sent 
from the Attorney General, Hoicard W. McOrath, to the 
Chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 
John Kce. 

My dear Mr. Congressman : This is in response 
to your request for the views of the Department 
of Justice with respect to tlie approval of tlie 
Havana Charter for an International Trade Or- 
ganization, commonly known as the Ito Charter. 

The Department of Justice is primarily inter- 
ested in Chapter V of the Ito Charter which 
would provide the first international machinery 
intended to cope with restrictive business prac- 
tices. Since others will, or have, commented on 
other parts of the proposed Charter which relate 
more directly to the work of their particular de-r 
partments, I would like to direct my remarks to 
Chapter V. 

As you are well aware, production and market- 
ing of important raw materials and manufactured 
commodities in world trade are frequently con- 
trolled by cartels, combines and other restrictive 
international business arrangements. In their de- 
sire to increase profits and avoid competition these 
organizations engage in practices which reduce 
the volume of world trade and employment, such 
as division of fields of activity, division of mar- 
kets, allocation of production or export quotas, 
restriction on new capacity and fixing of prices 
and terms of sale. The policy of the United 
States to eliminate restrictive practices in the 
foreign trade of our country has long been es- 
tablished. 

In the successful negotiation of the Ito Char- 
ter, in general, and Chapter V in particular, fifty- 
four other nations important in international 
trade have now indicated a willingness to work 
together with the United States in extending the 
general policy of eliminating restrictive practices 
in world trade. The success of our Government's, 
negotiations in getting such an agreement among 
other delegations representing different national 
experiences and traditions is in itself an accomp- 

Jo/y 3, 7950 



lishment, and a real step toward breaking down 
barriers to world trade. 

I should like to point out at the outset that the 
Ito Charter clearly preserves the strength of our 
competitive traditions and our antitrust laws and 
their administration. The Ito is not given the 
power to interfere with the domestic laws or pro- 
cedures of the United States or any other nation. 

The Charter contains an express provision that 
"no act or omission to act on the part of the Or- 
ganization shall preclude any Member from en- 
forcing any national statute or decree directed 
toward preventing monopoly or restraint of 
trade." This provision keeps inviolate our anti- 
trust legislation. It says in effect that if the Ito 
does not find a violation of the Charter in a partic- 
ular instance, but the United States nevertheless 
finds that its laws have been violated, the right of- 
the United States to enforce its laws is not im- 
paired. Ito decisions or recommendations — or 
lack of them — do not supersede, supplant or mod- 
ify in any way our antitrust laws. 

The Charter should provide a useful instrument 
for extending the principles of our competitive 
system to other countries and thereby render the 
enforcement of the antitrust laws themselves in- 
creasingly effective. While the Charter does not 
write a Sherman Act for the world, it does set a 
pattern, clearly recognizable as American in ori- 
gin, for curbing restrictive business practices, such 
as I have pointed out above, affecting international 
trade. The Organization would be empowered to 
receive complaints from Member governments, 
initiate investigations, hold hearings, and make 
reports and recommendations for remedial meas- 
ures, with final action resting in the individual 
governments. Subscribing nations, agreeing to 
this pattern, commit themselves to take such meas- 
ures as will achieve the objective of the Charter. 
The effect of this commitment is to raise the stand- 
ards of other countries for curbing cartels and 
restrictive business practices toward our level — 

31 



and not the reverse. In this respect, the Charter 
helps to extend the concepts of free enterprise 
upon which our own antitrust laws are based. 

The commitment of Members to take full account 
of Ito recommendations for remedial action in 
specific instances, can be most useful in prevent- 
ing cartels and conspiracies in restraint of interna- 
tional trade. Thus, the Ito provides machinery 
for effecting a substantial measure of international 
cooperation in avoiding restrictive business prac- 
tices, and bringing about an increasing acceptance 
of free enterprise objectives. 

Frequently, in the course of investigating or 
prosecuting restraints upon our foreign commerce 
we find some of the guilty parties wholly outside 
the jurisdiction of our courts. This means that 
while we may cut off some parts of the offense, 
complete and adequate relief cannot always be 
achieved. The result in some cases may be to limit 
the effectiveness of the Justice Department and of 
our courts in eliminating violations of our anti- 
trust laws. The Charter provides methods which 
are designed to overcome these jurisdictional limi- 
tations. 

One of these methods consists of voluntary con- 
sultation among Member nations. Wlien a 'Mem- 
ber nation considers that in any particular in- 
stance a business practice has or is likely to have 
a harmful effect, it may consult directly with other 
Members concerned "with a view to reaching mu- 
tually satisfactory conclusions." Or, if Members 
wish, they may request the Ito to facilitate such 
consultation. This contemplates a cooperative 
method by which Members may agree among 
themselves as to the best means of dealing with 
mutual problems of international cartels or re- 
strictive business practices. In carrying out cor- 
rective measures, each Member is to act within its 
own jurisdiction in accordance with its own con- 
stitution and economic organization. In this way 
irritating jurisdictional obstacles may be avoided. 
Another method for avoiding jurisdictional bar- 
riers consists of cooperation among Members "for 
the purpose of making more effective within their 
respective jurisdictions any remedial measures 
taken in furtherance of the objectives of this 
Chapter and consistent with tlieir obligations 
under other provisions of this Charter." By this 
procedure restrictive or monopolistic practices 
may be eliminated voluntarily and amicably. 

The possibilities of Ito success, so far as Chapter 
V is concerned, seem good. I am sure that many 
other governments have had unhappy experiences 
with international cartels and would welcome a 
mechanism through which harmful practices of 
these enterprises might be curbed. It is hearten- 
ing to note that Sweden, Norway, Canada, and 
more recently Great Britain, have passed statutes 
providing for continuing commissions to investi- 
gate restrictive business practices within their 
respective jurisdictions. These laws will help im- 
plement their obligations under the Charter. The 

32 



significance of the new British law relative to the 
Ito Charter was indicated in the House of Lords 
during debate on the Bill. In asking for a second 
reading on July 5, 1948, the First Lord of the 
Admiralty (Viscount Hall), stated: 

The present Bill was drafted at the same time as the 
Charter was being given its final shape at Havana. The 
two documents are entirely consistent; the procedure of 
the International Trade Organization will, like our own, 
be one of investigation into particular restrictive arrange- 
ments to try to establish what effects they have on inter- 
national trade. If at a later date His Majesty's Govern- 
ment ratify the Charter, and are called upon to take any 
action under Chapter V, this Bill will provide us with 
adequate power to carry out our international obliga- 
tions . . . The Bill is in line with developments in other 
countries ... It has the support of all Parties in its 
general purpose. 

Furthermore, the Austrian Government has re- 
cently introduced antitrust legislation in its Par- 
liament, a commission under the Minister of Com- 
merce of Denmark is drafting anti-monopoly 
legislation, and the French Government is also 
drafting an antitrust law. 

The significant progress that has been made in 
assisting the economic recovery of Western Europe 
has made possible an increasing emphasis under 
the ERP for the creation of an integrated Western 
European economy. The liberalization of trade 
and the creation of a wide Western European 
market as measures to obtain increased produc- 
tivity, lowered costs, a higher standard of living 
and the establishment of a viable European econ- 
omy can be promoted by the Ito. Following the 
termination of the European Recovery Program 
the Ito may well become the most important 
single international instrument for the attain- 
ment of an expanding competitive international 
trade. Under Chapter V machinery can be estab- 
lished to help prevent the regrowth of cartel ar- 
rangements which would nullify by private agree- 
ment these economic objectives. Promptness in 
getting the Ito under way will, I believe, help to 
facilitate world economic recovery and promote 
continued prosperity. 

The Ito represents the high water mark in 
efforts to establish a cooperative intergovern- 
mental organization equipped with the machinery 
and procedures necessary to solve common prob- 
lems in the field of international business prac- 
tices. If the Ito is competently and adequately 
staffed, and properly administered, it should in 
my opinion, prove most helpful in eliminating in- 
ternational restrictive cartel arrangements which 
have worked hardships on American and foreign 
economies alike. This, in turn, would also remove 
an important source of international ill-will gener- 
ated by restrictive cartel activities. Participation 
in the Ito could provide a valuable supplement 
to the unilateral action to which we have in the 
past been limited. 

I therefore believe we should support this Char- 
ter and should participate actively in the Ito. 

Department of State Bulletin 



Commission on Migratory Labor 



FIRST MEETING HELD 

The President's Commission on Migratory La- 
bor held its first meeting on June 23 to hear facts 
presented by Government agencies on migi'atory 
labor problems. 

The President appointed Maurice T. Van Hecke, 
now professor of law, North Carolina University, 
Chairman of the Commission, and named as the 
other members: 

Robert E. Lucey, Catholic Archbishop of San Antonio, 

Texas 
Paul Miller, Chief, University of Minnesota Extension 

Service 
William Leiserson, former Chairman of the Mediation 

Board 
Peter H. Odegard, University of California, Professor, 

Political Science 

The number of migratory workers in the United 
States has been variously estimated at from 1 to 5 
million workers. 

During this meeting the Commission received 
data from the Department of Labor on manpower 
problems, existing legislation and housing diffi- 
culties ; from tlie Department of Agriculture con- 
cerning industries using migratory labor; from 
the Department of State on international compli- 
cations ; from the Department of Justice on immi- 
gration aspects; and from the Federal Security 
Agency on welfare problems. 

The Commission will formally open its offices 
on June 26, in Temporary Building V at 14th 
Street and Pennsylvania Avenue, NW. 

The two Washington meetings will form the 
background for public hearings in various sections 
of the nation, beginning in California and Texas. 

Previous studies have shown that in many in- 
stances living standards among migratory workers 
and their families are markedly below those of 
other elements in the population, and that because 
of the absence of a fixed residence as well as their 
specific exemption in various laws, the migratory 
workers are frequently denied the benefits of Fed- 
eral, as well as State and local, social legislation. 

Besides the domestic migratory workers, the 
United States since tlie war has imported farm 
laborers, principally from Mexico. The migra- 
tion from Mexico is governed by an international 
agreement which was renegotiated on several 
occasions, the current agreement having been 
signed in 1949. A number of organizations have 
taken a stand against the further importation of 
alien workers, contending that domestic labor can 
fulfill the needs in the United States, while other 
organizations have insisted that agricultural pro- 
duction would suffer if employers could not fall 
back upon alien labor in instances where domestic 
labor proved to be insufficient. 



EXECUTIVE ORDER 101291 

By virtue of the authority vested in me as President of 
the United States, it is hereby ordered as follows : 

1. There is hereby created a Commission to be known as 
the President's Commission on Migratory Labor, which 
shall consist of a Chairman and four other members to be 
designated by the President. 

2. The Commission is authorized and directed to inquire 
into 

(a) social, economic, health, and educational condi- 
tions among migratory workers, both alien and domestic, 
in the United States ; 

(b) problems created by the migration of workers, for 
temporary employment, into the United States, pursuant 
to the immigration laws or otherwise ; 

(c) responsibilities now being assumed by Federal, 
State, county and municipal authorities with respect to 
alleviating the conditions among migratory workers, both 
alien and domestic ; 

(d) whether sufficient numbers of local and migra- 
tory workers can be obtained from domestic sources to 
meet agricultural labor needs and, if not, the extent to 
which the temjMrary employment of foreign workers may 
be required to supplement the domestic labor supply ; and 

( e ) the extent of illegal migration of foreign workers 
into the United States and the problems created thereby, 
and whether, and in what respect, current law enforce- 
ment measures and the authority and means possessed by 
Federal, State, and local governments may be strength- 
ened and improved to eliminate such illegal migration. 

3. The Commission shall make a report of its studies to 
the President in writing not later than December 15, 1950, 
including its recommendations for Governmental action, 
either legislative or administrative. 

4. In connection with its studies and inquiries, the Com- 
mission is authorized to hold such public hearings and to 
hear such witnesses as it deems appropriate. 

5. To the extent that the studies, inquiries, and recom- 
mendations of the Commission involve considerations of 
international arrangements and policies the Commission 
shall consult with the Department of State. 

6. All executive departments and agencies of the Fed- 
eral Government are authorized and directed to cooper- 
ate with the Commission in its work and to furnish the 
Commission such information and assistance, not incon- 
sistent with law, as it may require in the performance of 
its duties. 

7. During the fiscal year 1950, the compensation of the 
members of the Commission (including traveling expenses 
and per-diem allowances) and the exjpenditures of the 
Commission shall be paid out of an allotment made by the 
President from the appropriation appearing under the 
heading "Emergency Fund for the President" in the Inde- 
pendent Offices Appropriation Act, 1950 (Public Law 266, 
approved August 24, 1949) ; and during the fiscal year 1951 
such compensation and expenditures shall be similarly 
paid from any corresponding or like appropriation made 
available for the fiscal year 1951. Such payments shall be 
made without regard to the provisions of section 3681 of 
the Revised Statutes (31 U.S.C. 672), section 9 of the Act 
of March 4, 1909, 35 Stat. 1027 (31 U.S.C. 673) and such 
other provisions of law as the President may hereafter 
specify. 

8. Thirty days after rendition of its report to the Presi- 
dent, the Commission shall cease to exist unless otherwise 
determined by further Executive Order. 

Haekt S. Teuman 
The White House 
June S, 1950 



' 15 Fed. Reg. 3499. 



July 3, 1950 



33 



INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES 



Calendar of Meetings' 



Adjourned During June 1950 

Port-au-Prince Bicentennial Exposition Port-au-Prince .... 

Ilo (International Labor Organization): Governing Body: 112th Session Geneva 

Congress of International Association for Protection of Industrial Property Paris 

International Agricultural Genetics Congress Rieti, Italy 

IcAO (International Civil Aviation Organization): 

Council: Tenth Session Montreal 

Assembly: Fourth Session Montreal 

Legal Committee: Sixth Session Montreal 

High Frequency Assignment Planning Meeting for European-Mediter- Paris 

ranean Region. 
United Nations: 

Economic and Social Council: 

Economic Commission for Latin America: Third Session Montevideo 

Economic Commission for Europe: Fifth Session Geneva 

Technical Assistance Conference Lake Success 

Who (World Health Organization) : 

Executive Board: Sixth Session . Geneva 

International Meeting of Tonnage Measurement Experts Stockholm 

Fag (Food and Agriculture Organization) : 

Latin American Nutrition Conference: Second Session Rio de Janeiro .... 

International Congress for the Education of the Deaf and Dumb . . . Groningen, Netherlands . 

Biennial Session of the International Committee on Weights and Measures . Sfevres, France .... 

Conference of World Organization for Brotherhood Paris 

Brussels Colonial Fair, Third Brussels 

Tenth International Ornithological Congress Upsala, Sweden .... 

Twenty-fourth Session of the Journees M6dicales Brussels 

International Wool Conference Stockholm 

Nineteenth General Assembly of the International Criminal Police Com- The Hague 

mission. 

Third Session, International Wheat Council London 

International Oil Shale Conference Glasgow 

In Session as of June 30, 1950 

United Nations: 

Advisory Council for Libya Tripoli 

Visiting Mission to Trust Territories in the Pacific Pacific Area 

Trusteeship Council: Seventh Session Lake Success 

International Law Commission: Second Session Geneva 

Permanent Central Opium Board: 55th Session, Narcotic Drugs Super- Geneva 

visory Body: 34th Session; and Third Joint Session of Pcob and 
Ndsb. 

National Capital Sesquicentennial Celebration Washington 

Ilo (International Labor Organization): 

33rd International Labor Conference Geneva 

UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organiza- 
tion) : 

Seminar on Adult Education Salzburg, Austria . . 

Swiss-Allied Accord, Four Power Conference on Bern 

IcAO Council: Eleventh Session Montreal 

Caribbean Commission: Tenth Meeting Martinique 

Sugar Council, International: Meeting of Special Committee London 

North Atlantic Council: Planning Board for Ocean Shipping London 

Electric Systems, International Conference on Large High Tension: 13th Paris 

Biennial Session. 

' Prepared in the Division of International Conferences, Department of State. 
34 Department of Sfafe Bulletin 



Feb. 


12-June 8 


May 


26-June 3 


Mav 


29-June 3 


May 30-June 2 


May 


16- June 5 


May 


30-June 20 


May 


30-June 20 


June 


6-June 26 


June 5- 


Mav 


31-June 14 


June 


12-15 


June 


2-16 


June 


2-16 


June 


5-13 


June 


5-9 


June 


6- 


June 


8-11 


June 


10-25 


June 


10-17 


June 


10-14 


June 


12-18 


June 19-21 


June 


19-20 


June 


26- 


Apri 


U- 


Apri 


5- 


June 


1- 


June 


5- 


June 


14- 


April 


15- 


June 


7- 


June 


18- 


June 


20- 


June 


22- 


June 


26- 


June 


26- 


June 


27- 


June 


29- 



Calendar of Meetings — Continued 
Scheduled July 1-August 31, 1950 

United Nations: 

Economic and Social Council: 

Eleventh Session Geneva July 3- 

Commission on Narcotic Drugs: Fifth Session Lake Success Aug. 21- 

Subcommission on Statistical Sampling: Fourth Session Lake Success Sept. 5- 

Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East, Regional Conference Bangkok September 

of Statisticians. 

Special Committee on Information Transmitted under Article 73(e) of Lake Success Aug. 18- 

the Charter. 

General Assembly; Fifth Session Lake Success Sept. 19- 

Meeting of the Council, International Organization for Standardization . Geneva July 3- 

Thirteenth International Conference on Public Education Geneva July 6- 

General Assembly of the International Union of Biological Sciences . . . Stockholm July 7- 

International Congress of Private Law Rome July 8- 

Eighth International Congress of Agricultural Industries Brussels July 9- 

Fao (Food and Agriculture Organization): 

International Meeting on Dairy Technology Reading, England . . . July 10- 

Meeting of Fisheries Technologists Bergen, Norway .... Sept. 17- 

Fourth World Power Conference London July 10- 

Seventh International Botanical Congress Stockholm July 12- 

Unesco (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organiza- 
tion): 

Seminar on "The Teaching of Geography as a Means of Developing Montreal July 12- 

International Understanding." 

Seminar on the Improvement of Textbooks, Particularly of History Brussels July 12- 

Books. 

Seminar on the Role of Public and School Libraries in Adult Education. Malmo, Sweden .... July 24- 

North Atlantic Council: Military Production and Supply Board .... Copenhagen July 12- 

Cancer, Fifth International Congress of Scientific Research and Social Paris July 17- 

Struggle Against. 

Sixteenth International Congress of Ophthalmology London July 17- 

Second Meeting of the International Commission for the Regulation of Oslo July 17- 

Whaling. 

Fourth A.ssembly, World Organization of the Teaching Profession . . . Ottawa July 17- 

Third International Conference of the Legal Profession London July 19- 

Sixth International Congress of Radiology London July 2.3- 

Sixth International Conference of Directors of Mine Safety Research . . Paris July 24- 

Stations. 

Sixth International Pediatrics Congress Ziirich July 24- 

Fourth International Congress of Soil Science Amsterdam July 24- 

International Institute of Administrative Sciences: Eighth International Florence July 25- 

Congress. 

Congress of the International Union for Prevention of Venereal Disease . Ziirich July 29- 

First United States International Trade Fair Chicago Aug. 7- 

Eleventh International Exhibition of Cinematographic Art Venice Aug. 8- 

Radio and Television Exhibition Copenhagen Aug. 11- 

Penal and Penitentiary Commission, Twelfth Congress of the Interna- The Hague Aug. 13- 

tional. 

International Congress of the History of Science Amsterdam Aug. 14- 

Fifth International Congress on Microbiology Rio de Janeiro .... Aug. 17- 

Edinburgh Film Festival Edinburgh Aug. 20- 

Izmir International Trade Fair Izmir Aug. 20- 

Eighth Convention of Speech and Voice Disorders Amsterdam Aug. 21- 

Itu (International Telecommunication Union): 

Fifth Session, Administrative Council Geneva Aug. 21- 

Extraordinary Administrative Radio Conference The Hague Sept. 1- 

First International Congress on Archives Paris Aug. 23- 

Vineyards and Wine, Sixth International Congress on Athens Aug. 23- 

International Federation for Housing and Town Planning: 20th Interna- Amsterdam Aug. 27- 

tional Congress. 

Ninth International Congress of the Historical Sciences Paris Aug. 28- 

Ilo-Who Meeting of Joint Committee on Industrial Hygiene Geneva Aug. 28- 

First International Conference on Alcohol and Traffic Stockholm Aug. 30- 

International Conference of Mathematicians Cambridge, Mass. . . . Aug. 30- 



iuly 3, 1950 35 



U.S. Delegations to 
International Conferences 

Methods and Techniques of Adult Education 

The Department of State announced on June 19 
that the United States delegation to the Inter- 
national Seminar on Methods and Techniques of 
Adult Education, to be held near Salzburg, 
Austria, June 18-July 29, is as follows : 
Chairman 

Watson Dickerman, assistant professor of education, 
School of Education, University of California, Berkeley, 
Calif. 

Delegates 

Ruth M. Brewer, assistant to director, Chicago Council on 
Foreign Relations, Chicago, 111. 

Robert H. Levin, national education director. Amalgam- 
ated Clothing Workers, Headquarters, Congress of 
Industrial Organizations, New York, N. Y. 

Thomas A. Van Sant, director. Adult Education, Baltimore 
Board of Education, Baltimore, Md. 

The United Nations Educational, Scientific and 
Cultural Organization (Unesco) and the World 
Federation of United Nations Associations are 
jointly sponsoring the Seminar, which is being 
convened in response to a recommendation of the 
Unesco International Conference on Adult Edu- 
cation held at Elsinore, Denmark, in June 1949. 

The objective of the Seminar is to make a practi- 
cal study of the methods and techniques of adult 
education with a view to contributing to the ad- 
vancement of such methods and techniques ; arriv- 
ing at a general concept of adult education and 
practical conclusions with regard to leadership 
training and seminar techniques; and preparing 
documents designed to assist adult education 
leaders and workers not present at the Seminar. 
An integral part of this study will be consideration 
of ways and means by which adult education can 
be used to promote international understanding. 

It is expected that the Conference will establish 
four working groups to deal specifically with the 
following topics : organization and administration 
of adult education programs; intellectual and 
scientific training techniques employed to foster 
the adult's mental development; the economic and 
social training of adults; and methods and tech- 
niques appropriate for initiating adults into the 
arts, as well as activities suitable to the educational 
use of spare time. 

Ornithological Congress 

The Department of State announced on June 12 
that Dr. Alexander Wetmore, Secretary of the 
Smithsonian Institution, Washington, D.C., has 
been named chairman of the United States dele- 
gation to the Tenth International Ornithological 
Congress which convened at Upsala, Sweden, on 
June 10. Dr. Wetmore is also President of the 



Congress. Assisting Dr. Wetmore are the follow- 
ing United States delegates : 

Dr. Herbert Friedmann, curator of birds, United States 

National Museum, Washington, D.C. 
Dr. Alfred O. Gross, professor of biology and director, 

Kent Island Scientific Station, Bowdoin College, 

Brunswick, Maine 
Frederick C. Lincoln, assistant to the director. Fish and 

Wildlife Service, Department of the Interior 
Dr. S. Dillon Ripley, curator of birds, Peabody Museum, 

Yale University, New Haven, Conn. 
Dr. Josselyn Van Tyne, curator of birds. Museum of 

Zoology, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Mich. 

The Tenth Congress, the first since World War 
II, was organized by the Ornithological Society 
of Sweden. On the program of the Congress are 
included discussions on bird bandino^ and bird 
migration. In addition, delegates will have an 
opportunity to observe the migration, hibernation, 
estivation, and feeding habits of various birds 
through excursions before and after the Congress 
to many points of ornithological interest, such as 
breeding places, in Sweden. 

The United States is one of the few nations in 
which ornithology is a matter of practical govern- 
ment administration. This fact is the result of 
the enactment of such basic laws as the Lacey Act, 
the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, which imple- 
mented conventions between the United States and 
Canada and between the United States and Mexico, 
and the Migratory Bird Conservation Act. 

Consular Conference 

The Department of State announced on June 5 
the opening of a 3-day consular conference at Rio 
de Janeiro. The American Ambassador to Brazil, 
Herschel V. Johnson, ranking Embassy officers, 
representatives from the Department, and prin- 
cipal officers of the consular posts in Brazil are 
meeting to discuss subjects of common interest, 
with emphasis on consular and administrative 
matters. This conference is being held in pursu- 
ance of the Department's policy of bringing 
together departmental and field officers fop 
discussion of mutual problems. 

Representing the Department are the following 
officers : 

William P. Hughes, executive director, Bureau of Inter- 
American Affairs 

Elbridge Durbrow, chief-designate. Division of Foreign 
Service Personnel 

William K. Ailshie, special assistant, OflSce of Consular 
Affairs 

Principal officers from consular posts attending 
the conference are : 

Julian C. Greenup, consul general, Sao Paulo 

V. Lansing Collins, Jr., consul, Porto Alegre 

George E. Miller, consul, Recife 

Robert C. Johnson, Jr., consul, Salvador 

Arthur G. Parsloe, consul, Santos 

Williams Beal, vice counsul, Vit6ria 

George T. Colman, consul, BeWm 

Richard A. Godfrey, vice consul, Fortaleza 



36 



Department of State Bulletin 



Technical Assistance 

The Department of State annoimced on June 13 
that the following United States delegation has 
been designated to attend the first meeting of the 
United Nations Technical Assistance Conference 
which convened at Lake Success on June 12. 

United States Representative 

Willard L. Thorp, Assistant Secretary for Economic Af- 
fairs, Department of State 

Deputy United States Representative 

Walter Kotschnig, Director, Office of United Nations Eco- 
nomic and Social Affairs, Department of State 

Advisers 

Eleanor Dennison, Office of United Nations Economic and 
Social Affairs, Department of State 

William O. Hall, Director, Office of International Admin- 
istration and Conferences, Department of State 

Louis K. Hyde, Jr., United States Mission to the United 
Nations, New York 

Paul W. Jones, Jr., Division of International Administra- 
tion, Department of State 

In recognition of the need for a broad attack on 
problems of economic development, the President 
of the United States, in his inaugural address of 
January 20, 1949, called upon all countries to pro- 
vide technical assistance for the development of 
underdeveloped areas, such assistance to be ren- 
dered where practicable through the United Na- 
tions and the specialized agencies of the United 
Nations. 

After the Secretary-General of the United Na- 
tions, pui-suant to a resolution of the Economic 
and Social Council, had, in May 1949, issued a 
report on the extent and manner in which the 
United Nations and the specialized agencies could 
contribute to a technical assistance progi'am, the 
Economic and Social Council, meeting at Geneva 
in the summer of 1949, studied such questions as 
how the expanded program should be planned and 
coordinated, how it should be financed, and how 
it should be administered. 

Arrangements were made, and, subsequently, 
unanimously approved by the members of the 
United Nations in the General Assembly in the 
fall of 1949, for annual programs of technical 
assistance to be planned by the secretariats of the 
various agencies acting together; for the over-all 
program to be financed through a special account 
to be established by the United Nations, to which 
all governments belonging to any of the partici- 
pating organizations would be invited to contrib- 
ute; for this fund to be distributed among the 
organizations on the basis of agreed percentages ; 
and for the respective secretariats to have respon- 
5ibility for administering and operating the pro- 
2;ram, while policy control would be vested in the 
Economic and Social Council and ultimately in 
-he General Assembly of the United Nations and 
:he conferences or governing bodies of the 
igencies. 

The forthcoming Conference will be primarily 



concerned with ascertaining the total amount of 
contributions available from participating gov- 
ernments for the execution of the technical assist- 
ance programs of the United Nations and the spe- 
cialized agencies during the first year of its opera- 
tion. The Conference must also give final consent 
to plans for the allotment of proportionate shares 
of the total amount of contributions to the various 
participating organizations. 

Plans are now under way for the coordination 
of bilateral programs to be carried out by the 
United States with those of the United Nations. 

Wlieat Council 

The Department of State announced on June 16 
that the third session of the International Wlieat 
Council will convene at London on June 19 
with the following United States delegation in 
attendance : 

Delegate 

Stanley Andrews, director. Office of Foreign Agricultural 
Relations, Department of Agriculture 

Alternate Delegate 

Elmer F. Kruse, assistant administrator for commodity 
operations. Production and Marketing Administra- 
tion, Department of Agriculture 

Advisers 

Maurice M. Benidt, chief. International Wheat Agreement 
Staff, Production and Marketing Administration, De- 
partment of Agriculture 

James O. Foster, director. Commodities Division, Office of 
International Trade, Department of Commerce 

Francis A. Linville, assistant chief. Economics Resources 
and Security Staff, Department of State 

Paul O. Nyhus, agricultural attach^, American Embassy, 
London 

Adviser and Secretary 

Gordon Eraser, United States member of Executive Com- 
mittee of Wheat Council, London 

The International Wlieat Council was estab- 
lished in 1949 pursuant to the terms of the Inter- 
national Wheat Agreement of March 23, 1949, an 
instrument designed to assure supplies of wheat 
to importing countries and markets for wheat to 
exporting countries at equitable and stable prices. 
Administration of the provisions of the agreement 
is the primary function of the Council which is 
composed of the 39 exporting and importing 
countries parties to the agreement. Each coun- 
try may be represented on the Council by a dele- 
gate, an alternate, and such technical advisers as 
are necessary. 

The forthcoming session of the Council will 
discuss how quantities brought into the agreement 
by accessions and by increase of quotas shall be 
apportioned among the exporting countries. This 
apportionment involves agreement among the 
four exporting counties, i.e., Australia, Canada, 
France, and the United States. 

Ajnong other subjects for consideration by the 
third session of the Council are: review of the 



iuly 3, 1950 



37 



operative problems connected with the recording 
of sales and the reporting of the status of quota 
fulfillment to members by the Secretariat ; review 
of changes in the rules of procedure suggested by 
the Executive Committee and determination of 
powers to be delegated to the Executive Commit- 
tee; election of members of the Executive Com- 
mittee for the crop year 1950-51; election of a 
chairman and vice chairman ; elaboration of a 
budget for 1950-51; and the time and place of the 
next meeting of the Council. 

Congress for Education of Deaf and Dumb 

The Department of State announced on June 5 
that Leonard M. Elstad, president of Gallaudet 
College, Washington, D.C., and Maj. Jerome G. 
Sacks, MSC, assistant chief of the Clinical 
Psychology Branch, Office of the Surgeon General, 
Department of the Army, will represent the 
United States Government at the International 
Congress for Education of the Deaf and Dumb at 
Groningen, the Netherlands, beginning June 5. 

The Netherlands Government is sponsoring this 
Congress in commemoration of the establishment 
160 years ago of the Royal Institution for the 
Deaf and Dumb in Groningen. 

Teaching by ear or vibration, by talking visibly, 
and other methods of improving the means of 
communication by the deaf will be intensively 
studied at the forthcoming Congress. Although 
considerable progress has been made in the United 
States, in recent years, in developing improved 
methods for teaching children born without hear- 
ing to speak, in many other countries such instruc- 
tion is confined to lip reading and sign language. 

In many other countries, little stress is placed 
on the education of deaf students after the com- 
pletion of the elementary grades, in contrast to 
the United States where the deaf are urged to 
complete at least a hig'h school education and 
where there is the only college in the world for 
deaf students. In an effort to find means of rais- 
ing educational standards for the deaf every- 
where, the forthcoming Congress will discuss pro- 
grams of vocational education, higher education, 
and out-of-school education for the deaf. 

Other topics which have a close correlation to 
improvement of means of communication by the 
deaf and their education will also be discussed. 
Among the topics will be: the testing of the deaf; 
language and thinking — psychological problems 
of the deaf ; and aftercare of the deaf. 

Journees Medicates 

The Department of State announced on June 8 
that two delegates have been named to represent 
the United States Government at the 24th session 
of the Journees Medicales (Medical Days of Brus- 
sels) convening at Brussels on June 10. They are: 
Col. Robert U. Merikangas, MC, USA, Chief of 
Medicine, 97th General Hospital, Frankfort, Ger- 

38 



many; and Walter G. Nelson, Medical Director, 
Public Health Service, American Embassy, Paris, 
France. 

Annual meetings of the Journees Medicales are 
sponsored by the Belgian Government to bring 
together distinguished doctors with the object of 
keeping the practicing physician in touch with 
current medical research. An International Expo- 
sition of Sciences and Arts as applied to medicine, 
surgery, pharmacy, and hygiene will, as in the 
past, be held in conjunction with the 24th session. 
Representatives of the United States Govern- 
ment have participated in most of the meetings of 
this organization since 1932. 



U.S. Representative Named 

to NAC Board for Ocean Shipping 

The Department of State announced on June 19 
that Huntington T. Morse, special assistant to the 
administrator of the Maritime Administration of 
the Department of Commerce, has been appointed 
the United States representative on the North At- 
lantic Planning Board for Ocean Shipping. Mr. 
Morse will fill this post in addition to his other 
present duties. 

At its fourth session in London, on May 18, the 
North Atlantic Council announced that it had 
established, in furtherance of article 9 of the 
Treaty, a North Atlantic Planning Board for 
Ocean Shipping.^ This Board will report directly 
to the Council and will work in close cooperation 
with other bodies of the Treaty organization in all 
matters relating to merchant shipping in defense 
planning. 

Achieving a Community Sense — Continued from.'page 17 
overcome the obstacles in our path must be con- 
sonant with our aims, and must accord with our 
deepest moral sense. 

The fundamental moral value on which our 
society rests is the brotherhood of man. To the 
extent that our actions abroad, and our relations 
among ourselves at home, are expressive of this 
humanist principle, we shall create a good that 
will live after us. 

It is not in the words we profess, but in what we 
do, and in how we do it, that our ends will be 
found. 

Justice Holmes expressed it: 

Man Is born a predestined idealist, for he is born to act. 
To act is to alfirm the worth of an end, and to persist in 
aflirming the worth of an end is to make an ideal. 



' Bulletin of May 29, 1950, p. 830. 

Department of State Bulletin 



The United States in the United Nations 



[June 24-30] 

Security Council 

The Security Council on June 27 adopted a 
resolution, introduced by the United States, rec- 
ommending that United Nations members "fur- 
nish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as 
may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to 
restore international peace and security in the 
area."' ' The resolution, opposed only by Yugo- 
slavia, received seven affirmative votes. The 
Soviet representative was not present. Egypt 
and India stated tliat they had not received in- 
structions from their Governments and, therefore, 
could not participate in the vote. However, at a 
Council meeting on June 30, the Indian repre- 
sentative announced that his Government accepted 
the resolution, while the Egyptian representative 
said that Egypt would have abstained in the vote, 
because it considered that the Korean situation is 
just another element of the East-West conflict. 

In presenting the resolution, Warren E. Austin 
of the United States called it a "logical conse- 
quence" of the Council's resolution of June 25 ^ and 
of the North Korean authorities' failure to observe 
it. Ambassador Austin read President Truman's 
statement of June 27 ^ announcing that United 
States air and sea forces had been ordered "to give 
the Korean Government troops cover and sup- 
port." In concluding his remarks. Ambassador 
Austin said that the "keynote of the resolution and 
my statement and the significant characteristic of 
the action taken by the President is support of the 
United Nations purposes and principles — in a 
word 'peace'." * 

Two Yugoslav resolutions were defeated by the 
Council. At the emergency meeting on June 25, 
Yugoslavia proposed that the Council call for 
cessation of hostilities and withdrawal of forces 
and "invite the Government of North Korea to 
state its case before the Security Council." At the 
June 27 meeting, Yugoslavia presented a resolu- 
tion by which the Council would renew its call 



' See ante p. 7. 
' See ante p. 4. 
' See ante p. 5. 
* See ante p. 6. 

July 3, 1950 



for cessation of hostilities, invite the North 
Koreans to send a representative to the United 
Nations, and, in addition, initiate a procedure of 
mediation. 



Economic Commission for Latin America 

The Economic Commission for Latin America, 
which held its third session at Montevideo, Uru- 
guay, on June 5-21, adopted a number of resolu- 
tions dealing with problems of economic develop- 
ment, technical assistance, immigration, foreign 
investments, foreign trade, and agricultural credit. 
The most important of the resolutions, one on 
economic development and anticyclical policy, con- 
tains a declaration of general principles. The 
resolution was strongly endorsed by the 17 Latin 
American delegations present (Costa Rica, Peru, 
and Venzuela were not represented) and ap- 
proved by the French, Netherlands, and United 
Kingdom delegations. The resolution is so sweep- 
ing in character, however, that the United States 
delegation felt compelled to state that, although 
it would vote in favor of the resolution, it did so 
"subject to study by its government to determine 
whether there is anything in the resolution which 
may not be in harmony with United States eco- 
nomic policy and international commitments." 

Trusteeship Council 

Discussion of the annual reports on the trust 
territories of British and French Togoland was 
completed by the Trusteeship Council on June 29, 
and a committee consisting of Belgium, Iraq, the 
Philippines, and the United States was appointed 
to draft the Council reports on these territories. 

Excejit for an annex including individual opin- 
ions of Council members, examination of the 
drafting committee's report on Australia's annual 
report on New Guinea was concluded on June 28. 
Approval was given to the drafting committee's 
report on New Zealand's annual report on Western 
Samoa on June 29. On that day, the Council also 
approved nine resolutions submitted by its ad hoc 
Committee on Petitions dealing with petitions 
from New Guinea and the British and French 
Cameroons. 



39 




General Policy Page 

North Korean Forces Invade South Korea: 
U.S. Presents Cease-Fire Resolution to Se- 
curity Council. Statement by Ambassador 

Ernest A. Gross 3 

U.S. Air and Sea Forces Ordered Into Sup- 
porting Action. Statement by the Presi- 
dent; Remarks by Secretary Acheson ... 5 
U.S. Asks Security Council To Assist in Re- 
pelling Attack. Statement by Ambassador 
Warren R. Austin 6 

The Korean Experiment in Representative 
Government. Statement by John Foster 
Dulles 12 

Achieving a Community Sense Among Free 
Nations — A Step Toward World Order. 
Address by Secretary Acheson 14 

Keeping Peace in the Caribbean Area. By 

Edward A. Jamison 18 

Upholding Principles and Rights of Others in 
the Process of International Negotiation. 
By Philip C. Jessup, Ambassador at Large . 26 

Army Attach^, Declared Persona Non Grata, 

Withdrawn From Rumania 29 

Rumania Protests Against Travel Restrictions 
on Personnel in U.S. Statement by Secre- 
tary Acheson • • • • 30 

Treaty Information 

Soviet Violations of Treaties and Agreements. . 8 



Page 

Tax Treaty Negotiations To Open With Israel . 13 
The Need for an International Trade Organiza- 
tion. Views of Howard W. McGrath, 
Attorney General 31 

The United Nations and 
Specialized Agencies 

The United States in the United Nations ... 39 

International information and 
Cultural Affairs 

Commission on Migratory Labor. Executive 

Order 10129 33 

International Organizations and 
Conferences 

Calendar of Meetings 34 

U.S. Delegations: 

Methods and Techniques of Adult Educa- 
tion 36 

Ornithological Congress 36 

Consular Conference 36 

Technical Assistance 37 

Wheat Council 37 

Congress for Education of Deaf and Dumb . 38 

Journ^es Medical es 38 

U.S. Representative Named to Nac Board for 

Ocean Shipping 38 



mmy&^mtdo^ 



Edward A. .Tamison, author of the article on keeping peace in the 
Americas, is ofiicer in charge, Special Political Affairs, Office of Re- 
gional American Affairs. 



U. 5. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE) 19B0 



tJne/ ^eha/yi7}teni/ ^ t/taie^ 



-fcti^ 





ACT OF AGGRESSION IN KOREA: 

Address by Secretary Acheson '^^^^^' 43 

Statement by John Foster Dulles 49 

SUPPORT OF MUTUAL DEFENSE ASSISTANCE 

PROGRAM FOR 1951 • Statement by Secretary 
Acheson 31 

LABOR'S ROLE IN WORLD AFFAIRS • By Bernard 

Wiesman 54 



For complete contents see back cover 




Vol. XXIII, No. 575 
July 10, 1950 



^ENX o^ 




<'^^^^*. 







^Ae Qlefi€t/)tim,&rvt jCL ^ate V^ W i 1 \D L 1 i 1 



Vol. XXIII, No. 575 • Publication 3906 
July 10, 1950 



For sale by the Superintendent of Documents 

U.S. Government Printing Office 

Washington 25, D.C. 

Price: 

62 issues, domestic $6, foreign $8.60 

Single copy, 20 cents 

The printing of this publication has 
been approved by the Director of the 
Bureau of the Budget (February 18, 1949). 

Note: Contents of this publication are not 
copyrighted and items contained herein may 
be reprinted. Citation of the Department 
OF State Bulletin as the source will be 
appreciated. 



Tlie Department of State BULLETIN, 
a weekly publication compiled and 
edited in the Division of Publications, 
Office of Public Affairs, provides the 
public and interested agencies of 
the Government with information on 
developments in the field of foreign 
relations and on the work of the De- 
partment of State and the Foreign 
Service. The BULLETIN includes 
press releases on foreign policy issued 
by the White House and the Depart- 
ment, and statements and addresses 
made by the President and by the 
Secretary of State and other officers 
of the Department, as well as special 
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national affairs and the functions of 
the Department. Information is in- 
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United States is or may become a 
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currently. 



ACT OF AGGRESSION IN KOREA 






REVIEW OF U.N. AND U.S. ACTION 
TO RESTORE PEACE 

Address hy Secretary Acheson'^ 

I would like to review with you the facts of the 
situation which I am sure is uppermost in your 
minds — the events which have been taking place 
and are now going on in Korea. 

I think you will agree that this has been what 
newspaper men call a fast-breaking story. 

The immediate events of the story go back less 
than 5 days. On Saturday afternoon — it was just 
before daybreak of Sunday morning in Korea — 
without warning and without provocation, Com- 
munist forces of the north launched a coordinated 
full-scale assault on the Republic of Korea. After 
heavy artillery fire, Communist infantry began 
crossing the 38th parallel at three points, while 
amphibious forces were landing at several points 
on the east coast, some 20 miles to the south. 

First reports to reach the capital at Seoul, 30 
miles below the 38th parallel, were fragmentary 
and confused. There had been small border 
forays on many previous occasions, and the mag- 
nitude of this attack was not immediately cleai'. 

Our Ambassador at Seoul, John Muccio, imme- 
diately got in touch with Korean Army headquar- 
ters, through our Military Advisory Group, and, 
as soon as it became evident that this was more 
than another border incident, he cabled the State 
Department. 

Ambassador Muccio's cable reached the State 
Department code room at 9 : 26 Saturday night, 
having crossed an inquiry the Department had 
sent to him a few minutes before, based on the 
first press flash on the action. 

' Delivered before the 17th annual convention of the 
American Newspaiser Guild, Washington, D. C, on June 29 
and released to the press on the same date. 



Within a matter of minutes, the message was 
decoded and the Department was alerted for 
action. 

By 10 : 30 p.m., our Assistant Secretary for Far 
Eastern Affairs, Dean Rusk, and the Secretary of 
the Army, Frank Pace, were conferring at the 
Department. 

By 11:00, Secretary Pace had alerted the De- 
partment of Defense, a full operating staff was on 
duty at our Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, and I 
had discussed the situation by phone with the 
President. 

Action developed along two fronts in the State 
Department during the night. 

One group of Department officers worked 
through the night preparing for a meeting of the 
Security Council which we had immediately re- 
quested. The United Nations had established the 
Republic of Korea and had, since early 1948, main- 
tained a Commission in Korea. We, therefore, 
felt a primary responsibility to bring this matter 
to the immediate attention of the United Nations. 

By Sunday afternoon, within 20 hours of the 
time the first official word of this invasion was re- 
ceived here, the Security Council had taken its 
first action. Representatives of 10 member na- 
tions of the Security Council had been assembled 
from their Sunday places of rest — the eleventh 
was the representative of the Soviet Union, who 
stayed away. After hearing the report of the 
United Nations Commission concerning the un- 
provoked act of aggression, the Security Council 
passed a resolution which called for an immediate 
end to the fighting and for the assistance of all 
members in restoring the peace. All actions 
taken by the United States to restore the peace in 
Korea have been under the aegis of the United 
Nations. 

Another group of Department officers, mean- 
while, were working with their colleagues in the 



Jo/y TO, 7950 



43 



Defense Department, consulting on measures to 
be taken within the framework of existing policy 
and plans and the emergency orders of the 
President. 

Complete Study Ready for President 

The President flew to Washington. By the 
time he had arrived, at 7 : 20 Sunday evening, com- 
pleted staff work and recommendations had been 
prepared and were laid before him. The De- 
partments of State and Defense had worked as 
one department, with complete agreement and co- 
ordination of effort. 

During Sunday night and early Monday morn- 
ing, actions flowing from the conference with the 
President were set in motion. General MacAr- 
thur was authorized to respond at once to urgent 
appeals from the Govermnent of Korea for addi- 
tional supplies of ammunition and in a matter of 
hours was flying into Korea loaded transport 
planes with fighter protection to assure their safe 
arrival. At about the same time, the Seventh 
Fleet with all men aboard was steaming north out 
of Subic Bay, to be on hand in case of need. 

It became possible on Monday to get a clearer 
picture of the military situation, by sifting the 
fragmentary and sometimes conflicting reports 
we had been receiving from many different 
sources. 

From the size and speed of the Communist at- 
tack, it was evident that it was a premeditated ac- 
tion ; that it had been carefully plotted for many 
weeks before. The initial thrust, supported by 
planes and tanks, had clearly caught the Korean 
Government troops by surprise. Although the 
defending forces rallied and launched several 
small counteractions, it did not appear that they 
were in a position to bar the tank-and-plane-sup- 
IJorted Communist thrust down the corridor to the 
capital city. 

By Monday night, in the light of this situation, 
recommendations were prepared by the President's 
civil and military advisers on the course of action 
to be taken. In preparing these recommendations, 
it was clear to all concerned that this act of ag- 
gression had brought in issue the authority and, 
indeed, the continued existence of the United Na- 
tions and the security of the nations of the free 
world, including the United States and its forces 
in the Pacific. These recommendations were pre- 
pared with the sober realization of the issues in- 



volved and with the full agreement of all the 
President's advisers. 

As in many other situations which have arisen 
in the years in which I have served as Under 
Secretary and Secretary, the President was faced 
with difficult decisions which had to be made 
quickly. And as in the previous cases, the Presi- 
dent assumed the responsibility, made the deci- 
sions, and has given leadership and direction to 
the entire action of the Government of the United 
States. 

Consultations with Congressional leaders on 
Tuesday morning demonstrated a complete unity 
in understanding the problem and the course of 
action which needed to be taken. 

At Tuesday noon, the President announced the 
actions which this Government would take to sup- 
port the United Nations and uphold a rule of law 
in the Pacific area. 

In the interval between the meetings of the Se- 
curity Council on Sunday and again on Tuesday, 
the United Nations Commission on Korea had con- 
firmed tlie fact that the Communist authorities in 
North Korea had ignored the cease-fire order and 
defied the authority of the United Nations. There- 
fore, the Security Council recommended at its 
meeting Tuesday night that member nations give 
aid to the Rei^ublic of Korea and help to restore 
peace and security to the area. 

Yesterday — i days after the fighting began — the 
fall of Seoul was confirmed, but American air 
and sea support for Korean Government troops 
was beginning to make itself felt, and peace-loving 
nations the world over were able to hope that this 
act of brutal, unprovoked, and naked aggression 
would not be allowed to succeed. 

Historical Background 

It may be useful at this point to review briefly 
the background of recent history against which 
the present act of aggi'ession against Korea is to 
be considered. 

Since the nineteenth century, American mission- 
aries, doctors, and educators have been especially 
active in Korea, so that through the years of 
Japanese occupation, which began in the first dec- 
ade of this century, the Korean people came to 
regard the United States as a symbol of the free- 
dom and independence to which they aspired. 

In the Cairo Declaration of December 1943, the 
United States, the United Kingdom, and China 
pledged their determination that Korea would be- 



44 



DeparlmenI of Sfafe Bulletin 



come free and independent. This pledge was re- 
affirmed in the Potsdam Declaration of July 26, 
1945. and was subscribed to by the Soviet Union 
when it entered the war against Japan 13 days 
later. 

The defeat of Japan made it possible for Korea 
to look forward to the realization of its desire for 
independence. 

On the day following the first Japanese offer 
of surrender, which was made on August 10, 1945, 
the Secretary of War submitted to the Secretary 
of State a plan for the arrangements to be fol- 
lowed in accepting the surrender of Japanese 
troops in various places. To meet the immediate 
problem, it was proposed that the nearby Soviet 
troops accept the surrender of Japanese armed 
forces in Korea down to the 38th parallel and that 
American troops be brought up from Okinawa 
and the Philippines to accept the surrender of 
Japanese troops in the southern part of Korea. 
This arrangement was approved by the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, the State-War-Navy Coordinating 
Committee, and the President and, after it had 
been accepted by Generalissimo Stalin, was in- 
corporated in the first general order to be issued 
by General AlacArthur as Supreme Commander 
for the Allied Powers on September 2, 1945. 

Soviet troops had occupied the northern part 
of Korea on August 12. The Soviet desire and 
intention to put troops into Korea had been made 
evident at the Potsdam discussions, 1 month be- 
fore. On September 8, American troops had been 
landed to accept the surrender of the Japanese in 
the southern part of Korea, 4ind we began efforts 
to negotiate with the Soviet Union for the unifi- 
cation and independence of the country. 

We soon found that the Soviet Union consid- 
ered the 38th parallel not as a line drawn on a 
map for the sake of administrative convenience 
but as a wall around their preserve. 

U.S.S.R. BLOCKS KOREAN UNITY 

At the Moscow meeting of Foreign Ministers in 
December 1945, a joint commission for the unity 
and independence of Korea was agreed to between 
the Soviet Union and ourselves, but we found that 
every effort to give effect to this agreement and 
i:irevious agreements was blocked by Soviet in- 
transigence. 

The United States was unwilling to permit this 
situation to delay further the realization of Korean 
independence. 



This Government therefore laid the question 
of Korean independence before the United Na- 
tions. The General Assembly of the United Na- 
tions, in November 1947, called for an election in 
Korea under the observation of a United Nations 
Commission, to choose a representative national 
assembly for the purpose of drafting a democratic 
constitution and establishing a national gov- 
ernment. 

The Soviet Union refused to allow the United 
Nations Commission to enter its zone. Conse- 
quently, the right of the Korean people to par- 
ticipate in a free election to establish a free govern- 
ment was confined to southern Korea. The 
election was held there, and the Government 
of the Republic of Korea was established on 
August 15, 1948. 

U.S. EFFORTS TO SUPPORT REPUBLIC 

It has been the aim of the United States to pro- 
vide the people of the Republic of Korea with suf- 
ficient assistance and support to enable them to 
progress through their own efforts toward free- 
dom and independence. The transfer of functions 
from the United States Army Military Govern- 
ment to Korean agencies was carried out 
progressivelj' from the moment of the establish- 
ment of the Republic. 

The United States has continued to give assist- 
ance and support to the Republic, both within the 
framework of the United Nations and directly. 
We have trained and equipped Korean defense 
forces, we have extended economic aid and tech- 
nical advice, fostered exchange of students and 
professors, and, in general, done everything pos- 
sible to help the people of Korea in establishing 
a democratic jiolitical and economic structure re- 
sponsive to their needs. 

The Government of the Republic of Korea was 
accepted by the United Nations, in December 1948, 
as the validly elected, lawful Government of the 
area in which elections were permitted — and the 
only such Government in Korea. The General 
Assembly established a reconstituted Commission 
to continue to work for unification and a repre- 
sentative government for the entire country. 

The United States recognized the new govern- 
ment on January 1, 1949. Many other members 
of the United Nations have since done the same. 
Membership of the Republic of Korea in the 
United Nations has been blocked by the Soviet 
veto. 



July 10, 1950 



45 



38TH PARALLEL— A PART OF THE IRON CURTAIN 

Meanwhile, the 38th parallel had become a part 
of the Iron Curtain. Behind that curtain, the 
Soviet Union established a Communist regime. 
The formal creation of this regime was proclaimed 
on September 9, 1948, as the so-called "Democratic 
People's Republic of Korea," claiming jurisdiction 
over the entire country. This regime has lived, 
as it was created, in complete defiance of the 
United Nations. 

The great single fact which stands out from this 
summary history is that a peaceful people ruled 
by a sovereign independent government of their 
own choosing, brought into being by the United 
Nations and recognized by the great majority of 
the free nations of the world, was attacked in a 
cynical and brutal act of aggression. 

We are confronted with a direct challenge to 
the United Nations. Whether this organization, 
which embodies our hopes for an international 
order based on peace with justice and freedom, 
can survive this test will depend upon the vigor 
with which it answers the challenge and the sup- 
port which it receives from free nations. 

Free Nations Answer Aggression 

The President has enunciated the policy of this 
Government to do its utmost to uphold the sanctity 
of the Charter of the United Nations and the rule 
of law among nations. We are, therefore, in con- 
formity with the resolutions of the Security Coun- 
cil of June 25 and June 27, giving air and sea 
support to the troops of the Korean Government. 
This action, pursuant to the Security Council reso- 
lutions, is solely for the purpose of restoring the 
Republic of Korea to its status prior to the in- 
vasion from the north and of reestablishing the 
peace broken by that aggression. 

In order that the Communist movement may 
not further threaten the security of the Pacific 
area by force of arms, we shall increase military 
assistance to the Philippines and to the forces of 
France and the Associated States in Indochina. 

The President has also ordered the Seventh 
Fleet to prevent any attack on Formosa, and we 
have called upon the Chinese Government on 
Formosa to cease all air and sea operations against 
the mainland. This action is not intended to 
determine the future status of Formosa, which 



can be settled only upon the restoration of peace 
and security in the Pacific, a peace settlement with 
Japan, or consideration by the United Nations. 

As a further measure toward the restoration of 
peace, we have, through our Embassy in Moscow, 
asked the Soviet Government to exercise its in- 
fluence with the North Korean authorities for the 
withdrawal of the invading forces and the cessa- 
tion of hostilities in Korea. 

In conclusion, the action of the United States 
Government in Korea is taken in support of the 
authority of the United Nations. It is taken to 
restore peace and security to the Pacific area. 

It is taken in the conviction that peace and 
security cannot be obtained by sacrificing the in- 
dependence of nations to aggression. 

Free men the world over have spoken out with 
one voice since this dawn attack was launched 5 
days ago. They endorse our resolve and stand 
with us in support of the United Nations. Those 
Governments in a position to provide armed forces 
to assist in the support of the Republic of Korea 
are already taking steps to provide that support. 

It is now clear to all — if indeed, it was not clear 
before — that free nations nmst be united, they 
must be determined, and they must be strong, if 
they are to preserve their freedom and maintain 
a righteous peace. There is no other way. 



THE PRESIDENT AUTHORIZES 
USE OF GROUND UNITS 

[Released to the press hy the White Bouse June 30] 

At a meeting with Congressional leadere at the 
White House this morning, the President, together 
with the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of 
State, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, reviewed the 
latest developments of the situation in Korea. 

The Congressional leaders were given a full 
review of the intensified military activities. 

In keeping with the United Nations Security 
Council's request for support to the Republic of 
Korea in repelling the North Korean invaders and 
restoring peace in Korea, the President announced 
that he had authorized the United States Air Force 
to conduct missions on specific military targets in 
Northern Korea, wherever militarily necessary, 
and had ordered a naval blockade of the entire 
Korean coast. 

General MacArthur has been authorized to use 
certain supporting ground units. 



46 



Deparimeni of Sfafe Bulletin 



ANSWER TO CHINA'S OFFER 
TO SEND TROOPS 

[Released to the press July 2] 

On June 29 and 30, the Chinese Qovernment informed 
the Ooveniniciit of the United States of the willinciness of 
the Chinese Qovernment to send land troops to South 
Korea to assist in the operations now going on in that 
country. The Chinese Qovernment asked for the opinion 
of the United States Government on this matter. The 
aide-mimoires received from the Chinese Qovernment 
follow. 



Aide-memoire of June 29 

The Government of the Eepublic of China re- 
ceived today a communication from the Secretary- 
General of the United Nations requesting it, in 
accordance with the resohition adopted by the 
Security Council on June 27, 1960, to furnish such 
assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be 
necessary to help repel the armed attack from 
North Korea. The Chinese Republic is willing 
to send land troops to South Korea to assist in the 
operations for the purpose. The Chinese Govern- 
ment will be glad to be apprised of the opinion of 
the United States Government at its earliest con- 
venience. In view of the urgent situation in South 
Korea, the Chinese Government is instructing the 
Chief of the Chinese Mission in Japan to approach 
General MacArthur and inquire about the pos- 
itive measures which may be desired. 



Aide-memoire of June 30 

The Chinese Government will make available 
for use in South Korea to repel the armed attack 
of North Korea one army of seasoned troops of 
approximately 33,000 men suitable for operations 
in plains or hilly terrain. 

These troops carry the best equipment at China's 
disposal. 

For the transportation of these troops the 
Chinese Government will provide 20 air trans- 
ports of the type of C-46 ancl, if necessary, can give 
a reasonable amount of air cover. If the troops 
are to be transported by sea, the Chinese Govern- 
ment can provide a moderate amount of naval 
escort. 

These troops can be ready for embarkation in 
five days. 



The United States Qovernment, icithont assuming in 
any way to speak for the United Nations, expressed its 
opinion to the Chinese Qovernment on July 1 in the fol- 
loiving terms. 

In response to the request contained in the 
Chinese Embassy's Aide-Memoire of June 29, 
1950, the appropriate authorities of the Govern- 
ment of the United States have given considera- 
tion to the expression of willingness on the part 



of the Government of the Republic of China to 
furnish ground forces for service in Korea in sup- 
port of the United Nations. 

The Secretary of State desires to inform His 
Excellency the Ambassador of the Republic of 
China of the deep appreciation of the United 
States Government for this prompt and substan- 
tial demonstration of support for the United 
Nations on the part of the Government of the 
Republic of China. In light, however, of the 
threat of invasion of Taiwan by Communist forces 
from the mainland, a threat repeated in the last 
day or so by spokesmen for the Chinese Com- 
munist regime in Peiping, it is the view of the 
Government of the United States of America that 
it would be desirable for representatives of Gen- 
eral MacArthur's Headquarters to hold dis- 
cussions with the Chinese military authorities on 
Taiwan concerning the plans for the defense of 
the island against invasion prior to any final de- 
cision on the wisdom of reducing the defense forces 
on Taiwan by transfer of troops to Korea. It 
is understood that General MacArthur's Head- 
quarters will be in communication with the ap- 
propriate Chinese military authorities on Taiwan 
with a view to the dispatch from Tokyo of repre- 
sentatives of General MacArthur's Headquarters 
for this purpose. 



U.S.S.R. RESPONDS TO REQUEST 
FOR MEDIATION 

[Released to the press June Z9'\ 

The American Embassy at Moscow on June 27, 
1950, communicated with the Soviet Foreign Of- 
fice in regard to the invasion of the Republic of 
Korea by North Korean armed forces. 

The Embassy called to the attention of the So- 
viet Foreign Office the fact that forces of the 
North Korean regime had crossed the 38tli paral- 
lel and had invaded, in force, the territory of the 
Republic of Korea at several points. It was also 
pointed out that the refusal of the representative 
of the Soviet Union to attend the Security Coun- 
cil meeting in New York despite the clear threat to 
the peace and despite the obligations of a Council 
member under the United Nations Charter re- 
quired the Government of the United States to 
bring this matter directly to the attention of the 
Government of the U.S.S.R. 

The Embassy concluded by calling attention to 
the universally known close relations between the 
Soviet Union and the North Korean regime and 
stated that the United States Government was 
asking assurances that the Soviet Union would 
disavow responsibility for this unwarranted and 
unprovoked attack and that it would use its influ- 
ence with the authorities of North Korea to with- 
draw their invading forces at once. 

Ambassador Alan G. Kirk today was read the 



Ju/y 10, 1950 



47 



following statement by Deputy Soviet Foreign 
Minister Andrei Gromyko : 

In connection with the statement of the Government of 
the United States of America transmitted by you on June 
27, the Soviet Government has instructed me to state the 
following : 

1. In accordance with facts verified by the Soviet Gov- 
ernment, the events talking place in Korea were provoked 
by an attacli by forces of the South Korean authorities 
on border reuions of North Korea. Therefore the respon- 
sibility for these events rests upon tlie South Korean 
authorities and iipon those who stand behind their back. 

2. As is known, tlie Soviet Government withdrew its 
troops from Korea earlier than the Government of the 
United States and thereby confirmed its traditional prin- 
ciple of noninterference in the internal affairs of other 
states. And now as well the Soviet Gdvernment adheres 
to the principle of the impermissibility of interference by 
foreign powers in the internal affairs of Korea. 

3. It is not true that the Soviet Government refused to 
participate in meetinss of the Security Council. In spite 
of its full willingness, the Soviet Government has not been 
able to take part in the meetings of the Security Council 
in as much as, because of the position of the Government 
of the United States, China, a permanent member of the 
Security Council, has not been admitted to the Council 
which has made it impossible for the Security Council to 
take decisions having legal force. 



PRECEDENT CONTRADICTS SOVIET 
ALLEGATION OF ILLEGALITY IN U.N. ACTION 

[Released to the prcus June SO] 

In its reply to the United Nations and to the 
United States, the U.S.S.K. alleges that the ac- 
tion of the Security Council with respect to Korea 
was illegal, since, the action taken did not have 
the concurring votes of all the permanent mem- 
bers. In its reply of June 29, to the United States 
communication of June 27, asking the U.S.S.R. to 
use its influence with the North Korean authori- 
ties to cease hostilities, the U.S.S.R. made the same 
point and contended, further, that the action of 
the Council was illegal because the representative 
of China participating in this action was not the 
representative of the Feiping regime. 

With respect to article 27 of the Charter dealing 
with Security Council voting, it is provided that 
substantive questions be decided by an affirmative 
vote of seven members including the concurring 
votes of the permanent members. 

By a long series of precedents, however, dating 
back to 1946, the practice has been established 
whereby abstention by permanent members of the 
Council does not constitute a veto.^ 

In short, prior to the Soviet allegations, every 
member of the TTnited Nations, including the 
U.S.S.R. accejjted as legal and binding decisions of 
the Security Council made without the concur- 
rence, as expressed tlirough an affirmative vote, 
of all permanent members of the Council. 

As to the Soviet claim concerning the Chinese 
vote, the rules of procedure of the Security Coun- 

' See Bulletin of July 4, 1948, p. 3. 



cil provide the machinery for the seating of an 
accredited representative of the Security Council. 
No affirmative action has been taken which, by 
any stretch of the imagination, could give force 
to the contention of the U.S.S.R. that a representa- 
tive of the Peiping regime should be regarded as 
the representative of China on the Security Coun- 
cil. The credentials of the representative of the 
National Government of China were approved by 
the Council, and the Soviet attempt, at a later 
date, to withdraw this approval was defeated. 
Therefore, the vote of the Nationalist representa- 
tive on June 25 and 27 was the official vote of 
China. 

A list of some of the more important prece- 
dents involving action by the Security Council on 
substantive matters taken without the concurrence 
of an affirmative vote by the Soviet Union follow : 

Palestine Case 

On April 16, 1948, the Soviet Union abstained 
on a resolution which called for a truce in 
Palestine. 

On IMay 22, 1948, the Soviet Union abstained on 
a resolution for a "cease-fire"' in Palestine. 

On July 15, 1948, the Soviet Union abstained 
on a resolution ordering a "cease-fire" in Palestine 
and giving instructions to the Mediator there. 

On November 4, 1948, the Soviet Union ab- 
stained on a resolution calling upon all govern- 
ments concerned to withdraw beyond positions 
they held in Palestine on October 14. 1948. 

In none of these instances has the Soviet Union 
challenged the legality of the action taken by the 
Security Council. 

Kashmir Case 

On January 17, 1948, the Soviet Union abstained 
on a resolution calling upon the parties concerned 
to avoid actions aggravating the situation. 

On January 20, 1948, the Soviet Union ab- 
stained on a resolution for setting up a United 
Nations Commission for India and Pakistan and 
which gave that Commission broad terms of ref- 
erence. 

On April 21, 1948, the Soviet Union ab- 
stained on a resolution expanding the terms of 
reference of the United Nations Commission for 
India and Pakistan and which set the terms for 
bringing about a "cease-fire" and the conditions 
for the holding of a plebiscite. 

On June 3, 1948, the Soviet Union abstained 
on a resolution which affirmed previous resolution 
and ordered the United Nations Commission to 
proceed to the area. 

In none of tiiese instances has the Soviet Union 
challenged the legality of the action taken by the 
Security Council. 

Indonesian Case 

On December 24, 1948, the Soviet Union ab- 
stained on a resolution calling upon the parties 



48 



Deparfmenf of Sfafe Bulhfin 



to cease hostilities and ordering the release of 
Indonesian officials. In that ease, the French also 
abstained. 

On January i2S. 1949, the Soviet Union abstained 
on a nnmber of paragraphs of a resolution setting 
up tlie United Nations Commission for Indonesia 
with wide powers. 

In none of these instances has the Soviet Union 
challenged the legality of the action taken by the 
Secnritj' Council. 

Furthermore, the Soviet Union has never ques- 
tioned the legality of action taken by the Security 
Council in which it voted with tlie majority but 
on which other permanent members of the Council 
abstained. 

This action has occurred in at least thi'ee sub- 
stantive decisions : 

1. In the action of the Council on December 28, 

1948, in which a resolution was passed calling on 
the Netherlands to set free political prisoners in 
Indonesia (a resolution introduced by the repre- 
sentative of China). France and the United 
Kingdom abstained on this resolution. 

2. In the action of the Council on March 4, 

1949, recommending to the General Assembly that 
Israel be admitted to United Nations membership. 
The United Kingdom abstained on this resolution. 

3. In the action of the Council on March 5, 
1948, i-ecommending consultation of the perma- 
nent members of the Council in connection with 
the Palestine situation. The United Kingdom 
abstained on this resolution. 

Tlie voluntary absence of a permanent member 
from the Security Council is clearly analogous to 
abstention. 

Furthermore, article 28 of the Charter provides 
that the Security Council shall be so organized 
as to be able to function continuously. This in- 
junction is defeated if the absence of a repre- 
sentative of a permanent member is construed to 
have the effect of preventing all substantive action 
by the Council. 

No one of the 10 members of the Council par- 
ticipating in the meetings of June 2.5 and June 
27 raised any question regarding the legality of 
the action — not even the member who dissented 
on June 27. 



ECA AIDS SOUTH KOREA 

The Economic Cooperation Administration an- 
nounced on June 26 that it took immediate action 
to back up the resistance of the South Korean 
people in their heroic struggle to maintain their 
independence. 

Dr. Edgar A. J. Johnson, Director of ECA's 
Korean pi-ogi-am, stated that "primary emphasis is 
being placed upon the setting up of machinery for 
the jH'ompt procurement of supplies and equip- 
ment that can be shipped to Korea from Japan or 
the United States." Dr. Johnson said that 'Sve 

July 10, 1950 



will bend every effort to meet the ci'isis that immi- 
nently threatens a free nation." 

ECA"s immediate-action program consisted of: 

1. Diverting all vessels carrying war nonessen- 
tials to ports where they would not fall into Com- 
munist hands. 

2. Rearranging shipping schedules so that all 
available supply vessels could be used to rush mili- 
tary supplies to the besieged peninsula. 

;3. Insuring that nonmilitary supplies, such as 
fertilizer, are diverted to other ports to keep dock 
workers free for unloading of guns and ammuni- 
tion. 

4. Switching its procurement progi-am to an 
emergency basis. (Essential commodities like 
petroleum and foodstuffs would be given priority 
over such normal peacetime exports as fertilizer 
and raw cotton.) 

5. Coordinating its activities with the United 
States Army Forces in Japan. 



A MILITARISTIC EXPERIMENT 

Statement by John Foster Dulles ^ 

I have just returned from 2 weeks in Korea and 
Japan. Last week I was in Seoul, the capital of 
Korea, on the invitation of President Ehee. Now 
he is a fugitive, and the Embassy residence where 
Mrs. Dulles and I were staying is being looted by 
the Reds. 

Earlier this week, Mrs. Dulles and I were quietly 
dining at our Embassy in Tokyo with General 
and Mrs. MacArthur. Now the General is lead- 
ing the American and Allied air, sea, and land 
forces, fighting the Red aggressors in Korea. 

Events have happened fast. The Communists 
of North Korea struck hard and suddenly with 
strong forces well-equipped with Russian tanks, 
Russian planes, and Russian heavy artillery. 
They have made big initial gains, and it will not 
be easy to stop them and throw them back. 

Why did the North Korean Reds make this 
armed attack on the peaceful Republic of South 
Korea ? One thing is certain, they did not do this 
purely on their own but as part of the world 
strategy of international communism. 

It is possible to make a good guess as to why 
Communist strategy directed this present attack 
against the Republic of Korea. 

Reason for Attack 

In the first place, the Republic of Korea was 
growing in such a healthy way that its presence 
on the continent of Asia was an embarrassment to 
the Communist areas. In South Korea, I talked 

' Prepared portion of a radio interview over CBS at 
Wasliinfiton, D.C., on July 1 which was released to the 
press on the same date. 

49 



with all sorts of people, and everywhere I got the 
impression of a happy, wholesome society. There 
had just been the second general election, which 
was watched by representatives of the United Na- 
tions. It was a free and fair election ; 80 percent 
of the eligible voters had gone to the polls, and 
the representatives elected were men and women 
of fine character. I attended the opening of the 
Assembly, and it was an inspiring event. 

The economy of the country was picking up 
with some American economic help. All in all, 
the prospects were good. 

This Republic of Korea was attracting a con- 
stant stream of refugees from the north who 
wanted to escape from Communist despotism. 
Just 2 weeks ago tonight, at this very hour, I was 
meeting at Seoul with a group of 3,000 Christian 
refugees from the north. We were in a great new 
church which was in process of construction. I 
talked to the refugees through an interpreter, and 
I have never seen men and women more clearly 
dedicated to Christian principles. 

The Communists seem to have felt that they 
could not tolerate this hopeful, attractive Asiatic 
experiment in democracy. They had found that 
they could not destroy it by indirect aggression, 
because the political, economic, and social life of 
the Republic was so sound that subversive efforts, 
which had been tried, had failed. The people 
were loyal to their Republic. Therefore, if this 
experiment in human liberty was to be crushed, 
this crushing could only be done by armed attack. 
That is what is being attempted. 

A second reason which doubtless influenced them 
was the desii-e to embarrass our plans for putting 
Japan more and more onto a peace basis, with in- 
creasing self-government in the Japanese people 
themselves. I went to Japan so as to be able to 
advise the President and the Secretary of State 
as to what our next moves should be in carrying 
forward the program of making Japan a full mem- 
ber of the free world. Secretary of Defense John- 
son and General Bradley, the Chief of Staff, were 
in Japan at the same time looking into the situa- 
tion from the standpoint of its security aspects. 

The Communists must have feared the positive 
and constructive steps which we were considering 
in regard to Japan. They probably felt that if 
they could capture all of Korea this would throw 
a roadblock in the path of Japan's future develop- 
ment. The Russians already hold the island of 
Sakhalin, just to the north of Japan, and Korea is 
close to the south of Japan. Thus, if the Com- 
munists have not only Sakhalin to the north but 
also Korea to the south, Japan would be between 
the upi^er and lower jaws of the Russian Bear. 
That, obviously, would make it more difficult to 
provide the Japanese people with security as self- 
governing, unarmed members of the free world. 

Broadly speaking, the United States was de- 
veloping positive and constructive policies to check 



the rising tide of communism in Asia and the 
Pacific. The Communist leaders doubtless expect 
their action in Korea to dislocate our plans. 

Attack Strengthens Free World 

They will, I think, be disappointed. The result 
of their armed attack on the Republic of Korea 
will be to strengthen both the resolution and the 
capabilities of the free world. We now know we 
have to meet a new danger to world peace and 
security. We have always known that Commu- 
nists believed in advancing their cause by methods 
of violence. We have, however, hoped, up to now, 
that they would limit themselves to violence of an 
internal character such as strikes, sabotage, and 
possibly guerrilla and civil warfare. We hoped 
that they would not use military might to attack 
and conquer peaceful countries in open violation 
of the principles established by the United Na- 
tions to insure international peace and security. 

The Korean attack marks a new phase in Com- 
munist recklessness. If the members of the United 
Nations sat idly by and did nothing to repel the 
present armed attack, then almost certainly that 
method would be used elsewhere. One country 
after another would be conquered by Red armies, 
and the result would be to make a third world war 
almost certain. Also, by that time, the Russian 
position would be so strong that the United States 
and other remnants of the free world would be in 
great peril. 

Fortunately, the world is organized for peace 
better than in 1939. The United Nations Security 
Council acted almost instantly to condemn the ag- 
gression on Korea and called on the member states 
to help repel the attack. The j^rompt response of 
the United States and other members shows that 
aggressors cannot now act with impunity. 

The President of the United States, with bi- 
partisan backing, has given our nation, and indeed 
the entire free world, fine leadership. Tlie Ameri- 
can people are united for action, not only in Korea 
but also, as the President has pointed out, to pre- 
vent Formosa, Indochina, and the Philippines 
falling into Communist aggression. 

In my recent book. War or Peace, I said that 
men would never see lasting jjeace unless they 
were willing to mobilize for peace the moral and 
material resources that they would mobilize for 
war. 

We are now waging peace. I think we shall 
win it. It will not be won easily. It will require 
sacrifices and will involve risks. It seems that 
the immediate risk is not general war but rather 
that of an experimental probing effort to find out 
whether, under present world conditions, armed 
aggression pays. That militaristic experiment 
nuist fail. If we, with other free nations, make 
it fail, then we will have made an epochal step 
toward lasting peace. 



50 



Department of State Bulletin 



Support of Mutual Defense Assistance Program for 1951 



Statement by Secretary Acheson ^ 



I appear before you today to support an ap- 
propriation for the continuance of the Mutual De- 
fense Assistance Program during fiscal year 1951. 
This appropriation is required for three purposes : 
First, to provide new obligational authority for 
the program which is proposed for the forthcom- 
ing 12 months ; second, to provide cash to liquidate 
this year's contract authority ; and third, to make 
available, for use in fiscal year 1951, that small 
portion of cash and contract authority which is 
required to complete the current program and 
which may still remain unobligated on June 30. 

On October 28, 1949, Congress appropriated 
$814,010,000 in cash and $500,000,000 in contract 
authority for the purposes of carrying out the 
Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949. This 
represented a total of $1,314,010,000 in new obli- 
gational authority. 

The appropriation of these funds did not occur 
until late last year. Their expenditure, in large 
part, was made contingent upon certain condi- 
tions precedent which were not fulfilled until late 
in January. Nevertheless, as was estimated in 
hearings before this Committee last year, it has 
been possible to obligate these funds almost com- 
pletely. Thus, we have been able to inaugurate 
the planned programs of aid which are so essen- 
tial to our security and to proceed with further 
plans and programs which are solidly based on 
the foundations thus constructed. The legisla- 
tion before this Committee includes a request that 
that the small proportion of authorized funds not 
yet obligated be made available for future obli- 
gation. This is necessary in order to complete the 
1950 progi-ams already begun. Also in the legis- 
lation before you is a request for appropriations 
to liquidate $455,523,729 worth of contract obli- 
gations which have been entered into pursuant to 
the authority granted last year. 

The most important aspect of the proposed 

" Made before the Senate Appropriations Committee on 
June 26 and released to the press on the same date. 



legislation, is, of course, the provision of funds 
for the continuation of the Mutual Defense As- 
sistance Program in 1951. For this purpose, 
$1,222,500,000 is requested. The total is proposed 
to be allocated as follows : 

Allocation of 1951 MDAP Funds 

A total of 1 billion dollars for provision of 
military assistance to our partners in the North 
Atlantic area; $131,500,000 for provision of mili- 
tary assistance to Greece, Turkey, and Iran; 
$16,000,000 for provision of military assistance to 
the Republics of the Philippines and Korea, and 
$75,000,000 for provision of assistance in the gen- 
eral area of China. 

I want to assure this Committee that I fully 
appreciate that these are not small sums. It is 
equally true that the problems we face are neither 
small nor susceptible of cheap and easy solution. 
The most careful and extensive consideration of 
the need for these appropriations has been given 
by the three agencies of the executive branch pri- 
marily concerned — the Department of Defense, 
the Economic Cooperation Administration, and 
the Department of State. We have sought care- 
fully to determine what is necessai-y in the present 
world situation to maintain and enhance our se- 
curity, what are the most effective and best means 
for achieving that result, and what is required to 
assure that we will obtain the maximum return. 

When this Committee and the Congress last 
year considered and approved an appropriation 
for military assistance for nations in the North 
Atlantic area, there had been a similar careful ex- 
amination of requirements and methods, but there 
was absent then an element of great importance 
which is present now. That element is experience. 
This year, we have the benefit of actual operation 
of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(Nato) . The results to date are highly encourag- 
ing ; they are real ; they are substantial ; they augur 
well for the future. 

The members of the North Atlantic Treaty have 



July 10, 1950 



51 



achieved an amazing record, a record of peace- 
time cooperation for peace unprecedented in his- 
tory. Let us quickly review these remarkable 
accomplishments from the point of view of what 
they signify with respect to the next year. 

Achievement of NAP Countries 

The quick agreement of the North Atlantic 
Treaty countries upon a strategic concept for the 
integrated defense of the North Atlantic area as- 
sured us that all the member nations are agreed 
that tlie defense of the North Atlantic area can 
not and will not be based on 12 individual and 
separate nationalistic defense schemes but, rather, 
on a coordinated and integrated defense plan for 
the entire area, under which each nation would 
play the role for which its location and resources 
best fit it. We knew last year that such an agree- 
ment must be reached if the task of defending the 
area was to be met efficiently and effectively. The 
fact that it was reached, and that it was reached 
quickly, is significant of the mutual realization 
and acceptance of the need for it by all the Treaty 
members. 

The progress made under the North Atlantic 
Treaty is not confined to the acceptance of the 
basic principles contained in the mutually agreed 
and approved strategic concept. This was but 
the fii-st step in a long series required to give life 
and strength to the compact. 

An effective organization, designed to meet and 
solve the problems involved, has been established 
by the North Atlantic Treaty countries. That or- 
ganization, on its military side, provides the 
means to reach sound collective military judg- 
ments, with respect to the defensive requirements 
for the North Atlantic Treaty area. On its fi- 
nancial and economic side, it provides a means for 
tackling the difficult problems involved in finding 
ways and means to meet the common need for in- 
creased strength. Illustrative of common prob- 
lems are those involved in agreeing upon 
production location and procedures, financing of 
production, and transfers, standardization, and 
the like. The agreement reached at the recent 
North Atlantic Treaty Council meeting to estab- 
lish a permanent Council of Deputies will provide 
a mechanism in continuous operation to guide, 
coordinate, and integrate the work of the various 
subordinate bodies of the organization. 

Outstanding in the progress of the Nato to date 
is the resolution of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Council urging governments in developing forces 
for the defense of the North Atlantic area to con- 
centrate on the creation of balanced collective 
forces rather than balanced national forces. This 
resolution, which, significantly, also urged the 
progressive build-up of defense forces, exemplifies 
the realistic and forthright determination of all 
members to proceed vigorously and to base their 
efforts on a principle of fundamental importance. 

The bilateral agreements between the North 



Atlantic Treaty countries and the United States, 
under which our aid is provided, are solemn under- 
takings wliich assure that our assistance is but a 
part of, and is matched by, a cooperative self-help 
program designed to increase the defensive 
strength of the area. That these undertakings 
were sincere and earnestly supported by all par- 
ticipants has been borne out by the implementing 
deeds thereunder. Thus, in spite of the continued 
necessity of attaining economic recovery and sta- 
bility, wliich is essential to the success of any 
defense effort in Western Europe, oiu- European 
partners are progressively devoting greater effort 
and more funds to meeting defense needs. In spite 
of the violent and full-scale Soviet propaganda at- 
tacks against the program of defense, and despite 
Soviet efforts to promote strikes and violence to 
prevent the unloading of material being shipped 
under this program, these nations have proceeded 
courageously, steadily, and effectively to increase 
the defensive strength of the area, through their 
own efforts and with our help. The fact that they 
have and are so acting is significant of a new spirit 
which is being developed in Eui'ope, a spirit which 
is based upon the conviction that the job can and 
will be done. 

The proposals recommended by the Administra- 
tion for fiscal year 1951 are specifically related to 
these accomplishments. The manner in which 
next year's program has been developed demon- 
strates this fact. "Wliile based on a variety of 
factors, those fundamental to our consideration 
here are: First, the program consists of those 
items most urgently needed at this time, based 
on the i-equirements for the defense of the area as 
they have been developed by the planning of the 
Treaty Organization; second, it takes account of 
the ability of the European nations, actively co- 
operating together on the basis of self-help and 
mutual aid, tlirough their own increased military 
production, to fill these requirements without 
destroying their economic stability; third, it is 
limited by the capability of the European nations 
to support forces and the capacity of those forces 
to assimilate the aid which can be furnished; and 
fourth, it is governed by our own military supply 
position and capacity to furnish aid. 

Assistance Promotes Security of U.S. 

What has been agreed to, accomplished, and 
undertaken to date offers us full assurance that 
our aid will contribute to the integrated defense of 
the area; that it will be utilized solely for the 
build-up of balanced collective defense forces, and 
that we will, thereby, promote the security of the 
United States. 

This program for next year will certainly not 
complete the task of building adequate defensive 
strength in the North Atlantic area. Much re- 
mains to be done; Soviet Russia still pursues the 
course of arming for aggression, threatening the 
weaker nations, jn-obing for their weakest spots, 



52 



Department of State Bulletin 



refusinp; to work through the United Nations for 
peace. We have not yet been able fully to deter- 
mine the exact size and nature of the defensive 
strength required to insure us against future ag- 
gression against the North Atlantic area. We do 
know that our defenses are far too weak; we do 
know that we must aid our partners to build up 
their forces swiftly. 

We also know that the spirit of the peoples of 
the North Atlantic area is progressively more 
hopeful, reflecting an increasing conviction that 
free peoples, working freely together on terms of 
equality and mutual understanding, can make 
their own defense a real and attainable objective. 
We and our partners must continue to work hard; 
we must work effectively. Each must do what he 
best can to achieve the goal. By working together, 
our cherished freedoms can be maintained. 

Turning to the recommendation of continued 
militaiy assistance for Greece and Turkey, we find 
ourselves with a more extensive and equally en- 
couraging record. The success which has been 
achieved by the peoples of Greece is clear proof 
that the forces of aggression can be halted by in- 
voking the pi'oper measures at the proper time. 
The Greek Government now has full control of 
all its territories for the first time since 1940. 
These hard-won gains must not be lost. Greece 
must continue to build up its defensive strength in 
order to maintain its internal security which is 
so essential to the attainment of economic and po- 
litical stability. The people of Greece must be aole 
to subdue, quickly, any possible recrudescence of 
Communist guerrilla activities. The successes so 
far, which United States aid enabled the Greeks 
to attain, do make it possible for military assist- 
ance from the United States to be reduced sub- 
stantially below that provided last year. The 
Greek program is a concrete illustration of the 
practical values of providing military assistance 
to peoples determined to defend themselves and 
their liberties. 

The record of our program of military assistance 
to Turkey is another one of which we can be proud. 
The Turkish people, even before any provision of 
assistance by us, and unprepared for modern war- 
fare though they were, withstood Soviet pressures. 
With our assistance, supplementing their own de- 
termination, this strong resistance against con- 
tinued Soviet pressures has been based on an in- 
creasing ability to meet force with force. The 
Turkish will to resist is characterized by its ex- 
penditure of 35^0 percent of its revenues for 



military purposes. These heavy expenditures, 
which cannot be increased without serious en- 
dangering of the Turkish economy, cannot provide 
the equipment which is required to complete the 
modernization of the Turkish armed forces and 
to provide the further training in modern warfare 
which is needed. Our continued assistance will 
enable Turkey to meet the requirements imposed 
by a ruthless potential aggressor. 

I need not, in discussing the request for the con- 
tinuation of military assistance to Iran, elaborate 
on its strategic position and the importance to the 
free world of maintaining its security. To main- 
tain its security, Iran needs modern well-equipped 
forces. Iran cannot, in its present economic con- 
dition, meet its needs without help. It requires 
assistance to modernize its forces and to meet its 
most urgent military deficiencies. We propose to 
aid Iran in filling some of its most urgent needs 
in order that it may become capable of meeting 
its security problems. 

The situation in the Far East was never more 
than today a matter of the gravest concern to this 
Government. The bill before the Committee pro- 
vides $16,000,000 in additional funds for aid to 
Korea and the Philippines and $75,000,000 for aid 
in the general area of China. The importance of 
obtaining these funds need not be underlined. 
All matters relating to United States aid in the 
Far East are now in the hands of the President 
for his decision so far as the executive branch is 
concerned. Under these circumstances and at his 
direction, I shall not talk today about possible 
courses of action in that area. It must be obvious 
that the immediate passage of tlris bill, with the 
funds which it will provide for use in the Far East 
and the flexibility which it contains, is of the 
greatest importance. 

In summary, I would like to repeat what I said 
earlier : It is our sincere and honest judgment that 
this program, and every dollar of it, is urgently 
needed for the security of our friends and our- 
selves. Military assistance is not a panacea of 
all the ills of the world, nor will this pi-ogram solve 
all the problems with which we must deal. I am 
convinced, however, that this aid will contribute, 
and materially contribute, to the creation of situ- 
ations in which we may be able more efl'ectively to 
deal with and to solve those problems. 

Our objective is peace. If we are to have peace, 
the free nations of the world must be strong. 
This program will aid them in the achievement 
of that strength which will discourage aggression 
and promote peace. 



July 10, 1950 



53 



LABOR'S ROLE IN WORLD AFFAIRS 



hy Bernard Wiesman ^ 



American labor is so important a segment of the 
American population and so dynamic a force in 
American economics and politics that it must play 
a major part in the shaping of American diplo- 
macy. Even if labor were to remain completely 
silent, its very silence would influence American 
policy and remove one of the most potent in- 
fluences which now constitute America's activity 
in world affairs. 

Labor's role in world affairs is obviously that 
of one section of the American people and pre- 
supposes similar activity by other elements of 
American life whether they be in industry or 
agriculture, in religion or in education. 

Labor is more than a numerical portion of the 
American population so far as world affairs are 
concerned. Labor has a special significance in 
the production of essentials of national life and 
of international trade. In addition, it has a par- 
ticular importance in people-to-people relation- 
ships. In the present phase of world progress, 
working people are in the lead in what might be 
described as a revolutionary development. In 
some of the older industrial countries, labor has 
come of age and has begun to exercise the duties 
of the head of the family. In newer countries, 
there is an almost frantic haste to bridge within 
months or years the experience of many centuries. 
In such areas, working people are being invited 
to take on roles of responsibility in the political, 
social, and economic life of their country for which 
they have lacked even the most elementary of the 
three E's. Whether this situation is good or bad 

' This article is based on an address delivered before 
the eight annual conference of the Labor Education As- 
sociation at Swarthmore, Pa., on June 17. 



is not the question. It is a fact, and we must try 
as a nation to face facts and to build upon them 
the structures which, in the long range, will be 
in the best interests of all concerned. 

Control of the organized labor movement of the 
world is among the foremost objectives for which 
the Kremlin is now waging its cold war. Labor's 
role in world affairs, therefore, becomes a matter 
of major significance to our country as a whole. 
Leaders in AFL, CIO, and Railway Brotherhoods 
have a keen realization of that fact and have taken 
effective steps aimed to checkmate the Comin- 
form's program as exemplified in the so-called 
World Federation of Trade Unions (Wrru). 

Labor's Role in Promoting Freedom 

What organized labor can do to promote the 
basic freedoms in the present world is a respon- 
sibility for labor to decide. The Department of 
State has no desire to dictate to labor what it 
should do or to try to control what labor does. 
We know that we neither have the right nor the 
wisdom to manage the affairs of a free world labor 
movement. The Department of State realizes the 
fundamental truth in what President Truman re- 
cently said concerning the effectiveness of Ameri- 
can labor's testimony among workers in other 
lands. 

The Department, therefore, asks the trade-union 
leaders of this country to carry America's message 
abroad through all available channels and to see 
that workers in other lands come to know what 
our freedoms mean and to choose those freedoms 
as their way of life. We want American trade 
unionists to show other workers that the strength 
of our nation is in its freedom, its friendliness, its 



54 



Department of State Bulletin 



hope of helping others, its moral principles. We 
want American trade unionists to show workers of 
otlier lands that the American worker is about as 
close as anyone can get to the average American 
citizen, that he is a hard-working decent guy who 
aims to earn his pay and get more of it, using it 
for a comfortable living for his family, going to 
church on Sunday, and sending his youngsters to 
school and many of them to college. 

If the masses of workers in other lands could 
know American workers as they are, they would 
reject instinctively the deceits of the Cominform, 
which are predicated upon the thesis that Ameri- 
can workers are either fools or knaves. The kind 
of false propaganda which they peddle is based 
upon the fiction that American labor leaders are 
the tools of the State Department and that the 
State Department is the tool of Wall Street. 

The propagandists of the so-called World Fed- 
eration of Trade Unions attack the new Inter- 
national Confederation of Free Trade Unions as 
a sort of Titoist deviationism and label it the 
"Yellow Internationale." They use that label in 
countries outside of the Orient. In that area, they 
presumably use a different adjective. 

Labor's Contribution 

to International Cooperation 

The trade-union centers of this country, AFL, 
CIO, and Railway Labor Executives, are actively 
committed to a program of international co- 
operation to advance free trade unionism and to 
unmask and discredit the Wftu as the satellite 
of the Cominform. The AFL, the CIO, and the 
United Mine Workers all participated in the 
founding, last December at London, of the In- 
ternational Confederation of Free Trade Unions 
(IcFTu). The Railway Labor Executives under- 
standably make their international cooperation 
through the IcFTU-affiliated International Trans- 
portworkers' Federation (Itf). Credit should be 
acknowledged to the part played by two great 
American trade unionists in bringing about the 
affiliation of the Railway Labor Executives with 
the Itf at a time when it was the sole rallying 
point of international opposition to the Wftu. 
I refer to the late Bob Watt, of the AFL, and the 
late Harry Frazer, of the Railway Labor Exec- 
utives. 

Membership in these world organizations is by 
no means the only evidence of AFL or CIO ac- 
tivity internationally. Both have standing in- 



ternational committees composed of executive 
council members and full-time international 
representatives. Both devote an extensive por- 
tion of the time of the aimual conventions to in- 
ternational affaii's and the President and Secre- 
tary-Treasurer of each take direct personal in- 
terest in the international activity. 

The Free Trade Union Committee of the AFL 
has been an active and constructive force in Europe 
and Asia. Tlie Amalgamated Clothing Workers 
is an example of international activity by one of 
the great trade unions of the CIO. The UAW 
is another CIO union which has shown initiative 
in international activity. A further example, per- 
haps the most dramatic because of its far-reaching 
influence is the International Ladies Garment 
Workers Union. 

The specialized Latin American activities of the 
AFL, and of the CIO, should also be noted espe- 
cially in view of this country's good-neighbor 
policy. 

Traditional ties with other countries have also 
brought fraternal relations between the trade- 
union movements. A half-century practice of ex- 
changing fraternal delegates has knit a bond be- 
tween the AFL and the British Trades Union Con- 
gress, while both AFL and CIO have sent special 
representatives to Italy and Israel to help the 
trade-union movements there meet their postwar 
problems. 

Trade-union dollars are backing up the words 
of convention resolutions, and day-to-day efforts 
of trade-union leaders abroad are translating the 
policies of international committees. 

Activities of International Labor Organizations 

The International Confederation of Free Trade 
Unions is the trade-union center of the free world 
to which belongs almost every major labor organi- 
zation which is free to choose. Those affiliated 
with the International Federation of Christian 
Trade Unions and a small handful of others re- 
main outside at present, for cogent national rea- 
sons. American labor leaders have tried hard to 
secure the affiliation of all trade-union centei-s of 
the free world, but the Christian unions, which 
are of great importance in certain European coun- 
tries, have a long tradition of international col- 
laboration to seek Christian ideals of employer- 
worker relations as distinguished from the Social- 
ist philosophy which permeates the thinking of 
their major rivals. Italy now has a unified trade- 



July 10, 1950 



55 



union center of major non-Communist unions to 
compete with the Communist-controlled Federa- 
tion headed by Di Vittorio. 

The International Confederation of Free Trade 
Unions with headquarters at Brussels was cre- 
ated only in December. Late in May, the Icftu 
held its first Council meeting and gave evidence 
that it has begun to function. Icftu is sending a 
delegation of five members, including two Ameri- 
cans, to make a 3-month survey of the situation in 
Asian countries with a view to determining what, 
if any, regional organization should be established. 
Later in the year, the possibility of a Latin Amer- 
ican regional set-up will be investigated. A re- 
cent meeting at Dusseldorf, to consider the prob- 
lems of the Ruhr, indicates the possible develop- 
ment of a European unit. The Icftu is getting 
under way as a nongovernmental organization with 
category A consultative status with the Economic 
and Social Council of the United Nations, the In- 
ternational Labor Organization, etc. The Icftu 
intends to be the voice of free world labor, sustain- 
ing the cause of legitimate trade unions as essen- 
tial in any economic democracy and as bulwarks 
of any political democracy. All major American 
trade unions have shown their support for the 
Icftu, but it is to be expected that the unions ex- 
pelled by the CIO for devotion to the Communist 
Party will confirm that misguided zeal by affiliat- 
ing with the Wftu. 

The AVorld Federation of Trade Unions wears 
a resjiectable label, placed upon it by a great 
American labor leader who had thought that 
active participation in Wftu would contribute to 
a democratic peace. He was eager to emphasize 
that it should be a bona fide trade-union system, 
rather than a political mechanism for labor, but 
he has long since concluded that the ideals he 
sought could not be achieved in a Wftu controlled 
by the Kremlin. The Wfitt was Moscow's major 
postwar front organization through which Mos- 
cow sought to manipulate world opinion, to con- 
trol the international policies of national trade- 
union centers, and to infiltrate national centers. 
It was founded in 1945, and, in 1949, the three 
major free trade-union members withdrew. They 
had decided that they could no longer associate 
with a Wftu which in 1945 appealed for all pos- 
sible aid for reconstruction of Europe and which 
in 1947 refused even to publicize the Marshall 
Plan. The Wftu, free of the restraining influ- 
ence of the legitimate trade unionists from the 



United States, United Kingdom, and Nether- 
lands, has enrolled itself in the service of the Com- 
inform even to the extent of denouncing the 
Wftu Executive Council member from Yugo- 
slavia severing ties with him as a Titoist, and of 
divorcing tiie Yugoslav labor oi-ganization of 
which he is Secretary General, from contact with 
other members of the Wftu. The color of the 
Wftu was also shown by the pronounciamentos 
at its Peiping meeting late last year. In language 
of plainly incendiary character, it called upon the 
workers of Asia to follow the example of China 
and to overthrow their alleged exploiters in the 
governments of the new and old nations of Asia. 
The Wftu delegates at Peiping included a choice 
collection of Asian representatives who have been 
in process of education at Moscow for many years 
and who are evidently being returned to their 
native lands for subversive activities among the 
workere in such countries as India, Indonesia, and 
Malaya. 

Perhaps, the best description of the Wrru of 
today is that it is the company union for the Com- 
inform in which membership ordinarily is com- 
pulsory for Communist-dominated unions and 
through which the Wftu management hopes to 
sabotage and destroy legitimate, and hence free, 
trade unionism. 

In this hemisphere, the Confederation of Latin 
American Workers predated the Wftu but rarely 
has deviated from the master pattern. 

AFL and CIO leaders are now working with 
the Icftu leadership toward a legitimate demo- 
cratic regional organization. The sponsors of the 
Inter-American Confederation of Labor, estab- 
lislied only 2 or 3 years ago as a rallying point for 
iniions free of Communist control, are eager to 
take such steps as will effectuate their original 
intent in union with the Icftu. Similiar 
strengthening of two other regional organizations 
is expected through the Icftu. I refer to the 
Asian Federation of Labor which held its first 
regional meeting in Ceylon last January and to 
the ERP-Trade Union Advisory Committee in 
Europe. 

Mention must be made of another form of inter- 
national cooperation among workers. I refer to 
the international trade secretariats or, as they 
might be called, the international industrial or 
craft federations. There are more than a dozen 
of these affiliated with the Icftu in a cooperating 
arrangement which preserves the essential auton- 



56 



Department of State Bulletin 



omy of these federations. This group includes 
the International Federation of Transport work- 
ers wliich combines national organizations repre- 
senting between 4 and 5 million workers in marine, 
rail, highway, and air transport in countries all 
over the world. The International Metal Work- 
ers, the Miners' Federation, the Textile "Workers 
are among the next largest. Only one of these 
groups has chosen to desert freedom and that one 
is the journalists' union where leadei-ship was 
secured on a narrow margin and the organization 
perverted to Communist aims. Organizations 
such as the Newspaper Guild have accordingly 
left the group. 

In Europe, most of these international trade 
secretariats have functioned since early in this 
century. They have supplied fraternal ties among 
workers in the great industries, and those which 
have enjoyed any substantial income have been im- 
portant factors in the economic life of the Conti- 
nent. They are not competitors of the Icftu. 
They have their own financing through dues col- 
lected from national affiliates such as the Kailway 
Labor Executives, the Machinists, the UAW-CIO, 
the Mine Workers, etc. 

The importance of their work is emphasized by 
the energy with which the World Federation of 
Trade Unions, having failed to capture the secre- 
tariats, has undertaken to set up rival organiza- 
tions. The Wrru program, originally, was to 
transform the autonomous secretariats into indus- 
trial departments of the Wrru. Wlien the major 
free unions left the Wrxu, it undertook to estab- 
lish international unions with the appearance of 
autonomy which could invite the affiliation of out- 
fits such as the International Longshoremen's and 
Warehousemen's Union. There Wrru agencies 
have sought to get the affiliation of any national 
unions of like-minded leadei'ship even when the 
national trade-union center has repudiated the 
Wftu itself and denounced all of its arms and 
legs. 

Labor's role in world affairs is recognized in 
the operations of the United Nations and its organs 
and specialized agencies. On the one hand, many 
national delegations include among their dele- 
gates or advisers men and women from labor- 
union leadership. On the other hand, as author- 
ized in the Charter of the United Nations, 
international nongovernmental organizations have 
been accorded consultative status with the Eco- 
nomic and Social Council and its commissions. 



The Icftu and the Ifctu now are among the cate- 
gory A consultants which also include the Wftxt. 
The Transport workers are in category B which 
consists of the more specialized groups. Ameri- 
can labor leaders have been among the United 
States delegations to the International Trade Or- 
ganization Preparatory Conference and to confer- 
ences of the World Health Organization and of 
the United Nations Educational, Scientific and 
Cultural Organization as well as on the National 
Commission for Unesco. 

The Operation of the ILO 

I have reserved mention of the International 
Labor Organization until now. The Ilo is the 
unique intergovernmental organization which, 
since 1919, constitutionally includes in its confer- 
ences and Governing Body, representatives of 
employers and workers who jointly share author- 
ity on a par with those of governments in formu- 
lating international labor standard treaties. It 
was created at the urgent demand of a few great 
progressive leaders at Versailles. The Ilo is ded- 
icated to the principle that enduring peace must 
be founded on social justice and that the pro- 
gressive improvement of conditions among work- 
ers anywhere is essential to the well-being of 
people everywhere. At Philadelphia, 6 years ago, 
the principles of 1919 were reviewed by the repre- 
sentatives of employers, workers, and governments 
of member nations so that social progress could be 
charted even while war was being desperately 
waged. The solemn declaration of Philadelphia 
has since been annexed to the Ilo Constitution and 
demonstrates general acceptance of the facts that 
"poverty anywhere constitutes a danger to pros- 
perity everywhere," that "labor is not a commod- 
ity," and that "freedom of expression and of 
association are essential to sustained progress." 

Another quote from the declaration of Phila- 
delphia expresses a concise and far-reaching phi- 
losophy about labor's role in world affairs : 

The war against want requires to be carried on with 
unrelenting vigour within each nation, and by continuous 
and concerted international effort in which the represent- 
atives of workers and employers, enjoying equal status 
with those of Governments, jdin with them in free dis- 
cussion and democratic decision with a view to the pro- 
motion of the common welfare. 

In the framing of that declaration, representa- 
tives of the workers and employers of this coun- 
try shared with representatives of this Govem- 



July 70, 1950 



57 



ment. The declaration itself was transmitted by 
President Roosevelt to both Houses of the 
Congress. 

What is an objective estimate of Ilo's contribu- 
tion to the world? 

The Ilo has substantially benefited the world by 
building within the minds and consciences of gov- 
ernments, employei's, and workers a realization of 
national duty and international responsibility, 
progressively, to improve the conditions of life 
among working people. Many tangible proofs 
exist of Ilo service to member nations, but it has 
most significantly served by causing responsible 
leaders to recognize the need and to accept the 
challenge that remedies must be found together. 

Role of the Trade Unionists 

In the State Department, the importance of 
having expert knowledge of what labor is think- 
ing and doing is evidenced in several ways. The 
Department itself, under the reorganization of 
1949, has a labor adviser in each of the four geo- 
graphic areas, headed by Assistant Secretaries of 
State, one in the German Affairs office, which has 
equivalent status because of its operating respon- 
sibilities, in addition to the Labor Adviser to the 
Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs, who 
has active responsibility for relations extending 
beyond the limits of any single area. Their duties 
concern the activities and interests of national and 
international labor organizations which extend 
beyond the areas of any single geographic area and 
involve political as well as economic matters. 

The Department of State has trade-union con- 
sultants from the AFL and the CIO who provide 
valuable advice and liaison. 

Top officers of the Department, beginning with 
Secretary Acheson, have meetings with represen- 
tative labor leaders from time to time. On some 
matters, such as policy concerning relations with 
Spain and the Argentine, trade unionists freely 
criticize the Department's policies after careful 
considerations of general over-all character which 
included American labor's well-known views on 
the subject. On most matters, however, American 
trade unions stand firmly in support of American 
foreign policy. 

The Foreign Service of the United States now 
includes about 30 labor attaches and labor re- 
porting officers, including several trade unionists, 
whose duties include knowing what the trade 
unions are thinking and doing, advising Embassy 



and Departmental officers of any significant de- 
velopments and helping to transmit some under- 
standing to trade unionists and government of- 
ficials about what American labor is and does. 

The Department of Labor also recognizes the 
responsibility of our Govermnent to promote 
understanding and cooperation among the work- 
ing people and the trade unions of all countries 
accessible to us. Under the Assistant Secretary 
of Labor, Philip Kaiser, there is an Office of In- 
ternational Labor Affairs with which our office 
works closely and cooperatively. The State De- 
partment does not duplicate the technical services 
of the Department of Labor in connection with 
international labor standards. An interdepart- 
mental committee on international social policy 
provides the vehicle for formal cooperation among 
the several departments concerned with specific 
problems. Through that device, position papers 
on labor matters which may arise at Ilo or United 
Nations meetings are normally formulated. 

The Labor Department has a trade union ad- 
visory committee on international labor affairs 
which has furnished a useful channel for con- 
sultation and cooperation. 

EGA, of course, has formalized labor's partici- 
pation in its top councils here and abroad. 

Labor's role in world affairs would be meaning- 
less if economic isolation were to govern its poli- 
cies. The IcFTu Constitution declares as one of 
its aims to — 

advocate with a view of raising the general level of pros- 
perity, increased and properly planned economic coopera- 
tion among the nations in such a way as will encourage 
the development of wider economic units and freer ex- 
change of commodities and to seek full participation of 
workers' representatives in olBcial bodies dealing with 
these questions. 

The pressing need among free peoples is to 
reduce, as rapidly as consistent with the general 
welfare, such artificial barriers as lead to mis- 
understanding, suspicion, or exploitation. It is 
to be devoutly hoped that trade unionists in all 
free countries, including our own, can lead in pro- 
moting the brotherhood of peoples and finding 
the ways to make the adjustments necessary to 
prevent or minimize local repercussions. 

Conclusion 

My experience in 20 years of intimate collabora- 
tion with the trade-union movement of the United 
States and of considerable experience with the 



58 



Deparfmenf of State Bulletin 



trade-union movements of other countries leads 
me to assert that what is good for labor inter- 
nationally is generally good for our country and 
all other countries which shai'e our basic beliefs. 
Workers constitute around one third of the popu- 
lation, and, in many countries, the trade-union 
movement which speaks on their behalf includes in 
its membership one out of every three or four 
workers. 

The chief area of controversy usually comes in 
the exercise of judgments as to whether a specific 
program is good for labor and for the general 
public. Honest men of good will can diiler objec- 
tively in reaching a decision and, once taken, can 
work to carry out that decision even if it does not 
appear to any of them to be perfect. One of the 
most unfortunate aspects of the trial by accusation 
through which the Department is now passing is 
that real common goals have been obscured by con- 
troversy which should have been avoidable. 

I refer to that controversy as I approach what 
to me is perhaps the greatest contribution which 
American labor can make in world affairs at this 
time. Basic American foreign policy is, I hon- 
estly believe, designed to accomplish goals which 
are good for mankind and which are essential in 
combating the threatened enslavement of the 
minds and bodies of men. 

If that objective is true, as I believe it to be, the 
next problem is how to persuade the people of our 
country and of the world that these goals are 
their goals and that we should all work together 
to attain them. It is my opinion — and one shared 
widely within the Department of State — that the 
American trade unions, in cooperation with the 
International Confederation of Free Trade 
Unions — can best convince the workers of other 
lands that they should support these goals in their 
own self-interest. 

If I know trade unions at all, I know that they 
must rest their first judgments on the credentials 
a man carries. If he carries a card in a union, it 
takes him as a brother unless he proves himself 
to the contrary. If he carries a message to that 
union, it goes on the assumption that it is designed 
to be in its interest. So with American foreign 
policy. If American trade unionists will take 
these basic American foreign policies which they 



believe are in the best interests of their brothers 
and sisters of the Icfttj and endorse them for the 
consideration and support of associated free trade 
unions around the world, they will strike a deadly 
blow at the propaganda of the Cominform and the 
Wftu. Labor's endorsement is worth far more 
than tons of newsprint or hours of radio time by 
official spokesmen so far as convincing workers in 
other lands that we are really their friends. 

The essence of trade unionism, whether non- 
denominational, or Socialist, or Christian, is to 
be a good provider and to share its strength with 
its brothers. It combines the patriotism of the 
loyal citizen with the brotherhood among workers 
which is truly international. With that combina- 
tion Labor's role in world affairs must be active 
and should always be a firm foundation for the 
building of a peace and social justice. 

Special Staff To Assist 
Ambassador Grady in Iran 

[Released to the press June 28] 

Dr. Henry F. Grady, whose appointment as 
United States Ambassador to Iran was confirmed 
by the Senate on June 26, will have the assistance 
of a special economic staff, some of whose members 
have preceded him to Tehran in the past few days. 
Ambassador Grady, who has been in Athens con- 
cluding his duties there as Ambassador and Chief 
of the American Aid Mission, is expected to arrive 
in Tehran shortly. 

The special staff will assist the Ambassador in 
assessing the present economic situation in Iran 
with authority to recommend to both Governments 
appropriate steps which might be taken to bring 
about improved conditions in the economic life of 
this important Middle Eastern country. 

The economic staff, which is expected to remain 
in Iran for about 3 months, will include Leslie A. 
Wheeler, a senior Foreign Service officer and well- 
known specialist in agricultural economics; 
George Woodbridge, officer in charge of economic 
affairs, Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Af- 
fairs of the Department of State ; and Paul Parker, 
the Middle East representative of the Treasury 
Department. Leslie L. Kood, a Foreign Service 
officer assigned to the Embassy, will serve as execu- 
tive secretary of the staff. It is expected that a 
few additional specialists may be added at a later 
date. 



My 10, 1950 



59 



Answer to Soviet Protest on MacArthur Clemency Circular 



U.S. NOTE OF JUNE 8, 1950 > 

• The Department of States aclmowledges the re- 
ceipt of note No. 74 of May 11, 1950 from the Em- 
bassy of the Union of Soviet Socialist Kepublics. 
The note calls attention to Circular No. 5 "Clem- 
ency for War Criminals" issued by command of 
General MacArthur on March 7, 1950. It is al- 
leged that the circular runs counter to the Charter 
of the International Military Tribunal for the 
Far East and the decision of the Far Eastern 
Commission of April 3, 1946, relating to the appre- 
hension, trial and punishment of war criminals 
in the Far East. The Government of the United 
States is urged to take measures to have Circular 
No. 5 revoked. 

Inasmuch as the matters referred to in the note 
are vrithin the jurisdiction of the Far Eastern 
Commission, the request of the Soviet Government 
should have been addressed to the Commission. 
In this connection the attention of the Soviet Gov- 
ernment is called to the minutes of the 193d meet- 
ing of the Fec, May 18, 1950 which contain a 
statement of the views of the United States on the 
parole of Japanese war criminals. Nevertheless, 
as the position of the Soviet Government is at 
variance with the views of the Government of the 
United States, those views are set forth for the 
Soviet Government's information. 

The Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers 
is the sole executive authority for the Allied 
Powers in Japan, and as such, has the responsi- 
bility for carrying out the judgments of any inter- 
national courts appointed by him. This is spe- 
cifically recognized by Article 17 of the Charter 
of the International Military Tribunal for the 
Far East and by paragi-aph 5 (b) (1) of the Far 
Eastern Commission policy decision of April 
3, 1946. 

Under Article 17 of the Charter of the Inter- 
national Military Tribunal for the Far East the 
Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers may 
"at any time" reduce or otherwise alter a sentence 
of the Tribunal except to increase its severity and 
paragraph 5 (b) (2) of the Far Eastern Commis- 



' Delivered on June 8 to the Soviet Embassy at Wash- 
ington, and released to the press on the same date. 



60 



sion policy decision of April 3, 1946, confirms that 
he has "the power to approve, reduce or otherwise 
alter any sentences," imposed by any international 
courts appointed by him. Whether the Supreme 
Commander can exercise his power to reduce or 
otherwise alter a sentence "only while considering 
the question of the approval of this sentence" as 
contended in the Soviet Government's note or 
whether this may be done "at any time" as provided 
by Article 17 of the Charter quoted above is un- 
necessary to consider at this time as no reductions 
or alterations in the sentences imposed by the In- 
ternational Military Tribunal for the Far East 
have been made by the Supreme Commander and 
none are contemplated by him. 

The Soviet Government is apparently under the 
impression that paroles such as are provided for 
by Circular No. 5 are alterations of the sentences 
imposed by the International Military Tribunal. 
This is fundamental error. A parole is in no 
sense an alteration of a sentence but permission by 
the appropriate authority for the convicted crimi- 
nal to serve part of his sentence outside of prison 
under certain conditions and controls and subject 
to being returned to prison for serving the re- 
mainder of the sentence if the conditions of the 
parole are violated. This method of dealing with 
convicted criminals is in accordance with the prac- 
tice in enlightened and democratic countries. 

For the reasons indicated the Government of 
the United States declines the request of the Soviet 
Government that it take measures looking to the 
revocation by the Supreme Commander of his Cir- 
cular No. 5. 



SOVIET NOTE OF MAY 11, 1950 

[Translation] 

The Embassy of the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics, under instructions from the Soviet 
Government, has the honor to communicate to the 
Department of State of the U.S.A. the following. 

On March 7 of this year. General MacArthur, 
Commander-in-Chief for the Allied Powers in 
Japan, issued Circular No. 5 by which it was es- 
tablished that all the war criminals who are now 
serving terms in prison in Japan, according to 



Department of State Bulletin 



sentence, may be released before the completion 
of their terms. 

As is well known, 16 Japanese major war crim- 
inals who were sentenced to imprisonment by the 
International Military Tribunal for the Far East, 
for the gravest crimes against humanity, are serv- 
ing their sentences in Japan. 

The circular of the Commander-in-Chief repre- 
sents an attempt to free by a unilateral order the 
major Japanese war criminals from completing 
their punishment, which was determined and came 
into legal force by the sentence of the Inter- 
national Tribunal, in which representatives of the 
U.S.S.R., the U.S.A., Great Britain, France, 
China, the Netherlands, Canada, Australia, New 
Zealand, India, and the Philippines participated. 
Such acts of the Commander-in-Chief, directed 
towards changing or entirely reversing the de- 
cision of the International Tribunal established 
on the basis of the agreement between the U.S.A., 
Great Britain, the U.S.S.R., and China, authoriz- 
ing the said Court to determine the degree of 
punishment for the major Japanese war criminals, 
guilty of committing the gravest crimes against 
humanity, constitute a gross violation of the ele- 
mentary norms and principles of international 
law. 

According to Article 17 of the Charter of the 
International Military Tribunal, as well as accord- 
ing to clause "B" (2) of paragraph 5 of the de- 
cision of the Far Eastern Commission of April 3, 
1916 concerning "the apprehension, trial, and pun- 
ishment of war criminals in the Far East," the 
Commander-in-Chief has the right to reduce or 
otherwise alter the sentence pronounced by the 
International Tribunal only while considering the 
question of the approval of this sentence. Neither 
the Charter of the Tribunal nor the afore-men- 
tioned decision of the Far Eastern Commission 
contain any provisions which would give the Com- 
mander-in-Chief the right to reduce or otherwise 
alter the sentence after it has been approved and 
put into effect. 

The sentence pronounced by the International 
Tribunal in regard to Sadao Araki, Kiitsiro Hir- 
anuma, Mamoru Sigemitsu and 13 other defend- 
ants was approved by the Commander-in-Chief 
after consultation with the Allied Council and 
with the representatives of other powers which are 
members of the Far Eastern Commission. On 
November 24, 1948, the Commander-in-Chief an- 
nounced his approval of the sentence of the In- 
ternational Military Tribunal in the case of the 
said Japanese major war criminals. In addition, 
the Commander-in-Chief declared that he did not 
find any omissions which could serve as a basis 
for introducing any modifications in the sentence. 
By his approval of the sentence of the Inter- 
national Military Tribunal, the Commander-in- 
Chief exhausted the authority granted him by the 
Charter of the International Military Tribunal 
for the Far East and by the decision of the Far 



Eastern Commission of April 3, 1946, concerning 
the introduction of modifications in the sentence 
pronounced by the said International Military 
Tribunal. By issuing the circular mentioned 
above, the Commander-in-Chief exceeded his 
authority, strictly limited by the provisions of the 
appropriate international documents, which are 
the Charter of the International Military Tri- 
bunal and the policy decision of the Far Eastern 
Commission of April 3, 1946, concerning "the 
apprehension, trial, and punishment of war crim- 
inals in the Far East." 

The Soviet Government calls the attention of 
the Govermnent of the United States to the acts 
of General MacArthur, mentioned above, which 
violate the agi'eement concerning the establish- 
ment of an International Military Tribunal for 
the Far East, reached between the U.S.S.R., the 
U.S.A., Great Britain, China, and other countries 
participating in the Tribunal, and which run 
counter to the Charter of the International Mili- 
tary Tribunal for the Far East and the decision 
of the Far Eastern Commission of April 3, 1946. 
The Soviet Government urges the Government of 
the United States to take measures immediately 
to revoke the afore-mentioned illegal Circular No. 
5 of March 7 of this year in regard to the Japanese 
major war criminals sentenced by the Interna- 
tional Military Tribunal for the Far East. 



Soviet Walk-Outs Flout 

Democratic Process in United Nations 

Statement hy Francis B. Sayre 

U.S. Representative on the Trusteeship Council'^ 

The withdrawal of the Soviet representative 
from this meeting repeats what now appears to 
be the standard Soviet practice in the United Na- 
tions organizations where China is represented. 

Under the Council's rules of procedure, any 
question regarding the credentials of any repre- 
sentative on the Trusteeship Council is decided 
by the majority vote of the Council after exami- 
nation of the credentials by the Secretary-Gen- 
eral. This has been done and the Council has 
made its decision. 

The United States accepts the decision just 
taken by the Council. If the decision had been 
otherwise, the United States, although opposed 
to it, would have been prepared to abide by that 
decision and continue its cooperation in the work 
of the Council. I would ask the Trusteeship 
Council members to consider the prospects for ef- 
fective action by the Council or any other United 
Nations organizations if all the members showed 

" Made on the occasion of the withdrawal of the Soviet 
representative from the meeting of the Trusteeship Coun- 
cil on June 1, 1950, and released to the press by the U.S. 
Mission to the United Nations on the same date. 



July 10, J 950 



61 



the same arbitrary and dictatorial attitude as the 
representative of the U.S.S.R. and absented them- 
selves or refused to recognize decisions of the 
organizations concerned whenever their own views 
on any particular problem were not accepted. 
Clearly, such an attitude would make it impossible 
for the United Nations organizations to operate 
effectively. 

Needless to say, neither this Council nor other 
United Nations organizations and agencies can 
for one moment agree to the doctrine that the will- 
ful absence of a single member can have any ef- 
fect whatever upon the validity of decisions taken. 
As members of this Council are well aware, the 
Trusteeship Council operated during most of its 
first two sessions as well as during its last session 
without the benefit of Soviet participation. The 
Council is fully able to do so again. 

The very kernel of democracy is the acceptance 
by all of the will of the majority under a system 
which protects the rights of the minority. With- 
out this, democratic government and world co- 
operation become impossible. The growing prac- 
tice on the part of the Soviet Government to re- 
fuse to accept the vote of the majority is an attack 
upon the fundamental principles of democracy and 
upon the United Nations itself. It is tantamount 
to an open flouting of the burning desire of well- 
nigh all the peoples of the world for peace and 
world cooperation. 



Czechoslovak U.N. Representative 
Resigns; U.S. Grants Asylum 

[Released to the press June 13] 

Vladimir Houdek, on May 16, 1950, announced his resig- 
nation as permanent representative of Czechoslovakia to 
the United Nations and wrote as follows to the Acting 
Secretary-Oeneral of the United Nations. 

The recent events in Czechoslovakia forced me as 
Permanent Representative of the Czech Republic 
to the United Nations to subject my relations to the 
government I represent to a thorough and funda- 
mental examination. These events show me that a 
few individuals installed in a "Rokossowski way" 
in the top positions mechanically apply methods 
which are flagrant contradiction to our best tradi- 
tions. Czechoslovak thus ceased to exist as an in- 
dependent state. In protest of this development I 
am submitting my resignation from the post of 
the Permanent Representative of Czechoslovakia 
to the United Nations. 



At the same time, Mr. Houdek addressed the following 
communication to President Truman. 

JVIr. President : As a result of the recent events 
in Czechoslovakia I deemed it my duty to resign 
today from the post of the Czechoslovak Perma- 
nent Representative to the United Nations. I did 
so in order to protest before the whole world 
against the methods which are being used in 
Eastern European countries, including my own, 
against the people who have brought the greatest 
sacrifices in the interest of their nation both dur- 
ing the war and after. These methods have been 
imported to our country by a few individuals in- 
stalled in a "Rokossowski way" in the top positions. 
They ai'e in flagrant contradiction to our best tra- 
ditions. The treatment of the American diplomats 
by the Czechoslovak Ministry for Foreign Aii'aira 
recently was but another expression of this atti- 
tude. I cannot agree with this development. I 
have therefore resigned from my present position 
and ask you to grant me an asylum for me and my 
family in the United States. 

I arrived in the United States with my wife and 
daugliter in 194G, and have been here ever since, 
first as the member of the Czechoslovak Embassy 
in Washington and later as the Permanent Repre- 
sentative of Czechoslovakia to the United Nations. 
During our stay in Washington a second daughter 
of ours was born. Prior to my arrival in the 
United States I was the Secretary for Slovak Af- 
fairs to the late President Benes. 

In submitting my request, I wish to say that the 
only relatives we have in this world outside Czech- 
oslovakia are living in the United States. This 
not being the only reason I hope that the asylum 
for us will be granted. 



These public statements indicate that Mr. Hou- 
dek can retain no ties with the Czechoslovak Com- 
munist dictatorship. Were he to be returned to 
Czechoslovakia, his life would of course be forfeit, 
other potential defectors would be effectively dis- 
couraged, and the Communist security apparatus 
would, thereby, have gained a marked benefit. 

It has been the traditional policy of the United 
States to give sympathetic consideration to the 
granting of asylum to political refugees. How- 
ever, when requests are made to this Government 
for political asylum, the Department considers 
each according to its individual circumstances. 
After careful consideration of Mr. Houdek's re- 
quest, this Government, in accordance with the 
procedure for dealing with such matters, has deter- 
mined that it will not require him to depart from 
the United States at this time. 



62 



Department of State Bulletin 



CARRYING OUT POINT 4: A COMMUNITY EFFORT 



Address hy Secretary Acheson^ 



It is a great pleasure for me to be with you tliis 
morning and, particularly, a great pleasure to be 
introduced by my own governor of Maryland. 
Last night, as Governor Lane said, you listened to 
Mr. Hoffman who gave you a very broad and com- 
prehensive survey of the problems which exist in 
the field of the foreign relationships of the United 
States. This morning, I want to take one of those 
problems and put it in a much narrower frame 
than we had last night. I am taking this particular 
problem, because it is of very great practical im- 
portance to all of us here. It is of great impor- 
tance to the United States. It is of great impor- 
tance to the Secretary of State as one who will 
have charge, I hope, of administering the law 
which is about to be implemented by the Congress, 
and it is a program in which you governors as a 
practical matter can be of very great assistance. 

First of all, let me put this program in its 
frame. 

I have recently come back from meetings abroad 
in which we have been dealing primarily with the 
defensive system of the Western world. That 
whole defensive system is to create a shield behind 
which the great constructive actions of the world 
can go on. Our military programs are not an end 
in themselves; they are a means, and, just as in 
the early days, some members of the community 
have to protect those people who are working in 
the fields, who are building houses, who are doing 
the constructive tasks of the community. So, to- 
day, we must have this protective shield. I have 

' Made before the Council of State Governments, White 
Sulphur Springs, W. Va., on June 20 and released to the 
press on the same date. 



spoken in other places about the keystone role of 
the Atlantic community in the constructive tasks 
of the world, and I shall not talk about that this 
morning. This great Western community with its 
tremendous skills, with its great productive ca- 
pacity, must be in the very center of the whole 
effort of the free world to make itself strong, and 
virile, and self-reliant. 

What I should like to mention today is a task 
which belongs to the Western world in its rela- 
tions with less fortunate peoples. We have many 
I^roblems of our own, and we will work those out 
in the West. We have to take barriers away from 
the flow of trade ; we have to get greater coopera- 
tion in the intellectual and other spheres ; we have 
to make our own views known throughout the 
world much more vigorously than we are doing 
at present ; but those are intra-Western problems. 
There are another series of problems which have 
to do with the relation of the Western world to that 
vast unnumbered millions of people who live in 
Asia, and in Africa, and in the Middle East. These 
areas are called the underdeveloped portions of 
the world. 

It is in regard to this problem that I should 
like to talk with you this morning and that, to be 
very brief, has to do with what has become known 
as the Point 4 Program — that is, the program of 
technical assistance. It is a program which was 
originally announced by the President in his 
inaugural address in 1949. The law which permits 
us to go forward with technical assistance has 
been passed by the Congress, and the matter of 
providing funds for it is now before the House 
and the Senate ; and I want to talk for a few mo- 
ments about the nature of that problem and about 



Jo/y JO, 7950 



63 



the help which you governors can give to us in 
carrying it out. 

I think the program has been very much mis- 
understood. In many areas, it is talked of as 
though it were a give-away program, a program 
which is going to take hundreds and hundreds of 
millions of dollars. 

That is not what we are talking about. We are 
talking about a program of technical assistance. 
It is a jirogram which costs comparatively little 
money, and the money which we have asked from 
the Congress is very small indeed compared to 
what may be accomplished. It is very hard for 
you in the United States to understand what can 
be accomplished by the program because the things 
we are doing are common phrases to you. 

Every one of j'ou governors has under you de- 
partments which are doing the sort of thing which 
we want to carry to peoples in other parts of the 
world, and I venture to say that it does not take 20 
minutes a week, or 20 minutes a month, perhaps, 
of your time. Take, for instance, the question of 
the water supply. I am not talking about the 
quantity — I undei'stand that Governor Dewey has 
a problem about that, and I know there are prob- 
lems in the Western States that have to do purely 
with the quantity of water which is available. I 
am talking about the purity of the water which is 
available. To you, that is just a thing that 
happens automatically. 

Every one of your cities, every one of your towns, 
has a water supply. There is a municipal official 
in most cases, sometimes a State official, who every 
few hours takes a sample out of the tap into his 
test tube, does some things which I do not under- 
stand with it, and automatically issues some orders 
so that the chlorination is increased, or something 
else is put in the water. You never pay any atten- 
tion to it, and, yet, this is one of the most funda- 
mental problems to millions and millions of people 
in the world. 

There are areas where there is not a single drop 
of water which we can drink without getting some 
dreadful intestinal disease, and one of the ex- 
traordinary things to visitors from the underde- 
veloped parts of the world who come to the United 
States is to see people go to a tap, get some water 
in a glass, and drink it. They are perfectly 
amazed by what happens. One man who came to 
us from the Far East was on the fifteenth floor of 
his hotel, and he saw somebody taking some water 
out of the tap, and he was amazed by this — and we 



said : "Are you impressed by the fact that we have 
running water on the fifteenth floor?" And he 
replied : "We are not so much surprised by that as 
by the fact that you drink it!" 

That is the sort of thing that is so important. 
And how can you help us? Well, here is a prac- 
tical illustration. 

State Assistance 

A few years ago, we asked Governor Youngdahl, 
of Minnesota, if he would lend us one of his 
experts from the Minnesota Department of Health. 
His name was Edmund Wagner, and the State of 
Minnesota lent him to us, and we sent him to 
Brazil to work out a water system on an experi- 
mental basis for a small town. Tliis town was on 
the banks of the Amazon, and people would go to 
the river, and then dip out a bucket of water, take 
it home, and wash, and use it for cooking and 
drinking ; and everybody in this town was ill from 
intestinal parasites which came from this water, 
and it had a very serious effect on the people. 

Mr. Wagner worked out a very simple water 
system for this town on the Amazon, the sort of 
system which would be almost too primitive for 
most American communities, put it in operation, 
and within 2 or 3 years this town began to be 
trebled, and again people came from miles around, 
because this was one place where you could get 
pure water. And then, the pumping system al- 
lowed the town to get away from the banks of the 
Amazon, and it went into the higher gi-ound, and 
the water went up there. But here in the middle 
of Brazil is a city which is the envy of that entire 
country because one officer from the State of 
Minnesota went down and put in an experimental 
system. 

Not long ago, we asked Governor Dever, of the 
State of Massachusetts, to lend us Clarence Ster- 
ling of their Department of Sanitation. He went 
to Santiago, Chile, and there he put into effect a 
sewer system. The effect of this was so startling 
in Chile that all of Latin America asked for Mr. 
Sterling, and he spent several years in South 
America putting these systems into country after 
country, and now he is back again in Massachusetts 
with this work well-done. 

Governor McMath has lent us William Bell, 
one of their sanitary engineers, who went to Mex- 
ico to install a sanitation system. The city of 
Seattle, Washington, recently released its Public 
Health Director, Dr. Emil Palmquist, and its Di- 



64 



Department of State Bulletin 



rector of Sanitation, Frederick Aldrich, and they 
undertook a public healtli mission in Iran. An- 
other liealth man from Governor Langlie's State of 
Washington, Herbeit Colwell, went out with the 
ECA mission to Greece to fight malaria. He 
started working witli the United Nations Organi- 
zation, the World Health Organization, and the 
ECA ; and this man, and a half dozen people work- 
ing on this whole scheme in Greece, have reduced 
the incidence of malaria in Gi'eece from 2 million 
cases a j'ear to 50 thousand. 

Now, there is another area in which we need 
help from you. When one of you governors takes 
office, you have whole operating school systems, tax 
systems, road systems. All of that is working. 
You have school boards and road districts, and 
all of tliat sort of thing. Since the end of the war, 
there are nine countries in Asia which have become 
independent. Those nine countries have a popu- 
lation of over 600 million people, and, in many of 
them, the entire system of government has to be 
started from the ground up. 

Success of Individual Effort 

Many of these governments have asked us for 
experts who will go out to help them to organize 
the simple administration of government depart- 
ments, and we are going to ask you for help in 
getting them to do that work. Just a few years 
ago, for instance, the Government of Bolivia 
wanted to set up a system for running rural schools. 
They did not know how to do that. So, we asked 
the Governor of New Mexico if he would lend us 
one of his men, which he did. That man went 
down to Bolivia, and set up a very simjile system 
of count}' school administration. This was so 
sensational in Bolivia that six countries in South 
America asked for this officer, Ernest Maes, of 
New Mexico, who went to the six countries and set 
up this county school administrative system. 

Governor Duff has lent us Dr. Powers, who is 
reorganizing the normal schools in Ecuador. The 
Director of Vocational Education of Connecticut, 
Dr. A. S. Boynton, has been lent to us by Governor 
Bowles, who is setting up industrial schools in 
Panama. 

Now there are dozens of other State officials and 
municipal officials who are out doing this work in 
the area in which we have been j^ermitted to do 
it in the past — which has been largely in South 
America. Now, if this Point 4 legislation is 
passed, we will have an oi^portmiity to carry this 



work into other areas of the world which need it 
very badly, and those are particularly in Asia and 
Africa. 

In the agricultural field, for instance, in which 
you are so rich in talent, we will need a great deal 
of help. Recently, we had a problem in Liberia. 
The dry season in Liberia used to be called a 
"hungry season," because they did not know how 
to grow food during that dry period, and there 
was a great deal of starvation and a great deal of 
siclmess in Liberia during the dry season. We 
asked Governor Fuller Warren if he would lend us 
a man who could work on that problem, and he 
lent us Frank Pindar, who went to Liberia. 

Now, this did not take millions of dollars or 
vast equipment. In fact, Frank Pindar went off 
with a small amount of baggage, and he had a sack 
of corn, half dozen ordinary hoes, and a shotgun. 
We asked him who the shot gun was for, and he 
said that was for crows, so we thought it was all 
right to let him take it. He went to Liberia, and 
there he taught people how to gi-ow vegetables in 
a dry season — the simi^lest kind of irrigation, the 
simplest sort of cultivation of the soil to bring 
whatever moisture there was up to the surface — 
and the result of all of that now is that the work 
of this one man in Liberia has completely dissi- 
pated this "hungry season." People can now eat 
during the dry season in Liberia. 

Now, these people that we send out are not 
merely technicians; they are not merely people 
to teach this, that, or the other technique; but 
they are the great apostles, the gi-eat spreaders of 
democracy. One of the things that we have 
learned — and we have learned it the hard way — 
is that great programs which seem so important 
to us from the American side look quite dif- 
ferently to the people who are on the receiving 
end. We often think that when we put forward 
a program which fills ship after ship of commodi- 
ties, and off they go to various parts of the world, 
that the people on the receiving end must be very 
much impressed by our tremendous productive 
power, by our generosity, and all that sort of 
thing. We see it from the outgoing point of view. 
We see great warehouses full of goods; we see 
tremendous ocean liners full of things. 

That is not the way it looks on the other end. 
The way it looks to the person in the Far East or 
Southeast Asia is not from the point of view of 
the vast ship crowded with material coming in, 
but it looks to him like a bowl of rice. Wlien there 



July 10, 1950 



65 



is a little bit of rice in it, it is not terribly impres- 
sive. That is what he sees, and we have to look 
at our program through other people's eyes. One 
of the important things is that we should have 
these apostles of democracy who go out and work 
with people — not merely officials who work with 
officials of government, not merely people who live 
in the good hotels and walk into government 
offices, but men who go into the back country; a 
man who can take a simple agricultural instru- 
ment and show people how to use it, a man who can 
explain the difference between different types of 
seed. If you can improve by 10 percent the quality 
of rice seed in Asia, you have almost solved the 
food problem. It is as simple as that. And, yet, 
the men who go out have to work with the people. 
You can not say to them, "This is the way it is 
done in the agricultural college of Iowa," or some- 
thing of that sort. You have to understand their 
nature. You have to understand their back- 
ground, their religious or other prejudices, and 
you have to teach them how to help themselves. 

Cooperation: An American Tradition 

That is what these men that you have lent us 
have been doing. This is in the American tradi- 
tion. This is the right way for America to act. 
If you think back over our history, and you think 
of tlie great people who did this sort of thing in 
our early days, you remember Eleazer Wheelock 
going up the Connecticut Kiver Valley when the 
frontier was at Springfield — and going beyond the 
frontier up to Hanover to start a school for the 
Indians. And you remember Pere Marquette going 
out into the Micliigan area with nothing except 
what he had on his back — but going out to teach 
and instruct and live with these people. And over, 
and over, and over again this was true in the early 
days of the United States. Now, the fi'ontier has 
gone very much beyond our own country, and here 
is another challenge to Americans. And we need 
not only these highly skilled men that you can give 
us, but we need younger men, too. I have often 
wondered whether that spirit of adventure and 
hardship still exists in the United States. I think 
it does, but I think it is an open question. 1 won- 
der how many volunteers from all our colleges, 
who are graduating this June, you would get if 
you went to them and said, "I want to offer you a 
hard life; you are not going to be paid much; you 
are going to live in backward areas of the world 
where there is disease lurking everywhere; you 



are going to work and to live with people who 
know nothing and are going to be very suspicious 
of you. But here is one of the great tasks which 
the United States, and the United Nations, and 
the other Western countries can bring to the under- 
developed parts of the world. Will you go out and 
take this missionary task with you?" How many 
would go? I think we would be surprised. I 
think a lot of boys and girls would do that. 

I am talking to j'ou about this program not be- 
cause it is exciting or anything of that sort ; it is not 
nearly as much fun to talk about this or to listen 
to this as it is to talk about what men in the Krem- 
lin are up to; that is much more fun than this sort 
of thing, but this is something we can do. 

People come to me, and they say foreign policy 
is all right, and we like to read this, and that, and 
the other columnist, but how can the American 
people — how can a person participate in our for- 
eign policy ? Well, here is a way you can partici- 
pate in it. Every one of you governors can helj) 
us. We will be coming to you and asking you for 
men, and it is going to be very inconvenient for 
you. You will not want to let some of these people 
go, but we are going to ask you to do that. You 
can explain to your people how important it is, and 
we are going to ask you to get some volunteers 
from the younger people in your States, and you 
can explain that to them. And it seems to me that 
if the people of your communities could feel that 
they had a part in this work because their city 
engineer or the head of their State health depart- 
ment is going to a particular country, and if they 
could follow his work, and if they could get letters 
from him which are printed in the papers, and if 
everybody in that community could follow what a 
man they know, with a few assistants, is doing in 
some distant part c f the earth, then you would get 
this real feeling that the world is, after all, one 
world and it is not as large as it seems. 

This program is now before Congress. It went 
before the Congress as a complete bipartisan pro- 
posal. It was worked out in the House and Senate, 
and bills were put in by Republicans and Demo- 
crats jointly. The Senate Conunittee on Foreign 
Relations reported it out unanimously. The 
House committee was practically unanimous. It 
was passed by a very large majority in both 
Houses. Now, we come to the very difficult thing 
of getting the money for it, and, now, we are 
running into attacks — a narrow attack, isolation- 
ist points of view are brought up, and the whole 



66 



Department of State Bulletin 



program is being misrepresented and damaged. 
The sort of attack that we have was ilhistrated the 
day before yesterday by two men who attacked it 
for exactly opposite reasons. One attacked it be- 
cause we had been talking with various countries 
about programs in advance of the Congress appro- 
priating the money, and we were criticized very 
severely by him for doing that. He said, "Here 
you are putting pressure on the Congress. You go 
and talk to this, that, and the other country about 
a program before Congress has given you money. 
That is very bad." And he had hardly gotten 
through with that before another man got up and 
said, "The trouble with you fellows is that you 
haven't got a fully detailed program. Why don't 
you talk to these countries and find out exactly 
what it is going to cost before you come in and ask 
us for the money T' Well, you cannot win. You 
get it coming and going on that basis. 

But I believe that the Congi'ess is going to give 
us the money for this program. I believe it will 
have the most tremendous effect in parts of the 
world which it is very difficult to reach in any 
other way. I have been asked: Wliy don't you 
set up a great Marshall Plan for Asia ? Perhaps, 
later in the day, Ambassador Jessup can talk with 
you about the problems of Asia. But you will find 
that it is wholly different from the problem of 
Europe. In Europe, you have a more or less 
homogeneous community with problems which are 
fairly identical, people who are used to working 
together and understand that each one is depend- 



ent on the other. In Asia, you have vast distances, 
different peoples, peoples who are quite ditferent 
racially, whose languages are wholly different, who 
have absolutely no common experience of any sort 
at all. Most of these Asian countries have had 
their connections with the world through individ- 
ual Western countries and not with one another. 
They do not want a Marshall Plan for themselves; 
they do not want to be brought into one common 
operation. Each one is dealing with its own prob- 
lem in its own way, and we have got to adapt our- 
selves to the world in which we live. We might 
wish it were different, but it is not different, and, 
therefore, we must adapt ourselves to the situation 
which confronts us. In doing that, we can, with 
this technical assistance program, be of real help to 
individual people in this great part of the world 
and make them realize that it is not merely the 
Communists who send people out to live in the 
country and teach them doctrines of one sort but 
that we also are willing to send people who will live 
with them and that we are not teaching them 
doctrines. They must realize that we are teach- 
ing them how to do things which are going to let 
them develop in their own way and that we are 
helping them, not trying to coerce them, or rule 
them, or use them for our own purposes. That, I 
submit to you, is the purpose, the significance, the 
object of this Point 4 Program. 

I hope very much that we can have the support 
of all of you governors not only in getting the 
authority to do it but also in carrying it out after 
we have gotten that authority. 



The Need for an International Trade Organization 

Statement hy Charles F. Brannan 
Secretary of Agriculture ^ 



In appearing before you to discuss the proposed 
charter for an International Trade Organization, 
I should like to speak particularly of the relation 
of this charter to United States agriculture. 

Agriculture has a very real interest in this 
charter. American agriculture produces a good 
deal more of many important agricultural prod- 
ucts than is consumed in the United States, in- 
cluding wheat, cotton, tobacco, lard, and many 
fruits and vegetables. In the crop year 1948^9, 

' Made before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs 
on May 1, 1950. 



our agricultural exports were valued at over 31^ 
billion dollars. We sent abroad about 40 percent 
of our wheat, 32 percent each of our cotton and 
our rice, 22 percent of our tobacco, almost 30 per- 
cent of our raisins and over 40 percent of our 
prunes, 30 percent of our peanuts, and 25 percent 
of our hops — to mention some of the more strik- 
ing items. 

The level of our agricultural exports during 
recent years has been higher than normal because 
of emergency and postwar requirements. Much 
of this was implemented by the financial assist- 



iuly JO, 7950 



67 



ance this country has been giving the purchaser 
countries. With the progressive restoration of 
agricultural production abroad, we can expect an 
over-all shrinkage of our agricultural exports from 
the high level reached during the emergency 
period. 

This return of our farm exports toward more 
normal levels will require adjustments in our agri- 
cultural production. Should our agricultural ex- 
l^orts drop to the levels which prevailed in the 
late thirties, serious production curtailments 
could not be avoided. On the other hand, to the 
extent we succeed in maintaining our agricultural 
exports at their present levels, the domestic ad- 
justment i^roblem will be reduced. 

The history of the 1930's indicates that we cannot 
hope to maintain a high level of agricultural ex- 
ports unless conditions favorable to multilateral 
nondiscriminatory trade are restored in the portion 
of the world economy with which we carry on the 
bulk of our trade. You will recall that the trade 
restrictions and exchange controls employed by 
foreign countries in the thirties hurt our agi-icul- 
tural exports considerably more than they did our 
industrial exports. This was because foreign 
countries turn to alternative sources of supply, 
such as stinndation of domestic production, for 
many of the agricultural products normally pur- 
chased from the United States more readily than 
they did for the products of our industry which 
they found more difficult to purchase elsewhere. 

IJnder the impact of the war and postwar emer- 
gency, foreign governments have greatly increased 
their intervention in trade by such means as eni- 
bargoes and quotas, exchange controls and arti- 
ficial exchange rates, state-trading monopolies, 
and bilateral or regional trade and payment ar- 
rangements. Recourse to these restrictive and 
discriminatory measures has sometimes been justi- 
fied by the difficidties encountered by many foreign 
countries in balancing their trade and payments 
with the United States and other so-called hard- 
currency countries. EGA assistance is helping 
many of those countries overcome their acute finan- 
cial difficulties. But if the world is to obtain last- 
ing benefits from the rebuilding of the war-torn 
economies, it is necessary that those abnorrnal trade 
restrictions and discriminations be discontinued as 
I'apidly as improvements in international financial 
and trade conditions permit. 

To assure international cooperative progress to- 
ward this objective, and thus to provide for a 
revival of multilateral nondiscriminatory trade, is 
the principal objective of the Ito charter. 

EHorts on Behalf of World Trade 

Thus — as has been pointed out by those who 
have already testified before this Committee — it 
would supplement our efforts through EGA. It 
would also supplement o>ir trade agreement pro- 
gram and the international monetary and finan- 
cial arrangements of Bretton Woods. Further- 



68 



more, it would help achieve the United Nations 
Food and Agi'iculture Organization's objectives 
of improved nutrition and standards of rural liv- 
ing throughout the world. Signatory countries 
to this charter would undertake to work together 
to avoid the type of situation we had in the thirties. 
In addition to the interest of American farmers 
in the charter because of the need to export farm 
products, they have an overwhelming interest in 
the maintenance of other portions of the United 
States economy in an active healthy condition. 
It is my belief that the cooperation of nations in 
the establishment of the International Trade 
Organization provided for in the charter being 
considered by this Committee will advance those 
interests. Other witnesses will elaborate on these 
aspects of the charter. I would like now to turn 
to the specific provisions of the charter as they 
relate to matters of most direct interest to Ameri- 
can farmers. 

The charter approach is a realistic approach. 
The Habana conference and the other interna- 
tional meetings in which this charter was drafted 
did not stop with the establishment of broad 
principles. They studied specific difficulties likely 
to be encountered, and they wrote into the charter 
provisions allowing for sufficient flexibility to deal 
with the realities of the trade situation. 

For example, there is a "general escape clause" 
similar to that included in the more recent trade 
agreements. It provides, in essence, that any 
countiy may suspend obligations undertaken 
under "the charter or may withdraw tariff conces- 
sions if, as a result of unforeseen developments, 
increased imports of a product cause or threaten 
serious injury to domestic producers. 

As concerns import restrictions on agricultural 
products, the charter develops what I believe to be 
a fair basis for meeting the very difficult problem 
of imports of products on which we have domestic 
support programs. As you know, we have tradi- 
tionally imported substantial quantities of agri- 
cultural pi'oducts of kinds similar to, or supple- 
mental to, those we produce in this country. We 
have a serious basic problem because imports of 
these commodities, many of them interrupted dur- 
ing the war, are resuming just at the time when we 
are struggling hardest with the problem of adjust- 
ing our agriculture to a peacetime basis through 
the support of the domestic market. 

It is obvious that we cannot permit imported 
products to take advantage of a market support 
operation designed to help United States pro- 
ducers. On the other hand, it would be unwise for 
us to take the other extreme and completely pro- 
hibit imports of a product traditionally imported 
into the United States. The one action would be 
unfair to us. The other would be unfair to foreign 
countries. Moreover, it would lead to a type of 
economic warfare which, in the long run, would 
harm the export market for United States agricul- 
tural products. 

Department of State Bulletin 



The churtcr deals with fhis problem by pennit- 
ting restriction upon imports of an agricnltnral 
conunodity beino- supported under any domestic 
program in the same proportion as the domestic 
produceis benefiting trom that program accept 
restrictions on the production or marketing of 
that con)niodity. 

This is not a simple rule to apply, but I am 
sure that the Committee will recognize it as a 
fair principle on which to base any continuing 
import restriction. Moreover, it does not prevent 
the mutually beneficial development of trade be- 
tween countries that sign the charter. 

In addition to this principle regarding continu- 
ing import restrictions, the charter permits tem- 
porary use of restrictions on imports of agricul- 
tural products in connection with operations to 
remove temporary surpluses. 

Subsidy Provisions and Commodity Studies 

I would next like to mention the relationship 
between the subsidy provisions of the charter and 
our agricultural programs. One objective of our 
farm legislation is to maintain a fair relationship 
between agricultural and nonagricultural incomes. 
Sometimes our price-support program results in 
holding domestic prices up when world prices are 
falling. This tends to price us out of our foreign 
market. Export subsidies can be used to offset 
such differentials. The charter permits this in 
special cases, even though it bans export subsi- 
dies in general. Again, however, it imposes a 
limitation that, I believe, we must recognize as 
fair. It requires that a country using export sub- 
sidies does not use them to push its export quanti- 
ties beyond an equitable share of world trade in 
the commodity involved. This limitation aims 
to prevent international economic warfare which 
would be harmful to all producers of the com- 
modity anywhere in the world. 

The charter recognizes, however, that limita- 
tions on subsidized exports alone cannot solve the 
problems arising in the world economy as a re- 
sult of the accumulation of burdensome surpluses 
of a primary product. Therefore, there is a spe- 
cial chapter — chapter VI — on international com- 
modity agi'eements. It provides machinery for 
intergovernmental study of world connnodity 
problems and for cooperation among the inter- 
ested governments in efforts to achieve a solution 
of those problems in a manner fair to both pro- 
ducers and consumers. International bodies 
studying commodity situations are already in ex- 
istence in the instances of such important products 
as wheat, cotton, and sugar. 

We already have an international agi-eement for 
wheat approved by the Congress last year. That 
agreement gives a specific example of one way in 
which an international commodity problem can 
be handled under the charter chapter on interna- 
tional commodity agreements. I should add that 



the extended international discussion that led to 
the initialing of the commodity agreement chap- 
ter of tlie charter by representatives of 513 coun- 
tries was an important preparatory process that 
helped make possible the final negotiation of the 
Wheat Agreement. 

I might say just a word about the Wheat Agree- 
ment. American wheat growers responded whole- 
heartedly to the war and jDostwar appeal to pro- 
duce in abundance to feed a hungry world, and 
they have developed wheat production so that it 
can be maintained substantially above prewar 
levels. Thus they have a real and legitimate in- 
terest in their share in foreign markets. During 
the life of the Wheat Agreement, they will have a 
large guaranteed export market in the participat- 
ing importing countries. 

The producers of other export staples, as for 
example cotton, who also may in the future be 
faced with the threat of an accumulation of bur- 
densome surpkises, are interested in the Wheat 
Agreement because they may want to use a simi- 
lar technique in future years. 

The over-all importance of the Wlieat Agree- 
ment, and of other commodity agreements that 
might be concluded in the future, from the view- 
point of international economic relations, cannot 
be underestimated. There is a basic interdepend- 
ence among the leading trading countries of the 
world, and this is particularly important in the 
field of agriculture. You cannot satisfactorily 
solve the problem of wheat in terms of United 
States pi'oduction for the United States market, 
any more than the British can solve it in terms 
of production and consumption in the Uiiited 
Kingdom alone. Unless all of the governments 
principally concerned get together to discuss the 
pi'oblems that arise out of their common interest in 
wheat, all will suffer more than need be. The same 
is true for many other agricultural commodities. 
Only by friendly cooperation among the main con- 
suming and producing countries will we be able 
to assure a measure of stability in the world's com- 
modity markets. 

There is one additional point I should stress in 
respect to the commodity agreement chapter of the 
charter. It does not permit the indiscriminate use 
of intergovernmental agreements to control trade. 
It limits recourse to control agreements to cases 
of real difficulty. In fact, the charter permits such 
agreements only when there is or threatens to be a 
burdensome surplus of a primary commodity 
which cannot be corrected by normal market forces 
in time to pi'event hardship to a large number of 
small producers. 

I would like, in conclusion, to stress that leading 
farm organizations have expressed support for the 
principles of the Ito charter. 

American farmers recognize the need to supple- 
ment international political cooperation by eco- 
nomic cooperation. 

I urge favorable action on this charter. 



July 10, 1950 



69 



The Need for an International Trade Organization 



Statement hy Charles Sawyer 
Secretary of Commerce ^ 



The Department of Commerce has a vital in- 
terest in the international trade of the United 
States. It has this interest because it is charged 
with serving the American business community 
and aiding in the maintenance of a strong domes- 
tic economy in addition to the part it plays in the 
development of our foreign economic policy. 
Bearing these responsibilities in mind, I want to 
make clear at the outset that, in our judgment, 
adherence to the charter will have beneficial re- 
sults for our country. 

Over the past few weeks, you have heard the 
testimony of many witnesses. Most of these have 
spoken in favor of joining the Ixo. Since you 
have heard both sides of the question, I shall not 
impose on you a repetition either of the arguments 
or the charter's details. What I should like to 
do is to comment on the attitude of business toward 
the Ito. 

I am aM'are of the criticisms that have been 
made by a number of business organizations. 
Nevertheless, while these groups have differed re- 
garding details in the chaiter, I believe that they, 
as well as those which have spoken in favor, agree 
with the basic principles of the Ito. All are con- 
vinced that something is wrong in world trade 
today, and all are of like mind that something 
needs to be done about it. 

Criticisms of Charter 

Criticisms of the charter have been many and 
varied. On the one hand, the charter has been 
called an impractical idealistic document; on the 
other hand, it is criticized because of its conces- 
sions to the realities of the world in which we are 
now living. While some have said that the char- 
ter is too technical and complicated, others feel 
that it is full of platitudes and generalizations. 
The most frequent criticisms, however, have been 

' Submitted to the House Foreign Affairs Committee 
on May 11, 1950. 



leveled at the so-called "exceptions" to the charter 
and the fact that it might cause an increase in 
imports which these people feel would be bad for 
the country. 

I do not believe that these criticisms should be 
ignored. They have been made in the main by 
sincere and conscientious individuals and organi- 
zations which have studied the charter. I should, 
therefore, like to devote a few lines to them. The 
avenues of trade are still congested with restric- 
tions and discriminatory arrangements instituted 
to deal with abnormal economic conditions with 
which you are all familiar. Our businessmen com- 
plain about them every day. The point is that 
the charter did not create those conditions ; yet it 
cannot fail to recognize their existence. In other 
words, many of the criticisms which have been 
leveled at the charter should really be directed 
against world conditions. If the charter did not 
recognize the state of affairs today it would not 
be worth having because it would be based on illu- 
sions and wishes — not on realities. 

The establishment of the Ito, however, will give 
us an opportunity to work continuously at the 
ailments which now afflict international trade. 
For adequate diagnosis and treatment we need a 
continuous appraisal. Nations must consult with 
one another to find out what is wrong and reach 
agreement on what must be done. 

I do not believe that the charter will usher in 
a new era; neither am I so cynical as to believe 
that it is worthless. It is a step forward; it is 
more than we have now. It ]>rovides for the elim- 
ination of many nuisances and unnecessary trade 
barriers that plague the trader today. I have in 
mind, for example, the field of customs formali- 
ties — often referred to as "invisible tariffs." What 
the charter seeks to do in tliis, as in other fields, 
is to establish agreed rules or principles of rea- 
sonableness or fairness in the administration of 
customs and related regulations and thus to elim- 
inate or cut down some of the foi-malities and 
complexities that have become a part of customs 
administration all over the world. 



70 



Department of State BuUelin 



I should like to direct your attention to two 
points with which critics of the Ito have been 
principally concerned. One of these relates to 
the so-called "exceptions." The critics feel that 
the charter would be unfair to the United States 
because our trade would be carried on without 
exceptions while the trade of other countries 
would be carried on under the exceptions. This 
arjiument does not hold water. The charter binds 
all of the member nations to live up to its terms. 
Some of these terms are unqualified. Those 
which relate to customs procedures, internal taxes 
and regulations, and restrictive trade practices 
are examples. 

It is true that exceptions ai'e written into the 
charter to provide for the unusual conditions to 
which I have already referred. It should be kept 
in mind, however, that some were put in at our 
request for our benefit. Some benefit no other 
country, an example being the preference excep- 
tion regarding trade between the United States 
and the Philippines and Cuba. Other exceptions 
we asked for and got were those relating to secu- 
rity considerations, import quotas on certain agri- 
cultural products, and the use of the "escape 
clause" in connection with tariff concessions. 



Need for Compromise 

Now in order to get these exceptions, and to get 
otlier countries to agree to general principles 
which both the proponents and opponents of the 
charter have agreed are desirable, we had to com- 
promise on some issues. After all, we were deal- 
ing with a large group of sovereign independent 
nations, many of whom have varied backgrounds, 
traditions, and customs. We have always com- 
jiromised in order to reach mutually satisfactory 
conclusions in dealing with other nations. If we 
were unwilling to give and take we would make no 
progi-ess. 

Some criticism of the charter has also come from 
those who fear the effects of greater imports into 
the United States. This is a problem in which 
I am intensely interested. The charter, as you 
know, provides certain rules for trade. It does 
not in itself cause trade to flow. Thus, it will not 
by itself create more or less imports. And it does 
not require us to take any action with respect to 
tariffs to which we are not already committed 
under the Trade Agreements Program. 

With regard to the question of imports, I should 
like to point out that the great bulk of the business 
community not only does not fear imports but is 
taking active steps to encourage them. Among 
the national organizations which have taken this 
position are such diverse groups as the National 
Association of Manufacturers, the Chamber of 
Commerce of the United States, the United States 
Council of the International Chamber of Com- 
merce, the National Foreign Trade Council, the 
Congress of Industrial Organizations, the Ameri- 



can Farm Bureau Federation, and a host of other 
organizations well-known to you. In an expand- 
ing economy, more goods will be exchanged, not 
less, and goods must flow into the United States 
as well as out if we are eventually to avoid subsi- 
dizing our foreign trade with dollar loans and 
grants. 

I should also like to call your attention to the 
provisions dealing with so-called restrictive busi- 
ness practices. Experience has shown that cer- 
tain activities of private international cartels, 
such as the allocation of trade territories and in- 
dustrial fields, limitation of production, and price 
fixing, can restrict the flow of trade and limit 
competition just as effectively as any government- 
imposed tariff or quota. For a long time, it has 
been our general policy in this country to elim- 
inate such practices, but very few other countries 
have heretofore been concerned with this subject 
to any appreciable extent. Under the Ito char- 
ter, however, each member nation would be re- 
quired to take steps to assure that enterprises in 
its jurisdiction do not engage in practices which 
restrain international trade and interfere with the 
realization of any of the objectives of the charter. 

In the light of the hard facts and realities of 
the present world, I believe that the Ito charter 
is in the interest of the United States — and I want 
to emphasize that by participating in the Ito, 
we do not prejudice our ability to seek improve- 
ments as soon as they can be achieved. I believe 
we are right in hoping for a day when world 
trade will conform more nearly to the conditions 
of business practice within the borders of this 
country. We should, therefore, in my judgment, 
approve an agreement that advances us toward 
our objective even if it is not entii'ely perfect. 

Whatever the shortcomings of the Ito charter, 
I am convinced that our failure to ratify would be 
a mistake. The alternative is likely to be a period 
of more restrictive and conflicting systems of for- 
eign trade control on the part of many countries. 
We would probably see greater efforts at national 
self-sufficiency, and wider governmental interven- 
tion in commerce. Controls which become no 
longer justifiable on economic grounds might be 
continued for bureaucratic or political reasons, 
and our only recourse would be retaliation which 
would be bound to have depressing effects upon the 
economic progress and prosperity of the United 
States. 

Stated simply, I believe the charter should be 
approved because its fundamental premises are 
good and agreed to by most businessmen ; because 
most of its provisions are constructive; and be- 
cause there is nothing in it which will harm the 
position of the United States or its businessmen. 
The common-sense approach to this problem 
would seem to be to approve this charter and then 
to work with other member countries through 
the International Trade Organization to accom- 
plish our purposes. 



July 10, 1950 



71 



Relaxing Restrictions on Foreign Investment in Germany 



PROCEDURE ESTABLISHED 

BY ALLIED HIGH COMMISSION 

[Released to the press June 15] 

At its meeting in Berlin today, the Council of 
the Allied High Commission approved the detailed 
procedure prepared by its financial advisers for 
the first stage in the i^rogressive relaxation of the 
present i-estrictions on foreign investment in 
Germany. 

The formulation of this procedure, which is to 
be operated on a licensing system under the direc- 
tion of the Allied Bank Commission and based on 
Military Government Laws No. 52 and No. 53, 
follows the approval in principle by the Council, 
on May 31, 1950, to the reopening of Germany to 
foreign investment. The new opportunities, 
which are to be granted to foreign owners of prop- 
erty and funds in Germany and to foreigners wish- 
ing to bring new capital into Germany, were the 
subject of discussions with the Federal Finance 
Minister on June G, 1950, and with the representa- 
tives of the Benelux Governments on June 9, 1950. 
The decision of the High Commission has eifect 
in the area of the Federal Eepublic of Germany 
and in the American, British, and French sectore 
of Berlin. 

In deciding on the new procedure which, it is 
hoped, will contribute to the economic recovery of 
the Federal Republic, the High Commission has 
had to take into account a ninnber of considera- 
tions of which the most important are the need 
to safeguard Germany's foreign-exchange posi- 
tion, to prevent undue concentration of foreign 
capital in German industry, and to provide equal- 
ity of opportunity and treatment (for foreign in- 
vestment made from blocked funds now held in 
Germany and new funds from abroad) as between 
existing foreign owners of property, prewar cred- 
itors, and new foreign investors and German 
investors. 

Further measures of liberalization and relaxa- 
tion will be introduced in the light of the experi- 
ence gained in the operation of the present new 
procedure. However, it is not foreseen that con- 
vertibility in foreign exchange of capital or in- 



come from old or new investments will be per- 
mitted. 

Pi'incipal features of the scheme are: 

(1) Cajiital equipment, raw materials and semi- 
finished goods, and engineering and other techni- 
cal services may be brought into the Federal Re- 
l^ublic for investment purposes under special 
license ; 

(2) Deutchemarks may be acquired from the 
Bank Deutscher Laender at the current rate of 
exchange against acceptable foreign currencies 
and may be used in Germany under the same con- 
ditions as govern the use of existing foreign 
balances ; 

(3) Foreign owners of claims, expressed in for- 
eign currencies against German persons, corpora- 
tions, or German public bodies will be permitted 
by special license to enter into voluntary agree- 
ments with the debtors for repayment in deutsche- 
marks ; 

(4) Foreign-owned real estate or other non- 
monetary property may be sold in Germany or 
transferred to another foreign owner for foreign 
exchange consideration by special license ; 

(5) Foreign owners of deutschemark bank bal- 
ances (including deutschemarks acquired by the 
above methods) and foreign-owned or -controlled 
German corporations will be allowed by general 
license to invest in real estate, in securities issued 
b}' public bodies, and in pul)licly-dealt-in securi- 
ties and, by special license, will be allowed to ac- 
quire investments in private business enterprises 
and loans ; 

(6) The permitted daily drawings from foreign- 
owned deutschemark balances for travel expenses 
in Germany will be increased to DM 75 per person 
with a maximum of DM 200 per day per family. 
General licenses imder Military Government Laws 
Nos. 52 and 53 to give legal effect to the above 
arrangements will be issued by Bank Deutscher 
Laender in the near future. 

In reaching its decision to relax restrictions on 
foreign investment in Germany, the Allied High 
Commission lias been influenced by the urgent need 
for new capital investment in Germany to insure 



72 



Department of State Bulletin 



the continued economic recovery of the Federal 
Republic. It recognizes that tlie foreign investor 
has a part to phiy in providing tlie necessary 
cajiital for this purpose. 

In order to attract new foreign capital to Ger- 
many and to encourage productive use of existing 
foreign funds in Germany, the High Commission 
ap]ireciates tliat the regulations governing the em- 
l^loyment of foreign funds must be as liberal as 
possible and that exchange-control restrictions 
must be kept to a minimum. At the same time, 
the overriding necessity of safeguarding the sta- 
bility of tlie currency and of maintaining foreign- 
exchange accruals, upon which the general stand- 
ard of living and the level of imports so largely 
depend, must be borne in mind. It is for these 
reasons that it is possible to proceed only by pro- 
gressive stages in the removal of the restrictions 
on existing foreign owners of assets and on new 
investors and in restoring the normal contractual 
relationship between creditors and debtors. 

In opening the way for an increase in foreign 
investment in Gei-many, certain additional safe- 
guards are essential. These have been provided 
for in the detailed scheme. The development of 
new foreign investment is to be kept under con- 
stant survey to prevent any undue concentration 
of economic power. Finally, the same opportu- 
nities as are afforded to new foreign investors are 
made available to old creditors and existing prop- 
erty owners. 

Inquiries in connection with this policy and 
applications for special licenses should be ad- 
dressed to the Bank Deutscher Laender at Frank- 
fort, Germany, or to the appropriate Land Cen- 
tral Banks in the Federal Republic of Gennany. 



REGULATIONS GOVERNING 
FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN GERMANY 

Tlie Department of State on June 16 released to the press 
the details of the new policy concertmiri foreign invest- 
ments in the Federal Republic of Qermany and, the Ameri- 
can. British, and French sectors of Berlin. This policy 
was apprnrid by the Allied High Commission at its meet- 
ing in Berlin on June 15, 19.50, and was announced in sum- 
mary in the Department's press release 638 of June 16, 
1950. The details of the new regulations are as follows: 

A. Subject to the provisions of paragrapli B. below : 

(1) Foreign owners of DM balances may utilize and 
dispose of .such balances, including DM proceeds from 
settlements referred to in paragraph (6) below, as follows : 

(i) disbursements which are now or which may 
hereafter be permitted by general licenses issued pursuant 
to Military Government Laws Nos. 52 and 53. General 
licenses will l)e issued which will enable foreign owners 
to utilize and dispose of their DM balances subject to the 
same limitations as apply to German owners but only in 
so far as foreign exchange control objectives of the Federal 
Republic are not contravened. In particular, the existing 
general license for travel expense will be amended to per- 
mit the account owner to withdraw up to DM 75 per day 
per person to cover the travel expenses in Germany for 



himself and members of his family provided the total of 
such withdrawals does not exceed DM 200 per day. 

(ii) investments in real estate and in securities 
issued by public bodies and their agencies and securities 
publicly dealt in to be permitted in accordance with a 
general license to be issued pursuant to M. G. Laws Nos. 
52 and 53 which will provide tliat re.'il estate and se- 
curities so acquired shall be subject to the provisions of 
such laws. 

(iii) investments in private business enterprises 
and loans will be permitted in accordance with special 
licenses to be issued on a case bv case basis pursuant to 
M. G. Laws Nos. 52 and 53. 

(2) Foreign owners of real or other property in the 
Federal Republic of a nimmonetary nature will be per- 
mitted in accordance with special licenses to be issued on 
a case by case basis pursuant to M. G. Laws Nos. 52 and 53 : 

(i) to dispose of such property subject to the same 
limitations which apply to German owners of similar 
property on condition that any DM or other proceeds 
accruing therefrom shall be paid into a blocked account 
in the name of the foreign owner, which may be utilized 
in the same manner as outlined in paragraph (1) above; 

(ii) to transfer title to any such property to other 
foreigners for foreign-exchange considerations provided 
that such transfers are not for the purpose of avoiding 
foreign exchange control objectives of the Federal Repub- 
lic and that such property was not acquired after the date 
of the lifting of the investment moratorium. 

(3) Foreign-owned or -controlled business enter- 
prises organized under German law and operating in the 
Federal Republic will be freed by way of a general license 
from any restrictions under 51. G. Laws Nos. 52 and 53 
which do not affect the operations of German enterprises 
except for the control of investments to the extent set 
forth in paragraphs 1 (ii) and 1 (iii) above. 

(4) Foreign persons will be permitted in accordance 
with special licenses to be issued pursuant to M. G. Laws 
Nos. .52 and 53 to bring into the Federal Repul)lic capital 
equipment, raw materials and semifinished goods, engi- 
neering and other technical services for use in the Federal 
Republic subject to the same regulations as apply to 
German-owned properties on condition that any DM or 
other proceeds accruing therefrom shall be jiaid into a 
blocked account in the name of the foreign owner, which 
may be utilized in the same manner as outlined in para- 
graph (1) above. 

(5) (i) The Bank Deutscher Laender will be author- 
ized, under the supervision of the Allied High Commission 
or its designated agency, to sell deutschemarks, at the 
current rate of exchange, against acceptable foreign cur- 
rencies including those placed at the disposal of the Bank 



Information on Doing Business 
With Germany and Austria 

The Economic Cooperation Administration an- 
nounced on June 12 that materials on Doing 
Business With Austria and Doing Business With 
Germany are now available from its OflBce of Small 
Business at Washington. 

These materials, prepared by the OflBce of Inter- 
national Trade, Department of Commerce, con- 
tained detailed information of interest to American 
businessmen engaged in, or contemplating, trade 
witli German and Austrian firms. 

In addition to describing general trade possibil- 
ities with these ECA countries, the materials 
discuss exchange controls and capital movements, 
exchange rates, and trade procedures and regu- 
lations. 



July 10, 1950 



73 



Deutscher Laender under existing payment agreements or 
pursuant to such subsequent payment arrangements as 
may be set up. Foreign excliange derived under tliis pro- 
vision shall be held by the Bank Deutscher Laender sub- 
ject to the same controls as other foreign exchange 
resources. 

(ii) DM balances created or other assets acquired 
as a result of the foregoing, including income, shall be 
held subject to the provisions of M. G. Lavps Nos. 52 and 
53 and may be utilized in the same manner as outlined 
in paragraph (1) above. 

(6) (i) Foreign owners of securities, claims or other 
obligations expressed in foreign currencies which repre- 
sent debts of private persons, firms or coiiiorations in the 
Federal Republic will be permitted in accordance with 
special licen.ses to be issued pursuant to M. G. Laws Nos. 
52, 53 and 63 to enter into voluntary agreements with the 
debtors for the settlement of such debts in DM provided 
that : 

(a) Such securities were issued or the claims or 
other obligations arose prior to September 1, 1939, and 
were, except in the case of bonds, held by the present owner 
on the date the lifting of the investment moratorium is 
announced. 

(b) Any DM received by the foreign owners as 
a result of any such settlements shall be paid into a 
blocked account in the name of the foreign owner, which 
may be utilized in the same manner as outlined in para- 
graph (1) above. 

( c ) The security, claim or other obligation, if sub- 
ject to the provisions of the Law for the Settlement of 
Matters Concerning Foreign Currency Securities (Vali- 
dation Law) when enacted, shall have been duly validated 
pursuant to the provisions of such Law. 

(d) It is established that all other foreign credi- 
tors of the German debtor involved have been given at least 
60 days notice of the proposed .settlement by publication 
and by registered letter where possible; such notice to 
inform creditors that any ob.iections to the proiX)sed set- 
tlement must be registered with the designated licensing 
authority within the stipulated time. The licensing 
authority shall be empowered to withhold licenses for a 
settlement when in its opinion a prima facie case of 
reasonable objection has been established by one or more 
creditors within the stipulated time on the ground that 
the proposed settlement would lead to a preference be- 
tween creditors or to bankruptcy of or foreclosure pro- 
ceedings against the debtor. 

(ii) Public bodies and their agencies will be per- 
mitted in accordance with special licenses issued pur- 
suant to M. G. Laws Nos. 52 and 53, to enter into volun- 
tary agreements with foreign owners of foreign currency 
claims to settle such claims in DM provided that such 
settlements can be made by the public body or agency 
thereof without impairing other obligations or causing 
additional "borrowing and that the conditions .set forth 
in subparagraphs (6) (i) (a) (b) (e) and (d) above 
are met. 

(ill) As used herein, the term "foreign owners" 
shall mean owners who are not residents of the area 
constituting "Das Deutsche Reich" as it existed on 31 
December 1937. 

B. It is not intended that the provisions of paragraph 
A. above will result in unduly increasing foreign owner- 
ship in industry and commerce in the Federal Republic. 
Therefore, appropriate limitations may subsequently be 
imposed on the provisions of paragraph A. should deter- 
mination be made that an undue proportion of industry 
and commerce in the Federal Republic would otherwise 
come under foreign ownership. Moreover, any licenses 
issued pursuant to the provisions of paragraph A. above 
shall provide that the parties to the transactions are not 
thereby exonerated from the requirement of full com- 
pliance with decartelisiation and deconcentration legis- 
lation in force in the Federal Republic. 

74 



U.S. Will Designate Civilian 
High Commissioner for Austria 

Following is the te.i-t of the United States note sent by 
Ambassador Alan O. Kirk to A. Y. Yyshinsky, the Minister 
for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union, on June 12, 1950, 
and released to the press on June 15. 

I have the honor to refer to the situation in 
which the deputies for the Austrian treaty nego- 
tiations have been unable to reach agreement on 
tlie terms of an Austrian state treaty. It will be 
recalled that Austrian independence was pledged 
in the Moscow Declaration of 1943, and my Gov- 
ernment regrets exceedingly the failure to reach 
an agreement which would result in the fulfillment 
of this pledge. 

The Foreign Ministers of the United Kingdom, 
France, and the United States at their meeting 
in London on May 18 reaffirmed that their policy 
with respect Austria requires the earliest possible 
completion of an Austrian treaty which will lead 
to the restoration of a free and independent Aus- 
tria in accordance with the pledge given in the 
Moscow Declaration and to the withdrawal of the 
forces of occupation. The three governments 
further agreed that they are ready at any time to 
settle without delay all outstanding issues of the 
treaty, provided that this will definitely bring 
about agreement on the treaty as a whole. 

In the absence of a treaty, the three governments 
agreed that they are prepared to carry out such 
measures as may properly be taken to strengthen, 
within the framework of existing quadripartite 
agreements, the authority of the Austrian Gov- 
ernment and to lighten the burden of the occupa- 
tion on Austria to the greatest extent possible as 
requested by the Austrian Government in recent 
notes to the occupying powers. The three For- 
eign Ministers further agreed to proceed at an 
early date to appoint civilian high commissioners 
in Austria in accordance with the provisions of 
Article 9 of the Control Agreement of June 28, 
1946. 

My Government would be pleased if the Gov- 
ernment of the Soviet Union, pending final de- 
cision on the treaty, would associate itself with 
the program determined upon by the three For- 
eign Ministers. In the meantime, my Govern- 
ment will, on its part, as a first step in such a pro- 
gram, proceed at an early date to designate a 
civilian high commissioner to replace its present 
military commander in Austria and hopes that the 
Soviet Government will take similar action. 



Visit of Burmese Banker 

Mr. Tin Tun, chief accountant of the Union 
Bank of Burma, has arrived in Washington to 
begin a 3-month visit in the United States for the 
purpose of observing financial institutions. 



Department of State Bulletin 



REPORT ON INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE ORGANIZATION 



iy George L. 'Warren 



The General Council of the International Ref- 
ugee Organization (Iro) held its fifth session in 
Geneva from March 14 through March 22, 1950. 
The Executive Committee met concurrently from 
March 8 through March 21, 1950. 

At the fourth session of the Council held in Ge- 
neva in October 1949, the General Council decided 
to extend the period of Iro operations from June 
30, 1950, to March 31, 1951, in order to complete 
the task of resettling all eligible refugees in central 
Europe who might qualify for resettlement and to 
complete arrangements for the continuing care of 
refugees requiring permanent institutional treat- 
ment. It was planned at the fifth session of the 
Council to review the remaining tasks facing Iro 
to reach more specific decisions as to the termina- 
tion of services and to give further consideration 
to the organization of legal protection for refugees 
under the objectives of the United Nations after 
the termination of Iro. The Executive Committee 
was convened on March 8, 1950, to consider and 
to comment upon reports of the Director-General 
to be transmitted thereafter to the General Council 
for action. 

Of the 18 member governments of Iro, 16 were 
represented at the meeting ; China and Iceland not 
being represented : ^ 



Australia 


Luxembourg 


Belgium 


Netherlands 


Canada 


New Zealand 


Denmark 


Norway 


Dominican Republic 


Switzerland 


France 


United Kingdom 


Guatemala 


United States 


Italy 


Venezuela 



Chairman; Dr. V. Montoya of Venezuela as Sec- 
ond Vice-Chairman ; and Mr. A. B0gh-Andersen 
of Denmark as rapporteur. 

Executive Committee 

The Executive Committee considered the semi- 
annual report of the Dii-ector-General for the pe- 
riod July 1 through December 31, 1949; partial 
financial reports for the first and second quarters 
of the fiscal year 1949-50; and gave attention to 
the problems of the resettlement of refugees re- 
maining in Shanghai and on the island of Samar 
in the Philippines. Incidental to its consideration 
of the Director-General's report it recommended 
that the Council approve the recommendation of 
the Director-General that all refugees qualifying 
for resettlement for whom definite destinations 
were available should be maintained in Iro camps 
after June 30, 1950, until their resettlement had 
been accomplished. 

This decision while maintaining the principle 
of earlier resolutions was taken in the conviction 
that such action would facilitate the movement of 
these refugees and contribute to the greater ac- 
complishment of the task remaining before Iro. 

The Committee noted with satisfaction that the 
Director-General had made available without cost 
to the United Nations Relief for Palestinian Ref- 
ugees, in accordance with authority previously 
given, approximately 600,000 dollars in supplies 



Dr. P. J. de Kanter of the Netherlands presided 
as Chairman of the Council for the session. Mr. 
P. Zutter of Switzerland served as First Vice- 



' Representatives of the Governments of Israel, Mexico, 
and Sweden, of the United Nations, the Vatican, Ilo, and 
Who also attended as official observers and representa- 
tives of many voluntary agencies serving refugees were 
present. 



Jo/y ?0, 1950 



75 



surplus to Iro operations and that Iro had com- 
pleted arrangements to make an interest-free loan 
to the United Nations in an amount of 2,800,000 
dollars in other currencies than United States dol- 
lars for the relief of Palestinian refugees. 

The Committee also welcomed information from 
the Director-General that negotiations with the 
Western European countries for the transfer of 
Iro responsibility with respect to residual refugees 
who will remain on their territories had proceeded 
satisfactorily. The plan of expenditure for the 
supplementary period of operations 1950-51 pre- 
sented by the Director-General totaling 55,165,456 
dollars was recommended to the General Council 
for adoption. Included in these expenditures was 
an item of 27,219,000 dollars for transportation 
covering the cost of movement of approximately 
100,000 refugees to the United States, 20,000 to 
Australia, 10,000 to Canada, and 17,000 to all other 
countries. 

General Council 

The General Council accepted the reports of the 
Director-General; adopted the plan of expendi- 
ture for the supplementary period after June 30, 
1950; and approved the decision to maintain re- 
settleable refugees in camps after June 30, 1950, 
until their resettlement had been accomplished. 
The Council gave serious attention to the financial 
reports and urged the Director-General to pay 
particular attention to the control and reduction 
of inventory supplies in order that all resources 
of the organization might be fully applied to the 
accomplishment of the remaining tasks. The 
Council also gave special consideration to the 
problems of refugees remaining in Austria and 
Italy and urged the Director-General to make 
special efforts to reduce the number of refugees 
in those countries in order that they might not be 
further burdened after the termination of Iro by 
refugees remaining in their territories. AVith re- 
spect to the problem of protection of refugees 
particularly in Germany the Council recom- 
mended to the High Commission for Germany 
that the German Federal Government be requested 
to give consideration to adherence to the draft 
convention on the protection of refugees presently 
under consideration by the Economic and Social 
Council when this convention becomes open for 
signature. 

On the initiative of the representative of 
France, the Council sent a further communication 



to the United Nations with respect to the afford- 
ing of protection to refugees by the High Com- 
missioner for Refugees when he assumes office on 
January 1, 1951. It was recommended that cer- 
tain listed provisions of the Iro constitution which 
were deemed no longer applicable to the provi- 
sion of protection to refugees should not be ap- 
plied and that the High Commissioner should not 
be bound in his activities by decisions which the 
Iro had found it necessary to take restricting its 
services to refugees for administrative or financial 
reasons. In the course of the discussion on the 
adoption of this recommendation to the United 
Nations, the United States representative made a 
statement that the United States Government 
would not find it possible to make a further con- 
tribution to Iro after the contribution for the sup- 
plementary period June 30, 1950-March 31, 1951, 
then under consideration in the Congress, had been 
made. This statement reflected the judgment that 
ujion the conclusion of Iro services in 1951 the 
need for international funds for the direct as- 
sistance of refugees would no longer exist because 
the numbers of refugees remaining in any par- 
ticular country will not constitute more than a 
normal burden upon that country. 

A decision was also reached by the General 
Council with respect to the termination of the In- 
ternational Tracing Service which has done com- 
mendable work in reuniting members of families, 
in locating missing children, and in supplying in- 
valuable records concerning the experiences of 
refugees and displaced persons during the war. 
The Director-General was instructed to reduce the 
staff of the Service progressively with the view to 
the ultimate transfer of the function of tracing 
missing persons to the High Commission for Ger- 
many on March 31, 1951. 

The Director-General re^Dorted satisfactory 
progress in concluding arrangements for the con- 
tinuing care of refugees for whom institutional 
treatment must be provided after the termination 
of Iro. The details of such arrangements with 
Norway, Sweden. Belgium, and New Zealand were 
made known to the Council, and during the course 
of the session the French Government announced 
its agreement to receive 900 aged persons from 
Germany for permanent care in private institu- 
tions in France. 

The Council adjourned its fifth session on March 
22, 1950, after resolving to convene its next session 
at Geneva on or about October 9, 1950. 



76 



Deparfment of State Bulletin 



THE DEPARTMENT 



PUBLICATIONS 



Report on Department's 
Security Program Being Studied 

[Released to the press June 15] 

The Department has just received the report 
of the Subcommittee of Two ^ concerning tlie 
practical operations, enforcement, and day-to-day 
policing of the security program in the Depart- 
ment of State. The Department is very happy to 
observe that they felt that the security officers 
■whom they interviewed are alert, capable, and 
well-trained men with a thorough grasp of their 
subject. The report contains suggestions de- 
signed to improve the Department's security pro- 
gram in certain particulars. These suggestions 
were made in a constructive spirit, and we are 
examining them most carefully in order to deter- 
mine whether they should be put into effect and 
whether they are possible in the light of our cur- 
rent budgetary situation. 

One suggestion on which particular comment 
might be appropriate is that aliens employed by 
the Department abroad should be replaced as rap- 
idly as possible with United States citizens. The 
difficult administrative, budgetary, and human 
problems which such a project presents have been 
under consideration for some time, and a gradual 
program of replacement is now under way. 

In considei'ing this problem, however, it should 
be borne in mind that the great bulk of these em- 
ployees are engaged in routine and administrative 
tasks completely removed from matters involving 
any classifaed data or questions relating to national 
security. Many of these aliens have been in the 
employ of the United States Government for 10, 
20, and 30 years. They have demonstrated, often 
in exceedingly trying circumstances and some at 
the cost of their lives, that they are carrying out 
their assigned duties faithfully and with great 
credit both to the United States and to themselves. 
The value of their services must not be overlooked. 



'The subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee, that is investigating the charges of Senator 
McCarthy of Communist penetration of the Department 
of State, appointed a subcommittee, consisting of Sen- 
ators Theodore Francis Green and Henry Cabot Lodge, 
Jr., to inspect precautions that the Department is taking 
in its missions abroad against Communist espionage. The 
Senators made an 11-day inspection trip abroad and 
submitted their report on June 14. 



Recent Releases 

For sale hy the Superintendent of Documents, Oovem- 
ment Printing Office, Wushinriton 25, D. C. Address re- 
quests direct to the Suixrinlcndcnt of Documents, except 
in the case of free puhlications, which may he obtained 
from the Department of State. 

Air Transport Services. Treaties and Other International 
Acts Series 1955. Pub. 3011. 15 pp. 10«f. 

Agreement and accompanying exchange of notes be- 
tween the United States and the Dominican Re- 
public — Signed at Ciudad Trujillo July 19, 1949; en- 
tered into force July 19, 1949. 

Economic Cooperation With Sweden Under Public Law 
472 — 80th Congress, as amended. Treaties and Other 
International Acts Series 2034. Pub. 3776. 9 pp. 5^. 

Agreement between the United States and Sweden, 
amending agreement of July 3, 1948 — Effected by ex- 
change of notes, signed at Washington January 5 and 
17, 1950 ; entered into force January 17, 1950. 

Foreign Service List, April 1, 1950. Pub. 3792. 165 pp. 
30^ a copy ; $1.50 a year domestic, $2 a year foreign. 

Lists officers in the American Foreign Service, their 
po.sts of assignment, and 2 indexes : geographic and 
personnel. 

United States Educational Foundation in Egypt. Trea- 
ties and Other International Acts Series 2039. Pub. 3799. 

11 pp. 5^. 

Agreement between the United States and Egypt — 
Signed at Cairo November 3, 1949 ; entered Into force 
November 3, 1949 and exchange of notes — Signed at 
Cairo November 3, 1949. 

Economic Cooperation With Denmark Under Public Law 
472 — 80th Congress, as amended. Treaties and Other 
International Acts Series 2022. Pub. 3802. 9 pp. 5(f. 

Agreement between the United States and Denmark 
amending agreement of June 29, 1948 — Effected by ex- 
change of notes, signed at Wa.shington February 7, 
1950; entered into force February 7, 1950. 

Economic Cooperation With Italy Under Public Law 472 — 
80th Congress, as amended. Treaties and Other Inter- 
national Acts Series 2028. Pub. 3804. 9 pp. 5^. 

Agreement between the United States and Italy- 
Effected by exchange of notes, signed at Washington 
February 7, 1950 ; entered into force February 7, 1950. 

Mutual Defense Assistance. Treaties and Other Inter- 
national Acts Series 2016. Pub. 3805. 21 pp. 100. 

Agreement between the United States and Norway — 
Signed at Washington January 27, 1950; entered into 
force February 24, 1950. 

U.S. National Commission UNESCO News, April 1950. 

Pub. 3807. 16 pp. 100 a copy; $1.00 per year, domestic; 
$1.35 per year, foreign. 

Prepared monthly for the United Nations Educa- 
tional, Scientific and Cultural Organization. 



July 10, 1950 



77 



The United States in the United Nations 



Security Council 



[July 1-7] 



On July 7, the Security Council approved a joint 
French-British resolution which recommends that 
United Nations members providing military forces 
under the Council resolutions on Korea make such 
forces available to a unified command under the 
United States and requests the United States to 
designate the commander of such forces. This 
unified command is authorized, at its discretion, 
to use the United Nations flag in the course of 
operations against North Koi'ean forces, together 
with the flags of the various nations participating. 
The United States is asked to report to the Coun- 
cil, as ajapropriate, on the course of action taken 
under the unified command. Seven votes sup- 
ported the resolution, and none opposed it. 
Egypt, India, and Yugoslavia abstained. 

Ambassador Warren R. Austin told the Council 
that the United States accepted the responsibilities 
placed upon it by this resolution, adding that the 
United States Government had not sponsored the 
resolution because of the "special responsibilities" 
imposed on her by the resolution. 

Secretary-General's Communique on Korea 

Following the adoption by the Security Council 
on June 27 of a resolution recommending the 
United Nations members "furnish such assistance 
to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to 
repel the armed attack and to restore international 
peace and security in that area," the Secretary- 
General of the United Nations sent the following 
telegram to member governments : 

I have the honour to call the attention of your Govern- 
ment to the resolution adopted by the Security Council 
at its 474th meeting on 27 June 1950 which recommends 
that the Members of the United Nations furnish such 
assistance to the Republic of Korea as may he necessary 
to repel the armed attack and to restore international 
peace and security in that area. In the event that your 
government is in a position to provide assistance, it would 
facilitate the implementation of the resolution if you were 
to be so good as to provide me with an early reply as to 
the type of assistance. I shall transmit the reply" to the 
Security Council and to the Government of the Republic 
of Korea. 

By July 10, the following states, in communica- 



tions to the Secetary-General, had indicated their 
support of Security Council action with respect 
to Korea : 



Afghanistan 
Argentina 
Australia 
Belgium 
Bolivia 
Brazil 
Burma 
Canada 
Chile 
China 
Colombia 
Costa Rica 
Cuba 
Denmark 
Dominican 
Reimblic 
Ecuador 



El Salvador 

Ethiopia 

Greece 

Guatemala 

Haiti 

Honduras 

Iceland 

India 

Iran 

Iraq 

Israel 

Lebanon 

Luxembourg 

Mexico 

Netherlands 

New Zealand 

Nicaragua 



Norway 

Panama 

Pakistan 

Paraguay 

Peru 

Sweden 

Syria 

ThaUand 

Turkey 

Union of 

South Africa 
United Kingdom 
United States 
Uruguay 
Venezuela 



The following states had not replied to the 
Secretary-General's communication on Korea : 

Byelorussia Ukraine 

Egypt ' Yugoslavia ^ 

Liberia 

The U.S.S.R., Czechoslovakia, and Poland have 
rejected as "illegal" the Security Council action 
on Korea. Yemen took note of the resolution of 
June 25, calling for a cease-fire in Korea, and Saudi 
Arabia took note of the-resolution of June 27. 

The Council of tlie Organization of American 
States on June 28 adopted a resolution declaring 
"its firm adherence to the decisions of the compe- 
tent organs of the United Nations." Italy, a non- 
member of the United Nations, has also indicated 
general support for Security Council action on 
Korea. 



Following is a letter, dated July 6, 1950, from Ambassa- 
dor Warren R. Austin to Sccretary-Oeneral Trygve hie 
concerning United States assistance to Korea:' 

Upon the instruction of my Government, I have 
the lionor to acknowledge receipt of your com- 
munication of June 29, 1950, in which you request 
information concerning the type of assistance the 
Government of the United States is prepared to 

' These two states are members of the Security Council ; 
Yugoslavia voted against the resolution of June 27 ; and 
Egypt did not participate in the decision. 

' U.N. doe. S/1580. 



78 



Department of State Bulletin 



offer pursuant to the resolution adopted by the 
Security Council on June 27, 1950, which recom- 
mends that the Members of the United Nations 
furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea 
as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and 
to restore international peace and security in the 
area. 

In response to your request, I am authorized to 
inform you that, in support of the resolutions 
approved by the Security Council relative to the 
attack upon the Republic of Koi'ea by invading 
forces from North Korea, the President of the 
United States has ordered United States air and 
sea forces to give the Korean Government troops 
cover and support and has authorized the use of 
certain supporting ground units. The President 
has also authorized the United States Air Force 
to conduct missions on siJecific military targets in 
Northern Korea wherever militarily necessary and 
has ordered a naval blockade of the entire Korean 
coast. The United States will continue to dis- 
charge its obligations as a member of the United 
Nations to act vigorously in support of the Se- 
curity' Council's resolutions. 

The United Kingdom, New Zealand, Australia, 
Canada, China, and the Netherlands have offered 
specific military assistance. In addition, Chile 
has offered "regular and adequate supplies of 
cooper, saltpetre, and other strategic materials to 
countries responsible for operations"; Thailand 
has offered foodstuffs, such as rice; Denmark has 
offered to make available certain medicaments; 
Norway has suggested that its tonnage might be 
offered for transportation purposes; Nicaragua 
has stated that she is prepared to assist in food- 
stuffs and rubber, and if deemed advisable, to 
contribute pei'sonnel; and the Philijipines is pre- 
pared to contribute, as called upon, such amounts 
of copra, coconut oil, soap, rice, and certain medi- 
caments as may help to facilitate the implementa- 
tion of the resolution. 

Economic and Social Council 

The United Nations experts' recommendations 
on full employment, the related item on methods 
of financing of economic development of under- 
developed countries, and the draft Covenant on 
Human Rights are among the main topics on the 
52-item agenda adopted by the Economic and 
Social Council at the opening of its eleventh ses- 
sion at Geneva on July 3. The Council will also 
review reports of a number of its subsidiary bodies 
and of the specialized agencies. Representatives 
of the Soviet Union, Poland, and Czechoslovakia 
were absent. 

The Council decided to refer the draft Human 



Rights Covenant to the Social Committee for con- 
sideration of the draft's broad aspects with a view 
to transmitting it with relevant documentation to 
the General Assembly. The United States repre- 
sentative supported this proposal on the under- 
standing that the Committee would consider only 
the general aspects of the Covenant, although 
earlier he had supported a recommendation to send 
the Covenant to the General Assembly without 
discussion. 

The Secretary-General's arrangements for a 
training program in public administration were 
noted with approval by the Council, which recom- 
mended that additional activities undertaken in 
the field of training in public administration, at 
the request of member governments, be considered 
under the expanded program of technical assist- 
ance. The United States representative's endorse- 
ment of this Council action was based on the under- 
standing that activities financed under the tech- 
nical assistance account would be limited to re- 
quests from underdeveloped countries. 

Trusteeship Council 

On July 5 and 6, the Trusteeship Council heard 
and discussed statements from representatives of 
various groups in French and British Togoland 
to which the Council had earlier agreed to grant 
oral hearings in connection with certain petitions. 
Following statements by representatives of the 
All-Ewe Conference, the Togoland Union, the 
Supreme Council of Natural Rulers of Togoland, 
and the Togoland Progress Party, Council mem- 
bers questioned them on their various proposals 
for unification of the Ewe people and Togoland 
and on the comparative strength of Togolese ad- 
herence to their views. 

The first two parts of the Council's report on 
the United States annual report on the trust terri- 
tory of the Pacific Islands and the entire Council 
report on Australia's annual report on New Guinea 
were adopted on July 6. 

International Civil Aviation Organization 

The assembly of the International Civil Avia- 
tion Organization, after a 3-week review of the 
entire field of international air transport, con- 
cluded its fourth session at Montreal on June 20. 
The Assembly approved the report of the Icao 
Council relating to its work of the past year and 
elected a new Council of 20 nations to serve as 
IcAo's executive body for the next 3 years. The 
Assembly also took action on a number of matters 
in the technical, economic, legal, and administra- 
tive fields. 



July 10, 7950 



79 




Genera! Policy 

Act of Aggression in Korea: Page 

Review of U.N. and U.S. Action To Restore 

Peace. Address by Secretary Acheson . 43 

Tlie President Authorizes Use of Ground 

Units 46 

Answer to China's Offer To Send Troops . 47 
U.S.S.R. Responds to Request for Media- 
tion 47 

Precedent Contradicts Soviet Allegation of 

Illegality in U.N. Action 48 

ECA Aids South Korea 49 

A Militaristic Experiment. Statement by 

John Foster Dulles 49 

Special Staff To Assist Ambassador Grady in 

Iran 59 

Czechoslovak U.N. Representative Resigns; 

U.S. Grants Asylum 62 

The United Nations and 
Specialized Agencies 

Soviet Walk-Outs Flout Democratic Process 
in United Nations. Statement by Francis 
B. Sayre 61 

Report on International Refugee Organiza- 
tion. By George L. Warren 75 

The United States in the United Nations . . 78 

Economic Affairs 

Labor's Role in World Affairs. By Bernard 

Wiesman 54 

Treaty Information 

The Need for an International Trade 
Organization : 
Statement by Charles F. Brannan, Secre- 
tary of Agriculture 67 



Treaty Information — Continued 

Statement by Charles Sawyer, Secretary of ^^^^ 
Commerce 70 



Occupation Matters 

Answer to Soviet Protest on MacArthur 
Clemency Circular: 

U.S. Note of June 8, 1950 

Soviet Note of May 11, 1950 

Relaxing Restrictions on Foreign Investment 

in Germany 

U.S. Will Designate Civilian High Commis- 
sioner for Austria 

Technical Assistance 

Carrying Out Point 4: A Community Effort. 
Address by Secretary Acheson 



National Security 

Support of Mutual Defense Assistance Pro- 
gram for 1951. Statement by Secretary 
Acheson 

International Information and 
Cultural Affairs 

Visit of Burmese Banker 

The Department 

Report on Department's Security Program 
Being Studied 

Publications 

Recent Releases 



60 

60 

72 
74 



63 



51 



74 



77 



77 



P 



Bernard Wiesman, autlior of the article on labor's role iu 
world affairs, is Acting Labor Adviser, Office of Assistant Secre- 
tary for Economic Affair.'^. 

Oeorge L. Wurren, author of the article on the Iko, is adviser on 
refugees and displaced per.sons, Department of State. Mr. Warren was 
United States representative to the fifth session of the General Council 
and to the seventh session of the Executive Committee of Iro. 



U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1960 



J/ie/ ^eha^t^^en(/ ,c^ t/iaie/ 




U.S. COMMANDS U.N. MILITARY FORCES IN 

KOREA • Text of Security Council Resolution .... 83 

THE UNITED NATIONS AND KOREA • By Ambassador 

Philip C. Jessup 84 

U.S. MILITARY ACTIONS IN KOREA • Address by 

John Foster Dulles 88 

POINT 4: AN INVESTMENT IN PEACE • Address by 

the President 93 



For complete contents see back cover 




Vol. XXIII, No. 576 
July 17, 1950 



^vi®"'' o*. 




^'ATBS o* 



^^»HT o. 




*^.wy*. bulletin 



Vol. XXIII, No. 576 • Publication 3913 
July 17, 1950 



For sale by the Superintendent of Documents 

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Washington 25, D.C. 

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Note; Contents of this publication are not 
copyrighted and items contained herein may 
be reprinted. Citation of the Department 
or State Bulletin as the source will be 
appreciated. 



The Department of State BULLETIN, 
a weekly publication compiled and 
edited in the Division of Publications, 
Office of Public Affairs, provides the 
public and interested agencies of 
the Government u)ith information on 
developments in the field of foreign 
relations and on the work of the De- 
partment of State and the Foreign 
Service. The BULLETIN includes 
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ment, and statements and addresses 
made by the President and by the 
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U i. W^+- '>4 



U.N. Places Unified Command 

of Military Forces in Korea Under United States 



(Otr. 



s-v*-vr^i, (. V Va 



III 11 jt^ 



TEXT OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION' 

"The Security Council, 

"Ha\'ing determined that the armed attack upon 
the Kepublic of Korea by forces from North 
Korea constitutes a breach of the peace. 

"Having recommended that the members of the 
United Nations furnish such assistance to the Re- 
public of Korea as may be necessary to repel the 
armed attack and to restore international peace 
and security in the area, 

"1. Welcomes, the prompt and vigorous sup- 
port which Governments and peoples of the United 
Nations have given to its resolutions of 25 and 27 
June 1950 to assist the Republic of Korea in de- 
fending itself against armed attack and thus to 
restore international peace and security in the 
area; 

"2. Notes that members of the United Nations 
have transmitted to the United Nations offers of 
assistance for the Republic of Korea ; 

"3. Recommends that all members providing 
military forces and other assistance pursuant to 
the aforesaid Security Council resolutions make 
such forces and other assistance available to a uni- 
fied command under the United States; 

"4. Bequests the United States to designate the 
commander of such forces ; 

"5. Authorises the unified command at its dis- 
cretion to use the United Nations flag in the course 
of operations against North Korean forces concur- 
rently with the flags of the various nations 
participating; 

"6. Bequests the United States to provide the 
Security Council with reports as appropriate on 
tlie course of action taken under the unified 
command." 



GENERAL MacARTHUR DESIGNATED 
AS COMMANDING GENERAL 

Statement by the President 

[Released to the press by the White House July 8] 

The Security Council of the United Nations, in 
its resolution of July 7, 1950, has recommended 
that all members providing military forces and 
other assistance pursuant to the Security Council 
resolutions of June 25 and 27, make such forces and 
other assistance available to a unified command 
under the United States. 

The Security Council resolution also requests 
that the United States designate the commander 
of such forces, and authorizes the unified command 
at its discretion to use the United Nations flag in 
the course of operations against the North Korean 
forces concurrently with the flags of the various 
nations participating. 

I am responding to the recommendation of the 
Security Council and have designated General 
Douglas MacArthur as the Commanding General 
of the military forces which the members of the 
United Nations place under the unified command 
of the United States pursuant to the United Na- 
tions' assistance to the Republic of Korea in repel- 
ling the unprovoked armed attack against it. 

I am directing General MacArthur, pursuant to 
the Security Council resolution, to use the United 
Nations flag in the course of operations against the 
North Korean forces concurrently with the flags 
of the various nations participating. 



' Introduced by France and U.K. (S/1588) and adopted 
on .luly 7 by a vote of 7 to 0, with 3 abstentions (Egypt, 
India, and Yugoslavia) ; Soviet Union was absent. 

July 17, 1950 



Ambassador Austin Comments on Resolution 

On July 7, Ambassador Austin told the Security 
Council that the United States accepts the responsi- 
bility and makes the sacrifice that is involved in 
carrying out these principles of the United Nations. 
In spirit, if not in word, this resolution has been in 
efCect since the very first resolution was adopted 
in response to the call for help from Korea. 



83 



The United Nations and Korea 



hy Philip 0. Jessup 
Atribassador at Large ^ 



The Communist-inspired attack on the Repub- 
lic of Korea is the most barefaced attack on the 
United Nations itself. An assault upon the 
United Nations headquarters at Lake Success 
could hardly have been more direct or more re- 
vealing. Of all the countries in the world, none 
is more closely identified with the United Nations 
than the Republic of Korea. Despite the ac- 
tions of the Soviet Union, from March 20, 1946, 
to September 23, 1947, to prevent the establish- 
ment of Korea as a free and independent nation, 
the United Nations helped to set it up when the 
United States laid the case of Korea before the 
world organization. 

As could be expected, the propaganda of world- 
wide Communist imi^erialism has tried to hide its 
aggression under a flood of lies. As Al Smith 
used to say, "Let's look at the record." 



Record on Korea 

Fortunately, the record is crystal clear. There 
have been times in history when serious and con- 
scientious scholars have debated the question 
"Wlro started the war?" No serious or conscien- 
tious scholar can have any question here. The 
North Korean Communist forces attacked the Re- 
public of Korea without warning, without provo- 
cation, without any justification whatsoever. It 
has never been more true than in this case that 
actions speak louder than words. Communist 
peace propaganda has sought to lull the peoples 
of the free world at the very moment when Com- 
munist imperialism was preparing and launching 
this war of aggression. 

Knowledge of the facts of the situation does 
not depend upon statements by the Korean Gov- 
ernment nor upon statements by the Americans 



* Highlights of an address made before the Institute of 
Public Affairs, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, Va., 
on July 10 and released to the press on the same date. 



on the spot. The United Nations has a Commis- 
sion in Korea. At the last meeting of the General 
Assembly, this Commission was specifically au- 
thorized to have teams of observers to watch the 
38th parallel, north of which the Communist 
forces were entrenched. This United Nations 
Commission is composed of representatives of the 
following countries: Australia, China, India, EI 
Salvador, Turkey, the Philippines, and France. 
The Commission's team of observers had con- 
cluded an on-the-spot survey, barely 24 hours be- 
fore the Communist forces attacked. Here is 
what these impartial United Nations representa- 
tives reported. 

U.N. COMMISSION REPORT 

The principal impression left with observers after 
their field tour is that the South Korean Army is organized 
for defense and is in no condition to carry out an attack 
on a large scale against forces of the North . . . 

This impression, they said, was based on eight 
observations including the facts that "there is no 
concentration of [South Korean] troops and no 
massing for attack visible at any point". 

At several points, North Korean forces are in effec- 
tive possession of salients on the south side of the par- 
allel, occupation in at least one case being of fairly recent 
date. There is no evidence that South Korean forces 
have taken any steps for or making any preparation to 
eject North Korean forces from any of these salients . . . 

So far as the equipment of South Korean forces Is con- 
cerned, in absence of armour, air support, and heavy 
artillery, any action with object of invasion would, by 
any military standards, be impossible . . . 

In general, they reported, the attitude of South Korean 
commanders is one of vigilant defense. Their instruc- 
tions do not go beyond retirement in case of attack upon 
previous prepared positions . . . 

Immediately after the Communist forces of the 



84 



Hepaiimen^ of Stale Bulletin 



North attacked and began their invasion of the 
Eepublic of Korea the United Nations Commis- 
sion reported as follows to Secretary-General Lie : 

Commission met this morning 1000 hours and con- 
sidered latest reports on hostilities and results direct 
observation along parallel by Uncok Military observers 
over period ending forty-eight hours before hostilities be- 
gan. Commission's present view on basis this evidence 
is first that judging from actual progress of operations 
Northern Regime is carrying out well-planned concerted 
and full scale invasion of South Korea, second that South 
Korean forces were deployed on wholly defensive basis in 
all sectors of the parallel and third, that they were taken 
completely by surprise . . . 

The Security Council had the evidence and 
passed judgment immediately. The judgment of 
the Security Council is the judgment of the world 
organization. The Communist invaders have been 
adjudged as having launched an armed attack and 
no amount' of Communist propaganda will succeed 
in hiding the "mark of Cain" on their foreheads. 

U.N. RESOLUTION 

In view of the attemjit of Communist propa- 
ganda to confuse the issue let us get one other 
point clear on the record. The Communist forces 
attacked on Sunday, June 25, at 4 : 00 a.m., Korean 
time. The United Nations Security Council met 
at 2 : 00 p.m. Washington time on Sunday, June 
25th, and by 6 : 00 p.m. that afternoon adopted a 
resolution determining that the armed attack of 
the North Koreans constituted a breach of the 
peace. They called upon all members of the 
United Nations to assist. 

AVliat had the United States done before the 
Security Council issued this judgment and ap- 
peal? The only steps which the United States 
took prior to 6 : 00 p.m. on Sunday were : 

U.S. ACTION 

(1) It took the initiative in the early morning 
hours of Smiday to call the Security Council to 
consider this aggression immediately. 

(2) It began the evacuation of American women 
and children from the danger area. 

(3) In the immediate vicinity of Seoul, the 
capital of Korea, it provided the necessary mili- 
tary protection to keep these women and children 
from being killed during the course of the evac- 
uation. 

It was not until 10 : 30 p.m. on June 25, after 
the Security Council had passed its resolution, that 
the first orders were issued by the President of 
the United States directing that assistance should 
lie given to the Republic of Korea in pursuance of 
the Security Council resolution. 



During the next day, as the armed forces from 
North Korea advanced southward, the United 
States continued to carry out the resolution of 
June 25 by increasing its aid to the Korean 
Government. 

'\\1ien the Security Council met again two days 
later, on June 27th, and made more specific its ap- 
peal for help to the Republic of Korea, the Presi- 
dent of the United States ordered an intensifica- 
tion of our help. The free world greeted these 
actions with enthusiastic approval and forty-six 
members of the United Nations have already sig- 
nified to the headquarters of the United Nations 
their approval and support of the Security Coun- 
cil resolution. The armed forces of six members, 
in addition to those of the United States, are either 
already participating in giving help to the Repub- 
lic of Korea or have announced that these forces 
are being made available. Other members have 
offered other types of material assistance. Here 
indeed is collective security in action. 

Before going back to consider these matters in 
more detail let us summarize these essential points 
which the record proves. 

(1) The Communist forces in North Korea at- 
tacked without warning and without provocation. 
They started it. That is what the Prime Minister 
of India, Pandit Nehru, calls the "Major fact of 
well-planned invasion and aggression of South 
Korea". 

(2) The Security Council as the authorized rep- 
resentative of the world's organization responsible 
for the maintenance of international peace and se- 
curity has found that these are the facts which 
were established by the report of its own United 
Nations Commission on the spot. 

( 3 ) The United States acted promptly as a loyal 
member of the United Nations and everything 
which it has done has been in support of the action 
of the United Nations in the effort to stop the 
Communist armed attack and to restore peace in 
the area. 

Let us now go back to consider some of these 
items in more detail. Let us first look at the Com- 
munist propaganda line which says in effect that 
the United Nations has no right to keep the peace 
when it is Communist imperialists who have com- 
mitted a breach of the peace. 

Answer to Soviet Illegality Charge 

The Soviet Union argues that the Security 
Council is without power to act if their represent- 
ative violates his Charter obligation to participate 
in its meetings. 

It is necessary first to recall that article 24 of 
the Charter says that the members of the United 
Nations confer on the Security Council "primary 
responsibility for the maintenance of interna- 



Ju// 17, 7950 



85 



tional peace and security". In the next place 
article 28 of the Charter says that — 

The Security Couucil shall be so organized as to be able 
to function continuously. Rach member of the Security 
Council shall for this purpose be represented at all times 
at the seat of the Organization. 

This is the language of the Charter. It is per- 
fectly clear that a state which is a member of the 
Security Council is obligated to be in a position 
at all times to take part in its work. This provi- 
sion would have no meaning if in spite of having 
a representative at the seat of the organization 
the representative should have a right to refuse to 
attend the meetings. The Soviet Union has thus 
violated its obligations under the Charter by re- 
sorting to the tactics of "walking out." 

Disregarding this question, the Soviet Union 
argues that it nevertheless has the power to 
cripple the functioning of the Security Council 
because article 27 of tlie Charter says that deci- 
sions of the Security Council on substantive 
matters — 

. . . shall be made by an affirmative vote of seven 
members including the concurring votes of the permanent 
members. 

Since the Soviet Union is a permanent member, 
it is argued that the absence of their concurring 
vote invalidates the action of the Council. 

The history of the drafting of this article and 
of its application in practice leads to quite a differ- 
ent conclusion. The provision which I have just 
cited from article 27 about the concurring votes 
of the permanent members iSj of course, the legal 
language describing the decision at the San Fran- 
cisco conference to give the permanent members 
a veto on substantive questions. The Charter is 
a constitutional document and like all constitu- 
tions, including that of the United States, the 
exact meaning of its words is developed by 
practice. 



U.S.S.R. PAST ACTIONS CONTRADICT CHARGE 

One of the practices in the Security Council 
which has developed over the years is the prac- 
tice of abstaining from voting on questions which 
are put to the vote. The Soviet Union, begin- 
ning in April 1948, abstained in four instances 
on Security Council resohitions dealing with 
Palestine.^ Beginning in January 1948, the So- 
viet Union abstained on four resolutions dealing 
with the Kashmir case. Beginning in December 
1948, the Soviet Union abstained on two resolu- 
tions in the Indonesian case. In none of these 
ten cases has the Soviet Union challenged the le- 
gality of the action taken by the Security Council. 
Furthermore, tlie Soviet Union has never ques- 
tioned the legality of action taken by the Security 
Council in which it voted with the majority but 

' See BtTLLETiN of July 10, 1950, p. 48. 



on which other permanent members of the Coun- 
cil abstained. This has occurred in at least three 
instances. We thus already have over a dozen 
cases in which it has been established that the 
meaning of article 27 of the Charter is that, while 
the negative vote of a permanent member can de- 
feat the substantive resolution, the failure of a 
permanent member to vote for a resolution does 
not defeat it. 

Clearly it can make no difference in terms of 
the application of the Charter on this point 
whether the representative of a permanent mem- 
ber sits at the table and abstains or whether he 
fails to come at all. The essential difference re- 
lates to tlie question of a member's sense of re- 
sponsibility and willingness to discharge its obli- 
gations under the Charter. The Soviet Union 
had the legal power to attend the meeting of the 
Security Council and, by taking the responsibility 
before the world, to cast a veto to block Security 
Council action. The U.S.S.R. did not have the 
power to block action by staying away from the 
meeting in violation of its obligations under ar- 
ticle 28. 

The consideration of this part of the Soviet 
Union's argument would not be complete without, 
mention of the excuse which the Soviet Govern- 
ment has given for its recent refusal to cooperate 
with the United Nations. The excuse is that a 
majority of the members have not accepted the 
Soviet view that the representative of the Chinese 
Communists should be seated as the representative 
of China. The position of the United States on 
this point has been frequently stated. Our po- 
sition is that we are always ready to abide by the 
decision which is made by any one of the organs 
of the United Nations in accordance with the es- 
tablished procedures of that organ. We have 
never taken the position that we will disregard 
decisions merely because we do not agree with 
them. We have made it very clear that we do not 
believe that this question of deciding what repre- 
sentative is entitled to sit for his government is 
subject to the veto. We believe that under es- 
tablished rules this is a procedural question to 
which the veto does not apply. 

It is also necessary to recall that the Soviet 
tactics of resorting to a walk-out in the United 
Nations has not been confined to the pretext of 
the issue of Chinese Communist representation. 
Mr. Gromyko resorted to the same tactics in the 
case of Iran in 1946; the trick was unsuccessful 
then as now. If the question is asked whether 
China was represented at the meetings of the Se- 
curity Council on June 25th and 27th, the answer 
is clearly yes. The Security Council had consid- 
ered the claim of the Soviet Union that the Chinese 
Government was not entitled to represent China, 
and it rejected this claim. Until this decision is 
changed by a duly authorized organ of the United 
Nations, it obviously stands as the decision which 
the members are bound to follow. 



86 



Department of State Bulletin 



U.S. vs. U.S.S.R. Policy Toward Asia 

It is a familiar pattern of international Com- 
munist propaganda that they loudly accuse others 
of the sins which they themselves have committed. 
It is therefore not surprising that they accuse the 
United States of imperialism in Asia, because the 
Russian imperialistic design is the same in Asia 
today as it was under the Czai's. The Soviet en- 
croachments upon Chinese sovei"eignty in Man- 
churia, Mongolia, Sinkiang, and elsewhere have 
frequently been pointed out. The Soviet Union 
and its satellites were the only members of the 
United Nations which refused during the last Gen- 
eral Assembly to join in approving a resolution 
reasserting the historic American doctrine of 
respect for tlie integrity of China. 

The experience of so-called Communist "libera- 
tion" of strongly nationalist states like Poland, 
Czechoslovakia, Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia 
holds out the gloomiest prospects for the peoples 
of Asia. During the period of this type of Soviet 
"liberation,"' what has been the record of the 
Western world? The Philippines and Burma 
have become separate independent states. India, 
Pakistan and Ceylon have become independent 
states, members of the Commonwealth. Indonesia 
has also become independent and a member of the 
Netherlands-Indonesian Union. Cambodia, Laos, 
and Vietnam have become independent members 
of the French Union. Once again, the record is 
the proof to which we turn. The Communist 
propaganda cannot wipe out the facts. 

The Ignited States has steadily supported the 
development of independent nationalism through- 
out Asia. We supported the cause of Indonesia 
in the United Nations Security Council when the 
Communist international movement was denounc- 
ing the Indonesian patriotic leaders, Sukarno and 
Hatta as "traitors." It was the United States 
which took the case of Korea to the United Na- 
tions and sought United Nations guaranties for 
Korean independence. It was the Soviet Union 
which by walkout and noncooperation blocked the 
union of the country which all real Korean patriots 
desire. 

The objective and purpose of the United States 
in Korea today is to support the United Nations 
effort to restore and maintain peace. We are help- 
ing to carry out Security Coimcil resolutions which 
call for a cease-fire, the withdrawal of the North 
Koreans to the SSth parallel, and for the restora- 
tion of international peace and security in the 
area. Thereafter, we shall continue our policy 
of supporting the United Nations in its efforts to 
secure a permanent adjustment of the situation 
in Korea in the interest of the Korean people. We 
have no other or separate interest of our own. 

Other Attaclts To Be Defeated 

It is always true that at times when thought and 
action are concentrated upon meeting an emer- 



gency a conscious effort is required to keep in 
mind the importance of moving forward with 
long-range plans. The present situation in Korea 
requires and is receiving the concentrated atten- 
tion of the Government of the United States. But, 
at the same time, we must go forward with many 
other plans and policies. It should be particularly 
emphasized that this great demonstration of com- 
bined action under the United Nations cannot be 
allowed to slacken the efforts of this world organi- 
zation to grapple with the fundamental problems 
affecting the peace and welfare of mankind. One 
of the most important of the long-range efforts of 
the United Nations is the program of technical 
assistance which is allied to our own Point 4 Pro- 
gram. Sudden aggressive armed attacks on 
peaceful, independent states must be met and rolled 
back, but the peace and welfare of mankind are 
always under attack by poverty and disease. Our 
resources are adequate to cooperate in this peren- 
nial struggle at the same time that we are meeting 
the emergency of the moment. We have demon- 
strated to the world our will and our ability to 
meet the emergenc_y; surely we will not fail 
through support of the Point 4 Program to do our 
full part in the longer campaign. 



Charging South Korea as Aggressor 
Reminiscent of Nazi Tactics 

Statement hy Secretary Acheson 

[Released to the press July 5] 

In regard to the Korean hostilities, four sunple 
points must be recognized and long-remembered 
by all the world. The people of this free nation 
have clearly shown that they know the truth and 
are not going to be misled by false versions of it. 
These are the facts: 

1. The present troubles in Korea started not 
when the United Nations Security Council acted 
or when the United States and others acted in 
support of the Security Council. It all started at 
dawn on Sunday, June 25, Korean time. 

2. At that time, troops from North Korea, with- 
out any provocation whatever, crossed the 38th 
parallel and launched an aggressive attack against 
the Republic of Korea. All the reliable witnesses, 
on the scene, at the time, including the United 
Nations Commission, have established that the 
North Korean forces were the aggi'essors. 

3. The Security Council of the United Na- 
tions acted in support of tlie Republic of Korea 
only after it was satisfied that this was a case of 
utterly unprovoked aggression. 

4. Any contention that hostilities were started by 
the Republic of Korea is clearly in the category of 
the Nazi claims of 1939 that Poland started hos- 
tilities by attacking Nazi Germany. 



July 17, 1950 



87 



U.S. Military Actions in Korea 



Addresses iy John Foster Dulles 
Consultant to the Secretary 



NEW PHASE OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY > 

The Korean affair obviously brings us nearer 
to the day of fateful decision. Also, it makes it 
more probable that we will make the kind of 
effort needed to fend off the utter disaster of war. 

The danger of war has lain largely in our past 
failure to see clearly and respond adequately to 
the peril that stems from Soviet communism. 
That slowness is probably inevitable in a democ- 
racy when national policy depends on public 
opinion. However, even now it is not too late 
to put peace onto a more stable basis than ever 
before. 

The nature of the Soviet Communist threat has 
been fully set out by Stalin himself in his Prob- 
lems of Leninism. The latest English edition, 
printed in Moscow, is dated 1940. Stalin there 
outlines the program, whereby, Soviet commu- 
nism expects to extend its system throughout the 
world and establish its "one world" of state so- 
cialism. The plan is to conquer the weaker coun- 
tries, one by one, by methods of propaganda, 
penetration, subversive warfare, and, as a last 
resort, open war. The strongest non-Communist 
countries, notably the United States, will be left 
to the last and, gradually, encircled and their 
economies weakened until, finally, they are sup- 
posed either to capitulate voluntarily or be over- 
thrown by open assault which the Communist 
countries will presumably then have the power to 
launch successfully. Stalin points out, and this 
dates back to 1925, that the "road to victory" 
oyer the West lies through "revolutionary al- 
liance with the liberation movement" in the col- 
onies and countries of the East. The hostile tide 
of communism in Asia, which looms so danger- 

'An address made at Colgate University Conference on 
American Foreign Policy, Hamilton, N. Y., in July 7 and 
released to the press on the same date. 



ously today, has been announced and actively nur- 
tured for 25 yeai-s. 

Stalin's Strategy 

Stalin's book, which is the present-day Commu- 
nist bible, except in Yugoslavia, gives us the same 
preview that Hitler gave in Mein Kamvf. 
There is, however, an important distinction be- 
tween the Hitler program and the Stalin pro- 
gram. Hitler felt that his whole program had to 
be achieved in short order, during his own life- 
time. That required intensive and sustained of- 
fensive action. In the case of the Communist 
program, there is no such time urgency. It is 
anticipated that full realization of the Commu- 
nist conquest may take what Stalin refers to as 
"an entire historical era." And, he teaches, that 
"tactics of retreat" are as important as tactics of 
attack. Also, he teaches, the necessity of com- 
promise when, as he puts it, this is necessary "to 
buy off a powerful enemy and gain a respite." 

Therefore, under the Connnunist program, war 
by Russia is not necessarily inevitable or immi- 
nent if we are powerful enough to make it seem 
expedient to the Soviet Communist leaders to use 
tactics of delay or compromise. 

U.S. Awakens to Reality 

We have only recently begun to take seriously 
Stalin's world program for comnumism, long an- 
nounced, superbly implemented, and already one- 
third consummated. Our national attitude has 
only gradually moved toward realism. There has 
been an evolution through four phases: 

1. Cooperation. — That was the war phase. 
When Hitler made the Soviet Union and the 
United States war allies, there was a military ne- 
cessity of cooperation that made it expedient to 
draw a veil over the basically hostile attitude of 
Soviet communism toward the United States. We 



88 



Deparfment of Stale Bulletin 



emphasized the courageous fighting qualities of 
the Russian people, and we ignored the basic an- 
tipathy toward us of the Communist leaders. On 
the theory that the Soviet Union had to be given 
inducements to prevent her making a separate 
peace with Germany and to get her to enter into 
the war against Japan, we agreed to go along 
with large Soviet postwar expansion in both cen- 
tral Europe and in Asia. 

2. Non€ooperation.—T\\& second phase of our 
policy came immediately after the close of the 
fighting. The Soviet Union then sought to secure 
continuing support from the United States for 
her expansionist policj'. Her leaders argued that 
postwar cooperation of the Soviet Union and the 
United States was necessary in order to assure 
world peace and that that cooperation neces- 
sitated the United States acquiescing in the ex- 
pansionist ambitions of the Soviet Union. That 
■was in essence the Molotov thesis which was pre- 
sented at the first Council of Foreign Ministers 
meeting at London, in September 1945, which I at- 
tended with Secretary Byrnes. We then made the 
momentous decision that we would not continue in 
time of peace the Yalta type of appeasement which 
had seemed necessary in time of war. 

That decision taken at London, in the fall of 
1945, did not, however, immediately make itself 
felt throughout all aspects of the United States 
foreign policy. Notably, there was a lag in bring- 
ing our Eastern policy into line with our Western 
policy. Many Eastern students were impressed by 
the abuses and deficiencies of existing Eastern gov- 
ernments and felt that a good dose of Communist 
reform might be healthy. 

3. Prevention. — The third phase of American 
policy was marked by realization that there was 
in fact an irreconcilable conflict between the am- 
bitions of Soviet communism and the interests and 
welfare of the United States and that we needed 
to assert ourselves positively to prevent the ex- 
tension of Soviet communism. This new ap- 
proach came out of the 1947 Moscow and London 
Conferences of the Council of Foreign Ministers 
which I attended with Secretary Marshall. Be- 
tween these two Council meetings came the Mar- 
shall Plan proposal (June 1947) . We then clearly 
saw that we were threatened by a so-called "cold 
war," and we made up our minds to make positive 
efforts to strengthen the free world and to fill up 
military, economic, and moral vacuums into which 
Soviet communism was moving. 

Our maximum efforts were directed to Europe. 
But there was also a change of policy in the Far 
East, as indicated by the fact that in August 1948 
Secretary Marshall advised our Embassy in China 
that "the LTnited States Government must not 
directly or indirectly give any implication of 
support, encouragement, or acceptability of 
coalition govermnent in China with Communist 
participation." 

We have, however, up to now, assumed, and 



that was a fair working hypothesis, that com- 
nuniism would probably limit itself to "cold war" 
tactics and that there would not be open military 
attack. However, some preparations were made 
as against the possibility of armed attack, notably 
in Western Europe. We made the North At- 
lantic Treaty and adopted the Military Assistance 
Program. 

4. Opposition. — The fourth phase of policy is 
marked by the North Korean attack upon South 
Korea and our active fighting opposition under 
the direction of the United Nations. The Korean 
affair shows that communism cannot be checked 
merely by building up sound domestic economies. 
The South Korean experiment in democracy was 
as hopeful as could be expected. There was politi- 
cal, intellectual, and economic freedom. The sec- 
ond national election had just been held, and the 
majority elected were independent of the party 
in power which controlled the police force and the 
election machinery. The fact that that could hap- 
pen is good evidence of political freedom. As 
recently as 2 weeks ago, I met with the Korean 
National Assembly, with leading educators, with 
religious groups, businessmen, and representa- 
tives of labor. I conferred with our mission, and 
economic advisers, and with the Korean Commis- 
sion of the United Nations. All the evidence was 
that the Republic of Korea provided a wholesome, 
free society and one which could not be over- 
thrown by subversive efforts. Such efforts had, 
indeed, been repeatedly tried and had failed. The 
military blow from the north dissipates the thesis 
that internal reform and well-being is itself a 
sufficient defense against Communist aggression. 

Korea Attack Part of Communist Plan 

The armed attack that occurred shows that, 
while the Soviet Union seems not at the moment 
prepared to engage its own army, nevertheless, 
international communism is prepared to use, in 
open warfare, the armed forces of puppet and 
satellite Communist states which are equipped 
with armament of Russian manufacture. 

It was realized for some time that the Republic 
of Korea was in danger of attack from the north. 
Proof of that is found in the fact that the United 
Nations continued its Korean Commission after 
the government of the Republic had been set up 
under United Nations supervision, and in the fall 
of 1949, the General Assembly added to the func- 
tions of the Commission the task of maintaining 
military observation along the northern frontier. 

When, I, myself, went to the Far East, on June 
14th, it was primarily to look into the possibilities 
of the Japanese peace treaty. But I went first to 
Korea to acquaint myself personally with a situa- 
tion which, for several years, I had dealt with 
as a United States delegate to the United Nations. 
I was concerned about the increasing insistence 
by the North Korean Communist regime that it 
must rule all of Korea and the intensive Com- 



Jo/y 17, 7950 



89 



munist propaganda in South Korea that it had 
better succumb to communism without resistance, 
because neither tlie United Nations nor the United 
States would give protection if the Republic 
should be attacked. 

Before leaving Washington, I drafted a speech 
to be made in Korea. In it I said that if the 
Republic of Korea were attacked, it could expect 
support from the United Nations. I pointed out 
that the United Nations Charter required all na- 
tions "to refrain from any threat or use of force 
against your territorial integrity or political in- 
dependence" and, I added, that the United States 
stood behind the United Nations. I concluded 
with these words: 

You are not alone. You will never be alone so long 
as you continue to play worthily your part in the great 
design of human freedom. 

That address was made on June 19th at the 
opening of the Second National Assembly. It 
was broadcast in the Korean language, through- 
out Korea, and Korean language leaflet copies 
were widely distributed. Nevertheless, 6 days 
later the North Korean army struck, in a long- 
prepared and fully implemented effort. There 
were ample supplies of Russian-made planes, 
tanks, and heavy artillery. The Republic's army 
fought bravely iDut hopelessly. It had no combat 
planes, no tanks, and no artillery heavy enough to 
stop the invading tanks. Unopposed enemy 
planes flew low, strafing the civilian population, 
setting fire to gasoline supplies, and spreading 
terror throughout the capital area. In 3 days, 
Seoul, 30 miles south of the northern border, was 
captured, and the tank formations moved on to 
the south. 

New Phase in American Foreign Policy 

This open military attack and United Nations 
resistance to it opens a new phase in American 
foreign policy. It will, I hope and believe, arouse 
us to a greater effort than any we have yet made 
to fend off the danger of war. It may require 
us to devote a greater percentage of our vast eco- 
nomic productivity to military production so that 
other free nations will not be exposed to being 
overrun by Communist satellite forces equipped 
with armament furnished by Russia. 

What has happened to the Republic of Korea 
shows, I fear, that the communistic assaults can- 
not be prevented merely by economic aid or merely 
by developing good societies. The open military 
assault on the Republic of Korea occurred be- 
cause the Republic of Korea was too good a so- 
ciety to be tolerated on the otherwise Communist- 
dominated mainland of north Asia, and because 
it was so good that it could not be overthrown 
from within by indirect aggression. Dii-ect ag- 
gression was the only way to blot out this moral 
salient on the Communist mainland. 

There are probably two further reasons for the 
attack. One was that if it succeeded it would 

90 



envelop Japan both from the north, where the 
Russians now have already gained hold of all of 
Sakhalin Island and the Kurile Islands, and from 
the south, where Korea is only separated by a 
narrow strait from the south of Japan. There 
was doubtless a desire to throw a roadblock in 
the way of the positive program of the United 
States for putting Japan onto a peaceful and self- 
governing basis, as part of the free world. 

Furthermore, the Communists doubtless calcu- 
lated that if the attack failed through the use of 
United States force to repel the attack, the process 
would bog down the West in the mire of anti- 
colonialism in Asia. 

As we have seen, Stalin long ago calculated that 
the best way to conquer the West was to involve 
it in fighting the anticolonial aspirations of Asia 
and the Pacific. The colonial powers, including 
the United States in the Philippines, Britain in 
India, Burma, and Ceylon, and the Dutch in In- 
donesia, by wise statesmanship, extricated them- 
selves largely from this trap. No doubt the Korean 
venture is designed in part to draw the Western 
world back into that trap. That is a danger that 
has to be carefully avoided by relating our conduct 
to the policies of the United Nations which, as an 
organization, is strongly dedicated to self-gov- 
ernment and independence for the non-self-gov- 
erning peoples of the world. 

Prospects for Peace 

The situation is certainly fraught with danger. 

However, if the members of the United Nations 
support and make good the Security Council de- 
cision to repel and throw back the unprovoked 
military aggression in Korea; if the defensive 
military position around the periphery of Soviet 
control is strengthened, so that satellite forces can- 
not easily break through with violence ; if the colo- 
nial powers support the newly born nations and 
avoid general entanglement with the legitimate in- 
dependence aspirations of the Asiatic peoples; 
then there will be a condition where peace is 
likely, unless the Soviet Union itself connnits its 
total might to total war. It may not be prepared 
to do this because of its relative economic weak- 
ness. 

Speaking in Tokyo on June 22, 1950, I pointed 
out that, in terms of key commodities such as 
steel, aluminum, electric power, and crude oil, the 
United States had an advantage over the Soviet 
Union of anywhere from five or ten to one. I 
concluded "Any struggle that openly pitted the 
full might of the free world against that of the 
captive world could have but one outcome. That 
would be the total demolition of the artificial, 
rigid, and relatively weak structure that Soviet 
communism has built." I believe that that is a 
correct analysis of the present situation. I do 
believe, however, that it will be necessary for us 
to convert more of our economic potential into 
present strength in order that the free nations who 

Department of State Bulletin 



are menaced by Communist military attack can 
be better protected. 

In the case of Korea, it was felt necessary to 
give a very low priority to the military position 
of the Republic of Korea because of the great 
shortage of available military equipment. Con- 
gress had appropriated funds to extend the Mili- 
tary Assistance Program to Korea. However, it 
had not yet been found possible to convert that 
appropriation into a reality. When I was there, 
the Korean defense establishment pointed out 
that while the morale and discipline of the Re- 
public's army was first class, they could not 
be expected to hold for long without a single com- 
bat plane, without any tanks, without antiaircraft 
guns, and without artillery sufficient to stop the 
known concentrations of enemy tanks on the 
border. 

We are now having to make good that deficiency 
in a costly way. 

What has happened in Korea will, I think, 
bring home to the American people the need of 
adequate measures to strengthen the free world 
as against the possibility of sudden, armed attack. 
If we do that, we can close the most dangerous 
remaining loophole for war. 

If we have strength ; if we and the other mem- 
bers of the free worlcl put that strength at the 
disposition of the United Nations ; if the United 
Nations continues to show a capacity for decisive 
action, that will check the likelihood of a series 
of little wars which could develop into a big war. 

Relations between the free world and the Com- 
munist world are no doubt in a dangerous phase. 
It is a period of testing. Out of it could come 
great disaster. Equally, the test could supply 
proof that peace has been established on a basis 
sounder than ever before in history. 

THE INTERDEPENDENCE OF INDEPENDENCE ^ 

The Declaration of Independence is expressed 
not in terms of American rights but in terms of 
the natural moral rights of all men. It proceeds 
from the promise that all men "are endowed by 
their Creator with certain inalienable Rights," and 
the Founding Fathers made it clear that they were 
setting a pattern of freedom for men everywhere. 

Largely under the inspiration of that example, 
the nineteenth century became a great period of 
liberalism, when human beings freed themselves 
from the yoke of despotism. Wherever they 
sought to do so, they had the support of the United 
States. 

We early established the Monroe Doctrine, to 
warn Czarist Russia and its allies to keep their 
hands off the republics of this hemisphere whose 



' In an address made at the Sesquicentennial Fourth of 
July Celebration, at Washington, D.C., and released to 
the press on the same date. 

July 17, 1950 



continuing independence, we said, was vital to our 
own peace and happiness. Toward the end of the 
nineteenth century, we enunciated the "Open 
Door" policy for China, to help the Chinese people 
develop in their own way, free of alien domination. 
In this twentieth century, we have joined in two 
world wars when the freedom of the West was im- 
periled by military despotism. Five years ago, 
we signed the United Nations Charter and, 
thereby, pledged ourselves to seek universal re- 
spect for human rights, and fundamental free- 
doms, and the preservation of political independ- 
ence as against violent attack. 

U.S. Tradition — Support of Human Freedom 

The history of our Nation makes a consistent, 
unfolding pattern. We have supported human 
freedom and political independence throughout 
the world, both as a matter of good morals and 
because we saw that our own freedom was an inte- 
gral part of total human freedom. 

The United States can never be isolationist, and 
it never will be so long as we are true to our herit- 
age. An isolationist America would be a contra- 
diction in terms, for America has from the be- 
ginning been a symbol of the universal cause of 
human liberty. Wltat we are doing today is in 
keeping with the tradition of our past. 

I was in Korea only 2 weeks ago and saw with 
my own eyes that that Republic was a land of 
freedom. The people had just had their second 
general election. Eighty percent of the eligible 
voters had gone to the polls. A majority of the 
representatives elected were independent of the 
party which controlled the election machinery and 
the police force. That is proof of real political 
liberty. 

I talked with leading educators and attended 
a gathering of professors and students at one of 
their leading universities. I spent an evening of 
religious worship with 3,000 Christian refugees 
who had fled from the northern dictatorship of 
atheistic communism so as to enjoy the religious 
and intellectual liberty of the Republic of Korea. 
There was no doubt as to the reality of that liberty. 
The people were happy and industrious and using 
energetically and cooperatively their new-found 
freedom. 

The society was so wholesome that it could not 
be overthrown from within. That had been tried 
and failed. So early Sunday morning, 9 days 
ago, open aggression was brought into play. 
Without warning, heavy tank formations drove 
down from the north, moving through the valleys 
to converge first upon the capital of Seoul, then to 
fan out to the south. They were preceded and 
covered by combat planes which, swooping low, 
machine-gunned and terrorized the civilian popu- 
lation. The forces of the Republic had no combat 
planes, tanks, or heavy artillery with which to 
oppose them. 

91 



Korean Attack— Military Despotism 

Tlie long-prepared, suddenly exploded, ruthless 
attack was characteristic of military despotism. 
It was, in miniature, the kind of attack that could 
hit us if we are content to live in a world where 
such methods are tolerated. The struggle in Ko- 
rea represents the timeless issue of whether lovere 
of liberty will be vigilant enough, brave enough, 
and united enough to survive despotism. 

The United States, as a member of the United 
Nations, had helped to create the Korean Kepublic. 
We had given it economic aid. We alone of the 
free world had military strength in the immediate 
area. We were the logical first defenders of the 
liberty that had been assaulted. 

It was, however, important that we should not 
act alone or without international sanction. The 
United Nations had been established for the very 
purpose of dealing with such situations. Its Se- 
curity Council met within a few hours of the open- 
ing of the assault. All of the members were 
present, except the Soviet Union, which sought by 
absence to veto restraint on the aggressive action 
of its satellite in North Korea. The Council, 
nevertheless, acted. It had a direct report from 
its own Commission in Korea and, in the light of 
that report, unhesitatingly, branded the attack as 
a breach of the peace. It called upon the member 
states to assist in repelling it. 

President Truman, with bipartisan support, 
acted promptly and vigorously to bring the United 
States to respond to that appeal. The Govern- 
ments of many other members of the United Na- 
tions did likewise. 

Thus, we see international authority at work to 
prevent the committing, against the Republic of 
Korea, of what I call "international murder." 

The task undertaken is not a light one and be- 
fore it is finished we shall all of us have to pay a 
price. Already, today, in Korea, our youth are 
beginning to pay the final price of life itself. The 
rest of us may have to cut down on our economic 
indulgence so that, out of our great productive 
capacity, we can help our friends to match the of- 
fensive power which the Soviet Union, out of its 
economic poverty, supplies to its friends. 

Threat to Liberty 

I am confident that what has happened in Korea 
will arouse the American people. We have never 
flinched when a great principle was involved. We 
are engaged, toclay, in the same battle which was 
begun in 1776. Our own liberty cannot long be 
safe in a world where despots can strike down lib- 
erty, piecemeal, with fire and sword. 

We have, today, the great opportunity to join 
with the other fi-ee societies to prove that unpro- 
voked aggression does not pay. If we sternly 
teach that lesson in terms of the North Korean 
adventure, then our own peace will be more secure 
than ever before. But if the free world fails to 



rally to the support of one of its stricken members, 
then one by one others would be struck down and 
military despotism, intoxicated by repeated vic- 
tories, would lose all sense of restraint. 

The United States has been ever bound, by faith 
and by sacrifice, to the cause of righteousness. 
Washington, under the shadow of whose monu- 
ment we stand, committed our Nation in its youth- 
ful dedication. Lincoln, whose shrine adjoins, 
said that our Declaration of Independence en- 
visioned liberty "not alone to the people of this 
country but hojje for the world for all future time." 
We have never sat idly by when despots attempted 
by violence to snuff out that hope. Today, we face 
a new test. I am confident that our response will 
be worthy of our great heritage and that we shall 
not be afraid to live sacrificially and even danger- 
ously in a righteous cause. 



U.N. Commission Reestablishes 
Headquarters in Korea 

[Released to the press by the 

U. N. Department of Public Information July 1] 

The United Nations Commission in Korea on 
July 1 adopted, in Tokyo, the following resolution : 

Whekeas information has been received from the Com- 
mission's advance party, including the Chairman and the 
Rapporteur, at present in Pusan (ITusan), Southern Ko- 
rea, that satisfactory arrangements have now been made 
for the return of the Commission to the Republic of Korea. 

Recalijng the Commission's decision of 27 .June 1950 
to ti'ansfer its headquarters temporarily from Seoul and 
to hold itself ready to return to Korea immediately sub- 
ject to developments, 

Decides to reestablish its seat forthwith in the Republic 
of Korea, and 

Whereas facilities at present available in the Republic 
of Korea are limited, the Commission further decides to 
constitute the members of the Commission at present in 
Tokyo as an Ad Hoc Committee for the purpose of en- 
abling the Commission in the Republic of Korea to keep 
in close touch with international developments and in 
particular with the Security Council. 

The Commission members, at present in Pusan, 
Southern Korea, who, in accordance with this res- 
olution now constitute the United Nations Com- 
mission on Korea, are : the Commission Chairman 
Dr. Yu-wan Liu (China), Henri Brionval 
(France), A. B. Jameison (Australia), who is the 
rapjDorteur of the Commission and C. Kondapi, 
deputy representative of India. The represent- 
atives of the remaining three member states of the 
Commission — El Salvador, Philippines and Tur- 
key — will remain in Tokyo to constitute the Ad 
Hoc Committee. 

Col. Alfred G. Katzin, personal representative 
of Secretary-General Lie in Korea, arrived in that 
country on July 7 ; and, on July 8, he presented his 
credentials from the Secretary-General to the 
Korean Government. 



92 



Department of State Bulletin 



Point Four: An Investment in Peace 



Address iy the President ^ 



It is hard for us to realize just how bad eco- 
nomic conditions are for many peoples of the 
world. Famine, disease, and poverty are the 
scourge of vast areas of the globe. Hundreds of 
millions of people in Asia, for example, have a 
life expectancy of 30 years or less. Many of 
these people live on inadequate diets, unable to 
perform the tasks necessary to earn their daily 
bread. Animal plagues and plant pests carry 
away their crops and their livestock. Misuse of 
natural resources exposes their land to flood or 
drought. 

Conditions such as these are the seedbed of po- 
litical unrest and instability. They are a threat to 
the security and growth of free institutions every- 
where. It is in areas where these conditions exist 
that communism makes its greatest inroads. The 
people of these areas are eagerly seeking better liv- 
ing conditions. The Communists are attempting 
to turn the honest dissatisfaction of these people 
with their present conditions into support for 
Communist efforts to dominate their nations. 

In addition to these attempts at persuasion, the 
Communists in these countries use the weapon of 
fear. They constantly threaten internal violence 
and armed aggression. 

The recent unprovoked invasion of the Republic 
of Korea by Communist armies is an example of 
the danger to which the underdeveloped areas par- 
ticularly ai'e exposed. 

It is essential that we do everything we can to 
prevent such aggression and to enforce the prin- 
ciples of the United Nations Charter. We must 
and we shall give every possible assistance to 
people who are determined to maintain their in- 
dependence. We must counteract the Communist 
weapon of fear. 

But we must not be misled into thinking that 
our only task is to create defenses against aggres- 
sion. Our whole purpose in creating a strong 

" Made at the annual convention of the American 
Newspaper Guild, at Washington, D.C., on June 28 and 
released to the press by the White House on the same 
date. 



defense is to permit us to carry on the great con- 
structive tasks of peace. Behind the shield of a 
strong defense, we must continue to work to bring 
about better living conditions in the free nations. 



Strengthening Undeveloped Nations 

Particularly in the underdeveloped areas of the 
world, we must work cooperatively with local gov- 
ernments which are seeking to improve the welfare 
of their people. We must help them to help them- 
selves. We must aid them to make progress in 
agriculture, in industry, in health, and in the edu- 
cation of their children. Such progress will in- 
crease their strength and their independence. 

The growing strength of these countries is im- 
portant to the defense of all free nations against 
Communist aggression. It is important to the eco- 
nomic progress of the free world. And these 
things are good for us as well as good for them. 

For these reasons, I recommended in my in- 
augural address the program that has become 
known as "Point 4." Tlie Congress has recently 
authorized technical assistance to underdeveloped 
areas under this program. This new law marks 
Congressional indorsement of a practical and sen- 
sible course of action that can have tremendous 
benefits for the future of the world. 

It is possible to make tremendous improvements 
in underdeveloped areas by very simple and inex- 
pensive means. Simple measures, such as the im- 
provement of seed and animal stocks, the control 
of insects, the dissemination of health information, 
can make great changes almost overnight. This 
does not require vast expenditures. It requires 
only expert assistance offered to the people on a 
genuinely cooperative basis. We have already 
seen, on a relatively small scale, what can h&, 
accomplished. 

I am going to give you a factual — a reporter's — 
account of a few technical assistance projects which 
have raised living standards in the countries where 
they were carried out. These are a preview of 



Ju/y ?7, 1950 



93 



what a full-scale Point 4 Program can mean in 
the future. 

Successful Assistance Projects 

In northern India, there is a very rich farming 
area known as the Terai district. In recent years, 
the malaria mosquito forced people to leave this 
land. One hundred and four villages were aban- 
doned. Even in the face of India's tragic food 
shortage, no crops were planted in this rich soil. 

India called on the World Health Organization 
for help, and that organization sent a malaria con- 
trol team which arrived in northern India in April 
1949. In the face of great difficulties, this inter- 
national group sprayed the area with DDT. 

Today, a year later, no infected mosquito is to 
be found in any village in the Terai district. 
Local workers have been trained to continue the 
spraying. Families who were refugees from ma- 
laria, only 1 year ago, are back in their homes, and 
their fields are green again. 

This demonstrates how a simple program can 
make tremedous improvements in a short time. 

Let me give you another example of what Point 
4 can mean; this one in Iran. This story con- 
cerns not an international organization but one 
of our American voluntary groups, the Near East 
Foundation. 

Four years ago, the Government of Iran asked 
the Foundation to set up a demonstration project 
in a group of 35 villages not far from the capital 
at Tehran. The Foundation brought village lead- 
ers to a series of training courses. It won their 
confidence, and through these leaders, it began to 
carry out agricultural and health improvements. 
The Foundation met a water shortage by drilling 
deep wells. It overcame water-borne diseases 
with an inexpensive water filter. It sprayed 
homes with DDT. It sprayed crops with insecti- 
cides. It helped to organize schools in each of 
the 35 villages. 

Today, only 4 years later, the village people are 
at work in new carpentry shops, vegetable gardens, 
and orchards. And, most startling of all, the 
yield of grain in this area has tripled. 

The effects of the Near East Foundation's work 
are spreading throughout Iran. This story will 
be matched many times over, under the Point 4 
Program. 

IVIy next illustration is in the Eepublic of Li- 
beria on the west coast of Africa. Here a United 
States Government economic mission has been 
working since 1944 — headed, incidentally, by a 
former agricultural extension agent from Mis- 
souri. This mission in Liberia has laid out roads, 
and mapped the timber supply, and helped to open 
up an iron deposit. Agricultural technicians have 
helped to expand rice production for the local 
market and the production of palm oil and cocoa 
for export. 

The effect of these steps has been remarkable. 
In one village near Monrovia, the cash income of 



the people, derived from selling rice, cocoa, and 
palm oil, has increased from 5 dollars per pei-son 
a year to 35 dollars, since the arrival of our eco- 
nomic mission. 

Our mission — which has only five Americans in 
it — has worked in close cooperation with the Li- 
berian Government. That Government already 
has built three new agricultural experiment sta- 
tions. This is remarkable progress, but it is only 
the beginning of the economic development which 
Liberia needs to become a prosperous member 
of the family of nations. 

Point 4: Equipment for Independence 

These achievements I have cited are samples of 
the kind of work that needs so badly to be done 
in underdeveloped areas all over the world. 

Under the expanded Point 4 Program, we can 
greatl}' enlarge the scope of these activities. There 
are tremendous opportunities to improve living 
standards for wide areas of the globe. It may 
prove altogether possible, for example, through 
the activities of the Food and Agriculture Organi- 
zation, to wipe out the scourge of rinderpest, the 
fatal animal disease that is responsible for much 
of the rural poverty of the Far East. The devel- 
opment of hybrid rice seed, which the Food and 
Agriculture Organization is now working on, 
could conceivably increase rice production by 10 
percent and improve the health and living condi- 
tions in the Orient immeasurably. As an example 
of what hybrid seed can do, our corn hybrids, 
where they have been used in Italy, have increased 
corn production by over 25 percent. 

Aside from these basic improvements in agri- 
culture and health, it is equally important, in 
many areas, to build modern communication and 
transportation systems and to establish local in- 
dustries. Without these, the underdeveloped 
areas cannot put their natural resources to use for 
their own benefit and in profitable trade with the 
rest of the world. Building roads, and railroads, 
and factories will require considerable amounts of 
public and private capital. To aid the flow of 
American capital abroad, I have recommended 
that the Congress provide for limited guaranties 
to encourage greater investments overseas. I am 
hopeful that this legislation will be enacted soon. 

Point 4 is not now — and should not become — a 
matter for partisan differences of opinion. How- 
ever, some critics have attempted to ridicule Point 
4 as a "do-good" measure; others have said it is 
a waste of money. This is the most foolish kind 
of shortsightedness. If we fail to carry out a 
vigorous Point 4 Program we run the risk of 
losing to communism, by default, hundreds of 
millions of people who now look to us for help 
in their struggle against hunger and despair. 

Point 4 is an investment in a peaceful and pros- 
perous world. It is a program which will bring 
increasing results over the years. It will bring 
about a chain reaction in economic development. 



94 



Department of Slate Bulletin 



It will serve to create economic health where pov- 
erty existed, and to equip the people of under- 
developed areas to carry forward their economic 
gains and preserve their independence. 

A major share of this world campaign to im- 
prove the livelihood of peoples will be carried out 
under the United Nations. 



U.N. Technical Assistance Program 

In the United Nations Charter, each member 
government pledged that it would promote so- 
lutions of international economic, social, health, 
and related problems. 

At its last session, the General Assembly voted 
unanimously to support a technical assistance 
program for raising the standard of living in 
underdeveloped areas. 

Two weeks ago, the United Nations conducted 
a Technical Assistance Conference to make plans 
and to raise funds for this new program. Fifty- 
four nations attended and 50 of them offered 
contributions. 

By the end of the Conference, more than 20 
million dollars had been pledged. The United 
States pledged 12 million dollars, subject, of 
course, to the appropriation of the necessary funds 
by the Congress. This was the largest single 
contribution, but, in relation to their resources, 



a number of other nations contributed more. 

The outstanding characteristic of this Technical 
Assistance Conference is the fact that it demon- 
strated clearly the common desire of the peoples 
of the world to work together for human advance- 
ment. In a world dark with apprehension, the 
Point 4 idea offers new hope. 

All our citizens must play a part in making the 
Point 4 Program a success. Our missionary 
groups, our philanthropic and charitable agencies, 
must continue the efforts they have been making 
over the years for the improvement of conditions 
in foreign lands. Our young people can find 
careers in the pioneering woi'k of bringing tech- 
nical assistance to these countries. Our unions 
and our business organizations should enlarge 
their foreign contacts and bring the benefits of 
their experience to less developed countries. You 
newspaper men and women can help Point 4 to 
achieve its aims by telling its story to the Ameri- 
can people and to the people of the world. 

Our Point 4 Program and the work of the 
United Nations are constructive ways to build the 
kind of world where all nations can live in peace- 
ful prosperity, dedicated to the purpose of cre- 
ating better lives for their people. We support 
this program because we seek a peaceful world, 
and a free world, where all men can live as good 
neighbors. 



Foreign Relations Volumes Released 

American Republics 

The Department of State announced on June 17 
that it released on that date Foreign Relations of 
the United States, 1933, Volume IV, The Amer- 
ican Republics. This volume contains the general 
section on problems of a multilateral nature and 
on relations with Argentina. Volume V, con- 
taining papers on bilateral relations with the 
other republics of the Western Hemisphere for 
1933, will be published later. Volume II, dealing 
with the British Commonwealth, Europe, the 
Near East, and Africa, and Volume III, on the 
Far East, have previously been published. 

Efforts to restore peace and to maintain good 
relations between the states of the Western Hem- 
isphere are the chief subjects of this volume. 
Leading jDlace is given to the Seventh Interna- 
tional Conference of American States held at 
Montevideo in December 1933. Other major chap- 
ters of this volume record the combined efforts of 
the League of Nations and of the United States 
and other American governments to settle the 
Chaco dispute between Bolivia and Paraguay and 
the Leticia dispute between Colombia and Peru. 

Copies of this volume (Ixxxiv, 812 pp.) may be 
purchased from the Superintendent of Documents, 
United States Government Printing Office, Wash- 
ington 25, D.C., for $3.00 each. 



Political and Economic Problems 

The Department of State released on June 27 
Foreig?!, Relations of the United States, 1933, Vol- 
ume I, General. This volume contains more than 
800 documents on international political and eco- 
nomic problems, the multilateral aspects of which 
cannot be listed under separate country headings. 
Volumes II (British Commonwealth, Eui'ope, 
Near East, and Africa), III (Far East), and IV, 
dealing with diplomatic negotiations among the 
American Republics and on relations with Argen- 
tina, have previously been published. Volume V, 
covering bilateral relations with the other Ameri- 
can Republics, will be issued later. 

Documents in volume I relate to the Conference 
for Reduction and Limitation of Armaments, the 
major political problem. 

Other documents in this volume are devoted to 
the London Economic Conference. 

Negotiations ancillary to the London Economic 
Conference, such as those relating to silver, copper, 
and wheat, are separately treated; similarly are 
those concerned with intergovernmental debts, 
initiation of the reciprocal trade agreements pro- 
gram, and the Foreign Bondholders Protective 
Council. 

Copies of this volume (xciii, 991 pp.) may be 
purchased from the Superintendent of Documents, 
for $3.75 each. 



Ju/y U, 7950 



95 



New Challenges to American Diplomacy 



hy George C. McGhee^ Assistant Secretary 

for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs ' 



American policies grow out of the attitudes and 
vital interests of the American people. The pur- 
pose of our policies is, of course, to preserve and 
advance those interests. Now, what are the most 
important, the most vital of our American in- 
terests in the year 1950 ? 

First, you will agree that our fundamental 
national interest is in peace and security. There- 
fore, it is our policy to create and maintain a world 
climate of peace; to eliminate the recurrent threat 
of war. 

Second, we have a vital interest in being able 
to continue to enjoy, here in this country, our 
own democratic way of life. Our policies are, 
therefore, designed to strengthen, both here and 
abroad, the rights and freedoms of the individual 
which are basic to our system. 

Third, we have an interest in economic progress, 
both as an end in itself and as a means of achieving 
our other objectives. Our policies must aim at 
improving our own standard of living. They 
must help to promote healthy economic conditions 
generally throughout the world. 

A New American interest 

Now if we look back over the past half century, 
we see that these vital interests in peace, freedom, 
and economic progress have been continuously 
threatened and periodically attacked. The ex- 
perience of two world wars and a major depres- 
sion has taught us that we have a fourth vital 
interest. It has become clear that the peace, the 
freedom, the economic progress — more than 
these — the very survival of our country — depend 
on a clear recognition and a vigorous pursuit of 
that fourth national interest. 

We have learned, in short, that we have a vital 



' An address made before the Northwest Institute of 
International Relations at Portland, Oreg., on June 22 and 
relea.sed to the press on the same date. 



interest in building an international community 
based on principles which have become universally 
accepted among civilized men but which have not 
been universally practiced among nations. Such 
an international community would permit the 
application, between nations, of the same basic 
principles that apply between individuals within 
a democracy. Each country would be able to 
make its own unique contribution to the world 
community in the light of its own particular his- 
tory, interests, and capabilities. 

Such a community, we have come to believe, 
offers the best and perhaps the only chance of 
preserving and promoting our national interests. 
I think it is accurate to say that the building of 
this community constitutes the boldest challenge 
to American leadership in the world today. To 
the present generation of Americans, it offers a 
tangible hope for a better world. 

We have, moreover, already taken the lead in 
creating such a community, and much progress 
has been made. The Charter of the United 
Nations embodies the principles, and the organi- 
zation of the United Nations provides a founda- 
tion, on which an international community can be 
built. We have taken further action to strengthen 
the foundation by means consistent with the 
Charter, such as the Rio pact and the North At- 
lantic Treaty. 

I need not recount to you all that the free 
nations of the world have done to organize and 
strengthen themselves in the 5 short years since 
the end of hostilities. I predict that men will 
look back on this period as one of remarkable 
progress toward this end. Indeed, I think we 
tend to underestimate our achievements, to play 
down what we have succeeded in doing, and to 
highlight what we have not done. 

Perhaps, on the other hand, we have not always 
correctly estimated the difficulties that were in- 
hei-ent in what we were trying to do. Perhaps, 
we did not foresee, and could not have foreseen. 



96 



Department of State Bulletin 



that some of these difficulties would become serious 
obstacles to the building of an intei-national 
community. 

Obstacles To Building a World Community 

One of those obstacles was a direct consequence 
of the war. It was nothing less than the tem- 
porary eclipse of Western Europe as a produc- 
tive and jjrogressive force in the world. What 
had been a great workshop, the largest single 
aggregation of skilled people in the world, an 
essential link in world trade, and the center of 
far-flung empires, was a continent in chaos and 
despair. Iklillions of its people were homeless, 
jobless, hungry, and without hope at the war's 
end. 

With our help, these people are rebuilding their 
lives, reorganizing their societies in a new and 
more cooperative spirit. Today, Western Europe 
is still a stronghold of freedom. The gi-atifying 
response to the bold proposal of FrencTi Foreign 
Minister Schuman for the integration of the basic 
European industries, and to the proposed forma- 
tion of the European Payments Union, shows that 
its members are playing an active and creative 
part in the building of our international 
community. 

The postwar collapse of Western Europe might 
have delayed indefinitely and even prevented the 
building of a strong community of free nations. 
The fact that the trend has been reversed by a 
combination of creative imagination, planning, 
and sheer hard work, is, as General Marshall put 
it, a "near miracle." The fact that the Western 
European countries have not all rebuilt their 
economies on strictly American lines seems to 
trouble some people. To me, it demonstrates that 
there is room for wide diversity of approach to 
the problems of a free world. We Americans 
should welcome that divei'sity, for it is a funda- 
mental principle of our own way of life. 

THREAT OF SOVIET IMPERIALISM 

A second serious obstacle to the building of an 
international community is, of course, the threat 
of Soviet imperialism. We have watched the So- 
viet design unfolding over the past 5 years. We 
see it at work, today, in many parts of the world, 
including the Far East, and we have been forced 
inescapably to the conclusion that it is hostile to 
the creation of a community of free nations. Its 
facade of Marxist communism has been clearly re- 
vealed as a mask for naked aggression. 

The men in the Kremlin want to organize the 
world, to be sure. But they want to organize it 
on principles that civilized men have rejected and 
fought during hundreds of years. The Soviet 
principle is rule by absolute power, the power of 
a small group of men over other men, the power 
of one nation over other nations. The means of 
achieving this power are the police state, subver- 
sion, and concealed aggression. 

July 17, 1950 

894368—50 3 



We believe that we have learned how to meet 
that threat. We may not always be able to con- 
tain it at every point, but we are confident that 
we can not only contain but overcome it in time 
by a great cooperative effort of free men. We 
shall overcome it in the very act of building an 
international community so strong, so free, and so 
prosperous that all peojile will want to be a part 
of it, even those whose governments are now 
opposing it. 

UNDERDEVELOPED AREAS 

But even if Western Europe had not suffered a 
temporary eclipse, even if the Soviet Union had 
been a strong and willing partner, we would still 
have had to deal with a third obstacle to the build- 
ing of an international community. We would 
still have been faced with the fact that large areas 
of the world and hundreds of millions of people 
are not yet in a position to make t'heir full con- 
tribution to the economic and political life of an 
international community. 

I want to talk tonight about some of these areas, 
in South Asia, Africa, and the Near East, which 
constitute my special responsibility in the State 
Department. Although these areas have rich ma- 
terial resources and human potentialities, they are 
included in the "underdeveloped" regions of the 
world. This region contains almost 700 million 
people. It includes the great subcontinent of India 
and Pakistan, two nations which have only re- 
cently joined the international community as fully 
independent members. It includes the expanses of 
the Near East, with states as old as Greece and 
Iran and as young as Israel and Jordan. It in- 
cludes also the continent of Africa, with its inde- 
pendent peoples of Liberia and Ethiopia and its 
numerous protectorates, colonies, and trust terri- 
tories administered by European powers. 

The people of this area practice five great re- 
ligions: Islam, Christianity, Hinduism, Judaism, 
and Buddhism. They speak more than 145 lan- 
guages. Much of what we now know and value 
in the realm of science, art, religion, and philos- 
ophy, we drew from their early cultures. 

How can one generalize about an area so vast? 
If there is a common denominator among these 
lands and their peoples it is the fact that all have 
great potentialities which have not yet been real- 
ized. Another common characteristic of these 
people is their growing realization that they have 
not participated fully in the world's progress and 
their desire to make up for lost time. 

Symbols of Progress 

They have made substantial progress in terms 
of political independence, representative govern- 
ment, and personal freedom. In the period be- 
tween the two world wars, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, 
and Iraq gained full independence. More recently, 
this area has given birth to nine other nations: 



97 



Syria, Lebanon, Israel, and Jordan in the Near 
East; India, Pakistan, Ceylon, and Burma in 
South Asia. Libya has been promised its inde- 
pendence by 1952 and Italian Somaliland within 
10 years. 

Political independence, however, is only one 
symbol of progress . It is not the only symbol. 
These people are beginning also to associate prog- 
ress with a chance to better their lot in the world. 
They want better food, better housing, better 
schools, better health, and they are willing to make 
great efforts in order to obtain them. Although 
this new urge creates great dislocations and on 
occasion disappointments, it is on balance an en- 
couraging development. It shows a growing 
understanding on the part of these peoples of their 
ability to help themselves. It shows a will to 
change. It is a force which, if used for construc- 
tive ends, can help achieve our objective of creating 
a stable international community. 

Now what do these distant events mean to Amer- 
icans? Do they affect our vital interests, and, if 
so, how should we shape our policies ? Whenever 
these questions are asked of me, in one form or 
another, I think of the tragic and ironic remark 
that Neville Chamberlain made at the time of 
Munich, when he said, in a broadcast, that Czecho- 
slovakia was a far-away country of which we knew 
little. 

During the past year, I have visited almost all 
of the countries under discussion. The places and 
the peoples I have been describing may seem far 
away to you, and we Americans may still know 
little about them. But surely we know — or should 
know by now — that there is no corner of the world 
so remote that its fate cannot affect our own. 

Community Problems on a Familiar Scale 

But let us assume that our interest in these far- 
off peoples still needs to be demonstrated. Most 
of the states, I have mentioned, belong to the in- 
ternational community of which we have been 
speaking. Let us, by the convenient device of 
oversimplification, reduce this community problem 
to a familiar scale. Let us suppose that a com- 
parable community problem existed in a city like 
Portland. 

Suppose you could apply the term underdevel- 
oped to two-thirds of the people of that city, whicli 
is about the proportion of peoples of underdevel- 
oped areas to the population of the world as a 
whole. That figure would mean that two-thirds 
of the men, women, and children of Portland 
are now living in dire poverty, hunger, disease, 
and ignorance, amidst one-third that are enjoy- 
ing all of the benefits of the good life in this 
beautiful city. 

In this imaginary Portland, it would mean that 
among the citizens you would have an annual death 
rate of 28 per thousand, compared with 10 for the 
more favored citizens, although the birth rate 
would be 44 per thousand, rather than 26. Infant 

98 



mortality would be 153 per thousand live births, 
instead of 25. Deaths from tuberculosis might 
be as high as 283 per hundred thousand, instead 
of 33. These are figures from a representative 
part of the underdeveloped area. 

More than eight out of ten adults in this group 
could not read or write. In other words, they 
would have an illiteracy rate of 80 percent instead 
of 3 percent. Their per capita income would be 
somewhere between 5 and 85 dollars a year, instead 
of the average American figure of 1,410 dollare. 
Suppose that the life expectancy of this two-thirds 
of Portland's population, instead of C3 yeai-s, were 
about 30 years ; that, in other words, these particu- 
lar citizens of Portland could expect to die when 
the rest of your citizens were approaching the 
most productive and useful years of their lives. 

If you can imagine such a situation, I think you 
will agree that it would create a grave problem 
for the whole imaginary community of Portland. 
Indeed, the two-thirds would scarcely be convinced 
that the community as organized offered them 
adequqate oiDportunities. They would have little 
incentive to support the community but would seek 
to change it or — failing that- — to overthrow it by 
force. They would form an easy foil for trouble- 
makei-s and agitators. The privileged one-third 
would, indeed, have an uneasy and insecure 
existence. 

I have not talked about the underdevelo])ed 
lands of South Asia, Africa, and the Near East 
in terms of the Soviet threat, and I shall not do 
so. Communism in these particular areas is not 
an immediate danger. The problem in these areas 
is not to put out fires, since the sparks of com- 
munism have not found adequate fuel there. But 
comnuuiism may well become a threat if the grow- 
ing aspirations of these peoples are frustrated. 
The problem is to help the peoples of these areas 
build a house that will be fireproof. And when 
we think of the time required for the building, we 
think in terms not of months or years but of 
decades. 

What should our policies be toward these un- 
derdeveloped peoples'? What type of assistance 
can we render them that is within our means and 
will be effective in meeting their particular 
problems ? 

Policies Toward Asia, Africa, and Near East 

First, we must keep in mind that we are deal- 
ing with proud and independent peoples. In 
many instances, they are the direct inheritors of 
distinguished civilizations that provided the basis 
for our own more recent civilization. Their de- 
velopment will not take place along the same lines 
as ours. They must develop in their own way, and 
their way— for them— can be just as right as is 
our way— for us. The goals toward which they 
strive, although not always identical with ours, can 
assure them the same fullness of life and the 

Department of Sfafe Bulletin 



same opportunities to make a contribution to the 
world eomniunity as does ours. 

In any event, they intend to shape tlieir own 
future. Fortunately, that future is, today, in the 
hands of some ^I'^i^t leaders, with whom we are 
working on a basis of mutual understanding and 
respect. Several of these leaders have only re- 
cently visited the United States at our invitation. 
We hope, increasinfjly, to convince them that our 
attitude toward them is friendly and disinter- 
ested: that we have no desire to dominate them, 
to enlist them in any "bloc" in pursuit of our 
own interests, or to force our economic system or 
ideologies upon them. 

We must also not think of assistance as being, 
exclusively, in terms of financial aid. Indeed, I 
am afraid that we have, as a result of the highly 
successful European Recovery Program, which 
was basically financial in nature, come to attach 
too much importance to financial assistance and 
too much confidence in its ability to meet all prob- 
lems. There are in the underdeveloped areas too 
many other limiting factors, too many other basic 
problems to be overcome to permit the useful ex- 
penditure of large amounts of capital in a short 
time, even if such funds existed in inexhaustible 
supply, which they do not. Dreams of a Ten- 
nessee Valley Authority for the Tigris-Euphrates 
Valley must await the achievement of less am- 
bitious beginnings with smaller dams and works. 

But beginnings must be made. Our efforts must 
begin where the people of the underdeveloped 
areas now are. We must help them with all the 
various means at our disposal — financial, tech- 
nical, administrative, and moral assistance, 
to meet their basic problems in their way, to in- 
crease production of food, to pi'ovide better 
houses, better roads, schools, health, and public 
administration. 

We know that we cannot oifer them our own 
standards. We cannot, even within the city of 
Portland, guarantee absolute uniformity of liv- 
ing standards even though there is an opportunity 
for all people. We can, however, demonstrate our 
desire to assist by means of tangible evidence of 
progress. We can give these peoples hope which 
will provide the incentive to seek their future in 
continued cooperation with us and the other free 
nations of the world, within the framework of the 
United Nations. 

What have we done so far? Is it enough? 



FORMS OF U.S. ASSISTANCE 

Apart from the magnificent work which our 
private organizations have carried on in these 
areas for many years, American aid has thus far 
been modest. It has taken a number of forms, in 
response to many diverse situations. 

We have extended loans, through the Export- 
Import Bank, for development projects in Greece, 
Turkey, Egypt, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Afghanis- 
tan, Ethiopia, and Liberia. We have supported 



loans to India and Iraq by the International Bank 
for Eeconstruction and Development. The Euro- 
pean Recovery Program has enabled us to con- 
tribute, directly, to economic rehabilitation and 
development in Greece and Turkey and to eco- 
nomic development in the overseas territories of 
European nations in Africa; In Greece and 
Turkey, and now Iran, we have met special 
emergencies with a highly successful program of 
military aid, under the Mutual Defense Assistance 
Program. 

We have, as you know, been carrying on a pro- 
gram for the exchange of teachers, students, and 
technicians of various kinds. We can now pro- 
vide scholarships under Fulbright agreements 
with Greece, India, Burma, Egypt, Iran, and 
Turkey. We set great store by these exchange 
programs. We hope to extend them considerably. 

Congress has now authorized the Point 4 Pro- 
gram of technical assistance, and we hope that 
approjiriation will soon be made to perinit that 
vital program to get under way. The area under 
discussion, which includes a large portion of the 
underdeveloped part of the world, was very much 
in Pi'esident Truman's mind when he first an- 
nounced his program of technical assistance. 

UNITED NATIONS AID 

From now on, a sizable part of our technical 
assistance will go forward through the United 
Nations and its specialized agencies. I want to 
mention just one of these projects which is now 
being put into operation. That is a United Na- 
tions program of relief and works projects for the 
Arab refugees from Palestine, for which the Con- 
gress has recently authorized an American con- 
tribution of about 27 million dollars. 

This project grew out of a United Nations Eco- 
nomic Survey Mission headed by Gordon Clapp, 
Chairman of the Board of the Tennessee Valley 
Authority. I can give you no better statement of 
our policy toward the underdeveloped areas than 
by quoting from his report. 

Higher living standards [says the Introduction to this 
report] cannot be bestowed by one upon another like 
a gift. An improved economy does not come in a neat 
package sold or given away in the market place. A higher 
standard of living must grow out of the application of 
human skill and ingenuity to the physical resources of 
a country or region. 

The highly developed nations of the world did not make 
their way by wishing. By work and risk they forced 
the earth, the soil, the forests and the rivers to yield 
them riches. They pooled their energy and resources by 
taxation and mutual enterprise to discover new ways of 
doing tilings. They worked, they invented, they edu- 
cated and trained their children, and they invested in 
their national and in their private enterprises. This they 
must continue so to do, if they are to maintain the standard 
of living they have achieved. 

There is no substitute for the application of work and 
local enterprise to each country's own resources. Help 



July 17, 1950 



99 



to those who have the will to help themselves should be 
the primary policy guiding and restraining the desire 
of the more developed areas of the world to help the less 
developed lands. 

This, I believe, is both an accurate and a realistic 
statement of our policies toward the peoples of 
the underdeveloped areas of the world. Our ap- 
proach to these jjeople, and it is a characteristically 
American approach, is on the level of partnership. 
We know that human progress cannot be bestowed ; 
that it must grow out of cooperative effort ; out of 
mutual respect. We know also that it can only 
be made to grow among those who have the will 
to help themselves. 



Among the many who have that will and who 
look to us for cooperation, there is a natural im- 
patience to get on with the job, a tendency to feel 
that the United States is not doing enough to as- 
sist the underdeveloped areas to play their part 
in the building of a community of free nations. 
Indeed, we must do so, since it is in our own vital 
interests to achieve this objective. We must make 
certain that we leave nothing undone that is within 
our capability to assure that other peoples are con- 
vinced that their own aspirations can best be 
served within the community of free nations. 
Only by so doing can we assure the realization of 
our own aspirations. 



Support for an Expanded Information and Education Program 

Statement hy Secretary Acheson ^ 



I welcome warmly the action of Senator Benton 
and the 12 Senators ^ associated with him in intro- 
ducing Senate Resolution 243, calling for "a 
greatly expanded program of information and ed- 
ucation among all the peoples of the world to the 
full extent that they can be reached." The spon- 
sors of this resolution have accurately diagnosed 
one of the elements not only vital but, in fact, indis- 
pensable to the conduct of American foreign rela- 
tions today. We must make the truth known to 
the peoples of the world. This is a task that calls 
for greatly expanded and intensified efforts. 

Truth in the world today is a political force, 
Nothing makes plainer the power of this force, I 
think, than the Communist fear of it. Behind 
the Iron Curtain, it has been said, "Truth is trea- 
son." We are familiar with the immense machin- 
ery of the police states for insuring that the words 
and acts of their citizens conform slavishly to the 
doctrines advocated publicly by their masters. 
That machinery has also, as one of its primary 
tasks, to exclude the truth, to suppress facts. Some 
of tliese facts seem to us curiously harmless, but 
once you begin to exclude the truth, to found your 
state on deliberately preserved ignorance and de- 
liberately disseminated falsehood, even very simple 
facts have a potentially explosive force. 



' Made before a subcommittee of the Senate Committee 
on Foreign Relations on S. R. 243 on July 5 and released to 
the press on the same date. 

' Submitted by Senator Benton on March 22 for himself 
and Senators Douglas, Flanders, Fulbright, Graham. Hen- 
drickson, Lehman, McMahon, Morse, Mundt, Smith 
(Maine), Sparkman, and Tobey. 

100 



Communist States Fear Truth 

The Communist states have not only shown their 
fear of truth by elaborate internal controls and 
policing. They have set up at their borders bars 
against free communication and free movement of 
men, books, ideas — against all the carriers of truth 
and information. They have pursued a policy of 
deliberate self-isolation. They are afraid to let 
their citizens look out, and they are afraid to let 
others look in. The recent demands that the 
United States close its information services in Ru- 
mania and Czechoslovakia are witnesses to the 
power of truth as a political force. So is the Soviet 
jamming of our radio broadcasts. 

If totalitarian regimes cannot flourish where the 
truth is fully available, free and democratic coun- 
tries cannot flourish unless their citizens do have 
access to the truth. The freedom of free nations 
grows out of the minds of its citizens. Free men 
make up their own minds, on the basis of free 
access to the truth, to the facts. 

The growth of an international community of 
free and democratic nations depends upon the 
ready and free flow of facts, ideas, and people. 
Only this free flow of facts, ideas, and people can 
make clear the common bonds and interests of na- 
tions and allow them to settle their differences 
peaceably and justly. 

International Communist propaganda has been 
engaged in a great campaign of falsification, dis- 
tortion, suppression, and deception. We have had 
recently in Korea an illustration of the cruel de- 
ception being practiced by Communist propaganda 
on the universally felt desire for peace. Just a 

Department of State Bulletin 



i 



few weeks before Cominmiist armed forces 
launched tlieir carefully planned attack across the 
38tli parallel, over half the population of North 
Korea was reported to have signed Communist- 
circulated petitions for peace. The cynical ag- 
gression of communism in Korea, and the false- 
hoods that have preceded and accompanied it, 
make inescapably clear the unportance of the ob- 
jectives in this proposed resolution. 

This country has been a special target of the 
Communist campaign of falsehood and abuse. 
We have not been selected as a target simply be- 
cause the Communists do not love us. The Com- 
munist effort to misrepresent and discredit the 
aims and nature of American life, and the aims 
and nature of American foreign policy, has pri- 
marily a great strategic value in the furtherance 
of Communist world objectives. This Commu- 
nist campaign, therefore, jeopardizes the security 
of the United States and is a threat to the security 
of the free world. 



Objectives of Communist Campaign 

One of the strategic objectives of this Commu- 
nist campaign is to divide the free world, whose 
unity is essential to its strength and essential to 
the elimination of Communist expansion. 

Another is to confuse the world about the nature 
of democratic aspirations and ideals and to weaken 
the moral force and attraction of the free world. 

Another is to spread deception about the free 
world's strength and resources, of every kind, and, 
thus, to weaken the free world's confidence in itself. 

Another is to sow doubts regarding the free 
world's firmness of purpose, its determination to 
fulfill the international obligations it has accepted 
in the cause of freedom, and, thus, to produce ir- 
resolution, fear, and uncertainty. 

So far as Communist efforts to foster falsehood 
about the United States are successful, they serve 
these Communist designs. They help to drive 
wedges between the United States and other coun- 
tries, to create hesitancy, and to prevent clear, 
effective, imified resistance against Communist 
aims. 

We must, therefore, make unmistakable the 
truth about the United States and the other free 
nations. In doing this, we will make plain the 
essential bond of common beliefs, and common in- 
terests that underlie differences in national cus- 
toms and circumstances. We must make plain the 
facts of international relationships today, so that 
every man has an opportunity to make a true judg- 
ment on the immense issues and decisions that con- 
front him. We must make plain the difference 
between Communist pretensions and Communist 
performance. 

The President, in his address before the Ameri- 
can Society of Newspaper Editors on April 20,^ 
said, 

Our task is to present the truth to the millions of people 



wlio are uninformed or uiisiuformed or unconvinced. Our 
task is to reach them in their daily lives, as they work 
and learn. We must be alert, ingenious, and diligent in 
reaching peoples of other countries, whatever their edu- 
cational and cultural backgrounds may be. Our task is 
to show them that freedom is the way to economic and 
social advancement, the way to political independence, the 
way to strength, happiness, and peace. 

. . . We must pool our efforts with those of the other 
free peoples in a sustained, intensified program to promote 
the cause of freedom against the propaganda of slavery. 
We must make ourselves heard round the world in a 
great campaign of truth. 

The President directed me at that time "to plan 
a strengthened and more effective national effort 
to use the great power of truth in working for 
peace." In accordance with that directive, the 
Department of State has submitted to the Presi- 
dent a plan for a broader and stronger program of 
information and education designed to carry out "a 
great campaign of truth," in the interest of a free 
and peaceful world. That plan is presently being 
considered by the President. It is dedicated to the 
achievement of the principles and purposes so 
clearly set forth in the proposed resolution. 

Necessity for a Truth Campaign 

The task of telling the truth, as the President 
has emphasized, is not "separate and distinct from 
other elements of our foreign policy. It is a 
necessary part of all we are doing to build a peace- 
ful world." It is essential to the success of our 
foreign policy that the military, political, and 
economic measures we are taking be accompanied 
by an effective information program. The Mar- 
shall Plan, Point 4, military aid must be seen fully 
and truthfully in the widest context of the United 
States' hopes and aspirations. The facts about 
what we do, the facts about why we do it, the facts 
about the way we do it, are integral parts of what 
we do in foreign affairs. 

We must remember in these efforts that the truth 
is a hard master. 

We must always be on our guard against per- 
mitting what we say to outrun what we do. We 
must recognize that the more fully our principles 
are understood, the more closely our practice will 
be inspected. Our performance must not lag be- 
hind our principles. We must remember, too, that 
jieoples speaking to peoples involves peoples lis- 
tening to peoples. We must remember that the 
truth cannot be monopolized. 

In the struggle for men's minds and men's al- 
legiances, the free nations have great advantages. 
The truth is on their side. In addition, the free 
nations have developed to a high degree as in- 
tegral parts of their free institutions, technical 
resources and skills for discovering the truth and 



' For a complete text of President's address, see Bttlle- 
TiN of May 1, 1950, p. 669. 



July 17, 7950 



101 



for telling the truth. The democratic concept has 
depended on the ability of every man to learn the 
truth and to act as an individual on the basis of it. 
Just as totalitarian states by their nature are 
equi^Dped to suppress the truth, so the free nations 
are equipped by their nature to discover and dis- 
seminate it. These great resources, implicit in 
democratic life, must be utilized to the fullest. 
The emphasis placed in the sixth point of Senate 
Resolution 243 on the efforts of private American 
citizens seems to me to recognize this essential 
principle, and I welcome particularly this em- 
phasis on private participation. Governments can 
do only a very small part of the task. It is the 
individual citizens, the private organizations, the 
independent groups, who make the major contribu- 
tion to insuring that the truth is known. 

There has never been a time when men every- 
where who value freedom had a greater need to 
know the truth. 



Senate Resolution 243 

Whekeas the struggle now raging between freedom and 
communism is a contest for the minds and loyalties of 
men ; and 

Whekeas in such a struggle force and the threat of 
force do not change men's minds or win their loyalties ; 
and 

Whereas the real methods of Communist aggression 
are incessant and skillful propaganda designed to prepare 
the way for political Infiltration, for sabotage, and for 
the consolidation of power by suppression and terror ; and 

Whereas these tactics have poisoned and continue to 
poison the minds of hundreds of millions throughout the 
world; and 

Whereas we have learned that such Communist meth- 
ods cannot be beaten back by arms and dollars alone but 
require world-wide offensive in behalf of the ideas which 
express our democratic principles and aspirations : There- 
fore be it 

Resolved, That the United States should initiate and 
vigorously prosecute a greatly expanded program of in- 
formation and education among all the peoples of the 
world to the full extent that they can be reached — with a 
view to closing the mental gulf that separates the United 



States from other peoples and that now blockades the 
universal hope for freedom and peace ; be it further 

Resolved, That it is the sense of the Senate that any 
such program should encompass, among other things — 

(1) maintenance, through the United Nations and 
through our own diplomacy, of a steady and steadily in- 
creasing pressure in behalf of world-wide freedom of 
information ; 

(2) acceleration of the work of the United Nations 
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization to the 
point where, with effective leadership, it has a chance to 
make a significant, perhaps decisive, contribution to 
peace ; 

(3) development of the activities of the Offices of 
International Information and Educational Exchange in 
the Department of State, in the following ways among 
many others — 

(a) preparation and execution of a comprehensive 
world-wide program to exhibit documentary and educa- 
tional motion pictures designed to explain the democratic 
principles and ideals which underlie our foreign policy ; 

(b) significant and immediate expansion of our 
program for bringing foreign students to the United 
States ; 

(c) creation of a world broadcasting network 
capable of broadcasting on long wave, short wave, or 
medium wave, with an ultimate goal of reaching virtually 
every radio set in the world ; 

(d) use of any and all possible means to reach 
people who are shut off from the free world by censorship 
and suppression ; 

(4) promotion of democratic education abroad, not- 
ably in the occupied areas of Germany and Japan ; 

(5) convening of a conference of non-Communist na- 
tions now conducting international information programs, 
with a view to reaching a better understanding on com- 
mon themes and on greatly increasing the effectiveness of 
the projection of such themes ; 

(6) encouragement of the establishment of a nongov- 
ernmental agency to help inspire and guide the efforts of 
the millions of private American citizens who might use 
their talents and resources and contacts overseas in fur- 
therance of the programs and objectives of this resolution, 
and be it further 

Resolved, That it is the sense of the Senate that the in- 
ternational propagation of the democratic creed be made 
an instrument of supreme national policy — by the develop- 
ment of a Marshall plan in the field of ideas. 



102 



Department of State Bulletin 



Forging a Free World With a Truth Campaign 



hy Edward W. Barrett 

Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs ' 



Since the early 1940's, it has been apparent to the 
American people that a new era had arrived in 
world affairs — the era of the interdependence of 
nations, making international cooperation an im- 
perative. 

In order to defeat the Axis Powers in World 
War II, we discovered that we had to pool our 
physical and moral resources with those of our 
Allies and organize a high command to direct our 
collective effort. And by reaching the minds of 
the enemy peoples, we weakened their resolution 
and brought peace nearer. 

Along with other free nations, we realized while 
the fighting was still going on that voluntary 
collaboration would also be required to deal with 
the problems of the postwar world. We agreed 
that intensive information activities would be 
needed to mobilize the support of the peoples of 
the world in a determined effort to rebuild shat- 
tered economies, to extend human freedoms, and 
to avert a recurrence of war. We joined in the 
establishment of the United Nations, only to see 
the United Nations — despite its great accomplish- 
ments — deprived of the power to safeguard world 
peace by tlie peculiar tactics of the Soviet Union. 
We found that the struggle between tyranny and 
freedom was still going on. The only difference 
was that the enemies of freedom were using not 
guns but threats of war, political and economic 
pressures on weaker countries, and the subversive 
activities of fifth columnists in every land, in- 
cluding our own. 

I doubt very much whether the United States 
has ever faced a more difficult and perilous world 
situation than now, even allowing for the events 
in recent weeks which have signalized a forward 
leap in the collective strength of the free nations 
at the expense of Soviet imperialist ambitions. 



' An address made at Bard College, Annandale-on-Hud- 
son, N.y., on June 17 and released to the press on the same 
date. 



The world situation is still precarious. This is no 
time to be baselessly undermining public confi- 
dence in those to whom the all-important conduct 
of our foreign policy is entrusted. 

But, unfortunately, we still have with us those 
who are perfectly willing to undermine confidence 
in the United States at home and abroad for cheap 
political reasons, who do not hesitate to make loose 
charges first and search for evidence later, who 
resort to reckless smear tactics. However, it is 
heartening to know that at Washington there are 
many, many more men of both parties who have 
submerged political rivalries in the field of foreign 
affairs — men, for example, like Herbert Lehman 
and John Foster Dulles, to cite but two from this 
State. Such men are working devotedly, and 
without headlines, to strengthen their Govern- 
ment in the international field, to help their Gov- 
ernment in the difficult job of eliminating any 
possible security risks, and to help devise ever 
stronger international policies for their Govern- 
ment. We should bow to such fine decent public 
servants who realize there is a limit to politics. 
It is because of them that the damage done by 
selfish irresponsibles is now being repaired. The 
passage by the Congress of the full foreign aid 
bill while Secretary Acheson was in Europe, for 
the recent London meetings, gave an impressive 
demonstration that a unified Am'^rica is still back- 
ing up a consistent line of policy. The strong pleas 
by leaders of both of our major political parties 
for increased two-party collaboration in the mak- 
ing and the carrying out of our policy has also 
had a salutary effect at home and abroad. The 
signs point clearly now to a renewed, indeed inten- 
sified, bipartisan policy, enabling us to cooperate 
with our friends abroad to even better effect. 

Building a Community of Free Nations 

Certainly there is no mistaking either the need 
for the closer association of the Atlantic pact na- 



Jo/y J 7, J 950 



103 



tions or the real progress that is being made in 
that direction. The agreements reached by the 
North Atlantic Treaty Council at London show 
that the powerful democracies of this Atlantic area 
are forging a true community of free nations. 
Through the increasing coordination of their mili- 
tary, moral, economic, and political strength, they 
are reducing the likelihood of war and bringing 
nearer the day when at least the majority of the 
world's peoples can realize the goals of the United 
Nations Charter. 

So far as it is within our power to prevent them, 
there are two things that we must not allow to 
occur — that is, for the industrial complex of West- 
ern Europe to fall into the grip of the Soviet Union 
or for any more of the potentially great nations of 
Asia and the Far East to suffer that fate. If either 
happened, our hopes for a free world society would 
be set back. If both happened, so far as we were 
concerned, the ballgame would be oyer. 

Those two eventualities are precisely what the 
Soviet Union is aiming for, and precisely what we 
and our friends are determined shall not take 
place. 

There is no need for me to review now the vig- 
orous actions which we are taking in concert with 
the nations of Western Europe to shatter the So- 
viet ambitions. AVe believe we can make Soviet 
aggression too hazardous to be risked. We seek 
to render Soviet subversion ineffective by building 
up economic, social, and political stability. 

In the Far East and Asia, as you know, we have 
respected and supported movements toward na- 
tional independence. We encourage emerging new 
nations to prove to themselves that only democ- 
racy — in the words of Nehru — can "deliver the 
goods, materially and spiritually," and by direct 
aid, support their efforts toward advancement. 
Now that Cliina has fallen under the control of 
Moscow, an already delicate political situation has 
worsened. We must act wisely and firmly in help- 
ing to prevent the further spread of communism 
among the Asian millions. As a newcomer in gov- 
ernment, I feel we are doing so. 

In Europe, in Asia, and the Far East, in other 
world areas, we must continue to act positively 
wherever freedom is in danger for our own free- 
dom is at stake. 

Truth as a Tool f r Freedom 

I am especially concerned with the positive ac- 
tion of supplying truth and promoting mutual un- 
derstanding. My job, in the State Department, 
is to see that we do not neglect the vitally impor- 
tant factor of world public opinion in our interna- 
tional relations. The description of 1;he so-called 
"cold war" as a contest to win the minds of men 
has been worked to death, but it remains a decisive 
guidepost for shaping our policies and actions. 

In his recent address to the American Society of 
] .ewspaper Editors, President Truman cut to the 
] eart of the matter. He said: 



The cause of freedom is being challenged throughout the 
world today by the forces of imperialist communism. . . . 
Deceit, distortion, and lies are systematically used by them 
as a matter of deliberate policy. . . . 

We cannot run the risk that nations may be lost to the 
cause of freedom because their people do not know the 
facts. 

It is hard for me to conceive that anyone in this 
day could question the need for us to reach into 
every nation in the world with a barrage of truth- 
ful information about the kind of people we are, 
how we really live, and what our intentions are 
toward other peoples. It is surely self-evident 
tliat we must make the citizens of other free na- 
tions understand that we have a real community of 
interests and that we must pull together if we 
are to have a world in which a decent kind of life 
is possible. 

It may sound dry as dust to us, but the clear 
explanation of United States foreign policy and 
the views of our leading statesmen and of the 
American people on the world situation are of the 
liveliest interest to people abroad. The more we 
reach people abroad with that kind of factual in- 
formation, the better our prospects of pulling to- 
gether in the common cause of freedorn. We are 
building mutual trust and understanding on the 
only basis on which they can be built — that of 
knowledge of the facts as they exist. Any man 
who really knows what is going on is a long way 
toward knowing what to do about it. 

The power of the simple, unadulterated truth is 
precisely our answer to the distortions of Com- 
mimist propaganda, and I, for one, am confident 
that if we hit with the truth hard enough, long 
enough, and on a sufficient scale — and that means 
no less than a world-wide scale — we can make the 
Communist propaganda start backfiring not only 
outside the Iron Curtain but inside it as well. I 
do not want to make it sound easy ; it is not. It is 
a terrific and arduous job, but it is one that we 
must get done — through both public and private 
cliannels. 

I believe that we must intensify greatly our ef- 
forts along these lines. In the Department of 
State, we are now completing a thorough study 
and analysis of the complete range of our infor- 
mational, educational, and cultural exchange pro- 
grams to appraise the results we are getting and 
to discover ways of getting better results. We 
are very eager to measure up to what the Presi- 
dent recently described as the need for a great 
new "campaign of truth." 

Meanwhile, we have encouraging evidence that 
we are accomj^lishing something very wortliwhile 
in what we are now doing through the world-wide 
broadcasts of the Voice of America, the daily 
Morse code transmission of official texts and in- 
formation to missions abroad for public release, 
tlie showing of documentary films and photo- 
graphic displays, the services of libraries and in- 
formation centers open to the general public, the 
legwork of public affairs and information and 



104 



Department of State BuUefin 



cultural officers of the Foreign Service, and our 
practice of bringing students, teachers, laborers, 
and jirofessional people to the United States so 
and they can go back home with first-hand infor- 
mation about American democracy. 

Very briefly, I would like to give 3'ou a few 
highlights which will suggest the promise this 
type of activity offers. 

The radio Voice of America is now operating on 
a 24-hour schedule, with a total of 70 daily pro- 
gi-ams in 24 languages. About 30,000 words are 
beamed out daily in news reports, commentaries 
and news analyses, and features on American life. 
It is impossible to be accurate about how many 
people we are reaching with this international 
radio network, but we estimate our potential listen- 
ing audience at 300 million people. We do have 
one solid basis of measurement — letters from 
listeners. In 1949, excluding the Iron Curtain 
countries, the Voice received from abroad around 
10,000 letters a month. The number has now in- 
creased to a monthly rate of 25,00. I think that is 
impressive evidence of the impact which the Voice 
is making. 

A German recently wrote the Voice in colorful 
English as follows: 

Having just returned from Russian captivity, I wish 
to inform you tliat I have experienced in Russia that your 
transmissions in Russian language are paid attention to 
and that the Russians lUje very much to listen in for them. 

Even the officials of the Slinistry of National Security 
occupied in our camps sent off the prisoners of war whom 
they were trying at 9 o'cloclv in order to hear the Voice of 
America. Next day the party men of course assured one 
another that it was a big twaddle what they had told on 
the Voice of America — but they heard it every one ! 

From many sources, we are able to piece together 
bits of information which add up to this: That 
we are still reaching a hard core — a substantial 
core — of listeners in the Soviet Union. There are 
many Russian citizens whose experience in slave 
labor camps and the like have left them with little 
fondness for the Communist dictatorship. We 
are reaching them with the truth about what is 
going on in the outside world, and I think it is 
most unlikely that what they are learning stops 
with them. They are surely passing it on through 
the grapevine to be found in any land smothered 
by oppression and denied access to news of the 
outside world. There is always a great hunger 
for news where it has been arbitrarily cut off. This 
is our opportunity to keep alive, even in Russia, 
the possibility of ultimate cooperation between 
our people and a free Russian people. Meanwhile, 
the more we reach the Russian people with honest 
news, the more we force the Russian dictators to 
beware of an explosion within if they step too far 
in their adventures abroad. 

Soviet Reaction 

Probably the best measure of the impact of the 
Voice is the case of jitters it seems to have instilled 



in the men in the Kremlin. As you know, the 
wholesale Russian jamming operation which began 
April 24, 1949, is still going on 24 hours a day. In 
devoting several hundred Soviet transmitters to 
this jamming operation, the Soviet Government 
is spending more money to keep our broadcasts 
out than we are spending on our entire world-wide 
Voice operations. You know, too, that we have 
long had engineers devising methods of breaking 
through the jamming. That costs money, and the 
Congress voted it — 11.5 million dollars. We are 
now getting through the jamming on a scale which 
is still less than can satisfy us but is enough to 
keep the Soviet rulers acutely uncomfortable. We 
mean to make them more so. I can now announce 
that, as a result of recent frantic Russian attempts 
to shut us out of Czechoslovakia, we are today 
doubling our Voice of America output in the Czech 
and Slovak languages. We shall not let them shut 
out the truth as long as we can help it. The more 
we can keep the Russian bear busy scratching his 
own fleas, the less likely he is to molest the rest of 
the world. 

The jamming of the Voice is by no means the 
only evidence of the fear of all the Iron Curtain 
governments of having their peoples reached by 
truthful information. Hungary, Bulgaria, Czech- 
oslovakia, and Communist China have adopted 
oppressive tactics to prevent people from listening 
to our broadcasts, such as heavy fines, imprison- 
ment, and confiscation of the radios of those caught 
listening. For an extreme example, on April 22, 
1950, a Hungarian court at Gyor sentenced Agos- 
ton Rohring, Jr., t6 death on charges of hiding 
arms and of listening — in the words of the court 
"to the United States imperialistic radio which 
incites to war." Nevertheless, a Hungarian-born 
United States citizen, who returned March 27 
from a visit in Hungary, said he did not speak with 
anyone who did not eagerly await the daily VOA 
broadcast, despite the severe punislunent they 
would face if detected. 

We are now witnessing a systematic campaign 
to black-out our information activities entirely in 
the Iron Curtain countries. Most of our informa- 
tion centers have been shut down in the Iron Cur- 
tain countries or so cramped by Governmental 
edicts as to render them practically useless. The 
Iron Curtain is seeking daily to increase the isola- 
tion of the peoples within from any and all healthy 
contacts with the outer world. This development 
points all the more emphatically to the importance 
of the Voice broadcasts and the value of increasing 
its power. Foy Kohler, who returned last year 
from long duty in Moscow to head up the Voice, 
said recently that he would like to see an expanded 
Voice of America which could reach loud and clear 
throughout the world in all languages. I go along 
with him in that, and I agree that it would be 
worth to us every cent it would cost. That cost, 
incidentallj^, would amount annually to about the 
cost of 6 minutes of the kind of shooting war which 
we financed in World War II. 



July 17, 7950 



105 



other Measures of Strength 

I would like to highlight another way in which 
we are cultivating understanding between our- 
selves and other peoples and correcting miscon- 
ceptions about the American people and our way 
of life which are circulated abroad. I refer to our 
educational exchange and exchange of persons pro- 
grams, under which we bring to this country a 
great number of foreign teachers, officials, editors, 
industrialists, labor leaders, students, and people 
from other walks of life. We welcome every op- 
portunity to enable these visitors to move freely 
among us, to work and study with us, to see the bad 
with the good, and then go back to their own lands 
to i-eport on what they have seen and learned. I 
would like to see this program expanded until we 
had a stream of visitors from every country in the 
world. As an illustration of the importance of 
this activity, there are now 5,000 Chinese students 
studying in American schools and universities and 
learning about us while living among us. Most of 
them will probably go back to China, where they 
can potentially serve as a potent corrective to the 
attacks now being made on us by the Communist 
regime. I ask you to ask yourselves only one 
question : What would we not give to have an equal 
number of Soviet students live among us and then 
go back to their own land to report on what they 
had seen ? 

The simple, unadulterated truth that we are 



trying to get across to the citizens of other coun- 
tries is that the United States is pursuing a gen- 
uine policy of peace. We are spending billions 
and sending thousands of our ablest people abroad 
to assist other nations in solving their difficulties, 
so that they may join their growing strength with 
ours in creating a world free of war, free of polit- 
ical oppression, and free of economic or any other 
foi'm of human slavery. As a result of what we 
and other free nations are accomplishing together, 
we are beginning to see new horizons in interna- 
tional understanding, the light of the day in which 
the peoples of the world will have what they 
want — a world in which the diversity of human 
skills and the force of human energies can be con- 
centrated on lifting standards of living, materially 
and spiritually, throughout civilization. 

I think that there is no higher purpose to which 
you could give your support. As American citi- 
zens, you have the opportunity to make your in- 
fluence felt by supporting these ultimate aims of 
American policy. We cannot remind ourselves 
too often that the Voice of America is the collec- 
tive voice of this nation. You are a part of that 
voice. 

We can eventually forge a world of decency, of 
freedom, and of peace if we push ahead, if we 
boldly use the great weapons of economics and 
truth at our command — and if we keep our heads 
and use our heads. 



Analysis of Senator McCarthy's Public Statements 



MILWAUKEE SPEECH 

The Deportment of State on June 17 made public^ the 
following analysis of some of the factual inaccuracies in 
the speech delivered hy Senator McCarthy at Milirnukee, 
Wisconsin, to the Reputjlican State Convention of 'Wiscon- 
sin on June 9, 1950. 

Several misstatements which Senator McCarthy 
made at Milwaukee, he has repeated since in his 
speech of June 15 at New London, Connecticut, to 
the convention of the National Editorial Associa- 
tion. In particular, he repeated at New London 
the first misstatement dealt with here — Senator 
McCarthy's perversion of the record of Secretary 
Acheson's position in the matter of the loan to 
Poland. The actual record of the Senate Commit- 
tee which explored this matter is set forth in this 
release. He has also since repeated his asser- 
tions — which are here once again shown false — 
about United States policy with regard to Poland 
and China and about State Department files. 

' Department of State press release 648. 
106 



1. SENATOR McCarthy said: Prom October 1945, 
to March of 1947, Acheson's law firm was retained by 
the Communist government of Poland to obtain a 90 mil- 
lion-dollar loan from the United States. The loan was 
put through and Acheson's firm received a fee of over 50 
thousand dollars, according to Acheson's sworn testimony. 
During this time, Acheson was Assistant Secretary. . . . 
He admitted in January 1949, that he was charged with 
responsibility of making that loan ! Fifty million of that 
90 million went to equip and arm the Communist army 
and the dreaded . . . Communist secret police ... It 
was Mr. Acheson who placed the guns, the whips, the black- 
snakes, and the clubs in the hands of those Communists, 
[and] . . . who furnished them with bullets to keep a 
Christian population under Soviet discipline . . . 

The Facts : This charge, with its innuendoes, is 
utterly false and based on a deliberate distortion of 
the public record. The circumstances of the loan 
to Poland were carefully scrutinized by the Senate 
Committee on Foreign Relations in January 1949, 
prior to the confirmation of Mr. Acheson's nomi- 

Deparfment of State Bulletin 



nation as Secretary of State. The Committee's 
hearings establislied that Mr. Acheson had severed 
all connections with his former law firm 5 years 
before the Polish loan wns approved by the De- 
partment of State; that he acted on the loan only 
after it had been recommended by the various divi- 
sions of the Department, including Will Clayton's 
economic divisions and the political divisions ; and 
that the Department, at that time, still had hopes 
that the Mikolajczyk government, then in power 
in Poland, might be saved from Russian domina- 
tion. 

Any person really desiring the facts would care- 
fully have examined the record of the Committee 
on Foreign Relations. The entire published record 
of this Committee's hearings dealing with this 
question is set forth below: 

The Chairman: There have been charges over the radio 
that there was some activity by that firm [Covington, Bur- 
lin.u', iiublee, Achesoa & Sliorb] with regard to a Polish 
loan while you were in the State Department. Can you 
tell us about that? 

Mr. Acheson: Yes, Mr. Chairman. I shall be glad to do 
that. 

The Chairman: I assume, of course, that while you 
were in the State Department you had severed your 
relationships with the firm as far as the receipt of any 
iwrtion of their revenues as compensation. 

iff. Acheson: On the 1st of February 1945 [subsequently 
corrected to February 1, 1941], when I took the oath as 
Assistant Secretary of State, I severed all connection of 
any sort with my tirm. The interest which I had in it was 
valued, computed, and paid to me by the firm, and I had 
no further connection with it until I returned to private 
practice on July 1, 1947. 

The Chairman: Was your name dropped from the firm? 

Mr. Acheson: My name was not dropped from the title 
of the firm. It was dropped from the list of partners who 
were connected with the firm. The name and style of 
the firm remained the same. 

The Chairman: Like many firms, they wanted the firm 
name to go on, as I understand. 

Mr. Acheson: That was the desire of my partners, a 
desire in which I acquiesced. 

I'he Chairman: But on the list of attorneys in the firm, 
your name was not included? 

Mr. Acheson: Certainly not. 

Senator Wiley: You had no financial interest in it? 

Mr. Acheson: No, sir. 

The Chairman: You were starting to tell us about the 
charge with respect to the Polish loan in which your 
firm, while you were in oflice, had some unusual inter- 
est. Tell us about that. 

Mr. Acheson: This matter, Mr. Chairman, was a matter 
which was begun and finished at a time when I had no 
connection with the firm whatever. In October 1945, the 
Polish Supply Mission employed the senior partner of 
that firm, Mr. Edward B. Burling, and some of his asso- 
ciates, to work with that Supply Mission in the drafting 
of contracts, papers, and so forth, having to do with a 
loan which the Supply Mission wished to make with the 
Export-Import Bank. That work continued from Octo- 



ber 1945 until March 1947. It consisted In drawing up 
in legal form various conditions which were to be imposed 
to the granting of that loan. After the loan was granted 
and approved by the Export-Import Bank, there were 
various legal documents having to do with the nature of 
the payment and repayment, in which the firm assisted. 
After the loan began to be paid out, there were contracts 
which were made between the Polish Supply Mission and 
various suppliers in the United States. The firm assisted 
in that matter. 

In March 1947, after the President of the United States 
made a strong statement of disapproval of the activities 
of the Polish Government, the firm notified the Polish 
Supply Mission that they were no longer at its service. 

It has been stated somewhat extravagantly that the 
firm received in the neighborhood of a million dollars for 
its services. Its services for the period October 1945 to 
March 1947 were paid for on the basis of the time of 
the various people engaged in it, and the total fee was 
50,175 dollars. 

The Chairman: And not a million? 

Mr. Acheson: No, sir ; it was not that. 

I think it would be appropriate at this point, in view 
of the charges that I had something to do with the grant- 
ing of this loan, which was of benefit to a firm with which 
I had been connected, to state the facts in regard to that 
matter. The Polish Supply Mission and the Polish Gov- 
ernment approached the United States in 1945 for two 
credits. One was a credit of 40 million dollars to be 
used for the purchase of coal cars. The other was a 
credit of 50 million dollars to be used for the purchase 
of surplus supplies owned by the United States and located 
in Europe. The matter of this loan was discussed in the 
State Department for sometime and was also discussed 
with the Secretary of State, who was in Europe. It was 
discussed in 1945 and 1946. 

On April 24, 1946, at a time when I was Acting Secre- 
tary of State, the various divisions of the State Depart- 
ment, including the economic ones under Mr. Clayton 
and the political ones under the political ofiicers, recom- 
mended that these credits should be granted on certain 
conditions. That recommendation was approved by me, 
and on April 24, 1946, a release was given stating what 
the conditions were and stating an exchange of notes 
between the Polish Government and the Government of 
the United States. 

Subsequently, some of the conditions imposed were, in 
the opinion of the Government of the United States, not 
fulfilled by the Government of Poland, and again, as 
Acting Secretary of State, I suspended the loan until 
those conditions were met. 

A matter which was not stated as a condition of the 
loan, but was a consideration which entered into the 
making of it, was that there should be free elections in 
Poland. Those elections were held. They were not re- 
garded by the State Department or by the President 
of the United States as free elections. The President 
made a statement on that subject, and so did I. How- 
ever, since this matter was not a condition to the loan, 
the loan was not again suspended. 

The consideration which led to the granting of 40 mil- 
lion dollars for the purchase of coal cars was the great 
necessity of supplying Polish coal to western Europe. 



iu\Y 17, 1950 



107 



That coal is now being supplied in very substantial quan- 
tities with the use of these cars. 

The Chairman: May I ask you one question : Did your 
former firm have any relation whatever to the policy 
matters that were determined or was it purely a legal 
arrangement about these contracts and drafting of the 
instruments that were necessary to bring about the loan? 

Mr. Achcson: It was purely a legal matter, Mr. Chair- 
man. The firm had nothing to do with the question of 
whether or not the loan should be granted. 

The Chairman: That is what I had in mind. 

Senator Vandenhcrg: At that point, Mr. Acheson, was 
it the policy of the Government to make the loans sub- 
ject to these suspensions and reservations that you have 
indicated? 

Mr. Acheson: That was correct. Senator Vandenberg. 

Senator Vandenberg: Would the.se be the instructions 
also to our Ambassador at Warsaw? 

Mr. Acheson: I do not think I understand that question. 

Senator Yandenl)crg: To come right down to the bare 
bones of it, why would there then be a dispute, or an 
alleged dispute, between the American Ambassador at 
Warsaw, in respect to this thing and our representatives 
in Paris? 

Mr. Acheson: There was throughout the consideration 
of this loan a difference of opinion between the American 
Ambassador in Warsaw and the officers of the State 
Department, including the Secretary and myself, who were 
charged with responsibility in it. That was a difference 
of view. It was one in which the unanimous opinion of 
the officers of the State Department was on one side and 
the Ambassador took a different view. 

It has been stated, and I have seen it in the press, that 
the Ambassador resigned on account of this loan. That is 
not the fact. The loan was made on the 24th of April 1946. 
The Ambassador resigned on the 31st of March 1947. 

Senator Vandenhcrg: Was this PolLsh Government, 
which your firm represented in this connection, what we 
would call a satellite government or was it still a govern- 
ment which pretended — at least, through the cooperation 
of Mikolajczyk — to still be, in pretense at least, a coalition 
government? 

Mr. Acheson: It was the latter, Senator Vandenberg. 
This was the Mikolajczyk government, and there was, 
during that period, a hope that it might in some respects 
be free from complete Russian domination. 

Senator Wiley: I want to make an inquiry. I under- 
stand, Mr. Acheson, that you claim that you yourself, 
personally, in no way profited from this transaction that 
your firm had ; that at the time that the firm was engaged 
by the Government of Poland you had no legal or financial 
interest in the firm ; that you had really stepped out from 
it; is that correct? 

Mr. Acheson: That is correct. Senator. 

Senator Wiley: And never since have you received any 
remuneration from this transaction? 

Mr. Acheson: That is correct, Senator. 

Senator Smith: Mr. Chairman, might I ask another 
question in that connection? 

The Chairman: Yes. 

Senator Smith: Mr. Acheson, I understood you to say 
that in February 1945, when you became Under Secretary 



of State, you severed your connection with the firm. I also 
understood you to say that prior to that time, in 1944, if I 
have the figures correct, you were Assistant Secretary of 
State in other matters in the State Department. Were 
you an active member of your law firm during that period? 

Mr. Acheson: No, Senator. You misunderstood me, I 
think. What I believe I said was that on the 1st of Febru- 
ary 1941 I entered the service of the Government. At that 
time, I severed all connection with my firm and did not 
reestablish any connection with it whatever until July 
1947, wlien I returned to private life. 

Senator Smith: Thank you. That is what I wanted to 
bring out. I was not quite clear about that. 

Senator Tydings: I think you said in your direct testi- 
mony that at one time this loan was suspended. Is that 
correct? 

Mr. Acheson: That is correct. Senator Tydings. 

Senator Tydings: At that time, was your former law 
firm still representing the Polish Government? 

Mr. Acheson: Ye.?, sir; that is correct. 

Senator Tydings: Then it seems to be an inference that 
the steps and your part in the suspension of the Polish 
loan were adverse to the interests of your law firm. Is 
that correct? 

Mr. Acheson: That is correct. Senator Tydings. 

Senator Tydings: I would like to ask you now if the 
first name in your firm does not represent the name of a 
man who is deceased, Mr. Harry Covington. 

Mr. Acheson: That is true. 

Senator Tydings: Isn't it a matter of fact that when 
a law firm is organized, in a matter of law, and any 
member dies or withdraws from the firm, that in the 
nature of the partnership the goodwill of the name itself, 
even though a member leaves the firm, the remaining 
partners can continue to keep his name as a part of the 
firm? 

Mr. Acheson: That is true. Senator Tydings. It is a 
very common practice. 

Senator Tydings: I think it is supported by numerous 
cases in the court. 

Mr. Acheson: I should believe so. 

Senator Tydings: Where a man leaves a law firm, the 
remaining partners are entitled to the goodwill created 
by the old name, and in case of death the same thing 
applies. It belongs to the partnership and not to the 
individual once the goodwill label is created. Is that 
correct? 

Mr. Acheson: I believe so. I can't answer authorita- 
tively. I have not looked it up. 

Senator Tydings: During the negotiations between the 
State Department and the Polish Government concerning 
this loan, did your law partners at any time talk to you 
about tlie loan or urge its rejection, adoption, modification, 
or alteration? 

Mr. Acheson: No, Senator. I had no conversation with 
any of them of any sort. 

Senator Tydings: Then, when you severed your con- 
nection with your law firm as you have stated, during the 
time you filled the Government position, none of your 
partners or associates in your office in any manner, shape, 
or form contacted you to assist them in work that was in 



108 



Department of State Bulletin 



the office that might also have some connection in the 
State Dopartniont ; is that correct? 

Mr. Achesoii: That is correct, Senator. 

As I can recall it, and I think my memory is clear, in 
the 6I2 years in which I was in the State Department I 
had one call from one member of that firm and that was 
to tell me that a client that he represented, who was an 
exporter of materials, would like to know whether the 
State Department would be pleased if that firm ceased 
exporting materials to Japan. I told him that the State 
Department would indeed be pleased at that action and 
that action was taken, and I believe that is the only 
conversation on any matter of business which I had with 
any one of my partners in <i\n years. 

Senator Tydings: That is all, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator Vandcnberp: Do you think there is any chance 
for public misunderstanding through the retention, let us 
say, of the name of the Secretary of State in the title of 
a law firm? 

Mr. Aclicson: I should think that there might very 
easily be, and it will be my recommendation to my part- 
ners that they would please me very much, and I think 
serve themselves, by dropping my name from the title of 
the firm. [The firm name now is Covington, Burling, 
Rublee, O'Brian and Shorb.] 

2. SENATOR MCCARTHY SAID : I pointed out to the 
Senate 4 days ago that some of those men who the FBI 
listed as Soviet agents are still working in the State 
Department shaping our foreign policy at this very 
moment. 

The Facts: Wliat Senator McCarthy actually 
had said to the Senate 4 days before was that: 

At least three of those listed as Communist agents by 
the FBI 3 years ago are still holding high positions in 
the State Department. . . . Those names I have checked 
and I know the persons are working in the State Depart- 
ment. . . . I . . . have the proof that those men are 
working in the State Department as of this very moment. 

Instead of proof, Senator McCarthy now pro- 
duces a watered-down version of his previous 
charge, which the Department also refuted in its 
statement of June 9. 

In his speech to the Senate, Senator McCarthy 
further stated that the names of the three so-called 
"agents" still in the Department were also among 
the 106 submitted by bim to the Tydings Subcom- 
mittee. In actuality, of a total of 20 persons 
hypothesized on the cliart as ''agents," there is only 
one who — after thorough reinvestigation, includ- 
ing a full P"BI investigation, and clearance uitder 
the Department's loyalty and security proce- 
dures — is still in the employ of the Department. 
That one does not hold a "high position." His 
grade is GS-9. Furthermore, that one is not on the 
list of 106 which Senator McCarthy gave the Sub- 
committee. 

3. SENATOR MCCARTHY SAID: (immediately after 
asserting that "untouchables" in the State Department 
were plotting the "Communistic enslavement of the world" 
and that the Administration was protecting "Communists 

July 17, 1950 



and traitors in Government") : As an example, I would 
like to give you the complete case proven on Dr. Philip 
Jessup, the State Department's Amhassador-at-Large. . . . 
This is the man who, under the guidance of Lattimore, 
is determining to a large extent our Far Eastern pol- 
icy. . . . The documentary evidence shows that Jessup 
belonged to five organizations which had been officially 
declared as fronts for and doing the work of the Commu- 
nist Party . . . 

The Facts : On the Senate floor on June 6, and 
under the protection of his Senatorial immunity, 
Senator McCarthy had gone even farther — he vir- 
tually said that Ambassador Jessup was a member 
of the Communist Party : 

Their [The Communist Party's] top aim was to get 
some of their members on that Executive Committee [of 
the Institute of Pacific Relations], to control that. For 
example, we find Frederick V. Field, we find Philip C. 
Jessup, and Harriet Moore, a very well-known Commu- 
nist. 

Ambassador Jessup, in his testimony before the 
Tydings Subcommittee, demonstrated the com- 
plete falsity of Senator McCarthy's allegations, 
and the Department has repeatedly set forth the 
facts — particularly in its analysis, on May 28,^ of 
Senator McCarthy's May 25 speech at Rochester, 
New York, and of the various documents which 
he presented at that time as "evidence." 

4. SENATOR MCCARTHY SAID: So far, those who 
object to our methods in this present fight have offered 
as their only alternative that we go back to the method 
used for the past 16 years during which the Communists 
have been permitted to take control of our State Depart- 
ment, infiltrate our Government, and work with the Soviet 
Union to accomplish the two major Russian aims : 

1. To create a Red China ; and 

2. To create a Red Poland. 

The Facts : The Department of State has stren- 
uously objected to the methods adopted by Sen- 
ator McCarthy. The objection stems from the 
irresponsible and destructive approach which the 
Senator has seen fit to adopt in his attacks. The 
Department has actively solicited constructive 
suggestions and criticism from the Congress, pri- 
vate organizations, and individual citizens regard- 
ing the conduct of our foreign relations, so that 
the policies of the Department may be as repre- 
sentative of the best thinking of the American 
people as possible. Senator McCarthy's repeated 
misstatements concerning the Department and its 
policies obviously do not fall into this category. 

In Poland, the Department did everything in its 
power to bring about free elections and the estab- 
lishment of an independent democratic govern- 
ment. That this effort so far has been unsuccess- 
ful is strictly attributable to the realities of the 
situation which Senator McCarthy deliberately 
ignores ; viz., the geographic proximity of Poland 
and the Soviet Union combined with the political 



' Bulletin of June 19, 1950, p. 1013. 



109 



blackjack of scores of Red divisions in and around 
Polish territory. Soviet intransigence left the 
United States Government only the alternative of 
force which even Senator McCarthy, under the 
circumstances, might hesitate to recommend. 

In China, the United States Government poured 
out billions of dollars for economic, fiscal, and 
military assistance of the anti-Communist forces. 
This effort was frustrated by the fact that there 
ultimately ceased to exist in China any political 
entity with the organic integrity and determina- 
tion to combat communism on a scale which would 
make further support practical and effective. 

5. SENATOR MCCARTHY SAID : For nearly 20 years 
we have allowed dilettante diplomats to do the "fighting" 
for us with kid gloves in perfumed drawing rooms . . . 

The Facts : The members of the United States 
Foreign Service are drawn from all States of the 
Union and from all walks of life. Angus Ward, 
Consul General in China, for almost a year im- 
prisoned with his staff of 18 by the Chinese 
Communists, saw none of Senator McCarthy's 
imaginary perfumed drawing rooms. He and 
his people suffered real hardship in real risk of 
their lives. Departmental obsei'vers were fre- 
quently under fire during the Greek civil war 
and similarly exposed in the war between the 
Israeli and the Arabs for Palestine. Consul Gen- 
eral Thomas Wasson was killed by a sniper at 
Palestine in 1948. Officers assigned to certain 
posts in Southeast Asia are required by Depart- 
mental order to carry firearms for their personal 
protection. Out of some 8,000 officers in the 
Foreign Service, about 2,000 are veterans. Sen- 
ator McCarthy is simply repeating, here, frayed 
cliches based on ignorance or malice. 

6. SENATOR MCCARTHY SAID: This letter [from 
the Secretary of State to Representative Sabath] shows 
that the Department insisted on hiring 205 individuals 
who had been declared unfit ... by the President's own 
Security and Loyalty Board ... I told him [the Presi- 
dent] I had the names of 57 individuals whose files would 
indicate that they were with Communists or loyal to the 
Party ... My continual investigation has increased that 
list to 81 ... I have given them 25 more names, totaling 
106 .. . The FBI gave the State Department a detailed 
chart . . . showing that there were a total of 124 .. . 
2 months later 106 .. . were still working in the Depart- 
ment . . . 

The Facts: At Wheeling, West Virginia, on 
February 9, 1950, Senator McCarthy asserted in a 
Lincoln Day address: 

. . . While I cannot take the time to name all the men 
in the State Department who have been named as active 
members of the Communist Party and members of a spy 
ring, I have here in my hand a list of 205 — a list of 
names that were made known to the Secretary of State 
as being members of the Communist Party and who 
nevertheless are still working and shaping policy in 
the State Department. 



The next day, he said he had the names of "57 
card-carrying members of the Communist Party" 
allegedly working in the Department. Later, he 
talked in terms of 81 security risks of various 
sorts. Then, he said he would stand or fall on his 
ability to prove that there was one "top espionage 
agent" in the State Department. Recently, he has 
directed his attention to the Civil Service clear- 
ances, 7 years ago, of two Chinese for Office of 
War Information employment. Reverting to his 
numbers game, he now injects a new "106," paired 
with another big "3." 

To date, Senator McCarthy has utterly failed 
to prove that there is a single Communist or pro- 
Communist in the State Depai-tment. 

7. SENATOR MCCARTHY SAID : He [President Tru- 
man] announced that he would make available not all 
of the files, but the loose-leaf, raped, and denuded State 
Department files in some of the cases — files which, ac- 
cording to a House Committee rejiort based on an FBI 
survey, had been extensively tampered with. 

The Facts : Here, Senator McCarthy dishes up 
once again a previous assertion already refuted 
by the Department — most recently in its May 25 
analysis^ of the Senator's May 15 speech in 
Atlantic City. 

As the Department then pointed out, these files 
are now as rigidly controlled, accurate, and com- 
plete as it is possible to make them. The files de- 
livered to the Subcommittee are complete files — 
State Department reports, FBI reports, interro- 
gations, hearings, administrative memoranda, 
even pencilled working papers — everything. On 
May 10, when the Committee started examining 
the files, Senator Tydings is quoted as having 
said : 

These 81 files contain not only all of the data which 
the State Department investigators have assembled, but 
also all of the loyalty data which the FBI has gathered 
and referred to the State Department and which has 
been made a part of these files. 

Thus the Committee will have the complete record from 
all sources . . . 

8. SENATOR MCCARTHY SAID : It is the Lattimore- 
Acheson plan for Soviet conquest of the Pacific . . . This 
is what he [Owen Lattimore] says . . . This ... by the 
architect of our State Department Far Eastern policy 
. . . Lattimore's master plan . . . bought lock, stock and 
barrel by Acheson . . . The Lattimore-Acheson axis 
served the purpose of the Kremlin . . . 

The Facts : Both the State Department and Mr. 
Lattimore himself have rejaeatedly reiterated the 
falsity of these assertions. Mr. Lattimore is not 
an employee of the State Department and is not 
the "architect" of its Far Eastern policy. Senator 
Tydings asked Secretaries Hull, Byrnes, Marshall, 
and Acheson * whether such a characterization oi 



' Bulletin of June 12, 1950, p. 968. 
* Bulletin of June 12, 1950, p. 972. 



110 



Deparfmenf of State Bulletin 



Mr. Lattimore was true or false. They all replied 
that it was false. 

9. SENATOR MCCARTHY SAID: "This is the Ache- 
sou who reinstated and put in charge of personnel in the 
Far East, John Stewart Service . . ." 

The Facts : The following letters from the then 
Secretary of State, Mr. James F. Byrnes, and for- 
mer Undersecretary Joseph C. Grew clearly set 
forth the circmnstances of Mr. Service's rein- 
statement to the Foreign Service — by Secretary 
Byrnes on the reconnnendation of the Foreign 
Service Personnel Board: 

August 14, 1945 

My deak Mr. Service : I am advised that the Grand 
Jury, after hearing the testimony of witnesses, has found 
nothing to warrant an indictment against you. 

One of the fundamentals of our democratic system is the 
investigation by a Grand Jury of criminal charges. By 
that process you liave been cleared. 

T am advised that at the time of your arrest you were 
placed on leave of absence with pay. I am happy to 
approve the recommendation of the personnel board that 
you be returned to active duty. You have now been 
reassigned to duty in the Department for important worlj 
in connection with Far Eastern Affairs. 

I cnngratulate you on tliis happy termination of your 
ordeal and predict for you a continuance of the splendid 
record I am advised you have maintained since first you 
entered the Foreign Service. 

With all good wishes, 
Sincerely yours, 

James F. Byrnes 



August 14, 1945 

Dear Service: The Secretary has just told me of the 
letter he has written you expressing his pleasure at your 
complete vindication. I just want to add a personal word 
of my own. 

When I learned, only a few days before your arrest, 
that your name had been coupled with thefts of official 
documents I was inexpressibly shoclsed. Having known 
you for some time and of the high calibre of your work 
I could not believe that you could be implicated in such 
an affair. As the Secretary has stated, you have been 
completely cleared of any such imputation by operation 
of our democratic machinery of investigation and law 
enforcement. 

I am particularly pleased that you are returning to duty 
in the field of your specialization. Far Eastern Affairs, 
where you have established an enviable record for integrity 
and ability. 

With all good wishes, 
Sincerely yours, 

Joseph C. Grew 

Mr. Service has never been in charge of per- 
sonnel in the Far East. At the end of 1948, Mr. 



Service was assigned to the Department in line 
with the established policy of rotating Foreign 
Service officers and bringing back to the United 
States those who, like Mr. Service, have spent 
considerable time in the field. For 3 months in 
1949, Mr. Service served on the Foreign Service 
Selection Board, which includes public as well as 
governmental members. The Board recommends 
promotions throughout the Foreign Service, but it 
does not deal with assignment and is not in charge 
of field personnel in the Far East or anywhere else. 
During the remainder of his Washington assign- 
ment, in 1949, Mr. Service served as a special assist- 
ant in the Division of Foreign Service Personnel 
but had nothing to do with appointments or assign- 
ments in the Foreign Service. He has never been 
in charge of the Foreign Service personnel in the 
Far East. 

10. SENATOR McCarthy said : . . . Jessup was in 
charge of the publication of a Communist-front known as 
the Institute of Pacific Relations. This publication under 
Jessup spearheaded the Communist Party line and spewed 
forth the Communist Party line perfumed sewerage . . . 
This publication was supported by Communist money. 
Along with the material being furnished you are photo- 
stats of checks totaling $6,000, all signed by the self-pro- 
claimed Communist, Frederick Vanderbilt Field. 

The Facts : Once again — as it has done follow- 
ing each of Senator McCarthy's ASNE, Chicago, 
Atlantic City,^ and Rochester ^ speeches — the De- 
partment states these facts : 

a. Senator McCarthy grossly exaggerated Dr. 
Jessup's relationship with Far Eastern Survey, 
the publication to which he refers, based on the 
single fact that, in 1944, Dr. Jessup sei'ved on the 
Research Advisory Committee of the American 
Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations. 

b. As for Senator McCarthy's charges and im- 
plications that the Institute or its publication were 
bought and paid for by "Communist money," about 
half of the Institute's budget was met by the 
Rockefeller Foundation and the Carnegie Corpo- 
ration. Mr. Field's contributions were only a drop 
in the bucket as compared witli the generous dona- 
tions of large industrial concerns. 

Senator McCarthy in previous speeches, had 
claimed to have "evidence" of contributions from 
Mr. Field totaling $6,500 in 2 years. Signifi- 
cantly, however, following the Department's ex- 
posure of the fact that one of the photostated 
checks included in that "evidence" was payable not 
to the Institute of Pacific Relations but to the 
American Council on Soviet Relations, a totally 
unrelated organization, he now reduces his figure 
to $6,000. 

" See Bulletin of June 12, 1950, p. 963, 966, 96S, for 
analysis. 

" Bulletin of June 19, 1950, p. 1012. 



My 77, 7950 



m 



Where We Stand Today 



hy Francis H. Russell 

Director, Office of Public Affairs ^ 



It is a good thing for us to give some attention 
every once in a while to that famous bit of advice 
of Daniel Webster. "When the mariner," he said, 
"has been tossed for many days in thick 
weather ... he naturally avails himself of the 
first pause in the storm to take his latitude and 
ascertain how far the elements have driven him 
from his true course. Let us," said Webster, "im- 
itate this prudence." 

The storm Webster was concerned about had 
been a storm of words. The American people to- 
day are entitled to feel that they know what Web- 
ster meant. In fact, we may wonder whether 
Webster could possibly have had any idea of what 
a storm of words can really be. In a time of the 
nation's most pressing need for unity, vision, and 
clear-headedness, the air has been filled instead 
with patently false accusations, trumped-up sus- 
picion, and artificial schisms. Our energies have 
been diverted from the dangers that are real to 
bogies that are fictitious. 

But we are beginning to emerge from this emo- 
tional and mental orgy. Although this impres- 
sion that we are on the point of enjoying a pause 
in the storm may jirove wholly illusory, it may 
be prudent to make believe there is a jaause while 
we try to "take our latitude" in the real world 
that lies about us. 

Let us first remind ourselves that in the impor- 
tant struggles of mankind victory has never come 
easily and at once. Always along the way there 
are ebbs and flows. If it were a matter of all 
victories and no setbacks, we should not have to 
spend our concern on the issue. 

I should like to examine broadly this evening 
how we stand with respect to the ebb and the flow 
in the two great tasks that today face the people 
of the world : the first, of course, being the task 
of creating a healthy world order with adequate 
political instrumentalities to make possible world 



' An nddress made at Radcliffe College, Boston, Mass., 
June 19 and released to the pre.ss on the same date. 



peace and economic and social progress; and the 
second, the task of protecting and advancing hu- 
man freedom. 

It is a ticklish business plotting broad trends 
contemporaneously but that is what anyone must 
do who wants to "take his latitude" and map his 
course. 

This plotting does not call for a discourse on 
the successes that we have achieved in our foreign 
policy during the past half decade : the setting up 
of international institutions on a democratic pat- 
tern, the United Nations with its specialized agen- 
cies, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the 
Organization of American States; the program 
for economic recovery in Europe; the plans for 
military security of the democracies, and all the 
rest. They are firmly in the record. So are the 
obstacles that have been faced : inertia, ancient 
hatreds, totalitarian measures of aggression. 
Wliat I would like to do, rather, is to examine two 
or three of the most crucial world situations and 
to point to some recent developments that bear 
on our current reckoning. 

The Far East 

The major development in the Far East has 
been, of course, the seizure of China by the Chinese 
Communists. 

There is a tendency sometimes for Americans 
to ask themselves and those who have been most 
immediately responsible for our policies in that 
area, "Wliat went wrong? Wlio was asleep at the 
switch ? "Wliat was it that should have been done 
that was not done?" China constitutes a large 
chunk of the world's surface, and the people who 
inhabit that area are a sizable portion of the 
world's population. The overrunning of that 
area by forces allied to the Kremlin is, obviously, 
an adverse factor of some magnitude in the cur- 
rent issue between totalitarianism and democracy. 

It is natural for people who have been largely 
preoccupied with domestic jjroblems, over which 



112 



Department of State Bulletin 



we liave a larpe measure of control and where, if 
something goes wrong, we can pin the responsi- 
bility, to assume the same attitude toward prob- 
lems abroad. But, obviously, there is a oasic 
difference. Since we believe in the right of each 
people to work out their own way of life, we 
realize, when we stop to think of it, that it is not 
and should not be possible for the people of one 
country to have the final deteiunination on what 
shall take place in another country. We may^ 
take a friendly interest. We may offer help. We 
may recognize the importance of what takes place 
in another country to the cause of world peace 
and freedom, but, in the final analysis, it is for 
the people of each coimtry to determine whose help 
they will accept, what use they will make of it, 
and wliat leaders they will follow. 

The Chinese people for more than a generation 
have been in a mood of revolt against the feudal 
system that had prevailed in their country since 
the dawn of history. They knew that modern 
methods of government and modern technology 
made possible a higher standard of living than 
they enjoyed. For a decade, they pinned their 
hopes for the accomplishment of their objective 
of a better life on the Kuomintang. Gradually, 
however, the idea became fixed in the minds of 
the Chinese people that the Kuomintang had 
come under the domination of a small clique of 
men who had no interest in the welfare of the 
Chinese people as a whole and that the Kuomin- 
tang was either unable or unwilling to make the 
necessary changes in Chinese life. With the 
spread of this conviction, support for the regime 
disappeared. 

Many of the soldiers in the Nationalist Army 
merely laid down their arms when they came into 
the presence of the Communist forces, because they 
felt the Government they were supposed to be 
fighting for offered no hope for them or their 
families. The Nationalist Government was driven 
farther and farther back and, finally, off the main- 
land of Asia onto Formosa. 

U.S. POLICY IN ASIA 

There were three things that the United States 
could do to stem this development. Two of them 
she did. The first was to provide substantial as- 
sistance to the Nationalist Government in the 
form of military equipment, food and other sup- 
plies, and funds. More than half of the total in- 
come of the Nationalist Government, during tlie 
4 years following the cessation of the war with 
Japan, came in tlie form of assistance from the 
United States. In all major engagements, the 
Nationalist Armies had a superiority in equip- 
ment over the Communist forces. 

The second thing that we could do, and did, was 
to send a great American of our time, one whose 
integi'ity and persuasiveness are unexcelled, 
George Marshall, in an effort to convince the 
Kuomintang of the necessity of measures on its 



part to reestablish itself with the Chinese people 
and to offer American economic aid in any such 
effort. General Marshall failed in this effort. It 
can be assumed that any other person that coidd 
have been sent would have failed too. 

The third thing that we could have done, but 
did not do, was to send American generals, Ameri- 
can aviators, American soldiers, to take part in 
the Chinese civil war. If we had sent forces on a 
sufficient scale there can be little doubt but that 
the Communist armies would have been turned 
back — but with two results : 

First, we would, thereby, have committed our 
limited resources to China, whose productive 
power and strength from the point of view of in- 
ternational strategy is very small, at the expense 
of Western Europe which is second only to the 
United States in its peacetime and wartime 
potential. 

Secondly, and even more important, if we had 
sent American armed forces to take part against 
the Chinese Communists, we would have wound 
up with the resentment of the Chinese people who 
would have considered that we had crammed down 
their throats a government in which they had lost 
all confidence and all respect. More tlaan that, 
we would have incurred the resentment of other 
hundreds of millions of people who live on the 
periphery of China. We would have "won a 
battle and lost the campaign" in the effort to forge 
ties of friendship between ourselves and the peo- 
ple of the East. We could not and we cannot 
afford to make enemies of the entire population 
of the Far East either in terms of our current ob- 
jectives or in terms of the long-range relations 
between the peoples of that area and the West. 

The determination of the Chinese people to 
abandon the Nationalist Government, and the re- 
sulting seizure of power by the Communists, is an 
adverse development which should not and cannot 
be minimized. 

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 

But I said I was going to talk in terms of recent 
developments and their significance for the imme- 
diate future. The significant change in the situa- 
tion in the Far East is this : 

Up to the present time, we have been attempting 
to deal with a situation in a country where the 
Government was losing the support of the people, 
disastrously and increasingly, day by day. For 
that reason, the aid which we gave in large 
amounts was ineffective. There was no govern- 
ment that was representative of the people with 
whom the United States could work to preserve 
and extend the freedom of the Chinese people. 
The creation of such a government was a matter 
beyond the power of the United States. 

Now, however, the situation that we face in the 
Far East, while still one of great difficulty, is one 
that has less of the characteristics of a quagmire. 



July 17, 1950 



113 



It is sometimes better to take a step or two back 
and get a firm footing. 

In the case of China, the possibilities of action 
on our pait for the immediate future are severely 
limited, but they are definable. We intend to do 
everything we can to maintain communication 
with the Chinese people ; to make it plain to them 
that we are prepared to aid them in their efforts 
to improve their lot to the extent they make pos- 
sible by renouncing the foreign domination which 
sooner or later they will know has been foisted 
upon them. 

By contrast, there are countries like Australia, 
New Zealand, the Philippines, and Japan where 
democracy is well-established and where we shall 
do everything that is necessary to prevent their 
independence and democracy from being success- 
fully attacked. 

In between are the countries like Indonesia, 
Indochina, Burma, and Korea, where independ- 
ence has only recently been won and where the 
new Governments and their people are struggling 
against fearful odds to get democratic institu- 
tions started and to improve the desperately low 
standards of living. They are faced with nearly 
overpowering problems : illiteracy, wretched 
health, an utter lack of experience in self-govern- 
ment, frequently not even adequate means of 
communication laetween the government and the 
people. These people are not interested in becom- 
ing party to the world's ideological struggle, in 
being cannon fodder in what they regard as other 
people's battles. They feel that they have prob- 
lems enough of their own. They will shy away 
from any effort to involve them. 

If, however, we can convince them that our 
objectives with respect to them are only to help 
them accomplish their own objectives of internal 
development and improvement they will welcome 
our aid, and, through it, they will be better able 
to prevent Soviet penetration or domination. 

The United States is the best able of all coun- 
tries in the world to assist these people. Our big 
job is to convince them that we desire to assist 
them without requiring them to assume commit- 
ments. 

We are, therefore, dealing with a manageable 
situation now in the Far East. We are dealing 
with a situation wliere the things that we wish 
to do can be done and not, as before, with a de- 
teriorating situation that was beyond our power 
to influence. We are dealing with a situation 
where there are long-term factors which can work 
strongly in our favor. There is not only the good 
will that will accrue to us from our past and 
present policies, but there is the ancient deep- 
seated determination of tlie Chinese people to 
throw off any outside domination. Tliere is the 
ability of the American people to cooperate with 
other peoples who are engaged in improving their 
standard of life. There is the appeal of human 
freedom, an appeal which becomes stronger the 
more it is denied. 



In the Far East, then, we are in a situation 
where one of our valued allies has temporarily 
gone under. We have witnessed an eastern "Bat- 
tle of France." But the lines in this struggle for 
peace and freedom are now drawn on more fav- 
orable territory. The struggle in this area for 
freedom and progress is by no means irretrievably 
lost. 



The European Situation 

Let us look at the situation in Europe. The 
Economic Recovery Program is well under way. 
Much of the rubble has been cleared away. The 
factories ai'e in operation. The people are being 
fed. Two problems remain of serious dimen- 
sions. 



GERMANY 

First is the problem of Germany. Germany is 
the greatest center of productive power outside the 
United States. It is a matter of first importance 
that this power not come into the hands of those 
who are directing the Soviet conspiracy against 
the freedom of tlie world. It is equally important 
tliat the German people themselves not be per- 
mitted again to become a threat against the world. 
Both of these ends can be met only by making 
Germany an integral part of a closely knit pattern 
of Western Europe. 

It has been apparent that the leadership in this 
effort would have to come from the French. For 
a few years following the war, the French gave no 
indication that they had tlie will or the capacity 
to undertake this leadersliip. Their morale had 
been sliattered by the experience of the war. The 
British, concerned with their own special eco- 
nomic problems and wanting to maintain their po- 
sition as the center of the British Commonwealth 
of nations, were unwilling to merge their political 
and economic sovereignty in sucli a pattern of 
Western Europe. Now, however, with the pro- 
posals recently made by Mr. Schuman for a 
French-German coal and steel pool, in which other 
European countries would be invited to join, the 
action that can and must be taken to solve the 
problem of Germany and of Western Europe has 
become much clearer. This reemergence of 
French statesmanship is one of the most encour- 
aging signs of the postwar period. Tlie "flow" 
here is setting in. 

PROBLEM OF SECURITY 

The second problem of Europe is security 
against the possibility of aggression by the Soviet 
Union. This security has been profoundly and 
favorably affected by tlie developments that have 
recently taken place in weapons of war. The 
countries that want peace and security today are 
more fortunate than those that wanted them when 
Hitler was on the march. The rise of Hitler coin- 



114 



Departmenf of State Bulletin 



cided with a period of superiority of weapons of 
aggression over weapons of defense. The ar- 
mored division and the bombing pUme were 
mightier tlian the means cf defense against them. 
The only elfective defense then was to construct a 
more powerful offense. 

Today, there are indications that the pendulum 
is swinging buck, that the balance will be in favor 
not of countries who are threatening to engulf 
other peoples but in favor of those who wish to 
defend themselves, their peace, and their liberties 
against aggression. This development is un- 
favorable from the point of view of the Soviet 
Union, which has made abundantly clear its pur- 
pose of extending as far and as rapidly as possible 
the number of countries satellite to it. The jet 
fighter plane, the guided missile, the improved 
bazooka, and radar are all weapons of defense, 
not weapons of aggression. They are, therefore, 
weapons that strengthen the hands of the people of 
the world who covet no additional territories, no 
domination over other peoples. They strengthen 
the non-Communist world which wishes only for 
the right of each people to work out its own way of 
life in its own way. The "flow" here in the di- 
rection of peace is strong. 

BATTLE OF IDEOLOGIES 

The third problem today relates to the struggle 
for the minds of men. It has fallen to our lot to 
be living at the point in world history when two 
great concepts of human existence are pitted in 
what may be the conflict from which one or the 
other will emerge and prevail for as long into the 
future as we can see. 

One concept is, of course, the belief that the life, 
the interests, the integrity, the growth, the hap- 
jjiness of the individual human being is the ulti- 
mate value and that human institutions exist to 
promote that value. This belief is the concept of 
life that emerges from the great religions of the 
world. It has been developed by the political 
philosophers of the Western world. It has pro- 
duced among other ways of life our American de- 
mocracy. The preamble to the Constitution of the 
Commonwealth of Massachusetts puts it like this : 

The end of government is to furni.sh all of the individuals 
who compose it with the power of enjoying the blessings 
of life. 

The other philosophy, that also has roots going 
far back into history, is premised upon the con- 
cept of the state, the corporate entity, as the ulti- 
mate value. Human beings exist only as expend- 
able items, as cogs, of no value in themselves other 
than as they contribute to this artificial entity. 
This philosophy asserts that all human thought, 
all human activity must be dominated by the state 
and devoted to the ends of the state. This con- 
cept, the intellectual product of Hegel, Fichte, 
Feuerbach, and Kant, produced as one of its off- 
shoots nazism; as another, Soviet communism. 



The results of its application are found in the 
present-day police state, slave labor, the drive for 
world domination, the effort to create artificial eco- 
nomic chaos and want, the efforts to render inter- 
national institutions ineffective, in the drive to 
intensify international insecurity and tension, and 
in the all-out assault upon human freedom. 

The Soviet leaders have several kinds of head- 
start in the race for the minds of the people of the 
world. They have been carrying on an energetic 
propaganda campaign for several score of years. 
Their philosophies are rigid and uniform so that 
they lend themselves to packaged thinking and 
packaged explanation. It is easier to tear down 
and to destroy than it is to build. It is easier to 
create doubt and suspicion than it is to create con- 
fidence. It is easier to set forth a rigid monolithic 
theory than something whose virtues flow from 
diversification and flexibility. 

But here, too, there has been a "flow." There 
has been growing discrimination by the great ma- 
jority of people in appraising various proposals 
for an easy out from their problems. There has 
also been a growing awareness of the spurious na- 
ture of many proposals to which the attractive 
word "peace" has been affixed. 

For example, the Communists have recently 
been active in Europe in obtaining signatures to 
what they call "an appeal." This appeal reads as 
follows : 

We demand the absolute banning of the atom weapon, 
arm of terror and mass extermination of populations. 

We demand the establishment of strict international 
control to insure the implementation of this banning 
measure. 

We consider that any government which would be lirst 
to use the atom weapon against any country whatsoever 
would be committing a crime against humanity and 
should be dealt with as a war criminal. 

We call on all men of good will throughout the world 
to sign this appeal. 

The Communists are now making plans to cir- 
culate this appeal in this country in a campaign 
beginning in the next 2 or 3 weeks and extending 
through next October. 

What is the background of this "appeal?" 

True Nature of the Soviet "Appeal" 

The United Nations has been tackling the prob- 
lem of how to achieve security against the de- 
structiveness of the atom bomb for the past 4 years. 
All of the member nations outside of the Soviet 
Union with its satellites are agreed on the essen- 
tials for effective control. The basic factors of the 
situation have led to these essentials with the in- 
evitability of the multiplication table. Because 
the stuff that is used for atomic power to run fac- 
tories can in a matter of hours be put into a piece 
of machinery that converts it into an atom bomb, 
it is necessary to have some international agency, 
in which all nations will have confidence, in con- 
trol of atomic materials from the time the minerals 
are first extracted from the earth until the last 



July 17, 7950 



115 



ounce of energy has been expended. Mere prom- 
ises will not suffice. We have found that Soviet 
promises are often broken. We must assume that 
they would be broken in the future. Production 
and control by an international agency is the only 
guaranty of security. All the members of the 
United Nations except the Soviet Union and its 
satellites have indicated their willingness to take 
this course. 

Why has the Soviet Union I'efused? Because 
the operations of an international agency would, 
to some degree, breach the Iron Curtain that the 
Soviet Union has erected around the area of the 
earth that it controls. Faced as it was by the ne- 
cessity of a choice between cooperating in a pro- 
gram of secui-ity against the atom bomb and main- 
taining the Iron Curtain, the Soviet Union chose 
the latter. To put a better front on this position, 
however, it has come up with some alternatives — 
alternatives whicli place a premium upon bad faith 
and evasion. The Soviet Union proposals are: 
First, that all countries agree not to make any 
atomic bombs and, second, that all countries agree 
not to be first to use the atom bomb. 

The first of these proposals means that coun- 
tries with democratic institutions whose budgets 
and policies are necessarily matters of public 
knowledge would be at the mercy of countries 
which operate behind an iron curtain and whose 
every activity is a state secret. 

The second agreement would mean that during 
the period when the Soviet Union was supreme in 
mass armies, which it refuses to reduce, and com- 
paratively weak in its development of atomic 
weapons, it would be asking the rest of the world 
to discard atomic weapons and leave itself at the 
mercy of the Soviet armies. The "appeal" which 
the Communists are circulating is an appeal to 
provide these strategic advantages for the Soviet 
Union. 

It is necessary in the present world for people 
to read the fine print in resolutions that are pre- 
sented to them; even more, to read between the 
lines of the fuie print. 

In spite of propaganda barrages, however, 
democracy and freedom still remain for the great 
majority of the people of the world the most at- 
tractive way of life. This fact is shown by the 
votes in the United Nations. It is shown by the 
vast dissatisfactions among many of the people 
living in police states behind the Iron Curtain. 

Moreover, believers in democracy are once again 
becoming articulate. We are beginning to reex- 
amine and define the things by which we live. 
There has been an encouraging increase in articles 
and books on the philosophical foundations of 
democracy. We are once again taking on the job 
of becoming political philosophers and are meet- 
ing the adversary in that field. 

These, I believe, are some of the developments 
in the world's situation during the last few weeks 
and months that future historians may point to as 
milestones at the midpoint of the twentieth cen- 



tury having significant bearing on the effort to 
build a world marked by confidence and coopera- 
tive effort. 

They are not guaranties of success. No genera- 
tion can pass on to its successors the boon for 
human freedom fully forged and forever guaran- 
teed. The most each age can do is to bequeath to 
the next a living freedom, to be extended, strength- 
ened, and, if necessary, defended. The most that 
any generation can ask is to have a freedom to 
defend. 

There are, as we have seen, those who get greater 
zest out of throwing stones at those who are in 
the front line than in joining in the effort. But 
that has always been. 

I said when I began that there were two issues 
in the world. One was creating the structure of 
peace and the other protecting our freedoms. In 
fact, however, they are one and the same. The 
struggle for freedom today is the struggle for 
peace. Those who menace our peace would de- 
stroy our freedom. It is because freedom is being 
challenged all over the world that we have become 
universally preoccupied with the defense of peace. 
It is because freedom is won or lost in so many 
different ways and in such varying degr-ees that 
these efforts reach into every kind of activity and 
every area of life, compelling us to work on a 
universal front. 

Present U.S. Strategy 

It is for this reason that the broad strategy 
which we must follow is the strategy of doing 
what has to be done. It used to be a tenet of 
nineteenth century international political philos- 
ophy that the people of the United States should 
concern themselves only with the things that they 
are able effectively to control. That was true in 
the nineteenth century world. It is not true in 
the world of today. The people of Arizona, can- 
not make their will absolutely effective in Massa- 
chusetts, but they have a right, indeed a duty, to 
take a position on matters in Massachusetts that 
affect the national interest. Similarly, the world 
today is one, and we cannot make it otherwise. 

The history of the last 3 years in Greece is a 
case in point. There were those who said that 
we should not give assistance to the Greek Gov- 
ernment in its effort to preserve the freedom of 
that country from outside aggressions, because 
we were not in a position to exercise absolute au- 
thority in that sector of the world, because we 
could not guarantee the outcome. However, be- 
cause the Greeks were threatened with engulf- 
ment, and because the free world could not afford 
to see one country after another succumb, we 
provided help, and, today, Greece and Turkey, 
and the Near East to which they are the path- 
way, are still free. A world order is emerging 
in which the test of what each country is called 
upon to do is not its own ability to control the 



116 



Department of State Bulletin 



outcome, but rather what is needed as a part of 
the whole. 

This new world order will not, we may be sure, 
be patterned exactly on anythinj^ that has gone 
before. Like all living, strong political organ- 
isms, it must be fashioned according to the par- 
ticular facts and needs with which it must deal. 
It will be a complex of United Nations organs 
and agencies, coal and steel and atomic energy au- 
thorities, North Atlantic and inter- American, and 
other regional oi-ganizations, all designed for the 
job at hand. 

Here again, it seems clear, events are in our 
direction. These organizations are democratic in 
their structure and operation. They are based 
upon the principles of free discussion, free voting 
by the membei-s, the prevailing of the will of the 
majority with safeguards of the rights of the 
minority. These are our kind of outfit. Col- 
lectively, they can carry us far down the road to 
a healthy world. 

We cannot afford to be either optimists or pessi- 
mists in this great struggle of our time. The out- 
come is not predetermined. It is largely in our 
hands, because the leadership of the free world 
has fallen to us. What we say, what we do, what 
we tear down, what we support, all bear on the 
extent of each ebb and the strength of each flow 
and will determine the final direction of the tide. 



U.S. Replies to Rumanian Protest 
Against Restrictive Travel Order 

[Released to the press July 6] 

The United States Oovernment has replied to the Ru- 
manian Goi-erninent's protest of June 19, 1950, regard- 
ing the institution of restrictions on travel by personnel 
of the Rumanian Legation at Washington} The text of 
the United States note, delivered to the Rumanian Le- 
gation on July 3, 1960, follows. 

The Secretary of State presents his compli- 
ments to the Honorable the Minister of Rumania 
and, with reference to his note No. 2421 of June 
19, 1960, has the honor to respond to the Ku- 
manian Government's protest against regulations 
which the United States Government has insti- 
tuted in respect of travel by personnel of the Ru- 
manian Legation at Washington. 

It is of interest to note the Rumanian Govern- 
ment's explicit acknowledgment that the imposi- 
tion of travel restrictions by a receiving govern- 
ment upon the oflBcial pereonnel of a sending 
government constitutes a limitation of the normal 
activity of a diplomatic Mission. With this view, 
the United States Govermnent readily agrees. 

Restrictions of movement, like restrictions 
upon the free flow of information and cultural 
exchange as imposed by the Rumanian Govern- 

" Bulletin of June 5, 1950, p. 921 ; July 3, 1950, p. 30. 
July 17, 1950 



ment, are basically distasteful to the American 
people and its Government. Travel regulations 
applicable to personnel of the Rumanian Lega- 
tion at Washington have been instituted merely as 
a reciprocal limitation of dipkunatic privilege in 
view of the nature and effect of travel restrictions 
as applied by Rumanian authorities to membei-s 
of the American Legation at Bucharest. 

On the one hand, the Rumanian Government 
complains that restrictions on the travel of its Le- 
gation jDersonnel tend to prevent its diplomatic 
Mission from carrying on its normal activity. 
On the other hand, the Govermnent of Rumania 
alleges that its own travel restrictions are applied 
without discrimination to all diplomatic Missions 
in Rumania. The inescapable deduction from 
this argument, if taken at face value, would be 
that the Rumanian Government is applying 
measures which tend to prevent the performance 
of normal activities by all diplomatic Missions in 
Rumania. 

Without debating the artificial contention of 
the Rumanian Government that its travel restric- 
tions are nondiscriminatory, it may be said that 
the United States Government rejects the thesis 
that, no matter how obstructive and abnormal the 
behavior of a particular state toward American 
interests and official American representatives, the 
conduct of United States relations with that state 
must correspond uniformly with the conduct of 
United States relations with other states. 

At such time as the Rumanian Government may 
be disposed to remove the restrictions which it 
has placed upon the travel within Rumania of 
American Legation personnel, especiallv in per- 
formance of tTie normal functions of a diplomatic 
Mission, the United States Government will be 
prepared to alter accordingly the restrictions 
which presently apply to travel by personnel of 
the Rumanian Legation within the United States. 
Meanwhile, as the Rumanian Government has 
been informed, the travel procedure will be ad- 
ministered with a view to the current treatment 
in this regard by Rumanian authorities of the 
United States representatives in Rumania. 



U.S. Survey Mission To Study 
Philippine Economic Situation 

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT 

[Released to the press iy the White House June 29] 

The United States Government, at the request 
of President Elpidio Quirino, is sending an Amer- 
ican Economic Survey Mission to Manila to study 
and report on the jDresent pressing economic prob- 
lems of the Philippines. When President Quirino 
was in Washington last February he discussed 

117 



with me some of the difficulties which face his 
country. The idea of this mission has developed 
out of these discussions and subsequent ones in 
Manila between President Quirino and Ambassa- 
dor Cowen. 

The purpose of this mission will be to survey the 
entire Philippine economic situation, to make rec- 
ommendations on measures of self-help which 
might be undertaken by the Philippine Govern- 
ment itself, and to make recommendations on ways 
in which the United States might be helpful. 
President Quirino has assured me that this mission 
will receive the fullest cooperation of the 
Philippine Government. 

The Honorable Daniel W. Bell, President of the 
American Security and Trust Company of Wash- 
ington, and formerly Under Secretary of the 
Treasury, has accepted the important position of 
chief of the mission. He will be my personal rep- 
resentative, with the personal rank of Ambassador, 
and will report directly to me. The deputy chief 
of the mission will be Maj. Gen. Kichard J. Mar- 
shall, President of the Virginia Military Institute, 
who has had many years' experience in the Philip- 
pines. He will have the personal rank of Minister. 
Work is now proceeding actively on the selection 
of the other members of the mission, and I hope 
it will be prepared to start its work early in July. 

I consider this mission to be of the highest im- 
portance, not only because of the results which I 
expect it to produce but also because it is a symbol 
of the half-century of intimate relationship be- 
tween the Philippine and American peoples. It 
is my hope that the mission will further solidify 
this historic association. 



SURVEY MISSION MEMBERSHIP 

The Department of State announced on July 7 
that the Economic Survey Mission to the Philip- 
pines will arrive at Manila on July 10. 

Members and advisers of the Mission follow : 

Memiers 

Daniel W. Bell (Chief of Mission), President, American 
Security and Trust Company, Washington, D.C. 

Richard J. Marshall (Deputy Chief of Mission), Major 
General, U.S.A., Ret., Superintendent, Virginia Mili- 
tai-y Institute, Lexington, Va. 

Edward M. Bernstein (Chief Economist) (On leave of 
absence from the International Monetary Fund), 
Washington, D.C. 

August L. Strand (Agricultural Survey), President, Ore- 
gon State College, Corvallis, Oreg. 

Francis McQuillin (Industry and Power), Assistant to the 
President, West Penn Power Company, Pittsburgh, 
Pa. 

Advisers 

Alvin H. Cross (Fiscal Management), Deputy Commis- 
sionar, Accounts and Collection TJnit, Bureau of In- 
ternal Revenue, Department of the Treasury 



Michael J. Deutch (Industrial Engineering), 1737 H 
Street, NW., Washington, D.C. 

David I. Ferber (Political Adviser), Foreign Service OflS- 
cer. Department of State 

Lawrence Fleishman (Fiscal Management), Supervising 
C\istoms Agent, Department of the Treasury, Seattle, 
Wash. 

Joseph B. Friedman (Legal Affairs), 1026 Woodward 
Building, Washington, D.C. 

Wilbur A. Gallahan (Fiscal Management), Tax Adviser 
to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Depart- 
ment of the Treasury 

William T. Heffelfinger (Fiscal Management), Assistant 
to the Fiscal Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, 
Department of the Treasury 

Richard A. jMiller (Distribution and Trade), 420 East 23d 
Street, New Yorli 

Austin Nisonger (Fiscal Management), Deputy Chief, 
Accounting Division, Civil Aeronautics Administra- 
tion, Department of Commerce 

Jameson Parker (Public Relations), 2116 Bancroft Place, 
NW., Washington, D.C. 

Clarence M. Purves (Agriculture), Assistant Chief, Re- 
gional Investigations Branch, Office of Foreign Agri- 
cultural Relations, Department of Agriculture 

Louis Shere (Taxation), Professor of Economics and Di- 
rector of Tax Research, University of Indiana, Bloom- 
ington, Ind. 

William W. Tamplin (Mining), Bureau of Mines, Depart- 
ment of the Interior 

Donald Thompson (Banking), Vice President, Federal Re- 
serve Bank of Cleveland, Cleveland. Ohio 

Carlton L. Wood (Distribution and Trade), Office of In- 
ternational Trade, Department of Comniei-co 



German Export- Import Figures 
for 1947-48 Released 

The Department of State on June 22 released 
the report of an international firm of auditors 
on the audit of the Joint Export-Import Agency 
accounts for the years 1947-48. JEIA was the 
official military government agency which, during 
the period covered by these accounts, was respon- 
sible for the trade and commerce of the United 
States-United Kingdom bizonal area of Germany. 
The agency's responsibility was, subsequently, ex- 
tended to the French zone as well. 

With the formation of the German Government 
late in 1949, JEIA's responsibilities were gradu- 
ally assigned to German agencies, and the organi- 
zation was terminated on December 19, 1949. 
The organization is now in liquidation, and an 
audit for tlie period from January to September 
30, 1949, is now under way, with final audit at date 
of complete liquidation. 

Assets on December 31, 1948, consisted of bal- 
ances in foreign banks of $296,328,274 and ac- 
counts receivable at $182,312,474, for a total of 
$478,640,748. The principal liabilities were ac- 
counts payable at $82,174,711, and the capital of 
the agency was $125,355,504, consisting of equal 
United States-United Kingdom contributions in 
the manner specified in the bizonal fusion agree- 
ment of December 2, 1946. 



118 



Department of State Bulletin 



The United States in tiie United Nations 



[July 8-14] 

Secretary-General's Communique on Korea 

All United Nations members, with the excep- 
tions of Yugoslavia and Egypt, had, by July 13, 
replied to the circular telegram sent out by Secre- 
tary-General Lie inquiring about the type of as- 
sistance members might be prepared to offer in 
implementation of the Security Council resolution 
of June 27.^ Fifty-two replies from members, as 
well as two from nonmembers — Italy and the 
Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, acknowledge the 
communication and indicate moral support and, in 
some cases, offer direct military assistance or other 
material aid. Byelorussia, the U.S.S.E., Czecho- 
slovakia, Poland, and the Ukraine rejected the 
Security Council action as "illegal, as did the 
Chinese Communist regime and North Korea. 



Economic and Social Council 

During the second week of its eleventh session, 
now in progress at Geneva, the Economic and 
Social Council concluded general debate on meth- 
ods for financing economic development of under- 
developed countries, approved the report of the 
Statistical Commission, including the resolutions 
contained therein, and almost completed consider- 
ation of the report of the Transport and Com- 
munications Commission. 

The question of methods for financing economic 
development of underdeveloped countries was re- 
ferred to the Council's Economic Committee for 
more detailed study. In the course of the general 
debate, Isidor Lubin of the United States com- 
mented on the progress that had been made in 
reaching a common understanding of the basic 
elements of the problem of economic development. 
Not only was there a full realization that internal 
effort and organization on the part of the coun- 
tries themselves is required, he said, but also that 
capital from foreign sources, both private and pub- 
lic, can play a vital part in the process. One of 
the major tasks before the Council, Mr. Lubin con- 
tinued, "is to try to analyze the conditions and 
factors which may affect the pace and scope of 
economic development in the near future." 

The Council approved a number of proposals of 
the Transpor-t and Communications Commission 

" BuLLEi'iN of July 3, 1950, p. 7. 



in connection with consideration of its report. 
One of the approved resolutions recommends rati- 
fication of the convention establishing the Inter- 
governmental Maritime Consultative Organiza- 
tion, and, in this connection, Mr. Lubin announced 
that the United States Senate had ratified this 
convention. Other resolutions involved proposals 
to remove barriers to international transport of 
goods, coordination of inland transport, maritime 
shipping affecting Latin America, international 
road transi^ort, the problem of pollution of sea 
water, and implementation of the decisions of the 
Atlantic City telecommunications conference in 
1947. 

A resolution authorizing the Secretary-General, 
on the advice of the Interim Coordinating Com- 
mittee for International Commodity Arrange- 
ments, to convene a conference to consider inter- 
national commodity problems was referred, after 
India's opposition, to the Council's Economic 
Committee for further study. 

Interim Committee 

On July 13, the Interim Committee opened dis- 
cussion on disposition of the former Italian colony 
of Eritrea, with presentation of the report of the 
United Nations Commission for Eritrea by Kap- 
porteur Ziaud Din of Pakistan. The report puts 
forth three different proposals for the disposition 
of Eritrea. The first, favored by the delegations 
of Burma and the Union of South Africa, calls 
for a federation of Eritrea, as a self-governing 
unit, with Ethiopia, under the sovereignty of the 
Ethiopian Crown. The second proposal, submit- 
ted by the Norwegian delegation, suggested re- 
union of Eritrea with Ethiopia, with provision 
that the western province could provisionally and 
for a limited period of time be left under the pres- 
ent British administration. The third proposal, 
submitted by Guatemala and Pakistan, would 
place Eritrea under direct United Nations trus- 
teeship for a maximum period of 10 years, at the 
end of which it would become independent. 

In the ensuing debate the Norwegian and South 
African delegates supported, in general, the pro- 
posals of their Commission representatives, while 
the United Kingdom delegate spoke in favor of 
a partition plan. The Burmese and Pakistani 
representatives, lacking instructions, reserved 
their right to speak when the debate resumes on 
July 14. 



July 17, 1950 



119 




General Policy p^^^ 

U.N. Places Unified Command of Military 
Forces in Korea Under United States: 
Text of Security Council Resolution ... 83 

General MacArthur Designated as Com- 
manding General. Statement by the 
President 83 

The United Nations and Korea. By Philip 

C. Jessup 84 

Charging South Korea as Aggressor Reminis- 
cent of Nazi Tactics. Statement by 
Secretary Acheson 87 

U.S. Military Actions in Korea. Addresses 
by John Foster Dulles: 
New Phase of American Foreign Policy . . 88 

The Interdependence of Independence . . 91 

New Challenges to American Diplomacy. By 

George C. McGhee 96 

Where We Stand Today. By Francis H. 

Russell 112 

U.S. Replies to Rumanian Protest Against 

Restrictive Travel Order 117 

The United Nations and 
Specialized Agencies 

U.N. Places Unified Command of Military 
Forces in Korea Under United States: 
Text of Security Council Resolution ... 83 

General MacArthur Designated as Com- 
manding General. Statement by the 

President 83 

The United Nations and Korea. By Philip 

C. Jessup 84 



The United Nations and Page 

Specialized Agencies — Continued 

U.N. Commission Reestablishes Headquarters 

in Korea 92 

The United States in the United Nations . . 119 

Economic Affairs 

U.S. Survey Mission To Study Philippine 
Economic Situation: 

Statement by the President 117 

Survey Mission Membership 118 

International Information and 
Cultural Affairs 

Support for an Expanded Information and 
Education Program. Statement by Sec- 
retary Acheson 100 

Forging a Free World With a Truth Cam- 
paign. By Edward W. Barrett .... 103 



Technical Assistance 

Point Four: An Investment in Peace, 
dress by the President 



Ad- 



The Department 

Analysis of Senator McCarthy's Public State- 



ments 



93 



106 



Publications 

Foreign Relations Volumes, 1933, Released . 95 

German Export-Import Figures for 1947-48 

Released 118 



U. S, GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1980 



^Ae/ z/)eh€f/)^tmeni/ 4)^ ^aie^ 




JUSTICE BASED ON HUMAN RIGHTS: A THREAT 

TO TYRANNY • Address hy the President 123 

THE WORLD COTTON SITUATION 145 

FOURTH SESSION OF CONTRACTING PARTIES 

TO GATT • By Melvin E. Sinn 150 

ADMINISTERING THE DISPLACED PERSONS 

ACT • By Herv4 J. L'Heureux 125 



For complete contents see back cover 



Vol. XXIII, No. 577 
July 24, 1950 





M 



%e 



Qje/ia/y^me^ ^/ y^te J3llilGiin 



Vol. XXIII, No. 577 . Pubucation 3919 
July 24, 1950 



For sale by the Superintendent of Documenti 

U.S. Qovernment Printing Office 

Washington 26, D.O. 

Prick: 

62 Issues, domestic $6, foreign $8.50 

Single copy, 20 cents 

The printing of this publication has 
been approved by the Director of the 
Bureau of the Budget (February 18, 1849). 

Note: Contents of this publication are not 
copyrighted and items contained herein may 
be reprinted. Citation of the Department 
oy State BtJU-Exra as the soiu-ce will be 
appreciated. 



The Department of State BULLETIN, 
a weekly publication compiled and 
edited in the Division of Publications, 
Office of Public Affairs, provides the 
public and interested agencies of 
the Government with information on 
developments in the field of foreign 
relations and on the work of the De- 
partment of State and the Foreign 
Service. The BULLETIN includes 
press releases on foreign policy issued 
by the White House and the Depart- 
ment, and statements and addresses 
made by the President and by the 
Secretary of State and other officers 
of the Department, as well as speciai 
articles on various phases of inter- 
national affairs and the functions of 
the Department. Information is in- 
cluded concerning treaties and in- 
ternational agreements to which the 
United States is or may become a 
party and treaties of general inter- 
national interest. 

Publications of the Department, as 
well as legislative material in the field 
of international relations, are listed 
currently. 






Justice Based on Human Rights: A Threat to Tyranny 



Address by the President ^ 



To our forefathers, the courts were the distinc- 
tive symbol of the kind of government — the kind 
of society — which they were creating in the wilder- 
ness of this continent. This new nation was to be 
a democracy based on the concept of the rule of 
law. It was to be a society in which every man 
had rights — inalienable rights — rights which 
were not based on creed, or rank, or economic 
power but on equality. In such a society, the 
courts had the function not only of dealing out 
justice among citizens but of preserving justice 
between the citizens and the state. 

The founders of this country had a very clear 
conception of the corruptibility of power — of the 
innate danger in all human affaii-s of the selfish 
or arbitrary exercise of authority. To guard 
against this ever-present danger, they adopted the 
principle that there is a fundamental law — ex- 
pressed in the Constitution, and particularly in the 
Bill of Rights — to which every exercise of power 
has to conform. The purpose of this fundamental 
law is to protect the rights of the individual. To 
apply this underlying law became the special task 
of the courts. 

This concept of justice based on individual 
rights is so familiar to us that we take it for 
granted. Yet, in essence, it is a revolutionary con- 
cept. It has always been a threat to absolutism 
and tyranny. It was the great weapon in our 
own Eevolution and the basis of our Republic. 
Today, in a world where absolute power is again 
on the march, this concept of justice has tremen- 
dous strength. It is a challenge to the new forms 
of tyranny as it was to the old. 

Totalitarian Concept of Justice 

In our lifetime, we have witnessed a world- 
wide attack on this ideal of justice. Fascism, 
nazism, Soviet communism, all have tried to con- 



" Made at the laying of the cornerstone of the new 
United States Courts Building in the District of Columbia 
(111 June 27 and released to the press by the White House 
on the same date. 



vince people that our concern with individual 
human rights is false and fraudulent. 

In the areas under their control, these totali- 
tarian movements have swept away all restraints 
on their own power. They have subjected their 
own people to all the evils of tyranny — to kid- 
naping, torture, slavery, murder — without hope 
of redress or remedy. They have made a mock- 
ery of the forms of justice. Their judges are 
prosecutors; their prosecutors are hangmen; 
their defense attorneys are puppets. Their trials 
are coldly calculated displays of propaganda, 
based on torture and designed to spread 
falsehood. 

Wherever nations or peoples have been over- 
come by totalitarianism, the practice of justice 
has been snuffed out. But the ideal remains, deep 
in the hearts of men. Men will always long for 
protection against the midnight arrest, the slave 
camp, the torture chamber. Men will never ac- 
cept these things as right. Today, men feel more 
deeply than ever that all human beings have 
rights and that it is the duty of government to 
protect them. 

Today, we are participating in a great inter- 
national movement for the better protection of 
individual rights. New methods of protecting 
and advancing human rights are being proposed 
and discussed. Across the world, men of good 
will are seeking new ways of making human 
rights triumphant over tyranny. 

steps for Triumph Over Tyranny 

The first step was taken in the Charter of the 
United Nations. Weary of the crimes of the Axis 
tyrants, all the united nations pledged themselves, 
in the Charter, to promote universal respect for 
and observance of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms. The San Francisco conference ended 
with the promise that there would be, in time, 
an international bill of rights, which would be 
as much a part of international life as our own 
Bill of Rights is part of our life under the 
Constitution. 



July 24, 1950 



123 



From this point, many steps have been taken 
toward the creation of an international law and 
morality which will protect human rights against 
the misuse of arbitrary power. 

By the judgment of the Niirnberg Tribunal, 
October 1, 1946, it was established that the highest 
officials of a government are answerable before 
the bar of an international court for committing 
war crimes, crimes against peace, and — in connec- 
tion with either of these — crimes against hu- 
manity. This great principle was further con- 
firmed by a resolution of the United Nations Gen- 
eral Assembly of December 11, 1946. 

International action is also being taken against 
the crime of genocide — the slaughter of entire hu- 
man groups — whether committed in time of peace 
or in time of war. One of the most shocking 
examples of genocide was the Nazi attempt to 
exterminate an entire religious group deliberately 
and methodically. The General Assembly of the 
United Nations has denounced this terrible prac- 
tice and has affirmed that genocide is a crime 
under international law. 

To prevent and punish the crime of genocide 
in the future, a multilateral convention on the sub- 
ject was prepared and approved by the General 
Assembly of the United Nations in December of 
1948. The convention is now before the various 
members of the United Nations, as well as some 
nonmember nations, for ratification. Over half 
the ratifications necessary to bring the convention 
into force have already been deposited. 

I have asked the Senate of the United States 
to give its advice and consent to the ratification 
of that convention. I am hopeful that the Sen- 
ate will do so before this Congress adjourns. We 
must do our part to outlaw forever the mass 
murder of innocent peoples. 

Covenant of Human Rights 

Another step toward the international protec- 
tion of human rights was taken by the General 
Assembly of the United Nations in December 
1948, when it proclaimed the Universal Declara- 
tion of Human Rights. Like our own Declara- 
tion of Independence, this document asserts that 
all membei's of the human family are endowed 
with certain inalienable rights. It enumerates 
and describes these fundamental rights and 
freedoms. 

But the Declaration of Human Rights is only 
an appeal to the conscience of the world. It 
offers no means of redress when rights are vio- 
lated. To meet this need, a multilateral conven- 
tion is now in preparation. This is designed to 
make binding law out of a number of the guiding 
principles of the Declaration. It will be known 
as the Covenant on Human Rights. 

The task of obtaining general agreement on such 
a Covenant in the face of existing differences in 
legal systems and of language barriers is, of 

124 



course, an arduous one. I have faith, however, 
that the Covenant will ultimately be adopted and, 
also, that it will be followed by other agreements 
to give effect to the principles enunciated in the 
Declaration of Human Rights. 

Thus, bit by bit, new concepts of international 
law and justice are taking form. Through an in- 
ternational society of nations, the concept is de- 
veloping that the barbarous treatment of individ- 
uals by any nation is the concern of all nations. 
This growth of international law is most im- 
portant in building for peace. 

It is a mistake to underestimate the significance 
of these developments. In our divided world, it 
is easy to point to the tremendous gulf between 
the concept of individual human rights and the 
attainment of conditions which will insure their 
enjoyment. It is easy to be discouraged by the 
difficulty of creating international safeguards 
against the infringement of these rights. 

Governments Created To Serve Human Rights 

But we must remember that it is our belief that 
governments are created to serve human rights. 
We must understand clearly that our belief in 
human rights is shared today by peoples all over 
the world. We must have faith and vision 
sufficient to realize that this belief is the rock on 
which the peoples of the world can build a better 
and a peaceful future. 

In its beginnings, this world movement toward 
the protection of human rights may not appear 
particularly impressive. But the courts of the 
District of Columbia were not very impressive, 
either, when they were first set up, 150 years ago. 
They were without buildings or physical equip- 
ment and uncertain of their jurisdiction. These 
courts have grown strong, because they are based 
on a living truth. And so it will be with the quest 
for the international protection of human rights. 
It, too, will succeed, because it is based upon the 
same great concept. 

On us, as a nation, rests the responsibility of 
taking a position of leadership in the struggle for 
human rights. We cannot turn aside from the 
task if we wish to remain true to the vision of 
our forefathers and the ideals that have made our 
history what it is. 

Above the outward forms of our Government, 
above our laws and the Constitution itself, there 
is an eternal law of justice. This is the justice 
of a God who created mankind to live together in 
brotherly love. This is the justice by which all 
the deeds of men are judged. The fundamental 
purpose of our lives is to strive toward it, to the 
best of human ability. 

As a nation, we must devote ourselves to that 
struggle. In the words of the ancient Hebrew 
prophet, we should say, "Let judgment run down 
as waters, and righteousness as a mighty stream." 

In no other way can the nations of the earth 
endure. 

Department of State Bulletin 



ADMINISTERING THE DISPLACED PERSONS ACT OF 1948, AS AMENDED 



iy Herve J. VHeureux 
Chiefs Visa Division 



The Displaced Persons Act of 1948, as amended 
by Public Law 555, gives the Department of State 
and its consular officers major responsibility for 
administering four new programs : 

1. The immigration of up to 18,000 Polish vet- 
erans in Great Britain, sometimes referred to as 
Anders Army Poles ; 

2. The immigration of up to 4,000 refugees from 
China ; 

3. The immigration of Greek refugees and of 
certain nationals of Greece, entitled to preference 
status under our regular quota laws; 

4. The immigration of European refugees in 
Europe outside Germany, Austria, and Italy, some- 
times called "out-of-zone refugees." 

Together with the Displaced Persons Commis- 
sion and the Immigration and Naturalization 
Service, the Department of State and its consular 
officers, as in the past, share responsibility for 
;he immigration of all other persons who may be 
ssued immigration visas under the act, with these 
nodifications : 

1. The program for the admission of persons 
)f ethnic German origin, formerly exclusively in 
-he hands of the consuls, and of the Immigration 
,nd Naturalization Service has now been made the 
)rimary responsibility of the Displaced Persons 
I!ommission whose favorable findings are subject 
Jo review by the consuls and by the immigration 
tuthorities. Assurances of employment, housing, 
nd against becoming a public charge are now re- 
uired to be submitted, for this class of immigrants, 
o the Displaced Persons Commission, as in the 
ase of eligible persons and eligible displaced 
rphans ; 

uly 24, 1950 



2. Although under the original act the Displaced 
Persons Commission had exclusive authority to 
determine the eligibility of displaced persons 
under the act. Public Law 555 leaves the first de- 
termination of such eligibility in the hands of the 
Commission but gives the consular officer and the 
Immigration and Naturalization Service the right 
to review those cases approved by the Displaced 
Persons Commission and to take adverse action 
if they do not agree with the findings of the 
Commission. 

Briefly, the principal problems confronting the 
Department and our consular officers in adminis- 
tering those programs of the Displaced Persons 
Act for which the Department of State carries 
major responsibility, are these : 

As soon as the President signed the amendnsents 
to the Displaced Persons Act, the Department sent 
instructions to its consular officers in Germany, 
Austria, and Italy that informed them of the 
major provisions of the new act and enabled them 
to issue visas in most cases that originate with 
the Displaced Persons Commission. Also, the 
Visa Division commenced the preparation of a 
first draft of regulations which are expected to 
cover all phases of the consular responsibilities in 
relation to the Displaced Persons Act. 

The regulations, although desirable and help- 
ful in implementing the act, are actually not re- 
quired by the act except in relation to assurances 
which may be submitted in lieu of affidavits or 
other evidence of support for certain groups. 
However, it is planned to cover by regulation the 
full range of the program and to anticipate as 
many questions as may arise under the act so that 

125 



in administering the act questions of interpreta- 
tion and policy will cause a minimum of delay. 

In reference to the procedure and problems in 
relation to those parts of the displaced persons 
program for which the Department carries the 
major responsibility, certain general observations 
apply to all four groups. 

In lieu of affidavits of support or other evidence 
of support, assurances of employment, housing, 
and against becoming a public charge, may be 
submitted by a citizen or citizens of the United 
States for the Polish veterans in Great Britain, 
refugees from Cliina, the Greek refugees and 
Greek preferentials, and for the so-called Euro- 
pean "out-of-zone" refugees. 

Congress has made this provision in order that 
American organizations interested in these groups 
of refugees may assist in their resettlement. In 
these cases, either form of evidence will be ac- 
ceptable and either may be used for different indi- 
viduals. Affidavits of support in these cases may 
be submitted by aliens as well as by citizens ; only 
assurances of employment, housing, and against 
becoming a public charge must be submitted by a 
citizen or citizens of the United States. If the 
alien submits a satisfactory affidavit of support, 
which may indicate available employment, he is 
exempt from the contract labor provisions in sec- 
tion 3, Act of February 5, 1917. He is likewise 
exempt from those provisions of the Act of Feb- 
ruary 5, 1917, which bar aliens whose passage is 
paid for by corporations and others. In other 
words, an applicant is entitled to the exemptions 
specified whether he submits affidavits of support 
or an assurance as authorized in the Displaced 
Persons Act of 1948, as amended. 

Although the Department and its consular offi- 
cers will do everything possible to assist in ad- 
ministering the Displaced Persons Act, every 
effort will be made to prevent the entry into the 
United States of any alien who may be a source 
of danger to our country. The question of se- 
curity shall be paramount. Therefore, consular 
officers are being instructed to exercise particular 
care in screening applicants of the groups referred 
to inasmuch as the thorough investigation and 
written report required of eligible displaced per- 
sons and persons of German ethnic origin is not 
required for these groups. 

All groups referred to must meet certain resi- 
dence requirements in order to qualify under the 



act. A Polish veteran, for example, must have 
resided in the British Isles on June 16, the effec- 
tive date of the amended act. The question has 
been raised whether a person meeting this resi- 
dence requirement who has since moved to other 
countries, for example, to a country in the Western 
Hemisphere, without being firmly resettled there, 
could apply there for a visa. It is doubtful that 
Congress intended that he should be permitted to 
apply there for a visa. For the time being, at 
least, the issuance of visas to Polish veterans will 
be restricted to our consular offices in the British 
Isles. 

There are exceptions, of course. Eefugees from 
China, if otherwise qualified, may apply for visas 
anywhere in the world outside of the United 
States as long as they are not firmly resettled. 
The same rule applies in the case of Greek refu- 
gees, some of whom have found temporary asylum 
in neighboring countries. 

In cases in which affidavits of support have 
already been submitted for aliens in the four 
groups described, new affidavits may not have to 
be submitted, assuming the date of preparation of 
such affidavits and corroboratory evidence is rea- 
sonably current. No rule applies, except that of 
reason, regarding the length of time such affidavits 
may be regarded as having probative value. This 
value depends to a great extent upon the relations 
between the applicant and the sponsor, the surplus 
margin of income shown, and the apparent per- 
manency of the means of support of the sponsor 
as indicated in the affidavit and accompanying 
evidence. The consul, of course, has the final re- 
sponsibility to determine whether the evidence 
submitted is satisfactory. Wherever doubt exists 
in the mind of the sponsor, he should possibly sub- 
mit new evidence to the consul. 

The Department of State is preparing assurance 
forms for use by citizens and American organiza- 
tions who wish to sponsor persons within the four 
groups. The Department's regulations will set 
forth, in considerable detail, the manner in which 
these assurances are to be submitted. 

As a rule a sponsor will have to submit assur- 
ances directly to the consular office in which the 
alien plans to apply for his immigration visa. It 
is not planned to sot up a "validation procedure" 
similar to that of the Displaced Persons Commis- 
sion at Washington. However, the Department 
will exercise a general supervision over the work 
performed by consuls as it is presently doing with 



126 



Deparfmenf of State Bulletin 



reference to all consular activities. It also plans 
to require consuls to refer to the Department un- 
named assurances ; that is, assurances which do not 
identify an alien by name but only by skill, if the 
consul within a reasonable period of time is un- 
able to find an applicant meeting the requirement 
of the assurance. The Department will then refer 
these assurances to other consular offices where 
Such applicants might be registered. The Depart- 
ment will also request consuls to set up a vocational 
index for all registrants so they can handle "un- 
named assurances" as expeditiously as possible. 

Polish Veterans in Great Britain 

Eighteen thousand immigration visas may be 
issued to Polish veterans in Great Britain. The 
act requires that these persons, in order to qualify, 
must have resided in the British Isles on June 16, 
1950, and must have registered for immigration 
visas with an American consul in Great Britain 
before that date. The terms "Great Britain" 
and "British Isles," as used in the act, are con- 
sidered to be synonymous. The Department does 
not know how many persons in Great Britain may 
qualify under this provision. Requests for in- 
formation regarding specific cases should be 
addressed to the American consul with whom the 
applicant is registered, otherwise to the consul gen- 
eral at London who will, most likely, be desig- 
nated as the coordinator for the Polish program. 
Within a few weeks, consuls in England will begin 
to process cases under this program, particularly 
cases in which satisfactory affidavits of support 
have been submitted. In determining whether an 
applicant is firmly resettled in England, the con- 
sul will be guided by the expressed Congressional 
intent that registration for an immigration visa 
with an American consular officer in Great Britain 
before June 16 shall be considered indicative of the 
failure of such registrant to become either firmly 
settled or resettled, notwithstanding the provisions 
of British legislation, except in the case in which 
such person has applied for British citizenship. 

To qualify as a "Polish veteran," a person does 
not have to be a native of Poland. As a matter of 
fact, many Polish veterans were born in other 
central European countries, such as Czechoslo- 
vakia. 

Refugees From China 

Four thousand immigration visas may be issued 
to refugees from China. They must be "Iro ref u- 

Jo/y 24, J 950 



gees" who resided in China on July 1, 1948, or on 
June 16, 1950, and who are either still in China 
or have departed but have not been ijermanently 
resettled. Most of the beneficiaries of this pro- 
vision are the so-called Samar refugees, persons 
who were received for temporary refuge by the 
Goverimient of the Philippine Islands after the oc- 
cupation of parts of China by Communist forces. 
The files of these aliens are being assembled and 
forwarded to Manila, pending the opening of an 
office at Samar. Therefore, affidavits or assur- 
ances, when the assurance forms become available, 
may be sent directly to the American Legation at 
Manila. Every effort is being made to hasten the 
implementation of this program, but technical diffi- 
culties must be overcome in setting up offices at 
Samar and in providing staff and equipment. An- 
other serious question will be presented in con- 
nection with this group as far as the security check 
is concerned since, in many instances, security files 
established in various consular offices in China 
have been destroyed. 

The Department is making efforts to have the 
United States Public Health Service examine all 
applicants at Samar at the earliest possible date, 
even before a consular office is actually opened, 
thereby eliminating applicants mandatorily inad- 
missible on medical grounds. 

Greek Refugees and Greek Preferentiais 

Seven thousand five hundred visas are author- 
ized to be issued to Greek refugees and 2,500 to 
Greek preferentiais. The Greek refugees are na- 
tives of Greece, who are either victims of military 
operations in Greece by the Nazi government or 
by military operations in Greece by the Com- 
munist guerrillas. The term "native" as used in 
the Act will be interpreted to mean persons born 
on Greek soil and other persons chargeable to the 
Greek quota under the Immigration Act of 1924. 

Greek preferentiais are persons who, prior to 
June 30, 1950, were residents and nationals of 
Greece and are eligible for admission into the 
United States as first or second preference quota 
immigrants; that is, as the wife or minor child 
of an alien admitted for permanent residence, or 
as parent, or husband by marriage subsequent to 
January 1, 1948, if an American citizen; or as a 
skilled agriculturist, as provided in the 1924 act. 
The term "nationals of Greece" will be interpreted 
as including any person who is a citizen of Greece 
regardless of his place of birth or the quota to 

127 



which he is chargeable under the Immigration Act 
of 1924, 

Many more persons will undoubtedly qualify for 
admission under these provisions than the number 
of visas authorized for them. Greek refugees will 
be issued visas in the order of their registration, 
and they should be advised to register with the 
American consular offices, in the district where 
they reside, at the earliest possible date. Imme- 
diate registration is also advised for alien wives 
and minor children, of lawfully admitted perma- 
nent residents of the United States, who intend to 
apply for visas. The alien relatives in the United 
States should file with the Immigration and Nat- 
uralization Service Form 1-475 verifying their 
lawful admission, which form will then be sent 
to the appropriate American consular office. 
American citizens who desire to bring in their 
alien parents or their husbands by marriage since 
January 1, 1948, should be advised to file with the 
Immigi-ation and Naturalization Service Petition 
Form 1-133. 

European Refugees in Europe 

This class consists of aliens who, between Sep- 
tember 1, 1939, and January 1, 1949, entered an 
area or country in Europe outside Italy or the 
American, British, or French sectors or zones of 
Germany or Austria. In order to qualify under 
this class, the aliens must establish that they are 
persons of European national origin displaced 
from the country of their birth or nationality or 
of their last residence, as a result of events subse- 
quent to the outbreak of World War II ; and they 
must be unable to return to any of such countries 
because of persecution or fear of persecution on 
account of race, religion, or political opinions. 
Also, they must not have been firmly resettled in 
any other country. Between July 1, 1950, and 
June 30, 1954, 50 percent of the nonpreference por- 
tion of the immigration quotas under the 1924 
act will be made available to such aliens. Visas 
issued to them are in addition to those 341,000 
authorized under the Displaced Persons Act. 

In determining what constitutes "last residence," 
the Department plans to define in its regulations 
this term as meaning the country of the alien's 
residence in which he had the right to reside per- 
manently and the right to work. 

The issuance of quota visas under the Displaced 
Persons Act does not depend on the availability 
of quotas since future quotas are charged where 



the current quota is oversubscribed. Therefore, 
the incentive to an alien to misrepresent his place 
of birth in order to be chargeable to a more favor- 
able quota does not exist in the case of eligible 
displaced persons who may be issued visas under 
the act. Consular officers will, therefore, be in- 
structed not to insist upon presentation of birth 
certificates if they are not reasonably procurable. 
An exception applies only in cases where a consul 
knows, or has reason to believe, that an applicant 
for a visa was not born in the country he lists as 
his country of birth. In such case, the consul will 
require secondary evidence in the absence of a 
birth certificate. Also, where police certificates 
are not reasonably available, as a rule, the consul 
will accept, instead, character references and other 
evidence. 

In addition to the major groups, there is another 
gi-oup of persons benefiting under the Displaced 
Persons Act of 1948, as amended, for whose im- 
migration the Department carries the primary and 
major responsibility. This group includes alien 
children, chargeable to the German or Austrian 
quotas under the provisions of the Immigration 
Act of 1924, for whom section 12 of the Displaced 
Persons Act, as amended, contains special pro- 
vision for the issuance of visas. In order to qual- 
ify for visa issuance, these children must not have 
passed their sixteenth birthday on June 25, 1948, 
and before May 1, 1949, must have been legally 
adopted, under the laws of the country in which 
they resided, by American citizens residing abroad 
temporarily. These children are accorded what 
might be called a "super priority" in that they are 
entitled to be issued quota visas ahead of any other 
group specified in the Immigration Act of 1924 
and in preference to any alien admissible as a 
quota immigrant under the Displaced Persons Act. 
This provision is intended to facilitate the admis- 
sion of children adopted by members of the armed 
forces and other American personnel temporarily 
stationed during the war and postwar period in 
Germany. In view of the rather stringent date- 
line requirements, possibly few qualified appli- 
cants will fall in this category. 

Notwithstanding the top priority provided for 
the issuance of visas to these children, they are 
classifiable as nonpreference quota immigrants. 
Tliese children are exempt from paying visa fees 
and are also exempt from the provisions of the 
contract labor law and from those excluding pro- 
visions of the 1917 act barring the admission of 



128 



Department of State Bulletin 



aliens whose passage has been paid for by cor- 
liorations, individuals, or others. 

In regard to the four groups discussed earlier, 
that is, the refugees from China, Polish veterans 
in Great Britain, Greek refugees and Greek 
preferentials, and European refugees in Europe, 
a few general observations should be made. 

Spouses and unmarried dependent children 
under 21 years of age, including adopted children 
and stepchildren of pei-sons qualifying for visa 
issuance as membere of any of the four groups 
described, may be issued visas within the numeri- 
cal limitation provided for each group if such 
persons are otherwise admissible into the United 
States. 

The Department has been asked whether visas 
authorized to be issued to these special groups are 
exclusively reserved for them or, if not used by 
these special groups, whether they can be used by 
the general group of eligible displaced persons. 
It was not the intent of Congress to reserve, ex- 
clusively, for example, 18,000 visas for Polish 
veterans in England if there should not be so many 
qualified applicants. On the other hand, consular 
officers should be given ample time to issue visas 
to these special groups before they can reasonably 
conclude that there are not any more qualified ap- 
plicants and that, accordingly, unused numbers 
earmarked for them can be made available to 
eligible displaced persons. This whole question 
will have to be reviewed after the programs have 
been under way for some time. 

The Department expects to publish its regula- 
tions very shortly. However, in order to give full 
implementation to the act, personnel changes must 
be made; the opening of new offices will be re- 
quired; additional supplies and equipment must 
be obtained ; the proposed regulations must be ap- 
proved by the Department's legal adviser and by 
the Attorney General before they can be signed 
by the Secretary of State ; and other phases of the 
work must be coordinated with appropriate politi- 
cal officers and by those officials of the Department 
who are charged with the administration of the 
Foreign Service. 

The Visa Division is a technical unit which is 
responsible for only one phase of consular adminis- 
tration of the displaced persons program, namely, 
supervision of the execution of the law and the 
regulations. Administration and policy are 
primarily the responsibility of other units of the 
Department. 



As in the past, the Visa Division welcomes any 
suggestion from public or voluntary agencies, from 
other citizen groups interested in the administra- 
tion of the program, and from our consular per- 
sonnel. Many valuable and helpful suggestions 
have already been received. The Department of 
State is making every effort to resolve procedural 
and policy questions in a mutually satisfactory 
way and in a way that it believes to be in compli- 
ance with the intent of Congress. 



Scope of Atomic Energy 
Program Expanded 

Statement hy the President 

[Released to the press hy the White House July 7] 

I have today transmitted to the Congress a sup- 
plemental appropriation request for the Atomic 
Energy Commission for fiscal year 1951, in the 
amount of 260 million dollars, to enable the Com- 
mission to build additional and more efficient 
plants and related f acilties required in furtherance 
of my directive of January 31, 1950. That direc- 
tive called upon the Commission to continue its 
work on all forms of atomic weapons, including the 
hydrogen or fusion bomb. These additional plants, 
like the existing facilities, will provide materials 
which can be used either for weapons or for fuels 
potentially useful for power purposes. The plants 
will be of advanced design, and their operation 
will provide new knowledge that will speed the 
progress of the atomic energy program. In this 
new undertaking, the Atomic Energy Commission 
has my complete confidence, based upon the able 
and vigorous leadership which it has given to the 
atomic energy program in the past. We shall, 
moreover, continue to depend heavily upon the in- 
genuity and cooperation of American industry. 

The expansion in the scope of our atomic energy 
program gives added emphasis to the fact that 
atomic energy has great potentialities both for de- 
struction and for the benefit of mankind. From 
the very outset, we have stood, and we continue to 
stand, firm in our desire for effective international 
control of atomic energy to insure its use for peace- 
ful purposes only. This is a fundamental objec- 
tive to which this Government and the vast 
majority of the United Nations have committed 
their best efforts. Agreement on this goal would 
make the facilities of our atomic energy enterprise 
fully available for peaceful purposes. Until this 
objective is achieved, however, we must strengthen 
our own defenses by providing the necessary 
atomic energy production capacity. 



July 24, 7950 



129 



Assistance Placed at Disposal 
of Unified Command in Korea 

Statement hy Secretary Acheson 
[Released to the press July 12] 

Fifty-six out of 59 members of the United Na- 
tions have responded to the Security Council reso- 
lution of June 27 ^ which recommended that the 
members of the United Nations furnish such as- 
sistance to the Republic of Korea as may be neces- 
sary to repel the armed attack and to restore inter- 
national peace and security in the area. 

Three of these 56, the U.S.S.R., Czechoslovakia, 
and Poland, rejected the resolution. 

Of the remaining 53 states which replied, with 
possibly one exception, all have given at least 
some moral support to the resolution. 

Military assistance has been oifered by the 
United Kingdom, New Zealand, Australia, Can- 
ada, the Republic of China, and the Netherlands. 
I understand that other states are considering 
making offers. Other assistance, chiefly economic, 
has already been offered by Thailand, Norway, 
Denmark, Chile, the Philippines, and Nicaragua. 

The Security Council resolution recommencling 
a unified command under the United States was 
passed on July 7.^ The machinery has not yet been 
created to take full advantage of the vigorous sup- 
port which has been given to the United Nations 
resolutions. It is expected that this machinery 
will be set up in the very near future. In the 
meantime, however, naval and air contingents 
from Australia, New Zealand, and the United 
Kingdom are already operating under the unified 
command, and contributions from Canada and the 
Netherlands will be arriving shortly. 

Many states have indicated a desire to assist but 
do not know what types of assistance within their 
capabilities would be useful. Advantage will be 
taken of these offers as soon as channels are set up. 



Your prompt and accurate reporting of the situ- 
ation, the dispatch and efficiency with which you 
carried out the evacuation of the many American 
citizens for whom you were responsible, and the 
confidence which you have inspired in the face of 
the unpi'ovoked aggression against Korea are in 
the finest tradition of the Foreign Service. 



Korean Foreign Minister 
Expresses Gratitude for U.S. Aid 

[Released to the press July 15] 

Secretary of State Acheson has received the following 
message, dated July H, from the Foreign Minister of the 
Reinihlic of Korea, Ben C. Limb. 

In this hour of extreme trial for the Korean 
nation, I want you to know how deeply grateful 
we are for the magnificent fight America is waging 
to save Korea as well as democracy, and for your 
own great personnel service in it. Korea is very 
proud to be the front-line ally of the United States 
and the United Nations and most emphatically 
pledges all in her power to win a lasting victory 
for tlie cherished common cause. 

The Government and people of Korea feel sure, 
and I know you do, that now is the time and Korea 
is the place to demonstrate to the world once and 
for all that democracy is the only way of peaceful 
life, and that despotic Communism must be de- 
cisively defeated. The morale and stamina of our 
forces are very high. The fighting ability and 
the material power of the American and Allied 
Forces are unsurpassed. I know that our over-all 
victory is only a question of time. We are all very 
confident here. 

Korea will never forget what the government 
and people of America are doing for her; it will 
go down in Korean history for many centuries as 
a great turning point in her national life. I shall 
highly appreciate it if you will kindly convey this 
sentiment to President Truman, the Armed 
Forces, and the people of the United States. 



Ambassador Muccio Commended 
on Performance of Duty in Korea 

[Released to the press July 13] 

Secretary Acheson has sent the following message to 
John J. Muccio, United States Ambassador to the Re- 
public of Korea. 

The President has asked me to extend to you and 
to your staff his appreciation and commendation 
for your courageous and effective performance of 
duty since the onset of the present emergency in 
Korea. 



' Bulletin of July 3, 1950, p. 7. 
' Bulletin of July 17, 1950, p. 83. 



United States Policy 
in the Korean Crisis 

The Department of State released on July 20 
United States in the Korean Crisis. The Depart- 
ment in this publication presents the documents 
bearing on United States policy toward the de- 
velopments in Korea in order to place full and 
accurate information on such critical events before 
the people of the United States and the world so 
that they may reach informed judgments concern- 
ing the actions of this Government. 

Included in this account is a narrative describ- 
ing the events from June 25, 1950 (Korean time), 



130 



Department of Slate Bulletin 



when the North Korean forces launched an all-out 
offensive across the 38tli parallel against the Re- 
public of Korea to July 8 when President Truman 
complied with a Security Council resolution, re- 
questing all nations supplying forces and other 
assistance for the defense of the Republic of Korea 
to put them under a unified command headed by 
the United States, and designated General Mac- 
Arthur as commanding general of the forces 
operating in Korea. 

More than a himdred accompanying dociunents 
cover the period from June 25-July 11, 1950. 

United States Policy hi the Korean Crisis (xi, 
68 pp.). Department of State publication 3922, 
may be purchased from the Superintendent of 
Dociunents, U.S. Government Printing Office, 
Washington 25, D.C., for 25(4 a copy. 



Soviet World-Peace Appeal 
Called Propaganda Trick 

Stateme7\t hy Secretary Acheson 
[Released to the press July 12] 

I am sure that the American people will not be 
fooled by the so-called world-peace appeal or 
"Stockholm Resolution" now being circulated in 
this country for signatures. It should be recog- 
nized for what it is — a propaganda trick in the 
spurious "peace offensive of the Soviet Union. 

The resolution was adopted last March at the 
Stockholm session of the Partisans of Peace, an 
international organization established by the 
Communists, and the campaign for signatures in 
the United States is being actively promoted by 
the Communist Party. 

An analysis of the petition shows that it tries to 
do two things: (1) promote the unenforceable 
Soviet proposals concerning atomic energy, ignor- 
ing the effective control plan approved by the over- 
whelming majority of the United Nations and 
opposed only by the Soviet Union and four of its 
satellites; and (2) center attention on the use of 
atomic weapons by branding as a war criminal the 
first nation to use atomic weapons, ignoring the 
aggression in other forms presently being prac- 
ticed by the Communists. 

As for the second point, namely, that the first 
nation to use atomic weapons will liave committed 
a crime against humanity and should be branded as 
a war criminal, it is obvious that this is an utterly 
cynical begging of the question. The real crime 
against humanity is aggression and, in particular, 
the deliberate resort to armed aggression in defi- 
ance of the United Nations. The war criminals 
are the people who sanction such action. The 
weapons used are quite incidental to the crime. 
Thus, the Communists throughout the world have 



given the lie to the Stockholm proposal in their 
support of North Korean aggression. 

Just before the North Korean armed forces 
launched their unprovoked attack against the Re- 
public of Korea, more than half the population of 
North Korea was reported to have signed the peti- 
tion. This illustrates better than anything else 
the basic hypocrisy of the Communist "peace 
appeal." 



Soviet Tactics Again Stall 
Negotiations on Austrian Treaty 

Statement hy Secretary Acheson 
[Released to the press July 12] 

The deputies for the Austrian treaty negotia- 
tions met in London on July 10 for their 256th 
meeting. In obvious preparation for this meeting, 
the Soviet Government on July 8 sent to the Amer- 
ican Embassy in Moscow a second note regarding 
the Allied position in Trieste. This second note 
merely repeats the unfounded allegations in the 
Soviet note of April 20. 

This Government's I'eply of June 16 ^ adequately 
answered those allegations. There is, of course, 
no valid reason for linking the two questions, but, 
true to the Soviet propaganda pattern, the Soviet 
deputy for the Austrian treaty negotiations, at the 
July 10 meeting, instead of discussing the remain- 
ing unagreed articles of the Austrian treaty, 
utilized the meeting to read a prepared statement 
on Trieste. 

This Soviet action once again emphasizes that 
the Soviet Government does not wish to conclude 
an Austrian treaty at this time despite the pledge 
which it made in the Moscow Declaration in 1943 
to reestablish Austria as a free and independent 
nation.^ The efforts of the Western deputies to 
negotiate and conclude the treaty were unsuccess- 
ful and, in view of the impasse, the -deputies ad- 
journed, with the Western deputies a^eeing to 
meet again on September 7. The Soviet deputy 
stated that it would be necessary for him to refer 
to his Government for consideration the Western 
proposal to meet again on September 7. 

The British, French, and United States Foreign 
Ministers agreed at their meeting in London last 
May that their respective Governments are ready 
at any time to settle without delay all outstanding 
issues of the treaty provided that this will defi- 
nitely bring about agreement on the treaty as a 
whole. ^ The principles agreed upon by the three 



'For text of the U.S. note, answering the Soviet note 
of April 20, see Bulletin of June 26, 1950, p. 1054. 
' Bulletin of Nov. 6, 1943, p. 311. 
• Bulletin of June 26, 1950, p. 1054. 



July 24, 1950 



131 



Foreign Ministers were communicated to the So- 
viet Government on June 12 * in the hope that the 
Soviet Government would agree to associate itself 
with the program and that more definite progress 
in the solution of the Austrian problem might thus 
be achieved. No reply has been received from the 
Soviet Government to this approach. 

The only true basis on which Austria can exer- 
cise full sovereignty is by four-power agreement 
and the withdrawal from Austrian soil of all forces 
of occupation. It is fundamental that the Gov- 
ernment of the United States desires the achieve- 
ment of this objective. 

Soviet actions designed to prevent conclusion of 
the Austrian treaty must necessarily result in a 
delay in the fulfillment of Austria's desire, with 
which this Government is in full sympathy, to 
enjoy complete independence. Under these cir- 
stances, the three Western Governments are en- 



deavoring, within the framework of existing 
four-power agreements, to carry out such measures 
as may properly be taken to strengthen the au- 
thority of the Austrian Government and to lighten 
Austria's occupation burdens. 

It should be borne in mind, in this connection, 
that any steps heretofore taken or to be taken by 
this Government to reduce Austria's occupation 
burdens are not regarded as a substitute for the 
treaty. Our actions, in this respect, are endeavors 
on our part to take such constructive measures as 
may properly be taken, pending conclusion of the 
treaty, to fulfill our obligations under the Control 
Agreement of 1946 ^ which provides that the 
Allied Commission for Austria shall assist the 
freely elected Government of Austria to recreate 
a sound and democratic national life and to assume 
as quickly as possible full control of its own affairs 
of state. 



Soviet Delay in Repatriating German War Prisoners 

COMPLETE DISREGARD OF HUMAN RIGHTS 

[Released to the press July 141 



Following is the text of a note delivered today to the 
Soviet Foreign Office by the American Embassy at Mos- 
0010 on the subject of prisoners of war still in Soviet 
custody. 

The Ambassador of the United States of Amer- 
ica presents his compliments to the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics and on instructions for his Govern- 
ment has the honor to refer to the Soviet press 
announcement of May 5, 1950, stating that the 
repatriation of German prisoners of war from the 
Soviet Union to Germany has been completed with 
the exception of 9,717 persons convicted of grave 
war crimes, 3,815 persons whose alleged war crimes 
are in the process of investigation, and 14 persons 
detained owing to illness. 

The Government of the United States shares the 
shock and concern of the German people over this 
public announcement, and is unable to give cre- 
dence to the Soviet statement that there are only 
13,546 German prisoners of war in its custody. 
These figures are completely at variance with the 
information in the possession of the Govenunent 
of the United States, showing that large numbers 
of German prisoners of war known to have been in 

* Bulletin of July 10, 1950, p. 74. 
' Bulletin of July 28, 1946, p. 175. 



the Soviet custody have not yet been returned to 
their homes. 

The Soviet Government is again informed that, 
in accordance with the agreement reached by the 
Council of Foreign Ministers at Moscow in April 
1947 for the repatriation before December 31, 
1948, of all German prisoners of war in the custody 
of the four occupying powers, the United States, 
the United Kingdom, and France did in fact re- 
patriate all German prisoners of war in their 
custody prior to the agreed date. The United 
States, on its part, actually completed its program 
of repatriation of German prisoners of war as 
early as June 30, 1947. 

Tlie Government of the Soviet Union has repeat- 
edly failed to respond to requests for pertinent 
information of its actions under the agreement of 
April 1947. On January 24, 1949, the Soviet Min- 
ister of Foreign Affairs, in acknowledging receipt 
of one of these inquiries, admitted that an unspec- 
ified number of German prisoners of war were still 
held in Soviet custody, failing however to furnish 
any information concerning them, but stating 
unequivocally that the Soviet Government would 
complete the repatriation of German prisoners of 
war remaining in its custody during 1949. It is 
clear from the announcement of May 5, 1950, that 
the Soviet Government has failed to honor this 



132 



Department of State Bulletin 



commitment just as it lias failed to honoi" its earlier 
commitment of April 1947. In this connection, 
the Government of the United States desires to 
make it plain that the arbitrary reclassification 
by the Soviet Government of prisoners of war as 
civilians would not, of course, have the effect of 
relieving- the Soviet Government of its obligation 
to return these persons to their homes and families. 
By its delay in repatriating these German pris- 
oners of war, and by its repeated refusal to furnish 
information concerning them, the Soviet Govern- 
ment has caused suffering and anxiety for large 
numbers of prisoners of war in the Soviet custody 
and their relatives and friends, and has demon- 
strated a complete disregard for the fundamental 
human rights of the unfortunate persons con- 
cerned. The Soviet Government alone has the 
power to mitigate this suffering, and it could do so 
by taking the following steps : 

(1) Furnish full information on the identifica- 
tion of the 9,7l7 persons alleged to have been con- 
victed of grave war crimes, the 3,815 persons whose 
alleged war crimes are in the process of investiga- 
tion, and the 14 persons said to be under treatment 
for illness, who are still retained by the Soviet 
Union as stated in the Soviet announcement of 
May 5. This information would include the 
present location and treatment of these persons, 
data on the sentences imposed on those said to have 
been convicted of war crimes, and the status of the 
investigations pending, as well as information 
with respect to measures taken by the Soviet 
Government to ensure the right of these prisoners 
of war to correspond with their families in 
Germany. 

(2) In accordance with the Geneva Convention 
of July 27, 1929, to which the Soviet Union is a 
party, to provide information on the number, 
identity, date of death and place of burial of pris- 
oners of war and civilian internees who have died 
in captivity in the Soviet Union or in transit. 

(3) Permit investigation in the Soviet Union 
by an impartial international body in order that 
the actual fate of the prisoners of war known to 
have been in Soviet custody may be ascertained. 
For this purpose, the Government of the United 
States suggests the appointment of an ad hoc com- 
mission designated by the United Nations, or a 
^roup composed of representatives of the four 
powers now occupying Germany, or representa- 
:ives of neutral powers, or any other group mutu- 
illy acceptable. It is noted in this connection that 
he United States, the United Kingdom, and 
France, at the time when they still had German 
prisoners of war in their custody, furnished full 
nformation concerning them to the interested 
)arties, and permitted full and impartial access to 
he prisoners of war by international agencies. 

In concerning itself at this time with the ques- 
ion of German prisoners of war, a question on 
vhich the Soviet Government has made and 



broken specific commitments, the Government of 
the United States does not overlook the equally 
disturbing parallel situation concerning the So- 
viet failure to repatriate, or to account for, the 
numerous nationals of the German-occupied coun- 
tries who were taken prisoners during the war, or 
who were brought to the U.S.S.K. as civilian in- 
ternees. 

Information concerning the action which the 
Soviet Government is prepared to take on this 
matter would be welcomed by the Government of 
the United States, which would be willing to coop- 
erate in any appropriate way. 
* * * 

The British and French Embassies are also com- 
municating with the Soviet Government on this 
subject. 

As is well-known, the continued detention of 
German prisoners of war in the Soviet Union has 
been a matter of concern to the United States 
Government ^ and to the Governments of the 
United Kingdom and France for a considerable 
period. The Foreign Ministers of the United 
States, the United Kingdom, and France issued a 
statement at London on May 12 with respect to 
this subject which stated that the Foreign Min- 
isters had agreed to take all possible steps to ob- 
tain information bearing on the fate of prisoners 
of war and civilians not yet repatriated from the 
Soviet Union and to bring about repatriation in 
the largest possible number of cases. 



Americans Visiting Abroad 

Ernest Carroll Faust, head of the Division of 
Parasitology, Tulane University School of Medi- 
cine, New Orleans, Louisiana, will lecture at the 
University of Chile for the summer term. 

Clifford H. MacFadden, assistant professor of 
geography, at the University of California, Los 
Angeles, will teach geography at the University 
of Ceylon, Colombo, Celyon, for 1 year. 

Francis M. Rogers, associate professor of ro- 
mance languages and literature and dean of the 
graduate school of arts and sciences, Harvard 
University, will lecture for C weeks in Brazil. 

John M. Henderson, of the Division of Public 
Health, Columbia University Medical School, will 
serve as visiting consultant at various schools of 
public health and confer with public health offi- 
cials in Argentina, Brazil, and Chile for 3 months 
this summer. 

These visits have been made possible through 
grants-in-aid awarded by the Department of State. 

1 For texts of previous communications on the subject 
of German prisoners of war in Soviet custody, see Bitl- 
LETiN of Jan. 16, 1949, p. 77; Mar. 27, 1949, p. 389; June 
26, 1949, p. 824. 



o/y 24, 1950 



133 



Soviet "Beetle'' Charge Labeled Ridiculous Propaganda 



COMMUNIST FABRICATIONS AIM TO 
COVER PEST CONTROL FAILURE 

[Released to the press July 6] 

The Soviet Government, in a note dated June 
30, 1950, has identified itself with ridiculous propa- 
ganda statements emanating for several weeks past 
from Eastern European Communist regimes alleg- 
ing that the occurrence of potato bugs in certain 
areas of Eastern Germany has been caused by the 
"dropping" of these insects fi'om American air- 
planes. 

It is interesting to note that the Soviet propa- 
gandists have borrowed this whole invention from 
the Nazis who during the war used to level the 
same fantastic charge against Allied airplanes. 

The facts — of which the Soviet Government was 
undoubtedly aware when making ita charges^are 
that potato bugs, or Colorado beetles, have existed 
in Germany since before the war; have been 
spreading rapidly in wartime due to the absence 
of effective countermeasures ; and were recognized 
as a serious threat to the East zone economy by 
the Eastern German puppet government several 
months prior to the date of the alleged American 
bug offensive. A decree by the so-called German 
Democratic Republic, dated March 2, 1950, ordered 
the initiation of a major antipotato beetle cam- 
paign throughout the entire area of the Soviet 
zone. Special measures were to be concentrated 
in a belt following the Czechoslovak and Polish 
borders, apparently in an attempt to protect east- 
ern Europe and the U.S.S.R. from further beetle 
invasions. This problem had been one of major 
concern to the Polish authorities as early as May 
1949 when a nation-wide conference was held in 
Warsaw, devoted to the combating of plant pests, 
especially the potato beetle. Furthermore, the 
Soviet Government itself issued a pamphlet en- 
titled. The Colorado Potato Beetle^ signed for 
printing May 16 — 6 days before United States 
planes are supposed to have "dropped" the beetles 
over Eastern Germany — in which the population 
of the Soviet Union was instruct-ed to take special 
precautions against an invasion of potato bugs 
from Germany. 

Manifestly, the Eastern German authorities 
have been unable to cope with the problem. On 

134 



May 17, the official paper of the Socialist Unity 
(Communist) Party for Saxony-Anhalt published 
an appeal to the population, betraying distinct 
alarm at long last to institute search parties and 
other countermeasures. The appeal contains this 
sentence: "The annual increase of swarms can be 
traced to the fact that searches and chemical coun- 
termeasures have repeatedly and consistently been 
instituted too late, in spite of all orders." Mean- 
while, the potato bug has spread farther into East- 
ern Europe; and Soviet-German authorities are 
faced with one other problem : the threat of a seri- 
ous potato shortage this year, caused by a number 
of factors besides the bug, such as inadequate agri- 
cultural methods and last year's poor crop in 
Eastern Germany which compelled the peasants 
to consume a substantial portion of seed potatoes 
during the planting season. 



U.S. REPLY TO SOVIET NOTE 

[Released to the press July 7] 

The followinff is the text of the United States reply to 
the Soviet note of June 30 alleging American responsibility 
for potato crop infestation in East Qermany. The United 
States note was delivered to the Soviet Foreign Ministry 
hy the United States Embassy at Moscow today. 

While reluctant to give weight and credence to 
this communication (The Soviet Note of June 30) 
as an official message of the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
the Government of the United States nevertheless 
now feels obliged, in view of the extraordinary al- 
legations contained therein, to point out that the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs has neglected to ac- 
quaint itself with the most elementary and gener- 
ally known facts of the situation with which its 
communication purports to deal. 

It is apparent that the Ministry has not even 
troubled to consult with competent Soviet and 
Eastern European experts familiar with the his- 
tory of potato crop infestation in Eastern Europe 
and whose description of the progress of this 
infestation over a period of years has appeared in 
official Soviet and other Eastern European pub- 
lications. 



Department of State Bulletin 



i 



This Government prefers to consider that the 
Ministry has neglected to consult even its own of- 
ficial publications on this subject rather than to 
believe that the Soviet authorities are trafficking 
lightly for propaganda or other purposes in mat- 
ters vital to the welfare of the people of Eastern 
Europe. 

What has happened in obvious enough : the Com- 
munist authorities in Eastern Germany have failed 
to bring the bug problem under control and pro- 
tect the agriculture of other satellite countries and 
of the Soviet Union. Moreover, they are in need 
of an excuse for the anticipated shortage. Instead 
of holding them responsible for the hardships their 
failure will cause to the people of Eastern Ger- 
many and Eastern Europe, the Soviet Government 
has resorted to a well-known device and invented 
a "saboteur" — this time in the guise of the United 
States Air Force. Soviet and German Communist 
authorities are undoubtedly aware of the fact that 
American aircraft have strictly and consistently 
observed the established corridor and have at no 
time flown over the areas in which the beetles are 
alleged to have been dropped. 

In the present world situation, fraught with ex- 
plosive tensions, the Soviet Government has chosen 
to poison the atmosphere even further with one of 
the most fantastic fabrications that has ever been 
invented by one government against another. In 
this whole absurd and ridiculous propaganda in- 
vention, this is the one fact that deserves to be 
noted. 



U.S. ANSWERS CZECHOSLOVAK CHARGES 

[Released to the press July 7] 

The follotmng is the text of a note sent by the Amer- 
ican Embassy at Praha to the Czechoslovak Foreign 
Office on July 6 with reference to Cxechoslorak allega- 
tions concerning the potato bug. 

The American Embassy presents its compli- 
ments to the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and has the honor to make the following 
observations with reference to the potato bug : 

To the extent that the potato bug represents a 
Czechoslovakian domestic problem, it is not a 
matter of concern to the American Embassy, 
which nevertheless expresses its sympathy over 
the damage to Czechoslovak agricultural produc- 
tion caused by the insect in question. 

To the extent, however, that efforts have been 
made in Czechoslovakia to connect the United 
States with the presence of the potato bug in this 
country, the matter is of legitimate interest to the 
American Embassy, which declares that allega- 
tions to the effect that the United States encour- 
ages the depredations of the potato bug in Czecho- 
slovakia, or that the United States has sought 
clandestinely to introduce the potato bug into 
Czechoslovakia, are false and preposterous. 

The Embassy ventures to suggest the inherent 



unsuitability of the potato bug (doryphora de- 
comlineata) as an instrument of national policy. 
The Embassy doubts whether the potato bug, 
even in its most voracious phase, could nibble 
effectively at the fabric of friendship uniting the 
Czechoslovak and the American people. 

The Embassy avails itself of this opportunity 
to renew to the Ministry the assurance of its 
highest consideration. 



U.S.-Spain Amend Air Agreement 

[Released to the press June 23] 

Negotiations between delegations of the Gov- 
ernments of the United States and Spain to amend 
the air transport services agreement between the 
two Governments signed on December 2, 1944, 
were concluded today. 

After a cordial interchange of the viewpoints 
of both delegations, it has been agreed that the 
agreement shall be amended in the following 
respects : 

Air carriers of Spain will be permitted to con- 
duct services to the United States over the follow- 
ing routes : 

Route 1 

A route from Spain to San Juan, Puerto Rico, 
via Lisbon, the Azores and Bermuda, and Caracas ; 
in both directions. 

Route 2 

A route from Spain via Lisbon, the Azores and 
Bermuda to Miami, and beyond Miami (a) to 
Mexico and (b) to Habana and points beyond in 
the Caribbean area and the west coast of South 
America ; in both directions. 

Under the existing agreement, the United States 
has two routes through Spain : 

Route 1 

A route from New York through Lisbon to 
Barcelona, proceeding therefrom to Marseilles, 
and possible points beyond, in both directions. 

Route 2 

A route from New York through Lisbon to 
Madrid proceeding therefrom (a) to Rome and 
points beyond and (b) to Algiers and points 
beyond, in both directions. 

The United States route to Spain via South 
America and Africa contained in the original 
agreement will be deleted, inasmuch as United 
States civil air carriers now have no interest in 
using this route. 

Articles dealing with machinery for arbitration 
and determination of rates were added to the 
agreement. 



iM\i 24, 1950 



135 



The Need for an International Trade Organization 



Views of Maurice J. Tobin 
Secretary of Labor 



The following letter dated March 10, 1950, was sent 
from the Secretary of Labor, Maurice J. Tobin, to the 
Chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 
John Kee. 

Dear Congressman Kee: On May 24, 1949, I 
submitted to your Committee a statement of my 
views on the question of United States approval of 
the Charter for an International Trade Organiza- 
tion. I would like to take this opportunity to 
supplement my earlier statement with respect to 
events which have occurred since the original state- 
ment was made. 

The problem of maintaining full employment 
was the subject of intensive discussion at the 1949 
meetings of the International Labor Conference 
and the Economic and Social Council of the United 
Nations, and at the current (1950) meetings of the 
Economic and Employment Commission of the 
Economic and Social Council. The intensity of 
this discussion was to some extent a reflection of 
events in the United States and of concern as to 
the course which these events would take. Despite 
the basic health of our economy, the prospects of 
its continued prosperity, and the clearly tempo- 
rary character of the 1949 recession, fear was 
widely expressed that any drying-up of American 
purchasing power would curtail foreign sales in 
our markets, with serious resulting effects upon 
the other economies involved. 

Under these circumstances, the renewing of our 
pledge to maintain full employment at home, as 
set forth in the Employment Chapter of the Ito 
Charter, is clearly appropriate. The taking of 
other steps to expand world trade, on a multilat- 
eral basis, as envisaged in the Charter, is also es- 
sential as an adjunct in the international field to 
the measures which we take at home to maintain 
full employment. 

Specifically, the Employment Chapter of the 
Charter obligates the United States to take meas- 
ures with a view to achieving and maintaining full 
employment through actions appropriate to our 
own political, economic, and social institutions. 

136 



Such a commitment is fully in keeping with our 
own domestic policy of maintaining a high and 
productive level of employment as set forth in the 
Employment Act of 1946. The furtherance of this 
aim throughout the world should do much to aid in 
the expansion of world trade and the general rais- 
ing of living standards. 

I want to repeat my earlier statement to the 
Committee that the Employment chapter of the 
Charter preserves our right to seek full employ- 
ment with the minimum of Government interven- 
tion that we ourselves determine to be wise. In 
other words, in accepting the Charter we would 
not be agreeing to any planning or control that 
we ourselves do not find to be necessary. We 
would not be agreeing to give the other nations 
of the world any power to compel us to take steps 
that we ourselves are unwilling to take. We 
would remain free to devise our own policies and 
progi'ams. 

The employment pledge is very specific on this 
point stating that: 

"Each member shall take action designed to 
achieve and marntain full and productive em- 
ployment and large and steadily growing de- 
mand within its own territory thru measures 
ap-propriate to its political, economic and social 
institutions. ^^ (Italics supplied.) 

Our freedom of domestic action can be well 
illustrated by reference to the specific proposals 
for maintaining full employment which have been 
referred to or discussed at international meetings 
during the last year. At none of the sessions was 
there any question that a country's choice of meth- 
ods was its own, and that it would remain so 
should the Charter for an International Trade 
Organization come into effect. There is now be- 
fore the Employment Commission of the Eco- 
nomic and Social Council, for example, a report 
by a group of experts appointed by the Secre- 
tary-General of the United Nations concerning 
further steps which the nations of the world might 

Department of State Bulletin 



take to aid in tlie maintenance of full employment, 
entitled "National and International Measures 
for Full Employment." This report deserves a 
great deal of study. Many of its details include 
things that we now do under the Employment Act 
of 194G; others would require further legislative 
action. It is unmistakably clear, however, that 
whatever our reaction to tlie report, we are not 
committed to it or any part of it until and unless 
we ourselves decide tliat it has merit. This is 
the case now ; it would continue to be the case 
after the Ito Charter comes into effect. 

The months since the submission of my earlier 
statement have also seen the development of the 
Point IV Program as one of the most significant 
parts of our foreign economic policy. This pro- 
gram is a voluntary program on the part of the 
United States which pursues further the same 
broad objectives as the Economic Development 
Chapter of the Charter. The role of the Inter- 
national Trade Organization in the field of eco- 
nomic development would buttress and facilitate 
the sound realization of the program which we 
are initiating. The Ito Charter as a whole 
would ensure that the products of economic de- 
velopment have a maximum opportunity to move 
in the channel of world trade and to contribute 
to a general raising of world living standards. 



STATEMENT SUBMITTED ON MAY 24, 1949 

I appreciate this opportunity to present my 
views on the Charter for an International Trade 
Organization to the members and have heard in 
some detail of the basic problems which were 
involved in its negotiation from members of the 
Department of LaJbor staff who participated in the 
drafting conferences which led to the document 
presented to you for acceptance. 

Interrelations of Labor and Trade 

I regard the Charter as a great achievement in 
an important field and a forward step in foreign 
relations. Not only does it provide for an inter- 
national forum in which trade matters can be 
discussed and differences ironed out, but agree- 
ment has been reached on many important points 
of substance in a way which should strengthen 
the economic base upon which healthy world trade 
and prosperity are founded. These points of 
agreement, affecting matters of basic employment 
policy, the problems of economic development, the 
multitude of commercial problems (such as those 
involving the nondiscriminatory use of quotas and 
internal taxation), the special problems of inter- 
governmental commodity agreements, and inter- 
national cartels, have in every case the merit of 
minimizing restrictions and promoting freedom 
of trade and enterprise. This achievement is the 
more notable because it has occurred in a world 
which for over two decades has been moving in 

July 24, 1950 

895251—50 3 



the direction of more and more government inter- 
vention in economic life. If we can achieve the 
trade freedom for which the Charter provides and 
maintain that degree of freedom, the accomplish- 
ment will be substantial. 

Maintaining the maximum of goods in world 
trade with a minimum of restrictions has implica- 
tions beyond the immediate effects on trade. Free 
institutions in the world of trade have their influ- 
ence upon the maintenance of freedom in other 
situations. The effects of the Charter can be ex- 
pected to contribute, for example, to the healthy 
and improving economic environment which sup- 
ports and strengthens the kind of free trade union 
movement which we have found to be essential to 
the survival of democratic institutions. 

I do not need to dwell at length upon the obvious 
importance of healthy and unfettered world trade 
to the welfare of the wage and salary workers of 
the United States. As our industrial system has 
developed, it has brought with it increasing inter- 
relationships between our production and distribu- 
tion mechanisms and the trade channels of the 
world. In 1947, for example (the latest year for 
which such data are available), almost two and 
one-half million jobs in American nonagricul- 
tural establishments were dependent upon export 
trade. This represented 5.6 percent of non- 
agricultural employment at the time; in some 
individual industry groups, the proportion was as 
high as 15 percent. Many additional jobs in the 
agricultural sector of our economy are also de- 
pendent on export markets. The flow of raw ma- 
terials into this country is an essential part of the 
fabric of the production process ; imports of con- 
sumers' goods into our markets help to raise our 
own consumption level. Imports into this coun- 
try contribute to the support and maintenance of 
the export markets on which so many of our jobs 
at home depend. 

Restrictions on the regular flow of trade in es- 
tablished channels can have serious repercussions 
on our own employment. The impact of a single 
restrictive action can be illustrated by the situa- 
tion in the United States textile industry during 
the spring and sunnner of 1948, when unreason- 
able licensing requirements of one of our Carib- 
bean neighbors resulted in a piling-up in ware- 
houses of textile yardage equivalent in manhour 
requirements to roughly a full month's production 
of more than 40,000 textile wage earners. On a 
broader scale, the continuation of unpredictable 
interruptions to trade can seriously affect the 
livelihood of important groups of workers in our 
economy. 

From the point of view of safeguarding the 
welfare of workers in our domestic industry, we 
must also be certain that our commitment does 
not lightly remove justifiable protection or elimi- 
nate the possibility of necessary withdrawals of 
tariff or other concessions in the event that se- 
rious injury threatens the weaker portions of our 

137 



economy. I do not feel that we have given up, 
in tlie Charter, our basic ability to protect Ameri- 
can jobs, where appropriate, through proper tar- 
iff protection, or to withdraw concessions which 
threaten employment. The Charter provides the 
same mechanisms for doing this which is speci- 
fied in the successfully-applied procedures of our 
own Trade Agreements Act and for an appi'o- 
priate degree of international consultation. 

The welfare of the wage and salary worker is 
related to world trade in more ways, however, 
than through the impact of specific trade restric- 
tions or protective devices. High levels of world 
trade mean high consumption levels. The wel- 
fare of our poj^ulation at home can best be sought 
by achieving a level of world trade in which there 
is a continually rising volume of goods to be ex- 
changed, based upon continually rising produc- 
tion and purchasing power to buy the goods that 
are produced. 

The goal of a higher consumption of goods 
and services implies something more than the 
process of removing barriers to trade. It also im- 
plies taking steps to establish and insure the con- 
tinued existence of a healthy economic base upon 
which world trade can develop. Such positive 
steps must be taken in conjunction with efforts to 
minimize restrictions on existing trade channels. 
The two approaches complement each other. 

Provisions for Employment 
and Economic Activity 

Positive steps to expand world trade are pointed 
to in the Charter's chapter on employment and 
economic activity, and in the Chapter on Eco- 
nomic Development. From a long-range point of 
view, these chapters may well prove to be as im- 
portant to the full development of world trade, 
and to improved consumption levels that in- 
ci'eased trade brings, as are many of the remain- 
ing provisions of the Charter. I want to discuss 
the broad purposes of the provisions of these 
chapters. 

The basic obligation assumed in the Employ- 
ment Chapter is agreement to take steps to main- 
tain full and productive domestic employment. 
The basic obligation is similar to that provided in 
articles 55 and 56 of the United Nations Charter. 
It is also similar to that provided by our own 
Employment Act of 1946. It reserves to us the 
choice of measures to achieve full and productive 
domestic employment. As an obligation, it does 
not go beyond the obligation we have already as- 
sumed to the population of our own country. 

Why, then, it might be asked, is it necessary to 
repeat this obligation, already self-imposed, in 
an international document? The answer is to be 
found in the wides|)read concern of the nations 
of the world over the possibility of large-scale 
unemployment, over the possibility that they 
might not be able to maintain the nondiscrimina- 
tory principles of the Charter in the face of major 



economic difficulties. Each has been concerned to 
have a positive statement of the other nations' 
intent, even though fully aware that a statement 
of determined intention is something less than an 
ironclad guaranty of successful performance. 

It is especially important that the United 
States join in expression of this determination. 
Concern over the possible effects of serious unem- 
ployment in any country on world trade and on 
the economies of all countries is well-known. Al- 
though our own external trade may sometimes 
seem small to us in relation to our total volume 
of production, it is a fairly large proportion of 
world trade in terms of dollar volume. Most im- 
portant, our market bulks very large in the total 
market of some individual nations. Disappear- 
ance of this market through a drying-up of United 
States purchasing power might have serious effects 
on their economies. Our production system is the 
envy of the world, and we need lack no confidence 
in our ability to maintain our economic system on 
a prosperous basis. Nevertheless, it must be rec- 
ognized that fear of serious unemployment in the 
United States has been an important factor in 
negotiations, in conference after conference to 
which our delegates have gone during the postwar 
period, including those which have been in prep- 
aration for the International Trade Organization. 

There were many representatives at the confer- 
ences leading up to the formulation of the Havana 
charter who wanted the United States to assume 
greater obligations to control its economy in the 
interest of providing a more certain guaranty of 
full employment. This was not agreed to by our 
delegates. There can be no question about our 
continued right under the Charter's Employment 
Chapter to seek full employment with the mini- 
mum of government intervention that we ourselves 
determine to be wise. 

The obligation to take preventive action to main- 
tain full and productive employment obviously 
must have its counterpart in the event that we 
cannot maintain full employment, despite our best 
efforts. The Charter obligates us to consult with 
other nations on action to be taken in the event that 
another economic crisis does affect world trade. 
It would be unrealistic not to make such provision. 
If we should have economic problems ahead, we 
will want to handle them in such a way as to pre- 
serve the cooperative and reciprocal trade rela- 
tionships that we ai'e building up during times of 
prosperity. We want the machinery we are build- 
ing to weather, and not to flounder, in time of 
storm. 

Provisions for consultation in time of crisis must 
be drawn with extreme care. We cannot agi'ee to 
advance commitment of our resources or arbitrary 
abridgment of the rights we have acquired by 
negotiation with individual nations on a great 
many trade matters. I do not propose in this 
statement to elaborate on these provisions. It is 
my understanding that expert and detailed testi- 
mony on this matter will be offered before the 



138 



Deparlment of State Bulletin 



Committee. The basic point I want to make is re- 
lated to the over-all principle of consultation. If 
we get into economic difficulties, we must coop- 
erate, in our own interest and in the interest of 
world economic stability, to minimize the effects 
of our own troubles on other nations. We cannot 
escape the fact that our own economy is of great 
importance in the world economy or, tlie fact that 
our economic difficulties can have wide repercus- 
sions. Moreover, I do not see how we can avoid 
becoming the subject of official discussion in in- 
ternational forums in the event that we do begin 
to have serious unemployment. Nor do I see how 
we can avoid participation in cooperative endeav- 
ors to solve serious world-wide problems. What 
specific results this consultation will lead to cannot 
be foreseen, as we cannot foresee the precise kinds 
of economic problems with which we shall be deal- 
ing. All that we can provide for at this time is 
a mechanism and certain essentially procedural 
rules concerning consultation. We cannot agree, 
and I do not believe that we would be agreeing in 
the charter, to go bej'ond the stage of consultation 
and of cooperation on a basis to which we agree 
in dealing with the most difficult problems of se- 
rious economic maladjustment. 

The undertaking to maintain full and produc- 
tive employment is supplemented in the Employ- 
ment Chapter by a separate undertaking to main- 
tain fair labor standards, particularly in produc- 
tion for export. Since the problem of competition 
from countries with lower labor standards than 
our own has been a perennial problem in our tariff 
history, that is a provision we should welcome. Its 
effectiveness will be realized at an extremely slow 
rate, of course, because of the tremendous difficul- 
ties involved in raising labor standards in coun- 
tries with very low productivity. The method 
of implementing the fair labor standards obliga- 
tion will remain a domestic matter. Close rela- 
tionship will obviously have to be maintained with 
the Intei'national Labor Organization, which has 
primary responsibility among the specialized 
agencies in the labor field. The charter provides 
an avenue of appeal to the Ito itself if it can 
be shown that a country's failure to maintain fair 
labor standards has the effect of nullifying or im- 
pairing another Member's benefits under the 
Charter. 

ITO and Economic Development 

The Chapter on Employment and Economic Ac- 
tivity emphasizes chiefly the attainment and main- 
tenance of employment. The chapter on economic 
development looks to another major source of 
the future expansion of world trade, through the 
raising of productivity levels and realizing the 
potential capacity of relatively underdeveloped 
areas. The contribution to be made to world trade 
and living standards here is the kind which is en- 
visaged in the principles of Point 4 of President 
Truman's inaugural message. 

July 24, 1950 



The Economic Development Chapter envisages 
no intervention in the development plans of any 
member nation. The responsibility for develop- 
ment is a domestic one in each country, and devel-, 
opment will necessarily take different forms in 
each. Development in some countries may con- 
centrate on industrialization, in others on exploi- 
tation of mineral resources or the development of 
sizable projects in the field of transport or power, 
and in others on the achievement of higher pro- 
ductivity in agriculture. Although a domestic 
responsibility, development will necessarily re- 
quire assistance from the capital, technical, and 
industrial resources of the capital-exporting coun- 
tries. Their cooperation on a voluntary basis is 
important and offers advantages to them as well 
as to the developing countries. The role of the 
Ito under the Charter is essentially a coordinat- 
ing role. Members in need of technical advice or 
financial assistance may come to the organization 
for aid. The organization will help them find 
such assistance, which may take the form of pri- 
vate technical service from other nations, paid 
for by the developing country, or reference to the 
collaborative aid of another specialized intergov- 
ernmental organization, such as the International 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development. 

It is entirely likely that the actual role of the 
International Trade Organization in the field of 
positive economic development will be limited. 
The primary sources for developmental aid will 
continue to be private investment and govern- 
mental aid. Among the intergovernmental agen- 
cies, the role of the World Bank, the technical aid 
supplied by such specialized agencies as the Inter- 
national Labor Organization, and work done un- 
der the auspices of the Economic and Social 
Council should prove to be of equal or greater 
importance. 

The Ito has a necessary role in the development 
field because of its special role in cases where 
trade barriers are used to protect development. 
In this connection, the Ito provides a mechanism 
through which restrictions on trade during the 
developmental process, especially when exercised 
through quantitative restrictions rather than 
tariff rates, can be held to a reasonable and super- 
vised minimum. This necessary concern of Ito 
members with problems of development may re- 
quire attention to various phases of the problem 
of development, including helping the nation in- 
volved to find technical assistance or means to de- 
velopment other than trade restrictions. 

One of the most difficult problems faced in 
drafting the Charter was the question of the use 
of restrictions otherwise prohibited by the 
charter for purposes of economic development. 
At times during the negotiations, the provisions 
relating to the use of trade restrictions for "devel- 
opmental" purposes threatened to offer the widest 
loopholes for escape from basic commercial policy 
rules. The deliberations were characterized by 

139 



disputes between the industrialized countries and 
the relatively undeveloped nations, with the lat- 
ter contending that limitations on their right 
to use restrictive trade practices were designed to 
keep them from industrializing. This miscon- 
ception was corrected ordy by agreement of the 
larger industrial nations to an express endorse- 
ment of the idea of development and by a com- 
mitment on their part to cooperate in such devel- 
opment by imposing no unreasonable barriers to 
the international movement of capital and skills 
for developmental purposes. The more difficult 
problems of the use of trade barriers and re- 
gional preferences for development purposes were 
worked out through a series of elaborate and tech- 
nical articles, which will be best reviewed by the 
Committee during the course of the expert testi- 
mony before it. 



The Charter is the product of negotiations 
among many people from many nations, each 
bringing his own experience and the reflection of 
his own political, economic, and social institu- 
tions. This is an element of strength in the 
charter. The basic provisions of the employment 
chapter, for example, were embodied in the origi- 
nal United States proposals which led to the Char- 
ter. Both the employment and the economic de- 
velopment provisions embody principles which are 
an accepted part of our own national and foreign 
economic policy. They embody the positive steps 
which we must consider seriously in our own self 
interest and as part of our participation in world 
affairs. 

I respectfully urge that your Committee rec- 
ommend unqualified acceptance of the Charter for 
an International Trade Organization. 



Clarification Asitedon Senate Coffee Report 

Statement by Edward G. Miller 

Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs ''^ 



I greatly appreciate your courtesy in giving the 
Department of State this hearing. I assure you 
of the desire of the Department to work coopera- 
tively with your Committee and with all of the 
other committees of Congress that consider sub- 
jects relating to United States foreign policy. I 
hope that you individually and collectively will 
take advantage of our desire to be of assistance 
whenever you want our help. 

Especially in view of the strong protests which 
have been made to the Department by the coffee- 
producing countries regarding your subcommit- 
tee's report on coffee, I believe that it is important 
from the standpoint of our foreign relations that 
the Committee be informed of the attitude of these 
countries toward the report and the interpreta- 
tion which they are placing upon its recommenda- 
tions. I know that this Committee and the mem- 
bers of the subcommittee are as anxious as the 
State Department to correct any misunderstand- 
ings or misapprehension regarding the intent of 
the report. 

Officials of the Department have previously ap- 
peared before the subcommittee which prepared 
the report to answer questions and to provide data. 
The Department has endeavored to give the sub- 
committee all assistance possible in obtaining such 
material as it required from Embassy sources. 
The Department did not, however, see the report 

' Made before the Senate Committee on Agriculture and 
Forestry on June 20 and released to the press on the same 
date. 



itself before it was made public, and was, there- 
fore, not able to comment in advance on those sec- 
tions which it might have recognized as poten- 
tially troublesome. I doubt that even we in the 
Department could have foreseen the full measure 
of resentment which the report has aroused. That 
it is resented deeply, not only by the governments 
of the countries which have lodged protests with 
the Department but by their citizens, is becoming 
increasingly apparent. Our Embassies in the 
principal coffee-producing countries report that 
even those newspapers which are customarily 
friends of the United States have been sharply 
critical of the United States on this issue and that 
many of the attacks have been extremely bitter. 

It is always to this Government's interest to 
maintain relations with neighboring countries on 
as friendly a basis as possible. The opening par- 
agraphs of the subcommittee's report express what 
I am sure is a sincere concern for the welfare of 
the Latin American people. Recognizing, then, 
the fund of good will which exists, I am hopeful 
that the Committee will be able to develop its 
final position on the coffee report in a form which 
will both make possible the attainment of the de- 
sirable objectives, upon which I am sure we can 
all agree, and demonstrate a full understanding 
of the position of the coffee-producing countries. 
Our record for cooperation within the hemisphere 
on matters relating to coffee is one of long stand- 
ing. It has been of mutual benefit; and I hope 
that it can be maintained. 



140 



Department of State Bulletin 



The State Department is not here to plead a 
case for high coffee prices. The Department takes 
no position regarding the fairness or unfairness 
of any given level of coffee prices. It assumes 
that under a system of free private enterprise, 
such as we encourage in the United States, prices 
will adjust automatically to reflect a fair balance 
between the conflicting interests of producer and 
consumer, always assuming, of course, that the 
market is broad enough to assure competition of 
sellers and buyers. Coffee prices may seem ex- 
tremely high to us at the present time. During 
the period of the thirties, they seemed to the 
coffee-producing countries to be unduly low, and 
I am sure that this Committee will understand 
me when I say that, I believe, the 1930's would not 
be a fair base period to select for coffee. 

I realize that the price of coffee is an important 
consideration for the American consumer, and I 
can appreciate his confusion at seeing the price 
double within a few months. I fully understand 
his desire to have this sudden price rise investi- 
gated, and I believe that the subcommittee should 
Be commended for its efforts to uncover any market 
manipulation which contributed to the increase 
in prices. The Department is not trying in any 
way to shield any individual or group of in- 
dividuals — in the United States or abroad — who 
may have taken unfair advantage of the tight 
situation which developed in the coffee market 
last fall. Furthermore, it recognizes that with 
the virtual disappearance of the Brazilian Gov- 
ernment-owned stocks, which had served as a buf- 
fer for so many years, the possibilities of manipu- 
lation were appreciably increased. 

Propriety of Statements Questioned 

On the other hand, the Department believes 
strongly that no accusations of manipulation of 
markets, or collusion between producing interests, 
should be made unless and until there is clear 
evidence to substantiate such charges. With re- 
spect to such matters, the Department must rely 
largely on other agencies of the Government and 
on the findings of Congressional committees of 
investigation. Apparently, the subcommittee 
itself has had some difficulty in developing infor- 
mation of this character. I am informed that no- 
where in the report or in the record of the hearings 
is conclusive evidence presented to show that there 
actually was collaboration on the part of the pro- 
ducing countries to withhold coffee from this 
market in order to bring about a rise in price. 
Accordingly, I question the propriety of the state- 
ment on page 16 of the report that "it is likely" 
that the decision of the National Coffee Depart- 
ment of Brazil to close out its coffee stocks in 1948 
was "the prelude of a well-laid campaign by Bra- 
zil and Colombia to raise coffee prices." The Na- 
tional Coffee Department of Brazil has been en- 
deavoring to liquidate its surplus coffee stocks 



over a long period of years, and it was logical to 
suppose that it would eventually succeed. 

Another section of the report refers to the fact 
that the National Federation of Coffee Growers 
of Colombia is currently holding considerable 
stocks of coffee and that both Colombia and Bra- 
zil undertake, from time to time, to support coffee 
prices either by maintaining a fixed buying price 
or by assisting in the financmg of the crop. This, 
surely, cannot be regarded as evidence of price 
rigging. Maintenance of pi-ice supports for agri- 
cultural commodities is an accepted practice of 
many governments, including our own. As surely 
as the withholding of stocks leads to a temporary 
price increase, their future liquidation will lead to 
a decrease in prices, and each goverimient must 
make its own decision as to what rate of disposal 
is in the best interests of its producers. Unless 
there is collaboration among suppliers to misrep- 
resent the facts, and thus to mislead consuming 
interests, these price-support programs cannot 
properly be regarded as market manipulation. 

If, on the other hand, what the subcommittee 
had in mind was manipulation by individual 
speculators, and if there is evidence of such opera- 
tions, certainly the situation should be investi- 
gated by the Department of Justice, and any in- 
fringement of our antitrust laws should be 
IDunished. The State Department, of course, fully 
subscribes to the thesis that the Attorney General 
should be vigilant in protecting the consumer 
against any infraction of our laws, whether by 
foreign or by domestic speculators. Recommen- 
dation 7 seems to me, however, in the circum- 
stances, to prejudge the case. It requests the 
Attorney General to bring civil suit under the 
antitrust laws to compel disposition of the coffee 
stocks which the National Federation of Coffee 
Growers of Colombia holds in the United States. 
On the basis of the evidence presented in the re- 
port, I believe that it should have simply proposed 
that the Attorney General make an investigation 
to determine whether there might be basis for 
charges under our antitrust laws. 

The Department's principal interest in the re- 
port, however, relates to some of the other recom- 
mendations. Surprisingly, little or no informa- 
tion is supplied in the report by way of background 
on such recommendations. This, together with 
the fact that they appear to the Governments and 
the people of the Latin American countries to be 
either a reflection upon the Governments or an 
attack upon their economies, accounts very largely, 
I believe, for the reaction which the report has 
aroused. I shall take these recommendations in 
order beginning at recommendation 9 and ask that 
you examine them with me from the viewpoint of 
our Latin American friends. 

Recommendations Arousing Protests 

Recommendation 9 is that at all future meetings 
of the Special Commission on Coffee of the Inter- 
American Economic and Social Council, a repre- 



Ju/y 24, 1950 



141 



sentative of the Department of Justice, detailed 
for that purpose by the Attorney General, be pres- 
ent. Very little information is given in the body 
of the report regarding the activities of the Coffee 
Commission. There is one statement to the effect 
that most of the representatives on the Coffee 
Commission also represent their countries on the 
Pan American Coffee Bureau, which is a sales pro- 
motion organization, and which has been accused 
of endeavoring to influence the trend of coffee 
prices. The implication which is immediately 
drawn from the subcommittee's recommendation 
by the foreign representatives on the Commission 
is: first, that they are suspected of being unable 
to divorce their trade interests from their official 
duties, and second, that surveillance is required to 
prevent them from using the Commission as a 
front for other activities, which might be detri- 
mental to the United States consumer. This is a 
case where misunderstanding can be harmful. 

In order to save your time, I should like, at this 
point, to incorporate by reference the testimony of 
the Department's representative before the sub- 
committee regarding the importance of coffee to 
Latin America and the origin, purpose, and sig- 
nificance to Latin American producers and to 
United States consumers of the inter-American 
coffee agreement. For the coffee producers, it 
meant material assistance during one of their 
darkest hours. For our consumers, it has meant 
that supplies are now undoubtedly more adequate, 
because it helped check a very substantial decline 
in coffee production. The testimony in question 
begins on page 818 of part 2 of the hearings. From 
that testimony, it will be noted that this agreement 
was a treaty which was approved by the Senate, 
and the protocols extending it were presented to 
the Senate for their advice and consent. 

From that testimony, it will also be noted that 
it was apparent by 1945 that conditions in the 
world coffee industry had changed significantly. 
Brazil's production, which had accounted for the 
major part of the world's exports, had declined 
greatly. Consumption in the United States had 
increased substantially during the war years, and 
European markets were again becoming accessible. 

This change with respect to the world coffee sit- 
uation was referred to in the report of the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee submitted by Sen- 
ator Lodge on February 19, 1947. The report 
pointed out that because of the changed situation 
the United States had suggested that the quota 
provisions of the agreement be rendered inopera- 
tive. The same report also indicated that the 
United States view regarding the quotas had pre- 
vailed notwithstanding some reluctance by other 
signatory governments. 

From the time the quota provisions were 
dropped on October 1, 194.5, the Coffee Agreement 
ceased to be a factor in the world coffee-price sit- 
uation. The coffee-producing countries wished, 
nevertheless, to see the agreement extended — not 
because it could be of any further assistance to 



them pricewise, but because of what it had meant, 
and because it would be an indication of our con- 
tinuing interest in their coffee problems. 

It was later decided, again upon the initiative 
of the United States, to allow the agreement to 
terminate altogether. In the report of the For- 
eign Relations Committee on April 20, 1948, rec- 
ommending approval of the final protocol, which 
extended the agreement until September 30, 1948, 
the Committee pointed out that the protocol pro- 
vided that the Coffee Board "should undertake 
to make arrangements to transfer its functions, 
assets, and records to an appropriate inter-Amer- 
ican or other international organization" by Sep- 
tember 30, 1948, and said "The Foreign Relations 
Committee which has repeatedly urged the more 
effective coordination of existing international or- 
ganizations, believe that the program contem- 
plated for tlae Coffee Board would be a step in the 
right direction." 

In pursuance of this provision of the protocol, 
the United States join with the other members in 
petitioning the Organization of American States 
to assume responsibility for certain aspects of the 
work carried out by the Coffee Board under the 
agreement. The Inter-American Economic and 
Social Council agreed that "in order to provide 
facilities necessary for keeping the world coffee 
situation under continuous review and for collect- 
ing, analyzing and disseminating information 
bearing on long-range coffee developments," it 
would create a Special Commission on Coffee. 

COFFEE COMMISSION 

The Coffee Commission is merely a consultative 
body. Any recommendations it makes must be 
passed upon by the Economic and Social Council 
of the Organization of American States. It has 
no staft' and no separate budget. Its principal 
activities are to improve coffee statistics and to 
cooperate with the Institute of Agricultural Sci- 
ences in Turrialba, Costa Rica, on projects for the 
improvement of coffee production and handling. 
It is, nevertheless, a symbol of cooperation be- 
tween the governments of the American Republics. 
The coffee-producing countries believe, very 
strongly, that, during the period of the operation 
of the agreement, coffee consumers in the United 
States, especially because of the relatively low 
prices during the period of price control, have been 
the principal beneficiaries of this cooiDeration. 

The Coffee Commission now meets about once 
a month and prior to the coffee investigation, so 
far as the Department is aware, no question had 
even arisen regarding the desirability of holding 
open meetings, because no one had evidenced any 
interest in attending. Statistics on coffee have 
appeal for a very small group, and the general 
interest in technical assistance has been focused on 
a whole program, rather than on the $27,000 
project for the year ending June 30, 1950, that is 
being carried out on coffee at Turrialba. 



142 



Departmenf of Stafe Bulletin 



I hope that with tliis background you may be 
able to appreciate why the recominendatioa that 
a repi"esentative of the Depai'tnient of Justice at- 
tend the meetings of tlie Coffee Commission has 
been interpreted by the members of the Commis- 
sion as an afl'ront both to themselves and to their 
govermnents. The Commission believes, and 
made evident at the special meeting which 
it called last Friday afternoon to consider the 
coffee report, that it has been placed in an un- 
favorable light ; that the affront was not deserved ; 
and that it has no adequate means of protecting 
itself. However, among other actions taken at 
the meeting of the Commission on Friday was a 
decision, by unanimous vote, that the Commis- 
sion's meetings would customarily be open to any- 
one who might wish to attend. The Department 
believes that this decision was a wise one in that 
it should help protect the Commission against un- 
warranted criticism in the future, and it may lead 
to a somewhat better understanding of the Com- 
mission's activities both on the part of the public 
and the press. I must, therefore, in all respect, 
say that in my opinion this recommendation was 
unwise. 

QUARTERLY REPORTS 

With respect to recommendation 10, that the 
Bureau of the Census undertake to make regular 
quarterly reports of the stocks of green and roasted 
coffee on hand, I should like to mention that the 
Coffee Commission some months ago requested the 
United States representative to take this matter 
up with the Bureau of the Census and to see 
whether data on stocks could not be collected reg- 
ularly. It was disappointed to learn that this 
was not possible at that time, largely because funds 
for this purpose were not available. If, as a re- 
sult of your interest in the matter, this difficulty 
can be overcome, a real improvement in our own 
statistics on coffee could be realized. This might 
serve as a useful example to other countries in- 
terested in international trade in coffee. 

Recommendation 11 is one to which the other 
American Republics have taken strong exception 
and which the State Department would not be 
able to support. It suggests "that the United 
States, through diplomatic channels, offer to assist 
the Brazilian and Colombian Governments in such 
a way as may seem feasible to aid these countries 
in acljusting their official exchange rates of the 
cruzeiro and the peso to the certificate-of-exchange 
or realistic value of these jnoneys." Brazil and 
Colombia are both members of the International 
Monetary Fund, as is also the United States. The 
Fund is the international authority on questions 
of exchange, and the subject is a highly technical 
one. Any request for an adjustment of exchange 
rates must, under the Fund's regulations, originate 
with the country desiring the change and come 
before the directors of the Fund for consideration. 
The United States Director on the Fund has an 



opportunity, at that time, to make known the 
views of this Government, and any action by this 
Government through channels other than the 
Fund would be considered inappropriate. 

Recommendation 12 of the report urges the cof- 
fee-producing countries "to establish full reliable 
statistical organizations within their governments 
that will provide accurate statistics on stocks of 
coffee both in warehouses and interior, proper crop 
estimates, tree census, acreage, etc." 

This is another instance where I believe that 
the wording of the recommendation could be im- 
proved. I believe that no one is more aware of 
the need for improvement of coffee statistics than 
the producing countries themselves. Through 
their representatives on the Special Commission 
on Coffee, they have recently devoted much time 
and thought to the preparation of a questionnaire 
which has now been sent to the government of 
each coffee-producing country in an effort to ob- 
tain data which will be accurate, comparable, and 
up to date. The Commission has also worked 
with the United Nations Food and Agriculture 
Organization to try to insure that the 1950 census 
of agriculture which is now being taken in many 
of the countries of the hemisphere will increase 
the statistical information on coffee. But you will 
note that the subcommittee's recommendation re- 
fers not to reliable statistics but to "reliable statis- 
tical organizations." This has been interpreted 
by the coffee-producing countries as a reflection 
not on their statistics — which they will readily 
admit are not as comprehensive as they would like 
to have them — but on their public officials. I'm 
sure that no such interpretation was intended and 
that a slight revision of wording would have elim- 
inated the misunderstanding. 

ANOMALOUS RECOMMENDATIONS 

Recommendations 13 and 14 can best be consid- 
ered together. One recommends that the United 
States offer technical assistance to friendly nations 
other than those in the Western Hemisphere in 
expanding their coffee production. The other ad- 
vises careful scrutiny of any loans made by this 
Government to the Central and South American 
countries in view of the fact that their economies 
are largely dependent on coffee and that any per- 
manent decline in consumption comparable to that 
which occurred in the first 4 months of this year 
will, ultimately, result in "a crash in coffee prices." 
These two recommendations, presented in conjunc- 
tion seem to be an anomaly. If the price of coffee 
should fall to a level which might endanger the 
financial structure of the countries now producing 
coffee, it would not appear to be a promising field 
for development in other countries under the tech- 
nical assistance program. 

Actually, I doubt that the first 4 months of this 
year afford a reliable guide to future consimiption 
trends. That was the period immediately follow- 
ing the rapid price increase, and the hoarding 



July 24, 1950 



143 



which we know occurred during the last quarter 
of 1949 probably finds its parallel in the dis- 
hoarding which took place during the first quarter 
of 1950. I understand that there is a wide differ- 
ence of opinion among men who know the coffee 
trade best as to what effect the price increase is 
likely to have on consumption in the long run. 
In view of this fact, it seems to me that the need 
for recommending special precautions with re- 
spect to loans made to coffee-producing countries 
has not been established. All loans made by the 
Government will continue to be carefully scruti- 
nized as to their economic and financial sound- 
ness, and a determination as to repayment ability, 
based upon the long-term internal and external 
financial outlook, is always a fundamental 
consideration. 

With reference to the recommendation that the 
United States encourage the production of coffee in 
countries outside the hemisphere, there would ap- 
pear to be no reason for placing a geographical 
restriction on whatever aid may be offered through 
the technical assistance program. If the outlook 
is for a continuance of short supplies, we would, 
logically, welcome increased production in any 
country, including those to the south, which have 
customarily supplied more than 95 percent of our 
coffee imports and cooperated fully both with this 
Government and with the domestic coffee trade in 
endeavoring to meet our requirements. If the as- 
sumption on which the recommendation was based 
was that no assistance would be required to en- 
courage production in areas which are already ac- 
quainted with coffee culture, I believe that the 
assumption was in error. Actually, improved cul- 
tural practices could be introduced, advanta- 
geously, in many countries which are now large 
producers, and support and encouragement of ex- 
perimental work on coffee in institutions such as 
the Inter-American Institute of Agriculture in 
Turrialba is urgently needed. 

Kecommendation 15 is that the Economic Co- 
operation Administration refuse to authorize any 
further allocation of dollars for the purchase of 
coffee. The coffee-producing countries might well 
ask why their principal procluct should be singled 
out for special restrictions. Is it punishment for 
allowing prices to rise or is it to be interpreted 
merely as an effort on the part of the United States 
to obtain the lion's share of a limited supply? 
Whatever the explanation, it is fresh salt in an old 
wound. As you probably know, the EGA pro- 
gram is regarded by many of these countries as 
an obstacle to their own industrial development. 
They have pointed out that this program for Euro- 
pean reconstruction operates to their disadvan- 
tage in at least two ways. First, they fear that 
through possible future development of colonial 
possession, active competition for their products 
may be built up. Second, because of the strain 
which it placed, especially in the early years, on 
our industrial plant, they claim that the Marshall 
Plan delayed them in obtaining new equipment 



and replacement parts which were needed to face 
the new competition. They asked, at one time, 
for a Marshall Plan for South America, pointing 
out that they were relatively undeveloped and that 
capital was urgently needed. They could point 
to an excellent record of cooperation with this 
Government throughout the war in supplying 
products which we then urgently needed. Our 
answer included the assurance that they would 
benefit, at second hand, from the demand for their 
products which would develop in Europe as a 
result of the flow of EGA dollars to the European 
countries. 

Actually, they have benefited much less from 
the program than might have been expected. The 
surplus disposal provisions of the EGA Act 
limited procurement of agricultural products to 
the United States if surplus stocks were available, 
even when prices here were substantially higher 
than elsewhei'e. So far as competing commodities 
were concerned, therefore, Latin American coun- 
tries were out of the market. They still might 
benefit, however, from the purchase of petroleum, 
coffee, sugar, and other tropical products, but it 
would be difficult to establish the fact that their 
export of coffee to Europe is larger because of the 
EGA program. A relatively small amount of 
coffee has actually been financed by EGA, and most 
of this has been of inferior grades that are not 
used in appreciable quantities in the United States. 
In view of all the circumstances, it is understand- 
able, I think, that they should regard the recom- 
mendation regarding EGA procurement of coffee 
as added evidence that the subcommittee is not 
sympathetic to their problems. 

View on Proposed Legislation 

I do not wish to comment in detail on the other 
recommendations of the report because they are, 
in general not so directly related to the foreign 
policy of the United States as are those that I have 
already discussed with you, and since the Com- 
mittee will presumably receive comments from 
the agencies of the Government which are most 
closely concerned. However, since two of the 
recommendations deal with the only legislative 
action proposed in the report, I should like to 
indicate the present thinking of the Department 
with respect to them. 

The Department would have no objection, in 
principle, to the bill proposed in recommendation 
4 which would place trading in coffee under the 
Commodity Exchange Act. The Department is 
at present aware of no reason why. from the for- 
eign policy viewpoint, coffee should not be subject 
to the same legislation in respect of trading on 
the commodity exchanges that applies to a large 
number of staple commodities that are primarily 
of domestic origin. In fact, unless there are prac- 
tical reasons why this should not be done, the re- 
duction that has gradually occurred over a period 
(Continned on page 157) 



144 



Department of State Bulletin 



INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES 



The World Cotton Situation 



REPORT ON NINTH PLENARY MEETING 

OF INTERNATIONAL COTTON ADVISORY COMMITTEE 



The International Cotton Advisory Commit- 
tee convened its ninth plenary meeting on May 22 
at AVashington to strive for further progress 
toward its three major, continuing objectives 
which are : 

1. To furnish information regarding the current 
economic position of cotton in the world. 

2. To serve as a forum for the exchange of views 
and ideas designed to facilitate solution of prob- 
lems affecting the world's cotton industry. 

3. To formulate suggestions for international 
economic study in dealing with world cotton 
problems. 

Summary of Action 

The Committee took no action on negotiating 
an international cotton agreement but recom- 
mended that the Standing Committee continue to 
keep the world cotton situation under continuous 
review and "make such recommendations to mem- 
ber governments as it deems appropriate and com- 
patible with their international obligations." 

The Committee, although recognizing that bal- 
ance-of-payments difficulties constitute a world- 
wide problem whose solution is outside its scope, 
agreed that the world for years to come will be 
highly dependent upon raw cotton exports from 
the United States. It took note of the fact that 
those exports, at present, are made possible largely 
through exceptional financing methods. In this 
connection, the Committee asked its Standing 
Committee, with the assistance of the Secretariat, 
to follow developments in the balance-of-pay- 
ments situation as it affects cotton and to report 
on the matter at the tenth plenary meeting. 

With reference to increasing world cotton con- 
sumption, the Committee invited all member gov- 



ernments to help raise clothing standards in their 
countries through a study of national clothing 
habits and by assisting manufacturers in carrying 
out necessary sales promotion programs and by 
further research and development of cotton pro- 
duction and processing methods. 

The Committee, reaffirming a resolution at its 
eighth plenary meeting, recommended again to 
member governments that where satisfactory steps 
have not already been taken for the purpose, they 
establish a national coordinating agency or desig- 
nate an existing office to supply the Secretariat 
with needed statistical and other information. 
It recommended, furthermore, that such coordi- 
nating agency of office serve also to distribute to 
all appropriate agencies and offices of the respec- 
tive governments information and material re- 
ceived from the Secretariat and generally keep in 
close touch with the Secretariat. 

The Committee commended the Secretariat for 
its report and published periodicals. One of the 
studies prepared by the Secretariat was the An- 
nual Review of the World Cotton Situation. This 
document contains an analysis and summary of 
developments during the current season and pros- 
pects for the future in the various sectors of the 
world economy — production, consumption, stocks, 
trade, and prices. 

Representation 

Representation at the ninth plenary meeting was 
the largest since the organization of the Com- 
mittee 11 years ago. Edwin D. White (United 
States) was elected chairman of the Standing 
Committee which meets regularly during the year 
at the permanent Secretariat at Washington to 
keep the world cotton situation continuously under 
review and promote the flow of information be- 
tween the Committee's member governments. 



Jw/y 24, ?950 



145 



The Governments of the following States were 
represented at the Meeting by delegates : 



Argentina 

Australia 

Austria 

Belgium 

Brazil 

Canada 

China 

Esypt 

France 

Greece 



India 

Italy 

Mexico 

Netherlands 

Pakistan 

Peru 

Turkey 

United Kingdom 

United States 



The Governments of the following States were 
represented by observers : 



Bolivia 

Colombia 

Ceylon 

Cuba 

Denmark 

Dominican Republic 

Ecuador 

Finland 

Germany, 

Federal Republic of 
Guatemala 
Haiti 
Israel 
Korea 



Klcaragua 

Panama 

Philippines 

Poland 

Portugal 

Supreme Command 

Allied Powers 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
Syria 

Union of South Africa 
Venezuela 
■Jugoslavia 



The following International Organizations were 
represented by observers: 

Intergovernmental Organizations 

Food and Agriculture Organization of the United 
Nations 

Interim Coordinating Committee for International 
Commodity Arrangements of the United 
Nations 

International Bank for Reconstruction and Devel- 
opment 

International Monetary Fund 

Organization for European Economic Cooperation 

Nongovernmental Organisations 

International Federation of Master Cotton Spin- 
ners' and Manufacturers' Association 



Summary Review of World Cotton Situation 

The 1949-50 season has been of special impor- 
tance for cotton. It is the first in the prewar era 
to see an increase in the world supply (carry-over 
plus production) of cotton. World production 
has expanded on a broad front. At about 31 mil- 
lion bales, it is expected to exceed consumption by 
some 2 million bales. This amount would result 
in a world carry-over of about 17 million bales on 
August 1, 1950, this carry-over being actually and 
proportionately the greatest in the United States. 
Keintroduction of acreage restrictions in the 
United States and Egypt will affect production in 
the 1950-51 season. Despite prospective expan- 
sion in the Indian Union, Pakistan, and elsewhere, 
the global production in 1950-51 will possibly be 
moderately smaller than in the current season. 

World consumption of cotton, estimated at ap- 
proximately 29 million bales in 1949-50, has shown 
relatively little change in the past 4 seasons and 



is still slightly less than the prewar (1934-38) 
average. Unsettled conditions in the Far East 
and the rebuilding of textile inventories in other 
areas are among the local and short-term factors 
offsetting each other in the current season. In the 
face of substantial increases over prewar levels in 
general economic activity and in consumption of 
other fibers, the failure of cotton consumption to 
expand is a world problem of great importance. 
The review concludes that it is difficult to envisage 
any significant and sustained advance in global 
cotton consumption in the near future, with cotton 
and cotton textile prices at current levels, and in 
the context of the continuing world dollar short- 
age, unless special mitigating arrangements are 
made. 

International trade in cotton has made further 
gains, and world exports in 1949-50 are expected 
to total 11.5 million bales — half a million bales 
more than in 1948-49. The increased movement, 
chiefly in dollar cottons, has been given assist- 
ance by United States foreign aid programs and 
impetus by the prospect of a smaller crop in the 
United States next season. 

Prices for cotton in national currencies have fol- 
lowed divergent courses in 1949-50, moving up- 
ward sharply in countries where currencies were 
devalued and receding slightly in others. At the 
same time, the United States price supports were 
again operative and continued to influence, to some 
extent, world prices for medium staples. Since 
the announcement of acreage restrictions for the 
1950-51 crop in the United States, market prices 
have been stronger. 

The review draws attention to the intensified 
competition from rayon, which had a price advan- 
tage over cotton in all major consuming countries 
in 1949-50. This advantage was greatly enhanced 
in Europe as a result of the higher cost of cotton 
following devaluation. The displacement of cot- 
ton by rayon is to some extent affected by consum- 
ers' preferences for cotton, on the one hand, and 
by insufficient supply of rayon on the other. In 
the latter connection, note is taken of the fact that 
in countries where rayon production is not already 
close to the limit of capacity it is expanding rap- 
idly. 

Resolutions Approved 

RESOLUTION I 

It is Resolved: 

That Messrs. Price, Waterhouse and Company's "Re- 
port and Summary of Cash Receipts and Disbursements 
for the Fiscal Year ending June 30, 1949" contained in 
their letter of August 22, 1949, be accepted along with 
the Secretariat's statement of the financial position of the 
Committee as of March 31, 1950. 

RESOLUTION II 

It is Resolved: 

(1) That the Standing Committee be authorized to ap- 
prove expenditures in the twelve months ending June 
30, 1951, in the following amounts : 



146 



Department of State Bulletin 



Salaries, including tax reimbursements $48, 000 

Office expenses (supplies, printing, duplicating, 

binding, etc.) 6,000 

Communications (cable, telephone, telegraph, 

messenger and jwstage) 2,000 

Transportation 9, 500 

OflSce equipment 2, (XK) 

Miscellaneous exiHjnses 1, 000 

Total 68, 500 

(2) That the Standing Committee be authorized to in- 
crease expenditures, if necessary to carry out the approved 
program of work, bv an amount not exceeding 15 percent 
of the total of $68,500. 

(3) That the Standing Committee be further authorized 
to make such shifts and adjustments of funds from one 
item to another within the total as it shall find to be in 
the best interest of the work. 

resolution iii 

Wheeeas: 

A graduated scale for contributions by member govern- 
ments was established by Resolution II of the Sixth 
Plenary Meeting, based on Ave categories of contributions 
according to the annual average of total cotton exports 
and imports in the five years of 1934-35 through 1938-39, 
and 

"Whereas: 

It is deemed that postwar trade in cotton is insuffi- 
ciently stabilized to afford a basis for a revision of the 
scale of contributions, 

Jt is Resolved: 

(1) That assessments of member governments be made 
according to the formula adopted for 1947-48, based on 
the annual average of total cotton exported and imported 
in the five years, 1934-35/1938-39, insofar as practicable, 
and 

(2) That assessments in 1950-51 conform to the fol- 
lowing schedule : 

Group I Over 4.000,000 bales $12, 000 

United States 

Group II 2,000,000 to 4,000,000 bales 8, 000 

United Kingdom 

Group III 500,000 to 2,000,000 bales 4, 000 

Brazil Indian Union 

China Italj; 

Egypt Pakistan 

Prance 

Group IV 100,000 to 500,000 bales 2,500 

Anglo-Eiiyptian Canada 

Sudan Czechoslovakia 

Argentina Mexico 

Austria Netherlands 

Belgium 

Group V Less than 100,000 bales 1, 000 

Australia 

Greece 

Turkey 



Total 71,000 

(3) That the contribution of a government newly ac- 
ceding to membership in the International Cotton Ad- 
visory Committee at any time during a fiscal .vear shall be 
the annual assessment as calculated in accordance with 
Section (1) of this Resolution, multiplied by the number 
of quarters of the year in which the government is a mem- 
ber and divided by four. 

(4) That on resignation of a member, no refund shall 
be made of any part of that member's contribution for any 
unexpired portion of a financial year remaining at the 
time of the member's resignation. 

July 24, 1950 

895251—50 4 



(5) That the Standing Committee be requested to sub- 
mit to the 10th Plenary Meeting a revised schedule of 
assessments of contributions for member governments 
for the year 1951-52, and to consider ways and means of 
increasing the revenues of the Committee such as making 
a charge for copies of its publications distributed to other 
than member governments. 



resolution iv 

Whereas : 

A Reserve Fund has been set up in accordance with 
Resolution II of the Sixth Plenary Meeting and Resolu- 
tion VI of the Seventh Plenary Meeting, and 

Whereas : 

The Reserve Fund on July 1, 1948 was $50,000.00, and 

Whereas: 

A Working Fund is needed from which to defray the 
operating expenses of the Committee, 

It is Resolved: 

(1) That the Plenary Committee declare that the 
amount of Reserve Fund on July 1, 1949, was $50,000.00. 

(2) That Paragraphs 3, 4, and 5 of Resolution VI, 
Seventh Plenary Meeting continue to be applicable to 
the Reserve Fund. 

(3) That any funds of the Committee in excess of 
$50,000.00 shall constitute the Working Fund. 



RESOLUTION V 

Whereas : 

It was agreed in Resolution VII of the Eighth Plenary 
Meeting that invitations to accede to the International 
Cotton Advisory Committee be held open to all members 
of the United Nations of the Food and Agriculture Organ- 
ization of the United Nations, having a substantial inter- 
est in cotton ; and that the Standing Committee be au- 
thorized to consider and to act upon applications for 
membership from any other government having a sub- 
stantial interest in cotton. 

It is Resolved: 

(1) That the Standing Committee be requested to 
send to all governments eligible under Resolution VII of 
the Eighth Plenary Meeting formal invitations to accede 
to the Committee, 

(2) That the authority of the Standing Committee to 
consider and act upon the applications of other govern- 
ments to accede to the Committee be reaffirmed, 

(3) That the Standing Committee be requested to es- 
tablish forthwith procedures for acting upon any ac- 
ceptance, application, or withdrawal by such govern- 
ments. 



RESOLUTION Vi 

Whereas : 

The action developing from Resolution VIII of the 
Eighth Plenary Meeting has yielded very useful results 
and promises further benefits, 

It is Resolved: 

(1) To reaffirm Resolution VIII of the Eighth Plenary 
Meeting, 

(2) To recommend again to member governments that 
where satisfactory organizational measures have not al- 
ready been taken for this purpose, they consider favorably 
the establishment of a National Coordinating Agency or 
the designation of an existing office to provide the Secre- 
tariat with all the information referred to in Resolution 
VIII of the Eighth Plenary Meeting as well as to distrib- 

147 



ute to appropriate agencies and officers of tlieir govern- 
ments all the information and material received from 
the Secretariat, and generally to keep in close contact 
with it, 

(3) To recommend again to member governments that 
they ascertain that statistical and other information re- 
quested by the Secretariat, as specified in Annex A of 
Resolution VIII of the Eighth Plenary Meeting, be sup- 
plied regularly and rapidly. 

RESOLUTION VII 

Whereas : 

Adequate data on the prices of cotton are of special 
importance, and 

Whereas : 

It is not now possible to compute prices of various 
growths on a world-wide basis, 

/* is Resolved: 

That member governments examine their facilities for 
assembling price statistics in their respective countries 
and consider the desirability and possibility of further 
practical measures for the improvement of their price 
information. 



resolution viii 

Whereas : 

The Committee appreciates the excellent reports on the 
Developing World Cotton Situation prepared by the Stand- 
ing Committee and Secretariat, and 

Where^as : 

The information and Statistics furnished in these re- 
ports are very valuable and some of the suggestions made 
by the Standing Committee on various items merit con- 
tinued consideration, and 

Whereas: 

The Committee also appreciates the high quality of the 
Monthly Review and Quarterly Statistical Bulletin pre- 
pared by the Secretariat 

It is Resolved: 

(1) That this Plenary Committee place on record Its 
indebtedness to the Chairman, members of the Standing 
Committee, the Secretariat, and others who participated 
in the preparation of these reports, and 

(2) That Parts A and B of the "Report on the Develop- 
ing World Cotton Situation," prepared by the Secretariat 
and the Standing Committee as working documents for 
the Ninth Plenary Meeting of the International Cotton 
Advisory Committee, be printed and sold to the public, 
including as an annex the relevant resolutions of this 
meeting. 

Note : Resolution VIII was adopted with the reservation that 
no restricted material supplied by other international bodies 
would be published. 

RESOLUTION IX 

It is Resolved: 

To continue to publish 

(a) The Monthly Review of the World Cotton Situation 
in accordance with the following schedule: 



Publication date 

July 15, 1950 
August 15, 1950 
September 15, 1950 
October 15, 1950 
November 15, 1950 



Containing information 
received through 
June 30, 19.50 
Julv 31, 1950 
August 31, 1950 
September 30, 1950 
October 31, 1950 



December 15, 1950 
January 15, 1951 
February 15, 1951* 
March 15, 1951 
April 15, 1951 
May 15, 1951 
June 15, 1951 



November 30, 1950 
December 31, 1950 
January 31, 1951 
February 28, 1951 
March 31, 1951 
April 30, 1951 
May 31, 1951 



•To Include annual statement on the World Cotton Situation 
prepared for the Tenth Meeting of the Plenary Committee, and 

(b) The Quarterly Statistical Bulletin for cotton and 
competing fibers in accordance with the following 
schedule : 



September 15, 1950 
December 15, 1950 



March 15, 1951 
June 15, 1951 



RESOLUTION X 



information is lacking on the following 



Whereas : 

Adequate 
subjects 

It is Resolved: 

That the Secretariat undertake the work specified 
below : 

(1) The publication of information and statistics as 
they become available of 

(a) The production of cotton in individual countries 
by staple length and grade ; 

(b) The United States C.C.C. stocks, by staple length 
and grade ; and the price policy regarding same from time 
to time ; 

(2) An investigation into the availability of informa- 
tion concerning the supply of textile machinery, report- 
ing to the next (Tenth) Plenary Meeting and if possible 
making an interim report before then ; 

(3) The transmittal of such condensed and bibliograph- 
ical Information as is published and can be obtained from 
member governments on : 

(a) Relative production costs and farm incomes 
from cotton and food crops including methods of account- 
ing and actual results of investigations undertaken; 

(b) New discoveries in the field of pest controL 

RESOLUTION XI 

It is Resolved: 

That the following draft Resolution submitted by the 
Peruvian Delegate be referred to the Standing Committee 
for consideration and for such action as It deems desir- 
able, bearing in mind budgetary limitations. 

"Wherbias : 

Resolution (Document 26) of the Fifth Plenary Meet- 
ing, May 1946, states in item 8 'That the official and work- 
ing languages of the International Cotton Advisory Com- 
mittee be the same as those adopted by the United Na- 
tions,' 

Whereias : 

It Is convenient to the Spanish-speaking people for their 
full understanding of the work of this Committee and its 
reports 

It is Resolved: 

That all the proceedings and information now being 
compiled by the International Cotton Advisory Committee 
and all subsequent proceedings and data, be published in 

Spanish." 

resolution xii 

Whereas : 

(1) Governments are concerned to increase general 
standards of living for their populations, the more so 



148 



Department of State Bulletin 



after the disruption of national economies caused by the 
war, 

(2) Governments are concerned that farmers receive 
remunerative prices for their output, 

(o) If both these objectives are to be met, production 
and price policies must be evolved which give due regard 
to the interests of both producers and consumers, 

(4) World cotton consumption has not increased since 
1947 in proportion to the general recovery in economic 
activity and the rise in population, 

(5) Cotton production since the end of the war has 
increased in the dollar area, but remains below prewar 
levels in some other areas, due mainly to the need for 
food crops, 

(6) Cotton stoclis increased in 1949/50 for the first 
time since the war, mostly in the United States, resulting 
in the reintroduction of acreage controls in that country ; 
while at the same time cotton stocks have decreased else- 
where, 

(7) Postwar international trade in cotton is still greatly 
hampered by the world-wide dollar shortage, 

(S) Very outstanding results have already been at- 
tained in the field of genetics and methods of production, 

(9) The relatively higher price of cotton may in itself 
have an unfavorable influence on the consumption of 
cotton, and may stimulate recurring surplus production, 

(10) Most of the non-dollar cottons currently enjoy 
over the doUar cottons relatively wider price differentials 
than the normal price premiums and discounts accounted 
for by the difference in quality and grade, 

(11) Technological progress has considerably improved 
the quality of synthetic fibers, at the same time reducing 
costs materially, resulting in keener competition with 
cotton, which has been intensified by the effect of de- 
valuation in many countries, 

It is Resolved: 

That the Meeting express in terms of the following para- 
graphs, A through F, its views, conclusions, and recom- 
mendations with respect to measures that governments 
might appropriately take to improve the conditions for 
consumption of cotton. 

A. Cotton Consumption 

The Committee considers that for various reasons, 
Including the low level of incomes in many countries and 
the failure of cotton consumption to respond to rises in 
the level of incomes in other countries, the present ag- 
gregate level of world consumption of cotton is unsatis- 
factory, particularly In view of the general objective of 
member governments of promoting for their populations 
minimum standards of clothing (along with food and 
housing). 

The population in the countries where the level of 
income is low is generally very dense and under-clothed, 
and even a small Increase in the per capita consumption 
of cotton and cotton goods in these countries would bring 
about a large over-all increase in world consumption of 
cotton. 

With a view to creating conditions favorable for the 
expansion of cotton consumption but without requesting 
any preferential treatment for cotton vis-S-vis other 
fibers, the Committee invites all member governments 
to examine the factors which appear to hamper such ex- 
pansion and when appropriate to modify national policies 
which may contribute to this result, having special regard 
to the following fields : 

1. The practicability of reducing or removing im- 
pediments, whether fiscal, commercial, or by other regu- 
lations, on the exports and imports of cotton and cotton 
goods and on the flow of internal trade in cotton and 
cotton goods ; 

2. Promoting a study of national clothing habits 
and assisting manufacturers to popularize suitable cloth- 
ing items with necessary sales promotion ; 

3. Encouraging technical assistance in the field 
both of agricultural and industrial production; 

July 24, 1950 



4. Supplying of cotton textile machinery on an easy 
and long-term commercial basis ; and 

5. Promoting research and developing alternative 
uses of cotton. 

B. Cotton and the Balance of Payments 

While recognizing that balance-of-payments difficul- 
ties are a world-wide problem, the solution of which is 
not within the scope of this Committee, it seems never- 
theless appropriate to remind member governments that 
the level of textile activity in the world is still, and will 
be for years to come, highly dependent upon the main- 
tenance of large exports of raw cotton from hard currency 
countries, which are at present largely made possible by 
exceptional methods of financing. 

The Committee invites the Standing Committee to 
follow developments in the balance-of-payments situation 
as it affects cotton and to report on the matter at the 
Tenth Plenary Meeting. 

C. Prices 

Recognizing fully the essential objective of protecting 
both the level and the stability of cotton growers' income 
and providing textiles for a living standard as high 
as possible, and calling the member governments' atten- 
tion to outstanding and progressive achievements in the 
field of synthetic fibers, the Committee: 

1. Invites the Governments of all producing coun- 
tries to give serious consideration to such modification of 
their respective national production and price policies as 
may be required to enable the world's consumers of cot- 
ton and cotton goods to receive the maximum benefit from 
improvements in technology and efficiency, and thereby 
to contribute to the maintenance of cotton's position as 
the most widely used and popular textile fiber and to an 
Improvement of cotton's competitive position; 

2. Invites the Governments of all consuming coun- 
tries to take all practicable measures to increase the effi- 
ciency of production and distribution of cotton goods ; 

3. Invites all member governments to make every 
effort to keep the greatest possible quantity of cotton 
flowing in international trade at fair and reasonable 
prices. 

D. Research 

The Committee draws the attention of the member 
governments to the fact that research efforts are more 
than ever necessary. It is only insofar as such research 
in cotton production, manufacturing and distribution 
meets with increasing success that cotton will be able to 
maintain its outstanding position in the textile world, 
and that cotton farmers will be able to maintain a satis- 
factory outlet for the production of their land. Member 
governments are requested to send their published infor- 
mation, which may be of special interest to other govern- 
ments, to the Secretariat for distribution. 

E. Concessional Price Arrangements 

The Committee, fully aware that the aggregate con- 
sumption of cotton depends on the quantity of cotton and 
cotton goods which can effectively move into international 
trade from producing to consuming countries and noting 
the present dilBculties which impede such international 
trade, feels that every effort should be undertaken to 
increase it. 

Very serious objections in principle have been raised 
against exceptional devices as being incompatible with the 
normal, free flow of trade. 

The Committee has therefore not found any possibility 
of elaborating an arrangement of this kind, which would 
help to solve the ditficulties, but if member governments 
develop specific proposals regarding concessional prices 
for cotton and cotton goods, they may be presented to the 
Standing Committee for study and report to the Tenth 
Plenary Meeting. Any such proposal should relate to 
trade over and above normal trade and contain adequate 
safeguards for the protection of the interests of other 
exporting and importing countries. 

149 



F. International Cotton Agreement 

Having in mind the present tendency of world cotton 
production to exceed effective demand and the unstable 
factors in the world cotton trade situation, the Committee 
anticipates that the Standing Committee, under its original 
terms of reference, will keep the vporld cotton situation 
under continuous review and will make such recommenda- 
tions to member governments as it deems appropriate 
and compatible with their international obligations. 

The Committee notes the discussion of intergovern- 
mental measures relating to commodity agreements pre- 
pared by the Interim Coordinating Committee for Inter- 
national Commodity Arrangements of the United Na- 
tions, which appears in Section A of the Report on the 
Developing World Cotton Situation, and invites the Stand- 
Committee to consider these measures in relation to cot- 
ton and to report to the Tenth Plenary Meeting. 

RESOLUTION XIII 

Whereas : 

The Government of Pakistan through its delegation has 
invited the Committee to hold its Tenth Plenary Meeting 
in Pakistan in the second fortnight of February 1951, and 

Wherel^s : 

It has been determined that an opening date approxi- 
mating February 20, 1951, will be convenient alike to the 
Government of Pakistan and to the Committee, 

It is Resolved: 

(1) That the Committee accept the gracious invitation 
of the Government of Pakistan, and 

(2) That a letter be addressed to the Government of 
Pakistan expressing the warm thanks and appreciation 
of the Committee. 



resolution xiv 

Wheehias : 

The Government of India through its delegation has 
expressed a desire to extend a most cordial invitation to 
the Committee to hold its Tenth Plenary Meeting in India 
and has in conclusion expressed its desire to be host to 
the Committee at some future date, 

It is Resolved: 

(1) That the Committee express to the Government of 
India warm thanks and appreciation and 

(2) That the Committee take note of the interest of 
the Government of India for the future. 



RESOLUTION XV 

It is Resolved: 

(1) That the Delegates to this Ninth Plenary Meeting 
of the International Cotton Advisory Committee express 
to the Government of the United States their appreciation 
and thanks for the excellent arrangements made for this 
Meeting and for the hospitality and courtesy with which 
they have been received ; 

(2) That they express thanks, particularly to the 
Chairman of this Meeting, the Honorable Charles F. Bran- 
nan ; the Vice Chairman, Mr. Edwin D. White ; the Secre- 
tary General, Dr. Arthur W. Palmer, and to the other 
members of the Secretariat and of the International Con- 
ferences Division of the State Department for their per- 
sonal contributions to the success of the present Meeting ; 
and 

(3) That they wish the Chairman to convey to the 
Government of the United States and its officials this 
expression of their appreciation. 



Fourth Session of the Contracting Parties 

to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 

by Melvin E. Sinn 



The Conference recently held at Geneva from 
February 22 to April 3, 1950, was the latest in a 
series convened in accordance with the provisions 
of article XXV of the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade, which provide that : 

Representatives of the Contracting Parties ' shall meet 
from time to time for the purpose of giving effect to those 
provisions of tliis Agreement which involve joint action 
and, generally, with a view to facilitating the operation 
and furthering the objectives of this Agreement. 

Three previous sessions of the Contracting 
Parties have been held : the first at Habana in 
1948, the second at Geneva from August-Septem- 
ber 1948, and the third at Annecy, France, from 



The words "Contracting Parties" are capitalized when 
used in the collective sense of the contracting parties 
acting jointly. 



April-August 1949, where tariff negotiations were 
held concurrently. The fact that more countries 
were represented at the fourth session of the Con- 
tracting Parties than at any previous session indi- 
cates the importance which nations are attribut- 
ing to cooperative action in the field of interna- 
tional trade. The following countries were repre- 
sented at the Conference as contracting parties : 
Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Burma, Canada, 
Ceylon, Chile, Czechoslovakia, France, India, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, 
Pakistan, Southern Ehodesia, the Union of South 
Africa, the United Kingdom, and the United 
States. During the course of the session, Greece 
and Indonesia, who were also represented at the 
Conference, became contracting parties. The 
Netherlands sponsored Indonesia under the pro- 
visions of Article XXVI of the Agreement. 



150 



Department of Slate Bulletin 



Denmark, the Doiuiiiican Republic, Finland, 
Italy, Sweden, and Ui'uguay, who participated in 
the 1949 Annecy taritf negotiations, were repre- 
sented, and all except Ui'iiguay have now acceded 
to the Agreement. Austria, the German Federal 
Republic, and Turkey were also represented and 
expect to partici]iate in the next round of tariff 
negotiations. Observers at the Conference in- 
cluded representatives from the International 
Monetary Fund, the Economic Commission for 
Europe, the Organization for European Economic 
Cooperation, and the Allied High Conmiission. 
During the session, notice of withdrawal from the 
Agreement was received from the Nationalist 
Government of China. 

The United States delegation to the Conference 
was headed by Ambassador Henry F. Grady, 
■with John W. Evans, chief of the Economic Re- 
sources and Security Staff of the Department of 
State, as vice chairman. 

Work of the Conference 

As in previous sessions, the Conference pro- 
ceeded by first considering items in plenary ses- 
sion and then referring those which required 
further study to working groups. For purposes 
of analysis, the business covered by the fourth 
session can be roughly divided into three cate- 
gories: (A) preparations for the next round of 
tariff negotiations, (B) examination of trade 
practices, and (C) other problems arising from 
the operation of the Agreement. 

Preparation for the Tariff Negotiations 

One of the most important tasks of the Con- 
ference was to make advance preparations for the 
third round of tariff negotiations which had been 
decided upon by the third session at Annecy. The 
Contracting Parties accepted an invitation from 
the United Kingdom to hold the negotiations, 
•which will begin on September 28 of this year, 
at Torquay, England. They also decided to holcl 
their fifth session at the same place beginning on 
November 2, the two conferences to run concur- 
rently. The Torquay tariff negotiations will be on 
a large scale, with approximately 40 countries par- 
ticipating. About 400 separate bilateral negotia- 
tions will take place, as compared with 123 com- 
pleted at Geneva in 1947 and 147 at Annecy in 
1949. 

Revalidation of Geneva and Annecy Schedules 

In preparing for the forthcoming tariff negotia- 
tions, the Contracting Parties were anxious to in- 
sure that the negotiations will not be made the oc- 
casion for raising tariffs, even though the technical 
right exists in article XXVIII to adjust individual 
rates in the tariff schedules after January 1, 1951. 
To achieve this purpose, the Contracting Parties 
considered a proposal designed to extend the as- 
sured life of the Geneva and Annecy schedules 

July 24, 1950 



for a further period beyond January 1, 1951. Al- 
though the Contracting Parties decided not to take 
any definitive action before the Torquay negotia- 
tions, they did pass a resolution recommending 
that such an extension be made and further that in- 
dividual contracting parties take the steps neces- 
sary to be in a position to extend until January 
1, 1954, the assured life of the tariff schedules 
when the Torquay negotiations are completed. 

The Contracting Parties also reaffirmed the rule, 
followed at previous negotiations, that the binding 
of a low tariff rate should be considered equivalent 
in principle to the substantial reduction of a high 
rate. 

Participation of Switzerland 

In September 1949, Switzerland had been in- 
vited to participate in the third round of tariff 
negotiations and in her reply had indicated cer- 
tain special difficulties which she anticipated would 
result from acceptance of the obligations of the 
Agreement. The Contracting Parties examined 
several proposals by which they hoped to meet 
these difficulties and enable Switzerland to par- 
ticipate. After long and sympathetic considera- 
tion, however, the Conti'acting Parties concluded 
that none of the particular proposals advanced 
could both meet the Swiss position and be regarded 
as satisfactory to the Contracting Parties. The 
Contracting Parties hoped that a way might still 
be found within the letter and spirit of the Agree- 
ment for Switzerland to participate. 

Participation of Western Germany 

A vote of 17-1 rejected a proposal by Czecho- 
slovakia that Western Germany should be excluded 
from the Torquay negotiations. 

EXAMINATION OF TRADE PRACTICES 

The Contracting Parties conducted an extensive 
survey of the use of quantitative restrictions in 
the light of the requirements of the Agreement and 
approved two reports on the subject. The first 
report consists of a close examination of the 
various techniques used in the imposition of quan- 
titative restrictions on imports and exports and 
suggests specific measures to minimize their harm- 
ful effects. The second report considers the dis- 
criminatory application of import restrictions per- 
mitted by the postwar transitional period arrange- 
ments of the Agreement. 

Review of Quantitative Restrictions on Imports 
and Exports 

The final report of the Contracting Parties re- 
flected general agreement that, with certain minor 
exceptions, the following types of export restric- 
tions were inconsistent with the provisions of the 
General Agreement : 

(a) Those export restrictions used by one coun- 

151 



try for the purpose of obtaining the relaxation of 
another country's import restrictions. 

(b) Those export restrictions imposed by one 
country to obtain a relaxation of another coun- 
try's export restrictions on commodities in short 
supply or to obtain an advantage in the procure- 
ment from another country of such commodities. 

(c) Restrictions imposed by a country on the 
export of raw materials in order to protect a do- 
mestic fabricating industry. 

(d) Export restrictions used by a coimtry to 
avoid price competition among its exporters. 

On the import side, the Contracting Parties 
agreed that every effort should be made to mini- 
mize the incidental protective effect resulting from 
the imposition of quantitative restrictions even 
where those restrictions were imposed legitimately 
for balance-of-payments reasons. The report sug- 
gested several methods of accomplishing this ob- 
j ecti ve. It urged members to avoid encouragement 
of investment in enterprises which could not sur- 
vive without protection when the balance-of-pay- 
ments justification for such protection has disap- 
peared. The report also urged the members to take 
every opportunity to impress upon producers, re- 
ceivmg incidental protection from balance-of-pay- 
ments restrictions, the temporary nature of the 
restrictions. It asked countries to administer such 
restrictions as are necessary on a flexible basis and 
to adjust them to changing circumstances. The 
report agreed that where quotas are necessary, 
they should preferably be unallocated and should 
apply without discrimination to as many countries 
as possible. 

The report cited certain instances of the misuse 
of import restrictions : 

(a) Maintenance by a country of balance-of- 
payments restrictions which give priority to im- 
ports of particular products on the basis of the 
competitiveness or noncompetitiveness of such im- 
ports with a domestic industry. 

(b) The imposition by a country of administra- 
tive obstacles to the full utilization of import 
quotas in order to afford protection to a domestic 
industry. 

(c) The use of import restrictions as a means of 
retaliation against a country which has refused 
to conclude a bilateral trade agreement with the 
country concerned. 

The report also recommended that each con- 
tracting party review its system of import and 
export restrictions in the light of the report and 
that officials responsible for the administration of 
quantitative restrictions and those engaged in 
negotiating bilateral agreements be made familiar 
with the conclusions reached. 

Discriminatory Application of Import 
Restrictions 

The Contracting Parties examined the docu- 
mentation submitted on the discriminatory appli- 



cation of import restrictions under the transitional 
arrangements of article XIV and annex J of the 
Agreement and prepared the first in a series of 
annual reports required by the provisions of para- 
graph 1 (g) of article XIV. The report is based 
on information received from 20 countries which 
are applying import restrictions under these tran- 
sitional arrangements. It indicates that although 
many countries have made rapid strides in elim- 
inating their balance-of-payments difficulties, they 
have not yet been able to earn the amounts of hard 
currencies which their importers would desire to 
expend under a regime of nondiscriminatory im- 
portation. They have, therefore, had to conserve 
their hard-currency earnings for essential imports 
while, at the same time, allowing their importers 
a relatively greater degree of freedom with respect 
to purchases in the soft-currency areas. 

Because the Agreement contemplates that rela- 
tive prices shall still be an important factor in 
determining the source of imports, even in the case 
of countries permitted to discriminate as between 
hard- and soft-currency areas, close examination 
was made of the administrative devices used to 
implement this objective. 

The Contracting Parties also considered the 
effect of bilateral agreements on trade patterns. 
They concluded that although devaluation and in- 
creased production had done much to minimize the 
effect of bilateral agreements, a danger existed that 
such arrangements, together with the relatively 
high prices prevailing in certain soft-currency 
areas, might attract exports that would otherwise 
have been sent to dollar markets and assisted in 
easing balance-of-payments difficulties. 

The Contracting Parties also utilized informa- 
tion obtained during the examination of individual 
countries' import restrictions to determine which 
countries should be invited to consult at the next 
session with respect to intensifications in their im- 
poi"t programs. The most important members in 
this category are the sterling area countries, which, 
in July 1949, agreed to attempt to reduce their 
dollar imports by 25 percent below the 1948 level. 
Australia, Ceylon, Chile, India, New Zealand, 
Pakistan, Southern Rhodesia, and the United 
Kingdom were invited to consult at the fifth 
session. 

OTHER PROBLEMS ARISING 

FROM OPERATION OF THE AGREEMENT 

Rectifications and Modifications of Schedules 

The problem of rectifications and modifications is 
a highly technical one, involving careful work in 
the correction of errors in the tariff schedules an- 
nexed to the General Agreement. The Contract- 
ing Parties approved rectifications to the authentic 
texts of the Geneva and Annecy tariff schedules 
of a number of countries, correcting errors in cer- 
tain parts of these schedules, and also approved 
corrections in annex C of the General Agreement 
and in the "First Protocol of Modifications." An- 



152 



Department of Slate Bulletin 



nex C contains a list of temtories which are con- 
nected with the Benelux Customs Union by 
common sovereignty or relations of protection or 
suzerainty, while the "First Protocol of Modifica- 
tions'" contains revisions affecting certain articles 
of the General Agreement. The results were em- 
bodied in a Protocol of Rectifications which was 
opened for signature at the end of tlie session and 
signed by John W. Evans for the United States. 

Australian Fertilizer Subsidies 

The Contracting Parties examined a complaint 
by Chile with respect to an Australian subsidy on 
imports of ammonium sulphate. The Chilean 
complaint protested against Australia's retention 
of a subsidy on imports of ammonium sulphate 
when a similar subsidy had been removed from im- 
ports of sodium nitrate, a competing product of 
Chile. The Contracting Parties, although decid- 
ing that the Australian action was not contrary to 
the Agreement, took into consideration the fact 
that a subsidy had been paid on both products at 
the time that a tariff concession on sodium nitrate 
had been granted by Australia at the 1947 negotia- 
tions. The Contracting Parties therefore, acting 
under the provisions of article XXIII of the 
Agreement, on "Nullification and Impairment," 
recommended an adjustment by Australia which 
would remove any competitive inequality which 
the Australian action had created. 

Economic Development Measures 

The Contracting Parties considered applica- 
tions under article XVIII of the Agreement by 
Haiti, Ceylon, and Syria and Lebanon for per- 
mission to use special measures to promote their 
economic development. They rejected the appli- 
cation of Syria and Lebanon because those coun- 
tries had failed to supply the information required 
to determine whether the criteria of the Agree- 
ment were complied with. Subject to certain limi- 
tations and conditions, they granted a waiver to 
Ceylon for a period of 5 years to permit the regu- 
lation of the importation of cotton verties, or 
sarongs, in order to promote the development of a 
local industry. In the case of Haiti, action on an 
application for a release to cover a measure for 
protection of its tobacco products industry was 
scheduled for consideration at the next session. 

Budget 

The Contracting Parties approved a revised 
budget report for 1949-50. It was designed to 
take into account the contributions of governments 
expecting to accede to the Agreement at the third 
round of tariff negotiations and also the contri- 
bution of Indonesia which became a contracting 
party during the course of the session. 

Derestriction of Documents 

In order that the work of the Contracting 
Parties might be made more readily accessible to 



businessmen, students, research workers, journal- 
ists, and the public in general, the Contracting 
Parties unanimously approved a proposal by the 
United States which would automatically dere- 
strict most conference documents 90 days after the 
end of a session. 

Waiver on U.S. Potato hnports 

A request by the United States was granted, 
permitting the United States to alter the figure 
in its tariff schedule which determines the quantity 
of potatoes that may be imported at the reduced 
rate of duty negotiated in 1947. Under the waiver, 
the United States may limit the importation of 
table stock potatoes at the reduced rate to 1 million 
bushels, plus any amount by which the domestic 
crop in 1950 shall fall below 335 million bushels, 
instead of 350 million as originally provided in 
the Agreement. 

Special Exchange Agreements 

Under the provisions of article XV of the 
Agreement, contracting parties not members of 
the International Monetary Fund must either be- 
come members of the Fund or sign a special ex- 
change agreement having substantially equivalent 
effect. The Contracting Parties examined the 
position of countries affected by the provisions of 
this article and also considered proposals to im- 
plement the procedural aspects of the special ex- 
change agreements. 

Application of Norwegian Tariff Conxiessions 

Because of the inability of the new Norwegian 
Storting to act by April 30, 1950, the Contracting 
Parties agreed to extend to June 30, 1950, the date 
by which Norway must put into effect its Annecy 
tariff concessions. 

MEN for Japan 

At the close of the session, the United States 
made a short statement indicating that she still 
considered it desirable for the Contracting Parties 
to devise some way of extending most-favored- 
nation treatment to Japan on a reciprocal basis 
and that the question may be raised at the fifth 
session. 



Conclusion 

This latest session of the Contracting Parties 
has again proved the value of the General Agree- 
ment as a vital and effective force in setting stand- 
ards of fair practices in international trade, in 
providing a forum for the hearing and settlement 
of disputes, and in exerting a constant influence 
in the direction of restoring world trade to a multi- 
lateral and nondiscriminatory basis. 

The General Agreement, although young in 
years, has, nevertheless, demonstrated itself to be 
mature, dynamic, and effective in its operation. 



i»lY 24, 1950 



153 



German Participation 
in International Bodies ^ 

It is the policy of the Allied Governments, an- 
nounced in the Petersberg protocol, to promote 
and encourage German membership of all the rec- 
ognized international bodies. In this regard the 
Petersberg agreement states : 

The High Commission and the Federal Government are 
agreed to promote the participation of Germany in all 
those international organizations through which German 
experience and support can contribute to the general 
welfare. 

Since the Petersberg agreement was signed (No- 
vember 22, 1949) considerable progress has been 
made in the accession of Western Germany to in- 
ternational bodies. 

Following is a list of international organiza- 
tions to which the Federal Government adheres: 

1. Organization for European Economic Co- 
operation (Oeec). 

2. International Authority for the Euhr. 

3. Customs Committee of the European Cus- 
toms Union Study Group. 

4. International Union for the Publication of 
Customs Tariffs. 

5. International Wlieat Council. 

6. Central Rhine Commission. 

Following are the organizations and confer- 
ences in which the Federal Government has par- 
ticipated or will participate : 

1. Meetings of Contracting Parties to the Gen- 
eral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (Gatt). 
(German observer.) 

2. Third Assembly of the World Health Organ- 
ization (Who). (German observers.) 

3. International Anti-VD Commission of the 
Rhine ( Who ) . ( Part of Who. ) 

4. International Labor Organization (Ilo) Con- 
ferences : 

(a) On Social Insurance and Working Con- 
ditions of Rhine Boatmen (Oct., Nov., Dec. 1950). 
(German delegation.) 

(b) 33rd Session of Ilo Conference. (Ger- 
man observers.) 

(c) Committee for Chemical Industries 
(April 1950). (German observers.) 

(d) Preliminary Conference on Migration 
(April 1950). (Gennan observers.) 

(e) Preparatory Tripartite Technical Con- 
ference on Training Adults. (German observers.) 

5. Invitation extended by Dutch Government to 
Federal Government to send a representative to 

'Reprinted from Information Bulletin of U. S. High 
Commissioner for Germany of July 1950. 



154 



Conferences of Italian and Austrian Experts on 
Tobacco Production to be held in Rome in Septem- 
ber 1950. (German delegation will attend.) 

6. Conference on the Control of Plant Diseases — 
Holland, April-May 1950. (German representa- 
tives attended.) 

7. International Committee for Colorado Beetle 
Control, Florence, January 1950. (German rep- 
resentatives attended. ) 

8. Conference on Agricultural Technology held 
under Fag auspices in Geneva in March 1950. 
(German observers.) 

9. Meeting of the International Seed Testing 
Authority (United States Government-spon- 
sored). (German observers.) 

10. Biennial Art Exposition, Venice, June 1950. 
(German exhibits.) 

11. International Congress at Groningen, June 
1950, on occasion of the 160th anniversary of the 
founding of the Royal Netherlands Institute for 
the Deaf and Mute. (German representatives 
attended.) 

12. International Poplar Committee, Geneva 
April 18-21. (German experts attended.) 

Following are the international organizations in 
which German participation has been or is under 
consideration by the Allied High Commission : 

1. United Nations Food and Agriculture Or- 
ganization (Fao). 

2. United Nations Educational, Scientific and 
Cultural Organization (Unesco). 

3. International Committee for Bird Preserva- 
tion. 

4. Twenty-eighth International Industrial Ex- 
hibition, Padua, June 1950. 

Following are the international organizations 
in which participation has been invited and is 
under consideration by the Federal Government : 

1. International Patent Office at The Hague. 

2. International Wine Office. 

3. International Commissions, established under 
the Fishery Convention of Juno 1885 among the 
Netherlands, Switzerland and Germany, on (i) 
Rhine pollution and (ii) salmon fishery. 

4. Twenty-fourth International Congress on 
Sociology to be held in Rome in September 1950. 

5. United Nations Social Activities Division. 

G. The International Office for Animal Diseases 

in Paris. 

7. Eighth International Congress of Agricul- 
tural Industries (Invitation from Permanent Na- 
tional Agricultural Committee of Belgium). 

8. International Refrigerator Car Company. 

9. Fourteenth Levant Fair, Paris, September 
1950. 

10. Permanent International Agricultural Ex- 
position in Tehran, October 1950. 

Department of State Bulletin 



U.S. Delegations to International Conferences 



Agricultural Industries 

The Department of State announced on June 
22 that Dr. Guido Edward Hilbert, chief, Bureau 
of Agricultural and Industrial Chemistry, De- 
partment of Agriculture, has been named United 
States delegate to the Eighth International Con- 
gress of Agricultural Industries, to be held at 
Brussels from July 9-15. The American Am- 
bassador at Brussels has been requested to name 
a member of the Embassy to act as alternate for 
Dr. Hilbert. 

This Congress is one of a series of meetings 
organized in various capitals of Europe by the 
International Commission of Agricultural Indus- 
tries, which has its headquarters at Paris, for the 
purpose of developing new and improved agricul- 
tural techniques for use in combating malnutri- 
tion. The United States Government is not a 
member of the Commission, but it has sent offi- 
cial delegates to several of the previous congresses. 
The Seventh Congress was held at Paris in July 
1948. 

Discussions at the forthcoming meeting will 
cover such subjects as the development of agricul- 
tural industries in tropical countries, the world 
market for raw foodstuffs, agricultural produc- 
tion, and agricultural sciences. 

Sugar Council 

The Department of State announced on June 
26 that Elmer F. Kruse, Assistant Administrator 
for Commodity Operations, Production and Mar- 
keting Administration, Department of Agricul- 
ture, has been named United States delegate to the 
meeting of the Special Committee of the Inter- 
national Sugar Council at London beginning on 
June 26. Others on the United States delegation 
are: 

Alternate Delegate 

Lawrence Myers, director, Sugar Branch, Production and 
Marketing Administration, Department of Agriculture 

Advisers 

Stanley Andrews, director. Office of Foreign Agricultural 
Relations, Department of Agriculture 

Howard H. Tewksbury, director, Office of East Coast Af- 
fairs, Department of State 



James C. Foster, director. Commodities Division, Office 
of International Trade, Department of Commerce 

Francis A. Linville, assistant chief. Economic Resources 
and Security Staff, Department of State 

Paul O. Nyhus, agricultural attach^, American Embassy, 
London 

Adviser and Secretary 

Catherine T. Corson, Sugar Branch, Production and Mar- 
keting Administration, Department of Agriculture 

In 1948, the International Sugar Council es- 
tablished the Special Committee to make a study 
of the sugar situation with a view to ascertaining 
the need for negotiating a new international sugar 
agreement. The effective provisions of the exist- 
ing International Sugar Agreement, which came 
into force on September 1, 1937, have not been in 
operation since the outbreak of World War II, 
although the Council, which was established pur- 
suant to terms of the agreement, continued to 
function as a standby organization to keep the 
sugar situation under study. 

At the forthcoming meeting of the Special Com- 
mittee, approximately 20 sugar-exporting and im- 
porting countries will discuss the world sugar out- 
look and the Cuban proposal for a new inter- 
national sugar agreement. The meeting will also 
decide whether sufficient areas of agreement exist 
among sugar-exporting and importing countries 
to warrant the convening of a conference in the 
fall of 1950 to negotiate a new international sugar 
agreement. 

High Tension Electric Systems 

The Department of State announced on June 
29 tliat the United States delegation to the thir- 
teenth session of the International Conference on 
Large High Tension Electric Systems, wliich con- 
vened at Paris on June 29 is as follows : 

Chairman 

B. Robert deLuccia, Chief, Bureau of Power, Federal 
Power Commission 

Vice Chairman 

Frederic Attwood, Chairman, United States National 
Committee, International Conference on High Tension 
Electric Systems 



July 24, 1950 



155 



Delegates 

Eugene O. Crittenden, Associate Director, National Bu- 
reau of Standards, Department of Commerce 

Orin A. Demuth, Cliief, Brancli of System Engineering, 
Bonneville Power Administration, Department of the 
Interior, Portland, Oreg. 

Carl H. Giroux, Special Assistant, Corps of Engineers, 
Department of the Army 

Cecil L. Killgore, Assistant to the Chief Designing Engi- 
neer, Bureau of Reclamation, Department of the 
Interior, Denver, Colo. 

The International Conference on Large High 
Tension Electric Systems, founded in March 1921, 
is an organization with a membership of approxi- 
mately 1,400 technicians, executives, and govern- 
mental officials from various countries. Its 
members meet biennially to exchange information 
on the most recent progress in design, construc- 
tion, and operation of high tension electric 
systems. 

The work of this session is divided into four 
sections as follows: (1) generation, transforma- 
tion, and rupture of current; (2) construction, 
insulation, and maintenance of overhead and un- 
derground lines; (3) operation, protection, and 
interconnection of networks; and (4) higher 
voltages than that actually used. 

Study Group on Germany 

The Department of State announced on June 
30 that Lewis W. Douglas, American Ambassador, 
London, and the United States member of the 
Intergovernmental Study Group on Germany, will 
attend the first meeting of this body at London 
beginning July 3, 1950. Other members of the 
United States delegation are : 

Alternate United States Member 

Jacques J. Reinstein, Director, Office of German Economic 
Affairs, Department of State 

Special Adviser 

Samuel Reber, Counselor, Office of the United States High 
Commissioner for Germany, Frankfort on the Main, 
Germany 

Assistant to the United States Member 

William C. Trimble, First Secretary, American Embassy, 
London 

Advisers 

John W. Auchincloss, OflSce of German Political Affairs, 
Department of State 

John A. Calhoun, Deputy Director, Office of German Polit- 
ical Affairs, Department of State 

Robert Eisenberg, Economic Specialist, Office of German 
Economic Affairs, Department of State 

George H. Jacobs, Acting Officer in Charge, Office of Ger- 
man Economic Affairs, Department of State 

Brunson MacChesney, Professor of LavF, Northwe.stern 
University Law School, Chicago, 111. 

Covey T. Oliver, Professor of Law, University of Cali- 
fornia Law School, Berkeley, Calif. 

Gardner Palmer, Adviser, Office of Financial and Develop- 
ment Policy, Department of State 

Henry Parkman, United States Representative on Inter- 
national Authority for the Ruhr, American Consulate 
General, Frankfort on the Main, Germany 

John M. Raymond, Assistant Legal Adviser, Office of the 
Legal Adviser, Department of State 



Legal Assistant 

Donald A. Wehmeyer, Assistant to the Legal Adviser, 
Office of the Legal Adviser, Department of State 

Agreement to establish the Intergovernmental 
Study Group on Germany was announced in the 
joint declaration on Germany issued at London 
on May 14, 1950, by Foreign Ministers Acheson, 
Bevin, and Schuman. 

ECOSOC CEIeventh Session) 

The Department of State announced on June 
30 that Isador Lubin, recently named by Presi- 
dent Truman as United States representative to 
the United Nations Economic and Social Council, 
will attend the eleventh session of that body at 
Geneva beginning July 3. Assisting Mr. Lubin at 
this session will be the following : 

Deputy United States Representative 

Walter Kotschnig, Director, Office of United Nations 
Economic and Social Affairs, Department of State 

Advisers 

Robert E. Asher, Alternate United States Representative 
to the Economic Commission for Europe, Geneva 

Kathleen Bell, Office of United Nations Economic and 
Social Affairs, Department of State 

Henry J. Bitterman, Adviser, Office of International 
Finance, Department of the Treasury 

John Gates, Jr., Office of United Nations Economic and 
Social Affairs, Department of State 

Gerhard Colm, Economist, Council of Economic Advisers, 
Executive Office of the President 

Joseph Coppock, Adviser, Office of International Trade 
Policy, Department of State 

Eleanor Dennison, Office of United Nations Economic and 
Social Affairs, Department of State 

Arthur E. Goldsehmidt, Special Assistant to the Secretary, 
Department of the Interior 

Haldore Hanson, Chief, Technical Cooperation Projects 
StatT. Interim Office for Technical Cooperation and 
Development, Department of State 

Gladys Harrison, Assistant General Counsel, Office of the 
Administrator, Federal Security Agency 

Louis Henkin, Division of International Administration, 
Department of State 

Frances Kernohan, Assistant Officer in Charge, United 
Nations Social Affairs, Office of United Nations Eco- 
nomic and Social Affairs, Department of State 

Lewis L. Lorwin, Economic Adviser, Office of International 
Trade, Department of Commerce 

Alvin Roseman, United States Representative for Special- 
ized Agency Affairs, Geneva 

Charles D. Stewart, Assistant Commissioner, Bureau of 
Labor Statistics, Department of Labor 

William Stibravy, Office of Financial and Development 
Policy, Department of State 

Press Relations Officer 

Donald C. Dunham, American Legation, Bern 

Tlie Economic and Social Council was estab- 
lished in accordance with the United Nations 
Charter as one of the principal organs of the 
United Nations for the purpose of promoting 
higher standards of living, full employment, eco- 
nomic and social progress, international cultural 
and educational cooperation, and respect for ob- 
servance of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms. Nine functional commissions, three 



156 



Department of Sfafe Bulletin 



regional commissions, as well as certain standing 
and ad hoc committees and special bodies comprise 
the structure of the Council. Eighteen countries 
are represented on the Council. 

Since its beginning, the Council has worked on 
many projects in the economic and social field, of 
which one of the most recent is the technical assis- 
tance program. Through this project, the Coun- 
cil, in collaboration with the specialized agencies, 
is attempting to overcome conditions of poverty, 
disease, and hunger in underdeveloped countries 
and territories. The Council's Commission on 
Human Rights has prepared a draft international 
covenant on human rights, and draft international 
conventions regarding freedom of information 
and of the press have been formulated by the 
Council's Subcommission on Freedom of Infor- 
mation and of the Press. The Council has been 
active also in such matters as the care of children 
and displaced persons, better conditions of employ- 
ment, the improvement and expansion of produc- 
tion and trade, and the development of adequate 
transport and communications facilities. 

Of the 51 items on the agenda for the forth- 
coming session, the following are of primary 
interest to the United States Government: the 
question of national and international measures 
required to achieve full employment; technical 
assistance for the economic development of under- 
developed areas; methods of financing economic 
development ; convention on statelessness; the con- 
tinuing needs of children; and the development 
of a long-range program of social welfare. In 
addition, the Council will review reports of seven 
functional commissions, three regional commis- 
sions, and eight specialized agencies. The Council 
will make recommendations regarding work in 
the economic and social fields to be undertaken or 
discontinued by these commissions, the General 
Assembly, and the specialized agencies concerned. 

Teaching of Geography 

The Department of State announced on July 11 
that the United States delegation to the United 
Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Or- 
ganization (Unesco) international seminar on the 
teaching of geography as a means for developing 
international understanding, to be held at Mon- 
treal from July 12-August 23, is as follows : 

Chairman 

Zoe Agnes Thralls, professor of education and geography, 
University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, Pa. 

Delegates 

Thomas P. Barton, professor of geography, University of 

Indiana, Bloomington, Ind. 
Sister Mary Ursula Hauk, teacher of geography and 

English, .Johnstown Central Catholic High School, 

Johnstown, Pa. 
Marion H. Seibel, critic teacher, New York State College 

for Teachers, Buffalo, N. Y. 

The topic of study for the seminar, which is one 
of a number of seminars being sponsored by 
Unesco, is "How can the teaching of geography 

Jo/y 24, 7950 



in its various branches — physical geography, eco- 
nomic geography, and human geography — be used 
as a means for developing international under- 
standing?" Emphasis will be placed on teaching 
problems and methods, on the education and train- 
ing of geography teachers, and on the study of 
practical techniques to be applied in the classroom. 
The study groups which will carry out the work 
of the seminar will give consideration also to the 
relationship between geography and other subjects 
of study, the use of audiovisual teaching aids, and 
suggested techniques for the use of schools in war- 
devastated or underdeveloped countries. 



Coffee Report- 



-Continued from page 144 



of years in the annual coffee carry-over would ap- 
pear to support the judgment of the subcommittee. 

Recommendation 8 and the legislation proposed 
thereunder, apparently contemplate establishing 
a withholding tax implemented by a tentative 
substantial withholding from transfers pending 
determination by the Commissioner of Internal 
Revenue of the nature and results of the transac- 
tions involved within the United States. The ad- 
ministration of such a withholding tax would ap- 
pear to be a difficult administrative task involving 
controls and impediments to transfers which 
might become of foreign policy concern. I believe 
that this proposal should be carefully studied by 
the appropriate agencies. It is my understanding 
that the tax revision bill now pending before other 
committees of the Congress contains recommenda- 
tions for imposing a tax on the capital gains of 
nonresident aliens and that the matter will re- 
ceive careful attention. 

There are a number of places in the body of the 
report where the drafting might have been im- 
proved from the viewpoint of our foreign affairs. 
I should like merely to refer to one case in which 
different language would have had a greater ap- 
peal to our good neighbors to the soutTi. This is 
the discussion of the award by the Brazilian Gov- 
ernment of the Order of the Southern Cross to 
Mr. Robbins and Mr. Kurtz which begins on page 
16 and concludes at the top of page 17. 

Before closing this statement and attempting to 
answer any questions you may wish to ask, I should 
like to ask your aid in giving a fully satisfactory 
answer to a question put to Secretary Acheson 
yesterday morning jointly by the Ambassadors 
of the coffee-producing countries. This question 
was whether the report of your subcommittee is 
to be considered as marking a change in United 
States foreign policy as it relates to Latin Amer- 
ica. I believe that real doubt as to the intentions 
of this Government has been created by the report. 
The Department is convinced that this is not the 
intent of the Committee and will, of course, do its 
best to dispel the doubt. I earnestly request that 
you, in the manner you may consider most ap- 
propriate, help the Department to answer the 
Ambassadors' question. 

157 



The United States in the United Nations 



July 15-21 

Interim Committee 

Continuing consideration of the report of the 
Commission for Eritrea, the Interim Committee 
heard the views of Ethiopia, Italy, New Zealand, 
Canada, and the United States on the disposition 
of that former Italian colony. Charles P. Noyes 
of the United States reiterated that his Govern- 
ment continues to believe "the best and most equit- 
able solution would be the immediate incorpora- 
tion of all of Eritrea, excluding the Western 
Province, into Ethiopia." The United States is 
willing, however, to give careful consideration to 
a compromise solution involving federation of 
Eritrea and Ethiopia under the sovereignty of the 
Ethiopian crown. Such a formula, he continued, 
"holds out the best promise of a harmonious recon- 
ciliation of all the interests involved." He ex- 
plained the United States opposition to either 
independence or trusteeship for Eritrea. 

Ethiopia favored the union of Eritrea with 
Ethiopia and opposed independence, the solution 
with which Italy agreed. Both Canada and New 
Zealand supported our view that some form of 
federation between Eritrea and Ethiopia would be 
most likely to harmonize conflicting interests. 

International Court of Justice 

An advisory opinion on the international status 
of Southwest Africa was delivered by the Inter- 
national Court of Justice at The Hague on July 11 
and on the second phase of the case concerning 
interpretation of the peace treaties with Bulgaria, 
Hungary, and Rumania on July 18. 

In the former opinion, the Court stated its 
unanimous view that Southwest Africa is a terri- 
tory under international mandate assumed by the 
Union of South Africa on December 16, 1920. In 
its opinion, requested by the General Assembly, 
the Court, in answer to three specific questions, 
decided: (a) by a 12-2 vote, that the Union of 
South Africa continues to have international obli- 
gations toward the territory resulting from the 
mandate, including the obligation to submit re- 
ports on the territory and to transmit petitions 
from its inhabitants, with supervisory functions 



being exercised by the United Nations in place of 
the League of Nations and reference to the Perma- 
nent Court of Intei'national Justice being replaced 
by reference to the International Court of Justice ; 
(b) unanimously, that the provisions of chapter 
XII of the United Nations Charter (pertaining to 
the international trusteeship system) are appli- 
cable to the territory of Southwest Africa in the 
sense that they provide a means by which it may 
be brought under the trusteeship system, but, by 8 
votes to 6, that the Charter imposes no legal obli- 
gation on the Union of South Africa to place the 
territory under trusteeship ; and (c) unanimously, 
that the Union of South Africa, acting alone, is 
not competent to modify the international status 
of Southwest Africa but that such competence 
rests with the Union acting with the consent of the 
United Nations. 

In general, the opinion sustained the views pre- 
sented to the Court by the United States. Written 
statements wei'e also filed by Egypt, India, Poland, 
and the Union of South Africa, and oral state- 
ments were presented on behalf of the Philippines, 
the Union of South Africa, and the United Nations 
Secretary-General. 

In the second case, the Court, also in reply to 
questions from the General Assembly, by a vote of 
11-2, decided that, if one party is obligated but 
fails to appoint a representative to a treaty com- 
mission under the peace treaties with Bulgaria, 
Hungary, and Rumania, the United Nations 
Secretary-General is not authorized, upon the 
request of the other party to the dispute, to appoint 
the third member of the Commission. 

On March 30 the Court had answered affirma- 
tively the first two questions referred to it by the 
Assembly in connection with the alleged human 
rights violations in Bulgaria, Hungary, and 
Rumania. Those questions were (1) whether a 
dispute subject to the treaty settlement provisions 
existed, and (2) if so, whether the three countries 
were obligated to appoint treaty commission rep- 
resentatives. Benjamin V. Colien presented oral 
argument on behalf of the United States in both 
phases of the case. The Court's opinion in the 
second phase rejected the contentions of the 
United States. 



158 



Deparfmenf of State Bulletin 



Trusteeship Council 

Oil July 14 the Trusteeship Council adopted a 
resolution proposed by the United States and 
Argentina which expressed the hope that the ad- 
ministering authorities of British and French 
Togoland would proceed with their plans for solu- 
tion of the Ewe problem in those two territories 
and would insure equitable representation on the 
Consultative Commission of the various gi'oups 
residing in the territories; requested a progress 
report at the next Council session; and recom- 
mended that, pending final settlement of the prob- 
lem, the common traits and traditions of the Ewe 
people in the two trust territories be preserved. 
In the voting, only Iraq and the Philippines 
opposed the resolution, while China abstained. 

A special report to the General Assembly trans- 
mitting the draft trusteeship agreement for the 
former Italian colony of Somaliland was approved 
on July 14. On July 20, the Council approved a 
request to the Assembly for funds for a visiting 
mission to that territory, if the draft trusteeship 
agreement receives Assembly approval, as well as 
to the trust territories of Tanganyika and Ruanda- 
Urundi. 

In connection with the administering powers' 
annual reports on the trust -territories, the Coun- 
cil's repoil to the Security Council on the United 
States annual report on the Trust Territory of the 
Pacific Islands, a strategic area, was adopted on 
July 14 and the Council's report to the General 
Assembly on the British Togoland report on July 
20. On the latter date, the Council also gave its 
approval to the first two parts of its Assembly 
reports on Australia's report on Nauru and on the 
French Togoland report. 



Economic and Social Council 

The Economic and Social Council, in the third 
week of its eleventh session at Geneva, concluded 
general debate on full employment and referred 
the item to the Economic Committee for more 
detailed study. It also completed action on the 
reports of the Population and Social Commissions 
and of the Commission on Status of Women. 

For its discussion of full employment, the Coun- 
cil had before it the report of a group of experts 
on "National and International Measures for Full 
Employment," on which member governments had 
been invited to submit their views. Isidor Lubin 
of the United States, in his statement on this re- 
port, told the Council that American people will 
not again tolerate a major depression. "Through 
our free institutions," he said, "we shall pursue a 
policy of steadily rising production and employ- 
ment. We shall do this not for domestic reasons 
alone. We shall do it, also, because we recognize 
the place of American economy in the world 
economic and political structure." 

Following a discussion of the specific recom- 
mendations of the experts' report, Mr. Lubin 



submitted a proposal that United Nations member 
governments report periodically to the Secretary- 
General on their economic situation and their 
policies and programs for employment. The Sec- 
retary-General would analyze the reports and 
make studies on the problems of full employment 
in the world economy. The reports and studies 
would be considered by the Economic and Employ- 
ment Commission, whicli would make recom- 
mendations for action to the Council. The United 
States further recommended preparation of a 
report on underemployment, particularly in under- 
developed countries. 

In connection with the consideration of the 
report of the Social Commission, the Council ap- 
proved a long-range work program for the Com- 
niission, a broad program for social rehabilitation 
of the physically handicapped, and plans for revi- 
sion and expansion of the United States advisory 
social welfare services. The Secretary-General 
was asked to prepare a report on the world social 
situation. Welfare of the aged, migration, social 
rehabilitation of the physically handicapped and 
a declaration of child rights were the topics of 
other resolutions. 

Turning to the report of the Commission on the 
Status of Women, the Council approved resolu- 
tions dealing with a possible draft convention 
grantmg women equal political rights, as well as a 
convention on the nationality of married women 
which the International Law Commission was 
asked to draft. Political education for women, the 
role of women in the technical assistance program, 
the application of penal law to women, educational 
opportunities for women, the problem of Greek 
mothers whose children have not yet been repatri- 
ated, and the plights of male and female survivors 
of Nazi concentration camps who were victims of 
so-called scientific experiments were the subject of 
other proposals. The United States supported aU 
of these resolutions. 

With approval of the Population Commission's 
report, the Council endorsed recommendations for 
studies by the Secretary- General of the interrela- 
^on of demographic, economic, and social factors. 
This involved a special field study of this problem 
in India, a study which Walter Kotschnig, for the 
United States, strongly supported in the Social 
Committee's discussion. The Secretary-General 
was also asked to press forward studies on migra- 
tion, including a study of practical measures^for 
the international financing of European migration 
to underdeveloped areas. Another of the recom- 
mendations is to call the attention of the Technical 
Assistance Board to the Commission's recom- 
mendations on the demographic aspects of tech- 
nical assistance. Unless some of the related demo- 
graphic aspects were elucidated, Mr. Kotschnig 
said in the Social Committee, it might be difficult 
to carry through some parts of the technical 
assistance program. 



July 24, 1950 



159 




General Policy Page 

Justice Based on Human Rights: A Threat to 

TjT-anny. Address by the President . . 123 

Assistance Placed at Disposal of Unified 
Command in Korea. Statement by 
Secretary Acheson 130 

Ambassador Muccio Commended on Per- 
formance of Duty in Korea 130 

Korean Foreign Minister Expresses Gratitude 

for U.S. Aid 130 

United States Policy in the Korean Crisis . . 130 

Soviet World-Peace Appeal Called Propa- 
ganda Trick. Statement by Secretary 
Acheson 131 

Soviet "Beetle" Charge Labeled Ridiculous 
Propaganda : 
Communist Propaganda Aims To Cover 

Pest Control Failure 134 

U.S. Reply to Soviet Note 134 

U.S. Answers Czechoslovak Charges . . . 135 

Treaty Information 

Soviet Tactics Again Stall Negotiations on 
Austrian Treaty. Statement by Secre- 
tary Acheson 131 

Soviet Delay in Repatriating German War 
Prisoners — Complete Disregard of Hu- 
man Rights 132 

U.S.-Spain Amend Air Agreement 135 

The Need for an International Trade Organ- 
ization. Views of Maurice J. Tobin, 
Secretary of Labor 136 

Fourth Session of the Contracting Parties to 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade. By Melvin E. Sinn 150 

The United Nations and 
Specialized Agencies 

The United States in the United Nations . . 158 



Occupation Matters page 
Soviet Delay in Repatriating German War 
Prisoners — Complete Disregard of Hu- 
man Rights 132 

National Security 

Scope of Atomic Energy Program Expanded. 

Statement by the President 129 

International Organizations and 
Conferences 

The World Cotton Situation — Report on 
Ninth Plenary Meeting of International 

Cotton Advisory Committee 145 

Fourth Session of the Contracting Parties to 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and 

Trade. By Melvin E. Sinn 150 

German Participation in International Bodies . 154 
U.S. Delegations: 

Agricultural Industries 155 

Sugar Council 155 

High Tension Electric Systems 155 

Study Group on Germany 156 

Ecosoc (Eleventh Session) 156 

Teaching of Geography 167 

International Information and 
Cultural Affairs 

Americans Visiting Abroad 133 

The Congress 

Clarification Asked on Senate Coffee Report. 
Statement by Edward G. Miller Assist- 
ant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs . 140 

The Department 

Administering the Displaced Persons Act of 
1948, as Amended. By Herv6 J. 
L'Heureux 125 



'wn^}mml(yy^ 



Melvin E. Sinn, author of the article on the fourth session of the 
Contracting Parties to GATT, is foreign affairs analyst on the Com- 
mercial Policy Staff. Mr. Sinn also accompanied the U.S. delegation 
to the Geneva meeting. 



U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTIN6 OFFICEi 1*10 



A- 



iJAe/ ^eha/yimteni/ ,(w tftale^ 




THE KOREAN SITUATION: 

The President's Message to the Congress 163 

Authority of the President To Repel Attack 173 

Chronology of Events, 1949-50 179 

EXPANDED INFORMATION PROGRAM VITAL TO 

NATIONAL SECURITY 194 

BENELUX— A CASE STUDY IN ECONOMIC UNION • 

Ky Howard J. Hilton, Jr 181 



For complete contents see back cover 



Vol. XXIII, No. 578 
July 31, 1950 



^,jl».NT 0«, 




^<V»"» o. 




.jAe z!/^€fi(M(tment /w c/lciie 



bulletin 



Vol. XXIII, No. 578 • Publication 3926 
July 31, 1950 



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(AS..'w^. o~l ^^^rzA^-^y^ji^J::, 



^. if, i ')^'^ 

The Korean Situation: Its Significance to the People 
of the United States 



The Presidents Message to the Congress 



[Released to the press hy the White House July ifl] 



I am reporting to the Congress on the situation 
which has been created in Korea and on the actions 
■which this Nation has tal^en, as a member of the 
United Nations, to meet this situation. I am also 
laying before the Congress my views concerning 
the significance of these events for this Nation and 
the world and certain recommendations for legis- 
lative action which, I believe, should be taken at 
this time. 

Background on Korean Invasion 

^At 4 o'clock in the morning, Sunday, June 25, 
Korean time, armed forces from north of the 38th 
parallel invaded the Republic of Korea. 

The Eepublic of Korea was established as an 
independent nation in August 1948, after a free 
election held under the auspices of the United Na- 
tions. This election, which was originally in- 
tended to cover all of Korea, was held only in the 
part of the Korean peninsula south of the 38th 
parallel, because the Soviet Government, ip^hich 
occupied the peninsula north of that parallel, re- 
fused to allow the election to be held in the area 
under its control. 

The United States, and a majority of the other 
members of the United Nations, have recognized 
the Republic of Korea. The admission of Korea 
to the United Nations has been blocked by the 
Soviet veto. 

In December 1948, the Soviet Government 
stated that it had withdrawn its occupation troops 
from northern Korea and that a local regime had 
been established there. The authorities in north- 
ern Korea continued to refuse to permit United 
Nations observers to pass the 38th parallel to su- 
pervise or observe a free election or to verify the 
withdrawal of Soviet troops. 

Nevertheless, the United Nations continued its 
efforts to obtain a freely elected government for 
all of Korea, and at the time of the attack, a United 

My 37, 7950 



Nations Commission, made up of representatives 
of seven nations — Australia, China, El Salvador, 
France, India, the Philippines, and Turkey — was 
in the Republic of Korea. 

Just 1 day before the attack of June 25, field ob- 
servers attached to the United Nations Commis- 
sion on Korea had completed a routine tour, last- 
ing 2 weeks, of the military positions of the 
Republic of Korea south of the 38th parallel. The 
report of these international observers stated that 
the army of the Republic of Korea was organized 
entirely for defense. The observers found the 
parallel guarded on the south side by small bodies 
of troops in scattered outposts, with roving pa- 
trols. They found no concentration of troops and 
no preparation to attack. The observers con- 
cluded that the absence of armor, air support, 
heavy artillei-y, and military supplies precluded 
any offensive action by the forces of the Republic 
of Korea. 

On June 25, within a few hours after the in- 
vasion was launched from the north, the Commis- 
sion reported to the United Nations that the at- 
tack had come without warning and without prov- 
ocation. 

The reports from the Commission make it un- 
mistakably clear that the attack was naked, de- 
liberate, unprovoked aggression, without a shadow 
of justification. 

This outright breach of the peace, in violation of 
the United Nations Charter, created a real and 
present danger to the security of every nation. 
This attack was, in addition, a demonstration of 
contempt for the United Nations, since it was an 
attempt to settle, by military aggression, a ques- 
tion which the United Nations had been working 
to settle by peaceful means. 

The attack on the Republic of Korea, therefore, 
was a clear challenge to the basic principles of the 
United Nations Charter and to the specific actions 
taken by the United Nations in Korea. If this 



163 



challenge had not been met squarely, the effective- 
ness of the United Nations would have been all 
but ended, and the hope of mankind that the 
United Nations would develop into an institution 
of world order would have been shattered. 

U.N. Action 

Prompt action was imperative. The Security 
Council of the United Nations met, at the request 
of the United States, in New York at 2 o'clock in 
the afternoon, Sunday, June 25, eastern daylight 
time. Since there is a 1-i-hour difference in time 
between Korea and New York, this meant that 
the Council convened just 24 hours after the at- 
tack began. 

At this meeting, the Security Council passed a 
resolution which called for the immediate cessa- 
tion of hostilities and for the withdrawal of the 
invading troops to the 38th parallel,^ and which 
i-equested the members of the United Nations to re- 
frain from giving aid to the northern aggi'essors 
and to assist in the execution of this resolution. 
The representative of the Soviet Union to the 
Security Council stayed away from the meeting, 
and the Soviet Government has refused to support 
the Council's resolution. 

The attack launched on June 25 moved ahead 
rapidly. The tactical surprise gained by the ag- 
gressors, and their superiority in planes, tanks, 
and artillery, forced the lightly armed defenders 
to retreat. The speed, the scale, and the coordina- 
tion of the attack left no doubt that it had been 
plotted long in advance. 

Wlien the attack came, our Ambassador to 
Korea, John J. Muccio, began the immediate evac- 
uation of American women and children from the 
danger zone. To protect this evacuation, air 
cover and sea cover were provided by the Com- 
mander in Chief of United States Forces in the 
Far East, General of the Army Douglas MacAr- 
thur. In resjjonse to urgent appeals from the 
Government of Korea, General MacArthur was 
immediately authorized to send supplies of am- 
munition to the Korean defenders. These sup- 
plies were sent by air transport, with fighter pro- 
tection. The United States Seventh Fleet was or- 
dered north from the PhilipiDines, so that it might 
be available in the area in case of need. 

Throughout Monday, June 26, the invaders con- 
tinued their attack with no heed to the resolution 
of the Security Council of the United Nations. 
Accordingly, in order to support the resolution, 
and on the unanimous advice of our civil and mili- 
tary authorities, I ordered United States air and 
sea forces to give the Korean Government troops 
cover and support. 

On Tuesday, June 27, when the United Nations 
Commission in Korea had reported that the north- 
ern troops had neither ceased hostilities nor with- 
drawn to the 38th parallel, the United Nations 

' Bulletin of July 3, 1050, p. 4. 
164 



Security Council met again and passed a second 
resolution recommending that members of the 
United Nations furnish to the Republic of Korea 
such aid as might be necessary to repel the attack 
and to restore international peace and security in 
the area.^ The representative of the Soviet Union 
to the Security Council stayed away from this 
meeting also, and the Soviet Government has re- 
fused to support the Council's resolution. 

World Response to U.N. Action 

The vigorous and unhesitating actions of the 
ITnited Nations and the United States in the face 
of this aggression met with an immediate and 
overwhelming response throughout the free world. 
The first blow of aggression had brought dismay 
and anxiety to the hearts of men the world over. 
The fateful events of the 1930's, when aggression 
unopposed bred more aggression and eventually 
war, were fresh in our memory. 

But the free nations had learned the lesson of 
historJ^ Their determined and united actions up- 
lifted the spirit of free men everywhere. As a 
result, where there had been dismay there is hope ; 
where there had been anxiety there is firm 
determination. 

Fifty-two of the 59 member nations have sup- 
])orted the United Nations action to restore peace 
in Korea. 

A number of member nations have offered mili- 
tary support or other types of assistance for the 
United Nations action to repel the aggressors in 
Korea. In a third resolution, passed on July 7, 
the Security Council requested the United States 
to designate a commander for all the forces of the 
members of the United Nations in the Korean op- 
eration and authorized these forces to fly the 
United Nations flag.^ In response to this resolu- 
tion. General MacArthur has been designated as 
commander of these forces. These are important 
steps forward in the development of a United 
Nations system of collective security. Already, 
aircr*t of two nations — Australia and Great 
Britain — and naval vessels of five nations — Aus- 
tralia, Canada, Great Britain, the Netherlands, 
and New Zealand — -have been made available for 
operations in the Korean area, along with forces 
of Korea and the United States, under General 
MacArthur's command. The other offers of as- 
sistance that have been and will continue to be 
made will be coordinated by the United Nations 
and by the unified command, in order to support 
the effort in Korea to maximum advantage. 

All the members of the United Nations who 
have endorsed the action of the Security Council 
realize the significance of the step that has been 
taken. This united and resolute action to put 
down lawless aggression is a milestone toward the 
establishment of a rule of law among nations. 



"■ Bulletin of July 3. 1950, p. 7. 
= Bulletin of July 17, 1950, p. 83. 



Department of Stale Bulletin 



Only a few countries have failed tb support the 
common action to restore the peace. The most 
important of these is the Soviet Union. 

Soviet Attitude Toward Restoring Peace 

Since the Soviet representative had refused to 
participate in the meetings of the Security Coun- 
cil, which took action regarding Korea, the United 
States brought the matter directly to the attention 
of the Soviet Government in Moscow. On June 
27, we requested the Soviet Government, in view 
of its known close relations with the north Korean 
regime, to use its influence to have the invaders 
withdraw at once.^ 

The Soviet Government, in its reply on June 29 ^ 
and in subsequent statements, has taken the posi- 
tion that the attack launched by the north Korean 
forces was provoked by the Republic of Korea and 
that the actions of the United Nations Security 
Council were illegal. 

These Soviet claims are flatly disproved by the 
facts. 

The attitude of the Soviet Government, toward 
the aggression against the Republic of Korea, is 
in direct contradiction to its often expressed in- 
tention to work with other nations to achieve 
peace in the world. 

For our part, we shall continue to support the 
United Nations action to restore peace in the 
Korean area. 



U.S. Support of U.N. Resolutions 

As the situation has developed, I have author- 
ized a number of measures to be taken. Within 
the firet week of the fighting. General MacArthur 
reported, after a visit to the front, that the forces 
from north Korea were continuing to drive south, 
and further support to the Republic of Korea was 
needed. Accordingly;, General MacArthur was 
authorized to use United States Army troops in 
Korea and to use United States aircraft of the 
Air Force and the Navy to conduct missions 
against specific military targets in Korea north of 
the 38th parallel, where necessary, to carry out 
the United Nations resolution. General Mac- 
Arthur was also directed to blockade the Korean 
coast. 

The attacking forces from the north have con- 
tinued to move forward, although their advance 
has been slowed down. The troops of the Re- 
public of Korea, though initially overwhelmed 
by the tanks and artilleiy of the surprise attack 
by the invaders, have been reorganized and are 
fighting bravely. 

United States forces, as they have arrived in 
the area, have fought with gi'eat valor. The Army 
troops have been conducting a very difficult delay- 
ing operation with skill and determination, out- 

* Bulletin of July 10, 1950, p. 47. 
' Bulletin of July 10, 1950, p. 48. 

July 31, J 950 



numbered many times over by attacking troops, 
spearheaded by tanks. Despite the bad weather 
of the rainy season, our troops have been valiantly 
supported by the air and naval forces of both the 
United States and other members of the United 
Nations. 

Nature of Military Action in Korea 

In this connection, I think it is important that 
the nature of our military action in Korea be un- 
derstood. It should be made perfectly clear that 
the action was undertaken as a matter of basic 
moral principle. The United States was going to 
the aid of a nation established and supported by 
the United Nations and unjustifiably attacked by 
an aggressor force. Consequently, we were not 
deterred by the relative immediate superiority of 
the attacking forces, by the fact that our base of 
supplies was 5,000 miles away, or by the further 
fact that we would have to supply our forces 
through port facilities that are far from satis- 
factory. 

We are moving as rapidly as possible to bring to 
bear on the fighting front larger forces and heavier 
equipment and to increase our naval and air su- 
periority. But it will take time, men, and material 
to slow down the forces of aggression, bring those 
forces to a halt, and throw them back. 

Nevertheless, our assistance to the Republic of 
Korea has prevented the invaders from crushing 
that nation in a few days — as they had evidently 
expected to do. We are determined to support the 
United Nations in its effort to restore peace and 
security to Korea, and its effort to assure the peo- 
ple of Korea an opportunity to choose their own 
form of government free from coercion, as ex- 
pressed in the General Assembly resolutions of 
November 14, 1947, and December 12, 1948. 

Implications for World Peace 

In addition to the direct military effort we and 
other members of the United Nations are making 
in Korea, the outbreak of aggression there re- 
quires us to consider its implications for peace 
throughout the world. The attack upon the Re- 
public of Korea makes it plain beyond all doubt 
that the international Communist movement is 
prepared to use armed invasion to conquer inde- 
pendent nations. We must, therefore, recognize 
the possibility that armed aggression may take 
place in other areas. 

In view of this, I have already directed that 
United States forces in support of the Philippines 
be strengthened and that militaiy assistance be 
speeded up to the Philippine Government and to 
the Associated States of Indochina aJid to the 
forces of France in Indochina. I have also or- 
dered the United States Seventh Fleet to prevent 
any attack upon Formosa, and I have requested the 
Chinese Government on Formosa to cease all air 
and sea operations against the mainland. These 

165 



steps were at once reported to the United Nations 
Security Council.'^ 

Our action in regard to Formosa was a matter of 
elementary security. The peace and stability of 
the Pacific area had been violently disturbed by 
the attack on Korea. Attacks elsewhere in the 
Pacific area would have enlarged the Korean 
crisis, thereby rendering much more difficult the 
carrying out of our obligations to the United 
Nations in Korea. 

In order that there may be no doubt in any 
quarter about our intentions regarding Formosa, 
I wish to state that the United States has no ter- 
ritorial ambitions whatever concerning that island, 
nor do we seek for ourselves any special position 
or privilege on Formosa. The present military 
neutralization of Formosa is without prejudice to 
political questions affecting that island. Our de- 
sire is that Formosa not become embroiled in 
hostilities disturbing to the peace of the Pacific 
and that all questions affecting Formosa be set- 
tled by peaceful means as envisaged in the Charter 
of the United Nations. With peace reestablished, 
even the most complex political questions are sus- 
ceptible of solution. In the presence of brutal 
and unprovoked aggression, however, some of 
these questions may have to be held in abeyance 
in the interest of the essential security of all. 

The outbreak of aggression in the Far East does 
not, of course, lessen, but instead increases, the 
importance of the common strength of the free 
nations in other parts of the world. The attack 
on the Republic of Korea gives added urgency to 
the efforts of the free nations to increase and to 
unify their common strength, in order to deter a 
potential aggressor. 

To be able to accomplish this objective, the free 
nations must maintain a sufficient defensive mili- 
tary strength in being and, even more important, 
a solid basis of economic strength, capable of 
rapid mobilization in the event of emergency. 

Growing Strength of Free World 

The strong cooperative efforts that have been 
made by the United States and other free nations, 
since the end of World War II, to restore eco- 
nomic vitality to Europe and other parts of the 
world and the cooperative efforts we have begun 
in order to increase the productive capacity of un- 
derdeveloped areas are exti-emely important con- 
tributions to the growing economic strength of all 
the free nations and will be of even greater im- 
portance in the future. 

We have been increasing our common defensive 
strength under the treaty of Eio de Janeii-o and 
the North Atlantic Treaty, which are collective 
security arrangements within the framework of 
the United Nations Charter. We have also taken 
action to bolster the military defenses of indi- 

" Bulletin of July 3, 1950, p. 7. 
166 



vidual free nations, such as Greece, Turkey, and 
Iran. 

The defenses of the North Atlantic Treaty area 
were considered a matter of great urgency by the 
North Atlantic Council in London this spring. 
Recent events make it even more urgent than it 
was at that time to build and maintain these 
defenses. 

Under all the circumstances, it is apparent that 
the United States is required to increase its mili- 
tary strength and preparedness not only to deal 
with the aggression in Korea but also to increase 
our common defense, with other free nations, 
against further aggression. 

increased Strength Needed by U.S. 

The increased strength which is needed falls 
into three categories. 

In the first place, to meet the situation in Korea, 
we shall need to send additional men, equipment, 
and supplies to General MacArthur's command 
as rapidly as possible. 

In the second place, the world situation requires 
that we increase substantially the size and materiel 
support of our armed forces, over and above the 
increases which are needed in Korea. 

In the third place, we must assist the free na- 
tions associated with us in common defense to 
augment their military strength. 

Of the three categories I have just enumerated, 
the first two involve increases in our own military 
manpower, and in the materiel support that our 
men must have. 



MILITARY MANPOWER 

To meet the increased requirements for military 
manpower, I have authorized the Secretary of De- 
fense to exceed the budgeted strength of military 
personnel for the Army, Navy, and Air Force and 
to use the Selective Service system to such extent 
as may be required in order to obtain the increased 
strength which we must have. I have also author- 
ized the Secretary of Defense to meet the need for 
military manpower by calling into active Federal 
service as many National Guard units and as many 
units and individuals of the Reserve forces of the 
Army, Navy, and Air Forces as may be required. 

I have directed the Secretary of Defense and the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff to keep our military man- 
power needs under constant study, in order that 
further increases may be made as required. There 
are now statutory limits on the sizes of the armed 
forces, and, since we may need to exceed these lim- 
its, I recommend that they be removed. 

SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT 

To increase the level of our military strength 
will also require additional supplies and equip- 
ment. Procurement of many items has already 
been accelerated, in some cases for use in Korea, in 

Department of Stale Bulletin 



others to replace reserve stocks which are now be- 
ing sent to Korea, and in still others to add to our 
general level of preparedness. Further increases 
in procurement, resulting in a higher rate of pro- 
duction of military equipment and supplies, will 
be necessary. 



APPROPRIATIONS 

The increases in the size of the armed forces, and 
the additional supplies and equipment which will 
be needed, will require additional appropriations. 
Within the next few days, I will transmit to the 
Congress specific requests for appropriations in the 
amount of approximately 10 billion dollars. 

Tliese requests for appropriations will be ad- 
dressed to the needs of our own military forces. 
Earlier, I referred to the fact that we must also 
assist other free nations in the strengthening of 
our common defenses. The action we must take 
to accomplish this is just as important as the 
measures required to strengthen our own forces. 

The authorization bill for the Mutual Defense 
Assistance Program for 1951, now before the 
House of Representatives, is an important imme- 
diate step toward the strengthening of our collec- 
tive security. It should be enacted without de- 
lay. 



Strengthening Other Free Nations 

But it is now clear that the free nations of the 
world must step up their common security pro- 
gram. The other nations associated with us in 
the Mutual Defense Assistance Program, like our- 
selves, will need to divert additional economic re- 
sources to defense purposes. In order to enable 
the nations associated with us to make their maxi- 
mum contribution to our common defense, further 
assistance on our part will be required. Addi- 
tional assistance may also be needed to increase 
the strength of certain other free nations whose 
security is vital to our own. 

In the case of the North Atlantic area, these re- 
quirements will reflect the consultations now going 
on with the other nations associated with us in the 
North Atlantic Treaty. As soon as it is possible 
to determine what each nation will need to do, I 
shall lay before the Congress a request for such 
funds as are shown to be necessary to the attain- 
ment and maintenance of our common strength at 
an adequate level. 

The steps which we must take to support the 
United Nations action in Korea, and to increase 
our own strength and the common defense of the 
free world, will necessarily have repercussions 
upon our domestic economy. 

Many of our young men are in battle now, or 
soon will be. Others must be trained. The equip- 
ment and supplies they need, and those required 
for adequate emergency reserves, must be pro- 
duced. They must be made available promptly, 

July 31, 1950 



at reasonable cost, and without disrupting the 
efficient functioning of the economy. 

Protecting Economic Growth 

We must continue to recognize that our strength 
is not to be measured in military terms alone. Our 
power to join in a common defense of peace rests 
fundamentally on the productive capacity and 
energies of our people. In all that we do, there- 
fore, we must make sure that the economic 
strength which is at the base of our security is 
not impaired, but continues to grow. 

Our economy has tremendous productive power. 
Our total output of goods and services is now 
running at an annual i-ate of nearly 270 billion 
dollars — over 100 billion dollars higher than in 
1939. The rate is now about 13 billion dollars 
higher than a year ago and about 8 billion dollars 
higher than the previous record date reached in 
19-18. All the foregoing figures have been adjusted 
for price changes and are, therefore, a measure of 
actual output. The index of industrial production, 
now at 197, is 12 percent higher than the average 
for last year and 81 percent higher than in 1939. 

We now have 611/2 million people in civilian em- 
ployment. There are 16 million more people in 
productive jobs than there were in 1939. We are 
now producing 11 million more tons of steel a year 
than in the peak war year 1944. Electric power 
output has risen from 128 billion kilowatt hours 
in 1939, to 228 billion hours in 1944, to 317 billion 
hours now. Food production is about a third 
higher than it ever was before the war and is prac- 
tically as high as it was during the war years, when 
we were sending far more food abroad than we 
are now. 

The potential productive power of our economy 
is even greater. We can achieve some immediate 
increase in production by employing men and fa- 
cilities not now fully utilized. And we can con- 
tinue to increase our total annual output each year, 
by putting to use the increasing skills of our grow- 
ing population and the higher productive capacity 
which results from plant expansion, new inven- 
tions, and more efficient methods of production. 

With this enormous economic strength, the new 
and necessary programs I am now recommending 
can be undertaken with confidence in the ability 
of our economy to bear the strains involved. Nev- 
ertheless, the magnitude of the demands for mili- 
tary purposes that are now foreseeable, in an 
economy which is already operating at a very high 
level, will require substantial redirection of eco- 
nomic resources. 



ACTION AGAINST SHORTAGES 

Under the program for increasing military 
strength which I have outlined above, military 
and related procurement will need to be expanded 
at a more rapid rate than total production can 

167 



be expanded. Some materials were in short supply 
even before the Korean situation developed. The 
steel industry, for example, was operating at ca- 
pacity levels and, even so, was not able to satisfy 
all market demands. Some other construction 
materials, and certain other products, were also 
under pressure and their prices were rising — even 
before the outbi'eak in Korea. 

The substantial speed-up of military procure- 
ment will intensify these shortages. Action must 
be taken to insure that these shortages do not inter- 
fere with or delay the materials and the supplies 
needed for the national defense. 



PROTECTION AGAINST INFLATION 

Further, the dollars spent now for military pur- 
poses will have a magnified effect upon the econ- 
omy as a whole, since they will be added to the high 
level of current civilian demand. These increased 
pressures, if neglected, could drive us into a gen- 
eral inflationary situation. The best evidence of 
this is the recent price advances in many raw 
materials and in the cost of living, even upon the 
mere expectancy of increased military outlays. 

In these circumstances, we must take action to 
insure that the increased national defense needs 
will be met and that in the process we do not bring 
on an inflation, with its resulting hardship for 
every family. 

At the same time, we must recognize that it will 
be necessary for a number of years to support 
continuing defense expenditures, including assist- 
ance to other nations, at a higher level than we 
had previously planned. Therefore, the economic 
measures we take now must be planned and used 
in such a manner as to develop and maintain our 
economic strength for the long run as well as the 
short run. 



SAFEGUARDS THROUGH LEGISLATION 

I am recommending certain legislative measures 
to help achieve these objectives. I believe that 
each of them should be promptly enacted. We 
must be sure to take the steps that are necessai-y 
now, or we shall surely be required to take much 
more drastic steps later on. 

First, we should adopt such direct measures as 
are now necessary to assure prompt and adeqiuite 
supplies of goods for military and essential civil- 
ian use. I, therefore, recommend that the Con- 
gress now enact legislation authorizing the 
Government to establish priorities and allocate 
materials as necessary to promote the national 
security; to limit the use of materials for nones- 
sential purposes; to prevent inventory hoarding; 
and to requisition supplies and materials needed 
for the national defense, particularly excessive and 
unnecessary inventories. 

Second, we must pi'omptly adopt some general 
measures to compensate for the growth of demand 
caused by the expansion of military programs in a 



period of high civilian incomes. I am directing all 
executive agencies to conduct a detailed review of 
Government progi-ams, for the purpose of modify- 
ing them wherever practicable to lessen the de- 
mand upon services, commodities, raw materials, 
manpower, and facilities which are in competition 
with those needed for national defense. The Gov- 
ernment, as well as the public, must exercise great 
restraint in the use of those goods and services 
which are needed for our increased defense efforts. 

Increase in Revenues 

Nevertheless, the increased appropriations for 
the Department of Defense, plus the defense-re- 
lated appropriations which I have recently sub- 
mitted for power development and atomic energy, 
and others which will be necessary for such pur- 
poses as stockpiling, will mean sharply increased 
Federal expenditures. For this reason, we should 
increase Federal revenues more sharply than I 
have previously recommended, in order to reduce 
the inflationary effect of the Government deficit. 

There are two fundamental principles which 
must guide us in framing measures to obtain these 
additional revenues : 

(A) We must make every effort to finance the 
greatest possible amount of needed expenditures 
by taxation. The increase of taxes is our basic 
weaj^on in offsetting the inflationary pressures ex- 
erted by enlarged government expenditures. 
Heavier taxes will make general controls less 
necessary. 

(B) We must provide for a balanced system of 
taxation which makes a fair distribution of the 
tax burden among the different groups of indi- 
viduals and business concerns in the Nation. 
A balanced tax program should also have as a 
major aim the elimination of profiteering. 

At an appropriate time, as soon as the neces- 
sary studies are completed, I shall present to the 
Congress a program based on these principles to 
assui'e the financing of our needs in a manner 
which will be fair to all our citizens, which will 
help prevent inflation, and which will maintain 
the fiscal position of the Nation in the soundest 
possible condition. 

Control of Credit 

As a further important safeguard against in- 
flation, we shall need to restrain credit expansion. 
I recommend that the Congress now authorize the 
control of consumer credit and credit used for 
commodity speculation. In the housing field, 
where Government credit is an important factor, 
I have directed that certain available credit re- 
straints be applied, and I recommend that further 
controls be authorized, particularly to restrain 
expansion of privately financed real estate credit. 
These actions will not only reduce the upward 
])ressure on prices but will also reduce the demand 
for certain critical materials which are required 
for the production of military equipment. 



168 



Department of State Bulletin 



Third, we must take steps to accelerate and in- 
crease the production of essential materials, prod- 
ucts, and services. I recommend, therefore, that 
the Congress authorize, for national defense pur- 
poses, production loan fj;uaranties and loans to 
increase production. I also recommend that the 
Congress authorize the making of long-term con- 
tracts and other means to encourage the produc- 
tion of certain materials in short supply. 

In the forthcoming midyear economic report, 
I shall discuss in greater detail the current eco- 
nomic situation and the economic measures which 
I have recommended. If these measures are made 
available promptly, and firndy administered, I 
believe we will be able to meet military needs 
without serious disruption of the economy. 

If we are to be successful, there must be sensible 
and restrained action by businessmen, labor, farm- 
ers, and consumers. The people of this country 
know the seriousness of inflation and will, I am 
sure, do everything they can to see that it does not 
come upon us. However, if a sharp rise in prices 
should make it necessary, I shall not hesitate to 
recommend the more drastic measures of price 
control and rationing. 

Need for Building Strength 

The hard facts of the present situation require 
relentless determination and firm action. The 
course of the fighting thus far in Korea shows that 
we can expect no easy solution to the conflict there. 
We are confronted in Korea with well-supplied, 
well-led forces which have been long trained for 
aggressive action. We and the other members of 
the United Nations who have joined in the effort 
to restore peace in Korea must expect a hard and 
costly militai'y operation. 

We must also prepare ourselves better to fulfill 
our responsibilities toward the preservation of in- 
ternational peace and security against possible 
further aggi'ession. In this effort, we will not 
flinch in the face of danger or difficulty. 

The free world has made it clear, through the 
United Nations, that lawless aggression will be 
met with force. This is the significance of 
Korea — and it is a significance whose importance 
cannot be overestimated. 

I shall not attempt to predict the course of 
events. But I am sure that those who have it in 
their power to unleash or withhold acts of armed 
aggi-ession must realize that new recourse to ag- 
gression in the woidd today might well strain to 
the breaking point the fabric of world peace. 

The United States can be proud of the part it 
has played in the United Nations action in this 
crisis. We can be proud of the unhesitating sup- 



port of the American people for the resolute ac- 
tions taken to halt the aggression in Korea and 
to sujjport the cause of world peace. 

The Congress of the United States, by its strong, 
bipartisan support of the steps we are taking and 
by repeated actions in support of international 
cooperation, has contributed most vitally to the 
cause of peace. The expressions of support which 
have been forthcoming from the leaclers of both 
political parties for the actions of our Govern- 
ment and of the United Nations in dealing with 
the present crisis have buttressed the firm morale 
of the entire free world in the face of this 
challenge. 

The American people, together with other free 
peoples, seek a new era in world affairs. We seek 
a world where all men may live in peace and free- 
dom, with steadily improving living conditions, 
inider governments of their own free choice. 

For ourselves, we seek no territory or domina- 
tion over others. We are determined to maintain 
our democratic institutions so that Americans 
now and in the future can enjoy personal liberty, 
economic opportunity, and political equality. We 
are concerned with advancing our prosperity and 
our well-being as a nation, but we know that our 
future is inseparably joined with the future of 
other free peoples. 

We will follow the course we have chosen with 
courage and with faith, because we carry in our 
hearts the flame of freedom. We are fighting for 
liberty and for peace — and with God's blessing we 
shall succeed. 



U.S. and Belgium Consult 
on Korean Assistance 

[Released to the press July 22] 

The Belgian Government is exchanging views 
with the United States Government regarding 
assistance in the Korean conflict. These discus- 
sions were instituted as a result of Belgium's de- 
cision which was communicated to the Secretary- 
General of the United Nations. The two Govern- 
ments are, at jDresent, in consultation with a view 
to ascertaining what types of aid Belgium can best 
furnish consistent with its international obliga- 
tions. It is planned, as a first step, that the 
Belgian Government will lend assistance in air 
transport operations to and from the Korean 
theatre. A communication to this effect has been 
made this morning to the Secretary-General of 
the United Nations. 



July 31, 1950 



169 



Prime Minister Neliru's Appeal To Settle Korean Problem 
by Admitting Chinese Communists to U.N. Rejected 

[Released to the press July 19] 



On July IS, Prime Minister Nehru, through the Indian 
Ambassador at Washington, transmitted to Secretary 
Acheson a message concerning the Korean situation. On 
July 18, the Secretary replied, through the American 
Ambassador at New Delhi. On July 19, the Indian Prime 
Minister transmitted, through the Indian Ambassador at 
Washington, a reply to the Secretary's message. Texts of 
the messages follow. 



PRIME MINISTER NEHRU'S MESSAGE OF 
JULY 13 

In interviews which your Ambassador has had 
with officials of the Ministry of External Affairs, 
we have explained India's position in the Korean 
dispute. 

India's purpose is to localize the conflict and to 
facilitate an early peaceful settlement by break- 
ing the present deadlock in the Security Council so 
that representatives of the People's Government of 
China can take a seat in the Council, the Union 
of Soviet Socialist Eepublics can return to it, and, 
whether within or through informal contacts out- 
side the Council, the United States of America, the 
Union of Soviet Socialist Eepublics, and China, 
with the help and cooperation of other peace- 
loving nations, can find a basis for terminating 
the conflict and for a permanent solution of the 
Korean problem. 

In full confidence of Your Excellency's deter- 
mination to maintain peace and thus to preserve 
the solidarity of the United Nations, I venture to 
address this personal appeal to you to exert your 
great authority and influence for the achievement 
of this common purpose on which the well-being 
of mankind depends. 



SECRETARY ACHESON'S MESSAGE OF JULY 18 

I am deeply appreciative of the high purpose 
which prompted Your Excellency in sending the 
message which I received on July 13, 1950, through 
your distinguished Ambassador in Washington 

170 



and your subsequent message of the I7th trans- 
mitting Prime Minister Stalin's reply to your 
similar letter to him of July 13. Both the Presi- 
dent and I have given the most thoughtful consid- 
eration to these communications. 

One of the most fundamental objectives of the 
foreign policy of the United States is to assist in 
maintaining world peace, and the Government of 
the United States is firmly of the opinion that the 
United Nations is the most effective instrument yet 
devised for maintaining and restoring interna- 
tional peace and security. The United States is, 
therefore, eager to do all that is proper and pos- 
sible to preserve and strengthen the United 
Nations. 

The purpose of the United States Government 
and of the American people with respect to Korea 
is to support by all means at our disposal the deter- 
mination of the United Nations to repel the armed 
attack upon Korea and to restore international 
peace and security in the area. We desire both to 
prevent the spread of aggression beyond Korea 
and to end it there — as required by the Security 
Council of the United Nations. 

We are deeply conscious of the fact that law- 
abiding governments and peoples throughout the 
world have a vital stake in the issues involved in 
this aggression and in the success of the United 
Nations in dealing with it. It is painful to real- 
ize that there could have long since been a restora- 
tion of peace and the saving of the lives of those 
fighting on behalf of the United States had not 
a small minority of the United Nations failed to 
meet their obligations under tlie Charter and re- 
fused to use their authority and influence to pre- 
vent or stop tJie hostilities. The acceptance of 
their obligations and the exercise of their author- 
ity and influence in accordance with those obliga- 
tions would restore peace tomorrow. 

A breach of the peace or an act of aggression 
is the most serious matter with which the United 
Nations can be confronted. We do not believe 
that the termination of the aggression from noi'th- 
ern Korea can be contingent in any way upon the 

Department of State Bulletin 



determination of other questions which are cur- 
rently before the United Nations. 

There has not been at any time any obstacle to 
the full participation by the Soviet Union in the 
■work of the United Nations except the decision of 
the Soviet Government itself. The Security 
Coinicil has shown that it is both competent and 
willing to act vigorously for the maintenance of 
peace. 

In our opinion, the decision between competing 
claimant governments for China's seat in the 
United Nations is one which must be reached by 
the United Nations on its merits. It is a question 
on which there is at present a wide diversity of 
views among the membership of the United Na- 
tions. I know you will agree that the decision 
should not be dictated by an unlawful aggression 
or by any other conduct which would subject the 
United Nations to coercion and duress. 

I know that Your Excellency shares our earnest 
desire to see an early restoration of peace in Korea 
in accordance with the resolutions of the Security 
Council, and I assure you of our eagerness to work 
with you and your great country to establish in 
the^United Nations a means by which the fear of 
aggression can be permanently lifted from the 
peoples of the earth. 

PRIME MINISTER NEHRU'S MESSAGE OF 
JULY 19 

I thank you for your letter which your Ambas- 
sador convej'ed to me last night. 

I am grateful to President Truman and to you 
for the consideration that you have given to my 
message of the 13th July and to the subsequent 
communication forwarding Marshal Stalin's reply 
to my message to him of the same date. 

I recognize that one of the most fundamental 
objectives of the foreign policy of the United 
States is to assist in maintaining world peace, and 
that the Government of the United States is firmly 
of the opinion that the United Nations is one of 
the most effective instruments yet devised for 
maintaining and restoring international peace and 
security. As Your Excellency must be aware, the 
maintenance of peace and support of the United 
Nations has consistently been the policy of the 
Government of India. 

My suggestion for breaking the present dead- 
lock in the Security Council, so that representa- 
tives of the People's Government of China can 
take their seat in the Council and the Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics can return to it, was 
designed to fulfill this policy, not to weaken it. In 
voting for the resolutions on Korea adopted by the 
Security Council, on the 25th and 27th June, it was 
our purpose to strengthen the United Nations in 
resisting aggression. 

Since the Government of India recognized the 
People's Government of China on 30th December 
1949, it has been our endeavour to bring about the 

July 31, 1950 



admission of its representatives to the various 
organs and agencies of the United Nations. Our 
present proposal was a renewal of this effort. It 
was made on its merits and also in the hope that 
it would create a suitable atmosphere for the peace- 
ful solution of the Korean problem. I do not think 
that the admission of China now would be an 
encouragement of aggression. 

I am requesting our Ambassador in Moscow to 
communicate the text of Your Excellency's letter 
to me, and of my reply, to Marshal Stalin. Ar- 
rangements are also being made to release at 3 a. m. 
tomorrow (20 July, Indian standard time), copies 
of these two letters, of my messages to Your Excel- 
lency and to Marshal Stalin dated 13th July, and 
of the messages exchanged between Marshal 
Stalin and me on the 15th and 16th July, respec- 
tively. 



Korea in Perspective 

Extemporaneous Remarks hy Secretary Acheson ^ 

Tomorrow evening, it will be exactly 4 weeks 
since the attack took place in Korea. I thought 
it might be useful if we stopped for a moment and 
surveyed bi'oadly what has happened in the 4 
weeks which have followed that attack. I think 
we become so absorbed in the daily report of the 
fighting in Korea that it might be useful to get 
some perspective in the larger field. 

This attack, as you know, was a very carefully, 
well-planned sneak attack which was supposed to 
overwhelm the Republic of Korea in a very short 
time. As a result of the prompt, vigorous, and 
determined action of the free world that has not 
happened. 

What has happened in the month is that there 
was an instantaneous and vigorous response from 
the Security Council of the United Nations. Here, 
it was confronted with a clear case of aggression, 
and it met that issue squarely and clearly. That 
is a most important development. 

Following that, there was instantaneous and 
strong support of the United Nations from the 
United States. The United States was joined in 
that by other nations which promptly made forces 
available, so that you have not only strong action 
by the United Nations, strong action by the United 
States, you also have actual participation in the 
resistance to aggression by other countries and 
overwhelming international support throughout 
the entire free world for the action of the United 
Nations. You have a united free world, you have 
a united country and a united nation behind the 
United Nations. So much for the larger interna- 
tional picture. 

' Made at a news conference on July 21, 1950 and re- 
leased on the same date. 

171 



In the United States, the President has imme- 
diately assumed the leadership in this critical 
period, and a program was presented by him to 
Congi-ess on Wednesday which again met with a 
warm response from the Congress. He did not, as 
he said, put this forward as tlie complete program. 
There are other matters which he said would be 
presented to the Congress as soon as they could be 
worked out. Those are largely related to our as- 
sistance in strengthening the other free nations 
associated with us. 

Now, all of these steps have taken place within a 
month. They have brought about this extraordi- 
nary degree of unity within the free world and 
within the country, this vigorous response to the 
aggression and a very determined effort on the 
part of the United States to put itself in a position 
of security. 

I do not recall any period of 4 weeks in the his- 
tory of the United States when so much has been 
accomplished. 



General MacArthur's Estimate 
of the Korean Situation 

The following message from General Mac Arthur to the 
President icas received on Julij IS and released to the 
press t)y the White House on July 20. 

The following is my current estimate of the 
Korean situation : 

With the deployment in Korea of major ele- 
ments of the Eighth Army now accomplished, the 
first phase of the campaigii lias ended and with it 
the chance for victory by the North Korean forces. 
The enemy's jslan and great opportunity depended 
upon the speed with which he could overrun South 
Korea once he had breached the Han River line 
and with overwhelming ntimbers and superior 
weapons temporarily shattered South Korean re- 
sistance. This chance he has now lost through 
the extraordinary speed with which the Eighth 
Army has been deployed from Japan to stem his 
rush. Wlien he crashed the Han Line the way 
seemed entirely open and victory was within his 
grasp. 

The desperate decision to throw in piecemeal 
American elements as they arrived by every avail- 
able means of transport from Japan was the only 
hope to save the situation. The skill and valor 
thereafter disj^layed in successive holding actions 
by the ground forces in accordance with this con- 
cept, brilliantly supported in complete coordina- 
tion by air and naval elements, forced the enemy 
into continued deployments, costly frontal attacks 
and confused logistics, which so slowed his ad- 
vance and blunted his drive that we have bought 
the precious time necessary to build a secure base. 

I do not believe that history records a com- 



parable operation which excelled the speed and 
precision with which the Eighth Army, the Far 
East Air Force and the Seventh Fleet have been 
deployed to a distant land for immediate commit- 
ment to major operations. It merits highest com- 
mendation for the commanders, staffs and units 
concerned and attests to their superior training 
and high state of readiness to meet any eventual- 
ity. This finds added emphasis in the fact that 
the Far East Command, until the President's great 
pronouncement to support the epochal action of 
the United Nations, had no slightest responsibility 
for the defense of tlae Free Republic of Korea. 
With the President's decision it assumed a com- 
pletely new and added mission. 

It is, of course, impossible to predict with any 
degree of accuracy future incidents of a military 
campaign. Over a broad front involving continu- 
ous local struggles, there are bound to be ups and 
downs, losses as well as successes. Our final sta- 
bilization line will unquestionably be rectified and 
tactical improvement will involve planned with- 
drawals as well as local advances. But the issue 
of battle is now fully joined and will proceed along 
lines of action in which we will not be without 
choice. Our hold upon the southern part of Korea 
represents a secure base. Our casualties despite 
overwhelming odds have been relatively light. 
Our strength will continually increase while that 
of the enemy will relatively decrease. His supply 
line is insecure. He has had his great chance but 
failed to exploit it. We are now in Korea in force, 
and with God's help we are there to stay until 
the constitutional authority of the Republic is 
fully restored. 



Korean Commission Concerned Over 
Breach of Geneva Conventions 

[Released to the press hy V. N. Department of Piiblic 
Information July H'i 

The United Nations Commission on Korea, at 
its meeting held today in Pusan, expressed grave 
concern at reports of the shooting of prisoners and 
other acts contrary to humanitarian principles in 
the course of the present conflict in Korea. 

In a personal statement issued at the same time, 
the current Chairman of the Commission, Angel 
Gochez Marin, the representative of El Salvador, 
declared : 

The Commission has considered the grave implications 
of tlie acts committed during the present conflict against 
the Geneva Conventions which provide for protection on 
both sides of military wounded and sielj, of war jjrisoners, 
of civilian internees and of the civilian population. 

The Commission is convinced that sucli actions are not 
only barbarous and conti-ary to the basic principles of 
humanity but can have no other effect than embittering 
relations between the people of Korea still further, and 
postponing to a more remote date any hope of an ultimate 
settlement or of unification in this country. 



172 



Department of State Bulletin 



Mr. Marin referred to Secretary-General 
Trygve Lie's appeal to the North Korean author- 
ities and to the Kepublic of Korea, suggesting that 
both use the services cf the International Red 
Cross to insure implementation of the Geneva con- 
ventions in the Korean conflict. The Chairman 
then said : 

The Commission believes it will be failing in its duty if 
it does not make every possible effoit to secure tlie adop- 
tion of these humanitarian measures in the present hos- 
tilities. It therefore makes a heartfelt appeal for action to 
be taken by the North Korean authorities and the Republic 



of Korea that will ensure that no lireach of the Conven- 
tions are committed liy tlieir forces. 

The Commission feels deeply that at all costs anything 
that will further embitter relations must bo avoided. It 
is convinced that nothing is better calculated to keep alive 
hatred in Korea than cruel and barbarous acts contrary 
to the Geneva Conventions. 

The Commission is in session on the soil of Korea and 
will wholeheartedly support any steps which might be 
taken by the International Red Cross, by the Republic of 
Korea or by the North Korean authorities to establish 
measures for the application of the Conventions. 

The Chairman's message was broadcast from the 
Commission's headquarters in Korea. 



Authority of the President To Repel the Attack in Korea 



DEPARTMENT OF STATE MEMORANDUM 
OF JULY 3, 19501 

[Excerpts] 

This memorandum is directed to the authority 
of the President to order the Armed Forces of 
the United States to repel the aggressive attack 
on the Republic of Korea. 

As explained by Secretary Acheson to the press 
on June 28, as soon as word of the attack on Korea 
was received in Washington, it was the view of 
the President and of all his advisers that the first 
responsibility of the Government of the United 
States was to report the attack to the United 
Nations. 

Accordingly, in the middle of the night of Sat- 
urday, June 24, 1950, Ambassador Gross, the 
United States deputy representative at the Se- 
curity Cotmcil of the United Nations, notified 
Mr. Trygve Lie, the Secretary-General of the 
United Nations, that armed forces from North 
Korea had commenced an unprovoked assault 
against the territory of the Republic of Korea. 

The President, as Commander in Chief of the 
Armed Forces of the United States, has full con- 
trol over the use thereof. He also has authority 
to conduct the foreign relations of the United 
States. Since the beginning of United States 
history, he has, upon numerous occasions, utilized 
these powers in sending armed forces abroad. The 
preservation of the United Nations for the main- 
tenance of peace is a cardinal interest of the 
United States. Both traditional international law 
and article 39 of the United Nations Charter and 
the resolution pursuant thereto authorize the 
United States to repel the armed aggression 
against tlie Republic of Korea. 



Constitutional Powers of the President 

The President's control over the Armed Forces 
of the United States is based on article 2, section 
2 of the Constitution which provides that he "shall 
be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy 
of the United States." 

In United States v. Sweeny, the Supreme Court 
said that the object of this provision was "evi- 
dently to vest in the President the supreme com- 
mand over all the military forces, — such supreme 
and undivided command as would be necessary 
to the prosecution of a successful war." ^ 

That the President's power to send the Armed 
Forces outside the country is not dependent on 
Congressional authority has been repeatedly em- 
phasized by numerous writers. 

For example, ex-President William Howard 
Taft wrote : 

The President is made Commander in Chief of the Army 
and Navy by the Con.stitution evidently for the purpose 
of enabling him to defend the country against invasion, 
to suppress insurrection and to take care that the laws 
be faithfully executed. If Congress were to attempt to 
prevent his use of the Army for any of these purposes, 
the action would be void. . . . Again, in the carrying on 
of war as Commander in Chief, it is he who is to deter- 
mine the movements of the Army and of the Navy. Con- 
gress could not take away from him that discretion and 
place it beyond his control in any of his subordinates, nor 
could they themselves, as the people of Athens attempted 
to carry on campaigns by votes in the market-place.' 

Professor Willoughby writes : 

As to bis constitutional power to send United States 
forces outside the country in time of peace when this is 
deemed by him necessary or expedient as a means of 
preserving or advancing the foreign interests or relations 
of the United States, there would seem to be equally little 
doubt, although it has been contended by some that the 
exercise of this discretion can be limited by congressional 
statute. Tbat Congress has this rigbt to limit or to 



^ This memorandum also appeared in H. Rept. 2495, 
81st Cong., 2d sess., p. 61. 

Ju/y 3?, 1950 



129. 



"157 U.S. (1895) 281, 284. 

^ Our Chief Magistrate and His Powers, 1916, pp. 128- 



173 



forbid the sending of United States forces outside of the 
country in time of peace has been asserted by so eminent 
an authority as ex-Secretary Root. It would seem to 
author, however, that the President, under his powers as 
Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy, and liis gen- 
eral control of the foreign relations of the United States, 
has this discretionary right constitutionally vested in him, 
and, therefore, not subject to congressional control. Es- 
pecially, since the argument of the court in ilyerg v. 
United States with reference to the general character of 
the executive power vested in the President, and, appar- 
ently, the authority impliedly vested in him by reason of 
his "obligation to take care that the laws be faithfully 
executed, it is reasonable to predict that, should the ques- 
tion be presented to it, the Supreme Court will so hold. 
Of course, if this sending is in pursuance of express provi- 
sions of a treaty, or for the execution of treaty provisions, 
the sending could not reasonably be subject to constitu- 
tional objection.' 

In an address delivered before the American Bar 
Association in 1917 on the war powers under 
the Constitution, Mr. Hughes stated that "There 
is no limitation upon the authority of Congress to 
create an army and it is for the President as 
Commander-in-Chief to direct the campaigns of 
that Army wherever he may think they should be 
carried on." He referred to a statement by Chief 
Justice Taney in Fleming v. Page (9 How. 615) in 
which the Chief Justice said that as Commander 
in Chief the President "is authorized to direct the 
movements of the naval and military forces placed 
by law at his command." ^ 

At the time the approval of the Treaty of Ver- 
sailles was under consideration in the Senate, there 
was under discussion a reservation to article 10, 
presented by Senator Lodge, to the effect that 
"Congress . . . under the Constitution, has the 
sole power to declare war or authorize the employ- 
ment of the military or naval forces of the United 
States." Senator Walsh of Montana stated in de- 
bate on November 10, 1919 that the statement was 
a recital of "What is asserted to be a principle of 
constitutional law." He said that if — 

any declaration of that character should ever be 
made by the Senate of the United States, it would be 
singularly unfortunate. It is not true. It is not sound. 
It is fraught with the most momentous consequences, and 
may involve disasters the extent of which it is hardly pos- 
sible to conceive. 

The whole course of our history has been a refutation 
of such a declaration, namely, that the President of the 
United States, the Chief Executive of the United States, 
the Commander in Chief of the Army of the United States, 
has no power to employ the land or naval forces without 
any express authorization upon the part of Congress. 
Since the beginning of our Government, our Navy has been 
.sent over the seven seas and to every port in the world. 
Was there ever any congressional act authorizing the 
President to do anything of that kind? 

He stated that our Navy travels the sea "in order 
to safeguard and protect the rights of American 
citizens in foreigns lands. Who can doubt that 
the President has no authority thus to utilize the 
naval and land forces of the United States?" 



Mr. Borah stated : 

I agree fully with the legal or constitutional proposition 
which the Senator states, and I hoi)e this [reservation] 
will be stricken out. It is an act of supererogation to put 
it in. It does not amount to anything. It is a recital 
which Is not true. 

It can not change the Constitution, and it ought not to be 
there. ... It would simply be vain and futile and, if I 
may say so, with due respect to those who drew it, the 
doing of an inconsequential thing." " 

Not only is the President Commander in Chief 
of the Army and Navy, but he is also charged with 
the duty of conducting thi', foreign relations of 
the United States and in this field he "alone has 
the power to speak or listen as a representative of 
the Nation." ' 

Obviously, there are situations in which the 
powers of the President as Commander in Chief 
and his power to conduct the foreign relations of 
this country complement each other. 

The basic interest of the United States is inter- 
national peace and security. The United States 
has, throughout its history, upon orders of the 
Commander in Chief to the Armed Forces and 
without congressional authorization, acted to pre- 
vent violent and unlawful acts in other states from 
depriving the United States and its nationals of 
the benefits of such peace and security. It has 
taken such action both unilaterally and in concert 
with others. A tabulation of 85 instances of the 
use of American Armed Forces without a declara- 
tion of war was incorporated in the Congressional 
Record for July 10, 1941. 

Purposes for Sending American Troops Abroad 

It is important to analyze the purposes for 
which the President as Commander in Chief has 
authorized the despatch of American troops 
abroad. In many instances, of course, the Armed 
Forces have been used to protect specific American 
lives and property. In other cases, however, 
United States forces have been used in the broad 
interests of American foreign policy, and their use 
could be characterized as participation in interna- 
tional police action. 

The traditional power of the President to use 
the Armed Forces of the United States without 
consulting Congress was referred to in debates in 
the Senate in 1945. Senator Connally remarked : 

The historical instances in which the President has di- 
rected armed forces to go to other countries have not 
been confined to domestic or internal instances at all. 
Senator Millikin pointed out tliat in many cases the 
President lias sent troops into a foreign country to pro- 
tect our foreign policy . . . notably in Central and South 
America. That was done, he continued, in order to keep 
foreign countries out of there — was not aimed at pro- 
tecting any particular American citizen. It was aimed 
at protecting our foreign policy. 



' The Confititutional Law of the United States, 1929, 
vol. Ill, p. 1567.) 
' S. doc. 105, 65th Cong., 1st sess., p. 7. 

174 



' 58 Cong. Rec, pt. 8, p. 8195, Nov. 10, 1919, 66th Cong., 
1st sess. 

' United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp. et al. 
(209 U.S. (1936) 304, 319). 

Departmenf of State Bulletin 



To his remark that he presumed that by the 
Charter of the United Nations we had laid down 
a foreign policy which we could protect, Senator 
Connally replied that that was absolutely correct. 
He added : 

I was trying to indicate tliat fact by reading the list of 
Instances of intervention on our part in order to keep 
another government out of territory in this hemisphere. 
That was a question of carrying out our international 
policy, and not a question involving the protection of some 
American citizen or American property at the moment." 

During the Boxer Rebellion in China in 1900- 
1901, the President sent about 5,000 troops to join 
with British, Eussian, German, French, and Japa- 
nese troops to relieve the siege of the foreign 
quarters in Peking and reestablish the treaty 
status. This was done without express congres- 
sional authority. In defining United States policy 
at the time Secretary of State Hay said : 

. . . The purpose of the President is, as it has been 
heretofore, to act concurrently with the other powers ; 
first, in opening up communication with Peking and 
rescuing the American officials, missionaries, and other 
Americans who are in danger; secondly, in affording all 
possible protection everywhere in China to American life 
and property; thirdly, in guarding and protecting all 
legitimate American interests ; and, fourthly, in aiding 
to prevent a spread of the disorders to the otlier provinces 
of the Empire and a recurrence of such disasters. It is, 
of course, too early to forecast the means of attaining this 
last result ; but the policy of the Government of the 
United States is to seek a solution which may bring about 
permanent safety and peace to China, preserve Chinese 
territorial and administrative entity, protect all rights 
guaranteed to friendly powers by treaty and international 
law, and safeguard for the world the principle of equal 
and impartial trade with all parts of the Chinese Empire.' 

After the opening up of Japan to foreigners in 
the 1850's through the conclusion of commercial 
treaties between Japan and certain Western pow- 
ers, antiforeign disturbances occurred. In 1863, 
the American Legation was burned following pre- 
vious attacks on the British Legation. The com- 
mander of the U. S. S. Wyoming was instructed 
to use all necessary force for the safety of the lega- 
tion or of Americans residing in Japan. Secretary 
of State Seward said that the prime objects of the 
United States were : 

First, to deserve and win the confidence of the Japanese 
Government and people, if possible, with a view to the 
common interest of all the treaty powers ; secondly, to 
sustain and cooperate with the legations of these powers, 
in good faith, so as to render their efforts to tlie same end 
effective." 

In 1864, the Mikado, not recognizing the treaties 
with the Western powers, closed the straits of 
Shimonoseki. At the request of the Tycoon's 
government (opposed to the Mikado), American, 
British, French, and Netherlands forces, in a joints 

' Cono- R^r., 79th Cong., 1st sess., vol. 91, pt. 8, Nov. 26, 
1945, p. 10967. I 

' John Bassett Moore, A Digest of International Law, 
vol. V, p. 482. See also Taf t, op. cit. pp. 114-115 ; Rogers, 
op. at. pp. ."iS-fia. 

" John Bassett Moore, A Digest of International Law, 
vol. V, pp. 747-748. 

July 31, 7950 



operation, opened the straits by force. The ob- 
ject of the Western powers was the enforcement of 
treaty rights, with the approval of the govern- 
ment that granted them.'' 

Again, in 1868, a detachment of Japanese troops 
assaulted foreign residents in the streets of Hiogo. 
One of the crew of the Oneida was seriously 
wounded. The safety of the foreign population 
being threatened, naval forces of the treaty powers 
made a joint landing and adopted measures to 
protect the foreign settlement." 

Former Assistant Secretary of State James 
Grafton Rogers has characterized these uses of 
force as "international police action", saying : 

They amounted to executive use of the Armed Forces to 
establish our own and tlie world's scheme of international 
order. Two American Presidents used men, ships and 
guns on a large and expensive scale." 

In 1888 and 1889, civil war took place in Samoa 
where the United States, Great Britain, and Ger- 
many had certain respective treaty rights for the 
maintenance of naval depots. German forces 
were landed, and the German Government in- 
vited the United States to join in an effort to re- 
store calm and quiet in the islands in the interest 
of all the treaty powers. The commander of the 
United States naval forces in the Pacific was in- 
structed by the Secretary of the Navy that the 
United States was willing to cooperate in restor- 
ing order "on the basis of the full preservation 
of American treaty rights and Samoan authority, 
as recognized and agreed to by Germany, Great 
Britain, and the United States." He was to ex- 
tend full protection and defense to American citi- 
zens and property, to protest the displacement of 
the native government by Germany as violating 
the positive agreement and understanding between 
the treaty powers, but to inform the British and 
German Governments of his readiness to cooperate 
in causing all treaty rights to be respected and 
in restoring peace and order on the basis of the 
recognition of the Samoan right to independence.'* 

On July 7, 1941, The President sent to the Con- 
gress a message announcing that as Commander 
in Chief he had ordered the Navy to take all neces- 
sary steps to insure the safety of conununications 
between Iceland and the United States as well as 
on the seas between the United States and all other 
strategic outposts and that American troops had 
been sent to Iceland in defense of that country. 
The United States, he said, could not permit "the 
occupation by Germany of strategic outposts in 
the Atlantic to be used as air or naval bases for 
eventual attack against the Western Hemisphere." 
For the same reason, he said, substantial forces of 
the United States had been sent to the bases ac- 



" John Bassett Moore, A Digest of International Law, 
vol. v, p. 750; S. Ex. Doc. 58, 41 Cong. 2d sess. 

" Report of the Secretary of the Navy, 1868, p. xl. 

" World Policing and the Constitution, published by 
the World Peace Foundation, 1945, pp. 66, 67. 

"John Bassett Moore, A Digest of International Law, 
vol. I, pp. 545-546. 

175 



quired from Great Britain in Trinidad and British 
Guiana in the South to forestall any pincers move- 
ment undertaken by Germany against the Western 
Hemisphere.^^ 

Thus, even before the ratification of the United 
Nations Charter, the President had used the 
Armed Forces of the United States without con- 
sulting the Congress for the purpose of protecting 
the foreign policy of the United States. The rati- 
fication of the United Nations Charter was, of 
course, a landmark in the development of American 
foreign policy. As noted above, Senator Connally 
and Senator Millikin agreed that the President was 
entitled to use armed forces in protection of the 
foreign policy represented by the Charter. This 
view was also expressed in the Senate debates in 
connection with the ratification of the Charter. 
For example, Senator Wiley made the following 
pertinent statement : 

It is my understanding, according to the testimony 
given before the Foreign Relations Committee of the 
Senate, that the terms "agi'eement or agreements" as used 
in article 4.3 are synonymous with the word "treaty." On 
the other hand, I recognize that Congress might well in- 
terpret them as agreements brought about by the action 
of the Executive and ratified by a joint resolution of both 
Houses. These agreements would provide for a police 
force and the specific responsibility of each nation. But 
outside of these agreements, there is the power in our 
Executive to preserve the peace, to see that the "supreme 
laws" are faithfully executed. When we become a party 
to this charter, and define our responsibilities by the agree- 
ment or agreements, there can be no question of the power 
of the Executive to carry out our commitments in relation 
to international policing. His constitutional power, how- 
ever, is in no manner impaired." 

An even fuller exposition of the point was made 
by Senator Austin, who stated : 

Mr. President, I am one of those lawyers in the United 
States who believe that the general powers of the Presi- 
dent — not merely the war powers of the President but the 
general authority of the President — are commensurate 
with the obligation which is imposed upon him as Presi- 
dent, that he take care that the laws are faithfully exe- 
cuted. That means that he shall take all the care that is 
required to see that the laws are faithfully executed. 

Of course, there are other specific references in the Con- 
stitution which show that he has authority to employ 
armed forces when necessary to carry out specific things 
named in the Constitution; but the great over-all and 
general authority arises from his obligation that he take 
care that the laws are faithfully executed. That has 
been true throughout our history, and the Chief Executive 
has taken care, and has sent the armed forces of the 
United States, without any act of Congress preceding their 
sending, on a great many occasions. I have three dif- 
ferent compilations of those occasions. One of them runs 
as high as 150 times ; another of them 72 times, and so 
forth. It makes a difference whether we consider the 
maneuvers which were merely shows of force as com- 
bined in the exercise of this authorit.y — as I do — or 
whether we limit the count to those cases in which the 
armed forces have actually entered upon the territory of 
a peaceful neighbor. But there is no doubt in mv mind of 
his obligation and authority to employ all the force that 
is necessary to enforce the laws. 



"■ Coiiff. Rec, 77th Cong., 1st sess., vol. 87, pt. 6, July 7, 
1941, p. 5868. 

" Cong. Rec, 79th Cong., 1st sess., vol. 91, July 27, 194.5, 
p. 8127-8128. ... 

176 



It may be asked. How does a threat to International 
security and peace violate the laws of the United States? u 
Perhaps, Mr. President, it would not have violated the laws ' 
of the United States previous to the obligations set forth 
in this treaty. Perhaps we have never before recognized as 
being true the fundamental doctrine with which I opened 
my remarks. But we are doing so now. We recognize 
that a breach of the peace anywhere on earth which 
threatens the security and peace of the world is an attack 
uiion us; and after this treaty is accepted by 29 nations, 
that will be the express law of the world. It will be the 
law of nations, because according to its express terms it 
will bind those who are nonmemliers, as well as members, 
and it will be the law of the United States, because we 
shall have adopted it in a treaty. Indeed, it will be above 
the ordinary statutes of the United States, because it will 
be on a par with the Constitution, which provides that 
treaties made pursuant thereto shall be the supreme law 
of the land. 

So I have no doubt of the authority of the President 
in the past, and his authority in the future, to enforce 
peace. I am bound to say that I feel that the President is 
the officer under our Constitution in whom there is exclu- 
sively vested the responsibility for maintenance of peace." 

Action contrary to the Charter of the United 
Nations is action against the interests of the 
United States. Preservation of peace under the 
Charter is a cornerstone of American foreign 
policy. President Truman said in his inaugural 
address in 1949 : 

In the coming years, our program for peace and free- 
dom will emphasize four major courses of action. 

First, we will continue to give unfaltering support to 
the United Nations and related agencies, and we will 
continue to search for ways to strengthen their author- 
ity and increase their effectiveness. 

In the Korean situation, the resolution of the 
Security Council of June 2.5 determined, under 
article 39 of the Charter, that the action of the 
North Koreans constituted a breach of the peace 
and called upon "the authorities in North Korea 
(a) to cease hostilities forthwith; and (b) to with- 
draw their armed forces to the thirty-eighth 
j^arallel."' It also called upon "all Members to 
render every assistance to the United Nations in 
the execution of this resolution." This is an appli- 
cation of the principles set forth in article 2, para- 
graph 5 of the Charter, which states : "All Mem- 
bers shall give the United Nations every assistance 
in any action it takes in accordance with the 
present Charter . . ." The Security Council reso- 
lution of June 27, passed after the North Korean 
authorities had disregarded the June 2.'i resolution, 
recommended "that Members of the United Na- 
tions furnish such assistance to the Republic of 
Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed 
attack and to restore international peace and se- 
curity in the area." This recommendation was 
also made trnder the authority of article 39 of the 
Charter. 

The President's action seeks to accomplish the 
objectives of both resolutions. 

The continued defiance of the United Nations 
by the North Korean authorities would have meant 
that the United Nations would have ceased to 



" Conq. Rrc. T9th Cong., 1st sess., vol. 91, Julv 26, 1945, 
p. 8064-8065. 

Department of Slate Bulletin 



exist ;is a serious instrumentality for the main- 
tenance of international peace. The continued ex- 
istence of the United Nations as an effective inter- 
national organization is a paramount United 
States interest. The detiance of the United Na- 
tions is in clear violation of the Charter of the 
United Nations and of the resolutions adopted by 
the Security Council of the United Nations to 
bring about a settlement of the problem. It is a 
threat to international peace and security, a threat 
to the peace and security of the United States and 
to the security of United States forces in the 
Pacific. 

These interests of the United States are inter- 
ests which the President as Commander in Chief 
can protect by the employment of the Armed 
Forces of the tJnited States without a declaration 
of war. It was they which the President's order 
of June 27 did protect. This order was within 
Ills authority as Commander in Chief. 



USE OF LAND AND NAVAL FORCES 

OF THE UNITED STATES 

FOR PROTECTION PURPOSES '^ 

The United States has used its land and naval 
forces in foreign territories during peacetime on 



many occasions during the past hundred years. 
They have been landed, inter alia, for the protec- 
tion of American citizens and American territory, 
as in the instance of the Spanish Floridas in 1817 ; 
for the protection of American citizens located in 
disturbed areas ; for the suppression of piracy ; for 
meting out punishment (in an early day) to law- 
less bands who had murdered American citizens; 
for the suppi-ession of local riots and the preserva- 
tion of order; for the purpose of securing the pay- 
ment of indemnity ; and to jjrevent massacre. 

Although there may have been eai'lier instances, 
the first instance that has been drawn to my atten- 
tion of the landing of United States troops oc- 
curred in 1812 when President Monroe sent forces 
to expel freebooters who had taken possession in 
the name of the Governments of Buenos Aires and 
Venezuela of Amelia Island, off the coast of Flor- 
ida. Although the island belonged to Spain the 
measure was not taken in concert with the Span- 
ish Government or the local authorities of Florida. 
I find that as late as 1932 iVmerican forces were 
sent to Shanghai owing to the Sino-Japanese con- 
flict as a measure of protection for the lives and 
property of American citizens in that area. 

A list of various landings of American forces 
and the occasions therefor follows : 



Place 



Year 



Purpose 



1. 

2. 

3. 

4. 

5. 

6. 

7. 

8. 

9. 
10. 
11. 

12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
17. 

18. 
19. 
20. 
21. 
22. 
23. 

24. 
25. 
26. 
27. 



28. 
29. 



Amelia Island 1812 To protect Spanish island from foreign invasion or control. 

Spanish Florida 1814 To expel the British. 

Cuba 1823 To pursue and break up an establishment of pirates. 

Puerto Rico 1824 To atone for insult to the flag and procure apology. 

Falkland Islands 1831 To procure the release of certain vessels and their crews. 

Island of Sumatra 1832 To punish natives for attack and seizure'of American ship and murder of crew. 

Fiji Islands 1840 To punish natives for an attack upon Americans. 

Samoa 1841 To punish natives for the murder of a white man. 

Island of Johanna 1851 To collect indemnity (display of force). 

Japan 1853-54. ... To procure a commerical treaty. 

China 1854 American and British forces acted jointly during civil war in China to 

protect American and British nationals. 

Greytown 1854 To protect American property rights. 

Fiji Islands 1855 To protect American life. 

Uruguay 1855 To protect American consulate and American life and property. 

China 1856 To prevent injury to American interests. 

Egypt 1858 To secure protection of American citizens. 

Uruguay 1858 To protect life and property of foreign residents; action taken at request 

of regular Government in conjunction with forces of other powers. 

Fiji Islands 1858 To punish natives for murder of two Americans. 

China 1859 To restore order in Shanghai. 

Kisembo, Africa 1860 To prevent destruction of American property. 

Panama 1860 To restore order during insurrection. 

Japan 1863 To obtain redress for an unwarranted attack upon an American vessel. 

Do 1864 To open the Straits of Shimonoseki in conjunction with other powers; 

action taken at request of the Tycoon's government. 

Formosa 1867 To punish natives who had murdered the crew of a wrecked American bark. 

Japan 1868 To protect American interests during local hostilities. 

Uruguay 1868 To protect American interests at request of local authorities. 

Korea 1871 To capture Korean forts after a surveying party which had been granted 

permission to make certain surveys and soundings in the interest of 

science and commerce had been treacherously attacked. 

Honolulu 1874 To suppress riotous proceedings at request of local authorities. 

Me-xico 1876 To preserve order, pending arrival of regular Government forces after 

evacuation of revolutionists. 



" Reprinted from H. Rept. 2495, 81st Cong., 2d sess., p. 67. 



Ju/y 37, 7950 

896355—50- 



177 



Place Year Purpose 

30. Egypt 1882 To suppress riots and protect American interests. 

31. Korea 1888 To protect American residents. 

32. Samoa 1888 To establish a stable government; joint action by United States, Great 

Britain, and Germany. 

33. Haiti 1888 To obtain the release of an American merchant vessel captured by a 

Haitian war vessel. 

34. Navassa Island 1891 To protect American life and property. 

35. Chile 1891 To protect American consulate at Valparaiso. 

36. Hawaii 1893 To protect life and property at the time of the deposition of the Queen. 

37. Brazil 1893 To protect American commerce in Brazilian waters during a revolt of 

the Brazilian Navy; it was reported that the insurgents had the 
assistance of certain European powers. 

38. Korea 1894 To protect the American Legation. 

39. Samoa 1899 To assist in settling controversy over succession to Samoan throne. 

40. Nicaragua 1899 To protect life and property, upon petition of foreign merchants during 

insurrection. 

41. China 1900 To protect life and property at time of Boxer uprising. 

42. Dominican Republic 1903 To protect American interests. 

43. Do 1903 To protect American lives and property and to prevent fighting within 

certain area. 

44. Honduras 1907 To protect American consulate and American interests during hostilities 

between Honduras and Nicaragua. 

45. Nicaragua 1910 To protect American life and property during revolution; to prevent the 

bombardment of Blueflelds. 

46. Honduras 1910-11 .... To protect American interests during revolutionary disturbances. 

47. China 1911 To protect the consulate and property of American citizens of Foochow. 

48. Do 1911 To protect American consulate and American citizens at Chinkiang. 

49. Do 1911 To increase the guard of the American Legation at Peking. 

60. Do 1912 To keep open the railroad from Peking to the sea. 

51. Do 1912 To extend protection. 

52. China, Swatow 1912 To save a woman and some children and conduct them to safety. 

53. Cuba 1912 To quell uprising; to protect American life and property. 

54. Honduras 1912 To protect an American-owned railroad. 

55. Nicaragua 1912-13. ... To protect American property, at request of Government of Nicaragua. 

66. Dominican Republic 1912-14. ... To protect Dominican customshouses, in conformity with the provisions 

of the treaty of 1907. 

57. China, Chapei 1913 To prevent disorder and give protection. 

68. China, Shanghai 1913 For protection. 

59. Paris 1914 To act as a guard for the American Embassy. 

60. Mexico, Veracruz 1914 To enforce demands for amends for affronts and indignities to an officer 

of the LT. S. S. Dolphin and the crew of the whaleboat of the Dolphin. 

61. Haiti 1914-1915. . To protect American life and property during disturbed conditions. 

62. China, Nanking 1916 To quell a riot. 

63. Mexico 1916-17. ... To pursue Villa after his invasion of American territory. 

64. Dominican Republic 1916-24. . . . To suppress revolution; to establish military government. 

65. Cuba 1917-19. ... To protect American consulate and American lives and property during 

insurrection and banditti fighting. 

66. China, Chungking 1918 For protection during a political crisis. 

67. Honduras 1919 To cooperate with the forces of Honduras in maintaining order in a neu- 

tral zone. 

68. Panama 1919 To extend protection, at request of Panamanian Government. 

69. China, Kiukiang 1920 To restore order during riot. 

70. China, Youchow 1920 To guard American property. 

71. Guatemala 1920 To protect the American Legation during local fighting. 

72. Smyrna 1922 To protect American life and property during the advance of Turkish 

forces on that city. 

73. China, Tungchow 1922 To protect against possible violence by retreating Fengtien forces. 

74. China, Foochow 1922 To protect American nationals. 

75. China, Masu Island 1923 To protect Americans again.st brigandage. 

76. Honduras 1924 To protect American life and property during unsettled conditions; 

intermittent landing of forces. 

77. Do 1925 To protect American property. 

78. Panama 1925 To extend protection during unsettled conditions, at request of Panama- 

nian Government. 

79. Nicaragua 1926 To protect life and property during revolution. 

80. China, Hankow 1927 To protect lives and interests of Americans during mob-riot disturbances. 

81. China, Shanghai 1927 To protect American lives and property. 

82. China, Nanking 1927 ' ' To afford protection against looting and general disorder. 

83. China, Chinkiang 1927 To extinguish fire on American property caused by gunfire. 

84. China, Canton 1927 To aid in evacuation. 

85. China, Shanghai 1932 To strengthen forces at Shanghai, as a measure of protection for the lives 

and property of American nationals. 



178 Department of State Bulletin 



KOREA: CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS 
JULY 1, 1949 TO JUNE 30, 1950 1» 

JuJu 1, 19 ',9: Korean Milltwry Advisory Group (KMAG) 
established. 

August 4, 19i!>: North Korean forces launch a new and 
large-scale invasion of the Ongjin Peninsula, but are re- 
pulsed after heavy fighting. 

August 6, 19^9: Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek arrives 
in Korea for talks with President Rhee on projected 
Pacific Fact. 

August 9, 19^9: North Korean radio calls for revolt 
against the government of Syngman Rhee in South Korea. 

August 2S, 191,9: The Republic of Korea is formally ad- 
mitted to membership in the World Health Organization 
as its sixty-fifth member. 

Scptemhcr: The "Democratic People's Republic of Ko- 
rea" fails to hold the all-Korea election called for in the 
manifesto issued on June 28, j949, by the Communist- 
dominated Democratic Front for the attainment of uni- 
fication of the fatherland. No explanation is given for 
the failure to carry out previously announced plans. 

September 9-20, 19^9: Extremely heavy guerrilla war- 
fare commences across 38th parallel; heavy casualties are 
reported on both sides. 

September 22, 191i9: Steamship Kimball Smith defects 
to Chinnampo, North Korea, with EGA employees, Willis 
and Meschter, held captive by crew. 

September 28, 19 1,9: The United States Congress passes 
the Mntual Defense Assistance Act, which authorizes ex- 
penditure of $27,0(J0,000 for military aid to Iran, the 
Philippines, and the Republic of Korea. 

October 2, 19J,9: The United States presents to the 
Soviet Foreign Office a note requesting that the U. S. S. R. 
assist in determining the location of the missing ship and 
EGA officials and facilitate their return. 

Two hundred and forty-nine guerrillas are executed on 
Cheju Island with approval of President Rhee as a result 
of riots earlier in the year. Those executed include 1 
officer and 20 enlisted men of Ninth Regiment, formerly 
stationed on Cheju. 

October 6, 1949: "Democratic People's Republic of Ko- 
rea" recognizes the People's Republic of China. 

October 10, 1949: Tlie President signed Public Law 343, 
the third deficiency bill appropriating $.30,000,000 for eco- 
nomic assistance to the Republic of Korea during the 
period July 1-October 15, 1949, and covering sums ap- 
propriated by Public Law 1.54 of June 30, 1949, which per- 
mitted spending on the basis of the annual budget esti- 
mate for 1 month ending July 30, 1949, and Public Law 
196 approved August 1, 1949, permitting the continuation 
of spending on the same basis until August 16, 1940. 

October 12. 1949: S. 2319 authorizing an appropriation 
of $120,000,000 for economic assistance to the Republic of 
Korea passed by the Senate. 

October 14, 1949: The U. S. S. R. rejects the request 
made in the American note of October 2, stating that the 
matter is within the province of the "Democratic People's 
Republic of Korea." 

The Foreign Minister of the "Democratic People's Re- 
public of Korea" sends a letter to the Secretary-General 
of the UN challenging the legality of UN activity in 
Korea and expressing determination to drive the UN Com- 
mission out of Korea. 

North Korean forces begin a new offensive on the Ong- 
jin Peninsula, and severe fighting continues for several 
days. 

October 22, 1949: The UN General Asseml^ly decides to 
continue the UN Commission on Korea (UNCOK) and to 
charge it to investigate developments "which might lead 
to or otherwise involve military conflict in Korea." 

The Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East 
(ECAFE) admits the Republic of Korea as an associate 
member and rejects the application of the "Democratic 
People's Republic of Korea." 



"• Reprinted from H. Rept. 2495, 81st Cong., 2d sess., 
p. 69. 

July 37, 7950 



October 25, 1949: The Home Minister of the Republic 
of Korea announces that "SKLP (South Korea Labor 
Party) Extermination Week" will begin on November 1; 
those who wish to repent and join the National Guidance 
Alliance (an organization for converted ex-Gommunists) 
are urged to do so before that date. 

October 28, 1949: The President of the United States 
signs Public Law 430, second supplemental appropriation 
bill, appropriating another $30,000,000 for economic aid 
to the Republic of Korea during the period October 15, 
1949 to February 15, 1950. 

October 29, 1949: Tlie United States presents to the 
U.S.S.R. a second note concerning the Steamship Kim.- 
ba!l Smith and the two American officials of the Economic 
Cooperation Administration held in northern Korea. 

November 7, 1949: The "Democratic People's Republic 
of Korea" recognizes the (East) German Democratic Re- 
public. 

yovcmbcr 14, 1949: The U.S.S.R., replying to the 
American note of October 29, agrees to inform the North 
Korean authorities, through the Soviet Ambassador in 
Pyongyang, of the United States request for information. 

November 15. 1949: In a radio broadcast, the "Demo- 
cratic People's Republic of Korea" acknowledges for the 
first time the presence of the two American officials in 
northern Korea and states that the authorities in the north 
are willing to turn them over to the American Government. 

November 23, 1949: The Republic of Korea is admitted 
to membership in the UN Food and Agriculture Organiza- 
tion. 

November 24-25, 1949: Village people's committees are 
elected in North Korea. 

Novc(m,ber 26, 1949: The new Secretary General of the 
UN Commission on Korea and other staff members arrive 
in Seoul. 

December 3. 1949: Township people's committees are 
elected in North Korea. 

December 11, 1949: Meschter and WiUis, the two Ameri- 
can officials of the Economic Cooperation Administration 
held in North Korea since September 22, are turned over 
to a representative of the American Embassy at the 38th 
parallel. 

December V,, 1949: Kim II Sung, Premier of the "Demo- 
cratic People's Republic," and party leave North Korea 
for Moscow to participate in the celebration of Stalin's 
seventieth birthday. 

December 17, 1949: Republic of Korea approved pro- 
gram discussed with them by MDAP Survey Team. 

December 26, 1949: MDAP Survey Team arrives in Re- 
public of Korea. Chung Paek, prominent and long-time 
Communist arrested in South Korea in late November on 
his return from North Korea, denounces the Nortli Korean 
rerfme and pledges his allegiances to the Republic, lend- 
ing prominence to the National Guidance Alliance and the 
South Korea "Voluntary Surrender Week." 

Jimuarij 12. 1950: Ambassador Philip Jessup speaks be- 
fore the National Assembly of the Republic of Korea. 

January IS. 1950: UN International Children's Emer- 
gency Fund (UNICEF) announces plans for a .$550,000 
child welfare program in Korea; Dr. Clarence W. Mac- 
Charles, of Canada, is named director. 

January 19. 1950: H. R. 5330 authorizing the appropria- 
tion of $120,000,000 for economic assistance to the Re- 
public of Korea defeated in the House of Representatives 
by a vote of 192-191. 

January 26, 1950: The military defense assistance pro- 
gram and Korea Military Advisory Group (KMAG) agree- 
ments are signed. 

February 8, 1950: The UN Economic and Social Council 
(ECOSOC) at Lake Success endorses the Republic of 
Korea's application by membership in the United Nations 
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization 
(UNESCO). 

February 9, 1950: S. 2319 authorizing the appropria- 
tion of $120,000,000 for economic assistance to the Re- 
public of Korea for fiscal year 1950 with an amendment 
extending aid to China passed by the House of 
Representatives. 

779 



Feiiuary 10, 1950: S. 2319, as amended by the House, 
passed by the Senate; President Rhee hands foreign 
correspondents message of gratitude for passage of the aid 
bill. 

February 1^, 1950: President Rhee, accompanied by 
Foreign Minister, Director of Office of Public Informa- 
tion (OPI), Deputy Chief of Staff of Korean Army, and 
staff, departs for Tokyo for consultation. 

February 15, 1950: Korea requests spare parts and am- 
munition for 10 ATO planes, and State Department allo- 
cates money to Defense Department. 

Febrmir^ 17, 1950: The World Health Organization 
grants the Republic of Korea .fTSO.OOO for public health 
program for fiscal year 1950. 

February 2Ji, 1950: The Republic of Korea signs a con- 
tract with Japan for export of 100,000 metric tons of rice 
to Japan at $142 per ton. 

February 27, 1950: President Truman transmits to the 
United States Congress requests for appropriation of 
.?60,000,0<J0 for aid to the Republic of Korea for fiscal year 
1950 and for the authorization of $100,000,000 for economic 
assistance for fiscal year 1951. 

March 3, 1950: Headquarters of the Special Army- 
Police Joint Search Organ in South Korea announces 
arrest of 196-man "destruction party" led by Ch'oe Yung 
Ch'oo. The party allegedly was taking orders from the 
North Korean Vice Minister of Internal Security in order 
to stage a revolt in March. 

March 4, 1950: The Secretary-General of the UN an- 
nounces that, in compliance with a request from the UN 
Commission on Korea, eight observers are being sent to 
Korea to observe clashes along the 38th parallel. 

March 15, 1950: Korean program submitted by Depart- 
ment of Defense to Department of State. 

March 20, 1950: KMAG agreement ratified by Korean 
legislature. 

March 29, 1950: Korean military aid program approved 
by State Department. 

March 30, 1950: The South Korea Assembly ratifies the 
Korea Military Advisory Group and military defense- 
assistance program agreement by a vote of 90 to 1. 

March 31, 1950: The United States House of Represent- 
atives passes H. R. 7797, authorizing the appropriation of 
$100,000,000 for aid to the Republic of Korea during fiscal 
year 1951. 

April 3, 1950: Korean Ambassador in Washington 
(John M. Chang) is handed United States aide-memoire 
regarding financial situation in Korea and ECA assistance. 

April Ji, 1950: United States Ambassador to Korea 
(John J. Muccio) hands United States aide-memoire to 
President Rhee. Ambassador Muccio is subsequently re- 
called for consultation regarding financial situation in 
Korea. 

April 11, 1950: South Koreans request armament and 
ammunition for PC boats (sec. 408 (e) MDA Act). 

April 19, 1950: The Office of Public Information of the 
Republic of Korea announces that a general election for 
members of the National Assembly is to lie held on May 30. 

April 20, 1950: Air Force directed to supply machine 
guns, spare parts, and ammunition to South Korea under 
section 408 (e) of the MDA Act on patrol craft sailing 
from west coast in May 1950. 

April 2//, 1950: The Foreign Minister of the Republic 
of Korea invites the United Nations Commission on Korea 
to observe general elections in the Republic. Allocation 
made by Department of State to Defense Department of 
funds to carry out supply action by Air Force. 

April 28, 1950: Fulbright agreement between United 
States and Korea (ROK) is signed. 

May 5, 1950: Senate passed S. 3304, authorizing the 



appropriation of 100 million dollars for economic assist- 
ance to the Republic of Korea. 

May 15, 1950: State Department authorizes additional 
Army and Coast Guard military assistance to South 
Korea. 

May 18, 1950: House and Senate conferees agreed on 
H. R. 7797. 

May 23, 1950: H. R. 7797 as reported by conference 
passed by House. Allocation by State Department to 
Defense Department of funds to carry out supply action. 

May 25, 1950: H. R. 7797 as reported by conference 
passed by Senate. Joint Chiefs of Staff directed to pro- 
gram the additional Army and Coast Guard items author- 
ized May 15. 1950. 

May SO, 1950: National Assembly elections are held in 
the Republic of Korea. About 90 percent of the electorate 
vote.s, and the established political parties, including both 
the supporters of and the opposition to President Rhee, 
retain only a small percentage of their Assembly member- 
ship ; over 65 percent of the seats go to independents. 

June 5, 1950: President approves Foreign Economic 
Assistance Act of 1950 (Public Law 535), including au- 
thorization of $100,000,000 economic aid to Korea. 

June 7, 1950: The North Korea regime proposes a gen- 
eral all-Korea election on August 5, a meeting of a Supreme 
Korean Assembly on August 15, and the holding of a 
preliminary Joint North-South Conference near the 38th 
parallel. The proposal specifically forbids the participa- 
tion of members of the UN Commission on Korea, Presi- 
dent Rhee, Lee Bum Suk, and other co-called national 
traitors. 

June 19, 1950: The new National Assembly of the Re- 
public of Korea convenes for its first meeting. The final 
turn-over in Assembly membership is approximately 85 
percent. 

June 20, 1950: North Korea makes a second unification 
proposal, varying only slightly from original offer. This 
second proposal emanates from the North Korean Govern- 
ment directly rather than from the Democratic Front, the 
political instrument for unification propaganda. 

Jvne 25, 1950: The North Korea People's Army and 
border constabulary forces invade South Korea and launch 
amphibious landings, supported by air attacks on Seoul 
and other strategic locations. General MacArthur directed 
to send available MDAP equipment from stocks of the 
Far Eastern Command. 

June 25, 1950: The United States sponsors resolution 
befoi'e UN Security Council that armed attack on Republic 
of Korea by forces from North Korea constitutes breach of 
the peace and calling for immediate cessation of hostilities. 
Re.solution passes 9 to 0. 

June 27, 1950: Statement by President of United States 
announcing he has ordered air and sea forces to give troops 
of Republic of Korea cover and support. 

General MacArthur begins implementation of the Presi- 
dent's order. 

UN Security Council resolution adopted, calling upon 
members of UN to furnish such assistance to the Republic 
of Korea as may be necessary to repel armed attack. 
Adopted 7 to 1 (later changed to 8 to 1, when India on June 
20 voted in favor). 

June SO, 1950: Statement by President of United States 
that he has authorized General MacArthur to use certain 
supporting ground units, authorizing USAF to conduct 
missions on specific targets in northern Korea wherever 
militarily necessary, and ordering naval blockade of entire 
Korean coast. 

As of this date, the following countries have announced 
they would assist in enforcing the UN Security Council's 
resolutions : The United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, 
China, and the Netherlands. 



180 



Department of State Bulletin 



BENELUX— A CASE STUDY IN ECONOMIC UNION 



by Howard J. Hilton, Jr. 



Benelux is the abbreviation used to describe the 
union of the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxem- 
bourg or, to be more precise, the union of two 
economies, that of the Netherlands and that of 
the economic union of Belgium-Luxembourg 
which was previously established as a tariff union 
in 1921. The first stage in creating the Benelux 
Union was the organization of a tariff union. The 
next stage, and the one through which Benelux 
is now passing, is that of restricted union or pre- 
union. The final objective is complete economic 
union. 

In days past, when currencies were freely con- 
vertible and based upon gold, the terms "customs 
union" and "economic union" were practically 
synonomous since the elimination of customs bar- 
riers between any two countries created an area 
within which the free play of economic forces 
produced an integrated economy. This situation, 
however, no longer exists. Although Belgium 
and Luxembourg, on the one hand, and the Neth- 
erlands, on the other, have had a virtual customs 
union since 1948, they do not expect to attain eco- 
nomic union before mid-1950 at the earliest. This 
fact does not imply that the fundamental require- 
ments for an economic union have changed since 
such a union remains an area of free economic 
activity unhampered by political boundaries. It 
does mean, however, that the difficulties to be over- 
come in attaining economic union have increased. 
Among these difficulties may be mentioned the 
foreign-exchange controls and quantitative re- 
strictions which have been imposed as a result of 
the so-called "dollar shortage." 

Different economic philosophies manifest in the 
two economies following the termination of hostil- 

iuly 3 J, 7950 



ities complicate the solution of these technical 
problems; nevertheless, the three countries are 
strenuously engaged in reconciling differences and 
in solving the problems involved in economic 
union. 

The lesson of Benelux — as the outstanding con- 
temporary experiment in deliberate economic 
union — reveals the difficulties involved in such a 
project as well as in charting the paths for over- 
coming these obstacles. Fortunately, the states- 
men of these three countries, realizing the impor- 
tance of their experience, are interested in making 
it available to others. They have, for example, 
been the host to the European Customs Union 
Study Group and have provided much material 
for that organization.' 

CONCEPTION OF BENELUX 

Benelux was conceived during the war when the 
three Governments-in-exile decided that, follow- 
ing liberation, the three countries would form a 
customs union as the first step toward complete 
economic union. On September 5, 1944, the three 
countries signed a customs convention by which 
they agreed to establish a common tariff. This 
convention, however, established the framework 
for only a customs community. It did not pro- 
vide for the elimination of excise duties and other 



' They have also prepared English translations of basic 
documents, e. g., Report on the Conference of Cabinet Min- 
isters of the Netherlands, Belgimn and Luxembourg, held 
at The Hague on March 10th to 13th, 191,9. Much of the 
documentation on Benelux which was made available to 
the Select Committee on Foreign Aid was incorporated in 
the valuable report on Benelux to be found in the Pinal 
Report on Foreign Aid (H. Kept. 1845, 80th Cong. 2d sess., 
pp. 181-189). The material for this article has been 
drawn largely from these two sources. 

181 



taxes upon goods originating in partner countries, 
and the additional steps required to achieve a com- 
plete customs union or for the mutual adjustment 
of such duties and taxes and the coordination of 
policies are necessary for the formation of an 
economic union. 

In the midst of the world economic crisis of 
1932, at the Ouchy convention, the three countries 
endeavored to establish a preferential system by 
agreeing to a 10 percent reduction in duties levied 
on goods exchanged among themselves. Further 
annual reductions of 10 percent were to follow this 
initial reduction. This arrangement was never 
implemented primarily because the United King- 
dom and the United States contended that it vio- 
lated most- favored-nation agreements. 

Although the complementary nature of the two 
economies facilitates the achievement of economic 
union, the problems are mmierous and compli- 
cated. 

Belgium is a heavily industralized country with 
a large steel industry, whereas the Netherlands 
draws primarily on Belgium and Luxembourg for 
her steel requirements. In agriculture, the two 
economies are in about the same situation with 
respect to cereals, but the Netherlands produces 
surpluses of vegetables and dairy products which, 
prior to the war, she exported primarily to the 
German market. 

In order to make the union a reality, free move- 
ment of goods, capital, and persons will be neces- 
sary and will require, in addition to many other 
essential conditions, general comparability of 
price, tax, and wage structures. Many technical 
difficulties beset such an arrangement: Belgium 
and Luxembourg, for example, have not yet suc- 
ceeded in equalizing their sales and excise taxes 
after 18 years of economic union. 

Following liberation, the three countries en- 
countered great difficulties in making even the 
customs community a reality. The Netherlands 
suffered months of famine and destruction under 
German occupation; Belgium, having been lib- 
erated with a minimum of destruction, was serv- 
ing as a base for Allied operations. The payments 
received from the Allies enabled Belgium to re- 
cover more quickly with a minimum of economic 
controls. The Netherlands, on the other hand, 
suffered destruction not only of physical plants, 
roads, harbors, and housing, but also of the net- 
work of financial and commercial relationships. 



In planning the economic recovery of the coun- 
try, the Netherlands Government instituted an 
elaborate set of controls covering both production 
and consumption as well as strict controls over 
foreign trade. She established the level of living 
by controlling wages, prices, rationing, and by 
subsidizing certain products. 

Because of these differences and the preoccu- 
pation of each country with the problems of 
recovery, the customs convention was not imple- 
mented immediately upon liberation ; however, the 
Conference of Cabinet Ministers, which met at 
The Hague in April 1946, took steps to enforce 
and to strengthen the customs convention of Sep- 
tember 5, 1944. Since that date, the three coun- 
tries have made steady progress in reconciling the 
different views, in meeting the many problems 
associated with integi-ating these divergent na- 
tional economies into an economic union, and in 
developing the necessary organizations to handle 
joint problems. 

Despite the efforts to realize the tariff union 
in 1946, the common tariff did not enter into force 
before January 1, 1948. The period of preunion 
was scheduled to begin on July 1, 1949, with the 
achievement of the economic union proper by July 
1, 1950. In the protocol of October 1949, the 
contracting parties agreed that the full economic 
union would be established on July 1, 1950, and 
would be developed in the light of the experience 
gained during the jsreunion period. Although the 
developments following devaluation have favored 
the formation of complete economic union, some 
delays have been incurred which have postponed 
the date for the implementation of economic union. 
Even when the proclamation of full economic 
union is made, certain limitations may possibly 
have to be maintained for goods and payments. 

It is, of course, recognized that the continual H 
existence of such limitations would not be con- 
sonant with the criteria for the attainment of the 
economic union. As defined by the report of the 
Cabinet Ministers: 

An economic union of two or more sovereign States 
covers a definite economic territory : 

a. wherein persons, goods and capital can move freely; 

b. wherein the establislimeut and application of the 
economic, financial and social policies are coordinated ; 

c. which acts in its relations to third countries as a 
single economic, financial and social entity, except in mat- 
ters of purely national interest, which cannot have reper- 
cussions on the partner countries. 



182 



Department of State Bulletin 



ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC UNION 

To f ullill the requirements of this definition of 
economic union requires a great measure of agree- 
ment and an organization for the coordination of 
policies. In addition, there is always the neces- 
sity for good faith and understanding and consid- 
eration of problems from the point of view of 
union interest rather than national interest. The 
three countries, in appreciation of this factor, have 
decided to refer difficult problems, which might 
endanger good economic relations between the 
three countries, to the Board of Presidents of the 
Customs Convention Councils. The Conference 
of Cabinet Ministers noted that "the fact that this 
body can approach these problems from a Union, 
rather than from a national viewpoint, makes it 
reasonable to expect a satisfactory solution in 
many cases." 

In addition to the conferences of the Ministers, 
which have been held on the average of twice a 
year, the administration of Benelux required the 
establishment of a Council for Economic Union, 
an Administrative Council on Customs Duties, 
which is assisted by a Commission for Customs 
Disputes, a Commercial Agreement Council, and 
a General Secretariat. 

The conferences of Cabinet Ministers are held to 
settle the major problems encountered in realizing 
economic union and to plan the further steps to be 
taken. At the Conference held in March 1949, 
the Cabinet Ministers organized six ministerial 
committees to study the problems raised and dis- 
cussed in the report from the President of the 
Council. The range of problems presented to the 
Cabinet Ministers is indicated by the scope of these 
six committees which investigated problems relat- 
ing to (1) the return to free consumption and the 
reduction of subsidies, (2) the coordination of in- 
vestment programs, (3) fiscal policy, (4) social 
policy, (5) monetary and commercial policy, and 
(6) agricultural policy. At the meeting held in 
October 1949, the Ministei-s approved resolutions 
concerning waterways and seaport problems and 
parliamentary contacts, in addition to further 
resolutions on some of the above problems. 

The Council for Economic Union consists of 
three delegates of the Netherlands and three dele- 
gates of the Economic Union of Belgium and 
Luxembourg (hereinafter referred to as Bleu). 
It transmits its views to competent authorities in 
the Netherlands and Bleu concerning the 



measures which they might intend to take for the 
purpose of regulating imports, exports, and tran- 
sit by imposing restrictions of an economic char- 
acter, such as licenses, quotas, or special license fees 
and administrative charges. For the purpose of 
establishing the conmion regime, it also coordi- 
nates such of these measures as may be introduced 
and achninisters joint import, export, and transit 
quotas. The Council for Economic Union may 
also inform the competent authorities of its views 
concerning all measures relating to bounties or 
subsidies which the contracting parties intend to 
adopt. 

The Administrative Council on Customs Duties 
also consists of three delegates from the Nether- 
lands and three from Bleu. It proposes meas- 
ures designed to unify the legislative provisions 
and regulations governing the collection of im- 
port and excise duties. A Commission on Cus- 
toms Disputes assists this Council. 

The Commission on Customs Disputes, at the 
request of the competent Ministers, makes binding 
decisions in the cases of disputes arising from the 
application of the legal provisions and regulations 
resulting from the agreement. It communicates 
its decisions to the competent Ministers who are 
responsible for implementing them. 

The Commercial Agreements Council, which, 
likewise, consists of three representatives of each 
party, has the function of insuring the coordina- 
tion of measures in respect of relationships estab- 
lished with third countries. This is the body with 
primary responsibility for meeting the require- 
ment that the economic union speak with one 
voice. In the tariff negotiations under the Gen- 
eral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the Bene- 
lux delegation was divided into a series of work- 
ing groups headed alternately by a representative 
of the Netherlands and by a representative of 
Bleu. 

The General Secretariat handles the work for 
the intraunion bodies and makes the necessary 
preparations for the conferences of the Cabinet 
Ministers. 



PROBLEMS OF ECONOMIC UNION 

Balance of Payments 

As indicated above, economic union requires the 
free movement of goods, persons, and capital, and 



July 31, 1950 



183 



the coordination of certain types of internal legis- 
lation and of relations with third countries. One 
of the basic considerations in achieving economic 
union is the maintenance of an equilibrium in the 
payments among the parties of the union. With- 
out this equilibrium, the members of the economic 
union would find it difficult, if not impossible, to 
permit the uncontrolled movement of goods and 
capital. Chronic deficits in the payments position 
also affect the movement of people and the pos- 
sibility of coordinating internal taxes. One of 
the primary objectives in forming an economic 
union, in the view of the Benelux experts, must, 
therefore, be the attainment of an equilibrium in 
the payments position of the parties. This 
equilibrium naturally involves the relation be- 
tween the union and third countries, for the fa- 
vorable balance of trade with other countries by 
one member may be used to finance its deficit with 
the other member. The payments problem in 
Benelux, which arises from the apparently in- 
tractable bilateral balance-of -payments disequilib- 
rium between the Netherlands on the one side and 
Bleu on the other, has proved the major obstacle 
to attaining complete economic union. 

The Netherlands deficit in its trade with Bleu 
is not merely the result of the war, but postwar 
developments and the program for economic 
union have magnified the proportions of the prob- 
lem. Prior to the war, the Netherlands imported 
from Bleu around 50 percent more than she ex- 
ported. Transfers of gold or balances in other 
currencies covered the balance. In the postwar 
period, the deficit has been somewhat higher, the 
Netherlands importing around 60-70 percent more 
than her exports to Bleu. The settlement of this 
balance in the postwar period has proved to be 
a real problem. Although the Netherlands has 
some sterling balances, she has no surplus gold or 
dollar balances over her own direct requirements 
to settle the deficit, and Bleu is unwilling to take 
large sterling balances beyond its own needs un- 
less these balances are convertible into dollars. 
The Economist describes this manifestation of 
divergent economic interest as the dollar line that 
runs through the heart of the potential union. To 
one side, lies Holland, recently closely associated 
with the sterling area ; and, on the other, are Bel- 
gium and Luxembourg, for all economic intents 
and purposes part of the dollar world. 

The solution to the payments problem may re- 
quire a fundamental economic adjustment by the 

184 



parties in the union. During the transitional 
stage, or preunion, as it is termed, restrictions are 
to be maintained to control the volume of trade 
and capital movements, while an effort is being 
made to remove the causes of imbalance. The 
parties of Benelux agreed that, during this stage, 
certain conditions must be fulfilled. The three 
countries must return to a system of free consump- 
tion and the realization and maintenance of in- 
ternal monetary equilibrium. Dutch exports 
would have to be increased in order to provide 
sufficient currency for additional imports from 
Bleu. Although the Union can be realized, with- 
out unifying the currencies of the central banks 
of partner countries, by continuing the present 
technical procedure of exchanging guilders and 
Belgian francs through their respective central 
banks, the countries agreed that, as an essential 
condition of such an arrangement, one partner 
cannot be permitted to accumulate the currency 
of another. 

In order that the Netherlands might make the 
necessary changes in her policy to permit the ful- 
fillment of these conditions for preunion, the Bleu 
agreed to grant credits to the Netherlands on the 
understanding that the amounts of these credits 
would be automatically adjusted to the extent of 
the trade liberalization measures taken by the 
Netherlands in agreement with the Governments 
of Belgium-Luxembourg. In determining the de- 
gree of priority to be assigned to the various cate- 
gories of decontrolled goods, special attention was 
to be paid, on the one hand, to products involved 
in the employment policy pursued by the Bleu 
and, on the other hand, to the conditions essential 
to the abolition of rationing and restrictions on 
the Netherlands market. By April 1, 1950, ap- 
proximately 98 percent of the national trade be- 
tween the members was not subject to quantitative 
restrictions. 

EGA aid has played an important role in financ- 
ing the Netherlands deficit with Bleu. With this 
conditional aid, Bleu has been able to grant the 
Netherlands drawing rights and credits up to 
139 million dollars for the year ending June 30, 
1950. 

Coordination of Relations With Tiiird Countries 

During the period of preunion and continuing 
through the period of complete union, the com- 
mercial and monetary policies of the members to- 
ward third countries are to be coordinated. New 

Depatiment of Sfafe Bulletin 



trade and payments agreements are to be con- 
eluded only after prior consultation between part- 
ners. Once these common agreements have been 
prepaivd, negotiated, and put into effect, the re- 
sulting receipts and expenditures are to be worked 
out according to an automatic procedure. This 
procedure could be established either by institut- 
ing a common foreign-currency fund or by main- 
taining separate foreign-currency funds. In both 
cases, however, the Benelux experts feel that the 
effort should be concentrated on working out a 
common trade and payments policy particularly 
■with reference to the dollar area. The bilateral 
balance could be covered by foreign currency 
supplied by the debtor country ; but, in any case, 
a safety clause should be provided to enable timely 
discovery and redress of any fundamental devia- 
tions which might develop in the balance-of-pay- 
ments positions. 

The initial step to achieve this coordination was 
taken with the organization of the Commercial 
Agi-eements Council. In customs and tariff nego- 
tiations, for example, those under the General 
Agreements on Tariffs and Trade, Belgium, the 
Netherlands, and Luxembourg speak as one 
voice — that of the Benelux delegation. In other 
international conferences, they generally adopt a 
.common attitude. 

Free Movement of Goods 

The first condition of a tariff union or customs 
union is the establishment of a common tariff and 
the elimination of duties on products exchanged 
between members of the union. Benelux achieved 
this condition with the introduction of the com- 
mon tariff on January 1, 1948. Quantitative re- 
strictions imposed to protect the balance-of-pay- 
ments position of the members and to assure the 
fulfillment of various trade and payments agree- 
ments still rigidly controlled trade among the 
members of Benelux. The external features of 
these restrictions are gradually being coordinated, 
and those applicable to other members are to be 
eliminated. 

As a first step in the elimination of such re- 
strictions, the members are replacing the system 
of licenses by that of the "declaration in lieu of 
license" which will permit free importation while 
maintaining the possibility of checking imports 
a posteriori. Since quotas have become a device 
for protecting domestic industries in the absence 
of tariffs, the removal of such restrictions affects 



special interests previously protected and forces 
the rationalization of production. The Govern- 
ments will have to ignore the pleas of special 
interests or fonnulute other solutions than protec- 
tion for their problems in the interest of attain- 
ing the objective and advantages of complete 
economic union. 

The removal of controls, the elimination of sub- 
sidies, the adjvistment of price structures, the co- 
ordination of sales and excise taxes, the adoption 
of similar consumer credit policies, and the mutual 
adjustment of port and transit charges are all 
steps which, to a greater or lesser degree, affect 
the free movement of goods. Once they are taken, 
the removal of quantitative restrictions and the 
rationalization of production are facilitated. 

The three Governments agreed in March 1949 
to remove controls over the distribution of con- 
sumer goods and over the allocation of raw mate- 
rials. The removal of all such controls is partly 
dependent upon international factors such as the 
international allocation of raw materials and the 
availability of foreign currency and foreign loans 
for the purchase of such goods. They also agreed 
to abolish all rationing of consumer goods by the 
end of 1949. For imports of certain products 
from third countries, primarily those financed by 
dollar payments, the three Governments recog- 
nized the possible necessity of maintaining, as a 
temporary measure, regulations on the rationing 
and allocation of such products. In these cases, 
the decision is to be made by mutual agreement, 
and joint action is to be taken to formulate and 
implement the decision. 

The removal or adjustment of subsidies is im- 
portant not only for the free movement of goods 
but also for the free movement of capital. The 
subsidies policy pursued in the Benelux countries 
is not a natural historical phenomenon but is a 
combination of temporary prewar and postwar 
measures, which may be altered as conditions im- 
prove. One exception to these measures is the 
Netherlands "monopoly system" of agricultural 
subsidies which is an element of the Netherlands 
agricultural policy for influencing price levels and 
jDroducers' income. In cases of import subsidies 
for maintaining domestic prices, agreements can 
be reached governing the amount of the subsidies 
to be paid until foreign prices and domestic prices 
become adjusted. At the pi-esent time, the Neth- 
erlands subsidizes the difference between the im- 
port price and the domestic price of bread grains, 



July 37, 7950 



185 



meats, vegetables, and oils. Belgium, on the other 
hand, subsidizes the importation of flour products 
as a means of maintaining the price of bread. 
Subsidies on production pi-ovide a more difficult 
problem. As a general principle, the objective in 
Benelux is the complete elimination of such sub- 
sidies with the exception of those which, by mutual 
agreement, are deemed to be required by the par- 
ticular structure of the economy. 

As a general principle for achieving economic 
union, all controls on prices should be removed and 
normal economic forces should establish price 
levels. The member Governments of Benelux 
have accepted this principle but with the recog- 
nition of the right of the Governments, after con- 
sultation and by mutual agreement, to issue price 
regulations for all cases where world economic 
developments or disturbances in certain sectors of 
the economy make such action desirable. In addi- 
tion, when marked structural differences cause an 
appreciable divergence in the price of essential 
products in the three countries, the Governments 
may take special measures to alleviate the possible 
consequences of these differences. 

Although economic union does not necessarily 
require the unification of the fiscal system and the 
equalization of taxes, the three Governments of 
Benelux have agreed that unification of different 
systems of taxation should be as thorough as pos- 
sible, particularly for direct taxes on goods such as 
import duties, excise duties, purchase taxes, turn- 
over taxes, and taxes for motor vehicles. They 
have made much progress in this direction. A 
protocol of December 22, 1947, unified the excise 
duties on fruit wines and sparkling fermented 
beverages. Another agreement was concluded on 
December 16, 1948, providing for unification of 
additional excise charges and the elimination of 
others. The Customs Administrative Council of 
Benelux has proposed further steps in this direc- 
tion. The common system based on these pro- 
posals will result in an increase in fiscal revenues 
for the Netherlands as against a marked decrease 
in Belgium and Luxembourg. 

The mutual adjustment of port and transit 
charges is recognized as an important element in 
the effective organization and operation of eco- 
nomic union. The Governments of Benelux have, 
therefore, appointed a special committee to under- 
take the study of the technical, economic, and 
financial aspects of the problems concerning sea- 
ports and waterways. 



Free Movement of Capital 

As in the case of free movement of goods, the 
free movement of capital requires the fulfillment 
of a number of conditions. The payments posi- 
tion of the member countries, which, as previously 
mentioned, is a basic factor in all aspects of eco- 
nomic union, should be balanced without the ne- 
cessity of unusual settlements in gold or large 
governmental loans. Continuing capital move- 
ments may, of course, be utilized to offset tempo- 
rary deficits in the exchange of commodities and 
to restore basic equilibrium in the trade pattern of 
the member countries. If a substantial propor- 
tion of the capital transferred is utilized for capi- 
tal investments designed to increase the produc- 
tion of products which can compete in third coun- 
tries and which are needed in other parts of the 
union, then, such capital movements would have 
the effect of correcting disequilibrium in the bal- 
ance of payments. In an area as small as that 
covered by Benelux, coordination of large-scale 
capital investments may serve a useful function 
in promoting the type of investment best designed 
to insure the viability of the union. Production 
subsidies, which arbitrarily alter the competitive 
position of industries, are to be abolished or ad- 
justed by mutual agreement. The experts agree 
that corporation taxes and other charges influ- 
encing the movement of capital must be recognized 
and, where necessary, adjusted by mutual agree- 
ment. 

The members of Benelux accept the converti- 
bility of the currencies within the union. They 
recognize that special attention will have to be 
given to the conditions which determine the mu- 
tual convertibility of both currencies, the Dutch 
guilder and the Belgian franc. They are to adopt 
measures to recognize and to remedy any disturb- 
ances of the monetary equilibrium once it is estab- 
lished. Such measures are to be concentrated in 
the field of commercial policy. As as basis for 
convertibility, they recognize that arrangements 
will have to be developed during the preunion 
stage to insure unity of action in currency policiy 
to be pui'sued in relation to third countries. Such 
arrangements are compatible with the mainte- 
nance of separate internal monetary regimes and 
with the autonomy of the central banks. Pay- 
ments to third countries could be made either 
through the central banks acting jointly or from a 
common currency fund. Without such unity of 
action, convertibility would operate to the disad- 



186 



Department of Slate Bulletin 



vantage of one or the othei" of the members. 

The aim of the program for the coordination 
of investment is to insure the highest and most 
bahmced level of employment possible in the three 
countries. Consideration is to be given to the 
demographic development in order that produc- 
tive capacity will increase in those ai'eas in which 
industrial workers increase from year to year. 
Investments naturally should be made in regions 
where cost price is lowest for products of equal 
quality excluding all artificial considerations. The 
members of Benelux have agreed that investment 
policy, which is to follow the principles adopted 
by Oeec, should give due consideration to market- 
ing possibilities for new products and the im- 
portance of the proposed investments to the bal- 
ance-of-payments position. Under the Benelux 
program, coordination will be limited to those 
investments which, on the basis of quality or 
quantity, are of primary importance for the eco- 
nomic activities of the three countries. Equal 
attention is to be given to investments in industry 
and agriculture. Investments in important public 
works are to be coordinated since such investments 
influence the level of emplojanent. The Benelux 
Governments believe that the coordination of pri- 
vate investments can be facilitated by encouraging 
reciprocal understanding and cooperation between 
industrial leaders ; however, participating govern- 
ments in the Oeec and in the EGA bilateral agree- 
ments have undertaken commitments to act against 
private restrictive arrangements which interfere 
with the achievement of European recovery. Be- 
cause of the importance of pure scientific and 
applied scientific research to the development of 
industry, the three Governments have agreed to 
further such research by mutual consultation and 
cooperation. 

Subsidies, by altering the competitive ability 
of various industries within the union, can arbi- 
trarily influence the flow of capital. The Govern- 
ments therefore will have to eliminate or mutually 
adjust the payment of particular subsidies to meet 
the needs of the union as a whole. Since tax and 
credit policies are also important factors in di- 
recting capital movements, arrangements are to 
be developed to insure general comparability of 
policies in these fields. 

The Movement of Persons 

In the formation of an economic union among 
countries, in which barriers of various types pre- 



viously inhibited transfers of population, a num- 
ber of factors may influence the movement of 
persons within the union. The basic factors de- 
termining the ultimate movement of people within 
the union are the relative distribution of economic 
resources and, thus, the productivity of workers 
in various parts of the union, the demographic 
pattern, and the mores and customs of the people. 
To alter these conditions is difficult. Wage struc- 
tures and social policies, which also influence the 
movement of persons, are, therefore, the primary 
factors to be adjusted. 

At the present time, disparities exist in the 
structure of wages in the three countries. The 
level of wages in Belgium appears to be about 20 
percent higher than that in the Netherlands, and 
for Luxembourg the difference is about 40 percent. 
Although these differences need not be eliminated, 
they should be reduced to the degree of difference 
that might be expected to exist in different regions 
of the same country. The difference in wages may 
be expected to decrease as a result of the coordina- 
tion of the economic policy of the member 
countries. 

In order to coordinate the wage structure, the 
Ministers asked the Council of the Economic 
Union to study the question of wages. This study 
involves the collection of comparative data in the 
three countries on wages paid to adult men and 
women and to juveniles. The job classification of 
workers in the three countries also has to be ex- 
amined. With this basic information, certain 
conclusions could be reached regarding the pur- 
chasing power of wages and its probable trend 
under the impact of economic union. Light would 
also be shed on the factors influencing the migra- 
tion of industries especially those of an economic 
nature arising from geographical differences or 
from excessive wage differentials. In certain 
cases, such differentials might hamper the develop- 
ment of favorable economic relations among the 
members. The Ministers have also suggested that 
a study be made for those sectors of production 
where great differences in wages exist and where 
marked competition may be expected either from 
within the union or from foreign countries. 

In the field of social security, the first step has 
been the conclusion of agreements providing for 
reciprocity in covering workers in the countries 
parties to the agreements. The members of Bene- 
lux hope to extend these arrangements to include 



July 3h 1950 



187 



the other members of the Brussels pact, i.e. France 
and the United Kingdom. As a long-range objec- 
tive, the Ministers have asked the Council of the 
Economic Union to investigate a comprehensive 
equalization of social security charges on the 
assumption that such equalization is to be pre- 
ferred to leveling the charges in individual sectoi-s. 

The broader problems in this field have been 
assigned to the Council of the Economic Union 
for investigation. These relate to the relationship 
of unemployment and wages in the three countries, 
the demographic problems from the social point 
of view, movement of labor within Benelux, and 
the preparation of a draft multilateral reciprocity 
agreement on social security including the coun- 
tries of Benelux and the other members of the 
Brussels pact. 

Consideration is also to be given to the position 
of the farmer. The agricultural policy of the three 
countries is designated to insure security in well- 



managed enterprises for farmers and agricultural 
laborers. 

CONCLUSION 

Much painful labor between the conception of 
economic union and its birth appears evident from 
this discussion of the developments and prob- 
lems involved in the organization of the Benelux 
union. Although the problems would differ in 
detail for countries other than Belgium, the 
Netherlands, and Luxembourg, the consummation 
of economic union by any other countries would 
require solutions to the same broad problems. The 
important conclusion which can be drawn is that 
the problems can be solved. Given good inten- 
tions, good will, good faith, and a desire to pro- 
mote the common good at the price of some 
sacrifice, economic union, with all of its economic 
and political advantages, can be born. 



PUBLICATIONS 



Recent Releases 

For sale 61/ the Superintendent of Documents, Government 
Printing Office, Washington 25, D. G. Address requests 
direct to the Superintendent of Documents, except in the 
case of free publications, which may be obtained from the 
Department of State. 

Tensions Between the United States and the Soviet Union. 

General Foreign Policy Series 22. Pub. 3810. 16 pp. 
[Bulletin Reprint] Free. 

Addre.ss by Secretary Acbeson made at the Univer- 
sity of Ca'lifornia on March 16, 1950, discussing the 
Soviet philosophy and motives, etc. and our policy 
toward them. 

The International Trade and Traffic in Arms— Its Super- 
vision and Control. General Foreign Policy Series 23. 
Pub. 3822. 26 pp. [BirLLiiTiN Reprint] Free. 

Leonard H. Pomeroy outlines the past and present 
measures to supervise and control the traffic in arms. 
The participation of American citizens and Ameri- 
can arms in the Far East clandestine arms traffic is 
considered with respect to its implications for U.S. 
arms policy and administrative policy. 

Aspects of International Petroleum Policy. Commercial 
Policy Series 127. Pub. 3845. pp. [Bulletin Reprint] 
Free. 

Substance of statement by Willard L. Thorp, Assistant 
Secretary for Economic Affairs, made before the 
special subcommittee on petroleum of the House Com- 
mittee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on April 
5, 1950. 

188 



The ITO Charter: A Code of Fair Trade Practices. Com- 
mercial Policy Series 128. Pub. 384.. 14 pp. [Bulletin 
Reprint] Free. 

Statement by Secretary Acheson on origin, purpose, 
general significance, etc., of the Charter. Made be- 
fore the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on April 
19, 1950. 

The Quality of American Patriotism. General Foreign 
I'olicy Series 27. Pub. 3848. 8 pp. [Bulletin Reprint] 
Free. 

Remarks made by Secretary Acheson, made on the 
occasion of the 200th anniversary of the Holy Trinity 
Parish at Middletown, Conn., on April 17, 19.50. 

Strengthening the Forces of Freedom. General Foreign 
Policy Series 28. Pub. 3852. 192 pp. 50^. 

Selected speeches and statements of Secretary Ache- 
son, giving a survey of U. S. foreign policy and dis- 
cussion of tJie United Nations, the Ito charter, the 
North Atlantic Treaty, the Military Assistance Pro- 
gram, etc. as instruments of that policy. 

National Commission UNESCO News, June 1950. Pub. 

3858. 12 pp. 10^ a copy; $1.00 per year, domestic; $1.35 
[ler year, foreign. 

Prepared monthly for the United Nations Educa- 
tional, Scientific and Cultural Organization. 

Threats to Democracy and Its Way of Life. General For- 
eign Policy Series 29. Pub. 3859. 14 pp. [BuLLE-niN 
Reprint | Free. 

Address by Secretary Acheson before the American 
Society of Newspaper Editors, Washington B.C., 
April 22, 1950. 

The Problem of International Organization Among Coun- 
tries of Europe and the North Atlantic Area. Interna- 
tional Organization and Conference Series II, European 
and British Commonwealth, 2. Pub. 3861. 8 pp. [Bul- 
letin Reprint] Free. 

Address by Secretary Acheson made before the So- 
ciety of Pilgrims, London, May 10, 1950. 

Deparfment of Sfate Bulletin 



Settlement of Bizonal Fusion Agreement 



[Released to the press July 7] 



The Department of State announced today that 
through an exchange of notes with the British 
Embassj' an agreement has been reached on the 
settlement of outstanding financial issues under 
the bizonal fusion agreement. 

The British note quotes the full text of the 
United States note and the agreement to conclude 
these financial matters became effective upon re- 
ceipt of the British note on June 28, 1950. 

The original bizonal fusion agreement was 
signed by former Secretary Byrnes and Mr. Bevin 
on December 2, 19-16 ; it became effective on Janu- 
ary 1, 1947. The agreement was revised on De- 
cember 17, 1917, and was later extended on 
December 31, 1948, March 31, 1949, and June 30, 
1949. On September 15, 1949, when the Federal 
Republic of Germany was established, the ar- 
rangements between the United States and the 
United Kingdom for bizonal fusion were super- 
seded by trizonal fusion. The trizonal fusion 
arrangements are set forth in the Washington 
agreements of April 8. 1949, and the Charter 
of the Allied High Commission of June 20, 1949. 
There remained outstanding, however, certain 
financial issues which required settlement by the 
United States and the United Kingdom in order 
to wind up the bizonal fusion arrangements. 
These issues are settled in the attached document, 
which deals with the following topics : 

(1) Unused portion of British contribution — 
the British have undertaken, in the fusion agree- 
ment as amended and extended, to make available 
certain goods and services under certain condi- 
tions. The British contribution had not been 
fully utilized when the bizonal fusion agree- 
ment came to a close on September 15, 1949. 
Paragraph 1 of the attached agreement disj^oses 
of the problem of the unused portion of the con- 
tribution through a lump sum settlement of 
2,450,000 pounds sterling which the Uiiited King- 
dom will make to Germany through the Joint 
Export -Import Agency. 

(2) Paragraph 2 of the agreement deals with 
the Joint Export-Import Agency which was orig- 
inally established under the fusion agreement as 

July 31, 1950 



an Allied agency for the handling of Germany's 
foreign trade. The functions of this agency have 
now been turned over to the German Government. 
The jjresent agreement provides for the speedy 
final liquidation of the agency and for the turn- 
ing over of its assets to the German Government, 
subject to appropriate ]Drovision for settlement 
of claims outstanding against it. 

(3) Paragraph 3 of the agreement deals with 
the so-called No. 2 Account maintained by the 
Bank of England on behalf of the Joint ExiX)i't- 
Import Agency. The No. 2 Account was derived 
from funds originally made available to the Joint 
Export-Import Agency by the United Kingdom 
as a capital contribution. The final liquidation 
of the Joint Export-Import Agency permits the 
closing of this account under conditions provided 
for in this paragraph and under paragraph 6 of 
the agreement. 

(4) The fourth and fifth paragraphs deal with 
the possibility that special measures might be 
needed to cover a German sterling deficit. Under 
the terms of the Washington agreements of April 
8, 1949, it was understood that further contri- 
butions by the United Kingdom to Germany 
would be in the framework of a multilateral pay- 
ments plan. The present provision states that, in 
the event that such a plan should not be in exist- 
ence and Germany should require sterling in order 
to cover its current essential needs, the United 
Kingdom would consult with the United States 
in regard to this problem if the United States 
were at the same time making aid available to 
Germany. 

( 5 ) The sixth paragraph provides for the wind- 
ing up of arrangements laid down in jjaragraph 4 
of the agreement of December 17, 1947, for con- 
verting into dollars in certain circumstances part 
of the sterling balance of the JEIA number 2 
account. 

(6) The final paragraph of the agreement re- 
affirms the intention of the two Governments to 
treat contributions made to Germany prior to and 
under the fusion agreement as a claim against 
Germany to be repaid under terms consistent with 

189 



the reconstruction of the German economy along 
healthy nonaggressive lines. 

At the present time, the United States is making 
economic aid available to Germany through the 
EGA out of funds in part appropriated to EGA 
and in part originally appropriated to the Depart- 
ment of the Army. Funds for the support of Ger- 
many are included in the appropriation request 
submitted by EGA for fiscal year 1951. The Army 
is no longer requesting funds for economic support 
of Germany. In addition to the aid made avail- 
able to Germany through contributions under the 
bizonal fusion agreement, the United Kingdom 
has extended drawing rights to Germany under 
intra-European Payments Agreement. 

Following is the text of the British note of June 
28, 1950 : 

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your note 
of today's date, the terms of which are as follows : 

"I have the honor to refer to the discussions which have 
taken place between the Government of the United King- 
dom and the Government of the United States on the sub- 
ject of financial issues arising from the Bizonal Fusion 
Agreement of December 2, 1946, as amended tjy the Agree- 
ment of December 17, 1947, and its extensions agreed on 
December 31, 194S, March 31, 1949 and June 30, 1949, and 
the financial issues arising from the Trizonal Fusion which 
has been accomplished under the Charter of the Allied 
High Commission for Germany. 

"In the interest of settling these outstanding issues, I 
have the honor to submit the following proposals for the 
consideration of the Government of the United Kingdom. 

"1. The Government of the United Kingdom will make 
available sterling funds to the Government of the German 
Federal Republic, by payment to the Joint Export-Import 
Agency, in final discharge of its obligations under para- 
graph 1 of the Revised Fusion Agreement of December 
17, 1947, as subsequently amended and extended. It is 
the understanding of the Government of the United States 
that the Government of the United Kingdom proposes to 
make availalile pounds sterling 1,30,"),000 under paragraph 
1 (a) (ii) and pounds sterling 1,150,000 under paragraph 
1 (a) (iii) of the Agreement. 

"2. In order to implement the provisions of the Charter 
of the Allied High Commission and of the Bizonal Fusion 
Agreement of June 30, 1949, the Government of the United 
States proposes that the two Governments instruct their 
respective High Commissioners to work out with the 
French High Commissioner suitable arrangements to come 
into eilect as promptly as possible for the liquidation of 
the Joint Export-Import Agency, the transfer to the Fed- 
eral Government of its assets, and the assumption by the 
Federal Government of the liability to meet any of the 
remaining claims on the Joint Export-Import' Agency 
\\hich are approved under procedures established by the 
Allied High Commission. 

"3. Sterling balances to the credit of the No. 2 Account 
of the Bank Deutseher Laender with the Bank of England 
will be transferred to the No. 1 Account on June 30, 1950. 
While these funds will be regarded as existing resources 
for the purposes of the European Payments Union, they 
will be segregated in a special sub-account or by other 
means and will not be merged with other funds of "the No. 
1 Account pending the determination of the rights of the 
parties to the Euroi)ean Payments Union with respect 
to sterling balances. It is agreed that the United King- 
dom Government will not claim that the funds from the 
No. 2 Account so transferred should be taken into account 
in the determination of drawing rights for the purposes 
of the Intra-European Payments Agreement of 1949-50. 

190 



"4. The Government of the United Kingdom will under- 
take to consult with the Government of the United States 
in regard to the provision of sterling to meet the current 
essential needs of the Federal Republic, in the event that 
the Federal Republic should be faced with a deficit in its 
sterling availabilities of .such a character as to endanger 
the achievement of the objectives of the occupation, and 
there is no Intra-European Payments Agreement or other 
similar multilateral payments agreement in force, pro- 
vided that the United States is concurrently making eco- 
nomic aid available to the Federal Republic. 

"5. The provisions of the preceding paragraph do not 
relate to expenditures which may be incurred for the 
maintenance of forces of occupation and control stafC 
for Germany. 

"fi. As part of the proposals outlined herein the Gov- 
ernment of the United States will agree to release the 
Government of the United Kingdom from its obligation 
for conversion of sterling in the No. 2 Account into dol- 
lars under the terms of paragraph 4 of the Revised Fusion 
Agreement of December 17, 1947. 

"7. The understandings between the two Governments 
contained in paragraph 6 (e) of the Bizonal Fusion Agree- 
ment of December 2, 1946 with respect to the recovery of 
the costs incurred by the two Governments prior and 
pursuant to the Agreement remain in force. 

"Should these proposals commend themselves to the 
Government of the United Kingdom, I have the honor to 
suggest that this note and your reply should constitute 
an Agreement between our two Governments, which shall 
come into force upon the date of your reply." 

In reply, I have the honour to inform you that His 
Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom accept the 
propo.sals set forth in your note and, in accordance with 
the suggestion contained therein, your note and this reply 
shall be regarded as constituting an Agreement between 
our two Governments in this matter, to be in force from 
the date of this reply. 

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to you the 
a.ssurance of my highest consideration. 



Abuse of Kuman Rights 
in Satellite States 

Statement by Secretary Acheson 
[Released to the press July 21'\ 

I would lilie to comment on the present status 
of the efforts which are being made with respect 
to the abuse of human riglits and freedoms in 
Bulgaria, Himgary, and Rumania. 

Over a year ago, the United States, together 
with the United Kingdom and certain British 
Commonwealth countries, charged the Govern- 
ments of Bulgaria, Hungary, and Rumania with 
flagrant violation of their obligations under the 
treaties of peace to secure to all persons under 
their jurisdictions the enjoyment of human rights 
and fundamental freedoms. The accused Gov- 
ernments, in rejecting the charges, refused to 
comply with provisions of the peace treaties for 
the resolution of the consequent disputes concern- 
ing the interpretation and execution of the 
treaties. 

Nevertheless, in the interests of human liberty, 

Department of State Bulletin 



I'usticc, and the integrity of international law, the 
Jnited States and other interested Allied Powers 
have pressed the issue, step by step, according to 
the applicable procedures of the peace treaties. 
When this process reached a point at which the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations might 
have been requested to participate in the action, 
the United Nations General Assembly asked the 
International Court of Justice for guidance on 
several procedural questions which arose because 
of the refusal of the accused Governments to co- 
operate in the proceedings. Early this year, tlie 
Court ruled that treaty disputes exist and that 
Bulgaria, Hungary, and Rumania are obligated 
to comply with the treaty provisions for the 
resolution of such disputes. 

The accused Governments denied the compe- 
tence of the International Court and persisted in 
refusing to participate in the disputes proceedings. 
The Court was then asked whether, under the 
treaties, commissions could be formed to settle 
the disputes without the cooperation of Bulgaria, 
Hungary, and Rumania. It is now reported that 
the Court has ruled, in effect, that the treaties do 
not provide for such a contingency. 

The United States will naturally respect the 
opinions of the International Court of Justice. 
Consequently, although it has been determined 
that disputes exist and that the three Governments 
in question are legally bound to cooperate in the 
settlement of such disputes, their wrongful refusal 
to do so obstructs resort, in this instance, to the 
disputes procedures provided by the treaties of 
peace and renders it necessary, in the light of the 
Court's decision, to pursue the issue by other 
means. 

I want to emphasize that this by no means puts 
an end to our efforts in defense of human rights 
and freedoms in Bulgaria, Hungary, and 
Rumania. The United Nations General As- 
sembly has shown a deep and continuing concern 
with this problem. In its sessions during 1949, 
the Assembly took account of the existing proceed- 
ings under the treaties of peace. Now, that 
establishment of the proposed treaty commis- 
sions has been blocked by willful default on the 
part of the accused Governments, the Assembly 
will undoubtedly wish to consider what further 
steps it should take with respect to the charges that 
the Governments of Bulgaiia, Hungary, and 
Rumania have been suppressing systematically 
the fundamental freedoms of their people. 

It is the intent of this Government to bring 
to light and place before the conscience of man- 
kind the facts relating to the denial of human 
rights by the accused Governments. These Gov- 
ernments, which have considered themselves free 
to disregard treaty obligations and the peaceful 
machinery for the settlement of disputes, should 
be made to feel the full weight of the condemna- 
tion of all free peoples which their actions 
provoke. 



U.S. and U.K. Establish 

Proving Ground for Guided Missiles 

[Released to the press July 21] 

The Secretary of State and the British Ambas- 
sador have today signed an agreement for the 
establishment and operation of a long-range 
proving ground for guided missiles in the Bahama 
Islands. 

The base and launching facilities for the 
proving ground are located on the east coast of 
Florida in the vicinity of Cape Canaveral, and the 
flight testing range will extend to the southeast 
over the Atlantic Ocean. 

The agreement signed today will permit the 
United States, jointly with the United Kingdom, 
to establish and operate technical and supporting 
facilities at selected sites in the Bahama Islands, 
which are necessary for acquiring test data and 
maintaining continuous control of the guided 
missiles throughout their flight. 

The agreement will continue in force for a period 
of 25 years and authorizes the United States, 
jointly with the United Kingdom, to launch, fly, 
and land guided missiles in the resignated range 
area and to operate such vessels and aircraft m 
the area as may be necessary for purposes con- 
nected directly with the operation of the range. 

The missiles to be flight tested will be unarmed 
and will carry instruments for measuring missile 
performance, for control of the missile, and for 
destruction of the missile in flight if necessary for 
reasons of safety. Radar and visual surveillance 
will be maintained along the range to determine 
the presence and location of any air or surface 
craft in the area. 



Executive Order on U.S. Higii 
Commissioner for Germany Amended ' 

By virtue of the authority vested in me by the 
Constitution and the statutes, and as President of 
the United States and Commander in Chief of 
the Armed Forces of the United States, Executive 
Order No. 10062 of June 6, 1949, entitled "Estab- 
lishing the Position of United States High Com- 
missioner for Germany,^" is hereby amended as 
follows : 

1. The following paragraphs are added to the 
said order at the end thereof: 

"5. The High Commissioner, as representative 
of the United States, shall share the four-power 
responsibility for the custody, care, and execution 
of sentences and disposition (including pardon, 
clemency, parole, or release) of war criminals con- 



• Ex. O. 10144 ; 1.5 Fed. Reg. 4705. 
= BuiiETiN of June 26, 1949, p. 828. 



iu\Y 31, J 950 



191 



fined in Germany as a result of conviction by the 
International Military Tribunal, Niirnberg, and 
shall be responsible for the custody, care, and ex- 
ecution of sentences and disposition (including 
pardon, clemency, parole, or release) of war 
criminals confined in Germany as a result of con- 
viction by military tribunals established by the 
United States Military Governor pursuant to Con- 
trol Council Law No. 10. 

"6. The Commander in Chief, European Com- 
mand, shall be responsible for the custody, care, 
and execution of sentences and disposition (in- 
cluding pardon, clemency, parole, or release) of 
war criminals confined in Germany under sen- 
tences adjudged by military tribunals established 
by United States Military Commanders in Ger- 



many and elsewhere, other than those referred to 
in paragraph 5 hereof. On the request of the 
High Commissioner, the Commander in Chief, 
European Command, shall take necessary meas- 
ures for carrying into execution any sentences 
adjudged against war criminals as to whom the 
High Commissioner has responsibility and con- 
trol, namely: war criminals convicted and sen- 
tenced by military tribunals established pursuant 
to Control Council Law No. 10." 

2. The term "Commander of the United States 
Armed Forces in Germany,'' occurring in para- 
graph 3 of the said order, is changed to read 
"Commander in Chief, European Command." 

This order shall be effective as of June 6, 1949. 



Austria Signs Fulbright Agreement 

EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITIES FOR 1951 ANNOUNCED 



AGREEMENT WITH AUSTRIA 

Austria and the United States on June 6 signed 
an agreement ^ putting into operation the program 
of educational exchanges authorized by the Ful- 
bright Act. 

The signing is the fii'st such ceremony to take 
place at Washington, all previous agreements hav- 
ing been signed in the capitals of the countries 
concerned. 

Secretary Acheson represented the Government 
of the United States, and Dr. Ludwig Klein- 
waechter. Minister of Austria, represented the 
Government of that country. 

This agreement is the eighteenth signed under 
the act, previous agreements having been signed 
with the Governments of Australia, Belgium and 
Luxembourg, Burma, China, Egypt, France, 
Greece, India, Iran, Italy, Korea, the Netherlands, 
New Zealand, Norway, the Philippines, Turkey, 
and the United Kingdom. 

The agreement provides for a United States 
Educational Commission in Austria to assist in the 
administration of the educational program fi- 
nanced from certain funds resulting from the 
sale of United States surplus jiroperty to that 
country. It provides for an annual progi'am of 
the equivalent of approximately 250,000 dollars 
in Austrian schillings for certain educational 
purposes. 

These purposes include the financing of : 

studies, research, instruction, and other educational 
activities of or for citizens of the United States of America 



' For text of agreement, see Department of State press 
release 595. 



in schools and institutions of higher learning located in 
Austria or of nationals of Austria in United States schools 
and institutions of higher learning located outside the 
continental United States . . . including payment for 
transportation, tuition, maintenance, and other exi>enses 
incident to scholastic activities ; or furnishing transporta- 
tion for nationals of Austria who desire to attend United 
States schools and institutions of higher learning in the 
continental United States . . . whose attendance will not 
deprive citizens of the United States of America of an 
opportunity to attend such schools and institutions. 

All recipients of awards under this act are 
selected by the Board of Foreign Scholarships, 
appointed by the President of the United States. 

The Commission in Austria will consist of eight 
members, the honorary chairman of which will be 
the United States Minister to Austria. The mem- 
bers of the Commission will include four citizens 
of Austria and four citizens of the United States. 

After the members of the Commission in Austria 
have been appointed, information about specific 
opportunities for American citizens to pursue 
study, teaching, or research in that country, for 
the 1951-52 academic year, will be made public. 
At that time, applications for these opportunities 
will be received by : 

F07' graduate study 

The Institute of International Education 
2 West Forty-fifth Street 
New York 19, New York 

Fulbright Program Advisers on the campuses of 
American colleges and universities 

For teaching in Austrian elementary or secondary schools 

The Uiiitfd States Office of Education 
Federal Security Agency 
Washington 25, D.C. 



192 



Department of State Bulletin 



For univeraity teaching, or advanced research 

The Conference Board of Associated Research 

Councils 
2101 Constitution Avenue NW. 
Washington 25, D. C. 



FULBRIGHT OPPORTUNITIES FOR 1951 

Opportunities for more than 1,000 Americans to 
undertake graduate study, teaching, or research 
abroad, during the 1951-52 academic year, under 
the terms of tlie Fulbright Act. were announced, 
on June 5, by the Department of State. A com- 
parable number of opportunities will be available 
for foreign nationals to come to the United States 
for similar purposes. 

The countries in which these opportunities will 
be available are Australia. Belgium, Burma, 
Egypt. France, Greece. India, Iran, Italy, the 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, the Philip- 
pines, Turkey, and the United Kingdom. 

All applications for visiting lecturers, teachers, 
and research awards must be submitted by October 
15 and for students awards by October 31. Per- 
sons wishing to apply should send their inquiries 
to the following agency, in addition to those 
already listed on the preceding page : 

For teaching in American secondary schools abroad 

American Schools Service 
American Council on Education 
744 Jackson Place NW. 
Washington 6, D. C. 

These awards are made under Public Law 584, 
79th Congi'ess, the Fulbright Act, which author- 
izes the Department of State to use certain foreign 
currencies and credits acquired through the sale 
of surplus property abroad for programs of educa- 
tional exchange with other nations. 

Grants are normally made for 1 academic year 
and are renewable only in exceptional cases. 
Grants to Americans usually include round-trip 
transportation, tuition or a stipend, a living allow- 
ance, and a small amount for necessary books and 
equipment. Grants to foreign nationals include 
round-trip transportation only, and their expenses 
in the United States must be met from other 
sources. All grants under the act are made in 
foreign currencies. 

Opportunities in each country are listed below : 

Belffium and Lica;e7nl)0iirg. — For Americans : 20 
graduate students : 3 teachers ; 3 research scholars ; 
2 visiting lecturers. For Belgians and Luxem- 
bourgers : travel grants to 20 students; 3 teachere; 

4 research scholars ; 1 visiting lecturer. 
Burma. — For Americans : 3 graduate students ; 

5 teachers ; 5 research scholars ; 5 visiting lecturers. 
For Burmese: travel grants to 25 students, 
teachers, research scholars, and lecturers. 

France. — For Americans: 220 graduate stu- 
dents ; 12 teachers ; 30 research scholars ; 10 visit- 

Ju/y 31, 1950 



ing lecturers; 4 instructors in library science; 4 
instructors in social work; 2 instructors in nurs- 
ing education. For French : travel grants to an 
identical number in the categories listed above. 

Greece. — For Americans : 10 graduate students ; 
22 teachers; 6 research scholars; 7 visiting lec- 
turers. For Greeks : travel grants to 33 students, 

10 research scholars and lecturers; 247 scholar- 
ships for Greek students to attend American-spon- 
sored schools in Greece. 

I tall/. — For Americans : 100 graduate students ; 

11 teachers; 21 research scholars; 12 visiting lec- 
turers. For Italians: travel grants to 80 stu- 
dents; 9 teachers; 50 research scholars and lec- 
turers; 5 scholarships for Italian students to 
attend American-sponsored schools in Italy. 

The Netherlands. — For Americans: 25 gi-adu- 
ate students; 25 teachers; 4 research scholars; 12 
visiting lecturers. For Netherlanders : travel 
grants to the United States to 100 students, 
teachers, and research scholars and 10 visiting 
lecturers. 

Nero Zealand. — For Americans: 10 graduate 
students ; 2 teachers ; 3 research scholars ; 3 visit- 
ing lecturers. For New Zealanders : travel grants 
to 10 students; 8 teachers, research scholars, and 
lecturers. 

The Philippines. — For Americans: 6 graduate 
students ; 4 teachers ; 2 research scholars ; 8 visit- 
ing lecturers. For Filipinos : travel grants to 35 
students; 5 teachers, research scholars, and 
lecturers. 

Australia, Egypt, India, Iran, Norway, Turkey, 
United Kingdom. — The awards to be offered in 
these countries are of comparable nature, but the 
exact number of awards is not known at the pres- 
ent time — and will be announced later. In the 
meantime, ai^plications may be submitted to the 
agencies listed above by persons interested in 
study, research, or teaching in these countries. 



Letters of Credence 

Greece 

The newly appointed Ambassador of Greece 
Athanase G. Politis presented his credentials to 
the President on July 13, 195U. For texts of the 
Ambassador's remarks and the President's reply 
see Department of State press release 748 of 
July 13. 

Portugal 

The newly appointed Ambassador of Portugal, 
Sehor Luis Esteves Fernandes, presented his cre- 
dentials to the President on June 23, 1950. For 
texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the Pres- 
ident's reply, see Department of State press release 
672 of that date. 

193 



Expanded Information Program Vital to National Security 



MESSAGE OF THE PRESIDENT 

The President on July 13 sent the following letter to the 
Speaker of the House of Representatives ivhich was re- 
leased to the press by the White House on the same date. 

I have the honor to transmit herewith for the 
consideration of the Congress supplemental esti- 
mates of appropriation for the fiscal year 1951 in 
the amount of $89,000,000 for the Department of 
State and the General Services Achninistration. 

On several recent occasions I have directed the 
attention of the Congress and the Nation to the 
growing abuse and vilification of Communist 
propaganda. Unsuccessful in its attempts to win 
Western Europe through ideological appeals, 
communism is seeking to discredit the United 
States and its actions throughout the world. If it 
succeeds in this effort to create distrust and hatred 
of our Government and its motives, the gains we 
have recently made in Western Europe may be 
substantially nullified. Our material assistance, 
to be fully effective, must be complemented by a 
full-scale effort in the field of ideas. 

The free nations of the world have a great ad- 
vantage in that truth is on their side. Communist 
leaders have repeatedly demonstrated that they 
fear the truth more than any weapon at our com- 
mand. We must now throw additional resources 
into a campaign of truth which will match in 
vigor and determination the measures we have 
adopted in meeting postwar economic and mili- 
tary problems. Anything less than our best and 
most intense effort will be insufficient to meet the 
challenge — and the opportunity. 

This expanded program has been developed on 
the basis of first things first. It does not propose 
a general world-wide expansion of our informa- 
tion and educational exchange efforts. Instead 
it is concentrated on the most critical areas in the 
world today. Each of these critical areas has 
been studied with great care; our objectives for 
each area have been defined. What we ai^e now 
doing in each area has been appraised, and the 
additional steps needed have been determined. 

I regard such an expanded campaign of truth 
as vital to our National Security. We will never 
attain real security until people everywhere recog- 



nize that the free nations of the world are the 
true seekers of permanent peace. 

The details of these estimates are set forth in 
the letter of the Director of the Bureau of the 
Budget, transmitted herewith, in whose comments 
and observations thereon I concur. 

ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INFORMATION 
ENDORSES PROGRAM 

The President on July 17 received the following com- 
munication, dated July 14, from the Advisory Commission 
on Information which was released to the press July 17. 
Members include Mark Ethridge, Chairman, Mark A. May, 
Erwin D. Canham, Philip C. Reed, and Justin Miller. 

The Advisory Commission on Information, set 
up by Congress under Public Law 402 and ap- 
pointed by yourself, desires to communicate to you 
its feeling of the urgency of an immediate step-up 
in our whole information program directed to 
peoples of other countries. 

As you are aware, the Commission, since its 
organization, has called attention to the anomaly 
which exists by reason of the expenditure of 15 
billions of dollars a year on defense, 5 to 61/2 bil- 
lions a year on economic and foreign aid, and, this 
year, a little over 30 million dollars on our total 
information and education program designed to 
make the rest of the world understand our 
purposes. 

You have been aware of the necessity for a much 
more vigoi'ous "campaign of truth," as you demon- 
strated in your speech to the American Society of 
Newspaper Editors. In that speech, you said, 
among other things, 

We know how false these Communist promises are. But 
it is not enough for us to know this. Unless we get the 
real story across to people in other countries, we will lose 
the battle for men's minds by default. 

That statement is even truer now than when 
you gave utterance to it, because of the aggres- 
sion in Korea and the light in which Soviet propa- 
gandists have tried to place our resistance to it. 
The Korean aggression has made it all the more 
imperative that we intensify our effort to give 
the true picture of America, her intentions and 



194 



Department of Sfafe Bulletin 



her actions, than it has ever been before. The 
Commission feels that the field for that sort of 
information is even moi'e fruitful than it has 
ever been because the Kremlin has revealed itself 
and its intentions more clearly than at any time 
since the end of the war. Now is the time to mar- 
shal the determination of the peoples of the free 
world not to succumb to this vicious ideology 
which promises Utopia but gives chains. 

Although the Commission heartily endorsed 
what you said to the editoi's, it has refrained from 
expressing tliat endorsement because it wanted to 
see more concrete proposals from the State De- 
partment as to how additional money would be 
spent and a more explicit statement of the national 
objectives which we were trying to communicate 
to others. 

Within the past few days, the Commission has 
had an opportunity to review field studies which 
have been made by the Public Affairs Division of 
the Department. They are quite explicit as to 
facilities which will be required to reach the crit- 
ical areas of the world and to counter, as best it 
may be done, the tremendous jamming effort which 
the Russians are making. They are quite explicit 
as to the manpower and money which will be re- 
quired to reach the peoples we want to reach. 
Moreover, there is a better understanding in the 
Depaiiment, and a better expression of that under- 
standing, of what our information objectives are. 
The Commission has previously reported to the 
Secretary of State and to the Congress that there 
is a much better integration between policy mak- 
ing and policy exposition through information 
channels than there has been at any time in the 
2 years of the Commission's life. 

The proposals which resulted from the Public 
Affairs Division's field study and from its policy 
studies in the Department have been sent to the 
Budget Bureau in the form of a request for a sup- 
plemental appropriation for physical facilities 
and for operating funds. That proposal is in line 
with your own statement to the editors, and we 
understand that it has been given approval in 
principle for the National Security Council. To 
that, the Commission desires to add its own unani- 
mous endorsement and stress the urgency of early 
action. 

We think certain considerations are obvious in 
warranting action before the adjournment of 
Congress: 

The time element is such that the United States 
must move as rapidly as possible. We do too little 
now, and next year may be too late in many areas. 

The propaganda effort of the U.S.S.R., now bor- 
dering on open psychological warfare, is a major 
threat to this Government's foreign policy objec- 
tives. 



A psychological offensive by the United States 
based on truth is essential if the United States is 
to succeed in its foreign policy objectives. 

The present funding of the USIE program is in- 
sufficient to provide the means effectively to take 
the psychological offensive. 

The Commission is directing a similar communi- 
cation to the appropriate chairmen of the Senate 
and House Committees. 



Dedication of Memorial at Bastogne 

Address hy the President ^ 

[Excerpts] 

As you dedicate this noble monument, it is dif- 
ficult to realize that only a few short years ago 
these fields and forests of the Ardennes bore one 
of the most bitter battles of the war. On this 
spot, the backbone of Hitler's armed forces was 
broken, for his inability to reduce Bastogne 
doomed his final offensive to failure. 

Belgium and the United States share a love of 
freedom that springs from the roots of our na- 
tional characters. We have stood side by side 
throughout two world-wide conflicts in defense of 
freedom. Today, we find ourselves "partners in 
peace" in the North Atlantic Treaty. Both of our 
nations fervently desire peace — permanent, ever- 
lasting peace — but neither of us is willing to buy 
that peace at the price of liberty. As we have 
stood united before when our liberty has been en- 
dangered, we stand united today in the hope that 
proof of our determination to fight again for our 
liberty, if necessary, will make it unnecessary for 
us to do so. In freedom there is strength and in 
union there is strength. Both our nations are 
founded on these principles. 

This monument commemorates our joint efforts 
in battle with Hitlerite Germany. Never again 
must we permit Germany or any other nation to 
launch such destruction. In spite of the suffering 
so bravely endured by your country as a result of 
German aggression, you have shown vision, re- 
straint, and understanding toward the Germans. 
In this attitude, we find a source of hope and en- 
couragement, for only vision, restraint, and under- 
standing can build a new Europe, all of whose 
peoples can live and work together in peace and 
freedom. 

In future years, we can hope that our children 
and grandchildren will look upon this memorial 
and know its meaning but without the burning 
memory of war's horror — having read of it in their 
history books but not knowing its actuality. 

^Read by the U.S. Ambassador to Belgium, Robert 
Murpby, at the dedication ceremonies, on July 16, at Bas- 
togne, Belgium, of a memorial to the Americans who lost 
their lives in the battle at Bastogne, and released to the 
press on the same date. 



Ju/y 31, 1950 



195 



The United States in the United Nations 



REVIEW, JUNE 16-JULY 31 



An attack by North Korean forces across the 
38th parallel in the early hours of Sunday, June 
25, evoked prompt and continuing action on the 
part of the United Nations to meet the crisis. To 
deal with the problem, up to August 1, the Securi- 
ty Council had held seven meetings, none of which 
were attended by the Soviet representative. How- 
ever, on July 2^ Soviet representative Yakov A. 
Malik telephoned the Secretary-General that "in 
accordance with established procedure, I am 
assuming the Presidency" of tlie Security Coun- 
cil in August and requested that a Council meet- 
ing be arranged for August 1. This will be the 
first time a Soviet representative has attended a 
Security Council meeting since the Soviet boycott 
began in January, of all United Nations organs 
on which the Chinese National Government is 
represented. 

The eleventh session of the Economic and Social 
Council is in progress in Geneva. At Lake Success, 
the Trusteeship Council concluded its seventh 
session and the Interim Committee held six meet- 
ings, the first since February 7. The Economic 
Commission for Latin America concluded its meet- 
ing in Montevideo, and general conferences of 
three specialized agencies ended in Geneva, Mont- 
real, and Florence. The International Court of 
Justice, sittincr at The Hague, handed down ad- 
visory opinions on the questions of the interna- 
tional status of South West Africa and on the 
satellite peace treaties in connection with alleged 
violations of human rights in Bulgaria, Hungary, 
and Eumania. Field bodies established by tlie 
General Assembly continued to deal with the "prob- 
lems in Korea, Greece, Libya, Palestine and other 
parts of the world. 

Security Council 

As a result of the Korean crisis, the Security 
Council met in emergency se.ssion on Sunday, 
June 25, at the request of the United States. It 
had before it a report to the Secretary-General 
from the United Nations Commission on Korea in 



Seoul reporting on the North Korean attack and 
confirming the existence of a situation "which is 
assuming character of full-scale war." The 
Council adopted a resolution, on the basis of a 
United States draft which determined that the 
attack of Noi'th Korean forces upon the Republic 
of Korea constituted a breach of the peace, called 
for the immediate cessation of hostilities and the 
withdrawal of North Korean forces to the 38th 
parallel, asked the Korean Commission to keep the 
Council informed on the execution of the resolu- 
tion, and called upon all members to render evei-y 
assistance to the United Nations in the execution 
of the resolution and to refrain from giving aid 
to the North Korean authorities. All Council 
members voted for the June 25 resolution except 
Yugoslavia, which abstained and the U.S.S.R. 
which was absent. 

The Council followed up this resolution with 
passage of another on July 27, which, after noting 
the Korean Commission's report of the noncom- 
pliance by the North Korean authorities with the 
Council's requests of June 25, recommended that 
United Nations members "furnish such assistance 
to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to 
repel the armed attack and to restore international 
l^eace and security in the area.'' 

The June 27 resolution received seven affirma- 
tive votes. Yugoslavia opposed it, the U.S.S.R. 
was absent, and Egypt and India abstained be- 
cause of lack of instructions. India, however, at 
a June 30 Council meeting announced its accept- 
ance of the second resolution. 

Under a resolution sponsored jointly by the 
United Kingdom and France, the Council on July 
7 recommended that offers of military and other 
assistance for the ReiJublic of Korea be made 
available to "a vniified command under the United 
States," asked the United States to designate a 
connnander of the unified foi'ces, and authorized 
the use of the United Nations flag by the unified 
command. Seven states supported the resolution ; 
Egyjit, India, and Yugoslavia abstained, and 'the 
U.S.S.R. was absent. The United States named 



196 



Department of State Bultetin 



General Doufjlas IMacArtlmr as the couunaiuler 
of the unilied forces, and he is now flyin<i the 
United Nations tiaji over his headquarters. 

Fifty-two United Xations nieniV)ers replied fa- 
vorably to Secretary-General Lie's communication 
asking support for the Security Council action of 
June 25 and 27. All members except Egypt and 
Yugoslavia answered the communication. In 
addition to the United States assistance furnished 
to the Republic of Korea almost immediately fol- 
lowing Security Council action, 23 United Nations 
members had by July 31 made offers of combat 
units, naval and air support, merchant ship- 
ping, medical supplies, food, and other material 
assistance. 

In response to a request in the July 7 resolution, 
United States Ambassador Warren R. Austin 
presented to the Council on July 25 the first report 
of the unified connnand on the Korean operations. 
The repoit outlined the coordination of various 
United Nations national units of land, sea, and 
air forces, and concluded with General Mac- 
Artlnir's prediction of continually increasing 
strength for the United Nations forces and his as- 
sertion that the enemy "has had his great chance 
but failed to exploit it." Commendatory state- 
ments on the report were made at a brief Council 
meeting July 28. 

Com>ni»sion. for Conventional Armaments. — On 
June 22 and July 20, the working committee of the 
Commission for Conventional Armaments contin- 
ued consideration of the United States views on 
the subject of safeguards for an effective system 
of regulation and control of conventional arma- 
ments. On May 18 the United States submitted a 
paper setting forth the basic elements of a plan of 
safeguards; and at these two meetings, three addi- 
tional papers were submitted. One dealt with a 
proposed organization for the administration of a 
system of safeguards. Military and industrial 
safeguards were the subjects of the other two pa- 
pers. These working papers will be transmitted to 
the full Commission for Conventional Armaments 
along with the records of the working committee. 

General Assembly 

The General Assembly's Interim Committee has 
been considering the Eritrean Commission's report 
and the report of its Sub-Committee on Interna- 
tional Cooperation in the Political Field, while 
in Libya another step has been taken toward con- 
stitutional development. United Nations field 
commissions operating in Greece and Palestine 
continued their work temporarily in Geneva, 
where the International Law Commission has also 
been in session. The United Nations representa- 
tive for India and Pakistan studied the Kashmir 
problem with the Prime Ministers of the two coun- 
tries concerned. 

Interim Committee. — On July 13 the Interim 
Committee began consideration of the report of 



the United Nations Commission for Eritrea re- 
garding the disposition of that former Italian 
colony. The report presents three alternative pro- 
posals: (1) federation of Eritrea with Ethiopia, 
under the sovereignty of the Ethiopian crown; 
(2) reunion of the whole territory with Ethiopia; 
and (3) independence for Eritrea after a maxi- 
mum period of 10 years under United Nations 
trusteeship. In four meetings the delegations ex- 
pressed their views on the problem, but readied 
no conclusions. 

The United States continues to believe that the 
best and most equitable solution would be the im- 
mediate incorporation of Eritrea, excluding the 
western province, into Ethiopia, Charles P. Noyes 
told the Committee. However, he continued, the 
United States is willing to consider a compromise 
solution involving federation of Eritrea and Ethi- 
opia under the sovereignty of the Ethiopian 
crown, and believes that such a formula otiers 
"the best promise of a harmonious reconciliation 
of all the interests involved." He expressed the 
opposition of the United States to any proposals 
involving independence or United Nations trustee- 
ship for Eritrea. Ethiopia favored the union of 
Eritrea with Ethiopia and opposed independence; 
whereas Italy advocated independence as a 
solution. 

Two meetings of the Committee were devoted 
to a discussion of the report of its Sub-Committee 
on International Cooperation in the Political 
Field and decided to transmit the report to the 
General Assembly "for its information and that 
of all the member states." 

Libya. — The Libyan Council, of which the 
United States is one of ten members, approved on 
July 11 the membership of a committee which is 
to prei^are a plan for calling a Libyan National 
Assembly. The committee is composed of seven 
representatives from each of the three territories 
of Libya — Cyrenaica, Tripolitania, and the Fez- 
zan. The assembly was called for under a Gen- 
eral Assembly resolution, and its primary task will 
be to write a constitution for Libya. 

Greece. — The Special Committee on the Bal- 
kans, having left a subsidiary grouji in Athens to 
maintain liaison between the Committee and its 
observer corps, assembled in Geneva late in June 
to begin drafting its report to the General Assem- 
bly for the year ending July 31, 1950, a task now 
nearing completion. On July 18 the Committee 
adopted a resolution expressing its serious con- 
cern over recent accusations emanating from 
Greek Communist leaders, to the effect that the 
United States and tlie United Kingdom were fo- 
menting a Greek attack upon Albania and Bul- 
garia and to that end were engaged in expanding 
Greek forces. Stating that the accusations were 
false and that it saw no evidence of aggressive in- 
tentions or preparations by Greece, the Committee 
added that, since aggression is frequently preceded 
by propaganda accusing the intended victim of 



ii3\y 37, 1950 



197 



aggressive intentions, the Committee "cannot dis- 
regard the possibility that such statements might 
constitute an attempt to justify in advance aggres- 
sive action." 

Palestine. — On July 18 the Conciliation Com- 
mission for Palestine transmitted its seventh prog- 
ress report to the Secretary-General, including 
an annex containing the exchange of notes between 
the Commission on the hand, and the Arab states 
and Israel on the other, on a proposal to establish 
mixed committees for direct negotiations between 
the parties regarding the Palestine peace settle- 
ment. The Commission expressed regret that 
the Arab states and Israel could not reach agree- 
ment on the Commission's proposal and announced 
its decision to return from Geneva to its official 
headquarters in Jerusalem, where it will resume 
meetings in August. 

Kashmir. — July 20 through 24 the United Na- 
tions representative for India and Pakistan, Sir 
Owen Dixon, met with the Prime Ministers of 
India and Pakistan in New Delhi to discuss solu- 
tion of the Kashmir problem. It was announced 
that the next meeting of the Prime Ministers is to 
be held in Karachi. 

Trusteeship Council 

With the adoption on July 21 of its report to 
the General Assembly, the Trusteeship Council 
completed its seventh session, which had been in 
progi'ess at Lake Success since June 1. After de- 
ciding on June 14 to submit to the General As- 
sembly the draft statute for Jerusalem, along with 
a report on its findings, the Council began exami- 
nation of the annual reports on trust territories 
submitted by administering authorities. Reports 
on the following territories were considered: 
Western Samoa, administered by New Zealand; 
New Guinea and Nauru, under Australian admin- 
istration; British Togoland; French Togoland; 
and the United States' strategic trust territory of 
the Pacific islands. Council reports containing 
a factual outline of conditions in the territories, 
conclusions and recommendations, and individual 
observations of Council members were approved 
for all six territories. 

One petition, presented orally by a representa- 
tive of the all-Ewe Conference, urged unification 
under one administration of all Ewe people who 
i-eside in the Britisli and French Togolands and 
the British Gold Coast Colony. In connection 
with consideration of this petition, the Council 
adopted a joint United States-Argentine resolu- 
tion noting the plan of the administering authori- 
ties to ascertain the wishes of the inhabitants 
of the trust territories and requesting a report 
on the plan's progress, and recommending that 
appropriate measui'es be taken to insure preserva- 
tion of the common traits and traditions of the 
Ewe people until a definite settlement is reached. 
The Council also handled over 180 other petitions 
from individuals or groups in trust territories. 



On the final day of the session resolutions were 
approved on flying the United Nations flag and 
on the improvement of nutrition in the trust terri- 
tories. The former, adopted by six affirmative 
votes, with Belgium and Australia voting nega- 
tively and Argentina, the United Kingdom, and 
New Zealand abstaining, recommends that the 
United Nations flag be flown over all trust terri- 
tories side by side with the flag of the administer- 
ing authority and the territorial flag, if there is 
one, "it being understood, however, that the Ad- 
ministering Authorities have latitude to handle 
any practical difficulties of administration which 
this recommendation might create." 

The Council established a standing committee 
comprised of Argentina, New Zealand, the Phil- 
ippines, and the United States to deal with the 
question of administrative unions in which trust 
territories participate. 

Other Council action included the transmis- 
sion in a special report to the General Assembly 
of a declaration of constitutional principles and 
the draft trusteeship agi'eement for Somaliland, 
under which Italy will administer its former col- 
ony; the conclusion of arrangements for a visit- 
ing mission to trust territories in East Africa 
(Tanganyika, Ruanda-Urundi, and Somaliland) ; 
and the establishment of a committee, composed 
of Belgium, the Dominican Republic, Iraq, and 
the United Kingdom, to revise the provisional 
questionnaire, which serves as the basis for the 
preparation of administering authorities' annual 
i-eports on trust territories under their charge. 

Economic and Social Council 

Full employment, methods of financing eco- 
nomic development of underdeveloped countries, 
and the Human Rights Covenant are among the 
topics being considered by the Economic and So- 
cial Council, which opened its eleventh session on 
July 3 in Geneva. Final action, including ap- 
proval of a report from seven of the specialized 
agencies and five of the Council's commissions, 
was taken on a number of the 52 items on the 
Council's agenda. 

After a general debate on full employment, in- 
cluding consideration of a report of a group of 
experts on national and international measures 
for full employment, the matter was referred to 
the Economic Committee for further study. In 
this connection the United States submitted a 
proposal that United Nations member govern- 
ments report periodically to the Secretary-General 
on their economic situation and their policies and 
programs for employment. The Secretary-Gen- 
eral would analyze the reports and make studies 
on the problems of full employment in the world 
economy. The Economic and Employment Com- 
mission which would make recommendations for 
action to the Council would consider these reports 
and studies. 

With regard to financing economic development 



198 



Deparfmenf of S/afe Bulletin 



of underdeveloped countries, also referred to the 
Economic Committee for study, the United States 
co-sponsored a resolution, recommending, among 
other things, that governments promote domestic 
measures and international agreements designed 
to encourage larger and more stable flow of capital 
exports toward underdeveloped countries and 
areas. Governments are also asked to take neces- 
sary measures to encourage the use of private 
capital in economic development. 

The draft Covenant on Human Rights was re- 
ferred to the Social Committee for consideration 
of its broad aspects. A proposal supported by the 
United States to send the Covenant to the General 
Assembly without discussion by the Council was 
defeated. 

Approval of the reports of the Social, Popula- 
tion, Statistical, Transport and Communications, 
and the Status of Women Commissions involved 
approval of the number of commission recommen- 
dations. The Council expressed its satisfaction 
with the reports of the International Labor Or- 
ganization, Food and Agriculture Organization, 
Universal Postal Union, International Refugee 
Organization, and Unesco. In connection with 
the latter, a United States-sponsored resolution 
was adopted which requested Unesco to seek 
greater concentration of its program, and also to 
give special attention to assisting underdeveloped 
areas through means of education and the develop- 
ment of international understanding. 

The United States co-sponsored other resolu- 
tions (adopted by the Council) one of which un- 
derlines the importance of raising the living stand- 
ards of aboriginal populations of the American 
continent, and another of which concerns teaching 
the purposes, principles, structure, and activities 
of the United Nations and the specialized agencies 
in schools and other educational institutions of 
member states. In connection with the latter, Isi- 
dor Lubin of the United States emphasized the 
necessity of creating public support for the United 
Nations and said that the main problem is to get 
adults to accept their responsibilities in an inter- 
dependent world. 

Other Council decisions involved approval of the 
Secretary-General's arrangements for a program 
of training in public administration and of a re- 
port by the International Labor Organization on 
the training of technical workers from countries 
lacking specialized personnel necessary to the de- 
velopment of their national economy. Final ac- 
tion was also taken on a number of items relating 
to nongovernmental organizations. 

Economic Commission for Latin America. — 
The third session of the Economic Commission for 
Latin America, which took place at Montevideo, 
Uruguay, June 5-21, was devoted primarily to a 
discussion of specific problems of economic devel- 
opment. In this connection the Commission re- 
viewed the economic survey of Latin America for 
1949 and incorporated its basic conclusions and 



recommendations on economic development in a 
10-point resolution which received unanimous ap- 
proval. The United States representatives ex- 
plained that his supporting vote was subject to 
study by his Government "to determine whether 
there is anything in the resolution which may not 
be in harmony with United States economic policy 
and international commitments." Other resolu- 
tions dealt with the problems of technical assist- 
ance ; distribution, markets and prices of agricul- 
tural products; immigration; foreign investment; 
trade with Europe and intraregional trade; and 
agricultural credit. 

Specialized Agencies 

UNESCO.— On the final day of its fifth session, 
which was held in Florence, Italy, May 22-June 17 
UNESCO's General Conference adopted a resolution 
expressing the belief that the 1951 program con- 
stitutes a "more direct and important contribution 
to the cause of i^eace than the program of any pre- 
vious year." The satisfaction of the delegations 
was based largely on the fact that agreement had 
been reached that Unesco's program in the future 
must contribute more directly to peace; that em- 
phasis had been placed on working for the exten- 
sion of human rights throughout the world ; that 
a greatly expanded project for the reeducation of 
Western Germany had been voted; and that a 
"decalogue" of basic objectives, proposed in its 
original form by the United States, had won gen- 
eral concurrence as a guide to the future. 

International Labor Organization. — Unemploy- 
ment problems, vocational training, industrial re- 
lations, and equal jaay for work of equal value by 
men and women were among the questions dealt 
with by the 33d General Conference of the Inter- 
national Labor Organization which met in Geneva 
June 7-July 1. In its resolution containing a 
plan for combating unemployment the Confer- 
ence among other things urged the establishment 
of a system of unemployment benefits in countries 
having no such schemes. The Conference recom- 
mended setting up international standards for 
vocational training of adults, including disabled 
persons. The Conference will take final action 
in 1951 on a recommendation for collective agree- 
ments providing international standai-ds for col- 
lective bargaining machinery and on the matter of 
equal remuneration for equal work by men and 
women. 

International Civil Aviation Organization. — In 
its 3-week session in Montreal which concluded 
June 20, the Assembly of the International Civil 
Aviation Organization considered a number of 
technical, economic, and legal problems involved 
in the safe and orderly development of interna- 
tional civil aviation. It also approved the report 
of the IcAO Council on its past year's work and 
elected a new Council of 20 nations to serve as 
IcAo's executive body for the next full-scale meet- 
ing in 3 years. 



i\i\y 37, 7950 



199 




General Policy Fage 

The Korean Situation: Its Significance to the 
People of the United States. The Presi- 
dent's Message to Congress 163 

U.S. and Belgium Consult on Korean Assist- 
ance 169 

Prime Minister Nehru's Appeal To Settle 
Korean Problem by Admitting Chinese 
Communists to U.N. Rejected: 
Prime Minister Nehru's Message of 

July 13 170 

Secretary Acheson's Message of July 18 . . 170 
Prime Minister Nehru's Message of 

July 19 171 

Korea in Perspective. Extemporaneous Re- 
marks by Secretary Acheson 171 

General MacArthur's Estimate of the Korean 

Situation 172 

Korean Commission Concerned Over Breach 

of Geneva Conventions 172 

Authority of the President To Repel the 
Attack in Korea: 
Department of State Memorandum of 

July 3, 1950 173 

Use of Land and Naval Forces of the United 

States for Protection Purposes .... 177 
Korea: Chronology of Events, July 1, 1949 

to June 30, 1950 179 

U.S. and U.K. E.stablish Proving Ground for 

Guided Missiles 191 

Letters of Credence: 

Greece 193 

Portugal 193 

Dedication of Memorial at Bastogne. Address 

by the President 195 

The United Nations and 
Specialized Agencies 

Korean Commission Concerned Over Breach 

of Geneva Conventions 172 

Abuse of Human Rights in Satellite States. 

Statement by Secretary Acheson ... 190 

The United States in the United Nations . . 196 



Economic Affairs Page 

Benelux — A Case Study in Economic Union. 

By Howard J. Hilton, Jr 181 

International Information and 
Cultural Affairs 

Austria Signs Fulbright Agreement — Educa- 
tional Opportunites for 1951 An- 
nounced 192 

Expanded Information Program Vital to 
National Security: 

Message of the President _ . 194 

Advisory Commission on Information 

Endorses Program 194 

Treaty Information 

Benelux — A Case Study in Economic LTnion. 

By Howard J. Hilton, Jr 181 

Settlement of Bizonal Fusion Agreement . . 189 
Austria Signs Fulbright Agreement — Educa- 
tional Opportunities for 1951 An- 
nounced 192 

Occupation Matters 

Executive Order on U.S. High Commissioner 

for Germany Amended 191 

Settlement of Bizonal Fusion Agreement . . 189 

National Security 

U.S. and U.K. Establish Proving Ground for 

Guided Missiles 191 



The Congress 

The Korean Situation : Its Significance to the 
People of the United States. The Presi- 
dent's Message to Congress 



Publications 

Recent Releases . 



163 



188 



Howard J. Hilton, Jr.. author of the article on Benelux, a study in 
economic union, is International Relations officer, Office of Western 
European Affairs, Department of State. 



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August 7, 1950 



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The Department of State BULLETIN, 
a weekly publication compiled and 
edited in the Division of Publications, 
Office of Public Affairs, provides the 
public and interested agencies of 
the Government with information on 
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relations and on the work of the De- 
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COURSE OF ACTION UNDER UNIFIED COMIViAND IN KOREA 



United States Report to the Security Council ^ 



U.N. doc. S/1626 
Dated July 25, 1950 

At 0-100 Korean time on Sunday, 25 June 1950, 
the North Korean Army launched a completely 
unprovoked invasion of South Korea. North 
Korean infantry crossed the 38th parallel, led by 
Soviet-made tanks in an estimated number of 100. 
The main attack was down the Pochon-Uijongbu- 
Seoul corridor. Simultaneously, attacks were 
launched in the Ongjin Peninsula to the West, 
against Chunchon in the eastern mountains, and 
down the east coast road. The North Korean Air 
Force covered the amphibious landings, and at- 
tacked Kimpo Airfield, near Seoul. The size of 
the attack, the fact that it covered the principal 
areas along the 38th parallel, and the amount and 
character of material involved, and the use of 
amphibious landings, indicated clearly that the 
invasion had been carefully planned for long in 
advance. 

The character and disposition of the Republic 
of Korea Army indicated that it did not expect 
this sudden attack. This fact is supported by a 
report of an observation team of the United 
Nations Commission on Korea, made along the 
38th parallel and dated 24 June 1950. This report 
stated that its team of observers "had, in the 
course of a two-week inspection been left with the 
impression that the Republican Army was or- 
ganized entirely for defense and (was) in no 
condition to carry out a large-scale attack against 
the forces in the North. The observers found that 
the Republic of Korea forces were disposed in 
depth all along the 38th parallel with no concen- 



' Transmitted to the Security Council by Ambassador 
Warren R. Austin on July 24. This report is also printed 
as Department of State publication 3935. 

August 7, 7950 



tration of troops at any point, that a large number 
of Republic of Korea troops were actively engaged 
in rounding up guerrillas and were, in any case, 
entirely lacking in the armor, heavy artillery, and 
air support necessary to carry off an invasion of 
North Korea." These facts controverted com- 
pletely the North Korea broadcast from Pyong- 
yang, late in the morning of 25 June, that the 
Republic of Korea had initiated an attack across 
the border and that the North Korean Forces had 
been ordered to repel the attack. 

Strength of North and South Forces 

The North Korean invaders were reported to 
have committed initially 6 divisions of Infantry, 
3 Border Constabulary Brigades, supported by 
approximately 100 Soviet-made T34 and T70 
tanks and ample heavy artillery. Their Air Force 
held complete control of the air, and was at the 
time estimated to be composed of 100-150 Soviet- 
made combat planes. The total strength of the 
North Korean forces was placed at between 90,000 
and 100,000, organized in approximately 7 divi- 
sions and 5 brigades, well trained and equipped 
chiefly with excellent Soviet material. 

Opposed to this mobile army. Republic of Korea 
troops were initially deployed along the 38th par- 
allel with elements of 4 divisions, with the remain- 
der in the interior, without tanks or heavy artillery 
and with only 16 trainers as an air force; an organ- 
ization assigned primarily for preserving internal 
security. 

With such a discrepancy in character and arma- 
ment between North and South Korea, the actual 
date of the assault is immaterial; the potential 
for it was present for months. 



203 



In the light of the above facts, it is apparent that 
the attack upon South Korea was a carefully- 
planned, full-scale invasion in force. 

Four Major Drives From North 

From the attack to the fall of Seoul on 28 June, 
North Korean forces struck southward across the 
38th parallel on 25 June, in four major drives : 

A. To the west, a Border Constabulary Brigade 
attacked in the Ongjin Peninsula against approxi- 
mately one Republic of Korea regiment and was 
reported on 26 June in control of the area. How- 
ever, a considerable number of Republic of Korea 
men escaped by sea. 

B. One North Korean division, plus 42-50 tanks 
captured Kaesong on the afternoon of 25 June, and 
later pushed south through Hunsan toward Seoul. 
Another North Korean force of from 8,000-10,000 
men, plus more than 50 tanks, drove down the 
Pochon-Uijongbu Corridor toward Seoul. 

C. A division of North Korean troops, sup- 
ported by heavy artillery and tanks, struck south 
toward Chunchon. 

D. Along the east coast, a Border Constabulary 
Brigade reinforced to approximately 10,000, at- 
tacked Kangnung and carried out two amphibious 
landings further south. 

The North Korean attack was initially opposed 
by five Republic of Korea divisions located in or 
north of Seoul. They were armed with rifles, ma- 
chine guns, and other light infantry weapons. 
Taken completely by surprise, and facing greatly 
superior equipment, they fought desperately, but 
were forced to withdraw gradually. Another Re- 
public of Korea division, hastily brought up froin 
the south, was badly mauled in the fighting of 26 
June. An official report on 30 June indicated that 
the Republic of Korea forces had suffered a high 
percentage of casualties and had lost much equip- 
ment in the hurried withdrawal. 

Use of Air, Ground, and Naval Forces 

On 28 June, aircraft of the United States Air 
Force, operating pursuant to the resolution of 
the Security Council of the United Nations, began 
air operations against the North Korean invaders 
in support of Republic of Korea forces and later 
struck at military targets north of the 38th parallel 
with a view to disrupting the lines of communica- 
tions and supply of the invading forces. 

The badly decimated Republic of Korea forces 



reformed south of the Nan River, and with 
U.S.A.F. assistance, sought to delay the North 
Korean advance. By sheer weight of numbers 
and material they were forced back step by step 
until, on 2 July (Korean time) the town of Suwon, 
20 miles south of Seoul, was reported in North 
Korean hands. 

Meanwhile, in pursuance of United Nations rec- 
ommendations. United States ground forces were 
committed to the area for stabilization of the 
front. On 5 July, a very small United States force 
made contact with the invaders, south of Suwon. 
On 7 July, upon the recommendation of the Secu- 
rity Council, the Unified Command was established 
and General Douglas MacArthur was designated 
by the President of the United States as the Com- 
manding General of the forces of the members of 
the United Nations. 

The first United States troops were small in 
number and were committed as a holding force 
only. They were followed by additional support- 
ing forces as rapidly as these could be transported 
to the battle line. Facing odds at times as high as 
20 to one, "Our Army troops, ably supported by 
tactical aircraft of the United States Air Force 
and Navy and our Australian friends, flying under 
most adverse conditions of weather . . . distin- 
guished themselves in the most difficult of military 
operations — a delaying action". 

Under the protection of this delaying action 
Unified Coimnand forces have steadily been 
strengthened. Under the combined impact of 
ground, air and naval forces, the progress of 
the invasion has been slowed, while the enemy 
has suff'ered severe losses on sea and land which 
are curtailing his supply and transportation 
capabilities. 

At the outset of the North Korean invasion, 
naval forces available to oppose the aggression 
consisted of a small Republic of Korea Coast 
Guard. United States and other forces proceeded 
to the operational areas and by virtue of over- 
whelming superiority established a patrol of both 
coasts of Korea. These forces took the necessary 
action to prevent movement by sea of forces and 
supplies for use in operations against the Republic 
of Korea, including ingress and egress to and from 
Korean ports of merchant vessels furnishing or 
likely to fui'nish assistance to the North Korean 
authorities. United Nations Naval Forces covered 
some of the initial necessary evacuations, rendered 
logistic support, and by operating against North 



204 



Department of State Bulletin 



Korean watevborne forces denied tlie Communist 
invaders the logistic support of its forces by sea. 

Naval units proceeded to accomplish the water- 
lift of troops and supplies to Korea, patrol by 
naval aircraft of water and coastal areas, escort 
duties and coastal patrol functions. Harassing 
fire from naval units on both coasts shelled targets 
susceptible to naval gunfire, breached roads, and 
generally interfered with enemy communications. 
Naval units have attacked North Korean water 
trafHc where found, and have already destroyed 
approximately one-third of the vessels originally 
available to North Korean naval forces. 

A new phase of naval operations commenced on 
3 July with the first aircraft carrier air strike. 
They struck on the west coast of North Korea. 
Subsequent carrier strikes on the east coast of 
Korea have been made by the British and United 
States units. The first amphibious landing by 
United Nations Forces was accomplished on the 
east coast of Korea on 18 July 1950. 

The present naval situation finds both coasts of 
Korea covered by naval forces of the Unified Com- 
mand. Harassing fire and fire support missions 
are being carried out by these forces. Patrols 
and reconnaissances are being conducted by naval 
patrol planes over coastal and water areas. Logis- 
tic support of men, equipment, and supplies by 
transport continues with escort. 

It has been inspiring to witness the rapidity 
with which various Member States have contrib- 
uted to the naval forces assisting in the restora- 
tion of peace in Korea. The United Kingdom, 
Australia, New Zealand, Canada and the Nether- 
lands have dispatched vessels to support the 
United Nations' effort to cut off supplies for the in- 
vading hordes from north of the 38th parallel. 
In carrying out this work, shore bombardments 
have been conducted where and as necessary to in- 
terdict the supply of Communist troops which 
have moved into that poi'tion of Korea governed 
by the Republic of Korea under the aegis of the 
United Nations. Valuable service has also been 
rendered by a British naval unit in the rescue from 
the water of airmen who had been compelled to 
abandon their airplane. The Coast Guard of the 
Republic of Korea has been rendering invaluable 
service in providing for the security of the shore- 
lines. Naval air forces provided by the United 
Kingdom has contributed in a major way in the 
suppoi't of landing operations at Pohang-dong. 

Upon the request by the Security Council of the 



United Nations for assistance to defend the Re- 
public of Korea against the North Korean aggi'es- 
sors, the only forces in the area immediately 
available were those United States and British 
Commonwealth occupation forces under the com- 
mand of General MacArthur in the occupation of 
the Japanese Islands. The size and nature of these 
forces were suificient only to perform the occupa- 
tion duties in Japan. 

Task of Achieving Superiority 

Before committing the forces, in response to 
the Security Council resolutions, they had to be 
regrouped and re-equipped from standards for 
peacetime occupation of Japan to standards suit- 
able for combat in Korea. This also involved 
moving these troops, with their equipment and 
supplies, from their various occupation stations 
in Japan, by combinations of motor, rail, water 
and air transportation, to Korea. Even so, all the 
materials for sustained combat were not immedi- 
ately available to General MacArthur and there- 
fore had to be rushed to Korea from the United 
States — a distance of one-third of the way around 
the globe. Future assistance for the defense of 
the Republic of Korea, both men and materials, 
must be transported over corresponding distances 
from the Member nations of the United Nations 
rendering such assistance. The well-planned 
attack by the North Korean regime, the size of 
their force, their logistical support and their 
ability to continue to press the attack, account for 
the degree of initiative enjoyed by the aggressor. 
The defenders of the Republic of Korea have been 
forced to submit to the time and place selected by 
the aggressor, and now must dej^end upon assist- 
ance from nations peacefully disposed and lying 
not merely hundreds, but thousands of miles away. 

From the continuing appearance on the battle- 
field of large numbers of enemy personnel and 
equipment, it is now apparent that the North 
Korean aggressors have available to them re- 
sources far in excess of their internal capabilities. 
This, with the initial advantage of the aggressor, 
combines to give the enemy a strength that cannot 
be overcome until the United Nations forces 
achieve the effect of superiority in weapons and 
manpower. The task is not a small one when 
viewed in comparison with the potential resources 
of the aggressor force. Until forces of the Unified 
Command are increased further in strength, the 
rapidity with which success will be achieved can- 



August 7, 1950 



205 



not be predicted. However, with the combined 
efforts of the United Nations, the full efFect of the 
contribution from each member nation will be felt 
in the ultimate defeat of the aggressors from north 
of tlie 38 degree parallel. 

Estimate of Korean Operations 

In conclusion, it is believed appropriate to quote 
the Unified Commander's latest estimate of the 
Korean operations. 

With the deployment in Korea of major elements of the 
Eighth Army now accomplished the first phase of the 
campaign has ended and with it the chance for victory 
by the North Korean Forces. The enemy's plan and great 
opportunity depended upon the speed with which he could 
overrun South Korea once he had breached the Han River 
line and with overwhelming numbers and superior weapons 
temporarily shattered South Korean resistance. This 
chance he has now lost through the extraordinary speed 
with which the Eighth Army has been deployed from 
Japan to stem his rush. When he crashed the Han Line 
the way seemed entirely open and victory was within his 
grasp. The desperate decision to throw in piecemeal 
American elements as they arrived by every available 
means of transport from Japan was the only hope to save 
the situation. The skill and valor thereafter displayed in 
successive holding actions by the ground forces in accord- 
ance with this concept, brilliantly supported in complete 
co-ordination by air and naval elements, forced the enemy 
Into continued deployments, costly frontal attacks and 
confused logistics which so slowed his advance and 



blunted his drive that we have bought the precious time 
necessary to build a secure base. 

I do not repeat not believe that history records a com- 
parable operation which excelled the speed and precision 
with which the Eighth Army, the Far East Air Force 
and the Seventh Fleet have been deployed to a distant land 
for immediate commitment to major operations. It merits 
highest commendation for the commanders, staffs and 
units concerned and attests to their superior training 
and high state of readiness to meet any eventuality. This 
finds added emphasis in the fact that the Far East Com- 
mand, until the President's great pronouncement to sup- 
port the epochal action of the United Nations, had no 
repeat no slightest responsibility for the defense of the 
Free Republic of Korea. With the President's decision it 
assumed a completely new and added mission. 

It is, of cour.se, impossible to predict with any degree 
of accuracy future incidents of a military campaign. Over 
a broad front involving continuous local struggles, there 
are bound to be ups and downs, losses as well as successes. 
Our final stabilization line will unquestionably be rectified 
and tactical improvement will involve planned with- 
drawals as well as local advances. But the issue of battle 
is now fully joined and will proceed along lines of action 
in which we will not repeat not be without choice. 
Our hold upon the southern part of Korea represents a 
secure base. Our casualties despite overwhelming odds 
have been relatively light. Our strength will continually 
increase while that of the enemy will relatively decrease. 
His supply line is insecure. He has had his great chance 
but failed to exploit it. We are now in Korea in force, 
and with God's help we are there to stay imtil the con- 
stitutional authority of the Republic is fully restored. 
MacArthur. 



South Korean Forces Placed Under 
Unified Command of United Nations 

On July Z5, Ambassador Warren R. Austin transmitted 
to the Secretary-General of the United Nations the fol- 
lowing exchange of letters between President Syngman 
Rhec of the Republic of Korea and General Douglas 
MacArthur. ' 

15 July 1950 

In view of the joint military effort of the United Nations 
on behalf of the Republic of Korea, in which all military 
forces, land, sea, and air, of all the United Nations fighting 
in or near Korea have been placed under your operational 
command, and in which you have been designated Supreme 
Commander of United Nations Forces, I am happy to 
assign to you command authority over all land, sea, and air 
forces of the Republic of Korea during the period of the 
continuation of the present state of hostilities; such 
command to be exercised either by you personally or by 
such military commander or commanders to whom you 
may delegate the exercise of this authority within Korea 
or in adjacent seas. 



' U.N. doc. S/1627 of July 25, 1950. 
206 



The Korean army will be proud to serve under your 
command, and the Korean people and Government will be 
equally proud and encouraged to have the over-all direc- 
tion of our combined combat effort in the hands of so 
famous and distinguished a soldier, who also in his person 
possesses the delegated military authority of all the United 
Nations who have joined together to resist the infamous 
Communist assault on the independence and integrity of 
our beloved land. 

With continued highest and warmest feelings of personal 
regard, 

* * * 

18 July 1950 

Please express to President Rhee my thanks and deepest 
appreciation for the action taken in his letter of 15 July. 
It cannot fail to increase the coordinated power of the 
United Nations forces operating in Korea. I am proud 
indeed to have the gallant Republic of Korea forces under 
my command. Tell him I am grateful for his generous 
references to me personally and how sincerely I recipro- 
cate his sentiments of regard. Tell him also not to lose 
heart, that the way may he long and hard, but the ultimate 
result cannot fail to be victory. 

Department of State Bulletin 



Korean Attack Opens New Chapter in History 



Ijy John Foster Dulles 
Consultant to the Secretary ^ 



The Time and the Place 

'\^nien the armies of the puppet Communist 
regime of North Korea attacked the Republic of 
Korea, they opened a new chapter in history. No 
one knows how that chapter will end, but, already, 
the national response shows that what we shall 
write into that chapter will be written with unity, 
power, courage, and high resolve. 

No doubt, this dangerous moment had to come. 
There would be a time when the leaders of 
Bolshevik communism would judge that they had 
largely exhausted the possibilities of indirect 
aggression and would explore the possibilities of 
direct aggression. That, they are doing now. 

Their timing is understandable. Indirect ag- 
gression was no longer likely to pay big dividends. 
It was being checked in Europe and in Asia where 
lie the Ruhr and Japan — two areas which, it 
seems, Bolshevik leaders particularly covet and 
which, under their control, would sharply alter 
the balance of world power. The European Re- 
covery Plan, the North Atlantic pact, and the 
Military Aid Program are withering Communist 
hopes for overrunning the European continent; 
and the Schuman plan would end their hope of 
communizing Western Germany. 

In Asia, the United States had turned from 
what had seemed a policy of drift, and we were 
developing policies which would give hope to 
those new nations whose independence was en- 
dangered by a new form of international enslave- 
ment. Secretary Johnson, General Bradley, and 
I had gone to Japan to confer with General 
MacArthur about Japan's future. That showed 
that we did not admit that the Soviet had veto 
power over that future and could perpetuate a 
do-nothing policy which would enable communism 
to make great underground gains. 

' An address made before the Commonwealth Club at 
San Francisco, Calif., on July 31 and released to the press 
on the same date. 



The Communist world was in process of being 
contained unless it resorted to open force. That 
may explain why there came armed attack at this 
particular time. 

As to place, there were good reasons why Korea 
should have been picked. 

There was, in North Korea, a thoroughly trained, 
fanatical, and well-equipped satellite army with 
a hard core of battle-trained veterans drawn from 
Siberian and Chinese armies. 

Opposed to them, was the young and inexperi- 
enced army of the Republic of Korea. It had ex- 
cellent morale and discipline but not a single 
combat plane or tank or artillery heavy enough 
to stop opposing tanks. 

The Republic of Korea's army was no conceiv- 
able match for the North Korean Red army but 
the Communist leaders may have felt that the 
Republic, if attacked, would not get help from 
the United Nations or the United States. Their 
propaganda was spreading that impression 
throughout the Republic of Korea and trying to 
develop a defeatist attitude. 

Our Government sensed the danger and tried 
to remove it. On June 21, 1 addressed the Korean 
Second National Assembly at its opening session 
and pointed out that although the Republic of 
Korea was technically not a member of the United 
Nations because of Soviet veto, nevertheless the 
United Nations considers her as, spiritually, one 
of them. I recalled that the United Nations Char- 
ter binds all nations — 

to refrain from any threat or use of force against your 
territorial integrity or political independence. 

I went on to say that the Republic of Korea had 
built a healthy society which was entitled, on merit, 
to membership in the free world, and that as be- 
tween the members of the free world — 

compulsions to common action are powerful, because they 
flow from a profound sense of common destiny." ' 



' Bulletin of July 3, 1950, p. 12. 



August 7, 1950 



207 



We had hoped that that public declaration might 
contribute to peace. But the time fuse had already 
been lighted. Almost at the exact time I was 
speaking in Seoul, the Communist regime in 
Pyongyang was proclaiming its program. It 
called for the unification under it of South Korea. 
It promised the liquidation of President Rhee 
who, it was said, was serving "the plundering in- 
terests of American imperialists"; it demanded 
the expulsion from Korea of the United Nations 
Commission and the holding on August 15 of all- 
Korean elections under North Korean auspices. 
The next Sunday, the Red army was hurled against 
the Republic in order to impose that program. 

Even though the Communist leaders may have 
been uncertain that their act would bring United 
Nations or United States aid to the Republic of 
Korea, there is considerable evidence that they 
took that possibility into account. That did not 
deter them, for they doubtless figured that, if, in 
fact. Western powers gave military help to the 
Republic of Korea, they might become bogged 
down in an all-Asia struggle of the "masses" 
against the "colonial imperialists" and their 
"lackeys." That has, from the beginning, been a 
main point of Stalin's strategy. 

A further reason for the selection of Korea was, 
no doubt, the important role that the Korean pen- 
insula occupies in relation to Japan, Port Arthur, 
and Vladivostok. During the Russo-Japanese 
war of 1904-5, the control of Korea by Japan pre- 
vented the Russians from carrying the offensive 
to Japan and made it possible for the Japanese to 
capture Port Arthur, 150 miles to the west of 
Korea, and to threaten Vladivostok, 75 miles to the 
east of Korea. Russian analyses of the cause of 
Russia's failure in that war ascribe it largely to 
the fact that Japan controlled the Korean penin- 
sula. Ever since, Russian strategists sought that 
control for Russia. 

All in all, it must be conceded that, from the 
Bolshevik Communist standpoint, the blow in 
Korea was shrewdly struck. To the extent that it 
was a surprise, it was a tactical surprise of the 
kind that those who strike offensively can usually 
inflict on those who accept a defensive role. The 
orbit of Soviet and satellite control extends con- 
tinuously from the Berin Strait, south to the China 
Sea, west to the Mediterranean, and north to the 
border of Norway. There are 15,000 miles of iron 
curtain, behind which a single will can secretly 
prepare and execute land thrusts against any one 
of 15 contiguous nations. If to this we add the 
capability of striking by air across the Arctic re- 
gions, it can be seen how hard is the task of defense. 
It was already difficult when the Bolshevik Com- 
munists limited themselves to methods of indirect 
aggression. Now that they have shown willing- 
ness to use also methods of direct aggression the 
task of anticipation is truly colossal. 

We do not, I think, need to conclude from 

208 



Korea that the Bolshevik leaders have decided on 
general war. The action, there, plainly indicates 
that they are now willing to run greatly increased 
risks. That, however, cloes not necessarily mean 
that they want general war or that they are ir- 
revocably committed to provoke it. The place 
selected for the first ai'med attack was one that 
could be exploited without an open use of Soviet 
foi-ces. That indicates that the leaders may not 
yet be prepared to make the fateful decision that 
would mean general war. It may be that the free 
world, by a show of resolution and strength, can 
bring the Soviet leaders to avoid that reckless 
course. 

"Wlien only one assumption gives chance of 
winning peace, we must act on that assumption. 

Political Objectives 

Military victory in the battle of Korea is bound 
to loom large in our thinking and acting. But 
those who are not directly involved in the fight- 
ing must not become mere battle watchers. Korea 
must not monopolize our thoughts and actions and 
divert us from achieving vital political objectives 
elsewhere. 

The United States has one very bad habit. In 
times of fighting we usually forget all about po- 
litical objectives. In my recent book, War or 
Peace, I pointed out that we Americans usually 
look on war as a kind of gigantic prize fight. The 
objective is to knock out your opponent. If you 
do knock him out, the job is done. Then, it is in 
order to go home, break training, and enjoy your- 
self until you may have to go into training for a 
return bout. 

That habit explains the wisecrack that the 
United States has never lost a war and never won 
a peace. Our statesmen and diplomats are not 
less able than those of other countries; but we 
consider that wartime is their vacation time. If 
we have even childish capacity to learn by ex- 
perience. World War II should have taught us 
the folly of that attitude. 

At Yalta, Stalin won great political victories 
which enabled him to expand Soviet influence into 
the heart of Europe and throughout much of north 
China. He won those victories because his eye 
was on the political ball while we were thinking 
only in military terms. Mr. Stettinius, who was 
at Yalta as Secretary of State, records that he 
asked the President whether he wanted any help 
from the State Department. The answer was 
"no," because, says Stettinius, the President 
thought "it was primarily a military matter and 
. . . had best remain on a purely military level." 

Mr. Justice Byrnes, who was at Yalta as a 
principal political adviser to the President and 
who was shortly to become Secretary of State, 
says of the Yalta agreement regarding Asia, "I 
did not know of this agreement. . . . The evidence 
is clear that the agreement was, in great part, a 

Department of State Bulletin 



military decision."' So it was, from our stand- 
point; but not from Stalin's. 

Military victory is, of course, indispensable. 
But if the moral and material power marshaled 
to win victory is not used to attain political objec- 
tives, then sacrifice is cruelly wasted. 

There are, today, political goals of the utmost 
importance which ought to be promoted by the 
national strength, unity, and momentum which 
we shall develop to help the United Nations win 
the battle for Korea. Let me mention three of 
the political fronts. 

Japan. — The Japanese nation should be given 
the opportunity to become equal partners in the 
community of the free nations and to contribute 
to the peace and security, the economic prosperity 
and the cultural and spiritual life of the free 
world. As General MacArthur has pointed out, 
the conduct of the Japanese under occupation 
entitles them to that, legally and morally. The 
battle for Korea should not lead the free world 
to forget about Japan or to postpone dealing with 
her problems. The Japanese are front-seat spec- 
tators of a drama which is arousing them from 
their postwar stupor. The very fact that the 
attack in Korea may be aimed at Japan and de- 
signed to check positive and constructive action 
there shows how imijortant it is to take such 
action. Japan represents the only large industrial 
power in Asia outside of the Soviet Union and 
that power should, in the future, serve the cause 
of freedom and not become a tool of despotism. 
Neglect and indecision in Japan could lose the 
great gains of General MacArthur's superb ad- 
ministration. We could, indeed, lose more in 
Japan than can be won in Korea. 

Europe. — The free peoples of Europe, backed 
by Canada and the United States in the North 
Atlantic Council, are seeking security through 
increased unity and common defense. There is 
still a long way to go, and getting there is more 
important than ever. We cannot afford, now, to 
neglect that goal. 

In the past, concentration upon the problem of 
Europe may have led us to subordinate the 
problem of Asia. Now that the problem of Asia 
hits us with a violence that compels attention, let 
us not go wholly into reverse gear and neglect 
Europe. We face a two-front struggle, in Asia 
and in Europe. That requires from us balanced 
effort, for we cannot afford to lose on either front. 
The fact that Bolshevik Communists are now 
using methods of open warfare in Korea shows 
that they may do so elsewhere. That means that 
we should speed up the unity and the economic 
and military strengthening of a fi'ee Europe that 
would include West Germany. 

Let us not forget that, although most of Ger- 
many and all of Japan are geographically within 
the orbit of the free world, they lie at the outer 
fringe and are physically close to the world of 
despotism. If they were lost to exploitation by 



Soviet communism, that would substantially com- 
plete the encirclement phase of the strategy that 
Soviet communism has announced. The stage 
would be set for what they call the final act, which 
could be slow strangulation or overpowering as- 
sault. 

In the long run, the continuing freedom of the 
Germans and Japanese can be assured only by 
their cooperation. The United States cannot 
alone, by remote control, keep the 45 million West 
Germans and the 85 million Japanese within the 
free world unless our power reinforces the good- 
will efforts of the Germans and Japanese them- 
selves. These people want to make those efforts, 
and they ought to be given that opportunity. 
That does not mean giving them national armies 
to serve purely national ambitions. It does mean 
treating them as equal partners within the frame- 
work of a European, a Pacific, or a United Nations 
effort which subordinates national ambitions to 
goals which advance the general welfare of all 
free peoples. 

The United Nations. — The Security Council 
showed an amazing capacity to respond quickly 
and effectively to the needs of the Korean crisis. 
However, only unusual circumstances made that 
possible. The Soviet Union was boycotting the 
Security Council, and the representative of the 
Chinese Communist regime had not been seated. 
Either, if present, would have vetoed the action 
which i^roduced the world's first peacetime dem- 
onstration of solidarity against unprovoked 
aggression. 

No one who wants peace should want the Soviet 
to go on boycotting the United Nations. That 
recalls the withdrawal of Germany, Italy, and 
Japan from the League of Nations. Stalin, speak- 
ing of that in March 1939, interpreted it as de- 
signed by the "aggressive states ... in order to 
have their hands free." 

When international differences exist, as they 
now do, it is better to bring them into the open, 
around a council table, rather than to have the 
differing parties separate and each go his inde- 
pendent way. 

A town meeting is of little value if it is attended 
only by those who agi'ee. We want those who differ 
to be present when the United Nations functions 
as the town meeting of the world. 

On the other hand, the members of the United 
Nations now have a vision of what the United 
Nations can be. The Assembly had established 
observers to watch the northern frontier of the 
Republic of Korea, anticipating the possibility of 
armed attack. When the armed attack occurred, 
these observers instantly reported to the Security 
Council. The Security Council met within 24 
houi'S and initiated a series of actions to repel the 
aggression and to restore peace and security in the 
area. Fifty-two nations indicated their support 
of the Security Council action. The United Na- 
tions has established under its flag a United Na- 



Augwsf 7, 7950 



209 



tions military command in Korea, and six mem- 
bers have already contributed military force to 
that command. Others have offered armed assist- 
ance, and the details are being worked out. 

That is a magnificent accomplishment, and the 
member nations, particularly the smaller nations, 
who have seen that accomplishment and who have 
taken hope from it, will not be happy to revert to 
a condition where similar action on their behalf 
could be prevented by one malevolent vote in the 
Security Council. 

Of course, it is important that the United 
Nations should be a universal organization. But 
it is also important that that universality should 
not turn the United Nations into an impotent 
organization. 

At this juncture, we can usefully recall the 
Senate resolution of June, 1948 — the "Vanden- 
berg" resolution — calling for "voluntary agree- 
ment to remove the veto from all questions involv- 
ing pacific settlements of international disputes 
and situations, and from the admission of new 
members." If there were such agreement, which 
our Government has sought, it would be far easier 
to achieve universality. 

Prime Minister Nehru of India, the great leader 
of a great people, has expressed the hope that the 
United Nations should not be plagued by Soviet 
boycott or by an unresolved dispute about whether 
the Communist regime is now entitled to replace 
the Nationalist Government of China. We should 
all like to clear up these matters and to see the 
United Nations fully representative of all of the 
peoples of the world. However, we are bound to 
be concerned about seating a Chinese Communist 
regime which openly preaches violence as an in- 
strument of international policy and which en- 
courages the North Korean regime to act in 
flagrant defiance of the expressed will of the 
United Nations. Our concern about seating that 
regime is bound to be deepened when the seating 
gives it not merely a right to vote, but a right to 
veto the peacemakmg role of the Security Council. 

The Korean crisis has opened our eyes to the 
great possibilities of good inherent in the United 
Nations. There has developed a momentum of 
action, a lift of spirit, which should be used to 
realize the high hopes which the whole world felt 
when, 5 years ago, the United Nations was born 
here at San Francisco. 

I have now called attention to three political 
fronts that require our continuing attention. 
There are many more. They ought not to be 
obscured by the smoke of battle. Victory is in- 
dispensable, but let us be sure this time to use 
constructively the power that is required to win 
victory. 

Policies are of little use unless behind them lies 
the power, moral or material, potential or actual, 
to make them good. Equally, power is of little 
value unless it be the servant of wise policies. 
From now on, let policy and power go hand in 
hand in quest of peace that is just and durable. 



Military Aid to Certain 
Free Nations Continued 

Statement hy the President 

[Released to the press by the White House July 26] 

I have today signed S. 3809, the act which will 
enable our country to continue military aid to 
certain free nations of the world. 

The overwhelming support for this act among 
the Members of Congress is a further mark of the 
unity of purpose of the American people in support 
of the foreign policy of the United States. Such 
support serves to remind those bent on aggression 
that they dare not count on a division of opinion 
among our people to help them gain their evil ends. 

We are today engaged in a serious undertaking 
in the Far East — carrying out our responsibility 
as a member of the United Nations. Side by side 
with us, under the flag of the United Nations, 
stand other members of the United Nations who 
have joined to put down the raw aggression which 
would dejirive the people of the Republic of Korea 
of their freedom. 

This spectacular breach of the peace does not 
lessen our concern in those other places in the 
world where aggression would likewise aflfect the 
collective security of the free nations. 

We are bound by a solemn pledge to regard an 
attack on any of the members of the North Atlantic 
Treaty as an attack on us. This pledge recognizes 
that the fate of the United States and that of 
western Europe are bound together. The act 
signed today is a further step toward the common 
goal of the North Atlantic Treaty nations. Our 
goal is to create the kind of strength which will 
deter potential aggressors from attacking so 
formidable and united a group and to defeat 
aggression, should it come. 

This act will permit the United States to make 
a significant contribution to that goal by provid- 
ing some of the equipment and materials which 
our European partners urgently need in building 
up the strength they require. Wliat we provide 
will be used, under the recent determination of 
the North Atlantic Council, to equip balanced 
collective forces of the North Atlantic Treaty 
nations which are now being created. 

In Greece, in Turkey, and in Iran, this act will 
permit us to continue to help keep these bastions 
strong and determined — free of alien influence 
and free to grow and develop in their own way. 

The act also authorizes military assistance to 
Asia and the Far East, in parts of which direct 
conflict is now going on. 

The military assistance authorized by this act, 
the economic assistance and the other foreign aid 
measures we have undertaken — indeed, our entire 
foreign policy — recognize one central fact — that, 
today, the freedom-loving nations are determined 
to stand together to preserve their freedom. 



210 



Department of State Bulletin 



U.S.-Canadian Treaty for Diverting Niagara River for Power Purposes 



State7ncnt iy Adrian S. Fisher 
Legal Adviser ^ 



The treaty signed on February 27, 1950, between 
the United States and Canada provides for the 
equal diversion between the two countries of the 
waters of the Niagara River for power purposes. 
Under the proposed treaty, this amount will 
average approximately 50,000 cubic feet per sec- 
ond for each country in the daytime during the 
tourist season. Higher amounts will be permitted 
at nighttime and during the winter. The present 
diversions from the Niagara River are 32,500 cubic 
feet per second for this country and 54,000 cubic 
feet per second for Canada. Approximately two- 
thirds of this is permitted by the existing treaty, 
the remainder being permitted by temporary 
notes exchanged between the two Governments in 
1940, 1941, and 1948. In order to preserve the 
beauty of the Falls, the treaty provides for re- 
medial works and stipulates certain minimum 
amounts of water which are reserved for flow 
over the Falls. 

Urgent need for additional power in the Niag- 
ara Falls region of Canada and the United States 
has been felt for several years. The present di- 
versions of water for power which are based, in 
part, on a number of temporary arrangements as 
well as the 1909 Boundary Waters Treaty do not 
provide an adequate permanent basis for long- 
term redevelopment of this great resource. This 
need was recognized in the 1946 report of this 
committee dealing with the 1941 St. Lawrence 
Basin agreement. 

Accordingly, negotiations with Canada were 
initiated, and on December 7, 1949, a meeting of 
representatives of the two Governments was held 
in Washington which resulted in the drafting of 
the present treaty. 

The United States negotiators at this meeting 
included me, as legal adviser of the Depart- 
ment of State, E. Robert DeLuccia, chief, Bureau 

' Made before a subcommittee of the Senate Committee 
on Foreign Relations on June 27 and released to the press 
on the same date. 



of Power, Federal Power Commission, and Col. 
W. E. Potter, acting chief of Engineers for Civil 
Works, Corps of Engineers, United States Anny. 

Gerald V. Cruise, trustee and chief engineer of 
the Power Authority of the State of New York, 
Col. Ivan C. Sattem, representing the chairman 
of the New York Power Authority, and Ed- 
win S. Bundy, vice president and chief engineer 
of the Niagara Mohawk Power Company, were 
present as technical consultants to our delegation. 

It is fair to state that the scenic spectacle of 
Niagara Falls and Rapids is an outstanding part 
of our national scenic heritage, and this for the 
people of both the United States and Canada. 
Regular records of the flow of the Niagara River 
have been kept for almost a hundred years, and 
numerous investigations of its condition have been 
conducted during this period. This data now en- 
ables the two Governments to make a confident 
judgment as to the amount of water which should 
flow over the Falls in order to insure the con- 
tinuance of the high quality of the scenic spectacle. 

In 1926, the Governments of the United States 
and Canada established the Special International 
Niagara Board to recommend measures for the 
maintenance and enhancement of the beauty of the 
Falls and Rapids. This Board recommended the 
construction of remedial works above the Falls; 
and, finally, in 1942, the two Governments com- 
menced construction of a submerged weir, which 
when completed in 1948 almost doubled the flow 
over the American Falls. Construction of this 
weir, however, was only a part of the remedial 
works recommended by the Board, and it has long 
been necessary to conclude an arrangement with 
Canada to provide for construction of the re- 
mainder of these works. 

The growing urgency to provide for the develop- 
ment of the water resources of the river for power 
is illustrated by the history of the agreements re- 
lating to the use of the waters for power, begin- 
ning with the treaty between the United States 



Augusf 7, J950 



211 



and Canada of January 11, 1909, regarding bound- 
ary waters. This treaty provided for permanent 
diversions of 20,000 cuuic feet per second in the 
United States and 36,000 cubic feet per second in 
Canada. Notes exchanged between the two Gov- 
ernments in 1940, 1941, and 1948, autliorize adcli- 
tional diA^ersions of 12,500 cubic feet per second in 
this country and 18,000 and 20,500 cubic feet per 
second during the navigation and nonnavigation 
seasons respectively, in Canada. Of the two hitter 
amounts, 5,000 culaic feet per second is compen- 
sated for by the diversion into Lake Superior from 
the Long Lac-Ogoki River of an equivalent 
amount of water from the Hudson Bay Drainage 
Basin in Canada. These exchanges of notes do 
not provide a satisfactory legal basis for the con- 
struction of new hydroelectric power facilities 
which are needed to replace and supplement the 
older plants now in operation. 

The power situation in northeast United States 
became critical during World War II when the 
heavily industrialized Niagara area developed so 
serious a power shortage that it became necessary 
to ration power among the factories producing 
war materials. After a temporary decline in 1945 
and 1946, the demand for power in this area ad- 
vanced sharply and is now actually larger than 
during the war. An even more critical shortage 
exists in Ontario where extensive industrialization 
has occurred in recent years. At various times, in- 
cluding the postwar period, it has been necessary 
to ration the consumption of power in Ontario 
both for civilian and industrial purposes. 

This drastic and growing shortage of power in 
the Niagara area naturally created the interest in 
redevelopment of the waters of the river which re- 
sulted in a report of the Federal Power Commis- 
sion, completed in September of last year, entitled 
Ponsibilities for Redevelopjnent of Niagara Falls 
for Pawer. This report, together with the 1929 
report of the Special International Niagara Board, 
provided the necessary technical basis for nego- 
tiating this treaty. 

Analysis of the Treaty 

Article I of the resulting treaty terminates the 
third, fourth, and fifth paragraphs of article V of 
the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909, which pro- 
vide for the permanent power diversions from the 
Niagara River, and the exchanges of notes dated 
May 20, 1941, October 27, 1941, November 27, 1941, 
and December 23, 1948, which provide for the 
subsequent temporary diversions. I should like 
to insert copies of these exchanges in the record at 
this time. These permanent and temporary di- 
versions terminated by article I would be replaced 
by the permanent diversions provided for in ar- 
ticle V of the new treaty. The necessary usage of 
water for sanitary, domestic, and navigation pur- 
poses is not affected by the new treaty. 

The protection of the beauty of the Falls 
through construction of remedial works by insur- 



ing a proper spread of the flow of water over the 
Falls is provided for in article II of the treaty, 
which is based upon the final report submitted to 
the United States and Canada on December 11, 
1929, by the Special International Niagara Board 
mentioned above. While this Board made specific 
recommendations for the remedial works, it seemed 
advisable before completing them to review the 
recommenchxtions in the light of experience and 
IDresent conditions. As sucli, a review will requii-e 
investigations on both sides of the boundary ; and, 
as the International Joint Commission has con- 
ducted many investigations into works of this 
character required in connection with changes in 
the level of boundary waters under the 1909 treaty, 
it was considered advisable to place the respon- 
sibility for these investigations on this inter- 
national body. The recommendations of the In- 
teniational Joint Commission as to the nature and 
design of remedial works and the allocation of 
the task of construction between the two countries 
are subject to approval of both United States and 
Canada. Upon such approval, construction is to 
be conducted under the supervision of the Com- 
mission. 

Article II further provides a limitation of 4 
years within which the remedial works shall be 
completed after the date of approval and directs 
that the two countries shall share the total cost 
of the works equally. 

Article III is a definition of the waters which 
are subject to the provisions of the new treaty. 
Such waters are the total outflow from Lake Erie 
through three outlets — the Welland Canal, the 
Niagara River, and the Black Rock Canal through 
Buffalo Harbor — less waters used and necessaiy 
for domestic, sanitary, and navigation purposes. 
This provision is in accordance with the priorities 
established by article VIII of the Boundary 
Waters Treaty of 1909 as to the order of prece- 
dence to be observed among the various uses for 
boundary waters. Water, for one or more of the 
three latter purposes, is now beings diverted 
through the Welland and Black Rock Canals and 
directly from the Niagara River. Water is also 
diverted for navigation purposes from the Niagara 
River to the New York State Barge Canal at 
Tonawanda, about 13 miles downstream from 
Buffalo. 

Article III provides that the water which is 
being diverted from the Hudson Bay drainage 
basin in Canada into the Great Lakes system 
through the Long Lac-Ogoki works shall con- 
tinue to be governed by the exchange of notes of 
October 13 and 31 and' November 7, 1940. These 
notes authorized Ontario to turn these Long Lac- 
Ogoki waters into the Great Lakes system and take 
out the equivalent for power purposes at the Falls. 
Tliis was a temporary measure pending a final 
Great Lakes-St. Lawrence agreement between the 
two countries. However, under article III the 
divei'sion at Long Lac-Ogoki will be limited to 



212 



Department of State Bulletin 



amounts of water which can be diverted through 
the existing works. 

Article III defines the watei-s which are the 
subject matter of the treaty. This same definition 
is used in articles IV and V of the treaty which 
deal with the water necessary for maintenance of 
the scenic spectacle of Niagara Falls and Kapids 
and with the water which may be diverted for 
power purposes. 

Article IV of the treaty provides for the regu- 
lation of the flow of water over the Falls for scenic 
purposes. It has been worked out with particular 
regard to the tourist season and the hours of day- 
light and gives priority to the use of water for 
maintaining the beauty of the Falls. While Mi*. 
DeLuccia of the Federal Power Commission will 
explain the details of this proposed method of 
maintaining the beauty of the Falls, I should like 
to mention that the schedule of flows set forth in 
this article, in general, follows the recommenda- 
tions of the special Niagara Board of 1929 and, 
where is fails to do so, it constitutes, in our 
opinion, a definite improvement from the point 
of view of preserving the natural spectacle. Ac- 
cording to the approach of the special board in 
1929, power diversion would have had first call on 
the flow of the river (after domestic, sanitary, 
and navigation uses) and the remainder would 
have been available for the Falls and Rapids, an 
amount which would have fluctuated with the 
changing river flows. Under article IV of the 
new treaty, positive protection for the Falls and 
Eapids is provided by giving them a prior call on 
the river flow, with power diversions limited to 
the remainder. 

Article V of the new treaty provides that the 
outflow from Lake Erie, remaining after use of the 
flows necessary for domestic, sanitary, navigation, 
and scenic purposes, may be diverted for power 
purposes. 

Article VI provides that waters made available 
for power purposes under the new treaty shall be 
divided equally between the United States and 
Canada. 

Article VII directs that representatives of the 
two countries acting jointly shall ascertain and 
determine the amounts of water available for the 
purposes of the treaty and shall keep records 
thereof. The flow of the river varies from day 
to day, and the amount which may be diverted 
for power purposes under the treaty depends on 
the time of day. Accordingly, it is necessary, as 
a practical matter, to empower official representa- 
tives of Canada and the United States to allot the 
water for the various purposes in accordance with 
the terms of the treat}^ This activity is now be- 
ing carried on by an officer of the United States 
Corps of Engineers in cooperation with an officer 
of the Water Resources Division of the Depart- 
ment of Resources and Development of Canada by 
virtues of notes exchanged on February 3, July 25, 
and August 21, 1923, copies of which are supplied 



for the record. Article VII merely makes provi- 
sion for continuing the existing practice and gives 
authority for such changes in procedure as the 
new treaty may make advisable. 

Article VIII provides that one country having 
sufficient facilities for the purpose may utilize the 
unused portion of the other country's share of 
water for power purposes until the second country 
has completed facilities to use its own full share. 
It may take some time for the parties to the treaty 
to construct the necessary works to make full use 
of the water made available for power purposes. 
Therefore, it was believed advantageous to make 
provision for avoiding waste of the water during 
this period. 

Article IX frees each country from responsibil- 
ity for injury or damage occurring in the territory 
of the other country as a result of acts authorized 
by the treaty. 

Article X provides that the new treaty shall 
come into force upon exchange of ratifications and 
shall remain in force for 50 years thereafter. Fol- 
lowing this period, the treaty can be terminated 
after 1 year's notice by either country of its inten- 
tion to terminate the treaty. The long term of 
50 years takes into consideration the probable pe- 
riod of time needed for amortization of the very 
large investments, running into hundreds of mil- 
lions of dollars, which will be required for the re- 
development permitted under the terms of the new 
treaty. 

I am advised that the Canadian Parliament has 
considered this treaty and favorable action there- 
on was taken on June 14, 1950. Consequently, the 
Canadian Government is prepared to bring the 
treaty into effect as soon as it receives the approval 
of this Government. I believe that such joint ac- 
tion will initiate steps on both sides of the bound- 
ary to relieve the power shortage and preserve the 
scenic beauty of the Falls. 

The Department of State recommends without 
qualification the approval of this treaty by the 
Senate. 



Greece Grants Income Tax Exemption 
on U.S. Aircraft Operations 

[Released to the press July 25] 

The Greek Government has notified the Ameri- 
can Embassy at Athens that, in consideration of 
the exemption from income taxation granted by 
United States law (Internal Revenue Code, sees. 
212 and 231) with respect to earnings derived from 
the operation of aircraft registered under the laws 
of a foreign country which grants an equivalent 
exemption to United States citizens and corpora- 
tions, American air navigation enterprises are ex- 
empt from the Greek "patente" tax and from the 
tax on income realized in Greece. The exemption, 
retroactive from July 1, 1946, is reciprocal. 



August 7, 1950 



213 



Pacific Weatlier Stations Program 
Agreed Upon by U.S.-Canada 

[Released to the press June 25] 

The establishment, at an early date, of a joint 
Pacific network of ocean-weather ships has been 
agreed upon by the Canadian and United States 
Governments, it was announced today at Ottawa 
and Washington by Lionel Chevrier, Minister of 
Transport, and Dean G. Acheson, Secretary of 
State. 

Agreement has been reached on a plan to estab- 
lish a network of seven stations across the north 
Pacific to provide an interim program until a 
broader international agreement can be worked 
out by the International Civil Aviation Organiza- 
tion. 

Five weather stations (called "N" for Nan, "O" 
for Oboe, "Q" for Queen, "S" for Sugar, "T" for 
Tare) are to be operated by the United States and 
one station ("P" for Peter) by Canada. The 
Japanese will continue to operate a station ("X" 
for X-ray) in the far western Pacific. 

The Canadian Government has been operating 
an Atlantic Ocean weather station at position "B" 
for Baker, off the Labrador coast, on a joint basis 
with the United States Government. Under the 
new agreement, the United States will take over 
complete operation at station "B," allowing Can- 
ada to concentrate her full efforts on the Pacific. 

The new agreement is in full conformity with 
previous international agreements on the estab- 
lishment and maintenance of weather-ship net- 
works on both the Atlantic and the Pacific. 

The agreement marks a significant step forward 
in insuring better weather forecasts for both coun- 
tries, as well as further guarding the safety of 
transoceanic aviation and shipping. 



tives of Canadian Government Departments will 
take part in the expedition, with J. W. Burton 
of the Northwest Territories Administration, De- 
pai'tment of Resources and Development, Ottawa, 
acting as senior Canadian repi'esentative. The 
senior representative of the United States Weather 
Bureau will be C. J. Hubbard, chief of Arctic 
jjrojects in the Weather Bureau. 

The ships are due to sail from Boston and Hali- 
fax in mid-July. The supplies will be unloaded 
at the central joint weather station at Resolute 
Bay, Cornwallis Island, and will, subsequently, be 
shipped to the more northerly weather stations by 
air transport, possibly next spring. It is expected 
that the ships will return to home ports by the 
end of September. 

Ice conditions for water transportation in the 
Canadian Arctic are normally favorable for a 
short time each year, usually during the latter 
part of August and the first part of September. 
It is anticipated that the icebreakers and cargo 
ships will encounter considerable ice before they 
reach their main destination at Resolute. 

Should ice conditions be favorable, it is antici- 
pated that an attempt will be made by the U.S.S. 
Edisto and the U.S.C.G.C. Eastwind to reach the 
most northerly weather station in Canada which 
is located within 500 miles of the North Pole. This 
new joint weather station, named "Alert" after 
Capt. George Nares' ship which wintered in the 
vicinity during 1875-76, was established in April 
by air transport. The same icebreakers recon- 
noitered the station site during the 1948 summer 
supply expedition. If conditions are such that 
icebreakers cannot reach the station this sum- 
mer, additional supplies will be carried in by air 
later this year. Time and conditions permitting, 
the two icebreakers may also carry supplies to the 
joint weather station at Eureka and reconnoiter 
the south coast of Melville Island where a further 
weather station might be established at some future 
date. 



U.S.-Canadian Weatlier Stations 
To Be Resupplied by Ship 

{Released to the press July 11] 

It was announced at Ottawa and Washington 
today that the meteorological stations in the Ca- 
nadian Arctic islands that have been established 
jointly by the Meteorological Division of the De- 
partment of Transport of Canada and of the 
United States Weather Bureau will again be re- 
supplied by ship this summer. 

The resupply expedition will be carried out by 
United States Navy and Coast Guard ships under 
the command of Capt. G. E. Peterson, United 
States Navy. These ships are the U.S.S. Edisto 
and the U.S.C.G.C. Eastwind, icebreakers; the 
U.S.S. Whitley, a cargo ship, and the U.S.S. 
LST-633, serving as a cargo vessel. Representa- 



Nortliwest Atlantic Fisheries 
Convention Enters into Force 

[Released to the press July 10] 

The international convention for the Northwest 
Atlantic fisheries, opened for signature at Wash- 
ington from February 8-22, 1949, entered into 
force on July 3, 1950, in accordance with the terms 
of article XV, thereof, which provides that it 
shall enter into force upon the deposit of instru- 
ments of ratification by four signatory govern- 
ments. 

The fourth instrument of ratification was de- 
posited on July 3, 1950, by Canada with this Gov- 
ei-nment, which is designated by the convention as 
the depositary government. The United States, 



214 



Department of State Bulletin 



Iceland, and the United Kingdom had previously 
deposited instruments of ratification. 

Under the terms of the convention, there will 
now be established the International Commission 
for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries and separate 
panels for each of the five siibareas constituting 
the over-all area covered by the convention. All 
contracting governments will be represented on 
the Commission, and those contracting govern- 
ments having jjarticular fishing interests in each 
subarea will be repi'esented on the panels of the 
subareas. 

The primary function of the Commission will 
be to collect, collate, and disseminate scientific in- 
formation on international fisheries in the con- 
vention area. Although the Commission has no 
direct regulatory powers, any panel may transmit 
through the Commission to the contracting govern- 
ments recommendations for measures, based upon 
scientific information, which are deemed necessary 
for maintaining those stocks of fish which support 
international fisheries in the convention area. 
Within a specified time, after acceptance of such 
recommendations by the panel governments of each 
subarea affected, the measures will become appli- 
cable to all contracting governments. 



Trade Agreement With Mexico 
Terminated 

The Department of State announced on June 23 
that notes have been exchanged between repre- 
sentatives of the Government of the United States 
of America and the Government of the United 
Mexican States terminating the trade agreement 
between the two Governments signed December 23, 
1942. As the result of this exchange of notes, the 
United States-Mexican trade agreement will cease 
to be in force after December 31, 1950.^ 

Under present United States laws and policies, 
imports from Mexico will, upon termination of 
the trade agreement, be subject to the same tariff 
treatment as that accorded to imports of the same 
products from other countries, except Cuba and 
the Republic of the Philippines, under the most- 
favored-nation principle. 

The trade agreement with Mexico was signed in 
1942. In 1946 and 1947, the Mexican Govern- 
ment was confronted with a large imbalance in its 
trade with the United States which resulted in 
a serious drain on its reserves of dollar exchange. 
She was also faced with strong pressures to in- 
crease tariffs to protect her domestic industries, to 
encourage economic development, and to restore 

' For the text of the U.S. note and a list of changes in 
the U.S. import duties which will result from termination 
of this trade agreement, see Department of State press 
release 676 of June 23. 



the protective incidence of specific duties to earlier 
levels. 

In 1947, the Mexican Government, impelled by 
these circumstances and after consultation with 
this Government in cases where consultation was 
required, took a number of steps to restrict im- 
ports. These steps included a prohibition against 
imports of a wide range of nonessential goods, in- 
cluding some items covered by the trade agree- 
ment, and a change to the ad valorem equivalent, 
or higher, of the duty in 1942 on some 5,000 items 
not covered by the trade agreement. By the end 
of the year, it became evident that the Mexican 
Government would also find it necessary to make 
similar increases in rates on products included in 
the trade agreement. 

Rather than denounce the agreement without 
the fullest exploration of the facts and the maxi- 
mum effort to reach an agreed solution, the United 
States agreed to provisional increases by Mexico 
in duties on the trade-agreement items to levels 
equivalent on an ad valorem basis to those pro- 
vided in the trade agreement when it first came into 
effect. From the point of view of the United 
States, this materially lessened the benefits of the 
agreement, and the Mexican Government agreed 
on her part to negotiations intended to restore the 
balance in the agreement through revision of the 
new Mexican rates on items not previously in- 
cluded in the trade agreement. These negotiations 
were begun in April 1948. 

As stated in the note, representatives of the 
United States and Mexican Governments have, for 
many months, endeavored earnestly to find a basis 
for achieving a mutually satisfactory revision of 
the agreement. This has unfortunately proved 
to be impossible, and the two Governments have 
consequently agreed that the agreement should 
be terminated. 



U.S.-Mexico Tuna Convention 
Enters into Force 

[Released to the press July 11] 

A convention between the United States and 
Mexico for the establishment of an International 
Commission for the Scientific Investigation of 
Tuna, signed at Mexico City on January 25, 1949, 
entered into force today upon the exchange of 
instruments of ratification by Secretary Acheson 
and Rafael de la Colina, Mexican Ambassador.^ 

This convention provides for a Commission 
composed of two national sections of four mem- 
bers each, which will engage in scientific investi- 
gation of tuna and tuna-like fishes of the eastern 

' For text of the convention see Department of State 
press release 53, dated January 25, 1949. For announce- 
ment of the signing of the convention see Btjt.t.f.tin of 
Feb. 6, 1949, p. 174. 



Augusf 7, 7950 



215 



Pacific Ocean, as well as those fishes which are 
used for bait in the tuna fisheries. Scientific in- 
formation now available, based on studies made 
in the past, is not sufficiently extensive to indicate 
■whether tuna stocks are in danger of depletion. 
The two coimtries will cooperate under the con- 
vention with a view to maintaining the popula- 
tions of these fishes at a level which will assure a 
maximum utilization year after year without de- 
pletion. 

This convention is similar to the convention be- 
tween the United States and Costa Eica for the 
establishment of an Inter-American Tropical 
Tuna Commission, signed at Washington, May 31, 
19-19, in that the Commission to be established is 
an investigatory body, and any regulatory meas- 
ures which are indicated by the study would have 
to be the subject of future negotiation between the 
two countries. 



Cuba Makes New Rates of Duty 
Effective Without 30-Day Notice 



[Released to the press June 15] 



and would be even more seriously effected if Unit«d 
States exporters could continue for another 30 
days to send products to Cuba under the old rates 
of duty. 

Products which were in transit to Cuba and 
products covered by consular invoices which had 
been cleared by Cuban consulates before June 12, 
1950, will apparently be allowed to enter Cuba 
at the old rates of duty. 

It is regretted that it was not possible to per- 
suade the Cuban Government to grant more tnan 
the 12-day notice which United States exporters 
had that new rates of duty had been agreed upon. 



U.S.-Argentina Sign Agreement 
for Relief From Double Taxation 

[Released to the press July 20] 

On July 20, 1950, Secretary Acheson and Dr. Don 
JerOnimo Remorino, Argentine Amiassador, signed and 
exchanged notes constituting an agreement between the 
United, States and Argentina for the avoidance, on. a 
reciprocal basis, of double taxation on earnings derived 
from the operation of ships and aircraft. The texts of 
the two notes follow. 



The State Department has received a complaint 
from the Commerce and Industry Association of 
New York charging that the Cuban Government 
made effective on June 12, without advance notice, 
the increased rates of duty on ribbons and trim- 
mings, nylon hosiery, and rubber tires and tubes 
agreed to by the United States in renegotiations 
with Cuba which had recently been concluded.^ 
The Association urged that the Department re- 
quest the Cuban Government for a 30-day grace 
period before the increased rates of duty become 
effective. 

The matter has been discussed with representa- 
tives of the Cuban Government who state that it 
was necessary for the Cuban Government to make 
the new rates of duty effective without the usual 
30-day notice because imports into Cuba had in- 
creased tremendously since notice was given that 
renegotiations would be undertaken with Cuba 
early in February of certain items in the Cuban 
schedule IX of the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade." In addition to this notice, the De- 
partment announced on February 7 that the rene- 
gotiations of ribbons and trimmings, nylon ho- 
siery, and rubber tires and tubes had begun on 
February 6.^ The Cuban Government considers 
that these announcements, together with the an- 
nouncement of May 31, had given United States 
exporters sufficient notice in the circumstances and 
that certain Cuban industries had been adversely 
affected by the considerable increase in imports 

' BiTLi.ETiN of .Tune 12, 1950, p. 980. 
' BuixETiN of Jan. 9, 19.^)0, p. 58. 
" Bulletin of Feb. 20, 1950, p. 297. 

216 



ARGENTINE NOTE 

[Translation] 

I have the honor, in the name of the Government of 
the Argentine Republic, to inform Your Excellency that, 
with a view to the avoidance of double taxation of earn- 
ings derived from the operation of ships and aircraft and 
to promote trade with the United States of America, the 
Argentine Government agrees to the following : 

1. The Argentine Government, exercising the powers 
conferred b.v Article 10 of Law No. 11,682 (text revised 
in 1947), shall, on the basis of reciprocity, exempt from 
tax on income and from any other tax on profits the 
earnings of corporations organized in the United States 
of America, or of individuals who are nationals of and 
resident in the United States of America and are not 
resident in Argentina, derived from the operation of ships 
or aircraft documented or registered under the laws of 
the United States of America which call at ports of 
Argentina or land at airports in Argentina. 

2. The expression "operation of ships or aircraft" means 
the business, carried on by owners or